G.R. No.

137187 August 3, 2006

CARMELITA V. LIM and VICARVILLE REALTY and DEVELOPMENT

CORPORATION, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. BENJAMIN T. VIANZON in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 1 of the
Regional Trial Court of Bataan and VALENTIN GARCIA and CONCEPCION
GARCIA, Respondents.

The Motion to Dismiss, as earlier noted, is predicated on two grounds, namely: breach of the forum-
shopping rule and extinguishment of the cause of action by the previous sale of the property
involved to them.

Forum-shopping exists when the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment in
one case will amount to res judicata in another. Litis pendentia requires the concurrence of the
following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties as those representing the same
interests in both actions; (2) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the reliefs being
founded on the same facts; and (3) identity with respect to the two preceding particulars in the two
cases, such that any judgment that may be rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party
is successful would amount to res adjudicata in the other case. 39

What is pivotal in determining whether forum-shopping exists or not is the vexation caused the
courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts and/or administrative agencies to
rule on the same or related causes and/or grant the same or substantially the same reliefs, in the
process creating possibility of conflicting decisions being rendered by the different courts and/or
administrative agencies upon the same issues. 40

LITIS PENDENTIA DRESSED IN

PRISON GREY
MB CAMPANILLA·FRIDAY, JUNE 23, 2017·READING TIME: 7 MINUTES

Before, helping a criminal offender to escape was only an act of accessory under Article
18 of the Revised of the Revised Penal Code. Now, such act of assisting a criminal
offender to escape is also covered by PD No. 1829.

However, the intention of PD No. 1829 in punishing an act of an accessory by assisting a

principal to escape as an obstruction of justice is not to supplant Article 18 of the Revised
Penal Code but to supplement it. That is why the penalty for obstruction of justice is that
prescribed by PD No. 1829 or that by the Revised Penal Code for a felony committed by
an accessory, whichever is higher.
The penalty prescribed for obstruction of justice under PD No. 1829 is prision
correccional in its maximum period unless other law prescribed a higher penalty. PD No.
1829 provides “If any of the acts mentioned herein is penalized by any other law with a
higher penalty, the higher penalty shall be imposed.” The intendment of the law in
prescribing a fixed penalty or that provided by other law, whichever is higher, is not to
prosecute the offender for obstruction of justice and for other crime arising from the same
act such as furnishing a firearm to an escaping offender.

The concept of an act of an accessory by assisting a principal to escape is the same as that
of obstruction of justice by facilitating the escape of an offender. However, PD No. 1829
has broadened the concept of this act of an accessory by making the exempting
circumstance of relationship under Article 20 the Revised Penal Code inapplicable, and
by punishing one who helps an offender to escape regardless of the classification and
kind of crime committed by and the nature of the participation of an escaping offender.

make an accused liable as an accessory, it is important that he did not participate as

principal or accomplice (Article 18 of the Revised Penal Code). Although this is not
expressly required in PD No. 1829, to make one liable for obstruction of justice, it is also
important that he did also not participate as principal or accomplice. In sum, a principal
himself cannot be held liable for obstruction of justice. PD No. 1829 is applicable only to
another person and not to the offender himself (Angeles vs. Gaite, G.R. No. 165276,
November 25, 2009).

In a case, where the accused is charged as principal in the crime of murder for conspiring
with the principal actor in killing the victim, he should not be charged for obstruction of
justice for giving a firearm to the principal actor to frustrate his apprehension. The act of
furnishing firearm should be considered as an act made in furtherance of conspiracy to
commit murder; hence, such act of furnishing a gun is necessarily included in the charge
of murder. To prosecute the accused for obstruction of justice, which is considered as
necessarily included in the charge of murder, is to offend the rule on double jeopardy.

Prior to the 2000 Revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, one of the grounds to
quash an information is that when the accused has been previously convicted or “in
jeopardy of being convicted” or acquitted of the offense charged. Interpreting this
provision, Justice Florenz Regalado in his dissenting opinion in the case of People vs.
Pineda, G.R. No. 44205 February 16, 1993 stated:

“Spelled out to the point of elemental details, said paragraph (h) actually provides for
two modes constitutive of separate grounds for quashal of a second indictment for the
same offense. Recasting its provisions for greater clarity, the first mode allows quashal
where the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the same offense with
which he is again presently charged and in danger of a second conviction. This would
correspond, in civil procedure, to res judicata as a ground for dismissal. The second
mode stated in the same paragraph contemplates the situation where the accused is only
in jeopardy or danger of being convicted in the first case, since no judgment or final
order has yet been rendered therein, and he is now charged anew with the same offense.
This is equivalent, in civil case, to litis pendentia or auter action pendant, likewise a
ground for dismissal.”

In connection with the concept of litis pendentia dressed in prison grey, Justice Regalado
wrote in his book, Remedial Law Compendium:

“The Rule prohibits a duplicitous information and declares the same to be quashable, but
does not specifically provide for the situation where a complex crime which should be
properly charged in a single information is made the subject of several informations by
charging each component crime thereof separately. It is submitted that, under such
situation and provided all other requisites are present, the proper remedy is to move to
quash the other charges on the ground of double jeopardy.”

However, in the case of People vs. Pineda, supra, the majority held that there can be no
double jeopardy if both cases are still pending. The 2000 Revision of the Rules of
Criminal Procedure deleted the phrase “in jeopardy of being convicted” to incorporate the
Pineda doctrine.

But if the special law treats an offense punishable therein and a felony under the Revised
Penal Code as one crime, and yet, there are two informations filed by the Office of the
Prosecutor, one will stand while the other will the quashed despite both cases are still
pending. In Celino vs. CA, G.R. No. 170562, June 29, 2007, it was held:

“When the other crime involved is one of those enumerated under RA 8294 (now RA No.
10591), any information for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed because the
illegal possession of firearm would have to be tried together with such other offense,
either considered as an aggravating circumstance in murder or homicide, or absorbed as
an element of rebellion, insurrection, sedition or attempted coup d’etat.”

Rephrasing the substance of the ruling in Celino case, where the other case involves
rebellion or coup d’etat, the information for illegal possession of firearm should be
quashed since the former absorbs the latter (note: sedition is excluded by RA No. 10591
from the rule on absorption); where the other case is homicide or murder, the information
for illegal possession of firearm should be quashed since the latter is just an aggravating
circumstance of the former. Obviously, the ground for the quashal of information is not
double jeopardy or res judicata in prison grey since there is no final judgment yet.
Although the Supreme Court did not describe the ground for quashing the information, it
is submitted that the basis of quashing the information for illegal possession of firearm is
litis pendentia in prison grey. In sum, the information for illegal possession is quashable
because of the pending litigation for murder, homicide or rebellion.

Moreover, if an offense punishable under special law is absorbed in a felony punishable

under the Revised Penal Code, and yet, there are two informations filed by the Office of
the Prosecutor, the information for the absorbing felony will stand while that for the
absorbed offense will be quashed, despite both cases are still pending. In Enrile vs Amin,
G.R. No. 93335, September 13, 1990, Juan Ponce Enrile was charged for rebellion in first
information and obstruction of justice in the second information for harboring or
concealing Gregorio "Gringo" Honasan in his house to frustrate his apprehension for
rebellion. Since obstruction of justice is committed in furtherance of rebellion, the latter
absorbs the former. Hence, the Supreme Court quashed the information for obstruction of
justice even though both cases are still pending.

It is submitted that the Enrile case is another classic example of the principle of litis
pendentia in prison grey. In sum, the information for obstruction of justice is quashable
because of the pending litigation for rebellion.

In this case, since the act of furnishing weapon to the principal actor, which is
constitutive of obstruction of justice, is made in furtherance of the conspiracy to commit
murder, and the intention of the law is not to prosecute violator of PD No. 1829 for
obstruction of justice and at the same time a felony under the Revised Penal Code, the
information for obstruction of justice must be quashed despite the pendency of the case
for murder applying the principle of litis pendentia in prison grey.

G.R. No. 181489, April 19, 2017 - STEVEN R. PAVLOW, Petitioner, v.

CHERRY L. MENDENILLA, Respondent.
The dismissal of a complaint on preliminary investigation by a prosecutor "cannot be considered a valid and
final judgment."57 As there is no former final judgment or order on the merits rendered by the court having
jurisdiction over both the subject matter and the parties, there could not have been res judicata— actual or
looming as to bar one (1) of several proceedings on account of litis pendentia — as to bar Mendenilla's
petition for being an act of forum shopping.

Res judicata is the conceptual backbone upon which forum shopping rests. City of Taguig v. City of
Makati,58 explained in detail the definition of forum shopping, how it is committed, and the test for
determining if it was committed. This test relies on two (2) alternative propositions: litis pendentia and res
judicata. Even then, litis pendentia is itself a concept that merely proceeds from the concept of res
judicata:chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary

Top Rate Construction & General Services, Inc. v. Paxton Development Corporationexplained that: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

Forum shopping is committed by a party who institutes two or more suits in different courts, either
simultaneously or successively, in order to ask the courts to rule on the same or related causes or to grant
the same or substantially the same reliefs, on the supposition that one or the other court would make a
favorable disposition or increase a party's chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action.

....
Jurisprudence has recognized that forum, shopping can be committed in several ways: chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry

(1) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action and with the same prayer, the previous case not
having been resolved yet (where the ground for dismissal is litis pendentia); (2) filing multiple cases based
on the same cause of action and the same prayer, the previous case having been finally resolved (where the
ground for dismissal is res judicata); and (3) filing multiple cases based on the same cause of action but
with different prayers (splitting of causes of action, where the ground for dismissal is also either litis
pendentia or res judicata). (Emphasis in the original)

....
The test for determining forum shopping is settled. In Yap v. Chua, et al.: chanRoblesvi rtua lLawl ibra ry

To determine whether a party violated the rule against forum shopping, the most important factor to ask is
whether the elements of litis pendentia are present, or whether a final judgment in one case will amount
to res judicatain another; otherwise stated, the test for determining forum shopping is whether in the two
(or more) cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights or causes of action, and reliefs sought.
For its part, litis pendentia "refers to that situation wherein another action is pending between the same
parties for the same cause of action, such that the second action becomes unnecessary and vexatious."
For litis pendentia to exist, three (3) requisites must concur: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry

The requisites of litis pendentia are: (a) the identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same
interests in both actions; (b) the identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on
the same facts; and (c) the identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other.
On the other hand, res judicata or prior judgment bars a subsequent case when the following requisites are
satisfied:
chanRob lesvi rtua lLawl ib rary

(1) the former judgment is final; (2) it is rendered by a court having jurisdiction over the subject matter and
the parties; (3) it is a judgment or an order on the merits; (4) there is — between the first and the second
actions — identity of parties, of subject matter, and of causes of action.59(Citations omitted)

G.R. No. 44205 February 16, 1993

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,

vs.
HON. GREGORIO G. PINEDA, Branch XXI, Court of First Instance of Rizal, and
CONSOLACION NAVAL, respondents.

The Solicitor General for petitioner.

Salonga. Ordoñez, Yap & Associates for private respondent.

MELO, J.:

When Consolacion Naval, the herein private respondent, was separately accused of having
committed the crime of estafa in Criminal Case No. 15795 before Branch 19, and of falsification in
Criminal Case No. 15796 before Branch 21, both of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal of the
Seventh Judicial District stationed at Pasig, Rizal, she sought the quashal of the latter charge on the
supposition that she is in danger of being convicted for the same felony (p. 16, Record). Her first
attempt in this respect did not spell success
(p. 34, Record) but the Honorable Gregorio G. Pineda, Presiding Judge of Branch 21 was persuaded
to the contrary thereafter on the belief that the alleged falsification was a necessary means of
committing estafa (p. 149, Record). It is this perception, along with the denial of the motion for re-
evaluation therefrom (p. 66, Record) which the People impugns via the special civil action
for certiorari now before Us.

The indictment for estafa against Consolacion Naval and her co-accused Anacleto Santos, reads:

That on or about March 23, 1973 and soon thereafter, in the municipality of Pasig,
province of Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping
 and aiding one another, by means of deceit and with intent to defraud, knowing that
their parcel of land among others, situated in Malaking Bundok, Barrio Dolores,
Taytay, Rizal, and more particularly described as follows, to wit:

OJA No. 5851

Isang lagay na lupa (bulubundukin) na nasa lugar ng Malaking

Bundok, Bo. Dolores, Taytay, Rizal, na may lawak na 14,615.5
metrong parisukat na may tasang P580.00 at may hanggahang gaya
ng sumusunod: Hilagaan-Hermogenes Naval (now part of Rev. Tax
Dec. 9284; Silanganan-Nicolas del Rosario (now Jaime del Rosario);
Timugan-Eduvigis, Consolacion, Apolinaria, Naval; Kanluran-Creek
(sapang bato)

was already sold and encumbered to one Edilberto V. Ilano as can be gleaned from
a document entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O Condicion"
sometime on August 12, 1969; and the latter having paid the partial amount of
P130,850.00 to the herein accused and without informing said Edilberto V. Ilano, the
herein accused Consolacion Naval executed and filed an Application for Registration
over the same parcel of land among others, which document is designated as LRC
Case No. N-7485, "Consolacion, Eduvigis and Apolinaria, all surnamed Naval" of the
Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Rizal, as a result of which the Presiding Judge
of Branch XIII to which said case was assigned issued Original Certificate of Title No.
9332 in her name, which area was reduced to 10,075 sq. meters as appearing in
item No. 2 in said OCT and subsequently referred to in TCT No. 370870 in favor of
said accused Naval through Rodolfo Mendoza, sold more than one-half (1/2) of said
parcel of land in her name in favor of Maria, Anacleto, Carmelo, Mariano, Cecilia and
Teodorica, all surnamed Santos and Iluminada Tambalo, Pacita Alvarez and Pedro
Valesteros which sales were registered and annotated with the Register of Deeds of
Rizal at Pasig, Rizal; and likewise a portion of which was partitioned to herein
accused Anacleto Santos; that despite repeated demands the accused refused and
still refuse to return said amount and/or fulfill their obligations under said "Kasulatan
Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O Condicion", to the damage and prejudice of
said Edilberto V. Ilano in the aforementioned amount of P130,850.00. (pp. 44-
45, Rollo)

while the charge for falsification narrates:

That on or about the 17th day August, 1971, in the municipality of Pasig, province of
Rizal, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, being then private individual did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously falsify a public document by making untruthful statements in a
narration of facts, committed as follows: the said accused on August 17, 1971,
executed a document entitled "Application For Registration" for parcels of land
located at Taytay, Rizal, to the effect that "She is the exclusive owner in fee simple of
a parcel of land situated in Malaking Bundok, Barrio Dolores, Taytay, Rizal with Psu-
248206 and that she "does not know any mortgage or encumbrance of any kind
whatsoever affecting said land or that any person has estate or interest therein, legal
or equitable, in possession remainder, reversion or expectancy", as a result of which
the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972 declared the herein accused the true and
absolute owner of said parcel of land free from all liens and encumbrances of any
nature, when in truth and in fact the herein accused has already sold and
 encumbered to one Edilberto V. Ilano said parcel of land referred to above as can be
gleaned from a document entitled "Kasulatan Ng Bilihan Ng Lupa Na May Pasubali O
Condicion" dated August 12, 1969 and said Edilberto V. Ilano has already paid partial
amount of P130,850.00 to the herein accused.

Contrary to law. (p. 2, Rollo)

The confluence of the foregoing assertions disclose that Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty
on August 12, 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who made a partial payment of P130,850.00. About two years
later, or on August 17, 1971, an application for registration under the Land Registration Act was
submitted by Consolacion wherein she stated that she owned the same lot and that it was
unencumbered. For those reasons, the corresponding title was issued in her name but she allegedly
disposed of the half portion of the property to nine other persons.

These antecedents spawned the simultaneous institution of the charges on September 17, 1975.

On October 28, 1975, private respondent Consolacion Naval moved to quash the information for
falsification, premised, among other things, on the apprehension that she is in danger of being
condemned for an identical offense. The following day, Naval pleaded not guilty to the charge
levelled against her for falsification (p. 22, Record) and on December 22, 1975, the court a
quo denied her motion to quash (p. 34, Record).

As earlier intimated, the magistrate below thereafter reconsidered his order of denial which gave rise
to the corresponding unsuccessful bid by the People for reinstatement of the information for
falsification.

Hence the instant petition, which practically reiterates the same disqualification put forward in the
proceedings below (p. 7, Petition; p. 47, Rollo).

The issue of whether the court below correctly quashed the information for falsification must be
answered in the negative for the following reasons:

1. Assuming in gratia argumenti that falsification was indeed necessary to commit estafa, which
ordinarily constitutes a complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code and thus
susceptible to challenge via a motion to quash under Section 2 (e), Rule 117 vis-a-vis Section 12,
Rule 110 (Moran, Rules of Court, Vol. 4, 1980 Ed., p. 42; 230), still, it was serious error on the part
of the magistrate below to have appreciated this discourse in favor of private respondent since this
matter was not specifically raised in the motion to quash filed on October 28, 1975 (p. 16, Record). It
was only in the motion for reconsideration where private respondent pleaded this additional ground
after her motion to quash was denied (p. 39, Record). The legal proscription against entertaining
another saving clause to abate the charge for falsification is very explicit under Section 3, Rule 117
of the Revised Rules of Court:

Sec. 3. Motion to quash — Form and contents — Failure to state objection — Entry
of record — Failure to record. — The motion to quash shall be in writing signed by
the defendant or his attorney. It shall specify distinctly the ground of objection relied
on and the court shall hear no objection other than that stated in the motion. It shall
be entered of record but a failure to so enter it shall not affect the validity of any
proceeding in the case.

It must be observed that the denial of the motion to quash was re-examined not in the light of "res
judicata dressed in prison grey" but on the aspect of whether falsification was supposedly
perpetrated to commit estafa. The course of action pursued by the trial court in this context may not
even be justified under Section 10 of Rule 117 which says that:

Sec. 10. Failure to move to quash — Effect of — Exceptions. — If the defendant

does not move to quash the complaint or information before he pleads thereto he
shall be taken to have waived all objections which are grounds for a motion to quash
except when the complaint or information does not charge an offense, or the court is
without jurisdiction of the same. If, however, the defendant learns after he has
pleaded or has moved to guash on some other ground that the offense for which he
is now charged is an offense for which he has been pardoned, or of which he has
been convicted or acquitted or been in jeopardy, the court may in its discretion
entertain at any time before judgment a motion to quash on the ground of such
pardon, conviction, acquittal or jeopardy.

for the simple reason that the theory of a single crime advanced by private respondent in her
belated, nay, "second" motion to quash couched as motion for reconsideration is not synonymous
with "pardon, conviction, acquittal or jeopardy". In effect, therefore, respondent judge accommodated
another basis for the quashal of the information albeit the same was not so stated in the motion
therefor. This should not have been tolerated because it is anathema to the
foregoing proviso (Moran, supra, at p. 283, citing Suy Sui vs. People, 49 O.G. 967). This caveat is
now amplified in Section 8 of Rule 117 as amended, thus:

Sec. 8. Failure to move to quash or to allege any ground therefor. — The failure of
the accused to assert any ground of a motion to quash before he pleads to the
complaint or information, either because he did not file a motion to quash or failed to
allege the same in said motion shall be deemed a waiver of the grounds of a motion
to quash, except the grounds of no offense charged, lack of jurisdiction over the
offense charged, extinction of the offense or penalty and jeopardy, as provided for in
paragraphs (a), (b), (f) and (h) of Section 3 of this Rule.

At any rate, it is virtually unacceptable to suppose that private respondent concocted the sinister
scheme of falsification in 1971 precisely to facilitate the commission of estafa in 1973 such that both
crimes emanated from a single criminal impulse. Otherwise, an unfounded verisimilitude of this
nature will run afoul with what this Court already observed in People vs. Penas (68 Phil. 533 [1939];
1 Aquino, Revised Penal Code, 1976 Ed., p. 574) to the effect that the eleven estafas through
falsification which the same accused therein committed between November 24, 1936 and January 3,
1937 including the falsification which he committed on January 8, 1937 were considered distinct
offenses, not one complex crime, because they were committed on different dates, not to mention
the discrepancy in places where they were accomplished.

In the same breath, it necessarily follows that the suspended hiatus, between 1971 and 1973 in the
case at bar will not afford the occasion to buttress the unwarranted submission that the first is an
integral part of or intimately interwoven with the second felony. A simple perusal of the two
informations will disclose, and this cannot be gainsaid, that the recitals thereof radically differ with
each other. The indictment for falsification allegedly perpetrated in 1971 was levelled against private
respondent because of the pretense in the application for registration of her exclusive dominion over
a parcel of land notwithstanding the previous sale of the same lot in 1969 to Edilberto V. Ilano. By
contrast, the inculpatory aspersions against private respondent in 1973 for estafa have their roots in
the overt act of disposing the same piece of lot in favor of other persons subsequent to the
conveyance in favor of Edilberto V. Ilano in 1969. Indeed, the intent to prevaricate on a piece of
document for the purpose of securing a favorable action for registration within the context of Article
171 (4) in conjunction with Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code is definitely distinct from the
perceived double sale contemplated by the first paragraph under Article 316 of the same code.

2. It was similarly fallacious for the lower court to have shared the notion that private respondent is in
danger of being convicted twice for the same criminal act, a circumstance recognized under Section
2(h) Rule 117 of the Old Rules as suggested in the motion to quash, because this plea is understood
to presuppose that the other case against private respondent has been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without her express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint
or information, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge (People of the Philippines versus
Hon. Maximiano C. Asuncion, et al., G.R. Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992; Section 7, Rule 117, 1985
Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended). In the Asuncion case, Justice Nocon said that:

. . . according to a long line of cases, in order that a defendant may successfully

allege former jeopardy, it is necessary that he had previously been (1) convicted or
(2) acquitted, or (3) in jeopardy of being convicted of the offense charged, that is, that
the former case against him for the same offense has been dismissed or otherwise
terminated without his express consent, by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a
valid complaint or information, and after the defendant had pleaded to the charge.

Withal, the mere filing of two informations charging the same offense is not an appropriate basis for
the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has not yet set in by a previous conviction,
acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the accused (People vs. Miraflores, 115
SCRA 586 [1982]; Nierras vs. Dacuycuy, 181 SCRA 8 [1990]).

In People vs. Miraflores (supra), the accused therein, after he had pleaded to the charge of multiple
frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. 88173 and subsequent to his arraignment on a separate
charge of Murder in Criminal Case No. 88174, invoked the plea of double jeopardy but Justice
Barredo who spoke for the Court was far from convinced:

But the more untenable aspect of the position of appellant is that when he invoked
the defense of double jeopardy, what could have been the first jeopardy had not yet
been completed or even began. It is settled jurisprudence in this Court that the mere
filing of two informations or complaints charging the same offense does not yet afford
the accused in those cases the occasion to complain that he is being placed in
jeopardy twice for the same offense, for the simple reason that the primary basis of
the defense of double jeopardy is that the accused has already been convicted or
acquitted in the first case or that the same has been terminated without his consent.
(Bulaong vs. People, L-19344, July 27, 1966, 17 SCRA 746; Silvestre vs. Military
Commission No. 21, No. L-46366, March 8, 1978, Buscayno vs. Military
Commissions Nos. 1, 2, 6 and 25, No. L-58284, Nov. 19, 1981, 109 SCRA 273).

Moreover, it appears that private respondent herein had not yet been arraigned in the previous case
for estafa. Thus, there is that other missing link, so to speak, in the case at bar which was precisely
the same reason utilized by Justice Davide, Jr. in Lamera vs. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 186
[1991]) when he brushed aside the claim of double jeopardy of the accused therein who was
arraigned in the previous case only after the judgment of conviction was promulgated in the other
case. The ponente cited a plethora of cases in support of the proposition that arraignment of the
accused in the previous case is a condition sine qua non for double jeopardy to attach (at page 13:
People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; People vs. Consulta, 70 SCRA 277; Andres v. Cacdac, 113 SCRA
216; People vs. Bocar, et al., 132 SCRA 166; Gaspar vs. Sandiganbayan, 144 SCRA 415) and
echoed the requisites of legal jeopardy as announced in People vs. Bocar thus:
 Legal jeopardy attaches only (a) upon a valid indictment, (b) before a competent
court, (c) after arraignment, (d) a valid plea having been entered, and (e) the case
was dismissed or otherwise terminated without the express consent of the accused.
(at p. 193.)

To be sure, Chief Justice Moran said in his treatise on the subject under consideration that:

Where there is no former conviction, acquittal, dismissal or termination of a former

case for the same offense, no jeopardy attaches. (Comments on the Rules of Court,
by Moran, Vol. 4, 1980 Ed., p. 281)

Of course, We are not unmindful of the erudite remarks of Mr. Justice Florenz D. Regalado, in his
Remedial Law Compendium that:

It would now appear that prior conviction or acquittal in the first case, as long as the
accused had entered his plea therein is no longer required in order that the accused
may move to quash a second prosecution for the same offense on the ground of
double jeopardy. (Volume 2, 1988 Edition, page 323; 339)

xxx xxx xxx

Jeopardy attaches from the entry of his plea at the arraignment (People vs. City
Court of Manila, et al., L-3642, April 27, 1983). (Vide page 327).

The sentiments expressed in this regard by Our distinguished colleague which rest on the ruling of
this Court in People vs. City Court of Manila, Branch XI (121 SCRA 637 [1983], cited by Regalado,
Vide, at p. 339 to the effect that jeopardy would already attach when the accused enters his plea due
to the obiter dictum of the ponente in that case, based on the following factual backdrop:

The question presented in this case is whether a person who has been prosecuted
for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence and convicted thereof may be
prosecuted subsequently for homicide thru reckless imprudence if the offended party
dies as a result of the same injuries he had suffered.

xxx xxx xxx

In the case at bar, the incident occurred on October 17, 1971. The following day,
October 18, an information for serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence was
filed against private respondent driver of the truck. On the same day, the victim
Diolito de la Cruz died.

On October 20, 1972, private respondent was arraigned on the charge of serious
physical injuries thru reckless imprudence. He pleaded guilty, was sentenced to one
(1) month and one (1) day of arresto mayor, and commenced serving sentence.

On October 24, 1972, an information for homicide thru reckless imprudence was filed
against private respondent.

On November 17, 1972, the City Court of Manila, upon motion of private respondent,
issued an order dismissing the homicide thru reckless imprudence case on the
ground of double jeopardy.
where it was opined, thus:

Well-settled is the rule that one who has been charged [implying that there is no
need to show previous conviction, acquittal, or dismissal of a similar or identical
charge] with an offense cannot be charged again with the same or identical offense
though the latter be lesser or greater than the former. (Emphasis supplied.)

From the conclusion thus reached, it would appear that one simply "charged" may claim possible
jeopardy in another case. However, a closer study of the case adverted to reveals that
the ponente may have overlooked the fact that the accused therein was not only charged, but he
actually admitted his guilt to the charge of serious physical injuries through reckless imprudence and
more importantly, he was convicted of such crime and commenced serving sentence. Verily, there
was no occasion in said case to speak of jeopardy being properly invoked by a person
simply charged with an offense if he is again charged for the same or identical offense. It may be
observed that in City Court of Manila the accused therein pleaded on the first offense of which he
was charged and subsequently convicted, unlike in the scenario at bar where private respondent
entered her plea to the second offense. But the variance on this point is of no substantial worth
because private respondent's plea to the second offense is, as aforesaid, legally incomplete to
sustain her assertion of jeopardy for probable conviction of the same felony, absent as there is the
previous conviction, acquittal, or termination without her express consent of the previous case for
estafa, and it being plain and obvious that the charges did not arise from the same acts. In short, in
order for the first jeopardy to attach, the plea of the accused to the charge must be coupled with
either conviction, acquittal, or termination of the previous case without his express consent
thereafter. (Tolentino vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 97 [1938]). Justice Oscar Herrera, in his book
"Remedial Law" enumerates the elements constitutive of first jeopardy, to wit:

1. Court of competent jurisdiction;

2. Valid complaint or information;

3. Arraignment and a

4. Valid plea (People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851; 853)

5. The defendant was acquitted or convicted or the case was dismissed or otherwise
terminated without the express consent of the accused (People vs. Declaro, G.R. No.
64362, February 9, 1989, 170 SCRA 142; See also People vs. Santiago, 174 SCRA
143; People vs. Gines, G.R. No. 83463, May 27, 1991, 197 SCRA 481; Que vs.
Cosico, 177 SCRA 410 [1989]; Caes vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, 179 SCRA
54; Lamera vs. Court of Appeals, 198 SCRA 186 [1991]). (Herrera, Remedial Law,
1992 Ed., Volume 4, p. 417).

Citing cases, both old and of recent vintage, Justice Herrera continues to submit the idea that:

The first jeopardy is said to have validly terminated upon conviction, acquittal or
dismissal of the case or otherwise terminated without the express consent of
defendant (People vs. Garcia, 30 SCRA 150; People vs. Ledesma, 73 SCRA 77;
People vs. Pilpa, 79 SCRA 81; Buscayno vs. Military Commission, 109 SCRA 273;
People vs. Cuevo, 104 SCRA 319; Galman, et al. vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No.
72670, September 12, 1987.) (Vide, at page 423).

In People vs. Ledesma (73 SCRA 77 [1976]), Justice Martin declared in no uncertain terms:
 . . . In the case before Us, accused-appellee was charged with estafa in Criminal
Case No. 439 before a competent court under a valid information and was duly
convicted as charged. He was therefore placed in legal jeopardy for the crime of
estafa in Criminal Case No. 439 for having failed to turn over the proceeds of the
sale of an Avegon radio in the amount of P230.00 to the offended party. . . . (at p. 81)

The same observation was made by then Justice, later Chief Justice Aquino in People vs. Pilpa (79
SCRA 81 [1977]):

In synthesis, there is former jeopardy when in the first case there was a valid
complaint or information filed in a court of competent jurisdiction, and after the
defendant had pleaded to the charge, he was acquitted or convicted or the case
against him was terminated without his express consent (People vs. Consulta, L-
41251, March 31, 1976, 70 SCRA 277; People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851, 853). (86)

At any rate, and inasmuch as this Court has spoken quite recently in People vs. Asuncion, (G.R.
Nos. 83837-42, April 22, 1992), the ambiguity stirred by the imprecise observation in People vs. City
Court of Manila, a 1983 case, can now be considered modified in that a prior conviction, or acquittal,
or termination of the case without the express acquiescence of the accused is still required before
the first jeopardy can be pleaded to abate a second prosecution.

While We are at a loss as to the status of the progress of the estafa case on account of private
respondent's apathy towards Our order for the parties herein to "MOVE IN THE PREMISES" (p.
125, Rollo) which information could substantially affect the results of this case, from all indications it
appears that the estafa case has not yet been terminated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED and the Orders of respondent judge dated January 23,
1976 quashing the information for falsification, and March 23, 1976 denying the People's motion for
reconsideration therefrom are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the information for
falsification be reinstated and this case be remanded to the lower court for further proceedings and
trial. No special pronouncement is made as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

Cruz, Padilla, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Davide, Jr., Romero, Nocon, Bellosillo and Campos, Jr., JJ.,
concur.

Quiason, J., took no part.

Gutierrez, Jr., J., on leave.

Separate Opinions
REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result reached in the eloquently articulated and well researched ponencia of Mr.
Justice Melo in that the assailed order of respondent judge quashing the information for falsification
should be reversed and the case be remanded to the lower court for appropriate proceedings. I
regret, however, that some of the reasons advanced for that conclusion do not square with my own
views as I shall shortly explain.

1. First, on the concessible areas of concurrence. The majority holds that private respondent
Consolacion Naval failed to seasonably raise the issue, and respondent judge correspondingly erred
in declaring, that she was supposedly being prosecuted for falsification perpetrated to commit estafa.
The specific contention of the accused that she was charged with the complex crime of estafa
through falsification, in connection with her submission on double jeopardy, was allegedly not raised
in a motion to quash but only subsequently in a motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
preceding motion, hence under the omnibus motion rule expressed in Section 3, Rule 117 of the
1964 Rules of Court that ground was waived and could not be made the basis for the quashal
complained of.

To be more accurate, however, the accused did raise in her basic motion to quash filed on October
28, 1975 in Criminal Case No. 15796, not with the desirable explicitness required by the rules on
pleadings but acceptable under a liberal application thereof, the issue of double jeopardy in this
wise:

3. That accused is in jeopardy of being convicted for a similar offense

that is pending in court.

Attached to this motion is a zerox copy of the information in Criminal Case No.
15795, CFI, Rizal, which alleges the identical fact of giving alleged false testimony in
the land registration proceedings that is alleged in the information before this
Honorable Court. The defense of jeopardy is applicable not only to a situation where
the accused has in fact been convicted but also to a situation where he is in danger
of being convicted for the same offense.1

At any rate, I would go a little farther, beyond that mere procedural lapse, especially since the main
decision took recourse to that bar under the Rules prefaced by the assumption "in gratia
argumenti that falsification was indeed necessary to commit estafa." During the deliberations in this
case, I advanced the view that even under substantive law, specifically the provisions of and the
jurisprudence on Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the offenses of which private respondent
stands charged cannot be considered together as component offenses constitutive of a single
complex crime. I am gratified that in the revised ponencia, the majority now shares my position.

Private respondent was charged on the same day with estafa in Criminal Case No. 15795 before
Branch 19, and with falsification in Criminal Case No. 15796 before Branch 21, both of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal. From the indictments in these two cases which are reproduced in the
decision, the majority notes that "(t)he confluence of the foregoing assertions disclose that
Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty on August 12, 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who made a partial
payment of P130,850.00. About two years later, or on August 17, 1971, an application for
registration under the Land Registration Act was submitted by Consolacion wherein she stated that
she owned the same lot and that it was unencumbered. . . ."

The foregoing allegations constitute the basis for the falsification charge for, as the information
therein states, because of her aforesaid representations that "(s)he is the exclusive owner in fee
simple" of the land and that she "does not know of any mortgage or encumbrance of any kind
whatsoever affecting said land, . . . the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972 declared the herein
accused the true and absolute owner of said parcel of land free from all liens and encumbrances of
any nature . . ."

On the other hand, the charge for estafa in Criminal Case No. 15795 alleges that on or about March
23, 1973, private respondent and one Anacleto Santos, "without informing said Edilberto V. Ilano, . .
. executed and filed an Application for Registration over the same parcel of land among others, as a
result of which the Presiding Judge of Branch XIII to which said case was assigned issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 9332 in her name, . . ." and "sold more than one-half (1/2) of said parcel of
land" to nine (9) other persons named therein.

In his challenged order 2 rendered on January 23, 1976 quashing the information in the falsification
case (Criminal Case No. 15796), and with express reference to the "information for estafa . . .
previously filed against the accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15795 assigned to Branch XIX
of this Court," respondent judge arrived at the following conclusion:

This Court, therefore, finds the contention of the accused that the crime of
falsification charged in the present case and the estafa case pending in Branch XIX
of this Court constitute the so-called complex crime. The falsification charge in the
case at bar was the means for committing crime of estafa now pending in Branch
XIX. In justice to the accused considering that if this case should not be dismissed
she stands in danger of being convicted twice for the same criminal act that she
allegedly committed, this court is constrained to grant the motion for
reconsideration. 3

I regret that I cannot follow the logic in the aforesaid disposition. The falsification charged in Criminal
Case No-15796 was allegedly committed on August 17, 1971 with an application for land registration
containing false statements. No private offended parties, other than Edilberto Ilano, were
contemplated therein since no other sales of the land or portions thereof were alleged to have been
effected. On the other hand, the estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 15795 was supposedly
committed almost two (2) years later, on March 23, 1973, allegedly by the filing of another
application for registration of parts of the same parcel of land, portions of which were thereafter sold
to nine (9) other persons who would be the potential aggrieved parties. It is hard to conceive of how
a falsification committed in 1971 which, at that time, had no probable or direct connection with the
estafa committed in 1973, could be considered as the necessary means to commit the latter such
that both could be considered a single complex crime.

In this type of complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code known in Spanish law as
a delito complejo,there must be a direct connection, both in point of time and intention, that the first
felony committed by the offender was deliberately adopted by him as a necessary means to commit
the other. That singularity of purpose, or unity of criminal intent, is the basis for penalizing both
offenses with a single penalty, albeit in the maximum period of that for the graver offense, since this
is the so-called case of formal or ideal plurality of crimes which is generated by a single criminal
resolution. 4

Thus, in Regis vs. People, 5 we stressed:

. . . The statement in the appealed decision that there was only one intention to
commit the falsification and the malversation of April 30 and May 2, 1931 is not
supported by the facts of the case. They were committed on different dates
sufficiently distant from each other (April 30 and May 2, 1931). It does not appear
 that when the malversation and the falsification were committed on April 30, it was
already the intention of the appellant to commit also the falsification and the
malversation of May 2, 1931, the same being necessary to justify the finding that,
although they were committed on different dates, a single intention determined the
commission of both. The acts being independent from each other and executed by
different voluntary actions, each constitutes an independent offense.

While the foregoing discussion may also apply to plurality of complex crimes committed on different
dates, the rationale is the same. As already emphasized, there must be an evident nexus between
the first and the second felonies, in that the first was resorted to precisely to ensure the commission
and in anticipation of the second. Here, it defies sober analysis as to how the falsification in 1971
and the estafa in 1973 could be the component felonies of a single complex crime.

On both procedural and substantive legal considerations, therefore, I hold that public respondent
erred in quashing the information for falsification on the theory that, together with the estafa, a
complex crime is involved, hence to charge private respondent in two separate criminal cases using
each offense as the respective subject of each charge would put her in double jeopardy.

Private respondent, under the factual milieu of this case, cannot be in double jeopardy. She is being
charged with two separate and distinct crimes. On top of that, the thesis of the majority is that she
even failed to duly raise the issue of a complex crime vis-a-vis the rule of double jeopardy in the
manner which public respondent seized upon for the quashal of Criminal Case No. 15796. We could,
therefore, stop here and write finis to the posturings of private respondent in this recourse, leaving
the inquiry into the case on the merits to the court a quo. The majority, however, discourses on
certain aspects of the doctrine of double jeopardy which, although obiter in light of the foregoing
premises, warrants more than just the proverbial second look and on which I would like to make
some respectful observations.

2. It is the postulation of the majority that "(t)he mere filing of two informations charging the same
offense is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has
not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the
accused." This would be correct if what had transpired was the mere filing of the two informations
charging identical offenses, but what about the situation where the accused has already entered a
plea to the first charge and is now confronted with a second charge for the same offense? To this,
the majority ripostes that "in order for the first jeopardy to attach, the plea of the accused to the
charge must be coupled with either conviction, acquittal, or termination of the previous case without
his express consent thereafter."

In fine, what the majority posits is that the doctrine of double jeopardy can be invoked only if there
was a previous conviction, acquittal, or unconsented dismissal in the first case against the accused
and he is now charged again with the same offense. Ergo, even if he was already arraigned on the
first charge, or even if he was undergoing trial therein when the same offense is made the subject of
a second charge, he cannot, for lack of a prior conviction, acquittal or unconsented dismissal in the
first charge, move to quash the second identical indictment on the ground of double jeopardy since
putatively there is still no first jeopardy to speak of.

----------------Explanation as to when jeopardy set in---------------

This will necessitate an inquiry into and require clarification as to stage of or point in time in the
criminal proceedings when an accused is considered as already in legal jeopardy or in danger of
conviction either for the first or second time. Since our basic rules on double jeopardy are admittedly
of American judicial origin, the rulings in that jurisdiction would be instructive. We find these
annotations in Corpus Juris Secundum:

The general rule established by the preponderance of judicial opinion and by the best
considered cases is that, when a person has been placed on trial on a valid
indictment or information before a court of competent jurisdiction, has been
arraigned, and has pleaded, and a jury has been impaneled and sworn, he is in
jeopardy, but that, until these things have been done, jeopardy does not attach. 6

xxx xxx xxx

If jeopardy is considered to attach when the jury are sworn or when the first witness
is heard, it is not ordinarily necessary that the prior trial shall have resulted in a valid
judgment either of conviction or acquittal: it is sufficient if the prisoner was actually
placed in jeopardy in that he was in danger of having a valid judgment pronounced
as the result of the trial: it is not the verdict or judgment which places a prisoner in
jeopardy.

In those jurisdictions which follow the generally recognized rule, jeopardy attaches at
the time the trial commences, and if the trial is to a jury, the trial commences when
the jury are impaneled and sworn, and thus it is said that jeopardy attaches when the
jury are impaneled and sworn. If the trial is to the court without a jury, it is well settled
that, for the purpose of determining when the jeopardy attaches, the trial begins at
the time of the commencement of the taking of testimony, that is, when the first
witness is duly sworn, and, accordingly, in such a case, jeopardy begins after
accused has been indicted, arraigned, and has pleaded, and the court has begun to
hear the evidence, or the trial has begun to hear the evidence, or the trial has begun
by the reading of the indictment to the court. In the application of these principles it is
assumed that there has been a plea of not guilty, and that the court has
jurisdiction.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The doctrine above discussed to the effect that the accused is in legal jeopardy from the moment he
enters a valid plea to the indictment is not terra incognita in our jurisdiction.

As early as 1933, in applying Section 28 of the then Code of Criminal Procedure which was
substantially incorporated in Section 9, Rule 117 of the 1964 Rules of Court (now Section 7, Rule
117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure), this Court, with minor allowances for our procedural
differences with criminal proceedings in American jurisdiction, substantially reiterated the above-
quoted doctrines as a basic proposition of law.

It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions of law, a defendant in a criminal
prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions:
(1) In a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3)
after he has been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the complaint or
information. Tested by this standard, we are of the opinion that the appellee has
been once in jeopardy for the offense for which she is now prosecuted. . . . All that
the law requires is that the accused has been brought to trial "in a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined." Under our
system of criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after the accused has entered
a plea of not guilty. The mere calling of a witness would not add to the danger,
annoyance, and vexation suffered by the accused, after going through the process of
 being arrested, subjected to preliminary investigation, arraigned and required to
plead and stand trial.8 (Emphasis mine.)

This is reiterated and clarified by a recognized authority who explains that legal jeopardy exists from
the moment the accused has pleaded to the charge, and that the disposition of his case thereafter is
merely the consequence of the former as to constitute a bar to another prosecution, thus:

. . ., legal jeopardy does not exist and a plea to that effect is not accordingly available
but under the following conditions: (a) upon a valid complaint or informations: (b)
before a court of competent jurisdictions: and (c) after he has been arraigned and
has pleaded to the complaint or information. When all of these conditions are shown
to exist, the subsequent acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or
termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res adjudicata and,
therefore, a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes
or is included therein. 9

In other words, the concurrence of the three conditions above enumerated having placed the
accused in legal jeopardy, he can invoke the ground in Section 3(h) of the present Rule 117; and
after judgment has been rendered therein, the ground for quashal is furnished by Section 7 of the
same rule which speaks of previous conviction, acquittal or unconsented dismissal. Parenthetically,
the overriding significance of a plea is underscored when we recall that after a plea has been
entered, there can be no amendment in substance of the information or complaint, but only in form
and this by leave and at the discretion of the court if it can be done without prejudice to the
accused. 10 And, of course, it is fundamental that there can be no valid judgment without a valid
standing plea to the charge. 11

It is regrettable that the role of a plea entered to an indictment appears to have been denigrated in
our decisional rulings on double jeopardy. While in almost all cases decided by the Court double
jeopardy was sustained because of a previous conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case without
the consent of the accused, these were so because the facts thereof really made out in each a case
of autrefois aquit or autrefois convict. In addition, with the specific provision of then Section 9 (now
Section 7) of Rule 117 providing for the requirements, and under the heading of "Former conviction
or acquittal or former jeopardy" (now rephrased as such epigraph reading "Former conviction or
acquittal; double jeopardy."), the impression created was that the doctrine of double jeopardy can be
invoked only if there was prior conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case involving the same
offense of which the accused is charged again. The writer respectfully submits otherwise.

It has long been my position that the issue of double jeopardy arises in three different ways, that is,
when: (a) the accused is charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, in one of
which he has validly pleaded; (b) The accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he has
been previously convicted or acquitted thereof or the charge therefor had been dismissed without his
consent; or (c) the prosecution makes a legally unauthorized appeal from a judgment in the same
case. The first instance is contemplated in then Section 2 (now Section 3), paragraph (h), Rule 117;
the second is covered by Section 7 of the same Rule; and the third is governed by Section 2, Rule
122.

That the first and the third instances are rarely involved in cases or found in our jurisprudential
annals is to the credit of our prosecutorial agencies which, with respect to the first instance, can
seldom be faulted with simultaneously or successively charging the same person twice with the
same offense in separate cases and, regarding the third instance, of scrupulously avoiding the
proscribed appeals. Evidently, this is not to be construed to mean, however, that only the second
instance, or "former jeopardy," can be the basis of a motion to quash.

Section 3 of Rule 117 provides the ground for a motion to quash and, just like the provisions of the
1964 Rules of Court, includes therein as paragraph "(h) That the accused has
been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the offense charged."
Indisputably, the first part of this paragraph regarding previous conviction refers to the "former
jeopardy" embraced in the present Section 7 of this Rule.

Now, unless we are prepared to treat the second part therein as faulty drafting or linguistic
surplusage, that second part referring to the accused as "in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted
of the offense charged" necessarily presupposes that he has not yet been convicted or acquitted of
an offense identical to that with which he is again indicted. Since double jeopardy requires, aside
from the other requisites, at least two cases involving identity of offenses but wherein the accused is
in legal jeopardy in at least one of them, this consequently envisages the situation where the
accused, who has already entered a plea to the first charge but wherein no final adjudication has yet
been rendered, is again charged with the same offense. It is, to paraphrase from the American
expression quoted in the main opinion, a proper case of "litis pendentia in prison grey" and wherein
quashal of the second case may accordingly be sought pursuant to said Rule.

Spelled out to the point of elemental details, said paragraph (h) actually provides for two modes
constitutive of separate grounds for quashal of a second indictment for the same offense. Recasting
its provisions for greater clarity, the first mode allows quashal where the accused has been
previously convicted or acquitted of the same offense with which he is again presently charged and
in danger of a second conviction. This would correspond, in civil procedure, to res judicata as a
ground for dismissal. The second mode stated in the same paragraph contemplates the situation
where the accused is only in jeopardy or danger of being convicted in the first case, since no
judgment or final order has yet been rendered therein, and he is now charged anew with the same
offense. This is equivalent, in civil case, to litis pendentia or auter action pendant, likewise a ground
for dismissal.

Now, in criminal procedure, these two variant grounds are provided for in a single paragraph but
definitely not as identical, but alternative and discrete, grounds although embraced in the same
concept of double jeopardy. While the censorious would prefer a more felicitous term for the second
mode, instead of also referring to it as double jeopardy, this is a matter properly addressed to the
framers of the rule or law thereon. I can very well live with that term since, whether or not the liability
of the accused has been adjudged or still awaiting adjudication in the first prosecution, what is
sought to be avoided is his subjection to another danger or jeopardy or being again convicted and
sentenced for an identical offense.

Judicial proceedings and determinations should never be the victims of the tyranny of labels. What
should control is the legislative intendment and the purpose to be subserved. If we were to be
squeamish about terminology, we need merely note that improper venue is not a ground for a motion
to quash. Its counterpart in criminal procedure is lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense
charged, under Section 3(b) of Rule 117, since in criminal cases venue is jurisdictional as the court
has no jurisdiction to try an offense committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. 12Yet, we still have to
hear any strident objection to the practice equating both terms as virtually synonymous objections to
the validity of a criminal prosecution.

Coming back to my preceding disquisition on double jeopardy, I humbly submit that a view contrary
thereto could be productive of mischievous, if not preposterous, results. While, as earlier observed, it
is a little remote for the same authority to charge the same accused with two criminal suits involving
the same offense, this is not an absolute improbability, as witness politically-motivated harassment
prosecutions. It is also possible that duplicity of suits on identical offenses may be brought about by
acts of different authorities in separate local jurisdictions.

Thus, to illustrate, 13 if forcible abduction is committed and commenced in Manila and the victim is
taken to Tarlac and thence to Cagayan, being a continuing crime the criminal action therefor may be
instituted in the proper court of any province in which the offense is continued. If, by error or design,
three cases involving the same parties and offense are lodged in Manila, Tarlac and Cagayan, either
categorized under the same offense of forcible abduction or with two of them dissembled as different
offenses of arbitrary detention or grave coercion through the expedient of variations in the particulars
of the indictment, we would have the not improbable scenario of the same accused enmeshed in
three different criminal actions which actually involve the same offense.

Where, thereafter, the accused upon arraignment pleaded not guilty in Manila, it would be a judicial
travesty that for lack of a final disposition in said case he cannot be allowed to move to quash the
other two pending cases on the ground of double jeopardy, in the hearing of which motion the
identity of the offenses can be proved and the dismissal of the other two actions could accordingly
be ordered.

Again, since the majority insists that a final judgment in the first case is a sine qua non for a motion
to quash the other two cases, if the accused was convicted in the first case and said conviction is
brought on appeal where it may remain pending for years, what happens to the other two cases?
Shall they instead be consolidated for trial with the inevitable inconvenience and expenses
necessitated by transfer of venue and production of witnesses from a different vicinage, not to speak
of the awkward and improbable situation of two of the same cases being each consolidated with
itself and with the court having to resolve all? Shall they be allowed to proceed on independent trial
utilizing the same evidence or shall the proceedings therein be indefinitely suspended to await the
ultimate outcome of the first?

The absurdity of having to be unnecessarily confronted with the aforesaid options is further
underscored by the fact that howsoever the first case is disposed of, the other two cases would be
barred by previous jeopardy under Section 7 of Rule 117, hence the independent proceedings that
may have been conducted or the suspension thereof in those two cases would be completely
pointless and unnecessary. Permitting the accused to move to quash the said two cases after he
had pleaded to the first would have obviated the impasse created by requiring a prior final decision
and spared him the vexation and expenses for fees and bail in the other two improvident
prosecutions.

..........MISSING LINE..........

This is where Section 3(h) of the same rule

could have been overlooked, misconstrued,
or altogether ignored.
One final word. The majority points out that it was obiter for the Court to rule in People vs. City Court
of Manila, Branch XI 14 that the accused therein was in double jeopardy because he had already
been charged for the same offense, emphasizing that such imprecision of language would give the
impression that one simply charged may claim possible jeopardy in another case. This writer is
aware that the ponente therein committed an innocent oversight hence in my comment thereon, as
quoted in the main decision, it was explained that this would be so as long as the accused had
entered his plea therein. Aware that such statement in that case could further be, as it is now,
blandly dismissed as obiter, I also made the qualification that my comment was as the doctrine
"would now appear" based on the holding in said case.

Yet, as a statement of a rule of procedure, I believe that, properly and completely expressed, the
view of theponente in that case was in the right direction on that score. Also, we have held that while
an obiter dictum is generally not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule, it may
be followed if sufficiently persuasive. 15 I make this observation since it may also be argued that the
present discussion regarding the bases of my dissent would be orbiter if we hold that in the present
case the issue of double jeopardy is not really involved since the private respondent is not being
charged with a complex crime, the component felonies of which have been made subject of separate
suits, but of two distinct and independent crimes.

Nonetheless, as ultimate arbiters of the law, we cannot and we should not continue to cleave with
obstinate tenacity or persist in citing with rote-like consistency clearly inapposite or inapplicable
doctrines catalogued in works notable not for logical analysis but by their reliance on the numerical
weight of cases decided on the bases of disparate factual situations, or by reason of a slavish
obsession for footnotes. Perpetuating a misconception spawned by the inertia of cavalier reliance on
supposed precedents is a disservice to the doctrine of stare decisis.

As earlier stated, therefore, since my present dissent is on an issue which I believe this court should
soonest clarify, on the considerations hereinbefore expressed. I categorically submit that where an
accused has validly pleaded to the appropriate indictment sufficiently charging him with an offense in
a court of competent jurisdiction, he can seek and obtain the quashal of a subsequent charge for the
same offense on the ground of double jeopardy even before the final disposition of the first case.

Narvasa, C.J. and Feliciano, J., concur.

# Separate Opinions

REGALADO, J., concurring and dissenting:

I concur in the result reached in the eloquently articulated and well researched ponencia of Mr.
Justice Melo in that the assailed order of respondent judge quashing the information for falsification
should be reversed and the case be remanded to the lower court for appropriate proceedings. I
regret, however, that some of the reasons advanced for that conclusion do not square with my own
views as I shall shortly explain.

1. First, on the concessible areas of concurrence. The majority holds that private respondent
Consolacion Naval failed to seasonably raise the issue, and respondent judge correspondingly erred
in declaring, that she was supposedly being prosecuted for falsification perpetrated to commit estafa.
The specific contention of the accused that she was charged with the complex crime of estafa
through falsification, in connection with her submission on double jeopardy, was allegedly not raised
in a motion to quash but only subsequently in a motion for reconsideration of the denial of the
preceding motion, hence under the omnibus motion rule expressed in Section 3, Rule 117 of the
1964 Rules of Court that ground was waived and could not be made the basis for the quashal
complained of.

To be more accurate, however, the accused did raise in her basic motion to quash filed on October
28, 1975 in Criminal Case No. 15796, not with the desirable explicitness required by the rules on
pleadings but acceptable under a liberal application thereof, the issue of double jeopardy in this
wise:

3. That accused is in jeopardy of being convicted for a similar offense

that is pending in court.

Attached to this motion is a zerox copy of the information in Criminal Case No.
15795, CFI, Rizal, which alleges the identical fact of giving alleged false testimony in
the land registration proceedings that is alleged in the information before this
Honorable Court. The defense of jeopardy is applicable not only to a situation where
the accused has in fact been convicted but also to a situation where he is in danger
of being convicted for the same offense.1

At any rate, I would go a little farther, beyond that mere procedural lapse, especially since the main
decision took recourse to that bar under the Rules prefaced by the assumption "in gratia
argumenti that falsification was indeed necessary to commit estafa." During the deliberations in this
case, I advanced the view that even under substantive law, specifically the provisions of and the
jurisprudence on Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code, the offenses of which private respondent
stands charged cannot be considered together as component offenses constitutive of a single
complex crime. I am gratified that in the revised ponencia, the majority now shares my position.

Private respondent was charged on the same day with estafa in Criminal Case No. 15795 before
Branch 19, and with falsification in Criminal Case No. 15796 before Branch 21, both of the then
Court of First Instance of Rizal. From the indictments in these two cases which are reproduced in the
decision, the majority notes that "(t)he confluence of the foregoing assertions disclose that
Consolacion Naval sold the subject realty on August 12, 1969 to Edilberto Ilano who made a partial
payment of P130,850.00. About two years later, or on August 17, 1971, an application for
registration under the Land Registration Act was submitted by Consolacion wherein she stated that
she owned the same lot and that it was unencumbered. . . ."

The foregoing allegations constitute the basis for the falsification charge for, as the information
therein states, because of her aforesaid representations that "(s)he is the exclusive owner in fee
simple" of the land and that she "does not know of any mortgage or encumbrance of any kind
whatsoever affecting said land, . . . the Court in its Decision of March 22, 1972 declared the herein
accused the true and absolute owner of said parcel of land free from all liens and encumbrances of
any nature . . ."

On the other hand, the charge for estafa in Criminal Case No. 15795 alleges that on or about March
23, 1973, private respondent and one Anacleto Santos, "without informing said Edilberto V. Ilano, . .
. executed and filed an Application for Registration over the same parcel of land among others, as a
result of which the Presiding Judge of Branch XIII to which said case was assigned issued Original
Certificate of Title No. 9332 in her name, . . ." and "sold more than one-half (1/2) of said parcel of
land" to nine (9) other persons named therein.

In his challenged order 2 rendered on January 23, 1976 quashing the information in the falsification
case (Criminal Case No. 15796), and with express reference to the "information for estafa . . .
previously filed against the accused, docketed as Criminal Case No. 15795 assigned to Branch XIX
of this Court," respondent judge arrived at the following conclusion:

This Court, therefore, finds the contention of the accused that the crime of
falsification charged in the present case and the estafa case pending in Branch XIX
of this Court constitute the so-called complex crime. The falsification charge in the
case at bar was the means for committing crime of estafa now pending in Branch
XIX. In justice to the accused considering that if this case should not be dismissed
she stands in danger of being convicted twice for the same criminal act that she
allegedly committed, this court is constrained to grant the motion for
reconsideration. 3

I regret that I cannot follow the logic in the aforesaid disposition. The falsification charged in Criminal
Case No-15796 was allegedly committed on August 17, 1971 with an application for land registration
containing false statements. No private offended parties, other than Edilberto Ilano, were
contemplated therein since no other sales of the land or portions thereof were alleged to have been
effected. On the other hand, the estafa charged in Criminal Case No. 15795 was supposedly
committed almost two (2) years later, on March 23, 1973, allegedly by the filing of another
application for registration of parts of the same parcel of land, portions of which were thereafter sold
to nine (9) other persons who would be the potential aggrieved parties. It is hard to conceive of how
a falsification committed in 1971 which, at that time, had no probable or direct connection with the
estafa committed in 1973, could be considered as the necessary means to commit the latter such
that both could be considered a single complex crime.

In this type of complex crime under Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code known in Spanish law as
a delito complejo,there must be a direct connection, both in point of time and intention, that the first
felony committed by the offender was deliberately adopted by him as a necessary means to commit
the other. That singularity of purpose, or unity of criminal intent, is the basis for penalizing both
offenses with a single penalty, albeit in the maximum period of that for the graver offense, since this
is the so-called case of formal or ideal plurality of crimes which is generated by a single criminal
resolution. 4

Thus, in Regis vs. People, 5 we stressed:

. . . The statement in the appealed decision that there was only one intention to
commit the falsification and the malversation of April 30 and May 2, 1931 is not
supported by the facts of the case. They were committed on different dates
sufficiently distant from each other (April 30 and May 2, 1931). It does not appear
that when the malversation and the falsification were committed on April 30, it was
already the intention of the appellant to commit also the falsification and the
malversation of May 2, 1931, the same being necessary to justify the finding that,
although they were committed on different dates, a single intention determined the
commission of both. The acts being independent from each other and executed by
different voluntary actions, each constitutes an independent offense.

While the foregoing discussion may also apply to plurality of complex crimes committed on different
dates, the rationale is the same. As already emphasized, there must be an evident nexus between
the first and the second felonies, in that the first was resorted to precisely to ensure the commission
and in anticipation of the second. Here, it defies sober analysis as to how the falsification in 1971
and the estafa in 1973 could be the component felonies of a single complex crime.
On both procedural and substantive legal considerations, therefore, I hold that public respondent
erred in quashing the information for falsification on the theory that, together with the estafa, a
complex crime is involved, hence to charge private respondent in two separate criminal cases using
each offense as the respective subject of each charge would put her in double jeopardy.

Private respondent, under the factual milieu of this case, cannot be in double jeopardy. She is being
charged with two separate and distinct crimes. On top of that, the thesis of the majority is that she
even failed to duly raise the issue of a complex crime vis-a-vis the rule of double jeopardy in the
manner which public respondent seized upon for the quashal of Criminal Case No. 15796. We could,
therefore, stop here and write finis to the posturings of private respondent in this recourse, leaving
the inquiry into the case on the merits to the court a quo. The majority, however, discourses on
certain aspects of the doctrine of double jeopardy which, although obiter in light of the foregoing
premises, warrants more than just the proverbial second look and on which I would like to make
some respectful observations.

2. It is the postulation of the majority that "(t)he mere filing of two informations charging the same
offense is not an appropriate basis for the invocation of double jeopardy since the first jeopardy has
not yet set in by a previous conviction, acquittal or termination of the case without the consent of the
accused." This would be correct if what had transpired was the mere filing of the two informations
charging identical offenses, but what about the situation where the accused has already entered a
plea to the first charge and is now confronted with a second charge for the same offense? To this,
the majority ripostes that "in order for the first jeopardy to attach, the plea of the accused to the
charge must be coupled with either conviction, acquittal, or termination of the previous case without
his express consent thereafter."

In fine, what the majority posits is that the doctrine of double jeopardy can be invoked only if there
was a previous conviction, acquittal, or unconsented dismissal in the first case against the accused
and he is now charged again with the same offense. Ergo, even if he was already arraigned on the
first charge, or even if he was undergoing trial therein when the same offense is made the subject of
a second charge, he cannot, for lack of a prior conviction, acquittal or unconsented dismissal in the
first charge, move to quash the second identical indictment on the ground of double jeopardy since
putatively there is still no first jeopardy to speak of.

This will necessitate an inquiry into and require clarification as to stage of or point in time in the
criminal proceedings when an accused is considered as already in legal jeopardy or in danger of
conviction either for the first or second time. Since our basic rules on double jeopardy are admittedly
of American judicial origin, the rulings in that jurisdiction would be instructive. We find these
annotations in Corpus Juris Secundum:

The general rule established by the preponderance of judicial opinion and by the best
considered cases is that, when a person has been placed on trial on a valid
indictment or information before a court of competent jurisdiction, has been
arraigned, and has pleaded, and a jury has been impaneled and sworn, he is in
jeopardy, but that, until these things have been done, jeopardy does not attach. 6

xxx xxx xxx

If jeopardy is considered to attach when the jury are sworn or when the first witness
is heard, it is not ordinarily necessary that the prior trial shall have resulted in a valid
judgment either of conviction or acquittal: it is sufficient if the prisoner was actually
placed in jeopardy in that he was in danger of having a valid judgment pronounced
 as the result of the trial: it is not the verdict or judgment which places a prisoner in
jeopardy.

In those jurisdictions which follow the generally recognized rule, jeopardy attaches at
the time the trial commences, and if the trial is to a jury, the trial commences when
the jury are impaneled and sworn, and thus it is said that jeopardy attaches when the
jury are impaneled and sworn. If the trial is to the court without a jury, it is well settled
that, for the purpose of determining when the jeopardy attaches, the trial begins at
the time of the commencement of the taking of testimony, that is, when the first
witness is duly sworn, and, accordingly, in such a case, jeopardy begins after
accused has been indicted, arraigned, and has pleaded, and the court has begun to
hear the evidence, or the trial has begun to hear the evidence, or the trial has begun
by the reading of the indictment to the court. In the application of these principles it is
assumed that there has been a plea of not guilty, and that the court has
jurisdiction.7 (Emphasis supplied)

The doctrine above discussed to the effect that the accused is in legal jeopardy from the moment he
enters a valid plea to the indictment is not terra incognita in our jurisdiction.

As early as 1933, in applying Section 28 of the then Code of Criminal Procedure which was
substantially incorporated in Section 9, Rule 117 of the 1964 Rules of Court (now Section 7, Rule
117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure), this Court, with minor allowances for our procedural
differences with criminal proceedings in American jurisdiction, substantially reiterated the above-
quoted doctrines as a basic proposition of law.

It seems clear that under the foregoing provisions of law, a defendant in a criminal
prosecution is in legal jeopardy when placed on trial under the following conditions:
(1) In a court of competent jurisdiction; (2) upon a valid complaint or information; (3)
after he has been arraigned; and (4) after he has pleaded to the complaint or
information. Tested by this standard, we are of the opinion that the appellee has
been once in jeopardy for the offense for which she is now prosecuted. . . . All that
the law requires is that the accused has been brought to trial "in a court of competent
jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other formal charge sufficient in
form and substance to sustain a conviction, after issue properly joined." Under our
system of criminal procedure, issue is properly joined after the accused has entered
a plea of not guilty. The mere calling of a witness would not add to the danger,
annoyance, and vexation suffered by the accused, after going through the process of
being arrested, subjected to preliminary investigation, arraigned and required to
plead and stand trial.8 (Emphasis mine.)

This is reiterated and clarified by a recognized authority who explains that legal jeopardy exists from
the moment the accused has pleaded to the charge, and that the disposition of his case thereafter is
merely the consequence of the former as to constitute a bar to another prosecution, thus:

. . ., legal jeopardy does not exist and a plea to that effect is not accordingly available
but under the following conditions: (a) upon a valid complaint or informations: (b)
before a court of competent jurisdictions: and (c) after he has been arraigned and
has pleaded to the complaint or information. When all of these conditions are shown
to exist, the subsequent acquittal or conviction of the accused, or the dismissal or
termination of the case without his express consent constitutes res adjudicata and,
therefore, a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or for any attempt to
 commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes
or is included therein. 9

In other words, the concurrence of the three conditions above enumerated having placed the
accused in legal jeopardy, he can invoke the ground in Section 3(h) of the present Rule 117; and
after judgment has been rendered therein, the ground for quashal is furnished by Section 7 of the
same rule which speaks of previous conviction, acquittal or unconsented dismissal. Parenthetically,
the overriding significance of a plea is underscored when we recall that after a plea has been
entered, there can be no amendment in substance of the information or complaint, but only in form
and this by leave and at the discretion of the court if it can be done without prejudice to the
accused. 10 And, of course, it is fundamental that there can be no valid judgment without a valid
standing plea to the charge. 11

It is regrettable that the role of a plea entered to an indictment appears to have been denigrated in
our decisional rulings on double jeopardy. While in almost all cases decided by the Court double
jeopardy was sustained because of a previous conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case without
the consent of the accused, these were so because the facts thereof really made out in each a case
of autrefois aquit or autrefois convict. In addition, with the specific provision of then Section 9 (now
Section 7) of Rule 117 providing for the requirements, and under the heading of "Former conviction
or acquittal or former jeopardy" (now rephrased as such epigraph reading "Former conviction or
acquittal; double jeopardy."), the impression created was that the doctrine of double jeopardy can be
invoked only if there was prior conviction, acquittal or dismissal of the case involving the same
offense of which the accused is charged again. The writer respectfully submits otherwise.

It has long been my position that the issue of double jeopardy arises in three different ways, that is,
when: (a) the accused is charged with the same offense in two separate pending cases, in one of
which he has validly pleaded; (b) The accused is prosecuted anew for the same offense after he has
been previously convicted or acquitted thereof or the charge therefor had been dismissed without his
consent; or (c) the prosecution makes a legally unauthorized appeal from a judgment in the same
case. The first instance is contemplated in then Section 2 (now Section 3), paragraph (h), Rule 117;
the second is covered by Section 7 of the same Rule; and the third is governed by Section 2, Rule
122.

That the first and the third instances are rarely involved in cases or found in our jurisprudential
annals is to the credit of our prosecutorial agencies which, with respect to the first instance, can
seldom be faulted with simultaneously or successively charging the same person twice with the
same offense in separate cases and, regarding the third instance, of scrupulously avoiding the
proscribed appeals. Evidently, this is not to be construed to mean, however, that only the second
instance, or "former jeopardy," can be the basis of a motion to quash.

Section 3 of Rule 117 provides the ground for a motion to quash and, just like the provisions of the
1964 Rules of Court, includes therein as paragraph "(h) That the accused has
been previously convicted or in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted of the offense charged."
Indisputably, the first part of this paragraph regarding previous conviction refers to the "former
jeopardy" embraced in the present Section 7 of this Rule.

Now, unless we are prepared to treat the second part therein as faulty drafting or linguistic
surplusage, that second part referring to the accused as "in jeopardy of being convicted or acquitted
of the offense charged" necessarily presupposes that he has not yet been convicted or acquitted of
an offense identical to that with which he is again indicted. Since double jeopardy requires, aside
from the other requisites, at least two cases involving identity of offenses but wherein the accused is
in legal jeopardy in at least one of them, this consequently envisages the situation where the
accused, who has already entered a plea to the first charge but wherein no final adjudication has yet
been rendered, is again charged with the same offense. It is, to paraphrase from the American
expression quoted in the main opinion, a proper case of "litis pendentia in prison grey" and wherein
quashal of the second case may accordingly be sought pursuant to said Rule.

Spelled out to the point of elemental details, said paragraph (h) actually provides for two modes
constitutive of separate grounds for quashal of a second indictment for the same offense. Recasting
its provisions for greater clarity, the first mode allows quashal where the accused has been
previously convicted or acquitted of the same offense with which he is again presently charged and
in danger of a second conviction. This would correspond, in civil procedure, to res judicata as a
ground for dismissal. The second mode stated in the same paragraph contemplates the situation
where the accused is only in jeopardy or danger of being convicted in the first case, since no
judgment or final order has yet been rendered therein, and he is now charged anew with the same
offense. This is equivalent, in civil case, to litis pendentia or auter action pendant, likewise a ground
for dismissal.

Now, in criminal procedure, these two variant grounds are provided for in a single paragraph but
definitely not as identical, but alternative and discrete, grounds although embraced in the same
concept of double jeopardy. While the censorious would prefer a more felicitous term for the second
mode, instead of also referring to it as double jeopardy, this is a matter properly addressed to the
framers of the rule or law thereon. I can very well live with that term since, whether or not the liability
of the accused has been adjudged or still awaiting adjudication in the first prosecution, what is
sought to be avoided is his subjection to another danger or jeopardy or being again convicted and
sentenced for an identical offense.

Judicial proceedings and determinations should never be the victims of the tyranny of labels. What
should control is the legislative intendment and the purpose to be subserved. If we were to be
squeamish about terminology, we need merely note that improper venue is not a ground for a motion
to quash. Its counterpart in criminal procedure is lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the offense
charged, under Section 3(b) of Rule 117, since in criminal cases venue is jurisdictional as the court
has no jurisdiction to try an offense committed outside its territorial jurisdiction. 12Yet, we still have to
hear any strident objection to the practice equating both terms as virtually synonymous objections to
the validity of a criminal prosecution.

Coming back to my preceding disquisition on double jeopardy, I humbly submit that a view contrary
thereto could be productive of mischievous, if not preposterous, results. While, as earlier observed, it
is a little remote for the same authority to charge the same accused with two criminal suits involving
the same offense, this is not an absolute improbability, as witness politically-motivated harassment
prosecutions. It is also possible that duplicity of suits on identical offenses may be brought about by
acts of different authorities in separate local jurisdictions.

Thus, to illustrate, 13 if forcible abduction is committed and commenced in Manila and the victim is
taken to Tarlac and thence to Cagayan, being a continuing crime the criminal action therefor may be
instituted in the proper court of any province in which the offense is continued. If, by error or design,
three cases involving the same parties and offense are lodged in Manila, Tarlac and Cagayan, either
categorized under the same offense of forcible abduction or with two of them dissembled as different
offenses of arbitrary detention or grave coercion through the expedient of variations in the particulars
of the indictment, we would have the not improbable scenario of the same accused enmeshed in
three different criminal actions which actually involve the same offense.

Where, thereafter, the accused upon arraignment pleaded not guilty in Manila, it would be a judicial
travesty that for lack of a final disposition in said case he cannot be allowed to move to quash the
other two pending cases on the ground of double jeopardy, in the hearing of which motion the
identity of the offenses can be proved and the dismissal of the other two actions could accordingly
be ordered.

Again, since the majority insists that a final judgment in the first case is a sine qua non for a motion
to quash the other two cases, if the accused was convicted in the first case and said conviction is
brought on appeal where it may remain pending for years, what happens to the other two cases?
Shall they instead be consolidated for trial with the inevitable inconvenience and expenses
necessitated by transfer of venue and production of witnesses from a different vicinage, not to speak
of the awkward and improbable situation of two of the same cases being each consolidated with
itself and with the court having to resolve all? Shall they be allowed to proceed on independent trial
utilizing the same evidence or shall the proceedings therein be indefinitely suspended to await the
ultimate outcome of the first?

The absurdity of having to be unnecessarily confronted with the aforesaid options is further
underscored by the fact that howsoever the first case is disposed of, the other two cases would be
barred by previous jeopardy under Section 7 of Rule 117, hence the independent proceedings that
may have been conducted or the suspension thereof in those two cases would be completely
pointless and unnecessary. Permitting the accused to move to quash the said two cases after he
had pleaded to the first would have obviated the impasse created by requiring a prior final decision
and spared him the vexation and expenses for fees and bail in the other two improvident
prosecutions.

..........MISSING LINE..........

This is where Section 3(h) of the same rule

could have been overlooked, misconstrued,
or altogether ignored.
One final word. The majority points out that it was obiter for the Court to rule in People vs. City Court
of Manila, Branch XI 14 that the accused therein was in double jeopardy because he had already
been charged for the same offense, emphasizing that such imprecision of language would give the
impression that one simply charged may claim possible jeopardy in another case. This writer is
aware that the ponente therein committed an innocent oversight hence in my comment thereon, as
quoted in the main decision, it was explained that this would be so as long as the accused had
entered his plea therein. Aware that such statement in that case could further be, as it is now,
blandly dismissed as obiter, I also made the qualification that my comment was as the doctrine
"would now appear" based on the holding in said case.

Yet, as a statement of a rule of procedure, I believe that, properly and completely expressed, the
view of theponente in that case was in the right direction on that score. Also, we have held that while
an obiter dictum is generally not binding as authority or precedent within the stare decisis rule, it may
be followed if sufficiently persuasive. 15 I make this observation since it may also be argued that the
present discussion regarding the bases of my dissent would be orbiter if we hold that in the present
case the issue of double jeopardy is not really involved since the private respondent is not being
charged with a complex crime, the component felonies of which have been made subject of separate
suits, but of two distinct and independent crimes.
Nonetheless, as ultimate arbiters of the law, we cannot and we should not continue to cleave with
obstinate tenacity or persist in citing with rote-like consistency clearly inapposite or inapplicable
doctrines catalogued in works notable not for logical analysis but by their reliance on the numerical
weight of cases decided on the bases of disparate factual situations, or by reason of a slavish
obsession for footnotes. Perpetuating a misconception spawned by the inertia of cavalier reliance on
supposed precedents is a disservice to the doctrine of stare decisis.

As earlier stated, therefore, since my present dissent is on an issue which I believe this court should
soonest clarify, on the considerations hereinbefore expressed. I categorically submit that where an
accused has validly pleaded to the appropriate indictment sufficiently charging him with an offense in
a court of competent jurisdiction, he can seek and obtain the quashal of a subsequent charge for the
same offense on the ground of double jeopardy even before the final disposition of the first case.

Narvasa, C.J. and Feliciano, J., concur.

# Footnotes

1 Rollo, 4-5.

2 Ibid., 66.

3 Ibid., 70-71.

4 See Gamboa vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 68 SCRA 308 (1975).

5 67 Phil. 1938 (1938).

6 22 C.J.S., Criminal Law 637.

7 Op. cit., 639-640.

8 People vs. Ylagan, 58 Phil. 851 (1933).

9 Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. IV, 1980 Ed., 240.

10 Sec. 14, Rule 110, Rules of Court.

11 People vs. Balisacan, 17 SCRA 119 (1966); People vs. Padernal, 21 SCRA 34
(1967).

12 People vs. Mercado, 65 Phil. 665 (1938); Alfelor, et al. vs. Intia, et al., 70 SCRA
460 (1976).

13 The observations here could also very well apply to the case of libel wherein the
criminal action can be filed in specified regional trial courts of different provinces as
alternative venues (Art. 360 Revised Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 4363).

14 121 SCRA 637 (1983).

15 Lee, et al. vs. Court of Appeals, et al., 68 SCRA 196, 204 (1975).
16th proposal on the Rules of Criminal Procedure
January 19, 2014 at 9:47 AM
PROPOSED REVISED VERSION

SEC. 3. Grounds.–The accused may moveto quash the complaint or information on any of following
grounds:(a) That thefacts charged do not constitute an offense;(b) That the court trying the casehas no
jurisdiction over the offense charged;(c) That the court trying the casehas no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;(d) That the officer whofiled the information had no authority to do so;(e) That it does not
conformsubstantially to the prescribed form;(f) That more than one offense is chargedexcept when a single
punishment for various offenses is prescribed by law;(g)That the criminal action or liability has been
extinguished;(h) That itcontains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse orjustification; and(i)
That the accused has been previously convicted oracquitted of the offense charged, or the case against him was
dismissed orotherwise terminated without his express consent.(j) That crime charged is aconstituent of a
complex crime or special complex crime, the most seriouscomponent of which is charged in another complaint
or information, or the crimecharged is an element of or an indispensable means to commit another, which
ischarged in another complaint or information.

EXPLANATORY NOTE

1. Res judicata and litis pendentia - If there is a violation of the rule on a splitting of a singlecause of action
under Section 4 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the remedy ofthe defendant is to file a motion to dismiss on
the ground of litis pendentiaif the other case containing the same cause of action is still pending, or resjudicata
if there is already a final judgment in the other case.

2. Res judicata in prison grey - Under Section 3, Rule 117 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, ifthere is
splitting of a single crime, the remedy of the accused is to file amotion to quash information on the ground of
double jeopardy, which is thecounterpart of res judicata in Civil Procedure. That is why double jeopardy isalso
called as “res judicata dressed in prision grey.” However, the concept oflitis pendentia has no equivalent in
criminal procedure. The proposed revisionto Section 3, Rule 117 seeks to introduce in the Criminal Procedure
thecounterpart of litis pendentia in Civil Procedure. This provision supplementsthe proposed revised rule on
splitting a single crime under Section 13, Rule112.

3. Litis pendentia in prison grey - Prior to the 2000 Revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, oneof the
ground to quash information is that when the accused has been previouslyconvicted or “in jeopardy of being
convicted” or acquitted of the offensecharged. Interpreting this provision, Justice Florenz Regalado in
hisdissenting opinion in the case of People vs. Pineda, G.R. No. 44205 February16, 1993 stated:

“Spelled out to the point of elemental details, said paragraph (h)actually provides for two modes constitutive of
separate grounds for quashal ofa second indictment for the same offense. Recasting its provisions for
greaterclarity, the first mode allows quashal where the accused has been previouslyconvicted or acquitted of
the same offense with which he is again presentlycharged and in danger of a second conviction. This would
correspond, in civilprocedure, to res judicata as a ground for dismissal. The second mode stated inthe same
paragraph contemplates the situation where the accused is only injeopardy or danger of being convicted in the
first case, since no judgment orfinal order has yet been rendered therein, and he is now charged anew with
thesame offense. This is equivalent, in civil case, to litis pendentia or auteraction pendant, likewise a ground
for dismissal.”

In connection with the concept oflitis pendentia dressed in prision grey, Justice Regalado wrote in his
book,Remedial Law Compendium:

“The Rules prohibits a duplicitous information and declares thesame to be quashable, but does not specifically
provide for the situation wherea complex crime which should be properly charged in a single information
ismade the subject of several informations by charging each components crimethereof separately. It is
submitted that, under such situation and provided allother requisites are present, the proper remedy is to move
to quash the othercharges on the ground of double jeopardy.”

However, inthe case of People vs. Pineda, supra, the majority of the Justices held thatthere can be no
double jeopardy if both cases are still pending. The 2000Revision of the Rules of Criminal Procedure deleted
the phrase “in jeopardy ofbeing convicted” to incorporate the Pineda doctrine.

This rule creates an irregularsituation where the court would resolve the problem in splitting complex crimeor
special complex crime at the stage of rendering decision instead of at theearly stage of the case such as upon
filing of information. In People vs.Legaspi, 92167-68, July 14, 1995, Supreme Court ruled that accused cannot
beconvicted of special complex crime of robbery with homicide constitutive of variouscrime alleged in two
informations. However, in People vs. Laog, G.R. No.178321, October 5, 2011, the Supreme Court convicted
the accused for specialcomplex crime of rape with homicide despite the fact that the accused wascharged with
homicide and rape in two separate informations.

The Supreme Court in the Laog caseprovides a solution to the problem of splitting crime, and that is, to
convictthe accused of special complex crime even if the components thereof are chargedin two different
informations. However, the Laog case does not apply where onecomponent of special complex crime is
cognizable by the Regional Trial Courtwhile the other by the first level court.

To avoid multiplicity of suits and tounclog the dockets of the courts it is high time to adopt the concept of
litispendentia in prision grey as explained by Justice Regalado. This is notanathema to the rule on double
jeopardy. Litis pendentia in prision grey andres judicata in prision grey as grounds for quashing information
have differentlegal foundations. The latter is an implementation of the constitutional ruleagainst double
jeopardy while the former is an implementation of thelegislature intention to punish a complex crime or special
complex crime as asingle crime.

Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code,which governs a complex crime, is designed to favor the accused by
providing asingle penalty for plurality of crimes. On other hand, the law prescribes asingle penalty for two or
more crimes, which constitute a special complexcrime. This is also called special indivisible crimes since they
are notsubject to division. The intention of the law in treating several crimes as onewill be defeated if splitting
thereof will remain unregulated.

Litis pendentia in prision greyalso includes a situation where a crime is split into two or more crimescharged
in different infromations although one is just an element or anindispensable means to commit the other. It is a
settled rule that in this kindof a circumstance the latter absorbs the former. Hence, there is only onecrime, such
as treason absorbing murder or robbery by force upon thingabsorbing use of false name.

In Celino vs. CA, G.R. No. 170562, June29, 2007, it was held that “When the other crime involved is one of
those enumeratedunder RA 8294, any information for illegal possession of firearm should bequashed because
the illegal possession of firearm would have to be triedtogether with such other offense, either considered as an
aggravatingcircumstance in murder or homicide,, or absorbed as an element of rebellion,insurrection, sedition
or attempted coup detat.”

Rephrasing the substance of the rulingin Celino case, where the other case involves rebellion, insurrection,
seditionor attempted coup detat, the information for illegal possession of firearmshould be quashed since the
former absorbs the latter; where the other case ishomicide or murder, the information for illegal possession of
firearm should bequashed since the latter is just an aggravating circumstance of the former.Obviously, the
ground for the quashal of information is not double jeopardy or resjudicata in prision grey since there is no
final judgment yet. Although theSupreme Court did not describe the ground for quashing the information, it
issubmitted that the basis of quashing the information for illegal passion offirearm is litis pendentia in prision
grey.

4. Most serious component – Under theproposed revision, information containing the most serious
component of complexcrime or special complex crime is not quashable. That is why the pendency ofcase
involving such most serious component is the ground to quash theinformation for other components. For
example, if the special complex crime ofrobbery with rape is split by charging to two informations, what is
quashableis the information for robbery, while information for rape, which is the mostserious component, is
not.

G.R. No. 138218 March 17, 2000

CLAUDIUS C. BARROSO, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE FRANCISCO S. AMPIG, JR., in his capacity as Acting Judge of the RTC, Br. 24,
11th Judicial Region, Koronadal, South Cotabato, and DR. EMERICO V.
ESCOBILLO, respondents.

PUNO, J.:

Petitioner files this petition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure questioning the
orders dated November 23, 1998 and February 24, 1999 of the Regional Trial Court, Eleventh
Judicial Region, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato. Respondent trial court denied petitioner's
motion to dismiss the petition in an election contest filed by private respondent.
Petitioner Claudius G. Barroso and private respondent Emerico V. Escobilio were candidates for
mayor of the municipality of Tampakan, Cotabato in May 11, 1998 elections. Private respondent and
filed with the Commission on Elections (Comelec) several cases against petitioner. He filed SPC 98-
009, a pre-proclamation protest under Section 234 of the Omnibus Election Code alleging massive
vote-buying, bribery, terrorism by petitioner and opening of ballot boxes outside the precincts in at
least thirteen (13) of the sixty-three (63) precincts in the municipality. Private respondent also filed
SPC 98-124, another pre-proclamation case under Section 241 of the Omnibus Election Code. In
addition, he filed SPA 98-359 for petitioner's disqualification alleging election offenses committed by
the latter. He likewise filed two (2) criminal complaints against petitioner with the Law Department of
the Comelec: Election Offense Case No. 161 for illegal possession of firearm and violation of the
gun ban, and Election Offense Case. No. 177 for massive vote-buying.

On July 9, 1998, the Comelec First Division, issued a Resolution dismissing SPC 98-124. Private
respondent moved for reconsideration on June 26, 1998.

On July 14, 1998, the Comelec First Division, issued another Resolution dismissing SPC 98-009
without prejudice to the filing of a proper election protest. The dispositive portion of the Resolution
reads:

WHEREFORE, it being that the complaint alleges grounds which are not proper for a pre-
proclamation issue, the petition is hereby DISMISSED without prejudice to the petitioner's
action for relief in the proper election protest.
1âw phi 1.nêt

SO ORDERED.1

Private respondent moved for reconsideration of this Resolution.

On July 17, 1998, the Municipal Board of Canvassers of Tampakan proclaimed petitioner as the
winning mayoralty candidate.

On July 27, 1998, private respondent filed with the Regional Trial court, Branch 24, Koronadal,
South Cotabato a petition contesting petitioner's election. The election contest was docketed as E.C.
Case No. 15-24. Private respondent certified in his petition that SPA 98-359 and Election Offense
Cases Nos. 161 and 177 were then pending.

Petitioner raised several affirmative defense in his answer, particularly, private respondent's failure
to disclose to the court the pendency of the two (2) pre-proclamation controversies — SPC 98-009
and SPC 98-124. Petitioner thereafter filed a Motion for Preliminary Hearing on his affirmative
defenses and sought the dismissal of the petition for non-compliance with Supreme Court
Administrative Circular No. 04-94 and Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure. The
motion was granted and the parties were required to submit their respective memoranda.

On November 23, 1998, the trial court issued an order denying petitioner's motion to dismiss. Thus:

ACCORDINGLY, for lack of merit the protestee's affirmative and special defense of lack of
proper certification against forum shopping is denied.

SO ORDERED.2

Private respondent moved for reconsideration which was denied on February 24, 1999. Hence this
recourse.
This petition involves the sole issue of whether the election contest case, E.C. Case No. 15-24,
should be dismissed in view of private respondent's failure to declare in his certification against
forum shopping the existence of two pre-proclamation cases then pending with the Comelec.

The certification against forum shopping is required under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, viz:

Sec. 5. Certification against forum shopping. — The plaintiff or principal party shall certify
under oath in the complaint or other initiatory pleading asserting a claim for relief, or in a
sworn certification annexed thereto and simultaneously filed therewith: (a) that he has not
theretofore commenced any action or filed any claim involving the same issues in any court,
tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such other action or
claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, a complete
statement of the present status thereof; and (c) if he should thereafter learn that the same or
similar action or claim has been filed or is pending, he shall report that fact within five (5)
days therefrom to the court wherein his aforesaid complaint or initiatory pleading has been
filed.

Failure to comply with the foregoing requirements shall not be curable by mere amendment
of the complaint or other initiatory pleading but shall be cause for the dismissal of the case
without prejudice, unless otherwise provided, upon motion and after hearing. The submission
of a false certification or non-compliance with any of the undertakings therein shall constitute
indirect contempt of court, without prejudice to the corresponding administrative and criminal
actions. If the acts of the party or his counsel clearly constitute willful and deliberate forum
shopping, the same shall be ground for summary dismissal with prejudice and shall
constitute direct contempt as well as a cause for administrative sanctions.

In a complaint or other pleading initiating an action in court, the plaintiff or principal party shall certify
as to three undertakings: (a) that he has not commenced any action or filed any claim involving the
same issues in any court, tribunal or quasi-judicial agency and, to the best of his knowledge, no such
other action or claim is pending therein; (b) if there is such other pending action or claim, he should
make a complete statement of the present status of said action or claim; and (c) if he should
thereafter learn that the same or similar action has been filed or is pending in any court, tribunal or
quasi-judicial agency, he shall report that, fact within five (5) days therefrom to the court where his
complaint or initiatory pleading has been filed. Failure to comply with these requirements shall be
cause for dismissal of the case without prejudice or with prejudice but only upon motion and after
hearing. The submission of a false certification or the non-compliance with any of the undertakings
therein may subject the party to indirect contempt of court as well as administrative and criminal
actions. If the party's or his counsel's acts constitute willful and deliberate forum shopping, the same
shall be a ground for summary dismissal of the case with prejudice, and the imposition of direct
contempt and administrative sanctions.

The foregoing provision was taken with modification from Administrative Circular No. 04-94 issued
by the Supreme Court on February 8, 1994.3 This Circular complements Revised Circular No. 28-91
designed "to prevent the multiple filing of petitions or complaints involving the same issues in other
tribunals or agencies as a form of forum shopping."4

In the case at bar, the certification against forum shopping of private respondent declared the
pendency of SPA 98-359 and Election Offense Cases Nos. 161 and 177. No reference was made to
SPC 98-009 and SPC 98-124, the two pre-proclamation controversies also pending before the
Comelec. Petitioner alleges that private respondent engaged in forum shopping by deliberately
concealing from the trial court the existence of these two cases.5 Private respondent, on the other
hand, claims that there was no need to mention the two cases because they were deemed
abandoned and rendered moot and academic upon the filing of the election contest.6

SPC 98-124 was terminated pursuant to the provisions of Section 16 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7166 and Comelec Omnibus Resolution No. 3049 on pending cases dated June 29, 1998. All pre-
proclamation cases pending before the Comelec in the May 11, 1998 elections were deemed
terminated at noon of June 30, 1998, the beginning of the term of office involved; and the rulings of
the board of canvassers concerned were deemed affirmed, without prejudice to the filing of a regular
election protest by the aggrieved party. SPC 98-124 before the Comelec was an appeal from the
ruling of the board of canvassers,7 hence, was deemed terminated by noon of June 30, 1998. When
private respondent filed the election contest on July 27, 1998, SPC 98-124 had already been
terminated.

SPC 98-009 which was originally filed with the Comelec nevertheless continued pursuant to the
same R.A. 7166 and Comelec Omnibus Resolution 3049. On July 14, 1998, a Resolution was
issued by the Comelec, First Division, dismissing SPC 98-009. Private respondent forthwith moved
for reconsideration. It was during the pendency of this motion that private respondent filed E.C. Case
No. 15-24. And yet he failed to mention the filing of both SPC 98-124 and SPC 98-009 and the
pendency of SPC 98-009 in the certification against forum shopping. This failure, however, does not
mandate the outright dismissal of E.C. Case No. 15-24.

E.C. Case No. 15-24 is not governed by the Rules of Civil Procedure. The Rules of Civil Procedure
1âwphi1

generally do not apply to election cases. They apply only by analogy or in a suppletory character and
whenever practicable and convenient.8 Election contests are subject to the Comelec Rules of
Procedure. Rule 35 thereof governs election contests involving elective municipal officials before the
Regional Trial Courts.9 Rule 35 does not require that the petition contesting the election of any
municipal official be accompanied by a certification or any statement against forum shopping.

Applying the Rules of Civil Procedure suppletorily, the failure to comply with the non-forum shopping
requirements of Section 5 of Rule 7 does not automatically warrant the dismissal of the case with
prejudice as petitioner insists. The Rule states that the dismissal is without prejudice. The dismissal
may be with prejudice but only upon motion and after hearing. Here, a motion was made by
petitioner and a hearing conducted by the trial court. The court found that there was a certificate
against forum shopping attached to the petition but the certificate did not completely state all the
cases filed and pending at the time of filing of the petition. There was no allegation that private
respondent submitted a false certification as to constitute contempt of court. Neither was there
evidence that private respondent and his counsels committed acts amounting to a willful and
deliberate forum shopping as to warrant the summary dismissal of the case and the imposition of
direct contempt on them. Accordingly, the trial court found it just and proper not to dismiss the case.

Private respondent has explained that despite the pendency of his motion for reconsideration in SPC
98-009, the pre-proclamation case, he was compelled to file the election contest as a result of
petitioner's proclamation by the Municipal Board of Canvassers. Under the Comelec Rules of
Procedure, a petition contesting the election of any municipal official must be filed within ten (10)
days following the date of proclamation of the results of the election. 10This period is mandatory and
jurisdictional. 11 When no action was taken by the Comelec in SPC 98-009, private respondent filed
the election contest on July 27, 1998, the tenth day after petitioner's proclamation on July 17, 1998.
It was only on January 19, 1999, six (6) months later, that the Comelec en banc rendered a
Resolution denying private respondent's motion for reconsideration and affirming the July 4, 1998
Resolution of the Comelec, First Division. 12
Private respondent alleges that when he filed the election contest, he automatically abandoned SPC
98-009. His acts, however, show otherwise. At the time the trial court rendered its questioned order
of November 23, 1998, it had no knowledge that private respondent had already abandoned SPC
98-009. The trial court itself urged in said order that private respondent "would do well to make a
definite choice of his remedy." 13 In addition, there is petitioner's allegation that after the filing of the
election contest, the Comelec, First Division, issued an order giving due course to private
respondent's motion for reconsideration and at the same time certifying SPC 98-009 to the
Comelec en banc. Private respondent received a copy of this order on August 5, 1998. He failed to
report this Order to the trial court within five (5) days from its receipt, in violation of one of the
undertakings in the certificate against forum shopping.14 This allegation has not been rebutted by
private respondent.

Be that as it may, in dismissing SPC 98-009, the Comelec First Division, itself noted that the issues
raised therein were not proper for a pre-proclamation case, but should be made in an election
protests, E.C. Case No. 15-24 is precisely the election protest. 1âwphi 1.nêt

The strict application of non-forum shopping rule in the case at bar would not work to the best
interest of the parties and the electorate. An election contest, unlike an ordinary civil action, is
clothed with a public interest. The purpose of an election protest ascertain whether the candidate
proclaimed by the board of canvassers is the lawful choice of the people. What is sought is the
correction of the canvass of votes, which was the basis of proclamation of the winning
candidate. 15 An election contest therefore involves not only the adjudication of private and pecuniary
interests of rival candidates but paramount to their claims is the deep public concern involved and
the need of dispelling the uncertainty over the real choice of the electorate. And the court has the
corresponding duty to ascertain by all means within its command who is the real candidate elected
by the people. 16

Moreover, the Comelec Rules of Procedure are subject to a liberal construction. This liberality is for
the purpose of promoting the effective and efficient implementation of the objectives of ensuring the
holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful and credible elections and for achieving just, expeditious
and inexpensive determination and disposition of every action and proceeding brought before the
Comelec. 17 Thus we have declared:

It has been frequently decided, and it may be stated as a general rule recognized by all
courts, that statutes providing for election contests are to be liberally construed to the end
that the will of the people in the choice of public officers may not be defeated by mere
technical objections. An election contest, unlike an ordinary action, is imbued with public
interest since it involves not only the adjudication of the private interests of rival candidates
but also the paramount need of dispelling the uncertainty which beclouds the real choice of
the electorate with respect to who shall discharge the prerogatives of the office within their
gift. Moreover, it is neither fair nor just to keep in office for an uncertain period one whose
right to it is under suspicion. It is imperative that his claim be immediately cleared not only for
the benefit of the winner but for the sake of public interest, which can only be achieved by
brushing aside technicalities of procedure which protract and delay the trial of an ordinary
action. 18

Similarly, the Rules of Civil Procedure on forum shopping should be applied with liberality. In the
instant case, the revision of ballots has already started in ten (10) precincts. The right of the people
of Tampakan to freely express their choice of representative through a free and honest election
should not be smothered by a strict adherence to technical rules of procedure.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is dismissed.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

Pardo, J., On leave.

Footnotes

1
Annex "1" to Comment, Rollo, p. 55.

2
Annex "A" to Petition, Rollo, p. 32.

3
J. Feria, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, p. 29 [1997]; J. Regalado, Remedial Law
Compendium, vol. I, pp. 147-148 [1997].

4
Par. 1, Administrative Circular No. 04-94.

5
Petition, pp. 12-14; Rollo, pp. 16-18.

6
Comment, pp. 7-9; Rollo, pp. 44-46.

7
Reply to Comment, p. 4; Rollo, p. 77.

8
Sec. 4, Rule 1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure provides:

Sec. 4. In what cases not applicable. — These Rules shall not apply to election
cases, land registration, cadastral, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and
other cases not herein provided for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character
and whenever practicable and convenient.

9
Sec. 2, Rule 1; Section 1, Rule 35, Comelec Rules of Procedure.

10
Sec. 3, Rule 35.

11
Roquero v. Commission on Elections, 289 SCRA 150, 156 [1998].

12
Annex "4" to Comment, Rollo, pp. 70-71.

13
Order dated November 23, 1998, Annex "A" to Petition, p. 2; Rollo, p. 31.

14
Petition, p. 13; Rollo, p. 17.

De Castro v. Ganite, 27 SCRA 623, 629-630 [1969]; also cited in Agpalo, Comments on the
15

Omnibus Election Code, p. 361 [1992].

Bince, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, 242 SCRA 273, 287 [1995]; Duremdes v.
16

Commission on Elections, 178 SCRA 746, 759 [1989]; Juliano v. Court of Appeals, 20 SCRA
808, 818-819 [1967].

17
Sec. 3, Rule 1, Comelec Rules of Procedure.
 Pahilan v. Tabalba, 230 SCRA 205, 212-213 [1994]; see also Punzalan v. Commission on
18

Elections, 289 SCRA 702, 720 [1998]; Bince, Jr. v. Commission on Elections, supra, pp. 286-
287.

Sec. 4. In what cases not applicable.

These Rules shall not apply to election cases, land registration, cadastral,
naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided for,
except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient.