SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 127240 March 27, 2000

ONG CHIA, petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES and THE COURT OF APPEALS, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This is a petition for review of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals reversing the decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, Koronadal, South Cotabato2 admitting petitioner Ong Chia to
Philippine citizenship.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner was born on January 1, 1923 in Amoy, China. In 1932, as a nine-year old boy, he arrived
at the port of Manila on board the vessel "Angking." Since then, he has stayed in the Philippines
where he found employment and eventually started his own business, married a Filipina, with whom
he had four children. On July 4, 1989, at the age of 66, he filed a verified petition to be admitted as a
Filipino citizen under C.A. No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised Naturalization Law, as
amended. Petitioner, after stating his qualifications as required in §2, and lack of the disqualifications
enumerated in §3 of the law, stated —

17. That he has heretofore made (a) petition for citizenship under the provisions of Letter of
Instruction No. 270 with the Special Committee on Naturalization, Office of the Solicitor
General, Manila, docketed as SCN Case No. 031776, but the same was not acted upon
owing to the fact that the said Special Committee on Naturalization was not reconstituted
after the February, 1986 revolution such that processing of petitions for naturalization by
administrative process was suspended;

During the hearings, petitioner testified as to his qualifications and presented three witnesses to
corroborate his testimony. So impressed was Prosecutor Isaac Alvero V. Moran with the testimony
of petitioner that, upon being asked by the court whether the State intended to present any witness
present any witness against him, he remarked:

Actually, Your Honor, with the testimony of the petitioner himself which is rather surprising, in
the sense that he seems to be well-versed with the major portion of the history of the
Philippines, so, on our part, we are convinced, Your Honor Please, that petitioner really
deserves to be admitted as a citizen of the Philippines. And for this reason, we do not wish to
present any evidence to counteract or refute the testimony of the witnesses for the petitioner,
as well as the petitioner himself.3

Accordingly, on August 25, 1999, the trial court granted the petition and admitted petitioner to
Philippine citizenship. The State, however, through the Office of the Solicitor General, appealed all
the names by which he is or had been known; (2) failed to state all his former placer of residence in
violation of C.A. No. 473, §7; (3) failed to conduct himself in a proper and irreproachable manner
during his entire stay in the Philippines, in violation of §2; (4) has no known lucrative trade or
occupation and his previous incomes have been insufficient or misdeclared, also in contravention of
§2; and (5) failed to support his petition with the appropriate documentary evidence.4

Annexed to the State's appellant's brief was a copy of a 1977 petition for naturalization filed by
petitioner with the Special Committee on Naturalization in SCN Case No. 031767,5 in which petitioner
stated that in addition to his name of "Ong Chia," he had likewise been known since childhood as
"Loreto Chia Ong." As petitioner, however, failed to state this other name in his 1989 petition for
naturalization, it was contended that his petition must fail.6 The state also annexed income tax
returns7 allegedly filed by petitioner from 1973 to 1977 to show that his net income could hardly
support himself and his family. To prove that petitioner failed to conduct himself in a proper and
irreproachable manner during his stay in the Philippines, the State contended that, although
petitioner claimed that he and Ramona Villaruel had been married twice, once before a judge in
1953, and then again in church in 1977, petitioner actually lived with his wife without the benefit of
marriage from 1953 until they were married in 1977. It was alleged that petitioner failed to present
his 1953 marriage contract, if there be any. The State also annexed a copy of petitioner's 1977
marriage contract8 and a Joint-Affidavit9 executed by petitioner and his wife. These documents show
that when petitioner married Ramona Villaruel on February 23, 1977, no marriage license had been
required in accordance with Art. 76 of the Civil Code because petitioner and Ramona Villaruel had
been living together as husband and wife since 1953 without the benefit of marriage. This, according
to the State, belies his claim that when he started living with his wife in 1953, they had already been
married.

The State also argued that, as shown by petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, 10 petitioner
resided at "J.M. Basa Street, Iloilo," but he did not include said address in the petition.

On November 15, 1996, the Court of Appeals rendered its decision which, as already noted,
reversed the trial court and denied petitioner's application for naturalization. It ruled that due to the
importance naturalization cases, the State is not precluded from raising questions not presented in
the lower court and brought up for the first time on appeal. 11 The appellate court held:

As correctly observed by the Office of the Solicitor General, petitioner Ong Chia failed to
state in this present petition for naturalization his other name, "LORETO CHIA ONG," which
name appeared in his previous application under Letter of Instruction No. 270. Names and
pseudonyms must be stated in the petition for naturalization and failure to include the same
militates against a decision in his favor. . . This is a mandatory requirement to allow those
persons who know (petitioner) by those other names to come forward and inform the
authorities of any legal objection which might adversely affect his application for citizenship.

Furthermore, Ong Chia failed to disclose in his petition for naturalization that he formerly
resided in "J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" and "Alimodian, Iloilo." Section 7 of the Revised
Naturalization Law requires the applicant to state in his petition "his present and former
places of residence." This requirement is mandatory and failure of the petitioner to comply
with it is fatal to the petition. As explained by the Court, the reason for the provision is to give
the public, as well as the investigating agencies of the government, upon the publication of
the petition, an opportunity to be informed thereof and voice their objections against the
petitioner. By failing to comply with this provision, the petitioner is depriving the public and
said agencies of such opportunity, thus defeating the purpose of the law. . .

Ong Chia had not also conducted himself in a proper and irreproachable manner when he
lived-in with his wife for several years, and sired four children out of wedlock. It has been the
consistent ruling that the "applicant's 8-year cohabitation with his wife without the benefit of
clergy and begetting by her three children out of wedlock is a conduct far from being proper
and irreproachable as required by the Revised Naturalization Law", and therefore disqualifies
him from becoming a citizen of the Philippines by naturalization . . .

Lastly, petitioner Ong Chia's alleged annual income in 1961 of P5,000.00, exclusive of
bonuses, commissions and allowances, is not lucrative income. His failure to file an income
tax return "because he is not liable for income tax yet" confirms that his income is low. . . "It
is not only that the person having the employment gets enough for his ordinary necessities in
life. It must be shown that the employment gives one an income such that there is an
appreciable margin of his income over expenses as to be able to provide for an adequate
support in the event of unemployment, sickness, or disability to work and thus avoid one's
becoming the object of charity or public charge." . . . Now that they are in their old age,
petitioner Ong Chia and his wife are living on the allowance given to them by their children.
The monthly pension given by the elder children of the applicant cannot be added to his
income to make it lucrative because like bonuses, commissions and allowances, said
pensions are contingent, speculative and precarious. . .

Hence, this petition based on the following assignment of errors:

 I. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN RULING THAT IN
NATURALIZATION CASES, THE APPELLATE COURT CAN DENY AN APPLICATION FOR
PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP ON THE BASIS OF DOCUMENTS NOT PRESENTED BEFORE
THE TRIAL COURT AND NOT FORMING PART OF THE RECORDS OF THE CASE.

II. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER HAS BEEN
KNOWN BY SOME OTHER NAME NOT STATED IN HIS PETITION IS NOT SUPPORTED
BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

III. CONTRARY TO THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS, THE PETITIONER

STATED IN HIS PETITION AND ITS ANNEXES HIS PRESENT AND FORMER PLACES
OF RESIDENCE.

IV. THE FINDING OF THE COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE PETITIONER FAILED TO
CONDUCT HIMSELF IN A PROPER AND IRREPROACHABLE MANNER IS NOT
SUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD.

Petitioner's principal contention is that the appellate court erred in considering the documents which
had merely been annexed by the State to its appellant's brief and, on the basis of which, justified the
reversal of the trial court's decision. Not having been presented and formally offered as evidence,
they are mere "scrap(s) of paper devoid of any evidentiary value," 12 so it was argued, because under
Rule 132, §34 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, the court shall consider no evidence which has not
been formally offered.

The contention has no merit. Petitioner failed to note Rule 143 13 of the Rules of Court which provides
that —

These rules shall not apply to land registration, cadastral and election
cases, naturalization and insolvency proceedings, and other cases not herein provided
for, except by analogy or in a suppletory character and whenever practicable and
convenient. (Emphasis added).

Prescinding from the above, the rule on formal offer of evidence (Rule 132, §34) now being invoked
by petitioner is clearly not applicable to the present case involving a petition for naturalization. The
only instance when said rules may be applied by analogy or suppletorily in such cases is when it is
"practicable and convenient." That is not the case here, since reliance upon the documents
presented by the State for the first time on appeal, in fact, appears to be the more practical and
convenient course of action considering that decisions in naturalization proceedings are not covered
by the rule on res judicata. 14 Consequently, a final favorable judgment does not preclude the State
from later on moving for a revocation of the grant of naturalization on the basis of the same
documents.

Petitioner claims that as a result of the failure of the State to present and formally offer its
documentary evidence before the trial court, he was denied the right to object against their
authenticity, effectively depriving him of his fundamental right to procedural due process. 15 We are
not persuaded. Indeed, the reason for the rule prohibiting the admission of evidence which has not
been formally offered is to afford the opposite party the chance to object to their
admissibility. 16 Petitioner cannot claim that he was deprived of the right to object to the authenticity of
the documents submitted to the appellate court by the State. He could have included his objections,
as he, in fact, did, in the brief he filed with the Court of Appeals. thus:

The authenticity of the alleged petition for naturalization (SCN Case No. 031767) which was
supposedly filed by Ong Chia under LOI 270 has not been established. In fact, the case
number of the alleged petition for naturalization. . . is 031767 while the case number of the
petition actually filed by the appellee is 031776. Thus, said document is totally unreliable and
should not be considered by the Honorable Court in resolving the instant appeal. 17

Indeed, the objection is flimsy as the alleged discrepancy is trivial, and, at most, can be accounted
for as a typographical error on the part of petitioner himself. That "SCN Case No. 031767," a copy of
which was annexed to the petition, is the correct case number is confirmed by the Evaluation
Sheet 18 of the Special Committee on Naturalization which was also docketed as "SCN Case No.
031767." Other than this, petitioner offered no evidence to disprove the authenticity of the
documents presented by the State.
Furthermore, the Court notes that these documents — namely, the petition in SCN Case No.
031767, petitioner's marriage contract, the joint affidavit executed by him and his wife, and
petitioner's income tax returns — are all public documents. As such, they have been executed under
oath. They are thus reliable. Since petitioner failed to make a satisfactory showing of any flaw or
irregularity that may cast doubt on the authenticity of these documents, it is our conclusion that the
appellate court did not err in relying upon them.

One last point. The above discussion would have been enough to dispose of this case, but to settle
all the issues raised, we shall briefly discuss the effect of petitioner's failure to include the address
"J.M. Basa St., Iloilo" in his petition, in accordance with §7, C.A. No. 473. This address appears on
petitioner's Immigrant Certificate of Residence, a document which forms part of the records as
Annex A of his 1989 petition for naturalization. Petitioner admits that he failed to mention said
address in his petition, but argues that since the Immigrant Certificate of Residence containing it had
been fully published, 19 with the petition and the other annexes, such publication constitutes
substantial compliance with §7. 20 This is allegedly because the publication effectively satisfied the
objective sought to be achieved by such requirement, i.e., to give investigating agencies of the
government the opportunity to check on the background of the applicant and prevent suppression of
information regarding any possible misbehavior on his part in any community where he may have
lived at one time or another. 21 It is settled, however, that naturalization laws should be rigidly
enforced and strictly construed in favor of the government and against the applicant. 22 As noted by
the State, C.A. No. 473, §7 clearly provides that the applicant for naturalization shall set forth in the
petition his present and former places of residence. 23 This provision and the rule of strict application
of the law in naturalization cases defeat petitioner's argument of "substantial compliance" with the
requirement under the Revised Naturalization Law. On this ground alone, the instant petition ought
to be denied.1âwphi1.nêt

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED and the instant petition is hereby
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. NOS. 140538-39 : June 14, 2004]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee, v. GODOFREDO B.

ADOR and DIOSDADO B. ADOR III, Appellants.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

The quiescence of the fading day was shattered by bursts of gunfire,

startling the otherwise tranquil but sanguine folks of Pacol, Naga
City.As the fusillade of shots ceased and the wisp of smoke cleared,
frolicking promenaders stumbled upon Ompong Chavez who was
gasping his last, clutching his intestines which had spewed out from
his bloodied stomach.He did not in fact reach the hospital alive.A
breath away, Abe Cuya lay lifeless on the pavement.He died on the
spot.For the twinned deaths, the Adors, six (6) of them, were haled
to court.

In two (2) separate informations,1 Diosdado Sr.,2 Diosdado Jr.,

Diosdado III, Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, all surnamed Ador,
were charged with the murder of Absalon Abe S. Cuya III and
Rodolfo Ompong S. Chavez.The Informations in Crim. Cases
Nos.97-6815 and 97-6816 identically read: ςηαñrοblε š νιr†υαl lαω lιb rα rÿ

That on or about March 10, 1997, in the City of Naga, Philippines,

and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, conspiring, confederating together and mutually
helping one another, with intent to kill, with treachery and the aid of
armed men, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
shoot ABSALON ABE CUYA III (RODOLFO OMPO CHAVEZ y SAN
ANDRES3 for Crim. Case No. 97-6816) with firearms, inflicting upon
him multiple and mortal gunshot wounds which caused his death, to
the damage and prejudice of his heirs.

With the aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation and

nighttime.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

However, only four (4) of the six (6) Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr.,
Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan, were taken into custody.The two (2),
Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III, remained at large.Trial thus
proceeded only against Diosdado Sr., Godofredo, Rosalino and Allan
who all pleaded not guilty.Diosdado Sr. is the father of Diosdado Jr.,
Diosdado III and Godofredo, while Rosalino is the father of
Allan.Diosdado Sr. and Rosalino are brothers.4 ςrνll

In its effort to secure the conviction of the accused, the prosecution

presented a total of sixteen (16) witnesses: Mercy Beria, Larry
Cado, Medico-Legal Officer of Naga City Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Police
Inspector Ma. Julieta Razonable, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, SPO3
Augusto Basagre, Major Ernesto Idian, Inspector Reynaldo F.
Fulgar, SPO1 Noli Reyes Sol, SPO3 Eduardo C. Bathan, Inspector
Vicente C. Lauta, Ernani Castillo, PO3 Augusto I. Nepomuceno,
Absalon Cuya Sr., Efren Chavez and Pablo Calsis.

From the evidence of the prosecution, it appears that on March 10,

1997, at around seven-thirty in the evening, while Mercy Beria,
Larry Cado and some eleven (11) others were leisurely walking
along Kilometer 11 on their way to Zone 1, Kilometer 10, Pacol,
Naga City, to attend a wedding anniversary, they heard several
gunshots.Shortly after, they met a certain Pablito Umali who told
them that Ompong Chavez had been shot.They ran to Chavez
straight off and saw him already lying on the ground, about 1
meters away from a lighted electric post, holding on to his intestines
which were starting to come out.Beria shook Chavez and asked him
what had happened.Chavez replied tinambangan kami na Ador (We
were ambushed by the Adors) and requested that he be brought to
the hospital as he was dying.About eight (8) meters from where
Chavez was, in a dark spot, lay Abe Cuya, dead.5 ςrνll
Upon learning of the shooting incident through their radio
communication, SPO1 Benjamin Barbosa, together with PO2
Alexander Diaz, immediately proceeded to the crime scene to
conduct an investigation.SPO3 Eduardo Bathan and SPO1 Wilfredo
Fernandez, among others, were already there.6 SPO1 Barbosa
collected some pieces of evidence, took some pictures and made
some sketches.7 SPO1 Fernandez on the other hand interviewed one
Cresenciana Mendoza in her house which was nearby, and when he
heard people shout that Chavez was still alive, he brought Chavez
to the hospital but the latter expired on the way.8
ςrνll

That same evening, upon being informed that the Adors had a long-
standing grudge against the Cuyas, SPO1 Barbosa sought the help
of then Barangay Captain Josue Perez to accompany him to the
residence of the Adors.They arrived at the Adors at around ten
oclock that evening and spoke with their patriarch, Diosdado Ador
Sr. SPO1 Barbosa looked for the other male members of the Ador
family but was told by Diosdado Sr. that they were already
asleep.Diosdado Sr. nevertheless promised to present them the
following day.9ςrνll

The following morning, March 11, 1997, Barangay Captain Perez

accompanied the Adors, namely, Diosdado Sr., Diosdado III,
Godofredo, Rosalino, Allan and Reynaldo, to SPO1 Barbosa at the
PNP Central Police Headquarters.The Adors were informed of their
constitutional rights to remain silent and to choose their own
counsel.They were then brought to the PNP Crime Laboratory at the
Provincial Headquarters and subjected to paraffin tests.10 On the
way to the crime laboratory, Godofredo told his police escort that he
had been entrusted with a handgun which he kept in his
residence.11 The information was relayed to Major Ernesto Idian,
then Deputy Chief of Police of Naga City, who ordered PO3 Augusto
I. Nepomuceno to accompany him in recovering the gun because
Godofredo said that he would turn in the gun only to PO3
Nepomuceno.Thus, Major Idian, PO3 Nepomuceno and some others
accompanied Godofredo to the latters residence.

Upon reaching the Ador residence, Godofredo, together with PO3

Nepomuceno, went to their backyard, retrieved the gun from under
a fallen coconut trunk and turned it in to the latter.Godofredo
allegedly told the police that he fired the said gun outside their
house on the night of March 10 after he heard several
gunshots.12 PO3 Nepomuceno identified the gun as a caliber .38
paltik handgun which had no serial number.13 PO3 Nepomuceno
then turned over the handgun to Major Idian14 who likewise
identified it as a .38 caliber revolver.Major Idian returned the
handgun to PO3 Nepomuceno for ballistic and paraffin
examination.15 Thereafter, PO3 Nepomuceno placed his initials on
the gun and put it in his private locker while preparing the
documents for the examinations and the possible filing of a case for
Illegal Possession of Firearm.16ςrνll

Also, on the same day, March 11, 1997, Dr. Joel S. Jurado, Medico-
Legal Officer of Naga City, conducted an autopsy on the bodies of
Chavez and Cuya.Based on the autopsy reports, Dr. Jurado testified
that Cuya sustained five (5) gunshot wounds and died from cardio-
pulmonary arrest, massive intra-thoracic, intra-abdominal, intra-
cranial hemorrhage secondary to multiple gunshot wounds
penetrating the heart, brain, lungs and digestive tract.17 Chavez on
the other hand had three (3) gunshot wounds and died from
traumatic shock and massive intra-abdominal hemorrhage
secondary to multiple gunshot wounds penetrating the right kidney
and the internal abdominal organs.18 Dr. Jurado further testified
that that he recovered a slug from Cuyas head three (3) days after
he conducted the autopsy - after Cuyas relatives called his attention
to a protruding mass in Cuyas head.Thus, he had Cuyas cadaver
sent back to the funeral parlor, opened it and was able to extract a
deformed .38 caliber slug which he thereafter submitted to the City
Prosecutors Office.19ςrνll

Police Inspector Reynaldo Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification

Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory, Camp Ola, Legaspi City,
testified that based on the ballistic examination he conducted on the
bullets submitted to his office, the .38 caliber slug recovered from
Cuyas head matched the three (3) .38 caliber test bullets which
were test-fired from the suspected firearm surrendered by
Godofredo.He however averred that the .38 caliber bullets were
actually fired from a .357 Smith and Wesson Magnum homemade
revolver without serial number, and not from a .38 caliber
revolver.20ςrνll

The paraffin casts taken from the Adors were also transmitted to
the PNP Crime Laboratory Services for examination and yielded the
presence of gunpowder nitrates, thus

(1) Diosdado A. Ador both hands, positive;

(2) Diosdado B. Ador III right hand, positive; left hand, negative;

(3) Godofredo B. Ador right hand, positive; left hand, negative;

(4) Rosalino A. Ador both hands, positive;

(5) Reynaldo T. Ador both hands, negative;21

(6) Allan T. Ador both hands, positive.22 ςrνll

Absalon Cuya Sr., father of deceased Cuya III, said that the killing
of his son was driven by the long-standing feud between the Adors
and his family.He said that Diosdado Jr. had earlier accused his
other son Liberato of frustrated homicide for allegedly stabbing him
(Diosdado Jr.). 23 Then, Adelina, a daughter of Diosdado Sr., filed a
case for abduction with multiple rape against him, Absalon III,
Rayne and Josephine, all surnamed Cuya, after the romantic
relationship between Adelina and his deceased son Absalon III
turned sour.24 He also presented official receipts of the funeral and
burial expenses which amounted to P10,230.00.25 ςrνll

Efren Chavez, brother of deceased Chavez, likewise spoke of the

animosity between the Chavez and the Ador families.He produced a
certification from the PNP Naga City Police Station that on February
17, 1997, a blotter was entered in the Daily Record of Events
showing that deceased Chavez reported a certain Ricardo Ador who
while under the influence of liquor caused him physical injury.26 The
witness likewise presented an official receipt showing that the family
spent P3,500.00 for the funeral of the deceased Chavez.27 After
presenting Chavez, the prosecution rested its case.

On April 7, 1998, the four (4) accused filed a demurrer to evidence

for utter lack of evidence.28 On May 13, 1998, the trial court
dismissed the cases against Diosdado Sr., Rosalino and Allan but
denied the demurrer to evidence against Godofredo

WHEREFORE, this Court finds the demurrer to evidence to be

justified for the accused Diosdado A. Ador, Allan T. Ador and
Rosalino Ador, hence, the same is hereby granted insofar as these
accused are concerned.Said accused therefore, namely: Diosdado A.
Ador, Allan T. Ador and Rosalino Ador are ACQUITTED in Crim.
Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.The bailbonds posted for their
provisional liberty are hereby cancelled.

Trial of the case insofar as Godofredo B. Ador is concerned shall

proceed.

SO ORDERED.29 ςrνll

Thus, trial proceeded against Godofredo.

For his defense, Godofredo denied any participation in the killings of

Cuya and Chavez.He said that on March 10, 1997, at aroundseven
oclock in the evening, he heard several gunshots while he was
having dinner with his wife and four (4) children in their house in
Pacol,NagaCity.Since his wife advised him not to go out anymore,
he slept after dinner.The following day, while he was gathering pili
nuts, his long-time friend Dominador Bautista arrived and asked
him to go down from the tree.Bautista wanted to borrow money and
on his way to see him, found a gun by the footpath.Bautista gave
the gun to him.It was his first time to hold a gun.He tried it out and
fired three (3) times.After firing the gun, he removed the empty
shells from its chambers and threw them away.He then wrapped the
gun with plastic and hid it under a coconut trunk.Bautista left when
he told him that he had no money.He then continued to gather pili
nuts until Major Idian and three (3) other policemen came.

Godofredos father told him that they were being suspected of killing
Chavez and Cuya the night before.Thus, they went to the provincial
headquarters, were subjected to paraffin testing and made to sign a
blank bond paper.After that, they went back to the central police
station.At the central police station, Godofredo narrated to a certain
Calabia that that morning, his friend Bautista found a gun along the
road and gave it to him.He hid the gun under a coconut
trunk.Calabia relayed the information to Major Idian who directed
PO3 Nepomuceno to go with Godofredo to get the gun.Godofredo
led PO3 Nepomuceno to where he hid the gun, retrieved it and
handed it to the latter.They then returned to the police
headquarters where he was jailed.He asserted that the gun
presented in court is different from the gun he surrendered to the
police.30ςrνll

Bautista corroborated Godofredos story.He testified that he found

the gun which Godofredo yielded to PO3 Nepomuceno.He said that
he was on his way to see Godofredo to borrow money when he
chanced upon the handgun on the pathway.He gave the gun to
Godofredo and the latter tested it by pulling its trigger.After firing
the gun, Godofredo removed the empty shells and threw
them.Godofredo then wrapped the gun with plastic and hid it under
a fallen coconut trunk.31ςrνll

Meanwhile, Diosdado Jr. was arrested on October 9, 1998, at

Barangay Doa, Orani,Bataan, and committed to the Naga City Jail
on November 17, 1998, while Diosdado III surrendered to the court
and was committed to the same city jail on November 22, 1998.On
November 23, 1998, both Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III were
arraigned and entered a plea of not guilty.Hence, trial against them
commenced and proceeded jointly with the case of the remaining
accused, Godofredo.

The prosecution presented Pablo Calsis32 as a witness against

Diosdado Jr. and Diosdado III.Calsis testified that on March 10,
1997, at around 7:30 in the evening, he dropped by the house of
Cresenciana Mendoza whom he fondly called Lola Kising at
Kilometer 10, Pacol, Naga City, before going home from work.After
asking permission from her to go home and while about to urinate
outside her house, he heard several gunshots.He ducked by
a sineguelas tree at a nearby flower plantation.As he was about to
stand up, he saw Disodado Jr., Diosdado III, Godofredo and another
unidentified man run away.Godofredo was carrying a short firearm
while Diosdado Jr. had a long firearm.33 He saw Chavez and Cuya
lying on the road.Chavez was about five (5) meters away from
where he stood while Cuya was ten (10) meters away.The place was
illuminated by a bright light from an electric post.There were no
other people around.Calsis ran away for fear that he might be
identified by the assailants.He heard Chavez mumbling but shirked
nevertheless.34ςrνll

Calsis narrated to Absalon Cuya Sr. what he saw only after about
one (1) year and nine (9) months.Fear struck him.35 He maintained
that he knew the assailants because he and his wife lived in the
house of Lola Kising after they got married.36 Immense fear
prevented him from attending to Chavez, even while he heard him
murmuring, and from informing the families of the victims of the
incident that very same night.He was about to tell the Chavez
family the following morning but was counseled by his Lola Bading,
the sister of his Lola Kising, against getting involved in the
case.37 Calsis and his family left their residence in Pacol one (1)
month after the incident because he was afraid the assailants might
have identified him.38 Even Lola Kising left her residence two (2)
months after the incident.39 It was only after he learned from
Absalon Cuya Sr.that the trial court dismissed the cases for lack of
evidence insofar as some of the original accused were concerned
that he took pity on the respective families of the victims who have
failed to get justice for the death of their loved ones.40
ςrνll

In defense, Diosdado Jr. testified that on March 10, 1997, he was in

Marikina City working as a warehouseman and timekeeper of the
Consuelo Builders Corporation.He was there the whole time from
February 15, 1997, until March 24, 1997.41 Pablo Aspe, a co-worker
of Diosdado Jr., corroborated the latters testimony.He said that on
February 15, 1997, he and Diosdado Jr. left Pacol, Naga City,
together to work in Consuelo Construction in Marikina City.They
were with each other in Marikina City the whole time from February
15, 1997, until he (Aspe) went home to Naga City on March 22,
1997.While in Marikina City, they resided and slept together in their
barracks at the construction site.42
ςrνll

Diosdado III also took the witness stand.On March 10, 1997, at
around seven oclock in the evening, he was at their house at Zone
1, Pacol, Naga City, watching television with his parents and cousins
Reynaldo and Allan when they heard gunshots.They ignored the
gunshots, continued watching television and slept at eight
oclock.The following day, at around six oclock in the morning, while
he was fetching water, four (4) policemen arrived at their house and
talked to his father.Thereafter, his father called him, his brother
Godofredo, uncle Rosalino and cousins Allan and Reynaldo.The
policemen then requested all of them to go to the PNP Central Police
Headquarters for investigation regarding the killings of Chavez and
Cuya.Upon reaching the police headquarters, they were interviewed
by the media and afterwards brought to the provincial headquarters
where they were subjected to paraffin tests.They were then brought
back to the Central Police Headquarters and later allowed to go back
home to Pacol.

Then, sometime in October, 1997, his father was arrested by the

police.Diosdado III was at their residence when his father was
picked up.Only his father was taken by the police.He continued to
reside in their house until April, 1998, when he transferred to
Sagurong, San Miguel, Tabaco, Albay, to work as a fisherman.On
November 21, 1998, he received a letter from his father telling him
to come home.Thus, he went home the following day.On November
23, 1998, he surrendered to the court.43 ςrνll

The defense also presented Barangay Captain Josue Perez and an

uncle of Diosdado Jr. and Disodado III, Jaime Bobiles.Perez testified
that he was the barangay captain of Pacol from 1982 until May,
1997.In 1996, Cresenciana Mendoza left their barangay
permanently to live with her children in Manila because she was
sickly and alone in her house.He said that Mendoza never came
back.He does not know any Pablo Calsis and the latter could not
have talked to Mendoza on March 10, 1997, because at that time,
Mendoza was not there and her house was already
abandoned.44 Similarly, Bobiles confirmed the testimony that
Diosdado III worked as a fisherman in Tabaco and stayed in his
residence from May 1, 1998, until November 1998 when Diosdado
III received a letter from his father and had to go home.45ςrνll

In rebuttal however, prosecution witness SPO1 Fernandez asserted

that he interviewed Cresenciana Mendoza that fateful night of March
10, 1997.46 After the rebuttal witness was presented, the cases
were finally submitted for decision.47
ςrνll

On August 2, 1999, the trial court held that a chain of

circumstances x x x lead to a sound and logical conclusion that
indeed the accused (Diosdado III and Godofredo) committed the
offense charged48 and as such rendered judgment

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this court finds the accused

Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of MURDER, defined and penalized
under the provisions of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended by Republic Act 7659 in Criminal Cases Nos. 97-6815 and
97-6816, hereby sentences the said accused Godofredo B. Ador and
Diosdado B. Ador III to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA
in Criminal Case No. 97-6815; RECLUSION PERPETUA in Criminal
Case No. 97-6816, to pay the heirs of Absalon Abe Cuya III P25,000
each by way of actual damages andP50,000 in each criminal case by
way of indemnity.To pay the heirs of Rodolfo Ompong Chavez the
sum of P50,000 in each criminal case by way of indemnity, such
accessory penalties as provided for by law and to pay the cost.For
insufficiency of the prosecution to prove the guilt of the accused
Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby
ACQUITTED in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816.

The Jail Warden of the Naga City District Jail is hereby ordered to
forthwith release from its custody the accused Diosdado B. Ador,
Jr., unless his further detention is warranted by any other legal
cause or causes.

SO ORDERED.49 ςrνll

Hence, this joint appeal interposed by Disodado III and

Godofredo.They maintain that the trial court gravely erred in
convicting them of murder based on circumstantial evidence.The
testimony of prosecution witness Pablo Calsis that he saw them
running away from the scene of the crime was concocted.The
handgun turned in by Godofredo was not the same gun presented
by the prosecution during the trial.The unusual discovery of a slug
from the head of the deceased - three (3) days after the autopsy
was conducted and after the cadaver was turned over to the family
of the victim - was quite doubtful.Even the supposed dying
declaration of the victim specifically pointed to neither Diosdado III
nor Godofredo.And, the trial court erred in admitting in evidence
those taken against them in violation of their constitutional rights to
counsel during custodial investigation.50 ςrνll

The rules of evidence allow the courts to rely on circumstantial

evidence to support its conclusion of guilt.51 It may be the basis of a
conviction so long as the combination of all the circumstances
proven produces a logical conclusion which suffices to establish the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.52 All the
circumstances must be consistent with each other, consistent with
the theory that all the accused are guilty of the offense charged,
and at the same time inconsistent with the hypothesis that they are
innocent and with every other possible, rational hypothesis except
that of guilt.53 The evidence must exclude each and every
hypothesis which may be consistent with their innocence.54 Also, it
should be acted on and weighed with great caution.55 Circumstantial
evidence which has not been adequately established, much less
corroborated, cannot by itself be the basis of conviction.56 ςrνll
Thus, for circumstantial evidence to suffice, (1) there should be
more than one circumstance; (2) the facts from which the
inferences are derived are proven; and (3) the combination of all
the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction beyond
reasonable doubt.57 Like an ornate tapestry created out of
interwoven fibers which cannot be plucked out and assayed a strand
at a time apart from the others, the circumstances proved should
constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable
conclusion that the accused, to the exclusion of all others, is guilty
beyond reasonable doubt.58 The test to determine whether or not
the circumstantial evidence on record are sufficient to convict the
accused is that the series of the circumstances proved must be
consistent with the guilt of the accused and inconsistent with his
innocence.59 Accordingly, we have set guidelines in appreciating
circumstantial evidence:(1) it should be acted upon with caution;
(2) all the essential facts must be consistent with the hypothesis of
guilt; (3) the facts must exclude every theory but that of guilt; and
(4) the facts must establish such a certainty of guilt of the accused
as to convince the judgment beyond a reasonable doubt that the
accused is the one who committed the offense.60 ςrνll

Measured against the guidelines set, we cannot uphold the

conviction of the accused based on the circumstantial evidence
presented.

The first circumstance which the prosecution sought to prove is that

the accused were supposedly seen fleeing from the locus
criminis, armed with their respective weapons.Thus, the trial court,
gleaning from the evidence presented, found that [w]hen about to
stand, Calsis saw Godofredo B. Ador, Diosdado B. Ador, Jr. and
Diosdado B. Ador III, and a person going to the direction of the
house of the Adors which is about 500 meters away.61 In fact,
prosecution witness Calsis allegedly even saw Diosdado Jr. carrying
a long firearm but x x x could not determine what kind of gun it
was.62 However, the trial court acquitted Diosdado Jr.But only
rightly so.For, Calsis had difficulty in identifying the Adors
notwithstanding his assertion that he knew and saw them
personally.We defer to his direct examination

ATTY. TERBIO (Private Prosecutor) : ςηαñ rοblε š νιr†υα l lαω lιb rα rÿ

Q.You said you recognized the persons running, could you tell us
their names? chanroblesv irtualawl ibra ry

PABLO CALSIS: ςηαñrοblε š νιr†υαl lαω lιb rα rÿ

A.Yes sir.

Q.Name them? chanroblesvi rtualaw lib rary

A.Godofredo Ador, Jr., Sadang III.

Q.How about the others? chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

A.I could not tell his name but if I see him I could identify him.

Q.The 4 persons whom you saw that night, if they are present in
court, please point them out? chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

A.Yes sir.

Q.Point particularly Godofredo Ador, Jr.? chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

A.(Witness pointed or tapped the shoulder of a person inside the

courtroom who answered by the name Diosdado Ador, Jr.)

Q.How about this Sadang III? chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

A.(Witness tapped the shoulder of a man who answered by the

name of Diosdado Ador III.)

Q.Likewise, point to the third person? chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

A.(Witness pointed to a man)

COURT:

Delete that portion from the record, he is not on trial.

ATTY TERBIO: ςηαñrοbl εš νι r†υα l lαω lιb rα rÿ

Q.You said you saw 4 persons, is the fourth one inside the
courtroom? chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

A.None sir.

Q.But if you saw that person, will you be able to recognize him? chanroblesv irt ualawli bra ry

A.Yes sir.

Q.Why do you know these persons whom you just tapped the
shoulder?

x x xx x xx x x

A.I know these persons having lived in the house of Lola Kising.

Q.How far? chanroble svi rtualawl ib rary

A.Around 100 meters.

Q.On the said date and time and place, you said you saw them
running, how far were you from them? chanroblesvi rtua lawlib rary

A.Around 10 meters. (Emphases supplied)63 ςrνll

The testimony of Calsis, if at all, could hardly be used against

Diosdado III whom he miserably failed to positively identify during
trial.In fact, the acquittal of Diosdado Jr. by the trial court renders
the entire testimony of Calsis in serious doubt.Calsis was presented
to positively identify the assailants who were supposedly personally
known to him and were just ten (10) meters away from him.It
puzzles us no end why he cannot even identify the Adors in open
court.

Thus, despite Calsis assertion that Diosdado Jr. was one of the
assailants, the trial court doubted him and gave credence to the
alibi of Diosdado Jr. that the latter was in Nangka, Marikina, when
the killings took place.The trial court favored the unbiased
testimony of Aspe who said that Diosdado Jr. worked as a
timekeeper and warehouseman with him at the Consuelo
Construction at Nangka, Marikina, from February 15, 1997, until
March 22, 1997, and went home to Pacol only on May 27, 1997.This
ruling is strengthened by the fact that on the morning following the
killings, all the male members of the Ador family were brought to
the police headquarters for paraffin examination and Diosdado Jr.
was not among them.64 We thus respect the finding of the trial court
that indeed Diosdado Jr. was not at the scene of the crime absent
any indication that the lower court overlooked some facts or
circumstances which if considered would alter the outcome of the
case.65ςrνll

While it is true that the courts are not bound to accept or reject an
entire testimony, and may believe one part and disbelieve
another,66 our Constitution and the law mandate that all doubts
must be resolved in favor of the accused.Calsis committed an
obvious blunder in identifying the supposed assailants which this
Court cannot simply let go.On the contrary, it creates reasonable
doubt in our minds if Calcis really saw the persons he allegedly saw
or if he was even where he said he was that evening.For, it is
elementary that the positive identification of the accused is crucial
in establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.That is wanting in
the instant case.

What is more, Calsis asseverations, at the outset, could no longer

be used against Godofredo since both the prosecution and the
defense have already rested and the case against Godofredo was
already submitted for decision when Calsis was presented.67 Neither
can they still be used against Diosdado Jr. who was already
acquitted by the trial court.
Both Diosdado III and Godofredo denied the charges hurled against
them.But, while it is true that alibi and denial are the weakest of the
defenses as they can easily be fabricated,68 absent such clear and
positive identification, the doctrine that the defense of denial cannot
prevail over positive identification of the accused must yield to the
constitutional presumption of innocence.69 Hence, while denial is
concededly fragile and unstable, the conviction of the accused
cannot be based thereon.70 The rule in criminal law is firmly
entrenched that verdicts of conviction must be predicated on the
strength of the evidence for the prosecution and not on the
weakness of the evidence for the defense.71 ςrνll

The second circumstance is the handgun turned in by Godofredo.But

this was bungled by the prosecution.Major Idian, Deputy Chief of
Police of the Naga City Police Station, to whom the handgun was
turned over after Godofredo surrendered it, identified it as a caliber
.38 revolver, thus

ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor) : ςηαñ rοblε š νιr†υα l lαω lιb rα rÿ

Q.What kind of firearm was it? chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

MAJOR IDIAN: ςηαñrοblεš ν ιr† υαl l αω lιb rαrÿ

A.Revolver handgun, caliber .38 with 6 rounds ammunition.

Q.What is the caliber? chanroble svi rtualaw lib rary

A..38 caliber.72 ςrνll

Similarly, PO3 Nepomuceno who then had been with the PNP for
eight (8) years already and to whom Godofredo turned in the
handgun, likewise identified it as a caliber .38, thus

ATTY TERBIO (Private Prosecutor) : ςηαñ rοblε š νιr†υα l lαω lιb rα rÿ

Q.What is the caliber of that gun? chanroblesvi rt ualawlib ra ry

PO3 NEPOMUCENO: ςηαñrοb lεš νι r† υαl lαω l ιb rαrÿ

A..38 caliber.73 ςrνll

However, Insp. Fulgar, Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of

the PNP Crime Laboratory, testified that [t]he indorsement coming
from the City Prosecutors Office x x x alleged that the .38 caliber
live bullet was fired from a .38 caliber revolver.But our office found
out that the firearm was not a .38 caliber revolver but a .357 caliber
revolver.74 ςrνll
Could it be that the handgun was replaced before it was turned over
to the PNP Crime Laboratory?While the prosecution traced the trail
of police officers who at every stage held the gun supposedly
recovered from Godofredo, it never clarified this discrepancy which
is quite glaring to ignore.It is difficult to believe that a Deputy Chief
of Police and a police officer of eight (8) years will both mistake a
.357 caliber for a .38 caliber handgun.Likewise, a Chief of the
Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime Laboratory cannot
be presumed not to know the difference between the two (2)
handguns.Suffice it to say that the prosecution failed to clear up the
variance and for this Court to suggest an explanation would be to
venture into the realm of pure speculation, conjecture and
guesswork.Thus, faced with the obvious disparity in the suspected
firearm used in the crime and that which was turned over by
Godofredo, his declaration that the handgun presented in court was
different from the gun he gave to the police deserves serious, if not
sole consideration.

Consequently, even the third circumstance, the .38 caliber slug

supposedly recovered from the head of the victim three (3) days
after the autopsy was conducted loses evidentiary value as its
source is now highly questionable.It has become uncertain whether
the deformed slug was fired from the .38 caliber revolver turned in
by Godofredo or from a .357 caliber handgun as attested to by the
Chief of the Firearm Identification Section of the PNP Crime
Laboratory.

Neither can this Court rely on the dying declaration of the dying
Chavez nor on the results of the paraffin tests to convict either
Diosdado III or Godofredo or both.To refute these, we need not go
far and beyond the 13 May 1998 Order of the trial court partially
granting the demurrer to evidence filed by the accused

The only direct evidence introduced by the prosecution is the

testimony of Mercy Beria, that she heard Rodolfo Ompong Chavez
say tinambangan kami na Ador (We were ambushed by the Adors)
.Sad to say, no specific name was ever mentioned by the
witness.Neither was she able to tell how many (persons) Adors were
involved.This testimony if it will be given credence may inculpate
any person with the family name Ador as assailant.The prosecution
therefore was not able to establish with moral certainty as to who of
the Adors were perpetrators of the offense x x x x Paraffin tests are
not conclusive evidence that indeed a person has fired a gun.

The fact that the accused-appellants tested positive of gunpowder

nitrates does not conclusively show that they fired the murder
weapon, or a gun for that matter, for such forensic evidence should
be taken only as an indication of possibility or even of probability,
but not of infallibility, since nitrates are also admittedly found in
substances other than gunpowder. (People v. Abellarosa, G.R. No.
121195, 27 November 1996; People v. de Guzman, 250 SCRA 118;
People v. Nitcha, 240 SCRA 283)75 ςrνll

Thus, while a dying declaration may be admissible in evidence, it

must identify with certainty the assailant.Otherwise, it loses its
significance.Also, while a paraffin test could establish the presence
or absence of nitrates on the hand, it cannot establish that the
source of the nitrates was the discharge of firearms a person who
tests positive may have handled one or more substances with the
same positive reaction for nitrates such as explosives, fireworks,
fertilizers, pharmaceuticals, tobacco and leguminous
plants.76 In People v. Melchor, 77 this Court acquitted the accused
despite the presence of gunpowder nitrates on his hands

[S]cientific experts concur in the view that the result of a paraffin

test is not conclusive.While it can establish the presence of nitrates
or nitrites on the hand, it does not always indubitably show that
said nitrates or nitrites were caused by the discharge of firearm.The
person tested may have handled one or more of a number of
substances which give the same positive reaction for nitrates or
nitrites, such as explosives, fireworks, pharmaceuticals and
leguminous plants such as peas, beans and alfalfa.A person who
uses tobacco may also have nitrate or nitrite deposits on his hands
since these substances are present in the products of combustion of
tobacco.The presence of nitrates or nitrites, therefore, should be
taken only as an indication of a possibility but not of infallibility that
the person tested has fired a gun.

In fine, the admissions made by Godofredo to Major Idian and PO3

Nepomuceno including the gun in question cannot be considered in
evidence against him without violating his constitutional right to
counsel.Godofredo was already under custodial investigation when
he made his admissions and surrendered the gun to the police
authorities.The police had already begun to focus on the Adors and
were carrying out a process of interrogations that was lending itself
to eliciting incriminating statements and evidence: the police went
to the Ador residence that same evening upon being informed that
the Adors had a long-standing grudge against the Cuyas; the
following day, all the male members of the Ador family were told to
go to the police station; the police was also informed of the dying
declaration of deceased Chavez pointing to the Adors as the
assailants; the Adors were all subjected to paraffin examination;
and, there were no other suspects as the police was not considering
any other person or group of persons.The investigation thus was no
longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime as the Adors were
already being held as suspects for the killings of Cuya and Chavez.
Consequently, the rights of a person under custodial investigation,
including the right to counsel, have already attached to the Adors,
and pursuant to Art. III, Sec. 12(1) and (3), 1987 Constitution, any
waiver of these rights should be in writing and undertaken with the
assistance of counsel.Admissions under custodial investigation made
without the assistance of counsel are barred as evidence.78 The
records are bare of any indication that the accused have waived
their right to counsel, hence, any of their admissions are
inadmissible in evidence against them.As we have held, a suspects
confession, whether verbal or non-verbal, when taken without the
assistance of counsel without a valid waiver of such assistance
regardless of the absence of such coercion, or the fact that it had
been voluntarily given, is inadmissible in evidence, even if such
confession were gospel truth.79 Thus, in Aballe v. People,80 the
death weapon, a four-inch kitchen knife, which was found after the
accused brought the police to his house and pointed to them the pot
where he had concealed it, was barred from admission as it was
discovered as a consequence of an uncounseled extrajudicial
confession.

With hardly any substantial evidence left, the prosecution likewise

played up the feud between the Adors on one hand and the
Chavezes and the Cuyas on the other hand, and suggested that the
Adors had an axe to grind against the Chavezes and the Cuyas.For
sure, motive is not sufficient to support a conviction if there is no
other reliable evidence from which it may reasonably be adduced
that the accused was the malefactor.81 Motive alone cannot take the
place of proof beyond reasonable doubt sufficient to overthrow the
presumption of innocence.82 ςrνll

All told, contrary to the pronouncements of the trial court, we

cannot rest easy in convicting the two (2) accused based on
circumstantial evidence.For, the pieces of the said circumstantial
evidence presented do not inexorably lead to the conclusion that
they are guilty.83 The prosecution witness failed to identify the
accused in court.A cloud of doubt continues to hover over the gun
used and the slug recovered.The dying declaration and paraffin
examination remain unreliable. Godofredos uncounseled admissions
including the gun he turned in are barred as evidence.And, the
supposed motive of the accused is simply insufficient.Plainly, the
facts from which the inference that the accused committed the
crime were not proven.Accordingly, the guilt of the accused cannot
be established, more so to a moral certainty.It is when evidence is
purely circumstantial that the prosecution is much more obligated to
rely on the strength of its own case and not on the weakness of the
defense, and that conviction must rest on nothing less than moral
certainty.84
ςrνll
Consequently, the case of the prosecution has been reduced to
nothing but mere suspicions and speculations.It is hornbook
doctrine that suspicions and speculations can never be the basis of
conviction in a criminal case.85 Courts must ensure that the
conviction of the accused rests firmly on sufficient and competent
evidence, and not the results of passion and prejudice.86 If the
alleged inculpatory facts and circumstances are capable of two (2)
or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence
of the accused, and the other consistent with his guilt, then the
evidence is not adequate to support conviction.87 The court must
acquit the accused because the evidence does not fulfill the test of
moral certainty and is therefore insufficient to support a judgment
of conviction.88 Conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral
certainty of the guilt of the accused.89 The overriding consideration
is not whether the court doubts the innocence of the accused but
whether it entertains a reasonable doubt as to his guilt.90 It is thus
apropos to repeat the doctrine that an accusation is not, according
to the fundamental law, synonymous with guilt the prosecution
must overthrow the presumption of innocence with proof of guilt
beyond reasonable doubt.The prosecution has failed to discharge its
burden.Accordingly, we have to acquit.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of

Naga City, Br. 25, in Crim. Cases Nos. 97-6815 and 97-6816 dated
August 2, 1999, finding accused-appellants Godofredo B. Ador and
Diosdado B. Ador III guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of murder and imposing on them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.Accused-appellants
Godofredo B. Ador and Diosdado B. Ador III are ACQUITTED on
reasonable doubt and their IMMEDIATE RELEASE is hereby
ORDERED unless they are being held for some other legal cause.

SO ORDERED.

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 140679 January 14, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
MANNY A. DOMINGCIL, appellant.

DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:

For the sale and delivery of one (1) kilo of marijuana to a poseur-buyer, the appellant Manny
Domingcil was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 16, for violation of
Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 in an Information, the accusatory portion of which
reads:

That on or about the 12th day of August, 1994, in the City of Laoag, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, not authorized by law, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell and deliver mixed dried marijuana leaves, tops
and seeds in brick form, wrapped with paper placed in a plastic bag, a prohibited drug,
weighing 800 grams, to a poseur-buyer in a buy-bust operation conducted by Police Officers
of Laoag City, in violation of the aforesaid law.1

Upon arraignment on August 29, 1994, the appellant, assisted by counsel, pleaded not guilty to the
offense charged.2 The case thereafter proceeded to trial.

The Case for the Prosecution

On August 12, 1994, at around 11:00 a.m., Belrey Oliver, an employee of Ferd’s Upholstery Shop
located in Barangay 2, Laoag City, arrived at the Laoag Police Station. He reported to Chief
Investigator SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura that the appellant went to their shop looking for a buyer of
marijuana. Oliver recounted telling the appellant that he knew of someone who was interested and
ready to buy marijuana, and instructing him to bring one (1) kilo of the substance to a store located
in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag at General Segundo Avenue, Laoag City at around 1:30
p.m. of that same day.3

Acting on the said report, SPO4 Ventura formed a team to conduct a buy-bust operation against the
appellant. He assigned SPO1 Orlando Dalusong as the poseur-buyer, and SPO2 Marlin Ramos,
SPO2 Warlito Maruquin, SPO1 Rovimanuel Balolong, SPO1 Loreto Ancheta, and SPO2 Rosemarie
Agustin, all assigned at the Investigation Section of the Laoag Police Station as back-up. The
marked "buy-money" consisting of one P500-bill bearing Serial No. G-242745 was recorded in the
police blotter in accordance with standard operating procedure.4

Except for SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver, the rest of the team left the precinct on board two (2) owner-
type jeeps and posted themselves near the Macmac Store, across the gate of the Divine Word
College. Five minutes later, SPO1 Dalusong and Oliver arrived at General Segundo Avenue.5 Oliver
immediately approached the appellant, who was then standing between the Macmac Store and a
xerox center, and introduced poseur-buyer SPO1 Dalusong, who was sporting casual clothes and
slippers: "Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen" ("Friend, this is the buyer"). At this point, the appellant who
was carrying an orange plastic bag, brought out a brick-like item wrapped in newspaper. He handed
the item to SPO1 Dalusong, who forthwith checked the same by making a small hole through it.
Convinced that the brick-like item was indeed marijuana, SPO1 Dalusong handed the P500 bill to
the appellant. He thereupon scratched his head, a signal to the back-up men that the transaction
had been consummated.6 Momentarily, the back-up officers, who had earlier positioned themselves
separately in different strategic locations near the poseur-buyer, rushed to the scene and arrested
the appellant. SPO1 Dalusong then handed the orange plastic bag containing the suspected
marijuana to SPO4 Ventura. SPO2 Ramos frisked the appellant and recovered the buy-money from
the latter’s pocket. Thereafter, the appellant was brought to the headquarters where he was booked,
and the incident was recorded in the police blotter.7 The suspected marijuana was brought to and
initially examined by Dr. Joseph Adaya, an accredited physician of the Dangerous Drugs Board
(DDB), who certified that the item comprised of three genuine mixture of marijuana leaves with
seeds.8

On September 5, 1994, SPO4 Ventura sent a letter to the Commanding Officer of the PNP Crime
Laboratory Service, Camp Diego Silang, San Fernando, La Union, requesting for the examination of
samples of the suspected marijuana taken from the appellant.9 On September 6, 1998, SPO1 Loreto
Ancheta, evidence custodian of the Laoag City, PNP, delivered the orange plastic bag containing the
suspected marijuana to the PNP provincial crime laboratory service in Camp Juan, Laoag City. The
bag, together with SPO4 Ventura’s letter-request, was received by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos.10 On
September 8, 1994, SPO3 Mamotos forwarded the laboratory request and the confiscated item, and
were duly received by SPO4 Tampos.11 The latter, in turn, handed the item to Police Superintendent
Theresa Ann B. Cid, Forensic Chemist of the Crime Laboratory Center, Region I, Camp Diego
Silang, Carlatan, San Fernando, La Union, who conducted an examination of representative
samples extracted from the suspected marijuana confiscated from the appellant.12 On the basis of
her examination, Superintendent Cid issued Chemistry Report No. D-074-94 with the following
findings:

SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

One (1) block of suspected marijuana fruiting tops weighing eight hundred grams
(800) wrapped with newspaper pages contained in an orange plastic bag.

...

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of marijuana on the above-mentioned specimen.

F I N D I N G S:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-mentioned specimen prove

POSITIVE result to the test for marijuana, a prohibited drug.13

The Case for the Appellant

The appellant interposed the twin defenses of denial and alibi. He testified that sometime in the first
week of August 1994, he and Ernesto Gamiao went to the City of Laoag to canvass the price for the
repair of the upholstery of a passenger jeepney. On that occasion, they befriended a certain Belrey
Oliver who was an employee of the Ferd’s Upholstery Shop. In the course of their conversation,
Oliver asked the appellant where he came from and what his occupation was. Upon being told that
he helped in harvesting mangoes in Cagayan, Oliver immediately offered refreshments to Gamiao
and the appellant. While taking their snacks, Oliver inquired whether they wanted to back up the
promotion of certain policemen who, in the future, might be able to return the favor to them. When
the appellant asked in what way they could extend help, Oliver suggested that they look for
somebody in Cagayan from whom they could buy one (1) kilo of marijuana. He agreed to Oliver’s
suggestion. The latter handed to him the amount of P700.00 to cover the purchase of the marijuana.
The appellant immediately went to the terminal bound for Cagayan to look for somebody from that
province who could be of help. When he could not find anyone, he decided to personally take the
trip. He then instructed Gamiao to just go home to Vintar and inform his mother that he was going to
Cagayan.

The appellant thereafter took a bus bound for Tuguegarao, Cagayan. After three (3) days, he was
able to buy one kilo of marijuana for P300.00. When he returned to Laoag City on August 12, 1994,
he went to Ferd’s Upholstery Shop at 11:30 a.m. to inform Oliver that he had procured the order.
After seeing the marijuana, Oliver instructed him to take it and meet him at about 12:30 p.m. of the
same day in front of the Divine Word College where they would hand over the marijuana to the
policemen they intended to help.

At about 12:00 noon, the appellant arrived at Macmac’s Store and took his merienda. Momentarily,
Oliver arrived alone on a tricycle. Oliver summoned him and they walked southward, away from the
Macmac’s Store, looking for the policemen to whom they would deliver the marijuana. They walked
back northward, at which point they encountered an owner-type jeep which suddenly stopped. He
was nonplussed when Oliver grabbed him by the neck, seized his knapsack containing the
marijuana, and pushed him inside the jeep. He was made to sit beside the driver with another
policeman, while Oliver seated himself at the back seat with another policeman. The jeep they were
riding was followed by a patrol car. Still dazed at the sudden turn of events, he asked Oliver four
times, "Why is it that this is now happening to me(?)," but Oliver did not respond. At the police
station, he was immediately locked up. That afternoon, SPO4 Ventura and SPO2 Ramos,
accompanied by Oliver, brought him to the City Fiscal’s Office. He was later brought to the provincial
hospital where he was subjected to a physical check-up. That was the last time he saw or heard of
Oliver.14

On July 9, 1999, the court a quo rendered judgment,15 the dispositive portion of which reads :

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court is morally convinced beyond reasonable

doubt that the accused Manny Domingcil is GUILTY under Sec. 4 of Art. II, RA No. 6425, as
 amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. The quantity of marijuana
involved is more than 750 grams; hence, in accordance with Sec. 20, the penalty provided
for in Sec. 4, shall be applied. The accused is hereby sentenced to reclusion perpetua with
all its accessory penalties and to pay the costs.

Hence, the present appeal.

The appellant submits the following assignment of errors:

1. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused was not instigated in looking for
marijuana and bringing it to Laoag.

2. The lower Court erred in finding that the accused received the FIVE HUNDRED PESO bill,
despite his denial that he received the same and that his denial cannot prevail over the
positive testimony of the police officers who are presumed to be regularly performing their
official duties, there being no improper motive attributed to them.

3. The lower Court erred in convicting the accused.16

The appellant contends that contrary to the collective testimonies of the prosecution witnesses,
Oliver instigated him to buy marijuana. The trial court erred in not giving credence and probative
weight to his testimony and in considering the testimonies of the witnesses of the prosecution.

The appeal has no merit.

Time and again, this Court has ruled that the evaluation by the trial court of the credibility of
witnesses is entitled to the highest respect and will not be disturbed on appeal unless certain facts of
substance and value were overlooked which, if considered, might affect the result of the case. The
reason for this rule is that the trial court is in a better position to decide thereon, having personally
heard the witnesses and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial.17 After a
thorough and careful review of the records of this case, we find that the guilt of the appellant was
sufficiently established by the evidence, and the trial court’s judgment is well-supported by law and
jurisprudence.

What is material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof that the sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti as evidence.18 In this
case, the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the appellant sold one (1) kilo of
marijuana to poseur-buyer SPO1 Orlando Dalusong in the entrapment operation.

Q How has the case involving drug or marijuana involving the accused brought to your
attention or to your office, for that matter?

A Our informant by the name of Belrey Oliver tipped of (sic) to us that he met Manny
Domingcil at the Upholstery Shop along Ablan Avenue and he also informed us that he
ordered P500.00 worth of marijuana.

Q Who ordered from whom?

A Belrey Oliver from Manny Domingcil, sir.

Q By the way, who was the chief of the Intelligence Section of Laoag City PNP, at that
time?

A SPO4 Ventura, sir.

Q Was he present when the informant Belrey Oliver tipped you of (sic) about this matter?

A Yes, sir.

Q And because of that information from Belrey Oliver, what did your Chief, SPO4 Ventura
do?
A SPO4 Ventura made or designed a plan purposely to conduct a buy-bust operation, sir.

Q Where will the operation take place?

A In front of Macmac Store, particularly, in front of the Divine Word College of Laoag, sir.

Q And did you have any participation in that operation?

A Yes, sir, I acted as the poseur buy (sic).

Q At what time was the operation scheduled to be executed?

A 1:30 P.M. of August 12, 1994, sir.

Q For the said operation, what preparations, if any, did your group take?

A Our Chief of Intelligence made a plan, sir.

Q What was the plan?

A To conduct the buy-bust operation, sir.

Q And you said that you were to act as poseur buyer, anything was given to you in
connection with your specific participation?

A I was given the buy-bust money in the amount of P500.00, sir.

Q And what will you do with that P500.00?

A The Chief of Intelligence, SPO4 Ventura directed me to reflect the serial number of the
money in the police blotter, the P500.00 to be used as marked money.

Q And after the serial number was entered in the police blotter, what next did you do?

A Before we went out of the station, the team or companions of SPO4 Ventura went ahead
to the place where the transaction will take place, sir.

Q And who were the companions of SPO4 Ventura who went ahead?

A Rosemarie Agustin, SPO2 Marlin Ramos and SPO4 Balolong, sir, while Oliver and myself
were the ones who went together.

Q Who went ahead to the place where the sale will take place?

A The team of SPO4 Ventura, sir.

Q And did you reach the place where the transaction will take place?

A Yes, sir.

Q Before you started to the place where the transaction will take place in front of the Divine
Word College of Laoag, did you know then the face of Manny Domingcil?

A No, sir.

Q How did you know his face then?

A Belrey Oliver, the informant, informed me that the person is Manny Domingcil.

Q So, what you are saying is: when you arrived at the scene where the transaction would
take place, Manny Domingcil was already there and that Belrey Oliver pointed him to you?
A Yes, sir.

Q After that, what did you do with Belrey Oliver?

A We went near Manny Domingcil, sir.

Q And after or as soon as you were near him, what happened next?

A Belrey Oliver introduced Manny Domingcil to me as the buyer, sir.

Q What did Oliver say?

A "Pare, daytoy tay gumatangen", (which when translated into english[sic] means): "Pare,
this is the buyer."

Q And so, what was the reaction of Manny Domingcil?

A Before that I asked Manny Domingcil if he has the stuff that was ordered.

Q And what did he say?

A Manny Domingcil said: "There is, Pare."

Q By the way, who ordered the stuff from Manny Domingcil?

A Belrey Oliver, sir.

Q Did you ask Oliver where he ordered that from Manny Domingcil?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where?

A At the Upholstery Shop at Ablan Avenue, sir.

Q That was what Oliver told you when he ordered the stuff?

A Yes, sir.

Q When Manny Domingcil said: "There is, pare," what transpired next, if any?

A I told him: "Can I look at it" and he brought out a wrapped brick-type form wrapped in a
newspaper inside an orange plastic bag.

Q And after he had brought out the said thing, what did you do with it?

A I checked the contents if it is real marijuana, sir.

Q You said the thing was wrapped with newspaper and you said you checked its contents?

A Yes, sir, I opened the wrapper, by making a small hole at the side.

Q And what was the result of your inspection?

A I found out that it was real marijuana, sir.

Q And, so what did you do then?

A After I found out that it was marijuana I handed to Manny Domingcil the P500 peso bill,
sir.
Q And as soon as you have handed the P500.00 bill, what did you do next?

A I gave the signal to my companions, sir.

Q And what did your companions do when you gave the signal?

A They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.

Q What was your signal?

A I scratched my head, sir.

Q And, what was your attire at that time you bought the brick-type marijuana from Manny
Domingcil?

A Ordinary clothes, sir, wearing slippers.

Q And all the time during your transaction with Manny Domingcil, where was Belrey Oliver?

A At my side, sir.

Q And during the transaction, did Belrey Oliver say anything?

A None, sir.

Q And after giving your signal to your companion police officers who were nearby and they
rushed to your place where you were, what happened?

A They apprehended Manny Domingcil, sir.

Q And what about the marijuana which you said Manny Domingcil sold to you?

A I handed it to SPO4 Rodrigo Ventura, sir.

Q And what about the P500 peso bill, do you know what happened to it?

A SPO2 Marlin Ramos recovered the P500 peso bill from the pocket of Manny Domingcil.

Q And after arresting Manny Domingcil where did your group go?

A To the police station, sir.

Q Do you know if any records were made to your police station when you returned or
arrived there?

A Yes, sir.

Q What for example?

A They made a request ... we reflected in the police blotter the apprehension of Manny
Domingcil, the confiscation of the marijuana and the recovery of the marked money in the
amount of P500.00.

Q Was the serial number of the P500 bill you recovered from the pocket of Manny
Domingcil recorded?

A Yes, sir.

Q And do you know what happened to the stuff later on after you returned to the police
station?
 A They made a request to Dr. Adaya to conduct an initial examination on the confiscated
marijuana, sir.19

The foregoing testimony of SPO1 Orlando Dalusong was corroborated on material points by SPO4
Rodrigo Ventura, then Chief of the Intelligence Section of the PNP of Laoag City who organized and
conducted the operation and was part of the buy-bust team itself.20 SPO4 Ventura remained
steadfast and unwavering on cross-examination despite intense grilling by the defense counsel.21

Police Superintendent Theresa Ann Cid, the Forensic Chemist assigned at the PNP Crime
Laboratory Center at San Fernando, La Union, confirmed22 Dr. Joseph Adaya’s initial finding23 that
the substance seized from the appellant was indeed marijuana, a prohibited drug.

It was also fairly established by SPO3 Diosdado Mamotos24 and SPO1 Loreto Ancheta25 that the
confiscated marijuana was the same substance examined by the forensic chemist and later
presented as evidence in court.

The testimonies of the principal prosecution witnesses complement each other, giving a complete
picture of how the appellant’s illegal sale of the prohibited drug transpired, and how the sale led to
his apprehension in flagrante delicto. Their testimonies establish beyond doubt that dangerous drugs
were in the possession of the appellant who had no authority to possess or sell the same. More
importantly, all the persons who obtained and received the confiscated stuff did so in the
performance of their official duties. Unless there is clear and convincing evidence that the members
of the buy-bust team were inspired by any improper motive or were not properly performing their
duty, their testimonies on the buy-bust operation deserve full faith and credit.26

The appellant’s bare denial of the crime charged and his barefaced claim that he was merely
instigated by Oliver into procuring the marijuana cannot prevail over the straightforward and positive
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses. It is incredible that the appellant, who had just met Belrey
Oliver in the course of his canvass for the upholstery of his brother’s jeepney, would readily leave his
errand behind and allow a stranger to talk him into buying a prohibited drug, a known criminal activity
for which he could be prosecuted, and if convicted, sentenced to reclusion perpetua. All this he was
willing to risk, in exchange for an empty promise of alleged future favors from another who was also
unknown to the appellant. The appellant supposedly traveled to and spent almost three days in
Tuguegarao, Cagayan, just to be able to accommodate a newly found acquaintance, who handed
the appellant the meager sum of P700.00 for the intended purpose. The Court cannot give credence
to such a preposterous stance as advanced by the appellant and confirmed by his supposed
corroborative witness, Ernesto Gamiao.

It is axiomatic that for testimonial evidence to be believed, it must not only proceed from the mouth
of a credible witness but must also be credible in itself such that common experience and
observation of mankind lead to the inference of its probability under the circumstances. In criminal
prosecution, the court is always guided by evidence that is tangible, verifiable and in harmony with
the usual course of human experience and not by mere conjecture or speculation. Testimonies that
do not adhere to this standard are necessarily accorded little weight or credence.27 Besides,
instigation, or the appellant’s claim of a frame-up, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by
this Court with disfavor because the same can easily be concocted and is a common standard
defense ploy in most prosecutions for violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act.28 Thus, in People vs.
Bongalon,29 the Court held:

As we have earlier stated, the appellant’s denial cannot prevail over the positive testimonies
of the prosecution witnesses. We are not unaware of the perception that, in some instances,
law enforcers resort to the practice of planting evidence to extract information or even to
harass civilians. However, like alibi, frame-up is a defense that has been viewed by the Court
with disfavor as it can easily be, concocted, hence, commonly used as a standard line of
defense in most prosecutions arising from violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act. We realize
the disastrous consequences on the enforcement of law and order, not to mention the well-
being of society, if the courts, solely on the basis of the policemen’s alleged rotten reputation,
accept in every instance this form of defense which can be so easily fabricated. It is precisely
for this reason that the legal presumption that official duty has been regularly performed
exists.

The failure of the prosecution to present Oliver, the police informant, does not enfeeble the
case for the prosecution. Informants are almost always never presented in court because of
the need to preserve their invaluable service to the police. Their testimony or identity may be
 dispensed with inasmuch as his or her narration would be merely corroborative, especially so
in this case, when the poseur-buyer himself testified on the sale of the illegal drug.30

The appellant’s claim that the prosecution offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the P500.00 buy
money and did not account for its failure to adduce in evidence the original copy thereof is not
supported by the records. The records show that the original, and not merely a xerox copy of the
marked money, was in fact offered in evidence by the prosecution.31 The appellant would surely
have objected if the prosecution had offered in evidence a mere xerox copy of the bill. The appellant
did not do so. The only ground for his objection to the admission of the marked money was that it
was self-serving.

Even if the xerox copy of the P500.00 bill was erroneously admitted in evidence by the trial court, the
absence of the original of the marked money is inconsequential. The marked money used in the buy-
bust operation is not indispensable in drug cases;32 it is merely corroborative evidence. Moreover,
the appellant was charged not only for the sale of marijuana but also for the delivery thereof, which
is committed by the mere delivery or transfer of the prohibited drug. The consideration for the
transaction is of no moment.33

The law defines deliver as "a person’s act of knowingly passing a dangerous drug to another with or
without consideration."34 Considering that the appellant was charged with the sale and the delivery of
prohibited drugs, the consummation of the crime of delivery of marijuana may be sufficiently
established even in the absence of the marked money. The erasures and alterations in the Joint
Affidavit of the policemen involved in the buy-bust operation did not debilitate the case of the
prosecution. First. The Joint Affidavit of the policemen was not admitted in evidence for any
party. Second. The investigator who prepared the "Joint Affidavit" erroneously stated that the
two P500.00 bills were used by the policemen who conducted the buy-bust operation bearing Serial
Numbers AA823675 and G242745. As shown by the prosecution’s evidence the policemen used
only the P500.00 bill bearing Serial No. G242745 for the purchase of the drug. Hence, the "Joint
Affidavit" of the policemen had to be corrected to reflect the truth.

All told, the presumption of regularity in the performance of duty is, in this case, uncontradicted by
evidence to the contrary and, therefore, stands. This is bolstered by the fact that the prosecution’s
evidence fully shows and confirms such regularity. Accordingly, there exists no cogent reason to
reverse or even modify the findings of the trial court giving credence to the evidence of the
prosecution.

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City,
Branch 16, in Criminal Case No. 7079, finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425, is hereby AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 96027-28 March 08, 2005

BRIG. GEN. LUTHER A. CUSTODIO*, CAPT. ROMEO M. BAUTISTA, 2nd LT. JESUS D.
CASTRO, SGT. CLARO L. LAT, SGT. ARNULFO B. DE MESA, C1C ROGELIO B. MORENO, C1C
MARIO E. LAZAGA, SGT. FILOMENO D. MIRANDA, SGT. ROLANDO C. DE GUZMAN, SGT.
ERNESTO M. MATEO, SGT. RODOLFO M. DESOLONG, A1C CORDOVA G. ESTELO, MSGT.
PABLO S. MARTINEZ, SGT. RUBEN AQUINO, SGT. ARNULFO ARTATES, A1C FELIZARDO
TARAN, Petitioners,
vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
 RESOLUTION

PUNO, J.:

Before us is a Motion To Re-Open Case With Leave Of Court filed by petitioners who were convicted
and sentenced to reclusion perpetua by the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and
10011 for the double murder of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman on August 21,
1983.1

Petitioners were members of the military who acted as Senator Aquino’s security detail upon his
arrival in Manila from his three-year sojourn in the United States. They were charged, together with
several other members of the military, before the Sandiganbayan for the killing of Senator Aquino
who was fatally shot as he was coming down from the aircraft of China Airlines at the Manila
International Airport. Petitioners were also indicted for the killing of Rolando Galman who was also
gunned down at the airport tarmac.

On December 2, 1985, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision in Criminal Cases Nos. 10010-
10011 acquitting all the accused, which include the petitioners. However, the proceedings before the
Sandiganbayan were later found by this Court to be a sham trial. The Court thus nullified said
proceedings, as well as the judgment of acquittal, and ordered a re-trial of the cases.2

A re-trial ensued before the Sandiganbayan.

In its decision dated September 28, 1990, the Sandiganbayan, while acquitting the other accused,
found the petitioners guilty as principals of the crime of murder in both Criminal Cases Nos. 10010
and 10011. It sentenced them to reclusion perpetua in each case.3 The judgment became final after
this Court denied petitioners’ petition for review of the Sandiganbayan decision for failure to show
reversible error in the questioned decision,4 as well as their subsequent motion for reconsideration.5

In August 2004, petitioners sought legal assistance from the Chief Public Attorney who, in turn,
requested the Independent Forensic Group of the University of the Philippines to make a thorough
review of the forensic evidence in the double murder case. The petitioners, assisted by the Public
Attorney’s Office, now want to present the findings of the forensic group to this Court and ask the
Court to allow the re-opening of the cases and the holding of a third trial to determine the
circumstances surrounding the death of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. and Rolando Galman.

Petitioners invoke the following grounds for the re-opening of the case:

Existence of newly discovered pieces of evidence that were not available during the second
trial of the above-entitled cases which could have altered the judgment of the
Sandiganbayan, specifically:

A) Independent forensic evidence uncovering the false forensic claims that led to the
unjust conviction of the petitioners-movants.

B) A key defense eyewitness to the actual killing of Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr.

II

There was a grave violation of due process by reason of:

A) Insufficient legal assistance of counsel;

B) Deprivation of right to counsel of choice;

C) Testimonies of defense witnesses were under duress;

D) Willful suppression of evidence;

 E) Use of false forensic evidence that led to the unjust conviction of the petitioners-
movants.

III

There was serious misapprehension of facts on the part of the Sandiganbayan based on
false forensic evidence, which entitles petitioners-movants to a re-trial.6

Petitioners seek to present as new evidence the findings of the forensic group composed of Prof.
Jerome B. Bailen, a forensic anthropologist from the University of the Philippines, Atty. Erwin P. Erfe,
M.D., a medico-legal practitioner, Benito E. Molino, M.D., a forensic consultant and Human Rights
and Peace Advocate, and Anastacio N. Rosete, Jr., D.M.D., a forensic dentistry consultant. Their
report essentially concludes that it was not possible, based on the forensic study of the evidence in
the double murder case, that C1C Rogelio Moreno fired at Senator Aquino as they descended the
service stairway from the aircraft. They posit that Senator Aquino was shot while he was walking on
the airport tarmac toward the waiting AVSECOM van which was supposed to transport him from the
airport to Fort Bonifacio. This is contrary to the finding of the Sandiganbayan in the second trial that
it was C1C Moreno, the security escort positioned behind Senator Aquino, who shot the latter. The
report also suggests that the physical evidence in these cases may have been misinterpreted and
manipulated to mislead the court. Thus, petitioners assert that the September 28, 1990 decision of
the Sandiganbayan should be voided as it was based on false forensic evidence. Petitioners submit
that the review by the forensic group of the physical evidence in the double murder case
constitutes newly discovered evidence which would entitle them to a new trial under Rule 121 of
the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure. In addition to the report of the forensic group, petitioners seek
to present the testimony of an alleged eyewitness, the driver of the waiting AVSECOM van, SPO4
Ruben M. Cantimbuhan. In his affidavit submitted to this Court, SPO4 Cantimbuhan states that he
saw a man in blue uniform similar to that of the Philippine Airlines maintenance crew, suddenly fire
at Senator Aquino as the latter was about to board the van. The man in blue was later identified as
Rolando Galman.

Petitioners pray that the Court issue a resolution:

1. [a]nnulling and setting aside this Honorable Court’s Resolutions dated July 23, 1991 and
September 10, 1991;

2. [a]nnulling and setting aside the Decision of the Sandiganbayan (3rd Division) dated
September 28, 1990 in People vs. Custodio, et al., Case No. 10010-10011[;]

3. [o]rdering the re-opening of this case; [and]

4. [o]rdering the Sandiganbayan to allow the reception of additional defense evidence/re-trial

in the above entitled cases.7

The issue now is whether petitioners are entitled to a third trial under Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

The pertinent sections of Rule 121 of the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure provide:

Section 1. New Trial or reconsideration. — At any time before a judgment of conviction

becomes final, the court may, on motion of the accused or at its own instance but with the
consent of the accused, grant a new trial or reconsideration.

Sec. 2. Grounds for a new trial. — The court shall grant a new trial on any of the following
grounds:

(a) That errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the substantial rights of the
accused have been committed during the trial;

(b) That new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused
could not with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial
and which if introduced and admitted would probably change the judgment.

xxx
 Sec. 6. Effects of granting a new trial or reconsideration. — The effects of granting a
new trial or reconsideration are the following:

(a) When a new trial is granted on the ground of errors of law or irregularities
committed during the trial, all the proceedings and evidence affected thereby shall be
set aside and taken anew. The court may, in the interest of justice, allow the
introduction of additional evidence.

(b) When a new trial is granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
evidence already adduced shall stand and the newly-discovered and such other
evidence as the court may, in the interest of justice, allow to be introduced shall be
taken and considered together with the evidence already in the record.

(c) In all cases, when the court grants new trial or reconsideration, the original
judgment shall be set aside or vacated and a new judgment rendered
accordingly. (emphasis supplied)

In line with the objective of the Rules of Court to set guidelines in the dispensation of justice, but
without shackling the hands that dispense it, the remedy of new trial has been described as "a new
invention to temper the severity of a judgment or prevent the failure of justice."8 Thus, the Rules
allow the courts to grant a new trial when there are errors of law or irregularities prejudicial to the
substantial rights of the accused committed during the trial, or when there exists newly discovered
evidence. In the proceedings for new trial, the errors of law or irregularities are expunged from the
record or new evidence is introduced. Thereafter, the original judgment is vacated and a new one is
rendered.9

Under the Rules, a person convicted of a crime may avail of the remedy of new trial before the
judgment of conviction becomes final. Petitioners admit that the decision of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Cases Nos. 10010 and 10011 became final and executory upon denial of their petition for
review filed before this Court and their motion for reconsideration. Entry of judgment has in fact been
made on September 30, 1991.10 Nonetheless, they maintain that equitable considerations exist in
this case to justify the relaxation of the Rules and re-open the case to accord petitioners the
opportunity to present evidence that will exonerate them from the charges against them. We do not
find merit in their submission.

Petitioners anchor their motion on the ground of newly discovered evidence. Courts are
generally reluctant in granting motions for new trial on the ground of newly discovered evidence for
it is presumed that the moving party has had ample opportunity to prepare his case carefully and to
secure all the necessary evidence before the trial. Such motions are treated with great caution due
to the danger of perjury and the manifest injustice of allowing a party to allege that which may be the
consequence of his own neglect to defeat an adverse judgment. Hence, the moving party is often
required to rebut a presumption that the judgment is correct and that there has been a lack of due
diligence, and to establish other facts essential to warrant the granting of a new trial on the ground of
newly discovered evidence.11 This Court has repeatedly held that before a new trial may be granted
on the ground of newly discovered evidence, it must be shown (1) that the evidence was
discovered after trial; (2) that such evidence could not have been discovered and produced at the
trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence; (3) that it is material, not merely cumulative,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (4) the evidence is of such weight that it would probably change
the judgment if admitted. If the alleged newly discovered evidence could have been very well
presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence, the same cannot be considered
newly discovered.12

These standards, also known as the "Berry" rule, trace their origin to the 1851 case of Berry vs.
State of Georgia13 where the Supreme Court of Georgia held:

Applications for new trial on account of newly discovered evidence, are not favored by the
Courts. x x x Upon the following points there seems to be a pretty general concurrence of
authority, viz; that it is incumbent on a party who asks for a new trial, on the ground of newly
discovered evidence, to satisfy the Court, 1st. That the evidence has come to his knowledge
since the trial. 2d. That it was not owing to the want of due diligence that it did not come
sooner. 3d. That it is so material that it would produce a different verdict, if the new trial were
granted. 4th. That it is not cumulative only — viz; speaking to facts, in relation to which there
was evidence on the trial. 5th. That the affidavit of the witness himself should be produced, or
 its absence accounted for. And 6th, a new trial will not be granted, if the only object of the
testimony is to impeach the character or credit of a witness. (citations omitted)

These guidelines have since been followed by our courts in determining the propriety of motions for
new trial based on newly discovered evidence.

It should be emphasized that the applicant for new trial has the burden of showing that the new
evidence he seeks to present has complied with the requisites to justify the holding of a new trial.

The threshold question in resolving a motion for new trial based on newly discovered evidence is
whether the proferred evidence is in fact a "newly discovered evidence which could not have been
discovered by due diligence." The question of whether evidence is newly discovered has two
aspects: a temporal one, i.e., when was the evidence discovered, and a predictive one, i.e., when
should or could it have been discovered. It is to the latter that the requirement of due diligence has
relevance.14 We have held that in order that a particular piece of evidence may be properly regarded
as newly discovered to justify new trial, what is essential is not so much the time when the evidence
offered first sprang into existence nor the time when it first came to the knowledge of the party now
submitting it; what is essential is that the offering party had exercised reasonable diligence in
seeking to locate such evidence before or during trial but had nonetheless failed to secure it.15

The Rules do not give an exact definition of due diligence, and whether the movant has exercised
due diligence depends upon the particular circumstances of each case.16 Nonetheless, it has been
observed that the phrase is often equated with "reasonable promptness to avoid prejudice to the
defendant." In other words, the concept of due diligence has both a time component and a good
faith component. The movant for a new trial must not only act in a timely fashion in gathering
evidence in support of the motion; he must act reasonably and in good faith as well. Due diligence
contemplates that the defendant acts reasonably and in good faith to obtain the evidence, in light of
the totality of the circumstances and the facts known to him.17

Applying the foregoing tests, we find that petitioners’ purported evidence does not qualify as newly
discovered evidence that would justify the re-opening of the case and the holding of a third trial.

The report of the forensic group may not be considered as newly discovered evidence as petitioners
failed to show that it was impossible for them to secure an independent forensic study of the physical
evidence during the trial of the double murder case. It appears from their report that the forensic
group used the same physical and testimonial evidence proferred during the trial, but made
their own analysis and interpretation of said evidence. They cited the materials and methods
that they used for their study, viz:

MATERIALS AND METHODS

MATERIALS:

a. Court records of the case, especially photographs of: a) the stairway where the late Sen.
Aquino and his escorts descended; b) the part of the tarmac where the lifeless bodies of the
late Sen. Aquino and Galman fell; and c) the autopsy conducted by the NBI Medico-legal
team headed by Dr. Mu[ñ]oz; and the autopsy report of the late Sen. Benigno Aquino[,] Jr.
signed by Dr. Mu[ñ]oz and Dr. Solis;

b. The gun and live ammunitions collected at the crime scene;

c. A reference human skull photos and X-rays of the same to demonstrate wound location
and bullet trajectory;

d. The reports of interviews and statements by the convicted military escorts, and other
witnesses;

e. Re-enactment of the killing of Aquino based on the military escorts[’] version, by the
military escorts themselves in the Bilibid Prison and by volunteers at the NAIA Tarmac;

f. Various books and articles on forensic and the medico-legal field[;]

g. Results of Forensic experiments conducted in relation to the case.

 METHODS:

a. Review of the forensic exhibits presented in the court;

b. Review of TSNs relevant to the forensic review;

c. Study of and research on the guns, slugs and ammunitions allegedly involved in the crime;

d. Interviews/re-enactment of the crime based on the military’s accounts, both in the Bilibid
Prison where the convicts are confined and the MIA (now NAIA) stairway and tarmac;

e. Conduct of ocular inspection and measurements on the actual crime scene (stairway and
tarmac) at the old Manila International Airport (now NAIA);

f. Retracing the slug’s trajectory based on the autopsy reports and experts’ testimonies using
an actual human skull;

g. X-rays of the skull with the retraced trajectory based on the autopsy report and experts’
testimonies;

h. Evaluation of the presented facts and opinions of local experts in relation to accepted
forensic findings in international publications on forensic science, particularly on guns and
[gunshot] wound injuries;

i. Forensic experiments and simulations of events in relation to this case.18

These materials were available to the parties during the trial and there was nothing that prevented
the petitioners from using them at the time to support their theory that it was not the military, but
Rolando Galman, who killed Senator Aquino. Petitioners, in their present motion, failed to present
any new forensic evidence that could not have been obtained by the defense at the time of the trial
even with the exercise of due diligence. If they really wanted to seek and offer the opinion of other
forensic experts at the time regarding the physical evidence gathered at the scene of the crime,
there was ample opportunity for them to do so before the case was finally submitted and decided.19

A reading of the Sandiganbayan decision dated September 28, 1990 shows a thorough study by the
court of the forensic evidence presented during the trial, viz:

COURT FINDINGS

As to the physical
evidence

Great significance has to be accorded the trajectory of the single bullet that penetrated the
head and caused the death of Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. Basic to the question as to trajectory
ought to be the findings during the autopsy. The prosector in the autopsy, Dr. Bienvenido
Muñoz, NBI Medico-Legal Officer, reported in his Autopsy Report No. N-83-22-36, that the
trajectory of the gunshot, the wound of entrance having been located at the mastoid region,
left, below the external auditory meatus, and the exit wound having been at the anterior
portion of the mandible, was "forward, downward and medially." (Autopsy Report No. N-83-
22-36, Exhibit "NNNN-2-t-2")

A controversy as to this trajectory came about when, upon being cross-examined by counsel
for the defense, Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz made a significant turn-about by stating that the
correct trajectory of the fatal bullet was "upward, downward, and medially." The present
position of Dr. Muñoz is premised upon the alleged fact that he found the petrous bone
fractured, obviously hit by the fatal bullet. He concluded, in view of this finding, that the fatal
bullet must have gone upward from the wound of entrance. Since the fatal bullet exited at the
mandible, it is his belief that the petrous bone deflected the trajectory of the bullet and, thus,
the bullet proceeded downwards from the petrous bone to the mandible.

This opinion of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz in this regard notwithstanding, We hold that the
trajectory of the fatal bullet which killed Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was, indeed, "forward,
downward and medially." For the reason that the wound of entrance was at a higher
elevation than the wound of exit, there can be no other conclusion but that the trajectory was
downward. The bullet when traveling at a fast rate of speed takes a straight path from the
wound of entrance to the wound of exit. It is unthinkable that the bullet, while projected
upwards, would, instead of exiting to the roof of the head, go down to the mandible because
it was allegedly deflected by a petrous bone which though hard is in fact a mere spongy
protuberance, akin to a cartilage.

Clear is proof of the downward trajectory of the fatal bullet; First, as Dr. Pedro Solis and Dr.
Ceferino Cunanan, the immediate superiors of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, manifested before the
Court, that, since the wound of entrance appeared ovaloid and there is what is known as a
contusion collar which was widest at the superior portion, indicating an acute angle of
approach, a downward trajectory of the bullet is indicated. This phenomenon indicates that
the muzzle of the fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the point of entry of the fatal
bullet.

There was no showing as to whether a probe could have been made from the wound of
entrance to the petrous bone. Out of curiosity, Dr. Juanito Billote tried to insert a probe from
the wound of exit into the petrous bone. He was unsuccessful notwithstanding four or five
attempts. If at all, this disproves the theory of Dr. Muñoz that the trajectory was upward,
downward and medially. On the other hand, Dr. Juanito Billote and photographer Alexander
Loinaz witnessed the fact that Dr. Muñoz’[s] understudy, Alejandrino Javier, had successfully
made a probe from the wound of entrance directly towards the wound of exit. Alejandrino
Javier shouted with excitement upon his success and Alexander Loinaz promptly
photographed this event with Alejandrino Javier holding the protruding end of the probe at
the mandible. (Exhibit "XXXXX-39-A")

To be sure, had the main bullet hit the petrous bone, this spongy mash of cartilage would
have been decimated or obliterated. The fact that the main bullet was of such force, power
and speed that it was able to bore a hole into the mandible and crack it, is an indication that
it could not have been stopped or deflected by a mere petrous bone. By its power and force,
it must have been propelled by a powerful gun. It would have been impossible for the main
bullet to have been deflected form an upward course by a mere spongy protuberance.
Granting that it was so deflected, however, it could not have maintained the same power and
force as when it entered the skull at the mastoid region so as to crack the mandible and
make its exit there.

But what caused the fracture of the petrous bone? Was there a cause of the fracture, other
than that the bullet had hit it? Dr. Pedro Solis, maintaining the conclusion that the trajectory
of the bullet was downward, gave the following alternative explanations for the fracture of the
petrous bone:

First, the petrous bone could have been hit by a splinter of the main bullet, particularly, that
which was found at the temporal region; and,

Second, the fracture must have been caused by the kinetic force applied to the point of
entrance at the mastoid region which had the tendency of being radiated towards the petrous
bone.

Thus, the fracture in the occipital bone, of the temporal bone, and of the parietal bone, Dr.
Pedro Solis pointed out, had been caused by the aforesaid kinetic force. When a force is
applied to the mastoid region of the head, Dr. Pedro Solis emphasized, a radiation of forces
is distributed all over the cranial back, including, although not limited to, the parietal bone.
The skull, Dr. Solis explains, is a box-like structure. The moment you apply pressure on the
portion, a distortion, tension or some other mechanical defect is caused. This radiation of
forces produces what is known as the "spider web linear fracture" which goes to different
parts of the body. The so-called fracturing of the petrous portion of the left temporal bone is
one of the consequences of the kinetic force forcefully applied to the mastoid region.

The fact that there was found a fracture of the petrous bone is not necessarily indicative of
the theory that the main bullet passed through the petrous bone.

Doubt was expressed by Dr. Pedro Solis as to whether the metal fragments alleged by Dr.
Bienvenido Muñoz to have been found by him inside the skull or at the wound of exit were
really parts of the main bullet which killed the Senator. When Dr. Pedro Solis examined these
fragments, he found that two (2) of the fragments were larger in size, and were of such
shapes, that they could not have gone out of the wound of exit considering the size and
shape of the exit wound.

Finding of a downward
trajectory of the
fatal bullet fatal
to the credibility
of defense witnesses.

The finding that the fatal bullet which killed Sen. Benigno Aquino, Jr. was directed
downwards sustains the allegation of prosecution eyewitnesses to the effect that Sen.
Benigno Aquino, Jr. was shot by a military soldier at the bridge stairs while he was being
brought down from the plane. Rebecca Quijano saw that the senator was shot by the military
man who was directly behind the Senator while the Senator and he were descending the
stairs. Rebecca Quijano’s testimony in this regard is echoed by Jessie Barcelona, Ramon
Balang, Olivia Antimano, and Mario Laher, whose testimonies this Court finds likewise as
credible.

The downward trajectory of the bullet having been established, it stands to reason that the
gun used in shooting the Senator was fired from an elevation higher than that of the wound
of entrance at the back of the head of the Senator. This is consistent with the testimony of
prosecution witnesses to the effect that the actual killer of the Senator shot as he stood at
the upper step of the stairs, the second or third behind Senator Aquino, while Senator Aquino
and the military soldiers bringing him were at the bridge stairs. This is likewise consistent
with the statement of Sandra Jean Burton that the shooting of Senator Aquino occurred while
the Senator was still on the bridge stairs, a conclusion derived from the fact that the fatal
shot was fired ten (10) seconds after Senator Aquino crossed the service door and was led
down the bridge stairs.

It was the expert finding of Dr. Matsumi Suzuki that, as was gauged from the sounds of the
footsteps of Senator Aquino, as the Senator went down the bridge stairs, the shooting of the
Senator occurred while the Senator had stepped on the 11th step from the top.

At the ocular inspection conducted by this Court, with the prosecution and the defense in
attendance, it should be noted that the following facts were established as regards the bridge
stairs:

"Observations:

The length of one block covering the tarmac – 19’6";

The width of one block covering the tarmac – 10’;

The distance from the base of the staircase leading to the emergency tube to the Ninoy
marker at the tarmac – 12’6";

There are 20 steps in the staircase including the landing;

The distance from the first rung of the stairway up to the 20th rung which is the landing of
stairs – 20’8";

Distance from the first rung of the stairway up to the 20th rung until the edge of the exit door –
23’11";

Distance from the 4th rung up to the exit door – 21’;

Distance from the 5th rung up to the exit door – 19’11";

Length of one rung including railpost – 3’4";

Space between two rungs of stairway – 9";

 Width of each rung – 11-1/2";

Length of each rung (end to end) – 2’9":

Height of railpost from edge of rung to railing – 2’5".

(underlining supplied)20

The Sandiganbayan again exhaustively analyzed and discussed the forensic evidence in its
resolution dated November 15, 1990 denying the motion for reconsideration filed by the convicted
accused. The court held:

The Autopsy Report No. N-83-2236, Exhibit "NNNN-2-t-2" indicated a downward trajectory of the
fatal bullet when it stated that the fatal bullet was "forward, downward, and medially . . ."

xxx

II

The wound of entrance having been at a higher elevation than the wound of exit, there can
be no other conclusion but that the trajectory was downward. The fatal bullet, whether it be a
Smith and Wesson Caliber .357 magnum revolver or a .45 caliber, must have traveled at a
fast rate of speed and it stands to reason that it took a straight path from the wound of
entrance to the wound of exit. A hole indicating this straight path was proven to have existed.
If, as contended on cross-examination by Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz, that the bullet was
projected upwards, it ought to have exited at the roof of the head. The theory that the fatal
bullet was deflected by a mere petrous bone is inconceivable.

III

Since the wound of entrance appeared ovaloid and there is what is known as a contusion
collar which was widest at the superior portion, indicating an acute angle of approach, a
downward trajectory of the fatal bullet is conclusively indicated. This phenomenon indicates
that the muzzle of the fatal gun was at a level higher than that of the point of entry of the fatal
bullet.

IV

There was no hole from the petrous bone to the mandible where the fatal bullet had exited
and, thus, there is no support to the theory of Dr. Bienvenido Muñoz that the fatal bullet had
hit the petrous bone on an upward trajectory and had been deflected by the petrous bone
towards the mandible. Dr. Juanito Billote’s testimony in this regard had amplified the matter
with clarity.

xxx

These physical facts, notwithstanding the arguments and protestations of counsel for the
defense as now and heretofore avowed, compel the Court to maintain the holding: (1) that
the trajectory of the fatal bullet which hit and killed Senator Benigno Aquino, Jr. was
"forward, downward and medially"; (2) that the Senator was shot by a person who stood at a
higher elevation than he; and (3) that the Senator was shot and killed by CIC Rogelio
Moreno on the bridge stairs and not on the tarmac, in conspiracy with the rest of the accused
convicted herein.21

This Court affirmed said findings of the Sandiganbayan when it denied the petition for review in its
resolution of July 25, 1991. The Court ruled:

The Court has carefully considered and deliberated upon all the contentions of the
petitioners but finds no basis for the allegation that the respondent Sandiganbayan has
gravely erred in resolving the factual issues.
 The attempt to place a constitutional dimension in the petition is a labor in vain. Basically,
only questions of fact are raised. Not only is it axiomatic that the factual findings of the
Sandiganbayan are final unless they fall within specifically recognized exceptions to the rule
but from the petition and its annexes alone, it is readily apparent that the respondent Court
correctly resolved the factual issues.

xxx

The trajectory of the fatal bullet, whether or not the victim was descending the stairway or
was on the tarmac when shot, the circumstances showing conspiracy, the participants in the
conspiracy, the individual roles of the accused and their respective parts in the conspiracy,
the absence of evidence against thirteen accused and their co-accused Col. Vicente B.
Tigas, Jr., the lack of credibility of the witnesses against former Minister Jose D. Aspiras,
Director Jesus Z. Singson, Col. Arturo A. Custodio, Hermilo Gosuico, Major General
Prospero Olivas, and the shooting of Rolando Galman are all factual matters w[h]ich the
respondent court discussed with fairness and at length. The petitioners’ insistence that a few
witnesses in their favor should be believed while that of some witnesses against them should
be discredited goes into the question of credibility of witnesses, a matter which under the
records of this petition is best left to the judgment of the Sandiganbayan.22

The report of the forensic group essentially reiterates the theory presented by the defense
during the trial of the double murder case. Clearly, the report is not newly discovered, but rather
recently sought, which is not allowed by the Rules.23 If at all, it only serves to discredit the version of
the prosecution which had already been weighed and assessed, and thereafter upheld by the
Sandiganbayan.

The same is true with the statement of the alleged eyewitness, SPO4 Cantimbuhan. His narration
merely corroborates the testimonies of other defense witnesses during the trial that they saw
Senator Aquino already walking on the airport tarmac toward the AVSECOM van when a man in
blue-gray uniform darted from behind and fired at the back of the Senator’s head.24 The
Sandiganbayan, however, did not give weight to their account as it found the testimonies of
prosecution eyewitnesses Rebecca Quijano and Jessie Barcelona more credible. Quijano and
Barcelona testified that they saw the soldier behind Senator Aquino on the stairway aim and fire a
gun on the latter’s nape. As earlier quoted, the Sandiganbayan found their testimonies to be more
consistent with the physical evidence. SPO4 Cantimbuhan’s testimony will not in any way alter the
court’s decision in view of the eyewitness account of Quijano and Barcelona, taken together with the
physical evidence presented during the trial. Certainly, a new trial will only be allowed if the new
evidence is of such weight that it would probably change the judgment if admitted.25 Also,
new trial will not be granted if the new evidence is merely cumulative, corroborative or
impeaching.

As additional support to their motion for new trial, petitioners also claim that they were denied due
process because they were deprived of adequate legal assistance by counsel. We are not
persuaded. The records will bear out that petitioners were ably represented by Atty. Rodolfo U.
Jimenez during the trial and when the case was elevated to this Court. An experienced lawyer in
criminal cases, Atty. Jimenez vigorously defended the petitioners’ cause throughout the entire
proceedings. The records show that the defense presented a substantial number of witnesses and
exhibits during the trial. After the Sandiganbayan rendered its decision, Atty. Jimenez filed a petition
for review with this Court, invoking all conceivable grounds to acquit the petitioners. When the Court
denied the petition for review, he again filed a motion for reconsideration exhausting his deep
reservoir of legal talent. We therefore find petitioners’ claim to be unblushingly unsubstantiated. We
note that they did not allege any specific facts in their present motion to show that Atty. Jimenez had
been remiss in his duties as counsel. Petitioners are therefore bound by the acts and decisions of
their counsel as regards the conduct of the case. The general rule is that the client is bound by the
action of his counsel in the conduct of his case and cannot be heard to complain that the result of
the litigation might have been different had his counsel proceeded differently.26 We held in People
vs. Umali:27

In criminal as well as civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and
mistakes may have been made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as a result
of the ignorance, inexperience, or incompetence of counsel, does not furnish a ground for a
new trial.
 If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for reopening cases, there would never be
an end to a suit so long as new counsel could be employed who could allege and show that
prior counsel had not been sufficiently diligent, or experienced, or learned.

So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the
sufficiency, relevancy, materiality, or immateriality of a certain evidence, the proper defense,
or the burden of proof are not proper grounds for a new trial; and in general the client is
bound by the action of his counsel in the conduct of his case, and can not be heard to
complain that the result of the litigation might have been different had counsel proceeded
differently. (citations omitted)

Finally, we are not moved by petitioners’ assertion that the forensic evidence may have been
manipulated and misinterpreted during the trial of the case. Again, petitioners did not allege concrete
facts to support their crass claim. Hence, we find the same to be unfounded and purely speculative.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the motion is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.