THE POISON IS THE DOSE

Or how 'more egalitarianism' may work in

some places but not in all

Frank Hendriks

A comparison of the city development of Munich (Germany) and Birmingham (England) shows
the adverse consequences of excluding egalitarian-minded organizations and perspectives from
public decision making. Since the Second World War, Munich has become an economically
thriving and beautiful city in which people from all walks of life can feel at home. During the
same period of time, Birmingham has struggled economically, socially and aesthetically. Their
diverging paths, from quite similar starting positions, can be explained with the help of the
argument that in Munich a much more pluralistic policy regime has reigned, whereas in
Birmingham egalitarian views have been ignored until very recently. Yet, another attempt at
urban revitalization—this time in the multi-ethnic, impoverished Schilderswijk in The Hague, the
Netherlands—illustrates that policy making can also become too egalitarian. An in-depth study
of a municipal attempt to revitalize this neighbourhood reveals that this effort floundered, as it
was overly infused with egalitarian concerns and values.

Introduction
Cultural theory can be read as a plea for perspectivistic pluralism or, vice versa, as
a warning against the suppression of cultural perspectives that could shed light on
matters new and different from the light shed by perspectives that are commonly or
habitually used. In a comparative study, finished in the mid-1990s, I looked at post-war
urban planning in relation to the car in two European cities: Birmingham and Munich. In
the early post-war period, two of the four cultural perspectives distinguished in cultural
theory, or grid-group theory, appeared to be quite dominant in these two cities, as they
were in many other cities at the time: the hierarchical culture (in this policy field a culture
of 'research and development') and the individualistic culture (in this policy field a culture
of 'laissez-aller'). In terms of grid-group theory, they formed an 'establishment coalition'
along the 'positive diagonal'. In the 1960s, an egalitarian counter-culture became appar-
ent in many Western cities, approaching issues of urban traffic from an entirely different
angle—working along the 'negative diagonal' crosswise to the 'establishment coalition',
cultural theorists would say. In Munich, unlike Birmingham, the egalitarian counter-culture
was able to build a relatively strong position in the policy-making arena, equal—in terms
of influence, not in terms of perspective—to the already established policy cultures. The
added dose of egalitarianism in the cultural mix of policy making had a positive effect in
this particular policy field, and in this particular place. In Birmingham, perspective

Innovation, Vol. 17, No 4, 2004

ISSN 1351-1610 print/ISSN 1469-8412 online/04/040349-13
Carfax Publishina ® ^^^^ Interdisciplinary Centre for Comparative Research in the Social Sciences
' T>yio,s,F,andsc™p DOI: 10.1080/1351161042000291978
350 FRANK HENDRIKS

pluralism, and the related capacity for policy-oriented learning, remained relatively weak,
which did not do the city good—at least until the 1990s, when Birmingham had to take
huge corrective measures, almost 30 years later than Munich.
In the following section I will present some more detailed and contextual infor-
mation on the Birmingham-Munich comparison, as far as this is relevant to the discussion
of culturally rich, or 'clumsy', solutions. In subsequent sections I will move to a couple of
questions that follow from the Birmingham-Munich comparison. Theoretically most
pressing is the question of the status of egalitarianism. The notions of 'establishment
coalition' and 'establishment cultures' suggest that 'more egalitarianism' is almost always
a good thing. More of a counter-culture, more of a counterweight, is always welcome
when dealing with established ways of thinking and acting. Or is it?
Taking a case study from the Dutch city of The Hague as an example, I will argue
that 'more egalitarianism' is not always a good thing, and is not always a corrective to
established ways of thinking and acting either. In some places, at some times, egalitarian-
ism will work as an establishment culture itself, and will need correction rather than
reinforcement. In the words of Thompson et al. (1990) cultural theory stipulates: 'the
poison is the dose'. This can also be turned around: 'the cure is the dose'. The right
'antidote' may be healing, but the wrong dosage may be poisonous. This I will illustrate
with a case study of neighbourhood participation-promotion in The Hague.
In January 2001 The Hague initiated a project to promote 'multi-ethnic partici-
pation' in one of its most troubled neighbourhoods: the Schilderswijk. The project
inserted an extra dose of egalitarianism into a policy domain that was already character-
ized by a cultural coalescence of 'help-givers' on the one hand and 'help-receivers' on the
other. The project was targeted at those who. In terms of cultural theory, came closest to
fatalism. It was targeted at those in the different ethnic groups who needed a lot of help,
not at those in these groups who needed just a little assistance.
Referring to Milbrath's (1965) participation pyramid (many participate a little, few
participate a lot), the professional help-givers in the Schilderswijk focused one-sidedly on
the broad base of the participation pyramid: on the many who tend to participate less,
and who in neighbourhoods like the Schilderswijk find many structural, cultural and
individual constraints on their path to participate more. The participation-promotion
project in The Hague did not remove these constraints. Rather, it reinforced the cultural
coalescence between help-givers on the one hand and help-receivers on the other. The
relatively strong element of fatalism in the cultural mix of the Schilderswijk was not
pushed back, but was rather reinforced by professional help-givers inspired by an
egalitarian ethos. The development of a viable 'civic culture'—characterized by a rich
cultural mix, by confidence in collective and individual efficacy, and trust in the possibility
of taking action, when needed (cf. Almond & Verba, 1963, 1980; Thompson et al.,
1990)—has not been supported, but rather undermined.
To explain this, some observers use a politics of interest model or entertain some
sort of conspiracy theory ('help-givers have a vested interest in the subsistence of
help-needers, in the continuation of problems'). Below, I hope to show that cultural
theory works better as an explanatory framework in the case of The Hague, just as it does
in the cases of Birmingham and Munich. At the end of the article I will come back to the
notion of multiculturality, which in my view should not be constricted to the 'negative
diagonal'—the coalescence of egalitarianism and fatalism—but should be broadened to
include and mobilize all active cultures, and not only those that are deemed deserving
 THE POISON IS THE DOSE 351

and 'politically correct' from an egalitarian point of view. Learning needs le choc des
opinions, as pluriform as democratically possible.

The Cases of Munich versus Birmingham

Post-war Urban Planning

Birmingham (England) and Munich (Germany) present interesting cases for compar-
ative urban research, as they displayed similar opportunities for tabula rasa planning at
the end of the Second World War.^ Munich's city centre was almost totally in ruins.
Devastation in Birmingham was less complete, but nevertheless the city centre was
written off. Both cities had the opportunity to reconstruct the city centre in such a way
that it would be able to accommodate the expected rise of car ownership and car use.
Both cities made far-reaching plans to do so, but only Birmingham really made it all the
way. While Munich gradually turned away from the model of the car-oriented city,
Birmingham went ahead and became the European prototype of the car-dependent city.
Munich developed a multi-modal transportation system corresponding to a multi-func-
tional city centre, which worked as a magnet in attracting much-wanted activities and
enterprises, while Birmingham's mono-functional city centre did, basically, the opposite.
The contrast in policy-making patterns appeared to be strongly related to the
divergent ways in which Birmingham and Munich dealt with cultural bias and cultural
pluralism. Munich's policy-making system was characterized by inclusion, balance of, and
interaction between, rival cultures. Birmingham's policy-making system was characterized
by selective exclusion, lack of balance and defective interaction. This influenced the
quality and the level of 'policy-oriented learning' (cf Sabatier, 1988,1993). Two types (and
levels) of policy-oriented learning can be distinguished: (a) single-loop learning, being able
to detect and correct error in relation to a given set of operational norms, and (b)
double-loop learning, being able to take a double look at the situation by questioning the
relevance and the importance of operating norms. Single-loop learning tends to confine
policy making to a single-problem/single-solution approach, characterized by a focus on a
single-problem definition and, as a consequence, a fixation on a particular type of
solution. Double-loop learning, on the other hand, can push policy making up to a
multiple-problem/multiple-solution approach, characterized by sensitivity to more than one
way of defining and tackling a problem (Thompson & Warburton, 1985).
In Birmingham, policy-oriented learning appeared to be confined to 'single-loop
learning' for most of the post-war period. Policy makers were almost invariably focused
on the norm that growing car traffic should be accommodated. The car-accommodating
policy was based on an implicit consensus between hierarchical and individualistic
cultures. Egalitarian culture, which gained momentum in Munich in the 1960s and the
1970s, had a relatively weak position in Birmingham's policy community. It was not until
the end ofthe 1980s and the early 1990s that Birmingham's policy community appeared
to be able to take a double look at the normative premises of the car-accommodating
policy.
In Munich the rival policy cultures interacted much earlier and more intensively
than in Birmingham, where the hierarchical culture dominated policy making in the
absence of effective opposition. As a consequence, Munich's policy community did not
develop the sort of tunnel vision that Birmingham's policy community did. During the
352 FRANK HENDRIKS

post-war period, Munich has developed into one of the most successful European cities
in terms of both prosperity and liveability, and has surpassed Birmingham—which started
the post-war period in poll position—in both these terms.

Institutions Matter
The cases of Birmingham and Munich suggest a correlation between the level of
policy-oriented learning and the degree of cultural pluralism and interaction or, con-
versely, the degree of cultural blindness and the 'mobilization of bias'. Urban policies in
Birmingham and Munich were shaped by institutional settings that affected the mobiliza-
tion and the correction of cultural bias in different ways (cf. Schattschneider, 1961).
Birmingham's institutional setting supported hierarchical and individualistic policy
cultures ('pushing' and 'pulling' car-accommodating policies, respectively) to a greater
extent than Munich's institutional setting. Munich's institutional setting promoted an
egalitarian policy culture ('countering' car-accommodating policies) to a greater extent.
The egalitarian culture could build on more institutional opportunities to offer a counter-
weight, and to enter into alternative coalitions with individualistic and hierarchical policy
cultures. Post-war institutional reform was also geared to containing a fatalistic culture,
which was seen as anathema to the restoration of democracy in post-war Germany. This
contrasted with Birmingham's institutional setting, where the egalitarian policy culture
received relatively little institutional support, while the fatalistic culture received plenty of
room to grow in the background.
It is beyond the scope of this article to go into all the details of Birmingham's and
Munich's institutional settings. Some highlights of the effects of institutional design will
have to do for the purpose of illustration. The effects of institutional design can partly be
understood as formative, or identity-shaping, effects. Institutions shape and cultivate the
norms and goals that actors value, the habits that they cherish, and the categories that
they use in constructing meaning. The effects of institutional design can also be
understood as relational, or interaction-arranging, effects. Institutions support, empower,
or constrain cultural biases in terms of getting across and getting connected in the
policy-making arena. Some institutional settings present strategic advantages to a par-
ticular cultural bias, or to a coalition of cultural biases, while other settings present
strategic disadvantages.
In the cases of Birmingham and Munich, identity-shaping effects can partly be
traced to the dominant administrative doctrines of the UK and the Federal Republic of
Germany. A hierarchical culture has been cultivated by Westminister-Unitarism with its
emphasis on centralization and concentration. The decentralized administrative doctrine
of post-war Germany, on the other hand, has been effective in suppressing a hierarchical
culture in a variety of ways. Underlying the British Westminster system is a distinction
between 'high politics' and 'low polities'. This distinction has cultivated a hierarchical
approach to the system of home administration. The hierarchical lines are much less
accentuated in the organic administrative doctrine underlying Germany's Co-operative
Federalism. The individualistic bias has been cultivated by the pluralist political philoso-
phy that accompanies the English 'stateless society', more than by the organic tradition
that accompanies the German 'state society'. The egalitarian culture has found a better
seedbed in the German soziale Rechtstaat than in the British minimal state, with its
emphasis on negative freedom rights. Institutionalized policy styles support these pat-
 THE POiSON IS THE DOSE 353

terns. The British policy style is generally more incremental and reactive. The German
policy style is generally more comprehensive and proactive.
Interaction-arranging effects can be traced to institutions that helped or hindered
policy cultures to interact in the urban realm. Channels between Birmingham's city
government and civil society conventionally offered more opportunities to the hierarchi-
cal and the individualistic 'establishment cultures' than to the egalitarian counter-culture.
In Munich, new channels between government and society were established after the
Second World War—Neighbourhood Councils, Citizens' Assemblies, Munchner Forum—
which have been relatively open and supportive to the egalitarian policy culture from the
start. For the egalitarian counter-culture, the German new-politics party Die Grunen
established a helpful bridgehead in politics at various levels. A similarly strong bridgehead
for counter-cultural concerns did not develop in Westminster, nor in Birmingham City
Council. The British 'first-past-the-post' electoral system proved to be a high barrier for a
green or postmaterialist party. By contrast, the threshold built into the German electoral
system proved to be a stimulus rather than a barrier to the merging of a number of
movements into one green new-politics party. Government in Germany is dependent on
the agreement and co-operation of policy-making partners to a much greater degree
than government in the UK. In the German system of Co-operative Federalism, blocking
powers and veto powers are more dispersed than in the British Westminster-style unitary
state. German counter-cultural movements can link up with a host of rules and proce-
dures, and with a multitude of administrative bodies, all representing bits of blocking
power.
In conclusion, the institutional design of Birmingham's policy-making system con-
tributed to the development of a comparatively strong, hierarchically biased
road-building sector, which was supported rather than corrected by outside forces. In
Munich, post-war policies with respect to the car were made in an institutional setting,
which countered the tendency to close policy communities, and which more or less
forced policy actors with different views to interact. The relationships between engineers,
planners, politicians and citizens were organized in ways that stimulated cross-cultural
checks and balances. In other words, relatively complicated and 'clumsy' institutions gave
rise to comparatively rich, polyvalent policy solutions—contrasted by comparatively thin,
biased policy solutions developed in a rather straightforward, 'lean and mean' policy-mak-
ing system.

Pressing Questions
Revisiting the Birmingham-Munich comparison, two pressing questions come to
the fore—questions relevant to thinking about the production of clumsy solutions.
First, how to interpret the latest developments, i.e. the developments after the
1944-94 timeframe? In particular, how to interpret Birmingham's recent turn towards
urban policies that should make the city more liveable, and more attractive to the
knowledge workers and the (business) tourists that are supposed to be key drivers of the
new, competitive, 'post-Fordist' city? Spirou and Loftman (2004) show that this turn is
rather forcefully implemented by city government, giving a strong swing to the pendu-
lum, very much in line with the majoritarian, power-concentrating institutional setting
just described. Since the 1990s, Birmingham has witnessed a radical turn towards
city-centre policies that Munich had already started to develop in the 1960s, and in a
354 FRANK HENDRIKS

much more incremental, piecemeal way. Institutional complexity, and associated checks
and balances, kept Munich away from the type of pendulum politics (either this or that!)
that underlies Birmingham's institutional order. But there is a flipside to institutional
complexity: it is difficult to make decisions and to implement them in a time-efficient
manner. And that is where Birmingham's institutional setting came in handy. When the
city had finally accepted the weakness of its long-standing city-centre policy—unfortu-
nately much later than most other European cities in its league—then it was also very
quick and decisive in giving the pendulum a swing in the other direction. The swift
makeover of Birmingham's city centre is quite impressive, at least in terms of decisiveness.
Spirou and Loftman (2004) show that this decisiveness is again accompanied by cultural
bias and cultural blindness, different from the bias/blindness combination of the period
1944-94, but supported by the same institutional logic.
Second, a more encompassing question comes to the fore: does the comparative
analysis presented above justify the intensified promotion of egalitarianism in public
policy making? Does it justify the promotion of what is commonly (but incorrectly)
understood as 'multicuituralism' in urban democracy? This question is more difficult to
answer. It needs more detail, more qualification, more words. The only short answer to be
had is: it depends. If one deals with a policy field where the 'positive diagonal'—the
'establishment' diagonal connecting hierarchy and individualism—tends to be dominant,
then the institutional promotion of egalitarianism may be worthwhile, as the comparison
of urban traffic policy in Birmingham and Munich shows. In Munich, egalitarianism was
supported by institutions for public participation and protest, albeit not to the extent that
the countervailing cultures were pushed away altogether. Policy-oriented learning needs
a system of checks and balances, not a system of chokes and biases. So, if one deals with
a policy field where the 'negative diagonal'—the non-establishment diagonal connecting
egalitarianism and fatalism—tends to be quite strong already, then the amplified pro-
motion of egalitarianism may work out negatively, supporting the negative diagonal to
the point of sapping viable democratic relations, as the following case study will show.

The Case of The Hague

Multi-ethnic Participation
Many Dutch cities have initiated public-participation policies that should make
public participation more 'multicultural', especially in neighbourhoods that have become
highly multi-ethnic during the last four decades.^ In January 2001, The Hague initiated an
interesting experiment with multicultural participation—or, in administrative jargon, 'pilot
project multi-ethnic participation'—in one of the best-known multi-ethnic neighbour-
hoods of the Netherlands: the Schilderswijk, located in the heart of The Hague.^
Pilot project multi-ethnic participation was expected to bring a second wave of
public (this time, 'multi-ethnic') participation to the Schilderswijk. The first wave of public
participation (rather mono-ethnic and blue collar in character) washed over the neigh-
bourhood in the 1970s, in a period of intense neighbourhood restructuring and
rebuilding. In its slipstream, a range of rather strong residents' organizations developed,
institutionalized and finally merged into three residents' associations. Around the turn of
the century, these residents' associations were perceived by policy makers to pose
something of a problem. While the Schilderswijk had turned into a fully-fledged multi-
 THE POISON IS THE DOSE 355

ethnic neighbourhood—with a population of almost 90% immigrant, 'non-Dutch' de-

scent—the three neighbourhood associations remained basically mono-ethnic—with an
active membership of about 90% Dutch descent. The residents' associations kept a
privileged position in consultation procedures, but they were perceived to be less and
less representative of the neighbourhood.
Another aspect of the problem, as perceived by policy makers, was a pattern of
non-participation of and non-interaction across immigrant communities. In 1999, The
Hague commissioned a study of the Schilderswijk, revealing a comparatively low level of
'social capital' in the Schilderswijk. In so far as they existed, supra-individual institutions
were organized along familial, religious and ethnic lines—lines that do much less in terms
of 'bridging' than in terms of 'bonding', Putnam (2000) would say. But even the level of
'bonding' social capital should not be overestimated, the study suggested. It reported a
rather low level of organization, of voluntary association, and a virtually non-existent 'civic
culture'. Social patterns revealed a tendency towards a culture of fatalism, as cultural
theorists would call it. Social institutions governing the public domain appeared to be
rather low group (little sense of community) and high grid (strong individual regulation,
especially through religious prescriptions and expectations).''
Pilot project multi-ethnic participation was initiated to bring a radical change in this
situation. Quite drastically, the three institutionalized neighbourhood associations were
cut off from the municipal subsidies on which they had come to depend. Municipal
money and energy were going to be put into four 'neighbourhood offices', each open to
all residents' groups, staffed by publicly funded professionals specializing in matters of
'physical maintenance' and 'social integration'. An important part of the pilot project was
the reshuffling and partial relocation of the professional-help industry, which had prolifer-
ated strongly in the Schilderswijk during the previous four decades.^
In official language, the pilot project was designed to achieve 'optimal, multi-ethnic
citizen participation', with an eye on 'furthering social cohesion and integration'. With the
pilot project, 'the municipality wants to achieve growing participation among immi-
grants'. The solution would be a way of organizing in which 'citizens participate, in
multiple, open and intercultural networks'. The municipality would like the pilot project
to open a new chapter in its minderhedenbeieid (minorities policy), which once started as
migrantenbeieid (migrant policy), and which has become integratiebeleid (integration
policy) 'with room and respect for social diversity, and the wish to invest in a common
ground of norms and values'.*
The ethos behind the pilot project could be described as 'egalitarian professional-
ism' (or 'professional egalitarianism'). Its logic is predominantly egalitarian (social
cohesion, access for all, equal voice, bottom up, open, intercultural, multi-ethnic, broad
citizen participation). Its agents are predominantly professionals specializing in pro-
fessional help and assistance. Most prominent are the professions of community work and
social work. The political figurehead of the pilot project is a social-democratic alderman
charged with neighbourhood governance. It is not argued here that these actors exhibit
'egalitarian professionalism' in every aspect of life. There is no research available at that
level. There is, however, extensive research available at the level of the pilot project,
following the pilot project from its initiation and taking stock after three years of
experimentation. And this research quite clearly exhibits an ethos of egalitarian profes-
sionalism, officially aiming to increase multi-ethnic participation in the Schilderswijk, but
failing to really achieve this in practice.^
356 FRANK HENDRIKS

In practice, multi-ethnic participation and interaction has hardly grown in the

Schilderswijk since the introduction of the pilot project. A culture of non-participation and
non-interaction—a culture of fatalism, as cultural theorists would call it—has hardly been
suppressed, but has rather been maintained and reinforced. After three years of trying to
stimulate multi-ethnic participation in the way described above, Milbrath's 'participation
pyramid' (many participate a little, few participate a lot) was paramount and more skewed
than ever (many participate hardly, very few participate a little more). The pilot project,
designed and run by professionals inspired by an egalitarian ethos, reinforced this pattern
rather than diminished it. The few that participated somewhat more in the past—those
from the old neighbourhood associations—have been pushed aside as being 'non-rep-
resentative'.* Attention has shifted, quite radically, from the thin 'top' of the participation
pyramid (the few that tended to participate a bit more) to the broad 'basis' of the
participation pyramid (the many that tended to participate hardly or less). The interesting
middle part of the participation pyramid—where upwardly mobile participation potential
is most likely to be found—has been skipped and neglected dramatically. The pilot
project was aimed at those who needed a lot of help, not at those who needed a little
assistance. It was aimed at those who stayed far behind, not at those who—with a little
support—could have walked in front.
Research reveals that those who can walk in front, those who need just a little
assistance, could be found in each of the major ethnic groups in the Schilderswijk. The
problem is that they were not attracted by the pilot project at all. 'Much ado about
nothing, much talk and little substance', remarked a highly educated, young Moroccan
woman when interviewed. She would not like to be associated with a participation policy
targeted at 'the laggards' in the neighbourhood, as she called it. 'Neighborhood office?
I am some sort of neighborhood office myself, for my own family, said a young, upwardly
mobile Surinamese: These neighborhood offices are more appropriate for the less-inte-
grated immigrants in the neighborhood. My friends and I, we are already integrated, we
don't need that type of policy.'
In interviews and expert meetings, professionals central to the pilot project
confirmed that the participation policy was targeted in the way just described. In
retrospect, many were able to detect the inherent weaknesses of this targeting. They
expressed a culture of egalitarian-inspired professionalism, not egalitarian radicalism of
the extreme type that puts on blinkers that are difficult to remove. But in the everyday
practice of policy making they unmistakably expressed an egalitarian bias and associated
blindness. They expressed a rather paternalistic 'helpers' culture' focused on producing
help for the helpless—typically along the negative diagonal, cultural theorists would
say—in a relatively biased and blind way. In an expert meeting one professional talked
about 'professional paternalism', and about the professional 'supply-side' being dominant
in designing and delivering participation policy. There is too little bottom-up, demand-
led, and too much top-down, supply-led, activity', added another professional.'
With their 'supply' of help, the professional help-suppliers tended to maintain the
'demand' for help and to confirm the self-sustaining dynamic of dependency: residents
taking a dependent position vis-a-vis professionals and professional giving help without
taking away the need for help, thus perpetuating relations of dependency, feelings of
helplessness and expressions of frustration, anger and bitterness. Expressions like these
were paramount in interviews among citizens coming from different ethnic groups in the
Schilderswijk. Little trust—in the future, in the changeability of things, in personal
 THE POISON IS THE DOSE 357

efficacy, in fellow citizens, in politicians—came to the fore in ways that should have been
unlikely to be found in the Schilderswijk, if the pilot multi-ethnic participation had lived
up to its expectations.
Some scattered, but illustrative, quotes taken from interviews with different immi-
grant residents are illuminating: 'Most of the people in this neighborhood do nothing in
terms of participation.' 'We don't speak the language, so no one will take us seriously';
'We are not being heard'; 'We don't trust these false politicians, they are liars!'; Things will
not get better as long as there are so many immigrants in the Schilderswijk'; This
neighborhood is full of immigrants and they are not important enough'; The Schilder-
swijk cannot be saved, all this research is useless'; This whole neighborhood does not
interest me anymore. I used to mind, but now I don't care anymore. Even when someone
gets killed on my doorstep, I would not call the police. I would keep well out of it. I just
can't be bothered.'
Before the pilot project started, a book appeared with the telling title De zwijgende
portieken van de Schilderswijk [The Silent Porches of the Schilderswijk] (Mulder, 1999). This
title referred to the culture of non-interaction in the Schilderswijk: even neighbours
sharing the same front door did not exchange words and views. Three years after the
pilot project took effect, the same title would still be quite apt for a book describing the
multi-ethnic archipelago of the Schilderswijk. The Schilderswijk is still one big
archipelago, with many islands, and very few connecting bridges between them', a
professional said in one of the expert meetings. 'First of all, the attitude is one of distrust
and complaint', observed another professional: 'not only vis a vis the government, but
also vis a vis the social group, when one gets invited to participate.' 'All groups in the
Schilderswijk are full of cynicism', wrote a third one in a questionnaire.
These abundant expressions of frustration, anger and bitterness, related to feelings
of powerlessness, inadequacy and dependency, are hardly the type of multi-ethnic 'civic
culture' that the designers of the pilot project envisaged but nevertheless represent the
type of culture that came to the fore three years after the initiation of the multi-ethnic
participation project.

Again: Institutions Matter

In the case of the Schilderswijk, local government attempted to further immigrant
integration in the public domain through an experiment with 'multi-ethnic participation'.
Noble intentions turned into disappointing results. After three years of working with a
new model of citizen participation, multi-ethnic participation and social integration has
not come closer—quite the contrary, as in-depth empirical research has revealed.
In terms of cultural theory, it could be argued that the participation-promotion
project inserted an extra dose of egalitarianism into a policy domain that was already
characterized by a cultural coupling along the negative diagonal, a coalescence of
egalitarian 'help-givers' on the one hand, and fatalistic 'help-receivers' on the other. The
participation-promotion project in The Hague did not break up this alliance. Rather, it
reinforced it. To explain this, some observers use a politics of interest model or entertain
some sort of conspiracy theory ('help-givers have a vested interest in the subsistence of
help-needers, a vested interest in the continuation of social problems'). However, empiri-
cal research did not support such interpretations. It did not reveal some economic or
358 FRANK HENDRIKS

self-serving rationale, but rather a cultural and institutional logic behind the plans and
actions of the professionals involved.
The professionals involved focused attention on the residents and groups that were
most behind in terms of participation, mainly because the cultural and institutional
contexts in which they operated told them that this was the right thing to do (cf. Douglas,
1970, 1986). It was a matter of reaching out to le different along the negative diagonal.
Reaching out to others, to successful ethnic business people in the neighbourhood for
example, would have been inappropriate in the eyes of their professional peers, as well
as in their own eyes, trained as they have been in a particular way. The most important
professionals involved have been socialized in the professions of social help and com-
munity work. In the Dutch setting, these professions have in turn been socialized in a
welfare-state ethos with strong egalitarian overtones.
It would be too simple to label the Dutch politico-administrative context as outright
egalitarian. One of the strengths of Dutch 'polder politics' is its relative openness to
different cultures, not only the egalitarian. Polder politics builds on the legacy of 'the
merchant' and 'the vicar', of 'the technocrat' and 'the protester' (Hendriks & Toonen,
2001). In this particular institutional field, however, the egalitarian culture has been able
to grow comparatively strong. The professions of community work and social assistance
have been highly influenced by the egalitarian sub-current, which has waxed significantly
in the Netherlands since the 1960s. As I have elaborated above, the institutional effects
have not only been formative or 'identity-shaping' in nature. They have also been
relational or 'interaction-arranging' in nature. The effects could be traced quite well in the
case of the Schilderswijk. The egalitarian-inspired professionals in the Schilderswijk
expressed an institutionally pre-arranged notion of not only who they are but also whom
they are for, that is, to whom they should reach out in their professional practice.
At the other end of the negative diagonal, at the 'receiving end' in the case of the
Schilderswijk, institutions also produced identity-shaping and interaction-arranging ef-
fects. The notion of 'minorization', used in relation to Dutch minorities policy by Rath
(1991), comes to mind. 'Minorization' is a way of naming and framing, through which
individuals get lumped together as categories of help and care, which gain quantitative
('minorities') as well as qualitative ('minors') connotations. Minorization is also a way of
acting, of policy making, which tends to approach people as subjects and dependants,
and which tends to be self-fulfilling in the prophecy that people will always need help.
A culture of fatalism—a culture of marginalization and dependency—which had already
developed quite strongly in the Schilderswijk, has been fortified rather than weakened by
the 'minorization' that has been inherent in public policy geared to further multi-ethnic
participation.
Without doubt, the institutions of the professional help industry are not the sole
fortifiers of fatalism in the Schilderswijk. To explain the relatively strong element of
fatalism in the neighbourhood's cultural mix, one should also look at social and economic
factors that explain why many immigrants in the Schilderswijk are comparatively poor,
poorly educated, socio-economically excluded, little fluent in the Dutch language, and
distrusting of politics and policy making. One should then also look at the religious
backgrounds and political traditions that many immigrants bring with them, coming from
relatively traditional rural areas of homelands such as Morocco and Turkey. I do not have
the space here to map all the underlying factors of fatalism at the receiving end of the
negative diagonal. With this analysis I hope to have shown that inserting an extra element
 THE POISON IS THE DOSE 359

of egalitarianism at the other end, at the providing end, of the negative diagonal did not
help at all in terms of diminishing fatalism and building a culturally rich, diverse and
viable civic culture (cf. Almond & Verba, 1963, 1980; Thompson et al., 1990).

Conclusion

Cultural theory can be read as a plea for multicuituralism, but only in a very special
way, diverging from the way in which multicuituralism has been promoted in The Hague.
In The Hague, and more specifically in the Schilderswijk, the promotion of multicuitural-
ism has been confined to what cultural theorists would call the 'negative diagonal': the
coalescence of egalitarianism and fatalism. Multicuituralism is often understood—misun-
derstood I would say—in this fashion. The case of The Hague shows what the result can
be: a self-perpetuating coupling of help-givers and help-needers, far removed from the
type of multicuituralism that cultural theory would support. Taking cultural theory
seriously, the concept of multicuituralism would not be confined to the negative diagonal
but would be broadened to include and mobilize all the active cultures, and not only
those that are deemed deserving and politically correct from an egalitarian point of view.
Multicuituralism in a grid-group sense would mean the activation of perspectivistic
pluralism, the mobilization of voices coming from all corners of the cultural typology.
Institutions make a crucial difference in this respect, as the cases of Birmingham and
Munich show. 'Clumsy solutions' (Verweij & Thompson, 2005)—i.e. culturally rich, diverse
and resilient solutions, to be distinguished from culturally poor, biased and short-sighted
solutions—tend to be produced by institutionally rich, diverse and resilient institutional
settings, settings that promote instead of limit le choc des opinions, which is crucial to all
social and political learning.

NOTES
1. For a detailed discussion of these two cases, see Hendriks (1999). A more theoretical
approach to the connection between policy-oriented learning and institutional structur-
ing—presented here in brief—can be found in Hendriks (2000, pp. 281-297).
2. The (limited) integration of immigrants has become a politicized topic in recent years,
having been the subject of pacification and accommodation for some time.
3. With a registered population of 33,400 inhabitants—87% of migrant or non-Dutch
descent (24% Turkish, 20% Moroccan, 24% West-Indian-Surinamese, 12% Dutch)—the
Schilderswijk is one of the best-known examples of a multi-ethnic neighbourhood in the
Netherlands.
4. Source: Gebiedsbeschrijving Schilderswijk (Neighborhood Analysis Schilderswijk), Dienst
Onderwijs, Cultuur en Welzijn, Gemeente Den Haag, 1999.
5. The document outlining 'the new formula for multi-ethnic participation in the Schilder-
swijk' (Formule voor multi-etnische bewonersparticipatie. Den Haag, Oct. 2000) includes
a densely dotted map, pinpointing all the offices and counters for professional help and
assistance in the Schilderswijk in the year 2000. The document also includes a map of
the new, desired situation: concentration and integration of particular elements of help
and assistance in four neighbourhood offices, servicing different parts of the Schilder-
swijk.
6. Literal translations from: Gemeente Den Haag, Raadsvoorstel, Een nieuw elan voor de
Schilderswijk, Pilot Bewonersparticipatie, 28 Nov. 2000; Gemeente Den Haag, De kracht
360 FRANK HENDRIKS

van Den Haag (periode 2000-03); Bureau Attema & van de Wetering, Formule voor
multi-etnische bewonersparticipatie in de Haagse Schilderswijk, Eindrapportage, Oct.
2000; Gemeente Den Haag, Beleidsprogramma 1998-2002; Gemeente Den Haag, Retro-
spectief, Haags integratiebeleid in vogelvlucht, het laatste kwart van de twintigste eeuw.
Den Haag, 2001.
7. This research has been reported in Hendriks (2003).
8. 'We were discarded just like that, after all these years of doing voluntary neighborhood
work. And we are not even involved in the making of the new participation model', one
of them remarked in an interview. 'We are corrected like little children, as if we are to
blame and no one else has done anything wrong', said another: 'We are about the only
ones active in this neighborhood, and then we are blamed for the fact that immigrants
participate less in the neighborhood. We have tried everything to get them involved,
but you don't get them in.'
9. Getting immigrants more involved in neighbourhood politics, and building bridges
between different ethnic communities, was supposed to be the stronghold of the new
neighbourhood offices. Thus far, they have not been very successful in that respect.
Neighbourhood offices and related activities have attracted only few 'participants', only
marginally distinguishable from the vast majority who say 'don't know' or 'not inter-
ested' to the question that asks what neighbourhood offices mean to them. The few
participants that do show up at the gate of the city's participation policy show up with
highly particularistic and individualistic questions: a tax form needs to be filled out, a
waste pipe needs to be fixed, etc. These are real issues to the people involved, but they
are not the types of issues around which multi-ethnic participation grows.

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