The Sword and The Shield The Mitrokhin Archive and The Secret History of The KGB OCR PDF

THE
THE
SIllOHD
A N D THE
AND THE
SHIELD
BY
BY CHRISTOPHER
C H R I S T O P H E R ANDREW
ANDREW
THEOPHILE DELCASSE AND

THEOPHILEDELCASSE A N D THE
THE MAKING
M A K I N G OF
OF THE
THE ENTENTE CORDIALE
ENTENTECORDIALE
THE
THE FIRST
F I R S T WO
WORLDRLDWAR:
WAR:CAUSES
CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES
AND CONSEQUENCES
(VOLUME 19
(VOLUME 1 9 OF
OF THE
THE HAMLYN
HAMLYN HISTORY
HISTORY OF
OF THE
THE WORLD)
WORLD)
FRANCE OVERSEAS: THE

FRANCEOVERSEAS: GREAT WAR
THEGREAT WAR AND
A N D THE
THE CLI MAX OF
CLIMAX OF FRENCH IMPERIAL
FRENCHIMPERIAL
EXPANSION (WITH
EXPANSION(WITH A.S.
A.S. KANYA-FORSTNER)
KANYA-FORSTNER)
THE
THE MI SSING DIMENSION:
MISSING DIMENSION:GOVERNMENTS
GOVERNMENTSANDAND INTELLIGENCECOMMUNITIES
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITIES
ININ
THE
THE TWENTIETH CENTURY(WITH
TWENTIETH CENTURY (WITH DAVID
DAVID DILKS)
DILKS)
HER
HER MAJESTY'S
MAJESTY'S SECRET
SECRET SERVICE:
SERVICE: THE
THE MAKING
M A K I N G OF THE
OF THE
BRITISH
BRITISH INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE COMMUNITY
COMMUNITY
CODEBREAKING
CODEBREAKING AND
AND SIGNALS
SIGNALS INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE AND
A N D INTERNATIONAl RELATIONS, 1900-1945
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS, 1900-1 945
(WITH JEREMY NOAKES}
(WITH JEREMY NOAKES}
KGB:
KGB: THE
THE INSIDE
INSIDE STORY
STORY OF
OF ITS
ITS FOREIGN
FOREIGN OPERATIONS
OPERATIONS FROM
FROM LENIN
LENIN TO
TO GORBACHEV
GORBACHEV
(WITH
(WITH OLEG GORDIEVSKY)
OLEG GORDIEVSKY)
INSTRUCTIONS
INSTRUCTIONS FROM
FROM THE
THE CENTRE:
CENTRE: TOP
TOP SECRET
SECRET FILES
FILES ON
ON
KGB
KGB FOREIGN OPERATIONS, 1975-1985
FOREIGN OPERATIONS, 1975-1 985
(PUBLISHED
(PUBLISHED IN
I N THE
THE USA
USA AS: COMRADE KRYUCHKOV'S
AS: COMRADE KRYUCHKOV'S INSTRUCTIONS)
INSTRUCTIONS)
(WITH
(WITH OLEG GORDIEVSKY)
OLEG GORDIEVSKY)
MORE
MORE 'INSTRUCTIONS
'INSTRUCTIONS FROM
FROM THE
THE CENTRE':
CENTRE': TOP
TOP SECRET FILES ON
SECRETFILES ON KGB
KGB
GLOBAL OPERATIONS, 1975-1985
GLOBAL OPERATIONS, 1975-1 985
(WITH
(WITH OLEG
OLEG GORDIEVSKY)
GORDIEVSKY)
FOR THEPRESIDENT'S
FORTHE PRESIDENT'S EYES ONLY:
EYES ONLY: SECRET
SECRET INTELLIGENCE
INTELLIGENCE AND
AND THE
THE
AMERICAN
AMERICAN PRESIDENCY
PRESIDENCY FROM
FROM WASHINGTON
WASHINGTON TO
TO BUSH
BUSH
ETERNAL
ETERNAL VIGILANCE?
VIGILANCE?
FIFTY YEARS OF
FIFTYYEARS OF THE CIA
THE CIA
(WITH
[WITH RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES)
RHODRI JEFFREYS-JONES)
This Page Intentionally Left Blank
CHRISTOPHER
RnDREUJ
AND
AND
V RSI L I
IDITROHHIn
B
BASIC
E
BOOKS
BOOKS
A
A MEMBER
M E M B E R OF
OF THE
THE
PERSEUS
P E R S E U SBBOOKS
O O K SG RGROUP
OUP
Copyright 01999
Copyright © 1999 by
by Christopher
ChristopherAndrew
Andrew
Introduction
Introduction to
to the
thePaperback
PaperbackEdition 02001
Edition© 2001
Published
Published by
by Basic
BasicBooks,
Books,
A
A Member
Member of
of the
the Perseus
PerseusBooks
BooksGroup
Group
All rights
rights reserved.
reserved.Printed
Printedininthe
theUnited
UnitedStates of America.
States No No
of America. partpart
of this
of book
this book
may
may be
bereproduced
reproducedininanyany
manner whatsoever
manner whatsoeverwithout written
without permission
written except except
permission
in
in the
the case
case of
of brief
briefquotations
quotationsembodied
embodiedin critical articles
in critical and reviews.
articles For intor-
and reviews. For infor-
mation,
mation, address
address Basic
Basic Books,
Books,10
10 East
East 53rd
53rdStreet,
Street, New
NewYork, NY 10022-5299.
York, NY 10022-5299.
Unless
Unless otherwise
otherwise credited,
credited, photos
photos are
arefrom
fromthe
theauthors'
authors’collections.
collections.
Designed
Designed by
by Victoria
VictoriaKuskowski
Kuskowski
A
A CIP catalog
catalog record
recordfor
forthis
thisbook hashas
book been applied
been for from
applied the the
for from
Library
Library of ofCongress.
Congress.
ISBN
ISBN 0-465-003 12-5
0-465-00312-5
01
01 02
0 2 // 110
0 9
9 8 7 6 5
5 44 3
F-
IN
IN M E MORY OF
MEMORY OF liM
" MAA""
CONTENTS
CONTENTS
Abbreviations
Abbreviationsand Acronyms
andAcronyms xixi
The
TheEvolution
Evolutionof theKGB,
ofthe KGB,1917-1991
r917-rpy xv
xv
The
TheTransliteration
Transliterationof
ofRussian
RussianNames
Names xvii
xvii
FForeword
oreword xix
xix
Introduction
Introductiontotothe
thePaperback
PaperbackEdition
Edition xxi
xxi
11 The Mitrokhin Archive

TheMitrokhin Archive 11
22 From Lenin's Cheka

FromLenin’s Cheka toto Stalin's
Stalin’sOGPU
OGPU 23
23
33 The
T h eGGreat
r e a t Illegals
Illegals 42
42
44 The Magnificent
TheMagnificent Five
Five 56
56
55 Terror
Terror 68
68
66 War
War 89
89
77 The Grand
T h eG r a n d Alliance
Alliance 104
1 04
88 Victory
Victory 122
122
99 From
FromWar toCold
War to Cold War
War 137
137
10
1 o The
T h eMain
M a i nAdversary
Adversary
Part
PartI:r:North
NorthAmerican
AmericanIllegals
Illegalsin
inthe
the1950S
r950 j. 162
1 62
11
11 The
T h eMain
M a i nAdversary
Adversary
Part
Part2:2:Walk-ins
Walk-insand
andLegal
LegalResidencies
Residenciesin
i nthe
theEarly
Early Cold
ColdWar
War 176
176
12
12 The
T h eMain
M a i nAdversary
Adversary
Part 3: Illegals
Fart3: Illegalsafter
aftey/1.bel"
Xbel” 190
1 90
13
13 The
T h eMain
M a i nAdversary
Adversary
Part4:4:Walk-ins
Part Walk-insand
andLegal
LegalResidencies
Residenciesin
inthe
theLater
LaterCold
ColdWar
War 203
203
14
14 Political
PoliticalWarfare:
Warfare:Active
ActiveMeasures
Measures and
and the
the Main
MainAdversary
Adversary 224
2 24
15
15 PROGRESS Operations
PROGRESSOperations
Part
PartI:I:Crushing
Crushingthe
thePrague
PragueSpring
Spring 247
247
1 6 PROGRESS
16 PROGRESSOperations
Operations
PPart
art 2:
2: Spying onthe
Spying on theSoviet
SovietBloc
Bloc 262
262
C oo nn tt ee nn tt ss / x
x
17
17 The
The KGB and
and Western
Parties Communist Parties
Western
Communist 276
2 76
18
18 Eurocommunism
Eurocommunism 294
2 94
19
19 Ideological
Ideological Subversion
Subversion
Part I:
I: The
Dissidents
The
the War
WarAgainst the Dissidents
Against 307
307
20
20 Ideological Subversion
Ideological Subversion
Part 2:
2: The Victory
Victory of
of the Dissidents
Dissidents 322
322
War Cold 21
the
21 SIGINT
SIGINT in
in the Cold War 3 37
337
22
22 Special
Special Tasks
Tasks
Part I:
r: From
From Marshal Tito
Tito to
t o RudolfNureyev
RudoYNureyev 356
356
23
23 Special
Special Tasks
Tasks
2:
PartAndropov
2: The
The Andropov Era and Beyond
Beyond 374
374
24
24 Cold
Cold War
War Operations
OperationsAgainst
AgainstBritain
Britain
the I:
Part r:After
“MagnzficentAfter the "Magnificent Five"
Five” 397
397
25
25 Cold
Cold War
War Operations
OperationsAgainst
AgainstBritain
Britain
Part 2:
2: After
Operation After Operation FOOT 417
417
26
26 The
T h e Federal
Federal Republic of
Republic of Germany
Germany 437
437
27
27 France
France and
and Italy
Italyduring
duringthe Cold
the War:
Cold Agent
War: Penetration
Agent Penetration
Active and
and Active Measures 460
460
28
28 The
T h e Penetration
Penetration
andand Persecution of
Persecution of the
the Soviet
Soviet Churches
Churches 486
486
29
29 The
T of
hRisePolish
Pope Pope and the Rise of Solidarity
Solidarity
e the
Polish
and 508
508
30
30 The
T h e Polish
Polish Crisis
Crisis
and and
the the Crumbling of
Crumbling of the
the Soviet
BlocBloc
Soviet 517
517
31
31 Conclusion:
Conclusion: From
From the One-PartyState
the One-party Statetoto the Yeltsin
the Presidency
Yeltsin Presidency 544
544
Appendices
Appendices
A
A KGB Chairmen,
Chairmen, 19I7-z6
1917-26 566
566
B
B Heads
Heads of
of Foreign Intelligence, 19Z0-99
ForeignIntelligence, 1920-99 567
567
c
C The Organization of
The Organization of the
the KGB 568
568
D
D The Organization of
The Organization of the
the KGB First ChiefDirectorate
First Chief Directorate 570
570
EE The Organization of aa KGB Residency
The Organization Residency 571
571
Notes
Notes 572
572
Bibliography 671
67 1
Index
Index 685
685
A
ABBB
BREVI
R E V IATIONS
A T I O N SA AND
N DA C A
R CRONY
O N Y M SMS
AFSA Armed
Armed Forces
Forces Security
Security[SIGINT]
[SIGINT] Agency
Agency [USA]
[USA]
AKEL
AKEL Cyprus
Cyprus Communist
Communist Party
Party
Amtorg
Amtorg American-Soviet
American-Soviet Trading
TradingCorporation,
Corporation,New
NewYork
York
ASA
ASA Army
Army Security
Security [SIGINT] Agency [USA]
[SIGINT] Agency [USA]
AVH
AVH Hungarian security
Hungarian security and
andintelligence
intelligenceagency
agency
AVO
AVO predecessor
predecessor ofofAVB
AVH
BN
BfV FRG security
security service
service
BND
BND FRG foreign
foreign intelligence
intelligence agency
agency
CDU
CDU Christian
Christian Democratic
Democratic Union
Union [FRG]
[FRG]
Cheka
C heka All -Russian Extraordinary
All-Russian Extraordinary Commission
Commissionfor
forCombating
Combating
Counter-Revolution and Sabotage:
Counter-Revolution and Sabotage: predecessor
predecessor KGB
(1917-22)
(19 17-22)
CIA
CIA Central
Central Intelligence
IntelligenceAgency
Agency[USA]
[USA]
COCOM
COCOM Coordinating
Coordinating Committee
Committee for
forEast-West
East-WestTrade
Trade
Comecon
Comecon [Soviet
[Soviet Bloc]
Bloc]Council
Councilforfor
Mutual Economic
Mutual Aid
Economic
Comintern
Comintern Communist
Communist International
International
CPC
CPC Christian
Christian Peace
Peace Conference
Conference
CPC
CPC Communist
Communist Party
PartyofofCanada
Canada
CPCz
CPCZ Communist
Communist Party
Party ofofCzechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia
CPGB
CPGB Communist
Communist Party
PartyofofGreat
GreatBritain
Britain
CPSU
CPSU Communist
Communist Party
Party of the
the Soviet
SovietUnion
Union
CPUSA
CPUSA Communist
Communist Party
Party of the
the United
United States
Statesof of
America
America
csu
CSU Christian
Christian Social
SocialUnion
Union[FRG:
[FRG: ally of
of CDU]
CDU]
DCI
DCI Director
Director of Central
Intelligence [USA]
[USA]
DGS
DGS Portuguese
Portuguese security
security service
service
DGSE
DGSE French
French foreign
intelligenceservice
service
DIA
DIA Defense
Defense Intelligence
Intelligence Agency
Agency [USA]
[USA]
DLB
DLB dead
dead letter-box
letter-box
DRG
DRG Soviet
Soviet sabotage
sabotageand
andintelligence
intelligencegroup
group
DS
DS Bulgarian
Bulgarian security
securityand
andintelligence
intelligenceservice
service
DST
DST French
French security
security service
service
FF Line
Line "Special
“SpecialActions"
Actions”department
departmentinin
KGB residencies
residencies
A bb bb rr ee vv ii aa tt ii oo nn ss a n dd A
A A cc rr oo n y
ymm ss // xx it it
FAPSI
FAPSI Russian (post-Soviet)
Russian SIGINT agency
(post-Soviet) SIGINT agency
FBI
FBI Federal Bureau
Federal Bureau of
ofInvestigation
Investigation[USA]
FCD
FCD First Chief
First Chief [Foreign
[ForeignIntelligence]
Intelligence]Directorate,
Directorate,KGB
FCO
FCO Foreign and
Foreign and Commonwealth
Commonwealth Office
Office [UK]
FRG
FRG Federal Republic
Federal RepublicofofGermany
Germany
GCHQ
GCHQ Government
Government Communications
Communications Head-Qyarters
Head-Quarters [British
[British
SIGINT Agency]
Agency]
GDR
GDR German Democratic
German Democratic Republic
Republic
GPU
GPU Soviet security
Soviet securityand
andintelligence service
intelligence (within
service NKVD,
(within
1922-3)
1922-3)
GRU
GRU Soviet Military
Soviet MilitaryIntelligence
Intelligence
GUGB
GUGB Soviet security
Soviet securityand
andintelligence
intelligenceservice (within
service NKVD,
(within
1943-43)
1943-43)
Gulag
Gulag Labour
Labour Camps
Camps Directorate
Directorate
HUMINT
HUMINT intelligence
intelligence from
fromhuman
humansources
sources(espionage)
(espionage)
H VA
HVA GDR foreign
intelligenceservice
service
ICBM
ICBM intercontinental
intercontinental ballistic
ballistic missile
missile
IMINT
IMlNT imagery intelligence
imagery intelligence
INO
IN0 foreign
intelligencedepartment
departmentof Cheka/GPU/OGPU/
ChekalGPU/OGPUI
GUGB, 1920-1941; predecessor
GUGB, 1920-1941; predecessor of of INU
INU
INU foreign
intelligencedirectorate
directorateofof
NKGB/GUGB/MGB,
1941-54; predecessor
1941-54; predecessor of of FCD
IRA
IRA Irish
Irish Republican
RepublicanArmyArmy
JIC
J IC Joint
Joint Intelligence
Intelligence Committee
Committee [UK]
[UK]
K-231
K-23 1 club
club ofofformer
formerpolitical
politicalprisoners jailed
prisoners under
jailed Article
under Article of of
231 231
the
the Czechoslovak
Czechoslovakcriminal
criminalcode
code
KAN
KAN Club
Club of ofNon-Party
Non-PartyActivists
Activists[Czechoslovakia]
[Czechoslovakia]
KGB
KGB Soviet
Soviet security
securityand
andintelligence
intelligenceservice
service(1954-1991)
(1954-1991)
KHAD
KHAD Mghan security service
Afshan security service
KI
KI Soviet
Soviet foreign
foreignintelligence
intelligenceagency,
agency,initially combining
initially combiningforeign
foreign
intelligence
intelligence directorates
directoratesofofMGB and and GRU (1947-51)
(1947-51)
KKE
KKE Greek
Greek Communist
Communist PartyParty
KKE-es
KKE-es breakaway
breakaway Eurocommunist
EurocommunistGreek GreekCommunist
Communist Party
Party
KOR
KOR Workers
Workers Defence
Defence Committee
Committee [Poland]
[Poland]
KPO
KPO Austrian
Austrian Communist
KR
KR Line
Line Counter-intelligence
Counter-intelligence department
department in in KGB residencies
residencies
llB
LLB live
live letter
letter box
box
MGB
MGB Soviet
Soviet Ministry
MinistryofofState
StateSecurity (1946-54)
Security (1946-54)
...
A bb bb rr e vv ii aa tt ii oo nn ass nadAncdr oAnc yr m
A o ns y m s // Xt t t
xaza
MGIMO
MGlMO Moscow State
Moscow State Institute
Institutefor
forInternational Relations
International Relations
MI5
MI5 British security
British security service
service
MI6
MI6 alternative designation
alternative designation for
for SIS [UK]
MOR
MOR Monarchist Association
Monarchist Association ofofCentral
CentralRussia ("The
Russia Trust")
(“The Trust”)
N Line
N line Illegal support
support department
departmentininKGB residencies
NATO
NATO North Atlantic Treaty
North TreatyOrganization
Organization
NKGB
NKGB People's Commisariat
People’s Commisariat for
for State
StateSecurity
Security(Soviet security
(Soviet andand
security
intelligence service,
intelligence service, 1941 and
and 1943-6)
1943-6)
NKYD
NKVD People's Commisariat
People’s Commisariat for
for Internal
InternalAffairs
Affairs(incorporated state
(incorporated state
security, 1922-3, 1934-43)
1922-3,1934-43)
NSA
NSA National Security
National Security [[SIGINT] Agency [USA]
SIGINT] Agency [USA]
NSC
NSC National Security
National Security Council
Council[USA]
NSZRiS
NSZRiS People's
People’s [anti-Bolshevik]
[anti-Bolshevik] Union
Union forforDefence Country and
Defenceof Country and
Freedom
Freedom
NTS
NTS National Labour
Labour Alliance
Alliance(Soviet
(Sovietemigre
tmigrisocial-democratic
social-democratic
movement)
Okhrana
Okhrana Tsarist security service,
Tsarist service,1881-1917
1881-1917
OMS
OMS Comintern
Comintern International
International Liaison
LiaisonDepartment
Department
oss
OSS Office of
of Strategic
StrategicServices [USA]
Services[USA]
OT
OT Operational
Operational Technical
TechnicalSupport
Support (FCD)
(FCD)
OUN
OUN Organisation
Organisation of of Ukrainian
UkrainianNationalists
Nationalists
OZNA
OZNA Yugoslav security
securityandandintelligence
intelligenceservice
service
PCF
PCF French
French Communist
Communist Party Party
PCI
PC1 Italian Communist
Italian Communist Party Party
PCP
PCP Portuguese Communist
PFlP
PFLP Popular Front
Frontforforthe Liberation
the Liberationof Palestine
of Palestine
PIDE
PlDE Portuguese Liberation
Liberation Organization
Organization
PLO
PLO Palestine
Palestine Liberation
Liberation Organization
Organization
POUM
POUM Workers Unification
UnificationPartyParty(Spanish
(Spanish Marxist
Mamist Trotskyist Party
Trotskyist Party
in
in 1930s)
PR
PR line
Line political
political intelligence
intelligencedepartment
departmentininKGB residences
PSOE
PSOE Spanish Socialist
SocialistParty
Party
PUWP
PUWP Polish United
UnitedWorkers
Workers[Communist]
[Communist]PartyParty
RCMP
RCMP Royal
Royal Canadian
CanadianMounted
MountedPolice
Police
ROYS
ROVS [W hite] Russian Combined
[White] Combined Services
Services Union
Union
RYAN
RYAN Raketno-Yadernoye
Raketno-Yadernoye Na p adenie
Napaa’enie (Nuclear Missile
MissileAttack)
Attack)
SALT
SALT Strategic
Strategic Arms
ArmsLimitation
LimitationTalksTalks
SAM
SAM Soviet surface-to-air
surface-to-air missile
missile
A
A bb bb rr e v i a tt ii oo n as nadAn cdr oAnc yr m
o ns y m s / XlV
xiv
SB
SB Polish Security
Security and
and intelligence
intelligenceservice
service
SCD
SCD Second Chief
Chief [Internal
[InternalSecurity
Securityand Counter-Intelligence]
and Counter-Intelligence]
Directorate,
Directorate, KGB
SDECE
SDECE French foreign
intelligenceservice;
service;predecessor
predecessorof DGSE
of
SDI
SDI Strategic Defense
Defense Initiative
Initiative('Star
(‘StarWars')
Wars’)
SED
SED Socialist
Socialist Unity
Unity[Communist]
[Communist]Party [GDR]
Party[GDR]
SIGINT
SlGlNT intelligence derived
derivedfrom frominterception
interceptionand andanalysis of of
analysis signals
signals
SIS
SIS Secret Intelligence
Intelligence Service
Service[UK]
SK
SK line
Line Soviet
Soviet colony
colonydepartment
departmentininKGB residencies
SKP
SKP Communist PartyPartyofof Finland
Finland
SOE
SOE Special
Special Operations
Operations Executive
Executive[UK][UK]
SPD
SPD Social
Social Democratic
DemocraticParty Party[FRG]
[FRG]
Spetsnaz
Spetsnuz Soviet special
special forces
forces
SR
SR Socialist Revolutionary
Revolutionary
S&T
S&T scientific
scientific and
andtechnological
technologicalintelligence
intelligence
Stapo
Stapo Austrian police
Austrian police security
securityservice
service
Stasi
Stasi GDR Ministry of of State
StateSecurity
Security
Stavka
Stavka Wartime
Wartime Soviet
SovietGHQLhigh
GHQIhigh command
command
StB
StB Czechoslovak security
securityand andintelligence
intelligenceservice
service
SYR
SVR Russian (post-Soviet) foreign
intelligenceservice
service
TUC
TUC Trades Union
Trades Union Congress
Congress [UK][UK]
UAR
UAR United Arab
United Arab Republic
Republic
UB
UB Polish security
security and
andintelligence
intelligenceservice; predecessor
service; predecessorof SB
of
UDBA
UDBA Yugoslav security
security and
andintelligence
intelligenceservice;
service;successor to to
successor
OZNA
YPK
VPK Soviet Military
MilitaryIndustrial
IndustrialCommission
Commission
WR
VVR Supreme Military
MilitaryCouncil
Council[anti-Bolshevik
[anti-Bolshevik Ukranian
Ukranianunder
under-
ground]
ground]
wee
WCC World
World Council
Councilof Churches
WPC World
World Peace
Peace Council
Council
X line
Line S&T department in
S&T department in KGB residencies
residencies
t
THE
T H E EVOLUTION
E V O L U T I O N OF
OF THE
T H E KG
K G BB,, 1917-1991
1917-1991
December 1917
1917 Cheka
Cheka
J,
\1
February 1922
1922 Incorporated into NKVD (as GPU)
GPU)
J,
\1
July 1923
1923 OGPU
J,
\1
July 1934
1934 Reincorporated
Reincorporated in NKVD (as
(as G
GUGB)
UGB)
J,
\1
February 1941
1941 NKGB
J,&
July 1941
1941 Reincorporated
Reincorporated in NKVD
N K V D (as G
GUGB)
UGB)
J,\1
April 1943
April 1943 NKGB
J,
\1
March 1946
1946 MGB
J,
\1
~ ~ ~ ~
October 1947-
1947- Foreign Intelligence
Intelligence
November 1951
1951 transferred to KI
transferred to KI
J,
\1
March 1953 with
1953
Combined Combined with MVD form
toenlarged
to form enlarged MVD
MVD
J,\1
1954 March 1954 KGB
The term
term KGB is
is used
used both
both generally
generallytotodenote
denotethe Soviet
the State
Soviet Security
State Security
organisation throughout
throughout its
itshistory
historysince its its
since foundation
foundationas the Cheka
Cheka inin
1917 and,
and,more
morespecifically, to refer
refer to
toState
StateSecurity
Securityafter
after1954
1954when
whenit
took its final name.
took its final name.
THE
T H E TRANSLITERATION
T R A N S L I T E R A T I O N OF
OF
RUSSIAN
R U S S I A N NAMES
NAMES
We
We have
have followed
followedaa simplified
simplified version
version of
of the
the method
methodused
used by
by the
the U.S. Board
Board on
on Ge
Ge-
ographic
ographic Names
Names and
and BBe Monitering
Monitering Service.
BBC Service. Simplifications
Simplifications include
include the
the substitu
substitu-
tion
tion of"y"
of ‘Y,for
for"iy"
“iy”in
in surnames
surnames (Trotsky
(Trotsky rather
rather than
thanTrotskiy)
Trotskiy) and
and of"i"
of “i”for
for"iy"
“if in
in first
first
names
names (Yuri
(Yuri rather
rather than
than Yuriy).
Yuriy). T “y” between
he "y"
The between the
the letters
letters "i"
“i”and/or
andlor"e"
“e”is
is omitted
omitted
(for
(for example,
example, Andreev
Andreev and
and Dmitrievich-not
Dmitrievich-not Andreyev
Andreyev and
and Dmitriyevich),
Dmitriyevich), as
as isis the
the
apostrophe
apostrophe used
used to
to signify
signify aa soft
soft sign.
sign.
In
In cases
cases where
where aa mildly
mildly deviant
deviant English
English version
version of
of aa well-known
well-known Russian
Russian name
name
has
has become
become firmly
firmly established,
established, we have retained
we have retained that
that version,
version, for
for example:
example: Beria,
Beria,
Evdokia (Petrova),Izvestia,
Evdokia (Petrova), Izvestia,Joseph
Joseph (Stalin),
(Stalin), Khrushchev,
Khrushchev, Nureyev
Nureyev and
and the
the names
names of
of
Tsars.
Tsars.
FF O
ORRE
EW RD
WOR D
I have
have written
written thisthis book
book in in consultation
consultation with with Vasili
Vasili Mitrokhin,
Mitrokhin, based based on on the
the exten
exten-
sive
sive top
top secret
secret material (described in
material (described in Chapter
Chapter1) 1) which
which he he has
has smuggled
smuggled out out from
from the
the
KGB foreign
intelligence archive.
archive. For
For thethe past
past quarter
quarter of of aa century,
century, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin has has
passionately
passionately wanted wanted this this material,
material, which
which for for twelve
twelve yearsyearshe
he risked
risked hishis life
life to assem
to assem-
ble,
ble, to
to see
see the
the light
lightofof day.
day. He
H e wished
wished to to reveal
reveal "how
“how thin thinthethethread
thread of of peace
peaceactually
actually
was during the
was during the Cold
ColdWar."
War.” From
From that
that passion
passion this
this book
book hashas been
been born.
born. I havehave felt
felt it
it
my
my duty
duty to to ensure
ensure thatthat this
this material,
material, which
which offers
offers detailed
detailed andand often
often unique
unique insights
insights
into
into thethe workings
workings of of the
the Soviet
Soviet State
State andand the
the history
history ofof the
the Soviet Union, achieves
Soviet Union, achieves
the
the level
level ofof public
public awareness
awareness and recognition that
and recognition that itit deserves.
deserves.
Like
Like allall archives,
archives,thosethose of the KGB require
of the require interpretation
interpretation in in the
thelight
lightofof previous
previous
research
research and and related documents. The
related documents. The end
end notes
notes andand bibliography
bibliography provide
provide full details
details
of
of the
the additional
additional sources
sources usedused toto place
place Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s revelations
revelations in in historical context.
historical context.
These
These sources
sources also alsoprovide
provide overwhelming
overwhelming corroborative evidence for
corroborative evidence for his
his genuineness
genuineness
as
as aa source.
source.
Codenames (also
Codenames (also known
known as as "worknames"
“worknames” in in the
the case
case of KGB officers)
of KGB officers) appear
appear in in
the
the text
text in
in capitals.
capitals. Many
Many KGB codenames
codenames were were usedusedmore
more than
than once.
once. In I n such
such cases,
cases,
the
the text
text and
and index
index make
make clear
clear which
which individual
individual is is referred
referred to.to. It isis also
also important
important to to
note
note that,
that, although
although certain
certain individuals
individuals werewere targeted
targeted by by the KGB, and
the KGB, and may
may have havebeen
been
given
given codenames,
codenames, this this does
does notnot mean
mean that
that the
thepersons
persons named
named were were conscious
conscious or or wit
wit-
ting
ting agents
agents or sources-or even
or sources-or even that
that they
they were aware that
were aware that they
they were being targeted
were being targeted
for
for recruitment
recruitment or or political influence operations.
political influence operations. Similarly,
Similarly, thethe fact
fact that
that an anindividual
individual
may have endorsed a position that was favorable to the Soviet Union does not neces
may have endorsed a position that was favorable to the Soviet Union does not neces-
sarily
sarily mean
mean thatthat this
this person
person waswas working
working as as anan agent,
agent, oror agent
agent of of influence,
influence, for for the
the
KGB. The
KGB. The KGB frequently
frequently gavegave prominent policymakers codenames
prominent policymakers codenames in order to
in order to pro
pro-
tect
tect the
the identity
identity of of their
their targets,
targets, and
and to to order recruited KGB agents
order recruited agents to to target
target such
such
individuals.
individuals.
For
For legal reasons, some
legal reasons, some ofof the
the Soviet
Soviet agents identified in
agents identified in KGB files files can
can be be referred
referred
to
to in
in this book only
this book only byby their
their codenames.
codenames. In In aa limited
limited number
number of cases, chiefly
of cases, chiefly because
because
of
of the
the risk
risk of
of prejudicing
prejudicing aa possible
possible prosecution,
prosecution, no no reference
reference can can bebe made
made to to them
thematat
all.
all. These omissions do
These omissions do not,
not, so
so far
far as
as I amam aware,
aware, significantly
significantly affect
affect the
the main
main con-con
clusions
clusions of of any
any chapter.
chapter.
Christopher
ChristopherAndrew
Andrew
II N T R
R O
ODDU
UCC TT II O
ON T
TO T EP AP P
THE A EP R
E B
R A
B C
AKCE K
D I ET D
I OI TN I O N
On
O n October
October 17, 1995, I was
17,1995, was invited
invited to
to the
thepost-modern
post-modern London
London headquarters
headquarters of
of
the
the Secret
Secret Intelligence
Service (better
(better known
known as
as SIS
SIS or
or MI6)
M16) at
at Vauxhall
Vawhall Cross
Cross on
on
the
the banks
banks of
of the
the Thames
Thamestotobe briefed on
be briefed on one
one of
of the
the most
most remarkable intelligence
remarkable intelligence
coups
coups of
of the
thelate
late twentieth
twentieth century.
century. SIS
SIS told
told me
me how in 1992
how in 1992it
it had
had ext1ltrated
exfiltrated from
from
Russia
Russia aa retired
retired senior
senior KGB archivist,
archivist, Vasili
VasiliMitrokhin,
Mitrokhin, his
his family
familyand
and six
six large
large cases
cases
of
of top-secret
top-secret material
material from
from the
the KGB's
KGB’s foreign
intelligence archive.
archive.Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’sstag
stag-
gering
gering feat
feat in
in noting
noting KGB files almost
files almost every
every working
working day
day for
foraa period
period of twelve years
oftwelve years
and
and smuggling
smuggling his
his notes
notes out
out of
of its
its foreign
intelligenceheadquarters
headquarters at
at enormous
enormous per
per-
sonal
sonal risk isis probably
probably unique
unique in
in intelligence history. W
intelligence history. hen I first
When saw Mitrokhin’s
first saw Mitrokhin's
archive
archive aa few weeks after
few weeks after the
the briefing, both
briefing, both its
its scope
scope and
and secrecy
secrecy took
took my
my breath
breath
away.
away. It
I t contained
contained important
important new material on
new material on KGB operations
operations around
around the
the world.
world.
The
The only
only European
European countries
countries absent
absent from
from the
the archive
archive were
werethe
the pocket
pocket states
states of
of An
An-
dorra,
dorra, Monaco
Monaco and Liechtenstein. (There
and Liechtenstein. (There was,
was, however,
however,some
some interesting
interesting material
material on
on
San
San Marino.)
Marino.) It was clear that
was clear that Mitrokhin had had
Mitrokhin had had access
access to
to even
even the
the most
most highly
highly
classified
classified KGB
KGB files
files -
- among
among them
themthose
those which
which gave
gave the
the real
real identities
identities and
and "legends"
“legends”
of
of the
the Soviet
Soviet "illegals"
“illegals”living under
under deep
living deep cover
cover abroad
abroad disguised
disguised as
as foreign
foreign nationals.1
nationals.’
Soon
Soon after
after my
my first
firstexamination
examination of
of the
the archive,
archive, I met
met Vasili
Vasili Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin over
over tea
tea in
in
aa conference
conference room
room at
at SIS
SIS headquarters
headquarters and
and discussed
discussed collaborating
collaboratingwith
with him
himininaa his
his-
tory
tory based
based on
on his material. Mitrokhin
his material. Mitrokhin said
said little
little about
about himself.
himself. Indeed
Indeed itit later
later re
re-
quired
quired some
some persuasion
persuasion to
to convince
convince him
him th�t
that ititwas
was worth
worth including
including his
his own
ownstory
story at
at
the
the beginning
beginning of
of our
our book.
book. But
But Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin was
was passionate
passionateabout
about his
his archive
archive and
and anx
am-
ious
ious that
that as
as much
much of
of it
it as
as possible
possible be
be used
used to
to expose
expose the
the record
record of
of the KGB.
the KGB,
Early
Early in
in 1996
1996 Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin and
and his
his family
family paid
paid their
their first
first visit
visit to
to Cambridge
Cambridge Uni
Uni-
versity,
versity, where
where I am
am Professor
Professor ofofModern
Modern and
andContemporary History. I met
ContemporaryHistory. met them
them out
out-
side
side the
the Porters'
Porters’ Lodge
Lodge atatCorpus
CorpusChristi
ChristiCollege,
College, of
of which I'm aa Fellow,
which I’m Fellow, and
and we
we had
had
lunch
lunch together
together in
in aa private
private room
room overlooking
overlooking the
the medieval Old Court
medieval Old Court (the
(the oldest
oldest
complete
complete court
court in
in Cambridge).
Cambridge). After
After lunch
lunch we
we went
went to
to the
the College
College Hall
Hall to
to look
look at
at
what
what is
is believed
believedto
to be
be the
the only
only surviving
surviving portrait
portrait ofofthe College's first
theCollege’s first spy
spyand
and great
great-
est
est writer
writer -
- the Elizabethan dramatist
the Elizabethan Christopher Marlowe,
dramatist Christopher Marlowe, who
who had
hadbeen
been killed
killedin
in
aa pub
pub brawl
brawl in
in 1593
1593 at
at the
the age
age of
of only
only twenty-nine,
twenty-nine, probably
probably while
while working
working for
for the
the
secret
secret service
serviceofQyeen
of QueenElizabeth 1. Then
Elizabeth I. Then we
we walked
walked along
alongthe
the Backs
Backs through
through King's
King’s
and
and Clare
Clare colleges
colleges to
to visit
visit Trinity
Trinity and
andTrinity
TrinityHall,
Hall,the
thecolleges
colleges of
of the KGB's best
the KGB’s best-
known
known British
British recruits,
recruits, the
the "Magnificent
“Magnificent Five,"
Five,” some
some ofof whose
whose fi les Mitrokhin
files Mitrokhin had
had
Introduction
I n t r o d u c t i o n to
t o the
t h eP aPaperback
p e r b a c kE d i Edition
tion // XXII
xxii
noted.2
noted.2Mitrokhin
Mitrokhinhad had long
long ago mastered the
ago mastered the artartof being inconspicuous.
of being inconspicuous. The The friends
friends
and
and colleagues
colleagues whomwhom we we met
met as as we
we walked
walked roundround Cambridge
Cambridge did did notnot give him aasec
give him sec-
ond
ond glance.
glance.
In
In March
March 1996 1996 the thethen
then Foreign
Foreign Secretary,
Secretary, Malcolm
Malcolm Rifkind,
Rifkind, gave gave approval
approval in in
principle
principle (later
(later confirmed
confirmed by by his
his successor,
successor, Robin
Robin Cook)Cook) for for me
me to to write
write aa book based
bookbased
on
on Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s extraordinary
extraordinary archive.3
a r ~ h i v eFor
. ~ the
For the next three and
next three and aa half
half years,
years, because
becausethe the
archive
archive waswas still
still classified,
classified, I waswas ableable to
to discuss
discuss nonenone of of it
it with colleagues in
with colleagues in Corpus
Corpus
Christi
Christi College
College and and thethe Cambridge
Cambridge History HistoryFaculty
Faculty - - or
or even
even to to reveal
reveal the
the nature
nature ofof
the
the book
book that
that I waswas writing.
writing. In In Britain
Britain at at least,
least, the
the secret
secret ofof the
the Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin archive archive
was
was remarkably
remarkably well kept. Until
well kept. Until The Mitrokhin Archive went
The Mitl-ukhin went to the publishers,
to the publishers, who who
also
also successfully
successfully avoided
avoided leaks,
leaks, the
the secret
secret waswas known,
known, outside
outside the the intelligence
intelligence com com-
munity,
munity, only
only to to aasmall
small number
number of of senior
senior ministers
ministers and and civil
civil servants.
servants. Tony Tony Blair
Blair was
was
first
first briefed
briefed on on Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin while while Leader'
Leader of of the
the Opposition
Opposition in in January
January 1995.1995. Three
Three
years
years later,
later, asas Prime
Prime Minister,
Minister, he he endorsed
endorsed the publication project.4
the publication project.4
The
The secret
secret of of the Mitrokhin archive
the Mitrokhin archive was waslessless rigorously
rigorously preserved
preserved by by some
some of of
Britain's
Britain’s allies.
allies.But
But though
thoughthere therewere
were aa fewfew partial
partial leaks
leaks byby foreign
foreign governments
governments and and
intelligence
intelligence agencies
agencies which
which had had been
been given access to
given access to parts
parts ofof the
the archive,
archive, nonenone hadhad
much
much resonance
resonance in in Britain.
Britain. In In December
December 1998, 1998, I received
received out out ofof the
the blue
blue aa phone
phonecallcall
from
from aa German
German journalist
journalist who who had discovered both
had discovered boththethe codename
codenarne by which
by which
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin was was known
known in Germany and
inGermany and the contents of
the contents of somesome fragments
fragments of of
Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s GermanGerman material.
material. He H e told
told me me he he knew
knew I was was completing
completing aa first first volume
volume
based on
based on thethe Mitrokhin
Mitrokhinarchivearchive and and hadhad already planned aa second.
already planned second. For For the next few
the next few
months
months I expected
expected the the story
story toto break
break in in the
the British
British press.
press. Somewhat
Somewhat to to my
my surprise,
surprise,
it
it did
did not
not do so.
do so.
On
O n Saturday,
Saturday, September
September 11, 11, 1999,
1999, after
after three
three andand aa half
half years
years of of secrecy
secrecy and and si
si-
lence, The Mitrokhin Archive suddenly
lence, suddenly becamebecame front-page
front-page news news when when serialization
serialization
began
began in in The Times. Between Between FridayFriday nightnight and and Saturday
Saturday morning
morning I moved moved from from aa
long period in
long period in which
which I had had notnot talked
talked at at all
all about Mitrukhin Archive in
about The Mitrokhin in public
public toto
aa month
month in in which
which I seemed
seemed to to talk
talk about
about little else. Unsurprisingly,
little else. Unsurprisingly, the the revelations
revelations
which
which captured
captured media media attention
attention were were human-interest
human-interest stories stories aboutabout Soviet
Soviet spiesspies inin
Britain
Britain rather
rather thanthanthe themore
more important
important but but less
less parochial
parochial disclosures
disclosures about about KGB op op-
erations
erations against
against NATO as as aa whole
whole and and against
against democratic
democratic dissentdissent within
within the the Soviet
Soviet
Bloc.
Bloc. Hitherto
Hitherto the the media
media stereotype
stereotype of of aa major
major Soviet
Soviet spy spy inin Britain,
Britain, modeled
modeled on on
Kim
Kim Philby
Philby andand hishis friends,
friends, hadhad been
been of of aa bright
brightbut subversive Cambridge
butsubversive graduate,
Cambridge graduate,
preferably
preferably fromfrom aa good public public school
school andand with
with an an exotic
exotic sex life. In
sex life. In September
September 1999 1999
the
the stereotype
stereotype changed
changed almost almost overnight
overnight with with Mitrokhin's unmasking of
Mitrokhin’s unmasking of Melita
Melita
Norwood,
Norwood, an an 87-year-old great-grandmother from
87-year-old great-grandmother from Bexleyheath
Bexleyheath memorablymemorably dede
scribed
scribed by Times as
by The Times as "The
“The Spy Spy Who
W h o CameCame In In from
from thethe Co-op"
Co-op” (where,
(where, for for ideo
ideo-
logical
logical reasons,
reasons, she she does
does most
most of of her
her shopping),
shopping), as as the
the longest-serving
longest-serving of of all
all Soviet
Soviet
spies in Britain.
spies
A Times reporter
reporter was was with
with Mrs.Mrs.Norwood
Norwood early early onon thethemorning
morningof of September
September 111 1
as she listened to John Humphrys
as she listened to John Humphrys on the on the Today program fi r st recount
program first recount some of the some of the
contents
contents of ofher herKGB
KGB file noted by
file noted Mitrokhin, then
by Mitrokhin, interview myself
theninterview myself and and AnnAnn Wid Wid-
decombe. "Oh
decombe. dear!" she
“Oh dear!” she told
told the
the Times reporter.
reporter. "This
“This is all so
is all so different
different from from my my
In
I n tt rr oo dd uc
u c t ii o nn tt oo t hh te! P na p e
e rr bb na rc kk E
E ddi
i tt ii oo nn /1 nXcXx111
iii
quiet
quiet little
little life.
life. I thought
thought I'd I’d got
got away
away with
with it.it. But I'm not
But I’m not that
that surprised
surprised it's finally
it’s finally
come out."
come out.” Within
Within aa few few hours,
hours,aa media
media scrum
scrum had had gathered
gathered expectantly
expectantly outside
outside Mrs.Mrs.
Norwood's
Norwood’s end-of-terrace
end-of-terrace house, house,interviewing friends and
interviewing friends and neighbours
neighbours about
about howhow she she
drank
drank teatea from
from aa CheChe Guevara
Guevara mug, mug, put "Stop Trident”
put “Stop Trident" posters
posters inin her window, sold
her window, sold
home-made
home-made chutney chutney in in aid
aid ofof Cuban
Cubansupport
supportgroups, and delivered
groups, and more than
delivered more than thirty
thirty
copies
copies of the Morning Star every
of the every Saturday morning to
Saturday morning veterans of
to veterans of the Bexleyheath
the Bexleyheath
Old
Old Left. Mrs. Norwood
Left.Mrs. Norwood behavedbehaved with extraordinary composure
with extraordinary composure when when she
she emerged
emerged
later
later in
in the
the day
day to
to face
face the
the media
media forfor the
the first time in
first time in her
herlife.
life. The_ image of
The-image of the great
thegreat-
granny
granny spy spy walking
walking downdown her her garden
garden path between well-tended
path between well-tended roserose bushes to make
bushesto,make
aa confession
confession of of sorts
sorts to
to aa large
large crowd
crowdof of reporters
reporters caught the imagination
caught the imagination of of millions
millions
of
of television
television viewers
viewers and
and newspaper-readers.
newspaper-readers. "I'm 87 and
“I’m 87 and unfortunately
unfortunately my memory
my memory
is
is not
not what
what it was," Mrs.
it was,” Mrs. Norwood
Norwood began. began. "I “I did
did what
what I did
did notnot to
to make
make money
money but but
to
to help
help prevent
prevent thethe defeat
defeat of of aa new
new system which had,
system which at great
had, at cost, given
great cost, ordinary
given ordinary
people food
people food and
and fares
fares which
which theythey could afford, given
could afford, given them
them education
education andand aa health
health
.
serVIce.
service.” "
As
As well
well asas being
being aa media sensation, Mrs.
media sensation, Mrs. Norwood's
Norwood’s guarded
guarded public confession
public confession
was
was aa remarkable historical document.
remarkable historical document. What What had had captured
captured her imagination before
her imagination before
the
the Second
Second World
World War, War, like
likethat
that of most other
of most Soviet agents
other Soviet agents of of the time, was
thetime, was notnot thethe
brutal
brutal reality
reality ofofStalin’s
Stalin'sRussia
Russia butbut thethe idealistic
idealistic myth-image
myth-image of of the
the world's
world’s firstfirst
worker-peasant
worker-peasant state state which
which had had abolished
abolished unemployment
unemployment and for the
and for first time
the first time en- en
abled
abled working
working people
people to to realize
realize their
their full potential - the
full potential the "new system" nostalgically
“new system” nostalgically
recalled by
recalled Mrs. Norwood
byMrs. Norwood when whensheshe spoke
spoke to reporters. In
to reporters. In the mid 1930s
themid 1930s that
that myth-
myth
image was
image was soso powerful that, for
powerful that, for true believers who,
true believers who, unlike
unlike Melita
Melita Sirnis (as she
Sirnis (as she then
then
was),
was), were
wereableableto
to go onon pilgrimage
pilgrimage to to the
theSoviet Union, ititsurvived
Soviet Union, survived even the contrary
eventhe contrary
evidence
evidence of of their
their own eyes. Malcolm
own eyes. Malcolm Muggeridge, probably the
Muggeridge, probably the best
best of
of the
the British
British
journalists
journalists then
then in inMoscow,
Moscow, laterlater wrote
wrote of of the British pilgrims
theBritish pilgrims he encountered:
he encountered:
Their
Their delight
delight inin all they
they saw
saw and
and were told, and
were told, and the
the expression
expression they
they gave
gave to
to
that
that delight,
delight, constitute
constitute unquestionably
unquestionably one one of the wonders
of the wonders of our age.
of our age. There
There
were
were earnest
earnest advocates
advocates ofof the,
the,humane
humane killing
killing of
of cattle
cattle who looked up
who looked up at
at the
the
massive
massive headquarters
headquarters of of the
the OGPU [later the KGB] with
[later the tears of
with tears gratitude in
of gratitude in
their
their eyes,
eyes, earnest
earnest advocates
advocates of of proportional representation who
proportional representation eagerly as-
who eagerly as
sented
sented when
when the
the necessity
necessity for
foraa Dictatorship
Dictatorship of of the
the Proletariat
Proletariat was
was explained
explained to
to
them,
them, earnest
earnest clergymen
clergymen whowho reverently
reverently turned the pages
turned the pages of atheistic literature,
ofatheistic literature,
earnest pacifists
earnest pacifists who
who watched
watched delightedly tanks rattle
delightedly tanks across Red
rattle across Red Square
Square and
and
bombing
bombing planes
planes darken
darken the
th.e sky, earnest town-planning
sky, earnest town-planning specialists
specialists who
who stood
stood
outside
outside overcrowded ramshackle tenements aJ:?d mutt�!e�:, "�f only
nly we
we had
had
, ?
overcrowded ramshackle tenements and muttered:.,,-‘‘If
something like
something this in
like this in England!"
England!” The almost unbelievable
The almost unbelievable credulity
credulityof ofthese
these
mostly university educated
mostlyuniversity educated tourists
tourists astounded
astounded evenevenSoviet
Sovietofficials
officials
usedused to
to
handling
handling foreign visitors .. . . 5
foreign visitors . .’
When
When Melita Sirnis became
Melita Sirnis became aa Soviet
Soviet agent
agent in
in 1937,
1937,the Soviet Union
theSoviet Union was
was in
in the
the
midst of
midst of the
the Great
GreatTerror
Terror - the
the greatest
greatest peacetime persecution in
peacetime persecution in modern
modernEuropean
European
history.6
history.6 Mrs.
Mrs. Norwood,
Norwood, however,
however, still
still does not seem
does not seem to
to grasp
grasp the depravity of
the depravity of the
the
In
I n tt rroo dd uu cc t i o n
n tt oo t he
b e P a per
p e r b a cc k E
E dd i t i o n
n I xx
xxiv
Stalinist
Stalinist regime
regime into
into whose
whose service
service she entered. "Old
she entered. “Old Joe
Joe [Stalin],"
[Stalin],” she
she acknowl
acknowl-
edges,
edges, "wasn't
“wasn’taa hundred
hundred percent,
percent, but
but then
then the
the people
people around
around him
him might
mighthave
have been
been
making
making things
things awkward,
awkward, as
as folks
folks do."
do.” At
At the end of
the end of her
her press
press statement,
statement, she
she was
was
asked
asked ifif she
she had
had any
any regrets
regrets about
about her
her career
career as
as aa Soviet
Soviet agent.
agent. "No,"
“No,” she
she replied,
replied,
then went back
then went back inside
inside her
her house.
house. In
In another
another interview
interview she declared, "I
she declared, “I would
would do
do
everything
everything again."7
again.”’
Another
Another former
former Soviet
Soviet spy
spyidentified in The
identified in The Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin Archive
Archive who
who made
made front
front-
page news in
page news in Britain
Britain was
was ex-Detective
ex-Detective Sergeant
Sergeant John
John Symonds.
Symonds. Like
Like Norwood,
Norwood,
Symonds
Symonds gave
gave aa number
number of
of interviews.
interviews. Symonds
Symonds confessed
confessed to
to being,
being, as
as Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s
notes
notes reveal,
reveal, probably
probably the
the first
first British
British "Romeo
“Romeo spy"
spy” recruited
recruited by
by the
the KGB. He
H e said
said
that
that he
hehad
had admitted
admitted as
as much
much almost
almost twenty
twenty years
years earlier
earlier to
to MI5
MI5 and
and Scotland
Scotland Yard
Yard
but
but had
hadbeen
been disbelieved.
disbelieved. Though
Though Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notes
notes give
give no
no statistics
statistics of
of the
the number
number
of
of women
women seduced
seduced by
by Symonds
Symonds during
during his
his career
career as
as aa KGB
KGB illegal,
illegal, Symonds
Symonds claims
claims
that
that there
there were
were "hundreds"
“hundreds”of
of them.
them. Initially
Initially the
the KG
KGBB decided
decided that
that his
his sexual
sexual tech
tech-
nique
nique was
was deficient
deficient and,
and, to
to his
his delight,
delight, sent
sent "two
“two extremely
extremely beautiful
beautiful girls"
girls”to
to act
act as
as
his
his instructors.
instructors. Symonds's
Symonds’s recollection
recollection of
of his
his subsequent
subsequent career
career as
as. aa Romeo
Romeo spy is
spy is
rather
rather rosier
rosier than
than suggested
suggested by
by his
his KGB
KGB file:
file:
II just
just had
hada anice
nice life.
life.I'd
I’d say
sayjoin
join the
the KGB,
KGB, see
see the
the world
world -
- first
first class.
class. II went
went
all
all over
overthe
the world
world on
on these
these jobs
jobs and
and II had
had aamarvellous
marvelloustime.
time. II stayed
stayed in
in the
thebest
best
hotels,
hotels, II visited
visited all
all the
the best
best beaches.
beaches. I've
I’ve had
had access
access to
to beautiful
beautiful women,
women, unlim
unlim-
ited
ited food,
food, champagne,
champagne, caviar,
caviar, whatever
whatever you
you like,
like, and
and II had
had aa wonderful
wonderful time.
time.
That
That was
was my
my KGB
KGB experience.
experience.
"The
“The only
only people
people II hurt,"
hurt,” Symonds
Symonds now
now claims,
claims, "was
“was the
the Metropolitan
Metropolitan Police."8
Police.”g
Many
Many of
of the
the women
women he
he seduced
seduced on
on KGB
KGB instructions
instructions would
would doubtless
doubtless disagree.
disagree.
Media
Media reaction
reaction to
to Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s revelations
revelations was
was as
as parochial
parochial in
in most
most other
other coun
coun-
tries
tries as
as itit was
was in Britain. The
in Britain. The public
public appeal
appeal of
of the
the Russian
Russian agents
agents identified
identified by
by
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin is
is curiously
curiously similar
similar to
to that
thatof
of Olympic
Olympicmedal-winners.
medal-winners. In
In espionage
espionage as
as in
in
athletics,
athletics, most
most of
of the
theworld's
world’s media
media are
are interested
interested first
first and
and foremost
foremost in
in the
theexploits
exploits
of
of their
their own
own nationals.
nationals. The
The human-interest
human-interest stories
stories which
which aroused
aroused most
most interest
interest in
in
the
the United States were
United States were probably
probably the
the KGB
KGB "active
“active measures"
measures” designed
designed to
to discredit
discredit
the
the long-serving
long-serving Director
Director of
of the FBI, J.
the FBI, J. Edgar
Edgar Hoover,
Hoover, and
and the
the great
great civil
civil rights
rights
leader
leader Martin Luther King.
Martin Luther King. The
The KGB
KGB was
was among
among the
the first
first to
to spread stories that
spread stories that
Hoover
Hoover was
was aapredatory
predatory homosexual.
homosexual. King,
King,whom
whom the
theKGB
KGB feared
feared might
might avert
avert the
the race
race
war
war itit hoped
hoped would be ignited
would be ignited by
by the
the long
long hot
hot summers
summers which
which began
began in
in 1965,
1965, was
was
probably
probably the
the only
only American
American to
to be
be the
the target
target of
of both
both KGB
KGB and
and FBI active
active measures.
measures.
The
The topic
topic in
in The Mitrokhin Archive (published
(published in
in the
the USA
USA as
as The
Th7e Sword and the
the
ShieZd) which
Shield) which attracted
attracted most
most attention
attention in
in Congress
Congress concerned
concerned KGB
KGB preparations
preparations for
for
sabotage
sabotage operations
operations against
against American
American targets
targets during
during the
the Cold
ColdWar.
War. On October 26,
O n October 26,
1999,
1999, II gave
gave televised
televised testimony
testimony on
on these
these preparations
preparations to
to aa packed
packed hearing
hearing of
of the
the
House
House of
of Representatives
Representatives Armed
Armed Services
Services Committee.
Committee. Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s material
material identi
identi-
fies
fies the
the approximate
approximate locations
locations of
of aa number
number of
of the
the secret
secret sites
sites in
in the
theUnited
UnitedStates
States se
se-
lected
lected for
for KGB
KGB arms
arms and
and radio
radio caches
caches for
for use
use in
in sabotage
sabotage operations.
operations. On
O n present
In
I n tt rr oo d u c t ii o n
n t o t bh e P aapp ee rr bb aacckkE E
d idi
t i toino n / x xv
xxv
evidence,
evidence,itit is
is impossible
impossible to
to estimate
estimate the
the number
number of
of these
these c�ches
caches which
which were
were put
put in
in
place.
place. However,
However, the
the former
former KGB
KGB general
general Oleg
Oleg Kalugin,
Kalugin, who
who was
was stationed
stationed in
in New
New
York
York and
and Washington
Washington during
during the
the1960s
1960s and
and early
early 1970s,
1970s, has
has confirmed
confirmed the
the existence
existence
of
of some
some KGB
KGB arms
arms caches
caches in
in the
the United
United States.9
States.’ As
As in Europe, some
in Europe, some caches
caches were
were
probably
probably booby-trapped
booby-trapped and
and may
may now
now be
be in
in aa dangerous
dangerous condition.
condition. For reasons of
For reasons of
public
public safety, The Mitrokhin Archive gave
safety, The gave no
no clues
clues to
to the
thelocation
location of
of any
any of
of the
theAmer
Amer-
ican
ican sites
sites selected
selected for
for KGB
KGB arms
arms caches.
caches. ABC
ABC TV News,
News, however,
however, revealed
revealedthat
that one
one
of
of the
the sites
sites is
is located
located in
in the
theregion
region of
of Brainerd,
Brainerd, Minnesota.1o
Minnesota.” Later
Later press
press reports,
reports, cit
cit-
ing
ing "congressional
“congressional sources,"
sources,” claimed
claimed that the FBI
that the FBI had
had carried
carried out
out aa search
search of
of the
the
Brainerd
Brainerd area.ll
area.”
In
In western
western Europe,
Europe, The Archivegenerated
The Mitrokhin Archive generated more
more front-page
front-page stories
stories in
in
Italy
Italy than
than ititdid
did even
even in
in Britain
Britain-- though
though almost
almost all
all the
the stories,
stories, unsurprisingly,
unsurprisingly, were
were
on
on Italian
Italiantopics.
topics. In
In October
October 1999
1999 an
an Italian
Italianparliamentary
parliamentarycommittee
committeereleased
released 645
645
pages
pages of
of reports
reports (codenamed
(codenamed IMPEDIAN)
IMPEDIAN) on the Italians
onthe Italians mentioned
mentionedinin
thethe
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin archive
archive which
which had
hadbeen
been supplied
supplied several
several years
yearsearlier
earlier by
by SIS
SIS to
to Italian
Italianin
in-
telligence.
telligence. Most
Most KGB
KGB contacts
contacts were
were identified
identified in
in the
thereports
reports by
by name
name as
as well
well as
as code
code-
name.
name. The
The Italian
Italian Foreign
Foreign Ministry
Ministry was
was said
said to
to be
be investigating
investigating the
the cases
cases of
of thirty
thirty
employees
employees referred
referred to in Mitrokhin's
to in Mitrokhin’s notes.
notes. Much
Much of
of the
the furore
furore aroused
aroused by
by The
The
Archive in
MitrokhinArchive in Italy,
Italy, however,
however,consisted
consisted of
of aa revival
revival of
of Cold
Cold War
Warpoints-scoring
points-scoring
which
which produced
produced more
more political
political heat
heat than
than historical
historical light.
light. Opponents
Opponentsof
of the
the govern
govern-
ment
ment headed
headed by
by the
the former
former Communist
Communist Massimo
Massimo D'Alema
D’Alema seized
seizedon
on the
thereferences
references
to Cossutta, leader
to Armando Cossutta, leader of
of the Communist PDCI
the Communist PDCI which
which was
was represented
represented in
in
D'Alema's
D’Alema’scoalition
coalition government.
government.The
The Left
Left retaliated
retaliated by
by pointing
pointing totothe identification
the
identification
in
in an
an IMP EDIAN report
IMPEDIAN report of
of a asenator
senator of
of the
theright-wing
right-wing Forza
Forxa ltal£a. The
Italia. The debate
debate be
be-
came
came further
further confused
confbsedby
by conspiracy
conspiracytheorists
theorists on
on both
bothright
rightand
and left.
left. A
A cartoon
cartoon in
in La
RepubbZica, which
Repubblica, which D' Alema denounced
D’Alema denounced as
as libellous,
libellous,showed
showed him
him blanking
blanking out
out aaseries
series
of
of (presumably
(presumablyleft-wing)
left-wing) names
names from
from the
the IMPEDIAN
IMPEDIAN reports
reports before
before their
their release.
release.
L’Unita, by
L'Unita, by contrast,
contrast, claimed
claimed that
that left-wing
left-wing ministers
ministers were
were increasingly
increasingly convinced
convinced
that
that the
thereports
reports were
were the
the result
result of
of aa plot
plotby
by MIS
MIS (which
(which itit apparently
apparently confused
confused with
with
SIS):
SIS): "W hat has
“What has arrived
arrived is
is not
not aa dossierfrom
dossierpornthe
theKGB
KGB but one about the
but one the KGB
KGB con
con-
structed
structed by
by British
British counter-espionage
counter-espionage agents
agents based
based on
on the
theconfession
confession of
of an
an ex-agent,
ex-agent,
if
if there
there is
is one,
one, and
and 'Mitrokhin'
‘Mitrokhin’is
is just
just aacodename
codename for
for an
an MI5
MIS operation."12
operation.”12
The
The political
political controversy
controversy provoked
provoked in
in Britain
Britain by
by the
the publication
publication of
of The
The Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin
Archive centred
Archive centred chiefly
chiefly on
on the
the behaviour
behaviour of
of ministers
ministers and
and the
the intelligence
intelligence commu
commu-
nity.
nity, W hy, it
Why, it was
was asked,
asked, had
had Melita
MelitaNorwood
Norwood not
not been
been prosecuted
prosecuted when
when her
her tre�ch
treach-
ery
ery had
had been
been known
known at
at least
least since
since Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s defection
defection in
in 1992?
1992? And
And why
why had
had
ministers
ministers not
not been
been better
better briefed
briefed about
about her
her and
and other
other traitors
traitors identified
identified in the
in the
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin archive
archive by
by the
the intelligence
intelligence and
and security
security agencies?
agencies? It
It emerged,
emerged, to
to my
my sur
sur-
prise,
prise, that
that II had
had known
known about
about the
the Norwood
Norwood case
case for
for considerably
considerably longer
longer than
than either
either
the
the Home
Home Secretary
Secretary or
or the
the Prime
Prime Minister.
Minister. Jack
Jack Straw
Straw was
was informed
informed in
in December
December
1998
1998 that
that Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s information
information might
might lead
lead to
to the
the prosecution
prosecution of
of "an
“an 86-year-old
86-year-old
woman
woman who
who spied
spied for
for the
the KGB forty
forty years
years ago,"
KGB ago,” but
but was
was not
not told
told her
her identity
identity until
until
some
some months
months later.
later,Tony
Tony Blair
Blair was
wasnot
not briefed
briefed about
about Mrs.
Mrs. Norwood
Norwooduntil
untilshortly
shortly be
be-
fore
fore her
her name
name appeared
appeared on
on the
thefront
frontpage of The
page of The Times.13
Times.13
II n
n tt r
rod
d uu cc tt ii oo nn tt oo tt hh eeP aPpaeprebr ab ca kc
E kd i E
t ido int i o n I/ XXVl
xxvi
The
The failure
failure to
to prosecute
prosecute Mrs.
Mrs. Norwood combined with
Norwood combined with the
the delays
delays inin briefing
briefing
ministers aroused deep suspicion in some of the media. The
ministers aroused deep suspicion in some of the media. The Express denounced "an
Express denounced “an
appalling
appalling culture
culture of cover-ups and
of cover-ups and incompetence
incompetence in
in Britain's secret services.”
Britain’s secret services." The
The
Guardian suspected
Guardian suspected anan MIS
MIS plot:
plot:
We
We need
need to
to know
know whether
whether Melita
Melita Norwood
Norwood made made aa deal
deal with
with the
the security
security
services.
services. Remember
Remember Blunt.14
Blunt.14Was
Was the
the decision
decision not
not to
to prosecute
prosecute her
her based
based on
on
compassion,
compassion, oror aa desire
desire to
to cover
cover up
up security
security service
serviceincompetence?
incompetence?
Less
Less than
than aa decade
decade earlier
earlierthere
there would
would have havebeenbeenno no mechanism
mechanism for for investigating
investigating
these
these charges
charges capable
capable of of inspiring
inspiring public
public andand parliamentary
parliamentary confidence.
confidence. UntilUntil 19921992
successive
successive British
British governments
governments refusedrefused evenevento to admit
admit SIS's
SIS’s existence
existence on on the
theextraor
extraor-
dinary,
dinary, though
though traditional,
traditional, grounds
grounds that that such
such an an admission
admission would would putput national
national secu
secu-
rity at risk. Had SIS still been officially taboo seven years
rity at risk. Had SIS still been officially taboo seven years later, no official inquiry later, no official inquiry
could possibly
couldpossibly have produced
have produced aa credible public report
crediblepublic report on onthethe handling
handlingofof the the
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin archive.archive. In In 11999,
999, however,
however, there there was
was an an obvious
obvious body body to to conduct
conduct an an in
in-
quiry:
quiry: the
the Intelligence
Intelligence and and Security
Security Committee
Committee (ISC), (ISC),established
established underunder the the Intelli
Intelli-
gence
gence Services
Services Act Act of of 1994
1994totoexamine
examine "the “the expenditure,
expenditure, administration
administration and and policy"
policy”
of
of the
the intelligence
intelligence and and security
security agencies.
agencies.
Since
Since itit began
began workwork in in 1994,
1994, thethe ISC
ISC has been aa largely
has been largely unsung
unsung success
success story.1S
story.”
Though
Though not nottechnically
technically aaparliamentary
parliamentary committee,
committee, since sinceitit reports
reports toto Parliament
Parliament only only
through
through the the Prime
PrimeMinister,
Minister, eight
eight of of its
its nine
nine members
members are areMPs.
MPs. (The (Theninth
ninth isis aa mem
mem-
ber
ber ofofthe
the House
House of of Lords.)
Lords.)Under
Under the the chairmanship
chairmanship of of thetheformer
former Conservative
Conservative De De-
fense
fense Secretary,
Secretary,Tom Tom King,
King, its
its membership
membership spans spans thethe political
political spectrum.
spectrum. Its Its founder
founder
members
members included
included Dale Dale Campbell-Savours,
Campbell-Savours, previously previouslyaa leading
leading Labour
Labour critic
critic of ofthe
the
intelligence
intelligence community,
community,who who still
still serves
serveson on it.
it. Largely
Largely because
becauseits its members
members have havefailed
failed
either
either toto divide
divide on on party
party lines
lines and
and fall
f d outout among
among themselves
themselves or or to
to fifind
nd evidence
evidence of of
major
major intelligence abuses, the
intelligence abuses, the ISC
ISC hashas attracted
attracted relatively
relatively little
little media
media attention.
attention. Its Its
generally
generally positive
positivereports
reports on on the
theperformance
performance of of the
the intelligence
community,however, however,
have
have inevitably
inevitablybeenbeen dismissed
dismissed by bysome
some conspiracy
conspiracy theorists
theorists as as evidence
evidence of of aa cover-up.
cover-up.
On
O n Monday,
Monday, September
September 13, 1999, only
13,1999, only two
two days
days after
after The Times had
The Times had begun
begun seriseri-
alization
alization of of The
TheMitrokhin Archive,Jack
MitrokhinArchive, Jack Straw
Straw announced
announced in in aa statement
statement to to thetheComCom-
mons
mons thatthat thethe ISC
ISC had had been
been asked
asked to to conduct
conduct an an inquiry
inquiry into "the policies
into “the policies and and
procedures
procedures adopted adopted within
within the
the Security
Security and and Intelligence
Intelligence Agencies
Agencies for for the
the handling
handling
of
of the
the information
information suppliedsupplied by by MrM r Mitrokhin."
Mitrokhin.” Over Overthe the next
next nine
nine months
months the the ISCISC
heard evidence from Jack Straw, Robin Cook and four
heard evidence from Jack Straw, Robin Cook and four former Conservative minis- former Conservative minis
ters,
ters, from
from the the heads
heads andand other
othersenior
senior officers
officersof of MIS
MIS and and SIS,
SIS,from
from the
the previous
previous head head
of
of MIS,
MIS, and and fromfromthe the Cabinet
Cabinet Secretary,
Secretary,Permanent
Permanent Under UnderSecretaries
Secretaries at at the
theHomeHome
and
and Foreign
Foreign Offices
Offices and and other
other officials.
officials.Among
Among the the final
final witnesses
witnesses werewere Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin
and
and myself,
myself,who who gave
gave evidence
evidenceto to the
theISC
ISC in in the
theCabinet
Cabinet OfficeOffice at at 70
70Whitehall
Whitehall one one
after the other on the morning of March 8, 2000.
after the other on the morning of March 8, 2000. While writing The Mitrokhin While writing The Mitrokhin
Archiwe, II had
Archive, had wrongly
wrongly assumed
assumed that that thethe Committee
Committee had had beenbeen informed
informed about about the the
project.
project. SomeSome of of the
the confusion
confusion whichwhich followed
followed publication
publication might might well havebeen
well have been
avoided
avoided ififthe the ISC
ISC had had been
been properly
properly briefed
briefed well wellbeforehand.
beforehand.
II nn tt rr oo dd uu cc tt ii oo n tt o t h e P a pp ee r bb aa cc kkE dEi dt i ot ino n / x x vtt
xxvii
The
The ISC report
report in
in June
June2000 identified aa series
2000 identified series of
of administrative
administrative err()rs which, as
errors which, as
usual in
usual in Whitehall,
Whitehall,hadhad more
more to
to do
dowith cock-up than
withcock-up than with conspiracy. The
with conspiracy. The first
first “se-
"se
rious
rious failure"
failure”identified
identified by
by the
the ISC was
wds the
the failure
failure of
of the
theSecurity
Security Service to refer
Service to refer the
the
case of
case of Mrs. Norwood to
Mrs.Norwood to the
the Law
Law Officers in 1993:
Officers in 1993:
This failure .. .. .. resulted

This failure resulted in
in the decision whether
the decision whether or not to
or not to prosecute
prosecute Mrs.
Mrs.
Norwood
Norwood effectively
effectively being
being taken
taken byby the Security Service.
the Security The Committee
Service. The Committee is is
concerned
concerned that
that the
theService
Service used
usedpublic
public interest
interest reasons
reasons to
to justifY taking no
justify taking fur
no fur-
ther
ther action
action against Mrs. Norwood,
against Mrs. Norwood, when this was
whenthis for the
was for the Law
Law Officers
Officers to de
to de-
cide. We
cide. We also
also believe
believe that
that the
the failure
failure of the Security
of the Service to
Security Service to interview
interview Mrs.
Mrs.
Norwood
Norwood at at this
this time
time prevented
prevented herher possible prosecution.
possible prosecution.
For the next five years, owing to "a “a further

hrther serious failure by the Security Ser-
serious failure Ser
vice,"the
vice,”the Norwood
Norwood case case "slipped
“slipped out out of
of sight."16
sight.”16MIS may not deserve
may not deserve aa great deal of
great deal of
sympathy
sympathy for for its
its oversight,
oversight, but but ititdoes
does deserve
deserve some.
some. The
The first
first priority
priority of of any security
any security
service
service areare actual,
actual, followed
followed by by potential,
potential, threats. Among the
threats. Among mass of
the mass of material pro
material pro-
vided
vided byby Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin in in 1992,
1992, thethe case
case of
of the eighty-year-old Mrs.
the eighty-year-old Mrs. Norwood,
Norwood,who whohad had
last been in
last been in contact
contact withwith the theKGB over over aa decade earlier and
decade earlier and no
no longer posed any
longer posed any con
con-
ceivable
ceivable danger
danger to to national
national security,
security, must
must have seemed aa very
have seemed very low
low priority particu
priority - particu-
larly
larly given
given the the strain
strain onon MIS's
MIS’s resources caused by
resources caused by cutbacks
cutbacks at at the
the end
end of the Cold
of the Cold
War
War andand the thethreat
threatfrom
from Irish
Irish terrorist
terrorist groups.
groups.
Arguably,
Arguably, however,
however,MIS MIS underestimated
underestimated Mrs. Mrs. Norwood's
Nonvood’s past past importance.
importance. In In ev
ev-
idence
idence to to the
the ISC,
ISC, the the Security
Security Service
Service concluded
concluded that that her
her "value
“value as an atom
as an atom spyspy toto
the
the scientists
scientists who who constructed
constructed the the Soviet bomb must
Soviet bomb must have been, at
have been, at most,
most, marginal.”17
marginal."17
That
That waswas not not thethe view
view of the NKGB (as
of the the KGB was
(as the then known)
was then known) in in the
the final
final
months
months of of the Second World
the Second World War. War. InIn March
March 19451945 it it described
described the the atomic intelli
atomic intelli-
gence
gence she
she hadhad provided
provided as as "of
“of great
great interest and aavaluable
interest and contribution to
valuable contribution toth�the,devel-
devel
opment of
opment of work
work in in this
this field."18
field.”18Though
Though Mrs. Mrs. Norwood
Norwood was was not,
not, of of course,
course, anan atom
atom
spy
spy in
in the
the same
same classclass asas Ted
Ted Hall and and Klaus Fuchs, both
Klaus Fuchs, both of whom
whom provided
provided intelli-
intelli
gence
gence from inside the
from inside the main
main nuclear
nuclear laboratory
laboratory at at Los
Los Alamos,
Alamos, the the NKGB and and thethe
Soviet scientists with
Soviet scientists with whom
whom.. it it was
was in
in close touch plainly
close touch plainly regarded
regarded her her intelligence
intelligence as as
somewhat
somewhat better better thanthan "marginal."
“marginal.”The The intelligence
intelligence she she was
was able
able to to provide
provide on on ura
ura-
nium
nium fuel
he1 cladding
cladding and and post-irradiation
post-irradiation corrosion
corrosion resistance
resistance was
was probably
probably applicable
applicable
to
to weapons development as
weapons development as well
well as as to
to the
the construction
construction of nuclear reactors.19
of nuclear Until�l the
reactors.” Unt the
final
final months
months of of thethe War,
War, thethe NKGB rated rated the atomic intelligence
the atomic intelligence obtained
obtained inin Britain
Britain
almost
almost as as highly
highly as as that
that from
from the the United
United States.20
States.20
As
As Jack
Jack Straw
Straw toldtold the
the Commons
Commonswhen announcing the
when announcing the ISC
ISC inquiry, "There is
inquiry, “There is no
no
reason to
reason doubt .. .. .. that
to doubt the KGB regarded
that the regarded Mrs.Mrs. Norwood
Norwood as as an important spy."
an important spy.”
Nor
Nor isis there reason to
there reason doubt that
to doubt that she
she was both the
was both the KGB's
KGB’s longest-serving
longest-serving British British
agent
agent and
and its its most
most important
important female female British spy. From
British spy. From early in her
early in her career,
career, the
the KGB
had
had high
high expectations
expectations of of her.
her. It maintained
maintained contact
contact with her in
with her in 1938-39
1938-39 at at aa time
time
when
when thethe shortage
shortage of of foreign
intelligence officers, many of
officers, many of whom
whom were were executed dur
executed dur-
ing
ing the
the Terror,
Terror, led led it
it to
to lose
lose touch
touch with
with many other agents
many other agents - including
including some some of of the
the
Magnificent
Magnificent Five. Five. SinceSince the the publication
publication of of The Mitrokhin Archive,
Tbe Mitrokbin Viktor Os-
Archbe, Viktor Os-
Int
I n t rr oo dduc
u c t i on
nt ot thoeP tahpe e rPba ap ce krE bdai ct ki o E
n d i t i on / x x vzzz
xxviii
hchenko,
hchenko, aa former senior officer
former senior officer inin thetheKGB scientific
scientific and
and technological
technological intelligence
intelligence
(S&T)
(S&T) directorate,
directorate, has has kindly
kindly given
given me me his
his recollections
recollections of of the
the Norwood
Norwood case. case. While
While
stationed
stationed at at the
theLondon
Londonresidency
residency in in 11975,
975, Oshchenko
Oshchenko recruited
recruited Michael
Michael Smith,
Smith,the the
KGB's
KGB’s mostmost important
important British
British S&T agent agent during
during the the later
later Cold
Cold War.21
War.21He H e remem
remem-
bers
bers Mrs.
Mrs. Norwood's
Norwood’s career career as
as aa Soviet
Soviet agent
agent asas "a legendary case
“alegendary case in
in thetheannals
annals of the
of the
KGB - - an
an important,
important, determined
determinedand andvery
very valuable
valuableagent,"
agent,”andand.was was
deeply impressed
deeply impressed
both
both byby her
her ideological
ideological commitment
commitment and and byby her
her remarkable
remarkable access
access to to her
her boss's
boss’s pa pa-
pers.
pers. Among
Among the the intelligence
intelligence which
which Oshchenko
Oshchenko believesbelieves Mrs. Norwood supplied
Mrs. Norwood supplied
were
were "valuable
“valuablepapers
papers relating
relating to
to the thematerials
materials involved
involved inin missile
missile production."22 De
p r o d ~ c t i o n . ”De-
~~
tails
tails of
of the
the use
use made
made of of Mrs.
Mrs. Norwood's
Norwood’s intelligence
intelligence within
within thethe Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, howhow
ever, remain
ever, remain scarce.
scarce. Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notes notes fromfrom her her file,
file, though
though givinggiving precise
precise
information on Mrs. Norwood's controllers and other operational matters, give little
information on Mrs. Norwood’s controllers and other operational matters, give little
indication
indication of of the
the doubtless complex intelligence
doubtless complex intelligence she she supplied
supplied in the course
in the course of of her
her
long
long career
career asas aa Soviet
Soviet agent.
agent. It
It is
is highly
highly unlikely
unlikely thatthat the
the SVR will will reveal
revealany details
any details
of
of this intelligence until
this intelligence until after Mrs. Norwood’s
after Mrs. Norwood's death. death.
As well
well asas criticizing
criticizing MIS for for allowing
allowing the the Norwood
Norwood case case to
to "slip out of
“slip out of sight,"
sight,” the the
ISC also
also considered
considered it it "a seriousfailure
“a serious failureof of the
the Security
Security Service
Service not not to
to refer
refer Mr. Mr.
Symonds'
Symonds’ case case toto the
the Law
Law Officers
Officers in in mid-1993."
mid-1993.’’ This This too
too was plainly the
was plainly result of
the result of
cock-up rather than
cock-up rather than conspiracy
conspiracy - probably
probably somewhere
somewhere in MIS's middle
in MIS’s middle management.
management.
Even
Even thethe Director-General
Director-General of of the
the Security
Security Service
Service from 1992 to
from 1992 to 1996,
1996, Stella
Stella Rim
Rim-
ington,
ington, was
was not
not informed
informed by by her
her staff
staff of either
either the
the Norwood
Norwoodor or the
the Symonds
Symonds case,case, andand
was
was thus
thus unable
unable to to brief
brief Michael
Michael Howard,
Howard, Home Home Secretary
Secretary inin thetheMajor
Majorgovernment,
government,
and
and his
his Permanent
Permanent Under Under Secretary.
Secretary.Further
Further confusion
confusion arose
arose asas aa result
result ofofthe
the fact
fact that
that
the
the "interdepartmental
“interdepartmental working working group"
group” in in Whitehall
Whitehall responsible
responsible for for monitoring
monitoring the the
progress of the publication
publication project wasitself itself "unaware
“unaware of the significance of of
[Mitrokhin's]
[Mitrokhin’s]UK material material until
until late
late 1998."23
1998.”23My My ownown direct contact with
direct contact with the
the working
working
group
group was limited to
was limited to an
an enjoyable
enjoyable lunchlunch with
with itsits Chairman
Chairman shortly
shortly before
before Christmas
Christmas
1998.
1998. I was asked, when
was asked, when giving evidence to
giving evidence the ISC, whether,
to the whether, whilewhile writing
writing The
Archiwe, I would
Mitrokhin Archive, would have
have liked
liked greater
greater contact
contact with
with the
thegroup.
group. I would indeed.
would indeed.
The
The ISC's
ISC’s Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin inquiry
inquiry found
found muchmuch to to praise
praise as
as well
well as as criticize:
criticize:
Carrying
Carrying the
theinitial
initial contact
contact with
with Mr.
Mr.Mitrokhin
Mitrokhinright through
right to his
through to and
his and his
his
family's successful exfiltration
family’s successhl exfiltration together
together with
with all
all his
his material
material represents
represents aa major
major
achievement
achievement byby SIS.
SIS. In
In addition
addition the
the management
management of of the
the material
material and
and its
its dis
dis-
semination,
semination, as
as appropriate,
appropriate, to
to foreign
foreign liaison
liaison [intelligence]
[intelligence] services was well
services was well
handled.
handled. The
The Committee
Committee wishwish to
to pay
pay tribute
tribute to
tothis
this outstanding piece ofintel
outstanding piece of intel-
ligence
ligence work. 24
work.24
I was heartened by the ISC's

ISC’s end orsement of
endorsement ofthe
the1996 decision to authorize
1996 authorizeme to
write The Mitrokhin Archiwe in collaboration with Mitrokhin,
Mitrokbin Archive Mitrokhin,as well as byby the Com
Com-
mittee's
mittee’s conclusion (which I hope it is not too immodest to quote)quote) that
that the
the book
bookis
"of
“of tremendous value, as it gives
gives a real insight into
into the
theKGB's
KGB’s work and the persecu
persecu-
tion of the dissidents."25
of the dissident^."^' The ISC's
ISC’s greatest praise was,
was, quite rightly,
rightly, reserved for
Vasili Mitrokhin:
II n tt rr oo dd u c t i o n tt oo tt hA ee P
P aa p
p ee rr bb aa cc kk E
E dd i tt ii oo n I/ XXlX
xxix
The
The Committee
Committee believes
believes that
that he
he is
is aa man
man of remarkable commitment
of remarkable commitment and and
courage,
courage, who
who risked
risked imprisonment
imprisonment or or death
death in
in his
his determination
determination that
that the
the truth
truth
should
should bebe told
told about
about the
the real
real nature
nature of
of the
the KGB and
and their
their activities,
activities,which
which he
he be
be-
lieved
lieved were
werebetraying
betraying the
the interests
interests of
of his
his own
own country
country and
and people.
people. He
He succeeded
succeeded
in
in this,
this, and
and we
we wish
wish to
to record
record formally
formallyour
our admiration
admiration for
for his
his achievement.
achievement.
The
The ISC ISC report
report regrets
regrets that
that "poor
“poor media
media handling
handling [presumably
[presumably by by Whitehall]
Whitehall] of of
the
the publication
publication of of The Mitrokhin Archive, Archive,which
which allowed
allowed the the emphasis
emphasis to to fall
fall on
on the
the
UK spies,
spies, detracted
detracted from from the
the brave
brave work
work of of Mr.
Mr. Mitrokhin
Mitrokhinand and the
the importance
importance of of the
the
revelations
revelations about about thethe KGB's
KGB’s work
work he he wanted
wanted to to expose."26 In In the initial media
the initial media cover
cover-
age,
age, there
there was was little
little mention
mention of of the
the fact
fact that
that vastly
vastly more
more of of the book is
the book is devoted
devoted to to the
the
KGB's war against the dissidents and its attempts to stifle
KGB’s war against the dissidents and its attempts tostifle dissent throughout the So- dissent throughout the So
viet
viet Bloc
Bloc than than toto the
thecareers
careers ofofMelita
Melita Norwood
Nonvood and and John
John Symonds.
Symonds.
The
The chiefchief problem
problem in in understanding
understanding both both Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin and and his his archive,
archive, which
which waswas
evident
evident in in much
much of of thethe media
media coverage,
coverage, is is that
that neither
neither is is truly
truly comprehensible
comprehensible in in
Western
Western terms. terms. The
The veryvery notion
notion of of the
the hero,
hero, familiar
familiar to to all
all other
other cultures
cultures and and all
all pre
pre-
vious
vious Western
Western generations,
generations, arouses
arouses greater
greater scepticism
scepticism in in thetheearly
early twenty-first
twenty-first century
century
West
West thanthan at at any
any other
other timetime or or place
place inin recorded
recorded history.
history. For For those
those whose
whose imagina
imagina-
tions
tions have
have been beencorroded
corroded by by the
the cynicism
cynicism of the age,
ofthe age, the
the idea
idea that
that Mitrokhin
Mitrokhinwas was will
will-
ing
ing to
to risk
risk his
his life
life for
for twenty
twenty years
years for
for aa cause
cause in in which
which he he passionately
passionately believed
believed is is
almost
almost too too difficult
difficult to to grasp.
grasp. Almost
Almost equally
equally hardhard toto comprehend
comprehend is is Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s will will-
ingness
ingness to to devote himself throughout
devote himself throughout that thatperiod
period to to compiling
compiling and and preserving
preserving aa secret
secret
archive
archive which
which he he knew
knew might
might never
never seeseethe
the light
light ofof day.
day. For
For any anyWestern
Western authorauthor ititis is
almost
almost impossible
impossible to to understand
understand how how aa writer
writer could
could devote
devote all all his
his or
or her
her energy
energy and and
creative
creative talent
talent for
for many
many years
years to to secret
secret writing
writing which
which might might nevernever be be publicly
publiclyre- re
vealed.
vealed. Yet,Yet, asas Chapter
Chapter 11 seeksseeks to to show,
show, some
some of of the
the greatest
greatest Russian
Russian writers
writers of of the
the
Soviet
Soviet era era diddid precisely
precisely that.27
that.27 No No biography
biography of of any
any Western
Western writer writer contains
contains any any
death-bed
death-bed scene scene comparable
comparable to to the
the description
description by by the
the widow
widow of of Mikhail Bulgakov of
MikhailBulgakov of
how
how sheshe helped
helped himhim out out of bed for
of bed for the
the last time so
last time so that
that.hehecould
could satisfy
satisfy himself
himself before
before
he
he died
died thatthat his
his great,
great, unpublished
unpublished masterpiece,
masterpiece, The Master andMargarita, and Margarita, arguablyarguably
the
the greatest
greatest novelnovel ofof the twentieth century,
the twentieth century, was wasstill
still in
in its
its hiding
hiding place.
place. The The Master
Master and and
Margarita survivedsurvived to to be
be published
published aa quarter
quarter of of aa century
century later.later. ItI t is
is aa sobering
sobering
thought,
thought, however,
however, that that for
for every
every forbidden
forbidden masterpiece
masterpiece of of the
the Soviet
Soviet era era which
which sursur-
vives,
vives, there
there must
must be be aa larger
larger number
number whichwhich have have failed
failedto to survive
survive or or which,
which, eveneven now,
now,
are
are mouldering
mouldering in in their
their forgotten
forgotten hiding
hiding places
places - - as the Mitrokhin
as the Mitrokhinarchive archive might
might well
well
have done ifMitrokhin
have done if Mitrokhin and and SIS
SIS hadhad not
not succeeded
succeeded in removing it
in removing it to
toBritain.
Britain.
The Mitrokhin
The Mitrokhin archivearchive is is no
no more
more comprehensible
comprehensible in in purely
purely Western
Western terms terms than
than
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin himself.himself.The The commonest
commonest error error inin interpreting
interpretingthe theKGB is is to
to suppose
suppose thatthat
it
it was
was roughly
roughly equivalent
equivalent to to its
its main
main Western
Western rivals.
rivals. There
There were,were, of of course,
course, similari
similari-
ties
ties in
in thethe operational
operational techniques
techniques employed
employed by by intelligence
intelligence agenciesagencies in Eastand
in East and
West,
West, as as well
well as
as in
in the
the importance
importance which which eacheach side
side attached
attached to to the
the other
otheras as an
an intel
intel-
ligence
ligence target.
target. The
The fundamental
fundamental difference
difference between
between the the . Soviet
Soviet one-party
one-party state state and
and
the
the Western
Westerndemocracies,
democracies, however,
however, was wasreflected
reflectedinin fundamental
hndamental differences
differences between
between
their
their intelligence
intelligence communities.
communities.
II nn tt rr oo d
d uu cc tt ii oo nn tt oo tt hh ee P
P aa p
p ee rr bb aa cc k
k E
E ddii tt ii o n / x x x
xxx
The
The differences
differences were were greatest
greatest in in the
the Stalinist
Stalinist era. era. At
At thethe outbreak
outbreak of of the
the Second
Second
World
World War,War, Stalin
Stalin regarded
regarded the the NKVD's
NKVD’s pursuit pursuit in in Mexico
Mexico of of the
the great,
great, though
though
harmless,
harmless, heretic,
heretic, LeonLeon Trotsky,
Trotsky, as as aa higher
higher priority
priority thanthan collecting intelligence on
collecting intelligence on
Adolf
Adolf Hitler.
Hitler. In In the
the middle
middle of of the
the War,
War, thethe paranoid
paranoid strainstrain which
which regularly
regularly distorted
distorted
Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence assessment
assessment persuaded
persuaded Soviet Soviet intelligence
intelligence chiefschiefs -- and and nono doubt
doubt
Stalin
Stalin himself
himself -- that that thethe Magnificent
Magnificent Five, Five, probably
probably its its ablest
ablest group
group of of foreign
foreign
agents,
agents, were
were partpart of of aagigantic
gigantic British
British intelligence
intelligence deception.
deception. DuringDuring his his final
final years
years
Stalin
Stalin was
was sometimes
sometimes obsessedobsessed with with the the hunting
hunting down down of of often
often imaginary
imaginary Titoists
Titoists
and
and Zionists.
Zionists. His His chief
chief foreign
foreign policy
policy objective
objective at at the
the endendof of his
his life
life may
may well
well have
have
been
been the
the plan
plan forfor anan MGB
MGB (later (later KGB)
KGB) illegal
illegal to to assassinate Marshal Tito,
assassinate Marshal Tito, who
who hadhad
succeeded Trotsky as the leading heretic of the
succeeded Trotsky as the leading heretic of the Soviet Bloc. Stalin once called Soviet Bloc. Stalin once called
Lavrenti
Lavrenti Beria,
Beria, thethe most
most powerful
powerhl of of his
his intelligence
intelligence chiefs,chiefs,"my“my Himmler."
Himmler.” But But there
there
was
was nono Western
Western intelligence
intelligence chief chief withwith whomwhom Beria Beria -- or or Himmler,
Himmler, the the head
head of of the
the
SS
SS -- could
could be be credibly
credibly compared.
compared.
Even
Even after
after Stalin's
Stalin’s death
death and and Beria's
Beria’s execution
execution in in 1953,
1953,there
there remained
remained basic basic dif
dif-
ferences
ferences between
between intelligence
intelligence priorities
priorities in in East
East andand West.
West. Perhaps
Perhaps the the simplest
simplest way way
of judging whether
ofjudging whetherany any intelligence
intelligence reportreport is is of
of critical
critical importance
importance is is to
to ask
ask the
the ques
ques-
tion:
tion: If
If ititarrives
arrives in in thethemiddle
middle of of the
the night
nightwould
would you you wakewakethethe relevant
relevant government
government
minister?
minister? The The answer
answer to to that
thatquestion
question in in Moscow
Moscow was was often
often quite
quite different
different fromfrom that
that
in
in Western
Western capitals.
capitals. On O n October
October 27, 27, 1978,
1978, for for example,
example, the the KGB residentresident in in Oslo,
Oslo,
Leonid
Leonid Makarov,
Makarov, rang rang Mikhail
Mikhail Suslov,
Suslov, the the member
member of of the
the Politburo
Politburo chieflychiefly respon
respon-
sible
sible for
for ideological
ideological purity,purity, in in thethe early
early hours.
hours. Why?Why? Not Nottoto tell
tell him
him that that some
some great
great
international
international crisiscrisis waswas about
about to to break
break but but to to report
report thatthat thethe Russian
Russian dissident
dissident Yuri
Yuri
Orlov
Orlov had hadfailed
failed to to win
win the the Nobel
Nobel Peace Peace Prize.
Prize. TheThe Oslo
Oslo residency
residency was was warmly
warmly con con-
gratulated
gratulated for for its
its supposed
supposed "operational
“operational effectiveness"
effectiveness”in in achieving
achieving this this entirely
entirely pre
pre-
dictable
dictable result.28
result.28It It is
is simply
simply not not possible
possible to to imagine
imagine any any Western
Western minister minister being
being
woken
woken for for any
any comparable
comparable reason. reason.
The
The KGB's
KGB’s domestic
domestic obsession
obsessionwith with the thedetection
detection and and suppression
suppression of"ideological
of “ideological
subversion"
subversion” spilled
spilled overover into its foreign
into its foreign operations.
operations. It sought sought to to impress
impress the Party
the Party
leadership
leadership by by its
its zeal
zeal inin discrediting
discrediting dissidents
dissidents abroadabroad as as well
well asas at
at home.
home. In In the
the sum
sum-
mer
mer ofof 1978
1978 the theKGB First First Chief
Chief(Foreign
(Foreign Intelligence)
Intelligence) and and Fifth
Fifth (Ideological
(Ideological Sub Sub-
version)
version) Directorates
Directorates jointly jointly arranged
arranged the the secret
secret screening
screening in in Moscow
Moscow to to an
an audience
audience
of
of KGB and and Party
Party notables
notables of of the
the commencement
commencement address address by by thethe dissident
dissident writer
writer
Aleksandr
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Solzhenitsyn at at Harvard
HarvardUniversity.
University.The The purpose
purpose of of this
this extraordinary
extraordinary (by (by
Western
Western standards)
standards) eveningevening was was to to seek
seek to to demonstrate
demonstrate that, that,thanks
thankstotothethe efforts
efforts ofof
the
the KGB,
KGB, Solzhenitsyn
Solzhenitsyn was was nownow aa largely
largely discredited
discredited figure figure in in the
the United
United States.29
States.29
The
The KGB's
KGB’s mission
mission to to discredit
discredit dissidents
dissidents who who had had emigrated
emigrated to to thetheWest
West extended
extended
even
even toto dissident
dissident balletballet dancers,
dancers, musicians
musicians and and chess
chess players.
players.
For
For Western
Western media media used used to to interpreting
interpretingthe thesecret
secret Cold
Cold WarWarininterms terms of of spy
spy ver
ver-
sus
sus spy,
spy,Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s materialmaterial on on thetheKGB's
KGB’s war war against
against ideological
ideological subversion,
subversion,unlike unlike
the
the revelations
revelations about about individual
individual spies, spies, hadhad little
little interest.
interest. There
There was, predictably,
was,predictably,
greater
greater interest
interest in in this
this material
material in in the
thecountries
countries of of the
the former
former Soviet
Soviet BlocBloc - - reflected,
reflected,
for
for example,
example,in in the
thenumber
numberof of translations
translations of of The Mitrokhin Archive into
TheMitrokhin into Eastern
EasternEu Eu-
ropean
ropean languages.
languages.The The priority
priority given
given by by thethe KGB
KGB to to maintaining
maintaining the the ideological
ideological or- or-
I
I nn tt rr oo dd uu cc t ii oo n tt o tt h e P a pp e r b a cc kkE dEi dt ii ot ni o n / XXX t
xxxi
thodoxy
thodoxy of of the
theSoviet
Soviet Bloc
Blocwas wasreflected
reflectedbyby the
the fact
fact that
that ititdeployed
deployed more more of of its
its elite
elite
group
group of of illegals
illegalstoto Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia during during the the Prague
Prague Spring
Spring of of 1968
1968than,than,so
so far
far as
as
is
is known,
known, were were ever
ever used
usedinin any
any operation
operation against
against aa Western
Western target. target.
The
The ColdCold War chapters of
Warchapters of The Mitrokhin Archive give give equalequalweight
weight to to KGB oper oper-
ations against the United States and to those against ideological subversion.
ations against the United States and to those against ideological subversion.
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin smuggled
smuggled out out ofof the
the KGB foreign intelligence headquarters
foreign intelligence headquarters important
important
material
material on on operations
operations against some of
against some of the
the leaders
leaders of of the
the struggle
struggle for for democracy
democracy
within
within the the Soviet
Soviet Bloc
Bloc whose
whose extraordinary
extraordinary moral moral courage
courage eventually
eventually prevailed
prevailed overover
the immense coercivecoercive force
force of the KGB ap,d its, alli��. T'Yg e,xamples
and its, allies. Two examples stand out.
out. The
first isis the great Russian dissident and nuclear scientist scientist Andrei Sakh3:rov, Sakharov, dubbed
"Public
“Public Enemy Number Number One"One” by Yuri Yuri Andropov (successively
(successively KGB Chairman and
Soviet
Soviet leader),
leader), who
who survived
survived persecution
persecutionand and internal
internal exileexile by bythe
the KGB to to become,
become, in in
Gorbachev's
Gorbachev’s words, "unquestionably
“unquestionably the most outstanding personality" personality” at the the 1989
1989
Congress of People's
People’s Soviets.
Soviets. One of the most striking visual images imagesof the crumbling
of the Soviet system, which deserves deserves to be as well known as the destruction of the
Berlin Wall,
Wall, is of Gorbachev and other other members of th� the PoliJl:mro �tanqi�g bare
Politburo standing bare-
headed by Sakharov's
Sakharov’s open coffin after his sudden death in December 1989. 1989.
The
The second
second outstanding
outstanding case is that
case is that of Cardinal Karol
of Cardinal Karol Wojtyla,
Wojtyla, Archbishop
Archbishop of of
Krakow,
Krakbw, whom whom the the KGB seemsseems toto have
have identi,
identifiedfieci in
in t,the,
he e�rly
ea$y 1970s
1970s as as its most dan
its most dan-
gerous
gerous opponent
opponent in in the
the Soviet
Soviet Bloc.
Bloc. Wojtyla,
Wojtyla, however,
however, was was protected
protected by by his
his moral
moral
authority
authority and and eminence.
eminence. The The KGB, like like the
the Polish
Polish SB, SB, shrank
shrank from from thethe immense
immense
public outcry which his arrest would provoke. Seen in hindsight, Wojtyla's Wojtyla’s election
election
1978 as Pope John Paul II
in 1978 I1 marked the beginning of the the endend of ofthe
theSoviet Bloc.Bloc.
Though the Polish problem was, with difficulty, difficulty, contained for the next decade, decade, it
could not be resolved.
resolved.
The organization which has studied The Mitrokhin Archive with the closest atten atten-
tion
tion since
since its
its publication
publication is is the
the SVR,
SVR, which
which is is deeply
deeply concerned
concerned by by its
its contents.
contents. No
intelligence agency
agency can canexpect
expecteither to recruit new agents or to maintain the loyalty
tomaintain
of its
itsexisting agents unless it can convince them that, that.itit can keep their secrets indef indef-
initely.
initely. The SVR is now ill-placed to do so.
do so. Thanks to
to Mitrokhin, no one who spied
for
for the
the Soviet Union at
Soviet Union at any
any period
period between
between the the October
October Revqlution
Revolution and and thethe eve
eve of
of
the
the Gorbachev
Gorbachev era cannow
era can now be be confident
confident that that hishis or her secrets
or her. secrets are arestill
still secure.
secure.
Mitrokhin's material also
Mitrokhin’s material also contains
contains information
information on on Colq
Cold W�r War operations
operations conducted
conducted
by
by the
the current
current head
head ofof the
the SVR, VyacheslavTrubnikov,
VyacheslavTrubnikov, and and otherotherformer senior KGB
former senior
officers.
officers. Volume
VolumeTwo Two will
will contain
contain aa chapter
chapter on on KGB activities
activities in in IIldi�,
India,where
where Trub
Trub-
nikov
nikov mademade hishis reputation.
reputation. If If the
thepast
past secrets
secrets ofof the
the SVR
SVR leadership
leadership have have proved
provedinin-
secure,
secure, SVR agents agents may
may well
wellconclude
conclude thatthat theirs
theirs areare also.
also.
From
From the moment the
the moment the Mit, rokhin archive
Mitrokhin archive arrived
arrived in in Britain,
Britain, SIS SIS realized
realized that
that its
its
contents
contents werewere "of “ofexceptional
exceptionalcounter-intelligence
counter-intelligence significance,
significance, not only
not only illuminating
illuminating
past
past KGB activity
activity against
against Western
Western countries
countries but but also promising to
also promising to nullify
nullifjr many
many of of
Russia's
Russia’s current assets." The
current assets.’’ The CIA similarly
similarly found found the the archive
archive "the“the biggest
biggest CI
[counter-intelligence]
[counter-intelligence] bonanza bonanza of of the
the post-war
post-war period."
period.”The The FBI agreed.agreed. As the the ISC
ISC
report
report reveals,
reveals, other
other Western
Western intelligence agencies have
intelligence agencies have also also been
been "extremely
“extremely grategrate-
ful"
ful” for
for the numerous CI leads
the numerous leads provided
provided by bythe
the Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin archive.30
archive.30
I
I n tt rr oo dd u c t i o n tt o t h eP aPpaepr ebrabcakEc dk i E
t i do int i o n / xxxii
Some
Some insight
insight intointo the
theturmoil
turmoil inside
inside the
the SVR whichwhich must
must havehave been
been provoked
provoked by by
the
the publication
publication of of The
TheMitrokhin Archive is
Mitrukhin Archive is provided
provided by bythe
the file
file (noted
(noted byby Mitrokhin)
Mitrokhin)
on
on the book on
thebook on thetheKGB published
published by bythe
the American
American journalist
journalist John John Barron
Barron aa quarter
quarter
of
of aa century
century ago.ago. KGB headquarters
headquarters ordered
ordered no no fewer
fewer than
than 370 reports
reports inin an
an attempt
attempt
to assess the
to assess the damage
damage to to its interestscaused
its interests caused by by various sections of
various sections of Barron's bookY
Barron’s book.”
Mitrokhin's revelationshave
Mitrokhin’s revelations havedoubtless
doubtless ledled toto even more damage
even more damage assessments
assessments thanthan
Barron's.
Barron’s. There
There is is already
alreadyun attributable evidence
unattributable evidence of of efforts
efforts by bythe
the SVR to to ensure
ensure that
that
no
no archivist
archivist ever everagain
againhas hasthe unrestricted access
the unrestricted access toto files enjoyed
files enjoyedby by Mitrokhin.
Mitrokhin.
Like
Like the
the KGB First First Chief Directorate, the
ChiefDirectorate, the SVR contains
contains an an "active
“active measures"
measures”sec sec-
tion,
tion, Department
Department MS, specializing specializing in in disinformation,
disinformation, which which was inevitably in
wasinevitably in-
structed
structed to to totry to undermine
try undermine the the credibility
credibilityof of The Mitrukhin Archive.32 On
The Mitrokhin O n two
two
occasions
occasions sincesincethethe publication
publication of of the
thebook,
book, it has sent
it has sent apparent
apparent Russian
Russian defectors
defectors to to
Western
intelligence agencies,
agencies,each eachwith
with the
the same story about
same story about The MitrokhinArchive.
MitrokbinArchiue.
The SVR,
The SVR, claimed
claimed the the "defectors,"
“defectors,” had had decided
decided on on aa massive
massive clear-out
clear-out of of redundant
redundant
and
and retired
retired agents
agents which
which it it had
had inherited
inherited fromfrom thethe KGB, and and hadhad therefore
therefore chosen
chosen aa
retired
retired KGB archivist
archivist - - Vasili
Vasili Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin - - to transmit their
to transmit their names
names to the West.33
to the West.33
This
This poorly conceivedactive
poorly conceived activemeasure
measure proved counter-productive
proved counter-productive for for two
two reasons.
reasons.
First,
First, aa series
series of of Western
Westernintelligence
agencies had had already
already been
beenable ableto
to establish
establish that
that
Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s material
material waswas farfartoo
too valuable
valuable to to them
themforfor the
the SVR to to have
have willingly
willinglymade
made
it
it available.
available. Secondly,
Secondly, both both the
the bogus "defectors" were
bogus “defectors” were quickly
quickly and and conclusively
conclusively exex-
posed as SVR plants.
posed as plants. The
The whole episode has
whole episode has merely
merely served
served to underline the
to underline the SVR's
SVRs
deep anxiety
deep anxiety at at the
thedamage
damage to to its
its agent
agent operations caused by
operations caused byMitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’smaterial.
material. Its
Its
mood will
mood will not
not have
have been lightened by
been lightened by the
the knowledge
knowledge that that there
there areare many
many more
more rev
rev-
elations still
elations still to come in
to come in Volume
Volume Two. Two.Mitrokhin's ambition - unchanged
Mitrokhin’sambition unchanged for almost
for almost
thirty years -
thirty years remains to publish as much as possible of the top-secret material which
remains to publish as much as possible of the top-secret material which
he
he risked
risked hishis life
life to
to collect.
collect.
NOTES
NOTES
11.. By
By the
the time
time I gained
gained access
access to
to the
thearchive,
archive, the
the greater
greater part
part had been translated
had been translated
and
and carefully
carefully checked
checkedby SIS officers
by SIS officers working
working in close collaboration
in close collaborationwith
with Mitrokhin.
Mitrokhin.
The
The Security
Security Service
Service and
and US intelligence
intelligence officers
officersalso
alsoassisted
assistedin
in the translation. The
thetranslation. The
translated
translated archive
archive waswasmade
made available
available to
to me
me in
in an SIS office
an SIS office both
both inin hard
hard copy
copy and
and on
on
aa computer
computer database
database with
with sophisticated
sophisticated indexing
indexing and
and search While IX was
software. While
search software. was
writing
writing the the book,
book, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin worked
worked three
three days
days aa week
week with
with an
an SIS
SIS officer
officer complet
complet-
ing
ing the
the translation
translation and
and checking
checking process.
process.
2. On O n the
the Magnificent
Magnificent Five,
Five, see
seebelow,
below,Chapter
Chapter 4.4.
3. Intelligence
Intelligence andand Security
Security Committee,
Committee, The Mitrokhin
Mitrukhin Inquiry Report, C Cmm
4764,
4764,June June 13, 2000, pp. 44-5,
13,2000, 47. The
44-5,47. The authorization
authorization doubtless
doubtless hadhad something
somethingtotododo
with
with thethe fact
fact that
that I had
had earlier
earlier written
written aa KGB history
history and
and edited
edited two
two volumes
volumes of
of
KGB documents
documents (listed
(listed in the
the Bibliography)
Bibliography) with
with Oleg
Oleg Gordievsky,
Gordievsky, aa former
former KGB
colonel
colonel who who forfor eleven
eleven years had been
years had one of the
been one most important
the most important SIS agents of the
SIS agents the
Cold War.
4. Some details of the
details of thebriefing of senior
briefing of senior ministers and civil
ministers and civil servants
servants are
aregiven
givenin
in
Intelligence
Security Committee,
Committee, The Mitrukhin Inquiry Report, Annex
T6e Mitrokhin Annex E.
II nn tt rr oo du
d u cc tt ii oo nn ttoot ht eh Pe a P
p ae p
r be ar cb ka Ec kd i E
t id oi nt i o n / X X X l lt
xxxiii
5. Hollander,
Hollander, Political PiZgrims, p. 102.
Pulitical Pilgrims, 102.
6. See
6. See below,
below, Chapter
Chapter 5. 5.
7. David
David Rose,
Rose, "“‘I 'I would
would do do everything
everything again,'
again,’ says
says the
the agent
agent from
from suburbia,"
suburbia,”
Sunday Telegraph, September 12,
Telegraph, September 12, 1999.
1999. While
While interviewing
interviewing Mrs. Mrs. Norwood
Norwood on on Au
Au-
gust 1010 for a BBC2 documentary based on The MitrokhinArchive, Mitrukhin Archiwe, Rose had obtained
the first confession
confession that she had been a Soviet spy. spy.
8. John
John Symonds
Symonds (interviewed
(interviewed,by David Rose),
by David Rose), "I told you
“I told you I was
was aa spy,"
spy,” Guardian
(G2), September 14,1999.
(G2), 14, 1999. Cf Cf. below, pp. 559-63.
559-63.
9. Interview
Interview withwith Oleg
Oleg Kalugin
Kalugin on on ABC Nightline, SeptemberSeptember 9, 1999.
9,1999.
10. ABC News
10. News report
report by by John
John McWethy,
McWethy, September
September 9, 1999.
9,1999.
11. New York
11. E’ork Post, 7 November 1999. 1999. Philadelphia
Philade4hia Daily Niws, 88 November 1999.
DailyNews, 1999.
12. For
12. For aa selection
selection of of Italian
Italian newspaper articles,see:
newspaper articles, see: Dossier Stampa: L’AfareL'Affire
Mitrokhhz (Rome:
Mitrokhin (Rome: Camera
Camera dei dei Deputati,
Deputati, Ufficia
Ufficia Stampa,
Stampa, October
October22,22,1999).
1999). SomeSome of of
the IMP
IMPEDIANEDIAN reports are published in the the Italian edition of The Mitrokhin Mitrukhin
Archive: Mitrukhin (Milan: Rizzoli, 1999),
L'Archivio Mitrokhin
Archiwe: L’Archiwio 1999), Appendix F. F.
13. Intelligence
Security Committee,
Committee, The Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, pp.
Mitrokhin Inquiry pp. 48,
52-5.
52-5.
14. In
14. In 1963,
1963, after
after aa long
long investigation
investigation had had failed
failed to
to find
find enough
enough usable
usable evidence
evidenceto to
secure
secure aa conviction,
conviction, the the Soviet
Soviet spy spy SirSir Anthony
Anthony BluntBlunt had been offered
had been offered immunity
immunity
from
from prosecution
prosecution in in return
return for for aa full
full confession
confession (not(not aa bargain
bargain he seems to
he seems to have
have com
com-
pletely
pletely honoured).
honoured). It It was
was later
later alleged,
alleged, on on no
no adequate
adequate evidence,
evidence, that
that the
thereal
real reason
reason
for
for the
the decision
decision notnot to toprosecute
prosecute had had been
been an an establishment
establishment or or MIS coverup.
coverup.
15. In
15. In stating
statingthis
this conclusion,
conclusion, I should perhaps declare
should perhaps declare an interest. Since
an interest. Since the
the late
late
1970s
1970s I had had argued
argued the the case
case forfor the establishment of
the establishment of aa parliamentary
parliamentary intelligence
intelligence
committee
committee with with roughly
roughly the the role
role of of the present Intelligence
the present Intelligence and and Security
Security Committee.
Committee.
(See,
(See, for
for example,
example,the the introduction
introduction to to Andrew
Andrew and andDilks
Dilks [eds.],
[eds.], Missing Dimension,
and
and the conclusion to
the conclusion to Andrew,
Andrew, Secret Service.) The proposalwas
The proposal wasinitially
initially given aa
given
frosty
frosty reception
reception in in Whitehall.
Whitehall.
16. Intelligence
16. Intelligence and and Security
Security Committee, Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, p. 12.
Committee, The Mitrokhin 12.
17. Intelligence
Security Committee, Mitrukhin Inquiry Report, p. 69.
Committee, The Mitrokhin
18. See
18. See below,
below, p.p. 168.
168. It is is difficult
difficult to to see
see how
how Mrs.
Mrs. Norwood
Nonvood could could have
have provided
provided
atomic intelligence of
atomic intelligence of such "greatvalue”
such “great value" in in March
March 19451945 if, as as claimed
claimed by by Phillip
Phillip
Knightley,
Knightley she she did not return
did not return to to work
work in in the British Non-Ferrous
the British Non-Ferrous Metals Research As
Metals Research As-
sociation
sociation (BN-FMRA)
(BN-FMRA) after extended maternity
after extended maternity leave
leave until
until 1946
1946 (Knightley,
(Knightley, "Nor
“Nor-
wood:
wood: thethe spy
spy who
who never
never was," Statesman, December
was,”New Statesman, 13, 1999). MIS
December 13,1999). MI5 evidence
evidence toto
the
the ISC confirms
confirms that
that in in 1945
1945 Mrs.Mrs. Norwood
Nonvood was secretary to
was secretary to the
the Chairman
Chairman of of the
the
BN-FMRA (Intelligence
(Intelligence and Security Committee,
and Security Committee, The MitrokhinMitro-okhin Inquiry Report,
p. 67).
67).
19. This
19. This is is the
the view
view of of aa government
government scientist
scientist who
who prefers
prefers not
not toto be
be identified.
identified.
Precise
Precise details
details of
of the
the atomic
atomic intelligence
intelligence provided
provided by byMrs.
Mrs. Norwood
Norwood are are unavailable.
unavailable.
Not
Not until
until they
they have
have been
been carefully
carefully analyzed
analyzed andand compared
compared with with the
the other
other atomic
atomic in
in-
telligence obtained by Soviet intelligence intelligencewill willit be possible
possibleto form a final judgement
on
on the
the importance
importance of of her
her role
role as an atom
as an atom spy.
spy. Atomic
Atomic intelligence
provided by Mrs.
by Mrs.
Norwood qfter
Norwood after 1945
1945 was was irrelevant
irrelevant to to the
the construction
construction of of the
the Soviet
Soviet bomb
bomb which,
which,
I
I n tt r
rod
d un cc tt ii oo nn tt oo tt hh ee P
P aa p
p ee r
r bb aa cc kk E
Edd i tt i o nn // XXX l V
xxxiv
thanks
thanks chiefly
chiefly toto Hall
Hall and and Fuchs,
Fuchs, waswas an an exact replica of
exact replica of the
the American
American -- not not thethe
British
British -- bomb.
bomb. It It remained,
remained, however,however, of of some
some significance.
significance.Probably
Probably the the most
most imim-
portant
portant secret
secret in
in post-war
post-war Britain Britain -- aa secret
secret so so sensitive
sensitive that
that Prime
PrimeMinister
MinisterClementClement
Attlee
Attlee withheld
withheld itit fromfrom most most of of his
his cabinet
cabinet -- concerned
concerned the the construction
the
British atomic bomb. Mrs. Norwood's intelligence must
British atomic bomb. Mrs. Norwood’s intelligence must have provided some insight have provided some insight
into
intothethe highly
highly classified
classified progress
progress of of British
British atomic
atomic scientists.
scientists. (See (See below,
below,
pp.
pp. 5518-19.)
1 8-19.)
20.
20. According
According to to aafile
file noted
noted by by Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin (vol. (vol. 7,7, ch.
ch. 2,
2, item
item 19),
19),upup toto Novem
Novem-
ber
ber 1944 the NKGBobtained 1,167 documents on “nuclear secrets” from the USA
1 944 the NKGB obtained 1,167 documents on "nuclear secrets" from the USA
and
and UK.
UK. Of O f these
these 88 88 from
from the the USA
USA and and 79 79 from
from the the UKUK were
were rated
rated asas "very
“veryvalu
valu-
able."
able.’’ Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notes notes contain
contain no no similar
similar statistics
statistics forfor the
the period
period after
after November
November
11944.
944. Further
Furtheratomic
atomic intelligence
intelligence was was received
receivedfrom from thethe GRU.
GRU.
221.
1 . See below, pp. 550-53,
See below, pp. 550-53,567-8. 567-8.
22.
22. InIn 1992,
1992, while
while head head of Line X
of Line X (S&T)
(S&T) at at the
the Paris
Paris residency,
residency, Oshchenko
Oshchenko de de-
fected
fected to to Britain,
Britain, where
where he he now
now lives.
lives.
23.
23. Intelligence
Security Committee,
Committee, The The Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin Inquiry Report, pp.
Inqzriry Report, pp. 13,13,
20, 26.
20,26.
24.
24. Intelligence
Security Committee,
Committee, The TheMitrokhin
Mitrokbin Inquiry Report,p.
InquiryReport, p. 4.
4.
25.
25. Intelligence
Security Committee,
Mitrokhin Inquiry Report,pp.
Inquiry Report, pp. 4, 16.
4,16.
The
The government's
government’s response
response welcomed
welcomed the the ISC's
ISC’s endorsement.
endorsement.
Q . Intelligence
Security Committee,
Mitrokhin Inquiry Report,p.
Inquiry Report, p. 4.
4.
27.
27. See
See below,
below,pp.pp. 13-14.
13-14.
28.
28. See
See below,
below,pp. pp.429-30.
429-30.
29.
29. See
See below,
below,pp.pp. 418-19.
418-19.
30.
30. Intelligence
Security Committee,
Committee, The TheMitrokhin
Mitrokhin Inquiry Report,p.
Inqzriry Report, p. 4.
4.
31.
31. See
See below,
below, p.p. 25.
25.
32.
32.TheThe KGB
KGB had had similarly
similarlysoughtsought totodiscredit
discredit Andrew
Andrew and and Gordievsky,
Gordievsky,KGB: KGB: The The
Inside Story, after
Inside St07), after its
its publication
publication in in 1990,
1990,by by claiming
claiming that that its
its best-publicized
best-publicized revelarevela-
tion
tion -- the
the identification
identification of of John
John Cairncross
Cairncross as as the
the "Fifth
“FifthMan" Man”and and the
the first
first agent
agent to to
provide
provide warning
warning of of plans
plans to to build
build the
the atomic
atomic bombbomb --was was wrong.
wrong. The The SVRSVR now now ac ac-
knowledges
knowledges that that thetheidentification
identification was was correct
correct on on both
bothcounts.
counts.
33.
33. InIn devising
devising this this ill-advised active measure,
ill-advised active measure, Department
Department MS MS maymay havehave been
been
encouraged
encouraged by by the
the fact
fact that
that two
two somewhat
somewhat similar
similar suggestions
suggestionshad had surfaced
surfaced indepen
indepen-
dently
dently in the Western
in the Western media. media. A A writer
writer inin Le Mondc had
L e Monde had suggested
suggested that that "“.. .. ..The
The
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin archive
archive operation
operation was was organized
organized in in Moscow
Moscow either either by by an
an undisciplined
undisciplined
Stalinist
Stalinist faction
faction in in the
the KGB KGB or or by
by the
the provisional
provisional leadership
leadership of of the
the [intelligence]
[intelligence]
agencies
agencies between
between November
November 1991 1991andand February
February 1992."1992.”("Voyages
(“Voyagesen en memoire
mimoire soviesoviC-
tique," Monde, November
tique,” Le Monde, November 5, 1999.) In
5,1999.) In her
her review
review of ofThe
TheMitrokhin ArchiveArchiwe in in The
The
Times
Times Literary Supplement (November
Literary Supplement (November 26, 26, 1999),
1999), Dr. Amy Knight
Dr. Amy Knight alsoalso could
could not not
"help
“helpbut butwonder
wonder whether
whether [Mitrokhin]
[Mitrokhin] had
had aalittle
little help
help from
from hishis former bployers in
former eeLployers in
making
making knownknown the the KGB's
KGB’s archival
archival secrets."
secrets.”"This,"
“This,”she she added,
added, "is “isby
by no
no means
means aa far
far-
fetched
fetched suggestion."
suggestion.”Dr. Dr. Knight's
Knight’s earlier
earlier review
review of of my
my book
book withwith Oleg
Oleg Gordievsky,
Gordievsky,
KGB: The Inside Story, had included the eccentric suggestion that might not
KGB: The Inside Story, had included the eccentric suggestion that I might not have
have
I n tt rr oo d u c t i o n t oo tt hd ee P aapp ee rr bb aa cckkE E
d idt i to ino n // x x xv
xxxv
written
written the
the lengthy
lengthy introduction TLS, December
introduction ((TLS, December 7,7, 1990).
1990). My
My own
own review
review of
of Dr.
Dr.
Knight's
Knight’s book,
book, Spies
Spies Without Cloaks, makes
Without Cloaks, makes clear
clearmy
my respect
respect for
for her
her research
research on
on Rus
Rus-
sian
sian intelligence.
intelligence.There
There is,
is, however,
however,occasionally aa mild
occasionally mild element
element ofof conspiracy
conspiracy theory
theory
in
in her
her work
work -- as
as evidenced,
evidenced, for
for example,
example, by her
her suggestion
suggestion in
in Spies
Spies Without
Without Cloaks
Cloaks
that
that Gorbachev
Gorbachev was
was complicit
complicit in
in the
the attempted
attemptedcoup
coup against
against him
him ininAugust
August 1991.
1991.
o n E
T
T H EE M IT
TRRO
O KK H
H II N AR
R C
C H II V
VEE
TThis
his book
book is
is based
based on
on unprecedented
unprecedented and
and unrestricted
unrestricted access
access to
to one
one of
of the
the world's
world’s
most secret
most secret and
and closely
closely guarded
guarded archives-that
archives-that ofof the the foreign
intelligence arm
arm of of the
the
KGB, the FirstChief
the First Chief Directorate (FCD).
Directorate Hitherto the
(FCD). Hitherto the present
present Russian
Russian foreign
foreign
intelligence
service, the the SVR (Sluzhba Vneshnei Raxwedki),, has
Vneshnei Razvedki) been supremely
has been supremely con con-
fident
fident that
that aa book
book suchsuch as as this
this could
could notnot be be written.
written. When
When the the German
German magazine
magazine
Foczcs reported
Focus reported in in December
December 1996 1996 that
thata aformer
former KGB officerofficer had
had defected
defected toto Britain
Britain
with
with "the
“the names
names of of hundreds
hundreds of of Russian
Russian spies,"
spies,”Tatyana Samolis, spokeswoman
Tatyana Samolis, spokeswoman for for
the SVR, instantly
the SVR, instantly ridiculed
ridiculed thethe whole
whole storystory asas "absolute
“absolute nonsense." "Hundreds of
nonsense.” “Hundreds of
people! That
people! just doesn't
That just doesn’t happen!"
happen!” she she declared.
declared. ''Any
“Any defector
defector could
could get
get the
the name
name of of
one,
one, two,
two, perhaps
perhaps threethree agents-but
agents-but not not hundreds!"l
hundreds!”’
The
The facts,
facts, however,
however, are are far
far more
more sensational
sensational even even than
than thethestory
story dismissed
dismissed as as
impossible
impossible by by the
the SVR.
SVR. The The KGB defector
defector had had brought
brought withwithhim himtotoBritain
Britain details
details
not
not of
of aa few
few hundred
hundred but butofofthousands
thousands of of Soviet
Soviet agents
agents and
and intelligence
officers inin all
all
parts
parts of
of the
the globe,
globe, somesome of of them
them "illegals"
“illegals”living under deep
living under deep cover
cover abroad,
abroad, disguised
disguised
as
as foreign
foreign citizens.
citizens. No one one who
who spied
spied for
for the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union at atany
any period
period between
between the the
October
October Revolution
Revolution and and the
the eve
eve of
of the
the Gorbachev
Gorbachev era era can
can now
now be be confident
confident that
that his
his
or
or her
her secrets
secrets areare still
still secure.
secure. When
When the the British
British Secret
Secret Intelligence
Service (SIS)
exfiltrated
exfiltrated thethe defector
defector and and his
his family
family fromfrom Russia
Russia in 1992, it
in 1992, it also
also brought
brought outout sixsix
cases
cases containing
containing the the copious notes he
copious notes he hadhad taken almost daily
taken almost daily for
for twelve
twelve years,
years,before
before
his
his retirement
retirement in in 1984,
1984, on on top
top secret
secret KGB files files going
going as as far back as
far back as 1918.
1918. The
The concon-
tents
tents of
of the
the cases
cases havehave since
since been
been described
described by by the
the American
American FBI as as "the
“the most
most com
com-
plete
plete and
and extensive
extensive intelligence
intelligence everever received
receivedfrom from any
any source."
source.”
The
The KGB KGB officer
officer whowho assembled
assembled this this extraordinary
extraordinary archive,
archive, Vasili
Vasili Nikitich
Nikitich
Mitrokhin,
Mitrokhin, is is now
now aa British
British citizen. Born in
citizen. Born in central
central Russia
Russia in in 1922,
1922, hehe began
began his his
career
Soviet foreign
intelligence officer
officer in 1948, atataatime
in 1948, timewhenwhen thethe foreign
foreign
intelligence
intelligence arms
arms of the MGB (the
the MGB (the future KGB) and
future KGB) and the
the GRU (Soviet
(Soviet military
military intel
intel-
ligence)
ligence) were
were temporarily
temporarily combined
combined in in the
the Committee
Committeeofoflnformation.2
Information.2 By By the
the time
time
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin was was sent
sent on on his
his first
first foreign
foreign posting
posting in in 1952,3
1952,3thethe Committee
Committee had disin
haddisin-
tegrated
tegrated andand the
the MGB had had resumed
resumed its its traditional
traditional rivalry
rivalry with
with thethe GRU. His His first
first
five years
five years in in intelligence
intelligence were were spent
spent in in the
the paranoid
paranoid atmosphere
atmosphere generated
generated by by the
the
final
final phase
phase of of Stalin's
Stdin’s dictatorship,
dictatorship, when when the the intelligence
agencies werewere ordered
ordered to to
T E WSOWR O
THS
E A
DNR D
D HAS
T ENH IDE LT D
H E S H I E L D / 2
z
conduct
conduct witch-hunts throughout the
witch-hunts throughout the Soviet
Soviet Bloc
Bloc against
against mostly
mostly imaginary
imaginary Titoist
Titoist
and
and Zionist
Zionist conspiracies.
conspiracies.
In
In January
January 1953
1953 the theMGB was was officially
officiallyaccused
accusedof of "lack
“lack ofof vigilance"
vigilance” inin hunting
hunting
down
down the conspirators. The
the conspirators. The Soviet
Soviet news
news agency
agencyTassTass made
made thethe sensational
sensational announce
announce-
ment
ment that
that for
for the
the past
past few
few years
years world
world Zionism
Zionism and and Western
agencies
had
had been
been conspiring
conspiring withwith "a“a terrorist
terrorist group"
group” of of Jewish
Jewish doctors
doctors "to“to wipe
wipe out
out thethe lead
lead-
ership
ership ofof the
the Soviet
Soviet Union."
Union.” During
During the the final
final two
two months
months of of Stalin's
Stalin’s rule,
rule, the
the MGB
struggled
struggled toto demonstrate
demonstrate its itsheightened
heightened vigilance
vigilance byby pursuing
pursuing the the perpetrators
perpetrators of of this
this
non-existent plot. Its
non-existent plot. Its anti-Zionist
anti-Zionist campaign
campaign was, was, inin reality,
reality, little
little more
more than
than aa thinly
thinly
disguised
disguised anti-Semitic
anti-Semitic pogrom.
pogrom. Shortly
Shortly before
before Stalin's
Stalin’s sudden
sudden deathdeathininMarch
March1953, 1953,
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin was was ordered
ordered to to investigate
investigate thethe alleged
alleged Zionist
Zionist connections
connections of of the
the Pravda
correspondent
correspondent in in Paris,
Paris, Yuri
Yuri Zhukov,
Zhukov, who who hadhad come
come under
under suspicion
suspicion because
because of of his
his
wife's
wife’s Jewish
Jewish origins.
origins. Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin had hadthethe impression
impression that that Stalin's
Stalin’s brutal
brutal security
security
supremo,
supremo, Lavrenti
Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria, was
Pavlovich Beria, was planning
planning to to implicate
implicate Zhukov
Zhukov in in the
the sup-
sup
posed Jewish
posed Jewish doctors'
doctors’ plot.
plot. A few
few weeks
weeks after
after Stalin's
Stalin’s funeral,
hneral, however, Beria sud-
however, Beria sud
denly announcedthat
denly announced that
the the plot
plot had
had never
never existed,
existed, andand exonerated
exonerated the the alleged
alleged
conspirators.
conspirators.
By
By the
the summer
summer of of 1953
1953 most
most ofof Beria's
Beria’s colleagues
colleagues in in the
thePresidium
Presidium werewere united
united inin
their
their fear
fear of
of another
another conspiracy-that
conspiracy-that he he might
might be be planning
planning aa coupcoup d'itat to step
d’itat to step into
into
Stalin's
Stalin’s shoes.
shoes.While
While visiting
visiting aa foreign
foreign capital
capital inin July,
July, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin received
received aa top
top secret
secret
telegram
telegram with
with instructions
instructions to to decipher
decipher it it himself,
himself, and
and waswas astonished
astonished to to discover
discover that that
Beria had
Beria been charged
had been charged with
with "criminal
“criminal anti-Party
anti-Party and anti-state activities."
and anti-state activities.” Only later
later
did Mitrokhin learn
did Mitrokhin learn that
that Beria
Beria had
had been
been arrested
arrested atat aa special
special meeting
meeting of of the
the Presidium
Presidium
on June 26 after
on June after aa plot
plot organized
organized by by his
his chief
chief rival,
rival, Nikita
Nikita Sergeyevich
Sergeyevich Khrushchev.
Khrushchev.
From
From hishis prison
prison cell, Beria wrote
cell, Beria wrote begging
begging letters
letters to
to his
his former
former colleagues,
colleagues, pleading
pleading
pathetically
pathetically for
for them
them to to spare
spare his
his life
life and
and "find
“find the
the smallest
smallest jobjob for
for me":
me”:
You
You will see
see that
that in
in two
two or or three
three years
years I'll
I’ll have
have straightened
straightened out
out fine
fine and
and will
will
still
still be
be useful
useful to you .. .. .. I ask
to you ask the comrades to
the comrades to forgive
forgive me
me for
for writing somewhat
writingsomewhat
disjointedly
disjointedly and
and badly because of
badly because of my
my condition,
condition, and
and also
also because
because of
of the
the poor
poor
lighting and
andnotnothaving my pince-nez.
No longer
longer in
in awe
awe of
of him,
him,the
thecomrades
comrades simply
simply mocked
mocked his
his loss
loss of
of nerve.
nerve.
On December 24 it
O n December it was
was announced
announced thatthat Beria
Beria had
had been
been executed
executed after
after trial
trial by
by the
the
Supreme Court. Since neither his responsibility for mass murder in the theStalin era nor
his own record as a serial rapist of of under-age girls could be publicly mentioned for
fear
fear of
of bringing
bringingthethe
Communist
Communist regime
regime into disrepute, he
into disrepute, he was
was declared
declared guilty
guilty instead
instead
of a surreal plot "to
“to revive capitalism and to restore the rule of of the bourgeoisie"
bourgeoisie” in
association
association with
with British
British and
and other
other Western
Westernintelligence
intelligence services.
services. Beria
Beria thus
thus became,
became,
following
following Yagoda
Yagoda and
and Yezhov
Yezhov inin the
the 1930s, the
the third
third Soviet security chief
Soviet security to be
chief to be shot
shot
for crimes which included serving as an (imaginary) British secret agent. In true Stal- Stal
inist tradition,
inist subscribers to
tradition, subscribers the Great Soviet
to the Soviet Encyclopedia
Encyclopediawere
were advised
advised toto use "a
use “a
small knife or razor blade”
blade" to remove the entry
entryononBeria, and then
thento insert a replace
replace-
ment article on thethe Bering Sea.4
Sea.4
T
T bh eM iMt ri ot rk ob ki hnAirnc hAi rv ceh i v e / J
3
The
The first
first official
official repudiation
repudiation of Stalinism was
of Stalinism was Khrushchev's
Khrushchev’sno�-celebrated
now-celebrated secret secret
speech to
speech to aa closed
closed session
sessionof of the
theTwentieth Congress of
TwentiethCongress of thetheCommunist
CommunistParty Party of the
of the
Soviet Union
Soviet (CPSU) in
Union (CPSU) in February
February 1956.
1956. Stalin's "cult of
Stalin’s “cult of personality," Khrushchev
personality,” Khrushchev
declared,
declared, had been responsible
had been responsible for for "a
“a whole series of
whole series of exceedingly
exceedingly serious serious and and grave
grave
perversions
perversions of of Party
Party principles,
principles, of of Party
Party democracy,
democracy, of revolutionary legality."
of revolutionary legality.” TheThe
speech
speech waswas reported
reported to to thethe KGB
KGB PartyParty organization
organization in in aa secret letter from
secret letter from thethe Cen
Cen-
tral
tral Committee.
Committee. The The section
section to to which Mitrokhin belonged
which Mitrokhin belonged took took two two daysdays toto debate
debate
its contents. He
its contents. H e still
still vividly
vividly recalls
recallsthe conclusion of
the conclusion of the
the section's
section’s chairman,
chairman, Vladimir
Vladimir
Vasilyevich
Vasilyevich Zhenikhov
Zhenikhov (later (later KGB resident
resident in Finland): "Stalin
in Finland): “Stalin waswas aa bandit!"
bandit!” SomeSome
Party
Party members
members were were too
too shocked-or cautious-to
shocked-or cautious-to say say anything.
anything. OthersOthers agreedagreed with
with
Zhenikhov. None
Zhenikhov. None dared
dared ask ask the question which
the question Mitrokhin was
which Mitrokhin c9nviflced �as
was convinced was in in all
all
their minds:
their "Where was
minds: “Where was Khrushchev
Khrushchev while while all these crimes
all these crimes were taking place?"
were taking place?”
In the aftermath
aftermath of ofthe
the secret speech Mitrokhin became too outspoken for his
own
own good.good. Though
Though his his criticisms
criticisms of the the way
way the the KGB had had been
been run run were
were mild
mild by by
Western
Western standards,
standards, late late inin 1956
1956Mitrokhin
Mitrokhinwas was moved
moved from from operations
operations to to the
the FCD
archives,
archives, where
where his his main
main job job waswas answering
answering queriesqueries from from other departmentsand
other departments and
provincial
provincial KGBs.5KGBs.’ Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin discovered
discovered that that Beria's
Beria’s personal
personal archive
archive had had beenbeen
destroyed
destroyed on on Khrushchev's
Khrushchev’s orders orders so as as to
to leave
leave no no trace
trace of the �he compromising
c<?mpromising mate- mate
rial
rial hehe had
had collected
collected on on his
his former
former colleagues.
colleagues. Ivan Ivan Aleksandrovich
Aleksandrovich Serov, Serov, chairman
chairman
of
of the
the KGB from from 19541954 to to 1958, dutifully reported
1958,dutifully reported to to Khrushchev
Khrushchev that that thethe files
files had
had
contained
contained much much "provocative
“provocative and and libelous"
libelous” material.6
material.6
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin was was an an avid
avid reader
reader ofof the
the Russian
Russian writers
writers who who had fallen out
hadfallen out ofof favor
favor inin
the
the final
final years
years of of Stalinist
Stalinist rulerule and
and began
began to to bebe published
published again again duringduring the the mid-
mid-
1950s.
1950s. TheThe first
first great
great literary
literary event
event inin Moscow
Moscow after after Stalin's
Stalin’s death
death was was thethe publica
publica-
tion
tion in in 1954,
1954, for
for thethe first
first time
time since
since 1945,
1945, of new poems by
new poems by Boris
Boris Pasternak,
Pasternak, the the last
last
leading Russian author to have begun his career before the Revolution. Published in
leading Russian author to have begun his career before the Revolution. Published in
aa literary
literary magazine
magazine under under thethe title "Poems from
title “Poems from the the Novel
Novel Dgctor Zhivago,” they
Doctor Zhivago," they were
were
accompanied
accompanied by by aa brief
brief description
description of of the
the epic
epic butbut still
still unfinished
unfinished work work in in which
whichtheythey
were
were to appear. However,
to appear. However, the the completed
completed text text of of Doctor Zhivago,
Zhivago, whichwhich followed
followed the the
meandering
meandering life life of
of its
its enigmatic
enigmatic hero hero from
from the final phase
the final phase ofTsarist
ofTsarist rule rule to
to the early
the early
years of
years of the Soviet regime,
theSoviet regime, was was judged
judged farfar too subversive for
too subversive for publication
publication and and was
was offi
offi-
cially
cially rejected
rejected in in 1956.
1956. In In the
the novel,
novel, when
when Zhivago
Zhivago hears hears the news of
the news of the
the Bolshevik
Bolshevik
Revolution,
Revolution, "He “He waswas shaken
shaken and and overwhelmed
overwhelmed by by the
the greatness
greatness of of thethe moment,
moment, and and
thought
thought of of its
its significance
significance for for the
the centuries
centuries to to come."
come.” But But Paster�ak
Pasternak
. . goes
goes onon totocon-
con
vey
vey an an unmistakable
unmistakable sense sense of of the
the spiritual emptiness of
spiritual emptiness of thethe regime
regime which emerged
which emerged
from
from it. it. Lenin
Leninis is "vengeance
“vengeance incarnate"
incarnate” and and Stalin
Stalin aa "pockmarked
“pockmarked Caligula." Caligula.”
Pasternak
Pasternak became
became the the first
first Soviet
Soviet author since the
author ,since the 1920s
1920s to to circumvent
circumvent the the ban
ban-
ning
ning of of his
his work
work in in Russia
Russia by by publishing
publishing it it abroad.
abroad. As he he handed
handed the the typescript
typescript of of
ZzJivagoto
Doctor Zhivago to aa representative
representative of of his
his Italian
Italian publisher,
publisher, Giangiacomo
Giangiacomo Feltrinelli,
Feltrinelli,
he
he told
told him
him with
with aa melancholy
melancholy laugh: laugh: "You
“You are are hereby
hereby invited
invited to to watch
watch me me face the
face the
firing
firing squad!"
squad!” Soon Soon afterwards,
afterwards, acting acting onon official
official instructions,
instructions, Pasternak
Pasternak sent sent aa
telegram
telegram to to Feltrinelli insisting that
Feltrinelli insisting that his
his novel
novel be be withdrawn
withdrawn from publication; pri-
from publication; pri
vately,
vately, however,
however,he he wrote
wrote aa letter
letter telling
telling him
him to to go ahead.
ahead. Published
Published first first in
in Italian
Italian in in
November
November 1957, 1957, Doctor ZhivagoZhivago became
became aa bestseller
bestseller in in twenty-four
twenty-four languages.
languages. Some Some
T
T H EE S
SW O
ORRD
D AN D
D T
T H EE S
S H I EE L D / 4
Western
Western critics
critics hailed
hailed it it as
as the
the greatest Russian novel
greatest Russian since Tolstoy's
novel since Tolstoy’s Resurrection,
Resurrection,
published
published in in 11899.
899. Offi cial outrage
Official outrage in in Moscow
Moscow at at Doctor Zhivago’s success
Doctor Zhivago's success was was com
com-
pounded
pounded by by the
the award
award to to Pasternak
Pasternak of of the
the 1958
1958Nobel
Nobel Prize
Prize for for Literature.
Literature. In In aa cable
cable
to
to the Swedish Academy,
the Swedish Pasternak declared
Academy, Pasternak declared himself"immensely
himself “immensely thankful, thankful, touched,
touched,
proud,
proud, astonished, abashed." The newspaper
astonished, abashed.”The newspaper of of the
the Soviet
Soviet Writers'
Writers’ Union,
Union, the theLiter
Liter-
aturnaya Gazeta, however,
atzmzaya Gazeta, however, denounced
denounced him him as as "a literary Judas
“a literary Judas who betrayed his
who betrayed his peo-
peo
ple for thirty pieces of silver-the Nobel Prize." Under immense official pressure,
ple for thirty pieces of silver-the Nobel Prize.” Under immense official pressure,
Pasternak
Pasternak cabled
cabled Stockholm
Stockholm withdrawing
withdrawing his his acceptance
acceptance of of the theprize
prize "in
“in view
view of of the
the
significance given
significance given toto this
this award
award in in the society to
the society to which
which I belong.
be10ng.”~ "7
Though Pasternak was
Though Pasternak was not one of
not one of his
his own
own favorite
favorite authors,
authors, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin saw saw the
the
official
official condemnation
condemnation of of Doctor Zhivago as as typifying
typifying Khrushchev's
Khrushchev’s cultural cultural bar- bar
barism.
barism. "The“The development
development of of literature
literature and art in
and art in aa socialist
socialist society,"
society,” Khrushchev
Khrushchev
boorishly
boorishly insisted, “proceeds .. .. .. as
insisted, "proceeds as directed
directed by by the
the Party."
Party.” Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin was was soso outraged
outraged
by
by the
the neo-Stalinist
neo-Stalinist denunciations
denunciations of of Pasternak
Pasternak by by Moscow's
Moscow’sliterary literary establishment
establishment
that in October
that in October 1958 1958 he he sent
sent an an anonymous
anonymous letter letter ofof protest
protest to to the
the Literaturnaya
Gazeta. Though
Gaxeta. Though he he wrote
wrotethe the letter
letter with his left
with his left hand
hand in in order
order to to disguise
disguise his his hand
hand-
writing,
writing, he he remained
remained anxious
anxious for for some
some time that his
time that his identity
identity might might be be discovered.
discovered.
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin knew knew from
from KGB fi les the
files the immense
immense resources
resources which which werewere frequently
frequently
deployed
deployed to to track
track down
down anonymous letter-writers. H
anonymous letter-writers. Hee was
was even evenworried
worried that,
that, by lick
by lick-
ing the
thegum gumonon thethe
back of the theenvelope
envelope before sealing it, he hehad hadmade it possible for
his
his saliva
saliva toto be identified by
be identified by aa KGB laboratory.
laboratory. TheThe whole episode strengthened
whole episode strengthened his his
resentment at
resentment at Khrushchev's
Khrushchev’s failure failure to to follow
follow hishis secret speech of
secret speech of 1956
1956 by by aa thor
thor-
oughgoing
oughgoing programprogram of of de-Stalinization.
de-Stalinization. Khrushchev,
Khrushchev, he he suspected,
suspected, had had personally
personally
ordered
ordered Pasternak's
Pasternak‘s persecution
persecution as as aa warning
warning to to all
all those
those inclined
inclined to to challenge
challenge his his
authority.
authority.
As
As yet,
yet, however,
however, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin pinned pinned his his faith
faith not
not onon thethe overthrow
overthrow of of the
the Soviet
Soviet
regime
regime butbut on on the emergence of
the emergence of aa newnew leader
leader less
less tainted
tainted than than Khrushchev
Khrushchev by by his
his
Stalinist past. When,
Stalinist past. When, latelate in
in 1958,
1958,Serov
Serov was wasreplaced
replaced as
as KGB chairmanchairman by by one
one of of his
his
leading
leading critics,
critics, Aleksandr
Aleksandr Nikolayevich
Nikolayevich Shelepin,Shelepin, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin believed believed thatthat thethe new
new
leader
leader had
had emerged.
emerged. Aged
Aged only only forty,
forty, Shelepin
Shelepin had had made
made his his reputation
reputation as as aa guerrilla
guerrilla
commander
commander during during thethe Second
Second World World War. War. As head head of of thetheCommunist
Communist Youth Youth
League
League (Komsomol)
(Komsomol) from from 1952 1952 to to 1958,
1958,hehehad hadmobilized
mobilized thousands
thousands of young peo
of young peo-
ple
ple from
from Khrushchev's
Khrushchev’s "Virgin Lands" campaign
“Virgin Lands” campaign to turn vast
to turn areas of
vast areas of steppe
steppe into into
arable
arable farmland.
farmland. Though
Though many many of of the
the new
new collective
collective farms
farms were were later
later ruined
ruined by by soil
soil
erosion,
erosion, in in the
the short
short term
term the the campaign
campaign seemed seemed aa spectacular
spectacular success. success. Soviet
Soviet news
news-
reels
reels showed endless lines
showed endless lines of of combine-harvesters
combine-harvesters as as they
they advanced
advanced through
through prairies
prairies
rippling with grain and stretching as far as the eye could see. see.
As Mitrokhin had hoped, Shelepin rapidly established himself as a new broom
within
within thethe KGB, replacing
replacing many many veteran
veteran Stalinists
Stalinists with
with bright
brightyoungyoung graduates
graduates from from
KomsomoL
Komsomol. Mitrokhin was impressed by the way that when when Shelepin gave televised televised
speeches,
speeches, he he looked
looked briefl
briefly y at
at his notes, then
his notes, then spoke
spoke directly
directly to to thetheviewer-:-instead
viewer-instead ofof
woodenly reading
woodenly reading from
from aa prepared
prepared text text like
like most Soviet leaders.
most Soviet leaders. Shelepin sought to
Shelepin sought to
give the KGB a new public image. "“Violations Violations of socialist
socialist legality,"
legality,,”he claimed in
1961, “have been completely eliminated .. .. .. The Chekists [KGB offi
1961, "have cers] can look
officers]
T
T h eM M
i t ri to rkohki hnAi rn c A
h ir vc eh i v e / 5
the
the Party
Party and and thethe Soviet
Soviet people
people in in the
the eye
eye with
with aa clear
clear conscience."
conscience.” Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin also also
remembers Shelepin
remembers Shelepin for for an
an act
act of personal kindness
of personal kindness to to aaclose
close relative.
relative.
Like Beria before him and andAndropov after him, Shelepin's Shelepin’s ambitions stretched far
beyond
beyond the the chairmanship
chairmanship of of the
the KGB. As As aa twenty-year-old
twenty-year-old universityuniversity student,
student, he he
was once asked what he he wanted to become. become. According to the Russian historian Roy
Medvedev,
Medvedev, he he instantly
instantly replied,
replied, ''A chief1"g Shelepin
“A chief?’@ Shelepin saw saw the
the KGB as as aa stepping
steppingstonestone
in
in aacareer
career which
which he he intended
intendedto to take
take him
him to to the post of
thepost First Secretary
of First Secretary of of the CPSU.
the CPSU.
In December 1961
In December 1961 he heleft thethe
left KGB but but continued
continued to to oversee
oversee itsits work
work as as chairman
chairman of of
the
the powerful
powerful new new Committee
Committee of of Party
Party andandState
StateControl.
Control.The The new new KGB chairman chairman
was Shelepin's youthful
was Shelepin’s youthful but less dynamic
but less dynamic protege,
protkgk, thirty-seven-year-old
thirty-seven-year-old Vladimir Vladimir
Yefimovich Semichastny. On
Yefimovich Semichastny. O n Khrushchev's
Khrushchev’s instructions,
instructions, Semichastny
Semichastny resumed resumed the the
work
work of of pruning
pruning the the archives
archives of of material
material which
which too too vividly
vividly recalled
recalled thethe Presidium's
Presidium’s
Stalinist past,
Stalinist past, ordering
ordering the the destruction
destruction of of nine
nine volumes
volumes of on the
fues 011
of files liquidation of
the liquidation of
Central Committee members,
Central Committee members, seniorsenior intelligence
officers and and foreign
foreign Communists
Communists
living
living inin Moscow
Moscow during during the the Stalin era.9
Stalin era.’
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin continued
continued to to see
see Shelepin
Shelepin as as aa future
future First
First Secretary,
Secretary, and and was was not
not sur
sur-
prised
prised when
when he he became
became one one ofofthe theleaders
leaders of of the
the coup
coup which
which toppled
toppled Khrushchev
Khrushchev in in
1964.
1964. Memories
Memories of of Beria,
Beria, however,
however, were were still
still too
too fresh
fresh in in the
the minds
minds of of most
most of of the
the
Presidium
Presidium for for them
them to tobe
be prepared
prepared to to accept
accept aa security
security chief
chief asas Party
Party leader.
leader. For most
For most
of
of his
his colleagues,
colleagues, LeonidLeonid IlichIlich Brezhnev,
Brezhnev, who who had had succeeded
succeeded Khrushchev
Khrushchev as as First
First
(later General) Secretary,
(later General) Secretary, was wasaa farfar more reassuring figure-affable,
more reassuring figure-affable, lightweight
lightweight and and
patient in
patient reconciling opposing
inreconciling opposing factions,
factions, though
though skillful
skillful in in outmaneuvering
outmaneuvering his his polit
polit-
ical
ical rivals.
rivals. By 19671967 Brezhnev
Brezhnev felt felt strong
strong enough
enough totosack sack the
the unpopular
unpopular Semichastny
Semichastny
and
and sideline
sideline the the still-ambitious
still-ambitious Shelepin,
Shelepin, who who was demoted from
was demoted from heading
heading the the Com
Com-
mittee
mittee of of Party
Party and and State
State Control
Controltotobecome
become chairman
chairman of of the
the comparatively
comparatively uninfluuninflu-
ential
ential Trade
Trade Union
Union Council.
Council. On O n arriving
arriving in in his
his spacious
spacious new new office,
office, Shelepin
Shelepin foundfound
that
that his
his predecessor,
predecessor, Viktor Viktor Grishin,
Grishin, had hadwhat what Medvedev
Medvedev later later euphemistically
euphemistically
described
described as as “a"a specially
specially equipped
equipped massage massage parlor"
parlor” in in an
an adjoining
adjoining room. room. Shelepin
Shelepin
took
took revenge
revenge for for his
his demotion
demotion by by circulating
circulating stories
stories about
about Grishin's
Grishin’s sexual
sexual exploits
exploits
around
around Moscow.lo
Moscow.l0
The
The main beneficiary of
main beneficiary the downfall
of the downfall of of Semichastny
Semichastny and the sidelining
and the sidelining of of
Shelepin was
Shelepin was YuriYuri Vladimirovich
Vladimirovich Andropov, Andropov, who became chairman
who became chairman of the KGB.
of the
Andropov
Andropov had had whatwhat somesome of of his
his staff
staff called
called aa “Hungarian
"Hungarian complex.” complex." As As Soviet
Soviet
ambassador in
ambassador in Budapest
Budapest duringduring the the Hungarian
HungarianUprising
Uprising in in 1956,
1956, he he had watched in
had watched in
horror
horror from
from the the windows
windows of of his embassy as
his embassy as officers
officers of of the
thehated
hatedHungarian
Hungariansecurity
security
service
service were
were strung
strung up up from
from lampposts.
lampposts. Andropov remained haunted
Andropov remained haunted for for the
the rest
rest of
of
his
his life by the
life by the speed
speed withwith which
which an an apparently
apparently all-powerful Communist one-party
all-powerful Communist one-party
state had
state had begun
begun to to topple. When other
topple. When other Communist
Communist regimes later seemed
regimes later seemed at at risk-in
risk-in
Prague
Prague in in 1968,
1968,ininKabulKabul in in 1979,
1979,ininWarsaw
Warsaw in in 1981-he
1981-he was was convinced
convinced that, that, as
as in
in
Budapest
Budapest in in 1956,
1956, onlyonly armed
armed force
force could
could ensure
ensure their
their survival.
survival.’* Since leaving
11 Since leaving HunHun-
gary
gary in 1957 Andropov
in 1957 Andropov had had been
been head head of of the CentralCommittee
the Central Committee Department
Department
responsible
responsible for for relations
relations with Communist parties
with Communist parties in the Soviet
in the Bloc. His
Soviet Bloc. His appoint
appoint-
ment
ment in in1967
1967 as as the
the first
first senior
senior PartyParty official
official brought
brought in in to
to head
head thethe KGB KGB was was
intended
intended by by Brezhnev
Brezhnev to to secure
secure political
political control
control of of the
the security
security and and intelligence
intelligence sys- sys-
T
T H EE S
SW RD
WOR A N D T
T H EE S E L
SHIE L D
D // 6
terns.
tems. Andropov
Andropov went
went on
ontotobecome
become the
the longest-serving
longest-serving and
and most
most politically
politically astute
astute of
of
all
all KGB chiefs,
chiefs, crowning
crowning his
his fifteen
fifteen years
years as
as chairman
chairman by
by succeeding
succeeding Brezhnev
Brezhnev as as
General
General Secretary
Secretary in
in 1982.
1982.
T H E F I R ST G REAT
GREAT crisis
crisis of
of Andropov's
Andropov’s years years atat the
the KGB was was the attempt by
the attempt by the
the
Czechoslovak
Czechoslovak reformers
reformers of of the
the Prague Spring to
Prague Spring to create
create what
what the the Kremlin
Kremlin saw saw as as an
an
unacceptably
unacceptably unorthodox
unorthodox "socialism
“socialism with with aa human
human face."face.” Like
Like Khrushchev's
Khrushchev’s Secret Secret
Speech,
Speech, thethe invasion
invasion of of Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia by by the forces of
the forces of the
the Warsaw
Warsaw Pact Pact inin August
August
1968 was
1968 was an important staging
animportant staging post post in what
inwhat Mitrokhin calls
Mitrokhin calls his
his "intellectual
“intellectual
odyssey." Stationed in
odyssey.” Stationed in East
EastGermany
Germanyduring duringthethe Prague Spring, Mitrokhin
Prague Spring, Mitrokhin was was able
able
to listen to
to listen to reports
reports fromfrom Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia on the Russian-language
on the Russian-language services services of of the
the
BBC World Service, Radio
World Service, Radio Liberty, Deutsche Welle
Liberty, Deutsche Welle and and the
the Canadian
Canadian Broadcasting
Broadcasting
Company,
Company, but hadno
but had noone onewith
with whom
whom he he felt
felt able
able toto share
share his his sympathy
sympathy for the
for the
Prague
Prague reforms.
reforms. One One episode
episode about
about aa month
month before
before Soviet
Soviet tanks entered Prague
tanks entered Prague leftleft
aa particular
particular impression
impression on him. An
on him. An FCDFCD Department
Department V (“special ("special tasks”)
tasks") officer,
officer,
Colonel
Colonel Viktor
Viktor Ryabov,
Ryabov, saidsaid to
to Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin that thathehe was
was "just
“just off
off to Sweden for
to Sweden for aa few
few
days,"
days,” but
but made
made clearclear byby his
his expression
expression that that Sweden
Sweden was was not
not his
his real
real destination.
destination. A
few
few days
days after
after Ryabov's
Ryabov’s return,
return, hehe told Mitrokhin there
told Mitrokhin there would
would be be an
an interesting
interesting arti-arti
cle
cle in
in the
the following
following day'sday’s Pravda, implying
implying thatthat itit was
was connected
connected with with his his mission.
mission.
When
When Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin read read thethe report
report thethe next
next day
day that
that an an "imperialist
“imperialist arms arms dump"
dump” had had
been discovered
been discovered in in Czechoslovakia,
Czechoslovakia, he he realized
realized atat once
once that
that itit had been planted
had been planted by by
Ryabov
Ryabov and and other
other Department
DepartmentV officers officers toto discredit
discredit thethe reformers.
reformers.
Soon after
Soon after the
the crushing
crushing of of the
the Prague
Prague Spring,
Spring, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin heard heard aa speech
speech given
given by by
Andropov
Andropov in in the
the KGB's
KGB’s EastEast German
German headquarters
headquarters at at Karlshorst
Karlshorst in in the
the Berlin
Berlin sub
sub-
urbs.
urbs. Like
Like Shelepin,
Shelepin, Andropov
Andropov spoke spoke directly
directly toto the
theaudience,
audience, rather
rather than-like
than-like most most
Soviet
Soviet officials-sticking
officials-sticking to to aa prepared
prepared platitudinous
platitudinous text.text. With
With an an ascetic
ascetic appear
appear-
ance,
ance, silver
silver hair
hair swept
swept back
back over
over aa large
large forehead, steel-rimmed glasses
forehead, steel-rimmed glasses and and anan intel
intel-
lectual
lectual manner,
manner, Andropov
Andropov seemedseemed far far removed
removedfromfrom Stalinist
Stalinist thugs
thugs such
such as as Beria
Beria andand
Serov.
Serov. His
His explanation
explanation for for the
the invasion
invasion of ofCzechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia was was far more sophisticated
far more sophisticated
than
than that
thatgiven
given to to the
the Soviet
Soviet public.
public. It It had,
had, he insisted, been
he insisted, been the only way
the only way to to preserve
preserve
Soviet
Soviet security
security andand thethe new
new European
European order order which
which had had emerged
emerged from from the Great
the Great
Patriotic
Patriotic War.
War. ThatThat objective
objective political
political necessity,
necessity, Andropov
Andropov claimed,claimed, was accepted
was accepted
even
even byby such
such unorthodox
unorthodox figuresfigures as as the
the great
great physicist
physicist Pyotr
Pyotr Kapitza,
Kapitza, who who hadhad ini
ini-
tially
tially shown
shown somesome sympathy
sympathy for for the
the Prague
Prague revisionists.
revisionists. Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin drew drew quite
quite differ
differ-
ent
ent conclusions
conclusions from from the the Warsaw
Warsaw Pact Pact invasion.
invasion. TheThe destruction
destruction of Czechoslovak
of Czechoslovak
"socialism
“socialism withwith aa human
human face" proved, he
face” proved, he believed,
believed, thatthat the Soviet system
the Soviet system was was unre
unre-
formable. He H e still vividly recalls
recallsa curiously mythological image, which henceforth henceforth he
saw increasingly in his mind's mind’s eye,eye,ofof the Russian people in thrall
theRussian thrall to "a three-headed
“a three-headed
hydra":
hydra”: thethe Communist
Communist Party, privileged nomenklatura and
the privileged
Party, the and thethe KGB.
Mter
After his
his return
return to to Moscow
Moscow from from East
East Germany,
Germany, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin continued
continued to to listen
listen toto
Western
Western broadcasts,
broadcasts, although, because ofof Soviet
although, because Soviet jamming,
jamming, he hehadhad frequently
frequently to to
switch
switch wavelengths
wavelengths in in order
order to find an
to find an audible station. Often
audible station. Often he he ended
endedup up with only
with only
fragments
fragments ‘of of news
news stories. Among the
stories. Among the news
news which
which mademade the greatest impression
the greatest impression on on
him
him were
were items
items on on thethe Chronicle oj Cu,rrent Events, aa samizdat
ofCqrrent samizdat journal
journal first
first produced
produced
TT h eM iM
t ri ot rk ohki hnAi rnc hAi rvc eh i v e /I 7
by Soviet
by Soviet dissidents
dissidents inin 1968
1968toto circulate
circulate news
news on
on the
the struggle
struggle against
against abuses
abuses ofof
human rights.
human rights. The
The Chronicle carried
carried on
on its
its masthead
masthead the
the guarantee
guarantee of
of freedom
freedom of of
expression in
expression in the
theUnited
United Nations Universal
Nations Universal Declaration
Declaration ofof Human
Human Rights, daily
Rights, daily
abused in
abused in the Soviet Union.
the Soviet Union.
As the
As the struggle
struggle against
against “ideological
"ideological subversion”
subversion" intensified,
intensified, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin saw saw
numerous examples
numerous examples of of the
the way in which
way in which the
the KGB manipulated,
manipulated, virtually
virtually at
at will,
will, the
the
Soviet justice system.
Soviet justice system. HHee later
later copied
copied down
down the
the sycophantic
sycophantic congratulations
congratulations sent
sent toto
Andropov by
Andropov by A. F. Gorkhin,
Gorkhin, chairman
chairman ofof the
the Soviet
Soviet Supreme
Supreme Court,
Court, on
on the fiftieth
thefiftieth
anniversary of
anniversary of the
the founding
foundingofofthetheCheka
Chekain December
December
in 1967:
1967:
The Soviet Courts

The Soviet Courts andand the Committee of
theUSSR Committee of State
State Security
Security [KGB]
[KGB] are
are of
of
the
the same age. But
same age. But this
this is
is not
not the
themain thing which
main thing which brings
brings us
us together;
together; the main
the main
thing is
thing is the
the identity of our
identity of tasks .. .. ..
our tasks
We are
We are glad
glad to
to note
note that
that the
the State Security agencies
StateSecurity agencies and
and the
the Courts solve all
Courtssolve all
their complicated
their complicated tasks
tasks in
in aa spirit
spirit ofof mutual
mutual understanding
understanding and sound profes-
and sound profes
sional relations.12
sional relations.12
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin saw saw mounting
mounting evidence
evidence both bothininthethe classified
classified in-house
in-house journal,
journal, KGB
Sbornik, and
Sbornik, and in in FCD filesfues ofof Andropov's personal obsession
Andropov’s personal obsession with
with the destruction of
the destruction of
dissent
dissent in in all its
its forms
forms andand his
his insistence
insistence that
that the struggle for
the struggle for human
human rights
rights was
was part
of aa wide-ranging
of wide-ranging imperialist
imperialist plotplot to
to undermine
undermine the the foundations
foundations of of the
the Soviet
Soviet state.
state. In
In
1968
1968 Andropov
Andropov issuedissued KGB Chairman's
Chairman’s OrderOrder No.No. 0051, "On the
0051, “On thetasks
tasks ofof State
State secu
secu-
rity
rity agencies
agencies in in combating
combating ideological
ideological sabotage
sabotage by the the adversary,"
adversary,”calling
calling for
for greater
greater
aggression
aggression in in the
the struggle against both
struggle against both dissidents
dissidents at home and
at home and their
their imperialist sup
imperialist sup-
porters.13 One
. ~ ~ example
p o r t e r ~ One example of of this
this greater
greater aggression
aggression which
which left Mitrokhin, as
left Mitrokhin, as an
an ardent
ardent
admirer
admirer of of the
the Kirov
Kirov Ballet,
Ballet,with
with aa sense
sense ofof personal
personal outrage
outrage was
was the
the plan
plan which
which he he
discovered
discovered in in FCD mes files to
to maim
maim the the ballet's
ballet’s star
star defector,
defector, Rudolf
Rudolf Nureyev.14
Nureyev.14
By the
the beginning
beginning of of the
the 1970s
1970s Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s political
political views
views were
were deeply
deeply influenced
influenced
by
by the
the dissident
dissident struggle,
struggle, which
which he he was able to
was able to follow
follow both
both inin KGB records
records andand
Western
Western broadcasts.
broadcasts. "I “Iwas
was aa loner,"
loner,”he he recalls,
recalls, "but
“but I now
now knew
knew that
that I was
was not
not alo�e."
alone.”
Though
Though Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin never never hadhad any
any thought
thought of of aligning
aligning himself
himself openly
openly with the
with the
human
human rights
rights movement,
movement, the the example
example of the Chronicle of Current Events and
of the and other
other
samizdat
samizdat productions
productions helpedhelped to to inspire
inspire him
him with
with thethe idea
idea of
of producing
producing aa classified
classified
variant
variant of of the dissidents' attempts
the dissidents’ attempts to to document
document the the iniquities
iniquities of
of the
the Soviet
Soviet system.
system.
Gradually
Gradually the the project
project began
began to to form
form in inhis
his mind
mind ofof compiling
compiling hishis own
own private
private record
record
of
of the
the foreign
foreign operations
operations of of the
the KGB.
KGB.
Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s opportunity
opportunity came came in in June
June 1972
1972 when
when the the First
FirstChief
Chief(Foreign
(Foreign Intelli
Intelli-
gence)
gence) Directorate
Directorate left left its
its overcrowded
overcrowdedcentralcentral Moscow
Moscow offi<:�s
ofices in
in the
the�QB
KGB ��adquar
headquar-
ters
ters at the Lubyanka
at the Lubyanka (once (once thethe pre-Revolutionary
pre-Revolutionary home home of of the
the Rossiya
Rossiya Insurance
Insurance
Company)
Company) and and moved
moved to to aa new
new building
building south-east
south-east of of Moscow
Moscow at at Yasenevo,
Yasenevo, halfhalf aa
mile
mile beyond
beyond the the outer
outer ringroad.
ringroad. Designed
Designed by by aa Finnish
Finnish architect,
architect, the
the main
main Y-shaped
Y-shaped
seven-story
seven-story office
officebuilding
building was
was flanked
flanked on on one
one side
side by
by an
an assembly
assembly hall
hall and
and library,
library, on
on
the
the other
otherbyby aa polyclinic,
polyclinic, sports
sports complex
complex and and swimming
swimming pool, pool,with
with pleasant
pleasant views
views over
over
hills
hills covered
covered withwith birch
birch trees,
trees, green
green pastures,
pastures, and-in summe�fields of
and-in summer-fields of wheat
wheat andand
.
T E WSOW
T H SE RAO
D NR TDDH SEAHNI E
DL D
T H E S H I E L D I/ 8
rye.
rye. To
To the
the other
other KGB directorates, most of
directorates, most of which
which worked
worked in in cramped
cramped conditions
conditions in in
central
central Moscow, Yasenevo
Moscow,Yasenevo waswas known-with more
known-with more envyenvy than
than condescension-as
condescension-as
"The
“The Woods."
Woods.”
For
For the
the next
next ten
ten years,
years, working
working fromfrom private
private offices
offices both
both in in the
theLubyanka
Lubyanka and and at
at
Yasenevo,
Yasenevo, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin was was alone
alone responsible
responsible forfor checking
checking and and sealing
sealing the
the approxi
approxi-
mately
mately 300,000
300,000 files15
files’’ in
in the
the FCD archive
archive prior
prior toto their
their transfer
transfer to to the
the new
new head
head-
quarters.
quarters. While
While supervising
supervising the the checking
checking of of files,
files, the
the compilation
compilation of of inventories
inventories andand
the
the writing
writingof of index
index cards,
cards, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin was was able
ableto
to inspect
inspect what
what fi les he
files he wished
wished in in one
one
or other of his offIces.
or other of his offices. Few Few KGB officers
officers apart from Mitrokhin have ever spent as
apart from Mitrokhin have ever spent as
much
much time
time reading,
reading, let let alone
alone noting,
noting, foreign
foreign intelligence files. Outside
intelligence files. Outside the the FCD
archives,
archives, only
only the
the most
most senior
senior officers
officers shared
shared his
his unrestricted access, and
unrestricted access, and none
none had
had
the
the time
time toto read
read more
more than
than aa fraction
fraction ofof the
the material
material noted
noted by him.
by him.
Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s usualusual weekly
weekly routine
routine was
was toto spend
spend eacheach Monday,
Monday, Tuesday
Tuesday andand Friday
Friday
in
in his
his Yasenevo office. O
Yasenevo office. Onn Wednesdays
Wednesdays he went to
he went to the
the Lubyanka
Lubyanka to to work
work on the
on the
FCD's
FCD’s most
most secret
secret files,
files, those
those ofof Directorate
DirectorateSS which
which ran ran illegals-KGB
illegals-KGB officers and
officers and
agents,
agents, most
most ofof Soviet
Soviet nationality,
nationality, working
working under deep cover cover abroad disguised
disguised as as for
for-
eign
eign citizens.
citizens. Once reviewed
reviewed by by Mitrokhin,
Mitrokhin, each batch of of files
files was
was placed
placed inin sealed
sealed
containers
containers which
which were
were transported
transported to to Yasenevo
Yasenevo on on Thursday
Thursdaymornings,
mornings, accompanied
accompanied
by
by Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin who who checked
checked them them onon arrival.16
arrival.16 Unlike
Unlike the other departments,
the other departments,who who
moved to
moved to the
the new
new FCD headquarters
headquarters in in 1972,
1972, Directorate
Directorate S remained
remained based
based in in the
the
Lubyanka
Lubyanka for for aa further
further decade.
decade.
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin thus thusfoundfound himself
himself spending
spending more
more time
time dealing
dealing with
with the
thefiles
files ofDirec
of Direc-
torate
torate S,
S, the
the most
most secret
secret inin the
the FCD, thanthan with
with those
thoseofofany other section
any other section of of Soviet
Soviet
foreign
foreign intelligence.
intelligence. The The illegals retained aa curious
illegals retained curious mystique
mystique within
within the the KGB. Before
Before
being posted
being abroad, every
posted abroad, every illegal
illegalofficer waswas
officer required to
required to swear
swear aa solemn,
solemn, ifif somewhat
somewhat
melodramatic,
melodramatic, oath: oath:
Deeply
Deeply valuing
valuing the
the trust
trust placed
placed upon
upon meme by
by the
the Party
Party and
and the the fatherland,
fatherland, and
and
imbued
imbued with
with aa sense
sense of intense gratitude
of intense gratitude for
for the
the decision
decision to send me
to send me toto the
the
sharp
sharp edge
edge of
of the
the struggle
struggle for
for the
the interest
interest of
of my people .. .. .. as
my people as aa worthy
worthy son
son of
of
the
the homeland,
homeland, I would
would rather
rather perish
perish than
than betray
betray the
the secrets
secrets entrusted
entrusted to to me
me or
or
put
put into
into the
thehand
handofofthethe
adversary
adversary materials
materials which
which could
could cause
cause political
political harm
harm
to
to the
the interests
interests of
of the
the State.
State. With
With every
every heartbeat, with
with every
every day day that
that passes,
passes,
I swear
swear to
to serve
serve the
the Party,
Party, the
the homeland,
homeland, and
and the
the Soviet
Soviet people.17
pe0p1e.l~
The
The files
files showed
showed that
that before
before the
the Second
Second World
World War
War the greatest
greatest foreign
foreign successes
successes
had
had been
been achieved
achieved by
by aa legendary
legendary group
group of
of intelligence
intelligence officers,
officers, often
often referred
referred toto as
as
the "Great
“GreatIllegals."
Illegals.”After the
the Second World War, the KGB had tried to recreate its
pre-war
pre-war triumphs
triumphs byby establishing an
an elaborate
elaborate network
network of
of "illegal
“illegal residencies"
residencies”along
along-
side
side the
the "legal
“legal residencies"
residencies”which
which operated
operated under
under diplomatic
diplomatic or
or other
otherofficial
official cover
coverin
in
foreign capitals.
capitals.
The records of of Directorate S revealed some remarkable
remarkable individual
individual achievements.
achievements.
KGB illegals
illegals successfully
successfully established
established bogus identities as foreign nationals in a great
variety of professions ranging from Costa Rican ambassador
ambassador to piano tuner to the
T h ee M
M ii tt rr o k h i n
n A
A rr c hk i v e I/ 9
Governor
Governor of of New
New York.
York. Even
Even inin the
the Gqrbachev
Gorbachev era,
era, KGB
KGB propaganda
propaganda continued
continued toto
depict
depict the
the Soviet
Soviet illegal
illegalas
as the supreme embodiment
the supreme embodiment ofof the
the chivalric
chivalric ideal
idealin
in the
the ser
ser-
vice
vice of
of secret
secret intelligence.
intelligence.The
The retired
retired British
British KGB
KGB agent
agent George
George Blake
Blake wrote in 1990:
wrote in 1990:
Only
Only aa man
man who
who believes
believes very
very strongly
strongly in
in an
an ideal
ideal and
and serves
serves aa great
great cause
cause will
will
agree
agree to
to embark
embark on on such
such aa career,
career, though
though the
the word
word "calling"
“calling”isis perhaps
perhaps appro
appro-
priate
priate here.
here. Only
Only an anintelligence
intelligence service
service which
which works
works forfor aa great
great cause
cause can
can ask
ask
for such
for such aa sacrifice
sacrifice from
from its
its officers.
officers.That
That is
is why,
why, as
asfar
far as
as I know,
know, at
at any
any rate
rate in
in
peacetime,
peacetime, only
only the
the Soviet
Soviet intelligence
service has
has"illegal
“illegalresidents."18
residents.”’*
The
The SVR continues
continues the
the KGB
KGB tradition
tradition ofof illegal
illegal hagiography.
hagiography.In July 1995,
In July 1995, aa month
month
after
after the
the death
death ofof the
the best-known
best-known American-born
American-born illegal,
illegal, Morris
Morris Cohen,
Cohen, President
President
Yeltsin
Yeltsin conferred
conferred onon him
himthe
theposthumous
posthumous title title of
of Hero
Hero ofof the
the Russian
Russian Federation.
Federation.
The
The files
files of
ofDirectorate
Directorate SS noted
Mitrokhin reveal
reveal aa quite
quite different
different kind
kind ofille
of ille-
gal.
gal. Alongside
Alongside the the committed
committed FCD officers
officers who
who maintained
maintained their
their cover
cover and
and profes
profes-
sional
sional discipline
discipline throughout
throughout their
their postings,
posting, there
there were
were others
others who
who could
could not
not cope
cope
when
when confronted
confronted by by the
the contrast
contrast between
between thethe Soviet
Soviet propaganda
propaganda image
image ofof capitalist
capitalist
exploitation
exploitation and and the
the reality
reality of
of life
life in
in the
the West.
West.An Aneven
even darker
darker secret
secret of
of the
the Direc
Direc-
torate
torate SS records
records was
was that
that one
oneofofthetheprincipal
principal uses
uses of
of the
the illegals
illegals during
during thethelast
last quar
quar-
ter
ter of
of aa century
century ofof the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union was was to
to search
search out
out and
and compromise
compromise dissidents
dissidents in
in
the other countries
the other countries ofof the
the Warsaw
Warsaw Pact.Pact. The
The squalid
squalid struggle
struggle against
against "ideological
“ideological
subversion"
subversion”was wasas
as much
much aa responsibility
responsibility of of Directorate
Directorate SS asas of
of the
the rest
rest of
of the
the FCD.
FCD.
M ITRO
OKKH
HIINN WAS
WAS U N D E R S TA
UNDERS TANN DA
D AB L Y cautious
BLY cautious as
as he
he set
set out in 1972
out in, 1972 to to compile
compile hishis
forbidden
forbidden FCDFCD archive.
archive. ForFor aa few
few weeks
weeks he he tried
tried toto commit
commit names,
names, codenames
codenames and and
key
key facts
facts from
from thethe files
filesto
to memory
memory and and transcribe
transcribe themthem each
each evening
eveningwhen when he he returned
returned
home.
home. Abandoning
Abandoning that that process
process asas too
too slow
slow andand cumbersome,
cumbersome, he he began
began to to take
take notes
notes
in
in minuscule
minuscule handwriting
handwriting on on scraps
scraps of
of paper
paper which
which he he crumpled
crumpled up up and
and threw
threw intointohis
his
wastepaper
wastepaper basket.
basket. Each
Each evening,
evening, he he retrieved
retrieved his his notes
notes from
from thethe wastepaper
wastepaper and and
smuggled
smuggled themthem out outofYasenevo
of Yasenevo concealed
concealed in in his
his shoes.
shoes. Gradually
Gradually Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin becamebecame
more
more confident
confident as as hehe satisfied
satisfied himself
himself that the Yas�nevo
that the Yasenevo security
security guards
guards confined
confined
themselves
themselves to to occasional
occasional inspections
inspections of of bags
bags and
and briefcases
briefcases without
without attempting
attempting bodybody
searches.
searches.Mter
After aa few
few months
months he hestarted
started taking
taking notes
notes on on ordinary
ordinary sheets
sheets ofof office
office paper
paper
which
which he he took
took outoutofof his
his office
office in
in his
his jacket
jacket andand trouser
trouser pockets.
pockets.
Not
Not once
once inin the
thetwelve
twelve years
yearswhich
which Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin spent spentnoting
notingthetheFCD archives
archiveswas was
he
he stopped
stopped andand searched.
searched. There
There were,
were, however,
however, some some desperately
desperately anxious
anxious moments.
moments.
From
From time
time toto time
time he he realized
realized that,
that, like
like other
other FCD officers,
officers, he
he was
was being
being tailed
tailed-
probably
probably by by teams
teams fromfrom thethe Seventh
Seventh (Surveillance)
(Surveillance) or or Second
Second Chief (Counter
Chief (Counter-
intelligence)
intelligence) Directorates.
Directorates, On O n one
one occasion
occasion whilewhile he he was
was being
being followed,
followed, he he visited
visited
the Dynamo Football
the Dynamo Football Club
Club sports
sports shop
shop and,and, toto his
his horror,
horror, found
found himself
himself standing
standing
next
next to
to two
two English
English visitors
visitors whom
whom hishis watchers
watchers might
might suspect
suspect were
were spies
spieswith
with whom
whom
he had arranged a rendezvous. Ifhe was searched, his notes on
he had arranged a rendezvous, If he was searched, his notes on topsecret files would top secret files would
be
be instantly
instantly discovered.
discovered. Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin quickly
quickly moved
moved on on totoother
othersports
sports shops,
shops, hoping
hoping toto
convince
convince his watchers that
his watchers thathehe waswas on on aa genuine
genuine shopping
shopping expedition.
expedition. As As hehe
TT H
H ES
E WS O
WROA
D RN DT
D HAS
ENH D
I E TL D
H E S H I E LD I/ I O
ro
approached
approached his his apartment
apartment block, block, however,
however, he he noticed
noticed two two men
men standing
standing near near thethe
door
door to to his
his ninth-floor
ninth-floor flat. flat. By
By thethe time
time he he arrived,
arrived, theythey had haddisappeared.
disappeared. FeD FCD offioffi-
cers
cers had standing instructions
hadstanding instructions to report suspicious
toreport suspicious incidents
incidents such such as as this,
this, butbut
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin did did notnot do do soso for
for fear
fear ofof prompting
prompting an an investigation
investigation which which wouldwould draw draw
attention
attention to to thethefact
fact that
that he hehadhadbeen
been seen
seen standing
standing next next to to English
Englishvisitors.
visitors.
Each
Each nightnightwhen when he hereturned
returned to to his
his Moscow
Moscow flat, flat,Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin hid hidhis
his notes
notes beneath
beneath
his
his mattress.
mattress. On O n weekends
weekends he he took
took themthemtoto a family
family
a dacha
dacha thirty-six
thirty-six kilometers
kilometers from from
Moscow
Moscow and and typed
typed up up as as many
many as as possible,
possible, thoughthough the the notes
notes became
became so so numerous
numerous
that
that Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin was was forced
forced to to leave
leave some
some of of them
them in in handwritten
handwritten form. form. He H e hid
hid the
the
first
first batches
batches of of typescripts
typescripts and and notes
notes in in aa milk-churn
milk-churn which which he he buried
buried below
below the the
floor.19
fl00r.l~The Thedacha
dacha was was built
built on on raised
raised foundations,
foundations, leaving leaving just
just enough
enough room room for for
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin to to crawl
crawl beneath
beneath the the fl oorboards and
floorboards and digdig aa hole
hole with
with aa short-handled
short-handled
spade.
spade. He H e frequently
frequently found found himself
himself crawling
crawling through
through dog dog andand cat
cat feces
feces andand some
some-
times
times disturbed
disturbed rats rats while
while he he was
was digging,
digging, but but he heconsoled
consoled himself
himself with
with the thethought
thought
that
that burglars
burglars were were unlikely
unlikely to to follow
follow him.
him. WhenWhen the the milk-churn
milk-churn was was full,
full, he
he began
began
concealing
concealinghis his notes
notes and and typescripts
typescripts in in aatintin clothes-boiler.
clothes-boiler. Eventually
Eventually his his archive
archive also also
filled
filledtwotwo tin
tin trunks
trunksand and twotwo aluminum
aluminum cases, cases, all allof
of them
themburied
buried beneath
beneath the the dacha.20
dacha.20
Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s most most anxious
anxious moment
moment came came whenwhen he he arrived
arrived at at his
his weekend
weekend dacha dacha to to
find
find aa stranger
stranger hiding
hiding in in the
the attic.
attic. He
H e waswas instantly
instantly reminded
reminded of of the
the incident
incident aafew few
years
years earlier,
earlier,inin August
August 1971 1971,, when
when aafriend
friend of of the
the writer
writer Aleksandr
Aleksandr Solzhenitsyn
Solzhenitsyn had had
called
called unexpectedly
unexpectedly at at his
his dacha
dacha whilewhile Solzhenitsyn
Solzhenitsyn was away and
was away and surprised
surprised two two
KGB
KGB officers
officers in in the
the attic
attic who
who werewere probably
probably searching
searching for for subversive
subversive manuscripts.
manuscripts.
Other
Other KGB KGB men men had had quickly
quicklyarrived
arrived on on thethescene
scene and and Solzhenitsyn's
Solzhenitsyn’sfriend friend hadhad been
been
badly
badly beaten.
beaten. Andropov
Andropov cynically
cynicallyordered
ordered Solzhenitsyn
Solzhenitsyn to to be
be "informed
“informed that that the thepar
par-
ticipation
ticipation of of the theKGB
KGB in in this
this incident
incident is is aa figment
figmentofof his
his imagination."21
imagination.’’21The The incident
incident
was
was still
still fresh
fresh in in Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s mind mind when when he he arrived
arrived at the dacha
at the dacha because
because he had
he had
recently
recently notednoted filesfiles which
which recorded
recorded minutely
minutely detaileddetailed plansplans for
for the
the persecution
persecution of of
Solzhenitsyn
Solzhenitsyn and and the the"active
“activemeasures"
measures’’ by by which
which the theKGBKGB hopedhoped to to discredit
discredit him him in in
the
the Western
Westernpress.
press.To To his
his immense
immense relief,
relief,however,
however,the the intruder
intruderinin thetheattic
attic turned
turned out out
to
to be
be aa homeless
homeless squatter.
squatter.
During
During summer
summer holidaysholidays Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin worked worked on on batches
batches of of his
his notes
notes at at aa second
second
family
family dacha
dacha nearnear Penza,
Penza, carrying
carrying themthem in in an
an oldold haversack
haversack and and dressing
dressing in in peasant
peasant
clothes
clothes in in order
order not not to toattract
attract attention.
attention.In In the
the summer
summer of of 1918
1918Penza,
Penza, 630 630 kilome
kilome-
ters
ters southeast of Moscow, had been the site of oneof the first peasant risings against
southeast of Moscow, had been the site of one of the first peasant risings against
Bolshevik
Bolshevik rule. rule. Lenin
Lenin blamed
blamed the the revolt
revolt on on the kulaks (better-off
thekulaks (better-off peasants)
peasants) and and furi
furi-
ously
ously instructed
instructed the the local
local Party
Party leaders
leaders to to hang
hangin in public
public at at least
least one
one hundred
hundred of ofthemthem
so
so that
that ((for
“for hundreds
hundreds of ofkilometers
kilometers aroundaround the the people
people may may seeseeand tremble .. .. ..”22
and tremble "22 By
the
the 1970s,
1970s, however,
however, Penza'sPenza’s counter-revolutionary
counter-revolutionary past past waswas long forgotten,and
longforgotten, and
Lenin's
Lenin’s bloodthirsty orders for mass executions were kept from public view in the
bloodthirsty orders for mass executions were kept from public view in the
secret
secret section
section of of the
the Lenin
Leninarchive.
archive.
One
One of of the
themost
most striking
striking characteristics
characteristics of of the
the best
best literature
literature produced
produced under under the the
Soviet
Soviet regime
regime is is how
how muchmuch of of itit was
was written
written in in secret.
secret. ((To“To plunge
plunge underground,"
underground,”
wrote
wrote Solzhenitsyn,
Solzhenitsyn, ((to “to make
make it it your
your concern
concern not not toto win
win thethe world's
world’s recognition
recognition-
Heaven
Heaven forbid!-but on thecontrary to shunit: this variant of thewriter’s lot
forbid!-but on the contrary to shun it: this variant of the writer's lot is
is pecu-
pecu-
T
T h eM M
i t ri ot rk ohki hnAi rnc A
h irvc eh i v e / I
III
liarly
liarly our
our own,
own, purely
purely Russian,
Russian, Russian
Russian andand Soviet!"23
Soviet!”23Between
Between the the wars
wars Mikhail
Mikhail Bul
Bul-
gakov
gakov hadhad spent
spent twelve
twelve years
yearswriting
writing TheThe Master
Masterand Margarita, one
andMargarita, one ofof the
thegreatest
greatest
novels
novels ofof the
the twentieth
twentiethcentury,
century,knowing
knowing that
that ititcould
could not
not be
be published
published inin his
his lifetime
lifetime
and
and fearing
fearing that
that ititmight
might never
never appear
appear atat all.
all. His
His widow
widow later
later recalled
recalled how,
how,just
just before
before
his
his death
death inin 1940,
1940,Bulgakov
Bulgakov "made
“made meme getget out
out ofof bed
bed and
and then,
then,leaning
leaning onon my
my arm,
arm,
he
he walked
walked through
through all all the
the rooms,
rooms, barefoot
barefoot andand inin his dressing gown,
his dressing gown, toto make
make sure
sure that
that
the
the manuscript
manuscript of of The Master was
TheMaster was still
still there"
there” inin its
itshiding
hidingplace.24
place.24Though
Though Bulgakov's
Bulgakov’s
great
great work
work survived,
survived, it it was
was not
not published
published until
until aaquarter
quarter of
of aa century
century after
after his
his death.
death.
As
As late
late as
as 1978,
1978, itit was
was denounced
denounced inin aa KGB memorandum
memorandum to to Andropov
Andropov as as "a
“a dan
dan-
gerous
gerous weapon
weapon in in the
the hands
hands of
of [Western]
[Western] ideological
ideological centers
centers engaged
engaged inin ideological
ideological
sabotage
sabotage against
against the
the Soviet
Soviet Union."25
Union.”25
When
When Solzhenitsyn
Solzhenitsyn beganbegan writing
writing in in the
the 1950s,
1950s, hehe told
told himself
himself he
he had
had "entered
“entered
into
into the
theinheritance
inheritance of of every
every modern
modern writer
writer intent
intent on onthe
thetruth":
truth”:
II must
must write
write simply
simply to
to ensure
ensure that
that it
it was
was not
not forgotten,
forgotten, that posterity might
that posterity might
some
some day
day come
come to
to know
know ofof it. Publication in
it. Publication in my
my own
own lifetime
lifetime I must
must shut
shut out
out
of
of my
my mind,
mind, out
out of
of my
my dreams.
dreams.
Just
Just as
as Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s first
first notes
notes were
were hidden
hidden in in aa milk-churn
milk-churn beneath
beneath hishis dacha,
dacha, soso
Solzhenitsyn's
Solzhenitsyn’s earliest
earliest writings,
writings, inin minuscule
minuscule handwriting,
handwriting, were
were squeezed
squeezed into
into an
an
empty
empty champagne
champagne bottle
bottle and
and buried
buried inin his
his garden.26
garden.26Mter
After the
thebrief
brief thaw
thaw ininthe
theearly
early
years
years of
of "de-Stalinization"
“de-Stalinization” which made possible
which made possible the
the publication
publication of of Solzhenitsyn's
Solzhenitsyn’s
story of
story of life
life in
in the
the gulag, One Day
gulag, One Day inin the Life
Life of
of Ivan Denisovich, he
Ivan Denisovich, waged aa time
he waged time-
consuming
consuming struggle
struggle to try to
to try to prevent
prevent the
the KGB from from seizing
seizing his
his other
other manuscripts
manuscripts
until
until he
hewas
was finally
finally forced
forced into
into exile
exile in
in 1974.27
1974.27It It did
did not
not occur
occur to
to Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin totocom-
com
pare
pare himself
himself with
with such
such literary
literary giants
giants as
as Bulgakov
Bulgakov andand S0lzhenitsyn.
Solzhenitsyn. But,
But, like
like them,
them,
he
he began
began assembling
assembling his his archive
archive "to
“to ensure
ensure that
that the
thetruth
truthwas
was not
not forgotten,
forgotten, that
that pos
pos-
terity
terity might
mightsome
some day
day come
come to to know
know of of it."
it.”
T H E KGB
KGB FILES which
which had
had thethe greatest
greatest emotional
emotional impact
impact on on Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin were were those
those
on
on the
thewar
war in
in Mghanistan.
Afghanistan. On O n December
December 28, 1979 Babrak
28,1979 Babrak Karmal,
Karmal, the the new
new Mghan
Afghan
leader
leader chosen
chosen byby Moscow
Moscow to to request
request "fraternal assistance" by
“fraternal assistance” by the
the Red
Red Army
Army which
which
had
had already
already invaded
invaded hishis country,
country, announced
announced overover Kabul
Kabul Radio
Radio that
that his
his predecessor,
predecessor,
Hafizullah Amin, an
Hafizullah Amin, an "agent
“agent of American imperialism,"
of American imperialism,” had been tried
had been tried by
by aa "revolu
“revolu-
tionary
tionary tribunal"
tribunal” and
and sentenced
sentenced to death. MitrokJ:1in
to death. Mitrokhin quickly
quickly discovered
discovered from
from the fues
the files
on
on the
the war
war which
which flooded
flooded intointo the
the an;hives
archives ,that
that.Arp.iIl
Amin had ha4 !11J�a.lity
in,redltybeen been assassi
assassi-
nated,
nated, together
together with
with his
his family
family andand entourage,
entourage, inin an
an assault
assault on
on thetheKabul
Kabul presidential
presidential
palace
palace by byKGB special
special forces
forcesdisguised
disguised inin Mghan
Afghan uniforms.28
uniforms.28
The
The female
female clerks
clerks who
who filed
filed KGB reports
reports on
on the
thewar
war inin the
thearchives
archives after
after they
they had
had
been circulated
been circulated to the Politburo
to the Politburo and and other sections of
other sections of the
the Soviet
Soviet hierarchy
hierarchy hadhad soso
much
much material
material to
to deal
deal with
with that
that they
they sometimes
sometimes submitted
submitted to to Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin thirty
thirty files
files
at
at aa time
timefor
for his
his approval.
approval. The
The horrors
horrors recorded
recorded in the. files
in the, files were
were carefully
carefully concealed
concealed
from
from thethe Soviet
Soviet people.
people. The
The Soviet
Soviet media
media preserved
preserved aa conspiracy
conspiracy of of silence
silence about
about thethe
systematic
systematic destruction
destruction ofof thousands
thousands of of Afghan
Afghan villages,
villages, reduced
reduced to to forlorn
forlorn groups
groups of of
”
T
THHS
E WSOWR O
E A
DNRT
DHA
D S
EHN IDE LTDH E S H I E L D I/ I
122
uninhabited,
uninhabited, roofless
roofless mud-brick
mud-brick houses;
houses; thethe flight
flight ofof four
four million
million refugees;
refugees; and and the
the
death of of aa million Afghans
Afghans in in aawar
war which
which Gorbachev
Gorbachev later describeddescribed as as aa "mistake."
“mistake.”
The
The coffins
coffins of of the
the 15,000
15,000 Red Red Army
Army troops
troops killed
killed in the conflict
in the conflict were
were unloaded
unloaded
silently at Soviet
Soviet airfields,
airfields, with none of the military pomp and and solemn music which
traditionally
traditionally awaited
awaited fallen
fallen heroes
heroes returning
returning to to the
the Motherland.
Motherland. Funerals
Funerals were were held
held
in
in secret,
secret, and
and families
families told
told simply
simply that
that their
theirloved
loved ones
ones had
had died
died "fulfilling
“hlfilling their
their inter
inter-
nationalist
nationalist duty." Some were
duty.’’ Some were buried
buried in in plots
plots near
near the
the graves
graves ofMitrokhin's
of Mitrokhin’s parentsparents inin
the
the cemetery
cemetery at at Kuzminsky
Kuzminsky Monastery.
Monastery. No No reference
reference to to Afghanistan
Afghanistan was was allowed
allowedon on
their
their tombstones.
tombstones. DuringDuring the the Afghan
Afghan War War Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin heard heard thethe first
first open
open criticism
criticism
of
of Soviet
Soviet policy
policy byby his
his more
more outspoken
outspoken colleagues
colleagues at at Yasenevo.
Yasenevo. "Doesn't
“Doesn’tthe the war
war make
make
you ashamed to
you ashamed to be
be Russian?"
Russian?” an an FCD colonel
colonel asked
asked himhim oneone day.
day. "Ashamed
“Ashamed to to be
be
Soviet,
Soviet, you mean!" Mitrokhin
you mean!’’ Mitrokhin blurted
blurted out.out.
When
When Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin retired
retired inin 1984,
1984,he hewas
was still
still preoccupied
preoccupied with with the the Afghan
Afghan War. War.
Hee spent
H spent the thefirst
first year
year and
and aahalf
half ofof his
his retirement
retirement sorting
sorting through
throughhis his notes,
notes, extract
extract-
ing
ing the
the material on on Mghanistan,
Afghanistan, and and assembling
assembling it it in
in aalarge
large volume
volume with with aa linking
linking
narrative.
narrative. Despite Gorbachev's call
Gorbachev’s call for glasnost after he became Party leader in 1985, 1985,
Mitrokhin did not believe the Soviet system would ever allow allowthe truthtruthabout
aboutthethe war
to
to be told.
told. Increasingly, however, he
Increasingly, however, he began to think of
to think waysofof transporting
of ways transporting his his
archive
archive to to the
theWest
Westand publishing
publishing it
and it there.
there.
One novel method suggested suggested itself on May May 28, 1987, 1987, when a single-engine
Cessna
Cessna piloted
piloted by by aa nineteen-year-old West German, Matthias
West German, Matthias Rust, Rust, crossed the the
Finnish border into
Finnish border Soviet airspace
into Soviet airspace andand flew
flew undetected
undetected for miles before
for 450 miles landing
before landing
in
in Red Square. After
Red Square. After an an hour
hour of confusion, during
of confusion, during which
which Kremlin
Kremlin security
security guards
guards
wondered whether Rust Rust was
was an an actor
actor in in aa film,
film, hehe was
was taken
taken away
away to the KGB’s
to the KGB's
Lefortovo
Lefortovo Prison. Mitrokhin briefly
Prison. Mitrokhin briefly considered
considered but but quickly
quickly abandoned
abandoned the idea of
the idea of
using
using aa microlite
microlite fromfrom aa KGB sportssports club
club to
to fly with
with hishis archive
archive in in the
theopposite
opposite direc
direc-
tion
tion to
to Finland.
Finland.
The
The most practical
practical of of the
the various schemes considered
various schemes considered by by Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin before before thethe
collapse
collapse of ofthe
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union was was toto get
geta position
a on
on thethelocal
local Party
Party committee
committee which which
issued permits for
issued permits for foreign
foreign travel, obtain permits
travel, obtain permits for himself and
for himself and his
his family,
family, then
then book
book
reservations
reservations on on aa cruise
cruise from
from Leningrad
Leningrad to to Odessa
Odessa in in the
the Black
Black Sea.
Sea. AtAt oneone of of the
the
cruise's West
cruise’s West European
Europeanports of of call,
call, Mitrokhin would would makemake contact with with the theauthor
author-
ities and
ities and arrange
arrange to to leave
leave his
his archive
archive in in aa dead letter-box near near Moscow for for collection
collection
by a Western
Western intelligence agency. agency. He H e eventually
eventually abandoned the idea because of the
difficulty of separating himself himself from the Soviet Soviet tour group group and and the ever-watchful
group leaders for
group leaders for long
longenough
enough to to tell
tell his story and
his story and arrange
arrange the the hand-over.
hand-over.
As
As the
the Berlin
Berlin Wall came down
Wall came down in in November
November 1989 1989 andand thethe Soviet
Soviet Bloc began to
Bloc began to
disintegrate, Mitrokhin told himself to be patient and wait for his opportunity. In the
meantime he carried on typing up his handwritten notes in his Moscow flat and at
the two family dachas,
dachas, assembling
assembling some some of them ininvolumesvolumes covering the FCD’s FCD's chief
target countries-first
countries-first and foremost the United United States, known known in KGB jargon as the
"Main
“Main Adversary."
Adversary.”He H e shared the relief of most Muscovites at the thefailure
failure of the thehard
hard-
line
line coup
coup in in August
August 1991 1991 toto depose
depose Gorbachev
Gorbachev and reestablish the
and reestablish the one-party
one-party Soviet
Soviet
t
T
The M
M ii tt rroo k h i n
n A
A rrcc h i vv ee / I3
13
state.
state. It
It came
came as as no
no surprise
surprise toto Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin that thatthe
thech�t;:f
chief r.�I1gleader
ringleader inin the
thefailed coup
failed coup
was
was Vladimir
Vladimir Aleksandrovich
Aleksandrovich Kryuchkov,
Kryuchkov, headhead of the FeD from
the FCD from 1974
1974 to to 1988
1988and and
chairman of
chairman of the
the KGB from from 1988
1988 until
untilthe coup.
thecoup.
Though
Though Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov proved proved better
better at
at public
public relations
relations than
than most previous
previous KGB
chairmen, he
chairmen, he had long long represented
represented much
much of of what Mitrokhin most detested in
what Mitrokhin in the
FCD.
FCD. As As aa young diplomat at
young diplomat the Soviet
at the Soviet embassy
embassy in in Budapest,
Budapest, Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov had had
caught
caught thethe eye
eye of
of the
the ambassador,
ambassador,Yuri Yuri Andropov,
Andropov, by by his
his uncompromising
uncompromising opposition
opposition
tothethe "counter-revolutionary"
“counter-revolutionary” Hungarian Uprising of 1956. 1956. When Andropov
became KGB chairmanchairman in in 1967,
1967, Kryuchkov became head
Kryuchkov became head of of his personal secretariat
his personal secretariat
and a loyal supporter of his obsessiveobsessive campaign against "ideological
“ideologicalsubversion"
subversion”in all
its forms.
forms. The filesfiles seen
seenby Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin showed that, as head of the FCD, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov
collaborated
collaborated closely
closely withwith the
the KGB Fifth
Fifth (Ideological
(Ideological Subversion)
Subversion) Directorate
Directorate in in the
the
war against dissidents at home home and abroad.29
abroad.29He H e had made a sellior
senior member of the
Fifth
Fifth Directorate,
Directorate, I. 1. A.
A. Markelov,
Markelov, one one of
of the
thedeputy
deputyheads of of the
theFCD withwith respon
respon-
sibility
sibility for
for coordinating
coordinating the the struggle
struggle against
against ideological
ideological subversion.30
sub~ersion.~’ TheThefailed
failed coup
coup
of
of August
August 19911991 marked
marked an an appropriately
appropriately discreditable
discreditable end end toto Kryuchkov's
Kryuchkov’s KGB
career. Instead
career. Instead of of shoring
shoring up up the Soviet Union
the Soviet Union and and the
the one-party
one-party state,
state, it served only
it served only
to
to hasten
hasten their collapse.
collapse.
On
O n October 111,1991,
1 , 1991, the State
State Council
Councilof of the disintegrating Soviet
Soviet Union abol- abol
ished the KGB in its existing form. The former FCD was reconstituted as the SVR,
the
the foreign
service of
of the
the Russian
Russian Federation,
Federation, independent
independent of of the
the inter
inter-
nal
nal security
security service.
service. Instead
Instead of of repudiating
repudiating its its Soviet
Soviet past,
past, however,
however, thethe SVR saw saw
itself
itself as
as the
the heir
heir ofof the
the old FCD.
FCD. Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin had h,ad seen
seen the
the Fc::
FCD P fil�
file on the SVR's
on the SVR’s
newly
newly appointed
appointed head, head, Academician
Academician Yevgeni Maksimovich Primakov,
Yevgeni Maksimovich previously
Primakov,previously
Director of
Director of the
the Institute
InstituteofofWorld World Economics
Economics and and International Relations and
International Relations one of
and one of
Gorbachev's leading
Gorbachev’s leading foreign policy advisers.
foreign policy advisers.The
The file
file identified
identified Primakov
Primakov as as aa KGB
co-optee,
co-optee, code named MAKSIM,
codenamed MAKSIM, who had been
who had been sent
sent onon frequent intelligence mis
frequent intelligence mis-
sions
sions to
to the
theUnited
UnitedStates
States and
and the
the Middle
MiddleEast.31
East.31Primakov
Primakov went went ononto
to become
become BorisBoris
Yeltsin's
Yeltsin’s Foreign
Foreign Minister
Minister in in 1996
1996and andPrime
PrimeMinister
Minister in in
1998.
1998.
IN TTHE
HE F I N A L months
FINAL months of of 1991,
1991, the
the breakup
breakup of the Soviet
of the Soviet Union
Union and and the
the relative
relative
weakness
weakness ofof frontier controls at
frontier controls the new
at the new borders
borders of of the
the R�sS!�g F�,qera�ign, at
R u s s i a n Federatjon at last
last
opened
opened the way to the West for Mitrokhin and his archive. In March 1992 hehe
the way to the West for Mitrokhin and his archive. In March 1992
boarded
boarded anan overnight
overnight train in Moscow
train in Moscow bound bound forfor the
the capital
capital of of one
one of
of the
the newly
newly
independent
independent Baltic
Baltic republics.32
republics.32With
With himhim he hetook
tookaa case
case on
on wheels,
wheels, containing
containing bread,
bread,
sausages
sausages and
and drink
drink forforhis
his journey
journey on
on top,
top, clothes
clothes underneath,
underneath, and-atand-at the the bottom
bottom-
samples
samples of
of his notes. The
his notes. The next
next day
dayhehe arrived
arrived unannounced
unannounced at at the
theBritish
British embassy
embassy in in
the
the Baltic
Baltic capital
capital and
and asked
asked to
to speak
speak to "someone in
to “someone in authority."
authority.” Hitherto
Hitherto Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin
had
had had
had an
an image
image of of the British as
the British as rather
rather formal
formal andand "a“a bit
bit . of
of aa mystery."
mystery.” But the
But the
young
young female
female diplomat
diplomat whowho received
received himhim atatthe
the embassy
embassy struck
struck himhim asas "young,
“young,
attractive
attractive and
and sympathetic,"
sympathetic,” as as well
well as fluent in
as fluent in Russian. Mitrokhin told
Russian. Mitrokhin told her
her he
he had
had
brought
brought with him important material from KGB files. While he rummaged at the
with him important material from KGB files. While he rummaged at the
bottom
bottom ofof his
his bag
bag to
to extract
extract his
his notes
notes from beneath the
from beneath the sausages
sausages and clothes, the
and clothes, the
T E WSOW
T HS
E RO
D NR T
A DH A
S
EHN I DE LTDH E S H I E L D / I
144
diplomat ordered tea. As Mitrokhin drank drankhis first cup of English tea, she read some
of
of his
his notes,
notes, then
then questioned
questioned him him about
about them.
them. Mitrokhin
Mitrokhintold told her
her they
they were
were only
only part
part
of
of aa large
large personal
personal archive
archive which
which included
included material
material on on KGB operations
operations in in Britain.
Britain.
He
H e agreed
agreed to to return
return toto the
the embassy
embassy aa monthmonth later
later to
to meet
meet representatives
representatives from from the the
Secret
Secret Intelligence
Intelligence Service.
Service.
Emboldened
Emboldened by by the ease with
the ease with which
which he he had crossed the
had crossed Russian frontier
the Russian frontier in in
March,
March, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhinbrought brought withwithhimhimon his
hisonnext
next trip
trip totothe theBaltic
Baltic capital
capital 2,000
2,000 typed
typed
pages
pages which
which he he had
had removed
removed fromfrom thethe hiding
hidingplace
place beneath
beneath his his dacha
dacha near
near Moscow.
Moscow.
Arriving
Arriving at at the
the British
British embassy
embassy on on the
the morning
morning of of April
April 9, he he identified
identified himself
himself to to
the
the SIS officers
officers by by producing
producing his his passport,
passport, Communist
Communist Party card and
Partycard and KGB pensionpension
certificate,
certificate, handed
handed over over his
his bulky
bulky typescript
typescript and and spent
spent aa day day answering
answering questions
questions
about
about himself,
himself, his his archive
archive andand how
how he he had
had compiled
compiled it. it. Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin accepted
accepted an an invi
invi-
tation
tation toto return
returnto to the
the embassy
embassy about
about two months later
two months later to to discuss arrangements for
discuss arrangements for aa
visit to
to Britain.
Britain. Early
Early in inMay
Maythe the SIS
SIS Moscow
Moscow stat ion reported
station reported to Londonthat
to London that
,
Mitrokhin planned to
Mitrokhin planned to leave
leave Moscow
Moscow on on an an overnight
overnight’traintrain ononJune
June10.
10. On
O n June
June 111 1
he
he arrived
arrived in in the
theBaltic
Baltic capital
capital carrying
carrying aa rucksack
rucksack containing
containing more more material
material fromfrom hishis
archive. Most of
archive. Most of his
his meeting
meeting withwith SISSIS officers
officers waswasspent
spent discussing
discussing plans
plans forfor him
him to to
be
be debriefed
debriefed in in Britain
Britain during the the following
following autumn.
autumn.
On
O n September
September 7, escorted by by SIS,
SIS, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin arrived
arrived in in England
Englandforfor the
the fi rst time.
first time.
After
After the
the near
near chaos
chaos of of post-Communist
post-Communist Moscow, Moscow, London
London made made an an extraordinary
extraordinary
impression on him-"thehim-“the model of what aa capital city should be." be.” At the time, even
the heavy traffic,
traffic, dotted with with thetheblack cabs and red doubledecker buses he had had seen
only
only inin photographs,
photographs, seemed seemed but but proof
proof of of the
the capital's prosperity. While
capital’sprosperity. While being being
debriefed
debriefed at at anonymous
anonymous safe safe houses
houses in in London
Londonand and the
the countryside,
countryside, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin took took
the
the fi nal decision
final decision to to leave
leave Russia
Russiaforfor Britain,
Britain, andand agreed
agreed withwith SISSISononarrangements
arrangements to to
exfiltrate himself,
exfiltrate himself, his his family
family and his archive.
archive. O Onn October
October 13 13 he
he was
was infiltrated
infiltrated backback
into
into Russia
Russia to to make
make final
final arrangements
arrangements for for his
his departure.
departure.
On
O n November
November 7, 1992, the
7,1992, theseventy-fi
seventy-fifth fth anniversary
anniversary of of the
the Bolshevik
Bolshevik Revolution,
Revolution,
Mitrokhin arrived with his family in the theBaltic capital where he had first made con con-
tact with SIS.
SIS. A few days later they arrived in London Londontotobegin a new life in Britain.
It was
was aa bittersweet
bittersweet moment.
moment. Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin was was safe
safe and
and secure
secure for
for the
the first
first time
time since
since
he
he had
had begun
begun assembling
assembling his his secret
secret archive
archive eighteen
eighteen years
years previously,
previously,butbut atatthethesame
same
time
time he hefelt
felt aa sense
sense of
of bereavement
bereavement at at separation
separation fromfrom a homeland
homeland he knew knew he he would
would
probably never see see again.
again. The bereavement has passed, though his attachment to
to
Russia remains. Mitrokhin is now a British citizen. Using his senior citizen’s citizen's railcard
to
to travel
travel the
the length
lengthand andbreadth
breadth of
of the
the country,
country, he he has seen more
has seen more ofof Britain than
than most
most
who were born here. Since 1992 1992 he has spent several several days a week working on his
archive, typing up the remaining handwritten notes, and responding to questions
about his archive from intelligence services services from five continents. Late in in1995
1995hehe hadhad
his first meeting with with Christopher
Christopher AndrewAndrew totodiscuss the preparation of of this book.
Though
Though The The Sword and the the Shield could
could notnot have been written
have been written in in Russia,
Russia, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin
remains as convinced
convinced as he was in 1972 1972 thatthat the
thesecret history of of the KGB is a cencen
tral part of ofthetheSoviet past which the Russian people have the right right to know. He H e also
T
T h eM iMt ri ot rk ohki hnAi rnc hAirvc eh i v e / I15S
believes
believes that
that the
theKGB's
KGB’s worldwide
worldwide fo.reign operations form
foreign operations form an
an,essential,
essential, though
though often
often
neglected,
neglected, part
part ofofthe
thehistory
history of
of twentieth-century
twentieth-centuryinternational
internationalrelations.
relations.
NO
N O W O R D LLEEA
AKKE D out
ED out in
in the
the British
British media about either
media about either Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin or or his
his archive.
archive.
Because
Because material
material from
from the
the archive
archive was
waspassed
passedto
to so
so many
many other
other intelligence secu
intelligence and secu-
rity
rity services,
services, however,
however,there
there were,
were, unsurprisingly,
unsurprisingly, some
some partial
partial leaks
leaks abroad.
abroad. The fi rst,
first,
slightly garbled reference
slightly garbled reference toto Mitrokhin's archive occurred
Mitrokhin’s archive occurred in
in the
the United States nine
United States nine
months
months after
after his
his defection.
defection. InIn August 1993 the
August 1993 well-known Washington
the well-known Washington investiga-
investiga
tive
tive journalist
journalist Ronald Kessler published
Ronald Kessler published aa bestselling book on
bestselling book on the based in
the FBI based in part
part
on sources
sources inside the Bureau.
Bureau. Among his revelations
revelations was a brief
brief reference to a sensa:
sensa-
tional "probe
“probe by the FBI into information from a former KGB employee who had had
had access
access to KGB files":
files”:
According
According to to his
his account,
account, the
the KGB hadhad had
hadmany hundreds of
many hundreds of Americans
Americans and
and
possibly
possibly moremore than
than aa thousand
thousand spying
spying for
for them
them in
in recent years.
years. So specific was
was
the information that the theFBI was quickly
quicklyable to establish the source's credibil
source’s credibil-
ity.. .. .. By
ity By the
the summer
summer of of 1993,
1993, the
the FBI had
had mobilized
mobilized agents
agents in
in most major
cities
cities to
to pursue
pursue the
the cases.
cases. A top
top secret
secret meeting
meeting was
was called
calledat Qyantico
Quantico[the[theFBI
N ational Academy]
National Academy] to to plot
plot strategy.33
strategy.33
Kessler
Kessler did
did not
not name
name any
any of
of the
the "many
“many hundreds
hundreds of of Americans"
Americans” identifiedidentified by by the
the
defector.
defector. AnAn unnamed “US "US intelligence
intelligence official"
official” interviewed by by the
the W ashington Post
Washington
"confirmed
“confirmed that that the had received
the FBI had received specific
specific information
information that that has
has led
led toto aa 'signifi
‘signifi-
cant'
cant’ ongoing
ongoing investigation
investigation into past KGB activities
into past activities in theUnited
in the United States,"
States,” but but
declined
declined to to be
be drawn
drawn inin on
on "how
“howmany
many people
people are are implicated."34 ~ ~ reported
i m p l i ~ a t e d . ”Time reported that that
"sources
“sources familiar
familiar with
with the case" of
the case” ofthe
the KGB
KGB,defector
defector had identified him
had identified him as as aa former
former
employee
employee of of the
the First
First Chief
Chief Directorate,
Directorate, butbut had described Kessler's
had described Kessler’s figures
figures for for the
the
number
number of of "recent"
“recent” Soviet spies in
Soviet spies in the
the United States as
UnitedStates "highly exaggerated."35
as,“highly e~aggerated.”~’
Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notesnotes do
do indeed contain the
indeed contain names of
the .names "many hundreds”
of “many hundreds" of of KGB offioffi
cers, agents and
cers, agents and contacts in the
contacts in theUnited
United States
States active
active at at various
various periods
periods since
since thethe
1920s. Kessler, however,
1920s. Kessler, however,wrongly
wrongly suggested that this
suggested that number applied
this number applied to "recent years”
to “recent years"
rather
rather than
thantotothethewhole
whole history
history of
of Soviet espionage in
Soviet espionage in the
theUnited
UnitedStates.
States. Though
Though his his
figures
figures were
were publicly
publicly disputed,
disputed, the
the suggestion
suggestion that
that thetheKGB defector
defector had had gone
gone to to the
the
United
United States
States rather
rather than
than totoBritain
Britain went
went unchallenged.36
~nchallenged.~~ WhenWhen no further
no informa
furtherinforma-
tion
tion ononthetheunidentified
unidentified defector
defector was forthcoming, media
was forthcoming, media interest
interest in in the
thestory
story quickly
quickly
died away.
died away.
There
There was no furtherfurtherleak
leak from
from Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s archive
archive for
for over three
three years.
years. In Octo
Octo-
ber
ber 1996,
1996, however,
however, reports
reports in
in the
the French
French press
press alleged
alleged that
that Charles
Charles Hernu, Defence
Hernu, Defence
Minister from
Minister from 1981
1981 toto 1985,
1985,hadhadworked
worked forfor Soviet Bloc intelligence
Soviet Bloc services from
intelligence services from
1953
1953 until
untilatatleast 1963, and
least 1963, and that,
that,when
when informed
informed by by the
the French
French security
security service,
service, the
the
DST, President
President Fran<;:ois
Franqois Mitterrand
Mitterrand had hushed the
had hushed the scandal Up.37 Le Monde
scandal up.37 reported
Munde reported
that
that from
from 1993
1993 onwards British intelligence
onwards British intelligence had
had passed
passed onon totothe theDST "a “a list of about
list of about
300 names
300 names of of diplomats
diplomats and
and officials
officials of
of the
the Qyai d'Orsay alleged
Quaid’Orsay alleged to to have
have worked
worked for for
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
R D
D A
ANND
D TT H
HEE SS H
H II E
E LL D
D // I16
6
SSoviet
oviet Bloc
Bloc intdligence."3s
intelligen~e.”~~ In reality,
In French
reality, French diplomats
diplomats and and Foreign
Foreign Ministry
Ministry offi
off-
cials
cials made
made up up only
only aa minority
minority of
of the
the names
names in in Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notesnotes supplied
supplied by
by the
the SIS
SIS
to DS T.
to the DST. Charles Hernu was not among them.39None of the media reports on
the Charles Hernu was not among them.39 None of the media reports on
either
either side
side ofof the
the Channel
Channelrelated
related the
the SIS
SIS lists
lists of
of Soviet
Soviet agents
agents inin France
France to
to Kessler's
Kessler’s
earlier
earlier story
story ofofa adefector
defector with
with extensive
extensive access
accesstoto KGB
KGB files.
files.
In
In December
December 1996 1996thetheGerman
Germanweekly Fucus reported
weekly Focus reported that,
that, according
according to
to "reliable
“reliable
sources,"
sources,’’SIS had also provided the BN, the Germansecurity service, with thenames
SIS had also provided the BN, the German security service, with the names
of
of several
severalhundred
hundred German
Germanpoliticians,
politicians, businessmen,
businessmen, lawyers
lawyers and
and police
police officers
officerswho
who
had
had been
been involved
involved with
with the
the KGB.
KGB. On O n this
this occasion
occasion thethe SIS
SIS source
source was
was identified
identified as
as
aa Russian
Russian defector
defector who
who hadhadhad
hadextensive
extensive access
accesstoto the
theKGB
KGB archives.
archives. A later
later article
article
in Focus reported:
in Focus reported:
The
The Federal
Federal Prosecutor
Prosecutor has
has been
been examining
examining numerous
numerous detailed
detailed new
new leads
leads to
to aa
hitherto
hitherto undiscovered
undiscovered agent
agent network
network of of the
the former
former Soviet
Soviet secret
secret service,
service, the
the
KGB,
KGB, inin Germany.
Germany. TheThe researchers
researchers in in Karlsruhe
Karlsruhe are
are primarily
primarily concentrating
concentrating
on
on Moscow
Moscow sources
sources who
who were
were taken
taken on
on by
by the
the successors
successors toto the
the KGB
KGB andand have
have
probably
probably been
been reactivated
reactivated since
since the
the end
endofof the
the Cold
ColdWar.
War.
The
The basis
basis for
for the
the research
research isis extensive
extensiveinformation
information on on agents
agents which
which aa Rus
Rus-
sian
sian defector
defector smuggled
smuggled into London from
into London from the
the Moscow
Moscow secret
secret service.
service. After
After
intensive
intensive analysis,
analysis, the
the British
British secret
secret service passed all
service passed all information
information on on KGB
KGB
connections
connections inin Germany
Germanytotothe theBNBfV inin Cologne
Cologneininearly
early 1996.40
1996.40
In
In July
July 1997 another leak
1997 another leak from
from Mitrokhin's
archive occurred
occurred in in Austria.
Austria. Press
Press
reports
reports quoted aKGB document giving directions for locating a secret arms dump of
quoted a KGB document giving directions for locating a secret arms dump of
mines,
mines, explosives
explosives and
and detonators,
detonators, codenamed
codenamed GROT,
GROT, hidden
hidden inin aa dead
dead letter-box
letter-box
near
near Salzburg
Salzburg in
in 1963,
1963, which
which had
had been
been intended
intended for
for use
use in
in sabotage
sabotage operations:
operations:
Leave
Leave thethe town
town ofof Salzburg
Salzburg by by the
the SchaIlmoser
Schallmoser Haupstrasse
Haupstrasse leading
leading toto High
High-
way
way No.No. 158.
153.AtAt aa distance
distance of of 88 km
km from
from thethe town
town limit,
limit, ininthethe
direction
direction ofof Bad
Bad
Ischl-Graz,
Ischl-Graz, therethereisis aa large
large stone
stone bridge
bridge across
across aa narrow
narrow valley.
valley. Before
Before reaching
reaching
this
this bridge,
bridge, leave
leave the
the federal
federal highway
highway by by turning
turning right
rightonontoto a local
a road
local road which
which
follows
follows the valley in thedirection of Ebenau; then go on 200 meters to theend
the valley in the direction of Ebenau; then go on 200 meters to the end
of
of the
the metal
metal parapet,
parapet, which
which stands
stands onon thetheleft-hand
left-hand side
side of
of the
the road.
road. On
O n reach
reach-
ing
ing thetheendendof
of the
the parapet,
parapet, turn
turn left
leftatatonce
once and
and follow
follow aa village
village road
road leading
leading in in
the
the opposite
opposite direction.
direction. TheThe DLBDLB isis located
located about
about 5050 meters
meters (60 (60 paces)
paces) fromfrom
the
the turn-off
turn-off point
point leading
leading from
from thethe main
main road
road onon totothe
thevillage road .. .Y
village road . .41
Though
Though thetheAustrian
Austrian press
press did
did not
not mention
mentionit,it,thethedocument
document came
came from
from Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s
archive,
archive,which
which also
also revealed
revealedthat
that inin1964
1964road
road repair
repair works
works had
had covered
covered the
the entrance
entrance
to
to the
the DLB,
DLB,raised
raised the
the ground
groundlevel,
level, and
and changed
changed thethe layout
layout of
of the
the surrounding
surroundingarea.
area.
The
The KGB
KGB had
had decided
decided not
not to
to try
try to
to recover
recover and
and relocate
relocate the
the GROT
GROT armsarms dump.
dump.
Attempts
Attempts byby the
the Austrian
Austrian authorities
authorities to find
tofind the dump
thedump in1997in 1997 alsoalso failed.42
failed.42
Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notes
notes reveal
reveal that
that similar
similar KGB
KGB arms
arms andand radio
radio caches,
caches, some
some ofof them
them
booby-trapped,
booby-trapped, are
are scattered
scattered around
around much
much ofof Europe
Europe andand North
North America.43
America.43
T
T h eM M
i t ri to rkohki hnAi rn c A
h irvc eh i v e I
/ I7
17
The press leak which came closest to revealing the existence of of Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s
archive waswasa further
hrther article in the theGerman
German weekly Focus,
Focus,in June 1998. Focus reported
1998. Focus
that a colonel
colonel in the
the FCD registry with access
access to "all
“all the files on Moscow's
Moscow’s agents"
agents”
had smuggled handwritten copies of them out of of KGB headquarters to his dacha
near Moscow. In 11992 992 he
hehad defected to Britain and, according to Focus, Focus,SISSIS agents
had
had brought
brought thethe"explosive"
“explosive”notes
notes hidden
hidden in in th� dacha. back
thedacha back to
to LQndofl
L0nd0.n.~~ .44 Four
Four years
years
later, in an operation codenamed WEEKEND,
WEEKEND, SIS SIS had allegedly briefed the BfV B N on
the German
Germanmaterial in the thearchive.
archive. According to Focus,
Focus,"The
“The defector has presented
the
the BfV
B N with
with hundreds
hundreds of of leads
leads to
to Moscow's
Moscow’s spy spynetwork
network in in the
theFederal
Federal Republic
Republic of of
Germany."
Germany.” A "high-ranking
“high-ranking BfV B N official"
official” was
was said
said to
to have
have commented,
commented, "We “We werewere
quite shocked at
quite shocked at how
how much
much [the[the defector]
defector] knew.
knew. Moscow clearly possesses tons
clearly possesses tons of
blackmail material."
blackmail material.” The
The B BfVN was
was reported
reported toto have
have received
received new leads on
new leads on fifty
f i f v espi
espi-
onage
onage cases
cases and
and toto have
have begun
begun twelve
twelve new
new investigations.
investigation^.^^45
The Focus article,
The Focus article, however,
however, inspired
inspired widespread
widespread skepticism-partly
skepticism-partly because because the the
story of
of a top
topsecret KGB archive exfiltrated from a Russian dacha seemed inherently
improbable, partly
improbable, because the
partly because the only
only detailed
detailed example
example given
given by Focus
Focus ofof the
the intelli
intelli-
gence it contained was the sensational allegation that the former Chancellor, C.hancellor, Willy
Brandt, "the
“theicon of Germany's
Germany’sSocial Democrats," had been a Soviet spy during the
Social Democrats,” the
Second
Second World
World War.
War. The
The Brandt
Brandt story
storywas
was instantly
instantly dismissed as as "completely
“completely absurd"
absurd”
by
by Yuri
Yuri Kobaladze,
Kobaladze, head
head of
of the
the SVR press
press bureau.
bureau. When
When asked
asked why
why in in this instance
this instance
the
the SVR waswas abandoning
abandoning its its usual
usual practice
practice ofof not
not commenting
commentingononindividuals
individuals alleged
alleged
Russian spies, Kobaladze
to be Russian spies, Kobaladze replied:
It
I t would
would naturally
naturally be
be very
veryflattering
flattering to
tohave
have such
such aa high-ranking
high-ranking politician
politician on
on
our
our list
list of
of credits,
credits, but
but in
in the
the interests
interests of preserving historical
of preserving historical truth we felt
truth we felt it
it
necessary to reject this fiction, which could be misused for political purposes.
necessary to reject this fiction, which could be misused for political purposes.
Kobaladze
Kobaladze alsoalso dismissed
dismissed thethe story
story of
of the
the secret
secret archive
archive inin aa KGB colonel's
colonel’s dacha
dacha as as
aa myth.
myth. TheThe source
source ofof the Brandt story,
the Brandt story, he
he insisted,
insisted, could
could onlyonly bebe aa former
former KGB
major
major inin the
the Oslo
Osloresidency, Mikhail Butkov,
residency, Mikhail Butkov, whowho had
had defected
defected to to Britain
Britain in in 1991
1991.46.46
Though
Though wrongwrong about
about the
the secret
secret archive,
archive, Kobaladze
Kobaladze was was right
right toto reject
reject thethe allega
allega-
tion thatBrandt
tion that Brandthadhad been
been aa Soviet
Soviet spy.
spy. Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notesnotes reveal
reveal that the KGB
that the
archives
archives do do indeed
indeed contain
contain aa file
file on Brandt (codenamed
on Brandt (codenamed POLYARNIK),
POLYARNIK), which which
shows
shows that
that while
while in
in Stockholm
Stockholm during
during the
the Second
Second World
World War War he he passed
passed on on infor
infor-
mation to
mation to the
theNKVD residency. But, as
residency. But, as the
the file makes clear,
file makes clear, Brandt
Brandt was was also
alsoinin touch
touch
with
with British
British and
and American
American intelligence
intelligence officers-as
officers-as wellwell as
as with
with the Norwegian for
the Norwegian for-
mer secretary
mer secretary ofof Leon
Leon Trotsky,
Trotsky, regarded
regarded by by the
the NKVD as as the
the greatest traitor in
greatest traitor in
Soviet
Soviet history.47
hist01-y.~’ Brandt's
Brandt’s overriding motive was
overriding motive was to provide any
to provide any information
information to to all
three members
three members of of the
the wartime
wartimeGrand Grand Alliance
Alliance which
which might
might hasten
hasten the the defeat
defeat of of
Adolf Hitler.
Adolf In the
Hitler. In the case
case of
of the
the Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, he he calculated-accurately-that
calculated-accurately-that his
his
best
best channel
channel ofof communication
communication with with Moscow
Moscow was was.via
viath(!
the S�oc. �
Stockholm.
ol Il1
,l
reside
residency.
.. . n, cy. The
The
real
real embarrassment
embarrassment in in the
the POLY
POLYARNIKARNIK file concerns the
file concerns the role
role not
not <?f Branqt bl,lt
of Brandt but of
of
the
the KGB. In In 1962,
1962, almost
almost certainly
certainly with
with Khrushchev's personal approval,
Khrushchev’s personal approval, the the KGB
embarked
embarked on on an
an operation
operation to to blackmail Brandt by
blackmail Brandt threatening to
by threatening to use the evidence
use the evidence of of
TT H
H ES
E WS OWRO
DR D A
ANND
D TT H E H SI EHLI D
H SE E L D // I18
8
his
his wartime
wartime dealings
dealings with
with the
the Stockholm
Stockholm residency
residency to
to "cause
“causeunpleasantness"
unpleasantness”unless
unless
he agreed to cooperate. The attempted blackmail failed.48
he agreed to cooperate. The attempted blackmail failed.48
LLIIK
KEE TTH HEE B F V and
BFV and Austrian
Austrian counter
counter intelligence,
intelligence, aa number
number of ofother
othersecurity
security services
services
and
and intelligence
agencies around
around the the world
world fromfrom Scandinavia
Scandinaviato] apan have
to Japan have been
been pur
pur-
suing
suing leads from Mitrokhin’s archive for several years-usually unnoticed by the
leads from Mitrokhin's archive for several years-usually unnoticed by the
media.
media. MostMost of of the
the leads
leads have
have been
been usedused forfor counterintelligence
counterintelligence purposes-to
purposes-to help help
resolve
resolve unsolved
unsolved cases
cases and
and neutralize
neutralize SVR SVR operations
operations begunbegun in in the
theKGB
KGB era-rather
era-rather
than
than to to mount
mount prosecutions.
prosecutions. There There have, however, been
have, however, been aa number
number of of convictions
convictions
which
which derivederive from
from Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s evidence.
evidence.
On
O n oneone occasion,
occasion,Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin himself himself was was almost
almost called
called to to give
give evidence
evidence in in court.
court.
The
The case
case concerned
concerned Robert Robert Lipka,
Lipka, an an army
army clerk
clerk assigned
assigned in in the
the mid-1
mid-1960s960s to to the
the
National
National Security
Security Agency
Agency (NSA, (NSA, the the US US SIGINT
SIGINT service),
service), whom
whom Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin had had
identified
identified as as aa KGB
KGB agent.49
agent.49In In May
May 1993 1993 FBIFBI agent
agent Dmitri
Dmitri Droujinsky
Droujinsky contacted
contacted
Lipka,
Lipka, posing as “Sergei Nikitin,” a GRU officer based in Washington. Lipka com
posing as "Sergei Nikitin," a GRU officer based in Washington. Lipka com-
plained
plained thatthat hehewas
was still
still owed
owed money
money for for his
his espionage
espionageover over aa quarter
quarter ofofaa century
century ear ear-
lier,
lier, and
and waswas given
given aa total
total ofof $10,000
$10,000 by by "Nikitin"
“Nikitin” over over the
the next
next few
few months.
months. He He
appeared
appeared confident
confident that that hehe could
could no no longer
longer be be prosecuted.
prosecuted. "The “The statute
statute of of limita
limita-
tions,"
tions,”he he told
told "Nikitin,"
“Nikitin,”"has “has run
run out."
out.”"Nikitin"
“Nikitin”corrected
corrected him:him: "In“InAmerican
American law law the
the
statute
statute of oflimitations
limitations for for espionage
espionage never never runs
runs out."
out.” Lipka
Lipka replied
replied that,
that, whatever
whatever the the
legal
legal position,
position, he he "would
“wouldnevernever admit
admit totoanything."
anything.”After After aa lengthy
lengthy FBI FBI investigation,
investigation,
Lipka
Lipka was was arrested
arrested in in February
February 11996 996 at at his
his home
home in in Millersville,
Millersville, Pennsylvania,
Pennsylvania, and and
charged
charged with with handing
handing classified
classified documents
documents to to the
the Soviet
Soviet Union.50
Union.”
Since
Since Lipka
Lipka denied
denied all all charges
charges against
against him,him, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhinexpected
expected to to give
give evidence
evidence
at
at his
his trial
trial in
in the
the U.S.
U.S. District
District Court,
Court, Philadelphia,
Philadelphia, in in May
May 1997.1997.But, But,ininwhatwhatthe the
Philadelphia
PhiZade@ia InquirerInquirer termed
termed "a “a surprising
surprising turnaround"
turnaround” ininthethe courtroom,
courtroom, Lipka Lipka
"exploded
“exploded into into tears
tears asas he
he confessed
confessed that that hehe hadhad handed
handedover over classified
classified information
information
to KGB agents." Lipka had been persuaded by his
to KGB agents.” Lipka had been persuaded by his lawyer, Ronald F. Kidd, to lawyer, Ronald F. Kidd, to accept
accept
aa prosecution
prosecution offer offer ofof aa plea
plea bargain
bargain whichwhich would
would limit
limit his
his sentence
sentence to to eighteen
eighteen years'
years’
imprisonment
imprisonment with time off
with time off for
for good
good behavior,
behavior, rather than continue
rather than continue to to plead
plead not not
guilty
guilty andand face
face the
the prospect
prospect of of spending
spendingthethe rest
rest of
of his
his life
life in
in jail.
jail.Though
Though Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s
name
name was was never
nevermentioned
mentioned in in court,
court, it it was
was thethe evidence
evidence he he hadhadobtained
obtained fromfrom KGB KGB
files
fileswhich
which seemsseems to to have
have prompted
prompted Lipka'sLipka’s change
change of of heart.
heart. "We
“We saw sawhowhow significant
significant
the
the evidence
evidence was,"was,” hishis lawyer
lawyer toldtold reporters.
reporters. "But “But thethe government
government also also realized
realized theythey
couldn't
couldn’t go go through
through aa fullfull trial
trial and
and not
not have
have thethe mystery
mystery witness
witness exposed."
exposed.”The The "mys
“mys-
tery
tery witness"
witness”was was Mitrokhin.
Mitrokhin. After After Lipka's
Lipka’s confession,
confession, U.S. Assistant
Assistant Attorney
Attorney Bar Bar-
bara].
bara J. Cohan
Cohan admitted,
admitted,"We “We had
had aavery
very sensitive
sensitivewitness
witness who,who, ifhe
if he hadhadhad hadto
to testify,
testify,
would
would have have had
had to to testify
testify behind
behind aa screen
screen andand under
under an an assumed
assumed name, name, andand nownow we we
don't
don’t have
have toto surface
surface himhim at at all."51
all.”51 "I“Ifeel
feel like
like Rip
Rip Van Spy," said
Van Spy,’’ said Lipka
Lipka when
when he he was
was
sentenced
sentenced in in September
September 11997. 997. "I “Ithought
thought II had had putput this
this to
to bed
bed many
many years
years agoago and
and II
never dreamed it would turn out like this." As well as
never dreamed it would turn out like this.” As well as being sentenced to eighteen being sentenced to eighteen
years'
years’imprisonment
imprisonment and andfined
fined 10,000
10,000dollars,
dollars, Lipka
Lipka waswas ordered
ordered to to repay
repay thethe further
further
10,000
10,000 dollars
dollars from
from FBIFBI funds
funds given
given himhim by by "Nikitin."52
“Nikitin.”’2
T
The M
M ii tt rr oo k bh i nA rAc rhcihviev e I
/ I199
There
There are are many
many other
other "Rip
“Rip Van Spies" whose
Van Spies’’ whose memories
memories of of Cold
Cold WarWar espionage
espionage
are
are likely
likely toto be
be reawakened
reawakened by by Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s archive. Some will
archive. Some will recognize
recognize themselves
themselves
in the pages
in the pages which
which follow. About aa dozen
follow. About dozen important
important casescases which
which are are still
still being
being
actively
actively pursued-including
pursued-including several several inin leading
leading NATO
NATO countries-cannot
countries-cannot be be referred
referred
to
to for
for legal reasons until
legal reasons until they
they come
come to to court.
court. Only
Only aa small
small minority
minority of of the
the Soviet
Soviet
agents
agents whose
whose codenames
codenames appearappear inin this
this volume,
volume, however,
however, are are likely
likely toto be
be prosecuted.
prosecuted.
But,
But, asas the
the SVR embarks
embarks on the biggest
on the biggest andand most
most complex
complex damage assessment in
damage assessment in
Russian
Russian intelligence
intelligence history,
history, itit has
has to
to face
face the
the unsettling
unsettling possibility
possibility that
that some
some of of the
the
spies identified
spies identified by by lVIitrokhin
Mitrokhin have have since been turned
since been turned into
into double agents.
double agents.
Mter
After each
each ofof the
therevelations
revelations from
from Mitrokhin's
archive mentioned above, above, the SVR
undoubtedly
undoubtedly conducted
conducted the the usual
usual damage
damage assessment exercise in
assessment exercise an attempt
in an attempt to to deter
deter-
mine
mine thethe source
source and seriousness of
and seriousness of the
the leak.
leak. Its official.
official st�tement
statement in
. . in. 19.?6
1996
. (effectively
(effectively
reaffirmed
reaffirmed as recently as
as recently as June
June 1998),
1998),which
which dismissed
dismissed as "absolute nonsense"
as “absolute nonsense” the sug
the sug-
gestion
gestion that
that the names
names of several hundred Soviet
of several Soviet agents could possibly
possibly have been been
given
given by by aa defector
defector toto any
any Western
intelligence agency,
agency, demonstrates
demonstrates that that the
the con
con-
clusions of these exercises
exercises were
were very wide of the mark. Not until the the publication of
this
this book
book was was announced
announced in 1999 did
in 1999 did the
the SVR seem
seem to to begin
begin to to grasp
grasp thethe massive
massive
hemorrhage
hemorrhage of of intelligence
intelligence which
which hadhad occurred.
occurred.
S
SOOM
M E OF T H E files
files noted
noted byby Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin givegive aa vivid
vivid indication
the ferocity
ferocity withwith
which
which the Centre (KGB
the Centre (KGB headquarters)
headquarters) has traditionally
traditionally responded
responded to intelligence
intelligence
leaks
leaks about
about its
its past
past foreign operations. The
foreign operations. The publication
publication in 1974 of
in 1974 John Barron's
of John Barron’s
KGB: The The Secret W Woork Agents,53 based
rk of Soviet Secret Agents,53 based onon information
information from Soviet
from Soviet
defectors
defectors and and Western
Western intelligence agencies, generated
intelligence agencies, generated no no fewer
fewer than
than 370 KGB dam- dam
age
age assessments
assessmentsand and other reports. The
other reports. resident in
The resident in Washington,
Washington,Mikhail Mikhail Korneyevich
Korneyevich
Polonik
Polonik (codenamed
(codenamed ARDOV),
ARDOV), was was instructed
instructed to obtain all
to obtain all available
availableinformation
information on on
Barron,
Barron, then
then aa senior editor at
senior editor Reader’sDigest, and
at Reader's and to to suggest
suggest waysways "to compromise
“to compromise
him."54 Most
him.”54 Most of of the
the "active
“active measures"
measures” used
used by
by the
the KGB in in its
its attempts
attempts to to discredit
discredit
Barron
Barron mademade much
much of of his
his Jewish
Jewish origins,
origins, but
but its
its fabricated
fabricated claim,s
claims that
that he
hewas
was part
part of
of
aa Zionist
Zionist conspiracy
conspiracy (a (a favorite
favorite theme
theme inin Soviet
Soviet disinformation)
disinformation) appearappear toto have had
have had
little
little resonance
resonance outside
outside the the Middle
MiddleEast.55
East.”
The
The active
active measures
measures employed
employed against
against some
some of of the
the journalists
journalists who who wrote
wrote articles
articles
based on Barron’s book were more imaginative. Doctored versions of blank "infor
based on Barron's book were more imaginative. Doctored versions of blank “infor-
mation
mation cards"
cards’’ from
from thethe Austrian
Austrian Stapo
Stapo (security
(security police)
police) registry
registry previously
previously obtained
obtained
by
by KGB agentsagents were used to
were used compromise Austrian
to compromise Austrian journalists
journalists judged
judged to to have used
have used
material
material from
from KGB: The Secret W Woork
rk oof Agents to
f Soviet Secret Agents to undermine
undermine the the"peace
“peace-
loving"
loving” policies
policies ofof the
the USSR.
USSR. Fabricated
Fabricated entries
entries on
on the cards prepared
the cards prepared byby Service
ServiceA,
the
the FCD activeactive measures
measures specialists,
specialists, purported
purported to to show
show thatthat the
the Stapo
Stapo believed
believed thethe
journalists
journalists concerned
concerned to be hand-in-glove
to be hand-in-glove with the CIA.
with the CIA. Photocopies
Photocopies of of the cards
the cards
were
were then
then circulated
circulated among
among the the Austrian media. The
Austrian media. files noted
The files noted byby Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin list list
other
other KGB countermeasures
countermeasures against against Barron's bookinin countries
Barron’s book countries as as far afield as
farafield as
Turkey, Cyprus, Libya,
Turkey, Cyprus, Libya, Lebanon, Egypt, Iran,
Lebanon, Egypt, Iran, Kuwait,
Kuwait, Somalia, Uganda, India,
Somalia, Uganda, Sri
India, Sri
Lanka
Lanka andand Mghanistan.56
Afghani~tan.’~
T H ESE WS OWR OD
A RNDD
T HA SENHDI ETLHDE S H I E L D / 2
200
The
The other
other study
study of of the
the KGB which which diddid the
the most
most to to arouse
arouse thethe ire
ire of
of the
the Centre
Centre
was
was thethe history
history published
published in 1990 by
in 1990 by Christopher
Christopher Andrew Andrewand andOleg
Oleg Gordievsky,
Gordievsky,
KGB: The Inside Story of of Its Foreign Operations
Operationsfiom from LeninLenin tot o Gorbachev, which drew
Gorbachev, which drew
on KGB documents
on documents and and other
otherinformation
information obtained
obtained by by Gordievsky
Gordievsky whilewhile working
working as as
aa British
British agentagent inside
inside thethe KGB from from 1974 to 1985.’’ The
to 1985.57 The Centre
Centre predictably
predictably
responded
responded with with active measures against
active measures against both
both the book and
the book and its
its authors.58
authors.’’ (Some
(Some indi
indi-
cation
cation ofof its
its continuing
continuing hostility
hostility toto Gordievsky
Gordievsky is is provided
provided by by the
the fact
fact that,
that, atat the
the
time
time of of this
this writing,
writing,heheis is still
still under
under sentence
sentence of of death
deathininMoscow.)
Moscow.) ThereThere was,was, how
how-
ever, one important
ever, one important new new element
element in the reaction
in the reaction of of the
the KGB, and and ofof its
its chairman
chairman
Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov in in particular,
particular, toto the
the publication
publication of of the
thehistory
history byby Andrew
Andrew and andGordievsky.
Gordievsky.
In aa top
In top secret
secret "Chairman's
“Chairman’s Order"Order” of September 1990 emphasizing
ofSeptember emphasizing the the importance
importance
of
of influence
influence operations
operations and and other
other active
active measures
measures("one (“oneof of the
the most
most important
important funcfunc-
tions
tions of of the
the KGB's
KGB’s foreign
intelligence service"),
service”), Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov instructed
instructed thatthat "wider
“wider
use should
use should be be made
made of of archive material" to
archive material” to publicize
publicize aa "positive"
“positive” image
image of of the
the KGB
and
and "its
“its more celebrated cases."59
more celebrated ca~es.”’~
The
The firstfirst approach
approach to to aa Western
Westernwriterwriter offering
offering material
material fromfrom KGB archivesarchives
intended
intended to to create
create this
this "positive"
“positive”image
image waswas to the mercurial
to the mercurial JohnJohn Costello,
Costello, aa free
free-
lance
lance British
British historian
historian who who combined
combined flairflair for
for research
research withwith aa penchant
penchantfor for conspir
conspir-
acy
acy theory.6o
theory6’ In 1991 Costello
In 1991 Costello published
published aa bookbook on on the
the mysterious
mysterious flight
flight toto Britain
Britain
fifty
fifty years
years previously
previously of of Hitler's
Hitler’s deputy
deputy Fiihrer,
Fuhrer, Rudolf Hess, which
Rudolf Hess, which drewdrew on on KGB
records
records selected
selected by by the
the SVR as as well
well as
as Western
Western sources,
sources, and argued
argued (implausibly,
(implausibly, in in
the
the view
view of of most experts on
most experts on the
theperiod)
period) that
that thethekeykey to
to the
thewhole
whole affair
affair was
wasaa plot
plotbyby
British
British intelligence.61
intelligence.61Two Two years
years later,
later, in
in collaboration
collaboration with with thethe SVR consultant
consultant (and (and
former
former FCD offi cer) Oleg
officer) Oleg Tsarev,
Tsarev, Costello
Costello published
published aa somewhat
somewhat less less controversial
controversial
biography
biography of of the
the inter-war
inter-war Soviet
Soviet intelligence
officer Aleksandr
Aleksandr OrlovOrlov which
which was was
described on
described the dust
on the jacket as
dustjacket as "The
“The first book from
first book from the the KGB archives-the
archives-the KGB
secrets
secrets the British government
the British government doesn'tdoesn’t want
want you you to to read." The book
read.”The book began
began with
with trib
trib-
utes
utes toto the
thedisgraced
disgraced former
former chairman
chairman of of the
the KGB, Vladimir
Vladimir Kryuchkov,
Kryuchkov, and and the
the last
last
head
head of of the FCD, Leonid
the FCD, Leonid Vladimirovich
Vladimirovich Shebarshin,
Shebarshin, for for initiating
initiating thethe project.
project.
Costello
Costello addedadded aa note
note of of "personal
“personal gratitude"
gratitude” to to the
the SVR "for “for the
the ongoing
ongoing support
support
that they have given given to this project which has established a new precedent for openopen
ness and objectivity
objectivity in the study of intelligence history, history, not only in Russia, but the
rest of the world."62
world.”62
The Costello-Tsarev
Costello-Tsarev combination set the pattern pattern for other collaborations bebe
tween Russian authors selected selected or approved by the SVR and Western Western writers (who
have included both well-known historians and a senior retired CIA offi cer): a project
officer):
initially
initially sponsored,
sponsored, but but later
later abandoned,
abandoned, by by Crown
Crown BooksBooks in in the
the United
United States.
States. For
For
each volume
each volume in in the
the series, which covers
series, which covers topics
topics from
from thethe inter-war
inter-war period
period to to the
the early
early
Cold
Cold War,
War, thethe SVR has has given
giventhethe authors
authors exclusive
exclusive accessaccessto copies of
to copies of previously
previously top top
secret documents selected by it from KGB archives.
secret archives. All the books published so so far
have contained interesting and sometimes important new material; several several are also
impressive
impressive for the quality of of their historical analysis.
analysis. Their main weakness,weakness, for which
the authors cannot be blamed, is that the choice of KGB documents on which they
the choice
are based has has been made not by them but but by the SVR.63
SVR.63
T
The M
M ii tt rr oo k h i n A
A rr cc h i v e / 2
21I
The
The choice
choice is is sometimes
sometimes highly highly selective.
selective. During
During the the1990s,
1990s,for example, the
for example, the SVR
has
has made
made available
available to to Russian
Russian and Western authors
and Western authors fourfour successive tranches from
successive tranches from the the
bulky file of the KGB's most famous British agent,
bulky file ofthe KGB’s most famous British agent, Kim P h i l b ~ . ~ order Kim Philby.64 In order to preserve
~ I nto preserve
both
both Philby's
Philby’s heroic heroic image
image and and thethe reputation
reputation of of Russian
Russian foreign
foreign intelligence,
intelligence, how how-
ever,
ever, the SVR has been careful
has been careful not not toto release
release the record of
the record of Philby's final weeks
Philby’s final weeks as as
head of the SIS SISstation in the the United
UnitedStates (the climax of of his career as a Soviet spy), spy),
when money and instructions intended for Philby were mislaid, mislaid, and he he fell out withwith
his incompetent controller who was subsequently recalled to Moscow in disgrace. disgrace.
Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notes notes on on those partsparts of of the
the Philby
Philby file still
still considered by by the
the SVR unsuit-
unsuit
able
able for
for public consumption reveal
public consumption reveal this
this farcical episode for
farcical episode for the
the first
first time.65
time.65
The SVR has publicly denied even the existence of ofsome of the files files which it fi nds
finds
embarrassing.
embarrassing.While While writing
writing aahistory
history of of KGB-CIA rivalry rivalry in Berlin before
in Berlin before thethe con
con-
struction
struction of of the
the Wall,
Wall, based
based partly
partly on on documents
documents selected
selected by by the
the SVR, the the Russian
Russian
and
and American
American authors authors (one (one ofof them
them aa former
former deputy
deputy head head of of the
the FCD) asked asked to to see
see
the
the file
file of of the
the KGB agent agent Aleksandr
Aleksandr Grigoryevich
Grigoryevich KopatzkyKopatzky (alias(alias Igor
Igor Orlov).
Orlov).The The
SVR replied
replied that that itithad
had no no record
record of of any
any agent
agent of
of thatthatname.
name. Its onlyonly record
record of of "Igor
“Igor
Orlov"
Orlov” was,was, it it claimed,
claimed, of of aa visit
visit made
made by by him
him toto thetheSoviet embassy in
Soviet embassy in Washington
Washington
in
in 1965,
1965, whenwhen he he complained of of FBI harassment
harassment and and enquired
enquired aboutabout asylum
asylum in in the
the
USSR.66
USSR.66Though Though still still officially
officially an an unperson in in the
the SVR version of of Russian
Russian intelli
intelli-
gence
gence history,
history, Kopatzky
Kopatzky was was in in reality
reality oneone ofof the
the KGB's
KGB’s most most highly
highly rated
rated agents.
agents. His His
supposedly
supposedly non-existent
non-existent KGB file, file, noted
noted by by Mitrokhin,
Mitrokhin, revealsreveals that
that he hehadhadnono fewer
fewer
than
than twenty-three
twenty-three controllers.67
controller^.^^
As
As well
well as as initiating
initiating an an unprecedented
unprecedented series series of
of collaborative
collaborative histories
histories forfor publica
publica-
tion
tion ininthe theWest,
West, the the SVR has has produced
produced aa number number of ofless sophisticated works
less sophisticated works for for the
the
Russian market. In
Russian In 1995,
1995, to to mark
mark the the seventy-fi
seventy-fifthfth anniversary
the foundation
foundation of of
the
the Soviet
Soviet foreign intelligence service,
foreign intelligence service, of ofwhich
which it sees itself
it sees as the
itself as the heir,
heir, the
the SVR pub- pub
lished
lished aa volume
volume on the careers
on the careers of of seventy-five
seventy-five intelligence
intelligence officers-all,
officers-all, it it appears,
appears,
sans peur et
sanspeur eproche-which differs
e t sans rreproche-which little from
differs little from thethe uncritical hagiographies of
uncritical hagiographies of the
the
KGB era.68era.68In In 1995
1995 the the SVR also also began
began the the publication
publication of of aa multi-volume
multi-volume official official
history
history of of KGKGB B foreign
foreign operations
operations which which by by 1997
1997 had had reached
reached the the beginning
beginning of of thethe
Great
Great Patriotic
Patriotic War.69War.69Though
Though aa mine mine of of mostly
mostly reliable
reliable factual information, it
factual information, it too
too
presents
presents aa selective
selective and and sanitized
sanitized viewview of of Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence history.
history. ItI t also
also preserves,
preserves,
in
in a mercifully
mercifully diluted diluted form,form, some
some of of the
the traditional
traditional conspiracy
conspiracy theories
theories of of the
the KGB.
The
The literary
literary editor
editor of of the
the official
official history,
history, Lolly
Lolly Zamoysky,
Zamoysky, was was formerly
formerly aa seniorsenior
FCD analyst,
analyst, well well known
known withinwithin the the Centre
Centre and
and foreign
foreign residencies
residencies for for his
his belief
belief in in
aa global Masonic-Zionist plot.70
global Masonic-Zionist plot.70 In In 1989
1989 he he published
published aa volume volume grandly
grandly entitled
entitled
Behind the the Farade
Fafade of of the Masonic
Ma~onicTemple,Temple, which
which blamed
blamed the the Freemasons
Freemasons for, for, inter alia,
the outbreak
the outbreak of the Cold
of the ColdWar.War.71 71
The
The underlying
underlying rationale
rationale for for the
the SVR's
SVRs selection
selection of of topics
topics and
and documents
documents for for his
his-
tories
tories of of past
past operations
operations is is to
to present
present Soviet
Soviet foreign
intelligence as as aa dedicated
dedicated and and
highly
highly professional
professional service, service, performing
performing much much thethe samesame functions
functions as as its
its Western
Western
counterparts
counterparts but, but, more
more oftenoften thanthannot,not,winning
winningthethe contest
contest against them.72 Even
against them.72 Even
under
under Stalin,
Stalin, foreign
intelligence is presented as
is presented as the
the victim
victim rather
rather than
than the perpetra
theperpetra-
tor
tor of
of the
the Terror73-despite
Terr~r~~-despite the
the fact
fact that
that during
during the later 1930s
thelater 1930s hunting
hunting down "ene-
down “ene-
T E WSOW
T HS
E RO
D NR T
A DH S
D A
E HNI DE L TDH E S H I E L D / 2
222
mies
mies of of the
the people"
people” abroadabroad became
became its its main
main priority.74
pri~rity.’~ Similarly,
Similarly, the the SVR seeks
seeks to to
distance
distance the the foreign
intelligence operations
operations of of the during the
the FCD during the Cold
Cold War
War from
from
the
the abuse
abuse of of human
human rights rights byby the
the domestic
domestic KGB. In In reality, however, the
reality, however, the struggle
struggle
against "ideological
against “ideological subversion"
subversion” both both at at home
homeand abroad was
andabroad was carefully
carefdly coordinated.
coordinated.
The
The KGB took took aacentral
central rolerole in
in the
the suppression
suppression of of the
the Hungarian
Hungarian Uprising
Uprising in in 1956,
1956,
the
the crushing
crushing of of the
the Prague
Prague Spring
Spring in in1968,
1968,the
the invasion
invasion of of Afghanistan
Afghanistan in in 1979,
1979,and and
the
the pressure
pressure on on thethePolish
Polish regime
regime to to destroy
destroy Solidarity
Solidarity in in 198
1981. 1 . Closely
Closely linked
linked toto the
the
persecution
persecution of of dissidents
dissidents within within thethe Soviet
Soviet Union
Union werewere the
the FCD's
FCD’s PROGRESS
PROGRESS
operations
operations against
against dissidents
dissidents in in the
the rest
rest ofof the
the Soviet
Soviet Bloc
Bloc andand its
its constant
constant harass
harass-
ment
ment of ofthose
thosewho who hadhad taken
taken refuge
refuge inin thetheWest.75
West.75By By the
the mid-1970s
mid-1970s the the FCD's
FCD’s warwar
against
against ideological
ideological subversion
subversion extended
extended even even toto operations
operations against
against Western
Western Commu
Commu-
nist
nist leaders
leaders who
who werewere judged
judged toto have
have deviated
deviated from
from Moscow's
Moscow’s rigidrigid Party
Party line.76
line.76
On
O n these
these and
and many
many other other operations,
operations, Mitrokhin's
archive contains
contains much
much material
material
from
from KGB files files which
which the the SVR is is still
still anxious
anxious toto keep
keep from
from public
public view.
view. Unlike
Unlike thethe
documents selected
documents selected for for declassification
declassification by by the
the SVR, none none ofof which
which are are more
more recent
recent
than
than thetheearly
early 1960s,
1960s, his his archive
archive covers
coversalmost
almost the
the whole
whole of of the
the Cold
ColdWar.
War. Most
Most of of it
it
is
is still
still highly
highly classified
classified in in Moscow.
Moscow. The The originals
originals ofof some
some ofof the
the most
most important
important docdoc-
uments
uments notednoted oror transcribed
transcribed by by Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin may may nono longer
longer exist.
exist. InIn 1989
1989 most
most ofof the
the
huge
huge multi-volume
multi-volume file file on the dissident
on the dissident Andrei
Andrei Sakharov,
Sakharov, earlier
earlier branded
branded "Public
“Public
Enemy
Enemy NumberNumber One” One" by by Andropov,
Andropov, was was destroyed.
destroyed. Soon afterwards,
afterwards, Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov
announced that all
announced files on
a l l files on other
otherdissidents
dissidents charged
charged under
under thethe infamous
infamous Article
Article 7070 ofof
the
the criminal
criminal codecode (anti-Soviet
(anti-Soviet agitation
agitation and and propaganda)
propaganda) were were being
being shredded.77
shredded.77In aa
number
number of of cases,
cases, Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notes notes onon them
them may
may now
now bebe all that
that survives.
survives.
Vasili Mitrokhin has thus made it possible to extend what John John Costello praised
in 1993
1993as the "new“new precedent for openness and objectivity objectivity in the study of of intelligence
history"
history” setset by
by Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov and and his
his SVR successors
successors far
far beyond
beyond the the limits
limits any
any of
of them
them
could
could have
have envisaged.
envisaged.
k . . . .
T UJ 0
FFROM
R O M LLEEN
NII N
N ‘' S
S C
CH E K
HE KAA T
TOO S
S TTAA LLI I NN '‘ S
S O
OGGP
PUU
FForor most
most of
of Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s career
career in
in the
the KGB,
KGB, the
the history
history of
of its
its domestic
domestic operations
operations
was
was something
something of of anan embarrassment
embarrassment even even to its own
to its own historians.
his!orians. During
During the the late
late
1930s
1930s the
the KGB
KGB (then
(then known
known as as the
the NKVD)
NKVD)had had been
been the
the chief
chief instrument
instrument of of Stalin's
Stdin’s
Great
Great Terror,
Terror, the
the greatest
greatest peacetime
peacetime persecution
persecution in in European
Europeanhistory.
history. The
The KGBKGB offioffi-
cers
cers club
club inin the
the Lubyanka,
Lubyanka, its its Moscow
Moscow headquarters,
headquarters, lackedlacked eveneven the
the usual
usual board
board-
room
room photographs
photographs of of past
past chairmen;
chairmen; mostmost were
were more
more suited
suited to to aachamber
chamber of of horrors
horrors
than
than totoaa hall
hall of
of fame.
fame.Three
Three hadhad been
been shot
shot after
after being
being found
found guilty
guilty of
of horrific
horrific crimes
crimes
(some
(some real,
real, others
others imaginary):
imaginary): Genrikh
Genrikh Yagoda
Yagoda in in 11938,
938, Nikolai
Nikolai Yezhov
Yezhov in in 1940
1940andand
Lavrenti
Lavrenti Beria
Beria in in 1953.
1953. A fourth-Ivan Serov-blew his
fourth-Ivan Serov-blew his brains
brains outout in
in 1963.
1963. KGBKGB
historians
historians in in the
thepost-Stalin
post-Stalin era era tended
tended toto take
take refuge
refuge from
from the the blood-stained
blood-stained reality
reality
of
of their
their Stalinist
Stalinist past
past and
and homicidal
homicidal former
former chairmen
chairmen by by returning
returning to to anan earlier,
earlier,
mostly
mostly mythical,
mythical, Leninist
Leninist golden
golden ageage of
ofrevolutionary
revolutionary purity.
purity.
The
The KGBKGB traced
traced itsits origins
origins toto the
thefoundation
foundation on on December
December20, 1 9 1 7, six
20,1917, six weeks
weeks
after the Bolshevik Revolution, of the Cheka, the first Soviet
after the Bolshevik Revolution, of the Cheka, thefirst Soviet security and intelli- security and intelli
gence
gence agency.
agency. Throughout
Throughout Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s career,
career, KGBKGB officers
officers styled
styled themselves
themselves
Chekists
Chekists (Chekisty)
(Chekisty) and andwere
were paid
paid their
their salaries
salaries not
not ononthe thefirst
first but
but ononthe thetwenti
twenti-
eth
eth of
of each
each month
month ("Chekists'
(“Chekists’Day") Day”)ininhonor
honorof ofthe
the Cheka's
Cheka’s birthday.
birthday. TheThe KGB KGB
also adopted the Cheka symbols of the sword and the shield:
also adopted the Cheka symbols of the sword and the shield: the shield to .defend the shield to defend
the
the revolution,
revolution, the the sword
sword to to smite its foes.
smiteits foes. Outside
Outside the the Lubyanka,
Lubyanka, the the KGB's
KGB’s
Moscow
Moscow headquarters,
headquarters, stood stoodaahuge
huge statue
statue ofof the
thePolish-born
Polish-born head head ofof the
the Cheka,
Cheka,
Feliks
Feliks Dzerzhinsky,
Dzerzhinsky, venerated
venerated in in countless
countless official
official hagiographies
hagiographies as as the
the selfless,
selfless,
incorruptible
incorruptible“Knight"Knight of the Revolution" who slew the
of the Revolution” who slew the dragonofcounter- dragon of counter
revolution
revolution which threatened the
which threatened the young
young Soviet
Soviet state.
state. He H e had
had been
been aa professional
professional
revolutionary
revolutionary for for over
over twenty
twenty years
years before
before the
the Revolution,
Revolution, spending
spending eleven
eleven of of those
those
years
years inin Tsarist
Tsaristprisons,
prisons, penal
penal servitude
servitude oror exile.
exile. KGB
KGB training
training manuals
manuals quoted
quoted his his
description
description of of the
theChekist
Chekist as as aa man
man with
with,“a"a warm
warm heart,
heart,a a coolcool head
head and and clean
clean
hands."
hands.” Like
Like Lenin,
Lenin,hehewas was anan incorruptible
incorruptibleworkaholic,
workaholic, prepared
prepared to to sacrifice
sacrifice bothboth
himself
himself and others in
and others in the
the defense
defense of of the
the Revolution.1
Revolution.’ In In the
the headquarters
the
KGB
KGB First
First Chief
Chief (Foreign
Intelligence) Directorate
DirectorateatatYasenevo,
Yasenevo,the the main
mainobject
object ofof
veneration
veneration was was aa large
large bust
bust ofof Dzerzhinsky
Dzerzhinsky on on aa marble
marble pedestal
pedestal constantly
constantly sur sur-
rounded
rounded by by fresh
fresh flowers.
flowers.
TT H
H ESE WS OWROD
A RNDD
T HA SENHDI ET LH DE S H I E L D I/ 224
4
The
The KGB's
KGB’s effusive
effusive public
public tributes
tributes to to its
its saintly
saintly founding
founding father father concealed
concealed the the
degree
degree to to which
which Dzerzhinsky
Dzerzhinsky derived derived his his intelligence
intelligence tradecraft
tradecraft from from thethe Cheka's
Cheka’s
much
much smaller
smaller Tsarist
Tsarist predecessor,
predecessor, the the Okhrana.
Okhrana. The The Bolsheviks
Bolsheviks had had extensive
extensive firstfirst-
hand
hand experience
experience of of the
the Okhrana's
Okhrana’s expertise
expertise in the use
in the use of of penetration
penetration agents agents and and
agents provocateurs. In
agentsprovocateurs. In July
July 1913
1913LeninLeninhad had discussed
discussed the the difficult
difficult problem
problem of of
Okhrana
Okhrana penetration
penetration with with two
two of of his
his chief
chief lieutenants,
lieutenants, Lev Lev Kamenev
Kamenev and and Grigori
Grigori
Zinovyev,
Zinovyev,and and thetheleader
leader ofof the
theBolshevik
Bolshevik deputies
deputies in in thetheDuma,
Duma, RomanRoman Malinovsky.
Malinovsky.
All
Allwere
were agreed
agreed thatthat there
there must
must be be anan unidentified
unidentified Okhrana Okhrana agent agent in in close
close contact
contact
with
with the the Bolshevik
Bolshevik deputies.
deputies. TheThe agent
agent waswas in in even
even closer
closer contact
contact thanthan Lenin
Lenin realreal-
ized.
ized. ItIt was
was Roman
Roman Malinovsky.
Malinovsky.Mter After Okhrana
Okhranafi les later
files later revealed
revealed his his identity,
identity, he he was
was
shot
shot ininthe theKremlin
Kremlin gardensgardens on on the
thefirst
first anniversary
anniversary of of thetheBolshevik
Bolshevik Revolution.2
Revolution.2
The
The Cheka's
Cheka’s success
success in in penetrating
penetrating its its opponents
opponents derived derived in in large
large part
part from
from itsits
imitation
imitation ofofthethe techniques
techniques employed
employed by by Malinovsky
Malinovsky and other Tsarist
and other Tsarist agents.
agents.
Dmitri
Dmitri Gavrilovich
Gavrilovich Yevseyev,
Yevseyev, thethe author
author of of two
two of of the
the Cheka's
C.heka’s earliest
earliest operational
operational
manuals,
manuals,Basic Tenets ofIntelligence and
Basic Tenets $Intelligence and BriejYnstructionsfor the Cheka on How to
Brief Instructions for the Cheka on How t o Con
Con-
duct InteZZigence, based
duct Intelligence, based his his writings
writings on on detailed
detailed study
study of of Okhrana
Okhrana tradecraft.
tradecraft. Though
Though
the
the Cheka
Cheka was was "an“an organ
organ for for building
building the the dictatorship
dictatorship of of the
the proletariat,"
proletariat,” Yevseyev
Yevseyev
insisted-like
insisted-like Dzerzhinsky-that
Dzerzhinsky-that itit must must notnot hesitate
hesitate to to learn
learn from
from the the experience
experienceof of
"bourgeois"
“bourgeois”intelligence
intelligence agencies.3
agen~ies.~
The
The Cheka's
Cheka‘s earlyearly priorities
priorities were were overwhelmingly
overwhelmingly domestic. domestic. Dzerzhinsky
Dzerzhinsky
described
described itit as as "an
“an organ
organ for for the
the revolutionary
revolutionary settlement
settlement of of accounts
accounts with with counter
counter-
revolutionaries,"4
revol~tionaries,”~ aa label
label increasingly
increasingly applied
applied to to all
all the
the Bolsheviks'
Bolsheviks’ opponents
opponents and and
"class
“classenemies."
enemies.”Within
Within days days of
of its
its foundation,
foundation, however,
however, the the Cheka
Chekahad had also
also taken
taken itsits
first tentative steps in foreign intelligence collection. The career
first tentative steps in foreign intelligence collection.The career of thefirst agent sent of the first agent sent
on
on a amission
mission abroad,
abroad,Aleksei
Aleksei Frolovich
FrolovichFilippov,
Filippov,was wassadly
sadly at at variance
variancewith with the theheroic
heroic
image
image whichwhich KGB KGB historians
historians struggled
struggled to to maintain
maintain in their descriptions
in their descriptions of of the
the
Leninist
Leninist era.era. Born
Born in in 1870
1870andand trained
trained as as aa lawyer,
lawyer,Filippov
Filippov had had made
made aa career
career before
before
the
the Revolution
Revolution as as aa newspaper
newspaper publisher.
publisher. At At the end of
the end of 1917
1917 he he was
was recruited
recruited by by
Dzerzhinsky
Dzerzhinsky to to go
go onon intelligence
intelligence assignments
assignments to to Finland
Finland under undercover
cover as as aajjournalist
ournalist
and
and businessman.
businessman. Before Before departing
departing on on his
his first
first mission
mission in in January
January 1918, 1918, Filippov
Filippov
gave
gave aa written
writtenundertaking
undertaking"on “on aa voluntary
voluntary basis,
basis, without
without receiving
receiving payment,
payment, to to pass
pass
on all the information which I hear in industrial, banking
on all the information which I hear in industrial, banking and particularly in conser- and particularly in conser
vative
vative [nationalist]
[nationalist] circles."5
circle^."^
On January 44 Lenin
O n January Lenin publicly
publicly recognized
recognized the the independence
independence of of Finland,
Finland, formerly
formerly
part
part ofof the
the Tsarist
Tsarist Empire,
Empire, then thenimmediately
immediately set set about
about trying
trying totosubvert
subvert it.it. AA putsch
putsch
at
at the
theend endof
of the
the month
monthby by Finnish
Finnish Communists,
Communists,supported supported by by the
the Russian
Russian military
military
and
and naval
naval garrison
garrison in in Helsinki,
Helsinki, seized
seized control
control of of the
the capital
capital and and muchmuch of of southern
southern
Finland.
Finland. The The Communists
Communists were were quickly
quickly challenged
challenged by by aa defense
defense corpscorps of of Finnish
Finnish
nationalists
nationalists led led byby the
the former
former Tsarist
Tsarist officer
officer General
General Karl Karl Mannerheim.6
Mannerheim.6 Filippov'sFilippov’s
main
main Cheka
Cheka assignment
assignment was was toto report
report on on Mannerheim,
Mannerheim, his his dealings
dealings with with thethe Ger
Ger-
mans,
mans, and and the
the mood
mood of of the
the sailors
sailors who
who had had supported
supported the the putsch.
putsch. Early
Early in April
in April
1918,
1918, however,
however, German
German forces forces intervened
intervened in in Finland,
Finland, and and by by the
the endend ofof the
themonth
month
both
both thethe Communist
Communist putsch putsch andand Filippov's
Filippov’s brief brief career
career as as the
the first
first Soviet
Soviet foreign
foreign
agent
agent werewere atat an
an end.7
end.7
I.”.
F r oo m
m L e n ii nn ’' sC hCehk eak a t o S t aa Zl i n ’' ss O
OGP
PU / 2
255
DD U R IINNGG TTHE C CIIV L war,

VII L war, which
which beganbegan in in May
May1918
1918 and and continued
continued for for two
two andand aa half
half
years,
years, thethe Bolshevik
Bolshevik regime regime had had to to fight
fight for
for its
its survival
survival against
against powerful
powerhl but but divided
divided
White
White Russian
Russian armies.
armies. Behind
Behind all all the
the forces
forces arraigned
arraigned against
against them,
them, the the Bolshevik
Bolshevik
leaders
leaders saw saw aa vast
vast conspiracy
conspiracy orchestrated
orchestrated by by Western
Western capitalism.
capitalism. "What“What we we are
are fac
fac-
ing,"
ing,” declared
declared LeninLenin in inJuly,
July, "is
“is aa systematic,
systematic, methodical
methodical and and evidently
evidently long-planned
long-planned
military
military and and financial
financial counter-revolutionary
counter-revolutionary campaign campaign againstagainst the the Soviet
Soviet Republic,
Republic,
which
which all the the representatives
representatives of of Anglo-French
Anglo-French imperialismimperialism have have been
been preparing
preparing for for
months."g
months.”’ In In reality,
reality, though
though the the young
young SovietSoviet regime
regime had had many enemies both
many enemies both at at
home
home and and abroad,
abroad, there
there was was no no carefully
carefully planned,
planned, well well coordinated imperialist plot
coordinated imperialist plot to
bring
bring it it down.
down. The The illusion
illusion thatthat suchsuch aa plot
plot existed,
existed, however,
however, helped
helped to to shape
shape the the
Cheka's
Cheka’s earlyearly operations
operations againstagainst its its imperialist
imperialist foes.
foes.
In
In the
the course
course of of the
the civil
civil war,
war,thethe Cheka
Cheka claimed
claimed to to have
have uncovered
uncovered and and defeated
defeated
aa series
series of of major
major conspiracies
conspiraciesby by Western
Western governments
governments and and their
their intelligence
agencies
to
to overthrow
overthrow the the Bolshevik
Bolshevik regime.regime. The The first
first such
such conspiracy
conspiracy in in thethesummer
summerof of 191
1918 8
was
was the
the "envoys'
“envoys’plot,"plot,” also
also known
known aass the the "Lockhart
“Lockhartplot" plot”(after
(after itsits instigator,
instigator, Robert
Robert
Bruce
Bruce Lockhart,
Lockhart, aajunior junior British
British diplomat).
diplomat). According
According to to aaKGB history
history published
published in in
1979,
1979, "One“One couldcould say say without
without exaggeration
exaggeration that theshattering
that the shattering blow blow dealt
dealt byby thethe
Chekists
Chekists to to the
the conspirators
conspirators was was equivalent
equivalent to to victory
victory in in aa major
major military
military battle."9
battle.”’
That
That is is what
what the the Cheka
Chekahad had claimed
claimed in in 1918
1918 and and what
what most
most of of Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s col col-
leagues continued to believe over half a century later. In
leagues continued to believe overhalf a century later. In reality, however,the “envoys’ reality, however, the "envoys'
plot"
plot” waswas mounted
mounted not not by by aa coalition
coalition of of capitalist
capitalist governments
governments but but byby aa group
group of of
politically
politically naive naive Western
Western diplomats
diplomats and and adventurous
adventurous secret secret agents
agents who who werewere left left
largely
largely to to their
theirownown devices
devices during
during the thechaotic
chaotic early
early months
months of of the
the Bolshevik
Bolshevik regimeregime
and
and became
became involved
involved in in farcically
fiarcically inept
inept attempts
attemptstotooverthrow
overthrow it. it. The
The best-known
best-known of of
the
the secret
secret agents
agents was was Sidney
Sidney Reilly
Reilly of of the
the British
British Secret
Secret Intelligence
Intelligence ServiceService (then
(then
known
known as as MIlc),
MIlc), whosewhose exploits
exploits oscillated
oscillated between
between high high adventure
adventure and and low
low farce,
farce,
and
and whose
whose increasing
increasing tendency
tendency to to fantasy
fantasy later
later led
led toto his
his exclusion
exclusion from SIS. Reilly
from SIS. Reilly
announced
announced his his arrival
arrival in in Moscow
Moscow on on MayMay 7, 1918 in
7,1918 in bizarre
bizarre butbut characteristic
characteristic fashfash-
ion
ion by
by marching
marching up up to to the
theKremlin
Kremlin gates, gates, announcing
announcing that that he hewas
was an an emissary
emissary from from
the
the British
British primeprime minister,
minister, LloydLloyd GeorgeGeorge (who (who had had probably
probably nevernever heard
heard of of him),
him),
and
and unsuccessfully
unsuccessfully demanding demanding to to see
see Lenin.
Lenin.
By
By farfar the
the most
most sophisticated
sophisticated part part of of the
the "envoys'
“envoys’plot"plot” was devised not
was devised not byby thethe
envoys
envoys themselves
themselves or or their
their secret
secret agents
agents but but byby the
the Cheka,
Cheka, possibly
possibly at at Lenin's
Lenin’s sugsug-
gestion,
gestion, as as aa trap
trap forfor Western
Western conspirators.
conspirators. In In August
August 1918 1918 the Cheka officer
the Cheka officer Yan
Yan
Buikis,
Buikis, posing
posing as as anan anti-Bolshevik
anti-Bolshevik conspiratorconspirator named Shmidkhen, succeeded
named Shmidkhen, succeeded in in
persuading
persuading Lockhart,Lockhart, Reilly Reilly and and the the French consul-general that
French consul-general that Colonel
Colonel Eduard
Eduard
Berzin,
Berzin, commander
commander of of aa Latvian
Latvian regiment
regiment in in the
the Kremlin
Kremlin (in (in reality
reality aa Cheka
Cheka agent
agent
provocateur), was
provocateur), was ready
readyto to lead
lead anan anti-Bolshevik
anti-Bolshevik rising. rising. ToTo finance
finance Berzin's
Berzin’s proposed
proposed
coup,
coup, Reilly gave him
Reilly gave ,200,000 roubles
him 11,200,000 roubles which
which Berzin
Berzin promptly
promptly passed passed on on to to the
the
Cheka.10
Cheka.” Reilly's
Reilly’s schemes
schemes for for the
the coup coup varied.
varied. At one point he
one point he imagined
imagined himself
himself
leading
leading aa detachment
detachment of of Latvian
Latvian troops
troops on on toto the
thestage
stage of of the
the Bolshoi
Bolshoi Theatre
Theatre dur dur-
ing
ing the
theCongress
Congress of of Soviets,
Soviets,seizing
seizing Lenin,Lenin, Trotsky
Trotsky and and other
otherBolshevik
Bolshevik leaders,
leaders, andand
T E WSOWR O
T HS
E A
DNRT
DH A
S
EHN I DE LTDH E S H I E L D I/ 2 66
shooting
shooting them them on onthe
the spot.ll
spot.” However,
However, Reilly was also
Reilly was also attracted
attracted by by an
an alternative
alternative
scheme
scheme not not toto execute
execute Lenin
Lenin and and Trotsky,
Trotsky,but but instead
instead to to remove
remove theirtheir trousers,
trousers, parade
parade
them
them in in their
their underpants
underpants through
through the the streets
streets of
of Moscow,
Moscow, and and so so "hold
“hold them
them up up toto
ridicule
ridicule beforebefore the the world.
world.”12 "12
Reilly's
Reilly’s fantasies
fantasies however
however were wereovertaken
overtaken by by events.
events. On August 30 the
O n August the head
head ofof the
the
Petro
Petrograd grad Cheka,
Cheka, Moisei
MoiseiSolomonovich
Solomonovich Uritsky, Uritsky, waswasassassinated
assassinated by by aa former
former mem
mem-
ber
ber of of the
the moderate
moderate Workers'
Workers’ Popular
Popular Socialist
Socialist Party,
Party, Leonid
Leonid Kannegiser.13
Kannegiser.13 In In anan
unrelated
unrelated attack attack on onthe
the same
same day,day, Lenin
Lenin was was shot
shot andand seriously
seriously wounded
wounded by by the
the
Socialist
Socialist Revolutionary,
Revolutionary,Fanya Fanya (Dora) Kaplan. "I
(Dora) Kaplan. shot Lenin
“I shot Leninbecause
because I believe
believe himhim to to
be
be aa traitor
traitor [to[to Socialism],"
Socialism],” Kaplan
Kaplan toldtold her her Cheka
Cheka interrogators.14
interrogators.14In In the
the aftermath
aftermath
of
of bothboth shootings,
shootings, Dzerzhinsky
Dzerzhinsky decided decided to to wind
wind up the "envoys'
up the plot," which
“envoys’ plot,” which the the
Cheka itself
Cheka itself had been largely
had been largely responsible
responsible for for orchestrating.
orchestrating. On O n September
September 2 it it was
was
announced
announced that that thethe Cheka
Cheka had “liquidated .. .. .. the
had "liquidated the conspiracy
conspiracy organized
organized by Anglo
by Anglo-
French diplomats .. .. .. to
French diplomats to organize
organize the capture of
the capture of the
the Council
Council of of People's
People’s Commissars
Commissars
and the the proclamation of of military
military dictatorship
dictatorship in in Moscow;
Moscow; this this was
was toto be
be done
done by by
bribing
bribing Soviet Soviet troops."
troops.” Predictably,
Predictably, the the statement
statement mademade no no mention
mention of of the
the fact
fact that
that
the
the planplan to to bribe
bribe Soviet
Soviet troops
troops andand stage
stage aa military
military coup
coup had been devised
had been devised by by the
the
Cheka itself
Cheka itself and
and that the diplomats
that the diplomats had had beenbeen drawn
drawn into
into the the conspiracy
conspiracy by agents
by agents
provocateurs
provocateurs relying relying on Okhrana tradecraft.
onOkhrana tradecraft. O Onn September
September 55 Dzerzhinsky
Dzerzhinsky and and
Zinovyev,
Zinovyev, the the Petrograd
Petrograd Party boss, issued
Party boss, issued aa further statement declaring
further statement declaring that the
that the
Anglo-French
Anglo-French conspirators conspirators had had been
been the the "organizers"
“organizers”of of the
the attempt
attempt on on Lenin's
Lenin’s life
life
and
and the the "real
“real murderers"
murderers’’ ofUritsky. Dzerzhinsky did
of Uritsky. Dzerzhinsky did not,
not,however,
however, reveal revealReilly's
Reilly’s plan
plan
to
to remove Lenin's and
remove Lenin’s and Trotsky's
Trotsky‘s trousers.
trousers. Though
Though happy happy to to publicize,
publicize, or or invent,
invent,
Western
Western involvement
involvement in in assassination
assassination plots plots against Lenin, the
against Lenin, the Cheka
Cheka dared
dared not dis
not dis-
IS
close
close aa plot plot toto hold
hold him
him up up totoridicule.
ridi~u1e.l~
The
The attempt
attempt on on Lenin's
Lenin’s life,
life, the
the killing
killing of of Uritsky
Uritsky and and the
the announcement
announcement of of the
the
"liquidation"
“liquidation”of of "the
“the envoys'
envoys’plot" plot’’were
were quickly
quickly followed
followed by bythe
the declaration of of the
the Red
Red
Terror.
Terror. With With the the Bolsheviks
Bolsheviks engaged
engaged in in aa bitter
bitter civil
civil war
war against
against their
their White
White ene- ene
mies, the
mies, the Cheka
Chekaset set out
out tototerrorize
terrorize the the regime's opponents. Lenin
regime’s opponents. Lenin himself,
himself, only
only three
three
weeks
weeks before before thethe attempt
attemptononhis his own
own life,
life, had
had written
writtentotothethe Bolsheviks
Bolsheviks in Penza, and
in Penza, and
probably
probably elsewhere,
elsewhere, urging
urging themthem to to organize
organize public
public executions
executions to to make
make thethe people
people
"tremble"
“tremble” "for “for hundreds of kilometers around." around.” While still recoveringrecovering from his
wounds,
wounds, he he instructed,
instructed, "It “It is
is necessary
necessary secretly-and urgently-to prepare
secretly-and urgently-to prepare thethe ter
ter-
ror."16
r0r.”I6On O n October
October 15 15Uritsky's
Uritsky‘s successor
successorin in Petrograd,
Petrograd, Gleb
Gleb Ivanovich
Ivanovich Boky,Boky, proudly
proudly
reported
reported to to Moscow
Moscow that that 800800 alleged
alleged counterrevolutionaries
counterrevolutionaries had had been shot and and
another
another 6,229 imprisoned. Among
6,229 imprisoned. Among those those arrested,
arrested, and
and probably
probably executed,
executed, in in Petro
Petro-
grad
grad was was thethe Cheka's
Cheka’s first
first foreign
foreign agent,
agent, Alexei
Alexei Filippov.
Filippov. His
His liquidation was was due,
due, in in
all probability,
probability, not to the failure failure of his Finnish missions missions but to his "bourgeois"
“bourgeois” ori ori-
gins,
gins, which
which marked
marked him him down
down as as an
an enemy
enemy of of the
the people
people inin the theparanoid
paranoid atmosphere
atmosphere
of
of the the Red
Red Terror.17
Terror.17Twenty
Twenty years years later
later Boky was was himself
himself to to fall
fall victim
victim to to the
the even
even
greater paranoia of Stalin's Stah’s Terror.18
Terror.’*
"’ < -Berzin
L ,Benin and and Buikis,
Buikis, the
the Cheka
Cheka agents provocateurs who
agentsprovocateurs who hadhad helped
helped orchestrate
orchestrate the the
"envoys'
“envoys’ plot," plot,” subsequently
subsequently became victims of their own deception. Berzin's
became victims Berzin’s career
initially prospered. He
initially prospered. H e was
was awarded
awarded the the OrderOrderofof the
the Red
Red Banner for his role as agent
F
F rr o m L ee nn ii nn ’' sC kCehk eak a tt o S tt a ll ii nn ’' s O G P U / 2
277
provocatezlr, joined
provocateur, joined thethe Cheka
Cheka and and later
later became
became head head of of aa for.��cl
.... labor .c
forced . .
a,mp in
camp in the
the
Kolyma goldfields which
Kolyma goldfields which had one of
had one of the highest death
the highest death rates
rates inin Stalin's
Stalin’s gulag.
*lag. In In 193
1937,7,
however,
however, he he was
was arrested
arrested and shot as
and shot as an
an enemy
enemy of of thethepeople.19
people.’’ The The exact charges lev
exact charges lev-
eled
eled against
against Berzin
Berzin areare not
not known,
known, but but itit is
is likely
likely that
that they
they included accusations that
included accusations that
he
he had
had actually
actually collaborated
collaborated withwith Western
Western plotters
plotters in in 1918.
1918. In In the
the somewhat
somewhat para- para
noid Stalinist interpretation
noid Stalinist interpretation of of thethe "envoys' plot," his
“envoys’ plot,” his collaborator
collaborator Buikis Buikis(alias (alias
"Shmidkhen")
“Shmidkhen”) was was portrayed
portrayed as as aa covert
covert counter-revolutionary
counter-revolutionary rather rather than than aa ChekaCheka
officer
officer carrying
carrying out
out his orders. That
his orders. That remained
remained the the . accepted
accepted interpretation
interpretation even even in in
classified
classified KGB histories
histories during
during Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s early early career.
career. Buikis
Buikis survived
survived the the Terror
Terror
only
only by concealing his
by concealing his identity.
identity. NotNot until
until thethe mid-1960s
mid-1960s did research in
did research the KGB
in the
archives
archives reestablish
reestablish "Shmidkhen's"
“Shmidkhen’s’’true true !q.�ntity
identity and andhis
his real
real role
role in in 1918.20
191€L20
Throughout
Throughout Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s career,
career, KGB historians
historians continu�d
continued to. to. interpret
interpret all all plots
plots
and
and attacks
attacks against
against thethe young
young Soviet
Soviet regime
regime as as "manifestations
“manifestations of of aa unifl,ed .c:onspir
unified,conspir-
acy"
acy” by
by its
its class
class enemies
enemies at at home
home and and the
the "imperialist
“imperialist powers"
powers’’abroad.21
abroad.21 The
The reality
reality
was
was very
very different.
different. Had
Had there been "a
there been unified conspiracy,"
“a unified conspiracy,” the the regime
regime would would surelysurely
have
have lost
lost the
the civil
civil war.
war.IfIf two
two oror three
three divisions
divisions of of Western
Westerntroopstro?ps had landed in
had landed in the
the
Gulf
Gulf ofof Finland
Finland in in 1919,
1919,they
they could
could probably
probably have have forced
forced their
their wayway to to Moscow
Moscow and and
overthrown
overthrown the the Bolsheviks.
Bolsheviks. But But in in the
the aftermath
aftermath of of the First World
the First World War War not .noteven
even
two
two or
or three
three divisions
divisions could
could be be found�
found, Thos.e
ThoseAmerican,
American, British,
British, French
French and and Japanese
Japanese
troops
troops who
who intervened
intervened against
against thethe RedRed Army
Army served
served ma iniy ' to d
mainly.to iscredit the
discredit the White
White
cause and
cause and thus
thus actually
actually to to assist
assist the
the Bolsheviks.
Bolsheviks. They They were
were too too few
few to to affect
affect the mil
the mil-
itary
itary outcome of of the
the civil
civil war
war but
but quite
quite sufficient
sufficient to to allow
allow thethe Bolsheviks
Bolsheviks to brand brand
their
their opponents
opponents as as the
the tools
tools of
of Western
Western imperialism.
imperialism. Most Most Bolshevik.
Bolshevikss were, were, in in any
any
case, sincerelyconvinced
case, sincerely convinced that that during
duringthe the civil
civil war they had
war they had facedfaced aa determined
determined
onslaught
onslaught from
from the
the full
f d l might
might of of Western
Western capitalism.
capitalism.That That illusion
illusion continued
continued to to color
color
Soviet
Soviet attitudes
attitudes toto the
the West
West throughout,
throughout,and and eveneven beyond,
beyond, the the Stalin
Stalin era. era.
'
TH
HEE C H E KA S I N T
CHEKA’S TEEL
LLLIIG
GE N
NCCE operations
operations bothboth atathome
home andand abroad
abroad were
were profoundly
profoundly
influenced not
influenced not merely
merely byby the
the legacy
legacy of the 0
of the khrana but
Okhrana butalso
also by
by the
the Bolsheviks'
Bolsheviks’ own
own
pre-Revolutionary
pre-Revolutionary experience
experience as as aa largely
largely illegal
illegal clandestine
clandestine underground. Many of
underground. Many of
the Bolshevik
the Bolshevik leadership
leadership had
had become
become so so used
used to living under
to living under false
false identitie�
identities before
before
1917
1917 thatthatthey
they retained
retained their
their aliases
aliases even
evenafter
after the
the RevolutioIl:
Revolution: among
among them
themthe Rus
theRus-
sian
sian nobleman
nobleman Vladimir
Vladimir Ilyich
Ilyich Ulyanov,22
Ulyanov,22who who kept
kept the
the pseudonym Lenin, an
pseudonym Lenin, d
and the
the
Georgian Joseph Vissarionovich
Georgian Joseph VissarionovichDzhugashvili,
Dzhugashvili, who continued to
who continued to be
be known
known as as Stalin.
Stah.
Both
Both Lenin
Lenin andand Stalin
Stalin retained
retained many
many of of the
the habits
habits ofof mind
mind developed
developed during
during their
their
underground
underground existence.
existence. OnO n highly
highly sensitive
sensitive matters
matters Lenin
Lenin would
would insist
insist no
no copy
copy be
be
made
made of of his
his instructions
instructions and
and that
that the
the original
original either
either be
be returned
returned toto him
him f()r destruc
for.destruc-
tion
tion orordestroyed
destroyed byby the
the recipient.
recipient. Happily
Happily forfor the
the historian,
historian, his
his instructions
instructions were
were not
not
always
always carried
carried out.23
Stalin
Stalin continued
continued to to doctor
doctor hishis own.
own pre-Revolutionary
pre-Revolutionary record record during the 1920s,
during the 1920s,
changing
changing eveneven the
the day
day and
and year
year ofof his
his birth;
birth; thethecorrect date (December
correct date (December 6, 1878) was
6,1878) was
not made public
not made public until
until 1996.24 During aa visit
1996.24During visit to the secret
to the secret section
section of
of the
the Moscow
Moscow
Main
Main Archives
Archives Directorate
Directorate (Glavarkhiv),
(Glavarkhiv), Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin was was once
once shown
shown an Okhrana
an Okhrana
file on
file on Dzhugashvili.
Dzhugashvili. The The file
file cover
coverand
and title
title followed standard Okhrana
followed standard format, but,
Okhranaformat,. but,
T
T H EE S
SW R D
WOR A
ANNT
DDH S
TH
E H IEE LS DH I E L D / 2
28
on
on looking
looking inside,inside, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin discovered
discovered that thatthethe contents
contents had had beenbeen entirely
entirely
removed. The
removed. The probability
probability is is that
that thethe Okhrana
Okhrana had had compromising
compromising materials materials on the
on the
young
young Dzhugashvili,
Dzhugashvili, and and that
that at at the
thefirst
first opportunity
opportunity Stalin Stalin arranged
arranged for for the
the file
file to
to
be gutted. In typical Soviet bureaucratic fashion, however,
be gutted. In typical Soviet bureaucratic fashion, however, the cover was preserved the cover was preserved
since the
since the existence
existence of of the
thefile
file was
wasindelibly
indelibly recorded
recorded in in the
thesecret
secret registers.
registers. Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin
suspects that
suspects that whoever emptied the
whoever emptied the file,
file, presumably
presumably on on Stalin's instructions, was
Stalin’s instructions, was later
later
eliminated to
eliminated to preserve
preserve thethe dark secret of
darksecret of its missing contents.25
its missing contents.25What What Stalin
Stalin waswas most
most
anxious
anxious to to destroy
destroy may maywell wellhavehave beenbeen evidence
evidence that that hehe had
had been
been an an Okhrana
Okhrana
informer.
informer. ThoughThough ititfallsfalls well
well short
short of of conclusive
conclusive proof,proof, aapossible
possible trace
trace ofof that
that evi
evi-
dence still
dence still survives.
survives. According
According to to reports
reports fromfrom an an Okhrana
Okhrana agent agent discovered
discovered in in the
the
State Archive
State Archive of of the Russian Federation,
the Russian Federation, Baku Baku Bolsheviks
Bolsheviks beforebefore the First World
the First World
War
War "confronted
“confronted Dzhugashvili-Stalin
Dzhugashvili-Stah with with thethe accusation
accusation that that he he was
was aa provocateur
provocateur
and
and an an agent
agent of of the
the Security
Security Police.
Police. AndAnd that that he
he hadhad embezzled
embezzled Party funds."26
Party hnds.”26
From
From almostalmost the the beginning
beginning of of the
the civil
civil war
war in 1918, ininkeeping
in 1918, keeping withwith thethe Bolshe
Bolshe-
vik
vik tradition
tradition of of operating
operating under underfalse
false identities,
identities, the the Cheka
Chekabegan
began sending
sending officers
officers and
and
agents
agents under
under various
various disguises
disguisesand and pseudonyms
pseudonyms behind behind enemyenemy lines
lines toto gather
gatherintelli
intelli-
gence. By
gence. By June
June 19191919 thethe number
number of these "illegals"
of these “illegals”was wassufficiently
sufficiently large
large to to require
require
the
the foundation
foundationof of an
an illegals operations department
illegals operations department (later (later to
to become
become Directorate
Directorate SS of of
the
the KGB First Chief Directorate).27
First Chief Dire~torate).~’ KGB classified
classified histories
histories note
note that
that henceforth
henceforth
"illegal" operations became
“illegal” operations became "an “an inseparable
inseparable part part of offoreign
foreign intelligence."
intelligence.” On O n Decem
Decem-
ber
ber 20, 1920, the
20,1920, the third
third anniversary
the Cheka's
Cheka’s foundation,
foundation, aa new new foreign
foreign depart
depart-
ment
ment (Innostranyi
(Innostranyi Otdel Otdel or or INO)
INO) was was set
set upup toto direct
direct all operations
operations beyond
beyond Soviet
Soviet
borders.
borders. DuringDuring the the early
early years
years of of Soviet Russia, when
Soviet Russia, when the theCommunist
Communist regime regime
remained
remained an international pariah,
an international pariah, it it had
had fewfew official
official missions
missions abroad
abroad capable
capable of of pro
pro-
viding
viding official
official cover
cover forfor "legal"
“legal” intelligence
intelligence stations
stations ("residencies"
((‘residencies”in Cheka jargon)
in Cheka jargon)
and
and thus
thus relied
relied chiefly
chiefly on illegals. As
on illegals. diplomatic and
As diplomatic and trade
trade missions
missions were were established
established
in foreign capitals,
capitals, each was was given
given a "legal
“legal residency"
residency” headed by a "resident" “resident” whose
identity
identity was was officially
officiallycommunicated
communicated only only toto the
theambassador
ambassador or or head
head of of the
the mission.
mission.
Illegals,
Illegals, sometimes
sometimes groupedgrouped in in "illegal
“illegal residencies,"
residencies,” operated
operated without
without the the benefit
benefit of of
diplomatic
diplomatic or or official
official cover
coverandand reported
reported directly
directly to to IN
I N00 inin Moscow.28
Moscow.28
During
During the the civil
civil war
war of 1918-20, foreign
of 1918-20, foreign intelligence
intelligence collection
collection was was of of minor
minor
importance
importance by by comparison
comparison with with thethe Cheka's
Cheka’s role role in
in assisting
assisting thethe victory
victory of of the
the Red
Red
Army
Army over over itsits White
White enemies.
enemies. Like Like the the KGB later, later, the
the Cheka
Cheka liked
liked to to quantify its its
successes.
successes. In the autumn
In the autumn of 1919, probably
of 1919, probably the turningpoint
the turning pointinin thethe civil war, it
civil war, it
proudly claimed that
proudly claimed that during
during the thefirst nineteen months
first nineteen months of of its
its existence
existence it it had
had discov
discov-
ered
ered andand neutralized
neutralized "412 “412 underground
underground anti-Soviet
anti-Soviet organizations."29
organization^."^^ The The Cheka's
Cheka’s
most effective
most method of
effective method of dealing
dealing with with opposition
opposition was was terror.
terror. Though
Though its its liking
liking ofof
quantification did
quantification did not
not extend
extend to to calculating
calculating the the number
number of of its
its victims,
victims, it it is
is clear
clear that
that
the Cheka
Cheka enormously outstripped the Okhrana Okhrana ininboth boththethescale and the ferocity of
scale of
its
its onslaught
onslaught on on political opposition. In
political opposition. 1901, 4,113 Russians
In 1901, Russians werewere in in internal
internal exile
exile
for political crimes,
crimes, of whom only 1180 80 were on hard labor. Executions Executions for political
crimes
crimes were were limited
limited to to those
those involved
involved in in actual
actual or or attempted
attempted assassinations.
assassinations. During During
the
the civil
civil war,
war,by bycontrast,
contrast, Cheka
Cheka executions
executions probably
probably numbered
numbered as as many
many as as 250,000,
and may well have exceeded exceededthe number number of ofdeaths in battle.3o
battle.30
F
F r o m L ee nn iinn’' s C h e k a tt o S t a ll ii nn ’' s O G P U
U / 2 99
2
At
At the
thetime
time of ofthe
theOctober
OctoberRevolution,
Revolution, it
it had
had never
never occurred
occurred to
to Lenin
Leninthat he and
that. and
he
the
the Bolshevik
Bolshevik leadership
leadership would
would be responsible for
be responsible for the
the rebirth
rebirth of
of the Okhrana in
the Okhrana in aa
new
new and
and far
far more
more terrible
terrible form.
form. In
In The Revolution, which
Tbe State and Revolution, which hehe had
had almost
completed
completed in in the
the summer
summerof of 1917,
1917, he
he had
had claimed
claimed that
that there
there would
would be no need
be no need for
for aa
police force,
force,let alone a political police, after the Revolution. Though ititwould be nec- nec
essary
essary to
to arrange
arrange for for "the suppression of
“the suppression the minority
of the minority of exploiters by
of exploiters the majority
by the majority of of
wage
wage slaves
slavesofof yesterday,"
yesterday,”such
such suppression
suppression would
would be
be "comparatively
“comparativelyeasy."
easy.”The
The "pro
“pro-
letarian
letarian dictatorship"
dictatorship”whichwhich would preside over
would preside over the rapid destruction
the rapid destruction of
of the
the bourgeois
bourgeois
order
order would
would require
require aa minimum
minimum of of rules,
rules, regulation
regulation and
and bureaucracy.
bureaucracy. Lenin had had
never
never foreseen
foreseen the the possibility
possibility of
of mass opposition to
mass opposition to aa revolution
revolution carried
carried out
out in
in the
the
name
name ofof the
the people.31
people.31But,But, once
once in
in power,
power, he
he used whatever
whatever methods
methods were
were necessary
necessary
to retain it, claiming always
always that the
theBolsheviks wereweredefending "the
“the people's
people’s power"
power”
and refusing to accept the reality that he hehad
had made himself the infallible
infallible leader
Vozhd) of
((Y,zbd) of the
the world's
world’s first
first one-party
one-party state.
state.
A P P R O P R I AT E LY, T H
APPROPRIATELY, HEEMMEMEMOO RR L L erected
I AI A erected next
next to the Lubyanka
to the Lubyanka in the closing
in the closing
years
years ofof the
the Soviet
Soviet era
era to
to cOI'l1memorate
commemorate "the “the victims
victims of
of totalitari,(in repression"
totalitarian repression’’con
con-
sists
sists ofofaa large
large block
block of
of granite
granite taken
taken not not from
from Stalin's
Stalin’s gulag
gulag but
but from
from a concentration
concentration
camp
camp established
established by Lenin on
by Lenin on thethe shores
shores of
of the
the White
White SeaSea in
in the
the autumn
autumn ofof 1918.
1918.
Many
Many Chekists
Chekists regarded
regarded brutality
brutality against
against their
their class
class enemies
enemies as as aa revolutionary
revolutionary
virtue.
virtue. According
According to to aareport
report from
from the the Cheka
Cheka ininMorshansk:
Morshansk
He
H e who
who fights
fights for
for aa better
better future
future will be merciless
will be merciless towards
towards his
his enemies.
enemies. He
He
who
who seeks
seeks to
to protect
protect poor
poor people
people will
will harden
harden his
his heart
heart against
against pity
pity and
and will
will
become
become cruel. 32
Even at
Even at aa time when the
time when the Soviet
Soviet regime
regime was
was fighting
fighting for its survival
for its survival during
during the civil
the civil
war, many of
war, many its own
of its own supporters
supporters were
were sickened
sickened by the scale
by the scale of
of the
the Cheka's
Cheka’s brutality.
brutality.
A number
number of of Cheka
Cheka interrogators,
interrogators, somesome only in their
only in their teens,33
teens,33employed
employed tortures
tortures ofof
scarcely
scarcely believable
believablebarbarity.
barbarity.In In Kharkhov
Kharkhov thethe skin was peeled
skin was peeled off
off victims'
victims’ hands
hands to to
produce
produce "gloves"
“gloves”of of human
human skin; in Voronezh
skin; in Voronezh naked
naked prisoners
prisoners were
were rolled
rolled around
around in in
barrels
barrels studded
studded with with nails;
nails; in
in Poltava
Poltava priests
priests were
were impaled;
impaled; in in Odessa, captured
Odessa, captured
White
White officers
officers wereweretied
tied toto planks
planks and
and fed slowly into
fed slowly furnaces; in
into furnaces; in Kiev
Kiev cages
cagesofof rats
rats
were fixed to
were fixed to prisoners' bodies and
prisoners’ bodies and heated
heated until
until the
the rats
rats gnawed
gnawed their
their way
way into
into the
the
victims'
victims’ intestines.34
intestine^.^'
Though
Though Lenin Lenin did
did not
not approve
approve ofof such sadism, he
such sadism, he was
was content
content to to leave
leave "excesses"
“excesses”
to
to be
be corrected
corrected by by Dzerzhinsky.
Dzerzhinsky. Brushing
Brushing aside
aside complaints
complaints of of Cheka brutality, he
Cheka brutality, he
paid
paid fulsome
fulsome tribute
tribute to
to its
its role
role in
in helping
helping toto win
win the
the civil
civilwar.
war.The Cheka, he
The Cheka, claimed,
heclaimed,
had
had proved
proved aa "devastating
“devastating weapon
weapon against
against countless
countless conspiracies
conspiracies and and countless
countless
attempts against Soviet power by people who are infinitely stronger
attempts against Soviet powerby people who are infinitely stronger than us”: than us":
Gentlemen
Gentlemen capitalists
capitalists of
of Russia
Russia and
and abroad!
abroad! We
We know
know that
that ititi�
is not
not possible
possible for
for
you
you to
to love
love this
this establishment.
establishment. Indeed,
Indeed, it
it is
is not!
not! [The Cheka] has
[The Cheka] been able
has been to
able to
counter
counter your
your intrigues
intrigues and
and your machinations as
your machinations as no
no one else could
one else could have done
have done
T
THHE
E S
SW OR
WO RD A
AND T
THHS
E H SI EHLI DE L D
E // J
30O
when
when you
you were
weresmothering
smothering us,
us, when
when you
you had
had surrounded
surrounded us
us with
with invaders,
invaders, and
and
when
when you
you were
were organizing
organizing internal conspiracies and
internal conspiracies and would
would stop
stop at
at no
no crime
crime in
in
order
order to
to wreck
wreck our
our peaceful
peacefbl work. 35
work.’5
Some of
Some of the most secret
the most documents in
secret documents in Dzerzhinsky's
Dzerzhinsky’s archive archive carry
carry aa note
note that
that only
only
ten copies were
ten copies were to to be made: one
be made: one for Lenin, the
for Lenin, the rest
rest for
for Cheka
Cheka department
department chiefs.36
chiefs.36
Lenin's
Lenin’s absorption
absorption in in the
theaffairs
affairs of
of the
the Cheka
Chekaextended
extended even even toto operational
operational detail.
detail. He
He
sent
sent Dzerzhinsky
Dzerzhinsky advice advice on on how
how to to carry
carry out
out searches
searches and and conduct
conduct surveillance,
surveillance, and and
instructed
instructed himhim that
that arrests
arrests were best carried
were best carried out out at at night.37 Lenin also
night.37Lenin also took
took aa some
some-
what
what naive
naive interest
interest in the application
in the application of of new
new technology
technology to to the
the hunt
hunt forfor counter
counter-
revolutionaries,
revolutionaries, telling
telling Dzerzhinsky
Dzerzhinsky to to construct
construct aa large large electromagnet
electromagnet capable capable of of
detecting
detecting hidden
hidden weapons
weapons in in house-to-house
house-to-house searches. searches. Though
Though the the experiment
experiment was was
tried and
tried and failed,
failed, Dzerzhinsky
Dzerzhinsky had hadsome
some difficulty
difficulty in in persuading
persuading Lenin Lenin that,
that,"Magnets
“Magnets
are
are not
not much
much use use inin searches."38
searches.”38
Far
Far more
more important
important than than Lenin's
Lenin’s sometimes
sometimes eccentric
eccentric interest
interest in in intelligence
intelligence
techniques and
techniques and technology
technology was was his
his belief
belief inin thethe central importance of
central importance of the
the Cheka
Cheka to to
the
the defense
defense of of thethe Bolshevik
Bolshevik one-party
one-party state state against
against imperialism
imperialism and and counter
counter-
revolution.
revolution. The
The extent
extent of of Lenin's
Lenin’s andand Dzerzhinsky's
Dzerzhinsky’s fear fear of imperialist subversion
of imperialist subversion is is
well
well illustrated
illustrated by by their
their deep
deep suspicion
suspicion of of the
the aidaid which
which they
they felt
felt forced
forced to to accept
accept inin
August 1921 from
August 1921 from the the American
American Relief
Relief Association
Association (ARA) ( A M ) to to feed
feed millions
millions of of starv
starv-
ing
ing Soviet
Soviet citizens.
citizens. Lenin
Lenin was was convinced
convincedthat that the theARA was was aa front
frontfor United States
for United States
intelligence,
intelligence, andand ordered
ordered the closest surveillance
the closest surveillance of of all its members.
all its members. Once Once the the ARA
AM
began
began work,
work, hehe was
was equally convinced that
equally convinced that ititwas
was using
using food
food as as an
an instrument
instrument of sub
of sub-
version.
version. He complained to
H e complained to Dzerzhinsk'y's
Dzerzhinsky’s deputy,deputy, IosifIosif Stanislavovich
Stanislavovich Unshlikht,
Unshlikht, that that
foreign
foreign agents
agents were
were "engaged
“engaged in in massive
massive bribery
bribery of hungry and and tattered Chekists
tatteredChekists
[Lenin's
[Lenin’s emphasis]
emphasis].. The The danger
danger herehere is is extremely
extremely great."great.” Lenin
Lenin insisted that urgent
insisted that urgent
steps be
steps be taken
taken to 'feed and clothe
to '“)ed dothe the Chekists" in
the Chekists” in order
order to remove them
to remove them from imperi
from imperi-
alist
alist temptation.39
temptati~n.~~
Though
Though the United States
the United States still
still had
had no no peacetime
peacetime espionage
espionage agency,
agency, the Cheka
the Cheka
reported
reported that
that over
over 200200 of of the
the 300 ARA staff, staff, who
who werewere devoting
devoting all all their
their energies
energies toto
dealing
dealing with
with oneone of of the
the most terrible
terrible famines
famines in in modern
modern European
European history,
history, were
were inin
reality
reality undercover
undercover intelligence
officers whowho "could
“could become
become fi rst-class instructors
first-class instructors forfor aa
counter-revolutionary
counter-revolutionary uprising.”uprising." The The Cheka
Cheka also also alleged
allegedthat
that thetheARA was was building
building
up
up aa large
large food
food supply
supply in Vienna so
in Vienna so that
that "in
“in thethe event
event ofof aa coup
coup [it]
[it] could
could provide
provide
immediate support
support to to the
theWhite
White government."40
government.”4oLenin was was far
far more
more exercised
exercised by bythe
the
ARA's non-existent intelligence
A M s non-existent operations than
intelligence operations than by by the
the approximately
approximately five five million
million
Russians and
Russians and Ukrai
Ukrainians�ians who
who starved
starved to to death. Without
Without the themassive
massive aid aid program
program of of
the ARA, which in 1922 1922 was feeding up to to eleven million people a day, the famine
the.famine
would
would have
have been
been far far worse.
worse. Even
Even after
after thethe ARA
A M had had departed,
departed, however,
however, Soviet
Soviet intel
intel-
ligence remained convinced that itit had hadbeen, first and foremost, an espionage espionage rather
thana ahumanitarian
humanitarian agency. agency. A quarter of of a century later, all surviving Russian
employees
employees of of ARA
A M were were made
made to to sign
sign confessions
confessions that that they
they hadhad been
been American
American
spies.41
spies.41
The
The priorities
priorities of of Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence underunder Lenin,
Lenin, and andstill
still more
more under
under Stalin,
Stalin, con-
con-
. . . _. . .
F
F r o m L ee n
n ii nn’' sC hCehkeak a tt o S tt aa ll iinn’' s O G P U / 3 1I
tinued
tinued to
to be
be shaped
shaped byby greatly
greatly exaggerated
exaggerated beliefs
beliefs in
in an
an unrelenting
unrelenting conspiracy
conspiracy byby
Western
Western governments
governments and and their intelligence agencies.
their intelligence agencies. ToTo understand
understand Soviet
Soviet intelli
intelli-
gence operations between
gence operations between the the wars,
wars, it
it is
is frequently necessary to
frequently necessary enter aa world
to enter world ofof
smoke
smoke and
and mirrors
mirrors where
where thethe target
target is
is as
as much
much thethe product
product of of Bolshevik
Bolshevik delusions
delusions asas
of real
realcounter-revolutionary conspiracy.
conspiracy.The Soviet propensity to conspiracy conspiracy theory
derived
derived both
both from
from the
the nature
nature ofof the
the one-party
one-party state
state and
and from
from its
its Marxist-Leninist
Marxist-Leninist
ideology. All
ideology. All authoritarian
authoritarian regimes,
regimes, since
since they
they regard
regard opposition
opposition as as fundamentally
fundamentally
illegitimate, tend to
illegitimate, tend see their
to see their opponents
opponentsas engaged in
as engaged in subversive
subversive conspiracy.
conspiracy.Bolshe
Bolshe-
vik
vik ideology
ideology further
further dictated
dictated that
that capitalist
capitalist regimes
regimes could
could not
not fail
fail to
to be
be plotting
plotting the
the
overthrow of the world's
world’s first and only worker-peasant
worker-peasant state.state. If
If they were not visibly
preparing anan armed invasion,
invasion, then their intelligence
then their agencies must
intelligence agencies must necessarily
necessarily be
be
secretly
secretly conspiring
conspiring to
to subvert
subvert Soviet
Soviet Russia
Russia from
from within.
within.
'
IINO’S
N a s F I R SST
T TWO heads
heads served
served between
between themthem for
for aa total
total of
of barely
barely eighteen months.
eighteen months.
The
The first
first foreign
intelligence chief
chief to to make
make his his mark
mark waswas Mikhail
Mikhail Abramovich
Abramovich
Trilisser,
Trilisser, appointed
appointed as as head
head of of IINO
N 0 inin 1922-undoubtedly
1922-undoubtedly with with Lenin's
Lenin’s personal
personal
approval.
approval.Trilisser
Trilisser was
was aa Russian
Russian JewJew who
who hadhad become
become aa professional
professional revolutionary
revolutionary inin
1901
1901 atatthetheage
age of
of only
only eighteen.
eighteen. Like
Like Dzerzhinsky,
Dzerzhinsky, he he had
had spent
spent much
much of of his
his early
early
career in
career in exile
exile or
or in
in Tsarist
Tsarist prisons.
prisons. Before
Before the
the First
FirstWorld
WorldWar,
War, he he had
had specialized
specialized in
in
tracking
tracking down
down police
police spies
spiesamong
among Bolshevik
Bolshevik emigres.
CmigrCs. While
While serving
serving with
with the
the Cheka
Cheka
in
in 1918,
1918, hehe was
was reputed
reputed toto have
have been
been caught
caught by by "bandits"
“bandits”and and hung
hung from
from aa tree,
tree, but
but to
to
have
have been
been cutcut down
down just
just in
in time
time byby Red
Red forces
forces who
who successfully
successfidly revived
revived him.
him. Unlike
Unlike
any
any of
of his
his successors,
successors,Trilisser
Trilissersometimes
sometimes traveled
traveled abroad
abroad to meet INO
to meet I N 0 agents.42
agents.42At
least
least until
until Lenin
Leninwas
was incapacitated
incapacitated by by his
his third
third stroke
stroke inin March
March1923,1923, he
he continued
continued toto
take
take an
anactive,
active,though sometimes ill-informed,
though sometimes ill-informed, interest,
interest, in
in INO
I N 0 reports.
reports. He
H e noted,
noted, for
for
example,
example, thatthat somewhat
somewhat inaccurate
inaccurate information
information received
received in in . 1922
1922 fr9m
from one
one ofof the
the
Cheka's
Cheka’s fewfew early British sources,
early British sources, the
the journalist
journalist Arthur
Arthur Ransome
Ransome (later(later famous
famous asas aa
children's
children’s novelist),
novelist),was
was"very
“veryimportant
important and,and, probably,
probably, fundamentally
fimdamentally true."43
true.”43
The
The early priorities of
early priorities of INO
I N 0 foreign operations, approved
foreign operations, approved by Lenin, were:
by Lenin, were:
the
the identification,
identification, on
on the
theterritory
territory of
of each
each state,
state, of
of counter-revolutionary
counter-revolutionary groups
groups
operating
operating against
against the Russian Socialist
the Russian Socialist Federal
FederalSoviet Republic;
SovietRepublic;
the thorough study
the thorough study ofof all
all organizations engaged in
organizations engaged in espionage against our
espionage against our
country;
country;
the
the elucidation
elucidation of
of the
the political
political course
course of
of each
each state
state and
and its economic situation;
its economic situation;
the
the acquisition
acquisition of
of documentary
documentary material
material on
on all
all the
the above
above requirements.44
requirement^.^^
The
The "counter-revolutionary
“counter-revolutionary groups"
groups”which
which were
were of
of most
most immediate
immediate concern
concern to
to Lenin
Lenin
and the Cheka after
the Cheka the civil
after the war were
civil war remnants of
the remnant�
were the of th.� White armies
defeated White
the defea�ed armies
and the
and nationalists. Mter
Ukrainian nationalists.
the Ukrainian last Whit�Jqfc:es
the last
After the left-.Russi?n.�S?�l
White.,forcesl�f!-.R:l:!�,�� late . in
soil late in .
1920, they
1920, no realistic
stood no
they stood chance of
realistic chance mounting another
of mounting another serious to Bol
challenge to
serious challenge Bol-
however,was
That, however,
shevik rule. That, not Lenin's
wasnot “Abeaten
view. ''A
Lenin’sview. army,’’ he
beaten army," declared, "learns
he declared, “learns
much."
much.’’ He estimated that
that there
there were
were one
one and
and a
a hal.f
half to
to two
two million
million
. . anti-Bolshevik
anti-Bolshevik
Russian emigres:
Russian CmigrCs:
T E WSOWR O
THS
E D
ANR D
T HAS
D ENH IDE LT DH E S H I E L D /
/ 3
3 2
2
We
We can
can observe
observe themthem all
all working
working together
together irrespective
irrespective of
of their
their former
former political
political
parties .. .. .. They
parties They are
are skillfully
skillfdly taking
taking advantage
advantage ofof every
every opportunity
opportunity inin order,
order,
in one way
in one way or or another,
another, toto attack Soviet Russia
attack Soviet Russia and smash her
and smash her to pieces .. .. ..
to pieces
These
These counter-revolutionary
counter-revolutionary emigres CmigrCs are
are very
verywell
wellinformed,
informed, excellently
excellently orga
orga-
nized
nized and
and good good strategists.45
strategist^.^'
In
In the
the early
early andand mid-1920s
mid-1920s INO's INO’s chief
chief target
target thus
thus became
became the the emigre
CmigrC White
White
Guards, based mainly
Guards, based mainly in in Berlin,
Berlin, Paris
Paris and
and Warsaw,
Warsaw, who continued to
who continued to plot-far
plot-far lessless
effectively
effectively than
than Lenin
Lenin supposed-the
supposed-the overthrowoverthrow of of the
the Bolshevik
Bolshevik regime.
regime.
The
The other
other "counter-revolutionary"
“counter-revolutionary” threat which most
threat which most concerned
concerned Lenin Lenin and and the
the
Bolshevik leadership came from Ukrainian nationalists,
Bolshevik leadership came from Ukrainian nationalists, who had fought both Redwho had fought both Red
and
and White
White forces
forces in
in an
an attempt
attempt totowin
win their
their independence.
independence. In In the
the winter
winter of of 1920
1920 and and
the
the spring
spring of of 1921
1921 thethe entire
entire Ukrainian
Ukrainian countryside
countryside was was in
in revolt
revolt against
against Bolshevik
Bolshevik
rule. Even
rule. Even after
after the
the brutal
brutal"pacification"
“pacification”of Ukraine by
of Ukraine by the
the Red
Red Army
Army and and the
the Cheka,
Cheka,
partisan
partisan groups
groups who had taken
who had taken refuge
refuge in in Poland
Poland and and Romania
Romania continued
continued to to make
make
cross-border raids.46 In
cross-border raids.46 In the
the spring
spring of of1922
1922the theUkrainian
Ukrainian GPU received received intelligence
intelligence
reports that SimonSimon Petlyura's
Petlyura’s Ukrainian government-in-exile had established established a "par “par-
tisan
tisan headquarters"
headquarters” under under General
GeneralYurko
Yurko Tutyunnik
Tutyunnik whichwhich waswas sending
sending secret
secret emis
emis-
saries
saries to
to the
the Ukraine
Ukraine to to establish
establish aa nationalist
nationalist underground.47
~nderground.~~
The
The GPU was was ordered
ordered not not merely
merely to to collect
collect intelligence
intelligence on on thethe emigre
CmigrC White
White
Guards
Guards and and Ukrainian
Ukrainian nationalists
nationalists butbut also
also to penetrate and
to penetrate and destabilize
destabilize them.48
them.48Its Its
strategy was the same against both opponents-to opponents-to establish bogus anti-Bolshevik
undergrounds
undergrounds under under GPU control control which
which could
could bebe used to to lure
lure General TutyunnikTutyunnik
and
and the
the leading
leading White
White generals
generals back
back across
across the
the frontier.
frontier.
The
The fi rst step
first step in
in enticing
enticing Tutyunnik
Tutyunnik back back toto Ukraine
Ukraine (an operation codenamed
(an operation codenamed
CASE 39) 39) was
was the
the capture
capture of of Zayarny,
Zayarny, one one ofof his
his "special
“special duties"
duties” officers,
officers, who
who was was
caught crossing the frontier in 1922. 1922. Zayarny was successfully
successfully turned back by the
GPU and and sent to to Tutyunnik's
Tutyunnik‘s headquarters
headquarters with with bogus
bogus reports that that an an underground
underground
Supreme Military Council Council (Vysshaya
(Vysshaya Voyskovaya Rada or VVR) W R ) had been estab estab-
lished
lished in Ukraine and
in Ukraine and was anxious to
wasanxious to set
set up
up anan operational
operational headquarters
headquarters under under
Tutyunnik's
Tutyunnik‘s leadership
leadership to to wage
wage war
war against
against the
the Bolsheviks.
Bolsheviks. Tutyunnik
Tutyunnik was was tootoo cau
cau-
tious to return immediately but sent emissaries
sent several emissaries who attended
attended stage-managed
meetings
meetings of the VVR,
of the W R , at at which
which GPU officersofficers disguised
disguised as as Ukrainian
Ukrainian nationalists
nationalists
reported
reported thethe rapid
rapid growth
growth of of underground
underground opposition
opposition to to Bolshevik
Bolshevik rule rule and
and agreed
agreed
on
on the
the urgent
urgent needneed for
for Tutyunnik's
Tutyunnik‘s leadership.
leadership. Like
Like Zayarny,
Zayarny, oneone of of the
the emissaries,
emissaries,
Pyotr
Pyotr Stakhov,
Stakhov, aa close
close associate
associateofTutyunnik,
ofTutyunnik, was was recruited
recruited byby the
the GPUGPU and and used
used asas
aa double
double agent.
agent.
Attempts
Attempts to to persuade
persuade Tutyunnik
Tutyunnik himself
himself toto return
returntoto Ukraine
Ukraine fi nally succeeded
finally succeeded on on
June 26, 1923.49
June 26, 1923.49Tutyunnik,
Tutyunnik, with with his
his bodyguard
bodyguard and and aides,
aides, arrived
arrived at at aa remote
remote hamham-
let on the Romanian bank of the river Dniester, where Zayarny met him with the
news that the theVVR
W R and Pyotr Pyotr Stakhov were waiting on the other side. At 111
other side. 1 p.m. a
light from the Ukrainian bank signaled signaled that itit was safe safe for Tutyunnik
Tutyunnik and his
entourage
entourage to to cross
cross the
the river.
river. Still
Still cautious,
cautious,Tutyunnik
Tutyunnik sent senthis
his bodyguard
bodyguard to to make
make sure
sure
that
that nono trap
trap hadhadbeen laid
laid for
for him. Stakhov
Stakhov returned
returned with with the
the bodyguard
bodyguard to reassure
to reassure
F
F r o m L ee nn ii nn ’' sC bCehkeak a tt o S tt na lliinn’ 's O G P U / 33
him.
him. According
According to to an
an OGPU report,
report, Tutyunnik
Tutyunniktold
told him,
him, "Pyotr,
“Pyotr, I know
know you and you
you and you
know
know me.me. We
We won't
won’t fool
fool each
each other.
other. The The VVRW R is aa fiction, isn't it?"
fiction, isn’t it?”"That
“Thatis
is impossi
impossi-
ble,"
ble,” Stakhov replied. “I know them all
replied. "I al,, particularly those whowho are with me [today].
[today] '
You
You know
know you
you can
can rely
rely on me .. .. ..’7
on me " Tutyunnik
Tutyunnik got into the the boat
boat with
with Stakhov
Stakhov and
crossed
crossed the
the Dniester.
Dniester. Once
Once hehe was
was in the hands
in the hands of of the
the OGPU,
OGPU, letters
letters written
written byby
Tutyunnik or in his name were sent to prominent Ukrainian nationalists abroad say say-
ing
ing that
thattheir
theirstruggle
struggle was
was hopeless
hopeless and and that
thathehehad
had aligned himself
himself irrevocably
irrevocably with
with
the
the Soviet
Soviet cause.
cause. He
H e was
was executed
executed six years later.
six years 50
later.”
O PER RAT
A T I O N S AGA
A G AIINNSSTT T H E White
White Guards resembled those
Guards resembled against Ukrainian
those against Ukrainian
nationalists.
nationalists. In In 1922
1922the the Berlin residency
residency recruited
recruited the the former
former Tsarist
Tsarist General
General
Zelenin
Zelenin as as aa penetration
penetration agent
agent within
within the the emigre
CmigrC community.
community. A later later OGPU report report
claimed,
claimed, possibly
possibly withwith some
some exaggeration,
exaggeration, that Zeleninhad
that Zelenin had engineered
engineered "a “a huge
huge
schism
schism within the the ranks
ranks ofof the
the Whites"
Whites”and and had caused
caused aa large
large number
number of of offi cers to
officers to
break away
away fromfrom Baron
Baron Peter Wrangel,
Wrangel, the thelast ofof the
the White generals
generals to to be
be defeated
defeated
in
in the
the civil
civil war.
war.Other
Other OGPU moles moles praised
praised for for their
their work
work in in disrupting
disrupting the theWhite
White
Guards
Guards included
included General
General Zaitsev,
Zaitsev, former
former chiefchief ofof staff
staff to
to the
the Cossack
Cossack Ataman
Ataman A. I. I.
Dutov,
Dutov, andand the the ex-Tsarist
ex-Tsarist General
General Yakhontov,
Yakhontov, who who emigrated
emigrated to to the
theUnited
UnitedStates.51
States.’l
The
The OGPU's
OGPUs greatestgreatest successes
successes against
against the the White
White Guards,
Guards, however,
however, were
were two two
elaborate
elaborate deception
deception operations,
operations, codenamed
codenamed SINDIKAT SINDIKAT ("Syndicate")
(“Syndicate”) and and TREST
TREST
("Trust"),
(“Trust”), both bothofof which
which made
made imaginative
imaginative use use of
of agents provocateurs. 52 SINDIKAT
agentspro~ocateurs.~~ SINDIKAT
was
was targeted
targeted against
against the
the man
man believed
believed to to be
be the
the most
most dangerous
dangerous of of all
all the
the White
White
Boris Savinkov,
Guards: Boris Savinkov, a former Socialist
Socialist Revolutionary terrorist who had served as
deputy
deputy minister
minister of of war
war in
in the
the provisional government
government overthrown
overthrown in in the
the Bolshevik
Bolshevik
Revolution.
Revolution. Winston
Winston Churchill,
Churchill, amongamongothers,
others, was
was captivated
captivated by his anti-Bolshevik
by his anti-Bolshevik
fervor. “When all
fervor. "When all is
is said
said and
and done,"
done,” Churchill
Churchill wrote wrote later,
later, "and
“and with
with all the
the stains and
stains and
tarnishes there
tarnishes be, few
there be, few men
men tried
tried more,
more, gave more, dared
gave more, dared more
more and
and suffered
suffered more
more forfor
the
the Russian
Russian people."
people.” During
During the the Russo-Polish
Russo-Polish War War of of 1920, Savinkov was
1920, Savinkov largely
was largely
responsible
responsible for recruiting the
for recruiting the Russian People's Army
Russian People’s Army whichwhich fought under Polish
fought under Polish
command
command against against the
the Red
Red Army.
Army. Early
Early in 1921 he
in 1921 he founded
founded aa new new organization
organization in in
Warsaw
Warsaw dedicated
dedicated to to the
the overthrow
overthrow of of the
the Bolshevik
Bolshevik regime:
regime: thethe People's
People’s Union
Union for for
Defence
Defence of of Country
Country and and Freedom
Freedom (NSZRiS),
(NSZRiS), which which ranran anan agent
agent network
network inside
inside
Soviet
Soviet Russia
Russia to to collect
intelligence on on the the Bolsheviks
Bolsheviks and and plan
plan uprisings
uprisings against
against thethe
regime.
regime.
The
The first
first stage
stage of
of the
the operation
operation against
against Savinkov,
Savinkov, SINDIKAT-1,
SINDIKAT-1,successfully
successfully neuneu-
tralized
tralized the
the NSZRiS
NSZRiS agent agent network
network withwith the the help
help of
of aa Cheka
Cheka mole
mole within his orga
within his orga-
nization.
nization. Forty-four
Forty-four leading
leading members
members of of the
the NSZRiS
NSZRiSwere were paraded
paraded at at aashow
show trial
trial in
in
Moscow
Moscow in in August
August 1921 .53 SINDIKAT-2
1921.53 SINDIKAT-2 was was aimed
aimed atat luring
luringSavinkov
Savinkov back
back to to Rus
Rus-
sia
sia to
to star
star inin aafurther
furthershow
show trial
trial and
and complete
complete the the demoralization
demoralization of of his
his emigre
Cmigr6 supsup-
porters. Classified KGB histories
porters. Classified histories give
give the
the main
main credit
credit for
for the
the operation
operation to to the head
the head
of
of the OGPU counter-intelligence
theOGPU counter-intelligence department,
department, Artur ArturKhristyanovich
Khristyanovich Artuzov
Artuzov (later
(later
head
head ofof INO),
INO), the the Russian
Russian son son ofof an
an immigrant
immigrant Swiss-Italian
Swiss-Italian cheesemaker,
cheesemaker, assisted
assisted
by
by Andrei
Andrei Pavlovich
Pavlovich Fyodorov
Fyodorov and Grigori Sergeyevich
andGrigori Sergeyevich Syroyezhkin.54
Syroye~hkin.~~ ThoughThough
SINDIKAT-2
SINDIKAT-2 made made skillful use of
skillhl use of agents provocateurs, however,
agentsproaocateurs, however, KGB records records fail
fail to
to
T HE
E S
SW O R
RD A N D T
T H EE S
S H I EE LL D / 34
acknowledge
acknowledge how how much
much theythey were
were assisted
assistedbybySavinkov's
Savinkov’s own
own increasing
increasing tendency
tendency toto
fantasize.
fantasize. During
During aa visit
visit to
to London late in
Londonlate 1921he
in 1921 he claimed improbably that
claimed improbably that the
thehead
head
of
of the
the Russian
Russian trade
trade delegation
delegation had
had suggested
suggested thatthat he
he join
join the
the Soviet
Soviet government.
government.
Savinkov
Savinkov also
also alleged
allegedthat
that Lloyd
Lloyd George
George andand his
his family
family had
had welcomed
welcomed him him atat Che
Che-
quers
quers by
by singing
singing "God
“God SaveSave the
the Tsar";
Tsar”; in
in reality, the song
reality, the song was
was aa hymn sung in
hymn sung Welsh
inWelsh
by
by aa Welsh
Welsh choir
choir at at aa pre-Christmas
pre-Christmas celebration.
celebration. In In July 1923 Fedorov,
July 1923 Fedorov, posing
posing as
as aa
member of
member of an
an anti-Bolshevik underground, visited
anti-Bolshevik underground, visited Savinkov
Savinkov inin Paris,
Paris, where
where hehe had
had
installed his
installed his headquarters
headquarters after after the
the collapse
collapse of
of the
the NSZRiS, and persuaded him
and persuaded him to
to
send his
send aide, Colonel
his aide, Colonel Sergei
Sergei Pavlovsky, back to
Pavlovsky, back Russia with
to Russia with Fedorov
Fedorov for for secret
secret talks
talks
with
with the
thenon-existent
non-existent underground.
underground. Once Onceinin Moscow,
Moscow, Pavlovsky
Pavlovskywas turned ininby
was
turned by the
the
OGPU and used to
and used to lure
lure Savinkov
Savinkov himself
himself toto Russia
Russia for further talks.
for further talks. O
Onn August
August 1515
Savinkov
Savinkov crossed
crossed thethe Russian
Russian border
border with
with some
some of of his
his supporters
supporters andand walked
walked straight
straight
into
into an
an OGPU trap. Under OGPU interrogation
trap. Under interrogation Savinkov's
Savinkov’s resistance
resistance swiftly col
swiftly col-
lapsed.
lapsed. At aa show
show trial
trial on
on August
August 2727 Savinkov
Savinkov mademade an an abject
abject confession
confession of his
of his
counter-revolutionary
counter-revolutionary sins: sins:
I unconditionally
unconditionally recognize
recognize Soviet
Soviet power
power andand no
no other.
other. To
To every
every Russian
Russian who
who
loves his country
loves his country I,
I, who
who have
have traversed
traversed the entire road
the entire road of
of this
this bloody, heavy
bloody, heavy
struggle against you,
struggle against you, I who refuted you
who refbted you asas no
no one else did,
oneelse did, I tell
tell you
you that
that if
if you
you
are
are aa Russian,
Russian, if
if you
you love
love your
your people,
people, you
you will
will bow
bow down
down to to worker-peasant
worker-peasant
power
power and
and recognize
recognize itit without
without any
any reservations.55
reservation^.^^
The
The deception
deception of of Savinkov
Savinkov continued
continued eveneven after
after he
he was
was sentenced
sentenced to to fifteen
fifteen years
years inin
jail.
jail. He
H e failed
failed toto realize
realize that
that his
his cellmate,
cellmate, V. 1. I. Speransky,
Speransky,was wasanan OGPU officer,officer, later
later
promoted for
promoted for hishis success
success in in gaining
gaining Savinkov's
Savinkov’s confidence
confidence and and surreptitiously
surreptitiously
debriding
debriefing him him over
over aa period
period ofof eight
eight months.56
months.56Savinkov
Savinkov diddid not
not long
longsurvive
survive Sper
Sper-
ansky's
ansky’s final
final report
report on on him.
him. KGB fi les appear
files appear toto contain
contain nono contemporary
contemporary record record of of
how
how he he metmet his
his death.
death. According
According to to the
the SVR's
SVRs implausible
implausible current
current version
version of of events,
events,
Savinkov
Savinkov fell fell or
or jumped
jumped fromfrom anan upper-story
upper-story window
window after
after aa congenial
congenial "drinking
“drinking
bout with aa group
bout with group of of Chekists"-despite
Chekists”-despite aa heroic heroic attempt
attempt to to save
save him
him by by Grigori
Grigori
Syroyezhkin.57
S y r o y e ~ h k i nIt. ~seems
seems
~ I t more
more likely
likely that
that Syroyezhkin pushed him
Syroyezhkin pushed him to to his
his death.58
death.5s
Even
Even moremore successful
successful than than SINDIKAT
SINDIKAT was was operation
operation TREST,
TREST, the the cover
cover name
name
given
given to to aa fictitious monarchist
fictitious monarchist underground,
underground, the theMonarchist
MonarchistAssociation
Association of of Central
Central
Russia
Russia (MOR),
(MOR), first first invented
invented by by Artuzov
Artuzov in 1921and
in 1921 and used
used asas the basis of
the basis of aa six-year
six-year
deception.59
de~eption.’~ By
By 1923 the O
1923 the OGPU
G P U officer Aleksandr Yakushev,
officer Aleksandr Yakushev, posing
posing as as aa secret
secret
MOR membermember able able toto travel
travel abroad
abroad in in his
his official
official capacity
capacity as as aa Soviet
Soviet foreign
foreign trade
trade
representative,
representative, had had won won thethe confidence
confidence during
during visits
visits to
to Paris
Paris ofof both
both Grand
Grand DukeDuke
Nikolai
Nikolai Nikolayevich,
Nikolayevich, cousin cousin of of the
the late
late Tsar
Tsar Nicholas
Nicholas 11,II, and General Aleksandr
and General Aleksandr
Kutepov
Kutepov of of the
the [White] Russian Combined
[White] Russian Combined Services
Services Union
Union (ROVS).
(ROVS). The leading
The leading
victim
victim of of the deception, however,
the deception, however, was was the
the former SIS agent
former SIS Sidney Reilly,
agent Sidney Reilly, an
an even
even
greater
greater fantasist
fantasist thanthan Savinkov.
Savinkov. Reilly
Reillyhad
had become
become aa tragicomic
tragicomic figure
figure whose
whose hold
hold on on
reality
reality was
was increasingly
increasingly uncertain.
uncertain. According
According to to one
one of
of his
his secretaries, Eleanor Toye,
secretaries, Eleanor Toye,
"Reilly used to
“Reilly used to suffer
suffer from
from severe
severe mental
mental crises
crises amounting
amounting to delusion. Once
to delusion. Once he he
thought
thought he he was
was Jesus
Jesus Christ."
Christ.” The
The OGPU,
OGPU, however,
however, failed
failed to
to grasp
grasp that
that Reilly
Reilly was
was
F
F r o m L ee n
n ii nn’' s C h e k a tt oo S tt aa ll ii nn’' s O G P U / 35
now
now ofof little
little significance,
significance, regarding
regarding him him instead
instead as
as aa British
British masterspy
masterspy and and oneoneof
of its
its
most dangerous
most dangerous opponents.
opponents. On O n September 26, 1925 itit succeeded
September 26,1925 succeeded in in luring
luring him,
him,like
like
Savinkov
Savinkov aa yearyear before,
before, across
across the Russian frontier
the Russian frontier toto aa meeting
meeting with
with bogus
bogus MOR
conspirators.6o
conspirators.60
Reilly's
Reilly’s resistance
resistance after
after his
his arrest
arrest did
did not
not last
last much
much longer
longer than
than Savinkov's.
Savinkov’s. HisHis
KGB file contains a letter, probably authentic, to Dzerzhinsky
file contains a letter, probably authentic, to Dzerzhinsky dated October 30, dated October 30,
1925,
1925, ininwhich
which he he promised
promised to to reveal
reveal allallhe
he knew
knew about
about British and American
British and intel
American intel-
ligence
ligence asas well
well asas Russian
Russian emigres
CmigrCs in in the
the West.
West.Six
S i x days
days later
later Reilly
Reilly waswas taken
taken forfor aa
walk
walk in
in thethewoods
woods near
near Moscow
Moscow and, and, without
without warning,
warning, shotshot from
from behind.
behind. According
According
to
to an
an OGPU report, report, he
he "let
“let out
outa adeep
deep breath
breath and
and fell
fell without
without aa cry."
cry.” Among
Among thosethose
who accompanied him
who accompanied him onon his
his final
final walk
walk inin the
the woods
woods was was Grigori
Grigori Syroyezhkin,
Syroyezhkin, the the
probable
probable assassin
assassin of
of Savinkov
Savinkov aa year
year earlier.
earlier.Reilly's corpse was
Reilly’s corpse was put
put on onprivate
private display
display
in the Lubyanka
inthe Lubyanka sickbay
sickbay to to allow
allow OGPU officers officers to to celebrate their triumph.61
celebrate their triumph.61
Appropriately
Appropriately for for aa career
career in
in which
which mythmyth andand reality
reality had
had become
become inextricably
inextricably con
con-
fused,
&sed, rumors
rumors circulated
circulated for
for many
many years
years in
in the
theWest
West thatthat
Reilly
Reilly had
had escaped execution
escaped execution
and
and adopted
adopted aa new new identity.
identity. The
The TREST deception was
TRESTdeception was finally
finally exposed
exposed in in 1927,
1927, to
to
the
the embarrassment
embarrassment of of the
the intelligence
intelligence services
services of Britain, France,
of Britain, France, Poland,
Poland, Finland
Finland
and
and the
the Baltic
Baltic states
states who
who had
had all,
all, in
in varying
varying degrees, been taken
degrees, been taken inin by
by it.62
it.62
W E L L AS engaging
AS WELL engaging inin permanent
permanent conflict
conflict with
with counter-revolution,
counter-revolution, bothboth real
real and
and
imagined,
imagined, Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence between
between the the wars
wars also
alsobecame
became increasingly
increasinglysuccessful
successful in in
penetrating
penetrating thethe main
main imperialist
imperialist powers.
powers. It had had two
two major
major operational
operational advantages
advantages
over
over Western intelligence agencies.
Western intelligence First, while
agencies. First, security in
while security Moscow became
in Moscow became obses
obses-
sional,
sional, much
much Western
Western security
security remained
remained feeble.
feeble. Secondly,
Secondly, the Communist parties
the Communist parties
and
and their
their "fellow
“fellow travelers"
travelers”in
in the
theWestWest gave
gave Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence aa major
major source
source of ide
of ide-
ological
ological recruits
recruits of
of which
which itit took
took increasing
increasing advantage.
advantage.
While
While operation
operation TREST was was at at its
its height, INO, the
height, INO, the OGPU's
OGPU’s foreign
intelligence
service,
service, succeeded
succeededin in making
making its its first major penetration
first major penetration of of the
the British
British foreign service.
foreign service.
The
The penetration
penetration agent
agent was
was an an Italian
Italian messenger
messenger in the British
in the British embassy
embassy in in Rome,
Rome,
Francesco
Francesco Constantini
Constantini (codenamed
(codenamed DUNCAN),
DUNCAN), who who waswas recruited
recruited in 1924 by
in 1924 by the
the
OGPU residency
residency with
with the
thehelp
help ofof an Italian Communist,
an Italian Communist, Alfredo Allegretti, who
Alfred0 Allegretti, had
who had
worked
worked as as aa Russian embassy clerk
Russian embassy clerk before
before thethe Revolution.
Revolution. Despite
Despite his
his lowly
lowly status,
status,
Constantini
Constantini hadhad access
access to
to aaremarkable
remarkable range range ofof diplomatic
diplomatic secrets.63
secrets.63Until
Until thetheSecond
Second
World
World War,
War, the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office diddid not
not possess
possess aa single
single security
security officer,
officer, let
let alone
alone aa
security
security department.
department. Security
Security inin many
many British embassies was
British embassies wasremarkably
remarkably lax.lax.
In Rome,
In Rome,
according
according to to Sir
Sir Andrew
Andrew Noble,
Noble, who who waswas stationed
stationed atat the
theembassy
embassy in in the
the mid-1930s,
mid-l930s,
it
it was
was "virtually
“virtually non-existent."
non-existent.” Embassy
Embassy servants
servants had
had access
access to
to the
the keys
keys to
to red boxes
red boxes
and
and filing
filing cabinets
cabinets containing classified documents,
containing classified documents, as as well
well as-probably-the
as-probably-the num
num-
ber
ber of
of the
the combination
combination lock lock on
on the embassy safe.
the embassy safe. Even
Even when
when two copies of
two copies of aa diplo-
diplo
matic
matic cipher
cipher were missing in
were missing in 1925,
1925, it it did
did not
not occur
occur to British diplomats
to British diplomats that that they
they
might
might have
have been
been removed
removedbybyConstantini-as
Constantini-as they they almost
almost certainly
certainly were.
were.6464
For
For more
more than
than aa decade
decade Francesco
Constantini handed
handed over
over aa great
great variety
variety ofof
diplomatic
diplomatic documents
documents and and cipher
cipher material.
material. Probably
Probably from
from an an early
early stage
stage he he also
also
involved
involved hishis brother,
brother, Secondo,
Secondo, who who worked
worked as as an embassy servant,
an embassy servant, in the theft
in the theft ofof
T
T H EE S
SWW OR
RDD A ND
D T
T H EE S
S H II EE L D / J
36
documents.
documents. In In addition
addition to
to despatches
despatches onon Anglo-Italian
Anglo-Italian relations
relations exchanged
exchanged between
between
London and
London andthe theRome
Rome embassy,
embassy, Constantini
Constantini was
was often
often able
able to
to supply
supply the "confiden
the “confiden-
tial
tial print"
print” of
of selected
selected documents
documents from
from the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office and
and major British missions
major British missions
designed
designed to to give
give ambassadors
ambassadors an an overview
overview ofof current
current foreign
foreign policy.65
policy.65By By January
January
1925
1925 he hewas
was providing,
providing, onon average,
average, 150
150 pages
pages of classified material
of classified material aa week.
week. Constan
Constan-
tini
tini made
made no no secret
secret of
of his
his motives.
motives. The
The Rome
Rome residency
residency reported
reported toto the
theCentre, "He
Centre, “He
collaborates
collaborates with
with us
us exclusively
exclusively for
for money,
money, and
and does
does not
not conceal
conceal the
the fact.
fact. He
H e has
has set
set
himself
himself the
the goal
goal of
of becoming
becoming aa rich
rich man,
man, and
and that
thatis
is what
what hehestrives
strives for."
for.’’ In
In 1925
1925 thethe
Centre
Centre pronounced
pronounced Constantini
Constantini its most valuable
its most agent. Convinced
valuable agent. Convinced of of aa vast,
vast, nonex
nonex-
istent British
istent British plot
plot to
to destroy
destroy the
the Soviet
Soviet state,
state, it
it counted
counted on on agent
agent DUNCAN to to pro
pro-
vide
vide early
early warning
warning of of aa British
British attack,
attack, and
and instructed
instructed thethe Rome
Rome residency:
residency:
England
England is is now
now the the organizing
organizing force
force behind
behind aaprobable
probable attack
attack on
on the
the USSR inin
the
the near
near future.
future. A continuous
continuous hostile
hostile cordon
cordon [of[of states]
states] is
is being
being formed
formed against
against
us
us in
in the
theWest.
West. In In the
the East,
East,ininPersia,
Persia, Mghanistan
Afghanistan and China we
and China we observe
observe aa sim
sim-
ilar picture .. .. .. Your
ilar picture Your task
task (and
(and consider
consider it
it aa priority)
priority) is
is to
to provide
provide documentary
documentary
and
and agent
agent materials
materials which
which reveal
reveal the
the details
details of
of the
the English
English plan.
plan.
The
The Rome
Rome residency's
residency’s pride
pride in
in running
running the
the OGPU's
OGPU’sleading
leading agent
agent is
is refl ected in
reflected in its
its
flattering
flattering descriptions
descriptions ofof him.
him. Constantini
Constantini was
was said
said to
to have
have the
the face
face of
of "an
“an ancient
ancient
Roman," and
Roman,” andtotobe
be known
known to to his
his many
many female
female admirers
admirers asas "the
“the handsome
handsome one."66
one.”66By
1928
1928 thetheOGPU suspected
suspected him-accurately-of
him-accurately-of also
also supplying
supplying documents
documents to to Italian
Italian
intelligence. Despite suspicions
intelligence. Despite suspicions about
about Constantini's
Constantini’s honesty,
honesty, however,
however, there
there was
was nono
mistaking
mistaking the
the importance
importance of of the
the material
material he
he supplied.
supplied. Maksim
Maksim Litvinov,
Litvinov, who
who byby the
the
late 1920s was
late 1920s was the
the dominating
dominating figure
figure in the People's
in the People’s Commissariat
Commissariat for for Foreign
Foreign
Affairs,
Affairs, pronounced
pronounced it it "of
“of great use to
to me."67
\
great use me.”67
'
TH E
E O G P U S FIRST
OGPU’S FIRST successful
successful penetration
penetration of of the
the British
British foreign
foreign service was over-
service was over
shadowed in 1927 by an embarrassing series of well-publicized intelligence failures.
shadowed in 1927 by an embarrassing series of well-publicized intelligence failures.
The
The security
security ofof the
the rapidly
rapidly expanding
expanding foreign
foreign network
network of of OGPU and Fourth
andFourth
Department
Department (Military
(MilitaryIntelligence)
Intelligence) residencies
residencies was
was threatened
threatened byby the
the vulnerability
vulnerability of
of
early
early Soviet
Soviet cipher
cipher systems
systems toto Western
Western cryptanalysts,
cryptanalysts, by by the
the inexperience
inexperience ofof some
some ofof
the first generation of ofINO
I N 0 officers,
officers, and by errors in the theselection and training
trainingof
of for
for-
eign
eign Communists
Communists as as agents.
agents. The
The International
International Liaison
Liaison Department
Department (OMS)
(OMS) of the the
Communist
Communist International
Internationalprovided
provided aa ready pool of
ready pool of enthusiastic volunteers for
enthusiastic volunteers for Soviet
Soviet
intelligence operations. Some, such as the German German Richard Sorge,
Sorge, were to be num-
num
bered
bered among
among thethe greatest spies of
greatest spies of the
the century.
century. Others
Others ignored
ignored orthodox
orthodox tradecraft
tradecraft
and
and neglected
neglected standard
standard security
security procedures.
procedures.
In
In the
the spring
spring of
of 1927
1927 there
there were
were dramatic
dramatic revelations
revelations ofof Soviet
Soviet espionage
espionage in
in eight
eight
different
different countries.
countries. InIn March
March aa major
major OGPU spy spy ring
ring was
was uncovered
uncovered inin Poland;
Poland; aa
Soviet
Soviet trade
trade official was arrested
officialwas arrested for
for espionage
espionage in in Turkey;
Turkey; and
and the
the Swiss
Swiss police
police
announced the arrest oftwo Russian spies. spies.In April a police raid on
on the Soviet consulate
consulate
in Beijing uncovered
uncovereda mass of incriminating intelligence documents; and the French
intelligence documents;
Surete, arrested members of a Soviet
Sfiretk, arrested Soviet spy
spyring in Paris run by Jean Cremet,
Crkmet, a leading
F
F rr oomm LL ee nn ii nn ’' ssC C
k eh ke ak a tt oo SS tt aa ll ii n
n '’ss O G P U
OGPU I/ 3377
French
French Communist.
Communist. In
In May
May Austrian
Austrian foreign
foreign ministry
ministry officirus
officialswere
were found
found passing
passing
classified
classifiedinformation
informationto
tothe
theOGPU
OGPUresidency,
residency,and
andthe
the British
BritishHome
HomeSecretary
Secretaryindig
indig-
nantly
nantlyannounced
announcedto
to the
theHouse
Houseof
ofCommons
Commons the
thediscovery
discoveryof
of"one
“oneof
ofthe
the most
most com
com-
plete
pleteand
and one
oneof
ofthe
the most
most nefarious
nefariousspy
spysystems that
systemsthat itithas
hasever
everbeen
beenmy
mylot
lot totomeet."68
meet.”68
Following
Followingthis
this last
last discovery,
discovery,Britain-still
Britain-still regarded
regarded in
in the
the Soviet
SovietUnion
Union as
as the
the
leading
leadingworld
world power
power and
and its
its most
most dangerous
dangerous enemy-formally
enemy-formally broke
broke off
off diplomatic
diplomatic
relations,
relations, and
and senior
senior ministers
ministers read
read out
out to
to the Cornmolls decrypted
the Commons decrypted extracts
extracts from
from
intercepted
intercepted Soviet
Soviet telegrams.
telegrams. To
To tighten the security
tightenthe security of
of Soviet
Soviet diplomatic
diplomatic and
and
OG PU communications
OGPU communications after
after the
the dramatic
dramatic revelation
revelation of
of British
British cociebreaking
codebreaking suc
suc-
cesses,
cesses, the
the laborious
laborious but
but virtually
virtually unbreakable
unbreakable "one-time
“one-time pad"
pad” cipher
cipher system was
system was
introduced.
introduced. As
As aaresult,
result,Western
Western cryptanalysts
cryptanalystswere
wereable
ableto
todecrypt
decrypt almost
almost no
no further
further
high-grade
high-grade Soviet
Sovietcommunications
communications until
until after
after the
the Second
SecondWorld
World War.69
War.69
T
THHEE M OST W
MOST WO R Y SOOMMEE as
ORRRYS as well
well as
as the
the most
most plentiful
plentiful foreign
intelligence in
in 11927
927
concerned
concernedJapan.
Japan. Since 1925INO
Since 1925 I N 0had
had been
been able
ableto
to intercept
intercept the
the secret
secret communica
communica-
tions
tions of
ofboth
bothJapan's
Japan’s military
militarymission
mission and
and its
its consulate-general
consulate-generalin
in the
thenortheast
northeast Chi
Chi-
nese
nese city
city of
of Harbin.
Harbin. Remarkably,
Remarkably, instead
instead of
of using
using diplomatic
diplomatic bags
bags and
and their
their own
own
couriers,
couriers,Japanese
Japaneseofficial
officialrepresentatives in
representativesin Harbin
Harbincorresponded
correspondedwith
with Tokyo
Tokyovia
via the
the
Chinese
Chinesepostal
postalservice. The OGPU
service.The OGPUrecruited
recruitedthe
the Chinese
Chinese employees
employeeswho
whowere
wereused
usedto
to
take
takeJapanese
Japanese official
officialdespatches
despatchesto
to the
theHarbin
Harbinpost
postoffice,
office,and
and sent
sent expert
expertteams
teamsoflet
of let-
ter-openers
ter-openers to
to examine
examineand
and photograph
photograph the
the despatches,
despatches,before
before sending
sendingthem
them on
on their
their
way
way in
in new
new envelopes
envelopeswith
with copies
copies of
ofJapanese
Japanese seals.
seals.Professor
ProfessorMatsokin,
Matsokin, aaJapanese
Japanese
specialist
specialistfrom
from Moscow,7o
Moscow,70was
wasemployed by
by INO
employed I N 0 in
in Harbin
Harbintotoperuse
peruse the
the despatches
despatches
and
and send
sendtranslations
translationsof
of the
the most
most important
important promptly
promptly to
to the
the Centre.
Centre.There
There was
was ample
ample
evidence
evidencein
in the
theintercepts
interceptsforwarded
forwardedto
to Moscow
Moscowof
of designs
designsbybythe
theJapanese
Japanese military
militaryon
on
China
China and
and the
the Soviet
SovietFar
Far East.
East. But
But the
themost
most tr()ubling
troubling document,
document, intercepted
intercepted in
inJuly
July
1927,was
1927, was aasecret
secretmemorandum
memorandum written
written by
by Baron
Baron Gi-ishi
Gi-ishi Tanaka,
Tanaka,the
theJapanese
Japanese prime
prime
minister
minister and
and foreign
foreignminister,
minister,which
which advocated
advocated the
the conquest
conquest of
of Manchuria
Manchuria and
and Mon
Mon-
golia
golia as
as aaprelude
preludeto
toJapanese
Japanese domination
domination over
over the
the whole
whole of
of China,
China, and
and predicted
predicted that
that
Japan
Japan "would
“wouldonce
once again
againhave
haveto
to cross
crossswords
swordswith
with Russia."71
Ru~sia.’’~’
A second
A second copy
copyof
ofthe
the memorandum
mem.orandumwas
was obtained
obtained in
in Japanese-occupied
Japanese-occupied Korea
Koreaby
by
the
the residency
residencyat
at Seoul,
Seoul,headed
headed by
by Ivan
Ivan Andreevich
Andreevich Chichayev
Chichayev(later
(later wartime
wartime resident
resident
in
in London).
London). A
AJapanese
Japanese interpreter,
interpreter,codenamed
codenamedANO,
ANO,recruited
recruitedby
by the
the INO
I N 0 residency,
residency,
succeeded
succeededin
in extracting
extractingthe
the document,
document, along
along with
with other
other secret
secret material,
material,from
fromthe
the safe
safe
of
of the
the Japanese police chief
Japanesepolice chief in
in Seoul.72 A
A copy of the
copyof the Tanaka
Tanaka memorandum
memorandum was
was later
later
leaked
leakedby
by INO
I N 0 to
to the
theAmerican
American press
press to
to give
give the
the impression
impression that
that itithad
had been
been obtained
obtained
by
by an
an agent
agent working
working for
for the
the United
United States.73
States.73As
As recently
recently as 1997 an
as 1997 an SVR
SVR official
official his
his-
tory
tory continued
continued to
to celebrate
celebrate the
the simultaneous
simultaneous acquisition
acquisition of
of the
the memorandum
memorandum in
in
Harbin
Harbin and
and Seoul
Seoul as
as "an
“an absolutely
absolutely unique
unique occurrence
occurrence in
in intelligence
,intelligenceoperations."74
operation~.”~~
Though
Though somewhat
somewhatexaggerated,
exaggerated,this
thisjudgment
judgment accurately
accuratelyreflects the
the enormous
reflects enormousimpor
impor-
tance
tance attached
attached at
at the
thetime
time to
to the
thediscovery
discoveryof
ofTanaka's
Tanaka‘s prediction
prediction of
ofwar
war with
with Russia.
Russia.
The
The acute
acute anxiety
anxiety in
in Moscow
Moscow caused
caused by
by the
the breach
breach of
of diplomatic
diplomatic relations
relations with
with
Britain
Britain and
and the
the apparent
apparent threat
threat from
fromJapan
Japan was
was clearly
clearlyreflected
reflected in
in an
an alarmist
alarmist article
article
by
by Stalin,
Stalin, published
published aa few
few days
daysafter
after he
he received
received the
the Tan�a
Tanaka memorandum:
memorandum:
TT H
HEE SSW
WO R D
OR D A
ANND
TD H TE
S HH EI E SL H
DI E L D // J
3 88
IIT
T II S
S H ARD
HAR DLLY
Y open
open to
to doubt
doubt that
that the
the chief
chief contemporary
contemporary question
question is
is that
that of
of
the threat of a new imperialist war. It is not a question of some indefinite
the threat of a new imperialist war. It is not a question of some indefinite and and
immaterial
immaterial "danger"
“danger”ofof aanew
new war.
war. It
I t is
is aa matter
matterof
of aa real
real and
and material
material threat
threat of
of
aa new
new war
war in
in general,
general, and
and war
war against
against thethe USSR
USSR in in particular.75
~articular.~’
The
The factfact that Constantini had
that Constantini had failed
failed toto provide
provide anything
anything remotely
remotely resembling
resembling aa
British
British version
version ofof the
the Tanaka
Tanaka memorandum
memorandum did didnot notlead
lead either
either Stalin
Stalin or or the
the conspir
conspir-
acy
acy theorists
theorists ofof the
theCentre
Centretotoconclude
conclude that that Britain
Britain had had no no plans
plans to
to attack
attack the the Soviet
Soviet
Union.
Union. TheyThey believed
believed instead
instead that that greater
greater efforts
efforts werewere required
required to to penetrate
penetrate the the
secret
secret councils
councils of of the
the Western
Westernwarmongers.
warmongers. Stalin, Stalin, whowho had had emerged
emerged as as the
the clear
clear vic
vic-
tor in the three-year power struggle which followed Lenin's
tor in the three-year power struggle which followed Lenin’s death, demanded more death, demanded more
intelligence
intelligence on on the
the(mostly
(mostly imaginary)
imaginary) WesternWestern plots plots against
against thethe Soviet
Soviet Union
Union whichwhich
he
he was
was sure
sure existed.
existed.
In
In anan effort
effort to
to make
make Soviet
Soviet espionage
espionage less less detectable
detectable and and more
more deniable,
deniable, the the main
main
responsibility for intelligence collection was shifted from "legal"
responsibility for intelligence collection was shifted from “legal”to “illegal”residen- to "illegal" residen
cies,
cies,which
which operated
operated independently
independently of of Soviet
Soviet diplomatic
diplomatic and and trade
trade missions.
missions. In In later
later
years
years thethe establishment
establishment of of aa newnew illegal
illegal residency
residency became became an an immensely
immensely time time-
consuming
consuming operation
operation which
which involved
involved years years of of detailed
detailed training
training andand thethe painstaking
painstaking
construction
construction of “legends” to give the illegals false identities. The largely improvised
of "legends" to give the illegals false identities. The largely improvised
attempt
attempt totoexpand
expand the the illegal
illegal network
network rapidly
rapidly in in thethelate
late 1920s
1920s andand early
early 1930s,
1930s,with with-
out
out thethe detailed
detailed preparation
preparation which which laterlater became
became mandatory,
mandatory, brought
brought into into OGPUOGPU
foreign
foreign operations
operations bothboth unconventional
unconventional talent talent andand aanumber
number of of confidence
confidence tricksters.
tricksters.
Among
Among thesecret scandals discovered by Mitrokhin in KGB files wasthat ofthethe
the secret scandals discovered by Mitrokhin in KGB files was that of ille
ille-
gal
gal residency
residency established
established in in Berlin
Berlin in in 1927
1927with withthethe Austrian
Austrian Bertold
Bertold KarlKarl IlkIlk as
as res
res-
ident
ident andand Moritz
Moritz Weinstein
Weinstein as as his
his deputy.
deputy. A later later investigation
investigation concluded
concluded that that the
the
Centre
Centre should
should have
have noted
noted thethe "suspicious
“suspicious speed"
speed”with with which
which the the Ilk-Weinstein
Ilk-Weinstein resi resi-
dency
dency claimed
claimed to to be
be expanding
expanding its its agent
agent network.
network. Within
Within two two months
months ititwas was report
report-
ing
ing operations in Britain, France and Poland as well as in Germany. Ilk refused to
operations in Britain, France and Poland as well as in Germany. Ilk refused to
provide
provide moremore than
than sketchy
sketchy information
information on on his
his agents'
agents’ identity
identity on on security
security grounds.
grounds.
His
His failure
failure to
to supply
supply detailed
detailed biographies
biographies was was reluctantly
reluctantly accepted
accepted by by the Centre,
the Centre,
which
which was was still
still reeling
reeling from
from the the widespread
widespread unmasking
unmasking of of OGPU
OGPU networks
networks in in the
the
spring
spring ofof 1927. It gradually became clear, however, that the
1927. gradually became clear, however,that thecore of the Ilk-Weinstein core of the Ilk-Weinstein
illegal
illegal network
network consisted
consisted of of their
their ownown relatives
relatives and and that
that some
some elements
elements of of it
it were
were pure
pure
invention.
invention. Its Its agent
agent operations
operations in in Britain
Britain andand France
France were discovered to
were discovered to be be "plain
“plain
bluff,"
bluff,”though
though an aneffective
effectiveway wayof of obtaining
obtaining fundsfunds fromfrom thethe Centre
Centreforfor Ilk
Ilk and
and Wein
Wein-
stein.
stein. The
The network
network in in Germany
Germany and and Poland,
Poland, whilewhile not not wholly
wholly fictitious,
fictitious, was was under
under
surveillance
surveillance by by the
the local
local police
police and and security
security services.
services. TheThe Centre
Centre closed
closed down down the the
entire
entire residency
residency in in 1933,
1933, though
though withoutwithout attracting
attractingthe thepublicity
publicity occasioned
occasioned by by the
the
intelligence
intelligence failures
failures ofof11927.76
927.76
T
TH E M
HE MAA II N
N II N
NF LU
FL EN
UE on
on the
CE
NC E theevolution
evolution of
of the
theOGPU
OGPU and and its
its successors
successorsduring
during the
the
Stalinist
Stalinist era
era was
was the
the change
change in
in the
thenature
nature of
of the
the Soviet
Soviet state.
state. Much
Much of of what
what was
was later
later
F
F r o m L ee n
n ii nn’' sC hCehkenk a tt o S tt aa ll ii nn’' s O G P U / 39
called
called "Stalinism"
“Stalinism”was was inin reality
reality thethe creation
creation of of Lenin:
Lenin: the cult qf
thenIlt o f the
the infalliple lead�r,
infallible.leader,
the
the one-party
one-party statestate andand aa huge
huge security
security service
service with with aa ubiquitous
ubiquitous system system of of surveil
surveil-
lance and aanetwork of of concentration camps camps to terrorize the regime's regime’s opponents. But
while Lenin's
Lenin’s one-party
one-party state left leftroom for comradely debate within the the ruling
rulingparty,
Stalin
Stalin used
used thethe OGPU
OGPU to to stifle
stifle that
that debate,
debate, enforce
enforce his his own
own narrow
narrow orthodoxy
orthodoxy and and
pursue
pursue vendettas
vendettas against opponents both
against opponents both real real and imagined. The
and imagined. The most most vicious
vicious andand
long-lasting
long-lasting of of those
those vendettas
vendettas was was against
against Leon Leon Trotsky,
Trotsky, Lenin's
Lenin’sformerformer Commissar
Commissar
for War.
In its
In its early
early stages
stages at at least, the OGPU's
least, the OGPU’scampaign campaign againstagainst Trotsky
Trotsky and and his his support
support-
ers
ers was
wascharacterized
characterized by by aa bizarre
bizarre combination
combination of of brutality
brutality and and farce.
farce. When
When Trotsky
Trotsky
refused
rehsed to to recant
recant and and admit
admit his his "“crimes
crimes against
against the the Party,"
Party,” he he was
was sent sent into
into internal
internal
exile
exile at Alma-Ata, a town in aa remote corner of Kazakhstan Kazakhstan on on the the Chinese
Chineseborder.
border.
The OGPU detachment
The OGPU detachment which which came came to to his Moscow flat
his Moscow on the
flat Of} , �.9tl]..ing of
the,,morning of January
January
17,
17, 1928
1928 to to take
take him
him intointo exile
exile found
found Trotsky
Trotsky still still in
in his pajamas. When
his pajamas. When he he refused
refused
to
to come
come out,out, the
theOGPU broke broke downdown the the door.
door. Trotsky
Trotsky was was surprised
surprised to to recognize
recognize the the
officer
officer leading
leading the the detachment
detachment as as oneone ofof hishis former
former bodyguards
bodyguards from from the the civil
civil war.
war.
Overcome
Overcome with with emotion
emotion at at the sight of
thesight of the ex-Commissar for
the ex-Commissar for War,
War, the the officer
officer broke
broke
down
down and sobbed, "Shoot
and sobbed, “Shoot me, Comrade Trotsky,
me, Comrade Trotsky, shootshoot me."me.” Trotsky
Trotsky calmed calmed him him
down,
down, told
told him
him itit was
was his
his duty
duty to to obey
obey orders
orders however reprehensible, and
however reprehensible, and adopted
adopted aa
posture
posture of passive resistance
ofpassive resistance while while the the OGPU removed removed his his pajamas,
pajamas, put put on on his
his
clothes
clothes andand carried
carried him him to to aa carcar waiting
waiting to to transport
transport him himtoto thethe Trans-Siberian
Trans-Siberian
Express.
Express.77 77
Save
Save forfor aa few
few hunting
hunting trips,
trips, Trotsky
Trotsky spent spent most most of of his time in
his time in Alma-Ata
Alma-Ata at at his
his
desk. Between
desk. Between AprilApril and October 1928
and October 1928 he he sent
sent his supporters about
his supporters about 550 550 telegrams
telegrams
and 800 "political
and 800 letters," some
“political letters,” some of of them
them lengthy
lengthy polemical
polemical tracts. During the
tracts. During the same
same
period
period he he received
received 700 telegrams
telegrams and and 1,000
1,000 letters
letters from
from various
various parts parts of of the
the Soviet
Soviet
Union, but
Union, butbelieved
believed thatthat atatleast
least as as many
many more more had been confiscated
had been confiscated en route.78 Every
en route.78 Every
item
item inin Trotsky's
Trotsky‘s intercepted
intercepted correspondence
correspondence was was carefully
carefullynotednoted by by the
the OGPU,
OGPU, and and
monthly
monthly digests
digests of of them
them werewere sent sent bothboth to to Vyacheslav
Vyacheslav Rudolfovich
Rudolfovich Menzhinsky Menzhinsky
(Dzerzhinsky's
(Dzerzhinsky‘s successor)
successor) and and to to S Stalin.79
t a l i r ~ Stalin,
. ~ ~ who
Stalin, who never failed to
never failed to overreact
overreact to to
opposition,
opposition, cannot
cannot but but have
have beenbeen unfavorably
unfavorably impressedimpressed by letters which
by letters regularly
which regularly
described
described him him andand hishis supporters
supporters as as "degenerates."
“degenerates.”
OGPU reportsreports on on Trotsky
Trotsky and and his his followers
followers were were written,
written, in inaa ..,tone
�one of of self
self-
righteous
righteous outrage.
outrage. No counter-revolutionary
counter-revolutionary group since the
group since the October
October Revolution,
Revolution, it it
declared,
declared, had had dared
dared to to behave
behave "as “as insolently,
insolently, boldly boldly andand defiantly"
defiantly” as as the Trotskyists.
the Trotskyists.
Even
Even when
when brought
brought in in for
for interrogation,
interrogation, Trotsky's Trotsky‘s supporters
supporters refused refused to to be intimi
be intimi-
dated
dated byby their
their interrogators.
interrogators. Most Most declined
declined to to reply
reply to to questions.
questions. InsteadInstead they they sub
sub-
mitted
mitted impudent
impudent written written protests,
protests, such such as: as: "I
“I consider
consider the the struggle
struggle I am am engaged
engaged in in
to
to be
be aa Party
Party matter.
matter. I shall
shall explain
explain myselfmyself to to the
the Central
CentralControl ControlCommission,
Commission, not not
to
to the
the OGPU."
OGPU.” Early Early in in 1928
1928 the the OGPU carried carried outout itsits first
first mass arrests of
mass arrests Trot
of Trot-
skyists,
skyists, incarcerating
incarcerating severalseveral hundred
hundred of theminin Moscow's
of them Moscow’s �utyrka Butyrka prison. prison. TheThe
Butyrka,
Butyrka, however,
however, had had not
not yet descended into
yet descended into the thebrutal
brutal squalor
squalor for for which
which it it became
became
infamous
infamous during
during the the Great
GreatTerror
Terror aa decade
decade later, later, nor
nor had had thethe spirit
spiritofTrots1...
of Trotsky’s '}" s fol
fol-
lowers
lowers been
been broken.
broken. On O n their
their first
first night
night in in prison
prison thethe Trotskyists
Trotskyists staged staged aa riot,
riot,kick-
kick-
T E WSOWR O
T HS
E A
DNR T
D HA
S
EHN IDE LTDH E S H I E L D /
/ 4
400
ing down doors, breaking windows and chanting chantingpolitically incorrect slogans. "Such," “Such,”
reported
reported the the OGPU indignantly,
indignantly, "was “was the
the behavior
behavior of of the
the embittered
embittered enemies
enemies of of the
the
Party
Party and Soviet power."80
and Soviet power.”8o
The
The liquidation
liquidation of of the
theTrotskyist
Trotskyist heresy
heresy and
and the
the maintenance
maintenance of of ideological
ideological ortho
ortho-
doxy withinthe the Communist one-party state required,
Communist required, in Stalin's view,
Stalin’sview, Trotsky's
Trotsky‘s
removal
removal fromfrom the Soviet Union.
the Soviet Union. In In February
February 1929 1929 the the great
great heretic
heretic was deported to
was deported to
Turkey and
Turkey and given
given 1,500 dollars by
1,500 dollars by an OGPU escort
an OGPU escort to enable him
to enable him to "settle abroad."81
to“settle abroad.””
With
With Trotsky
Trotsky outout of of the
the country,
country, the
the tone
toneofOGPU
OGPU reports
of reports on on the
thedestabilization
destabilization and and
liquidation
liquidation of of his
his rapidly
rapidly dwindling
dwindling band band of of increasingly
increasingly demoralized
demoralized followers
followers
became
became more more confident.
confident. According
According to one report,
to one report, "a “a massive
massive retreat
retreat from
from Trotskyism
Trotskylsm
began
began in in the
the second
second half half ofof 1929." Some of
1929.” Some of those
those whowho recanted
recanted werewere turned
turned intointo
OGPU agents agents toto inform
inform on on their
their friends.
friends. The
The same
same report
report boasts
boasts ofof the
the subtlety
subtlety ofof thethe
methods
methods used used to to undermine
undermine the the credibility
credibility ofof the
the "counter-revolutionary"
“counter-revolutionary”hard hard core.
core.
Individual
Individual Trotskyists
Trotskylsts were summoned to
were summoned to OGPU offices offkes fromfrom their
their workplaces,
workplaces, left left
standing
standing around
around in in the
the corridors
corridors forfor several
several hours,
hours, then
then released
released without
without explanation.
explanation.
On
O n returning
returning to to work
work they they could
could give
give no no credible
credible account
account of of what
what had happened.
had happened.
When
When the the process
process was was repeated
repeated their
their workmates
workmates became became increasingly
increasingly suspicious
suspicious and and
tended
tended to to believe
believe rumors
rumors planted
planted by by the
the OGPU that that they
they were
were employed
employedby bythem
them as as
informers.
informers. Once Oncethe the "counter-revolutionaries"
“counter-revolutionaries” were were discredited,
discredited, they they were
were thenthen
arrested
arrested forfor their
their political
political crimes.82
crimes.82
Stalin, however,
Stdin, however, was wasfar farfrom reassured. H
from reassured. Hee increasingly
increasingly regretted
regretted the decision to
the decision to
send
send Trotsky
Trotsky abroad rather than
abroad rather than keep him in
keep him inthe Soviet Union,
theSoviet where he
Union, where could have
he could have
been
been putput under
underconstant
constantsurveillance.
surveillance. OneOne episode
episode onlyonly sixsix months
months after
after Trotsky
Trotsky waswas
sent into
sent into exile
exile seems
seems to to have
have made
made aa particular
particular impression
impression on on Stalin.
Stalin. InIn the
the summer
summer
of
of 1929
1929Trotsky
Trotsky received
received aa secret
secret visit
visit from
from aa sympathizer
sympathizer within within thethe OGPU,
OGPU, Yakov Yakov
Blyumkin. As a young and impetuous Socialist Socialist Revolutionary in the the Cheka
Chekainin1918, 1918,
Blyumkin had assassinated the German ambassador in defiance of orders from
Blyumkin had assassinated the German ambassador in defiance of orders from
Dzerzhinsky.
Dzerzhinsky. With With Trotsky's
Trotsky‘s help,help, however,
however, he he had
had been
been rehabilitated
rehabilitated and and hadhad risen
risen
to
to become
become chiefchief illegal
illegal resident
resident in in the
the Middle
Middle East.East.Blyumkin
Blyumkin agreed agreed to to transmit
transmit aa
message from Trotsky to Karl Radek, one of of his most important former supporters,
and to try to set up lines of communication with
and to try to set up lines of communication what Trotsky
with what Trotsky termed
termed his his "co
“CO-
thinkers"
thinkers” in in the
theSoviet
Soviet Union.83
Union.83Trilisser,
Trilisser, the
the head
head of foreign intelligence,
of foreign intelligence, waswas proba
proba-
bly
bly alerted
alerted to to Blyumkin's
Blyumkin’s visit visit by
by an
an OGPU agent agent inin Trotsky's
Trotsky‘s entourage.
entourage. He He did
did not,
not,
however,
however, order Blyumkin's
Blyumkin’s immediate arrest. Instead he he arranged an early version of of
what
what later became known
later became known as as aa “honey
"honey trap.”
trap." Trilisser instructed an
Trilisser instructed attractive OGPU
an attractive
agent,
agent, Yelizaveta
YelizavetaYulyevna
YulyevnaGorskaya
Gorskaya (better
(better known
known as as "Lisa,"
“Lisa,”or or "Vixen"),84
“Vixen”),84to "aban
to “aban-
don
don bourgeois
bourgeois prejudices,"
prejudices,”seduceseduce Blyumkin,
Blyumkin, discover
discover the the full
fill extent
extent ofof his
his collabora
collabora-
tion with
with Trotsky, and ensure his return to to the
the Soviet
Soviet Union. Once lured back to
Moscow, Blyumkin was
Moscow, Blyumkin was interrogated, tried in
interrogated, tried in secret
secret and
and shot.
shot. According
According to to the
thelater
later
OGPU defector Aleksandr Mikhailovich Orlov, Blyumkin’s Blyumkin's last words before his
execution
execution were, "Long live
were, “Long live Trotsky!"
Trotsky!” Soon
Soon afterwards ((Lisa" Gorskaya
afterwards “Lisa” Gorskaya married
married the the
OGPU resident in Berlin (and later in New NewYork),
York), Vasili Mikhailovich Zarubin.85 Zarubin.’’
As Stalin became increasingly
increasingly preoccupied during the the early 1930s
1930s with the the oppo
oppo-
sition to him within the the Communist
Communist Party, he began to fear that there were other,
F r oo m L e n ii nn ’' s C h ee kk aa tt oo S t a ll ii nn ’' s O
OGPU // 4
4 I1
undiscovered Blyumkins
Blyumkins within IN INO.O. But Trotsky himself had not notyet been targeted
for assassination.
assassination. The main “enemies "enemies of tbe people" outside the Soviet
the people” Soviet Union were
still
still considered
considered to be the White Guards. General GeneralKutepov,
Kutepov, the head of the ROVS ROVS in
Paris,
Paris, was
was brave,
brave,upright,
upright, teetotal,
teetotal, politically
politically naive
naive andand anan easy
easy target
target forfor the
the OGPU.
OGPU.
His entourage was skillfully penetrated by Soviet
was skillfblly Soviet agents, and agents provocateurs
provocateurs
brought
brought him him optimistic
optimistic news news of of aa nonexistent
nonexistent anti-Bolshevik
anti-Bolshevik underground.
underground. "Great“Great
movements
movements are are spreading
spreading across Russia!" Kutepov
acrossRussia!” Kutepov declared
declared in in November
November 1929. 1929.
"Never
“Never havehave so so many
many people
people come
come fromfrom 'over
‘over there'
there’ to
to see
see me
me and
and askask me
me toto collabo
collabo-
rate
rate with their clandestine
with their clandestine organizations."
organizations.” UnlikeUnlike Savinkov
Savinkov and and Reilly, however,
Reilly,however,
Kutepov
Kutepov resisted
resisted attempts
attempts to to lure him back
lure him back to to Russia
Russia for
for meetings
meetings with the bogus
with the bogus
anti-Communist conspirators. With
anti-Communist conspirators. With Stalin's
Stalin’s approval,
approval, the OGPU thus
the OGPU decided to
thus decided to
kidnap him instead and bring him himback for interrogation and execution in Moscow.86 Moscow.86
Overall planningofof
Overall planning thethe Kutepov
Kutepov operation
operation was given to
wasgiven to Yakov
Yakov Isaakovich
Isaakovich
("Yasha")
(“Yasha”)Serebryansky,
Serebryansky,head head of of the
the euphemistically
euphemistically titled titled "Administration
“Administration for for Spe
Spe-
cialBefore
Tasks."87 Before the Second Second World War, the administrationadministration functioned
functioned as a par par-
allel
allel foreign
service, reporting
reporting directly
directly to theCentre
to the Centrewithwith special
special
responsibility
responsibility for sabotage, abduction
for sabotage, abduction and and assassination
assassination operations
operations on foreign soil. 88
on foreign
Serebryansky
Serebryansky later later became
became aa severe
severe embarrassment
embarrassment to to official
official historians
historians anxious
anxious to to
distance Soviet foreign
distance Soviet foreign intelligence
intelligence from from the
the blood-letting
blood-letting of of the late 1930s
the late 1930s andand por-
por
tray
tray itit as
as aa victim
victim rather
rather than
than aa perpetrator
perpetrator of of the
the Great
Great Terror.
Terror. An An SVR-sponsored
SVR-sponsored
history
history published
published in in 1993 claimed that
1993 claimed that Serebryansky
Serebryansky was was «not
“not aa regular member of
regular member of
State
State Security,"
Security,” but but «only
“only brought
broughtinin for for special
special jobs."89 KGB files files show
show that,
that,ononthe the
contrary, he
contrary, he was
was aa senior
senior OGPU officer officer whose
whose Administration
Administration for for SpecialTasks
Special Tasks grew grew
elite service,
into an klite service, more than 200-strong, dedicated to hunting down “enemies «enemies of
the people”
the people" on on both sides of
bothsides of the Atlantic. 90
theAtlantic.”
Detailed preparations
Detailed preparations for for thethekidnaping
kidnapingof of Kutepov
Kutepov werewere entrusted
entrusted by by Serebryan-
Serebryan
sky to
sky to his
his illegal
illegal Paris
Paris resident,
resident, V. I. Speransky,
Speransky, who who had taken part
had taken part in in the deception
thedeception
of Savinkov
of Savinkov six years years earlier.91
earlier.91O On the morning
n the morning ofofSunday,
Sunday, January 26, 1930 Kutepov
January 26,1930 Kutepov
was bundled
was bundled into intoa a taxi
taxi inin the
· the middle
middle of of aa street
street in
in Paris’s
Pru:is's fashionable
fa�,hi9nable seventh
sev<.:!nth
arrondissement. StandingStanding nearby
nearby was was aa Communist
Communist Paris Paris policeman
policeman who who hadhad been
been
asked to
asked to assist
assist byby Speransky
Speransky so so that any bystander
that any bystander who who sawsaw the
the kidnaping
kidnaping (one (one did)
did)
would mistake
would mistake it it for
for aa police
police arrest.
arrest. Though
Though the the Centre
Centre commended
commended the the kidnaping
kidnaping
«a brilliant operation,”
as “a operation," the chloroform used to overpower Kutepov proved too
much for
much for the
the general’s
general's weak
weak heart.
heart. H Hee died
died aboard
aboard aa Soviet,steamer
Soviet st�am�r while whil� bejng
be,ing taken
taken
back to
back to Russia.92
Russia.92
Kutepov operation
The Kutepov
The operation was was to to set
set an
an important precedent. In
important precedent. In the
the early and mid-
early and mid-
1930s the
1930s the chief
chief Soviet
Soviet foreign
intelligence priority
priority remained
remained intelligence
intelligence collection.
collection.
During the
During later years
thelater years ofof the
the decade,
decade, however,
however, all other operations
allother operations were were toto be
be subor-
subor
dinated to
dinated to “special
«special tasks."
tasks.”
TT HH HR EE EE
T EG R
THE GERAETIALTL EI G
l lAEL G
SAlS
OOnn January
January 30, 1930 the
30,1930 the Politburo
Politburo (effectively
(effectively the
the ruling body of
ruling body of both
both the
the Party
Partyand
and
the
the Soviet
Soviet Union)
Union) met met toto review
review INO I N 0 operations
operations and
and ordered
ordered it it to increase intelli
to increase intelli-
gence
gence collection
collection in three target
in three target areas: Britain, France
areas: Britain, France and Germany (the
and Germany (the leading
leading
European
European powers);
powers); the the Soviet
Soviet Union's
Union’s westernwestern neighbors, Poland, Romania,
neighbors, Poland, Finland
Romania, Finland
and
and the
the Baltic
Baltic states;
states; and Japan, its
and Japan, its main
main Asian
Asian rivaU The United
rival.’ The States, which
United States, which
established
established diplomatic
relations with with the the Soviet Union only
Soviet Union only inin 1933,
1933, was not men-
was not men
tioned.
tioned. Though
Though the the first
first Soviet
Soviet illegal
illegal had had been
been sent across the
sent across the Atlantic
Atlantic asas early as
early as
1921,2
1921; thethe USA's
USA’s relative
relative isolation
isolation from from world
world affairs
affairs made American intelligence
made American intelligence
collection
collection still
still aa secondary p r i ~ r i t 3y . ~
secondary priority.
On
O n Politburo
Politburo instructions,
instructions, the the main expansion of
main expansion of IINO operations was
N 0 operations was achieved
achieved
through increasing the
through increasing the number
number of of illegal
illegal residencies, each with
residencies, each with up
up to
to seven
seven (in
(in aa few
few
cases as many
cases as many as as nine)
nine) illegal
illegal officers.
officers. By contrast,
contrast, even
even in in Britain and France
Britain and France legal
legal
residencies operating under
residencies operating diplomatic cover
underdiplomatic cover in
in Soviet embassies had
Soviet embassies had three officers at
threeofficers at
most
most and
and sometimes
sometimes only only one. Their main
one. Their main function
hnction waswas toto provide
provide channels
channels of of com-
com
munications
munications with withthe the Centre
Centre and other technical
andother technical support
support for for the
the more highly
more highly
regarded illegals.4
regarded illegal^.^ During
During the the 1920s
1920s both both legal
legal and illegal residencies
and illegal residencies hadhad had
had thethe
right
right to
to decide
decide what agents to
what agents to recruit
recruit and and how
how to recruit them.
to recruit them. O Onn succeeding
succeeding
Trilisser
Trilisser asas head
head of IINO N 0 in 1930, however,
in1930, however, Artur Artuzov, the
Artur Artuzov, the hero
hero of of the
the
SINDIKAT
SINDIKAT and and TREST operations, complained
TREST operations, complained that the existing
that the agent network
existing agent network
contained
contained "undesirable
“undesirable elements."
elements.’’He H e decreed
decreed that
that future agent recruitment
fbture agent recruitment required
required
the
the authorization
authorization of of the
the Centre.
Centre. Partly because of
Partly because problems of
of problems of communication,
communication, his his
instructions
instructions werewere not
not always
always carried
carried out.’ out.5
The
The early
early and
and mid-1930s
mid-1930s were were to to bebe remembered
remembered in in the history of
the history of Soviet foreign
Soviet foreign
intelligence as
intelligence as the
the era
era of
of the
the "Great
“GreatIllegals,"
Illegals,” aa diverse group of
diverse group of remarkably
remarkably talented
talented
individuals
individuals whowho collectively
collectively transformed
transformed OGPU agent recruitment and
agent recruitment and intelligence
intelligence
collection.
collection. Post-war
Post-war illegals
illegals had
had to toendure
endure longlong training periods designed
trainingperiods designed toto establish
establish
their
their bogus identities, protect
bogus identities, protect their
their covercover and
and prepare
prepare themthem forfor operations
operations in in the
the
West.
West. Their
Their pre-war predecessors were
pre-war predecessors weresuccessful
successful partly because they
partly because they had
had greater
greater
freedom
freedom from
from bureaucratic
bureaucratic routine
routine and and more
more opportunity
opportunity to to use
use their own initiative.
their own initiative.
But they also had totocontendcontendwith withfar softer targets than their successors. By the stan
theirsuccessors. stan-
dards of the Cold ColdWar, most inter-war
inter-war Western security systems were primitive. The
individual flair of the the Great
GreatIllegals
Illegals combined with the the relative vulnerability of of their
Th e G r e a t Ill ega Is / 43
targets
targets to to give
give somesome of of their
their operations
operations aa much much moremore unorthodox,
unorthodox, at times even
at times even
eccentric,
eccentric, character
character than than those
those of of the
the Cold
Cold War.
War.
Some
Some of of thethe ablest
ablest ofof the
the Great
Great Illegals
Illegals were
were not
not Russians
Russians at at all,
all, but cosmopoli
but cosmopoli-
tan,
tan, multilingual
multilingual Central Central Europeans
Europeans who who ha.dh d worked
worked in in thetheComintern
Comintern under under-
ground
ground before
before joining
joining the the OGPU and and shared
shared aa visionary
visionary faith
faith in the Communist
in the Communist
millennium.6
millennium.6Arnold Arnold Deutsch,
Deutsch,the thechief
chief recruiter
recruiter of of students
students and and young
young graduates
graduates at at
Cambridge
Cambridge University
University (discussed
(discussed in in chapter
chapter 4), waswas an an Austrian
Austrian Jew. Jew. The
The mostmost suc-
suc
cessful of
cessful of the Fourth Department
the Fourth Department(Military(Military Intelligence)
Intelligence) illegals
illegals was was the German
the German
Richard
Richard Sorge,
Sorge, later later described
described by by one
one of
of his
his Comintern
Comintern admirers
admirers as as aa "startlingly
“startlingly
good-looking .. .. .. romantic,
good-looking romantic, idealistic scholar," who
idealistic scholar,” who exuded
exuded charm.?
charm.’ WhileWhile Sorge's
Sorge’s
main successes were achieved posing as a Nazi journalist in Japan, those of
main successes were achieved posing as a Nazi journalist in Japan, those of the
the
OGPUINKVD
OGPU/NKVD illegals illegals mostly
mostly tooktook place
place inin Europe.
Europe.
Though
Though the the Great
Great Illegals
Illegals areare nowadays
nowadaysbest best remembered,
remembered, particularly
particularly in in Britain,
Britain,
for
for their
their recruitment
recruitment of of young,
young, talented,
talented, ideological
ideological agents,
agents, their
their first
first major successes
major successes
were
were thethe less
less glamorous
glamorous but but scarcely
scarcely lesslessimportant
important acquisition
acquisition of of diplomatic
diplomatic ciphers
ciphers
and documents from
and documents from agents
agents motivated
motivated by by money
money and sex rather
and sex rather than ideology. Code
thanideology. Code-
breaking
breaking is is often
often supposed
supposed to to depend
depend on on little
little more
more than
than the
the cryptanalytic
cryptanalytic geniusgenius of of
brilliant
brilliant mathematicians,
mathematicians, nowadays nowadays assisted
assistedbyby huge
huge networks
networks of of computers.
computers. In In real
real-
ity, most major
ity, most major twentieth-century codebreaking coups
twentieth-century codebreaking coups on which information
on which information is is avail
avail-
able have been
able have been assisted-sometimes
assisted-sometimes crucially-bycrucially-by agent agent intelligence
intelligence on code and
on code and
cipher systems.
cipher systems.Tsarist
Tsarist codebreakers
codebreakers had led the
had led the world chiefly because
world chiefly becauseofoftheir
their skill in
skill in
stealing
stealing or or purchasing
purchasing the the codes
codes andand ciphers
ciphers of of foreign
foreign powers.
powers. Ten years before
Ten years before the the
First World
First WorldWar War thethe
British
British ambassador
ambassador in in St.
St.Petersburg,
Petersburg, Sir Sir Charles
Charles Hardinge,
Hardinge,dis dis-
covered
covered thatthat his his head
head Chancery
Chancery servant
servant had
had been
been offered
offered the
the thenthen enormous
enormous sum sum of of
1,000
1,000 pounds
pounds to to steal
steal the
the embassy's
embassy’s main main cipher.
cipher. Though
Though the theOkhrana
Okhranafailedfailed on on this
this
occasion,
occasion, it succeeded on
it succeeded on many others. Hardinge
many others. Hardinge was was disconcerted
disconcerted to to be
be told
told by by aa
Russian statesman
Russian statesman that that he
he "did
“did not
not mind
mind howhow much
much I reported
reported in in writing
writing whatwhat he he
had
had told
told meme in in conversation,
conversation, but but he
he begged
begged me me onon nono account
account to to telegraph
telegraph as as all
all our
our
[ciphered]
[ciphered] telegrams
telegrams are are known!"
known!”The The Okhrana became the
Okhrana became the first
first modern intelligence
modern intelligence
service
service to to make
make one one ofof its
its major
major priorities
priorities the theft of
the theft of foreign
foreign ciphers
ciphers to to assist
assist its
its
codebreakers. In
codebreakers. In soso doing
doing itit set
set an
an important precedent for
important precedent for its
its Soviet
Soviet successors.8
successors.8
Research
Research on on the
the making
making of of Stalin's
Stalin’s foreign
foreign policy
policy has,
has, as
as yet,
yet, barely
barely begun
begun to to take
take
account of
account of thethe large
large volume
volume of of Western
Western diplomatic
diplomatic traffic which the
traffic which the Great Illegals
Great Illegals
and
and thethe codebreakers
codebreakers were were instrumental
instrumental in in providing.
providing.
TH E D O CU ME N T
TSS O B TA
T AI N E Dfrom
from Francesco Constantini in
Francesco Constantini .the Bri.tish
inthe British �mbassy
embassyin in
Rome
Rome from
from 1924
1924 onwards
onwards included
included important
important cipher
cipher materia1.9
material.’ KGB
KGB records,
records, how
how-
ever,
ever, give
givethe main credit
the main credit for
for the
the OGPU's
OGPU’s early
early successes
successes in
in obtaining
obtaining foreign
foreign diplo
diplo-
matic
matic ciphers
ciphers to
to the most flamboyant
the most flamboyant of of the Great Illegals,
the Great Illegals, Dmitri
Dmitri Aleksandrovich
Aleksandrovich
Bystroletov,
Bystroletov, codenamed
codenamed HANS
HANS or ANDREI, who
or ANDREI, who operated
operated abroad under aa series
abroad under series of
of
aliases,
aliases, including
including several
several bogus
bogus titles
titles of
of nobility.
nobility. His
His was
was one
one of
of the
the portraits
portraits ofof the
the
leading
leading heroes
heroes of
of foreign
foreign intelligence later chosen
intelligence later chosen toto hang
hang ononthe
thewalls
walls ofof the
the secret
secret
"memory
“memory room"
room” at the KGB First
atthe Chief (Foreign
FirstChief (Foreign Intelligence)
Intelligence) Directorate
Directorateinin
Yasenevo
Yasenevo (now
(now the
the headquarters
the SVR).
SVR). Bystroletov
Bystroletovwaswas aa strikingly
strikingly handsome,
handsome,
T
T H SE WS' O
WRO RT
AD N D
DH SA
E HNI D
E L TD H E S H I E L D / 4
444
multilingual
multilingual extrovert,
extrovert, born
born in in 1901,
1901,thethe illegitimate
illegitimate sonson ofof aa Kuban
Kuban Cossack
Cossack mother
mother
and-Bystroletov
and-Bystroletov later persuaded himself-the
later persuaded himsel6"the celebrated
celebrated novelist
novelist Aleksei
Aleksei Tolstoy.lo
To1stoy.l'
A
A hagiography
hagiography of of By stroletov's career
Bystroletov's careerpublished
published by by the
the SVR
SVR in in 1995
1995unsurprisingly
unsurprisingly
fails to mention
fails to mention either his fantasy
either his fantasy abo,!lt the identity
a b o p the identity of his father
of his father or the fact
or the that one
fact that one
of
of his
his first
first claims
claims to to fame
fame within
within thethe OGPU
OGPU was was thethe seduction
seduction of of female
female staff
staff with
with
access
access toto classified
documents in in foreign
foreign embassies
embassies and and ministries:l1
ministries:" aa technique later
technique later
employed
employed on on aa larger
larger scale
scale byby Soviet
Soviet BlocBlocintelligence
agencies in in operations
operations such such asas
the
the "secretaries
'(secretaries offensive"
offensive"in in West Germany. A
West Germany. A report noted by
report noted by Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin quaintly
quaintly
records that
records that Bystroletov
Bystroletov "quickly
"quicklybecame
became on close terms
on close terms with women and
with women and shared their
shared their
beds." His fi
beds." His rst major
first major conquest
conquest for for the OGPU occurred
the OGPU occurred in in Prague,
Prague, where
where in in 1927
1927hehe
seduced
seduced aa 29-year-old
29-year-old woman
woman in in the
the French
French embassy
embassy whom whom the the OGPU
OGPU codenamed
codenamed
LAROCHE.12
LAROCHE.12Over Over the
thenext
next two
two years
years LAROCHE
LAROCHE gave gave Bystroletov
Bystroletovcopies copiesof
of both
both
French
French diplomatic
diplomatic ciphers
ciphers and
and classified
classified communications.13
communications.13
Bystroletov's
Bystroletov's unconventional
unconventional flamboyance
flamboyance may may helphelp to to explain
explain why why he he never
never
achieved
achieved offi cer rank
officer in Soviet
rank in Soviet intelligence
intelligence and remained simply
and remained simply an an illegal agent,14
illegal agent,14
attached
attached in the early
in the early 1920s
1920s and
and late
late 1930s
1930s to the illegal
to the illegal Berlin
Berlin residency
residency of of Boris
Boris
Bazarov
Bazarov (codenamed
(codenamed KIN).15
KIN).15Unlike
Unlike Bystroletov,
Bystroletov, more
more conventional
conventional OGPU OGPU officers
officers
missed aa number
missed number of of opportunities
opportunities totorecruit
recruit agents
agents with
with access
access to to diplomatic ciphers.
diplomatic ciphers.
One
One suchsuch opportunity,
opportunity, which
which later
later ledled to
to aa personal
personal rebuke
rebuke by by Stalin
S t a h to
to the OGPU
the OGPU
personnel responsible,
personnel responsible, occurred
occurred in in Paris
Paris inin August
August 1928.
1928. A A stranger,
stranger, later identified
later identified
as
as the
the Swiss
Swiss businessman
businessman and and adventurer
adventurer Giovanni
Giovanni de de RyRy (codenamed
(codenamed ROSSI), ROSSI), pre pre-
sented himself
sented himself at at the
theSoviet
Soviet embassy
embassy and and asked
asked to
to see the military
see the military attache,
attachC, or or the
the first
first
secretary.I6
secretary.16 According
According to to aa later
later account
account by by Bystroletov
Bystroletov basedbased on on an embassy report,
an embassy report,
de
de Ry
Ry waswas aa short
short man
man whose
whose red red nose
nose contrasted
contrasted colorfully
colorhlly with with his
his yellow
yellow brief
brief-
case.I?
case.17 HeH e allegedly
allegedly told
told the OGPU resident,
the OGPU resident, Vladimir
Vladimir Voynovich:18
Voynovich:'*
This
This briefcase
briefcase contains
contains the codes and
the codes and ciphers
ciphers of
of Italy.
Italy. You,
You, no
no doubt,
doubt, have
have
copies
copies of the ciphered
of the ciphered telegrams
telegrams ofof the local Italian
the local Italian embassy.
embassy.Take the briefcase
Take the briefcase
and
and check
check the
the authenticity
authenticity ofits
of its contents.
contents. Once
Once you
you have
havesatisfied
satisfied yourself
yourself that
that
they
they are
are genuine, photograph them
genuine, photograph them andandgive
give me
me 200,000
200,000 French
French francs.
francs.
De
De RyRy also
also offered
offered toto provide
provide future
future Italian
Italian diplomatic
diplomatic ciphers
ciphers for
for aa similar
similar sum.
sum.
Voynovich
Voynovich tooktook thethe ciphers
ciphers into
into aa back
back room,
room, where
where they
they were
were photographed
photographed by by his
his
wife.
wife. He
H e then
then returned
returned thethe originals
originals toto dede Ry,
Ry, denounced
denounced themthem as as forgeries,
forgeries, ordered
ordered
him
him out
out of
of the embassy and
the embassy and threatened
threatened to to call
call the police. Though
the police. Though the the Centre
Centre later
later
changed
changed itsits mind,
mind, atatthethetime
time it
it commended
commended Voynovich
Voynovich for for his astuteness in
his astuteness in obtain
obtain-
ing
ing Italian
Italian ciphers
ciphers atat no
no cost
cost toto the
the OGPU.19
OGPU.19
Exactly
Exactly aa year
year later,
later,in
in August
August 1929,
1929, there
there was
was another,
another, similar
similar walk-in
walk-in atat the
theParis
Paris
embassy.
embassy. OnO n this
this occasion
occasion the
the visitor
visitor was
was aa cipher
cipher clerk
clerk from
from the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office Com
Com-
munications
munications Department,
Department, ErnestErnest Holloway
Holloway Oldham,
Oldham, then then accompanying
accompanying aa British
British
trade
trade delegation
delegation in in Paris.
Paris. Voynovich
Voynovich seemsseemsto to have
have tried
tried to
to repeat
repeat the
the deception
deception prac
prac-
ticed
ticed on
on de
de Ry
Ry aa year
year earlier. Oldham, however,
earlier.Oldham, however, was wasmore
more cautious
cautious than
than de
de Ry,
Ry, brought
brought
no
no cipher
cipher material
material with
with him,
him, tried
tried to
to prevent
prevent hishis identity
identity being
being discovered
discovered and
and sought
sought
to
to limit
limit his
his contact
contact with
with thetheOGPU to to aa single
single transaction.
transaction. HeH e identified
identified himself
himself only
only
T
T h e G r e a tt II ll ll ee gg a ll s / 45
as
as "Charlie,"
“Charlie,” misled Voynovich by
misled Voynovich by claiming
claiming to to work
work in in thethe Foreign
Foreign Offi Officece printing
printing
department,
department, and and announced
announced that that he he could
could obtain
obtain aa copy copy of of the
the British
British diplomatic
diplomatic
cipher.
cipher. Oldham
Oldham asked asked forfor 50,000 pounds, Voynovich
50,000 pounds, Voynovich beat beat himhim down
down to 10,000 pounds
to 10,000 pounds
and
and they
they agreed
agreed on on aa meeting
meeting in in Berlin
Berlin early
early thethe following
following year. year.2020
Before
Before that that meeting
meeting took place, the
took place, work of
the work of the
the Paris
Paris embassy
embassy and OGPU resi-
and OGPU resi
dency was
dency was disrupted
disrupted by by the
the defection
defection of of the
the Soviet
Soviet charge
char& d'affaires,
d’affaires, Grigori Bese
Grigori Bese-
dovsky,
dovsky, in October 1929.
in October 1929. Accused
Accused of of counter-revolutionary
counter-revolutionary “plotting,” "plotting," Besedovsky
Besedovsky
made aa dramatic
made dramatic escapeescape overover the embassy wall,
the embassy pursued by
wall, pursued OGPD guards
by OGPU guards who who hadhad
orders to
orders to return
return himhim to to Moscow
Moscow for for interrogation
interrogation and, and, almost certainly, execution.
almost certainly, execution.
Besedovsky's memoirs,
Besedovsl$s memoirs, published
published in in 1930,
1930, caused outrage in
caused outrage inthe the Centre. They
Centre. They
denounced
denounced Stalin Stalin as as "the
“the embodiment
embodiment of of the most senseless
the most senseless type type of of oriental
oriental despo-
despo
tism
tism,”, " and
and revealed
revealed aa number
number of of OGPU
OGPD secrets: secrets: among
among them themthe offers of
theoffers of Italian
Italian and
and
British
British ciphers
ciphers to to the Paris residency
the Paris residency by by unidentified
unidentified walk-ins.21
walk-ins.21
These revelations led
These revelations led toto Bystroletov's
Bystroletov’s urgent urgent recall
recall toto Moscow.
Moscow. At At the Lubyanka,
the Lubyanka,
Abram Aronovich Slutsky
Abram Aronovich Slutsky (later
(later head
head of foreign intelligence)
of foreign intelligence) showed showed him him aa copy
copy ofof
Besedovsky's
Besedovskyb memoirs. memoirs. Opposite
Opposite the thereference
reference to to the deception of
thedeception de Ry,
of de Ry, the
the uniden-
uniden
tified
tified walk-in
walk-in who who had had provided
provided ItalianItalian ciphers
ciphers in in 1928,
1928, the the instruction "Reopen!"
instruction “Reopen!”
had been
had been penciled
penciled in in the
the margin
margin by by Stalin
Stalin himself.
himself. Slutsky
Slutsky instructed
instructed Bystroletov
Bystroletov to to
return to
return to Paris
Paris at once, discover
at once, discover the the identity
identity of of thethewalk-in swindled two
walk-in swindled years ear
two years ear-
lier,
lier, renew
renew contact
contact and and obtain
obtain further ciphers from
further ciphers from him.him. "Where
“Where can can II find
find him?”
him?"
Bystroletov
Bystroletov asked. "That's your
asked. “That’s your business,"
business,” Slutsky
Slutsky replied.
replied. "You“You havehave six six months
months to to
"22
track
track himhim down.
down.”‘2
Bystroletov
Bystroletov ran ran dede RyRy toto ground
ground in in aa Geneva
Geneva bar. Believing that,
bar. Believing that, after
after the fraud
the fraud
practiced on
practiced on him him ininParis
Paris two
two years
years earlier,
earlier,dede RyRy might reject an
might reject an approach
approach from from thethe
OGPD,
OGPU, Bystroletov
Bystroletov decided
decided to use what
to use what later
later became
became knownknown as as the
the "false
‘‘false fl,ag"
flag” tech
tech-
nique
nique and and pretended
pretended to to be
be working
working for for the
the Japanese
Japanese intelligence
intelligence service. Though de
service. Though de
Ry was not
Ry was not deceived
deceived for for long
long by by thethe "false flag," he
“false flag,” he agreed
agreed to to sell
sell further
further Italian
Italian
ciphers
ciphers which
which he he claimed
claimed to to be
be able
ableto obtain from
to obtain from .aa corrupt
corruptItalian diplomat. Future
Italian diplomat. Future
meetings
meetings with with de de RyRy usually took place
usually took place in in Berlin, where the
Berlin, where the diplomat
diplomat was was allegedly
allegedly
stationed.
stationed. KGB KGB records,
records, possibly
possibly incomplete,
incomplete, show show thatthat de de Ry Ry was paid at
was paid at least
least
200,000
200,000 French
French francs.23
francs.23
Bystroletov
Bystroletov was alsogiven
was also given thethe task
task of of tracing
tracing the the unidentified
unidentified British British walk-in
walk-in
(Ernest Oldham) who
(Ernest Oldham) who hadhad offered
offered to to sell
sell Foreign
Foreign OfficeOffice ciphers
ciphers to to the
the Paris
Paris resi
resi-
dency.
dency. In In April
April 1930,
1930, at at the
the meeting
meeting arranged
arranged in in the previous year,
the previous Oldham (code-
year, Oldham (code
named
named ARNO ARNO by by thethe OGPD)
OGPU) handed handed over over only part of
only part of aa diplomatic
diplomatic cipher,cipher,
probably
probably as as aa precaution
precaution against being double-crossed,
against being double-crossed, and demanded aa6,000-dollar
and demanded 6,000-dollar
down-payment
down-payment before providing the
before providing rest. The
the rest. The OGPUOGPU tried tried to to locate
locate him him after the
after the
meeting but
meeting but discovered
discovered that that hehe had
had given
given aa false address.24
false address.24
Probably
Probably soon soon after
after his
his first
first meeting
meeting with with de de Ry,Ry, Bystroletov
Bystroletov succeeded
succeeded in in track
track-
ing
ing down Oldham in
down Oldham in aaParis bar, struck
Paris .bar, struck up up aa conversation
conversation with with him, him, won
won his his confi
confi-
dence
dence and and booked
booked into into thethe hotel
hotel where
where he he was
was staying.
staying. There
There Bystroletov
Bystroletov revealed
revealed
himself to
himself to Oldham
Oldham and andhis
his wife
wife Lucy
Lucy as an impoverished
as an impoverished Hungarian aristocrat who
Hungarian aristocrat who
had
had fallen,
fallen, like Oldham, into
like Oldham, into thethe clutches
clutches of Soviet intelligence.
of Soviet intelligence. With With his his wife's
wife’s
approval,
approval, Oldham
Oldham agreed agreed to to provide
provide Foreign
Foreign Office
Office ciphers
ciphers and and other
other classified
classified doc-
doc-
T
THH EE S
SW OR
WO RD
D A
ANND
D T
THHE
E S
SHH II E
E LL D
D / 4 66
uments
uments to toBystroletov
Bystroletov to to pass
pass on
on totothe theOGPU.OGPU. Oldham
Oldham was
was given
givenaa first
first payment
payment of of
6,000 dollars,
6,000 dollars, aa second
second of 5,000 dollars,
of 5,000 dollars, thenthen 1,000
1,000 dollars
dollars aa month.
month. Bystroletov
Bystroletov por por-
trayed himself throughout
trayed himself throughout as as aa sympathetic
sympathetic friend, friend, visiting
visiting the
the Oldhams
Oldhams on on several
several
occasions
occasions at their London
at their London home home in in Pembroke
Pembroke Gardens,
Gardens, Kensington.
Kensington. Oldham's
Oldham’s doc doc-
uments,
uments, however,
however, were werehanded
handed over over at at meetings
meetings in in France
France andand Germany.
Germany.
Having
Having originally
originally triedtried toto hold
hold the the OGPU at arm's length,
at arm’s Oldham became
length, Oldham became
increasingly
increasingly nervous nervous aboutabout thethe risks
risks of of working
working as as aa Soviet
Soviet agent.
agent. InIn order
order to put
to put
pressure
pressure on on him, him, Bystroletov
Bystroletov was was accompanied
accompanied to to several
several ofof their
their meetings
meetings by by the
the
head
head of of the
the illegal
illegal residency
residency in in Berlin,
Berlin, Boris
Boris Bazarov
Bazarov (codenamed
(codenamed H KIN), who posed
N ) , who posed
as
as aa rather
rather menacing
menacing Italian Italian Communist
Communist named named da da Vinci.
Vinci. With
With Bazarov
Bazarov and and Bystro
Bystro-
letov
letov playing
playing the the hard
hard man/soft
manlsoft man man routine,
routine, Oldham
Oldham agreed
agreed to to continue
continue but took
but took
increasingly
increasingly to to drink.
drink. Bystroletov
Bystroletov strengthened
strengthened his his hold
hold over
over Lucy
Lucy Oldham
Oldham (hence
(hence-
forth
forth codenamed
codenamed MADAM) MADAM) by by putting
putting his his relationship
relationship with
with her heronon what
what an an OGPU
report
report coyly
coyly describes
describesas as "an
“an intimate
intimate footing."25
footing.’’2s
Though
Though Bystroletov successfully deceived
Bystroletov successfully deceived the Oldhams, he
the Oldhams, he seems
seems to to have
have beenbeen
unaware
unaware that that the the Oldhams
Oldhamswere were also
also deceiving
deceiving him.him. AtAt their
their first
first meeting,
meeting, Oldham
Oldham
explained
explained that that he he was
was "a“alord,
lord, who
whoworked
worked out out ciphers
ciphers for
for the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office and
and waswas
aa very
very influential
influential person,"
person,’, rather
rather than,
than, in inreality,
reality, aa minor
minor functionary.
functionary. At later meet
later meet-
ings
ings Oldham
Oldham claimed claimed thatthat hehe traveled
traveled abroadabroad on on aa diplomatic
diplomatic passport
passport illegally
illegally propro-
vided
vided for for him
him by by aa Foreign Office friend
Foreign Office named Kemp
friend named Kemp whomwhom he he alleged,
alleged, almost
almost
certainly
certainly falsely,
falsely,was wasin
in the
the Secret
Secret Intelligence
Service. Having
Having helped
helped Bystroletov
Bystroletov to to
acquire a British passport in the name of Robert Grenville, Oldham told him that the
acquire a British passport in the name of Robert Grenville, Oldham told him that the
passport had
passport had been personally issued
been personally issued by by thethe Foreign Secretary, Sir
Foreign Secretary, Sir John Simon, who
John Simon, who
believed
believed it it to to bebe for
for aa minor
minor British
British aristocrat
aristocrat of hisacquaintance,
of his acquaintance, Lord Lord Robert
Robert
Grenville,
Grenville, then resident in
then resident Canada. "I
in Canada. “I didn't
didn’t know
know Lord
Lord Robert
Robert was was here
here inin Britain,"
Britain,”
Simon was alleged to have remarked
Simon was allegedto have remarked to Oldham. Mrs. Oldham to Oldham. Mrs. Oldham also specialized
also specializedin in tall
tall
stories.
stories. SheShe told told Bystroletov
Bystroletov that that sheshe waswas thethe sister
sister ofof an
an army
army officer
officer named
named MontMont-
gomerywho,
gomery who, she she claimed,
claimed, held heldthe
the (non-existent)
(non-existent) post post of
of head
head ofof the intelligence ser
the intelligence ser-
vice
vice at at the
the Foreign Office;26 aa later
Foreign Office;26 later note
note on on the
the KGB file,file, probably
probably dating from the
dating from the
1940s,
1940s, identified
identified the the mysterious
mysterious and and possibly
possibly mythical
mythical Montgomery
Montgomery as Field Mar-
as Field Mar
shal Viscount Montgomery
shal Viscount Montgomery of of Alamein!
Alamein! Expert Expert though
though Bystroletov proved as
Bystroletov proved as an
an
agent controller,
agent controller, his his ignorance
ignorance of of thethe ways
ways of of the
the Foreign Office and
Foreign Office and thethe British
British
establishment
establishment made made him him curiously gullible-though perhaps
curiously gullible-though perhaps no no more
more so so than
than thethe
Centre, which was
Centre, which was also taken in.27
also taken in.27
De
De Ry, meanwhile,
meanwhile, was wasproviding
providingBystroletov
Bystroletov at meetings
at meetings in Berlin with
in Berlin with aa mixture
mixture
of genuine diplomatic documents (Italian ciphers probably chief among them) and
colorful
colorful inventions.
inventions. According
According to to Bystroletov,
Bystroletov, when asked whether
when asked whether some some ofof his
his mate-
mate
rial was genuine, he replied indignantly, "What “What kind of question is that? that? O Off course
they
they areare .. .. .. Your
Your Japanese
Japanese are are idiots. Write and
idiots.Write and tell
tell them
them to tostart
startprinting
printing American
American
dollars. Instead of paying me 200,000
dollars. Instead of paying me 200,000 genuine genuine francs,
francs, give
give me
me aa million
million forged
forged doldol-
lars and we'll
we’ll be quits."quits.’’The Centre was taken in by at least some of de Ry's Ry’s inven
inven-
tions. Possibly
tions. Possibly to to disguise
disguise thethe fact
fiact that
that he he was
was also
also trying
trying totosell
sell Italian
Italian ciphers
ciphers to to thethe
French
French and andother other purchasers,
purchasers, he he claimed
claimed that that Mussolini's son-in-law, Count
Mussolini’sson-in-law, Count
Galeazzo Ciano di Cortellazzo (later Italian foreign minister), had organized "an “an
Th e G r e a t Illega ls / 47
extensive
extensive trade
trade in in ciphers"
ciphers” and,
and, when when aacipher
cipher was was missing
missing from from thethe Berlin
Berlin embassy,
embassy,
had
had ordered
ordered the the liquidation
liquidation of of an an innocent
innocent scapegoat
scapegoat to to divert
divert attention
attention from from himhim-
self
self. Since
Since the
the OGPU believed that
OGPU believed that Western intelligence agencies,
Western intelligence agencies, like like itself,
itself, orga
orga-
nized
nized secret
secret assassinations,
assassinations, it had surprisingly
it had surprisingly little little diffi culty in
difficulty crediting de
in crediting Ry's
de Ry’s
improbable
improbable tale.28
tale.28De De RyRy appears
appears to to have
have tried
tried to to deceive
deceive the the OGPU on on twotwo other
other
occasions by
occasions by putting
putting ititin in contact
contact with with bogus officials who
bogus officials who claimed
claimed to to have German
have German
and
and British
British diplomatic ciphers for
diplomatic ciphers for sale.29
sale.29
The
The Centre
Centre attached
attached greatgreat importance,
importance, however,
however, to to an
an introduction
introduction providedprovided by by
de
de Ry
Ry toto his
his friend
friend thethe Paris
Paris businessman
businessman Rodolphe Lemoine, an
Rodolphe Lemoine, an agent
agent and and recruiter
recruiter
of
of the
the French
French foreign
foreign intelligence service, the
intelligence service, the military Deuxieme Bureau.3o
military Deuxikme Bureau.30Born Born
Rudolf Stallmann, the son of a wealthy Berlin jeweler, Lemoine had begun working
Rudolf Stallmann, the son of a wealthy Berlin jeweler, Lemoine had begun working
for
for the Deuxieme Bureau
the Deuxikme Bureau in 1918 and
in 1918 and acquired
acquired FrenchFrench citizenship.
citizenship. Intelligence
Intelligence for for
Lemoine
Lemoine was was aa passion
passion as as well
well as as aa second
second career.
career. According
According to to one
one of of his chiefs in
his chiefs in
the Deuxieme Bureau,
the Deuxikme Bureau, “He "He waswas as as hooked
hooked on espionage as
on espionage as aa drunk
drunk is is on alcohol."
on alcohol.”
Lemoine's
Lemoine’s greatest
greatest coup coup waswas thethe recruitment
recruitment in in 1931
1931 of of aa German
German ciphercipher and SIG
and SIG-
INT
INT clerk,
clerk, Hans-Thilo
Hans-Thilo Schmidt,Schmidt, whose whose compulsive
compulsive womanizing
womanizing had had run run himhim into
into
debt.
debt. For
For the
the next
next decade
decade Schm�dt (codenamed HE
Schmidt (codenamed ,qnd ASCHE. by
HE.and.ASCHE. by the
the French)
French) was was
the
the Deuxieme
Deuxikme Bureau's
Bureau’s most most irnportant
important foreignforeign agent.31
agent.31SomeSome of of the
the intelligence
intelligence he he
provided
provided laidlaid thethe foundations
foundations for for the
the breaking
breaking of of the GermanEnigma
the German Enigma machine machine
cipher
cipher by by British
British cryptanalysts
cryptanalysts in in the Second World
the Second World War. War,32 32
Mter
After Bystroletov
Bystroletov had had made
made the the initial
initial contact
contact with with Lemoin�
,Lemoine (codenamed
(codenamed REX
by
by the
the Deuxieme
Deuxikme Bureau Bureau and and JOSEPH
JOSEPH by by the
the OGPU),
OGPU), he he was instructed to
was instructed to hand
hand
the
the case over to
case over to another,
another, lessless flamboyant
flamboyant Soviet Soviet illegal,
illegal, Ignace
Ignace Reiss (alias “Ignace
Reiss (alias "Ignace
Poretsky," codenamed RAYMOND)
Poretsky,” codenamed RAYMOND) so so that
that hehe could
could concentrate
concentrate on on running
running Old Old-
ham.
ham. At At meetings
meetings with with Lemoine,
Lemoine,Reiss Reiss posed
posed initially
initially as as an
an American
American militarymilitary intel
intel-
ligence
ligence officer. Lemoine appeared
officer. Lemoine appeared anxiousanxious to to set
set up
up an an exchange
exchange of of intelligence
intelligence on on
Germany
Germany and and foreign
foreign cipher systems, and
cipher systems, and supplied
supplied aa curious
curious mixture
mixture of of good
good and and badbad
intelligence
intelligence as as evidence
evidence of of the
the Deuxieme
Deuxikme Bureau'sBureau’s willingness
willingness to cooperate. An
to cooperate. An Ital
Ital-
ian
ian cipher
cipher which
which he he provided
provided in in May
May 193 19311 seems
seems to to have been genuine.
have been genuine. In February
In February
1932,
1932, however,
however, Lemoine reported the
Lemoine reported the sensationally inaccurate news
sensationally inaccurate news thatthat Hitler
Hitler(who(who
became
became German
German chancellor
chancellor lessless than
than aa year later) had
year later) made two
had made secret visits
two secret visits,to
to Paris
Paris
and
and was
was inin the
the paypay ofof the
the Deuxieme
Deuxikme Bureau. Bureau. "We “We French,"
French,” he he claimed,
claimed, "are “are doing
doing
everything
everything to to hasten
hasten his his rise
rise toto power."
power.”The The Centre dismissed the
Centre dismissed the report
report as as disinfor
disinfor-
mation,
mation, but but ordered
ordered meetings
meetings with Lemoine to
with Lemoine to continue
continue and, and,for
for himhim to to bebe paid,
paid,
probably
probably withwith the the intention
intentionof of laying
laying aa trap
trapwhich
which wouldwould end end in inhis
his recruitment.33
re~ruitment.~~
In
In November
November 1933 Lemoine brought
1933 Lemoine broughtwith withhim himtoto meet
meet ReissReiss the the head
head of of the
the
SIGINT
SIGINT sectionsection of the Deuxikme
of the Deuxieme Bureau, Bureau, Gustave
Gustave Bertrand,
Bertrand, codenamed
codenamed OREL OREL
("Eagle")
(“Eagle”)by by the
the Centre.
Centre.To To try
try to toconvince
convince Bertrand
Bertrand that that he hewaswas anan American
American intel intel-
ligence
ligence officer
officer willing
willing to to exchange
exchange cipher cipher material,
material, ReissReiss offered
offered him him Latin
Latin AIIleri
Ameri-
can
can diplomatic
diplomatic ciphers.
ciphers. Bertrand,
Bertrand, predictably,
predictably,was was more
more interested
interested in European
inEuropean
ciphers.34 Soon after
cipher^.'^ Soon after his
his first
first meeting
meeting with Bertrand, Reiss
with Bertrand, informed Lemoine
Reiss informed Lemoine that that
he
he worked
worked not not forfor American
intelligence but but for
for the
the OGPU.
OGPU. The The Centre probably
Centre probably
calculated
calculated thatthat it it had
had caught
caught Lemoine
Lemoine in in aa trap,
trap, forcing
forcing him him either
either to admit to
to admit to hishis
superiors
superiors that
that he he had been both
hadbeen both paid paid and
and deceived
deceived by by the OG PU or
the OGPU or to
to conceal
conceal that that
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
RDD A
AN D
ND TT H
HEE SS H
H II E
E L
L D
D // 4 88
4
information
information and
and risk
risk being
being blackmailed
blackmailed into
into working
working for
for the
the Soviet
Soviet Union.
Union. The
The
blackmail
blackmail failed.35
failed.35Lemoine
Lemoine had
hadprobably
probably realized
realized for
for some
some time
time that
thatReiss,
Reiss, whom
whom he he
knew as "Walter Scott," worked for Soviet intelligence. Reiss had several
knew as “Walter Scott,” worked for Soviet intelligence. Reiss had several further further
meetings
meetings with
with Lemoine
Lemoine andand Bertrand,
Bertrand, atatwhich
which they
they exchanged
exchanged intelligence
intelligence on
on Ital
Ital-
ian,
ian, Czechoslovak
Czechoslovak andand Hungarian
Hungarian ciphers.36
ciphers.36
W
WHH I LE
LE R E I S S WA
REISS WASS maintaining
maintaining contact
contact with Lemoine, Bystroletov
withLemoine, Bystroletov waswas finding
finding
Oldham
Oldham increasingly
increasingly desperate
desperate to to extricate
extricate himself
himself fromfrom the
the OGPU.
OGPU. By By the
the summer
summer
of
of 1932
1932 Bystroletov
Bystroletov feared
feared that
that Oldham's
Oldham’s worsening
worsening alcoholism
alcoholism and and carelessness
carelessness at at
work
work would
would attract theattention
attract the attention of of MI5.
MIS. TheThe Centre
Centre concluded
concluded thatthat Oldham's
Oldham’s
increasingly
increasingly erratic
erratic behavior
behavior alsoalso risked
risked exposing
exposing Bystroletov
Bystroletov to to aa terrible
terrible revenge
revenge
from
from thethe supposedly
supposedly ruthless
ruthless British
intelligence services.
services. OnO n September
September 17, 17, in
in
recognition
recognition of of his
his bravery
bravery in in the
the face
face of
of nonexistent
nonexistent British
British assassination
assassination squads,
squads, it it
presented
presented him him with
with aa rifl
riflee carrying
carrying thethe inscription
inscription "For “For unstinting
unstinting struggle
struggle against
against
Counter-Revolution,
Counter-Revolution, from from your
your colleagues
the OGPU."37
OGPU.”37
On
O n September
September 30, 30, 1932,
1932, less
less than
than aa fortnight
fortnight after
after Bystroletov
Bystroletov received
received his
his rifl e,
rifle,
Oldham
Oldham resigned
resigned from
from the
the Foreign
Foreign Office,
Office, unable
unable to to stand
stand the
the pressures
pressures ofof his
his double
double
life.38
life.38To
To his
his despair,
despair,the
the OGPU
OGPU still still refused
refused to
to leave
leave him
him in peace. Over
in peace. Over thethenext
next year
year
Bystroletov
Bystroletov extracted
extracted from
from himhim details
details of
of all his
his former
former colleagues
the Communi
Communi-
cations
cations Department,
Department, hoping
hoping to to recruit
recruit at
at least
least one
one of of them
them as as Oldham's
Oldham’s successor.
successor.As As
his
his drinking
drinking got gotfurther
furtheroutout of control,
control,
of Oldham
Oldham became
became convinced
convincedthat that his
his arrest
arrest was
was
only
only aa matter
matter of of time.
time. His
His wife
wife told
told Bystroletov
Bystroletov thatthat her
her husband
husband believed
believed that
that the
the
permanent
permanent under-secretary
under-secretary at at the
the Foreign
Foreign Office,
Office, Sir Robert Vansittart,
Sir Robert Vansittart, had
had person
person-
ally
ally put
put him
him under
under observation
observation and and that
that British
intelligence was also on
was also on the
the trail
trail of
of
Bystroletov.39
by st role to^.^^ Though
Though there
there was
was probably
probably no no substance
substance to to these
these fears,
fears, the
the Centre
Centretook took
them
them seriously.
seriously.The
The OGPUOGPUtrouble-shooter
trouble-shooter and and "flying
“flying illegal"
illegal”Teodor
Teodor Maly
Maly reported
reported
to
to the
theCentre
Centrefrom
from London
London on onJuly
July 66 that
that Bystroletov
Bystroletov was wasinin great
great danger:
danger:
It
It is
is possible
possible thatthat AND
ANDREI REI [Bystroletov]
[Bystroletov] will
will be
be liquidated
liquidated by
by the
the enemy.
enemy.
None
None the the less
less II have
have not
not given
given an
an order
order for
for his
his immediate
immediate departure.
departure. For
For him
him
to
to depart
depart nownow would
would mean
mean the
the loss
loss of
of aa source
source of
of such
such importance
importance [Oldham]
[Oldham]
that
that ititwould
would weaken
weaken ourour defense
defense and
and increase
increase the
the power
power of ofthe
the enemy.
enemy.The
The loss
loss
of
of ANDREI
ANDREI is possible today,
is possible today, as
as is
is that
that of
of other
other colleagues
colleagues tomorrow.
tomorrow. The
The
nature
nature of of their
their work
work makes
makes such
such risks
risks unavoidable.40
~navoidable.~’
The
The Centre
Centre replied
replied on
on August
August 10:
10:
Please
Please inform
inform ANDREI
ANDREI that that we
we here
here are
are fully
fully aware
awareof
of the
the self-denial,
self-denial, disci
disci-
pline,
pline, resourcefulness
resourcefulness and
and courage
courage that
that he
he has
has shown
shown in
in the
the very
very difficult
difficult and
and
dangerous
dangerous conditions
conditions of
of recent
recent days
days while
while working
working with
with ARNO.41
ARN0.41
Bystroletov
Bystroletov continued
continued to
to receive
receive high
high praise
praise for
for his
his skill
skill in
in outwitting
outwitting aaBritish
British ver
ver-
sion
sion of
of the
the Serebryansk-y Service
Serebryansky Service which
which existed
existed only
only in
in the
theconspiratorial
conspiratorial imagination
imagination
of
of the
the OGPU.
OGPU.
T h ee G r ee aa tt II ll ll ee g
g a ll s I/ 4
4 99
On
O n September
September 29, 1933, almost
29,1933, almost aa yearyear to to the
theday
day after
after his
his resignation
resignation fromfrom thethe For
For-
eign
eign Offi ce, Oldham
Office, Oldham was was found
found unconscious
unconscious in in the
the gas-filled
gas-filled kitchen
kitchen of of his
his house
house inin
Pembroke
Pembroke Gardens,
Gardens, rushed
rushed to to thethehospital
hospital and and pronounced
pronounced dead dead onon arrival.
arrival. An inquest
inquest
found
found that
that he he had
had taken
taken his
his life
life by by "coal
“coal gas gassuffocation"
suffocation”while whileof
of "unsound
“unsound mind."42
mind.’742
The
The Centre
Centre had had no no doubt
doubt that Oldham had
that Oldham had been
been murcI.�red.
murdered. Its Its report
report on on hishis death
death
concluded:
concluded: "In “In order
order toto avoid
avoid aa scandal
scandal the [British] intelligence
the [British] intelligence service
service had had ARNO
ARNO
physically
physically eliminated,
eliminated,making
making his his death
death appear
appear to to be
be suicide."
suicide.”ItIt believed,
believed, however,
however,that
that
Bystroletov
Bystroletov had had disguised
disguised his his identity
identity so so successfully
successfdly that that the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office believed
believed
Oldham
Oldham had had been
been working
working for for French
French rather
rather than
than Soviet
Soviet intelligence.43
intelligen~e.‘~
Oldham's
Oldham’s suicidesuicide did
did little
little ifif anything
anything to to alert
alert the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office to to the
the chronic
chronic
problems
problems of of its
its own
own sequity
security and and that that ofof British
British embassies
embassies abroad.44
abroad.44Still
Still concerned
concerned-
by
by fears
fears that
that he he was
was being
being pursued
pursued by by aa secret
secret British
British assassination
assassination squad,
squad, however,
however,
Bystroletov
Bystroletov failedfailed toto grasp
grasp howhow relatively
relatively unprotected
unprotected aa target target the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office
remained.
remained. He H e concluded
concluded thatthat aasafersafer recruiting
recruiting ground
ground was was Geneva,
Geneva, where
where several
several ofof
Oldham's
Oldham’s former
former colleagues
colleagueswere wereworking
working as as cipher
cipher clerks
clerks with
with thetheBritish
British delegation
delegation
to
to the
the League
League of of Nations.
Nations. In In December
December 1933 1933 he he made
made contact
contact there
there with Raymond
with,Raymond
Oake
Oake (codenamed SHELLEY),one of themost promising potential recruits in
(codenamed SHELLEY), one of the most promising potential recruits in the
the
communications
communications department department identified
identified by by Oldham.45
Oldham.45Oake Oake had had good
good reason
reason to to
resent
resent hishis underprivileged
underprivileged status. status. Since
Since joining
joining the the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office in 1920 he
in 1920 he had
had
remained
remained in in thethe lowly
lowly rank
rank of of "temporary
“temporary clerk" clerk”without
without pension
pension rights.46
rights.46Bystrole
Bystrole-
tov
tov handed
handed over over the
the cultivation
cultivation of of Oake
Oake to tothe
theDutch
Dutch art�st
artist JI.eJ:}ri
Henri <::: :hristian ("Han"
Christian (“Han”) )
Pieck,
Pieck, who
who operated
operated as as an
an OGPU
OGPU illegal illegal codenamed
codenamed COOPER.47
COOPER.47
Pieck
Pieck was was almost
almost asas flamboyant
flamboyant an an extrovert
extrovert as as Bystroletov,
Bystroletov,with with aaconvivial
convivial man man-
ner
ner which
which won won himhim aawide
wide circle
circle of of friends
friends and and acquaintances
acquaintances among among British
British officials
officials
and
and journalists
journalists in in Geneva.
Geneva. He H e invited
invited OakeOake and and oth�r
other cipher
cipher clerks
clerks to to stay
stay atat his
his
house
house in in The
The Hague
Hague where
where he he lavished
lavished charmcharm and and hospitality
hospitality on on them
them while
while assess
assess-
ing
ing them
them as as possible
possible recruits.
recruits. Oake's
Oake’s main main service
service to to Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence was was toto pro
pro-
vide
vide an introductiontoto
an introduction Captain
Captain JohnJohn H. H. King,
King, who joinedthe
who joined the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office
communications
communications department department as as aa "temporary
“temporary clerk" clerk” in in 193448
193445and and subsequently
subsequently
became
became aa far far more
more important
important agent agent thanthan Oake Oakehimself.
himself. Pieck
Pieck reported
reported thatthat King
King had
had
been
been born
born in in Ireland, considered himself
Ireland, considered himself IrishIrish rather
rather thanthan British
British and,
and, though
though anti
anti-
Soviet,
Soviet, also
also "hated
“hated the theEnglish."
English.” Estranged
Estranged from from hishis wife
wife and
and with
with anan American
American mis mis-
tress
tress to
to support,
support,hehe found
foundit difficult
difficult
it to
to live
live on
on his
his mode�t
modest F'oreign
Foreign Office
Office salary.
salary. Pieck
Pieck
cultivated
cultivated KingKing with
with patience
patience and and skill.
skill. OnO n one
one occasion
occasion he he and
and his
his �fe
wife !ook
took KiIlg
King
and
and his
his lover
lover for for an
an expensive
expensive touringtouring holiday
holiday in in Spain,
Spain, staying
staying atat the best hotels.
the best hotels.
Mrs.
Mrs. Pieck
Pieck complained
complained that that thethewhole
whole holiday
holiday had had been
been "a “a real
real ordeal"
ordeal”andand that
that King
King
and
and his
his mistress
mistress werewere "incredibly
“incrediblyboring."49
boring.’749 The
The Piecks'
Piecks’hospitality,
hospitdlty, however,
however, paid paid off
off
handsomely. Seven months after his first meeting
handsomely. Seven months after his first meeting with Pieck, King (henceforth with Pieck, King (henceforth
codenamed
codenamed MAG) MAG) began began to to hand
hand over over large
large amounts
amounts of of classified
classified material,
material, includ
includ-
ing
ing Foreign
Foreign OfficeOffice telegrams,
telegrams, ciphers ciphers and and secret
secret daily
daily and
and weekly
weekly summaries
summaries of of
diplomatic
diplomatic correspondence.
corre~pondence.~’ 50
AN
AN A
AN LY
NAL the
the Centre
Y SSII SS BY
BY Centreconcluded
concluded that
that apo,u�3Q
abo,ut 30 percent
percent of
of King's
King’s material
material was
was
the
the same
same as
as that
that provided
provided by
by Francesco
Constantini (DUNCAN),
(DUNCAN), the the long-serving
long-serving
T E WSOW
T H SE RO
D NR TDDH SE
A AHNI D
E L TD H E S H I E L D / 50
OGPU
OGPU agent agent in in the
the British
British embassy
embassy at at Rome.51
Rome.” The The overlap
overlap was,was, almost
almost certainly,
certainly,
regarded
regarded as as useful
useful for for checking
checking the the authenticity
authenticityof the documents
of the documents received
received from from bothboth
agents.
agents. It It was
was aa sign
sign of the importance
of the importance attachedattached to to Constantini's
Constantini’s intelligence
intelligence that that
Abram
Abram Aronovich
Aronovich Slutsky,Slutsky, whowho succeeded
succeeded Artuzov
Artuzov as head ofINO
as head of I N 0 in in 1934,
1934, decided
decided
to
to transfer
transfer him him from
from the the legal
legal residency
residency in in Rome
Rome to another of
to another of the Great I1legals,
the Great Illegals,
Moisei Markovich
Moisei Markovich AkselrodAkselrod (codenamed
(codenamed OST OST or or OSTO),
OSTO), one one ofof the
the leading
leading Soviet
Soviet
agent controllers. Born
agent controllers. Born intointo aaJewish
Jewish family
family in in Smolensk
Smolensk in in 11898,
898, Akselrod
Akselrod had been
had been
aa member
member of of the
the Russian
Russian branchbranch of of the Zionist socialist
the Zionist socialist organization
organization Poale Poale Zion,
Zion,
until
until its its dissolution
dissolution in in 1922.
1922. He H e then joinedthe
then joined the Bolsheviks
Bolsheviks and and inin 1925
1925 beganbegan aa
career
career in in INO.52
INO.” Like most of
Like most of the Great Illegals,
the Great Illegals, Akselrod
Akselrod was was aa remarkable
remarkable lin lin-
guist-fluent
guist-fluent in in Arabic,
Arabic, English,
English, French,
French, German
German and and Italian-and,
Italian-and, according
according to to aa
fellow
fellow illegal,
illegal, aa man
man of of"extraordinary
“extraordinary culture"
culture” with with "a “a fine
fine indifference
indifference to to risk. ,,53 In In
ri~k.’”~
1934
1934 he hetraveled
traveled to Rome on
to Rome onan
an Austrian
Austrian passport
passport to establish aa new
to establish new illegal residency
illegal residency
and
and actact asas Constantini's
Constantini’s controller.
controller. He H e had
had his his first
first meeting
meeting with with Constantini
Constantini ininJan Jan-
uary
uary 1935.54
1935.54
Few-if any-Soviet controllers
Few-if any-Soviet controllers everever met
met an an agent
agent as as frequently
frequently as as Akselrod
Akselrod saw saw
Constantini.
Constantini. At At times
times theythey hadhad almost
almost daily
daily meetings.
meetings. O Onn October
October 27, 1935 the
27,1935 the Cen Cen-
tre
tre cabled
cabled Akselrod:
Akselrod: "Between September 24
“Between September 24 andand October
October 14 14 you met [Constantini]
you met [Constantini]
16 times.
16 times. There
There mustmust be be no more than
no more than two
two or or three
three meetings
meetings aa week."
week.” It is not
It is diffi
not diffi-
cult
cult toto understand
understand Akselrod's
Akselrod’s enthusiasm
enthusiasm for for agent
agent DUNCAN.
DUNCAN. Constantini supplied
Constantini supplied
him
him withwith aa remarkable
remarkable range range of of documents
cipher material
material fromfrom embassy
embassy red red
boxes,
boxes, diplomatic
diplomatic bags, bags, filing
filing cabinets
cabinets and-probably-the
and-probably-the embassy safe.
embassy safe. FarFar from
from
consisting
consisting simply simply of of material
material on on British-Italian
British-Italian relations,
relations, the the documents
documents included included
Foreign
Foreign OfficeOffice reports
reports and and British ambassadors' despatches
British ambassadors’ despatches on on aagreat
great variety
variety of of major
major
international
international issues,issues, which
which werewere sentsent for
for information
information to to the
theRome
Rome embassy.
embassy. A A Centre
Centre
report
report noted
noted on on November
November 15, 1935 that
15,1935 thatno
no fewer
fewer than
than 101101 of of the
the British
British documents
documents
obtained
obtained from from Constantini
Constantini since since thethe beginning
beginning of of the
the year
year had been judged
had been judged suffisuffi-
ciently
ciently important
important to to be
be "sent
“sent to Comrade Stalin"
to Comrade Stalin”:: among
among them them thethe Foreign
Foreign Office
Office
records
records of of talks
talks between
between Sir Sir John
John Simon,
Simon, the the British
British Foreign Secretary, Anthony
Foreign Secretary, Anthony
Eden,
Eden, juniorjuniorForeign
Foreign Office
Office minister
minister (who(who became
became ForeignForeignSecretary
Secretary at at the
theend endof
of thethe
year), and
year), Hitler in
and Hitler in Berlin; between Eden
Berlin; between Eden and and Litvinov,
Litvinov, the the Soviet
Soviet Commissar
Commissar for for
Foreign
Foreign Mfairs,
Affairs, inin Moscow;
Moscow; between
between Eden Eden and and Joseph Beck, the
Joseph Beck, the Polish
Polish foreign
foreign min min-
ister,
ister, inin Warsaw;
Warsaw; between
between Eden Eden and and Edvard
Edvard Benes,Beneg, the the Czechoslovak
Czechoslovak foreign foreign minis
minis-
ter,
ter, in
in Prague;
Prague; and and between
between Eden Eden and and Mussolini
Mussolini in in Rome.55
Rome.”
A
A striking
striking omission
omission from from thethe Centre's
Centre’s list list of
of the
the most
most important
important Foreign
Foreign Office
Office
documents
documents supplied supplied to to Stalin
Stalin was Eden's account
was Eden’s account of his talks
of his talks with
with himhim during
during his his
visit
visit to to Moscow
Moscow in in March
March1935-despite
1935”despite the thefact
fact that
that this
this document
document was was sent
sent to to thethe
Rome
Rome embassy
embassy and and waswas probably
probably amongamong those thoseobtained
obtained by Constantini.56 Since
by C~nstantini.’~ Since this this
was Stalin's first
was Stalin’s first meeting
meeting with with aa minister
minister from from aa Western
Western government,
government, their their talkstalks
were
were of of unusual
unusual significance.
significance.The The mostmost likely
likely explanation
explanation for for the
the Centre's
Centre’s failure
failure to to
send
send the the British record of
British record of the
the meeting
meeting to to the
the Kremlin
Kremlin is is that
that Slutsky
Slutsky feared
feared to to pass
pass
on
on toto Stalin
Stalin some
some of of Eden's
Eden’s comments
comments about about him.him. INO I N 0 would
would havehave been
been unembar
unembar-
rassed
rassed to to report
report the thefact
fact that
that Eden
Eden was was impressed
impressed by by Stalin's
Stalin’s "remarkable
“remarkable knowledge
knowledge
and understanding of
and understanding international affairs."
of international affairs.” But But it it doubtless
doubtless lacked
lacked the the nerve
nerve to to
T
T h e G r e a It l lIel gl ea gl as l s / 51I
S
repeat
repeat Eden's conclusion that.
Eden’s conclusion that Stalin
Stalin w:a,
wasS "a
“a mal}
man of. �!r(:mg oriental
of,strong oriental traits of character
traits of character
with
with unshakeable assurance and
unshakeable assurance and contg>l
control 'Ypost:!
whose <:o:tJ:rt,
courtesy�sy in no way
in no way hidhid from
from us us anan
implacable ruthlessness." The Centre was probably also nervous about reporting
implacable ruthlessness.” The Centre was probably also nervous about reporting
some of
some of the
the opinions
opinions attributed
attributed by Eden to
by Eden to Stalin-for
Stalin-for example, example, that that hehe was
was "per
“per-
haps
haps more
more appreciative
appreciative of of [the]
[the] German
German point pointof of view
viewthanthan Monsieur
Monsieur Litvino[v]
LitvinoI]~].”~~ ."57
There
There waswas no no more
more dangerous
dangerous activity activity inin Moscow
Moscow than than repeating
repeating criticisms
criticisms of of Stalin
Stalin
or
or attributing
attributing heretical
heretical opinions
opinions to to him.
him.
The
The British
British ambassador
ambassador in in Moscow,
Moscow, Viscount
Viscount Chilston,
Chilston, optimistically reported
optimistically reported
that,
that, as
as aa result
result of
of Eden's
Eden’svisit,
visit, "the
“the Soviet
Soviet Government
Government appears appears to to have
have got
got rid
rid ofof the
the
bogey
bogey in their minds,
in their minds, thatthat we were encouraging
we were encouraging Germany Germany against against Soviet
Soviet plans
plans for for
Eastern security."58
Eastern ~ecurity.”~’ Stalin, however,
Stalin, however, rarely-if ever-abandoned aa conspiracy
rarely-if ever-abandoned conspiracy theory theory
and
and remained
remained deeply suspicious of
deeply suspicious ofBritish
British policy.
policy. In In aa communique
communiquk at at the
the endendof of his
his
talks
talks in
in Moscow,
Moscow, Eden Eden had had welcomed
welcomed the the Soviet
Soviet Union's
Union’s support
support for for the
the principle
principle of of
collective
collective security,
security, following
following its its entry
entry thethe previous
previous year into the
year into the League
League of Nations
of Nations
(hitherto
(hitherto denounced
denounced by by Moscow
Moscow as as the
the "League
“League of of Burglars").
Burglars”). But But Stalin
Stalin must
must havehave
learned
learned fromfrom Foreign
Foreign Office
Office documents
documents that Eden was
that Eden was disinclil1ed
disinclined to involve the
to involve the
Soviet
Soviet Union
Union in in any
any collective
collective security
security arrangements
arrangements designed designed to to contain
contain NaziNazi GerGer-
many.59
m a n ~To To. ~Stalin's
Stalin’s
~ deeply
deeply suspicious
suspicious mind, mind, this
this reluctance
reluctance w�s was further
hrther evidence
evidence of of aa
British plot
British plot toto focus
focus , German
German aggression
aggression in the east.60
in the Though he
east.60Though he was
was content
content to to
entrust
entrust most
most day-to-day
day-to-day diplomacy
diplomacy to to the
the efficient
efficient and and far more pragmatic
far more pragmatic Litvinov,
Litvinov,
it was
it was Stalin
Stalin whowho determined
determined the thestrategic
strategic thrust
thrust of of Soviet foreign policy.
Soviet foreign policy.
The
The Centre
Centre had had suspected
suspected for for some
some timetime thatthatitsits principal
principal source
source of of British
British diplo
diplo-
matic
matic documents
documents over over thethe last
last decade,
decade, the the mercenary
mercenary agent agent Francesco
Constantini
(DUNCAN),
(DUNCAN), had been selling
had been selling somesome material
material to to Italian
Italian iIltelligence
intelligence as as well
well as as toto the
the
NKVD. It
NKVD. It had
had dramatic confirmation of
dramatic confirmation of these
these suspicions
suspicions in in February
February 1936,1936, when whenaa
British
British assessment
assessment of of the
the Italo-Ethiopian
Italo-Ethiopian war-purloined
war-purloined byby Constantini Constantini from from the the
British
British embassy-was
embassy-was published published on thefront
on the front pagepage of of the d’ItaZia.61On
Giornale dltalia.61
the Giornale On
being
being challenged
challenged by by Akselrod,
Akselrod, Constantini
Constantini was was forced
forcedto to admit
admit that thathe
he had
had supplied
supplied
some
some documents
documents to to the
the Italians,
Italians, but but concealed
concealed the the large scale on
large scale on which
which he he had
had done done
so.
so. Constantini
Constantini also also admitted
admitted in in 1936
1936that thathehe hadhad lost
lost his
his job
job in inthe British embassy,
theBritish embassy,
though
though he he apparently
apparently omitted
omitted that that he he had
had been
been sacked
sacked for dishon�sty. H
for dishonesty. Hee tried
tried to to
reassure
reassure Akselrod
Akselrod by by telling
telling himhim that that hehehad hada former
former
a colleague in
colleague in the embassy who
the embassy who
would continue
would continue to to supply
supply him him withwith classifi
classifieded documents.
documents. The The colleague
colleague was was later
later
identified as
identified as Constantini's
Constantini’s brother Secqndo (cod(!named
brother Secondo (codenamed DQDLEY), DUDLEY), who who had had
worked
worked as as aa servant
servant in in the embassy Chancery
the embassy Chancery for for the
the previous
previous twenty years. 62
twenty years.62
Secondo Constantini,
Secondo Constantini, however, however, took took fewer precautions than
fewer precautions than his brother
his brother
Francesco.
Francesco. In In January
January he he stole
stole aa diamond
diamond necklace
necklace belonging
belonging to the ambassador’s
to the ambassador's
wife
wife from
from aa locked
locked red
red boxbox (normally
(normally used used forfor diplomatic
docum�nts rather rather than jew
thanjew-
elery)
elery) which
which was was kept
kept in the ambassador's
in the ambassador’s apartmentapartment next next to the Chancery.
to the Chancery. The The
ambassador,
ambassador, Sir Sir Eric
Eric Drummond
Drummond (soon (soon to to become
become Lord Lord Perth),
Perth),who whohad hadpreviously
previously
dismissed
dismissed the idea that
the idea that thethe British
British diplomatic
documents appearingappearing in the Italian
in the Italian
press might
press might have been purloined
have been purloined from from hishis embassy,
embassy, now nowbegan
began to to grasp
grasp that embassy
that embassy
security
security might,
might, after
after all,
all, require
require serious attention. Since
serious attention. Since the Foreign Office
the Foreign Office had had no no
security
security offi cer, it
officer, it was
was forced
forced to to seek
seek th�the help
help of Major Valentine
of Major Vivian, the
Valentine Vivian, head of
the head of
TT H
HSEE WS O
WR O
A
DNR T
D HA
D S
EHN IDE LTDH E S H I E L D // 5
5 22
SIS
SIS counter-intelligence.
counter-intelligence. Vivian Vivian modestly
modestly disclaimed
disclaimed signifi cant expertise
significant expertise In in
embassy
embassy security
security but,
but, in in view
view ofof the
the even
even greater
greater lack
lack ofof expertise
expertise in the Foreign
in the Foreign
Office,
Office, agreed
agreed toto carry
carry out out an
an investigation.63
in~estigation.~~ Once
Once in in Rome,
Rome, hehe quickly
quickly discovered
discovered
an
an appalling
appalling series
series of
of basic
basic lapses.
lapses.The
The embassy
embassy files,
files,safe
safeand
and red
red boxes wereall
boxes were all inse
inse-
cure
cure and
and "it
“it would
would notnot bebe impossible
impossible oror even
even difficult
difficult for
for unauthorized
unauthorized persons
persons toto
spend
spend long
long periods
periods in in the
theChancery
Chancery or or Registry
Registry rooms."
rooms.”
Vivian
Vivian quickly
quickly identified
identified Secondo
Secondo Constantini
Constantini asas the
the man
man probably
probably responsible
responsible
for
for the
the theft
theft both
both of of the
the diamond
diamond necklace
necklace and
and of
of at
at least
least some
some ofof the
the documents
documents
supplied
supplied toto Italian
Italianintelligence:
intelligence:
S.
S. Constantini
Constantini .. .. ..has
has been
been employed
employed in in the
the Chancery
Chancery for for twenty-one
twenty-one years.
years.
He
H e might,
might, therefore,
therefore, have
have been
been directly
directly or
or indirectly
indirectly responsible
responsible for
for any,
any, or
or all,
all,
of
of the
the thefts
thefts ofof papers
papers oror valuables
valuables which
which have
have taken
taken place,
place, or
or are
are thought
thought to to
have
have taken
taken place,
place, from
from this
this Mission.
Mission. He H e was,
was, II understand,
understand, not not quite
quite free
free ofof
suspicion
suspicion of of being
being himself
himself concerned
concerned in in aa dishonest
dishonest transaction
transaction for
for which
which his his
brother
brother [Francesco],
[Francesco], then
then also
also aa Chancery
Chanceryservant,
servant, was
was dismissed
dismissed aa short
short time
time
ago.
ago. Moreover,
Moreover, though
though the
the Diplomatic
Diplomatic Staff
Staff atat the
the time
time did
did not
not connect
connect himhim
with
with the
the matter,
matter, II am
am clear
clearinin my
my own
own mind
mind that
that the
the circumstances
circumstances of of the
the loss
loss
of
of two
two copies
copies of the "R"
of the “ R Code
Code from
from aa locked
locked press
press [[filing
filing cabinet]
cabinet] in the
in the
Chancery in 1925 point towards S. Constantini, or his brother,
Chancery in 1925 pointtowards S. Constantini, or his brother, or both, as the or both, as the
culprits. 64
culprits.64
Though
Though Sir Sir Eric Drummond politely
EricDrummond politely welcomed
welcomed Vivian's
Vivian’s recommendations
recommendations for for
improvements in the security of his embassy, he took little action.65 In
improvements in thesecurity of his embassy, he took littleaction.65In particular, nei- particular, nei
ther
ther he
he nor
nor most
most ofof his
his staff
staff could
could credit
credit the
the charges
charges against
against Secondo
Secondo Constantini,
Constantini,
whom
whom theytheyregarded
regarded as as "a
“asort
sort of
of friend
friend of
of the
the family."66
family.”66Instead
Instead ofof being
being dismissed,
dismissed,
age ht DUDLEY
agent DUDLEY and and his
his wife
wife were-amazingly-invited
were-amazingly-invited to
to London
Londonin in May
May19371937as
as
the guests of His Majesty's Government at the coronation of King
the guests of His Majesty’s Government at the coronation of King George VI, as aa George VI, as
reward
reward for
for his
his long
long andandsupposedly
supposedly faithful
faithhl service.67
service.67
When
When Secondo
Secondo Constantini
Constantini returned
returned from
from his
his expense-paid
expense-paid junket
junket ininLondon,
London, he he
was
was able
able to
to resume
resume supplying
supplying classified
classified British
British documents
documents to to his
his brother
brother Francesco,
Francesco,
who
who passed
passed them
them on on for
for copying
copying by by both
both Akselrod's illegal residency
Akselrod’s illegal residency and
and Italian
Italian
intelligence
intelligence before
before returning
returning themthem toto embassy
embassy fifiles.
les. The
The Centre
Centre regarded
regarded the
the whole
whole
improbable
improbable story
story of
of Constantini's
Constantini’s continued
continued access
access toto embassy files after
embassy files after Vivian's
Vivian’s
investigation
investigation asas deeply
deeply suspicious.
suspicious.Unable
Unable toto comprehend
comprehend the the naivety
naivety of
of the
the British
British
foreign
foreign service
service in
in matters
matters of of embassy
embassy security,
security, itit suspected
suspected instead
instead some
some deep-laid
deep-laid
plot
plot by
by British
British andlor
andor Italian
Italian intelligence.
intelligence. Regular
Regular meetings
meetings withwith Francesco
Francesco Con
Con-
stantini
stantini were
were suspended
suspended in in August
August 1937.68
1937.68
T
THHE
ECCIIPP H
HEER
R M
MAT
A TE
ER obtained
obtained from
R II A
ALL from thethe Constantini
Constantini brothers,
brothers, Captain
Captain King
King and
and
other
other agents
agents in
in Western
Western embassies
embassies and
and foreign
foreign ministries
ministries was passed to
was passed to the
the most
most
secret
secret section
section of
of Soviet
Soviet intelligence,
intelligence, aa joint
joint OGPU/Fourth Department SIGINT
OGPU/Fourth Department SIGINT
unit
unit housed
housed not
not in
in the
the Lubyanka
Lubyanka but
but in
in the
the Foreign
Foreign Mfairs
Affairs building
building on
on Kuznetsky
Kuznetsky
Bridge.
Bridge. According
According toto Evdokia
Evdokia Kartseva
Kartseva (later
(later Petrova),
Petrova), who
who joined
joinedthe
theunit
unitinin
1933,
1933,
T
T h e G r e aa tt II Zl Zl ee g a Zl s / 53
53
its
its personnel
personnel werewere forbidden
forbidden to to reveal
reveal even
eventhe location of
the location of their
their office
office to to their
theirclosest
closest
relatives.69
relative^.^^ Like
Like most
most young
young women
women in in the
the unit,
unit, Kartseva
Kartseva was was terrified
terrified of of its
its head,
head,
Gleb
Gleb Ivanovich
Ivanovich Boky,
Boky, whowho had
had made
reputation firstfirst in
in conducting
conducting the the "Red
“RedTer Ter-
ror" in Petrograd in 1918, then in terrorizing Turkestan later in the civil war.70
ror” in Petrograd in 1918, then in terrorizing Turkestan later in the civil war.7o
Though
Though in in his
his mid-fifties,
mid-fifties, BokyBoky still prided himself
still prided himself on on his sexual athleticism
his sexual athleticism andand
arranged
arranged group
group sexsex weekends
weekends at at his dacha. Kartseva
his dacha. Kartseva livedlived in
in.fear
fear of being invited
of being invited toto
the orgies. During
the orgies. During the the night
night shift,
shift, when
when sheshe felt most vulnerable,
felt most vulnerable, she she wore
wore herher
"plainest
“plainest andand dullest clothes for
dullest clothes for fear
fear ofof attracting [Boky's] unwelcome
attracting [Boky‘s] unwelcome attention.'m
attenti~n.”~’
Despite
Despite the thepersonal
personal depravity
depravity of of its chief, the
its chief, the combined
combined OGPU/Fourth
OGPU/Fourth Depart Depart-
ment
ment unitunit was
was the
the world's
world’s largest
largest and
and best-resourced
best-resourced SIGINT SIGINT agency.
agency. In In particular,
particular,
thanks
thanks to toBystroletov
Bystroletov and and others,
others, itit received
received more
more assistance
assistance from
from espionage
espionage thanthan any
any
similar
similar agency
agency in in the
theWest.
West. The records seen
The records seen by Mitrokhin show
by Mitrokhin show that Boky's unit
that Boky‘s unit was
was
able
able to decrypt at
to decrypt at least
least some
some of of the
the diplomatic
diplomatic traffic
traffic of
of Britain,
Britain, Austria,
Austria, Germany
Germany
and
and Italy.72
Italy.72Other
Other evidence
evidence showsshowsthat
that Boky's
Boky‘s unit
unit was
was also
alsoable
able to
to decrypt
decrypt some
some Jap
Jap-
anese,
anese, Turkish73
and-almost and-almost certainly-American74 and
certainly-American7‘ and French75
French7’ cables. No
cables. No West
West-
ern
ern SIGINT
SIGINT agency
agency during
during thethe 1930s
1930s seems
seems toto have
have collected
collected so much political
so much political and
and
diplomatic intelligence.
diplomatic intelligence.
The
The unavailability
unavailability of of most
most ofof the
the decrypts
decrypts produced
produced by by Boky's
Boky‘sunitunit makes
makes detailed
detailed
analysis
analysis of of their
their influence
influence on on Soviet
Soviet foreign
foreign policy
policy impossible.
impossible. Soviet SIGINT suc
Soviet SIGINT suc-
cesses, however,
cesses, however, included
included important
important Japanese
Japanese decrypts
decrypts on the negotiation
on the negotiation of of the
the
Anti-Comintern
Anti-Comintern Pact Pact between
between Germany
Germany and and Japan.
Japan. TheThe published
published version
version of of the
the
Pact,
Pact, concluded
concluded in in November
November 1936, 1936, merely
merely provided
provided for for an
an exchange
exchange of of information
information
on Comintern activities
on Comintern activities andand cooperation
cooperation on on preventive
preventive measures
measures against
against them.
them. A A
secret protocol,
secret protocol, however,
however, added
added that
that ifif either
either ofofthe signatories became
thesignatories became the the victim of
victim of
"an
“an unprovoked
unprovoked [Soviet]
[Soviet] attack
attack oror threat
threat ofof attack,"
attack,” both
both would
would immediately
immediately consultconsult
together
together on on the
the action
action toto take
take and
and do do "nothing
“nothing to to ease
ease the
the situation
situation of of the
the USSR."
USSR.”
Moscow,
Moscow, unsurprisingly,
unsurprisingly, read read sinister
sinister intentions
intentions intointo this
this tortuous
tortuous formula,
formula, though
though
Japan was, in
Japan was, in reality,
reality, still anxious not
still anxious not to be drawn
to be drawn into into aa European
European war war and
and had
had nono
intention of
intention of concluding
concluding aa military
military alliance.
alliance. Three
Three daysdays after
after the
the signing
signing of of the
the Anti
Anti-
Comintern Pact,
Comintern Pact, Litvinov
Litvinov publicly announced in
publicly announced in aa speech
speech to to aa Congress
Congress of of Soviets
Soviets
that
that Moscow
Moscow knew knew its its secret
secret protocol.
protocol. His speech also
His speech also contained
contained aa curious
curious veiled
veiled
allusion
allusion to to codebreaking:
codebreaking:
It
It is
is not
not surprising
surprising that
that itit is assumed by
is assumed by many
many that the German-Japanese
that the German-Japanese
agreement
agreement is is written
writteninina a special
special code
code in
in which
which anti-Communism
anti-Communism means
means
something
something entirely
entirely different
different from
from the
the dictionary
dictionary definition
definition of
of this
this word,
word, and
and
that
that people
people decipher
decipher this
this code
code inin different
different ways.76
ways.76
The
The success
success of
of Boky's
Boky‘s unit
unit in
indecrypting
decrypting Italian
Italian diplomatic
diplomatic traffic
traffic probably
probably provided
provided
intelligence on
intelligence on Italy's
Italy’s decision
decision to
to join
jointhe
theAnti-Comintern
Anti-Comintern Pact
Pact in
in the
thefollowing
following year.
year.
TH A N K
K SS TO I T penetration
penetration agents
TSS agents and codebreakers, as
and codebreakers, as well
well as
as to primitive Foreign
to primitive Foreign
Office
Office security, Soviet intelligence was able to gather vastly more intelligence on
security, Soviet intelligence was able to gather vastly more intelligence on the
the
foreign policy of
foreign policy of its main Western
its main target, Great
Western target, Great Britain,
Britain, than
than thethe much
much smaller
smaller
TT H
HEE SS W
WO R D
OR D A
ANND
D TT H
HEE SS H
H II E
E LL D
D // 5
5 4#
British
intelligence community
community was wasableable to to obtain
obtain oon n Soviet
Soviet policy.
policy. Since
Since 1927 1927
British
British codebreakers
codebreakers had had been
been unable
unable to to decrypt
decrypt any any high-level
high-level SovietSoviet communica
communica-
tions
tions (though
(though they they had
had some
some success
successwithwith thethe less
less sophisticated
sophisticated Comintern
Comintern ciphers).
ciphers).
SIS
SIS did not even possessa Moscow station. In 1936 theBritish ambassador,Viscount
did not even possess a Moscow station. In 1936 the British ambassador, Viscount
Chilston,
Chilston, vetoed
vetoed aa proposal
proposal to to establish
establish one one on onthe thegrounds
grounds that that ititwould
would be be "liable
“liableto to
cause
cause severe
severeembarrassment."
embarrassment.” But But without
withoutan an SIS
SIS presence
presence he he despaired
despaired of of discover
discover-
ing
ing anything
anythingof of importance
importance about about Soviet
Soviet policy-making.77
p~licy-making.~~
The
The Soviet capacity to understand the political
Soviet capacity to understand the political andand diplomatic
diplomatic intelligence
intelligence it it col
col-
lected,
lected, however,
however, never never approached
approached its its ability
ability toto collect
collect that
that intelligence
intelligence in in the
the fifirst
rst
place.
place. ItsIts natural
natural tendency
tendency to to substitute
substitute conspiracy
conspiracy theory theory for for pragmatic
pragmatic analysisanalysis
when
when assessing
assessing the the intentions
intentions of of the
the encircling
encircling imperialist
imperialist powerspowers was was made
made worseworse
during
during the 1930s by Stalin’s increasing tendency to act as his own intelligence ana
the 1 930s by Stalin's increasing tendency to act as his own intelligence ana-
lyst.
lyst. Stalin,
Stalin, indeed,
indeed, actively
actively discouraged
discouraged intelligence
intelligence analysis
analysis by by others,
others, which
which he he
condemned
condemned as as "dangerous
“dangerousguesswork."
guesswork.”"Don't “Don’ttelltell meme what
what you you think,"
think,” he heisis reported
reported
to
to have
have said.
said. "Give
“Give me me the
the facts
facts and
and thethe source!"
source!”As As aa result,
result, IN I N00 had
had no no analytical
analytical
department.
department. Intelligence reports throughout and even beyond the Stalin era charac
Intelligence reports throughout and even beyond the Stalin era charac-
teristically
teristically consisted
consisted of of compilations
compilations of of relevant
relevant information
information on on particular
particular topics
topics with
with
little
little argument
argumentor or analysis.78
analysis.7sThose
Those who whocompiled
compiled them them increasingly
increasinglyfeared feared for for their
their
life
life expectancy
expectancy if if they
they failed
failed toto tell
tell Stalin
Stalin what
what he he expected
expected to to hear.
hear. Their
Their main main pri
pri-
ority
ority as
as they
they trawled
trawled through
through the the Centre's
Centre’s treasure
treasure trove
trove of of British
British diplomatic
diplomatic docu docu-
ments
ments and and decrypts
decrypts was was to to discover
discover the the anti-Soviet
anti-Soviet conspiracies
conspiracies which which Comrade
Comrade
Stalin,
Stalin, "Lenin's
“Lenin’s outstanding
outstanding pupil,pupil, the
the best
best son
son of of the
the Bolshevik
Bolshevik Party,Party, the the worthy
worthy
successor
successor and and great
great continuer
continuer of of Lenin's
Lenin’s cause,"
cause,”knewknew werewere there.
there. TheThe main
main function
function
of
of Soviet
Soviet foreign
intelligence was was thus
thus to to reinforce
reinforce ratherrather than
than to to challenge
challenge Stalin's
Stalin’s
misunderstanding
misunderstanding of of the
the West.
West.
A characteristic
A characteristic example
example of of the
the Centre's
Centre’sdistorted
distorted but butpolitically
politicallycorrect
correct presenta
presenta-
tion
tion ofof important
important intelligence
intelligence was was its
its treatment
treatment of of the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office record
record of of the
the
meeting
meeting in in March
March19351935between
between Sir SirJohn
John Simon,
Simon,Anthony AnthonyEden Eden and
and Adolf
Adolf Hitler
Hitler inin
Berlin.
Berlin. Copies
Copies of of the
the minutes
minutes were were supplied
supplied bothboth by by Captain
Captain King King in in the
the Foreign
Foreign
Offi
Officece and
and by by Francesco
Constantini in the Rome
in the Rome embassy.79
emba~sy.’~ Nine
Nine days
days before
before thethe
meeting,
meeting, in in defiance
defiance of of the post-First World
the post-First World War War Treaty
Treaty of of Versailles,
Versailles, Hitler
Hitler had had
announced
announced the introduction of
the introduction of conscription.
conscription. The The fact fact that the meeting-the
that the meeting-the fi rst
first
between
between Hitler
Hitler andand aa British
British foreign
foreign secretary-went
secretary-went ahead ahead at at all
all was,
was, inin itself,
itself, cause
cause
for
for suspicion
suspicion in in Moscow.
Moscow. On O n the
the British
British sideside the
the talks
talks were
were mainly
mainly exploratory-to
exploratory-to
discover
discover whatwhat the the extent
extent of of Hitler's
Hitler’s demands
demands for for the
the revision
revision of of the
the Treaty
Treaty of of Ver
Ver-
sailles
sailles really
really was,
was, andand what
what prospect
prospect there
there was was of of accommodating
accommodating them. them. Moscow,
Moscow,
however,
however,saw sawgrounds
grounds for for deep
deep suspicion.
suspicion.While While disclaiming
disclaiming any any intention
intention of of attack
attack-
ing
ing the
theSoviet
Soviet Union,
Union, Hitler
Hitlerclaimed
claimed thatthat there
there waswas aa distinct
distinct danger
danger of of Russia
Russia start
start-
ing
ing aa war,
war, andand declared
declared himself
himself "firmly
“firmly convinced
convinced that that oneone dayday cooperation
cooperation and and
solidarity
solidarity would
would be be urgently
urgently necessary
necessary to to defend
defend Europe
Europe against
against the the .. .. .. Bolshevik
Bolshevik
menace."
menace.” Simon Simon and Eden showed
and Eden showed not the slightest
not the slightest interest
interest in in an
an anti-Bolshevik
anti-Bolshevik
agreement,
agreement, but but their
theirfairly
fairly conventional
conventional exchange
exchange of of diplomatic
diplomatic pleasantries
pleasantries had had sin
sin-
ister overtones in Moscow. According to the Foreign
ister overtones in Moscow. According to the Foreign Office record, “The British Office record, "The British
Ministers were
Ministers were sincerely
sincerely thankful
thankful for for the
the way
way in in which
which they they hadhad been
been received
received in in
T
T h e G r e a tt II ll llee gg a ll s / 55
Berlin,
Berlin, and
and would
would taketake away
away very
very pleasant
pleasant memories
memories of of the
the kindness
kindness and and hospitality
hospitality
shown
shown them."80
them.""
The
The British
British record
record of
of the
the talks
talks ran
ran toto over 23,000 words.
over 23,000 The Russian
words. The Russian translation
translation
circulated
circulated byby the
the Centre
Centre to
to Stalin
Stalin and others in
and others in the
the Soviet
Soviet leadership
leadership camecame toto fewer
fewer
than
than 4,000. Instead of
4,000. Instead of producing
producing aa conventional
conventional precisprecis the
the Centre
Centre selected
selected aa series
series of
of
statements
statements by Simon, Eden,
by Simon, Eden,Hitler
Hitlerandandother participants
participants in
other in thethetalks,
talks, and assembled
and assembled
them intowhat
them into what appeared
appeared asas aa continuous
continuous conversation.
conversation. The The significance
significance of of some
some
individual
individual statements
statements was was thus
thus distorted
distorted byby removing
removing them them from
from their
their detailed
detailed con
con-
text.
text. Probably
Probably at at the
thetime,
time, certainly
certainly subsequently,
subsequently,one one ofof Simon's
Simon's comments
comments was was mis
mis-
construed
construed as as giving Germany carte blanche to
giving Germany to take
take over
over Austria.81
Austria."
Doubtless in
Doubtless in line
line with
with Stalin's
Stalin's own
own conspiracy theories, the
conspiracy theories, the Centre
Centre interpreted
interpretedthe the
visit
visit by Simon and
by Simon Eden to
and Eden Berlin as
toBerlin as the
the first
first in
in aaseries
series of
of meetings
meetings at at which
which British
British
statesmen
statesmen not not only
only sought
sought to to appease
appease Hitler
Hitler but
but gave
gave him
him encouragement
encouragement to to attack
attack
Russia.82
Russia.82In In reality,
reality, though some British
though some British diplomats
diplomats would
would havehave been content to
been content to see
see
the
the two dictators come to blows of their own accord, no British foreign
two dictators come to blows of their own accord, no British foreign secretary and secretary and
no
no British
British government
government would would have
have contemplated
contemplated orchestrating
orchestrating such such aa conflict.
conflict. The
The
conspiracy
conspiracy theories
theories which
which were
were born
born inin Stalin's
Stalin's Moscow
Moscow in in the
the 1930s,
1930s, however,
however,
have-remarkably-survived the
have-remarkably-survived the end
endof of the
the Soviet
Soviet era. An SVR
era. An SVR official history pub-
official history pub
lished
lished in
in 1997
1997 insists
insists that
that the
themany
many volumes
volumes of of published
published Foreign
Foreign Office
Office documents
documents
as
as well
well asas the
the even
even more
more voluminous
voluminous unpublished
unpublished files in the
files in the Public
Public Record
Record Office
Office
cannot
cannot bebe relied
reliedupon.
upon. The
The British
British government,
government, it it maintains,
maintains, is is still
still engaged
engaged inin aacon-
con
spiracy
spiracy toto conceal
conceal thethe existence
existence ofof documents
documents which reveal the
which reveal the terrible
terrible truth
truth . about
about
British
British foreign
foreign policy
policy before
before the
the Second
Second World
World War:War:
Some
Some documents
documents from
from the
the 1930s
1930s having
having to
to do
dowith
withthethe
negotiations
negotiations ofof British
British
leaders
leaders with
with the
thehighest
highest leadership
leadership ofof Fascist Germany, including
Fascist Germany, including directly
directly with
with
Hitler,
Hitler, have been kept
have been kept to
to this
this day
day in secret archives
in secret archives ofof the
the British
British Foreign
Foreign
Office.
Office. The British do
The British do not
notwant
want thethe
indiscreet peering
indiscreet peering at
at the
theproof
proof of
of their pol
their pol-
icy
icy of
of collusion
collusion with
with Hitler
Hitlerand
and spurring
spurring Germany
Germany on ontotoits its
eastern ~ampaign.'~
eastern campaign.83
F 0 U H
T
TH E MM
HE AAGG
N INF II FCI ECNE TNF TI V FE I V E
HR mong the select group of inter-war heroes of foreign intelligence whose portraits
mong the select group of inter-war heroes of foreign intelligence whose portraits
hang
hang today
today on on thethewalls
walls of
of the
the SVR's Memory Room
SVRs Memory Room at at Yasenevo
Yasenevo isisthe the Austrian
Austrian Jew Jew
Arnold
Arnold Deutsch,
Deutsch,probably
probably the most talented
the most talented of of all
all the
the Great Illegals. According
GreatIllegals. According to to an
an
SVR
SVR official
official eulogy,
eulogy, thethe portrait
portrait immediately
immediately "attracts
“attracts the
the visitor's
visitor’s attention"
attention’’to to "its
“its
intelligent,
intelligent, penetrating
penetrating eyes,eyes, and
and strong-willed
strong-willed countenance."
countenance.” Deutsch's
Deutsch‘s rolerole as as an
an
illegal was not
illegal was not publicly
publicly acknowledged
acknowledged by by the
the KGB
KGB until
until 1990.1
1990.’ Even
Even now,
now, somesome
aspects
aspects of of his
his career
career are
are considered
considered unsuitable
unsuitable forfor publication
publication in in Moscow.
Moscow.
Deutsch's
Deutsch‘s academic
academic career
career was
was one
one of the most
of the most brilliant
brilliant inin the
the history of Soviet
history of Soviet
intelligence.
intelligence. In In July
July 1928,
1928, two
two months after his
his twenty-fourth
twenty-fourth birthday
birthday andand less
less than
I
months after than
five
five years
years after
after entering
entering Vienna
Vienna University
University as as an
an undergraduate,
undergraduate, he he was
was awarded
awarded the the
degree
degree of of PhD
PhD with with distinction.
distinction. Though
Though his his thesis
thesis had
had been
been on on chemistry,
chemistry, Deutsch
Deutsch
had
had also become deeply
also become deeply immersed
immersed in in philosophy
philosophy and and psychology.
psychology. His His description
description of of
himself
himself in in university
university documents
documents throughout
throughout his his student
student years
years as as an
an observant
observant Jew Jew
(mosaisch)2
(m~saisch)~ was
was probably
probably intended
intended to to conceal
conceal his his membership
membership of theCommunist
of the Communist
Party. Deutsch's religious
Party. Deutsch‘s religious faith
faith had
had been
been replaced
replaced by by an
an ardent
ardent commitment
commitment to to the
the
Communist
Communist International's
International’s vision
vision of
of aa new
new world
world order
order which
which would
would free
free the
the human
human
race
race from
from exploitation
exploitation and and alienation.
alienation. The
The revolutionary
revolutionary myth
myth image
image of of the
the world's
world’s
first worker-peasant
first worker-peasant state state blinded both Deutsch
blinded both Deutsch and and the
the ideological
ideological agents
agents he later
he later
recruited to
recruited to the
the increasingly
increasingly brutal
brutal reality
reality of
of Stalin's
Stalin’s Russia.
Russia.Immediately
Immediately after after leaving
leaving
Vienna
Vienna University,
University, Deutsch began secret
Deutsch began secret work
work as as aa courier
courier forfor OMS,
OMS, Comintern's
Cornintern’s
international
international liaison
liaison department,
department, traveling
traveling to to Romania,
Romania, Greece, Palestine and
Greece, Palestine and Syria.
Syria.
His
His Austrian
Austrian wife,
wife, Josefine,
Josefine, whom
whom he he married
married in in 1929,
1929, was
was also
also recruited
recruited by by OMS.3
OMS.3
Deutsch's
Deutsch‘s vision
vision ofof aa new
new world
world order
order included
included sexual
sexual asas well
well asas political
political libera
libera-
tion.
tion. At
At about
about the the time
time hehe began
began covert
covert work
work forfor Comintern,
Comintern, he he became
became publicly
publicly
involved
involved in in the
the "sex-pol"
“sex-pol” (sexual
(sexualpolitics)
politics) movement,
movement, founded
founded by by the
the German
German Com Com-
munist
munist psychologist
psychologist and and sexologist
sexologist Wilhelm
Wilhelm Reich,
Reich, which
which opened
opened clinics
clinics to bring
to bring
birth control and
birth control and sexual
sexual enlightenment
enlightenment to to Viennese
Viennese workers.4
worker^.^ At At this
this stage
stage of his
of his
career,
career, Reich
Reich was was engaged
engaged in in an
an ambitious
ambitious attempt
attempt toto integrate
integrate Freudianism
Freudianism with with
Marxism
Marxism and and in in the
the early stages of
early stages of an
an eccentric
eccentric research program on
research program on human sexual
human sexual
behavior
behavior which
which laterlater earned
earned him
him an
an undeserved
undeserved reputation
reputation as as "the
“the prophet
prophetofof thethe
bet
bet-
ter
ter orgasm."5
~ r g a s m . ”Deutsch
Deutsch
~ enthusiastically
enthusiastically embraced
embraced Reich's
Reich‘s teaching
teaching that that political
political andand
,.
i~... . ... . 1 .... .. ...., . .. .
T
The M
M aa gg nn iifi
f i c ee nn tF
t iFv iev e /
1 5
577
sexual
sexual repression
repression were were different
different sides
sides of ofthe
the same
same cq. ip a,p.9:,together paved
c,oin,and~together paved the the way
way forfor
fascism.
fascism. He H e ranran the Munster Verlag
the Munster Verlag in Vienna which
in Vienna published Reich's
which published Reich‘s work work andand
other
other "sex-pol"
“sex-pol” literature.6
literature.6 Though
Though the the Viennese
Viennese policepolice werewere probably
probably unaware
unaware of of
Deutsch's
Deutsch‘s secret secretwork
work forfor OMS,OMS, its its anti-pornography
anti-pornography section section tooktook aa keen
keen interest
interest inin
his
his involvement
involvement with with thethe"sex-pol"
“sex-pol”movement.
movement.’ 7
Remarkably,
Remarkably, Deutsch Deutsch combined,
combined, at least for
at least for aa few
few years,
years, hishis role
role as
as anan open
open disci-
disci
ple
ple ofof Reich
Reich withwith secret
secret workwork as as aa Soviet
Soviet agent.
agent. InIn 1932
1932 he he was
was transferred
transferred from from
OMS
OMS totothe the INO,
INO, and and trained
trained in in Moscow
Moscow as as an
an OGPU
OGPU illegal illegal with
with the the alias "Stefan
alias “Stefan
Lange"
Lange” and and thethe codename
codename STEFAN. STEFAN. (Later, (Later, he he also used the
also used the codename
codename OTTO.) OTTO.)
His
His first
first posting
posting waswas in in France,
France, where
where he he established
established secret
secret crossing
crossing points
points on on the
the
Belgian,
Belgian, DutchDutch and and German
German borders,
borders, and and made
made preparations
preparations to to install
install radio
radio equip
equip-
ment
ment on on French
French fishing
fishing boats boats toto be
be used
used forfor OGPU
OGPU communications
communications in in times
times of of
war.s
war.* Deutsch
Deutsch owed owed his his posthumous
posthumous promotionpromotion to to the
the ranks
ranks of of KGB
KGB immortals
immortals to to
his
his second
second posting
posting in in England.
England.
The
The rules
rules protecting
protecting the the identities
identities and and legends
legends of of illegals
illegals in in the
the mid-1930s
mid-1930s were were
far less rigid
far less rigid andand elaborate
elaborate than than they
they were
were to to become
become later. Early in
later. Early 1934 Deutsch
in 1934 Deutsch
traveled
traveled to to London
London under under his his real
real name,
name, giving
giving hishis profession
profession as as "university
“university lecturer"
lecturer”
and using his
and using academic credentials
his academic credentials to to mix
mix in in uniyersity circles. After
university circles. After living
living in in tempo
tempo-
rary
rary accommodation,
accommodation, he he moved
moved to to aa flat
flat in
in Lawn
Lawn Road,
Road, Hampstead,
Hampstead, the heartland of
theheartland of
London's
London’s radicalradical intelligentsia.
intelligentsia. The The "Lawn
“Lawn Road Road Flats,"
Flats,” as as they
they were
were thenthen known,
known,
were
were thethe first
first "deck-access"
“deck-access”apartments
apartments with withexternal
external walkways
walkways to be built
to be built inin England
England
(a
(a type
type of of construction
construction later later imitated
imitated in in countless
countless blocks.
blocks. of ofco�;-t�il
council flats)
flats) and,
and, at at the
the
time,
time, were
were probably Hampstead's most
probably Hampstead’s most avant-garde
avant-garde building.
building. DeutschDeutsch moved moved into into
number 7,
number 7, next
next to
to aa flat
flat owned
owned by by the
the celebrated
celebrated crimecrime novelist Agatha Christie,
novelist Agatha Christie,then then
writing
writing Murder
Murder on the Orient Express. Express. Though
Though ititis is tempting
tempting to to imagine Deutsch and
imagine Deutsch and
Christie
Christie discussing
discussing the the plotplot ofof her
her latest
latest novel,
novel, they
they may
may nevernever have
have met.met. Christie
Christie
lived elsewhere and
lived elsewhere and probably
probably visited
visited Lawn
Lawn Road Road rarely,
rarely, if if at
at all,
all, in
in the
the mid- 1930s.
mid-1930s.
Deutsch,
Deutsch, in in any
any case,
case, is is likely
likely to
to have
have keptkept aa low
low profile. While the
profile. While the front
front doors
doors of of
most
most flats
flats were
were visible
visible from
from the the street,
street, Deutsch's
Deutsch‘s was wasconcealed
concealed by by aa stairwell which
stairwell which
made
made it it possible
possible for for him
him and and his
his visitors
visitors to enter and
to enter and .leave
leave unobserved.9,
u1].obs�rved.9 DeutschDeutsch
strengthened
strengthened his his academic
academic cover cover by by taking
taking aa postgraduate
postgraduate course course in in psychology
psychology at at
London University
London University and and possibly
possibly by part-time teaching.10
by part-time teaching.” In In 1935
1935 he he waswas joined
joined by by
his
his wife,
wife, who
who had been trained
had been trained in in Moscow
Moscow as as aa radio
radio operator.ll
operator.”
KGB
KGB files files credit
credit Deutsch
Deutsch during during his his British
British posting
posting with with the the recruitment
recruitment of of
twenty
twenty agents
agents and and contact
contact with with aa total
total of of twenty-nine.12
twenty-nineY By By farfar the most celebrated
the most celebrated of of
these
these agents
agents werewere aa group
group of five young
of five young Cambridge
Cambridge graduates,
graduates, who who by by the
the Second
Second
World
World War Warwere
were known
known in in the
the Centre
Centreas as "The
“The Five": An�h�ny Blunt,
Five”: Anthony Blunt,Guy GuyBurgess,
Burgess,
John
John Cairncross,
Cairncross, Donald
Donald Maclean Maclean and and Kim Philby. After
Kim Philby. After the the release
release of the enor
of the enor-
mously
mously popular
popular Western
Western The Magnzjknt Magnificent Seven Seven in in 1960,
1960,theythey were
were often referred to
often referred to
as the
as the "Magnificent
“Magnificent Five." Five.” The The key key to to Deutsch's success was
Deutsch‘s success was . his
his new
new strategy
strategy of of
recruitment,
recruitment, approved
approved by by thethe Centre, based on
Centre,based on the
thecultivation
cultivation of of young
young radical high
radical high-
fliers
fliers from leading universities
from leading universities beforebefore . they entered the
they entered corridors of
the corridors of power.
power. As As
Deutsch
Deutsch wrote wrote to to the
the Centre:
Centre:
T H E S
S W O RR D A N D T H E S H II EE LL D / 58
Given
Given that
that the
the Communist
Communist movement
movement in in these
these universities
universities is
is on
on aa mass
mass scale
scale
and thatthere
and that there isis aa constant
constant turnover
turnover ofof students,
students, itit follows
follows that
that individual
individual
Communists
Communists whom whomwe pluck out
we pluck out of
of the
the Party remain will
Partyremain pass unnoticed,
will pass unnoticed, both
both
by
by the
the Party
Party itself
itself and
and by
by the
the outside
outside world.
world. People
People forget
forget about them. And
about them. And if
if
at
at some time they
some time they dodo remember
remember thatthat they
they were once Communists,
were once Communists, this thiswill
will be
be
put
put down
down to to aa passing
passing fancy
fancy of
of youth,
youth, especially
especially as
as those
those concerned
concerned are are scions
scions
of
of the
the bourgeoisie.
bourgeoisie. It It is
is up
up to
to us
us to
to give
give the
the individual
individual [recruit]
[recruit] aa new
new [non
[non-
Communist]
communist] political
political personality.13
per~onality.’~
Since
Since the
the universities
universities ofof Oxford
Oxford and andCambridge
Cambridgeprovided
provided aa disproportionate
disproportionate number
number
of Whitehall's highest fliers, it was plainly logical to target Oxbridge rather than the
of Whitehall’s highest fliers, it was plainly logical to target Oxbridge rather than the
red brick universities
red brick universities elsewhere.
elsewhere.The The fact
fact that
that the
the new
new recruitment
recruitment was
was based
based chiefly
chiefly
on
on Cambridge
Cambridge rather
rather than
than Oxford
Oxford was was due
due largely
largely toto chance:
chance: the
the fact
fact that
that the first
the first
potential recruit to
potential recruit come to
to come to Deutsch's
Deutsch‘s attention,
attention, Kim
Kim Philby, was aa graduate
Philby, was graduate ofTrin
ofTrin-
ity
ity College,
College, Cambridge.
Cambridge. Of Of the other members
theother members of of the "Magnificent Five,"
the“Magnificent Five,” allall
recruited
recruited asas aa direct
direct oror indirect
indirect consequence
consequence of of Philby's
Philby’s own
own recruitment, three
recruitment, three
(Blunt,
(Blunt, Burgess
Burgess andand Cairncross)
Cairncross) also came from
also came from Trinity
Trinity College
College and
and the fourth
the fourth
(Maclean)
(Maclean) from
from the
the neighboring
neighboring TrinityTrinity Hall.14
Hall.14
Deutsch's
Deutsch‘s recruitment
recruitment strategy
strategy was
was toto prove
prove aa spectacular
spectacular success. By the
success. By the early
early
years
years of
of the
the Second
Second World
World War Warallall of
of the
the Five
Five were
were toto succeed
succeed in
in penetrating
penetrating either
either
the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office oror the
the intelligence
intelligence community.
community. TheThe volume
volume of
of high-grade
high-grade intelli
intelli-
gence
gence which
which they
they supplied
supplied was was to become so
to become so large
large that
that Moscow
Moscow sometimes
sometimes hadhad dif
dif-
ficulty coping with
ficulty coping with it.
it.
AF TTE
ER R G RA D UAT I N G F R O
GRADUATING OMM Cambridge
Cambridge in in June
June 1933
1933 with
with the
the conviction
conviction thatthat "my
“my
life
life must
must bebe devoted
devoted to to Communism,"
Communism,” PhilbyPhilby spent
spent most
most ofof the
the next
next year
year in Vienna
in Vienna
working
working forfor the
the MOPR (the (the Russian
Russian acronym
acronym ofof the
the International
International Workers
Workers Relief
Relief
Organization) and acting as a courier for the underground Austrian Communist
Organization) and acting as a courier for the underground Austrian Communist
Party.15
Party.” While
While in in Vienna
Vienna he met and
he met and married
married aa young
young Communist
Communist divorcee,
divorcee, Litzi
Litzi
Friedman,
Friedman, afterafter aa brief
brief but
but passionate
passionate love
love affair which included
affair which included his first experience
his first experience
of
of making
making lovelove inin the
the snow
snow ("actually
(“actually quite
quite warm,
warm, once
once you
you got used to
got used it," he
to it,” he later
later
recalled).16
recalled).16TheThe first
first to
to identify
identify Philby's
Philby’s potential
potential as
as aa Soviet
Soviet agent-and
agent-and probably
probably to to
draw
draw himhim to to the
the attention
attention of Arnold Deutsch-was
of Arnold Deutsch-was Litzi’sLitzi's friend Edith Suschitsky,
friend Edith Suschitsky,
who
who waswas herself
herself recruited
recruited by Deutsch and
by Deutsch and given
given thethe unimaginative
unimaginative codenamecodename
EDITH.
EDITH.I7 17
In
In May
May 1934
1934 KimKim andand Litzi
Litzi Philby
Philby returned
returned toto London,
London, arriving
arriving some
some weeks
weeks after
after
Deutsch.
Deutsch. Several
Several months
months earlier
earlier Edith
Edith Suschitsky
Suschitsky hadhad also
also taken
taken up residence in
up residence in
London,
London, marrying
marrying another
another recruit
recruit of
of Deutsch's,
Deutsch‘s, anan English
English doctor
doctor named
named Alex Alex
Tudor
Tudor Hart.
Hart. The The newly
newly married
married couple
couple were given the
were given the joint
joint codename
codename STRELA STRELA
("Arrow") .18 In June
(‘‘Arr~w’’).~~ JuneIn 1934 Edith Tudor
1934 Edith Hart took
Tudor Hart took Philby
Philby toto his
his first
first meeting
meeting with
with
Deutsch
Deutsch on on aabench
bench in Regent's Park,
in Regent’s Park, London. According to
London. According to aalater
later memoir written
memoir written
by
by Philby
Philby forfor the
the KGB,
KGB, Deutsch
Deutsch instructed him, "We
instructed him, need people
“We need people whowho could
could pene
pene-
trate intothe
trate into the bourgeois
bourgeois institutions.
institutions. Penetrate
Penetrate them
them for for US!"19
us!’”? AtAt this
this early
early stage,
stage,
however,
however, Deutsch
Deutsch did did not
not tell
tell Philby
Philby that
that he
he was
was embarking
embarking on on aa career
career as as aa Soviet
Soviet
T
The M
M aa gg n
n iifi
f i cc e nn t F ive
Five / 59
agent.
agent. Instead,
Instead, he
he gave
gave him the initial
him the initial impression
impression that
that he
he was
was joining
joining Comintern's
Comintern’s
underground war
underground against international
war against international fascism. Philby's immediate
fascism. Philby’s immediate task,
task, Deutsch
Deutsch
told
told him,
him, was
was to
to break
break all
all visible
visiblecontact
contact with
with the
theCommunist
CommunistParty andand
Party to try to
trywin
to to win
the
the confidence
confidence of of British pro-German and
British pro-German and pro-fascist
pro-fascist circles.20
circles.20AsAs was not uncom-
was not uncom
mon
mon at
at this
this period,
period, Philby's
Philby’s first codename, given
first codename, given him
him immediately
immediately after
after his
his meeting
meeting
with
with Deutsch,
Deutsch, hadhad two
two versions: S OHNCHEN in
versions: SOHNCHEN Germanoror ,SYNOK
in German SYNOK in in Rus
Rus-
sian-both
sian-both roughly
roughly equivalent
equivalent toto "Sonny"
“Sonny”in in English.21
EnglishS2’
Half
Half aa century
century later,
later, Philby
Philby still
still remembered
remembered his his first
first meeting
meeting with
with the man he
the man he
knew
knew asas "Otto"
“Otto”asas "amazing":
“amazing’’:
He
H e was
was aa marvelous
marvelous man.man. Simply
Simply marvelous.
marvelous. II felt
felt that
that immediately.
immediately. And
And [the
[the
feeling]
feeling] never
never left me .. .. .. The
left me The first
first thing
thing you noticed about
you noticed him were
about him were his eyes.
his eyes.
He
He looked
looked at
at you
you asas if
if nothing
nothing more
more important
important inin life than you
life than you and
and talking
talking to
to
you
you existed
existed at
at that
that moment
moment.. .. .. And
And he he had
hada amarvelous sense of
marvelous sense of humor.22
humor.22
It
I t is
is difficult
difficult to
to imagine
imagine any any other
other controller
controller in in the
the entire
entire history
history ofof the
the KGB
KGB as as ide
ide-
ally
ally suited
suited as
as Deutsch
Deutsch to to the
the Cambridge
Cambridge Five. Five. Though
Though four four ofof the
the Five graduated
Five graduated
from Cambridge with
from Cambridge with first-class honors,23 Deutsch's
first-class honors,23 academic career
Deutsch‘s academic career waswas even
evenmore
more
brilliant than
brilliant than theirs,
theirs, his understanding of
his understanding human character
of human character more more profound
profound and and hishis
experience
experience of of life
life much
much broader.
broader. He combined aa . ch�rismatic
H e combined charismatic personality
personality and deep
and deep
psychological
psychological insight
insight with
with visionary
visionary faith
faith ininthe future
future of
the of aa human
humanracerace freed
freed from
from thethe
exploitation
exploitation and and alienation
alienation of of the
the capitalist
capitalist system.
system. HisHis message
message of of liberation
liberation had had all
all
the greater appeal
the greater appeal to to the
the Cambridge
CambridgeFive Five because
because it it had
had aa sexual
sexual as well as
as well as aa political
political
dimension. All the
dimension. the Five
Five were
were rebels
rebels against
against the
the strict sexual mores
strict sexual mores as as �ell
well asas the
the anti
anti-
quated
quated class system of
classsystem of inter-war
inter-war Britain.
Britain. Burgess
Burgess and Blunt were
and Blunt were homosexuals,
homosexuals,
Maclean
Maclean aa bisexual
bisexual and and Philby
Philby aa heterosexual
heterosexual athlete. Cairncross, aa committed
athlete. Cairncross, committed het het-
erosexual,
erosexual, later
later wrote
wrote aa history
history of of polygamy
polygamywhichwhich concluded
concluded with with aa quotation
quotation from from
George
George Bernard
Bernard Shaw: Shaw: "Women
“Women will will always
always prefer
prefer aa 1010 percent
percent share
share ofof aa first-rate
first-rate
man
man to to sole
sole ownership
ownership of of aa mediocre man."24 Cairncross
mediocre man,”24 Cairncross plainly
plainly considered himself
considered himself
first-rate
first-rate rather
rather thanthan mediocre.
mediocre. Graham Graham Greene
Greene was was charmed
charmed by by Cairncross's
Cairncross’s book.book.
"Here
“Here at at last,"
last,” hehe wrote
wrote to to Cairncross,
Cairncross, "is “is aa book
book which
which will appeal strongly
will appeal strongly to to all
all
polygamists.
polygarni~ts.’’~~"25
During
During almost
almost four four years
years as as anan illegal
illegal controlling
controlling British
British agents,
agents, Deutsch
Deutsch servedserved
under
under three
three illegal residents, each
illegal residents, each ofof whom
whom operated under aavariety
operated under variety ofof aliases:
aliases: Ignati
Ignati
Reif, codenamed MARR;
Reif, codenamed MARR; Aleksandr
Aleksandr Orlov, Orlov, codenamed
codenamed SCHWED SCHWED ("Swede"); (“Swede”);and and
Teodor
Teodor Maly,
Maly, successively
successivelycodenamed
codenamed PAUL, PAUL,THE0 THEO and MANN. By
and MANN. By 1938
1938 allall three
three
were
were to to become
become victims
victims ofof the
the Terror.
Terror. Reif
Reif and
and Maly
Maly were
were shot
shot for imaginary crimes.
for imaginary crimes.
Orlov
Orlov defected
defected justjust inintime
timeto North
to North America,
America, securing
securing his his survival
survival byby threatening
threatening to to
arrange
arrange forfor the
the revelation
revelation of of all
allhe
he knew
knew abo.ut
abo.ut Soviet
Soviet e�pionage
espionage shouldshould he be pursued
he be pursued
by
by anan NKVD
NKVD assassination
assassination squad.26
squad.26Somewhat
Somewhat misleadingly,
misleadingly, aa KGB/SVR-sponsored
KGBISVR-sponsored
biography
biography of Orlov published in 1993claimed that-hewas “the maste
of Orlov published in 1993 claimed that he was "the �mil1d" respon
mastermind” respon-
sible
sible for
for the
the recruitment
recruitment of of the
the Cambridge
Cambridgeagents.27
agents.27There
There are are probably
probably two two reasons
reasons
for
for this
this exaggeration.
exaggeration.The The first
first is
is hierarchical.
hierarchical.Within
Within the theSoviet nomenklatura senior
Soviet nomenkZa‘atz/ra senior
bureaucrats
bureaucrats commonly
commonly claimed,claimed, and and were
were accorded,
accorded, the the credit
credit forfor their
theirsubordinates'
subordinates’
T
THH ES
E WS O
WROD
A RNDD A N D T
T H EE S
S H I EE LL D I
/ 60
successes.
successes. The The claim
claim that that Orlov,
Orlov, the the most
most senior
senior intelligence
intelligence officer involved in
officer involved in
British
British operations
the 1930s,
1930s, "recruited"
"recruited" Philby Philby is is aa characteristic
characteristic example
example of of this
this
common
common phenomenon.28
phenomenon.2gBut But there
thereareare also
alsomoremore contemporary
contemporary reasons reasons forfor thetheinfla
infla-
tion
tion of of Orlov's
Orlov's historical
historical importance.
importance. It It suits
suits thethe SVR,SVR,whichwhich seessees itself
itself as
as the
the inher
inher-
itor
itoroftheof the finestfinest traditions
traditions of ofthethe KGBKGB First FirstChief Chief Directorate,
Directorate, to to seek
seek to to
demonstrate
demonstrate the thefoolishness
foolishness of of Western
intelligence and and security
security services
services by by claiming
claiming
that
that theythey failed
failed forfor over
over thirty
thirty years
years to to notice
notice that that the the leading
leading recruiter
recruiter of of the
the Cam
Cam-
bridge
bridge Five Five andand other
other agents
agents waswas living
living under
under theirtheir noses
noses in in the
the United
United States.
States. For
For
several
several years
yearsbefore
before his his death
death in in 1973,
1973,the theKGB
KGB tried tried to to persuade
persuade Orlov
Orlov to to return
returntoto
aa comfortable
comfortable fl at and
flat and generous
generous pension
pension in in Russia,
Russia, where where he he would
would doubtless
doubtless have have
been portrayed for
been portrayed for propaganda
propaganda purposespurposes as as aa man
man who, who, despite
despite being
being forced
forced to to flee
flee
from
from Stalin's
Stalin's Terror,
Terror, had-like Philby-"kept faith
had-likePhilby-"kept with Lenin's
faith with Lenin's Revolution"
Revolution" and and
used
used his his superior
superior intelligence
intelligence training
training to to take
take in Western intelligence
in Western intelligence agencies
agencies for for
many
many years.29
years.29
In
In reality,
reality, Orlov
Orlov spent spentonly just over
only just over aa year
year in in London-ten
London-ten days days inin July
July 1934,
1934, fol
fol-
lowed
lowed by by the
the period
period from from September
September 1934 1934 to October 1935.30
to October 1935.30During
During that that period
period
Deutsch,
Deutsch, who whowas was subordinate
subordinate in in rank
rankto to Orlov,
Orlov, had had to to seek
seek his
his approval
approval for for his
his intel
intel-
ligence operations. On
ligence operations. occasion Orlov
O n occasion Orlov took took the the initiative
initiative in in giving
giving instructions
instructions to to
Deutsch. But
Deutsch. But the thefiles
files noted
Mitrokhin make make clear clear that
that thethe grand
grandstrategy
strategy which
which
led to
led to the
thetargeting
targetingof Philby and
of Philby and other
otheryoung
young Cambridge
Cambridge high-fliers
high-fliers waswas devised
devisednotnot
by
by Orlov
Orlov but butbyby Deutsch.31
D e ~ t s c h . And,
~ ' as
And, as Philby
Philby himself
himself acknowledged,
acknowledged, no no other
othercontroller
controller
equaled
equaled Deutsch's
Deutsch's tactical
tactical skill
skill in
in implementing
implementing that thatstrategy.
strategy.
Philby's
Philby's firstfirst major service to
major service Soviet intelligence
to Soviet intelligence was was to direct Deutsch
to direct Deutsch to to two
two
other potentialCambridge
other potential Cambridge recruits,recruits, Donald
Donald Maclean Maclean and and GuyGuy Burgess.32
Burgess.32 If If not
not
already
already aa committed
committed Communist Communist by by the
the time
time he he entered
entered Trinity
Trinity Hall,
Hall,Cambridge,
Cambridge, in in
193
1931,1 , Donald
DonaldMacleanMacleanbecamebecame one one during
duringhis his first
first year.
year. AsAs thethe handsome,
handsome, academacadem-
ically
ically gifted
gifted sonson ofof aa former
former Liberal
Liberal cabinet
cabinet minister,
minister, Maclean
Maclean must must have
have seemed
seemed to to
Deutsch
Deutsch an an almost
almost ideal ideal candidate
candidate to to penetrate
penetrate the the corridors
corridors of of power.
power. O Onn his
his grad
grad-
uation
uation with with first-class honors in
first-class honors in modern
modern languages
languages in in June
June 1934,
1934, however,
however, Maclean
Maclean
showed
showed no no immediate
immediatesign sign ofof wanting
wantinga career career
a in
in Whitehall.
Whitehall.His His ambition
ambition was was either
either
to
to teach
teach English
English in in the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union or or to
to stay
stay at at Cambridge
Cambridge to towork
work for
for aa PhD.
PhD. In In
the
the course
course of of the
the summer
summer he he changed
changed his his mind,
mind, telling
telling his his mother
mother thatthat he he intended
intended
to
to prepare
prepare for for the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office entrance
entrance examinations
examinations in in the
the following
following year.33
year.33That
That
change
change of of heart
heart reflected
reflected the the influence
influence of of Deutsch.
Deutsch. The The first
first approach
approach to to Maclean
Maclean
was
was mademade through
through Philby Philby in in August
August 1934. 1933. Deutsch
Deutsch reportedreported that that Phi1by
Philby had been
had been
'
,'instructed
instructed to meet Maclean,
to meet Maclean, discuss
discuss his his job
job prospects
prospects and and contacts
contacts and
and ask ask him
him to to
open
open contact
contact with with the Communist Party
the Communist Party and and begin
begin work work for for the
the NKVD.
NKVD. MacleanMaclean
agreed.
agreed. For For thethetime time being,
being, however,
however, the Centre refused
theCentre refused to to sanction
sanction meetings
meetings
between
between DeutschDeutsch and and Maclean,
Maclean, and and contact
contact with with him him for for the
the next
next two
two months
months was was
maintained
maintained through through Philby.Philby. Maclean's
Maclean'sfirst codename, like
first codename, like Phi1by's,
Philby's, hadhad two
two versions:
versions:
WAISE
WAISE in in German,
German, SIROTA SIROTA ininRussian-both
Russian-both meaning meaning "Orphan"
"Orphan" (an (an allusion
allusion to to
the
the death
death of of his
his father
father two two years
years earlier).34
earlier).34
For
For somesome months
months Guy Guy Burgess,
Burgess, then then in in his
his second
second year year asas aa history
history research
research stustu-
dent atatTrinity
dent Trinity College
College preparing
preparing aa thesis thesis he he was never to
wasnever complete, had
to complete, had been
been
T
The M
M aa g n iifi
f i cc e n t F
F ii v e / 66 I1
enthused
enthused by by the
the idea
idea ofof conducting
conducting an an underground
underground war war against
against fascism
fascism on on behalf
behalf of of
the CommunistInternational.
the Communist International. Ironically,
Ironically, inin view
view ofof the
the fact that he
fact that he was
was soonsoon to to
become
become one one of of the
the Magnificent
Magnificent Five, Five, he
he seems
seems toto have
have been
been inspired
inspired by by the
the example
example
of
of the
the Fun fergruppen, the
Fiinfergruppen, secret "groups
the secret “groups of of five" being formed
five” being formed by by German
German Commu Commu-
nists
nists to
to organize
organize opposition
opposition to to Hitler.
Hitler. Maclean
Maclean was, was, very
very probably,
probably, amongamong the the ComCom-
munist
munist friends
friends withwith whom
whom he he discussed
discussed the the (in
(in reality
reality rather
rather unsuccessful)
unsuccesshl) German German
groups
groups of of five.35
five.35When
When Maclean
Maclean admitted,
admitted, against
against hishis instructions,
instructions, that that he he had been
hadbeen
asked
asked to to engage
engage in in secret
secret work,36 Burgess
Burgesswas was desperate
desperate for for an
an invitation
invitation to joinhim.
to join him.
In
In December
December 1934 1934 Maclean
Maclean arranged
arranged aa fi rst meeting
first meeting between
between Deutsch
Deutsch and and BurBur-
gess.3?
g e ~ s . ~Deutsch
Deutsch
’ already
already knew
knew that
that Burgess
Burgess was wasone
one ofof the
the most
most fl amboyant fi
flamboyant gures in
figures in
Cambridge:
Cambridge: aa brilliant,
brilliant, gregarious
gregarious conversationalist
conversationalist equally
equally at at home
home withwith the teetotal
the teetotal
intellectual
intellectual discussions
discussions of of the
the Apostles,
Apostles, the the socially
socially exclusive
exclusiveand heavy-drinking Pitt
and heavy-drinking Pitt
Club
Club andand the the irreverent
irreverent satirical
satirical revues
revues ofof the
the Footlights.
Footlights. He H e made
made no no secret
secret either
either of of
his
his Communist
Communist sympathiessympathies or or of
of his
hisenjoyment
enjoyment of the then
of the thenillegal
illegal pleasures
pleasuresof of homo
homo-
sexual
sexual "rough
“rough trade"
trade” with
with young
young working-class
working-class men. men. A A more
more doctrinaire
doctrinaire and and lessless
imaginative controller than Deutsch might well have concluded that the outrageous
imaginative controller than Deutsch might well have concluded that the outrageous
Burgess
Burgess wouldwould be be aa liability
liability rather
rather than
than anan asset. But Deutsch
asset. But Deutsch may may wellwell have
have sensed
sensed
that
that Burgess's
Burgess’s very very outrageousness
outrageousness would would give
give him
him good,
good, if if unconventional,
unconventional, cover cover for for
his
his work
work as as aa secret
secret agent.
agent. No No existing
existing stereotype
stereotype of of aa Soviet
Soviet spyspyremotely resembled
remotely resembled
Burgess.38
Burgess.38When When invited
invited to join the
to join the Comintern's
Comintern’s underground
underground strugglestruggle against
against fasfas-
cism,
cism, Burgess
Burgesstold told Deutsch
Deutsch that thathe
he was
was "honored
“honored and and ready
ready to sacrifice everything
to sacrifice everything for for
the
the cause."
cause.” His codename M
His codename ADCHEN39 ("Little
MADCHEN39 Girl," by
(“Little Girl,” by contrast
contrast with with Philby's
Philby’s
codename
codename "Sonny")“Sonny”) was wasanan obvious
obvious reference
referenceto his homose-ruality.
to his homosexuality.
Deutsch
Deutsch initially
initially told
told both
both Maclean
Maclean and and Burgess,
Burgess, like
like Philby,
Philby, thatthat their
their first
first task
task
was
was toto distance
distance themselves
themselves from from thethe l�ft
left and
and conform
conform to t9 theide,
the ideas as ooff the
th� ,,establish
. establish-
. ..
ment
mentinin order order to to penetrate successh1ly4’0 Maclean
penetrateitit successfully.4 Maclean successfully
successfully persuaded
persuaded his his
mother,
mother, Lady Lady Maclean,
Maclean, that that hehe had
had “rather
"rather gone
gone off"
off” his
his undergraduate
undergraduate flirtation
flirtation
with
with Communism.
Communism. In In August
August 1935 1935 he passed the
he passed the Foreign
Foreign Office exams with
Office exams with flying
flying
colors. When asked
colors. When asked about
about hishis "“Communist
Communist views" views” atat Cambridge,
Cambridge, MacleanMaclean decided
decided to to
"brazen
“brazen it it out":
out”:
"Yes,"
“Yes,”II said,
said, "I
“Idid
did have
have such
such views-and
views-and II haven't
haven’t entirely shaken them
entirely shaken them off.”
of£" II
think
think they
they must
must have
have liked
liked my honesty because
my honesty because they nodded, looked
they nodded, looked atat each
each
other
other and smiled. Then
and smiled. Then the chairman said:
the chairman sed:.., ‘‘.Thank
"That:l;k you,
you, that
that will
will be all, Mr.
be all, Mr.
Maclean."41
Ma~lean.”~’
In October
In October 1935,
1935, asas aa new
new member
member of of His
His Majesty's
Majesty’s Diplomatic
Diplomatic Service,
Service, Maclean
Maclean
became
became the
the first of the
first of the Magnificent
Magnificent Five
Five toto penetrate
penetrate the
the corridors of power.
corridors of power.
Burgess
Burgess went
went about burying his
aboutburying his Communist
Communist past past with
with characteristic flamboyance.
characteristic flamboyance.
Late
Late in
in 1935
1935he became personal
he became personal assistant to the
assistant to the young rightwing gay
young rightwing gay Conservative
Conservative
MP Captain
MP Captain "Jack"
“Jack” Macnamara. Together they
Macnamara. Together went on
they went on fact-finding
fact-finding missions
missions to
to
Nazi Germany which, according to Burgess, consisted largely
NaziGermany which, according to Burgess, consisted largely of homosexual of homosexual
escapades
escapades with like-minded members
with like-minded members of of the
the Hitle_ r yqu_
Hitler �h)�urgess built
YouJh.,Burgess built up
up aaremark-
remark
able
able range
range of
of contacts
contacts among
among the continental “Homintern.”
the continental "Homintern." ChiefChief among
amongthemthemwas
was
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
R D
D A
AND TT H
H SE
E H ISEHL I DE L D // 66 22
Edouard
Edouard Pfeiffer,
Pfeiffer, chef chef de de cabinet
cabinet to Edouard Daladier,
to Edouard Daladier, French
French warwar minister
minister from from
January 1936 to
January 1936 toMayMay1940 1940 andand prime
prime minister
minister fromfrom April 1938 to
April 1938 toMarch
March1940. 1940.
Burgess
Burgess boasted
boasted to to friends
friends that,
that, "He
“He and and Pfeiffer
Pfeiffer and and twotwo members
members of of the
the French
French
cabinet
cabinet .. .. .. had spent an
had spent an evening
evening together
together at at aa male
male brothel
brothel in in Paris.
Paris. Singing
Singing and and
dancing,
dancing, they
they had had danced
danced around
around aa table,
table, lashing
lashing aa naked
naked boy,boy, who
who was
was strapped
strapped to to it,it,
with
with leather
leather whips.
whips.”12 ,,42
In
In February
February 1935 1935 there
there was
was aa security alert at
security alert at the
the London
London illegal
illegal residency.
residency. Rei£,
Reif,
operating under the
operating under the alias
alias "Max
“Max Wolisch,"
Wolisch,” was was summoned
summoned for for an
an interview
interview at the
at the
Home
Home Offi Officece andand observed
observed aa largelarge file
file in
in the
the name
name of of Wolisch
Wolisch on on his
his interviewer's
interviewer’s
desk.
desk. Orlov
Orlov reported
reported to to the
theCentre
Centrethat thatthethe
British
British authorities
authorities appeared
appeared to to have
have been
been
"digging
“digging around
around but but could
could notnot come
come up up with
with anything
anythingand and decided
decided to to get
getrid
rid of
of him."
him.”
Reif
Reif obeyed
obeyed Home Home Office Office instructions
instructions to to arrange
arrange for for his
his prompt
prompt departure.
departure. OrlovOrlov
feared
feared that MIS might also be on the trail of Deutsch and announced that as a pre
that MIS might also be on the trail of Deutsch and announced that as a pre-
caution
caution he he waswas taking
taking personal
personal control
control of of Philby,
Philby, Maclean
Maclean and and Burgess,
Burgess, by by nownow
sometimes
sometimes referred
referred to to as
as the
the "Three
“ThreeMusketeers."
Musketeers.” Orlov Orlov believed
believed that
that his
his own
own cover
cover
as
as an
an American
American businessman
businessman selling selling imported
imported refrigerators
refrigerators from from an an office
office in
in Regent
Regent
Street
Street was
was still
still secure.
secure. In In October,
October, however,
however, therethere waswas another
another security
security alert
alert when
when he he
accidentally
accidentally encountered
encountered aa man man who, who, somesome years earlier, had
years earlier, had given
given him him English
English
lessons
lessons inin Vienna
Vienna and and knew
knew his his real
real identity.
identity. Orlov
Orlov mademade aa hasty
hasty exit
exit from
from London,
London,
never
never toto return,
return, leaving
leaving Deutsch
Deutsch to to resume
resume the the running
running of of the
the Cambridge
Cambridge recruits.43
recruits.43
Under
Under Deutsch's
Deutsch‘s control,control, Philby,
Philby, Maclean
Maclean and and Burgess
Burgess rapidly
rapidly graduated
graduated as as fully
fully
fledged Soviet
fledged Soviet agents.
agents. TheyThey may may notnot have
have been
been told
told explicitly
explicitly that
that they
they were
were working
working
for
for the
the NKVD
NKVD rather rather thanthan assisting
assisting Comintern
Comintern in in its
itsunderground
underground strugglestruggle against
against
fascism,
fascism, but
but theythey no no longer
longer needed
needed formal
formal notifi cation. As
notification. As Deutsch
Deutsch wrotewrote later
later inin aa
report
report for
for the Centre, "They
the Centre, “They all all know
know that that they
they areare working
working for for the
the Soviet
Soviet Union.
Union.
This
This was
was absolutely
absolutely understood
understood by by them.
them. My My relations
relations withwith them
them were
were based
based upon
upon
our
our Party
Party membership."
membership.” In In other
other words,
words, Deutsch
Deutsch treated
treated themthem notnot as as subordinate
subordinate
agents
agents butbut asas comrades
comrades workingworking underunder his his guidance
guidance in in aa common
common cause cause andand for
for the
the
same
same ideals.
ideals. Later,
Later, lessless flexible
flexible controllers
controllers thanthan Deutsch
Deutsch were were unhappy
unhappy that that Philby,
Philby,
Burgess
Burgess andand Maclean
Maclean appeared
appeared to to consider
consider themselves
themselves as as offi cers, rather
officers, rather thanthanagents,
agents,
of
of Soviet
intelligence.44lt It came
came as as aa considerable
considerable shock shock to to Philby
Philby after
after hishis defection
defection
to
to Moscow
Moscow in in 1963
1963to to discover
discover that,
that, like
like other
other foreign
foreign agents,
agents, he he did
did not
not possess,
possess, and
and
would
would never
never be be allowed
allowed to to acquire,
acquire, offi cer rank-hence
officer rank-hence his his various
various attempts
attempts to to mis
mis-
lead
lead Western
Western journalists
journalists into into believing
believing thatthat hehewas
was Colonel,
Colonel, or or even
even General,
General, Philby
Philby
of
of the
the KGB.45
KGB.45In In his
his memoirs,
memoirs, published
published in in 1968,
1968,Philby
Philby repeated
repeated thethe lie
lie that
that hehe had
had
"been
“been aa Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence offi cer for
oflcer for some
some thirty-odd
thirty-odd years."46
years.”46
AF
A FTE R
R T H E SSE ECCU
UR IT
TYY scares
scaresofof 1935, Deutschand
1935,Deutsch and
the the illegal
illegal residency
residency took
took
increased
increased precautions
precautions toto evade
evade MIS
MI5 and and Special
Special Branch
Branch surveillance.
surveillance. Before
Before prepar
prepar-
ing
ing for
for aa meeting
meeting with
with an
an agent,
agent, usually
usually in
in London,
London,Deutsch
Deutschwould
would bebe driven
driven out
out of
of
town,
town, watching
watching carefully
carefully to
to see
see if
if the
the car
car was
was being
being followed.
followed. Once
Once satisfied
satisfied that
that he
he
was
was not
not being
being tailed,
tailed, he
he returned
returned to London by
to London by public
public transport,
transport, changing
changing several
several
times
times en
en route.
route. During
During hishis travels
travels Deutsch
Deutsch concealed
concealed film
film of
of secret
secret documents
documents inside
inside
Th e M
M a gn
n iifi
f i c ee n
nt Five / 63
63
hairbrushes,
hairbrushes, traveltravel requisites
requisitesand and household
household utensils.
utensils. Reports
Reports to to thetheCentre
Centre were
were usu
usu-
ally
ally sent
sent in insecret
secret ink
ink totoan
an address
address in in Copenhagen
Copenhagen for for forwarding
forwarding to to Moscow.47
MOSCOW.~~
Though
Though the the KGB
KGB and and SVR released
released interesting
interesting material
material in in the
theearly
early 1990s
1990s on on the
the
"Three
“Three Musketeers,"
Musketeers,” they they avoided
avoided any anyreference
reference to Norman John
to Norman John ("James") Klug
(“James”) Klug-
mann,
mann, recruited
recruited by by Deutsch
Deutsch in in 1936.48
1936.‘* Klugmann
Klugmann and and the
the young
young Marxist
Marxist poet poet John
John
Cornford,
Cornford, "James“Jamesand and John,"
John,’’were werethe
the two
two most
most prominent
prominent Communist
Communist Party Party activists
activists
in
in Cambridge.
Cambridge. Though Though Cornford
Cornford was was killed
killed inin the
the Spanish
Spanish Civil
Civil WarWar in 1937, just
in 1937, just
after
after hishis twenty-first
twenty-first birthday,
birthday, Klugmann
Klugmann went went on onto
to become
become head
head of of the
the Party's
Party’s Pro
Pro-
paganda
paganda and and Education
Education Department,
Department, aa member member of of the political committee
the political committee (in (in effect
effect
its
its Politburo)
Politburo) and and the
the Party's
Party’s official
officialhistorian.
historian. He He hadhad become
become aa Communist
Communist at at Gre
Gre-
sham's
sham’s School,
School, Holt,
Holt, where
where he he had
had been
been aa friend
friend andand contemporary
contemporary of of Donald
Donald
Maclean.
Maclean. Klugmann
Klugmann won won an an open
open scholarship
scholarship in in modern
modern languages
languages to to Trinity
Trinity Col
Col-
lege,
lege, Maclean
Maclean aa slightly
slightly less
less prestigious
prestigious exhibition
exhibition to to the
the neighboring
neighboring Trinity Trinity Hall.
Hall.
Both
Both graduated
graduated with with first-class
first-class honors.
honors. LikeLike Maclean,
Maclean, Anthony
Anthony Blunt's
Blunt’s conversion
conversionto to
Communism
Communism owed owed something
something to to Klugmann's
Klugmann’s influence.
influence. Blunt
Blunt foundfound him him "an “an
extremely
extremely good good political
political theorist"
theorist” who who "ran
“ran the
the administration
administration of of the
the Party
Party with
with great
great
skill
skill and energy .. .. .. It
and energy It was
was primarily
primarily he he who
who decided
decided whatwhat organizations
organizations and and societies
societies
in
in Cambridge
Cambridge were were worth
worth penetrating
penetrating [by [by the
the Communists]
communist^]."^^ ."49 Klugmann
Klugmann had had anan
unshakable
unshakable conviction
conviction that that British
British capitalism
capitalismwas was close
closeto
to collapse.
collapse."We “We simply
simply knew,
knew,
all
all of
ofus,us,that
that the
therevolution
revolutionwas was at at hand,"
hand,’’hehe later
later recalled.
recalled. "If
“If anyone
anyone had had suggested
suggested it it
wouldn't
wouldn’t happenhappen in in Britain
Britain for for say
say thirty
thirty years,
years, I'd
I’d have
have laughed
laughed myself
myself sick."50
sick.””
Since
Since Klugmann
Klugmann was was oneone of of Britain's
Britain’s most
most activ�
active young
young Communists,
Communists, there there waswas
little
little prospect
prospect that,
that, like
like the
the Five,
Five, hehe could
could convincingly
convincingly distance
distance himself
himself fromfrom thethe
Party
Party and and penetrate
penetrate the the "bourgeois
“bourgeois apparatus."
apparatus.’’Deutsch
Deutsch saw saw another
another role role for
for Klug
Klug-
mann:
mann: as as aa talent-spotter
talent-spotter for for the NKVD, capable,
the NKVD, capable, whenwhen necessary,
necessary, of of persuading
persuading
Communist
Communist students studentsto to engage
engage in in underground
underground work work rather
rather than
thanconventional
conventional Party Party
militancy.
militancy. BeforeBeforeDeutsch
Deutsch recruited
recruited Klugmann,
Klugmann, the the NKVD obtained
obtained the the approval
approval of of
the
the British
British Party
Party leadership.
leadership. ThereThere was was never
never any
any likelihood
likelihood that
that thethe British
British general
general
secretary,
secretary, HarryHarry Pollitt,
Pollitt, would
would object.
object. Like
Like most
most Western Communist le.:Iders
Western Communist leaders he he
believed
believed that that the
the interests
interests of of the Communist International
the Communist International required
required unconditional
unconditional
support
support for for the
the Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, whatever
whatever the the twists
twists of of policy
policyin
in the
theKremlin.
Kremlin. With With PolPol-
litt's
litt’s consent,
consent, Klugmann
Klugmann was was recruited
recruited by by Deutsch
Deutsch as as agent
agent MER.51
MER.” The The refusal
refusal byby
the
the SVR until 1998 to
until 1998 to admit
admit Klugmann's
Klugmann’s recruitment
recruitment was was due
due to the involvement
to the involvement
of
of the
the British
British Communist
Communist Party. Party.5252 One
One of of the
the KGB's
KGB’s mostmost closely
closely guarded
guarded secrets
secrets
was
was the extent to which, as late as the 1980s, it expected the leaders of “fraternal par
the extent to which, as late as the 1980s, it expected the leaders of "fraternal par-
ties"
ties”in in the
theWestWestto assist
to in
assist in thetherecruitment
recruitment of of agents
agents andand the
the fabrication
fabrication of of "legends"
“legends”
for
for itsitsillegals.53
illegal^.'^
I N T H E SSPP R I N G of
IN of 1936
1936 the
theCentre
Centreappointed
appointed another
another of
ofthe
theGreat
GreatIllegals,
Illegals,Teodor
Teodor
Maly (codenamed MANN), head of the illegal London residency.54
Maly (codenamed MANN), head of the illegal London residencys4 Like Deutsch, Like Deutsch,
Maly
Maly was
was later
later included
included among
among the
the intelligence
intelligence immortals
immortals whose
whose portraits
portraits hung
hung on
on
the
the walls
walls of
of the
the First
First Chief
Chief Directorate
DirectorateMemory
MemoryRoom.
Room. Hungarian
Hungarian by by birth,
birth, Maly
Maly
had
had entered
entered aa Catholic
Catholic monastic
monastic order
order before
before the
the First
First W()rl�
World War
War butbut had
had volun-
volun-
T
THHE
E S
SW OR
WO RD
D A
ANNT
DDH S
TH
E H IEE LS DH I E L D /
/ 66 44
teered
teered for
for military
military service
service in
in 1914.55
1914.” He
H e was
was taken
taken prisoner
prisoner while
while serving
serving as
as second
second
lieutenant in the
lieutenant in the Austro-Hungarian
Austro-Hungarian army army on the Russian
on the Russian front in 1916,
front in 1916, and
and spent
spent
the
the rest
rest of
of the
thewar
war in
in aaseries
series of
of POW camps.
camps. Maly
Maly later
later told
told one
one of
of his agents:
his agents:
I saw
saw all
all the
the horrors,
horrors, young
young men
men with
with frozen
frozen limbs
limbs dying
dying in
in the trenches .. .. .. I
the trenches
lost
lost my
my faith
faith in God and
in God and when
when the
the Revolution
Revolution brokebroke out
out I joined
joined the
the Bolshe
Bolshe-
viks.
viks. I broke
broke with
with my
my past completely.. .. .. I became
past completely became aa Communist
Communist and and have
have
always
always remained
remained one.
one?56
Maly was
was originally
originally posted
posted to to London
London ininJanuary
January 1936 1936 to torun
runthe
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office
with
with cipher clerk Captain
cipher clerk Captain KingKing (previously
(previously controlled
controlled by by Pieck),
Pieck), toto whom
whom he he intro
intro-
duced
duced himself
himself as as an
an executive
executive of ofthe
the fictitious
fictitious Dutch
Dutch bankbank which
which King
King believed
believed was was
paying
paying himhim forfor classified documents. In
classified documents. In April Maly was
April Maly was appointed
appointed illegal resident
illegal resident
and
and henceforth
henceforth shared shared with
with Deutsch
Deutsch in in the
the running
running of of the
the Cambridge
Cambridge agents.
agents. Like
Like
Deutsch,
Deutsch, he impressed them
he impressed them with
with both both his
his human
human sympathy
sympathy and and his
his visionary
visionary faith
faith
in
in the
the Communist
Communistmillennium.
millenni~m.’~ 57
During the
During the early months of
early months of 1937
1937 Deutsch
Deutsch and and Maly
Malycom pleted the
completed the recruitment
recruitment
of
of the
theMagnificent
MagnificentFive. Five. AtAt the beginning of
the beginning of the
theyear,
year, Burgess,
Burgess,byby then
then aaproducer
producer at at
the
the BBC, arranged
arranged aa first meeting between
first meeting Deutsch and
between Deutsch and Anthony
Anthony Blunt,Blunt,French lin
French lin-
guist,
guist, art historian and
art historian and Fellow
Fellow of of Trinity
Trinity College,
College, Cambridge.58
Cambridge.58Though Though the the title
title of
of
"Fourth
“Fourth Man"
Man”later accorded Blunt was a media invention rather than than aaKGB sobrisobri-
quet,
quet, hehewas
was both
both the thefourth
fourth ofofthe theFive
Five to
to beberecruited
recruited and,and, over
over forty
forty years
years later, the
later, the
fourth
fourth totobe
be publicly
publicly exposed.
exposed. Until
Until the thewar
war Blunt's
Blunt’s chief
chief role
role for
for the
the NKVD was was that
that
of talent-spotter. His first recruit, by agreement with Deutsch, Deutsch, was a wealthy young
American Communist undergraduate at Trinity, MichaelStraight Straight (codenamed
NIGEL).s9
NIGEL).59 Shortly Shortlyafter his own first meeting with with Deutsch,
Deutsch,Blunt Bluntinvited Straight
to his elegant rooms in Trinity. Straight was still shattered by the news a fortnight
earlier that his close
earlier close friend, John Cornford,
Cornford, had had died a hero's
hero’s death in the the Spanish
Civil War. "Our“Our friends,"
friends,” Blunt told toldhim,
him,hadhad been giving much thought to to his
future.
future. "They
“They have have instructed
instructed me me to to tell you .. .. .. what
tell you what you
you must
must do."
do.” "What
“What friends?"
friends?”
Straight
Straight asked.
asked. "Our“Our friends
friends in theInternational,
in the International,the the Communist
Communist International,"
International,”
Blunt replied. The "friends"
“friends” had decided that Straight's Straight’s duty was to break all all overt
connection
connection withwith the the Party,
Party, get
get aajob jobin in
Wall Street after
Wall Street after his graduation later
his graduation later that
that year
year
and provide
and provide Comintern
Comintern with with inside
inside information.
information. Straight
Straight protested.
protested. Cornford
Cornford had had
given
given his
his life
life for
for the International. “Remember
the International. " Remember that,” that," Blunt
Blunt told
told him.
him. A few few days
days
later, Straight agreed.
later, agreed. "“InIn the
the course of a week," week,” Straight wrote later, later, "I
“I had moved
out of the noisy, crowded world of of Cambridge into into aaworld of shadows
shadows and echoes."
echoes.”
His only meeting with Deutsch, Deutsch,whom whomhehe mistook for a Russian, took place in Lon Lon-
don just
just after his graduation. Deutsch asked him for some personal documents.
Straight gave him aadrawing. Deutsch tore it in two, two, gave him one half halfback
back and told
him thethe other halfhalf would be returned
returned to him him by a man who would contact him in
New York.60
York.60
The last of the Magnificent
Magnificent Five to be recruited, and later the last to be publicly
exposed,
exposed, was the “Fifth "Fifth Man,"
Man,” John Cairncross, a brilliant Scot who in 1934 1934 hadhad
T
The M
M aa g n iifi
f i cc e n t F i v e // 65
entered
entered Trinity
Trinity atat the
the age of twenty-one
age of twenty-one with with aa scholarship
scholarship iinn modern
modern languages,
languages,
having
having already
already studied
studied forfor two
two years
years at
at Glasgow
Glasgow University
University and
and gained
gained aa licence es2s lel
Zet-
tres at
Ires at the
the Sorbonne.61
Sorbonne.61His His passionate
passionate Marxism
Marxism led led the
the Trinity Magazineto
Trinity Magazine to give
give him
him
the
the nickname
nickname "The “The Fiery Cross," while
Fiery Cross,” while his
his remarkable
remarkable facility
facility as
as aa linguist
linguist led
led the
the
same
same magazine
magazine to to complain,
complain, "Cairncross
“Cairncross .. .. .. learns
learns aa new
new language
language everyevery fort
fort-
night."62 Among
night.”62 Among his his college
college teachers
teachers in in French
French literature
literature was
was Anthony
Anthony Blunt, Blunt,though
though
Cairncross
Cairncross laterlater claimed
claimed thatthat they
they never discussed Communism.63
never discussed Communism.63 In In 1936,
1936, after
after
graduating
graduating with first-class honors,
with first-class honors, Cairncross
Cairncross passed
passed top
top of
of the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office
entrance
entrance examinations,
examinations, one one hundred
hundred marks
marks ahead
ahead of of the
the next
next candidate
candidate (though
(though he he
did
did less
less well
wellatat the
theinterview).64
interview).64
After
After Blunt
Blunt had hadacted
acted as
as talent-spotter,
talent-spotter, thethe initial
initial approach
approach to to Cairncross
Cairncross early
early inin
1937
1937 waswas entrusted
entrusted by by Deutsch
Deutsch to to Burgess65-much
Burgess65-much asas Philby Philby had
had made
made the
the first
first
recruitment
recruitment overture
overture to to Maclean
Maclean in in 1934.
1934. The
The actual
actual recruitment
recruitment of of Cairncross
Cairncross
shortly
shortly afterwards
afterwards was was entrusted
entrusted toto James
James Klugmann.66
Klugmann.66On April 99 Maly
O n April Maly informed
informed
the Centrethat
the Centre that Cairncross
Cairncross had had been
been formally
formally recruited
recruited and
and given
given thethe codename
codename
MOLI
MOLIERE.67ERE.67 Had Had Cairncross
Cairncross known
known hishis codename,
codename, he he might
mightwell
well have
have objected
objected to to
its
its transparency
transparency but but would
would undoubtedly
undoubtedly have have found
found appropriate
appropriate the the choice
choice of
of his
his
favorite
favorite French
French writer,
writer, onon whom
whom he helater
later published
published twotwo scholarly
scholarly studies
studies inin French.
French.
For
For reasons
reasons notnot recorded
recorded in in KGB files,
files, the
the codename
codename MOLIMOLIERE E RE was
was later
later replaced
replaced
by
by that
that of of LISZT.68
LISZT.68In In May
May Klugmann
Klugmann arranged
arranged Cairncross's
Cairncross’s first
first rendezvous
rendezvous with
with
Deutsch.
Deutsch. According
According to to Cairncross's
Cairncross’sadmittedly
admittedly unreliable
unreliable memoirs,
memoirs, the the meeting
meeting took
took
place
place one
one evening
evening in in Regent's
Regent’s Park:
Park
Suddenly there
Suddenly there emerged
emerged from
from behind the trees
behind the trees aa short,
short, stocky
stocky figure
figure aged
aged
around
around forty,
forty, whom
whom Klugmann introduced to
Klugmann introduced to me
me as
as Otto.
Otto. Thereupon,
Thereupon, Klug
Klug-
mann
mann promptly
promptly disappeared
disappeared .. .. ..69
69
Deutsch
Deutsch reported
reported to to Moscow
Moscow that that Cairncross
Cairncross "was“was very
very happy
happy that
that wewe hadhad estab
estab-
lished
lished contact
contact with
with him
him and
and waswas ready
readyto to start
startworking
working for for us
us at
at once."70
once.”7o
Among
Among the the pre-Second
pre-Second World World War War Foreign
Foreign Office
Office documents
docoments available
available to to both
both
Maclean
Maclean and Cairncross, and thus to the NKVD,were what Cairncross described as
and Cairncross, and thus to the NKVD, were what Cairncross described as
"a
“a wealth
wealth of of valuable
valuable information
information on on the
theprogress
progress ofof the
the Civil
Civil War
War in inSpain."71
Spain.”71Only Only
in aa few
in few cases,
cases, however,
however, isis it it possible
possible to to identify
identify individual
individual documents
documents supplied
supplied by by
Maclean
Maclean and and Cairncross
Cairncross which
which the the Centre
Centreforwarded
forwarded to to Stalin,
Stalin, probably
probably in in the
the form
form
of
of edited
edited extracts.72
extracts.72OneOne suchsuch document,
document, which which seems
seems to to have
have made
made aa particular
particular
impression
impression on on Stalin,
Stalin, is
is the
the record
record of of talks
talks with
with Hitler
Hitler in November 1937
in NoveIl1b�r 1937 by Lord
by Lord
Halifax,
Halifax, Lord
Lord President
President of of the Council (who,
the Council (who, three months later,
three months later, was
was to to succeed
succeed
Eden
Eden as as Foreign
Foreign Secretary).73
S e ~ r e t a r y )Halifax's
Halifax’s
.~~ visit to
visit to Hitler's
Hitler’s mountain
mountain lair,
lair, the
the "Eagle's
“Eagle’s
Nest"
Nest” atatBerchtesgaden,
Berchtesgaden, got got offoff to
to aa farcical start. As
farcical start. Asthethearistocratic
aristocratic Halifax
Halifax stepped
stepped
from
from his car, he mistook Hitler for a footmanand was. about to hand himhis,hat
his car, he mistook Hitler for a footman and was about to hand him hi�. hat afld
and
coat
coat when
when aa German
Germanminister
minister hissed
hissed in in his
his ear,
ear, "Der
“DerFuhrer!
Fiibrer! Der F i i b r e ~The
Der Fuhrer!74 f ~ ~Cen
The Cen-
tre,
tre, however,
however, saw saw the
the whole
whole meeting
meeting as as deeply
deeply sinister.
sinister. The
The extracts
extracts from
from Halifax's
Halifax’s
record
record ofof his
his talks
talks with
with Hitler, tailored to
Hitler,tailored to fit
fit Stalin's
Stalin’s profound
profound distrust
distrust of
of British
British pol
pol-
icy,
icy, emphasized
emphasized that that Britain
Britain viewed
viewed Nazi Germany as
Nazi Germany as "the
“the bastion
bastion of of the West
the West
T E WSOW
T H SE RO
D RD A
AND T
T HSEEH ISEHL D
I E L D / 66
against
against Bolshevism"
Bolshevism” and
and would
would take
take aa sympathetic
sympathetic view
view of
of German
German expansion
expansion toto the
the
east.75
east.75Though
Though Halifax's
Halifax’s assessment
assessment of
of Hitler,
Hitler, whom
whom he regarded as
he regarded as "“very
very sincere,"
sincere,”
was
was lamentably
lamentably naive,
naive, his
his record
record of
of his
his comments
comments onon Germany's
Germany’srole
role in
in defending
defending the
the
West
West against
against Communism
Communism were were much
much more
more qualified
qualified than
than the
the Centre's
Centre’s version
version of
of
them. He
them. H e told
told Hitler:
Hitler:
Although
Although therethere was
was much
much in the Nazi
in the Nazi system
system thatthat offended British opinion
offended British opinion
(treatment
(treatment of of the Church; to
the Church; to aa perhaps
perhaps lesser
lesser extent,
extent, the treatment of
the treatment of Jews;
Jews;
treatment
treatment of Trade Unions),
ofTrade Unions),I was
was not blind to
not blind to what
whathehehad haddone for
done Germany
for Germany
and
and toto the
the achievement
achievement fromfrom his point of
his point of view
view of of keeping
keeping Communism
Communism out out of
of
his
his country
country and,and,as
as he
he would
would feel,
feel, of
of blocking
blocking its its passage
passage West.
West.
Halifax
Halifax also
also said
said nothing
nothing toto support
supportGerman
Germanaggression
aggression in in eastern
eastern Europe.
Europe.
His aim-unrealistic though it was-was to turn Hitler into "a good Euro
His aim-unrealistic though it was-was to turn Hitler into “a good Euro-
pean"
pean” byby offering
offering him
him colonial
colonial concessions
concessions in in order
order toto persuade
persuade him him totolimit
limithis
his
European
European ambitions
ambitions to to those
those he
he could
could achieve peacefully. Halifax
achieve peacefully. Halifax made
made clear,
clear,
however,
however, that
that Britain
Britain was prepared to
was prepared to contemplate
contemplate the the peaceful
peaceful revision
revisionofVer
of Ver-
sailles:
sailles:
I said
said that
that there
there were
were no doubt .. .. .. questions
no doubt questions arising
arising outout of
of the
the Versailles
Versailles
settlement which
settlement which seemed
seemed toto us
us capable
capable of of causing
causing trouble
trouble if if they
they were
were unwisely
unwisely
handled,
handled, e.g. Danzig, Austria,
e.g. Danzig, Austria, Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovakia. O Onn all these
these matters
matters we were
we were
not necessarily
not necessarily concerned
concerned toto stand
standfor
for the status quo
the status quo asas today,
today,but
but we
we were
werecon
con-
cerned
cerned toto avoid
avoid such
such trouble
trouble of
of them
them asas would
would be be likely
likely toto cause
cause trouble.
trouble. If
If rea
rea-
sonable
sonable settlements
settlements could
could be
be reached
reached with
with the thefree
free assent
assent andand goodwill
goodwill ofof those
those
primarily
primarily concerned
concerned we we certainly
certainly had
had nono desire
desire toto block them.
block them.
Such
Such statements
statements were music to
were music to Hitler's
Hitler’s ears-not
ears-not because
because hehe was
was interested
interested inin the
the
peaceful revision
peaceful revision of
of Versailles,
Versailles, but because he
but because interpreted Halifax's
he interpreted Halifax’s rather
rather feeble
feeble
attempt
attempt at conciliation as
at conciliation as evidence
evidence that Britain lacked
that Britain lacked the
the nerve
nerve toto fight
fight when
when the
the
time came for
time came for him
him totobegin
begin aa war
war of conquest. 76 Stalin,
of conquest.76 Stalin, characteristically,
characteristically,sawsaw aa much
much
more sinister purpose
more sinister purpose behind
behind Halifax's
Halifax’s remarks
remarks and persuaded himself
and persuaded himself that
that Britain
Britain
had
had deliberately
deliberately given
given the
the green
green light to Nazi
light to Nazi aggression
aggression in the east.
in the east. The
The Foreign
Foreign
Office
Office documents supplied by
documents supplied Maclean and
by Maclean and Cairncross
Cairncross which recorded British
which recorded British
attempts
attempts to
to appease
appease Hitler
Hitler were used by
were used by the
the Centre
Centre to to provide
provide the
the evidence
evidence which
which
Stalin demanded of a deep-laid British plot to to turn
turnHitler
Hitlerononthethe
Soviet Union.
TH
HOOU
UGGH
H K
KIIM
M P H I L BY ultimately
ultimately became
became thethe most
most important
important of of the
the Magnificent
Magnificent
Five,
Five, his
his career
career took
took off
off more
more slowly
slowly than
than those
those of
of the
the other
other four.
four. He abandoned an
H e abandoned an
attempt
attempt to tojoin
jointhe civil
civil service
the serviceafter
after both
both his
his referees
referees (his
(his Trinity
Trinity director
director of studies
of studies
and
and aa family
family friend)
friend) warned
warned him him that,
that,while
while they
they admired
admired hishis energy
energy and
and intelligence,
intelligence,
they
they would
would feel
feel bound
bound to to add
add that
that his "sense of
his “sense of political
political injustice
injustice might
might well
well unfit
unfit
him
him for
for administrative
administrative work."
work.” HisHis only
only minor successes before
minor successes before 1937
1937 were
were to
to gain
gain aa
job on
job on an
an uninfluential
uninfluential liberal
liberal monthly,
monthly, thethe Review of Reviews, and
of Reviews, become aa mem
and become mem-
ber
ber of
of the
theAnglo-German
Anglo-GermanFellowship,
Fellowship, contemptuously
contemptuously described
described by
by Churchill
Churchill as
as the
the
"Heil Hitler Brigade." As Philby
“Heil Hitler Brigade.’’ later acknowledged,
Philby later acknowledged, he he would
would often turn up
often turn up for
for
T e aMg angi nf iifi
ThM c e cn eFt ni vt eF i v e /I 67
meetings
meetings withwith Deutsch
Deutsch "with “withnothing
nothingto to offer" and in
offer” and in need
need of of reassurance.
reassurance.The The out-
out
break
break ofof the Spanish Civil
the Spanish Civil WarWar gave
gave him
him his his first important intelligence
first important intelligence mission.
mission. H Hee
eventually
eventually persuaded
persuaded aa LondonLondonnews news agency
agencyto to give
give himhim aaletter of accreditation
letterof accreditation as as aa
freelance
freelance warwar correspondent
correspondent and and arrived
arrived in Spain in
in Spain in February
February 1937. 1937. “My
"My immediate
immediate
assignment,"
assignment,” he he wrote
wrote later
later inin his memoirs, "was
his memoirs, “was toto get
get first-hand
first-hand information
information on on all
all ,
aspects
aspects ofof the
the fascist
fascist warwareffort."
effort.” As usual,
usual, hishis memoirs
memoirs fail fail to
to tell
tell the
the whole
whole ttruth.77
r~th.’~ .. .>
A few
few weeks
weeks after
after Philby's
Philby’s departure,
departure, the London illegal
theLondon illegal residency
residency received
received
instructions,
instructions, undoubtedly
undoubtedly approved approved by by Stalin himself, to
Stalin himself, to order Philby to
order Philby to assassinate
assassinate
General
General Francisco
Francisco Franco,
Franco, leader
leader ofof the
thenationalist
nationalist forces.78
forces.78MalyMaly duly passed on
duly passed on the
the
order
order but
but made
made clear
clear to
to thetheCentre
Centrethat thathe
he did
did not believe ,Philby
not believe Philby capable
capable of of fulfilling
fulfilling
it.79
it.79Philby
Philby arrived back in
arrived back in London
London in inMayMaywithout even having
withouteven having set set eyes
eyes on on Franco
Franco
and,
and, Maly
Maly toldtold the Centre, "in
the Centre, “in aa very depressed state.”
very depressed state." Philby’s
Philby's fortunes
fortunes improved,
improved,
however,
however, afterafter hehe was
was taken
taken on on byby The Times
Times as as one
one ofof its
its two correspondents in
two correspondents in
nationalist Spain.80 At
nationalist Spain.*’ At thethe endend of
of the
the year
year he became aa minor
he became minor war hero. Three
war hero. Three jour
jour-
nalists
nalists sitting
sitting in inaa car
car in in which
which he he had been traveling
had been traveling were were fatally injured by
fatally injured by an
an
artillery
artillery shell.
shell. Philby
Philby himself
himself was was slightly
slightly wounded.
wounded. He H e reported modestly to
reported modestly to Times
readers,
readers, "Your correspondent .. .. .. was
“Your correspondent taken to
was taken to aa first
first aid station where
aid station whe):"e light
light head
head
injuries
injuries were
were speedily
speedily treated."
treated.” "My “My wounding
wounding in Spain," wrote
in Spain,” wrote Philby
Philby later, "helped
later, “helped
my
my work-both
work-both journalism
journalism and and intelligence-no
intelligence-no end.” end." ForFor the first time
the first time he he gained
gained
access
access toto Franco,
Franco, who who on March 2,
on March 1938 pinned
2,1938 pinned on on hishis breast
breast the Red Cross
the Red Cross of of Mil-
Mil
itary
itary Merit.
Merit. Then,Then,as as Philby
Philby reported,
reported, "all“all sorts
sorts of doors opened
of doors opened for for me."81
me.”*’
The
The doors,
doors, however,
however, openedopened too too late.
late. By
By the time Philby
the time Philby gained
gained access
access to to Franco,
Franco,
the
the NKVD assassination
assassination plot plot had
had been
been abandoned.
abandoned. Since Since the the spring
spring of of 1937
1937 thethe
Centre
Centre hadhad been
been increasingly
increasingly diverted
diverted fromfrom the war against
the war against Franco
Franco by by what became
what became
known
known as as the
the civil
civil war
war within
within the the Civil
Civil War.
War. TheThe destruction
destruction ofTrotskyists
ofTrotskyists became became aa
higher
higher priority
priority than
than thethe liquidation
liquidation of of Franco.
Franco. By By the
the endend of 1937 the
of1937 the hunt
huntforfor “ene-
"ene
mies
mies ofof the
the people"
people” abroad
abroad took took precedence
precedence over intelligence collection.
over intelligence collection. The remark
The remark-
able
able talents
talents of of the Magnificent Five
the Magnificent Five hadhad yet
yet toto bebefully
fully exploited.
exploited, IINO N 0 was was inin
turmoil,
turmoil, caught
caught up up ininthethe paranoia
paranoia of of the Great Terror,
the Great Terror, with
with most most of of its officers
its officers
abroad
abroad suspected
suspected of of plotting
plotting with withthe the enemy.
enemy. The The age age of of thethe Great
Great Illegals
I1legals was
was
rapidly
rapidly drawing
drawing to to aa brutal
brutalclose.
close.
FF II VV EE
T E
E RR RR O
OR
TThough
hough "special
“special tasks"
tasks” only
only began
began to
to dominate
dominate NKVD foreign
foreign operations
operations in
in 1937,
1937,
the
the problem
problem of of "enemies
“enemies of of the
thepeople"
people” abroad
abroad hadhad loomed
loomed steadily
steadily larger
larger in in Stalin's
Stalin’s
mind
mind since
since the
the early
early 1930s
1930s as as he
he became
became increasingly
increasingly obsessed
obsessed with
with thetheopposition
opposition to to
him
him inside
inside the
the Soviet
Soviet Union.
Union. The The most
most daring
daring denunciation
denunciation of of the
thegrowing
growing brutality
brutality
of
of Stalin's
Stdin’s Russia
Russia was
was aa letter
letter of
of protest sent totothe
protest sent the Central
CentralCommittee
Committee in thein autumn
autumn
the
of
of 1932
1932 by by aa former
former Party
Party secretary
secretary in in Moscow,
Moscow, Mikhail
Mikhail Ryutin,
Ryutin, andand aa small
small band
band of of
supporters.
supporters. The The "Ryutin
“Ryutin platform,"
platform,” whose
whose text
text was
was made
made public
public only
only inin 1989,
1989, con
con-
tained
tained such
such anan uncompromising
uncompromising attack attack onon Stalin
Stalin and
and thethehorrors
horrors which
which had had accom
accom-
panied
panied collectivization
collectivization and and thethe First
First Five
Five Year
Year Plan
Plan over
over the
the previous
previous fewfew years
years that
that
some
some Trotskyists
Trotskyists who who sawsaw thethe document
document believed
believed it it was
was anan OGPU provocation.1
provocation.’ It It
denounced
denounced Stalin Stalin as
as "the
“the evil
evil genius
genius of of the
the Russian
Russian Revolution,
Revolution, motivated
motivated by by vindic
vindic-
tiveness
tiveness andand lust
lustfor
for power,
power, whowho has
has brought
brought the theRevolution
Revolution to to the
theedge
edge of of the
the abyss,"
abyss,”
and
and demanded
demanded his his removal
removal fromfrom power:
power: "It
“It is
is shameful
shameful for for proletarian
proletarian revolutionar
revolutionar-
ies
ies to
to tolerate
tolerate any
any longer
longer Stalin's
Stalin’s yoke,
yoke, his
his arbitrariness,
arbitrariness, his his scorn
scorn for
for the
the Party
Party andand
the laboring masses."2
the laboring masse^."^
At
At aa meeting
meeting of of the
the Politburo
Politburo Stalin
Stalin called
called for
for Ryutin's
Ryutin’s execution.
execution. Only Only Sergei
Sergei
Mironovich
Mironovich Kirov Kirov dared
dared toto contradict
contradict him.
him. "We
“Wemustn't
mustn’t do do that!"
that!” he
he insisted.
insisted. "Ryutin
“Ryutin
is
is not
not aa hopeless
hopeless case,
case, he's
he’s merely
merely gone
gone astray." For the
astray.” For the time being Stalin
time being Stalin backed
backed
down
down and and Ryutin
Ryutin waswas sentenced
sentenced to to ten
ten years
years in
in jail.
jail.33 Five
Five years
years later,
later, during
during the theGreat
Great
Terror,
Terror, when
when Stalin
Stalin had
had gained
gained the the virtually
virtually unchallenged
unchallenged power power of of life
life and
and death
death
over
over Soviet
Soviet citizens,
citizens, Ryutin
Ryutin was was shot.
shot.
During
During the theearly
early 1930s
1930s Stalin
Stalin lost
lost whatever
whatever capacity
capacity he he had
hadonce
once possessed
possessed to to dis
dis-
tinguish
tinguish personal
personal opponents
opponents from from "enemies
the people."
people.” By far far the
the most
most danger
danger-
ous
ous of of these
these enemies,
enemies, he he believed,
believed, werewere the
the exiled Leon Trotsky
exiled Leon Trotsky (codenamed
(codenamed
STARIK,
STANK, "Old “Old Man,"
Man,”by the the Centre)4
Centre)4and andhis
his followers.
followers. "No“No normal
normal 'constitutional'
‘constitutional’
paths
paths forfor the
the removal
removal of ofthe
the governing
governing [Stalinist]
[Stalinist] clique
clique now remain," wrote
now remain,” wrote Trotsky
Trotsky
in
in 1933.
1933. "The
“The only
only way
way to
to compel
compel the the bureaucracy
bureaucracy to to hand
hand over
over power
power to to the
the prole
prole-
tarian
tarian vanguard
vanguard is is by
by force."
force.” Henceforth
Henceforth Stalin
Stalin used
used that
that assertion
assertion toto argue
argue thatthat the
the
Soviet
Soviet state
state was faced with
was faced with aathreat
threat of of forcible
forcible overthrow,
overthrow, which
which mustmust itself
itself bebe
forcibly
forcibly prevented.5
prevented.’
Opposition
Opposition to toStalin
Stalin resurfaced
resurfaced at at the
the1934
1934 Party
Party Congress,
Congress, though
though in in so
so muted
muted aa
form
form that
that itit passed unnoticed by
passed unnoticed by the
the mass
mass ofof the population. In
the population. In the
the elections
elections to to the
the
T e rro r
Terror // 66 99
Central
Central Committee,
Committee, Stalin
Stalin polled
polled several
several hundred
hundred votes
votes fewer
fewer than
than Kirov,
Kirov, who
who was
was
assassinated,
assassinated, probably
probably onon Stalin's
Stalin’s orders,
orders, at
at the
the end
end of
of the
the year.
year. What
What increasingly
increasingly
obsessed
obsessed Stalin,
Stalin, however,
however,were
wereless
lessthe
the powerless
powerless remnants
remnants of ofreal
real opposition
opposition toto him
him
than
than the
the gigantic,
gigantic, mythical
mythical conspiracy
conspiracy by by imperialist
imperialist secret
secret services
services and
and their
their Trot
Trot-
skyist
skylst hirelings.
hirelings.Though
Though the
theparanoid
paranoid strain
strain inin what
what Khrushchev
Khrushchev laterlater called
called Stalin's
Stalin’s
"sickly
“sickly suspicious"
suspicious”personality
personality does
does much
much to to explain
explain his
his obsession
obsession with
with conspiracy
conspiracy
theory,
theory, there
there was
was an
an impeccable
impeccable Leninist
Leninist logic
logic at
at the
the heart
heart of
of that
that obsession.
obsession. Stalin
Stalin
claimed
claimed Lenin's
Lenin’s authority
authority for
for his
his insistence
insistence that
that ititwas
was impossible
impossible for
for the
the imperialists
imperialists
not to
not to attempt
attempttotooverthrow
overthrow the
the world's
world’s first
first and
and only
only worker-peasant
worker-peasant state:
state:
We
We are
are living
living not
not only
only in
in aaState,
State,butbut
in ainsystem
system
a of
of States,
States, and
and the
the existence
existence of
of
the
the Soviet
Soviet Republic
Republic side
side byby side
side with
with imperialist
imperialist States
States is
is in thelong
in the longrunrun
unthinkable.
unthinkable. But until that
But until thatend
end comes,
comes, aa series
series of
of the
the most
most terrible
terrible clashes
clashes
between the Soviet Republic and bourgeois States is unavoidable.
between the Soviet Republic and bourgeois States is unavoidable.
It
It was
was equally
equally inevitable,
inevitable, Stalin
Stalin argued,
argued, that the enemies
that the enemies without
without would
would conspire
conspire
with
with traitors
traitors within.
within. OnlyOnly "blind
“blindbraggarts
braggarts or or concealed
concealed enemies
enemies of of the
the people,"
people,” he he
declared, would dispute this elementary
declared, would dispute this elementary logic.6 Those
Thosewho disagreed thus automati--
who disagreed thus auto mati
cally
cally branded
branded themselves
themselves as as traitors.
traitors.
Despite
Despite Stalin's
Stalin’sincreasing
increasing obsession
obsession during
during the the 1930s
1930s with
with Trotskyist
Trotskyist conspiracy,
conspiracy,
Trotsky
Trotsky never
never really
reallyrepresented
represented anyany credible
credible threat
threat totothe
theStalinist
Stalinist regime.
regime. HeHe spent
spent
his early years in exile trying vainly to fin d a European base from
his early years in exile trying vainly to find a European base from which to organize which to organize
his
his followers.
followers. In In 1933
1933 he he left
leftTurkey
Turkey forfor France,
France, then
then two
two years
years later
later moved
moved on on toto
Norway,
Norway, but but his
his political
political activity
activity in
in all
all three
three countries
countries waswas severely
severelyrestricted
restricted byby the
the
reluctant
reluctant host
host governments.
governments. In In 1937,
1937, having
having finally
finally despaired
despaired ofof finding
finding aaEuropean
European
headquarters,
headquarters,Trotsky left for Mexico, where he remained until his assassinationthree
Trotsky left for Mexico, where he remained until his assassination three
years
years later.
later.The
The chief
chief European
European organizer
organizer of of the
the Trotskyist
Trotskyist movement
movement for for most
most ofof the
the
11930s
930s was
was not
not Trotsky
Trotsky himself
himself but
but hishis elder
elder son,
son, Lev
Lev Sedov,
Sedov, who
who fromfrom 1933
1933 waswas
based
based inin Paris.
Paris. ltIt was
was Sedov
Sedovwho,
who, until
until his
his death
death inin1938,
1938,organized
organized publication
publication of of his
his
father's
father’s Bulletin
Bulletin of Opposition and
the Opposition
Ofthe and maintained
maintained contact
contact with
with Trotsky's
Trotsky‘s scattered
scattered
supporters.
supporters. Sedov's
Sedov’s entourage,
entourage, like
like his
his father's,
father’s, was
was penetrated
penetrated byby the
the OGPU
OGPU and and
NKVD. From From 19341934 onwards
onwards his his closest
closest confidant
confidant and and collaborator
collaborator in in Paris
Paris was
was anan
NKVD
NKVD agent, agent, the
the Russian-born
Russian-born PolishPolish Communist
Communist Mark, Mark. Zboro:wski,
Zborowski, knownknown to to
Sedov
Sedov asas etienne
Stienne andand successively
successivelycodenamed
codenamed by by the
the Center
CenterMAKS,
MAKS, MAK, MAK, TULIP
TULIP
and
and KANT.
KANT. SedovSedov trusted Etienne" so
trusted "“Etienne” so completely
completely thatthat he
he gave
gave him
him thethe key
key toto his
his
letterbox,
letterbox, allowed
allowed him him totocollect
collect his
his mail
mail andand entrusted
entrustedhiIIl
himwith Tr9tsky'S most
withTrotsky‘s most con
con-
fidential
fidential files
files and
and archives
archives for
for safekeeping.7
safekeeping7
AS
AS T
THHE
E C
CHHII E
EFF headquarters
headquarters ofof both the Trotskyist
boththe Trotskyist movement
movement and and the
the White
White
Guards,
Guards, Paris became for several yearsthe main center of operations for the NKVD
Paris became for several years the main center of operations for the NKVD
Administration
Administration forfor Special
SpecialTasks,
Tasks, headed
headed by
by "Yasha"
“Yasha”Serebryansky, which
which specialized
Serebryansky’ specialized
in
in assassination
assassination and
and abduction.
abduction. Serebryansky's illegal residency
Serebryansky‘s illegal residency in
in Paris
Paris had other
had other
targets,
targets, too.
too. The
The most
most prominent
prominent waswas the
the mercurial
mercurialJacques
Jacques Doriot,
Doriot, aarabble-rousing
rabble-rousing
orator
orator who
who during
during the
the early
early 1930s
1930s was
was considered
considered aa likely
likely future
hture contender
contender forfor the
the
TT H
HEE SSW
WO R D
OR D A
ANND
D TT H
HEE SS H
H II E
E LL D
D // 77 00
leadership
the French
French Communist
Communist Party.8 Party.8In In thetheearly
early months
months of of1934,
1934, he he aroused
aroused
the
the ire
ire of
of Moscow
Moscowby by calling
calling onon thetheParty
Party toto form
form an an anti-fascist
anti-fascist Popular
Popular FrontFront with with
the
the socialists,
socialists, still officially condemned
still officially condemned in Moscow as
in Moscow "socialfiascists.’’
as “social fascists." Doriot
Doriot was was
summoned
summoned to to Moscow
Moscowtotorecantrecant but but refused
refused to to go.
go. HeH e was
was expelled
expelled from from the the Party
Party
for
for indiscipline
indiscipline in in June
June 1934,
1934, ironically
ironically at at the
the very
very moment
moment when when the the Communist
Communist
International,
International, in in aa rapid
rapid volte-face
volte-face instantly
instantly accepted
accepted by by the
the French
French Communist
Communist
Party,
Party, decided
decidedin in favor
favor of
of aa Popular
Popular FrontFront policy.
policy.
Doriot
Doriot responded
responded with with aa series
series of ofincreasingly
increasinglybitterbitter attacks
attacks on on both
both Stalin's
Stalin’s"ori“ori-
enta1"
ental” despotism and the French Communist leadership, whomhe derided as
despotism and the French Communist leadership, whom he derided as
"Stalin's
“Stalin’sslaves."
slaves.”The The Centre,
Centre, fearing
fearing thethe effect
effect ofof Doriot's
Doriot’s impassioned
impassioned and and nownow subsub-
versive
versive oratory
oratory on on the
theFrench
French left,
left, ordered
ordered Serebryansky
Serebryansky to to keep
keep him him under
under continu
continu-
ous surveillance. In
oussurveillance. In 1935,
1935, after
after almost
almost the the whole
whole non-Communist
non-Communist press press hadhad
publicized Doriot's
publicizedDoriot’srevelation revelation that the French Communist
that the French Communist Party receivedsecretParty received secret
instructions
instructions and and funds
funds from
from Moscow,
Moscow, the the Centre
Centreinstructed
instructed Serebryansky
Serebryansky to to draw
drawupup
plans
plans forfor his
his liquidation.9
liquidation.’ The The order
order toto go
go ahead
ahead withwith thethe assassination
assassination seems seems nevernever
to
to have
have been
been given,
given,perhaps
perhaps because
because of ofthe
the triumph
triumph of ofthe
the Popular
Popular FrontFront in inthe the1936
1936
elections and Doriot's foundation soon afterwards of the
elections and Doriot’s foundation soon afterwards of the neofascist Parti Populaire neofascist Parti Populaire
Frans:ais.
FranGais. Doriot's
Doriot’s publicpublic vindication
vindication of of the
the Communist
Communist charge charge thatthat hehe was
was aa fascist
fascist
collaborator
collaborator provided
provided the the Centre
Centre withwith aa propaganda
propaganda victory victory which
which his his assassination
assassination
would
would havehave spoiled
spoiledrather
rather than
than enhanced.10
enhanced.’(’
Among
Among other otherassassinations
assassinations which
which Serebryansky
Serebryanskywas wasordered
ordered to to organize
organize was wasthat
that
of
of the
the leading
leading Nazi Nazi Hermann Goering, who
Hermann Goering, who was was reported
reported to to be
be planning
planning aa visit visit to
to
Paris.
Paris. The
The Administration
Administration for for Special
Special Tasks
Tasks ordered
ordered its its Paris residency to
Paris residency to recruit
recruit aa
sniper
sniper andand flnd
find aa wayway ofof infi ltrating him
infiltrating him into
into thethe airport,
airport, probably
probably Le Le Bourget,
Bourget, at at
which
which Goering
Goering was was expected
expected to to landY
land.’’ Goering,
Goering, however,
however, failedfailed to to visit
visit France
France and and
the
the sniper
sniper was
was stoodstood down.
down. TheThe fi les seen
files seen by by Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin give give no no indication
the
Centre's
Centre’s motive
motive in in ordering
ordering an an assassination
assassination which which was was undoubtedly
undoubtedly authorized
authorized by by
Stalin
Stalin himself.
himself. The The probability
probability is, is, however,
however, that that thethe main
main objective
objective was was to to damage
damage
relations
relations between
between France France andand Germany
Germany ratherrather than
than to tostrike
strike aa blow
blow against
against Nazism.
Nazism.
The
The assassination on French soil in 1934 of the President of the Republic and
assassination on French soil in 1934 of the President of the Republic and the
the
King
King of of Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia by by aa non-Communist
non-Communist assassin assassin doubtless
doubtless encouraged
encouraged the the Centre
Centre
to
to believe
believe that
that ititcould
could avoid
avoid responsibility
responsibilityfor forthe
the killing
killing of of Goering
Goeringif if an
an opportu
opportu-
nity
nity arose.
arose.
Despite
Despite thethe numerous
numerous otherother duties
duties ofof Serebryansky's
Serebryansky’sParis Parisresidency,
residency, its its
main
main tasktask
remained the surveillance and destabilization of French
remained the surveillance and destabilization of French Trotskyists. Until 1937 Lev Trotskyists. Until 1937 Lev
Sedov,
Sedov,thanks
thanks to to his
his misplaced
misplacedbut but total
total confidence
confidence in in " E tienne" Zborowski,
“Etienne” Zborowski,was was such
such
an
an indispensable
indispensable source source onon the
thePOLECATS
POLECATS (as (as the
the Trotskyists
Trotskyists were were codenamed
codenamed by by
the
the Centre)
Centre) thatthat he he was
was not
not marked
marked down down as as aa target
target forfor liquidation.
liquidation.12 12 In
In the
the autumn
autumn
of
of 1936
1936 Zborowski
Zborowski warned warned the the Centre
Centrethat, that,because
because of ofhis
his fi nancial problems,
financial problems,Trot Trot-
sky
s k y was
was selling
selling partpart ofofhis
his archive
archive (formerly
(formerly amongamong the the papers
papers entrusted
entrusted by by Sedov
Sedov to to
Zborowski
Zborowski for safekeeping) to
for safekeeping) the Paris
to the Paris branch
branch of of the InternationalInstitute
the International Instituteofof
Social
Social History
History based based inin Amsterdam.
Amsterdam. Serebryansky
Serebryansky was wasordered
ordered to to set
set upup aa task
task force
force
to
to recover
recover it,it, codenamed
codenamed the the HENRY
HENRYgroup. group. He H e began
began by by renting
renting the the flat
flat immedi
imtnedi-
ately
ately above
abovethe
the institute
institutein in
thetherue
rue Michelet
Michelet in in order
order to to keep
keep it it under
under surveillance.
surveillance. On On
Te r r o r I 7I
Serebryansky's
Serebryansvs instructions,
instructions, Zborowski,
Zborowski, then then working
working as as aa service
service engineer
engineer at at aaParis
Paris
telephone
telephone exchange,
exchange,was was ordered
ordered to to cause
cause aa fault
fault onon the
the Institute's
Institute’s telephone
telephone line line in
in
order
order toto give
give him
him aachance
chance to to reconnoitre
reconnoitre th� the exact
exact 10catiC?�
location of o f th�
the Tr()��ky
Trotsky papers
papers and
and
examine
examine the the locks.
locks,When
When the the Institute
Institute reported
reported the the fault
fault on on its
itsline,
line, however,
however, one one ofof
Zborowski's
Zborowski’s colleagues
colleagueswas wassent
sent to to mend
mend the the fault
fault instead.
instead. Zborowski
Zborowski promptlypromptly put put
the
the Institute's
Institute’s phone
phone outoutofofaction
action once
once again
again and
and onon this
this occasion
occasion was was called
called to to make
make
the
the repair
repair himself.
himself. As As he he left
left the Institute, having
the Institute, having mended
mended the the fault
fault andand closely
closely
inspected
inspected thethe locks
locks to
to the
the front
front and
and backback doors,
doors, hehe was
was given
given aa five
five franc
franc tiptip by
by the
the
director,
director, Boris
Boris Nikolayevsky,
Nikolayevsky, aa prominent
prominent Menshevik
Menshevik emigre CmigrC classed
classed by by the
the NKVD
as
as an
an "enemy
“enemy of of the
the people."13
people.”13
Serebryansky
Serebryansky fixed fured the time for
the time for the
the burglary
burglary at at two
two o'clock
o’clock on the morning
on the morning of of
November
November 7, 1936, and
7,1936, and ordered
ordered it it toto be
be completed
completed by by 55 a.m.
a.m. at at the
the latest.
latest. Since
Since hishis
agents
agents were
were unable
unable to to find
find keyskeys toto fit
fit the
the Institute
Institute locks,
locks, he he decided
decided to to cut
cut them
themout out
with aadrill
with drill powered
powered by by anan electric
electric transformer
transformer concealed
concealed in in aabox
box filled
filled with
with sawdust
sawdust
and
and cotton
cotton wool
wool to to deaden
deaden the the sound.14
sound.14The Th,eburglars
burglars broke
broke in in unobserved
unobserved and and left
left
with
with Trotsky's
Trotsky’s papers.
papers. Both
Both SedovSedov and and the
the Paris
Paris police
police immediately
immediately suspectedsuspected the the
NKVD
NKVD because
because of of both
both the the professionalism
professionalism of of the
the burglary
burglary and and thethe fact
fact that
that money
money
and
and valuables
valuables in in the
theInstitute
Institutehad hadbeen
been left
left untouched.
untouched. Sedov Sedov assured
assured .thethe police
police that
that
his
his assistant Etienne" Zborowski,
assistant "“Etienne” Zborowski~was was completely
completely above above suspicion,
suspicion, and and in in any case
any case
kept
kept the
the main
main archive,
archive, which
which had had not not been
been stolen,
stolen, at at his
his home
home address.
address. Ironically,
Ironically,
Sedov
Sedov suggested
suggested thatthat the
the NKVD might might have learned of the transfer of a partof
have learned of the transfer of a part of the
the
archive
archive asas the
the result
result of
of an
an indiscretion
indiscretion by by the
the Institute
Institute director,
director, Nikolayevsky.15
Nik01ayevsky.l~
The
The extraordinary
extraordinary importance
importance attached attached by by the
the Centre
Centre to to the
the theft
theft ofof the
the papers
papers
was
was demonstrated
demonstrated by by the
the award
award of of the Order of
the Order of the
the Red
Red Ban11:er
Banner to to . the
�4e HENRY
group.16
group.16TheThe operation,
operation, however,
however, was wasas as pointless
pointless as as it
it was
was professional.
professional.The The papers
papers
stolen
stolen from
from the
the Institute
Institute (many
(many of of them
them press
press cuttings)
cuttings) werewere of of no
no operational
operational sig sig-
nificance
nificance whatever
whatever and and ofof farfar less
less hi�torical
historical jmportance
,importance than than the the Trotsky
Trotsky archive
archive
which
which remained
remained in in Zborowski's
Zborowski’s hapds hands a.n and.d later
later ,.ended
�n�e4 up up atat Harvard
Harvard UniversityY
University.17
But
But byby the
the mid-1930s
mid-1930s StalinStalin had had lost
lost all
all sense
sense ofo f proportion
proportion in in his
his pursuit
pursuit of of Trot
Trot-
skyism
skyism in in all
all its
its forms,
forms, both
both real real and
and imaginary.
imaginary. Trotsky
Trotsky had had become
become an an obsession
obsession
who
who dominated
dominated many many ofof Stalin's
Stalin’swaking
waking hours
hours andand probably
probably interfered
interfered with with his
his sleep
sleep
at
at night.
night. AsAs Trotsky's
Trotsky‘sbiographer,
biographer, Isaac Isaac Deutscher,
Deutscher, concludes:
concludes:
The
The frenzy
frenzy with
with which
which [Stalin]
[Stalin] pursued
pursued thethe feud,
feud, making
making it the paramount
it the paramount
preoccupation
preoccupation of of international
international communism
communism as as well
well as
as of
of the
the S<?yiet
Soviet Uni()Il,and
Union. .and
.
subordinating
subordinating to all political,
to ititall political, tactical,
tactical, intellectual
intellectual and
and other
otherinterests,
interests, beggars
beggars
description;
description; there
there is
is in
in the
thewhole
whole ofof history
history hardly
hardly another
another case
case in
in which
whichsuch
such
immense
immense resources
resources of of power
power and
and propaganda
propaganda werewere employed
employed against
against aa single
single
is
individual.
individual.’*
The
The British
British diplomat
diplomat R. A. Sykes
Sykes later
later wisely
wisely described
described Stalin's
Stalin’sworld
world view view as
as "a
“acuri
curi-
ous
ous mixture
mixture of
of shrewdness
shrewdness and
and n()nsense."19 St�in.\
Stalin’s-�hre� .. es s
�Il. .. w:-a� pparent in the
.31
n~nsense.”~’ shrewdness was apparent
.. ,.... in the
.
i ,
way that he outmaneuvered his rivals after the death of Lenin, gradually
way that he outmaneuvered his rivals after the death of Lenin, gradually acquired acquired
absolute
absolute power
power as
as General
General Secretary,
Secretary, and
and later
later out-negotiated
out-negotiated Churchill
Churchill and and Roo-
Roo-
T
THHS
E WSOWR O
E DR D A
AND T
THHSE
EH ISEHL IDE L D / 72
sevelt
sevelt during
during their
their wartime
wartime conferences.
conferences. Historians
Historians have
have found
found itit difficult
difficult to
to accept
accept
that
that so
so shrewd
shrewd aa man
man also
also believed
believed in in so
so much
much nonsense.
nonsense. But
But it
it is
is no
no more
more possible
possible
to understand Stdin
to understand Stalin without
without acknowledging
acknowledging his his addiction
addiction toto conspiracy
conspiracy theories
theories
about
about Trotsky
Trotsky (and
(and others)
others) than
thanit
it is
is to
to comprehend
comprehend Hitler
Hitler without
withoutgrasping
grasping the
the pas
pas-
sion
sion with
with which
which hehe pursued
pursued his
his even
even more
more terrible
terrible and
and absurd
absurd conspiracy
conspiracy theories
theories
about
about the
the Jews.
Jews.
GEE N RI
R IKKHH G R I G O RY E V I C H YAG
GRIGORYEVICH O D A , head
YAGODA, head ofof the
the NKVD from from 1934 1934 to to 1936,
1936, was
was far
far
less obsessed
less obsessedby by Trotsky
Trotsky than
than Stalin
Stalin was.
was. Stalin's chief grudge
Stalin’schief grudge against
against him him was was proba
proba-
bly
bly aa growing
growing conviction
conviction thatthat he hehad been deliberately
had been deliberately negligent
negligent in in his
his hunt
hunt forfor Trot
Trot-
skyist
skyist traitors.2o
traitors.20His His nemesis arrived in
nemesis arrived in September
September 19361936 in the form
in the form of of aa telegram
telegram
from Stalin and
from Stdin and his protege, Andrei
his protCgC, Andrei Zhdanov,
Zhdanov, to the Central
to the Central Committee
Committee declaringdeclaring
that
that Yagoda
Yagoda had had "definitely
“definitely proved
proved himself
himself incapable
incapable of of unmasking
unmasking the the Trotskyite
Trotskyite-
Zinovyevite
Zinovyevite bloc" bloc”andand demanding
demanding his his replacement
replacement by by Nikolai
Nikolai Ivanovich
Ivanovich Yezhov.
Yezhov.
As head of the NKVD NKVDfor the next two two years, Yezhov
Yezhovcarried through the the largest
scale
scale peacetime political persecution
peacetime political persecution and blood-letting in
and blood-letting in European
European history,history, known
known
to
to posterity
posterity as as the
the Great
GreatTerror.
Terror.21 21 One
One NKVD document document from from the the Yezhov
Yezhov era, era, which
which
doubtless reflected-and
doubtless reflected-and probably probably slavishly imitated-Stalin's own
slavishlyimitated-Stalin’s own view,
view, asserted
asserted
that "the scoundrel
that “the scoundrel Yagoda"
Yagoda” had had deliberately
deliberately concentrated
concentrated the the attack
attack on the "lower
on the “lower
ranks"
ranks” of of "the
“the right-wing
right-wing Trotskyite underground" in
Trotskyite underground” in order
order to to divert
divert attention
attention fromfrom
its true leaders:
leaders: Zinovyev,
Zinovyev, Bukharin, Rykov, Tomsky, Tomsky, Kamenev and Smirnov. Smirnov. Yagoda,Yagoda,
it was claimed, had either sacked or sidelined NKVD staff who had tried to indict
these former heroes of the Leninist Leninistera for their imaginary crimes.22 crimes.22 All save save Tomsky,
Tomsky,
who committed suicide, were given
committed suicide, given starring roles in the the show trials of 11936 936 toto1 938,
1938,
gruesome
gruesome morality
morality plays
plays which
which proclaimed
proclaimed aa grotesque
grotesque conspiracy
conspiracy theory theory uniting
uniting all
all
opposition
opposition at home and
at home and abroad
abroad by by the use of
the use elegantly absurd
of elegantly absurd formulae
formulae such such as:
as:
"Trotskyism
“Trotskyism is is aa variety
variety of fascism
fascism andand Zinovyevism
Zinovyevism isisaa variety
variety of Trotskyism." In
ofTrotskyism.” In the
the
last
last of
of the
the great
great show
show trials
trials Yagoda, despite aa plea
Yagoda, despite plea for
for mercy
mercy writtenwritten “on "on bended
bended
knees,"
knees,”waswas himself
himself unmasked
unmasked as as aa leading
leading Trotskyist
Trotskyist conspirator.
conspirator.The The chief
chief author
author of of
the
the gigantic
gigantic conspiracy
conspiracy theory,
theory, which became undisputed
which became undisputed orthodoxyorthodoxy within within thethe
NKVD and and provided
provided the the ideological
ideological underpinning
underpinning of of the Great Terror,
the Great Terror, was Stalin
was Stalin
himsel[23 Stalin personally proofread the transcripts of the show trials before their
himself.23 Stalin personally proofread the transcripts of the show trials before their
publication, amending
publication, amending the the defendants'
defendants’ speeches
speeches toto ensure
ensure that they did
that they not deviate
did not deviate
from their well-rehearsed confessionsconfessions to imaginary conspiracies.24
con~piracies.~~ NKVD records of
the period proclaim with characteristic obsequiousness obsequiousness that, "The “The practical organizaorganiza-
tion ofthe
tion of the work
work exposing
exposing the the right-wing
right-wing Trotskyite
Trotskyite underground
underground was was supervised
supervised
personally
personally by by Comrade
Comrade Stalin,
Stalin, and
and in in 1936-8
1936-8 crippling
crippling blows
blows were were delivered
delivered to to the
the
rabble. "25
rabble.”25
"Crippling blows"
“Crippling blows” against both real and imaginary Trotskyist "rabble" “rabble”were struck
outside as well as inside the Soviet Union. The beginning of the the Spanish Civil War
in July 1936
1936 opened up aa major new new field of operations for Serebryansky's
Serebryanskyb Adminis Adminis-
tration
tration for
for Special
Special Tasks
Tasks andand for
for INO
I N 0 as as aa whole.
whole. The
The struggle
struggle of of the Spanish repub
theSpanish repub-
lican government to defend itself against the nationalist rebellion led by General
Francisco
Francisco Franco
Franco fired
fired the
the imagination
imagination of of the
the whole
whole of thethe European
Europeanleft leftas
as aa crusade
crusade
T
T ee rn"r o r / 7733
against international fascism:

against international fascism: 35,000
35,000 foreign volunteers, most
foreign volunteers, most of them Communist,
of them Communist,
set
set out
out for
for Spain
Spain to join the
to join theInternational
International Brigades
Brigades in in defense of the
defense of the republic. In
republic. In
October
October 1936
1936Stalin
Stalin declared
declared in in an
an open
open letter
letter toto Spanish
Spanish Communists: "Liberation
Communists: “Liberation
of
of Spain
Spain from
from the
the yoke
yoke ofof the Spanish reactionaries
the Spanish reactionaries is is not the private
not the private concern
concern of
of
Spaniards
Spaniards alone,
alone, but
but the
the common
common causecause of
of all
all progressive humanity." From
progressive humanity.” From the
the out
out-
set, however,
set, however, the
the NKVD was was engaged
engaged in Spain in
in Spain in aawar
war on
on two fronts: against
two fronts: against Trot
Trot-
skyists
skyists within the republicans
within the republicans and theInternational
and the International Brigades, as well
Brigades, as well as
as against
against
Franco
Franco and
and the
the nationalist
nationalist forces.
forces. The
The former
former .illegal resident in
illegal resident in London, Aleksandr
London, Aleksandr
Orlov, sent to
Orlov, sent Spain as
to Spain as legal resident after
legal resident after the
the outbreak
outbreak ofof the
the Civil
Civil War,
War, confi dently
confidently
assured theCentre
assured the Centrein in October,
October, "The
“The Trotskyist
Trotskyist organization
organization POUM [Partido [Partido
Obrero
Obrero de Unificacion Marxista]
de Unificacion Marxista] cancan be
be easily
easilylliquidated."26
iq~idated.”~~
WHILE O RL O V C O O R D I NAT E D
COORDINATED the
the NKVD's
NKVD’s secretsecret two-front
two-front war war within
within Spain,
Spain,
Serebryansky
Serebryansky conducted
conducted operations
operations from from abroad.
abroad. Serebryansky
Serebryansky organized
organized training
training
courses
courses in in Paris
Paris for
for saboteurs
saboteurs from
from the the International Brigades, run
InternationalBrigades, run byby GIGI, aa French
French
Communist
Communist mechanicmechanic who who usually
usually worked
worked without pay, FRANYA, aa female
without pay, female Polish
Polish
student paid
student paid 1,500
1,500francs
francs aa month,
month,and LEGRAND, on
and LEGRAND, on whom
whomnonofurther details are
Lrther details are
available.
available. The greatest sabotage
The greatest sabotage success
success reported Serebryansky was
reported by Serebryansky was the claim by
the claim by
the ERNST TOLSTY group
the group ofillegals,
of illegals, based
basedinin the Baltic and
theBaltic and Scandinavia,
Scandinavia, to have
to have
sunk
sunk seventeen
seventeen shipsships carrying
carrying armsarms to to FrancoP
franc^.^^ One
One of the leading
of the leading saboteurs
saboteurs waswas aa
young German Communist,
young German Communist,Ernst ErnstWollweber,
Wollweber, who who twenty
twenty years
years later was to
later was to become
become
head
head of of the
the Stasi
Stasi inin East Germany.28 An
East Germany2* AnNKVD inquiry after the
inquiry after Civil War
the Civil War con-
con
cluded, however, that some of the reports of sinkings were fabrications.29
cluded, however, that some of the reports of sinkings were fabrication^.^^
The
The main
main NKVD training training grounds
grounds for for guerrillas
guerrillas andand saboteurs
saboteurs werewere within
within Spain
Spain
itself
itself at
at training
training camps
camps supervised
supervised by by Orlov
Orlov atat Valencia,
Valencia, Barcelona,
Barcelona, Bilbao
Bilbao andand
Argen.
Argen. Orlov
Orlov later
later boasted
boasted of of how
how his his guerrilla platoons succeeded
guerrilla platoons succeeded in in blowing
blowing up up
power lines
power and bridges
lines and bridges and and in
in attacking
attacking enemy convoys far
enemy convoys far behind
behind the the nationalist
nationalist
lines. As an
lines. SVR-sponsored biography
an SVR-sponsored biography of Orlov acknowledges,
of Orlov acknowledges, his his larger purpose
larger purpose
was
was "to
“to build
build up
up aa secret
secret police
police force
forceunder
under NKVD control control to
to effect
effect aa Stalinization
Stalinization of of
Spain."
Spain.” TheThe chief
chief Soviet
Soviet military
military adviser
adviser inin republican Spain, General
republican Spain, General Jan Jan Berzin,
Berzin,
formerly
formerly head head ofof Red
Red Army
Army intelligence, complained that
intelligence, complained Orlovand
that Orlov andthethe NKVD
NKVD
were
were treating
treating republican
republican SpainSpain as as aa colony
colony rather than an
rather than an ally3’
ally. 30
In
In the
the spring
spring ofof 1937
1937 Orlov
Orlovand Serebryansky were
andSerebryansky were ordered
ordered to to move
move from
from the
the sur-
sur
veillance
veillance andand destabilization
destabilization of of Trotskyist
Trotskyist groups
groups to the liquidation
to the liquidation of of their
their leaders.
leaders.
While
While Serebryansky
Serebryansky began began preparing
preparing the the abduction
abduction of of Sedov,31
S e d ~ v , ~Orlov
Orlov
’ supplied
supplied thethe
republican government with · forged documents designed to discredit POUM as “a
republican government with forged documents designed to discredit POUM as ((a
German-Francoist
German-Francoist spy spy organization."
organization.” On June 16
O n June 16 the
the head
head ofof POUM, Andreu Andreu Nin, Nin,
and
and forty
forty leading
leading members
members were were arrested,
arrested, its headquarters closed
its headquarters closed andand its
its militia
militia bat
bat-
talions
talions disbanded.
disbanded. Less Less than
than aa week
week later
later Nin disappeared from
Nin disappeared from prison.
prison. AnAn official
official
investigation announced that
investigation announced that hehe hadhad escaped.
escaped. In In reality,
reality, he
he was
was abducted
abducted and and mur-
mur
dered
dered by by aa ('mobile squad" of
“mobile squad” of NKVD
NKVD assassins, supervised by
assassins, supervised by Orlov. Nin was
Orlov. Nin was one
one of of
many
many Trotskyists
Trotskyists in in Spain,
Spain, both
both realreal and
and imagined,
imagined, who who met such fates.
met such fates. Until
Until Orlov
Orlov
defected
defected to the United
to the United States
States in 1938, fearing
in 1938, that he
fearing that he too
too had
had been
been placed
placed onon anan
NKVD
NKVD death list, he
death list, he lived
lived in some luxury
in some while organizing
luxury while organizing the the liquidation
liquidation of of ene-
ene-
TT H
HEE SS W R D
WOR D A
ANNT
DDH S
TH
E H IEE LS DH I E L D // 7
7 44
mies
mies of of the
the people.
people. A youngyoung volunteer
volunteer in in the
the International
International Brigades
Brigades summoned
summoned to to
his
his presence
presence was was struck
struck by by how
how strongly
strongly he he reeked
reeked of of eau
eau dede cologne,
cologne, and and watched
watched
enviously
enviously as as he
he consumed
consumed aa large large cooked
cooked breakfast
breakfast wheeled
wheeled in in onona trolley
trolley
a by
by aa white
white-
coated
coated servant.
servant. Orlov
Orlov offered
offered nonenone of of it
it totothethe famished
famished volunteer,
volunteer, who who had hadnot noteaten
eaten
for twenty-four hours.32
for twenty-four hours.32
Though
Though unusually
unusually forthcoming
forthcoming about about Orlov,
Orlov, who,who, because
because of of his
his defection,
defection, nevernever
qualifi
qualifieded for
for the
the KGB
KGB Valhalla,
Valhalla, the the SVR has has been
been much
much moremore reluctant
reluctant to to release
release
material
material on on the
the Spanish
Spanish Civil
Civil WarWar which
which mightmight damage
damage the the reputation
reputation of of the
the tradi
tradi-
tional heroes of Soviet foreign intelligence: among them
tional heroes of Soviet foreign intelligence: among them Hero of the Soviet Union Hero of the Soviet Union
Stanislav
Stanislav Alekseyevich Vaupshasov, long
Alekseyevich Vaupshasov, long celebrated
celebrated for for his
his daring
daring exploits
exploits behind
behind
enemy
enemy lines
lines during
during the the Second
Second WorldWorld War. War. With
With four four Orders
Orders of of Lenin,
Lenin, twotwo Orders
Orders
of
of the
theGreat
GreatPatriotic
Patriotic War
War and and a achestful
chesthl of of other
other medals,
medals, Vaupshasov
Vaupshasov was wasprobably
probably
the
the Soviet
Soviet Union's
Union’s most
most profusely decorated intelligence
profusely decorated intelligence hero.
hero. As As recently
recently as as 1990
1990 he he
was
was honored
honored by by aa commemorative
commemorative postage postage stamp.
stamp. Vaupshasov's
Vaupshasov’s murderous
murderous pre-war
pre-war
record,
record, however,
however, isisstill
still kept
kept from
from public
public viewview by by the
the SVR.
SVR. In In the
the mid-1920s
mid-1920s he he led
led aa
secret
secret OGPU
OGPU unit unit inin numerous
numerous raids raids on on Polish
Polish and and Lithuanian
Lithuanian border border villages,
villages,
dressed
dressed in in Polish
Polish andand Lithuanian
Lithuanian army army uniforms.
uniforms. In In 1929
1929 Vaupshasov
Vaupshasovwas wassentenced
sentenced
to
to death for murdering acolleague, but managed to have the sentence commuted to
death for murdering a colleague, but managed to have the sentence commuted to
ten
ten years
years in
in the
the gulag.
gulag. HeH e was
was quickly
quickly released
released and and resumed
resumed his his career
career as as one
one of of the
the
NKVD's leading experts
NKVD’s leading experts in in assassination.
assassination. Among Among Vaupshasov's
Vaupshasov’s dutiesduties in in Spain
Spain was was
the
the construction
construction and and guarding
guarding of of aa secret
secret crematorium
crematorium which which enabled
enabled the the NKVD to to
dispose
dispose of of its
its victims
victims without
without leaving
leaving any any trace
trace of their remains.
of their remains. ManyMany of of those
those
selected
selected forfor liquidation
liquidation werewere lured
lured into
into the thebuilding
building containing
containing the thecrematorium
crematorium and and
killed
killed onon the
the spot.33
spot.33
The
The NKVD agent agent inin charge
charge of of the
the crematorium
crematorium was was Jose
JoseCastelo
Castelo Pacheco
Pacheco (code(code-
named
named JOSE,
JOSE, PANSO PANS0and and TEODOR),34
TEODOR),34aa Spanish Spanish Communist
Communist born bornininSalamanca
Salamanca
in
in 1910,
1910,who who was
was recruited
recruited by by Orlov's
Orlov’sdeputy
deputy resident,
resident, Leonid
Leonid Aleksandrovich
Aleksandrovich Eitin Eitin-
gon,
gon, inin 1936.35
1936.35In In 1982,
1982, somesome years
years after
after Castelo's
Castelo’s death,
death, thethe KGB received
received aa letter
letter
from
from aa female
female relative
relative appealing
appealing for for aa pension
pension and and claiming
claiming that that hehe had
had told
told herher
before
before hishis death,
death, "If “Ifyou
you havehaveany anyproblems
problems and and there
there is
is no
no other
otherway
way out,
out, I mean
mean only only
in
in extreme
extreme circumstances,
circumstances, then then contact
contact my my Soviet
Soviet comrades."
comrades.’’Though
Though Castelo's
Castelo’s file file
showed
showed thatthat he hehad hadpromised
promised never never to to reveal
reveal any anydetails
details of
of his
his work
work as as aa Soviet
Soviet agent,
agent,
there
there was
was anan obvious
obvious risk
risk that
that his
his relative
relative hadhad discovered
discovered hishis work
work ininthe
the NKVD cre cre-
matorium.
matorium. The The Centre
Centre therefore
therefore concluded
concluded that to refuse
that to rehse her her request
request might
might have have
"undesirable
“undesirable consequences."
consequences.” In In January
January 1983 1983 she she was
was summoned
summoned to the consular
to the consular
department
department of of the
the Soviet
Soviet embassy
embassy in in Madrid
Madrid by by the
the resident
resident and and told
told that,
that, though
though
she
she had
had nonolegal
legal right
right toto aa pension,
pension, it it had
had been
been decided
decided toto make
make herher anan ex gratia pay
exgratia pay-
ment
ment of of 5,000
5,000 convertible
convertible roubles,
roubles, then
then the theequivalent
equivalent of of 6,680
6,680 US dollars.
dollars. No referrefer-
ence
ence was
was made
made to to Castelo's
Castelo’s workwork for for the
the NKVD.36
NKVD.36
R
REEM
MAA R KA
K ABBLY,
LY, M
M ANY
ANY O OT
THER RWW I S E admirable
admirable studies
studies of
of the
the Stalin
S t a h era
era fail
fail to
to men
men-
tion
tion the
the relentless
relentless secret
secret pursuit
pursuit of of "enemies
“enemies of
of the
the people"
people’’in
in western
western Europe.
Europe. The
The
result,
result, all too
too frequently,
frequently, isis aa sanitized,
sanitized, curiously
curiously bloodless
bloodless interpretation
interpretation of of Soviet
Soviet
foreign
foreign policy
policy on
on the
the eve
eve of
of the
the Second
Second World
World War
Warwhich
which fails
fails to
to recognize
recognize thethe pri-
pri-
4
. . ,
T
T ee rr rr oo rr / 75
75
ority
ority given
given to to assassination.
assassination. Outside
Outside Spain, the main
Spain, the theater of
main theater operations for
of operations for the
the
NKVD's
NKVD’s assassins
assassins was wasFrance, where their chief targets were Lev Sedov and General
Yevgeni
Yevgeni Karlovich
KarlovichMiller, Kutepov's
Kutepov’s successor
successorasashead of of the White
White GuardGuardROVS. In
the
the summer
summer of of 1937
1937 Serebryansky
Serebryanskydevised similar plans
devised similar plans to to liquidate
liquidate both.
both. Sedov
Sedov and and
Miller
Miller werewere each
each to to be
be kidnapped
kidnapped in in Paris, smuggled on
Paris, smuggled on board
board aa boat
boat waiting
waiting off the
off the
Channel coast,coast, then brought to the Soviet Union for interrogation and retribution.
The
The fi rst stage
first stage in in the
the abduction
abduction operations
operations waswas the penetration of
the penetration of their entourages.
their entourages.
Like Sedov's
Sedov’s assistant "“Etienne”E tienne" Zborowski, Miller's Miller’s deputy,
deputy, General Nikolai
Skoblin, was an NKVD agent. Probably unknown to Skoblin,
Skoblin, Skoblin, Serebryansky
Serebryansky also used used
an illegal,
illegal, Mireille Lyudvigovna
Lyudvigovna Abbiate (codenamed AVIATORSHA, AVIATORSHA, “aviator’s "aviator's
wife"),
wife”), to keep Miller under surveillance.surveillance. Abbiate was the daughter of a French music
teacher
teacher in in St.
St. Petersburg,
Petersburg, born born andand brought
brought up up ininRussia.
Russia. When
When her her family
family returned
returned
to
to France
France in in 1920,
1920, sheshe had
had stayed
stayed in in Russia and married
Russia and married the the aviator Vasili Ivanovich
aviator Vasili Ivanovich
Yermolov
Yermolov (hence(hence her her later
later codename).
codename). In 1931, when
In 1931, when she
she traveled
traveled to to France
France to to visit
visit
her parents, she was recruited by the NKVD. During her visit she recruited her
brother, Roland Lyudvigovich
brother, Roland Lyudvigovich Abbiate,Abbiate, who also became
who also became an an illegal
illegal with
with thethe code
code-
name
name LETCHIK ("pilot"). (“pilot”). AVIATORSHA rented rented aa flat
flat next
next to to General
General Miller,
Miller,
secretly
secretly forced
forced an an entry,
entry, stole some of
stole some of his papers and
his papers and installed
installed aa hidden microphone
hidden microphone
which
which enabled
enabled her her toto bug
bug his
his apartment.37
apartment.37 O On September 22, 1937,
n September 1937, like
like Kutepov
Kutepov
seven
seven years
yearsearlier,
earlier,Miller
Miller disappeared
disappeared in in broad
broad daylight
daylight on on aaParis
Paris street.
street. The Surete
The %rete
later concluded that
later concluded that Miller
Miller had been taken
had been taken toto the Soviet embassy,
the Soviet embassy, killed
killedand
and hishis body
body
placed in aalarge trunk which was then taken by a Ford truck totobe loaded on aaSoviet
freighter
freighter waiting
waiting at at Le
Le Havre.
Havre. Several
Several witnesses reported seeing
witnesses reported seeing the trunk being
the trunk being
loaded on board. Miller, however, however, was was still alive inside the trunk, trunk, heavily drugged.
Unlike
Unlike Kutepov
Kutepov in in 1930,
1930, he he survived
survived the the voyage
voyage to to Moscow,
Moscow, where where he was interro-
he was interro
gated
gated and shot. Skoblin,
and shot. Skoblin, who who fell
fell under immediate suspicion
under immediate suspicion by by Miller's
Miller’s supporters,
supporters,
fled
fled toto Spain.38
Spain.38Mireille
Mireille Abbiate,
Abbiate, whosewhose role
role went undetected, was
went undetected, awarded the
was awarded the
Order
Order of of the
the Red
Red Star,
Star, then reassigned to
then reassigned to the operation against
the operation against Sedov.39
Sed~v.~~
Planning
Planning for for the
the abduction
abduction of of Sedov
Sedov was
was at an advanced
at an advanced stagestage by the time
by the time Miller
Miller
disappeared.
disappeared.A fishing fishing boatboat had been hired
had been at Boulogne
hired at Boulogne to to take him on
take him on the
the first
first stage
stage
of
of his
his journey
journey to to the
the Soviet
Soviet Union.40
Union.40The operation, however,
The operation, however, was was aborted-possibly
aborted-possibly
as
as aa result
result ofof the
the furor
furor aroused
aroused in in France
France by by the
the NKVD's suspected involvement
NKVD’s suspected involvement in in
Miller's
Miller’s abduction.
abduction. A few few months
months laterlater Sedov
Sedov met diffel,"�pt �l)�.
met aa different end. O Q.nn February
f(!��ary 8, 8,
1938
1938 he he entered
entered hospital
hospital with
with acute
acute appendicitis. E tienne" Zborowski
appendicitis. "“Etienne” Zborowski helpedhelped to to per
per-
suade
suade himhim that,
that, to toavoid
avoid NKVD surveillance,
surveillance, he must have
he must have his his appendix
appendix removed
removed not not
at aaFrench hospital but at ata asmall private
privateclinic run by Russian emigres, CmigrCs,which was in
reality
reality an an easier
easier target
target for
for Soviet
Soviet penetration.
penetration. No No sooner
sooner had had Zborowski
Zborowski orderedordered the the
ambulance than, as he later admitted, he alerted the NKVD.
ambulance than, as he later admitted, healerted the NKVD. But, for alleged security But, for alleged security
reasons,
reasons, he refused to
he refused to reveal
reveal the
the address
address ofof the clinic t()
the clinic Fren�h Trotskyists.
to French Trotskyists. Sedov's
Sedov’s
operation
operation was was successful
successful and and for
for aa few
few days
days he seemed to
he seemed to be making aa normal
be making normal recov-
recov
ery. Then he
ery. Then he had
had aa sudden
sudden relapse
relapse which
which baffled
baffled his
his doctors._
doctors..Despite
Despite repeated
repeated bloodblood
transfusions,
transfusions, he he died
died inin great
great pain
pain on on February
February 16 16 at
at the age of
the age of only thirty-two. The
only thirty-two. The
contemporary files
contemporary files contain
contain no no proof
proof that
that the
the NKVD was was responsible
responsible for his death.41
for his death.41
It
It had,
had, however,
however, aa sophisticated
sophisticated medical
medical section,
section, thethe Kamera,
Kamera, which experimented
which experimented
T H ESE WS OWR OD
A RN DD
T HASENH DI ETLHDE S H I E L D /
/ 76
with
with lethal
lethal drugs
drugs andand was capable of
was capable of poisoning
poisoning Sedov.Sedov. ItIt is
is certain
certain that the NKVD
that the
intended to
intended assassinate Sedov,
to assassinate just as
Sedov,just as it
it planned
planned to to kill
kill Trotsky
Trotsky and and his
his other
other leading
leading
lieutenants. What
lieutenants. What remains
remains in in doubt
doubtis is whether
whether SedovSedov was wasmurdered
murdered by the the NKVD in in
February
February 1938
1938 or or whether
whether he he died
died of of natural
natural causes
causes before
before he
he could
could bebe assassinated.42
as~assinated.~~
Sedov's
Sedov’s death
death enabled
enabled thethe NKVD to to take
take aa leading
leading role
role inin the
the Trotskyist
Trotskyist organi
organi-
zation.
zation. Zborowski became both
Zborowski became both publisher
publisher of of the
the Bulletin of Opposition and
of the Opposition and Trot
Trot-
sky's
sky‘s most
most important
important contact
contact withwith hishis European
European supporters.
supporters. While
While unobtrusively
unobtrusively
encouraging
encouraging internecine
internecine warfare
warfare between
between the the rival
rival Trotskyist
Trotskyist tendencies,
tendencies, Zborowski
Zborowski
impeccably
impeccably maintained
maintained his his own
own cover.
cover. O Onn one
one occasion
occasion he he wrote
wroteto tell Trotsky
to tell Trotsky that that
the Bulletin was
the about to
was about publish an
to publish article entitled
an article entitled "Trotsky's
“Trotsky‘sLife Life in
in Danger,"
Danger,” which which
would expose the
would expose the activities
activities of of NKVD agents agents in Mexico. In
in Mexico. In the summer of
thesummer 1938 the
of 1938 the
defector
defector Aleksandr
Aleksandr Orlov,
Orlov, thenthen living
living in in the
the United
United States,
States, sent
sent Trotsky
Trotsky an an anony
anony-
mous letter
mous letter warning
warning him him that
that his
his life
life was
was inin danger
danger fromfrom an an NKVD agent agent in in Paris.
Paris.
Orlov
Orlov diddid not
not know
know thethe agent's
agent’s surname
surname but but said
said that
that his
his first
first name
name was was Mark
Mark (the (the
real
real first
first name
name of " Etienne" Zborowski),
of “Etienne” Zborowski), and and gavegave aa detailed description of
detailed description of his
his
appearance
appearance and and background.
background. Trotsky
Trotsky suspected
suspected that that this
this letter
letter andandothers
others likelike itit were
were
the
the work
work ofof NKVD agents Zborowski agreed.
provocateurs. Zborowski
agentsprowocnteurs. agreed. When
When toldtold about
about one one ofof
the
the accusations
accusations against him, he
against him, he is
is reported
reported as as having
having given
given "a hearty laugh."43
“a hearty laugh.”33
Following
Following the the death
deathofof Sedov,
Sedov,the the NKVD's
NKVID’s next next major
major Trotskyist
Trotskyist target
target inin Europe
Europe
was
was the
the German
GermanRudolfRudolf Klement,
Klement, secretary
secretary of of Trotsky's
Trotsky’s Fourth
Fourth International,
International,whose whose
founding
founding conference
conference was was due
due to to be
be held
held later
later in the year.44
in the year.44On July July 13, 1938 the
13, 1938 the
NKVD abducted
abducted Klement
Klement from from his his Paris home. A few
Paris home. few weeks
weeks later
later his headless
his headless
corpse
corpse was
was washed
washed ashore
ashore on on the
the banks
banks of of the
the Seine.
Seine. TheThe founding
founding conference
conference of of the
the
Fourth
Fourth International
International in in September
September was was aa tragicomic
tragicomic event,event, attended
attended by by only
only twenty
twenty-
one delegates
one delegates claiming
claiming to to represent
represent mostly
mostly minuscule
minuscule Trotskyist groups in
Trotskyist groups in eleven
eleven
countries. The Russian section, whose authentic members had probably been entirely
countries. The Russian section, whose authentic members had probably been entirely
exterminated, was
exterminated, was represented
represented by Zborowski.
Zborowski. The American Trotskyist
The American Trotskyist Sylvia Sylvia
Angeloff,
Angeloff, oneone ofof the
the conference
conference translators,
translators, was was accompanied
accompanied by her Spanish
by her Spanish lover,lover,
Ramon
Ram6n Mercader,
Mercader, an an NKVD illegal illegal posing
posing as as aa Belgian
Belgian journalist
journalist who who was later to
was later to
achieve
achieve fame
fame as as Trotsky's
Trotsky’s assassin
assassinin in Mexico
Mexico City.45
City.”
'
BY
B Y I938 E R E B RYA N S KY S Administration for Special
1938 SSEREBRYANSKY’S Special Tasks was the largest section
of Soviet foreign intelligence,
intelligence, claiming to have 212 illegal officers
officers operating in six
six-
teen countries: the USA, France, Belgium, Holland, Norway, Denmark, Sweden,
Finland, Germany, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Romania, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia and
Mter Trotskyists,
China. After Trotskyists, the largest number of “enemies
"enemies of the people”
people" pursued
abroad
abroad byby the
the NKVD duringduring the
the Great
Great Terror
Terror came
came from
from the
the ranks
ranks of
of its
its own
own for
for-
eign intelligence service.46
service.46When receiving reports from Moscow of show trials and
the unmasking of their their colleagues
colleagues as agents of imperialist powers, intelligence offi
offi-
cers stationed abroad had to pay careful
carehl attention not merely to what they said but
also to their
their facial expressions
expressionsand body language.
language. Those who
whofailed to respond with
sufficiently
sufficiently visible or heartfelt outrage tothethe non-existent conspiracies
conspiracies being
unveiled in Moscow
Moscow were likely to have adverseadverse reports sent to
tothe
the Centre-fre
Centre-fre-
quently with fatal consequences.
consequences.
T
T ee r r o r I
/ 77
Afterthe
the trial of Lenin's
Lenin’s forrner lieute�aI1t� Zinovyev,
formerlieutenants ��p.ovyev, Kamenev
Kamenev and and other
other
"degenerates"
“degenerates” in
in August
August 1936,
1936, the Centre received
the Centre received an
an outraged communication
outraged communication
from the Paris legal residency regarding the unsatisfactory
unsatisfactory level of
of indignation
indignation dis-
dis
played
played by
by the
the military
military intelligence
officer Abram
Abram Mironovich
Mironovich Alb�m (code named
Albam (codenamed
BELOV):
BELOV doesdoes not

not appear
appear to
to feel
feel aa deep
deep hatred
hatred or
or aa sharply critical attitude
sharply critical attitude
towards
towards these political bandits.
these political bandits. During
During discussions
discussions ofof the
the trial
trial ,of
of the
th.e Trot-
Trot
skyite-Zinovyevite bandits, he
skyite-Zinovyevite bandits, he retreats
retreats into silence. BELQV
into silence. BELOV was was �oping
hoping that
that
the sixteen convicted men would be shown mercy, and, when he read about
the sixteen convicted men would be shown mercy, and, when he read about
their
their execution
execution in
in the newspaper today,
the newspaper he actually
today, he sighed. 47
actually sighed.47
Albam's
Albam’s subversive
subversivesigh sighhelped
helped to convict not
to convict not merely
merely himself
himself but
but also
also aa number
number ofof his
his
colleagues
colleagues of of imaginary
imaginary crimes.
crimes. His
His file
file lists thirteen of
lists thirteen of his acquaintances who
his acquaintances who were
were
subsequently
subsequently arrested;
arrested; atat least some, probably
least some, most, were
probably most, were shot. Albam's wife,
shot. Albam’s wife, Frida
Frida
Lvovna,
Lvovna, tried
tried toto save
save herself
herself by
by disowning
disowning her her arrested husband. “The
arrested husband. "The most
rnost horrible
horrible
realization
realization for
for an honest Party
an honest member," she
Party member,” she wrote indignantly to
wrote indignantly to thethe NKVD, “is "is the
the
fact
fact that
that he
he was
was an an enemy
enemy ofof the people surrounded
thepeople surrounded by by other
other enemies
enemies of of the people."48
thepe~ple.”~’
Both
Both at at home
home and and abroad
abroad the Great Terror
the Great favored the
Terror, favored
. '" -
the survival
survival
..... , .- .
. , . of the
. of
.
most
the most
. . .
morally
morally unfit.
unfit. Those
Those who who were
were quickest
quickest to denounce their
to denounce colleagues for
their colleagues for imaginary
imaginary
crimes stood the
crimes stood the greatest
greatest chance
chance of being among
of being among the the minority
minorityof survivors. The
of survivors. The fact
fact
that Yakov Surits, ambassador
ambassador in Berlin at the thebeginning of of the Great
GreatTerror, was one
of
of the
the few senior diplomats
few senior diplomats to to survive
survive maymaywell
well have
have owed something totohis
owedsomething expertise
his expertise
in denunciation. Surits sought to to head off denunciation by the head of the legal res res-
idency
idency inin his
his embassy,
embassy, B. M. Gordon,
Gordon, by denouncing Gordon
by denouncing Gordon first.
first. At the outset of
the outset of
the
the Terror,
Terror, Surits
Surits drew
drew to the attention
to the attention of the Centre
of the Centre that
that aa Soviet
Soviet diplomat
diplomat with
with
whom
whom Gordon
Gordon was was onon friendly terms was
friendly terms was aa former
former Socialist
Socialist Revolutionary
Rev9luti<mary who who fre-
fre
quently
quently visited
visited relatives
relatives in
in Prague
Prague "where
“where other
other SR emigres
CmigrCs reside."49 After
Afterthe
the show
show
trial
trial of
ofthethe "Trotskyite-Zinovyevite
“Trotskyite-Zinovyevite TerroristTerrorist Center"
Center”inin January
January 1937, Surits
1937, Surits
reported
reported disturbing
disturbing evidence
evidence ofof Gordon's Trots1..),ite sympathies:
Gordon’s Trotskyite sympathies:
On February 22 aa Party
O n February Partymeeting
meeting waswas held in the
held in Berlin embassy.
theBerlin embassy. Gordon,
Gordon, B. M.,
the
the resident
resident and
and Communist
Communist PartyParty organizer, delivered aa report
organizer, delivered report onon thethe trial of
trial of
the
the Trotskyite
Trotskyite Center.
Center.
Gordon
Gordon did did not
not say
say aa word
word about
about the
the fact
fact that
that his
his rabble ,of band��s
rabble ,of bandits had had aa
specifi
specificc program
program ofof action;
action; he
he did
did not
notsay
say why
why this
this scum hid its
scum hid its program
program from from
the
the working
working class
class and
and from
from all
all working people; why
working people; why itit led
led aa double
double life;
life; why
why itit
went
went deeply
deeply underground.
underground.
He
He did
did not
not dwell
dwell on
on the
thereasons
reasons why after all
why after the enemies
all the enemies managed
managed to to cause
cause
damage
damage forfor so many years.
so many years.
He
H e did
did not
not deal
deal with
with the
the question
question why, despite wrecking,
why, despite wrecking, sabotage,
sabotage, terror
terror-
ism
ism and espionage, our
and espionage, our industry
industry andand transport
transport constantly made progress
constantly made progress and and
continue
continue toto make
make progress.
progress.
He
H e did
did not
not touch
touch onon the
the international
internationalsignificance
significance of trial. 50
the trial.”
of the
. .
TT H
HEE SS W R D
WOR D A
AN D TT H
ND H SE
E H ISEHL IDE L D // 7 88
Surits,
Surits, however,
however, was
was unaware
unaware that
that he
he was
was himself
himself being
being simultaneously
simultaneously denounced
denounced
for
for similar
similar failings
failings by
by one
one of
of his
his secretaries,
secretaries,who
who wrote
wrote virtuously
virtuously to
to the
the Centre:
Centre:
To
To this
this day
day the
the office
office of of Comrade
ComradeSurits
Surits is
is adorned
adorned with
with aaportrait
portraitofBukharin
of Bukharin
with
with thethefollowing
following inscription:
inscription: "To “To my
my dear
dear Surits,
Surits, my
my oid
old friend
friend and
and comrade,
comrade,
with
with love-No
love-N. Bukharin."
Bukharin.” I deliberately
deliberately do not take
do not take itit down,
down, notnot because
because I
greatly
greatly enjoy
enjoy looking
looking at at it,
it, but because I want
but because want toto avoid
avoid the
the cross
cross looks
looks which
which
Comrade
Comrade Surits
Surits gave
gave meme when
when I removed
removed the the portrait
portrait ofYenukidze.
ofyenukidze.
I am
am waiting
waiting for for him
him to to remove
remove itit himself,
himself, since
since ifif Bukharin
Bukharin was was indeed
indeed
once
once his
his close
close friend,
friend, he he must
must nownow bebe his
his enemy,
enemy, as ashe
he has
has become
become the the enemy
enemy
of our Party and of the whole working class. The portrait
of our Party andof the whole working class. The portrait should immediately should immediately
have
have been
been thrown
thrown into into the
thefi re.
fire.
That,
That, really,
really, isis all
all that
that I considered
considered it it my
my Party
Party duty
dutytotoreport
reporttotoyou.
you. After
After
the
the adoption
adoption ofof thethe Stalin
Stalin Constitution
Constitution [of [of 1936]
19361 which
which hashas granted
granted usus great
great
rights
rights and
andput
put us
us under
under great
great obligations,
obligations, calling
calling us
us to
to exercise
exercise discipline,
discipline, hon
hon-
est
est work
work and
and vigilance,
vigilance, I couldcould notnot remain
remain silent
silent about
about these
these facts.51
facts.”
In 1937-8,
In 1937-8, following
following thethe recall
recall andand liquidation
liquidation of all or
of all or most
most of of their
their offi cers,
officers,
many
many NKVD residencies ceased to
residencies ceased to function.
function. Though
Though the the residencies
residencies in in London,
London,
Berlin,
Berlin, Vienna
Vienna and and Tokyo
Tokyo diddid not
notclose,
close, they
they were
were reduced
reduced to to oneoneor,
or, at
at the
themost,
most, two
two
offi cers each.
officers 52 Most
each.52 Most of of the
theGreat
GreatIllegals
Illegals were
were purged
purged with
with the the rest. Among the
rest. Among thefirst
first
to fall
fall under suspicion
suspicion was the London London head of probably
probably the NKVD's
NKVD’s most success success-
ful illegal
illegal residency,
residency, Teodor Maly, Maly, whose religious background and revulsion at the
use
use of terror made him an obvious obvious suspect.
suspect. He accepted
accepted the order to return returntoto
Moscow
Moscow in June 1937
in June 1937 with
with an
an idealistic fatalism. "1
idealistic fatalism. “I know
know thatthat as as aa former
former priestpriest I
haven't
haven’t gotgot aa chance,"
chance,” he he told
told Aleksandr
Aleksandr Orlov. “But 1I have
Orlov. "But have decided
decided to to go there
there so
so
that
that nobody
nobody can can say:
say: 'That
‘That priest
priest might
might have
have been
been aa real
real spy after
after all.'
all.’ "53
’’53 Once
Once in in
Moscow
Moscow he he was
was denounced
denounced as as aa German
German spy, spy, interrogated
interrogated and and shot
shot aa few
few months
months
later.
later. Moisei Akselrod, head of the illegal illegal residency in Italy
Italy and controller of DUN DUN-
CAN,
CAN, the the most
most productive
productive source
source of of intelligence
intelligence on
on Britain
Britain during
during the the previous
previous
decade,
decade, waswas also
also recalled
recalled to
to Moscow.
Moscow. After After aa brief
brief period
period in in limbo,
limbo, he he too
too waswas exe
exe-
cuted
cuted as as an
an enemy
enemy of of the
thepeople.
people.5454
Amid
Amid the theparanoia
paranoia of of the
theGreat
GreatTerror,
Terror, Arnold
Arnold Deutsch's
Deutsch‘sJewish-Austrian
Jewish-Austrian origins origins
and
and unorthodox
unorthodox earlyearly career
career made
made himhim automatically
automatically suspect
suspect in in the
theCentre.
Centre.After Afterthethe
recall
recall of Maly,
Maly, Akselrod and other illegals, illegals, he must have fearedfeared that his own turn
would
would not not be
be long
long inincoming.
coming. In In an
an effort
effort toto extend
extend his
his visa
visa hehe hadhadrecently
recently contacted
contacted
aa Jewish
Jewish relative
relative inin Birmingham,
Birmingham,Oscar Oscar Deutsch,
Deutsch, president
president of of aa local
local synagogue
synagogue and and
managing director of Odeon Theatres. Arnold sometimes visited his Birmingham
relatives
relatives for Friday night sabbath dinners, and Oscar promised to to provide work to
enable
enable him to to stay Britain.”55 These contacts doubtless
stay in Britain. doubtless added to the suspicions suspicions of
the Centre.
Centre.
Remarkably,
Remarkably, however,
however, Deutsch
Deutsch survived.
survived. He H e may
may well
well have
have owed
owed his his survival
survival toto
the defection in July July 1937
1937 of aa Paris-based NKVD illegal, illegal, Ignace Poretsky (alias (alias
Reiss,
Reiss, codenamed RAYMOND). Poretsky was tracked down in Switzerland by a
Te
T er r o r /
/ 79
9
French illegal in the the "Serebryansky

“Serebryansky Service,"
Service,” Roland Abbiate (alias “Rossi,” "Rossi," codecode
named LETCHIK), whose sister Mir�ille, Mireiue, also in the the "Serebryansky Service," was
“Serebryansky Service,” was
simultaneously
simultaneously preparing the abduction of of General Miller
Millerinin Paris.56
Paris.56To lure Poretsky
J=>ore.tsky
to his death, Abbiate used one of his friends, Gertrude Schildbach, a German GermanCom Com-
munist
munist refugee
refugee who
who was
was persuaded
persuaded to to write
write toto Poretsky
Poretsky to to say
say that
that she urgently
she urgently
needed his advice.
advice. Schildbach refus�q,a,
refused.,.arequest to give Poretsky a box of of chocolates
chocolates
laced with strychnine (later recover�drecovered by the Swiss police), but enticed him into
Swiss police), into aa
side-road near
side-road Lausanne where
near Lausanne where Ab.. Qi�!�}:y�s.,��i�ing
Abbjaie 4wa5Gvaiting with aamachine-gun.
with machine-gun. At the the last
last
moment Poretsky realized that he hewas b�ing
being led into aatrap trapand tried to grab hold of of
Schildbach.
Schildbach. His bullet-ridden body was later discovered, discovered, clutching in in one
onehand handa a
strand
strand of of her
her greying
greying hair. 57
hair.57
The
The NKVD damage damage assessment
assessment afterafter Poretsky's
Poretsky’s defection concluded that
defection concluded that.h,he e hadhad
probably
probably betrayed
betrayed Deutsch,
Deutsch, withwith whom
whom he he had been stationed in in Paris . aa . fe�
few years
years
earlier,
earlier, to Western
Westernintelligence services. 58 Deutsch's
intelligence services.58 Deutsch‘s classification as a victim of Trot-
classification Trot
skyite
skyite and Western conspiracy helped to protect him froIn from charges of of being part of of
that conspiracy.
conspiracy. He H e was recalled
recalledto Moscow in November 1937, 1937, not,not,like Maly, to be
shot, but because the Centre believed he had,
shot, ha,d, been
pyen compromised by Poretsky and
other traitors.
The liquidation of Maly and recall of of Deutsch did severes�ver� andaq.d potentially cata cata-
strophic damage to the the NKVD's operations. All
NKVD’s British operations. All contact was broken with
Captain King (MAG),(MAG),the cipher clerk in the theForeign Office recruited in 1935, 1935, since
the NKVD damage assessment assessment absurdly concluded that Maly “had "had betrayed MAG
to the
theenemy."59 files noted by Mitrokhin do
enemy.”59The files do not
notrecord wha,�
what tilethedamage assess- assess
ment concluded about the Cambridge Cambridgerecruits, but, since since Maly knew all their names,
there
there were
were undoubtedly
undoubtedly fears
fears that
that they
they too
too had
hadbeen compromised. Those fear, fearsS must
must
surely have been
surely have been heightened
heightened by by the
the defection
defection in in N oV�J1lber . o
November qff WaJtt:r Viyitsky,
Walter .-Kriyitsky,
J
the illegal resident
the illegal the N
resident in the etherland,� . Though Krivitsky seems
Netherlands. seems not to to have
have known
the names of any of the Cambridge
Cambridge Five, Five, he knew some details about them, includ- includ
ing thethefact that one of them was a young journalist journalist who had been sent to to. Spain with
aa mission
mission to to assassinate
assassinate Franco.6o
Franco.60
Mter
After Deutsch's
Deutsch‘s recall
recallto
to Moscow,
Moscow, the the three
three members
members of o f the
the Five
Five who who remained
remained in
England-Burgess,
England-Burgess, Blunt Blunt andand Cairncross-were
Cairncross-were out of direct
out of contact with
direct .contact with the the CenCen-
tre for nine months. They were so highly motivated, however, however, that they continued to
work for the NKVD even as the illegal residency residency which had controlled them th�m was dis- clis
integrating. Burgess,
Burgess, who had had been allowed by by Deutsch and Maly Maly totoconsider himhim:
self
self an
an NKVD officerofficer rather
rather than
than an an agent wholly dependent
agent wholly dependent on on instructions
instructions from from
his
his controller,
controller, continued
continued recruiting
recruiting agents
agents on his own own initiative. H Hee saw himself as
saw himself
continuing
continuing and and developing
developing Deutsch's
Deutsch‘s strategy
strategy ofof recruiting
recruiting bright
bright students
studentsatatOxf()rd Oxford
as
as well
well asas Cambridge
Cambridge who who could
could penetrate
penetrate Whitehall.
Whitehall.
Burgess intended his
Burgess intended his chief
chief tal�nt:-spotter
talent-spotter at at Oxford
Oxfordtotobe be Goronwy
Goronwy Rees, Rees, aa young
young
Welsh
Welsh Fellow
Fellow ofof All
All Souls
Souls andand assistant
assistant ecl��o,r of�he
editor ,of, Spectator. Rees
the Spectator. Rees had first met met
Burgess
Burgess in in 1932
1932and,
and, though
though resisting
resisting Burgess's
Burgess’s attempt
attempt to toseduce him, had
seduce him, hadnonenone the the
less been deeply
less been deeply impressed
impressed by by him:
him: "It seemed to
“It seemed me that
to me that there
therewas something deeply
was something deeply
original,
original, something which was, as it were, his very own in everything he had say."61
hadto say.”61
TT H
H ESE WS OWROD
A RNDD
T HA SENHDI ET LHDE S H I E L D I/ 8
800
It
It was
was probably
probably aa book
book review
review by
by Rees
Rees late
late in
in 1937
1937which
whichpersuaded
persuaded Burgess
Burgess that
that he
he
was ready for recruitment. The misery of mass unemployment in south Wales, wrote
was ready for recruitment. The misery of mass unemployment in southWales, wrote
Rees,
Rees, was
was
misery
misery of
of aaspecial
special and
and peculiar kind .. .. .. and
peculiar kind and to
to many
many people
people it it implies
implies aa final
final
condemnation
condemnation of the society which has produced it . . . If you tell men and
of the society which has produced it . . . If you tell men and
women,
women, already
already inclined
inclined by
by temperament
temperament and and tradition
tradition to to revolutionary
revolutionary opin
opin-
ions,
ions, that
that their
their sufferings
sufferings are
are caused
caused by
by an an impersonal
impersonal economic
economic system,
system, you
you
leave
leave them
them butbutone
onechoice.
choice. Lenin
Lenin could
could not not do
do better.
better.
One
One evening,
evening, probably
probably at the beginning
at the beginning of 1938, sitting
of 1938, sitting inin Rees's
Rees’s flat
flat with,
with, as
as
usual,
usual, aa bottle
bottle of
of whiskey
whiskey between
between them,
them, Burgess
Burgess told
told him
him that
that his pectator review
his SSpectator review
showed
showed thatthat he
he had
had "the
“the heart
heart of
ofthe
thematter
matterininhim."
him.” Then,
Then, according
according to to Rees,
Rees, he
he
added
added with
with unusual
unusual solemnity,
solemnity,"I “I am
am aa Comintern
Cominternagent
agent and
and have
have been
been ever
ever since
since II
came
came down
down from
from Cambridge."62
Cambridge.”62In In later
later years
years Rees
Rees was
wasto
to try
trytotogive
give the
the impression
impression
that he did
that he did not
not agree
agree to
to become
become an an agent.
agent. His
His KGB
KGB file makes clear
file makes clear that
that he
he was
was
recruited-though
recruited-though it it confirms
confirms thatthat Burgess
Burgess asked
asked him
him not
not to
to work
work for
for the
the NKVD
NKVD
but
but "to
“tohelp
help the
theParty."63
Party.”63AsAs ananNKVD
NKVD case case officer
officerwith
with whom
whomBurgess
Burgess made
made contact
contact
later in the year reported to the Centre, he regarded Rees (henceforth
later in the year reported to the Centre, he regarded Rees (henceforth codenamed codenamed
FLEET
FLEET or or GROSS)
GROSS) as as aa key
key part
part ofofhis
his Oxbridge
Oxbridge recruitment
recruitment strategy:
strategy:
The
The kind
kind of
of work
work which
which he he would
would do do with
with great
great moral
moral satisfaction
satisfaction and
and with with
absolute
absolute confidence in its success and effectiveness is the recruitment by us of
confidence in its success and effectiveness is the recruitment by us of
young
young people
people graduating
graduating fromfrom Oxford
Oxford and and Cambridge
Cambridge Universities
Universities and and
preparing
preparing them
them to
to enter
enter the
the civil
civil service.
service. For
For this
this kind
kind of
of work
work hehe has
has such such
assistants
assistants as
as TONY
TONY [Blunt]
[Blunt] in Cambridge and
in Cambridge and GROSS
GROSS [Rees][Rees] in
in Oxford.
Oxford.
M AD CHEN [Burgess]
MADCHEN [Burgess] always
alwaysreturns
returns toto this
this idea
idea at
at every
every meeting 64
meeting .. .. ..64
Though
Though unhappy
unhappy withwith Burgess's
Burgess’s undisciplined
undisciplined recruiting
recruiting methods,
methods, the Centre
theCentre
regarded
regarded Rees
Rees asas potentially
potentially an important agent.
animportant agent. Three
Three of Britain's leading
ofBritain’s leading
appeasers-Lord
appeasers-Lord Halifax,
Halifax, the
the Foreign
Foreign Secretary;
Secretary; Sir
Sir John
John Simon,
Simon,then thenHome
Home Secre
Secre-
tary;
tary; and
and Geoffrey
Geoffrey Dawson,
Dawson, editor
editor ofof The
T6e Times-were
Times”were nonresident
nonresident Fellows
Fellows ofof All
Souls.
Souls.The
The Center
Center attached
attached exaggerated
exaggerated importance
importance to
to the
the fact
fact that
that Rees
Rees met
met all
all three
three
from
from time
time to
to time
time ononhigh
high table.
table. It also
also overestimated
overestimatedthethe infl uence ofRees's
influence of Rees’s friend
friend Sir
Sir
Ernest
Ernest Swinton,
Swinton, aa retired
retired major-general
major-general who who had
had been
been Chichele
Chichele Professor
Professor ofof Military
Military
History
History since
since 1925
1925 and
and was
was referred
referredtoto by
by the
the Centre
Centreas as "General
“General Swinton."65
Swint~n.”~’
W
WHH II LE
LE B
BUU RGE pressing
pressing ahead
R G E SS SS WA
WASS ahead enthusiasticall
enthusiasticallyy with
with his
his Oxbridge
Oxbridge recruit
recruit-
ment
ment strategy,
strategy,INO
I N 0 was
was in
in turmoil.
turmoil. OnOn February
February 17, 1938 its
17,1938 its head,
head, Abram
Abram Slutsky,
Slutsky,
was
was found
found dead
dead in
in his
his offi c e, allegedly
office, allegedlyfrom
from aa heart
heartattack.
attack. But
But atathis
his lying
lying in
in state
stateinin
the
the NKVD
NKVD officers'
officers’club,
club, his
his senior
senior staff
staff noticed
noticed on
on his
his face
face the
the tell-tale
tell-tale signs
signs of
of
cyanide
cyanide poisoning.66
poisoning.66Yagoda,
Yagoda, meanwhile,
meanwhile, waswas confessing
confessing at
at his
his trial
trial to
to working
working for
for
the
the German,
German,Japanese
Japanese andand Polish
Polish intelligence
intelligence services,
services, to
to poisoning
poisoning hishis predecessor,
predecessor,
Menzhinsky,
Menzhinsky, and
and to
to attempting
attempting totopoison
poison his
his successor,
successor,Yezhov.67
Y e ~ h o vBy
By
.~~ the
the end
end of
ofthe
the
T
T e r r oo r / 8 I1
year, Slutsky's
Slutsky‘stwo immediate successors
successors as heaq
head ofofINO,
INO, Zelman Pasov and Mikhail Mikhail
Shpigelglas,
Shpigelglas, had alsoalso been shot as enemies of of the people.
people.68 68 IINO
N 0 collapsed into such
confusion during 1938
conhsion 1938thatthatfor 127
127 consecutive daysdaysnot a single foreign intelligence
report was forwarded to Stalin.69
Stalin.69In December Y ezhoV �as
Yezhov, wasreplaced as head of of the
NKVD by Lavrenti Pavlovich Beria; a few months later he was accused
Pavlovich Beria; of treason
accused of treason-
able conspiracy
conspiracywith Britain, Germany, Japan and Poland.70 Pqland.70 As NKVD officers went
home in in the
the evening, each one must have wondered whether the kn.ock kn.ock at the door
door
in the
the early hours would signal that his own doom was nigh.
Most of thetheINO
I N 0 officers
officers who were interrogated and brutally tortured during duringthe the
late 1930s
1930s in the
thename of the vast conspiracy theories of of Stalin and his NKVD chiefs
did not live to tell the tale. One of the few who did didwas the first of of the Great Illegals,
GreatIllegals,
Dmitri Bystroletov.
Bystroletov. In 19371937Bystroletov
Bystroletov had been sent on ona mission to Berlin to concon
tact a Soviet
Soviet agent on the the Reichswehr general staff. staff HHee later claimed that, before he
left, he was embraced by Yezhov. “Be "Be proud that we have have given
given you
youone ofof our best
sources," Yezhov told him. "Stalin
sources,”Yezhov “Stalin and your fatherland will not forget yoU."71 Early in
1938,
1938, however,
however, Bystroletov
Bystroletovwas suspended from duty and transferred to the Moscow
Chamber of Commerce, where he worked until his arrest in September.72 September.” During
Bystroletov's
Bystroletov’sinterrogation by Colonel Colonel Solovyev,
Solovyev,Yezhov
Yezhoventered the room and asked
what he hewas accused
accusedo£of.When told h� he was charged with spying for four foreign pow pow-
ers, Yezhov
Yezhovreplied "Too
“Too few!",
few!”, turned on his heels and left.73left.73
When
When Bystroletov
Bystroletov refused
refused to to confess
confess toto his
his imaginary
imaginary crimes, Solovyev
Solovyev and
and his
his
assistant,
assistant, Pushkin, beat him with witha ball-bearing on the theendendofof an iron rope, breaking
two of his ribs and penetrating a lung. His skull was fractured by one of of the
the other
other
instruments of torture, a hammer wrapped in cotton
instruments cotton wool and bandages, and his
stomach muscles
muscles torn by repeated kicks from his interrogators. Convinced that he
would die if the beating continued, Bystroletov
Bystroletov signed a confession
confession dictated to him him
by
by Solovyev.
Solovyev.For most INO
For most I N 0 officers,
officers, torture
torture and
and confession
confession to to imaginary
imaginary crimes were
crimes were
followed
followed byby aa short
short walk
walk to to an
an execution
execution chamber
chamber and and a� bullet
bul1e� in
. .
in the back of
the back of the
the
head. Bystroletov,
head. Bystroletov,however,
however,survived
survived to
to write an account
write an account of of his interrogation. Though
his interrogation. Though
sentenced to twenty years’years' imprisonment in 1939, 1939, hehe was rehabilitated during the
Second
Second World
World War.
War. By
By the time he
the time he was
was released, his wife,
released, his wife, Shelmatova,
Shelmatova, sent
sent to
to the
the
gulag
gulag as
as the spouse of
the spouse of an
an enemy
enemy of of the
the people,
people, had killed
killed herself byby cutting
cutting her
herthroat
throat
with a kitchen knife.
knife. His eld�rly
elderly mother poisoned herself.74
herself.74
A F T E R TH E D
AFTER of
of the
I S I N T E G RATI O N
DISINTEGRATION the LqggoIl
London �egal residency following
gegal residency followingthe liquida
the liquida-
tion
tion ofMaly
of Maly and
and the
the recall
recall of
ofDeutsch, the
the Centre
Centreplanned to hand over over the running of of
its
its main
main British
British agents
agents toto the
the legal
legal residency
residency at
at thethe Soviet
Soviet embassy
embassy in in Kensington.
Kensington. In In
April 1938 aa new
April 1938 new resident,
resident, Grigori
Grigori Grafpen
&+en (code named SAM),
(codenamed SAM), arrived to take
charge.75
charge.75The
The massacre
massacre ofof many
many of of the most experienced
the most experienced IIN N00 officers
officers had
had aa dramatic
dramatic
effect
effect on
on the
thequality
quality of
of NKVD tradecraft. Deutsch, Orlov
tradecraft. Deutsch, Orlov andand Maly
Maly had
had taken
taken elabo
elabo-
rate
rate precautions
precautions to
to avoid
avoid surveillance
surveillancebefore Il1c::
before
meeting��ing their
their agents.
agents. But an inexperienced
But an inexperienced
emissary
emissary from
from the
the Centre
Centre who who came
came to inspect Grafpen's
to inspect Grafhen’s residency had so
residencyhad so little idea
little idea
about
about tradecraft
tradecraft that
that he assumed it
heassumed it was
was safe to operate
safeto operate in in the
theimmediate environs of
immediate environs ofthe
the
embassy.
embassy. He
He reported
reported naively
naively to
to Moscow, "Next to
Moscow, “Next to the Embassy there
the Embassy there is
is aa park
park [Ken-
[Ken-
. _ . . . .
T
T H EE S
SW R D
WOR A
ANNT
DDH SET HH I EE LSDH I E L D /
/ 882
2
sington
sington Gardens]
Gardens] which
which is convenient .. .. .. for
is convenient for holding
holding meetings
meetings with
with agents,
agents, asas one
one can
can
simply
simply givegivethe
the appearance
appearance of of having
having gone
gone out out for
for aa walk
walk in
in this
this park."76
park.”76
Grafpen's
Grafpen’s first
first priority
priority was
was to
to renew
renew contact
contact with
with Donald
DonaldMaclean, then then the
the most
most
productive
productive of of the Cambridge Five
the Cambridge Five and
and able
able toto smuggle
smuggle large
large numbers
numbers of of classified
classified
documents
documents out out ofofthetheForeign
Foreign Office.
Office. On
O n April
April 1010 aa young
young and apparently inexperi
and apparently inexperi-
enced
enced female
female NKVD officer, officer, codenamed
codenamed NORMA, met met Maclean
Maclean in theEmpire
in the Empire
Cinema in
Cinema in Leicester
Leicester Square.
Square. A few
few days
days later
later Maclean
Maclean camecame toto NORMA's
NORMA’Sflat flat with
with
aa large
large bundle
bundle of Foreign Office
of Foreign Office documents
documents which which she she photographed,
photographed, before giving
before giving
the
the undeveloped
undeveloped film film to
to Grafpen
Grafpen forfor shipment
shipment to to Moscow.
Moscow. Either
Either on
on that
that occasion
occasion
or
or soon
soon afterwards,
afterwards, the the young
young British
British agent
agent and and his
his Soviet
Soviet case
case officer
officer followed
followed the
the
photography session by
photography session by going
going toto bed
bed together.
together. In In defiance
defiance ofof her
her instructions,
instructions,
NORMA also
NORMA also told
told Maclean,
Maclean, probably
probably in bed, that
in bed, that his
his current
current codename
codename (which
(which hehe
was not supposed
was not supposed to to know)
know) was
was LYRIC.77
LYRIC.77
In
In September
September 193 1938 8 Maclean
Maclean left
left for
for his
his fi rst foreign
first foreign posting
posting as
as third
third secretary
secretary in
in
the
the Paris
Paris embassy,
embassy, preceded
preceded byby an
an effusive
effusive testimonial
testimonial from
from the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office per
per-
sonnel
sonnel department:
department:
Maclean, who is
Maclean, who is the
the son
son of
of the
the late
late Sir
Sir Donald Maclean .. .. .. has
Donald Maclean has done
done exex-
tremely well during his first
first two
two years here and is one of the mainstays
mainstays of the
Western Department.
Department. H Hee is a very nice individual indeed and has plenty of
brains
brains and keenness.
keenness. He is, too, nice-looking
H e is, nice-looking and
and ought,
ought,we
we think, to to be aa suc
suc-
cess
cess in
in Paris
Paris from
from the
the social
social as
as well
well as
as the
the work
work point
point of
of view. 78
view.78
As Maclean
Macleanwas leaving
leaving for Paris, the Munich
Munichcrisis was
wasreaching its humiliating cli- cli
ma..
max x with the
the surrender of of the
the Czech
CzechSudetenland to Nazi Germany. On O n September
30 the British prime minister, Neville Chamberlain, returned returned to aa hero's
hero’s welcome in
London, brandishing the worthless piece of paper bearing Hitler's Hitler’s signature which,
he claimed, meant not
he claimed, not only
only "peace
“peace with honor" but
with honor” but "peace
“peace for
for our time." For
our time.” For the
the
Cambridge
Cambridge Five,
Five, incapable
incapable of of imagining
imagining that less than
that less than aayear
year later
later Stalin
S t a h would
would sign
sign
aa pact
pact with
with Hitler,
Hitler,Munich
Munichwaswas further confirmation of
further confirmation of the justice of their
the justice their cause.
cause.
During the theMunich
Munich crisis Cairncross had access
access to Foreign Office files containing
what Burgess described as "the “the very best information imaginable"
imaginable” on British policy,
policy,
which he passed to the theNKVD via Klugmann and Burgess.79
Burgess.79Cairncross's
Cairncross’s documents
on
onthethe attempted appeasement
attempted appeasement of of Germany,
Germany, which
which reached
reached its
its nadir
nadir with
withthethe
Munich
Munich agreement,
agreement, were were used
usedbybythe
the Centre
Centretotoprovide
provide further
further evidence
evidence for
for the
the con
con-
spiracy theory thatthat thethesecret aim of British foreign policy,
policy, supported by the French,
was "to
“to lure Germany into into an attack on Russia."
Russia.” Though the chief advocate
advocate ofof this
theory was Stalin,
S t a h , it was also
alsofervently espoused by ININO.O. Throughout the theCold
ColdWar,
the claim that Britain's
Britain’s aimaimat Munich had hadbeen not merely to appease
appease Hitler but butalso
to drive him intointoa aconflict with the theSoviet
Soviet Union remained unchallenged orthodoxy
among KGB historians. As late as the mid-1990s, Yuri Modin, the post-war con con-
troller of the Five, was still insisting that, "This “This claim was neither propaganda nor
disinformation but the the unvarnished truth, proven by the documents obtained for us
by Burgess"
Burgess” (chiefly,
(chiefly, no doubt,
doubt, from Cairncross).8o
Cairncross).”
T
T ee rr rr oo rr / 8J
83
After Maclean's
Maclean’s posting to Paris duringthe the Munich crisis,
Munich cnSlS, Cairncross was
intended by the Centre
Centre totosucceed
succeed him as its chief sourcesource within the the Foreign Office.
The
The London
London resident,
resident, Grafpen,
Grafpen, bungled
bungled the
the transition.
transition. Cairncross's person
Cairncross’s prickly person-
ality
ality and
and lack
lack of
of social
social graces
graceshadhad not
not won
won the
the same encomiums from
same encomiums from his
his colleagues
colleagues
or the
the Foreign Office personnel department as Maclean's Maclean’s more patrician manner. In
December 1938
December 1938 he he moved
moved to to the
the Treasury.
Treasury.”81 At almost
almost thethe same
same moment
moment as Cairn
Cairn-
cross's
cross’s departure for the Treasury, though for unconnected reasons, reasons, Grafpen was
recalled
recalled to
to Moscow.
Moscow. Given
Given the the atIl!o�_phere
atmos-phereof the the time, he may may actually have been
relieved, after being "unmasked"
“unmasked” as a Trotskyist on his arrival, to be sentenced to only
five
five years
yearsin
in aalabor camp
camp rather than thanbeing led to an execution cellar in the
anexecution theLubyanka
basement.82 En route for Moscow in December 1938,
basement.82 1938, Grafpen accompanied
NORMA (renamed ADA since since her earlier indiscretion)
indis<;reti()l!) to Paris where she was due
to
to resume
resume contact
contact with
with Maclean. ADA reported reported that
that Maclean
Maclean was having an affair
with an American student at atthe
theSorbonne,
Sorbonne,Melinda
Melinda Marling,
Marling,whom whomhe was
he later to
marry.
marry. She also
also discovered
discovered that that Maclean,
Maclean, nownow drinking heavily, had
drinking heavily, had admitted that that
while drunk he he had
had told both his mistJ.'es.s
mistress and hig.brother
his_ h,r()ther that,h
that. ...e
he was _working
working for
_l.I , _
'
.
Soviet
intelligen~e.’~ ADA remained in in Paris, filming the documents provided provided by by
Maclean from embassy files,
from embassy files, then
then passing
passing the film
film to to an illegal codenamed FORD
for
for transmission to to the
theCentre.84
Centre.84
The news in December 1938 1938 of Maclean's
Maclean’s drunken security lapse was balanced by
a spectacular
spectacular success.
success. In the same month Burgess reported, probably via Paris, that he he
had
had succeeded
succeeded in in joining
joining the
the Secret
Secret Intelligence
Service. H Hee had
had been been taken
taken onon by
by
SIS's
SIS’s newest
newest branch,
branch, Section
Section D, D, founded earlier in
founded earlier in the
the year
year to devise dirty
to devise dirty tricks
tricks
ranging from sabotage
sabotage to psychological
psychological warfare (delicately
(delicately described asways ways of of
"attacking
“attacking potential enemies by
potential enemies by means
means other
other than
than the
the operations
operations of of military
military force")
force”)
for
for use
use in
in aa future
future war.85
war.” Instead
Instead of of being
being elated by by the however, the
the news, however, the Centre
Centre
appeared almost paralyzed by fear and
appeared almost paralyzed by fear and suspicion. suspicion.
T H E EXP
EXPO su
O S U RE
R E OF two
two London
London illegal
illegal residents,
residents, Reif and Maly,
Reif and Maly, andand the
the legal
legal resi
resi-
dent, Grafpen, as
dent, Grafpen, as imaginary
imaginary enemy
enemy agents, combined with
agents, combined with the the defection
defection of of Orlov,
Orlov,
put the
put the entire future of
entire future of intelligence
Britain in in doubt. The illegal
doubt. The illegal resi
resi-
dency
dency had
had been
been wound
wound up up and,
and, with
with one
one exception,
exception, the the staff
staff of the legal
of the legal residency
residency
were recalled to
were recalled to Moscow.86
MOSCOW.’~ The
The only
only remaining
remaining IN I N00 officer
officer in London, Anatoli
in London, Anatoli
Veniaminovich
Veniaminovich Gorsky,
Gorsky, waswas poorly
poorly briefed about even
briefed about even thethe mostmost important
important British
British
agents.
agents. In
In the
the summer
summer of of 1939,
1939, when
when Philby was due
Philby was due to return to
to return to London
London after the
after the
end
end ofofthe
theSpanish
Spanish Civil
Civil War,
War, Gorsky
Gorsky told the Centre,
told the Centre, "When
“When you you give
give us orders on
usorders on
what
what toto do
do with OHNCHEN, we
with SSOHNCHEN, we would
would appreciate
appreciate somesome orientation
orientation on on him,
him, forfor
he is
he is known
known to us only
to us in the
only in the most
most general
general terms."87
An
An assessment
assessment in the Centre
in the Centre concl�ded
concluded that intelligence work
that intelligence work in in Britain "was
Britain “was
based
based onon doubtful
doubtful sources,
sources, onon an
an agent
agent network acquired at
network acquired the time
at the time when
when it it was
was
controlled by
controlled by enemies
enemies ofof the
thepeople
people and
and was
was therefore extremely dangerous.”
therefore extremely dangerous." It It con-
con
cluded
cluded with
with aarecommendation
recommendation. to break
to contact
break contact with
with
.- all British
all'/. British
. ~ .. agents-the Five
agents-the Five
included.88 Though contact
included.” Though contact was not yet
was not yet broke
broken,� , the
the Five � ee� to
Five seem to have been held
have been helq atat
arm's
arm’s length
length for most of
for most of 1939. InteUigence from
1939. Intelligence from them
them waswas accepted,
accepted, often
often without
without
T
TH E WSOW
HS
E RO
D NR T
A DH S
D A
E HN I DE LTDH E S H I E L D I
/ 884
4
any
any visible
visible interest
interest in it, while
in it, while the Centre continued
the Centre continued to
to debate
debate the
the possibility
possibility that
that
some or
some were agents
or all were agents provocateurs.
provocateurs. ADA reported
reported that
that Philby
Philby "frequently"
“frequently” com
com-
plained
plained to
to Maclean
Maclean about
about the
the NKVD's
NKVD’s lack
lack of
of contact
contact with,
with, and
and interest
interest in,
in, him.89
him.89
Litzi
Litzi Philby
Philby (MARY)
(MARY) and and Edith
Edith Tudor
Tudor Hart
Hart (EDITH),
(EDITH),whowho were
were used
used by
by Burgess
Burgess
and
and others
othersas
as couriers
couriers to
to make
make contact
contact with
with the
theNKVD in in Paris
Paris in
in 193 8-9, grumbled
1938-9, grumbled
that
that their
their expenses
expenses were
were not being paid.
not being paid. Gorsky
Gorsky reported
reported to
to the
theCentre
Centrein July
in 1939:
July 1939:
MARY announced
announced that,
that, as
as aa result
result of
of aafour-month
four-monthhiatus
hiatus in
in communications
communications
with her, we weowe
oweher and
andM ADCHEN L65.
MADCHEN £65. I promised to check at home
home [the
[the
Centre] and gave him £30 L30 in advance, since since she said they were in material
need .. .. .. MARY continues to live in [France]
[France] and for some
some reason,
reason, she says on
our
our orders,
orders, maintains
maintains aa large
large flat
flat and
and so onon there.
there.
The Centre replied:
At one time, when it was necessary,

necessary,MARY was given
given orders to keep a fl at in
flat
Paris. That is no longer necessary.
necessary. Have her get rid of
of the flat and live more
willnot pay. MARY should not be paid £65,
modestly, since we will L65, since
since we do notnot
feel that we owe her,foranything.
oweher,for anything. We confirm the payment of £30. Tell her that
ofL30. that
we will
willpay
payno more.90
more.”
To a remarkable degree, however,

however, the ideological
ideological commitment of the main British
agents survived the turmoil in inthe
theCentre.
Centre. In 19381938 Burgess recruited one of his
lovers, Eric Kessler,
Kessler, a Swiss
Swiss journalist turned diplomat on the the staff of the Swiss
embassy in London.
London. Later
Later codenamed OREND and SHVEYTSARETS SHVEYTSARETS ("Swiss"), (“Swiss”),
Kessler proved
proved a valuable source
source on Swiss-German
Swiss-German relations.91
relations.” Probably in 1939, 1939,
Burgess recruited another foreign lover, the Hungarian
HungarianAndrew AndrewRevoi, later leader of of
the exiled Free Hungarians in in wartime London. Codenamed TAFFY ("Toffee"), (“Toffee”),he
was described in his KGB file as a pederast; the same source source also claimed that he hehadhad
"had
“had homose:x.
homosexual'Ual relations with aaForeign Office official."
official.”Ironically,
Ironically,in 1942
1942Burgess
was also
also to recruit Revoi as an MI5 source.92
MIS source.92
Kim and Litzi
Lhzi Philby,
Philby, still good comrades according to KGB files though though they
both now had different partners, made a probably even more important recruitment
in 1939:
1939: that of the Austrian journalist H. H. P. P. Smolka, whom Litzi had had known in
Vienna. Soon after the Nazi Anschluss,
Anschluss, which united Austria with Germany Germanyinin1938,1938,
Smolka became a naturalized British subject with the the name of of Peter Smollett. Code
Code-
named ABO
A B 0 by the Centre,
Centre, Smollett later succeeded in becoming head of the Rus Rus-
sian section in the
thewartime Ministry of Information.
I n f o r m a t i ~93n . ~ ~
The signature of the Nazi-Soviet
Nazi-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in Moscow on August 23,
1939
1939 was an even bigger blow to the the morale of of the NKVD's
NKVD’s British agents than the the
turmoil ininthe Centre. Exchanging toasts with Hitler's Hitler’s foreign minister, Joachim von
Ribbentrop, Stalin told him,him, "I
“I can guarantee, on my word of honor, that the the Soviet
Union will not betray its partner." The ideological
partner.”The ideological agents recruited during the the 1930s
1930s
had been motivated, at least in part, by the desire desire to fight fascism.
fascism. Most, after vary-
T error
Terror // 85
ing
ing degrees
degrees of ofinner
inner turmoil,
turmoil, overcame
overcame their their sense
sense of of shocked
shocked surprise
surprise at at the
theconclu
conclu-
sion
sion ofof the
the Nazi-Soviet
Nazi-Soviet Pact. Pact. Over
Over the the previous
previous few few years,
years, they
they had
had become
become suffisuffi-
ciently
ciently indoctrinated,
indoctrinated, often often self-indoctrinated,
self-indoctrinated, in in Stalinist
Stalinist double-think
double-think to to perform
perform
the
the intellectual
intellectual somersaults
somersaults required
required to to sustain
sustain their
their commitment
commitmenttotothe vision
vision of
the of the
the
Soviet
Soviet Union
Union as as the
the world's
world’s first
worker-peasant state, state, thethe hope
hope of progressive
ofprogressive
mankind.
mankind.
A minority
minority of of the
the ideological
ideological agents
agents in in the
theWest,
West, however,
however,were were so
so sickened
sickened by by the
the
Nazi-Soviet
Nazi-Soviet Pact Pact thatthat they
they ended
ended theirtheir connection
connection with with the theNKVD.
NKVD. The The mostmost
important
important of of those
those who who broke
broke contact
contact in in Britain
Britain was
was FLEET,
FLEET, Goronwy
Goronwy Rees. Rees. Dur-
Dur
ing
ing aa visit
visit to
to Moscow
Moscow in in 1993,
1993,Rees's
Rees’s daughter
daughter JennyJenny was was informed,
informed, accurately,
accurately, durdur-
ing
ing aa briefing
briefing by by anan SVR representative
representative that that Rees
Rees hadhad refused
refused to to cooperate
cooperate after
after the
the
Pact:
Pact: "We
“We hearhear no no more
more of of him
him after
after that."
that.” At the the endend of of the
the briefing,
briefing, Jenny
Jenny Rees Rees
asked
asked perceptively:
perceptively: "You “You know something else,
know something else, do
do you,
you, about
about Rees
Rees that
that you
you areare not
not
going
going to to tell
tell me?"94
me?”94The The SVR SVR diddid indeed.
indeed. The The most
most important
important of of the
the secrets
secrets that
that the the
SVR
SVR was was unwilling
unwilling to to reveal
reveal was
wasthat Burgess, by
that Burgess, by now
now an SIS officer,
an SIS panicked when
officer, panicked when
Rees decided to
Rees decided to break
break away, sent an
away, sent an urgent
urgent message
message to to the
theCentre
Centrewarning
warning thatthat Rees
Rees
might
might betray
betray both
both himself
himself and and Blunt,
Blunt, and and asked
asked forfor Rees
Rees to to be
be assassinated.
assassinated. The The
Centre
Centre refused.
rehsed.Rees's
Rees’s KGB me, file, however,
however,records
records that
that he hedid
did not
not betray
betray Burgess
Burgess and and
Blunt
Blunt because
because of of his
his "old
“old friendship"
friendship with with Burgess.
Burgess. In In anan attempt
attempt to to make
make betrayal
betrayal
less likely,
less likely, Burgess
Burgess toldtold Rees
Rees that
that he he too
too had
had been
been disillusioned
disillusioned by by the Nazi-Soviet
the Nazi-Soviet
Pact
Pact and
and had ended illegal
hadended illegal work
work for
for the
the Communist
CommunistParty.95 Maclean was
Party.95Maclean was also
alsodeeply
deeply
worried
worried by by Rees's
Rees’s "defection."
“defection.”YearsYears later,
later, as as he
he was
was beginning
beginning to to crack
crack under
under the the
strain
strain ofof his
his double
double life life as British diplomat
as British diplomat and and Soviet
Soviet agent,
agent, hehe spat
spat at Rees: "You
at Rees: “You
used
used toto be
be one
one of of us, but you
us, but you ratted!"9
ratted!”96 6
The
The doubts
doubts aboutabout Moscow
Moscow felt felt by some of
by some of the
the NKVD's
NKVD’s BritishBritish agents
agents after
after the
the
Nazi-Soviet
Nazi-Soviet Pact Pact were
were moremore than
than matched
matched by by the
the Centre's
Centre’s doubts
doubts about
about itsits agents.
agents.
The
The Center
Center launched
launched an an investigation
investigation into the possibility
into the possibility that that Philby
Philby waswas either
either aa
German or
German or aa British
British agent.97 Since Philby
agent.97Since Philby had had provided
provided the the original
original leads
leads which
which led led
to
to the
the recruitment
recruitment of of Burgess
Burgess and Maclean, and
and Maclean, and ultimately
ultimately to to all
all the Cambridge
the Cambridge
recruits,
recruits, doubts
doubts aboutabout him him reflected
reflected on on the thewhole
whole British
British agent
agent network.
network. The The lowest
lowest
point
point in in the
the history
history of of NKVD operations
Britain camecame at at the
the beginning
beginningof of 1940
1940
when
when Gorsky,
Gorsky, the the last
last member
member of of the London legal
the London residency, was
legal residency, was withdrawn
withdrawn to to
Moscow, leaving not
Moscow, leaving not aa single
single NKVD officer active in
officer active in Britain.
Britain. A me file in the . KGB
in the
archives records,
archives records, “The "The residency
residency was was disbanded
disbanded on on thethe instruction
instruction of of Beria
Beria [head
[head of of
the
the NKVD]
NKVD].”98 ."98 Beria's
Beria’s reasons
reasons are are not
not recorded,
recorded, at least in
at least the files
in the files examined
examined by by
Mitrokhin,
Mitrokhin, but butchief amongamong them themwaswas undoubtedly
undoubtedly the the recurrent fear fear that
that the
theBritish
British
agent
agent network
network was was . deeply
deeply suspect.
suspect. InIn February
February 1940 1940 the the Centre
Centreissued
issued orders
orders forfor all
all
contact
contact with
with Philby
Philby to to be
be broken
broken off. 99 Contact
Contact with Burgess was
with Burgess terminated at
was terminated at about
about
100
the
the same
same time.
time.”’
D
DUU R II N
NG T H E LAT
THE LATERE R 1930s
1930s the hunt for
the hunt for "enemies
“enemies ofof the people" replaced
the people” replaced intelli
intelli-
gence
gence collection
collection as
as the
the main
main priority
priority of
of NKVD
NKVD foreign operations. The
foreign operations. The NKVD's
NKVD’s
most
most active
active foreign
intelligence agency
agency was
was Serebryansky's
Serebryansws Administration
Administration for
for Spe
Spe-
cial
cial Tasks,
Tasks, whose
whose persecution
persecution ofINO
of I N 0 officers
officers steadily
steadily diminished
diminished the
the flow
flow of
of foreign
foreign
T
THHE
E SS W O R
RDD A
ANNT
DDH S
T H IEE LS DH I E L D
E / 86
intelligence
intelligence and
and degraded
degraded its its analysis
analysis at the Center.
at the Center. Even
Even the the executioners
executioners abroad,
abroad,
however,
however, were
were not
not immune
immune from from thethe Terror
Terror atat home.
home. Serebryansky
Serebryansky himself became
one of the victims of of his own witch-hunt. Though he heheld the OrderOrderof of Lenin for his
many
many victories
victories over
over enemies
enemies of of the
the people,
people, he
he was
was recalled
recalled toto Moscow
Moscow in in November
November
1938
1938 andand exposed
exposed as as“a"a spy
spy of
of the
the British
British and
and French
French intelligence
intelligence services."
services.” AnAn
inquiry later concluded that his network contained "a “a large number of of traitors and
plain gangster elements."
elements.”Though the allegations
allegations ofof espionage
espionage for Britain and France
were
were absurd,
absurd, the
the charge
charge that
that Serebryansky
Serebryansky had had inflated
inflated both the size
both the size of
of his
his illegal
illegal
network and the scale of
the scale of its accomplishments in reports to to the Centre
Centrewas probably
well
well founded.lol
founded.’”
Serebryansky's
Serebryansky’s successor
successorwas wasPavel
Pave1 Anatolyevich Sudoplatov,
Sudoplatov, who a few months
earlier had assassinated
assassinated the emigre
Cmigrk Ukrainian
Ukrainian nationalist leader Yevkhen Konovalets Konovalets
with an ingeniously booby-trapped box of of chocolates.
chocolates. In March 1939 1939 Sudoplatov
became deputy head of foreign intelligence,
intelligence, thus bringing "special
“special tasks"
tasks” and INOIN0
into closer association
association than ever before. 102 He
before.lo2 H e was personally instructed by Stalin that
his chief task was to send a task force to Mexico to assassinate assassinate Leon Trotsky.
Trotsky. The
killing of Trotsky,
Trotsky, codenamed operation UTKA ("Duck" (“Duck”), ), had become the chief
objective of Stalin's
Stalin’s foreign policy.
policy. Even after the outbreak of of the
theSecond World War War
in September 1939,1939, discovering
discovering the intentions
intentionsof Adolf
Adolf Hitler remained a lower pri pri-
ority than arranging the liquidation of of the great heretic. Sudoplatov's
Sudoplatov’s task force was was
composed of of Spanish and Mexican NKVD agents recruited during the Civil War,
supervised
supervised by by his
his deputy,
deputy, Leonid
Leonid Eitingon,
Eitingon,whose longlong experience
experience of of "special actions"
“specialactions”
included the liquidation of "enemies of
of “enemies of the people’’
people" in Spain.103
Spain.’03
The
The task
task force
force consisted
consisted of of three
three groups.
groups. The
The first
first was
was anan illegal
illegal network
network headed
by the Spanish Communist Caridad Caridad Mercader del Rio KO(codenamed MOTHER),
who was both recruited and seduced by Eitingon, one of of the NKVD's
NKVD’s most cele- cele
brated womanizers.lo4
womanizers.lo4The most important agent in Caridad Mercader's Mercader’s group was
her son Ramon (codenamed RAYMOND),105RAYMOND),’05who traveled on aadoctored Canadian
passport in thethename of of Frank
FrankJacson (an eccentric NKVD spelling of ofJackson). Like
Eitingon, Ramon Mercader employed employed seduction as an operational technique, using
his affair with thetheAmerican Trotskyist Sylvia Ageloff to penetrate Trotsky’s Trotsky's villa
villanear
Mexico City. His opportunity came when Ageloff began work as one of of Trotsky’s
Trotsky's
secretaries early in 1940.
secretaries 1940.Each Eachday Mercader drove her to toTrotsky's
Trotsky‘s villavillain the
themorn
morn-
ing and returned
returned to collect her after work. Gradually he became a well-known figure
with the
the guards and some of of Trotsky's
Trotsky’s entourage, who, in March March 1940, allowed him
into the
the villa for the first time. Mercader's
Mercader’s role role at this stage was still that of penetra
of penetra-
tion agent rather than assassin,
thanassassin, with the
the task of
of reporting on the villa's defenses, occu
on thevilla’s defenses, occu-
pants and guards.lo6
guards.lo6
The attack on the thevilla waswasto be led by a second group of of agents drawn from vet- vet
erans of thethe Spanish Civil War, headed by the celebrated Mexican Communist
painter David Alfaro Siqueiros
Siqueiros (codenamed KONE),107KONE),’07 who was animated by an
ideological
exuberant ideological mix of art, revolution, Stalinism and exhibitionism. Both Mer Mer-
cader and Siqueiros
Siqueiros were later to become well known for their involvement in oper- oper
ation UTKA. KGB files, files, however, also reveal
reveal the involvement of of a shadowy third
T
T ee r r o r / 87
group of assassins
assassins headed by one of the most remarkable of all Soviet illegals, illegals, Iosif
Iosif
Romualdovich
Romualdovich Grigulevich (then codenamed MAKS MAKS and FELIPE), who had had taken
a leading role in liquidating Trotskyists during the the Spanish Civil War, as well as
training saboteurs
saboteurs and arsonists
arsonists to operate behind Franco's lines."* lines.lo8 It measure of
I t is a measure of
Grigulevich's skill in assuming false identities that, though though born borna aLithuanian
Lithuanian 1
Jew, 09
Jew,'''
he was to succeed,
succeed, a decade
decade later,
later, in passing himself off as a Costa diplomat.11o
CostaRican diplomat.'"
Early in 1940
1940 he recruited Siqueiros's
Siqueiros's former pupil, the painter Antonio Pujol (code- (code
named JOSE),
JOSE),whom he later described described as lacking in initiative but "very loyal, loyal,excep
excep-
tionally reliable and quite bold," bold," to act as Siqueiros's second-in-command in the
Siqueiros's second-in-command the
assault
assault on Trotsky's villa.ll1
villa."' Grigulevich's other recruits included his future hture wife and
assistant,
assistant, the Mexican Communist Laura Araujo Aguilar (codenamed LUISA)Y2 LUISA).'12
A key part of the assault plan was the infiltration in April April1940 of of a young Amer-Amer
ican agent, Robert Sheldon Harte (codenamed AMUR), posing as a New NewYork Trot
YorkTrot-
skyist,
skyist, as a volunteer guard in Trotsky'sTrotsky's villa. Harte's
Harte's role was was to open the main gate
when the assault
assault group staged its surprise attack in the the middle of the night.l13
of the night.l13
Though enthusiastic,
enthusiastic, he was also alsonaive.
naive. Grigulevich decided not to to brief
brief him on on
what would happen after he opened the villa gate.
KGB records
records identify
identi+ Grigulevich as the real leader of of the assault on Trotsky's
Trotsky's
villa.114
~i1la.l'~ Grigulevich's role rolein the
theattack was two-fold: to ensure that Siqueiros's
Siqueiros's assault
assault
group gained entrance to the villa compound, and to try to inject some element of
discipline
discipline into the the attack. Left to to his own devices,
devices, Siqueiros
Siqueiros would have led the
assault with
with all
all guns
guns blazing
blazing but
but probably
probably have
have made few few attempts totocovercover his tracks.
On
O n the
the evening
evening of of May 23, 1940 Siqueiros
May 23,1940 Siqueiros and
and aagroup
group of of about twenty
twenty followers
followers put
on a mixture of army and police uniforms and armed themselves themselves with pistols and
revolvers.
revolvers. As they did so, according to one of their number, they "laughed and joked
as if
ifit day.'"155 Then,
it were a feast day."11 Then, with
with Pujol
Pujol carrying
carrying thethe only
only machine-gun,
machine-gun, Grigule
Grigule-
vich
vich and
and the
the assault
assault group
group set offoff to
to assassinate
assassinate Trots1... -y. 116
TrotsAy116
On
O n arriving
arriving at the villa in the early hours of of May 24, Grigulevich spoke to the
American
American volunteer
volunteer guard,
guard, Harte,
Harte, whowho opened
opened thethe gate.1I7
gate.'17 The assault group
The assault group raked
raked
the
the bedrooms
bedrooms with gun fire
with gun fire to
to such
such effect that the
effect that the Mexican
Mexican policepolice later counted
later counted
seventy-three
seventy-three bullet
bullet holes
holes inin Trotsky's
Trotsky's bedroom
bedroom walL wall. Remarkably,
Remarkably, however, Trotsky
however,Trotsky
and
and his
his wife
wife survived
survivedby by throwing
throwing themselves
themselves beneath
beneath their
their bed.
bed. Though an incendi
incendi-
ary bomb was thrown into the bedroom of of their
their small grandson, he too escaped by
hiding
hiding under his his bed. lIS
bed.'" Harte
Harte waswas shocked
shocked by by the
the attack-particularly,
attack-particularly, perhaps, by by
the
the attempt
attempt to to kill
kill Trotsky's
Trotsky's grandchild.
grandchild. He H e angrily
angrily told the assault
told the assault group
group that,
that, had
had
he known how they would behave, behave, he would never have havelet them themin.in.
To prevent
To Harte
revealing
revealing whatwhat hadhad happened, he he was
was taken
taken away and and shot.1I9
shot.'" A few few months
months later,
Siqueiros
Siqueiros was was tracked
tracked downdown and arrested yo Grigulevich,
and arrested.120 Grigulevich, however,
however, managed to to
smuggle himself,
smuggle himself, Pujol
Pujol and Laura Araujo
and Laura Aguilar out
Araujo Aguilar out of of the country without
the country without his his
identity
identity being
being discovered
discovered by by the
the Mexican
Mexican police.
police. From
From 1942
1942 to to 1944
1944 hehe ran
ran anan illegal
illegal
residency in Argentina
Argentinawhich, according to KGB files, files, planted more than 150 150 mines
in
in cargoes
cargoes andand ships
ships bound
bound forfor Germany.12l
Germany.12'
The
The failure
failure of
of the
the attack
attack on
on Trotsky's
Trotsky's villa,
villa,followed
followedbyby the dispersal of
the dispersal of Siqueiros's
Siqueiros's
gunmen, led to the the promotion
promotionof RamonRam6n Mercader from penetration penetration agent to assas-
T
T H EE S
SW RD
WOR A
AND T
T H SEE H ISEHL I DE L D /
/ 88
sin. Mercader succeeded

succeeded partly because he was patient. Five days after the raid he
met Trotsky for the thefirst time. Amiable as ever, ever,he gave
gave Trotsky's
Trotsky‘sgrandson a toy glider
and taught him how to fly it. Over Over the the next three months he paid ten visits to the
villa, sometimes bringing smallsmall presents with him himand always taking care not to over over-
stay his welcome.
welcome. Finally, on August 20, 20, he
he brought an an article he
he had written and
asked for Trotsky's
Trotsky’s advice.
advice.As Trotsky sat reading it at his study desk, Mercader took took
an icepick from his pocket and brought ititdown with all the force he could muster on
the back of Trotsky's
Trotsky’s skull.122
skull.122
Mercader had had expected Trotsky to die instantly and silently,silently, thus allowing
allowing him to to
make his escape to a car nearby where his mother and her lover, lover, Eitingon, were wait
wait-
ing. But Trotsky, though mortally wounded, let out “a "a terrible piercing cry."
cry.” ("I
(“I shall
hear that cry all my life,"
life,” said Mercader afterwards.) Mercader was arrested and later
sentenced totwenty
twenty years inEitingon
jail. 123 Eitingon persuaded his mothertoto flee withhim him
to Russia,
Russia, promising to marry her if she did so. Senora
so. In Moscow Seiiora Mercader was
welcomed by Beria,
Beria, received by by Stalin
Stalk in the Kremlin and decorated with the the Order
Order
of Lenin. But
But within
within aafew years, abandoned by Eitingon and denied permission to
leave Russia,
Russia, she was consumed with guilt at having turned her her son into an assassin
assassin
then leaving him to languish in aaMexican jail. 124
and then
Ramon
Ram6n Mercader
Mercader keptkept thethe Stalinist
Stalinistfaith
faiththroughout
throughouthis twenty years in prison.
History, he claimed, would see him as a soldier who had had served the cause of the
working-class revolution by ridding it of of aatraitor. KGB fi les reveal
files reveal(contrary totomost
most
published accounts) that whenMercader Mercader was finally released and traveled to
Moscow in in 1960,
1960, he was awarded the title Hero of the the Soviet Union, along with a
general's pension and aa three-room
general’s three-roomapartment,
apartment,and andwas personally congratulated by
Khrushchev. Twenty years after the assassination of Trotsky, Trotsky, the liquidation of ofene
ene-
mies of the people abroad still remained, on a reduced scale, a significant part of of
KGB foreign operations.12
operations.12’ 5
SS II XH
W AR
WAR
Dnuring the later months of 1940, with Trotsky dead and the worst of the blood-
uring the later months of 1940, with Trotsky dead and the worst of the blood
letting
letting inside
inside INO
I N 0 atat an
an end,
end, the Centre sought
the Centre soughttoto rebuild
rebuild its
its foreign
intelligence
network. Until the the Great
GreatTerror, all all new recruits to IINON 0 had been trained individu
individu-
ally
ally at
at secret
secret apartments
apartments in in Moscow
Moscow and and kept
kept strictly
strictly apart
apart from trainees. By
from other trainees. By
1938,
1938, however,
however, soso many INOI N 0 offi cers had been unmasked as (imaginary)
officers (imaginary) enemies of of
the people that the the Centre
Centre decided group training training was required to increase
increase the flow
of
of new
new recruits.
recruits. NKVD order no. 00648 00648 of October 33 set up up the Soviet Union’s
the Soviet Union's first
first
foreign intelligence training school,
school, hidden from public view in the themiddle of of aawood
at Balashikha, fifteen miles east of of the Moscow ringroad. Given the official title
Shkola Osobogo Naznacheniya (Special (Special Purpose School),
Schoo!), but better known by the
acronym SHON,
SHON, it drew its recruits either from Party and Komsomol members with
higher education or from new university graduates in Moscow, Leningrad, Kiev and
elsewhere.’1
elsewhere.
Since most of the new recruits had experienced
Since experienced only the cramped, squalid living
conditions of crowded city apartment blocks, collective collectivefarms and army barracks,
barracks, an
attempt
attempt waswas made to to introduce
introduce themthem to togracious
gracious living
living so
so that
that they
they would
would feel at at ease
in Western
Western"high
“highsociety."
society.”Their rooms were furnished with what what ananofficial history
solemnly
solemnly describes
describes as "rugs,
“rugs, comfortable and beautiful furniture, and tastefully chocho
sen pictures on the thewalls,
walls, with excellent
excellent bed linens and expensive
expensive bedspreads."2
bedspreads.”2With
no
no experience
experience of of personal
personal privacy,
privacy, thethe trainees
trainees would
would have
have been
been disoriented
disoriented by by being
being
accommodated
accommodated separately
separately even
even ififspace
space had
had allowed,
allowed, and
and soso were
were housed
housed twotwo toto aa
room. The
The curriculum
curriculum included four four hours'
hours’ teaching
teaching aa day
day on
on foreign
foreign languages,
languages, two two
hours on intelligence tradecraft, and lectures on on the CPSU,
CPSU, history,
history, diplomacy,
diplomacy, phiphi-
losophy,
losophy, religion and painting-an
painting-an eclectic eclectic mix designed both to to reinforce
reinforce their ide
ide-
ological
ological orthodoxy
orthodoxy andand toto acquaint
acquaint them withWestern
them with Western bourgeois
bourgeois culture.3
~ulture.~ ThereThere
were
were also
also regular musical evenings.
regular musical evenings. Instructors experience living
Instructors with experience living in the West
in the West
gave the trainees crash courses in bourgeois manners, diplomatic etiquette, fashion fashion-
able
able dressing
dressing and
and "good
“good taste."4
t a ~ t e . ”During
During
~ its
its first
first three
three years, SHON taught
years, SHON taught annual
annual
intakes totalling about 120 120 trainees-all
trainees-all but four of of them male.5
male.’
The
The most
most successful
successful of
of SHON's
SHON’s first first intake
intake ofof students
students was Pavel Mikhailovich
was Pave1 Mikhailovich
Fitin, whose
Fitin, whose early
early career
career had been spent
had been spent ininananagricultural publishing house.
agricultural publishing house. InIn Feb
Feb-
ruary
ruary 1938
1938 he hehadhadbeen recruited by
been recruited by the
the NKVD's internal training
NKVD’s internal training school
school toto fill
fill one
one
TT H
H EE SS W
WO R D
OR D A
ANND
D TT H
H SEE H SI EH LI DE L D // 9
9 00
of
of the
the many
many vacancies
vacancies caused
causedby by the
the liquidation
liquidation of of "enemies
the people"
people” within
within its its
ranks.
ranks. InIn October
October he he was
was transferred
transferred to to SHON,
SHON, where, where, according
according to to an official
anofficial
hagiography,
hagiography,his his "high
“high intellect
intellect and outstanding organizational
and outstanding organizational ability" ability” made
made an an
immediate
immediate impression.
impression. AfterAfter onlyonly aa fewfew months,
months,with withhis
his training
training still
still incomplete,
incomplete, he he
was
was drafted
drafted into into foreign
intelligence. In In May
May 193 1939 9 he
he was
was appointed
appointed head head ofof INO.
INO.
At
At age
age thirty-one,
thirty-one, FitinFitin was
was both
both the the youngest
youngest and and most
most inexperienced
inexperienced foreign foreignintel
intel-
ligence chief in
ligence chief in Soviet
Soviet history.
history. At At the the time
time of his sudden
of his sudden promotion
promotion his prospects
his prospects
must
must have
have seemed
seemedpoor. poor.During
During the thechaotic
chaotic previous
previous fifteen
fifteen months
months three threeof of his
hispre
pre-
decessors had been liquidated and a fourth transferred.6
decessors had been liquidated and a fourth transferred.6 Fitin, however,proved Fitin, however, proved
remarkably
remarkably tenacious.
tenacious. He H e remained
remained head head of of INO
I N 0 forfor seven
seven years,
years,thethe longest
longest period
period
anyone
anyone had had held
held that
that offi ce since
office since the the 11920s,
920s, before
before losing
losing favor
favor and returning to
and returning to
provincial
provincial obscurity.?
obscurity.’
Towards
Towards the the endendofof1940,
1940,fourfour INO
I N 0 officers
officerswere weredespatched
despatched to to London
LondonononFitin's
Fitin’s
orders
orders toto reopen
reopen the the legal residency. The
legal residency. The new new resident
resident was was Anatoli
Anatoli Veniaminovich
Veniaminovich
Gorsky
Gorsky (codenamed
(codenamed VADIM), VADIM), the the last intelligenceofficer
last intelligence officer to to bebe withdrawn
withdrawn from from
London
London beforebefore thethe residency
residency had had closed
closed thatthat February.s
February.’ GorskyGorsky was was aa grimly
grimly effi
effi-
cient, humorless, orthodox Stalinist, a far cry from the
cient, humorless, orthodox Stalinist, a far cry from the Great Illegals of the mid- Great I1legals of the mid-
1930s.
1930s. Blunt
Blunt found
found himhim "fl at-footed" and
“flat-footed” and unsympathetic.9
un~ympathetic.~ Another
Another of of his
his wartime
wartime
agents
agents described
described him him as "a short,
as(‘a short, fattish
fattish man man in in his
his mid-thirties,
mid-thirties, with with blond
blond hairhair
pushed
pushed straight
straight backback andand glasses
glasses thatthat failed
failed to to mask
mask aa pairpair ofof shrewd,
shrewd, cold cold eyes.””
eyes."lO
Like
Like Fitin,
Fitin, Gorsky
Gorsky owed owed his hisrapid
rapidpromotion
promotion to to the
therecent
recent liquidation
liquidation of of most
most ofof his
his
colleagues.
colleagues.
Gorsky
Gorsky returned
returned to to London,
London,however,
however, far farbetter
better briefed
briefed than than during
during hishis previous
previous
tour
tour of
of duty,
duty,when
when he hehad
had been
been forced
forced to to ask
ask the
the Centre
Centre for for background
background materialmaterial on on
Kim
Kim Philby.l
Philby.’’ 1 On
O n Christmas
Christmas Eve Eve 1940
1940 he he reported
reported that that hehe hadhadrenewed
renewed contact
contact with
with
O HNCHEN. The
SSOHNCHEN. The Centre
Centre appeared
appeared jubilant
jubilant at at Gorsky's
Gorsky’s report.
report. In In the
the summer
summer of of
1940
1940 Burgess
Burgess had had succeeded
succeeded in in recruiting
recruiting Philby Philby to to Section
Section D D of of SIS,
SIS, which
which soonsoon
afterwards
afterwards was merged into
was merged into aa newnew organization,
organization, the the Special
Special Operations
Operations Executive
Executive
(SOE),
(SOE), instructed
instructed by by Churchill
Churchill to to "set“set Europe
Europe ablaze"
ablaze” through
through subversive
subversive warfare
warfare
behind enemy lines. Following the six-week defeat of
behind enemy lines. Followingthe six-week defeat of France and the Low Countries, France and the Low Countries,
the
the Prime
Prime Minister's
Minister’s orders
orders proved
proved wildlywildly optimistic.
optimistic. The The Centre,
Centre, however,
however, warmly
warmly
welcomed Gorsky's report
welcomed Gorsky’s report thatthat Philby
Philby "was “was working
working as as aa political
political instructor
instructor at at the
the
training
training center
center of of the
the British
British Intelligence
Intelligence Service Service preparing
preparing sabotage
sabotage agentsagents to to be
be
sent
sent to
to Europe."
Europe.” ThereThere was, however, one
was, however, one major surprise in
major surprise in Philby's
Philby’s earlyearly reports.
reports.
'�ccording
‘According to OHNCHEN's date,"
to SSOHNCHEN’s date,” Gorsky
Gorsky informed
informed the the Centre,
Centre, "[SOE]
“[SOE] has has not
.not
sent
sent its
itsagents
agents to to the
theUSSR yet yet and
and is is not
not even
even training
training themthem yet.yet. The
The USSR
USSR isis tenth
tenth
on
on the
thelist
list of
of countries
countries to to which
which agents
agents are are to
to bebe sent."
sent.” Wrongly
Wrongly convinced
convinced that that the
the
Soviet
Soviet Union
Union remained
remained aa priority
priority target,
target, aa skeptical
skeptical deskdesk officer
officer in in the
the Centre
Centreunder
under-
lined
lined this
this passage
passage and and placed
placed two two large
large red red question
question marksmarks in in the
the margin.I2
margin.12
Early
Early inin1941,
1941, thethe London
Londonresidency
residency renewed renewedcontact
contact with with the
the other
other members
members of of
the
the Five.
Five. Maclean
Maclean continued
continued to to provide
provide large largenumbers
numbers of of Foreign
ForeignOffice Officedocuments.
documents.
Unlike
Unlike Philby,
Philby, Burgess
Burgesshad had failed
failed to to secure
secure aa transfer
transfer from
from Section
Section D D ofof SIS
SIS toto SOE
SOE
and
and had
had returned
returned to to the
the BBC.
BBC. Blunt,Blunt, however,
however, had had succeeded
succeeded in in entering
entering the theSecu
Secu-
rity
rity Service,
Service, MIS, MI5, in in the
the summer
summer of of 1940.
1940. As As wellwell asas providing
providing large largeamou’nts
amounts of of
Wa
?Vu r / 9I
1
material from MIS MI5 files,

files, Blunt also ran as a sub-agent one of of his former Cambridge
pupils, Leo LongLong(codenamed ELLI), ELLI),who worked in military intelligence.13
intelligen~e.’~ Among
Among
the
the early
early intelligence
provided byby Blunt
Blunt from MIS files
from MI5 files was
wasevidence that during
evidence that during thethe
two
two years before
beforethe outbreak of the Second World War Warthe theNKVD
NKVDhad abandoned
had
one of its best-placed British agents.agents. In the summer of 1937, at the height
of 1937, height ofof the
paranoia generated by the Great Terror, the Centre had had jumped
jumpedtotothe theabsurd con
con-
clusion that Captain
Captain King, the Foreign Office cipher clerk recruited three years ear ear-
lier,
lier, had been betrayed to British intelligence by Teodor Maly, the illegal resident in
London. BluntBlunt revealed
revealed that King had gone undetected until his identification by a
Soviet
Soviet defector at the theoutbreak ofwar. 14
war.14
Cairncross too had succeeded
succeeded in occupying what the Centre considered a prime
position in Whitehall.
Whitehall.In September 1940 1940 he heleft thethe
left Treasury to become private sec sec-
retary to one of Churchill's
Churchill’s ministers, Lord Hankey, Chancellor of Duchy of
of the Duchy of
Lancaster.
Lancaster. Though not aamember of the theWarWarCabinet
Cabinet (initially composed of of only five
senior ministers), Hankey received all all cabinet papers, chaired many secret commit commit-
tees and was responsible
responsible for overseeing the work of of the intelligence services.1s
services.15 By the
end
end of of the
the year
year Cairncross
Cairncross waswas providing
providing so so many classified documents-among
documents-among
them
them WarWarCabinet
Cabinetminutes, SIS reports,
minutes, SIS reports, Foreign
Foreign Office
Office telegrams
telegrams and
and General
General Staff
Staff
assessments-that
assessments-that Gorsky complained there was far too much to transmit inincipher.16 cipher.16
During 19411941 London
London was easily
easily the NKVD’s
NKVD's most productive legal residency. residency.
According
According to to the
the Centre's
Centre’s secret
secretstatistics, the residency
statistics, the residency forwarded
forwarded to to Moscow
Moscow 7,8677,867
classified
classified political
political and
and diplomatic
diplomatic documents,
documents, 715 715 onon military matters,
matters, 127 eco
127 on eco-
nomic affairs
affairs and 5151 on British intelligenceY
intelligence.” In addition it provided many other
reports based on verbal information from the Five and other agents. agents. It is difficult to
avoid the conclusion
conclusion that, until the Soviet Union entered the war, most of of this treasure
trove of high-grade intelligence
intelligence was simply wasted.
wasted. Stalin's
Stalin’s understanding of of British
policy
policy waswasso
so distorted
distorted by
by conspiracy
conspiracy theory that no
theory that amount of
no amount of good
good intelligence
intelligence was
was
likely to enlighten him. Despite the fact that Britain and Germany were at war, he
continued
continued to to believe-as
believe-as he he had
had done
done since
since the mid-1930s-that the British
the mid-1930s-that British were
plotting
plotting to embroil him
to embroil him with
with Hitler.
Hitler. His belief
belief in
in aa non-existent
non-existent British conspiracy
helped to blind him to the theexistence
existence ofofa real German plot to invade the Soviet Union.
TH E L E GAL RE
LEGAL RESS I DEN
NCCY
Y in
in the
the Berlin
Berlin embassy resumed work
embassy resumed in 1940
work in 1940 at
at about
about the
the
same
same time
time asas that
that inin London.
London. TheThe NKVD
NKVD had had lost
lost touch
touch with its most
with its most important
important
German
German agent,
agent, Arvid
Arvid Harnack (codenamed CORSICAN),
Harnack (codenamed CORSICAN), an an official
official in the Eco-
in the Eco
nomics
nomics Ministry,
Ministry, inin June
June 1938.
1938. Early
Early ononthe
themorning
morning of September
of September 17,1940
17, 1940 contact
contact
was
was resumed
resumed by by the
the newly
newly arrived deputy
deputy Berlin resident, Aleksandr Mikhailovich
Korotkov
Korotkov (alias "Erdberg," codenamed
(alias “Erdberg,” SASHA and
codenamed SASHA and DLINNY). The The fact
fact that
that
Korotkov
Korotkov simply
simply knocked
knocked on on Harnack's
Harnack‘s door and arranged
door and arranged their
their next
next meeting
meeting inin the
the
Soviet
Soviet embassy
embassy is evidence both
is evidence both of
of the
the decline
decline in
in tradecraft caused by
tradecraft caused by the
the liquidation
liquidation
of most experienced
of most experienced IN I N00 officers
officers and
and of the fact
of the that the
fact that the Gestapo was at
Gestapowas at this
this stage
stage
of
of the
the war
war far
far less omnipresent than
less omnipresent than was
was widely
widely supposed.
supposed.
A fellow
fellow member
member of of the GermanCommunist
the German Communistunderground,
underground, Reinhold
Reinhold Sch6n
Schon-
brunn,
brunn, later
later recalled:
recalled:
T H E S
SW R D
WOR D A N D T H E S
S H II E LL D / 9
922
Harnack .. .. .. had little sense of

of humor, and we, his colleagues,
colleagues, did not feel at
ease in
ease in his
his presence.
presence. There
There was
was something
something of
of the puritan in
the puritan in the
the man,
man, some
some-
thing
thing narrow
narrow and and doctrinaire.
doctrinaire. But
But he
hewas
was extremely
extremely devoted.
devoted.
Like Burgess and Philby,

Philby, Harnack was so highly motivated that he had carried on
recruiting
recruiting intelligence
intelligence sources
sources even
even during
during the
the two
two and
and aa quarter
quarter years
years that
that he
he was
was
out
out of
of contact
contact with
with the
the Centre.
Centre.Korotkov reported
reported that
that Harnack
Harnack was
was in touch with
with aa
loose network
loose network ofof about
about sixty
sixty people,
people, although
although hehe could
could not
not "personally
“personally vouch
vouch for
for
every
every person"
person”::
CORSICAN's
CORSICAN’Sdescription of the way that they camoufl age their operations is
camouflage
that, while not all of the members ofof the circle know one another, something ofof
aa chain
chain exists.
exists. CORSICAN
CORSICAN himselfhimself tries
tries to
to remain
remain in
inthethe background
background
18
although
although he
he is
is at
at the
theheart
heartof
of the
the organization.
organization.ls
The most important of the sources sources cultivated

cultivated by Harnack was a lieutenant in the
Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe intelligence service, Harro
intelligenceservice, Harro Schulze-Boysen, codenamed STARSHINA
Schulze-Boysen, codenamed STARSHINA
("Senior"),
(“Senior”),whose dynamic personality
personalityprovided a striking contrast with that of the dour
Harnack. Leopold Trepper,
Trepper, who knew them both, found Schulze-Boysen
Schulze-Boysen "as “as passion
passion-
ate
ate and
and hot-headed
hot-headed as as Arvid
A m d Harnack
Harnack was
was calm
calm and
and reflective."
reflective.” His
His tall,
tall, athletic
athletic frame,
frame,
fair hair,
hair,blue eyes and Aryan features were
blue werefarfar
removed
removedfrom the Gestapo stereotype
stereotype of
the Communist
Communistsubversive.
subversive. OnO n March 15, 1941 the Centre ordered Korotkov to make
15,1941
direct
direct contact
contact with
with Schulze-Boysen
Schulze-Boysen and persuade him
and persuade him toto form
form his
his own
own network
network of of
informants independent of Harnack. Schulze-Boysen
Schulze-Boysen needed
neededlittle persuasion.19
persuasi~n.~’
Even a more experienced
experienced intelligence offi cer than Korotkov would have found
officer
Harnack,
Harnack, Schulze-Boysen
Schulze-Boysen and and their
their groups
groups of
of agents
agents difficult
difficult to
to run.
run. Both
Both networks
networks
put themselves at increased risk by combining covert opposition to the the Nazi regime
with espionage
espionage for the Soviet
Soviet Union. Schulze-Boysen
Schulze-Boysen and his glamorous wife, Lib
.wife,Lib-
ertas, held evening discussion
ertas, discussion groups for members of, and potential recruits to, an
anti-Hitler underground. Libertas's
anti-Hitler Libertas’s many
many lovers
lovers added
added to
to the
thedanger
danger of of discovery.
discovery. As As
young resisters
resisters pasted anti-Nazi
anti-Nazi posters on Berlin walls, Schulze-Boysen
Schulze-Boysen stood guard
over
over them
them dressed
dressed in in his
his Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe uniform,
uniform, with
with his
his pistol at the ready and
at the and the
the
safety catch off. 20
ofE20
The
The most important intelligence
provided byby the
the Harnack and and Schulze-Boysen
Schulze-Boysen
networks in the thefi rst half
first half of
of 11941
941 concerned Hitler's
Hitler’s preparations for operation BAR BAR-
BAROSSA, the the invasion of Russia. On June 16 16 Korotkov cabled the Centre Centre that
that
intelligence from the two networks indicated that ‘‘[all1 "[a]ll of the military training by
Germany in inpreparation for its attack on the theSoviet Union is complete, and the strike
may bebe expected at any time."21
time.”21Similar intelligence
intelligence arrived from NKVD sources sources as
far afield as China and Japan. Later KGB historians counted "over “over a hundred"
hundred”intel
intel-
ligence warnings of preparations for the German Germanattack forwarded to Stalin by Fitin
between January 11 and June 21 .22 Others came from military intelligence.
21.22 intelligence. All were
wasted. Stalin was as as resistant to good intelligence from Germany as he was to good
intelligence from Britain.
F
W a rr
Wa I
/ 9
9 33
The Great Terror had institutionalized the paranoid strain iinn Soviet Soviet intelligence
assessment.
assessment.Many NKVD officers officers shared,
shared, ifif usually to aaless grotesque degree,
degree, Stalin's
Stalin’s
addiction to conspiracy
conspiracy theory. None the the less,
less, the main blame for the catastrophic
failure
failure to foresee the surprise attack on onJune 22 belongs to Stalin himself, con
himself, who con-
tinued
tinued toto act
act asas his
his own
own chief
chief intelligence analyst. Stalin
intelligence analyst. Stalin did not merely ignore a
did not
series of
series ofwholly accurate
accurate warnings. He H e denounced many of of those who provided them.
His response to an an NKVD report from Schulze-Boysen
Schulze-Boysen on June 16 was the obscene
June 16
minute: "You
“You can send your 'source' ‘source’from the German German air force to his whore of of aa
mother!
mother! This
This is is not
not aa 'source'
‘source’butbut a disinformer.
disinformer. J. Stalin.”23
Stalin."23 Stalin
Stalin also heaped abuse
on the
the great GRU illegal Richard Sorge, Sorge, who sent similar warnings from Tokyo,
where he had penetrated the German embassy and seduced the ambassador’s ambassador's wife.
wife.
Sorge's
Sorge’s warnings of operation BARBAROSSA were dismissed by Stalin as disinfor- disinfor
mation from a lying "shit “shit who has set himself
himself up with some small factoriesfactories and broth-
broth
els in Japan. "24
Japan,”23
Stalin was much less less suspicious
suspiciousof Adolf
Adolf Hitler
Hitler than
thanofofWinston Churchill, the evil
genius
genius who had preached an anti-Bolshevik crusade crusade in the the civil war
wartwenty years ear ear-
lier and had been plotting against against the Soviet Union ever since.
since. Behind many of the
of
reports of impending German attack Stalin claimed claimed to detect a disinformation cam cam-
paign by Churchill designed to continue the long-standing British plot to embroil
him with Hitler. Churchill's personal warnings to Stalin of preparations for BAR
Churchill’s personal BAR-
BAROSSA
BAROSSA only only heightened
heightened his his suspicions. intelligence reports sent by the
suspicions. From the intelligence
London residency,
residency, Stalin almost certainly certainly knew that until 1941 the
untilJune 1941 theJoint
JointIntelli
Intelli-
gence Committee (]IC), (JIC),the thebody responsible for forthe main British intelligence assess
intelligence assess-
ments, did not believe that Hitler Hitlerwas preparing an invasion.
invasion. IItt reported to Churchill
as
as late
late as
as May
May 23 23 that
that "the advantages .. .. .. to Germany of concluding an agreement
“the advantages
with the USSR are overwhelming."25
over~helrning.”~~ The JIC Theassessments were wereprobably regarded by
Stalin as further proof
proof that Churchill's
Churchill’s warnings were intendedintended to deceive him. Stalin’s
Stalin's
deep suspicions
suspicions of Churchill and of British policy in general were cleverly exploited by
cleverlyexploited
the
the Germans.
Germans. As As part
part ofof the
the deception
deception operation which preceded BARBAROSSA, BARBAROSSA,
the
the Abwehr,
Abwehr, German
German military
military intelligence,
intelligence, spread
spread reports
reports that
that rumors
rumors of of an impend-
impend
ing German attack were part of a British disinformation campaign. campaign.
By early June, reports of German troop troop movements toward the Soviet frontier
were too numerous to be explained, explained, even by by Stalin, simply as British disinformation.
At aa private lunch in the German
private lunch in the German embassy in embassy in Moscow,
Moscow, the the ambassador,
ambassador, Count
Count vonvon
der
der Schulenberg,
Schulenberg, revealed
revealed that Hitler had
that Hitler had definitely decided on
definitely decided on invasion.
invasion. “You
"You will
will
ask me
me why
why I am am doing this,"this,” hehe said toto the
the astonished Soviet Soviet ambassador to Ger Ger-
many, Vladimir Georgyevich Dekanozov. Dekanozov. "I “Iwas raised
raisedin the thespirit ofof Bismarck,
Bismarck, who
was
was always
always anan opponent
opponent of of war
war with
with Russia."
Russia.’’ Stalin's response was
Stalin’s response was toto tell
tell the
the Polit-
Polit
buro, "Disinformation
“Disinformation has now reached ambassadorial ambassadorial level! "26 O On n June 9, or soon
afterwards,
afterwards, however,
however, StalinStalin received
received aa report
report that
that the
theGerman
Germanembassy
embassy had had been
been sent
sent
orders
orders by
by telegram
telegram to to prepare
prepare forfor evacuation within aa week
evacuation within week andand had
had begun burning
begun burning
documents
documents in in thethebasement.27
basement.27
Though Stalin remained preoccupied by a non-existent British conspiracy, conspiracy, he
increasingly
increasingly began
began to to suspect
suspect aa German
German plot as well-though
plot as well-though not not one
one which aimed
which aimed
T
THH EE S
SW R D
WOR A N D T
THH EE S H II E L
L D / 94
at surprise attack.
at surprise attack. As
As it became ever
it became ever more
more difficult
difficult to
to conceal German
German trooptroop move
move-
ments, the
ments, the Abwehr
Abwehr spread
spread rumors
rumors that
that Hitler
Hitler was
was preparing
preparing to issue an
to issue ultimatum,
an ultimatum,
backed
backed by some display
by some display of of military might, demanding
military might, demanding new new concessions
concessions from from the
the
Soviet
Soviet Union.
Union. ItIt was
was this illusory threat
this illusory threat of
of an
anultimatum,
ultimatum,rather
ratherthan
thanthethe
real threat
real threat
of German invasion,
invasion, which increasingly
increasingly worried Stalin during the the few weeks and
days
days before
before BARBAROSSA.
BARBAROSSA. He H e was
was not alone. A succession
not alone. succession of
of foreign
foreign statesmen
statesmen
and journalists were alsoalso taken in by the planted rumors of of aaGerman
Germanultimatum.28
ultimatum.28
Beria sought to to protect his position as head of of the
the NKVD by expressing
expressing mount
mount-
ing
ing indignation
indignation atat those
those inside
inside and
and outside
outside the
the NKVD who who dared
dared to
to send
send reports
reports of
of
preparations
preparations for
for aa German
German invasion.
invasion. OOnn June
June 21, 1941 he
21,1941 heordered
ordered four
four NKVD offi offi-
cers
cers who
who persisted
persisted in sending
sending such
such reports
reports to
to be "ground
“ground into
into labor
labor camp
camp dust."
dust.” He
He
wrote
wrote toto Stalin
Stalin on
on the samesame day
day with
with his
his characteristic
characteristic mix
mix ofof brutality
brutality andand syco
syco-
phancy:
phancy:
I again insist on recalling

recalling and punishing our ambassador to Berlin, Dekanozov,
Dekanozov,
who
who keeps
keeps bombarding
bombarding me me with
with "reports"
“reports” on Hitler's
Hitler’s alleged
alleged preparations
preparations to to
attack
attack the
the USSR.
USSR.He H e has
has reported
reported that
that this
this attack
attack will
will start tomorrow .. .. .. But
start tomorrow But
I and my people, Iosif
Iosif Vissarionovich,
Vissarionovich, have fi rmly embedded in our memory
firmly
your wise conclusion:
conclusion: Hitler is not going
going totoattack us in 1941 .29
1941.29
Also in jeopardy for providing intelligence on the theforthcoming

forthcomingGerman
German invasion waswas
the senior IINO
N 0 officer Vasili Mikhailovich Zarubin, later chief resident in the United
States.30
States.ja Early
Eariy inin 1941
1941Zarubin
Zarubinwas sent to to China
China totomeet
meetWalter
WalterStennes, German
adviser to the Chinese nationalist leader Chiang Kai-shek. Stennes had once been
deputy head of Hitler's
Hitler’s storm troopers, the Sturmabteilung, but developed
stormtroopers, developed a grudge
against him after being sacked
sacked in 1931.
1931. In 1939
1939 Stennes was approached by the
NKVD Chungking residency and agreed to supply intelligence on Hitler. Hitler. In Febru
Febru-
ary 1941
1941 Zarubin reported to the theCentre
Centrethatthat a visitor from Berlin had secretly
assured Stennes that "an “an attack against the USSR by the Germans Germans .. .. .. was being
planned for the end of May this year" year” (the original date set by Hitler but post
but later post-
poned).31
poned).” Zarubin cabled on June 20: 20: "The
“The FRIEND [Stennes] repeats and confirms
categorically-based
categorically-based on absolutely reliable information-that
information-that Hitler has completed
preparations for war against the USSR."3
USSR.”32 2 Fitin outraged Beria by taking these and
similar warnings seriously.
seriously. An SVR official history concludes,
concludes, probably correctly,
correctly,
"Only theoutbreak of war saved P.
“Only the P. M. Fitin from the firing
firingsquad."33
squad.”33
The devastating surprise achieved by the German invasion in the early hours of
June 22 was made possible both by the nature of the Soviet Soviet intelligence system at the the
time and by the personal failings
failings of
of the
the dictator who presided over it. In Whitehall
the patient,
patient,if
if uninspired, examination of of intelligence
intelligence reports through thethecommittee
system
system eventually turned the the belief
belief that Germany
Germany saw the "overwhelming"
“overwhelming” advan
advan-
tages of a negotiated settlement with withRussia into recognition that Hitler
Hitlerhad haddecided
to attack. In Moscow the whole system of intelligence assessment
assessment was dominated by
the fearful sycophancy encapsulated in the
fearhl sycophancy the formula "sniff
“sniff out, suck up, survive,”
survive," and
by a culture of conspiracy theory.
Wa r / 95
Stalin had institutionalized both aaparanoid strain and a servile servile political correctness
which
which continued
continued to
to distort
distort in
in greater
greater or lesser degree all
or lesser intelligence assessment even
all intelligence even
after the outbreak of the Great
Great Patriotic War in in 1941.
1941. From 19421942 to 1944 the
to 1944 the Cam
Cam-
bridge Five, probably the ablest group of Soviet Soviet wartime agents, were to be seriously
seriously
suspected by bythe Centre
Centreof being double agents controlled by British intelligence intelligence sim
sim-
ply because their voluminous
voluminous and highly classified classified intelligence
intelligence sometimes failed to
conform
conform to Stalin's
Stalin’sconspiracy
conspiracytheories.34
t h e ~ r i e sThe
. ~ ~ responsibility,
responsibility,
The however,
however,did not rest with
Stalin alone. Some degree
degree of distortion in intelligence
intelligence assessment remained inherent
in the autocratic
autocratic nature of the Soviet
Soviet system
system throughout the Cold War. The Centre
always shrank from telling the Kremlin what it did not want to hear. The last head of of
KGB foreign
foreign intelligence,
intelligence,Leonid Shebarshin, confessed in 1992 1992that until
that until
Gorbachev
introduced a measure of glasnost, the KGB “had
ofglasnost, "had to topresent its reports in aafalsely pos
pos-
itive
itive light"
light” which pandered to the thepredilections
predilections of leadership.35
of the political leader~hip.~’
I N TH E E A R LY months of the Great

EARLY GreatPatriotic War, while the German
Germanforces advanc
advanc-
ing into
into Russia werewere sweeping
sweeping all before them, Stalin faced the even more terrifying
prospect of a two-front
two-front war. Ribbentrop
IClbbentrop instructed the German embassy in Japan,
“DOeverything to rouse the Japanese to begin war against Russia .. .. .. Our goal
"Do
remains to shake hands with the the Japanese on thethe Trans-Siberian Railway before the
beginning of winter."
winter.” Opinion in Tokyo was initially divided between those who
favored the "northern
“northernsolution"
solution”(war with the theSoviet Union) and the supporters of of the
"southern solution”
“southern solution" (war
(war with
with Britain andand the
theUnited
UnitedStates). Sorge, deeply distrusted
States). Sorge, distrusted
by Stalin, sought to provide reassurance
reassurancefrom Tokyo that the theadvocates of ((south
ofthe “south-
ern
ern solution"
solution”were
were gaining
gaining thethe upper
upper hand. ButButononOctober
October 18 Sorge was arrested and
18
his
his spy
spy ring
ring rapidly
rapidly rounded
rounded up. up.
SIGINT
SIGINT was was more
more influential
influential than
than Sorge in persuading
Sorge in persuading Stalin
Stalin that
that there
there would
would be be
no Japanese attack. Late in 1938 1938 the combined NKVD/Fourth Department SIG-
NKVD/Fourth Department SIG
INT unitunit had
had been
been broken
broken up.up. The
The NKVD sectionsection moved
moved into the former
into the formerHotel
Hotel
Select
Select on Dzerzhinsky Street, Street, where it concentrated on diplomatic traffic; traffic; most, but
not all
al,, military communications were the responsibility of cryptanalysts of
of the cryptanalysts of the
GRU (successor to
GRU (successor to the
the Fourth
FourthDepartment).
Department).In In February
February 1941
1941 the
theNKVD cryptan
NKVDcryptan-
alysts
alysts had
had been
been integrated
integrated intointoaanew
new and
and enlarged
enlarged Fifth (Cipher)
(Cipher) Directorate, with,
at its heart, aaresearch section responsible
responsible for the attack
attackononforeign codes
codes and ciphers.
The chief Japanese specialist in the section, Sergei Sergei Tolstoy,
Tolstoy, went on to become the
most decorated Soviet cryptanalyst of of the
the war,
war, winning two Orders of
winning two of Lenin. In the
autumn
autumn of of 1941,
1941, a agroup
group led
led by
by him
him replicated
replicated the
the success of American codebreakers
success of codebreakers
aa year
year earlier
earlier inin breaking
breaking thethe main
main Japanese diplomatic
diplomatic cipher,
cipher, codenamed
codenamed by by the
the
Americans and since since known to Western
Westernhistorians as PURPLE. The teetotal Amer- Amer
ican
ican codebreakers
codebreakers had had celebrated
celebrated their
their success
success byby sending out forfor aa case
case of
of Coca
Coca-
Cola.
Cola. Tolstoy
Tolstoy isis unlikely
unlikely toto have
have had
had time
timetotocelebrate
celebrate at all. The Japanese diplomatic
decrypts
decrypts which
which he he provided,
provided, however, were of
however, were of enormous
enormous importance.
importance. Japan,
Japan, they
they
made
made clear,
clear, would
would not not attack
attack the
the Soviet Union. 36
Soviet Union.36
The
The reassurance
reassurance about
about Japanese
Japanese intentions
intentions provided
provided byby SIGINT
SIGINT enabled
enabled Stalin
Stalin to
to
shift
shift to
to the
the west
west half
half the
the divisional
divisional strength
strength ofof the Far
Far Eastern
Eastern Command.
Command. During
During
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
RDD A
ANNT
DDH E
T H E SS H
H II E
E L
L D
D // 96
October
October andand November
November 1941,1941, between
between eight
eight andand ten
ten rifle divisions, together
rifle divisions, together with
with
about
about aa thousand
thousand tanks
tanks and
and aathousand
thousand aircraft,
aircraft, were
were flung
flung into
intothe fight
the against Ger
fight
against Ger-
many.
many. These
These forces,
forces, together
together with
with other
other Red
Red Army
Army divisions
divisions which
which hadhad been
been held
held in
in
reserve, may well
reserve, may wellhave
havesaved
saved the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union fromfrom defeat.
defeat. As Professor
Professor Richard
Richard
Overy
Overy concludes
concludes in in his
his study
study of
of the
the eastern
eastern front,
front, "It
“Itwas
was not
not the
the tough
toughwinter
winter con
con-
ditions
ditions that
that halted
halted the
the German
Germanarmyarmy [in
[in December
December 1941] 19411butbut the
theremarkable
remarkable revival
revival
of
o f Soviet
Soviet military
military manpower
manpower afterafter the
the terrible
terrible maulings
maulings of o f the summer
thesummer andand
autumn.
autumn.”37"37
As
As well
well asas providing
providing reassurance
reassurance that
that Japan
Japan diddid not
not propose
propose to to attack
attack the
the Soviet
Soviet
Union,
Union, SIGINT
SIGINT alsoalso gave
gave indications
indications ofof its
its move
move towards
towards warwar with
with Britain
Britain andand the
the
United
United States,
States, though
though thethe diplomatic
diplomatic decrypts
decrypts contained
contained no no mention
mention of of plans
plans for
for aa
surprise
surprise attack
attack on
on Pearl
Pearl Harbor.
Harbor. A decrypted
decrypted telegram
telegram fromfrom Tokyo
Tokyo to to its
its Berlin
Berlin
embassy
embassy (probably
(probably copied
copied toto the
the Moscow
Moscow embassy)
embassy) on on November
November 27, 1941, ten
27,1941, tendays
days
before
before Pearl
Pearl Harbor,
Harbor, instructed
instructed the
the ambassador:
ambassador:
See
See Hitler
Hitler and
and Ribbentrop,
Ribbentrop, and and explain
explain to
to them
themininsecret
secret our
our relations
relations with
with the
the
United States .. .. ..Explain
United States Explain to
to Hitler
Hitlerthat
thatthe
themain
main Japanese
Japanese efforts
efforts will
will be
be con
con-
centrated
centrated inin the
the south
south and
and that
that we
we propose
propose toto refrain
refrain from
from deliberate
deliberate opera
opera-
tions
tions in
in the
the north
north[against
[against the
the Soviet
Soviet Union] .38
Union].38
Soviet
Soviet cryptanalysts,
cryptanalysts, however, were unable
however, were unable to match the
to match the success
success of o f the
the British
British
wartime
wartime SIGINT
SIGINT agency
agency atat Bletchley
Bletchley Park
Park in
in breaking
breaking the the main
main high-grade
high-grade ciphers
ciphers
used
used by by the
the German
German armed
armed forces.
forces. They
They failed
failed to
to dodo so
so partly
partly for
for technological
technological rea
rea-
sons.
sons. Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence was
was unable
unable toto construct
construct the the powerful
powerful electronic
electronic "bombs,"
“bombs,”
first
first constructed
constructed atat Bletchley
Bletchley Park
Park in
in 1940
1940totobreak
break the the daily
daily settings
settings ofof the
the German
German
Enigma
Enigma machine
machine cipher.
cipher. It was
was even
even further
further from
from being
being able
able to
to replicate
replicate COLOS
COLOS-
SUS,
SUS, thethe world's
world’s first
first electronic
electronic computer
computer usedused byby Bletchley
Bletchley from
from 11943
943 to to decrypt
decrypt
the Geheimschreiber
the Geheimschreibermessages
messages (radio
(radio signals
signals based
based onon teleprinter
teleprinter impulses
impulses enciphered
enciphered
and deciphered automatically)
automatically) which for the last two two years of the the war yielded
yielded more
operational
operational intelligence
intelligence than
than the
the Enigma
Enigmatraffic.
traffic. But
But there
there was
was aa human
human as as well
well as
as aa
technological
technological explanation
explanation for
for the
the inferiority
inferiority of
of Soviet
Soviet to to British
British SIGINT.
SIGINT.The The Soviet
Soviet
system
system would
would never
never have
havetolerated
tolerated the
the remarkable
remarkable infusion
infusion of of unconventional
unconventional youthyouth-
ful
ful talent
talent ononwhich
which much
much of of Bletchley's
Bletchley’s success
successwas wasbuilt.
built. Alan
Alan Turing-the
Turing-the brilliant
brilliant
eccentric
eccentric who
who buried
buried his
his life
life savings
savings (converted
(converted into into silver
silver ingots)
ingots) inin the
the Bletchley
Bletchley
Woods,
Woods, forgot
forgot where
where hehe had
had hidden
hiddenthem,
them,butbutwentwentonon to to
be
be chiefly
chiefly responsible
responsible for
for
the
the invention
invention ofof COLOSSUS-was
COLOSSUS-was one one ofof many
many British
British cryptanalysts
cryptanalysts who who would
would
surely
surely have
have been
been incapable
incapable of of conforming
conforming to to the political correctness
the political correctness demanded
demanded by by
the Stalinist system.39
system.39Some
Some British ULTRA-the
ULTRA-the SIGINT SIGINT derived from decrypting
high-grade enemy
enemy traffic-was,
traffic-was, however,
however, passed
passedofficially
officiallyto Moscow in aa disguised
disguised
form,
form, andand in
in an
an undisguised
undisguised formform byby several
severalSoviet
Soviet agents.
agents.4040
J U S T AS
AS T H EKGB later sought to take refuge from the horrors of its Stalinist past
by constructing a Leninist golden age of revolutionary purity, so
so it also
also sought to
reinvent its record during the
the Great
GreatPatriotic War of
of 1941-5
1941-5 as
as one
one ofofselfless
selfless hero-
Wa r I 97
ism-best exemplified
ism-best exemplified by by itsits role
role in special operations
in special operations and and partisan
partisan warfare
warfare behindbehind
enemy
enemy lines.
lines. According
According to to Pavel
Pave1 Anatolyevich
Anatolyevich Sudoplatov,Sudoplatov, head head of of the wartime
the wartime
NKVD Directorate
Directorate for Special Tasks
for Special Tasks and and Guerrilla
Guerrilla Warfare,
Warfare, "This chapter
“Thischapter in in
NKVD history history is is the
the only
only oneone thatthatwas
was not not officially
officially rewritten,
rewritten, since since its
its accomplish
accomplish-
ments
ments stood
stood on on their
their ownown merit
merit and and did did not
not contain
contain Stalinist crimes that
Stalinist crimes that hadhad to be
to be
covered Up."41 In
covered up.’’41 In reality,
reality, thethe NKVD's
NKVD’s wartime record, like
wartime record, like the
the rest of its
rest of its history,
history, waswas
extensively
extensively doctored.
doctored.
Among
Among the thebest-publicized
best-publicized examples examples of of the NKVD's bravery
theNKVD’s bravery behindbehind enemy
enemy lineslines
were
were thethe heroic
heroic deeds
deeds of of its
its detachment
detachment in in the
theUkrainian
Ukrainian Black Black Sea Sea port
port of Odessa
of Odessa
during
during the the 907 -day occupation
907-day occupation by by German
German and and Romanian
Romanian forces. forces. The detachment
The detachment
based
based itself
itself inin the
the catacombs
catacombs there, there, aa mazemaze of underground
underground tunnels tunnels usedused to to excavate
excavate
sandstone
sandstone for for the
the construction
the elegant nineteenth-century buildings
elegant nineteenth-century buildings which which
still line many
still line many of of Odessa's streets and
Odessa’s streets and boulevards.
boulevards. With With over over aa thousand
thousand kilometers
kilometers of of
unmapped
unmapped tunnels tunnels as as well
well as as numerous
numerous entrances
entrances and and exits,
exits, thethe catacombs
catacombs made made an an
almost
almost ideal base for
ideal base for partisan
partisan warfare.
warfare. In 1969, on
In 1969, onthethe twenty-fifth anniversary of
twenty-fifth anniversary ofVEVE
Day,
Day, aa section
section of of thethe catacombs
catacombs on on thethe outskirts
outskirts of Odessa was
of Odessa was opened
opened as as the
the
Museum
Museum ofof PartisanPartisan Glory, Glory, whichwhich throughout
throughout the the remainder
remainder of of the
the Soviet
Soviet era era
received
received over overaa million
million visitors
visitors aa year.42
year.42
After
After the theSecond
Second World World War, War, however,
however, the the sometimes
sometimes heroic heroic story
story of the struggle
of the struggle
to liberate Odessa from enemy occupation was hijacked by the KGB to
to liberate Odessa from enemy occupation was hijacked by the to refurbish
refurbish its its
dubious
dubious wartime
wartime record.
record. Pride
Pride of of place
place in in the
the Museum
Museumof Partisan Glory
of Partisan Glory is is given
given to to
the
the exploits
exploits of of the
the NKVD detachment detachment headed headed by by Captain
Captain Vladimir
Vladimir Aleksandrovich
Aleksandrovich
Molodtsov,
Molodtsov, who who was was posthumously
posthumously made made aa Hero Hero of of the
the Soviet Union and
Soviet Union and suffered
suffered
the
the indignity
indignityofof having
having his his whole
whole life life transformed
transformed into into thatthatofof aa Stalinist
Stalinist plaster saint.
plaster saint.
The
The origins
origins ofMolodtsov's
of Molodtsov’s heroism heroism were were officially traced back
officiallytraced back to selfless devotion
to selfless devotion in in
overfulfilling
overfdfilling his his norms
norms as as aa miner
miner during
during the first Five
the first Year Plan.
Five Year Plan. "What
“What aa wonder-
wonder
ful
ful thing
thing ititis,”
is," he
he was
was saidsaid toto have
have declared
declared in in 1930,
1930,“not"not to notice or
to notice or watch
watch the the time
time
during
during the theworking
working day, day, not
not to towait
wait for
for the end of
the end of the
the shift
shiftbut buttoto seek
seek toto prolong
prolong it, it,
to
to run
run behind
behindthe the[coal]
[coal] trolley,
trolley, to to be
be bathed
bathed in in sweat
sweat and and at at thethe end
endofof the
the shift
shift to
to
emerge
emerge victorious
victorious in fulfilling the
in fulfilling the plan!"43
plan!”43
The
The Museum
Museum of of Partisan
Partisan GloryGlory contains
contains aa “reconstruction’’
"reconstruction" of of the
the NKVD detach detach-
ment's
ment’s underground
underground headquarters,
headquarters, complete complete with with dormitories,
dormitories, ammunition
ammunition depot, depot,
workshops,
workshops, fuel fuel store,
store, kitchen
kitchen and and meeting
meeting room room with-inevitably-a
with-inevitably-a portrait
portrait of of
Lenin
Lenin (but (butnot notof Stalin) on
of Stalin) on thethewalL
wall.44 44 Nearby
Nearby is is aa vertical
vertical shaft
shaft 17 meters long
17 meters long link-
link
ing the
ing the headquarters
headquarters to the surface,
to the surface, through
through which which it it received
received messages
messages and and food
food
from
from itsits agents
agents in in Odessa.
Odessa. DuringDuring the the Soviet
Soviet era numerous films,
era numerous films, books, magazine
books, magazine
and
and newspaper articles, many
newspaper articles, promoted by
many promoted the KGB, celebrated
by the celebrated the the heroic
heroic feats
feats ofof
the
the NKVD detachmentdetachment in in holding
holding at at bay thousands of
bay thousands German and
of German and Romanian
Romanian
troops
troops in Odessa before
in Odessa before giving
giving theirtheir lives
lives in defense of
in defense the fatherland.
of the fatherland.
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin owed owed his his discovery
discovery of ofthe
the true
true story
story of of the
the catacombs
catacombs to to aa colleague
colleague in in
the
the FCD Illegals
Illegals Directorate
Directorate S, S, who
who borrowed
borrowed the multi-volume Odessa
the multi-volume Odessa file file and,
and,
when
when he he returned
returned it, it, told
told Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin he he might
might findfind it it interesting.
interesting. The file began
The file began by by
recording
recording the despatch of
the despatch of Molodtsov's
Molodtsov’s detachment
detachment of six NKVD officers
of six officers to to Odessa
Odessa
shortly
shortly before
before it it fell
fell toto the Germans in
the Germans in October
October 1941, with with orders
orders to to establish
establish an an
T
THE S O RR D
SWO D A N D T
THE S H II E L D
D / 98
underground
underground residency
residency which
which would
would organize
organize reconnaissance,
reconnaissance, sabotage
sabotage and special
and special
operations
operations behind
behind the the German lines. In
Germanlines. Odessa they
In Odessa they were joined by
were joined by thirteen members
thirteen members
of
of the
the local
local NKVD Special Special Department,
Department, commanded
commanded by by Lieutenant
Lieutenant V. A. Kuznetsov.
Kuznetsov.
According
According to the official
to the official version
version of of events,
events, thethe two
two groups
groups held
held aa Party/Komsomol
Party/Komsomol
meeting
meeting on on the
the evening
evening of of October
October 15 15 immediately
immediately before before going
going down
down intointo the the cata
cata-
combs
combs to to set
set up
up their base. What
their base. What actually
actually took
took place,
place, according
according to to the
theKGB file, file, was
wasaa
raucous
raucous dinner
dinner party
party and
and heavy
heavy drinking
drinking which
which ended
ended in in aafight
fight between
between the the Moscow
Moscow
and Odessa
and Odessa NKVD detachments.
detachments. The The next
next day the two
daythe two groups
groups entered
entered thethe catacombs
catacombs
still
still at
at daggers
daggers drawn,
drawn, with
with Molodtsov
Molodtsov and and Kuznetsov
Kuznetsov each each claiming
claiming overall
overall com-com
mand. Over the next nine months Muscovites and Odessans combined operations
mand. Over the next nine months Muscovites and Odessans combined operations
against
against the
the Germans
Germans and and Romanians
Romanians with with internecine
internecine warfare
warfare among
among themselves.
themselve~.~~ 45
Molodtsov's
Molodtsov’s end end may
may well
well have been genuinely
have been heroic. According
genuinely heroic. According to to thethe official
official
Soviet version, he
Soviet version, he was
was captured
captured by by the
the enemy
enemy in in July 1942 but
July 1942 butrefused
rehsed to to beg
beg for his
for his
life,
life, courageously
courageously telling
telling his captors, "We
his captors, “We areare in
in our
ourown
own country
country and andwill
will notnot ask
ask the
the
enemy for
enemy for mercy."46
mercy.”46The The rest
rest of
of the history of
the history of the
the Odessa
Odessa catacombs,
catacombs, however,
however, was wasan
an
NKVD horrorhorror story.
story. After
After Molodtsov's
Molodtsov’s execution,
execution, Kuznetsov disarmed his
Kuznetsov disarmed detach
his detach-
ment and
ment and put
put them
them under
under guard inside the
guard inside catacombs. All but
the catacombs. one, N. F.
but one, F’. Abramov,
Abramov,
were
were executed
executed on on Kuznetsov's
Kuznetsov’s orders
orders on on charges
charges of of plotting
plotting against
against him.
him. As As condi
condi-
tions
tions in
in the
the catacombs
catacombs deteriorated,
deteriorated, the Odessans then
the Odessans then proceeded
proceeded to to fall
fall out
out among
among
themselves.
themselves. The The dwindling
dwindling foodfood supply became moldy;
supply became moldy; and, withtheir
and, with their kerosene
kerosene
almost
almost exhausted,
exhausted, the the detachment
detachment was was forced
forced toto live
live in
in semidarkness.
semidarkness. O Onn August
August 28
Kuznetsov
Kuznetsov shotshot one one of
of his men, Molochny,
his men, Molochny, for for the
the theft
theft of
of aa piece
piece ofof bread.
bread. On O n Sep
Sep-
tember 27 two
tember two others,
others, Polschikov
Polschikov and and Kovalchuk,
Kovalchuk, were were executed
executed for for stealing
stealing food food
and
and ((lack
“lack of
of sexual
sexual discipline."
discipline.” Fearing
Fearing that
that hehe might
might bebe shot
shot next,
next, Abramov
Abramov killed killed
Kuznetsov
Kuznetsov aa monthmonthlater. In his
later. In his notebook,
notebook, later discovered in
later discovered in the
thecatacombs
catacombs and pre
and pre-
served
served inin the
the KGB OdessaOdessa file,
file, Abramov
Abramov wrote:
wrote:
The
The former
former head
head of
of the
the Third
Third Special Department of
Special Department of the
the Odessa
Odessa district
district of
of the
the
NKVD, State
NKVD, State Security Lieutenant V. A. Kuznetsov,
Security Lieutenant was· shot by
Kuznetsov, was’shot by me
me with
with two
two
bullets in the
bullets in thetemple in the
temple in the underground
underground "Mirror Factory" [the
“Mirror Factory” [the base
base in
in the
the cat
cat-
acombs]
acombs] onon October
October 21, 1942.
21,1942.
By this time, following several

several other deaths at the hands of of the enemy,
enemy, only three
NKVD officers
officers remained alive in the
the catacombs:
catacombs: Abramov, Glushchenko and Litvi Litvi-
nov. Abramov and Glushchenko
Glushchenko together killed Litvinov,
Litvinov, then began to eye each
suspiciously in the
other suspiciously the semi-darkness.
Glushchenko wrote in his diary that Abramov wanted toto surrender: surrender: "We
“We are
beaten. There is no victory to wait for.
for. He told me not to be frightened of of commit
commit-
ting treason or being shot as he has friends in German
Germanintelligence."
intelligence.’’On
O n February 18,
18,
1943, apparently suffering from hallucinations, Glushchenko wrote, "[Abramov]
1943, “[Abramov] was
bending over, attending to to his papers. I took my pistol from my belt and shot him him inin
the back of the head."
head.” Over the next few months Glushchenko spent much of his
time outside the catacombs in his wife's
wife’s Odessa flat, finally abandoning thethe under
under-
10, 1943. After
ground base on November 10,1943. Afterthe liberation of
the of Odessa by the Red Army
Wa r / 99
in
in April 1945Glushchenko
April1945 Glushchenko returned
returned with
with members
members of of the
the Ukrainian
Ukrainian NKVD to to col
col-
lect
lect equipment
equipment and and compromising
compromising papers papers fromfrom the the catacombs,
catacombs, but but was
was fatally
fatally
wounded
wounded whenwhen aagrenade
grenade he he picked
picked up up exploded
exploded in his hands.47
in his hands.47
For
For almost
almost twenty
twenty years,
years, the
the Centre
Centre believed
believed that
that no nosurvivor
survivor ofof the
the Odessa
Odessa catacata-
combs remained to cast doubt on the heroic myth it had constructed.
combs remained to cast doubt on theheroic myth it had constructed. In 1963, how- In 1963, how
ever,
ever, the
the KGB was was disconcerted
disconcerted to to discover
discover that Abramov had
that Abramov not been
had not been killed
killed by by
Glushchenko
Glushchenko after after all,
all, but
but had
hadescaped
escaped and and was
was living
living in France. His
in France. His father,
father, who
who may may
also
also have
have known
known the the true
true story
story of
of the
the Odessa
Odessa catacombs,
catacombs, was reported to
was reported to have
have emi
emi-
grated
grated toto the
the United
United States.
States. Abramov's
Abramov’s supposed
supposed widow,
widow, NinaNina Abramova,
Abramova, who who had had
been
been working
working in in the
theKGB First First Chief
ChiefDirectorate,
Directorate, was was quietly
quietly transferred
transferred toto another
another
job.
job. The
The myth
myth of of the
the NKVD heroes heroes ofof the
the Odessa
Odessa catacombs
catacombs was was left
left undisturbed.
~ n d i s t u r b e48d . ~ ~
According
According to to statistics
statistics inin KGB
KGB files,
files, the
the NKVD
NKVD ran ran aa total
total of 2,222 "operational
of 2,222 “operational
combat
combat groups"
groups” behind
behind enemy
enemy lines
lines during
during the the Great
Great Patriotic
Patriotic War.49
War.49Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin
found
found no no realistic
realistic appraisal,
appraisal, however,
however, of of the
the effectiveness
effectiveness of partisan warfare.
of partisan warfare. ConCon-
trary
trary to
to the
the claims
claims of of post-war
post-war Soviet
Soviet hagiographers,
hagiographers, the the combat
combat groups
groups seem
seem onlyonly
rarely
rarely to
to have
have tied
tied down
down German
German forces
forces larger
larger than
than themselves.5o
thernselve~.’~ Because
Because about
about half
half
of all partisans
of all partisans were
were NKVD personnel personnel or or Party
Party officials,
officials, they
they were
were frequently
frequently
regarded
regarded with
with acute
acute suspicion
suspicion by by the
the peasant
peasant population
population on on whom
whomthey
they depended
depended for for
local
local support.
support. TheThe virtual
virtual collapse
collapse of of partisan
partisan warfare
warfare in the western
in the western Ukraine,
Ukraine, for for
example,
example, waswas duedue largely
largely to the hostility
to the hostility of of the inhabitantstotothethe
the inhabitants Party
Party andandthe the
NKVD. Though
Though partisan
partisan warfare
warfare became
became moremore effective
effective after
after Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, there
there were
were
important
important areas-notably
areas-notably Crimea Crimea and and the
the steppes-where
steppes-where it it never
never became
became aa signifi
signifi-
cant
cant factor
factor in
in the
the fighting
fightingononthethe eastern
eastern front.
front.”51
O U TS I D E
E EEUURRO NKVD's
NKVD’s most
O PPEE, , T H E most successful
successful attacks
attacks on German targets
on German targets were
were
mounted by an illegal residency in Argentina,52 headed by
mounted by an illegal residency in Argentina,52 headed by Iosif Romualdovich Iosif Romualdovich
Grigulevich
Grigulevich (codenamed
(codenamed ARTUR),
ARTUR), aa veteran
veteran both
both of of sabotage
sabotage operations
operations in the
in the
Spanish
Spanish Civil
CivilWar
War and
and of
of the
the first attempt totoassassinate
first attempt assassinateTrotsky
Trotsky in in Mexico
Mexico City. 53 In
City.53 In
September
September 19411941 an an official
official Argentinian
Argentinian inquiry
inquiry reached
reached thethe hysterical
hysterical conclusion,
conclusion,
endorsed
endorsed byby the
the Chamber
Chamberof of Deputies
Deputies but butrejected
rejected by
by the
the government,
government, thatthat thetheGer
Ger-
man
man ambassador
ambassador was was the
the head
head ofof over
over half
half aa million
million Nazi
Nazi stormtroopers
stormtroopers operating
operating
under
under cover
cover in
in Latin America.54 During
Latin Ameri~a.’~ During the
the months
months after
after Pearl
Pearl Harbor,
Harbor, Argentina
Argentina
and
and Chile
Chile were
were thethe only
only Latin
Latin American
American states
states not
not toto break
break off
off diplomatic
relations
with
with Germany
Germany and and Japan.
Japan. The
The rumors
rumors of of Nazi
Nazi plots
plots among
among Argentina's
Argentina’s quarter
quarter ofof aa
million
million German
German speakers,
speakers, pro-German
pro-German sympathies
sympathies in in its
its officer corps, and
officer corps, and the
the pres
pres-
ence
ence of
of an
an Argentinian
Argentinian military
military purchasing
purchasing mission
mission in in Berlin
Berlin until 1944, helped
until 1944, helped to to
persuade
persuade the
the Centre
Centre that
that Argentina
Argentina waswas aa major
major Nazi
Nazi base.
base. Though
Though thisthis belief
belief was
was
greatly
greatly exaggerated,
exaggerated, it it was
was shared
shared by by OSS,
OSS, the
the USUS wartime
wartime foreign
intelligence
agency,
agency, which reported that Dr. RamonCastillo, president of Argentina from
which reported that Dr. Ramon Castillo, president of Argentina from 1941
1941
to 1943,was
to 1943, was in
in the
thepay
pay of
ofHitler. 55 Such
Hitler.55 Such reports,
reports, passed
passed on on totothe
theCentre
Centreby
by its
its agents
agents
in
in OSS
OSS and
and the State Department,56
the State De~artment,’~ doubtless
doubtless reinforced
reinforced Moscow's suspicions of
Moscow’s suspicions of
Nazi
Nazi plots
plots in
in Argentina.
Argentina.
Mter
After the
theoutbreak
outbreak of war the
ofwar theGerman
German merchant
merchant navy
navy waswasunable
unable to
to run
run the
the gaunt
gaunt-
let of the Royal Navy and enter Argentinian ports. Grigulevich's residency,
let of the Royal Navy and enter Argentinian ports. Grigulevich‘s residency, however, however,
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
RDD A
AN D
ND TT H
HEE SS H
H II E
E L
L D
D // I1 O0 O0
reported
reported in in 1941
1941 that thatcopper,
copper, saltpetre,
saltpetre, cotton
cotton and aad other
other strategic
strategic rawraw materials
materials were were
being
being exported
exported from from Argentina
Argentina in in neutral vessels to
neutral vessels to Spain,
Spain, whence
whence they they were
were being
being
secretly
secretly transported
transported overland overland through
through FranceFrance to to Germany.
Germany. To To disrupt
disrupt this this export
export
trade,
trade, Grigulevich
Grigulevich recruitedrecruited aa sabotage
sabotage team team of of eight
e,ight Communist
Communist dockyarddockyard workers workers
and
and seamen,
seamen, headedheaded by by aa Polish
Polish immigrant,
immigrant, Feliks Feliks Klementyevich
KlementyevichVerzhbitsky
Verzhbitsky(code (code-
named
named BESSER),
BESSER),who who in in December
December 1941 1941 obtained
obtained aa job jobas
as aa blacksmith
blacksmith in in the
the port
port
of
of Buenos
Buenos Aires.
Aires. The The first
first major
major exploit
exploit ofVerzhbitsky's
of Verzhbitsky's groupgroup waswas to to burn
burndowndown the the
German
German bookshop
bookshop in in Buenos
Buenos Aires,Aires,which
which Grigulevich
Grigulevich regarded
regarded as as the
the main
main center
center of of
Nazi
Nazi propaganda.
propaganda. Thereafter
Thereafter it it concentrated
concentrated on on planting
planting delayed-action
delayed-action incendiary
incendiary
devices
devices onon ships
ships and and in in warehouses
warehouses containing
containing goodsgoods bound
bound forfor Germany.57
Germanys7 Grigule Grigule-
vich
vich also
also ran
ran smaller
smaller sabotage
sabotage and and intelligence
intelligence networks
networks in in Chile
Chile andand Uruguay.
Uruguay The The
approximately
approximatelyseventy seventy agents
agents in in his
his far-fl ung illegal
far-flung illegal residency
residencywere
were to to remain
remain the the basis
basis
of
of Soviet
Soviet intelligence
operations in in Argentina,
Argentina, Uruguay
Uruguay and-to
and-to aa lesser extent
lesser extent-
Chile
Chile during
duringthe theearly
early years
years of ofthe
the Cold
ColdWar Waras as well
well asas the
the Second
Second World
World War.58War.58
Between
Between the the beginning
beginningofof1942 1942 and
and the
the summer
summer of of 1944,
1944, according
according to to statistics
statistics in in
KGB files, over 150
files, over 150 successful
successful incendiary
incendiary attacks
attacks were
were mounted
mounted by Grigulevich's
by Grigulevich's
agents against German
agents against German cargoes, cargoes, and and anan unspecifi
unspecified ed number
number of of Spanish,
Spanish, Portuguese
Portuguese
and
and Swedish
Swedish vesselsvessels sunk.sunk. One,One, probably
probably exaggerated,
exaggerated, assessment
assessment by by the Centre
the Centre
claims
claims that
that the the attacks
attacks succeeded
succeeded early early in 1944ininhalting
in 1944 haltingGerman
German exports exports fromfrom
Buenos Aires.59 A more serious problem for Germany than
Buenos A i r e ~ . ' ~ more serious problem for Germany thanSoviet sabotage, however, Soviet sabotage, however,
was
was the change of
the change of government
government in in Argentina.
Argentina.A military
military coup
coup in in the
thesummer
summer of of 1943,
1943,
followed
followed by by thethe uncovering
uncovering of of aa Nazi
Nazi espionage
espionage network,
network, led led Argentina
Argentina to to sever
sever
diplomatic
relations with with Germany
GermanyininJanuary
January 1944.60
1944.60
For
For most
most of of the
the warwar communications
communications between between Grigulevich's
Grigulevich's residency
residency and and thethe
Centre
Centre were
were slowslowand and spasmodic,
spasmodic, depending
depending on on occasional
occasional couriers
couriers between
between Buenos Buenos
Aires
Aires and
and the theNew NewYorkYork residency.61
residency6' In In the
the summer
summer of of 1944,
1944, shortly
shortly after
after the
the NKGB
had
had established
established aa legal legal residency
residency in in Uruguay,
Uruguay, Grigulevich
Grigulevich was was summoned
summoned totoMonte Monte-
video
video toto give
give aa detailed
detailed reportreport on onhishis intelligence
intelligence operations,
operations, finances
finances and and agent
agent net
net-
works
works since
since the the beginning
beginning of of the Great Patriotic
the Great Patriotic War.
War. TheThe Centre
Centre had had become
become
alarmed
alarmed at at the
thescale
scale of of his
his incendiary
incendiary attacks
attacks on on neutral
neutral shipping
shipping and and feared
feared thatthat his
his
cover
cover might
might be be blown.
blown. In In September
September it it ordered
ordered him him to to suspend
suspend sabotage
sabotage operations
operations
and
and limit
limit himself
himself to to intelligence
collection in in Argentina,
Argentina, Brazil
Brazil andand Chile.62
Chile.6' Once Once
instructed
instructed to to stop
stopwork
work by by Grigulevich,
Grigulevich, Verzhbitsky
Verzhbitsky began began making
making grenades
grenades for for the
the
underground
underground Argentinian
Argentinian Communist Communist Party Partybut butwas
was seriously
seriouslyinjured
injured in in October
Octoberby by
an
an explosion
explosion in in his
his workshop
workshop which which costcost himhim his
his left
left arm
arm and
and the sight in
the sight in one
one eye.
eye.
Grigulevich
Grigulevich reported
reported that that he he behaved
behaved with with great
great bravery
bravery during
during police
police investigation,
investigation,
sticking
sticking toto aa prepared
prepared cover cover story
story that
that aa personal
personal enemy
enemy had had planted
planted explosives
explosives on on
him, hidden in
him, hidden inaa packet
packet of of dried
dried milk.
milk. In In 1945
1945 Verzhbitsky
Verzhbitsky was was smuggled
smuggled out out ofof
prison
prison and
and exfiltrated
exfiltrated by by thethe Argentinian Communist Party
Argentinian Communist Party across
across the the border
border intointo
Uruguay,
Uruguay,wherewhere he he lived
lived on on aaParty
Partypension.63
pension.63
Remarkable
Remarkable though though they they were,
were, the the sabotage
sabotage operations
operations run run from
from Buenos
Buenos Aires Aires
had
had nono perceptible
perceptible infl uence on
influence the course
on the course of of the Great Patriotic
the Great Patriotic War. War. Once Once the the
alarmism
alarmism of the summer
of the summer of of 1944
1944 had had died
died down,
down, however,
however, they they greatly
greatly enhanced
enhanced
Grigulevich's
Grigulevich's reputation
reputation in theCentre
in the Centre as as saboteur
saboteur and and assassin.
assassin. His His successes
successes in in
Wa
W a rr I
/ I
IOOI
I
wartime
wartime Argentina
Argentina help
help to
to explain
explain his
his later
later selection
selection for the most
for the important assassi
most important assassi-
nation
nation mission
mission ofof the
the Cold
Cold War.64
War.64By contrast,
contrast, Grigulevich's
Grigulevich‘s chief saboteur, Verzh-
chief saboteur, Verzh
bitsky, was
wasregarded as an embarrassment because of of his disablement. His request to
emigrate
emigrate toto the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union in in 1946
1946was brusquely turned
was brusquely turned down.
down. In
In 1955,
1955, however,
however,
when Verzhbitsky,
Verzhbitsky, by then completely blind, applied again, his application was
accepted-possibly
accepted-possibly for for fear
fear that he might
that he might otherwise
otherwise reveal his wartime
reveal his wartime role.65
role.65 On
On
arrival in the Soviet Union, Verzhbitsky was awarded an invalidity pension of of 100
100
roubles
roubles aa month,
month,but buthis
his application
application for
for membership
membership of of the Soviet Communist
theSoviet Communist Party
Party
was turned down.66
was turned down.66
D E SP I T
TEE IINDIVIDUAL ACTSS of
N D I V I D UAL ACT of heroism,
heroism, thethe NKVD and and NKGB (as (as its security and
its security and
intelligence
intelligence components
components were were renamed
renamed in in 1943) deserve to
1943) deserve be remembered
to be remembered less less for
for
their
their bravery
bravery during
during the theSecond
Second World
World War Warthan for their
thanfor their brutality.
brutality. After
After the forcible
theforcible
incorporation
incorporation into into the
the Soviet Union of
Soviet Union eastern Poland
of eastern Poland in September 1939,
in September 1939, followed
followed
by
by the
the Baltic states and
Baltic states and Moldavia
Moldavia in in the
thesummer
summer of of 1940, the NKVD quickly
1940, the quickly moved
moved
in
in to liquidate “class
to liquidate "class enemies"
enemies” and
and cow
cow the populations into
the populations into submission.67
s u b m i ~ s i o n On June
. ~ ~June
On
25, 1941, three
25,1941, threedays
days after
after the
the beginning
beginningof Hitler's invasion,
of Hitler’s invasion, thethe NKVD was was ordered
ordered
to
to secure
secure thethe rear
rear ofof the
the Red
Red Army
Army by by arresting deserters and
arresting deserters and enemy
enemy agents,
agents, protect-
protect
ing communications and
ing communications and liquidating isolated pockets
liquidating isolated pockets of of German
German troops.
troops. InIn August
August
1941
1941 Soviet
Soviet parachutists disguised as
parachutists disguised Germans landed
as Germans landed among
among the the villages
villages of of the
the
Volga German Autonomous
Volga German Autonomous Region
Region and asked to
and asked to be hidden until
be hidden until the
the arrival
arrival ofof the
the
Wehrmacht.
Wehrmacht. When When they they were
were given
given shelter, the whole
shelter, the whole village
village was exterminated by
was exterminated by
the
the NKVD. All All other
other Volga
Volga Germans,
Germans, however
however loyal,
loyal, were deported by
weredeported by the
the NKVD
to
to Siberia
Siberia and northern Kazakhstan,
and northern Kazakhstan, with enormous loss
with enormous loss of
oflife.68
life.@
When
When the the Red
Red Army
Army took
tookthetheoffensive
offensive inin 1943,
1943,the theNKVD followed
followed in in its wake
its wake
to mop up resistance
to mop resistance andand subversion.
subversion. Beria
Beria reported proudly to
reported proudly to Stalin
Stalin at at the
the end of
end of
the
the year:
year:
In
In 1943,
1943, the
the troops
troops of
of the
the NKVD, who are responsible
who are responsible for
for security
security in
in the rear
the rear
of
of the
the Active
Active Red
Red Army,
Army, inin the process of
the process of cleaning
cleaning up the territory
up the territory liberated
liberated
from
from the
the enemy,
enemy, arrested
arrested 931 ,549 people
931,549 people for
for investigation.
investigation. Of
Of these,
these, 582,515
582,5 15
were
were servicemen
servicemen and
and 394,034
394,034 were
were civilians.
civilians.
Of
Of those
those arrested,
arrested, 80,296
80,296 were
were "unmasked,"
“unmasked,” in many cases
in many cases wrongly,
wrongly,as spies, traitors,
as spies, traitors,
deserters,
deserters, bandits
bandits and
and "criminal
“criminal elements."
elements.”
Stalin
Stalin used
used the NKVDtoto punish
the NKVD punish and deport entire
and deport entire nations
nations within
within the
the Soviet
Soviet
Union whomhehe accused
Union whom accused of
of treachery: among them
treachery: among themChechens,
Chechens,Ingushi,
Ingushi, Balkars,
Balkars,
Karachai,
Karachai, Crimean
Crimean Tartars,
Tartars, Kalmyks
Kalmyks and Meskhetian Turks.
and Meskhetian In response
Turks. In response to Stalin's
to Stalin’s
instructions
instructions to
to reward
reward "those
“those who
who have carried out
have carried out the
thedeportation order in
deportationorder in an exem
anexem-
plary
plary manner," Beria replied:
manner,” Beria replied:
In
In accordance
accordance with
with your instructions, I submit
your instructions, submit aa draft
draftdecree of the
decree of the Presidium
Presidium
of
of the Supreme Soviet
the Supreme Soviet of
of the
the USSR on on decorations
decorations and
and medals for the
medals for most
the most
outstanding
outstanding participants in the operation involving the deportation of the
participants in the operation involving the deportation of the
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
R D
D A
AN D
ND TT H
HEE SS H
H II E
ELL D
D // I1 00 22
Chechens
Chechens and
and Ingushes.
Ingushes. 19,000
19,000 members
members of of the
the NKVD, NKGB
NKGB and and Smersh
Smersh
took
took part,
part,plus
plus up
up to
to 100,000
100,000officers
officers of
of the
theNKVD forces
forces .. .. ..
As
As on
on this
this occasion,
occasion, many
many of
of the
the NKVD and and NKGB
NKGB personnel
personnel decorated
decorated during
during the
the
war
war received
received their
their medals
medals not for valor
not for valor against
against the
the enemy
enemy but
but for
for crimes
crimes against
against
humanity.69
humanity.69
T H E WA
W ART
R TI M E
E REC
COOR
RDD of
of Soviet
Soviet intelligence
the eastern
eastern front
front waswas patchy.
patchy. Up Up
to
to the
theend
end of
of 1942
1942 the main espionage
themain espionage system
system providing
providing intelligence
intelligence from from Nazi
Nazi GerGer-
many
many and and occupied
occupied Europe
Europe was was aa loosely
loosely coordinated
coordinated GRU illegal illegal network
network linked
linked to to
the
the NKVD Harnack Harnack and and Schulze-Boysen
Schulze-Boysen groups, groups, codenamed
codenamed the the Rote
Rote Kappelle
("Red
(“Red Orchestra")
Orchestra”) by by the
the Abwehr.
Abwehr.The The "musicians"
“musicians”were were the
the radio
radio operators
operators who who sent sent
coded
coded messages
messages to to Moscow;
Moscow; the the "conductor"
“conductor” was was thethe Polish
Polish JewJew Leopold
Leopold Trepper,
Trepper,
alias
alias Jean
Jean Gilbert,
Gilbert,known
known withinwithin thethe network
network as as Ie
le grand chef:The
grand chef The Rote Kappelle had
Rote Kappelle had
117
117 agents:
agents: 48
48 ininGermany,
Germany, 35 35 in
in France,
France, 17 17in in Belgium
Belgium and and 1717 inin Switzerland.7°
Swit~erland.~’The The
network
network was was gradually
gradually wound wound up up during
duringthe thelater
later months
months of of 1942
1942 as as German
German radio radio
direction-finding
direction-finding trackedtracked down down thethe "musicians."
“musicians.”Trepper
Trepper himself
himself waswas captured
captured as as he
he
sat
sat in
in aa dentist's
dentist’s chair
chair in in occupied
occupied Paris
Paris onon December
December 5. 5. According
According to to the
the Abwehr
Abwehr
officer
officer who
who arrested
arrested him,him, "“For
For aa second
second he he was
was disturbed;
disturbed; then then he hesaid
said in in perfect
perfect Ger
Ger-
man,
man, 'You
‘You did
did aa fine
fine job.'
job.’ "” Only
Only Rado's
Rado’s GRU illegal illegal residency
residency in in Switzerland,
Switzerland, known known
as
as the Rote Drei
the Rote Drei after
after itsits three
three main
main radio
radio transmitters,
transmitters, which which was was out out of
of reach
reach of of
German
German intelligence,
intelligence, continued
continued work work for
for another
another year year until
until itit was
was shut
shut down
down by by the
the
SWiSS.71
Swiss.71
Though
Though both both Trepper
Trepper and and Rad0
Rado werewere sentenced
sentenced to ten years'
to ten years’ imprisonment
imprisonment in in
Moscow
Moscow after after the
the war,
war, it it was
was later
later alleged
alleged byby Soviet
Soviet historians
historians thatthat intelligence
intelligence from from
the
the Rote Kappelle had
Rote Kappelle had been
been of of enormous
enormous assistance
assistance to to the
theRed
Red Army.
Army.In In reality,
reality, intel
intel-
ligence
ligence diddid not
not begin
begin to to have
have aa signifi cant influence
significant influence on on Soviet
Soviet military
military operations
operations
until
until after
after Trepper
Trepper was was arrested
arrested andand most
most ofof his
his network
network woundwound up. up. Military
Military intelli
intelli-
gence
gence failed
failed to
to detect
detect thethe sudden
sudden German
German turn turn south
south whichwhich captured
captured Kiev Kiev in in Sep
Sep-
tember
tember 1941,
1941, and and waswas taken
taken aback
aback by by the
the intensity
intensity of of the October assault
theOctober assault on on
Moscow.
Moscow. The The loss
loss ofof Kharkov
Kharkov in in May
May1942 1942 was
was due
due partly
partly toto the
thefact
fact that
that the
theStavka
Stavka
(a wartime
(a wartime combination
combination of of GHQand
G H Q a n d high
high command)
command) was was expecting
expecting another
another attack
attack
on
on thethecapital.
capital.The
The Wehrmacht's
Wehrmacht’s move move south
south ininthe thesummer
summer againagain took
took the theStavka
Stavka by by
surprise.
surprise. Throughout
Throughout the the German
German advance
advance to to Stalingrad
Stalingrad and and thethe Caucasus,
Caucasus, SovietSoviet
forces
forces were
were constantly
constantly confused
confused aboutabout where
where the the next
next blow
blow would
would fall.
fall. When
When the the RedRed
Army
Army encircled
encircled AxisA x i s forces
forces at Stalingradinin November
at Stdingrad November 1942, 1942, it it believed
believed it it had
had
trapped
trapped 85,000
85,000 to to 90,000
90,000 troops;
troops; in in reality
reality itit had
had surrounded
surrounded three three times
times as as many.72
many.72
The
The NKVD's
NKVD’s main main rolerole at
at Stalingrad
Stalingrad waswas lesslessin
in providing
providing good good intelligence
intelligence than than
in
in enforcing
enforcing aa ferocious
ferocious discipline
discipline within the Red
within the Red Army.
Army. About 13,500 Soviet
About 13,500 Soviet solsol-
diers
diers were
were executed
executed for for "defeatism"
“defeatism”and and other
other breaches
breaches of of military
military discipline
discipline in in the
the
course
course of of the
the battle,
battle, usually
usually by by aa squad
squad from
from the the NKVD
NKVDSpecial Special Detachment.
Detachment. Before Before
execution,
execution, mostmost werewere ordered
ordered to strip so
to strip so that their uniform
that their uniform and and boots
boots could
could be be
reused.
reused. The
The NKVD postal postal censorship
censorship seized
seized on on any
any unorthodox
unorthodox or or politically
politically incor
incor-
rect
rect comment
comment in in soldiers'
soldiers’ letters
letters to their families
to their families as as evidence
evidence of of treachery.
treachery. A lieu- lieu-
Wa
W ar I/ I1 O0 J3
tenant
tenant whowho wrote
wrote "German
“German aircraftaircraft areare very good .. .. .. Our
very good Our anti-aircraft people shoot
anti-aircraft people shoot
down
down only only very
very fewfew of of them"
them” was, inevitably, condemned
was, inevitably, condemned as as aa traitor.
traitor. InIn the the 62nd
62nd
Army alone, in the the first half half of October 1942, 1942, thethe NKVD claimed that "military “military
secrets were
secrets were divulged
divulged in in 12,747
12,747 letters."73
letters.”73The great victory
The great victory at at Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, sealed sealed by by
the surrender of
the surrender of the
the German
German Field Marshal Friedrich
Field Marshal Friedrich Paulus,
Paulus, twenty-tw
twenty-twoo generalsgenerals
and
and 91,000
91,000 troops
troops early
early in in 1943,
1943, waswas achieved
achieved in spite of,
in spite of, rather than because
rather than because of, of, the
the
contribution
contribution of of the
the NKVD.
Stalingrad
Stalingrad was was followed
followedby by aa major
major improvement
improvement in in the
thequality
quality of of Soviet
Soviet military
military
intelligence
the eastern
eastern front,
front, made
made possible
possible in in part
part by
by massive supplies of
massive supplies of radio
radio
equipment from
equipment from the Americans and
the Americans and thethe British.74
British.74At the the endend ofof 1942
1942 the the Stavka
Stavka
established special-purpose
established special-purpose radio radio battalions,
battalions, each equipped with
each equipped with eighteen
eighteen to to twenty
twenty
radio-intercept receivers and
radio-intercept receivers and four
four direction-finding
direction-finding sets. sets. The
The result, according to
result, according to aa
Soviet historian given
Soviet historian given access
access to to the
the battalions' records, was
battalions’ records, was "a “aqualitative
qualitative jumpjump in in the
the
development
development of of radio-electronic
radio-electronic combat combat in in the Soviet army."
the Soviet Though Soviet
army.” Though Soviet crypt-crypt
analysts
analysts lacked
lacked the the state-of-the-art
state-of-the-art technologytechnology which enabled Bletchley
which enabled Bletchley Park Park to to
decrypt high-grade
decrypt high-grade Enigma Enigma and and Geheimschreiber
Geheimschreiber messages, messages, they they mademade major major
advances
advances during
during 1943-reluctantly
1943-reluctantly assisted assisted by German cipher
by German cipher personnel captured at
personnel captured at
Stalingrad-in direction-finding, traffic
Stalingrad-in direction-finding, traffic analysis
analysis andand the
the breaking
breaking of of lower-grade
lower-grade
hand ciphers. In
hand ciphers. In 1942-3
1942-3 they they also
also had
had the benefit ofLuftwa±Ie
the benefit of Luftwaffe EnigmaEnigma decrypts
decrypts supsup
plied
plied by by an
an agent inside Bletchley
agent inside Bletchley Park. Park.
All
All these
these improvements
improvements were were evident
evident duringduring the thebattle
battle of of Kursk
Kursk in in the summer of
the summer of
1943
1943 when
when thethe Red
Red Army Army defeated
defeated the the last
last great
great German
German offensive
offensive on on the eastern
the eastern
front.
front. Intelligence
Intelligence reports
reports captured
captured by the the Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht from from thethe RedRed Army
Army during during
the
the battle
battle revealed
revealed that that Soviet SIGINT had
Soviet SIGINT located the
had located the positions
positions and and headquarters
headquarters
of
of the
the 6th,
6th, 7th
7th and
and 111th 1th Panzer
Panzer Divisions,
Divisions, II I1 and
and XIII Panzer Corps,
XI11 Panzer Corps, and and Second
Second
Army
Army HQ H Q Aerial
Aerial reconnaissance
reconnaissance before before and and during
during Kursk
Kursk was wasalsoalsoon
on aalarger
larger scale
scale
and
and more successful than
more successhl than ever
ever before.
before.75 75
Victory
Victory at at Kursk opened the
Kursk opened the wayway to to anan almost continuous advance
almost continuous advance by by thethe RedRed
Army
Army on onthetheeastern
eastern frontfront which
which was was to to end
end with
with Marshal
IMarshal Zhukov accepting the
Zhukov accepting the sur
sur-
render
render of of Berlin
Berlin in May 1945.
in May 1945. WithWith aa four-to-one
four-to-one superiority
superiority in in men
men over over thethe
Wehrmacht,
Wehrmacht, large large amounts
amounts of of military equipment from
military equipment from itsits Western
Western alliesallies and
and grow
grow-
ing
ing dominance
dominance in in the
the air,
air, the
the Red
Red Army, though suffering
Army, though enormous losses,
suffering enormous losses, proved
proved
unstoppable.
unstoppable. In In the course of
the course of its advance, the
its advance, the Red Army sometimes
Red Army captured lists
sometimes captured lists of
of
the
the daily
daily settings
settings forfor periods
periods of of up
up toto aamonthmonth of the Wehrmacht’s
of the Wehrmacht's Enigma Enigma machines,
machines,
as
as well
well as as some
some of of the
the machines
machines and and their
their operators.
operators. During
During the final stages
the final stages of of the
the
war
war these
these captures
captures sometimes
sometimes enabled enabled SovietSoviet cryptanalysts
cryptanalysts to to decrypt spasmodically
decrypt spasmodically
aa still
still unknown
unknown numbernumber of of Enigma
Enigma messages.76
messages.76
Despite
Despite the the improvements
improvements after after Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, however,
however, the the quality
quality ofof Soviet intelli
Soviet intelli-
gence
gence on the eastern
on the eastern front-in
front-in particular
particular the SIGINT-never compared
the SIGINT-never compared with with thethe
intelligence
intelligence on on Germany
Germany availableavailable to to their
their Western
Western allies.
allies. The intelligence
The ULTRA intelligence
provided
provided to to British
British and and American
American commanders
commanders was, quite simply,
was, quite simply, thethe best
best in in the his
thehis-
tory
tory ofof warfare.
warfare. TheThe Soviet
Soviet Union's
Union’s most most striking
striking intelligence successes during
intelligence successes during the the
Great Patriotic
Great Patriotic War,
War, by contrast,
contrast, were achieved not
were achieved against its
not against its enemies
enemies but against its
but against its
allies
allies in
in the
the wartime
wartime Grand Grand Alliance:
Alliance: Britain
Britain and and the
the United
United States.
States.
S E V E n
T
T H EE G
GRRA
ANN D A LL LL II A CE
ANC E
FForor most
most of
of the
the inter-war
inter-war years
years the United States
the United States had
had ranked
ranked some
some way
way behind
behind
Britain
Britain as
as aa target
target for
for INO
I N 0 operations.
operations. Even
Even in in the
the mid-1930s
mid-1930s the
the main
main Soviet
Soviet espi
espi-
onage
onage networks
networks in in the
the United
United States
States were
were runrun by
by the
the Fourth
Fourth Department
Department (Military
(Military
Intelligence,
Intelligence, later
later renamed
renamed the the GRU)
GRU) rather
rather than
than byby the
the NKVD. Fourth Depart
Fourth Depart-
ment
ment agents
agents included
included aa series
series of
of young,
young, idealistic
idealistic high-flyers
high-flyers within
within the
the federal
federal gov
gov-
ernment,
ernment, among
among them:them:Alger
Alger Hiss
Hiss and Julian Wadleigh,
and Julian both of
Wadleigh, both of whom
whomentered the
entered the
State Department
State Department in in 11936;
936; Harry
HarryDexter White of
DexterWhite of the
the Treasury
Treasury Department;
Department; and
and
George
George Silverman,
Silverman, aa government
government statistician
statistician who
who probably
probably recruited
recruited White.1
White.’ Like
Like
the
the Cambridge
Cambridge Five,Five, the
the Washington
Washington moles
moles sawsawthemselves
themselves as
as secret
secret warriors
warriors in
in the
the
struggle against fascism. Wadleigh wrote later:
struggle against fascism. Wadleigh wrote later:
When
When the Communist International
the Communist International represented
represented the
the only
only world
world force
force effec
effec-
tively
tively resisting
resisting Nazi
Nazi Germany,
Germany, I had
had offered
offered my
my services
services to
to the
the Soviet
Soviet under
under-
ground
ground ininWashington
Washingtonas
as one
one small
small contribution
contribution to
tohelp
help stem
stem the fascist tide.2
the fascist tide.2
The
The main
main NKVD operations
theUnited
UnitedStates
States during
during the
themid-1930s
mid-1930s were
were run
run
by
by an
an illegal
illegal residency
residency established
established in 1934 under
in 1934 under the
the former
former Berlin
Berlin resident,
resident, Boris
Boris
Bazarov
Bazarov (codenamed
(codenamed NORD), with Iskhak Abdulovich
withIskhak Abdulovich Akhmerov
Akhmerov (YUNG), aa
Soviet
SovietTartar,
Tartar, as
as his
his deputy.3
d e p ~ t yBazarov
Bazarov
.~ was remembered with
wasremembered with affection
affection by Hede Mass
by Hede Mass-
ing,
ing, an
an Austrian
Austrian agent
agent in
in his
his residency,
residency, as
as the
the warmest
warmest personality
personality she
she had
had encoun
encoun-
tered
tered in
in the
the NKVD.
NKVD.On O n the
the anniversary
anniversary ofof the
the October
October Revolution
Revolution in
in 1935
1935 he
hesent
sent
her fifty long-stemmed
long-stemmed red roses roseswith aa note which read:
Our lives are

are unnatural, but we must endure itit for [the sake of] humanity.
Though we cannot always
always express
expressit, our
ourlittle
littlegroup is bound by love
group love and con
con-
sideration for one another. I think of
ofyou with great warmth.
Though Akhmerov, by contrast, struck Massing

Massingas a "Muscovite
“Muscovite automaton,"
automaton,’’he was
less robotic than he appeared.4
a ~ p e a r e dUnknown
.~ to Massing, Akhmerov was engaged in a
passionate love affair with his assistant, Helen Lowry, the cousin of the American
Communist Party
Party leader, Earl Browder, and-unusually-gained
and-unusually-gained permission from
the Centre
Centre to marry her.5
her.’
T
T h eG rGa rnadAn ldl iAa lnlci ea n c e / I0
1 OS
5
Bazarov's
Bazarov’s andand Akhmerov's
Akhmerov’s recruits included three
recruits included three agents
agents in
in the
theState
StateDepartment:
Department:
ERIKH,
EFUKH, KIY and "19."6 “19.”6Probably the most important, as well as the only one of of the
three who
who can be clearly
clearly identified, was agent “19,” " 19," Laurence Duggan, who who later
became
became chief
chief of
of the
the Latin
Latin American
American Division.7
Di~ision.~ To Hede
To HedeMassing, Duggan seemed
Massing, Duggan seemed
"an
“an extremely
extremely tense, high-strung,
high-strung, intellectual young man." man.” His recruitment took
some
some time,
time, not
not least
least because
because Alger
Alger Hiss
Hiss was
was simultaneously
simultaneously attempting
attempting to to recruit
recruit
him
him for
for the
the Fourth Department. In
Fourth Department. In April 1936 Bazarov
April 1936 complained to
Bazarov complained to the Centre
the Centre
that the
the"persistent
“persistent Hiss"
Hiss” showed no sign of abandoning the attempt.* attempt.8 A year later, in
the
the midst
midstof of the Moscow show
the Moscow trials, Duggan
show trials, Duggan told Akhmerov that
told Akhmerov that hehewas afraid that,
was afraid that,
ifhe
if he "collaborated"
“collaborated”with Soviet Soviet intelligence,
intelligence, he mightmightbe exposed
exposedbybya Trotskyite trai trai-
tor. By the beginning of 1938, 1938, however,
however, Duggan was was supplying
supplying Akhmerov
Akhmerov with with State
State
Department
Department documents
documents whichwhich were
were photographed
photographed in in the
the illegal residency and
illegal residency and then
then
returned. In March Duggan Duggan reported that his close friend Sumner Welles, underunder
secretary
secretary atat the
the State
StateDepartment
Departmentfrom from 1938
1938 to 1945, had
to 1945, told him
had told him he was becom-
he was becom
ingtoo
too attracted to Marxism and had given him a a friendly warning about his
left-wing acquaintances.9
acquaintances.’ Duggan's
Duggan’sfuture in the theState
StateDepartment,
Department, however, seemed
however,
as
as bright
bright asas that
that of
of Donald
Donald Maclean
Maclean in in the
the Foreign
Foreign Office.
Office.
The Centre also saw saw a bright
bright future for Michael Straight Straight (codenamed NOMAD
and
and NIGEL),
NIGEL), the the wealthy
wealthy young
young American recruited shortly
American recruited before his
shortly before his graduation
graduation
from Cambridge University in 1937.10 1937.lo Its optimism
optimism sprang
sprang far
far more from
from Straight’s
Straight's
family
family connections
connections thanthan from
from any evidence of
any evidence of his
his enthusiasm
enthusiasm for for aa career
career asas aa secret
secret
agent. Straight's job hunt after his return to the United States began at the top-over
agent. Straight’s job hunt after his return to the United States began at the top-over
tea at the
theWhite House
House withwithFranklin and Eleanor Eleanor Roosevelt.
Roosevelt. With
With some
some assistance
assistance
from Mrs. Roosevelt, he obtained a temporary, unpaid assignment assignment in in the
theState
State
Department
Department early early in in 1938.
1938. SoonSoon afterwards,
afterwards, he he received
received aaphonephone callcall from
from
Akhmerov,
Akhmerov, who who passed
passed on on "greetings
“greetings fromfrom your
your friends at Cambridge
friends at Cambridge University"
University”
and
and invited
invited him
him to todinner
dinneratata a local
local restaurant. Akhmerov introduced
restaurant. Akhmerov introduced himself
himself as as
"Michael Green," then
“Michael Green,” thenordered a large meal. Straight watched as he ate:
He
He was
was dark
dark and
and stocky,
stocky, with
with broad
broad lips and aa ready
lips and smile. His
ready smile. His English
English was
was
good;
good; his
his manner
manner was affable and
was affable and easy. Hee seemed
easy. H seemed toto be
be enjoying
enjoying his
his life
life in
in
America.
America.
Ahkmerov
Ahkmerov seemed
seemed toto accept
accept that
that ititwould
would be some time
be some time before
before Straight
Straight had access to
hadaccess to
important
important documents,
documents, butbut was
was evidently
evidently prepared
prepared to to wait. Before paying
wait. Before the bill,
paying the bill, he
he
delivered
delivered aa brieflecture
brief lecture on
on international
international relations.
relations. Straight was “too
Straight was "too stunned to think
stunnedto think
clearly."
clearly.”Though
Though Straight
Straight claims
claims that
that he
he was
was "unwilling
“unwilling to to become
become aa Soviet
Soviet agent
agent in
in
the Departmentof
the Department of State,"
State,” he
he plainly
plainly did not say
did not say soso to
to Akhmerov.
Akhmerov. The The two men
two men
"parted
“parted asas friends"
friends” and
and Straight
Straight agreed
agreed to
to continue
continue their meetings.ll
their meetings.”
With
With the the approach
approach ofof war
war in Europe, the
in Europe, Centre's interest
the Centre’s in the
interest in the United States
United States
steadily
steadily increased.
increased. InIn 193
19388 the
the NKVD
NKVD used used the defection of
the defection of the
the main
main Fourth
Fourth
Department
Department courier,
courier, Whittaker Chambers, as
Whittaker Chambers, as aa pretext
pretext for
for taking
taking over
over most
most of
of the
the
military
military intelligence agent network,
intelligence agent network, with the notable
with the notable exception
exception of of Alger
Alger Hiss.12
Hiss.12 In
In
the United States,
the United States, as
as elsewhere,
elsewhere, however,
however, thethe expansion
expansion of of NKVD
NKVD operations
operations was
was
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
R D
D A
AN D
ND TT H
HEE SS H
H II E
E L
L D
D // I1 o0 66
disrupted
disrupted byby the hunt for
the hunt for imaginary
imaginary "enemies
the people."
people.” Ivan
Ivan Andreyevich
Andreyevich
Morozov
Morozov (codenamed
(codenamed YUZ and and KIR),
KIR), who
who waswas stationed
stationed inin the
theNew
New York
York legal
legal res
res-
idency
idency in
in 1938-9,
1938-9, sought
sought to
to prove
prove his
his zeal
zeal toto the
theCentre
Centrebyby denouncing
denouncing the the Resident,
Resident,
Pyotr
Pyotr Davidovich
Davidovich Gutzeit
Gutzeit (codenamed
(codenamed NIKOLAI),
NIKOLAI), and and most
most ofof his
his colleagues
colleagues asas
secret
secretTrotskyists. 13 In 1938
Trotsky~sts.~~ In both
1938 bothGutzeit
Gutzeitand
and Bazarov,
Bazarov, the
the legal
legal and
and illegal
illegal residents,
residents,
were
were recalled
recalled and
and shot.14
shot.14Morozov's
Morozov’s denunciation
denunciation of of the
the next
next legal
legal resident,
resident, Gayk
Gayk
Badalovich
Badalovich Ovakimyan
Ovakimyan (codenamed
(codenamed GENNADI),
GENNADI),was was less
lesssuccessful
successfuland
and may
may have
have
prompted
prompted Morozov's
Morozov’s own
own recall
recall in
in 1939 ,t S
1939.l’
Bazarov
Bazarov was wassucceeded
succeeded as as illegal
illegal resident
resident by by hishis former
former deputy,
deputy, Iskhak
Iskhak Akhmerov,
Akhmerov,
who
who henceforth
henceforth controlled
controlled most most political
operations in the
inthe United
United
States.16
States.16Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin noted noted thethe codenames
codenames of of eight
eight rather
ratherdiverse
diverse individuals
individuals in in whom
whom
the
the Centre
Centre seemed
seemed to to place
place particularly
particularly high
high hopes
hopes on on the
the eve
eve ofof the
the Second
Second World
World
War:17 Laurence
War:17 Laurence DugganDuggan (agent (agent "19,"
“19,” later
later FRANK)
F M N K ) in theState
in the StateDepartment;”
Department;18
Michael Straight (NIGEL),
Michael Straight (NIGEL), also also in theState
in the State Department; Martha
Department; Martha Dodd Dodd SternStern
(LIZA),
(LIZA), daughter
daughterof of the
the former
former US ambassador
ambassador to to Germany,
Germany, William
William E. Dodd, and
E. Dodd, and
wife
wife of
of the
the millionaire
millionaire Alfred
Alfred Kaufman
Kaufman SternStern (also
(also aa Soviet
Soviet agent);
agent); Martha's
Martha’s brother,
brother,
William
William E. E. Doss,
DOSS, Jr.
Jr. (PRESIDENT),
(PRESIDENT), who who had had run rununsuccessfully
unsuccessfully for for Congress
Congress as as aa
Democrat and
Democrat and still
still had
had political
political ambitions;
ambitions; Harry Harry Dexter
Dexter White
White in the Treasury
in the Treasury
Department (KASSIR,
Department (KASSIR,later later JURIST);
JURIST); an anagent
agent codenamed
codenamed MORIS MORIS (probably
(probablyJohnJohn
Abt)
Abt) ininthe Justice
Justice Department";19
the Department”;” Boris Boris Morros
Morros (FROST),
(FROST), the the Hollywood
Hollywood producer
producer
of
of Laurel
Laurel and Hardy’s Flying Deuces and
and Hardy's and other
other box-office
box-office hits;20
hits;2oMary
Mary WolfWolf Price
Price
(code named KID and
(codenamed and DIR),
DIR), an an undeclared
undeclared Communist
Communist who who was was secretary
secretary to the
to the
well-known
well-known columnist
columnist Walter Lippmann;
WalterLippmann; andand Henry Buchman (KHOSYAIN,
Henry Buchman (KHOSYMN,
"Employer"),
“Employer”), owner owner of of aa women's
women’s fashion
fashion salon
salon in in Baltimore.21
Baltimore.21
In
In August
August 1939,1939, however,
however, political
operations in in thetheUnited
UnitedStates,
States, asas
in Britain,
in Britain, werewere partially
partially disrupted
disrupted by by the
the signing
signing of of the
the Nazi-Soviet
Nazi-Soviet Pact. Pact. Laurence
Laurence
Duggan
Duggan broke broke off off contact
contact withwith Akhmerov
Akhmerov in in protest.22
protest.22 Others
Others who whohad had serious
serious
doubts
doubts included
included Michael Straight. At aa meeting
Michael Straight. meeting in October in
in October in aa restaurant
restaurant below
below
Washington's
Washington’s Union Station, Akhmerov
UnionStation, Akhmerov tried tried to to reassure him. “Great
reassure him. "Great days
daysare are
approaching!" he declared. With the beginning of the Second
approaching!” he declared. With the beginning of the Second World War, revolution World War, revolution
would
would spread
spread likelike wildfire
wildfire across
across Germany
Germany and and France.23
France.23Straight
Straight was was unimpressed
unimpressed
and
and failed
failed to attend the
to attend the next
next meeting.24
meeting2‘ Duggan
Duggan and and Straight
Straight are are unlikely
unlikely toto have
have
been
been the
the only
only agents
agents to to break
break contact,
contact, atat least
least temporarily,
temporarily,with with the the NKVD.
Further
Further disruption
disruption to to NKVD operations
operations in in the theUnited
United States
States followed
followed Akhmerov's
Akhmerov’s
recall,
recall, soon
soon after
after his
his last
last meeting
meeting withwith Straight,
Straight,totoMoscowMoscow wherewhere he he was
was accused
accused by by
Beria
Beria ofof treasonable
treasonable dealings
dealings withwith enemies
enemies of of the
the people.25
people.25Though,
Though, for unknown rea
for unknown rea-
sons,
sons, the
the charges were dropped,
charges were dropped, Akhmerov
Akhmerov was placed in
was placed the NKVD reserve
in the reserve andand
remained
remained under under suspicion
suspicion for for the
the next
next two
two years
years while
while his
his record
record was was thoroughly
thoroughly
checked.
checked. For For the
the fi rst time,
first time, the
the center
center ofof NKVD operationsoperations in in the
the United
UnitedStates
States was
was
moved,
moved, afterafter Akhmerov's
Akhmerov’s recall, recall,toto the
the legal
legal residency
residency headed
headed by by Gayk
Gayk Ovakimyan,
Ovakimyan,
later
later known
known to to the
the FBI as as the
the "wily
“wily Armenian."
Armenian.” OvakimyanOvakimyan found found himself
himself terribly
terribly
overworked,
overworked, all all the
the more
more so so since
since he
he was also expected
was also expected to to take
take anan active
active part
part inin the
the
complex
complex preparations
preparations for for Trotsky's
Trotsky‘sassassination
assassinationin in Mexico
Mexico City.
City. He He would
would sometimes
sometimes
return
return home
home exhausted
exhausted after after meeting
meeting as as many
many as as ten
ten agents
agents inin aasingle
single day.26
day.26
T
T h e G 1," -annndd A
A Zl Zl ii an n c e /
/ I1 0 7
Ovakimyan's
Ovakimyan’s main main successes
successes werewere in in scientific
scientific and and technological
technological (S&T), (S&T), rather
rather
than
than political,
political, intelligence.
intelligence. He He was
was unusual
unusual amongamong INO I N 0 officers
officers in in holding
holding aa science
science
doctorate
doctorate fromfrom the the MVTU (Moscow (Moscow Higher Higher Technical
Technical School)
School) and, and, since
since 1933,
1933,had had
operated
operated under
under cover
cover as as an
an engineer
engineer at at Amtorg
Amtorg(American-Soviet
(American-Soviet Trading Trading Corpora
Corpora-
tion)
tion) inin New
NewYork.York. In In 1940
1940 he heenrolled
enrolled as as aa graduate
graduate student
student at at aaNewNewYork
York chemi
chemi-
cal
cal institute
institute to to assist
assist himhim in in identifying
identifying potential
potential agents.27
agents.27Ovakimyan
Ovakimyan was was the
the first
first
to
to demonstrate
demonstrate the theenormous
enormous potential
potential for for S&T
S&T in in the
the United
United States.
States. In In 1939
1939 alone
alone
NKVD operations
operations in the United
in the United States
States obtained
obtained 118,0008,000 pages
pages of of technical
technical docu
docu-
ments,
ments, 487487 sets
sets ofof designs
designs and and 5454 samples
samples of of new
new technology.28
technology.28
Ovakimyan
Ovakimyan was was probably
probably also also the
the first
first to
to suggest
suggest using
using an an INOI N 0 officer,
officer, under
under
cover
cover asas an
an exchange
exchange student,
student, to to penetrate
penetrate the the Massachusetts
Massachusetts InstituteInstitute of of Techno
Technol- 1-
ogy.
ogy. The
The first
first such
such "student,"
“student,” Semyon
Semyon Markovich
Markovich SemyonovSemyonov (code named TVEN),
(codenamed
entered
entered MIT in in 1938.
1938.The The scientific
scientific contacts
contacts whichwhich he he made
made overover thethe next
next two
two years,
years,
before
before changing
changing his his cover
cover in in 1940
1940 to to that
that of
of anan Amtorg
Amtorg engineer,
engineer, helped
helped to to lay
lay the
the
basis
basis for
for the
the remarkable
remarkable wartime
wartime expansion
expansion of of S&T
S&T collection
collection in in the
the United
United States.
States.
One
One of of his
his colleagues
colleagues in in the New York
the New York residency
residency was was struck
struck by Semyonov's "large
by Semyonov’s “large
eyes
eyes which,
which, whilewhile he he was
was talking
talking to to somebody,
somebody, [revolved]
[revolved]like like parabolic
parabolic antennae."29
antennae.”29
By April
April 1941
1941 the the total
totalNKVD agent agent network
network in in the
the United
United States
States numbered
numbered 221, 221,
of
of whom
whom forty-nine
forty-nine were were listed
listed inin NKVD statistics
statistics as as "engineers"
“engineers”(probably
(probably aa cate
cate-
gory
gory which
which included
included aa rather
rather broad
broad rangerange of of scientists).3o
scientist^).^' In In the
the same
same month
month the the
Centre
Centre forfor the
the first
first time
time established
established separate
separate departments
departments in in its
its major residencies to
major residencies to
specialize
specialize in in scientific
scientific andand technological
operations (later(later known
known as as Line
Line
X),
X), aa certain
certain signsign ofof their
their increasing
increasing priority.3
pri~rity.~’ 1
According
According to to anan SVR official history, the
official history, the sheer
sheer number
number of of agents
agents withwith whom
whom
Ovakimyan
Ovakimyan was was inin contact
contact "blunted
“blunted his his vigilance."
vigilance.”In In May
May 1941 1941hehe was
was caught
caught by by the
the
FBI in the act
in the ofreceiving
act of receiving documents
documents from from agent
agent OCTANE,
OCTANE, briefly briefly imprisoned,
imprisoned,
freed
freed onon bail
bail and
and allowed
allowed to to leave
leave thethe country
country in in JulyY
July.32ButBut forfor the
the remarkably
remarkably lax lax
security
security of of the
the Roosevelt
Roosevelt administration,
administration, the the damage
damage to to NKVD operationsoperations mightmight
have
have been
beenveryverymuch
much worse
worse thanthan thethearrest
arrest ofof Ovakimyan.
Ovakimyan. On O n September
September 2, 1939, the
2,1939, the
day
day after
after the
the outbreak
outbreak of of war
warinin Europe,
Europe, Whittaker Chambers had
Whittaker Chambers had told
told much
much of of what
what
he
he knew
knew about
about Soviet
Soviet espionage
espionagein in the
theUnited
UnitedStates
States toto Adolf Berle, Assistant
Adolf Berle, Assistant Secre
Secre-
tary
tary of
of State
State andand President
President Roosevelt's
Roosevelt’s adviseradviseron on internal
internal security.
security. Immediately
Immediately after after-
wards,
wards, Berle
Berle drewdrew upup aa memorandum
memorandum for for the
the President
President which
which listed
listed Alger
Alger Hiss,
Hiss, Harry
Harry
Dexter
Dexter White
White and and thethe other
other leading
leading Soviet
Soviet agents
agents forfor whom
whom Chambers
Chambers had had acted
acted as as
courier.
courier. One
One of of those
those on on thethelist
list was
was aa leading
leading presidential
presidential aide,aide, Lauchlin
Lauchlin Currie
Currie (mis
(mis-
transcribed
transcribed by by Berle
Berle as as Lockwood
Lockwood Curry). Curry). Roosevelt,
Roosevelt, however,
however,was was not
not interested.
interested. HeHe
seems
seems to to have
have dismissed
dismissedthe the whole
whole ideaidea of of espionage
espionage rings rings within
within his his administration
administration
as
as absurd.
absurd. Equally
Equally remarkable,
remarkable, Berle Berle simply
simply pigeon-holed
pigeon-holed his his own
own report.
report. HeH e did
did not
not
even
even send
send aa copy
copy toto the
the FBI untiluntil the
the Bureau
Bureau requested
requested it it in
in 1943.33
1943.33
II M M
MEED
DIIA
ATT EELLY
Y AFT TE
ERR T
THE Japanese attack
E Japanese attack on
on Pearl
Pearl Harbor
Harbor and
and Hitler's
Hitler’s declara
declara-
tion
tion of
of war
war onon the
the United
United States
States in December 1941,
in December 1941, Vassili
Vassili Zarubin
Zarubin (alias
(alias Zubilin,
Zubilin,
codenamed
codenamed MAKSIM)
MAKSIM) was was appointed
appointed legal
legal resident
resident in
in New
New York.
York. Already
Already deeply
deeply
suspicious
suspicious ofof British commitment to
British commitment to the
the defeat
defeat of
of Nazi
Nazi Germany,
Germany, Stalin
Stalin also
also had
had
T
THHE
E S
SW OR
WO RD
D A N D T
THHE
E S
SHH II E
E LL D
D / Ir o 8
doubts
doubts about
about American
American resolve.
resolve. He H e summoned
summoned Zarubin Zarubin before
before hishis departure
departure and and
told
told him
him thatthathis
his main
main assignment
assignment in in the
theUnited
UnitedStates
States was
was toto watch
watch outout for
for attempts
attempts
by
by Roosevelt
Roosevelt and and "US
“US ruling
ruling circles"
circles” to to negotiate
negotiate with Hitler and
with Hitler and sign
sign aa separate
separate
peace.
peace. As resident in
As resident New York,
in New based in
York, based the Soviet
in the consulate, Zarubin
Soviet consulate, Zarubin was also
was also
responsible for
responsible subresidencies in
for subresidencies in Washington,
Washington, San San Francisco,
Francisco, and and Latin
Latin America.34
America.34
Though fragmentary,
fragmentary, the evidence suggests suggests that Stalin continued to take a direct per per-
sonal
sonal interest
interest inin overseeing
overseeing intelligence
operations against
against hishis allies.
allies.
A brief
brief official
official SVR biography
biography portrays
portrays Zarubin's
Zarubin’s wartime
wartime record
record in New York
in New York
(and later
(and later inin Washington)
Washington) as as one
one of of unblemished
unblemished brilliance.35
brillian~e.~’ In reality,
reality,
In his
his abrasive
abrasive
personality
personality and and foul-mouthed
foul-mouthed behavior caused immediate
behavior caused immediate uproar.uproar. Zarubin's
Zarubin’s prefer
prefer-
ence for
ence for the operations offi
the operations cers whom
officers whom he he brought
brought withwith himhim (among
(among themthem hishis wife,
wife,
Yelizaveta
Yelizaveta Yulyevna
YulyevnaZarubina)36
Z a r ~ b i n aandand his unconcealed
) ~ ~his unconcealed contempt
contempt for for existing
existing residency
residency
staff
staff led
led toto open
open rebellion.
rebellion. TwoTwo of of the
the operations
operations offi cers whom
officers whom he he insulted,
insulted, Vasili
Vasili
Dmitryevich Mironov and Vas VasiliiIi Georgyevich Dorogov, went totothethe remarkable remarkable
lengths
lengths of reporting "his
of reporting “his crudeness, general lack
crudeness, general lack ofof manners,
manners, use use of
of street
street language
language
and
and obscenities,
obscenities, carelessness
carelessness in in his
his work,
work, and repugnant secretiveness"
and repugnant secretiveness”to to the
the Centre,
Centre,
and
and asking
asking for for his
his recall
recall along
along withwith his
his almost
almost equally
equally unpopular
unpopular wife.wife. Feuding
Feuding
within
within the the residency
residency continued
continued throughout
throughout the the Second
Second World
World War.37
War.37
Zarubin's
Zarubin’s recruitment
recruitment strategy
strategy was was simple
simple and and straightforward.
straightforward. He H e demanded
demanded
that
that thetheleaders
leaders ofof the
the Communist
CommunistParty Partyof
of the
the United
UnitedStates
States (CPUSA)
(CPUSA) identifY
identify sup
sup-
porters
porters andand sympathizers
sympathizers in in government
government establishments
establishments suitable
suitable for
for work
work as as agents.38
agents.3s
When
When Zarubin
Zarubin arrived
arrived in
in New
New York,
York, thethe CPUSA leader leader EarlEarl Browder
Browder (codenamed
(codenamed
RULEVOY -"Helmsman") was
RULEVOY-“Helmsman”) was serving
serving aa prison
prison sentence
sentence for for using
using aa false
false passport
passport
during
during his his frequent
frequent secret
secret journeys
journeys to to the
the Soviet
Soviet Union.
Union. His His first
first contact
contact was
was there
there-
fore
fore with
with Eugene
EugeneDennis
Dennis(born
(born Francis
Francis X. Waldron,
Waldron, code named RYAN),
codenamed RYAN), aa Moscow
Moscow-
trained Comintern
trained Comintern agent agent who
who later
later succeeded
succeeded Browder
Browder as CPUSA general
as CPUSA general secretary.
secretary.
Dennis
Dennis reported
reported that
that aa number
numberof of Communists
Communists (mostly (mostly secret Party members)
secret Party members) were were
joining the the first professional
professional American foreign intelligence agency, agency, the OffiOfficece of the
Coordinator
Coordinator of of Information,
Information, reorganized
reorganized in in June
June 1942
1942 asas the
the Office
Office of Strategic Ser
of Strategic Ser-
vices
vices (OSS).
( O S ) .Shortly
Shortly before
before the foundation of
the foundation of OSS,
OSS, Browder
Browder left left prison
prison to to resume
resume
the
the Party
Party leadership.
leadership. He H e was, Dennis told
was, Dennis told Moscow,
Moscow, "in “in aasplendid
splendid mood."39
mood.7739
Among
Among the thefirst
first Soviet
Soviet agents
agents to to penetrate
penetrate OSS was was Duncan
Duncan Chaplin
Chaplin Lee Lee(code
(code-
named KOCH), who became personal assistant to its head, General "Wild Bill"
named KOCH), who became personal assistant to its head, General “Wild Bill”
Donovan. Donovan
Donovan. Donovan had had aarelaxed
relaxed attitude
attitude totothe therecruitment
recruitment of of Communists.
Communists. "I'd “I’d put
put
Stalin
Stalin onon the
theOSS payroll,"
payroll,” hehe once
once said,
said, "if
“if I thought
thought ititwould
would helphelp usus defeat
defeat Hitler."
Hitler.”
Throughout
Throughout the the Second World War War the the NKVD knew vastly more about OSS than
OSS knewknew about
about the
the NKVD.40
NKVD.40
Browder's
Browder’srecruitment leads also also included foreign Communists and fellow fellow travelers
travelers
who had taken refuge rehge in thetheUnited States.States. Among the themost important was the French
radical politician
politician Pierre Cot, six times Minister ofAir and twice Minister of Commerce
six times
in the short-lived governments
governments of the prewar Third Republic. Cot had probably been been
recruited by the NKVD in the mid-1930s, but seems to have drifted out of touch dur dur-
ing the chaotic period which followed
thechaotic followed the purge of much of Soviet Sovietforeign
foreignintelligence
intelligence
and
and had
had condemned
condemned the the signing
signing of of the
the Nazi-Soviet
Nazi-Soviet Pact. Pact. Rebuffed
RebuffedbybyGeneral
General Charles
Charles
T h ee G r aa nn dd A
A ll ll ii a n c ee // I1 00 99
de
de Gaulle,
Gaulle, the
the leader
leader of
of the
the Free
Free French
French after
after the
the fall
f d of
of France
Francein
in 1940,
1940, Cot
Cot spent
spent the
the
next
next few
few years
years in
in the
the United
United States.41
States.41In
In November
November Browder
Browderreported
reported toto Moscow:
Moscow: "Cot
“Cot
wants
wants the
the leaders
leaders ofofthe
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union to to know
know ofof his
his willingness
willingness to
to perform
perform whatever
whatever
mission
mission we wemight
might choose,
choose, forfor which
which purpose
purpose he he is
is even
evenprepared
preparedto
to break
break faith
faith with
with his
his
own position."42Probably
ownposition.”42 Probably aa month
month or or soso after
after his arrival in
hisarrival in New
New York,
York, Zarubin
Zarubin
approached
approached Cot Cot and,
and, with
with his
his habitual
habitual brusqueness,
brusqueness, pressed
pressedCot
Cot totobegin
begin active
active work
work
as
as aa Soviet
Soviet agent
agent forthwith.
forthwith. Cot's
Cot’s KGB
KGB flle records that
file records that he
he was
was taken
taken aback
aback by
by the
the
peremptory
peremptory nature
nature of
of Zarubin's
Zarubin’s summons
summons and and insisted
insisted that
that one
one of
of the
the leaders
leaders of
of the
the
French Communist
French Communist Party Party exiled
exiled in
in Moscow
Moscow give his approval.43
give his approval.43 On
O n July
July 11 Zarubin
Zarubin
reported
reported toto the
theCentre
Centre "the signing
signing on
“the on of
of Pierre Cot" as
Pierre Cot” as agent
agent DAEDALUS.44
DAEDALUS.4 In In 1944
1944
Cot
Cot was
was to
to be
be sent
sent on
on aa three-month
three-month mission
mission toto Moscow
Moscow on on behalf
behalf of
of de
deGaulle's
Gaulle’spro
pro-
visional
visionalgovernment.
government.He He concluded
concludedthe the report
report on
on his
his mission:
mission:"Liberty
“Libertydeclines
declinesunceas
unceas-
ingly
ingly under
under capitalism
capitalism and
and rises
rises unceasingly
unceasinglyunder
under socialism."45
sociali~m.”~~
Though
Centre was
was plainly
plainly impressed
impressed by by the
the quality
quality of
of Communist
Communist recruits
recruits
talent-spotted
talent-spotted by by Browder,
Browder, it it cautioned
cautioned Zarubin
Zarubin against
against over-reliance
over-reliance onon them:
them:
We
We permit
permit thethe use use ofof the Communist[Party
the Communist [Party members'] illegal intelligence
members’] illegal intelligence
capabilities
capabilities .. .. .. as
as aa supplement
supplement toto the
the Residency's
Residency’s operations,
operations, but
but itit would
would be
be
aa mistake
mistake to
to turn
turn these
these capabilities
capabilities into
into the
themain
main basis
basis of
of operations.
operation^.^^46
At
At almost
almost the the same
same moment
moment in in December
December 1941 1941 when
when Zarubin
Zarubin arrived
arrived in New
in New
York as
Yorkaslegallegal resident, Iskhak Akhmerov (successively
resident, Iskhak Akhmerov (successively codenamed code named YUNG and
and
ALBERT)
ALBERT) returnedreturned to to reestablish
reestablish thethe illegal residency,also
illegal residency, also based
based in New York,
in New York,
which
which hehe had
had been
been ordered
ordered toto abandon
abandon two two years
years earlier.
earlier.Though
Though he he had
had previously
previously
used
used Turkish
Turkish and and Canadian
Canadian identity
identity documents,
documents, on on this
this occasion
occasion hehe carried
carried aa doc
doc-
tored
tored USUS passport
passport which
which he he had
had acquired
acquired in in 1938.47
1938.47Unlike
Unlike Zarubin,
Zarubin, Akhmerov
Akhmerov
avoided
avoided allallcontact
contact with
with Browder-despite
Browder-despite the the fact
fact that
that his
his wife
wife and
and assistant,
assistant, Helen
Helen
Lowry
Lowry (codenamed
(codenamed MADLENMADLEN and and ADA),
ADA),was Browder's niece.48
was Browder’s niece.48 In
In March
March 19421942
the
the Akhmerovs
Akhmerovs moved moved from
from NewNew York
York to to Baltimore,
Baltimore, aa more more convenient
convenient location
location
from
from which
which to to run
run agents
agents based
based inin Washington.
Washington.There ThereAkhmerov,
Akhmerov, whosewhose stepfather
stepfather
had
had been
been aa furrier,
furrier, opened
opened aa fur
h r and
and clothes
clothes business
business in in partnership
partnership with
with aa local
local
Soviet
Soviet agent,
agent, KHOSYAIN,
KHOSYAIN, to togive
give himself
himself aa cover
cover occupation.49
oc~upation.~~
Michael Straight (NIGEL),
Michael Straight (NIGEL), in whom Akhmerov
in whom Akhmerov had had placed
placed such
such high
high hopes
hopes
before
before the
the Second
Second World
World War,
War, refused
rehsed totoresume
resume work work asas aa Soviet
Soviet agent.
agent. Straight
Straight had had
one
one last
last meeting
meeting withwith Akhmerov
Akhmerov in in Washington
Washingtonearly early in
in 1942,
1942,declined
declined anyany further
further
meeting,
meeting, shook
shook hands
hands and
and said
said goodbye.50
g~odbye.’~ Most Most other
other pre-war
pre-war agents,
agents, however,
however,werewere
successfully
successhlly reactivated,
reactivated, among
among themthemLaurence
Laurence DugganDuggan (FRANK)51
(FRANK)’* and and Harry
Harry Dex
Dex-
ter
ter White
White (JURIST).52
(JURIST).52Henry Henry Wallace,
Wallace, vice-president
vice-president duringduring Roosevelt's
Roosevelt’sthird
third term
term
of
of office
office (1941
(1941 to to 1945),
1945), said
said later
later that
that if
if the
the ailing
ailing Roosevelt
Roosevelt had had died
died during
during that
that
period
period and
and hehe had
had become
become president,
president, it it had
had been
been his his intention
intention to to make
make Duggan
Duggan his his
Secretary
Secretary of of State
State and
and White
White hishis Secretary
Secretary of of the
the Treasury.53
Treasurys3 The
The fact
fact that
that Roosevelt
Roosevelt
survived
survived three
three months
months into
into an
an unprecedented
unprecedented fourth fourth term
term in inthe
theWhite
White House,
House, andand
replaced
replaced Wallace
Wallace with Harry Truman
with Harry Truman as as vice-president
vice-president in in January
January 1945,
1945, deprived
deprived
Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence of of what
what would
would have
have been
been itsits most
most spectacular
spectacular success
success inin penetrat-
penetrat-
T
THHE
E S
SW OR
WO R D
D A
ANN D
D T
THHE
E S
S H II EE LL D // II II OO
ing
ing aa major
major Western
Western government.
government. The The NKVD succeededsucceeded nonenone thethe less
less in
in penetrat
penetrat-
ing
ing all
all the most sensitive
the most sensitive sections
sections of of the
the Roosevelt
Roosevelt administration.
administration.
Akhmerov's
Akhmerov’s most most productive
productive Washington
Washington network
network was was aa group
group of of Communists
Communists
and
and fellow
fellow travelers
travelers with
with government
government jobs jobs run
run by
by Nathan
Nathan Gregory
GregorySilvermaster (suc
Silvermaster (suc-
cessively
cessively codenamed
codenamed PAL and and ROBERT),
ROBERT), aa statistician
statistician ininthethe Farm
Farm Security
Security
Administration,
Administration, later later seconded
seconded to to the
the Board
Board of
of Economic
Economic Warfare.
Warfare.54 54 “Greg”
"Greg" Silver-
Silver
master retained
master retained thethe untarnished idealism of
untarnished idealism of the
the revolutionary dream. A chronic
revolutionary dream. chronic suf
suf-
ferer
ferer from
from bronchial asthma, which
bronchial asthma, which often left him
often left him gasping
gasping for
for breath,
breath, he he believed
believed
that,
that, "My
“Mytime time isis strictly limited, and
strictly limited, and when
when I diedie I want
want to tofeel
feel that
that atatleast
least I have
have had
had
some
some part
part in in building
building aa decent
decent life for those
life for those who
who comecome after me."55
after me.”55
Akhmerov believed, probably correctly, correctly, that, despite the security risks involved involved in
Silvermaster's
Silvermaster’sunorthodox
unorthodox tradecraft,
tradecraft, hehe was
was able
abletoto obtain
obtain far
far more
more intelligence
intelligence fromfrom
his increasing number of sources than if each of them was run individually individually by a Soviet
controller. Silvermaster
Silvermaster himself disdained
disdained the NKVD's
NKVD’s bureaucratic "orthodox“orthodox methmeth-
ods."
ods.” Though
Though most most of of his
his sources
sources must
must have
have been
been aware
aware ofof the
the ultimate
ultimate destination
destination
of
of their
their intelligence,
intelligence, the the network
network was was run
run under
under what
what Akhmerov
Akhmerov termedtermed “the"the Com
Com-
munist
munist Party
Party flag."
flag.” Informants
Informants regarded
regarded themselves
themselves as as helping
helping thethe CPUSA,
CPUSA, which which
would
would in in turn
turn assist
assist its
its Soviet
Soviet comrades.
comrade^.'^56
To limit the security risks, risks,Akhmerov placed two twocut-outs between himself and the
Silvermaster
Silvermaster group.
group. The
The fi rst was
first was aa courier,
courier, Elizabeth
Elizabeth Bentley
Bentley (codenamed
(codenamed MIRNA,
then, more
then, more condescendingly,
condescendingly, UMNITSA-"Good
UMNITSA-“Good Girl"), Girl”), aa Vassar
Vassar graduate
graduate who who inin
1938,
1938, at the age
at the age of thirty, had
of thirty, been persuaded
had been persuaded to break her
to break her visible
visible links
links with
with the
the
CPUSA
CPUSA in in order
order toto work
work forfor the
the NKVD. Every Every fortnight
fortnight Bentley
Bentley collected
collectedclassified
classified
documents microfilmed by Silvermaster and his wife in her knitting bag. She reported
not to Akhmerov himself himself but to another Soviet illegal in his residency, residency, Jacob
Jacob Golos
(ZVUK-"Sound"),
(ZWK-“Sound”), whom she knew "Timmy."
knew as “Timmy.” Golos broke NKVD rules by
byseduc
seduc-
ing Bentley during a New York snowstorm. snowstorm. According to Bentley's Bentley’s enthusiastic
enthusiastic
description
description of the seduction,
seduction, she felt herself "fl oat away into an ecstasy
“float ecstasythat seemed
seemed to
have no beginning and no end." end.” Encouraged by Golos's Golos’sunprofessional
unprofessionalexample,
example, Bent
Bent-
ley mixed friendship and espionage in a way which would have have horrifi
horrifieded the Centre.
Each Christmas she used usedNKVD funds to buy carefully carefullychosen
chosenpresents,
presents, ranging from
whiskey to lingerie, for the agents in Silvermaster's
Silvermaster’s group.
group. These, she said later, later, were
were
"the good old days-the
“the good days-the days days when
when we worked together as
workedtogether as good
good comrades."57
comrade^.'"^
Like Zarubin's,
Zarubin’s, Akhmerov's
Akhmerov’s illegal residency recruited non-American non-American as well as
American agents. Among the themost important was the British journalist and wartime
intelligence officer Cedric Belfrage (codenamed CHARLIE), who joined joined British
Security Coordination (BSC) in New New York shortly after the United States entered
the war.58
war.” Directed by the SIS SIS head of station, Sir William Stephenson, for much of of
the war, BSC handled intelligence liaison with the the Americans on behalf behalf of ofMI5
MI5 and
SOE as well as SIS.59
SOE SIS.59Belfrage volunteered his services services to Soviet intelligence.
intelligence. Like a
number of other American agents in the the United
UnitedStates, he made his initial approach
to Earl
EarlBrowder, who passed him on ontotoGolos.60
Golos.60Given the unprecedented number of of
wartime secrets exchanged by the British and American intelligence communities,
Belfrage had access
access to an unusually wide range of intelligence.intelligence.
T
T hh ee G
G rr aa nn dd A
A l ll i a n c ee // IIIIII
The
The rolls
rolls of
of microfllm
microfilm forwarded
forwarded by by Akhmerov's
Akhmerov’sillegal
illegalresidency
residency to to the
the Centre
Centre
via
via the
the legal
legalresidency
residencyin in New
NewYork
York increased
increased almost
almost four-fold
four-fold inin the
thespace
space of
of aa year,
year,
from
from fifty-nine
fifty-nine in in 1942
1942toto 211
211inin1943.
1943. Zarubin
Zarubinnone
none the
the less
less regarded
regarded Akhmerov's
Akhmerov’s
refusal
refusalto
to have
have direct
directdealings
dealingswith
with the
theCPUSA
CPUSAleadership
leadership and
and his
his roundabout
roundabout methmeth-
ods of controlling the Silvermaster group as feeble and long-winded.
ods of controlling the Silvermaster group as feeble and long-winded. Akhmerov Akhmerov
himself,
himself, Zarubin
Zarubin complained,
complained, had had aa "dry
“dry and
and distrustful"
distrustful” manner-which
manner-which may may well
well
have been true
have been true asas far
far as
as his
his relations
relations with
with Zarubin
Zarubin were
were concerned.
concerned. Zarubin
Zarubin hadhad aa
much
much higher
higher opinion
opinion of ofAkhmerov's
Akhmerov’swife, wife,Helen
Helen Lowry,
Lowry,whom
whom he heregarded
regarded asas more
more
quick-witted, more business-like in manner, and-because of her American
quick-witted, more business-like in manner, and-because of her American upbring- upbring
ing-better
ing-better ableable to
to make
make direct
direct contact
contact with
with US
US agents.61
agents.61
T
THHE
E RE
R E WAS
WAS T
TH USS aabreathtaking
HU breathtaking gulf
gulfbetween
between the
the intelligence
intelligencesupplied
suppliedto
to Stalin
Stalin on
on
the
the United
UnitedStates
States and
andthatthatavailable
availableto to Roosevelton
Roosevelt.onthe the Soviet
SovietUnion.62
Union.62Whereas
Whereas the the
Centre
Centre hadhad penetrated
penetrated everyeverymajor
majorbranch
branch of of Roosevelt's
Roosevelt’sadministration,
administration, OSS-like
OSS-like
SIS-had
SIS-had not not aasingle
singleagent
agent in in Moscow.
Moscow.At At thethe Tehran
TehranConference
Conference of of the
theBig
BigThree
Three
in
in November
November 1943-the
1943-the first first time
time Stalin
Stalin and
and Roosevelt
Roosevelt had had met-vastly
met-vastly superior
superior
intelligence
intelligence gavegave Stalin
Stalin aa considerable
considerable negotiating
negotiating advantage.
advantage.ThoughThough therethere isis no no
precise
precise indication of what intelligence reports and documents were shown to
indication of what intelligence reports and documents were shown to Stalin
Stalin
before
before the
the summit,
summit, there
there can
can be be no
no doubt
doubt thatthat hehe was
was remarkably
remarkablywell well briefed.
briefed. He He
was
was almost
almost certainly
certainlyinformed
informed that that Roosevelt
Roosevelthad had come
come to to Tehran
Tehrandetermined
determined to to do do
his
his utmost
utmost totoreach
reach agreement
agreementwith with Stalin-even
Stalin-even at at the
thecost
cost ofof offending
offending Churchill.
Churchill.
FDR
FDRgave gaveproof
proof of
of his
his intentions
intentions as as soon
soon asas hehe arrived.
arrived.He H e declined
declined Churchill's
Churchill’spro pro-
posal
posal that
that they
they should
should meet meet privately
privately before
before the the conference
conference began,
began, but but accepted
accepted
Stalin's
Stalin’spressing
pressing invitation
invitation that-allegedly
that-allegedly on on security
securitygrounds-he
grounds-he should should staystay at at aa
building
building in in the
the Soviet
Soviet embassy
embassy compound
compound rather rather than
than atat the
the USUS legation.
legation. It It seems
seems
not
not to
to have
have occurred
occurredto to Roosevelt
Roosevelt that that the
thebuilding
building was,was, inevitably,
inevitably,bugged,
bugged, and and that
that
every
everyword
word uttered
uttered byby himself
himself and and his
his delegation
delegationwould would be be recorded,
recorded, transcribed
transcribed and and
regularly
regularlyreported
reported to to Stalin.63
Stalir~.~~
Stalin
Stalinmust
must also
alsohave
havewelcomed
welcomedthe the fact
factthat
that Roosevelt
Rooseveltwas was bringing
bringing to to Tehran
Tehran his his
closest wartime adviser, Harry Hopkins, but leaving behind
closest wartime adviser, Harry Hopkins, but leaving behind his Secretary of State, his Secretary of State,
Cordell
Cordell Hull.
Hull. Hopkins
Hopkins had had established
established aa remarkable
remarkable reputation
reputation in in Moscow
Moscow for for tak
tak-
ing
ing the
the Russians
Russians intointo his
his confidence.
confidence.EarlierEarlier in in the
theyear
year he
he had
had privately
privatelywarned
warned the the
Soviet
Soviet embassy
embassy in in Washington
Washington that that the
the FBI
FBI had had bugged
bugged aa secret
secret meeting
meeting at at which
which
Zarubin
Zarubin (apparently
(apparently identified
identified by by Hopkins
Hopkins only only asas aa member
member of of the
the embassy)
embassy) had had
passed
passed money to Steve Nelson, a leading member of the US Communist under
money to S teve Nelson, a leading member of the US Communist under-
ground.64
ground.64Information
Information sent senttoto Moscow
Moscow by by the New York
the New residency on
York residency the talks
on the talks
between
between Roosevelt
Roosevelt and and Churchill
Churchill in in May
May1943 1943had hadalso
also probably
probably come come from
from HopHop-
kins.65
kin^.^* There
There isis plausible
plausiblebut but controversial
controversialevidence
evidencethat,that, ininaddition
addition to to passing
passing con
con-
fidences to the Soviet ambassador, Hopkins sometimes
fidences to the Soviet ambassador, Hopkins sometimes used Akhmerov as a back used Akhmerov as a back
channel
channel to to Moscow,
Moscow, much much as as the
the Kennedys
Kennedyslater later used
used the
the G GRURU officer
officer Georgi
Georgi Bol Bol-
shakov.
shakov.Hopkins's
Hopkins’sconfidential
confidential information
information so so impressed
impressed the the Centre
Centrethat,
that,years
years later,
later,
some
some KGBKGB officers
officersboasted
boasted thatthat hehehad hadbeen
been aa Soviet
Soviet agent.66
agent.66These
These boasts
boasts were
were far far
from the truth. Hopkins was an American patriot with little
from the truth. Hopkinswas an American patriot with littlesympathy for the Soviet sympathy for the Soviet
system.
system. ButBut hehe was
was deeply
deeply impressed
impressed by by the
the Soviet
Sovietwarwar effort
effort and
and convinced
convinced that, that,
TT H
HEE SS W
WO R D
OR D A
ANN DD TT H
H SEE H SI EH LI D
E L D // I1I122
"Since
“Since Russia
Ru.ssiaisisthe
the decisive
decisive factor
factor in
in the
thewar
war she
she must
must be
be given
givenevery
every assistance
assistance and
and
every
every effort
effort must
must bebe made
made to
to obtain
obtain her
her friendship."67
friend~hip.”~’ "Chip" Bohlen,
Bohlen, who
“Chip” who acted
acted as
as
American
American interpreter,
interpreter, later
later described
described Hopkins's
Hopkins’s influence
influence on the President
on the President at the
at the
Tehran
Tehran summit
summitas as "paramount."68
“param~unt.”~~
It
It was at Tehran,Churchill
was at Tehran, Churchilllater
later claimed,
claimed, that
that he
he realized
realized for
for the
the first
first time
time how
how
small
small the
the British
British nation
nation was:
was:
There
There II sat
sat with the great
with the great Russian
Russian bear
bear on on one
one side
side of me, with
of me, with paws
paws out
out-
stretched,
stretched, and on the other side the great American buffalo, and between the
and on the other side the great American buffalo, and between the
two
two sat
sat the
the poor
poor little
little English
English donkey
donkey .. .. ..69
69
Despite the closeness

Despite the closeness of the British-American
of the British-American wartime
wartime "special
“special relationship"
relationship” and
and
Roosevelt's
Roosevelt’sfriendship
friendship with
with Churchill,
Churchill, his
his priority
priority at
at Tehran
Tehranwas
was to
to reach
reach agreement
agreement
with
with Stalin.
Stalin. He
H e told
told his
his old
old friend,
friend, Frances
Frances Perkins,
Perkins, the
the Secretary
Secretaryof
of Labor,
Labor, how
how
Winston
Winston got got red
red and
and scowled,
scowled, and
and the
the more
more hehe did
didso,
so, the
the more
more Stalin
Stalin smiled.
smiled.
Finally,
Finally, Stalin
Stalin broke
broke out
out into
into aa deep,
deep, hearty
hearty guffaw,
guffaw, andand for
for the
the first
first time
time in
in
three days I saw light. I kept it up until Stalin was laughing with me,
three days I saw light. I kept it up until Stalin was laughing with me, and it wasand it was
then that II called
then that called him
him "Uncle
“UncleJoe."
Joe.” He
H e would
would have
have thought
thought me me fresh
fresh the
the day
day
before,
before, but
but that
thatday
day he
he laughed
laughed and
and came
came over
over and
and shook
shook my my hand.
hand.
From
From that
that time
time on
on our
ourrelations
relationswere personal .. .. ..We
were personal We talked
talked like
like men
men andand
brothers. 70
brother^.^'
In
In the
the course
course ofofthe
theTehran
TehranConference,
Conference,Hopkins
Hopkins sought
sought out
out Churchill
Churchill privately
privately at
at the
the
British
British embassy,
embassy,and and told
told him
him that
that Stalin
Stalin and
and Roosevelt
Rooseveltwere wereadamant
adamant that that Operation
Operation
OVERLORD,
OVERLORD, the the British-American
British-American cross-Channel
cross-Channel invasion
invasion of ofoccupied
occupied France,
France,
must
must take
take place
placethe
the following
followingspring,
spring,and
and that
that British
British opposition
opposition must must cease.
cease.Churchill
Churchill
du1y
dulygave
gaveway.
way.The
The most
mostimportant
important political
politicalconcession
concessionto to Stalin
Stalinwas
was British-American
British-American
agreement
agreement to to give
give the
the post-war
post-war Soviet
SovietUnion
Union its 1941 frontier,
its 1941 frontier,thus
thus allowing
allowing Stalin
Stalin toto
recover
recover hishis territorial
territorial gains
gains ill-gotten
ill-gotten under
under thethe Nazi-Soviet
Nazi-Soviet Pact: Pact: eastern
eastern Poland,
Poland,
the
the Baltic
Baltic states
states and
and Moldova.
Moldova. The The Polish
Polish government-in-exile
government-in-exile in in London
London waswas not
not
consulted.
consulted.
Stalin
Stalin returned
returned to toMoscow
Moscow in in high
highspirits.
spirits.The
The United
United States
States and
and Britain
Britain seemed
seemed
to
to have
have recognized,
recognized, as as aa Russian
Russian diplomat
diplomat put
put ititprivately,
privately, Russia's
Russia’s "right
“right to
to establish
establish
friendly
friendly governments
governments in in the
the neighboring
neighboring countries."71
c~untries.’’~~ Roosevelt's
Roosevelt’s willingness
willingness to to go
go
so
sofar
far to
to meet
meet Stalin's
Stalin’swishes
wishes at atTehran
Tehranhad
had derived
derived chiefly
chieflyfrom
from hishis deep
deep sense
sense of
of the
the
West's
West’s military
military debt
debt toto the
the Soviet
SovietUnion
Union atat aa time
time when
whenthe theRed
Red Army
Army was was bearing
bearing
the
the overwhelming
overwhelming brunt brunt of ofthethe
war
warwith
with Germany.
Germany. But But there
thereisis equally
equallyno no doubt
doubtthatthat
Stalin's
Stalin’snegotiating
negotiating success
successwas wasgreatly
greatly assisted
assistedbyby his
his knowledge
knowledgeof of the
thecards
cards in
in Roo
Roo-
sevelt's
sevelt’s hand.72
hand.”
Despite
Despite the the considerable
considerable success
success ofof the
the legal
legal and
and illegal
illegal American
American residencies
residencies inin
penetrating
penetrating the the Roosevelt
administration, however,
however, theythey had
had failed
failed totally
totally in
in one
one
important
important respect.
respect. Part
Part ofof Zarubin's
Zarubin’s original
original brief
brief from
from the Centre had
the Centre had been
been to to
recruit
recruit agents
agents from
from among
among the the large
large German-American
German-American community community who who could
could bebe
T
T h eG rGa rnadAn ldl i A
a nl lci ea n c e / I I]
113
used against
used against Germany.
Germany. In In the endhehe recruited
the end recruited not
not aa single
single one.
one. When
When asked
asked toto
explain this
explain this omission,
omission, he he told
told the Centre that
the Centre that most
most German-Americans
German-Americans were were Jews
Jews
and therefore
and therefore unsuitable.73
~ n s u i t a b l eThe
. ~ ~ Centre,
T h e like
Centre, Zarubin, had
like Zarubin, hadbecome so engrossed
become so engrossed in
in the
the
intelligence
intelligence offensive
offensive against
against its allies that
its allies that ititappears to have
appears to have judged leniently his
judged leniently his fail-
fail
ure
ure against
against the
the enemy.
enemy.
WART I M E I NT
WARTIME TEEL L I G E
ENNC
CEE GAT
G A TH E RI N G continued
continued to to expand
expand in in Britain
Britain as
as well as
well as
the
the United
United States.
States. At the the beginning
beginning of of 1942
1942 aa second
second legal residency began
legal residency began toto oper
oper-
ate
ate in
in London
London under
under Ivan
Ivan Andreyevich
Andreyevich Chichayev
Chichayev (JOHN) (JOHN) alongside
alongside that
that of Ana
of Ana-
toli
toli Gorsky
Gorsky (successively
(successively HENRY and and VADIM).
VADIM). Unlike Gorsky, who
Unlike Gorsky, remained in
who remained in
charge
charge of of the
the agent
agent network,
network, Chichayev
Chichayev announced
announced his presence in
his presence in London
London to to the
the
authorities
authorities andand was
was responsible
responsible for for intelligence liaison with
intelligence liaison with bothboth the
the British
British and
and
allied
allied governments-in-exile.74
governments-in-e~ile.~~ Chichayev
Chichayev also also ran
ran an an agent
agent network
network of of emigre offi
CmigrC offi-
cials
cials from
from central
central and
and eastern
eastern Europe
Europe who whokept
kept him informed of
him informed of British
British negotiations
negotiations
with
with thethe Polish
Polish government-in-exile,
government-in-exile, the Czechoslovak president,
the Czechoslovak president, Edvard Bene s,
Edvard Bene’s, v
King
King Peter
Peter of
of Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia and and hishis prime
prime minister, Ivan S
minister, Ivan Subas.75
~bis.~’
The
The Cambridge
Cambridge Five, Five, meanwhile,
meanwhile, continued
continued to to generate
generate aa phenomenal
phenomenal amountamount of of
intelligence.
intelligence. For
For 1942
1942 alone
alone Maclean's
Maclean’sdocuments
documents filledfilled more
more thanthan forty-five
forty-five volumes
volumes
in
in the
theCentre
Centrearchives.76
archives.76Philby
Philby too too was
was providing large quantities
providing large quantities of of highly
highly classified
classified
flies.
files. Since
Since September
September 1941 1941 he he had
had been
been working
working in Section V (Counter-intelligence)
in Section (Counter-intelligence)
of
of SIS. Though Section V was
Though Section was then
then located
located in St. Albans,
in St. Albans, rather
rather thanthan in SIS London
in SIS London
headquarters
headquarters at at Broadway
Broadway Buildings,
Buildings, it it had
had the advantage of
the advantage of being next door
being next door toto the
the
registry
registry which housed SIS
which housed archives. Philby spent some time cultivating
SIS archives. Philby spent some time cultivating the archivist, the archivist,
Bill
Bill Woodfield,
Woodfield, withwith whom
whom he he shared
shared aa common appreciation of
common appreciation of pink gin. As
pink gin. As Philby
Philby
later recalled, “This
later recalled, "This friendly
friendly connection
connection paid paid of£"77 OverOver aa period
period of of months,
months, Philby
Philby
borrowed
borrowed the operational files
the operational files ofof British
British agents working abroad
agents working abroad and and handed
handed themthem to to
Gorsky
Gorsky in in batches
batches toto be
be photographed.78 Early
p h ~ t o g r a p h e d Early
. ~ ~ inin April
April 1942 1942 thethe Centre completed aa
Centre completed
lengthy
lengthy analysis
analysis of
of the SIS records
the SIS records removed
removed by byPhilby
Philby up up to to the end of
the end of the
the previous
previous
year.
year. Though O HNCHEN for
praising SSOHNCHEN
Though praising for "systematically sending aa lot
“systematically sending of interesting
lot of interesting
material,"
material,” itit was
was puzzled
puzzled thatthat this
this material
material appeared
appeared to to show
show thatthat SIS hadhad nono agent
agent
network
network in in Russia
Russia and and was
was conducting
conducting only only “extremely
"extremely insignificant”
insignificant" operations
operations
against
against the
the Soviet
Soviet Union.
Union. Centre
Centre analysts
analysts hadhad two reasons for
two reasons for disputing
disputing these
these entirely
entirely
accurate
accurate conclusions. First, though
conclusions.First, though atatleast partly aware
least partly aware thatthat the evidence used
theevidence usedtoto con-
con
vict
vict some
some ofof their
their liquidated
liquidated predecessors
predecessors of of working
working for for British
intelligence waswas
fraudulent,
fraudulent, they
they remained convinced that
remained convinced that SIS SIS had
had been conducting major
been conducting major operations
operations
against
against the
the Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, usingusing "their most highly
“their most skilled agents,”
highly skilled agents," throughout
throughout the the
1930s.
1930s.TheThe reality-that
reality-that SIS SIS hadhad not
not even
even possessed
possessedaa Moscow
Moscow station-was,
station-was, so so far
far as
as
the
the Centre
Centre was
was concerned,
concerned, literally
literally unbelievable.
unbelievable. The The Centre
Centre refused
refused toto believe
believe that
that
the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union waswas aa smaller
smaller priority
priority for British intelligence
for British intelligence (which(which was,
was, inin truth,
truth,
almost wholly
almost wholly geared
geared to to the
thewarwar effort)
effort) than Britain was
than Britain was forfor Soviet
Soviet intelligence:
intelligence:
If
If the
the HOTEL [SIS]
[SIS] has
has recruited
recruited aa hundred
hundred agents
agents in
in Europe over the
Europe over the past
past
few years, mainly
few years, mainly from
from countries
countries occupied by the
occupied by Germans, there
the Germans, can be
there can be no
no
doubt
doubt that
that our
our country
country gets
gets no less attention.79
no less attention.79
T
THHE
E S
SW OR
WO RD
D A
ANNT
DDH S
TH
E H IE E LS D
H I E L D /
/ Ir Ir 4q
Such
Such reports
reports merely
merely echoed
echoed Stalin's
Stalin’s own
own acute
acute suspicions
suspicions of
of his
his British
British allies.
allies.
The
The intelligence
intelligence from
from the London residency
the London residency during the first
during the first year
year of
of the Great
the Great
Patriotic
Patriotic War
War which
whichultimately
ultimately had
had the
the greatest
greatest impact
impact on
on both
both Stalin
Stalin and
and the
the Cen
Cen-
tre came from Cairncross. On September 25, 1941 Gorsky telegraphed
tre came from Cairncross. O n September 25,1941 Gorsky telegraphed Moscow: Moscow:
I am
am informing
informing you
you very
very briefly
briefly about
about the
the contents
contents of
of aa most
most secret
secret report
report of
of
the
the Government
Government Committee
Committeeononthethe
development
development of
of uranium
uranium atomic
atomic energy
energy to
to
produce explosive material which was submitted on September 24, 1941
produce explosive material which was submitted onSeptember 24,1941 to the to the
War
War Cabinet.80
Cabinet.80
The
The secret
secret committee
committee which which produced
produced the the report
report was
was thethe Scientific
Scientific Advisory
Advisory Com- Com
mittee,
mittee, chaired
chaired by by Lord
Lord Hankey,
Hankey, whose
whose codename
codename BOSS reflects reflects the
the fact
fact hehe was
was
Cairncross's
Cairncross’s employer.81
employer.81The The report
report which
which Cairncross
Cairncross gavegave Gorsky
Gorsky was was the
the first
first toto
alert
alert the
the Centre
Centre totoBritish
British plans
plans to
to build
build the
the atomic
atomic bomb.82
bomb.82
Vitally
Vitally important
important thoughthough that
thatreport,
report, and
and others
others on on the
the atomic
atomic bomb
bomb despatched
despatched
from London over
from London over the
the next
next few months, proved
few months, proved to to be,
be, they
they had
had aa delayed
delayed impact
impact in in
Moscow.
Moscow. When When Cairncross's
Cairncross’s first
first report
report arrived,
arrived, Stalin
Stalin and
and the
the Stavka
Stavka were
were preoccu
preoccu-
pied
pied by
by the German advance
the German advance which
which in October 1941
in October 1941 forced
forced them
them to to evacuate
evacuate the the
capital.
capital. It
It was
was notnot until
untilMarch
March1942 1942 thatthat
Beria sent
Beria sent Stalin
Stalin aa full
hll assessment
assessment of of British
British
atomic
atomic research.
research. The The British
British high command, he
high command, hereported,
reported, waswas now
now satisfied
satisfied that
that thethe
theoretical problems of
theoretical problems of constructing
constructing an an atomic
atomic bomb
bombhad had been
been "fundamentally
“fundamentally
solved," and Britain's
solved,” and Britain’s best
best scientists
scientists andand major
major companies
companies were were collaborating
collaborating on on the
the
project.83
project.83At At Beria's
Beria’s suggestion,
suggestion, detailed
detailed consultations
consultations with with Soviet
Soviet scientists
scientists followed
followed
over
over the
the next
next fewfew months.84
months.84
In
In June
June 19421942 President
President Roosevelt
Roosevelt ordered
ordered an an all-out
all-out effort,
effort, codenamed
codenamed the the
MANHATTAN project, project, to build an
to build an American atomic bomb.
American atomic bomb. Though
Though ititwaswas another
another
year
year before
before British
British participation
participation in in the
the project
project was
was formally
formally agreed,
agreed, thethe NKVD dis dis-
covered
covered that
that Roosevelt
Roosevelt and and Churchill
Churchill had had discussed
discussed cooperation
cooperation on on the
the building
building of of
the
the bomb
bomb during
duringtalks
talks inin Washington
Washington on onJune 20.85 On
June 20.85 October 6, following
O n October following exten
exten-
sive consultations with
sive consultations with Soviet
Soviet scientists,
scientists, the Centre
theCentre submitted
submitted the the first
first detailed
detailed
report
report on Anglo-American plans
on Anglo-American plans to construct an
to construct an atomic
atomic bombbomb to to the
theCentral
CentralCom Com-
mittee
mittee and
and the
the State
StateDefence
Defence Committee,
Committee, both bothchaired
chaired by by Stalin.86
Stalin.86By the the end
endof of the
the
year, Stalin had
year, Stalin had decided
decided to begin work
to begin work on on thetheconstruction
construction of of aa Soviet
Soviet atomic
atomic bomb.87
bomb.87
In
In taking that momentous
taking that momentous decision
decision in the middle
in the middle of of the
the battle
battle ofof Stalingrad,
Stalingrad, the the
main turning
main turning pointpoint inin the
the war
war on
on thethe eastern
eastern front, Stalin was
front, Stalin was not thinking of
not thinking the
of the
needs of
needs of the
the Great
GreatPatriotic
Patriotic War, since it
War, since it was
was clear
clearthat
that thethebomb
bombcould not be
could not ready .
be ready
in
in time
timetotoassist
assist in
in the
thedefeat
defeat of
of Germany.
Germany. Instead,
Instead, he hewas
was already
alreadylooking
looking forward
forward to to
aa post-war world in
post-war world in which,
which, since
since the
the United
United States and Britain
States and Britain would
would havehave nuclear
nuclear
weapons, the
weapons, the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union must
must have
have them
them toO.88
too.88
For
For most
most of of the
the Great
Great Patriotic War Moscow
Patriotic War Moscow collected
collected moremore atomic intelligence
atomic intelligence
from
from Britain
Rritain than
than from
from thethe United
United States.
States. In December
December 1942 1942 the
the London
London residency
residency
received
received aa detailed
detailed report
report onon atomic
atomic research
research in Britain and
in Britain and the United States
the United States from
from aa
Communist scientist codenamed “K.”
Communist scientist codenamed "K." Vladimir
Vladimir Barkovsky,
Barkovsky,head head ofof scientific and tech
scientific and tech-
nological intelligence
intelligence (S&T) at the residency, later reported that "K" “ K "works
“works for us
T
T h e G r aa n dA lAl ilal in ac ne c e // I IS
115
with enthusiasm, but

with enthusiasm, but .. .. .. turns
turns down
down thethe slightest
slightest hint
hint of
of financial reward." With
financial reward.” With thethe
help
help ofof aa duplicate
duplicate keykey personally
personally manufactured
manufactured by by Barkovsky
Barkovskyfromfrom aa wax impression
wax impression
provided
provided by "K," he
by “K,” he was
was able able toto remove
remove numerous classified documents
numerous classified documents from from col-
col
leagues'
leagues’safessafesas as
well as his
well as own.
his own.The most valuable,
The most valuable, in in the
the Centre’s
Centre's view, were those
view, were those onon
"the
“the construction
construction of of uranium
uranium piles."
piles.”AtAt least two other
least two other scientists,
scientists, codenamed
codenamed MOOR
and
and KELLY, also also provided
provided intelligence
intelligence on on various aspects of
various aspects of TUBE ALLOYS,
ALLOYS, the the
British
British atomic
atomic project.89
project.89
The
The mostmost important
important of of the
the British
British atomatom spies,
spies, the Communist physicist
the Communist Klaus
physicist Klaus
Fuchs,
Fuchs, aa naturalized
naturalized refugee
refugee from from Nazi
Nazi Germany,
Germany, was initially aa GRU rather
was initially rather than
than an
an
NKVDINKGB
NKVD/NKGB agent. agent. Fuchs
Fuchs was was aa committed
committed Stalinist
Stalinist who
who waswas later
later to
to take
take part
part in
in
the
the construction
the first
first atomic
atomic bomb. Before the
bomb. Before the war he had
war he had been
been an enthusiastic
an enthusiastic
participant
participant in in dramatized
dramatized readingsreadings of of the
the transcripts
transcripts of of the
the show
show trials
trials organized
organized by by
the
the Society
Society forfor Cultural
Cultural Relations
Relations withwith thethe Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, and impressed his
and impressed his research
research
supervisor,
supervisor, thethe future
future Nobel
Nobel Laureate
Laureate Sir Sir Neville Mott, with
Neville Mott, the passion
with the passion with which
with which
he
he played
played thethe part
part of
of the
the prosecutor
prosecutor Vyshinsky,
Vyshinsky, "accusing
“accusingthe defendants with
the defendants with aa cold
cold
venom
venom thatthat I would
would never
never havehave suspected
suspected fromfrom so quiet and
so quiet and retiring
retiring aa young
young man."
man.”
Late
Late inin 1941,
1941,Fuchs
Fuchs asked
asked the the leader
leader ofof the
the German
German Communist
CommunistParty Party (KPD)
(KPD) under
under-
ground
ground in in Britain,
Britain, Jurgen
Jurgen Kuczynski,
Kuczynski, for for help
help inin passing
passing toto the Russians what
the Russians what he he had
had
learned
learned while
while working
working on on thethe TUBE ALLOYS project project at
at Birmingham
Birmingham University.
University.
Kuczynski
Kuczynski put put him
him in in touch
touch withwith Simon
Simon Davidovich
Davidovich Kremer,
Kremer, an an officer
officerat
at the
the GRU
London
London residency,
residency, whowho irritated
irritated Fuchs
Fuchs by his insistence
by his insistence on on taking long rides
taking long rides inin Lon
Lon-
don
don taxis,
taxis, regularly
regularlydoubling
doubling back back in in order
order to to throw
throw offoff anyone
anyonetrying to tail
trying to tail them.”
them.90
In
In the
the summer
summer of of 1942
1942Fuchs Fuchs waswas moved
movedon on toto another
another and more congenial
and more congenial GRU
controller,
controller, SONYA (referred(referred to to inin KGB files under the
files under alternative codename
the alternative FIR),91
codename FIR),91
who
who he he almost
almost certainly
certainly never
never realized
realized waswas the
the sister ofJurgen
sister of Kuczynski. They
Jurgen Kuczynski. They usu
usu-
ally met
met near Banbury, midway
near Banbury, midway between
between Birmingham
Birmingham and and Oxford,
Oxford, where SONYA
where SONYA
lived
lived as Mrs. Brewer,
as Mrs. Brewer, aJewish
a Jewish refugee
refugee from Nazi Germany.
from Nazi Germany. SONYA remembered remembered the the
material
material she collected from
she collected from Fuchs
Fuchs as "just strings
as “just strings of of hieroglyphics
hieroglyphics and and formula
formula writ-
writ
ten
ten in
in such
such tiny
tiny writing
writing that that they just looked
they just looked likelike squiggles:"
squiggles:”
Klaus
Klaus and
and I never
never spent
spent more
more than
than half
half an hour together
an hour together when
when we met. Two
we met. Two
minutes would
minutes would have been enough
have been but, apart
enough but, apart from the pleasure
from the pleasure of the meeting,
of the meeting,
it
it would
would arouse
arouse less
less suspicion
suspicion if
if we took aalittle
wetook little walk together rather
walk together rather than part
thanpart-
ing
ing immediately.
immediately. Nobody
Nobody who
who diddidnot
notlive
live in
in such isolation can
such isolation can guess
guess how pre
how pre-
cious
cious these
these meetings
meetings with
with another
another German comrade were.92
German comrade were.92
SONYA later
later became
became thethe only
only woman
woman ever to be
ever to be made
made an honorary colonel
an honorary colonel of the
ofthe
Red
Red Army,
Army,in recognition of
in recognition of her
her remarkable
remarkable achievements
achievementsinin the
the GRU93
GRU93ButBut though
though itit
has been publicly
has been publicly acknowledged
acknowledged that that she ran other
she ran other agents besides Fuchs
agents besides during her
Fuchs during her
time
time in Britain, both
in Britain, both thethe SVR andand the
the G
GRURU have gone to
have gone to some
some pains to conceal
pains to conceal the
the
existence
existence of ofthe most important
the most important of them: Melita
of them: Melita Stedman
Stedman Nonvood,
Norwood, nCenee Sernis
Sernis (code-
(code
named
named HOLA).
HOLA).Norwood's
Nonvood’s filefilein
in the
the Centre shows her
Centre shows to have
her to have been, in d
been, in all probabil
probabil-
ity,
ity, both
boththethe most
most important British female
important British female agent in KGB history
agent in history andand the
the
longest-serving
longest-serving of ofall
all Soviet
Soviet spies
spiesin
in Britain.94
Britain.94
T E WSOWR O
T HS
E A
DNR D
D HAS
T ENH IDE LT DH E S H I E L D / Ir rI 6
HOLA was was born

born in
in 1912
1912 to to aaLatvian
Latvian father
father andand British
British mother,
mother, joined
joined thethe Com
Com-
munist
munist Party
Party ofof Great
Great Britain
Britain (CPGB),
(CPGB), married
married another
another Party
Party member
member employed
employed as as aa
mathematics
mathematics teacher teacher in in aa secondary
secondary school,
school, andand from
from the the ageage ofof twenty
twenty onwards
onwards
worked
worked as as aa secretary
secretary in in the research department
the research department of of the British Non-Ferrous
the British Non-Ferrous Metals Metals
Association.
Association. Talent-spotted
Talent-spotted in in 1935
1935 by one of
by one of the
the CPGB's
CPGB’s founders,
founders, Andrew
Andrew Roth- Roth
stein,
stein, she
she waswas recommended
recommended to to the
the NKVD by by the
the Party
Party leadership
leadership and recruited two
and recruited two
years
years later.
later. Like
Like thethe Magnificent
Magnificent Five, Five, Norwood
Norwood was was aa committed
committed ideological
ideological agentagent
inspired by
inspired by aa myth-image
myth-image of of the Soviet Union
the Soviet Union which
which bore bore little relationship to
little relationship the
to the
brutal
brutal reality
reality ofof Stalinist rule. Her
Stalinist rule. Her forty-year
forty-year career
Soviet agent,
agent, however,
however, nearly
nearly
ended
ended almost
almost as as soon
soon as
as it
it began.
began. She She was
was involved
involved withwith aaspy ring operating
spy ring operating inside
inside thethe
Woolwich Arsenal, whose
Woolwich Arsenal, whose three leading members
three leading members were were arrested
arrested in in January
January 1938, tried
1938, tried
and
and imprisoned
imprisoned three months later.
three months later. MIS
MI5 failed,
failed, however,
however, to detect clues
to detect clues toto her
her iden
iden-
tity
tity contained
contained in in aa notebook
notebook taken taken from
from thethe ringleader,
ringleader, Percy
Percy Glading
Glading (codenamed
(codenamed
GOT),
GOT), and and after
after aa few
few months
months "on “on ice"
ice”she
she was
was reactivated
reactivated in in May
May 1938.
1938. ItIt is
is aa sign
sign
of
of the
the Centre's
Centre’s high opinion of
high opinion of Norwood
Norwood that that contact
contact withwith herher was maintained at
was maintained at aa
time
time when
when it it was
was broken
broken withwith many
many other
other agents,
agents, including
including some some of of the
the Five,
Five, because
because
of
of the
the recall
recall oror liquidation
liquidation of of most
most foreign
intelligence officers.95
officer^.^'
Contact
Contact with with Norwood
Norwood was was suspended,
suspended, however,
however, after
after thethe temporary
temporary closureclosure of of
the London residency
the London residency early
early in 1940. When
in 1940. When reactivated
reactivated in in 1941,
1941, sheshe was
was forfor unex
unex-
plained
plained reasons
reasons handed
handed over over to to SONY
SONYA A ofof the
the GRU rather rather thanthan totoananNKVD concon
troller.
troller. Her
Her jobjob atatthe
theNon-Ferrous
Non-Ferrous Metals Metals Association
Association gave gave herher access
access toto extensive
extensive
S&T
S&T documents
documents which which she she passed
passed on on totoSONY
SONYA A and
and subsequent
subsequent controllers.
controllers. By the the
final
final months
months of of the
the warwar Norwood
Norwood was was providing
intelligence on onthethe TUBE
ALLOYS project. project. According
According to to Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notesnotes on on herher file,
file, she
she was assessed
wasassessed
throughout
throughout her her career
career asas aa "committed,
“committed, reliable
reliable and
and disciplined
disciplined agent,agent, striving
striving to to be
be
of
of the
the utmost
utmost assistance."96
as~istance.”~~
By
By the
the beginning
beginning of of 1943,
1943, aware
aware of of American
American plans plans to to build
build thethe first
first atomic
atomic
bomb,
bomb, the the Centre
Centrewas was even
evenmore
more anxious
anxious to to collect
collect atomic
atomic intelligence
intelligence in in the
the United
United
States
States than
than in in Britain.
Britain. OneOne certain
certain indication
indication of of the importance attached
the importance attached by by thethe
Centre to monitoring
monitoring the the MANHATTAN
MANHATTAN project project waswas the the dispatch
dispatch of of its
its head
head of of
scientific
scientific andand technological
technological intelligence,
intelligence, Leonid
Leonid Romanovich
Romanovich Kvasnikov Kvasnikov (ANTON),
(ANTON),
to New
New York where he became deputy resident for S&T S&T in January 1943.97 1943.97Igor
Vasiliyevich Kurchatov, the
Vasiliyevich Kurchatov, the newly appointed scientifi
newly appointed scientific c head
head of the Soviet
of the Soviet atomic
atomic
project,
project, wrote
wrote to Beria on
to Beria on March
March 7: 7:
My
My examination
examination ofof the
the [intelligence]
[intelligence] material
material has
has shown
shown that
that their
theirreceipt
receipt is
is of
of
enormous
enormous and and invaluable
invaluable significance
significance toto our
our nation
nation and
and our science. On
our science. O n the
the
one
one hand,
hand, the
the material
material has
has demonstrated
demonstrated the the seriousness
seriousness and intensity of
and intensity of the
the
scientific
scientific research being conducted
research being conducted on on uranium
uranium in Britain, and
in Britain, and on the other
on the other
hand, it
hand, it has
has made
made itit possible
possible to
to obtain important guidelines
obtain important guidelines for
for our
our own
own scien
scien-
tific
tific research,
research, by-passing
by-passing many
many extremely
extremely difficult
difficult phases
phases in
in the
the development
development
of
of this
this problem,
problem, learning
learning new
new scientific
scientific and
and technical
technical routes
routes forfor its
its develop
develop-
ment, establishing three
ment, establishing three new
new areas
areas for
for Soviet
Soviet physics,
physics, and
and learning
learning about
about the
the
possibilities
possibilities for using not
for using not only
only uranium-235
uranium-235 butbut also
also uranium-238.98
uranium-238.98
T
T hh ee G rr aa nn d
dA lAl il al inac ne c e I/ I117
I?
While
While BeriaBeria was
was reading
reading the the report,
report,a anew
new top-secret
top-secret laboratory
laboratory was was starting
starting work
work at at
Los
Los Alamos
Alamos in in New
New Mexico
Mexico to to build
build the
the fi rst atomic
first atomic bomb.
bomb. LosLos Alamos
Alamos contained
contained
probably
probably the the most
most remarkable
remarkable collection
collection of of youthful
youthful talent
talent ever
ever assembled
assembledin in aasingle
single
laboratory.
laboratory. A majority
majority of of the
the scientists
scientists who
who worked
worked on on the
the bomb
bomb werewere still
still in
in their
their
twenties;
twenties; the the oldest,
oldest, Robert
Robert Oppenheimer,
Oppenheimer, the the head
head ofof the
the laboratory,
laboratory, was was thirty
thirty-
nine.
nine. LosLos Alamos
Alamos eventually
eventually included
included twelve
twelve Nobel
Nobel Laureates.
Laureates.
In
In April 1943,aa month
April 1943, monthafterafter the
the opening
openingof of Los
Los Alamos,
Alamos, the the New
NewYorkYork residency
residency
reported
reported an an important
important source
source on on the
theMANHATTAN
MANHATTAN project. project. AnAn unknown
unknown womanwoman
had
had turned
turned up up at
at the
the Soviet
Soviet consulate-general
consulate-general and and delivered
delivered aa letter
lettercontaining
containing clas
clas-
sified
sified information
theatomic
atomic weapons
weapons program.
program. A monthmonth later
later the
the same
same woman,
woman,
who
who again
again declined
declined to to give
give her
her name,
name, brought
brought another
anotherletter
letter with
with details
details of
of research
research
on
on the
the plutonium
plutonium routeroute to to the
the atomic
atomic bomb.
bomb. Investigations
Investigations by by the
the New
New York
York resi
resi-
dency
dency revealed
revealed that
that thethewoman
woman was was anan Italian
Italian nurse,
nurse, whose
whose first
first name
name waswas Lucia,
Lucia, thethe
daughter
daughter of of an
an anti-fascist
anti-fascist Italian
Italian union
union leader, “D.”At
leader, "D." At aa meeting
meeting arranged
arranged by by the
the
residency
residencythrough
through the theleaders
leaders of of the
the Friends
Friends of of the
the USSR Society,
Society,Lucia
Lucia said
said that
that she
she
was
was acting
acting only
only asas an
an intermediary.
intermediary. The The letters
letters came
came from
from her
her brother-in-law,
brother-in-law, an an
American
American scientist
scientist working
working on on plutonium
plutonium research
research forfor the
the DuD u Pont
Pont company
company in in
Newport
Newport while while completing
completing aa degreedegree course
course in New York,
in New York, whowho had had asked
asked his
his wife
wife
Regina
Regina to to pass
pass his
his correspondence
correspondence to to the
the Soviet
Soviet consulate
consulate via
via her
her sister
sister Lucia.
Lucia. The
The
scientist-apparently
scientist-apparently the the first
first of
of the
the American
American atom atom spies-was
spies-was recruited
recruited under
under the the
codename
codename MAR; MAR Regina
Regina became
became MONA and and Lucia
Lucia OLIVIA.99
OLIVIA.99
In
In June
June thetheNew
NewYork
York residency
residency forwarded
forwarded intelligence
intelligence onon uranium
uranium isotope
isotope sepa
sepa-
ration through gaseous diffusion from an unidentified
ration through gaseous diffusion from an unidentified agent codenamed KVANT agent code named KVANT
("�antum"
(“Quantum”) ) working
working for for the
the MANHATTAN
MANHATTAN project. project. KVANT
KVANT demandeddemanded pay pay-
ment
ment and and was
was given 300 dollars.loo
given300 dollars.’” On O n July
July 3,3, after
after examining
examining the the latest
latest atomic
atomic intel
intel-
ligence
ligence from
from thethe United
UnitedStates,
States, Kurchatov
Kurchatovwrote wrote to to the
theNKVD
NKVD (probably
(probably to to Beria
Beria in in
person):
person):
II have
have examined
examined the
the attached
attached listlist of
of American
American projects
projects on
on uranium.
uranium. Almost
Almost
every
every one
one of
of them
them is
is of
of great
great interest
interest to us .. .. ..These
to us These materials
materials are
are of
ofenormous
enormous
interest
interest and
and great value .. .. ..The
great value The receipt
receipt of
of further
further information
information of
of this
this type
type is
is
extremely
extremely desirable.lol
desirable.’”
As
As yet,
yet, however,
however, atomic
atomic intelligence
intelligence from
from the United States
the United States was less detailed
was less detailed than
than
that
that obtained
obtained from
from Britain
Britain in 1941-2.1°2Among
in 1941-2.102 Among those
those who
who supplied
supplied some
some of
of the
the fur
fur-
ther intelligence requested by Kurchatov was MAR, who in October
ther intelligence requested by Kurchatov was MAR, who in October1943 was trans- 1943 was trans
ferred
ferred to the Du
tothe D u Pont
Pont plantplant in Hanford,
inHanford, Washington State,
Washington State, which
which produced
produced
plutonium
plutonium forfor the
the MANHATTAN
MANHATTAN project. project. He
H e told
told his
his controller
controller that
that his
his aim
aim was
was
to
to defeat
defeat the
the "criminal"
“criminal”attempt
attempt ofof the
the US
US military
military to
to conceal
conceal the
the construction
construction of of an
an
atomic
atomic bomb from the USSR.lo3Other sources of atomic intelligence included aa
bomb from the USSR.103 Other sources of atomic intelligence included
"progressive
“progressive professor"
professor” in in the
the radiation
radiation laboratory
laboratory atat Berkeley,
Berkeley, California,104
California,lo4and
and-
probably-a
probably-a scientist
scientist in the MANHATTAN
in the MANHATTAN project's project’s metallurgical
metallurgical laboratory
laboratory at at
IDS
Chicago
Chicago University.
University.”’ The
The mercenary
mercenary KVANT
KVANT seemsseems toto have
have faded
faded away,
away, but
but byby
early 1944 another
early 1944 another agent,
agent, aa Communist
Communist construction
construction engineer
engineer codenamed
codenamed FOGEL
T
THHE
E S
SW RD
WOR A
AND T
THHE
E S
S H I EE LL D // I1 Ir 8
(later
(later PERS),
PERS), waswas providing
intelligence onon the
the plant
plant and
and equipment
equipment being
being used
used in
in
the
the MANHATTAN
MANHATTAN project.106 project.lo6There
There is, however, no
is, however, no reliable evidence that
reliable evidence that Soviet
Soviet
intelligence
intelligence yetyet had
had an
an agent inside Los
agent inside Los Alamos.107
Alamos.lo7
The
The penetration
the MANHATTAN project project waswas only
only the
the most
most spectacular
spectacular
part
part of
of aa vast
vast wartime
wartime expansion
expansion of of Soviet
Soviet scientific
scientific and
and technological
technological espionage.
espionage.
S&T fromfrom the
the United
United States
States and
and Britain
Britain made
made aa major
major contribution
contribution to to the
thedevelop
develop-
ment of
ment Soviet radar,
of Soviet radar, radio
radio technology,
technology, submarines,
submarines, jetjet engines,
engines, aircraft
aircraft and
and synthetic
synthetic
lOS
rubber,
rubber, asas well
well as
as nuclear
nuclear weapons.
weapons.”‘ Atomic
Atomic intelligence
intelligence waswas codenamed
codenamed ENORENOR-
MOZ ("Enormous"),
(“Enormous”),jet jetpropulsion
propulsion VOZDUKH ('�ir"), (“Air”),radar
radar RADUGA
RADUGA ("Rain
(“Rain-
bow").109
bow”).109A. S. s.Yakovlev,
Yakovlev, thethe aircraft
aircraft designer
designer and
and Deputy
Deputy Commissar
Commissar of of the
the Aviation
Aviation
Industry,
Industry, paid
paid handsome,
handsome, though
though private,
private, tribute
tribute toto the
the contribution
contribution ofof S&T to to the
the
Soviet aircraft
Soviet aircraft which
which bore
bore his
his name.110
name.’” Political
Political and
and military
intelligence from
from inside
inside
all
all the
the main
main branches
branches of of the
the Roosevelt
Roosevelt administration
administration also also continued
continued to to expand,
expand,
thanks
thanks chiefly
chiefly to
to the
the increasing
increasing activity
activity of
of Akhmerov's
Akhmerov’s Washington
Washington networks.
networks. TheThe
rolls
rolls of
of film
film of classified documents
of classified documents sent
sent by
by his
his illegal
illegal residency
residency to to Moscow
Moscow viavia New
New
York increased from
York increased from 211
211 inin 1943
1943 toto 600 in
in 1944.111
1944.”’
THE
T H E QUA
QUALITYLITY O F political
intelligence from from Britain
Britain probably
probably exceeded
exceeded eveneven that
that
from
from thethe United
United States,
States, partly
partly asas aa result
result ofof thethe greater coordination of
greater coordination of British
British gov
gov-
ernment
ernment and and intelligence
intelligence assessment
assessment through
through the theWar WarCabinet
Cabinetandand thethe Joint Intelli
Joint Intelli-
gence
gence Committee
Committee (of (of which
which there
there were
were no no real
real equivalents
equivalents in theUnited
in the United States,
States,
despite
despite thethe existence
existence ofof bodies
bodies with
with similar
similar names).
names). The The wartime
wartime filesfiles of
of the
the London
London
residency
residency contain
contain what
what Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s summary
summary describesdescribes as as "many
“many secrets
secrets of of the
the
British
British War Cabinet," correspondence
War Cabinet,” correspondence between between Churchill
Churchill and and Roosevelt,
Roosevelt, telegrams
telegrams
exchanged
exchanged between
between the the Foreign
Foreign Office,
Office, the the embassies
embassies in in Moscow,
Moscow, Washington,
Washington,
Stockholm,
Stockholm, AnkaraAnkara andandTehran,
Tehran,and andthethe minister-resident in
minister-resident in Cairo,
Cairo, andand intelligence
intelligence
reports.ll3
reports.’l3 From
From the summer of
the summer of 1942
1942 to to the
thesummer
summer of of 1943,
1943, the
the intelligence
intelligence reports
reports
included
included ULTRA decrypts decrypts direct
direct from
from Bletchley
Bletchley Park, Park, the
the main
main wartime
wartime home home of of
the
the British
British SIGINT agency, agency, where John Cairncross
where John Cairncross spent spent aa year
year asas aa Soviet
Soviet agent.
agent.
His
His controller,
controller, Anatoli
Anatoli Gorsky,
Gorsky, whom,
whom, likelike thethe rest
rest of
of the
the Five,
Five, hehe knew
knew as as "Henry,"
“Henry,”
gave
gave him
him thethe money
money to to buy
buy aa second-hand
second-hand car car toto bring
bring ULTRA to to London
London on on his
his
days
days off 113 Because of
Because of the
the unprecedented
unprecedented wartime wartime collaboration
collaboration of of the
the Anglo
Anglo-
American intelligence communities,
communities, the the London residency was
London residency also able
was also able to
to provide
provide
American
American as as well
well as
as British
British intelligence.114
intelligence.”‘
The
The problem
problem forfor the
the professionally
professionally suspicious
suspicious minds minds in in the
the Centre
Centrewas was that
that itit all
all
seemed
seemed too good to
too good to be
be true.
true. Taking
Taking their
their cue
cue from
from thethe master
master conspiracy
conspiracy theorist
theorist in in
the
the Kremlin,
Kremlin, theythey eventually
eventually concluded
concluded that that what
whatappeared
appeared to to be
be the best intelligence
the best intelligence
ever
ever obtained
obtained from
from Britain
Britain byby any
any intelligence
service waswasatat root
root aa British
British plot.
plot. The
The
Five,
Five, later
later acknowledged
acknowledged as as the
the ablest
ablest group
group of of agents
agents inin KGB history,
history, were
were discred
discred-
ited
ited in
in the
theeyes
eyes of
of the
the Centre
Centreleadership
leadership by by their
their failure
failure to
to provide
provide evidence
evidence of of aa mas-
mas
sive,
sive, non-existent
non-existent British
British conspiracy
conspiracy against
against the the Soviet
Soviet Union.
Union, Of the the reality
reality ofof that
that
conspiracy,
conspiracy, Stalin, and therefore his chief intelligence advisers, advisers, had no doubt. In
October
October 1942 1942 Stalin
Stalin wrote
wrote toto the
the Soviet
Soviet ambassador
ambassador in in Britain,
Britain, Ivan Maisky:
Ivan Maisky:
T
T h e G r aa nn d A
A Zl Z
l ii a n cc e // rI I 9
All of us in Moscow have gained the impression that Churchill

Churchillis aiming at the
the
defeat
defeat of
of the
the USSR, in in order
order then to come
then to come to
to terms
terms with
with the
theGermany
Germany of of
Hitler or Bruning
Briining at the
the expense of our
ourcountry.ll5
country.’l5
Always
Always in in Stalin's
Stalin’s mind
mind when
when he he brooded
brooded on on Churchill's
Churchill’s supposed wartime conspir-
supposed wartime conspir
acies
acies against
against himhim was
was the
the figure
figure of Hitler's
Hitler’s deputy Fuhrer, Rudolf
deputy Fuhrer, Hess, whom,
Rudolf Hess, whom, he he
told Maisky, Churchill was keeping "in reserve." In May 1941
“in reserve.” 1941 Hess
Hesshad had made a
bizarre
bizarre flight
flight to Scotland, in
to Scotland, in the
the deluded
deluded belief that he
belief that he could
could arrange peace between
arrange peace between
Britain and
Britain and Germany.
Germany. Both Both London
London and and Berlin
Berlin correctly
correctly concluded
concluded thatthat Hess
Hess was
was
somewhat
somewhat deranged.
deranged. Stalin,
Stalin, inevitably,
inevitably, believed instead that
believedinstead Hess's flight
that Hess’s flight was part of
was part of
a deeply laid British plot. His suspicions suspicions deepened after the German German invasion in
June.
June. For
For atat least
least the
the next
next two
two years
years he suspected that
he suspected that Hess
Hesswaswas part of aa British
part of con
British con-
spiracy
spiracy to to abandon
abandon its its alliance
alliance with
with the the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union and and sign
sign aa separate
separate peace with
peace with
Germany.l16
Germany.l16At At dinner
dinner with
with Churchill
Churchill in in the Kremlin in
the Kremlin in October
October 19441944 Stalin
Stalin pro
pro-
posed
posed aa toast
toast to
to "the
“theBritish
intelligence service which had
service which had inveigled
inveigled Hess
Hess into com
into com-
ing
ing toto England:"
England:” "He “He could
could not not have
have landed without being
landed without being given signals. The
givensignals. The
intelligence
service must
must havehave been
been behind
behind it it all."117
all.”117Stalin's mood at
Stalin’s mood at dinner
dinner was
was
jovial,
jovial, but
but his conspiracy theory
his conspiracy theory was was deadly
deadly earnest.
earnest. IfIfhis misunderstanding of
his misunderstanding Hess's
of Hess’s
flight
flight to
to Britain
Britain did
did not
not derive
derive fromfrom Centre
Centre intelligence assessments, it
intelligence assessments, it was certainly
was certainly
reinforced
reinforced by them. As
by them. As late
late asas the
the early
early 1990s
1990s the same conspiracy
the same conspiracy theory
theory was was still
still
being publicly
being publicly propounded
propounded by by aa KGB spokesman
spokesman who claimed that
who claimed that inin 1941
1941 Hess
Hess
"brought
“brought the the Fuhrer's
Fuhrer’s peace
peace proposals
proposals with him and
with him and aa plan
plan for
for the invasion of the
the invasion the
Soviet
Soviet Union."
Union.” ThatThat myth
myth is is still,
still, apparently, believed by
apparently, believed some of
by some of their
their SVR
SVR succes
succes-
sors.l1S
sors.’’*
On
O n October 2S, 1943 the
October 25,1943 theCentre
Centreinformed
informed the the London residency that
London residency that ititwas
was now
now
clear,
clear, after
after long
long analysis
analysis ofof the
the voluminous intelligence from
voluminous intelligence from thethe Five,
Five, that
that they
they were
were
double agents,
double agents, working
working on on the theinstructions
instructions of of SIS
SIS andandMIS. As far back as
far back as their
their years
years
at
at Cambridge,
Cambridge,Philby, Maclean and
Philby, Maclean and Burgess
Burgess hadhad probably
probably beenbeen acting
acting onon instructions
instructions
from
from British
intelligence to to infi ltrate the
infiltrate the student
student left before making
left before contact with
making contact with the
the
NKVD.
NKVD. Only Onlythus,
thus, the
the Centre
Centre reasoned,
reasoned, waswas it it possible
possible to to explain
explain why both SIS
why both SIS and
and
MIS
MIS were
were currently
currently employing
employing in in highly
highly sensitive jobs Cambridge
sensitive jobs Cambridge graduates
graduates withwith aa
Communist
Communist background.
background. The The lack
lack of of any
any reference
reference to to British
British recruitment
recruitment of Soviet
of Soviet
agents
agents in in the
the intelligence
intelligence supplied
supplied either S OHNCHEN (Philby)
by SOHNCHEN
either by from SIS
(Philby) from SIS or
or by
by
TONY (Blunt)(Blunt) from
from MIS
MIS was seen as
was seen as further
hrther evidence
evidence thatthat both were being
bothwere being used
used to
to
feed
feed disinformation
disinformation to to the
the NKGB:
NKGB:
During
During the
the entire
entire period
period that
that S[ O HNCHEN] and
S[OHNCHEN] and T[ONY]
T[ONY] worked
worked for
for the
the
British
British special
special services, they
services, they did
did not
not help expose aa single
help expose single valuable
valuable
ISLANDERS
ISLANDERS [British]
[British] agent either in
agent either in the
the USSR or
or in
in the
the Soviet
Soviet embassy in
embassy in
the
the ISLAND
ISLAND [Britain]
[Britain].'
There
There was,
was, of
of course,
course,no
no such
such "valuable
“valuableagent"
agent” for
for Philby
Philby or Blunt to
or Blunt to expose,
expose, but
but that
that
simple
simple possibility
possibilitydid
did not
not occur
occur to
to the
theconspiracy theorists in
conspiracy theorists in the
theCentre. Philby's accu-
Centre. Philby’s accu-
T
THHS
E WSOW
E RO
D NR T
A DHA
D S
EHN I DE LTDH E S H I E L D // I
12 0
20
rate
rate report
report that that "at
“at the
the present
present time
time the
the HOTEL [SIS] [SIS] is is not
not engaged
engaged in in active
active work
work
against
against the the Soviet
Soviet Union"
Union” waswas also,
also,in
in the
theCentre's
Centre’s view,view,obvious
obviousdisinformation.119
di~information.~”
Since
Since thethe Five
Five were
were double
double agents,
agents, itit followed
followed thatthat those
those they they had
had recruited
recruited to to thethe
NKVD
NKVD were were also plants. One
also plants. One example
example which
which particularly
particularly exercised
exercised the the Centre
Centre waswas
the case of
the case of Peter
Peter Smollett
Smollett (ABO),
(ABO), who whoinin1941 1941had had achieved
achieved the the remarkable
remarkable featfeat of of
becoming
becoming head head of of the
the Russian
Russian department
department in in the
thewartime
wartime Ministry
Ministry of of Information.
Information.
By
By 1943 Smollett was
1943 Smollett was using
using hishis position
position to organize pro-Soviet
to organize pro-Soviet propaganda
propaganda on on aa
prodigious
prodigious scale. scale. A vast meeting at
vast meeting theAlbert
at the Albert Hall in in February
February to to celebrate
celebrate thethe
twenty-fifth anniversary of
twenty-fifth anniversary of the
the Red
Red Army
Army included
included songssongs of praise by
of praise byaa massed
massed choir,
choir,
readings by
readings by John
John Gielgud
Gielgud and Laurence Olivier,
andLaurence Olivier, andand was attended by
was attended leading politi
by leading politi-
cians
cians from
from all parties. The
all parties. The film
film USSR
USSR at W ar was
War was shown
shown to to factory
factory audiences
audiences of of one
one
and
and aa quarter
quarter million.
million. In In September
September 1943 1943 alone,
alone, the
the Ministry
Ministry of of Information
Information orga orga-
nized
nized meetings
meetings on on the
theSoviet
Soviet Union
Union for for34 public venues, 35
public venues, 35 factories,
factories, 100100voluntary
voluntary
societies,
societies,28 civil civil defense
defense groups,
groups, 99 schools
schools andand aaprison;
prison; the the BBC in in the same month
thesame month
broadcast
broadcast thirtythirty programs
programs withwith aa substantial
substantial Soviet
Soviet content.120
content.12’ Yet, Yet,because
becauseSmollett
Smollett
had
had been recruited by
been recruited by Philby,
Philby, he was, in
he was, in the
the eyes
eyes ofof the
the Centre,
Centre, necessarily
necessarily aa plant.
plant.
His
His apparently
apparently spectacular
spectacular success
success in in organizing
organizing pro-Soviet
pro-Soviet propaganda
propaganda on on an an
unprecedented
unprecedented scale was thus
scale was thus perversely
perversely interpreted
interpreted as as aa cunning
cunning plot plot by British
by British
intelligence
intelligence to to hoodwink
hoodwink the the NKVD.l2l
NKVD.12’
Even
Even the the hardened
hardened conspiracy
conspiracy theorists
theorists of of the Centre, however,
the Centre, however, had had some
some diffi
diffi-
culty
culty in in explaining
explaining why why the
the Five
Five were
were providing,
providing, along along with with disinformation,
disinformation, such such
large
large amounts
amounts of of accurate
accurate high-grade
high-grade intelligence.
intelligence. In In its
its missive
missive to to the
theLondon resi
Londonresi-
dency
dency of of October
October 25, 25, the
the Centre
Centresuggested
suggested aa number
number of of possible
possible answers
answersto to this
this baf
baf-
fling problem.
fling problem. The The sheer
sheer quantity
quantity of ofForeign
Foreign Office
Office documents
documents supplied supplied by by Maclean
Maclean
might indicate, it
mkht indicate, it believed,
believed, that,
that, unlike
unlike the
the other
otherfour,
four, hehe waswas not consciously deceiving
not consciously deceiving
the
the NKVD,
NMVD, but but was
was merely
merelybeing
being manipulated
manipulated by by the others to
the others to the
thebest of their
best of their abil
abil-
ity.
ity. The Centre also
The Centre also argued
argued thatthat the
the Five
Five were instructed to
were instructed pass on
to pass on important
importantintel
intel-
ligence
ligence about
about Germany
Germany which which diddid not
not harm
harm British
British interests
interests in in order
order to to make
make their
their
disinformation
disinformation about about British
British policy
policy more
more credible.122
credible.122
The
The mostmost valuable
valuable "documentary
“documentary material material about
about the the work
work of the Germans”
of the Germans" in in
1943
1943 waswas thethe German
German decrypts
decrypts supplied
supplied by by Cairncross
Cairncross from from Bletchley
Bletchley Park.
Park. A brief
brief
official
official biography
biography of of Fitin
Fitin published
published by by the
the SVR singles
singles out out for
for special
special mention
mention the the
ULTRA intelligence
intelligence obtained
obtained fromfrom Britain
Britain on on German
Germanpreparations
preparations for for the
the battle
battle of of
Kursk
Kursk whenwhen the the Red
Red Army
Army halted
halted Hitler's
Hitler’s last
last major
major offensive
offensive on on thetheeastern
eastern front.123
front.123
The
The Luftwaffe
Luftwaffe decrypts decrypts provided
provided by by Cairncross
Cairncross were were of of crucial
crucial importance
importance in in
enabling the Red Air Force to launch massive pre-emptive strikes against German
airfields
airfields which destroyed over 500 enemy enemy aircraft.124
aircraft.’24
The
The Centre's
Centre’s addiction
addiction to to conspiracy
conspiracy theory
theory ran ran so so deep,
deep, however,
however, that that itit was
was
capable
capable of regarding the
of regarding agent who
the agent who supplied
supplied intelligence
intelligence of of critical
critical importance
importance before
before
Kursk
Kursk as as part
part of of an
an elaborate
elaborate network
network of of deception.
deception. It therefore
therefore ordered
ordered the the London
London
residency to create a new independent agent network network uncontaminated
uncontaminated by the Five.
But, though
But, thoughthe theFive
Five were "undoubtedly double
were “undoubtedly agents," the
double agents,’’ residency was
the residency was ordered
ordered to to
maintain contact
maintain contact with with them.
them. TheThe Centre
Centre gave
gave three reasons for
three reasons for this
this apparently
apparently concon-
tradictory decision.
decision. First, if British intelligence
intelligence realized that their grand
that their grand deception
T
T h e G r a n dA lAl ilal ni ac ne c e // I
122 I1
involving
involving thethe Five
Five had been discovered,
had been discovered, they they might
might well
well intensify
intensify their search for
their search for the
the
new
new network
network intended
intended to to replace them. Secondly,
replace them. Secondly, the Centre acknowledged
the Centre acknowledged that, that,
despite the
despite the Five's
Five’s "unquestionable
“unquestionable attempts attempts to to disinform
disinform us,"us,” they
they were none the
were none the less
less
providing
providing "valuable
“valuable material
material aboutabout thethe Germans
Germans and and other
other matters."
matters.” Finally,
Finally, "Not
“Not all
all
the
the questions about this
questions about this group
group ofof agents
agents have
have been
been completely
completely cleared
cleared up." The Cen
up.”The Cen-
tre
tre was,
was, inin other
otherwords,
words, seriously
seriously confused
confbsed about
about what
what exactly
exactly the
the Five were up
Five were up tto.125
~ . ’ ~ ~
To
To try
try totodiscover
discover thethe exact
exact nature
nature of of the
the British
intelligence conspiracy,
conspiracy, the
the Cen
Cen-
tre
tre sent,
sent, for
for the
the fi rst time
first time ever,
ever, aa special
special eight-man
eight-man surveillance
surveillance team
team toto the
the London
London
residency
residency to to trail
trail the
the Five
Five andand other
other supposedly
supposedly bogus
bogus Soviet
Soviet agents
agents inin the
the hope
hope of of
discovering
discovering their
their contacts
contacts withwith their
their non-existent
non-existent British
British controllers.
controllers. The
The same
same team
team
also
also investigated
investigated visitors
visitors to the Soviet
to the Soviet embassy,
embassy, somesome of of whom
whom were were suspected
suspected of of
being
being MIS agents provocateurs. The
agentsprouocateurs. The newnew surveillance
surveillance system
system was
was hilariously unsuc
hilariously unsuc-
cessful.
cessful. None
None of of the
theeight-man
eight-man team team spoke
spoke English;
English; all
all wore conspicuously Russian
wore conspicuously Russian
clothes,
clothes, were
were visibly
visiblyill
ill at
at ease
ease in
in English
English surroundings
surroundings and and must frequently have
must frequently dis
have dis-
concerted
concerted those
those they
they followed.
followed.126 126
The
The absurdity
absurdity of of trailing
trailing thethe Five
Five highlights
highlights thethe central
central weakness
weakness in in the
the Soviet
Soviet
intelligence
intelligence system.
system. The
The Centre's
Centre’s ability
ability toto collect
intelligence from
from the
the West
West always
always
comfortably
comfortably exceeded
exceeded its its capacity
capacity to to interpret
interpretwhatwhatitit collected.
collected. Moscow's
Moscow’s view viewof its
of its
British allies
British allies was
was invariably
invariably clouded
clouded by by variable
variable amounts
amounts of of conspiracy
conspiracy theory.
theory. The
The
Soviet leadership was
Soviet leadership was to to find
find itit easier
easier toto replicate
replicate the
the first atomic bomb
first atomic bomb thanthan toto
understand policy-making
understand policy-making in in London.
London.
EE II GG HH TT
VICTO
ORRY
GGiven
iven the
the closeness
closeness of
of the British-American "special
the British-American relationship," the
“specialrelationship,” Centre
theCentre
inevitably
inevitably suspected
suspected that some of
that some of the
the President's
President’s advisers
adviserssympathized
sympathized withwith Church
Church-
ill's
ill’s supposed
supposed anti-Soviet
anti-Soviet plots.1
plots.’ Suspicions
Suspicions of of Roosevelt himself, however,
Roosevelt himself‘, however,were
were never
never
as
as intense
intense as those of
as those Churchill. Nor
of Churchill. Nor did did the
the Centre
Centreform
form conspiracy theories about
conspiracy theories about itsits
American
American agents agents asas preposterous
preposterous as as those
those about
about the the Cambridge
Cambridge Five. Five. Perhaps
Perhaps because
because
the
the NKVD had had penetrated
penetrated the OSS from
the OSS from thethe moment
moment of of its
its foundation,
foundation, it it was
was less
less
inclined
inclined to to believe
believe that
that United
United States
States intelligence
intelligence was was running
running aa system
system of deception
of deception
which
which compared
compared with with the supposed use
thesupposed use ofof the
the Five
Five byby the
the British.
British. The
The CPUSNs
CPUSA’s assisassis-
tance
tance in the operation
in the operation to to assassinate Trotsky, combined
assassinate Trotsky, combined with the enthusiasm
with the enthusiasm with with
which
which it it "exposed
“exposed and and weeded
weeded out out spies
spies and
and traitors,"2
traitor~,”~ appeared
appeared to to make
make itsits under
under-
ground
ground section
section aa reliable
reliable recruiting
recruiting ground.
ground. Vasili Zarubin's regular
Vasili Zarubin’s regularcontacts
contacts with
with thethe
CPUSA leader, leader, Earl
Earl Browder,
Browder, plainly
plainly convinced
convinced him him of the reliability
of the reliability of those covert
of those covert
Party
Party members
members who who agreed
agreed to to provide
provide secretsecretintelligence.
intelligence.
By the
the spring
spring ofof 1943,
1943, however,
however, the the Centre
Centre was was worried
worried about
about the security of
the security of its
its
large
large andand expanding
expanding American
American agent agent network.
network. Zarubin
Zarubin became
became increasingly
increasingly incau
incau-
tious
tious both
both in in his
his meetings
meetings with Party leaders
with Party leaders and and inin arranging
arranging forfor the
the payment
payment to to
them
them of secret subsidies
of secret subsidies from Moscow. One
from Moscow. One of of the files noted
the files noted by Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin records
records
censoriously,
censoriously, "Without
“Without the theapproval
approval of the Central
of the CentralCommittee,
Committee, Zarubin
Zarubin crudely vio
crudely vio-
lated
lated thethe rules
rules ofof clandestinity."
clandestinity.” On O n one occasion Browder
one occasion Browder askedasked Zarubin
Zarubin to deliver
to deliver
Soviet money
Soviet money personally
personally to to the Communist underground
the Communist organization in
underground organization in Chicago;
Chicago;
the
the implication
implication in the KGB file
in the file isis that
that hehe agreed.
agreed. O Onn another occasion, in
another occasion, April
in April
1943, Zarubin traveled
1943, Zarubin traveled to to California
California for for aa secret
secret meeting
meeting with
with Steve Nelson, who
Steve Nelson, who ran
ran
aa secret
secret control
control commission
commission to seek out
to seek out informants
informants and spies in
and spies the Californian
in the Californian
branch
branch of of the
the Communist
Communist Party, Party, but
but failed
failed toto find
find Nelson's home. Only
Nelson’s home. Only on on aasecond
second
visit
visit did
did he
he succeed
succeed in in delivering
delivering the the money.
money. On O n this occasion, however,
this occasion, however, thethe meeting
meeting
was
was bugged
bugged by by the
the FBI whichwhich had had placed
placed listening
listening devices
devices in Nelson's home.3
in Nelson’s home.3 The The
Soviet ambassador
Soviet ambassador in in Washington
Washingtonwas was told
told confidentially
confidentially by none none other
other than
thanRoose
Roose-
velt's
velt’s adviser,
adviser,Harry
Harry Hopkins,
Hopkins,that thata amember of his embassy had been detected pass- pass
ing
ing money
money to to aa Communist
CommunistininCalifornia.4
Calif~rnia.~
Though
Though ZarubinZarubin becamebecame somewhat
somewhat more more discreet
discreet after
after this
this "friendly
“friendly warning,"
warning,”
his
his cover
cover had been blown.
had been blown. Worse
Worse was was yet yet to come. Four
to come. Four months
months later
later Zarubin
Zarubin was was
secretly denounced to
secretly denounced to the
the FBI by Vasili Mironov,
by Vasili Mironov, aa seniorsenior officer
officer in
in the
the New
New York
York
V
V ii cc tt oo rr yy I/ I1 2233
residency
residency whowho hadhad earlier
earlier appealed
appealed unsuccessfully
unsuccessfully to to the
theCentre
Centrefor
for Zarubin's
Zarubin’s recalLs
recall.’
In an
In an extraordinary
extraordinary anonymous
anonymous letter letter toto Hoover
Hoover on on August
August 7, 1943,, Mironov
7, 1943 Mironoviden iden-
tified
tified Zarubin
Zarubin and and ten
ten other
other leading
leading members
members of of residencies
residencies operating
operating under under diplo
diplo-
matic
matic cover
cover inin the
theUnited
UnitedStates,
States, himself
himself included,
included, as as Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence officers.
officers.He He
also
also revealed
revealedthatthat Browder
Browder was was closely
closelyinvolved
involvedwith
with Soviet
Soviet espionage
espionage and and identified
identified
the
the Hollywood
Hollywood producer
producer Boris Boris Morros
Morros (FROST)
(FROST) as as aa Soviet
Soviet agent.
agent. Mironov's
Mironov’s
motives
motives derived partly from personal loathing for Zarubin himself. He told Hoover,
derived partly from personal loathing for Zarubin himself. He told Hoover,
speaking
speaking of of himself
himself in in the
the third
thirdperson,
person, thatthat Zarubin
Zarubin and and Mironov
Mironov "both “bothhate hateeach
each
other."
other.” Mironov
Mironov also also appears
appears to to have
have been
been tortured
tortured by by aa sense
sense ofof guilt
guilt forfor his
his part
part in in
the
the NKVD's
NKVD’s massacre
massacre of of the
the Polish
Polish officer
officer corps
corps in 1940. Zarubin,
in 1940. Zarubin, he he told
told Hoover,
Hoover,
"interrogated
“interrogated and and shot
shot Poles
Poles in in Kozelsk,
Kozelsk, Mironov
Mironov in in Starobelsk."
Starobelsk.” (In (In reality,
reality, though
though
Zarubin
Zarubin did did interrogate
interrogate some some of of the
the Polish
Polish officers,
officers, he he does
does notnot appear
appear to to have
have beenbeen
directly
directlyinvolved
involved in in their
their execution.)
execution.) But But there
there are
are also
alsoclearclearsigns
signsin
in Mironov's
Mironov’s letter,
letter,
if
if not
not of
of mental
mental illness,
illness, at
at least
least ofof the
the paranoid mindset generated
paranoid mindset generated by by the
the Terror.
Terror. He He
accused Zarubin of being a Japanese agent and his wife
accused Zarubin of being a Japanese agent and his wife of working for Germany, andof working for Germany, and
concluded
concluded bizarrely:
bizarrely: "If
“Ifyou
you proveproveto to Mironov
Mironovthat thatZ isis working
working for for the
the Germans
Germansand and
Japanese,
Japanese, he he will
will immediately
immediately shoot shoot him him without
withoutaatrial,trial, asas he
he too
too holds
holds aa very
very highhigh
post
post inin the
theNKVD."6
NKVD.”6
By
By the
the time
timeMironov's
Mironov’s extraordinary
extraordinary denunciation
denunciation reached reached the the FBI,
FBI, Zarubin
Zarubin had had
moved
moved from from NewNew York
York to to Washington-a
Washington-a move move probably
probably prompted
prompted by by the
the steady
steady
growth
growth in in intelligence
intelligence of of all
all kinds
kinds from
from within
within the the Roosevelt
Roosevelt administration.
administration. As As thethe
senior
senior NKVD
NKVD officerofficer inin the
theUnited
UnitedStates,
States, Zarubin
Zarubin retained
retained overall
overall control
control in in Wash
Wash-
ington
ington of of the
the New
NewYork
York andand San San Francisco
Francisco residencies;
residencies; responsibility
responsibility for for liaison
liaison withwith
the
the head
head of of the
the CPUSA,
CPUSA, Browder,Browder, and and with
with thethe head
head of of the
the illegal
illegal residency,
residency,Akh Akh-
merov;
merov; and and direct
direct control
control of of some
some of of his
his favorite
favorite agents,
agents, amongamong them them the the French
French
politician
politician Pierre
Pierre Cot
Cot andand thethe British
officer Cedric
Cedric Belfrage,
Belfrage, whom whom he he
took
took over
over from
from Golos.7
Go~os.~
With
With hishis cover
cover blown,
blown, however,
however, Zarubin
Zarubin foundfound life
life in
in Washington
Washington difficult.
difficult.OneOne of of
his
his most
most humiliating
humiliating moments
moments came came at at aa dinner
dinner forfor members
members of of the
the Soviet
Soviet embassy
embassy
given
given early
earlyin 1944 by
in 1944 by the
the governor
governor of of Louisiana,
Louisiana, Sam Sam Houston
Houston Jones.8
Jones.8Mter After dinner,
dinner,
as
as guests
guests wandered
wandered round round the the governor's
governor’s househouse in in small
small groups,
groups, aa lady
lady whowho appeared
appeared
to
to know
know that
that Zarubin
Zarubin was was aa senior
senior NKGB
NKGB officer,
officer, turned
turned to to him
him andand said,
said, "Have
“Have aa
seat,
seat, General!"
General!” Zarubin,
Zarubin, whose
whose fuse fuse and
and sense
sense of of humor
humor were were both
both somewhat
somewhat short, short,
took
took the
the seat
seat but
but replied stiffly, "I
replied stiffly, “I am
am notnot aa general!"
general!” Another
Another guest,guest, whowho identified
identified
himself
himself as as an
an officer
officer inin military
intelligence, complimented
complimented the the lady
lady on on her
her inside
inside
knowledge.
knowledge. He He then
then caused
caused Zarubin
Zarubin further
further embarrassment
embarrassment by by asking
asking forfor his
his views
views on on
the
the massacre
massacre of 16,000Polish
of16,000 Polish officers,
officers,some
some of of whose
whose bodies
bodies had had been
been exhumed
exhumed in in the
the
Katyn
Katyn woods.
woods. Zarubin
Zarubin replied
replied thatthat German
Germanallegations
allegations that that thetheofficers
officers hadhad been
been shotshot
by
by the
the NKVD (as (as indeed
indeed they they had)
had) were
were aa provocation
provocation intendedintended to to sow
sow dissension
dissension
within
within thethe Grand
GrandAlliance
Alliance whichwhich wouldwould deceive
deceiveonlyonly thethe naive.9
naive.’
Zarubin
Zarubin subsequently
subsequently sought sought to to persuade
persuade the the Centre
Centre that that his
his humiliating
humiliating loss loss of of
cover was due
cover was due not to his
not to his own
own indiscretion
indiscretion but but toto the
the fact
fact that the Americans
that the Americans had had
somehow
somehow discovered
discovered thatthat he hehad hadinterrogated
interrogated imprisoned
imprisoned Polish Polish officers
officers in in Kozelsk.
Kozelsk.
The
The Centre
Centre waswas unimpressed.
unimpressed. In In aa letter
letter toto the
the Central
CentralCommittee,
Committee,thetheNKGB NKGB Per-
Per-
T
THHE
E S
SW OR
WO RD
D A
ANND
D T
THH SE
EH S
I EHLI DE L D // I1 22 44
sonnel
sonnel Directorate
Directorate reported
reported thatthat his
his period
period asas resident
resident inin the
theUnited
UnitedStates
States hadhad been
been
marked
marked by by aa series
series ofof blunders.10
blunders.” Mironov
Mironov not notlonglongbefore
before had
had informed
informed on on Zarubin
Zarubin
to
to Hoover,
Hoover, now now appears
appears to to have
have written
written to to Stalin,
Stalin, accusing
accusing Zarubin
Zarubin of being in
of being in con
con-
tact
tact with
with the theFBI.ll
FBI.” In In the
the summer
summer of of 1944,
1944, both bothZarubin
Zarubinand
and Mironov
Mironov were were recalled
recalled
to
to Moscow.
Moscow. AnatoliAnatoli Gorsky,
Gorsky7who until aa few
who until months earlier
few months had been
earlier had been resident
resident in in
London,
London, succeeded
succeeded Zarubin
Zarubin in in Washington.12
Washington.12
Once
Once backback inin Moscow,
Moscow, ZarubinZarubin quickly
quickly succeeded
succeeded in in reestablishing
reestablishing his his position
position at at
the
the expense
expense of of Mironov
Mironov and and was
was appointed
appointed deputy
deputy chief
chief of
of foreign
intelligence. By
the
the time
time he he retired
retired three
three years
years later,
later, allegedly
allegedly on on grounds
grounds of of ill
ill health,
health, he he had
had suc
suc-
ceeded
ceeded in in taking
taking much
much of of the
the credit
credit for
for the
the remarkable
remarkable wartime
wartime intelligence
intelligence obtained
obtained
from
from thethe United States, and
United States, and was
was awarded
awarded two two Orders
Orders of Lenin, two
of Lenin, two Orders
Orders of of the
the
Red
Red Banner,
Banner, one one Order
Order of of the
the Red
Red Star,
Star, and numerous medals.13
and numerous medals.13Mironov,
Mironov, by con
by con-
trast,
trast, was sentenced soon
was sentenced soon after
after his
his return
return to to Moscow
Moscow to to fi ve years
five years in
in aa labor camp,
labor camp,
probably
probably for for making
making false accusations against
false accusations Zarubin. In
against Zarubin. In 1945
1945 he he tried
tried toto smuggle
smuggle
out
out of
of prison
prison to to the
the US embassy
embassy in Moscow information
in Moscow information aboutabout thethe NKVD massacre
massacre
of
of Polish
Polish officers similar to
officers similar to that which, unknown
that which, unknown to to the
the Centre,
Centre, he he had sent to
had sent to the
the
FBI twotwo years
years earlier.
earlier. On
O n this
this occasion
occasion Mironov
Mironov was was caught
caught in in the
the act,
act, given
given aa sec
sec-
ond
ond trial
trial and
and shot.
shot.1414
Even
Even after
after the
the recall
recall ofof Zarubin
Zarubin and and Mironov,
Mironov, feuding
feuding andand denunciations
denunciations contin
contin-
ued
ued within
within the theAmerican
American residencies.
residencies. As As with
with Mironov's
Mironov’s bizarre
bizarre accusations,
accusations, somesome of of
the
the feuds
feuds hadhad an an almost
almost surreal
surreal quality
quality about
about them.
them. In In August
August 1944 1944 the the newly
newly
appointed
appointed resident
resident in in San
San Francisco,
Francisco, Grigori
Grigori Pavlovich
Pavlovich Kasparov,
Kasparov, telegraphed
telegraphed to to the
the
Centre a bitter
bitter denunciation of the resident in Mexico City, Lev Tarasov, Tarasov, who, he
claimed,
claimed, had had bungled
bungled attempts
attempts to to liberate
liberate Trotsky's
Trotsky‘s assassin,
assassin, Ramon
Ramon Mercader,
Mercader, and and
had
had adopted
adopteda a"grand
“grand lifestyle."
lifestyle.” As well
well asas renting
renting aahouse
house with
with grounds
grounds and employ
and employ-
ing
ing two servants in
two servants addition to
in addition to the
the staff allocated to
staff allocated to him,
him, Tarasov
Tarasov waswas alleged
alleged to be
to be
spending
spending too too much
much time time breeding
breeding parrots,
parrots, poultry
poultry and other birdsY
and other birds.” TheThe fatefate ofof
Tarasov's denounced parrots
Tarasov’s denounced parrots is is not
not recorded.
recorded.
There was dissension
dissension too ininNew New York, where the inexperienced 28-year-old
Stepan Apresyan (MAY) had hadbeen appointed resident early in 1944, 1944,despite the fact
that
that hehe had
had never
never previously
previously been been outside
outside the the Soviet Union. His
Soviet Union. His appointment
appointment was was
bitterly
bitterly resented
resented by his his much
much moremore experienced
experienced deputy, Roland Abbiate
deputy, Roland Abbiate (alias
(alias "Vlad
“Vlad-
imir
imir Pravdin," codenamed SERGEI),
Pravdin,” codenamed SERGEI), whose whose previous
previous assignments
assignments had had included
included the the
liquidation of the defector Ignace Poretsky. Poretsky. Operating under undercover as asthe Tass bureau
chief in New York, Abbiate had a grasp of of American conditions which greatly ex ex-
ceeded Apresyan's,
Apresyan’s, but his career continued to be held back by the fact that, although
he had
hadbeen born ininSt. St. Petersburg in 1902, 1902,his parents were French and had hadreturned
to France in 1920.1920. Abbiate had returned with them, them,living in France until his recruit recruit-
ment by the OGPU as an illegal in 1932.16 1932.16
As
As aa stop-gap
stop-gap measure
measure to to compensate
compensate for for Apresyan's
Apresyan’s nownow visible
visible incompetence,
incompetence,
the
the Centre
Centre gave
gave Abbiate
Abbiate virtually
virtually equal status with
equal status with Apresyan
Apresyan in in the
the autumn
autumnof 1944
of 1944
in
in running
running the the residency.
residency. Abbiate
Abbiate responded
responded by by telegraphing
telegraphing to to Moscow
Moscow aa scathing
scathing
attack
attack onon Apresyan,
Apresyan, whom whom he he condemned
condemned as as "incapable
“incapable of of dealing
dealing with
with thethe tasks
tasks
which are set him" him” or of of gaining
gainingthe therespect of of his staff:
staff:
V
V ii cc tt oo rr yy / I1 22 55
MAY [Apresyan]
[Apresyan] is
is utterly
utterly without the knack
without the knack of dealing with
of dealing people, fre-
with people, fre
quently showing
shgwing himself excessively
excessively abrupt and inclined to nag, and too rarely
finding time to chat with them.Sometimes our operational workers .. .. .. cannot
withthem.
get an answer to an urgent
urgent question from him for several
several days time.. .. .. A
days at aa time
worker who has no experience
experience of work abroad cannot cope on his own with the the
work of directing the TYRE OFFICE
OFFICE [New York residency].
residency] .
The real responsibility,

responsibility, Abbiate clearly implied, rested with the Centre
Centre for appoint-
appoint
ing such an obviously unsuitable and unqualified resident.”
resident.17 The civil war between
the resident and his deputy continued for just over a year before ending ininvictory for
Abbiate. In March 1945
1945Apresyan was transferred to San Francisco, leaving
leavingAbbiate
IS
as resident in New
NewYork.
York.18
W
W HHIILLEE THE
THE WAW A SS H
HIINN G T O N and
and New
New York
York residencies
residencies were both in
wereboth insome turmoil in
some turmoil in
the
the summer
summer of of 1944,
1944, sanity
sanity was
was returning
returning to London. The
to London. Magnificent Five
The Magnificent Five were
were
officially
officially absolved
absolved of of all suspicion
suspicion ofof being double agents
being double agents controlled
controlled by by the
the British.
British.
On
O n June
June 2929 the
the Centre
Centreinformed
informed thethe London
London residency, then headed
residency, then headed by by Konstantin
Konstantin
Mikhailovich
Mikhailovich Kukin (codenamed IGOR),19
Kukin (codenamed that recent
IGOR),19 that recent important documents
important SIS documents
provided
provided by by Philby
Philby had had been
been largely
largely corroborated
corroborated by material from
by material from "other
“other sources"
sources”
(some probably in the
(some theAmerican OSS, OSS, with whom SIS exchanged many highly clas- clas
sified
sified reports):20
reports):20"This
“This is is aa serious
serious confirmation
confirmation ofof S[ OHNCHEN] ,s honesty
S[OHNCHEN]’s honesty in in his
his
work
work with
with us,
us, which
which obliges
obliges usus to
to review our attitude
review our toward him
attitude toward him andand the entire
the entire
group."
group.” It It was
was now
now clear,
clear, the
the Centre
Centre acknowledged, that intelligence
acknowledged, that intelligence from
from the Five
the Five
was
was "of“ofgreat
great value,"
value,” andand contact
contact with
with them must be
them must be maintained
maintained atat all costs:
all costs:
On
O n our
our behalf
behalf express
express much
much gratitude
gratitude to
to S[ OHNCHEN] for
S[OHNCHEN] for his work.. .. .. If
his work If
you
you find
find itit convenient
convenient and
and possible,
possible, offer O
S[ HNCHEN] in
offer S[OHNCHEN] in the most tactful
the most tactful
way
way aa bonus
bonus of of 100 pounds or
100 pounds or give him aagift
give him of equal
giftof equal value.
value.
After
After six
six years
years in
in which
which hishis phenomenal
phenomenal work work asas aa penetration
penetration agent
agent had been fre-
had been fre
quently
quently undervalued,
undervalued, ignored
ignored or or suspected
suspected byby the
the Centre,
Centre, Philby
Philby waswas almost
almost pathet
pathet-
ically
ically grateful
grateful for
for the
the long
long overdue
overdue recognition
recognition of of his
his achievements.
achievements. "During“During thisthis
decade of
decade of work,"
work,” hehe told
told Moscow,
Moscow, "I “I have
have never been so
never been deeply touched
so deeply touched as as now
now with
with
your
your gift
gift and
and no
no less
less deeply
deeply excited
excited bybyyour communication [of
yourcommunication thanks] ,"21
[of thanks].”21
High
High among
among the
the intelligence
intelligence which
which restored
restored the
the Centre's
Centre’s faith
faith inin Philby were his
Philby were his
reports,
reports, beginning
beginning early
early in
in 1944,
1944, on
on the
thefounding
founding by SIS of
by SIS of aa new Section IX
new Section "to study
IX“to study
past records
past records of Soviet and
of Soviet and Communist
Communist activity."
activity.”Urged
Urged on on by his new
by his new controller,
controller, Boris
Boris
Krotenschield
Krotenschield (alias
(alias Krotov,
Krotov,codenamed KRECHIN), Philby
codenamed KRECHIN), Philby succeeded
succeeded at at the
theend
end ofof
the
the year
year in
in becoming head of
becoming head of an expanded Section
anexpanded Section E, with aaremit
IX, with remit for for “the
"the collection
collection
and
and interpretation
interpretation ofof information concerning Soviet
information concerning Soviet and Communist espionage
and Communist espionage andand
subversion
subversion inin all parts
parts ofof the
the world
world outside British territory.”
outside British territory." As one one ofof his
his SIS col-
col
leagues,
leagues, Robert
Robert Cecil,
Cecil, wrote
wrote later,
later, "Philby
“Philby atat one
one stroke had .. .. .. ensured
stroke had ensured that the
that the
whole
whole post-war
post-war effort
effort to
to counter
counter Communist espionage would
Communist espionage would become
become knownknown in in the
the
Kremlin. The
Kremlin. history of
The history of espionage records few,
espionage records few, if
if any, comparable masterstrokes."22
any,comparable masterstroke^."^^
TT H
HSEE WS O
WRO
D RN DT
A D HAS
ENHD
I E LT DH E S H I E L D // I1 22 6
6
At
At about
about the the same
same time time that
that Philby
Philby was was given
given hishis present,
present, Cairncross
Cairncross was was belat
belat-
edly
edly rewarded
rewarded for for his
his contribution
contribution to tothe
theepic
epic Soviet
Sovietvictory
victory at at Kursk.
Kursk. Krotenschield
Krotenschield
informed
informed him him thatthat hehe had
had been
been awarded
awarded one one of of the
the highest
highest SovietSoviet decorations,
decorations, the the
Order
Order of of the
the RedRed Banner.
Banner. He H e opened
opened aa velvet-lined
velvet-lined box, box, tooktook outoutthe thedecoration
decoration and and
placed
placed it it in
inCairncross's
Cairncross’s hands. hands. Krotenschield
Krotenschield reported reported to to the
theCentre
Centrethat thatCairncross
Cairncross
was
was visibly
visiblyelated
elated by by the
the award,
award, though
though he hewas
was told
told toto hand
handititbackback forfor safekeeping
safekeeping in in
Moscow.23
Moscow.23The The award
award camecame too too late,
late, however,
however,to to achieve
achieve its its full effect.
effect. InIn the
the summer
summer
of 943, exhausted
of 11943, exhausted by by thethe strain
strain of of his
his regular
regular car car journeys
journeys to to London
London to to deliver
deliver
ULTRA decrypts to Gorsky, and probably discouraged
decrypts to Gorsky, and probably discouraged by Gorsky‘slack of apprecia-by Gorsky's lack of apprecia
tion,
tion, Cairncross
Cairncross had had leftleft Bletchley
Bletchley Park.Park. Though
Though he he succeeded
succeeded in in obtaining
obtaining aajob jobinin
SIS,
SIS, first
first inin Section
Section V (Counterintelligence),
(Counterintelligence), then then in in Section
Section I (Political
(Political Intelli
Intelli-
gence),
gence), his his importance
importance ininthe theCentre's
Centre’s eyes eyes now
now ranked
ranked clearly
clearly below
belowthatthat ofof Philby.24
Philby.24
Unlike
Unlike Philby, Cairncross did not get on well with his SIS colleagues. The head
Philby, Cairncross did not get on well with his SIS colleagues. The head of of
Section
Section I, I, David
David Footman,
Footman, found found him him "an “an odd
odd person,
person, withwith aachip chip onon his
his shoulder."25
shoulder.”25
Encouraged
Encouraged by by the
the Centre's
Centre’s new new appreciation
appreciation of of their
their talents,
talents, the
the other
other members
members
of
of the
the Five-Maclean,
Five-Maclean,Burgess Burgess and and Blunt-became
Blunt-becameeveneven more more productive
productive than than
before.
before. In In the
the spring
spring of 944 Maclean
of 11944 Maclean was was posted
posted to to the
theWashington
Washingtonembassy,embassy,wherewhere
he
he was
was soon
soon promoted
promoted to to first
first secretary.
secretary. His His zeal
zeal was
was quickly
quickly apparent.
apparent. According
According to to
one
one ofof his
his colleagues,
colleagues, "No “No task
task waswas tootoo hard
hard forfor him;
him; no no hours
hours were
were too too long.
long. He He
gained
gained the the reputation
reputation of of one
one who
who would
would always
always taketake over
over aa tangled
tangled skein
skein from
from aa col
col-
league
league who who was was sick,
sick, or or going
going on on leave,
leave, or or simply
simply lessless zealous."
zealous.”The The mostmost sensitive,
sensitive,
and
and in the NKGB's
in the NKGB’s view view probably
probably the the most
most important,
important, area area ofof policy
policy in in which
which
Maclean
Maclean succeeded
succeeded in in becoming
becoming involved
involved by by early 1945 was
early 1945 was Anglo-American
Anglo-American col col-
laboration
laboration in in thethebuilding
building of of the
the atomic
atomic bomb.26
bomb.26
Burgess
Burgess increased
increased his his usefulness
usefulness to the NKGB by
to the by gaining
gaining aa job job inin the
the Foreign
Foreign
Office press department soon after Maclean was posted
Office press department soon after Maclean was posted to Washington. Claiming to Washington. Claiming no no
doubt
doubt thatthat he herequired
required access
access to to aawide
wide range
range of of material
material to to be
be adequately
adequately informed
informed
for
for press
press briefings,
briefings, Burgess
Burgess regularly
regularly filled
filled aa large
large holdall
holdall with with Foreign
Foreign Office
Office docu
docu-
ments,
ments, some some of of them
them highly
highly classified,
classified, and and took them to
took them to bebe photographed
photographed by by the
the
NKGB. The holdall, however, was almost his undoing.
The holdall, however, was almost his undoing. At a meeting with Kroten- At a meeting with Kroten
schield,
schield, Burgess
Burgess was wasapproached
approached by by aa police
police patrol,
patrol, whowho suspected
suspected that that thethe bag
bag con
con-
tained
tained stolen
stolen goods.
goods. Once Once reassured
reassured that thatthe the twotwo men men had had no no housebreaking
housebreaking
equipment
equipment and andthatthatthethe hold all contained
holdall contained only only papers,
papers, the the patrol
patrol apologized
apologized and and pro
pro-
ceeded
ceeded on on itsits way.
way. Though
Though BurgessBurgess may may subsequently
subsequently have used aa bag
have used bag which
which lessless
resembled
resembled that that of of aa housebreaker,
housebreaker, his his productivity
productivity was was unaffected.
unaffected. According
According to to one
one
of
of the
the files
files examined
examined by by Mitrokhin,
Mitrokhin, of of the
the Foreign
Foreign OfficeOffice documents
documents provided
provided by by
Burgess
Burgess in in the
thefirst
first six
six months
months of of 1945,
1945,389 389 were
were classified
classified "top “top secret."27
secret.”27
Blunt's
Blunt’s productivity
productivitywas was prodigious
prodigious too. too. In
In addition
addition to to providing
intelligence from from
MIS,
MIS, he he continued
continued to runLeo
to run Leo Long
Long in in military
intelligence, and and in inthethe crucial
crucial
months
months beforebefore D-Day
D-Day gainedgained access
access to to Supreme
Supreme Headquarters
Headquarters Allied Allied Expeditionary
Expeditionary
Force
Force (SHAEF),
(SHAEF), not not farfar from
from MIS MIS headquarters.28
headquarters.28Part Part of Blunt's contribution
of Blunt’s contribution to to
NKGB
NKGB operations
operations in in London
London was was to to keep
keep the the residency
residency informed
informed of of the
the nature
nature andand
extent
extent of of MIS
MI5 surveillance.
surveillance.Intelligence
Intelligence which which he he provided
provided in 1945revealed
in 1945 revealed that that MIS
MI5
V
V ii cc tt oo rr yy / I
12 7
had
had discovered
discovered thatthat his
his Cambridge
Cambridge contemporary,
contemporary,James
James Klugmann,
Klugmann, was was aa Commu
Commu-
nist
nist spy.
spy. In
I n 1942
1942 Klugmann
Klugmann had had joined
joined thetheYugoslav
Yugoslav section
section ofof SOE
SOE Cairo,
Cairo, where
where his
his
intellect,
intellect, charm
charm andand fluent Serbo-Croat gave
fluent Serbo-Croat gave him
him an
an influence
influence entirely
entirely dispropor
dispropor-
tionate
tionate totohis
his relatively
relativelyjunior
junior rank
rank (which
(which eventually
eventually rose
rose to
to major).
major). As well
well as
as brief
brief-
ing
ing Allied
Allied offi cers about
officers about toto be
be dropped
dropped into
into Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, he
he also
also briefed
briefed the
the NKGB on on
British
British policy
policy andand secret
secret operations.
operations. InIn both
both sets
sets of
of briefings
briefings hehe sought
sought toto advance
advance
the interests ofTito's
the interests ofTito’s Communist
Communist partisans
partisans over those ofMihailovich's
over those ofMihailovich‘s royalist
royalist Chet
Chet-
niks.
niks. For
For four
four months
months in in 1945
1945 he
he served
served inin Yugoslavia
Yugoslavia with
with the
the British
British military mis
military mis-
sion
sion toto Tito's
Tito’s forces.
forces. Blunt
Blunt was
was able
ableto
to warn
warn Krotenschield
Krotenschield that
that MI5
MIS listening
listening devices
devices
in
in the British Communist
the British Communist Party Party headquarters
headquarters in in King
King Street,
Street, London,
London, had recorded
hadrecorded
aa conversation
conversation in in which
which Klugmann boasted of
Wugmann boasted of secretly passing classified
secretly passing classified information
information
to
to the
theYugoslav
Yugoslav Communists.29
communist^.^^
W I T H T H E EXCE X CEEPPT T I O N of
of the
the Five,
Five, potentially
potentially the the most
most important
important Soviet Soviet spy spy inin
Britain
Britain was
was the
the nuclear
nuclear physicist
physicist Klaus
Klaus Fuchs,
Fuchs, recruited
recruited byby the
the G GRURU late
late in in 1941
1941.30.30
When
When Fuchs
Fuchs left
left for
for the
the United
United States
States late
late in
in 1943
1943 as as part
part ofof the
the British
British team team chocho-
sen
sen to
to take
take part
part in in the
theMANHATTAN
MANHATTANproject, project, he he was-though
was-though he he did
did notnot realize
realize
it-transferred
it-transferred from from GRU to to NKGB controlcontrol and and given
given the
the codename
codename REST (later (later
changed
changed to to CHARLES).31
CHARLES).31Earlier Earlier inin 1943,
1943, the
the Centre
Centrehad hadinstructed
instructed its its residencies
residencies
in
in Britain
Britain and
and thethe United
United States
States that
that "[t]he
“[tlhe brain
brain centers
centers [scientitic
[scientific research
research estab
estab-
lishments]
lishments] mustmust comecome within
within ourour jurisdiction."
jurisdiction.” Not Not for
for the
the first
first time,
time, thethe GRU was was
forced
forced toto give
give way
wayto to thethe demands
demands of of its
its more
more powerful
powerful "neighbor."32
“ n e i g h b ~ r . In
”~~ 1944
1944 I nMelita
Melita
Norwood,
Norwood, the the long-serving
long-serving Soviet Soviet agent
agent in in the
the British
British Non-Ferrous
Non-Ferrous Metals Metals Associ
Associ-
ation, ceased contact with
ation, ceased contact with SONYA of the SONYA of the GRU and
and was given an NKGB con
was given an NKGB con-
troller.33
troller.33 In
In March
March 1945, 1945, after
after herher employer
employer won won aa contract
contract from from the the TUBE
ALLOYS project,project, Norwood
Norwood gained gained access
access to to documents
documents of of atomic
atomic intelligence34
intelligence3‘
which
which the Centre described
the Centre described as as "of
“of great
great interest
interest andand aa valuable
valuable contribution
contribution to to the
the
development
development of of work
work in in this
this fi eld." She
field.” She waswas instructed
instructed to to say
say nothing
nothing about
about her her espi
espi-
onage
onage work
work to to her
her husband,
husband, and and inin particular
particular to to give
give nono hint
hint of of her
herinvolvement
involvement in in
atomic
atomic intelligence.35
intelligen~e.~’ Atomic
Atomic intelligence
intelligence fromfrom London
London and and thethe American
American residenresiden-
cies was complementary
cies was complementary as as well
well asas overlapping.
overlapping. According
According to to Vladimir
Vladimir Barkovsky,
Barkovsky,
head
head ofof S&T
S&T at at thetheLondon
Londonresidency,
residency, “In "In the
theUSA we we obtained
obtained information
information on on how
how
the
the bomb
bombwas made and
was made and inin Britain
Britain of what ititwas
ofwhat was made,
made, so so that
that together
together [intelligence
[intelligence
from
from the
the two
two countries]
countries] covered
covered thethe whole
whole problem."36
problem.”36
On
O n February
February 5, 1944 Fuchs
5,1944 Fuchs hadhad his
his first
first meeting
meeting in in New
NewYork's
York‘s East
East Side
Side withwith his
his
NKGB
NKGB controller,
controller, Harry
Harry GoldGold (codenamed
(codenamed successively GOOSE and
successively GOOSE and ARNO),
ARNO), an an
industrial
industrial chemist
chemist bornborn in in Switzerland
Switzerland of of Russian
Russian parents.37
parents.37Fuchs
Fuchs was was told
told to to iden
iden-
tify
ti@himself
himself by by carrying
carrying aa tennis
tennis ball
ball in
in his
his hand
hand and and toto look
look forfor aa man
man wearing
wearing one one
pair
pair of
of gloves
gloves and
and carrying
carrying another.38
another.38Gold,Gold, whowho introduced
introduced himself
himself as as "Raymond,"
“Raymond,”
reported
reported to to Leonid
LeonidKvasnikov,
Kvasnikov,head head ofof S&T
S&T at at the
theNewNew York
York residency
residency (later
(later known
known
as Line X),
as Line X), that
that Fuchs
Fuchs had "greeted him
had “greeted him pleasantly
pleasantly but but was
was rather
rather cautious
cautious at at first."39
Fuchs
Fuchs later
later claimed,
claimed, after
after his
his arrest
arrest in
in 1949,
1949, that
that during
during their
theirmeetings
meetings "the “the attitude
attitude
of'Raymond'
of ‘Raymond’was was atat all
all times
times that
that of
of an
an inferior."
inferior.” Gold
Gold admitted,
admitted,afterafter his
his own
own arrest
arrest
TT H
HSEE WS OWR O
DRD A
AN D
ND T
TH EH S
HSE I EHL I DE L D // I1 22 88
by
by the
the FBI,
FBI, that
that he hewaswas overawed
overawedbybythe the extraordinary
extraordinary intelligence
intelligence which
which Fuchs
Fuchs propro-
vided and had found the idea of an atomic bomb "so
vided and had found theidea of an atomic bomb “so frightening that theonly thingfrightening that the only thing
II could
could do do was
was shove
shoveit it away
away asasfar farback
back inin mymy mindmind asas II could
could and
and simply
simply not not think
think
on
on the
the matter
matteratatall."40
all.7740
On
O n July
July 25, 1944 the
25,1944 the New
NewYork York residency
residency telegraphed
telegraphed the the Centre:
Centre:''Almost
“Almosthalf half aa
year
year of contact established with REST [Fuchs] has demonstrated the value of his
of contact established with REST [Fuchs] has demonstrated the value of his
work
work forfor us."
us.” It asked
asked permission
permission to to pay
pay him
him aa "reward"
“reward”of of 500
500 dollars.
dollars. The
The Centre
Centre
agreed,
agreed, but,but, before
before the the money
money couldcould be be handed
handed over, over, Fuchs
Fuchs had had disappeared.41
di~appeared.~’ It
It was
was
over
over three months before
threemonths before Gold
Gold discovered
discovered that that Fuchs
Fuchs had had been
been posted
posted to to LosLos
Alamos,
Alamos, and and he hedid did notnot
renew
renew contact
contact withwith himhimuntiluntilFuchs
Fuchs returned
returned to to the
theeast
east coast
coast
on
on leave
leave in in February
February 1945.42
1945.42
During
During 11944 944 Kvasnikov's
Kvasnikov’s responsibilities
responsibilities were were extended:
extended: he he was given the
was given the new new
post
post of
of S&TS&T resident
resident for for the
the whole
whole of of the
the United
United States-a
States-a certain
certain indication
the
increasing
increasing priority
priority of of atomic
atomic espionage.43
espionage.43Late Late inin 1944
1944 Kvasnikov
Kvasnikov was wasable ableto
to inform
inform
the
the Centre
Centre that, that,ininaddition
addition to to Fuchs,
Fuchs, there
there were
were nownow twotwo more
more prospective
prospective spiesspies at at
Los
Los Alamos.
Alamos.
The
The first,
first, David
David Greenglass,
Greenglass, was was recruited
recruited through
through aagroupgroup of of S&T
S&T agents
agents run run by by
Julius Rosenberg (codenamed successively ANTENNA
Julius Rosenberg (codenamed successively ANTENNA and LIBERAL), a26-year- and LIBERAL), a 26-year
old
old New
New York York Communist
Communist with with aa degree
degree in in electrical
electrical engineering.
engineering. Like Like Fuchs,
Fuchs, the the
members
members of of the
the Rosenberg
Rosenberg ring, ring, who
who included
included his his wife
wife Ethel,
Ethel, had been rewarded
had been rewarded
with
with cash
cash bonuses
bonuses in in the
the summer.
summer. The The ring
ring waswas producing
producing so so many
many classified
classified docu
docu-
ments
ments to to be
be photographed
photographed in in Kvasnikov's
Kvasnikov’s apartment
apartment that that the
the New
New YorkYork residency
residency
was
was running
running dangerously
dangerously short short of of film.
film. The
The residency
residency reported
reported thatthat Rosenberg
Rosenberg was was
receiving
receiving so so much
much intelligence
intelligence from from hishis agents
agents that that hehewas
was finding
finding ititdifficult
difficult to to cope:
cope:
"We
“We areare afraid
afraid ofof putting
putting LIBERAL
LIBERAL out out ofof action
action with
with overwork."44
overwork.’744
In
In November
November 1944 1944 Kvasnikov
Kvasnikovinformed
informed the the Centre
Centrethat thatEthel
EthelRosenberg's
Rosenberg’s sister, sister,
Ruth
Ruth Greenglass
Greenglass (codenamed
(codenamed WASP), WASP), had had agreed
agreed to to approach
approach her her husband,
husband, who who
worked
worked as as aa machinist
machinist at Los Alamos.45
at Los A l a m ~ s . ~"I
“I’ was
was young,
young, stupid
stupid andand immature,"
immature,” said said
David
David Greenglass
Greenglass (codenamed
(codenamed BUMBLEBEE
BUMBLEBEE and and CALIBRE)
CALIBRE) later, later, "but
“but II was
was aa
good
good Communist."
Communist.” Stalin Stalin and and thethe Soviet
Soviet leadership,
leadership, he he believed,
believed, were were "really
“really
geniuses,
geniuses, every one ofthem:” “More power to theSoviet Union and abundant life for
every one of them:" "More power to the Soviet Union and abundant life for
their
their peoples!"
peoples!”"My “My darling,"
darling,” Greenglass
Greenglass wrotewrote to to his
his wife,
wife, "I“I most
most certainly
certainly willwill be be
glad
glad toto bebe part
part ofof the
the community
communityproject project [espionage]
[espionage] that that Julius
Julius andand his
his friends
friends [the[the
Russians]
Russians] have have inin mind."46
mind.’746
The
The New New York York residency
residency also also reported
reported in in November
November 1944 1944 that
that the
the precociously
precociously
brilliant
brilliant nineteen-year-old
nineteen-year-old Harvard Harvard physicist
physicist Theodore
Theodore Alvin Alvin ("Ted")
(“Ted”) Hall,
Hall, thenthen
working
working at at Los
LosAlamos,
Alamos, had had indicated
indicated his his willingness
willingness to to collaborate.
collaborate.As As well
well asas being
being
inspired
inspired by by the
the myth-image
myth-image of of the
the Soviet
Soviet worker-peasant
worker-peasant state, state, which
which was was anan article
article
of
of faith
faith forfor most
most ideological
ideological SovietSoviet agents,
agents, Hall
Hall convinced
convinced himself
himself that
that anan American
American
nuclear
nuclear monopoly
monopoly would would threaten
threaten the the peace
peace of of the
the post-war
post-war world.
world. Passing
Passing the the
secrets
secrets of of the
the MANHATTAN
MANHATTAN project project to to Moscow
Moscow was was thus
thus aa wayway "to“to help
help the the
world,"
world,” as as well
well as
as the
the Soviet
Soviet Union.
Union. As the the youngest
youngest of of the
the atom spies, Hall
atom spies, Hall was
was givengiven
the
the appropriate,
appropriate, if if transparent,
transparent, codename
codename MLAD MLAD ("Young").
(“Youngn).Though
Though only only one
one year
year
older,
older, thethe fellow
fellow Harvard studentwho
Harvard student who first
first brought
brought HallHallintointo contact
contact with with the the
V
V ii cc tt oo rr yy / II 22 99
NKGB, Saville
Saville Savoy
SavoySax,
Sax, was codenamed STAR (“Old”).47
("Old").47 Hall himself
himself went on
ontoto
become
become probably
probably the
the youngest
youngest major
major spy
spy of the twentieth
ofthe twentieth century.
century
THE
E PPENETRATION
E N E T RAT I O N O
OFF Los
Los Alamos
Alamos was part of
was part of aa more general surge
more general surge in in Soviet
Soviet
intelligence
collection in the theUnited States during
UnitedStates during the last two years of
thelast the war, as
of the the
asthe
NKGB's agents,
NKGB’s agents, buoyed
buoyed up up byby the
the remorseless advance of
remorseless advance of the Red Army
the Red Army towards
towards
Berlin
Berlin andand the
the opening
opening of of aa second
second front, looked forward
front, looked forward to to aa glorious
glorious victory
victory overover
fascism.
fascism. The number of
The number of rolls
rolls ofof microfilm
microfilm sent sent byby Akhmerov's
Akhmerov’s illegal illegal residency
residency to to
Moscow
Moscow via via New
New YorkYork grew
grew from
from 211211 inin 1943
1943 to to 600
600inin19441944andand 1,896
1,896 in in 1945.48
1945.48
The Centre, however,
however, found it difficult to believe that espionage espionage in the theUnited
UnitedStates
could
could really
really be be asas straightforward
straightforward as as it seemed. During
it seemed. During 1944-5
1944-5 the the NKGB grew grew
increasingly
increasingly concerned
concerned about about thethe security
security of its American
of its American operations
operations and and sought
sought to to
bring them under more direct contro1.49 Among its
bring them under more direct control.49Among its chief anxieties was Elizabeth chief anxieties was Elizabeth
Bentley's
Bentley’s habit
habit of of socializing
socializing with
with thethe agents
agents for whom she
for whom she acted
acted as as courier.
courier. When
When
Bentley's
Bentley’s controller
controller and and lover,
lover, Jacob
Jacob Golos,
Golos, dieddied from
from aa sudden
sudden heart heart attack
attack on on
Thanksgiving
Thanksgiving Day Day 1943,1943,Akhmerov
Akhmerov decideddecided to to dispense
dispense withwith aa cut-out
cut-out and and act
act as
as her
her
new
new controller.
controller. Bentley's
Bentley’s first
first impressions
impressions were were of of aa smartly
smartly dressed
dressed “jaunty-looking
"jaunty-looking
man
man in in his
his mid-thirties"
mid-thirties” with with an an expansive manner. (Akhmerov
expansive manner. (Akhmerov was was actually forty
actually forty-
two). She soon
two). She soon realized,
realized, however,
however, thatthat "despite
“despite thethe superficial appearance of
superficial appearance of aa boule-
boule
vardier,
vardier, he he was
was aa toughtough character."5o
character.”” For For the
the next
next sixsix months,
months,though though Bentley
Bentley
'
continued
continued to to’act
act as courier for
as courier for the
the Silvermaster
Silvermaster groupgroup in in Washington,
Washington,she she felt
felt herself
herself
under
under increasing
increasing pressure.
pressure.
In
In March
March 1944 1944 Earl Earl Browder
Browder passedpassed on on toto her
heranother
anothergroupgroup of of Washington
Washington
bureaucrats
bureaucrats who who had been sending
had been sending him him intelligence
intelligence which
which he he hadhadpreviously
previously passed passed
on
on toto Golos.51
G o ~ o sBentley. ~ ~ regarded
Bentley regarded Victor
Victor Perlo
Perlo (RAIDER),
( W I D E R ) , aa government
government statistician
statistician
who
who provided
provided intelligence
intelligence on on aircraft
aircraft production,
production, as as the
the leader
leader ofof the group-proba
the group-proba-
bly
bly because
because he he acted
acted as as spokesman
spokesman during during herherfirst
first meeting
meeting withwith them.52
them.52Akhmerov,
Akhmerov,
however,
however, believed
believedthat that thethe real
real organizer
organizer waswas Charles
Charles Kramer
Kramer (LOT),
(LOT), aa government
government
economist,
economist, and and waswas furious
hrious thatthatthe thePerlo/Kramer
Perlo/Kramer network
network had had been
been handed
handed over over by
Browder
Browder not not toto him
him but but to
to Bentley.
Bentley For For over
over aa year,
year, he
he told
told the
the Centre,
Centre, Zarubin
Zarubinand and
he had wanted
he had wanted to to make
make direct
direct contact
contact with
with thethe group,
group, butbut Browder
Browder had had failed
failed to to
arrange
arrange it.it. "If
“If we
we work
work withwith this
this group,"
group,” Akhmerov
Akhmerov added, added, "it “it will
will be necessary to
be necessary to
remove
remove [Bentley]
[Bentley]."53 .”53
Bentley
Bentley appealed
appealed to to Browder
Browder for for support
support as as she
she struggled
struggled to to remain
remain the the courier
courier for for
the
the Washington
Washington networks.
networks. "Night
“Night after
after night,
night, after
after battling
battling with
with [Akhmerov]
[Akhmerov],” ," wrote
wrote
Bentley
Bentley later,
later, "I“Iwould
would crawlcrawl home
home to bed, sometimes
to bed, sometimes too too weary
weary to to undress."
undress.” Eventu
Eventu-
ally,
ally, Bentley
Bentley agreed
agreed to to arrange
arrange aa meeting
meeting between
between Akhmerov
Akhmerov and and Silvermaster
Silvermaster (PAL). (PAL).
Soon
Soon afterwards,
afterwards, according
according to to Bentley,
Bentley, Akhmerov
Akhmerov told told her,
her, "almost
“almost drooling
drooling withwith
arrogance:"
arrogance:”"Earl“Earl [Browder]
[Browder] has hasagreed
agreedtoto turn
turn Greg
Greg[Silvermaster]
[Silvermaster] over over to me .. .. .. Go
to me Go
and
and ask
ask him."
him.” "Don't
“Don’tbe benaive,"
naive,”Browder
Browdertoldtold Bentley
Bentley the the next
next day. "You know
day. “You know that that
when
when thethe cards
cards are aredown,
down, I have
have to to take
take mymy orders
orders from
from them."s4
them.”54Akhmerov
Akhmerov reported reported
to
to the
the Centre
Centre that thatBentley
Bentley had had taken
taken herher removal
removal fromfrom thethe Silvermaster
Silvermaster group group "very
“very
much
much to heart .. .. .. evidently
to heart evidently supposing that we do not trust her. She is offended at
supposing that we do not trust her. She is offended at
RULEVOY
RULEVOY [Browder] [Browder] for for having
having consented
consented to to our
our liaison
liaison with
with PAL."55
PAL.””
T
T H EE S
SW OR
WO RD
D A
AND T E H ISEHL IDE L D
T HSE // IJ
130O
Bentley
Bentley was alsoremoved
was also removed from from contact
contact with
with thethe Perlo/Kramer
Perlo/Kramer group.group. GorskyGorsky
tried
tried toto placate
placate her
her by by inviting
inviting herher to to dinner
dinner atataawaterfront
waterfront restaurant
restaurant in in Washing
Washing-
ton.
ton. He
H e made
made aa bad
bad start.start. "I
“I hope
hope the thefood
food is good," he
is good,” said. ''Americans
he said. “Americans are are such
such stu
stu-
pid
pid people
people that
that even
even when when it comes to
it comes to aasimple
simple matter
matter like
like cooking
cooking aa meal,
meal, they
they do do itit
very
very badly."
badly.”''Ah, yes," he
“Ah,yes,” added, seeing
he added, seeing Bentley's
Bentley’s expression change. "I
expressionchange. “Ihad
had forgotten
forgotten
for
for the
the moment
moment that thatyou,
you, too,
too, are
are anan American."
American.” Gorsky Gorsky went
went on on to
to tell
tell her
her that she
that she
had been awarded
had been awarded the the Order
Order of of the
the RedRed Star ("one of
Star (“one of the highest-reserved for
the highest-reserved for all
all
our best fi
our best ghters") and
fighters”) and showed
showed her her aa facsimile:
facsimile: "We “We allall think
think you've
you’ve done splendidly
done splendidly
and
and have
have aa great
great future
future before you." GOOD GIRL was
before you.” was not
not toto be
be placated.56
pla~ated.’~ A year
year
later
later she
she secretly
secretly began
began telling
telling her
her story
story to tothe
theFBI.
FBI.
The
The Centre
Centre waswas also also worried
worried by by increased
increased FBI surveillance
surveillance of of the
the NewNew York York
Soviet consulate, which
Soviet consulate, housed the
which housed the legal
legal residency,
residency, and and byby aa warning
warning fromfrom Duncan
Duncan
Lee
Lee (KOCH)
(KOCH) in in September
September 1944 1944 thatthat thethe OSS Security
Security Division
Division was
was compiling
compiling aa
list
list of
of Communists
Communists and and Communist
Communist sympathizers
sympathizers in in OSS.57
OSS.57The The Centre's
Centre’s nervous
nervous-
ness
ness was
was shared
shared by by somesome of of its
its best
best agents.
agents. Bentley
Bentley found
found Lee Lee himself"on
himself “on the the verge
verge
of
of cracking
cracking up up .. .. .. so
so hypercautious
hypercautious that that he hehad taken to
had taken to crawling around the
crawling around floor of
the floor of
his
his apartment
apartment on on hands
hands and and knees
knees examining
examining the the telephone
telephone wireswires to
to see
see ifif they
they had
had
been
been tampered
tampered with."58
with.”’* Another
Another highly
highly placed
placed Soviet
Soviet agent,
agent, the
the senior
senior Treasury
Treasury offi off-
cial Harry
cia1 Harry Dexter
Dexter WhiteWhite (JURIST),
(JURIST), told told his
his controller
controller that,
that, though
though he he was
was uncon
uncon-
cerned
cerned for for his
his own
own personal
personal security
security and and hishis wife
wife had
had prepared
prepared herself
herself "for “for any
any
self-sacrifice,"
self-sacrifice,” hehe would
would have have toto bebe very
very cautious
cautious because
because of of the damage to
the damage to the the "new
“new
course"
course” (the
(the Soviet
Soviet cause)cause) which
which wouldwould occuroccur if if he
he were
were exposed
exposed as as aa spy.
spy. He there
H e there-
fore
fore proposed
proposed thatthat ininthe thefuture
future they
they havehave relatively
relativelyinfrequent
infrequent meetings,
meetings, each lasting
each lasting
about
about half
half an
an hour,
hour, whilewhile driving
driving around
around in in his
his car.59
car.59
There
There waswas aa further
furtheralarm alarm inin November
November which, which, according
according to to Bentley,
Bentley, followed
followedan an
urgent
urgent warning
warningfromfrom an an agent
agent in in the
theWhite WhiteHouse,
House, Roosevelt's
Roosevelt’s administrative
administrative assis assis-
tant
tant Lauchlin
Lauchlin Currie.
Currie. CurrieCurrie reported
reported that "the Americans
that “the Americans were were on the verge
on the verge of of
breaking
breaking the the Soviet
Soviet code."60
code.”60TheThe alarm
alarm appears
appears to to have
have subsided
subsided whenwhen it it was
was discov
discov-
ered
ered that Curriehadhad wrongly
that Currie concluded that
wrongly concluded that aa fire-damaged
fire-damaged NKGB codebook codebook
obtained
obtained by OSS from from the the Finns
Finns would
would enable
enable Soviet
Soviet communications
communications (which (which went went
through
through aafurther,
further, theoretically
theoretically impenetrable,
impenetrable, encipherment
encipherment by by "one-time
“one-time pad")
pad”) to be
to be
decrypted.61
decrypted.61 (Given the phenomenal success of Anglo-American codebreakers in
of Anglo-American codebreakers
breaking
breaking the the highest
highest grade grade German
German and and Japanese ciphers, Currie's
Japanese ciphers, Currie’s mistake
mistake is is under
under-
standable.) At Roosevelt's
Roosevelt’s insistence, Donovan returned returned the NKGB codebook to the the
Soviet
Soviet embassy.
embassy. A doubtless
doubtless bemused
bemused Fitin Fitin sent
sent Donovan
Donovan his his "sincere thanks."62
“sincere thanks.”62
DESPIT TEE AL L TH
HEE Centre's
Centre’s anxiety
anxiety that Soviet espionage
that Soviet espionage was
was about
about to
to be
be exposed,
exposed,
and despite all the confusion in the
the residencies,
residencies, the NKGB's eager American and
NKGB’s eager
British agents continued to provide intelligence remarkable for both its quantity andand
quality.
quality. The
The NKGB proudly
proudly calculated
calculated after
after the
the war
war that thegrand
that the grand total of
total of its
its
wartime agents and informers ("confidential
(“confidentid contacts")
contacts”) around the world had been
1,240,
1,240,who hadhad provided 41,718 items of intelligence.
intelligence. Approximately 3,000
3,000 foreign
intelligence reports and documents had been judged important
intelligence important enough to be sent to
V
V ii cc tt oo rT yy I
/ IJ
131I
the State
State Defense Committee and the Central CentralCommittee.
Committee. Eighty-seven foreign
intelligence officers were decorated for their wartime work. 63
Moscow
Moscow mademade far
far better
better use
use of
of S&T
S&T thanthan of its political
of its political intelligence,
intelligence, which
which was
was
always
always likely
likelyto be ignored or regarded with suspicion when it disagreed
disagreed with Stalin's
Stalin’s
conspiracy theories-or
conspiracy theories-or with those of
with those of the
the Centre, which were
Centre,which were closely modeled on
closelymodeled his.
on his.
S&T
S&T from
from the
the West,
West,by
by contrast,
contrast, was
was welcomed
welcomed withwith open and unsuspicious
open and unsuspicious arms by
arms by
Soviet
Soviet scientists
scientists and technologists. A.
A. F.
F. loffe,
Ioffe, the director of
of the USSR Academy of of
Sciences
Sciences Leningrad Physics and Technological Institute, wrote of of wartime S&T:
S&T:
The information
The information always
always turns out to
turns out to be
be accurate
accurate and for the
and for the most
most part
part very
very
complete .. .. .. I have
complete have not
not encountered
encountered aa single false fi
single false nding. Verification
finding. Verification of
of all
all
the
the formulae
formulae and and experiments
experiments invariably
invariably confirms
confirms the data contained
the data contained in the
in the
materials.64
materials.@
The
The most
most valuable
valuable S&TS&T concerned
concerned the atomic program.
the atomic program. Kurchatov
Kurchatov reported
reported to to
Beria
Beria onon September
September 29, 29, 1944
1944 thatthat intelligence
intelligence revealed
revealed the the creation
creation for for the
the MAN
MAN-
HATTAN
HATTAN project project of of "a
“a concentration
concentration of scientific
scientific and
and engineering-technical
engineering-technical power power
on
on aa scale neverbefore
scale never before seen in
seen the history
in the history of of world
world science,
science, whichwhich has already
has already
achieved the
achieved most priceless
the most results."65 According
pricelessresults.”65 According to calculations, up
to NKGB calculations, up toto
November
November 1944 1944 itit had
had acquired
acquired 1,167
1,167 documents
documents on on nuclear
nuclear research,
research, of of which
which 88 88
from
from the
the United
United States
States and
and 7979 from
from Britain
Britain were judged of
were judged of particular importance. 66
particular importance.66
The most important,
The most important, however,
however, were wereyet yetto come.
to come.
On
O n February
February 28, 28, 1945
1945 thetheNKGB
NKGBsubmitted
submitted to to Beria
Beria its its first comprehensive
first comprehensive
report
report onon atomic
atomic intelligence
intelligence forfor two
two years-also
years-also the first to
the first to be
be based
based on on reports
reports from
from
inside
inside Los
Los Alamos.
Alamos. Five
Five months
months before
before the
the successful
successful test
test ofof the
the fi rst atomic
first bomb atat
atomic bomb
Alamogordo
Alamogordo in in southern
southernNew NewMexico,
Mexico, the the Centre was informed
Centrewas informed of of all the main
all the main ele-
ele
ments
ments in in its
its construction.
construction. The The information
information which which Fuchs
Fuchs had passed to
had passed to Gold
Gold on on the
the
east coast in
east coast in mid-February
mid-February arrivedarrived tootoo late to be
late to be included
included in in the Centre's assessment.
theCentre’s assessment.
The
The report
report passed
passed toto Beria
Beria was,
was, almost
almost certainly,
certainly, based
based chiefly
chiefly on intelligence from
on intelligence from
the
the nineteen-year-old
nineteen-year-old Theodore TheodoreHall Hall and and technical
technical sergeant
sergeant DavidDavid Greenglass.
Greenglass.
There
There cancan be
be little
little doubt
doubt thatthatHall's
Hall’s intelligence,
intelligence, delivered
delivered to to the
theNew York residency
NewYork residency
by
by his
his friend,
friend, Saville
Saville Sax,
Sax, was
was thethe more important. It
more important. was probably
It was probably Hall Hall who first
who first
revealed
revealed thethe implosion
implosion method
method of of detonating
detonating the the bomb,
bomb, thoughthough aa more more detailed
detailed
report
report onon implosion
implosion by by Fuchs
Fuchs reached
reached Kurchatov
Kurchatov on on April
April 6.67
6.67
In
In the
the spring
spring ofof 1945
1945 Sax was was replaced
replacedas as courier
courier between
between Hall Hall andand the
the New York
NewYork
residency by Leontina ("Lona") Cohen, codenamed
residency by Leontina(“Lona”)Cohen, codenamed LESLIE. “Lona’’ had been LESLIE. "Lona" had been
recruited
recruited in 1941 by
in 1941 by her
her husband
husband MorrisMorris (code named LUIS), who
(codenamed who had had become
become aa
Soviet
Soviet agent
agent during
duringthe the Spanish
Spanish Civil Civil War
War while
while serving
serving in the
inthe International
International
Brigades. The
Brigades. The couple,
couple, later
later to
to figure
figure among
among the heroes of
the heroes Soviet intelligence,
of Soviet were
intelligence, were
collectively
collectively codenamed
codenamed the the DACHNIKI ("Vacationers"), but
DACHNIKI (“Vacationers”), but their careers as
their careers as agents
agents
were
were interrupted
interrupted by Morris's conscription
by Morris’s conscription in 1942. “Lona’’
in 1942. "Lona" was reactivated early
was reactivated in
early in
1945
1945 to to act
act asas aa courier
courier to bothLos
to both Los Alamos
Alamos and and thethe Anglo-Canadian
Anglo-Canadian atomic atomic
research
research center
center at Chalk River,
at Chalk River, near
near Ottawa,
Ottawa, which
which was was alsoalso penetrated
penetrated by by Soviet
Soviet
T
TH E WSOW
HS
E RO
A
DNRT
DHA
S
EHN I DE LTDH E S H I E L D / IJ
1322
agents. While
agents. While she she made
made contact
contact with Hall,Gold
with Hall, Gold acted
acted as as courier
courier for Fuchs and
for Fuchs and
Greenglass.
Greenglass. Each Each of of the
the three
threeSoviet
Soviet agents
agents was
was completely
completely ignorant
ignorant of of the
the espionage
espionage
conducted
conducted by by the
the other
other two.
two.68 68
It
I t is
is probable
probable that
that both
both Fuchs
Fuchs and and Hall
Hall independently
independently furnished
furnished the the plans
plans ofof the
the
first
first atomic
atomic bomb,
bomb, eacheach of of which
which the Centre was
the Centre able to
was able to crosscheck
crosscheck againstagainst thethe
other.69
other.69Fuchs
Fuchs andand Hall
Hall also
also independently
independently reported
reported thatthat the
the test
test of
of the
the first atomic
first atomic
bomb
bomb had had been
been fixed
fuced forfor July
July 10,10, 1945,7°
1945,70though
though ininthe the
end end weather
weather conditions
conditions
caused
caused it it to
to be postponed for
be postponed for six
six days.
days. A month
month later
later the
the Pacific
Pacific War War waswas at at an end.
an end.
Following
Following the the bombing
bombing of of Hiroshima
Hiroshima and and Nagasaki
Nagasaki on August 6 and
on August and 9, 9, Japan
Japan sur
sur-
rendered.
rendered.
Lona Cohen
Lona Cohen spent
spent the thefinal
final dramatic
dramatic weeks
weeks of of the
the Pacific
Pacific War War in in New
NewMexico,
Mexico,
waiting
waiting for for Hall
Hall toto deliver
deliver the the results
results ofof the
the Alamogordo
Alamogordo test. test. After missing ren
After missing ren-
dezvous
dezvous in in Albuquerque
Albuquerque on on three
three consecutive
consecutive Sundays,
Sundays, Hall finally finally handed
handed aa set set of
of
highly
highly classified
classified papers
papers to to his
his courier,
courier, probably
probably soonsoon after
after thethe Japanese
Japanese surrender.71
surrender.71
On
O n catching
catching the the train
train back
back to to New
New York, Lona Cohen
York, Lona Cohen was was horrified
horrified to to see
see military
military
police on
police board searching
on board searching passengers'
passengers’ luggage.
luggage. With
With remarkable
remarkable presence
presence of mind
of mind
she
she thrust
thrust Hall's
Hall’s documents
documents inside inside aa newspaper
newspaper and and gave
gave it it to
to aa policeman
policeman to to hold
hold
while
while she she opened
opened her her purse
purse and and suitcase
suitcase forfor inspection.
inspection. The The policeman
policeman handedhanded the the
newspaper
newspaper back, back, inspected
inspected her her purse
purse andand suitcase,
suitcase, and
and Mrs.
Mrs. Cohen
Cohenreturned
returned safely
safely to
to
New York.
New Y ~ r72k . ~ ~
Thanks chiefly
Thanks chiefly toto Hall and and Fuchs,
Fuchs, the first Soviet
the first Soviet atomic bomb, successfully
atomic bomb, successfullytestedtested
just
just over
over four
four years
years later,
later, was
was to to be an exact
be an exact copy
copy of the Alamogordo
of the Alamogordo bomb. bomb. At the the
time,
time, however,
however, thethe Centre
Centre found foundit itdifficult
difficult to believe that
to believe that thethe theft
theftof
of two
two copies
copies of of
perhaps
perhaps the most important
the most important secret secret plans
plans inin American history could
American history could possibly
possibly escape
escape
detection.
detection. The The sheer
sheer scale
scale ofof its
its success
success made
made the the NKGB fear fear that
that the
thepenetration
penetration of of
the
the MANHATTAN project project would
would soonsoon bebe uncovered
uncovered by by the
the Americans.
Americans.
The
The NKGB officer officer in in charge
charge of of intelligence
intelligence collected
collected fromfrom Los Los Alamos
Alamos in 1945
in 1945
was
was Anatoli
Anatoli Antonovich
Antonovich Yatskov Yatskov (alias
(alias "Yakovlev,"
“Yakovlev,’’codenamed
codenamed ALEKSEI), ALEKSEI), an an engi
engi-
neer
neer recruited
recruited by by the
the NKVD in in 1939
1939 who succeeded Kvasnikov
whosucceeded Kvasnikov as as S&T resident
resident inin
the
the United
United States.73
States.73He H e isis nowadays
nowadaysremembered
remembered as as one
one ofof thetheheroes
heroes of of Russian
Russian forfor-
eign
eign intelligence.74
intelligen~e.~~ At the time, however,
the time, however, the the Centre
Centre waswas bitterly critical of
bitterly critical of him.
him. InIn
July
July 1945
1945 ititconcluded
concluded that that hishis carelessness
carelessness had had probably
probably compromised
compromised MLAD, MLAD, and and
denounced
denounced his "completely unsatisfactory
his “completely unsatisfactory work work with
with thetheagents
agents on on ENORMOZ [the [the
MANHATTAN project] ."75 At the
pr~ject].’’~~ At very
the very moment
moment of of Soviet
Soviet intelligence's
intelligence’s greatest
greatest
ever
ever triumph
triumph in in the
the United
United States,
States, the
the acquisition
acquisition of of the
the plans
plans of of the first atomic
the first atomic
bomb,
bomb, the Centre wrongly
the Centre wrongly feared feared that the whole
that the ENORMOZ operation
whole ENORMOZ operation was was inin
jeopardy.
jeopardy.
The GRU, as
The well as
as well the NKGB, had
as the had some
some striking
striking successes
successes in in the
the wartime
wartime
United
United States.
States. Though
Though SovietSoviet military
intelligence had been forced
had been forced to to surrender
surrender both both
Fuchs
Fuchs and and thethe majority
majority of of its
its more
more important
important pre-war
pre-war American
American agents agents to to the
the more
more
powerful
powerful NKGB, it it had succeeded in
had succeeded in retaining
retaining atatleast
least one
one of ofwhom
whom the the Centre
Centrewaswas
envious in 1945. 1945. Gorsky reported to the Centre aa conversation conversation between Akhmerov
and
and ALES (Alger (Alger Hiss),
Hiss), who whohad been working
hadbeen working for for the
the GRU for for the past ten
the past years.76
ten years.76
Though
Though Hiss Hiss was
was aa senior
senior diplomat,
diplomat, Akhmerov
Akhmerov said said that
that thethe G GRURU hadhad generally
generally
Vi c t o ry / IJ J
appeared
appeared little
little interested
interested in in State
StateDepartment
Departmentdocuments,
documents, and and had had asked
asked Hiss
Hiss andand aa
small
small group
group of of agents,
agents, ((for
“for the
the most
most part
part consisting
consisting of of his
his relations,"
relations,” to to concentrate
concentrate
on
on military
military intelligence.77
intelligen~e.~~ Late
Late inin1944, 1944,however,
however, Hiss's Hiss’s role
role asas aa Soviet
Soviet agent
agent tooktook on on
aa new
new significance
significance when when he he became
became actively
actively engaged
engaged in in preparations
preparations for for the
the final
final
meeting
meeting of of the
the wartime
wartime Big Big Three
Three at at Yalta
Yalta in in thetheCrimea
CrimeaininFebruary
February 1945. 1945.
Yalta
Yalta waswasto to prove
prove an aneven
evenbigger
bigger success
success for for Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence than than Tehran.
Tehran.ThisThis
time
time both
both thethe British
British and and thethe American
American delegations,
delegations, housedhoused respectively
respectively in in the
the or
or-
nate Vorontsov and Livadia Palaces, were successfully
nate Vorontsov and Livadia Palaces, were successfully bugged. The mostly female bugged. The mostly female
personnel
personnel usedused to to record
record andand transcribe
transcribe theirtheir private
private conversations
conversationswere were selected
selectedand and
transported
transported to to thethe Crimea
Crimeainin great
great secrecy.
secrecy.Not Not tilltill they
they arrived
arrived at at Yalta
Yalta diddid they
they dis
dis-
cover
cover the
the jobs
jobs that
that had
had been
been assigned
assigned to to them.78
them.78The The NKGB
NKGB sought, sought, withwith somesome sucsuc-
cess, to distract both delegations from its surveillance of them
cess, to distract both delegations from its surveillance of them by lavish and attentive by lavish and attentive
hospitality,
hospitality, personally
personally supervised
supervised by by aa massive
massive NKGB NKGB general,
general, SergeiSergei Nikiforovich
Nikiforovich
Kruglov.
Kruglov. When
When Churchill's
Churchill’s daughter,
daughter, Sarah,Sarah, casually
casually mentioned
mentioned that thatlemon
lemonwent went
well
well with
with caviar,
caviar, aa lemon
lemon treetree appeared,
appeared, as as ifby
if by magic,
magic, in in thetheVorontsov
Vorontsov orangery.
orangery.At At
the next Allied conference, in Potsdam, General Kruglov
the next Allied conference, in Potsdam, General Kruglov wasrewarded with a KBE, was rewarded with a KBE,
thus
thus becoming
becoming the the only
only Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence officerofficer to to receive
receive an an honorary
honorary knight
knight-
hood.
hood.
Stalin
Stalin was even better
was even better informed
informed about about his his allies
allies at Yalta than
at Ydta thanhehe had had been
been at at
Tehran. All of the Cambridge Five, no longer suspected
Tehran. All of the CambridgeFive, no longer suspected of being double agents, proof being double agents, pro
vided
vided aa regular
regular flowflow of of classified
classified intelligence
intelligence or or Foreign
Foreign Office
Office documents
documents in in the
therunrun-
up
up to
to the
the conference,
conference, thoughthough it it is
is not
not possible
identifywhichwhich of of these
these documents
documents
were
were communicated
communicated to to Stalin
Stalin personally.
personally.Alger Alger Hiss Hiss actually
actually succeeded
becoming
aa member
member of of the
the American
American delegation.
delegation. The The problem
problem which which occupied
occupied most most of of the
the
time
time atatYalta
Yalta waswasthe the future
future of of Poland.
Poland. Having
Having already
already conceded
conceded Soviet Soviet dominance
dominance of of
Poland
Poland at Tehran, Roosevelt
at Tehran, Roosevelt and and Churchill
Churchill made made aa belated
belated attempt
attempt to to secure
secure thethe
restoration
restoration of of Polish
Polish parliamentary
parliamentary democracy
democracy and and aa guarantee
guarantee of of free
free elections.
elections. BothBoth
were
were outnegotiated
outnegotiated by by Stalin,
Stdin, assisted
assisted once
once again
again by by aa detailed
detailed knowledge
knowledge of of the
the cards
cards
in
in their
their hands.
hands. He H e knew,
knew, for for example,
example, what what importance
importance his his allies
allies attached
attached to to allow
allow-
ing
ing some
some ((democratic"
“democratic” politicians
politicians into into thethepuppet
puppet PolishPolish provisional
provisional government
government
already
already established
established by by the
the Russians.
Russians. On O n this
this point,
point, after
after initial
initial resistance,
resistance, Stalin
Stdin gragra-
ciously
ciously conceded,
conceded, knowing knowing that that thethe ((democrats"
“democrats’’could could subsequently
subsequently be be excluded.
excluded.
Mter
After first
first playing
playing for for time,
time, Stalin
Stalin gave
gave wayway on on other
other secondary
secondary issues,issues, having
having first
first
underlined
underlined theirtheir importance,
importance, in in order
order to to preserve
preserve his his allies'
allies’consent
consent to to the
thereality
reality ofof aa
Soviet-dominated
Soviet-dominated Poland. Poland. Watching
Watching Stalin Stalin in in action
action at at Yalta,
Yalta, thethe permanent
permanentunder under-
secretary
secretary at at the
the Foreign
Foreign Office,
Office, Sir Sir Alexander
Alexander Cadogan,Cadogan, thought thought him him in in aa different
different
league
league asas aa negotiator
negotiator to to Churchill
Churchill and and Roosevelt:
Roosevelt: ((He “He is is aa great
great man,
man, andand shows
shows up up
very impressively against the background of the other
very impressivelyagainst the background of the other two aging statesmen.” Roose- two aging statesmen." Roose
velt,
velt, in
in rapidly
rapidly failing
failing health
health and and with
with only
only twotwo months
months to to live,
live, struck
struck Cadogan,
Cadogan, by by
contrast,
contrast, asas "very
“verywoolly
woolly andand wobbly."79
wobbly.”79
Roosevelt
Roosevelt and and Churchi11
Churchill left left Yalta
Yalta with
with no no sense
sense that
that they
they had had been
been deceived
deceived
about
about Stalin's
Stalin’s true intentions. Even
true intentions. Even Churchill, hitherto more
Churchill, hitherto more skeptical
skeptical than than Roo
Roo-
sevelt,
sevelt, wrote
wrote confidently,
confidently, "“Poor Poor Neville
Neville Chamberlain
Chamberlain believed believed he he could
could trust
trust Hitler.
Hitler.
He
H e was
was wrong.
wrong. But But I don't
don’t think
think I'm I’m wrong
wrong about about Stalin."Bo
Stalin.”*’ Some Some sensesense of of how
how
T
THHE
E S
SW OR
WO RD
D A
ANNT
DDH SET HHI EE LSDH I E L D // I3
1 3 44
Moscow
Moscow felt
felt that
that good
good intelligence
intelligence had
had contributed
contributed totoStalin's
Stalin’s success
successat
at Yalta
Yalta isis con
con-
veyed
veyed by
byMoscow's
Moscow’scongratulations
congratulations to
to Hiss.
Hiss. Gorsky
Gorsky reported
reported toto the
theCentre
Centrein
in March
March
1945,
1945, after
after aa meeting
meeting between
between Akhmerov
Akhmerov and
andHiss:
Hiss:
Recently
Recently ALES
ALES [Hiss]
[Hiss] and
and his
his whole
whole group
group were
were awarded
awarded Soviet
Soviet decorations.
decorations.
After
After the
the Yalta
Yalta conference,
conference, when
when he
he had
hadgone
gone on
on to
to Moscow,
Moscow, aa Soviet person
Soviet person-
age
age in
in aavery
very responsible
responsible position
position (ALES
(ALESgave
gave to
to understand
understand that
that ititwas Com
was Com-
rade
rade Vyshinsky
Vyshinsky [Deputy
[Deputy Foreign
Foreign Minister])
Minister]) allegedly
allegedly got
got in touch with
in touch with ALES
and at the
and at the behest
behest of
of the
the military
military NEIGHBOURS [GRU] passed on
[GRU] passed on to
to him
him
their
their gratitude
gratitude and
andso
so on.81
on.*l
The
The NKGB's
NKGB’s regret
regret at
at failing
failing to
to wrest
wrest Hiss
Hiss from
from the
the NEIGHBOURS must must surely
surely
have
have intensified
intensified in April when
in April when hehe was
was appointed
appointed acting
acting Secretary-General
Secretary-General of
of the
the
United Nations
United "organizing conference"
Nations “organizing at San
conference’’at San Francisco.82
Francisco.82
B
BE EH
H I N D T H E V I CT
CTOR RIIO
OUUSS Red
Red Army
Army as as it
it swept
swept into
into central
central Europe during the
Europe during the
fi nal months
final months of of the
the war came detachments
war came detachments of of Smersh
Smersh (short
(short for
for Smert
Snzert Shpionam,
"Death
“Death totoSpies!"),
Spies!”), aa military
military counter-intelligence
counter-intelligence agency agency detached
detached fromfrom the
the NKVD
in 1943 and
in 1943 and placed
placed directly
directly under
under thethe control
control of of Stalin
Stalin as
as Chairman
Chairman of of the State
the State
Defense Committee and
Defense Committee and Defense
Defense Commissar.83
C~mmissar.*~ Smersh's
Smersh‘s main mission was
main mission was to to hunt
hunt
for
for traitors
traitors and
and Soviet
Soviet citizens
citizens who
who hadhad collaborated
collaborated with the enemy.
with the enemy. On O n Stalin's
Stalin’s
instructions, it
instructions, it cast
cast its
its net
net remarkably
remarkably wide,
wide, screening
screening wellwell over
over fifive
ve million
million people.
people.
The
The million
million oror more
more Soviet
Soviet POWPOWss who who hadhad survived
survived thethe horrors
horrors of of German
German prison
prison
camps
camps were
were treated
treated asas presumed
presumed deserters
deserters and and transported
transported to to the
the gulag,
gulag, where
where many
many
died.
died.
In their anxiety to honor obligations to their ally, ally, both
both the
the British and American
British and American
governments
governments collaborated
collaborated in in aa sometimes
sometimes barbarous
barbarous repatriation.
repatriation. So So far
far as
as Britain
Britain
was concerned, the
was concerned, most controversial
the most controversial partpart ofof the
the forced
forced repatriation
repatriation waswas the
the hand
hand-
over
over ofof Cossacks
Cossacks and "dissident" Yugoslavs
and “dissident” Yugoslavs from from south
south Austria
Austria to
to the
the Red
Red Army
Army and and
Tito's
Tito’s forces respectively in
forces respectively May and
in May and June
June 1945.
1945. Most
Most had
had collaborated
collaborated with with thethe
enemy,
enemy, though sometimes only
though sometimes only to
to aa nominal
nominal degree.
degree. On O n June
June 11battle-hardened
battle-hardened sol sol-
diers
diers ofof the
the 8th
8th Argylls,
Argylls, some
some of of them
them in in tears,
tears, were
were ordered
ordered to
to break
break up
up aa Cossack
Cossack
religious
religious service
service and
and drive
drive several
several thousands
thousands of of unarmed
unarmed men,
men, women
women and and children
children
into
into cattle
cattle trucks
trucks with
with rifle
rifle butts
butts and pick handles.
and pick handles. There
There were
were similar
similar horrors
horrors on suc
on suc-
ceeding days.
ceeding days. Some
Some of of the
the Cossacks
Cossacks killed
killed themselves
themselves and and their
their families
families to
to save them
save them
from
from torture,
torture, execution
execution or or the
the gulag. Most of
gulag. Most of the
the 45,000
45,000 repatriated
repatriated Cossacks
Cossacks were were
Soviet
Soviet citizens, whom Churchill and Roosevelt had agreed at Yalta to return to the
Soviet Union. But
Soviet But aaminority, variously estimated at between 3,000 and 10,000 10,000were
so-called "old
“old emigres"
kmigrks”who had hadleft Russia after the civil war, war,had never been citizens
of
of the
the Soviet Union, and
Soviet Union, and were
were not
not covered
covered by by the
the Yalta
Yalta agreement.
agreement. TheyThey too too were
were
repatriated against theirtheir will. 84
will.84
Among the
Among the "old
“old emigres"
Cmigrks” werewere aa group
group of of White
White generals-chief
generals-chief among among them them
Pyotr Krasnov,
Krasnov, Andrei ShkuroShkuro and Ghirel5-whom the NKGB and
and Sultan Kelech Ghiref5-whom
its
its predecessors
predecessors had had been
been pursuing
pursuing for for aa quarter
quarter of of aa century.
century. A Smersh
Smersh detachment
detachment
V
V i cctto or y~ y / IJ
1355
was sent to Austria with orders to track them down. Its initial inquiries to the the British
about
about their
their whereabouts
whereabouts met met with
withnonoresponse
response other
other than
thanthe claim that
the claim that no
no informa-
informa
tion
tion was
was available.
available.After
After heavy
heavy drinking
drinking at at aadinner
dinnerfor Anglo-Russian troops,
for Anglo-Russian how
troops, how-
ever,
ever, a British soldier blurted out that,that,until
untilrecently, the generals had been at aacamp
in the
thevillage of Gleisdor£86
GleisdorLg6A group of of Smersh officers drove
droveimmediately to Gleis
Gleis-
dorf
dorf where
where they
they discovered
discovered that, thoughthe
that, though the generals had left,
generals had Shkuro's mistress
left, Shkuro’s mistress
Yelena
Yelena (surname
(surname unknown)
unknown) was was still
still there. Yelena was
there. Yelena was lured out of
lured out of the
the camp
camp onon the
the
pretense
pretense that
that she
she had
had aa visitor.
visitor. As
As she
she approached
approached thethe Smersh
Smersh car, she suddenly
car, she suddenly saw
saw
the Russian officers
officers inside and froze with fear. She was quickly bundled into the the car
and revealed,
revealed, under no doubt brutal brutal interrogation, that the theWhite
White generals had
appealed
appealed forfor the
the Supreme
Supreme Allied
Allied Commander,
Commander, Field Field Marshal Alexander, for
Marshal Alexander, for protec
protec-
tion. Yelena also
also disclosed
disclosed that the
the generals
generals had with them them fourteen kilograms of of
gold.87
gold.87What happened next is of such importance that Mitrokhin’s Mitrokhin's note on onit it
deserves
deserves toto be
be quoted
quoted asas fully as
as possible:
possible:
The
The Chekists
Chekists [Smersh
[Smersh officers] raised the
officers] raised matter of
the matter of the
the generals again at
generals again at aa
meeting with .. .. ., [a
meeting with British] lieutenant-colonel.
[a British] lieutenant-colonel. They
They mentioned
mentioned where the
where the
generals
generals were.
were. The Chekists proposed
The Chekists proposed that they should
that they approach the
should approach the question
question
of
of the
the generals'
generals’ fate
fate in in aabusiness-like
business-like way. "What do
way. “What do you mean by that?”
you mean that?" asked
asked
the
the Englishman.
Englishman. They They explained
explained to to him. If the
him. If the British
British would
would hand
hand them over
them over
quietly
quietly at
at the same time
the same time asas the
the Cossacks were repatriated,
Cossacks were repatriated, they
they could keep the
could keep the
generals' gold. “If
generals’ gold. "If thethe old men remain
old men remain with
with you,
you, you
you andand your
your colleagues
colleagues will
will
get no
get no benefit
benefit at
at all.
all. If you
you accept
accept our alternative, you
our alternative, you will
will get
get the gold." The
the gold.” The
lieutenant-colonel
lieutenant-colonel thoughtthought aawhile and then
while and agreed. H
thenagreed. Hee talked with two
talked with of his
two of his
colleagues
colleagues about
about the the details
details of the operation.
of the operation. On O n the
the pretext that they
pretext that they were
were
being
being taken
taken toto Alexander's
Alexander’s headquarters
headquarters forfor talks,
talks, the
the generals
generals were put into
were put into
cars
cars without
without any
any of of their
their belongings
belongings andand driven
driven to Odenburg [Judenburg]
to Odenburg [Judenburg]
where
where they
they were
were handed
handed over over to
to the Chekists. From
the Chekists. From the hands of
the hands Smersh they
of Smersh they
were
were transferred
transferred to to Moscow,
Moscow, to to the
theCalvary
Calvary of of the
the Lubyanka.88
Lubyanka.88
No corroboration
corroboration is is available
available from
from any
any other
other source
source for the claim
for the claim in
in aa KGB filefile
that
that aa British
British army
army offi cer (and
officer (and perhaps
perhaps twotwo of
of his
his colleagues) had been
colleagues) had been bribed
bribed into
into
handing over
handing over the
the White
White generals.
generals. Given
Given thethe failure
failure on
on the
the ground
ground toto distinguish
distinguish thethe
minority of
minority of non-Soviet
non-Soviet Cossacks
Cossacks from
from the rest, they
the rest, they might
might well have been
well have been surren-
surren
dered
dered to Smersh in
to Smersh in any
any case.
case.The
The generals
generals would
would probably
probably have
have survived,
survived,however,
however,ifif
their
their petitions
petitions had reached Field
had reached Marshal Alexander,
Field Marshal Alexander, whowho might
might well
well have
have granted
granted
them. But
them. But the petitions mysteriously
thepetitions disappeared en
mysteriously disappeared en route.89
route.89
The speed and
The speed and injustice
injustice of
of the
the "repatriation" derived chiefly
“repatriation’’derived chiefly from the desire
from the desire of mil
of mil-
itary
itary commanders
commanders on on the
the spot
spot to
to be
be rid
rid of
of an
an unwelcome
unwelcome problem
problem as as soon
soon as as possi
possi-
ble,
ble, combined
combined with
with the
thebelief
belief that
that individual
individual screening
screening toto determine
determinewhich
which Cossacks
Cossacks
were
were not
not of
of Soviet
Soviet nationality
nationality would
would bebe aa complex,
complex, long
long drawn
drawn out,
out, and
and in some cases
in some cases
impossible
impossible task.
task. On
Qn MayMay2121 Brigadier
Brigadier Toby
Toby Low
Low of5 Corps, which
of 5 Corps, was in
which was charge of
in charge of
the
the "repatriation,"
“repatriation,” issued
issued an
an order
order defining
defining who
who were
were toto be
be regarded
regarded asas Soviet
Soviet citi
citi-
zens. The
zens. The one
one White
White Russian
Russian group
group which
which could
could be collectively identified
be collectively identified as as non-
non-
T E WSOW
T HS
E RO
D NR T
A DHA
S
EHN IDE LTDH E S H I E L D / IJ
136
Soviet,
Soviet, thethe Schutzkorps,
Schutzkorps, commanded
commanded by ColonelAnatol
by Colonel Anatol Rogozhin,
Rogozhin, was, was, hehe
instructed,
instructed, not not toto be
be repatriated.
repatriated. ButBut those
those to to bebe "treated
“treated as as Soviet
Soviet Nationals"
Nationals”
included
included the the ''Ataman
“Ataman Group"
Group” (of(of which
which General
General KrasnovKrasnov was
was aa leading
leading member)
member)
and
and thethe “Units
"Units of of Lt.-Gen.
Lt.-Gen. Shkuro."
Shkuro.” Low Low addedadded thatthat "[i]ndividual
“[ilndividual cases [appeals]
cases [appeals]
. will
willNOTN O T bebe considered
considered unless
unless particularly
particularly pressed,"
pressed,” and and that
that "[i]n all cases
“[iln all cases of
of doubt,
doubt,
the
the individual
individual will
will be
be treated
treated as
as aa Soviet National."9o
Soviet Nati~nal.”~’
When
When all all allowance
allowance isismade
made for
for the
the difficulties
difficulties of of combining
combining loyalty
loyalty toto allies
allies with
with
respect
respect for
for the
the human
human rights
rights of
of the
the Cossacks,
Cossacks, the brutality with
the brutality with which
which the therepatria
repatria-
tion
tion was conducted remains
was conducted perhaps the
remains perhaps most ignominious
the most ignominious episode
episode in twentieth
in twentieth-
century British military
century British military history.
history. "1 “I reproach
reproach myselfmyself for justone
for just one thing,"
thing,” the the
76-year-old
76-year-old White White general
general Krasnov
Krasnov laterlater told
told the NKGB. "Why
the NKGB. “Why did did 1I trust the
trust the
British?"
British?” OnO n May
May 27, just
just before A.M., aa time
before 33 A.M., timeofof day
day much
much favored
favored by bySoviet
Soviet Secu
Secu-
rity,
rity, General
General Shkuro
Shkuro waswas awakened
awakened by by anan unidentified
unidentified British
British officer,
officer, who
who told
told him
him
he
he was
was under
under arrest
arrest and
and took
took him
him toto be
be held
held under
under close
close guard
guard well
well away
away from
from the
the
Cossack
Cossack camp.
camp. Another,
Another, or or perhaps
perhaps the the same,
same, British
British officer
officer later
later delivered
delivered an an
"urgent," though
“urgent,” bogus, invitation
though bogus, invitation to General Krasnov
to General Krasnov to to aa conference
conference with with Field
Field
Marshal
Marshal Alexander,
Alexander, his his former
former comrade-in-arms
comrade-in-arms during duringthe the Russian
Russian civil war.
civilwar.
Smersh
Smersh photographers
photographers were were waiting
waiting to to record
record the the historic
historic moment
moment when when the the
NKGB's oldest
NKGB’s oldest enemies
enemies were
were turned
turned over
over toto it.91
it.91ForForthe
the British
British army
army it was aa shame
it was shame-
ful
h l moment.
moment. For For Stalin,
Stalin, Smersh
Smersh andand the
the NKGB, it it was
was aa famous victory.
famous victory.
n I n E
FFROM
R O MWAR
WA R T
TOO C
C O LL D
D W A R
WAR
RRtt the
the end
endof
of the
the Second
Second World
World War,
War, the
the Centre
Centre faced
faced what
what itit feared
feared was
was impend
impend-
ing
ing disaster
disaster inin intelligence
operations against
against itsits wartime
wartime allies.
allies.The
The first
first major
major alarm
alarm
occurred
occurred in Ottawa, where
in Ottawa, where relations
relations among
among NKGB NKGB and and GRU personnel
personnel working
working
under
under "legal"
“legal”cover
coverin
in the
the Soviet
Soviet embassy
embassy were
were as as fraught
fraught as
as in
in New
NewYork.
York. TheThe situa
situa-
tion
tion was
was worst
worst in in the
the GRU residency.1
residency.’ On O n the
the evening
evening of
of September
September 5, 5, 1945
1945 Igor
Igor
Gouzenko,
Gouzenko, aa G GRURU cipher
cipher clerk
clerk at the Soviet
at the Soviet embassy
embassy in Ottawa, secretly
in Ottawa, secretly stuffed
stuffed
more
more than
than aa hundred
hundred classified
documents underunder his
his shirt
shirt and
and attempted
attempted to to defect.
defect.
He tried hard to hold his stomach in as he walked out of the embassy.
H e tried hard to hold his stomach in as he walked out of the embassy. “Otherwise,” "Otherwise,"
his
his wife
wife said
said later,
later, "he
“he would
would have
have looked
looked pregnant."
pregnant.”
Defection
Defection turned
turned out outto
to be
be more
more difficult
difficult than
than Gouzenko
Gouzenkohad had imagined.
imagined. When When he he
sought
sought help
help atat the
the offices
offices of
of the
the Ministry
Ministry of of Justice
Justice and
and the
the Ottawa Journal, he he was
was
told
told to
to come
come back
back thethe next
next day.
day. But
But on
on September
September 66 both
both the
the Ministry
Ministryof of Justice
Justice and
and
the Journal, which
the Ottawa Journal, which failed
failed toto realize
realize itit was
was being
being offered
offered the
the spy
spy story
story ofof the
the
decade,
decade, showed
showed no no more
more interest
interest than
than onon the
theprevious
previous evening.
evening.By By the
the night
night ofof Sep
Sep-
tember
tember 66 thethe Soviet
Soviet embassy
embassyrealized
realizedthat
that both
both Gouzenko
Gouzenko and and classified
documents
were
were missing.
missing.While
While Gouzenko
Gouzenko hid hid with
with his
his wife
wife and
and child
child in
in aaneighbor's
neighbor’sflat,flat, NKGB
men broke
men broke down
down his his door
door and
and searched
searched hishis apartment.
apartment. It was
was almost
almost midnight
midnight before
before
the local
the local police
policecame cametoto his
his rescue
rescue andand the
the Gouzenko
Gouzenkofamily
family atat last
last found
found sanctuary.2
sanctuary.2
As
As well
well as
as identifying
identifylng aa major
major GRU spy spy ring,
ring, Gouzenko
Gouzenko also also provided
provided fragmen
fragmen-
tary
tary intelligence
intelligence on on NKGB operations.
operations. Some Some months
months later
later Lavrenti
Lavrenti Beria,
Beria, the
the Soviet
Soviet
security
security supremo,
supremo, circulated
circulated to
to residencies
residencies aa stinging
stinging indictment
indictment of ofthetheincompetence
incompetence
of
of the
the GRU and, and, he heimplied,
implied, thethe NKGB in in Ottawa:
Ottawa:
The
The most
most elementary
elementary principles
principles of
of security
security were
were ignored,
ignored, complacency
complacency and and
self-satisfaction went unchecked. All this was the result of a decline in political
self-satisfaction went unchecked. All this was the result of adecline in political
vigilance
vigilance and sense of
and sense of responsibility
responsibility for
for work
work entrusted
entrusted byby the
the Party
Party and
and the
the
government.
government. G[ouzenkoJ's
G[ouzenko]’s defection
defection has caused great
has caused great damage
damage toto our
our country
country
and
and has,
has, in
in particular,
particular, very
very greatly
greatly complicated
complicated ourour work
work in the American
in the American
countries.3
countrie~.~
The
The fear
fear of
of being
being accused
accused of
of further
hrther breaches
breaches of
of security
security made
made the
the Ottawa
Ottawa residency
residency
unwilling
unwilling to
to take
take any
any initiative
initiative in
in recruiting
recruiting new
new agents.
agents. According
According to
to aa later
later damage
damage
T E WSOWR O
T HS
E A
DNRT A
DH S
EHN I DE LTDH E S H I E L D I
/ I3
1388
assessment,
assessment, Gouzenko's
Gouzenko’s defection
defection "paralyzed
“paralyzed intelligence
intelligence work
work [in Canada] for
[in Canada] for sev
sev-
eral
eral years
years and
and continued
continued toto have
have aa most
most negative
negative effect
effect on
on the
the work
work of
of the
the residency
residency
right
right up
up to
to 1960."
1960.” In
In the
the summer
summer of of 1949
1949 the
the acting
acting resident
resident in
in Ottawa, Vladimir
Ottawa, Vladimir
Trofimovich
Trofimovich Burdin (also known
Burdin (also known as as Borodin),
Borodin), newly
newly arrived
arrived from
from Moscow,
Moscow, wrote
wrote to
to
the
the Centre
Centre totocomplain about his
complain about his colleagues'
colleagues’inertia:
inertia:
The
The residency
residency not
not merely
merely lost
lost all
all its
its previous
previous contacts
contacts in
in Canadian
Canadian circles
circles but
but
did
did not
not even
even try
try to
to acquire
acquire new ones .. .. .. The
new ones The Soviet
Soviet colony closed in
colony closed in on
on itself
itself
and
and shut
shutitself
itself off
off from
from the
the outside
outside world, becoming wholly
world, becoming preoccupied with
wholly preoccupied with
its
its own
own internal
internal affairs.
affairs.
The
The Centre
Centre agreed.
agreed. TheThe residency,
residency, it it concluded,
concluded, had had "got
“got stuck
stuck inin aarut."4
rut.”‘
For
For the
the rest
rest of
of Gouzenko's
Gouzenko’s life life the
the KGB tried tried intermittently
intermittently and andunsuccessfully
unsuccessfullyto to
track
track him
him down.
down. In In 1975,
1975, after
after aa Progressive
Progressive Conservative
Conservative MP, MP, Thomas
Thomas Cossit,
Cossit,
requested
requested aa review
review of of Gouzenko's
Gouzenko’s pension,pension, the the Ottawa
Ottawaresidency
residency deduced
deduced thatthat Gou
Gou-
zenko
zenko lived
lived in in his
his constituency.
constituency. The The residency
residency alsoalso reported
reported thatthat Cossit
Cossit and
and Gou
Gou-
zenko
zenko had
had been
been seen
seen together
together at at an
an ice
ice hockey
hockey matchmatch during
duringa avisit
visit to
to Canada
Canadaby the
by the
Soviet national
Soviet national team.team. A KGB officer officer stationed
stationed in Ottawa,Mikhail
in Ottawa, Mikhail Nikolayevich
Nikolayevich
Khvatov, sought to
Khvatov, sought to cultivate
cultivate Cossit
Cossit in in the hope of
the hope of discovering Gouzenko's where-
discovering Gouzenko’s where
abouts.
abouts. H Hee had
had no no success
success andand thethe residency
residency subsequently
subsequently reported
reported thatthat parliamen
parliamen-
tary
tary questions
questions by Cossit were
by Cossit were "clearly
“clearlyanti-Soviet
anti-Soviet in tone." Some
in tone.” Some years
years later
later the
the KGB
began
began toto search
search forfor compromising
compromising material material on on Cossit's private life
Cossit’s private and prepare
life and active
prepare active
measures
measures to to discredit
discredit him.him. H Hee died
died in 1982 before
in 1982 before the the campaign
campaign against him had
against him had
begun.5
begun.’
Gouzenko's
Gouzenko’s defection
defection in in September
September 1945 1945 also
also caused
caused alarm
alarm at at NKGB
NKGB residencies
residencies
in
in Britain
Britain and and thetheUnited
United States.
States. As As head
head of SIS Section
of SIS Section IX IX (Soviet
(Soviet Counter
Counter-
intelligence)
intelligence) Philby
Philby was was keptkept well
well informed
informed of of the
the debriefing
debriefing of of Gouzenko
Gouzenko and and
reported
reported "“an an intensification
intensification of of counter-measures"
counter-measures” against against Soviet
Soviet espionage
espionage in in Lon
Lon-
don.
don. The
The Centre
Centre responded
responded with with instructions
instructions for for tight
tight security
security procedures
procedures to to ensure
ensure
that
that "the
“thevaluable
valuable agent
agent network
network is is protected
protected fromfrom compromise."
compromise.” Boris Boris Krotenschield
Krotenschield
(aka
(aka "Krotov"),
“K~o~ov”), the
the controller
controller of of the
the residency's
residency’s most most important
important agents,
agents, waswas told
told toto
hand over
hand over all but Philby
all but Philby to other case
to other case officers
officers andand to reduce the
to reduce the frequency
frequency of of meet
meet-
ings
ings to
to once
once aa month:
month:"Warn “Warnallall our
our comrades
comrades to to make
make aa thorough
thoroughcheck when going
check when going
out
out to
to aa meeting
meeting and, and, if if surveillance
surveillance is observed, not
is observed, not toto attempt
attempt underunder any
any circum
circum-
stances to
stances to evade
evade the the surveillance
surveillance and meet the
and meet agent .. .. ..”
the agent " If necessary, contact
If necessary, contact with
with
British agents was
British agents was to to be
be temporarily
temporarily broken broken of£6ofE6
Even
Even greater
greater alarm
alarm was was caused
causedby by the
the attempted
attempted defection
defection of of an
an NKGB
NKGB officer
officer in in
Turkey,
Turkey, Konstantin
Konstantin Dmitryevich
Dmitryevich Volkov. Volkov. On O n August
August 27, 1945 1945 Volkov
Volkov wrote
wrote to the
to the
British
British vice-consul
vice-consul in in Istanbul,
Istanbul, C. C. H. Page,
Page, requesting
requesting an an urgent
urgent appointment.
appointment. When When
Page
Page failed
failed toto reply,
reply, Volkov
Volkovturned
turned up up in person on
in person on September
September 44 and and asked
asked for
for polit
polit-
ical asylum
asylum for himself and his wife. In return for asylum and the sum of 50,000
pounds
pounds (about
(about aa million
million pounds
pounds at at today's
today’s values),
values), he he offered
offered important
important filesfiles and
and
information
information obtained
obtained whilewhile working
working on on the
the British
British deskdesk in in the
the Centre.
Centre. Among
Among the the
most highly
most highly rated
rated Soviet agents, he
Soviet agents, he revealed,
revealed, were
were two two inin the
the Foreign
Foreign Office (doubt-
Office (doubt-
F
F rr oo m
m Wa
W a rr tt oo C oo l d Wa
W a rr I/ I3
1 3 99
less
less Burgess
Burgessand
and Maclean)
Maclean) and and seven
seven "inside
“inside the
the British
British intelligence system," includ
intelligence system,” includ-
ing
ing one
one "fulfilling
“hlfilling the
thefunction
function of of head
head of
of aa section
section of British counter-espionage
of British counter-espionage in in
London"
London’’(almost
(almost certainly
certainly Philby).7
Philb~).~
On
O n September
September 19 19 Philby
Philby was
was startled
startled to
to receive
receive aa report
report ofVolkov's
of Volkov’s meeting
meeting with
with
Page
Page byby diplomatic
diplomatic bag
bag from
from the Istanbul consulate.8
the Istanbul consulate.’ HHee quickly warned Kr6ten
quickly warned Kroten-
schield.9
schield.’ On
O n September
September 21 21 the
the Turkish
Turkish consulate
consulate in
in Moscow issued visas
Moscow issued visas for
for two
two
NKGB hatchet
hatchet men
men posing
posing asas diplomatIC
diplomatic couriers. The next
couriers.The next day
day Philby
Philby succeeded
succeeded inin
gaining
gaining authorization
authorization from
from the
the chief
chief of
of SIS,
SIS, Sir
Sir Stewart
Stewart Menzies,
Menzies, to to fly to
fly to Turkey
Turkey toto
deal
deal personally
personallywith
with the
theVolkov
Volkov case.
case.Due
Due totovarious
various travel
traveldelays
delayshe
he did
did not
notarrive
arrive in
in
Istanbul
Istanbul until
until September
September 26. 26. Two
Two days
days earlier
earlier Volkov
Volkov and
and his
his wife,
wife, both
both onon stretch
stretch-
ers
ers and
and heavily sedated, had
heavily sedated, had been
been carried
carried on on board
board aa Soviet
Soviet aircraft
aircraft bound
bound forfor
Moscow.1o
Moscow.1oDuring
During thetheflight
flight back
back to
to London
LondonPhilby
Philby drafted
drafted aa cynical
cynical report
report to
to Men
Men-
zies
zies on
on the
thepossible
possible reasons
reasonsfor
for Volkov's
Volkov’s detection
detection by thethe NKGB. As As he
he wrote
wrotelater,
later,
Doubtless
Doubtless both
both his
his office
office andand his
his living
living quarters
quarters were bugged. Both
were bugged. Both he he and
and his
his
wife were reported
wife were reported toto be
be nervous.
nervous. Perhaps
Perhaps his
his manner
manner had
had given
given him
him away;
away;
perhaps
perhaps he
he had
had got
got drunk
drunk and talked too
andtalked too much;
much; perhaps
perhaps even
even he
he had
had changed
changed
his
his mind
mind and
and confessed
confessed to to his
his colleagues.
colleagues. Of course,
course, I admitted,
admitted, this
this was all
was all
speculation; the truth might never be known. Another theory-that
speculation; the truth might never be known. Another theory-that the Rus- the Rus
sians
sians had
had been
been tipped
tipped off
off about
about Volkov's
Volkov’s approach
approach to
to the
theBritish-had
British-had no no solid
solid
evidence
evidence to
to support
supportit.it.It
I t was
was not
not worth
worth including
including in
in my report.”l1
my report.
Under
Under interrogation
interrogation in in Moscow
Moscow before
before his his execution,
execution, Volkov
Volkov admitted
admitted that
thathehehadhad
asked
asked the
the British
British for
for political
political asylum
asylum and and 50,000
50,000 pounds,
pounds, andand confessed
confessed that
that hehe had
had
planned
planned to to reveal
reveal the
the names
names of of no
no fewer
fewer than
than 3314
14 Soviet
Soviet agents.12
agents.12Philby
Philby had
had hadhadthe the
narrowest
narrowest of of escapes.
escapes. With
With slightly
slightly less
less luck
luck in Ottawa aa few
in Ottawa few weeks earlier, Gou
weeks earlier, Gou-
zenko
zenko would
would notnot have
have been
been able
able to
to defect.
defect.WithWith slightly
slightly more
more luck
luck in
in Istanbul,
Istanbul, Vol
Vol-
kov
kov would
would have
have succeeded
succeeded in in unmasking
unmasking Philby Philby andand disrupting
disrupting the the MGB's
MGB’s British
British
operations.
operations.
The
The Gouzenko
Gouzenko and and Volkov
Volkov alarms
alarms occurred
occurred at at aa remarkably
remarkably busy busy period
period forfor the
the
London
London residency,
residency, headed
headed until 1947 by
until 1947 by Konstantin
Konstantin KukinKukin (codenamed
(codenamed IGOR)IGOR)..
From
From September
September 111 1 to
to October
October22,1945, 1945 thethe Council
Councilof of Foreign
Foreign Ministers
Ministers ooff the
the five
five
permanent
permanent members
members of of the
the UN Security
Security Council
Council (the
(the United
United States,
States, Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union,
Britain,
Britain, France
France andand China)
China) held
held its
its fi rst meeting
first meeting in in London
London totodiscuss
discuss peace
peacetreaties
treaties
with
with defeated
defeated enemy
enemy states
states and
and other
other post-war problems. The
post-war problems. The residency's
residency’s penetration
penetration
of
of the
the Foreign
Foreign Office
Office gave
gave itit an
an unusually
unusually important
important role.
role. Throughout
Throughout the the meeting,
meeting,
according
according to to KGB
KGB files,
files, the
the Soviet
Soviet ambassador,
ambassador, Ivan Ivan Maisky,
Maisky, placed
placed greater
greater reliance
reliance
on
on residency
residency staff
staff than
than onon his
his own
own diplomats,
diplomats, forcing
forcing themthem to to extend
extend each
each working
working
day
day into
into the
the early
early hours
hours of of the
the following
following morning.13
morning.13The The Security
Security Council
Council meeting,
meeting,
however,
however, was wasaa failure,
failure,publicly
publicly exposing
exposing for for the
the first
first time
time the
the deep
deep East-West
East-West dividivi-
sions which
sions which byby 1947
1947 were
were toto engender
engender the the Cold
ColdWar.
War.
At
At this
this and
and subsequent
subsequent meetings
meetings of the Security
of the Security Council,
Council, Stalin's
Stalin’s foreign
foreign minis
minis-
ter, Vyacheslav
ter, Vyacheslav Mikhailovich
Mikhailovich Molotov,
Molotov, depended
depended heavily
heavily onon the
theintelligence
supplied
by
by the
the MGB's
MGB’s Western
Western agents.
agents. Indeed,
Indeed, he he tended
tended to to take
take it
it for
for granted.
granted. "Why,"
“Why,”he he
T E WSOWR O
T HS
E A
DNR T
D
D HA
S
EHN IDE LT DH E S H I E L D // Ir 44 00
roared
roared onon one
one occasion,
occasion, "are“are there
there nono documents?"
documents?” At the the London
London conference
conference which
which
opened in
opened in November
November 1947, 1947, he he appears
appears to to have
have received
received some some Foreign
Foreign Office docu
Office docu-
ments even
ments even before
before they
they reached
reached the British delegation.14
the British delegation.14
The MGB's most
The MGB’s most important
important sources
sources during
during the meetings of
the meetings of the
the Council
Council ofof For
For-
eign Ministers
eign Ministers from from 1945
1945 toto1949 1949were
were British. Thanks to
British. Thanks tothethekidnapping
kidnapping ofVolkov,
of Volkov,
four
four of the wartime
of the wartime Magnificent
Magnificent Five were able
Five were able toto carry
carry on work as
on work as full-time Soviet
full-time Soviet
agents
agents after
after thethe war.
war. The
The exception
exception was was Anthony
Anthony Blunt, Blunt,who whowas
was under
under such
such visible
visible
strain
strain that
that thethe Centre
Centre did did not object to
not object his decision
to his decision to to leave
leave MI5.
MIS. Shortly
Shortly before
before hehe
returned
returned to to the
theartartworld
world in November 1945
in November 1945 as as Surveyor
Surveyor of the King’s
of the King's Pictures,
Pictures, Blunt
Blunt
made
made oneone extraordinary
extraordinary outburst
outburst whichwhich at at the time was
the time was notnot taken
taken seriously.
seriously. "Well,"
“Well,”
he
he told
told his
his MI5
MIS colleague
colleague Colonel
Colonel "Tar"“Tar”Robertson,
Robertson, "it's “it’s given
given meme great pleasure to
great pleasure to
pass on
pass on thethe names
names of of every
every MI5MI5 officer
officer to
to the
the Russians!"
Russians!”The The Centre
Centremaymay well
well have
have
hoped
hoped that
that LeoLeo Long
Long (code named ELLI),
(codenamed ELLI), whom
whom Blunt Blunt had had run
run as as aa sub-agent
sub-agent in in
military during the
intelligence during the war,
war, would
would succeed
succeed him him ininthe the Security
Security Service.
Service.
Blunt recommended Long
Blunt recommended Long for for aa senior
senior post
post inin MI5 but but thethe selection
selection board
board passed
passed
him
him over,
over, allegedly
allegedly by by aa narrow
narrow margin,
margin, in in favor
favor of of another
another candidate.
candidate. Long Long moved
moved
instead
instead toto the British Control
the British Control Commission
Commission in in Germany,
Germany, where where he he eventually
eventually became
became
Deputy Director of
Deputy Director of Intelligence.
Intelligence. ThereThere he he resisted
resisted attempts
attempts to to put
put him
himinin regular
regular
contact
contact with
with aacase
case officer-a
officer-a recalcitrance which the
recalcitrance which the Centre
Centreattributed
attributedin in partpart
to theto the
fact
fact that
that Blunt
Blunt hadhadceased
ceased to to be
be his controller. Among
his controller. Among the the occasional services which
occasional services which
Blunt continued
Blunt continued to to perform
perform for for the Centre were
the Centre were two two oror three visits to
three visits Germany to
to Germany to
seek intelligence from
seek intelligence Long.ls
from Long.” ,
Unlike
Unlike Blunt,Blunt, three
three of of the Magnificent Five-Philby,
the Magnificent Five-Philby, Burgkiss Burgis s and Maclean
and Maclean-
were
were all atat their peak as
theirpeak as Soviet agents, and
Soviet agents, Cairncross still
and Cairncross still close'to
closdto his,his, when
when the
the Cold
Cold
War began. Philby
War began. remained head
Philby remained head of SIS Section
of SIS Section IX until 1947, when
until 1947, when hehe was
was
appointed head
appointed head ofof station
station in in Turkey,
Turkey, aa position
position which enabled him
which enabled him to to betray
betray agents
agents
who crossed the
who crossed Russian border
the Russian border as as well
well asas their
their families
families and and contacts inside the
contacts inside the
Soviet Union.
Soviet Union. Maclean
Maclean established
established aa reputation
reputation as as aa high-flying
high-flying young young diplomat
diplomat in in
the Washington
Washington embassy,
embassy, where he remained until 1947. 1947. In 1946 1946 Burgess, who had
joined the Foreign
joined the Foreign Office
Office in 1944, became
in 1944, became personal
personal assistant
assistant to HectorMcNeil,
to Hector McNeil,
Minister of State totoErnest ErnestBevin in the thepost-war Labor government.16
government.16Mter After the
thewar
John
John Cairncross
Cairncross returned
returned to to the
theTreasury,
Treasury, where
where the the London
Londonresidency
residency renewed
renewed con
con-
tact
tact with
with him himinin1948.17
1948.17Cairncross's
Cairncross’s main
main jobjob at atthe
theTreasury
Treasury over the next
over the few years
next few years
was to authorize
authorize expenditure on defense research. According to his Treasury colcol
league G.G. A.A. Robinson:
[Cairncross] thus knew not just just about atomic weapons developments but also
plans for guided missiles, microbiological,
microbiological, chemical,
chemical, underwater and all other
types of weapons. He know, inter alia, about projected spending
H e also needed to know,
on aeronautical and radar research and anti-submarine detection, research by
the Post Office and other signals intelligence,
other bodies into signals intelligence, eavesdropping tech
tech-
niques, H e .. .. .. could legitimately ask for any further
niques, etc. He hrther details thought nec
thought nec-
essary to give Treasury approval
approval to the
the spending of money.1S
money.’*
F
F r oo m Wa
W a rr tt oo C oo l d Wa
W a rr // I1 4
4 Ir
Cairncross's
Cairncross’s controller,
controller, Yuri
Yuri Modin,
Modin, was, was, unsurprisingly,
unsurprisingly, "overjoyed
“overjoyed by bythe
the quality
quality of of
[his]
[his] information."19
inf~rmation.”~’
The
The newnew security
security procedures
procedures introduced
introduced in in thethewake
wake of of the
the Gouzenko
Gouzenkoand and Volkov
Volkov
alarms
alarms made
made controlling
controlling the the London
Londonresidency's
residency’s agents
agents far more laborious
far more laborious and and time
time-
consuming
consuming than than during
during or or before
before thethe war.
war. On
O n average,
average, before
before every
every meeting
meeting with with an an
agent,
agent, each
each case
case officer
officerspent
spent five
five hours
hours moving
moving on on foot
footoror byby public
public transport
transport (espe
(espe-
cially
cially the London Underground)
the London Underground) between between locations
locations he he had had studied
studied previously
previously in in
order
order toto engage
engage in in repeated
repeated checks
checks that that he
he was
was notnot under
under surveillance.
surveillance. Once Once at at the
the
meeting place,
meeting place, both
both thethe case
case officer
officer and
and the
the agent
agent were required to
were required to establish visual
establish visual
contact and
contact and to satisfy themselves
to satisfy themselves that that the
the other
other waswas not
not being
being watched
watched beforebefore they
they
approached
approached each each other.
other. If either had
If either had anyany doubts,
doubts, they they would
would fall back on
fall back on oneoneofof three
three
previously
previously agreed
agreedalternative
alternative rendezvous.
rendezvous.The The system
system pioneered
pioneered in in London
Londonwas was later
later
introduced
introduced into into other
other residencies.20
residencies.2o
The
The London
London residency
residency also also pioneered
pioneered the the useuse ofof radio
radio intercept
intercept units
units to to identify
identify
and
and monitor
monitor surveillance
surveillance of of its
its operations
operations by by the
the police
police andand MIS.
MIS. In In addition
addition to to the
the
main
main interception
interception unit unit ininthe theresidency,
residency, mobile
mobile units
units were
were established
established in in embassy
embassy cars cars
to
to check
check thethe areas
areas inin which
which meetings
meetings took took place
place with
with agents.21
agents.” However,
However, the the Centre's
Centre’s
experiment with the eight-man surveillance team
experiment with the eight-man surveillance team sent to London during the sent to London during the Second
Second
World
World War War totocarry
carry outout checks
checks on on agents
agents andand visitors
visitors toto thethe Soviet
Soviet embassy,
embassy, as as well
well
as
as to discover the
to discover the surveillance
surveillance methods
methods used used by by British
British intelligence,
intelligence, was was discontin
discontin-
ued.
ued. A report
report in in KGB
KGB archives
archives records
records that,
that, handicapped
handicapped by by its
its lack
lack of of fluency
fluency in in
English,
English, the the team
team had had "no
“no major
major successes."22
successes.”22The The experiment
experiment was was probably
probably aa totaltotal
failure.
failure.
The
The London
London residency's
residency’s attempts
attempts to to enforce
enforce the the strictest
strictest standards
standards of of secrecy
secrecyand and
security
security hadhad only
only aa limited
limited effect
effect on on GuyGuy Burgess.
Burgess. On O n one
one occasion,
occasion, whilewhile coming
coming
out
out of
of aa pub
pub where
where he he had
hadestablished
established visualvisual contact
contact withwith hishis case
case officer,
officer,he he dropped
dropped
his
his briefcase
briefcase andand scattered
scattered secret
secret Foreign
Foreign Office
Office papers
papers over
over thethe floor.
floor.There
There werewere fre
fre-
quent
quent complaints
complaints that that hehe turned
turned up up forfor meetings
meetings the the worse
worse for for drink
drink and and with
with hishis
clothing
clothing in in disarray.23
disarray2’When When George George Carey-Foster,
Carey-Foster, head head of of the
the embryonic
embryonic security
security
branch
branch in in the
theForeign
Foreign Office,
Office, first encountered Burgess
first encountered Burgess in in 1947,
1947,hehewaswas struck
struck byby his
his
"disheveled
“disheveled and and unshaven
unshaven appearance.
appearance. He H e also
also smelt
smelt so so strongly
strongly of of drink that I
drink that
enquired
enquired who who he he was
was andand what
what hishis job
job was."
was.”YetYet Burgess
Burgess could
could still
still display
display fragments
fragments
of
of the
the charm
charm and and brilliance
brilliance of of his
his Cambridge
Cambridge years. years. Late
Late in in 1947,
1947, probably
probably to to get
getrid
rid
of
of him,
him, Hector
Hector McNeil
McNeil recommended
recommended Burgess Burgess to to the
the parliamentary
parliamentary under-secretary
under-secretary
at
at the
the Foreign
Foreign OffiOffice,ce, Christopher
Christopher Mayhew, Mayhew, who who was was then
then organizing
organizing the the Informa
Informa-
tion
tion Research
Research Department
Department (IRD) (IRD)to to counter
counter Soviet
Soviet "psychological
“psychologicalwarfare."
warfare.’’ Mayhew
Mayhew
made what
made what he he later
later described
described as as "an
“an extraordinary
extraordinary mistake:"
mistake:” "I “I interviewed
interviewed Burgess.
Burgess.
He
H e certainly
certainly showed
showed aa dazzling
dazzling insight
insight into
into Communist
Communist methods methods of of subversion
subversion and and
I readily
readily took
took himhim on."
on.” Burgess
Burgess went went thethe rounds
rounds of of British
British embassies
embassies selling
selling IRD's
IRD’s
wares
wares while
while simultaneously
simultaneously compromising
compromising the the newnew department
department by by reporting
reporting all all its
its
plans
plans toto Yuri
Yuri Ivanovich
Ivanovich Modin,Modin, who who became
became his his case
case officer
officer in in 1947
1947 andand acquired
acquired aa
reputation
reputation as as one
one of of the
the ablest
ablest agent
agent controllers
controllers in in Soviet intelligence. The
Soviet intelligence. The chorus
chorus of of
protests
protests at at Burgess's
Burgess’s undiplomatic
undiplomatic behavior behavior led led toto his
his removal
removal from from thethe IRD and and
T
TH E WSOWR O
HS
E DR D A
ANND
D T
THHE
E S
SHH II E
E L
L D
D // I1 44 22
transfer
transfer to the Foreign
to the Foreign Office
Office Far
Far Eastern Department ininthe
Eastern Department theautumn
autumn of of 1948.24
1948.24
Though
Though itit disturbed
disturbed the the Centre,
Centre, Burgess's
Burgess’s frequently
frequently outrageous
outrageous conduct
conduct paradoxi
paradoxi-
cally
cally strengthened
strengthened his his cover.
cover. Even
Even to most of
to most of those
those whom
whom he he outraged
outraged hehe seemed
seemed as as
unlike
unlike aa Soviet
Soviet spyspy as
as it
it was
was possible
possible to
to imagine.
imagine.
Modin
Modin was was alsoalsoconcerned
concerned aboutabout Nikolai
Nikolai Borisovich
Borisovich Rodin
Rodin (alias
(alias "Korovin"),
“Korovin”),who
who
succeeded
succeeded KukinKukin as as London
London resident
resident in 1947. Rodin
in 1947. Rodin considered
considered himself
himself above the
above the
tight security regulations
tight security regulations on on which
which he he insisted
insisted for
for the other members
the other members of of the
the resi
resi-
dency.
dency. According
According to to Modin,
Modin, who who loathed
loathedhim himpersonally,
personally, Rodin
Rodin waswas "known
“known to to go
go
to clandestine meetings in one of the embassy cars, and sometimes
to clandestine meetings in one of the embassy cars, and sometimes was foolhardy was foolhardy
enough to
enough place direct
to place direct calls
calls to
to agents
agents in their offices."
in their But, in
offices.” But, in the
therigidly
rigidly hierarchical
hierarchical
world
world ofof Soviet intelligence, Modin
Soviet intelligence, Modin feltfelt that
that "there
“there was
was nothing
nothing I could
could do
do about it.
about it.
It was
was hardly
hardly my my place
place to denounce my
to denounce superior in
my superior in the
the service."
service.” As
As head
head of
of Faculty
Faculty
Number
Number One One (Political
(Political Intelligence)
Intelligence) in the FCD Andropov
in the Andropov Institute inthe
Institute in the early
early
1980s,
1980s, Modin
Modin was less inhibited.
was less inhibited. H Hee dismissed
dismissed Rodin
Rodin asas an
an arrogant,
arrogant, pretentious
pretentious
nonen tity. 25
n~nentity.~’
'
TH
HOOU
UGGH T H E
E M GB S
MGB’S most important
most important British
British agents
agents were
were still undetected at
still undetected at the end
the end
of
of the
the 1940s,
1940s, manymany of of their American counterparts
their American counterparts had been compromised.
had been compromised. The The
Centre
Centre had had complained
complained as as early
early as as March
March 19451945 that
that the
the membership
membership of of the
the Silver
Silver-
master
master spyspy ring
ring was
was anan open
open secret
secret among
among "many"
“many”Washington
Washington Communists
Communistsand and that
that
Harry Dexter White's
Harry Dexter White’s Soviet
Soviet "connection"
“connection” had had also become known.
also become known. It denounced
denounced
"not
“not only
only thethe falling
falling off
off in
in the
the [New[NewYork]
York] Residency's
Residency’swork
work of controlling and
of controlling and edu
edu-
cating
cating probationers
probationers [agents],
[agents], but but also
also the
the lack
lack of
of understanding
understanding by by our
our operational
operational
workers
workers of of the
the most
most elementary
elementary rules rules in
in our
our work."26
work.”26
The
The defections
defections later
later in
in 1945
1945 of of Igor
Igor Gouzenko
Gouzenko andand Elizabeth
Elizabeth Bentley confirmed
Bentley confirmed
the
the Centre's
Centre’s worst
worst fears.
fears. In September J. Edgar
In September Edgar Hoover
Hoover reported
reported to to the
theWhite
White House
House
and
and thetheState
StateDepartment
Departmentthat thatGouzenko
Gouzenko had
had provided
provided information
theactivities
activities
of
of aa number
numberof Soviet spies
of Soviet spies in
in thetheUnited
United States,
States, one
one of whom was
ofwhom was "an
“an assistant
assistant toto the
the
Secretary
Secretary of of State"
State” (almost certainly Alger
(almost certainly Alger Hiss). Onn November
Hiss). O November 7 Bentley,
Bentley, who
who hadhad
first
first contacted
contacted the the FBI six sir; weeks earlier, began
weeks earlier, began revealing
revealing what
what sheshe knew
knew of Soviet
of Soviet
espionage to
espionage to its
itsNew
New York
York field
field office.
office. Next
Next day
day Hoover sent President
Hoover sent President Truman's
Truman’s milmil
itary
itary aide
aide aa first
first list
list of
of fourteen
fourteen of of those
those identifi ed by
identified by Bentley
Bentley asas supplying
supplying informa
informa-
tion
tiontoto“the"the Soviet
Soviet espionage
espionage system:"
system:’’ among
amongthemthem Assistant
Assistant Secretary
Secretary of of the
the
Treasury
Treasury Harry
Harry Dexter
Dexter White,
White, OSS executive assistant Duncan
executive assistant Duncan C. C. Lee
Lee and
and Roo
Roo-
sevelt's
sevelt’s former
former aide aide Lauchlih
Lauchlin Currie.27
C ~ r r i eBentley's
Bentley’s
.~~ defection,
defection, in
in turn,
turn, revived
revived FBI inter
inter-
est
est in
in Whittaker
Whittaker Chambers'
Chambers’ earlier
earlier evidence
evidence of of pre-war
pre-war Soviet
Soviet espionage
espionage by by Hiss,
Hiss,
White
White and and others.28
others.28
On
O n November 20 Gorsky, Gorsky, the Washington
Washington resident whom Bentley knew as ('Al “AI,”,"
met
met her
her for
for the
the last
last time
time inin front
front of of Bickford's
Bickford’s cafeteria
cafeteria on 23rd Street
on 23rd Street and Sixth
and Sixth
Avenue in New NewYork.
York. Unaware that they were under surveillance surveillance by the FBI, Gorsky
arranged
arranged their
their next
next meeting
meeting for forJanuary
January 20. According
According to to Bentley,
Bentley, hehe told
told her
her that
thatshe
she
might
might soon
soon be be needed
needed ((back
“back inin undercover
undercover work."
work.” By the
the time
timethe thedate
datefor
for their next
their next
rendezvous had arrived,
rendezvous arrived, however,
however, Gorsky was back in Moscow.29 Moscow.29His hasty departure
F
F r o mW aWa
r r tt oo C o l d Wa
W ar / I 43
1
was
was probably
probably due due toto the
the discovery
discovery of of Bentley's defection.30 A few
Bentley’s defe~tion.~’ few months
months later the
later the
resident
resident in in New
New York,
York, Roland
Roland Abbiate
Abbiate (alias(alias "Pravdin"),
“Pravdin”),whose whose wife wife was known to
was known to
Bentley,
Bentley, was was also
also withdrawn.31
~ithdrawn.~ A’ damage
damage assessment
assessment in in the Centre concluded
the Centre concluded that that
Bentley
Bentley did did notnot know
know the the real
real name,
name, address
address or or telephone
telephone number number of of her
her previous
previous
controller,
controller, Iskhak
Iskhak Akhmerov,
Akhmerov, the the illegal
illegal resident
resident in in the
the United
United States.
States. As As aa precau-
precau
tion,
tion, however,
however, he he and
and his
his wife
wife werewere recalled
recalledto Moscow.32
to Moscow.32
The
The almost
almost simultaneous
simultaneous recall recall ofof Gorsky,
Gorsky, Abbiate
Abbiate and and Akhmerov
Akhmerov left left thethe MGB
without
without experienced
experienced leadership
leadership in in the
the United
UnitedStates.States,ThereThere were few
were few senior
senior officers
officers
at the Centre
at the Centre with with first-hand
first-hand knowledge
knowledge of North America
of North America capable capable of of succeeding
succeeding
them.
them. In In any case, as
any case, as Yuri
YuriModin
Modin later later acknowledged,
acknowledged, "We “We were leery of
were leery sending peo
of sending peo-
ple
ple out
out of of the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union for for fear
fear of of defections.
defections. Most Most of of our officers worked
our officers worked in in
Moscow,
Moscow, with with thetheresult
result that
that the thefew
few menmen posted
posted in in foreign countries had
foreign countries had aaworkload
workload
so crushing that
so crushing that many
many of of them
them cracked
cracked under under thethe pressure."33 AkhmerovAkhmerov was was notnot
replaced as
replaced as illegal
illegal resident
resident until
until 1948.
1948.34 34 Gorsky‘s
Gorsky's two two successors
successors as as chief
chieflegal
legal resident
resident
in
in the
the United
UnitedStates
States both became bywords
both became bywords for for incompetence
incompetence in in the
the Centre.
Centre. Grigori
Grigori
Grigoryevich
Grigoryevich Dolbin, Dolbin, who who arrived
arrived to to replace
replace Gorsky
Gorsky in in 1946,
1946, had had toto be replaced in
be replaced in
1948
1948 after
after showing
showing signssigns ofof insanity
insanity (due,(due, it it was
was rumored
rumored in in Moscow,
Moscow, to to the onset of
the onset of
hereditary
hereditary syphilis).
syphilis). His
His successor,
successor,Georgi Georgi Aleksandrovich
Aleksandrovich Sokolov, Sokolov, was wasreprimanded
reprimanded
by
by the
the Centre
Centrebefore
before being
being recalled
recalled in in 1949.35
1949.35
The
The mostmost effective
effective damage
damage limitation measure taken
limitation measure taken by by the
the MGB after after Bentley’s
Bentley's
defection
defection was was to break off
to break contact with
off contact with most
most of the wartime
of the wartime American
American agents agents whosewhose
identities
identities were were known
known to to her.
her. As As aa result, Bentley's many
result, Bentley’s leads resulted
many leads resulted in in not
not aa sin-
sin
gle
gle prosecution.
prosecution. The The FBI began began its its investigations
investigations too too late
late toto catch
catch anyany of of the spies
the spies
named
named by by Bentley
Bentley in in the
theact
act ofof passing
passing on classified information,
on classified information, and and it it was
was unable
unable to to
use
use evidence
evidence from from wiretaps
wiretaps in in court.
court. The Centre, however,
The Centre, however, failed failed toto grasp
grasp the the extent
extent
of
of the
the legal
legal obstacles
obstacles which
which confronted
confronted the the FBI and and continued
continued to to fear
fear forfor several
several
years
years that
that ititwould succeed in
would succeed in mounting
mounting aamajor major spy spy trial.
trial.
The
The Centre's
Centre’s fearsfearswere strengthened by
werestrengthened by aa major American codebreaking
major American codebreaking success, success,
later
later codenamed
codenamed VENONA. For For its
its high-grade diplomatic and
high-grade diplomatic and intelligence
intelligence commu-commu
nications
nications the the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union had hadused
used since 1927 aavirtually
since 1927 unbreakable cipher
virtually unbreakable cipher system
system
known
known in in the
the West
Westas as the
the "one-time
“one-time pad."36 During and
pad.”36During and immediately
immediately after after thethe Sec
Sec-
ond
ond World
World War, War, however,
however, some some of of the
the one-time
one-time pads were reissued,
pads were reissued, thus thus becoming
becoming
vulnerable-though
vulnerable-though it it took
took several
several yearsyears for
for American
American and and British
British codebreakers
codebreakers to to
exploit
exploit the the difficult
difficult opportunity
opportunity offered offered to them by
to them by Soviet cryptographic careless
Soviet cryptographic careless-
ness.
ness. Late
Late in in 1946
1946Meredith
MeredithGardner,Gardner, a brilliant
brilliant
a cryptanalyst
cryptanalyst in in the
the US Army Army Secu- Secu
rity [SIGINT] Agency,
rity [SIGINT] Agency, began
began decrypting
decrypting some some of of the
the wartime
wartime messages
messages exchanged
exchanged
between
between the Centre and
the Centre and its American residencies.
its American residencies. By the summer
By the summer of of 1947
1947 he had
he had
accumulated
accumulated evidence evidence fromfrom thethe decrypts
decrypts of of massive Soviet espionage
massive Soviet espionage in in the wartime
the wartime
United
United States.
States. In In 1948
1948 ASA called called in in the FBI. From
the FBI. From October
October specialspecial agent
agent Robert
Robert
Lamphere
Lamphere began began full-time
full-time workwork on VENONA, seeking
on VENONA, seeking to to identify
identify the the agents (some
agents (some
still
still active)
active) whose
whose codenames
codenames appeared appeared in the VENONA
in the VENONA decrypts.37 decrypts.37Remarkably,
Remarkably,
however,
however, the the Central
Intelligence Agency Agency was was not
not informed
informed of VENONA until
of VENONA late
until late
in
in 1952.38
1952.38Even Even more
more remarkably,
remarkably, President
President Truman appears not
Truman appears not to have been
to have been told
told
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
RDD A
ANND
D TT H
HEE SS H
H II E
E L
L D
D // I14444
of
of the
the decrypts,
decrypts, perhaps
perhaps for
for fear
fearthat
that he
he might
might mention
mentionthem them totothe theDirector
Director ofof Cen
Cen-
tral
tral Intelligence,
Intelligence, head head of of the
the CIA, at at one
one ofof hishis weekly
weekly meetings
meetings with him.
withhim.
VENONA
VENONA showed showed in in graphic
graphic detail
detail how
how OSS,OSS, thethe CIA's
CIA’Swartime
wartime predecessor,
predecessor, had
had
been
been heavily
heavily penetrated
penetrated by Sovietagents.
by Soviet agents. Both
Both Hoover
Hoover and and the
the Chairman
Chairman of of the
the
Joint Chiefs of Staff, General Omar N. Bradley, seem to
Joint Chiefs ofStaff, General Omar Bradley, seemto have suspected-wrongly- have suspected-wrongly
that
that the
thesame
same was true of
was true ofthe
theAgency.39
Agency.39
The Centre learned
The Centre learned thethe VENONA secret secret in 1947-five years
in 1947”five earlier than
years earlier than the
the
CIA-from
CIA-from anan agent agent inin ASA, William
William Weisband
Weisband (codenamed
(codenamed ZHORA).40
ZHORA).40The Theson
son
of
of Russian
Russian immigrants
immigrants to to the
the United
United States,
States, Weisband
Weisband was employedasas aa Russian
was employed Russian
linguist
linguist and
and roamed
roamed around
around ASA on on the
the pretext
pretext oflooking
of looking for for projects
projectswhere
where his
his lin
lin-
guistic
guistic skills
skills could
could bebeof assistance. Meredith
of assistance. Meredith Gardner
Gardner recalls
recalls Weisband
Weisband looking
looking over
over
his
his shoulder
shoulder at at aa critical
critical moment
moment in in the
the project
project late
late inin 1946,
1946,justjustas
as he
he was
was producing
producing
one
one of ofthe
the first
first important
important decrypts-an
decrypts-an NKGB telegram telegram of December 2,1944
of December 2, 1944 which
which
revealed
revealed Soviet
Sovietpenetration
penetration of of Los
LosAlamos.41
Alamos.41
For
For the
the Centre,
Centre, VENONA represented represented aa series
seriesofof unpredictable
unpredictable timebombs
timebombs
which
which threatened
threatened to to explode
explode over
over the
the next few years.
next few years. ItI t had
had no means of
no means of knowing
knowing
precisely
precisely what
what NKGB telegramstelegrams would
would be decrypted in
be decrypted in whole
whole or part, or
or part, or which
which
Soviet
Soviet agents
agents would
would be be compromised
compromised by them. Moscow's
by them. Moscow’s anxieties
anxietieswere
wereheightened
heightened
by
by the
the public controversy which
public controversy which broke
broke out in the
out in the United
United States
States in
in the summer of
the summer of
1948
1948 over
over Soviet
Soviet espionage.
espionage. In In July
July 1948
1948 Elizabeth
Elizabeth Bentley
Bentley gave
gave evidence
evidence in public
in public
for
for the
the first
first time
time toto the
theHouse
HouseCommittee
Committee on on
Un-American
Un-American Activities
Activities and achieved
and achieved
instant media celebrity
instant media celebrity as as the "Red Spy Qyeen."
the “Red Queen.” In evidence to
In evidence the committee
to the committee in in
early
early August,
August, Whittaker
Whittaker Chambers
Chambers identified
identified Hiss,
Hiss, WhiteWhiteand others as
and others as members
members of of
aa secret
secret pre-war
pre-war Communist
Communist underground.
underground. The The Centre
Centre wrongly
wrongly feared
feared that
that the
thecom
com-
mittee
mittee hearings
hearings would
would bebe the
the prelude
prelude to
to aa series
series ofofshow
show trials
trials which
which would
would expose
exposeitsits
wartime
wartime espionage
espionage network.
network.
D U R I N G TH HEE LAT
LATE E 1940s
1940s Soviet foreign intelligence
Soviet foreign intelligenceoperations
operationswerewere further
further con
con-
fused
filsed byby aa major reorganization in
major reorganization in Moscow,
Moscow, promptedprompted by by the
the American
American National
National
Security
Security ActAct ofof July
July 1947
1947 which
which established
established aa Central
Central Intelligence Agency “for
Intelligence Agency "for the
the
purpose
purpose of of coordinating
coordinating the the intelligence
intelligence activities
activities ofof the
the several
several government
government depart
depart-
ments
ments and and agencies
agencies inin the
theinterest
interest ofofnational
national security." Though that
security.”Though that coordination
coordination was
was
never
never fully achieved,
achieved, Molotov
Molotov argued
argued that
that the the unified foreign intelligence
unified foreign intelligence apparatus
apparatus
envisaged
envisaged by by the
the National
National Security
Security Act
Act would
would give givethe
the United
UnitedStates
States aa clear
clear advantage
advantage
over
over the
the fragmented
fragmented Soviet
Soviet system.
system.The
The solution,
solution, hehe argued,
argued,was
was toto combine
combine the
the for
for-
eign intelligence directorates
eign intelligence directoratesofof both
both thethe MGB MGB and and the
the GRU under under aa single roof
single roof.
Molotov's
Molotov’s proposal
proposal had
had the
the further
furtheradvantage,
advantage, from from Stalin's
Stalin’s viewpoint,
viewpoint, ofof weakening
weakening
the
the power
power of of Beria, whose protigi,
Beria, whose protege, Viktor
Viktor Semyonovich Abakumov,headed
Semyonovich Abakumov, headed thethe
MGB.42
MGB.42In In October
October 19471947thetheforeign
intelligencedirectorates
directoratesofofthe MGB and
the MGB and GRU
were
were combined
combined to to form
form aa new
new unifi ed foreign
unified foreign intelligence
intelligence agency,
agency,thethe Committee
Committee of of
Information (Komitet Informatsii
Information (Komitet Informatsii or or KI).43
K I ) . 4 3 Under
Under the
the new,
new, highly
highly centralized
centralized system,
system,
even
even the
the operational
operational plans
plans for
forarranging
arranging meetings
meetings with,
with, and
and investigating
investigating the
the reliabil
reliabil-
ity
ity of,
of, important
important agents
agents required
required the
the prior
prior approval
approval of ofthe
the KI.44
KI.44
F
From Wa
Warr tt oo C oo ll d
d Wa
Warr // I145
45
The
The appointment
appointment of ofMolotov
Molotovasas first
first chairman
chairman of of the
theCommittee
Committeeof of Information
Information
gave
gave the
the Foreign
Foreign Ministry
Ministry greater
greater influence
influence onon foreign
operations than
than
ever
ever before.
before.The
The fi rst deputy
first deputy chairman,
chairman, responsible
responsible to to Molotov
Molotov for for day-to-day
day-to-day oper
oper-
ations,
ations, was
was the
the relatively
relatively pliant
pliant Pyotr
Pyotr Vasilyevich Fedotov, who
Vasilyevich Fedotov, who hadhad become
become the the
MGB
MGB foreign
intelligence chiefin
chief in the
theprevious
previous year.45
year.4’ Like
Like most
most ofof the
theCentre
Centreman
man-
agement,
agement, Fedotov
Fedotov had had almost
almost nono experience
theWest.
West. Roland
Roland Abbiate,
Abbiate, the
the former
former
resident
resident in New York
in New York andand probably
probably the the senior
senior intelligence
officer best
best acquainted
acquainted
with
with the
the West,
West,waswas sacked
sacked onon the
the formation
formation of of the KI. His
the KI. His file
file records
records that
that he
he was
was
given
given nono explanation
explanation for for his
his dismissal
dismissal and that“it
and that "it was
was aa terrible
terrible blow
blow for
for him."
him.”
Though
Though the the reason
reason for
for the
the sacking
sacking isis not
not recorded,
recorded, it it may
may well
well have
havebeen
been related
related to
to
his
his foreign
foreign Jewish
Jewish ancestry,
ancestry, which
which isis duly
duly noted
noted in in his
his me.
file. Abbiate
Abbiate was
was briefly
briefly rein
rein-
stated
stated after
after Stalin's
Stalin’s death,
death, then
then sacked
sacked again
again and
and later
later committed
committed suicide.46
suicide.46
Molotov soughttoto
Molotov sought strengthen Foreign
strengthen Foreign Ministry
Ministry control
control of of KI operations
operations by by
appointing Soviet ambassadors in major capitals as "chief
appointing Soviet ambassadors in major capitals as “chief legal residents” with legal residents" with
authority
authority over
over both
both civilian
civilian (ex-MGB)
(ex-MGB) and and military
military (ex-GRU)
(ex-GRU) residents.
residents. InIn the
the jaun
jaun-
diced
dicedview
view of
of the
the later
later KGB
KGB defector
defector Ilya
Ilya Dzhirkvelov:
Dzhirkvelov:
This
This resulted
resulted in
in incredible
incredible confusion.
confbsion. The
The residents,
residents, the
the professional
professional intelli
intelli-
gence
gence officers,
officers, resorted
resorted toto incredible
incredible subterfuges
subterfuges toto avoid
avoid informing
informing their
their
ambassadors
ambassadors about
about their
their work,
work, since
since the
the diplomats
diplomats had
had only
only amateurish
amateurish knowl
knowl-
edge
edge of
of intelligence
intelligence work
work and
and its
its methods 47
methods .. .. ..47
Some
Some diplomats,
diplomats, however,
however, became
became directly
directly involved
involved in in intelligence
intelligence operations.
operations. Mter
After
the
the troubles
troubles in in the
the Washington
Washington residency
residency which
which led led to
to the
the recall
recall of
of two
two successive
successive
residents
residents in in 1948-9,
1948-9, thethe Soviet
Soviet ambassador,
ambassador, Aleksandr
Aleksandr Semyonovich
Semyonovich Panyushkin,
Panyushkin,
took personal charge for a year. H e acquired such a taste for intelligence that
took personal charge for a year. He acquired such a taste for intelligence that hehelater
later
became
became headhead ofof the
the KGB
KGB First
First (foreign
(foreign intelligence)
intelligence) Chief
Chief Directorate.48
Dire~torate.~~
In
In 1949
1949 Molotov,
Molotov, nownow out out of
of favor
favor with
with Stalin,
Stalin, was
was succeeded
succeeded as as both
both Foreign
Foreign
Minister
Minister andand chairman
chairman of of the IU by
the KI by his
his former
former deputy,
deputy, Andrei
Andrei Vyshinsky,
Vyshinsky, whowho hadhad
made
reputation as as the brutal prosecutor
the brutal prosecutor in the prewar
in the prewar show show trials.
trials. Vyshinsky
Vyshinsky
retained
retained aa sycophantic
sycophantic devotion
devotion to to Beria
Beria which
which showed
showed itself
itself even
even on
on the
thetelephone.
telephone.
According
According to to one
one of
of his
his successors,
successors, Andrei
Andrei Gromyko,
Gromyko, t'As “As soon
soon as
as he
he heard
heard Beria's
Beria’s
voice
voice Vyshinsky
Vyshinskyleapt
leapt respectfully
respectfully out out of
of his
his chair.
chair. The
The conversation
conversation itself
itself also
also pre
pre-
sented
sented an an unusual
unusual picture:
picture: Vyshinsky
Vyshinsky cringed
cringed like
like aa servant
servant before
before his
his master."49
master.”49
Unlike
Unlike Molotov,
Molotov, Vyshinsky
Vyshinsky had had little
little interest
interest inin KI affairs,
affairs, handing
handing over
over the
the chair
chair-
manship
manship after
after aa few
few months
months to to Deputy
Deputy Foreign
Foreign Minister
Minister Valerian
Valerian Zorin.
Zorin. Fedotov
Fedotov
was succeeded as
was succeeded as first
first deputy
deputy chairman
chairman in in charge
charge of of day-to-day
day-to-day operations
the
more
more brutal
brutal and
and decisive
decisive Sergei
Sergei Romanovich
Romanovich Savchenko,
Savchenko,like like Vyshinsky
Vyshinsky aa protege
protCgC of of
Beria. Savchenko seems to have answered to Beria rather
Beria. Savchenko seems to have answered to Beria rather than the Foreign Min- than the Foreign Min
istry.50
istry.”
By
By the
the time
time Vyshinsky
Vyshinsky succeeded
succeeded Molotov,
Molotov, muchmuch of of the
the Committee
Committee of of Informa
Informa-
tion
tion had
hadunraveled.
unraveled. In In the
the summer
summerof of 1948,
1948, after
after aa prolonged
prolonged disputedispute with
with Molotov,
Molotov,
Marshal
Marshal Nikolai
Nikolai Aleksandrovich
Aleksandrovich Bulganin,
Bulganin, Minister
Minister for for the Armed Forces,
the Armed Forces, began
began
T
THHE
E S
SW RD
WOR A
ANND
D T
THHE
E S
SHH II E
E LL D
D // Ir 44 66
withdrawing
withdrawing military
intelligence personnel
personnel from
from KI control
control and
and returning
returning them
them to
to
the
the G RU. Probably
GRU. Probably with
with the
the support
support of Beria, Abakumov
ofBeria, Abakumov then
then embarked
embarked on on aa long
long
drawn
drawn outout struggle
struggle to
to recover
recover control
control of
of the remnants of
the remnants of the KI. At
the KI. At the
the end
end ofof 1948
1948
all
all residency
residency offi cers in
officers in the
the EM (Russian
(Russian emigre)
tmigrt) and
and SK (Soviet
(Soviet colonies
colonies abroad)
abroad)
Lines returned
Lines returned to
to the
theMGB.
MGB. TheThe KI was
was finally
finally wound
wound upup and
and the
the rest
rest of
of its
its foreign
foreign
intelligence
intelligence responsibilities returned to
responsibilities returned to the
theMGB late
late in
in 1951.51
1951.”
T H E M A IIN N L E GACY of
LEGACY of the
the KI period
period to to the
the subsequent
subsequent development
development of of Soviet
Soviet intel
intel-
ligence
ligence was
was aa renewed emphasis on
renewed emphasis on illegals
illegals who,who, itit was
was believed,
believed, would
would eventually
eventually
establish
establish aa more secure and
more secure and better-concealed
better-concealed foundationfoundation for for foreign
intelligence
operations than
operations than thethe legal
legal residencies,
residencies, particularly
particularly in the United
in the United States.
States. The
The Fourth
Fourth
(Illegals) Directorate
(Illegals) Directorate of of the
the KI, formed
formed by by combining
combining the the illegals
illegals sections
sections of of the
the
MGB and
MGB andthe the
GRU, GRU,hada had a total total staff
staff of of eighty-seven,
eighty-seven, headed headed by by Aleksandr
Aleksandr
Mikhailovich
Mikhailovich Korotkov,
Korotkov, who who hadhad made
reputation during
during pre-war
pre-war missions
missions to to
assassinate “enemies
assassinate "enemies of of the people" on
the people’’ on foreign
foreign soil.soil. In
In 1949,
1949, by by which
which timetime military
military
personnel
personnel in the directorate
in the directorate had had returned
returned to to the
the G RU, forty-nine
GRU, forty-nine illegals
illegals were
were in in
training.
trainings2 52 Korotkov
Korotkov set set upup departments
departments specializing
specializing in in the
the selection
selection of of illegals,
illegals,their
their
training
training and and thethefabrication
fabrication of documentation to
of documentation to support
support their legends. By
their legends. By 1952
1952 thethe
documentation
documentation departmentdepartment had hadforged
forged or doctored 364
or doctored 364 foreign identity documents,
foreign identity documents,
including
including seventy-eight passports. Illegal
seventy-eight passports. Illegal support
support (Line(Line N)N) officers
officers were
were sent
sent by
by the
the
Centre
Centre to to all
all major
major legal
legal residencies.53
re~idencies.’~
The
The first
first priority
priority of of the
the Fourth
Fourth Directorate
Directoratewas was the
the creation
creation of of aa new
new illegal
illegal resi
resi-
dency
dency in in New
NewYork
York to to rebuild
rebuild itsits American
intelligence operations.
operations. The The manman selected
selected
as
as illegal
illegal resident,
resident, thethe first
first since
since Akhmerov's
Akhmerov’s departuredeparture from
from the the United
United States
States atat the
the
beginning
beginning of of 1946,
1946, waswas Vilyam
Vilyam("Willie")
(“Willie”) Genrikhovich
Genrikhovich Fisher, Fisher, codenamed
codenamed MARK,
probably
probably the the only
only English-born
English-born Soviet Soviet intelligence
intelligence officer.54
officer.54Fisher's
Fisher’sparents
parents were
were
Russian
Russian revolutionaries
revolutionaries of of the
the Tsarist
Tsarist era era who
who had had emigrated
emigrated in in 1901
1901 totoNewcastle
Newcastle-
on-Tyne,
on-Tyne, wherewhere Vilyam
Vilyam had been born
had been born in in 1903.55
1903.” In In 1921
1921 the the family
family returned
returned to to
Moscow,
Moscow, where where Fisher
Fisher became
became aa Comintern
Comintern translator.
translator. During military service
During military service inin
1925-6,
1925-6, he he was
was trained
trained as as aa radio
radio operator
operator and, and, after
after aa brief
brief period
period in in the Fourth
the Fourth
Department (Military Intelligence),
Department (Military Intelligence), was was recruited
recruited by by IINO
N 0 (OGPU foreign foreign intelli
intelli-
gence)
gence) in 1927. He
in 1927. He served
served as as aa radio
radio operator
operator in residencies in
in residencies in Norway, Turkey,
Norway, Turkey,
Britain
Britain andand France
France untiluntil 1936,
1936,when whenhehewas was appointed
appointed headhead of of aa training
training school
school for
for
radio
radio operators
operators in in illegal
illegal residencies.
re~idencies.’~ 56
Fisher
Fisher waswas fortunate
fortunate not not to
to be
be shot
shot during
duringthe theGreat
GreatTerror.
Terror. His His file
file records
records that,
that,
as
as well
well as being automatically
as being automatically suspectsuspect because
because of of his
his English
English background,
background, he had
he had
been "referred
been “referred to to in
in positive terms" by
positive terms’’ by aa series
series ofof "enemies
“enemies of of the people," and
the people,” and his
his
wife's
wife’s brother was accused accusedof being a Trotskyite. Though dismissed dismissed by the NKVD at
the
the end
end of of 1938,
1938, he he survived
survived to to bebe reemployed
reemployed during during thethe Great
Great Patriotic
Patriotic War in in aa
unit training
trainingradio operators for guerrilla and intelligence operations behind German German
lines. 57
lines.57
Fisher's
Fisher’s training as an illegal began in 1946 1946under
underthe the personal supervision
supervision of
Korotkov,
Korotkov, the head of the MGB I1legals Department. His legend was unusually
Illegals Department.
complicated.
complicated. Fisher assumed one identity identityduringduringhis journey to the United United States in
F
F r o m Wa
W a r tt oo C o l d W
Waa r // I47
147
1948
1948 and another shortly after his arrival. arrival. The first identity was that of of Andrei
Yurgesovich
Yurgesovich Kayotis,
Kayotis, aa Lithuanian
Lithuanian born born in in 11895
895 whowho hadhad emigrated
emigrated to to the
the United
United
States
States and become an
and become an American
American citizen.citizen. In In November
November 1947 1947 Kayotis crossed the
Kayotis crossed the
Atlantic to to visit relatives
relatives in Europe. While he was in Denmark, the the Soviet embassy
issued a travel document enabling him to visit Russia and retained his passport for
use byby Fisher.
Fisher. In October 1948 1948Fisher traveled to Warsaw on aa Soviet passport, then
traveled on Kayotis's
Kayotis’s passport via Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia and Switzerland to Paris, where he
purchased a transatlantic ticket on the SS Scythia. On
SS Scythia. O n November 6 he set sail from
Le Havre to Quebec,Qyebec, traveled on to Montreal and-still using Kayotis’s
Montreal and-still Kayotis's passport
passport-
crossed into the the United
UnitedStates on November 17.58 17.’*
On
O n November
November 26 26 Fisher
Fisher had
had aa secret
secret meeting
meeting in in New
New York
York with
with the celebrated
the celebrated
Soviet
Soviet illegal
illegalI.I. R. Grigulevich
Grigulevich (codenamed
(codenamed MAKS), MAKS), who who had taken part
hadtaken part inin the first
thefirst
attempt
attempt to assassinate Trotsky
to assassinate Trotsky in in Mexico
Mexico City City and
and had
had led
led aa Latin American sabo-
Latin American sabo
tage groupduring during thethe war attacking ships and cargoes bound for
cargoes bound for Germanys9
Germany. 59
Grigulevich gave Fisher 1,000 1,000 dollars
dollars and three documents in the the name of of Emil
Robert Goldfus:
Goldfus: a genuine birth certificate,certificate, a draft draft card forged by the Centre and a
tax
tax certificate
certificate (also
(also forged).
forged). Fisher
Fisher handedhanded back back Kayotis’s
Kayotis's documents
documents and and became
became
Goldfus.
Goldfus. The The real
real Goldfus,
Goldfus, bornborn in inNew NewYork
York on on August
August 2, 1902, had
2,1902, died at
had died at the age
theage
of
of only
only fourteen
fourteen months.
months. Fisher's
Fisher’s file file records
records thatthat his birth certificate
his birth certificate had had beenbeen
obtained by the NKVD in Spain at the theend endof the Spanish Civil Civil War, at at aatime
timewhen when
it
it was
was collecting
collecting identity
identity documents
documents from members of
from members of the
the International Brigades for
InternationalBrigades for
use
use in
in illegal
illegal operations,
operations, but but gives
gives nono other
other details
details ofof its
its provenance.
provenance. According
According to to the
the
legend constructed
legend constructed by by the
the Centre, Goldfus was
Centre,Goldfus was the son of
the son of aaGerman
Germanhousehouse painter
painter in in
New
New York,
York, had spent his
had spent his childhood
childhood at at 120120 East
East87th87thStreet, left school
Street,left school inin 1916
1916 and and
worked in Detroit
Detroit untiluntil 1926.
1926. After further periods
After further periods in in Grand
Grand Rapids, Detroit and
Rapids, Detroit and
Chicago, the
Chicago, legendary Goldfus
the legendary Goldfus had returned to
had returned to New
New YorkYork inin 1947.
1947. The
The legend,
legend,
however,
however, was wasfarfarfrom
from perfect.
perfect. The
The Centre
Centre instructed Fisher not
instructed Fisher not toto seek
seek employment
employment
for
for fear
fear that
that his
his employer
employer would
would makemake inquiries which would
inquiries which would blow
blow his his cover. Instead,
cover. Instead,
he
he was
was told
told toto open
open an an artist's
artist’s studio
studio and and claim
claim to to be
be self-employed.60
self-employed.60As As Fisher
Fisher min-min
gled
gled with
with other
otherNewNew YorkYork artists,
artists, his
his technique
technique gradually improved and
gradually improved and he became aa
hebecame
competent, if
competent, if rather
rather conventional,
conventional, painter.
painter. He surprised friends
H e surprised friends in in the artistic com-
the artistic com
munity
munity with withhis
his admiration
admiration for for the
the late
late nineteenth-century
nineteenth-century Russian Russian painter Levitan,
painter Levitan,
of whom they had never heard, but made no no mention of of Stalinist
Stalinist “socialist
"socialist realism,"
realism,’’
with
with which
which he he was
was probably
probably alsoalso inin sympathy. Fisher made
sympathy. Fisher made no no secret
secret of of his
his dislike
dislike forfor
abstract
abstract painting.
painting. "You
“You know,"
know,”he he told
told another artist, "I
another artist, think most
“I think most contemporary
contemporary art art
is headed down
is headed down aa blind
blind aliey."61
alley.”61
In
In 1949,
1949, as as the
the basis
basis ofof his
his illegal
illegal residency, Fisher was
residency,Fisher was given control of
givencontrol of aa group
groupof of
agents
agents headed
headed by by Morris Cohen (codenamed
Morris Cohen (codenamed LUIS and and VOLUNTEER),
VOLUNTEER), which which
included his wife Lona (LESLE).62 (LESLE).62 Following Elizabeth Bentley’s Bentley's defection, the
Centre had
Centre had temporarily
temporarily broken broken contact
contact with with the
the Cohens
Cohensearlyearly in
in 1946,
1946,but renewed
butrenewed
contact
contact with
with them
them in in Paris
Paris aa year
year later
later and and reactivated
reactivated them them inin the
the United States in
United States in
1948.63
1948.63TheThe mostmost important
important agentagent in in thethe VOLUNTEER network network was was the physicist
the physicist
Ted
Ted Hall
Hall(MLAD),
(MLAD), for
for whom
whom Lona LonaCohen Cohenhadhad acted
acted asas courier
courier inin 1945 when he
1945when he was
was
passing
passing atomic intelligence from
atomic intelligence from LosLos Alamos.64
Alamos.63Early Early inin 1948,
1948,Hall,
Hall, then working for
then
working for
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
R D
D A
AN D
ND TT H
H SE
E H ISEHL IDE L D // I148
48
his
his PhD atat Chicago
Chicago University,
University, had
had joined
joined the
the Communist
CommunistPartyPartytogether
together with
with his
his
wife Joan, apparently with the intention of abandoning work as a Soviet
wife Joan, apparently with the intention of abandoning work as a Soviet agent andagent and
working
working for
for the
the campaign
campaign ofof the
the Progressive
Progressive candidate,
candidate, the
the naively
naively pro-Soviet
pro-Soviet Henry
Henry
Wallace,
Wallace, in the presidential
in the presidential election.65
ele~tion.~’ Morris Cohen, however,
Morris Cohen, however, persuaded
persuaded Hall
Hall to
to
return
return to
to espionage.
espionage. On
O n August
August 2, 2, 1948
1948 the
the Washington
residency telegraphed
telegraphed the
the
Centre:
Centre:
LUIS
LUIS has
has met
met MLAD.
MLAD. He H e has
has persuaded
persuaded him
him toto break
break contact
contact with
with the
the Pro
Pro-
gressive
gressive organization
organization and
and concentrate
concentrate onon science.
science. Important
Important information
information
obtained
obtained onon MLAD's
MLAD’s twotwo new
new contacts.
contacts. They
They have
have declared
declared their
their wish
wish to
to
transmit data on
transmit data on ENORMOZ
ENORMOZ [the [the nuclear
nuclear program],
program], subject
subject to
to two
two condi
condi-
tions:
tions: MLAD
MLAD must must be
be their
their only
only contact
contact and
and their
their names
names must
must not
not be
be known
known
to
to officers
officers of
of ARTEMIS
ARTEMIS [Soviet
[Soviet intelligence].66
intelligence].66
The
The VOLUNTEER network network expanded
expanded to to include,
include, in in addition
addition to to MLAD,
MLAD, three three
other
other agents:
agents: ADADEN,EN, SERB
SERB and and SILVER.67
SILVER.67Two Two of of these
these were
were undoubtedly
undoubtedly the the two
two
nuclear
nuclear physicists
physicists contacted
contacted by by Hall.
Hall. Though
Though their their identities
identities remain
remain unknown,
unknown, the the
Centre
Centre clearly
clearly regarded
regarded their
their intelligence
intelligence as as of
of the
the fi rst importance.
first importance. According
According to to an
an
history, “the Volunteer group . . . were able to guarantee the transmittal to the
SVR history, "the Volunteer group . . . were able to guarantee the transmittal to the
Centre
Centre of of supersecret
supersecret information
information concerning
concerning the the development
development of of the
the American
American
atomic
atomic bomb."68
bomb.”68
In
In recognition
recognition of of the
the VOLUNTEER group's success, Fisher
group’s success, Fisher was awarded the
was awarded the
Order
Order of of Red
Red Banner
Banner in in August
August 1949.69
1949.69A year year later,
later,however,
however, his
his illegal
illegal residency
residencywas was
disrupted
disrupted by the the arrest
arrest ofof Julius
Julius andand Ethel
Ethel Rosenberg,
Rosenberg, for for whom
whom Lona Lona CohenCohen had had
acted
acted asas courier.
courier. Both
Both thetheCohens
Cohens were
were quickly
quicklywithdrawn
withdrawn to to Mexico,
Mexico,wherewhere they they were
were
sheltered
sheltered forfor several
several months
months by by the
the Soviet
Soviet agents
agents ORELOREL ("Eagle")
(“Eagle”)and and FISH-both
FISH-both
members
members of of the
the Spanish
Spanish Communist
Communist Party Party inin exile 7°-before moving
exile7’-before moving on on to toMoscow.
Moscow.
The
The Cohens
Cohens werewere toto resurface
resurface aa few years later,
few years later, under
under thethe names
names Peter
Peter and and Helen
Helen
Kroger,
Kroger, as as members
members of of aa new
new illegal
illegalresidency
residencyin in Britain.71
Britain.71Hall's
Hall’scareer
career as
as aa Soviet
Soviet spy
was also interrupted.
was also interrupted. In In March
March 1951 1951 he he was
was questioned
questioned by by an
an FBI teamteam which
which waswas
convinced
convinced thatthat hehe was
was guilty
guilty ofof espionage
espionage but but lacked
lacked thethe evidence
evidence for for aa prosecution.72
prose~ution.’~
Under
Under his his later
later alias
alias "Rudolf
“Rudolf Abel,"
Abel,” Fisher
Fisher waswas toto become
become one one ofof the
the best-known
best-known
of
of all
all Soviet
Soviet illegals,
illegals, whose
whose career
career waswaspublicized
publicized by by the
the KGB as as aa prime
prime example
example of of
the
the success
success andand sophistication
sophistication of of its
its operations
theWest
Westduring
duringthe theColdCold War.
War. InIn
reality,
reality, Fisher
Fisher never
never came
came close
close toto rivaling
rivaling the the achievements
achievements of of his
his wartime
wartime predeces
predeces-
sor,
sor, Iskhak
Iskhak Akhmerov.
Akhmerov. DuringDuring eight
eight years
years asasillegal
illegalresident,
resident, hehe appears
appears never
never to to have
have
identified,
identified, let
let alone
alone recruited,
recruited, aa single
single promising
promising potential
potential agent
agent to replace the
to replace the VOL
VOL-
UNTEER network.network.73 73 Unlike
Unlike Akhmerov,
Akhmerov, however, however, he he did
did not
not have
have the the active
active and
and
enthusiastic
enthusiastic assistance
assistanceof of aa well-organized
well-organized American American Communist
Communist Party Party(CPUSA)
(CPUSA)to to
act
act as
as talent-spotters
talent-spotters and and assistants.
assistants.Part Part ofof the
the reason
reason forfor Fisher's
Fisher’s lack
lack ofof success
success waswas
the
the post-war
post-war decline
decline and
and persecution
persecution of of the
the CPUSA.74
CPUSA.74
T H E M O SST
T II M P O RTA
R T AN
NTT American
agent
agent recruited
Americanrecruited during
during the
theearly
early Cold
Cold War,
War, Alek
Alek-
sandr
sandr ("Sasha")
(“Sashd’) Grigoryevich
Grigoryevich Kopatzky,
Kopatzky, was
was aa walk-in.
walk-in. Kopatzky
Kopatzky had
had been
been born
born in
in
F
F r o m Wa
W a rr tt oo C o l d Wa
W ar / I149
49
the
the city
city ofof Surozh
Surozh in in Bryansk
Bryansk Oblast
Oblast in in 1923,75
1923/5 and and had
had served
served as as aa lieutenant
lieutenant in in
Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence from from August
August 1941 1941 until he was
until he was wounded
wounded and and captured
captured by by the
the
Germans
Germans ininDecember
December 1943. 1943.While
While in in aaGerman hospital he
Germanhospital agreed to
he agreed to work
work for Ger
for Ger-
man
man intelligence.
intelligence. During
During the the last
last two
two months
months of of the
the war
war hehe served
served as as an
an intelligence
intelligence
officer
officer in General Andrei
in General Andrei Vlasov's
Vlasov’s anti-Soviet
anti-Soviet Russian
Russian Army Army of of Liberation
Liberation whichwhich
fought
fought the the Red
Red Army
Army inin alliance
alliance with
with thetheWehrmacht.
Wehrmacht. At At the end of
the end of the
the war,
war,
Kopatzky
Kopatzky was was briefly
briefly imprisoned
imprisoned by by the
the American
American authorities
authorities in in the
the former
former concen
concen-
tration
tration camp
camp at at Dachau.76
dacha^.^'
Despite
Despite his his service
service in the NKVD, Kopatzky's
in the Kopatzky‘s anti-Soviet
anti-Soviet credentials seemed so
credentials seemed so
well
well established
established thatthat he he was
was invited
invited to to join
join the American-supervised German
theAmerican-supervised German intel
intel-
ligence
ligence service
service established
established in 1946 at
in 1946 at Pullach,
Pullach, near Munich, by
near Munich, by General
General Reinhard
Reinhard
Gehlen, the
Gehlen, the former
former Wehrmacht
Wehrmacht intelligence
intelligence chiefchief on the eastern
on the eastern front.77
front.77In 1948
In 1948
Kopatzky
Kopatzky further
further distanced
distanced himself
himself fromfrom hishis Soviet
Soviet past
past byby marrying
marrying the the daughter
daughter of of
aa former
former SS SS officer, Eleonore Stirner,
officer, Eleonore Stirner, who
who had hadbeen
been briefly
briefly imprisoned
imprisoned for for her
her activ-
activ
ities in the
ities the Hitler
Hitler Youth. Eleonore later recalled that her her husband “drank "drank a lot lot of
vodka. He
vodka. He kissed
kissed ladies’ hands .. .. .. He
ladies' hands H e was very punctual,
was very punctual, shined
shined hishis shoes,
shoes, did his
did his
gymnastics in the morning, had a neat haircut, short hair all his life. And he was a
gymnastics
very
very good shot. Sasha
good shot. Sasha liked
liked toto hunt
hunt andand talked
talked of of hunting
hunting tigers
tigers in Siberia with
in Siberia with his
his
father."
father.” Many
Many years
years later,
later, after
after Sasha's
Sasha’s death,
death, it suddenly occurred
it suddenly occurred to to Eleonore,
Eleonore, while
while
watching aa televised
watching televised adaptation
adaptation of of aa John
John Le Le Carre novel, that
CarrC novel, that her
her husband
husband mightmight
have
have married
married her her totoimprove
improve his his cover.
cover. That
That realization,
realization, she says, "came
she says, ‘‘camelike
like aa moun
moun-
tain
tain ofof bricks
bricks onon me."78 By By their
their wedding
wedding day day Kopatzky
Kopatzky was was probably
probably already
already plan
plan-
ning
ning to torenew
renew contact
contact withwith Soviet
Soviet intelligence.
intelligence.
The
The SVR still regards the
still regards the Kopatzky
Kopatzky case case asas extremely
extremely sensitive.
sensitive. It It insisted
insisted asas
recently
recently as as 1997
1997 that
that no file exists
no file exists which
which suggests
suggests thatthat Kopatzky,
Kopatzky, under
under any any ofof his
his
aliases, ever engaged
aliases, ever engaged in “collaboration .. .. .. with
in "collaboration with Soviet
Soviet intelligence."79
intelligen~e.”~~ Mitrokhin,
Mitrokhin,
however,
however, was was able
able toto take
take detailed
detailed notes
notes from
from thethe bulky
bulky file
file which
which the the SVR claims
claims
does
does not
not exist. The file
exist.The file reveals
revealsthat
that in in1949
1949Kopatzky
Kopatzky visited
visited the
the Soviet
Soviet military mis
military mis-
sion
sion inin Baden-Baden,
Baden-Baden, and and was
was secretly
secretly transported
transported to to East
East Berlin
Berlin where
where he he agreed
agreed
to
to become
become aa Soviet
Soviet agent.80
agent.” Soon afterwards, he
Soon afterwards, infiltrated the
he infiltrated the anti-Soviet emigre
anti-Soviet CmigrC
organization Union
organization Union of of the
the Struggle
Struggle for Liberation
forLiberation oftheof the Peoples
Peoples of of Russia
Russia
(SBONR),
(SBONR), based based in in Munich,
Munich,which whichhad hadclose
close links
links with
with the
the CIA.
CIA. In In 1951,
1951, doubt
doubt-
less
less toto his
his Soviet
Soviet controllers'
controllers’ delight,
delight, he he was
was recruited
recruited by by the
the CIA station
station in in West
West
Berlin
Berlin as as "principal
“principal agent."81
agent.”” Successively
Successively codenamed
codenamed ERWIN, ERWIN, HERBERT and and
RICHARD by by the Centre, Kopatzky received a monthly salary of
the Centre, Kopatzky received a monthly salary of 500 marks in
marks in
addition
addition to to his
his income
income from from thethe CIA.
CIA. Among
Among his his earliest successes was,
earliest successes was, on Novem
on Novem-
ber
ber 5, 5, 1951,
1951, to to get
get oneone ofof his
his fellow
fellow CIA agents, agents, the Estonian Vladimir
the Estonian Vladimir Kivi Kivi
(wrongly described
(wrongly described in in Kopatzky's
Kopatzws file file as
as an
an "American
“American intelligence
intelligence chief"),
chief”), drunk,
drunk,
transport
transport him him to to East Berlin and
East Berlin and hand
hand himhim overover toto Soviet
intelligence.s2Though
Though
Kopatzky
Kopatzky was was not
not aaCIA staff staff officer
officer and
and never
never worked
worked at at Agency headquarters, he
Agency headquarters, he
did
did enormous
enormous damagedamage to to Agency
Agency operations
operations in in Germany
Germany for formore
more than
than aa decade.83
decade.83
According to his file, no fewer than twenty-three KGB legal operational officers
than twenty-three officers
and
and one
one illegal
illegal "met
“met and and worked
worked withwith him"
him”-a -a certain
certain indication
indication of of how
how highly
highly the
the
Centre
Centre rated
rated him.84
him.84
TT H
HSE WSOWR O
E A
DNRT
D HA
D S
EHN IDE LTDH E S H I E L D I/ I SO
150
TH
HRRO
OUUG
GHHOOUUTT T H E C O L D WA
COLD R,
WAR, Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence regarded
regarded the United States
the United States asas
its
its "main
“main adversary."
adversary.” In In second
second place place at thebeginning
at the beginning of of the Cold War
the Cold War was was the
the
United
United States's
States’s closest
closest ally,
ally, the United Kingdom.
the United Kingdom. In In third
third position
position camecame France.85
France.s5
Before
Before thethe Second
Second World World War, War, France
France had had beenbeen aa major
major base
base forfor NKVD foreign foreign
operations.
operations. Her Her crushing
crushing defeatdefeat in June 1940,
in June 1940, however,
however, followed
followed by by the German
the German
occupation
occupation of of northern
northern France,France, the the establishment
establishment of of the
the collaborationist
collaborationist Vichy Vichy
regime
regime in in thethesouth
south(later
(later also occupied by
also occupied by the
the Germans)
Germans)and Hitler's invasion
and Hitler’s invasion of of the
the
Soviet Union in
Soviet Union inJuneJune1941 1941 drastically
drastically reduced
reduced the scope for
the scope for Soviet
Soviet penetration.
penetration. The The
NKGB
NKGB did, did, however,
however, establish
establish aa strong
strongpresence
presence within
within Communist
Communist sectionssections of of the
the
French
French Resistance.
Resistance.
There
There werewere twotwo mainmain groups
groups of of Soviet
Soviet agentsagents inin wartime
wartime France:
France: one one in in Paris
Paris ofof
about
about fifty
fifty Communists
Communists and and fellow
fellow travelers
travelers headedheaded by by LEMOINE (transliterated
(transliterated
into
into the
the Cyrillic
Cyrillic alphabet
alphabet as as LEMONYE),
LEMONYE), and and another
another of of over
over twenty-five
twenty-five headed headed
by
by HENRI,
HENRI, based based on on Toulouse,
Toulouse, with, with, fromfrom 1941,1941, aasubgroup
subgroup in in Paris.
Paris. According
According to to
KGB records,
records, the the LEMOINE group, group, most most of of whom
whom believed
believed they
they were
were working
working for for
the
the Communist
Communist Party Partyrather
ratherthan thanthethe NKGB, "was disbanded because
“was disbanded because of oftreachery."
treachery.”
Though
Though six six members
members of of the
the HENRI group group (KLOD, LUCIEN, MORIS,
(KLOD, LUCIEN, MONS, ROBERT ROBERT
and
and ZHANETTA) were caught and shot by the Germans, thecore of the group sur
ZHANETTA) were caught and shot by the Germans, the core of the group sur-
vived.86
vived.86
At
At the
the end end ofof the
the warwar Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence had had much
much greater
greater freedom
freedom of of action
action inin
France
France thanthan in in either
either the United States
the United States or or Britain.
Britain. TheThe Parti
Parti Communiste
Communiste Fmnfais Frnnfais
(PCF)
(PCF) publicly
publicly congratulated
congratulated itself itself on on its its undeniably
undeniably heroicheroic rolerole in the wartime
in the wartime
Resistance,
Resistance, proudly
proudly termed termed itself
itself Ie le parti
parti des fusilks ("the
des fusillis (“the party
party of the shot”),
of the shot"), and
and
greatly
greatly inflated
inflated the the numbers
numbers of of its
its fallen heroes. From
fallen heroes. From August
August 1944,
1944,when whenGeneralGeneral de de
Gaulle
Gaulle invited
invited the the PCF to to join
jointhe theProvisional
Provisional Government,
Government, there there were
were Communist
Communist
ministers
ministers for for the
the first
first time
time in in French
French history.
history. According
According to to an
an opinion
opinion poll poll inin May
May
1945, 57 percent
1945,57 percent of of the
the population
population thought thought that thatthethedefeat
defeat ofof Germany
Germany was was due due prin
prin-
cipally
cipally to
to thethe Soviet
Soviet UnionUnion (20 (20 percent
percent gave gave the the most
most credit
credit to
to the
the United
UnitedStates,
States, 1212
percent
percent to to Britain).
Britain). In In the
the elections
elections of of October
October 1945 1945the thePCF,
PCF, with
with 26 26percent
percent of of the
the
vote,
vote, emerged
emerged as as the
the largest
largest party
party in in France.
France. By the the end
end ofof the
the year
year it had almost
it had almost
800,000
800,000members.
members.Though Though support
support for for thethe PCF had had almost
almost peaked,
peaked, there
there werewere many
many
who
who hoped-or
hoped-or feared, feared, particularly
particularly after after de de Gaulle's resignation early
Gaulle’s resignation early in
in 1946-that
1946-that
France
France waswas on on thethe road
road toto becoming
becoming aa Communist-controlled
Communist-controlled “people’s "people's democracy."
democracy.”
One
One socialist minister privately
socialist minister privately complained,
complained, "How “How many senior civil
many senior civil servants,
servants, even even atat
the
the very top, are
very top, are backing
backing Communism
Communism to to win! ,,87
The
The Centre's
Centre’s first
first instructions
instructions to to the
the newly
newly re-established
re-established Paris
Paris residency
residencyafter after the
the
Liberation,
Liberation, dateddated November
November 18, 1944, instructed
18,1944, instructed it it to
toprofi
profitt from
from thethe "current
“current favor
favor-
able
able situation"
situation” to to renew
renew contact
contact withwith the the pre-war
pre-war agent
agent network
network and and recruit
recruit newnew
agents
agents inin thetheforeign
foreign and interior ministries,
and interior intelligence agencies
ministries, intelligence agencies and and political
political parties
parties
and
and organizations.
organizations. InspiredInspired by by the
the success
success of of scientific
scientific and
and technological
intelligence-
gathering
gathering in in Britain
Britain and and the United States,
the United States, the Centre sent
the Centre sent further
further instructions
instructions on on
February
February 20, 1945, ordering
20,1945, ordering the the residency
residency to to extend
extend itsits recruitment
recruitment to to the
thePasteur
Pasteur andand
F
F r oo m
m Wa
W a rr tt oo C
C oo ll dd Wa
W a rr // Ir S
5 Ir
Curie
Curie Institutes
Institutes andand other
other leading
leading research
research bodies.88
bodies.8sThe The appointment
appointment of of the
the ardent
ardent
Communist
Communist and and Nobel
Nobel Laureate
Laureate Frederic
FrCdCric Joliot-Curie
Joliot-Curie as as the
the French
French government's
government’s
Director
Director of of Scientific
Scientific Research
Research doubdess
doubtless delighted
delighted the the Centre.
Centre. Joliot-Curie
Joliot-Curie assured
assured
Moscow
Moscow that that "French scientists .. .. .. will
“French scientists will always
always be be atat your
your disposal
disposalwithout
without asking
asking forfor
any
any information
information in in return."89
return.”89
During
During 1945 1945 the theParis
Paris residency
residency sent sent 1,123
1,123 reports
reports to to Moscow,
Moscow, based based on on intelli
intelli-
gence
gence fromfrom seventy
seventy sources.
sources. Its Its operational
operational problemsproblems derivedderived not not from
from any any lack
lack of of
agents
agents butbut from
from aa shortage
shortage of of controllers.
controllers. Up Up to to February
February 1945 1945 thethe residency
residency had had
only
only three
three operational
operational officers.9o
officers.” In In May
May MARCEL
MARCEL of of the
the wartime
wartime HENRIHENRI group group
was
was instructed
instructed to to set
set up
up aa new
new group
group to to assist
assist inin the
thepenetration
the post-war
post-war forfor-
eign
eign and
and domestic
domestic intelligence
intelligence agencies,
agencies, the the foreign
foreign ministry
ministry and and thethepolitical
political parties,
parties,
and
and ininre-establishing
re-establishing control
control over over agents
agents in in the
theprovinces.91
provinces.’l By By November
November the the num
num-
ber
ber ofof operational
operational officers
officers inin thetheParis
Paris residency
residency had had increased
increased to to seven,
seven,supported
supported by by
six
six technical
technical staff,
staff, but
but there
there was was to to be
be nono further
further increase
increase for for several
several years.
years.InIn addi
addi-
tion
tion toto recruiting
recruiting new new agents,
agents, the the residency
residency was was ordered
ordered to to check
check individually
individually everyevery
agent
agent recruited
recruited before
before the the war.
war. Unsurprisingly,
Unsurprisingly, its its 1945
1945 reports
reports were were criticized
criticized for for
lack
lack ofof depth
depthand andinsufficient
insufficient attention
attention to tothethemost
most valuable
valuable agents.92
agents.92
The
The next next available
available statistics
statistics on on the
the intelligence
supplied by by the
the Paris
Paris residency
residency
cover
cover the period from July 1,1946 toJune 30,1947, when it supplied 2,627 reports
the period from July 1, 1946 to June 30, 1947, when it supplied 2,627 reports
and
and documents,
documents, well well over
over double
double the the total
total for
for 11945.
945. It I t also
also had had some
some major
major recruit
recruit-
ing
ing successes.
successes.In In 1944
1944WEST,
WEST, recruitedrecruited by by HENRI
HENRI from from the the Resistance
Resistance in in the
thepre
pre-
vious
vious year,
year, joined
joined the the newly
newly founded
founded foreignforeign intelligence
intelligence agency agency the the DG
DGER ER (from
(from
January
January 1946 1946 the the Service
Service de de Documentation
Documentation Exterieure ExtCrieure et et de de Contre
Contre Espionnage
Espionnage
(SDECE»
(SDECE)),, workingworking firstfirst on
on the the British,
British,then thenthe theItalian,
Italian, desk.
desk. His His file
file records
records thatthat
he
he provided
provided "valuable
“valuable information
theFrench,
French,Italian
Italianand and British
intelligence
services."
services.’’Though
Though WEST WEST (later (later renamed
renamed RANOL) RANOL) was was dismissed
dismissed in 1945and
in 1945 and
moved
moved to to aa career
career in in publishing,
publishing, he he retained
retained contact
contact with with some some of of his
his former
former colcol-
leagues.
leagues. RATYEN,
RATYEN, the the first
first of of his
his recruits
recruits to to bebe identified
identified in the files
in the files noted
noted by by
Mitrokhin,
Mitrokhin, was was dismissed
dismissed from from SDECE
SDECE in 1946. In
in 1946. In 11947
947 WESTWEST recruited
recruited two,two,
more
more important
important SDECE SDECE officers,
officers, codenamed
codenamed CHOUAN CHOUAN (or (or TORMA)
TORMA) and and NOR
NOR
(or
(or NORMAN).93
NORNIAN).93
Soviet
Soviet penetration
penetration was was assisted
assisted by by the
the chronic
chronic infighting
infighting within withinSDECE.
SDECE.In I n May
May
1946
1946 Andre
AndrC Dewavrin
Dewavrin (alias (alias "Passy"),
“Passy”),de de Gaulle's
Gaulle’swartime
wartime intelligence
intelligence chiefchief and
and thethe
first
first head
head of of SDECE,
SDECE, was was arrested
arrested on on aa charge
charge of of embezzlement
embezzlement of of which
which he he was
was
later
later found
found innocent.94
innocent.94For For thethe next
next fewfew years Dewavrin's successor,
years Dewavrin’s successor, Henri Henri Ribiere,
Ribi’ere,
and his deputy, Pierre Fourcaud, were engaged in such
and his deputy, Pierre Fourcaud, were engaged in such bitter feuding that Fourcaud bitter feuding that Fourcaud
was
was forced
forced to to deny
deny accusations
accusations that that he he had
had sabotaged
sabotaged the the brakes
brakes of of Ribiere's
Ribi‘ere’s car
car and
and
caused
caused aa nearnear fatal
fatal accident.
accident. On O n oneone occasion,
occasion, duringduring the the fractious
fractious daily
daily meeting
meeting of of
SDECE
SDECE division
division heads,
heads, Ribiere
Ribikre drovedrove his his deputy
deputy out out ofof the
the room
room with
with hishis walking
walking
stick.
stick.AsAs oneoneSDECE
SDECE officerofficer complained,
complained, "[DJivision
“[Dlivision heads, heads, finding
finding themselves
themselveswith with
confl icting orders from their director and his deputy,
conflicting orders from their director and his deputy, did not know what to do.”95 did not know what to do."95
In
In the
the year
year upup toto June
June30,30,1947,
1947, thethe Paris
Paris residency
residency forwarded
forwarded to to the
theCentre
Centre1,147 1,147
documents
documents on on the
theFrench
French intelligence
services, 92 92 onon French
French intelligence
operations
against
Soviet Union
Union and and 50 50 on onother
other intelligence
intelligence agencies.96
agencies.96The The files
files noted
noted by by
T
THHS
E WSOWR O
E A
DNR D
D HAS
T ENH IDE LT DH E S H I E L D // I152
S2
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin record
record that
that both
both CHOUAN and and N O R worked
NOR worked oonn political
intelligence
(SDECE Section d’Ctudes
(SDECE Section d'etudes politiques).
politiques). CHOUAN was was employed
employed for
for aa time
time inin the
the
American department of SDECE, but by 1949 was working on Soviet
American department of SDECE, but by 1949 was working on Soviet Bloc affairs. Bloc affairs.
NOR
N O R specialized
specialized inin intelligence
intelligence onon ltaly.97
Italy.97WEST was was paid 30,000 francs
paid 30,000 francs aa month
month
by
by the
the Paris
Paris residency,
residency, and in 1957
and in 1957 was
was given
given 360,000 francs to
360,000 francs buy aa flat.98
to buy Ivan
flat.98Ivan
Ivanovich
Ivanovich Agayants,
Agayants, thethe Paris
Paris resident
resident from
from 1946
1946 to
to 1948,
1948,was
was fond
fond of
of boasting
boasting ofof his
his
success
success in penetrating SDECE.
in penetrating SDECE. In In aa lecture
lecture at theCentre
at the Centreinin 1952
1952 he he sneeringly
sneeringly
described
described French
French intelligence
intelligence as "that prostitute
as “that prostitute I put
put in
in my
my pocket."99
Penetration
Penetration of of the
the Foreign
Foreign Ministry
Ministry at at the
the Quai
Qyai d'Orsay
d’Orsay proved
proved more difficult.
more difficult.
During aa visit
During visit to
to Moscow
Moscow in in June
June 1946,
1946, thethe Communist
Communist trade union leader
trade union leader Benoit
Benoit
Frachon
Frachon reported
reported pessimistically:
pessimistically:
The
The officials
officials of
of the
the Foreign Ministry represent
Foreign Ministry represent aa very caste .. .. .. well
closed caste
very closed well
known
known forfor their
theirreactionary
reactionary views. Our situation
views. Our situation at
at the
theministry
ministry is very precar
is very precar-
ious. We
ious. We have
have only
only one Party member.
oneParty member. This
This is
is the
the private
private secretary
secretary of of
[Georges] Bidault
[Georges] Bidault [the
[the Foreign
Foreign Minister], who knows
Minister], who knows that she is
that she is Commu-
Commu
nist-so
nist-so we we do
do not
not have
have total
total confidence
confidence in
in her.
her. Among
Among the the diplomats
diplomats in for
in for-
eign postings, only
eign postings, only the
the embassy
embassy secretary
secretary in
in Prague
Prague isis Communist.
Communist.
The
The Communist
Communist embassy
embassy secretary
secretary was
was almost certainly E
almost certainly tienne Manac'h,
Etienne Manac’h, who who went
went
on
on to become French
to become ambassador in
French ambassador in Beijing
Beijing (1969 -
(1969-75).’0° Manac'h, codenamed
75).100 Manac’h, codenamed
TAKSIM,
TAKSIM, had had first
first made
made contact
contact with
with Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence while
while stationed
stationed in in Turkey
Turkey
in
in 1942. His KGB file
1942. His file describes him as
describes him as aa confidential
confidential contact rather than
contact rather than anan agent,
agent,
who
who provided
provided information
information from
from time to time
time to time “on
"on anan ideological-political
ideological-political basis”basis" until
until
1971. His information
1971. His information was was clearly valued by
clearly valued by the
the Centre.
Centre.During
During his his twenty-nine
twenty-nine
years'
years’ contact
contact with
with thetheKGB he he had six case
had six case officers,
officers,the
the last
last of
of whom-M.
whom-”. Tsim
S. Tsim-
bal-was
bal-was head head of of the
the FCD Fifth
Fifth Department,
Department,whose responsibilities included
whose responsibilities included oper
oper-
ations in France.10l
ations in France.”’
The
The KGB's
KGB’s most most important
important Cold
ColdWar Waragents
agents inin the
theForeign Ministry were
Foreign Ministry were cipher
cipher
personnel rather
personnel than diplomats.
rather than diplomats. Ultimately
Ultimately the most valuable
the most and longest-serving
valuable and longest-serving
agent recruited by
agent recruited by the
the Paris embassy at
Paris embassy at the
theendendof the war
of war was probably
the was probably aa 23-year-old
23-year-old
cipher
cipher officer
officer inin the
theQyai d'Orsay codenamed
Quaid’Orsay codenamed JOUR (transliterated into the
(transliterated into theCyrillic
Cyrillic
alphabet as
alphabet as ZHUR).
ZHUR). The Thelarge amount of
large amount Foreign Ministry
of Foreign Ministry documents
cipher
materials
materials provided
provided by by JOUR were
were despatched
despatched fromfrom Paris
Paris to Moscow in
to Moscow in what his file
whathis file
describes as
describes as "a special container,”
“aspecial container," and
and enabled much of
enabled much of the
the cipher
cipher traffic
traffic between
between thethe
Qyai d'Orsay and
Quai d’Orsay and French
French embassies
embassies abroad
abroad to to be
be decrypted.
decrypted. In In 1957
1957 he hewas
was secretly
secretly
awarded
awarded the the Order
Orderofof the
the Red
Red Star.
Star.JOUR was still active
was still active aa quarter
quarterofof aa century
century later,
later,
and
and inin 1982
1982 was
was awarded
awarded the
the Order
Order of
of the
the Friendship
Friendship of of Peoples
Peoples for his “long
for his "long and
and
fruitful
fruitful co-operation."102
co-operation.”lo2
The dismissal of
The dismissal Communist ministers
of Communist ministers from
from the the French governmentinin May
French government May
11947
947 made further Soviet
made further Soviet penetration
penetration of ofthe
the official
official bureaucracy
bureaucracy more more difficult.
difficult.
The Centre
The Centre complained
complained in in April
April1948
1948that:
that: the
the residency
residency had had nono agents
agents close
close toto
the
the leadership
leadership ofof the the Gaullist
Gaullist Rassemblement
RassembZement du Peuple PeupZe Fra nrais, the
FranGais, Christian
the Christian
F
F rr oo m
m Wa
W a rr tt oo C o l d Wa
W a rr // I153
S3
Democrat
Democrat MRP and and other
other "reactionary"
“reactionary” political parties; it
political parties; it had
had failed
failed to to penetrate
penetrate
the
the Soviet section of
Soviet section of SDECE; intelligence on
SDECE; intelligence on thethe British
British and and American
American embassies
embassies
was
was poor;
poor; and andinadequate
inadequateprogress
progress had had been
been mademade in inpenetrating
penetratingthe the Commissariat
Commissariat
on
on Atomic Energy and
Atomic Energy and other
other majormajor targets
targets for scientific and
for scientific technological intel-
and technological intel
ligence.lo3
1igen~e.l’~
A plan
plan was
was drawn
drawn up up to to remedy
remedy these these failings
failings and and to to promote
promote active
active measures
measures"to “to
compromise people
compromise people hostile
hostile to the USSR and
to the and the the French
French Communist
Communist Party." Party.” Once
Once
again,
again, Moscow
Moscow was was not
not fully
hlly satisfied
satisfied with
with the the results
results achieved.
achieved. In In the
the five-month
five-month
period
period from September 11 to
from September to February
February 1, 1, 1949,
1949, the the Paris
Paris residency
residency submitted
submitted 923 923
reports, of which 20 percent were judged sufficiently important to pass on to the
reports, of which 20 percent were judged sufficiently important to pass on to the
Central Committee. The
Central Committee. The Centre
Centre noted,
noted, however,
however, that "the requirement
that “the requirement set set by
by the
the
leadership
leadership with with regard
regard to to political
intelligence had had still
still not been adequately
not been adequately met." met.”
During
During the the eleven
eleven months
months from from February
February 11to to December
December 31 31 the
the residency
residency supplied
supplied
1,567
1,567reports.
reports. Though
Though 2121percent percent werewere passed
passedto to the
the Central
CentralCommittee,
Committee,thethe reports
reports
were
were criticized
criticized for for failing
failing to to "reveal
“reveal the innermost aspects
the innermost aspects of of events"
events” and for "not
and for “not
making
making it it possible
identify the the plans
plans of of ruling circles in
ruling circles in their struggle with
their struggle with demo
demo-
cratic
cratic [pro-Soviet]
[pro-Soviet] forces."lo4
forces.”1o4
The
The decline
decline in in the
the number
number of of reports
reports to to the
the Centre
Centre during
during 1949-about
1949-about forty forty aa
month
month fewerfewer than during the
than during the latter months of
latter months of 1948-was
1948-was due due chiefly
chiefly to to what
what thethe
files
files describe
describe as as aa "deterioration
“deterioration in in the
the operational situation" at
operational situation” at the
the beginning
beginning of the
of the
year,
year, caused
causedbybyheightened
heightened surveillance
surveillance by by the
the internal
internalsecurity
security service,
service, the
the Direction
Direction
de
de la
la Surveillance
Surveillance du du Territoire
Territoire (DST),(DST), and and the
the Surete.
ScretC. OnO n March
March 12, 1949 the
12,1949 the Cen
Cen-
tre
tre warned
warned the the Paris
Paris residency
residency of of the
the danger
danger of continuing to
of continuing to meet
meet agents
agents on the
on the
street
street oror in
in cafes
cafCs and restaurants and
and restaurants and advised
advised it it to
to make
make muchmuch greater
greater use use of dead
of dead
letter-boxes,
letter-boxes, messages
messages in in invisible
invisible ink ink andand radio
radio communication.
communication. The The residency
residency was was
also
also instructed
instructed to to train
train itsits agents
agents to to recognize
recognize and and evade
evade surveillance,
surveillance, and and to to instruct
instruct
them
them on on howhow to to behave
behave if if questioned
questioned or arrested. A month
or arrested. month laterlater the residency re
the residency re-
ported
ported to to the
the Centre
Centre that,that,though
thoughit it was
was impracticable
impracticable to to abandon
abandon completely
completely streetstreet
meetings
meetings with with agents,
agents, security
security had had been
been muchmuch improved.
improved. Case Case officers
officers were
were nownow for
for-
bidden
bidden to to gogo directly
directly fromfrom the the embassy
embassy or or anyany other Soviet premises
other Soviet premises to meet an
to meet an
agent.
agent. Before
Before eacheach meeting
meeting the the officer
officer waswas picked
picked up up by
by aa residency
residency driver
driver at at aa pre
pre-
arranged
arranged location
location and and driven
driven to to the
the area
area of
of the
the rendezvous,
rendezvous, after after elaborate
elaborate security
security
checks designed to
checks designed to detect
detect surveillance.
surveillance. Following
Following the meeting the
the meeting the case
case officer
officerwould
would
pass on
pass on any
any materials
materials supplied
supplied by by the
the agent
agent to to another residency officer
another residency officer in in aa "brush
“brush
contact"
contact’’ as they walked past each other. Both times and places of meetings with
as they walked past each other. Both times and places of meetings with
agents were
agents were regularly
regularly changed,
changed, and more rendezvous
and more rendezvous were arranged in
were arranged in churches,
churches, the the-
aters,
aters, exhibitions
exhibitions and and locations
locations outside
outside Paris.
Paris.”’ l OS
As
As aa further
further security
security precaution,
precaution, the the frequency
frequency of of meetings
meetings with agents was
with agents was also
also
reduced.
reduced. The The six most valuable
six most valuable were were seenseen twice
twice aa month,
month, ten tenother
otheragents
agents werewere metmet
once
once aa month
monthand andanother
another seven
seven onceonce every
every two months. Less
two months. Less important
important agentsagents were
were
either
either putput on onice
ice oror contacted
contacted by by pre-arranged
pre-arranged signals signals only
only asas the
the need arose. After
need arose. After aa
year
year operating
operating the thenew
new security procedures, the
security procedures, the Paris residency reported
Paris residency reported that that operat
operat-
ing
ing conditions
conditions had had improved.
improved. On O n April
April 22,22,19501950 itit informed
Centre that that ititwas
was
T
THHS
E WSOWR O
E DR D A
AND T
THH SE
E H ISEHL I DE L D // I1S5 4
in
in contact
contact with
with almost
almost fifty agents-twice
agents-twice asas many
many as
as aa year
year before.106
before.’06ForFormost
most of
of the
the
next decade the
next decade the residency
residency was
was to provide better
to provide better intelligence
intelligence than
than its
its counterparts in
counterparts in
Britain
Britain and
and the
the United
United States. l07
States.lo7
TH
HEE O R G A NI Z A TIIOONNAALLC O N F U SSIIOONNof
I ZAT of Soviet
Soviet foreign
intelligence in
in the
thelate
late 1940s
1940s
was
was reflected
reflected in in the
the running
runningof of its
its three
three most
most productive
productive British
British agents.
agents. Remarkably,
Remarkably,
even Kim Philby
even Kim Philby had had no no regular
regular controller
controller during
during his his term
term as as head
head of of station
station inin
Turkey
Turkey fromfrom 19471947 to to 1949.
1949. Except
Except during
during visits
visits to
to London,
London, he he communicated
communicated with with
Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence via via GuyGuy Burgess. Burgess'sbehavior,
Burgess.Burgess’s behavior, however,
however, was was becoming
becoming
increasingly
increasingly erratic.
erratic. To To hishis controller,
controller, Yuri
Yuri Modin,
Modin, itit seemed
seemed "that “that his nerve was
his nerve was
going,
going, andand that
that hehe could
could no no longer
longer take
take the
the strain
strain ofof his
his double
double life. "108 A trip
life.”’’* trip by
Burgess
Burgess to to Gibraltar
Gibraltar and and Tangier
Tangier in in the
the autumn
autumnof of 1949
1949 turned
turned into intowhatwhatGoronwy
Goronwy
Rees called aa "wild
Rees called “wild odyssey
odyssey of of indiscretions":
indiscretions”: amongamong them them failing
failing to to pay
pay hishis hotel
hotel
bills,
bills, publicly
publicly identifying
identifying British
officers andand drunkenly
drunkenly singing
singing in in local
local
bars,
bars, "Little
“Little boys
boys are cheap today,
are cheap cheaper than
today, cheaper than yesterday."
yesterday.” Burgess
Burgesswas surprised not
wassurprised not
to
to be
be sacked
sacked on on his
his return
return to London.l09 Once
to London.”’ Once backback inin the
the Foreign Office, however,
Foreign Office, however,
he
he resumed
resumed his his career
career as as aa dedicated
dedicated SovietSoviet agent, supplying large
agent, supplying large quantities
quantities of of clas
clas-
sified
sified papers.
papers. On O n December
December 7, 1949, for
7,1949, for example,
example, he he handed
handedModin Modin168 168 documents,
documents,
totaling
totaling 660660 pages.
pages. KGB files files also
alsocredit Burgess with
credit Burgess with using
using Anglo-American
Anglo-American policy policy
differences
differences over over thethe People's
People’s Republic
Republic of of China,
China, established
established in October1949,
in October 1949,toto
cause
cause friction
friction in in the
the "Special
“Special Relationship."l1O
Relationship.””’
Donald
Donald Maclean
Macleanwas was under
under even greater strain
even greater strain than
than Burgess.
Burgess. His posting to
His posting Cairo
to Cairo
in October 1948
in October 1948 as counselor and
as counselor head of
and head of chancery
chancery at the age
at the age of of only thirty-five
only thirty-five
seemed
seemed to set him
to set him on on aapath pathwhich
which would
would leadlead him
him toto the
thetop of the
topof the diplomatic
diplomatic ser- ser
vice,
vice, or
or aa position
position closeclose to to it.
it.ButButMaclean
Maclean became
became deeply
deeply depressed
depressed at at his
his insensitive
insensitive
handling
handling by by thethe Cairo
Cairo residency.
residency. The The documents
documents he he supplied
supplied were were accepted without
accepted without
comment
comment and andnonoindication
indication was was given
givenby thethe Centre
Centreof of what
what was expected of
was expected him. In
of him. In
December
December 1949 Maclean attached
1949 Maclean attached to to aa bundle
bundle of of classified diplomatic documents
classified diplomatic documents aa
note
note asking
asking to to be
be allowed
allowed to to give
give upup his
his work
work for Soviet intelligence.
for Soviet intelligence. The The Cairo
Cairo resi
resi-
dency
dency gave
gave so so little
little thought
thoughttotorunning running Maclean
Maclean thatthat
it forwarded
forwarded
it his
his note
note unread
unread to to
Moscow.
Moscow. Incredibly,
Incredibly, the the Centre
Centre alsoalso ignored
ignored it.it. Not
Not till
till Maclean
Maclean sent sent another
another appeal
appeal
in
in April
April 1950,
1950, asking
asking to to be
be released
released from
from the intolerable strain
the intolerable strain of of his double life,
his double life, did
did
he
he attract
attract thetheCentre's
Centre’s attention.
attention. It It then
then read
read for
for the first time
the first time the the letter
letterhehe had sent
had sent
four
four months
months earlier.111
earlier.’”
While
While the the Centre
Centrewas was deliberating,
deliberating, Maclean
Maclean went berserk. One
went berserk. One evening
evening in in May,
May,
while
while in in aa drunken
drunken rage,rage, he and his
he and his drinking
drinking companion
companion Philip Philip Toynbee
Toynbee broke broke intointo
the flat
flat of
of two
two female
female members
members of of the
the US embassy, ransacked their
embassy, ransacked their bedroom,
bedroom, rippedripped
apart their underclothes,
apart their underclothes, then then moved
moved on to destroy
on to destroy the bathroom. There,
the bathroom. Toynbee
There, Toynbee
later
later recalled,
recalled, "Donald
“Donald raises raises aa large mirror above
large mirror above hishis head
head and crashes it
and crashes it into
into the
the
bath, when to my amazement and delight, alas, alas, the bath
bathbreaks in two two while the mir- mir
ror remains intact.”
intact." A few days later Maclean was sent back to London London where the
Foreign Office gave him the thesummer off off and paid for treatment by a psychiatrist who
diagnosed
diagnosed overwork,
overwork, maritalmarital problems
problems and repressed homosexuality.
and repressed homosexuality. In the autumn,
In the autumn,
F
F r o m Wa
W a r tt oo C o l d Wa
W a rr / I155
SS
apparently
apparently backback in in control
control of of himself,
himself, at at least
least inin office
office hours,
hours, he he was
was mademade head
head of of the
the
American desk in the the Foreign Office.112
Office.l12
The
The impact
impact of of Burgess's
Burgess’s and and Maclean's
Maclean’s intelligence
intelligence in in Moscow
Moscow was heightened by
was heightened by
the outbreak of
the outbreak of the Korean War
the Korean War in in June
June 1950. Maclean's deputy
1950. Maclean’s deputy on on the
the American
American
. desk,
desk, Robert
Robert Cecil,
Cecil, later
later concluded
concluded that that the
theKremlin
Kremlin must must have have found
found the the documents
documents
provided
provided by by Maclean
Maclean "of “of inestimable
inestimable value value in in advising
advising the the Chinese
Chinese and and thethe North
North
Koreans on strategy and negotiating positions."113 In addition to supplying classified
Koreans on strategy and negotiating positions.”113 In addition to supplying classified
documents,
documents, Maclean
Maclean and and Burgess
Burgess also also put their own
put their own anti-American
anti-American gloss gloss on on them
them
and
and thus
thus strengthened
strengthened Soviet Soviet fears
fears that
that the
the United
UnitedStates
States might
might escalate
escalate thethe Korean
Korean
conflict into world war. For For perhaps the first time in in his diplomatic career, career, Maclean
showed open sympathy in a Foreign Office minute with the crude Stalinist analysis
showed open sympathy in a Foreign Office minute with the crude Stalinist analysis
of the inherently aggressive designs of
aggressive designs of American finance capital. capital. There was, he said,
"some
“some point"
point” to tothetheargument that the theAmerican economy was now so so geared
geared to to the
the
military
military machine
machine that all-out war
that all-out war might seem preferable
might seem preferable to to aa recession
recession produced
produced by by
demobilization.
demobi1ization.ll4 114
The
The Centre's
Centre’s most most prized
prized British
British agent,
agent, however,
however, remained
remained Kim Kim Philby,
Philby, who,who, it it
was
was hoped,
hoped, would
would one one day
day rise
rise to
to become
become ChiefChief of of the Secret Service.
the Secret Service. In In the
the autumn
autumn
of
of 1949
1949 he he was appointed SIS
was appointed SIS station
station commander
commander in in Washington.
Washington. Philby Philby was was exul
exul-
tant. His
tant. His new
new posting,
posting, he he later wrote, brought
later wrote, brought him him “right
"right back
back intointo the
the middle
middle of of
intelligence policy-making"
intelligence policy-making” and and gave
gave himhim "a “a close-up
close-up view view ofof the
the American
American intelli
intelli-
gence
gence organizations."115
organization^.')"^
Before
Before his his departure
departure for for the United States,
the United States, Philby
Philby was was "indoctrinated"
“indoctrinated” into into the
the
VENONA secret. secret. Though
Though aware aware of of the
the possibility
possibility that that one
one of of the
the decrypts
decrypts might
might
identify him
identify him asas aa Soviet
Soviet agent,
agent, he he was doubtless reassured
was doubtless reassured to to discover
discover thatthat VENONA
VENONA
provided
provided comparatively
comparativelylittle little information
information on on NKGB
NKGBactivities
activities in in Britain.
Britain.l16 116 The
The bulk
bulk
of
of the
the Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence decrypts
decrypts concerned
concerned operations
the United States. In
United States. In late
late
September
September 1949, 1949, immediately
immediately after after the successful test
the successhl test of of the
the first
first Soviet
Soviet atomic
atomic
bomb,
bomb, Philby
Philby discovered
discovered during during his his VENONA briefing briefing that thatthethe atom atom spy spy
CHARLES in
CHARLES in LosLos Alamos
Alamos had had beenbeen identified
identified as as Klaus
Klaus Fuchs.
Fuchs. The The Centre
Centre
promptly
promptly warned
warned thosethose of of its American agents
its American agents whowho had been in
had been in contact
contact withwith Fuchs
Fuchs
that
that they
they might
might havehave to to escape
escape through
through Mexico.117
Mexico.l17 It did did not,
not, however,
however, succeed
succeed in in
warning Fuchs, who in April 1950 was sentenced to fourteen years' imprisonment.11s
warning Fuchs, who in April 1950 was sentenced to fourteen years’ imprisonment.’’’
On
O n his
his arrival
arrival inin Washington
WashingtonininOctober October1949, 1949, Philby quickly succeeded
Philby quickly succeededin in gain
gain-
ing
ing regular
regular access
access to to VENONA decrypts. decrypts. That That access
access became
became particularly
particularly important
important
after
after the
the arrest
arrest and
and imprisonment
imprisonment in the following
in the following year year of of William
William Weisband,
Weisband, the the
American
American agent agent who who had had first
first revealed
revealed the VENONA secret
the VENONA secret to to the
the CentreY9
Centre.”’
Philby's
Philby’s liaison
liaison duties
duties with
with the the CIA allowed
allowed him him to towarn
warn the the Centre
Centreof of American
American as as
well
well asas British
British operations against the
operations against Soviet Bloc,
the Soviet Bloc, even enabling him
even enabling him to to provide
provide the the
geographical coordinates
geographical coordinates of parachute drops
of parachute drops by British and
by British and American
American agents.120
agents.12’
When
When writing
writing hishis memoirs
memoirs later,later, Philby
Philby was sometimes unable
was sometimes unable to resist gloating
to resist gloating overover
the
the fate
fate ofof the
the hundreds
hundreds of agents he
of agents betrayed. Referring
he betrayed. Referring to those who
to those who parachuted
parachuted
into
into the
the arms
arms of of the
the MGB, he he wrote
wrote withwith macabre
macabre irony,
irony, "I “I do
do not know what
not know what hap-hap
pened
pened to to the
the parties concerned. But
parties concerned. But I can can make
make an an informed
informed guess."12
guess.”121 I
T
T H EE S
SW OR
WO RD A D
AND T
T H EE S E L
SHIE L D
D / I156
S6
Philby's
Philby’s success
success in in Washington
Washington was was achieved despite, rather
achieved despite, rather than because of,
than because of, the
the
assistance
assistance given
given him him by by the KI/MCB in
the KI/MGB in Washington.
Washington.The chaotic state
The chaotic state ofof the
the Wash
Wash-
ington
ington residency,
residency, which which led led to to the
the recall
recall ofof two
two successive
successive residents
residents in in 1948-9,122
1948-9,122
made
made Philby
Philby refuse
refuse to to have
have any any contact
contact with with any
any legal
legal Soviet
Soviet intelligence
officers in in
the
the United
United States.123
States.123For For almost
almost aa year year Philby's
Philby’s sole
sole contact
contact with
with the the Centre
Centre was was viavia
messages
messages sent sent to Burgess in
to Burgess in London.124
London.124
In
In the summerof 1950 Philby received
the summer of 1950 Philby received an an unexpected
unexpected letterletter from
from Burgess.
Burgess. "I “I have
have
aa shock
shock for
for you,"
YOU,” Burgess
Burgess began.began. "I “I have
have just
just been
been posted
posted to to Washington."
Washington.” Philby Philby
later
later claimed
claimed in in his
his memoirs
memoirs that that hehe had
had agreed
agreed to to put Burgess up
put Burgess up inin his
his large
large neo
neo-
classical
classical house
house at at 4100
4100 Nebraska
Nebraska Avenue Avenue duringduring hishis tour
tour ofof duty
duty at at the
theWashington
Washington
embassy to
embassy try to
to try to keep
keep himhim out out of of the
the spectacular "scrapes" for
spectacular “scrapes” for which
which he he waswas now
now
notorious.125
notorious.125The The "scrapes,"
“scrapes,”however,however,continued.
continued. In In January
January 19511951 Burgess
Burgess burstburst in in onon
aa dinner
dinner party
party givengiven by by the
the Philbys
Philbys and and drew
drew an an insulting
insulting (and(and allegedly
allegedly obscene)
obscene)
caricature
caricature of of Libby
Libby Harvey,
Harvey, wife wife of of aa CIA officer.
officer. The
The Harveys
Harveys stormedstormed out, out, Aileen
Aileen
Philby
Philby retired
retired to to the
the kitchen
kitchen and and KimKim sat sat with
with his
his head
head inin his hands, repeatedly
his hands, repeatedly ask ask-
ing Burgess, "How
ing Burgess, “How could could you?
you? How How couldcould yoU?"126
Despite
Despite Burgess's
Burgess’s scrapes
scrapes in the United
in the United States,
States, hehe fulfilled
fulfilled an an important
important role role asas
courier
courier between
between Philby Philby andand his his newly
newly appointed
appointed casecase officer,
officer,aa Russian
Russian illegal code
illegal code-
named
named HARRY (CARRI (GARRI in in Cyrillic
Cyrillic transliteration),
transliteration), who who hadhad arrived
arrived in in New
New YorkYork
aa few
few months
months before
before Burgess
Burgess beganbegan his his posting
posting atat the
theWashington
Washingtonembassy.embassy. HARRY
had been born
had been born Valeri
Valeri Mikhaylovich
Mikhaylovich Makayev Makayev in in 1918.
1918.In In May
May 1947 1947hehe hadhad been sent
been sent
toto Warsaw
Warsaw to to establish
establish his his legend
legend as as aa US citizen
citizen whowho hadhad lived
lived for some years
for some years in in
Poland.
Poland. As As evidence
evidence of of his
his bogus
bogus identity
identity the Centre gave
the Centre gave himhim an an out-of-date
out-of-date US
passport
passport issued
issued in in 1930
1930 toto Ivan
Ivan ("John")
(“John”) Mikhailovich Kovalik, born
Mikhailovich Kovalik, born in in Chicago
Chicago to to
Ukrainian
Ukrainian parentsparents in in 1917.127
1917.127The The real Kovalik, whose
real Kovalik, whose identity
identity Makayev
Makayev assumed,
assumed,
had
had been
been taken
taken to to Poland
Poland as as aa child
child byby hishis parents
parents in in 1930,
1930,later
later settling
settling in in the Soviet
the Soviet
Union; he
Union; he died
died in in 1957
1957ininChelyabinskaya
Chelyabinskaya Oblast. Oblast.
After
After two
two years
years in in Warsaw,
Warsaw, Makayev
Makayev was was able
able to
to obtain
obtain aa new
new US passportpassport in in the
the
name of
name of Kovalik
Kovalik with with thethehelp
help of of aa female
female clerk at the
clerk at theAmerican
American embassy.embassy. The The MGB
discovered
discovered thatthat in in November
November 1948, 1948, without informing the
without informing the embassy,
embassy, the the clerk
clerk had
had
married
married aa Polish
Polish citizen
citizen with
with whom whom she sheplanned
planned to to return
return toto the
the United
United States
States after
after
her
her tour
tourof
of duty. Anxious to
duty. Anxious to keep
keep herher marriage
marriage secret,
secret, she was pressured
she was pressured by the the MGB
into
into swearing
swearing underunder oathoath thatthatshe she was
was personally
personally acquainted
acquainted with with Kovalik
Kovalik and and hishis
parents
parents and and could
could vouch
vouch for his good
for his character. According
good character. According to Makayev's file,
to Makayev’s file, his
his
application
application for for aa new
new US passport
passport was "processed in
was ‘processed an expeditious
in an expeditious manner manner and and with
with
significant
significant deviations
deviations from from the the rules."
rules.”TheThe corrupt
corrupt embassy
embassy clerkclerk received
received aa reward
reward of of
750 dollars.128
750 dollars.12*
On March 5,5,1950
O n March 1950 Makayev
Makayev left left Gdynia
Gdynia for for the
the United States on
United States board the
on board the ship
ship
Batory.
B a t 0 ~129
y .The
l ~ ~ Centre
The concluded that
Centre concluded that his
his cover,
cover, like
like Fisher's,
Fisher’s, could
could best best bebe preserved
preserved
within
within New York's cosmopolitan
New York‘s cosmopolitan artistic artistic community.
community. Soon Soon after
after his arrival, he
his arrival, he began
began
an affair with aa Polish-born
Polish-born ballerina, codenamed ALICE, who owned a ballet stustu
Manhattan. Makayev's
dio in Manhattan. Makayev’s gifts as a musician probably exceeded Fisher's
Fisher’s as a
painter.
painter. After
After aa brief period working
brief period working as as aa furrier,
furrier, he succeeded in
he succeeded obtaining aa job
in obtaining job
teaching musical composition at New UniversityYo
NewYork Uni~ersity.’~’
F
F r o m Wa
W a rr tt oo C oo Zl d Wa
W ar / I157
S7
The
The Centre
Centre had hadhigh highhopes
hopes of of Makayev.
Makayev.He H e was
was given
given25,000
25,000 dollars
dollars toto establish
establish
aa new
new illegal
illegalAmerican
American residency
residency to to run
run parallel
parallel with
with Fisher's.
Fisher’s. TwoTwo otherother Soviet
Soviet ille
ille-
gals
gals were
were selected
selected to to work
work underunder him:him: Reino
Reino Hayhanen
Hayhanen (codenamed
(codenamed VIK), who who hadhad
assumed
assumed aa bogus
bogus Finnish
Finnish identity,
identity, andand Vitali Ivanovich Lyampin
Vitali Ivanovich Lyampin (DIM (DIM or or DIMA),
DIMA),
who
who had had an an Austrian
Austrian legend.
legend. Two Two dedicated
dedicated communications
communications channels channels were were pre
pre-
pared
pared forfor the
the new
new residency:
residency: aa postalpostal route
route between
between agents
agents MAY in in New
New York
York andand
G ERY in
GERY London, and
in London, and aa courier
courier route
route using
using ASKO, aa Finnish Finnish seamanseaman on on aa ship
ship
which
which traveled
traveled between
between FinlandFinland and and New
New York.
York. Makayev
Makayev impressed
impressed the the Centre
Centre by by
getting
getting to to know
know the the family
family of the Republican
of the Republican senatorsenator forfor Vermont,
Vermont, Ralph Ralph E. E. Flan
Flan-
ders.
ders. His
His main mission, however,
main mission, however, was was toto act
act as
as controller
controller of of Moscow's
Moscow’s most most impor
impor-
tant
tant British
British agent,
agent, KimKim Philby.131
Philby.13’
Burgess's
Burgess’sfirst first journey
journey as as aa courier
courier between
between Philby
Philby in in Washington
Washingtonand and Makayev
Makayev in in
New
New York
York tooktook place
place inin November
November 1950.132 1950.132 The
The main
main pretext
pretext forfor his journeys to
his journeys to New
New
York
York waswasto to visit
visit his
his friend
friend AlanAlan Maclean
Maclean (younger
(younger brother
brother of of Donald),
Donald), private sec
private sec-
retary
retary toto the
theBritish
British representative
representative at at the
theUnited
UnitedNations,
Nations, Gladwyn
Gladwyn JebbY3 Once the
Jebb.133Once the
liaison
liaison established
established by by Burgess
Burgess was working smoothly,
wasworking smoothly, Philby
Philby agreed
agreed to meet Makayev
to meet Makayev
himself
himself. Burgess,
Burgess, however,
however, continued
continued to to act
act as
as the usual method
the usual method of communication
communication
between
between Philby
Philby andand hishis case
case officer.134
0 f f i ~ e r .His
l ~ ~visits
His visits toto Alan
Alan Maclean
Maclean becamebecame so so frequent
frequent
that
that Jebb
Jebb formed
formed the the mistaken
mistaken impression
impression that that the two men
the two men "shared
“shared aa flat."
flat.” Conver
Conver-
sations
sations with
with AlanAlan doubtless
doubtless also also helped
helped Burgess
Burgess keep keep track
track of of Donald
Donald Maclean's
Maclean’s
unstable
unstable mental
mental state.135
state.13’
Some of
Some of thethe most
most important
intelligence whichwhich Philby
Philby supplied
supplied to to Makayev
Makayev
directly
directly concerned
concerned Maclean.
Maclean. The The VENONA decrypts decrypts to which he
to which he had
had access
access con
con-
tained
tained aa number
number of of references
references to to an anagent
agent codenamed
codenamed HOMER operating operating in in Wash
Wash-
ington
ington at at the
theend end ofof the
the war,
war, butbut initially
initially only
only vague clues to
vague clues to his
his identity.
identity. Philby
Philby
quickly
quickly realized
realized that
that HOMER was was Maclean,
Maclean, but but was
was informed
informed by by the Centre that
the Centre that
"Maclean
“Maclean shouldshould stay
stay inin his post as
his post as long
long as as possible"
possible” andand that plans would
that plans would be be made
made
to
to rescue
rescue himhim "before
“before the the netnet closed
closed in."136
in.”136The
The net net did
did not
not begin
begin to to close until the
close until the
winter
winter of of 1950-1
1950-1.. By By the
the endend ofof 1950
1950 the list of
thelist of suspects
suspects hadhad narrowed
narrowed to to thirty-five.
thirty-five.
By
By the beginning of
the beginning of April
April 1951 1951it it had
had shrunk
shrunk to nine.137 A few
to nine.137 few days
days later
later aa telegram
telegram
decrypted
decrypted by by Meredith
Meredith GardnerGardner finally identified HOMER as
finally identified as Maclean.
Maclean. It revealed
revealed
that
that in
inJuneJune19441944HOMER's
HOMER’Swife wife was was expecting
expecting aa baby
baby andand living with her
living with mother
her mother
in
in New
NewYork138-information
York13*-information which which fitted
fitted Melinda Maclean but
MelindaMaclean but notnot the wife of
thewife of any
any
other suspect.
other suspect.
There
There still
still remained
remained aa breathing
breathingspacespace of of at least aa few
atleast few weeks
weeksin in which
which to to arrange
arrange
Maclean's
Maclean’s escape.escape.The
The search
search for for the evidence necessary
the evidence necessary to to convict
convict him him of of espionage,
espionage,
complicated
complicated by by the
the decision
decision not not to to use
use VENONA
VENONA in in any prosecution, made
any prosecution, neces
made neces-
sary
sary aa period
period of of surveillance
surveillanceby by MI5 before
before any anyarrest.
arrest. The
The plan
plan to to warn Maclean that
warn Maclean that
he
he had
had been
been identified
identified as as aa Soviet
Soviet agent
agent was was worked
worked out out not
not byby the
the Centre
Centre but but byby
Philby
Philby and Burgess.139In April 1951 Burgess was ordered home in disgrace after aa
and BurgessY9 In April 1951 Burgess was ordered home in disgrace after
series
series ofof escapades
escapadeshad had aroused
aroused the the collective
collective wrath
wrath of of the
the Virginia
Virginia State State Police,
Police, the
the
State Department
State Department and and the the British
British ambassador.
ambassador. O Onn the
the eve
eve of of Burgess's
Burgess’s departure
departure
from
from New
New York York aboard
aboard the Queen Mary, he
the Queen he and
and Philby dined together
Philby dined together in in aa Chinese
Chinese
restaurant
restaurant where
where the the piped
piped musicmusic inhibited
inhibited eavesdropping
eavesdropping and and agreed
agreed that
that Burgess
Burgess
T E WSOWR O
T HS
E DR D A
AND T EH S
T H SE I EHLI DE L D // I158
S8
would
would convey
convey aa warning
warning to to both Maclean and
both Maclean and the London residency
the London residency as soon as
as soon as he
he
reached
reached Britain.140
Britain.’“
Philby
Philby was even more
was even more concerned
concerned with with hishis own
own survival
survival than than withwith Maclean's.
Maclean’s. If If
Maclean
Maclean cracked
cracked under
under interrogation,
interrogation, as as seemed
seemed possible
possible in in view
view of of his
his overwrought
overwrought
condition,
condition, Philby
Philby and and the rest of
the rest of the
the Five
Five would
would also be at
also be at risk. Mitrokhin's notes
risk. Mitrokhin’s notes
on the KGB file
on the file record:
record: "STANLEY
“STANLEY [Philby] [Philby] demanded
demanded HOMER's HOMER’S immediate immediate
exfiltration
exfiltration to the USSR, so
to the so that
that he himself would
he himself would not not be be compromised."141
c o m p r ~ m i s e d . ”He ~~~ He
also
also extracted
extracted an assurance from
an assurance Burgess that
from Burgess that hehe would
would not not accompany
accompany Maclean Maclean
to
to Moscow,
Moscow, for for that
that tootoo would
would compromise
compromise him. him. Immediately
Immediately after after hishis return
return to to
England
England on on May
May 7, 7, Burgess
Burgess called
called onon Blunt
Blunt andand asked
asked himhim to to deliver
deliver aa message
message to to
Modin,
Modin, whom whom Blunt Bluntknew
knew as as "Peter."
“Peter.”According
According to to Modin,
Modin, Blunt's
Blunt’s anxious
anxious appear
appear-
ance,
ance, even
even before
before he he spoke,
spoke, indicated
indicated that
that something
somethingwas was desperately
desperately wrong. wrong. "Peter,"
“Peter,”
he said, "there's
he said, serious trouble.
“there’s serious trouble. Guy Burgess has
Guy Burgess has just
just arrived
arrived back back in London.
in London.
HOMER's
HOMER’Sabout about to to be arrested .. .. .. Donald's
be arrested Donald’s now now in in such
such aa state
state that
that I'm
I’m convinced
convinced
he'll
he’ll break
break down
down the the moment
moment they they question him." Two
question him.” Two days
days later
later thethe Centre
Centre agreed
agreed
to
to Maclean's
Maclean’s exfiltration.142
exfiltration.’j2
Meanwhile
Meanwhile BurgessBurgess had had seen
seen Maclean
Maclean and and was
was worried
worried that,that, despite
despite (or (or because
because
of)
of) his
his nervous
nervous exhaustion,
exhaustion, he he might
might refuse
refuse toto defect.
defect. HeH e reported
reported to to Modin
Modinand and thethe
London
London resident,
resident, Nikolai
Nikolai Rodin,
Rodin, that that Maclean
Maclean couldcould notnot bring himself to
bring himself to leave
leave hishis
wife
wife Melinda,
Melinda, who whowas expecting their
was expecting their third
thirdchild
child inin aafew weeks' time.
few weeks’ When Rodin
time. When Rodin
reported
reported Maclean's
Maclean’s hesitations
hesitations to to Moscow,
Moscow, the the Centre
Centre telegraphed,
telegraphed, "HOMER “HOMER must must
agree
agree toto defect." Melinda Maclean,
defect.” Melinda Maclean, who who had been aware
had been aware that that herher husband
husband was was aa
Soviet
Soviet spy
spy ever since he
ever since he had
had asked
asked herher to
to marry him, agreed
marry him, agreed that,that, forfor his
his own safety,
own safety,
he
he should
should leave
leave forfor Moscow
Moscow withoutwithout delay.143
delay.143It was clear,
It was clear, however,
however, that that Maclean
Maclean
would
would need
need an an escort.
escort. On O n May
May 17 17 the
the Centre
Centre instructed
instructed the the London
London residency
residency that that
Burgess
Burgess was was toto accompany
accompany him him to to Moscow.
Moscow. Burgess
Burgess initially
initially refused
refused to to go,
go, recalling
recalling
his promise to
his promise to Philby
Philby not not toto defect,
defect, and
and seemed
seemed to to Modin "close to
Modin“close to hysteria."
hysteria.” Rodin,
Rodin,
however, seems to
however, seems to have
have persuaded
persuaded Burgess
Burgess to to go by by giving
giving the the impression
impression that that hehe
would
would notnot need
need to to accompany
accompany MacleanMaclean all all the
the way,
way, and
and would
would in in any
any case
casebe befree
free toto
return
return toto London.
London. In In reality,
reality, the
the Centre
Centre believed
believed that
that Burgess
Burgess had had become
become aa liability
liability
and
and was
was determined
determined to to get
get him
him to to Moscow-by
Moscow-by deception,
deception, if if necessary-and
necessary-and keep keep
him
him there.
there. ''As
“As long
long as as he
he agreed
agreed to to go with
with Maclean,"
Maclean,” wrotewrote Modin Modin later,later, "the rest
“the rest
mattered precious little.
mattered precious little. Cynically enough, the
Cynically enough, the Centre
Centrehad had.. .. .. concluded
concluded that that we
we had
had
not
not one
one but
buttwo
two burnt-out
burnt-out agentsagents on on our
our hands."144
hands.”144
Though
Though the the Foreign
Foreign Secretary,
Secretary, Herbert Morrison,had
Herbert Morrison, had secretly
secretly authorized
authorized the the
interrogation
interrogation of of Maclean,
Maclean, no no date
date had been decided
had been decided forfor it
it toto begin.145
begin.145The The London
London
residency,
residency, however,
however,mistakenly
mistakenly believed
believed that
that Maclean
Maclean was was toto bebe arrested
arrested on on Monday,
Monday,
May
May 28, and and made
made plans
plans forfor his
his exfiltration
exfiltration with
with Burgess
Burgess during
during the the previous
previous weekweek-
end. It
end. It reported
reported to theCentre
to the Centrethat that surveillance
surveillance of of Maclean
Maclean by MIS and and Special
Special
Branch
Branch ceased
ceased at at 88 p.m.
p.m. each
each dayday and
and at
at weekends.
weekends. (It (It may
may not not have
have realized
realized that
that
there
there was
was no no surveillance
surveillance at at all
all of
of Maclean
Maclean at at his
his home
home atatTatsfi
Tatsfield eld on on the
theKent-Sur
Kent-Sur-
rey
rey border.)
border.) The The residency
residency also also discovered
discoveredthatthat the
the pleasure
pleasure boatboat Falaise made made week
week-
end
end round-trip
round-trip cruises
cruises from Southampton, calling
from Southampton, calling inin at
at French
French ports, ports, which
which did not
did not
require
require passports.
passports. Burgess
Burgess was was instructed
instructed to to buy
buy tickets
tickets for himself and
for himself and Maclean
Maclean
F
F rr oo m
m Wa
Warr tt oo C o l d Wa
Warr / I159
S9
under assumed
under assumed names
names forfor the
the ctuis'
cruisee leaving
leaving at at midnight
midnight on on Friday,
Friday, May May 25. 25. That
That
evening
evening Burgess arrived at
Burgess arrived at Tatsfield
Tatsfield inin aa hired
hired car,car, had dinner with
had dinner with thethe Macleans,
Macleans,
then drove offoff with Donald to to Southampton
Southampton where they were just in in time
timetotoboard
the Falaise before
the Falaise before it
it set
set sail.
sail. The
The next
next morning
morning they they left
left the
the boat
boat at at St. Malo,
Malo, made
made
their
their way
way to
to Rennes
Rennes andand caught
caught the
the train
train toto Paris.
Paris. From
From Paris
Paris they
they took
took another
anothertraintrain
to
to Switzerland,
Switzerland, where
where they
they were issuedfalse
were issued false passports
passports by the Soviet
by the Soviet embassy
embassy in in
Berne. In Zurich they bought air tickets to Stockholm via Prague, but left left the
theplane
at
at Prague,
Prague, where
where they
they were
were met
met byby Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence officers.146
0 f f i ~ e r s . IBy
~ ~ the
By time
thetime
Melinda
Melinda Maclean
Maclean hadhad reported
reported that
that her
her husband
husband had had not
not returned
returned home home afterafter the
the
weekend, Burgess
weekend, Burgess and
and Maclean
Maclean were behind the
were behind the Iron
IronCurtain.
Curtain.I4’ 147
Once
Once in inthe
theSoviet Union, Burgess
Soviet Union, Burgess was wastold
told that
that hehewould
would not not bebe allowed
allowedbackback to to
Britain but would receive an annual pension of 2,000 roubles.148 roubles.148Modin later comcom
plained that his talents were wasted by the Centre: "He “He read a lot, walked and and occa
occa-
sionally
sionally picked
picked up
up another
another man man for sex .. .. .. He
for sex H e might
might have
have been
been veryvery useful
usehl to to [the
[the
KGB];
KGB]; butbut instead
instead he
he did
did nothing
nothing because
because nothing
nothing waswas asked
asked ofof him,
him, and and itit was
was not
not
in
in his
his nature
nature to
to solicit
solicit work."149
work.”149Maclean
Maclean was was rather
rather better
better treated
treated thanthan Burgess.
Burgess. H Hee
settled in Kuibyshev,
Kuibyshev, took Soviet citizenship under the the name Mark Petrovich Fraser,
was
was awarded
awarded an annual pension
an annual pension twice
twice that
that of of Burgess
Burgess and and taught
taught for for thethe next
next two
two
years
years at the Kuibyshev
at the Pedagogical Institute.
Kuibyshev Pedagogical Institute. In In September
September 1953,1953, in in anan operation
operation
codenamed SIRA,
codenamed SIRA, hishis wife
wife and
and three
three children
children were exfiltrated from
were exfiltrated from Britain
Britain to to join
join
him
him inin Kuibyshev.150
Kuibyshev.lS0
TH E C ENTRE C
CENTRE O N G RATU LAT E D itself
CONGRATULATED itself that
that the
the successful
successful exfutration
exfiltrationof of Burgess
Burgess and and
Maclean
Maclean had had "raised
“raised the
the authority
authority ofof the
the Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligenceservice
service inin the
the eyes
eyes of
of Soviet
Soviet
agents."151 That,
That, however,
however,was wasnot
not Philby's
Philby’s view.
view.At
At aa meeting
meeting on on May
May24,24, Makayev
Makayev had had
found
found him
him "alarmed
“alarmed and and concerned
concerned for for his
his own
own security"
security”andand insistent
insistent that
that he
he would
would be be
put
put "in
“in jeopardy"
jeopardy” ififBurgessBurgess as
as well
wellasasMaclean
Maclean fled to Moscow.152
fled to Moscow.1s2The first that
The first that Philby
Philby
learned
learned of Burgess's defection
of Burgess’s defection with
with Maclean
Maclean waswas during
during aa briefing
briefing about
about five
five days later
dayslater
by
by the
the MI5
MIS liaison officer in
liaison officer in Washington.
Washington. "My consternation [at
“My consternation [at the
the news]," wrote
news],” wrote
Philby
Philby later,
later, "was
“wasnono pretense." Later that
pretense.” Later that day
day he
he drove
drove into
into the the Virginia
Virginia countryside
countryside
and
and buried
buried the the photographic equipment with
photographic equipment with which
which he he had
had copied documents for
copied documents for
Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligencein in aa forest-an
forest-an action
action hehe had
had mentally rehearsed many
mentally rehearsed many times
times since
since
arriving
arriving in in Washington
Washington two years earlier.IS3
two years earlier.153 Just
Just when Philby most
when Philby most needed
needed his his con-
con
troller's
troller’sassistance,
assistance,however,
however,Makayev
Makayev let him
let him down.
down. TheThe New
New York York legal
legalresidency
residencyleft
left
aa message
message and and 2,000 dollars
dollars in
in aa dead
dead letter-box
letter-box forfor HARRY to to deliver
deliver to Philby.
to Philby.
Makayev
Makayev failedfailedtoto find
find them
them and
and Philby
Philby never
never received
receivedthem.154
them.154
An
An inquiry
inquiry by by the
the Centre
Centre into
into Makayev's
Makayev’s conduct
conduct in New York,
in New York, prompted
prompted by by his
his
failure
failure to
to help Philby, was
help Philby, was highly
highly critical.
critical. It found
found himhim guilty
guilty of of “lack
"lack of of discipline,"
discipline,”
"violations
“violationsof of the
the Centre's
Centre’s orders"
orders” andand "crude manners"-a defect
“crude manners”-a blamed on
defect blamed on his
his
neglected
neglected childhood.
childhood. PlansPlans for Makayev to
for Makayev to found
found aa newnew illegal
illegalresidency
residencyin in the
theUnited
United
States
States were canceled and
were canceled and hehe was
was transferred
transferred to to Fisher's residency so
Fisher’s residency so that
that he he could
could
receive
receive expert
expert supervision.
supervision.His His performance,
performance, however,
however, failed
failedtoto improve.
improve. While return
While return-
ing
ing to
to New
New York York from
from leave
leave in
in Moscow,
Moscow, he lost aa hollow
he lost hollow imitation
imitation Swiss
Swiss coin which
coin which
contained secret
contained operational instructions
secret operational instructions on microfilm. After.a
on microfilm. Mter, a hrther
further inquiry
inquiry at at the
the
TT H
HSE
E WS OWROD R D A
ANND
D TT H EHS
H SE I EHLI DE L D I/ I1 66 00
Centre,
Centre, Makayev
Makayev was was recalled
recalled and and hishis career
career as as anan illegal
illegal terminated.
terminated. Attempts
Attempts to to
recover
recover 9,000
9,000 dollars
dollars allotted
allotted toto him
him in in New
New YorkYork (2,000
(2,000 dollars
dollars in in bank
bank accounts
accounts and and
7,000
7,000 dollars
dollars inin stocks)
stocks) were wereunsuccessful
unsuccesshl and and thethe whole
whole sum sum had had to to be
be written
written 0[£155
The
The Centre
Centre calculated
calculated that that since
since their
their recruitment
recruitment in in 1934-5, Philby,Burgess
1934-5, Philby, Burgess
and
and Maclean
Maclean had had supplied
supplied more more than
than 20,000
20,000pagespages of of "valuable"
“valuable”classified
documents
and
and agent
agent reports.156
reports.lS6As As Philby
Philby had had feared,
feared, however,
however, the the defection
defection of of Burgess
Burgess and and
Maclean did severe, though not quite terminal, damage
Maclean did severe, though not quite terminal, damage to the careers in Soviet intel- to the careers in Soviet intel
ligence
ligence of of the
the other
other members
members of of the
the Magnificent
MagnificentFive. Five. Immediately
Immediately after after the
the defec
defec-
tion,
tion, Blunt
Blunt went
went through
through Burgess's
Burgess’s flat,
flat, searching
searching for for and
and destroying
destroying incriminating
incriminating
documents.
documents. He H e failed,
failed, however,
however, to to notice
notice aa series
series of ofunsigned
unsigned notes notes describing
describing conficonfi-
dential discussions in Whitehall in 1939. In the course
dential discussions in Whitehall in 1939. In the course of a lengthy MIS investiga- of a lengthy MI5 investiga
tion,
tion, Sir
Sir John
John Colville,
Colville, one one ofof those
those mentioned
mentioned in inthe thenotes,
notes, was was ableabletoto identifY
identify the the
author
author as as Cairncross.
Cairncross. MI5 MIS began
began surveillance
surveillance of of Cairncross
Cairncross and and followed
followed him him to to aa
hurriedly
hurriedly arranged
arranged meeting
meeting withwith his his controller,
controller, Modin.
Modin. Just Just in in time,
time, Modin
Modin noticed
noticed
the
the surveillance
surveillance and and returned
returned home without meeting
home without meeting Cairncross.
Cairncross. At At aa subsequent
subsequent
interrogation
interrogation by by MI5,
MIS, Cairncross
Cairncross admitted
admitted passing
passing information
information to to the
the Russians
Russians but but
denied
denied being
being aa spy. spy. Shortly
Shortly afterwards
afterwards he he received
received "a “a large
large sum sum of of money"
money” at at aa
farewell
farewell meeting
meeting with with Modin,Modin,resigned
resigned from from thethe Treasury
Treasury and and went
went totolivelive abroad.1s7
abroad.lS7
Immediately
Immediately after after the the defection
defection of of Burgess
Burgess and and Maclean,
Maclean, the the Centre
Centre instructed
instructed
Modin
Modin totopress press Blunt
Blunt to to follow
follow them
them to to Moscow.
Moscow. Unwilling
Unwilling to to exchange
exchange the the presti
presti-
gious,
gious, congenial
congenial surroundings
surroundings of of the
the Courtauld
Courtauld Institute
Institutefor for the
the bleak
bleak socialist
socialist real
real-
ism
ism ofof Stalin's
Stalin’s Russia,
Russia, Blunt Blunt refused.
refused. "I “I know
know perfectly
perfectly well well howhow youryour people
people live,"
live,”
Blunt
Blunt toldtoldhis
his controller,
controller,"and “and II can
can assure
assure you youitit would
would be be very
veryhard,
hard, almost
almost unbear
unbear-
able,
able, for me to do likewise.” Modin, by his own account, was left speechless. Blunt
for me to do likewise." Modin, by his own account, was left speechless. Blunt
was
was rightly
rightly confident
confident that that MI5
MIS wouldwould havehave no hard evidence
no hard evidence againstagainst him.him. Soviet
Soviet
intelligence
intelligence had had fewfew further
further dealings
dealings with with him.ls8
him.158
As
As Philby
Philby had had feared,
feared, thethe defection
defection of of his
his friend
friend and and former
former lodger,
lodger, Burgess,
Burgess,
placed
placed him under immediate suspicion. The Director of Central Intelligence, Gen
him under immediate suspicion. The Director of Central Intelligence, Gen-
eral
eralWalter
Walter Bedell
Bedell Smith,
Smith, promptly
promptly informed
informed SIS SIS that
that he hewas
was no no longer
longer acceptable
acceptable as as
its
its liaison
liaison officer
officer in Washington. On
in Washington. O n his
his return
return to London, Philby
to London, Philby was officially
was officially
retired
retired from
from SIS.
SIS. In In December
December 1951 1951 hehewas was summoned
summoned to to aa"judicial
“judicialinquiry"
inquiry” at at MI5
MIS
headquarters-in
headquarters-in effect effect an an informal
informal trial,
trial, of
of which
which he helater
later gave
gave aa misleading
misleading accountaccount
in
in his
his memoirs.
memoirs. According
According to to one
one of of those
those present,
present, "There
“There was was notnot aa single
single officer
officer
who
who sat sat through
through the the proceedings
proceedings who who camecame away away not not totally
totally convinced
convinced of of Philby's
Philby’s
guilt."
guilt.” Contrary
Contrary to to the theimpression
impression PhilbyPhilby sought
sought totocreate
create in in Moscow
Moscow after after his
his defec
defec-
tion
tion twelve
twelve years
yearslater,
later, many
many of of his
his own
own former
former colleagues
colleagues in in SIS
SIS shared
shared the the opinion
opinion
ofMI5.
of MIS.But Butthethe"judicial
“judicialinquiry"
inquiry”concluded
concluded that that ititwould
would probably
probably nevernever be bepossible
possible
to
to find
findthe theevidence
evidencefor for aa successful
successfulprosecution.
prosecution. WithinWithin SIS SIS Philby
Philby retained
retained the the sup
sup-
port
port ofof aa loyal
loyal group
group of of friends
friends toto whom
whom he hecleverly
cleverlypresented
presented himself
himself as as the
the innocent
innocent
victim
victim of of aa McCarthyite
McCarthyitewitch-hunt. witch-hunt.SovietSoviet intelligence
intelligence had had no nofurther
furthercontact
contact with with
him
him until
until 1954.159
19S4.159
Philby
Philby seems
seems neverneverto to have
have realized
realizedthatthat Burgess's
Burgess’s suddensudden defection
defection was was thethe result
result
not
not ofofhis
his own
own loss
loss of of nerve
nerve butbut of of aa cynical
cynical deception
deception by by the
the Centre,
Centre, and and never
never forfor-
gave
gave Burgess
Burgessfor for putting
putting him himinin jeopardy.
jeopardy. By By the
the timetimePhilby
Philby himself
himself finally
finally defected
defected
F
F rr o m Wa
W a rr tt oo C o l d W
Waa r // I 66 I1
1
to
to Moscow
Moscow in in 1963,
1963, Burgess
Burgess waswas on
on his
his death bed. He
death bed. asked his
H e asked his old friend to
old friend to visit
visit
him
him at
at the
the KGB hospital
hospital in
in Pekhotnaya Street. Philby
Pekhotnaya Street. refused to
Philby refused to gO.160 His sense
go.16oHis sense of
grievance
grievance was
was increased
increased byby his
his own
own reception
reception inin Moscow.
Moscow. Philby
Philby hadhad long
long believed
believed
that
that he
he was
was an
an officer
officer in
in the
the Soviet
Soviet foreign
service and
and was shocked to
was shocked to
discover
discover that,
that, as
as aa foreign agent, he
foreign agent, he would never be
would never be awarded officer rank.
awarded officer rank. Worse
Worse still,
still,
he
he was
was not
not fully
fully trusted
trusted by
by the
the leadership
leadership either
either of
of the
theKGB
KGB or its First
or its First Chief
Chief (For
(For-
eign
eign Intelligence)
Intelligence) Directorate.
Directorate. Not
Not until
until the
the sixtieth
sixtieth anniversary
anniversary celebrations
celebrations of
of the
the
October
October Revolution,
Revolution, fourteen
fourteen years
years after his arrival
after his arrival in
in Moscow,
Moscow, waswas the
the KGB's
KGB’s most
most
celebrated
celebrated Western
Western agent
agent at
at last
last allowed
allowed to
to enter
enter its
its headquarters.161
headquarters.161
TT EE n-
HE
TH E MA
A II N
N A
ADDV
V EE RR S
SAA RR Y
Y
Pa
P a r tt rI : N
Noo rr tt hh A
Ammeerriicc aa n IIlle
l l e ggna llss i n tthh ee r950s
I95 0 S
O ne ooff the
One the most
most remarkable
remarkable public public appearances
appearancesever ever made
made by by aa Soviet iliegal took
Soviet iliegal took
place on
place on November
November 6,1951, 6, 1 951, when
when “Teodoro
"Teodoro B. Castro’*Castro" attended
attended the the opening
openingin in Paris
Paris
of the
of the Sixth Session of
Sixth Session of the
the United
United Nations
Nations General
General Assembly
Assembly as as anan adviser
adviser to to the
the
Costa Rican
Costa Rican delegation.
delegation. Castro
Castro was, was, in
in reality,
reality, Iosif
Iosif Romualdovich
Romualdovich Grigulevich
Grigulevich (var (var-
iously codenamed
iously code named MAKS, MAKS, ARTUR and DAKS) , 1 aa LithuanianJew
and DAKS),l Lithuanian Jew whose whose main
main pre-
pre
vious expertise
vious expertise had had been
been in in sabotage
sabotage and and assassination.
assassination. H Hee had
had trained
trained saboteurs
saboteurs
during the
during the Spanish
Spanish Civil War, taken
Civil War, taken aa leading
leading role in the
role in operations to
theoperations to kill Trotsky in
killTrotsky in
Mexico
Mexico andand hadhad run
run aa wartime
wartime illegalillegal residency
residencyin in Argentina
Argentinawhichwhich specialized
specialized in in the
the
sabotage of
sabotage of ships
ships andand cargoes
cargoes boundbound for for Germany.*
Germany.2 While While in Argentina, Grigulevich
inArgentina, Grigulevich
had begun to
had begun to develop
develop an an elaborate
elaborate LatinLatin American
American legend legend for use after
for use after the
the war.
war.33
Late
Late in in 1949,
1949, Grigulevich
Grigulevich and and hishis wife,
wife, Laura
Laura Araujo
Araujo Aguilar
Aguilar (a (a Mexican
Mexican illegal
illegal
agent
agent code named LUIZA),
codenamed LUIZA), set set up up anan illegal
illegal residency
residency in in Rome. Posing as
Rome. Posing as Teodoro
Teodoro
Castro,
Castro, the
the illegitimate
illegitimate son son of of aa dead (and childless)
dead (and childless) Costa
Costa Rican
Kcan notable,
notable, Grigule
Grigule-
vich
vich established
established aa smallsmall import-export
import-export business business to to provide
provide cover
cover forfor his
his intelligence
intelligence
work.
work. In
In thetheautumn
autumn of of 1950
1950 he hemade
made thethe acquaintance
acquaintance of of aa visiting
visiting delegation
delegation fromfrom
Costa
Costa Rica
Rica which
which included
included the the leading
leading Costa
Costa Rican
Rican politician
politician ofof his
his generation,
generation, JoseJose
Figueres Ferrer, head
Figueres Ferrer, head of of thethe founding
founding junta junta of of the
the Second
Second Republic
Republic which which had had
restored
restored constitutional
constitutional government
government and and later
later President
President of of the
the Republic
Republic in in 1953-8
1953-8
and
and 1970-4. Grigulevich's
1970-4.Grigulevich‘s success in
success in winning
winning Figueres's confidence must
Figueres’sconfidence must havehave
exceeded
exceeded his his wildest
wildest expectations.
expectations.Hoodwinked
Hoodwinked by Grigulevich's
Grigulevich‘s fraudulent
fraudulent account
account
of
of his illegitimate birth,
his illegitimate birth, Figueres
Figueres told told him
him theythey were
were distant
distant relatives.
relatives. Thereafter,
Thereafter,
according
according to to Grigulevich's
Grigulevich‘s file, file,he
he became
became the the friend
friend andand confi dant of
confidant the future
ofthe future pres
pres-
ident,
ident, using
using thethe Centre's
Centre’s money
money to to invest
invest with
with him himinin an
an Italian
Italian fi rm importing
firm importing CostaCosta
Rican
Rican coffee.
coffee.4 4
In
In October
October1951, 1951,underunder his cover name
hiscover name Teodoro
Teodoro Castro,Castro, Grigulevich
Grigulevich was was
appointed
appointed CostaC.osta Rica's
Rica’s charge
charge d'affaires
d’affaires in in Rome.
Rome. A month month later
later he
he waswas chosen
chosen as asan
an
adviser
adviser to the Costa
to the Costa Rican
Rican delegation
delegation to the Sixth
to the Sixth Session
Session of of thethe UN General
General
Assembly
Assembly at at its
its meeting
meeting in in Paris.
Paris. During
During the the assembly
assembly he he was
was introduced
introduced to to the
the US
Secretary
Secretary of of State,
State, Dean
Dean Acheson,
Acheson, and and the the British
British Foreign Secretary, Anthony
ForeignSecretary, Anthony
Eden-but
Eden-but not,
not, apparently,
apparently, to tothethe Soviet Foreign Minister,
SovietForeign Minister, Andrei
Andrei Vyshinsky.5
Vyshinsky5
Vyshinsky's
Vyshinsky’s usual usual oratorical
oratorical style
style at at international
international gatherings
gatherings was was tedious
tedious andand long
long-
winded.
winded. On O n this
this occasion,
occasion, however,
however,he he arrived
arrived withwith aa caged
caged dove,
dove, intended
intended to to repre-
repre-
T
The M
M ua i n A
A dd vvee rrss aa rr yy --
PPa ra tr t Ir / I1 6633
sent
sent the
the innocent
innocentvictims
victims of imperialist aggression,
of imperialist aggression, then proceeded to
then proceeded speak with
to speak with thethe
brutal sarcasm for
brutal sarcasm for which
which he he hadhadbeen
been infamous
infamous as as prosecutor
prosecutor duringduring the the show trials
show trials
of
of the
the Great
Great Terror.
Terror. Referring
Referring to to aa speech
speech by President Truman
by President Truman on on arms
arms limitation,
limitation,
Vyshinsky declared in the thecourse of a lengthy diatribe, "I “I could hardly sleep all allnight
last
last night
night having
having readread that
that speech.
speech. I could could notnot sleep
sleep because
becauseI keptkept laughing."6
laughing.”6
Among the theotherothertargets for Vyshinsky's
Vyshinsky’s sarcasm sarcasmwas wasthe Costa
Costa Rican delegation.
One
One of of the
the motions
motions debated
debated by by the
the General
GeneralAssembly
Assembly was was the
the call
call by
bythe
the Greek
Greekdel del-
egation
egation forfor the
the return
return toto Greece
Greece of of the
the children
children evacuated
evacuated to to the
the Soviet
Soviet Bloc
Bloc during
during
the
the Greek
Greekcivil
civil war.
war.At Acheson's
Acheson’s request,
request, thethe Costa
Costa Rican
Rican delegation
delegation agreed
agreed to to sup
sup-
port the motion.
port the motion. Doubtless
Doubtless to to his
his extreme
extreme embarrassment,
embarrassment, Grigulevich
Grigulevich was chosen
was chosen
to
to draft
draft aaspeech
speech in in favor
favor of ofit
it totobe
be delivered
deliveredby by Jorge
Jorge Martinez
Martinez Moreno.
Moreno.He H e did
did hishis
best
best toto limit
limit the
the offense
offense to the Soviet
to the Soviet delegation
delegation by by somewhat
somewhat vacuous
vacuous rhetoric
rhetoric
which emphasized "the
which emphasized “the anxiety
anxiety and and the the interest
interest withwith which
which [the[the Costa
CostaRican]
Rican] dele
dele-
gation
gation had
had always
always considered
considered any any threat
threat liable
liable to to endanger
endanger the the peace
peace of of the
the world,"
world,”
and
and congratulated
congratulated the the UN Special
Special Committee
Committee on on thetheBalkans
Balkans "for“for its
its work
work of obser
of obser-
vation
vation and
and conciliation,
conciliation, thanks
thanks to which .. .. .. although
to which although the the Balkans
Balkans remained
remained aa dan dan-
ger,
ger, atat least
least world
world peace
peace had had been safeguarded." The
been safeguarded.” The Soviet
Soviet delegation
delegation was was
unimpressed.
unimpressed. Probably
Probably unaware
unaware of of Castro's
Castro’s real
real identity,
identity, Vyshinsky
Vyshinsky condemned
condemned the the
speech
speech as as the
the ramblings
ramblings of of aa diplomatic
diplomatic clown. clown.7 7
Vyshinsky's
Vyshinsky‘s denunciation,
denunciation, however,however, did nothing to
did nothing to damage
damage Grigulevich's
Grigulevich‘s diplo-diplo
matic
matic career.
career. On
O n May
May 14, 1952 he
14,1952 presented his
he presented letters of
his letters of credence
credence as as Envoy
Envoy Extraor
Extraor-
dinary
dinary and
and Minister
Minister Plenipotentiary
Plenipotentiaryof Costa Rica
of Costa Rica in in Rome
Rome to to the
the Italian president,
Italian president,
Luigi
Luigi Einaudi.
Einaudi. According
According to to his
his file, Grigulevich was
file, Grigulevich was on good terms
on good terms with
with thetheAmer
Amer-
ican
ican ambassador,
ambassador, Ellsworth
Ellsworth Bunker,
Bunker, and and his
his successor,
successor, Claire
Claire Boothe
Boothe Luce,Luce, andand suc
suc-
cessfully
cesshlly cultivated
cultivated the Costa Rican
the Costa Rican nuncionuncio to the Vatican,
to the Vatican, Prince
Prince Giulio
Giulio Pacelli,
Pacelli, aa
nephew
nephew of of Pope
Pope Pius XII. Grigulevich
Pius XI. Grigulevich had had aa total
totalofoffifteen audiences with
fifteen audiences with the Pope.
thePope.
He also
also made
made friends with one
friends with one of of Italy's
Italy’s leading
leading post-war
post-war politicians,
politicians, the the Christian
Christian
Democrat
Democrat Alcide
Alcide de de Gasperi
Gasperi (Prime Minister, 1945-53),
(Prime Minister, 1945-53), who who gave
gave himhim aa camera
camera
inscribed
inscribed “In"In token
token of of our
our friendship."g
friendship.”*
Grigulevich's
Grigulevich‘s astonishing
astonishing transformation
transformation from from Soviet
Soviet saboteur
saboteur and assassin into
and assassin into aa
popular
popular andand successful
successful LatinLatin American diplomat, combined
American diplomat, combined with with thethe initial
initial success
success
of
of "Willie"
“Willie” Fisher's
Fisher’s illegal
illegal residency
residency in in providing
providing "supersecret"
“supersecret” nuclear
nuclear intelligence
intelligence
from
from the
the United
United States,9 seemed to
States,’ seemed vindicate the
to vindicate the Centre's
Centre’s early Cold War
early Cold Warstrategy
strategy of of
attempting
attempting to to recreate
recreate thethe age
age ofof the
the Great
Great I1legals.
Illegals. TheThe role of the
role of post-war illegals
the post-war illegals
was considered to
was considered to be
be potentially
potentially even even more
more important
important than than that
that ofof their
their illustrious
illustrious
predecessors.
predecessors. If the Cold
If the Cold War Warturned
turnedinto intohothotwar,
war, as as the
the Centre
Centre thought quite pos-
thought quite pos
sible,
sible, Soviet
Soviet embassies
embassies and and the
the legal residencies they
legal residencies they contained would have
contained would have to to be
be
withdrawn from NATO countries, leaving the illegals illegals to run wartime intelligence
operations.
operations.
DESsP I T E T HHEE EA R LY Cold

EARLY Cold War
War success
success of
of Grigulevich
Grigulevich and
and Fisher,
Fisher, the
the mood
mood inin the
the
Centre
Centre at at the
the beginning
beginning of
of the
the 1950s
1950s was
was anything
anything but
but triumphalist.
triumphalist. As
As aa result
result of
of
the
the identification
identification of of Soviet
Soviet spies
spies in the VENONA
in the VENONA decrypts,
decrypts, following
following the
the earlier
earlier
revelations
revelations by by Bentley,
Bentley, Chambers
Chambers and and Gouzenko,
Gouzenko,thethe Centre
Centre hadtohad to set
set about
about
T E WSOWR O
T HS
E A
DNR T
D
D HA
S
EHN IDE LT DH E S H I E L D / r64
rebuilding
rebuilding almostalmost its its entire
entire American
American agent agent network
network while while operating
operating underunder far far closer
closer
FBI surveillance
surveillance than than everever before.
before.”10 It I t could
could no no longer
longer count
count on onsignificant
significant help help from
from
the CommunistParty
the Communist Party of of the United States
the United States (CPUSA),
(CPUSA), which which during duringthe the Second
Second
World
World War Warhad had assisted
assisted SovietSoviet penetration
penetration of of thethe Roosevelt
administration, the the
intelligence
community and and thethe MANHATTAN project.ll project.” In In 1949
1949 Gene Dennis,
Gene Dennis,
the
the CPUSA general general secretary,
secretary, and and ten other party
ten other party leaders
leaders werewere tried
tried onon charges
charges of of
advocating
advocating the the forcible
forcible overthrow
overthrow of of the
the federal
federal government.
government. Dennis Dennis and andninenine of
of the
the
defendants
defendants were sentenced to
were sentenced to five
five years
yearsinin jail,
jail, the
the eleventh
eleventh was was jailed
jailed for
for three
three years,
years,
and
and allall the
the defense
defense attorneys
attorneys were were found
found in contempt of
in contempt of court.
court. After
After thethe Supreme
Supreme
Court
Court upheld
upheld the the sentences
sentences in in 1951,
1951, more
more than
than aahundredhundredother other leading
leading Communists
Communists
were
were convicted
convicted on on similar
similar charges.
charges. For For most
most of of the
the decade
decade the the Party
Party was
was forced
forced into
into
aa largely
largely underground
underground existence.12
existence.12
The
The Centre
Centre was was alsoalso greatly
greatly exercised
exercised by by the
the unprecedented
unprecedented publicity publicity given
given to to
Soviet
Soviet intelligence operations in
intelligence operations in the
theUnited
UnitedStates.
States. On O n January
January 24, 1950 Klaus
24,1950 Klaus Fuchs
Fuchs
began
began confessing
confessing his his wartime
wartime espionage
espionage at at Los
Los Alamos
Alamos to to his
his British
British interrogators.
interrogators.
The
The next
next day,
day, in in New
NewYork,
York, Alger
Alger HissHiss was sentenced to
was sentenced to fi ve years'
five years’imprisonment
imprisonment for for
perjury
perjury in in denying
denying espionage
espionage chargescharges before
before aa Grand
GrandJury.
Jury. On O n February
February 2 2 Fuchs
Fuchs was
was
formally
formally charged
charged in in London,
London,and andthethe menace of
menace of Soviet
Soviet atomic espionage burst
atomic espionage burst on
on to to
the
the front
frontpages
pages of of the
the American
American press. press. A weekweek laterlater the
the previously
previously little-known
little-known Wis Wis-
consin
consin senator,
senator, Joseph
Joseph R. McCarthy,
McCarthy, falsely falsely claimed
claimed to to have
have thethe names
names of of 205
205 State
State
Department Communists who
Department Communists who were
were "shaping"
“shaping”American
American foreign foreign policy.
policy. Despite
Despite his his
outrageous
outrageous inventions
inventions and and exaggerations,
exaggerations, McCarthyMcCarthy rapidly rapidly won won aa massmass following.
following.
He
H e did
did soso because
because he he succeeded
succeeded in in striking
striking aa popular
popular chord.chord. To To many
many Americans
Americans the the
idea of
idea of an "enemy within,"
an “enemy within,” given plausibility by
given plausibility by thethe convictions
convictions of of Hiss
Hiss and and Fuchs
Fuchs
(followed
(followed aa year year later
later by those of
by those of the
the Rosenbergs),
Rosenbergs), helped helped to to explain
explain why why the the United
United
States, despite
States, despite its its immense
immense power, seemed unable
power, seemed unable to to prevent
prevent the the onward
onward marchmarch of of
world Communism and
world Communism and the theemergence
emergence of of the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union as as aa nuclear
nuclear superpower.
superpower.
As
As late
late as
as January
January 1954 1954 opinion
opinion polls
polls found
found 50 percent
percent of Americans with
of Americans with aafavorable
favorable
opinion
opinion of of McCarthy
McCarthy and and only
only 2929 percent
percent opposed
opposed to to him.
him.
President
President Truman's
Truman’s claim claim in in 1951
1951 that that "the
“the greatest
greatest asset
asset that
that thethe Kremlin
Kremlin has has isis
Senator
Senator McCarthy"
McCarthy” was, was, inin thethelonglong run,run,
to be
betoproved
provedright.
right. McCarthy
McCarthy ultimately
ultimately did did
more
more forfor the
the Soviet
Soviet cause
cause than
than anyany agent
agent ofof influence
influence the the KGB ever ever had.
had. HisHis pre
pre-
posterous
posterous self-serving
self-serving crusade crusade against
against the the“Red"Red Menace" made
Menace” made liberal
liberal opinion
opinion
around
around the the world
world skeptical
skeptical of of the
the reality
reality of Moscow's secret
of Moscow’s secret intelligence
intelligence offensive
offensive
against the
against the Main MainAdversary.
Adversary. Even Even Julius
Julius and
and Ethel
Ethel Rosenberg,
Rosenberg, executed
executed one one after
after the
the
other
other in in the
thesame
same electric
electric chair
chair atat NewNewYork's Sing Sing
York‘s Sing SingPrison
Prison in in 1953,
1953,were
were widely
widely
believed
believed to to have been framed.
have been framed. It took some years,
took some years, however,
however, for for the Centre to
the Centre to grasp
grasp
the enormous propaganda advantages advantages of McCarthyism. At the time time thetheCentre
Centrewas
chiefly
chiefly concerned
concerned by by the
the increased
increased diffi culties created
difficulties created by by "spy
“spy mania"
mania,’ in in the
the United
United
States for
States for its
its attempts
attempts totorecruit
recruit andand runrun new American agents.
new American agents.
McCarthyism
McCarthyism reinforced reinforced the the Centre's belief in
Centre’s belief the importance
in the importance of of expanding
expanding its its
illegal presence on
illegal presence on thetheterritory
territoryofof the
the Main
MainAdversary.
Adversary. While While legal
legal residencies
residenciesbased based
in
in official
official Soviet
Soviet missions
missions were were inevitably
inevitably subject
subject to to increasingly
increasingly sophisticated
sophisticated FBI
surveillance,
surveillance,illegalillegal residencies
residenciescouldcould operate
operate freely
freely so so long
long asas they
they remained
remained uniden-
uniden-
T
T h eM aMi anAidnu eA1d-vs ea rr sya- rPya-
r tP a r t Ir / 1I 6 5S
tified. Since
tified. Since his
his arrival
arrival in the United
in the United States
States in in 1947
1947 "Willie"
“Willie” Fisher
Fisher (MARK)
(MARK) had had
attracted
attracted no no suspicion whatsoever-despite the
suspicion whatsoever-despite the fact
fact that
that his
his agent,
agent, Theodore
Theodore Hall, Hall,
was
was interrogated
interrogated by by the
the FBI in in 19511951 afterafter his
his identity
identity was disclosed
wasdisclosed by by the the
VENONA
VENONA decryptsY decrypts.13The The Centre
Centre also also took
took seriously
seriously the the possibility
possibility that that illegal res
illegal res-
idencies
idencies might
might have have to to take
take over all intelligence
over all intelligence operations
operations if if war
war or or other
other crises
crises led
led
to
to the
theexpulsion
expulsion of of Soviet
Soviet missions
missionsand and legal residencies. The
legal residencies. The preparations
preparations for for aa major
major
expansion
expansion of of the
the illegal
illegal residencies
residencies were enormously detailed.
were enormously detailed. In In 1954
1954 thethe Illegals
Illegals
Directorate drew
Directorate drew up upplans
plans for for aa network
network of of130
130 "documentation
“documentation agents” agents" whose
whose sole sole
responsibility
responsibility was was to to obtain
obtainbirth birthcertificates, passports and
certificates, passports and other
otherdocuments
documentsto to sup
sup-
port
port the
the illegals'
illegals’ legends.14
legends.14Operations
Operations officersofficers specializing
specializing in in illegal
illegal documentation
documentation
were
were posted
posted in
in twenty-two
twenty-two Western Western and andThird
Third World residencies, as
World residencies, as well
well as in China
as in China
and
and all
all Soviet
Soviet BlocBlocKGB liaison liaison missions.15
missions.15
There
There were, however,
were,however, moremore serious
serious obstacles
obstacles thanthan the the Centre was
Centre willing to
waswilling to
acknowledge
acknowledge than than the the expansion
expansion of of its illegal networks.
its illegal networks. The The age
age of of the
the Great
Great I1le
Ille-
gals-brilliant cosmopolitans
gals-brilliant cosmopolitans such
such as as Deutsch
Deutsch and and Maly,
Maly, ableable to
to inspire
inspire others
others withwith
their own
their visionary faith
own visionary faith in inthe
thefuture
future of of the
the Soviet system-had
Soviet system-had gone,gone,
nevernever to to
return.
return. Turning Soviet citizens
Turning Soviet brought up
citizens brought up inin the
the authoritarian,
authoritarian, intellectually
intellectually blink blink-
ered command economy
ered command economy of of Stalin's
Stalin’sRussia
Russiainto people who
into people who could
could pass pass as
as Westerners
Westerners
and
and cope
cope successfully
successfully with with life
life in
in the
the United
United States
States was
was to to prove
prove aa daunting,
daunting, as as well
well
as
as time-consuming,
time-consuming, business. Recruiting high-flying
business. Recruiting high-flying ideologically
ideologically committed
committed Amer Amer-
ican
ican agents
agentswas wasalso vastly
vastly more
also more difficult during the
difficult during theColdColdWar Warthan thanduring
duringthe 1930s
1930s
the
or
or the
the Second
Second WorldWorld War. War. The The Soviet
Soviet Union Union had had lost
lost much
much of of its appeal even
its appeal even to to
young radical intellectuals
young radical intellectuals alienated
alienated by by the
the materialism
materialism and and injustices
injustices of of American
American
society.
society. ItIt was
was deeply
deeply ironic
ironic that
that when
whenMcCarthy's self-serving campaign
McCarthy’s self-serving campaign against against the the
Red Menace was
Red Menace was at its height,
at its height, Soviet penetration of
Soviet penetration of the
theAmerican
Americangovernmentgovernmentwas was
at
at its
its lowest
lowest ebbebb for almost thirty
for almost thirty years.
years.
The
The Centre
Centre was was further
further hampered
hampered by by itsits own
own cumbersome
cumbersome bureaucracy,
bureaucracy, compli compli-
cated
cated during
during the the final
final years
years of of the
theStalinist
Stalinist era era by
by the
the rise and fall
rise and fall ofof the
theCommittee
Committee
of
of Information
Information (KI) (KI) as as the
the overseer
overseer of of Soviet
Soviet foreign intelligence.16 In
foreign intelligence.16 In the
the course
course of of
the
the Cold
Cold War,
War, the the organization
organization of of thethe Illegals
Directorate changed
changed eight times, and
eight times, and
the
the role assigned to
role assigned to itit was modified on
was modified fourteen different
on fourteen different occasions.17 Aleksandr
occasions.17 Aleksandr
Korotkov,
Korotkov, the the head
head of of the
the directorate
directorate during
during the first decade
thefirst decade of of thetheCold Cold War,
War, hadhad no no
experience
experience oflife
of life in in the
theWestWestand and little understanding
little understanding of theofproblems
problems
the faced
faced by byille
ille-
gals
gals in
in the
theUnited
UnitedStates.
States. FewFew of of his grandiose plans
his grandiose plans for illegal operations
for illegal operations against against thethe
Main Adversary
Main Adversary were were evereverrealized.
realized.
Throughout
Throughout the the 1950s,
1950s, the Centre struggled
the Centre struggled to to establish
establish eveneven one one more
more illegal
illegal
residency
residency in in the
the United
UnitedStates Statestoto addadd to that
to thatof
of Fisher.
Fisher. The The first
first attempt
attempt to to found
founda a
second residency
second residencycollapsed
collapsed in ignominious failure,
in ignominious failure, thethe recall
recall inin 1951
1951 of of Makayev
Makayev
(HARRY),
(HARRY), the the intended
intended resident,
resident, and and thethe disappearance
disappearance ofof 9,000 dollars dollars of of KI
funds. The
funds. The next
next attempt
attempt was more cautious.
was more cautious. UsingUsing aa strategy
strategy whichwhich it it was later to
was later to
repeat,
repeat, the
the Centre decided to
Centredecided send aa potential
to send potentialillegal resident to
illegal resident to Canada,
Canada,wait wait until
until he he
was
was well established, and
well established, and only
only then
then movemove him him onon totothe more difficult
themore terrain of
difficult terrain of the
the
Main
Main Adversary.
Adversary. The The first
first Soviet
Soviet illegal
illegal to use Canada
to use Canada as as aa staging
staging post post forfor the
the
United States
United States waswas thethe 30-year-old
30-year-old YevgeniYevgeni Vladimirovich
VladimirovichBrik Brik (codenamed
(codenamed HART), HART),
TT H
H ESE WS OWROD
A RNDD
T HA SENHDI ET LH DE S H I E L D // I1 66 6
6
who
who landed
landedininHalifax,
Halifax, NovaNova Scotia,
Scotia, in in November
November 1951 1951 withwithinstructions
instructions to to take
take up
up
residence in Montreal.
residence in Montreal.
Brik
Brik hadhad thethegreat
great advantage
advantage of of aa bilingual
bilingual education.
education. From From 1932 1932 to to 1937
1937he he had
had
been
been aa pupil
pupil at the Anglo-American
at the Anglo-American School School in in Moscow,18
MOSCOW,~~ subsequently
subsequently spendingspending
several
severalyears
yearsinin New
NewYork,
York,where
where his his father
father worked
worked for for Amtorg,
Amtorg, the theSoviet
Soviettrade
trade mis
mis-
sion in the United States/9
sion in the United s t a t e ~before before returning to serve in the
, ~ ~ returning to serve in the Red Army during theRed Army during the
Great
Great Patriotic War. In 1948 Brik was instructed to cultivate Western pupils at his
Patriotic War. In 1948 Brik was instructed to cultivate Western pupils at his
old
old school
school in in order
order to to test
test his
his suitability
suitability for for intelligence
intelligence work work in in North
North America.
America.
Having
Having succeeded
succeeded in in that
that exercise
exercise to to thethe Centre's
Centre’s satisfaction,
satisfaction, he he began
began aa two-year
two-year
training
training course
course in in 1949,
1949, covering
covering ciphers,
ciphers, secret
secret writing,
writing, use use of of short-wave
short-wave radio,
radio,
selection
selection and use of dead letter-boxes, anti-surveillance precautions and methods of
and use of dead letter-boxes, anti-surveillance precautions and methods of
intelligence
intelligence collection.
collection. Brik Brik was was also
also taught
taught thethe trade
trade of of aa watchmaker
watchmaker in in order
order toto
enable
enable himhim to to start
starta asmall
small business
business in in Canada.20
Canada.20
For
For hishisjourney
journey to to Canada,
Canada, Brik Brik adopted
adopted the theidentity
identityof of aa Canadian
Canadian"live “live double,"
double,”
Ivan
Ivan Vasilyevich Gladysh (codenamed FRED), recruited in July 1951 specifically to
Vasilyevich Gladysh (codenamed FRED), recruited in July 1951 specifically to
provide
provide cover
coverforfor him.
him. On O n instructions
instructions from from the
the Centre,
Centre,Gladysh
Gladysh crossed
crossed thethe Atlantic
Atlantic
to
to Britain,
Britain, then
then traveled
traveled through
through FranceFrance and and West
WestGermanyGermany to Vienna,
Vienna,
to where
where he he met
met
Brik.
Brik. InIn Vienna
Vienna Gladysh
Gladysh briefedbriefed BrikBrik on on the
the details
details of of his
his life
life in Canada and
in Canada and his
his
journey to Europe, then gave him his Canadian passport.
journey to Europe, thengave him his Canadian passport. Brik pasted his own photo- Brik pasted his own photo
graph
graph in in the
the passport
passport in in place
place of of Gladysh‘s
Gladysh's and and set set off across the
off across the Atlantic.21
Atlantic.21AfterAfter
landing
landing at at Halifax,
Halifax, BrikBrik took
took aatraintraintotoMontreal
Montrealand and went
went to to the
the station
stationlavatories.
lavatories.
On
O n one
one of of the
the cubicle
cubicle doors
doors he he saw
saw the the chalk
chalk mark
mark he he had
had been
been toldtold to
to expect.
expect. HeHe
went inside,
went inside, removed
removed the the toptop of of the
the cistern
cistern andand found
found tapedtaped to the underside
to the underside the the
birth
birth certificate
certificate and and other
other documents
documents belongingbelonging to to another
another "live“live double,"
double,” David
David
Semyonovich
Semyonovich Soboloff22
Soboloff.22Soboloff
Soboloff (codenamed
(codenamed SOKOL) SOKOL) had had been
been bornborn in in Toronto
Toronto
in
in 1919
1919but butatatthethe age
age of
of sixteen
sixteen had had emigrated
emigrated with with hishis family
family to to the
the Soviet
Soviet Union.
Union.
In
In 1951
1951 he hewas
was working
working as as aa teacher
teacher at at the
theMagnitogorsk
MagnitogorskMining Miningand and Metallurgical
Metallurgical
Institute.
Institute. ForFor the
the remainder
remainder of of his
his time
time in in Canada
Canada Brik Brik became
became David David Soboloff
Soboloff. In In
July
July he
he obtained
obtained aa passport
passport in in his
his name.23
name.23
Brik
Brik succeeded
succeeded in in persuading
persuading the the Centre
Centre that thatthere
therewas
was no no realistic
realistic possibility
possibility of of
establishing
establishing himself
himself as as aa watchmaker
watchmaker in in Montreal,
Montreal, and and that
that hehe should
should openopen aa one
one-
man
man photographic
photographic studio studio instead.
instead. While
While in Montreal, he
in Montreal, he was
was instructed
instructed to to begin
begin
making
making plansplans forfor emigration
emigration to to the
the United
United States.24
States.24Brik, Brik, however,
however, provedproved an an even
even
more
more disastrous
disastrous choicechoice thanthan Makayev
Makayev as as the
the potential
potential head head of of an
an illegal
illegal American
American
residency.
residency.Without
Without telling
telling the the Centre,
Centre, in in October
October1953 1953hehebegan
began aa passionate
passionate affair
affair
with
with thethe wife
wife of of aa Canadian
Canadian soldiersoldier living
living inin Kingston,
Kingston, Ontario.25
Ontari~.~’ In order
order not
In to
not to
break contact with her, Brik persuaded
break contact with her, Brik persuaded the Centre that wouldthe Centre that it would
it be premature
be premature for himfor him
to
to move
move to to the
theUnited
UnitedStates.
States. Before
Before longlong he headmitted
admittedto to his
his lover
lover that
that hehewas
was aa Rus
Rus-
sian
sian spy
spy living
living under
under aa false
false identity
identity and and tried
tried toto persuade
persuade her her to
to leave
leave her
her husband.
husband.
She
She refused
refused but but begged
begged him him to to go
go to
to thethe RCMP
RCMP (Royal (Royal Canadian
Canadian MountedMounted Police)
Police)
and
and make
make aa voluntary
voluntary confession.26
confession.26
In
In November
November 1953 1953 BrikBrik gave
gave in in toto his
his lover's
lover’s pleas
pleas and
and telephoned
telephoned the the RCMP
RCMP
headquarters
headquarters in Ottawa. Terry
in Ottawa. Terry Guernsey,
Guernsey, the the head
head of of the
the diminutive
diminutive B B (Counter
(Counter-
intelligence)
intelligence) Branch
Branch of of the
the RCMP
RCMP Security
Security Service,
Service,decided
decided to to run
run Brik
Brik (codenamed
(codenamed
T h eeM M
a ianAi nd vAe dr sv ae r sy a- rPya-
r tP a r t Ir / 11 6 7
GIDEON
GIDEON by by BB Branch)
Branch) as as aa double
double agent agent in in order
order to to uncover
uncover as as much
much as as possible
possible
about Soviet intelligence operations
about Soviet intelligence operations in Canada. in Canada. GIDEON proved
proved unusually difficult
unusually difficult
to
to run,
run,particularly
particularly whenwhen his his lover
lover broke
broke off off their
their affair,
affair, and
and his drinking ran
his drinking ran period
period-
ically
ically out
out ofof control.
control. OnO n oneone occasion,
occasion, after after consuming
consuming more more than than aa bottle
bottle of of Old
Old
Tom
Tom gin, gin,hehe rang
rang the
the Montreal
MontrealGazetteGazette and, and, totothe horror
thehorror of of the
the RCMP officer officer mon
mon-
itoring
itoring hishis telephone
telephone calls,
calls, said
saidinin aa drunken
drunkenslur, slur, "I'm
“I’maa Russian
Russian spy. spy. Do
Do youyou want
want aa
story?"
story?” Like
Like the Ottawa Journal which
the Ottawa which had had turned
turned away away Gouzenko
Gouzenko in in September
September
1945,
1945, thethe Gazette failed
failed toto realize
realize it it was
was being
being offered
offered the the spy
spy story
story exclusive
exclusive of of the
the
decade
decade and and dismissed
dismissed the the caller
caller asas aa drunk.
drunk.27 27
Until
Until thethe summer
summer of of 1955
1955 it it did
did notnot occur
occur to the KGB that
to the that thethe illegal
illegal HART
(Brik)
(Brik) might
might now now be be aa double
double agent.
agent. OnceOnce itit waswas satisfied
satisfied that
that he he hadhad successfully
successhlly
established
established his his bogus
bogus identity
identity and and cover
cover profession
profession in Montreal,the
in Montreal, theCentre
Centre propro-
ceeded
ceeded to to the
the next
next stage
stage in in his
his development
development as as anan illegal
illegal resident
resident whose
whose main main role
role
would
would be be asas an
an agent
agent controller.
controller. Between
Between 1951 1951 and and 1953
1953 the theOttawa
Ottawalegal legal residency,
residency,
spurred
spurred on on byby Moscow's
Moscow’s criticism
criticism of of its
its inertia
inertia sincesince thethe defection
defection of of Gouzenko,
Gouzenko,
recruited
recruited eleven
eleven agents
agents (all
(all apparently
apparently fairly fairly low-level)
low-level) with with the the assistance
assistance of of the
the
Canadian Communist Party.
Canadian Communist Party. Five
Five werewere Communists
Communists and and most
most supplied
supplied scientific
scientific
and
and technological
technological intelligence.28
intelligence.28By By transferring
transferring some some of of the
the agents
agents to to an
an illegal
illegal con
con-
troller, the Centre hoped to overcome the problems
troller, the Centre hoped to overcome the problems created by the RCMP security created by the RCMP security
service's
service’s surveillance
theOttawa
Ottawaembassy.
embassy.
By
By the
the time
time thethe KGB realized
realized thatthat Brik
Brik was
was under
under RCMPRCMP control,
control, it it had
had putput him
him
in touch
in touch withwith fivefive agents.
agents. Three
Three were weremale:male: LISTER,
LISTER, aa Toronto TorontoCommunist
Communist of of
Ukrainian
Ukrainian originorigin born
born in in 1919;
1919; LIND,
LIND, an an Irish-Canadian
Irish-Canadian Communist Communist employee employee of of
the
the A.
A. V.V. Roe
Roe aircraft
aircraft company,
company,also also resident
resident in in Toronto;
Toronto; and and POMOSHCHNIK,
POMOSHCHNIK,the the
Communist
Communist owner owner of of aa radio
radio and and television
television salessales and
and service
service business
business in Ottawa.29
in Ottawa.29
The
The intelligence
supplied by by LIND
LIND included
included plansplans forfor the
the CF -105 Avro
CF-105 Avro .Arrow,
Arrow,then
then
among
among the the most
most advanced
advanced jet jet fighter
fighter aircraft
aircraft in the world.30 Brik
inthe Brik also
also knew
knew the the iden
iden-
tities
tities of
of EMMA
EMMA and and MARA, two two female
female agents
agents used used asas "live
“liveletterboxes"
letterboxes”(LLBs) (LLBs) forfor
communications
communicationswith with the
the Centre.
Centre.EMMA,EMMA,who who had had been
been recruited
recruited while
while studying
studying at at
the
the Sorbonne
Sorbonne in in 1951,
1951,took
took thethe Canadian
CanadianExternal
External MfairsAffairs Ministry
Ministry entrance
entrance exami
exami-
nation,
nation, butbut waswas unsuccessful.
unsuccessful.In In 1954
1954 she she opened
opened an an arts
arts and
and crafts
crafts shop
shop in in OlIebec.
Quebec.
MARA
M A W was was aa French
French fashion
fashion designer,
designer,born born in
in 1939,
1939, thethe co-owner
co-owner of of aa furniture
furniture shopshop
in
in Paris
Paris who
who was was used
usedas as an
an LLB
LLB for for KGB communications
communications from from Canada.31
Canada.31
The
The Centre
Centre laterlater concluded
concluded that that Brik
Brik had
had betrayed
betrayed all five of
all five of the
the agents
agents with
with
whom
whom he he hadhadbeen
been put
put inincontact.
contact. He H e was
was unaware,
unaware, however,
however, of of the
the identity
identityof of Hugh
Hugh
Hambleton,
Hambleton, ultimately
ultimately the the most
most important
important of of the
the agents
agents recruited
recruited by by the Ottawa
the Ottawa
legal
legal residency
residencyin in the
theearly
early 1950s.
1950s. Hambleton
Hambleton had had been
been bornborn in in Ottawa
Ottawainin1922 1922and
and
had
had spent
spent somesome of of his
his childhood
childhood in in France,
France, where
where his his father
father waswas aa Canadian
Canadian press press
correspondent.
correspondent. During During the the Second
Second World World War War he he served
served as as anan intelligence
officer
with
with thethe Free
Free French
French in in Algiers
Algiers and, and, after
after the
the Liberation,
Liberation, in in Paris,
Paris, before
before becoming
becoming
French
French liaison
liaison officer
officer with
with the the USUS army's
army’s 103rd
103rd Division
Division in Europe. In
in Europe. I n 1945
1945 hehe
transferred
transferred to to the Canadian army
the Canadian army and and spent
spent aa year based in
year based in Strasbourg
Strasbourg analyzing
analyzing
intelligence
intelligence on on occupied
occupied Germany,
Germany, and and interrogating
interrogating prisoners-of-war.
prisoners-of-war. UnsurprisUnsurpris-
ingly,
ingly, the
the post-war
post-war yearsyears seemed
seemed dull dull by by comparison.
comparison. "To “To bebe important,
important, to tohave
have peo-
peo-
TT H
HSE WSOWR O
E A
DNR T
D
D HA
S
/ I1 66 88
pIe
ple pay
pay attention
attention to to you,"
you,” hehe once
once said,
said, "that
“that isis what
what counts
counts in in life."32
life.”32The
The KGB gave gave
him
him thethe recognition
recognition whichwhich he he craved.
craved.
Hambleton's
Hambleton’s KGB KGB fIlefile reveals
revealsfor for the
the first
first time
time that
that hehe emerged
emerged from from the
the war
war as
as aa
committed Communist and was talent-spotted by the
committed Communist and was talent-spotted by the Centre’s “Canadian friends.” Centre's "Canadian friends."
Harry
Harry Baker,
Baker, one one of of the CanadianCommunist
the Canadian Communist leaders, leaders, picked
picked him him outoutatatParty
Party
meetings
meetings and later vouched
and later vouched for for hishis ideological
ideological reliability.
reliability. Another
Another Party Party member,
member,
codenamed SVY
codenamed ASHCHENIK ("Priest"),
SWASHCHENIK (“Priest”), carried
carried outout background
background checks checks on him.
on him.
In
In 1952
1952 Hambleton
Hambletonwas was recruited
recruited as as aa Soviet
Soviet agent
agent byby the
the Ottawa
Ottawa resident,
resident, Vladimir
Vladimir
Trofimovich
Trofimovich Burdin,Burdin, andand given
given the codename RIM
the codename RIMEN EN (later
(later changed
changed to to RADOV).
RADOV).
Two
Two years
years later
later Hambleton
Hambleton moved moved to to Paris
Paris where
where he he began
began postgraduate
postgraduate research
research in in
economics
economics at at the
the Sorbonne.
Sorbonne. In In 1956
1956 he hegained
gained aa jobjobininthe theeconomics
economics directorate
directorate of of
NATO,
NATO, whosewhose headquarters
headquarters were were thenthen on on the
the outskirts
outskirts of of Paris.
Paris. Over
Over thethe next five
next five
years
years Hambleton
Hambleton handed handed over what his
over what his KGB file file describes
describes as "a huge
as “a huge quantity
quantity of of
documents,"
documents,” most most of of which
which werewere assessed
assessed by by the
the Centre
Centre as as "valuable
“valuable or or extremely
extremely
valuable
valuable in in content."33 Though
Though Brik Brik waswas unaware
unaware of of his
his existence,
existence, Hambleton
Hambleton was was
eventually betrayed twenty years later by another
eventually betrayed twenty years later by another Soviet illegal.34 Soviet illegal.34
Early
Early in in 1955,
1955,probably
probably as as part
part of of itsitspreparations
preparations to to transfer Brik to
transfer Brik to the
theUnited
United
States,
States,thethe
CentreCentre made made plansplans to to move
move another
another illegal resident, codenamed
illegal resident, codenamed
ZHANGO,
ZHANGO, to to Canada.
Canada. ZHANGO
ZHANGO was was aa 49-year-old
49-year-old Russian,
Russian, Mikhail
Mikhail Ivanovich
Ivanovich
Filonenko, who had been given the genuine birth certificate, and had assumed the
Filonenko, who had been given the genuine birth certificate, and had assumed the
identity,
identity, of of Joseph
Joseph Ivanovich
Ivanovich Kulda.
Kulda. Born Born on onJuly
July 7, 1914 in
7,1914 inAlliance, Ohio, Kulda
Alliance, Ohio, Kulda
had
had emigrated
emigrated to to Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia with with his his parents
parents in in 1922.
1922. Filonenko's
Filonenko’s wife,wife, Anna
Anna
Fyodorovna
Fyodorovna (code named successively
(codenamed successivelyMARTA and and YELENA),
YELENA),took tookthetheidentity of
identity
of
Mariya
Mariya Navotnaya,
Navotnaya, aa Czech Czech bornbornon onOctober
October 10, 1920 in Manchuria.
10, 1920 in Manchuria. Anna was Anna was
Czech
Czech on on herher father's side; before
father’s side; before marrying
marrying Filonenko
Filonenko she she had spent two
had spent two years
years in
in
Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia perfecting
perfecting her her grasp
grasp of of thethelanguage
language and and improving
improving her her legend.
legend. Pos
Pos-
ing
ing asas Czechoslovak
Czechoslovak refugees,refugees, the Filonenkos were
the Filonenkos were initially
initially unsuccessful
unsuccessful in their
in their
applications
applications for for Canadian
Canadianvisas,
visas, butbut with
withthe thehelp
help of
of the
the UN Refugees
Refugees Commission
Commission
(later
(later the
the UNHCR)
UNHCR) gained gained entry
entry to to Brazil
Brazil in in 1954.35
1954.35In In 1955
1955 thethe Centre
Centre mademade
plans
plans toto move
move Filonenko
Filonenko on on to
to join
joinBrik
Brik in in Canada,
Canada,wherewhere he he was
was to
to have
have thethe new
new
codename
codename HECTOR.HECTOR. Brik Brik duly
duly informed
informed the the RCMP of of HECTOR's
HECTORS planned planned
arrival. 36
arrival.36
The
The KGB
KGB was was saved
savedin in the
thenick
nick of of time
time from
from aa major
major intelligence
intelligence disaster,
disaster, which,
which,
it believed, would
it believed, would havehave included
included the the arrest
arrest andand show
show trial
trial of of Filonenko,
Filonenko, by by aa walk-in
walk-in
to the Ottawa
to the Ottawa residency.
residency. On O n July
July 21,21, 1955
1955 aa heavily
heavily indebted
indebted 39-year-old
39-year-old RCMP
corporal,
corporal, James
James Morrison,
Morrison, who who for some years
for some years had
had taken
taken part part in in surveillance
the
Ottawa
Ottawa embassy,
embassy, got got inin touch
touch with
with Burdin's
Burdin’s successor
successoras as resident,
resident, Nikolai
Nikolai Pavlovich
Pavlovich
Ostrovsky
Ostrovsky (codenamed
(codenamed GOLUBEV),
GOLUBEV), and and reported
reported that that BrikBrik hadhad been
been "turned"
“turned”
eighteen
eighteen months
months earlier.
earlier. He
H e was
was acting,
acting, he he claimed,
claimed, out out of of sympathy
sympathy for for the
the USSR
and
and aa desire
desire to to prevent
prevent aa repetition
repetition of of the
the Gouzenko
Gouzenko affairaffair which
which had had done
doneso so much
much
damage
damage to to Soviet-Canadian
Soviet-Canadian relationsrelations ten ten years
years earlier.
earlier. Morrison's
Morrison’srequestrequest forfor 5,000
5,000
dollars,
dollars, however,
however, provides
provides aa better
better indication
indication of of his
his motivesY
motives.37Unknown Unknown to Ostro
to Ostro-
vsky,
vsky, he
he had
had already
already been
been caught
caught embezzling
embezzling RCMP funds funds with with which
which he hehoped
hoped to to
pay
pay off
off the
the debts
debts caused
caused by by his
his taste
taste for
for high
high living. Remarkably, instead
living. Remarkably, instead of of being
being
T
The M
Main A
A dd v'lJee rr ss aa rr yy --
P aP ra tr t Ir // I1 6 9
sacked,
sacked, Morrison
Morrison was was allowed
allowed to to refund
rehnd the the money
money he he had
had stolen.
stolen. Ironically,
Ironically, he he was
was
to
to use
use money
money fromfrom thethe KGB to to repay
repay thethe RCMP.38
RCMP.38
The
The Centre
Centre initially
initially suspected
suspected that that thethe intelligence
intelligence from from Morrison
Morrison (later(later code
code-
named
named FRIEND)
FRIEND)was was an anelaborate
elaborate "provocation"
“provocation7’by by the
the RCMP,
RCMP, but but decided
decided to to inter
inter-
rogate
rogate Brik
Brik inin Moscow.
Moscow. Fortunately
Fortunately for for the theKGB, it it had
had already
already been
been decided
decided in in June
June
that
that Brik
Brik would
would travel
travel to to the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union for for aa holiday
holiday and and reunite
reunite withwith hishis wife
wife
later
later in the summer.39 Though
inthe Though understandably
understandably nervous nervous at the
atthe thought of
thought of returning
returningtoto
Moscow,
Moscow, he he appears
appears to to have
have been
been confident
confident of of his
his ability
ability to to continue
continue to to outwit
outwit thethe
KGB.40
KGB.“ Before
Before leaving
leaving Canada,
Canada, Brik Brik was
was briefed
briefed by by Charles
Charles Sweeny
Sweeny of of the
the RCMP
and Leslie Mitchell,
and Leslie Mitchell, the the SISSIS liaison
liaison officer
officer in Washington, and
in Washington, and asked
asked to to fi nd out
find out
what
what he he could
could about
about thethe fate
fate ofof Burgess
Burgess and and Maclean,
Maclean, as as well
well as
as to
to identify
identify as as many
many
KGB
KGB officers
officers as as possible
possible during
during his his visit.
visit. They
They told
told himhim that that if
if he
he needed
needed assistance
assistance
in
in Moscow
Moscow it it would
would be be provided
provided by by the
the British SIS, since
British SIS, since Canada
Canada had had no no foreign
foreign
intelligence
intelligence service.
service. HeH e waswas given
given details
details of of one
one rendezvous
rendezvous point point withwith anan SIS
SIS offi
offi-
cer,
cer, the
the location
location of of two
two dead
dead letter-boxes
letter-boxes and and signal
signal sites
sites to to indicate
indicate when
when aa DLB had had
been
been filled. If itbecame necessary to arrange an escape, SIS would leave in a DLB aa
filled. If it became necessary to arrange an escape, SIS would leave in a DLB
short-wave
short-wave radio,
radio, money,
money, aa pistol
pistol with
with silencer,
silencer, false
falseSoviet
Soviet passports
passports for for himself
himself and and
his
his wife,
wife, the
the internal
internaltravel
travel documents
documents needed needed to to go to to the thetown
town of of Pechenga
Pechenga near near the
the
Soviet-Norwegian
Soviet-Norwegian border border and and aa mapmap showing
showing wherewhere to to cross
cross the
the frontier.
fr~ntier.~’ 41
The
The Centre
Centre took took great
great care care not
not toto arouse
arouse Brik's suspicions before
Brik‘s suspicions before his departure.
his departure.
His
His first
first stop,
stop, arranged
arranged in in June,
June, waswas in in Brazil,
Brazil, where
where he he was
was due
due toto meet Filonenko
meet Filonenko
(HECTOR)
(HECTOR) on on August
August 7. 7. Filonenko
Filonenko was was warned
warned not not to to attend
attend the meeting, but
the meeting, but thethe
prearranged
prearranged rendezvous
rendezvous was was keptkept under
under KGB KGB observation.
observation. When When Brik Brik arrived
arrived on on
August
August 7, 7, the
the KGB watchers
watchers reportedreported that that he
he had
had twotwo companions,
companions, thus thus providing
providing
strong circumstantial evidence
strong circumstantial evidence that that hehe waswas now
now aa double
double agent.agent. Apparently
Apparently unde unde-
terred
terred byby Filonenko's
Filonenko’s failure
failure to to meet
meet him,
him, Brik
Brik continued
continued to to Moscow
Moscow via via Paris
Paris and
and
Helsinki.
Helsinki. TheThe residents
residents in in both
bothcapitals
capitalswerewere ordered
ordered to to give
give him
him aa friendly
friendly welcome
welcome
and
and discuss
discuss withwith himhimthe the travel
travel arrangements
arrangements for for hishis return
return to toCanada.
Canada. A KGB
strong-arm
strong-arm man man was, however, sent
was, however, sent totoFinland
Finlandinin case case Brik
Brik hadhad anyany last-minute
last-minute
doubts
doubts about
about going
going to to Moscow.
Moscow. If necessary,
necessary, aa Soviet
Soviet agentagent in the Finnish
in the Finnish police
police
agreed
agreed to to arrange
arrange for for his
his expulsion
expulsion to to the
the Soviet
Soviet Union.
Union.42 42
On
O n August
August 19, 1955 Brik
19,1955 Brik arrived
arrived at at Moscow
Moscow airport airport and and was was immediately
immediately
arrested.
arrested. He H e atat first
first denied
denied that that hehe was
was aa double
double agent,
agent, but but his file records
his file records thatthat hehe
subsequently
subsequently broke under "pressure"
broke under “pressure”and and "told
“told all."43 His confession
all.”43 His confession confirmed
confirmed every every-
thing reported to
thing reported the Ottawa
to the Ottawa residency
residency by James Morrison
by James Morrison (FRIEND),
(FRIEND), who who waswas
then
then paid
paid the
the 5,000
5,000 dollars
dollars he he had
had asked
asked for.for. Morrison
Morrison volunteered
volunteered for further pay
for further pay-
ment what
ment whatthe theCentre
Centre considered
considered "valuable"
“valuable”information
information about about the the organization,
organization,
personnel
personnel and and operations
operations of of the
theRCMP and, and, in
in particular,
particular, its its security
security service.44
service.44
On
O n September
September 4, 1956, 1956, at at aa closed sessionofof the
closed session Military Collegium
the Military Collegium of of the
the
Supreme
Supreme Court,Court, Brik Brik waswas sentenced
sentenced to to fifteen
fifteen years
years in in prison.
prison. TheThe factfact that
that hehe
escaped
escaped the the death
death penalty
penalty was was presumably
presumably due due to to his
his cooperation
cooperation in what his
in what his file
file
describes
describes as as "an
“an operational
operational game." Brik was
game.” Brik was not
not allowed
allowed to to meet
meet any
any member
member of of the
the
SIS
SIS station
station in in the
theMoscow
Moscow embassy, embassy, probably
probably for for fear
fear that
that he he would
would blurt
blurt outout what
what
had
had happened
happened to to him,
him,but butinstructed
instructed to to arrange
arrange aa rendezvous
rendezvous which which he he did
didnot notkeep.
keep.
T
TH E WSOWR O
HS
E A
DNRT
DHA
D S
EHN IDE LTDH E S H I E L D // I1 77 00
By
By keeping
keeping the the rendezvous
rendezvous sitesite under
under surveillance,
surveillance, the the KGB
KGB was able to
was able to identify
identify
Daphne (later
Daphne (later Baroness)
Baroness) Park,
Park, the the member
member of of the British embassy
the British embassy who turned up
who turned up
there,
there, as
as an
an SIS
SIS officer.
officer. DUring
During the the "operational
“operational game"game” Brik Brik was allowed to
was allowed to live
live at
at
home
home withwithhis
his family
family in
in order
order toto trytrytotogive SIS the
give SIS theimpression
impression that that he hewas
was still
still at
at lib
lib-
erty.
erty. The
The KGB
KGB discovered,
discovered, probably
probably by by bugging
bugging his his apartment,
apartment, that that hehe tried
tried unsuc
unsuc-
cessfully to persuade his wife to flee
cessfully to persuade his wife to flee abroad.45 abroad.4s
Morrison
Morrison continued
continued for
for three
three years
years toto work
Soviet agent.
agent. Including
Including the the5,000
5,000
dollars
dollars he
he received
received for
for betraying
betraying Brik, Brik, hehe was
was paid
paid aa total
total of
of 14,000
14,000 dollars
dollars by by the
the
KGB. TheThe Centre,
Centre, however,
however, became
became increasingly
increasingly dissatisfied
dissatisfied with
with thethe quality
quality of of the
the
information
information he he supplied.
supplied. In
In September
September 1955 1955 Morrison
Morrison was was posted
posted to to Winnipeg
Winnipeg as as
part
part of
ofa aunit
unitinvestigating
investigating drug
drug smuggling
smuggling from from the
the United States, and
United States, and lost
lost much
much of of
his
his previous
previous access
access to
to RCMP intelligence.
intelligence. His His last
last meeting
meeting withwith aa Soviet
Soviet controller
controller
took
took place
place onon December
December 7, 7, 1957.
1957. Morrison
Morrison asked asked forfor help
help in
in paying
paying off off aa debt
debt of of
4,800
4,800 dollars.
dollars. TheThe deputy
deputy resident
resident in Ottawa, Rem
inOttawa, Rem Sergeevich
Sergeevich Krasilnikov
Krasilnikov
(ARTUR),
(ARTUR), however,
however, paid
paid him
him onlyonly 150150 dollars
dollars and
and told
told him
him that
that hehewould
would need need to to
arrange aa transfer
arrange transfer toto Ottawa
Ottawaandand get better access
get better access toto RCMP intelligence
intelligence ifhe if hewished
wished
to
to earn
earn more
more money.
money. Morrison
Morrison failed failed to turn up
to turn up toto hishis next
next pre-arranged
pre-arranged meeting meeting
with
with Krasilnikov
Krasilnikov and and broke
broke off
off further
further contact
contact withwith thethe KGB.
KGB. In In 1958
1958 the Ottawa
the Ottawa
residency
residency discovered from press reports that Morrison had been dismissed from the
discovered from press reports that Morrison had been dismissed from the
RCMP and and given
given aa two-year
two-year suspended
suspended sentence
sentence for for fraud.46
fraud.36
Though
Though Morrison's
Morrison’s warning
warning in 1955 had
in 1955 had helped
helped to to contain
contain the
the damage
damage done done to to
KGB operations
operations by Brik's twenty-one
by Brik‘s twenty-one months months as as aa double
double agent,
agent, that
that damage
damage was was
none
none the less considerable.
the less considerable. The
The Centre
Centre was was forced
forced to abandon its
to abandon its plan
plan for
for aa second
second
illegal
illegal residency
residency in in the United States
the United States based
based on Brik and
on Brik and Filonenko.
Filonenko. In In addition
addition to to
betraying
betraying five
five KGB agents,
agents, Brik
Brik had had also
also identified
identified to to thetheRCMP aa numbernumber of of KGB
officers in the
officers in the Ottawa
Ottawalegal
legal residency,
residency,all all of whom were
of whom withdrawn from
were withdrawn from Canada.47
Canada.47
ANOTH E R PP LAN
ANOTHER B Y the
LAN BY the Centre
Centre totoestablish
establish aa further
furtherillegal
illegal residency
residency in
in the
the United
United
States
States also
also collapsed
collapsed in the mid-1950s.
in the mid-1950s. The The intended
intended illegal
illegal resident
resident was
was Vladimir
Vladimir
Vasilyevich Grinchenko (codenamed
Vasilyevich Grinchenko (codenamed RON and and KLOD),
KLOD), who who hadhadtaken
taken thethe identity
identity
of
of Jan
Jan Bechko,
Bechko, thethe son
son ofof aa Slovak
Slovak father
father and
and aa Ukrainian
Ukrainian mother. Since 1948
mother. Since 1948
Grinchenko
Grinchenko and andhis
his wife,
wife, Simona
Simona Isaakovna
Isaakovna Krimker
Krimker (codenamed
(codenamed MIRA),
MIRA), had had been
been
based
based inin Buenos
Buenos Aires,
Ares, where
where in in 1951
1951 they
they had
had gained
gained Argentinian
Argentinian citizenship.
citizenship. In
In
1954
1954 thetheCentre
Centreplanned
planned to to transfer
transfer them
them to tothetheUnited
United States.
States. At the
the last
last moment,
moment,
however,
however, it it was discovered that
was discovered the FBI had
that the had obtained
obtained Grinchenko's
Grinchenko’s fingerprints
fingerprints
while
while he he was
was working
working as as an
an agent
agent on ona a Soviet
Soviet ship
ship visiting
visiting North
North America.
America.
Grinchenko
Grinchenko was was hurriedly
hurriedly redeployed
redeployed to to France,
France, where,
where, aa few
few months
months later,
later, his
his career
career
as
as an
an illegal
illegal was
was ended
ended byby what
what his
his file
file describes
describes as "a gross
as “a gross breach
breach ofof security."
security.” In
In
August
August 1955
1955 hishis Argentinian
Argentinian passport,
passport, French
French residence
residence permit,
permit, student
student card
card and
and
expense
expense account
account were
were all stolen
stolen from
from hishis hotel
hotel room
room inin Paris.
Paris. So
So was
was the
the photograph
photograph
of,
of, and
and aa letter
letterinin Russian
Russian from,
from, another
another KGB illegal codenamed BORIS.
illegal codenamed BORIS. BothBoth
Grinchenko
Grinchenko and and BORIS
BORIS werewere hurriedly
hurriedly recalled
recalled toto Moscow.48
Moscow.48
Though
Centredid
did not
not yet
yet realize
realize it,
it, its
its one established American
one established American residency
residency
was
wasbyby nownow also
also inin trouble.
trouble. Unlike
Unlike Makayev
Makayev (HARRY),
(HARRY), Brik Brik (HART)
(HART) and and
T h ee M
Main A
A dd vv ee rr ss aa rr y
y --
PPa ra tr t II // Ir 7 Ir
Grinchenko
Grinchenko (KLOD), (KLOD), "Willie"“Willie” Fisher
Fisher (MARK),
(MARK), the the illegal
illegal resident
resident in New York,
in New York,
was
was aa paragon
paragon of of both
bothself-discipline
self-discipline and and ideological
ideological dedication.49 His
d e d i ~ a t i o nHis. ~ ~chief
chief assistant,
assistant,
Reino
Reino Hayhanen,
Hayhanen, however,
however,was wastoto prove
prove even even less
lessreliable
reliablethan
than Brik.
Brik.
Hayhanen
Hayhanen had had taken
taken the the identity
identity of of aa "live
“live double,"
double,” EugeneEugene Nikolai
Nikolai Maki,Maki, who who
had
had been
been born
born in inthetheUnited
UnitedStates
States inin 1919
1919totoa Finnish-American
Finnish-American
a father
father and
and aa New New
York
York mother,
mother, and and atat the
the age
age ofof eight
eight had had emigrated
emigrated with with his his parents
parents to to the
the Finnish
Finnish-
speaking
speaking Soviet
Soviet Republic
Republic of of Karelia.
Karelia. In In 1938
1938 Maki Makihad had been
been arrested
arrested on on suspicion
suspicion of of
espionage
espionage but but had
had been
been released,
released, given
giventhe the codename
codename DAVID and and employed
employed by by the
the
Interior
Interior Ministry
Ministrytotoinform
inform on on thethefamilies
families of of other
other Karelian
Karelian victims
victims of of the
the Terror.
Terror. In In
1949
1949 MakiMakisurrendered
surrendered his his birth
birth certificate
certificate to to Hayhanen,
Hayhanen, who whospent spent most
most ofof the
the next
next
three
three years
years inin Finland
Finland taking
taking over
over Maki's
Maki’s identity
identity with with the thehelp
help of of aa Finnish
Finnish Com Com-
munist, Olavi A
munist, Olavi hman, who
&man, who had had been
been recruited
recruited as as aa Soviet
Soviet agent
agent in in 1939.50
1939.”
On
O n October
October 20, 20, 1952
1952 Hayhanen,
Hayhanen, now now codenamed
codenamed VIK, arrived arrived in in New
New YorkYork on on
board
board the Queen Mary, and
the Queen and spent
spent most
most of of the
the next
next twotwo years
years establishing
establishing his his new
new
identity,
identity, collecting
collecting his his salary
salaryfrom
from dead
dead letter-boxes
letter-boxes in in the
the Bronx
Bronx and and Manhattan
Manhattan and and
periodically
periodically drawing
drawing attention
attention to to himself
himself by by heavy
heavydrinking
drinking and and violent
violent quarrels
quarrels with
with
his
his Finnish
Finnish wifewife Hannah.51
Hannah.” The The Centre,
Centre, doubtless
doubtless unaware
unaware of of Hayhanen's
Hayhanen’sdisorderly
disorderly
behavior,
behavior, sentsent him
him congratulations
congratulations on on his
his "safe
“safe arrival"
arrival”inin aamicrofilm
microfilm messagemessagehidden
hidden
inside
inside aa hollowed-out
hollowed-out nickel. nickel. Like
Like Makayev
Makayev aa year year oror so
so earlier,
earlier, Hayhanen
Hayhanen mislaidmislaid the the
nickel,
nickel, which
which in in the
the summer
summer of of 1953
1953 was was used,
used, possibly
possibly by byHayhanen
Hayhanen himself,himself, to to buy
buy
aa newspaper
newspaper from from aa Brooklyn
Brooklyn newsboy.
newsboy.The The newsboy
newsboy accidentally
accidentallydropped
dropped the the nickel
nickel
in
in aa stairway
stairway andand was
was amazed
amazed to to see
see it
it break
break in in two
two and
and aa minute
minute microfilm
microfilm drop drop out.out.
He
H e handed
handed bothboth the thecoin
coin and
and the
the microfi
microfilm lm toto the
theNew
New YorkYork police,
police,whowho passed
passed them
them
on
on toto the
theFBI.
FBI. Though
Though ititwas was some
some years
years before
beforethe the number
number groups groups in in the
the microfilm
microfilm
message
message couldcouldbebedecrypted,
decrypted, the the fact
fact that
that they
they hadhad been
been typed
typed on on aa Cyrillic
Cyrillic typewriter
typewriter
helped
helped to to alert
alert the
the Bureau
Bureau to to the
thepresence
presence in in New
New York York of of aa Soviet
Soviet illegal.52
illegal.52 It
It is
is highly
highly
unlikely
unlikely that
that VIK informed
Centrethat thatthe thecoin
coin and
and microfi
microfilm lm were
weremissing.
missing.
In
In the
the summer
summer of of 1954
1954 Hayhanen
Hayhanen at at last
last began
began work
work as as Fisher's
Fisher’s assistant.
assistant. OneOne of of
his
his first
first tasks
tasks waswastoto deliver
deliver aa report
report from
from aa Soviet
Soviet agent
agent in in the
theUnited
UnitedNations
Nations secre
secre-
tariat
tariat in
in New
NewYork,
York, aa French
French economist
economist codenamed
codenamed ORIZO, ORIZO, to to aadead
dead letter-box
letter-box for for
collection
collection by by the
the New
New York York legal
legal residency.
residency.ORIZO's
ORIZO’sreport report probably
probably concerned
concerned two two
American
American nuclearnuclear physicists
physicistswhom whom he he hadhad been
been instructed
instructed to to cultivate.
c~ltivate.’~ 53 TheThe report,
report,
however,
however, nevernever arrived.
arri~ed.’~ 54 Doubtless
Doubtless alarmed
alarmed at at this
this breach
breach of of security,
security,0 RIZO asked
ORIZO asked
to stop working
to stop working for thefor the KGB, but was ultimately persuaded
but was ultimately persuaded to carry on.” to carry on.55
Though
Though disturbed
disturbed by by the
the weakness
weakness of of Hay hanen's tradecraft,
Hayhanen’s tradecraft, Fisher
Fisher failed
failed toto grasp
grasp
that
that hehe was
was an an alcoholic
alcoholic fraudster
fraudster who who posed
posed aa serious
serious threat
threat to to the
thefuture
futureof
of his
his res
res-
idency. During
idency. During aa visit
visit toto Bear
Bear Mountain
Mountain Park Park in in the
thespring
springof of 1955,
1955, Fisher
Fisher andand Hay
Hay-
hanen
hanen buried
buried 5,000
5,000 dollars
dollars which
which Hayhanen
Hayhanen was was later
later supposed
supposed to to deliver
deliver toto the
the wife
wife
of
of Morton
Morton Sobell,
Sobell,aa convicted
convicted SovietSoviet spyspy and
and member
member of of the
the Rosenberg
Rosenberg spy spy ring,
ring, who
who
had
had been
been sentenced
sentenced to to thirty
thirty years
years inin jail.
jail. Hayhanen
Hayhanen later later reported,
reported, "I “I located
located HelenHelen
Sobell
Sobell and
and gave
gave her
her the
the money
money and and told
told herher toto spend care full^.'^ In
spendititcarefully." In fact,
fact, he
he kept
kept the
the
5,000
5,000 dollars
dollars for
for himself
himselCS6 56
Early
Early in in 1956
1956the thepolice
police were werecalled
calledtoto the
thehomehomeof of the
the "Makis"
“Makis”home home atatPeekskill
Peekskill
in Hudson
in Hudson Valley,
Valley, where
where they they found
found bothboth Hayhanen
Hayhanen and and his his wife
wife drunk;
drunk; Hayhanen
Hayhanen
TT H
HSEE WS O
WR O
A
DNR T
D HA
D S
EHN IDE LTDH E S H I E L D // I1 77 22
had
had aa deep
deep knife
knife wound
wound in in his
his leg,
leg, which
which he he claimed
claimed was was the
the result
result ofof an
an accident.
accident.
Later
Later thatthatyear
year he
he was
was found
found guilty
guilty of of drunken
drunken driving
driving and
and had
had his
his license
license suspended.
suspended.
In
In January
January 1957 1957 Hayhanen
Hayhanenwas was duedue toto return
returntotoMoscow
Moscow on on leave.
leave. Initially,
Initially, hehe could
could
not
not bringhimself to go, fabricating a series of stories to justify his delay. H e first told
bring himself to go, fabricating a series of stories to justify his delay. He first told
Fisher
Fisher that
that hehe was
was being
being tailed
tailed byby three
three men,
men, then
then claimed
claimed that that the
the FBI
FBI hadhad taken
taken
him
him offoff the
the Queen Mary, on
QueenMary, on which
which he he hadhadbooked
booked aa passage.
passage.The The unsuspecting
unsuspecting Fisher Fisher
told
told Hayhanen
Hayhanen to to leave
leave thethe country
countryas as soon
soon as as possible
possible toto escape
escape FBIFBI surveillance
surveillanceand and
gave him 200 dollars for his travel expenses. On April 24 Hayhanen
gave him 200 dollars for his travel expenses. O n April 24 Hayhanen set sail aboard set sail aboard
La
La Liber
Liberti te for
for France.
France. Arriving
Arriving in in Paris
Paris onon MayMayDay,
Day, he
he made
made contact
contact with
with thetheKGB
KGB
residency
residency and and was
was given
givenanother
another 200 200dollars
dollars to to complete
complete his his journey
journey to to Moscow.
Moscow. Four Four
days
days later,
later, instead
instead ofof returning
returning to toRussia,
Russia, he he entered
entered the
the American
American embassyembassy in in Paris,
Paris,
announced
announced that that hehewas
was aa KGBKGB officer
officer and
and began
began to to tell
tell his
his story. 57
st01-y.’~
Though
Though the the KGB
KGB did did notnot discover
discover the the defection
defection until
until August,
August, it it warned
warned Fisher,
Fisher,
probably
probably in in late
late May
May or or early
early June,
June, that
that Hayhanen
Hayhanen had had failed
failed toto arrive
arrive inin Moscow,
Moscow,
and
and instructed
instructed himhim asas aa precaution
precaution to to leave
leave the
the United
UnitedStates,
States, using
using aa new
new set
set ofiden
of iden-
tity
tity documents. Fisher disobeyed his orders and stayed.’* H e was arrested early on
documents. Fisher disobeyed his orders and stayed.58 He was arrested early on
the
the morning
morning of of June
June 2121 while
while staying
staying in in aa New
NewYork
York hotel
hotel on on East
East28th28thStreet
Streetand and
flown
flown to to the
the Alien
Alien Detention
Detention Facility
Facility in in McAllen,
McAllen, Texas,
Texas, for
for questioning.59
questioning.’‘ After After aa
few
few days
days spent
spent stonewalling
stonewalling his his questioners
questioners Fisher
Fisher finally
finally admitted
admitted that that hehe was
was aa
Russian
Russian who had been living under false identities in the UnitedStates, and gave as
who had been living under false identities in the United States, and gave as
his
his real
real name
name that
that ofof aa deceased
deceased friendfriend andand KGB
KGB colleague,
colleague, Rudolf
Rudolf Ivanovich
Ivanovich Abel.Abel.
The
The Centre,
Centre, Fisher
Fisher knew,
knew, wouldwould realize
realize what
what hadhad happened
happened as as soon
soon as as it
it saw
saw the
the
60
name
name Abel
Abel on onthethefront
frontpages
pages of of the
the American
American newspapers.
newspapers.60
FI S H E R' s A
FISHER’S ARRR
REE SST
T M
MAAR
RK D aa major
KEED major strategic
strategic defeat
defeat for
for KGB KGB operations
operations against
against the
the
Main
Main Adversary.
Adversary.The The Centre's
Centre’s early
early Cold
Cold WarWarstrategy
strategy in
in thetheUnited
United States
States had
had been
been
based
based on on the
the creation
creation of of an
an illegal
illegal network
network which
which would
would run run major
major agents
agents such
such asas
Hall and
and Philby,
Philby, and
and evenhlally
eventually penetrate
penetrate thethe administration
administration to to approximately
approximately the the
level
level achieved
achieved during
during the Great Patriotic
the Great Patriotic War.
War. Fisher's
Fisher’s failure,
failure, however,
however, appears
appears toto
have
have left
left the
the KGB
KGB without
without aa single
single illegal
illegal residency
residency in in the
the United
UnitedStates.
States. Instead
Instead of
of
adopting
adopting aa more
more realistic
realistic strategy
strategy with
with far
far more
more limited
limited aims,
aims, the
the Centre
Centre persisted
persisted
with
with its
its plan
plan to
to revive
revive the
the era
era of
of the
the Great
Great I1legals
Illegals and
and blamed
blamed its its initial
initial failure
failure on
on aa
series
series of
of operational
operational errors.
errors.
The
The Centre's
Centre’s investigations
investigations of of the
the cases
cases of
of Makayev
Makayev (HARRY),
(HARRY), Brik Brik (HART)
(HART)
and
and Hayhanen
Hayhanen (VIK)
(WK) all all revealed
revealedflawsflawsin
in the
theselection
selection of
of thethefirst
first generation
generation of of Cold
Cold
War
War illegals. Hayhanen'sfile
illegals.Hayhanen’s file in the KGB
in the KGB archives
archives contains
contains manymany warning
warning signs
signs
which
which should
should have
have been
been evident
evident well
well before
before hehe was
was despatched
despatched to to the
the United
United States
States
in
in 1952.
1952.In In both
both thethe Soviet
Soviet Union
Union andand Finland
Finland he hehadhada arecord
record for
for getting
getting into
intodebt
debt
and
and borrowing
borrowing money,
money, as as well
well asas for
for unusually
unusually complicated
complicated sexualsexual liaisons.
liaisons. Though
Though
already
already married
married in in the
the Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, Hayhanen
Hayhanen entered
entered into
into aabigamous
bigamous marriage
marriage inin
Finland-without
Finland-without informinginforming the the Centre
Centre beforehand-with
beforehand-with Hannah Hannah Kurikka,
Kurikka, with
with
whom
whom he he later
later lived
lived inin the
theUnited
UnitedStates.
States. The
The report
report onon Hayhanen
Hayhanen prepared
prepared for
for the
the
leadership
the KIK1 in 1949, however,
in 1949, glossed over
however, glossed over his
his character
character weaknesses
weaknesses andand
T
T h eM M
a ianAi nd vAe dr v
s ae r sy a- rPya-
r tP a r t II / I 73
173
insisted that his operational failings

failings would be rectified during training. Mitrokhin
noted after reading Hayhanen's
Hayhanen’s fi le in the
file the KGB archives:
archives:
It
It was
was obvious
obviousthat
that the
theKGB wanted
wanted to
to keep
keep VIK
WK in in intelligence
intelligence work
work no
nomat
mat-
ter
ter what,
what, regardless
regardless of
of signs
signs that
that he
he was
was in
in trouble,
trouble, because
because they did not
they did not want
want
to
to expose
expose any
anyof
of their
their operations,
operations, because
because the
the training
training of
of aa replacement would
replacement would
be
be difficult
difficult and
and time-consuming,
time-consuming, andand because they regretted
because they regretted wasting
wasting so
so much
much
time
time and
and money
money onon VIK.61
VIK.61
Hayhanen's
Hayhanen’s Russian
Russian wife wife waswas informed
informed of of his defection, divorced
his defection, divorced him him andand went
went
back
back toto her
her maiden
maiden name, name, Moiseyeva.
Moiseyeva. In In 1957
1957 thethe chairman
chairman of of the
the KGBKGB received
received aa
letter
letter from
from aa woman
woman named named M. M. Gridina Gridina asking
asking for for news
news of of Hayhanen,
Hayhanen, who, who, sheshe
said, was
said, was the
the father
father of of her 12-year-old son.
her 12-year-old son. The
The KGB was less frank
was less frank with
with Gridina
Gridina
than
than with
withMoiseyeva.
Moiseyeva. She She was
was told
told that
that the
theKGB had had never
never employed
employed Hayhanen
Hayhanen and and
did
did not
not know
know his his whereabouts,
whereabouts, but but had
had heard rumors that
heard rumors he had
that he had committed
committed aa seriseri
ous
ous crime
crime against
Soviet state
state and
and was wanted by
was wanted by the police. Gridina
the police. Gridina replied that
replied that
she
she would
would telltell her son that
her son that his his father
father had been killed
had been killed fighting
fighting thethe Germans
Germans duringduring
the
the Great
Great Patriotic
Patriotic War.62
War.62In In fact,
fact, Hayhanen
Hayhanen died died in in the
the United States in
United States in 1961.
1961. At At
the time it
the time it was
was alleged
alleged that
that he he had
hadbeen killed in
been killed in aa car
car accident
accident on on the Pennsylvania
the Pennsylvania
turnpike;
turnpike; in in reality
reality hehe seems
seems to to have died from
have died cirrhosis of
from cirrhosis of the
the liver.63
liver.63
On
O n November
November 15, 15, 1957
1957 the the 55-year-old
55-year-old "Rudolf
“Rudolf Abel” Abel" waswas sentenced
sentenced to to thirty
thirty
years
years in
in jail. His American
jail. His American lawyer, James Donovan,
lawyer, James Donovan, was struck by
was struck by ''Abel's''
“Abel’s”"uncanny
“uncanny
calm"
calm” asas he
he listened
listened to to what
what was,was, inin effect,
effect, aa life
life sentence:
sentence: "This cool professional's
“This cool professional’s
self-control
self-control was was just too much
just too much for for me."64
me.”64''Abel's''
“Abel’s”wife, Ilya, who
wife,Ilya, who had had last
last seen
seen herher
husband
husband whenwhen he he returned
returned on on leave
leave toto Moscow
Moscow in in thethe summer
summer of of 1955, made less
1955, made less
attempt
attempt to todisguise
disguise herher feelings.
feelings. SheShe wrote bitterly to
wrote bitterly the Centre
to the Centre that thatit
it was not sim-
was not sim
ply
ply aa question
question of of waiting
waiting for for twenty-five
twenty-five or thirty years
or thirty years butbut "I do not
“I do notknow
know if if my
my hus-
hus
band
band will
will ever
everreturn."
return.” ForFor the
the past
past seven
seven years
yearsshe
she hadhad worked
worked as as aa harpist
harpist in in aacircus
circus
orchestra; however,
orchestra; however, when when she she criticized
criticized the
the KGB after her husband
after her husband was jailed, she
was jailed, she
was
was made redundant on
made redundant on the
the pretext
pretext that the orchestra
that the orchestra no no longer
longer needed
needed aa harpist.
harpist.
The
The Centre
Centre rejected
rejected IlyaIlya "Abel's"
“Abel’s’’pleas
pleas for
for help
help in finding another
in finding another job,job, but
but granted
granted
her
her aa pension
pension of 51 roubles
of 51 roubles aa month.65
month.65
At Atlanta
Atlanta Penitentiary,
Penitentiary, in in Georgia,
Georgia, where
where "Rudolf
“Rudolf Abel" Abel” hadhad been
been sent
sent toto serve
serve
his
his sentence,
sentence, he became friends
he became friends withwith two
two other convicted Soviet
other convicted Soviet spies.
spies. H Hee played
played
chess with
chess Morton Sobell,
with Morton Sobell, whose
whose wife
wife had
had failed
failed toto receive
receive the
the 5,000 dollars embez-
5,000 dollars embez
zled by Hayhanen.66 "Abel"
zled by Hayhanen.66“Abel” also received also received a number of small favors from
a numberof small favors from Kurt Ponger, Kurt Ponger,
an
an Austrian-born
Austrian-born AmericanAmerican in in the
the penitentiary's dental section
penitentiary’s dental section whowho had been sen
had been sen-
tenced
tenced inin 1953
1953toto a term
a of
term of five
five to
to fifteen
fifteen years' imprisonment for
years’ imprisonment conspiracy to
forconspiracy to com
com-
mit
mit espionage
espionage whilewhile serving
serving in the US army
in the army in in Austria.
Austria. Ponger's
Ponger’s file file in
in the
the KGB
archives
archives reveals
reveals that
that he he had
had been
been aa Soviet
Soviet agent
agent since 1936, but
since 1936, but that
that after his arrest
after his arrest
the
the Centre
Centre had hadwrongly concluded that
wrongly concluded that hehewas
was aa double
double agent whose arrest
agent whose arrest had
had been
been
deliberately
deliberately staged
staged by by the
the Americans
Americans in in order
order to discredit the
to discredit Soviet Union
the Soviet Union in Aus
in Aus-
trian
trian public
public opinion.
opinion. "Abel"
“Abel”had had no nodoubt
doubtthat Ponger
that
Ponger was was aa genuine
genuine Soviet
Soviet agent
agent andand
T
THH EE S
SW OR
WO R D
D A
ANND
D T
T HH EE S
SHH II E
E LL D
D /
/ I1 7 43
later
later tried
tried to persuade the
to persuade the KGB to to give
give Ponger
Ponger financial
financial assistance
assistance after
after he he was
was freed
freed
in
in September
September 1962.67 1962.67
"Abel"
“Abel” served
served only just over
only just over four
four years
years of of hishis sentence.
sentence, On O n February
February 10, 10, 1962
1962 he he
was
was exchanged
exchanged on on the
the Glienicker
Glienicker Bridge,
Bridge, which
which linkedlinked West
West Berlin
Berlin with
with Potsdam,
Potsdam,
for
for the
the shot-down
shot-down American
American U-2 U-2 pilot
pilot Gary
Gary Powers.68
Powers.6*The The exchange
exchange was was treated
treated by by
the
the KGB as as aa major
major operation,
operation, codenamed
codenamed LYUTENTSIA,LYUTENTSIA, coordinated coordinated by by
Vladimir
Vladimir Trofimovich
Trofimovich Burdin, Burdin, thethe former
former resident
resident in in Ottawa.
Ottawa. An An undercover
undercover KGB
group was
group was stationed
stationed in in West
West Berlin
Berlin to watch for
to watch for signs
signs ofof American
American military
military activity
activity
in the area of the
in the area of the bridge. bridge. On the
the bridge itself, hidden in theoffices of the East Ger
bridge itself, hidden in the offices of the East Ger-
man
man Customs
Customs Service,
Service, was wasaa KGB armed armed operational
operational group.group. Close
Close at at hand,
hand, but butalso
also
out
out ofof view
view fromfrom thethe Western
Westernside side ofof the
the bridge,
bridge, was was another
another armed
armed group
group which
which had had
accompanied
accompanied Powers Powers fromfrom Potsdam
Potsdam for for the
the exchange.
exchange. At the the Soviet
Soviet checkpoint,
checkpoint, aa
specially
specially trained
trained officer
officer from
from the
the 105th
105thRegiment
Regiment was was put
put in command of
incommand of aa detail
detail ofof
sub machine gunners.
submachine gunners. The The East Germans provided
East Germans provided aa reserve
reserve unit
unit of of twenty
twenty men men
armed
armed withwith sub machine guns
submachine guns and
and grenades.69
grenades.69
The
The Centre
Centre congratulated
congratulated itselfitself onon the
the fact
fact that
that its
its absurdly
absurdly large,
large, concealed
concealed mil mil-
itary
itary presence
presence had had gone
gone almost
almost unobserved.70
unob~erved.~’ '�bel's"
“Abel’s”lawyer
lawyerwas wasmore
more impressed
impressed by by
the
the fact
fact that
that thethe American
American guard guard who who accompanied
accompanied his his client
client onon toto the
the bridge
bridge was was
"one of
“one of the
the largest men I have
largest men have ever
ever seen.
seen. H Hee must
must have
have been
been sixsix feet seven inches
feet seven inches talltall
and weighed perhaps
and weighed perhaps three hundred pounds."n
three hundred pounds.”71After After thethe exchange
exchange of '�bel" for
of “Abel” for
Powers,
Powers, the Glienicker Bridge
the Glienicker became famous
Bridge became famous duringduring the theCold
ColdWar War as
as the
the "Bridge
“Bridge of of
Spies."
Spies.” The The KGB file file on
on operation
operation LYUTENTSIA
LYUTENTSIA records records thatthat itsits total non
total non-
military
military costcost (food,
(food, train
train tickets,
tickets, hotel
hotel bills,
bills, various
various items
items for for '�bel"
“Abel” and and hishis wife
wife andand
daughter,
daughter, and anda a celebration
celebration dinner)
dinner) came came to to 5,388
5,388 marks
marks 90 90 pfennigs.
pfennigs. WalterWalter
Ulbricht, the
Ulbricht, the East
East German
German leader,
leader, diddid notnot share
share thethe Centre's
Centre’s satisfaction
satisfaction at at the
the suc
suc-
cess
cess ofof the
the operation.
operation. He H e complained
complained to to the
the Soviet
Soviet ambassador,
ambassador, Pervukhin,
Pervukhin, on on Feb
Feb-
ruary
ruary 15 15that
that hishis government
government had had notnot been
been adequately
adequately informed
informed and and that
that thethe failure
failure
to
to include
include East East German
German police among Powers's
police among Powers’s escort showed lack
escort showed lack ofof respect
respect for for the
the
sovereignty of
sovereignty of the German
theGerman Democratic Republic.
Democratic Ulbricht followed
Republic. Ulbricht followed his his verbal
verbal
protest
protest with
with aa diplomatic
diplomatic note note citing
citing other Soviet slights.72
other Soviet slights.72
In the United States, '�bel's" “Abel’s’’paintings and prints prints became collectors'
collectors’ items. The
Attorney-General,
Attorney-General, Robert Robert Kennedy,
Kennedy, asked asked the the Soviet
Soviet embassy
embassy to to find
find outout whether
whether
'�bel"
“Abel”would
would be be willing
willing to to give
give the
the USUS government
government aa portrait portrait of of his
his brother,
brother, Presi
Presi-
dent
dent Kennedy,
Kennedy, which which he he hadhadpainted
painted in in Atlanta
AtlantaPenitentiary,
Penitentiary, and and allow
allow it it to
tobebe hung
hung
in
in the
the White
White House.
House. The The Centre suspected aa plot.
Centre suspected plot. The proposal to
The proposal to display
display "Abel's"
“Abel’s”
portrait
portrait in inthetheWhite House was,
White House was, it it believed,
believed, aa provocation,
provocation, though
though ititwas was notnot certain
certain
what
what exactly
exactly it it was intended to
was intended to provoke.
provoke. Robert Robert Kennedy's request was
Kennedy’s request was turned
turned
down.
down.73 73
'�bel"
“Abel” received
received an an unpublicized
unpublicized hero's welcome on
hero’s welcome on hishis return
return to to Moscow,
Moscow, being being
received
received in in turn
turn by
by Vladimir
Vladimir Yefimovich
Yefimovich Semichastny,
Semichastny, chairmanchairman of of the
the KGB, Alek Alek-
sandr
sandr Mikhailovich
Mikhailovich Sakharovsky,
Sakharovsky,head head of of the
the KGBKGB First
First Chief
Chief(Foreign
Intelligence)
Directorate,
Directorate, and GeneralPyotr
and General Pyotr Ivashutin,
Ivashutin, head head of of the
the GRU.74
GRU.74At At Semichastny's
Semichastny’s
prompting,
prompting, “Abel” '�bel" wrote
wrote to to Khrushchev
Khrushchev to thank him
to thank him personally
personally for for the
the supposed
supposed
part
part he hehad hadtaken
taken in in securing
securing his release: "“.. .. .. I am
his release: am especially
especially touched
touched by by the
the fact
fact that,
that,
T
The M
Main A
A dd vveerrss aa rryy --
P aPrat r t rI /
1 I 75
175
amidst
amidst the the great
great variety
variety ofof your
your Party
Party and andgovernmental
governmental concerns, you found
concerns, you found thethe time
time
to
to think
think about
about meme as well."
as well.”
Though
Though ititsuited
suited thethe Centre,
Centre, for for the
the sake
sake of its own
of its own reputation
reputation inin the
the Party hier
Partyhier-
archy,
archy, toto portray
portray '�bel's"
“Abel’s”mission
mission to to the
theUnited States as
UnitedStates an operational
as an operational triumph
triumph by by aa
dedicated Chekist,
dedicated Chekist, brought
broughttotoa premature
premature
a conclusion only
conclusion only by
by an
an act
act of treachery for
of treachery for
which
which he he bore
bore no
no responsibility,
responsibility, it it was well aware
was well aware that
that inin reality he had
reality he had achieved
achieved
nothing
nothing of of real
real significance.
significance. He H e had been arrested
had been arrested in in 1957
1957 only because he
only because he had dis
had dis-
obeyed
obeyed instructions
instructions to to leave
leave the country after
the country after Hayhanen
Hayhanen had failed to
had failed returntoto
to return
Moscow.75
Moscow.75
The
The Centre
Centre tooktookadvantage
advantage of of the
the fact that "Abel"
fact that “Abel”was wasportrayed
portrayed in in the American
theAmerican
media
media as as aa master
master spyspy of
of heroic
heroic stature.
stature. That
That impression
impression was was strengthened
strengthened by by the
the
sympathetic
sympathetic portrayal
portrayal of of him
himininStrangers on on a B1-idge,
Bridge)an an account
account by
by his
his lawyer
lawyer of of his
his
trial,
trial, imprisonment
imprisonment and and exchange
exchange for for Powers published in
Powers published in 1964. Donovan made
1964. Donovan made clear
clear
that
that he he"admired
“admired Rudolf
Rudolf as as an
an individual,"
individual,” and and quoted Allen Dulles,
quoted Allen Dulles, Director
Director of ofCen
Cen-
tral
tral Intelligence
Intelligence from from 1953
1953 to to 1961,
1961, as as telling him, “I
telling him, "I wish
wish wewe had
had three
three oror four
four just
just
like
like him
him in inMoscow
Moscow right now .. .. ..”
right now " He
H e ended
ended his his book
book by printing aaletter
by printing '�bel" had
letter“Abel” had
sent
sent him
him fromfrom Moscow,
Moscow, enclosing
enclosing two two rare,
rare, sixteenth-century,
sixteenth-century, vellum-bound
vellum-bound Latin Latin
editions
editions of of Commentaries
Commentaries on on theJustinian
theJustinian Code. "Please accept
Code. “Please accept them,”
them," “Abel”
'�bel" wrote,
wrote, “as
"as
aa mark
mark of of mymy gratitude
gratitude for all that
for all that you
you have done for
have done for me."76
me.”76
All this
this was
was music
musicto to the
theCentre's
Centre’s ears.77
ears.77 The myth
The myth ofof the
the master
master spy Rudolf Abel
spy Rudolf Abel
replaced
replaced the pedestrian reality
the pedestrian reality ofof Fisher's
Fisher’s illegal
illegalresidency. The inconvenient
residency.The inconvenient lack lack ofof
heroic
heroic exploits
exploits toto celebrate
celebrate waswas glossed
glossedover overby
by the assurance that,
the assurance that, though
though there were
therewere
many
many of of them,
them, they
they remained
remained too secret to
too secret celebrate in
to celebrate in public.78 The
The real
real "Willie"
“Willie”
Fisher,
Fisher, however,
however, became
became increasingly
increasingly disillusioned.
disillusioned. Mter his return
After his return to to Moscow,
Moscow, he he
was
was given
given aa chair
chair inin aa corner
corner of of the
the FCD Illegals
Directorate butbut was denied even
was denied even aa
desk of
desk of his
his own.
own. When
When aa friend
friend asked
asked himhim whatwhathehedid,
did, he replied disconsolately,
he replied disconsolately, "I'm “I’m
aa museum
museum exhibit."79
exhibit.”79
E L E V E n
T
T H EE M
MAA II N
N AD
DVV EE R
R SAR
RY
Pa
P a rr tt 2
2:: Wa
W a lk
Z k--ii nn ss aa nnddLLe gega
a l lR R
e sei sdiede
n cniceisesi n itnh et E
h ea rEl ya rCly
o l dCW
o ld
a r Wa r
T
T hhee KGB's
KGB’s chief
chief successes
successes against
against the Main Adversary
the Main Adversary duringduring the the presidencies
presidencies of of
Dwight
Dwight D. Eisenhower (1953-61) and John F. Kennedy
Eisenhower (1953-61) and John Kennedy (1961-3) derived not from (1961-3) derived not from
its
its grand
grand strategy
strategy forfor new
new illegal
illegal residencies,
residencies, which
which collapsed
collapsed for for several
several years
years after
after
FISHER's
FISHERS arrest, arrest, but
but from
from aa series
series ofof walk-ins.
walk-ins. The most important
The most important was was probably
probably aa
CIA "principal
“principal agent"
agent” in inWest Berlin and
WestBerlin and Germany,
Germany, Alexsandr
Alexsandr ("Sasha")
(“Sasha”) Grigorye
Grigorye-
vich Kopatzky,alias
vich Kopatzky, alias "Koischwitz"
“Kois~hwitz’~ (successively
(successively codenamed
codenamed ERWIN, HERBERT HERBERT
and
and RICHARD),
RICHARD),who who had had offered himself for
offered himself for recruitment
recruitment by by Soviet
Soviet intelligence
intelligence inin
1949.1
1949.’ Trained
Trained byby thethe KGB in in secret
secret writing
writing andand microphotography,
microphotography, he he was
was paid
paid aa
total
total ofof 40,000 WestWest German
German and and 2,117 East German
2,117 East German marksmarks duringduring thethe 1950s,
1950s, asas
well
well asas being
being rewarded
rewarded for for his
his success
success with
with several
several goldgold watches.2
watches.2
Kopatzky
Kopatzky was was employed
employed at at one
oneof
of the
the focal
focal points
points ofof American
intelligence oper
oper-
ations.
ations. TheThe CIA's
CIA’SWestWest Berlin
Berlin station
station was
was situated
situated onlyonly aa few
few miles
miles fromfrom the
the greatest
greatest
concentration
concentration of of Soviet
Soviet forces
forces anywhere
anywhere in in the
theworld.
world. One
One of of Kopatzky's
Kopatzky’s chiefchief tasks
tasks
was
was toto find East German
find East German womenwomen willing
willing toto have
have sexsex with
with Soviet
Soviet soldiers
soldiers and
and act
act as
as
CIA agents.
agents. ByBy taking
taking an an active
active part in the
part in the station's attempt to
station’s attempt to recruit Soviet per
recruit Soviet per-
sonnel
sonnel and and encourage
encourage defections,
defections, he he was
was able
abletoto find
find numerous
numerous opportunities
opportunities to to sab
sab-
otage
otage its its operations.
operations. Among
Among the the wealth
wealth of of intelligence
intelligence whichwhich Kopatzky
Kopatzky provided
provided
were the identities of more than aahundred hundredAmerican intelligence officers officers and agents
in
in East
East Germany;
Germany; some some were
were arrested
arrested while
while others
others were turned into
were turned into double
double agents.
agents.
He
H e also
also assisted
assisted aa number
number of of KGB operations
operations to to "dangle"
“dangle”bogus
bogus agents
agents intended
intended to to
deceive
deceive the the CIA station. In
CIA station. In 1952
1952 he hehelped
helped to to organize
organize the the bogus
bogus defection
defection of of Soviet
Soviet
agent
agent VIKTOR,
VIKTOR, who who waswas later
later employed
employed by by the
the Voice
Voice of America radio
of America radio station
station and
and
supplied
supplied whatwhat Kopatzky's
Kopatzky‘s file file terms
terms "valuable
“valuable information."3
inf~rmation.”~
Mter
After Kopatzky
Kopatzky was was briefly
briefly imprisoned
imprisoned for for drunken
drunken driving
driving in in 1954,
1954, his
his name
name waswas
changed
changed by by the
the CIA to to "Igor
“IgorOrlov,"
Orlov,” so so that
that his
his criminal
criminal record
record would
would not not appear
appear onon
his
his application
application for for US citizenship.4
citi~enship.~ In 1957,
1957,
In withwith his his cover
cover as as aa CIA (but(but not
not Soviet)
Soviet)
agent
agent largely
largely blown
blown in Berlin, Orlov
in Berlin, Orlov waswas taken
taken to to Washington
Washington with with his
his family
family andand
given further operational training by the Agency. He then returned to Europe to take
given further operational training by the Agency. H e then returned to Europe totake
various CIA operations in Germany
part in various Germany and Austria.5Austria.’ In 1960 the CIA at last
began
began to to suspect
suspect that
that "Orlov"
“Orlov”was was working
working for for the
the KGB. A later later damage
damage assessment
assessment
at the
the Centre
Centre concluded that the the extraordinary number of KGB officers officers who had had
been in direct contact with him-over him-over twenty during the last decade-might decade-might have have
T
T h eeM M
a i anAi nd vAe d
r sv ae r sy a- P
r ya-
r tP a r t 2
2 // I‘77
77
helped
helped to to place
place himhim under
under suspicion.6
suspicion.6In In order
order to to prevent
prevent OrlovOrlov defecting
defecting before
before the the
case
case against
against himhim hadhad beenbeen established,
established, the the CIA
C.IA promised
promised him him aa new
new jobjob with
with the the
Agency
Agency in in Washington,
Washington, sacked sacked him him on on his
his arrival
arrival in in January
January 1961 1961 and and began
began an an
intensive
intensive investigation.7
in~estigation.~ Orlov
Orlov made made contact
contact with
with hishis new
new Soviet
Soviet controller,
controller, I. P. Sev
1. P. Sev-
astyanov,
astyanov, an an operations
operations officer
officer at theWashington
at the Washington residency,residency, got got aajob
job as as aa truck
truck
driver
driver and
and heard
heard nothing
nothing for for several
several yearsyears from
from either
either the the CIA or or the FBI. In
the FBI. In 1964
1964
he boughtaa picture-framing
he bought picture-framing gallery gallery in in Alexandria,
Alexandria, Virginia,
Virginia, paid paid forfor inin part,
part, no no
doubt,
doubt, byby his
his earnings
earnings from from the the KGB.s
KGB.’
By the
By the time
timeheheopened
opened his his gallery,
gallery, Orlov
Orlov may may well
wellhave have felt confident that
felt confident that the case
thecase
against
against him
him could
could never
never be be proved.
proved. His confidence evaporated
His confidence evaporated in in the
the spring
spring of of 1965
1965
when
when thethe FBI arrived
arrived on on his
his doorstep,
doorstep, spentspent several
several days days searching
searching his his home,
home, quesques-
tioned
tioned hishis wife
wife Eleonore
Eleonore and and summoned
summoned him him to to take
take aa polygraph
polygraph test.test. Orlov
Orlov seemsseems
to
to have
have panicked.
panicked. Under Under surveillance
surveillance and and unable
unable to to make
make covert
covert contact
contact with with thethe
KGB, he went into
he went into the
the Soviet
Soviet embassy
embassy on 16th Street
on 16th Street through
through aa rear rear door,
door, vainly
vainly
hoping
hoping totoenterenterunobserved.9
unobserved.’ The The Washington
Washington residencyresidency arranged
arranged withwith him himan an exfll
exfil-
tration plan
tration plan which
which was was agreed
agreedto to by
by Moscow.
Moscow. Encouraged
Encouraged by by ('Abel's"
“Abel’s”star
star rating
rating as as aa
master
master spy spy and
and his his American
American lawyer'slawyer’s affectionate
affectionate memoir memoir of him, the
of him, Centre
the Centre
intended
intended to to turn
turnthe theexfiltration
exfiltration into into aapublicity
publicity stunt.
stunt. It planned aa press
I t planned press conference
conference
in
in Moscow
Moscow at at which
which Orlov
Orlov would
would be be presented
presented as as aa Soviet
Soviet illegal
illegal who
who had hadperformed
performed
heroic
heroic deeds
deeds behind
behind the the German
Germanlines lines onon thetheeastern
eastern frontfront during
duringthe Second World
the Second World
War
War andand later
later penetrated
penetrated the CIA. Orlov
the CIA. Orlov wouldwould thenthen publish
publish his his life
life story,
story, which
which
would
would be be used
used as as an
an ((active
“active measure"
measure” to to glamorize
glamorize the the KGB and denigrate its
and denigrate its Main
Main
10
Adversary.
Adversary.”
The plan,
The plan, however,
however, had had to to be calledoff.
becalled off Orlov's
Orlov’s wifewife flatly flatly refused
refused to to go
go to to
Moscow
Moscow with with their
their two
two young
young sons, sons, so so he
he decided
decided to to tough
tough it it out
out ininWashington.
Washington.” ll
Though
Though the the FBI kept kept thethe (tOrlov"
“Orlov” file file open,
open, theythey were
were nevernever able
able toto prove
prove aa case case
against
against him.
him. Their
Their investigation,
investigation, like like that
that of of the
the CIA, however, however, was was based
based on on one
one
false
false assumption.
assumption. Mter After hishis defection
defection in in December
December 1961, 1961, KGB Major Major Anatoli
AnatoliGolit Golit-
syn
syn had
had provided
provided some some clues
clues which
which helped
helped to to confirm
confirm suspicions
suspicions about
about Orlov.
Orlov. Golit
Golit-
syn
syn correctly
correctly said
said that
that aa Soviet
Soviet spy spy whose
whose real real surname
surname began began withwith aa K had had been
been
active
active in
in Berlin
Berlin and and West
West Germany,
Germany, but but wrongly
wrongly said said that
that his
his codename,
codename, ratherrather thanthan
his
his real
real name,
name, was was SASHA.
SASHA. The The CIA and and FBI both both wrongly
wrongly concluded
concluded that that Alek
Alek-
sandr
sandr C(Sasha")
(“Sashd’) Kopatzky,
Kopatzky, alias alias((Igor
“Igor Orlov,"
Orlov,”was was agent
agent SASHAY
SASHA.12Orlov's Orlov’s KGB file file
shows
shows that
that hehe was
was at at various
various stages
stages of of his
his career
career successively
successively ERWIN, HERBERT HERBERT
and
and RICHARD,
RICHARD, but never SASHA,
but never SASHA, and and thatthatheheremained
remained aa Soviet Soviet agent
agent until
until aafewfew
years
years before
before hishis death
death in in 1982.
1982.After Aftera press
press
a article
article inin 1978 claimed that
1978claimed that Orlov
Orlovwas was aa
Soviet
Soviet spy,
spy, the
the KGBKGB brokebroke offoff contact
contact with with RICHARD.
RICHARD.13 13 In
In 1992,
1992, tenten years
years after
after
Orlov's
Orlov’s death,
death, the theGallery
Gallery Orlov,
Orlov, run run byby his
his widow,
widow, was wasstill described by
still described by aa Washing
Washing-
ton
ton guide
guide as as ((a
“a hangout
hangout for forespionage
espionage writers."14
writers.”I4
West
West Berlin and West Germany, where Kopatzky
Berlin and West Germany, where Kopatzky (aka (aka Orlov)
Orlov) hadhad first
first offered
offered his his
services
services toto the
the KGB in in 1949,
1949,were were the the KGB's
KGB’s mostmost successful
successfulrecruiting
recruiting grounds
grounds for for
disgruntled
disgruntled US military personnel. The
military personnel. The most
most important
important was was probably
probably Robert
Robert Lee Lee
Johnson,
Johnson, codenamed
codenamed GEORGE, GEORGE, aa disaffecteddisaffected army army sergeant
sergeant and and part-time
part-time pimp pimp in in
West
West Berlin.is
Berlin.15In In 1953
1953 Johnson
Johnson and and hishis prostitute
prostitute fiancee,
fiancke, Hedy,
Hedy, crossed
crossed into East
into East
TT H
HEE SSW
WO R D
OR D A
ANND
D TT H
HSEEH SI EHLI DE L D I/ I177 88
Berlin
Berlin andand asked
asked for
for political
political asylum.
asylum.The The KGB,
KGB, however,
however, persuaded
persuaded Johnson
Johnson toto stay
stay
in
in the
the West,
West,earn
earn aa second
second salary
salaryby by spying
spying forfor the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union and
and pay
pay off
off his
his old
old
scores
scores against
against the
the US
US army.
army. Despite
Despite hishis involvement
involvementin in prostitution,
prostitution, alcohol
alcohol abuse
abuse and
and
gambling
gambling (not(not toto mention
mention espionage),
espionage),Johnson
Johnson succeeded
succeeded in in gaining
gaining employment
employment as as aa
guard
guard from
from 1957
1957 toto1959
1959atatmissile
missile sites
sitesinin California
California andand Texas,
Texas,where
where he
he purloined
purloined
documents,
documents, photographs
photographs and, and, on
on one
one occasion,
occasion, aa sample
sample ofof rocket
rocket fuel
he1 for
for the
the KGB.16
KGB.16
Johnson's
Johnson’s most
most productive
productive period
period as as aa Soviet
Soviet agent
agent began
began in
in 1961
1961 when
when he he was
was
stationed as a guard in the US Armed Forces Courier Centre
stationed as a guard in the US Armed Forces Courier Centre at Orly Airport, near at Orly Airport, near
Paris,
Paris, one
one ofof the
the main
main nerve
nerve centers
centers in in the
the classified
classified military
military communications
communications sys sys-
tem.
tem. Over
Over thethenext
next two
two years
years hehe handed
handedover over 11,600
,600 pages
pages of
of top
top secret
secret documents
documents to to
his
his controller.
controller.Among
Among them themwere
were ciphers
ciphers andand daily
daily key-tables
key-tables for
for the
the Adonis,
Adonis,KW-9
KW-9
and
and HW-
HW-18 1 8 cipher
cipher machines;
machines; the the operational
operational plans
plans ofof the
the US
US armed
armed forces
forces com
com-
mand
mand in in Europe;
Europe; documents
documents on on the
the production
production of of American
American nuclear
nuclear weapons;
weapons; lists
lists
and
and locations
locations of of targets
targets in in the
the Soviet
Soviet Bloc;
Bloc; USUS intelligence
reports on
on Soviet
Soviet scien
scien-
tific
tific research,
research, aviation
aviation and
and missile
missile development;
development; and and SIGINT
SIGINT evidence
evidence onon the
the state
state
of
of readiness of the East German AirForce. Collectively the documents provided an
readiness of the East German Air Force. Collectively the documents provided an
extraordinary
extraordinary and and highly
highly classified
classified insight
insight both
both into
intoAmerican
American forces
forces in
in Europe
Europe and
and
into what they
into what they knew
knew about
about the
the forces
forces of of the
the Warsaw
Warsaw Pact.17
Pact.17 Johnson
Johnson waswas finally
finally
arrested
arrested inin 1964
1964after
after aa tip-off
tip-off from
from thethe KGB
KGB defector
defector Yuri
Yuri Nosenko.18
Nosenko.18
IIN
NTTH
HEEU
UNNIIT
TEED STATES itself
D STATES itself the
the most
most remarkable
remarkable KGB
KGB walk-ins
walk-ins during
during the
theEisen
Eisen-
hower
hower presidency
presidency were
were two
two employees
employees of
of the
the National
National Security
Security [SIGINT]
[SIGINT]Agency,
Agency,
331-year-old
1-year-old Bernon F. Mitchell
Bernon F. Mitchell and
and29-year-old
29-year-old William
William H.
H. Martin.
Martin. On
O n September
September
6,
6, 1960,
1960, inin Moscow's
Moscow’s House House of of Journalists,
Journalists, Mitchell
Mitchell and and Martin
Martin gave
gave perhaps
perhaps thethe
most embarrassing press conference in the history of the American
most embarrassing press conference in thehistory of the American intelligence com- intelligence com
munity.
munity. TheThe greatest
greatest embarrassment
embarrassment was was the
the public
public revelation
revelation thatthat NSA had had been
been
decrypting
decrypting the the communications
communications of of some
some of of the
the United
United States'
States’ allies.
allies. Among
Among them,them,
said
said Martin,
Martin, werewere "Italy,
“Italy, Turkey,
Turkey, France,
France, Yugoslavia,
Yugoslavia, the UnitedArab
theUnited Arab Republic
Republic
[Egypt
[Egypt and Syria], Indonesia, Uruguay-that’s enough to give a general picture, II
and Syria] , Indonesia, Uruguay-that's enough to give a general picture,
guess."19
Though
Though the the defection
defection of of the
the two
two NSANSA employees
employeeswas wasaa spectacular
spectacularpublicity
publicity coup,
coup,
Mitchell's
Mitchell’s KGBKGB filefile reveals
revealsthat
that itit fell
fell some
some way
way short
short ofof the
the Centre's
Centre’sexpectations.20
expectations.20
Somewhat
Somewhat surprisingly,
surprisingly,Mitchell
Mitchell had had been
been recmited
recruited byby NSA in in 1957
1957despite
despite admit
admit-
ting
ting to
to six
six years
years ofof "sexual
“sexualexperimentations"
experimentations’’ up
up to
to the
theage
age ofof nineteen
nineteen with
with dogs
dogs and
and
chickens.
chickens. HisHis gifts
gifts as
as aa mathematician
mathematician were were presumably
presumablythought
thought more
more important
important thanthan
his
his farmyard
farmyard experiences.
experiences. During
During Martin's
Martin’s positive
positive vetting,
vetting, acquaintances
acquaintances variously
variously
described
described him him as as irresponsible
irresponsible and and an an insufferable
insufferable egotist
egotist but-like
but-like his his friend
friend
Mitchell-a gifted mathematician. Politically naive and socially
Mitchell-a gifted mathematician. Politically naiveand socially inadequate, Mitchell inadequate, Mitchell
and
and Martin
Martin were seduced by
were seduced by the
the Soviet
Soviet propaganda
propaganda image image of of the
the USSR
USSR as as aa state
state
committed
committed to to the
thecause
cause of ofpeace
peacewhose
whose progressive
progressivesocial
socialsystem
system could offer
could them
them the
offer the
personal
personal fulf illment they
fulfilment they had
had failed
failed toto find
find in
in the
the United
United States.21
States.21
In
In December
December 1959, 1959, Mitchell
Mitchell flew
flew from
from Washington
Washington to to Mexico
Mexico City,
City, in
in defiance
defiance of of
NSA regulations, entered the Soviet embassy and asked for
NSA regulations, entered the Soviet embassy and asked for political asylum in the political asylum in the
USSR,
USSR, giving
giving ideological
ideological reasons
reasons as as the
the motive
motive forfor his action.22 The
his action.22 The KGB
KGB residency
residency
T
The M
Main A
A dd vvee rrss aa rryy--
P aPrat r t 22 / 1I 7 9
made
made strenuous
strenuous attempts
attempts to to persuade
persuade him him to to stay
stay onon inside
inside NSA as as aa defector-in-place,
defector-in-place,
but
but without success. Mitchell
without success. Mitchell agreed
agreed to to aa secret meeting with
secret meeting another KGB officer
with another officer in in
Washington
Washington but but maintained
maintained his insistence on
his insistence on emigrating
emigrating to to the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union withwith
Martin.
Martin. Once there, however,
Oncethere, however, he he promised
promised to reveal all
to reveal he knew
allhe about NSA.
knew about NSA.
On
O n June
June 25,25, 1960,
1960, atat thethebeginning
beginning of of three
three weeks' summer leave,
weeks’ summer Mitchell and
leave, Mitchell and
Martin
Martin boarded
boarded Eastern
Eastern Airlines
Airlines flight
flight 307307 at atWashington
WashingtonNational
National Airport,
Airport, bound
bound
for New Orleans. There, after a brief stopover, they took another another flight for Mexico
City,
City, stayed
stayed the the night
night atatthe theHotel
HotelVirreyes,
Virreyes, then then caught
caught aa Cubana Airlines plane
Cubana Airlines plane to to
Havana.23
Havana.23In In July
July they
they were exfiltrated from
were exfiltrated from CubaCuba to to the Soviet Union.
the Soviet Union, KGB codecode
breakers
breakers were were disappointed
disappointed in theamount
in the amount of detailed knowledge
of detailed knowledge of of NSA cryptcrypt-
analysis
analysis possessed
possessedby by Mitchell
Mitchell and and Martin.
Martin. Their Theirmostmost important intelligence, in
important intelligence, in the
the
Centre's
Centre’s view,view, waswasthe reassurance they
the reassurance they were
were able abletoto provide
provide on on NSA's
NSA’s lack of success
lack of success
in
in breaking
breaking current current high-grade
high-grade Soviet Soviet ciphers.24
ciphers.24 However,
However, the the KGB similarly
KGB similarly
remained
remained unable unable to decrypt high-grade
to decrypt high-grade US cipher cipher systems.25
systems.25
Security
Security was was so so lax
lax at
at NSA's
NSRs Fort Fort Meade
Meade headquarters
headquarters that that no no attempt
attemptwas made
was made
to
to track
track Mitchell
Martin down down until
until eight
eightdays
days after
after they
they had
had been
been duedue to return
toreturn
from
from their three-week vacation.
their three-week vacation. Inside Mitchell's house
Inside Mitchell’s house NSA security
security officers
officers found
found
the
the key
key to to aa safe
safe deposit
deposit box, box, which
which Mitchell
Mitchell had deliberately left
had deliberately for them
left for them to to find.
find.
Inside
Inside the the boxbox in in aa nearby
nearby bankbank theythey found
found aa sealed envelope bearing
sealed envelope bearing aa request,
request,
signed
signed by by both
both Mitchell
Mitchell and and Martin,
Martin, that that itsitscontents
contents be made public.
be made public. The envelope
The envelope
contained aa lengthy
contained denunciation of
lengthy denunciation of the
the US government
government and the evils
and the of capitalism
evils of capitalism
and
and aa bizarre
bizarre eulogy
eulogy of of life
life in
in the
the Soviet Union, including
Soviet Union, including the claim that
the claim its emanci-
that its emanci
pated
pated women
women were were "more
“more desirable
desirable as as mates."26
mates.”26
By decision
decision no. no. 295
295 of of the
the Communist
Communist Party Party of of the
the Soviet Union, dated
Soviet Union, August
dated August
11,
11,1960,
1960, Mitchell
Martin were
were given political asylum
given political asylum and monthly allowances
and monthly allowances
of
of 500
500 roubles each-about the
roubles each-about the same
same as their NSA
as their NSA salaries
salaries andand well above Soviet
well above Soviet
salary scales.27 In
salary scales.27 In the
the autumn
autumnMitchellMitchellwas was given
givenaa jobjobinin thethe
Institute
Instituteof Mathe
of Mathemat- mat
ics
ics at
at Leningrad
Leningrad University;
University; Martin Martin beganbegan doctoral
doctoral research
research at at the
the same institute.
same institute.
Both
Both defectors
defectors quickly
quickly put put their
their beliefs
beliefs about
about the the desirability
desirability of of Soviet
Soviet mates
mates to to the
the
test.
test. Mitchell
Mitchell married
married GalinaGalina Vladimirovna
Vladimirovna Yakovleva,
Yakovleva, aa 30-year-old assistant pro-
30-year-old assistant pro
fessor
fessor in in the piano music
the piano department of
music department of the
the Leningrad
Leningrad Conservatory.
Conservatory. Martin, Martin, who who
changed
changed his his name
name to to Sokolovsky,
Sokolovsky, married
married aa Russian
Russian woman
woman whom whom he he met
met on on holi
holi-
day on
day on thethe Black
Black Sea.28
Sea.2s
Within
Within aa few few years
years the Centrefound
the Centre foundboth both Mitchell and
Mitchell and Martin
Martin considerably
considerably
more trouble
more trouble than than they
they were
were worth.
worth. Predictably,
Predictably, both both defectors rapidly became
defectors rapidly became disil
disil-
lusioned
lusioned with with lifelife in
in the
the Soviet Union. Martin,
Soviet Union. Martin, whom whom the the Centre
Centre regarded
regarded as as the
the
more
more impressionable
impressionable of of the
the two,
two, was
was gullible
gullible enough
enough to to believe
believe aa tale concocted by
tale concocted by
the
the KGB that they had both been sentenced
that they had both been sentenced in absentia to twenty years' hard labor by
to twenty years’ hard labor by
aa closed
closed session
sessionof of the
the US USSupreme
Supreme Court.Court. H Hee was
was eventually
eventually shown
shown aa bogus copy of
bogus copy of
the
the judgment
judgment in in order
order to to persuade
persuade him him to to put
put allall thought
thought of of returning
returning home home out of
out of
his
his mind. Mitchell
Mitchell was more skeptical and by the 1970s appeared determined to
leave.
leave. As chairman of the KGB, Yuri Andropov gave personal personal instructions
instructions that under under
no circumstances was either Mitchell or Martin to be allowed to go, for
no circumstances was either Mitchell or Martin to be allowed to for fear
fear of
of deter
deter-
ring
ring other
otherpotential
potential defectors
defectors fromfrom thethe West.
West.In In aa further
hrther attempt
attempt to to deter Martin he
deter Martin he
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
R D
D A
AN D
ND TT H
H SE
E H ISEHL IDE L D // I1 88 00
was
was shown
shown an an article
article by
by Yuri
Yuri Semyonov
Semyonov in in Izvestia claiming
claiming that
that American
American agents
agents
had
had been
been found
found inin possession
possession of
of poison
poison ampoules,
ampoules, andand was
was led
led to
to believe
believe that
that these
these
were
were intended for Mitchell and himself. Mitchell correctly suspected that the story
intended for Mitchell and himsel£ Mitchell correctly suspected that the story
had
had been
been fabricated
fabricated byby the
the KGB.
KGB. Galina
Galina Mitchell
Mitchell was
was also
also anxious
anxioustoto leave,
leave, but
but the
the
KGB
KGB putput pressure
pressure onon her
her mother
mother totopersuade
persuade Galina
Galina to tochange
change herher mind.
mind.After
Aftertheir
their
applications
applications for
for visas
visas had
had been
been rebuffed
rebuffed byby Australia,
Australia, New
New Zealand,
Zealand, Sweden
Sweden andand
Switzerland,
Switzerland, asas well
well as
as the
the United
UnitedStates,
States, the
the Mitchells
Mitchells told
told the
the Soviet
Soviet authorities
authorities onon
March 29,
March 1980 that
29,1980 thatthey
they had
had given
given up
up their
their attempts
attempts to to emigrate.29
emigrate.29ButBut there
there were
were
persistent
persistent reports
reports afterwards
afterwards that
that Mitchell
Mitchell was
was still
still trying
trying to
toleave.3o
leave.30
FOR
F OR M
M O SST
T O
OFF the
the Cold
Cold War,
War, the the Washington
Washington and and New
New York
York legal
legal residencies
residencies had
had
little
little success
success in
in providing
providing thethe intelligence
intelligence from
from inside
inside the
the federal
federal government
government which
which
had
had been
been soso plentiful
plentiful during
during the the Second
Second World
World War.
War. Their limitations were
Their limitations were clearly
clearly
exposed
exposed during
during the
the two
two years
years before
before the
the most
most dangerous
dangerous moment
moment of of the
the Cold
Cold War,
War,
the
the Cuban
Cuban missile
missile crisis
crisisof
of 1962.
1962.
The
The vacuum
vacuum left
left by
by the
the lack
lack ofof KGB high-grade
high-grade political
intelligence from
from the
the
United
United States
States was
was partly
partly fi lled by
filled by dangerous
dangerous nonsense
nonsense from
from elsewhere,
elsewhere,some
some of
of which
which
refl ected the
reflected the paranoid
paranoid strain
strain inin Soviet
Soviet analysis.
analysis. On
O n June
June 29, 1960 the
29,1960 theKGB
KGB chairman,
chairman,
Aleksandr
Aleksandr Nikolayevich
Nikolayevich Shelepin,
Shelepin, personally
personally delivered
delivered to
to Khrushchev
Khrushchev an an alarmist
alarmist
assessment
assessment of of American
American policy,
policy, based
based on
on aamisinformed
misinformed report
report from
from an
an unidentified
unidentified
NATO liaison
liaison officer
officer with
with thethe CIA:
CIA:
In
In the
the CIA it it is
is known
known that
that the
theleadership
leadership ofof the
the Pentagon
Pentagon is is convinced
convinced of of the
the
need
need to to initiate
initiate aa war
war with the Soviet
with the Soviet Union
Union "as soon as
“as soon as possible"
possible” .. .. .. Right
Right
now
now thethe USA has has the
the capability
capability to
to wipe
wipe out
out Soviet missile bases
Soviet missile basesand
and other
other milmil-
itary targets
itary targets with
with its
its bomber
bomber forces.
forces. But
But over
over the the next
next little
little while
while the
the defense
defense
forces
forces of of the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union will
will grow
grow.. .. .. and
and the opportunity will
the opportunity will disap
disap-
pear
pear . . . As a result of these assumptions, the chiefs at the Pentagon are hop
. . . As a result of these assumptions, the chiefs at the Pentagon are hop-
ing
ing totolaunch
launch aa preventive
preventive war
war against
against the
the Soviet
Soviet Union.
Union.
Khrushchev
Khrushchev tooktook the
thewarning
warning seriously.
seriously. Less
Less than
than aafortnight
fortnightlater
later he
he issued
issued aa public
public
warning
warning to the Pentagon
to the Pentagon "not
“not to
to forget
forget that,
that, as
as shown
shown at the latest
at the tests, we
latest tests, have
we have
rockets
rockets which
which can can land
land in
in aapre-set square target
pre-set square target 13,000
13,000 kilometers
kilometers away."31
away.”31
Moscow
Moscow followed
followed thethe presidential
presidential elections
elections of of 1960
1960withwith close
close attention.
attention.
Khrushchev
Khrushchev regarded
regarded the
the Republican
Republican candidate,
candidate, Richard
Richard Nixon,
Nixon, asas aa McCarthyite
McCarthyite
friend
friend of
of the
the Pentagon
Pentagon hawks,
hawks, and
and was
was anxious
anxiousthat
that Kennedy should win.
Kennedy should win. The
The Wash
Wash-
ington resident,
ington resident, Aleksandr
Aleksandr Semyonovich
Semyonovich Feklisov (alias "Fomin"),
Feklisov (alias “Fomin”), waswas ordered
ordered to to
"propose
“propose diplomatic
diplomatic or or propaganda
propaganda initiatives,
initiatives, or
or any
any other
other measures,
measures, to to facilitate
facilitate
Kennedy's
Kennedy’s victory."
victory.” The
The residency
residency tried
tried to
to make
make contact
contact with Robert Kennedy
with Robert Kennedy but but
was
was politely
politely rebuffed.32
rebuffed.32
Khrushchev's
Khrushchev’s viewview ofof Kennedy
Kennedy changed
changed after
after the
the CIA's
CIA’Sabortive
abortive andand absurdly
absurdly
inept attempt
ineptattempt to to topple
topple Fidel Castro by
FidelCastro by landing
landing an an American-backed
American-backed "Cuban “Cuban
brigade"
brigade’’ at
at the
theBay
Bay of
of Pigs
Pigs in
in April
April 1961.
1961.In
In the
the immediate
immediate aftermath
aftermath of of the
the Cuban
Cuban
debacle,
dkbicle, Kennedy
Kennedy despairingly
despairingly asked
asked hishis special
special counsel,
counsel,Theodore
Theodore Sorensen,
Sorensen, "How
“How
T
The M
M a in
in A
A dduv ee rrss aa rry
y --
P aP ra tr t 2
2 I
1 I 88 1I
1
could
could I have been so stupid?"33 The
have been The young
young president,
president, Khrushchev concluded, was
Khrushchev concluded, was
unable
unable to
to control
control thethe "dark
“dark forces"
forces” of American capitalism's
of American military-industrial com-
capitalism’s military-industrial com
plex.34
~ l e xAt. ~aa ~summit
At summitmeeting
meeting with
with Kennedy
Kennedy at
at Vienna
Vienna inin June, Khrushchev belliger-
June, Khrushchev belliger
ently demanded an
ently demanded an end
end to the three-power
to the three-power status of Berlin
status of Berlin and
and aa German
German peace
peace
treaty
treaty by the
the endend of the
the year.
year. The
The two
two superpowers
superpowers seemed set on
seemed set on aa collision
collision course.
course.
Kennedy
Kennedy said
said afterwards
afterwards to
to the
thejournalist
journalist James
James Reston:
Reston:
I think
think [Khrushchev]
[Khrushchev] did
did it
it because
because of
of the Bay of
the Bay of Pigs.
Pigs. I think
think he
hethought any
thoughtany-
one who
one whowas
was so
so young and inexperienced
young and as to
inexperienced as to get
get in
in that mess could
thatmess could be
be taken,
taken,
and
and anyone
anyone who
who got
got into
into itit and
and didn't
didn’t see it through
see it had no
through had no guts.
guts. So he
he just
just
beat
beat the
the hell
hell out
out of
of me. 35
me.35
On
O n July 29,1961
29, 1961 Shelepin sent Khrushchev the outline of of a new and aggressive
aggressive
global
global grand
grand strategy
strategy against
against the
the Main
Main Adversary designed to
Adversary designed to “create
"create circumstances
circumstances
in
in different
different areas
areas of of the
the world
world which
which would assist in
would assist in diverting
diverting the
the attention
attentionand and forces
forces
of
of the
the United
United States
States and
and its
its allies,
allies, and
and would
would tie them down
tie them during the
down during thesettlement
settlementof of
the
the question
question ofof aa German
Germanpeace peace treaty
treaty and
and West Berlin's proposal.”
West Berlin’s proposal." TheThe first
first part
part of
of
the
the plan
plan was
was to use national
to use national liberation
liberation movements
movements around around the
the world
world to to secure
secure anan
advantage
advantage in in the
the East-West
East-West struggle
struggle and to “activate
and to "activate by
by the
the means
means available
available to to the
the
KGB armed
armed uprisings
uprisings against
against pro-Western reactionary governments."
pro-Western reactionary governments.” At the the top of
top of
the
the list
list for
for demolition
demolition Shelepin
Shelepin placed
placed "reactionary" regimes in
“reactionary”regimes in the
theMain Adversary's
MainAdversary’s
own backyard in
own backyard in Central
CentralAmerica,
America, beginning
beginning in Nicaragua where
inNicaragua where he he proposed
proposed coor- coor
dinating
dinating aa "revolutionary
“revolutionary front" front” inin collaboration
collaboration with with the
the Cubans
Cubans and and thethe Sandin-
Sandin
istas.
istas. Shelepin
Shelepin alsoalso proposed
proposed destabilizing
destabilizing NATONATO bases bases in
in western Europe and
western Europe and aa
disinformation
disinformation campaign designed to
campaign designed to demoralize
demoralize the the West
West byby persuading
persuading it it of
of the
the
growing
growing superiority
superiority of of Soviet
Soviet forces.
forces. On August 1,
O n August 1, with
with only
only minor
minor amendments,
amendments,
Shelepin's
Shelepin’smasterplan
masterplan was was approved
approved as as aa Central
CentralCommittee
Committeed directive.36 Elements
i r e ~ t i v eElements
.~~ of
of
it,
it, especially
especially the
the use
use of
of national
national liberation movements in
liberation movements in the struggle with
the struggle with the Main
the Main
Adversary,
Adversary, continued
continued to to reappear
reappear in in Soviet strategy for
Soviet strategy for the
the next
next quarter
quarter of of aa century.
century.
During
During thethe Kennedy
Kennedy administration,
administration, however,
however, the the role
role of
of the
the KGB in in Washing-
Washing
ton
ton was less important
was less important than than that
that of of the
the GRU.
GRU. In In May
May 1961
1961 GRU Colonel Colonel GeorgiGeorgi
Bolshakov,
Bolshakov, operating
operating under
under cover
cover as ashead
head ofof the
the Washington bureau of
Washingtonbureau of the
the Tass
Tass news
news
agency,
agency, began
began fortnightly
fortnightly meetings
meetings with
with thetheAttorney-General,
Attorney-General,Robert Robert Kennedy.
Kennedy.
Bolshakov
Bolshakov succeeded
succeededin in persuading
persuading Robert Kennedy that,
Robert Kennedy that, between
between them,
them, they they could
could
short-circuit the
short-circuit ponderous protocol
the ponderous protocol of official diplomacy,
of official diplomacy,“speak
"speak straightly
straightly and and
frankly
frankly without
without resorting
resorting to to the
the politickers! stock-in-trade propaganda
politickers’ stock-in-trade propaganda stunts” stunts" andand
set
set up
up aa direct
direct channel
channel of of communication
communication betweenbetween President Kennedy and
President Kennedy and First Sec
FirstSec-
retary
retary Khrushchev.
Khrushchev. Forgetting
Forgetting that that he
he was
was dealing with an
dealing with an experienced intelligence
experienced intelligence
professional
professional who whohad had been
been instructed
instructed to cultivate him,
to cultivate him,thethe President’s
President's brotherbrother
became convinced
became convinced that that "an
“an authentic
authentic friendship grew" between
friendship grew” between him him and Bolshakov:
and Bolshakov:
Any
Any time
time that
that he
he had some message
had some message to to give to the
give to President (or
the President (or Khrushchev
Khrushchev
had)
had) or
or when
when the
the President
President had
had somesome message
message toto give to Khrushchev,
give to Khrushchev, wewe went
went
through
through Georgi
Georgi Bolshakov
Bolshakov .. .. .. I met
met with
with him about all
himabout all kinds
kinds of
of things.37
things.37
T
THHE
E S
SW OR
WO R D
D A
ANND
D T
THH SE
E H ISEHL I DE L D // I1 88 22
Despite Bolshakov's
Despite success, GRU intelligence
Bolshakov’s success, intelligence assessment
assessment of of American
American policypolicy
was abysmal. In
wasabysmal. In March
March 1962 1962it it produced
produced two two dangerously
dangerously misinformed
misinformed reports reports
which
which served
served to to reinforce
reinforce the the KGB's
KGB’s earlier
earlier warning
warning that that the
the Pentagon
Pentagon was planning
was planning
aa nuclear
nuclear first
first strike.
strike. The
The GRU claimed claimed that that inin the
theprevious
previous JuneJune thethe United States
United States
had
had made
made the decision to
the decision to launch
launch aa surprise
surprise nuclear
nuclear attack
attack on the Soviet
on the Soviet Union
Union in in
September
September 1961, 1961, but
but had
had been
been deterred
deterred at at the
the last
last moment
moment by Soviet Soviet nuclear
nuclear tests
tests
which
which showed
showed that that the
theUSSR's
USSR’s nuclear
nuclear arsenal
arsenal was was more
more powerful
powerful than than thethePentagon
Pentagon
had realized. The
had realized. The woefully
woefully inaccurate
inaccurate Soviet Soviet intelligence
reports of of Washington's
Washington’s
plans for
plans for thermonuclear
thermonuclear warfare warfare coincided
coincided with with aa series
series ofof real
real but
but farcically
farcically inept
inept
American
American attemptsattempts to to topple
topple or or assassinate
assassinate Moscow's
Moscow’s Cuban Cuban ally,ally, Fidel
Fidel Castro
Castro-
actions
actions ideally
ideally calculated
calculated to to exacerbate
exacerbate the the paranoid strain in
paranoid strain in Soviet
Soviet foreign
foreign policy.
policy.
In
In March
March 1962 1962 Castro
Castro urged
urged thethe KGB to to set
set upup an
an operations
operations basebase inin Havana
Havana to to
export revolution
export revolution across
across Latin
Latin America.38
America.38Then, Then, in in May,
May, Khrushchev
Khrushchev decideddecided to to con
con-
struct
struct nuclear
nuclear missile
missile bases
bases in in Cuba-the
Cuba-the most most dangerous
dangerous gamble
gamble of of the
the Cold
Cold War.
War.
Hee was
H was partly
partly motivated
motivated by by his
his desire
desire to to impress
impress Washington
Washington with with Soviet
Soviet nuclear
nuclear
might
might andand so so deter
deter it
it from
from further
further (non-existent)
(non-existent) plans plans for
for aa first strike. At the
first strike. same
the same
time
time hehe intended
intendedtotomakemake aa dramatic
dramatic gesture
gesture of of support
support forfor the
the Cuban
Cuban revolution.39
rev~lution.~~
The
The Soviet
Soviet gamble
gamble was was taken
taken in in the
thebelief
belief that
that Washington
Washington would would not not detect
detect thethe
presence
presence of of the
the Cuban
Cuban missile
missile sites
sites until
until it it was
was tootoo late
late to
to do
do anything
anything aboutabout them.
them.
That
That belief
belief was was mistaken
mistaken for for two
two reasons.
reasons. First,
First, high-altitude
high-altitude U-2 spy planes planes werewere
able
able to
to photograph
photograph the the construction
the missile
missile bases.
bases.Secondly,
Secondly,American
American intelli
intelli-
gence
gence analysts
analysts werewere able
able toto make sense of
make sense of the
the confusing
confusing U -U-22 photographs
photographs becausebecause
they
they possessed
possessed plans plans ofof missile
missile sitesite construction
construction and otherimportant
and other important intelligence
intelligence
secretly
secretly supplied
supplied by by Colonel
Colonel Oleg Oleg Vladimirovich
Vladimirovich Penkovsky,
Penkovsky, aa spy in in the
the GRU run run
jointly
jointly by the British SIS
the British SIS andand the
the CIA.
CIA. All the the main
main American
reports
on theCuban
on the Cuban basesbases during
during the the missile
missile crisis
crisiswere
were later stamped IRONBARK, aa
later stamped
codeword indicating that
codeword indicating that they
they had
had made
made use use of
of Penkovsky's
Penkovsky‘s documents.4o
documents.40
As
As the theconstruction
construction of of nuclear
nuclear missile
missile basesbasesin in Cuba
Cubabegan,
began, Bolshakov
Bolshakov continued
continued
to
to provide
provide reassurance,
reassurance, probably
probably as as part
part of of aa deliberate
deliberate deception
deception strategy,
strategy, that that
Khrushchev
Khrushchev would would never
never countenance
countenance such such an an aggressive policy. When
aggressive policy. When U - U-22 spy
planes
planes revealed
revealed the the existence
existence of of the
the bases
bases in in mid-October,
mid-October, while while they
they were
were still
still in
in the
the
course
course of of construction,
construction, thus thus beginning
beginning the Cuban missile
the Cuban crisis, Robert
missile crisis, Robert Kennedy
Kennedy
turned
turned on on Bolshakov.
Bolshakov. "I “I bet
bet you
you know
know for for certain that you
certain that have your
you have missiles in
your missiles in
Cuba,"
Cuba,” he he remonstrated.
remonstrated. Bolshakov
Bolshakov denied denied it. it. According
According to to Sorensen,
Sorensen, "President
“President
Kennedy
Kennedy had had come
come toto rely
rely onon the
the Bolshakov
Bolshakov channel channel for for direct
direct private
private information
information
from
from Khrushchev,
Khrushchev, and and he he felt
felt personally
personally deceived.
deceived. He was personally
H e was personally deceived."41
deceived.”“
At thethe moment
moment in in the Cold War
the Cold War when
when the the Kremlin
Kremlin mostmost urgently
urgently needed
needed goodgood
intelligence
intelligence from Washington, the KGB residency was was unable to provide it. During
the Second World
the Second World War WarSoviet
Soviet agents
agents hadhad penetrated
penetrated every every major
majorbranch
branch of of the
the Roo
Roo-
sevelt
sevelt administration.
administration. The The Centre
Centre had had been
been better
better informed
informed on on some
some important
important
aspects
aspects of of American
American policypolicy (notably
(notably the the MANHATTAN
MANHATTAN project) project) than
than Roosevelt's
Roosevelt’s
vice-presidents
vice-presidents or most members
or most members of of his
his cabinets.42
cabinets.42During
During the theCuban missile crisis,
Cubanmissile crisis,by
by
contrast, the Washington residency's residency’s sources
sources were limited to agents and contacts in
the
the press
press corps
corps andand foreign
foreign embassies
embassies (especially
(especiallythosethose ofof Argentina
Argentina and and Nicaragua).
Nicaragua).
T
T bh eM M
a i anAi dn vAe d
r sv ae rr ys a- P
r ya -
r t P a r t 22 / I 83
183
Some of
Some of the
the intelligence
intelligencewhichwhich Feklisov,
Feklisov,the the resident,
resident, sent sent toto Moscow
Moscow was was simply
simply gos-gos
sip.
sip. He
H e had
had nono source
source capable
capableof of penetrating
penetrating the the secret
secret deliberations
deliberations of of EXCOMM,
EXCOMM,
Kennedy's
Kennedy’s closestclosestadvisers
advisers who
who assembled
assembled in in the cabinet room
thecabinet room on on October
October16 16 and
and metmet
in
in daily session for
daily session for thethe next
next thirteen
thirteen days
days untiluntil thethe crisis wasresolved.
crisis was resolved. Aleksandr
Aleksandr
Sakharovsky,
Sakharovsky, the the head
head of of thethe FCD,FCD, wrotewrote dismissively
dismissively on on several
severalofof Feklisov's
Feklkov’s
telegrams
telegrams at at the
the height
height of of the
the missile
missile crisis, "This report
crisis,“This report doesdoes not
not contain
contain any any secret
secret
information."43
inf~rmation.”~~
The
The relative
relative lack
lack ofof influence
influence of of the
the KGB on on Khrushchev's
Khrushchev’s policy during the
policyduring cri
the cri-
sis also reflected
sis also reflected the
the limitations
limitations of of its chairman. In
its chairman. In December
December 1961 1961 the influential
the influential
Aleksandr Shelepin had
Aleksandr Shelepin been succeeded
had been succeeded as as chairman
chairman by by his
his less
lessable
able protCgC,
protege,
Vladimir
Vladimir Semichastny,
Semichastny,who who knewknew so so little about intelligence
little about intelligence and and was
was so so unattracted
unattracted
by
by the post offered
the post offered toto himhim thatthatheheaccepted
accepted it it only
only under
under pressure from Khrushchev.
pressure from Khrushchev.
Khrushchev
Khrushchev made made clear
clear that
that his main reason
his main reason for appointing Semichastny
for appointing Semichastny was was to to
ensure
ensure thethe political
political loyalty
loyalty of of the
the KGB ratherrather than than totobenefit
benefit from
from hishis advice
advice on on for-
for
eign
eign policy.
policy. There
There is is no
no sign
sign in in any
any of
of the files noted
the files noted by by Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin that Semichastny
that Semichastny
ever followedShelepin’s
everfollowed Shelepin's example of
example of submitting
submitting to to Khrushchev ambitious grand
Khrushchev ambitious grand
strategies
strategies for for combating
combating the the Main
Main Adversary.
Adversary. During During the the missile
missile crisis Semichastny
crisis Semichastny
had not
had not aasingle
single meeting
meeting with with Khrushchev
Khrushchev and and was
was never invited to
never invited to attend meetings
attend meetings
of
of the
the Presidium
Presidium (an (an enlarged
enlarged Politburo
Politburo whichwhich for the previous
for the decade had
previous decade had been
been thethe
main
main policy-making
policy-making body). body).
Nor
Nor diddid Khrushchev
Khrushchev ever ever ask askfor,
for,or
or receive from, the
receive frcm, theKGB any assessment of
any assessment of the
the
likely American response
likely American response to to thetheplacing
placing of nuclear missile
of nuclear missile bases in Cuba.44
basesin Cuba.44 As As foreign
foreign
intelligence
intelligence chief,
chief, Sakharovsky
Sakharovskyseems seems to to have
have had had little
little insight
insight into
into American
American policy-policy
making.
making. Though
Though apparently
apparently aa competent
competent bureaucrat
bureaucrat in in the
the Soviet
Soviet mold,
mold, his his first-
first
hand
hand experience
experience of of thethe outside
outside world world was limited to
was limited to Romania
Romania and and other
other parts
parts of of
eastern
eastern Europe.
Europe. HisHis melancholy
melancholy expression
expression was was probably,
probably,as as one
one ofof his
his subordinates
subordinates
has
has written,
written, "due
“due toto thethe enormous
enormous pressures
pressures of of the
the job.””
job."45 Among
Among the pressures was
the pressures was
the
the need
need to to conform
conform to to the
thehighest
highest standards
standards of of political
political correctness.
correctness. The The FCD rarely rarely
submitted
submitted assessments
assessments save save at at the
thespecifi
specific c request
request of of the
the Foreign
Foreign Ministry,
Ministry, the the Inter
Inter-
national Department of the Central Committee or
national Department of the Central Committee or the Presidium. Most of what it the Presidium. Most of what it
termed
termed its its "analyses"
“analyses”were, were,in in reality,
reality, little more than
little more than digests
digests of of information
information on on par-
par
ticular
ticular topics
topics which
which generally
generally avoided
avoided arriving
arriving at at conclusions
conclusions for for fear
fear that
that these
these
might
might conflict
conflict with
with thethe opinions
opinions of of higher authority. The
higher authority. The supreme
supreme authority
authority during
during
the
the missile
missile crisis
crisiswaswas Khrushchev
Khrushchev himself rather than
himself rather thanthe Presidium. To
thePresidium. To aa remarkable
remarkable
degree
degree he he both
bothdetermined
determined Soviet Soviet policy
policy and, and, like
like Stalin
Stalin before
before him,
him, acted
acted as as his
his own
own
chief intelligence analyst.j6
chief intelligence analyst.46
Intelligence did,
Intelligence did, however,
however, have some influence
havesome influence on on Khrushchev’s
Khrushchev's policy during the
policyduring the
final
final stages
stages of of the
the crisis.
crisis. OOnn October
October 25 25 he he indicated
indicated to to the Presidium that,
the Presidium that, in order
in order
to
to resolve
resolve thethe crisis,
crisis, it
it might
mightultimately
ultimately be be necessary
necessary to to dismantle
dismantle the the missile
missile bases
basesinin
return
return forfor aa US guarantee
guarantee not not to to invade
invade Cuba. Cuba. Khrushchev,
Khrushchev, however,
however, was was not not yet
yet
ready
ready to to make
make such
such aa proposal.
proposal. He H e changed
changed his his mind
mind during
during the the night
night ofof October
October
25-6
25-6 after
after aa GRU report report thatthat US Strategic
Strategic Air Air Command
Command had had been
been placed
placed on on
nuclear
nuclear alert.
alert. Hitherto
Hitherto he he had
had hopedhoped to save face
to save face by by obtaining
obtaining the the removal
removal of of US
missile
missile bases
basesin Turkey in return return for stopping the the construction of of Soviet missile sites
T
THH EE S
SW OR
WO RD
D A
ANN D
D T
THH SEE H SI EH LI DE L D I
/ I184
84
in Cuba. On
in Cuba. O n the
the morning
morningof October 26,
of October 26,however,
however,wrongly
wrongly fearing
fearing that
that an American
anAmerican
invasion
invasion of
of Cuba
Cubamightmightbe
be imminent,
imminent, he he dictated
dictated aa rambling
rambling and emotional plea
and emotional plea for
for
peace to
peace to Kennedy
Kennedy which
which asked
asked for
for aa US
USguarantee
guarantee of of Cuban
Cuban territorial
territorial integrity
integrity but
but
made
made no mention of
nomention of the
the Turkish
Turkish missile
missilebases.bases. Within
Within twenty-four
twenty-four hours,
hours,
Khrushchev
Khrushchev hadhad changed
changed his his mind.
mind. OnO n October
October 27, having
having concluded
concluded thatthat an
an Amer
Amer-
ican
ican invasion was not
invasion was imminent after
not imminent all,, he
after all sent another
he sent anotherletter
letter insisting
insisting that the
that the
Turkish bases must
Turkish bases must be be part
part ofof the
the deal. 47
Shortly
Shortly after
after Khrushchev
Khrushchev had sent his
had sent second letter,
his second letter, Soviet
Soviet air
air defense
defense in Cuba,
in Cuba,
apparently
apparently as
as aa result
result of
of aa failure
failure in
in the
the chain
chain of of command,
command, shot
shot down
down anan American
American
U -2 spy
U-2 spy plane
plane over
over Cuba,
Cuba, killing
killing the
the pilot.
pilot. Khrushchev
Khrushchev panicked.
panicked. Reports
Reports that
that
Kennedy
Kennedy waswas to
to make
make aa speech
speech onon national
national television
television at
at noon
noonononOctober
October 28 wrongly
wrongly
28
persuaded
persuaded him
him that
that the
thePresident might be
President might about to
be about to announce
announce an an invasion
invasion of
of Cuba.
Cuba.
Khrushchev
Khrushchev gave
gave in in and
and accepted
accepted Kennedy's
Kennedy’s terms:terms: aa unilateral
unilateral withdrawal
withdrawal of of "all
“all
Soviet
Soviet offensive
offensive arms"
arms” from Cuba. To
from Cuba. To make
make sure sure his
his message
message reached
reached Kennedy
Kennedy in in
time, he
time, he ordered
ordered itit to
tobe broadcast over
be broadcast over Radio
Radio Moscow.48
Moscow.48
TH
HEE H U M I L IAT I O N OF
HUMILIATION the
the Soviet
Soviet climb down at
climbdown at the
the end
endofofthe
themissile
missile crisis,
crisis,which
which
led
led two
two years
years later
later toto Khrushchev's
Khrushchev’s overthrow
overthrow in ina a Kremlin
Kremlin palace coup, was
palace coup, was
strengthened ininthe
strengthened theCentre by
by the
Centre the discovery
discovery ofof aa series
series of
of penetrations
penetrations by,
by, and
and defec
defec-
tions
tions to,
to, the
the CIA.
CIA. In In December
December 1961
1961 aa KGB
KGB officer,
officer, Major Anatoli Mikhailovich
Major Anatoli Mikhailovich
Golitsyn, walked
Golitsyn, walked into
into the
the American
American embassy
embassy inin Helsinki
Helsinki andand was
was exfiltrated
exfiltrated to
to the
the
United States.
United In September
States. In September 1962
1962 the
theKGB arrested
arrested GRU Colonel
Colonel Oleg
OlegPenkovsky,
Penkovsky,
who
who forfor the past eighteen
the past months had
eighteen months been providing
had been providing high-grade
high-grade intelligence
intelligence toto the
the
British and
British and Americans.49
Arnerican~.~~
The
The damage
damage report
report onon Golitsyn
Golitsyn produced
produced thethe usual
usual stereotyped
stereotyped denunciation
denunciation of of
his
his motives. Since it
motives. Since it was
was impossible
impossible toto criticize
criticize either
either the
the KGB oror the
the Soviet
Soviet system,
system,
it
it followed
followed that
that the
the basic
basic cause
cause of all defections
of all defections waswas the
the moral
moral failings
failings of
of the
the defec
defec-
tors
tors themselves-in
themselves-in particular,
particular, "the
“the virus
virus of
of careerism"
careerism” unscrupulously
unscrupulously exploited
exploited byby
Western
intelligence services:
services:
The
The treason
treason ofof Golitsyn,
Golitsyn, anan ambitious
ambitious and and vain
vain man,
man, provides
provides aa typical
typical exam
exam-
ple
ple of
of aa person
person representing
representing the
the tribe
tribe of
of careerists.
careerists. In
In the
the mid-1950s
mid-1950s hehe reacted
reacted
painfully
painfully to
to aa demotion
demotion in in his
his position:
position: he he could
could not
not tolerate
tolerate having
having his mis
his mis-
takes
takes and
and blunders
blunders pointed
pointed outout and
and commented
commented on. on. Emphasizing
Emphasizing hishis excep
excep-
tional
tional qualities,
qualities, he
he said
said that
that only
only badbad luck
luck had
had prevented
prevented himhim from
from becoming
becoming aa
highly successful senior
highly successhl senior officer
officer during
during thethe Stalin
Stalin period.
period. [Late
[Late in
in 1961] Golit
19611 Golit-
syn made persistent
syn made persistent attempts
attempts to tolearn
learn the
the contents
contentsof of the
the evaluation
evaluation written
written on
on
him
him for
for Moscow,
Moscow, which
which was
was negative.
negative. TheThe [Helsinki] Residency believes
[Helsinki] Residency believes that
that
he
he succeeded
succeeded in learning its
in learning its essence
essence and,
and, knowing
knowing fromfrom the experience of
the experience of
others
others that he could
that he could expect
expect aa serious
serious talk
talk in
in the
the personnel
personnel department
department and and aa
demotion
demotion in in rank,
rank, he
he defected
defected to to the
theUnited
United States.50
States.”
Like all defectors, Golitsyn was given

given an insulting code name-in his case,
codename-in case, GOR
GOR-
BATY ("Hunchback" ).5 1 Measures taken to discredit him included the arrest of a
(“Hunchba~k”).~~
T
The M
Main A
P aPrat r t 2
2 /I I185
8S
Soviet smuggler
Soviet smuggler (code(codenamednamed MUSTAFA),
MUSTAFA),who who was persuaded to
was persuaded implicate Golitsyn
to implicate Golitsyn
in
in contraband operations across
contraband operations across the Finnish border.
the Finnish border. AnAn article
article in the newspaper
in the newspaper
Rosszja on
Sovetskaya Rossiya September 27,
on September 1962 condemned
27,1962 condemned Golitsyn's
Golitsyn’s (fictitious) involve
(fictitious) involve-
ment with
ment with smugglers.52
smuggler^.'^
Despite
Despite the the Centre's
Centre’s attemptattempt to tobelittle Golitsyn, the
belittle Golitsyn, the damage assessment after
damage assessment after his
his
defection
defection concluded
concluded that that he he had
had been
been able to betray
able to betray aa wide
wide range
range of of intelligence
intelligence to to
the
the CIA on on the
the operations
operations of of most
most of of the "Lines" (departments)
the “Lines” (departments) at atthetheHelsinki
Helsinki andand
other
other residencies,
residencies, as as well
well as as KGB methods
methods of recruiting and
of recruiting andrunning
running agents.53
agents.”
Between
Between January
January 44 and and February
February 16, 16, 1962
1962the theCentre
Centresent
sentinstructions
instructions to to fifty-four
fifty-four
residents on the action required to limit the damage to current operations. For the
time
time being,
being, allall meetings
meetings with important agents
with important agents were
were to be suspended
to be suspended and and contact
contact
limited
limited to to "impersonal
“impersonal means" means” such such asas dead letter-boxes.54
dead letter-b~xes.’~
As
As well
well asas providing
providing important
intelligence on on KGB methods
methods andand leads
leads toto aa num-
num
ber
ber of
of Soviet
Soviet agents,
agents, however,
however, Golitsyn
Golitsyn also confused the
also confused the CIA with with aa series
series ofof
increasingly
increasingly extravagant
extravagant conspiracy
conspiracy theories.
theories. He He persuaded
persuaded the the head
head of of the
the CIA
counter-intelligence
counter-intelligence staff, staff, James
James Angleton,
Angleton, that that the
the KGB was was engaged
engaged in in aa gigantic
gigantic
global deception, and
global deception, and thatthat eveneven the
the Sino-Soviet
Sino-Soviet split was aa charade
split was charade to deceive the
to deceive the
West.
West. Golitsyn
Golitsyn was was later
later to to maintain
maintain that
that the
the Prague Spring in
Prague Spring Czechoslovakia was
in Czechoslovakia was
also
also aa KGB description.
d e s c r i p t i ~55nIt
. ~did
~ Inot
did not occur to
t occur to the
the Centre
CentrethatthatGolitsyn's defection, by
Golitsyn’s defection, by
infecting a small
small but troublesome minority of of CIA offi cers with his own paranoid
officers
tendencies, would
tendencies, would ultimately
ultimately do do the
theAgency
Agency more harm than
more harm good.
than good.
In
In November
November 1963 Aleksandr Nikolayevich
1963 Aleksandr Cherepanov of
Nikolayevich Cherepanov of the
the KGB Second Second
Chief
Chief Directorate (internal security
Directorate (internal security and counter-intelligence), sent
and counter-intelligence), sent thethe American
American
embassy
embassy in in Moscow
Moscow aa packet packet of of highly
highly classified papers dealing
classified papers dealing with the surveil-
with the surveil
lance
lance and
and entrapment
entrapment of of diplomats
diplomats and and other foreigners in
other foreigners Russia, together
in Russia, together with with aa
note
note offering
offering hishis services
services to to the CIA. In
the CIA. In the
the ambassador's
ambassador’s absence,
absence, thethe deputy
deputyheadhead
of
of mission
mission feared
feared that
that the thedocuments
documents were were part
part ofofa aKGB provocation.
provocation. Though
Though the the
head
head ofof the
the CIA station
station was was allowed
allowed to to photograph
photograph the the documents,
documents, the the originals,
originals,
despite
despite his protests, were
his protests, were returned
returned to to the
the Russians.
Russians. Cherepanov
Cherepanov fl ed from
fled from Moscow
Moscow
but
but was
was arrested
arrested by by KGB border border guards
guards onon the
the frontier
frontier with
withTurkestan
Turkestanon Decem
on Decem-
ber
ber 117,1963.
7, 1963. He H e admitted
admitted during during interrogation
interrogationthat thatthe operational
the operational secrets
secrets he he had
had
revealed
revealed to to the
theAmericans
Americans included includedthe theuse
use ofof "spy (metka), special
dust" (metka),
“spy dust” chemicals
special chemicals
applied
applied to to suspects'
suspects’ shoes shoes to to facilitate
facilitate tracking.
tracking. Cherepanov
Cherepanov was was sentenced
sentenced to to
death at
death at aa secret
secret trial
trial in in April 1964. T
April 1964. The Centre's damage
h e Centre’s damage assessment
assessment of of the
the case
case
concluded:
concluded:
It
It is
is not
not possible
possible to
to determine
determine why
why the
the Americans betrayed Cherepanov.
Americans betrayed Cherepanov. Either
Either
they
they suspected
suspected that
that his
his action
action was
was aa KGB provocation
provocation or they wanted
or they wanted toto bur
bur-
den
den thetheKGB with
with aalengthy
lengthy search
search for
for the person who
the person who had
hadsent
sentthethe
package to
package to
the
the embassy. 56
emba~sy.’~
Though the
Though theCIA was not responsible
was not for Cherepanov's
responsible for betrayal, it
Cherepanov’s betrayal, it was
was shortly
shortly to
to
make
make another,
another, even
even more serious error.
more serious error. In
In February
February 1964
1964 Yuri
Yuri Ivanovich Nosenko, aa
Ivanovich Nosenko,
KGB officer
officer serving
serving on the Soviet
on the Soviet disarmament delegation in
disarmament delegation in Geneva,
Geneva, who
who had
had
T
THH EE S
SW OR
WO R D
D A
ANND
D T
THHSEEH ISEHL D
I E LD // r1 88 66
begun
begun working
working for for the
the Agency
Agency in June
inJune 1962, defected
1962, defected to the
tothe United States.
United States.
Nosenko's
Nosenko’s CIA debriefers,
debriefers, however,
however, wrongly
wrongly concluded
concluded that
that he
hewas
was aa KGB plant.57
plant.57
Unaware
Unaware of of the
the CIA's
CIA’Shorrendous
horrendous misjudgement,
misjudgement, the
the Centre
Centre regarded
regarded Nosenko's
Nosenko’s
defection
defection as
as aa serious
serious setback. Its damage
setback. Its damage assessment
assessment began
began with
with the
the usual
usual character
character
assassination, claiming that
assassination, claiming Nosenko (henceforth
that Nosenko (henceforth codenamed
codenamed IDOL),
IDOL), had had been
been
infected-like Golitsyn-with the
infected-like Golitsyn-with the "virus
“virus of
of careerism:"
careerism:”
Nosenko,
Nosenko, who
who lusted
lusted for
for power,
power, did
did not
not hide
hide his
his ambitions
ambitions and
and obtained
obtained aa high
high
position.
position. The
The leadership
leadership of of Department
Department 11 at Headquarters will
at Headquarters not forget
will not forget
Nosenko's hysterical reaction
Nosenko’s hysterical reaction when
when hehe was
was informed
informed of of their plans to
their plans to promote
promote
him
him from
from deputy
deputy chief
chief to
to chief
chief of
of section [otdeleniye].. "The
section [otdeleniye] chief of
“The chief of the direc
the direc-
torate
torate has
has promised
promised that
that I will
will replace
replace the
the head
head ofof the
the department
department [otdel] ," he
[utdel],” he
shouted
shouted shamelessly.
shamelessly. The
The characteristics
characteristics of
of careerism
careerism were
were evident
evident in
in many
many
curious
curious facets
facets of
of his
his life.
life. When
When he became the
he became the deputy
deputychief
chief of
of another
another depart
depart-
ment, Nosenko
ment, Nosenko was ashamed of
was ashamed of his
his rank
rank [KGB captain],
captain], which
which was
was below
belowthat
that
normally
normally associated
associated with
with his
his position.
position. HeH e would
would return
return unsigned
unsigned any
any docu
docu-
ments
ments with
with "Captain"
“Captain”on onthem,
them,and
and would
would only
only sign
sign documents
documents on on which
which his
his
perceptive
perceptive subordinates
subordinates hadhad not
not indicated
indicated his
his rank.
rank.”58
Throughout
Throughout the the Cold
Cold War,
War, thethe KGB had had much
much greater
greater success
success inin collecting
collecting sci
sci-
entific
entific and
and technological
intelligence (S&T)
(S&T) on on the
the Main
MainAdversary
Adversary than than penetrat
penetrat-
ing the federal
ing the federal government.
government. In In 1963
1963 thethe S&T department
department of of the
the FCD was given
was given
enhanced status as
enhanced status as Directorate T.59 Most
Directorate T.59 Most of of its tasking came
its tasking came from
from the
the Military
Military-
Industrial
Industrial Commission
Commission (VPK),(VPK), which
which was was responsible
responsible for
for overseeing
overseeing weapons
weapons propro-
duction,60 and was obsessed with American armaments and
duction,60and was obsessed with American armaments and advanced technology- advanced technology
almost
almost to
to the
theexclusion
exclusion ofof the
therest of the
rest of the world.
world. In In the
the early
early 1960s over 90
1960s over 90 percent
percent of of
VPK requirements
requirements concerned
concerned the the Main
Main Adversary.61
Adversary.61Among
Among the the American
American S&T S&T
obtained by
obtained by the
the KGB during
during these
these years
years was
wasintelligence
intelligence onon aircraft
aircraft and
and rocket tech
rocket tech-
nology,
nology, turbojet engines (from
turbojet engines (from aa source
source inin General
GeneralElectric),
Electric), the Phantom jet fighter,
the Phantomjet fighter,
nuclear research,
nuclear research, computers,
computers, transistors,
transistors, radio
radio electronics,
electronics, chemical
chemical engineering
engineering and and
metallurgy.62
metallurgy.62S&T agents in
S&T agents in the
theUnited
UnitedStates
States identified
identified in
in Mitrokin's notes (though
Mitrokin’s notes (though
with
with few
few details
details ofof their
their accomplishments)
accomplishments) include:include: STARIK
STANK and and BOR (or (or BORG),
BORG),
who
who worked
worked as as research
research scientists
scientists forfor the
the US air force; URBAN, identified
airforce; identified byby
Mitrokhin as
Mitrokhin as aa department
department headhead atat Kellogg (probably the
Kellogg (probably the M. W. Kellogg
Kellogg Technol
Technol-
ogy
ogy Company
Company ininHouston),
Houston),who who had
had served
served asas an
an agent
agent since
since 1940;63 BERG, aa senior
1940;63BERG, senior
engineer
engineer probably
probably employed
employed by by Sperry-Rand
Sperry-Rand (UNIVAC);64
(UNIVAC);64VIL, VIL, whowho worked
worked forfor the
the
chemical manufacturers
chemical manufacturers Union Carbide; FELKE,
Union Carbide; FELKE, an an agent
agent in
in D Duu Pont
Pont de deNemours,
Nemours,
the
the chemical,
chemical, biomedical
biomedical andand petroleum
petroleum conglomerate;
conglomerate; USACH,
USACH, of of the Brookhaven
the Brookhaven
National
National Laboratory
Laboratory atatUpton,
Upton,New New York,
York, which
which carried
carried out government research
out government research onon
nuclear
nuclear energy,
energy, high-energy
high-energy physics
physics andand electronics;
electronics; and
and NORTON of of RCA, which
which
manufactured
manufactured electronic,
electronic, telecommunications
telecommunications and and defense
defense equipment.65
eq~ipment.~’
During
During the the Cold
Cold War,
War, unlike
unlike the
the Second
Second World
World War,
War, thethe dwindling
dwindling bandband of of
American Communists and and fellow travelers
travelers rarely
rarelyhad access
access to the S&T sought by
the KGB. Most S&T S&T agents recruited in the United States States seem
seem to have spied for
T
The M
M aa ii nn A
A dd vv ee rr ss a rr y --
PPa ar tr t 22 / 1I 8 7
money.
money. Two Two such
such mercenary
mercenary spies were caught
spies were caught by by the
the FBI duringduring the the mid-1960s:
mid-1960s:
John
John Butenko,
Butenko, who who worked
worked for for anan ITT subsidiary
subsidiary which which did classified work
did classified work forfor
Strategic Air Command, and Colonel William Whalen,
Strategic Air Command, and Colonel William Whalen, who provided intelligence who provided intelligence
on missiles and
on missiles and atomic
atomic weapons.66
weapons.66In In 11963
963 thethe New
New York York residency
residency supplied
supplied 1141 14
classified S&T
classified S&T documents,
documents, totaling
totaling 7,967 pages, and
7,967 pages, and 30,131 unclassified documents,
30,131 unclassified documents,
totaling
totaling 181,454
181,454 pages,
pages, as as well
well asas 7171 "samples"
“samples’’of of state-of-the-art
state-of-the-art technology
technology and and
other items. Washington
other items. Washington sent sent the
the Centre
Centre 37 classifi
classified ed documents
documents (3,944 (3,944 pages)
pages) and
and
1,408
1,408 unclassified
unclassified documents
documents (34,506
(34,506 pages).67
pages).67
Some
Some of of the
the best
best American
American S&T, S&T, however,
however, came came from from residencies
residencies outside
outside the
the
United States.
United Possibly the
States. Possibly most important
the most important was was inin the field of
the field of computer
computer technology,
technology,
where
where thethe Soviet
Soviet Union
Union had had fallen
fallen far
far behind
behind the the West.
West. The The experimental
experimental Soviet Soviet
BESM-1, produced
produced in in 1953,
1953, was judged by
was judged by aa Western
Western expert expert to to be
be “a"a respectable
respectable
computer"
computer” for for its
its time,
time, with
with aa capability superior to
capability superior to that
that ofof the
the UNIVAC-1
UNIVAC-1 intro- intro
duced
duced in 195 1 . The
in 1951. The BESM-2,
BESM-2, however,however, which
which wentwent into into production
production in in 1959,
1959, was
was
only
only aa third
thirdas
as fast
fast as
as the
the IBM-7094,
IBM-7094,introduced
introduced in in 1955,
1955,andand one-sixteenth
one-sixteenth as as fast
fast as
as
the
the IBM -7090 of
IBM-7090 of 1959.
1959. Because
Because of of the
the embargo
embargo on on the export of
the export advanced technol-
of advanced technol
ogy
ogy to
to the
the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union maintained
maintained by by COCOM (the (the embargo
embargo coordinating
coordinating comcom
mittee
mittee of of NATO
NATO membersmembers and Japan), the
and Japan), computers legally
the computers legally imported
imported from from the
the
West
West were
were barely more powerful
barely more powerful than than their Soviet counterparts.6R
their Soviet counterparts.68 During During the 1960s
the 1960s
the attempt toto catch
the attempt catch upup with Western computer
with Western technology was
computer technology basedlargely
was based largely onon
espionage.
espionage.
The
The KGB's
KGB’s mainmain source
source of of computer
computer S&T was, was, almost
almost certainly,
certainly, IBM, which which
manufactured
manufactured over over half
half the
the computers
computers in use around
in use around the the world
world in in the
the mid-1960s.
mid-1960s.
Within
Within IBM,IBM, the the most
most important
important KGB agent agent identified
identified in in Mitrokhin’s
Mitrokhin's notes notes was
was
ALVAR, aa naturalized
naturalized French
French citizen born in
citizen born in Tsarist
Tsarist Russia,
Russia, whose
whose motives-unlike
motives-unlike
most Americans
most Americans in in the
theS&T
S&T network-may
network-may well wellhave
have beenbeen ideological.
ideological. Probably
Probably the
the
KGB's
KGB’s longest-serving
longest-serving Line Line X agent,
agent, ALVAR had had beenbeen recruited
recruited by by the
the NKVD
NKVD in in
1935.
1935. ByBy the
the 1950s
1950s he he held
held aa senior
senior post
post atat IBM’s
IBM's European
European headquarters
headquarters in in Paris,
Paris,
and
and in
in 1958
1958waswas awarded
awarded the the Order
Orderof of the Red Banner
the Red Banner for for his
his work
Soviet agent.
agent.
ALVAR carried
carried onon working
working for for the
the KGB until his retirement
until his retirement in in the
the late
late 1970s,
1970s, when
when
he
he was
was awarded
awarded aa Soviet
Soviet pension
pension of 300 dollars
of 300 dollars aa month
month ininaddition
addition to to his
his company
company
pension-a
pension-a certain
certain sign
sign of
of the
the Centre's
Centre’s appreciation
appreciation of of him.69
him.69
In
In the
the early
early 1960s
1960s thethe Paris
Paris residency supplied intelligence
residency supplied intelligence on on American
American transis-
transis
tor
tor manufacture
manufacture which,which, according
according to to KGB files,files, both
both improved
improved the the quality
quality of of Soviet
Soviet
transistors
transistors and
and brought
brought forward
forward the the start of mass
start of mass production
production by by one
one andand aahalf years.
half years.
It also
also provided
provided S&T S&T on on computer
computer networking systems which
networking systems were later
which were later imitated
imitated by by
the Soviet defense
the Soviet defense ministry.
ministry7’ 70 The most likely
The most source of
likely source of the
the intelligence
intelligence on on both
bothtran
tran-
sistor
sistor production
production and and computer
computer networks
networks was was ALVAR.
ALVAR. From From 1964,1964, however,
however, the the
Paris
Paris residency
residency alsoalso had
had anan agent, codenamed KLOD,
agent, codenamed KLOD, in in Texas
Texas Instruments.71
instrument^.^'
Among
Among other other agents
agents who
who provided
provided technology
technology and and S&T from from IBM was was aa Nordic
Nordic
national, codenamed KHONG.
national, codenamed KHONG. From From 19601960 to to 1966
1966 KHONG
KHONG worked worked for for aa Euro-
Euro
pean
pean affiliate
affiliate of IBM, and
of IBM, and purchased embargoed materials
purchased embargoed materials and and samples
samples worth
worth
124,000
124,000 dollars,
dollars, which
which he passed on
he passed on toto the
the KGB.
KGB. In In both
both 1961
1961 and and 1962
1962 hehe was
was
questioned
questioned by by the
the local
local US embassy
embassy on on the reasons for
the reasons for hishis purchases,
purchases, but but appears
appears to to
T
T H EE S
SW RD
WOR A N D T
T HSEE H ISEHL IDE L D / I1 8 8
have
have satisfied
satisfied the
the embassy
embassy on on both
both occasions.
occasions. KHONG's
KHONG’s motives, motives, unlikeunlike ALVAR's,
ALVARs,
seem to
seem to have been mainly
have been financial. H
mainly financial. Hee was
was initially
initially paid
paid 10 10 percent
percent commission,
commission,
subsequently
subsequently raised
raised to to 1515 percent,
percent, on on his
his purchases
purchases from from IBM. KHONG later later
worked
worked forfor the
theUnited
UnitedNationsNations in in
a number
a number of countries.
countries.
of The
The fact
fact that
that hehehad hada total
a total
of
of twelve
twelve controllers
controllers duringduring hishis career
Soviet agent
agent is is evidence
evidence that that the
the Centre
Centre
considered him
considered him an an important source. By the
importantsource. the time
time contact
contact with
with him ceased in
him ceased in 1982,
1982,a a
year
year after
after his retirement, the
his retirement, the KGB had had held
held about
about 150 150 meetings
meetings with with him.72
him.72
The
The Soviet
Soviet Union
Union often often found
found it it more
more difficult
difficult to to use
use than
than to to collect
collect the
the remark
remark-
able
able S&T
S&T which
which it collected from
it collected American businesses,
from American businesses, mostmost of of them
them defense
defense concon
tractors. In
tractors. In 1965
1965 the the Politburo
Politburo criticized
criticized thethe fact
fact that
that there
there was
was aa time time lag
lag of of two
two toto
three years
three years before Soviet industry
before Soviet industry began
began exploiting
exploiting S&T.73
S~CT.’~ Even
Even the the computer
computer tech tech-
nology
nology stolen
stolen byby the the KGB did did nono more
more than,
than, atat best,
best, stabilize
stabilize the the striking
striking gap gap
between
between East
East andand West.74
West.74The The gapgap was
was notnot to
to bebe explained
explained by by anyany lack
lack ofof expertise
expertise
among
among Soviet scientists and
Soviet scientists and mathematicians.
mathematicians. As As oneoneCanadian
Canadianexpert
expert wrote
wrote in in 1968,
1968,
"Westerners
“Westerners who who know know Soviet
Soviet computer
computer scientists
scientists can can testify
testify to their competence
to their competence
and their thorough
and their thorough knowledge
knowledge of of the
the field."75
field.’’75The
The continued
continued backwardness
backwardness of of the
the
Soviet computer industry,
Soviet computer despite the
industry, despite the expertise
expertise of of Soviet scientists and
Soviet scientists and the
the remark
remark-
able
able S&T obtained by
S&T obtained by the
the KGB, reflected
reflected the cumbersome inefficiency
the cumbersome inefficiency of of the
the Soviet
Soviet
command
command economy,
economy, in in which technological innovation
which technological innovation had had toto run
run the the gauntlet
gauntlet of of aa
complex
complex andand unresponsive
unresponsive state state bureaucracy.
bureaucracy.
Rather
Rather than
than accept
accept any any share
share of of responsibility
responsibility for the failure
for the failure to to make efficient use
make efficient use
of much of the S&T acquired from the West, the VPK chairman, L. V. Smirnov, Smirnov,
blamed
blamed thethe KGB for for not obtaining enough
not obtaining enough of of it.
it. In
In aa letter
letter toto thethe KGB chairman,
chairman,
Semichastny,
Semichastny, in in April
April1965 1965,, Smirnov complained that
Smirnov complained that over percent of
over 50 percent the top
of the pri
toppri-
ority
ority S&T
S&T tasks assigned to
tasks assigned to the
theKGB between two
KGB between and four
two and four years
years earlier
earlier had still not
had still not
been
been fulfilled.
hlfilled. Semichastny
Semichastny replied replied thatthat steps had been
steps had been taken
taken to improve the
to improve the KGB's
KGB’s
ability
ability to meet its
to meet its assignments,
assignments, but but criticized
criticized the the VPK for underestimating the
for underestimating the cur
cur-
rent
rent difficulty
difficulty of collecting S&T
of collecting S&T from from American
American targets.
targets. Since
Since some
some of of the
the same
same sci
sci-
entific and technological developments were taking place in Britain, France, Japan
and
and West
West Germany,
Germany, the the VPK should should pay greater attention
pay greater attention to targets in
to targets these coun
in these coun-
tries.76
tries.76In
In the
the following
following year year groups
groups of of Line
Line X officers
officers operating
operating against American
against American
targets were stationed in residencies in Argentina, Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Brazil, Denmark, Fin Fin-
land, India, Israel,
land, India, Lebanon, Mexico,
Israel, Lebanon, Mexico, Morocco,
Morocco, Norway,
Norway, Switzerland,
Switzerland, Turkey, Turkey, the the
United
United Arab
Arab Republic
Republic and and aanumber
number of of other
other Third
Third World countries.77
World countries.77
Despite
Despite Smirnov's
Smirnov’s criticisms,
criticisms, the the KGB's
KGB’s performance
performance in in S&T
S&T collection
collection was, was, on on
balance, a success story. story.As Smirnov himself himself acknowledged,
acknowledged, the FCD fulfilled almost
half
half of the VPK's
V P K s demanding tasks against the Main Main Adversary with a few years at
most. Measured against the spectacular spectacular successes
successes of twenty years earlier, earlier, however,
however,
Centre had
when the Centre had received the plans of the atomic bomb-the bomb-the world’s world's greatest
scientific secret-from
scientific secret-from two different agents and important nuclear intelligence from
several
several more, even the successes
successes of the early 1960s were bound to seem somewhat
disappointing.
disappointing. The The decline
decline waswas irreversible.
irreversible.Most
Most of the Soviet
of the Soviet spies
spies who penetrated
who penetrated
every
every major branch of
major branch the Roosevelt
of the Roosevelt administration
administration had had been ideological agents,
been ideological agents,
T
The M
Main A
A dd vvee rr ss aa rr yy --
P aP ra tr t 2
2 I/ I1 88 99
seduced
seduced byby the
the myth-image
myth-image of of Stalin's Russiaasas the
Stalin’s Russia the world's
world’s first
worker-peasant
state,
state, pointing
pointing the
the way
way toto aa new
new Socialist
Socialist society.
society. During
During the the early
early Cold
Cold War,
War, even
even
among
among American
American radicals,
radicals, the
the vision
vision faded. Most of
faded. Most of the
the successors
successors to the wartime
to the wartime
ideological
ideological moles
moles were
were mercenary
mercenary walk-ins
walk-ins and
and corrupt
corrupt employees
employees of of defense
defense con
con-
tractors
tractors willing
willing to
to sell
sell their
their companies'
companies’secrets.
secrets.
Though
Though thethe KGB could
could not
not bring
bring itself
itself to
to accept
accept it,
it, the
the golden
golden age
age of
of the
the high
high-
flying
flying American
American ideological
ideological agent
agent had
had gone,
gone, never
never to
to return.
return.
A
A PP P
P EE N
NDD II X
X
S
SOO M E FFAV
A VO R I TE K GB
KGB Y
YAAVKA
V K SA S
(M EE
(M ET
E ITNI N
GGP P
LAC EE
LAC S )S )I N
I NTTHHEE 11960’s
9 6 0' S
Baltimore: by
Baltimore: by the
the Clayton
Clayton men's
men’s clothing
clothing store
storeo nonNorth
NorthAvenue.
Avenue.
Boston: the
Boston: the music
musichall;
hall;byby
thethe
State Hilton
State Hotel.
Hilton Hotel.
Chicago: the
Chicago: the Chicago
Chicago Institute
Institute of
of Fine
Fine Arts
Arts buildings;
buildings; by
by the
the movie
movie theater
theater on
on State
State
Street;
Street; byby the
theLake
Lake State
State movie
movie theater;
theater; and and
by the by the men's
men’s tie store on
tie store onRandolph
Randolph
Street.
Street.
Cleveland: by
Cleveland: by thetheKhipp
Khippmovie
movietheater.
theater.
Indianapolis: by
Indianapolis: bythethenotice
noticeboard
board on on
Market
Market Street.
Street.
Los Angeles: by
Los Angeles: bythethenewspaper
newspaper stand "Out
stand ofTown
“Out of Town Papers" on LasonPalm
Papers” Lasas Palmas
Avenue;Avenue;
by by
the
the entrance
entrance totothe themovie
movietheaters
theatersViltern and Star
Viltern and Theater; by theby
Star Theater; display windowswindows
the display
on
on Hollywood
Hollywood Boulevard,
Boulevard,the thefurniture
furniture store MacMahon
store MacMahon Brasses; near near
Brasses; the entrance
the entrance
to
to the
the Hotel
HotelRoosevelt.
Roosevelt.
Newark:
Newark: by bythe theNewark
Newark train
train station,
station, onbench
on the the bench by the monument
by the monument to Sergeant to Sergeant
Donan
Do n a n A.
A. Bazilone.
Bazilone.
New Haven:by
New Haven: by the
the Taft
Taft Hotel;
Hotel;bybythethe Sherman
Sherman movie
movietheater.
theater.
New York (Bronx):
New York (Bronx):by by the
the David
David Marcus
Marcus movie
movie theater;
theater; by
by the
the restaurant
restaurantSavarin;
Savarin;byby
the display windows
the display windows of of the
the store
store Wilma’s
Wilma's Party
Party Center;
Center;under
underthe theawning
awningofof thethe
Middletown Inn
Middletown Inn Restaurant
Restaurantatat331881 88 Middletown
Middletown Road. Road.
Philadelphia: by
Philadelphia: by the
theRandolph
Randolphand andStanton
Stantonmovie
movie theaters; by the
theaters; Silvanna
by the Hotel.
Silvanna Hotel.
Portland: by
Pordand: by the
the parking
parking lotlotononthethemain
main street; by the
street; Parker
by the movie
Parker theater.
movie theater.
Rochester: by
Rochester: bythetheRandolph
Randolphmoviemovietheater.
theater.
Sacramento: by
Sacramento: by the Towermovie
the Tower movie theater,
theater, andthe
and near near the advertisements
advertisements at the cafeat the cafe
Camilia
Camilia Lodge.
Lodge.
Paul: by
St. Paul: bythe thedisplay
displaywindows
windows of of
thetheSt. Paul Hotel;
St. Paul by the
Hotel; byStrand moviemovie
the Strand theater.
theater.
San Francisco: by
San Francisco: the Metro
by the Metromovie
movietheater
theaterononUnion
Union Street;
Street; by by Fosters
Fosters Restaurant,
Restaurant,
Simms
Simms Cafe,Cafe, and andComptons
ComptonsCafe Cafe(in(inthethe
downtown
downtown area); the Canterbury
area); the Canterbury HoteL Hotel.
Seattle: by
Seatde: bythe themovie
movie theater Orpheum
theater Orpheum Cinema
Cinemaon Fifth Avenue;
on Fifth by the by
Avenue; Citythe
Motel
CityonMotel on
Qyeen
Queen AnneAnne Avenue.
Avenue.
Syracuse: by
Syracuse: bythetheCates
Catesmovie
movietheater.
theater.
Union
Union City,
City, New Jersey:byby
New Jersey: thethe
A&P supermarket.
supermarket.
Washington
Washington area: area: thethetelephone
telephoneboothbooth by by
thethe
entrance to the
entrance to Hot
the Shoppes
Hot ShoppesRestaurant
Restaurant
in the center
in the center of ofHyattsville,
Hyattsville, aaWashington
Washingtonsuburb; suburb;bybythethe entrance
entrance to to
thethe grocery
grocery
store
store ininthetheAspen
Aspen Hill Shopping
Hill Shopping Center on Georgia
Center Avenue
on Georgia in Maryland,
Avenue six
six miles
in Maryland, miles
north
north of ofWashington.
Washington.
TT Ulll I EE LL VV EE
T
TH E MM
HE A IANA
I ND VAEDRVSEARRS Y
A RY
Pa
P art J
3:: III f t ee rr ''A
ega Is aIt
IZZegaZs bel "
‘XbeZ”
II nn 1966
1966 the
the lack
lack of
of high-grade
high-grade political
intelligence from
from the
the United
United States
States led
led the
the
KG
KGB B Collegium,
Collegium, aa senior
senior advisory
advisory body body headed
headed by by the
the Chairman,
Chairman, totocall for aa major
call for major
improvement
improvement in in intelligence
operations againstagainst the Main Adversary.
theMain Adversary. The The chief
chief
method
method by by which
which it proposed to
it proposed to achieve
achieve thisthis improvement,
improvement, however,however, was wasone
one which
which
had
had already been attempted
already been attempted unsuccessfully
unsuccessfully during during the the 1950s:
1950s: the the creation
creation over
over the
the
next
next few
few years
years of
of aa network
network of illegal residencies
of illegal residencieswhich would take
which would take over
over the main bur-
the main bur
den
den of of intelligence
operations from from the the legal
legal residencies
residencies in in New
New York,York, Washington
Washington
and
and SanSan Francisco.1
Francisco.’
Not
Not until
until six
six years
years after
after the
the arrest
arrest of of "Rudolf
“Rudolf Abel"Abel” in in 1957
1957diddid the
the KGB succeed
succeed
in
in establishing
establishing another
another illegal
illegal residency
residency on on thetheterritory
territory of of the Main Adversary.
the Main Adversary.
Though
Though therethere were
were brief
brief missions
missions to or through
to or through the the United
United States
States by by aa number
number of of
illegals,
illegals, the
the first
first toto have
have taken
taken up up residence
residence who who is is recorded
recorded in the files
in the files noted
noted by by
Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin was was KONOV, aa Muscovite Muscovite of of Greek
Greek origin
origin born
born in in 1912,
1912, whowho tooktookthethe
identity
identity of ofGerhard
GerhardMax Kohler, Kohler, aa SudetenSudetenGermanGermanborn born in in Reichenberg
Reichenberg (now (now part
part
of
of the
the Czech
CzechRepublic)
Republic) in in 1917.
1917.KONOV was was aa war veteran and
war veteran and radio
radio specialist
specialistwhowho
worked
worked as as head
head ofof aa laboratory
laboratory in Leningrad until
in Leningrad until his
his recruitment
recruitment by by the
the KGB in in
April
April 1955.
1955. He
H e spent
spent the the next
next fourfour years
years in in East
East Germany,
Germany, working
working as as an
an engineer,
engineer,
establishing
establishing his German cover
his German identity and
cover identity andstudying
studying both both his next destination,
his next destination, WestWest
Germany,
Germany, and and his
his ultimate
ultimate target,
target, thethe United
United States.
States. The
The KGB, which specialized in
which specialized in
arranged
arranged marriages
marriages for for its
its illegals,
illegals, found
found him hima aGerman wife and
Germanwife assistant previously
and assistant previously
employed
employed by by the
the Stasi,
Stasi, codenamed
codenamed EMMA, EMMA, who who tooktook the
the identity
identity of Erna Helga
of Erna Helga
Maria Decker,
Maria born on
Decker, born September 2,1928
on September 2, 1928 near Breslau (now
near Breslau (now in in Poland).2
Poland).2
In
In October
October 1959,
1959,posing
posing as as East
East German
Germanrefugees,
refugees, KONOV and and EMMA crossed crossed
to
to the
the FRG,
FRG,where
where KONOV
KONOV found found work work as as aa radio
radio engineer.
engineer. In 1962 he
In 1962 he began
began cor
cor-
responding
responding withwith American
American radio radio and and electronics companies and
electronics companies and obtained
obtained several
several job
job
offers.
offers. After
After visiting
visiting the United States
the United States as as aa tourist,
tourist, hehe accepted employment in
accepted employment in aa
company
company whichwhich in 1963 enabled
in 1963 enabled EMMA and and himself
himself to obtain immigrant
to obtain immigrant visas.visas.
KONOV seems
KONOV seems to to have
have beenbeen the the first post-war illegal
first post-war illegal sent
sent to to the
the United States to
United States to
concentrate
concentrate on on scientific
scientific and and technological
technological intelligence (S&T). Specializing
intelligence (S&T). Specializing in in elec
elec-
tronic
tronic measuring
measuring devices,
devices, he he tooktookpart partin ainnumber
number
a of
of international exhibitions and
international exhibitions and-
according to
according his file-made
to his file-made several inventions. KONOV's
several inventions. KONOV’s S&T S&T was was soso highly
highly rated
rated
by the
by the Centre
Centre that
that itit won
won him him two two KGBKGB awards.
awards. O Onn June
June 20,
20, 1970, after living
1970, after for
living for
T h ee M
Main A
A dd vv ee rr ss a rr y
y --
PPa ra tr t J3 // I1 99 I1
seven
seven years
yearsinin the
theUnited
UnitedStates
States as as Gerhard
Gerhard and and Erna
Erna Kohler,
Kohler, KONOV and and EMMA
became
became American
American citizens,
citizens, swearing
swearing their their oaths
oaths ofof allegiance
allegiance in in Newark
Newark Court Court-
house.3
house.3
By
By the
the time
time KONOV
KONOV entered entered the the United
United States
States inin 1963,
1963,two two other
other KGB illegals illegals
were already established
were already established in in Canada,
Canada, both intended by
both intended by the Centre for
the Centre for subsequent
subsequent
transfer
transfer to to the
theMain
Main Adversary.
Adversary.Nikolai Nikolai Nikolayevich
NikolayevichBitnov Bitnov (codenamed
(codenamed ALBERT) ALBERT)
had
had arrived
arrived in in Canada
Canadainin1961. 1961.The The basis
basis ofof the
the legend
legend painstakingly
painstakingly constructed
constructed for for
Bitnov
Bitnov was was aa fabricated
fabricated version
version of of the
the life
life history
history of Leopold Lambert
of Leopold Lambert Delbrouck,
Delbrouck,
who
who had had been
been born
born in in Belgium
Belgium in in 11899,
899, emigrated
emigrated to Russia with
to Russia with hishis family
family at at the
the
age
age ofof eight
eight andand died
died there
there in in 1946.
1946. IInn the fictitious version
the fictitious version of Delbrouck's career
of Delbrouck‘s career
constructed
constructed by by the
the Centre,
Centre,however,
however, Delbrouck
Delbrouck had had married
married aa Romanian
Romanian woman, woman, set set
up
up home
home in in Gleiwitz
Gleiwitz in Germany (now
in Germany (now Gliwice
Gliwice in in Poland)
Poland) and and then
then movedmoved to to
Romania,
Romania, where where he he died
died in in 193
1931. 1 . While
While in in Gleiwitz,
Gleiwitz, the the couple
couple had had supposedly
supposedly had had
aa son,
son, Jean
Jean Leopold
Leopold Delbrouck,
Delbrouck, whose whose identity
identity Bitnov
Bitnov assumed.
assumed. Bitnov's
Bitnov’s wife, wife,Nina
Nina
(codenamed
(codenamed GERA), G E M ),took took over
over the
the identity
identityofof a "dead
“dead
a double,"
double,”YaninaYanina Batarovskaya,
Batarovskaya,
who
who had had been
been born
born in in France
France in in 1928
1928 andand died
died in
in Lithuania
Lithuania inin1956.4 1956.4
Early
Early in in 1956,
1956, now
now age age thirty,
thirty, Bitnov
Bitnov moved
moved withwith his his wife
wife to to Romania
Romania to to estab
estab-
lish
lish his
his legend
legend with
with thethe help
help of of thethe Romanian
Romanian intelligence
intelligence service,service, the the DGSP.
DGSP In In
April
April1957,1957, using
using identity
identity documents
documents forge' forged d byby the Centre, they
theCentre, they succeeded
succeeded in in
obtaining
obtaining passports
passports fromfrom thethe Belgian
Belgian diplomatic
diplomatic mission
mission in in Bucharest.5
Bucharest.’ Six S i x months
months
later,
later, they
they moved
moved to to Geneva
Geneva so so that
that Bitnov
Bitnov could
could enroll
enroll in in aabusiness
business school
school and and learn
learn
how
how to to operate
operate as as aa businessman
businessman in in the
theWest.
West.From
From late
late 1958
1958 totothe thesummer
summer of of 1961
1961
the
the couple
couple lived
lived inin Liege,
Likge, establishing
establishing Belgian Belgian identities
identities and and obtaining
obtaining new new passports
passports
which,
which, unlike
unlike those
those issued
issued in in Bucharest,
Bucharest, made made no no reference
reference to their residence
to their residence in in
Romania
Romania and and were
were thus
thus less likely to
less likely to arouse
arouse suspicion
suspicion in North America.
in North America. In In July
July
1960,
1960, the theBitnovs
Bitnovs emigrated
emigrated to to Canada.6
Canada.6
The
The Centre
Centre probably
probably intended
intended that thatBitnov
Bitnov should
should movemove on on after
after aa few
few years
years to to thethe
territory
territory of of the
the Main
MainAdversary.
Adversary. Initially,
Initially,however,
however,he he was
was ordered,
ordered, like like Brik
Brik (HART)
(HART)
aa decade
decade earlier,
earlier, to
to establish
establish himself
himself under under business
business covercover in in Canada.
Canada. DespiteDespite his his
course
course in in Geneva,
Geneva, however,
however, BitnovBitnov proved
proved aa hopeless
hopeless businessman.
businessman. First, First, he heinvested
invested
2,000
2,000 dollars
dollars of of KGB fundsfunds in in aabusiness
business which
which bought
bought up up land
land with
with mineral
mineral rightsrights
and
and sold
sold them
them to mining companies.
to mining companies. Mter After two years the company
two years the company went bankrupt. went bankrupt.
Then
Then Bitnov
Bitnov spent 2,000 dollars
spent 2,000 dollars purchasing
purchasing aa directorship
directorship in in aacar
car dealership
dealership which which
went
went into intoliquidation
liquidation only only two
two months
months later. later. Unwilling
Unwilling to to pour
pourgood
good money
money after after bad
bad
into
into any
any more
more of of his
his investment
investment schemes, schemes, the the Centre
Centre ordered
ordered him him to to look
look for paid
for paid
employment.
employment. After After aa period
period on on unemployment
unemployment benefits, benefits, Bitnov
Bitnov foundfound aapoorlypoorly paid paid
job
job asas aa bookkeeper
bookkeeper which,which, he he complained,
complained, left left him
him little
little or
or no no time
timefor
for intelligence
intelligence
work.
work. Having
Having achieved
achieved nothing
nothing of of any significance as
any significance as anan illegal,
illegal, he he was
was recalled
recalled to to
Moscow
Moscow in in 1969.7
1969.7The The following
following year, year, hehe was given aa pension
was given pension and sent into
and sent into early
early
retirement at
retirement at the
the age
age ofof only
only forty-five.8
forty-five.’ The The fact
fact that
that thethe Centre
Centre persevered
persevered with with
Bitnov
Bitnov for for so long was further evidence of the strength of its
so long was further evidence of the strength ofits determination to estab- determination to estab
lish
lish aa network
network of of illegal
illegal residencies
residenciesin in North
North America.
America.
Bitnov
Bitnov was was unaware
unaware that that in in February
February 1962, 1962, only
only sevenseven months
months after after his his own
own
arrival
arrival inin Canada,
Canada,another illegal, codenamed
anotherillegal, codenamed DOUGLAS,DOUGLAS, had had landed
landed withwith his his wife
wife
T
TH EE WSOW
HS RO
DR D A
ANND
D TT H
HEE S
SHH II E
E L
L D
D // I1 9
922
and
and four-year-old
four-year-old son son atat Montreal
Montreal airport.
airport. DOUGLAS
DOUGLAS was was Dalibar
Dalibar Valoushek,
Valoushek, aa
33-year-old
33-year-old Czech Czech border
border guard
guard recruited
recruited by by the
the KGB
KGB with with thethe assistance
assistance of of its
its
Czechoslovak
Czechoslovak counterpart,
counterpart, the the StB.9
StB.9 He H e took
took the the identity
identity of of aa Sudeten
Sudeten German,
German,
Rudolf
Rudolf Albert Herrmann, who
Albert Herrmann, whohad had died
died in the Soviet
in the Soviet Union
Union during
during thethe Second
Second
World
World War.War. According
According to to Valoushek's
Valoushek‘s legend,
legend, Herrmann
Herrmann had had survived
survived thethe war
war and
and
made his home in East Germany, then taken refuge in
made his home in EastGermany, then taken refuge in the West toescape the Com- the West to escape the Com
munist
munist regime.
regime. His His wife,
wife, Inga
Inga (codenamed
(codenamed GERDA), GERDA), aa Sudeten SudetenGerman
German whose whose
family
family had
had moved
moved to to the
theGDR,
GDR, tooktook the theidentity
identityof of In galore Noerke,
Ingalore Noerke, aa «dead
“dead double"
double”
who
who had hadbeen
been killed
killed during
during the thewartime
wartime bombing
bombing of of Stettin.
Stettin. At At the
the end
endofof 1957
1957 the the
Valousheks fled to the West, loudly proclaiming their
Valousheks fled to the West, loudly proclaiming their hatred of the East German hatred of the East German
regime.
regime. TheyThey spentspentthe the next
next four
four years
years strengthening
strengtheningtheir their legends
legends as as anti
anti-
Communist
communist refugeesrefugees while
while Valoushek
Valoushek learned
learned how how to to runrun aasmall
small business.1o
business.”
Once
Once in in Canada,
Canada, Valoushek proved aa much
Valoushek proved much betterbetter businessman
businessman than than Bitnov
Bitnov-
though
though not quiteas successful as published accounts of his career (which do not
not quite as successful as published accounts of his career (which do notgive
give
his
his real
real identity)
identity) havehave suggested.
suggested. Soon Soon after
after his
his arrival
arrival inin Canada
Canadahehebought bought Harold's
Harold’s
Famous
Famous Delicatessen
Delicatessen in in downtown
downtown Toronto,
Toronto, which
which he he and andInga,
Inga,as
as «Rudi"
“Rudi”and and"Inga
“Inga
Herrmann"
Herrmann” made made aa popular
popular rendezvous
rendezvous for for statf
staff from
from thethe nearby
nearby studios
studios of of the
the Cana
Cana-
dian
dian Broadcasting
Broadcasting Company.
Company. After After two two years
years Valoushek
Valoushek sold soldthethe delicatessen,
delicatessen, got got aa
job
job as as aa CBC
CBC soundsound engineer
engineer and and took
took courses
courses in in fUm-making.
film-making. His His first
first major
major
assignment
assignment was was on on aa film
film advertising
advertising campaign
campaign for for the
the Liberal
Liberal Party.
Party. ByBy the
the mid-
mid-
1960s
1960s he he had
had aareputation
reputation as as aa popular
popular and and successful
successful film-maker.
film-maker. At the the 1967
1967Lib
Lib-
eral
eral convention, which elected Pierre Trudeau as party leader, Trudeau leaned off the
convention, which elected Pierre Trudeau as party leader, Trudeau leaned off the
stage
stage and
and playfully
playfully popped
popped grapes
grapes into "Rudi Herrmann's"
into “Rudi Herrmann’s” mouth.l1mouth.” Though
Though Va Va-
loushek's
loushek‘s business
businessappeared
appeared prosperous,
prosperous, however,
however,his his KGB
KGB file file reveals
revealsthat
that thetheCentre
Centre
had
had toto provide
provide 10,000
10,000 dollars
dollars toto cover
cover trading
trading 10ssesY
losses.12
In
In 1967
1967 Valoushek
Valoushek became
became the the controller
controller of of thetheKGB's
KGB’s most most important
importantCanadianCanadian
agent,
agent, Hugh
Hugh Hambleton (RADOV)Y After
Hambleton (RADOV).13 Mter losing
losing hishis job
job atat NATO
NATO on on security
security
grounds
grounds in in 1961
1961(though
(thoughwithout
without any
any charges
charges being
being brought
brought against
against him),
him), Hamble
Hamble-
ton
ton had
had spent
spentthe thenext
next three
three years
years taking
taking aaPhDPhD at at the
theLondon
LondonSchool
School of of Econom
Econom-
ics,
ics, returning
returning to toCanada
Canadainin1967 1967to become
become
to aa professor
professor in in the
theeconomics
economics department
department
at
at Laval
LaVal University
University in in Qyebec.
Quebec. Once Once back
back inin Qyebec,
Quebec, Hambleton's
Hambleton’s contactcontact withwith the
the
KGB
KGB dwindled.
dwindled. He H e met
met an anofficer
officer from
from the
the legal
legal residency
residencythree three times
times inin Ottawa,
Ottawa,onon
each
each occasion
occasion talking
talking to to him
him in in aacar
car parked
parked nearnear thethe main
main postpost office.
office. Hambleton,
Hambleton,
however,
however, disliked
disliked hishis new
new controller,
controller, who who tried
tried unsuccessfully
unsuccessfully to to persuade
persuade him him toto
apply for a j ob in External Affairs. After an interval during
apply for a job in External Affairs. After an interval during which Hambletonfailed which Hambleton failed
to
to turn
turn up
up forfor meetings
meetings in in Ottawa,
Ottawa, Valoushek
Valoushek was was sent
sent to to Qyebec
Quebec totorenew
renew contact
contact
with
with him.him.During
During aa congenial
congenial dinner
dinner atatthe theChateau
Chiiteau Frontenac
Frontenac overlooking
overlooking the the Saint
Saint
Lawrence
Lawrence river,river, the
the two
two menmen established
established aa mutual
mutual rapport
rapport and and Hambleton
Hambletonagreed agreed toto
resume
resume his his career
career as as aa Soviet
Soviet agent.14
agent.14OverOver the the next
next few
few years,
years, hehe traveled
traveled to to aa great
great
variety
variety of of destinations,
destinations, combining
combining research
research on on academic
academic projects
projects with
with work
work for for the
the
KGB. He H e remained
remained in in touch
touch with
with Valoushek
Valoushek until until 1975,
1975, meeting
meeting him him in in Trinidad
Trinidad
and
and Haiti,
Haiti, asas well
well asas Canada
Canada and and thethe United
United States.
States. ButBut Hambleton's
Hambleton’s travelstravels were
were soso
far
far flung
flung that
that ititrequired
required aa considerable
considerable numbernumber of of KGB officers
officers to maintain contact
to maintain contact
with
with him.1s
him.”
T
The M
Main A
A dd vv ee rr ss aa rr yy --
P oP ra tr t 3 I
1 I1 9 3
In 1968,
1968, aayear after becoming Canadian citizens, Valoushek
Valoushek and his his family
family were
were
transferred
transferred to to the
the United
United States
States to
to found
foundaanew illegal residency
new illegal residency inin the
the New
New York
York
area.
area. His first KGB contact was IVANOVA, a young Russian woman who, having
formerly worked as an agent of the KGB Second Chief Chief Directorate
Directorateinside the Soviet
Union, had
Union, been allowed
had been (perhaps even
allowed (perhaps even encouraged)
encouraged) to to marry
marry anan American
American visitor
visitor
and had
had moved to the United States. IVANOVA gave
United States. gave Valoushek
Valoushek 15,000 dollars to
15,000 dollars to
establish himself
establish himself and
and had
had several
several further secret meetings
further secret meetings with him to
with him pass on
to pass on
instructions from the Centre
Centre and
andletters
lettersfrom
fromhis Czech relatives.16
relatives.16 With the funds
funds
provided by IVAN IVANOVA,OVA, Valoushek made a12,000 12,000 dollar downpayment ona a
secluded house fifteen miles north of of New
New York, in Hartsdale,17
Hartsdale,17 joined the New
York Press
PressClub and andbegan work as a freelance
freelance cameraman and commercial photog- photog
rapher. His first major assignment from the the KGB was to penetrate
penetratethetheHudson
Hudson
Institute, aa leading New York think tank. The Centre had had been excited by a report
report
from Hambleton giving information on the Institute's Institute’s members and believed it to
be a major potential source
source of intelligence on American
Americanglobal strategy and defense
policy.
policy1*is
1962, three
I N MAY 1962, three months
months afterafter Valoushek's
Valoushek‘s arrival,
arrival, BOGUN, another another Soviet ille
Soviet ille-
gal, had landed in Canada.
Canada. The Centre intended that, after establishing himself in
Canada, BOGUN,
BOGUN, like like DOUGLAS,
DOUGLAS, should should transfer
transfer to the territory
to the territory ofof the Main
the Main
Adversary. B
Adversary. () GUN was
BOGUN was Gennadi
Gennadi Petrovich Blyablin, aa 338-year-old
Petrovich Blyablin, 8-year-old Muscovite
Muscovite whowho
had taken the identity of Peter Carl Fisher,
the-identity Fisher, born in inSofia in 19291929of a German
Germanfather father
and
and Bulgarian
Bulgarian mother.
mother. Like
Like Valoushek,
Valoushek, he he perfected
perfected his his German
German legendlegend byby living in
living in
East Germany, then moved to the West in in 1959,
1959, posing as a refugee.refbgee. The Centre
allowed
allowed him
him three
three years
years to to settle,
settle, legalize
legalize his
his status
status and find work
and find work in in West
West Germany
Germany
before sending him
before sending him to Canada. On
to Canada. O n March
March 9,9,1961 1961 Blyablin married his
Blyablin married his KG
KGB- B
approved
approved partner,
partner, LENA,
LENA, in in Hanover.
Hanover. In I n December
December they obtained their
they obtained their West
West Ger
Ger-
man
man passports
passports before
before setting
setting offoff for
for Canada
Canada fivefive months
months later.19
later.’’
While
While Valoushek
Valoushek found
found covercover asas aa film-maker, Blyablin established
film-maker, Blyablin established himself
himself as as aa
freelance press photographer-a
freelance press photographer-a profession which provided
profession which provided numerous
numerous opportunities
opportunities
and
and pretexts
pretexts for
for traveling
traveling around
around Canada
Canada and and further
further afield.
afield. IInn February 1965, fol
February 1965, fol-
lowing
lowing the
the Centre's
Centre’s instructions,
instructions, Blyablin
Blyablin andand his
his wife
wife moved
movedto to the
theUnited States on
UnitedStates on
immigrant
immigrant visas.
visas. His
His main
main tasktask over
over the
the next
next three
three years
years waswasphotographing
photographing and and pro-
pro
viding
viding intelligence
intelligence on on major
major military,
military, scientific
scientific andand industrial
industrial targets
targets around
around the the
United
United States.20
States.20
In 1968,
1968, however,
however, Blyablin
Blyablin attracted
attracted thethe attention
attention of the the FBI during his investi-
during his investi
gation
gation ofof major
major targets
targets in
in the
theUnited States and
UnitedStates and hadhadtotobe
be hurriedly recalled, together
hurriedly recalled, together
with
with his
his wife,
wife, to
to Moscow.2
Moscow.21 i It
I t was
was later
later discovered
discovered thatthat some
some of his correspondence
his correspondence
with theCentre,
with the Centre, routed
routed via via agent
agent SKIF,
SKIF, had been intercepted.
had been intercepted. SKIF SKIF was Karo
was Karo
Huseinjyan,
Huseinjyan, an ethnic Armenian
an ethnic Armenian born born inin Cyprus
Cyprus in 1919 was
in 1919 was Karo
Karo Huseinjyan,
Huseinjyan, an an
ethnic
ethnic Armenian
Armenian born born in in Cyprus
Cyprus in in 1919
1919 who owned owned aa jewelry
jewelry shop
shop in Beirut and
in Beirut and
provided
provided aa forwarding
forwarding service
service forfor aa number
number of of illegals.
illegals. A Centre investigation dis
Centre investigation dis-
closed
closed that
that letters
letters from
from Blyablin,
Blyablin, dated
dated April
April 7 and
and July
July 27, 1968,
1968, sent
sentvia
via Husein
Husein-
jyan,
jyan, had
had been
been steamed
steamed open.22
open.”
T
THHE
E S
SW RD
WOR A N D T
T H EE S
S H II EE LL D / I1 9 4
A year
year before
before Blyablin's
Blyablin’s sudden
sudden recall,
recall, RYBAKOV, another another Soviet illegal, had
Soviet illegal, had
arrived
arrived in the United
in the United States.
States. RYBAKOV was was Anatoli
Anatoli Ivanovich
Ivanovich Rudenko,
Rudenko, whosewhose
early
early career
career was
was strikingly
strikingly similar
similar to to Blyablin's.
Blyablin’s. Like
Like Blyablin,
Blyablin, Rudenko
Rudenko was was aa Mus
Mus-
covite
covite born
born in in 1924
1924 whowho hadhadassumed
assumed aa bogus bogus German
German identity,
identity, spent
spent several
several years
years
in
in East
East Germany
Germanyworking
working on on his legend and
his legend and then
then moved
moved to to the
the West.
West.Rudenko
Rudenkowas was
given
given the identity documents
the identity documents of Heinz Walter
of Heinz Walter August
August Feder,
Feder, born
born in in Kalisch
Kalisch on on
November
November 6, 1927.23 While
6, 1927.23 While in East Germany
in East Germany he he had
had trained
trained as as aa piano
piano tuner and
tuner and
repairer.
repairer. After
After crossing
crossing to to West
West Germany
Germany in in April
April 1961,
1961, posing
piosing asas aa refugee
refugee from
from
Communism,
Communism, he he found
foundaajob jobwith
withthethe world-famous
world-famous piano piano manufacturers
manufacturers Steinway
Steinway
in Hamburg.
in Hamburg.Though Though Rudenko
Rudenko was was told
told that
that his
his ultimate
ultimate destination
destination waswas thethe United
United
States, in
States, in 1964
1964hehewas was sent
sent to
to work
work withwith aa musical
musical instrument
instrument company
company in in London,
London,
probably
probably in in order
order to to accustom
accustom him him to to an
an English-speaking
English-speaking environment.24
en~ironment.~~
Rudenko's
Rudenko’s period
period in in London
Londonalmost
almost ended
ended in in disaster.
disaster. Once,
Once, while
while returning
returning from
from
Brussels,
Brussels, where
where he he had
had received
received his maintenance allowance
his maintenance allowance from from aa KGB operations
operations
officer,
officer, hehe was
was stopped
stopped at at Heathrow
Heathrow and and 500 pounds
pounds werewere found
found on on him
him which
which he he
had
had failed
failed to to declare.
declare. Rudenko
Rudenko was was fortunate
fortunate to to fi nd aa sympathetic
find sympathetic customs
customs officer.
officer.
The
The money,
money, he he pleaded,
pleaded, waswas his
his life
life savings,
savings, the product of
the product of many sacrifices over
many sacrifices over the
the
years. He
years. H e was
was allowed
allowed toto keep
keep the 500 pounds
the 500 pounds and and no action was
no action was taken against him.
taken against him.
In
In 1966
1966 he hewent
wenttotoNew NewYork
York on on aa tourist
tourist visa
visa and
and visited
visited thethe Manhattan
Manhattan show show-
rooms of
rooms of Steinway
Steinway & Sons Sons on on West
West 57th 57thStreet,
Street, who
who offered Rudenko aajob
offered Rudenko job with
with aa
salary
salary of 80 dollars
of 80 dollars aa week.
week. With
With Steinway's
Steinway’s assistance,
assistance, he gained aa work
he gained permit and
work permit and
traveled
traveled to to the United States
the United States on on his
his German passport in
German passport in July
July 1967.
1967. In In New
New York
York
Rudenko
Rudenko becamebecame pianopiano tuner
tuner toto aa series
series ofof celebrities-among
celebrities-among them Nelson Rocke
them Nelson Rocke-
feller,
feller, Governor
Governor of of New
New York,
York, unsuccessful
unsuccessfulcandidate
candidate for for the
the Republican
Republican nomination
nomination
in
in 1964
1964and and future
future vice-president
vice-president of of the
the United States.25 Rockefeller
United States.25 Rockefeller was was regarded
regarded in in
Moscow
Moscow as as the
the "patron"
“patron’, of
of Henry
Henry Kissinger,
Kissinger, who who in inJanuary
January 19691969 became
became President
President
Nixon's
Nixon’s National Security Adviser (and later Secretary of State).26 State).26While professor at
Harvard during the the 1960s,
1960s, Kissinger had served as Nelson's paid part-time adviser
Nelson’s
and
and speechwriter,
speechwriter, receiving
receiving aa severance
severance pay paygift
gift ofof 50,000 dollars
dollars when
when he joined the
hejoined the
Nixon administration. “He "He has a second-rate mind but but aa first-rate intuition about
people,"
people,’’ Kissinger
Kissinger once said of Rockefeller.
Rockefeller. "I “I have a fi rst-rate mind but
first-rate but aathird-rate
third-rate
intuition about people."27
To the Centre
Centre itit must have seemed that Rudenko had penetrated one of the
innermost sanctums of the capitalist system, system, which the Rockefeller family had
seemed to epitomize for three generations. Nelson's Nelson’s second wife, "Happy," “Happy,” said of of
him in the the mid-l960s,
mid-1 960s, “He "He believed he could have it all. all. He
H e always
always had."
had.” The six six
square miles of Nelson'sNelson’s Westchester estate were one of the world's world’s most valuable
properties and contained some some of the most spectacularspectacular art treasures
treasures in any private
collection.
collection. Theodore White once offered to exchange exchange his Manhattan townhouse on
East 64th
64th Street
Streetfor a single
single Tong DynastyDynasty horse from the Westchester collection.28 collection.2*
Though
Though Rudenko's
Rudenko’s occasional
occasional visits
visits toto Westchester
Westchester impressed
impressed the the Centre,
Centre, however,
however,
they achieved nothing of significance.
significance.
Penetrating the the houses of the great and good appears to have become almost an
end in itself
itself for Rudenko, even though his access access to some of new York's York‘s most distin-
T
The M
Main A
P aPrat r t J
3 / I 95
195
guished
guished pianospianos failed
failed toto give
give him
him any any intelligence
intelligence access.
access. Among
Among the the well-known
well-known
musicians whose
musicians pianos he
whose pianos he tuned
tuned waswas the
the world's most famous
world’s most famous pianist,
pianist, the Russian
the Russian-
born Vladimir Horowitz, who whofor the past twenty years had lived on East East94th94thStreet
Street
near Central Park. In 1965, 1965, after a twelve-year hiatus hiatus caused by byaa mixture
mixture of of psychi
psychi-
atric
atric problems
problems and and colitis
colitis attacks,
attacks, Horowitz
Horowitz had had returned
returned to to the concert platform
the concert platform at at
the
the age
age of of sixty-two, becoming, with
sixty-two, becoming, Luciano Pavarotti,
with Lucian0 Pavarotti, one one ofof the two most
thetwo most highly
highly
paid classical
paid classical musicians
musicians in the world. The recital
the world. recital instrument which which he he chose
chose for for his
his
comeback
comeback was was the
the Steinway
Steinway concert
concert grandgrand numbered
numbered CD 186, 1 86, which
which had had toto be
be tuned
tuned
to
to an
an exact
exact440-A
440-A withwith aakey key pressure
pressure of of 45 grams instead
45 grams instead of of the
the usual
usual 4848 toto 52.29
52.29
Overimpressed
Overimpressed by by Rudenko's
Rudenko’s access access to the pianos
to the pianos of new York‘s
of new York's celebrities,
celebrities, the the
Centre
Centre made made detailed
detailed plans
plans forfor him
him to to become
become head head of of aa new
new illegal
illegal residency whose
residencywhose
chief
chief targets
targets would
would be be the
the US mission
mission to to the United Nations
the United Nations and and aa New
New York
York think
think
tank,
tank, concentrating
concentrating on on relatively
relatively junior
junior employees
employees with access to
with access classified informa-
to classified informa
tion-in
tion-in particular,
particular, single
singlewomen
women whosewhose loneliness
loneliness mademade themthem sexually
sexually vulnerable
vulnerable and and
poorly
poorly paidpaid employees
employeeswith with large
large families
familieswhowho werewere open
open to to financial
financial inducements.3o
inducement^.^'
Just
Just as as the
the new
new residency
residency was was about
about to to be be established
established in in New York, however,
New York, however,the the
Centre
Centre noticed
noticed what
what Rudenko's
Rudenko’s fifile le refers
referstoto as "irregularities" and
as “irregularities” and “suspicious
"suspicious behav-
behav
ior" and
ior” and lured
lured him
him back
back to to Moscow
Moscow in in Apri1
April1970 for what
1970for what he was probably
hewas probably toldtold were
were
final
final instructions
instructions before beginning work.
before beginning work. Exactly
Exactly what
what the the Centre
Centre suspected
suspected is is not
not
known,
known, but, since Rudenko
but, since Rudenko was was interrogated
interrogated under under torture,
torture, ititmay
may well wellhave
have feared he
feared he
was
was working
working as as aa double
double agentagent forfor the FBI. What
the FBI. What he he revealed
revealed was much less
wasmuch less serious,
serious,
but
but bad
bad enough
enough to to end
end his his career
career as as an
an illegal.
illegal. Soon
Soon afterafter arriving
arriving in Hamburg in
in Hamburg in
1961,
1961, Rudenko
Rudenko had had metmet BERTA,
BERTA, aa 32-year-old
32-year-old ladies’ladies'hairdresser,
hairdresser, whomwhom he he had
had
suggested
suggested recruiting
recruiting as as aa Soviet
Soviet agent.
agent. TheThe Centre
Centre refused
refused and and ordered
ordered himhim to break
to break
off
off all
all relations
relations with
with her.
her. During
During his his interrogation
interrogation in in 1970,
1970, Rudenko
Rudenko admitted
admitted that that
he
he had
had secretly
secretly defied
defied his instructions, married
his instructions, married BERTA and and taken
taken her with him
her with him to to
New
New York.York. Worse
Worse still,
still, he had taken
he had taken downdown radio messages from
radio messages from thethe Centre
Centre and and
decoded them
decoded them in in her
her presence.
presence. Her Her parents
parents had had discovered
discovered that that he he was
was aa spy,
spy, but
but
believed
believed he he was
was working
working for for East
East Germany.
Germany. Rudenko Rudenko also also admitted
admitted that that he was hav
hewas hav-
ing
ing an
an affair
affair with
with aa female
female accountant
accountant (code named MIRA)
(codenamed MIRA) in in Pennsylvania.31
Penn~ylvania.~’
As
As part
part of
of the
the Centre's
Centre’s damage
damage limitation exercise it
limitation exercise it instructed
instructed Rudenko
Rudenko to write
to write
to
to both
bothBERTA and and MIRA letters designed to convince both of
letters designed to convince both of them and,if neces-them and, if neces
sary,
sary, the
the FBI thatthat he hehadhadleftleftthe the
United UnitedStates because of
States because of the
the breakdown
breakdown of of his
his mar-
mar
riage.
riage. He H e told
told BERTA that that hehe had
had found
found ititimpossible
impossible to to live
live with her any
with her any longer
longer
and
and urged
urged her her not
not totowaste
waste timetime trying
trying to totrack him down
track him since she
down since she would never find
would never find
him.
him. InIn the
the letter
letterto
to MIRA, RudenkoRudenko was was allowed
allowedto to express
express his his love
love for
for her
her and pain
and pain
at their separation within what whathis file file quaintly describes "permissible bounds”
describes as “permissible bounds" and
his
his pain
pain at at the
the separation
separation from from her.her. But,
But, he he explained
explained somewhat unconvincingly, his
somewhat unconvincingly, his
sudden
sudden departure
departure fromfrom the the United
United States
States had had been
been the only way
the only way to to escape
escape from
from hishis
wife. Both letters were posted by the KGB in Austria, giving no other other indication of of
where
where Rudenko
Rudenko was was living.
living.32 32
T H E SS U
UCCC
CEE SSSSIIVof
of Makayev
VEE FAI
F A IL
LUUR(HARRY), Brik
Makayev (HARRY),
REESS Brik (HART), Hayhanen
(HART), Hayhanen
(VIK), Grinchenko
Grinchenko (KLOD),
(KLOD), Bitnov (ALBERT), Blyablin
Bitnov (ALBERT), Blyablin (BOGUN)
(BOGUN) and
and
TT H
HSEE WSOWR O
A
DNR T
D
D HA
S
EHN IDE LTDH E S H I E L D // Ir 99 6
6
Rudenko
Rudenko (RYBAKOV)
(RYBAKOV) underscoredunderscored the the Centre's
Centre’s difficulty
difficulty in in finding
finding illegals
illegals capa
capa-
ble
ble of
of fulfilling
fulfilling itsits expectations
expectations in in North
North America.
America. Fisherl'�bel"
FisherPAbel” (MARK) (MARK) was, was, inin
many ways, the exception who proved
many ways, the exception who proved the rule. the rule. He was able to survive, if not
was able to survive, if not actually actually
succeed,
succeed, as as an
an illegal
illegalresident
resident in in the
theUnitedUnited States
States because
because of of aa long
longexperience
the
West
West which
whichwent wentback
back toto his
his Tyneside
Tyneside childhood,
childhood, an an ideological
ideological commitment
commitment which which
probably
probably predated
predated even even the
the Bolshevik
Bolshevik Revolution
Revolution and and aa thirty-year
thirty-year career
career asas aa foreign
foreign
intelligence
intelligence officer, most of it under Stalin, from which he hademerged scarred but
officer, most of it under Stalin, from which he had emerged scarred but
battle-hardened.
battle-hardened. Other Other Cold
ColdWar Warillegals
illegals in in the
the United
United States
States were
were psychologically
psychologically
less
less well
well prepared
prepared for for the
the stress
stress of of their
their double
double lives.
lives. All
All had
had toto come
come to to terms
terms with
with aa
society
society which
which was was strikingly
strikingly different
different from from the the propaganda
propaganda image image of theMain
of the Main
Adversary with which they had been indoctrinated in
Adversary with whichthey had been indoctrinated in Moscow. Unlike KGB officers Moscow. Unlike KGB officers
stationed
stationed in in legal
legal residencies,
residencies, illegals
illegals did did not
not work
work in in aa Soviet
Soviet embassy,
embassy, wherewhere theythey
were
were constantly
constantly subject
subject to
to thetheideological
ideological discipline
discipline imposed
imposed by by the
the official
official hierarchy.
hierarchy.
They
They alsoalso had
had to to cope
cope with
with aa muchmuch greater
greater degree
degree of of personal
personal isolation,
isolation, which
which theythey
could
could diminish
diminish only only byby friendships
friendships and and sexual
sexual liaisons
liaisons which
which werewere liable
liable toto under
under-
mine
mine their
their professional
professional discipline.
discipline. No No wonder
wonder that that some
some illegals,
illegals, like
like Rudenko,
Rudenko, had had
affairs
affairs which
which they
they tried
tried to
to conceal
conceal from from the the Centre;
Centre;that thatothers,
others, like
like Hayhanen,
Hayhanen, took took
to
to drink
drink and
and embezzlement;
embezzlement; and and that
thatothers,
others, likelike Bitnov,
Bitnov, found
found ititdifficult
difficult to to survive
survive
in
in an
an alien
alien market
market economy.
economy.
I1legals
Illegals hadhad also
also to
to face
face unreasonable,
unreasonable, and and ultimately
ultimately impossible,
impossible, expectations
expectations
from
from thethe Centre.
Centre. UntilUntil almost
almost the the end end of of the
the Cold
Cold War,
War, no no post-war
post-war SovietSoviet leader,
leader,
KGB
KGB chairman
chairman or or foreign
intelligence chief chief hadhad either
eitherany
any personal
personal experience
experience ofliv
of liv-
ing
ing inin the
the West
West or or any
any realistic
realistic understanding
understanding of of it.
it. Accustomed
Accustomed to strong central
to strong central
direction
direction and and aa command
command economy,
economy, the the Centre
Centre found foundititdifficult
difficult toto fathom
fathom how how thethe
United
United States
States could
could achieve
achieve suchsuch high
high levels
levels ofof economic
economic production
production and and technolog
technolog-
ical
ical innovation
innovation with with soso little
little apparent
apparent regulation.
regulation. The The gapgap in in its
its understanding
understanding of of
what
what made
made thethe United
UnitedStates
States tick
tick tended
tended to to be
be filled
filledbybyconspiracy
conspiracytheory.
theory.TheThe diplo
diplo-
mat,
mat, and
and later
later defector,
defector,Arkadi
Arkadi Shevchenko
Shevchenko noted noted of of his
his Soviet
Soviet colleague:
colleague:
Many
Many are are inclined
inclined to the fantastic
to the fantastic notion
notion that
that there
there must
must bebe aa secret
secret control
control
center
center somewhere
somewhere in in the
the United
United States.
States. They
They themselves, after all
themselves, after all,, are
are used
used to
to
aa system
system ruled
ruled by
by aa small
small group
group working
working in in secrecy
secrecy in
in one
oneplace.
place. Moreover,
Moreover, the the
Soviets
Soviets continue
continue toto chew
chew onon Lenin's
Lenin’s dogma
dogma that that bourgeois
bourgeois governments
governments are are
just
just the
the "servants"
“servants”of of monopoly
monopoly capital.
capital. "Is
“Is not
not that
that the
the secret
secret command
command cen ten-
ter?"
ter?”they
they reason.33
reason.33
However
However much
much the Centre learned
the Centre learned about
about the West,itit never
the West, never truly
truly understood
understood it.
it.
Worse
Worse still,
still, it
it thought
thoughtititdid.
did.
'
T
TH E C
HE E N T R E S FA
CENTRE’S in
in the
ITH
FAITH the future
future of
of illegal
illegal operations
operations in
in the
the United
United States
States was
was
remarkably
remarkably unaffected
unaffected by
by the
the many
many failures
failures and
and disappointments
disappointments of of the
the 1950s
1950s and
and
1960s. At the beginning of the 1 970s the Centre still had high
1960s. At the beginning of the 1970s the Centre still had high hopes ofhopes of KONOV
and
and DOUGLAS.
DOUGLAS. It alsoalso had
had remarkably
remarkably ambitious
ambitious projects
projects for
for the
the next
next decade.
decade. A
plan
plan drawn
drawn up
up in
in the
the late
late 1960s
1960s envisaged
envisaged establishing
establishing and
and putting
putting into
into operation
operation
T
T h eM M
a ianAi nd vAe dr vs ae r sy a- rPya-
r tP a r t 3
J // I1 9 7
between
between 19691969 and and 1975
1975 tenten illegal
illegal residencies
residencies in in thethe United States, two
United States, two in in Canada,
Canada,
two
two in
in Mexico,
Mexico, and and one
one each
each in in Argentina,
Argentina,Brazil,
Brazil, Chile, Uruguay and
Chile, Uruguay and Venezuela.
Venezuela. For For
use in
use in wartime
wartime and and other
other major
major crises
crises it was also
it was also planned
planned to create five
to create five "strategic
“strategic
communications
communications residencies"
residencies”to maintain contact
to maintain contact with with the the Centre
Centreiflegal
if legal residencies
residencies
were
were unable to operate: two in the United States, one in Canada and two in
unable to operate: two in the United States, one in Canada and two Latin
in Latin
America.34
America.34
This
This visionary
visionary program
program was was to to prove
prove hopelessly
hopelessly optimistic.
optimistic. The The 1970s
1970s produced
produced
another
another crop
crop of of serious
serious setbacks
setbacks in in illegal
illegal operations
operations in in the United States-among
the United States-among
them
them thethe collapse
collapse of of the
the illegal residencies of
illegal residencies of KONOV and DOUGLAS. When
and DOUGLAS. When
KONOV and and EMMA swore swore theirtheir oaths
oaths of allegiance as
of allegiance as American
American citizens
citizens in in 1970,
1970,
their
their neighbors
neighbors apparently
apparently regarded
regarded them them as as aa model
model marriedmarried couple.
couple. In In reality,
reality, the
the
increasing
increasing friction between them
friction between them had begun to
had begun to affect
affect their
their operational effectiveness.
operational effectiveness.
In
In 1971
1971theythey flew
flew to
to Haiti
Haiti to to be
be divorced,
divorced, but informed only
but informed only the Centre and
the Centre and their
their
New
New York lawyer. On
York lawyer. O n their
their return
return theythey still
still contrived
contrived to to keep
keep up appearances as
up appearances as aa
married
married couple
couple by by living
living together
together in in their
their New
NewJersey apartment. EMMA, however,
Jersey apartment. however,
asked the
asked the Centre
Centre to to find
findher hera anew
new partner.
partner. In In October
October 1972 1972 KONOV was was recalled
recalled
to
to Moscow,
Moscow, where where he he died
died three
three years
years later.
later. EMMA was was dismissed
dismissed from from the the KGB.35
KGB.35
Valoushek's
Valoushek‘s career career as
as the
the illegal
illegal DOUGLAS
DOUGLAS was was to to end
end aa few
few years later in
years later in even
even
greater
greater ignominy.
ignominy. His His first
first assignment
assignment in in the
theUnited
UnitedStates,
States, to to penetrate
penetrate the the Hudson
Hudson
Institute,
Institute, was
was wholly
wholly unrealistic.
unrealistic. As As Valoushek
Valoushek later later complained,
complained, had had he hebeen
been able
able to to
use
use his
his real
real identity
identity andand mention
mention his his postgraduate
postgraduate degrees degrees from from Charles
Charles University,
University,
Prague,
Prague, andand Heidelberg,
Heidelberg, he he might
might havehave made contact with
made contact with senior
senior members
members of the
of the
Institute. But
Institute. posing as
But posing as photographer
photographer and cameraman without
and cameraman without higher education he
higher education he
had
hadno no worthwhile
worthwhile opportunity
opportunity to tododoInSO.36 In 1970,1970, unreasonably
unreasonably dissatisfied
dissatisfied with with
Valoushek's
Valoushek‘s progress,
progress, thethe Centre
Centre took tookhim himoff
off the
the Hudson
Hudson Institute
Instituteassignment.37
a~signment.~~
The
The Vaklousheks'
Vaklousheks’ elder elder son,
son, Peter
Peter Herrmann,
Herrmann, born borninin1957, 1957, hadhada brilliant
brilliant
a school
school
academic
academic record
record and and was
was expected
expected to to have opportunities to
have opportunities to recruit
recruit within
within American
American
universities
universities thatthat his
his parents
parents did did not.
not. InIn 1972 Valoushek revealed
1972 Valoushek revealed his his true
true identity
identity to to
Peter,
Peter, told
told the Centre he
the Centre he had
had donedone so so and said that
and said that hishis son
son waswas ready
ready to to join
join thethe
KGB. Moscow
Moscow accepted
accepted the the offer
offer and
and agreed
agreed to to pay Peter's university
pay Peter’s university fees.fees. In
In thethe
summer of
summer of 1975,
1975, shortly
shortly before
before entering
entering McGillMcGillUniversity
University in in Montreal,
Montreal,PeterPeter began
began
training
training in in Moscow
Moscow and and started
started his his career
career as as anan illegal
illegal withwith thethe German
German codenamecodename
ERBE ("Inheritor").
(“Inheritor”). In In 1976
1976 he he moved
moved from from McGill
McGill to to Georgetown
Georgetown University,
University,
where
where he he was
was instructed
instructed to to report
report on on students
students whosewhose fathersfathers had had government
government jobs jobs
(especially
(especially ififthey
they had
had character
character flawsflaws which
which couldcould be exploited), as
be exploited), as well
well as as on "pro
on “pro-
gressive"
gressive” students
students and and professors
professors opposedopposed to the imperialist
to the imperialist policies
policies ofof the United
the United
States. He
States. H e was
was also
also told
told to
to try
try toto find
find aa part-time
part-time job jobininthe Georgetown Center
theGeorgetown Center for for
Strategic
Strategic and International Studies,
and International Studies, make friends with
make friends with Chinese
Chinesestudents
studentsandand discover
discover
as
as much
much as as possible
possible about
about them.38
them.38
By
By the
the endendof of the
the academic
academic year, year, Peter
Peter Herrmann's
Herrmann’s brief career as
brief career as aa teenage
teenage illegal
illegal
was
was over.
over.Early
Early ininMay May1977 1977 Valoushek
Valoushek was arrested by
wasarrested by the
the FBI and and given
given the the choice
choice
of
of being
being charged
charged with with espionage,
espionage, together
together withwith his wife and
his wife and son, or of
son, or of working
working as as aa
double
double agent.
agent. He H e later
later told
told the espionage writer
the espionage writer John Barron that
John Barron that after
after hishis arrest
arrest he he
worked
worked as as aa double
double agent
agent under
under FBI control control forfor over
over two two years
years until
until the Bureau dis-
the Bureau dis-
T
T H EE S
SW OR
WO RD
D A
ANNT
DDH S
TH
E H IEE LSDH I E L D / I1 99 8
continued the operation. "Rudi “Rudi [Valoushek]

[Valoushek]gave us ushis word and he kept it,” it," the FBI
told
told Barron.
Barron. "We“We must
must keep
keep our
our word
word to to him."
him.” OnO n September 23,197923, 1979 an an unmarked
unmarked
furniture van removed all the contents of of the “Herrmann”
"Herrmann" household in Andover
Road, Hartsdale.
Road, Hartsdale. TheThe Valoushek
Valoushek family
family left
left to
to start
start new
new lives
lives elsewhere under new
elsewhere under new
iden tities.
id en tie^.^^39
Valoushek's
Valoushek‘s KGB file, file, however,
however, givesgivesaa very
very different account of
different account of his
his relations
relations with
with
the FBI. For
the FBI. For well
well over
over aa year
year after
after his
his arrest,
arrest, he included deliberate
he included deliberate errors
errors and
and warn
warn-
ing
ing signs
signs in
in his
his messages
messages to to the
the Centre
Centreas as an
an indication
indication that that he
he was
was working
working underunder
instructions
instructions fromfrom the FBI. The
the FBI. The KGB failed failed to
to notice
notice that
that anything
anything was
was wrong
wrong untiluntil
it
it was
was warned
warned by by an
an agent
agent early
early inin October
October 19781978 that
that Valoushek
Valoushek had had been
been turned.
turned.
Soon afterwards
afterwards the the Centre
Centre summoned
summoned him him toto aameeting
meeting in in Mexico
Mexico CityCity with
with thethe
Washington deputy resident, Yuri Konstantinovich Linkov (codenamed BUROV). BUROV).
The
The FBI told told him to keep
him to keep the
the rendezvous
rendezvous in in order
order toto continue
continue thethe double
double agent
agent
deception. Valoushek began his meeting with Linkov by admitting that he and his
family had been under Bureau control since since the spring
spring of the previous year. He H e sus
sus-
pected that he hehad been betrayed by LUTZ LUTZEN, EN , who had haddefected in West WestGermany
Germany
in 1969.40
1969.40He H e complained that he had done done his best to warn the Centre, Centre, butbutthat
thatnono
one had paid attention to his warnings. A subsequent investigation by the counter counter-
intelligence
intelligence department of of the
the FCD Illegals
Directorate uncovered
uncovered an an extraordinary
extraordinary
tale
tale of
of incompetence.
incompetence. A series series ofof warnings
warnings and deliberate errors
and deliberate errors in
in Valoushek's
Valoushek‘s com com-
munications
munications since since May
May 1977
1977hadhad been
been overlooked
overlooked and and messages
messages he he had
had posted
posted to to the
the
residencies
residencies in in Vienna
Vienna and
and Mexico
Mexico CityCity had simply been
had simply been ignored.41
ignored.41
Immediately
Immediately after after Valoushek's
Valoushek‘s warning
warning to the KGB in
to the in Mexico
Mexico City
City inin October
1978,
1978, thethe KGB warned
warned Hambleton
Hambleton that that contact
contact with
with his
his controller
controller would
would be tem
be tem-
porarily
porarily broken
broken for for security
security reasons. InsteadInstead of of being
being toldtold that
that Valoushek
Valoushek had had
defected, however,
however, he was simply given a vague warning that "progressive" “progressive”people and
organizations were under increased increased surveillance.
surveillance. He H e was instructed to destroy all all
compromising materials and to deny everything if he was questioned. In case of
emergency,
emergency, he wasadvised advised to escape toEast East Germany.
Germany. Hambleton, however, however,
remained confident that he had covered covered sufficient
sufficient of his tracks to prevent a case from
being brought against him. In June 1979 1979 he sent a confident message to the the KGB in
secret writing, saying
saying that there was no cause for alarm.4 alarm.42 2
At 7:15 a.m. on November 4, 1979 RCMP officers
4,1979 officers arrived
arrived at Hambleton's
Hambleton’s Que- C21te
bec City apartment with witha asearch warrant. For the next two and aahalf years there was
extensive press speculation and numerous questions about Hambleton in the
press speculation the Cana
Cana-
dian parliament, but no noCanadian
Canadianprosecution. On O n March 3,3,1980,
1980, the first day of
the of the
new Trudeau administration, the FBI made an apparent attempt to to force its hand
handby
producing Valoushek (under a pseudonym) for a press conference conference at Bureau head head-
quarters, where he publicly identified Hambleton as one of his agents. Hambleton
shrugged
shrugged off off the
the charges.
charges. Though
Though appearing
appearing to to revel
revel in
in detailed
detailed descriptions
descriptions of of his
his
secret contacts with Moscow by short-wave radio and other otherhocus pocus, he insisted
that
that he
he was
was not spy: ''A
not aa spy: “A spy
spy isis someone
someone who who regularly
regularly gets
gets secret material,
material, passes
passes it it
on, takes orders,
orders, and gets paid for it. I have never been paid."43 paid.”43According to Ham Ham-
bleton's
bleton’s KGB file, however,
however, between September 1975 1975 andand December 1978 1978 alone he
T
The M
Main A
A dd vvee rr ss aa rr yy --
PPa ra tr t 3
J / 1I 9 9
was
was paid
paid 18,000
18,000 dollars.44
dollars.44In In May
May 19801980the theCanadian
Canadian Ministry
MinistryofJustice,
of Justice, apparently
convinced that there was still insufficient evidence, evidence, announced thatHambleton Hambleton
would
would notnot be
be prosecuted.
prosecuted. Thereafter
Thereafter mediamedia interest
interest inin the case gradually
the case gradually died
died down.
down.
Two years later, however,
however, Hambleton was arrested during aa visit to London, London, tried
under
under the
the Official
Official Secrets
Secrets Act Act and sentenced to
and sentenced to ten years in
ten years in jail. 45
Valoushek's
Valoushek‘s intended successor
successor as as illegal
illegal resident in in the
the United
UnitedStates was proba-proba
bly Klementi Alekseyevich Korsakov, Korsakov,codenamed KIM, born born in in 1948
1948ininMoscow to
aa Russian
Russian father
father and
and aa German mother. Korsakov's
German mother. Korsakov’s mother, who who died in in 1971, had
herself been a KGB illegal,
illegal, codenamed EV A. Korsakov seems
EVA. seems to have been selected
as a potential
potentialillegal while still a child and, like his mother, was given given bogus identity
documents by the East Germans. According to his legend, Korsakov was was Klemens
Oskar
Oskar Kuitan,
Kuitan, an an illegitimate
illegitimate childchild born
born inin Dalleghof
Dalleghof in 1948. 1948. LikeLike many
many other
Soviet illegals,
illegals, he and his mother posed as East German German refugees, entering West West
Berlin in 1953
1953 and moving to the the FRG a year later. In 1967, 1967, at atthetheage of
of eighteen,
Korsakov obtained a West WestGermanGermanpassport. After his mother’s mother's death, he he spent sev
spentsev-
eral years in Vienna, fi rst at an art school,
first school, then taking an advertising course, while
simultaneously
simultaneously training secretlysecretly for illegal intelligence work. In 1978, after two
transatlantic trips to familiarize
familiarize himself with life in the the United
United States, he moved to
New
New York.
York.
Once he had begun work as a KGB illegal, however, however,Korsakov
Korsakov quickly became dis-
dis
illusioned.
illusioned. In January 1980,1980,while undergoing further tra ining inin
training secretly
Moscow, he secretly
entered the United
United States embassy,
embassy, identified himself as an illegal, gave gavethe identities
of
of aa number
number of of other
other KGB officers
officers (among them Artur
(among them Artur Viktorovich Pyatin, head
Viktorovich Pyatin, head of
of
Line N (illegals
(illegals support) in inWashington)
Washington)and and was debriefed by the CIA station.
Since
Since Korsakov
Korsakovwas wasnominally
nominally aa West WestGerman
German citizen,
citizen, itit was
was decided
decided to to transfer
transfer him
him
secretly
secretly to
to the
theembassy
embassy of of the
the FRG to to arrange
arrange for his exfiltration.
for his Mitrokhin's notes
exfiltration. Mitro’khin’s notes
do not
not record whether the the KGB had observed him entering entering the the American embassy,
embassy,
but
but they
they were
were waiting
waiting forfor him
him when
when he arrived
arrived at Moscow
Moscow airport to to return
return to
to the
the
West.
West. After
After lengthy
lengthy interrogation,
interrogation, Korsakov
Korsakov was wassent to to the
the Kazanskaya
Kazanskaya psychiatric
hospital, where,
hospital, where, like
like aa number
number of of prominent
prominent Soviet dissidents, he was diag
was falsely diag-
nosed
nosed asas schizophrenic.46
schizophrenic.16
T H IIR
RTY
T Y YEA
Y E ARS AFT
TEER
R the
the beginning
beginning ofof the
the Cold
Cold War,
War, the
the Centre's
Centre’s grand strategy
grand strategy
for
for aa powerful
powerful chain
chain of
of illegal residencies running
illegalresidencies running American
American agent agent networks
networks as as
important as
important those during
as those during the theSecond
Second World
World War Warhadhadlittle to show
little show
to forfor an
an enormous
enormous
expenditure
expenditure of of time
time and
and effort.
effort. At
At the
the end
end of of the
the 1970s, following aa string
1970s, following of previ-
string of previ
ous failures,
ous failures, Valoushek's
Valoushek‘sillegal
illegalresidency
residencywas under the
wasunder (albeit imperfect)
the (albeit control of
imperfect) control of
the
the FBI and
and Korsakov
Korsakov was preparing to
waspreparing to defect.
defect.
Particularly
Particularly galling
galling for
for the
the Centre
Centrewas
was the fact that
the fact that probably
probably the most remarkable
the most remarkable
penetration
penetration of of the Main Adversary
the Main Adversary by by an
an illegal
illegal during
during thethe Cold
ColdWar was achieved
Warwas achieved
not
not by
by the
the KGB
KGB butbut by
by its
its junior
junior partner, the Czechoslovak
partner, the Czechoslovak StB. In 1965
StB. In 1965 twotvvro StB
illegals,
illegals, Karl
Karl and Hana Koecher,
and Hana Koecher, arrived
arrived in
in New
New York, claiming to
York, claiming be refugees
to be from
refizgees from
persecution
persecution in in Czechoslovakia.
Czechoslovakia. Fluent
Fluent in in Russian,
Russian, English
English and French as
and French as well as
well as
Czech, Karl Koecher found a job as a consultant with Radio
Czech, Karl Koecher found a job as a consultant with Radio Free Europe while Free Europe while
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
RDD A
ANN D
D TT H
HSE H SI EHLI DE L D
E // 2z 0
o0o
studying
studying first
first for
for aa master's
master’s degree
degree at Indiana University,
at Indiana University, then
then forfor aa doctorate
doctorate at at
Columbia.
Columbia. AmongAmong his his professors
professors at at Columbia
Columbia was was Zbigniew
Zbigniew Brzezinski,
Brzezinski, who who later
later
became President
became President Carter's
Carter’s National
National Security Adviser. All
Security Adviser. All the
the time,
time, he he posed
posed as as aa vir
vir-
ulent
ulent anti-Communist,
anti-Communist, even even objecting
objecting to to the
the purchase
purchase of of an
an apartment
apartment in in his
his East
East
Side
Side building
building in in New
NewYork
York by bythe
the tennis
tennis star
star Ivan
Ivan Lendl-simply
Lendl-simply because becauseof of Lendl’s
Lcndl's
Czech
Czech origins.
origins. InIn 1969,
1969, aa year
year before
before gaining
gaining his
his PhD,
PhD, Karl
Karl Koecher
Koecher was was appointed
appointed
lecturer
lecturer inin philosophy
philosophy at at Wagner
Wagner College,
College, Staten
Staten Island.
Island. Hana,
Hana, meanwhile,
meanwhile, workedworked
for
for aa diamond
diamond business
business which
which gave
gave her
her regular
regular opportunities
opportunities to totravel
travel to Europe and
to Europe and
act
act as
as courier
courier for for the
the StB.
StB. The
The Koechers
Koechers may alsohave
may also have been
been the the most
most sexually
sexually
active illegals in
activeillegals the history
in the history of of Soviet
Soviet BlocBloc intelligence, graduating from
intelligence, graduating from "wife
“wife-
swapping"
swapping” parties
parties toto group
group orgies
orgies atat New
New York's
York‘s Plato's
Plato’s Retreat
Retreat and and Hell
Hell Fire
Fire sex
sex
clubs
clubs which
which flourished
flourished in in the
thesexually
sexuallypermissive
permissivepre-AIDS
pre-AIDS era era ofof the
the late
late 1960s
1960s and
and
1970s.
1970s.
With
With the the blessing
blessing ofof the
the StB,
StB, the
the Koechers
Koechers later
later revealed
revealed some
some of of their
their colorful
colorful
careers
careers toto the
the Washington
Washington investigative
investigative journalist
journalist Ronald
Ronald KesslerY
K e ~ s l e rKarl
. ~ ~ Koecher's
Karl Koecher’s
KGB
KGB file,
file, however,
however, reveals
revealsthat
that hehe withheld
withheldimportant
importantdetails.
details. In
In 1970
1970 he hewas
was sum
sum-
moned
moned back back toto Prague
Prague to to take
take part in an
part in anStB
StB active
active measure
measure designed
designed to to unmask
unmask
alleged
alleged CIA operations
operations using
using Czech
Czech emigres.
emigrCs. Koecher,
Koecher, however,
however,was wastoo
too attached
attached to to
his
his swinging
swinging lifestyle
lifestyle to
to leave
leave New
New York,
York, refused
rehsed totoreturn
return and
and for
for the
the next
next four
four years
years
broke
broke off
off contact
contact with
with thetheStB.48
StB.48InIn 1971
1971 hehesucceeded
becoming aa naturalized
naturalized US US
citizen;
citizen; his
his wife
wife waswasgranted
granted citizenship
citizenship aa year
year later.
later.
Karl
Karl Koecher
Koecher seems
seems to to have devised aa plan
have devised plan to
to mend
mend hishis fences
fences with the StB
with the StB by by
penetrating
penetrating the the CIA.
CIA. InIn 1973
1973 he hemoved
moved to to Washington
Washingtonand andobtained
obtained aa jobjob as
as trans
trans-
lator
lator in
in the
the Agency's
Agency’s Soviet
Soviet division,
division,with
with aa top
top secret
secret security
security clearance.
clearance. His His chutz
chutz-
pah
pah was
was such
such that
that only
only three
three weeks
weeks later
later he
he demanded
demandedaa better
better job:
job:
My
My present
present position
position is by no
is by no means
means one
one which
which would
would require
require aa PhD.
PhD. I am am
interested
interested in
in intelligence
intelligence work,
work, and
and I want
want to to stay
stay with the agency
with the agency and
and do do aa
good
good piece
piece of
of work.
work. But
But II also
also think
think that
thatit it
would
would only
only be
be fair
fairto
to let
letme
me do
do ititinin
aa position
position intellectually
intellectually far
far more
more demanding
demanding than than the
theone
oneI have now .. .. ..
have now
Probably asas a result of his complaints,

complaints, Koecher was later asked to write intelligence
intelligence
assessments
assessments based on some some of the Russian
Russian and Czech
Czech material which he translated
and
and transcribed
transcribed from
from tape
tape recordings.
recordings.
Sex
Sex in Washington
Washington struck
struck Koecher as as even more exciting
exciting than in New York.
York. In
the mid-1970s,
mid-l970s, he helater
later claimed
claimed nostalgically,
nostalgically,Washington waswas "the
“the sex capital of the
the
world."
world.” The Koechers
Koechers joined the the“Capitol
"Capitol Couples,"
Couples,” who metmet for dinner at at The
Exchange restaurant on Saturday evenings
evenings before moving on for group sex in a hotel
or private
private house,
house, asas well
well asas becoming members
members of a private club
club of Washington
swingers
swingers at Virginia's
Virginia’s In Place,
Place, about ten of whose members
members worked for the CIA. CIA.
Hana,
Hana, blonde,
blonde, attractive
attractive and
and ten
ten years
years younger
younger than
than her
her husband,
husband, later
later boasted
boasted that
that
she
she had had sexsex with numerous CIA personnel, Pentagon officials,
officials, reporters from
major newspapers
newspapers and a US Senator.
Senator. The
The organizer of "Capitol
“Capitol Couples"
Couples” remem
remem-
bered her as "strikingly
“strikingly beautiful;
beautiful; warm, sweet,
sweet, ingratiating; incredibly orgasmic."
orgasmic.”
T h ee M
Main A
P aPYa tt" ' J3 // 22 0
01I
Karl,
Karl, however,
however, "was “wasaa bit strange .. .. ..The
bit strange The women
women he he was
was with
with said
said he
he was
was aa terrible
terrible
lover,
lover, very
veryinsensitive.
insensitive. His wife was waseverything he wasn't."49
In
In 1974,
1974,having
having penetrated
penetrated the the CIA,
CIA, Karl
Karl Koecher
Koecher renewed
renewed contact
contact with
with the
theStB,
StB,
which consulted the the KGB
KGB about whether to reactivate him. Henceforth Henceforthhe hebecame a
KGB
KGB agent
agent with
with thethecodename
codename RINO, as as well
well as
as being
being an an StB
StB illegal.
illegal.The
The Koechers'
Koechers’
adventures
adventures in in Washington
Washingtonsex sex clubs
clubs are
are unlikely
unlikely toto have
have provided
provided the the StB andand KGB
with
with more
more thanthan compromising
compromising information
information and and gossip
gossip about
about Washington
Washington officials,
officials,
most
most ofof it
it of
of no
no operational
operational significance.
significance.Far Far more
more important
important was was the
the classified
classified Soviet
Soviet
and Czech material translated by Karl Koecher Koecher for the CIA which he forwarded to
the KGB.
KGB. Andropov personallypersonallypraised his intelligence
intelligence as "important
“important and valuable."50
~aluable.”’~
In 1975
1975 Koecher
Koecherleft left full-time
full-time Agency
Agency employment,
employment, but but continued
continued on on contract
contract work,
work,
based
based inin New
NewYork.
York. Among
Among the thesubjects
subjects ofof his
his assessments
assessmentswas was the
the decision-making
decision-making
process
process in in the
the Soviet
Soviet leadership.
leadership.” 51
In
In 1975
1975 Koecher
Koecher supplied
supplied the the KGB's
KGB’s New
New York
York residency
residency withwith highly
highly rated
rated intel
intel-
ligence
ligence on CIA CIA operations against the Soviet Soviet Union in in the
theThird World. As Aswell as as
arranging
arranging meetings
meetings in in New
NewYork,
York, hishis KGB casecase officers
officersalso alsomet
met him
him ininAustria
Austria andand
France.52
France.52Among his most important counter-intelligence leads leads was evidence that
was evidence
the
the CIA
CIA hadhad recruited
recruited aa Soviet
Soviet diplomat.
diplomat. Following
Following an an apparently
apparently lengthy
lengthy investiga
investiga-
tion,
tion, the
the KGB
KGB identified
identified the the diplomat
diplomat as as Aleksandr
Aleksandr Dmitryevich
Dmitryevich Ogorodnik,
Ogorodnik, then then
working
working in in the
the American
American department
department at at the
the Foreign
Foreign Ministry.
Ministry. Soon Soon after
after his
his arrest
arrest
in
in 1977,
1977, Ogorodnik
Ogorodnik agreed agreed to to write
write aa full confession
confession but but complained
complained that that the penpen
given
given him
him by by his
his interrogator
interrogator was was tootoo clumsy
clumsy for
for him
him to touse.
use. As
As soon
soon asas he
he was
was given
given
his
his own
own pen back, back, he removed
removed a concealed
concealed poison capsule,
capsule, swallowed
swallowed it before the
guard
guard could
could stop
stop him
himandand died
died in in the
the interrogation
interrogation room. 53
In the
In the early
early 1980s
1980s the the Koechers
Koechers were were themselves
themselves betrayed
betrayed by by aa CIA
CIA agent
agent inin the
the
StB.
StB. Arrested in 1984, 1984, they returned to Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia less less than twotwo years
years later asas
part
part of
of aa deal
deal which
which allowed
allowed the the imprisoned
imprisoned Russian
Russian dissident
dissident Anatoli
Anatoli Shcharansky
Shcharansky
to
to emigrate
emigrate to to Israel.
Israel. According
According to to aa newspaper
newspaper report,
report, asas they
they crossed
crossed thethe Glienicker
Glienicker
Bridge from West Berlin to
Bridge from West Berlin to East Germany:East Germany:
With
With his
his moustache
moustache and
and fur-lined
fur-lined coat, Karl F.
coat, Karl F. Koecher
Koecher looked
looked like
like nothing
nothing so
so
much
much as
as aa fox.
fox. His
His wife,
wife, Hana,
Hana, wore
wore aa mink
mink coat
coat and
and high
high white mink hat.
white mink hat.
Blonde
Blonde and
and sexy,
sexy, with
with incredibly
incredibly large
large blue
blue eyes,
eyes, she
she looked
looked like
like aa movie
movie star.
star.
"The
“The KGB
KGB thinks
thinks highly
highly of
of me,"
me,” Karl
Karl Koecher
Koecher later
later boasted
boasted toto Ronald
Ronald Kessler.54
Ke~sler.’~
There
There was
was aa curious
curious sequel
sequel to
to the
the Koechers'
Koechers’ espionage
espionage careers
careers in
in the
the West.
West. In
In 1992
1992
Hana
Hana succeeded
succeeded inin obtaining
obtaining aa job
job in
in the
thecommercial
commercial section
section at
at the
the British
British embassy
embassy
in
in Prague.
Prague. She
She was
was sacked
sackedtwo
two years
years later
later after
after aa Czech
Czech journalist
journalist revealed
revealed her
her back
back-
ground.55
ground.”
AT
AT T
THE B
BEEG
GII N
NNN II N G of
of the
the 1980s,
1980s, despite
despite all
all the
the setbacks
setbacks of
of the
the previous
previous thirty
thirty
years,
years, the Centre’s plans for the expansion of illegal networks on the territoryof the
the Centre's plans for the expansion of illegal networks on the territory of the
Main
Main Adversary
Adversary still
still remained
remained remarkably
remarkably ambitious-though
ambitious-though not not totoquite
quite the
the same
same
degree
degree as
as aa decade
decade earlier.
earlier. Instead
Instead of
of the
the ten
tenillegal
illegal residencies
residencieswhich
which itit had
had intended
intended
T
THHS
E WSOWR O
E A
DNR T
D HA
D S
/ 2
200 22
to
to establish
establish within theUnited
within the United States
States by 1975,
1975, the Centre planned
the Centre planned toto have
have six
six by
by
1982.
1982. Between them, the the six
six residencies werewere supposed to have three to four sources
sources
in
in each
each of
of aa series
series of
of major
major penetration
penetration targets:
targets: the
the White
White House, the the State
StateDepart
Depart-
ment, thethe Pentagon and what were described as "related “related institutions"-among
institutions”-among them
the Hudson
HudsonInstitute, thethe
Institute, Rand Corporation,
Rand Columbia
Corporation, University's
University’s School of Inter
Columbia Inter-
national Relations, Georgetown University's
university’s Center for for Strategic Studies and the the
West German affi liates of Stanford University's
affiliates University’s Center for Strategy and Research.
Research.
The Centre also planned the "active “activerecruitment"
recruitment” of students atatColumbia, New York
and
and Georgetown
GeorgetownUniversities.
Uni~ersities.’~56
It is clear that the KGB had some some success
success in deploying illegals
illegals against the Main
Main
Adversary in the the 1980s.
1980s. For example,
example, Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notes record that in in 1983
1983the ille
ille-
gal
gal couple
couple GORT and and LUIZA were were operating
operating inin the
theUnited
United States,
States, but
but give
give no
no
details
details of their achievements.57
achievement^.'^ However,
However, even the KGB's KGB’s downgraded plan for six
illegal residencies,
residencies, each with agents at the the heart
heart of the Reagan administration, was
hopelessly unrealistic.
unrealistic. The scale
scale of the Centre's
Centre’s ambitious projects for illegal opera
opera-
tions against the Main MainAdversary in the thelater years of the Cold
ColdWarWarreflected not thethe
reality of the 1980s
1980sbut butthethe
spell still cast by the triumphs
triumphs of the Great
GreatIllegals
Illegals half
half a
century
century before.
before.
T H I R T E E n
T
T H EE MA
A II N
NA D
AVDEVRE SR A
SRAY
RY
Pa
P a r t 4 : Wa
W a lk
l k - ii nn ss aannddLLe gega
a l lR R
e seisdiede
n cn icei se si ni n th
tbe L
L aattee rr CCoolld
d WWa
a rr
YYuri Andropov became KGB chairman in 1967 1967withwithextravagant

extravagant expectations
expectations of
of the
potential contribution of political intelligence to Soviet Soviet foreign policy,
policy, particularly
towards the United
United States. In a report to KGB Party activistsactivists soon after his appoint
appoint-
ment, he declared that the KGB must be in a position to influence the outcome of of
international crises
crises in aa way that it had
had failed to dodo during thethe Cuban
Cuban missile crisis
crisis
five
five years
years earlier.
earlier. He ordered the preparation within three to four months of a First First
Chief
Chief (Foreign Intelligence) Directorate report to the Central CentralCommittee
Committeeononthethe
current
current and
and future
hture policy
policy of
of the
the Main Adversary
Adversary andand its
its allies.
allies. The
The principal
principal weak
weak-
ness of current operations in the the United
United States, Andropov complained,
complained, was the lack
of American agents of the thecaliber of the Britons Kim Philby,
Philby,George Blake and John
Vassall,
Vassall, or
or the
the West
WestGerman
GermanHeinz HeinzFelfe.
Felfe. Only
Only byby recruiting
recruiting such
such agents,
agents, he
he insisted,
insisted,
could
could the
the FCD gaingain access
access to
to really
really high-grade intelligence.’1
high-grade intelligence.
Almost from the momentmoment he he became
became a candidate (non-voting) member of the
Politburo in 1967,
1967,Andropov established himself
himself as a powerful
powerhl voice in Soviet
Soviet foreign
policy.
policy. In 1968 he
1968 heemerged as the chief spokesman of those calling for "extreme mea
“extreme mea-
sures"
sures”to crush the Prague Spring.2
Spring.?During the the1970s
1970s he hebecame co-sponsor, with the the
foreign minister,
minister, Andrei Gromyko, of the main foreign policy proposals proposals brought
before
before the
the Politburo
Politburo (of
(of which
which both
both were
were full,
full, voting members from
voting members from 1973).
1973). Dmitri
Dmitri
Ustinov, who became Defense Minister in 1977, 1977, sometimes added his signature to
the proposals
proposals worked out with with Gromyko. According to the the long-serving Soviet
ambassador in Washington,
ambassador Washington,Anatoli
AnatoliDobrynin:
Dobrynin:
Andropov had the the advantage

advantage of familiarity with both
both foreign policy and milimili-
tary
tary issues
issues from
from thethe KGB's
KGB’s broad
broad sources
sources of information .. .. .. Gromyko
of information Gromyko andand
Ustinov
Ustinov were
were authorities
authorities inin their
their respective
respective domains
domains but
but laid
laid no
no special
special claim
claim
to
to each
each other's
other’sfields
fieldsin
in the
theway
way that
that Andropov
Andropov felt
felt comfortable
comfortable in in both.3
both.3
Under
Under Andropov,
Andropov, the
the FCD,
FCD, which
which had
had traditionally
traditionally been
been wary
wary of
of taking
taking the
the initia
initia-
tive
tive in
in issuing
issuing intelligence
intelligence assessments,
assessments, for
for fear
fear that
that they
they might
might contradict
contradict the
the opin
opin-
ions
ions of
of higher
higher authority,
authority, reformed
reformed and
and expanded
expanded its
its analytical
analytical branch.4
b r a n ~ hOn
. ~ aaO
number
number
n
of
of occasions
occasionsAndropov
Andropov circulated
circulated slanted
slanted assessments
assessments toto the
thePolitburo
Politburo inin an
anattempt
attempt
to
to influence
influence its
its policy.s
policy.’
TT H
HEE S
SW OR
WO R D
D A
ANN D
D TT H
HSE H SI EHLI DE L D
E // 22 00 4
4
Andropov
Andropov became
became one
one of
of Brezhnev's
Brezhnev’s most
most trusted
trusted advisers.
advisers. In
In January
January 1976,
1976, for
for
example,
example, he
he sent
sent the
the General
GeneralSecretary
Secretary aa strictly personal eighteen-page
strictly personal eighteen-page letter,
letter, which
which
began
began sycophantically:
sycophantically:
This
This document,
document, which
which I wrote
wrote myself,
myself, is
is intended
intended for
for you alone. If
you alone. If you
you find
find
something
something ininititof
of value
valueto
to the
thecause,
cause, I shall
shall be
be very
veryglad,
glad, and
and if
if not,
not, then
then I ask
ask
you
you to
to consider
consider itit as
as never
never having
having happened.6
happened.6
Though
Though careful
careful not to criticize
not to criticize Brezhnev
Brezhnev even
even in
in private
private discussions
discussions with
with senior
senior
KGB officers/
officer^,^ Andropov
Andropov was wellaware
was well aware ofof both
both his
his intellectual
intellectual limitations
limitations and
and
declining
declining health,
health, and
and set
set out
out totoestablish
establish himself
himself as
as heir-apparent.
heir-apparent. The
The General
General Sec
Sec-
retary
retary paid
paid little
little attention
attention toto the
the details
details of
of foreign
foreign policy.
policy. Dobrynin
Dobrynin quickly
quickly discov
discov-
ered
ered that what most
that what most interested
interested Brezhnev
Brezhnev about
about foreign
foreign affairs
affairs were
were the pomp and
the pomp and
circumstance
circumstance of of ceremonial
ceremonial occasions:
occasions:
.. .. .. the
the guards
guards of
of honor,
honor, the
the grand
grand receptions
receptions for
for foreign
foreign leaders
leaders in
in the
the Krem
Krem-
lin,
lin, the the fulsome
fulsome publicity,
publicity, and
and all
all the
the rest.
rest. He
H e wanted
wanted his
his photo
photo taken
taken for
for his
his
albums,
albums, which which he
he loved
loved to
to show.
show. He
H e much
much preferred
preferred aa fine
fine ceremony
ceremony signing
signing
final
final documents
documents rather
rather than
than working
working onon them.
them.
During
During oneone meeting
meeting with
with Dobrynin,
Dobrynin, Brezhnev
Brezhnev disappeared
disappeared upstairs
upstairs and
and reemerged
reemerged
in
in field
field marshal's
marshal’s uniform,
uniform, his
his chest
chest clanking
clanking with medals. "How
with medals. “How do I look?"
look?” he
he
asked.
asked. "Magnificent!"
“Magnificent!” Dobrynin
Dobrynin dutifully
dutifully replied.s
replied.* From
From 1974
1974 onwards
onwards aa series
series of
of
mild strokes caused by arteriosclerosis of the brain left Brezhnev a semi-invalid.
mild strokes caused by arteriosclerosis of the brain left Brezhnev a semi-invalid. At
the
the rear
rear of
of the
the cavalcade
cavalcade of
of black
black Zil
Zil limousines
limousines which
which accompanied
accompanied Brezhnev
Brezhnev wher
wher-
ever he went
went was a resuscitation vehicle. By the mid-1970s one of his closestclosest com
com-
panions
panions waswas a KGB nurse,
nurse, who
who fed
fed him
him aa steady
steady stream
stream of
of pills
pills without
without consulting
consulting
his
his doctors.9
doctors.’
THHOOU
UGGHH ANDR RO
O P O V SSTTRREEN
NGT D both
G TH E N E D both his
his own
own influence
influence and
and that
thatof
of the
the KGB
in the
themaking of Soviet
Soviet foreign policy,
policy, his ambitious plans for dramatically improved
political
intelligence onon the
the Main
Main Adversary
Adversary were were never realized. Line
never realized. Line PR (political
(political
intelligence)
intelligence) in the
theAmerican residencies failed failed to live up to his high expectations.
expectations. In
1968,
1968, aa scandal
scandal arose
arose over
over the
the New
New York
York resident,
resident, Nikolai
Nikolai Panteleymonovich
Panteleymonovich KuleKule-
byakin,
byakin, aa former
former head
head ofof the
the FCD
FCD First
First (North
(North American)
American) Department.
Department. Mter the
After the
Centre
Centre hadhadreceived
received aa complaint
complaint against him, probably
against him, probably from
from within
within his
his residency,
residency, an
an
enquiry
enquiry revealed
revealed that
that hehe had entered the
hadentered the KGB
KGB with
with aa bogus
bogus curriculum vitae. Con
curriculum vitae. Con-
trary
trary to
to the
the claims
claims in
in his
his CV,
CV, hehe had
had never
never completed
completed hishis school
school education
education and
and had
had
evaded military service.
service. Fearing that Kulebyakin might defect if he hewere confronted
with
with his
his crimes
crimes in
in Washington,
Washington, he hewas
was told
told he
he had
had been
been promoted
promoted to to deputy
deputy direc
direc-
tor
tor of the
the FCD and summoned home
and summoned home to to take
take up
up his
his new
new office.
office. On
O n arriving
arriving in
in
Moscow,
Moscow, however,
however, he was summarily dismissed
dismissed from the KGB and expelled from the
Communist Party.1D
Party.”
T
The M
Main A
A ddvvee rrss aa rr yy --
PPa ra tr t 4
4 / 2
2005
5
Thanks chiefly to two walk-ins, Line PR in Washington Washingtonperformed rather better better
than New
NewYork during the the mid- and late 1960s. 1960s. In September 1965 1965 Robert Lipka, a
twenty-year-old army clerk in NSA, caused great excitement in the theWashington
Washingtonres-res
idency by presenting himself himself at the the Soviet embassy on Sixteenth Street, a few blocks
from the White House, and announcing that he hewas responsible
responsible for shredding highly
classified
classified documents. Lipka (code-named DAN) was probably the youngest Soviet
agent
agent recruited
recruited in in the
the United
United States
States with
with access
access toto high-grade
high-grade intelligence
intelligence since
since the
the
nineteen-year-old Ted Ted Hall
Hall had
had offered
offered his his services
services to to the
the New
NewYork
York residency while while
working
working on on the the MANHATTAN
MANHATTAN project project at Los Alamos
at Los Alamos in in 1944.
1944. Lipka's
Lipka’s file notes
file notes
that he
hequickly mastered the intelligence trade craft taught him
tradecraft himby Line PRo PR. Over the the
next two years he made contact with the the residency about fifty times via dead letter letter-
boxes,
boxes, brush
brush contacts
contacts andand meetings
meetings withwith aa casecase offi cer.ll
officer.”
The
The youthful
youthful head head ofof Line
Line PR, OlegOleg Danilovich
Danilovich Kalugin,
Kalugin, spent
spent "countless
“countlesshours"
hours” inin
his cramped office in the the Washington residency sifting through the mass of material
provided by Lipka and choosing choosing the most important documents documents for cabling to
Moscow.1
Moscow.12 2 Lipka’s
Lipka's motives werepurely
motives were purely mercenary. During the
mercenary. the two
two years
years after
after he
walked into the the Washington embassy, he received a total of about 27,000 27,000 dollars,
dollars, but
regularly complained that he was not paid enough and threatened to break contact
unless his
his remuneration was increased. increased. Lipka eventually did break contact in August
1967,
1967, when he left NSA atatthe theendend of his
his military service
service to study at Millersville
Millersville Col-
Col
lege in Pennsylvania
Pennsylvania and probably concluded concluded that his loss lossofofintelligence
intelligenceaccess
accessmade it
no
no longer
longer worth
worth his his while
while maintaining
maintaining contactcontact with
with the
the Washington
Washington residency.
residency.ToTo dis
dis-
courage
courage the
the KGB from from trying
trying toto renew
renew contact,
contact, Lipka
Lipka sentsent aa final
final message
message claiming
claiming
that
that he
he had been aa double
had been double agent
agent controlled
controlled by by US intelligence.
intelligence. In In view
view of of the
the impor
impor-
tance
tance of
of the
the classified
documents he he had
had provided,
provided, however,
however, the the KGB had had no
no doubt
doubt
that
that he
he was
was lying.
lying. Attempts
Attempts by by both
both the the residency
residency and and illegals
illegals to
to renew
renew contact
contact with
with
Lipka continued
continued intermittently,
intermittently, without success, success, for forat
at least
least another eleven years.13
another eleven years.”
Only
Only aa fewfew months
months after
after Lipka
Lipka ceased
ceased working
working as as aa Soviet
Soviet agent,
agent, thethe Washington
Washington
residency
residency recruited
recruited another
another walk-in
walk-in with with access
access to SIGINT. The
to SIGINT. The mostmost important
important
Cold
Cold War
War agent
agent recruited
recruited in in Washington
Washington before before Aldrich
Aldrich Ames Ames walked
walked in in 1985
in in 1985
was
was probably
probably ChiefChief Warrant
WarrantOffi cer John
Officer John Anthony
AnthonyWalker,
Walker, aa communications
communications watch watch
officer
officer on
on thethe staff
staff of
of the
the Commander
Commander of Submarine Forces
of Submarine Forces in in the
the Atlantic
Atlantic(COM
(COM-
SUBLANT)
SUBLANT) in in Norfolk,
Norfolk, Virginia.
Virginia. LateLate in 1967 he
in 1967 he entered
entered thethe Soviet
Soviet embassy
embassy andand
announced, "I'm officer.I'd
“I’m a naval officer. I’d like to make some money and I’ll I'll give
give you
you some
genuine
genuine stuffin
stuff in return."
return.” Despite
Despite hishis junior
junior rank,
rank, Walker
Walker had had access
access to to very high-level
very high-level
intelligence-including
intelligence-including the the key settings of
key settings of US naval
naval ciphers.
ciphers. The sample batch
The sample batch ofof his
his
material,
material, which
which he he brought
broughtwith withhim him to
to the
the embassy,
embassy, was examined with
wasexamined amazement
with amazement
by
by Ka1ugin
Kalugin and and thethe Washington
Washington resident, Boris Aleksandrovich
Aleksandrovich Solomatin. Accord- Accord
ing to
to Kalugin, Solomatin's "eyes
Kalugin, Solomatin’s “eyes widened as he leafed through the
the Walker papers. 'I
papers. ‘I
want
want this!'
this!’ hehe cried."
cried.” Walker,
Walker, they
they later
later agreed,
agreed, waswas the kind kind of spy spy who turns up
"once
“once in a lifetime."
lifetime.” Enabling Soviet Soviet codebreakers
codebreakers to crack US navy codes, codes, claims
Kalugin,
Kalugin, gave
gave the the Soviet
Soviet Union
Union "an “an enormous intelligence advantage"
enormous intelligence advantage” by by allowing
allowing it it
to
to monitor
monitorAmerican
American fleet movements.14
fleet movements.14
T
T H EE S
SW RD
WOR A
AND T
T H EE S
SHH II E
E LL D
D // 22 00 66
Walker,
Walker, described
described in in aa fitness
fitness report
report from
from hishis commanding
commanding officer officer in 1972 as
in 1972 as
"intensely
“intensely loyal"
loyal” with
with "a“a fine sense of
fine sense of personal
personal honor
honor andand integrity,"
integrity,” found
found pho-pho
tographing top secret documents and cipher material with aa Minox Minox camera in the
COMSUBLANT communications communications center center so
so easy
easy that
that he hewas
was later
later to
to claim,
claim, "K “K Mart
Mart
has
has better
better security
security than
than thetheNavy."
Navy.’’ He H e went
went onon totoform
form aa spy-ring
spy-ring by by recruiting
recruiting aa naval
naval
friend, Jerry Whitworth,
friend, Jerry Whitworth, and and hishis own
own son son and
and elder
elder brother.15
brother.” ForFor Kalugin
Kalugin the the great
great-
est surprise
est surprise of both the
of both the Lipka
Lipka and and Walker
Walker cases
cases was
wastheir
their revelation
revelation of of"how
“how incredi
incredi-
bly
bly lax
laxsecurity
security still
still was
was atat some
some of of the
the United
United States'
States’ top
top secret
secret installations."16
installation^."^^
Mter
After the
the foundation
foundation in in 1968
1968of of the ultra-secret Sixteenth
the ultra-secret Sixteenth Department
Department to to handle
handle
SIGINT
SIGINT material
material collected
collected by by the
the FCD,
FCD, Walker was transferred to its control and
Walker was transferred to its control and
thus
thus no
no longer
longer figured
figured on on thethe Washington
Washington residency's
residency’s agent
agent list.I?
list.’’ Solomatin, how how-
ever,
ever, was
wascareful
careful to to ensure
ensure thatthat he heretained
retained personal oversight of
personal oversight of the
the running
running of of what
what
became
became thethe Walker
Walker family
family spyring
spyring throughout the the extraordinary
extraordinary eighteen years years ofof its
existence.18
existence.” TheThe reflected
reflected glory
glory of of the Lipka and
the Lipka and Walker
Walker cases
cases waswastoto win
win Solomatin
Solomatin
the
the Order
Orderof of the
the Red
Red Banner
Banner and, and, later,
later, promotion
promotion to to deputy
deputy head
head of the FCD.
of the FCD. Kalu-Kalu
gin's
gin’s career
career also
also benefited;
benefited; in in 1974
1974hehebecame
became the the FCD's
FCD’s youngest
youngest general.19
general.”
Most
Most walk-ins
walk-ins were werelessless straightforward
straightforward than than Lipka
Lipka andand Walker.
Walker. During
During the the
1970s
1970s KGB
KGB residencies,
residencies, especially
especially that that inin Mexico
Mexico City,City, had
had toto deal
deal with a growing
growing
number
number of of "dangles"-double
“dangles”-double agents agents controlled
controlled by by the
the US intelligence
community
who
who offered
offered their
their services
services as as Soviet
Soviet agents.
agents. OneOne ofof the most successful
the most successful dangles
dangles was was
MAREK, aa master
MAREK, master sergeant
sergeant of of Czech
Czech descent
descent atat the
the Fort
Fort Bliss army base
Bliss army base inin Texas,
Texas,
who
who visited
visited the
the Soviet
Soviet embassy
embassy in in Mexico
Mexico in in December
December 1966 1966 andand offered
offered informa
informa-
tion
tion on
on electronic
electronic equipment
equipment used used by by the
the US army.
army. Recruited
Recruited in in June
June 1968,
1968,he hehadhad
numerous
numerous meetings
meetings over over the
the next
next eight
eight years
years with
with aa grand
grand total
total ofof twenty-six
twenty-six case case
officers
officers in
in Mexico,
Mexico, West West Germany,
Germany, Switzerland,
Switzerland, Japan
Japan andand Austria.
Austria. In In May 1976,
May 1976,
however,
however, thethe KGB learnedlearned from from thethe former
former CIA officerofficer Philip
Philip Agee (PONT) that
Agee (PONT) that
MAREK was was aa US dangle, run
US dangle, run inin aajoint
jointCINDefense
CINDefenseIntelligence
Intelligence Agency
Agency operaopera-
tion
tion of
of which
which he he had
had personal
personal knowledge.
knowledge.20 20
By
By the
the late
late 1970s
1970s aa special
special Pentagon
Pentagon panel panel was
was selecting
selecting classified
documents
which
which were
were given
given to to American
American dangles,
dangles, mostly
mostly non-commissioned
non-commissioned officers officers selected
selected
by
by the
the DIA to strengthentheir
to strengthen their credibility
credibility as as Soviet spies. As
Soviet spies. As well
well asas providing
providing aa
potential channel for disinformation in a conflict or crisis, crisis, large amounts of KGB
time
time and
and energy
energy were
were wasted
wasted in in distinguishing
distinguishing dangles
dangles from
from genuine
genuine walk-ins.
walk-ins. The The
most successful
successful of of the real Soviet recruits, Aldrich Ames, said later that the therefusal
rehsalof
the Red Army to to release classified
classifieddocuments made it impossible impossible for Soviet dangles dangles
to
to compete withwith those
those ofof the
the United
United States:
States:
Even if a document were of no real value, no one in the Soviet military was
willing to sign off
off on releasing
releasing it, knowing that ititwas going totobe passed to the
West. They were afraid that a few months later,later, they would be called before
some Stalin-like tribunal and be shot for
some fortreason.
treason.2121
Throughout
Throughout thethe Cold
ColdWarWarthe weakness of the Washington
themain weakness Washington residency was
its inability to recruit agents able to provide high-level political intelligence from
T
The M
Main A
P aPrat r t 4 / 22 00 77
within the federal government. At the end of of the

the 1960s,
1960s, however,
however, it had one non non-
agent source
source to which it attached great importance. A line PR officer, officer, Boris Sedov,
Sedov,
operating
operating under
undercover
cover as as aa Novosti
Novosti journalist,
journalist, had hadsucceeded
succeeded in making makingcontact
contact with
with
Henry
Henry Kissinger
Kissinger whilewhile he he was
was still
still aa professor
professor at at Harvard
Harvard University.
University. According to to
Kalugin,
Kalugin, "We“We never
never hadhad any illusions about
any illusions about trying
trying totorecruit
recruit Kissinger:
Kissinger: he he was
was sim
sim-
ply a source of political intelligence."
intelligence.” When Kissinger became an adviser to Nixon
during
during thethe1968
1968 election
election campaign,
campaign, he he began
began to use Sedov
to use Sedov to pass messages
to pass messages to to
Moscow
Moscow that that Nixon’s
Nixon's public image as
public image as an
an unreconstructed
unreconstructed Cold Cold WarWar warrior
warrior was was
false
false and
and that
that hehewanted
wantedbetter betterrelations
relations with
with the the Soviet
Soviet Union.
Union. Mter Nixon's elec
After Nixon’s elec-
tion
tion victory,
victory, Brezhnev
Brezhnev sent sent personal
personal congratulations
congratulations to to him
himviavia Sedov
Sedov together
together withwith
aa note
note expressing
expressing the hope that
the hope together they
that together they would
would establish better US-Soviet
establish better US-Soviet
relations.
relations. While
While the the presidential
presidential campaign
campaign had been underway,
had been underway, the the long-serving
long-serving
Soviet
Soviet ambassador,
ambassador, Anatoli Dobrynin, had
Anatoli Dobrynin, had tolerated
tolerated Sedov's secret contacts
Sedov’s secret contacts with
with
Kissinger.
Kissinger. Once Nixon entered the White Houseand and Kissinger became his
National
National Security
Security Adviser,
Adviser, however,
however, he he insisted
insisted on on taking
taking overover the
the back channel to to
the
the Kremlin
Kremlin himself.
himself.22 22
When
When Kissinger
Kissinger tooktook overover asas Secretary
Secretary of of State
State inin 1973, Dobrynin
Dobrynin became
became the the
only
only ambassador
ambassador in Washington who
in Washington who . was allowed to
was allowed to enter the the State
StateDepartment
Department
unobserved
unobserved via via the
the underground
underground garage.garage.23 23 The
The Washington
residency complained
complained to to
the
the Centre
Centre thatthat Kissinger
Kissinger had had forbidden
forbidden his his officials
officials toto meet
meet members
members of of the
the Soviet
Soviet
embassy
embassy outside
outside office
office hours,
hours, thus
thus making
making it it impossible
impossible for for residency
residency officers
officers to to
develop
develop contacts
contacts of of their
their ownown within
within the the State
State Department
Department and and "check
“check Kissinger's
Kissinger’s
true intentions when
true intentions when negotiating
negotiating with Ambassador Dobrynin."24
with Ambassador D ~ b r y n i n . During
” ~ ~ his
During his twenty
twenty-
three
three years
years inin Washington
Washingtonfrom from 1963
1963 to to 1986,
1986,Dobrynids
Dobrynin’s accessaccessto to aa series
series of
of major
major
policy-makers
policy-makers from Dean Rusk under Kennedy to George Shultz underReagan was
from Dean Rusk under Kennedy to George Shultz under Reagan was
never
never equaled
equaled by by the
the Washington
Washingtonresidency.25
re~idency.~’
Line
Line PR at at the
theNew NewYork residency had
York residency had no success in
no success in recruiting
recruiting "valuable
“valuable agents"
agents”
within
within the the US administration
administration either. either. TheThe United Nations, however,
United Nations, however, was was aa much
much
softer
softer target.
target. Of
Of thethe more
more thanthan 300300Soviet
Soviet nationals
nationals employed
employed in in the
theUN Secretariat,
Secretariat,
many
many werewere KGBKGB and and GRU officers,
officers, agents
agents and and co-optees.
co-optees. KGB KGB officers
officers operating
operating
under
under diplomatic
diplomatic cover became the
cover became the trusted personal assistants
trusted personal assistants to to successive
successive UN
secretaries-general:
secretaries-general: Viktor Viktor Mechislavovich
Mechislavovich Lesiovsky Lesiovsky to to U Thant,
Thant, Lesiovsky
Lesiovsky and and
Valeri
Valeri Viktorovich
Viktorovich Krepkogorsky
Krepkogorsky to to Kurt
Kurt Waldheim
Waldheim and and Gennadi
Gennadi Mikhaylovich
Mikhaylovich
Yevstafeyev
Yevstafeyevto to Javier
Javier Perez
Pkrez de de Cuellar.
CuCllar.26 26 The
The KGB made made strenuous attempts to
strenuous attempts culti
toculti-
vate
vate Waldheim
Waldheim in in particular,
particular, arranging
arranging for for the
the publication
publication of flattering articles
of flattering articles about
about
him
him in in the
the Soviet
Soviet press
press andand selecting
selecting aa painting
painting of of Samarkand
Samarkand by by aa Soviet
Soviet artist
artist
which
which waswas personally
personally presented
presented to to him
him by by Lesiovsky
Lesiovsky and and Krepkogorsky
Krepkogorskywhen when he he vis
vis-
ited the USSR.
ited the USSR.27 2 7
According
According to to Arkadi
Arkadi Nikolayevich
Nikolayevich Shevchenko,
Shevchenko, the the Russian
Russian under
under secretary
secretary-
general
general at at the
the UN who who defected
defected in 1978, Lesiovsky
in 1978, Lesiovsky and and Krepkogorsky
Krepkogorsky were given
were given
largely
largely routine
routine responsibilities
responsibilities by by Waldheim,
Waldheim, checkingchecking the the order
order of of speakers
speakers at at the
the
General
General Assembly
Assembly or or representing
representing him him at at innumerable
innumerable diplomatic
diplomatic receptions,
receptions, but but
were
were frozen
frozen outout ofof sensitive
sensitiveUN business
business by by what
what they
they claimed
claimed was was Waldheim's
Waldheim’s''Aus “Aus-
trian
trian mafia."
mafia.” The
The UN Secretariat
Secretariat in in New
New YorkYork none
none the less became
the less became aa muchmuch moremore
TT H
HEE S
SW OR
WO R D
D A
ANN D
D TT H
HSEHS
E I EHLI DE L D // 22 00 88
successful
successful recruiting
recruiting ground
ground than the the federal
than federal government
government in in Washington.
Washington.
Shevchenko
Shevchenko frequently
frequently saw
saw Lesiovsky
Lesiovsky in in the
thedelegates'
delegates’lounge,
lounge, "buying
“buying drinks
drinks for
for an
an
ambassador,
ambassador, telling
telling amusing
amusing stories,
stories, procuring
procuring hard-to-get
hard-to-get theater
theater oror opera
opera tickets,
tickets,
name
name dropping,
dropping, ingratiating
ingratiating himself."28
himself.”28TheThe Secretary-General's
Secretary-General’s KGB personal personal
assistants
assistants spent much of their time cultivating and trying torecruit members of
spent much of their time cultivating and trying to recruit members of for
for-
eign missions and
eign missions and the
the UN
UN Secretariat
Secretariat from
from around
around thethe world. 29
The
The Centre,
Centre, however,
however, frequently
frequently expressed
expressed disappointment
disappointment with with political
political intelli
intelli-
gence
gence operations
operations byby the
the New
New York
York residency
residency outside
outside the
the United Nations. The
United Nations. The resi
resi-
dency's work was seriously disrupted in 1973 when it discovered
dency’s work was seriously disrupted in 1973 when it discovered that the that the FBI had
had
detailed
detailed information
the activities
activities of
of some
some ofof its
its operations
operations officers,
officers, as
as well
well as
as of
of
three
three "developmental"
“developmental”agents
agents (codenamed
(codenamed GREK,GREK, BREST
BREST and and BRIZ).30
BRIZ).30A report
report atat
the
the end
end of
of 1974
1974 concluded
concluded that
that Line
Line PR's
PR’s performance
performance had had been
been unsatisfactory
unsatisfactory for for
some
some time
time past:
past:
For
For aa number
number of
of years
years the
the Residency
Residency hashas not
not been
been able
able to
to create
create an
an agent
agent net
net-
work
work capable
capable of
of fulfilling
hlfilling the
the complex
complex requirements
requirements ofof our
our intelligence
intelligence work,
work,
especially
especially against
against the
the US WeWe have
have not
not succeeded
succeeded in
in achieving
achieving this
this goal
goal in
in 1974,
1974,
either,
either, although
although there
there has
has been
been some
some progress
progress in
in this
this line.
line.There
There have
have been
been sev
sev-
eral
eral recruitments
recruitments (SUAREZ,
(SUAREZ, DIF, DIF, HERMES)
HERMES) and and confidential
confidential contacts
contacts have
have
been
been acquired. But these
acquired. But these results
results still
still do
do not
not move
move us
us any
any closer
closerto
to fulfilling
fulfilling our
our
basic task. 31
basic task.31
None
None of of the
the three
threenew
new agents
agents waswas of
of major
major significance.
significance. SUAREZ
SUAREZ was was aa Colombian
Colombian
journalist
journalist recruited
recruited byby Anatoli
Anatoli Mikhailovich
Mikhailovich Manakov,Manakov, aa KGB officer officer operating
operating
under
under cover
cover asas Komsomolskaya
Komsonzolskaya Pravda correspondent
correspondent in in New
NewYork.
York. A few
few years
yearslater
later
SUAREZ succeeded in
SUAREZ succeeded in gaining
gaining US citizenship.32
~ i t i z e n s h i pDIF
. ~ ~ was
was aa US businessman
businessman who who
provided
provided political
political and economic assessments.33
and economic a s s e s ~ m e n t sHERMES,
. ~ ~ H E M Epotentially
potentially
S, the
the most
most
important
important of of the
the three
three new
new recruits,
recruits, was
was Ozdemir
Ozdemir Ahmet Ahmet Ozgur,
Ozgur,a aCypriot
Cypriot born in in
born
1929.
1929. InIn 1977,
1977,the the
NewNew York York residency
residency was wasableable to to arrange
arrange through
through Arkadi
Arkadi
Shevchenko
Shevchenko for for Ozgur
Ozgur toto gain
gain aa post
post at the UN Secretariat.
at the When Shevchenko
Secretariat. When Shevchenko
defected
defected in in 11978,
978, however,
however, thethe KGB was was forced
forced to to break
break off
off all contact
contact with
with HER
HER-
MES.34
MES.34
DIF,
DIF, the
the US businessman,
businessman, was was also
alsoincluded
included in in the
theWashington
Washingtonresidency's
residency’s list
list of
of
its
its Line
Line PR agents
agents in 1974. Line
in 1974. Line PR had had nine
nine other
other agents:
agents: GRIG,
GRIG, MAGY
MAGYAR, AR,
MORTON,
MORTON, NIK, RAMZES, REM,
NIK, RAMZES, REM, ROMELLA,
ROMELLA, SHEF S H E F and STOIC.35 GRIG
and STOIC.35 GRIG
remains
remains unidentified
unidentified but but is
is reported
reported asas operating
operating in in Canada.36
Canada.36MAGYMAGYAR AR was
was aa lead
lead-
ing
ing peace
peace activist.37
activist.37MORTON was was aa prominent
prominentlawyer lawyer recruited
recruited in
in 1970
1970but buttaken
taken
off
off the
the agent
agent list
list in
in 1975
1975because
because of of his
his advancing
advancing years.years. On
O n his
his retirement
retirement he he put
gut thethe
residency in touch with his son, son, who was was also
alsoa partner
partnerinina well-known
a
law firm.38
firm.38 NIK was aColombian Colombian whowho worked on US-Colombian US-Colombian cultural
exchange
exchange programs.39
program^.^' RAMZES
RAMZES was was anan American
American professor
professor with
with contacts
contacts inin Con
Con-
gress,
gress, academe,
academe, the the press
press and
and Latin
Latin America.40
Arneri~a.~’ REM was was anan Italian
Italian employee
employee of of the
the
UN Se~retariat.~’
Secretariat.41 ROMELLA
ROMELLA was a Latin American diplomat in the UN Secre Secre-
tariat, who made contact with the KGB to seek its help in renewing her contract at
T
T hh ee M
M aaii nn A
A dd vv ee rr ss aa rr y
y --PP
a ar tr t 44 /
/ 2
2 00 99
the
the UN before
before itit expired
expired in
in 1975;
1975; sheshe supplied
supplied both
both classified
documents and and recruit
recruit-
ment
ment leads.42
leads.42SHEF
SHEF was was aa professor
professor at at McMaster
McMasterUniversity,
University, recruited
recruited during
during aavisit
visit
to Lithuania in
to Lithuania in 1974.43
1974.43STOIC
STOIC was was aa Latin American diplomat
Latin American diplomat in in the
the UN Secre
Secre-
tariat.44
tariat.44As in New
As in New York,
York, none
none of of the
the Washington
Washington Line Line PR agents
agents had
had high-level
high-level
access
access to
to any
any branch
branch of of the
the federal
federal government.
government.
Though
Though the theNew
New York
York residency
residencyhad had some
some successes
successes inin electronic
electronic eavesdropping,
eavesdropping,
in
in active
active measures
measures and and in scientific and
in scientific and technological
technological intelligence,
intelligence, its
its Line
Line PR net-
net
work
work mostly
mostly consisted
consisted of of agents
agents atat thetheUN and and ininemigre
emigre communities,
communities, only only aa minor
minor-
ity of whom had
ofwhom had US citizenship.45
citi~enship.~’ TheThe largest
largest concentration
concentration of of agents
agents was
was within
within the
the
Soviet
Soviet colony
colony itself,
itself, most
most ofof whom
whom inhabited
inhabited thethe residential
residential complex
complex in in Riverdale.
Riverdale.
According
According to to KGB statistics,
statistics, in 1975 the
in 1975 the colony
colony numbered
numbered 1,3661,366 Soviet
Soviet employees
employees
and
and dependents.
dependents. Of O f the 533 employees,
the 533 employees, seventy-six
seventy-sixwere
wereoffi cially classed
officially classedas
as agents
agents
and
and sixteen
sixteen asas "trusted
“trusted contacts."46 Most,
~ ~ however,
~ o n t a c t s . ”Most, however,werewerechiefly
chiefly concerned
concerned withwith
informing
informing on on their
theircolleagues
colleagues toto Line
LineSK (Soviet
(Soviet Colony)
Colony) inin the
theresidency.
residency. The
The Cen
Cen-
tre's
tre’s assessment
assessment in in 1974
1974stressed
stressed thethe limitations
limitations ofof Line
Line PR's
PRs New
New York
York agents:
agents:
Not
Not one
one of
of these
these agents
agents has
has access
access to
to secret
secret American
American information.
information. The
The basic
basic
thrust
thrust of
ofoperations
operations with
with this
this network
network therefore
therefore consists
consists of
of using
using it
it for
for the
the col
col-
lection of information from
lection of information from UN diplomatic sources, and from several Ameri
diplomatic sources, and from several Ameri-
can
can [non-agent]
[non-agent] sources.47
sources.47
Lacking
Lacking any any high-level
high-level agents
agents in
in the
thefederal
federal government,
government, LineLine PR offi cers in
officers in New
New
York and Washington, usually operating under cover as diplomats
York and Washington, usually operating under cover as diplomats or journalists, or journalists,
devoted
devoted much
much ofof their
their time
time toto collecting
collecting insider
insider gossip
gossip from
from well-placed
well-placed non-agent
non-agent
sources
sources inin Congress
Congress andand the
the press
press corps.48
corps.48AsAs head
head ofof Line
Line PR in in Washington
Washington from from
1965
1965 to to 1970,
1970, Kalugin
Kalugin got got to
toknow
know thethe columnists
columnists Walter
Walter Lippmann,
Lippmann, Joseph Joseph Kraft
Kraft
and
and Drew
Drew Pearson;
Pearson; Chalmers
Chalmers Roberts
Roberts andand Murray
Murray Marder
Marder of the W
of the ashington Post;
Washington Post;
Joseph
Joseph Harsch
Harsch of the Christian
of the Christian Science
Science Monitor;
Monitor; Carl
Carl Rowan,
Rowan, former
former director
director of of the
the
US
US Information
Information Agency;
Agency; and and Henry
Henry Brandon
Brandon of of the London Times.
the London Times. Kalugin's
Kalugin’s rolerole
when
when he he called
called at
at their
their offices
offices or
or lunched
lunched withwith them
them in inWashington
Washingtonrestaurants
restaurants was was
not that of agent controller or recruiter. Instead, he "would act like a
not that of agent controller or recruiter. Instead, he“would act like a good reporter,’’good reporter,"
carefull
caremy y noting their assessments
noting their assessments of of the
the current
current political
political situation:
situation: "Rarely
“Rarely did did I
come
come upup with
with aascoop
scoop for
for the
the Politburo,
Politburo, butbut the
thereporting
reportingof
of our
our [PRJ
[PR] section
section enabled
enabled
Soviet
Soviet leaders
leaders to
to have
have aa better sense of
better sense of American
American political realities .. .. ..”
political realities " During
During the the
1968
1968 presidential
presidential election
election campaign
campaign somesome of of Kalugin's
Kalugin’s sources
sources provided
provided corrobora
corrobora-
tion
tion for
for Sedov's
Sedov’s reports,
reports, based
based onon conversations
conversationswithwith Kissinger,
Kissinger, that,
that, if elected, Nixon
if elected, Nixon
would
would prove
prove much
much less
less anti-Soviet
anti-Soviet than
than Moscow
Moscow feared. One of
feared. One of Kalugin's
Kalugin’s mostmost
important
important contacts
contacts was
was Senator
Senator Robert
Robert Kennedy
Kennedy who,who, but
but for
for his
his assassination
assassination just just
after
after he
he had
had won
won thethe California
California presidential
presidential primary,
primary, might
might havehave won
won the 1968
the 1968
Democratic
Democratic nomination.
nomination. Before
Before his
his death
death Kennedy
Kennedy presented
presented Kalugin
Kalugin withwith aatie-pin
tie-pin
showing
showing the the PT-109
PT-109 torpedo
torpedoboat boatwhich
which his his brother
brother hadhad captained
captained during
during the the war.
war.
Line
Line PR officers
officers in
in Washington
Washingtonalso had regular
also had regular meetings
meetings with such leading
with such leading senators
senators
as
as Mike
Mike Mansfi eld, William
Mansfield, William Fulbright,
Fulbright, MarkMark Hatfield,
Hatfield, Charles
Charles Percy,
Percy, Eugene
Eugene
McCarthy,
McCarthy, George
George McGovern
McGovern and and Jacob
Jacob Javits.
Javits. The
The Centre
Centre liked
liked to boast to
to boast to the
the
TT H
HSEE WS O
WRO
A
DNR D
D HA
T S
EHN IDE LTDH E S H I E L D I/ 2
2 I1 O
0
Politburo
Politburo that that its its assessments
assessments of of American
American policy policy werewerebased
based on on access
access toto the
the Con
Con-
gressional
gressional elite. lite.^^49
Most
Most of of thethe political
political reporting
reporting of of the
the Washington
residency was was thus
thus based
based on on
non-secret
non-secret sources-to
sources-to the the considerable
considerable annoyance
annoyance of of some
some of of the
theSoviet
Soviet diplomats
diplomats
whose
whose far far smaller
smaller foreign
foreign currency
currency allowances
allowances gave gave them
them lessless freedom
freedom to entertain
to entertain
their
their contacts
contacts in in Washington
Washingtonrestaurants.
restaurants. Despite
Despite his his insistence
insistence on on keeping
keeping the the back
back
channel
channel to himself, Dobrynin took a more benign view of the residency’s work, and
to himself, Dobrynin took a more benign view of the residency's work, and
seemed
seemed genuinely
genuinely interestedinterested in what
inwhat it it discovered
discovered from from both both its its contacts
contacts and and
agents.50
agents.” "In “In tootoo manymany SovietSoviet embassies,"
embassies,”Dobrynin
Dobrynin complained,
complained, "normal “normal personal
personal
relations
relations between
between the the ambassador
ambassador and and thethe KGB
KGB resident
resident were
were the the exception
exception rather
rather
than
than therule.” Ambassador and resident frequently became locked in bitterrivalry as
the rule." Ambassador and resident frequently became locked in bitter rivalry as
each
each sought
sought "to “toshow
showwho who really
really was
wasthe
the boss
boss inin the
theembassy"
embassy”and and to to demonstrate
demonstratetoto
Moscow
Moscow the the superiority
superiority of of his
his own
own sources
sourcesof of information.
information.”51
As
As resident
resident in in Washington
Washington from from 1965
1965 to to 11968
968 Solomatin
Solomatinhad hadgot gotononwell
well with
with
Dobrynin.
Dobrynin. When When he he became
became resident
resident in New York
in New York in 1971, however,
in 1971, however, he he quickly
quickly
began
began to to feud
feud with with YakovYakov Malik,Malik, the
the Soviet
Soviet representative
representative at at the
the United
United Nations.
Nations.
Malik
Malik strongly
strongly objectedobjected to to Solomatin's
Solomatin’s attempts
attempts to to develop
develop contacts
contacts whomwhomhe he
wished
wished to to cultivate
cultivate himself-among
himself-among them them DavidDavid Rockefeller,
Rockefeller,brother
brother of of Nelson
Nelson and and
chairman
chairman of of Chase Manhattan Bank.52
ChaseManhattan Bank.’2 MalikMalik was was fascinated
fascinated by Rockefeller's
byRockefeller’s
30,OOO-name
30,000-name card file of his contacts around the world, cross-indexed by
card file of his contacts around the world, cross-indexed by country,
country,
city
city and
and business.
business. On O n aa visit
visit to
to the
thechairman's
chairman’s sprawling
sprawling seventeenth·-floor
seventeenth-floor offi ce at
office at
the
the sixty-story
sixty-story Chase Chase Manhattan
Manhattan building,
building, MalikMalik asked
asked to to see
see aa sample
sample fromfrom thethe
file.
file. Rockefeller
Rockefeller picked picked out outthethe card
card for for Khrushchev.53
Khru~hchev.’~Malik Malik also also vigorously
vigorously
opposed
opposed Solomatin’s contacts with theveteran diplomat Averell Harriman, regarded
Solomatin's contacts with the veteran diplomat Averell Harriman, regarded
in
in Moscow
Moscow as as one
one of the most
of the most influential
influential American
American advocates
advocates of of better
better relations
relations
with
with thethe SSoviet
oviet Union.
U n i ~ n54. ’In ~ co-operation
co-operation
In with
with Dobrynin,
Dobrynin, HarrimanHarriman later laterreturned
returned
from
from retirement
retirement to to actact asas unofficial
unofficial channel
channel of of communication
communication between between Brezhnev
Brezhnev
and
and Jimmy
JimmyCarter Carterduring during thethe
transition
transition period
period after
after Carter's
Carter’s 19761976 election
election victory.
victory”55
Solomatin
Solomatin complained
complained to to thethe Centre
Centrethat thatMalik's
Malik‘s objections
objections to to his
his attempts
attempts to to cul
cul-
tivate
tivate Rockefeller
Rockefeller and Harriman were
and Harriman were ((characteristic"
“characteristic” of of his
his general
general obstruction
obstruction-
ism.56
ism.56He H e failed,
failed, however,
however, to to tell
tell the
the Centre
Centrethat thatthere
there was
was not not the
the slightest
slightest prospect
prospect
of
of recruiting
recruiting either either Rockefeller
Rockefeller or or Harriman.
Harriman.
In
In anan attempt
attempt to to improve
improve the the quality
quality of of agent
agent recruitment
recruitment in in thethe United
United States,
States,
the
the director
director of of the
the Institute
Institute of of Psychology
Psychology in in the
the Academy
Academy of of Sciences,
Sciences, Boris
Boris Fyo
Fyo-
dorovich
dorovich Lomov,
Lomov, aa ((trusted“trustedcontact"
contact” of
of the
the KGB,
KGB, was was sent
sent inin 11975
975 totoadvise
advise the
the New
New
York
York residency
residency on on techniques
techniques of of cultivation.57
cultivation.’’ In In 1976
1976 the the Centre
Centredevised
devised an an elabo
elabo-
rate
rate incentive
incentive scheme scheme to to reward
reward successful
successhl recruiters,
recruiters,withwith inducements
inducements ranging ranging fromfrom
medals
medals and and letters
letters of of appreciation
appreciation to to accelerated
accelerated promotion,
promotion, new new apartments
apartments and and
cash
cash bonuses
bonuses in in hard
hard currency
currency (which
(which would
would make make possible
possible the the purchase
purchase of of Western
Western
consumer
consumer goods goods that that could
could be be shipped
shipped backback to to Moscow
Moscow at at the
theend
end of of the
the officer's
officer’stour
tour
of
of dUty).58
duty).”
As
As chairman
chairman of of thethe KGB,
KGB, Andropov
Andropov seemed seemed unableunable to to grasp
grasp the the difficulties
difficulties ofof
penetrating
penetrating the the US US administration.
administration. During During the the mid-1
mid-1970s970s he he initiated
initiated aa series
series ofof
hopelessly
hopelessly impracticable
impracticable recruitment recruitment schemes.
schemes. Following
Following Nixon's
Nixon’s resignation
resignation in in
T
The M
Main A
A dd vv ee rr ss aa rr yy --
PPa ra tr t 44 I/ 2
2I1 I1
August
August 1974 1974 after
after the
the Watergate scandal, Andropov
Watergatescandal, Andropov instructed
instructed the
the Washington
Washington res res-
idency
idency to to establish
establish contact
contact with
with five members of
five members of the
the former
former administration:
administration: Pat Pat
Buchanan
Buchanan and and William
William Safire,
Safire, former
former advisers
advisers andand speechwriters
speechwriters to to Nixon;
Nixon; Richard
Richard
Allen,
Allen, Deputy
Deputy National
National Security
Security Adviser
Adviser during
during the thefirst
first year
year of
of Nixon's
Nixon’s administra
administra-
tion;
tion; C.
C. Fred
Fred Bergsten,
Bergsten, an an economist
economist on on the
the National
National Security
Security Council
Council (NSC);
(NSC); and and
S.
S. Everett
Everett Gleason,
Gleason, an an NSC veteran
veteran whowho died died three months after
three months after Nixon's
Nixon’s resigna
resigna-
ttion.59
i ~ n . ’All
Al~lwere
were wildly
wildly improbable
improbable recruits.
recruits. InIn 1975
1975 Andropov
Andropov personally
personally approved
approved aa
series
series of
of equally
equally improbable
improbable operations
operations designed
designed to to penetrate
penetrate thethe "inner
“innercircles"
circles” of of aa
series
series of
of well-known
well-known public public fi gures: among
figures: among them them George
George Ball,
Ball, Ramsey
Ramsey Clark,
Clark, KenKen-
neth
neth Galbraith,
Galbraith,Averell
Averell Harriman,
Harriman, Teddy Teddy Kennedy
Kennedy and and Theodore Sorensen.60 Some
Theodore Sorensen.60 Some-
what
what humiliatingly
humiliatingly for for the
the FCD,
FCD, the the KGB's
KGB’s most most productive
productive agent
agent during
during thethe 1976
1976
election
election campaign
campaign was was aa Democratic
Democratic activist
activist with
with access
access to
to the
theCarter
Cartercamp
camp who
who had had
been
been recruited
recruited during
during aa visit
visit to
to Russia
Russia by by the
the Second
Second Chief
Chief Directorate.61
Directorate.61
The
The KGB's
KGB’s most
most successful
successful strategy
strategy for
for cultivating
cultivating American
American policy-makers
policy-makers was wastoto
use
use the
the prestigious
prestigious academic
academic cover
cover of of the
the Moscow
Moscow Institute
Institute of
of the
the United
United States
States andand
Canada.
Canada.The The secret
secret 1968
1968 statute
statute ofof the
the institute
institute kept
kept at
at the
the Centre
Centreauthorized
authorized the
the KGBKGB
to
to task
task itit to
to research
research aspects
aspectsofofthe
the Main
MainAdversary
Adversary whichwhich were
were ofof interest
interest to
to it,it,toto
pro
pro-
vide
vide KGB
KGB officers
officers with
with cover
cover positions,
positions, to to invite
invite prominent
prominent American
American policy-makers
policy-makers
and
and academics
academicsto to Moscow
Moscow and and toto undertake
undertake intelligence-related
intelligence-related missions
missionstoto the
theUnited
United
States.
States. Among
Among the the KGB's
KGB’s cover
cover positions
positions at at the
the institute
institute was
was that
that of
of deputy
deputy director,
director,
occupied by
occupied Colonel Radimir
by Colonel Bogdanov (codenamed
Radimir Bogdanov (codenamed VLADIMIROV),
VLADIMIROV), sometimes sometimes
described
described behind his back as “the scholar in epaulets.”62The KGB’s most important
behind his back as "the scholar in epaulets."62 The KGB's most important
agent
agent atat the
the institute
institute was
was its
its director,
director, Georgi
Georgi Arbatov,
Arbatov, codenamed
codenamed V ASILI, who
VASILI, who builtbuilt
up
up aa large
large circle
circleof ofhigh-level
high-levelcontacts
contacts in in the
theUnited
United States
States and
and was
was regularly
regularlyrequired
required
to
to cultivate
cultivate them.63
them.63According
According to to Kissinger:
Kissinger:
[Arbatov]
[Arbatov] was especially subtle
was especially subtle inin playing
playing to
to the
the inexhaustible
inexhaustible masochism
masochism of of
American
American intellectuals
intellectuals who
who took
took ititas
as an
an article
article of
of faith
faith that
that every
every difficulty
difficulty in
in
US-Soviet
US-Soviet relations
relations had
had totobe
be caused
causedbyby American
American stupidity
stupidity or
or intransigence.
intransigence.
He
He was
was endlessly
endlessly ingenious
ingenious inin demonstrating
demonstrating howhow American
American rebuffs
rebuffs were
werefrus
frus-
trating
trating the
the peaceful,
peaceful, sensitive
sensitive leaders
leaders in the Kremlin,
in the Kremlin, who
who were
were being
being driven
driven
reluctantly
reluctantly by
by our
our inflexibility
inflexibilityinto conflicts that
into conflicts that offended
offended their inherently gen
their inherently gen-
tle
tle natures.64
natures.64
Though
Though Arbatov's
Arbatov’s access
accessto
to US policy-makers
policy-makers raised
raised KGB hopes
hopes ofof aa major
major pen
pen-
etration
etration of
of the
the federal
federal government,
government, Mitrokhin
Mitrokhin found
found no no evidence
evidence in
in the
the files
files of
of any
any
significant
significant recruitment
recruitment which resulted from
which resulted from it.
it. In
In the
the Centre's
Centre’s view,
view, Arbatov's
Arbatov’s most most
important
important contact
contact during
during the
the 1970s
1970s was
was former
former Under-Secretary
Under-Secretary of of Defense
Defense CyrusCyrus
Vance,
Vance, codenamed
codenamed VIZIR ("Vizier")
(“Vizier”).. During
During aa visit
visit to
to Moscow
Moscow in the spring
in the spring ofof
1973,
1973, Vance
Vance unsurprisingly
unsurprisingly agreed
agreed with
with Arbatov
Arbatov on on the
theneed
need to
to "increase
“increase thethe level
level of
of
mutual
mutual trust"
trust” in
in US-Soviet
US-Soviet relations.
relations. Arbatov
Arbatov reported
reported that
that he
he had
had told
told Vance
Vance-
doubtless
doubtless to no effect-that
to no effect-that thethe majority
majority ofof the American press
the American press corps
corps in in Moscow
Moscow
were
were propagating
propagating "a“a negative
negative propagandistic" image of
propagandistic” image of the
the USSR
USSRatatthethebehest
behest of of the
the
Zionist
Zionist lobby in the United States. In 1976 Arbatov was sent on anothermission to
lobby in the United States. In 1976 Arbatov was sent on another mission to
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
R D
D A
AN D
ND TT H
HEE SS H
H II E
E L
L D
D // 22 I1 22
the
the United
United States.
States. While
While there
there hehe claimed
claimed an an addition
addition 200200 dollars
dollars forfor "operational
“operational
expenses"
expenses”from from thethe New
NewYork
York residency
residency forfor entertaining
entertaining Vance
Vance andand others.
others. From
From such
such
inconsequential
inconsequential meetingsmeetings the Centre briefly
the Centre briefly formed
formed absurdly
absurdly optimistic
optimistic hopeshopes ofof
penetrating
penetrating the the new
new American
American administration
administration after after Jimmy
Jimmy Carter's
Carter’s victory
victory in in the
the
presidential
presidential election
election of
of November
November 1976 1976 and andhis
his appointment
appointment of of Vance
Vance as asSecretary
Secretary ofof
State.
State. OnO n December
December 19 Andropov personally
19 Andropov personally approved
approved operations
operations against
against Vance
Vance
which
which werewere probably
probably intended
intended to to make
make himhim at at least
least aa "trusted
“trustedcontact"
contact’’ of of the
the KGB.
KGB.
The
The operations
operations were, were, of
of course,
course, doomed
doomed to to failure.
failure. Vance's
Vance’s fi le records
file records that,
that, once
once hehe
entered
entered thethe Carter
Carteradministration,
administration, any any possibility
possibility of of unofficial
unofficial access
access to to both
bothhim himandand
his
his family
family drieddried Up.65
up.65 Doubtless
Doubtless to the frustration
tothe frustration of of the Centre, Ambassador
theCentre, Ambassador
Dobrynin
Dobrynin continued
continued to to have
have aa private
private entree
entrke to to the
the State
StateDepartment
Departmentvia via its
its under
under-
ground
ground garage,
garage,justjust as
as he
he had
haddonedoneduring
duringKissinger's
Kissinger’s term
term asas Secretary
secretary of of State,
State, and
and
prided
prided himself
himself on through Vance
on maintaining through Vance the the "confidential
“confidential channel"
channel” between
between
White
White House Houseand and Kremlin
Kremlin which
which thethe Centre
Centrehad had briefly
briefly deluded
deluded itself
itself into
into believing
believing
it
it could
could take
take over.66
over.66
The
The Centre's
Centre’s early
early expectations
expectations of of the
the Carter
Carter administration
administration were were so so unrealistic
unrealistic
that
that itit even devised schemes
even devised schemes to to cultivate
cultivate his his hardline
hardline National
National Security
Security Adviser,
Adviser,
Zbigniew Brzezinski. The FCD drew up a plan to send Arbatov's
Zbigniew Brzezinski. The FCD drew up a plan to send Arbatov’s deputy, Bogdanov, deputy, Bogdanov,
whom
whom Brzezinski
Brzezinski had had met
met previously,
previously, to to Washington
Washington "to “to strengthen
strengthen theirtheir relation
relation-
ship
ship and
and to to convey
convey to him some
to him some advantageous
advantageous information."
information.” On January 3,
O n January 3, 1977
1977
Andropov
Andropov also also approved
approved an an operation
operation to to collect
collect "compromising
“compromising information"
information’’ on on
Brzezinski
Brzezinski as a means of putting pressure on him. Unsurprisingly, as in the case of
as a means of putting pressure on him. Unsurprisingly, as in the case of
Vance,
Vance, thethe Centre's
Centre’searly
early hopes
hopes of of cultivating
cultivating Brzezinski
Brzezinski quickly
quickly evaporated,
evaporated, and and the
the
Centre
Centre concentrated
concentrated instead
instead on on devising
devising "active
“active measures"
measures”to to discredit
discredit him.67
him.67
KGB
KGB Decree
Decree No. No. 0017
0017 of of May
May 26, 1977 declared
26,1977 declared that
that there
there waswas anan urgent
urgent need
need
for better
for better intelligence
the Carter
Carteradministration.
administration. The The Centre's
Centre’s evaluations
evaluations of of the
the
work
work of of the
the Washington
Washingtonand and New NewYork
York residencies
residenciesin in both
both1977
1977 andand
19781978make
make clear
clear
that
that this
this requirement
requirement was was not
not met.
met.LineLinePR's
PRs agent
agent network
network in in the
theUnited
UnitedStates
States was
was
once
once again
again declared
declared incapable
incapable of of meeting
meeting the the objectives
objectives assigned
assigned to to it.
it. Not
Not aa single
single
agent
agent hadhad direct
direct access
access to
to major
major penetration
penetration targets.68
targets.68
Lacking
Lacking reliable,
reliable, high-level
high-level sources
sources within
within the the administration,
administration, the the Centre,
Centre, as as fre
fre-
quently
quently happened,
happened, fell fell back
back on on conspiracy
conspiracytheories.
theories. Early
Early inin1977
1977Vladimir
Vladimir Aleksan
Aleksan-
drovich
drovich Kryuchkov,
Kryuchkov, head head ofof the
the FCD
FCD and and aa protege
protCgC ofof Andropov,
Andropov, submitted
submitted to to him
him
aa report
reportentitled
entitled "On“On CIA PlansPlans to to Recruit
Recruit Agents
Agents Among
Among Soviet
Soviet Citizens,"
Citizens,” reveal
reveal-
ing
ing aa non-existent
non-existent CIA CIA masterplan
masterplan to to sabotage
sabotage Soviet
Soviet administration,
administration, economiceconomic
development
development and and scientifi
scientificc research:
research:
.. .. ..Today American intelligence

intelligence is planning to recruit agents among SovietSoviet
citizens,
citizens, train them and
trainthem and then
then advance
advance them into administrative
theminto administrative positions
positions
within
within Soviet
Soviet politics,
politics, the
the economy
economy and
and science.
science. The
The CIA has
has drafted
drafted aa pro
pro-
gram
gram to subject
subject agents
agents to individual
individual instruction
instruction in espionage
espionage techniques
techniques and
also
also intensive ideologicalbrainwashing .. .. ..The CIA
intensive political and ideological CIA intends that
that
individual
individual agents
agents working in isolation
isolation to carry out policies
policies of sabotage
sabotage and dis
dis-
tortion of superiors'
superiors’ instructions will be coordinated from a single single center
T
T hb ee M
M a i nn A
A dd vv ee1'r s a r yy -
- P Pa ar tr t 4
4 // 22 I133
within the US
within the US intelligence
intelligence system.
system. The
The CIA
CIA believes
believes that
that such
such deliberate
deliberate
action
action by agents
agents will
will create
create internal
internal political
political difficulties
difficulties for
for the
the Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union,
retard
retard development
development ofof its
its economy
economy and
and channel
channel its
its scientific
scientificresearch
research into
into dead
dead
ends.
ends.
Andropov
Andropov considered
consideredthis
this improbable
improbable top
top secret
secret conspiracy
conspiracytheory
theory so
so important
important that
that
on
on January
January 24, 1977 he
24,1977 he forwarded
forwarded it
it under
under his
his signature
signature to
to the
theother
othermembers
members of
of the
the
Politburo
Politburo and
and Central
Central Committee.69
C~mrnittee.~~
TTHHE E CCEENNT TRREE HHAAR RBBOORREEDD far

far fewer
fewer illusions
illusions aboutabout the the incoming
incoming Reagan
Reagan adminis
adminis-
tration
tration in in January
January 1981 1981 than
than itithad
haddonedoneabout
about Carter
Carter four four years
years earlier.
earlier. Any
Any hope
hope
that
that Reagan's
Reagan’s anti-Soviet
anti-Soviet speeches
speeches during
during the the election
election had had been
been mere
mere campaign
campaign
rhetoric
rhetoric quickly
quickly faded
faded after
after his
his inauguration.
inauguration. In In April
April 1981, 1981,after
after aa trip
tripto
to the
the United
United
States
States at at the
the Centre's
Centre’s request,
request, Arbatov
Arbatov sent sent aa report
report on on thethe new
new administration
administration to to
Andropov
Andropov and and Kryuchkov.
Kryuchkov. At At aa dinner
dinner in inthe the White
White House House he had been
he had been able
able to
to
observe
observe Reagan
Reagan for for one and aa half
one and half hours
hours from from aa distance
distance of of only
only fifteen
fifteen meters.
meters.
Though
Though ReaganReagan seemed
seemed to to be
be acting
acting thethe role
role of of president,
president, he he played
played thethe part
part with
with
genuine
genuine emotion.
emotion. TearsTears came
came to to his
his eyes
eyes when
when the the flags
flags of of the
the four
four armed
armed services
services
were
were brought
brought into intothe theroom
room andand when
when he he stood
stood up up andand placed
placed his his hand
hand on on his
his heart
heart
as
as the
the national
national anthem
anthem was was played.
played.Nancy
Nancy Reagan's
Reagan’s eyes eyes never
never left
left her
her husband.
husband. Her Her
adoring
adoring expression reminded Arbatov of a teenage girl suddenly placed next to her
expression reminded Arbatov of a teenage girl suddenly placed next to her
favorite
favorite poppop star.
star.Though
Though Reagan's
Reagan’s speech
speech to to the
the assembled
assembled journalists
journalists waswas "excep
“excep-
tionally
tionally shallow,"
shallow,”the the President
President played
played to to perfection
perfection the the role
role of
of "father
“father ofof the
the nation,"
nation,”
aa great
great leader
leaderwho who had hadkept
kept his
his humanity,
humanity, aa sense sense of of humor
humor and andthe
the common
common touch.70
Both
Both thethe Centre
Centre and and the
the Kremlin
Kremlin took took aa lessless benign
benign view view of of Reagan.
Reagan. In In aa secret
secret
speech
speech to to aamajor
major KGB KGB conference
conference in in MayMay1981 1981 a visibly
visibly
a ailing
ailing Brezhnev
Brezhnev denounced
denounced
Reagan's
Reagan’s policies
policies as as aa serious
serious threat
threat to to world
world peace.
peace. He He was was followed
followed by by Andropov,
Andropov,
who
who waswas to to succeed
succeed him him asas general
general secretary
secretary eighteen
eighteen monthsmonths later.later.To
To the
the astonish
astonish-
ment
ment of of most
most of of the
theaudience,
audience,the the KGB
KGB chairman
chairman announced
announced that, that, by
by decision
decision of of the
the
Politburo,
Politburo, the the KGB
KGB and and GRU
GRU were were for
for the
the first
first time
time to tocollaborate
collaborate in in aaglobal
global intel
intel-
ligence
ligence operation,
operation, codenamed
codenamed RYAN-a RYAN-a newly devised
newlydevised acronym for
acronym for Raketno
RaAetno-
Y Napadenie ("Nuclear
adernoye Napadenie
Yadernoye (“Nuclear Missile
Missile Attack").
Attack”). RYAN's RYAN’Spurpose purpose was was to to collect
collect
intelligence
the presumed,
presumed, but but non-existent,
non-existent, plans plans of of the
the Reagan
Reagan administration
administration
to
to launch
launch aa nuclear
nuclear first
first strike
strike against
Soviet U nion-a delusion
Union-a delusion which
which reflected
reflected
both
both thethe KGB's
KGB’s continuing
continuing failure
failure to to penetrate
penetrate the the policy-making
policy-making of of the Main
the Main
Adversary
Adversary and and its
its recurrent
recurrent tendency
tendency towards
towards conspiracy
conspiracytheory.71theory.71"Not
“Not since
since the
the end
end
of
of the
the Second
SecondWorldWorld War,"War,”Andropov
Andropov informed
informed foreignforeign residencies,
residencies,"has “hasthe theinterna
interna-
tional
tional situation
situation beenbeen as as explosive
explosive as as it
it is
is now."72
now.”72As As Brezhnev's
Brezhnev’s successor
successorin in Novem
Novem-
ber 1982, Andropov
ber 1982, Andropov retained
retained fullfull control
control over over thethe KGB;
KGB; his his most
most frequent
frequent visitors
visitors
were
were senior
senior KGB KGB officers.73
0ffice1-s.~~ Throughout
Throughouthis his term
term as as general
general secretary,
secretary, RYAN
RYAN
remained
remained the the FCD's
F C D s first
first priority.
priority.
For
For several years Moscow
several years Moscow succumbed
succumbed to whatits
to what its ambassador
ambassador in Washington,
in Washington,
Anatoli
Anatoli Dobrynin,fairly described as a “paranoid interpretation” of Reagan’s policy.
Dobrynin, fairly described as a "paranoid interpretation" of Reagan's policy.’‘74
Most
Most residencies
residencies in in Western
Westerncapitals
capitalswerewere lesslessalarmist
alarmist than than Andropov
Andropov and and the
the KGB
KGB
TT H
HSE
E WSOWR O
DRD A
AN D
ND T
THHE
E S
SHH II EE LL D
D // 22 I1 44
leadership.
leadership.When When Oleg Oleg Antonovich
Antonovich Gordievsky
Gordievskyjoinedjoined the theLondon
Londonresidency
residency in in June
June
1982
1982 he hefound
foundallall his
his colleagues
colleagues in in Line
LinePR skeptical
skeptical about
about operation
operation RYAN.
RYAN. None,None,
however,
however, were were willing
willing to to risk
risk their
their careers
careers byby challenging
challenging the the Centre's
Centre’s assessment.
assessment.
RYAN
RYAN thus created a vicious circle of intelligence collection and assessment. Resi
thus created a vicious circle of intelligence collection and assessment. Resi-
dencies
dencies were,
were, in in effect,
effect, ordered
ordered to to search
search out
out alarming
alarming information.
information. TheThe Centre
Centre waswas
duly
duly alarmed
alarmed by by what
what theythey supplied
supplied andand demanded
demanded more.75
more.75The The Washington
Washington resi resi-
dent,
dent, Stanislav
Stanislav Andreyevich
Andreyevich Androsov,
Androsov, aa protege
protCgC of of Kryuchkov,
Kryuchkov,was wasat
at pains
pains toto pro
pro-
vide it.76
vide it.76
The
The Centre
Centre interpreted
interpreted the the announcement
announcement of of the
the SDI
SDI ("Star
(“Star Wars")
Wars”) program
program in in
March
March 1983 1983 as as part
part ofof the
the psychological
psychological preparation
preparation of of the
the American
American people
people forfor
nuclear
nuclear war.war. On September 28,
O n September 1983 the
28, 1983 the terminally
terminally ill ill Andropov
Andropov issued
issued fromfrom his
his
sickbed
sickbed aa denunciation
denunciation of of American
American policy
policy couched
couched in in apocalyptic
apocalypticlanguage
language unparal
unparal-
leled
leled since
since thethe depths
depths of of the
the Cold
Cold War.
War. "Outrageous
“Outrageous military
military psychosis"
psychosis” hadhad taken
taken
over
over the
the United
United States.
States. "The
“The Reagan
Reagan administration,
administration, in in its
its imperial
imperial ambitions,
ambitions, goesgoes
so
so far
far that
that one
one begins
begins to to doubt
doubtwhether
whetherWashington
Washingtonhas has any
any brakes
brakes at
at all
all preventing
preventing
it
it from
from crossing
crossing the point at
the point at which
which anyany sober-minded
sober-minded person person must
must stop."
stop.” Alarm
Alarm
within
within the the Centre
Centre reached
reached aa climax
climax during
during thethe NATO
NATO exercise Archer 83,"
''Able Archer
exercise “Able 83,”
held
held in November 1983
in November 1983 to to practice
practice nuclear
nuclear release
release procedures.
procedures. For For aa time
time thethe KGB
KGB
leadership
leadership was was haunted
haunted by by the
the fear
fear that
that the
the exercise
exercise might
might be be intended
intended as as cover
cover for
for aa
nuclear
nuclear first
first strike.
strike. Some
Some FCD FCD officers
officers stationed
stationed in in the
theWestWest were
were by
by now
now more
more con
con-
cerned
cerned by by the
the alarmism
alarmism in theCentre
in the Centrethan
than by by the threatofof
the threat a a Western
Western surprise
surprise
attack.
attack.7777
Operation
Operation RYAN RYAN wound wound down down (though
(though it it did
did not
not end)
end) during 1984, helped
during 1984, helped by by
the
the death
death of of its
its two
two main
main proponents,
proponents, Andropov
Andropov and and defense
defense minister
minister Ustinov,
Ustinov, andand
by
by reassuring
reassuring signals
signals from
from London
London and andWashington,
Washington,both bothworried
worried byby intelligence
intelligence on on
Soviet
Soviet paranoia.78
paranoia.78The The alarmist
alarmist RYANRYAN reports
reports obediently
obediently provided
provided byby KGB
KGB residen
residen-
cies
cies were
were merely
merely an an extreme
extreme example
example of of Line
Line PR's
PR’s habitual
habitual tendency
tendency toto tell
tell Moscow
Moscow
what
what it it wanted
wanted to to hear.
hear. One
One political
officer later
later admitted:
admitted:
In
In order
order to
to please
please our
our superiors,
superiors, we
we sent
sent inin falsified
falsified and
and biased
biased information,
information,
acting
acting on
on the
the principle
principle "Blame
“Blame everything
everything on on the
the Americans,
Americans, and
and everything
everything
will
will be
be OK."
OK.”That's
That’s not
not intelligence,
intelligence, it's
it’s self-deception!79
~elf-deception!~~
During
During the the first
first Reagan
Reagan administration,
administration, as as at
at other
other periods,
periods, the
the Centre
Centre would
would have
have
gained
gained aa far
far more
more accurate
accurate insight into American
insight into American policy
policy by
by reading
reading the
the New York
York
Times or
Times or Washington Post than
Washington Post than by
by relying
relying onon the
the reports
reports of
of its
its own
own residencies.
residencies. One
One
of
of the
the most
most striking
striking signs
signs of
of Gorbachev's
Gorbachev’s"new“new thinking"
thinking” onon foreign
foreign policy
policy after
after he
he
became
became general
general secretary in 1985
secretary in 1985was
was his
his early
early dissatisfaction
dissatisfactionwith
with the
the FCD's
FCD’s politi
politi-
cal
cal reporting.
reporting. In December 1985
In December 1985 Viktor
Viktor Mikhailovich
Mikhailovich Chebrikov,
Chebrikov, KGB KGB chairman
chairman
since 1982,
since 1982, summoned
summoned aa meeting
meeting ofof the
the KGB
KGB leadership
leadership toto discuss
discuss aa stern
stern memo
memo-
randum
randum fromfrom Gorbachev
Gorbachev "on “on the
the impermissibility
impermissibility of of distortions
distortions ofof the
thefactual
factual state
state of
of
affairs
affairs in
in messages
messages andand informational
informational reports
reports sent
sent to
to the
the Central
Central Committee
Committeeof of the
the
CPSU
CPSU and and other
otherruling
ruling bodies."
bodies.”The
The meeting
meeting sycophantically
sycophanticallyagreedagreed on
on the
the need
need to
to
T
The M
Main A
P aP ratr t 44 // 22 1I S5
avoid sycophantic
sycophantic reporting and and declared the duty duty of all all Chekists both at at home
homeand
abroad
abroad to fulfill "the “the Leninist
Leninistrequirement that we need only the whole truth."80 truth.”8o
Gorbachev
Gorbachev was was far far more
more impressed
impressed initially
initially byby thethe performance
performance of of FCD's
FCD’s Direc
Direc-
torate
torate T. Throughout the Cold War the had greater success in collecting scien
T. Throughout the Cold War the KGB had greater success in collecting scien-
tific and
tific and technological
intelligence (S&T)(S&T) than than in inits
its political
operations
against
against the the Main
Main Adversary.
Adversary. Infiltrating
Infiltrating US defense defense contractors
contractors and and research
research insti-insti
tutes
tutes proved
proved far far easier
easier than than penetrating
penetrating the the heart of of the
the federal
federal government.
government. S&T S&T
also
also rarely suffered from the political correctness which distorted the reporting of
rarely suffered from the political correctness which distorted the reporting of
Line
Line PR in in residencies
residencies and and political
intelligence assessments
assessments at the Centre.
at the Centre. WhatWhat
remained
remained at at least
least partially
partially taboo,
taboo, however,
however, was was thethe difficulty
difficulty experienced
experienced by by Soviet
Soviet
state-run industry
state-run industry in in making
making full h l l use
use of of the
the extraordinary
extraordinary S&T S&T which
which it it received.
received. In In
1971,
1971, for for example,
example, the the defense
defense and and electronics
electronics industry
industry ministries
ministries began
began aa joint
jointproj
proj-
ect
ect toto duplicate
duplicate Westinghouse
Westinghouse cathode-raycathode-ray tubes. tubes. TwoTwo years
years later, because of
later, because ofproduc
produc-
tion
tion problems
problems at at the
the State
State Optical
Optical Institute,
Institute, little
little progress
progress had had been
been made.81
made.“ It It was
was
ideologically
ideologicallyimpossible
impossible to learn the
to learn the lessons
lessons of offailures such as
failuressuch as this,
this, for
for to
to dodoso
so would
would
have
have involved
involvedaa recognition
recognition of of the
the inferiority
inferiority of of the
the Soviet
Soviet command
command economy economy to to the
the
market
market economies
economies of of the
the West.
West. FCD reports reports thusthus concentrated
concentrated on on the thestructural
structural con con-
tradictions
tradictions of of Western
Western capitalism
capitalism whilewhile glossing
glossing over over thethe far
far more
more serious
serious economic
economic
problems
problems of of the
the Soviet
Soviet Bloc.82
Bloc.82
In
In 1970
1970 thethe NewNewYorkYork and and Washington
Washington residencies
residencies each each ran
ran nine Line X agents
nine Line agents
and
and five
five "trusted
“trusted contacts."83
contacts.”s3In In 1973
1973 the thenewnew position
position of of head
head S&TS&T resident
resident for for the
the
United
United States
States was
was established
established in in New
NewYork,
York, withwith responsibility
responsibility for for coordinating
coordinating Line Line
X operations
the three
three American
American residencies,
residencies, as as well
well as as attempts
attempts to to evade
evade the the
embargo
embargo on on thetheexport
export of of advanced
advancedtechnology
technology to to thetheSoviet
Soviet Union.
Union. By By 1975
1975 Direc
Direc-
torate
torate T had had seventy-seven
seventy-seven agents agents and and forty-two
forty-two trustedtrusted contacts
contacts working
working against
against
American
American targetstargets inside
inside and and outside
outside the the United
United States.84
States.83
Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notes notes identify
identify thirty-two
thirty-two of of the
the S&TS&T agents agents andand trusted
trusted contacts
contacts
active
active in in the
the United
UnitedStates
States during
during the the 1970s,
1970s, mostly
mostly recruited
recruited in in the
the same decade. A
same decade.
further
further eight
eight whose espionage is
whose espionage is not
not dated
dated in in the
thenotes
notes were also probably
were also probably active
active in in
the
the 1970s.85
1 9 7 0 ~The . ~ ~companies
The companies for for which
which they they worked
worked included
included some some of of the
the leading
leading
American
American defense
defense contractors:
contractors: among among them IBM, McDonnell
themIBM, McDonnell Douglas Douglas and and TRW.
TRW.86 86
The
The S&T S&T agent
agent network
network also also contained
contained scientists
scientists withwith access
access to
to important
important defense
defense-
related
related projects
projects at at some
some of of the
the United
United States'
States’best-known
best-known research research institutes:
institutes: among
among
them
them MIKE at the Massachusetts
at the Massachusetts Institute Institute of of Technology,87
Te~hnology,’~ and
and TROP in the
in the
Argonne
Argonne National
NationalLaboratory
Laboratory at at the
theUniversity
University ofChicago.88
ofChicago.ss IInn addition
addition to to the civil
thecivil-
ian
ian S&TS&T agent
agent network,
network, there there were also KGB
were also KGB agents
agents in in the armed forces
the armed forces who
who pro pro-
vided
vided intelligence
intelligence on on thethe latest
latest military
military technology:
technology: among among them them JOE, JOE, an an armyarmy
electronics
electronics engineer
engineer who who provided
provided "valuable
“valuable information"
information” on on military
military communica
communica-
tions
tions systems,89
system^,'^ and and NERPA,
NERPA, who who in in 11977
977 was
was engaged
engaged in in weapons
weapons research
research at at the
the
US army's
army’s Material
Material Development
Development and and Readiness
Readiness CommandCommand (DARCOM).90
(DARCOM).90
Though
Though Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s information
the extent
extent and and targets
targets ofof the
the S&T
S&T network
network
on
on thethe territory
territory of of the Main Adversary
the Main Adversary is far more
is far more extensive
extensive than than any previously
any previously
available
available account,
account, it it is
is not
not comprehensive.91
comprehen~ive.~’ There
There is, for
is, example, no
for example, no mention
mention in in
T
THHS
E WSOWR O
E DR D A
ANND
D T
THHS
EE H SI EHLI DE L D I/ 22 1I 66
Mitrokhin's
Mitrokhin’s notes notes of of the
the Californian
Californian drugdrug dealer
dealer Andrew DaultonLee,
Andrew Daulton Lee,
who whoin in
1975-6
1975-6 provided the KGB residency in Mexico City with with thethe operating manual for
the
the Rhyolite
Rhyolite surveillance
surveillance satellite
satellite and
and technical data
data onon other
othersatellite systems. Lee’s
satellite systems. Lee's
source
source waswas his
his friend Christopher Boyce,
friend Christopher Boyce, anan employee
employee of of Rhyolite's
Rhyolite’s manufacturer,
manufacturer,
TRW Corporations
Corporations in in Redondo
Redondo Beach.
Beach. Among the the TRW secretssecrets passed
passed on on to to the
the
KGB was detailed information on how American spy satellites satellites monitored Soviet
missile
missile tests.
tests. In
In 1977
1977 LeeLee and
and Boyce
Royce were
were arrested,
arrested, tried
tried and
and sentenced
sentenced to, to, respec
respec-
tively,
tively, life
life and
and forty
forty years'
years’ imprisonment.
imprisonment. Both Both achieved
achieved celebrity
celebrity status
status asas the
the sub
sub-
jects
jects of
of the
thebestselling
bestselling book
book and film The Falcon and the Snowman.92
and film Snowman.92One One ofof the
the KGB
files noted
files noted by by Mitrokhin reveals that only
Mitrokhin reveals only aa year after
after the
the arrest
arrest of
of Lee
Lee and BoyceBoyce the
KGB recruited
recruited another,
another, possibly
possibly even
even more important,
important, spyspy inin TRW with with thethe code
code-
name ZENIT. While WhileBoyce had been only a clerk (though with with access
access to classified
classified
documents),
documents), ZENIT ZENIT was was aa scientist.93
scientist.93
Directorate T was proud of of its achievements,
achievements, particularly against the Main MainAdver
Adver-
sary, anxious to
sary, and anxious to bring them
them to to the
the attention
attention of of the
the Soviet
Soviet leadership. Brezhnev
Brezhnev
was
was informed
informed in in 1972
1972 that
that S&T
S&T hadhad produced aa saving
saving during
during thethe past year
year of of over
over
a hundred million convertible roubles.94 roubles.94Among the the successes
successes singled out for Brezh- Brezh
nev's
nev’s attention was intelligence on the construction of of the American space shuttle
and
and preparations for for unmanned
unmanned flights
flights to
to Mars. This, he he was
was told,
told, would solve solve aa
number of of current problems in the development of of Soviet space technology. S&T S&T
intelligence
thepelletization
pelletization of of seeds,
seeds, he
he was
was further (doubtless unrealis-
fbrther assured (doubtless unrealis
tically),
tically), would increase
increase the Soviet grain harvest by 20 to 30 30 per cent and shorten
growing time.95
time.95 In 1973
1973 Directorate
DirectorateT reported
reported that
that itithad
hadacquired
acquired overover 26,000
26,000 doc doc-
uments and 3,700 "samples."
“samples.”Though only a minority of ofthis material was classified,
classified,
it
it included
included top top secret
secret information
the Saturn
Saturn rocket,
rocket, the
the Apollo space missions,
Apollo space missions,
the
the Poseidon,
Poseidon, Honest
Honest John,John, Redeye,
Redeye, Roland,
Roland, Hydra
Hydra andand Viper
Viper missiles,
missiles, thethe Boeing
747
747jumbo
jumbo jetjet
and
and computer
computer technology
technology subsequently plagiarized in
subsequently plagiarized in thetheconstruction
construction
of
of the
the Minsk-32
Minsk-32 computer.96
computer.96
The triumphs of of S&T collection figured prominently in the theChekist
ChekistHall of of Fame
opened by the FCD at Yasenevo Yasenevo in 1977 1977 to to mark the sixtieth anniversary
anniversary of the the
October Revolution. Directorate T's T’s exhibit claimed that during the the previous fivefive
year period it had had obtained over 140,000 140,000 S&T S&T documents and more than 20,000
"samples."
“samples.”These were alleged to have produced an economic benefit of of over one bil bil-
lion roubles for the Soviet economy and to have advanced advancedresearch
researchwork in a number
of
of branches
branches of of science
science andand technology
technology by periods of
by periods from two
of from two toto six
six years.97
years.97
Leonid
Leonid Sergeyevich Zaitsev, the
Sergeyevich Zaitsev, the dynamic
dynamic and and ambitious
ambitious head head of of Directorate
Directorate T
appointed inin1975, 1975,argued
argued that
that ititshould
should be
be allowed
allowedto leave the the FCD and and become an
independent directorate within the theKGB. It would, he claimed,claimed, need a budget of ofonly
11percent
percent per
per annum
annum of of the
the value
value of
of the
theS&T which
which itit supplied
supplied to to Soviet
Soviet industry
industry and and
agriculture.98
agri~ulture.~~ The Thehead ofof the FCD,
FCD, Kryuchkov,
Kryuchkov, however, was was determined not not to
allow
allow such
such aa prestigious
prestigious part of his
part of his intelligence
intelligence empire
empire to to escape
escape from his control.
from his control.
Despite failing to win its freedom, Directorate T increasingly increasingly operated indepen- indepen
dently
dently from
from thethe rest of the
rest of the FCD.
FCD. Its Its new
new recruits
recruits mostly
mostly came
came from
from scientific
scientific or or engi
engi-
neering backgrounds, had their own curriculum in the theAndropov
AndropovInstitute
Institute (the FCD
(the
T
T hh eeM M
a ianAi nd vAe dr ·v
s ae r sy a- rPya-
r tP a r t 4
4 // 22 I1 7
academy)
academy) and and trained
trained separately
separately from from those
those in other departments.
in other departments. In In foreign
foreign resi
resi-
dencies
dencies LineLine X X officers
officers mixed
mixedrelatively
relativelylittle
little with
with their
their colleagues
colleagues in in other
otherlines.99
lines,99
The
The Military-Industrial
Military-Industrial Commission Commission (VPK), (VPK), which
which was was mainly
mainly responsible
responsible for for
overseeing
overseeingDirectorate
DirectorateT, T,showed
showed greater
greater interest
interest in in non-American
non-American targets targets than
than durdur-
ing
ing the
theearly
early Cold
Cold War.
War.lo0100 The
The United
United States
States nonenone the the less
less remained
remained aa more more impor
impor-
tant
tant S&T
S&T target
target than
than thethe rest
rest of
of the
the world
world combined.
combined. In In 1980
1980 661.5 1 .5 percent
percent of of the
the
VPK's
VPKs information
information came came from from American
American sourcessources (some(some outside
outside the the USA),
USA), 10.510.5 per
per-
cent
cent from
from WestWest Germany,
Germany, 88 percentpercent fromfrom France,
France, 7.5 7.5percent
percent fromfrom Britain
Britain and and 33 per
per-
cent
cent from
from Japan.101
Japan.’” In In 1980
1980 the theVPK gave gave instructions
instructions for for 3,617
3,617 "acquisition
“acquisition tasks,"
tasks,’’
of
of which
which 1,0851,085 were
were completed
completed within within aa year,
year, benefi ting 3,396
benefiting 3,396 Soviet
Soviet research
research and and
development
development projects.102
projects.lo2Directorate
Directorate T T was
was its its chief
chief collection
collection agency.
agency.
Directorate
Directorate T T owed
owed much much of ofitsits success
success in meeting so
in meeting so many
many of of the
the VPK's
VPK’s
requirements
requirements to to its
its numerous
numerous collaborators
collaborators in in the
theSoviet
Soviet scientific
scientific community,
community, who who
numbered
numbered approximately
approximately 90 90 agent-recruiters,
agent-recruiters, 900 900 agents
agents and and 350350 trusted
trusted contacts
contacts
during
during the the mid- 1 970s. 1 03 Among
mid-1970~.”~ Among these these collaborators-probably
collaborators-probably the the largest
largest netnet-
work of talent-spotters in the history of S&T -were
work of talent-spotters in the history of S&T-were some of the Soviet Union’s some of the Soviet Union's
leading
leading scientists.
scientists. All All Western
Western scientists-particularly
scientists-particularly in theUnited
in the United States-in
States-in
fields
fields related
related to to Directorate
Directorate T's T’s "acquisition
“acquisition tasks" tasks’’ were
were potential
potential targets
targets for for the
the
KGB.
KGB. TheThe firstfirst approach
approach to to aa targeted
targeted scientist
scientist usually
usually camecame fromfrom aa Soviet
Soviet colcol-
league
league in in aa similar
similar field,
field, whowho would
would try try to to establish
establish cooperation
cooperation at at aa personal
personal or or
institutional
institutional level.level. Directorate
Directorate T T would
would then then seekseek toto recruit
recruit the the more
more naivenaive or or cor
cor-
rupt
rupt ofof the
the Western
Western scientists
scientists approached
approached in in this
this way
way as as agents
agents or trustedcon-
or trusted con
tacts.104
tact~.’’~ Among
Among thetheDirectorate's
Directorate’s agent-recruiters
agent-recruiters was was the
the director
director of of the
the Physics
Physics
and
and Energy Institute of
Energy Institute of the
the Latvian
Latvian Academy
Academy of of Sciences
Sciences (codenamed
(codenamed VITO VITOS), S),
who
who in 1 973 recruited
in 1973 recruited MIKE,MIKE, aa senior senior physicist
physicist at at MI T.
MIT.’” 105 SATURN,
SATURN, aa depart- depart
ment
ment headhead at at McDonnell
McDonnell Douglas, Douglas, was was recruited
recruited in 1978 with
in 1978 with similar
similar assistance
assistance
from
from the theLithuanian
LithuanianAcademy Academy of
of Sciences.106
Sciences.lo6
The
The KGBKGB also also took
took an an active
active part
part ininthetheselection
selection of of Soviet
Soviet students
students for for academic
academic
exchange
exchange programs
programs with with the theUnited
United States
States and and trained
trained manymany of of them
them as as talent
talent-
spotters.
spotters. Students
Students were were toldtold to to seek places at
seek places at universities
universities and and research
research institutes
institutes
within
within easy
easy reach
reach of of the
the residencies
residencies at at New
NewYork York (Brooklyn
(Brooklyn Polytechnic,
Polytechnic, MIT, MIT, RensRens-
selaer
selaer Polytechnic
Polytechnic and and thetheuniversities
universitiesof of Columbia,
Columbia, Cornell,
Cornell, Harvard,
Harvard,New New York
York andand
Princeton),
Princeton),Washington
Washington(American,
(American, Catholic,
Catholic, Georgetown,
Georgetown, George George Washington
Washington and and
Maryland
Maryland Universities)
Universities) and and San San Francisco
Francisco (the (the University
University of of California
California at at Berkeley
Berkeley
and
and San
San Francisco,
Francisco, California
California Institute
Institute of of Technology,
Technology, University
University of of Southern
Southern Cali Cali-
fornia
fornia and
and Stanford).lo7
Stanford).”’
Directorate
DirectorateT's T’s success
successin in penetrating
penetrating American
American targetstargets was wasgreatly
greatly assisted
assistedby
by poor
poor
security
security in in some
some of of its
its target
target companies
companies and and research
research institutes.
institutes. Appearing
Appearing in 1985
in 1985
before
before aa Senate
Senate committee
committee investigating
investigatingsecurity
security among
among defense
defense contractors,
contractors, Christo
Christo-
pher
pher Boyce
Boyce testified
testified that
that hehe andand colleagues
colleagues at atTRW
TRW"regularly
“regularlypartied
partied and and boozed
boozed it it up
up
during
during working
working hours hours with
with the the 'black
‘black vault'
vault’"” housing
housing the the Rhyolite
Rhyolite satellite project.
satellite project.
Bacardi
Bacardi rum, rum, he he claimed,
claimed, was was keptkept behind
behind the the cipher
cipher machines
machines and and aa cipher
cipher-
destruction
destruction device
device used
used as asaa blender
blender to to mix
mix banana
banana daiquiris
daiquiris and and Mai-Tais.108
Mai-Tais.’’* Security
Security
failures
failures in
in most
most other
other companies
companies probably probablytook took less
less exotic
exotic andand alcoholic
alcoholic forms.
forms.
_I_Ic_
. “*”.,-
T
THHS
E WSOWR O
E A
DNRT
DHA
D S
EHN IDE LTDH E S H I E L D / 22 I1 88
Since
Since most
most major
major American
American companies
companies operated
operated abroad,
abroad, they
they were
were vulnerable
vulnerable to to
penetration outside
penetration outside as as well
well as inside the
as inside the United
United States.
States. InIn the
the mid-1970s
mid-1970s seventeen
seventeen
major
major US companies
companies and and research
research institutes
institutes were
were targeted
targeted by by KGB residencies in
western
western Europe:
Europe: among
among them themIBM by by the
the London,
London,Paris,
Paris, Geneva,
Geneva, Vienna
Vienna andand Bonn
Bonn
residencies;
residencies; Texas
Texas Instruments
Instruments by Paris;Paris; Monsanto
Monsanto by London
London and and Brussels;
Brussels; West
West-
inghouse
inghouse Electric
Electric byby Brussels;
Brussels; Honeywell
Honeywell by Rome;Rome; ITT by by Stockholm;
Stockholm; and the
and the
National
National Institutes
Institutes of
of Health
Health byby Copenhagen.109
Copenhagen."' European
European residencies
residencies were wereassisted
assisted
by
by aa number
number ofof walk-ins.
walk-ins. In In 1974,
1974, for
for example,
example, aa Canadian
Canadian resident
resident of of Los
Los Angeles
Angeles
(later
(later given
given the
the codename SPRINTER) entered
codename SPRINTER) entered the
the Soviet embassy in
Soviet embassy in Helsinki,
Helsinki,
announced
announced that he worked
that he worked for for an
an electro-optical
electro-optical company
company whichwhich was was developing
developing
laser anti-missile
laser anti-missile systems
systems and and infra-red
infra-red sights
sights for firearms, tanks,
for firearms, ships and
tanks, ships and aircraft,
aircraft,
and offered
and offered to
to sell its secrets.110
sell its Like SPRINTER,
secrets.'" Like SPRINTER, most most ofof the
the KGB's S&T S&T network
network
in
in the
the United
UnitedStates appear to
States appear to have
have been mercenary spies.
been mercenary spies.
SIGINT addedadded substantially
substantially to to the
the S&T
S&T provided
provided by agents.
agents. TheThe SIGINT
SIGINT sta sta-
tions
tions within
within the
the Washington,
Washington,New New York
York and
and San
San Francisco
Francisco residencies
residencies (whose
(whose oper
oper-
ations
ations are discussed in
are discussed in chapter
chapter 21)21) succeeded
succeeded in in intercepting
intercepting the the telephone
telephone and and fax
communications
communications of of the
the Brookhaven
Brookhaven National
National Laboratory
Laboratoryand anda series
series
a of
of major
major com
com-
panies. Mitrokhin's
panies. Mitrokhin's notes,
notes, however,
however, do do not
not make
make it
it possible
possible toto assess
assess the
the proportion
proportion
of
of S&T
S&T provided
provided byby SIGINT rather rather than
than HUMINT.
HUMINT.
Since
Since before
before the
the Second
Second World
World WarWar S&TS&T hadhad been regarded as
been regarded as an
an essential
essential
means of preventing Soviet military technology and weapons systems from falling
means of preventing Soviet military technology and weapons systems from falling
behind
behind thethe West's.
West's. According
According to to one
one report noted by
report noted Mitrokhin, over
by Mitrokhin, over half the pro
the pro-
jects of
jects of the
the Soviet
Soviet defense industry in
defense industry in 1979
1979 were
were based
based onon S&T from from the West."'111
the West.
Andropov
Andropov claimed
claimed in 1981 that
in 1981 that all the
the tasks
tasks in
in military
military S&TS&T set set for
for the
the KGB had had
been
been successfully
successfully completed.1l2
completed.'12 According
According to to an
an official
official US report, based largely
report, based largely on
on
documents
documents supplied
supplied during
duringthethe early
early 1980s
1980s by Vladimir
Vladimir VetrovVetrov (codenamed
(codenamed
FAREWELL),
FAREWELL), aa French French agent
agent in in FCD Directorate
Directorate T: T:
The
The Soviets
Soviets estimate
estimate that by using
that by using documentation
documentation on onthe
the US F-1F-188 fighter
fighter
their
their aviation
aviation and
and radar
radar industries
industries saved some five
saved some five years
years of
of development
development time
and 35 million
and 35 million roubles
roubles (the 1980 dollar
(the 1980 cost of
dollar cost of equivalent research activity
equivalent research activity
would
would bebe $55
$55 million)
million) in project
project manpower
manpower and otherother developmental
developmental costs.
costs.
The
The manpower
manpower portion of these
portion of these savings
savings probably
probably represents
represents over
over aa thousand
thousand
man-years
man-years of of scientific
scientific research
research effort
effort and
and one
one of
of the
the most
most successful
successful individ
individ-
ual
ual exploitations
exploitations ever
ever of
of Western
Westerntechnology.
technology.
The documentation
documentation of the F -18 fire-control radar
F-18 radarserved
servedas the technical basis
for new
new lookdownlshootdown
lookdodshootdown engagementengagement radars for for the latest generation of
Soviet
Soviet fighters.
fighters.US methods
methods of of component
component design,
design, fast-Fourier-transform
fast-Fourier-transform algo
algo-
rithms, terrain mapping functions,
functions, and real-time resolution-enhancement
resolution-enhancement techtech-
niques were
werecited
citedas key
key elements
elements incorporated
incorporated into thetheSoviet
Soviet counterpart.1l3
counterpart.'l3
Other successful
successful military projects made possible by S&T were the construction of
of a
Soviet clone of the
the AWACS airborne radar system and the construction of of the
Blackjack Bomber modeled on the the American B 1-By4
B1-B.'I4
T
The M
Main A
A dd vvee rr ss aa rr y --
PPa ar tr t 4
4 // 2
21I9
9
From
From the the late
late 1970s
1970s onwards
onwards increasing emphasis was
increasing emphasis also put
was also put on on the contribu
the contribu-
tion ofofS&T to the the Soviet
Soviet economy.
economy. Directorate T calculated
calculated that the the main branches
of
of civilian
civilian industry
industry werewere ten
ten years
years behind
behind their
their Western
Western counterparts.l1S
counterpart^.^^^ In In January
January
1980
1980 Andropov instructed Directorate T to draw up S&T collection plans designed
S&T collection
to
to resolve
resolve current
current problems
problems in in Soviet agriculture, metallurgy,
Soviet agriculture, metallurgy, power-generation,
power-generation, engi engi-
neering
neering and and advanced technologyY6 Of
advanced technology,’16 Of the 5,456 "samples"
the 5,456 “samples” (machinery,
(machinery, compo-compo
nents,
nents, microcircuits,
microcircuits, etc.) acquired
acquired byby Directorate
Directorate T duringduring 1980,
1980,4444 percent
percent went
went to to
defense industries, 28 percent to civilian industry via the State Committee for Sci Sci-
ence
ence and
and Technology
Technology (GKNT) (GKNT) and and 28
28 percent
percent to to the
the KGB and and other
other government
government
agencies.
agencies. In In the
the same,
same, possibly
possibly exceptional
exceptional year,
year, just
just over
over half
half thethe intelligence
intelligence
obtained
obtained by by Directorate
Directorate T came came from
from allied
allied intelligence
services, chief
chief among
among themthem
the
the East
East German
German HVA and and the
the Czechoslovak StB.l17
Czechoslovak StB.’17
Among the theHV
HVA’sA's greatest S&T successes
successes waswasits penetration of of IBM. According
to
to the
the head
head of of the
the HVA,
HVA, Markus
Markus Wolf,
Wolf, the
the East
East German
German microelectronics
microelectronics company
Robotron "became so
Robotron “became so heavily
heavily dependent
dependent on on surreptitiously
surreptitiously acquiring
acquiring IBM's
IBM’s techno
techno-
logical
logical advances
advances that that ititwas,
was, in
in effect, a sort
sort ofof illegal
illegal subsidiary
subsidiary of of that
that company."l18
company.”118
Though
Though well well behind
behind the West,West,Robotron
Robotron was
was rather
rather better
better than
thanits Soviet equivalents
equivalents
in
in exploiting
exploiting IBM computer technology. technology. The The KGB's
KGB’s name-trace
name-trace systemsystem SOUDSOUD
("System
(“System for Operational and Institutional Data") Data”)used East German German computers.l19
computers.llg
S&T
S&T collection
collection continued
continued to to expand
expand during
during the the 1980s.
1980s. At At aa meeting of of senior
senior
FCD staff
staff early
early in 1984
1984Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov reported
reported that,
that, "In
“In the
the last two years the
last two the quantity
quantity
of material and
of material and samples handed over
samples handed over to
to civilian
civilian branches
branches of industry has
of industry has increased
increased byby
half
half as
as much
much again."
again.” This, he he claimed,
claimed, had
had been used "to “to real
real economic effect," par
effect,” par-
ticularly
ticularly inin energy
energy and and food
food production.
production. Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov characteristically
characteristically failed
failed to
to men
men-
tion that
that thethe sclerotic
sclerotic nature of of Soviet economic management made it far harder to
exploit
exploit S&T
S&T in in the
the civilian economy than
civilian economy than in in the
the imitation
imitation of of Western armaments.
Western armaments.
His
His obsession
obsession withwith operation
operation RYAN
RYAN also left left him
him dissatisfied
dissatisfied with
with Directorate T's T’s
intelligence
theweapons
weapons systems
systems at thetheheart of Reagan’s
heartof Reagan's non-existent plans plans for
for a
nuclear first strike.
nuclear first strike. "As previously," Kryuchkov
“As previously,” complained, “we
Kryuchkov complained, "we are experiencing an
are experiencing an
acute
acute shortage of of secret
secret information
information about
about newnew types
types of of weapon
weapon and their their means
means of of
delivery."
delivery.’’The FCD "work “work plan"
plan” for 1984 laid down as Directorate T’s T's main intelli
intelli-
gence
gence priorities:
priorities:
military
military technology
technology measures
measures taken
taken by
by the
the Main
Main Adversary
Adversary to build up
to build first
up first-
strike weapons: the
strike weapons: the quantitative increase in
quantitative increase in nuclear
nuclear munitions
munitions andand means
means of of
delivery (MX
delivery (MX missile
missile complexes,
complexes,Trident,
Trident, Pershing-2,
Pershing-2, cruise missiles, strategic
cruise missiles, strategic
bombers); replacement of
bombers); replacement of one generation of
one generation of nuclear
nuclear missiles
missiles by
byanother
another (Min
(Min-
uteman,
uteman, Trident-2), the development
Trident-2), the development of of qualitatively
qualitatively new
new types of weapons
types of weapons
(space devices for
(space devices for multiple
multiple use
use for
for military
military purposes,
purposes, laser and pencil
laser and beam
pencil beam
weapons,
weapons, non-acoustic anti-submarine defense
non-acoustic anti-submarine weapons, electronic
defense weapons, electronic warfare
warfare
weapons,
weapons, etc.).
etc.).
The
The second
second priority
priority was
was "information
“information and
and specimens
specimens of
of significant
significant interest
interest for
for civil
civil-
ian branches
ian branches of
of the
the USSR's
USSR’s economy."120
TT H
H EE SSW
WO R D
OR D AA N
N DD TT HH EE SS HH II EE LL DD // 2
2 22 0
0
Like
Like other
other Soviet
Soviet leaders,
leaders, Gorbachev
Gorbachev doubtless
doubtless took
took it
it for
for granted that Soviet
granted that Soviet
military
military technology
technology required
required S&T
S&Tfrom from thethe West.
West.HeH e was
was probably
probably more
more interested,
interested,
however,
however, in the use
in the use of
of S&T
S&T toto invigorate
invigorate the the civilian economy. In
civilian economy. In an
an address
address toto
embassy
embassy staffstaff in
in London
London on on December
December 15, 15, 11984,
984, three
three months
months before
before hehe became
became
general
general secretary,
secretary,he he singled
singled out
out for
for praise
praise the
the achievements
achievements of of Directorate
Directorate T T and
and its
its
Line X
Line X officers
officersin in foreign
foreign residencies. 121 It
residencies.12’ Itwas
was already
alreadyclear
clearthat
that Gorbachev
Gorbachevregarded
regarded
the
the covert
covert acquisition
acquisition of of Western
Western technology
technology and and scientific
scientific research
research asas an
an important
important
part
part ofofeconomic
economicperestroika.
perestroika.
The
The dramatic
dramatic improvement
improvement in in East-West
East-West relations
relations during
duringthethe later
later 11980s
980s
offered new opportunities for Directorate T, which produced 25-40,000
offered new opportunities for Directorate T, which produced 25-40,000 S&T “infor- S&T "infor
mation
mation reports"
reports” andand 12-13,000
12-13,000 "samples"
“samples”aa year.year. In
In 1986
1986 itit estimated
estimated their
their value
value atat
550
550million
million roubles;
roubles;inin 1988
1988and and19891989it
it put
putthe
the figure
figure at
at one
onebillion
billion roubles
roubles aa year. 122
year.122
In
In the
the later
later 1980s
1980s about
about 150150 Soviet
Soviet weapons
weapons systems
systems were
were believed
believed byby Western
Western
experts to be based on technology system stolen from
experts to be based on technology system stolen from the West.123 the West.123
AS
AS W ELL A
WELL ASS being
being impressed
impressed by by the
the achievements
achievements of of Directorate
Directorate T, T, Gorbachev
Gorbachev also also
seems
seems to to have
have revised
revised his his initially
initially critical
critical opinion
opinion of of the
the political
intelligence propro-
vided
vided by by the
the FCD.
FCD. During
During the the early
early 1980s
1980s Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov had had repeatedly
repeatedly berated
berated hishis
subordinates
subordinates for for their
their lack
lack of
of success
success in in recruiting
recruiting important
important American
American agents,
agents, and
and
demanded
demanded "a “aradical
radical improvement."
improvement.”As As late
late asas February
February 1985
1985 hehedenounced
denounced "the “thelow
low
standard"
standard” of of operations
operations against
against the Main Adversary
the Main Adversary and and "the
“the lack
lack ofof appreciable
appreciable
results"
results”byby KGB
KGB residencies
residenciesin in recruiting
recruiting US US citizens.124
~iti2ens.l~~
A
A walk-in
walk-in to to the
the Washington
Washington embassy embassy two two months
months later
later came
came asas the
the answer
answer to to
Kryuchkov's
Kryuchkov’s prayers.
prayers. By By the
the time
time Aldrich
Aldrich Ames Ames offered
offered his
his services
services toto the
the KGB
KGB in in
April
April 11985
985 hehehad hadbeen
been working
working for for the
the CIACIAfor for eighteen
eighteen years.
years.Within
Within two two months
months
he had betrayed
he had betrayed twenty
twenty Western
Western (mostly
(mostly American)
American) agents:
agents: among
among themthem Dmitri
Dmitri
Polyakov,
Polyakov, a GRU general who had worked for the FBI and CIA for over twenty
a GRU general who had worked for the FBI and CIA for over twenty
years;
years;Oleg
Oleg Gordievsky,
Gordievsky,aa British
British agent
agent in in the
theKGB
KGB whowho had hadjust been
been appointed
just appointed resres-
ident in London;
ident in London; Adolf Adolf Tolkachev,
Tolkachev, an an electronics
electronics expert
expert who
who hadhad provided
provided high
high-
grade
grade intelligence
the Soviet
Soviet avionics
avionics system;
system; andand at
at least
least eleven
eleven other
other KGB
KGB and and
GRU officers stationed in various parts of the world. A majority
GRU officers stationed in various parts of the world. A majority were shot, though were shot, though
Gordievsky
Gordievsky made made an an epic
epic escape
escape from
from Russia,
Russia, with
with SIS
SIS assistance,
assistance,while
while under
under KGB
KGB
surveillance.
surveillance.Collectively,
Collectively,they they had
had represented
represented probably
probably the
the most
most successful
successfulWestern
Western
agent
agent penetration
the Soviet
SovietUnion
Union sincesince thethe Bolshevik
Bolshevik Revolution.
Revolution. Ames's
Ames’s main
main
motive
motive forfor betraying
betraying them them was was probably
probably greed.greed. By By the
the time
time ofof his
his arrest
arrest nine
nine years
years
later,
later, the
the KGB
KGB and and itsits successor
successor agency
agency had had paid
paid him
him almost
almost three
three million
million dollars
dollars
(probably
(probably moremore than
than any any other
other agent
agent in in Russian
Russian history)
history) and
and had
had promised
promised him him
another
another twO.125 As As Gorbachev
Gorbachev embarkedembarked on on aa new
new course
course in in policy
policy towards
towards the the
United
United States,
States, hehe was
was doubtless
doubtless impressed
impressed by by the
the fact
fact that
that the
theKGB
KGB had,
had, for
for the
the first
first
time,
time, recruited
recruited aa majormajor agent
agent within
withinthe the CIA.
CIA. TheThe FCD
FCD also also appears
appears to to have
have
responded
responded to to Gorbachev's
Gorbachev’s demand demand for for less
less crudely
crudely biased
biased reporting
reporting on on the
theMain
Main
Adversary
Adversary and and its
its allies.
allies.According
According to to Leonid
LeonidVladimirovich
VladimirovichShebarshin,
Shebarshin, then then one
oneofof
Kryuchkov's
Kryuchkov’sdeputies,
deputies, "the“the FCD
FCD no no longer
longer had had totopresent
present its
its reports
reports inin aafalsely
falselypos-
pos-
T
T hh ee M
M aa ii nn A
Addv - P Pa ar tr t 44
v ee r s aa rr yy - // 2
2 22 I1
itive
itivelight,"126
light,”126though
though manymany of of its
its officers
officers must
must surely
surelyhavehavefound
found ititdifficult
difficult to
to throw
throw
off
off the
the habits
habits of
of aa lifetime.
lifetime.
In
In December
December 19871987Gorbachev
Gorbachev took took Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov withwith him
him onon his
his historic
historic visit
visit to
to
Washington
Washington to to sign
signwith
with President
President Reagan
Reaganthe
the first
first arms
arms control
control treaty
treaty to
to reduce
reduce the
the
nuclear
nuclear arsenals
arsenals of
of the
thesuperpowers.
superpowers.Never Never before
before hadhad aahead
head ofof the
the FCD
FCD accompa
accompa-
nied
nied aa Soviet
Sovietleader
leader on on aa visit
visit to
to the
theWest.
West. Gorbachev's
Gorbachev’s confidence
confidence in in Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov-
which
which he he would
would later
later bitterly
bitterly regret-doubtless reflected his
regret-doubtless reflected his high
high opinion
opinion of of the
the
FCD's
FCD’s success
successboth
both in ingathering
gatheringan an unprecedented
unprecedented volume
volume ofof S&T
S&Tand and ininpenetrat
penetrat-
ing
ing the
the CIA.
CIA. During
During the thevisit
visit to
to Washington
Washington Kryuchkov
Kryuchkovhad had dinner
dinner atatthe theMaison
Maison
Blanche
Blanche restaurant,
restaurant, unnoticed
unnoticed by by other
other diners,
diners, with
with thetheDeputy
DeputyDirector
Directorof of Central
Central
Intelligence,
Intelligence, Robert
Robert GatesGates(later
(later DCI)
DCI).. Gates
Gates wrote
wrote later:
later:
Looking
Looking back,
back, itit isis embarrassing
embarrassing toto realize
realize that,
that, atatthis
thisfirst
first high-level
high-level CIA
CIA-
KGB
KGB meeting,
meeting, Kryuchkov
Kryuchkovsmugly smuglyknew
knew that
that he
he had
had aaspy-Aldrich Ames-at
spy-Aldrich Ames-at
the
the heart
heart of
ofCIA,
CIA, that that he
heknew
knew quite
quite well
well what
what we
we were
weretelling
telling the
the President
President
and
and others
others about
about the the Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, and
and that he was
that he aware of
was aware of many
many of
of our
our
human
human and
and technical
technical collection
collection efforts
efforts in
in the
theUSSR.127
USSR.127
In
In October 1988 Kryuchkov
October 1988 Kryuchkovachieved
achieved his
his ambition
ambition ofof becoming
becoming thethe first
first foreign
foreign
intelligence
intelligence chief to become chairman of the KGB. His valedictory address on leav
chief to become chairman of the KGB. His valedictory address on leav-
ing
ing the
theFeD
FCD was
was aa remarkable
remarkable mixture
mixture of
of the
the old
old and
and new
new thinking.
thinking. "Democratiza
“Democratiza-
tion
tion and glasnost are
and glasnost are the
the motive
motive force
force of perestroika, " he
ofperestroiha,” he declared,
declared, "and
“and we
we shall
shall not
not
win
win through
through without
withoutthem:"
them:”
Unless
Unlesswewe have
haveanan objective
objectiveview
viewofof the
the world,
world, seeing
seeing itit unadorned
unadorned and
and free
free of
of
cliches
clichCs and
and stereotyped
stereotyped ideas,
ideas, all
all claims
claims about
about the
the effectiveness
effectiveness of
of our
our foreign
foreign
policy
policy operations
operations will
will be
be nothing
nothing butbutempty
emptywords.
words.
The
The old
old suspicions
suspicions and
and conspiracy
conspiracy theories
theories about
about the
the United
United States,
States, however,
however, still
still
lurked
lurked not
not far
far below
below the
the surface
surface of
of Kryuchkov's
Kryuchkov’s address.
address.Without
Without mentioning
mentioning oper
oper-
ation
ation RYAN
RYAN by by name,
name, he
he sought
sought to
to justify
justify the
the principles
principles on
on which
whichit itwas
was based:
based:
Many
Many of of[the
[theFCD's]
FCD’s] former
former responsibilities
responsibilitieshave
have not
not been
been removed
removed from
from the
the
agenda.
agenda.The
The principal
principal one
one of
of these
these isis not
not to
to overlook
overlook the
the immediate
immediate danger
danger of
of
nuclear
nuclear conflict
conflict being
being unleashed.
unleashed.
And
And he he added
added aa warning
warning about
about what
what hehe alleged was the
alleged was continuing brutality
the continuing brutality of
of
"provocation
“provocationoperations"
operations”by by Western
intelligence services;
services;hehe claimed
claimed that
that there
there had
had
been
been over 900 such
over 900 such operations
operations during the first
during the first half
half of 1988 alone.128
of 1988 alone.12*Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov
began 1989with
began 1989 with aa dramatic
dramatic demonstration
demonstration of of the
the new
new climate
climate of
of East-West rela
East-West rela-
tions, becoming the first chairman in KGB history to receive the
tions, becoming the first chairman in KGB history to receive the United States United States
ambassador
ambassador in in his
his office.
office.Thereafter
Thereafter he
he embarked
embarked on on an
an unprecedented
unprecedented public
public rela
rela-
tions
tions campaign
campaign designed
designed to to win
win over
overWestern
Western as aswell
well as
as Soviet
Soviet opinion.
opinion. "The
“The KGB,"
KGB,”
T H ESE WS OWR OD
A RNDD
T HA SENHDI ETLHDE S H I E L D // 2
22 2
22
he
he declared,
declared, "should
“should have
have an an image
image not not only
only in
in our
our country
country but but worldwide
worldwide which which is is
consistent
consistent with with the
the noble
noble goals
goals I believe
believe we wearearepursuing
pursuing in in our
ourwork."1
work.”1292 9
After aabrief
brief power struggle, Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov was succeeded
succeeded as head of of the
theFCD by the
53-year-old
53-year-old LeonidLeonid Shebarshin,
Shebarshin, the the first
first man
man with
with experience
experience of of working
working in in coun
coun-
tries outside the Soviet Bloc to run run foreign intelligence since since the Second World
War.13
War.13@ 0 One of Shebarshin's main jobs at
of Shebarshin’s at the beginning of of the
the Gorbachev era era had
been to prepare intelligence
intelligence reports for the Party leadership. leadership. The fact that he leap leap-
frogged
frogged several
several more
more senior
senior candidates
candidates for for his
his new
new post
post is
is aa certain
certain indication
indication that
that his
his
briefing had impressed Gorbachev.131
G0rba~hev.l~’ Foreign intelligence
intelligence offi cers interviewed by
officers
zvestia
zwestia after
after Shebarshin's
Shebarshin’s resignation
resignation in in September
September 1991 1991 described
described him him as as "the
“the first
first
really competent head of the FCD in decades."132 decades.”132 According to Shebarshin, his main
initial brief from Gorbachev was "to “to ensure the West did not cheat on arms con con-
trol."133
tr01.’’133
The tactical victories
victories of the FCD F C D against the Main Adversary which impressed
Gorbachev failed to avert strategic defeat. Directorate T's very success
T’s very success in stealing
Western
Western secrets merely underlined
secrets merely underlined the the structural
structural problems
problems of of the
the Soviet economy.
Soviet economy.
Despite
Despite S&T S&T worth
worth aa billion
billion roubles
roubles aa year
year and
and the
the Soviet
Soviet Union's
Union’s large
large numbers
numbers of of
scientists and
scientists engineers, Soviet
and engineers, Soviet technology
technology fell fell steadily
steadily further
further and and further
further behind
behind
the West. Gorbachev's
Gorbachev’s reforms served only to weaken further the command econ econ-
omy,
omy, without
without establishing
establishing aa market
market economy
economy in in its
its stead.
stead. There
There was was aa bread
bread shortage
shortage
even
even after
after the
the good
good harvest
harvest of of 1990Y4
1990.134No No amount
amount of of either
either economic
economic or or political
political
intelligence
intelligence could
could stave
stave offoffthe
the disintegration
disintegration of of the
the failing
failing Soviet
Soviet system.
system.
As
As the
the Soviet
Soviet Union's economic problems
Union’s economic problems multiplied
multiplied during 1990 and
during 1990 and separatist
separatist
movements strengthened, the the Centre's
Centre’s traditional suspicions
suspicions of the Main Adversary
revived.
revived. Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov did did not
not place
place all
all the
the blame
blame forfor Russia's
Russia’s ills
ills on
on imperialist plots.plots.
"The
“The main sources of our trouble, in the the KGB's
KGB’s view,"
view,”he declared, "are “are to be found
inside the country."
country.’’But he he accused the CIA and other other Western
Westernintelligence services services
of promoting "anti-socialist"
“anti-socialist” and separatist forces forces as part of a "secret
“secret war against the
Soviet state."135
Soviet state.”135According to Shebarshin, Gorbachev failed to heed the FCD's FCD’s warnwarn-
“He and his friends lived in aa world of self-delusion .. .. .. We were hitching our
ings. "He
ings.
wagon to the the Western train."136
train.”136With Gorbachev,
Gorbachev, in the Centre's
Centre’s view, unwilling to
offend the Americans, Kryuchkov Kryuchkov began to publicize publicize some of the KGB's KGB’s neglected
conspiracy
conspiracy the.ories.
the.ories.In December 1990 1990 he denounced a (non-existent) Western plot,
"akin
“akin to economic sabotage,"
sabotage,”to "deliver
“deliverimpure and sometimes infected grain, as well
as products with an above-average
above-average level level ofof radioactivity or containing harmful sub sub-
stances."137
s t a n c e ~ .In” ~February
~~ 1991
1991 first Kryuchkov's
Kryuchkov’s deputy,
deputy, Viktor Fyodorovich
Fyodorovich Grushko,
and then
then thethe new prime minister, Valentin Pavlov, denounced an equally imaginary
plot by Western banks to undermine the rouble. rouble. The fullest public version of the
Centre's theory of
Centre’s theory of aa vast
vast American-led
American-led conspiracy
conspiracy to to subvert
subvert the the Soviet Union was
Soviet Union was
set out in April 1991
in April 1991 a in a speech by the head of KGB assessments,
assessments, Nikolai Sergey
Sergey-
evich
evich Leonov,
Leonov, formerly
formerly deputy
deputy headhead of of the
the FCD, respon �ible for
responsible for operations
operations in in North
North
and South America. The goal of US policy, policy, he declared,
declared, was "to “to eliminate the Soviet Soviet
Union as a unitedunited state."
state.” Gorbachev,
Gorbachev, he implied, was refusing refusing to listen:
T
The M
M aaii nn A
A dd vv ee rr ss aa rr y --P P
a ar tr t 4 / 2 22 J3
2
The KGB has been informing the of the country

theleadership of country about this in time
time
and detail.
detail. We would not want a repetition ofof the tragic situation before the
Great
Great Patriotic
Patriotic War
War against
against Germany,
Germany, when
when Soviet intelligence
intelligence warned about
the imminent
imminent attack of Nazi Germany but but Stalin rejected this information as
wrong
wrong and
and even
even provocative.
provocative.You
You know
know what
what this mistake cost us.
Further dramatic evidence of the resurgence of of the KGB leadership's

leadership’straditional con
traditional con-
spiracy
spiracy theories
theories about
about thethe Main
Main Adversary
Adversary came
came in aa speech by Kryuchkov to aa
closed session
session of the Supreme
Supreme Soviet on June 17. Kryuchkov read out aa hitherto
June 17. hithertotop
top
secret FCD report to the the Politburo of January 1977, 1977, “On
"On CIA Plans to Recruit
Agents Among Soviet
Soviet Citizens,"
Citizens,” which denounced an imaginary CIA masterplan to
sabotage
sabotage the Soviet
Soviet administration, economy and scientificscientific research. This plan,
Kryuchkov claimed, remained activelyactively in force.138
force.138The CIA's
CIA’Smost important
important agent,
he solemnly
solemnly informed Gorbachev,
Gorbachev, was his own closest
closest adviser, Aleksandr Yakovlev,
allegedly recruited while an exchange
exchange student at at Columbia University over thirty
years earlier.139
ea1-1ier.l~~
As Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov later
later complained,
complained, Gorbachev
Gorbachev did didnot
nottake such
such nonsense seriously.
nonsense seriously.
Nor,
Nor, no
no doubt, did many
doubt, did many FCD officers with the
officers with the first-hand
first-hand experience
experience of
of the
the West
West
which
which the
the KGB Chairman
Chairman lacked.
lacked. Kryuchkov
Kryuchkov waswas now
now Gorbachev's
Gorbachev’smost dangerous
most dangerous
opponent,
opponent, convinced
convinced that,
that, having
having tamely accepted the
tamely accepted the collapse
collapse of the Soviet
of the Soviet Bloc
Bloc in
in
1989,
1989, Gorbachev
Gorbachev was was now
now presiding
presiding over
over the
the disintegration ofof the
the Soviet
Soviet Union. In
August
August 1991
1991 hehebecame
became the the chief
chief organizer
organizer of the coup
of the coup which
which attempted
attempted to topple
to topple
Gorbachev
Gorbachev and and preserve
preserve the
the Union.
Union.
F 0 U H T E E n
P
POO LL II T
T II C A
A LLW W
A RAFRAFRAER E
A c t i v e Me
Active M e aass uu rr eess aa nn dd tthhee M
Maa i ni nAA
d vdv
e resrs
a ra yry
T1 he philosophers,"
philosophers,”wrote Marx, "have
however, is to change it."l
point, however,
“have only interpreted the world in various ways; the
it.”l In addition to collecting intelligence and producing
politically correct assessments
assessments of of it,
it, the
the KGB also sought to influence the course of
to influence of
world events
events by a variety of "active measures” (aktivinyye meropriatia)
“active measures" meroprintia)ranging from
media manipulation to "special “special actions"
actions” involving
involving variousdegrees
degrees of
of violence.
violence.
Inspired by exaggerated
exaggerated accounts of its heroic defeat of counter-revolutionary con con-
spiracies
spiracies between the wars and aa desire desire to impress the political leadership, it fre fre-
quently
quently overestimated
overestimated its
its own
own effectiveness.
effectiveness.
Throughout the the Cold
ColdWar Warthe theUnited
UnitedStates was the main target for KGB active active
measures as well as for intelligence collection.
collection. Most were at the non-violent end of
the active
active measures
measures spectrum-"influence
spectrum-“influence operations"
operations” designed to discredit the Main Main
Adversary.
Adversary. A conference
conference ofof senior FCD officers
officers in January 1984
1984 reaffirmed a prior
prior-
ity which had remained unchanged since since the end of the Second World War: “Our "Our
chief task is to help to frustrate the aggressive aggressive intentions of of American imperial
imperial-
ism .. .. .. We must work unweariedly at exposing exposing the adversary's
adversary’s weak and vulnerable
vulnerable
points."2
points.”’ Much of what was euphemistically described as “exposure” "exposure" was
was in reality
disinformation fabricated by Service ServiceA, the active
active measures
measuresbranch of of the FCD, and
spread by Line PR offi
spread cers in foreign residencies.
officers residencies. Line PR officers
officers were supposed to
spend about 25 percent of time on
of their time on active
active measures,
measures, though in in practice some
failed to do do so.
so.
The wide variation in the the sophistication of of the
the disinformation generated by Ser Ser-
vice A reflected the uneven quality of of its personnel. About 50 per cent of of its officers
officers
were specialists
specialists in active measures.
measures. Some of of the remaining 50 per cent were rejects
from other departments.
departments.Few of the ablest and most ambitious FCD recruits wanted
jobs in Service
Service A;
A, it rarely offered the opportunity
opportunity of overseas
overseas postings and was
widely regarded as a career dead end.3 end.3There were, of course,
course, exceptions.
exceptions.Yuri Modin,
the last controller of the theMagnificent
MagnificentFive, became an active activemeasures
measuresspecialist,
specialist,was
appointed deputy head of Service A and subsequently had a successful successful Line PR post
post-
ing spreading disinformation in India India before becoming head of of political intelligence
at
at the
theAndropov
AndropovInstitute.4
In~titute.~ Many ManyService
Service A officers,
officers, however,
however,had little, if
if any, expe
expe-
rience of living in the the West conspiracy
Westand relied on crude conspiracy theories about the capi
capi-
talist and Zionist plotters who supposedly operated a secret "command “command center"
center” in the
the
P o l i tt ii cc a ll Wa
W a rrfa
f a rree I
/ 225
United
United States.5
state^.^ Successive chairmen of
Successive chairmen of the
the KGB and heads of
and heads of the
the FCD, none
none of
of
whom until the
thelate 1980s
1980s had worked in foreign residencies,
residencies, were influenced by the
same theories.
IIT
T W OULD H
WOULD AV E been wholly out of character had the
HAVE the Centre
Centre failed to interpret
President Kennedy's
Kennedy’s assassination
assassinationby Lee Harvey Oswald in Dallas on November 22,
1963 as anything less than conspiracy.
1963 conspiracy.The deputy chairman of
of the KGB reported to
the Central
Central Committee
CommitteeininDecember:
A reliable source ofthethe Polish friends [the Polish intelligence service], an

American entrepreneur and owner of a number of firms closely connected to
the petroleum circles
circles of the South,
South, reported in late November that the
the real
instigators of this criminal deed were three leading oil magnates from the
South of the USA-Richardson,
USA-Kchardson, Murchison and Hunt, all owners of of major
petroleum reserves
reserves in the
the southern
southern states who have long been connected to
pro-fascist and racist organizations in the
the South.6
South.6
It was not difficult

difficult to find circumstantial “evidence”
"evidence" for this simplistic conspiracy
theory,
theory, particularly as regards the oil magnate and anti-Communist
anti-Communist buffoon H. L.
Hunt. "The
“TheCommunists need not invade the United States," Hunt once preposter-
United States,” preposter
ously declared.
declared. "Pro-Bolshevik
“Pro-Bolshevik sentiment in in the
theUS is already
alreadygreater than when the
Bolsheviks
Bolsheviks overthrew the Kerensky government and took over Russia."7 R~ssia.”~
Hunt's
Hunt’s son, Bunker,
Bunker, was one of a group of right-wing
right-wing mavericks who had paid for
aa full-page
Ul-page advertisement
advertisement in in the Dallas Morning
theDallas Murning News News on thetheday Kennedy's visit,
day of Kennedy’s
accusing
accusing the President of being a Communist
Communist stooge-a
stooge-a charge which prompted
Kennedy to say he was "heading
“heading intointonut
nutcountry."g
country.”’ The Dallas strip-club owner Jack
Ruby,
Ruby, who
who shot
shotand
and fatally
fatally wounded
wounded Oswald
Oswald on November
November 24, had visited the Hunt Hunt
offices
offices shortly
shortly before
before Kennedy's
Kennedy’s assassination.9
assassination.’
The KGB reported
reported that
that aajournalist
journalist from
from the
the Baltimore Sun “said "said in aaprivate con-
con
versation
versation in
in early
early December
December thatthat on
onassignment
assignment from a group ofTexas financiers
groupofTexas financiers and
industrialists headed by millionaire
millionaire Hunt, Jack Ruby, who is now under arrest, pro pro-
posed a large sum of money to Oswald for the murder of Kennedy." Oswald had sub-
of Kennedy.” sub
sequently
sequently been
been shot
shot by
by Ruby
Ruby toto prevent
prevent him
him revealing the plot.iO Khrushchev seems
the plot.’’ seems
to have been convinced by the KGB view that the theaim ofof the right-wing
right-wing conspirators
behind Kennedy's assassination was to intensify the Cold War
Kennedy’s assassination War and and "strengthen
“strengthen the
reactionary and aggressive
aggressive elements of American foreign policy.”” policy."l1
The
The choice
choice ofof Oswald
Oswald asas Kennedy's
Kennedy’s assassin,
assassin,thethe KGB believed, was was intended toto
divert public attention from the racist oil magnates and make the assassination assassination
appear to be a Communist
Communist plot.12
plot.12The Centre had had strong
strongreasons of its own to wish
to deflect responsibility
responsibility for the assassination
assassination from Oswald. It I t was deeply embarrassed
by the fact that in in 1959
1959Oswald had defected to Russia, professing disgust with with the
American way of life and admiration for the Soviet system. system. Initially the KGB had
suspected
suspected that
that he
he might
mighthave been sent
have been sent on
on aa secret
secret mission
mission by by the
the CIA, butbut eventu-
eventu
ally concluded that
ally concluded that hehewas
was an unstable nuisance
an unstable nuisance and and were
were glad
glad toto see
see the back of
the back him
of him
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
R D
D A
AN D
ND TT H
HEE SS H
H II E
E L
L D
D I/ 22 22 66
when
when he he returned
returned to to Texas
Texas with
with hishis Russian
Russian wifewife inin 1962.
1962. After
After Oswald's
Oswald’s return
return the
the
FBI at at first similarly
first similarly suspected
suspected that he might
that he might be be aa Soviet
Soviet agent
agent but then seems
but then seems toto
have
have made
made the the same
samejaundiced
jaundiced assessment
assessment of of him
him asas the
the Centre,u
Centre.13KGB KGB suspicions
suspicions of of
Oswald
Oswald revived, however, when
revived, however, when he he wrote
wrote to to the
the CPUSA
CPUSA in in August
August 1963 1963 asking
asking
whether
whether itit might
might be be better
better for
for him
him to to continue
continue the fight against
the fight against "anti-progressive
“anti-progressive
forces"
forces”as as aa member
member of of the
the "underground"
“underground”rather ratherthan as
as an
than an open
open supporter
supporter of of "Com
“Com-
munist
munist ideals."
ideals.”Jack
Jack Childs
Childs (codenamed
(codenamed MARAT), MARAT), an am undeclared
undeclared member
member of of the
the
CPUSA
CPUSA who who acted
acted asas one
one ofof its
its main
main points
points of of contact
contact with
with the the KGB,
KGB, warned
warned
Moscow
Moscow that that Oswald's
Oswald’s letter
letter "was viewed as
“was viewed as an
an FBI provocation."
provocation.” The The fact
fact that,
that,
unknown
unknown to to the
the KGB,
KGB, Childs
Childs was
was himself
himself an an FBI agent
agent renders
renders his his warning
warning unusu
unusu-
ally
ally ironic.14
ironic.14
The
The Warren
Warren Commission,
Commission, appointed
appointed by by President
President Lyndon
Lyndon B. Johnson
Johnson to to investi
investi-
gate
gate Kennedy's
Kennedy’s assassination,
assassination, reported
reported in in September
September 1964 1964 that
that itit had
had found
found "very
“very
persuasive"
persuasive” evidence
evidence that
that Oswald
Oswald had had acted
acted alone
alone and
and none
none ofof aa conspiracy.
conspiracy.Though
Though
the
the report
reportwaswas flawed,
flawed, its
its main
main conclusions
conclusions are are probably
probably accurate.
accurate.” IS Service
Service A,A, which
which
may
may wellwellhavehavebeen
been genuinely
genuinely persuaded
persuaded that that Kennedy
Kennedy was was the
the victim
victim of of aa right-wing
right-wing
conspiracy,
conspiracy, succeeded
succeeded in in sponsoring
sponsoring its its first
first counterblast
counterblast even even before
before the Warren
the Warren
Report
Report appeared.
appeared. The The publisher
publisher waswas Carl
Carl AIdo
Aldo Marzani
M.arzani (codenamed
(codenamed NORD), NORD), an an
Italian-born
Italian-born American
American Communist
Communist and and Soviet
Soviet agent,
agent, probably
probably recruited
recruited before
before the
the
Second
Second WorldWorld War,War, who
who was extensively used
was extensively used byby the
the KGB for for active measures.16
active measures.16
Early
Early in in1960
1960the theNew
New York
York residency
residency recommended
recommended to to the
the Centre
Centrethat thatMarzani
Marzanibe be
given 6-7,000 dollars to enable his Liberty Book Club to continue
given 6-7,000 dollars to enable his Liberty Book Club to continue publishing pro- publishing pro
Soviet
Soviet material:
material:
NORD is is an
an extremely
extremely energetic
energetic person
person and
and is
is quite
quite devoted
devoted toto his
his task.
task.
Despite
Despite his financial difficulties, he is struggling to keep SEVER [North, the
his financial difficulties, he is struggling to keep SEVER [North, the
Liberty
Liberty Book
Book Club
Club publishing
publishing company]
company] afloat.
afloat. SEVER,
SEVER, together
together with
with itsits
commercial
commercial bookselling
bookselling network,
network, thethe Prometheus
Prometheus BookBook Club,
Club, has
has been
been in in exis
exis-
tence
tence for
for fourteen
fourteen years.
years. During
During thisthis time
time it
it has
has published
published and
and distributed
distributed
more
more than
than 200
200 titles of a progressive nature, by both American and foreign
titles of a progressive nature, by both American and foreign
authors.
authors. The
The catalogue
catalogue of
of the
the SEVER
SEVER publishing
publishing firm
firm lists
lists around
around fifty
f i f q titles,
titles,
and
and the Prometheus Book
the Prometheus Book Club
Club has has 7,000
7,000 members.
members. Books
Books arearealso
also sent
sent toto
8,000
8,000 addresses
addresses onon an
an individual
individual basis.
basis.
The
The international
international department
department of
of the
the Central
Central Committee
Committee was
was plainly
plainly impressed.
impressed. In
In
May
May 1960
1960it
it approved
approved aa secret
secret grant
grant of
of 15,000
15,000dollars,
dollars, more
more than
than twice
twice the
the sum
sum sug
sug-
gested
gested by
by the
the New
NewYork
York residency.17
residency.17
Marzani's
Marzani’s productions
productions during 1960 included
during 1960 included his
his own
own translation
translation of
of aa rapturous
rapturous
endorsement
endorsement of of the
the Soviet
Soviet system
system by
by an
an Italian
Italian Communist:
Communist:
It is the duty of every Socialist,

Socialist, of every democrat, of every modern man, to
deepen his understanding of the USSR USSR .. .. ..We are today
today capable
capable of continuing
to
to transform
transform the
the world,
world, thanks
thanks totothe
thesuccesses
successesof
of the
the USSR,
USSR, thanks
thanks totothe
thesuc
suc-
cesses
cesses in aa series
series of
of other countries, thanks to tothe . struggles which we all
thestruggles all wage
P oo l i t i c a l W
W aarrffaarree / 22 22 77
in our own lands. We can, and we will, extend the civilization

civilization that was born in
in
October
October 1917. 18
1917.”
In September 1961 1961 the CPSU Central Committee allocated another 55,000 55,000 dollars
for the next two two years to allow Marzani to to expand his publications. HHee was given a
further 10,000
10,000 dollars
dollars a year to cover advertising costS.19
costs.19When the young KGB offi offi-
cer Oleg Kalugin,
Kalugin, stationed in New York in the early 1960s 1960s under cover as a Radio
Moscow reporter, paid his first visit to one of Marzani’s Marzani's receptions, he found
found his
apartment "filled
“filled with a motley assortment of Communists, liberals, liberals, and KGB
spooks-all
spooks-all of them watched, undoubtedly, by FBI informers in attendance."2o attendan~e.”~’
Among the the books published by Marzani in in 1964
1964 was the first volume on the the
Kennedy assassination
assassination to appear in the UnitedStates, Oswald'
the United Oswald: Assassin or Fall-Guy?
01-Fall-Guy?
by the German
German writer Joachim Joesten. At the beginning of of the book Joesten
expresses “heartfelt thanks .. .. .. to Carl Marzani,
expresses his "heartfelt Marzani, aashrewd and hard-hitting
hard-hitting pub
pub-
lisher in thethe finest American tradition, who who put
put his whole heart and soul in this this
book;" Marzani succeeded in publishing it within
book;” withinfive weeks
weeksof receiving the manu-
manu
script. 2 1 Joesten supported Moscow's
script.21 Moscow’s line in pinning
pinning the
theblame for the assassination
assassination
on aaconspiracy by right-wing
right-wing racists, chief among them them"oil
“oil magnate H.
H. L. Hunt:"
Hunt:”
They all
all feared that Mr.
Mr.Kennedy,
Kennedy, with his test-ban
test-ban treaty, his neutralization of
Laos, his dislike ofof Latin-American
Latin-American militarists, and his quiet feelers towards
Castro,
Castro, intended
intended toto put
putan
an end to the
the Cold
ColdWar,
War, cut
cut back the
the arms budget and
bring under control the Warfare State-that
State-that "military-industrial
“military-industrial complex"
complex”
which President Eisenhower had excoriated,
excoriated, and warned the nation about, in
his
his farewell
farewell address. 22
address.22
According
According toto Joesten,
Joesten, Oswald
Oswald was “anFBI agent
was "an provocateur with
agentprovocateur with aaCIA background”
background"
who had been judged expendable,
expendable, used
usedas a fall guy
guyand murdered to prevent him giv giv-
ing evidence.
evidence.2323 Oswald'
Oswald Assassin
Assassin or
or Fall-Guy? thus established two themes which were
to Soviet and
to recur in Soviet and Russian
Russian active
activemeasures
measuresforfor
the
the next
next thirty years:
years: aa plot by
by Hunt
Hunt
and other right-wing fanatics;
fanatics; and the involvement of ofthe CIA.
CIA. At the time, however,
however,
Joesten's
Joesten’s book
book was
was overshadowed
overshadowedby by the
the publication
publication of
of the
the Warren
Warren report and further
report and further
undermined by
undermined by the
the publicity
publicity given
givento
to Joesten's
Joesten’s Communist
Communist background.24
ba~kground.~~
The KGB correctly identified the New York lawyer Mark Lane as the most tal tal-
ofthe
ented of the first wave of conspiracy
conspiracy theorists researching the JFK assassination.
assassination.
According
According to to one
onereport
report made
made onon him,
him,probably
probably byby the
the New
NewYork
York residency:
residency:
Mark
Mark Lane
Lane is
is well
well known
known asas aa person
person with
with close
close ties to Democratic
ties to Democratic Party
Partycir
cir-
cles
cles in
in the
theUS. He
He holds
holds liberal
liberal views
views on
on aanumber
number of of current
current American
American polit
polit-
ical
ical problems
problems and
and has
has undertaken
undertaken to to conduct his own
conduct his own private
private investigation of
investigation of
the circumstances
circumstances surrounding the murder of J. Kennedy.
Kennedy.25 25
Joesten praised
Joesten praised Lane
Lane asas “brilliant
"brilliant and courageous" and
and courageous’’ dedicated his
and dedicated his own book to
own book to
him:
him: "Neither
“Neither the
the 'police state tactics'
‘police state tactics’ of
of the FBI-to
the FBI-to useuse [Lane's] own
[Lane’s] words-nor
own words-nor
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
R D
D A
AND TT H
H SE
E H SI EHLI DE L D // 22 22 88
the
the conspiracy
conspiracy of of silence
silence of of the
the press
press magnates,
magnates, could could sway sway him
him from from doggedly
doggedly pur pur-
suing the truth."26 Together with student assistants
suing thetruth.”26 Together withstudent assistants and other volunteers, Lane and other volunteers, Lane
founded
founded the the Citizens'
Citizens’ Committee
Committee of of Inquiry
Inquiry in ina asmall
small office
office onon lower
lower Fifth
Fifth Avenue
Avenue
and
and rented
rented aa smallsmall theater
theater at at which,
which, each
each evening
evening for for several
several months,
months, he he gave
gave what
what
became
became knownknown as as "The
“The Speech,"
Speech,’’updating
updating the thedevelopment
development of of his
his conspiracy
conspiracy theory.
theory.
"This
“This alternative
alternative method
method of of dissent
dissent was
was required,"
required,’’writes
writes Lane,
Lane, "because
“because not not aasingle
single
network
network radioradio or or television
television program
program permitted
permitted the thebroadcast
broadcast of of aa word
word of of divergence
divergence
from
from the the official view."27 Though
officialview.”27 Though itit dareddared not not take
take the the risk
risk of of contacting
contacting Lane Lane
directly,
directly, thethe NewNew YorkYork residency
residency sent sent himhim 1,500
1,500 dollars
dollars to to help
help finance
finance hishis research
research
through
through the the intermediary
intermediary of of aa close
close friend
friend whom
whom Lane'sLane’s KGB file file identifies
identifies only
only asas aa
trusted
trusted contact.
contact. While
While LaneLane was was not
not told
told the
the source
source of of the
the money,
money, the the residency
residency sussus-
pected
pected thatthat he hemight
might have
have guessed
guessedwhere
where it it came
came from;
from; it it was
was also
alsoconcerned
concerned that that the
the
secret
secret subsidy
subsidy mightmight be be discovered
discoveredby by the
the FBI.28
FBI.28
The
The samesame intermediary
intermediary provided
provided 500 500 dollars
dollars toto pay
pay for for aa trip
trip byby Lane
Lane to to Europe
Europe
in 1964. While
in 1964. While there,
there, Lane
Lane askedasked toto visit
visit Moscow
Moscow in in order
order toto discuss
discuss some
some of of the
the
material
material he he had hadfound.
found. TheThe Centre
Centre regretfully
regretfully concluded
concluded that that inviting
inviting himhim to toRussia
Russia
would
would reveal
reveal itsits hand
hand inintootoo blatant
blatant aawayway andand his
his proposed
proposed trip trip waswas "tactfully
“tactfully post
post-
poned."
poned.” Trusted
Trusted contacts
contacts were, were, however,
however, selected
selected fromfrom amongamong SovietSoviet journalists
journalists to to
encourage him in his research. Among
encourage him in his research. Among them was the them was the KGB agent Genrikh
agent Genrikh Borovik, Borovik,
who
who later
later maintained
maintained regularregular contact
contact with
with Lane. Lane’s Rush
Lane. Lane's Rush to t oJudgment,
Judgment, published
published
in
in 1966,
1966, alleged
alleged complicity
complicity at at the
thehighest
highest levels
levels of government in
ofgovernment inthe theKennedy
Kennedy assas
assas-
sination.29
ina at ion.^^ It
I t was
was top
top ofof that
that year's
year’s hardback
hardback bestseller
bestseller list list and
and went wentonon to
to become
become the the
bestselling
bestselling paperback of 1967, as well as enjoying what Lane modestly describes as
paperback of 1967, as well as enjoying what Lane modestly describes as
"enormous
“enormous success success around
around the the world"
world” andand causing
causing "a “a dramatic
dramatic changechange in in public
public per
per-
ception"
ception”of of the
the assassination.30
assa~sination.~’
During
During the the late
late 1960s
1960s and and early
early 1970s,
1970s, Lane's success was
Lane’s success wasless less enormous.
enormous. The The
most
most popular
popular books books on on the
the assassination
assassination were were now
now those those that
that exposed
exposed some some of of the
the
excesses
excesses of of the
the conspiracy
conspiracy theorists.31
theorist^.^^ CPUSA
CPUSA leaders leaders who who visited
visited Moscow
Moscow in in 1971,
1971,
though describing Rush
though describing Rush to t o Judgment
Judgment as as "advantageous
“advantageousto to the
the Communists,"
Communists,” claimed claimed
that
that Lane's
Lane’s mainmain motive
motive waswas his his own
own self-aggrandizement.32
self-aggrandi~ement.~~ In thetheInmid-1970s,
mid-1970s7how how-
ever,
ever, the
the dramatic
dramatic revelations
revelations of of real
real conspiracy
conspiracy in in the
the Nixon
Nixon White
White HouseHouse and and ofof
CIA assassination
assassination plots plots against
against several
several foreign
foreign statesmen
statesmen gave gave the the conspiracy
conspiracy theo
theo-
rists aa new
new lease
lease onon life.33
life.33The
The KGB, predictably,
predictably, was wasanxious
anxiousto to lose
lose nono opportunity
opportunity
to
to promote
promote active active measures
measureswhich which supported
supported the the increasingly
increasinglypopular popular theory
theory thatthatthethe
CIA
CIA was was behind
behind Kennedy's
Kennedy’s assassination.
assassination.Its Its chief
chief target
target was was the
the former
former CIA officerofficer
turned
turned Watergate
Watergateconspirator
conspirator E. E. Howard
Howard Hunt Hunt (sometimes
(sometimes confused confusedwith with thetheTexan
Texan
oil
oil millionaire
millionaire H. H. L.L. Hunt),
Hunt), who who hadhad been
been wrongly
wrongly accused
accused of being in
ofbeing in Dallas
Dallas on on the
the
day
day ofof the
the assassination.
assassination.
The centerpiece
centerpiece of the active measure against Howard Hunt, codenamed
activemeasure
ARLINGTON,
ARLINGTON7was was aa forged
forged letter to him
letter to him fromfrom Oswald,
Oswald, allegedly
allegedly written
written aa fort-
fort
night before the assassination. The letter used phrases
night before the assassination. The letter used phrases and expressions taken from and expressions taken from
actual
actual letters
letters written
written by by Oswald
Oswald duringduring hishis two
two years
years in in the
the Soviet
Soviet Union,
Union, was was fabri
fabri-
cated
cated in in aaclever
clever imitation
imitation of of his
his handwriting.
handwriting.
P
P o l i tt ii cc aWll a W
r faarrfea r e // 22 22 99
Dear Mr.
Mr. Hunt,
I would like information concerning my position.
I am only asking for information. I am suggesting that
that we discuss
discuss the
matter fully before any steps are taken by me or anyone else.
else.
Thank-you.
Thank-you.
Lee Harvey
HarveyOswald34
O~wald~~
The implication, clearly,

clearly, was
wasthat Oswald wanted to meet Hunt before going ahead
with thethe assassination.
assassination.
Before being used, the forgery was twice twice checked for “authenticity”
"authenticity" by the Third Third
Department of the KGB's KGB’s OTU (operational technical)technical) Directorate. In 1975 1975 photo
photo-
copies
copies of ititwere sent totothree of the most active conspiracy buffs, together together with covcov-
ering letters from an anonymous
anonymous wellwisher who claimed that he hehadhad given the
original to thethe Director
Director of ofthe
theFBI,
FBI, Clarence Kelly, who appeared to be suppressing
it. The Centre was doubtless disappointed that for for almost two years its forgery
received
received no publicity.
publicity. In 1977,
1977, however,
however, the letter was published by Penn Jones, the
retired owner of a smallsmall Texas newspaper and self-published author of of four books
assassination.The New York Times reported that three
about the assassination. threehandwriting
handwritingexperts
had authenticated the letter. Oswald's
Oswald’s widow also identified her husband’s
husband's handwrit-
handwrit
ing.35 Experts summoned by the House
ing3* HouseSelect Committee on Assassinations in 1978
onAssassinations 1978
concluded more prudently that they were unable to reach a “firm "firm conclusion”
conclusion" because
of the
theabsence of the theoriginal document.36
document.36
The Centre was somewhat put out, however, however, by bythe fact that
that initial press reaction
reactionto
its forgery centered
centered chiefl
chieflyy on the likelihood of the letter being addressed to the late
Texan
Texanoiloil millionaire
mdhonaire H. H. L. Hunt Hunt (the
(the central
central character
character in initsits own
own original
original
conspiracy theory),
conspiracy theory), rather
rather than
than thetheKGB's
KGB’s current
current intended target, the Watergate concon
spirator Howard Hunt. ServiceServiceA believed there had been a CIA plot to disrupt its own
plot. The KGB reported that an "orchestrated"
“orchestrated”American press campaign
campaign was seekingseeking
to
to divert
divert public
public attention
attention from
from Oswald's
Oswald’s connections
connections with
with the American intelligence
community
community by by concentrating
concentrating on H. L. Hunt instead.
on H. instead. In April 1977,
1977 soon after
, after the pub
the pub-
lication
lication of the forged letter,
letter, the KGB informed the Central Central Committee
Committee that thatitit was
launching additional active measures
measuresto expose
expose the supposed
supposed roleroleof ''American spe
of the “American spe-
cial services"
services”in the Kennedy assassination.37
assa~sination.~~ By 1980
1980 Howard Hunt was complaining
that, "It's
“It’sbecome
becomean anarticle offaith that I had some
article some role in the Kennedy assa~sination.”~~
assassination. "38
By the late 1970s
1970s the
the KGB could fairly claim that far more Americans believed
some version of its own conspiracy
some conspiracy theory of of the Kennedy assassination,
assassination, involving a
right-wing
right-wing plot and the US intelligence community, than still accepted the main
findings
findings of of the
the Warren
Warren Commission.
Commission. Soviet
Soviet active measures, however,
active measures, however, had had done
done less
to
to influence
influence American
American opinion
opinion than
than the
the Centre
Centre believed. By their
believed. By their initial cover-ups
initial cover-ups
the
the CIA and and the
the FBI had
had unwittingly
unwittingly probably done more
probably done more than
than the KGB to
the KGB to encour-
encour
age
age the sometimes obsessional
the sometimes obsessional conspiracy theorists who
conspiracy theorists who swarmed
swarmed aroundaround thethe com-
com
plex
plex and
and confusing
conhsing evidence
evidence on on the
the assassination.
assassination. Allen Dulles, the
Allen Dulles, the recently retired
recently retired
DCI
D C I on theWarren
on the Warren Commission,
Commission, had had deliberately not informed
deliberately not informed the the commission
commission
TT H
HEE SS W
WOOR
R D
D A
AN D
ND TT H E H SI EHLI D
H SE E L D // 22 J3 0O
that
that the
the CIA hadhad plotted
plotted the
the assassination
assassination of of Castro.
Castro. On
O n the
the very
very day
day ofof Kennedy's
Kennedy’s
assassination,
assassination, thethe Agency
Agency hadhad supplied
supplied an an agent
agent with
with aa murder
murder weapon
weapon for for use
use
against
against Castro.
Castro. J.J. Edgar
Edgar Hoover
Hoover tootoo had
had held
held back
back important
important information.
information. He H e dis
dis-
covered,
covered, to
to his
his horror,
horror, that
that Oswald
Oswald had had not
notbeen
been included
included onon the
theFBI's
FBI’s security
security index
index
of
of potentially
potentially disloyal
disloyal citizens,
citizens, despite
despite having
having written
written aathreatening
threateningletterletter to the
to the
Bureau
Bureau after
after his
his return
return from
from Russia
Russia and
and subsequently
subsequently makingmaking an an appointment
appointment to to see
see
aa KGB
KGB officer in Mexico City. After reading a report on “investigativedeficiencies in
officer in Mexico City. After reading a report on "investigative deficiencies in
the
the Oswald
Oswald case,"
case,” Hoover
Hoover concluded
concluded that,
that, if if it
it became
became public,
public, the
the report
report would
would
destroy
destroy the
the FBI's
FBI’s reputation.39
rep~tation.~~
The
The information
information withheld
withheld byby Dulles
Dulles and
and Hoover
Hoover would
would have
have been
been most
most unlikely
unlikely
to
to undermine the Warren Commission7sconclusion that Oswald had been aa lone
undermine the Warren Commission's conclusion that Oswald had been lone
assassin.
assassin. But,
But, when
when ititbecame
became public
public inin the
the mid-1970s,
mid-l970s,ititinevitably
inevitably encouraged
encouraged the the
belief
belief that
that there
there had
had been
been other
other cover-ups
cover-ups which
which pointed
pointed totothe
theinvolvement
involvement of of the
the
intelligence
intelligence community.
community. The The Watergate
Watergate scandal,
scandal, andand the
the revelations
revelations of of intelligence
intelligence
abuses
abuses which
which followed,
followed, created
created aa perfect
perfect breeding
breeding ground
ground for
for the
the spread
spread of of conspir
conspir-
acy
acy theories.4o
theories.40Though
Though mostmost of
of the
the major
major abuses
abuses hadhad been
been ordered
ordered or or authorized
authorized by by
successive
successive presidents,
presidents, thethe belief
belief grew
grew that,
that, inin the
the words
words ofof Senator
Senator Frank
Frank Church,
Church,
chairman
chairman of of the
the Senate
Senate Select
Select Committee
Committee to to Study
Study Governmental
Governmental Operations
Operationswith with
Respect
Respect toto Intelligence
Intelligence Activities,
Activities, the
the CIA
CIA hadhad been
been "behaving
“behaving like
like aa rogue
rogue elephant
elephant
on
on the
therampage."41
rampage.”41
SSE
ERVI
R V IC
CEE A SS E
EIIZ
ZEE D eagerly

The Sword and The Shield The Mitrokhin Archive and The Secret History of The KGB OCR PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Sword and The Shield The Mitrokhin Archive and The Secret History of The KGB OCR PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

THE

THEOPHILE DELCASSE AND

FRANCE OVERSEAS: THE

11 The Mitrokhin Archive

22 From Lenin's Cheka

This failure .. .. .. resulted

For the next five years, owing to "a “a further

I was heartened by the ISC's

The Soviet Courts

DD U R IINNGG TTHE C CIIV L war,

against international fascism:

BELOV doesdoes not

French illegal in the the "Serebryansky

The Centre replied:

At one time, when it was necessary,

To a remarkable degree, however,

sin. Mercader succeeded

material from MIS MI5 files,

Harnack .. .. .. had little sense of

Like Burgess and Philby,

The most important of the sources sources cultivated

I again insist on recalling

Also in jeopardy for providing intelligence on the theforthcoming

I N TH E E A R LY months of the Great

By this time, following several

Our lives are

Though Akhmerov, by contrast, struck Massing

Despite the closeness

with enthusiasm, but

HOLA was was born

All of us in Moscow have gained the impression that Churchill

The real responsibility,

DESsP I T E T HHEE EA R LY Cold

insisted that his operational failings

Like all defectors, Golitsyn was given

continued the operation. "Rudi “Rudi [Valoushek]

Probably asas a result of his complaints,

YYuri Andropov became KGB chairman in 1967 1967withwithextravagant

Andropov had the the advantage

within the federal government. At the end of of the

.. .. ..Today American intelligence

TTHHE E CCEENNT TRREE HHAAR RBBOORREEDD far

The KGB has been informing the of the country

Further dramatic evidence of the resurgence of of the KGB leadership's

A reliable source ofthethe Polish friends [the Polish intelligence service], an

It was not difficult

It is the duty of every Socialist,

in our own lands. We can, and we will, extend the civilization

The implication, clearly,

You might also like