EN BANC

[G.R. No. 139465. January 18, 2000]

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner, vs. HON. RALPH C. LANTION,

Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.

DECISION

MELO, J.:

The individual citizen is but a speck of particle or molecule vis--vis the vast and
overwhelming powers of government. His only guarantee against oppression and
tyranny are his fundamental liberties under the Bill of Rights which shield him in
times of need. The Court is now called to decide whether to uphold a citizens basic
due process rights, or the governments ironclad duties under a treaty. The bugle
sounds and this Court must once again act as the faithful guardian of the fundamental
writ.

The petition at our doorstep is cast against the following factual backdrop:

On January 13, 1977, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Presidential Decree
No. 1069 "Prescribing the Procedure for the Extradition of Persons Who Have
Committed Crimes in a Foreign Country". The Decree is founded on: the doctrine of
incorporation under the Constitution; the mutual concern for the suppression of crime
both in the state where it was committed and the state where the criminal may have
escaped; the extradition treaty with the Republic of Indonesia and the intention of the
Philippines to enter into similar treaties with other interested countries; and the need
for rules to guide the executive department and the courts in the proper
implementation of said treaties.

On November 13, 1994, then Secretary of Justice Franklin M. Drilon, representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Manila the "Extradition
Treaty Between the Government of the Republic of the Philippines and the
Government of the United States of America" (hereinafter referred to as the RP-US
Extradition Treaty). The Senate, by way of Resolution No. 11, expressed its
concurrence in the ratification of said treaty. It also expressed its concurrence in the
Diplomatic Notes correcting Paragraph (5)(a), Article 7 thereof (on the admissibility
of the documents accompanying an extradition request upon certification by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the requested state resident in the
Requesting State).

On June 18, 1999, the Department of Justice received from the Department of Foreign
Affairs U. S. Note Verbale No. 0522 containing a request for the extradition of private
respondent Mark Jimenez to the United States. Attached to the Note Verbale were the
Grand Jury Indictment, the warrant of arrest issued by the U.S. District Court,
Southern District of Florida, and other supporting documents for said extradition.
Based on the papers submitted, private respondent appears to be charged in the United
States with violation of the following provisions of the United States Code (USC):

A)......18 USC 371 (Conspiracy to commit offense or to defraud the

United States; two [2] counts; Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);

B)......26 USC 7201 (Attempt to evade or defeat tax; four [4] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);

C)......18 USC 1343 (Fraud by wire, radio, or television; two [2] counts;
Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);

D)......18 USC 1001 (False statement or entries; six [6] counts;

Maximum Penalty 5 years on each count);

E)......2 USC 441f (Election contributions in name of another; thirty-

three [33] counts; Maximum Penalty less than one year).

(p. 14, Rollo.)

On the same day, petitioner issued Department Order No. 249 designating and
authorizing a panel of attorneys to take charge of and to handle the case pursuant to
Section 5(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1069. Accordingly, the panel began with the
"technical evaluation and assessment" of the extradition request and the documents in
support thereof. The panel found that the "official English translation of some
documents in Spanish were not attached to the request and that there are some other
matters that needed to be addressed" (p. 15, Rollo).

Pending evaluation of the aforestated extradition documents, private respondent,

through counsel, wrote a letter dated July 1, 1999 addressed to petitioner requesting
copies of the official extradition request from the U. S. Government, as well as all
documents and papers submitted therewith; and that he be given ample time to
comment on the request after he shall have received copies of the requested papers.
Private respondent also requested that the proceedings on the matter be held in
abeyance in the meantime.

Later, private respondent requested that preliminarily, he be given at least a copy of,
or access to, the request of the United States Government, and after receiving a copy
of the Diplomatic Note, a period of time to amplify on his request.

In response to private respondents July 1, 1999 letter, petitioner, in a reply-letter dated

July 13, 1999 (but received by private respondent only on August 4, 1999), denied the
foregoing requests for the following reasons:

1. We find it premature to furnish you with copies of the extradition

request and supporting documents from the United States Government,
pending evaluation by this Department of the sufficiency of the
extradition documents submitted in accordance with the provisions of
the extradition treaty and our extradition law. Article 7 of the Extradition
Treaty between the Philippines and the United States enumerates the
documentary requirements and establishes the procedures under which
the documents submitted shall be received and admitted as evidence.
Evidentiary requirements under our domestic law are also set forth in
Section 4 of P.D. No. 1069.

Evaluation by this Department of the aforementioned documents is not a

preliminary investigation nor akin to preliminary investigation of
criminal cases. We merely determine whether the procedures and
requirements under the relevant law and treaty have been complied with
by the Requesting Government. The constitutionally guaranteed rights of
the accused in all criminal prosecutions are therefore not available.

It is only after the filing of the petition for extradition when the person
sought to be extradited will be furnished by the court with copies of the
petition, request and extradition documents and this Department will not
pose any objection to a request for ample time to evaluate said
documents.

2. The formal request for extradition of the United States contains grand
jury information and documents obtained through grand jury process
covered by strict secrecy rules under United States law. The United
States had to secure orders from the concerned District Courts
authorizing the United States to disclose certain grand jury information
to Philippine government and law enforcement personnel for the purpose
of extradition of Mr. Jimenez. Any further disclosure of the said
 information is not authorized by the United States District Courts. In this
particular extradition request the United States Government requested
the Philippine Government to prevent unauthorized disclosure of the
subject information. This Departments denial of your request is
consistent with Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty which
provides that the Philippine Government must represent the interests of
the United States in any proceedings arising out of a request for
extradition. The Department of Justice under P.D. No. 1069 is the
counsel of the foreign governments in all extradition requests.

3. This Department is not in a position to hold in abeyance proceedings

in connection with an extradition request. Article 26 of the Vienna
Convention on the Law of Treaties, to which we are a party provides that
"[E]very treaty in force is binding upon the parties to it and must be
performed by them in good faith". Extradition is a tool of criminal law
enforcement and to be effective, requests for extradition or surrender of
accused or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously.

(pp. 77-78, Rollo.)

Such was the state of affairs when, on August 6, 1999, private respondent filed with
the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region a petition against the
Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and the Director of the National
Bureau of Investigation, for mandamus (to compel herein petitioner to furnish private
respondent the extradition documents, to give him access thereto, and to afford him an
opportunity to comment on, or oppose, the extradition request, and thereafter to
evaluate the request impartially, fairly and objectively); certiorari (to set aside herein
petitioners letter dated July 13, 1999); and prohibition (to restrain petitioner from
considering the extradition request and from filing an extradition petition in court; and
to enjoin the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of the NBI from
performing any act directed to the extradition of private respondent to the United
States), with an application for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and a
writ of preliminary injunction (pp. 104-105, Rollo).

The aforementioned petition was docketed as Civil Case No. 99-94684 and thereafter
raffled to Branch 25 of said regional trial court stationed in Manila which is presided
over by the Honorable Ralph C. Lantion.

After due notice to the parties, the case was heard on August 9, 1999. Petitioner, who
appeared in his own behalf, moved that he be given ample time to file a memorandum,
but the same was denied.
On August 10, 1999, respondent judge issued an order dated the previous day,
disposing:

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby Orders the respondents, namely: the

Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Director of
the National Bureau of Investigation, their agents and/or representatives
to maintain the status quo by refraining from committing the acts
complained of; from conducting further proceedings in connection with
the request of the United States Government for the extradition of the
petitioner; from filing the corresponding Petition with a Regional Trial
court; and from performing any act directed to the extradition of the
petitioner to the United States, for a period of twenty (20) days from
service on respondents of this Order, pursuant to Section 5, Rule 58 of
the 1997 Rules of Court.

The hearing as to whether or not this Court shall issue the preliminary
injunction, as agreed upon by the counsels for the parties herein, is set on
August 17, 1999 at 9:00 oclock in the morning. The respondents are,
likewise, ordered to file their written comment and/or opposition to the
issuance of a Preliminary Injunction on or before said date.

SO ORDERED.

(pp. 110-111, Rollo.)

Forthwith, petitioner initiated the instant proceedings, arguing that:

PUBLIC RESPONDENT ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF

JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN
ISSUING THE TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER
BECAUSE: 
I.

BY ORDERING HEREIN PETITIONER TO REFRAIN FROM

COMMITTING THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF, I. E., TO DESIST
FROM REFUSING PRIVATE RESPONDENT ACCESS TO THE
OFFICIAL EXTRADITION REQUEST AND DOCUMENTS AND
FROM DENYING PRIVATE RESPONDENT AN OPPORTUNITY
TO FILE A COMMENT ON, OR OPPOSITION TO, THE REQUEST,
THE MAIN PRAYER FOR A WRIT OF MANDAMUS IN THE
 PETITION FOR MANDAMUS, CERTIORARI AND PROHIBITION
WAS, IN EFFECT, GRANTED SO AS TO CONSTITUTE AN
ADJUDICATION ON THE MERITS OF THE MANDAMUS ISSUES;
II.

PETITIONER WAS UNQUALIFIEDLY PREVENTED FROM

PERFORMING LEGAL DUTIES UNDER THE EXTRADITION
TREATY AND THE PHILIPPINE EXTRADITION LAW;
III.

THE PETITION FOR (MANDAMUS), CERTIORARI AND

PROHIBITION IS, ON ITS FACE, FORMALLY AND
SUBSTANTIALLY DEFICIENT; AND
IV.

PRIVATE RESPONDENT HAS NO RIGHT IN ESSE THAT NEEDS

PROTECTION AND ENFORCEMENT, AND WILL NOT SUFFER
ANY IRREPARABLE INJURY.

(pp. 19-20, Rollo.)

On August 17, 1999, the Court required private respondent to file his comment. Also
issued, as prayed for, was a temporary restraining order (TRO)
providing:

NOW, THEREFORE, effective immediately and continuing until further

orders from this Court, You, Respondent Judge Ralph C. Lantion, your
agents, representatives or any person or persons acting in your place or
stead are hereby ORDERED to CEASE and DESIST from enforcing the
assailed order dated August 9, 1999 issued by public respondent in Civil
Case No. 99-94684.

GIVEN by the Honorable HILARIO G. DAVIDE, JR., Chief Justice,

Supreme Court of the Philippines, this 17th day of August 1999.

(pp. 120-121, Rollo.)

The case was heard on oral argument on August 31, 1999, after which the parties, as
directed, filed their respective memoranda.
From the pleadings of the opposing parties, both procedural and substantive issues are
patent. However, a review of these issues as well as the extensive arguments of both
parties, compel us to delineate the focal point raised by the pleadings: During the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings, is private respondent entitled to the
two basic due process rights of notice and hearing? An affirmative answer would
necessarily render the proceedings at the trial court, moot and academic (the issues of
which are substantially the same as those before us now), while a negative resolution
would call for the immediate lifting of the TRO issued by this Court dated August 24,
1999, thus allowing petitioner to fast-track the process leading to the filing of the
extradition petition with the proper regional trial court. Corollarily, in the event that
private respondent is adjudged entitled to basic due process rights at the evaluation
stage of the extradition proceedings, would this entitlement constitute a breach of the
legal commitments and obligations of the Philippine Government under the RP-US
Extradition Treaty? And assuming that the result would indeed be a breach, is there
any conflict between private respondents basic due process rights and the provisions
of the RP-US Extradition Treaty?

The issues having transcendental importance, the Court has elected to go directly into
the substantive merits of the case, brushing aside peripheral procedural matters which
concern the proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684, particularly the propriety of the
filing of the petition therein, and of the issuance of the TRO of August 17, 1999 by
the trial court.

To be sure, the issues call for a review of the extradition procedure. The RP-US
Extradition Treaty which was executed only on November 13, 1994, ushered into
force the implementing provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069, also called as the
Philippine Extradition Law. Section 2(a) thereof defines extradition as "the removal of
an accused from the Philippines with the object of placing him at the disposal of
foreign authorities to enable the requesting state or government to hold him in
connection with any criminal investigation directed against him or the execution of a
penalty imposed on him under the penal or criminal law of the requesting state or
government." The portions of the Decree relevant to the instant case which involves a
charged and not convicted individual, are abstracted as follows:

The Extradition Request

The request is made by the Foreign Diplomat of the Requesting State, addressed to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs, and shall be accompanied by:

1. The original or an authentic copy of the criminal charge and the warrant of arrest
issued by the authority of the Requesting State having jurisdiction over the matter, or
some other instruments having equivalent legal force;
2. A recital of the acts for which extradition is requested, with the fullest particulars as
to the name and identity of the accused, his whereabouts in the Philippines, if known,
the acts or omissions complained of, and the time and place of the commission of
these acts;

3. The text of the applicable law or a statement of the contents of said law, and the
designation or description of the offense by the law, sufficient for evaluation of the
request; and

4. Such other documents or information in support of the request.

(Section 4, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

Section 5 of the Presidential Decree, which sets forth the duty of the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, pertinently provides:

. . . (1) Unless it appears to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the

request fails to meet the requirements of this law and the relevant treaty
or convention, he shall forward the request together with the related
documents to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate
and authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case.

The above provision shows only too clearly that the executive authority given the task
of evaluating the sufficiency of the request and the supporting documents is the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs. What then is the coverage of this task?

In accordance with Paragraphs 2 and 3, Article 7 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the
executive authority must ascertain whether or not the request is supported by:

1. Documents, statements, or other types of information which describe the identity

and probable location of the person sought;

2. A statement of the facts of the offense and the procedural history of the case;

3. A statement of the provisions of the law describing the essential elements of the
offense for which extradition is requested;

4. A statement of the provisions of law describing the punishment for the

offense;

5. A statement of the provisions of the law describing any time limit on the
prosecution or the execution of punishment for the offense;
6. Documents, statements, or other types of information specified in paragraph 3 or
paragraph 4 of said Article, as applicable.

(Paragraph 2, Article 7, Presidential Decree No. 1069.)

7. Such evidence as, according to the law of the Requested State, would provide
probable cause for his arrest and committal for trial if the offense had been committed
there;

8. A copy of the warrant or order of arrest issued by a judge or other competent

authority; and

9. A copy of the charging document.

(Paragraph 3, ibid.)

The executive authority (Secretary of Foreign Affairs) must also see to it that the
accompanying documents received in support of the request had been certified by the
principal diplomatic or consular officer of the Requested State resident in the
Requesting State (Embassy Note No. 052 from U. S. Embassy; Embassy Note No.
951309 from the Department of Foreign Affairs).

In this light, Paragraph 3, Article 3 of the Treaty provides that "[e]xtradition shall not
be granted if the executive authority of the Requested State determines that the
request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which is not
punishable under non-military penal legislation."

The Extradition Petition

Upon a finding made by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs that the extradition request
and its supporting documents are sufficient and complete in form and substance, he
shall deliver the same to the Secretary of Justice, who shall immediately designate and
authorize an attorney in his office to take charge of the case (Paragraph [1], Section 5,
P. D. No. 1069). The lawyer designated shall then file a written petition with the
proper regional trial court of the province or city, with a prayer that the court take the
extradition request under consideration (Paragraph [2], ibid.).

The presiding judge of the regional trial court, upon receipt of the petition for
extradition, shall, as soon as practicable, issue an order summoning the prospective
extraditee to appear and to answer the petition on the day and hour fixed in the order.
The judge may issue a warrant of arrest if it appears that the immediate arrest and
temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice (Paragraph [1],
Section 6, ibid.), particularly to prevent the flight of the prospective extraditee.

The Extradition Hearing

The Extradition Law does not specifically indicate whether the extradition proceeding
is criminal, civil, or a special proceeding. Nevertheless, Paragraph [1], Section 9
thereof provides that in the hearing of the extradition petition, the provisions of the
Rules of Court, insofar as practicable and not inconsistent with the summary nature of
the proceedings, shall apply. During the hearing, Section 8 of the Decree provides that
the attorney having charge of the case may, upon application by the Requesting State,
represent the latter throughout the proceedings.

Upon conclusion of the hearing, the court shall render a decision granting the
extradition and giving the reasons therefor upon a showing of the existence of a prima
facie case, or dismiss the petition (Section 10, ibid.). Said decision is appealable to the
Court of Appeals, whose decision shall be final and immediately executory (Section
12, ibid.). The provisions of the Rules of Court governing appeal in criminal cases in
the Court of Appeals shall apply in the aforementioned appeal, except for the required
15-day period to file brief (Section 13, ibid.).

The trial court determines whether or not the offense mentioned in the petition is
extraditable based on the application of the dual criminality rule and other conditions
mentioned in Article 2 of the RP-US Extradition Treaty. The trial court also
determines whether or not the offense for which extradition is requested is a political
one (Paragraph [1], Article 3, RP-US Extradition Treaty).

With the foregoing abstract of the extradition proceedings as backdrop, the following
query presents itself: What is the nature of the role of the Department of Justice at the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings?

A strict observance of the Extradition Law indicates that the only duty of the
Secretary of Justice is to file the extradition petition after the request and all the
supporting papers are forwarded to him by the Secretary of Foreign Affairs. It is the
latter official who is authorized to evaluate the extradition papers, to assure their
sufficiency, and under Paragraph [3], Article 3 of the Treaty, to determine whether or
not the request is politically motivated, or that the offense is a military offense which
is not punishable under non-military penal legislation. Ipso facto, as expressly
provided in Paragraph [1], Section 5 of the Extradition Law, the Secretary of Justice
has the ministerial duty of filing the extradition papers.
However, looking at the factual milieu of the case before us, it would appear that there
was failure to abide by the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1069. For while it is
true that the extradition request was delivered to the Department of Foreign Affairs on
June 17, 1999, the following day or less than 24 hours later, the Department of Justice
received the request, apparently without the Department of Foreign Affairs
discharging its duty of thoroughly evaluating the same and its accompanying
documents. The statement of an assistant secretary at the Department of Foreign
Affairs that his Department, in this regard, is merely acting as a post office, for which
reason he simply forwarded the request to the Department of Justice, indicates the
magnitude of the error of the Department of Foreign Affairs in taking lightly its
responsibilities. Thereafter, the Department of Justice took it upon itself to determine
the completeness of the documents and to evaluate the same to find out whether they
comply with the requirements laid down in the Extradition Law and the RP-US
Extradition Treaty. Petitioner ratiocinates in this connection that although the
Department of Justice had no obligation to evaluate the extradition documents, the
Department also had to go over them so as to be able to prepare an extradition petition
(tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 24-25). Notably, it was also at this stage where private
respondent insisted on the following: (1) the right to be furnished the request and the
supporting papers; (2) the right to be heard which consists in having a reasonable
period of time to oppose the request, and to present evidence in support of the
opposition; and (3) that the evaluation proceedings be held in abeyance pending the
filing of private respondent's opposition to the request.

The two Departments seem to have misread the scope of their duties and authority,
one abdicating its powers and the other enlarging its commission. The Department of
Foreign Affairs, moreover, has, through the Solicitor General, filed a manifestation
that it is adopting the instant petition as its own, indirectly conveying the message that
if it were to evaluate the extradition request, it would not allow private respondent to
participate in the process of evaluation.

Plainly then, the record cannot support the presumption of regularity that the
Department of Foreign Affairs thoroughly reviewed the extradition request and
supporting documents and that it arrived at a well-founded judgment that the request
and its annexed documents satisfy the requirements of law. The Secretary of Justice,
eminent as he is in the field of law, could not privately review the papers all by
himself. He had to officially constitute a panel of attorneys. How then could the DFA
Secretary or his undersecretary, in less than one day, make the more authoritative
determination?

The evaluation process, just like the extradition proceedings proper, belongs to a class
by itself. It is sui generis. It is not a criminal investigation, but it is also erroneous to
say that it is purely an exercise of ministerial functions. At such stage, the executive
authority has the power: (a) to make a technical assessment of the completeness and
sufficiency of the extradition papers; (b) to outrightly deny the request if on its face
and on the face of the supporting documents the crimes indicated are not extraditable;
and (c) to make a determination whether or not the request is politically motivated, or
that the offense is a military one which is not punishable under non-military penal
legislation (tsn, August 31, 1999, pp. 28-29; Article 2 & and Paragraph [3], Article 3,
RP-US Extradition Treaty). Hence, said process may be characterized as an
investigative or inquisitorial process in contrast to a proceeding conducted in the
exercise of an administrative bodys quasi-judicial power.

In administrative law, a quasi-judicial proceeding involves: (a) taking and evaluation

of evidence; (b) determining facts based upon the evidence presented; and (c)
rendering an order or decision supported by the facts proved (De Leon, Administrative
Law: Text and Cases, 1993 ed., p. 198, citing Morgan vs. United States, 304 U.S. 1).
Inquisitorial power, which is also known as examining or investigatory power, is one
of the determinative powers of an administrative body which better enables it to
exercise its quasi-judicial authority (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 26).
This power allows the administrative body to inspect the records and premises, and
investigate the activities, of persons or entities coming under its jurisdiction (Ibid., p.
27), or to require disclosure of information by means of accounts, records, reports,
testimony of witnesses, production of documents, or otherwise (De Leon, op. cit., p.
64).

The power of investigation consists in gathering, organizing, and analyzing evidence,

which is a useful aid or tool in an administrative agencys performance of its rule-
making or quasi-judicial functions. Notably, investigation is indispensable to
prosecution.

In Ruperto v. Torres (100 Phil. 1098 [1957], unreported), the Court had occasion to
rule on the functions of an investigatory body with the sole power of investigation. It
does not exercise judicial functions and its power is limited to investigating the facts
and making findings in respect thereto. The Court laid down the test of determining
whether an administrative body is exercising judicial functions or merely
investigatory functions: Adjudication signifies the exercise of power and authority to
adjudicate upon the rights and obligations of the parties before it. Hence, if the only
purpose for investigation is to evaluate evidence submitted before it based on the facts
and circumstances presented to it, and if the agency is not authorized to make a final
pronouncement affecting the parties, then there is an absence of judicial discretion and
judgment.

The above description in Ruperto applies to an administrative body authorized to

evaluate extradition documents. The body has no power to adjudicate in regard to the
rights and obligations of both the Requesting State and the prospective extraditee. Its
only power is to determine whether the papers comply with the requirements of the
law and the treaty and, therefore, sufficient to be the basis of an extradition petition.
Such finding is thus merely initial and not final. The body has no power to determine
whether or not the extradition should be effected. That is the role of the court. The
bodys power is limited to an initial finding of whether or not the extradition petition
can be filed in court.

It is to be noted, however, that in contrast to ordinary investigations, the evaluation

procedure is characterized by certain peculiarities. Primarily, it sets into motion the
wheels of the extradition process. Ultimately, it may result in the deprivation of
liberty of the prospective extraditee. This deprivation can be effected at two
stages: First, the provisional arrest of the prospective extraditee pending the
submission of the request. This is so because the Treaty provides that in case of
urgency, a contracting party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought
pending presentation of the request (Paragraph [1], Article 9, RP-US Extradition
Treaty), but he shall be automatically discharged after 60 days if no request is
submitted (Paragraph 4). Presidential Decree No. 1069 provides for a shorter period of
20 days after which the arrested person could be discharged (Section 20[d]). Logically,
although the Extradition Law is silent on this respect, the provisions only mean that
once a request is forwarded to the Requested State, the prospective extraditee may be
continuously detained, or if not, subsequently rearrested (Paragraph [5], Article 9, RP-
US Extradition Treaty), for he will only be discharged if no request is submitted.
Practically, the purpose of this detention is to prevent his possible flight from the
Requested State. Second, the temporary arrest of the prospective extraditee during the
pendency of the extradition petition in court (Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1069).

Clearly, there is an impending threat to a prospective extraditees liberty as early as

during the evaluation stage. It is not only an imagined threat to his liberty, but a very
imminent one.

Because of these possible consequences, we conclude that the evaluation process is

akin to an administrative agency conducting an investigative proceeding, the
consequences of which are essentially criminal since such technical assessment sets
off or commences the procedure for, and ultimately, the deprivation of liberty of a
prospective extraditee. As described by petitioner himself, this is a "tool" for criminal
law enforcement (p. 78, Rollo). In essence, therefore, the evaluation process partakes
of the nature of a criminal investigation. In a number of cases, we had occasion to
make available to a respondent in an administrative case or investigation certain
constitutional rights that are ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions. Further,
as pointed out by Mr. Justice Mendoza during the oral arguments, there are rights
formerly available only at the trial stage that had been advanced to an earlier stage in
the proceedings, such as the right to counsel and the right against self-incrimination
(tsn, August 31, 1999, p. 135; Escobedo vs. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478; Gideon vs.
Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335; Miranda vs. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436).

In Pascual v. Board of Medical Examiners (28 SCRA 344 [1969]), we held that the
right against self-incrimination under Section 17, Article III of the 1987 Constitution
which is ordinarily available only in criminal prosecutions, extends to administrative
proceedings which possess a criminal or penal aspect, such as an administrative
investigation of a licensed physician who is charged with immorality, which could
result in his loss of the privilege to practice medicine if found guilty. The Court, citing
the earlier case of Cabal vs. Kapunan (6 SCRA 1059 [1962]), pointed out that the
revocation of ones license as a medical practitioner, is an even greater deprivation
than forfeiture of property.

Cabal vs. Kapunan (supra) involved an administrative charge of unexplained wealth

against a respondent which was filed under Republic Act No. 1379, or the Anti-Graft
Law. Again, we therein ruled that since the investigation may result in forfeiture of
property, the administrative proceedings are deemed criminal or penal, and such
forfeiture partakes the nature of a penalty. There is also the earlier case of Almeda, Sr.
vs. Perez (5 SCRA 970 [1962]), where the Court, citing American jurisprudence, laid
down the test to determine whether a proceeding is civil or criminal: If the proceeding
is under a statute such that if an indictment is presented the forfeiture can be included
in the criminal case, such proceeding is criminal in nature, although it may be civil in
form; and where it must be gathered from the statute that the action is meant to be
criminal in its nature, it cannot be considered as civil. If, however, the proceeding
does not involve the conviction of the wrongdoer for the offense charged, the
proceeding is civil in nature.

The cases mentioned above refer to an impending threat of deprivation of ones

property or property right. No less is this true, but even more so in the case before us,
involving as it does the possible deprivation of liberty, which, based on the hierarchy
of constitutionally protected rights, is placed second only to life itself and enjoys
precedence over property, for while forfeited property can be returned or replaced, the
time spent in incarceration is irretrievable and beyond recompense.

By comparison, a favorable action in an extradition request exposes a person to

eventual extradition to a foreign country, thus saliently exhibiting the criminal or
penal aspect of the process. In this sense, the evaluation procedure is akin to a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may have the same result the arrest
and imprisonment of the respondent or the person charged. Similar to the evaluation
stage of extradition proceedings, a preliminary investigation, which may result in the
filing of an information against the respondent, can possibly lead to his arrest, and to
the deprivation of his liberty.

Petitioners reliance on Wright vs. Court of Appeals (235 SCRA 241 [1992]) (p. 8,
Petitioners Memorandum) that the extradition treaty is neither a piece of criminal
legislation nor a criminal procedural statute is not well-taken. Wright is not authority
for petitioners conclusion that his preliminary processing is not akin to a preliminary
investigation. The characterization of a treaty in Wright was in reference to the
applicability of the prohibition against an ex post facto law. It had nothing to do with
the denial of the right to notice, information, and hearing.

As early as 1884, the United States Supreme Court ruled that "any legal proceeding
enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age or custom, or newly devised
in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the general public good,
which regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be
due process of law" (Hurtado vs. California, 110 U.S. 516). Compliance with due
process requirements cannot be deemed non-compliance with treaty commitments.

The United States and the Philippines share a mutual concern about the suppression
and punishment of crime in their respective jurisdictions. At the same time, both
States accord common due process protection to their respective citizens.

The due process clauses in the American and Philippine Constitutions are not only
worded in exactly identical language and terminology, but more importantly, they are
alike in what their respective Supreme Courts have expounded as the spirit with which
the provisions are informed and impressed, the elasticity in their interpretation, their
dynamic and resilient character which make them capable of meeting every modern
problem, and their having been designed from earliest time to the present to meet the
exigencies of an undefined and expanding future. The requirements of due process are
interpreted in both the United States and the Philippines as not denying to the law the
capacity for progress and improvement. Toward this effect and in order to avoid the
confines of a legal straitjacket, the courts instead prefer to have the meaning of the
due process clause "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in
the course of the decisions of cases as they arise" (Twining vs. New Jersey, 211 U.S.
78). Capsulized, it refers to "the embodiment of the sporting idea of fair play"
(Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Owners Association vs. City Mayor of Manila, 20
SCRA 849 [1967]). It relates to certain immutable principles of justice which inhere
in the very idea of free government (Holden vs. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366).

Due process is comprised of two components substantive due process which requires
the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty, or property, and procedural due process which consists of the two basic rights
of notice and hearing, as well as the guarantee of being heard by an impartial and
competent tribunal (Cruz, Constitutional Law, 1993 Ed., pp. 102-106).

True to the mandate of the due process clause, the basic rights of notice and hearing
pervade not only in criminal and civil proceedings, but in administrative proceedings
as well. Non-observance of these rights will invalidate the proceedings. Individuals
are entitled to be notified of any pending case affecting their interests, and upon notice,
they may claim the right to appear therein and present their side and to refute the
position of the opposing parties (Cruz, Phil. Administrative Law, 1996 ed., p. 64).

In a preliminary investigation which is an administrative investigatory proceeding,

Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court guarantees the respondents basic due
process rights, granting him the right to be furnished a copy of the complaint, the
affidavits, and other supporting documents, and the right to submit counter-affidavits
and other supporting documents within ten days from receipt thereof. Moreover, the
respondent shall have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the
complainant.

These twin rights may, however, be considered dispensable in certain instances, such
as:

1. In proceedings where there is an urgent need for immediate action, like the
summary abatement of a nuisance per se (Article 704, Civil Code), the preventive
suspension of a public servant facing administrative charges (Section 63, Local
Government Code, B. P. Blg. 337), the padlocking of filthy restaurants or theaters
showing obscene movies or like establishments which are immediate threats to public
health and decency, and the cancellation of a passport of a person sought for criminal
prosecution;

2. Where there is tentativeness of administrative action, that is, where the respondent
is not precluded from enjoying the right to notice and hearing at a later time without
prejudice to the person affected, such as the summary distraint and levy of the
property of a delinquent taxpayer, and the replacement of a temporary appointee; and

3. Where the twin rights have previously been offered but the right to exercise them
had not been claimed.

Applying the above principles to the case at bar, the query may be asked: Does the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings fall under any of the described
situations mentioned above?
Let us take a brief look at the nature of American extradition proceedings which are
quite noteworthy considering that the subject treaty involves the U.S.
Government.

American jurisprudence distinguishes between interstate rendition or extradition

which is based on the Extradition Clause in the U.S. Constitution (Art. IV, 2 cl 2), and
international extradition proceedings. In interstate rendition or extradition, the
governor of the asylum state has the duty to deliver the fugitive to the demanding state.
The Extradition Clause and the implementing statute are given a liberal construction
to carry out their manifest purpose, which is to effect the return as swiftly as possible
of persons for trial to the state in which they have been charged with crime (31A Am
Jur 2d 754-755). In order to achieve extradition of an alleged fugitive, the requisition
papers or the demand must be in proper form, and all the elements or jurisdictional
facts essential to the extradition must appear on the face of the papers, such as the
allegation that the person demanded was in the demanding state at the time the offense
charged was committed, and that the person demanded is charged with the
commission of the crime or that prosecution has been begun in the demanding state
before some court or magistrate (35 C.J.S. 406-407). The extradition documents are
then filed with the governor of the asylum state, and must contain such papers and
documents prescribed by statute, which essentially include a copy of the instrument
charging the person demanded with a crime, such as an indictment or an affidavit
made before a magistrate. Statutory requirements with respect to said charging
instrument or papers are mandatory since said papers are necessary in order to confer
jurisdiction on the governor of the asylum state to effect the extradition
(35 C.J.S. 408-410). A statutory provision requiring duplicate copies of the
indictment, information, affidavit, or judgment of conviction or sentence and other
instruments accompanying the demand or requisitions be furnished and delivered
to the fugitive or his attorney is directory. However, the right being such a basic one
has been held to be a right mandatory on demand (Ibid., p. 410, citing Ex parte
Moore, 256 S.W. 2d 103, 158 Tex. Cr. 407 and Ex parte Tucker, Cr., 324, S.W.2d
853).

In international proceedings, extradition treaties generally provide for the presentation

to the executive authority of the Requested State of a requisition or demand for the
return of the alleged offender, and the designation of the particular officer having
authority to act in behalf of the demanding nation (31A Am Jur 2d 815).

In petitioners memorandum filed on September 15, 1999, he attached thereto a letter

dated September 13, 1999 from the Criminal Division of the U.S. Department of
Justice, summarizing the U.S. extradition procedures and principles, which are
basically governed by a combination of treaties (with special reference to the RP-US
Extradition Treaty), federal statutes, and judicial decisions, to wit:
1. All requests for extradition are transmitted through the diplomatic channel. In
urgent cases, requests for the provisional arrest of an individual may be made directly
by the Philippine Department of Justice to the U.S. Department of Justice, and vice-
versa. In the event of a provisional arrest, a formal request for extradition is
transmitted subsequently through the diplomatic channel.

2. The Department of State forwards the incoming Philippine extradition request to

the Department of Justice. Before doing so, the Department of State prepares a
declaration confirming that a formal request has been made, that the treaty is in full
force and effect, that under Article 17 thereof the parties provide reciprocal legal
representation in extradition proceedings, that the offenses are covered as extraditable
offenses under Article 2 thereof, and that the documents have been authenticated in
accordance with the federal statute that ensures admissibility at any subsequent
extradition hearing.

3. A judge or magistrate judge is authorized to issue a warrant for the arrest of the
prospective extraditee (18 U.S.C. 3184). Said judge or magistrate is authorized to hold
a hearing to consider the evidence offered in support of the extradition request (Ibid.)

4. At the hearing, the court must determine whether the person arrested is extraditable
to the foreign country. The court must also determine that (a) it has jurisdiction over
the defendant and jurisdiction to conduct the hearing; (b) the defendant is being
sought for offenses for which the applicable treaty permits extradition; and (c) there is
probable cause to believe that the defendant is the person sought and that he
committed the offenses charged (Ibid.)

5. The judge or magistrate judge is vested with jurisdiction to certify extraditability

after having received a "complaint made under oath, charging any person found
within his jurisdiction" with having committed any of the crimes provided for by the
governing treaty in the country requesting extradition (Ibid.) [In this regard, it is noted
that a long line of American decisions pronounce that international extradition
proceedings partake of the character of a preliminary examination before a
committing magistrate, rather than a trial of the guilt or innocence of the alleged
fugitive (31A Am Jur 2d 826).]

6. If the court decides that the elements necessary for extradition are present, it
incorporates its determinations in factual findings and conclusions of law and certifies
the persons extraditability. The court then forwards this certification of extraditability
to the Department of State for disposition by the Secretary of State. The ultimate
decision whether to surrender an individual rests with the Secretary of State (18 U.S.C.
3186).
7. The subject of an extradition request may not litigate questions concerning the
motives of the requesting government in seeking his extradition. However, a person
facing extradition may present whatever information he deems relevant to the
Secretary of State, who makes the final determination whether to surrender an
individual to the foreign government concerned.

From the foregoing, it may be observed that in the United States, extradition begins
and ends with one entity the Department of State which has the power to evaluate the
request and the extradition documents in the beginning, and, in the person of the
Secretary of State, the power to act or not to act on the courts determination of
extraditability. In the Philippine setting, it is the Department of Foreign Affairs which
should make the initial evaluation of the request, and having satisfied itself on the
points earlier mentioned (see pp. 10-12), then forwards the request to the Department
of Justice for the preparation and filing of the petition for extradition. Sadly, however,
the Department of Foreign Affairs, in the instant case, perfunctorily turned over the
request to the Department of Justice which has taken over the task of evaluating the
request as well as thereafter, if so warranted, preparing, filing, and prosecuting the
petition for extradition.

Private respondent asks what prejudice will be caused to the U.S. Government should
the person sought to be extradited be given due process rights by the Philippines in the
evaluation stage. He emphasizes that petitioners primary concern is the possible delay
in the evaluation process.

We agree with private respondents citation of an American Supreme Court ruling:

The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve

legitimate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in
constitutional adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher
values than speed and efficiency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill
of Rights in general, and the Due Process Clause, in particular, that they
were designed to protect the fragile values of a vulnerable citizenry from
the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy that may characterize
praiseworthy government officials no less, and perhaps more, than
mediocre ones.

(Stanley vs. Illinois, 404 U.S. 645, 656)

The United States, no doubt, shares the same interest as the Philippine
Government that no right that of liberty secured not only by the Bills of
Rights of the Philippines Constitution but of the United States as well, is
sacrificed at the altar of expediency.
 (pp. 40-41, Private Respondents Memorandum.)

In the Philippine context, this Courts ruling is invoked:

One of the basic principles of the democratic system is that where the
rights of the individual are concerned, the end does not justify the means.
It is not enough that there be a valid objective; it is also necessary that
the means employed to pursue it be in keeping with the Constitution.
Mere expediency will not excuse constitutional shortcuts. There is no
question that not even the strongest moral conviction or the most urgent
public need, subject only to a few notable exceptions, will excuse the
bypassing of an individuals rights. It is no exaggeration to say that a
person invoking a right guaranteed under Article III of the Constitution
is a majority of one even as against the rest of the nation who would
deny him that right (Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines,
Inc. vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343, 375-376 [1989]).

There can be no dispute over petitioners argument that extradition is a tool of criminal
law enforcement. To be effective, requests for extradition or the surrender of accused
or convicted persons must be processed expeditiously. Nevertheless, accelerated or
fast-tracked proceedings and adherence to fair procedures are, however, not always
incompatible. They do not always clash in discord. Summary does not mean
precipitous haste. It does not carry a disregard of the basic principles inherent in
"ordered liberty."

Is there really an urgent need for immediate action at the evaluation stage? At that
point, there is no extraditee yet in the strict sense of the word. Extradition may or may
not occur. In interstate extradition, the governor of the asylum state may not, in the
absence of mandatory statute, be compelled to act favorably (37 C.J.S. 387) since
after a close evaluation of the extradition papers, he may hold that federal and
statutory requirements, which are significantly jurisdictional, have not been met (31
Am Jur 2d 819). Similarly, under an extradition treaty, the executive authority of the
requested state has the power to deny the behest from the requesting state.
Accordingly, if after a careful examination of the extradition documents the Secretary
of Foreign Affairs finds that the request fails to meet the requirements of the law and
the treaty, he shall not forward the request to the Department of Justice for the filing
of the extradition petition since non-compliance with the aforesaid requirements will
not vest our government with jurisdiction to effect the extradition.

In this light, it should be observed that the Department of Justice exerted notable
efforts in assuring compliance with the requirements of the law and the treaty since it
even informed the U.S. Government of certain problems in the extradition papers
(such as those that are in Spanish and without the official English translation, and
those that are not properly authenticated). In fact, petitioner even admits that
consultation meetings are still supposed to take place between the lawyers in his
Department and those from the U.S. Justice Department. With the meticulous nature
of the evaluation, which cannot just be completed in an abbreviated period of time due
to its intricacies, how then can we say that it is a proceeding that urgently necessitates
immediate and prompt action where notice and hearing can be dispensed with?

Worthy of inquiry is the issue of whether or not there is tentativeness of

administrative action. Is private respondent precluded from enjoying the right to
notice and hearing at a later time without prejudice to him? Here lies the peculiarity
and deviant characteristic of the evaluation procedure. On one hand, there is yet no
extraditee, but ironically on the other, it results in an administrative determination
which, if adverse to the person involved, may cause his immediate incarceration. The
grant of the request shall lead to the filing of the extradition petition in court. The
"accused" (as Section 2[c] of Presidential Decree No. 1069 calls him), faces the threat
of arrest, not only after the extradition petition is filed in court, but even during the
evaluation proceeding itself by virtue of the provisional arrest allowed under the treaty
and the implementing law. The prejudice to the "accused" is thus blatant and manifest.

Plainly, the notice and hearing requirements of administrative due process cannot be
dispensed with and shelved aside.

Apart from the due process clause of the Constitution, private respondent likewise
invokes Section 7 of Article III which reads:

Sec. 7. The right of the people to information on matters of public

concern shall be recognized. Access to official records, and to
documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or
decisions, as well as to government research data used as basis for policy
development, shall be afforded the citizen, subject to such limitations as
may be provided by law.

The above provision guarantees political rights which are available to citizens of the
Philippines, namely: (1) the right to information on matters of public concern, and (2)
the corollary right of access to official records and documents. The general right
guaranteed by said provision is the right to information on matters of public concern.
In its implementation, the right of access to official records is likewise conferred.
These cognate or related rights are "subject to limitations as may be provided by law"
(Bernas, The 1987 Phil. Constitution A Reviewer-Primer, 1997 ed., p. 104) and rely
on the premise that ultimately it is an informed and critical public opinion which alone
can protect the values of democratic government (Ibid.).
Petitioner argues that the matters covered by private respondents letter-request dated
July 1, 1999 do not fall under the guarantee of the foregoing provision since the
matters contained in the documents requested are not of public concern. On the other
hand, private respondent argues that the distinction between matters vested with
public interest and matters which are of purely private interest only becomes material
when a third person, who is not directly affected by the matters requested, invokes the
right to information. However, if the person invoking the right is the one directly
affected thereby, his right to information becomes absolute.

The concept of matters of public concern escapes exact definition. Strictly speaking,
every act of a public officer in the conduct of the governmental process is a matter of
public concern (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines,
1996 ed., p. 336). This concept embraces a broad spectrum of subjects which the
public may want to know, either because these directly affect their lives or simply
because such matters arouse the interest of an ordinary citizen (Legaspi v. Civil
Service Commission, 150 SCRA 530 [1987]). Hence, the real party in interest is the
people and any citizen has "standing".

When the individual himself is involved in official government action because said
action has a direct bearing on his life, and may either cause him some kind of
deprivation or injury, he actually invokes the basic right to be notified under Section 1
of the Bill of Rights and not exactly the right to information on matters of public
concern. As to an accused in a criminal proceeding, he invokes Section 14,
particularly the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against
him.

The right to information is implemented by the right of access to information within

the control of the government (Bernas, The 1987 Constitution of the Republic of the
Philippines, 1996 ed., p. 337). Such information may be contained in official records,
and in documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions.

In the case at bar, the papers requested by private respondent pertain to official
government action from the U. S. Government. No official action from our country
has yet been taken. Moreover, the papers have some relation to matters of foreign
relations with the U. S. Government. Consequently, if a third party invokes this
constitutional provision, stating that the extradition papers are matters of public
concern since they may result in the extradition of a Filipino, we are afraid that the
balance must be tilted, at such particular time, in favor of the interests necessary for
the proper functioning of the government. During the evaluation procedure, no official
governmental action of our own government has as yet been done; hence the
invocation of the right is premature. Later, and in contrast, records of the extradition
hearing would already fall under matters of public concern, because our government
by then shall have already made an official decision to grant the extradition request.
The extradition of a fellow Filipino would be forthcoming.

We now pass upon the final issue pertinent to the subject matter of the instant
controversy: Would private respondents entitlement to notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the proceedings constitute a breach of the legal duties of the
Philippine Government under the RP-Extradition Treaty? Assuming the answer is in
the affirmative, is there really a conflict between the treaty and the due process clause
in the Constitution?

First and foremost, let us categorically say that this is not the proper time to pass upon
the constitutionality of the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty nor the
Extradition Law implementing the same. We limit ourselves only to the effect of the
grant of the basic rights of notice and hearing to private respondent on foreign
relations.

The rule of pacta sunt servanda, one of the oldest and most fundamental maxims of
international law, requires the parties to a treaty to keep their agreement therein in
good faith. The observance of our country's legal duties under a treaty is also
compelled by Section 2, Article II of the Constitution which provides that "[t]he
Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to
the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations." Under the doctrine of incorporation, rules of international law form part of
the law of the land and no further legislative action is needed to make such rules
applicable in the domestic sphere (Salonga & Yap, Public International Law, 1992 ed.,
p. 12).

The doctrine of incorporation is applied whenever municipal tribunals (or local courts)
are confronted with situations in which there appears to be a conflict between a rule of
international law and the provisions of the constitution or statute of the local state.
Efforts should first be exerted to harmonize them, so as to give effect to both since it
is to be presumed that municipal law was enacted with proper regard for the generally
accepted principles of international law in observance of the Incorporation Clause in
the above-cited constitutional provision (Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1996 ed., p.
55). In a situation, however, where the conflict is irreconcilable and a choice has to be
made between a rule of international law and municipal law, jurisprudence dictates
that municipal law should be upheld by the municipal courts (Ichong vs.
Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155 [1957]; Gonzales vs. Hechanova, 9 SCRA 230 [1963]; In
re: Garcia, 2 SCRA 984 [1961]) for the reason that such courts are organs of
municipal law and are accordingly bound by it in all circumstances (Salonga & Yap,
op. cit., p. 13). The fact that international law has been made part of the law of the
land does not pertain to or imply the primacy of international law over national or
municipal law in the municipal sphere. The doctrine of incorporation, as applied in
most countries, decrees that rules of international law are given equal standing with,
but are not superior to, national legislative enactments. Accordingly, the principle lex
posterior derogat priori takes effect a treaty may repeal a statute and a statute may
repeal a treaty. In states where the constitution is the highest law of the land, such as
the Republic of the Philippines, both statutes and treaties may be invalidated if they
are in conflict with the constitution (Ibid.).

In the case at bar, is there really a conflict between international law and municipal or
national law? En contrario, these two components of the law of the land are not pitted
against each other. There is no occasion to choose which of the two should be upheld.
Instead, we see a void in the provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty, as
implemented by Presidential Decree No. 1069, as regards the basic due process rights
of a prospective extraditee at the evaluation stage of extradition proceedings. From the
procedures earlier abstracted, after the filing of the extradition petition and during the
judicial determination of the propriety of extradition, the rights of notice and hearing
are clearly granted to the prospective extraditee. However, prior thereto, the law is
silent as to these rights. Reference to the U.S. extradition procedures also manifests
this silence.

Petitioner interprets this silence as unavailability of these rights. Consequently, he

describes the evaluation procedure as an "ex parte technical assessment" of the
sufficiency of the extradition request and the supporting documents.

We disagree.

In the absence of a law or principle of law, we must apply the rules of fair play. An
application of the basic twin due process rights of notice and hearing will not go
against the treaty or the implementing law. Neither the Treaty nor the Extradition Law
precludes these rights from a prospective extraditee. Similarly, American
jurisprudence and procedures on extradition pose no proscription. In fact, in interstate
extradition proceedings as explained above, the prospective extraditee may even
request for copies of the extradition documents from the governor of the asylum state,
and if he does, his right to be supplied the same becomes a demandable right
(35 C.J.S. 410).

Petitioner contends that the United States requested the Philippine Government to
prevent unauthorized disclosure of confidential information. Hence, the secrecy
surrounding the action of the Department of Justice Panel of Attorneys. The
confidentiality argument is, however, overturned by petitioners revelation that
everything it refuses to make available at this stage would be obtainable during trial.
The Department of Justice states that the U.S. District Court concerned has authorized
the disclosure of certain grand jury information. If the information is truly confidential,
the veil of secrecy cannot be lifted at any stage of the extradition proceedings. Not
even during trial.

A libertarian approach is thus called for under the premises.

One will search in vain the RP-US Extradition Treaty, the Extradition Law, as well as
American jurisprudence and procedures on extradition, for any prohibition against the
conferment of the two basic due process rights of notice and hearing during the
evaluation stage of the extradition proceedings. We have to consider similar situations
in jurisprudence for an application by analogy.

Earlier, we stated that there are similarities between the evaluation process and a
preliminary investigation since both procedures may result in the arrest of the
respondent or the prospective extraditee. In the evaluation process, a provisional arrest
is even allowed by the Treaty and the Extradition Law (Article 9, RP-US Extradition
Treaty; Sec. 20, Presidential Decree No. 1069). Following petitioners theory, because
there is no provision of its availability, does this imply that for a period of time, the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended, despite Section 15, Article III of
the Constitution which states that "[t]he privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall
not be suspended except in cases of invasion or rebellion when the public safety
requires it"? Petitioners theory would also infer that bail is not available during the
arrest of the prospective extraditee when the extradition petition has already been filed
in court since Presidential Decree No. 1069 does not provide therefor,
notwithstanding Section 13, Article III of the Constitution which provides that "[a]ll
persons, except those charged with offenses punishable by reclusion perpetua when
evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction, be bailable by sufficient sureties,
or be released on recognizance as may be provided by law. The right to bail shall not
be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended " Can
petitioner validly argue that since these contraventions are by virtue of a treaty and
hence affecting foreign relations, the aforestated guarantees in the Bill of Rights could
thus be subservient thereto?

The basic principles of administrative law instruct us that "the essence of due process
in administrative proceedings is an opportunity to explain ones side or an opportunity
to seek reconsideration of the actions or ruling complained of (Mirano vs. NLRC, 270
SCRA 96 [1997]; Padilla vs. NLRC, 273 SCRA 457 [1997]; PLDT vs. NLRC, 276
SCRA 1 [1997]; Helpmate, Inc. vs. NLRC, 276 SCRA 315 [1997]; Aquinas School vs.
Magnaye, 278 SCRA 602 [1997]; Jamer vs. NLRC, 278 SCRA 632 [1997]). In
essence, procedural due process refers to the method or manner by which the law is
enforced (Corona vs. United Harbor Pilots Association of the Phils., 283 SCRA 31
[1997]). This Court will not tolerate the least disregard of constitutional guarantees in
the enforcement of a law or treaty. Petitioners fears that the Requesting State may
have valid objections to the Requested States non-performance of its commitments
under the Extradition Treaty are insubstantial and should not be given paramount
consideration.

How then do we implement the RP-US Extradition Treaty? Do we limit ourselves to

the four corners of Presidential Decree No. 1069?

Of analogous application are the rulings in Government Service Insurance System vs.
Court of Appeals (201 SCRA 661 [1991]) and Go vs. National Police
Commission (271 SCRA 447 [1997]) where we ruled that in summary proceedings
under Presidential Decree No. 807 (Providing for the Organization of the Civil
Service Commission in Accordance with Provisions of the Constitution, Prescribing
its Powers and Functions and for Other Purposes), and Presidential Decree No. 971
(Providing Legal Assistance for Members of the Integrated National Police who may
be charged for Service-Connected Offenses and Improving the Disciplinary System in
the Integrated National Police, Appropriating Funds Therefor and for other purposes),
as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1707, although summary dismissals may be
effected without the necessity of a formal investigation, the minimum requirements of
due process still operate. As held in GSIS vs. Court of Appeals:

... [I]t is clear to us that what the opening sentence of Section 40 is

saying is that an employee may be removed or dismissed even without
formal investigation, in certain instances. It is equally clear to us that an
employee must be informed of the charges preferred against him, and
that the normal way by which the employee is so informed is by
furnishing him with a copy of the charges against him. This is a basic
procedural requirement that a statute cannot dispense with and still
remain consistent with the constitutional provision on due process. The
second minimum requirement is that the employee charged with some
misfeasance or malfeasance must have a reasonable opportunity to
present his side of the matter, that is to say, his defenses against the
charges levelled against him and to present evidence in support of his
defenses. 

(at p. 671)

Said summary dismissal proceedings are also non-litigious in nature, yet we upheld
the due process rights of the respondent.
In the case at bar, private respondent does not only face a clear and present danger of
loss of property or employment, but of liberty itself, which may eventually lead to his
forcible banishment to a foreign land. The convergence of petitioners favorable action
on the extradition request and the deprivation of private respondents liberty is easily
comprehensible.

We have ruled time and again that this Courts equity jurisdiction, which is aptly
described as "justice outside legality," may be availed of only in the absence of, and
never against, statutory law or judicial pronouncements (Smith Bell & Co., Inc. vs.
Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA 530 [1997]; David-Chan vs. Court of Appeals, 268
SCRA 677 [1997]). The constitutional issue in the case at bar does not even call for
"justice outside legality," since private respondents due process rights, although not
guaranteed by statute or by treaty, are protected by constitutional guarantees. We
would not be true to the organic law of the land if we choose strict construction over
guarantees against the deprivation of liberty. That would not be in keeping with the
principles of democracy on which our Constitution is premised.

Verily, as one traverses treacherous waters of conflicting and opposing currents of

liberty and government authority, he must ever hold the oar of freedom in the stronger
arm, lest an errant and wayward course be laid.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant petition is hereby

DISMISSED for lack of merit. Petitioner is ordered to furnish private respondent
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers, and to grant him a
reasonable period within which to file his comment with supporting evidence. The
incidents in Civil Case No. 99-94684 having been rendered moot and academic by
this decision, the same is hereby ordered dismissed.

SO ORDERED. 6/2/00 2:12 PM

Davide, Jr., C.J., joins Mr. Justice Puno in his dissent.

Bellosillo, Purisima, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.

Puno, J., please see dissent.

Vitug, J., see separate opinion.

Kapunan, and Ynares-Santiago, JJ., see separate concurring opinion.

Mendoza, Pardo, and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., join dissenting opinion of J. Puno and J.
Panganiban.
Panganiban, J., please see dissenting opinion.

Quisumbing, J., with concurring opinion.

 EN BANC

[G.R. No. 118295. May 2, 1997]

WIGBERTO E. TAADA and ANNA DOMINIQUE COSETENG, as

members of the Philippine Senate and as taxpayers; GREGORIO
ANDOLANA and JOKER ARROYO as members of the House of
Representatives and as taxpayers; NICANOR P. PERLAS and
HORACIO R. MORALES, both as taxpayers; CIVIL LIBERTIES
UNION, NATIONAL ECONOMIC PROTECTIONISM ASSOCIATION,
CENTER FOR ALTERNATIVE DEVELOPMENT INITIATIVES,
LIKAS-KAYANG KAUNLARAN FOUNDATION, INC., PHILIPPINE
RURAL RECONSTRUCTION MOVEMENT, DEMOKRATIKONG
KILUSAN NG MAGBUBUKID NG PILIPINAS, INC., and
PHILIPPINE PEASANT INSTITUTE, in representation of various
taxpayers and as non-governmental organizations, petitioners,
vs. EDGARDO ANGARA, ALBERTO ROMULO, LETICIA RAMOS-
SHAHANI, HEHERSON ALVAREZ, AGAPITO AQUINO, RODOLFO
BIAZON, NEPTALI GONZALES, ERNESTO HERRERA, JOSE
LINA, GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO, ORLANDO MERCADO,
BLAS OPLE, JOHN OSMEA, SANTANINA RASUL, RAMON
REVILLA, RAUL ROCO, FRANCISCO TATAD and FREDDIE
WEBB, in their respective capacities as members of the
Philippine Senate who concurred in the ratification by the
President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization; SALVADOR ENRIQUEZ, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management; CARIDAD
VALDEHUESA, in her capacity as National Treasurer; RIZALINO
NAVARRO, in his capacity as Secretary of Trade and Industry;
ROBERTO SEBASTIAN, in his capacity as Secretary of
Agriculture; ROBERTO DE OCAMPO, in his capacity as
 Secretary of Finance; ROBERTO ROMULO, in his capacity as
Secretary of Foreign Affairs; and TEOFISTO T. GUINGONA, in
his capacity as Executive Secretary, respondents.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

The emergence on January 1, 1995 of the World Trade Organization, abetted by

the membership thereto of the vast majority of countries has revolutionized international
business and economic relations amongst states. It has irreversibly propelled the world
towards trade liberalization and economic globalization. Liberalization, globalization,
deregulation and privatization, the third-millennium buzz words, are ushering in a new
borderless world of business by sweeping away as mere historical relics the heretofore
traditional modes of promoting and protecting national economies like tariffs, export
subsidies, import quotas, quantitative restrictions, tax exemptions and currency
controls. Finding market niches and becoming the best in specific industries in a
market-driven and export-oriented global scenario are replacing age-old beggar-thy-
neighbor policies that unilaterally protect weak and inefficient domestic producers of
goods and services. In the words of Peter Drucker, the well-known management guru,
Increased participation in the world economy has become the key to domestic economic
growth and prosperity.

Brief Historical Background

To hasten worldwide recovery from the devastation wrought by the Second World
War, plans for the establishment of three multilateral institutions -- inspired by that grand
political body, the United Nations -- were discussed at Dumbarton Oaks and Bretton
Woods. The firstwas the World Bank (WB) which was to address the rehabilitation and
reconstruction of war-ravaged and later developing countries; the second, the
International Monetary Fund (IMF) which was to deal with currency problems; and the
third, the International Trade Organization (ITO), which was to foster order and
predictability in world trade and to minimize unilateral protectionist policies that invite
challenge, even retaliation, from other states. However, for a variety of reasons,
including its non-ratification by the United States, the ITO, unlike the IMF and WB, never
took off. What remained was only GATT -- the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade. GATT was a collection of treaties governing access to the economies of treaty
adherents with no institutionalized body administering the agreements or dependable
system of dispute settlement.
After half a century and several dizzying rounds of negotiations, principally the
Kennedy Round, the Tokyo Round and the Uruguay Round, the world finally gave birth
to that administering body -- the World Trade Organization -- with the signing of the
Final Act in Marrakesh, Morocco and the ratification of the WTO Agreement by its
members.[1]
 Like many other developing countries, the Philippines joined WTO as a founding
member with the goal, as articulated by President Fidel V. Ramos in two letters to the
Senate (infra), of improving Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners, through the reduction of tariffs on its exports, particularly agricultural
and industrial products. The President also saw in the WTO the opening of new
opportunities for the services sector x x x, (the reduction of) costs and uncertainty
associated with exporting x x x, and (the attraction of) more investments into the
country. Although the Chief Executive did not expressly mention it in his letter, the
Philippines - - and this is of special interest to the legal profession - - will benefit from
the WTO system of dispute settlement by judicial adjudication through the independent
WTO settlement bodies called (1) Dispute Settlement Panels and (2) Appellate
Tribunal. Heretofore, trade disputes were settled mainly through negotiations where
solutions were arrived at frequently on the basis of relative bargaining strengths, and
where naturally, weak and underdeveloped countries were at a disadvantage.

The Petition in Brief

Arguing mainly (1) that the WTO requires the Philippines to place nationals and
products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local products and
(2) that the WTO intrudes, limits and/or impairs the constitutional powers of both
Congress and the Supreme Court, the instant petition before this Court assails the WTO
Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to develop a self-reliant
and independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos x x x (to) give
preference to qualified Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor,
domestic materials and locally produced goods.
Simply stated, does the Philippine Constitution prohibit Philippine participation in
worldwide trade liberalization and economic globalization? Does it prescribe Philippine
integration into a global economy that is liberalized, deregulated and privatized? These
are the main questions raised in this petition for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court praying (1) for the nullification, on
constitutional grounds, of the concurrence of the Philippine Senate in the ratification by
the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization (WTO Agreement, for brevity) and (2) for the prohibition of its
implementation and enforcement through the release and utilization of public funds, the
assignment of public officials and employees, as well as the use of government
properties and resources by respondent-heads of various executive offices concerned
therewith. This concurrence is embodied in Senate Resolution No. 97, dated December
14, 1994.

The Facts

On April 15, 1994, Respondent Rizalino Navarro, then Secretary of

the Department of Trade and Industry (Secretary Navarro, for brevity), representing the
Government of the Republic of the Philippines, signed in Marrakesh, Morocco, the Final
Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations (Final Act,
for brevity).
By signing the Final Act,[2] Secretary Navarro on behalf of the Republic of the
Philippines, agreed:

(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their
respective competent authorities, with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in
accordance with their procedures; and

(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.

On August 12, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received a letter dated
August 11, 1994 from the President of the Philippines, [3] stating among others that the
Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On August 13, 1994, the members of the Philippine Senate received another letter
from the President of the Philippines[4] likewise dated August 11, 1994, which stated
among others that the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding
on Commitments in Financial Services are hereby submitted to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
On December 9, 1994, the President of the Philippines certified the necessity of the
immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, a resolution entitled Concurring in the Ratification of
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization.[5]
On December 14, 1994, the Philippine Senate adopted Resolution No. 97 which
Resolved, as it is hereby resolved, that the Senate concur, as it hereby concurs, in the
ratification by the President of the Philippines of the Agreement Establishing the World
Trade Organization.[6] The text of the WTO Agreement is written on pages 137 et seq. of
Volume I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations and
includes various agreements and associated legal instruments (identified in the said
Agreement as Annexes 1, 2 and 3 thereto and collectively referred to as Multilateral
Trade Agreements, for brevity) as follows:

ANNEX 1

Annex 1A: Multilateral Agreement on Trade in Goods

General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994

Agreement on Agriculture

Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and

 Phytosanitary Measures

Agreement on Textiles and Clothing

Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade

Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures

Agreement on Implementation of Article VI of the General

Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994

Agreement on Implementation of Article VII of the General on

Tariffs and Trade 1994

Agreement on Pre-Shipment Inspection

Agreement on Rules of Origin

Agreement on Imports Licensing Procedures

Agreement on Subsidies and Coordinating Measures

Agreement on Safeguards

Annex 1B: General Agreement on Trade in Services and Annexes

Annex 1C: Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights

ANNEX 2

Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement

of Disputes

ANNEX 3

Trade Policy Review Mechanism

On December 16, 1994, the President of the Philippines signed [7] the Instrument of
Ratification, declaring:

NOW THEREFORE, be it known that I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the

Republic of the Philippines, after having seen and considered the aforementioned
Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization and the agreements and
associated legal instruments included in Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that
Agreement which are integral parts thereof, signed at Marrakesh, Morocco on 15
April 1994, do hereby ratify and confirm the same and every Article and Clause
thereof.

To emphasize, the WTO Agreement ratified by the President of the Philippines is

composed of the Agreement Proper and the associated legal instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that Agreement which are integral parts
thereof.
On the other hand, the Final Act signed by Secretary Navarro embodies not only the
WTO Agreement (and its integral annexes aforementioned) but also (1) the Ministerial
Declarations and Decisions and (2) the Understanding on Commitments in Financial
Services.In his Memorandum dated May 13, 1996,[8] the Solicitor General describes
these two latter documents as follows:

The Ministerial Decisions and Declarations are twenty-five declarations and decisions
on a wide range of matters, such as measures in favor of least developed countries,
notification procedures, relationship of WTO with the International Monetary Fund
(IMF), and agreements on technical barriers to trade and on dispute settlement.

The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services dwell on, among other

things, standstill or limitations and qualifications of commitments to existing non-
conforming measures, market access, national treatment, and definitions of non-
resident supplier of financial services, commercial presence and new financial service.

On December 29, 1994, the present petition was filed. After careful deliberation on
respondents comment and petitioners reply thereto, the Court resolved on December 12,
1995, to give due course to the petition, and the parties thereafter filed their respective
memoranda. The Court also requested the Honorable Lilia R. Bautista, the Philippine
Ambassador to the United Nations stationed in Geneva, Switzerland, to submit a paper,
hereafter referred to as Bautista Paper,[9] for brevity, (1) providing a historical
background of and (2) summarizing the said agreements.
During the Oral Argument held on August 27, 1996, the Court directed:

(a) the petitioners to submit the (1) Senate Committee Report on the matter in
controversy and (2) the transcript of proceedings/hearings in the Senate; and

(b) the Solicitor General, as counsel for respondents, to file (1) a list of Philippine
treaties signed prior to the Philippine adherence to the WTO Agreement, which
derogate from Philippine sovereignty and (2) copies of the multi-volume WTO
Agreement and other documents mentioned in the Final Act, as soon as possible.
 After receipt of the foregoing documents, the Court said it would consider the case
submitted for resolution. In a Compliance dated September 16, 1996, the Solicitor
General submitted a printed copy of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations, and in another Compliance dated October 24, 1996, he listed the various
bilateral or multilateral treaties or international instruments involving derogation of
Philippine sovereignty. Petitioners, on the other hand, submitted their Compliance dated
January 28, 1997, on January 30, 1997.

The Issues

In their Memorandum dated March 11, 1996, petitioners summarized the issues as
follows:

A. Whether the petition presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable.

B. Whether the petitioner members of the Senate who participated in the

deliberations and voting leading to the concurrence are estopped from
impugning the validity of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization or of the validity of the concurrence.

C. Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization contravene the provisions of Sec. 19, Article II, and Secs. 10 and
12, Article XII, all of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.

D. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization unduly limit, restrict and impair Philippine sovereignty
specifically the legislative power which, under Sec. 2, Article VI, 1987
Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the Philippines;

E. Whether provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade

Organization interfere with the exercise of judicial power.

F. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they voted for
concurrence in the ratification of the constitutionally-infirm Agreement
Establishing the World Trade Organization.

G. Whether the respondent members of the Senate acted in grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when they concurred
only in the ratification of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization, and not with the Presidential submission which included the
 Final Act, Ministerial Declaration and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services.

On the other hand, the Solicitor General as counsel for respondents synthesized the
several issues raised by petitioners into the following:[10]

1. Whether or not the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade
Organization and the Agreements and Associated Legal Instruments included in
Annexes one (1), two (2) and three (3) of that agreement cited by petitioners directly
contravene or undermine the letter, spirit and intent of Section 19, Article II and
Sections 10 and 12, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

2. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement unduly limit, restrict or impair
the exercise of legislative power by Congress.

3. Whether or not certain provisions of the Agreement impair the exercise of judicial
power by this Honorable Court in promulgating the rules of evidence.

4. Whether or not the concurrence of the Senate in the ratification by the President of
the Philippines of the Agreement establishing the World Trade Organization implied
rejection of the treaty embodied in the Final Act.

By raising and arguing only four issues against the seven presented by petitioners,
the Solicitor General has effectively ignored three, namely: (1) whether the petition
presents a political question or is otherwise not justiciable; (2) whether petitioner-
members of the Senate (Wigberto E. Taada and Anna Dominique Coseteng) are
estopped from joining this suit; and (3) whether the respondent-members of the Senate
acted in grave abuse of discretion when they voted for concurrence in the ratification of
the WTO Agreement. The foregoing notwithstanding, this Court resolved to deal with
these three issues thus:

(1) The political question issue -- being very fundamental and vital, and being a
matter that probes into the very jurisdiction of this Court to hear and decide this case -
- was deliberated upon by the Court and will thus be ruled upon as the first issue;

(2) The matter of estoppel will not be taken up because this defense is waivable and
the respondents have effectively waived it by not pursuing it in any of their pleadings;
in any event, this issue, even if ruled in respondents favor, will not cause the petitions
dismissal as there are petitioners other than the two senators, who are not vulnerable
to the defense of estoppel; and
(3) The issue of alleged grave abuse of discretion on the part of the respondent
senators will be taken up as an integral part of the disposition of the four issues raised
by the Solicitor General.

During its deliberations on the case, the Court noted that the respondents did not
question the locus standi of petitioners. Hence, they are also deemed to have waived
the benefit of such issue. They probably realized that grave constitutional issues,
expenditures of public funds and serious international commitments of the nation are
involved here, and that transcendental public interest requires that the substantive
issues be met head on and decided on the merits, rather than skirted or deflected by
procedural matters.[11]
To recapitulate, the issues that will be ruled upon shortly are:
(1) DOES THE PETITION PRESENT A JUSTICIABLE
CONTROVERSY? OTHERWISE STATED, DOES THE PETITION INVOLVE A
POLITICAL QUESTION OVER WHICH THIS COURT HAS NO JURISDICTION?
(2) DO THE PROVISIONS OF THE WTO AGREEMENT AND ITS THREE ANNEXES
CONTRAVENE SEC. 19, ARTICLE II, AND SECS. 10 AND 12, ARTICLE XII, OF
THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION?
(3) DO THE PROVISIONS OF SAID AGREEMENT AND ITS ANNEXES LIMIT,
RESTRICT, OR IMPAIR THE EXERCISE OF LEGISLATIVE POWER BY
CONGRESS?
(4) DO SAID PROVISIONS UNDULY IMPAIR OR INTERFERE WITH THE EXERCISE
OF JUDICIAL POWER BY THIS COURT IN PROMULGATING RULES ON
EVIDENCE?
(5) WAS THE CONCURRENCE OF THE SENATE IN THE WTO AGREEMENT AND
ITS ANNEXES SUFFICIENT AND/OR VALID, CONSIDERING THAT IT DID NOT
INCLUDE THE FINAL ACT, MINISTERIAL DECLARATIONS AND DECISIONS,
AND THE UNDERSTANDING ON COMMITMENTS IN FINANCIAL SERVICES?

The First Issue: Does the Court Have Jurisdiction Over the Controversy?

In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it

contravenes the Constitution, the petition no doubt raises a justiciable
controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is seriously alleged to have
infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of the
judiciary to settle the dispute. The question thus posed is judicial rather than
political. The duty (to adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the
Constitution is upheld.[12] Once a controversy as to the application or interpretation of a
constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the instant case), it becomes a
legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide. [13]
The jurisdiction of this Court to adjudicate the matters[14] raised in the petition is
clearly set out in the 1987 Constitution,[15] as follows:
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government.

The foregoing text emphasizes the judicial departments duty and power to strike
down grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch or instrumentality of
government including Congress. It is an innovation in our political law.[16] As explained by
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion,[17] the judiciary is the final arbiter on the
question of whether or not a branch of government or any of its officials has acted
without jurisdiction or in excess of jurisdiction or so capriciously as to constitute an
abuse of discretion amounting to excess of jurisdiction. This is not only a judicial power
but a duty to pass judgment on matters of this nature.
As this Court has repeatedly and firmly emphasized in many cases,[18] it will not shirk,
digress from or abandon its sacred duty and authority to uphold the Constitution in
matters that involve grave abuse of discretion brought before it in appropriate cases,
committed by any officer, agency, instrumentality or department of the government.
As the petition alleges grave abuse of discretion and as there is no other plain,
speedy or adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, we have no hesitation at all in
holding that this petition should be given due course and the vital questions raised
therein ruled upon under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. Indeed, certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review
and/or prohibit/nullify, when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials. On this,
we have no equivocation.
We should stress that, in deciding to take jurisdiction over this petition, this Court
will not review the wisdom of the decision of the President and the Senate in enlisting
the country into the WTO, or pass upon the merits of trade liberalization as a policy
espoused by said international body. Neither will it rule on the propriety of the
governments economic policy of reducing/removing tariffs, taxes, subsidies, quantitative
restrictions, and other import/trade barriers. Rather, it will only exercise its constitutional
duty to determine whether or not there had been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in ratifying the WTO
Agreement and its three annexes.

Second Issue: The WTO Agreement and Economic Nationalism

This is the lis mota, the main issue, raised by the petition.
Petitioners vigorously argue that the letter, spirit and intent of the Constitution
mandating economic nationalism are violated by the so-called parity provisions and
national treatment clauses scattered in various parts not only of the WTO Agreement
and its annexes but also in the Ministerial Decisions and Declarations and in the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services.
 Specifically, the flagship constitutional provisions referred to are Sec. 19, Article II,
and Secs. 10 and 12, Article XII, of the Constitution, which are worded as follows:

Article II

DECLARATION OF PRINCIPLES AND STATE POLICIES

xx xx xx xx

Sec. 19. The State shall develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.

xx xx xx xx

Article XII

NATIONAL ECONOMY AND PATRIMONY

xx xx xx xx

Sec. 10. x x x. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation
and operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

xx xx xx xx

Sec. 12. The State shall promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic
materials and locally produced goods, and adopt measures that help make them
competitive.

Petitioners aver that these sacred constitutional principles are desecrated by the
following WTO provisions quoted in their memorandum:[19]

a) In the area of investment measures related to trade in goods (TRIMS, for

brevity):

Article 2

National Treatment and Quantitative Restrictions.

 1. Without prejudice to other rights and obligations under GATT 1994. no
Member shall apply any TRIM that is inconsistent with the provisions of
Article III or Article XI of GATT 1994.

2. An Illustrative list of TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of

general elimination of quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph I of
Article XI of GATT 1994 is contained in the Annex to this
Agreement. (Agreement on Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27,
Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p.22121, emphasis supplied).

The Annex referred to reads as follows:

ANNEX

Illustrative List

1. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligation of national treatment

provided for in paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 include those
which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic law or under
administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain an
advantage, and which require:

(a) the purchase or use by an enterprise of products of domestic origin or from

any domestic source, whether specified in terms of particular products, in
terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of proportion of volume
or value of its local production; or

(b) that an enterprises purchases or use of imported products be limited to an

amount related to the volume or value of local products that it exports.

2. TRIMS that are inconsistent with the obligations of general elimination of

quantitative restrictions provided for in paragraph 1 of Article XI of GATT
1994 include those which are mandatory or enforceable under domestic laws or
under administrative rulings, or compliance with which is necessary to obtain
an advantage, and which restrict:

(a) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to the local

production that it exports;

(b) the importation by an enterprise of products used in or related to its local

production by restricting its access to foreign exchange inflows attributable
to the enterprise; or
 (c) the exportation or sale for export specified in terms of particular products,
in terms of volume or value of products, or in terms of a preparation of
volume or value of its local production. (Annex to the Agreement on
Trade-Related Investment Measures, Vol. 27, Uruguay Round Legal
Documents, p.22125, emphasis supplied).

The paragraph 4 of Article III of GATT 1994 referred to is quoted as follows:

The products of the territory of any contracting party imported into the territory of any
other contracting party shall be accorded treatment no less favorable than that
accorded to like products of national origin in respect of laws, regulations and
requirements affecting their internal sale, offering for sale, purchase, transportation,
distribution or use. the provisions of this paragraph shall not prevent the application of
differential internal transportation charges which are based exclusively on the
economic operation of the means of transport and not on the nationality of the
product. (Article III, GATT 1947, as amended by the Protocol Modifying Part II, and
Article XXVI of GATT, 14 September 1948, 62 UMTS 82-84 in relation to paragraph
1(a) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round,
Legal Instruments p.177, emphasis supplied).

b) In the area of trade related aspects of intellectual property rights (TRIPS, for
brevity):

Each Member shall accord to the nationals of other Members treatment no less
favourable than that it accords to its own nationals with regard to the protection of
intellectual property... (par. 1, Article 3, Agreement on Trade-Related Aspect of
Intellectual Property rights, Vol. 31, Uruguay Round, Legal Instruments, p.25432
(emphasis supplied)

(c) In the area of the General Agreement on Trade in Services:

National Treatment

1. In the sectors inscribed in its schedule, and subject to any conditions and
qualifications set out therein, each Member shall accord to services and
service suppliers of any other Member, in respect of all measures affecting
the supply of services, treatment no less favourable than it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers.

2. A Member may meet the requirement of paragraph I by according to

services and service suppliers of any other Member, either formally
 identical treatment or formally different treatment to that it accords to its
own like services and service suppliers.

3. Formally identical or formally different treatment shall be considered to be

less favourable if it modifies the conditions of completion in favour of
services or service suppliers of the Member compared to like services or
service suppliers of any other Member. (Article XVII, General Agreement
on Trade in Services, Vol. 28, Uruguay Round Legal Instruments, p.22610
emphasis supplied).

It is petitioners position that the foregoing national treatment and parity provisions of
the WTO Agreement place nationals and products of member countries on the same
footing as Filipinos and local products, in contravention of the Filipino First policy of the
Constitution. They allegedly render meaningless the phrase effectively controlled by
Filipinos. The constitutional conflict becomes more manifest when viewed in the context
of the clear duty imposed on the Philippines as a WTO member to ensure the
conformity of its laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as
provided in the annexed agreements.[20] Petitioners further argue that these provisions
contravene constitutional limitations on the role exports play in national development
and negate the preferential treatment accorded to Filipino labor, domestic materials and
locally produced goods.
On the other hand, respondents through the Solicitor General counter (1) that such
Charter provisions are not self-executing and merely set out general policies; (2) that
these nationalistic portions of the Constitution invoked by petitioners should not be read
in isolation but should be related to other relevant provisions of Art. XII, particularly Secs.
1 and 13 thereof; (3) that read properly, the cited WTO clauses do not conflict with the
Constitution; and (4) that the WTO Agreement contains sufficient provisions to protect
developing countries like the Philippines from the harshness of sudden trade
liberalization.
We shall now discuss and rule on these arguments.

Declaration of Principles Not Self-Executing

By its very title, Article II of the Constitution is a declaration of principles and state
policies. The counterpart of this article in the 1935 Constitution [21] is called the basic
political creed of the nation by Dean Vicente Sinco.[22] These principles in Article II are
not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the
courts.[23] They are used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power
of judicial review, and by the legislature in its enactment of laws. As held in the leading
case of Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato,[24] the principles and state policies
enumerated in Article II and some sections of Article XII are not self-executing
provisions, the disregard of which can give rise to a cause of action in the courts. They
do not embody judicially enforceable constitutional rights but guidelines for legislation.
 In the same light, we held in Basco vs. Pagcor[25] that broad constitutional principles
need legislative enactments to implement them, thus:

On petitioners allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personal Dignity) 12

(Family) and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article
XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution,
suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and policies. As
such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by
Congress to clearly define and effectuate such principles.

In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing

principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives
addressed to the executive and to the legislature. If the executive and the legislature
failed to heed the directives of the article, the available remedy was not judicial but
political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the
executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2).

The reasons for denying a cause of action to an alleged infringement of broad

constitutional principles are sourced from basic considerations of due process and the
lack of judicial authority to wade into the uncharted ocean of social and economic policy
making. Mr. Justice Florentino P. Feliciano in his concurring opinion in Oposa vs.
Factoran, Jr.,[26] explained these reasons as follows:

My suggestion is simply that petitioners must, before the trial court, show a more
specific legal right -- a right cast in language of a significantly lower order of
generality than Article II (15) of the Constitution -- that is or may be violated by the
actions, or failures to act, imputed to the public respondent by petitioners so that the
trial court can validly render judgment granting all or part of the relief prayed for. To
my mind, the court should be understood as simply saying that such a more specific
legal right or rights may well exist in our corpus of law, considering the general policy
principles found in the Constitution and the existence of the Philippine Environment
Code, and that the trial court should have given petitioners an effective opportunity so
to demonstrate, instead of aborting the proceedings on a motion to dismiss.

It seems to me important that the legal right which is an essential component of a

cause of action be a specific, operable legal right, rather than a constitutional or
statutory policy, for at least two (2) reasons. One is that unless the legal right claimed
to have been violated or disregarded is given specification in operational terms,
defendants may well be unable to defend themselves intelligently and effectively; in
other words, there are due process dimensions to this matter.

The second is a broader-gauge consideration -- where a specific violation of law or

applicable regulation is not alleged or proved, petitioners can be expected to fall back
on the expanded conception of judicial power in the second paragraph of Section 1 of
Article VIII of the Constitution which reads:

Section 1. x x x

Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. (Emphases supplied)

When substantive standards as general as the right to a balanced and healthy ecology
and the right to health are combined with remedial standards as broad ranging as a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, the result will be,
it is respectfully submitted, to propel courts into the uncharted ocean of social and
economic policy making. At least in respect of the vast area of environmental
protection and management, our courts have no claim to special technical competence
and experience and professional qualification. Where no specific, operable norms and
standards are shown to exist, then the policy making departments -- the legislative and
executive departments -- must be given a real and effective opportunity to fashion and
promulgate those norms and standards, and to implement them before the courts
should intervene.

Economic Nationalism Should Be Read with Other Constitutional Mandates to

Attain Balanced Development of Economy

On the other hand, Secs. 10 and 12 of Article XII, apart from merely laying down
general principles relating to the national economy and patrimony, should be read and
understood in relation to the other sections in said article, especially Secs. 1 and 13
thereof which read:

Section 1. The goals of the national economy are a more equitable distribution of
opportunities, income, and wealth; a sustained increase in the amount of goods and
services produced by the nation for the benefit of the people; and an expanding
productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all, especially the
underprivileged.

The State shall promote industrialization and full employment based on sound
agricultural development and agrarian reform, through industries that make full and
efficient use of human and natural resources, and which are competitive in both
domestic and foreign markets. However, the State shall protect Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.

In the pursuit of these goals, all sectors of the economy and all regions of the country
shall be given optimum opportunity to develop. x x x

xxxxxxxxx

Sec. 13. The State shall pursue a trade policy that serves the general welfare and
utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and
reciprocity.

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, Sec. 1 lays down the basic goals of national
economic development, as follows:
1. A more equitable distribution of opportunities, income and wealth;
2. A sustained increase in the amount of goods and services provided by the nation
for the benefit of the people; and
3. An expanding productivity as the key to raising the quality of life for all especially
the underprivileged.
With these goals in context, the Constitution then ordains the ideals of economic
nationalism (1) by expressing preference in favor of qualified Filipinos in the grant of
rights, privileges and concessions covering the national economy and patrimony [27] and
in the use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally-produced goods; (2) by
mandating the State to adopt measures that help make them competitive; [28] and (3) by
requiring the State to develop a self-reliant and independent national economy
effectively controlled by Filipinos.[29] In similar language, the Constitution takes into
account the realities of the outside world as it requires the pursuit of a trade policy that
serves the general welfare and utilizes all forms and arrangements of exchange on the
basis of equality and reciprocity;[30] and speaks of industries which are competitive in
both domestic and foreign markets as well as of the protection of Filipino enterprises
against unfair foreign competition and trade practices.
It is true that in the recent case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. Government Service
Insurance System, et al.,[31] this Court held that Sec. 10, second par., Art. XII of the 1987
Constitution is a mandatory, positive command which is complete in itself and which
needs no further guidelines or implementing laws or rules for its enforcement. From its
very words the provision does not require any legislation to put it in operation. It is per
se judicially enforceable. However, as the constitutional provision itself states, it is
enforceable only in regard to the grants of rights, privileges and concessions covering
national economy and patrimony and not to every aspect of trade and commerce. It
refers to exceptions rather than the rule. The issue here is not whether this paragraph of
Sec. 10 of Art. XII is self-executing or not. Rather, the issue is whether, as a rule, there
are enough balancing provisions in the Constitution to allow the Senate to ratify the
Philippine concurrence in the WTO Agreement. And we hold that there are.
 All told, while the Constitution indeed mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods,
services, labor and enterprises, at the same time, it recognizes the need for business
exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of equality and reciprocity and limits
protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and trade practices
that are unfair.[32] In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy. It did not shut out foreign investments, goods and services in the development of
the Philippine economy. While the Constitution does not encourage the unlimited entry
of foreign goods, services and investments into the country, it does not prohibit them
either. In fact, it allows an exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity, frowning
only on foreign competition that is unfair.

WTO Recognizes Need to Protect Weak Economies

Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that the WTO itself has some built-in
advantages to protect weak and developing economies, which comprise the vast
majority of its members. Unlike in the UN where major states have permanent seats and
veto powers in the Security Council, in the WTO, decisions are made on the basis of
sovereign equality, with each members vote equal in weight to that of any other. There
is no WTO equivalent of the UN Security Council.

WTO decides by consensus whenever possible, otherwise, decisions of the Ministerial

Conference and the General Council shall be taken by the majority of the votes cast,
except in cases of interpretation of the Agreement or waiver of the obligation of a
member which would require three fourths vote.Amendments would require two
thirds vote in general. Amendments to MFN provisions and the Amendments
provision will require assent of all members. Any member may withdraw from the
Agreement upon the expiration of six months from the date of notice of withdrawals. [33]

Hence, poor countries can protect their common interests more effectively through
the WTO than through one-on-one negotiations with developed countries. Within the
WTO, developing countries can form powerful blocs to push their economic agenda
more decisively than outside the Organization. This is not merely a matter of practical
alliances but a negotiating strategy rooted in law. Thus, the basic principles underlying
the WTO Agreement recognize the need of developing countries like the Philippines to
share in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their
economic development. These basic principles are found in the preamble [34] of the WTO
Agreement as follows:

The Parties to this Agreement,

Recognizing that their relations in the field of trade and economic endeavour should
be conducted with a view to raising standards of living, ensuring full employment and
a large and steadily growing volume of real income and effective demand, and
expanding the production of and trade in goods and services, while allowing for the
optimal use of the worlds resources in accordance with the objective of sustainable
development, seeking both to protect and preserve the environment and to enhance the
means for doing so in a manner consistent with their respective needs and concerns at
different levels of economic development,

Recognizing further that there is need for positive efforts designed to ensure that
developing countries, and especially the least developed among them, secure a share
in the growth in international trade commensurate with the needs of their economic
development,

Being desirous of contributing to these objectives by entering into reciprocal and

mutually advantageous arrangements directed to the substantial reduction of tariffs
and other barriers to trade and to the elimination of discriminatory treatment in
international trade relations,

Resolved, therefore, to develop an integrated, more viable and durable multilateral

trading system encompassing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the results
of past trade liberalization efforts, and all of the results of the Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations,

Determined to preserve the basic principles and to further the objectives underlying
this multilateral trading system, x x x. (underscoring supplied.)

Specific WTO Provisos Protect Developing Countries

So too, the Solicitor General points out that pursuant to and consistent with the
foregoing basic principles, the WTO Agreement grants developing countries a more
lenient treatment, giving their domestic industries some protection from the rush of
foreign competition. Thus, with respect to tariffs in general, preferential treatment is
given to developing countries in terms of the amount of tariff reduction and the period
within which the reduction is to be spread out. Specifically, GATT requires an average
tariff reduction rate of 36% for developed countries to be effected within a period of six
(6) years while developing countries -- including the Philippines -- are required to effect
an average tariff reduction of only 24% within ten (10) years.
In respect to domestic subsidy, GATT requires developed countries to reduce
domestic support to agricultural products by 20% over six (6) years, as compared
to only 13% for developing countries to be effected within ten (10) years.
In regard to export subsidy for agricultural products, GATT requires developed
countries to reduce their budgetary outlays for export subsidy by 36% and export
volumes receiving export subsidy by 21% within a period of six (6) years. For
developing countries, however, the reduction rate is only two-thirds of that prescribed
for developed countries and a longer period of ten (10) years within which to effect such
reduction.
Moreover, GATT itself has provided built-in protection from unfair foreign
competition and trade practices including anti-dumping measures, countervailing
measures and safeguards against import surges. Where local businesses are
jeopardized by unfair foreign competition, the Philippines can avail of these
measures. There is hardly therefore any basis for the statement that under the WTO,
local industries and enterprises will all be wiped out and that Filipinos will be deprived of
control of the economy. Quite the contrary, the weaker situations of developing nations
like the Philippines have been taken into account; thus, there would be no basis to say
that in joining the WTO, the respondents have gravely abused their discretion. True,
they have made a bold decision to steer the ship of state into the yet uncharted sea of
economic liberalization. But such decision cannot be set aside on the ground of grave
abuse of discretion, simply because we disagree with it or simply because we believe
only in other economic policies. As earlier stated, the Court in taking jurisdiction of this
case will not pass upon the advantages and disadvantages of trade liberalization as an
economic policy. It will only perform its constitutional duty of determining whether the
Senate committed grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Does Not Rule Out Foreign Competition

Furthermore, the constitutional policy of a self-reliant and independent national

economy[35] does not necessarily rule out the entry of foreign investments, goods and
services. It contemplates neither economic seclusion nor mendicancy in the
international community. As explained by Constitutional Commissioner Bernardo
Villegas, sponsor of this constitutional policy:

Economic self-reliance is a primary objective of a developing country that is keenly

aware of overdependence on external assistance for even its most basic needs. It does
not mean autarky or economic seclusion; rather, it means avoiding mendicancy in the
international community. Independence refers to the freedom from undue foreign
control of the national economy, especially in such strategic industries as in the
development of natural resources and public utilities. [36]

The WTO reliance on most favored nation, national treatment, and trade without
discrimination cannot be struck down as unconstitutional as in fact they are rules of
equality and reciprocity that apply to all WTO members. Aside from envisioning a trade
policy based on equality and reciprocity,[37] the fundamental law encourages industries
that are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets, thereby demonstrating a
clear policy against a sheltered domestic trade environment, but one in favor of the
gradual development of robust industries that can compete with the best in the foreign
markets. Indeed, Filipino managers and Filipino enterprises have shown capability and
tenacity to compete internationally. And given a free trade environment, Filipino
entrepreneurs and managers in Hongkong havedemonstrated the Filipino capacity to
grow and to prosper against the best offered under a policy of laissez faire.

Constitution Favors Consumers, Not Industries or Enterprises

The Constitution has not really shown any unbalanced bias in favor of any business
or enterprise, nor does it contain any specific pronouncement that Filipino companies
should be pampered with a total
proscription of foreign competition. On the other hand, respondentsclaim that
WTO/GATT aims to make available to the Filipino consumer the best goods and
services obtainable anywhere in the world at the most reasonable prices. Consequently,
the question boils down to whether WTO/GATT will favor the general welfare of the
public at large.
Will adherence to the WTO treaty bring this ideal (of favoring the general welfare) to
reality?
Will WTO/GATT succeed in promoting the Filipinos general welfare because it will --
as promised by its promoters -- expand the countrys exports and generate more
employment?
Will it bring more prosperity, employment, purchasing power and quality products at
the most reasonable rates to the Filipino public?
The responses to these questions involve judgment calls by our policy makers, for
which they are answerable to our people during appropriate electoral exercises. Such
questions and the answers thereto are not subject to judicial pronouncements based on
grave abuse of discretion.

Constitution Designed to Meet Future Events and Contingencies

No doubt, the WTO Agreement was not yet in existence when the Constitution was
drafted and ratified in 1987. That does not mean however that the Charter is necessarily
flawed in the sense that its framers might not have anticipated the advent of a
borderless world of business. By the same token, the United Nations was not yet in
existence when the 1935 Constitution became effective. Did that necessarily mean that
the then Constitution might not have contemplated a diminution of the absoluteness of
sovereignty when the Philippines signed the UN Charter, thereby effectively
surrendering part of its control over its foreign relations to the decisions of various UN
organs like the Security Council?
It is not difficult to answer this question. Constitutions are designed to meet not only
the vagaries of contemporary events. They should be interpreted to cover even future
and unknown circumstances. It is to the credit of its drafters that a Constitution can
withstand the assaults of bigots and infidels but at the same time bend with the
refreshing winds of change necessitated by unfolding events. As one eminent political
law writer and respected jurist[38] explains:

The Constitution must be quintessential rather than superficial, the root and not the
blossom, the base and framework only of the edifice that is yet to rise.It is but the core
of the dream that must take shape, not in a twinkling by mandate of our delegates, but
slowly in the crucible of Filipino minds and hearts, where it will in time develop its
sinews and gradually gather its strength and finally achieve its substance. In fine, the
Constitution cannot, like the goddess Athena, rise full-grown from the brow of the
Constitutional Convention, nor can it conjure by mere fiat an instant Utopia. It must
grow with the society it seeks to re-structure and march apace with the progress of the
race, drawing from the vicissitudes of history the dynamism and vitality that will keep
it, far from becoming a petrified rule, a pulsing, living law attuned to the heartbeat of
the nation.

Third Issue: The WTO Agreement and Legislative Power

The WTO Agreement provides that (e)ach Member shall ensure the conformity of its
laws, regulations and administrative procedures with its obligations as provided in the
annexed Agreements.[39] Petitioners maintain that this undertaking unduly limits, restricts
and impairs Philippine sovereignty, specifically the legislative power which under Sec. 2,
Article VI of the 1987 Philippine Constitution is vested in the Congress of the
Philippines. It is an assault on the sovereign powers of the Philippines because this
means that Congress could not pass legislation that will be good for our national interest
and general welfare if such legislation will not conform with the WTO Agreement, which
not only relates to the trade in goods x x x but also to the flow of investments and
money x x x as well as to a whole slew of agreements on socio-cultural matters x x x.[40]
More specifically, petitioners claim that said WTO proviso derogates from the power
to tax, which is lodged in the Congress.[41] And while the Constitution allows Congress to
authorize the President to fix tariff rates, import and export quotas, tonnage and
wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts, such authority is subject to specified limits
and x x x such limitations and restrictions as Congress may provide,[42] as in fact it did
under Sec. 401 of the Tariff and Customs Code.

Sovereignty Limited by International Law and Treaties

This Court notes and appreciates the ferocity and passion by which petitioners
stressed their arguments on this issue. However, while sovereignty has traditionally
been deemed absolute and all-encompassing on the domestic level, it is however
subject to restrictions and limitations voluntarily agreed to by the Philippines, expressly
or impliedly, as a member of the family of nations. Unquestionably, the Constitution did
not envision a hermit-type isolation of the country from the rest of the world. In its
Declaration of Principles and State Policies, the Constitution adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land, and adheres to the
policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity, with all nations." [43] By
the doctrine of incorporation, the country is bound by generally accepted principles of
international law, which are considered to be automatically part of our own laws.[44] One
of the oldest and most fundamental rules in international law is pacta sunt servanda --
international agreements must be performed in good faith. A treaty engagement is not a
mere moral obligation but creates a legally binding obligation on the parties x x x. A
state which has contracted valid international obligations is bound to make in its
legislations such modifications as may be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the
obligations undertaken.[45]
By their inherent nature, treaties really limit or restrict the absoluteness of
sovereignty. By their voluntary act, nations may surrender some aspects of their state
power in exchange for greater benefits granted by or derived from a convention or
pact. After all, states, like individuals, live with coequals, and in pursuit of mutually
covenanted objectives and benefits, they also commonly agree to limit the exercise of
their otherwise absolute rights. Thus, treaties have been used to record agreements
between States concerning such widely diverse matters as, for example, the lease of
naval bases, the sale or cession of territory, the termination of war, the regulation of
conduct of hostilities, the formation of alliances, the regulation of commercial relations,
the settling of claims, the laying down of rules governing conduct in peace and the
establishment of international organizations.[46] The sovereignty of a state therefore
cannot in fact and in reality be considered absolute. Certain restrictions enter into the
picture: (1) limitations imposed by the very nature of membership in the family of nations
and (2) limitations imposed by treaty stipulations. As aptly put by John F. Kennedy,
Today, no nation can build its destiny alone. The age of self-sufficient nationalism is
over. The age of interdependence is here.[47]

UN Charter and Other Treaties Limit Sovereignty

Thus, when the Philippines joined the United Nations as one of its 51 charter
members, it consented to restrict its sovereign rights under the concept of sovereignty
as auto-limitation.47-A Under Article 2 of the UN Charter, (a)ll members shall give the
United Nations every assistance in any action it takes in accordance with the present
Charter, and shall refrain from giving assistance to any state against which the United
Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action. Such assistance includes payment
of its corresponding share not merely in administrative expenses but also in
expenditures for the peace-keeping operations of the organization. In its advisory
opinion of July 20, 1961, the International Court of Justice held that money used by the
United Nations Emergency Force in the Middle East and in the Congo were expenses of
the United Nations under Article 17, paragraph 2, of the UN Charter. Hence, all its
members must bear their corresponding share in such expenses. In this sense, the
Philippine Congress is restricted in its power to appropriate. It is compelled to
appropriate funds whether it agrees with such peace-keeping expenses or not. So too,
under Article 105 of the said Charter, the UN and its representatives enjoy diplomatic
privileges and immunities, thereby limiting again the exercise of sovereignty of members
within their own territory. Another example: although sovereign equality and domestic
jurisdiction of all members are set forth as underlying principles in the UN Charter,
such provisos are however subject to enforcement measures decided by the Security
Council for the maintenance of international peace and security under Chapter VII of the
Charter. A final example: under Article 103, (i)n the event of a conflict between the
obligations of the Members of the United Nations under the present Charter and their
obligations under any other international agreement, their obligation under the present
charter shall prevail, thus unquestionably denying the Philippines -- as a member -- the
sovereign power to make a choice as to which of conflicting obligations, if any, to honor.
Apart from the UN Treaty, the Philippines has entered into many other international
pacts -- both bilateral and multilateral -- that involve limitations on Philippine
sovereignty. These are enumerated by the Solicitor General in his Compliance dated
October 24, 1996, as follows:

(a) Bilateral convention with the United States regarding taxes on income, where
the Philippines agreed, among others, to exempt from tax, income received in
the Philippines by, among others, the Federal Reserve Bank of the United
States, the Export/Import Bank of the United States, the Overseas Private
Investment Corporation of the United States. Likewise, in said convention,
wages, salaries and similar remunerations paid by the United States to its
citizens for labor and personal services performed by them as employees or
officials of the United States are exempt from income tax by the Philippines.

(b) Bilateral agreement with Belgium, providing, among others, for the avoidance
of double taxation with respect to taxes on income.

(c) Bilateral convention with the Kingdom of Sweden for the avoidance of double
taxation.

(d) Bilateral convention with the French Republic for the avoidance of double
taxation.

(e) Bilateral air transport agreement with Korea where the Philippines agreed to
exempt from all customs duties, inspection fees and other duties or taxes
aircrafts of South Korea and the regular equipment, spare parts and supplies
arriving with said aircrafts.

(f) Bilateral air service agreement with Japan, where the Philippines agreed to
exempt from customs duties, excise taxes, inspection fees and other similar
 duties, taxes or charges fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment,
stores on board Japanese aircrafts while on Philippine soil.

(g) Bilateral air service agreement with Belgium where the Philippines granted
Belgian air carriers the same privileges as those granted to Japanese and
Korean air carriers under separate air service agreements.

(h) Bilateral notes with Israel for the abolition of transit and visitor visas where
the Philippines exempted Israeli nationals from the requirement of obtaining
transit or visitor visas for a sojourn in the Philippines not exceeding 59 days.

(I) Bilateral agreement with France exempting French nationals from the
requirement of obtaining transit and visitor visa for a sojourn not exceeding 59
days.

(j) Multilateral Convention on Special Missions, where the Philippines agreed that
premises of Special Missions in the Philippines are inviolable and its agents
can not enter said premises without consent of the Head of Mission
concerned. Special Missions are also exempted from customs duties, taxes and
related charges.

(k) Multilateral Convention on the Law of Treaties. In this convention, the

Philippines agreed to be governed by the Vienna Convention on the Law of
Treaties.

(l) Declaration of the President of the Philippines accepting compulsory

jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice. The International Court of
Justice has jurisdiction in all legal disputes concerning the interpretation of a
treaty, any question of international law, the existence of any fact which, if
established, would constitute a breach of international obligation.

In the foregoing treaties, the Philippines has effectively agreed to limit the exercise
of its sovereign powers of taxation, eminent domain and police power. The underlying
consideration in this partial surrender of sovereignty is the reciprocal commitment of the
other contracting states in granting the same privilege and immunities to the Philippines,
its officials and its citizens. The same reciprocity characterizes the Philippine
commitments under WTO-GATT.

International treaties, whether relating to nuclear disarmament, human rights, the

environment, the law of the sea, or trade, constrain domestic political sovereignty
through the assumption of external obligations. But unless anarchy in international
relations is preferred as an alternative, in most cases we accept that the benefits of the
reciprocal obligations involved outweigh the costs associated with any loss of political
sovereignty. (T)rade treaties that structure relations by reference to durable, well-
defined substantive norms and objective dispute resolution procedures reduce the risks
of larger countries exploiting raw economic power to bully smaller countries, by
subjecting power relations to some form of legal ordering. In addition, smaller
countries typically stand to gain disproportionately from trade liberalization. This is
due to the simple fact that liberalization will provide access to a larger set of potential
new trading relationship than in case of the larger country gaining enhanced success
to the smaller countrys market. [48]

The point is that, as shown by the foregoing treaties, a portion of sovereignty may
be waived without violating the Constitution, based on the rationale that the Philippines
adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the
land and adheres to the policy of x x x cooperation and amity with all nations.

Fourth Issue: The WTO Agreement and Judicial Power

Petitioners aver that paragraph 1, Article 34 of the General Provisions and Basic
Principles of the Agreement on Trade-Related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights
(TRIPS)[49] intrudes on the power of the Supreme Court to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedures.[50]
To understand the scope and meaning of Article 34, TRIPS, [51] it will be fruitful to
restate its full text as follows:

Article 34

Process Patents: Burden of Proof

1. For the purposes of civil proceedings in respect of the infringement of the rights
of the owner referred to in paragraph 1(b) of Article 28, if the subject matter of a
patent is a process for obtaining a product, the judicial authorities shall have the
authority to order the defendant to prove that the process to obtain an identical
product is different from the patented process. Therefore, Members shall provide,
in at least one of the following circumstances, that any identical product when
produced without the consent of the patent owner shall, in the absence of proof to
the contrary, be deemed to have been obtained by the patented process:

(a) if the product obtained by the patented process is new;

(b) if there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by
the process and the owner of the patent has been unable through
reasonable efforts to determine the process actually used.
 2. Any Member shall be free to provide that the burden of proof indicated in
paragraph 1 shall be on the alleged infringer only if the condition referred to in
subparagraph (a) is fulfilled or only if the condition referred to in subparagraph (b)
is fulfilled.

3. In the adduction of proof to the contrary, the legitimate interests of defendants

in protecting their manufacturing and business secrets shall be taken into account.

From the above, a WTO Member is required to provide a rule of disputable (note
the words in the absence of proof to the contrary) presumption that a product shown to
be identical to one produced with the use of a patented process shall be deemed to
have been obtained by the (illegal) use of the said patented process, (1) where such
product obtained by the patented product is new, or (2) where there is substantial
likelihood that the identical product was made with the use of the said patented process
but the owner of the patent could not determine the exact process used in obtaining
such identical product. Hence, the burden of proof contemplated by Article 34 should
actually be understood as the duty of the alleged patent infringer to overthrow such
presumption. Such burden, properly understood, actually refers to the burden of
evidence (burden of going forward) placed on the producer of the identical (or fake)
product to show that his product was produced without the use of the patented process.
The foregoing notwithstanding, the patent owner still has the burden of proof since,
regardless of the presumption provided under paragraph 1 of Article 34, such owner still
has to introduce evidence of the existence of the alleged identical product, the fact that
it is identical to the genuine one produced by the patented process and the fact of
newness of the genuine product or the fact of substantial likelihood that the identical
product was made by the patented process.
The foregoing should really present no problem in changing the rules of evidence as
the present law on the subject, Republic Act No. 165, as amended, otherwise known as
the Patent Law, provides a similar presumption in cases of infringement of patented
design or utility model, thus:

SEC. 60. Infringement. - Infringement of a design patent or of a patent for utility

model shall consist in unauthorized copying of the patented design or utility model for
the purpose of trade or industry in the article or product and in the making, using or
selling of the article or product copying the patented design or utility model. Identity
or substantial identity with the patented design or utility model shall constitute
evidence of copying. (underscoring supplied)

Moreover, it should be noted that the requirement of Article 34 to provide a

disputable presumption applies only if (1) the product obtained by the patented process
is NEW or (2) there is a substantial likelihood that the identical product was made by the
process and the process owner has not been able through reasonable effort to
determine the process used. Where either of these two provisos does not obtain,
members shall be free to determine the appropriate method of implementing the
provisions of TRIPS within their own internal systems and processes.
By and large, the arguments adduced in connection with our disposition of the third
issue -- derogation of legislative power - will apply to this fourth issue also. Suffice it to
say that the reciprocity clause more than justifies such intrusion, if any actually
exists. Besides, Article 34 does not contain an unreasonable burden, consistent as it is
with due process and the concept of adversarial dispute settlement inherent in our
judicial system.
So too, since the Philippine is a signatory to most international conventions on
patents, trademarks and copyrights, the adjustment in legislation and rules of procedure
will not be substantial.[52]

Fifth Issue: Concurrence Only in the WTO Agreement and Not in Other
Documents Contained in the Final Act

Petitioners allege that the Senate concurrence in the WTO Agreement and its
annexes -- but not in the other documents referred to in the Final Act, namely the
Ministerial Declaration and Decisions and the Understanding on Commitments in
Financial Services -- is defective and insufficient and thus constitutes abuse of
discretion. They submit that such concurrence in the WTO Agreement alone is flawed
because it is in effect a rejection of the Final Act, which in turn was the document signed
by Secretary Navarro, in representation of the Republic upon authority of the
President. They contend that the second letter of the President to the Senate[53] which
enumerated what constitutes the Final Act should have been the subject of concurrence
of the Senate.
A final act, sometimes called protocol de clture, is an instrument which records
the winding up of the proceedings of a diplomatic conference and usually includes a
reproduction of the texts of treaties, conventions, recommendations and other acts
agreed upon and signed by the plenipotentiaries attending the conference.[54] It is not the
treaty itself. It is rather a summary of the proceedings of a protracted conference which
may have taken place over several years. The text of the Final Act Embodying the
Results of the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations is contained in just one
page[55] in Vol. I of the 36-volume Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations. By
signing said Final Act, Secretary Navarro as representative of the Republic of the
Philippines undertook:

"(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their
respective competent authorities with a view to seeking approval of the
Agreement in accordance with their procedures; and

(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions."

 The assailed Senate Resolution No. 97 expressed concurrence in exactly what the
Final Act required from its signatories, namely, concurrence of the Senate in the WTO
Agreement.
The Ministerial Declarations and Decisions were deemed adopted without need for
ratification. They were approved by the ministers by virtue of Article XXV: 1 of GATT
which provides that representatives of the members can meet to give effect to those
provisions of this Agreement which invoke joint action, and generally with a view to
facilitating the operation and furthering the objectives of this Agreement.[56]
The Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services also approved in
Marrakesh does not apply to the Philippines. It applies only to those 27 Members which
have indicated in their respective schedules of commitments on standstill, elimination of
monopoly, expansion of operation of existing financial service suppliers, temporary
entry of personnel, free transfer and processing of information, and national treatment
with respect to access to payment, clearing systems and refinancing available in the
normal course of business.[57]
On the other hand, the WTO Agreement itself expresses what multilateral
agreements are deemed included as its integral parts,[58] as follows:

Article II

Scope of the WTO

1. The WTO shall provide the common institutional framework for the conduct of
trade relations among its Members in matters to the agreements and associated
legal instruments included in the Annexes to this Agreement.

2. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annexes 1, 2, and

3 (hereinafter referred to as Multilateral Agreements) are integral parts of this
Agreement, binding on all Members.

3. The Agreements and associated legal instruments included in Annex 4

(hereinafter referred to as Plurilateral Trade Agreements) are also part of this
Agreement for those Members that have accepted them, and are binding on those
Members. The Plurilateral Trade Agreements do not create either obligation or
rights for Members that have not accepted them.

4. The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 as specified in annex 1A

(hereinafter referred to as GATT 1994) is legally distinct from the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, dated 30 October 1947, annexed to the Final Act
adopted at the conclusion of the Second Session of the Preparatory Committee of
the United Nations Conference on Trade and Employment, as subsequently
rectified, amended or modified (hereinafter referred to as GATT 1947).
 It should be added that the Senate was well-aware of what it was concurring in as
shown by the members deliberation on August 25, 1994. After reading the letter of
President Ramos dated August 11, 1994,[59] the senators of the Republic minutely
dissected what the Senate was concurring in, as follows: [60]

THE CHAIRMAN: Yes. Now, the question of the validity of the submission came up
in the first day hearing of this Committee yesterday. Was the observation made by
Senator Taada that what was submitted to the Senate was not the agreement on
establishing the World Trade Organization by the final act of the Uruguay Round
which is not the same as the agreement establishing the World Trade
Organization? And on that basis, Senator Tolentino raised a point of order which,
however, he agreed to withdraw upon understanding that his suggestion for an
alternative solution at that time was acceptable. That suggestion was to treat the
proceedings of the Committee as being in the nature of briefings for Senators until the
question of the submission could be clarified.

And so, Secretary Romulo, in effect, is the President submitting a new... is he making
a new submission which improves on the clarity of the first submission?

MR. ROMULO: Mr. Chairman, to make sure that it is clear cut and there should be no
misunderstanding, it was his intention to clarify all matters by giving this letter.

THE CHAIRMAN: Thank you.

Can this Committee hear from Senator Taada and later on Senator Tolentino since
they were the ones that raised this question yesterday?

Senator Taada, please.

SEN. TAADA: Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Based on what Secretary Romulo has read, it would now clearly appear that what is
being submitted to the Senate for ratification is not the Final Act of the Uruguay
Round, but rather the Agreement on the World Trade Organization as well as the
Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding and Commitments in
Financial Services.

I am now satisfied with the wording of the new submission of President Ramos.

SEN. TAADA. . . . of President Ramos, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Taada. Can we hear from Senator
Tolentino? And after him Senator Neptali Gonzales and Senator Lina.
SEN TOLENTINO, Mr. Chairman, I have not seen the new submission actually
transmitted to us but I saw the draft of his earlier, and I think it now complies with the
provisions of the Constitution, and with the Final Act itself. The Constitution does not
require us to ratify the Final Act. It requires us to ratify the Agreement which is now
being submitted. The Final Act itself specifies what is going to be submitted to with
the governments of the participants.

In paragraph 2 of the Final Act, we read and I quote:

By signing the present Final Act, the representatives agree: (a) to submit as
appropriate the WTO Agreement for the consideration of the respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their
procedures.

In other words, it is not the Final Act that was agreed to be submitted to the
governments for ratification or acceptance as whatever their constitutional procedures
may provide but it is the World Trade Organization Agreement. And if that is the one
that is being submitted now, I think it satisfies both the Constitution and the Final Act
itself.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Tolentino, May I call on Senator Gonzales.

SEN. GONZALES. Mr. Chairman, my views on this matter are already a matter of
record. And they had been adequately reflected in the journal of yesterdays session
and I dont see any need for repeating the same.

Now, I would consider the new submission as an act ex abudante cautela.

THE CHAIRMAN. Thank you, Senator Gonzales. Senator Lina, do you want to make
any comment on this?

SEN. LINA. Mr. President, I agree with the observation just made by Senator
Gonzales out of the abundance of question. Then the new submission is, I believe,
stating the obvious and therefore I have no further comment to make.

Epilogue

In praying for the nullification of the Philippine ratification of the WTO Agreement,
petitioners are invoking this Courts constitutionally imposed duty to determine whether
or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of the Senate in giving its concurrence therein via Senate
Resolution No. 97. Procedurally, a writ of certiorari grounded on grave abuse of
discretion may be issued by the Court under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court when it is
amply shown that petitioners have no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law.
By grave abuse of discretion is meant such capricious and whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction.[61]Mere abuse of discretion is not
enough. It must be grave abuse of discretion as when the power is exercised in an
arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, and must be so
patent and so gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal
to perform the duty enjoined or to act at all in contemplation of law. [62] Failure on the part
of the petitioner to show grave abuse of discretion will result in the dismissal of the
petition.[63]
In rendering this Decision, this Court never forgets that the Senate, whose act is
under review, is one of two sovereign houses of Congress and is thus entitled to great
respect in its actions. It is itself a constitutional body independent and coordinate, and
thus its actions are presumed regular and done in good faith. Unless convincing proof
and persuasive arguments are presented to overthrow such presumptions, this Court
will resolve every doubt in its favor. Using the foregoing well-accepted definition of
grave abuse of discretion and the presumption of regularity in the Senates processes,
this Court cannot find any cogent reason to impute grave abuse of discretion to the
Senates exercise of its power of concurrence in the WTO Agreement granted it by Sec.
21 of Article VII of the Constitution.[64]
It is true, as alleged by petitioners, that broad constitutional principles require the
State to develop an independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos;
and to protect and/or prefer Filipino labor, products, domestic materials and locally
produced goods. But it is equally true that such principles -- while serving as judicial and
legislative guides -- are not in themselves sources of causes of action.Moreover, there
are other equally fundamental constitutional principles relied upon by the Senate which
mandate the pursuit of a trade policy that serves the general welfare and utilizes all
forms and arrangements of exchange on the basis of equality and reciprocity and the
promotion of industries which are competitive in both domestic and foreign markets,
thereby justifying its acceptance of said treaty. So too, the alleged impairment of
sovereignty in the exercise of legislative and judicial powers is balanced by the adoption
of the generally accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land
and the adherence of the Constitution to the policy of cooperation and amity with all
nations.
That the Senate, after deliberation and voting, voluntarily and overwhelmingly gave
its consent to the WTO Agreement thereby making it a part of the law of the land is a
legitimate exercise of its sovereign duty and power. We find no patent and gross
arbitrariness or despotism by reason of passion or personal hostility in such exercise. It
is not impossible to surmise that this Court, or at least some of its members, may even
agree with petitioners that it is more advantageous to the national interest to strike down
Senate Resolution No. 97. But that is not a legal reason to attribute grave abuse of
discretion to the Senate and to nullify its decision. To do so would constitute grave
abuse in the exercise of our own judicial power and duty. Ineludably, what the Senate
did was a valid exercise of its authority. As to whether such exercise was wise,
beneficial or viable is outside the realm of judicial inquiry and review. That is a matter
between the elected policy makers and the people. As to whether the nation should join
the worldwide march toward trade liberalization and economic globalization is a matter
that our people should determine in electing their policy makers. After all, the WTO
Agreement allows withdrawal of membership, should this be the political desire of a
member.
The eminent futurist John Naisbitt, author of the best seller Megatrends, predicts an
Asian Renaissance[65] where the East will become the dominant region of the world
economically, politically and culturally in the next century. He refers to the free market
espoused by WTO as the catalyst in this coming Asian ascendancy. There are at
present about 31 countries including China, Russia and Saudi Arabia negotiating for
membership in the WTO. Notwithstanding objections against possible limitations on
national sovereignty, the WTO remains as the only viable structure for multilateral
trading and the veritable forum for the development of international trade law. The
alternative to WTO is isolation, stagnation, if not economic self-destruction. Duly
enriched with original membership, keenly aware of the advantages and disadvantages
of globalization with its on-line experience, and endowed with a vision of the future, the
Philippines now straddles the crossroads of an international strategy for economic
prosperity and stability in the new millennium. Let the people, through their duly
authorized elected officers, make their free choice.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Puno, Kapunan,
Mendoza, Francisco, Hermosisima, Jr., and Torres, Jr., JJ., concur.
Padilla, and Vitug, JJ., in the result.

In Annex A of her Memorandum, dated August 8, 1996, received by this Court on August 12, 1996,
[1]

Philippine Ambassador to the United Nations, World Trade Organization and other international
organizations Lilia R. Bautista (hereafter referred to as Bautista Paper) submitted a 46-year Chronology
of GATT as follows:
1947 The birth of GATT. On 30 October 1947, the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT) was signed by 23 nations at the Palais des Nations in
Geneva. The Agreement contained tariff concessions agreed to in the first
multilateral trade negotiations and a set of rules designed to prevent these
concessions from being frustrated by restrictive trade measures.
The 23 founding contracting parties were members of the Preparatory Committee
established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council in 1946 to draft
the charter of the International Trade Organization (ITO). The ITO was envisaged
as the final leg of a triad of post-War economic agencies (the other two were the
 International Monetary Fund and the International Bank for Reconstruction - later
the World Bank).
In parallel with this task, the Committee members decided to negotiate tariff concessions
among themselves. From April to October 1947, the participants completed some
123 negotiations and established 20 schedules containing the tariff reductions
and bindings which became an integral part of GATT. These schedules resulting
from the first Round covered some 45,000 tariff concessions and about $10
billion in trade.
GATT was conceived as an interim measure that put into effect the commercial-policy
provisions of the ITO. In November, delegations from 56 countries met in Havana,
Cuba, to consider the ITO draft as a whole. After long and difficult negotiations,
some 53 countries signed the Final Act authenticating the text of the Havana
Charter in March 1948. There was no commitment, however, from governments
to ratification and, in the end, the ITO was stillborn, leaving GATT as the only
international instrument governing the conduct of world trade.
1948 Entry into force. On 1 January 1948, GATT entered into force. The 23 founding
members were: Australia, Belgium, Brazil, Burma, Canada, Ceylon, Chile, China,
Cuba, Czechoslovakia, France, India, Lebanon, Luxemburg, Netherlands, New
Zealand, Norway, Pakistan, Southern Rhodesia, Syria, South Africa, United
Kingdom and United States. The first Session of the contracting parties was held
from February to March in Havana, Cuba. The secretariat of the Interim
Commission for the ITO, which served as the ad hoc secretariat of GATT, move
from lake Placid, New York, to Geneva. The Contracting Parties held their
second session in Geneva from August to September.
1949 Second Round at Annecy. During the second Round of trade negotiations, held
from April to August at Annecy, France, the contracting parties exchange some
5,000 tariff concession. At their third Session, they also dealt with the accession
of ten more countries.
1950 Third Round At Torquay. From September 1950 to April 1951, the contracting
parties exchange some 8,700 tariff concessions in the English town, yielding tariff
reduction of about 25 per cent in relation to the 1948 level. Four more countries
acceded to GATT. During the fifth Session of the Contracting Parties, the United
States indicated that the ITO Charter would not be re-submitted to the US
congress; this, in effect, meant that ITO would not come into operation.
1956 Fourth Round at Geneva. The fourth Round was completed in May and produce
some $2.5 billion worth of tariff reductions. At the beginning of the year, the
GATT commercial policy course for officials of developing countries was
inaugurated.
1958 The Haberler Report. GATT published Trends in International Trade in
October. Known as the "Haberler Report" in honour of Professor Gottfried
Haberler, the chairman of the panel of imminent economist, it provided initial
guidelines for the work of GATT. The Contracting Parties at their 13th Sessions,
attended by Ministers, subsequently established 3 committees in
GATT: Committee I to convene a further tariff negotiating conference; Committee
II To review the agricultural policies of member governments and Committee III
to tackle the problems facing developing countries in their trade. The
establishment of the European Economic Community during the previous year
also demanded large scale tariff negotiation under Article XXIV 6 of the General
Agreement.
1960 The Dillon Round. The fifth Round opened in September and was divided into two
phases: the first was concerned with EEC members states for the creation of a
 single schedule of concessions for the Community based on its Common
External Tariff; and the second was a further general round of tariff
negotiations. Named in honor of US Under-Secretary of State Douglas Dillon
who proposed the negotiations, the Round was concluded in July 1962 and
resulted in about 4,400 tariff concessions covering $4.9 billion of trade.
1961 The Short-Term Arrangement covering cotton textiles was agreed as an
exception to the GATT rules. The arrangement permitted the negotiation of quota
restrictions affecting the exports of cotton-producing countries. In 1962 the "Short
Term " Arrangement become the "Long term" Arrangement, lasting until 1974
when the Multifibre Arrangement entered into force.
1964 The Kennedy Round. Meeting at Ministerial Level, a Trade Negotiations
Committee formally opened the Kennedy Round in May. In June 1967, the
Round's Final Act was signed by some 50 participating countries which together
accounted for 75 per cent of world trade. For the first time, negotiation departed
from product-by-product approach used in the previous Rounds to an across-the-
board or linear method of cutting tariffs for industrial goods. The working
hypothesis of a 50 per cent target cut in tariff levels was achieved in many
areas. Concessions covered an estimated total value of trade of about $40
billion. Separate agreements were reached on grains, chemical products and a
Code on Anti-Dumping.
1965 A New Chapter. The early 1960s marked the accession to the General Agreement
of many newly-independent developing countries. In February, the Contracting
Parties, meeting in a special session, adopted the text of Part IV on Trade and
Development. The additional chapter to the GATT required developed countries
to accord high priority to the reduction of trade barriers to products of developing
countries. A committee on Trade and Development was established to oversee
the functioning of the new GATT provisions. In the preceding year, GATT had
established the International Trade Center (ITC) to help developing countries in
trade promotion and identification of potential markets. Since 1968, the ITC had
been jointly operated by GATT and the UN Conference on Trade and
Development (UNCTAD).
1973 The Tokyo Round. The seventh Round was launched by Ministers in September at
the Japanese capital. Some 99 countries participated in negotiating a
comprehensive body of agreements covering both tariff and non-tariff matters. At
the end of the Round in November 1979, participants exchange tariff reduction
and bindings which covered more than $300 billion of trade. As a result of these
cuts, the weighted average tariff on manufactured goods in the world's nine major
Industrial Markets declined from 7.0 to 4.7 per cent. Agreements were reached in
the following areas; subsidies and countervailing measures, technical barriers to
trade, import licensing procedures, government procurement, customs valuation,
a revised anti-dumping code, trade in bovine meat, trade in daily products and
trade in civil aircraft. The first concrete result of the Round was the reduction of
import duties and other trade barriers by industrial countries on tropical products
exported by developing countries.
1974 On 1 January 1974, the Arrangement Regarding International Trade in textiles,
otherwise known as the Multifibre Arrangement (MFA), entered into force. Its
superseded the arrangement that had been governing trade in cotton textiles
since 1961. The MFA seeks to promote the expansion and progressive
liberalization of trade in textile product while at the same time avoiding disruptive
effects in individual markets in lines of production. The MFA was extended in
1978, 1982, 1986, 1991 and 1992. MFA members account for most of the world
exports of textiles and clothing which in 1986 amounted to US$128 billion.
 1982 Ministerial Meeting. Meeting for the first time in nearly ten years, the GATT
Ministers in November at Geneva reaffirmed the validity of GATT rules for the
conduct of international trade and committed themselves to combating
protectionist pressures. They also established a wide-ranging work programme
for the GATT which was to laid down the ground work for a new Round.
1986 The Uruguay Round. The GATT Trade Ministers meeting at Punta del
Este, Uruguay, launched the eighth Round of Trade Negotiations on 20
September. The Punta del Este, declarations, while representing a single political
undertaking, was divided into two section. The First covered negotiations on
Trade in goods and the second initiated negotiation on trade in services. In the
area of trade in goods, the Ministers committed themselves to a "standstill" on
new trade measures inconsistent with their GATT obligations and to a "rollback"
programme aimed at phasing out existing inconsistent measures. Envisaged to
last four years, negotiations started in early February 1987 in the following areas:
tariffs, non-tariff measures, tropical products, natural resource-based products,
textiles and clothing, agriculture, subsidies, safeguards, trade-related aspects of
intellectual property rights including trade in counterfeit goods, in trade- related
investment measures. The work of other groups included a review of GATT
articles, the GATT dispute-settlement procedure, the Tokyo Round agreements,
as well as functioning of the GATT system as a whole.
1994 "GATT 1994" is the updated version of GATT 1947 and takes into account the substantive
and institutional changes negotiated in the Uruguay Round.GATT 1994 is an integral part
of the World Trade Organization established on 1 January 1995. It is agreed that there be
a one year transition period during which certain GATT 1947 bodies and commitments
would co-exist with those of the World Trade Organization."
[2]
The Final Act was signed by representatives of 125 entities, namely Algeria, Angola, Antigua and
Barbuda, Argentine Republic, Australia, Republic of Austria, State of Bahrain, Peoples Republic
of Bangladesh, Barbados, The Kingdom of Belgium, Belize, Republic of Benin, Bolivia, Botswana,
Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic,
Chad, Chile, Peoples Republic of China, Colombia, Congo, Costa Rica, Republic of Cote dIvoire,
Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Kingdom of Denmark, Commonwealth of Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Arab Republic of Egypt, El Salvador, European Communities, Republic of Fiji, Finland,
French Republic, Gabonese Republic, Gambia, Federal Republic of Germany, Ghana, Hellenic
Republic, Grenada, Guatemala, Republic of Guinea-Bissau, Republic of Guyana, Haiti, Honduras,
Hong Kong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, State of Israel, Italian Republic, Jamaica,
Japan, Kenya, Korea, State of Kuwait, Kingdom of Lesotho, Principality of Liechtenstein, Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg, Macau, Republic of Madagascar, Republic of Malawi, Malaysia, Republic
of Maldives, Republic of Mali, Republic of Malta, Islamic Republic of Mauritania, Republic of
Mauritius, United Mexican States, Kingdom of Morocco, Republic of Mozambique, Union of
Myanmar, Republic of Namibia, Kingdom of the Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Republic
of Niger, Federal Republic of Nigeria, Kingdom of Norway, Islamic Republic of Pakistan,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portuguese Republic, State of Qatar, Romania, Rwandese
Republic, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, South Africa, Kingdom of Spain, Democratic Socialist
Republic of Sri Lanka, Republic of Surinam, Kingdom of Swaziland, Kingdom of Sweden, Swiss
Confederation, United Republic of Tanzania, Kingdom of Thailand, Togolese Republic, Republic
of Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of
Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America, Eastern Republic of Uruguay,
Venezuela, Republic of Zaire, Republic of Zambia, Republic of Zimbabwe; see pp. 6-25, Vol. 1,
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
[3]
11 August 1994
The Honorable Members
Senate
Through Senate President Edgardo Angara
Manila
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I have the honor to forward herewith an authenticated copy of the Uruguay Round Final Act signed by
Department of Trade and Industry Secretary Rizalino S. Navarro for the Philippines on 15 April
1994 in Marrakesh, Morocco.
The Uruguay Round Final Act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and strengthen the
interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting growth and development.
The Final Act will improve Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major trading partners
through the reduction of tariffs on its exports particularly agricultural and industrial
products. These concessions may be availed of by the Philippines, only if it is a member of the
World Trade Organization. By GATT estimates, the Philippines can acquire additional export
revenues from $2.2 to $2.7 Billion annually under Uruguay Round. This will be on top of the
normal increase in exports that the Philippines may experience.
The Final Act will also open up new opportunities for the services sector in such areas as the movement
of personnel, (e.g. professional services and construction services), cross-border supply (e.g.
computer-related services), consumption abroad (e.g. tourism, convention services, etc.) and
commercial presence.
The clarified and improved rules and disciplines on anti-dumping and countervailing measures will also
benefit Philippine exporters by reducing the costs and uncertainty associated with exporting while
at the same time providing a means for domestic industries to safeguard themselves against
unfair imports.
Likewise, the provision of adequate protection for intellectual property rights is expected to attract more
investments into the country and to make it less vulnerable to unilateral actions by its trading
partners (e.g. Sec. 301 of the United States Omnibus Trade Law).
In view of the foregoing, the Uruguay Round Final Act is hereby submitted to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
A draft of a proposed Resolution giving its concurrence to the aforesaid Agreement is enclosed.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
[4]
11 August 1994
The Honorable Members
Senate
Through Senate President Edgardo Angara
Manila
Ladies and Gentlemen:
I have the honor to forward herewith an authenticated copy of the Uruguay Round Final
Act signed by Department of Trade and Industry Secretary Rizalino S. Navarro for the Philippines
on 13 April 1994 in Marrakech (sic), Morocco.
Members of the trade negotiations committee, which included the Philippines, agreed that
the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and
Decisions, and the Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services embody the results of
their negotiations and form an integral part of the Uruguay Round Final Act.
 By signing the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Philippines, through Secretary Navarro,
agreed:
(a) To submit the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization to the Senate for its concurrence
pursuant to Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution; and
(b) To adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
The Uruguay Round Final Act aims to liberalize and expand world trade and strengthen the
interrelationship between trade and economic policies affecting growth and development.
The Final Act will improve Philippine access to foreign markets, especially its major
trading partners through the reduction of tariffs on its exports particularly agricultural and
industrial products. These concessions may be availed of by the Philippines, only if it is a member
of the World Trade Organization.By GATT estimates, the Philippines can acquire additional
export revenues from $2.2 to $2.7 Billion annually under Uruguay Round. This will be on top of
the normal increase in the exports that the Philippines may experience.
The Final Act will also open up new opportunities for the services sector in such areas as
the movement of personnel, (e.g., professional services and construction services), cross-border
supply (e.g., computer-related services), consumption abroad (e.g., tourism, convention services,
etc.) and commercial presence.
The clarified and improved rules and disciplines on anti-dumping and countervailing
measures will also benefit Philippine exporters by reducing the costs and uncertainty associated
with exporting while at the same time providing a means for domestic industries to safeguard
themselves against unfair imports.
Likewise, the provision of adequate protection for intellectual property rights is expected
to attract more investments into the country and to make it a less vulnerable to unilateral actions
by its trading partners (e.g., Sec. 301 of the United States Omnibus Trade Law).
In view of the foregoing, the Uruguay Round Final Act, the Agreement Establishing the
World Trade Organization, the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the Understanding on
Commitments in Financial Services, as embodied in the Uruguay Round Final Act and forming
and integral part thereof are hereby submitted to the Senate for its concurrence pursuant to
Section 21, Article VII of the Constitution.
A draft of a proposed Resolution giving its concurrence to the aforesaid Agreement is
enclosed.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
[5]
December 9, 1994
HON. EDGARDO J. ANGARA
Senate President
Senate, Manila
Dear Senate President Angara:
Pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 26 (2) Article VI of the Constitution, I hereby certify to
the necessity of the immediate adoption of P.S. 1083, entitled:
CONCURRING IN THE RATIFICATION OF THE AGREEMENT ESTABLISHING THE WORLD TRADE
ORGANIZATION
to meet a public emergency consisting of the need for immediate membership in the WTO in
order to assure the benefits to the Philippine economy arising from such membership.
Very truly yours,
(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS
[6]
Attached as Annex A, Petition; rollo, p. 52. P.S. 1083 is the forerunner of assailed Senate Resolution
No. 97. It was prepared by the Committee of the Whole on the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade chaired by Sen. Blas F. Ople and co-chaired by Sen. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo; see Annex
C, Compliance of petitioners dated January 28, 1997.
[7]
The Philippines is thus considered an original or founding member of WTO, which as of July 26, 1996
had 123 members as follows: Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Barbados, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Central African Republic, Chili, Colombia, Costa
Rica, Cote dIvoire, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominica, Dominican
Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, European Community, Fiji, Finland, France, Gabon,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Hongkong, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Jamaica, Japan,
Kenya, Korea, Kuwait, Lesotho, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macau, Madagascar, Malawi,
Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar,
Namibia, Netherlands -- for the Kingdom in Europe and for the Netherlands Antilles, New Zealand,
Nicaragua, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland,
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Rwanda, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent & the
Grenadines, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Solomon Islands,
South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Surinam, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tanzania, Thailand,
Togo, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom,
United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, Zambia, and Zimbabwe. See Annex A, Bautista Paper, infra.
[8]
Page 6; rollo, p. 261.
[9]
In compliance, Ambassador Bautista submitted to the Court on August 12, 1996, a Memorandum (the
Bautista Paper) consisting of 56 pages excluding annexes.This is the same document mentioned
in footnote no. 1.
[10]
Memorandum for Respondents, p. 13; rollo, p. 268.
[11]
Cf. Kilosbayan, Incorporated vs. Morato, 246 SCRA 540, July 17, 1995 for a discussion on locus
standi. See also the Concurring Opinion of Mr. Justice Vicente V. Mendoza in Tatad vs. Garcia,
Jr., 243 SCRA 473, April 6, 1995, as well as Kilusang Mayo Uno Labor Center vs. Garcia, Jr., 239
SCRA 386, 414, December 23, 1994.
[12]
Aquino, Jr. vs. Ponce Enrile, 59 SCRA 183, 196, September 17, 1974, cited in Bondoc vs. Pineda, 201
SCRA 792, 795, September 26, 1991.
[13]
Guingona, Jr. vs. Gonzales, 219 SCRA 326, 337, March 1, 1993.
[14]
See Tanada and Macapagal vs. Cuenco, et al., 103 Phil. 1051 for a discussion on the scope of political
question.
[15]
Section 1, Article VIII, (par. 2).
[16]
In a privilege speech on May 17, 1993, entitled Supreme Court -- Potential Tyrant? Senator Arturo
Tolentino concedes that this new provision gives the Supreme Court a duty to intrude into the
jurisdiction of the Congress or the President.
[17]
I Record of the Constitutional Commission 436.
[18]
Cf. Daza vs. Singson, 180 SCRA 496, December 21, 1989.
[19]
Memorandum for Petitioners, pp. 14-16; rollo, pp. 204-206.
[20]
Par. 4, Article XVI, WTO Agreement, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 1, p. 146.
[21]
Also entitled Declaration of Principles. The nomenclature in the 1973 Charter is identical with that in the
1987s.
[22]
Philippine Political Law, 1962 Ed., p. 116.
[23]
Bernas, The Constitution of the Philippines: A Commentary, Vol. II, 1988 Ed., p. 2. In the very recent
case of Manila Prince Hotel vs. GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, p. 8, it was held that A
provision which lays down a general principle, such as those found in Art. II of the 1987
Constitution, is usually not self-executing.
[24]
246 SCRA 540, 564, July 17, 1995. See also Tolentino vs. Secretary of Finance, G.R. No. 115455 and
consolidated cases, August 25, 1995.
[25]
197 SCRA 52, 68, May 14, 1991.
[26]
224 SCRA 792, 817, July 30, 1993.
[27]
Sec. 10, Article XII.
[28]
Sec. 12, Article XII.
[29]
Sec. 19, Art. II.
[30]
Sec. 13, Art. XII.
[31]
G.R. No. 122156, February 3, 1997, pp. 13-14.
[32]
Sec. 1, Art. XII.
[33]
Bautista Paper, p. 19.
[34]
Preamble, WTO Agreement p. 137, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade
Negotiations. Underscoring supplied.
[35]
Sec. - 19, Article II, Constitution.
[36]
III Records of the Constitutional Commission 252.
[37]
Sec. 13, Article XII, Constitution.
[38]
Justice Isagani A. Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 Ed., p. 13, quoting his own article entitled, A
Quintessential Constitution earlier published in the San Beda Law Journal, April 1972;
underscoring supplied.
[39]
Par. 4, Article XVI (Miscellaneous Provisions), WTO Agreement, p.146, Vol. 1, Uruguay Round of
Multilateral Trade Negotiations.
[40]
Memorandum for the Petitioners, p. 29; rollo, p. 219.
[41]
Sec. 24, Article VI, Constitution.
[42]
Subsection (2), Sec. 28, Article, VI Constitution.
[43]
Sec. 2, Article II, Constitution.
[44]
Cruz, Philippine Political Law, 1995 Ed., p. 55.
[45]
Salonga and Yap, op cit 305.
[46]
Salonga, op. cit., p. 287.
[47]
Quoted in Paras and Paras, Jr., International Law and World Politics, 1994 Ed., p. 178.
47-A Reagan vs. Commission of Internal Revenue, 30 SCRA 968, 973, December 27, 1969.
[48]
Trebilcock and Howse. The Regulation of International Trade, p. 14, London, 1995, cited on p. 55-56,
Bautista Paper.
[49]
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 31, p. 25445.
[50]
Item 5, Sec. 5, Article VIII, Constitution.
[51]
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. 31, p. 25445.
[52]
Bautista Paper, p. 13.
[53]
See footnote 3 of the text of this letter.
[54]
Salonga and Yap, op cit., pp. 289-290.
[55]
The full text, without the signatures, of the Final Act is as follows:
Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations
1. Having met in order to conclude the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, representatives
of the governments and of the European Communities, members of the Trade Negotiations
Committee, agree that the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (referred to in
the Final Act as the WTO Agreement), the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions, and the
Understanding on Commitments in Financial Services, as annexed hereto, embody the results of
their negotiations and form an integral part of this Final Act.
2. By signing to the present Final Act, the representatives agree.
(a) to submit, as appropriate, the WTO Agreement for the consideration of their respective competent
authorities with a view to seeking approval of the Agreement in accordance with their procedures;
and
(b) to adopt the Ministerial Declarations and Decisions.
3. The representatives agree on the desirability of acceptance of the WTO Agreement by all participants
in the Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations (hereinafter referred to as participants)
with a view to its entry into force by 1 January 1995, or as early as possible thereafter. Not later
than late 1994, Ministers will meet, in accordance with the final paragraph of the Punta del Este
Ministerial Declarations, to decide on the international implementation of the results, including the
timing of their entry into force.
4. The representatives agree that the WTO Agreement shall be opened for acceptance as a whole, by
signature or otherwise, by all participants pursuant to Article XIV thereof. The acceptance and
entry into force of a Plurilateral Trade Agreement included in Annex 4 of the WTO Agreement
shall be governed by the provisions of that Plurilateral Trade Agreement.
5. Before accepting the WTO Agreement, participants which are not contracting parties to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade must first have concluded negotiations for their accession to the
General Agreement and become contracting parties thereto. For participants which are not
contracting parties to the general Agreement as of the date of the Final Act, the Schedules are
not definitive and shall be subsequently completed for the purpose of their accession to the
General Agreement and acceptance of the WTO Agreement.
6. This Final Act and the Texts annexed hereto shall be deposited with the Director-General to the
CONTRACTING PARTIES to the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade who shall promptly
furnish to each participant a certified copy thereof.
DONE at Marrakesh this fifteenth day of April One thousand nine hundred and ninety-four, in a single
copy, in the English, French and Spanish languages, each text being authentic."
[56]
Bautista Paper, p. 16.
[57]
Bautista Paper, p. 16.
[58]
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Trade Negotiations, Vol. I, pp. 137-138.
[59]
See footnote 3 for complete text.
[60]
Taken from pp. 63-85, Respondent Memorandum.
[61]
Zarate vs. Olegario, G.R. No. 90655, October 7, 1996.
[62]
San Sebastian College vs. Court of Appeals, 197 SCRA 138, 144, May 15, 1991; Commissioner of
Internal Revenue vs. Court of Tax Appeals, 195 SCRA 444, 458 March 20, 1991; Simon vs. Civil
Service Commission, 215 SCRA 410, November 5, 1992; Bustamante vs. Commissioner on Audit,
216 SCRA 134, 136, November 27, 1992.
[63]
Paredes vs. Civil Service Commission, 192 SCRA 84, 94, December 4, 1990.
[64]
Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at
least two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.
[65]
Readers Digest, December 1996 issue, p. 28.