Republic of the Philippines to determine 1] whether the first paragraph of
SUPREME COURT Section 8, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution allows
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 202242 April 16, 2013
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ, Petitioner,
vs.
JUDICIALAND BAR COUNCIL, SEN. FRANCIS
JOSEPH G. ESCUDERO and REP. NIEL C.
TUPAS, JR., Respondents.
RESOLUTION
MENDOZA, J.:
This resolves the Motion for Reconsideration1 filed by
the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of
the respondents, Senator Francis Joseph G.
Escudero and Congressman Niel C. Tupas, Jr.
(respondents), duly opposed2 by the petitioner,
former Solicitor General Francisco I. Chavez
(petitioner).
By way of recapitulation, the present action stemmed
from the unexpected departure of former Chief
Justice Renato C. Corona on May 29, 2012, and the
nomination of petitioner, as his potential successor.
In his initiatory pleading, petitioner asked the Court
more than one (1) member of Congress to sit in the
JBC; and 2] if the practice of having two (2)
representatives from each House of Congress with
one (1) vote each is sanctioned by the Constitution.
On July 17, 2012, the Court handed down the
assailed subject decision, disposing the same in the
following manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
current numerical composition of the Judicial and Bar
Council is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL. The
Judicial and Bar Council is hereby enjoined to
reconstitute itself so that only one (1) member of
Congress will sit as a representative in its
proceedings, in accordance with Section 8(1), Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution.
This disposition is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
On July 31, 2012, following respondents’ motion for
reconsideration and with due regard to Senate
Resolution Nos. 111,3 112,4 113,5 and 114,6 the Court
set the subject motion for oral arguments on August
2, 2012.7 On August 3, 2012, the Court discussed
the merits of the arguments and agreed, in the
meantime, to suspend the effects of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17,
2012 Decision which decreed that it was immediately
executory. The decretal portion of the August 3,
2012 Resolution8 reads:
WHEREFORE, the parties are hereby directed to
submit their respective MEMORANDA within ten (10)
days from notice. Until further orders, the Court
hereby SUSPENDS the effect of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the Court’s
July 17, 2012 Decision, which reads: "This
disposition is immediately executory."9
Pursuant to the same resolution, petitioner and
respondents filed their respective memoranda.10
Brief Statement of the Antecedents
In this disposition, it bears reiterating that from the
birth of the Philippine Republic, the exercise of
appointing members of the Judiciary has always
been the exclusive prerogative of the executive and
legislative branches of the government. Like their
progenitor of American origins, both the Malolos
Constitution11 and the 1935 Constitution12 vested the
power to appoint the members of the Judiciary in the
President, subject to confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments. It was during these
times that the country became witness to the
deplorable practice of aspirants seeking confirmation
of their appointment in the Judiciary to ingratiate
themselves with the members of the legislative
body.13
Then, under the 1973 Constitution,14 with the fusion
of the executive and legislative powers in one body,
the appointment of judges and justices ceased to be
subject of scrutiny by another body. The power
became exclusive and absolute to the Executive,
subject only to the condition that the appointees
must have all the qualifications and none of the
disqualifications.
Prompted by the clamor to rid the process of
appointments to the Judiciary of the evils of political
pressure and partisan activities,15 the members of
the Constitutional Commission saw it wise to create
a separate, competent and independent body to
recommend nominees to the President.
Thus, it conceived of a body, representative of all the
stakeholders in the judicial appointment process, and
called it the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC). The
Framers carefully worded Section 8, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution in this wise:
Section 8. (1) A Judicial and Bar Council is hereby
created under the supervision of the Supreme Court
composed of the Chief Justice as ex officio
Chairman, the Secretary of Justice, and a
representative of the Congress as ex officio
Members, a representative of the Integrated Bar, a
professor of law, a retired Member of the Supreme
Court, and a representative of the private sector.
From the moment of the creation of the JBC,
Congress designated one (1) representative to sit in
the JBC to act as one of the ex-officio
members.16 Pursuant to the constitutional provision
that Congress is entitled to one (1) representative,
each House sent a representative to the JBC, not
together, but alternately or by rotation.
In 1994, the seven-member composition of the JBC
was substantially altered. An eighth member was
1âw phi1
added to the JBC as the two (2) representatives from
Congress began sitting simultaneously in the JBC,
with each having one-half (1/2) of a vote.17
In 2001, the JBC En Banc decided to allow the
representatives from the Senate and the House of
Representatives one full vote each.18 It has been the
situation since then.
Grounds relied upon by Respondents
Through the subject motion, respondents pray that
the Court reconsider its decision and dismiss the
petition on the following grounds: 1] that allowing
only one representative from Congress in the JBC
would lead to absurdity considering its bicameral
nature; 2] that the failure of the Framers to make the
proper adjustment when there was a shift from
unilateralism to bicameralism was a plain oversight;
3] that two representatives from Congress would not
subvert the intention of the Framers to insulate the
JBC from political partisanship; and 4] that the
rationale of the Court in declaring a seven-member
composition would provide a solution should there be
a stalemate is not exactly correct.
While the Court may find some sense in the
reasoning in amplification of the third and fourth
grounds listed by respondents, still, it finds itself
unable to reverse the assailed decision on the
principal issues covered by the first and second
grounds for lack of merit. Significantly, the
conclusion arrived at, with respect to the first and
second grounds, carries greater bearing in the final
resolution of this case.
As these two issues are interrelated, the Court shall
discuss them jointly.
Ruling of the Court
The Constitution evinces the direct action of the
Filipino people by which the fundamental powers of
government are established, limited and defined and
by which those powers are distributed among the
several departments for their safe and useful
exercise for the benefit of the body politic.19 The
Framers reposed their wisdom and vision on one
suprema lex to be the ultimate expression of the
principles and the framework upon which
government and society were to operate. Thus, in
the interpretation of the constitutional provisions, the
Court firmly relies on the basic postulate that the
Framers mean what they say. The language used in
the Constitution must be taken to have been
deliberately chosen for a definite purpose. Every
word employed in the Constitution must be
interpreted to exude its deliberate intent which must
be maintained inviolate against disobedience and
defiance. What the Constitution clearly says,
according to its text, compels acceptance and bars
modification even by the branch tasked to interpret it.
For this reason, the Court cannot accede to the
argument of plain oversight in order to justify
constitutional construction. As stated in the July 17,
2012 Decision, in opting to use the singular letter "a"
to describe "representative of Congress," the Filipino
people through the Framers intended that Congress
be entitled to only one (1) seat in the JBC. Had the
intention been otherwise, the Constitution could
have, in no uncertain terms, so provided, as can be
read in its other provisions.
A reading of the 1987 Constitution would reveal that
several provisions were indeed adjusted as to be in
tune with the shift to bicameralism. One example is
Section 4, Article VII, which provides that a tie in the
presidential election shall be broken "by a majority of
all the Members of both Houses of the Congress,
voting separately."20 Another is Section 8 thereof
which requires the nominee to replace the Vice-
President to be confirmed "by a majority of all the
Members of both Houses of the Congress, voting
separately."21 Similarly, under Section 18, the
proclamation of martial law or the suspension of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus may be
revoked or continued by the Congress, voting
separately, by a vote of at least a majority of all its
Members."22 In all these provisions, the bicameral
nature of Congress was recognized and, clearly, the
corresponding adjustments were made as to how a
matter would be handled and voted upon by its two
Houses.
Thus, to say that the Framers simply failed to adjust
Section 8, Article VIII, by sheer inadvertence, to their
decision to shift to a bicameral form of the
legislature, is not persuasive enough. Respondents
cannot just lean on plain oversight to justify a
conclusion favorable to them. It is very clear that the
Framers were not keen on adjusting the provision on
congressional representation in the JBC because it
was not in the exercise of its primary function – to
legislate. JBC was created to support the executive
power to appoint, and Congress, as one whole body,
was merely assigned a contributory non-legislative
function.
The underlying reason for such a limited participation
can easily be discerned. Congress has two (2)
Houses. The need to recognize the existence and
the role of each House is essential considering that
the Constitution employs precise language in laying
down the functions which particular House plays,
regardless of whether the two Houses consummate
an official act by voting jointly or separately. Whether
in the exercise of its legislative23 or its non-
legislative functions such as inter alia, the power of
appropriation,24 the declaration of an existence of a
state of war,25 canvassing of electoral returns for the
President and Vice-President,26 and
impeachment,27 the dichotomy of each House must
be acknowledged and recognized considering the
interplay between these two Houses. In all these
instances, each House is constitutionally granted
with powers and functions peculiar to its nature and
with keen consideration to 1) its relationship with the
other chamber; and 2) in consonance with the
principle of checks and balances, as to the other
branches of government.
In checkered contrast, there is essentially no
interaction between the two Houses in their
participation in the JBC. No mechanism is required
between the Senate and the House of
Representatives in the screening and nomination of
judicial officers. Rather, in the creation of the JBC,
the Framers arrived at a unique system by adding to
the four (4) regular members, three (3)
representatives from the major branches of
government - the Chief Justice as ex-officio
Chairman (representing the Judicial Department),
the Secretary of Justice (representing the Executive
Department), and a representative of the Congress
(representing the Legislative Department). The total
is seven (7), not eight. In so providing, the Framers
simply gave recognition to the Legislature, not
because it was in the interest of a certain
constituency, but in reverence to it as a major branch
of government.
On this score, a Member of Congress, Hon. Simeon
A. Datumanong, from the Second District of
Maguindanao, submitted his well-considered
position28 to then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno:
I humbly reiterate my position that there should be
only one representative of Congress in the JBC in
accordance with Article VIII, Section 8 (1) of the
1987 Constitution x x x.
The aforesaid provision is clear and unambiguous
and does not need any further interpretation.
Perhaps, it is apt to mention that the oft-repeated
doctrine that "construction and interpretation come
only after it has been demonstrated that application
is impossible or inadequate without them."
Further, to allow Congress to have two
representatives in the Council, with one vote each, is
to negate the principle of equality among the three
branches of government which is enshrined in the
Constitution.
In view of the foregoing, I vote for the proposition
that the Council should adopt the rule of single
representation of Congress in the JBC in order to
respect and give the right meaning to the above-
quoted provision of the Constitution. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
On March 14, 2007, then Associate Justice
Leonardo A. Quisumbing, also a JBC Consultant,
submitted to the Chief Justice and ex-officio JBC
Chairman his opinion,29 which reads:
8. Two things can be gleaned from the excerpts and
citations above: the creation of the JBC is intended
to curtail the influence of politics in Congress in the
appointment of judges, and the understanding is that
seven (7) persons will compose the JBC. As such,
the interpretation of two votes for Congress runs
counter to the intendment of the framers. Such
interpretation actually gives Congress more influence
in the appointment of judges. Also, two votes for
Congress would increase the number of JBC
members to eight, which could lead to voting
deadlock by reason of even-numbered membership,
and a clear violation of 7 enumerated members in
the Constitution. (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
In an undated position paper,30 then Secretary of
Justice Agnes VST Devanadera opined:
As can be gleaned from the above constitutional
provision, the JBC is composed of seven (7)
representatives coming from different sectors. From
the enumeration it is patent that each category of
members pertained to a single individual only. Thus,
while we do not lose sight of the bicameral nature of
our legislative department, it is beyond dispute that
Art. VIII, Section 8 (1) of the 1987 Constitution is
explicit and specific that "Congress" shall have only
"xxx a representative." Thus, two (2) representatives
from Congress would increase the number of JBC
members to eight (8), a number beyond what the
Constitution has contemplated. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
In this regard, the scholarly dissection on the matter
by retired Justice Consuelo Ynares-Santiago, a
former JBC consultant, is worth reiterating.31 Thus:
A perusal of the records of the Constitutional
Commission reveals that the composition of the JBC
reflects the Commission’s desire "to have in the
Council a representation for the major elements of
the community." xxx The ex-officio members of the
Council consist of representatives from the three
main branches of government while the regular
members are composed of various stakeholders in
the judiciary. The unmistakeable tenor of Article VIII,
Section 8(1) was to treat each ex-officio member as
representing one co-equal branch of government.
xxx Thus, the JBC was designed to have seven
voting members with the three ex-officio members
having equal say in the choice of judicial nominees.
xxx
No parallelism can be drawn between the
representative of Congress in the JBC and the
exercise by Congress of its legislative powers under
Article VI and constituent powers under Article XVII
of the Constitution. Congress, in relation to the
executive and judicial branches of government, is
constitutionally treated as another co-equal branch in
the matter of its representative in the JBC. On the
other hand, the exercise of legislative and
constituent powers requires the Senate and the
House of Representatives to coordinate and act as
distinct bodies in furtherance of Congress’ role under
our constitutional scheme. While the latter justifies
and, in fact, necessitates the separateness of the
two Houses of Congress as they relate inter se, no
such dichotomy need be made when Congress
interacts with the other two co-equal branches of
government.
It is more in keeping with the co-equal nature of the
three governmental branches to assign the same
weight to considerations that any of its
representatives may have regarding aspiring
nominees to the judiciary. The representatives of the
Senate and the House of Representatives act as
such for one branch and should not have any more
quantitative influence as the other branches in the
exercise of prerogatives evenly bestowed upon the
three. Sound reason and principle of equality among
the three branches support this conclusion.
[Emphases and underscoring supplied]
The argument that a senator cannot represent a
member of the House of Representatives in the JBC
and vice-versa is, thus, misplaced. In the JBC, any
member of Congress, whether from the Senate or
the House of Representatives, is constitutionally
empowered to represent the entire Congress. It may
be a constricted constitutional authority, but it is not
an absurdity.
From this score stems the conclusion that the lone
representative of Congress is entitled to one full
vote. This pronouncement effectively disallows the
scheme of splitting the said vote into half (1/2),
between two representatives of Congress. Not only
can this unsanctioned practice cause disorder in the
voting process, it is clearly against the essence of
what the Constitution authorized. After all, basic and
reasonable is the rule that what cannot be legally
done directly cannot be done indirectly. To permit or
tolerate the splitting of one vote into two or more is
clearly a constitutional circumvention that cannot be
countenanced by the Court. Succinctly put, when the
Constitution envisioned one member of Congress
sitting in the JBC, it is sensible to presume that this
representation carries with him one full vote.
It is also an error for respondents to argue that the
President, in effect, has more influence over the JBC
simply because all of the regular members of the
JBC are his appointees. The principle of checks and
balances is still safeguarded because the
appointment of all the regular members of the JBC is
subject to a stringent process of confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments, which is composed of
members of Congress.
Respondents’ contention that the current irregular
composition of the JBC should be accepted, simply
because it was only questioned for the first time
through the present action, deserves scant
consideration. Well-settled is the rule that acts done
in violation of the Constitution no matter how
frequent, usual or notorious cannot develop or gain
acceptance under the doctrine of estoppel or laches,
because once an act is considered as an
infringement of the Constitution it is void from the
very beginning and cannot be the source of any
power or authority.
It would not be amiss to point out, however, that as a
general rule, an unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no
protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it
has not been passed at all. This rule, however, is not
absolute. Under the doctrine of operative facts,
actions previous to the declaration of
unconstitutionality are legally recognized. They are
not nullified. This is essential in the interest of fair
play. To reiterate the doctrine enunciated in Planters
Products, Inc. v. Fertiphil Corporation:32
The doctrine of operative fact, as an exception to the
general rule, only applies as a matter of equity and
fair play. It nullifies the effects of an unconstitutional
law by recognizing that the existence of a statute
prior to a determination of unconstitutionality is an
operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot always be ignored. The past cannot always
be erased by a new judicial declaration. The doctrine
is applicable when a declaration of unconstitutionality
will impose an undue burden on those who have
relied on the invalid law. Thus, it was applied to a
criminal case when a declaration of
unconstitutionality would put the accused in double
jeopardy or would put in limbo the acts done by a
municipality in reliance upon a law creating it.33
Under the circumstances, the Court finds the
exception applicable in this case and holds that
notwithstanding its finding of unconstitutionality in the
current composition of the JBC, all its prior official
actions are nonetheless valid.
Considering that the Court is duty bound to protect
the Constitution which was ratified by the direct
action of the Filipino people, it cannot correct what
respondents perceive as a mistake in its mandate.
Neither can the Court, in the exercise of its power to
interpret the spirit of the Constitution, read into the
law something that is contrary to its express
provisions and justify the same as correcting a
perceived inadvertence. To do so would otherwise
sanction the Court action of making amendment to
the Constitution through a judicial pronouncement.
In other words, the Court cannot supply the
legislative omission. According to the rule of casus
omissus "a case omitted is to be held as intentionally
omitted."34 "The principle proceeds from a
reasonable certainty that a particular person, object
or thing has been omitted from a legislative
enumeration."35 Pursuant to this, "the Court cannot
under its power of interpretation supply the omission
even though the omission may have resulted from
inadvertence or because the case in question was
not foreseen or contemplated."36 "The Court cannot
supply what it thinks the legislature would have
supplied had its attention been called to the
omission, as that would be judicial legislation."37
Stated differently, the Court has no power to add
another member by judicial construction.
The call for judicial activism fails to stir the
sensibilities of the Court tasked to guard the
Constitution against usurpation. The Court remains
steadfast in confining its powers in the sphere
granted by the Constitution itself. Judicial activism
should never be allowed to become judicial
exuberance.38 In cases like this, no amount of
practical logic or convenience can convince the
Court to perform either an excision or an insertion
that will change the manifest intent of the Framers.
To broaden the scope of congressional
representation in the JBC is tantamount to the
inclusion of a subject matter which was not included
in the provision as enacted. True to its constitutional
mandate, the Court cannot craft and tailor
constitutional provisions in order to accommodate all
of situations no matter how ideal or reasonable the
proposed solution may sound. To the exercise of this
intrusion, the Court declines.
WHEREFORE, the Motion for Reconsideration filed
by respondents is hereby DENIED.
The suspension of the effects of the second
paragraph of the dispositive portion of the July 17,
2012 Decision of the Court, which reads, "This
disposition is immediately executory," is hereby
LIFTED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 186400 October 20, 2010
CYNTHIA S. BOLOS, Petitioner,
vs.
DANILO T. BOLOS, Respondent.
DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking a review of the
December 10, 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in an original action for certiorari under
Rule 65 entitled "Danilo T. Bolos v. Hon. Lorifel
Lacap Pahimna and Cynthia S. Bolos," docketed as
CA-G.R. SP. No. 97872, reversing the January 16,
2007 Order of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City,
Branch 69 (RTC), declaring its decision pronouncing
the nullity of marriage between petitioner and
respondent final and executory.
On July 10, 2003, petitioner Cynthia
Bolos (Cynthia) filed a petition for the declaration of
nullity of her marriage to respondent Danilo
Bolos (Danilo) under Article 36 of the Family Code,
docketed as JDRC No. 6211.
After trial on the merits, the RTC granted the petition
for annulment in a Decision, dated August 2, 2006,
with the following disposition:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered
declaring the marriage between petitioner CYNTHIA
S. BOLOS and respondent DANILO T. BOLOS
celebrated on February 14, 1980 as null and void ab
initio on the ground of psychological incapacity on
the part of both petitioner and respondent under
Article 36 of the Family Code with all the legal
consequences provided by law.
Furnish the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan as well
as the National Statistics Office (NSO) copy of this
decision.
SO ORDERED.2
A copy of said decision was received by Danilo on
August 25, 2006. He timely filed the Notice of Appeal
on September 11, 2006.
In an order dated September 19, 2006, the RTC
denied due course to the appeal for Danilo’s failure
to file the required motion for reconsideration or new
trial, in violation of Section 20 of the Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages.
On November 23, 2006, a motion to reconsider the
denial of Danilo’s appeal was likewise denied.
On January 16, 2007, the RTC issued the order
declaring its August 2, 2006 decision final and
executory and granting the Motion for Entry of
Judgment filed by Cynthia.
Not in conformity, Danilo filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 seeking to annul the
orders of the RTC as they were rendered with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction, to wit: 1) the September 19, 2006 Order
which denied due course to Danilo’s appeal; 2) the
November 23, 2006 Order which denied the motion
to reconsider the September 19, 2006 Order; and 3)
the January 16, 2007 Order which declared the
August 2, 2006 decision as final and executory.
Danilo also prayed that he be declared
psychologically capacitated to render the essential
marital obligations to Cynthia, who should be
declared guilty of abandoning him, the family home
and their children.
As earlier stated, the CA granted the petition and
reversed and set aside the assailed orders of the
RTC. The appellate court stated that the requirement
of a motion for reconsideration as a prerequisite to
appeal under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC did not apply in
this case as the marriage between Cynthia and
Danilo was solemnized on February 14, 1980 before
the Family Code took effect. It relied on the ruling of
this Court in Enrico v. Heirs of Sps. Medinaceli3 to
the effect that the "coverage [of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
SC] extends only to those marriages entered into
during the effectivity of the Family Code which took
effect on August 3, 1988."
Cynthia sought reconsideration of the ruling by filing
her Manifestation with Motion for Extension of Time
to File Motion for Reconsideration and Motion for
Partial Reconsideration [of the Honorable Court’s
Decision dated December 10, 2008]. The CA,
however, in its February 11, 2009
Resolution,4 denied the motion for extension of time
considering that the 15-day reglementary period to
file a motion for reconsideration is non-extendible,
pursuant to Section 2, Rule 40, 1997 Rules on Civil
Procedure citing Habaluyas v. Japson, 142 SCRA
208. The motion for partial reconsideration was
likewise denied.
Hence, Cynthia interposes the present petition via
Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the following
ISSUES
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED DECISION DATED
DECEMBER 10, 2008 CONSIDERING THAT:
A. THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE
HONORABLE COURT IN ENRICO V. SPS.
MEDINACELI IS NOT APPLICABLE TO THE
INSTANT CASE CONSIDERING THAT THE
FACTS AND THE ISSUE THEREIN ARE
NOT SIMILAR TO THE INSTANT CASE.
B. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT THE
PRONOUNCEMENT OF THE HONORABLE
COURT IS APLLICABLE TO THE INSTANT
CASE, ITS RULING IN ENRICO V. SPS.
MEDINACELI IS PATENTLY ERRONEOUS
BECAUSE THE PHRASE "UNDER THE
FAMILY CODE" IN A.M. NO. 02-11-10-SC
PERTAINS TO THE WORD "PETITIONS"
RATHER THAN TO THE WORD
"MARRIAGES."
C. FROM THE FOREGOING, A.M. NO. 02-
11-10-SC ENTITLED "RULE ON
DECLARATION OF ABSOLUTE NULLITY
OF VOID MARRIAGES AND ANNULMENT
OF VOIDABLE MARRIAGES" IS
APPLICABLE TO MARRIAGES
SOLEMNIZED BEFORE THE EFFECTIVITY
OF THE FAMILY CODE. HENCE, A MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION IS A
PRECONDITION FOR AN APPEAL BY
HEREIN RESPONDENT.
D. CONSIDERING THAT HEREIN
RESPONDENT REFUSED TO COMPLY
WITH A PRECONDITION FOR APPEAL, A
RELAXATION OF THE RULES ON APPEAL
IS NOT PROPER IN HIS CASE.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN
ISSUING THE QUESTIONED RESOLUTION
DATED FEBRUARY 11, 2009 CONSIDERING THE
FOREGOING AND THE FACTUAL
CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE.
III
THE TENETS OF JUSTICE AND FAIR PLAY, THE
NOVELTY AND IMPORTANCE OF THE ISSUE
AND THE SPECIAL CIRCUMSTANCES IN THIS
CASE JUSTIFY AND WARRANT A LIBERAL VIEW
OF THE RULES IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONER.
MOREOVER, THE INSTANT PETITION IS
MERITORIOUS AND NOT INTENDED FOR
DELAY.5
From the arguments advanced by Cynthia, the
principal question to be resolved is whether or not
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC entitled "Rule on Declaration
of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment
of Voidable Marriages," is applicable to the case at
bench.
Petitioner argues that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is also
applicable to marriages solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code. According to Cynthia,
the CA erroneously anchored its decision to an obiter
dictum in the aforecited Enrico case, which did not
even involve a marriage solemnized before the
effectivity of the Family Code.
She added that, even assuming arguendo that the
pronouncement in the said case constituted a
decision on its merits, still the same cannot be
applied because of the substantial disparity in the
factual milieu of the Enrico case from this case. In
the said case, both the marriages sought to be
declared null were solemnized, and the action for
declaration of nullity was filed, after the effectivity of
both the Family Code in 1988 and of A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC in 2003. In this case, the marriage was
solemnized before the effectivity of the Family Code
and A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC while the action was filed
and decided after the effectivity of both.
Danilo, in his Comment,6 counters that A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC is not applicable because his marriage
with Cynthia was solemnized on February 14, 1980,
years before its effectivity. He further stresses the
meritorious nature of his appeal from the decision of
the RTC declaring their marriage as null and void
due to his purported psychological incapacity and
citing the mere "failure" of the parties who were
supposedly "remiss," but not "incapacitated," to
render marital obligations as required under Article
36 of the Family Code.
The Court finds the petition devoid of merit.
Petitioner insists that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC governs
this case. Her stance is unavailing. The Rule on
Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages as contained in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which the Court promulgated
on March 15, 2003, is explicit in its scope. Section 1
of the Rule, in fact, reads:
Section 1. Scope – This Rule shall govern petitions
for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages
and annulment of voidable marriages under the
Family Code of the Philippines.
The Rules of Court shall apply suppletorily.
The categorical language of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
leaves no room for doubt. The coverage extends
only to those marriages entered into during the
effectivity of the Family Code which took effect on
August 3, 1988.7 The rule sets a demarcation line
between marriages covered by the Family Code and
those solemnized under the Civil Code.8
The Court finds Itself unable to subscribe to
petitioner’s interpretation that the phrase "under the
Family Code" in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC refers to the
word "petitions" rather than to the word "marriages."
A cardinal rule in statutory construction is that when
the law is clear and free from any doubt or ambiguity,
there is no room for construction or interpretation.
There is only room for application.9 As the statute is
clear, plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given
its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. This is what is known as the plain-
meaning rule or verba legis. It is expressed in the
maxim, index animi sermo, or "speech is the index of
intention." Furthermore, there is the maxim verba
legis non est recedendum, or "from the words of a
statute there should be no departure."10
There is no basis for petitioner’s assertion either that
the tenets of substantial justice, the novelty and
importance of the issue and the meritorious nature of
this case warrant a relaxation of the Rules in her
favor. Time and again the Court has stressed that
the rules of procedure must be faithfully complied
with and should not be discarded with the mere
expediency of claiming substantial merit.11 As a
corollary, rules prescribing the time for doing specific
acts or for taking certain proceedings are considered
absolutely indispensable to prevent needless delays
and to orderly and promptly discharge judicial
business. By their very nature, these rules are
regarded as mandatory.12
The appellate court was correct in denying
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration considering that the
reglementary period for filing the said motion for
reconsideration is non-extendible. As pronounced
in Apex Mining Co., Inc. v. Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, 13
The rule is and has been that the period for filing a
motion for reconsideration is non-extendible. The
Court has made this clear as early as 1986
in Habaluyas Enterprises vs. Japzon. Since then, the
Court has consistently and strictly adhered thereto. 1avv phil
Given the above, we rule without hesitation that the
appellate court’s denial of petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration is justified, precisely because
petitioner’s earlier motion for extension of time did
not suspend/toll the running of the 15-day
reglementary period for filing a motion for
reconsideration. Under the circumstances, the CA
decision has already attained finality when petitioner
filed its motion for reconsideration. It follows that the
same decision was already beyond the review
jurisdiction of this Court.
In fine, the CA committed no reversible error in
setting aside the RTC decision which denied due
course to respondent’s appeal and denying
petitioner’s motion for extension of time to file a
motion for reconsideration.
Appeal is an essential part of our judicial system. Its
purpose is to bring up for review a final judgment of
the lower court. The courts should, thus, proceed
with caution so as not to deprive a party of his right
to appeal.14 In the recent case of Almelor v. RTC of
Las Pinas City, Br. 254,15 the Court reiterated: While
the right to appeal is a statutory, not a natural right,
nonetheless it is an essential part of our judicial
system and courts should proceed with caution so as
not to deprive a party of the right to appeal, but
rather, ensure that every party-litigant has the
amplest opportunity for the proper and just
disposition of his cause, free from the constraints of
technicalities.
In the case at bench, the respondent should be given
the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of his
appeal considering that what is at stake is the
sacrosanct institution of marriage.
No less than the 1987 Constitution recognizes
marriage as an inviolable social institution. This
constitutional policy is echoed in our Family Code.
Article 1 thereof emphasizes its permanence and
inviolability, thus:
Article 1. Marriage is a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in
accordance with law for the establishment of
conjugal and family life. It is the foundation of the
family and an inviolable social institution whose
nature, consequences, and incidents are governed
by law and not subject to stipulation, except that
marriage settlements may fix the property relations
during the marriage within the limits provided by this
Code.
This Court is not unmindful of the constitutional
policy to protect and strengthen the family as the
basic autonomous social institution and marriage as
the foundation of the family.16
Our family law is based on the policy that marriage is
not a mere contract, but a social institution in which
the State is vitally interested. The State finds no
stronger anchor than on good, solid and happy
families. The break up of families weakens our social
and moral fabric and, hence, their preservation is not
the concern alone of the family members.17
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
 Republic of the Philippines When the judiciary mediates to allocate constitutional
SUPREME COURT boundaries, it does not assert any superiority over
Manila the other departments; it does not in reality nullify or
invalidate an act of the legislature, but only asserts
EN BANC the solemn and sacred obligation assigned to it by
the Constitution to determine conflicting claims of
G.R. No. 192935 December 7, 2010 authority under the Constitution and to establish for
the parties in an actual controversy the rights which
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO, Petitioner, that instrument secures and guarantees to them.
vs.
THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF --- Justice Jose P. Laurel1
2010, Respondent.
The role of the Constitution cannot be overlooked. It
x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x is through the Constitution that the fundamental
powers of government are established, limited and
G.R. No. 193036 defined, and by which these powers are distributed
among the several departments.2 The Constitution is
REP. EDCEL C. LAGMAN, REP. RODOLFO B. the basic and paramount law to which all other laws
ALBANO, JR., REP. SIMEON A. must conform and to which all persons, including the
DATUMANONG, and REP. ORLANDO B. FUA, highest officials of the land, must
SR., Petitioners, defer.3 Constitutional doctrines must remain
vs. steadfast no matter what may be the tides of time. It
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY PAQUITO N. OCHOA, cannot be simply made to sway and accommodate
JR. and DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND the call of situations and much more tailor itself to
MANAGEMENT SECRETARY FLORENCIO B. the whims and caprices of government and the
ABAD, Respondents. people who run it.4
DECISION For consideration before the Court are two
consolidated cases5 both of which essentially assail
MENDOZA, J.: the validity and constitutionality of Executive Order
No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the
Philippine Truth Commission of 2010."
The first case is G.R. No. 192935, a special civil
action for prohibition instituted by petitioner Louis
Biraogo (Biraogo) in his capacity as a citizen and
taxpayer. Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for
being violative of the legislative power of Congress
under Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution6 as it
usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature
to create a public office and to appropriate funds
therefor.7
The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil
action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners
Edcel C. Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A.
Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-
legislators) as incumbent members of the House of
Representatives.
The genesis of the foregoing cases can be traced to
the events prior to the historic May 2010 elections,
when then Senator Benigno Simeon Aquino III
declared his staunch condemnation of graft and
corruption with his slogan, "Kung walang corrupt,
walang mahirap." The Filipino people, convinced of
his sincerity and of his ability to carry out this noble
objective, catapulted the good senator to the
presidency.
To transform his campaign slogan into reality,
President Aquino found a need for a special body to
investigate reported cases of graft and corruption
allegedly committed during the previous
administration.
Thus, at the dawn of his administration, the
President on July 30, 2010, signed Executive Order
No. 1 establishing the Philippine Truth Commission
of 2010 (Truth Commission). Pertinent provisions of
said executive order read:
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 1
CREATING THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION OF 2010
WHEREAS, Article XI, Section 1 of the 1987
Constitution of the Philippines solemnly enshrines
the principle that a public office is a public trust and
mandates that public officers and employees, who
are servants of the people, must at all times be
accountable to the latter, serve them with utmost
responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act
with patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives;
WHEREAS, corruption is among the most
despicable acts of defiance of this principle and
notorious violation of this mandate;
WHEREAS, corruption is an evil and scourge which
seriously affects the political, economic, and social
life of a nation; in a very special way it inflicts untold
misfortune and misery on the poor, the marginalized
and underprivileged sector of society;
WHEREAS, corruption in the Philippines has
reached very alarming levels, and undermined the
people’s trust and confidence in the Government and
its institutions;
WHEREAS, there is an urgent call for the
determination of the truth regarding certain reports of
large scale graft and corruption in the government
and to put a closure to them by the filing of the
appropriate cases against those involved, if
warranted, and to deter others from committing the
evil, restore the people’s faith and confidence in the
Government and in their public servants;
WHEREAS, the President’s battlecry during his
campaign for the Presidency in the last elections
"kung walang corrupt, walang mahirap" expresses a
solemn pledge that if elected, he would end
corruption and the evil it breeds;
WHEREAS, there is a need for a separate body
dedicated solely to investigating and finding out the
truth concerning the reported cases of graft and
corruption during the previous administration, and
which will recommend the prosecution of the
offenders and secure justice for all;
WHEREAS, Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of
Executive Order No. 292, otherwise known as the
Revised Administrative Code of the Philippines,
gives the President the continuing authority to
reorganize the Office of the President.
NOW, THEREFORE, I, BENIGNO SIMEON
AQUINO III, President of the Republic of the
Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in me by
law, do hereby order:
SECTION 1. Creation of a Commission. – There is
hereby created the PHILIPPINE TRUTH
COMMISSION, hereinafter referred to as
the "COMMISSION," which shall primarily seek and
find the truth on, and toward this end, investigate
reports of graft and corruption of such scale and
magnitude that shock and offend the moral and
ethical sensibilities of the people, committed by
public officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector,
if any, during the previous administration; and
thereafter recommend the appropriate action or
measure to be taken thereon to ensure that the full
measure of justice shall be served without fear or
favor.
The Commission shall be composed of a Chairman
and four (4) members who will act as an independent
collegial body.
SECTION 2. Powers and Functions. – The
Commission, which shall have all the powers of an
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9,
Book I of the Administrative Code of 1987, is
primarily tasked to conduct a thorough fact-finding
investigation of reported cases of graft and
corruption referred to in Section 1, involving third
level public officers and higher, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories from the private sector,
if any, during the previous administration and
thereafter submit its finding and recommendations to
the President, Congress and the Ombudsman.
In particular, it shall:
a) Identify and determine the reported cases of
such graft and corruption which it will
investigate;
b) Collect, receive, review and evaluate
evidence related to or regarding the cases of
large scale corruption which it has chosen to
investigate, and to this end require any
agency, official or employee of the Executive
Branch, including government-owned or
controlled corporations, to produce
documents, books, records and other papers;
c) Upon proper request or representation,
obtain information and documents from the
Senate and the House of Representatives
records of investigations conducted by
committees thereof relating to matters or
subjects being investigated by the
Commission;
d) Upon proper request and representation,
obtain information from the courts, including
the Sandiganbayan and the Office of the Court
Administrator, information or documents in
respect to corruption cases filed with the
Sandiganbayan or the regular courts, as the
case may be;
e) Invite or subpoena witnesses and take their
testimonies and for that purpose, administer
oaths or affirmations as the case may be;
f) Recommend, in cases where there is a need
to utilize any person as a state witness to
ensure that the ends of justice be fully served,
that such person who qualifies as a state
witness under the Revised Rules of Court of
the Philippines be admitted for that purpose;
g) Turn over from time to time, for expeditious
prosecution, to the appropriate prosecutorial
authorities, by means of a special
or interim report and recommendation, all
evidence on corruption of public officers and
employees and their private sector co-
principals, accomplices or accessories, if any,
 when in the course of its investigation the
Commission finds that there is reasonable
ground to believe that they are liable for graft
and corruption under pertinent applicable laws;
h) Call upon any government investigative or
prosecutorial agency such as the Department
of Justice or any of the agencies under it, and
the Presidential Anti-Graft Commission, for
such assistance and cooperation as it may
require in the discharge of its functions and
duties;
i) Engage or contract the services of resource
persons, professionals and other personnel
determined by it as necessary to carry out its
mandate;
j) Promulgate its rules and regulations or rules
of procedure it deems necessary to effectively
and efficiently carry out the objectives of this
Executive Order and to ensure the orderly
conduct of its investigations, proceedings and
hearings, including the presentation of
evidence;
k) Exercise such other acts incident to or are
appropriate and necessary in connection with
the objectives and purposes of this Order.
SECTION 3. Staffing Requirements. – x x x.
SECTION 4. Detail of Employees. – x x x.
SECTION 5. Engagement of Experts. – x x x
SECTION 6. Conduct of Proceedings. – x x x.
SECTION 7. Right to Counsel of
Witnesses/Resource Persons. – x x x.
SECTION 8. Protection of Witnesses/Resource
Persons. – x x x.
SECTION 9. Refusal to Obey Subpoena, Take
Oath or Give Testimony. – Any government official
or personnel who, without lawful excuse, fails to
appear upon subpoena issued by the Commission or
who, appearing before the Commission refuses to
take oath or affirmation, give testimony or produce
documents for inspection, when required, shall be
subject to administrative disciplinary action. Any
private person who does the same may be dealt with
in accordance with law.
SECTION 10. Duty to Extend Assistance to the
Commission. – x x x.
SECTION 11. Budget for the Commission. – The
Office of the President shall provide the necessary
funds for the Commission to ensure that it can
exercise its powers, execute its functions, and
perform its duties and responsibilities as effectively,
efficiently, and expeditiously as possible.
SECTION 12. Office. – x x x.
SECTION 13. Furniture/Equipment. – x x x.
SECTION 14. Term of the Commission. – The
Commission shall accomplish its mission on or
before December 31, 2012.
SECTION 15. Publication of Final Report. – x x x.
SECTION 16. Transfer of Records and Facilities
of the Commission. – x x x.
SECTION 17. Special Provision Concerning
Mandate. If and when in the judgment of the
President there is a need to expand the mandate of
the Commission as defined in Section 1 hereof to
include the investigation of cases and instances of
graft and corruption during the prior administrations,
such mandate may be so extended accordingly by
way of a supplemental Executive Order.
SECTION 18. Separability Clause. If any provision
of this Order is declared unconstitutional, the same
shall not affect the validity and effectivity of the other
provisions hereof.
SECTION 19. Effectivity. – This Executive Order
shall take effect immediately.
DONE in the City of Manila, Philippines, this 30th
day of July 2010.
(SGD.) BENIGNO S. AQUINO III
By the President:
(SGD.) PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.
Executive Secretary
Nature of the Truth Commission
As can be gleaned from the above-quoted
provisions, the Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is
a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the
President with the primary task to investigate reports
of graft and corruption committed by third-level public
officers and employees, their co-principals,
accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and thereafter to submit its finding
and recommendations to the President, Congress
and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described
as an "independent collegial body," it is essentially
an entity within the Office of the President Proper
and subject to his control. Doubtless, it constitutes a
public office, as an ad hoc body is one.8
To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the
powers of an investigative body under Section 37,
Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative Code of
1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it
cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render
awards in disputes between contending parties. All it
can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft
and corruption and make recommendations. It may
have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite
people in contempt, much less order their arrest.
Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine
from such facts if probable cause exists as to
warrant the filing of an information in our courts of
law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal,
civil or administrative penalties or sanctions.
The PTC is different from the truth commissions in
other countries which have been created as official,
transitory and non-judicial fact-finding bodies "to
establish the facts and context of serious violations
of human rights or of international humanitarian law
in a country’s past."9 They are usually established by
states emerging from periods of internal unrest, civil
strife or authoritarianism to serve as mechanisms for
transitional justice.
Truth commissions have been described as bodies
that share the following characteristics: (1) they
examine only past events; (2) they investigate
patterns of abuse committed over a period of time,
as opposed to a particular event; (3) they are
temporary bodies that finish their work with the
submission of a report containing conclusions and
recommendations; and (4) they are officially
sanctioned, authorized or empowered by the
State.10 "Commission’s members are usually
empowered to conduct research, support victims,
and propose policy recommendations to prevent
recurrence of crimes. Through their investigations,
the commissions may aim to discover and learn
more about past abuses, or formally acknowledge
them. They may aim to prepare the way for
prosecutions and recommend institutional reforms."11
Thus, their main goals range from retribution to
reconciliation. The Nuremburg and Tokyo war crime
tribunals are examples of a retributory or vindicatory
body set up to try and punish those responsible for
crimes against humanity. A form of a reconciliatory
tribunal is the Truth and Reconciliation Commission
of South Africa, the principal function of which was to
heal the wounds of past violence and to prevent
future conflict by providing a cathartic experience for
victims.
The PTC is a far cry from South Africa’s model. The
latter placed more emphasis on reconciliation than
on judicial retribution, while the marching order of the
PTC is the identification and punishment of
perpetrators. As one writer12 puts it:
The order ruled out reconciliation. It translated the
Draconian code spelled out by Aquino in his
inaugural speech: "To those who talk about
reconciliation, if they mean that they would like us to
simply forget about the wrongs that they have
committed in the past, we have this to say: There
can be no reconciliation without justice. When we
allow crimes to go unpunished, we give consent to
their occurring over and over again."
The Thrusts of the Petitions
Barely a month after the issuance of Executive Order
No. 1, the petitioners asked the Court to declare it
unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. A perusal of the arguments
of the petitioners in both cases shows that they are
essentially the same. The petitioners-legislators
summarized them in the following manner:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates the separation of
powers as it arrogates the power of the
Congress to create a public office and
appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10,
Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987
cannot legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the
delegated authority of the President to
structurally reorganize the Office of the
President to achieve economy, simplicity and
efficiency does not include the power to create
an entirely new public office which was
hitherto inexistent like the "Truth Commission."
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the
Constitution and pertinent statutes when it
vested the "Truth Commission" with quasi-
judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding,
those of the Office of the Ombudsman created
under the 1987 Constitution and the
Department of Justice created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection
clause as it selectively targets for investigation
and prosecution officials and personnel of the
previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of
the other administrations, past and present,
who may be indictable.
(e) The creation of the "Philippine Truth
Commission of 2010" violates the consistent
and general international practice of four
decades wherein States constitute truth
commissions to exclusively investigate human
rights violations, which customary practice
forms part of the generally accepted principles
of international law which the Philippines is
mandated to adhere to pursuant to the
Declaration of Principles enshrined in the
Constitution.
(f) The creation of the "Truth Commission" is
an exercise in futility, an adventure in partisan
 hostility, a launching pad for trial/conviction by
publicity and a mere populist propaganda to
mistakenly impress the people that
widespread poverty will altogether vanish if
corruption is eliminated without even
addressing the other major causes of poverty.
(g) The mere fact that previous commissions
were not constitutionally challenged is of no
moment because neither laches nor estoppel
can bar an eventual question on the
constitutionality and validity of an executive
issuance or even a statute."13
In their Consolidated Comment,14 the respondents,
through the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), essentially questioned the legal
standing of petitioners and defended the assailed
executive order with the following arguments:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of
Congress to create a public office because the
President’s executive power and power of
control necessarily include the inherent power
to conduct investigations to ensure that laws
are faithfully executed and that, in any event,
the Constitution, Revised Administrative Code
of 1987 (E.O. No. 292), 15 Presidential Decree
(P.D.) No. 141616 (as amended by P.D. No.
1772), R.A. No. 9970,17 and settled
jurisprudence that authorize the President to
create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of
Congress to appropriate funds because there
is no appropriation but a mere allocation of
funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate
or supersede the functions of the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), because it is a
fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body
and its functions do not duplicate, supplant or
erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the
equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.
The OSG then points to the continued existence and
validity of other executive orders and presidential
issuances creating similar bodies to justify the
creation of the PTC such as Presidential Complaint
and Action Commission (PCAC) by President
Ramon B. Magsaysay, Presidential Committee on
Administrative Performance Efficiency (PCAPE) by
President Carlos P. Garcia and Presidential Agency
on Reform and Government Operations (PARGO) by
President Ferdinand E. Marcos.18
From the petitions, pleadings, transcripts, and
memoranda, the following are the principal issues to
be resolved:
1. Whether or not the petitioners have the
legal standing to file their respective petitions
and question Executive Order No. 1;
2. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1
violates the principle of separation of powers
by usurping the powers of Congress to create
and to appropriate funds for public offices,
agencies and commissions;
3. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1
supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and
the DOJ;
4. Whether or not Executive Order No. 1
violates the equal protection clause; and
5. Whether or not petitioners are entitled to
injunctive relief.
A final word
The issue that seems to take center stage at present
is - whether or not the Supreme Court, in the
exercise of its constitutionally mandated power of
Judicial Review with respect to recent initiatives of
the legislature and the executive department, is
exercising undue interference. Is the Highest
Tribunal, which is expected to be the protector of the
Constitution, itself guilty of violating fundamental
tenets like the doctrine of separation of powers?
Time and again, this issue has been addressed by
the Court, but it seems that the present political
situation calls for it to once again explain the legal
basis of its action lest it continually be accused of
being a hindrance to the nation’s thrust to progress.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article
VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested
with Judicial Power that "includes the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies
involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the government."
Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with
the power of judicial review which is the power to
declare a treaty, international or executive
agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation,
order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to
rule on the constitutionality of the application, or
operation of presidential decrees, proclamations,
orders, instructions, ordinances, and other
regulations. These provisions, however, have been
fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme
Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of
government, on the other. Many times the Court has
been accused of asserting superiority over the other
departments.
To answer this accusation, the words of Justice
Laurel would be a good source of enlightenment, to
wit: "And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
superiority over the other departments; it does not in
reality nullify or invalidate an act of the legislature,
but only asserts the solemn and sacred obligation
assigned to it by the Constitution to determine
conflicting claims of authority under the Constitution
and to establish for the parties in an actual
controversy the rights which that instrument secures
and guarantees to them."107
Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial
review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal
body but rather simply making sure that any act of
government is done in consonance with the
authorities and rights allocated to it by the
Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds
no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no
more authority of proscribing the actions under
review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to
pronounce said act as void and unconstitutional.
It cannot be denied that most government actions
are inspired with noble intentions, all geared towards
the betterment of the nation and its people. But then
again, it is important to remember this ethical
principle: "The end does not justify the means." No
matter how noble and worthy of admiration the
purpose of an act, but if the means to be employed
in accomplishing it is simply irreconcilable with
constitutional parameters, then it cannot still be
allowed.108 The Court cannot just turn a blind eye and
simply let it pass. It will continue to uphold the
Constitution and its enshrined principles.
"The Constitution must ever remain supreme. All
must bow to the mandate of this law. Expediency
must not be allowed to sap its strength nor greed for
power debase its rectitude."109
Lest it be misunderstood, this is not the death knell
for a truth commission as nobly envisioned by the
present administration. Perhaps a revision of the
executive issuance so as to include the earlier past
administrations would allow it to pass the test of
reasonableness and not be an affront to the
Constitution. Of all the branches of the government,
it is the judiciary which is the most interested in
knowing the truth and so it will not allow itself to be a
hindrance or obstacle to its attainment. It must,
however, be emphasized that the search for the truth
must be within constitutional bounds for "ours is still
a government of laws and not of men."110
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED.
Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the
equal protection clause of the Constitution.

As also prayed for, the respondents are hereby

ordered to cease and desist from carrying out the
provisions of Executive Order No. 1.

SO ORDERED.