G.R. No.

241144 June 26, 2019

JUANITA E. CAHAPISAN-SANTIAGO VS. JAMES PAUL A. SANTIAGO

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

FACTS:

Sometime in 1999, respondent met petitioner at a car service center along Marcos Highway,
Antipolo City. At that time, petitioner was forty (40) years old and respondent was twenty-two (22)
years old. Petitioner became respondent's girlfriend, and three (3) months into the relationship, she
became pregnant. Eventually, or on March 31, 2000, petitioner and respondent got married before
the Mayor of Pangil, Laguna. During their marriage, however, instead of experiencing marital bliss,
their relationship was fraught with quarrels.

Respondent averred that petitioner was domineering, considering that she was the one earning
and he was a high school drop-out. Sometime in 2005, petitioner and respondent separated because
they could no longer stand each other. After eleven (11) years of living apart, respondent filed a
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage before the RTC. In support of his petition, respondent
presented the report of an expert clinical psychologist, Ms. Shiela Marie 0. Montefalcon (Ms.
Montefalcon), who assessed him to be suffering from Dependent Personality Disorder (DPD), and
petitioner from Narcissistic Personality Disorder (NPD). According to the report, respondent's DPD
is a long term chronic condition that manifested itself through his overdependence on petitioner and
his own mother to meet his emotional and physical needs. The clinical features of respondent's DPD
were likewise exhibited through his: (a) difficulty in making everyday decisions without an excessive
amount of advice and reassurance from petitioner and his own mother; ( b) problem in expressing
disagreement with others because of fear or loss of support or approval; (c) struggle in initiating
projects on his own because of lack of self-confidence in judgment or abilities; (d) excessive
dependence on petitioner and his own mother to obtain nurturance and support; and (e) inclination
to substance use and abuse. On the other hand, petitioner's NPD was found to be grave, severe, and
already ingrained deeply within her adaptive system, as evidenced by her pervasive pattern of
grandiosity, need for admiration, and lack of empathy. As both parties were found to be
psychologically incapacitated to perform their essential marital obligations, Ms. Montefalcon,
therefore, recommended that their marriage be declared null and void.

For her part, petitioner contended that respondent was not psychologically incapacitated, but
was merely immature and lacked a sense of responsibility. She also pointed out that respondent's past
addictive behavior is not permanent, considering that the latter was able to cope with his drug
dependency and was able to change for the better. She added that respondent's alleged DPD is even
contrary to his personality, since the report stated that respondent "can present a proposal or lead a
group discussion with ease and tact. He is assertive but sometimes impatient. He is best in situations
that need sound common sense and practical ability with things. He relies on his ability to improvise
instead of preparing in advance."

ISSUE: Whether or not the parties' marriage should be nullified on the ground of respondent's
psychological incapacity.
RULING: The petition is meritorious.
The RTC, as affirmed by the CA, already ruled that there was insufficient evidence to prove the root
cause or juridical antecedence of petitioner's alleged NPD. Finding no cogent reason to disturb the
same, the resolution of this case shall, thus, revolve on whether or not, on the other hand, respondent's
psychological incapacity, i.e., DPD, was proven.
Jurisprudence states that the validity of marriage and the unity of the family are enshrined in our
Constitution and statutory laws; hence, any doubts attending the same are to be resolved in favor of
the continuance and validity of the marriage and that the burden of proving the nullity of the same
rests at all times upon the petitioner. The policy of the Constitution is to protect and strengthen the
family as the basic social institution and marriage as the foundation of the family. As such, the
Constitution decrees marriage as legally inviolable and protects it from dissolution at the whim of the
parties.
Under Article 3633 of the Family Code, as amended, psychological incapacity is a valid ground to
nullify a marriage. However, in deference to the State's policy on marriage, psychological incapacity
does not merely pertain to any psychological condition; otherwise, it would be fairly easy to circumvent
our laws on marriage so much so that we would be practically condoning a legal subterfuge for divorce.
According to case law, psychological incapacity should be confined to the most serious cases of
personality disorders that clearly manifest utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage. It should refer to no less than a mental-not merely physical incapacity
that causes a party to be truly incognitive of the basic marital covenants·· that concomitantly must be
assumed and discharged by the parties to the marriage, which, as provided under Article 68 of the
Family Code, among others, include their mutual obligations to live together, observe love, respect
and fidelity, and render help and support.
In this accord, psychological incapacity must therefore be characterized by three (3) traits: (a) gravity,
i.e., it must be grave and serious such that the party would be incapable of carrying out the ordinary
duties required in a marriage; (b) juridical antecedence, i.e., it must be rooted in the history of the party
antedating the marriage, although the overt manifestations may emerge only after the marriage; and
(c) incurability, i.e., it must be incurable, or even if it were otherwise, the cure would be beyond the
means of the party involved.
Applying the foregoing guidelines, the Court finds that contrary to the rulings of the courts a quo -
the totality of evidence presented failed to sufficiently establish respondent's psychological incapacity
based on his DPD.
G.R. No. 238513. July 31, 2019

Spouses Belinda Liu and Hsi Pin Lio Vs. Marcelina Espinosa, et al.

HERNANDO,J.:

FACTS:

Petitioner Belinda Y. Liu owns a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT)
No. 146-20100088914 in Barangay Centro, Agdao, Davao City. Petitioner Hsi Pin Liu is her husband.
They acquired said land from their predecessor-in-interest who, in tum, merely tolerated the
occupation of the property by respondents Marcelina Espinosa, Mary Ann M. Estrada, Archie
Asumbrado, Inesita Asumbrado, Loreta Tutor, Elias Penas, Benita Abantao, Basiliza Martizano,
Arman Paras, Miguelita M. Antega, Joventino Cahulogan, and Tito Tubae. The latter are the present
occupants of the land.
After title was transferred to the petitioners, they likewise tolerated the presence of the respondents
upon the understanding that they will peacefully vacate the land once the petitioners' need to use the
same arises. When petitioners' demands5 to vacate the property were made, however, the latest of
which was on February 12, 2013, the respondents refused to comply.
On November 11, 2014,8 the MTCC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners. It declared them as
the rightful possessors of the property and directed the respondents to vacate the subject land and to
tum the same over to the petitioners. Further, respondents were ordered to pay the petitioners PhP
20,000.00 as attorney's fees, as well as reasonable rental fee for the use of the subject property in the
amount of PhP 5,000.00 per month with 6% interest per annum, computed from August 6, 2013, the
date the ejectment suit was filed, until the respondents vacate the property.
Respondents thus filed an Appeal with the RTC, Branch 17, Davao City, from the MTCC Decision,
where they asserted that: (1) the MTCC had no jurisdiction to entertain the action because it failed to
take into consideration that the defendants were in possession of the land in the concept of an owner,
and not by tolerance of the plaintiffs nor of their predecessors-in-interest; (2) they were entitled to the
possession and occupation of the land because they had been in possession of the same in the concept
of an owner for more than twenty years and they introduced valuable improvements therein; (3) they
have priority in rights to apply for title of their respective lots because Original Certificate of Title No.
38 and its derivative titles were declared null and void by the Court of Appeals; and ( 4) they were
harassed and were thus entitled to the damages and reliefs that they prayed for in their counter-claim.
Moreover, respondent Joveniano Gorduiz, Sr. asserted that the MTCC committed a gross and blatant
error when it declared the petitioners as the rightful possessors of the property and that the defendants'
possession and/or occupation was one of unlawful detainer.
The Court of Appeals granted the respondents' petition in its October 23, 2017 Decision and reversed
the findings of the RTC. It held that petitioners were unable to sufficiently prove the presence of
tolerance of respondents' occupation from the start of their possession of the subject property. Also,
plaintiffs failed to adduce evidence that would have shown when the respondents entered the property
or who gave them the permission to do the same. Thus, the Court of Appeals found that the
petitioners' bare claim of tolerance could not sustain their action for unlawful detainer.

ISSUE: Whether this unlawful detainer case is independent of any claim of ownership by any of the
parties involved

RULING: The Court fully sustains both the MTCC and the RTC findings that the foregoing
requisites have been sufficiently established in the case at bar.
This occupation became illegal when respondents refused to heed petitioners' express and clear
demands to vacate the subject property, the last of which was dated February 12, 2013. It is evidently
clear that the complaint for unlawful detainer, filed on August 6, 2013, was made within one year from
the time the last formal demand to vacate was made.
Further, it should be pointed out that respondents would not have made an offer to purchase the
subject land from petitioners had they been truly in possession of the property in the concept of an
owner. Their claim is thus negated by the fact that the subject land is registered in the name of the
petitioners. It is settled that a Torrens title is evidence of an indefeasible title to property in favor of
the person in whose name the title appears. It is conclusive evidence with respect to the ownership of
the land described therein. Hence, petitioners as the titleholders are entitled to all the attributes of
ownership of the property including possession.
Even then, the respondents' claim of possession of the property in the concept of an owner is a
collateral issue that may not be decided upon in a case for unlawful detainer. To stress, the only issue
to be resolved in an unlawful detainer case is physical or material possession of the property involved,
independent of any claim of ownership by any of the parties involved.
Thus, the Court finds that the appellate court gravely erred when it reversed the findings of the RTC.
Petitioners clearly possess superior rights over the possession of the property as the registered owners
thereof, and all the elements of unlawful detainer were sufficiently proven in the case at bar.
G.R. No. 239727 July 24, 2019

Sps. Julian Belvis, Sr. and Cecilia Belvis, et al. Vs. Sps. Conrado V. Erola and Marilyn Erola,
as represented by Maureen Frias

CAGUIOA, J.:

FACTS:

Respondents alleged that they are owners of a 29,772 sq. m.-lot situated in Barangay Malag-it,
Pontevedra, Capiz. Lot 597 (subject property) is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-26108
and a tax declaration, both in the name of respondent Conrado V. Erola (Conrado), who allegedly
purchased the same in October of 1978. As the parties were close relatives, i.e., petitioner Cecilia
Erola-Bevis (Cecilia) being the sister of respondent Conrado, respondents allegedly allowed petitioners
to possess the lot, subject to the condition that they would vacate the same upon demand.

On July 2, 2012, respondents sent petitioners a letter requiring the latter to vacate the property within
30 days from receipt of the letter. Petitioners, however, refused to comply. After unsuccessful
barangay conciliation proceedings, respondents filed the instant complaint.

On the other hand, petitioners claimed that in 1979, the subject property was purchased by the late
Rosario V. Ero la (Rosario), the mother of petitioner Cecilia and respondent Conrado. Conrado,
however, allegedly succeeded in registering the property solely in his name. Hence, an implied trust
was allegedly created over the ½ undivided hereditary share of petitioner Cecilia. For over 34 years,
petitioners alleged that they possessed and cultivated the tot in the concept of an owner, believing in
good faith that they were co-owners of the subject lot. In the course of their possession, petitioners
allegedly introduced various improvements thereon by planting bamboos, nipa palms and coconut
trees, and by constructing fishponds. In their Answer, petitioners further claimed that respondents
failed to personally appear during the barangay conciliation proceedings and that their representative,
Maureen, had no authority to appear on their behalf.

The MCTC held that although petitioners claimed that respondents failed to personally appear during
the mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings, the Office of the Punong Barangay nevertheless
issued a Certification to File Action in accordance with Section 412 of Republic Act No. (R.A.) 7160.
Further, the case was referred to Philippine Mediation Center (PMC) during pre-trial but the parties
still failed to amicably settle the same.

On the issue of possession, the MCTC reasoned that petitioners failed to present any evidence to
prove that the property was purchased by the late Rosario and that it was registered solely in the name
of respondent Conrado in trust for his co-heir and sister, petitioner Cecilia. The MCTC further held
that petitioners were not builders in good faith as their possession of the lot was by mere tolerance,
which was subject to an implied promise to vacate the same upon demand. Hence, respondents had
the better right to possess the subject property.

R TC held that despite the non-appearance of respondents, the parties failed to arrive at a settlement
before the Office of the Punong Barangay, the PMC and even before the court during Judicial Dispute
Resolution (JDR) proceedings. In fact, the Certification to File Action was issued upon agreement of
the parties. Thus, the RTC relaxed the technical rules of procedure and held that a remand of the case
would be unnecessarily circuitous. On the substantive issue, the RTC held that petitioners failed to
prove that petitioner Cecilia was a co-owner of the property or that the same was purchased by
Rosario.

ISSUE: Whether respondents complied with the mandatory conciliation proceedings under R.A.
7160.

HELD: The Petition is partly meritorious.

Respondents substantially complied with the mandatory barangay conciliation proceedings

under R.A. 7160.
The CA, the R TC, and the MCTC unanimously found that petitioners and respondents' representative
underwent barangay conciliation proceedings. Unfortunately, they failed to arrive at any amicable
settlement. Thereafter, upon agreement of the parties, the Office of the Punong Barangay issued a
Certification to File Action. During pre-trial, the parties again underwent mediation before the PMC
and JDR before the court. Still, no settlement was reached. Given the foregoing, the Court finds that
the purposes of the law, i.e., to provide avenues for parties to amicably settle their disputes and to
prevent the "indiscriminate filing of cases in the courts," have been sufficiently met. Considering that
the instant complaint for unlawful detainer, an action governed by the rules of summary procedure,
has been pending for 6 years, the Court finds it proper to relax the technical rules of procedure in the
interest of speedy and substantial justice. Having disposed of the procedural issue, the Court shall now
proceed with the substantive issues raised.
In view of the fore going, the Court is therefore constrained to remand the instant case to
the MCTC for further proceedings to determine the facts essential to the proper application of Articles
448 in relation to Articles 546 and 548 of the Civil Code.
On a final note, it bears emphasis that this is a case for unlawful detainer. Thus, "the sole issue for
resolution is the physical or material possession of the property involved, independent of any claim
of ownership by any of the parties." The determination of the ownership of the subject lot is merely
provisional and is without prejudice to the appropriate action for recovery or quieting of title.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED

G.R. No. 227482 July 1, 2019

Joaquin Berbano, et al. Vs. Heirs of Roman Tapulao, namely: Albert D. Tapulao, et al.

LAZARO-JAVIER, J.:

FACTS:
Respondents Heirs of Roman Tapulao, namely: Albert D. Tapulao, Danilo D. Tapulao, Marieta
Tapulao-Reyes, Linda Tapulao-Ramirez, and Josefina Tapulao-Dacanay filed a Complaint for
Recovery of Possession and Damages against petitioners Joaquin Berbano, Trinidad Berbano, and
Melchor Berbano.
In their Complaint, respondents averred that their father Roman Tapulao was the registered owner of
a lot located in Taguing, Baggao, Cagayan covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. P-9331.
They paid the realty taxes thereon.
After the death of Roman Tapulao and his wife Catalina CasabarTapulao, respondents caused the
relocation survey of the lot. It revealed that petitioners occupied portions of the lot. Despite several
demands, however, petitioners refused to vacate and return the lot to respondents.
In their Answer, petitioners argued that the original owner of the lot was Felipe Pefia. Sometime in
1954, Felipe Pefia ceded his possession over half hectare of the lot in favor of Joaquin Berbano. From
that time on, Joaquin had been in open and exclusive possession of the lot.
Subsequently, Felipe Pefia sold the adjacent lot to Roman Tapulao. When Roman Tapulao caused its
registration, the survey mistakenly included therein the adjacent lot belonging to Joaquin. As a result,
OCT No. P-93 (in the name of Roman Tapulao) also covered Joaquin's lot. Roman and Catalina
Tapulao acknowledged this error through their Affidavit dated April 2, 1976. They promised to respect
Joaquin's ownership of that specific portion.6
The case was then called for pre-trial which for one reason or another got reset for eight (8)
consecutive times. During the pre-trial on January 30, 2014, petitioners and counsel failed to appear.
Thus, respondents moved to present evidence ex-parte which the trial court granted.

ISSUE: Is petitioners' challenge against the trial court's jurisdiction tenable?

RULING:

Petitioners' claim that the property in dispute is only a specific portion of the lot or only 6,804 square
meters, which supposedly carries the proportional assessed value of P8, 111. 72, is irrelevant. It does
not alter what is actually alleged in the complaint. Besides, it is not for petitioners to define the
allegations in their adversaries' complaint. That is the respondents' prerogative as plaintiffs below.
Additionally, petitioners cannot limit the dispute to the alleged area actually being contested. This is
because the rest of the contiguous portion of the lot could be relevant to the remedy or remedies
flowing therefrom. For example, who bears the burden of paying for improvements; what are the
indicators of good and bad faith by petitioners? The point is this: respondents' allegations in their
complaint cannot be at once deemed to be a case of bad and false pleading.

Lastly, but no less important, petitioners never questioned the trial court's jurisdiction in the
proceedings before it. In fact, petitioners even filed their Answer and sought affirmative relief therein.
The trial court summarized petitioners' prayer in their Answer, to wit:

Because of the groundless filing of the case, the defendants suffered mental anguish, wounded feelings,
social humiliation and they also incurred actual damages. They were likewise compelled to engage the
services of a counsel and incurred actual damages. Thus, defendants pray for the dismissal of the case,
that the plaintiffs be ordered to execute the necessary documents to cause the transfer and registration
of the lot in suit in the name of the defendants and the award of actual, moral and exemplary damages.

It is only after the case was decided against them that they challenged it for the first time via their
motion for reconsideration. In Tijam, et al. v. Sibonghanoy, et al., the Court held that a party cannot.
invoke the jurisdiction of a court and ask for affirmative relief against his opponent and, after obtaining
or failing to obtain such relief, repudiate or question that same jurisdiction. So must it be.

The petition is DENIED.

G.R. No. 228739 July 17, 2019

Rosemarie Eribal Bowden, represented by Florencio C. Eribal, Sr. Vs. Donald William
Alfred Bowden

REYES, J. JR., J.:

FACTS:

Rosemarie Eribal Bowden (petitioner) was the registered owner of a 2004 Mitsubishi Pajero
(subject vehicle) with Plate No. FFD 228.3 The subject vehicle was sold to Virgilio S. Ramos (Ramos)
without petitioner's consent by her then husband Donald William Alfred Bowden (respondent), a
British national residing in Iloilo City. The marriage of petitioner and respondent was dissolved by
virtue of a Decree of Divorce dated June 12, 2006. Petitioner claimed that while she was in London,
she entrusted the Original Receipt-Certificate of Registration (OR-CR) of the subject vehicle to her
niece Juvelyn Enate. However, during petitioner's marriage with respondent, the latter executed an
affidavit of loss of the OR-CR and submitted it to the Roxas City District, Office of the Land
Transportation Office (LTO). This paved the way for the issuance of a new OR-CR to respondent
which he used to execute a deed of sale6 of the subject vehicle in his favor. Respondent submitted the
deed of sale to the LTO and a new CR was issued in his name. Both affidavit of loss and deed of sale
bore forged signatures of petitioner, prompting her to file criminal complaints against respondent.

On April 4, 2014, respondent filed a demurrer to evidence with leave of court claiming
insufficiency of evidence. He argued that the petitioner failed to prove that he falsified the affidavit of
loss and deed of sale and used them as alleged in the informations. In the judicial affidavits of
petitioner's witnesses, Juvelyn Enate and Florencio S. Eribal, Sr. did not testify as to the identity of
the person who affixed the forged signature of petitioner in the affidavit of loss and submitted the
falsified document to the LTO. Even petitioner admitted in her judicial affidavit that she did not see
respondent sign the affidavit of loss and deed of sale bearing her forged signature, more so present
them to the LTO. Respondent likewise questioned petitioner's failure to present the original copy of
the purported affidavit of loss and deed of sale.

On July 7, 2014, the MTCC modified the May 6, 2014 Order by granting the demurrer to
evidence and acquitting respondent as to the charge of falsification. It held that petitioner failed to
prove that respondent was the one who actually forged the questioned documents. It also noted that
the informations are duplicitous, charging respondent with the commission of two crimes in each
information. However, considering that respondent had been arraigned and had entered his plea of
not guilty without a motion to quash having been filed, respondent was deemed to have waived the
defects.

On September 16, 2014, respondent filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Roxas City, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the MTCC in denying the
demurrer on the charge of use of falsified documents. Respondent averred that he cannot be tried for
the crime of use of falsified documents as it was already included in the crime of falsification for which
he was acquitted. Assuming that he can be prosecuted for the use of falsified documents, he pointed
out that the petitioner failed to prove that he used the falsified affidavit of loss and deed of sale given
that the purported CRs of the subject vehicle in his name and in the name of Ramos were not admitted
as evidence for the petitioner. He also contended that the element of damage or intent to cause damage
was wanting since at the time that he allegedly used the falsified documents, he was still married to
petitioner and the subject vehicle remained a property of the marriage.

RULING:

The petition is barren of merit.

Under Section 23, paragraph 1, Rule 119 of the Rules of Court, a criminal action may be
dismissed on the ground of insufficiency of evidence in two ways: (1) on the court's initiative, after an
opportunity to be heard is accorded the prosecution; and (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the
accused with or without leave of court. In both instances, the dismissal may be made only after the
prosecution rests its case.

When the accused files a motion to dismiss by way of demurrer to evidence, it is incumbent
upon the trial court to review and examine the evidence presented by the prosecution and determine
its sufficiency to sustain a judgment of conviction beyond reasonable doubt. If competent evidence
exists, the court shall deny the demurrer and the accused may still adduce evidence on his behalf if the
demurrer was filed with leave of court. If filed without leave, the accused submits the case for
judgment on the basis of the evidence of the prosecution. On the other hand, if the court finds the
evidence insufficient to support a verdict of guilt, the court shall grant the demurrer and the criminal
case shall be dismissed. Such dismissal is a resolution on the merits and tantamount to an acquittal.
Any further prosecution of the accused after an acquittal is a violation of his constitutional right against
double jeopardy. Accordingly, an order granting the demurrer to evidence and acquitting the accused
on the ground of insufficiency of evidence cannot be the subject of an appeal.

Petitioner files the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Civil Procedure,
instead of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65, hence, an erroneous remedy. On this point alone,
the petition must be dismissed.

But even if a Rule 65 petition is filed, the same will not prosper since the CA did not act with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in dismissing the cases for use of
falsified affidavit of loss and use of falsified deed of sale. The Court agrees with the CA that the
petitioner fails to put up a prima facie case of use of falsified documents which justifies the grant of
the demurrer but for a different reason. The petitioner was given an opportunity to present her case.
She pas formally offered her evidence and actively participated in the trial. Petitioner was afforded her
right to move for the reconsideration of the MTCC decision denying the demurrer to the charge of
use of falsified documents. When the trial proceeded before the MTCC, the court allowed the
petitioner to present Erwin Lou Calungcagin to whom respondent purportedly sold the subject
vehicle. Indubitably, there is no denial of due process that warrants the filing of a Rule 65 petition

The petition is denied.