LAND TITLE AND DEEDS By: Aejay V.

Barias
CASE DIGEST
SUBSEQUENT REGISTRATION
 VILLAFLOR VS JUEZAN
Facts:
On February 22, 1961 Juezan registered his affidavit of adverse claim in Transfer Certificate of Title No. T1217 (formerly a part of
Original Certificate of Title 806) under primary entry No. 26083 of the Register of Deeds of Davao. On March 1, 1961, Juezan filed
Civil Case 3496 seeking from Villaflor the surrender of owner’s duplicate of Transfer Certificate of Title T1217 in order that the deed
of sale in his favor will be registered or annotated in the certificate of title. Juezan further questioned the validity of the deed of sale
in favor of Villaflor.
More than four (4) years after Juezan’s adverse claim was annotated that is, on October 15, 1965 and while case No. 3496 is
pending, Villaflor presented for registration two (2) deeds of sale affecting the land subject of the action, the first dated March 21,
1963 conveying 8.6186 hectares and the second dated September 6, 1986 conveying the remaining 3.0219 hectares and as a
consequence, Transfer Certificate of Title T1217 was cancelled so Transfer Certificate of Title T7601 was issued to Villaflor wherein
the adverse claim annotated was carried on.
Issue:
Whether the adverse claim of Juarez should be cancelled
Held:
Yes. The basis of Civil Case No. 3496 is a deed of absolute sale dated July 7, 1956, allegedly executed by Simon Maghanay in favor
of Juezan. This document is also the basis of the Affidavit of Adverse Claim ordered cancelled by the trial court. The purpose of said
adverse claim is to protect the interest of the appellant pending this litigation. Thus, considering that a notice of lis pendens had
been annotated on T.C.T. No. T7601 Vi, the Court finds no basis for maintaining the adverse claim. This Court sees no reason for
disturbing the questioned order of the trial court dated August 25, 1967 directing the cancellation of the Juezan’s adverse claim at
the back of transfer certificate of Title No. T7601. The notice of lis pendens filed by Juezan affecting the same property in connection
with Civil Case No. 3496 is sufficient.
NON–REGISTRABLE
PROPERTIES
 REPUBLIC VS IAC
Facts:
Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc., a corp. represented by Mr. Rodolfo Nazario, acquired from Mariano and Acer Infiel, members of the Dumagat
tribe 5 parcels of land.Possession of the Infiels over the landdates back before the Philippines was discovered by Magellan.Land sought to be
registered is a private land pursuant to RA 3872 granting absolute ownership to members of the non-Christian Tribes on land occupied by
them or their ancestral lands, whether with the alienable or disposable public land or within the public domain.Acme Plywood & Veneer Co.
Inc., has introduced more than P45M worth of improvements.Ownership and possession of the land sought to be registered was duly
recognized by the government when the Municipal Officials of Maconacon, Isabela. Donated part of the land as the townsite of Maconacon
Isabela
IAC affirmed CFI in favor of Acme Plywood & Veneer Co., Inc
Issues:
1.Whether or not the land is already a private land.
2.Whether or not the constitutional prohibition against their acquisition by private corporations or associations applies.
Ruling:
1.YES. Already acquired, by operation of law not only a right to a grant, but a grant of the Government, for it is not necessary that a certificate
of title should be issued in order that said grant may be sanctioned by the courts, an application therefore is sufficient. It had already ceased
to be of the public domain and had become private property, at least by presumption. The application for confirmation is mere formality, the
lack of which does not affect the legal sufficiency of the title as would be evidenced by the patent and the Torrens title to be issued upon the
strength of said patent. The effect of the proof, wherever made, was not to confer title, but simply to establish it, as already conferred by the
decree, if not by earlier law
2. NO. If it is accepted-as it must be-that the land was already private land to which the Infields had a legally sufficient and transferable title
On October 29, 1962 when Acme acquired it from said owners, it must also be conceded that Acme had a perfect right to make such
acquisition. The only limitation then extant was that corporations could not acquire, hold or lease public agricultural lands in excess of 1,024
hectares.
 REPUBLIC VS VERA
Facts:
Private respondents filed with the lower court an application for registration of title under Act 496 over parcels of land located
in the Municipality of Mariveles, Bataan. The Court of First Instance of Bataan confirmed the titles to subject parcels of land and
adjudicated them in favor of the private respondents. Petitioner Republic of the Philippines filed with the lower court an
opposition to the application stating that the parcel of land applied for is a portion of the public domain belonging to the
Republic, not subject to private appropriation. Petitioner stressed that the lands in question can no longer be subject to
registration by voluntary proceedings, for they have already been subjected to compulsory registration proceedings under the
Cadastral Act.
Issue: Whether the lands in question being a subject of a cadastral proceeding may be a subject of private appropriation in
favor of the private respondents.

Held/Ratio:
No.
In cadastral proceedings any person claiming any interest in any part of the lands object of the petition is required by Section 9
of Act No. 2259 to file an answer on or before the return day or within such further time as may be allowed by the court. In the
absence of successful claimants, the property is declared public land.
In this case, private respondents apparently either did not file their answers in the aforesaid cadastral proceedings or failed to
substantiate their claims over the portions they were then occupying, otherwise, titles over the portions subject of their
respective claims would have been issued to them. The Cadastral Court must have declared the lands in question public lands,
and its decision had already become final and conclusive.
ACTIONS
INVOLVING
TITLES
 INGUSAN VS HRS. OF REYES
Facts:
This case involves a residential land originally owned by Leocadio Ingusan who was unmarried and childless when he
died in 1932. The petitioner is the grandnephew of Leocadio and Aureliano, Sr. was the latter's nephew. After the death
of Leocadio, Aureliano, Sr. was designated by the heirs as administrator of the land. He applied for and was granted a
free patent over the land. Petitioner filed an accion reivindicatoria against Aureliano, Sr. and sought recovery of Lot
120-A which was part of the land at issue here. 
Aureliano, Sr. executed a SPA in favor of his son Artemio authorizing him to mortgage the land in question to any bank.
Using that SPA, Artemio mortgaged the land to secure a loan of from the PNB. In 1983, Aureliano, Sr. died intestate.
Petitioner paid the PNB loan. The mortgage over the land was released and the owner’s duplicate copy of OCT No. P-
6176 was given to him. The RTC declared OCT No. P-6176 as well as the subsequent certificates of title as null and
void. On appeal, the CA contended that only OCT No. P-6176, remained valid because it had already become
indefeasible and could no longer be attacked collaterally. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence
this petition.
Issue: Whether OCT No. P-6176 was valid?

Held:
Yes. A certificate of title cannot be attacked collaterally. OCT No. P-6176 which was registered under the Torrens
System on the basis of a free patent became indefeasible and incontrovertible after the lapse of one year as provided
in Sec. 32 of PD 152. Any person aggrieved by such decree of registration in any case may pursue his remedy by
action for damages against the applicant or any other person responsible for the fraud.
LAC
HES
 ESTATE OF THE LATE JESUS
FACTS:
YUJUICO VS REPUBLIC
In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and confirmation of her title over a parcel of land located in Parañaque City, in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance
(CFI).The application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the Director of Lands, and byMercedes Dizon, a private party. Trial court ruled in favor of
Castro. The Director of Lands and Mercedes Dizon did not appeal from the adverse decision of the Pasig-Rizal CFI. Thus, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration became
final, and a Decree was issued by the Land Registration Commission (LRC). An Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Fermina Castro by the Register of Deeds. Land was
then sold to Jesus Yujuico. The OCT of Castro was cancelled and a TCT was issued in Yujuico’s name over Lot1 while another TCT was issued in favor of herein co-petitioner Augusto
Carpio. Meanwhile, PD no. 1085 was issued and asserts that Land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay became the properties of the Public Estates Authority
(PEA), a government corporation that undertook the reclamation of lands or the acquisition of reclaimed lands. Thus, an OCT was issued in favor of PEA. The PEA also acquired
ownership of other parcels of land along the Manila Bay coast which were subsequently sold to the Manila Bay Development Corporation (MBDC) The PEA undertook the construction of
the Manila Coastal Road. As this was being planned, Yujuico and Carpio discovered that a verification survey they commissioned showed that the road directly overlapped their
property, and that they owned a portion of the land sold by the PEA to the MBDC. Yujuico and Carpio filed before the Parañaque City Regional Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for the
Removal of Cloud and Annulment of Title with Damages. Respondent Republic argued that, first, since the subject land was still underwater, it could not be registered in the name
of Fermina Castro. Second, the land registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina
Castro was void. And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived from a void title, were likewise void. Trial Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and states that after 28 years
without being contested, the case had already become final and executory. The trial court also found that the OSG had participated in the LRC case, and could have questioned the
validity of the decision but did not. On appeal, reversed the decision of the lower court asserting that shores are properties of the public domain intended for public use and, therefore,
not registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private individuals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the Government for reversion is proper?
HELD:
No. We maintain to agree with the findings of the court that the property of Fermina Castro was registrable land, as based on the two (2) ocular inspections conducted on March 22,
1974 by Lands Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania and Lands Geodetic Engr. Manuel Cervantes, finding ‘… the same no longer forms part of Manila Bay but is definitely solid
land which cannot be reached by water even in the highest of tides’. This Berania-Cervantes report based on ocular inspections literally overturned the findings and recommendations
of Land Director Narciso V. Villapando dated November 15, 1973, and that of Director Ernesto C. Mendiola dated December 1, 1977, and the fact that the Villapando-Mendiola reports
were merely based on projections in the cadastral map or table surveys.
The recognition of petitioners’ legal ownership of the land is further bolstered by the categorical and unequivocal acknowledgment made by PEA in its September 30, 2003 letter where
it stated that: “Your ownership thereof was acknowledged by PEA when it did not object to your membership in the CBP-IA Association, in which an owner of a piece of land in CBP-IA
automatically becomes a member thereof.” Section 26, Rule 130 provides that “the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.”
The admissions of PEA which is the real party-in-interest in this case on the nature of the land of Fermina Castro are valid and binding on respondent Republic. Respondent’s claim that
the disputed land is underwater falls flat in the face of the admissions of PEA against its interests. Hence, res judicata now effectively precludes the relitigation of the issue of
registrability of petitioners’ lot.
In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Parañaque RTC. Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of
judgment under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the case nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already barred by laches. Even if laches is
disregarded, still the suit is already precluded by res judicata in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining therein.
MISCELLANEOUS
 MANOTOK REALTY INC. VS
CLT REALTY DEVT. CORP
Facts:
The Petition involved properties covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 994 which in turnencompasses 1,342 hectares of the Maysilo Estate. The vast tract of land
stretches over three (3) cities withinMetropolitan Manila, comprising an area larger than the sovereign states of Monaco and the Vatican.CLT Realty Development Corporation (CLT)
sought to recover from Manotok Realty, Inc. and Manotok EstateCorporation (Manotoks) the possession of Lot 26 of the Maysilo Estate. CLT’s claim was anchored on
TransferCertificate of Title derived from Estelita Hipolito. Hipolito’s title emanated from Jose Dimson whose title appears to have been sourced from OCT No. 994. For their part,
the Manotoks challenged the validity of the title relied on by CLT, claiming that Dimson’s title,the proximate source of CLT’s title, was irregularly issued and, hence, the same and
subsequent titles flowingtherefrom are likewise void. The Manotoks asserted their ownership over Lot 26 and claimed that they derivedit from several awardees and/or vendees of
the National Housing Authority. The Manotok title likewise tracedas its primary source OCT No. 994.The trial court ruled for CLT. Manotoks appeal to the CA was denied. 
Issue: Whether the title issued in the name of CLT valid.
Ruling:
It is evident from all three titles─CLT’s, Hipolito’s and Dimson’s—
that the properties they purport to coverwere " originally registered on 19
April 1917” in the Registration Book of the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal." These titles could be affirmed only if it can be proven that OCT No. 994 registered on 19 April
1917 hadactually existed. CLT were given the opportunity to submit such proof but it did not.The established legal principle in actions for annulment or reconveyance of title is
that a party seeking itshould establish not merely by a preponderance of evidence but by clear and convincing evidence that theland sought to be reconveyed is his. In an action
to recover, the property must be identified, and the plaintiffmust rely on the strength of his title and not on the weakness of the defendant's claim.Considering that CLT clearly
failed to meet the burden of proof reposed in them as plaintiffs in the action forannulment of title and recovery of possession, there is a case to be made for ordering the dismissal
of theiroriginal complaints before the trial court.As it appears on the record, OCT No. 994, the mother title was received for transcription by the Register ofDeeds on 3 May 1917
based from the issuance of the decree of registration on 17 April 1917.Obviously, April 19, 1917 is not the date of inscription or the date of transcription of the decree into
theOriginal Certificate of Title. Thus, such date cannot be considered as the date of the title or the date when thetitle took effect. It appears that the transcription of the decree
was done on the date it was received by theRegister of Deeds of Rizal on May 3, 1917here is a marked distinction between the entry of the decree and the entry of the certificate
of title; the entryof the decree is made by the chief clerk of the land registration and the entry of the certificate of title is madeby the register of deeds. The certificate of title is
issued in pursuance of the decree of registration. It wasstressed that what stands as the certificate of the title is the transcript of the decree of registration made bythe registrar of
deeds in the registry.Moreover, it is only after the transcription of the decree by the register of deeds that the certificate of title isto take effect.Hence, any title that traces its
source to OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 is void, for such mother title isinexistent. The fact that CLT titles made specific reference to an OCT No. 994 dated 17 April 1917 casts
doubton the validity of such titles since they refer to an inexistent OCT. This error alone is, in fact, sufficient toinvalidate the CLT claims over the subject property if singular
reliance is placed by them on the datesappearing on their respective titles.The Court hereby constitutes a Special Division of the Court of Appeals to hear the case on remand. In
ascertaining which of the conflicting claims of title should prevail, the Special Division is directed to makefurther determinations based on the evidence already on record and such
other evidence as may be presented at the proceedings before it.
PATENTS/GOVERNMENT
AWARDC
 TAGUINOD VS CA
Facts:
Then Pres. Marcos promulgated PD 27. Pursuant to this, DAR launched Operation Land Transfer (OLT) to implement the law’s provisos of
transferring ownership to qualified tenant-farmers or farmer-beneficiaries of the rice or corn land they are cultivating under a system of
sharecrop or lease-tenancy, with the landowner having retention of not more than 7 hectares of agricultural land. When OLT was
launched, Salud Aguila was the registered owner of the disputed lots. Subsequently, 1 lot was transferred to and registered in the name
of petitioner Vic Aguila, who was then 14 years old while the other was transferred to petitioner Josephine Taguinod. Both disputed lots
were placed under the coverage of the OLT pursuant to PD 27. Shortly after the transfer of the subject lot to Vic Aguila, Salud Aguila, on
behalf of then minor petitioner Aguila, filed a notarized application for retention. 
When he was already of age, Vic Aguila filed a letter-protest for exclusion or exemption from the OLT of his landholding. Taguinod sought
exemption from the OLT of her landholding. The petition was granted and was affirmed by the OP. Private respondents assailed the
decision of the OP before the CA through a Petition for Review under Rule 43. The CA granted the petition. Petitioners interposed a
Motion for Reconsideration but it was rejected by the CA. Thus, this petition.
Issues: Whether landowner Salud Aguila is entitled to retention under PD 27?

Held:
NO. LOI No. 474 mandates the DAR Secretary to "undertake to place under the Land Transfer Program of the Government pursuant to PD
27, all tenanted rice/corn lands with areas of seven (7) hectares or less belonging to landowners who own other agricultural lands of
more than seven (7) hectares in aggregate areas or lands used for residential, commercial, industrial or other urban purposes from
which they derive adequate income to support themselves and their families." Considering Salud Aguila’s other eleven (11) landholdings
and the application of LOI No. 474, the court agree with the DAR Secretary and CA’s holding that Salud Aguila is not entitled to retention
over the subject lots. Premised on said grounds, the issue on petitioners’ right to retention over the subject lots is answered in the
negative as they are not the owners, and consequently are not small landowners who are accorded the right of retention.
 JUSTALERO VS GONZALES
Facts:
Respondents Noemi San Agustin and Zenaida San Agustin Gonzales, together with their siblings, executed a document
denominated as "Subdivision Agreement" wherein they agreed, in accordance with a previously executed Extra-Judicial
Partitions of the estate of their deceased parents and a subdivision plan which they caused to be made, to allot Lot 8 and
Lot 9 to Noemi and Zenaida, respectively.
Noemi and Zenaida were issued their respective TCTs. Petitioners, Gil Justalero and the heirs of his now deceased brother
Jesus Justalero filed the complaint subject of the present petition against respondents Zenaida and Noemi, for quieting of
title and reconveyance with damages, with the RTC of Iloilo. The trial court dismissed petitioners’ complaint. On
petitioners’ appeal, the Court of Appeals affirmed that of the trial court. Hence, the instant petition.
Issue: Whether or not Lot No.8 which is claimed by plaintiffs Gil Justalero, et al., is embraced in the titles of defendants?

Held:
Almost two years before the filing of petitioners’ complaint, the Bureau of Lands, Iloilo City rendered a decision in the
Free Patent application by Jesus Justalero, declaring that the subject lot, Cadastral Lot No. 2596, is identical to Lot 8,
which is now titled in the name of Noemi. It is clear therefore that Lot 2596 became private property as early as May
1930, by virtue of which the Bureau of Lands has lost jurisdiction over the land.
There is no showing that Jesus Justalero as Free Patent applicant availed himself of any legal remedy to assail the said
decision which was adverse to him. Hence, petitioners are bound by the decision.
 
 ESTATE OF THE LATE JESUS
FACTS:
YUJUICO VS REPUBLIC
In 1973, Fermina Castro filed an application for the registration and confirmation of her title over a parcel of land located in Parañaque City, in the Pasig-Rizal Court of First Instance (CFI).The
application was opposed by the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) on behalf of the Director of Lands, and byMercedes Dizon, a private party. Trial court ruled in favor of Castro. The Director
of Lands and Mercedes Dizon did not appeal from the adverse decision of the Pasig-Rizal CFI. Thus, the order for the issuance of a decree of registration became final, and a Decree was issued
by the Land Registration Commission (LRC). An Original Certificate of Title was issued in the name of Fermina Castro by the Register of Deeds. Land was then sold to Jesus Yujuico. The OCT of
Castro was cancelled and a TCT was issued in Yujuico’s name over Lot1 while another TCT was issued in favor of herein co-petitioner Augusto Carpio. Meanwhile, PD no. 1085 was issued and
asserts that Land reclaimed in the foreshore and offshore areas of Manila Bay became the properties of the Public Estates Authority (PEA), a government corporation that undertook the
reclamation of lands or the acquisition of reclaimed lands. Thus, an OCT was issued in favor of PEA. The PEA also acquired ownership of other parcels of land along the Manila Bay coast which
were subsequently sold to the Manila Bay Development Corporation (MBDC) The PEA undertook the construction of tbhe Manila Coastal Road. As this was being planned, Yujuico and Carpio
discovered that a verification survey they commissioned showed that the road directly overlapped their property, and that they owned a portion of the land sold by the PEA to the MBDC.
Yujuico and Carpio filed before the Parañaque City Regional Trial Court (RTC), a complaint for the Removal of Cloud and Annulment of Title with Damages. Respondent Republic argued that,
first, since the subject land was still underwater, it could not be registered in the name of Fermina Castro. Second, the land registration court did not have jurisdiction to adjudicate inalienable
lands, thus the decision adjudicating the subject parcel of land to Fermina Castro was void. And third, the titles of Yujuico and Carpio, being derived from a void title, were likewise void. Trial
Court ruled in favor of the petitioner and states that after 28 years without being contested, the case had already become final and executory. The trial court also found that the OSG had
participated in the LRC case, and could have questioned the validity of the decision but did not. On appeal, reversed the decision of the lower court asserting that shores are properties of the
public domain intended for public use and, therefore, not registrable and their inclusion in a certificate of title does not convert the same into properties of private individuals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the action of the Government for reversion is proper?
HELD:
No. We maintain to agree with the findings of the court that the property of Fermina Castro was registrable land, as based on the two (2) ocular inspections conducted on March 22, 1974 by
Lands Administrative Assistant Lazaro G. Berania and Lands Geodetic Engr. Manuel Cervantes, finding ‘… the same no longer forms part of Manila Bay but is definitely solid land which cannot
be reached by water even in the highest of tides’. This Berania-Cervantes report based on ocular inspections literally overturned the findings and recommendations of Land Director Narciso V.
Villapando dated November 15, 1973, and that of Director Ernesto C. Mendiola dated December 1, 1977, and the fact that the Villapando-Mendiola reports were merely based on projections in
the cadastral map or table surveys.
The recognition of petitioners’ legal ownership of the land is further bolstered by the categorical and unequivocal acknowledgment made by PEA in its September 30, 2003 letter where it
stated that: “Your ownership thereof was acknowledged by PEA when it did not object to your membership in the CBP-IA Association, in which an owner of a piece of land in CBP-IA
automatically becomes a member thereof.” Section 26, Rule 130 provides that “the act, declaration or omission of a party as to a relevant fact may be given in evidence against him.” The
admissions of PEA which is the real party-in-interest in this case on the nature of the land of Fermina Castro are valid and binding on respondent Republic. Respondent’s claim that the
disputed land is underwater falls flat in the face of the admissions of PEA against its interests. Hence, res judicata now effectively precludes the relitigation of the issue of registrability of
petitioners’ lot.
In sum, the Court finds that the reversion case should be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Parañaque RTC. Even if we treat said case as a petition for annulment of judgment
under Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the case nevertheless has to be upheld because it is already barred by laches. Even if laches is disregarded, still the suit is
already precluded by res judicata in view of the peculiar facts and circumstances obtaining therein.
 
LAND REGISTRATION
 BUENAVENTURA VS REPUBLIC
Facts:
The subject property in dispute was acquired by Amado Buenaventura and Irene Flores (spouses Buenaventura) even before World War II.
In 1978, the spouses Buenaventura transferred, by way of Deed of Sale, the subject property to their children, among whom are herein
petitioners, Angelita and Preciosa. Petitioners then filed an Application for Registration of Title on 5 June 2000 before the RTC of Parañaque
City of the subject property, where they alleged that "they and their predecessors-in-interest acquired title to the said parcel of land thru
inheritance, transfer, and possession as owners of the same since time immemorial and/or within the period provided for by law." They also
presented and identified various documents supporting their claim. On 29 October 2001, the court a quo issued an Order granting the
application for registration of title of the subject property. Feeling aggrieved, the Republic appealed to the Court of Appeals, alleging that
petitioners’ own evidence tends to show that the subject property is not alienable and disposable because it was a salt bed and a fishpond
and under Section 2, Article XII of the Constitution, except for agricultural lands, all other natural resources shall not be alienated. Likewise,
under the Regalian Doctrine, all lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State.
On 23 August 2004, the Court of Appeals rendered a Decision in favor of the Republic, thus, overturning the Order of the court a quo.
Issue: Whether or not the subject property in dispute is a public land.

Held:
NO. It is true that under the Regalian Doctrine all lands of the public domain belong to the State and all lands not otherwise appearing to
be clearly within private ownership are presumed to belong to the State. However, such presumption is not conclusive. It can be rebutted
by the applicant’s presentation of incontrovertible evidence showing that the land subject of the application for registration is alienable
and disposable.
The certification issued by the Department of Environment and Natural Resources verified that the subject parcel of land is “alienable and
disposable land of the public domain”. The said certification is sufficient to establish the true nature or character of the subject property.
JUDICIAL CONFIRMATION OF
IMPERFECT TITLE
 REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS RESTITUTO
SARMIENTO

FACTS:
Restituto Sarmiento filed with the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) an application for registration of a parcel of land. He claimed that he and his
predecessors-in-interest have been in open, continuous, uninterrupted, adverse, and public possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for
more than 30 years.
The Solicitor General, through the Prosecutor of Taguig, filed an opposition to Sarmiento‘s application for registration. One of the contentions is that
the lot is part of the public domain belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, hence, not subject to private appropriation.
The MeTC granted Sarmiento‘s application for registration and ordered the issuance of decree of registration. The MeTC found that Sarmiento and
his predecessors-in-interest have been in possession of the lot in the concept of an owner for more than 30 years. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals (CA) held that the lot was sufficiently identified by the blue print copy of the plan and the technical description, the presentation of the
original tracing cloth ceased to become indispensable for the grant of the application and affirmed the decision of the MeTC.
ISSUE:Whether or not the parcel of land should be awarded to Sarmiento

HELD:
It is well settled that no public land can be acquired by private persons without any grant, express or implied, from the government, and it is
indispensable that the person claiming title to public land should show that his title was acquired from the State or any other mode of acquisition
recognized by law.
Judicial confirmation of imperfect title is, under the Public Land Act, one of the means by which public agricultural lands may be disposed. Under
Section 48(b) of the Public Land Act, as amended by P.D. 1073, an applicant for confirmation of imperfect title must prove that (a) the land forms
part of the disposable and alienable agricultural lands of the public domain; and (b) he has been in open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession and occupation of the land under a bona fide claim of ownership either since time immemorial or since June 12, 1945.
The absence or weakness of the evidence for Republic notwithstanding, Sarmiento still bears the burden of overcoming the presumption that the
lot he seeks to register forms part of the alienable agricultural land of the public domain.