A.
THE LAW ON NATURAL RESOURCES surveyed in their behalf even before the creation of the said
PART TWO: PUBLIC LANDS
VIII. RESERVATION FOR TOWN SITE & PUBLIC & SEMI-PUBLIC
USES
VOL. 172, APRIL 19, 1989 563
Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 75672. April 19, 1989. *
HEIRS OF GUMANGAN, namely: ANTONIA GUMANGAN,
BALBINA G. GOMEZ, IRENE KITDUD. LINA TOLAS,
MAGDALENA GUMANGAN, PABLO GUMANGAN, and
VICTORIA G. AMISTAD petitioners, vs. COURT OF
APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, and DIRECTOR OF
FOREST DEVELOPMENT, respondents.
G.R. No. 75673. April 19, 1989. *
HEIRS OF MOLINTAS, namely: MAGSIA M. LEUAN,
PULMANO MOLINTAS, SERGIO MOLINTAS, SALINDIA
CUYAN, AMADO MOLINTAS, ALMAQUIO MOLINTAS,
NENITA M. RILLERA, JOSEPHINE M. ABANAG, BELEN
M. MARANES, WATSON M. MARANES, EDUARDO M.
MARANES and JOHN MOLINTAS, petitioners, vs. COURT
OF APPEALS, DIRECTOR OF LANDS, DIRECTOR OF
FOREST DEVELOPMENT, HEIRS OF TIMOTEO
LAGASCA, SERA PATNAO, COMAD LIGARO, HEIRS OF
ELEN JUAN, and EDUARDO CUYAN, respondents.
Land Titles and Deeds; Public Land Act; Forest
Lands; Inalienable Public Lands; Forest lands are part of the public
domain and are inalienable, hence it is the Dir. of Lands and not the
courts, who has jurisdiction in the disposition of the same.—–Thus,
inasmuch as the said properties applied for by petitioners are part
of the public domain, it is the Director of Lands who has jurisdiction
in the disposition of the same (subject to the approval of the
Secretary of Natural Resources and Environment), and not the
courts. Petitioners nevertheless contend that said properties are
within the Busol Forest Reservation which was established on April
27, 1922 under Proclamation No. 15 and that they had the same
reservation. x x x Even assuming that petitioners did have the said
properties surveyed even before the same was declared to be part of
the Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it was so
converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more reason that
this action must fail. Forest lands are inalien-
_________________
*FIRST DIVISION.
564
564 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals
able and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert
the same into private property. And the courts are without
jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone.
PETITION for review from a decision and resolution of the
Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
GANCAYCO, J.:
Can a part of a forest reservation be titled in a land
registration proceeding? This is the controversy in this
petition for review of a decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals. On October 3, 1975, the Heirs of Gumangan,
represented by Victoria G. Amistad, filed with the then Court
of First Instance of Bagiuo (now Regional Trial Court) an
application for original land registration (Land Registration
Case No. N-396) covering Lots “C” and “K”, as shown in plan
II-13973 (RS-985), with a combined area of 14.3884 hectares
(143,884 sq. meters) and both situated in Res. Sec. “D”, City of
Baguio.
On November 13, 1975, the Heirs of Molintas, represented
by Josephine M. Abanag, also filed with the Court of First
Instance of Baguio an application for original land registration
(Land Registration Case No. N-400) covering Lots “A-2”, “B”,
and “C”, as shown on plan II-11935, with a total area of
23.3253 hectares (233,253 sq. meters) and all of which are
situated in Res. Sec. “D”, City of Baguio.
On May 5, 1977, the Director of Lands, represented by the
Solicitor General, filed identical motions to dismiss in Land
Registration Cases Nos. N-396 and N-400 and several other
land registration cases covering lands within the City of
Baguio, alleging that the Court of First Instance of Baguio has
no jurisdiction over the said applications inasmuch as the
parcels of land applied for have been declared public lands, the
disposition of which is the concern of the Director of Lands
with the prior approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources.
It is also alleged therein that whatever registrable rights
and/or claims the applicants may have over the subject lands
are barred by the Statute of Limitations and by prior judgment
(the Decision
565
VOL. 172, APRIL 19, 1989 565
Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals
dated November 13, 1922 in Civil Reservation Case No. 1,
G.L.R.O. Record No. 211.).
Both applicants in LRC-N-396 and LRC-N-400, now
petitioners, filed their oppositions to the said motion to
dismiss on the following grounds: the parcels of land applied
for cannot be disposed of by the Director of Lands under the
Public Land Act; that the parcels of land applied for, although
classified as residential, fall under the term “agricultural
lands,” hence there is no valid reason to exclude them from the
coverage of Section 48 of the Public Land Act; that the
applicants whose predecessors were not served with notices in
Civil Reservation Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211, as
required by Section 3 of Act No. 627, are not barred from
applying for registration of their titles to the lands applied for;
that the declaration of the subject lands as public lands in the
townsite proceedings did not disturb their possessory titles or
foreclose their right to apply for the benefits under Section 48
of the Public Land Act.
On February 15, 1978, the trial court issued an order
dismissing Cases Nos. N-396 and N-400, the dispositive
portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding merit in the present motions to dismiss, the
same are hereby granted and the applications in the three above-
entitled cases are dismissed, without costs.
On March 29, 1978, petitioners filed their motions for
reconsideration of the dismissal order, anchored on the
following grounds:
1. a.That the parcels of land covered by LRC-N-396 and
LRC-N-400 are included within the boundary lines of
Busol Forest Reservation, which reservation was
excluded from the proceedings in Civil Reservation
Case No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211;
2. b.That the parcels of land subject matter of the said
land registration cases are not among those declared
as public land in the Decision dated November 13,
1922 in the said reservation proceedings;
3. c.That the applicants-petitioners are not barred by the
said Decision dated November 13, 1922 from applying
for the registration of their titles under Act No. 496, as
amended.
566
566 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals
On June 13, 1978, the Director of Lands filed his opposition to
the motion for reconsideration, alleging that:
“x x x the Court of First Instance of Baguio has no jurisdiction over
the parcels of land subjects of land registration cases in question;
and that the claims of the Heirs of Gumangan and the Heirs of
Molintas in LRC-396 and LRC-400 have already been settled in
previous proceedings.”
On April 28, 1981, the trial court issued another order denying
the motion for reconsideration.
 On June 11, 1981, petitioners filed their notices of appeal
in both LRC-N-396 and LRC-N-400 with the Intermediate
Appellate Court (now Court of Appeals).
On May 8, 1985, the Director of Lands, through the Solicitor
General, filed a motion to dismiss the appeal, alleging therein
as follows—–
“On November 29, 1984, the Supreme Court promulgated its
Decision in G.R. Nos. 57112-21, entitled ‘Republic of the
Philippines, represented by the Director of Lands, petitioner vs.
Judge Sinforoso Fangonil, et al., respondents,’ holding that lands
within the Baguio Townsite reservation may not be the subject of
original registration proceedings; that said lots may only be
disposed of by the Director of Lands under the townsite provisions
of the Public Land Act’ and that claims for private lands not
presented in Civil Reservation Case No. 1 are concluded or barred
forever by the decision in said case.”
On July 1, 1985, petitioners opposed the motion to dismiss
filed by the Director of Lands on the following grounds—–
1. 1.That the lands applied for in Land Registration Case
Nos. N-396 and N-400 are admittedly within the
physical boundaries of Busol Forest Reservation,
which is outside the Baguio Townsite, hence the
Regional Trial Court of Baguio City has jurisdiction to
hear the cases;
2. 2.That the parcels of land applied for in Land
Registration Cases Nos. N-396 and N-400, are not
among those declared public lands in the Decision
dated November 13, 1922 in Civil Reservation Case
No. 1, G.L.R.O. Record No. 211, hence trial of said
cases are (sic) not barred by res judicata;
3. 3.That there is a necessity for the Regional Trial Court
of
567
VOL. 172, APRIL 19, 1989 567
Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals
1. Baguio City to conduct a regular hearing of Land
Registration Cases Nos. N-396 and N-400 to determine
if petitioners, by themselves and through their
predecessor have acquired registerable titles to the
lands claimed by them before the establishment of the
Busol Reservation on April 27, 1922.”
On November 6, 1985, petitioners submitted to respondent
Court of Appeals a memorandum of evidence with
documentary exhibits to prove the grounds of their opposition
to the motion to dismiss filed by the Director of Lands.
On January 13, 1986, the Third Civil Cases Division of the
Intermediate Appellate Court promulgated its Decision in 1
AC-G.R. CV Nos. 69847 and 69848, the dispositive portion of
which reads as follows:
“WHEREFORE, considering the foregoing, the motion to dismiss
the appeal filed by the Office of the Solicitor General has to be, as it
is hereby, granted, without the necessity of presentation of evidence.
“SO ORDERED.” 2
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the same was
denied on July 28, 1986. 3
Hence, these two petitions for certiorari to review the
decision of the respondent appellate court. This Court gave
due course to the petition on February 23, 1987. 4
The petition is devoid of merit.
Petitioners admit that the property subject of their
applications are within the Baguio Townsite Reservation that
was established on April 12, 1912. In a decision in Civil
Reservation Case No. 1 dated November 13, 1922, it was held
that all lands within the Reservation are public lands with the
exception of (1) lands reserved specific public uses and (2)
lands claimed and
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Floreliana Castro-Bartolome, concurred in by
Associate Justices Jorge R. Coquia, Mariano A. Zosa and Bienvenido C.
Ejercito.
2 Pages 29-39, Rollo.
 3Page 40, Rollo.
4Page 65, Rollo.
568
568 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals
adjudicated as private property. It was also held in said case
that claims for private lands by all persons not presented for
registration within the period fixed in Act No. 627, in relation
to the first Public Land Law, Act No. 926, are barred forever. 5
Of course petitioners claim lack of notice in the aforesaid
case so that they may not be barred by the former judgment.
This issue was squarely disposed of by this Court in a case of
other applicants similarly situated as petitioners. In Republic
vs. Fangonil, this Court held as follows:
6 who sleep on their rights. ‘For time is a means of destroying
“That 1922 decision established the rule that lots of the Baguio
Townsite Reservation, being public domain, are not registerable
under Act No. 496. As held by Judge Belmonte in a 1973 case the
Baguio Court of First Instance ‘has no jurisdiction to entertain any
land registration proceedings’ under Act No. 496 and the Public
Land Law, covering any lot within the Baguio Townsite Reservation
which was terminated in 1932 (Camdas vs. Director of Lands, L-
37782, Resolution of this Court of March 8, 1974, dismissing petition
for review of Judge Belmonte’s ruling).
In the instant cases, after more than half a century from the 1922
decision declaring the townsite public domain, or during the
years 1972 to 1976, Modesta Paris, Lagya Paris, Samuel Baliwan,
Pablo Ramos, Jr., Josephine Abanag, Menita T. Victor, Emiliano
Bautista and Odi Dianson filed with the Court of First Instance of
Baguio applications for the registration of lots (with considerable
areas) inside the Baguio Townsite Reservation.
xxx xxx xxx
As already noted, the fact is that the notice in Case No. 211 was
issued on July 22, 1915. The clerk of court certified that 134 persons
living upon or in visible possession of any part of the reservation
were personally served with notice of the reservation. Section 3 of
Act No. 627 provides that the certificate of the clerk of court is
‘conclusive proof of service.’ (Zarate case, pp. 158, 162).
xxx xxx xxx
We hold that the trial court erred in requiring the presentation
of evidence as to the notice required under Act No. 627. Such
evidence cannot be produced at this time because the court record of
Case No. 211 was completely destroyed during the last war.
________________
Sections 3 and 4, Act No. 627.
5
6133 SCRA 513 (1984).
569
VOL. 172, APRIL 19, 1989 569
Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals
xxx xxx xxx
The period of more than fifty years completely bars the
applicants from securing relief due to the alleged lack of personal
notice to their predecessors. The law helps the vigilant but not those
obligations and actions, because time runs against the slothful and
contemners of their own rights.’”
Thus, inasmuch as the said properties applied for by
petitioners are part of the public domain, it is the Director of
Lands who has jurisdiction in the disposition of the same
(subject to the approval of the Secretary of Natural Resources
and Environment), and not the courts.
Petitioners nevertheless contend that said properties are
with-in the Busol Forest Reservation which was established
on April 27, 1922 under Proclamation No. 15 and that they
had the same surveyed in their behalf even before the creation
of the said reservation. They cite the aforestated decision of
November 13, 1922 to the effect:
“x x x, el Juzgado por orden de fecha 7 de Octubre de 1922 ordeno
que este expediente de reserva sea incluido en el calendario de
sessiones del Tribunal, correspondiente al 27 de Octubre de 1922 se
celebro esta vista, y en esta dia se ha dado asimismo quenta el
Juzgado de la mocion presentado por el Fiscal pidendo que sean
excluido de este expediente de reserva las sequientes reservas
forestales, administrades por el Oficina de Monte.”
xxx xxx xxx
“Busol, reserva forestal establicida bajo la Proclama del Governa-
dor General de la Islas Filipinas, No. 15, de fecha 27 de Abril de
1922.
 “En su virtud, y teniendo en cuenta que se han cumplido todos los
tramites que requiere la ley en los casos de reserva como el que
tramita, esta Tribunal concluyentemento,
“ORDENA, ADJUCIA Y DECRETA:
“(a) Que con excepcion de las referidas reserva forestales tituladas
‘Forbes Park’, ‘Busol, y ‘The Cave’, cuyos linderos y superficios
8 The Director of Lands vs. Abanzado, 65 SCRA 5 (1975).
9 Vaño vs. Government of the Philippine Islands 41 Phil.
161 (1920); Adorable vs. Director of Forestry, 107 Phil. 401 (1960); Director of
Forestry vs. Muñoz, 23 SCRA 1183 (1968); Republic vs. Animas, 56 SCRA
499 (1974); Director of Lands vs. Reyes, 68 SCRA 177 (1975); and Director of
Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 117 SCRA 346 (1982).
10 Republic of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 89 SCRA 648 (1979).

constan en los planos respectivos; y de los terrenos mencionados en 571

los Expendiente referidos, numerados x x x, decididos y declarados © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
a favor de sus respectivos solicitantes, las parcelas de terrenos
arriba descritas y objecto de esta expediente de reserva, asi como los
intereses o
570
570 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Heirs of Gumangan vs. Court of Appeals
derechos reales comprendidos en dicha reserva, sonterrenos
publicos;” 7

Even assuming that petitioners did have the said properties

surveyed even before the same was declared to be part of the
Busol Forest Reservation, the fact remains that it was so
converted into a forest reservation, thus it is with more reason
that this action must fail. Forest lands are inalienable and 8

possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot convert the

same into private property. And the courts are without
9

jurisdiction to adjudicate lands within the forest zone. 10

WHEREFORE, the petitions are DISMISSED for lack of

merit, with costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, Cruz, Griño-
Aquino and Medialdea JJ., concur.
Petitions dismissed.
Note.—–Possession of forestal land cannot ripen into
ownership. (Director of Lands vs. Court of Appeals, 133 SCRA
701.)

——–o0o——–

________________

7 Memorandum of petitioners, page 93, Rollo.

 G.R. No. 180206. February 4, 2009.*
THE CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO CITY, represented
by REINALDO BAUTISTA, JR., City Mayor; THE ANTI-
SQUATTING COMMITTEE, represented by ATTY.
MELCHOR CARLOS R. RAGANES, CITY BUILDINGS and
ARCHITECTURE office, represented by OSCAR FLORES;
and PUBLIC ORDER and SAFETY OFFICE, Represented by
EMMANUEL REYES, petitioners, vs. ATTY. BRAIN
MASWENG, Regional Officer-National Commission on
Indigenous People-CAR, ELVIN GUMANGAN, NARCISO
BASATAN and LAZARO BAWAS, respondents.
Administrative Law; National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples (R.A. No. 8371); Administrative Agencies; The National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is the primary
government agency responsible for the formulation and
implementation of policies, plans and programs to protect and
promote the rights and well-being of indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples (ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of
their ancestral domains as well as their rights thereto; The National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) is vested with
jurisdiction over all claims and disputes involving the rights of
ICCs/IPs.—The NCIP is the primary government agency
responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies,
plans and programs to protect and promote the rights and well-
being of indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral domains as well as
their rights thereto. In order to fully effectuate its mandate, the
NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all claims and disputes
involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only condition precedent to the
NCIP’s assumption of jurisdiction over such disputes is that the
parties thereto shall have exhausted all remedies provided under
their customary laws and have obtained a certification from the
Council of Elders/Leaders who participated in the attempt to settle
the dispute that the same has not been resolved.
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
89
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 4, 2009 89
City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng
Same; Same; Same; Temporary Restraining Orders; The
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) may issue
temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without any
prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main action is
for injunction.—As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the
NCIP may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ
when the main action is for injunction. The power to issue
temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows parties to
a dispute over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to seek relief against
any action which may cause them grave or irreparable damage or
injury. In this case, the Regional Hearing Officer issued the
injunctive writ because its jurisdiction was called upon to protect
and preserve the rights of private respondents who are undoubtedly
members of ICCs/IPs.
Same; Same; Same; No restraining order or preliminary
injunction may be issued by any inferior court against the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) in any case, dispute or
controversy arising from or necessary to the interpretation of the
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and other laws
relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.—In order to reinforce
the powers of the NCIP, the IPRA even provides that no restraining
order or preliminary injunction may be issued by any inferior court
against the NCIP in any case, dispute or controversy arising from
or necessary to the interpretation of the IPRA and other laws
relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.
Same; Same; Indigenous People’s Rights Act of 1997 (R.A. No.
8371); The exemption of Baguio City from the Indigenous Peoples
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) cannot ipso facto be deduced because the
law concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or acquired
through any process before its effectivity.—Petitioners argue that
Baguio City is exempt from the provisions of the IPRA, and
necessarily the jurisdiction of the NCIP, by virtue of Sec. 78 thereof,
x x x The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is
governed by its own charter. Its exemption from the IPRA, however,
cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law concedes the validity
of prior land rights recognized or acquired through any process
before its effectivity. The IPRA demands that the city’s charter
respect the validity of these recognized land rights and titles.90
 90 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng
Same; Same; Same; Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be
a definitive recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land
claim.—Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a
definitive recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land claim.
The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan
families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as
claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not
acknowledge vested rights over the same. In fact, Proclamation No.
15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or
settlement.
Same; Same; Same; Busol Forest Reservation was declared by
the Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals,
172 SCRA 563 (1989).—The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest
Reservation was declared by the Court as inalienable in Heirs of
Gumangan v. Court of Appeals, 172 SCRA 563 (1989). The
declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such precludes its
conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts are not
endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
The City Legal Officer for petitioners.
Alfonso Aroco for respondents.
TINGA, J.:
Petitioners, the City Government of Baguio City,
represented by its Mayor, Reinaldo Bautista, Jr., the Anti-
Squatting Committee, represented by Atty. Melchor Carlos R.
Rabanes; the City Buildings and Architecture Office,
represented by Oscar Flores; and the Public Order and Safety
Office, represented by Emmanuel Reyes and later substituted
by Gregorio Deligero, assail the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 30-37; Penned by Associate Justice Estela M. Perlas-Bernabe
and concurred in by Associate Justices Marina L. Buzon and Lucas P.
Bersamin.
91
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 4, 2009 91
City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng
in CA G.R. SP No. 96895, dated April 16, 2007, and its
Resolution2dated September 11, 2007, which affirmed the
injunctive writ issued by the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) against the demolition orders of
petitioners.
The following undisputed facts are culled from the assailed
Decision:
“The case stemmed from the three (3) Demolition Orders issued
by the City Mayor of Baguio City, Braulio D. Yaranon, ordering the
demolition of the illegal structures constructed by Lazaro Bawas,
Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. and a certain Mr. Basatan on a portion of
the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora Hill, Baguio
City, without the required building permits and in violation of
Section 69 of Presidential Decree No. 705, as amended, Presidential
Decree No. 1096 and Republic Act No. 7279.
Pursuant thereto, the corresponding demolition advices dated
September 19, 2006 were issued informing the occupants thereon of
the intended demolition of the erected structures on October 17 to
20, 2006. Consequently, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and
Lazaro Bawas (hereinafter private respondents) filed a petition for
injunction with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction against the Office of the
City Mayor of Baguio City through its Acting City Mayor, Reynaldo
Bautista, the City Building and Architecture Office, the Anti-
Squatting Task Force, and the Public Order and Safety Division,
among others, (collectively called petitioners) before the National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera Administrative
Region (NCIP-CAR), Regional Hearing Office, La Trinidad,
Benguet, docketed as Case No. 31-CAR-06.
In their petition, private respondents basically claimed that the
lands where their residential houses stand are their ancestral lands
which they have been occupying and possessing openly and
continuously since time immemorial; that their ownership thereof
have been expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15 dated April
27, 1922 and recommended by the Department of Environment and
Natural Resources (DENR) for exclusion from the coverage of the
Busol Forest Reserve. They, thus, contended that the demolition of
_______________
2 Id., at pp. 39-40.
92
92 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng
their residential houses is a violation of their right of possession
and ownership of ancestral lands accorded by the Constitution and
the law, perforce, must be restrained.
On October 16 and 19, 2006, Regional Hearing Officer Atty.
Brain S. Masweng of the NCIP issued the two (2) assailed temporary
restraining orders (TRO) directing the petitioners and all persons
acting for and in their behalf to refrain from enforcing Demolition
Advice dated September 18, 2006; Demolition Order dated
September 19, 2006; Demolition Order No. 25, Series of 2004;
Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005; and Demolition Order No.
28, Series of 2004, for a total period of twenty (20) days.
Subsequently, the NCIP issued the other assailed Resolution
dated November 10, 2006 granting the private respondents’
application for preliminary injunction subject to the posting of an
injunctive bond each in the amount of P10,000.00.”3
Acting on the petition for certiorari filed by petitioners,4 the
Court of Appeals upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP over the
action filed by private respondents and affirmed the
temporary restraining orders dated October 165 and 19,
2006,6 and the Resolution dated November 10, 2006,7 granting
the application for a writ of preliminary injunction, issued by
the NCIP. The appellate court also ruled that Baguio City is
not exempt from the coverage of Republic Act No. 8371,
otherwise known as the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of 1997
(IPRA).
Petitioners assert that the NCIP has no jurisdiction to hear
and decide main actions for injunction such as the one filed by
private respondents. They claim that the NCIP has the
authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction only as auxiliary remedies to cases
pending before it.
_______________
3 Id., at pp. 31-35.
4 CA Rollo, pp. 2-23.
5 Id., at pp. 24-26.
6 Id., at pp. 27-33.
7 Id., at pp. 34-38.
93
VOL. 578, FEBRUARY 4, 2009 93
City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng
Further, the IPRA provides that Baguio City shall be
governed by its Charter. Thus, private respondents cannot
claim their alleged ancestral lands under the provisions of the
IPRA.
Petitioners contend that private respondents are not
entitled to the protection of an injunctive writ because they
encroached upon the Busol Forest Reservation and built
structures thereon without the requisite permit. Moreover,
this Court, in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court of Appeals,8 had
already declared that the Busol Forest Reservation is
inalienable and possession thereof, no matter how long, cannot
convert the same into private property. Even assuming that
private respondents have a pending application for ancestral
land claim, their right is at best contingent and cannot come
under the protective mantle of injunction.
Petitioners also claim that the Busol Forest Reservation is
exempt from ancestral claims as it is needed for public welfare.
It is allegedly one of the few remaining forests in Baguio City
and is the city’s main watershed.
Finally, petitioners contend that the demolition orders
were issued pursuant to the police power of the local
government.
In their Comment9 dated March 1, 2007, private
respondents defend the jurisdiction of the NCIP to take
cognizance of and decide main actions for injunction arguing
that the IPRA does not state that the NCIP may only issue
such writs of injunction as auxiliary remedies. Private
respondents also contend that the IPRA does not exempt
Baguio City from its coverage nor does it state that there are
no ancestral lands in Baguio City.
As members of the Ibaloi Indigenous Community native to
Baguio City, private respondents are treated as squatters
despite the fact that they hold native title to their ancestral
_______________
8 G.R. Nos. 75672 and 75673, April 19, 1989, 172 SCRA 563.
9 Rollo, pp. 186-203.
94
94 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng
land. The IPRA allegedly now recognizes ancestral lands held
by native title as never to have been public lands.
Private respondents aver that the Busol Forest Reservation
is subject to ancestral land claims. In fact, Proclamation No.
1510 dated April 27, 1922, which declared the area a forest
reserve, allegedly did not nullify the vested rights of private
respondents over their ancestral lands and even identified the
claimants of the particular portions within the forest reserve.
This claim of ownership is an exception to the government’s
contention that the whole area is a forest reservation.
Lastly, private respondents assert that the power of the city
mayor to order the demolition of certain structures is not
absolute. Regard should be taken of the fact that private
respondents cannot be issued building permits precisely
because they do not have paper titles over their ancestral
lands, a requirement for the issuance of a building permit
under the National Building Code.
Petitioners’ Reply to Comment11 dated June 11, 2008
merely reiterates their previous arguments.
We shall first dispose of the elemental issue of the NCIP’s
jurisdiction.
The NCIP is the primary government agency responsible
for the formulation and implementation of policies, plans and
programs to protect and promote the rights and well-being of
indigenous cultural communities/indigenous peoples
(ICCs/IPs) and the recognition of their ancestral domains as
well as their rights thereto.12 In order to fully effectuate its
mandate, the NCIP is vested with jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving the rights of ICCs/IPs. The only
condition precedent to the NCIP’s assumption of jurisdiction
over such disputes is that the parties thereto shall have
exhausted all remedies provided under their customary laws
and have obtained a
_______________
10 CA Rollo, pp. 85-87.
11 Rollo, pp. 228-233.
12 Rep. Act No. 8371 (1997), Sec. 3(k) and Sec. 38.
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City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng
certification from the Council of Elders/Leaders who
participated in the attempt to settle the dispute that the same
has not been resolved.13
In addition, NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 dated
April 9, 2003, known as the Rules on Pleadings, Practice and
Procedure Before the NCIP, reiterates the jurisdiction of the
NCIP over claims and disputes involving ancestral lands and
enumerates the actions that may be brought before the
commission. Sec. 5, Rule III thereof provides:
“Sec. 5. Jurisdiction of the NCIP.—The NCIP through its
Regional Hearing Offices shall exercise jurisdiction over all claims
and disputes involving rights of ICCs/IPs and all cases pertaining to
the implementation, enforcement, and interpretation of R.A. 8371,
including but not limited to the following:
(1) Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing
Office (RHO):
a. Cases involving disputes and controversies over
ancestral lands/domains of ICCs/IPs;
b. Cases involving violations of the requirement of free
and prior and informed consent of ICCs/IPs;
 c. Actions for enforcement of decisions of ICCs/IPs
involving violations of customary laws or desecration of
ceremonial sites, sacred places, or rituals;
d. Actions for redemption/reconveyance under Section
8(b) of R.A. 8371; and
e. Such other cases analogous to the foregoing.
(2) Original Jurisdiction of the Regional Hearing Officer:
a. Cases affecting property rights, claims of ownership,
hereditary succession, and settlement of land disputes,
between and among ICCs/IPs that have not been settled under
customary laws; and
b. Actions for damages arising out of any violation of
Republic Act No. 8371.
_______________
13 Rep. Act No. 8371 (1997), Sec. 66.
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96 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng
(3) Exclusive and Original Jurisdiction of the Commission:
a. Petition for cancellation of Certificate of Ancestral
Domain Titles/Certificate of Ancestral Land Titles (CADTs/
CALTs) alleged to have been fraudulently acquired by, and
issued to, any person or community as provided for under
Section 54 of R.A. 8371. Provided that such action is filed
within one (1) year from the date of registration.”
In order to determine whether the NCIP has jurisdiction
over the dispute in accordance with the foregoing provisions,
it is necessary to resolve, on the basis of the allegations in their
petition, whether private respondents are members of
ICCs/IPs. In their petition14 filed before the NCIP, private
respondents, members of the Ibaloi tribe who first settled in
Baguio City, were asserting ownership of portions of the Busol
Forest Reservation which they claim to be their ancestral
lands. Correctly denominated as a petition for injunction as it
sought to prevent the enforcement of the demolition orders
issued by the City Mayor, the petition traced private
respondents’ ancestry to Molintas and Gumangan and
asserted their possession, occupation and utilization of their
ancestral lands. The petition also alleged that private
respondents’ claim over these lands had been recognized by
Proclamation No. 15 which mentions the names of Molintas
and Gumangan as having claims over portions of the Busol
Forest Reservation.15
Clearly then, the allegations in the petition, which
axiomatically determine the nature of the action and the
jurisdiction of a particular tribunal,16 squarely qualify it as a
“dispute(s) or controversy(s) over ancestral lands/domains of
ICCs/IPs” within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of the
NCIP-RHO.
_______________
14 CA Rollo, pp. 78-84.
15 Id., at pp. 86-87.
16 Abacus Securities Corporation v. Ampil, G.R. No. 160016, February 27,
2006, 483 SCRA 315; Ballesteros v. Abion, G.R. No. 143361, February 9, 2006,
482 SCRA 23.
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City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng
The IPRA, furthermore, endows the NCIP with the power
to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction.
Sec. 69 thereof states:
“Sec. 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.—The NCIP shall
have the power and authority:
a) To promulgate rules and regulations governing the hearing
and disposition of cases filed before it as well as those pertaining to
its internal functions and such rules and regulations as may be
necessary to carry out the purposes of this Act;
b) To administer oaths, summon the parties to a controversy,
issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and testimony of
witnesses or the production of such books, papers, contracts,
records, agreements, and other document of similar nature as may
be material to a just determination of the matter under
investigation or hearing conducted in pursuance of this Act;
c) To hold any person in contempt, directly or indirectly, and
impose appropriate penalties therefor; and
 d) To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any
case pending before it which, if not restrained forthwith,
may cause grave or irreparable damage to any of the parties
to the case or seriously affect social or economic
activity.” [Emphasis supplied]
NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03 echoes the above-
quoted provision in Sec. 82, Rule XV, which provides:
“Sec. 82. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order.—A writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order may
be granted by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Sections
59 and 69 of R.A. [No.] 8371 when it is established, on the basis of
sworn allegations in a petition, that the acts complained of involving
or arising from any case, if not restrained forthwith, may cause
grave or irreparable damage or injury to any of the parties, or
seriously affect social or economic activity. This power may also be
exercised by RHOs in cases pending before them in order to preserve
the rights of the parties.”
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As can be gleaned from the foregoing provisions, the NCIP
may issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of the
writ when the main action is for injunction. The power to issue
temporary restraining orders or writs of injunction allows
parties to a dispute over which the NCIP has jurisdiction to
seek relief against any action which may cause them grave or
irreparable damage or injury. In this case, the Regional
Hearing Officer issued the injunctive writ because its
jurisdiction was called upon to protect and preserve the rights
of private respondents who are undoubtedly members of
ICCs/IPs.
Parenthetically, in order to reinforce the powers of the
NCIP, the IPRA even provides that no restraining order or
preliminary injunction may be issued by any inferior court
against the NCIP in any case, dispute or controversy arising
from or necessary to the interpretation of the IPRA and other
laws relating to ICCs/IPs and ancestral domains.17
Petitioners argue that Baguio City is exempt from the
provisions of the IPRA, and necessarily the jurisdiction of the
NCIP, by virtue of Sec. 78 thereof, which states:
“SEC. 78. Special Provision.—The City of Baguio shall remain
to be governed by its Charter and all lands proclaimed as part of its
townsite reservation shall remain as such until otherwise
reclassified by appropriate legislation: Provided, That prior land
rights and titles recognized and/or acquired through any
judicial, administrative or other processes before the
effectivity of this Act shall remain valid: Provided,
further, That this provision shall not apply to any territory which
becomes part of the City of Baguio after the effectivity of this Act.”
[Emphasis supplied]
The foregoing provision indeed states that Baguio City is
governed by its own charter. Its exemption from the IPRA,
however, cannot ipso facto be deduced because the law
concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or
acquired
_______________
17 Rep. Act No. 8371 (1997), Sec. 70.
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City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng
through any process before its effectivity. The IPRA demands
that the city’s charter respect the validity of these recognized
land rights and titles.
The crucial question to be asked then is whether private
respondents’ ancestral land claim was indeed recognized by
Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their right thereto may be
protected by an injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show
that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts
against which injunction is directed are violative of said
right.18
Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a
definitive recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land
claim. The proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and
Gumangan families, the predecessors-in-interest of private
respondents, as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest
Reservation but does not acknowledge vested rights over the
same. In fact, Proclamation No. 15 explicitly withdraws the
Busol Forest Reservation from sale or settlement. It provides:
“Pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen hundred and
twenty-six of Act Numbered Twenty-seven Hundred and eleven[,] I
hereby establish the Busol Forest Reservation to be administered
by the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose of conserving and
protecting water and timber, the protection of the water supply
being of primary importance and all other uses of the forest are to
be subordinated to that purpose. I therefore withdraw from sale or
settlement the following described parcels of the public domain
situated in the Township of La Trinidad, City of Baguio, Mountain
Province, Island of Luzon, to wit:”
The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation
was declared by the Court as inalienable in Heirs of
Gumangan v. Court of Appeals.19 The declaration of the Busol
Forest
entitled, Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and Lazaro
Bawas v. Office of the City Mayor of Baguio City, et al. is
DISMISSED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Quisumbing (Chairperson), Carpio-Morales, Velasco,
Jr. and Brion, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set
aside.
Note.—The duty of the court taking cognizance of a prayer
for a writ of preliminary injunction is to determine whether
the requisites necessary for the grant of an injunction are
present in the case before it. (Manila International Airport
Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 397 SCRA 348 [2003])
——o0o——
© Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

_______________

18 Viray v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 92481, November 9, 1990, 191 SCRA
308.
19 Supra note 8.
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100 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
City Government of Baguio City vs. Masweng
Reservation as such precludes its conversion into private
property. Relatedly, the courts are not endowed with
jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest lands.
All told, although the NCIP has the authority to issue
temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction, we are
not convinced that private respondents are entitled to the
relief granted by the Commission.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 96895
dated April 16, 2007 and its Resolution dated September 11,
2007 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Case No. 31-CAR-06
 G.R. No. 180882. February 27, 2013.*
THE BAGUIO REGREENING MOVEMENT, INC.,
represented by ATTY. ERDOLFO V. BALAJADIA; CITY
ENVIRONMENT AND PARKS MANAGEMENT OFFICE,
represented by its Officer-in-Charge, Cordelia C. Lacsamana;
and THE BUSOL FOREST RESERVATION TASK FORCE,
represented by its Team Leader, Victor Dictag,
petitioners, vs. ATTY. BRAIN MASWENG, in his capacity as
Regional Hearing Officer, NCIP-CAR; ELIZABETH MAT-AN,
for herself and as representative of the heirs of Rafael;
JUDITH MARANES, for herself and as representative of the
heirs of Molintas; HELEN LUBOS, for herself and as
representative of the heirs of Kalomis; MAGDALENA
GUMANGAN QUE, for herself and as representative of the
heirs of Gumangan; Spouses ALEXANDER AMPAGUEY and
LUCIA AMPAGUEY; and Spouses CARMEN PANAYO and
MELANIO PANAYO, respondents.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
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110 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Prohibition; Government
Infrastructure Projects; The governing law as regards the
prohibition to issue restraining orders and injunctions against
government infrastructure projects is Republic Act No. 8975, which
modified Presidential Decree No. 1818.—The governing law as
regards the prohibition to issue restraining orders and injunctions
against government infrastructure projects is Republic Act No.
8975, which modified Presidential Decree No. 1818, the law cited by
the parties, upon its effectivity on November 26, 2000. Section 9 of
Republic Act No. 8975 provides: Section 9. Repealing Clause.—All
laws, decrees, including Presidential Decree Nos. 605, 1818 and
Republic Act No. 7160, as amended, orders, rules and regulations or
parts thereof inconsistent with this Act are hereby repealed or
amended accordingly.
Administrative Law; Judges; Penalties; Any judge who shall
issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or
preliminary mandatory injunction in violation of Section 3, Republic
Act No. 8975, shall suffer the penalty of suspension of at least sixty
(60) days without pay.—Should a judge violate Section 3, Republic
Act No. 8975 provides the following penalty: Section 6. Penal
Sanction.—In addition to any civil and criminal liabilities he or she
may incur under existing laws, any judge who shall issue a
temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary
mandatory injunction in violation of Section 3 hereof, shall suffer
the penalty of suspension of at least sixty (60) days without pay.
(Emphasis added.) It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the
prohibition covers only judges, and does not apply to the NCIP or its
hearing officers. In this respect, Republic Act No. 8975 conforms to
the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 605 and Presidential Decree
No. 1818, both of which enjoin only the courts.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Stare Decisis; Under the
doctrine of stare decisis, once a court has laid down a principle of
law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that
principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same.—While res judicata does not apply on
account of the different subject matters of the case at bar and G.R.
No. 180206 (they assail different writs of injunction, albeit issued
by the same hearing officer), we are constrained by the principle
of stare decisis to grant the instant petition. The Court explained
the principle of stare decisis in Ting v. Velez-Ting, 582 SCRA 694
(2009): The principle of stare
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The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the
principle that once a question of law has been examined and
decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.
Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same issues,
necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil
Code. (Citations omitted.) We have also previously held that
“[u]nder the doctrine of stare decisis, once a court has laid down a
principle of law as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere
to that principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are
substantially the same.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and
resolution of the Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Melchor Carlos R. Rabanes for petitioners.
The Law Firm of Avila, Reyes, Licnachan, Maceda, Lim,
Arevalo & Libiran for respondents.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Revised Rule on Civil Procedure assailing the Decision1 of
the Court of Appeals dated April 30, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No.
78570 insofar as it affirmed the issuances of National
Commission on Indigenous Peoples (NCIP) Hearing Officer
Brain Masweng, and the Resolution of the same court dated
December 11, 2007 denying petitioners’ Motion for Partial
Reconsideration.
Herein private respondents Elizabeth Mat-an, Judith
Maranes, Helen Lubos, Magdalena Gumangan Que, spouses
Alexander and Lucia Ampaguey, and spouses Melanio and
_______________
1 Rollo, pp. 48-63; penned by Associate Justice Edgardo P. Cruz with
Associate Justices Fernanda Lampas-Peralta and Normandie B. Pizarro,
concurring.
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112 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
Carmen Panayo, claiming that their parents inherited from
their ancestors several parcels of land in what is now known
as the Busol Watershed Reservation, filed before the NCIP a
Petition for Injunction, with an application for a Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO), and thereafter a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction seeking to enjoin the Baguio District Engineer’s
Office, the Office of the City Architect and Parks
Superintendent, and petitioners The Baguio Regreening
Movement, Inc. and the Busol Task Force from fencing the
Busol Watershed Reservation.
In their Petition before the NCIP, private respondents
claim that they are members of the Ibaloi and Kankanaey
tribes of Baguio City. Their ancestors’ ownership of the
properties now known as the Busol Watershed Reservation
was allegedly expressly recognized in Proclamation No. 15
issued by Governor General Leonard Wood. As owners of said
properties, their ancestors paid the realty taxes thereon. The
fencing project of petitioners would allegedly impede their
access to and from their residences, farmlands and water
sources, and dispossess them of their yard where tribal rituals
and ceremonies are usually held.
On October 21, 2002, NCIP Regional Hearing Officer Brain
S. Masweng issued a TRO, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the petition in order and that grave
injustice may result should the acts complained of be not
immediately restrained, a Temporary Restraining Order is hereby
issued pursuant to Section 69 (d) of R.A. 8371, ordering the
respondents namely, the Baguio District Engineer’s Office,
represented by Engineer Nestor M. Nicolas, the Project Contractor,
Mr. Pel-ey, the Baguio Regreening Movement Inc., represented by
Atty. Erdolfo V. Balajadia, the Busol Task Force, represented by its
Team Leader, Moises G. Anipew, the Baguio City Architect and
Parks Superintendent Office, represented by Arch. Ignacio
Estipona, and all persons acting for and their behalf (sic) of the
respondents[,] their agents and/or persons whomever acting for and
their behalf (sic), to refrain, stop, cease and desist from fencing
and/or constructing fences around
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The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
and between the areas and premises of petitioners, ancestral land
claims, specifically identified in Proclamation No. 15 as Lot “A” with
an area of 143,190 square meters, included within the boundary
lines, Lot “B” 77,855 square meters, included within the boundary
lines, Lot “C” 121,115 square meters, included within the boundary
lines, Lot “D” 33,839 square meters, included within the boundary
lines, Lot “E” 87,903 square meters, included within the boundary
lines, Lot “F” 39,487 square meters, included within the boundary
lines, Lot “G” 11,620 square meters, included within the boundary
lines, Lot “H” 17,453 square meters, included within the boundary
lines, Lot “J” 40,000 square meters, included within the boundary
lines, all described and embraced under Proclamation No. 15, the
land embraced and described under the approved plan No. 12064 of
the then Director of Lands, containing an area of 186, square meters
surveyed for Gumangan, the land covered by LRC PSD 52910,
containing an area of 77,849 square meters as surveyed for Emily
Kalomis, that land covered by survey plan 11935 Amd, containing
an area of 263153 square meters as surveyed for Molintas, and that
land covered by AP-7489, containing an area of 155084 as surveyed
for the heirs of Rafael.
This Restraining Order shall be effective for a period of twenty
(20) days from receipt hereof.
Meantime, the respondents are further ordered to show cause on
November 5, 2002 (Tuesday) at 2:00 o’clock in the afternoon, why
petitioners’ prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction should not be granted.2
On November 6, 2002, Atty. Masweng denied petitioners’
motion to dissolve the TRO, explaining that a TRO may be
issued motu proprio where the matter is of extreme urgency
and the applicant will suffer grave injustice and irreparable
injury. He further stated that petitioners failed to comply with
the procedure laid down in Section 6, Rule 58 of the Rules of
Court.
On November 12, 2002, Atty. Masweng issued an Order,
the dispositive portion of which states:
_______________
2 Id., at p. 93.
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114 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
WHEREFORE, a writ of preliminary injunction is hereby issued
against the respondents, their agents, or persons acting for and in
their behalves (sic), ordering them to refrain, cease and desist from
implementing their fencing project during the pendancy (sic) of the
above-entitled case in any portion of petitioners’ ancestral land
claims within the Busol Watershed Reservation. The lands being
identified under Proclamation No. 15 as lot[s] ‘A’, ‘B’, ‘C’, ‘D’, ‘E’, ‘F’,
‘G’, ‘H’, and ‘J’, including the lands covered by Petitioners’ approved
survey plans as follows: that land identified and plotted under
Survey Plan No. B.L. FILE No. II-11836, September, 1916 surveyed
for Gumangan; that land covered by PSD-52910, May, 1921,
surveyed for Emily Kalomis; that land covered by survey plan II-
11935 Amd, 1916, surveyed for Molintas; and that land covered by
Survey Plan No. AP 7489, March 1916, surveyed for the heirs of
Rafael.
The writ of preliminary injunction shall be effective and shall be
enforced only upon petitioners’ compliance with the required
injunctive bond of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00) each in
compliance with Section 3, R.A. 8975.3
Atty. Masweng ruled that the NCIP has jurisdiction over
all claims and disputes involving rights of Indigenous Cultural
Communities (ICCs) and Indigenous Peoples (IPs) and, in the
exercise of its jurisdiction, may issue injunctive writs.
According to Atty. Masweng, the allegations in the verified
petition show that private respondents invoked the provisions
of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous
Peoples Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA), when they sought to enjoin
petitioners from fencing their ancestral lands within the Busol
Watershed Reservation. Petitioners’ fencing project violated
Section 58 of the IPRA, which requires the prior written
consent of the affected ICCs/IPs. The NCIP therefore has
authority to hear the petition filed by private respondents and
to issue the injunctive writ. As regards petitioners’ contention
that the issuance of the TRO violated Presidential Decree No.
_______________
3 CA Rollo, pp. 38-39.
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The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
1818, Atty. Masweng applied the Decision of this Court
in Malaga v. Penachos, Jr.,4 and held that:
[R]espondent’s project of fencing the Busol Watershed is not in the
exercise of administrative discretion involving a very technical
matter. This is so since the implementation of the fencing project
would traverse along lands occupied by people who claim that they
have a legal right over their lands. The fence would actually cut
across, divide, or segregate lands occupied by people. The effect of it
would fence in and fence out property claims. In this case,
petitioners invoke their constitutional rights to be protected against
deprivation of property without due process of law and of taking
private property without just compensation. Such situations involve
pure question of law.5
As regards the invocation of res judicata by petitioners,
Atty. Masweng held that they failed to present copies of the
Decisions supposedly rendered by the Regional Trial Court
and the Supreme Court.
On November 29, 2002, petitioners filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the above Order. On June 20, 2003, Atty.
Masweng denied said Motion on the ground that the same was
filed out of time.
Petitioners filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition
for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of
Atty. Masweng in issuing the TRO and the writ of preliminary
injunction.
On April 30, 2007, the Court of Appeals rendered its
Decision dismissing petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari. The
dispositive portion of the Decision is as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition
is DISMISSED and the assailed orders of public
respondent AFFIRMED. Nevertheless, private respondents are
hereby enjoined
_______________
4 G.R. No. 86695, September 3, 1992, 213 SCRA 516.
5 CA Rollo, p. 35.
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116 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
from (i) introducing constructions at the Busol Watershed and
Forest Reservation and (ii) engaging in activities that degrade the
resources therein until viable measures or programs for the
maintenance, preservation and development of said reservation are
adopted pursuant to Sec. 58 of Rep. Act No. 8371.6
The Court of Appeals ruled that since the petition before
the NCIP involves the protection of private respondents’ rights
to their ancestral domains in accordance with Section 7(b), (c)
and (g)7 of the IPRA, the NCIP clearly has jurisdiction
_______________
6 Rollo, p. 62.
7 Section 7. Rights to Ancestral Domains.—The rights of ownership and
possession of ICCs/IPs to their ancestral domains shall be recognized and
protected. Such rights shall include:
xxxx
b) Right to Develop Lands and Natural Resources.—Subject to Section 56
hereof, right to develop, control and use lands and territories traditionally
occupied, owned, or used; to manage and conserve natural resources within the
territories and uphold the responsibilities for future generations; to benefit and
share the profits from allocation and utilization of the natural resources found
therein; the right to negotiate the terms and conditions for the exploration of
natural resources in the areas for the purpose of ensuring ecological,
environmental protection and the conservation measures, pursuant to national
and customary laws; the right to an informed and intelligent participation in
the formulation and implementation of any project, government or private,
that will affect or impact upon the ancestral domains and to receive just and
fair compensation for any damages which they may sustain as a result of the
project; and the right to effective measures by the government to prevent any
interference with, alienation and encroachment upon these rights;
c) Right to Stay in the Territories.—The right to stay in the territory and
not to be removed therefrom. No ICCs/IPs will be relocated without their free
and prior informed consent, nor through any means other than eminent
domain. Where relocation is considered necessary as an exceptional measure,
such relocation shall take place only with the free and prior informed consent
of the ICCs/IPs concerned and whenever possible, they shall be guaranteed the
right to return to their ancestral domains, as soon as the grounds for
117
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The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
over the dispute pursuant to Section 66. The Court of Appeals
also upheld the conclusion of Atty. Masweng that the NCIP
can issue injunctive writs as a principal relief against acts
adversely affecting or infringing on the rights of ICCs or IPs,
because “(t)o rule otherwise would render NCIP inutile in
preventing acts committed in violation of the IPRA.”8
As regards petitioners’ allegations that government
reservations such as the subject Busol Watershed cannot be
the subject of ancestral domain claims, the Court of Appeals
pointed out that Section 589 of the IPRA in fact mandates the
_______________
relocation cease to exist. When such return is not possible, as determined
by agreement or through appropriate procedures, ICCs/IPs shall be provided
in all possible cases with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to that
of the land previously occupied by them, suitable to provide for their present
needs and future development. Persons thus relocated shall likewise be fully
compensated for any resulting loss or injury;
xxxx
g) Right to Claim Parts of Reservations.—The right to claim parts of the
ancestral domains which have been reserved for various purposes, except those
reserved and intended for common and public welfare and service[.]
8 Rollo, p. 59.
9 Section 58. Environmental Considerations.—Ancestral domains or
portions thereof, which are found to be necessary for critical watersheds,
mangroves, wildlife sanctuaries, wilderness, protected areas, forest cover, or
reforestation as determined by appropriate agencies with the full participation
of the ICCs/IPs concerned shall be maintained, managed and developed for
such purposes. The ICCs/IPs concerned shall be given the responsibility to
maintain, develop, protect and conserve such areas with the full and effective
assistance of government agencies. Should the ICCs/IPs decide to transfer the
responsibility over the areas, said decision must be made in writing. The
consent of the ICCs/IPs should be arrived at in accordance with its customary
laws without prejudice to the basic requirements of existing laws on free and
prior informed consent: Provided, That the transfer shall be temporary and
will ultimately revert to the ICCs/IPs in accordance with a program for
technology
118
118 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
full participation of ICCs/IPs in the maintenance,
management, and development of ancestral domains or
portions thereof that are necessary for critical watersheds.
The IPRA, thus, gives the ICCs/IPs responsibility to maintain,
develop, protect, and conserve such areas with the full and
effective assistance of government agencies.10
Despite ruling in favor of private respondents, the Court of
Appeals nevertheless found merit in petitioners’ own
application for injunction and observed that certain activities
by private respondents without regard for environmental
considerations could result in irreparable damage to the
watershed and the ecosystem. Thus, the Court of Appeals
enjoined private respondents from introducing constructions
at the Busol Watershed and from engaging in activities that
degrade its resources, until viable measures or programs for
the maintenance, preservation and development of said
reservation are adopted pursuant to the aforementioned
Section 58 of the IPRA.
Hence, the present Petition for Review wherein petitioners
assert the following grounds:
1. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY
ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE NCIP’S ISSUANCE OF A
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER AND WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DESPITE CLEAR AND PATENT
VIOLATION OF P.D. 1818, SUPREME COURT CIRCULAR NO.
68-94 AND SUPREME COURT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR
NO. 11-2000;
2. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE ACT OF THE NCIP IN ISSUING A
20-DAYS TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER EX
PARTE SANS THE MANDATORY NOTICE AND HEARING FOR
THE ISSUANCE THEREOF;
_______________
transfer: Provided, further, That no ICCs/IPs shall be displaced or relocated for
the purpose enumerated under this section without the written consent of the
specific persons authorized to give consent.
10 Rollo, p. 61.
119
VOL. 692, FEBRUARY 27, 2013 119
The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
3. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY
ERRED IN SUSTAINING THE NCIP’S ISSUANCE OF A WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION DESPITE ABSOLUTE ABSENCE
OF CLEAR, UNMISTAKABLE AND POSIT[I]VE LEGAL RIGHTS
ON THE PART OF THE APPLICANTS;
4. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY
ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE NCIP HEARING OFFICER
HAS JURISDICTION OVER A CASE OF INJUNCTION
INVOLVING A GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECT;
5. THE COURT OF APPEALS PATENTLY AND GRAVELY
ERRED IN BRUSHING ASIDE SECTION 78, A SPECIAL
PROVISION OF REPUBLIC ACT 8371 WHICH EXCLUDES THE
CITY OF BAGUIO FROM THE COVERAGE OF ANCESTRAL
LAND CLAIMS APPLICATIONS;
6. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY AND PATENTLY
ERRED IN UPHOLDING RULE XIII OF THE IMPLEMENTING
RULES OF REPUBLIC ACT 8371, EVEN IF THE PROVISIONS
OF SAID RULE XIII CLEARLY OVERSTEPPED AND
EXCEEDED SECTION 78 OF R.A. 8371.11
TRO and Preliminary Injunction against Government
Infrastructure Projects
The governing law as regards the prohibition to issue
restraining orders and injunctions against government
infrastructure projects is Republic Act No. 8975,12 which
modified Presidential Decree No. 1818, the law cited by the
parties, upon its effectivity on November 26, 2000.13 Section 9
of Republic Act No. 8975 provides:
_______________
11 Id., at pp. 20-21.
12 AN ACT TO ENSURE THE EXPEDITIOUS IMPLEMENTATION AND COMPLETION
OF GOVERNMENT INFRASTRUCTURE PROJECTS BY PROHIBITING LOWER COURTS
FROM ISSUING TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDERS, PRELIMINARY INJUNCTIONS OR
PRELIMINARY MANDATORY INJUNCTIONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATIONS
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.
13 Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8975 provides that the Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in at least
120
120 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
Section 9. Repealing Clause.—All laws, decrees, including
Presidential Decree Nos. 605, 1818 and Republic Act No. 7160, as
amended, orders, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent
with this Act are hereby repealed or amended accordingly.
Thus, in GV Diversified International, Incorporated v.
Court of Appeals,14 we ruled that Presidential Decree No. 1818
have been effectively superseded by Republic Act No. 8975.
The prohibition is thus now delineated in Section 3 of said
latter law, which provides:
Section 3. Prohibition on the Issuance of Temporary
Restraining Orders, Preliminary Injunctions and Preliminary
Mandatory Injunctions.—No court, except the Supreme Court,
shall issue any temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction
or preliminary mandatory injunction against the government, or
any of its subdivisions, officials or any person or entity, whether
public or private, acting under the government’s direction, to
restrain, prohibit or compel the following acts:
(a) Acquisition, clearance and development of the right-of-way
and/or site or location of any national government project;
(b) Bidding or awarding of contract/project of the national
government as defined under Section 2 hereof;
(c) Commencement, prosecution, execution, implementation,
operation of any such contract or project;
(d) Termination or rescission of any such contract/project; and
(e) The undertaking or authorization of any other lawful
activity necessary for such contract/project.
This prohibition shall apply to all cases, disputes or controversies
instituted by a private party, including but not limited to cases filed
by bidders or those claiming to have rights through such bidders
involving such contract/project. This prohibition shall not apply
when the matter is of extreme urgency involving a constitutional
issue, such that unless a temporary restraining order is issued,
_______________
two (2) newspapers of general circulation. Republic Act No. 8975 was published
in Malaya and the Manila Bulletin on November 11, 2000.
14 532 Phil. 296, 302; 500 SCRA 589, 596 (2006).
121
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The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
grave injustice and irreparable injury will arise. The applicant shall
file a bond, in an amount to be fixed by the court, which bond shall
accrue in favor of the government if the court should finally decide
that the applicant was not entitled to the relief sought.
If after due hearing the court finds that the award of the contract
is null and void, the court may, if appropriate under the
circumstances, award the contract to the qualified and winning
bidder or order a rebidding of the same, without prejudice to any
liability that the guilty party may incur under the existing laws.
(Emphasis supplied.)
Should a judge violate the preceding section, Republic Act
No. 8975 provides the following penalty:
Section 6. Penal Sanction.—In addition to any civil and
criminal liabilities he or she may incur under existing laws, any
judge who shall issue a temporary restraining order, preliminary
injunction or preliminary mandatory injunction in violation of
Section 3 hereof, shall suffer the penalty of suspension of at least
sixty (60) days without pay. (Emphasis added.)
 It is clear from the foregoing provisions that the prohibition
covers only judges, and does not apply to the NCIP or its
hearing officers. In this respect, Republic Act No. 8975
conforms to the coverage of Presidential Decree No. 60515 and
Presidential Decree No. 1818,16 both of which enjoin only the
_______________
15 Section 1. No court of the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order, preliminary injunction or preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case involving or growing out of the issuance, approval or
disapproval, revocation or suspension of, or any action whatsoever by the
proper administrative official or body on concessions, licenses, permits,
patents, or public grants of any kind in connection with the disposition,
exploitation, utilization, exploration and/or development of the natural
resources of the Philippines.
16 Section 1. No court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue
any restraining order, preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory
injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy involving an infrastructure
project, or a mining, fishery, forest or
122
122 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
courts. Accordingly, we cannot nullify the assailed Orders on
the ground of violation of said laws.
The Court’s Previous Decision in
G.R. No. 180206
On February 4, 2009, this Court promulgated its Decision
in G.R. No. 180206, a suit which involved several of the parties
in the case at bar. In G.R. No. 180206, the City Mayor of
Baguio City issued three Demolition Orders with respect to
allegedly illegal structures constructed by private respondents
therein on a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation. Private
respondents filed a Petition for Injunction with the NCIP.
Atty. Masweng issued two temporary restraining orders
directing the City Government of Baguio to refrain from
enforcing said Demolition Orders and subsequently granted
private respondents’ application for a preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals, acting on petitioners’ Petition
for Certiorari, affirmed the temporary restraining orders and
the writ of preliminary injunction.
This Court then upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP on the
basis of the allegations in private respondents’ Petition for
Injunction. It was similarly claimed in said Petition for
Injunction that private respondents were descendants of
Molintas and Gumangan whose claims over the portions of the
Busol Watershed Reservation had been recognized by
Proclamation No. 15. This Court thus ruled in G.R. No. 180206
that the nature of the action clearly qualify it as a dispute or
_______________
other natural resource development projects of the government, or any
public utility operated by the government, including among others public
utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and arrastre
contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or governmental official
from proceeding with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any
such project, or the operation of such public utility, or pursuing any lawful
activity necessary for such execution, implementation or operation.
123
VOL. 692, FEBRUARY 27, 2013 123
The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
controversy over ancestral lands/domains of the ICCs/IPs.17 On
the basis of Section 69(d)18 of the IPRA and Section 82, Rule
XV19 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03, the NCIP may
issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction
without any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when
the main action is for injunction.20
On petitioners’ argument that the City of Baguio is exempt
from the provisions of the IPRA and, consequently, the
jurisdiction of the NCIP, this Court ruled in G.R. No. 180206
that said exemption cannot ipso facto be deduced from Section
7821
_______________
17 City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng, G.R. No. 180206, February
4, 2009, 578 SCRA 88, 96.
18 Section 69. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the NCIP.—The NCIP shall
have the power and authority:
xxxx
d) To enjoin any or all acts involving or arising from any case pending
before it which, if not restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable
damage to any of the parties to the case or seriously affect social or economic
activity.
 19 Section 82. Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order.—A writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order may
be granted by the Commission pursuant to the provisions of Sections 59 and
69 of R.A. 8371 when it is established, on the basis of sworn allegations in a
petition, that the acts complained of involving or arising from any case, if not
restrained forthwith, may cause grave or irreparable damage or injury to any
of the parties, or seriously affect social or economic activity. This power may
also be exercised by RHOs in cases pending before them in order to preserve
the rights of the parties.
20 City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng, supra note 17 at pp. 97-98.
21 Section 78. Special Provision.—The City of Baguio shall remain to be
governed by its Charter and all lands proclaimed as part of its townsite
reservation shall remain as such until otherwise reclassified by appropriate
legislation: Provided, That prior land rights and titles recognized and/or
acquired through any judicial, administrative or other processes before the
effectivity of this Act shall remain valid: Provided, further, That this provision
shall not
124
124 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
of the IPRA because the law concedes the validity of prior land
rights recognized or acquired through any process before its
effectivity.22
Lastly, however, this Court ruled that although the NCIP
has the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and
writs of injunction, it was not convinced that private
respondents were entitled to the relief granted by the
Commission.23 Proclamation No. 15 does not appear to be a
definitive recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land
claim, as it merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan
families as claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest
Reservation, but does not acknowledge vested rights over the
same.24 Since it is required before the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction that claimants show the existence of a
right to be protected, this Court, in G.R. No. 180206,
ultimately granted the petition of the City Government of
Baguio and set aside the writ of preliminary injunction issued
therein.
In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents
present the very same arguments and counter-arguments
with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of the
Busol Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are thus
being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at bar,
except that different writs of injunction are being assailed. In
both cases, petitioners claim (1) that Atty. Masweng is
prohibited from issuing temporary restraining orders and
writs of preliminary injunction against government
infrastructure projects; (2) that Baguio City is beyond the
ambit of the IPRA; and (3) that private respondents have not
shown a clear right to be protected. Private respondents, on
the other hand, presented the same allegations in their
Petition for Injunction,
_______________
apply to any territory which becomes part of the City of Baguio after the
effectivity of this Act.
22 City Government of Baguio City v. Masweng, supra note 17 at pp. 98-99.
23 Id., at p. 100.
24 Id., at pp. 99-100.
125
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The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
particularly the alleged recognition made under Proclamation
No. 15 in favor of their ancestors. While res judicata does not
apply on account of the different subject matters of the case at
bar and G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different writs of
injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer), we are
constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the
instant petition. The Court explained the principle of stare
decisis25 in Ting v. Velez-Ting:26
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts
to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final decisions. It
is based on the principle that once a question of law has been
examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to
further argument. Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate
the same issues, necessary for two simple reasons: economy and
stability. In our jurisdiction, the principle 1s entrenched in Article
8 of the Civil Code. (Citations omitted.)
We have also previously held that “[u]nder the doctrine
of stare decisis, once a court has laid down a principle of law
as applicable to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that Notes.—Republic Act No. 8974 covers expropriation
principle and apply it to all future cases where the facts are proceedings intended for national government infrastructure
substantially the same.”27 projects. (National Power Corporation vs. Co, 578 SCRA 234
However, even though the principal action in the case at [2009])
bar is denominated as a petition for injunction, the relief The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence to judicial
prayed for and granted by the NCIP partakes of the nature of precedents. It requires courts in a country to follow the rule
a preliminary injunction in the sense that its effectivity would established in a decision of its Supreme Court. (Government
cease the moment the NCIP issues its decision in an Service Insurance System [GSIS] vs. Buenviaje-Carreon, 678
appropriate action. The conclusions of this Court in both the SCRA 259 [2012])
case at bar and that in G.R. No. 180206 as regards private ——o0o——
respondents’ ancestral land claim should therefore be © Copyright 2019 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.
considered provisional, as they are based merely on the
allegations in the
_______________
25 Stare decisis et non quieta movere (Stand by the decision and disturb not
what is settled).
26 G.R. No. 166562, March 31, 2009, 582 SCRA 694, 704-705.
27 Tala Realty Services Corporation v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130088,
April 7, 2009, 584 SCRA 63, 79.
126
126 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc. vs. Masweng
complaint or petition and not on evidence adduced in a full-
blown proceeding on the merits by the proper tribunal. Private
respondents are therefore not barred from proving their
alleged ancestral domain claim in the appropriate proceeding,
despite the denial of the temporary injunctive relief prayed
for.
WHEREFORE, the present Petition for Review
on Certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Decision and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78570
dated April 30, 2007 and December 11, 2007, respectively, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (C.J., Chairperson), Bersamin, Villarama,
Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set
aside.

G.R. No. 188913. February 19, 2014.*
CITY GOVERNMENT OF BAGUIO, herein represented by
CITY MAYOR REINALDO A. BAUTISTA, JR., petitioner, vs.
ATTY. BRAIN S. MASWENG, respondent.
Remedial Law; Special Civil Actions; Contempt; Words and
Phrases; Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court
by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity.—
Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court by acting
in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It signifies not only
a willful disregard or disobedience of the court’s orders, but such
conduct which tends to bring the authority of the court and the
administration of law into disrepute or in some manner to impede
the due administration of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of
the authority, justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends
to bring the authority and administration of the law into disrespect
or to interfere with or prejudice party litigants or their witnesses
during litigation.
Same; Same; Same; The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders,
and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice.—The power to punish for contempt is
inherent in all courts and is essential to the preservation of order in
judicial proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders,
and mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice. Only in cases of clear and contumacious
refusal to obey should the power be exercised, however, such power,
being drastic and extraordinary in its nature, should not be resorted
to unless necessary in the interest of justice. The court must exercise
the power of contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-
restraint, with the end in view of utilizing the same for correction
and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for retaliation or
vindication.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
96
Same; Same; Same; Respondent’s willful disregard and
defiance of this Court’s ruling on a matter submitted for the second
time before his office cannot be countenanced.—Respondent’s willful
disregard and defiance of this Court’s ruling on a matter submitted
for the second time before his office cannot be countenanced. By
acting in opposition to this Court’s authority and disregarding its
final determination of the legal issue pending before him,
respondent failed in his duty not to impede the due administration
of justice and consistently adhere to existing laws and principles as
interpreted in the decisions of the Court.
Same; Same; Same; Indirect Contempt; Penalties; Section 7,
Rule 71 of the Rules provides the penalty for indirect contempt.—
Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules provides the penalty for indirect
contempt. Section 7 of Rule 71 reads: SEC. 7. Punishment for
indirect contempt.—If the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect
contempt committed against a Regional Trial Court or a court of
equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not
exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) months, or both.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Contempt.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
City Legal Office for petitioner.
Mangallay-Dampac and Partners Law Office for
respondent.
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Before this Court is a petition for contempt[1] against
respondent Atty. Brain S. Masweng who issued the following
orders in his capacity as the Regional Hearing Officer of the
National Commission on Indigenous Peoples, Cordillera
Administrative Region (NCIP-CAR):
_______________
[1] Rollo, pp. 3-12.
97
(1) 72-Hour Temporary Restraining Order[2] dated July 27,
2009, Order[3] dated July 31, 2009 and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction[4] in NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09
and
(2) 72-Hour Temporary Restraining Order[5] dated July 27,
2009, Order[6] dated July 31, 2009 and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction[7] in NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09.
 The factual antecedents:
Petitioner City Government of Baguio, through its then
Mayor, issued Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005 and
Demolition Order Nos. 25 and 28, Series of 2004, ordering the
demolition of illegal structures that had been constructed on a
portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation located at Aurora
Hill, Baguio City, without the required building permits and
in violation of Section 69[8] of the Revised Forestry Code, as
_______________
[2] Annex “4,” id., at pp. 74-76.
[3] Annex “6,” id., at pp. 85-97.
[4] Annex “A,” id., at pp. 132-133.
[5] Annex “7,” id., at pp. 98-100.
[6] Annex “8,” id., at pp. 101-113.
[7] Annex “D,” id., at pp. 149-150.
[8] Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705, Section 69. Unlawful occupation or
destruction of forest lands.—Any person who enters and occupies or possesses,
or makes kaingin for his own private use or for others any forest land without
authority under a license agreement, lease, license or permit, or in any manner
destroys such forest land or part thereof, or causes any damage to the timber
stand and other products and forest growths found therein, or who assists, aids
or abets any other person to do so, or sets a fire, or negligently permits a fire
to be set in any forest land shall, upon conviction, be fined in an amount of not
less than five hundred pesos (P500.00) nor more than twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) and imprisoned for not less than six (6) months nor more than
two (2) years for each such offense, and be liable to the payment of ten (10)
times the rental fees and other charges which would have been accrued had
the occupation and use of the land been authorized under a license agreement,
lease, license or permit: Provided, That in the case of an offender found guilty
of making kaingin, the penalty shall be imprisoned for
98amended, the National Building Code[9] and the Urban
Development and Housing Act.[10] Pursuant to said
demolition orders, demolition advices dated September 19,
2006 were issued by the city government informing the
occupants of the intended demolition of the structures on
October 17 to 20, 2006.
On October 13, 2006, a petition for injunction with prayer
for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction was filed by Elvin Gumangan, Narciso Basatan and
Lazaro Bawas before the NCIP-CAR against the City of
Baguio, The Anti-Squatting Committee, City Building and
Architecture Office, and Public Order and Safety Office. The
case was docketed as NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-06.
On October 16 and 19, 2006, herein respondent, Atty. Brain
Masweng, the Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP-CAR,
issued two temporary restraining orders directing petitioner
and all persons acting in its behalf from enforcing the
demolition orders and demolition advices for a total period of
20 days. Subsequently, the NCIP-CAR, through respondent,
granted the application for preliminary injunction.
_______________
not less than two (2) nor more than (4) years and a fine equal to eight (8) times
the regular forest charges due on the forest products destroyed, without
prejudice to the payment of the full cost of restoration of the occupied area as
determined by the Bureau.
The Court shall further order the eviction of the offender from the land and
the forfeiture to the Government of all improvements made and all vehicles,
domestic animals and equipment of any kind used in the commission of the
offense. If not suitable for use by the Bureau, said vehicles shall be sold at
public auction, the proceeds of which shall accrue to the Development Fund of
the Bureau.
In case the offender is a government official or employee, he shall, in
addition to the above penalties, be deemed automatically dismissed from office
and permanently disqualified from holding any elective or appointive position.
[9] P.D. No. 1096.
[10] Republic Act No. 7279.
99
On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the
injunctive writ issued by the NCIP-CAR against the
demolition orders. The case was then elevated to this Court
in G.R. No. 180206 entitled, “City Government of Baguio City
v. Masweng.”[11]
On February 4, 2009, this Court rendered a Decision
reversing and setting aside the ruling of the CA and dismissed
NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-06. This Court held that although the
NCIP had the authority to issue temporary restraining orders
and writs of injunction, Elvin Gumangan, et al., were not
entitled to the relief granted by the NCIP-CAR. On April 22,
2009, this Court denied with finality the motion for
reconsideration filed by Elvin Gumangan, et al. The decision
thus became final and executory on June 9, 2009.[12]
 Thereafter, petitioner, through the Office of the Mayor,
issued Demolition Advices dated May 20, 2009[13] and July 20,
2009[14]against Alexander Ampaguey, Sr.,[15] a certain Mr.
Basatan, Julio Daluyen, Sr.,[16] Carmen Panayo, and
Concepcion Padang. Said Demolition Advices notified them
that Demolition Order No. 33, Series of 2005 and Demolition
Order No. 83, Series of 1999 will be enforced in July 2009 and
advised them to voluntarily dismantle their structures built
on the Busol Watershed.
On July 23, 2009, Magdalena Gumangan, Marion Pool,
Lourdes Hermogeno, Bernardo Simon, Joseph Legaspi, Joseph
Basatan, Marcelino Basatan, Josephine Legaspi and Lansigan
Bawas filed a petition[17] for the identification, delineation
and recognition of their ancestral land and enforce-
_______________
[11] G.R. No. 180206, February 4, 2009, 578 SCRA 88.
[12] Rollo, p. 166.
[13] Id., at p. 40.
[14] Id., at p. 43.
[15] Alex Ampaguey, Sr. in some parts of the records.
[16] Julio Daluyan in some parts of the records.
[17] Rollo, pp. 114-123.
100ment of their rights as indigenous cultural
communities/indigenous peoples, with prayer for the issuance
of a TRO and 0writ of preliminary injunction. The case was
docketed as NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09.
On July 27, 2009, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr., Julio Daluyen,
Sr., Carmen Panayo and Concepcion Padang filed a
petition[18] for injunction with urgent prayer for issuance
of00000000000 a temporary restraining order and writ of
preliminary injunction before the NCIP against petitioner and
the City Building and Architecture Office. The case was
docketed as NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09. They averred that
they are all indigenous people particularly of the Ibaloi and
Kankanaey Tribes, who are possessors of residential houses
and other improvements at Bayan Park and Ambiong, Aurora
Hill, Baguio City by virtue of transfers effected in accordance
with traditions and customary laws from the ancestral land
claimants namely, the Heirs of Molintas and the Heirs of
Gumangan. They sought to enjoin the enforcement of the
demolition orders.
On the same day, July 27, 2009, respondent issued two
separate 72-hour temporary restraining orders in NCIP Case
Nos. 31-CAR-09[19] and 29-CAR-09.[20] The order in NCIP
Case No. 31-CAR-09 restraining the implementation of the
demolition advices and demolition orders reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, a Temporary Restraining
Order pursuant to Section 69 (d) of R.A. [No.] 8371 in relation to
Section 83 of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1, series of 2003 is
hereby issued against the respondents namely, CITY OF BAGUIO
represented by City Mayor REINALDO BAUTISTA JR., CITY
BUILDING AND ARCHITECTURE OFFICE represented by
OSCAR FLORES and all persons under their instructions and
acting for and in their behalves are
_______________
[18] Id., at pp. 31-39.
[19] Id., at pp. 74-76.
[20] Id., at pp. 98-100.
101hereby ordered to stay and refrain from implementing
Demolition Advice dated May 20, 2009, Demolition Order No. 33
series of 2005, Demolition Advice dated July 20, 2009 and
Demolition Order No. 69 series of 2002 within Seventy Two (72)
Hours upon receipt of this order on the residential houses/structures
of Alexander Ampaguey Sr., Julio Daluyen Sr., Concep[c]ion Padang
and Carmen Panayo all located at Busol Water Reservation, Baguio
City.[21]
In NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09, petitioner and the City
Building and Architecture Office, represented by Oscar Flores;
Public Safety and Order Division, represented by Gregorio
Deligero; the Baguio Demolition Team, represented by
Engr. Nazeta Banez; and all persons under their instructions
were ordered to refrain from demolishing the residential
structures of Magdalena Gumangan, Marion Pool, Lourdes
Hermogeno, Bernardo Simon, Joseph Legaspi, Joseph
Basatan, Marcelino Basatan, Josephine Legaspi and Lansigan
Bawas located at Busol Water Reservation.
Subsequently, respondent issued two separate
Orders[22] both dated July 31, 2009 in NCIP Case Nos. 29-
CAR-09 and 31-CAR-09 extending the 72-hour temporary
restraining orders for another 17 days.
On August 14, 2009, respondent issued a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction[23] in NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09,
followed by a Writ of Preliminary Injunction[24] in NCIP Case
No. 29-CAR-09.
Hence, this petition asserting that the restraining orders
and writs of preliminary injunction were issued in willful dis-
regard, disobedience, defiance and resistance of this Court’s
Decision in G.R. No. 180206 which dismissed the previous
_______________
[21] Id., at p. 75.
[22] Id., at pp. 85-97, 101-113.
[23] Id., at pp. 132-133.
[24] Id., at pp. 149-150.
102injunction case. Petitioner contends that respondent’s act
of enjoining the execution of the demolition orders and
demolition advices is tantamount to allowing forum shopping
since the implementation of the demolition orders over the
structures in the Busol Forest Reservation had already been
adjudicated and affirmed by this Court.
In his Comment,[25] respondent claims that he issued the
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction in NCIP
Case Nos. 31-CAR-09 and 29-CAR-09 because his jurisdiction
was called upon to protect and preserve the rights of the
petitioners (in the NCIP cases) who were undoubtedly
members of the indigenous cultural communities/indigenous
peoples. He avers that his personal judgment and assessment
of the allegations of the parties in their pleadings, as
supported by their attachments, convinced him that the
petitioners therein were entitled to such restraining orders
and writs of injunction.
Respondent maintains that the orders and writs he issued
did not disregard the earlier ruling of this Court in G.R. No.
180206. He points out that the Court has in fact affirmed the
power of the NCIP to issue temporary restraining orders and
writs of injunction without any prohibition against the
issuance of said writs when the main action is for injunction.
He adds that he was aware of the said pronouncement and had
to rule on the matter so he extensively explained and laid out
his legal basis for issuing the assailed orders and writs.
Respondent further posits that if petitioner believes that he
committed an error in issuing his orders and resolutions, there
are judicial remedies provided by law. Thus, petitioner could
have filed a motion for reconsideration of the assailed orders
and resolutions or a petition for review if such motion for
reconsideration is denied. Petitioner likewise could have filed
a motion for inhibition or a request for change of venue if it
feels that valid ground exists to warrant the same.
_______________
[25] Id., at pp. 173-190.
103
The sole issue to be resolved is whether the respondent
should be cited in contempt of court for issuing the subject
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary
injunction.
We rule in the affirmative.
The applicable provision is Section 3 of Rule 71 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, which states:
SEC. 3. Indirect contempt to be punished after charge and
hearing.—After a charge in writing has been filed, and an
opportunity given to the respondent to comment thereon within
such period as may be fixed by the court and to be heard by himself
or counsel, a person guilty of any of the following acts may be
punished for indirect contempt:
xxxx
b) Disobedience of or resistance to a lawful writ, process,
order, or judgment of a court, including the act of a person who,
after being dispossessed or ejected from any real property by the
judgment or process of any court of competent jurisdiction, enters or
attempts or induces another to enter into or upon such real property,
for the purpose of executing acts of ownership or possession, or in
any manner disturbs the possession given to the person adjudged to
be entitled thereto;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied.)
 Contempt of court is defined as a disobedience to the Court
by acting in opposition to its authority, justice and dignity. It
signifies not only a willful disregard or disobedience of the
court’s orders, but such conduct which tends to bring the
authority of the court and the administration of law into
disrepute or in some manner to impede the due administration
of justice. Contempt of court is a defiance of the authority,
justice or dignity of the court; such conduct as tends to bring
the authority and administration of the law into disrespect or
104to interfere with or prejudice party litigants or their
witnesses during litigation.[26]
The power to punish for contempt is inherent in all courts
and is essential to the preservation of order in judicial
proceedings and to the enforcement of judgments, orders, and
mandates of the court, and consequently, to the due
administration of justice.[27] Only in cases of clear and
contumacious refusal to obey should the power be exercised,
however, such power, being drastic and extraordinary in its
nature, should not be resorted to unless necessary in the
interest of justice.[28] The court must exercise the power of
contempt judiciously and sparingly, with utmost self-
restraint, with the end in view of utilizing the same for
correction and preservation of the dignity of the court, not for
retaliation or vindication.[29]
In this case, respondent was charged with indirect
contempt for issuing the subject orders enjoining the
implementation of demolition orders against illegal structures
constructed on a portion of the Busol Watershed Reservation
located at Aurora Hill, Baguio City.
In the Decision dated February 4, 2009 rendered in G.R.
No. 180206, the Court indeed upheld the authority of the
NCIP to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
injunction to preserve the rights of parties to a dispute who
are members of indigenous cultural communities or
indigenous peoples. However, the Court categorically ruled
that Elvin Gumangan, et al., whose houses and structures are
the subject of demolition orders issued by petitioner, are not
entitled
_______________
[26] Roxas v. Tipon, G.R. Nos. 160641 & 160642, June 20, 2012, 674 SCRA
52, 62.
[27] Bank of the Philippine Islands v. Calanza, G.R. No. 180699, October
13, 2010, 633 SCRA 186, 193.
[28] Id.
[29] Heirs of Justice Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 392 Phil. 827, 843; 338 SCRA
282, 299 (2000).
105to the injunctive relief granted by herein respondent in his
capacity as Regional Hearing Officer of the NCIP, thus:
The crucial question to be asked then is whether private
respondents’ ancestral land claim was indeed recognized by
Proclamation No. 15, in which case, their right thereto may be
protected by an injunctive writ. After all, before a writ of
preliminary injunction may be issued, petitioners must show that
there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against which
injunction is directed are violative of said right.
Proclamation No. 15, however, does not appear to be a definitive
recognition of private respondents’ ancestral land claim. The
proclamation merely identifies the Molintas and Gumangan
families, the predecessors-in-interest of private respondents, as
claimants of a portion of the Busol Forest Reservation but does not
acknowledge vested rights over the same. In fact, Proclamation No.
15 explicitly withdraws the Busol Forest Reservation from sale or
settlement. It provides:
“Pursuant to the provisions of section eighteen hundred
and twenty-six of Act Numbered Twenty-seven Hundred and
eleven[,] I hereby establish the Busol Forest Reservation to be
administered by the Bureau of Forestry for the purpose of
conserving and protecting water and timber, the protection of
the water supply being of primary importance and all other
uses of the forest are to be subordinated to that purpose. I
therefore withdraw from sale or settlement the following
described parcels of the public domain situated in the
Township of La Trinidad, City of Baguio, Mountain Province,
Island of Luzon, to wit:”
The fact remains, too, that the Busol Forest Reservation was
declared by the Court as inalienable in Heirs of Gumangan v. Court
of Appeals. The declaration of the Busol Forest Reservation as such
precludes its conversion into private property. Relatedly, the courts
are not
106endowed with jurisdictional competence to adjudicate forest
lands.
All told, although the NCIP has the authority to issue
temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction, we
are not convinced that private respondents are entitled to
the relief granted by the Commission.[30] (Emphasis supplied.)
Accordingly, the CA decision affirming the injunctive writ
issued by respondent against the demolition orders of
petitioner was reversed and set aside, and the petition for
injunction (Case No. 31-CAR-06) was dismissed. In pursuance
of the final Decision in G.R. No. 180206, petitioner issued the
subject demolition advices for the enforcement of Demolition
Order No. 33, Series of 2005 against Alexander Ampaguey, Sr.
and Mr. Basatan, Demolition Order No. 83, Series of 1999
against Julio Daluyen, Sr., Concepcion Padang and Carmen
Panayo, and Demolition Order No. 69, Series of 2002 against
Julio Daluyen, Sr., Carmen Panayo, Benjamin Macelino,
Herminia Aluyen and five other unidentified owners of
structures, all in Busol Watershed, Baguio City. As it is, the
aforesaid individuals filed a petition for injunction (Case No.
31-CAR-09) while Magdalena Gumangan, et al., filed a
petition for identification, delineation and recognition of
ancestral land claims with prayer for temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction (Case No. 29-CAR-
09). Respondent issued separate temporary restraining orders
and writs of preliminary injunction in both cases.
The said orders clearly contravene our ruling in G.R. No.
180206 that those owners of houses and structures covered by
the demolition orders issued by petitioner are not entitled to
the injunctive relief previously granted by respondent.
We note that the same issues and arguments are raised in
the present petitions for injunction which sought to enjoin the
_______________
[30] Supra note 11, at pp. 99-100.
107same demolition orders. Magdalena Gumangan, et al., in
Case No. 29-CAR-09 anchored their ownership claim over
portions of Busol Forest Reservation on Proclamation No.
15 as the portions occupied by the Gumangans and Molintas,
their predecessors-in-interest, are indicated in the plans. In
Case No. 31-CAR-09, Alexander Ampaguey, Sr., et al.,
likewise trace their ownership claims to the Heirs of Molintas
and Heirs of Gumangan and a title (OCT No. 44) granted to
Molintas on September 20, 1919 before the property was
declared a reservation in 1922. The latter further argued that
by virtue of R.A. No. 8371, the jurisdiction of the DENR over
the Busol Forest Reservation was transferred to the NCIP.
These matters touching on the issue of whether a clear legal
right exists for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction
in favor of the said claimants have already been settled in G.R.
No. 180206. In other words, the same parties or persons
representing identical interests have litigated on the same
issue and subject matter insofar as the injunctive relief is
concerned. Evidently, the principle of res judicata applies to
this case so that the parties are precluded from raising anew
those issues already passed upon by this Court.
We do not subscribe to respondent’s contention that
petitioner resorted to the wrong remedy in assailing the
injunctive orders as it should have moved for reconsideration
of the same and then appeal the denial thereof to the CA.
Likewise, we do not accept his explanation that his act of
issuing the assailed injunctive writs was not contemptuous
because the Court in G.R. No. 180206 even affirmed the power
of the NCIP to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
injunction without any prohibition against the issuance of said
writs when the main action is for injunction.
As mentioned earlier, the Court while recognizing that the
NCIP is empowered to issue temporary restraining orders and
writs of preliminary injunction, nevertheless ruled
that petitioners in the injunction case seeking to restrain the
implementation of the subject demolition order are not entitled
to such
108relief.Petitioner City Government of Baguio in issuing the
demolition advices are simply enforcing the previous
demolition orders against the same occupants or claimants or
their agents and successors-in-interest, only to be thwarted
anew by the injunctive orders and writs issued by respondent.
Despite the Court’s pronouncement in G.R. No. 180206 that
no such clear legal right exists in favor of those occupants or
claimants to restrain the enforcement of the demolition orders
issued by petitioner, and hence there remains no legal
impediment to bar their implementation, respondent still
issued the temporary restraining orders and writs of
preliminary injunction. Worse, respondent would require
petitioner to simply appeal his ruling, a move that will only
result in multiple suits and endless litigation.
In the recent case of The Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc.
v. Masweng[31] respondent issued similar temporary
restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction in favor
of claimants which include Magdalena Gumangan and
Alexander Ampaguey, Sr. who sought to enjoin the Baguio
District Engineer’s Office, the Office of the City Architect and
Parks Superintendent, the Baguio Regreening Movement, Inc.
and the Busol Task Force from fencing the Busol Watershed
Reservation. The CA affirmed respondent’s orders and
dismissed the petition for certiorari filed by the aforesaid
offices. Applying the principle of stare decisis, the Court
ruled:
On February 4, 2009, this Court promulgated its Decision in G.R.
No. 180206, a suit which involved several of the parties in the case
at bar. In G.R. No. 180206, the City Mayor of Baguio City issued
three Demolition Orders with respect to allegedly illegal structures
constructed by private respondents therein on a portion of the Busol
Forest Reservation. Private respondents filed a Petition for
Injunction with the NCIP. Atty. Masweng issued two temporary
restraining orders directing the City
_______________
[31] G.R. No. 180882, February 27, 2013, 692 SCRA 109.
109Government of Baguio to refrain from enforcing
said Demolition
Orders and subsequently granted private respondents’ application
for a preliminary injunction. The Court of Appeals, acting on
petitioners’ Petition for Certiorari, affirmed the temporary
restraining orders and the writ of preliminary injunction.
This Court then upheld the jurisdiction of the NCIP on the basis
of the allegations in private respondents’ Petition for Injunction. It
was similarly claimed in said Petition for Injunction that private
respondents were descendants of Molintas and Gumangan whose
claims over the portions of the Busol Watershed Reservation had
been recognized by Proclamation No. 15. This Court thus ruled in
G.R. No. 180206 that the nature of the action clearly qualify it as a
dispute or controversy over ancestral lands/domains of the
ICCs/IPs. On the basis of Section 69(d) of the IPRA and Section 82,
Rule XV of NCIP Administrative Circular No. 1-03, the NCIP may
issue temporary restraining orders and writs of injunction without
any prohibition against the issuance of the writ when the main
action is for injunction.
On petitioners’ argument that the City of Baguio is exempt from
the provisions of the IPRA and, consequently, the jurisdiction of the
NCIP, this Court ruled in G.R. No. 180206 that said exemption
cannot ipso facto be deduced from Section 78 of the IPRA because
the law concedes the validity of prior land rights recognized or
acquired through any process before its effectivity.
Lastly, however, this Court ruled that although the NCIP has
the authority to issue temporary restraining orders and writs of
injunction, it was not convinced that private respondents were
entitled to the relief granted by the Commission. Proclamation No.
15 does not appear to be a definitive recognition of private
respondents’ ancestral land claim, as it merely identifies the
Molintas and Gumangan families as claimants of a portion of the
Busol Forest Reservation, but does not acknowledge vested rights
over the same. Since it is required before the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction that claimants show the existence of a right
to be protected, this Court,
110in G.R. No. 180206, ultimately granted the petition of the City
Government of Baguio and set aside the writ of preliminary
injunction issued therein.
In the case at bar, petitioners and private respondents
present the very same arguments and counter-arguments
with respect to the writ of injunction against the fencing of
the Busol Watershed Reservation. The same legal issues are
thus being litigated in G.R. No. 180206 and in the case at bar, except
that different writs of injunction are being assailed. In both cases,
petitioners claim (1) that Atty. Masweng is prohibited from issuing
temporary restraining orders and writs of preliminary injunction
against government infrastructure projects; (2) that Baguio City is
beyond the ambit of the IPRA; and (3) that private respondents
have not shown a clear right to be protected. Private
respondents, on the other hand, presented the same allegations in
their Petition for Injunction, particularly the alleged recognition
made under Proclamation No. 15 in favor of their ancestors.
While res judicata does not apply on account of the different subject
matters of the case at bar and G.R. No. 180206 (they assail different
writs of injunction, albeit issued by the same hearing officer), we
are constrained by the principle of stare decisis to grant the
instant petition. The Court explained the principle of stare
decisis in Ting v. Velez-Ting:
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower
courts to doctrinal rules established by this Court in its final
decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of
law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed
settled and closed to further argument. Basically, it is a bar to
any attempt to relitigate the same issues, necessary for two
simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the
principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.
(Citations omitted.)
111
We have also previously held that “[u]nder the doctrine of stare
decisis, once a court has laid down a principle of law as applicable
to a certain state of facts, it will adhere to that principle and apply
it to all future cases where the facts are substantially the
same.”[32] (Emphasis supplied.)
Respondent’s willful disregard and defiance of this Court’s
ruling on a matter submitted for the second time before his
office cannot be countenanced. By acting in opposition to this
Court’s authority and disregarding its final determination of
the legal issue pending before him, respondent failed in his
duty not to impede the due administration of justice and
consistently adhere to existing laws and principles as
interpreted in the decisions of the Court.
Section 7, Rule 71 of the Rules provides the penalty for
indirect contempt. Section 7 of Rule 71 reads:
SEC. 7. Punishment for indirect contempt.—If the respondent
is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed against a
Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may
be punished by a fine not exceeding thirty thousand pesos or
imprisonment not exceeding six (6) months, or both. x x x
For his contumacious conduct and considering the
attendant circumstances, the Court deems it proper to impose
a fine of P10,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for contempt
is GRANTED. The assailed Temporary Restraining Order
dated July 27, 2009, Order dated July 31, 2009 and Writ of
Preliminary Injunction in NCIP Case No. 31-CAR-09, and
Temporary Restraining Order dated July 27, 2009, Order
dated July 31, 2009 and Writ of Preliminary Injunction in
NCIP Case No. 29-CAR-09 are hereby all LIFTED and SET
ASIDE.
_______________
[32] Id., at pp. 122-125.
112
The Court finds respondent Atty. BRAIN S. MASWENG,
Regional Hearing Officer, National Commission on Indigenous
Peoples, Cordillera Administrative Region (NCIP-
CAR), GUILTY of Indirect Contempt and hereby imposes on
him a fine of TEN THOUSAND PESOS (P10,000.00) payable
to this Court’s Cashier within ten (10) days from notice, with
the additional directive for respondent to furnish the Division
Clerk of this Court with a certified copy of the Official Receipt
as proof of his compliance.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno (CJ., Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro,
Bersamin and Reyes, JJ., concur.
Petition granted.
Notes.—Under Sections 3 and 4 of Rule 71 of the Rules of
Court, the following procedural requisites must be satisfied
before the accused may be punished for indirect contempt: (1)
there must be an order requiring the respondent to show cause
why he should not be cited for contempt; (2) the respondent
must be given the opportunity to comment on the charge
against him; and (3) there must be a hearing and the court
must investigate the charge and consider respondent’s
answer. (Belen vs. Comilang, 692 SCRA 176 [2013])
A party and its counsel who deliberately or neglectfully
delay the prompt termination of their court case are further
guilty of abuse of court processes and of impeding the smooth
administration of justice, rendering them amenable to being
cited for indirect contempt of court under Section 3, (c) and (d),
Rule 71 of the Rules of Court. (Philworth Asia, Inc. vs.
Philippine Commercial International Bank, 697 SCRA 206
[2013])
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