IV. Quieting of Title This case started as an action (Civil Case No.
This case started as an action (Civil Case No. C-883) filed in the Regional Trial Court of
 
G.R. No. 104813. October 21, 1993.
HEIRS OF JOSE OLVIGA, NAMELY: PLACIDA S. OLVIGA, VIRGILIO OLVIGA, LOLITA
OLVIGA, CARMENCITA O. ALPUERTO and JEANETTE OLILA, petitioners, vs. THE
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, ANGELITA R. GLOR, SERILINA G. JAMON, EMELITA G.
MADELA, EMAN G. MANALO, MYRNA GLOR, FELIPE GLOR, GAUDENCIO GLOR and
CORNELIO GLOR, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Prescription; An action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on
implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years from registration of the deed or date of issuance of
certificate of title; Rule applies only when plaintiff is not in possession of the property.—With regard to
the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before that an action for reconveyance
of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust prescribes in ten years, the point of reference
being the date of registration of the deed or the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the
property (Vda. de Portugal vs. IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in
possession of the property,since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of
the property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the property, does
not prescribe.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Actual possession can wait until his possession is disturbed or his
title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right.—There is settled jurisprudence that one who
is in actual possession of a piece of land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is
disturbed or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being,
that his undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to
ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect on his own title,
which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession.
Remedial Law; Appeals; It is beyond the Court to make its own findings of facts different from
those of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.—The Court of Appeals and the trial court
correctly based their findings of fact on the testimonies of the parties and their witnesses. It can be said
therefore that those conclusions are based on substantial evidence. No cogent reason exists to disturb
them. As reiterated in a long line of decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to make its own
findings of facts different from those of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
Same; Same; Same; The jurisdiction of the Court is confined to a review of questions of law.—
In petitions for review of decisions of the Court of Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is confined to a
review of questions of law, except when the findings of fact are not supported by the records or are so
glaringly erroneous as to constitute a serious abuse of discretion.
GRIÑO-AQUINO, J.:
This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 30542,
affirming in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Calauag, Quezon ordering the
defendants, heirs of Jose Olviga (petitioners herein), to reconvey the land in dispute to the
plaintiffs, heirs of Cornelia Glor (now private respondents), and to pay attorney’s fees and
the costs of suit.
Calauag, Quezon by Angelita Glor and her children against the heirs of Jose Olviga for
reconveyance of a parcel of land, measuring 54,406 square meters (5.44 has), more or
less, known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision.
The court, after due trial, rendered judgment in favor of the private respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, and considering the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in favor of
the PLAINTIFFS and against the defendants as heirs of Jose Olviga to reconvey the
land in dispute to the plaintiffs as heirs of Cornelio Glor Sr.; condemning the defendants
jointly and severally to pay the plaintiffs attorneys fees of P5,000.00 plus the costs of the
suit. The counterclaim interposed by the defendants is dismissed.” (p. 12, Rollo.)
The judgment was appealed to the Court of Appeals by the defendants who raised several
factual issues regarding possession and fraud, as well as legal issues involving prescription
and purchaser in good faith, but the appellate court dismissed the appeal and affirmed in
toto the decision of the trial court.
It was established by the evidence on record that the land in question was, in 1950, still
forest land when Eutiquio Pureza, then only twelve years old, and his father cleared and
cultivated it. In 1954, they introduced improvements such as, coconut trees, jackfruit,
mangoes, avocado and bananas. When the area was released for disposition, the Bureau
of Lands surveyed the same in 1956 in the name of Eutiquio Pureza. Since then, the land
has been known as Lot 13, Pls-84 of the Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision. Godofredo
Olviga, a son of Jose Olviga then living with the latter, protested the survey but only with
respect to a one-half hectare portion “sa dakong panulukan ng Amihan-Silanganan.” This
protest or “tutol” (Exh. B) of Godofredo Olviga, brother of petitioners Virgilio Olviga and
Lolita Olviga Olila, is of public record in the Bureau of Lands (Exh. B). In said document,
Godofredo Olviga expressly admitted that the lot belonged to Eutiquio Pureza, except the
1/2 hectare portion claimed by him (Godofredo) which was included in the survey of
Pureza’s Lot 13.
In 1960, Eutiquio Pureza filed a homestead application over Lot 13. Without his
application having been acted upon, he transferred his rights in said lot to Cornelio Glor in
1961. Neither the homestead application of Eutiquio nor the proposed transfer of his rights
to Cornelio Glor was acted upon by the Director of Lands for reasons that the records of the
Bureau of Lands do not disclose.
In 1967, Jose Olviga obtained a registered title for said lot in a cadastral proceeding, in
fraud of the rights of Pureza and his transferee, Cornelio Glor and his family, who were the
real and actual occupants of the land.
What must have happened, as found by the Court of Appeals, is that since Cornelio
Glor, Sr. was sickly, and his wife (now widowed) Angelita Glor, was unschooled, they failed
to follow up Pureza’s homestead applications over Lot 13 in the cadastral proceedings in
the Municipal Court of Guinayangan Public Land Subdivision, Pls-84, Case 1 (Philcusa-
Foa). In fact, they were not aware of the proceedings. Angelita Glor testified that no notice
was ever posted on Lot 13 about the proceedings nor did anyone, not even the barangay
captain, tell her about them. Neither did she receive any notice from the court sheriff or any
court employee. This non-posting of the notice of the cadastral hearing on the land, or in the
barangay hall, was confirmed by petitioner Virgilio Olviga himself who testified that he did
not notice any papers posted on the property in question (tsn., October 18, 1990, pp. 83-
84). On the other hand, petitioners’ father, Jose Olviga, claimed both Lots 12 and 13, which
are adjoining lots, in the same cadastral proceedings. He falsely omitted in his answer
mention of the fact that other persons were in possession of, and claiming adverse interest
in, Lot 13 and that the land had been surveyed for Eutiquio Pureza, the former occupant
who sold his interests to private respondents’ parent, Cornelio Glor, in 1961. Glor was
Olvigas’ neighbor. As a result, both Lots 12 and 13 were declared as uncontested in the
name of Jose Olviga (Exh. 7), and were registered in his name in 1967 in Original
Certificate of Title, No. 0-12713 (Exh. 5). In 1971, Olviga requested that OCT No. 0-12713
be split into two (2) TCTs, one each for the two (2) lots. TCT Nos. T-103823 and T-103824
were issued for lots 12 and 13, respectively. Jose Olviga later transferred Lot 13 to his son-
in-law, Jaime Olila and daughter, Lolita Olviga resulting in the cancellation of TCT No. T-
03824 and the issuance of TCT No. T-241314 in the names of the spouses (Exh. 3).
It was also established that the spouses Jaime Olila and Lolita Olviga Olila, were not
innocent purchasers for value of the land from their father, and have never been in
possession. The Glors and their predecessors-in-interest (Cornelio Glor Sr., and Eutiquio
Pureza) were the ones found to be in possession of the property.
From said findings and conclusions, the appellate court in its decision dated January 13,
1992, resolved the issues presented, thus:
“x x x whether or not plaintiffs’ action is really one for quieting of title that does not
prescribe; or assuming that their demand for the reconveyance of the lot in question
prescribes in ten years, being based on an implied trust, whether their cause of action
should be counted from the date of the issuance of the late Jose Olviga’s title over said
lot in 1967 and has, therefore, already prescribed, or whether the prescriptive period
should be counted from the date of plaintiffs acquired knowledge of said title sometime
in 1988.
“The first question should be answered in the affirmative. x x x.
“x x x      x x x      x x x.
“But even assuming that plaintiffs’ action for reconveyance, being based on an
implied or constructive trust, prescribes in ten years, the lower court again correctly
ruled that their cause of action should be considered to have accrued not from the date
of registration of the title of Jose Olviga, defendants’ predecessor-in-interest, over the lot
in question in 1967, but only from the time plaintiffs learned of such title in 1988. x x x.
“x x x      x x x      x x x.
“All in all, therefore, the court a quo did not err in holding that plaintiffs’ action
against defendants-appellants for the reconveyance of the lot in question filed on April
10, 1989, or in less than a year after they learned of the issuance of a title over said lot
to Jose Olviga, predecessor-in-interest of defendants, has not yet prescribed.
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from herein is AFFIRMED in toto with costs
against defendants-appellants.” (pp. 48-51, Rollo.)
Petitioners now seek a review of the above decision. They allege that. (1) the present action
has already prescribed; (2) the Court of Appeals erred when it ruled that the private
respondents’ cause of action accrued not in 1967 but in 1988; (3) that the Court of Appeals
erred when it failed to consider that private respondents as mere homestead transferees
cannot maintain an action for reconveyance; (4) that the Faja and Caragay-Layno cases
have no bearing and direct application to the case at bar; and (5) that private respondents
have not proven by preponderance of evidence their ownership and possession of the
disputed land.
With regard to the issue of prescription, this Court has ruled a number of times before
that an action for reconveyance of a parcel of land based on implied or constructive trust
prescribes in ten years, the point of reference being the date of registration of the deed or
the date of the issuance of the certificate of title over the property (Vda. de Portugal vs.
IAC, 159 SCRA 178). But this rule applies only when the plaintiff is not in possession of the
property,since if a person claiming to be the owner thereof is in actual possession of the
property, the right to seek reconveyance, which in effect seeks to quiet title to the
property, does not prescribe.
In Sapto vs. Fabiana, 103 Phil. 683, 686-687, appellants’ predecessors sold to
appellees in 1931 a parcel of land. The sale was approved by the Provincial Governor of
Davao but was never registered. Possession of the land was, however, transferred to
Fabiana and the latter has been in possession thereof from 1931 up to the present. The
widow and children of Samuel Sapto filed an action to recover the land. This Court in
affirming the validity of the sale in favor of appellee (Fabiana) held:
“No enforcement of the contract is in fact needed, since the delivery of possession of
the land sold had consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser,
registration of the contract not being indispensable as between the parties. Actually the
action for conveyance was one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud cast upon
appellee’s ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by
their predecessors. This action accrued only when appellants initiated their suit to
recover the land in 1954. Furthermore, it is an established rule of American
jurisprudence (made applicable in this jurisdiction by Art. 480 of the New Civil Code)
that actions to quiet title to property in the possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible
(44 Am. Jur. p. 47; Cooper vs. Rhea, 39 L.R.A. 930; Inland Empire Land Co. vs. Grant
County, 138 Wash. 439, 245 Pac. 14).”
In Faja vs. Court of Appeals, 75 SCRA 441, 446, this Court likewise reiterated the ruling
that:
“x x x. There is settled jurisprudence that one who is in actual possession of a piece of
land claiming to be owner thereof may wait until his possession is disturbed or his title is
attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right, the reason for the rule being, that his
undisturbed possession gives him a continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity
to ascertain and determine the nature of the adverse claim of a third party and its effect
on his/own title, which right can be claimed only by one who is in possession. No better
situation can be conceived at the moment for Us to apply this rule on equity than that of
herein petitioners whose mother, Felipa Faja, was in possession of the litigated property
for no less than 30 years and was suddenly confronted with a claim that the land she
had been occupying and cultivating all these years, was titled in the name of a third
person. We hold that in such a situation the right to quiet title to the property, to seek its
reconveyance and annul any certificate of title covering it, accrued only from the time
the one in possession was made aware of a claim adverse to his own, and it is only then
that the statutory period of prescription commences to run against such possessor.”
In the case at bar, private respondents and their predecessors-in-interest were in actual
possession of the property since 1950. Their undisturbed possession gave them the
continuing right to seek the aid of a court of equity to determine the nature of the adverse
claim of petitioners, who in 1988 disturbed their possession.
The other issues raised in the petition are factual.
The Court of Appeals and the trial court correctly based their findings of fact on the
testimonies of the parties and their witnesses. It can be said therefore that those
conclusions are based on substantial evidence. No cogent reason exists to disturb them. As
reiterated in a long line of decisions, it is beyond the province of this Court to make its own
findings of facts different from those of the trial court as affirmed by the Court of Appeals
(Vda. de Cailles vs. Mayuga 170 SCRA 347; New Owners/Management of TML Garments,
Inc. vs. Zaragosa, 170 SCRA 563). In petitions for review of decisions of the Court of
Appeals, the jurisdiction of this Court is confined to a review of questions of law, except
when the findings of fact are not supported by the records or are so glaringly erroneous as
to constitute a serious abuse of discretion (Lim vs. Court of Appeals, 158 SCRA
307; Samson vs. CA, 141 SCRA 194; Republic vs. IAC, 144 SCRA 705). The case at bar
does not fall under the exceptions.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error in the decision of the Court of Appeals, the
petition for review is DENIED, with costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
     
Note.—Actions to quiet title to property in the possession of plaintiff are imprescriptible
(Mamadsual vs. Mason, 190 SCRA 83).

——o0o——
 G. R. No. 102909. September 6, 1993
SPOUSES VICENTE and LOURDES PINGOL, petitioners, vs. HON. COURT OF
APPEALS and HEIRS OF FRANCISCO N. DONASCO, namely: MELINDA D. PELAYO,
MARIETTA D. SINGSON, MYRNA D. CUEVAS, NATIVIDAD D. PELAYO, YOLANDA D.
CACERES and MARY DONASCO, respondents.
Civil Law; Contracts; Sale; Distinction between contract of sale and a contract to sell.—The
distinction between the two is important for in a contract of sale, the title passes to the vendee upon the
delivery of the thing sold, whereas in a contract to sell, by agreement, ownership is reserved in the
vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of the price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost
and cannot recover ownership until and unless the contract is resolved or rescinded, whereas in a
contract to sell, title is retained by the vendor until the full payment of the price, such payment being a
positive suspensive condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevented the obligation
of the vendor to convey title from becoming effective.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A perusal of Exhibit “A” leads to no other conclusion than that it
embodies a contract of sale.—A perusal of Exhibit “A” leads to no other conclusion than that it
embodies a contract of sale.The plain and clear tenor of the “DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-
HALF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND” is that “the VENDOR hereby x x
x SELL, CONVEY AND CONVEY by way of Absolute Sale the one-half (1/2) portion x x x to the
VENDEE x x x his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest.” That the vendor, petitioner Vicente
Pingol, had that clear intention was further evidenced by his failure to reserve his title thereto until the
full payment of the price.
Same; Same; Same; Same; A deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated as a
“Deed of Conditional Sale” where there is no stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is
reserved in the seller until the full payment of the price nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the
right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period.—
In Dignos vs. Court of Appeals, we held that a deed of sale is absolute in nature although denominated
as a “Deed of Conditional Sale” where there is no stipulation in the deed that title to the property sold is
reserved in the seller until the full payment of the price, nor is there a stipulation giving the vendor the
right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period. Exhibit
“A” contains neither stipulation. What is merely stated therein is that “the VENDEE agrees that in case
of default in the payment of the installments due the same shall earn a legal rate of interest, and to
which the VENDOR likewise agrees.”
Same; Same; Same; Same; The acts of the parties, contemporaneous and subsequent to the
contract clearly show that an absolute deed of sale was intended by the parties and not a contract to
sell.—Furthermore, as found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of the parties, contemporaneous and
subsequent to the contract, clearly show that an absolute deed of sale was intended by the parties and
not a contract to sell:
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The contract being one of absolute sale, the ownership of
the subject lot was transferred to the buyer upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof.—The
contract here being one of absolute sale, the ownership of the subject lot was transferred to the buyer
upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. The constructive delivery of the subject lot was made
upon the execution of the deed of sale while the actual delivery was effected when the private
respondents took possession of and constructed a house on Lot No. 3223-A.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; Delivery of the object of the contract divested the
vendor of the ownership over the same and he cannot recover the title unless the contract is resolved
or rescinded.—The delivery of the object of the contract divested the vendor of the ownership over the
same and he cannot recover the title unless the contract is resolved or rescinded pursuant to Article
1592 of the New Civil Code.
Same; Same; Although private respondents’ complaint before the trial court was denominated
as one for specific performance, it is in effect an action to quiet title.—Although the private respondents’
complaint before the trial court was denominated as one for specific performance, it is in effect an
action to quiet title.
Same; Same; Same; A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment
thereof, entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements thereon is entitled to bring suit to
clear his title to him.—A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof,
entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements thereon, is entitled to bring suit to clear
his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not necessary that the
vendee has an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe him with personality to bring an
action to quiet title.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Prescription; Prescription thus cannot be invoked against the
private respondents for it is aphoristic that an action to quiet title to property in one’s possession is
imprescriptible.—Prescription thus cannot be invoked against the private respondents for it is aphoristic
that an action to quiet title to property in one’s possession is imprescriptible .
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
An action denominated as one for specific performance and damages was brought by the
private respondents against the petitioners before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Caloocan City which, after due trial, rendered a decision in favor of the petitioners. On
appeal, the respondent Court reversed the trial court’s decision.
It is from this judgment that the petitioners have appealed to this Court by way of a
petition for review on certiorari.
The material facts of this case are simple and undisputed.
Petitioner Vicente Pingol is the owner of Lot No. 3223 of the Cadastral Survey of
Caloocan, with an area of 549 square meters, located at Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City and
more particularly described in Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 7435 of the Registry of
Deeds of Caloocan City. On 17 February 1969, he executed a “DEED OF ABSOLUTE
SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) [OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND” in
favor of Francisco N. Donasco which was acknowledged before a notary public. The parcel
of land referred to therein is Lot No. 3223 and the pertinent portions of the document read
as follows:
“That for and in consideration of the sum of TWENTY THOUSAND AND FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY (P20,530.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, the VENDOR hereby
these presents SELL, CONVEY AND CONVEY by way of Absolute Sale the one-half
(1/2) portion, equivalent to Two Hundred Seventy Four and point Fifty (274.50) square
meters, to the VENDEE, the above-mentioned property, his heirs, assigns and
successors-in-interest;
That the VENDOR hereby confesses and acknowledges the receipt of TWO
THOUSAND (P2,000.00) PESOS from VENDEE as advanced (sic) and partial payment
to the above-cited consideration of the Sale herein mentioned, leaving therefor a
balance of Eighteen Thousand and Five Hundred Thirty (P18,530) Pesos to be paid in
several equal installments within a period of six (6) years, beginning January, 1970;
That after computing the above-mentioned equal installments, the VENDEE agrees
and undertakes to pay unto the VENDOR a monthly amount equivalent to Two Hundred
Fifty Seven (sic) and Thirty Six Centavos (P257.36) within a period of Seventy One (71)
 months and on the Seven Two [sic] (72) month, the amount of (P257.44) as the last and
final installment thereof;
That the VENDEE agrees that in case of default in the payment of the installments
due the same shall earn a legal rate of interest, and to which the VENDOR likewise
agrees;
That the VENDEE undertakes to pay unto the VENDOR the herein monthly
installment within the first five (5) days of each month and the same shall be made
available and to be paid at the residence of the VENDOR, payment to be made either
directly to the VENDOR, his wife or his authorized representative or factor;
That in case of partition of the above-described property between herein VENDOR
and VENDEE, the same shall be divided into two (2) squal parts, the VENDOR gets the
corner facing J. De Jesus and Malolos Avenue and the VENDEE shall get the portion
with fifteen (15) meters frontage facing J. De Jesus Street only.”
Pursuant to the contract, Donasco paid P2,000.00 to Pingol. The one-half portion,
designated as Lot No. 3223-A, was then segregated from the mother lot, and the parties
prepared a subdivision plan (Exhibit “C”) which was approved by the Land Registration
Commission.
Francisco Donasco immediately took possession of the subject lot and constructed a
house thereon. In January 1970, he started paying the monthly installments but was able to
pay only up to 1972.
On 13 July 1984, Francisco Donasco died. At the time of his demise, he had paid
P8,369.00, plus the P2,000.00 advance payment, leaving a balance of P10,161.00 on the
contract price. Lot No. 3223-A remained in the possession of Donasco’s heirs.
On 19 October 1988, the heirs of Francisco Donasco filed an action for “Specific
Performance and Damages, with Prayer for Writ of Preliminary Injunction” against the
spouses Vicente and Lourdes Pingol (petitioners herein) before the RTC of Caloocan City.
The action was docketed as Civil Case No. 13572 and raffled off to Branch 125 of the said
court.
In their complaint, the plaintiffs (private respondents herein) averred that after the death
of their father, they offered to pay the balance of P10,161.00 plus the stipulated legal rate of
interest thereon to Vicente Pingol but the latter rebuffed their offer and has “been
demanding for a bigger and unreasonable amount, in complete variance to what is lawfully
due and payable.” They stated that they had “exerted earnest efforts to forge or reach an
amicable and peaceful settlement with the defendants” for the payment of the property in
question but to no avail. They further alleged that the defendants were committing “acts of
forcible entry and encroachment” upon their land and asked that a writ of preliminary
injunction be issued to restrain the defendants from the acts complained of.
Plaintiffs then prayed that the defendants be ordered, inter alia:
“a.x x x to accept the amount of P10,161.00, more or less, plus the stipulated legal rate
of interest due thereon, as full and complete payment of the balance for the agreed
price/consideration on the onehalf (1/2) portion of the parcel of land x x x; [and]
b.x x x to execute the final deed of sale on the one-half (1/2) portion of the lot x x x in
accordance with the partition reflected in the survey and subdivision plan, x x x.”
In their answer with counterclaim, defendants admitted the execution of the aforementioned
deed of sale, the segregation of the portion sold and the preparation and approval of the
subdivision plan, but set up the following special and affirmative defenses: (1) the plaintiffs’
cause of action had already prescribed; (2) the deed of sale embodied a conditional
contract of sale “as the consideration is to be paid on installment basis within a period of six
years beginning January, 1970”; (3) the subdivision plan was prepared on the assumption
that Francisco Donasco would be able to comply with his obligation; (4) when Francisco
died, he had not fully paid the total consideration agreed upon; and (5) considering the
breach by Francisco of his contractual obligation way back in 1976, the sale was deemed to
have been cancelled and the continuous occupancy of Francisco after 1976 and by his
heirs thereafter was by mere tolerance of Vicente Pingol. They then asked that the plaintiffs
be ordered to vacate the premises and to pay them attorney’s fees and a reasonable
compensation for the use of the land.
In their Reply and Answer to Counterclaim, the plaintiffs pointed out that there is no
provision in the deed of sale for its cancellation in case of default in the payment of the
monthly installments and invoked Article 1592 of the New Civil Code. They specifically
denied the allegations in the counterclaim.
The issues having been joined, the case was then tried on the merits.
On 22 January 1990, the trial court rendered a decision dismissing the complaint and
ordering the plaintiffs to pay the defendants P350.00 as reasonable monthly rental for the
use of the premises from the filing of the complaint, P10,000.00 by way of attorney’s fees,
and the costs of the suit. It held that: (1) the deed of absolute sale in question, marked and
offered in evidence as Exhibit “A,” is a contract to sell, not a contract of sale, since Vicente
Pingol had no intention to part with the ownership of the lot unless the full amount of the
agreed price had been paid; (2) the contract was deemed to have been cancelled from the
moment the late father of the plaintiffs defaulted in the payment of the monthly installments;
(3) title and ownership over the lot did not pass to Francisco Donasco and his heirs since
the contract to sell was never consummated; and (5) assuming, arguendo, that the plaintiffs
have a cause of action for specific performance, such action had already prescribed since
the complaint was filed only on 19 October 1988 or more than ten years from the time that
they could have lawfully demanded performance.
Plaintiffs elevated the case to the Court of Appeals where the appeal was docketed as
CA-G.R. CV No. 25967. On 12 November 1991, the said court rendered a decision
reversing the appealed decision and decreeing as follows:
“WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and
another one is rendered:
(1)Ordering appellee-vendor Vicente Pingol to accept the sum of P10,161.00,
plus the legal interest due thereon from the date of institution of this action on
October 19, 1988;
(2)Upholding the validity of the ‘DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF
(1/2) (of) AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND’ (Exh. A), and by
virtue and on the strength of which declaring the ‘Heirs of the Deceased
Francisco N. Domingo’ as the owners of the 274.50 sq. m. land, denominated as
Lot 3223-A, (LRC) Psd-146225 under the technical description (exh. D) and
reflected in the Plan of Subdivision Survey which was approved By
Commissioner of Land Registration on August 13, 1971 (exh. C), representing
one-half portion [of] lot 3223, situated at the corner of Malolos Avenue and G. de
Jesus St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City, and covered by TCT No. 7435 of the
Registry of Deeds of Caloocan City (exh. B); and
(3)Ordering the defendants-appellees to pay the costs.
      SO ORDERED.”
The Court of Appeals ruled that the deed of sale in question reveals the clear intention of
Vicente Pingol to part with the ownership of the one-half portion of the land by way of an
absolute sale; that the failure to fully pay the agreed price was not a ground for the
cancellation of the sale; and that the plaintiffs’ action is imprescriptible since it is akin to an
action to quiet title to property in one’s possession.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the Court of Appeals, the defendants, hereinafter
referred to as the petitioners, filed this petition for certiorari on 9 January 1992. Plaintiffs,
hereinafter referred to as the private respondents, filed their comment thereto on 10
September 1992 to which the petitioners filed a reply on 11 November 1992. We gave due
course to the petition and required the parties to submit their respective memoranda, which
they subsequently complied with.
Petitioners contend that the Court of Appeals erred:
“I
IN HOLDING THAT THE DOCUMENT (EXHIBIT “A”) DENOMINATED AS ‘ABSOLUTE
DEED OF SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2) OF AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL
OF LAND’ IS AN ABSOLUTE DEED OF SALE SUFFICIENT TO CONFER
OWNERSHIP ON THE VENDEE AND HIS SUCCESSORS-IN-INTEREST, DESPITE
THE FACT THAT BY ITS TERMS AND CONDITIONS, LIKE THE PRICE BEING
PAYABLE ON INSTALLMENTS WITHIN A FIXED PERIOD, THE SAME IS A
CONDITIONAL DEED OF SALE.
II
IN HOLDING THAT NOTWITHSTANDING THE FACT THAT THE VENDEE
FAILED TO COMPLY WITH THE TERMS OF THE CONTRACT (EXHIBIT “A”)
SPECIFICALLY TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT OF THE CONSIDERATION ON THE
DATE STIPULATED IN THE CONTRACT WHICH WAS SUPPOSED TO BE
IN JANUARY 1976, COMPLETE PAYMENT THEREOF CAN STILL BE ENFORCED IN
AN ACTION INSTITUTED BY THE HEIRS OF THE VENDEE FILED ON OCTOBER 19,
1988 OR A PERIOD OF MORE THAN TWELVE (12) YEARS FROM THE TIME
COMPLETE PAYMENT SHOULD HAVE BEEN MADE;
III
IN HOLDING THAT THE PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ ACTION IS ONE WHICH IS AN
OFFER TO COMPLETE THE PAYMENT LEFT UNPAID BY PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS’ FATHER WHICH DOES NOT PRESCRIBE;
IV
IN HOLDING THAT PRIVATE RESPONDENTS’ CAUSE OF ACTION HAS NOT
PRESCRIBED.”
The decisive issue in this case is whether Exhibit “A” embodies a contract of sale or a
contract to sell. The distinction between the two is important for in a contract of sale, the title
passes to the vendee upon the delivery of the thing sold, whereas in a contract to sell, by
agreement, ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass until the full payment of
the price. In a contract of sale, the vendor has lost and cannot recover ownership until and
unless the contract is resolved or rescinded, whereas in a contract to sell, title is retained by
the vendor until the full payment of the price, such payment being a positive suspensive
condition, failure of which is not a breach but an event that prevented the obligation of the
vendor to convey title from becoming effective.
A perusal of Exhibit “A” leads to no other conclusion than that it embodies a contract of
sale. The plain and clear tenor of the “DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE OF ONE-HALF (1/2)
[OF] AN UNDIVIDED PORTION OF A PARCEL OF LAND” is that “the VENDOR hereby x x
x SELL, CONVEY AND CONVEY by way of Absolute Sale the one-half (1/2) portion x x x to
the VENDEE x x x his heirs, assigns and successors-in-interest.” That the vendor, petitioner
Vicente Pingol, had that clear intention was further evidenced by his failure to reserve his
title thereto until the full payment of the price.
In Dignos vs. Court of Appeals, we held that a deed of sale is absolute in nature although
denominated as a “Deed of Conditional Sale” where there is no stipulation in the deed that
title to the property sold is reserved in the seller until the full payment of the price, nor is
there a stipulation giving the vendor the right to unilaterally resolve the contract the moment
the buyer fails to pay within a fixed period. Exhibit “A” contains neither stipulation. What is
merely stated therein is that “the VENDEE agrees that in case of default in the payment of
the installments due the same shall earn a legal rate of interest, and to which the VENDOR
likewise agrees.”
Furthermore, as found by the Court of Appeals, the acts of the parties,
contemporaneous and subsequent to the contract, clearly show that an absolute deed of
sale was intended, by the parties and not a contract to sell.
“[P]ursuant to the deed, the vendor delivered actual and constructive possession of the
property to the vendee, who occupied and took such possession, constructed a building
thereon, had the property surveyed and subdivided and a plan of the property was
prepared and submitted to the Land Registration Commission which approved it
preparatory to segregating the same and obtaining the corresponding TCT in his name.
Since the sale, appellee continuously possessed and occupied the property as owner
up to his death on July 13, 1984 and his heirs, after his death, continued the occupancy
and possession of the property up to the present. Those contemporaneous and
subsequent events are demonstrative acts that the vendor since the sale recognized the
vendee as the absolute owner of the property sold. All those attributes of ownership are
admitted by defendants in their answer, specifically in paragraphs 7 ad 9 of their special
and affirmative defenses.”
The contract here being one of absolute sale, the ownership of the subject lot was
transferred to the buyer upon the actual and constructive delivery thereof. The constructive
delivery of the subject lot was made upon the execution of the deed of sale while the actual
delivery was effected when the private respondents took possession of and constructed a
house on Lot No. 3223-A.
The delivery of the object of the contract divested the vendor of the ownership over the
same and he cannot recover the title unless the contract is resolved or rescinded pursuant
to Article 1592 of the New Civil Code which provides that:
“In the sale of immovable property, even though it may have been stipulated that upon
failure to pay the price at the time agreed upon the rescission of the contract shall of
right take place, the vendee may pay, even after the expiration of the period, as long as
no demand for rescission of the contract has been made upon him either judicially or by
a notarial act. After the demand, the court may not grant him a new term.”
Both the trial court and the Court of Appeals did not find that a notarial or judicial rescission
of the contract had been made. Although Vicente Pingol asserts that he had declared to
Francisco Donasco that he was cancelling the contract, he did not prove that his demand
for rescission was made either judicially or by a notarial act.
 Petitioners fault the respondent Court for holding that the action of the petitioners is not rate, shall be computed from 6 January 1976. Upon the payment by the private respondents
barred by the statute of limitations. They argue that the private respondents’ action, being to the petitioners of the said amount and the interest thereon, the latter are ordered to
based upon a written contract, has prescribed since it was brought only in 1988 or more deliver Transfer Certificate of Title No. 7435 to the Register of Deeds of Caloocan City who
than ten years from the time when the latter could have lawfully demanded performance. shall cancel the same and issue two new transfer certificates of title in lieu thereof, one of
which shall be in the name of the herein private respondents covering Lot No. 3223-A and
We disagree. the other in the name of the petitioners covering the remainder of the lot.
SO ORDERED.
Although the private respondents’ complaint before the trial court was denominated as
one for specific performance, it is in effect an action to quiet title. In this regard, the following Note.—Promise to sell do not transfer title until fulfillment of a positive suspensive condition
excerpt from Bucton vs. Gabar is apropos: (Alfonso vs. Court of Appeals, 186 SCRA 400).
“The real and ultimate basis of petitioners’ action is their ownership of one-half of the lot
coupled with their possession thereof, which entitles them to a conveyance of the
property. In Sapto, et al. v. Fabiana [103 Phil. 683, 686-87 (1958)], this Court, speaking ——o0o——
thru Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, explained that under the circumstances no enforcement
of the contract is needed, since the delivery of possession of the land sold had
consummated the sale and transferred title to the purchaser, and that, actually, the
action for conveyance is one to quiet title, i.e., to remove the cloud upon the appellee’s
ownership by the refusal of the appellants to recognize the sale made by their
predecessors.”

That a cloud has been cast on the title of the private respondents is indubitable. Despite the
fact that the title had been transferred to them by the execution of the deed of sale and the
delivery of the object of the contract, the petitioners adamantly refused to accept the tender
of payment by the private respondents and steadfastly insisted that their obligation to
transfer title had been rendered ineffective.

A vendee in an oral contract to convey land who had made part payment thereof,
entered upon the land and had made valuable improvements thereon, is entitled to bring
suit to clear his title against the vendor who had refused to transfer the title to him. It is not
necessary that the vendee has an absolute title, an equitable title being sufficient to clothe
him with personality to bring an action to quiet title.

Prescription thus cannot be invoked against the private respondents for it is aphoristic
that an action to quiet title to property in one’s possession is imprescriptible. The rationale
for this rule has been aptly stated thus:
“The owner of real property who is in possession thereof may wait until his possession
is invaded or his title is attacked before taking steps to vindicate his right. A person
claiming title to real property, but not in possession thereof, must act affirmatively and
within the time provided by the statute. Possession is a continuing right as is the right to
defend such possession. So it has been determined that an owner of real property in
possession has a continuing right to invoke a court of equity to remove a cloud that is a
continuing menace to his title. Such a menace is compared to a continuing nuisance or
trespass which is treated as successive nuisances or trespasses, not barred by statute
until continued without interruption for a length of time sufficient to affect a change of
title as a matter of law.”

Private respondents shall, however, be liable to pay the legal rate of interest on the unpaid
balance of the purchase price from the date of default or on 6 January 1976, when the
entire balance should have been paid, pursuant to the provision in the deed of sale.

WHEREFORE, except as above modified, the Decision appealed from is hereby

AFFIRMED. As modified, the interest on the unpaid balance of P10,161.00, at the legal
 G.R. No. 111141. March 6, 1998.
MARIO Z. TITONG, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS (4th
Division), VICTORICO LAURIO and ANGELES LAURIO, respondents.
Civil Law; Property; Quieting of Title; The ground or reason for filing a complaint for quieting of
title must be “an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.”—At the outset, we hold that
the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the lower court should have outrightly dismissed
the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy of quieting of title may be availed of under the
circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code: “ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real
property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable,
or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud
or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.” Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument,
record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or
shadow upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground or reason for filing a complaint
for quieting of title must therefore be “an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding.” Under
the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are exclusive so that other reasons
outside of the purview of these reasons may not be considered valid for the same action.
Same; Same; Same; The acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action for forcible
entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.—He prayed that, aside from issuing a writ or preliminary
injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired laborers from intruding into the land, the court
should declare him “the true and absolute owner” thereof. Hence, through his allegations, what
petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title to the property were private respondents’ alleged acts
of physical intrusioninto his purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for
an action for forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.
Same; Same; Prescription; A prescription title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession
thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con
justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith).—Petitioner’s claim that he acquired ownership
over the disputed land through possession for more than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious.
While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code provides that “(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable
property are acquired by ordinary prescription through possession of ten years,” this provision of law
must be read in conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that “x x x (o)rdinary
acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the time fixed by
law.” Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere possession thereof under claim of
ownership for a period of ten years unless such possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena
fe (with color of title and good faith). The good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief
that the person from whom he received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his
ownership. For purposes of prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into
possession of the property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership
or other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.
Same; Same; Same; Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and
just title.—Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As aptly
observed by the trial court, the plaintiff’s admitted acts of converting the boundary line (Bugsayon
River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts constituting deprivation of the
rights of others and therefore “tantamount to bad faith.” To allow petitioner to benefit from his own
wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo non oritur actio (no man can be allowed to found a
claim upon his own wrongdoing). Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership
over the property upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that “(o)wnership and other real
rights over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty years,
without need of title or of good faith.” Petitioner’s alleged possession in 1962 up to September 1983
when private respondents entered the property in question spanned twenty-one (21) years. This period
of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated by Art. 1137.
Same; Same; Same; A survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring ownership.
—A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and also a paper
containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land. A survey under a proprietary title is
not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of a partition; a customary mode in which
a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of the common estate. Therefore, a survey, not
being a conveyance, is not a mode of acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim
on the survey plan reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership as it
may refer only to a delineation of possession.
Same; Same; Same; A survey plan not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands is nothing
more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be proven in accordance
with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court.—Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved
by the Bureau of Lands in accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as
amended by Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private surveyors send their original field
notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the Bureau of
Lands for verification and approval. A survey plan not verified and approved by said Bureau is nothing
more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of which must be proven in accordance
with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The circumstance that the plan was admitted in
evidence without any objection as to its due execution and authenticity does not signify that the courts
shall give probative value therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not
contradictory to each other. This Court cannot alter the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the
credibility accorded to evidence presented by the parties.
Same; Same; Ownership; A tax declaration, by itself, is not considered conclusive evidence of
ownership.—Similarly, petitioner’s tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive
evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is not
considered conclusive evidence of ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of ownership. Because
it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving one’s ownership.
ROMERO, J.:
Like a priceless treasure coveted by many, but capable of ownership by only one, this
20,592 square-meter parcel of land located at Barrio Titong, Masbate, Masbate is claimed
by two contestants in this petition for review on certiorari. Unfortunately, legal title over the
property can be vested in only one of them.
The case originated from an action for quieting of title filed by petitioner Mario Titong.
The Regional Trial Court of Masbate, Masbate, Branch 441 ruled in favor of private
respondents, Victorico Laurio and Angeles Laurio, adjudging them as the true and lawful
owners of the disputed land. Affirmed on appeal to the Court of Appeals, petitioner comes to
us for a favorable reversal.
Petitioner alleges that he is the owner of an unregistered parcel of land with an area of
3.2800 hectares, more or less, surveyed as Lot No. 3918, and declared for taxation
purposes in his name. He claims that on three separate occasions in September 1983,
private respondents, with their hired laborers, forcibly entered a portion of the land
containing an area of approximately two (2) hectares, and began plowing the same under
pretext of ownership. Private respondents denied this allegation, and averred that the
disputed property formed part of the 5.5-hectare agricultural land which they had purchased
from their predecessor-in-interest, Pablo Espinosa on August 10, 1981.

In his testimony, petitioner identified Espinosa as his adjoining owner, asserting that no
controversy had sprouted between them for twenty years until the latter sold Lot No. 3479 to
private respondent Victorico Laurio. This was corroborated by Ignacio Villamor, who had
worked on the land even before its sale to Espinosa in 1962. The boundary between the
land sold to Espinosa and what remained of petitioner’s property was the old Bugsayon
river. When petitioner employed Bienvenido Lerit as his tenant in 1962, he instructed Lerit to
change the course of the old river and direct the flow of water to the lowland at the southern
portion of petitioner’s property, thus converting the old river into a riceland.
For his part, private respondent anchors his defense on the following facts: He denied
petitioner’s claim of ownership, recounting that the area and boundaries of the disputed land
remained unaltered during the series of conveyances prior to its coming into his hands.
According to him, petitioner first declared the land for taxation purposes under Tax
Declaration No. 2916, which showed that the land had an area of 5.5 hectares and was
bounded on the North by the Bugsayon River; on the East by property under the ownership
of Lucio Lerit; on the South by property owner by Potenciano Zaragoza; and on the West by
property owned by Agapito de la Cruz. Private Respondent then alleges that, on December
21, 1960, petitioner sold this property to Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug, after which
Tax Declaration No. 53398 was issued in her favor. In compliance with their mutual
agreement to repurchase the same, petitioner reacquired the property by way of sale9 on
August 24, 1962 and then declared it for taxation purposes in his name under Tax
Declaration No. 5720. However, the property remained in petitioner’s hands for only four (4)
days because, on August 28, 1962, he sold it to Espinosa who then declared it in his name
under Tax Declaration No. 12311. Consequently, the property became a part of the estate
of Pablo Espinosa’s wife, the late Segundina Liao Espinosa. On August 10, 1981, her heirs
executed an instrument denominated as “Extrajudicial Settlement of Estate with
Simultaneous Sale” whereby the 5.5-hectare property under Tax Declaration No. 12311
was sold to private respondent13 in consideration of the amount of P5,000.00. Thereafter,
Tax Declaration No. 12738 was issued in the name of private respondent. In all these
conveyances, the area and boundaries of the property remained exactly the same as those
appearing in Tax Declaration No. 2916 under petitioner’s name.
It was proved at the proceedings in the court a quo that two (2) surveys were made of
the disputed property. The first survey was made for petitioner, while the second was the
relocation survey ordered by the lower court. As anticipated, certain discrepancies between
the two surveys surfaced. Thus, contrary to petitioner’s allegation in his complaint that he is
the owner of only 3.2800 hectares, he was actually claiming 5.9789 hectares, the total
areas of Lot Nos. 3918, 3918-A and 3606. On the other hand, Lot No. 3479 pertaining to
Espinosa, was left with only an area of 4.1841 hectares instead of the 5.5 hectares sold by
petitioner to him. Apprised of the discrepancy, private respondent filed a protest15before the
Bureau of Lands against the first survey, likewise filing a case for alteration of boundaries
before the municipal trial court, the proceedings of which, however, were suspended
because of the instant case.
Private respondent testified that petitioner is one of the four heirs of his mother, Leonida
Zaragoza. In the Extrajudicial Settlement with Sale of Estate of the deceased Leonida
Zaragoza, the heirs adjudicated unto themselves the 3.6hectare property of the deceased.
The property involved is described in the instrument as having been declared under Tax
Declaration No. 330118 and as bounded on the North by Victor Verano, on the East by
Benigno Titong, on the South by the Bugsayon River and on the West by Benigno Titong.
On September 9, 1969, Tax Declaration No. 8723 was issued to petitioner for his
corresponding share in the estate.
However, instead of reflecting only .9000 hectare as his rightful share in the extrajudicial
settlement petitioner’s share was bloated to 2.4 hectares. It therefore appeared to private
respondent that petitioner encroached upon his (Laurio’s) property and declared it a part of
his inheritance.
The boundaries were likewise altered so that it was bounded on the North by Victor Verano,
on the East by Benigno Titong, on the South by property owner Espinosa, and on the West
by property owner Adolfo Titong. Private respondent accordingly denied that petitioner had
diverted the course of the Bugsayon River after he had repurchased the land from
Concepcion Verano vda. de Cabug because the land was immediately sold to Espinosa
shortly thereafter.
The lower court rendered a decision in favor of private respondents, declaring him as
the true and absolute owner of the litigated property and ordering petitioner to respect
private respondents’ title and ownership over the property and to pay attorney’s fees,
litigation expenses, costs and moral damages.
Petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals, which affirmed the decision. On motion for
reconsideration, the same was denied for lack of merit. Hence, this petition for review on
certiorari.
At the outset, we hold that the instant petition must be denied for the reason that the
lower court should have outrightly dismissed the complaint for quieting of title. The remedy
of quieting of title may be availed of under the circumstances enumerated in the Civil Code:
“ART. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by
reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is
apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.
An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.”
Under this provision, a claimant must show that there is an instrument, record, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding which constitutes or casts a cloud, doubt, question or shadow
upon the owner’s title to or interest in real property. The ground or reason for filing a
complaint for quieting of title must therefore be “an instrument, record, claim, encumbrance
or proceeding.” Under the maxim expresio unius est exclusio alterius, these grounds are
exclusive so that other reasons outside of the purview of these reasons may not be
considered valid for the same action.
Had the lower court thoroughly considered the complaint filed, it would have had no
other course of action under the law but to dismiss it. The complaint failed to allege that an
“instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding” beclouded the plaintiff’s title over
the property involved. Petitioner merely alleged that the defendants (respondents herein),
together with their hired laborers and without legal justification, forcibly entered the southern
portion of the land of the plaintiff and plowed the same.
 He then proceeded to claim damages and attorney’s fees. He prayed that, aside from
issuing a writ or preliminary injunction enjoining private respondents and their hired laborers
from intruding into the land, the court should declare him “the true and absolute owner”
thereof. Hence, through his allegations, what petitioner imagined as clouds cast on his title
to the property were private respondents’ alleged acts of physical intrusion into his
purported property. Clearly, the acts alleged may be considered grounds for an action for
forcible entry but definitely not one for quieting of title.
When the issues were joined by the filing of the answer to the complaint, it would have
become apparent to the court that the case was a boundary dispute. The answer alleged,
among other matters, that petitioner, “in bad faith, surreptitiously, maliciously and
fraudulently had the land in question included in the survey of his land which extends to the
south only as far as the Bugsayon River which is the visible and natural and common
boundary between the properties.” Moreover, during the hearing of the case, petitioner
proved that it was actually a boundary dispute by evidence showing what he considered as
the boundary of his property which private respondents perceived as actually encroaching
on their property. In this regard, the following pronouncements of the Court are apropos:
“x x x (T)he trial court (and likewise the respondent Court) cannot, in an action for
quieting of title, order the determination of the boundaries of the claimed property, as
that would be tantamount to awarding to one or some of the parties the disputed
property in an action where the sole issue is limited to whether the instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding involved constitutes a cloud upon the petitioners’
interest or title in and to said property. Such determination of boundaries is appropriate
in adversarial proceedings where possession or ownership may properly be considered
and where evidence aliunde, other than the ‘instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or
proceeding’ itself, may be introduced. An action for forcible entry, whenever warranted
by the period prescribed in Rule 70, or for recovery of possession de facto, also within
the prescribed period, may be availed of by the petitioners, in which proceeding the
boundary dispute may be fully threshed out.”
Nonetheless, even if the complaint below were to be considered as a valid one for quieting
of title, still, the instant petition for review on certiorari must fail.
As a general rule, findings of fact of the Court of Appeals are binding and conclusive
upon this Court. Such factual findings shall not be disturbed normally unless the same are
palpably unsupported by the evidence on record or the judgment itself is based on a
misapprehension of facts. Upon an examination of the records, the Court finds no evident
reason to depart from the general rule.
The courts below correctly held that when petitioner “sold, ceded, transferred and
conveyed” the 5.5-hectare land in favor of Pablo Espinosa, his rights of ownership and
possession pertaining thereto ceased and these were transferred to the latter. In the same
manner, Espinosa’s rights of ownership over the land ceased and were transferred to
private respondent upon its sale to the latter. This finds justification in the Civil Code, as
follows:
“ART. 1458. By the contract of sale one of the contracting parties obligates himself to
transfer the ownership of and to deliver a determinate thing, and the other to pay
therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent.
A contract of sale may be absolute or conditional.”
In other words, a sale is a contract transferring dominion and other real rights in the thing
sold. In the case at bar, petitioner’s claim of ownership must of necessity fail because he
has long abdicated his rights over the land when he sold it to private respondent’s
predecessor-in-interest.
Petitioner’s claim that he acquired ownership over the disputed land through possession
for more than twenty (20) years is likewise unmeritorious. While Art. 1134 of the Civil Code
provides that “(o)wnership and other real rights over immovable property are acquired by
ordinary prescription through possession of ten years,” this provision of law must be read in
conjunction with Art. 1117 of the same Code. This article states that “x x x (o)rdinary
acquisitive prescription of things requires possession in good faith and with just title for the
time fixed by law.” Hence, a prescriptive title to real estate is not acquired by mere
possession thereof under claim of ownership for a period of ten years unless such
possession was acquired con justo titulo y buena fe (with color of title and good faith). The
good faith of the possessor consists in the reasonable belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner thereof, and could transmit his ownership. For purposes of
prescription, there is just title when the adverse claimant came into possession of the
property through one of the modes recognized by law for the acquisition of ownership or
other real rights but the grantor was not the owner or could not transmit any right.32
Petitioners have not satisfactorily met the requirements of good faith and just title. As
aptly observed by the trial court, the plaintiff’s admitted acts of converting the boundary line
(Bugsayon River) into a ricefield and thereafter claiming ownership thereof were acts
constituting deprivation of the rights of others and therefore “tantamount to bad faith.” To
allow petitioner to benefit from his own wrong would run counter to the maxim ex dolo malo
non oritur actio (no man can be allowed to found a claim upon his own wrongdoing).
Extraordinary acquisitive prescription cannot similarly vest ownership over the property
upon petitioner. Art. 1137 of the Civil Code states that “(o)wnership and other real rights
over immovables prescribe through uninterrupted adverse possession thereof for thirty
years, without need of title or of good faith.” Petitioner’s alleged possession in 1962 up to
September 1983 when private respondents entered the property in question spanned
twenty-one (21) years. This period of time is short of the thirty-year requirement mandated
by Art. 1137.
Petitioner basically anchors his claim over the property on the survey plan prepared
upon his request,  the tax declaration in his name, the commissioner’s report on the
relocation survey, and the survey plan. Respondent court correctly held that these
documents do not conclusively demonstrate petitioner’s title over Lot Nos. 3918-A and
3606.
A survey is the act by which the quantity of a parcel of land is ascertained and also a
paper containing a statement of courses, distances, and quantity of land. A survey under a
proprietary title is not a conveyance. It is an instrument sui generis in the nature of a
partition; a customary mode in which a proprietor has set off to himself in severalty a part of
the common estate. Therefore, a survey, not being a conveyance, is not a mode of
acquiring ownership. A fortiori, petitioner cannot found his claim on the survey plan
reflecting a subdivision of land because it is not conclusive as to ownership as it may refer
only to a delineation of possession.
Furthermore, the plan was not verified and approved by the Bureau of Lands in
accordance with Sec. 28, paragraph 5 of Act No. 2259, the Cadastral Act, as amended by
Sec. 1862 of Act No. 2711. Said law ordains that private surveyors send their original field
notes, computations, reports, surveys, maps and plots regarding a piece of property to the      
Bureau of Lands for verification and approval. A survey plan not verified and approved by Note.—Tax receipts and declaration of ownership for taxation when coupled with proof of actual
said Bureau is nothing more than a private writing, the due execution and authenticity of possession of the property can be the basis of claim of ownership through prescription. (Heirs of
which must be proven in accordance with Sec. 20 of Rule 132 of the Rules of Court. The Placido Miranda vs. Court of Appeals, 255 SCRA 368 [1996])
circumstance that the plan was admitted in evidence without any objection as to its due
execution and authenticity does not signify that the courts shall give probative value ——o0o——
therefor. To admit evidence and not to believe it subsequently are not contradictory to each
other. This Court cannot alter the conclusions of the Court of Appeals on the credibility
accorded to evidence presented by the parties.

Similarly, petitioner’s tax declaration issued under his name is not even persuasive
evidence of his claimed ownership over the land in dispute. A tax declaration, by itself, is
not considered conclusive evidence of ownership. It is merely an indicium of a claim of
ownership. Because it does not by itself give title, it is of little value in proving one’s
ownership. Moreover, the incompatibility in petitioner’s tax declaration and the
commissioner’s report as regards the area of his claimed property is much too glaring to be
ignored. Tax Declaration No. 8717 states that petitioner’s property has an area of 3.2800
hectares while the totality of his claim according to the commissioned geodetic engineer’s
survey amounts to 4.1385 hectares. There is therefore a notable discrepancy of 8,585
square meters. On the other hand, private respondent’s claimed property, as borne out by
Tax Declaration No. 12738, totals 5.5 hectares, a more proximate equivalent of the
5.2433hectare property as shown by the commissioner’s report.

There is also nothing in the commissioner’s report that substantiates petitioner’s claim
that the disputed land was inside his property. Petitioner capitalizes on the lower court’s
statement in its decision that “as reflected in the commissioner’s report dated May 23, 1984
(Exhibit 3-3-A), the area claimed is inside lot 3918 of the defendants (Exhibit 2)” or
the private respondents. A careful reading of the decision would show that this statement is
found in the summary of defendants’ (herein private respondents) evidence. Reference to
Lot No. 3918 may, therefore, be attributed to mere oversight as the lower court even
continues to state the defendants’ assertion that the 2-hectare land is part of their
5.5hectare property. Hence, it is not amiss to conclude that either petitioner
misapprehended the lower court’s decision or he is trying to contumaciously mislead or
worse, deceive this Court.

With respect to the awards of moral damages of P10,000.00 and attorney’s fees of
P2,000.00, the Court finds no cogent reason to delete the same. Jurisprudence is replete
with rulings to the effect that where fraud and bad faith have been established, the award of
moral damages is in order. This pronouncement finds support in Art. 2219 (10) of the Civil
Code allowing the recovery of moral damages for acts enumerated in Art. 21 of the same
Code. This article states that “(a)ny person who wilfully causes loss or injury to another in a
manner that is contrary to morals, good customs or public policy shall compensate the latter
for the damage.” The moral damages are hereby increased to P30,000.00. We agree with
the respondent court in holding that the award of attorney’s fees is justified because
petitioner filed a clearly unfounded civil action.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED and the
questioned Decision of the Court of Appeals AFFIRMED. This Decision is immediately
executory. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
 G.R. No. 156171. April 22, 2005
SPOUSES RICARDO and FERMA PORTIC, petitioners, vs. ANASTACIA CRISTOBAL,
respondent.
Actions; Quieting of Title; Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem.—
Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they are neither in
rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as defendant. However, unlike
suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only between the parties.
Same; Same; Parties; Land Titles; While generally the registered owner of a property is the
proper party to bring an action to quiet title, the remedy may also be availed of by a person other than
the registered owner.—Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an
action to quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a person
other than the registered owner because, in the Article reproduced above, “title” does not necessarily
refer to the original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual certificate of title to a property
does not necessarily bar an action to quiet title. As will be shown later, petitioners have not turned over
and have thus retained their title to the property.
Contracts; Sales; In a contract to sell ownership is retained by the vendor and it will not be
passed to the vendee until full payment of the purchase price.—The claim of respondent cannot be
sustained. The transfer of ownership of the premises in her favor was subject to the suspensive
condition stipulated by the parties in paragraph 3 of the MOA, which states as follows: “3. That while
the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the FIRST PARTY OWNERS shall retain the
ownership of the above described parcel of land together with its improvements but the SECOND
PARTY BUYER shall have the right to collect the monthly rentals due on the first door (13-A) of the said
apartment”; The above-cited provision characterizes the agreement between the parties as a contract
to sell, not a contract of sale. Ownership is retained by the vendors, the Portics; it will not be passed to
the vendee, the Cristobals, until the full payment of the purchase price. Such payment is a positive
suspensive condition, and failure to comply with it is not a breach of obligation; it is merely an event
that prevents the effectivity of the obligation of the vendor to convey the title. In short, until the full price
is paid, the vendor retains ownership.
Same; Same; Land Titles; Registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence of title.—
The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in favor of Cristobal did not vest ownership in her. Neither
did it validate the alleged absolute purchase of the lot. Time and time again, this Court has stressed
that registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence of, title. Our land registration laws do not
give the holders any better title than that which they actually have prior to registration. Under Article
1544 of the Civil Code, mere registration is not enough to acquire a new title. Good faith must concur.
Clearly, respondent has not yet fully paid the purchase price. Hence, as long as it remains unpaid, she
cannot feign good faith. She is also precluded from asserting ownership against petitioners. The
appellate court’s finding that she had a valid title to the property must, therefore, be set aside.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
An agreement in which ownership is reserved in the vendor and is not to pass to the vendee
until full payment of the purchase price is known as a contract to sell. The absence of full
payment suspends the vendors’ obligation to convey title. This principle holds true between
the parties, even if the sale has already been registered. Registration does not vest, but
merely serves as evidence of, title to a particular property.
Our land registration laws do not give title holders any better ownership than what they
actually had prior to registration.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, challenging the
January 29, 2002 Decision and the November 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-GR CV No. 66393. The assailed Decision disposed as follows:
“WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the appealed decision is hereby REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. A new one is hereby entered ORDERING defendant-appellant to pay
the unpaid balance of P55,000.00 plus legal interest of 6% per annum counted from the
filing of this case. The ownership of defendant-appellant over the subject property is
hereby confirmed.
“No pronouncement as to costs.”
In the challenged Resolution, the CA denied petitioners’ Motion for Partial Reconsideration.
The Facts
The facts were summarized by the appellate court as follows:
“Spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam were the original registered
owners of a parcel of land with three-door apartment, located at No. 9, 1st Street BBB,
Marulas, Valenzuela City. Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-71316 was issued in the
names of spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam.
“On October 2, 1968, spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam sold the
subject property in favor of [petitioners] with the condition that the latter shall assume
the mortgage executed over the subject property by spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and
Candelaria Edrosalam in favor of the Social Security System.
“[Petitioners] defaulted in the payment of the monthly amortizations due on the
mortgage. The Social Security System foreclosed the mortgage and sold the subject
property at public auction with the Social Security System as the highest bidder.
“On May 22, 1984, before the expiration of the redemption period, [petitioners] sold the
subject property in favor of [respondent] in consideration of P200,025.89. Among others,
the parties agreed that [respondent] shall pay the sum of P45,025.89 as down payment
and the balance of P155,000.00 shall be paid on or before May 22, 1985. The parties
further agreed that in case [respondent] should fail to comply with the conditions, the
sale shall be considered void and [petitioners] shall reimburse [respondent] of whatever
amount already paid.
“On the same date, [petitioners] and [respondent] executed a ‘Deed of Sale with
Assumption of Mortgage’ whereby [petitioners] sold the subject property in favor of
[respondent] in consideration of P80,000.00, P45,000.00 thereof shall be paid to the
Social Security System.
“On July 30, 1984, spouses Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam, the original
owners of the subject property, sold the subject property in favor of [respondent] for
P50,000.00.
“On the same date, [respondent] executed a ‘Deed of Mortgage’ whereby [respondent]
constituted a mortgage over the subject property to secure a P150,000.00 indebtedness
in favor of [petitioners].
“[Respondent] paid the indebtedness due over the subject property to the Social
Security System.
“On August 6, 1984, Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-71316 in the names of spouses
Clodualdo Alcantara and Candelaria Edrosalam was cancelled and in lieu thereof
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113299 was issued in the name of [respondent].
“On May 20, 1996, [petitioners] demanded from [respondent] the alleged unpaid
balance of P55,000.00. [Respondent] refused to pay.
“On June 6, 1996, [petitioners] filed this instant civil case against [respondent] to
remove the cloud created by the issuance of TCT No. T-113299 in favor of [respondent].
[Petitioners] claimed that they sold the subject property to [respondent] on the condition
that [respondent] shall pay the balance on or before May 22, 1985; that in case of failure
 to pay, the sale shall be considered void and [petitioners] shall reimburse [respondent]
of the amounts already paid; that [respondent] failed to fully pay the purchase price
within the period; that on account of this failure, the sale of the subject property by
[petitioners] to [respondent] is void; that in spite of this failure, [respondent] required
[petitioners] to sign a lease contract over the apartment which [petitioners] occupy; that
[respondent] should be required to reconvey back the title to the subject property to
[petitioners].
“[Respondent] on her part claimed that her title over the subject property is already
indefeasible; that the true agreement of the parties is that embodied in the Deed of
Absolute Sale with Assumption of Mortgage; that [respondent] had fully paid the
purchase price; that [respondent] is the true owner of the subject property; that
[petitioners’] claim is already barred by laches.”
After trial, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Valenzuela City rendered this judgment in favor
of petitioners:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court hereby adjudicates on this case as
follows:
1.)The Court hereby orders the quieting of title or removal of cloud over the
[petitioners’] parcel of land and three (3) door apartment now covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113299 of the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan
City and Tax Declaration Nos. C-018-00235 & C-031-012077 respectively, of
Valenzuela City;
2.)The Court hereby orders the [respondent] to reconvey in favor of the
[petitioners] the parcel of land and three (3) door apartment now covered by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-113299 of the Registry of Deeds of Caloocan
City after reimbursement by the [petitioners] of the amount actually paid by the
[respondent] in the total amount of P145,025.89;
3.)The Court hereby DENIES damages as claimed by both parties.”
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals opined that the first Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) embodied the
real agreement between the parties, and that the subsequent Deeds were executed merely
to secure their respective rights over the property.8 The MOA stated that Cristobal had not
fully paid the purchase price. Although this statement might have given rise to a cause of
action to annul the Deed of Sale, prescription already set in because the case had been
filed beyond the ten-year reglementary period, as observed by the CA. Nonetheless, in
conformity with the principle of unjust enrichment, the appellate court ordered respondent to
pay petitioners the remaining balance of the purchase price.
In their Motion for Partial Reconsideration, petitioners contended that their action was
not one for the enforcement of a written contract, but one for the quieting of title—an action
that was imprescriptible as long as they remained in possession of the premises. The CA
held, however, that the agreement between the parties was valid, and that respondent’s title
to the property was amply supported by the evidence. Therefore, their action for the quieting
of title would not prosper, because they failed to show the invalidity of the cloud on their
title.
Hence, this Petition.
The Issue
In its Memorandum, petitioners raise the following issues for our consideration:
“(1)Whether or not the [petitioners’] cause of action is for quieting of title.
“(2)Whether or not the [petitioners’] cause of action has prescribed.”
The main issue revolves around the characterization of the parties’ agreement and the
viability of petitioners’ cause of action.
This Court’s Ruling
The Petition has merit.
Main Issue: Nature of the Action: Quieting of Title or  Enforcement of a Written Contract
Petitioners argue that the action they filed in the RTC was for the quieting of title.
Respondent’s demand that they desist from entering into new lease agreements with the
tenants of the property allegedly attests to the fact of their possession of the subject
premises. Further, they point to the existence of Civil Case No. 7446, an action for unlawful
detainer that respondent filed against them, as further proof of that fact. Being in continuous
possession of the property, they argue that their action for the quieting of title has not
prescribed.
On the other hand, respondent joins the appellate court in characterizing the action
petitioners filed in the RTC as one for the enforcement of the MOA. Being based on a
written instrument, such action has already prescribed, respondent claims. She adds that
petitioners could not have been in continuous possession of the subject property because,
under a duly notarized lease agreement, they have been paying her a monthly rental fee of
P500, which was later increased to P800.
Two questions need to be answered to resolve the present case; namely, (1) whether
Cristobal’s title to the property is valid; and (2) whether the Portics are in possession of the
premises, a fact that would render the action for quieting of title imprescriptible.
Validity of Title
The CA held that the action for the quieting of title could not prosper, because Cristobal’s
title to the property was amply supported by evidence.
Article 476 of the Civil Code provides as follows:
“Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of
any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or
effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and
may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove such cloud or to
quiet the title.
“An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.”
Suits to quiet title are characterized as proceedings quasi in rem. Technically, they are
neither in rem nor in personam. In an action quasi in rem, an individual is named as
defendant. However, unlike suits in rem, a quasi in rem judgment is conclusive only
between the parties.
Generally, the registered owner of a property is the proper party to bring an action to
quiet title. However, it has been held that this remedy may also be availed of by a person
other than the registered owner because, in the Article reproduced above, “title” does not
necessarily refer to the original or transfer certificate of title. Thus, lack of an actual
certificate of title to a property does not necessarily bar an action to quiet title. As will be part of the former constituting the basis for laches. (Vda. de Cabrera vs. Court of Appeals, 267 SCRA
shown later, petitioners have not turned over and have thus retained their title to the 339 [1997])
property.
An action for quieting of title can coexist with actions for unlawful detainer. (Oronce vs. Court of
Appeals, 298 SCRA 133[1998])
On the other hand, the claim of respondent cannot be sustained. The transfer of
ownership of the premises in her favor was subject to the suspensive condition stipulated by An action for quieting of title is imprescriptible. (Heirs of Ambrocio Kionisala vs. Heirs of Honorio
the parties in paragraph 3 of the MOA, which states as follows: Dacut, 378 SCRA 206 [2002])
“3.That while the balance of P155,000.00 has not yet been fully paid the FIRST PARTY
OWNERS shall retain the ownership of the above described parcel of land together with
its improvements but the SECOND PARTY BUYER shall have the right to collect the ——o0o——
monthly rentals due on the first door (13-A) of the said apartment”;
 
The above-cited provision characterizes the agreement between the parties as a contract to
sell, not a contract of sale. Ownership is retained by the vendors, the Portics; it will not be
passed to the vendee, the Cristobals, until the full payment of the purchase price. Such
payment is a positive suspensive condition, and failure to comply with it is not a breach of
obligation; it is merely an event that prevents the effectivity of the obligation of the vendor to
convey the title. In short, until the full price is paid, the vendor retains ownership.

The mere issuance of the Certificate of Title in favor of Cristobal did not vest ownership
in her. Neither did it validate the alleged absolute purchase of the lot. Time and time again,
this Court has stressed that registration does not vest, but merely serves as evidence of,
title. Our land registration laws do not give the holders any better title than that which they
actually have prior to registration.

Under Article 1544 of the Civil Code, mere registration is not enough to acquire a new
title. Good faith must concur. Clearly, respondent has not yet fully paid the purchase price.
Hence, as long as it remains unpaid, she cannot feign good faith. She is also precluded
from asserting ownership against petitioners. The appellate court’s finding that she had a
valid title to the property must, therefore, be set aside.

Continuous Possession

The issue of whether the Portics have been in actual, continuous possession of the
premises is necessarily a question of fact. Well-entrenched is the rule that findings of fact of
the Court of Appeals, when supported by substantial evidence, are final and conclusive and
may not be reviewed on appeal. This Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the CA’s
findings sustaining those of the trial court, which held that petitioners had been in
continuous possession of the premises. For this reason, the action to quiet title has not
prescribed.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Decision and Resolution of

the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the RTC of
Valenzuela City in Civil Case No. 4935-V-96, dated September 23, 1999, is hereby
REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
     
Notes.—Where the action for reconveyance (quieting of title) was instituted only after thirty
years from the time a party was able to acquire a Certificate of Title covering a particular property, while
the occupant, has been in active possession of the same, this surely constitutes such tardiness on the
 G.R. No. 193554. April 13, 2016.*
 
SPOUSES RODRIGO IMPERIAL, JR. and JOCELYN IMPERIAL, and FE IMPERIAL,
petitioners, vs. SPOUSES ROGELIO and ASUNCION PINIGAT, respondents.
Remedial Law; Civil Procedure; Judgments; Doctrine of Finality of Judgments; A final and
executory decision of the court, however, is applicable not only to the parties thereto but also to their
successors-in-interest.—Indeed, Civil Case No. 627 was between Rodrigo Sr. and the respondents. A
final and executory decision of the court, however, is applicable not only to the parties thereto but also
to their successors-in-interest. Thus, in Cabresos v. Tiro, 166 SCRA 400 (1988), the Court upheld the
validity of the writ of execution issued against the successors-in-interest of the losing litigant despite the
fact that these successors-in-interest were not mentioned in the judgment and were never parties to the
case. The Court explained that an action is binding on the privies of the litigants even if such privies are
not literally parties to the action. Their inclusion in the writ of execution does not vary or exceed the
terms of the judgment.
Civil Law; Succession; In Barcelona, et al. v. Barcelona and CA, 100 Phil. 251 (1956), the
Supreme Court (SC) emphasized that hereditary successors merely step into the shoes of the
decedent by operation of law and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-
interest. Hence, they acquire rights and interests not more than what their predecessors have at the
time of their death.—In Barcelona, et al. v. Barcelona and CA, 100 Phil. 251 (1956), the Court
emphasized that hereditary successors merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law
and are merely the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest. Hence, they acquire
rights and interests not more than what their predecessors have at the time of their death.
RESOLUTION
 
REYES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari filed under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
assailing the Decision dated March 25, 2010 and Resolution dated September 27, 2010 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 98950, which reversed and set aside the
Decision dated March 29, 2007 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37.
The instant case stemmed from Civil Case No. 627 for Quieting of Title, Recovery of
Possession and Damages filed by Rodrigo Imperial, Sr. (Rodrigo Sr.) against Betty Imperial
(Betty), involving a 248-square-meter residential lot with improvements, situated in San
Roque, Baao, Camarines Sur. The subject property was formerly declared for tax purposes
in the name of Isabelo Imperial (Isabelo), brother of Betty’s husband, Juan Imperial (Juan)
and of Rodrigo Sr.’s mother, Beatriz.
Rodrigo Imperial, Jr. (Rodrigo Jr.), testifying for Rodrigo Sr., claimed that the subject
property was sold by his grandfather, Isabelo, to his father, as evidenced by an Absolute
Deed of Sale dated September 28, 1979. Following the sale, however, Isabelo stayed in the
house with him while his father left for Manila. When the time came that Rodrigo Jr. needed
to go to Manila to pursue college studies, Isabelo allowed Juan and Betty to stay with him in
the house, with the agreement that they will leave upon demand. In 1985, Isabelo died.
Rodrigo Sr. asked Juan and Betty to stay in the house until Rodrigo Jr. finishes college.
Soon, thereafter, Spouses Rogelio and Asuncion Pinigat (respondents), who were the son-
in-law and daughter of Juan and Betty, respectively, were also allowed to move in to the
house.
In 1997, Rodrigo Jr. and his father were surprised to learn that there was already a
deed of sale over one-half portion of the subject property in favor of the respondents
registered with the Registry of Deeds of Camarines Sur. Rodrigo Sr. lodged a complaint
with Barangay Captain Edwin Bedural of Baao, Camarines Sur but the parties failed to
reach an amicable settlement of their dispute.
For her part, Betty alleged that Isabelo, during his lifetime, sold one-half portion of the
subject property to Juan for P10,000.00. Upon the death of Juan, she sold the said portion
of the property to Rogelio, who thereafter registered the same and paid taxes thereon.
On October 28, 2002, the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Baao, Camarines Sur,
rendered a Decision, recognizing the respondents’ ownership of one-half portion of the
subject property. The pertinent portion of the decision reads:
And the court after carefully scrutinizing the evidences submitted in the record finds
the preponderance of the evidence in favor of the defendants. If it is true the plaintiff had
bought the property in question in 1979, why is it that from that time and up to the
present, he never took steps to register the document and to caused [sic] the transfer of
the covering tax declaration in his name? He did not even pay the real property taxes as
they accrue annually. As shown by his exhibits C-1 to C-2, it was [Isabelo] who paid the
real property taxes of the property. If it is true, [Isabelo] had already sold to the plaintiff
the property in 1979, why is it that the former was still able to mort[g]aged [sic] the same
to Modesto Padua in January 1980 as shown by the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage
(exhibit 5)? x x x.
x x x x
x x x [T]he court is more inclined to believe [Betty’s] version that of having
purchased one-half of the property in question from [Isabelo] for the sum of
[P10,000.00] and that no document was executed to evidenced [sic] the sale. As
testified to by [Betty], she and her late husband [Juan] lived together in the house and
lot in question. In fact, after such sale, Isabelo [and] Juan had the property relocated
and subdivided by Geodetic Engineer Ramon Camposano, who prepared/made a
sketch plan x x x.
x x x x
Be that as it may, since as [Betty] herself admitted the remaining half of the house
and lot in question still belongs to [Isabelo], then, plaintiff should content himself of that
remaining half. The other half which was already sold to [the respondents] should be
recognized and respected. x x x.
The foregoing decision became final and executory after the RTC of Iriga City dismissed
the appeal of Rodrigo Sr. In the course of the execution, however, a survey on the subject
property revealed that portions of the existing houses of Spouses Rodrigo Jr. and Jocelyn
Imperial and Roberto Ballesteros and Fe Imperial (Fe) (petitioners) stood within the portion
pertaining to the respondents. The respondents demanded that the petitioners vacate the
encroached portions. Initially, the petitioners acceded to the demand and started
demolishing walls of their houses but later ceased from doing so notwithstanding the
respondents’ repeated demands. The parties failed to reach an amicable settlement of their
differences which prompted the respondents to file a Complaint for Unlawful Detainer with
Damages against the petitioners, which was docketed as Civil Case No. 845. The
respondents alleged that the petitioners unjustifiably refused to vacate the subject property
and remove structures erected therein.
 On June 16, 2006, the MTC rendered a Decision15 in favor of the respondents, the
dispositive portion of which reads, as follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of all of the foregoing, on preponderance of evidence, this
Court finds in favor of the [respondents] and against the [petitioners] who are ordered to:
1.) Peacefully vacate and remove the structures constructed on the portion of the
parcel of land subject of this case as declared under Tax Declaration
(A.R.P.) #94-020-0236 with an area of 124 sq. m. (i.e., 1/2 of the total 248
sq. m.) and turn over the same to the [respondents];
2.) Jointly and severally pay the [respondents] the amount of Php500.00 per
month from the date of judicial demand until they have effectively vacated
the land in question as reasonable rentals.
3.) Pay the costs of suit.
All other claims and counter-claims by the [respondents] and the [petitioners]
against each other are all denied.
SO ORDERED.
Unyielding, the petitioners appealed from the decision of the MTC. And in a Decision
dated March 29, 2007, the RTC reversed the decision of the MTC. The dispositive portion of
the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the [petitioners’] contention[s] are sustained and the decision of the
lower court dated June 16, 2006 is hereby ordered reversed for lack of jurisdiction and
cause of action. No damages are imposed against the [respondents] in favor of the
[petitioners].
SO ORDERED.
 
The RTC held that the respondents’ complaint failed to state the fact that the petitioners’
possession was lawful from the beginning but became illegal when their right to possess
had expired or terminated. It also noted that the complaint failed to aver the facts
constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer particularly the manner of entry; hence, the
proper remedy should be either an accion publiciana or accion reivindicatoria which must be
filed with the proper RTC. The RTC further observed that the dispositive portion of the
decision in Civil Case No. 627 did not mention that the respondents are entitled to the
possession of the property nor did it order the petitioners to vacate the same.
The respondents elevated the case to the CA on petition for review under Rule 42 of the
Rules of Court. Then, on March 25, 2010, the CA rendered a Decision, reversing the
decision of the RTC, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the [RTC] of Iriga City, Branch 37, dated March 29,
2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision of the [MTC] of Baao, Camarines
Sur, dated June 16, 2006, is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
 
The petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but the CA denied the same in its
Resolution dated September 27, 2010. Hence, this petition.
The petitioners claim that the decision of the MTC in Civil Case No. 627 does not apply
to them as they were not made parties thereto. They likewise question the validity of the
relocation survey that was conducted to divide the subject property, claiming that the same
was done unilaterally.
The petition lacks merit.
The respondents’ right to one-half portion of the subject property had long been settled
in the MTC’s Decision dated October 28, 2002 in Civil Case No. 627. The MTC
acknowledged the entitlement of the respondents to half of the subject property, holding that
they were able to clearly establish the source of their right and found their claims
adequately supported by convincing and credible evidence. It also noted the fact that the
property was already registered in the name of the respondents and that they have been
religiously paying real property taxes due the same. Its decision became final and executory
but the petitioners, in disregard thereof, refused to yield the possession of the portion
owned by the respondents on the pretext that the decision did not specifically order them to
vacate the house. Thus, the respondents were constrained to file another case for unlawful
detainer, to compel the petitioners to vacate the premises. For the second time, the MTC
recognized the respondents’ right to one-half portion of the subject property and ordered the
petitioners to peaceably surrender the possession of the same to the former. Still, the
petitioners were adamant and asserted that the MTC’s Decision dated October 28, 2002
would not bind them as they were not parties thereto.
The petitioners’ argument is misplaced.
Indeed, Civil Case No. 627 was between Rodrigo Sr. and the respondents. A final and
executory decision of the court, however, is applicable not only to the parties thereto but
also to their successors-in-interest. Thus, in Cabresos v. Tiro, the Court upheld the validity
of the writ of execution issued against the successors-in-interest of the losing litigant despite
the fact that these successors-in-interest were not mentioned in the judgment and were
never parties to the case. The Court explained that an action is binding on the privies of the
litigants even if such privies are not literally parties to the action. Their inclusion in the writ of
execution does not vary or exceed the terms of the judgment. The Court ratiocinated:
By “third party” is meant a person who is not a party to the action under
consideration. We agree with the private respondents that the petitioners are privies to
the case for recovery of ownership and possession filed by the former against the
latter’s predecessors-in-interest, the latter being the daughter-in-law and grandchildren
of the losing party in Civil Case No. 3150. By the term “privies” is meant those between
whom an action is deemed binding although they are not literally parties to the said
action. There is no doubt that the assailed decision is binding on the petitioners.
 
In Civil Case No. 627, the MTC dismissed Rodrigo Sr.’s claim of ownership after failing
to establish the veracity of his allegation that a contract of sale over the subject property
was executed between him and Isabelo. Hence, Rodrigo Jr. may not anchor his claim of title
on that supposed purchase by his father. The only possibility that Rodrigo Jr. may be
entitled to a portion of the property is by means of succession, his deceased father being
the nephew of Isabelo who died without any children. As a mere successor, however,
Rodrigo Jr. only succeeds to that portion of the estate that the decedent did not dispose of
during his lifetime. It is crystal clear from the facts that at the time of Isabelo’s death, he is
the owner of only one-half of the subject property, having disposed the other half by virtue
of an absolute sale to his brother, Juan. Rodrigo Jr. cannot now repudiate the
conclusiveness of the judgment in Civil Case No. 627, which delineated the portion of the
subject property still owned by Isabelo and that which he had already disposed to the
respondents. Rodrigo Jr., having merely stepped into the shoes of his predecessor, cannot
claim that the decision does not apply to him. Nemo dat quod non habet.
 In Barcelona, et al. v. Barcelona and CA,  the Court emphasized that hereditary An heir’s right of ownership over the properties of the decedent is merely inchoate as long as the
successors merely step into the shoes of the decedent by operation of law and are merely estate has not been fully settled and partitioned. (Medina vs. Court of Appeals, 679 SCRA 191 [2012])
the continuation of the personality of their predecessor-in-interest. Hence, they acquire  
rights and interests not more than what their predecessors have at the time of their death.  
On the other hand, Fe failed to present any basis for her claim of title over the subject ——o0o——
property. She, being the widow of the eldest son of Juan, Virgilio Imperial, cannot succeed
directly from Isabelo and had absolutely no business staying in the subject property.

Finally, the petitioners cannot evade the enforceability of the decision by merely
claiming that the relocation survey conducted on the property was done without their
participation. It appears from the records, that the geodetic engineer who conducted the
survey was appointed by the court and did his undertaking in the presence of the parties. In
the Affidavit dated August 12, 2005 of Salvador Guevara (Sheriff Guevara), the
implementing sheriff of the court in Civil Case No. 627 stated:
That in the execution of the aforementioned decision, Alfredo Samper, a Geodetic
Engineer by profession was appointed by the Court to conduct the subdivision survey in
equal shares of the land subject of the case.
That on June 3, 2004 at around 9:30 o’clock in the morning, Engr. Alfredo Samper,
the undersigned together with Sheriff Rolando T. Sergio and in the presence of the
parties of the case, including the spouses [Rodrigo Jr.] and Jocelyn Imperial, the person
of Roberto Ballesteros and other members of the family conducted the actual
subdivision survey of the land in question, dividing the property into two (2) equal
portions, for which the share where the building structure of Rogelio Pinigat was
constructed, and which actually identified and segreg[a]ted from the entire landholding.
x x x x
That on the actual survey, I came to know that that the house of Roberto
Ballesteros (part) and also the spouses [Rodrigo Jr.] and Jocelyn Imperial (part) whose
portion of their houses likewise encroached in the identified property of Rogelio Pinigat,
hence I filed a report on the matter with the [MTC] of Baao, Camarines Sur x x x.
 
The petitioners never disputed the statement of Sheriff Guevara throughout the
proceedings in the RTC and CA. If they had any question on the propriety of the survey,
they should have raised them at the time that the survey was being conducted or, at least,
noted their disagreement in the pleadings they submitted before the trial court. Considering
that the survey was undertaken to divide the property, it is only expected from the parties to
raise a protest should the same be conducted irregularly or with manifest partiality to one
party. There being neither resistance nor challenge to the survey conducted, it is only
reasonable for the Court to assume that the same was conducted properly and to conclude
that the petitioners were merely formulating issues in order to further delay the execution of
the final decision of the MTC. The Court will not countenance such a deliberate effort to
prevent the prevailing party from reaping the fruits of litigation.

WHEREFORE, the Decision dated March 25, 2010 and Resolution dated September
27, 2010 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. S.P. No. 98950 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—The property rights and obligations to the extent of the value of the inheritance of a
person are transmitted to another through the decedent’s death. (Republic vs. Marcos-Manotoc, 665
SCRA 367 [2012])
 G.R. No. 187633. April 4, 2016.
 
HEIRS OF DELFIN and MARIA TAPPA, petitioners, vs.  HEIRS OF JOSE BACUD,
HENRY CALABAZARON and VICENTE MALUPENG, respondents.
Civil Law; Quieting of Titles; In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 137 (2000), an
action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy grounded on equity.—The action filed by
Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of possession. In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of
Appeals, 325 SCRA 137 (2000), an action for quieting of title is essentially a common law remedy
grounded on equity, to wit: x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure “. . . an
adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the complainant, is
invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be forever afterward free from any
danger of hostile claim.” In an action for quieting of title, the competent court is tasked to determine the
respective rights of the complainant and other claimants, “. . . not only to place things in their proper
place, to make the one who has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also
for the benefit of both,so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt over the property
dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the improvements he may desire, to use,
and even to abuse the property as he deems best. x x x.” (Emphasis in the original) In our jurisdiction,
the remedy is governed by Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code, which state: Art. 476. Whenever
there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest therein, by reason of any instrument, record,
claim, encumbrance or proceeding which is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact
invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be
brought to remove such cloud or to quiet the title. An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud
from being cast upon title to real property or any interest therein. Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal
or equitable title to, or interest in the real property which is the subject matter of the action. He need not
be in possession of said property.
Same; Same; The rule that for an action to quiet title to prosper, two (2) indispensable requisites
must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the
real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie appearance.—For an action to quiet title to prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur,
namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property
subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud
on his title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
Same; Land Registration; Free Patents; The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free
patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and have passed to private ownership.—The
settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and produces no legal
effects, whatsoever. Private ownership of land — as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like
a duly registered possessory information or a clear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and
notorious possession, by present or previous occupants — is not affected by the issuance of a free
patent over the same land, because the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain.
The Director of Lands has no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in
character and have passed to private ownership.
Same; Ownership; Tax Declarations; Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property
are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner,
for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive
possession.—Records show that Lorenzo declared Lot No. 3341 for taxation purposes as early as
1948, and paid the real property taxes (evidenced by real property tax payment receipts in the name of
Lorenzo from 1952 until his death in 1961). Spouses Tappa were likewise shown to pay the real
property taxes from 1961 to 2000. Similarly, respondents also declared their respective portions of Lot
No. 3341 for taxation in their names in 1994, and paid real property taxes on those portions from 1967
to 2004. Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of
ownership, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind
would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute
at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
Same; Quieting of Titles; A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or
contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3)
but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated)
or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.—A cloud on a title exists
when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or claim or encumbrance or proceeding;
(2) which is apparenty valid or effective; (3) but is, in truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be
prejudicial to the title. The 1963 Affidavit is no doubt an instrument, which appears to be valid. It is
dated and appears to be executed and signed by Delfin, his mother and sisters. It is also notarized by a
public notary. It states that Genaro originally owns the land described, and that one-half (1/2) of which
is actually owned by Irene as a coheir. This is contrary to the claim of Spouses Tappa that the property
was solely Lorenzo’s. Respondents’ argue that this affidavit evidences the title of their predecessor-in-
interest over Lot No. 3341 and effectively, theirs. The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in
fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable or unenforceble, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by
extinctive prescription. The CA correctly found that Spouses Tappa’s claim of force and intimidation in
the execution of the 1963 Aftidavit was ‘‘unsubstantiated.” The CA pointed out that, “[a]side from the
testimony of Delfin Tappa, no other evidence was presented to prove the claim of force and
intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving.” Also, the 1963 Affidavit was duly notarized and, as such,
is considered a public document, and enjoys the presumption of validity as to its authenticity and due
execution.
Same; Certificate of Title; Collateral Attack; Section 48 of Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529,
provides that “[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered,
modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in accordance with law.”— The certificate of title
was not collaterally attacked. Section 48 of PD 1529, provides that “[a] certificate of title shall not be
subject to collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.” This rule is not applicable in this case. We reiterate our ruling in Lee Tek Sheng
v. Court of Appeals, 292 SCRA 544 (1998), where we stated that, “[w]hat cannot be collaterally
attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The certificate referred to is that document issued by
the Register of Deeds x x x. By title, the law refers to ownership which is represented by that
document.” Ownership is different from a certificate of title, the latter being only the best proof of
ownership of a piece of land. Title as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate
of title as evidence of such ownership although both are interchangeably used.
JARDELEZA, J.:
 
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the Decision dated February 19, 2009 and Resolution3 dated April 30, 2009 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 90026, which reversed and set aside the
Decision4 dated July 6, 2007 of Branch 5, Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Tuguegarao City,
Cagayan in Civil Case No. 5560 for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and
Damages.
The Facts
 
On September 9, 1999, petitioners Delfin Tappa (Delfin) and Maria Tappa (Spouses
Tappa) filed a complaint for Quieting of Title, Recovery of Possession and Damages
(Complaint) against respondents Jose Bacud (Bacud), Henry Calabazaron (Calabazaron),
and Vicente Malupeng (Malupeng). The property subject of the complaint is a parcel of land
identified as Lot No. 3341, Pls-793 with an area of 21,879 square meters, located in
Kongcong, Cabbo, Peñablanca, Cagayan (Lot No. 3341).
In their complaint, Spouses Tappa alleged that they are the registered owners of Lot
No. 3341, having been issued an Original Certificate of Title No. P-69103 (OCT No. P-
69103) on September 18, 1992, by virtue of Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194. Delfin
allegedly inherited Lot No. 3341 from his father, Lorenzo Tappa (Lorenzo). Spouses Tappa
claimed that both Delfin and Lorenzo were in open, continuous, notorious, exclusive
possession of the lot since time immemorial.1
In their Answer, respondents Bacud, Calabazaron and Malupeng claimed that the
original owner of Lot No. 3341 was Genaro Tappa (Genaro) who had two children, Lorenzo
and Irene. Upon Genaro’s death, the property passed on to Lorenzo and Irene by operation
of law; and they became ipso facto co-owners of the property. As co-owners, Lorenzo and
Irene each owned 10,939 square meters of the lot as their respective shares. Lorenzo had
children namely, Delfin, Primitiva, and Fermina. Upon the death of Irene, her share in turn
passed to her heirs, Demetria, Juanita, Pantaleon and Jose Bacud.
Respondents presented before the RTC a joint affidavit dated April 29, 1963 (1963
Affidavit) signed by Delfin, his sisters, Primitiva and Fermina, and their mother, Modesta
Angoluan. The 1963 affidavit stated that Genaro originally owned Lot No. 3341. It further
stated that one-half (1/2) of the property was owned by Lorenzo; but that the whole property
was declared as his, only for taxation purposes.
Calabazaron claimed that he became the owner of 2,520 square meters of Lot No. 3341
by virtue of two Deeds of Sale executed in his favor, one dated October 12, 1970 executed
by Demetria, and another dated August 22, 1971 executed by Juanita. After the sale,
Calabazaron entered into possession of his portion and paid the real property taxes. He
remains in possession up to this date.
Malupeng, on the other hand, claimed that he became the owner of 210 square meters
of Lot No. 3341 by virtue of a Deed of Sale executed on November 30, 1970 by Pantaleon
in his favor.After the sale, Malupeng entered into possession of his portion of property and
paid the real property taxes. He remains in possession up to this date.
Bacud claimed ownership over 1,690 square meters of Lot No. 3341 in his own right as
heir of Irene. Respondents started occupying their respective portions after the sale made to
each of them. They continued to occupy them despite several demands to vacate from
Spouses Tappa.
Spouses Tappa claimed that the 1963 Affidavit was executed through force and
intimidation. Bacud and Malupeng denied this allegation.
 
The Ruling of the RTC
 
The RTC issued its Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs and the Court
hereby orders:
1. Plaintiffs to be the owners of Lot 3341, Pls 793 and unqualifiedly vests in them
the full and untrammeled rights of ownership;
2. All the defendants must, if still in possession of portions of the lot in issue,
convey the same to the plaintiffs;
3. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
The RTC ruled that the basic requirement of the law on quieting of title under Article 447
of the Civil Code was met, thus:
Delfin and Maria’s title is clear and unequivocal, and its validity has never been
assailed by the defendants — nor has any evidence been adduced that successfully
overcomes the presumption of validity and legality that the title of Delfin and Maria
enjoys. (Emphasis in the original)
The RTC ruled that there was no document in the hands of respondents as strong and
persuasive as the title in the name of the Spouses Tappa that will support respondents’
claim of ownership and Irene’s antecedent ownership. The RTC stated that the 1963
Affidavit contains nothing more than the allegations of the affiants and does not, by itself,
constitute proof of ownership of land, especially as against documents such as titles.
Respondents appealed to the CA, raising the following arguments:
First, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa fraudulently applied for, and were issued
a free patent over Lot No. 3341, and eventually OCT No. P-69103 dated September 18,
1992. They alleged that Spouses Tappa committed fraud because they were not in
possession of the lot since 1963, which possession was required for an applicant for a free
patent under the law.
Second, respondents argued that the complaint should be dismissed because both
extinctive and acquisitive prescription have already set in. Respondents claimed that both
ordinary acquisitive prescription of 10 years, and extraordinary acquisitive prescription of 30
years in claiming ownership of immovable property apply in the case. They argued that
more than 30 years have already lapsed from the time they entered possession of the
subject lot in 1963 up to the filing of the complaint on September 9, 1999. They also pointed
out that Spouses Tappa admitted in their complaint that respondents were in possession of
the lot since 1963.
Particularly, Calabazaron argued that the 10-year prescriptive period under Article 1134
of the Civil Code applies to him by virtue of the two duly executed Deeds of Sale in his
favor. It was never alleged that he had any participation in the alleged duress, force and
intimidation in the execution of the 1963 Affidavit. Hence, he is a purchaser in good faith and
for value. Calabazaron entered possession of the lot after the sale to him in 1970, thus, the
prescriptive period of 10 years had long lapsed.
Bacud and Malupeng claimed that, even assuming that the execution of the 1963
Affidavit was attended with force and intimidation, the complaint against them should have
been dismissed because the extraordinary acquisitive prescriptive period of 30 years under
Article 1137 of the Civil Code applies to them. They also argued that the action for quieting
of title had already prescribed since the possession of Bacud and Malupeng started in 1963,
which fact was allegedly admitted by Spouses Tappa in their complaint. Thus, Spouses
Tappa had only until 1993 to file a complaint, which they failed to do.
 All respondents claimed that from the start of their possession, they (1) have paid real
taxes on the lot, (2) have planted crops, and (3) have continued to possess the lot in the
concept of owners.
Third, respondents alleged that Spouses Tappa failed to prove their right over the
subject lot because they cannot rely on the certificate of title issued to them on September
18, 1992 by virtue of a free patent.42 They asserted that Spouses Tappa fraudulently
obtained the free patent on Lot No. 3341 by concealing material facts, specifically the fact of
not being in possession of the lot since 1963.
The Ruling of the CA
 
The CA set aside the decision of the RTC. The relevant dispositive portion of the CA
decision reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is hereby GRANTED. The
assailed decision dated July 6, 2007 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and
another one entered DISMISSING the complaint.
SO ORDERED.
On the issue of prescription, the CA ruled in favor of respondents and explained that
their possession over Lot No. 3341 already ripened into ownership through acquisitive
prescription. The CA noted that Spouses Tappa acknowledged in their complaint that they
have not been in possession of the lot, and that respondents have been continuously
occupying portions of it since 1963.4 It explained:
The substantial length of time between 1963, up to the time of filing of the present
complaint on September 9, 1999, which is more than 30 years, should be considered
against [S]pouses Tappa, and in favor of defendants appellants. Settled is the rule that
an uninterrupted adverse possession of the land for more than 30 years could ripen into
ownership of the land through acquisitive prescription, which is a mode of acquiring
ownership and other real rights over immovable property. Hence, appellants’
possession of the land has ripened into ownership by virtue of acquisitive prescription.
(Citation omitted)
 
On the merits of the case, the CA ruled that the two indispensable requisites for an
action to quiet title under Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code were not met.
The first requisite is absent because Spouses Tappa do not have a legal or an equitable
title to or an interest in the property. The CA explained that the free patent granted to
Spouses Tappa produced no legal effect because Lot No. 3341 was a private land, thus:
As heretofore discussed, the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession by appellants of the subject parcel of land within the period prescribed by
law has effectively converted it into a private land. Consequently, the registration in the
name of Maria Tappa on September 18, 1992 under OCT [No.] P-69103, by virtue of
Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194, produces no legal effect. Private ownership of land
— as when there is a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory
information or a dear showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession, by present or previous occupants — is not affected by the issuance of a
free patent over the same land, because the Public Land [L]aw applies only to lands of
the public domain. (Citation omitted)
 
The CA further stated that while Spouses Tappa were able to obtain a free patent over
the property, and were able to register it under the Torrens system, they have not become
its owners. The CA said that “[r]egistration has never been a mode of acquiring ownership
over immovable property — it does not create title nor vest one but it simply confirms a title
already vested, rendering it forever indefeasible.”
The second requisite that the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be
casting cloud on the title must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima
facie  appearance of validity is likewise unavailing. The CA ruled that no other evidence
(aside from Delfin’s own testimony) was presented to prove the allegation of fraud and
intimidation, making the testimony self-serving. The CA further noted that Delfin’s own
sister, Fermina, one of the signatories of the 1963 Affidavit, belied his testimony. Fermina
testified that they went to the house of one Atty. Carag to sign the affidavit and they did so,
on their own.
Spouses Tappa filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the CA denied.
Hence, spouses Tappa filed a petition for review on certiorari before this court, raising
the following issues:
I. Whether the CA erred in dismissing Spouses Tappa’s complaint for quieting of
title against respondents;
II. Whether the CA erred in not finding that Spouses Tappa’s certificate of title
cannot be collaterally attacked in this case; and
III. Whether the CA erred in finding that respondents have acquired the property
through acquisitive prescription. 
 
The Ruling of the Court
 
We affirm the decision of the CA.
The action for quieting of title should not prosper.
The action filed by Spouses Tappa was one for quieting of title and recovery of
possession. In Baricuatro, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, an action for quieting of title is essentially
a common law remedy grounded on equity, to wit:
x x x Originating in equity jurisprudence, its purpose is to secure “. . . an
adjudication that a claim of title to or an interest in property, adverse to that of the
complainant, is invalid, so that the complainant and those claiming under him may be
forever afterward free from any danger of hostile claim.” In an action for quieting of title,
the competent court is tasked to determine the respective rights of the complainant and
other claimants, “. . . not only to place things in their proper place, to make the one who
has no rights to said immovable respect and not disturb the other, but also for
the benefit of both, so that he who has the right would see every cloud of doubt
over the property dissipated, and he could afterwards without fear introduce the
improvements he may desire, to use, and even to abuse the property as he deems
best. x x x.” (Emphasis in the original)
 
In our jurisdiction, the remedy is governed by Articles 476 and 477 of the Civil Code,
which state:
Art. 476. Whenever there is a cloud on title to real property or any interest
therein, by reason of any instrument, record, claim, encumbrance or proceeding which
is apparently valid or effective but is in truth and in fact invalid, ineffective, voidable, or
unenforceable, and may be prejudicial to said title, an action may be brought to remove
such cloud or to quiet the title.
 An action may also be brought to prevent a cloud from being cast upon title to real
property or any interest therein.
Art. 477. The plaintiff must have legal or equitable title to, or interest in the real
property which is the subject matter of the action. He need not be in possession of said
property.
From the foregoing provisions, we reiterate the rule that for an action to quiet title to
prosper, two indispensable requisites must concur, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant
has a legal or an equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and
(2) the deed, claim, encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title
must be shown to be in fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of
validity or legal efficacy.
Spouses Tappa failed to meet these two requisites.
First, Spouses Tappa’s claim of legal title over Lot No. 3341 by virtue of the free patent
and the certificate of title, OCT No. P-69103 issued in their name cannot stand. The
certificate of title indicates that it was issued by virtue of Patent No. 021519-92-3194. We
agree with the CA that at the time of the application for free patent, Lot No. 3341 had
already become private land by virtue of the open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious
possession by respondents. Hence, Lot No. 3341 had been removed from the coverage of
the Public Land Act, which governs public patent applications.
The settled rule is that a free patent issued over a private land is null and void, and
produces no legal effects, whatsoever. Private ownership of land — as when there is
a prima facie proof of ownership like a duly registered possessory information or a clear
showing of open, continuous, exclusive, and notorious possession, by present or previous
occupants — is not affected by the issuance of a free patent over the same land, because
the Public Land Law applies only to lands of the public domain. The Director of Lands has
no authority to grant free patent to lands that have ceased to be public in character and
have passed to private ownership.
In Magistrado v. Esplana, we cancelled the titles issued pursuant to a free patent after
finding that the lots involved were privately owned since time immemorial. A free patent that
purports to convey land to which the Government did not have any title at the time of its
issuance does not vest any title in the patentee as against the true owner.
In this case, the parties were able to show that Lot No. 3341 was occupied by, and has
been in possession of the Tappa family, even before the 1963 Affidavit was executed. After
the execution of the 1963 Affidavit, respondents occupied their respective portions of the
property. Delfin testified that before his father, Lorenzo, died in 1961, Lorenzo had been
occupying the lot since before the war, and that Delfin was born there in 1934.
Records show that Lorenzo declared Lot No. 3341 for taxation purposes as early as
1948, and paid the real property taxes (evidenced by real property tax payment receipts in
the name of Lorenzo from 1952 until his death in 1961). Spouses Tappa were likewise
shown to pay the real property taxes from 1961 to 2000.68Similarly, respondents also
declared their respective portions of Lot No. 3341 for taxation in their names in 1994, and
paid real property taxes on those portions from 1967 to 2004. Although tax declarations or
realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, they are
good indicia  of possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be
paying taxes for a property that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They
constitute at least proof that the holder has a claim of title over the property.
Spouses Tappa also admitted in their complaint that sometime in 1963, Bacud and
Malupeng started occupying portions of Lot No. 3341 and planted crops on the property,
while Calabazaron did the same on another portion of the lot in the 1970’s. The complaint
stated further that since 1963 the respondents “continuously occupied portion of the subject
land.”
In view of the foregoing circumstances that show open, continuous, exclusive and
notorious possession and occupation of Lot No. 3341, the property had been segregated
from the public domain. At the time the patent and the certificate of title were issued in 1992,
Spouses Tappa and their predecessors-in-interest were already in possession, at least to
the half of the lot, since 1934; and respondents were also in possession of the other half
since 1963. Therefore, the free patent issued covers a land already segregated from the
public domain.
In Heirs of Simplicio Santiago v. Heirs of Mariano E. Santiago, we ruled, thus:
Considering the open, continuous, exclusive and notorious possession and
occupation of the land by respondents and their predecessors-in-interests, they are
deemed to have acquired, by operation of law, a right to a government grant without
the necessity of a certificate of title being issued. The land was thus segregated from
the public domain and the director of lands had no authority to issue a patent. Hence,
the free patent covering Lot 2344, a private land, and the certificate of title issued
pursuant thereto, are void.
Records also show that Spouses Tappa were aware of respondents’ possession of the
disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. They even admitted such possession (since 1963) by
respondents in their complaint filed in 1999. Despite this, Spouses Tappa were able to
obtain a free patent of the whole property even if they were not in possession of some of its
portions. Therefore, Free Patent No. 021519-92-3194 and OCT No. P-69103 are void not
only because it covers a private land, but also because they fraudulently included
respondents’ portion of the property. In Avila v. Tapucar, we held that “[i]f a person obtains a
title under the Torrens system, which includes by mistake or oversight land which can no
longer be registered under the system, he does not, by virtue of the said certificate alone,
become the owner of the lands illegally included.”
In an action to quiet title, legal title denotes registered ownership, while equitable title
means beneficial ownership. As discussed, the free patent and the certificate of title issued
to Spouses Tappa could not be the source of their legal title.
The second requisite for an action to quiet title is likewise wanting. We find that although
an instrument (the 1963 Affidavit) exists, and which allegedly casts cloud on Spouses
Tappa’s title, it was not shown to be in fact invalid or ineffective against Spouses Tappa’s
rights to the property.
A cloud on a title exists when (1) there is an instrument (deed, or contract) or record or
claim or encumbrance or proceeding; (2) which is apparently valid or effective; (3) but is, in
truth and in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable, or unenforceable or extinguished (or
terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription; and (4) and may be prejudicial to the title.
 The 1963 Affidavit is no doubt an instrument, which appears to be valid. It is dated and
appears to be executed and signed by Delfin, his mother and sisters. It is also notarized by
a public notary. It states that Genaro originally owns the land described, and that one-half
(1/2) of which is actually owned by Irene as a coheir. This is contrary to the claim of
Spouses Tappa that the property was solely Lorenzo’s. Respondents’ argue that this
affidavit evidences the title of their predecessor-in-interest over Lot No. 3341 and
effectively, theirs.
The 1963 Affidavit however, was not proven to be, in fact, invalid, ineffective, voidable
or unenforceble, or extinguished (or terminated) or barred by extinctive prescription. The CA
correctly found that Spouses Tappa’s claim of force and intimidation in the execution of the
1963 Affidavit was ‘‘unsubstantiated.”  The CA pointed out that, “[a]side from the testimony
of Delfin Tappa, no other evidence was presented to prove the claim of force and
intimidation, hence, it is at most, self-serving.” Also, the 1963 Affidavit was duly notarized
and, as such, is considered a public document, and enjoys the presumption of validity as to
its authenticity and due execution.
Thus, we affirm the ruling of the CA that the requisites for an action to quiet title are
wanting in the case.
There is no collateral attack on the Certificate of Title.
 
Spouses Tappa argue that respondents collaterally attacked the certificate of title of Lot
No. 3441 when they raised the issue of its validity. Spouses Tappa used the same
argument against the CA when it declared the certificate of title to be without legal effect.
Spouses Tappa’s argument is without merit. The certificate of title was not collaterally
attacked. Section 48 of PD 1529, provides that “[a] certificate of title shall not be subject to
collateral attack. It cannot be altered, modified, or canceled except in a direct proceeding in
accordance with law.” This rule is not applicable in this case.
We reiterate our ruling in Lee Tek Sheng v. Court of Appeals, where we stated that,
“[w]hat cannot be collaterally attacked is the certificate of title and not the title. The
certificate referred to is that document issued by the Register of Deeds x x x. By title, the
law refers to ownership which is represented by that document.” Ownership is different from
a certificate of title, the latter being only the best proof of ownership of a piece of land. Title
as a concept of ownership should not be confused with the certificate of title as evidence of
such ownership although both are interchangeably used.90
that Spouses Tappa were owners of only onehalf (1/2) of the lot since it was originally
owned by Genaro, the father of Lorenzo and Irene. Respondents claim that Lorenzo and
Irene became ipso facto  co-owners of the lot.95Thus, respondents claim that, by virtue of a
valid transfer from Irene’s heirs, they now have ownership and title over portions of Lot No.
3341, and that they have been in continuous, exclusive, and uninterrupted possession of
their occupied portions. Malupeng and Calabazaron claim ownership and title over their
respective portions by virtue of a valid sale. Bacud claims ownership and title by virtue of
succession. Therefore, it is the ownership and title of Spouses Tappa which respondents
ultimately attack. OCT No. P-69103 only serves as the document representing Spouses
Tappas’ title.
Respondents cannot likewise argue that the certificate of title of Spouses Tappa is
indefeasible. We have already ruled that the one-year prescriptive period does not apply
when the person seeking annulment of title or reconveyance is in possession of the
property. This is because the action partakes of a suit to quiet title, which is
imprescriptible.99 In this case, respondents have been proved to be in possession of the
disputed portions of Lot No. 3341. Thus, their claim against Spouses Tappa cannot be
barred by the one-year prescriptive period.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 90026 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Notes.—Quieting of title is a common law remedy for the removal of any cloud upon or doubt or
uncertainty with respect to title to real property. (Heirs of Enrique Toring vs. Heirs of Teodosia
Boquilaga, 631 SCRA 278 [2010])
If the land covered by free patent was a private land, the Director of Lands has no jurisdiction over
it; Such free patent and the subsequent certificate of title issued pursuant thereto are a nullity. ( Heirs of
Margarito Pabaus vs. Heirs of Amanda Yutiamco, 654 SCRA 521 [2011])
 
——o0o——

In Vda. de Figuracion v. Figuracion-Gerilla,   citing Lacbayan v. Samoy, Jr.,  we reaffirm

this ruling, and stated that:
Mere issuance of a certificate of title in the name of any person does not foreclose
the possibility that the real property may be under co-ownership with persons not
named in the certificate, or that the registrant may only be a trustee, or that other
parties may have acquired interest over the property subsequent to the issuance of the
certificate of title. Stated differently, placing a parcel of land under the mantle of the
Torrens system does not mean that ownership thereof can no longer be disputed. The
certificate cannot always be considered as conclusive evidence of ownership.

In this case, what respondents dispute, as raised in their Answer, is Spouses Tappa’s
claim of sole ownership over Lot No. 3341. As affirmative defense, respondents claimed
 G.R. No. 181596. January 30, 2017.
 
JENESTOR B. CALDITO and MARIA FILOMENA T. CALDITO, petitioners, vs. ISAGANI
V. OBADO and GEREON V. OBADO, respondents.
Civil Law; Possession; Tax Declarations; Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as in the instant case, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or constructive possession.—Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of
property are not conclusive evidence of ownership, as in the instant case, they are good indicia of
possession in the concept of owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property
that is not in his actual or constructive possession. They constitute evidence of great weight in support
of the claim of title of ownership by prescription when considered with the actual possession of the
property by the applicant. Indeed, the respondents’ presentation of the tax declarations and tax receipts
which all are of ancient era indicates possession in the concept of an owner by the respondents and
their predecessors-in-interests. The tax declarations in the name of Paterno take on great significance
because the respondents can tack their claim of ownership to that of their father. It is worthy to note
that the respondents’ father Paterno to whom they inherited the entire Lot No. 1633 paid the taxes due
under his name from 1961 to 1989; and subsequently, the respondents paid the taxes due after the
death of Paterno in 2003. Granting without admitting that Felipe’s possession of Lot No. 1633 cannot
be tacked with the respondents’ possession, the latter’s possession can be tacked with that of Paterno.
Thus, from 1961 to the time of the filing of the quieting of title by the petitioners in 2003, the
respondents have been in possession of the entire Lot No. 1633 in the concept of an owner for almost
42 years. This period of time is sufficient to vest extraordinary acquisitive prescription over the property
on the respondents. As such, it is immaterial now whether the respondents possessed the property in
good faith or not.
 Same; Sales; Buyer in Good Faith; The Supreme Court (SC) had already ruled that the issue of
good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land but
not where the property is an unregistered land. One who purchases an unregistered land does so at his
peril.—While the findings of the CA that the petitioners were a buyer in bad faith is in accord with the
evidence on record, it must be pointed out, however, that they overlooked the fact that Lot No. 1633 is
an unregistered piece of land. The Court had already ruled that the issue of good faith or bad faith of a
buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a registered land but not where the property is an
unregistered land. One who purchases an unregistered land does so at his peril. His claim of having
bought the land in good faith, i.e., without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in,
the property, would not protect him if it turns out that the seller does not actually own the property. All
the same, the application of this doctrine will not affect the outcome of this case.
REYES, J.:
 
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of Revised Rules of Court
are the Decision dated July 17, 2007 and the Resolution dated January 29, 2008 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 87021, which reversed and set aside the
Decision dated December 23, 2005 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City, Ilocos
Norte, Branch 12, in Civil Case No. 12932-12.
The Facts
 
This petition stemmed from a complaint5 for quieting of ownership over a parcel of land
covering the 272.33 square meters eastern portion of Lot No. 1633 situated at Barangay
No. 5, San Vicente, Sarrat, Ilocos Norte, filed by Spouses Jenestor B. Caldito and Ma.
Filomena Tejada Caldito (Filomena) (petitioners) against Isagani V. Obado (Isagani) and
Gereon V. Obado (respondents).
The record showed that as early as 1921, Lot No. 1633 was declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Felipe Obado (Felipe). After Felipe’s death, Paterno Obado
(Paterno), whom Felipe treated like his own son, subsequently occupied Lot No. 1633 and
continued to pay the realty taxes of the same.
Sometime in 1995, Antonio Ballesteros (Antonio) executed an Affidavit of Ownership
dated February 23, 1995 narrating his claim over the subject parcel of land. In his affidavit,
Antonio claimed that Lot No. 1633 was co-owned by Felipe with his five siblings, namely:
Eladia, Estanislao, Maria, Severino and Tomasa, all surnamed Obado.
On the next day following the execution of the said affidavit or on February 24, 1995,
Antonio and Elena Ballesteros (Spouses Ballesteros) sold the subject parcel of land to the
petitioners for the sum of P70,000.000 evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale. Thereafter,
the petitioners declared the subject lot for taxation purposes and paid the realty taxes
thereon.
In 2002, the petitioners attempted to build a house on the subject parcel of land but the
respondents prevented them from completing the same. The respondents then filed a
complaint before the barangay but no amicable settlement was reached between the
parties. Hence, on December 8, 2003, the petitioners instituted a complaint for quieting of
ownership against the respondents before the RTC, as well as an injunctive writ to prevent
the respondents from interfering with the construction of their house.
For their part, the respondents averred that the Spouses Ballesteros were not the
owners and possessors of the subject parcel of land. They maintained that Lot No. 1633
was inherited by their father, Paterno, from its original owner Felipe, and they have been
paying the real property taxes for the entire property. They asserted that the petitioners are
buyers in bad faith since their family had been in possession of the entire Lot No. 1633
since 1969 and had been in open, peaceful and uninterrupted possession of the whole
property up to the present or for more than 30 years in the concept of an owner.
After trial, the court a quo rendered its judgment in favor of the petitioners. The trial
court upheld the validity of the sale between the petitioners and the Spouses Ballesteros
and dismissed the respondents’ claim of ownership over Lot No. 1633. The trial court held
that the petitioners presented convincing evidence of ownership over the subject parcel of
land which consists of the following: (a) the Deed of Absolute Sale executed between the
petitioners and the Spouses Ballesteros; (b) the tax declarations all paid by the petitioners
only; and (c) the Affidavit of Ownership allegedly executed by Antonio. The trial court also
found that the respondents have no successional rights over the property of Felipe based
on the governing law and on the order of intestate succession at that time and the
established facts. Thus, the RTC disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING PREMISES, the
preponderance of evidence having substantially and sufficiently tilted in favor of the
[petitioners] herein and against the [respondents] herein named and their siblings, this
Court hereby renders judgment declaring the validity of the 272.33 square meters
eastern portion of Lot No. 1633 in favor of the [petitioners] and, the [respondents] are
hereby ordered to do the following:
 1. to respect, recognize and not to molest the lawful ownership and
possession of the [petitioners] over the 272.33 square meters located at
the eastern portion of Lot No. 1633 of the Sarrat Cadastre;
2. to pay jointly and severally to the [petitioners] the total sum of:
2.a. P118,453.50 – as and for actual damages;
2.b. P400,000.00 – as and for moral damages;
2.c. P100,000.00 – as and for nominal damages;
2.d. P200,000.00 – as and for temperate damages; and
2.e. P300,000.00 – as and for exemplary damages or corrective.
With costs against the [respondents].
SO ORDERED. Emphasis and italics in the original)
 
On appeal, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC decision upon finding that: (1) the
petitioners failed to prove the title of their immediate predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses
Ballesteros; (2) the petitioners failed to support their claim that Felipe and his siblings,
Eladia, Estanislao, Maria, Severino and Tomasa, co-owned Lot No. 1633; (3) Antonio
should have been called to the witness stand to testify on the contents of his Affidavit of
Ownership; (4) the Deed of Absolute Sale is not a sufficient and convincing evidence that
the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest have a title on the subject parcel of land which they
can transfer; (5) the petitioners are not innocent purchasers for value since the subject lot is
not registered and is in the possession of another person, other than the Spouses
Ballesteros; (6) nothing in the record could establish the relationship between Felipe and his
supposed legal heirs; and (7) the respondents enjoy a legal presumption of just title in their
favor since they are in possession of the entire Lot No. 1633. The CA then ruled that:
For a party seeking to quiet their “ownership” of the portion in litigation, [the
petitioners] have, for starters, miserably failed to prove the title of their immediate
predecessors-in-interest, the [Spouses Ballesteros]. Except for the February 23,
1995 Affidavit of Ownership executed by [Antonio], there is, in fact, no evidence on
record to support the claim that the subject parcel was, indeed, co-owned by [Felipe]
[and] his siblings, Eladia, Estanislao, Maria, Severino and Tomasa, all surnamed
Obado. To our mind, the fact that [Antonio] was not even called to the witness stand to
testify on the contents of his Affidavit of Ownership should have immediately impelled
the trial court to discount its probative value and, with it, the very foundation of [the
respondents’] supposed cause of action.
x x x x
With even greater reason are we disposed towards the reversal of the trial court’s
holding that, pursuant to the provisions of the Spanish Civil Code of 1889 on intestate
succession, Eladia, Estanislao, Maria, Severino and Tomasa, all surnamed Obado were
the ones who have rightfully inherited the subject parcel from their brother, [Felipe].
Except for the aforesaid February 23, 1995 Affidavit of Ownership executed by
[Antonio], [the respondents] correctly argue that there is nothing on record from which
the relationship of said decedent and his supposed legal heirs may be reasonably
deduced. Even if said relationship were, moreover, assumed, the absence of evidence
showing that [Felipe] predeceased all of his supposed siblings impel us to regard, with
considerable askance, the trial court’s disposition of the case by application of said rules
on intestate succession. Litigations cannot be properly resolved by suppositions,
deductions, or presumptions, with no basis in evidence for the truth must have, to be
determined by the hard rules on admissibility and proof. This is particularly true of the
case at bench where the successional rights determined by the trial court are
diametrically opposed to [Antonio’s] Affidavit of Ownership which dubiously claimed
that the subject parcel was, in fact, co-owned by [Felipe] and his ostensible siblings and
had already been partitioned by and among them.
 
The petitioners moved for reconsideration14 but the same was denied.1 Hence, this
petition.
 
The Issue
 
WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONERS WERE ABLE TO PROVE
OWNERSHIP OVER THE SUBJECT PARCEL OF LAND.
 
Ruling of the Court
 
The petition has no merit.
At the outset, it bears to emphasize that there is no dispute with respect to the fact that
Felipe was the original owner of the entire parcel of unregistered land known as Lot No.
1633 which he started declaring as his property for taxation purposes as early as 1921.
When Felipe died without issue, Lot No. 1633 was subsequently occupied by Paterno who
then declared the same for taxation purposes and paid the realty taxes thereon.
The petitioners’ complaint styled as being for the “quieting of ownership” is in fact an
action for quieting of title. The petitioners anchor their cause of action upon the Deed of
Sale and the Affidavit of Ownership executed by Antonio. On the other hand, the
respondents countered that: (1) they inherited from their father, Paterno, Lot No. 1633, of
which the herein disputed subject parcel of land is part; and (2) they have been in
possession of the same for more than 30 years in the concept of an owner.
Essentially, the issues raised center on the core question of whether the petitioners
were able to prove ownership over the subject parcel of land. In resolving this issue, the
pertinent point of inquiry is whether the petitioners’ predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses
Ballesteros, have lawful title over the subject parcel of land.
While the question raised is essentially one of fact, of which the Court normally abstains
from, yet, considering the incongruent factual conclusions of the courts below, the Court is
constrained to go by the exception to the general rule and proceed to reassess the factual
circumstances of the case and make its own assessment of the evidence and documents
on record. But even if the Court were to reevaluate the evidence presented, there is still no
reason to depart from the CA’s ruling that Lot No. 1633 is owned by the respondents.
The Court concurs with the disquisition of the CA that the petitioners failed to: (1) prove
the title of their immediate predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses Ballesteros; and (2)
present evidence supporting the claim that Lot No. 1633 was co-owned by Felipe and his
siblings, Eladia, Estanislao, Maria, Severino and Tomasa. Also, the Court finds that the
RTC mistakenly relied upon the Affidavit of Ownership, executed by Antonio, to conclude
that the petitioners were possessors in good faith and with just title who acquired the
subject parcel of land through a valid deed of sale.
In this case, the petitioners’ cause of action relates to an action to quiet title which has
two indispensable requisites, namely: (1) the plaintiff or complainant has a legal or an
equitable title to or interest in the real property subject of the action; and (2) the deed, claim,
encumbrance or proceeding claimed to be casting cloud on his title must be shown to be in
fact invalid or inoperative despite its prima facie appearance of validity or legal efficacy.

From the foregoing provisions, it is clear that the petitioners’ cause of action must
necessarily fail mainly in view of the absence of the first requisite since the petitioners were
not able to prove equitable title or ownership over the subject parcel of land.
The petitioners’ claim of legal title over the subject parcel of land by virtue of the Deed
of Sale and Affidavit of Ownership issued by Antonio cannot stand because they failed to
prove the title of their immediate predecessors-in-interest, the Spouses Ballesteros. The
Court cannot give full credence to Antonio’s Affidavit of Ownership for he simply made
general and self-serving statements therein which were favorable to him, and which were
not supported with documentary evidence, with no specifics as to when their predecessors-
in-interest acquired the subject parcel of land, and when the Donations Propter
Nuptias were made. Indeed, such is hardly the well-nigh incontrovertible evidence required
in cases of this nature. The petitioners must present proof of specific acts of ownership to
substantiate his claim and cannot just offer general statements which are mere conclusions
of law than factual evidence of possession.17 More so, Antonio was not even called to the
witness stand to testify on the contents of his Affidavit of Ownership, thus, making the
affidavit hearsay evidence and its probative value questionable. Accordingly, this affidavit
must be excluded from the judicial proceedings being inadmissible hearsay evidence.
Furthermore, the said affidavit was executed by Antonio only a day before the subject
parcel of land was sold to the petitioners. The trial court should have considered this in
evaluating the value of the said affidavit in relation to the ownership of the subject parcel of
land. The trial court’s reliance on the Affidavit of Ownership executed by Antonio that the
entire Lot No. 1633 was co-owned by Felipe and his siblings, Eladia, Estanislao, Maria,
Severino and Tomasa is misplaced, considering that nothing on record shows the
relationship between Felipe and his supposed legal heirs. It also indicates the fact that there
is no evidence showing Felipe predeceasing all his supposed siblings.  Moreover, no other
piece of evidence was ever presented to prove that Lot No. 1633 was ever subdivided. In
fact, the petitioners admitted that the subject lot has always been declared for taxation
purposes in the name of Felipe and that the Spouses Ballesteros or the siblings of Felipe
have never declared the same for taxation purposes in their names.
While the petitioners submitted official receipts and tax declarations to prove payment of
taxes, nowhere in the evidence was it shown that Spouses Ballesteros declared the subject
parcel of land in their name for taxation purposes or paid taxes due thereon. True, a tax
declaration by itself is not sufficient to prove ownership. Nonetheless, it may serve as
sufficient basis for inferring possession.20 In fact, what the petitioners presented as their
pieces of evidence are receipts and tax declarations which they, as the new owners of the
subject parcel of land, have paid. Thus, the petitioners could not also rely on these tax
declarations and receipts because those are of recent vintage and do not reflect the fact
that their predecessors-in-interest have been paying realty taxes for the subject parcel of
land.
Be that as it may, the rights of the respondents as owners of Lot No. 1633 were never
alienated from them despite the sale of the subject parcel of land by the Spouses
Ballesteros to the petitioners nor does the fact that the petitioners succeeded in paying the
real property taxes of the subject parcel of land. Besides, it seems that the petitioners knew
of the fact that they did not have a title to the subject parcel of land and could not, therefore,
have validly registered the same, because of the respondents’ possession of the entire
property.
The respondents also presented the following pieces of evidence: (1) old certified
photocopies of declarations of real property and original copy of tax receipts from year 1921
to 1944 in the name of Felipe, covering payments by the latter for Lot No. 1633 from which
the subject parcel of land was taken;21 (2) original copy of tax receipts from year 1961 to
year 1989 in the name of the respondents’ father Paterno, covering payments by the latter
for Lot No. 1633;22(3) original copy of tax receipt dated July 21, 2004 in the name of Isagani,
covering payments by the latter for Lot No. 1633; (4) original copy of the Certification issued
by the Municipal Treasurer of Sarrat, Ilocos Norte that Lot No. 1633 covered by Tax
Declaration No. 03-001-00271 declared in the name of Felipe is not delinquent in the
payment of realty taxes.
Although tax declarations or realty tax payment of property are not conclusive evidence
of ownership, as in the instant case, they are good indicia of possession in the concept of
owner, for no one in his right mind would be paying taxes for a property that is not in his
actual or constructive possession. They constitute evidence of great weight in support of the
claim of title of ownership by prescription when considered with the actual possession of the
property by the applicant.
Indeed, the respondents’ presentation of the tax declarations and tax receipts which all
are of ancient era indicates possession in the concept of an owner by the respondents and
their predecessors-in-interests. The tax declarations in the name of Paterno take on great
significance because the respondents can tack their claim of ownership to that of their
father. It is worthy to note that the respondents’ father Paterno to whom they inherited the
entire Lot No. 1633 paid the taxes due under his name from 1961 to 1989; and
subsequently, the respondents paid the taxes due after the death of Paterno in
2003.27 Granting without admitting that Felipe’s possession of Lot No. 1633 cannot be
tacked with the respondents’ possession, the latter’s possession can be tacked with that of
Paterno. Thus, from 1961 to the time of the filing of the quieting of title by the petitioners in
2003, the respondents have been in possession of the entire Lot No. 1633 in the concept of
an owner for almost 42 years. This period of time is sufficient to vest extraordinary
acquisitive prescription over the property on the respondents. As such, it is immaterial now
whether the respondents possessed the property in good faith or not.
Admittedly, the respondents built their house at the western portion of Lot No. 1633, and
Isagani has declared that the eastern part was their family’s garden. Thus, it was fenced
with bamboo and was planted with banana trees and different vegetables. Clearly, there is
no doubt that the respondents did not only pay the taxes due for the whole Lot No. 1633, in
which the eastern portion is a part, but rather, the respondents were able to prove that they
have possession of the whole lot.
While the findings of the CA that the petitioners were a buyer in bad faith is in accord
with the evidence on record, it must be pointed out, however, that they overlooked the fact
that Lot No. 1633 is an unregistered piece of land. The Court had already ruled that the
issue of good faith or bad faith of a buyer is relevant only where the subject of the sale is a
registered land but not where the property is an unregistered land. One who purchases an
unregistered land does so at his peril. His claim of having bought the land in good faith, i.e.,
without notice that some other person has a right to, or interest in, the property, would not
protect him if it turns out that the seller does not actually own the property.28 All the same,
the application of this doctrine will not affect the outcome of this case.

Obviously, the petitioners cannot benefit from the deed of sale of the subject parcel of
land, executed by the Spouses Ballesteros in their favor, to support their claim of
possession in good faith and with just title. The Court noted that in Filomena’s testimony,
she even admitted that the respondents own the bigger portion of Lot No. 1633. Thus, it is
clear that the petitioners chose to close their eyes to facts which should have put a
reasonable man on his guard. The petitioners failed to ascertain whether the Spouses
Ballesteros were the lawful owner of the subject parcel of land being sold. Far from being
prudent, the petitioners placed full faith on the Affidavit of Ownership that Antonio executed.
Hence, when the subject parcel of land was bought by the petitioners, they merely stepped
into the shoes of the Spouses Ballesteros and acquired whatever rights and obligations
appertain thereto.

It is also worthy to note of the respondents’ reaction when the petitioners tried to
construct a house in the subject parcel of land in 2002. Upon learning that a house was
being built on the eastern portion of Lot No. 1633, the respondents went to the barangay to
file a complaint. Clearly, this indicates the respondents’ vigilance to protect their property.
The Court also notes that in the respondent’s possession of the entire Lot No. 1633 for
almost 42 years, there was no instance during this time that the petitioners or their
predecessors-in-interest, for that matter, questioned the respondents’ right over Lot No.
1633.

From the foregoing disquisitions, it is clear that the petitioners were not able to prove
equitable title or ownership over the subject parcel of land. Except for their claim that they
merely purchased the same from the Spouses Ballesteros, the petitioners presented no
other justification to disprove the ownership of the respondents. Since the Spouses
Ballesteros had no right to sell the subject parcel of land, the petitioners cannot be deemed
to have been the lawful owners of the same.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 17, 2007 and the
Resolution dated January 29, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 87021
are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Notes.—A buyer in good faith is defined as “one who buys the property of another without notice
that some other person has a right to or interest in such property and pays a full and fair price for the
same at the time of such purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other person
in the property.” (Kings Properties Corporation vs. Galido, 606 SCRA 137 [2009])

Registration of an adverse claim places any subsequent buyer of the registered land in bad faith.
(Id.)
 
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