LTD CASE DIGESTS (FINALS)
No other person
Indefeasibility of Title
DURAN vs IAC
FACTS:
Duran is the owner of two lands registered before the Register of
Deeds of Caloocan City which he purchased from Moja Estate. Said
properties were mortgaged to respondent Marcelo-Tiangco by his mother
powered by the alleged Deed of sale, which according to his mother, made
by Duran in favor of his mother. Upon the knowledge of said mortgage, he
informed the Register of Deeds that he did not consent to the said
transaction entered into by his mother. However, it was foreclosed on the
ground that the mortgagor defaulted in paying the debt.
Duran further claimed that the Deed of Sale in favor of her mother
was a forgery, saying that at the time of its execution, he was in the United
States of America - which said claim was controverted by the private
respondent claiming that it is genuine and hence, the subsequent mortgage
is valid.
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT the mortgage is valid
RULING:
YES. Private respondent is considered as an innocent third
person clothed by the presumption of regularity and good faith. Accordingly,
good faith consists in the possessor’s belief that the person from whom he
received the thing was the owner of the same and could convey his title.
Furthermore, where the innocent persons relying on the
correctness of the certificate of title issues, acquire rights over the property,
the court cannot disregard such rights and order the total cancellation of the
certificate for that would impair public confidence in the certificate of title;
otherwise, it would impair the integrity of the torrens system for it would
require each person to inquire as to the regularity of the title despite on its
face, it is regular.
Lastly, he is barred from filing the case on the basis of estoppel by
laches due to his failure to timely file the case.
Deferred Indefeasibility
Prescription
Action Based on Fraud
CARO VS COURT OF APPEALS
Facts:
Epifanio Caro bought 3 parcels of land from Simeon Gallego, Trinidad
Castem, Rolando Iranaya and Eriberto Iranaya sold a parcel of land which
they inherited from Custodia Jalandoni, and from the the heirs of Rafael
Gaylan.
In 1963, Epifanio Caro had those three (3) parcels of land surveyed and
were then designated as Lot No. 54. In 1963, Epifanio Caro had those three
(3) parcels of land surveyed.  The parcels of land of Epifanio Caro were
denominated as Lot No. 54 and the land claimed by the private respondents
Serafin V. Ronzales, Jose Ronzales, Jr. and Gemme Ronzales, as Lot No.
55. Epifanio Caro had the three lots consolidated after the survey into one
lot, and Tax Declaration No. 7688 was issued. During the cadastral
proceeding, Epifanio Caro filed an answer for Lot 54. There is no showing
whether or not a title was issued to him.
The private respondents claim that the questioned land was
formerly owned by Pascuala Lacson and was declared in her
name under Tax Declaration No. 4234. Pascuala Lacson was
married to Domingo Ronzales. When Epifanio Caro bought a
parcel of land from Simeon Gallego, respondents  were already
living in a house of semi-strong materials on the questioned land.
Sometime in 1964, another survey was conducted. The parcels of
land claimed by Epifanio Caro were denominated as Lot No. 54
and the land claimed by the private respondents was
denominated as Lot No. 55. Epifanio Caro filed an answer for Lot
No. 54 and Purificacion Ronzales, mother of private respondent
Jose Ronzales, Jr. filed an answer for Lot No. 55.
or persons filed an answer for Lot No. 55. Consequently, Original
Certificate of Title No. 0-6836 was issued in the names of the
private respondents, in equal shares of 1/3 portion each on
September 17, 1970.
In June 1973, the spouses Epifanio Caro and Paz Caro filed an
ejectment case against Augusta Chavez, Naciso Galila, Timoteo
Parreno, Ramon Aranduque and Rafael Galotera, involving Lot
Nos. 56, 59 and 60. In 1974, the spouses filed an ejectment and
illegal detainer case against Ramon Aranduque, Timoteo Parreno
and Augusta Chavez, involving Lot No. 54.
On June 4, 1975, Epifanio Caro flied a complaint before the Court
of First Instance of Iloilo (Civil Case No. 10235) for cancellation of
Certificate of Title No. 0-6836, reconveyance, recovery of
possession and damages on the ground of fraud. During the
pendency of the case, Epifanio Caro died, so he was substituted
by his heirs, namely, Eliseo Caro, Carlos Caro, Benito Caro,
Carmen Caro Batayola and Lorenzo Caro.
On November 22, 1982, trial court ruled in favor of the private
respondents on the grounds of estoppel, absence of fraud in the
registration of the questioned land and prescription. This ruling
was affirmed by the respondent court. Hence, the present petition
for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not the action in Civil Case No. 10235 has
prescribed.
 Held:  No. The Court stated that  the prescriptive period for the
reconveyance of fraudulently registered real property is ten (10)
years reckoned from the date of the issuance of the certificate of
title. The Supreme Court  came out with this decision by
correlating Section 53, paragraph 3 of Presidential Decree No.
1529 and Article 1456 of the Civil Code with Article 1144(2) of the
Civil Code.
Article 1144. The following actions must be brought within ten
years from the time the right of action accrues:
(1) Upon a written contract;
(2) Upon an obligation created by law;
(3) Upon a judgment.
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An action for reconveyance has its basis in Section 53, paragraph
3 of Presidential Decree No. 1529, which provides:
In all cases of registration procured by fraud, the owner may
pursue all his legal and equitable remedies against the parties to
such fraud without prejudice, however, to the rights of any
innocent holder of the decree of registration on the original
petition or application, ...
This provision should be read in conjunction with Article 1456 of
the Civil Code, which provides:
Article 1456. If property is acquired through mistake or fraud, the
person obtaining it is, by force of law, considered a trustee of an
implied trust for the benefit of the person from whom the property
comes.
The law thereby creates the obligation of the trustee to reconvey
the property and the title thereto in favor of the true owner. In the
present case, therefore, inasmuch as Civil Case No. 10235 was
filed on June 4, 1975, it was well-within the prescriptive period of
ten (10) years from the date of the issuance of Original Certificate
of Title No. 0-6836 on September 17, 1970.
Casipit v. CA
Facts:
On April 1987, a Complaint was filed by petitioners against private
respondents mainly for the recovery of a property, alleging that Emiliano
Casipit is the true and lawful owner of the questioned property located at.
Sinalhan, Sta. Rosa, Laguna by virtue of continuous, uninterrupted,
peaceful, open and public possession in the concept of owner since 1930;
that they were deprived of ownership thereof by the Beatos through narcisio
Beato, who filed a Petition for Reconstitution of Titles in the name of Gabriel
beato, using fictitious documents. Petitioners therefore prayed that TCT and
other succeeding titles be cancelled, as well as the tax declarations; that the
questioned property be reconveyed to them; that the document entitled,
“Kasulatan ng Pagmamana at Paghahati”. Insofar as it included the
questioned property be rescinded; and that private respondents be ordered
to pay damages and attorney’s fees.
The lower court dismissed the petition, holding that the defendants have a
better right than the plaintiffs, that the cause of action of the plaintiffs being
based on fraud has prescribed for it must be filed within 4 years after the
cause of action arose. The issuance of the reconstituted title over the
subject lot and its registration in the office of the Register of Deeds of
Laguna in 1953 is the starting date for the prescriptive period to commence.
The respondent court affirmed the said decision and denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration, hence this petition.
Petitioner’s contention: pursuant to the certification by the Bureau of Lands
that patent over the questioned property has not been issued to Gabriel
Beato, the Kasulatan is therefore a void contract. This being the case, the
action taken by petitioners is imprescriptible. Private respondents Diaz
spouses were buyers in bad faith because they had full knowledge that
Emiliano Casipit has been in actual possession in the concept of owner of
the questioned property and paid the real property taxes thereon.
Issue: Whether petitioners’ action already prescribed.
Held: Yes. There is no dispute that an action for reconveyance based on a
void contract is imprescriptible. However, this is not the case at bar. The
action filed by petitioner before the trial court was for: a. reconveyance
obased on fraud since the ownership of private respondents over the
questioned property was allegedly established on “false assertions,
misrepresentations and deceptive allegations. b. for rescission of the
Kasulatan. Thus the action based on fraud filed by petitioners before the
trial court is subject to prescription.
Based on jurisprudence, the prescriptive period for reconveyance of
fraudulently registered real property is 10 years reckoned from the date of
the issuance of the certificate of title. Conformably, the prescriptive period
for petitioners’ action for reconveyance is 10 years from August 30, 1963,
the date of the issuance of TCT in favor of Beato. Obviously, the subject
matter is not beneficial to petitioners because they filed for the action for
reconveyance only on April 27, 1987.
Action on Implied Trust
PAZ VILLAGONZALO, ESTELA VILLAGONZALO, AIDA
VILLAGONZALO, HERMINIA VILLAGONZALO, GWENDOLYN
VILLAGONZALO, JENSINE VILLAGONZALO and LEONILA
VILLAGONZALO, petitioners, vs. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT
and CECILIA A. VILLAGONZALO, respondents.
Facts: Juan C. Villagonzalo, the predecessor-in-interest of the parties,
purchased Lot at Barrio Dolores, Municipality of Ormoc from the Heirs of
Roman Matuguina for P1, 500. It was made to appear however that the sale
was in the name of his daughter, defendant Cecilia Villagonzalo, who was
single, since he borrowed from her the sum of P500.00 to complete the full
payment of the price of the lot. Consequently, TCT No. 4259 was issued in
the name of defendant Cecilia A. Villagonzalo as the registered owner on
July 18, 1962. The complaint was filed on April 2, 1975 thirteen (13) years
after the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title No. 4259 on the subject
land in the name of the defendant Cecilia Villagonzalo. The Court of
Appeals, held that the right of action of therein plaintiffs-appellees,
petitioners herein, had prescribed. It anchored its conclusion on doctrinal
holdings that an action for reconveyance based on an implied or
constructive trust prescribes in ten years counted from the date when
adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property. Respondent court
further noted that because of the neglect and inaction of the present
petitioners, the private respondent was thereby made to feel secure in her
belief that she had rightly acquired the controverted land and that no legal
action would be filed against her.
Petitioner’s contention: they contended that their action was seasonably
filed because private respondent's registration of the land in her name was
not a repudiation of the implied trust created between her and their father;
and, confusing extinctive for acquisitive prescription, that good faith and just
title are essential requisites in this case.
Issue: WON the action for reconveyance based on implied trust had already
been prescribed.
Ruling: Yes. It is now well settled that an action for reconveyance of real
property to enforce an implied trust shall prescribe after ten years, since it is
an action based upon an obligation created by law, and there can be no
doubt as to its prescriptibility. It is likewise established that said period of ten
years is counted from the date adverse title to the property is asserted by
the possessor thereof. In the case at bar, that assertion of adverse title,
which consequently was a repudiation of the implied trust for the purpose of
the statute of limitations, took place when Transfer Certificate of Title No.
4259 was issued in the name of private respondent on July 18, 1962. There
is also evidence of record that as far back as 1961, private respondent
refused to give any share in the produce of the land to petitioners; that in
1963 she mortgaged the property in her own name; and that in 1969, she
leased the same to one Ramon Valera, without the petitioners taking
preventive or retaliatory legal action.
Action based on Void Contract
Action based on fictitious deed
LACSAMANA, ET AL VS. CA
FACTS: 
Leon Robles and his niece Amparo Robles were the registered co-owners in
equal shares of a lot in Lipa City, covered by an OCT. Subsequently Amparo
sold her 1/2 undivided share to El Dorado Corp. a TCT was issued in the
names of EL DORADO and Leon Robles as co-owners.
On 24 September 1969 Leon Robles died survived by his wife Ester and 2
children as his sole heirs. However, in a Deed of Absolute Sale dated 22
July 1971, Leon Robles purportedly with the marital consent of his wife sold
his one-half 1/2 undivided share to one Lacsamana. 9 years later the Deed
of Absolute Sale was registered in the RD of Lipa City by one Gonzales.
Consequently, the TCT in the names of EL DORADO and Leon Robles was
cancelled and a new TCT was issued in the names of EL DORADO and
Lacsamana.
On 1980 Lacsamana purportedly sold his one-half 1/2 share to LBJ
Development Corporation represented by its President, Leviste. A certain
Lumanglas registered the deed of sale in the RD resulting in the
cancellation of the TCT of EL DORADO and Lacsamana and the issuance
of a new TCT in the names of EL DORADO and LBJ.
On 1982 LBJ became the owner of the entire lot when EL DORADO sold to
it its one-half share for a consideration. Consequently, the latest TCT was
cancelled and new TCTs Nos were issued in the name of LBJ.
On 1983 the surviving heirs of Leon Robles, filed a complaint with the RTC
of Lipa City against Lacsamana, EL DORADO, LBJ and Leviste for the
recovery of the one-half undivided share of Leon in the subject lot and the
cancellation of the TCTs in the name of LBJ. The complaint alleged that the
signature of Leon Robles in the Deed of Absolute Sale in favor of
Lacsamana was a forgery as Leon was already dead at the time of the
alleged sale.
The RTC rendered judgment in favor of plaintiffs, holding that defendant LBJ
is not a purchaser in good faith, further ordering the cancellation of all the
present titles covering the subject lot and to reinstate the TCT in the names
of Leon Robles and El Dorado Plantation, Inc.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings and conclusions of the trial court
on appeal by EL DORADO, LBJ and Leviste. The 2 courts differed only
insofar as the issue of prescription was concerned. Instead of the period of
four (4) years for filing actions for reconveyance on ground of fraud cited by
the trial court, respondent CA ruled that the present action had not yet
prescribed since actions to declare the nullity of a void contract was
imprescriptible
ISSUE:
1. WON the action instituted by the private respondents barred by reason
of prescription
2. WON the action instituted by the private respondents barred by reason
of laches
HELD: The petition is DENIED. The questioned decision of respondent CA
affirming that of the RTC of Lipa City  is AFFIRMED.
1. On the issue of prescription, we agree that the present action has not yet
prescribed because the right to file an action for reconveyance on the
ground that the certificate of title was obtained by means of a fictitious deed
of sale is virtually an action for the declaration of its nullity, which action
does not prescribe. Hence, the fact that the alleged sale took place in 1971
and the action to have it declared void or inexistent was filed in 1983 is of no
moment. To reiterate, an action for reconveyance based on a void contract
is imprescriptible.
2.  It should be noted that private respondents, upon learning that the
relevant portion of Lot No. 13535 was no longer registered in the name of
Leon, immediately caused an investigation to be made for the purpose of
finding out the author and the circumstances behind the execution of the
fictitious 1971 Deed of Absolute Sale. Thus, in less than two (2) months
after it was discovered by the NBI that Lacsamana was in fact a
fictitious/non-existent person, private respondents through their
attorney-in-fact instituted on 1983, the present action i.e., barely three (3)
years and nine (9) months after the fraudulent registration on 22 January
1980. Thus, it is said, the concept of laches is not concerned with the lapse
of time but only with the effect of unreasonable lapse.
NOTES:
1. The rule that a person dealing with registered land has the right to
rely on the Torrens title will not apply when such person has actual
knowledge of facts that would impel a reasonably cautious man to
make an inquiry. Given the attendant circumstances, in addition to the
defects of the 1971 Deed of Absolute Sale found, petitioner LBJ cannot
claim to be a buyer in good faith. But even if we concede that
petitioner LBJ was innocent of the fraud perpetrated against private
respondents, the records abound with facts which should have
impelled it to investigate deeper into the title of Lacsamana, more so
when such effort would not have entailed additional hardship, nay,
would have been quite easy, since the titled co-owner of Lacsamana is
LBJ’s own sister company EL DORADO
Action to quiet title
Sapto v. Fabiana
FACTS:
The subject property located in Alambre, Toril, Davao City was originally
owned by Sapto. He died, leaving three sons namely, Samuel, Constancio,
and Ramon. The latter predeceased his brothers, leaving no heirs. Samuel
and Constancio executed a deed of sale for a portion of said property in
favour of Fabiana in consideration of P240.00. The sale was approved by
the governor of Davao but was never registered. The property was
transferred to Fabiana and from then on he enjoyed possession from 1931
until the case was filed.
Constancio died with no issue, leaving Samuel as sole administrator of the
property. Upon the latter’s death, his widow and two children filed the
present action for recovery of the parcel of land sold by their predecessors
to defendant. The CFI held that although the sale between the Sapto
brothers and Fabiana was never registered, it was binding valid and binding
upon the parties and the vendors’ heirs. The Court of First Instance also
ordered the petitioners to execute the necessary deed of conveyance in
favor of the defendant.
 
ISSUE:
Whether or not the CFI’s order of conveyance in favour of Fabiana was
valid.
HELD:
The SC first affirmed the validity of the sale between the Sapto brothers and
Fabiana, ruling, that even though it was never registered the sale was valid,
binding, and effective upon the heirs of the vendor. According to the court,
actual notice of the sale served as registration. Futher, that the transfer and
possession of the property was a clear indication of the validity of the sale.
Regarding the issue on the validity of the order of conveyance, the SC ruled
that it was valid. In assailing the order, the Sapto heirs claimed that the CFI
cannot order the conveyance because the defendant’s cause of action had
already prescribed.
The SC ruled however, that the action for conveyance was actually one to
quiet title. In ruling so, the SC cited American jurisprudence and Art. 480 of
the New Civil Code, which states, that actions to quiet title to property in the
possession of the plaintiff are imprescriptible.
Laches
CONCORDIA MEJIA DE LUCAS v. ANDRES GAMPONIA
G.R. No. L-9335  October 31, 1956
 
Facts: On March 13, 1916, free patent No. 3699 was issued over the land
subject of the action in the name of Domingo Mejia. Such patent was
transcribed in the Register of Deeds in Nueva Vizcaya and issued in the
name of Meija.
 
On March 24, 1916, after the issuance of the patent but before the
registration of the same, patentee Domingo Mejia deeded the land to
Zacarias Ciscar, who immediately took possession thereof and enjoyed its
fruits.
Upon his death the property was included in the distribution of his estate
and adjudicated to Roque Sanchez which in turn sold the land on January
21, 1940 to Andres Gamponia. Sanchez was in possession and enjoyment
of the land from the time he acquired it by inheritance from Ciscar up to the
time he sold it to Andres Gamponia, the latter has also possessed and
enjoyed the property from the time he bought it to date
Domingo Mejia, upon his death, left no descendants or ascendants and his
only surviving kin was his brother Pedro Mejia. Pedro Mejia is now also
dead and is survived by his daughter Concordia Mejia de Lucas.
The court a quo held that the sale by the patentee to Zacarias Ciscar is null
and void, as the sale was made only 11 days after the issuance of a patent
in violation of the provisions of section 35 of Act No. 926. The Court further
held that since the land is registered land no title in derogation to that of the
registered owner could have been acquired either by Zacarias Ciscar or his
successors in interest, namely, Roque Sanchez and  Andres Gamponia
The main defense of Gamponia is that Plaintiff’s right of action has already
prescribed by virtue of the possession of the land by the Defendant and his
predecessors in interest for a period of 37 years.
Issue: Whether or not the defendant has an equitable defense in the form of
laches
Ruling: Yes. While no legal defense to the action lies, an equitable one lies
in favor of the Defendant and that is, the equitable defense of laches. No
hold that the defense of prescription or adverse possession in derogation of
the title of the registered owner Domingo Mejia does not lie, but that of the
equitable defense of laches. Otherwise, stated, we hold that
while Defendant may not be considered as having acquired title by virtue of
his and his predecessors’ long continued possession for 37 years, the
original owner’s right to recover back the possession of the property and the
title thereto from the Defendant has, by the long period of 37 years and by
patentee’s inaction and neglect, been converted into a stale demand.
In the case of Go Chi Gun vs Co-Cho et al, we held that the equitable
defense of laches requires four elements:
1. Conduct on the part of the defendant, or of one under whom he
claims, giving rise to the situation of which complaint is made and
for which the complaint seeks a remedy; 
 2. Delay in asserting the complainant’s rights, the complainant
having had knowledge or notice, of the defendant’s conduct and
having been afforded an opportunity to institute a suit;
3. Lack of knowledge or notice on the part of the Defendant that the
complainant would assert the right on which he bases his suit;  entire parcel of land covered therein to the Philippine National Bank to
4. Injury or prejudice to the Defendant in the event relief is accorded
to the complainant, or the suit is not held to be barred.
All the four elements mentioned above are present in the case at bar. The
first element is present because on March 24, 1916 Domingo Mejia sold the
land which was covered by a free patent title dated March 13, 1916 and said
sale or conveyance was made in violation of Section 35 of the Public Land
Act.
The second element is also present because from the date of the sale on
March 24, 1916 the patentee and vendor Domingo Mejia could have
instituted the action to annul the conveyance and obtain back the
possession and ownership of the land.
The third element of latches is constituted when the defendant and his
predecessors in interest, the original vendee and purchaser Zacarias Ciscar,
as well as vendee’s successors in interest, Roque Sanchez, and later,
Andres Gamponia, never expected or believed that the original patentee or
his successors in interest would bring an action to annul the sale.
The fourth element is also present, not only because Zacarias Ciscar paid
for the land but this same land was divided among the heirs of Zacarias
Ciscar in the proceedings for the settlement of his estate
State Not Bound By Prescription
Republic of the Philippines v. Ruiz - Digest
GR. No. L-23712 - April 29, 1986
This is an appeal from the decision of the Court of First Instance ordering
the cancellation of Original Certificate of Title No. I-1600, substituted by
Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-7196, issued in the names of therein
defendants and declaring the reversion to the State of the land covered
thereof.
Facts: The plaintiff (Republic of the Philippines) instituted the present action
for the reversion of the entire land containing an area of 23 hectares, 97
ares and 57 centares, covered by Homestead Patent No. 22711 granted in
the name of Cayetano Pinto, who died in 1945.  On May 28, 1937 the
registered owner, Cayetano Pinto, married to Ramona Ruiz, sold a portion
of 3 hectares of land in favor of Jacobo Pinto, married to Herminia Tinonas,
for the sum of P500.00.
The Deed of Sale executed by the deceased Cayetano Pinto in favor of
Jacobo Pinto who died sometime in 1950, was never registered in the Office
of the Register of Deeds of Isabela, nor annotated at the back of the
Original Certificate of Title. Ramona Ruiz and her children executed an
extrajudicial partition of the entire land on which was registered on
afterwards, being reason for the issuance of Transfer Certificate of Title.
The widow Herminia Tinonas and heirs of the late Jacobo Pinto filed an
action against the widow Ramona Ruiz and heirs of the late Cayetano Pinto
for the conveyance of the portion of 3 hectares, sold and conveyed by the
late Cayetano Pinto in favor of the late Jacobo Pinto.
The Court of First Instance rendered a decision declaring that the Deed of
Sale executed by the deceased Cayetano Pinto in favor of the late Jacobo
Pintonull and void ab initioand dismissed the complaint with costs against
the plaintiffs. from the decision of the Court of First Instance
The plaintiffs appealed to the Supreme Court which appeal was dismissed
thereby terminating Civil Case of the Second Branch of the Court of First
Instance, whereby the appealed decision became final and executory.
Before the appeal of the plaintiffs has been perfected and the record
elevated to the Supreme Court, the plaintiffs filed the instant action against
the widow and heirs of the late Cayetano Pinto for cancellation of the
Original Certificate of Title, the Transfer Certificate of Title, and the reversion
of the land covered by the said titles to the State.
That the registered owners in Transfer Certificate of Title mortgaged the
secure a loan of P4,000.00 and the mortgaged instrument was registered in
the Office of the Register of Deeds and annotated at the back of the
Transfer Certificate of Title No.
The court ruled that the execution by the homesteader Cayetano Pinto of
the document within the prohibited 5-year period from the issuance of the
patent, being in violation of Section 118 of Commonwealth Act 141,
produced the effect of annulling and cancelling the said patent and thus
caused the reversion to the State of the property thereby covered.
Issue: Whether or not there is lack of cause of action of the complaint.
Ruling: There is no merit to this appeal. This case is actually no necessity
for logical reasoning; by express provision of Section 118 of Commonwealth
Act 141, any transfer or alienation of a homestead grant within five years
from the issuance of the patent is forbidden, making said alienation null and
void, 1 and constituting a cause for reversion of the homestead to the State.
It may likewise be stated that while the prohibition against the alienation of
the land grant is designed to preserve it within the family of the
homesteader and to promote small land ownership in this country it is
equally true that this policy of the State can not be invoked to condone a
violation of the Public Land Act and withhold enforcement of the provision
directing the reversion of the property to the grantor in case of such
violation. For, the prohibitory provision against any alienation or
encumbrance of the land grant is not only mandatory, but is considered a
condition attached to the approval of every application. 
The court below committed no error in ordering the reversion to plaintiff of
the land grant involved herein, notwithstanding the fact that the original
certificate title based on the patent had been cancelled and another
certificate issued in the names of the grantee's heirs.
The principle of conclusiveness of the title of a registered owner, "although
sound as applied to land registered under the Land Registration Act through
judicial proceedings, cannot defeat the express policy of the State
prohibiting the alienation and encumbrance of lands of the public domain
acquired under the provisions of the Public Land Act within five years from
and after the date of the issuance of patent." Thus, where a grantee is found
not entitled to hold and possess in fee simple the land, by reason of his
having violated Section 118 of the Public Land Law, the court may properly
order its reconveyance to the grantor, although the property has already
been brought under the operation of the Torrens System.
The decision appealed from being in accordance with law, the same is
hereby affirmed; defendants-appellants(Ruiz) are ordered to reconvey to
plaintiff-appellee(Republic of the Philippines) the land.
 
Caveat Emptor
Dacasin vs. Court of Appeals
GR No. L-32723, Oct 28, 1977
Facts:
Sometime prior to January 19, 1943, a registered parcel of land located in
the barrio of Patayac Municipality of Sta. Barbara, Province of Pangasinan
was being possessed by Jose Maramba which he bought to Emiliana Abad
and in that month and year a certain Sabina Capua and companions
grabbed possession of the property and since then they possessed the said
parcel of land. Because of what happened Jose Maramba filed a civil case
for reivindicacion but notwithstanding the case Sabina Capua still remained
in the disputed land.
On April 21, 1950 while the civil case was pending, Sabina Capua sold the
property to Gualberto Calulot and there was no evidence that the latter was
informed or came to know of the pending litigation between Sabina Capua
and Jose Maramba. The CFI declared Jose Maramba as the absolute
owner of the property. However, the decision was not executed within the
reglementary period of 5 years from the time it had become final. Several
years later Calulot sold the same property to spouses Felipe Capua and
Sinforosa Padilla (respondents). However, Jose Maramba having died, his
heirs and successor-in-interest sold the property to (petitioner) Juan
Dacasin and his wife. Afterwards, they went to the Court and secured a writ
of possession and it was granted.   Held: No. The Supreme Court held that a careful study of the records
 Aggrieved, Felipe Capua together with his wife and his original vendors
Gualberto Calulot filed a civil case against Juan Dacasin and the heirs of
Jose Maramba. According to Felipe Capua he  has the better right over the
ownership of the property by virtue of his purchase in good faith and by the
continuous possession from 21 April, 1950 of his immediate
predecessor-in-interest Gualberto Calulot succeeded by himself. On other
hand, Juan Dacasin alleged that he was the true owner, and that the
question of ownership was already judicially settled. After trial, judgment
was rendered in favor of petitioners Juan Dacasin, On appeal, CA reversed
the judgment. Hence this petition for review on certiorari.
Issue: Whether or not Dacasin has the title over the property?
Held:
Yes. The deed of sale executed between Jose Maramba as vendee and
Emiliana Abad as vendor was duly registered in the Registry of Deeds.
Under the law, Article 709 of the New Civil Code, titles of ownership or of
other rights over immovable property duly inscribed or annotated in the
Registry of Property constitute notice to third persons and affords protection
in favor of him who in good faith relies upon what appears in the registry.
As between two parties relying on their respective instruments of sale of the
same property, law and justice command that he who has registered his
deed must prevail over his adversary who has not done so. The rule
of caveat emptor requires the purchaser to be aware of the supposed title of
the vendor and he who buys without checking the vendor's title takes all the
risks and consequent to such failure. None of the deeds of sale evidencing
the ownership of Gualberto Calulot and Felipe Capua were registered in the
Registry of Property; hence they cannot prevail over the rights of the
petitioner Juan Dacasin who holds in his favor the instrument of sale duly
registered.
SOCORRO COSTA CRISOSTOMO vs. COURT OF APPEALS
           G.R. Nos. 91383-84 May 31, 1991
Facts: Socorro Costa Crisostomo was the registered owner of a residential
house and lot, located in Mandaluyong and covered by a TCT. She has
occupied the property ever since she had her house built and has
introduced other improvements thereon. Sometime in 1978, Norma San
Jose offered to buy the land including the house thereon for P300,000.00.
Crisostomo and San Jose agreed that this amount would be paid from the
proceeds of a loan that San Jose would obtain from a bank using petitioner
Crisostomo's title as collateral. As payment, San Jose issued three (3) post
dated Far East Bank and Trust Company checks with a total amount of
P300,000.00. On San Jose’s request, another deed of sale was executed
over the same property, which was then registered, such that Crisostomo’s
TCT was cancelled and a new TCT was issued.
Because of unfulfilled promises to make the postdated checks “good”,
Crisostomo demanded San Jose to return the title. However, the latter
informed that the title was in the possession of Diana J. Torres, the
mortgagee. San Jose never returned the said title as she had promised nor
did she ever make any payment to the petitioner. Thus, Crisostomo made a
written demand to Diana J. Torres to reconvey the subject property to her.
This demand was not satisfied. Crisostomo was thus compelled to file a
Civil Case against San Jose but this was later amended to include Torres.
The RTC of Pasig decided in favour of Crisostomo and ordered for the
re-conveyance of the title and ordered San Jose and Torres to jointly and
severally pay Crisostomo P100,000 as moral damages, P20,000 attorney’s
fees and costs. On Torres’ appeal to the CA, the CA affirmed the RTC’s
decision with modifications that the Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor
of Torres is to be noted on the Certificate of Title which will be re-issued to
Crisostomo and excluded Torres from indemnifying Crisostomo. Crisostomo
filed a motion for partial reconsideration of the appellate court's decision but
was denied.
Issue: Whether Torres is a mortgagee in good faith
shows that the Court of Appeals erred in finding that private respondent
Diana Torres is a mortgagee in good faith on the basis of evidence.
There are strong indications that Atty. Flor Martinez, the lawyer of Diana J.
Torres, the mortgagee, knew of the defect of San Jose's title. When Atty.
Martinez personally inspected the property with San Jose for her client
Torres, she allowed herself to be introduced to Socorro Crisostomo who was
then actually occupying the house, as a Bank Inspector of the Development
Bank of Meycauayan, Bulacan from whom the loan was being obtained,
obviously to convince Crisostomo that the procedure is in accordance with
her agreement with San Jose.
Finally, when Torres herself visited the property she carefully evaded seeing
Crisostomo personally, the actual occupant thereof, who could have easily
enlightened her as to the true owner. Based on jurisprudence, a person
dealing with registered land has a right to rely upon the fact of the Torrens
Certificate of Title and to dispense with the need of inquiring further, except
when the party concerned has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances
that would impel a reasonably cautious man to make further inquiries
Even assuming that Torres does not in fact know the circumstances of the
sale, she is bound by the knowledge of Atty. Martinez or by the latter's
negligence in her haphazard investigation because the negligence of her
agents is her own negligence. It is a well-settled rule that a purchaser or
mortgagee cannot close his eyes to facts which should put a reasonable
man upon his guard, and then claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor or mortgagor. His
mere refusal to believe that such defect exists, or his willful closing of his
eyes to the possibility of the existence of a defect in the vendor's or
mortgagor's title, will not make him an innocent purchaser or mortgagee for
value, if it afterwards develops that the title was in fact defective, and it
appears that he had such notice of the defects as would have led to its
discovery had he acted with the measure of precaution which may be
required of a prudent man in a like situation
Faulty Registration
WIDOWS & ORPHANS ASSOCIATION, INC., Petitioner, v. COURT OF
APPEALS and ORTIGAS & COMPANY LIMITED
PARTNERSHIP, Respondents.
Facts
Widows and orphans association (WIDORA) claimed that it has in its
possession a parcel of land covered by a TituloPropiedad on 1894 which
was issued under the name of the deceased Mariano San Pedro y Esteban.
Widora then instituted a land registration case over the property at the CFI
over the said parcel of land which it applied for original registration.
Ortigas& Co. then opposed the application. It claimed that it owned the
parcel of land from its predecessor in interest in 1905. as evidenced by a
registered title registered under the Torrens system issued under the name
of Ortigas.
Commissioner of Land registration then informed the trial court that the land
sought to be registered was “identically the same” with the lot covered under
the transfer certificate of title issued to Ortigas.
During the span of 9 years (1979 to 1988) hearings were held and parties
adduced evidence to support their contentions.
Issue
WON the TCT is valid despite the absence of a supporting decree of occupancy. Thus, they have not complied with the requirements of
registration the law.
2. No. The lot has only been declared alienable in 1965. Thus, prior
Held to that period, it was incapable of private appropriation. Thus,
NO. The TCT is not valid although they have occupied the lot at an earlier time, those years
cannot be counted or included in the 30 year requirement.
Admission of Secondary Evidence
R: Republic v. Court of Appeals. Before secondary evidence may be
admitted, there must be 1) proof of the execution of the original writing and
2) that it has been lost or destroyed or cannot be produced in court or that it
is in the possession of the adverse party who has failed to produce it after
reasonable notice
A: In this case, Ortigas has not shown that it complied with the requisites
which would justify the admission of the secondary evidence used and
erroneously relied upon by the court of appeals

Dioquino v. Intermediate Appellate Court. "(w)hile it is true that the Court

of Appeals is vested with the 'power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual
issues raised ..."

A: In this case
● there was not even a request for evidentiary hearing filed in this
case. The Court of Appeals therefore should not have admitted
said evidence without giving the adverse party opportunity to
present counter evidence, if any. Besides, "evidence necessary in
regards to factual issues raised in cases falling within the
Appellate Court's original and appellate jurisdiction contemplates
incidental facts which were not touched upon, or fully heard by the
trial or respondent Court. The law could not have intended that
the Appellate Court would hold an original and full trial of a main
factual issue in a case, which properly pertains to trial courts"
● The trial court cannot be faulted for not having granted
respondent Ortigas' motion to dismiss simply because the TCTs
relied upon by the latter do not accurately reflect their supposed
origin. Thus, in Ledesma v. Municipality of Iloilo (49 Phil. 769
[1926]) this Court held that the "simple possession of a certificate
of title, under the Torrens System, does not make the possessor
the true owner of all the property described therein. If a person
obtains a title, under the Torrens System, which includes by
mistake or oversight land which cannot be registered under the
Torrens System, he does not, by virtue of said certificate alone,
become the owner of the lands illegally included

Confirmation of Imperfect Title

Republic vs. De Guzman

February 28, 2000 G.R. No. 137887

Facts:
Norma Almanzor and private respondent Salvador de Guzman filed
conflicting applications for confirmation of imperfect title over parcels of land
in Cavite. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of de Guzman and
Almanzor. It approved the petition for registration and placed the subject
parcels of land under Acts 141 and 946, and PD 1529. The Court of
Appeals affirmed such decision, hence, this case.

Issues:
1. Whether or not the de Guzmans have submitted proof of simple
title or possession in the manner and length of time required by
law to justify confirmation of an imperfect title?
2. Whether or not the de Guzmans have overthrown the
presumption that the lands are portions of public domain?
Ruling:
1. No. It could be traced from the records of the case that the period
of occupancy of the de Guzmans of the subject land only amounts
to 26 years, which 4 years short of the required 30 years of