G.R. No.
187587               June 5, 2013 At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten
NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner, 
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 187654
WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board
of Directors, Petitioner,  but this time excluded Lots 1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE,
DEPARTMENT OF NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Decision1promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 97925.
THE FACTS
The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:
On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved
parcels of land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and
Pasay City for a military reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William
McKinley, was later on renamed Fort Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).
On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation
No. 208, amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio
and reserved it for a national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga
Bayani, which is under the administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services –
Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-PVAO).
Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan
and Signal Village from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for
disposition under the provisions of Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.
addendum, which reads:
"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan
(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2
The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the
Official Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.
Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued
Proclamation No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published,
No. 423 and declared the said lots open for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274
and 730.
Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the
same day.
Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio
including portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito
Bautista issued General Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to
prevent further unauthorized occupation and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at
Fort Bonifacio.
On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc.
(NMSMI) filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP),
where it was docketed as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the
following: (1) the reclassification of the areas they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-
000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable and disposable land pursuant to
Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the Director of Lands; and
(3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the subject lot
to its bona fide occupants.4
On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI)
filed a Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for
by NMSMI with regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-
001302 in Western Bicutan.5
Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and
declaring the portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate
Commissioner Lina Aguilar-General dissenting.7
The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral
part of Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the
President could not be defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further,
considering that Proclamation
No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could
not be amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus,
Proclamation No. 172 could not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No.
2476, as the latter was issued on October 16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative
power had ceased.
In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that
pursuant to Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case.
Likewise, she held that when the provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that
there is no occasion for the court to look into legislative intent, the law must be taken as it
is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction.8 Finally, she maintained that the Commission
had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the published version of
Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the field of the
legislature.
Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by
the COSLAP in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF
WESTERN BICUTAN AS THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS
ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
RULING THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF
LAND OCCUPIED BY MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT
CONSIDERING THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND
TO THE PRESIDENT >INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY
VARIOUS LAND CASES.14
On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:

MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP
Resolutions dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.
Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed
Decision granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING
THAT THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND
DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE
HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING
WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS NOT INCLUDED IN THE
PUBLICATION.15

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in
Resolutions dated September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission
ruling that the subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No.
on the Settlement of Land Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED
2476 on the ground that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included
and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434
in the publication of the said law.
are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed herein. Further, pending urgent motions
filed by respondents are likewise
THE COURT’S RULING
DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)
We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.
12 13
Both NMSMI  and WBLOAI  appealed the said Decision by filing their respective
Petitions for Review with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject
lots), their claims were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to
Proclamation No. 2476. They allege that the former President intended to include all
THE ISSUES
Western Bicutan in the reclassification of portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public
land when he made a notation just below the printed version of Proclamation No. 2476.
Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:
However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when
I Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official Gazette.
The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable
lies in the determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has
the force and effect of law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly
provides:
ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their
publication in the Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take
effect one year after such publication.
Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to
the law, unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise
provided" refers to a different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the
completion of the law’s publication in the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the
requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The issue of the requirement of
publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon. Tuvera,16 in which we
had the occasion to rule thus:
Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide
that the usual fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed
out by the present Chief Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the
Civil Code which did not become effective after fifteen days from its publication in the
Official Gazette but "one year after such publication." The general rule did not apply
because it was "otherwise provided."
It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with
altogether. The reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would
deny the public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the
legislature could validly provide that a law shall become effective immediately upon its
approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an unreasonably short period
after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be prejudiced as a
result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply because
they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on
prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they
can begin to operate.
xxxx
The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for
strictly speaking all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not
apply to them directly. An example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual,
like a relative of President Marcos who was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot
be said that such a law does not affect the public although it unquestionably does not
apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter of public interest which
any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a proper
party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would
be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the
legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be
directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public
as a whole.
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation.
xxxx
Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to
only a portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place.
All presidential decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public
place after a favored individual or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements.
The circulars issued by the Monetary Board must be published if they are meant not
merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank Act which that body is
supposed to enforce.
xxxx
We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is
to inform the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners,
the mere mention of the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its
whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a
mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot satisfy the publication
requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the manner,
incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos
administration. The evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on
this vital law.
xxxx
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade
is drawn. (Emphases supplied)
Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten
note that was not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the
note never had any legal force and effect.
Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the
publication of any law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be
prima facie evidence of its authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to
include Western Bicutan is not only irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may
not speculate as to the probable intent of the legislature apart from the words appearing in
the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in the law when, evidently, there is
none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that "under Article 8 of the
Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall
form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that
courts can create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow
otherwise would be violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole
function of our courts is to apply or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae
exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but it will not arrogate unto itself the task of
legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial interpretation, but another
legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the reclassification.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack
of merit. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29
April 2009 is AFFIRMED in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June
2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is
DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
G.R. No. 180705               November 27, 2012
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., Petitioner,  December 28, 2004, denying COCOFED’s motion for reconsideration, and the May 11,
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
The Case
Of the several coconut levy appealed cases that stemmed from certain issuances of the
Sandiganbayan in its Civil Case No. 0033, the present recourse proves to be one of the
most difficult.
In particular, the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails and
seeks to annul a portion of the Partial Summary Judgment dated July 11, 2003, as
affirmed in a Resolution of December 28, 2004, both rendered by the Sandiganbayan in its
Civil Case ("CC") No. 0033-A (the judgment shall hereinafter be referred to as "PSJ-A"),
entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, v. Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al.,
Defendants, COCOFED, et al., BALLARES, et al., Class Action Movants." CC No. 0033-A
is the result of the splitting into eight (8) amended complaints of CC No. 0033 entitled,
"Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.," a suit for recovery of ill-
gotten wealth commenced by the Presidential Commission on Good Government
("PCGG"), for the Republic of the Philippines ("Republic"), against Eduardo M. Cojuangco,
Jr. ("Cojuangco") and several individuals, among them, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Maria Clara
Lobregat ("Lobregat"), and Danilo S. Ursua ("Ursua"). Each of the eight (8) subdivided
complaints, CC No. 0033-A to CC No. 0033-H, correspondingly impleaded as defendants
only the alleged participants in the transaction/s subject of the suit, or who are averred as
owner/s of the assets involved.
Apart from this recourse, We clarify right off that PSJ-A was challenged in two other
separate but consolidated petitions for review, one commenced by COCOFED et al.,
docketed as G.R. Nos. 177857-58, and the other, interposed by Danilo S. Ursua, and
docketed as G.R. No. 178193.
By Decision dated January 24, 2012, in the aforesaid G.R. Nos. 177857-58 (COCOFED et
al. v. Republic) and G.R. No. 178193 (Ursua v. Republic) consolidated cases1 (hereinafter
collectively referred to as "COCOFED v. Republic"), the Court addressed and resolved all
key matters elevated to it in relation to PSJ-A, except for the issues raised in the instant
petition which have not yet been resolved therein. In the same decision, We made clear
that: (1) PSJ-A is subject of another petition for review interposed by Eduardo Cojuangco,
Jr., in G.R. No. 180705, entitled Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. v. Republic of the Philippines,
which shall be decided separately by the Court,2and (2) the issues raised in the instant
petition should not be affected by the earlier decision "save for determinatively legal
issues directly addressed therein."3
For a better perspective, the instant recourse seeks to reverse the Partial Summary
Judgment4 of the anti-graft court dated July 11, 2003, as reiterated in a Resolution5 of
2007 Resolution6 denying
COCOFED’s motion to set case for trial and declaring the partial summary judgment final
and appealable, all issued in PSJ-A. In our adverted January 24, 2012 Decision in
COCOFED v. Republic, we affirmed with modification PSJ-A of the Sandiganbayan, and
its Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-F, dated May 7, 2004 (hereinafter
referred to as "PSJ-F’).7
More specifically, We upheld the Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the coconut levy funds are
special public funds of the Government. Consequently, We affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s
declaration that Sections 1 and 2 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") 755, Section 3, Article III
of P.D. 961 and Section 3, Article III of P.D. 1468, as well as the pertinent implementing
regulations of the Philippine Coconut Authority ("PCA"), are unconstitutional for allowing
the use and/or the distribution of properties acquired through the coconut levy funds to
private individuals for their own direct benefit and absolute ownership. The Decision also
affirmed the Government’s ownership of the six CIIF companies, the fourteen holding
companies, and the CIIF block of San Miguel Corporation shares of stock, for having
likewise been acquired using the coconut levy funds. Accordingly, the properties subject of
the January 24, 2012 Decision were declared owned by and ordered reconveyed to the
Government, to be used only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the
development of the coconut industry.
with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund was PCA. Like COCOFED with
which it had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory provisions scattered in different coco
levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy.
The following were some of the issuances on the coco levy, its collection and utilization,
how the proceeds of the levy will be managed and by whom and the purpose it was
supposed to serve:
1. P.D. No. 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization
Fund ("CCSF") and declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust
fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale of coconut-based products,
thus stabilizing the price of edible oil.

By Resolution of September 4, 2012,8 the Court affirmed the above-stated Decision 2. P.D. No. 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund
promulgated on January 24, 2012. ("CIDF") to finance the operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.

It bears to stress at this juncture that the only portion of the appealed Partial Summary 3. Then came P.D. No. 755 providing under its Section 1 the
Judgment dated July 11, 2003 ("PSJ-A") which remains at issue revolves around the following:
following decretal holdings of that court relating to the "compensation" paid to petitioner for
exercising his personal and exclusive option to acquire the FUB/UCPB shares.9It will be
It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide
recalled that the Sandiganbayan declared the Agreement between the PCA and
readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at
Cojuangco containing the assailed "compensation" null and void for not having the
preferential rates; that this policy can be expeditiously and
required valuable consideration. Consequently, the UCPB shares of stocks that are
efficiently realized by the implementation of the "Agreement
subject of the Agreement were declared conclusively owned by the Government. It also
for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the benefit of
held that the Agreement did not have the effect of law as it was not published as part of
Coconut Farmers" executed by the PCA…; and that the
P.D. 755, even if Section 1 thereof made reference to the same.
PCA is hereby authorized to distribute, for free, the shares
of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers….
Facts
Towards achieving the policy thus declared, P.D. No. 755,
We reproduce, below, portions of the statement of facts in COCOFED v. Republic relevant under its Section 2, authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and
to the present case:10 the CIDF collections to acquire a commercial bank and
deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank interest free,
the deposit withdrawable only when the bank has attained a
In 1971, Republic Act No. ("R.A.") 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment
certain level of sufficiency in its equity capital. The same
Company ("CIC") to administer the Coconut Investment Fund ("CIF"), which, under
section also decreed that all levies PCA is authorized to
Section 8 thereof, was to be sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of
collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary
copra. Of the PhP 0.55 levy of which the copra seller was – or ought to be – issued
funds or form part of the general funds of the government
COCOFUND receipts, PhP 0.02 was placed at the disposition of COCOFED, the national
within the contemplation of P.D. No. 711.
association of coconut producers declared by the

4. P.D. No. 961 codified the various laws relating to the development
Philippine Coconut Administration ("PHILCOA" now "PCA") as having the largest
of coconut/palm oil industries.
membership.

5. The relevant provisions of P.D. No. 961, as later amended by P.D.

The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance of several presidential
No. 1468 (Revised Coconut Industry Code), read:
decrees ("P.D.") purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through the
collection and use of the coconut levy fund. While coming generally from impositions on
the first sale of copra, the coconut levy fund came under various names x x x. Charged
 ARTICLE III
Levies
Section 1. Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy. —
The PCA is hereby empowered to impose and collect … the
Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy, ….
….
Section 5. Exemption. — The CCSF and theCIDF as well
as all disbursements as herein authorized, shall not be
construed … as special and/or fiduciary funds, or as part of
the general funds of the national government within the
contemplation of PD 711; … the intention being that said
Fund and the disbursements thereof as herein authorized
for the benefit of the coconut farmers shall be owned by
them in their private capacities: …. (Emphasis supplied)
6. Letter of Instructions No. ("LOI") 926, s. of 1979, made reference to
the creation, out of other coco levy funds, of the Coconut Industry
Investment Fund ("CIIF") in P.D. No. 1468 and entrusted a portion of
the CIIF levy to UCPB for investment, on behalf of coconut farmers, in
oil mills and other private corporations, with the following equity
ownership structure:
Section 2. Organization of the Cooperative Endeavor. – The
UCPB, in its capacity as the investment arm of the coconut
farmers thru the CIIF … is hereby directed to invest, on
behalf of the coconut farmers, such portion of the CIIF … in
private corporations … under the following guidelines:
a) The coconut farmers shall own or control at least …
(50%) of the outstanding voting capital stock of the private
corporation acquired thru the CIIF and/or corporation
owned or controlled by the farmers thru the CIIF …. (Words
in bracket added.)
Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or
indirectly to finance various projects and/or was converted into
various assets or investments.11 Relevant to the present petition is the
acquisition of the First United Bank ("FUB"), which was subsequently
renamed as United Coconut Planters Bank ("UCPB").12
Apropos the intended acquisition of a commercial bank for the
purpose stated earlier, it would appear that FUB was the bank of
choice which Pedro Cojuangco’s group (collectively, "Pedro
Cojuangco") had control of. The plan, then, was for PCA to buy all of
Pedro Cojuangco’s shares in FUB. However, as later events unfolded,
a simple direct sale from the seller (Pedro) to PCA did not ensue as it
was made to appear that Cojuangco had the exclusive option to
acquire the former’s FUB controlling interests. Emerging from this
elaborate, circuitous arrangement were two deeds. The first one was
simply denominated as Agreement, dated May 1975, entered into by
and between Cojuangco for and in his behalf and in behalf of "certain
other buyers", and Pedro Cojuangco in which the former was
purportedly accorded the option to buy 72.2% of FUB’s outstanding
capital stock, or 137,866 shares (the "option shares," for brevity), at
PhP 200 per share. On its face, this agreement does not mention the
word "option."
The second but related contract, dated May 25, 1975, was
denominated as Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank
for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers of the Philippines. It had PCA,
for itself and for the benefit of the coconut farmers, purchase from
Cojuangco the shares of stock subject of the First Agreement for
PhP200.00 per share. As additional consideration for PCA’s buy-out
of what Cojuangco would later claim to be his exclusive and personal
option, it was stipulated that, from PCA, Cojuangco shall receive
equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22%, of the 72.2%, or fully paid
shares. And so as not to dilute Cojuangco’s equity position in FUB,
later UCPB, the PCA agreed under paragraph 6 (b) of the second
agreement to cede over to the former a number of fully paid FUB
shares out of the shares it (PCA) undertakes to eventually subscribe.
It was further stipulated that Cojuangco would act as bank president
for an extendible period of 5 years.
Apart from the aforementioned 72.2%, PCA purchased from other
FUB shareholders 6,534 shares of which Cojuangco, as may be
gathered from the records, got 10%..
While the 64.98% portion of the option shares (72.2% – 7.22% =
64.98%) ostensibly pertained to the farmers, the corresponding stock
certificates supposedly representing the farmers’ equity were in the
name of and delivered to PCA. There were, however, shares forming
part of the aforesaid 64.98% portion, which ended up in the hands of
non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not
covered by any of the agreements.
Under paragraph # 8 of the second agreement, PCA agreed to
expeditiously distribute the FUB shares purchased to such "coconut
farmers holding registered COCOFUND receipts" on equitable basis.
 As found by the Sandiganbayan, the PCA appropriated, out of its own
fund, an amount for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity, albeit it
would later reimburse itself from the coconut levy fund.
And per Cojuangco’s own admission, PCA paid, out of the CCSF, the entire acquisition
price for the 72.2% option shares.13
As of June 30, 1975, the list of FUB stockholders included Cojuangco with 14,440 shares
and PCA with 129,955 shares.14 It would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on
maintaining Cojuangco’s equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to him 10% of its
subscriptions to (a) the authorized but unissued shares of FUB and (b) the increase in
FUB’s capital stock (the equivalent of 158,840 and 649,800 shares, respectively). In all,
from the "mother" PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of 95,304 FUB (UCPB)
shares broken down as follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840 shares) + 10% (649,800
shares) = 95,304.15
We further quote, from COCOFED v. Republic, facts relevant to the instant case:16
Shortly after the execution of the PCA – Cojuangco Agreement, President Marcos issued,
on July 29, 1975, P.D. No. 755 directing x x x as narrated, PCA to use the CCSF and
CIDF to acquire a commercial bank to provide coco farmers with "readily available credit
facilities at preferential rate" x x x.
Then came the 1986 EDSA event. One of the priorities of then President Corazon C.
Aquino’s revolutionary government was the recovery of ill-gotten wealth reportedly
amassed by the Marcos family and close relatives, their nominees and associates.
Apropos thereto, she issued Executive Order Nos. (EO) 1, 2 and 14, as amended by E.O.
14-A, all series of 1986. E.O. 1 created the PCGG and provided it with the tools and
processes it may avail of in the recovery efforts;17 E.O. No. 2 asserted that the ill-gotten
assets and properties come in the form of shares of stocks, etc., while E.O. No. 14
conferred on the Sandiganbayan exclusive and original jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth
cases, with the proviso that "technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be
applied strictly" to the civil cases filed under the EO. Pursuant to these issuances, the
PCGG issued numerous orders of sequestration, among which were those handed out x x
x against shares of stock in UCPB purportedly owned by or registered in the names of (a)
the more than a million coconut farmers, (b) the CIIF companies and (c) Cojuangco, Jr.,
including the SMC shares held by the CIIF companies. On July 31, 1987, the PCGG
instituted before the Sandiganbayan a recovery suit docketed thereat as CC No. 0033.
xxxx
3. Civil Case 0033 x x x would be subdivided into eight complaints, docketed as CC 0033-
A to CC 0033-H.
xxxx
5. By Decision of December 14, 2001, in G.R. Nos. 147062-64 (Republic v.
COCOFED),18 the Court declared the coco levy funds as prima facie public funds. And
purchased as the sequestered UCPB shares were by such funds, beneficial ownership
thereon and the corollary voting rights prima facie pertain, according to the Court, to the
government.
xxxx
Correlatively, the Republic, on the strength of the December 14, 2001 ruling in Republic v.
COCOFED and on the argument, among others, that the claim of COCOFED and Ballares
et al., over the subject UCPB shares is based solely on the supposed COCOFUND
receipts issued for payment of the RA 6260 CIF levy, filed a Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment RE: COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. dated April 22, 2002, praying that a
summary judgment be rendered declaring:
a. That Section 2 of [PD] 755, Section 5, Article III of P.D. 961 and
Section 5, Article III of P.D. No. 1468 are unconstitutional;
b. That x x x (CIF) payments under x x x (R.A.) No. 6260 are not valid
and legal bases for ownership claims over UCPB shares; and
c. That COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al. have not legally and
validly obtained title over the subject UCPB shares.
Right after it filed the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment RE: COCOFED, et al. and
Ballares, et al., the Republic interposed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re:
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., praying that a summary judgment be rendered:
a. Declaring that Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is unconstitutional insofar as it
validates the provisions in the "PCA-Cojuangco Agreement x x x" dated May 25,
1975 providing payment of ten percent (10%) commission to defendant
Cojuangco with respect to the FUB, now UCPB shares subject matter thereof;
b. Declaring that x x x Cojuangco, Jr. and his fronts, nominees and dummies,
including x x x and Danilo S. Ursua, have not legally and validly obtained title
over the subject UCPB shares; and
c. Declaring that the government is the lawful and true owner of the subject
UCPB shares registered in the names of … Cojuangco, Jr. and the entities and
persons above-enumerated, for the benefit of all coconut farmers. x x x
Following an exchange of pleadings, the Republic filed its sur-rejoinder praying that it be
conclusively declared the true and absolute owner of the coconut levy funds and the
UCPB shares acquired therefrom.19
We quote from COCOFED v. Republic:20 PEDRO COJUANGCO, Filipino, of legal age and with
residence at 1575 Princeton St., Mandaluyong, Rizal, for
and in his own behalf and in behalf of certain other
A joint hearing on the separate motions for summary judgment to determine what material
stockholders of First United Bank listed in Annex "A"
facts exist with or without controversy then ensued. By Order of March 11, 2003, the
attached hereto (hereinafter collectively called the
Sandiganbayan detailed, based on this Court’s ruling in related ill-gotten cases, the
SELLERS);
parties’ manifestations made in open court and the pleadings and evidence on record, the
facts it found to be without substantial controversy, together with the admissions and/or
extent of the admission made by the parties respecting relevant facts, as follows: – and –

As culled from the exhaustive discussions and manifestations of the parties in open court
of their respective pleadings and evidence on record, the facts which exist without any
substantial controversy are set forth hereunder, together with the admissions and/or the
extent or scope of the admissions made by the parties relating to the relevant facts:
1. The late President Ferdinand E. Marcos was President x x x for two
terms under the 1935 Constitution and, during the second term, he
declared Martial Law through Proclamation No. 1081 dated
September 21, 1972.
2. On January 17, 1973, he issued Proclamation No. 1102
announcing the ratification of the 1973 Constitution.
3. From January 17, 1973 to April 7, 1981, he x x x exercised the
powers and prerogative of President under the 1935 Constitution and
the powers and prerogative of President x x x the 1973 Constitution.
He x x x promulgated various P.D.s, among which were P.D. No. 232,
P.D. No. 276, P.D. No. 414, P.D. No. 755, P.D. No. 961 and P.D. No.
1468.
EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR., Filipino, of legal age and
with residence at 136 9th Street corner Balete Drive,
Quezon City, represented in this act by his duly authorized
attorney-in-fact, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, for and in his own
behalf and in behalf of certain other buyers, (hereinafter
collectively called the BUYERS)";
WITNESSETH: That
WHEREAS, the SELLERS own of record and beneficially a
total of 137,866 shares of stock, with a par value of
P100.00 each, of the common stock of the First United
Bank (the "Bank"), a commercial banking corporation
existing under the laws of the Philippines;
WHEREAS, the BUYERS desire to purchase, and the
SELLERS are willing to sell, the aforementioned shares of
stock totaling 137,866 shares (hereinafter called the
"Contract Shares") owned by the SELLERS due to their
special relationship to EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR.;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the

4. On April 17, 1981, amendments to the 1973 Constitution were
premises and the mutual covenants herein contained, the
effected and, on June 30, 1981, he, after being elected President,
parties agree as follows:
"reassumed the title and exercised the powers of the President until
25 February 1986."
1. Sale and Purchase of Contract Shares
5. Defendants Maria Clara Lobregat and Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. were
PCA Directors x x x during the period 1970 to 1986 x x x. Subject to the terms and conditions of this
Agreement, the SELLERS hereby sell, assign,
transfer and convey unto the BUYERS, and the
6. Plaintiff admits the existence of the following agreements which are
BUYERS hereby purchase and acquire, the
attached as Annexes "A" and "B" to the Opposition dated October 10,
Contract Shares free and clear of all liens and
2002 of defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. to the above-cited
encumbrances thereon.
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment:

2. Contract Price
a) "This Agreement made and entered into this ______ day
of May, 1975 at Makati, Rizal, Philippines, by and between:
The purchase price per share of the Contract in any agreement to which they are a
Shares payable by the BUYERS is P200.00 or an party or by which they may be bound.
aggregate price of P27,573,200.00 (the "Contract
Price").
(c) They have complied with the
condition set forth in Article X of the
3. Delivery of, and payment for, stock certificates Amended Articles of Incorporation of
the Bank.
Upon the execution of this Agreement, (i) the
SELLERS shall deliver to the BUYERS the stock 5. Representation of BUYERS
certificates representing the Contract Shares,
free and clear of all liens, encumbrances,
xxxx
obligations, liabilities and other burdens in favor
of the Bank or third parties, duly endorsed in
blank or with stock powers sufficient to transfer 6. Implementation
the shares to bearer; and (ii) BUYERS shall
deliver to the SELLERS P27,511,295.50
The parties hereto hereby agree to execute or
representing the Contract Price less the amount
cause to be executed such documents and
of stock transfer taxes payable by the SELLERS,
instruments as may be required in order to carry
which the BUYERS undertake to remit to the
out the intent and purpose of this Agreement.
appropriate authorities. (Emphasis added.)

7. Notices
4. Representation and Warranties of Sellers

xxxx
The SELLERS respectively and independently of
each other represent and warrant that:
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto
set their hands at the place and on the date first above
(a) The SELLERS are the lawful
written.
owners of, with good marketable title
to, the Contract Shares and that (i) the
certificates to be delivered pursuant PEDRO COJUANGCO EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR.
thereto have been validly issued and (on his own behalf and in  (on his own behalf and in behalf
are fully paid and non-assessable; (ii) behalf of the other  Sellers of the other Buyers)
the Contract Shares are free and clear listed in Annex "A" hereof) (BUYERS)
of all liens, encumbrances, obligations, (SELLERS)
liabilities and other burdens in favor of
the Bank or third parties x x x.
By:

This representation shall survive the

execution and delivery of this EDGARDO J. ANGARA
Agreement and the consummation or Attorney-in-Fact
transfer hereby contemplated.
xxxx
(b) The execution, delivery and
performance of this Agreement by the b) "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the
SELLERS does not conflict with or Benefit of the Coconut Farmers of the Philippines, made and entered
constitute any breach of any provision
into this 25th day of May 1975 at Makati, Rizal, Philippines, by and
between:
EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., Filipino, of legal age,
with business address at 10th Floor, Sikatuna Building,
Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal, hereinafter referred to as the
SELLER;
– and –
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, a public corporation
created by Presidential Decree No. 232, as amended, for
itself and for the benefit of the coconut farmers of the
Philippines, (hereinafter called the BUYER)"
WITNESSETH: That
WHEREAS, on May 17, 1975, the Philippine Coconut
Producers Federation ("PCPF"), through its Board of
Directors, expressed the desire of the coconut farmers to
own a commercial bank which will be an effective
instrument to solve the perennial credit problems and, for
that purpose, passed a resolution requesting the PCA to
negotiate with the SELLER for the transfer to the coconut
farmers of the SELLER’s option to buy the First United
Bank (the "Bank") under such terms and conditions as
BUYER may deem to be in the best interest of the coconut
farmers and instructed Mrs. Maria Clara Lobregat to convey
such request to the BUYER;
WHEREAS, the PCPF further instructed Mrs. Maria Clara
Lobregat to make representations with the BUYER to utilize
its funds to finance the purchase of the Bank;
WHEREAS, the SELLER has the exclusive and personal
option to buy 144,400 shares (the "Option Shares") of the
Bank, constituting 72.2% of the present outstanding shares
of stock of the Bank, at the price of P200.00 per share,
which option only the SELLER can validly exercise;
WHEREAS, in response to the representations made by the
coconut farmers, the BUYER has requested the SELLER to
exercise his personal option for the benefit of the coconut
farmers;
WHEREAS, the SELLER is willing to transfer the Option
Shares to the BUYER at a price equal to his option price of
P200 per share;
WHEREAS, recognizing that ownership by the coconut
farmers of a commercial bank is a permanent solution to
their perennial credit problems, that it will accelerate the
growth and development of the coconut industry and that
the policy of the state which the BUYER is required to
implement is to achieve vertical integration thereof so that
coconut farmers will become participants in, and
beneficiaries of the development and growth of the coconut
industry, the BUYER approved the request of PCPF that it
acquire a commercial bank to be owned by the coconut
farmers and, appropriated, for that purpose, the sum of
P150 Million to enable the farmers to buy the Bank and
capitalize the Bank to such an extension as to be in a
position to adopt a credit policy for the coconut farmers at
preferential rates;
WHEREAS, x x x the BUYER is willing to subscribe to
additional shares ("Subscribed Shares") and place the Bank
in a more favorable financial position to extend loans and
credit facilities to coconut farmers at preferential rates;
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the
foregoing premises and the other terms and conditions
hereinafter contained, the parties hereby declare and affirm
that their principal contractual intent is (1) to ensure that the
coconut farmers own at least 60% of the outstanding capital
stock of the Bank; and (2) that the SELLER shall receive
compensation for exercising his personal and exclusive
option to acquire the Option Shares, for transferring such
shares to the coconut farmers at the option price of P200
per share, and for performing the management services
required of him hereunder.
1. To ensure that the transfer to the coconut
farmers of the Option Shares is effected with the
least possible delay and to provide for the faithful
performance of the obligations of the parties
hereunder, the parties hereby appoint the
Philippine National Bank as their escrow agent
(the "Escrow Agent").
Upon execution of this Agreement, the BUYER
shall deposit with the Escrow Agent such amount
as may be necessary to implement the terms of
this Agreement x x x.
2. As promptly as practicable after execution of
this Agreement, the SELLER shall exercise his
option to acquire the Option Share and SELLER
shall immediately thereafter deliver and turn over
to the Escrow Agent such stock certificates as
are herein provided to be received from the
existing stockholders of the Bank by virtue of the
exercise on the aforementioned option x x x.
3. To ensure the stability of the Bank and
continuity of management and credit policies to
be adopted for the benefit of the coconut farmers,
the parties undertake to cause the stockholders
and the Board of Directors of the Bank to
authorize and approve a management contract
between the Bank and the SELLER under the
following terms:
(a) The management contract shall be
for a period of five (5) years, renewable
for another five (5) years by mutual
agreement of the SELLER and the
Bank;
(b) The SELLER shall be elected
President and shall hold office at the
pleasure of the Board of Directors.
While serving in such capacity, he shall
be entitled to such salaries and
emoluments as the Board of Directors
may determine;
(c) The SELLER shall recruit and
develop a professional management
team to manage and operate the Bank
under the control and supervision of
the Board of Directors of the Bank;
(d) The BUYER undertakes to cause
three (3) persons designated by the
SELLER to be elected to the Board of
Directors of the Bank;
(e) The SELLER shall receive no
compensation for managing the Bank,
other than such salaries or emoluments
to which he may be entitled by virtue of
the discharge of his function and duties
as President, provided x x x and
(f) The management contract may be
assigned to a management company
owned and controlled by the SELLER.
4. As compensation for exercising his personal
and exclusive option to acquire the Option
Shares and for transferring such shares to the
coconut farmers, as well as for performing the
management services required of him, SELLER
shall receive equity in the Bank amounting, in the
aggregate, to 95,304 fully paid shares in
accordance with the procedure set forth in
paragraph 6 below;
5. In order to comply with the Central Bank
program for increased capitalization of banks and
to ensure that the Bank will be in a more
favorable financial position to attain its objective
to extend to the coconut farmers loans and credit
facilities, the BUYER undertakes to subscribe to
shares with an aggregate par value of
P80,864,000 (the "Subscribed Shares"). The
obligation of the BUYER with respect to the
Subscribed Shares shall be as follows:
(a) The BUYER undertakes to
subscribe, for the benefit of the coconut
farmers, to shares with an aggregate
par value of P15,884,000 from the
present authorized but unissued shares
of the Bank; and
(b) The BUYER undertakes to
subscribe, for the benefit of the coconut
farmers, to shares with an aggregate
par value of P64,980,000 from the
increased capital stock of the Bank,
which subscriptions shall be deemed
made upon the approval by the
stockholders of the increase of the
 authorized capital stock of the Bank
from P50 Million to P140 Million.
The parties undertake to declare stock dividends
of P8 Million out of the present authorized but
unissued capital stock of P30 Million.
6. To carry into effect the agreement of the
parties that the SELLER shall receive as his
compensation 95,304 shares:
7. The parties further undertake that the Board of Directors and
management of the Bank shall establish and implement a loan policy
for the Bank of making available for loans at preferential rates of
interest to the coconut farmers x x x.
8. The BUYER shall expeditiously distribute from time to time the
shares of the Bank, that shall be held by it for the benefit of the
coconut farmers of the Philippines under the provisions of this
Agreement, to such, coconut farmers holding registered COCOFUND
receipts on such equitable basis as may be determine by the BUYER
in its sound discretion.

(a) The Escrow Agent shall, upon

9. x x x x
receipt from the SELLER of the stock
certificates representing the Option
Shares, duly endorsed in blank or with 10. To ensure that not only existing but future coconut farmers shall
stock powers sufficient to transfer the be participants in and beneficiaries of the credit policies, and shall be
same to bearer, present such stock entitled to the benefit of loans and credit facilities to be extended by
certificates to the Transfer Agent of the the Bank to coconut farmers at preferential rates, the shares held by
Bank and shall cause such Transfer the coconut farmers shall not be entitled to pre-emptive rights with
Agent to issue stock certificates of the respect to the unissued portion of the authorized capital stock or any
Bank in the following ratio: one share in increase thereof.
the name of the SELLER for every nine
shares in the name of the BUYER.
11. After the parties shall have acquired two-thirds (2/3) of the
outstanding shares of the Bank, the parties shall call a special
(b) With respect to the Subscribed stockholders’ meeting of the Bank:
Shares, the BUYER undertakes, in
order to prevent the dilution of
(a) To classify the present authorized capital stock of
SELLER’s equity position, that it shall
P50,000,000 divided into 500,000 shares, with a par value
cede over to the SELLER 64,980 fully-
of P100.00 per share into: 361,000 Class A shares, with an
paid shares out of the Subscribed
aggregate par value of P36,100,000 and 139,000 Class B
Shares. Such undertaking shall be
shares, with an aggregate par value of P13,900,000. All of
complied with in the following manner:
the Option Shares constituting 72.2% of the outstanding
upon receipt of advice that the BUYER
shares, shall be classified as Class A shares and the
has subscribed to the Subscribed
balance of the outstanding shares, constituting 27.8% of the
Shares upon approval by the
outstanding shares, as Class B shares;
stockholders of the increase of the
authorized capital stock of the Bank,
the Escrow Agent shall thereupon (b) To amend the articles of incorporation of the Bank to
issue a check in favor of the Bank effect the following changes:
covering the total payment for the
Subscribed Shares. The Escrow Agent
(i) change of corporate name to First United
shall thereafter cause the Transfer
Coconut Bank;
Agent to issue a stock certificates of
the Bank in the following ratio: one
share in the name of the SELLER for (ii) replace the present provision restricting the
every nine shares in the name of the transferability of the shares with a limitation on
BUYER. ownership by any individual or entity to not more
than 10% of the outstanding shares of the Bank;
 (iii) provide that the holders of Class A shares
shall not be entitled to pre-emptive rights with
respect to the unissued portion of the authorized
capital stock or any increase thereof; and
(iv) provide that the holders of Class B shares
shall be absolutely entitled to pre-emptive rights,
with respect to the unissued portion of Class B
shares comprising part of the authorized capital
stock or any increase thereof, to subscribe to
Class B shares in proportion t the subscriptions of
Class A shares, and to pay for their subscriptions
to Class B shares within a period of five (5) years
from the call of the Board of Directors.
(c) To increase the authorized capital stock of the Bank
from P50 Million to P140 Million, divided into 1,010,800
Class A shares and 389,200 Class B shares, each with a
par value of P100 per share;
(d) To declare a stock dividend of P8 Million payable to the
SELLER, the BUYER and other stockholders of the Bank
out of the present authorized but unissued capital stock of
P30 Million;
(e) To amend the by-laws of the Bank accordingly; and
(f) To authorize and approve the management contract
provided in paragraph 2 above.
The parties agree that they shall vote their shares and take all the
necessary corporate action in order to carry into effect the foregoing
provisions of this paragraph 11, including such other amendments of
the articles of incorporation and by-laws of the Bank as are necessary
in order to implement the intention of the parties with respect thereto.
12. It is the contemplation of the parties that the Bank shall achieve a
financial and equity position to be able to lend to the coconut farmers
at preferential rates.
In order to achieve such objective, the parties shall cause the Bank to
adopt a policy of reinvestment, by way of stock dividends, of such
percentage of the profits of the Bank as may be necessary.
13. The parties agree to execute or cause to be executed such
documents and instruments as may be required in order to carry out
the intent and purpose of this Agreement.
IN WITNESS WHEREOF x x x
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY
(BUYER)
By:
EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR. MARIA CLARA L. LOBREGAT
(SELLER)
xxxx
7. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the x x
x (PCA) was the "other buyers" represented by defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. in
the May 1975 Agreement entered into between Pedro Cojuangco (on his own behalf and
in behalf of other sellers listed in Annex "A"of the agreement) and defendant Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. (on his own behalf and in behalf of the other buyers). Defendant Cojuangco
insists he was the "only buyer" under the aforesaid Agreement.
8. Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. did not own any share in the x x x (FUB) prior to
the execution of the two Agreements x x x.
9. Defendants Lobregat, et al., and COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al. admit that in
addition to the 137,866 FUB shares of Pedro Cojuangco, et al. covered by the Agreement,
other FUB stockholders sold their shares to PCA such that the total number of FUB shares
purchased by PCA … increased from 137,866 shares to 144,400 shares, the OPTION
SHARES referred to in the Agreement of May 25, 1975. Defendant Cojuangco did not
make said admission as to the said 6,534 shares in excess of the 137,866 shares covered
by the Agreement with Pedro Cojuangco.
10. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the
Agreement, described in Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 755 dated July 29,
1975 as the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of
Coconut Farmers" executed by the Philippine Coconut Authority" and incorporated in
Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 by reference, refers to the "AGREEMENT FOR THE
ACQUISITION OF A COMMERCIAL BANK FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE COCONUT
FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES" dated May 25, 1975 between defendant Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. and the PCA (Annex "B" for defendant Cojuangco’s OPPOSITION TO
PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: EDUARDO M.
COJUANGCO, JR. dated September 18, 2002).
Plaintiff refused to make the same admission. a. there were other coconut farmers who received UCPB shares
although they did not present said COCOFUND receipt because the
PCA distributed the unclaimed UCPB shares not only to those who
11. As to whether P.D. No. 755 and the text of the agreement described therein was
already received their UCPB shares in exchange for their
published, the Court takes judicial notice that P.D. No. 755 was published in x x x volume
COCOFUND receipts but also to the coconut farmers determined by a
71 of the Official Gazette but the text of the agreement x x x was not so published with
national census conducted pursuant to PCA administrative issuances;
P.D. No. 755.

b. there were other affidavits executed by Lobregat, Eleazar, Ballares

12. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the
and Aldeguer relative to the said distribution of the unclaimed UCPB
PCA used public funds x x x in the total amount of P150 million, to purchase the FUB
shares; and
shares amounting to 72.2% of the authorized capital stock of the FUB, although the PCA
was later reimbursed from the coconut levy funds and that the PCA subscription in the
increased capitalization of the FUB, which was later renamed the x x x (UCPB), came c. the coconut farmers claim the UCPB shares by virtue of their
from the said coconut levy funds x x x. compliance not only with the laws mentioned in item (d) above but
also with the relevant issuances of the PCA such as, PCA
Administrative Order No. 1, dated August 20, 1975 (Exh. "298-
13. Pursuant to the May 25, 1975 Agreement, out of the 72.2% shares of the authorized
Farmer"); PCA Resolution No. 033-78 dated February 16, 1978….
and the increased capital stock of the FUB (later UCPB), entirely paid for by PCA, 64.98%
of the shares were placed in the name of the "PCA for the benefit of the coconut farmers"
and 7,22% were given to defendant Cojuangco. The remaining 27.8% shares of stock in The plaintiff did not make any admission as to the foregoing qualifications.
the FUB which later became the UCPB were not covered by the two (2) agreements
referred to in item no. 6, par. (a) and (b) above. "There were shares forming part of the
17. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. claim that the
aforementioned 64.98% which were later sold or transferred to non-coconut farmers.
UCPB shares in question have legitimately become the private properties of the 1,405,366
coconut farmers solely on the basis of their having acquired said shares in compliance
14. Under the May 27, 1975 Agreement, defendant Cojuangco’s equity in the FUB (now with R.A. No. 6260, P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 and the administrative issuances of the
UCPB) was ten percent (10%) of the shares of stock acquired by the PCA for the benefit PCA cited above.
of the coconut farmers.
18. On the other hand, defendant … Cojuangco, Jr. claims ownership of the UCPB
15. That the fully paid 95.304 shares of the FUB, later the UCPB, acquired by defendant x shares, which he holds, solely on the basis of the two Agreements…. (Emphasis and
x x Cojuangco, Jr. pursuant to the May 25, 1975 Agreement were paid for by the PCA in words in brackets added.)
accordance with the terms and conditions provided in the said Agreement. 16. Defendants
Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the affidavits of the
On July 11, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed PSJ-A, ruling in favor of the
coconut farmers (specifically, Exhibit "1-Farmer" to "70-Farmer") uniformly state that:
Republic, disposing insofar as pertinent as follows:21

a. they are coconut farmers who sold coconut products;

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

b. in the sale thereof, they received COCOFUND receipts pursuant to

xxxx
R.A. No. 6260;

C. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: EDUARDO M.

c. they registered the said COCOFUND receipts; and
COJUANGCO, JR.) dated September 18, 2002 filed by plaintiff.

d. by virtue thereof, and under R.A. No. 6260, P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and
1468, they are allegedly entitled to the subject UCPB shares.
but subject to the following qualifications:
1. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 755 did not validate the Agreement between PCA and
defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975 nor did it give the
Agreement the binding force of a law because of the non-publication of the said
Agreement.
 2. Regarding the questioned transfer of the shares of stock of FUB (later UCPB) and B of the same dispositive portion have already been finally resolved and adjudicated
by PCA to defendant Cojuangco or the so-called "Cojuangco UCPB shares" by this Court in COCOFED v. Republic on January 24, 2012.23
which cost the PCA more than Ten Million Pesos in CCSF in 1975, we declare,
that the transfer of the following FUB/UCPB shares to defendant Eduardo M.
From PSJ-A, Cojuangco moved for partial reconsideration but the Sandiganbayan, by
Cojuangco, Jr. was not supported by valuable consideration, and therefore null
Resolution24 of December 28, 2004, denied the motion.
and void:

Hence, the instant petition.

a. The 14,400 shares from the "Option Shares";

The Issues
b. Additional Bank Shares Subscribed and Paid by PCA, consisting
of:
Cojuangco’s petition formulates the issues in question form, as follows:25
1. Fifteen Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Four (15,884)
shares out of the authorized but unissued shares of the a. Is the acquisition of the so-called Cojuangco, Jr. UCPB shares by petitioner
bank, subscribed and paid by PCA; Cojuangco x x x "not supported by valuable consideration and, therefore, null
and void"?
2. Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty (64,980)
shares of the increased capital stock subscribed and paid b. Did the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction, in Civil Case No. 0033-A, an "ill-
by PCA; and gotten wealth" case brought under EO Nos. 1 and 2, to declare the Cojuangco
UCPB shares acquired by virtue of the Pedro Cojuangco, et al. Agreement
and/or the PCA Agreement null and void because "not supported by valuable
3. Stock dividends declared pursuant to paragraph 5 and
consideration"?
paragraph 11 (iv) (d) of the Agreement.

c. Was the claim that the acquisition by petitioner Cojuangco of shares

3. The above-mentioned shares of stock of the FUB/UCPB transferred to
representing 7.2% of the outstanding capital stock of FUB (later UCPB) "not
defendant Cojuangco are hereby declared conclusively owned by the plaintiff
supported by valuable consideration", a "claim" pleaded in the complaint and
Republic of the Philippines.
may therefore be the basis of a "summary judgment" under Section 1, Rule 35
of the Rules of Court?
4. The UCPB shares of stock of the alleged fronts, nominees and dummies of
defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. which form part of the 72.2% shares of
d. By declaring the Cojuangco UCPB shares as "not supported by valuable
the FUB/UCPB paid for by the
consideration, and therefore, null and void", did the Sandiganbayan effectively
nullify the PCA Agreement? May the Sandiganbayan nullify the PCA Agreement
PCA with public funds later charged to the coconut levy funds, particularly the CCSF, when the parties to the Agreement, namely: x x x concede its validity? If the
belong to the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines as their true and beneficial owner. PCA Agreement be deemed "null and void", should not the FUB (later UCPB)
shares revert to petitioner Cojuangco (under the PCA Agreement) or to Pedro
Cojuangco, et al. x x x? Would there be a basis then, even assuming the
Let trial of this Civil Case proceed with respect to the issues which have not been
absence of consideration x x x, to declare 7.2% UCPB shares of petitioner
disposed of in this Partial Summary Judgment. For this purpose, the plaintiff’s Motion Ad
Cojuangco as "conclusively owned by the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines"?26
Cautelam to Present

The Court’s Ruling

Additional Evidence dated March 28, 2001 is hereby GRANTED.22 (Emphasis and
underlining added.)
I
As earlier explained, the core issue in this instant petition is Part C of the dispositive
portion in PSJ-A declaring the 7.22% FUB (now UCPB) shares transferred to Cojuangco, THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE
plus the other shares paid by the PCA as "conclusively" owned by the Republic. Parts A SUBDIVIDED AMENDED COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING THE SHARES ALLEGEDLY
ACQUIRED BY COJUANGCO BY VIRTUE OF THE PCA AGREEMENTS.
The issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the subdivided amended complaints who shall be elected as members of the Board of Directors of the
has peremptorily been put to rest by the Court in its January 24, 2012 Decision in Bank;
COCOFED v. Republic. There, the Court, citing Regalado27 and settled jurisprudence,
stressed the following interlocking precepts: Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law,
(ii) to legitimize a posteriori his highly anomalous and irregular use
not by the consent or acquiescence of any or all of the parties. In turn, the issue on
and diversion of government funds to advance his own private and
whether a suit comes within the penumbra of a statutory conferment is determined by the
commercial interests, Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. caused the
allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the suitor will be entitled to
issuance by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos of PD 755 (a) declaring
recover upon all or part of the claims asserted.
that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and
fiduciary and trust funds and do not form part of the general funds of
The Republic’s material averments in its complaint subdivided in CC No. 0033-A included the National Government, conveniently repealing for that purpose a
the following: series of previous decrees, PDs 276 and 414, establishing the
character of the coconut levy funds as special, fiduciary, trust and
governmental funds; (b) confirming the agreement between
CC No. 0033-A
Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and PCA on the purchase of FUB
by incorporating by reference said private commercial agreement in
12. Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. served as a public officer during the Marcos PD 755;
administration. During the period of his incumbency as a public officer, he acquired assets,
funds and other property grossly and manifestly disproportionate to his salaries, lawful
(iii)To further consolidate his hold on UCPB, Defendant Eduardo
income and income from legitimately acquired property.
Cojuangco, Jr. imposed as consideration and conditions for the
purchase that (a) he gets one out of every nine shares given to PCA,
13. Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., taking undue advantage of his association, and (b) he gets to manage and control UCPB as president for a term
influence, connection, and acting in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. of five (5) years renewable for another five (5) years;
Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, AND THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, embarked upon
devices, schemes and stratagems, to unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff
(iv) To perpetuate his opportunity to deal with and make use of the
and the Filipino people, such as when he –
coconut levy funds x x x Cojuangco, Jr. caused the issuance by
Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos of an unconstitutional decree (PD
a) manipulated, beginning the year 1975 with the active collaboration of 1468) requiring the deposit of all coconut levy funds with UCPB,
Defendants x x x Maria Clara Lobregat, Danilo Ursua etc., the purchase by . . . interest free to the prejudice of the government.
(PCA) of 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of the x x x (FUB) which was
subsequently converted into a universal bank named x x x (UCPB) through the
(v) In gross violation of their fiduciary positions and in contravention of
use of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) being initially in the
the goal to create a bank for the coconut farmers of the country, the
amount of P85,773,100.00 in a manner contrary to law and to the specific
capital stock of UCPB as of February 25, 1986 was actually held by
purposes for which said coconut levy funds were imposed and collected under
the defendants, their lawyers, factotum and business associates,
P.D. 276, and with sinister designs and under anomalous circumstances, to wit:
thereby finally gaining control of the UCPB by misusing the names
and identities of the so-called "more than one million coconut
(i) Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. coveted the coconut levy funds farmers."
as a cheap, lucrative and risk-free source of funds with which to
exercise his private option to buy the controlling interest in FUB; thus,
14. The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with
claiming that the 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock of FUB could
one another, constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant
only be purchased and transferred through the exercise of his
breach of public trust and fiduciary obligations, brazen abuse of right and power,
"personal and exclusive action option to acquire the 144,000 shares"
and unjust enrichment, violation of the constitution and laws of the Republic of
of the bank, Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and PCA, x x x
the Philippines, to the grave and irreparable damage of Plaintiff and the Filipino
executed on May 26, 1975 a purchase agreement which provides,
people.28
among others, for the payment to him in fully paid shares as
compensation thereof 95,384 shares worth P1,444,000.00 with the
further condition that he shall manage and control the bank as In no uncertain terms, the Court has upheld the Sandiganbayan’s assumption of
Director and President for a term of five (5) years renewable for jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F.29 The Court
another five (5) years and to designate three (3) persons of his choice wrote:
Judging from the allegations of the defendants’ illegal acts thereat made, it is fairly obvious
that both CC Nos. 0033-A and CC 0033-F partake, in the context of EO Nos. 1, 2 and 14,
series of 1986, the nature of ill-gotten wealth suits. Both deal with the recovery of
sequestered shares, property or business enterprises claimed, as alleged in the
corresponding basic complaints, to be ill-gotten assets of President Marcos, his cronies
and nominees and acquired by taking undue advantage of relationships or influence
and/or through or as a result of improper use, conversion or diversion of government funds
or property. Recovery of these assets––determined as shall hereinafter be discussed as
prima facie ill-gotten––falls within the unquestionable jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30
P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and E.O. No. 14, Series of 1986, vests the
Sandiganbayan with, among others, original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases
instituted pursuant to and in connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Correlatively,
the PCGG Rules and Regulations defines the term "Ill-Gotten Wealth" as "any asset,
property, business enterprise or material possession of persons within the purview of E.O.
Nos. 1 and 2, acquired by them directly, or indirectly thru dummies, nominees, agents,
subordinates and/or business associates by any of the following means or similar
schemes":
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public
funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) x x x x
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to
the government or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or
government-owned or controlled corporations;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock,
equity or any other form of interest or participation in any business enterprise or
undertaking;
(5) Through the establishment of agricultural, industrial or commercial
monopolies or other combination and/or by the issuance, promulgation and/or
implementation of decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or
special interests; and
(6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship or
influence for personal gain or benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 2(a) of E.O. No. 1 charged the PCGG with the task of assisting the President in
"The recovery of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former … President Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates … including the takeover
or sequestration of all business enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them,
during his administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their
public office and/or using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationship."
Complementing the aforesaid Section 2(a) is Section 1 of E.O. No. 2 decreeing the
freezing of all assets "in which the Marcoses their close relatives, subordinates, business
associates, dummies, agents or nominees have any interest or participation."
The Republic’s averments in the amended complaints, particularly those detailing the
alleged wrongful acts of the defendants, sufficiently reveal that the subject matter thereof
comprises the recovery by the Government of ill-gotten wealth acquired by then President
Marcos, his cronies or their associates and dummies through the unlawful, improper
utilization or diversion of coconut levy funds aided by P.D. No. 755 and other sister
decrees. President Marcos himself issued these decrees in a brazen bid to legalize what
amounts to private taking of the said public funds.
xxxx
There was no actual need for Republic, as plaintiff a quo, to adduce evidence to show that
the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaints as it leaned
on the averments in the initiatory pleadings to make visible the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the ill-gotten wealth complaints. As previously discussed, a perusal
of the allegations easily reveals the sufficiency of the statement of matters disclosing the
claim of the government against the coco levy funds and the assets acquired directly or
indirectly through said funds as ill-gotten wealth. Moreover, the Court finds no rule that
directs the plaintiff to first prove the subject matter jurisdiction of the court before which the
complaint is filed. Rather, such burden falls on the shoulders of defendant in the hearing of
a motion to dismiss anchored on said ground or a preliminary hearing thereon when such
ground is alleged in the answer.
xxxx
Lest it be overlooked, this Court has already decided that the sequestered shares are
prima facie ill-gotten wealth rendering the issue of the validity of their sequestration and of
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the case beyond doubt. In the case of
COCOFED v. PCGG, We stated that:
It is of course not for this Court to pass upon the factual issues thus raised. That function
pertains to the Sandiganbayan in the first instance. For purposes of this proceeding, all
that the Court needs to determine is whether or not there is prima facie justification for the
sequestration ordered by the PCGG. The Court is satisfied that there is. The cited
incidents, given the public character of the coconut levy funds, place petitioners
COCOFED and its leaders and officials, at least prima facie, squarely within the purview of
Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as construed and applied in BASECO, to wit:
"1. that ill-gotten properties (were) amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous
regime;
"a. more particularly, that ‘(i) Ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by x x x Marcos, his
immediate family, relatives, subordinates and close associates, x x x (and) business
enterprises and entities (came to be) owned or controlled by them, during x x x (the Philippines, which shall be decided separately by this Court. Said petition should
Marcos) administration, directly or through nominees, by taking undue advantage of their accordingly not be affected by this Decision save for determinatively legal issues directly
public office and using their powers, authority, influence, connections or relationships’; addressed herein.34 (Emphasis Ours.)

"b. otherwise stated, that ‘there are assets and properties purportedly pertaining to the We, therefore, reiterate our holding in COCOFED v. Republic respecting the
Marcoses, their close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0033-A, including
nominees which had been or were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a those matters whose adjudication We shall resolve in the present case.
result of the improper or illegal use of funds or properties owned by the Government x x x
or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises, banks or financial institutions, or by
II
taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence, connections or relationship,
resulting in their unjust enrichment x x x;
PRELIMINARILY, THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PCA AND EDUARDO M.
COJUANGCO, JR. DATED MAY 25, 1975 CANNOT BE ACCORDED THE STATUS OF A
xxxx
LAW FOR THE LACK OF THE REQUISITE PUBLICATION.

2. The petitioners’ claim that the assets acquired with the coconut levy funds are privately
It will be recalled that Cojuangco’s claim of ownership over the UCPB shares is hinged on
owned by the coconut farmers is founded on certain provisions of law, to wit Sec. 7, RA
two contract documents the respective contents of which formed part of and reproduced in
6260 and Sec. 5, Art. III, PD 1468… (Words in bracket added; italics in the original).
their entirety in the aforecited Order35 of the Sandiganbayan dated March 11, 2003. The
first contract refers to the agreement entered into by and between Pedro Cojuangco and
xxxx his group, on one hand, and Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., on the other, bearing date "May
1975"36(hereinafter referred to as "PC-ECJ Agreement"), while the second relates to the
accord between the PCA and Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975 (hereinafter
E.O. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, it bears to stress, were issued precisely to effect the recovery of ill-
referred to as "PCA-Cojuangco Agreement"). The PC-ECJ Agreement allegedly contains,
gotten assets amassed by the Marcoses, their associates, subordinates and cronies, or
inter alia, Cojuangco’s personal and exclusive option to acquire the FUB ("UCPB") shares
through their nominees. Be that as it may, it stands to reason that persons listed as
from Pedro and his group. The PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shows PCA’s acquisition of
associated with the Marcoses refer to those in possession of such ill-gotten wealth but
the said option from Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
holding the same in behalf of the actual, albeit undisclosed owner, to prevent discovery
and consequently recovery. Certainly, it is well-nigh inconceivable that ill-gotten assets
would be distributed to and left in the hands of individuals or entities with obvious Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 incorporated, by reference, the "Agreement for the Acquisition
traceable connections to Mr. Marcos and his cronies. The Court can take, as it has in fact of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers" executed by the PCA.
taken, judicial notice of schemes and machinations that have been put in place to keep ill- Particularly, Section 1 states:
gotten assets under wraps. These would include the setting up of layers after layers of
shell or dummy, but controlled, corporations31 or manipulated instruments calculated to
Section 1. Declaration of National Policy. It is hereby declared that the policy of the State
confuse if not altogether mislead would-be investigators from recovering wealth deceitfully
is to provide readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates;
amassed at the expense of the people or simply the fruits thereof. Transferring the illegal
that this policy can be expeditiously and efficiently realized by the implementation of the
assets to third parties not readily perceived as Marcos cronies would be another. So it was
"Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the benefit of the Coconut
that in PCGG v. Pena, the Court, describing the rule of Marcos as a "well entrenched
Farmers" executed by the Philippine Coconut Authority, the terms of which "Agreement"
plundering regime of twenty years," noted the magnitude of the past regime’s organized
are hereby incorporated by reference; and that the Philippine Coconut Authority is hereby
pillage and the ingenuity of the plunderers and pillagers with the assistance of experts and
authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut
the best legal minds in the market.32
farmers under such rules and regulations it may promulgate. (Emphasis Ours.)

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, there can no longer be any serious challenge as
It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above in
to the Sandiganbayan’s subject matter jurisdiction. And in connection therewith, the Court
Section 1 of P.D. 755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. And it
wrote in COCOFED v. Republic, that the instant petition shall be decided separately and
is well-settled that laws must be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an
should not be affected by the January 24, 2012 Decision, "save for determinatively legal
indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law. Tañada v. Tuvera37 said as much:
issues directly addressed" therein.33 Thus:

Publication of the law is indispensable in every case x x x.

We clarify that PSJ-A is subject of another petition for review interposed by Eduardo
Cojuangco, Jr., in G.R. No. 180705 entitled, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. v. Republic of the
xxxx
We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which
of course presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any
legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of
Rights recognizes "the right of the people to information on matters of public concern," and
this certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments
of the government.
xxxx
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws,
shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after
publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by
the legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules
and regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing
law pursuant also to a valid delegation.38
We even went further in Tañada to say that:
Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the
shadows with their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules
cannot be recognized as binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a
valid publication intended to make full disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The
furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade
is drawn.39
The publication, as further held in Tañada, must be of the full text of the law since the
purpose of publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing
the number of the presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of
effectivity would not satisfy the publication requirement.40
In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1
of P.D. 755 did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree.
Neither was acopy thereof attached to the decree when published. We cannot, therefore,
extend to the said
Agreement the status of a law. Consequently, We join the Sandiganbayan in its holding
that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction between
agreeing minds to be governed by contract law under the Civil Code.
III
THE PCA-COJUANGCO AGREEMENT IS A VALID CONTRACT FOR HAVING THE
REQUISITE CONSIDERATION.
In PSJ-A, the Sandiganbayan struck down the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement as void for lack
of consideration/cause as required under Article 1318, paragraph 3 in relation to Article
1409, paragraph 3 of the Civil Code. The Sandiganbayan stated:
In sum, the evidence on record relied upon by defendant Cojuangco negates the presence
of: (1) his claimed personal and exclusive option to buy the 137,866 FUB shares; and (2)
any pecuniary advantage to the government of the said option, which could compensate
for generous payment to him by PCA of valuable shares of stock, as stipulated in the May
25, 1975 Agreement between him and the PCA.41
On the other hand, the aforementioned provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:
(1) Consent of the contracting parties;
(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;
(3) Cause of the obligation which is established. (Emphasis supplied)42
Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:
xxxx
(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;43
The Sandiganbayan found and so tagged the alleged cause for the agreement in question,
i.e., Cojuangco’s "personal and exclusive option to acquire the Option Shares," as
fictitious. A reading of the purchase agreement between Cojuangco and PCA, so the
Sandiganbayan ruled, would show that Cojuangco was not the only seller; thus, the option
was, as to him, neither personal nor exclusive as he claimed it to be. Moreover, as the
Sandiganbayan deduced, that option was inexistent on the day of execution of the PCA-
Cojuangco Agreement as the Special Power of Attorney executed by Cojuangco in favor
of now Senator Edgardo J. Angara, for the latter to sign the PC-ECJ Agreement, was
dated May 25, 1975 while the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement was also signed on May 25,
1975. Thus, the Sandiganbayan believed that when the parties affixed their signatures on
the second Agreement, Cojuangco’s option to purchase the FUB shares of stock did not
yet exist. The Sandiganbayan further ruled that there was no justification in the second
Agreement for the compensation of Cojuangco of 14,400 shares, which it viewed as
exorbitant. Additionally, the Sandiganbayan ruled that PCA could not validly enter, in
behalf of FUB/UCPB, into a veritable bank management contract with Cojuangco, PCA
having a personality separate and distinct from that of FUB. As such, the Sandiganbayan
concluded that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement was null and void. Correspondingly, the
Sandiganbayan also ruled that the sequestered FUB (UCPB) shares of stock in the name
of Cojuangco are conclusively owned by the Republic.
After a circumspect study, the Court finds as inconclusive the evidence relied upon by
Sandiganbayan to support its ruling that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement is devoid of
sufficient consideration. We shall explain.
Rule 131, Section 3(r) of the Rules of Court states:
Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.—The following presumptions are satisfactory if
uncontradicted, but may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:
xxxx
(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;
The Court had the occasion to explain the reach of the above provision in Surtida v. Rural
Bank of Malinao (Albay), Inc.,44 to wit:
Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable
presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course
of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. A
presumption may operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut it.
The effect of a legal presumption upon a burden of proof is to create the necessity of
presenting evidence to meet the legal presumption or the prima facie case created
thereby, and which if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The
burden of proof remains where it is, but by the presumption, the one who has that burden
is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment,
because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.
The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by the
bare uncorroborated and self-serving assertion of petitioners that it has no consideration.
To overcome the presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of consideration must be
shown by preponderance of evidence. Petitioners failed to discharge this burden x x x.
(Emphasis Ours.)
The assumption that ample consideration is present in a contract is further elucidated in
Pentacapital Investment Corporation v. Mahinay:45
Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that consideration exists and is lawful
unless the debtor proves the contrary. Moreover, under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules
of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair
and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3) there was
sufficient consideration for a contract. A presumption may operate against an adversary
who has not introduced proof to rebut it. The effect of a legal presumption upon a burden
of proof is to create the necessity of presenting evidence to meet the legal presumption or
the prima facie case created thereby, and which, if no proof to the contrary is presented
and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is, but by the presumption,
the one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in
support of the averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless
rebutted.46 (Emphasis supplied.)
The rule then is that the party who stands to profit from a declaration of the nullity of a
contract on the ground of insufficiency of consideration––which would necessarily refer to
one who asserts such nullity––has the burden of overthrowing the presumption offered by
the aforequoted Section 3(r). Obviously then, the presumption contextually operates in
favor of Cojuangco and against the Republic, as plaintiff a quo, which then had the burden
to prove that indeed there was no sufficient consideration for the Second Agreement. The
Sandiganbayan’s stated observation, therefore, that based on the wordings of the Second
Agreement, Cojuangco had no personal and exclusive option to purchase the FUB shares
from Pedro Cojuangco had really little to commend itself for acceptance. This, as opposed
to the fact that such sale and purchase agreement is memorialized in a notarized
document whereby both Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Pedro Cojuangco attested to the
correctness of the provisions thereof, among which was that Eduardo had such option to
purchase. A notarized document, Lazaro v. Agustin47 teaches, "generally carries the
evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due execution, and documents
acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the disputable presumption of
regularity."
In Samanilla v. Cajucom,48 the Court clarified that the presumption of a valid consideration
cannot be discarded on a simple claim of absence of consideration, especially when the
contract itself states that consideration was given:
x x x This presumption appellants cannot overcome by a simple assertion of lack of
consideration. Especially may not the presumption be so lightly set aside when the
contract itself states that consideration was given, and the same has been reduced into a
public instrument will all due formalities and solemnities as in this case. (Emphasis ours.)
A perusal of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement disclosed an express statement of
consideration for the transaction:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the other
terms and conditions hereinafter contained, the parties hereby declare and affirm that their
principal contractual intent is (1) to ensure that the coconut farmers own at least 60% of
the outstanding capital stock of the Bank, and (2) that the SELLER shall receive
compensation for exercising his personal and exclusive option to acquire the Option
Shares, for transferring such shares to the coconut farmers at the option price of P200 per
share, and for performing the management services required of him hereunder.
xxxx
4. As compensation for exercising his personal and exclusive option to acquire the Option
ShareApplying Samanilla to the case at bar, the express and positive declaration by the
parties of the presence of adequate consideration in the contract makes conclusive the
presumption of sufficient consideration in the PCA Agreement. Moreover, the option to
purchase shares and management services for UCPB was already availed of by petitioner
Cojuangco for the benefit of the PCA. The exercise of such right resulted in the execution
of the PC-ECJ Agreement, which fact is not disputed. The document itself is
incontrovertible proof and hard evidence that petitioner Cojuangco had the right to
purchase the subject FUB (now UCPB) shares. Res ipsa loquitur.
The Sandiganbayan, however, pointed to the perceived "lack of any pecuniary value or
advantage to the government of the said option, which could compensate for the generous
payment to him by PCA of valuable shares of stock, as stipulated in the May 25, 1975
Agreement between him and the PCA."49
Inadequacy of the consideration, however, does not render a contract void under Article
1355 of the Civil Code:
Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not
invalidate a contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Emphasis
supplied.)
Alsua-Betts v. Court of Appeals50 is instructive that lack of ample consideration does not
nullify the contract:
Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven which in the
case at bar was not, that there was fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Article 1355, New
Civil Code). We do not find the stipulated price as so inadequate to shock the court’s
conscience, considering that the price paid was much higher than the assessed value of
the subject properties and considering that the sales were effected by a father to her
daughter in which case filial love must be taken into account. (Emphasis supplied.)s and
for transferring such shares to the coconut farmers, as well as for performing the
management services required of him, SELLER shall receive equity in the Bank
amounting, in the aggregate, to 95,304 fully paid shares in accordance with the procedure
set forth in paragraph 6 below. (Emphasis supplied.)
Vales v. Villa51 elucidates why a bad transaction cannot serve as basis for voiding a
contract:
x x x Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains,
protect him from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the
effects of foolish acts. x x x Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use
miserable judgment, and lose money by them – indeed, all they have in the world; but not
for that alone can the law intervene and restore. There must be, in addition, a violation of
law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable wrong, before the courts are
authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. (Emphasis ours.)
While one may posit that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement puts PCA and the coconut
farmers at a disadvantage, the facts do not make out a clear case of violation of any law
that will necessitate the recall of said contract. Indeed, the anti-graft court has not put
forward any specific stipulation therein that is at war with any law, or the Constitution, for
that matter. It is even clear as day that none of the parties who entered into the two
agreements with petitioner Cojuangco contested nor sought the nullification of said
agreements, more particularly the PCA who is always provided legal advice in said
transactions by the Government corporate counsel, and a battery of lawyers and
presumably the COA auditor assigned to said agency. A government agency, like the
PCA, stoops down to level of an ordinary citizen when it enters into a private transaction
with private individuals. In this setting, PCA is bound by the law on contracts and is bound
to comply with the terms of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement which is the law between the
parties. With the silence of PCA not to challenge the validity of the PCA-Cojuangco
Agreement and the inability of government to demonstrate the lack of ample consideration
in the transaction, the Court is left with no other choice but to uphold the validity of said
agreements.
While consideration is usually in the form of money or property, it need not be monetary.
This is clear from Article 1350 which reads:
Art. 1350. In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party,
the prestation or promise of a thing or service by the other; in remuneratory ones, the
service or benefit which is remunerated; and in contracts of pure beneficence, the mere
liability of the benefactor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Gabriel v. Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros52 tells us of the meaning of consideration:
x x x A consideration, in the legal sense of the word, is some right, interest, benefit, or
advantage conferred upon the promisor, to which he is otherwise not lawfully entitled, or
any detriment, prejudice, loss, or disadvantage suffered or undertaken by the promisee
other than to such as he is at the time of consent bound to suffer. (Emphasis Ours.)
The Court rules that the transfer of the subject UCPB shares is clearly supported by
valuable consideration.
To justify the nullification of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement, the Sandiganbayan centered
on the alleged imaginary option claimed by petitioner to buy the FUB shares from the
Pedro Cojuangco group. It relied on the phrase "in behalf of certain other buyers"
mentioned in the PC-ECJ Agreement as basis for the finding that petitioner’s option is
neither personal nor exclusive. The pertinent portion of said agreement reads:
EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR., Filipino, of legal age and with residence at 136 9th Street
corner Balete Drive, Quezon City, represented in this act by his duly authorized attorney-
in-fact, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, for and in his own behalf and in behalf of certain other
buyers, (hereinafter collectively called the "BUYERS"); x x x.
A plain reading of the aforequoted description of petitioner as a party to the PC-ECJ
Agreement reveals that petitioner is not only the buyer. He is the named buyer and there
are other buyers who were unnamed. This is clear from the word "BUYERS." If petitioner
is the only buyer, then his description as a party to the sale would only be "BUYER." It
may be true that petitioner intended to include other buyers. The fact remains, however,
that the identities of the unnamed buyers were not revealed up to the present day. While
one can conjure or speculate that PCA may be one of the buyers, the fact that PCA
entered into an agreement to purchase the FUB shares with petitioner militates against
such conjecture since there would be no need at all to enter into the second agreement if
PCA was already a buyer of the shares in the first contract. It is only the parties to the PC-
ECJ Agreement that can plausibly shed light on the import of the phrase "certain other
buyers" but, unfortunately, petitioner was no longer allowed to testify on the matter and
was precluded from explaining the transactions because of the motion for partial summary
judgment and the eventual promulgation of the July 11, 2003 Partial Summary Judgment.
Even if conceding for the sake of argument that PCA is one of the buyers of the FUB
shares in the PC-ECJ Agreement, still it does not necessarily follow that petitioner had no
option to buy said shares from the group of Pedro Cojuangco. In fact, the very execution
of the first agreement undeniably shows that he had the rights or option to buy said shares
from the Pedro Cojuangco group. Otherwise, the PC-ECJ Agreement could not have been
consummated and enforced. The conclusion is incontestable that petitioner indeed had
the right or option to buy the FUB shares as buttressed by the execution and enforcement
of the very document itself.
We can opt to treat the PC-ECJ Agreement as a totally separate agreement from the
PCA-Cojuangco Agreement but it will not detract from the fact that petitioner actually
acquired the rights to the ownership of the FUB shares from the Pedro Cojuangco group.
The consequence is he can legally sell the shares to PCA. In this scenario, he would resell
the shares to PCA for a profit and PCA would still end up paying a higher price for the
FUB shares. The "profit" that will accrue to petitioner may just be equal to the value of the
shares that were given to petitioner as commission. Still we can only speculate as to the
true intentions of the parties. Without any evidence adduced on this issue, the Court will
not venture on any unproven conclusion or finding which should be avoided in judicial
adjudication.
The anti-graft court also inferred from the date of execution of the special power of
attorney in favor of now Senator Edgardo J. Angara, which is May 25, 1975, that the PC-
ECJ Agreement appears to have been executed on the same day as the PCA-Cojuangco
Agreement (dated May 25, 1975). The coincidence on the dates casts "doubts as to the
existence of defendant Cojuangco’s prior ‘personal and exclusive’ option to the FUB
shares."
The fact that the execution of the SPA and the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement occurred
sequentially on the same day cannot, without more, be the basis for the conclusion as to
the non-existence of the option of petitioner. Such conjecture cannot prevail over the fact
that without petitioner Cojuangco, none of the two agreements in question would have
been executed and implemented and the FUB shares could not have been successfully
conveyed to PCA.
Again, only the parties can explain the reasons behind the execution of the two
agreements and the SPA on the same day. They were, however, precluded from
elucidating the reasons behind such occurrence. In the absence of such illuminating proof,
the proposition that the option does not exist has no leg to stand on.
More importantly, the fact that the PC-ECJ Agreement was executed not earlier than May
25, 1975 proves that petitioner Cojuangco had an option to buy the FUB shares prior to
that date. Again, it must be emphasized that from its terms, the first Agreement did not
create the option.It, however, proved the exercise of the option by petitioner.
The execution of the PC-ECJ Agreement on the same day as the PCA-Cojuangco
Agreement more than satisfies paragraph 2 thereof which requires petitioner to exercise
his option to purchase the FUB shares as promptly as practicable after, and not before,
the execution of the second agreement, thus:
2. As promptly as practicable after execution of this Agreement, the SELLER shall
exercise his option to acquire the Option Shares and SELLER shall immediately thereafter
deliver and turn over to the Escrow Agent such stock certificates as are herein provided to
be received from the existing stockholders of the bank by virtue of the exercise on the
aforementioned option. The Escrow Agent shall thereupon issue its check in favor of the
SELLER covering the purchase price for the shares delivered. (Emphasis supplied.)
The Sandiganbayan viewed the compensation of petitioner of 14,400 FUB shares as
exorbitant. In the absence of proof to the contrary and considering the absence of any
complaint of illegality or fraud from any of the contracting parties, then the presumption
that "private transactions have been fair and regular"53 must apply.
Lastly, respondent interjects the thesis that PCA could not validly enter into a bank
management agreement with petitioner since PCA has a personality separate and distinct
from that of FUB. Evidently, it is PCA which has the right to challenge the stipulations on
the management contract as unenforceable. However, PCA chose not to assail said
stipulations and instead even complied with and implemented its prestations contained in
said stipulations by installing petitioner as Chairman of UCPB. Thus, PCA has waived and
forfeited its right to nullify said stipulations and is now estopped from questioning the
same.
In view of the foregoing, the Court is left with no option but to uphold the validity of the two
agreements in question.
IV
COJUANGCO IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE UCPB SHARES WHICH WERE BOUGHT
WITH PUBLIC FUNDS AND HENCE, ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY.
The coconut levy funds were exacted for a
special public purpose. Consequently, any
use or transfer of the funds that directly regulations as the Authority may prescribe. Until otherwise prescribed by the Authority, the
benefits private individuals should be current levy being collected shall be continued."
invalidated.
Like other tax measures, they were not voluntary payments or donations by the people.
The issue of whether or not taxpayers’ money, or funds and property acquired through the They were enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions, as provided under
imposition of taxes may be used to benefit a private individual is once again posed. PD No. 276:
Preliminarily, the instant case inquires whether the coconut levy funds, and accordingly,
the UCPB shares acquired using the coconut levy funds are public funds. Indeed, the very
"3. Any person or firm who violates any provision of this Decree or the rules and
same issue took center stage, discussed and was directly addressed in COCOFED v.
regulations promulgated thereunder, shall, in addition to penalties already prescribed
Republic. And there is hardly any question about the subject funds’ public and special
under existing administrative and special law, pay a fine of not less than P2, 500 or more
character. The following excerpts from COCOFED v. Republic,54 citing Republic v.
than P10,000, or suffer cancellation of licenses to operate, or both, at the discretion of the
COCOFED and related cases, settle once and for all this core, determinative issue:
Court."

Indeed, We have hitherto discussed, the coconut levy was imposed in the exercise of the
Such penalties were later amended thus: ….
State’s inherent power of taxation. As We wrote in Republic v. COCOFED:

(b) The coconut levies were imposed pursuant to the laws enacted by the proper
Indeed, coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes, which, in general, are enforced
legislative authorities of the State. Indeed, the CCSF was collected under PD No. 276, …."
proportional contributions from persons and properties, exacted by the State by virtue of
its sovereignty for the support of government and for all public needs.
(c) They were clearly imposed for a public purpose. There is absolutely no question that
they were collected to advance the government’s avowed policy of protecting the coconut
Based on its definition, a tax has three elements, namely: a) it is an enforced proportional
industry.
contribution from persons and properties; b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of its
sovereignty; and c) it is levied for the support of the government. The coconut levy funds
fall squarely into these elements for the following reasons: This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the coconut industry is one of the great
economic pillars of our nation, and coconuts and their byproducts occupy a leading
position among the country’s export products; ….
(a) They were generated by virtue of statutory enactments imposed on the coconut
farmers requiring the payment of prescribed amounts. Thus, PD No. 276, which created
the … (CCSF), mandated the following: Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the government, but also to
provide means for the rehabilitation and the stabilization of a threatened industry, which is
so affected with public interest as to be within the police power of the State ….
"a. A levy, initially, of P15.00 per 100 kilograms of copra resecada or its equivalent in other
coconut products, shall be imposed on every first sale, in accordance with the mechanics
established under RA 6260, effective at the start of business hours on August 10, 1973. Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still
public in character…. In Cocofed v. PCGG, the Court observed that certain agencies or
enterprises "were organized and financed with revenues derived from coconut levies
"The proceeds from the levy shall be deposited with the Philippine National Bank or any
imposed under a succession of law of the late dictatorship … with deposed Ferdinand
other government bank to the account of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, as a
Marcos and his cronies as the suspected authors and chief beneficiaries of the resulting
separate trust fund which shall not form part of the general fund of the government."
coconut industry monopoly." The Court continued: "…. It cannot be denied that the
coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the national economy. It is,
The coco levies were further clarified in amendatory laws, specifically PD No. 961 and PD therefore, the State’s concern to make it a strong and secure source not only of the
No. 1468 – in this wise: livelihood of a significant segment of the population, but also of export earnings the
sustained growth of which is one of the imperatives of economic stability. (Emphasis
Ours.)
"The Authority (PCA) is hereby empowered to impose and collect a levy, to be known as
the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy, on every one hundred kilos of copra
resecada, or its equivalent … delivered to, and/or purchased by, copra exporters, oil The following parallel doctrinal lines from Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Samahang
millers, desiccators and other end-users of copra or its equivalent in other coconut Magsasaka at Manggagawa sa Niyugan (PKSMMN) v. Executive Secretary55 came next:
products. The levy shall be paid by such copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators and other
end-users of copra or its equivalent in other coconut products under such rules and
The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law to support a
proper governmental purpose. They were raised with the use of the police and taxing
powers of the State for the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general. The
COA reviewed the use of the funds. The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) treated them
as public funds and the very laws governing coconut levies recognize their public
character.
The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes
and can only be used for public purpose. Taxes are enforced proportional contributions
from persons and property, levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support
of the government and for all its public needs. Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed
pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276. The funds were collected and managed
by the PCA, an independent government corporation directly under the President. And, as
the respondent public officials pointed out, the pertinent laws used the term levy, which
means to tax, in describing the exaction.
Of course, unlike ordinary revenue laws, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not raise money to
boost the government’s general funds but to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of a threatened industry, the coconut industry, which is so affected with public
interest as to be within the police power of the State. The funds sought to support the
coconut industry, one of the main economic backbones of the country, and to secure
economic benefits for the coconut farmers and far workers. The subject laws are akin to
the sugar liens imposed by Sec. 7(b) of P.D. 388, and the oil price stabilization funds
under P.D. 1956, as amended by E.O. 137.
From the foregoing, it is at once apparent that any property acquired by means of the
coconut levy funds, such as the subject UCPB shares, should be treated as public funds
or public property, subject to the burdens and restrictions attached by law to such
property. COCOFED v. Republic, delved into such limitations, thusly:
We have ruled time and again that taxes are imposed only for a public purpose. "They
cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons."
When a law imposes taxes or levies from the public, with the intent to give undue benefit
or advantage to private persons, or the promotion of private enterprises, that law cannot
be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose. In Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank,
the petitioning sugar producers, sugarcane planters and millers sought the distribution of
the shares of stock of the Republic Planters Bank (RPB), alleging that they are the true
beneficial owners thereof. In that case, the investment, i.e., the purchase of RPB, was
funded by the deduction of PhP 1.00 per picul from the sugar proceeds of the sugar
producers pursuant to P.D. No. 388. In ruling against the petitioners, the Court held that to
rule in their favor would contravene the general principle that revenues received from the
imposition of taxes or levies "cannot be used for purely private purposes or for the
exclusive benefit of private persons." The Court amply reasoned that the sugar
stabilization fund is to "be utilized for the benefit of the entire sugar industry, and all its
components, stabilization of the domestic market including foreign market, the industry
being of vital importance to the country’s economy and to national interest."
Similarly in this case, the coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed
under P.D. Nos. 232, 276 and 582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the
entire coconut industry. Clearly, to hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received
from the imposition of the coconut levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned
by private individuals in their private capacity and for their benefit, would contravene the
rationale behind the imposition of taxes or levies.
Needless to stress, courts do not, as they cannot, allow by judicial fiat the conversion of
special funds into a private fund for the benefit of private individuals. In the same vein, We
cannot subscribe to the idea of what appears to be an indirect – if not exactly direct –
conversion of special funds into private funds, i.e., by using special funds to purchase
shares of stocks, which in turn would be distributed for free to private individuals. Even if
these private individuals belong to, or are a part of the coconut industry, the free
distribution of shares of stocks purchased with special public funds to them, nevertheless
cannot be justified. The ratio in Gaston, as articulated below, applies mutatis mutandis to
this case:
The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State … for a special purpose – that of
"financing the growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components,
stabilization of the domestic market including the foreign market." The fact that the State
has taken possession of moneys pursuant to law is sufficient to constitute them as state
funds even though they are held for a special purpose….
That the fees were collected from sugar producers etc., and that the funds were
channeled to the purchase of shares of stock in respondent Bank do not convert the funds
into a trust fund for their benefit nor make them the beneficial owners of the shares so
purchased. It is but rational that the fees be collected from them since it is also they who
are benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived from it. ….56
In this case, the coconut levy funds were being exacted from copra exporters, oil millers,
desiccators and other end-users of copra or its equivalent in other coconut
products.57 Likewise so, the funds here were channeled to the purchase of the shares of
stock in UCPB. Drawing a clear parallelism between Gaston and this case, the fact that
the coconut levy funds were collected from the persons or entities in the coconut industry,
among others, does not and cannot entitle them to be beneficial owners of the subject
funds – or more bluntly, owners thereof in their private capacity. Parenthetically, the said
private individuals cannot own the UCPB shares of stocks so purchased using the said
special funds of the government.58 (Emphasis Ours.)
As the coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes and can only be used for public
purpose, and importantly, for the purpose for which it was exacted, i.e., the development,
rehabilitation and stabilization of the coconut industry, they cannot be used to benefit––
whether directly or indirectly–– private individuals, be it by way of a commission, or as the
subject Agreement interestingly words it, compensation. Consequently, Cojuangco cannot
stand to benefit by receiving, in his private capacity, 7.22% of the FUB shares without
violating the constitutional caveat that public funds can only be used for public purpose.
Accordingly, the 7.22% FUB (UCPB) shares that were given to Cojuangco shall be
returned to the Government, to be used "only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for
the development of the coconut industry."59
The ensuing are the underlying rationale for declaring, as unconstitutional, provisions that
convert public property into private funds to be used ultimately for personal benefit:
… not only were the laws unconstitutional for decreeing the distribution of the shares of
stock for free to the coconut farmers and therefore negating the public purposed declared
by P.D. No. 276, i.e., to stabilize the price of edible oil and to protect the coconut industry.
They likewise reclassified the coconut levy fund as private fund, to be owned by private
individuals in their private capacities, contrary to the original purpose for the creation of
such fund. To compound the situation, the offending provisions effectively removed the
coconut levy fund away from the cavil of public funds which normally can be paid out only
pursuant to an appropriation made by law. The conversion of public funds into private
assets was illegally allowed, in fact mandated, by these provisions. Clearly therefore, the
pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional for violating
Article VI, Section 29 (3) of the Constitution. In this context, the distribution by PCA of the
UCPB shares purchased by means of the coconut levy fund – a special fund of the
government – to the coconut farmers is, therefore, void.60
limited to, the exercise of pre-emptive rights, shall be reconveyed to the Government of
the Republic of the Philippines, which as We previously clarified, shall "be used only for
the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut industry."64
But apart from the stipulation in the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement, more specifically
paragraph 4 in relation to paragraph 6 thereof, providing for the transfer to Cojuangco for
the UCPB shares adverted to immediately above, other provisions are valid and shall be
enforced, or shall be respected, if the corresponding prestation had already been
performed. Invalid stipulations that are independent of, and divisible from, the rest of the
agreement and which can easily be separated therefrom without doing violence to the
manifest intention of the contracting minds do not nullify the entire contract.65
WHEREFORE, Part C of the appealed Partial Summary Judgment in Sandiganbayan Civil
Case No. 0033-A is AFFIRMED with modification. As MODIFIED, the dispositive portion in
Part C of the Sandiganbayan’s Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-A, shall
read as follows:
C. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: EDUARDO M.
COJUANGCO, JR.) dated September 18, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.

It is precisely for the foregoing that impels the Court to strike down as unconstitutional the
1. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 755 did not validate the Agreement between PCA and
provisions of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement that allow petitioner Cojuangco to personally
defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975 nor did it give the
and exclusively own public funds or property, the disbursement of which We so greatly
Agreement the binding force of a law because of the non-publication of the said
protect if only to give light and meaning to the mandates of the Constitution.
Agreement.

As heretofore amply discussed, taxes are imposed only for a public purpose.61 They must,
2. The Agreement between PCA and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
therefore, be used for the benefit of the public and not for the exclusive profit or gain of
dated May 25, 1975 is a valid contract for having the requisite consideration
private persons.62 Otherwise, grave injustice is inflicted not only upon the Government but
under Article 1318 of the Civil Code.
most especially upon the citizenry––the taxpayers––to whom We owe a great deal of
accountability.
3. The transfer by PCA to defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. of 14,400
shares of stock of FUB (later UCPB) from the "Option Shares" and the
In this case, out of the 72.2% FUB (now UCPB) shares of stocks PCA purchased using
additional FUB shares subscribed and paid by PCA, consisting of
the coconut levy funds, the May 25, 1975 Agreement between the PCA and Cojuangco
provided for the transfer to the latter, by way of compensation, of 10% of the shares
subject of the agreement, or a total of 7.22% fully paid shares. In sum, Cojuangco a. Fifteen Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Four (15,884) shares out
received public assets – in the form of FUB (UCPB) shares with a value then of ten million of the authorized but unissued shares of the bank, subscribed and
eight hundred eighty-six thousand pesos (PhP 10,886,000) in 1975, paid by coconut levy paid by PCA;
funds. In effect, Cojuangco received the aforementioned asset as a result of the PCA-
Cojuangco Agreement, and exclusively benefited himself by owning property acquired
b. Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty (64,980) shares of the
using solely public funds. Cojuangco, no less, admitted that the PCA paid, out of the
increased capital stock subscribed and paid by PCA; and
CCSF, the entire acquisition price for the 72.2% option shares.63 This is in clear violation of
the prohibition, which the Court seeks to uphold.1âwphi1
c. Stock dividends declared pursuant to paragraph 5 and paragraph
11 (iv) (d) of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement dated May 25, 1975. or
We, therefore, affirm, on this ground, the decision of the Sandiganbayan nullifying the
the so-called "Cojuangco-UCPB shares" is declared unconstitutional,
shares of stock transfer to Cojuangco. Accordingly, the UCPB shares of stock
hence null and void.1âwphi1
representing the 7.22% fully paid shares subject of the instant petition, with all dividends
declared, paid or issued thereon, as well as any increments thereto arising from, but not
 4. The above-mentioned shares of stock of the FUB/UCPB transferred to
defendant Cojuangco are hereby declared conclusively owned by the Republic
of the Philippines to be used only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for
the development of the coconut industry, and ordered reconveyed to the
Government.
5. The UCPB shares of stock of the alleged fronts, nominees and dummies of
defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. which form part of the 72.2% shares of
the FUB/UCPB paid for by the PCA with public funds later charged to the
coconut levy funds, particularly the CCSF, belong to the plaintiff Republic of the
Philippines as their true and beneficial owner.
Accordingly, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.
Costs against petitioner Cojuangco.
SO ORDERED.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 164026             December 23, 2008
SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner,  extension of its corporate term.
vs.
GMA NETWORK, INC., respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) assails the Decision1 dated
February 20, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68163, which directed that
SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for computing the
filing fee relative to GMA Network, Inc.’s (GMA’s) application for the amendment of its
articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its corporate term.
The undisputed facts as narrated by the appellate court are as follows:
On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA, for brevity),
a domestic corporation, filed an application for collective approval of various
amendments to its Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent
Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC, for brevity). The amendments
applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate name of
petitioner from "Republic Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as
well as the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from and
after June 16, 2000.
Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SEC’s Corporate and
Legal Department a separate filing fee for the application for extension of
corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20%
thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00.
On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to
contest the legality and propriety of the said assessment. However, the
petitioner requested the SEC to approve the other amendments being
requested by the petitioner without being deemed to have withdrawn its
application for extension of corporate term.
On October 20, 1995, the petitioner formally protested the assessment
amounting to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term.
On February 20, 1996, the SEC approved the other amendments to the
petitioner’s Articles of Incorporation, specifically Article 1 thereof referring to the
corporate name of the petitioner as well as Article 2 thereof referring to the
principal purpose for which the petitioner was formed.
On March 19, 1996, the petitioner requested for an official opinion/ruling from
the SEC on the validity and propriety of the assessment for application for
Consequently, the respondent SEC, through Associate Commissioner Fe Eloisa
C. Gloria, on April 18, 1996, issued its ruling upholding the validity of the
questioned assessment, the dispositive portion of which states:
"In light of the foregoing, we believe that the questioned assessment is in
accordance with law. Accordingly, you are hereby required to comply with
the required filing fee."
An appeal from the aforequoted ruling of the respondent SEC was subsequently
taken by the petitioner on the ground that the assessment of filing fees for the
petitioner’s application for extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1%
of the authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof is not in accordance with law.
On September 26, 2001, following three (3) motions for early resolution filed by
the petitioner, the respondent SEC En Banc issued the assailed order
dismissing the petitioner’s appeal, the dispositive portion of which provides as
follows:
 WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant Appeal is hereby dismissed.
SO ORDERED.2
In its petition for review3 with the Court of Appeals, GMA argued that its application for the
extension of its corporate term is akin to an amendment and not to a filing of new articles
of incorporation. It further averred that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994,
which the SEC used as basis for assessing P1,212,200.00 as filing fee for the extension of
GMA’s corporate term, is not valid.
The appellate court agreed with the SEC’s submission that an extension of the corporate
term is a grant of a fresh license for a corporation to act as a juridical being endowed with
the powers expressly bestowed by the State. As such, it is not an ordinary amendment but
is analogous to the filing of new articles of incorporation.
However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is
legally invalid and ineffective for not having been published in accordance with law. The
challenged memorandum circular, according to the appellate court, is not merely an
internal or interpretative rule, but affects the public in general. Hence, its publication is
required for its effectivity.
The appellate court denied reconsideration in a Resolution4 dated June 9, 2004.
In its Memorandum5 dated September 6, 2005, the SEC argues that it issued the
questioned memorandum circular in the exercise of its delegated legislative power to fix
fees and charges. The filing fees required by it are allegedly uniformly imposed on the
transacting public and are essential to its supervisory and regulatory functions. The fees
are not a form of penalty or sanction and, therefore, require no publication.
For its part, GMA points out in its Memorandum,6 dated September 23, 2005, that SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing fees for amended articles
of incorporation where the amendment consists of extending the term of corporate
existence. The questioned circular, on the other hand, refers only to filing fees for articles
of incorporation. Thus, GMA argues that the former circular, being the one that specifically
treats of applications for the extension of corporate term, should apply to its case.
Assuming that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is applicable, GMA avers that
the latter did not take effect and cannot be the basis for the imposition of the fees stated
therein for the reasons that it was neither filed with the University of the Philippines Law
Center nor published either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation
as required under existing laws.
It should be mentioned at the outset that the authority of the SEC to collect and receive
fees as authorized by law is not in question.7 Its power to collect fees for examining and
filing articles of incorporation and by-laws and amendments thereto, certificates of
increase or decrease of the capital stock, among others, is recognized. Likewise
established is its power under Sec. 7 of P.D. No. 902-A to recommend to the President the
revision, alteration, amendment or adjustment of the charges which it is authorized to
collect.
The subject of the present inquiry is not the authority of the SEC to collect and receive
fees and charges, but rather the validity of its imposition on the basis of a memorandum
circular which, the Court of Appeals held, is ineffective.
Republic Act No. 3531 (R.A. No. 3531) provides that where the amendment consists in
extending the term of corporate existence, the SEC "shall be entitled to collect and receive
for the filing of the amended articles of incorporation the same fees collectible under
existing law as the filing of articles of incorporation."8 As is clearly the import of this law,
the SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive the same fees it assesses and collects
both for the filing of articles of incorporation and the filing of an amended articles of
incorporation for purposes of extending the term of corporate existence.
The SEC, effectuating its mandate under the aforequoted law and other pertinent
laws,9 issued SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986, imposing the filing fee of
1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock but not less than P300.00 nor more
than P100,000.00 for stock corporations, and 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock
but not less than P200.00 nor more than P100,000.00 for stock corporations without par
value, for the filing of amended articles of incorporation where the amendment consists of
extending the term of corporate existence.
Several years after, the SEC issued Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994,
imposing new fees and charges and deleting the maximum filing fee set forth in SEC
Circular No. 1, Series of 1986, such that the fee for the filing of articles of incorporation
became 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof but not less
than P500.00.
A reading of the two circulars readily reveals that they indeed pertain to different matters,
as GMA points out. SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing
fee for the amendment of articles of incorporation to extend corporate life, while
Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 pertains to the filing fee for articles of
incorporation. Thus, as GMA argues, the former circular, being squarely applicable and,
more importantly, being more favorable to it, should be followed.
What this proposition fails to consider, however, is the clear directive of R.A. No. 3531 to
impose the same fees for the filing of articles of incorporation and the filing of amended
articles of incorporation to reflect an extension of corporate term. R.A. No. 3531 provides
an unmistakable standard which should guide the SEC in fixing and imposing its rates and
fees. If such mandate were the only consideration, the Court would have been inclined to
rule that the SEC was correct in imposing the filing fees as outlined in the questioned
memorandum circular, GMA’s argument notwithstanding.
However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the questioned memorandum circular is
invalid as it does not appear from the records that it has been published in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation. Executive Order No. 200, which repealed
Art. 2 of the Civil Code, provides that "laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the
completion of their publication either in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general
circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided."
In Tañada v. Tuvera,10 the Court, expounding on the publication requirement, held:
We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and
private laws, shall be published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall
begin fifteen days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.
exceedingly unreasonable and amounts to an imposition. A filing fee, by legal definition, is
that charged by a public official to accept a document for processing. The fee should be
just, fair, and proportionate to the service for which the fee is being collected, in this case,
the examination and verification of the documents submitted by GMA to warrant an
extension of its corporate term.
Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by
R.A. No. 3531 and other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the
courts to determine whether the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the
bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a
person’s right to property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated
SP No. 68163, dated February 20, 2004, and its Resolution, dated June 9, 2004, are
by the President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are
AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.
validly delegated by the legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the
Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if their
purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid SO ORDERED.
delegation.
DANTE O. TINGA
Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating Associate Justice
only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be
published. Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions
issued by administrative superiors concerning the rules or guidelines to be
G.R. No. 193993
followed by their subordinates in the performance of their duties.11

VIVENNE K. TAN, Petitioner 
The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been filed with the Office of
vs.
the National Administrative Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center as
VINCENT "BINGBONG" CRISOLOGO, Respondent
required in the Administrative Code of 1987.12

In Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor and
Employment,13 Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 of the Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration, which provided for the schedule of placement and
documentation fees for private employment agencies or authority holders, was struck
down as it was not published or filed with the National Administrative Register.
The questioned memorandum circular, it should be emphasized, cannot be construed as
simply interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This administrative issuance is an implementation
of the mandate of R.A.
No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. It cannot, therefore, be
considered a mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation of the law, but a rule
which must be declared ineffective as it was neither published nor filed with the Office of
the National Administrative Register.
A related factor which precludes consideration of the questioned issuance as interpretative
in nature merely is the fact the SEC’s assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 is
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
We resolve the petition for review on certiorari1 filed by petitioner Vivenne K.
Tan (Tan) assailing the 20 April 2010 Decision2 and the 1 October 2010 Resolution3 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 112815. The CA found that the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 95, Quezon City (RTC), exercised grave abuse of discretion when it
reversed the decision of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 37, Quezon City (MeTC), to
exclude Tan from the voter's list of Precinct 0853-A of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon
City.
THE FACTS
On 19 January 1993, Tan, born to Filipino parents, became a naturalized citizen of the
United States of America (US.A.).4
On 26 October 2009, Tan applied to be registered as a voter in Quezon City.5 She When' she took her oath of allegiance on December 1, 2009, she renounced any and all
indicated that she was a Filipino .Citizen by birth. Her application was approved by the allegiance to the Government of the United States of America. This act is again a clear
Election Registration Board (ERB) on 16 November 2009 making her a registered voter of showing that she was an American and not a Filipino citizen at the time she registered as
Precinct 0853-A, Sto. Domingo, Quezon City.6 a voter on October 26, 2009.

On 30 November 2009, Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines
before a notary public in Makati City.7
The following day, or on 1 December 2009, she filed a petition before the Bureau of
Immigration (BI) for the reacquisition of her Philippine citizenship.8 She stated in her
petition that she lost her Philippine citizenship when she became a naturalized American
citizen. However, Tan executed a sworn declaration renouncing her allegiance to the
U.S.A.9 Thereafter, the BI confirmed her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship.10
On the same day, Tan filed her Certificate of Candidacy (CoC) for the 2010 National
Elections to run as congresswoman for the First District of Quezon City.11
On 28 December 2009, respondent Vincent "Bing bong" Crisologo (Crisologo) filed a
petition before the MeTC, docketed as Civil Case No. 37- 09-1292, seeking the exclusion
of Tan from the voter's list because (1) she was not a Filipino citizen when she registered
as a voter; and (2) she failed to meet the residency requirement of the law.12
xxxx
The foregoing manifest that [Tan], through her subsequent acts and deeds, through the
authoritative permission given to her by governmental agencies, 'and through her
application for, and taking of an Oath of Allegiance for Filipino citizenship, could not be
considered as a Filipino citizen at the time that she registered as a Philippine voter.
In view thereof, the petition for her to be excluded as a voter is GRANTED. [Tan] is hereby
to be excluded from the voter's list of Precinct 0853-A of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon
City.15
The Ruling of the RTC
Aggrieved, Tan appealed the MeTC decision to the RTC, where it was reversed and
Crisologo's petition was dismissed for lack of merit. The RTC's position was that Tan's
questioned citizenship was cured, to wit:

In her answer, Tan countered that she is a natural-born citizen having been born to
In the case at bar, there is no doubt that [Tan] upon registration as voter in the First
Filipino parents on 1 April 1968. Although she became a naturalized American citizen on
District of Quezon City was still a naturalized American Citizen. But her questioned
19 January 1993, Tan claimed that since 1996 she had effectively renounced her
citizenship was cured when [Tan] made the following acts:
American citizenship as she had been continuously residing in the Philippines. She had
also found employment within the country and even set up a school somewhere in
Greenhills.13 1) She took an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines on November 30,
2009;
The Ruling of the Me TC
2) She filed a Petition for Reacquisition and/or Retention of Philippine Citizenship under
Republic Act No. 9225 before the [BI];
On 14 January 2010, the MeTC rendered a decision excluding Tan from the voter's list.14 It
held that she was not a Filipino citizen at the time that she registered as a voter, viz:
3) On December 1, 2009, the [BI] has issued an Order granting the petition and ordering
the issuance of a Certificate of Retention/Reacquisition of Philippine Citizenship in favor of
Through her acts and deeds, [Tan] clearly manifested and unequivocally admitted that she
[Tan]; and
was not a Filipino citizen at the time of her application as a registered voter. If indeed she
was a Filipino citizen as she claimed and represented, she would not have gone to the
extent of re-affirming her Filipino citizenship, by her act of applying for the same. If indeed 4) Lastly, [Tan] executed a Sworn Declaration that she make a formal renunciation of her
she was a Filipino citizen on October 26, 2009, the day she registered as a voter, she United States nationality; that she absolutely and entirely renounce her United States
would not have been allowed to apply for Filipino citizenship as she was already a Filipino nationality together with all rights and privileges and all duties and allegiance and fidelity
citizen. There is the act of [Tan] which would clearly manifest her lack of Philippine there unto pertaining before a notary public on December 1, 2009.
citizenship upon her registration. Said act is her taking an Oath of Allegiance on
December 1, 2009. A Filipino citizen would not be required to perform an Oath of
With these acts of [Tan], she is deemed to have never lost her Filipino citizenship.
Allegiance to affirm his or her Filipino citizenship, because affirmation is no longer
necessary because the citizenship has always been in her possession.
xxxx
Clearly, the court a quo erred in concluding that [Tan], through her subsequent acts and
deeds, through the authoritative permission given to her by government agencies, and
through her application for, and taking an Oath of Allegiance for Filipino citizenship, could
not be considered as a Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a Philippine voter.
[citation omitted]
[Tan] having re-acquired her Filipino citizenship under Republic Act No. 9225, she is
deemed not to have lost her Filipino citizenship and is, therefore, a valid registered voter.
In short, whatever defects [Tan] had in her nationality when she registered as a voter
should now be deemed cured by her re-acquisition of her Filipino citizenship under R.A.
No. 9225.
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated January 14, 2010 of the [Me TC] is REVERSED and
SET ASIDE and a new one is rendered dismissing the Petition For Exclusion Of A Voter
From The List for lack of merit.16
Since the RTC decision became final and executory pursuant to Republic Act (R.A.) No.
8189, otherwise known as the Voter's Registration Act of 1996,17 Crisologo filed a petition
for certiorari before the CA.18 He argued that Tan should have been excluded from the list
of registered voters for failure to meet the citizenship and residency requirement to be
registered as a voter.
The Assailed CA Decision
After the parties submitted their respective memoranda, the CA came up with a decision
finding that the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess
of jurisdiction in reversing the decision of the MeTC. The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed disposition is ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE. The MeTC decision dated January 14, 2010 excluding Vivenne K. Tan from
the voter's list of Precinct 0853-A of Barangay Sto. Domingo, Quezon City, is
REINSTATED. Costs against the Private Respondent.19
In coming up with its conclusion, the CA gave the following reasons:
(1) The taking of the Oath of Allegiance is a condition sine qua non for the reacquisition or
retention of Philippine citizenship by a natural-born Filipino citizen who became a
naturalized citizen of a foreign country;
(2) Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225,20 cannot be relied upon to declare that Tan never lost her
Philippine citizenship or that her reacquisition of such cured the invalidity of her
registration because the provision applies only to citizens of the Philippines at the time of
the passage of R.A. No. 9225;
(3) R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied retroactively as
regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign country prior to
the effectivity of the said law; and
(4) Tan must have first taken her Oath of Allegiance before she can be validly registered
as a voter because R.A. No. 9225 itself says that individuals with dual citizenships must
comply with existing laws for them to enjoy full civil and political rights.
Arguing on pure questions of law, Tan filed the present petition before this Court.
OUR RULING
The pivotal question in this case is whether Tan can be considered a Philippine citizen at
the time she registered as a voter.
A natural-born Filipino citizen who
renounces his or her Philippine
citizenship, effectively becomes a
foreigner in the Philippines with no
political right to participate in
Philippine politics and governance.
The right to vote is reserved for Filipino citizens. The Constitution is clear on this matter:
Section 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines, not otherwise
disqualified by law who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall have resided in
the Philippines for at least one year and in the place wherein they propose to vote for at
least six months immediately preceding the election. No literacy, property, or other
substantive requirement shall be imposed on the exercise of suffrage.21 (emphasis ours)
This constitutional provision is reflected in R.A. No. 8189 this way: "[a]ll citizens of the
Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law who are at least eighteen (18) years of age,
and who shall have resided in the Philippines for at least one (1) year, and in the place
wherein they propose to vote, for at least six (6) months immediately preceding the
election, may register as a voter."22 Although the Voter's Registration Act of 1996 does not
contain a similar provision like R.A. No. 918923 that disqualifies non-Filipino citizens from
voting, it does, however, provide that the ERB shall deactivate the registration and remove
the registration records of any person who has lost his or her Filipino citizenship.24
Without any doubt, only Filipino citizens are qualified to vote and may be included in the
permanent list of voters.25Thus, to be registered a voter in the Philippines, the registrant
must be a citizen at the time he or she .filed the application.
In the present case, it is undisputed that Tan filed her voter's registration application on 26
October 2009, and that she only took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines on 30 November 2009, or more than a month after the ERB approved her
application.
Tan argues that (1) her reacquisition of Philippine citizenship through R.A. No. 9225 has a
retroactive effect, such that a natural-born Filipino citizen is deemed never to have lost his
or her Filipino citizenship,26 and that (2) the reacquisition cured any and all defects,
assuming any are existing, attendant during her registration as a voter.27
R.A. No. 9225 was enacted to allow natural-born Filipino citizens, who lost their Philippine
citizenship through naturalization in a foreign country, to expeditiously reacquire Philippine
citizenship.28 Under the procedure currently in place under R.A. No. 9225, the
reacquisition of Philippine citizenship requires only the taking of an oath of allegiance to
the Republic of the Philippines.
Congress declared as a state policy that all Philippine citizens who become citizens of
another country shall be deemed not to have lost their Philippine citizenship under the
conditions laid out by the law.29 The full implications of the effects of R.A. No. 9225 can be
fully appreciated in Section 3, which reads:
SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary
notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their Philippine
citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are deemed
hereby to have reacquired Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of
allegiance to the Republic:
I _________, solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will support and defend the Constitution of
the Republic of the Philippines, and obey the laws and legal orders promulgated by the
duly constituted authorities of the Philippines; and I hereby declare that I recognize and
accept the supreme authority of the Philippines and will maintain true faith and allegiance
thereto; and that I imposed this obligation upon myself voluntarily without mental
reservation or purpose of evasion.
Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act, become
citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon taking the
aforesaid oath. (emphasis ours)
Based on this provision alone, it would seem that the law makes a distinction between
Filipino citizens who lost their Philippine citizenship prior to the effectivity of R.A. No. 9225
and reacquired their citizenship under the same law from those who lost their Philippine
citizenship after R.A. No. 9225 was enacted and retained their citizenship.30 On this point,
Tan contends that this distinction does not substantially affect her citizenship status
because reacquiring or retaining Filipino citizenship has the same effect.31 Moreover, she
points out that the framers of the law did not distinguish the difference; hence, using the
words "reacquire" and "retain" interchangeably.32
In the light of factual circumstances of this case and considering the plain meaning of the
words "reacquire" and "retain," we find it fitting to address the seeming confusion brought
about by Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225. In other words, by declaring "deemed to have not
lost their Philippine citizenship," does this mean that once Philippine citizenship is
reacquired after taking the Oath of Allegiance required in R.A. No. 9225, the effect on the
citizenship status retroacts to the period before taking said oath. We rule in the negative.
Borrowing the words of Chief Justice Maria Lourdes A. Serreno, "[t]he renunciation of
foreign citizenship is not a hollow oath that can simply be professed at any time, only to be
violated the next day. It requires an absolute and perpetual renunciation of the foreign
citizenship and a full divestment of all civil and political rights granted by the foreign
country which granted the citizenship."33 The tenor of these words in Maquiling v.
Comelec paved the way for the Court to rule that Amado, the mayoral candidate who
garnered the most number of votes during the May 2010 Elections, was disqualified from
running for any local elective position.34 In that case, the Court found that Amado
effectively recanted his oath of renunciation because he used his U.S. passport after
taking the oath.35
While the facts and issue in the case at bar do not involve the same matters discussed
in Maquiling and in Arnado,the Court's position on renunciation and its effect lead us to
conclude that once Philippine citizenship is renounced because of naturalization in a
foreign country, we cannot consider one a Filipino citizen unless and until his or her
allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines is reaffirmed. Simply stated, right after a
Filipino renounces allegiance to our country, he or she is to be considered a foreigner.
Note that Tan's act of acquiring U.S. citizenship had been a conscious and voluntary
decision on her part. While studying and working in the U.S.A., Tan chose to undergo the
U.S. naturalization process to acquire U.S. citizenship. This naturalization process
required her to renounce her allegiance to the Philippine Republic and her Philippine
citizenship. This is clear from the Oath of Allegiance she took to become a U.S. citizen, to
wit:
I, hereby declare, on oath, that I absolutely and entirely renounce and abjure all allegiance
and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty, of whom or which I have
heretofore been a subject or citizen; that I will support and defend the Constitution and
laws of the United States of America against all enemies, foreign or domestic; that I will
bear true faith and allegiance to the same; that I will bear arms on behalf of the United
States when required by the law; that I will perform noncombatant service in the Armed
Forces of the United States when required by the law; that I will perform work of national
importance under civilian direction when required by the law; and that I take this obligation
freely, without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion; so help me God.36(emphasis
and italics ours)
Renunciation or the relinquishment of one's citizenship requires a voluntary act for it to
produce any legal effect. This willingness to disassociate from a political community is
manifested by swearing to an oath. If we were to consider the words in the Oath of
Allegiance as meaningless, the process laid out under the law to effect naturalization
would be irrelevant and useless. Thus, to give effect to the legal implications of taking an
Oath of Allegiance, we must honor the meaning of the words which the person declaring
the oath has sworn to freely, without mental reservation or purpose of evasion.
Tan took an Oath of Allegiance to the U.S.A. on 19 January 1993, prior to the enactment
of R.A. No. 9225 on 29 August 2003. If we were to effect as retroactive Tan's Philippine
citizenship to the date she lost her Philippine citizenship, then the different use of the
words "reacquire" and "retain" in R.A. No. 9225 would effectively be futile.
Moreover, to consider that the reacquisition of Philippine citizenship retroacts to the date it
was lost would result in an absurd scenario where a Filipino would still be considered a
Philippine citizen when in fact he had already renounced his citizenship. We are not about
to give a statute a meaning that would lead to absurdity as it is our duty to construe
statutes in such a way to avoid such consequences. If the words of a statute are
susceptible [to] more than one meaning, the absurdity of the result of one construction is a
strong argument against its adoption and in favor of such sensible interpretation as would
avoid such result.42

An interpretation giving R.A. No. 9225 a retroactive effect to those who have lost their
Finally, it is a well-settled rule that statutes are to be construed as having only a
Philippine citizenship through naturalization by a foreign country prior to R.A. No. 9225
prospective operation, unless the legislature intended to give them a retroactive
would cause confusion to what is stated in Section 3: "natural-born citizens by reason of
effect.43 We must bear in mind that a law is a rule established to guide our actions without
their naturalization as citizens of a foreign country are hereby deemed to have reacquired
no binding effect until it is enacted.44 It has no application to past times but only to future
Philippine citizenship upon taking the following oath of allegiance to the Republic." To go
time, and that is why it is said that the law looks to the future only and has no retroactive
beyond what the law says and interpret it in its ordinary and plain meaning would be
effect unless the legislator may have formally given that effect to some legal provisions.45
tantamount to judicial legislation.

During the time Tan lost her Philippine citizenship, R.A. No. 9225 was not yet enacted and
The plain meaning rule or verba legis is the most basic of all statutory construction
the applicable law was still Commonwealth Act No. 63.1âwphi1 Under this law, both the
principles. When the words or language of a statute is clear, there may be no need to
renunciation of Philippine citizenship and the acquisition of a new citizenship in a foreign
interpret it in a manner different from what the word plainly implies.37 This rule is premised
country through naturalization are grounds to lose Philippine citizenship:
on the presumption that the legislature know the meaning of the words, to have used
words advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by use of such words as are found in the
statute.38 Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. - A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship in any
of the following ways and/or events:
Corollary to this rule is the holistic approach. There is no conflict between the plain
meaning rule and this approach as the latter does not espouse going outside the (1) By naturalization in a foreign country;
parameters of the statute. It merely adopts a broader approach towards the body of the
law. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. Urgello, 39 we pronounced:
(2) By express renunciation of citizenship;

The law must not be read in truncated parts; its provisions must be read in relation to the
xxxx
whole law. It is a cardinal rule in statutory construction that a statute's clauses and
phrases must not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole and every
part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts in order to Since the foregoing law was still effective when Tan became an American citizen, the loss
produce a harmonious whole. Every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference of her Philippine citizenship is but a necessary consequence. As the applicable law at that
to the context, i.e., that every part of the statute must be considered together with other time, Tan was presumed to know the legal effects of her choice to become a naturalized
parts of the statute and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole enactment.40 U.S. citizen. The loss of Tan's Philippine citizenship is reinforced by the fact that she
voluntarily renounced her Philippine citizenship as a requirement to acquire U.S.
citizenship.
To harmonize, given the distinction between citizens who have "reacquired" from those
who "retained" Philippine citizenship,41 coupled with the legal effects of renunciation of
citizenship, Section 2 of R.A. No. 9225 cannot be used as basis for giving a retroactive All said, absent any legal basis for the retroactive application of R.A. No. 9225, we agree
application of the law. R.A. No. 9225 contains no provision stating that it may be applied with the CA that Tan was not a Filipino citizen at the time she registered as a voter and
retroactively as regards natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign her inclusion to the permanent voter's list is highly irregular.
country prior to the effectivity of the said law. In fact, correlating Sections 2 and 3 of the
law would readily reveal that only those falling under the second paragraph of R.A. No.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED and
9225, i.e., natural-born citizens who became naturalized citizens of a foreign
the 20 April 2010 Decision and the 1 October 2010 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
country after the effectivity of the said law, shall be considered as not to have lost their
CA-G.R. SP No. 112815 is AFFIRMED in toto.
Philippine citizenship.
SO ORDERED.
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 224834
JONATHAN Y. DEE, Petitioner  postponement was made "to give the stockholders of [Alliance] better representation in the
vs
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST
PRIVATE LIMITED, and ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as
Director and Shareholder of ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC.,
Respondents
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 224871
HARVEST ALL INVESTMENT LIMITED, VICTORY FUND LIMITED, BOND EAST
PRIVATE LIMITED, ALBERT HONG HIN KAY, as Minority Shareholders of Alliance
Select Foods International, Inc., and HEDY S.C. YAP-CHUA, as a Director and
Shareholder of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc., Petitioners,  February 17, 2015 approving the SRO; and (b) instead, prayed that the Alliance Board be
vs.
ALLIANCE SELECT FOODS INTERNATIONAL, INC., GEORGE E. SYCIP, JONATHAN
Y. DEE, RAYMUND K.H. SEE, MARY GRACE T. VERA-CRUZ, ANTONIO C. PACIS,
ERWIN M. ELECHICON, and BARBARA ANNE C. MIGALLOS, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in these consolidated petitions1 for review on certiorari are the Decision2 dated
February 15, 2016 and the Resolution3 dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213, which reversed the Resolution4 dated August 24, 2015 of the
Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 (RTC) in COMM'L. CASE NO. 15-234 and,
accordingly, reinstated the case and remanded the same to the court a quo for further
proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees.
The Facts
Harvest All Investment Limited, Victory Fund Limited, Bondeast Private Limited, Albert
Hong Hin Kay, and Hedy S.C. Yap Chua (Harvest All, et al.) are, in their own capacities,
minority stockholders of Alliance Select Foods International, Inc. (Alliance), with Hedy S.C.
Yap Chua acting as a member of Alliance's Board of Directors.5 As per Alliance's by-laws,
its Annual Stockholders' Meeting (ASM) is held every June 15.6 However, in a Special
Board of Directors Meeting held at three (3) o'clock in the afternoon of May 29, 2015, the
Board of Directors, over Hedy S.C. Yap Chua's objections, passed a Board Resolution
indefinitely postponing Alliance's 2015 ASM pending complete subscription to its Stock
Rights Offering (SRO) consisting of shares with total value of ₱l Billion which was earlier
approved in a Board Resolution passed on February 17, 2015. As per Alliance's
Disclosure dated May 29, 2015 filed before the Philippine Stock Exchange, such
annual meeting, after taking into consideration their subscription to the [SRO] of
[Alliance]."7 This prompted Harvest All, et al. to file the instant Complaint (with Application
for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Mandatory Injunction and Temporary Restraining
Order/Writ of Preliminary Injunction)8 involving an intra-corporate controversy against
Alliance, and its other Board members, namely, George E. Sycip, Jonathan Y. Dee,
Raymund K.H. See, Mary Grace T. Vera-Cruz, Antonio C. Pacis, Erwin M. Elechicon, and
Barbara Anne C. Migallos (Alliance Board). In said complaint, Harvest All, et al. principally
claimed that the subscription to the new shares through the SRO cannot be made a
condition precedent to the exercise by the current stockholders of their right to vote in the
2015 ASM; otherwise, they will be deprived of their full voting rights proportionate to their
existing shareholdings.9 Thus, Harvest All, et al., prayed for, inter alia, the declaration of
nullity of the Board Resolution dated May 29, 2015 indefinitely postponing the 2015 ASM,
as well as the Board Resolution dated February 17, 2015 approving the SR0.10 The Clerk
of Court of the RTC assessed Harvest All, et al. with filing fees amounting to ₱8,860.00
which they paid accordingly.11 Later on, Harvest All, et al. filed an Amended
Complaint:12 (a) deleting its prayer to declare null and void the Board Resolution dated
enjoined from implementing and carrying out the SRO prior to and as a condition for the
holding of the 2015 ASM.13
For its part, the Alliance Board raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction on the ground of
Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay the correct filing fees. It argued that the latter should
have paid P20 Million, more or less, in filing fees based on the SRO which was valued at
Pl Billion. However, Harvest All, et al. did not mention such capital infusion in their prayers
and, as such, were only made to pay the measly sum of ₱8,860.00. On the other hand,
Harvest All, et al. maintained that they paid the correct filing fees, considering that the
subject of their complaint is the holding of the 2015 ASM and not a claim on the aforesaid
value of the SRO. Harvest All, et al. likewise pointed out that they simply relied on the
assessment of the Clerk of Court and had no intention to defraud the government.14
The RTC Ruling
In a Resolution15 dated August 24, 2015, the RTC dismissed the instant complaint for lack
of jurisdiction due to Harvest All, et al.'s failure to pay the correct filing fees.16 Citing Rule
141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC,17 and the Court's
pronouncement in Lu v. Lu Ym, Sr. (Lu),18 the RTC found that the basis for the
computation of filing fees should have been the ₱l Billion value of the SRO, it being the
property in litigation. As such, Harvest All, et al. should have paid filing fees in the amount I.
of more or less ₱20 Million and not just ₱5,860.00. In this regard, the RTC also found that
Harvest All, et al.'s payment of incorrect filing fees was done in bad faith and with clear
At the outset, the Court notes that in ruling that the correct filing fees for Harvest All, et
intent to defraud the government, considering that: (a) when the issue on correct filing
al.'s complaint should be based on the Pl Billion value of the SRO - and, thus, essentially
fees was first raised during the hearing on the application for TRO, Harvest All, et
holding that such complaint was capable of pecuniary estimation - both the RTC and the
al. never manifested their willingness to abide by the Rules by paying additional filing fees
CA heavily relied on the
when so required; (b) despite Harvest All, et al.'s admission in their complaint that the
SRO was valued at Pl Billion, they chose to keep mum on the meager assessment made
by the Clerk of Court; and (c) while Harvest All, et al. made mention of the SRO in the Court's pronouncement in Lu. In Lu, the Court mentioned that in view of A.M. No. 04-2-04-
body of their complaint, they failed to indicate the same in their prayer, thus, preventing SC dated July 20, 2004 which introduced Section 21 (k)27 to Rule 141 of the Rules of
the Clerk of Court from making the correct assessment of filing fees.19 Court, it seemed that "an intra-corporate controversy always involves a property in
litigation" and that "there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of
the subject matter cannot be estimated."28
Aggrieved, Harvest All, et al. appealed20 to the CA.

However, after a careful reading of Lu, it appears that Harvest All, et al. correctly pointed
The CA Ruling
out29 that the foregoing statements were in the nature of an obiter dictum.

In a Decision21 dated February 15, 2016, the CA reversed the RTC's order of dismissal
To recount, in Lu, the Court ruled, inter alia, that the case involving an intra-corporate
and, accordingly, reinstated the case and remanded the same to the court a quo for
controversy instituted therein, i.e., declaration of nullity of share issuance, is incapable of
further proceedings after payment of the proper legal fees.22Also citing Rule 141 of the
pecuniary estimation and, thus, the correct docket fees were paid.30 Despite such
Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, and Lu, the CA held that the
pronouncement, the Court still went on to say that had the complaint therein been filed
prevailing rule is that all intra-corporate controversies always involve a property in
during the effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, then it would have ruled otherwise because
litigation. Consequently, it agreed with the RTC's finding that the basis for the computation
the amendments brought about by the same "seem to imply that there can be no case of
of filing fees should have been the ₱l Billion value of the SRO and, thus, Harvest All, et
intra-corporate controversy where the value of the subject matter cannot be
al. should have paid filing fees in the amount of more or less ₱20 Million and not just
estimated,"31 viz.:
₱5,860.00.23 However, in the absence of contrary evidence, the CA held that Harvest
All, et al. were not in bad faith and had no intention of defrauding the government, as they
merely relied in the assessment of the Clerk of Court. Thus, in the interest of substantial The new Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-
justice, the CA ordered the reinstatement of Harvest All, et al.' s complaint and the remand 04-SC (July 20, 2004), expressly provides that "[f]or petitions for insolvency or other cases
of the same to the RTC for further proceedings, provided that they pay the correct filing involving intra-corporate controversies, the fees prescribed under Section 7 (a) shall
fees.24 apply." Notatu dignum is that paragraph (b) 1 & 3 of Section 7 thereof was omitted from
the reference. Said paragraph refers to docket fees for filing "[a]ctions where the value of
the subject matter cannot be estimated" and "all other actions not involving property."
The parties moved for reconsideration,25 which were, however, denied in a
Resolution26 dated May 25, 2016. Hence, these consolidated petitions.
By referring the computation of such docket fees to paragraph (a) only, it denotes that an
intra-corporate controversy always involves a property in litigation, the value of which is
The Issues Before the Court
always the basis for computing the applicable filing fees. The latest amendments seem to
imply that there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where the value of the
The primordial issues raised for the Court's resolution are: (a) whether or not Harvest subject matter cannot be estimated. Even one for a mere inspection of corporate books.
All, et al. paid insufficient filing fees for their complaint, as the same should have been
based on the Pl Billion value of the SRO; and (b) if Harvest All, et al. indeed paid
If the complaint were filed today, one could safely find refuge in the express phraseology
insufficient filing fees, whether or not such act was made in good faith and without any
of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 that paragraph (a) alone applies.
intent to defraud the government.

In the present case, however, the original Complaint was filed on August 14, 2000 during
The Court's Ruling
which time Section 7, without qualification, was the applicable provision. Even the
Amended Complaint was filed on March 31, 2003 during which time the applicable rule
The petition in G.R. No. 224834 is denied, while the petition in G.R. No. 224871 is partly expressed that paragraphs (a) and (b) 1 & 3 shall be the basis for computing the filing fees
granted. in intra-corporate cases, recognizing that there could be an intra-corporate controversy
where the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated, such as an action for
inspection of corporate books. The immediate illustration shows that no mistake can even
be attributed to the RTC clerk of court in the assessment of the docket fees.32 (Emphases
and underscoring supplied)
Accordingly, the passages in Lu that "an intra-corporate controversy always involves a
property in litigation" and that "there can be no case of intra-corporate controversy where
the value of the subject matter cannot be estimated" are clearly non-determinative of the
antecedents involved in that case and, hence, cannot be controlling jurisprudence to bind
our courts when it adjudicates similar cases upon the principle of stare decisis. As it is
evident, these passages in Lu only constitute an opinion delivered by the Court as a "by
the way" in relation to a hypothetical scenario (i.e., if the complaint was filed during the
effectivity of A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC, which it was not) different from the actual case before
it.
In Land Bank of the Philippines v. Santos,33 the Court had the opportunity to define
an obiter dictum and discuss its legal effects as follows:
[An obiter dictum] "x x x is a remark made, or opinion expressed, by a judge, in his
decision upon a cause by the way, that is, incidentally or collaterally, and not directly upon
the question before him, or upon a point not necessarily involved in the determination of
the cause, or introduced by way of illustration, or analogy or argument. It does not embody
the resolution or determination of the court, and is made without argument, or full
consideration of the point. It lacks the force of an adjudication, being a mere expression of
an opinion with no binding force for purposes of res judicata."34 (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)
For these reasons, therefore, the courts a quo erred in applying the case of Lu.
II.
In any event, the Court finds that the obiter dictum stated in Lu was actually incorrect.
This is because depending on the nature of the principal action or remedy sought, an
intra-corporate controversy may involve a subject matter which is either capable or
incapable of pecuniary estimation.
In Cabrera v. Francisco,35 the Court laid down the parameters in determining whether an
action is considered capable of pecuniary estimation or not:
In determining whether an action is one the subject matter of which is not capable of
pecuniary estimation this Court has adopted the criterion of first ascertaining the nature of
the principal action or remedy sought. If it is primarily for the recovery of a sum of money,
the claim is considered capable of pecuniary estimation, and whether jurisdiction is in the
municipal courts or in the [C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance would depend on the amount of the
claim. However, where the basic issue is something other than the right to recover a sum
of money, where the money claim is purely incidental to, or a consequence of, the
principal relief sought, this Court has considered such actions as cases where the subject
of the litigation may not be estimated in terms of money, and are cognizable exclusively by
[C]ourts of [F]irst [I]nstance (now Regional Trial Courts).36 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
This case is a precise illustration as to how an intra-corporate controversy may be
classified as an action whose subject matter is incapable of pecuniary estimation. A
cursory perusal of Harvest All, et al.'s Complaint and Amended Complaint reveals that its
main purpose is to have Alliance hold its 2015 ASM on the date set in the corporation's
bylaws, or at the time when Alliance's SRO has yet to fully materialize, so that their voting
interest with the corporation would somehow be preserved. Thus, Harvest All, et
al. sought for the nullity of the Alliance Board Resolution passed on May 29, 2015 which
indefinitely postponed the corporation's 2015 ASM pending completion of subscription to
the SR0.37 Certainly, Harvest All, et al.'s prayer for nullity, as well as the concomitant relief
of holding the 2015 ASM as scheduled in the by-laws, do not involve the recovery of sum
of money. The mere mention of Alliance's impending SRO valued at ₱l Billion cannot
transform the nature of Harvest All, et al.'s action to one capable of pecuniary estimation,
considering that: (a) Harvest All, et al. do not claim ownership of, or much less entitlement
to, the shares subject of the SRO; and (b) such mention was merely narrative or
descriptive in order to emphasize the severe dilution that their voting interest as minority
shareholders would suffer if the 2015 ASM were to be held after the SRO was completed.
If, in the end, a sum of money or anything capable of pecuniary estimation would be
recovered by virtue of Harvest All, et al.'s complaint, then it would simply be the
consequence of their principal action.
Clearly therefore, Harvest All, et al.'s action was one incapable of pecuniary estimation.
At this juncture, it should be mentioned that the Court passed A.M. No. 04-02-04-
SC38 dated October 5, 2016, which introduced amendments to the schedule of legal fees
to be collected in various commercial cases, including those involving intra-corporate
controversies. Pertinent portions of A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC read:
RESOLUTION
xxxx
Whereas, Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court, as amended by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC
effective 16 August 2004, incorporated the equitable schedule of legal fees prescribed for
petitions for rehabilitation under Section 21 (i) thereof and, furthermore, provided under
Section 21(k) thereof that the fees prescribed under Section 7(a) of the said rule shall
apply to petitions for insolvency or other cases involving intra-corporate controversies;
xxxx
NOW, THEREFORE, the Court resolves to ADOPT a new schedule of filing fees as
follows:
 xxxx
4. Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court is hereby DELETED as the
fees covering petitions for insolvency are already provided for in this Resolution. As for
cases involving intra-corporate controversies, the applicable fees shall be those provided
under Section 7 (a), 7 (b) (1), or 7 (b) (3) of Rule 141 of the Revised Rules of Court
depending on the nature of the action.
xxxx
This Resolution shall take effect fifteen (15) days following its publication in the Official
Gazette or in two (2) newspapers of national circulation. The Office of the Court
Administrator (OCA) is directed to circularize the same upon its effectivity. (Emphases and
underscoring supplied)
Verily, the deletion of Section 21 (k) of Rule 141 and in lieu thereof, the application of
Section 7 (a) [fees for actions where the value of the subject matter can be
determined/estimated], 7 (b) (1) [fees for actions where the value of the subject matter
cannot be estimated], or 7 (b) (3) [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the
same Rule to cases involving intra-corporate controversies for the determination of the
correct filing fees, as the case may be, serves a dual purpose: on the one hand, the
amendments concretize the Court's recognition that the subject matter of an intra-
corporate controversy may or may not be capable of pecuniary estimation; and on the
other hand, they were also made to correct the anomaly created by A.M. No. 04-2-04-SC
dated July 20, 2004 (as advanced by the Lu obiter dictum) implying that all intra-corporate
cases involved a subject matter which is deemed capable of pecuniary estimation.
While the Court is not unaware that the amendments brought by A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC
dated October 5, 2016 only came after the filing of the complaint subject of this case, such
amendments may nevertheless be given retroactive effect so as to make them applicable
to the resolution of the instant consolidated petitions as they merely pertained to a
procedural rule, i.e., Rule 141, and not substantive law. In Tan, Jr. v. CA,39 the Court
thoroughly explained the retroactive effectivity of procedural rules, viz.:
The general rule that statutes are prospective and not retroactive does not ordinarily apply
to procedural laws. It has been held that "a retroactive law, in a legal sense, is one which
takes away or impairs vested rights acquired under laws, or creates a new obligation and
imposes a new duty, or attaches a new disability, in respect of transactions or
considerations already past. Hence, remedial statutes or statutes relating to remedies or
modes of procedure, which do not create new or take away vested rights, but only operate
in furtherance of the remedy or confirmation of rights already existing, do not come within
the legal conception of a retroactive law, or the general rule against the retroactive
operation of statutes." The general rule against giving statutes retroactive operation whose
effect is to impair the obligations of contract or to disturb vested rights does not prevent
the application of statutes to proceedings pending at the time of their enactment where
they neither create new nor take away vested rights. A new statute which deals with
procedure only is presumptively applicable to all actions - those which have accrued or are
pending.
Statutes regulating the procedure of the courts will be construed as applicable to actions
pending and undetermined at the time of their passage.1âwphi1 Procedural laws are
retroactive in that sense and to that extent. The fact that procedural statutes may
somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their retroactive application to
pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative of any right
of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected. Nor is the retroactive application of
procedural statutes constitutionally objectionable. The reason is that as a general rule no
vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws. It has been held that "a person
has no vested right in any particular remedy, and a litigant cannot insist on the application
to the trial of his case, whether civil or criminal, of any other than the existing rules of
procedure."40 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In view of the foregoing, and having classified Harvest All, et al.'s action as one incapable
of pecuniary estimation, the Court finds that Harvest All, et al. should be made to pay the
appropriate docket fees in accordance with the applicable fees provided under Section 7
(b) (3) of Rule 141 [fees for all other actions not involving property] of the Revised Rules of
Court, in conformity with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC dated October 5, 2016. The matter is
therefore remanded to the R TC in order:
(a) to FIRST Determine if Harvest, et al.'s payment of filing fees in the amount of
₱8,860.00, as initially assessed by the Clerk of Court, constitutes sufficient compliance
with A.M. No. 04-02-04-SC;
(b) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is insufficient, to require Harvest, et al.' s
payment of any discrepancy within a period of fifteen (15) days from notice, and after such
payment, proceed with the regular proceedings of the case with dispatch; or
(c) if Harvest All, et al.'s payment of ₱8,860.00 is already sufficient, proceed with the
regular proceedings of the case with dispatch.
WHEREFORE, the petition in G.R. No. 224834 is DENIED, while the petition in G.R. No.
224871 is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision dated February 15, 2016 and the
Resolution dated May 25, 2016 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 142213 are
hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION in that COMM'L. CASE NO. 15-234 is
hereby REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 159 for further
proceedings as stated in the final paragraph of this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 189607
RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner, 
vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the
Resolution2 that affirmed the same. The CA reversed the Decision3 dated 23 March 2007
issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 84.
The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the
parties on the ground that respondent had a previous valid marriage before she married
petitioner. The CA believes on the other hand, that respondent was not prevented from
contracting a second marriage if the first one was an absolutely nullity, and for this
purpose she did not have to await a final decree of nullity of the first marriage.
The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in
holding thus and consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second
marriage.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista
(Bautista). On 6 January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo
(Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of
Marriage,4 praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting
marriage to Bautista and her psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code.
The CA states in its Decision that petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological
incapacity in the RTC. The reason for this finding by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in
this Petition.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to
Bautista was null and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of
them was a member of the denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.5
On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista
void. On 22 January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260
rendered its Decision6 declaring that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and
void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the
Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become final and executory. 7
On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that the proof
adduced by petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage
on the ground that it was bigamous. In his Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that whether
or not the first marriage of respondent was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had
belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of nullity, she still could not deny that at
the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous marriage was valid and
subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer in its Order 10 dated 8 March
2005.
In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage
under Article 41 of the Family Code. 12 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the
marriage between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted
on January 6, 1979, at the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is
hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under Article
41 of the Family Code. 13
The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she
married Renato on 6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus
rendering it void ab initio. The lower court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not
obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume the nullity of a prior subsisting
marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration exists, the prior
marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had
her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second
marriage were subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain
a judicial decree of nullity for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second
marriage with Renato. 14
Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were
concerned. 15 His motion, however, was denied by the RTC in its Order16 dated 6
September 2007. Thereafter, both petitioner17 and Respondent18 filed their respective
Notices of Appeal.
In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision
and Order and upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA
said that since Lea's marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the
effectivity of the Family Code on 3 August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since
it is the law in effect at the time the marriages were celebrated, and not the Family
Code.20 Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not state that a judicial decree
is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the
questioned CA Resolution22dated 16 September 2009.
Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.
Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to
petitioner valid be affirmed in toto, and that all properties acquired by the spouses during
their marriage be declared conjugal. In his Reply to the Comment,24 petitioner reiterated
the allegations in his Petition.
OUR RULING
We deny the Petition.
The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the
law in effect at the time of its celebration.25 In this case, the law in force at the time Lea
contracted both marriages was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born
while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in 1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must
resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil Code on void marriages, in
particular, Articles 80,2681,27 82,28 and 83 (first paragraph);29 and those on voidable
marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph),30 8531and 86.32
Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following
ways: (1) a void marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning -
while in a voidable marriage, the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2)
a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a voidable marriage can be ratified by
cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be collaterally attacked, while a
voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage, there is no
conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in
voidable marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the
decree of annulment are considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial
decree to establish the invalidity is necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be
a judicial decree.33
Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza,  34 People v. Aragon,  35 and Odayat v. Amante,  36 that the Civil
Code contains no express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a
void marriage. 37
In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The
second marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the
third marriage was contracted after the death of the second wife. The Court ruled that the
first marriage was deemed valid until annulled, which made the second marriage null and
void for being bigamous. Thus, the third marriage was valid, as the second marriage was
void from its performance, hence, nonexistent without the need of a judicial decree
declaring it to be so.
This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same
factual antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise
ruled that no judicial decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages
under Article 80 of the Civil Code.
It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings
in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August
1988. A judicial declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where
the nullity of a previous marriage is invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage. 38 A second marriage contracted prior to the issuance of this declaration of
nullity is thus considered bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of Appeals, we
explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social
institution, is the foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In
more explicit terms, the Family Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent
union between a man and a woman entered into in accordance with law for the
establishment of conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage and the family to the
stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents are
governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore, the
nullification of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be
accomplished merely on the basis of the perception of both parties or of one that
their union is so defective with respect to the essential requisites of a contract of
marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal effect - and nothing more.
Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a mockery and
would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage
would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For
such a socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the
courts, and nothing less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would
such an open and public declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of
the contract of marriage, but the same would be easily verifiable through records
accessible to everyone.40(Emphases supplied)1âwphi1
However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of Appeals,  42 the
requirement of a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were
celebrated before the effectivity of the Family Code, particularly if the children of the
parties were born while the Civil Code was in force. In Ty, this Court clarified that those
cases continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon, which embodied the
then-prevailing rule:
x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality
for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void
since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the
issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held
that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born
before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need
for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence
at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into
in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza
and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and
consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could contract a
second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent's second
marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to
the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her
children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect
unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of vested
rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x. (Citations omitted)
As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case.
The Court thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view
of the invalidity of her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage
license. That there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio
before the second marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement
under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of the RTC of Parañaque
City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the conclusion
that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the
marriage between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its
ruling.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals
Decision dated 20 April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV
No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
G.R. No. 173632               September 29, 2014
AMBROSIO ROTAIRO (substituted by his spouse MARIA RONSA YRO ROTAIRO,
and his children FELINA ROTAIRO, ERLINDA ROTAIRO CRUZ, EUDOSIA ROTAIRO
CRIZALDO, NIEVES ROTAIRO TUBIG, REMEDIOS ROTAIRO MACAHILIG, FELISA
ROTAIRO LEGASPI, JOSEFINA ROTAIRO TORREVILLAS, and CRISENCIO R.
ROTAIRO, MARCIANA TIBAY, EUGENIO PUNZALAN, and VICENTE DEL
ROSARIO, Petitioners,  bought from the Pilipinas Bank, because she lives near the land, and at the time she
vs.
ROVIRA ALCANTARA and VICTOR ALCANTARA, Respondents.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
For review is the Decision1 dated July 21, 2005 and Resolution2 dated July 7, 2006 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 58455, which set aside the Decision3 dated
December 27, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Antipolo, Rizal, Branch 71 in Civil
Case No. 672.
Civil Case No. 672 was filed by the respondent Rovira Alcantara (Rovira) for the recovery
of possession of a parcel of land in Barangay San Andres, Cainta, Rizal, measuring 2,777
square meters and originally titled under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 481018.
Said property was formerly owned by Rovira’s father, Victor C. Alcantara (Alcantara), and
Alfredo C. Ignacio (Ignacio), who mortgaged the property to Pilipinas Bank and Trust
Company (Pilipinas Bank) in 1968. Two years after, the property was parcelled out by
Alcantara and Ignacio, through their firm Wilfredo S. Ignacio & Company (Ignacio & Co.),
and separately sold to different buyers. One of the buyers was Ambrosio Rotairo (Rotairo)
who bought a 200-square meter portion on installment basis. Rotairo constructed his
house on the property identified as Lot C-1, and after completing payments, a Deed of
Absolute Sale was executed on September 25, 1979 in his favor by Ignacio & Co.4
In the meantime, Alcantara and Ignacio defaulted in their loan obligations causing Pilipinas
Bank to foreclose the mortgage on the entire property. Without redemption being made by
Alcantara and Ignacio, title was consolidated in the name of Pilipinas Bank, being the
highest bidder during the auction sale. Pilipinas Bank then sold the property in a Deed of
Absolute Sale dated June 6, 1975 to Rovira, who happens to be Alcantara’s daughter.5
In 1988, Rovira filed her Amended Complaint in Civil Case No. 672 for recovery of
possession and damages.After trial, the RTC dismissed Civil Case No. 672. The Decision
dated December 27, 1996 provides for the following dispositive portion:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing the complaint and defendant’s
counterclaim; and plaintiff, being the successor-in-interest of the subdivision owner,
Wilfredo S. Ignacio, is ordered to issue the corresponding transfer certificate of title to
defendant Ambrosio Rotairo pursuant to the provisions of PD [No.] 957.
SO ORDERED.6
The RTC ruled that the transaction between Ignacio & Co. and Rotairo was covered by
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957.7 Rovira, as "successor-in-interest of Wilfredo
S.Ignacio [and Victor Alcantara] was well aware of the condition of the property which she
purchased it she was aware of the existing houses or structures on the land."8 She was,
therefore, not entitled to the relief prayed for in her complaint.
On appeal, the CA set aside the RTC decision and ordered the turnover of possession of
the property to Rovira. The dispositive portion of the assailed CA Decision dated July 21,
2005 provides:
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is SET ASIDE. The Heirs of Ambrosio Rotairo
and their assigns, are ORDERED to turn over possession of Lot C-1 to Rovira Alcantara.
Third party defendants, William [sic] Ignacio and Victor Alcantara, are ORDERED to return
the purchase price of ₱10,000.00 to the Heirs of Ambrosio Rotairo, with interest at the rate
of 6% per annum until finality of this decision, and at the rate of 12% per annum thereafter
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.9
Petitioners sought reconsideration, which was denied by the CA in the assailed
Resolution10 dated July 7, 2006.
In granting possession in favor of Rovira, the CA held that P.D. No. 957 is not applicable
since the mortgagewas constituted prior to the sale to Rotairo. According to the CA,
Section 1811 of P.D. No. 957 protects innocent lot buyers, and where there is a prior
registered mortgage, the buyer purchases it with knowledge of the mortgage. In the caseof
Rotairo, P.D. No. 957 does not confer "more" rights to an unregistered buyer like him, as
against a registered prior mortgagee like Pilipinas Bank and its buyer, Rovira.12 Hence, the
present petition.
Petitioners raise the following issues:
1. Whether or not, notwithstanding that the subject land is subdivision lot,
Ambrosio Rotairo (father of the Petitioners), [a] buyer and builder in good faith
should suffer, while the seller in bad faith Victor Alcantara should be benefited
by his malicious acts.
2. Whether or not, Ambrosio Rotairo (father of the Petitioners), a buyer and
builder in good faith should suffer while the seller in bad faith Victor Alcantara
should be benefited by his malicious acts.13
Petitioners insist on the applicabilityof P.D. No. 957 in this case, and that the transaction
between Rotairo and Ignacio & Co. should fall within the protection of the law. On the
other hand, Rovira principally relies on the prior registration of the mortgage and the sale
in her favor vis-à-visthe petitioners’ unregistered transactions.
The first issue then that must be resolved is whether P.D. No. 957 is applicable in this
case. But the more crucial issue before the Court is who, as between the petitioners and
Rovira, has better right to the property in dispute?
Retroactive application of P.D. No. 957
The retroactive application of P.D. No. 957 to transactions entered into prior to its
enactment in 1976 is already settled.1âwphi1 In Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon,14 which
involved a land purchase agreement entered into in 1972, the Court stated that the
unmistakeable intent of the legislature is to have P.D. No. 957 operate retrospectively.
Moreover, the specific terms of P.D. No. 957 provide for its retroactive effect even to
contracts and transactions entered into prior to its enactment. In particular, Section 21 of
P.D. No. 957 provides:
Sec. 21. Sales Prior to Decree. In cases of subdivision lots or condominium units sold or
disposed of prior to the effectivity of this Decree, it shall be incumbent upon the owner or
developer of the subdivision or condominium project to complete compliance with his or its
obligations as provided in the preceding section within two years from the date of this
Decree unless otherwise extended by the Authority or unless an adequate performance
bond isfiled in accordance with Section 6 hereof.
Failure of the owner or developer to comply with the obligations under this and the
preceding provisions shall constitute a violation punishable under Section 38 and 39 ofthis
Decree. (Emphasis ours)
In this case, the contract to sell between Rotairo and Ignacio & Co. was entered into in
1970, and the agreement was fully consummated with Rotairo’s completion of payments
and the execution of the Deed of Sale in his favor in 1979. Clearly, P.D. No. 957 is
applicable in this case.
It was error for the CA to rule thatthe retroactive application of P.D. No. 957 is "warranted
only where the subdivision is mortgaged after buyers have purchased individual
lots."15 According to the CA, the purpose of Section 18 requiring notice of the mortgage to
the buyers is to give the buyer the option to pay the instalments directly to the mortgagee;
hence, if the subdivision is mortgaged before the lots are sold, then there are no buyers to
notify.16 What the CA overlooked is that Section 21 requires the owner or developer of the
subdivision project to complete compliance with its obligations within two years from
1976.The two-year compliance provides the developer the opportunity to comply with its
obligation to notify the buyers of the existence of the mortgage, and consequently, for the
latter to exercise their option to pay the instalments directly to the mortgagee.
Nevertheless, such concomitant obligation of the developer under Section 21 did not arise
in this case. It must be noted that at the time of the enactment of P.D. No. 957 in 1976 and
asearly as 1974, Pilipinas Bank had already foreclosed the mortgage and bought the
properties in the foreclosure sale. There was, thus, no mortgage to speak of such that
Rotairo should be notified thereof so that he could properly exercise his option to pay the
instalments directly to Pilipinas Bank.
Rovira is not a buyer in good faith
Notwithstanding the preceding discussion, the Court finds that Rovira cannot claim a
better right to the property because she is not a buyer in good faith. Initially, it must be
stated that the determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue,
which generally cannotbe determined by the Court in a petition for review filed under Rule
45.17 The rule, nonetheless, admits of exceptions, someof which are when the judgment of
the CA is based on a misapprehension offacts or when the CA overlooked undisputed
facts which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.18 A review of this
case shows that the CA failed to appreciate the relevance of certain undisputed facts, thus
giving rise to its erroneous conclusion that Rovira has a better right to the property in
dispute.
Rovira contended that the registered mortgage between Pilipinas Bank and Alcantara and
Ignacio is superior to the unregistered contract to sell between Ignacio & Co. and Rotairo,
which was sustained by the CA. The CA applied Section 50 of Act No. 496 or the Land
Registration Act and ruled that since the sale to Rotairo was unregistered and subsequent
to the registered mortgage, the latter was obligated to respect the foreclosure and
eventual sale of the property in dispute, among others.19
Indeed, the rule is that as "[b]etween two transactions concerning the same parcel of land,
the registered transaction prevails over the earlier unregistered right."20 This is in accord
with Section 50 of the Land Registration Act,21 which provides:
Sec. 50. An owner of registered land may convey, mortgage, lease, charge, or otherwise
deal with the same as fully as if it had not been registered. He may use forms of deeds,
mortgages[,] leases, or other voluntary instruments like those now in use and sufficient in
law for the purpose intended. But no deed, mortgage, lease, or other voluntary instrument,
except a will purporting to convey or affect registered land, shall take effect as a
conveyance or bind the land, but shall operate only as a contract between the parties and
as evidence of authority to the clerk or register of deeds to make registration. The act of
registration shall be the operative act to convey and affect the land, and in all cases under
this Act the registration shall be made inthe office of register of deeds for the province or
provinces or city where the land lies. (Emphasis ours)
Section 51 of the Land Registration Act further states that "[e]very conveyance, mortgage,
lease, lien, attachment, order, decree, instrument, or entry affecting registered land x x x, if
registered x x x be notice to all persons from the time of such registeringx x x." "The
principal purpose of registration is merely to notify other persons not parties to a contract
that a transaction involving the property has been entered into."22 Thus, it has been held
that "registration in a publicregistry creates constructive notice to the whole
world."23 Moreover, "[a] person dealing with registered land may safely rely on the
correctness of the certificate of title issued therefor, and he is not required to go beyond
the certificate to determine the condition of the property."24
The rule, however, is not without recognized exceptions. "The conveyance shall not be
valid against any person unless registered, except (1) the grantor, (2) his heirs and
devisees, and (3) third persons having actual notice or knowledge thereof."25 Moreover,
"when the party has actual knowledge of facts and circumstances that would impel a
reasonably cautious man to make such inquiry or when the purchaser has knowledge of a
defect or the lack of title in his vendor or of sufficient facts to induce a reasonably prudent
man to inquire into the status of the title of the property in litigation,26 he cannot find solace
in the protection afforded by a prior registration. Neither can such person be considered
an innocent purchaser for value nor a purchaser in good faith.27
In this case, two factors work against Rovira as a buyer in good faith. One, she cannot be
considered a third person for purposes of applying the rule. Rovira does not deny that she
is the daughter and an heir of Victor C. Alcantara, one of the parties to the contract to sell
(and the contract of sale) executed in favor of Rotairo. "The vendor’s heirs are his
privies."28 Based on such privity, Rovira is charged with constructive knowledge of prior
dispositions or encumbrances affecting the subject property made by her father.29 The fact
that the contract to sell was unregistered became immaterial and she is, therefore, bound
by the provisions of the contract to sell and eventually, the contract of sale, executed by
her father in favor of Rotairo.
Further, more than the chargeof constructive knowledge, the surrounding circumstances
of this case show Rovira’s actual knowledgeof the disposition of the subject property and
Rotairo’s possession thereof. It is undisputed that after the contract to sell was executed in
April 1970, Rotairo immediately secured a mayor’s permit in September 28, 1970 for the
construction of his residential house on the property.30 Rotairo, and subsequently, his
heirs, has been residing on the property since then. Rovira, who lives only fifty (50) meters
away from the subject property, in fact, knew that there were "structures built on the
property."31 Rovira, however, claims that "she did not bother to inquire as to the legitimacy
of the rights of the occupants, because she was assured by the bank of its title to the
property."32 But Rovira cannot rely solely on the title and assurances of Pilipinas Bank; it
was incumbent upon her to look beyond the title and make necessary inquiries because
the bank was not in possession of the property. "Where the vendor is not in possession of
the property, the prospective vendees are obligated to investigate the rights of one in
possession."33 A purchaser cannot simply close his eyes to facts which should put a
reasonable man on guard,34 and thereafter claim that he acted in good faith under the
belief that there was no defect in the title of the vendor.35 Hence, Rovira cannot claim a
right better than that of Rotairo' s as she is not a buyer in good faith.
"[I]t is a settled rule that the Land Registration Act protects only holders of title in good
faith, and does not permit its provision to be used as a shield for the commission of fraud,
or as a means to enrich oneself at the expense of others. "36
Under different circumstances, the prior registration of the mortgage between Pilipinas
Bank and Alcantara and Ignacio, and Rovira's subsequent purchase of the subject
property would have been valid and binding, and could have defeated Rotairo's
unregistered claim over it. But given Rovira's privity with her father Victor C. Alcantara and
the fact that she had actual knowledge of the disposition of the property and Rotairo's
possession thereof, her acquisition of the property cannot be upheld.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated July 21, 2005 and
Resolution dated July 7, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 58455 are SET
ASIDE. The Decision dated December 27, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court of Antipolo,
Rizal, Branch 71, dismissing Civil Case No. 672 is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 149417             June 4, 2004
GLORIA SANTOS DUEÑAS, petitioner, 
vs.
SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, respondent.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
For review on certiorari is the Decision1 dated December 29, 2000, of the Court of Appeals
in CA-G.R. SP No. 51601, setting aside the Decision2 of the Housing and Land Use
Regulatory Board (HLURB) in HLURB Case No. REM-A-980227-0032 which earlier
affirmed the Decision3 of the HLURB-NCR Regional Field Office in HLURB Case No.
REM-070297-9821. Said Regional Field Office dismissed the petition of herein respondent
Santos Subdivision Homeowners Association (SSHA) seeking to require herein petitioner,
Gloria Santos Dueñas, to provide for an open space in the subdivision for recreational and
community activities. In its assailed decision, the CA remanded the case to the HLURB for
determination of a definitive land area for open space.4 Petitioner assails also the Court of
Appeals’ Resolution5 dated July 31, 2001, denying her motion for reconsideration.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Petitioner Gloria Santos Dueñas is the daughter of the late Cecilio J. Santos
who, during his lifetime, owned a parcel of land with a total area of 2.2 hectares
located at General T. De Leon, Valenzuela City, Metro Manila. In 1966, Cecilio
had the realty subdivided into smaller lots, the whole forming the Cecilio J.
Santos Subdivision (for brevity, Santos Subdivision). The then Land Registration
Commission (LRC) approved the project and the National Housing Authority
(NHA) issued the required Certificate of Registration and License to Sell. At the
time of Cecilio’s death in 1988, there were already several residents and
homeowners in Santos Subdivision.
Sometime in 1997, the members of the SSHA submitted to the petitioner a resolution
asking her to provide within the subdivision an open space for recreational and other
community activities, in accordance with the provisions of P.D. No. 957,6 as amended by
P.D. No. 1216.7 Petitioner, however, rejected the request, thus, prompting the members of
SSHA to seek redress from the NHA.
On April 25, 1997, the NHA General Manager forwarded the SSHA resolution to Romulo
Q. Fabul, Commissioner and Chief Executive Officer of the HLURB in Quezon City.8
In a letter dated May 29, 1997, the Regional Director of the Expanded NCR Field Office,
HLURB, opined that the open space requirement of P.D. No. 957, as amended by P.D.
No. 1216, was not applicable to Santos Subdivision.9
SSHA then filed a petition/motion for reconsideration,10 docketed as HLURB Case No.
REM-070297-9821, which averred among others that: (1) P.D. No. 957 should apply
retroactively to Santos Subdivision, notwithstanding that the subdivision plans were
approved in 1966 and (2) Gloria Santos Dueñas should be bound by the verbal promise
made by her late father during his lifetime that an open space would be provided for in
Phase III of Santos Subdivision, the lots of which were at that time already for sale.
Petitioner denied any knowledge of the allegations of SSHA. She stressed that she was
not a party to the alleged transactions, and had neither participation nor involvement in the
development of Santos Subdivision and the sale of the subdivision’s lots. As affirmative
defenses, she raised the following: (a) It was her late father, Cecilio J. Santos, who owned
and developed the subdivision, and she was neither its owner nor developer; (b) that this
suit was filed by an unauthorized entity against a non-existent person, as SSHA and
Santos Subdivision are not juridical entities, authorized by law to institute or defend
against actions; (c) that P.D. No. 957 cannot be given retroactive effect to make it
applicable to Santos Subdivision as the law does not expressly provide for its retroactive
applicability; and (d) that the present petition is barred by laches.
On January 14, 1998, HLURB-NCR disposed of HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821 in
this wise:
In view of the foregoing, the complaint is hereby dismissed.
It is So Ordered.11
In dismissing the case, the HLURB-NCR office ruled that while SSHA failed to present
evidence showing that it is an association duly organized under Philippine law with
capacity to sue, nonetheless, the suit could still prosper if viewed as a suit filed by all its
members who signed and verified the petition. However, the petition failed to show any
cause of action against herein petitioner as (1) there is no evidence showing Santos-
Dueñas as the owner/developer or successor-in-interest of Cecilio Santos, who was the
owner/developer and sole proprietor of Santos Subdivision; (2) the LRC-approved
subdivision plan was bereft of any proviso indicating or identifying an open space, as
required by P.D. No. 957, as amended, hence there was no legal basis to compel either
Cecilio or his daughter Santos-Dueñas, as his purported successor, to provide said space;
and (3) the alleged verbal promise of the late Cecilio Santos was inadmissible as evidence Petitioner duly moved for reconsideration, which the Court of Appeals denied on July 31,
under the dead man’s statute.12 2001.

SSHA then appealed the NCR office’s ruling to the HLURB Board of Commissioners. The
latter body, however, affirmed the action taken by the HLURB-NCR office, concluding
thus:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review is hereby
DISMISSED and the decision of the Office below is hereby AFFIRMED IN
TOTO.
SO ORDERED.13
Hence, this petition grounded on the following assignment of errors:
I. THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR OF LAW BY
TAKING COGNIZANCE OF RESPONDENTS’ PETITION (WHICH ASSAILS
THE DECISION OF THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS OF THE HLURB)
WHEN JURISDICTION THEREON IS WITH THE OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT, AS CLEARLY MANDATED BY SEC. 2, RULE XVIII OF THE
1996 RULES OF PROCEDURE OF THE HOUSING AND LAND USE
REGULATORY BOARD.

II. IT WAS GRAVE ERROR FOR THE COURT OF APPEALS TO HAVE

The HLURB Board decreed that there was no basis to compel the petitioner to provide an
open space within Santos Subdivision, inasmuch as the subdivision plans approved on
July 8, 1966, did not provide for said space and there was no law requiring the same at
that time. It further ruled that P.D. No. 957 could not be given retroactive effect in the
absence of an express provision in the law. Finally, it found the action time-barred since it
was filed nine (9) years after the death of Cecilio. The Board noted that SSHA sought to
enforce an alleged oral promise of Cecilio, which should have been done within the six-
year prescriptive period provided for under Article 114514 of the Civil Code.
Dissatisfied, respondent sought relief from the Court of Appeals via a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. The petition, docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 51601, was decided by the appellate court in this manner:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED--and the decision, dated January 20,
1999, of the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB) in HLURB Case
No. REM-A-980227-0032 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly,
this case is ordered REMANDED to the HLURB for the determination of the
definitive land area that shall be used for open space in accordance with law
and the rules and standards prescribed by the HLURB. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.15
ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE PETITION BELOW WHEN
RESPONDENTS CLEARLY FAILED TO EXHAUST THE ADMINISTRATIVE
REMEDIES AVAILABLE TO THEM UNDER THE LAW.
III. THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT
RESPONDENT SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION, A
NON-REGISTERED ORGANIZATION, LACKED THE LEGAL PERSONALITY
TO SUE.
IV. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT
RESPONDENT SANTOS SUBDIVISION HOMEOWNERS ASSOCIATION HAS
NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST PETITIONER; NEITHER WAS SANTOS
SUBDIVISION, A NON-ENTITY, POSSESSED WITH CAPACITY TO BE SUED
NOR IS PETITIONER GLORIA SANTOS-DUEÑAS A PROPER PARTY TO
THE CASE, THE LATTER NOT BEING THE OWNER OR DEVELOPER OF
SANTOS SUBDIVISION.
V. THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN SUBSTITUTING ITS
FINDINGS WITH THAT OF THE ADJUDICATION BOARD AND BOARD OF
COMMISSIONERS OF THE HLURB WHEN THEIR DECISION IS BASED ON
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE AND NO GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION CAN
BE ATTRIBUTED TO THEM.

In finding for SSHA, the appellate court relied upon Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon,16 which
VI. THE COURT OF APPEALS DEVIATED FROM THE EXISTING LAW AND
held that while P.D. No. 957 did not expressly provide for its retroactive application,
JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT P.D. 957 HAS RETROACTIVE
nonetheless, it can be plainly inferred from its intent that it was to be given retroactive
APPLICATION -- WHEN THE LAW ITSELF DOES NOT PROVIDE FOR ITS
effect so as to extend its coverage even to those contracts executed prior to its effectivity
RETROACTIVITY AND THE EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE THEREON
in 1976. The Court of Appeals also held that the action was neither barred by prescription
CLEARLY PRONOUNCED THAT IT HAS NO RETROACTIVE APPLICATION.
nor laches as the obligation of a subdivision developer to provide an open space is not
TO PROVIDE RETROACTIVITY TO P.D. 957 WOULD CAUSE IMPAIRMENT
predicated upon an oral contract, but mandated by law, hence, an action may be brought
OF VESTED RIGHTS.
within ten (10) years from the time the right of action accrues under Article 114417 of the
Civil Code. Moreover, the equitable principle of laches will not apply when the claim was
filed within the reglementary period.
 VII. WHILE AS A GENERAL RULE, THE FACTUAL FINDINGS OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS IS BINDING ON THE SUPREME COURT, THE SAME
IS NOT TRUE WHEN THE FORMER’S CONCLUSION IS BASED ON
SPECULATION, SURMISES AND CONJECTURES, THE INFERENCE MADE
IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN OR ABSURD, THERE IS GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION, JUDGMENT IS BASED ON MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS
CONTRARY TO THOSE OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY CONCERNED,
AND IT WENT BEYOND THE ISSUES OF THE CASE AND THE SAME IS
CONTRARY TO THE ADMISSIONS OF BOTH PARTIES.18
To our mind, the foregoing may be reduced into the following issues: (1) the applicability of
the doctrine of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies; (2) the legal capacity of
respondent to sue the petitioner herein; and (3) the retroactivity of P.D. No. 957, as
amended by P.D. No. 1216.
On the first issue, the petitioner contends that the filing of CA-G.R. SP No. 51601 was
premature as SSHA failed to exhaust all administrative remedies. Petitioner submits that
since Section 1,19 Rule 43 of the 1997 Rule of Civil Procedure does not mention the
HLURB, the respondent should have appealed the decision of the HLURB Board in
HLURB Case No. REM-A-980227-0032 to the Office of the President prior to seeking
judicial relief. In other words, it is the decision of the Office of the President,20 and not that
of the HLURB Board, which the Court of Appeals may review.
We find petitioner’s contentions bereft of merit. The principle of non-exhaustion of
administrative remedies is, under the factual circumstances of this case, inapplicable.
While this Court has held that before a party is allowed to seek intervention of the courts, it
is a pre condition that he avail himself of all administrative processes afforded
him,21nonetheless, said rule is not without exceptions.22 The doctrine is a relative one and
is flexible depending on the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and circumstantial
settings of each case.23
In the instant case, the questions posed are purely legal, namely: (1) whether the
respondent had any right to demand an open space and the petitioner had any legal
obligation to provide said open space within Santos Subdivision under P.D. No. 957, as
amended by P.D. No. 1216, and (2) whether the action had already prescribed under
Article 1145 of the Civil Code. Moreover, the Court of Appeals found that SSHA had
sought relief from the Office of the President, but the latter forwarded the case to the
HLURB. In view of the foregoing, we find that in this particular case, there was no need for
SSHA to exhaust all administrative remedies before seeking judicial relief.
On the second issue, the petitioner claims that respondent SSHA failed to present any
evidence showing that it is a legally organized juridical entity, authorized by law to sue or
be sued in its own name. Thus, pursuant to Section 1, Rule 324 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, it has no legal capacity to file this suit before the HLURB and the Court of
Appeals.
SSHA counters that it has the capacity to sue as an association, since it is a member of
the Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., which is registered with the
Securities and Exchange Commission. In the alternative, the individual members of SSHA
who signed both the resolution and the complaint in this case may, as natural persons,
pursue the action.
There is merit in petitioner’s contention. Under Section 1, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of
Court, only natural or juridical persons, or entities authorized by law may be parties in a
civil action. Article 4425 of the Civil Code enumerates the various classes of juridical
persons. Under said Article, an association is considered a juridical person if the law
grants it a personality separate and distinct from that of its members.26 The records of the
present case are bare of any showing by SSHA that it is an association duly organized
under Philippine law. It was thus an error for the HLURB-NCR Office to give due course to
the complaint in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821, given the SSHA’s lack of capacity
to sue in its own name. Nor was it proper for said agency to treat the complaint as a suit
by all the parties who signed and verified the complaint. The members cannot represent
their association in any suit without valid and legal authority. Neither can their signatures
confer on the association any legal capacity to sue. Nor will the fact that SSHA belongs to
the Federation of Valenzuela Homeowners Association, Inc., suffice to endow SSHA with
the personality and capacity to sue. Mere allegations of membership in a federation are
insufficient and inconsequential. The federation itself has a separate juridical personality
and was not impleaded as a party in HLURB Case No. REM-070297-9821 nor in this
case. Neither was it shown that the federation was authorized to represent SSHA. Facts
showing the capacity of a party to sue or be sued or the authority of a party to sue or be
sued in a representative capacity or the legal existence of an organized association of
persons that is made a party, must be averred.27 Hence, for failing to show that it is a
juridical entity, endowed by law with capacity to bring suits in its own name, SSHA is
devoid of any legal capacity, whatsoever, to institute any action.
Anent the third issue, the petitioner ascribes error to the appellate court for holding that
P.D. No. 957 has retroactive application. She points out that there is no retroactivity
provision in the said decree. Hence, it cannot be applied retroactively pursuant to Article
428 of the Civil Code of the Philippines. The same holds true for P.D. No. 1216, which
amended Section 31 of P.D. No. 957 and imposed the open space requirement in
subdivisions. Petitioner stresses that P.D. No. 1216 only took effect on October 14, 1977
or more than ten (10) years after the approval of the subdivision plans of Cecilio Santos.
Although it may seem that this particular issue, given our ruling on the first issue regarding
the lack of capacity of SSHA to bring any action in its name, is now moot and academic,
we are constrained to still address it.
This petition was brought to us not by respondent SSHA but by Gloria Santos Dueñas who
assails the appellate court’s finding that our ruling in Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon29 allows
P.D. No. 957, as amended, to apply retroactively.
We find merit in petitioner’s contention.
Eugenio v. Exec. Sec. Drilon is inapplicable. It is not on all fours with the instant case. The
issue in Eugenio was the applicability of P.D. No. 957 to purchase agreements on lots
entered into prior to its enactment where there was non-payment of amortizations, and
failure to develop the subdivision. We held therein that although P.D. No. 957 does not
provide for any retroactive application, nonetheless, the intent of the law of protecting the
helpless citizens from the manipulations and machinations of unscrupulous subdivision
and condominium sellers justify its retroactive application to contracts entered into prior to
its enactment. Hence, we ruled that the non-payment of amortizations was justified under
Section 23 of the said decree in view of the failure of the subdivision owner to develop the
subdivision project.
Unlike Eugenio, non-development of the subdivision is not present in this case, nor any
allegation of non-payment of amortizations. Further, we have held in a subsequent
case30 that P.D. No. 957, as amended, cannot be applied retroactively in view of the
absence of any express provision on its retroactive application. Thus:
…Article 4 of the Civil Code provides that laws shall have no retroactive effect,
unless the contrary is provided. Thus, it is necessary that an express provision
for its retroactive application must be made in the law. There being no such
provision in both P.D. Nos. 957 and 1344, these decrees cannot be applied to a
situation that occurred years before their promulgation….
At any rate, our principal concern in this case is Section 31 of P.D. No. 957, an
amendment introduced by P.D. No. 1216. Properly, the question should focus
on the retroactivity of P.D. No. 1216 and not P.D. No. 957 per se.
We have examined the text of P.D. No. 1216 and nowhere do we find any clause or
provision expressly providing for its retroactive application. Basic is the rule that no
statute, decree, ordinance, rule or regulation shall be given retrospective effect unless
explicitly stated.31 Hence, there is no legal basis to hold that P.D. No. 1216 should apply
retroactively.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 51601 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Decision of the HLURB dated January 20, 1999 sustaining that of its Regional Office
is AFFIRMED and REINSTATED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 158298               August 11, 2010
ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner, 
vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the
marriage of his deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the
legal issue to be determined in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that
purpose has been dismissed by the lower courts on the ground that he, not being a party
in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action.
Antecedents
On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan,
Masbate a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on
December 26, 1949 between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila
Honato.1 The case was docketed as Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for
Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro
Ablaza, petitioner.
The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been
celebrated without a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9,
1950, thereby rendering the marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a
marriage license. He insisted that his being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had
died without any issue entitled him to one-half of the real properties acquired by
Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in interest; and that any
person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between Cresenciano
and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.2
Ruling of the RTC
On October 18, 2000, 3 the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:
Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to
DISMISS the petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had
long prescribed) and 2) petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev.
Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).
SO ORDERED.
The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the
motion for reconsideration on November 14, 2000.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:
The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the
petitioner is not a party to the marriage.
In its decision dated January 30, 2003,4 however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of
the RTC, thus:
While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning
does not prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the
proper party, which in this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the
instant case, the petition was filed by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse,
who is not a party to the marriage contracted by Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.
The contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a real party in interest under
Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to be benefited or
injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage
will not prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the case.
Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the
subject petition. More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not
even impleaded as a party to said case.
WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are
hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner-appellant.
SO ORDERED.5
Hence, this appeal.
Issues
The petitioner raises the following issues:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF
DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 49 AT
CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS IN CA-G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON
EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.
The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the
action to seek the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give
rise to the mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law
prescribes the requisites of a valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested
according to the law in force at the time the marriage is contracted.6 As a general rule, the
nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be changed by a subsequent
amendment of the governing law.7 To illustrate, a marriage between a stepbrother and a
stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the Family
Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of
a marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the
Civil Code. The Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a
marriage is governed by the law in force at the time of the marriage ceremony.8
Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of
Administrative Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15,
2003.
Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or wife. Such limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages
covered by the Family Code and those solemnized under the regime of the Civil
Code.9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to marriages covered by the
Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural rule that is
prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003.10
Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a
marriage are excepted from the limitation, to wit:
 1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any issue that may arise in the case.
02-11-10-SC; and When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is necessary even if the
purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment declaring
such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.13
Code and, those celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March
15, 2003.
It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes
cannot be construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the
Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on
absolute nullity of a marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be
December 26, 1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time
the party who stands to be benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the
of the celebration of the marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the
suit, for it is basic in procedural law that every action must be prosecuted and defended in
marriage as having the right to initiate the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage
the name of the real party in interest.15 Thus, only the party who can demonstrate a
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no application to the petitioner.
"proper interest" can file the action.16Interest within the meaning of the rule means material
interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the case, as
The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
nullity of a marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog,12 the children were One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as
allowed to file after the death of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of plaintiff in an action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is
their father’s marriage to their stepmother contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of dismissible on the ground of lack of cause of action.17
a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished between a void marriage and a
voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned, thuswise:
Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir.
Assuming that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material
Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to interest in the estate of Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the
establish the nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to suit. Indeed, a brother like the petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of
restore the parties to their original rights or to make the marriage void but though no succession, has the right to succeed to the estate of a deceased brother under the
sentence of avoidance be absolutely necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil Code, as follows:
society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it is expedient that the nullity of the
marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court of competent
Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or
jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
widower, the latter shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever
sisters or their children to the other half.
taken place. And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be
maintained in any proceeding in which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct
or collateral, in any civil court between any parties at any time, whether before or after the Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving
death of either or both the husband and the wife, and upon mere proof of the facts spouse, the collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in
rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-existent by the accordance with the following articles.
courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either,
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate
the marriage cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the
children of the deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to
Family Code expressly provides that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a
the deceased’s estate.18 Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the
previous marriage, though void, before a party can enter into a second marriage and such
action hinges upon a prior determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants,
absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to that effect. For the same reason,
ascendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the
the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of absolute nullity of
late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior determination must be made by the trial
marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the cause
court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.
of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in
However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare
this case. We reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any,
a marriage an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination
may not be prejudiced.
of heirship, legitimacy or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property
regime, or a criminal case for that matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage
even in a suit not directly instituted to question the same so long as it is essential to the
Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the time of his death as
Cresenciano’s surviving wife,19stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her well as whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late Cresenciano
own marriage. It is relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed
the old Civil Code required accordingly.

a marriage license for their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the No costs of suit.
more necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated
without a marriage license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage
SO ORDERED.
excepted from the requirement of a marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party
who must be joined herein:
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice
xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of
judicial power.1avvphi1 It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court
[that] the action should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all
subsequent actions of the court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the
absent parties but even as to those present.21
G.R. No. 163707             September 15, 2006

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025
MICHAEL C. GUY, petitioner, 
entitled Heirs of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v.
vs.
Spouses Isidro and Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. SIXTO MARELLA, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC,
the legal owners of the property involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025
Branch 138, Makati City and minors, KAREN DANES WEI and KAMILLE DANES WEI,
was decided on November 26, 2009, and the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was
represented by their mother, REMEDIOS OANES,respondents.
denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the petitioner is reasonably
presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were the wife
and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another DECISION
indispensable party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely
affect. The petitioner should likewise implead Leila.
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action,
however, considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither
misjoinder nor non-joinder of parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead her, for under the same
rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may be made "on motion of any
party or on (the trial court’s) own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as
are just."
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.
We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of
Appeals.
Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its
records are returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for
further proceedings, with instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory
pleading in order to implead Leonila Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as
parties-defendants; then to determine whether the late Cresenciano Ablaza had any
This petition for review on certiorari assails the January 22, 2004 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742, which affirmed the Orders dated July 21, 20002 and
July 17, 20033 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138 in SP Proc. Case No.
4549 denying petitioner's motion to dismiss; and its May 25, 2004 Resolution4 denying
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.
The facts are as follows:
On June 13, 1997, private respondent-minors Karen Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei,
represented by their mother Remedios Oanes (Remedios), filed a petition for letters of
administration5 before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City, Branch 138. The case was
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 4549 and entitled Intestate Estate of Sima Wei(a.k.a. Rufino
Guy Susim).
Private respondents alleged that they are the duly acknowledged illegitimate children of
Sima Wei, who died intestate in Makati City on October 29, 1992, leaving an estate valued
at P10,000,000.00 consisting of real and personal properties. His known heirs are his
surviving spouse Shirley Guy and children, Emy, Jeanne, Cristina, George and Michael,
all surnamed Guy. Private respondents prayed for the appointment of a regular
administrator for the orderly settlement of Sima Wei's estate. They likewise prayed that, in
the meantime, petitioner Michael C. Guy, son of the decedent, be appointed as Special
Administrator of the estate. Attached to private respondents' petition was a Certification
Against Forum Shopping6 signed by their counsel, Atty. Sedfrey A. Ordoñez.
In his Comment/Opposition,7 petitioner prayed for the dismissal of the petition. He
asserted that his deceased father left no debts and that his estate can be settled without
securing letters of administration pursuant to Section 1, Rule 74 of the Rules of Court. He
further argued that private respondents should have established their status as illegitimate
children during the lifetime of Sima Wei pursuant to Article 175 of the Family Code.
The other heirs of Sima Wei filed a Joint Motion to Dismiss8 on the ground that the
certification against forum shopping should have been signed by private respondents and
not their counsel. They contended that Remedios should have executed the certification
on behalf of her minor daughters as mandated by Section 5, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court.
In a Manifestation/Motion as Supplement to the Joint Motion to Dismiss,9 petitioner and his
co-heirs alleged that private respondents' claim had been paid, waived, abandoned or
otherwise extinguished by reason of Remedios' June 7, 1993 Release and Waiver of
Claim stating that in exchange for the financial and educational assistance received from
petitioner, Remedios and her minor children discharge the estate of Sima Wei from any
and all liabilities.
The Regional Trial Court denied the Joint Motion to Dismiss as well as the Supplemental
Motion to Dismiss. It ruled that while the Release and Waiver of Claim was signed by
Remedios, it had not been established that she was the duly constituted guardian of her
minor daughters. Thus, no renunciation of right occurred. Applying a liberal application of
the rules, the trial court also rejected petitioner's objections on the certification against
forum shopping.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration but was denied. He filed a petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals which affirmed the orders of the Regional Trial Court in its
assailed Decision dated January 22, 2004, the dispositive portion of which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is hereby DENIED
DUE COURSE and accordingly DISMISSED, for lack of merit. Consequently,
the assailed Orders dated July 21, 2000 and July 17, 2003 are hereby both
AFFIRMED. Respondent Judge is hereby DIRECTED to resolve the controversy
over the illegitimate filiation of the private respondents (sic) minors [-] Karen
Oanes Wei and Kamille Oanes Wei who are claiming successional rights in the
intestate estate of the deceased Sima Wei, a.k.a. Rufino Guy Susim.
SO ORDERED.10
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, hence, this petition.
Petitioner argues that the Court of Appeals disregarded existing rules on certification
against forum shopping; that the Release and Waiver of Claim executed by Remedios
released and discharged the Guy family and the estate of Sima Wei from any claims or
liabilities; and that private respondents do not have the legal personality to institute the
petition for letters of administration as they failed to prove their filiation during the lifetime
of Sima Wei in accordance with Article 175 of the Family Code.
Private respondents contend that their counsel's certification can be considered
substantial compliance with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping, and that the
petition raises no new issues to warrant the reversal of the decisions of the Regional Trial
Court and the Court of Appeals.
The issues for resolution are: 1) whether private respondents' petition should be dismissed
for failure to comply with the rules on certification of non-forum shopping; 2) whether the
Release and Waiver of Claim precludes private respondents from claiming their
successional rights; and 3) whether private respondents are barred by prescription from
proving their filiation.
The petition lacks merit.
Rule 7, Section 5 of the Rules of Court provides that the certification of non-forum
shopping should be executed by the plaintiff or the principal party. Failure to comply with
the requirement shall be cause for dismissal of the case. However, a liberal application of
the rules is proper where the higher interest of justice would be served. In Sy Chin v.
Court of Appeals,11 we ruled that while a petition may have been flawed where the
certificate of non-forum shopping was signed only by counsel and not by the party, this
procedural lapse may be overlooked in the interest of substantial justice.12 So it is in the
present controversy where the merits13 of the case and the absence of an intention to
violate the rules with impunity should be considered as compelling reasons to temper the
strict application of the rules.
As regards Remedios' Release and Waiver of Claim, the same does not bar private
respondents from claiming successional rights. To be valid and effective, a waiver must be
couched in clear and unequivocal terms which leave no doubt as to the intention of a party
to give up a right or benefit which legally pertains to him. A waiver may not be attributed to
a person when its terms do not explicitly and clearly evince an intent to abandon a right.14
In this case, we find that there was no waiver of hereditary rights. The Release and Waiver
of Claim does not state with clarity the purpose of its execution. It merely states that
Remedios received P300,000.00 and an educational plan for her minor daughters "by way
of financial assistance and in full settlement of any and all claims of whatsoever nature
and kind x x x against the estate of the late Rufino Guy Susim."15 Considering that the
document did not specifically mention private respondents' hereditary share in the estate
of Sima Wei, it cannot be construed as a waiver of successional rights.
Moreover, even assuming that Remedios truly waived the hereditary rights of private
respondents, such waiver will not bar the latter's claim. Article 1044 of the Civil Code,
provides:
ART. 1044. Any person having the free disposal of his property may accept or
repudiate an inheritance.
Any inheritance left to minors or incapacitated persons may be accepted
by their parents or guardians. Parents or guardians may repudiate the
inheritance left to their wards only by judicial authorization.
The right to accept an inheritance left to the poor shall belong to the persons
designated by the testator to determine the beneficiaries and distribute the
property, or in their default, to those mentioned in Article 1030. (Emphasis
supplied)
Parents and guardians may not therefore repudiate the inheritance of their wards without
judicial approval. This is because repudiation amounts to an alienation of property16 which
must pass the court's scrutiny in order to protect the interest of the ward. Not having been
judicially authorized, the Release and Waiver of Claim in the instant case is void and will
not bar private respondents from asserting their rights as heirs of the deceased.
Furthermore, it must be emphasized that waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right. Where one lacks knowledge of a right, there is no basis upon which waiver of
it can rest. Ignorance of a material fact negates waiver, and waiver cannot be established
by a consent given under a mistake or misapprehension of fact.17
In the present case, private respondents could not have possibly waived their
successional rights because they are yet to prove their status as acknowledged
illegitimate children of the deceased. Petitioner himself has consistently denied that private
respondents are his co-heirs. It would thus be inconsistent to rule that they waived their
hereditary rights when petitioner claims that they do not have such right. Hence,
petitioner's invocation of waiver on the part of private respondents must fail.
Anent the issue on private respondents' filiation, we agree with the Court of Appeals that a
ruling on the same would be premature considering that private respondents have yet to
present evidence. Before the Family Code took effect, the governing law on actions for
recognition of illegitimate children was Article 285 of the Civil Code, to wit:
ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only
during the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:
(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which
case the latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from
the attainment of his majority;
(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of
which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the
child.
In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of
the document. (Emphasis supplied)
We ruled in Bernabe v. Alejo18 that illegitimate children who were still minors at the time
the Family Code took effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are given
the right to seek recognition for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age.
This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.19
On the other hand, Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which superseded
Article 285 of the Civil Code, provide:
ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the
following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved
by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws.
ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his
or her lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during
minority or in a state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of
five years within which to institute the action.
The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the
death of either or both of the parties.
ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the
same way and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173,
except when the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in
which case the action may be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent.
Under the Family Code, when filiation of an illegitimate child is established by a record of other persons who might take by inheritance are before the court; and the
birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment, or an admission of filiation in a declaration of heirship is appropriate to such proceedings.
public document or a private handwritten instrument signed by the parent concerned, the
action for recognition may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime. However, if the
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated January 22, 2004 of
action is based upon open and continuous possession of the status of an illegitimate child,
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 79742 affirming the denial of petitioner's motion
or any other means allowed by the rules or special laws, it may only be brought during the
to dismiss; and its Resolution dated May 25, 2004 denying petitioner's motion for
lifetime of the alleged parent.
reconsideration, are AFFIRMED. Let the records be REMANDED to the Regional Trial
Court of Makati City, Branch 138 for further proceedings.
It is clear therefore that the resolution of the issue of prescription depends on the type of
evidence to be adduced by private respondents in proving their filiation. However, it would
SO ORDERED.
be impossible to determine the same in this case as there has been no reception of
evidence yet. This Court is not a trier of facts. Such matters may be resolved only by the
Regional Trial Court after a full-blown trial. Panganiban, C.J., Chairperson, Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., Chico-Nazario, J.J., concur.

While the original action filed by private respondents was a petition for letters of
administration, the trial court is not precluded from receiving evidence on private
respondents' filiation. Its jurisdiction extends to matters incidental and collateral to the
exercise of its recognized powers in handling the settlement of the estate, including the
determination of the status of each heir.20 That the two causes of action, one to compel
recognition and the other to claim inheritance, may be joined in one complaint is not new
in our jurisprudence.21 As held in Briz v. Briz:22
The question whether a person in the position of the present plaintiff can in any
event maintain a complex action to compel recognition as a natural child and at
the same time to obtain ulterior relief in the character of heir, is one which in the
opinion of this court must be answered in the affirmative, provided always that
the conditions justifying the joinder of the two distinct causes of action are
present in the particular case. In other words, there is no absolute necessity
requiring that the action to compel acknowledgment should have been instituted
and prosecuted to a successful conclusion prior to the action in which that same
plaintiff seeks additional relief in the character of heir. Certainly, there is nothing
so peculiar to the action to compel acknowledgment as to require that a rule
should be here applied different from that generally applicable in other cases. x
xx
The conclusion above stated, though not heretofore explicitly formulated by this
court, is undoubtedly to some extent supported by our prior decisions. Thus, we
have held in numerous cases, and the doctrine must be considered well settled,
that a natural child having a right to compel acknowledgment, but who has not
been in fact acknowledged, may maintain partition proceedings for the division
of the inheritance against his coheirs (Siguiong vs. Siguiong, 8 Phil., 5; Tiamson
vs. Tiamson, 32 Phil., 62); and the same person may intervene in proceedings
for the distribution of the estate of his deceased natural father, or mother
(Capistrano vs. Fabella, 8 Phil., 135; Conde vs. Abaya, 13 Phil., 249; Ramirez
vs. Gmur, 42 Phil., 855). In neither of these situations has it been thought
necessary for the plaintiff to show a prior decree compelling acknowledgment.
The obvious reason is that in partition suits and distribution proceedings the
G.R. No. 140500               January 21, 2002
ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner, 
vs.
CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN
BERNABE, respondent.
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:
The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were
still minors at the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The
minors have up to four years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for
recognition.
Statement of the Case
Before us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
praying for (1) the nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals2 (CA) Decision3 in CA-
GR CV No. 51919 and the October 14, 1999 CA Resolution4 denying petitioner’s Motion
for Reconsideration, as well as (2) the reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109) concerning the same case. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:
"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case
No. 94-0562 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to
the lower court for trial on the merits."5
 The Facts I

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:
"The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-
three (23) years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September
18, 1981 and was named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while
his wife Rosalina died on December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole
surviving heir.
"On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that
Adrian be declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he
(Adrian) be given his share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now being held by
Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.
"On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the
provisions of the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the
complaint is now barred x x x."6
"Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the
legitimate daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after
the putative father’s death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by
the latter.
II
"Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four
years from the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art.
285 of the Civil Code, in complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the
Family Code and the applicable jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.
III
"Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for
failure to implead the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents."9

Orders of the Trial Court

The Court’s Ruling

In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabe’s Motion for
The Petition has no merit.
Reconsideration of the trial court’s Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for
recognition. Citing Article 175 of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the
putative father had barred the action. First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition

In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had
not acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition
should have been filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity
to either affirm or deny the child’s filiation.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.
Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because
Article 285 of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code.
She argues that the latter Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right
would be impaired. We do not agree.

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as
be allowed to prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy follows:
was born in 1981, his rights are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an
action for recognition to be filed within four years after the child has attained the age of
"ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during
majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family Code did not take away that right.
the lifetime of the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

Hence, this appeal.7

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the
latter may file the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment
Issues of his majority;

In her Memorandum,8 petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

 (2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of
which nothing had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the
child.
"In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the
document."
The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted
by Articles 172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:
"ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:
(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or
(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private
handwritten instrument and signed by the parent concerned.
"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:
(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or
(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws."
"ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her
lifetime and shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a
state of insanity. In these cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to
institute the action.
"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of
either or both of the parties."
"ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way
and on the same, evidence as legitimate children.
"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when
the action is based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may
be brought during the lifetime of the alleged parent."
Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought
within the lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether
the former was still a minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the
new Code a chance to dispute the claim, considering that "illegitimate children are usually
begotten and raised in secrecy and without the legitimate family being aware of their
existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the opportunity to affirm or deny
the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already dead."10
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested
prior to its enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:
"ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or
impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."
The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrian’s right to an action for
recognition, which was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior
to the enactment of the Family Code. Our answer is affirmative.
A vested right is defined as "one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the
exercise of which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not
dependent upon a contingency x x x."11 Respondent however contends that the filing of an
action for recognition is procedural in nature and that "as a general rule, no vested right
may attach to [or] arise from procedural laws."12
Bustos v. Lucero13 distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:
"x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be
said to be synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one
enjoys under the legal system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law
is that part of the law which creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the
rights and duties which give rise to a cause of action; that part of the law which courts are
established to administer; as opposed to adjective or remedial law, which prescribes the
method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their invasion."14 (Citations omitted)
Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,15 the Court laid down the test for determining whether a
rule is procedural or substantive:
"[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and
procedure of the lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the
test is whether the rule really regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for
enforcing rights and duties recognized by substantive law and for justly administering
remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If the rule takes away a vested
right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to appeal, it may be
classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure."16
Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a
substantive law, as it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four
years from attaining majority age. Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take
Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition, because that right had already vested prior
to its enactment.
Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals17 is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff
therein sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a minor. On the
other hand, in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals18 the Court ruled that an action for
recognition filed while the Civil Code was in effect should not be affected by the
subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because the right had already vested.
Not Limited to Natural Children
To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of "natural"
children. Thus, petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by respondent,
because at the time of his conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each
other. In other words, he is not a natural child.
A "natural child" is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by
any legal impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,19 the
Court explained:
"A child’s parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of
conception for him to qualify as a ‘natural child.’"20
A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this
Court in the aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for recognition
even if their parents were disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint
averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz
Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an
action for recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and 1963, while the alleged
putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of their conception, the two children’s
parents were legally disqualified from marrying each other. The Court allowed the
Complaint to prosper, even though it had been filed almost a year after the death of the
presumed father. At the time of his death, both children were still minors.
Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,21 the Court said that the rules on
voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive
period for filing such action, may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent
portions of the case are quoted hereunder:
"The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children,
commonly known as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of
wedlock to a married woman cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a
married man cohabiting with a woman other than his wife. They are entitled to support and
successional rights. But their filiation must be duly proven.
"How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation
of the paternity or maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in
articles 283 and 284 of the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory
recognition of natural children are applicable to spurious children.
"Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on
proof of filiation of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory
acknowledgment for natural children may be applied to spurious children.
"That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used
with respect to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for
the acknowledgment of natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious
children.
"A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement
before a court of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary
recognition of natural children.
"In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his
filiation may be established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory
recognition prescribed in the aforementioned articles 283 and 284.
"The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of
natural children, as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious
children."22 (Citations omitted, italics supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over
spurious ones.23 However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights,
including the right to recognition granted by Article 285.
To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took
effect and whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek
recognition (under Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from
attaining majority age. This vested right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of
the Family Code.
Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not
have filed suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent
aptly points out in his Memorandum,24 the State as parens patriae should protect a minor’s
right. Born in 1981, Adrian was only seven years old when the Family Code took effect
and only twelve when his alleged father died in 1993. The minor must be given his day in
court.
Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA
Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required to
implead "the lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents." Under
Section 3, however, the lower tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition.
Hence, the failure of petitioner to implead the Court of Appeals as a party is not a
reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, (Chairman), Sandoval-Gutierrez, and Carpio, JJ., concur.
Vitug, J., no part. Relationship with family.
G.R. No. 127406               November 27, 2000
OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,  appears indisputable that private respondent and petitioner had a church wedding
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of
Appeals in C.A. – G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring the marriage contract between private respondent
Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null and void ab initio. It also ordered private
respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their children Faye Eloise Reyes
and Rachel Anne Reyes.
As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina
Villanueva in a civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church
wedding on August 27, 1977. However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic
Relations Court of Quezon City declared their marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a
valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27, 1977, was also declared null
and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.
Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private
respondent wed Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated
by the judge of the City Court of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding
in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig,
Branch 160, praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged
that they had no marriage license when they got married. He also averred that at the time
he married petitioner, he was still married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he
married petitioner the decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued.
The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was rendered only on August 4, 1980,
while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.
Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that
their marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their
Marriage License No. 5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12
and 12-A. He did not question this document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner
also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City
dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil marriage to Anna Maria
Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to said Anna
Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence during trial and,
according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact
that the civil marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979,
before the judgment declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also
ceremony on April 4, 1982.1
The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and declared his marriage to
herein petitioner null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both
parties appealed to respondent Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court
affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that a judicial declaration of nullity of the first
marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a subsequent marriage could be
validly contracted. Said the appellate court:
We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendant’s counsel that ‘no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages.’ It does not say, however,
that a second marriage may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is true that if
a marriage is null and void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are
unwilling to rule that the matter of whether a marriage is valid or not is for each married
spouse to determine for himself – for this would be the consequence of allowing a spouse
to proceed to a second marriage even before a competent court issues a judicial decree of
nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the least, and could not
have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code on
marriage.
xxx
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this
wise:
1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent]
Eduardo M. Reyes and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is
declared null and void ab initio;
2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the
amount of P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne
Reyes from November 4, 1991; and
 3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.
SO ORDERED.2
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting
that the Court of Appeals erred:
I.
BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE
VALIDITY OF PETITIONER’S MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL
DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY LAW.
II
IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT
OF APPEALS.
III
IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE
CIVIL EFFECTS OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE
SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.
IV
IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES
TO THE DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.
The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is
required before a subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this
question, we shall go over applicable laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the
assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which we shall discuss jointly.
In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to
private respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage
between private respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim
that People v. Mendoza3 and People v. Aragon4 are applicable in this case. For these
cases held that where a marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is
necessary to establish its invalidity. But the appellate court said these cases, decided
before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as amended by E.O No. 227), no
longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into the provisions of
law previously obtaining.5
In refusing to consider petitioner’s appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:
Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this
case. Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of
the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.
xxx
For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second
marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is
essential. . . .6
At the outset, we must note that private respondent’s first and second marriages
contracted in 1977 and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil
Code. The present case differs significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v.
Bobis7 and Mercado v. Tan,8 both involving a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous
marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the Family Code,9 under which a judicial
declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.
Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first
spouse of such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and
void from its performance, unless:
(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or
(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of
the second marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee
being alive, or if the absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven
years, is generally considered as dead and before any person believed to be so
by the spouse present at the time of contracting such subsequent marriage, or if
the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and 391. The marriage
so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and void
by a competent court.
As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil
Code contains no express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however,
appears to be conflicting.
Originally, in People v. Mendoza,10 and People v. Aragon,11 this Court held that no judicial
decree is necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the
same factual milieu. Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his
first marriage. After the death of his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during
the subsistence of the second marriage. The second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy.
The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the second marriage is void, having been
contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is no need for a judicial
declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and the
first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages.
Hence, there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it
is not for the spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not.
In Gomez v. Lipana,12 and Consuegra v. Consuegra,13 however, we recognized the right of
the second wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired
estate and in proceeds of the retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed
that although the second marriage can be presumed to be void ab initio as it was
celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there was a need for judicial
declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the husband
supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in the
estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.14
But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),15 the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as
precedents. We exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that
his marriage to Filomena Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already
previously married to one Eliseo Portales in February of the same year. The Court held
that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages. This ruling
was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.16
Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),17 the Court held that there is a need for a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In
1978, she married another man, Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic
Relations Court to declare his marriage to Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid
marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra, concluded that:18
There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her
first husband at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void
still needs according to this Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and
for all legal intents and purposes she would still be regarded as a married woman at the
time she contracted her marriage with respondent Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the
marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID under the law. (Emphasis
supplied).
In Yap v. Court of Appeals,19 however, the Court found the second marriage void without
need of judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.
At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code.
Our rulings in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of
the Family Code.20 Article 40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of
nullity of marriage –
Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
In Terre v. Terre (1992)21 the Court, applying Gomez,
Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a judicial declaration of nullity of a void
marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for contracting a bigamous marriage
during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first marriage in 1977 was
void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre should have
known that the prevailing case law is that "for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was
null and void ab initio is essential."
The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of
Appeals (1993),22 the Court held:
Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the
matter. A declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a
cause of action or a ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute
nullity of a previous marriage is sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second
marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law for said projected marriage to be free from legal
infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40;
See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148).23
However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the
case. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)24 the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of
immorality for entering into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage
was void since he was merely forced into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On
the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We
held that since the second marriage took place and all the children thereunder were born
before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code, there is no need
for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence
at that time.
Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into
in 1979, before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat,
Mendoza and Aragon. The first marriage of private respondent being void for lack of
license and consent, there was no need for judicial declaration of its nullity before he could
contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we conclude that private respondent’s
second marriage to petitioner is valid.
Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to
the present case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her
children. As held in Jison v. Court of Appeals,25 the Family Code has retroactive
effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In the present case, that impairment of
vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent. Additionally, we are not quite
prepared to give assent to the appellate court’s finding that despite private respondent’s
"deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her
silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein
petitioner married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier
in the civil ceremony, we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier
petitioner claimed as untruthful private respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner but
they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we find there was a marriage license, though it G.R. No. 125932 April 21, 1999
was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in both the civil and the church
rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil marriage. As
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioners 
petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and
vs.
salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed
CLAUDE A. MILLER and JUMRUS S. MILLER, respondents.
to raise this matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does
not prevent the appellate court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She
adds that the interest of the State in protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and  
social institution, outweighs such technicality. In our view, petitioner and private
respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for a valid marriage,
PARDO, J
including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this
license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the
ceremonial use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we The Republic of the Philippines, through the Solicitor General, appealed originally to the
hold that the latter rites served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate Court of Appeals from a decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City,
court might have its reasons for brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant granting the petition of respondent spouses to adopt the minor Michael Magno Madayag.
below which undoubtedly could have tendered a valid issue, but which was not timely
interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded we cannot play blind to
the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA calls "his own In its decision promulgated on April 17, 1996, the Court of Appeals certified the case to the
deceit and perfidy." Supreme Court because the petition raised only questions of law.

On the matter of petitioner’s counterclaim for damages and attorney’s
fees.1âwphi1 Although the appellate court admitted that they found private respondent
acted "duplicitously and craftily" in marrying petitioner, it did not award moral damages
because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her claim.26
Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the
present case, but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent
held valid and subsisting. She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the
same breath, she asks for damages from her husband for filing a baseless complaint for
annulment of their marriage which caused her mental anguish, anxiety, besmirched
reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we grant her prayer,
we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal or
common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not
common sense, militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend
an action for damages between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital
obligation.27There are other remedies.28
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated July 24, 1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so
that the marriage of petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is
hereby DECLARED VALID AND SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of
P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly support to their two children, Faye
Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of minor age or otherwise
legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.
By resolution adopted on September 23, 1996, we accepted the appeal. We shall treat the
appeal as one via certiorari from a decision of the regional trial court under Supreme Court
Circular 2-90, dated March 9, 1990, on pure questions of law.
The facts are undisputed and may be related as follows:
On July 29, 1988, the spouses Claude A. Miller and Jumrus S. Miller, filed with the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 59, Angeles City, a verified petition to adopt the minor
Michael Magno Madayag.
The trial court scheduled the petition for hearing on September 9, 1988, at 9:00 in the
morning. At the hearing, with the attendance of an assistant city fiscal of Angeles City, in
representation of the Solicitor General, respondents adduced evidence showing that:
Claude A. Miller, 38 years old and Jumrus S. Miller, 40 years of age,
both American citizens, are husband and wife, having been married
on June 21, 1982.
They were childless and "do not expect to have sibling out of their
union on account of a medical problem of the wife."
Claude A. Miller was a member of the United States Air Force, as
airman first class, assigned at Clark Air Base since January 26, 1985.

SO ORDERED.
The family maintains their residence at Don Bonifacio Subdivision,
Balibago, Angeles City, since 1985. 1
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Mendoza, Buena, and De Leon, Jr., JJ., concur.
 The minor Michael Magno Madayag is the legitimate son of Marcelo
S. Madayag, Jr. and Zenaida Magno. Born on July 14, 1987, at San
Fernando, La Union, the minor has been in the custody of
respondents since the first week of August 1987. Poverty and deep
concern for the future of their son prompted the natural parents who
have no visible means of livelihood to have their child adopted by
respondents. They executed affidavits giving their irrevocable consent
to the adoption by respondents.
The Department of Social Welfare and Development, through its
Regional office at San Fernando, Pampanga, recommended approval
of the petition on the basis of its evaluation that respondents were
morally, emotionally and financially fit to be adoptive parents and that
the adoption would be to the minor's best interest and welfare. 2
On May 12, 1989, the trial court rendered decision granting the petition for adoption, the
dispositive portion of which reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, finding that petitioners possess all the qualifications
and none of the disqualifications for adoption, the instant petition is
hereby Granted, and this Court decrees the minor MICHAEL MAGNO
MADAYAG freed from all obligation of obedience and support with
respect to natural parents and is hereby declared the child of the
herein petitioners by adoption. The minor's surname shall be changed
from "MADAYAG" to "MILLER", which is the surname of the herein  objective of the law. 12
petitioners. 3
In due time, the Solicitor General, in behalf of the Republic, interposed an appeal to the
Court of Appeals. As heretofore stated, the Court of Appeals certified the case to this
Court.
against arbitrary State action, or an innately just and imperative right which enlightened
free society, sensitive to inherent and irrefragable individual rights, cannot deny." 8 "Vested
rights include not only legal or equitable title to the enforcement of a demand, but also an
exemption from new obligations created after the right has vested. 9
As long as the petition for adoption was sufficient in form and substance in accordance
with the law in governance at the time it was filed, the court acquires jurisdiction and
retains it until it fully disposes of the case. To repeat, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the statute in force at the time of the commencement of the action. Such
jurisdiction of a court, whether in criminal or civil cases, once it attaches cannot be ousted
by a subsequent happenings or events, although of a character which would have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance. 10
Therefore, an alien who filed a petition for adoption before the effective of the Family
Code, although denied the right to adopt under Art. 184 of said Code, may continue with
his petition under the law prevailing before the Family Code. 11
Adoption statutes, being humane and salutary, hold the interests and welfare of the child
to be of paramount consideration. They are designed to provide homes, parental care and
education for unfortunate, needy or orphaned children and give them the protection of
society and family in the person of the adopter, as well as childless couples or persons to
experience the joy of parenthood and give them legally a child in the person of the
adopted for the manifestation of their natural parent instincts. Every reasonable
intendment should be sustained to promote and fulfill these noble and compassionate
WHEREFORE, we hereby AFFIRM the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 59, Angeles City, in SP. Proc. No. 3562.1âwphi1.nêt
No costs.

The issue raised is whether the court may allow aliens to adopt a Filipino child despite the
SO ORDERED.
prohibition under the Family Code, 4 effective on August 3, 1988 5 when the petition for
adoption was filed on July 29, 1988, under the provision of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code 6 which allowed aliens to adopt. Davide, Jr., C.J., Melo, Kapunan and Nares-Santiago, JJ., concur.

The issue is not new. This Court has ruled that an alien qualified to adopt under the Child
and Youth Welfare Code, which was in force at the time of the filing of the petition,
acquired a vested right which could not be affected by the subsequent enactment of a new
A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995
law disqualifying him. 7

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant, 

Consequently, the enactment of the Family Code, effective August 3, 1988, will not impair
vs.
the right of respondents who are aliens to adopt a Filipino child because the right has
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
become vested at the time of filing of the petition for adoption and shall be governed by
Manila, respondent.
the law then in force. "A vested right is one whose existence, effectivity and extent does
not depend upon events foreign to the will of the holder. The term expresses the concept
of present fixed interest which in right reason and natural justice should be protected
QUIASON, J.:
This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of
Impropriety against Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan
Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.
Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living
together at No. 34 Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in
said house, which he purchased in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.
In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping
on his (complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent
had been cohabiting with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent
and instead left the house after giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his
children.
Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the
affection of his children for him.
Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has
five children, as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities.
Furthermore, he alleges that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he
had a heated argument with De Castro inside the latter's office.
For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that
the filing of the administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air
residence, which was disputed by De Castro.
Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a
witness to the withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against
complainant. According to him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to
arrest complainant.
Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five
children with her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage
ceremony before a Nueva Ecija town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid
marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon the request of the parents of Ongkiko,
respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in Manila on June 5, 1965.
Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned respondent 17
years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.
Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California
on December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes,
that he was single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.
Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous
marriage before a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code
provides:
The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the
purposes of remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void.
Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to
him considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil
Code of the Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by
the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code
on August 3, 1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256
of the Family Code, said Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice
or impair vested or acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is
particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of procedure. Respondent has not shown
any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article 40 to his case.
The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude
their retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural
laws is not violative of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected
(Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26 SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule
no vested right may attach to, nor arise from, procedural laws (Billones v. Court of
Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).
Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the
institution of marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget
him five children.
Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law
in 1963. At the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was
already a lawyer. Yet, he never secured any marriage license. Any law student would
know that a marriage license is necessary before one can get married. Respondent was
given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first marriage when he and Ongkiko were
married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage license on these two
occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.
It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in
the legal profession.
While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a
Metropolitan Trial Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began
and continued when he was already in the judiciary.
The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff
of impropriety, not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to
his behavior as a private individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also
judged by his private life. A judge, in order to promote public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with propriety at all times, in the performance
of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial guideposts too self-evident
to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral righteousness and
uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229 SCRA
690 [1994]).
WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and
retirement benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or
agency of the government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This
decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa, C.J., Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo,
Puno, Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 184841
GERINO YUKIT, DANILO REYES, RODRIGO S. SUMILANG, LEODEGARIO O.
ROSALES, MARIO MELARPIS,1MARCELO R. OCAN, DENNIS V. BATHAN,
BERNARDO S. MAGNAYE, LORENZO U. MARTINEZ, ANTONIO M. LADERES, SOFIO
DE LOS REYES BAON, MARIO R. MIGUEL, RODOLFO S. LEOPANDO, EDGARDO N.
MACALLA, JR., MARIANO REYES, ALEJANDRO CUETO, VIRGILIO RINGOR and
JASON R. BARTE,Petitioners  employment as a result of the invalid closure of the company and were thus entitled to
vs.
TRITRAN, INC., JOSE C. ALVAREZ, JEHU C. SEBASTIAN, and JAM TRANSIT INC.,
Respondents
DECISION
SERENO, CJ.:
This Petition for Review2 involves a dispute as to the validity of the closure of respondent
Tritran, Inc. (Tritran) and the legality of the ensuing dismissal of petitioners, who were its
former employees. Petitioners seek the reversal of the Decision3 and Resolution4 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 97788. The CA affirmed the Resolution5 of the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), which set aside the earlier Decision6 of the
labor arbiter (LA) in favor of petitioners. The LA had ruled that petitioners had been
illegally dismissed by Tritran and were consequently entitled to separation benefits.
FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS
Petitioners Danilo Reyes, Rodrigo S. Sumilang, Leodegario O. Rosales, Mario R.
Melarpis, Marcelo R. Ocon, Dennis V. Bathan, Bernardo S. Magnaye, Lorenzo U.
Martinez, Antonio M. Laderes, Sofio de los Reyes Baon, Mario R. Miguel, Edgrado N.
Macalla, Jr., Alejandro Cueto, Virgilio Ringor and Jason R. Barte were formerly employed
as drivers and conductors of Tritran.7
Respondent Tritran was a corporation engaged in the business of transporting persons
and property as a common carrier.8 As such, it operated a fleet of buses in designated
routes between Metro Manila and selected areas in Batangas and Laguna.9
On 26 May 2004, Tritran sent a Notice of Closure/Cessation of Business10 to the Regional
Director, Regional Office No. IV of the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE
Regional Office), citing irreversible business losses to justify the permanent closure of the
establishment. Despite its financial condition, however, Tritran undertook to pay
separation benefits to its employees.11
A few months earlier, Tritran had informed the DOLE Regional Office of its decision to
temporarily close the establishment and cease operations effective 15 January
2004.12 The decision was made after the company had laid off a total of 114 employees in
200313 pursuant to a retrenchment program implemented to cut down costs.14 It cited
financial reverses as the reason for both the temporary closure and the retrenchment.15
In March and April 2004, petitioners filed complaints16 before the NLRC against Tritran; its
president, Jose C. Alvarez, and its vice president for finance and administration, Jehu C.
Sebastian.
In their Position Paper,17 petitioners alleged that they were illegally terminated from
reinstatement. They claimed that Tritran never ceased its business as shown by the
continued operation of its buses on the same routes under the management of JAM
Transit, Inc.,18 a company also owned by Alvarez.19 It was also alleged that the employees
of the company were asked to sign voluntary resignation letters if they wanted to avail
themselves of employment under the new management.20 To petitioners, these
circumstances proved that the closure was a mere ploy for the company to circumvent
their security of tenure and avoid its obligation to pay them separation benefits.21
In their Position Paper,22 respondents denied these allegations and asserted that the
closure was justified under Article 283 of the Labor Code. They cited the serious and
irreversible losses sustained by the company from 2000 to 2002.23 In support of this
allegation, they submitted the Audited Financial Statements (AFS) of Tritran for the years
ending 31 December 200124 and 31 December 2002,25 which were prepared by its
external auditors, Sicangco Menor Villanueva & Co. These documents showed that the
company had incurred the following losses: ₱30,023,774.45 in 2000,26 ₱37,621,961.71 in
200127 and ₱34,620,587 .61 in 2002.28 Respondents also emphasized their compliance
with the requirements of the Labor Code. For their part, Alvarez and Sebastian insisted
that they could not be held personally liable, since the closure of Tritran was based on the
"collective business judgment" of the officers of the company.29
In their Reply-Position Paper,30 petitioners emphasized that the figures contained in the
AFS were ridiculous and illogical. In particular, they questioned the fact that Tritran, a bus
company, spent around ₱10 million for security services, but paid only about ₱l.5 million
for the salaries and wages of its drivers and conductors.31 They also pointed out that there
was no evidence of the alleged sale of assets to JAM Transit; hence, the continued
operation of the buses of Tritran, even under this new management, contradicted the
alleged reason for the closure of former's business.
Respondents refuted the foregoing allegations in their Reply to Complainants' Position
Paper.32 They maintained that (a) Tritran suffered serious business losses as shown by
the AFS; and (b) JAM Transit purchased the vehicles and other assets of Tritran after the
closure.
THE RULING OF THE LA
In a Decision dated 15 August 2005,33 LA Numeriano D. Villena ruled in favor of
petitioners and awarded them full back wages, separation pay, and attorney's fees. He
observed that the AFS submitted by respondents to substantiate their supposed losses
contained "highly suspicious" expenditures for security.34 He thus gave little weight to
these documents and concluded that the closure was meant to circumvent the law on
termination of employment.35
THE RULING OF THE NLRC
On appeal,36 the NLRC initially affirmed the foregoing ruling. In a Decision37 dated 28 April
2006, it agreed with the observations of the LA with respect to the doubtful expenses
included in Tritran's AFS.38 On this basis, it concluded that serious business losses were
not sufficiently proven; therefore, the closure was not undertaken in good faith.39
Respondents sought reconsideration of the NLRC Decision on 30 May 2006.40 They
insisted that the expenses incurred by Tritran, particularly for security services, were
legitimate and justified by the need to maintain the safety of the terminals and premises of
the bus company. They also argued that there was sufficient evidence of serious business
losses, i.e., financial statements audited by independent external auditors,41 loan
agreements42 and a schedule of rollables.43
In a Resolution44 dated 18 August 2006, the NLRC granted the Motion for
Reconsideration.45 Reversing its earlier ruling, it declared that the closure of Tritran was
justified, given the serious business losses suffered by the company.46 This time, the
NLRC gave weight to the AFS as well other supporting documents submitted by
respondents.47 It also referred to its Decision in Antonio de Chavez, et al. v. Tritran, Inc., et
al.,48 in which it upheld the validity of the dismissal of certain employees of Tritran on the
basis of the closure of the company.49 Citing the principle of stare decisis, the NLRC
declared that De Chavez must be followed in this case.50
THE RULING OF THE CA
On 5 February 2007, petitioners elevated the case to the CA via a Petition
for Certiorari.51 Apart from reiterating their arguments on the incredulous figures contained
in Tritran's AFS,52 they challenged the application of De Chavez to this case. They pointed
out that (a) because De Chavez was issued two months after the NLRC had promulgated
the original Decision in this case, the ruling cannot be used as binding precedent;53 and
(b) stare decisis only applies to final decisions of the Supreme Court.54 Petitioners also
emphasized that there was no justification for the reversal of the earlier Decision, as no
new evidence or argument had been submitted.55 They particularly questioned the sudden
turnaround of the NLRC on the issue of the credibility of the AFS.56
In a Decision57 dated 18 October 2007, the CA dismissed the Petition for Certiorari. It
declared that the NLRC did not commit grave abuse of discretion when the latter reversed
its earlier Decision:
In rectifying its previous assessment of petitioners' termination of employment and
Tritran's closure or cessation of business, respondent NLRC did not commit any abuse of
discretion, much less grave. The reasons are as follows:
Petitioners reiterate their argument that no evidentiary weight should be given to the
Audited Financial Statements and supporting documents such as the Balance Sheet,
Statement of Income and Expenses and Statements of Cash Flow presented by private
respondents in substantiation of their contention of continuing irreversible financial losses
necessitating the closure of the respondent company. However, petitioners' disagreement
with respondent NLRC on the weight it gave to certain evidence is no basis to strike down
the assailed decision as capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to
lack of jurisdiction. If respondent NLRC gave more weight to Tritran's evidence, it was
simply because such evidence clearly demonstrated the facts it intended to establish.
xxxx
The respondent NLRC's decision in the Antonio De Chavez case was based on the same
facts and issues present in this case. It is thus logically expected that, after such error had
been discovered and rectified, respondent N LRC would abandon its former stance and
proceed to resolve the issues raised in the case below to the end that the latter may be
finally disposed of its merits, and to avoid possible conflicting decisions. Such
abandonment is demanded by public interest and the circumstances.58
With respect to the issues raised by petitioners concerning Tritran 's supposed losses, the
CA refused to interfere with the NLRC's assessment of the evidence presented by the
parties. The appellate court noted, however, that the suspicions brought up by petitioners
were "based on tenuous, if nonexistent evidentiary support."59 In contrast, respondents
were deemed to have proven the losses incurred by Tritran, as well as the validity of the
dismissal of the company's employees.60 Hence, the appellate court found no reason to
doubt the conclusions of the NLRC.
Petitioners sought reconsideration of the Decision. However, their motion61 was denied by
the CA in a Resolution62dated 6 October 2008.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THIS COURT
Petitioners again challenge the credibility of the evidence presented to prove Tritran 's
supposed losses63 and the applicability of the doctrine of stare decisis to this case.64 They
insist that the "sudden reversal of the NLRC's previous Decision dated 28 April 2006 was
done in such a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary and anomalous manner that it so brazenly
misapplied and violated the basic principle of stare decisis"65 and thereby warrants a
review.
In their Comment,66 respondents maintain the propriety of the CA's dismissal of the
Petition for Certiorari. They assert that there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the NLRC, since the reversal of the latter's earlier ruling was supported by law and
evidence.67 They also reiterate their arguments on the company's serious business losses,
which supposedly rendered the closure of Tritran legitimate.68
ISSUES
The following issues are presented for resolution:
1. Whether the principle of stare decisis was correctly applied by the NLRC
2. Whether the closure of Tritran was justified
3. Whether petitioners were validly dismissed from employment
OUR RULING
The Petition is DENIED.
The Court believes that the doctrine of stare decisis was erroneously applied by the NLRC
to this case, and that the CA should have rectified this error. However, we agree with the
conclusion of the CA that the NLRC did not act with grave abuse of discretion when the
latter reversed its earlier Decision. As will be further discussed, the closure of Tritran was
justified considering the serious business losses sustained by the company from 2000 to
2002. Given its legitimate closure, petitioners were validly terminated from employment.
The Court, however, deems it proper to modify the CA Decision and Resolution to take
into account Tritran 's voluntary undertaking to pay separation benefits to its terminated
employees.
The doctrine of stare decisis was
erroneously applied by the NLRC to
justify the reversal of its earlier Decision.
The doctrine of stare decisis et non quieta movere requires courts "to adhere to
precedents, and not unsettle things which are established.''69 Following this directive, when
a court has laid down a principle of law applicable to a certain state of facts, it must apply
the same principle to all future cases in which the facts sued upon are substantially the
same.70
In this case, the NLRC referred to the principle of stare decisis in its Resolution dated 18
August 2006 as one of the reasons for the reversal of its original Decision affirming the LA
ruling. As earlier discussed, it cited the Decision in De Chavez v. Tritran, Inc,. in support of
its finding that Tritran 's closure was due to serious business losses.71
The Court rejects the foregoing reasoning. We find that the stare decisis principle was
erroneously applied to this case.
It must be emphasized that only final decisions of this Court are deemed precedents72 that
form part of our legal system.73 Decisions of lower courts or other divisions of the same
court are not binding on others.74 Consequently, it was incorrect for the NLRC to
consider De Chavez - a ruling rendered by the same NLRC division - as a binding
precedent applicable to the present case.
We stress, however, that the erroneous application of the stare decisis principle to this
case does not automatically lead to the conclusion that the NLRC acted with grave abuse
of discretion when it reversed its original Decision.
The Court notes that the NLRC set aside its own ruling only after taking a second hard
look at the records; in particular, at the documentary evidence submitted by
respondents.75 Clearly, De Chavez was not the only basis of the NLRC for reversing its
original ruling. Consequently, we agree with the CA's observation that the reversal was
made pursuant to the inherent power of the NLRC to amend and control its processes and
orders, so as to make them conformable to law and justice.76
Like any other tribunal, the NLRC has the right to reverse itself, "especially when in its
honest opinion it has committed an error or mistake in judgment, and that to adhere to its
decision will cause injustice to a party litigant."77In this case, we find that there was
sufficient ground for the NLRC to reverse its original ruling.
The closure of Tritran was justified by the
serious business losses it incurred.
It is settled that employers can lawfully close their establishments at any time and for any
reason.78 The law considers the decision to close and cease business operations as a
management prerogative that courts cannot interfere with"79 Our review of this case is
therefore limited to a determination of whether the closure was made in good faith to
advance the employer's interest, and not for the purpose of circumventing the rights of the
employees.80
In this case, the Court agrees with the conclusion of the CA and the NLRC that the closure
of Tritran was legitimate, having been brought about by serious business losses as shown
in the company's AFS.
With respect to the alleged failure of respondents to submit other evidence to support their
claimed expenses, the Court agrees with the CA that they do not have this burden. Since
petitioners are the ones claiming that the expenditures are dubious and false, it is their
duty to prove their assertion. Only after the amounts spent on security services are shown
to be bloated would the burden of evidence shift to respondents. Absent any evidence that
the expenses are actually irregular, there is no basis for questioning the amounts stated in
the AFS.

In the same manner, the allegation of petitioners that Tritran 's buses continued to ply the
We have consistently ruled that a company's economic status may be established through
same routes remained unsubstantiated. We note that the LA,89 the NLRC,90 and the
the submission of financial statements.81 If prepared by independent external auditors,
CA91 all confirmed the fact of the closure and cessation of operations. None of them gave
these statements are particularly entitled to weight and credence. In Manatad v. Philippine
credence to petitioners' assertion that Tritran continued to operate its buses, albeit under
Telegraph and Telephone Corp.,82 this Court explained:
the management of JAM Transit. The Court finds no reason to reverse these conclusions.

That the financial statements are audited by independent auditors safeguards the same
Based on the foregoing, we affirm the ruling of the CA on this point. We find no grave
from the manipulation of the figures therein to suit the company's needs. The auditing of
abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in according evidentiary weight to the AFS
financial reports by independent external auditors are strictly governed by national and
and concluding that Tritran suffered serious business losses that led to its closure.
international standards and regulations for the accounting profession. It bears to stress
that the financial statements submitted by respondent were audited by reputable auditing
firms. Hence, petitioner's assertion that respondent merely manipulated its financial Petitioners were validly terminated from
statements to make it appear that it was suffering from business losses that would justify
the retrenchment is incredible and baseless.
employment.

In addition, the fact that the financial statements were audited by independent auditors
Proceeding from the conclusion that the closure of Tritran was carried out for legitimate
settles any doubt on the authenticity of these documents for lack of signature of the
reasons, this Court affirms the validity of the dismissal of petitioners from employment.
person who prepared it. As reported by SGV & Co., the financial statements presented
Article 28392 of the Labor Code expressly sanctions termination of employment due to
fairly, in all material aspects, the financial position of the respondent as of 30 June 1998
closure of establishment, subject to certain notice requirements. lf the closure is not due to
and 1997, and the results of its operations and its cash flows for the years ended, in
serious business losses or financial reverses, the company is likewise required to grant
conformity with the generally accepted accounting principles.83
separation benefits to dismissed employees.

Here, the AFS submitted by respondents were sufficient proofs of the serious business
Here, Tritran 's compliance with the notice requirement under the Labor Code has been
losses incurred by Tritran. These financial statements were prepared by Sicangco Menor
sufficiently proven. The company sent a written notice to its workers at least one month
Villanueva & Co., an independent external auditor, in accordance with generally accepted
prior to the effective date of its closure. It also informed the DOLE Regional Office of the
auditing standards.84 The AFS were also attested to as fair presentations of the financial
intended cessation of operations within the deadline.93
position of the company for the specified periods.85

The Court is aware of the objections of petitioners to the AFS on the ground that irregular
and suspiciously bloated expenses and cash advances were included therein.86 We also
note their argument that respondents failed to present receipts, vouchers, contracts, or
other documents to substantiate the figures in the financial statements.87
After judicious consideration, the Court finds that petitioners' arguments cannot prevail
over the AFS or the attestations of the independent external auditor as to the fairness and
accuracy of the figures contained therein. Bare allegations of ''suspicious figures" cannot
destroy the credibility of the documents, especially considering the strict national and
international standards governing the accounting and auditing profession.88
Since the closure of Tritran was due to serious business losses, petitioners would
ordinarily not be entitled to separation benefits under Article 283.1âwphi1 However, the
Court notes that the company voluntarily obligated itself to pay severance benefits to the
employees, notwithstanding its financial condition. In its letter to the DOLE Regional Office
and the written notices it sent to its workers, Tritran expressly promised to pay separation
benefits to the employees, less their actual accountabilities with the company. In fact, it
repeatedly alleged that it had paid its other employees these benefits94 and offered the
same remuneration to petitioners,95 as shown by photocopies of the check
vouchers96 prepared in the latter's name.
We likewise note that the undertaking to pay severance benefits was made to all affected
workers and relayed to the DOLE Regional Office even prior to the filing of this case.
Consequently, this promise must be considered a binding commitment, and not a mere
settlement offer.
Having voluntarily assumed the obligation to pay separation benefits to its terminated
employees,97 Tritran must now fulfill its obligation. The CA Decision must therefore be
modified in this respect.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for Review is DENIED. The CA Decision dated 18 October
2007 and Resolution dated 6 October 2008
are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Respondent Tritran, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay
petitioners their corresponding separation benefits less their accountabilities to the
company.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson
G.R. No. 181369
TALA REALTY SERVICES CORP., INC., PEDRO B. AGUIRRE, REMEDIOS A.
DUPASQUIER, DOLLY LIM, RUBENCITO M. DEL MUNDO AND ELIZABETH H.
PALMA, Petitioners, 
vs.
BANCO FILIPINO SAVINGS & MORTGAGE BANK, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
In G.R. No. 1883021 (2012) and the consolidated cases of G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469,
155171, 155201and1666082(2009), we applied the rule of stare decisis to deny Banco
Filipino's claims for reconveyance of various real properties based on a trust agreement
that we previously declared void in G.R. No. 1375333 (2002). This case raises the
question of whether Banco Filipino Savings & Mortgage Bank's (Banco Filipino) complaint
for reconveyance in the proceedings below is likewise precluded by stare decisis and
conclusiveness of judgment.
I In resolving this case, the sole determinative issue is whether Banco Filipino can recover
On September 5, 1995, Banco Filipino filed a complaint4 with the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila against Tala Realty Services Corporation, Inc. (Tala Realty) and the
individual petitioners. This was one of the 17 reconveyance cases instituted by Banco
Filipino against Tala Realty covering properties located in different parts of the
Philippines. 5
The complaint alleged that the properties were covered by a trust agreement between
Banco Filipino, as trustor-beneficiary, and Tala Realty, as trustee. The trust agreement
was essentially a sale and lease-back arrangement wherein Banco Filipino sold various
properties to Tala Realty, including the one located in Sta. Cruz, Manila, while the latter
concurrently leased to Banco Filipino the same property for a period of 20 years,
renewable for another 20 at the option of Banco Filipino.6 Banco Filipino admitted that the
purpose of the trust agreement was to "allow more flexibility in the opening of branches
and to enable the bank to acquire new branch [sites]," since at that time, Banco Filipino
was concerned about keeping within the 50% capital asset threshold for banks under the
General Banking Act. 7 However, sometime in August 1992, Tala Realty claimed the
property for itself and threatened to eject Banco Filipino. 8
Petitioners moved to dismiss9 the complaint based on the following grounds: forum
shopping, lack of cause of action, and pari delicto. The RTC initially denied 10 the motion
to dismiss but later reversed itself. 11 It ordered the dismissal of the complaint against
herein petitioners except Tala Realty and ordered the suspension of the proceedings in
view of our decision in G.R. No. 137533. 12 Banco Filipino moved for reconsideration
which the RTC denied. 13 Consequently, Banco Filipino elevated the case to the Court of
Appeals (CA) via Rule 65. The CA granted the petition, 14 finding that the R TC should
have hypothetically admitted the truth of the factual allegations in the complaint-including
the validity of the trust agreement-when it ruled on the motion to dismiss. 15 The CA also
said that the proceedings should not have been suspended because the matter resolved
in G.R. No. 137533, which originated from an ejectment suit, is distinct and separate from
the subject matter of the case for reconveyance. 16The CA subsequently denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 17
Hence, this appeal under Rule 45 where petitioners principally claim that Banco Filipino's
action for reconveyance is already barred by stare decisis and conclusiveness of
judgment considering the en banc decision in G.R. No. 137533, as reiterated in the April
7, 2009 consolidated decision in G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201, and
16660818 and the June 27, 2012 decision in G.R No. 188302.19 They also argue that
Banco Filipino availed of the wrong remedy when they filed a petition for certiorari with the
CA instead of an ordinary appeal. In response, 20Banco Filipino insists that it availed of the
correct mode of review and counters that G.R. No. 137533 cannot apply because it
involved an ejectment suit, which is distinct from its action for reconveyance. It cites the
final rulings in G.R. Nos. 144700,21 130184,22 139166,23 16725524 and 14470525-which
commonly held that the elements of forum shopping, litis pendentia and res judicata were
not present in Banco Filipino's various reconveyance cases-as the controlling precedents.
II
the Sta. Cruz property based on the same trust agreement which we declared void in G.R.
No. 137533.26 The issue, however, is not novel and has already been conclusively
resolved in both G.R. No. 18830227 and the consolidated cases of G.R. Nos. 130088,
131469, 155171, 155201, and 166608.28 The facts of the present case, save for the
specific parcel of land being disputed, are identical to those obtaining in these two
decisions. Therefore, the doctrines of stare decisis and conclusiveness of judgment
warrant the granting of the petition.
A
In G.R. No. 18830229 and G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201, and 166608,30 we
applied and extensively quoted the ruling in G.R. No. 13753331 that the trust agreement
between Banco Filipino and Tala Realty is void and cannot be enforced, thus:
The Bank alleges that the sale and twenty-year lease of the disputed property were part of
a larger implied trust "warehousing agreement." Concomitant with this Court's factual
finding that the 20-year contract governs the relations between the parties, we find the
Bank's allegation of circumstances surrounding its execution worthy of credence; the Bank
and Tala entered into contracts of sale and lease back of the disputed property and
created an implied trust "warehousing agreement" for the reconveyance of the property. In
the eyes of the law, however, this implied trust is inexistent and void for being
contrary to law.
xxx
An implied trust could not have been formed between the Bank and Tala as this
Court has held that "where the purchase is made in violation of an existing statute
and in evasion of its express provision, no trust can result in favor of the party who
is guilty of the fraud." x x x
x x x [T]he Bank cannot use the defense of nor seek enforcement of its alleged implied
trust with Tala since its purpose was contrary to law.1âwphi1 As admitted by the Bank, it
"warehoused" its branch site holdings to Tala to enable it to pursue its expansion program
and purchase new branch sites including its main branch in Makati, and at the same time
avoid the real prope1iy holdings limit under Sections 25(a) and 34 of the General Banking
Act which it had already reached. x x x
Clearly, the Bank was well aware of the limitations on its real estate holdings under the
General Banking Act and that its "warehousing agreement" with Tala was a scheme to
circumvent the limitation. Thus, the Bank opted not to put the agreement in writing and call
a spade a spade, but instead phrased its right to reconveyance of the subject property at
any time as a "first preference to buy" at the "same transfer price." This arrangement
which the Bank claims to be an implied trust is contrary to law. Thus, while we find
the sale and lease of the subject property genuine and binding upon the parties, we
cannot enforce the implied trust even assuming the parties intended to create it. In
the words of the Court in the Ramos case, "the courts will not assist the payor in achieving
his improper purpose by enforcing a resultant trust for him in accordance with the 'clean
hands' doctrine." The Bank cannot thus demand reconveyance of the property based
on its alleged implied trust relationship with Tala.
xxx
The Bank and Tala are in pari delicto, thus, no affirmative relief should be given to
one against the other. The Bank should not be allowed to dispute the sale of its lands to
Tala nor should Tala be allowed to further collect rent from the Bank. The clean hands
doctrine will not allow the creation or the use of a juridical relation such as a trust to
subvert, directly or indirectly, the law. Neither the Bank nor Tala came to court with
clean hands; neither will obtain relief from the court as one who seeks equity and
justice must come to court with clean hands.32 (Citations omitted; emphases supplied.)
In both cases, we applied the time-honored principle of stare decisis et non quieta
movere, which literally means "to adhere to precedents, and not to unsettle things which
are established," to settle the issue of whether Banco Filipino can recover the properties
subject of the void trust agreement. The rule of stare decisis is a bar to any attempt to re-
litigate the same issue where the same questions relating to the same event have been
put forward by parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and decided by a
competent court.33 Thus, the Court's ruling in G.R. No. 13753334 regarding the nullity of the
trust agreement-the very same agreement which Banco Filipino seeks to enforce in the
proceedings a quo-applies with full force to the present case. Consequently, Banco
Filipino's action for reconveyance of the Sta. Cruz property based on the void trust
agreement cannot prosper and must be dismissed for lack of cause of action.
It is the Court's duty to follow the precedents laid down in G.R. No. 137533,35 G.R. No.
18830236 and G.R. Nos. 130088, 131469, 155171, 155201 and 166608.37 The doctrine
of stare decisis is one of policy grounded on the necessity for securing certainty and
stability of judicial decisions. As well stated by Justice Cardozo in his book, The Nature of
the Judicial Process:
x x x It will not do to decide the same question one way between one set of litigants and
the opposite way between another.1âwphi1 "If a group of cases involves the same
point, the parties expect the same decision. It would be a gross injustice to decide
alternate cases on opposite principles. If a case was decided against me yesterday
when I was defendant, I shall look for the same judgment today if I am plaintiff. To decide
differently would raise a feeling of resentment and wrong in my breast; it would be an
infringement, material and moral, of my rights." x x x Adherence to precedent must then
be the rule rather than the exception if litigants are to have faith in the evenhanded
administration of justice in the courts.38 (Emphasis supplied.)
B
In addition to the principle of stare decisis, the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment,
otherwise known as "preclusion of issues" or "collateral estoppel,"39 bars the re-litigation of
Banco Filipino's claim based on the void trust agreement. This concept is embodied in the
third paragraph of Rule 39, Section 47 of the Rules of Civil Procedure:
Section 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.-The effect of a judgment or final order
rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or
final order, may be as follows:
xxx involved a different subject matter, i.e., a different parcel of land. Nonetheless, res
judicata as conclusiveness of judgment would still apply to these different cases, as it
does here, insofar as they involve material facts or questions which were in issue and
(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only
which have been adjudicated in a former action.
is deemed to have been adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears
upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was actually and necessarily
included therein or necessary thereto.(Emphasis supplied.) WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 89155 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Civil Case
No. 95-75214 before Branch 47 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila is DISMISSED.
Conclusiveness of judgment is a species of res judicata and it applies where there is
identity of parties in the first and second cases, but there is no identity of causes of
action.40 Any right, fact, or matter in issue directly adjudicated or necessarily involved in SO ORDERED.
the determination of an action before a competent court in which judgment is rendered on
the merits is conclusively settled by the judgment therein, and cannot again be litigated
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
between the parties and their privies whether or not the claim, demand, purpose, or
Associate Justice
subject matter of the two actions is the same.41 Thus, if a particular point or question is in
issue in the second action, and the judgment will depend on the determination of that
particular point or question, a former judgment between the same parties or their privies
will be final and conclusive in the second if that same point or question was in issue and
adjudicated in the first suit. Identity of cause of action is not required but mere1y identity of
G.R. No. 166562               March 31, 2009
issue. 42

In this case, the rule on conclusiveness of judgment is squarely applicable because Banco
Filipino's action for reconveyance is solely based on a trust agreement which, it cannot be
overemphasized, has long been declared void in a previous action that involved both Tala
Realty and Banco Filipino, i.e., G.R. No. 137533. In other words, the question on the
validity of the trust agreement has been finally and conclusively settled. Hence, this
question cannot be raised again even in a different proceeding involving the same parties.
Although the action instituted in this case is one for reconveyance, which is technically
different from the ejectment suit originally instituted by Tala Realty in G.R. No. 137533,
"the concept of conclusiveness of judgment still applies because under this principle, the
identity of causes of action is not required but merely identity of issues. Simply put,
conclusiveness of judgment bars the relitigation of particular facts or issues in another
litigation between the same parties on a different claim or cause of action. "43
Banco Filipino cannot rely on G.R. Nos. 144700,44 130184,45 139166,46 16725547 and
144705.48 In these cases, we ruled that Banco Filipino did not violate the rule against
forum shopping when it filed separate cases for reconveyance in different trial courts.
These rulings were based on the Court's finding that the elements of litis
pendentia and res judicata were not present. However, the concept of res
judicata referred to in these cases is the one commonly understood as "bar by prior
judgment," which is enunciated in Rule 39, Section 47(b).49 Bar by prior judgment is the
traditional formulation of res judicata, which requires the identity of parties, subject matter,
and causes of action. 50 It is this concept which is used in determining whether litis
pendentia or forum shopping exists. In contrast, and as previously discussed, res
judicata as conclusiveness of judgment requires only identity of parties and of issues.
These two kinds of res judicata are legally distinct.
Accordingly, under the doctrine of res judicata as bar by prior judgment, Banco Filipino
could not be prevented from filing separate actions for reconveyance because each action
BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner, 
vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003
Amended Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004
Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and
resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and
void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code.4
The facts follow.
Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first
met in 1972 while they were classmates in medical school.5 They fell in love, and they
were wed on July 26, 1975 in Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their
first child.
At first, they resided at Benjamin’s family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 When their
second child was born, the couple decided to move to Carmen’s family home in Cebu
City.7 In September 1975, Benjamin passed the medical board examinations8 and
thereafter proceeded to take a residency program to become a surgeon but shifted to
anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin completed the preceptorship program 1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and
for the said field9 and, in 1980, he began working for Velez Hospital, owned by Carmen’s his profession;
family, as member of its active staff,10 while Carmen worked as the hospital’s Treasurer.11
2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular
The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James drinking;
Louis, born on August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence,
born on July 21, 1986; Myles Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on
3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it
June 16, 1991.12
necessary to sell the family car twice and the property he inherited from his
father in order to pay off his debts, because he no longer had money to pay the
On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while same; and
their youngest child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the
RTC of Cebu City praying for the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36
4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal
of the Family Code. She claimed that Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity
to give regular financial support to his family.24
even at the time of the celebration of their marriage, which, however, only became
manifest thereafter. 13
In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that
he is a respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that
member of social and athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons
Benjamin used to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.14 But after they were
and for leisure. He also denied being a violent person, except when provoked by
married, petitioner continued to drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or
circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to support his family financially, Benjamin
sometimes in the wee hours of the morning drunk and violent. He would confront and
claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees from Velez
insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to have sex with him. There were
Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony,
also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their house.15 Because of
Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his means whenever
his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that he
he could and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his hard-earned
often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other
money on unnecessary things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted
anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they
and took care of their children, while Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a
perceived petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the
week.28
latter’s drinking problem, but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.16

During the trial, Carmen’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s drinking and gambling habits
Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to
and violent behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the
their family and would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their
spouses’ children from 1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed
children. Instead of providing support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and
instances when Benjamin maltreated Carmen even in front of their children.30
gambling and would even buy expensive equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed
home18 and even neglected his obligation to his children.19
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of
the usual personal interview, however, Dr. Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to
Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.20 He would gamble two
the transcript of stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the latter
or three times a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks
had already gone to work as an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After
whenever he had no money. Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife’s own jewelry to
reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr. Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s
finance his gambling.21 There was also an instance when the spouses had to sell their
compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of respondent are clear
family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited from his father just to be able to
indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.32
pay off his gambling debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going to the casinos in 1986 after he
was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he purposely
committed so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments.23 To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and
a consultant at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical
Center, as his expert witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin’s psychological behavior
In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the
based on the transcript of stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report
following manifestations:
prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa,
and his (Dr. Obra’s) interview with Benjamin’s brothers.34 Contrary to Dr. Oñate’s findings,
Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality, considering the
latter’s good relationship with his fellow doctors and his good track record as I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the
anesthesiologist.35 guidelines set forth under the Santos and Molina cases;

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the marriage II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological
between petitioner and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s incapacity for the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36
findings and the admissions made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found of the Family Code has been liberalized; and
him to be psychologically incapacitated to comply with the essential obligations of
marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an excessive drinker, a compulsive
III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and
gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his family, and a person
respondent null and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.
with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect existing
even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:
We find merit in the petition.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the
marriage between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the I. On the issue of stare decisis.
Family Code. x x x
The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules
xxxx established by this Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a
question of law has been examined and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed
to further argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
SO ORDERED.37
issues,50necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our jurisdiction, the
principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.51
Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision38 reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no
This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English
proof was adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically
courts and was later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice)
incapacitated at the time he married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only
Reynato S. Puno’s discussion on the historical development of this legal principle in his
on theories and not on established fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v.
dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission on Elections52 is enlightening:
Court of Appeals40and in Rep. of the Phils. v. Court of Appeals and Molina.41

Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina
guidelines should not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated
only on February 13, 1997, or more than five years after she had filed her petition with the
RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina ruling could not be made to apply retroactively, as it
would run counter to the principle of stare decisis. Initially, the CA denied the motion for
reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed period. Respondent thereafter
filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive period but the same was
likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for certiorari43 with
this Court. In a Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and
directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration.45 On review, the CA
decided to reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an
Amended Decision46 reversing its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision.47
A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by
the CA in its December 13, 2004 Resolution.48
Hence, this petition.
The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not
disturb the calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that
at the beginning of the 18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former
precedents where the same points come again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early
limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be followed if it were "plainly
unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting decisions; and,
(3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for
the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."
The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S.
Constitution. According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent
"arbitrary discretion in the courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the
precedent ventures into the realm of altering or repealing the law, it should be rejected."
Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison "disagree about the countervailing
policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a precedent." He added that
their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness required by the rule
of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that the
Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."

For our resolution are the following issues:

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation motion for reconsideration, that a private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and
although stare decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition process.
decisis have been isolated by legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis
deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the decisions of the higher courts to cases
An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are
involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare decisis requires that high
agreed on the factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These
courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that vertical
are workability, reliance, intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In
stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been
addition, courts put in the balance the following determinants: closeness of the voting, age
viewed as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one
of the prior decision and its merits.
of the precepts set in stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional
stare decisis and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial
interpretations of the Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of
statutes. The distinction is important for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply
stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the
doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In soothing prose, Brandeis
stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The rule of stare
decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely
within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once
decided." In the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate
touchstone of constitutionality is the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it."
In contrast, the application of stare decisis on judicial interpretation of statutes is more
inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has been construed, either by this
Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and agencies, it
acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the
Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to
preserve the courts' limited resources.
In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it
legitimizes judicial institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for
predictability. Contrariwise, courts refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1)
its application perpetuates illegitimate and unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot
accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it leaves the power to
overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist judges
can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck
agreeing with them.
In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule
and reversed its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v.
Board of Education which junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine."
Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law requirement that races be segregated on public
transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court, unanimously held that "separate . . . is
inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of stare decisis, the U.S.
Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the Philippine
setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in
order to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we
reversed our original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional.
Similarly, in Secretary of Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on
The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in
constitutional litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test.
The court should (1) determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in
defying practical workability; (2) consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance
that would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and add inequity to
the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related principles of law have so far
developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an abandoned doctrine; and,
(4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as to have
robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.53
To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos
and Molina should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare
decisis is no longer new. The same argument was also raised but was struck down in
Pesca v. Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v. Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the
interpretation or construction of a law by courts constitutes a part of the law as of the date
the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this Court is overruled, and a
different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied prospectively in
favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."
II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article
36.
Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.
We have not.
In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared that, in
hindsight, it may have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as
the one in Molina, in resolving all cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead
of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally became a straightjacket, forcing all cases
involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by it, which is not only contrary
to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to psychological
incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another.57
By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and
understandable to give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding
the psychological temperament of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical
antecedence, gravity and incurability of the psychological incapacity. However, such
opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua non in granting petitions for
declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At best, courts must treat such opinions as decisive but
not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the totality
of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then
actual medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be
resorted to.59The trial court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always
base its decision not solely on the expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the
totality of evidence adduced in the course of the proceedings.
It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case
involving the application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the
basis of a priori assumptions, predilections or generalizations but according to its own
attendant facts. Courts should interpret the provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by
experience, the findings of experts and researchers in psychological disciplines, and by
decisions of church tribunals.
Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent
requirements set forth therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the
Revision of the Rules on the rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:
To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the
psychological incapacity and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited
psychologist or psychiatrist have proved to be too expensive for the parties. They
adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is also a fact that there are provinces
where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee deemed it necessary to relax
this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for the examination of
a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.60
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and
expert opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s
alleged psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and,
accordingly, be weighed by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of
marriage.
III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.
Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent
insufficient to prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected
of him as a husband, and more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological
incapacity as of the date of the marriage eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse
the trial court’s and the appellate court’s rulings declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void ab initio.
The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most
serious cases of personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or
inability to give meaning and significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that
must have afflicted a party at the inception of the marriage should be a malady so grave
and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the duties and responsibilities of the
matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.621avvphi1.zw+
In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time
of the celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she
already knew that petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such
statement, by itself, is insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the
part of her husband. Neither did the evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be
incurable.
The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in
determining whether to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly,
however, we are not convinced that the opinions provided by these experts strengthened
respondent’s allegation of psychological incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically
contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate testified that petitioner’s behavior is a
positive indication of a personality disorder,63 while Dr. Obra maintained that there is
nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality. Moreover, there appears to be greater weight
in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamin’s
deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the
psychological evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who
personally examined Benjamin, as well as his (Dr. Obra’s) personal interview with
Benjamin’s brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s findings.
Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner’s drinking and gambling
problems, or his violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such
a behavior. Petitioner must remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his
spouse as much as the latter owes the same to him. Unfortunately, this court finds
respondent’s testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented by the respondent, to
be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.
It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of
marriage. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case, the presumption has not
been amply rebutted and must, perforce, prevail.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED.
The November 17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
SO ORDERED.
ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 206284
REDANTE SARTO Y MISALUCHA, Petitioner 
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
DECISION
MARTIRES, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 31 July 2012
Decision1 and the 6 March 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR
No. 32635, which affirmed the 18 May 2009 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
26, Naga City (RTC), in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400 finding petitioner Redante Sarto y
Misalucha (Redante) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Bigamy
THE FACTS
On 3 October 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly
contracting two (2) marriages: the first, with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria
Socorro), and the second, without having the first one legally terminated, with private
complainant Fe R. Aguila (Fe). The charge stemmed from a criminal complaint filed by Fe
against Redante on 4 June 2007. The accusatory portion of the Information reads:
That on or about December 29, 1998, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been previously
united in lawful marriage with one Ma. Socorro G. Negrete, as evidenced by hereto
attached Certificate of Marriage mark as Annex "A," and without said marriage having
been legally dissolved, did then and there, willfully and feloniously contract a second
marriage with FE R. AGUILA-SARTO, herein complaining witness, to her damage and
prejudice.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
During his arraignment on 3 December 2007, Redante entered a plea of "not guilty." Pre-
trial ensued wherein Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages but
interposed the defense that his first marriage had been legally dissolved by divorce
obtained in a foreign country.
On 22 May 2008, the defense filed a motion to allow the taking of Maria Socorro's
deposition considering that she was set to leave the country on the first week of June
2008.5 This was granted by the RTC in its Order,6 dated 26 May 2008. Maria Socorro's
deposition was taken on 28 May 2008.
On 22 August 2008, the prosecution moved for a modified or reverse trial on the basis of
Redante's admissions.7The RTC granted the motion in its Order,8 dated 27 August 2008,
wherein the defense was directed to present its case ahead of the prosecution.
Evidence for the Defense
The defense presented Redante and Maria Socorro as witnesses. Their testimonies, taken
together, tended to establish the following:
Redante and Maria Socorro, both natives of Buhi, Camarines Sur, were married on 31
August 1984 in a ceremony held in Angono, Rizal.9 Sometime thereafter, Maria Socorro
left for Canada to work as a nurse. While in Canada, she applied for Canadian citizenship.
The application was eventually granted and Ma. Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship on
1 April 1988.10 Maria Socorro then filed for divorce in British Columbia, Canada, to sever
her marital ties with Redante. The divorce was eventually granted by the Supreme Court
of British Columbia on 1st of November1988.11
Maria Socorro came back to Buhi, Camarines Sur, sometime in 1992 for a vacation. While
there Redante' s mother and grandparents, who were against the divorce, convinced her
and Redante to give their marriage a second chance to which they acceded. Their
attempts to rekindle their romance resulted in the birth of their daughter on 8 March 1993
in Mandaluyong City. In spite of this, Redante and Maria Socorro's efforts to save their
marriage were futile.12
Sometime in February 1998, Redante met Fe to whom he admitted that he was previously
married to Maria Socorro who, however, divorced him.13 Despite this admission, their
romance blossomed and culminated in their marriage on 29 December 1998 at the
Pefiafrancia Basilica Minore in Naga City.14 They established a conjugal home in Pasay
City and had two children. Their relationship, however, turned sour when Ma. Socorro
returned to the Philippines and met with Redante to persuade him to allow their daughter
to apply for Canadian citizenship. After learning of Redante and Maria Socorro's meeting
and believing that they had reconciled, Fe decided to leave their conjugal home on 31 May
2007.15 On 4 June 2007, Fe filed a complaint for bigamy against Redante.16
Meanwhile, Maria Socorro married a certain Douglas Alexander Campbell, on 5 August
2000, in Chilliwack, British Columbia, Canada.17
The defense presented a Certificate of Divorce18 issued on 14 January 2008, to prove the
fact of divorce.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution waived the presentation of testimonial evidence and presented instead,
the Marriage Contract19between Redante and Maria Socorro, to prove the solemnization of
their marriage on 31 August 1984, in Angono, Rizal; and the Marriage Contract20 of
Redante and Fe to prove the solemnization of Redante's second marriage on 29
December 1998, in Naga City. The prosecution also adopted the Certificate of
Divorce21 as its own exhibit for the purpose of proving that the same was secured only on
14 January 2008.
The RTC Ruling
In its judgment, the RTC found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
bigamy. The trial court ratiocinated that Redante's conviction is the only reasonable
conclusion for the case because of his failure to present competent evidence proving the
alleged divorce decree; his failure to establish the naturalization of Maria Socorro; and his
admission that he did not seek judicial recognition of the alleged divorce decree. The
dispositive portion of the decision reads:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused Redante Sarto y Misalucha guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,
and after applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court hereby sentenced him an
imprisonment of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as maximum.22
Aggrieved, Redante appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's Judgment. The appellate court
ratiocinated that assuming the authenticity and due execution of the Certificate of Divorce,
since the order of divorce or the divorce decree was not presented, it could not ascertain
whether said divorce capacitated Maria Socorro, and consequently Redante, to remarry. It
continued that Redante failed to present evidence that he had filed and had secured a
judicial declaration that his first marriage had been dissolved in accordance with Philippine
laws prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe. The dispositive portion of
the assailed decision provides:
WHEREFORE, the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellant Redante
Sarto y Misalucha of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400, is AFFIRMED.23
Redante moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its 6 March
2013 resolution.
Hence, the present petition.
On 26 June 2013, the Court issued a Resolution24 requiring the respondent Republic of
the Philippines to file its comment.
The OSG's Manifestation
In compliance with this Court's resolution, the respondent, through the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), filed its Manifestation (in lieu of Comment)25 advocating
Redante's acquittal. The OSG argued that the RTC had convicted Redante solely because
of his failure to provide evidence concerning the date when Maria Socorro acquired
Canadian citizenship. It observed that Maria Socorro failed to provide the exact date when
she acquired Canadian citizenship because of the loss of her citizenship certificate at the
time she took the witness stand. The OSG claimed, however, that Redante was able to
submit, although belatedly, a photocopy of Maria Socorro's Canadian citizenship
certificate as an attachment to his appellant's brief. The said certificate stated that Maria
Socorro was already a Canadian citizen as early as 1 April 1988; hence, the divorce
decree which took effect on 1 November 1988 is valid. The OSG further averred that
substantial rights must prevail over the application of procedural rules.
ISSUE
WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY FOUND
PETITIONER REDANTE SARTO y MISALUCHA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT OF BIGAMY.
THE COURT'S RULING
The petition is bereft of merit.
Elements of bigamy; burden of
proving the termination of the
first marriage.
For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following elements must concur: (1) that the
offender has been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved
or, in case of an absentee spouse, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead
according to the provisions of the Civil Code; (3) that the offender contracts a second or
subsequent marriage; and (4) that the second or subsequent marriage has all the
essential requisites for validity.26
Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. He, however, put forth the
defense of the termination of his first marriage as a result of the divorce obtained abroad
by his alien spouse.
It is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction that the burden of proof lies with the party
who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an
action.27 Since the divorce was a defense raised by Redante, it is incumbent upon him to
show that it was validly obtained in accordance with Maria Socorro's country's national
law.28 Stated differently, Redante has the burden of proving the termination of the first
marriage prior to the celebration of the second.29
Redante failed to prove his capacity
to contract a subsequent marriage.
A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have an
automatic effect in the Philippines. Consequently, recognition by Philippine courts may be
required before the effects of a divorce decree could be extended in this
jurisdiction.30 Recognition of the divorce decree, however, need not be obtained in a
separate petition filed solely for that purpose. Philippine courts may recognize the foreign
divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an integral aspect of his claim or
defense.31
Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must
prove it as a fact and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing
it.1âшphi1 Proving the foreign law under which the divorce was secured is mandatory
considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be expected to take judicial notice
of foreign laws.32 For the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a copy of the divorce
decree itself must be presented and admitted in evidence. This is in consonance with the
rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value only after it is
presented and admitted in evidence.33
In particular, to prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking them
must present copies thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised
Rules of Court.34 Pursuant to these rules, the divorce decree and foreign law may be
proven through (1) an official publication or (2) or copies thereof attested to by the officer
having legal custody of said documents. If the office which has custody is in a foreign
country, the copies of said documents must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the
foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.35
Applying the foregoing, the Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence
of the divorce as a fact or that it was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his
subsequent marriage to Fe.
Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of evidence
presented by the defense to prove the divorce, is the certificate of divorce allegedly issued
by the registrar of the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 14 January 2008. Said
certificate provides:
In the Supreme Court of British Columbia
Certificate of Divorce
This is to certify that Ma. Socorro Negrete SARTO and Redante M SARTO who were
married at ANGONO, RIZAL, PHILIPPINES on August 31, 1984 were divorced under the
Divorce Act (Canada) by an order of this Court which took effect and dissolved the
marriage on November 1, 1988.
Given under my hand and the Seal of this Court
January 14, 2008
(SGD.)
REGISTRAR
This certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to rebut the charge against
Redante. First, the certificate of divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules and
jurisprudence. As discussed previously, the divorce decree required to prove the fact of
divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by the foreign court and not a mere
certification. Second, assuming the certificate of divorce may be considered as the divorce
decree, it was not accompanied by a certification issued by the proper Philippine
diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Canada, as required under Section 24 of Rule
132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it
could not be reasonably determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord
with Maria Socorro's national law.
Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily
demonstrated, the type of divorce supposedly secured by Maria Socorro - whether an
absolute divorce which terminates the marriage or a limited divorce which merely
suspends it36 - and whether such divorce capacitated her to remarry could not also be
ascertained. As such, Redante failed to prove his defense that he had the capacity to
remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe. His liability for bigamy is,
therefore, now beyond question.
This Court is not unmindful of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
Indeed, in Republic v. Orbecido,37 a case invoked by Redante to support his cause, the
Court recognized that the legislative intent behind the said provision is to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse under the laws of his or her
country. The Court is also not oblivious of the fact that Maria Socorro had already
remarried in Canada on 5 August 2000. These circumstances, however, can never justify
the reversal of Redante's conviction.
In Orbecido, as in Redante's case, the alien spouse divorced her Filipino spouse and
remarried another. The Filipino spouse then filed a petition for authority to remarry under
paragraph 2 of Article 26. His petition was granted by the RTC. However, this Court set
aside said decision by the trial court after finding that the records were bereft of competent
evidence concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of the alien spouse. The
Court reiterated therein the rules regarding the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
and the foreign law allowing it, as well as the necessity to show that the divorce decree
capacitated his former spouse to remarry.38
Finally, the Court notes that the OSG was miserably misguided when it claimed that the WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of
sole reason for the RTC's judgment of conviction was Redante's failure to provide the Regional Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC.
evidence, during trial, of the date Maria Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship. PROC. NO. 2012-0005 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

An examination of the 18 May 2009 judgment would reveal that the trial court rendered the Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro
said decision after finding that there was lack of any competent evidence with regard to Manila.
the divorce decree39 and the national law governing his first wife,40 not merely because of
the lack of evidence concerning the effectivity date of Maria Socorro's naturalization. Thus,
SO ORDERED.3
even if the Court were to indulge the OSG and consider Maria Socorro's citizenship
certificate, which was a mere photocopy and filed belatedly, it would not have any effect
significant enough to produce a judgment of acquittal. The fact that Redante failed to The facts are undisputed.
prove the existence of the divorce and that it was validly acquired prior to the celebration
of the second marriage still subsists.
On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for
cancellation of
WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision,
dated 31 July 2012, of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CR No. 32635 which affirmed the
Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment
18 May 2009 Judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City, in Criminal
of divorce Japanese court.
Case No. 2007- 0400 is hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner Redante Sarto y Misalucha is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy and is sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The
maximum. petition and the notice of initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive
weeks in newspaper of general circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo
marked the documentary evidence (consisting of the trial courts Order dated January 25,
SO ORDERED.
2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27,
2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes of compliance
SAMUEL R. MARTIRES with the jurisdictional requirements.
Associate Justice
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of
G.R. No. 221029 the Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its
behalf. Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption
of the petition considering that based on the allegations therein, the proper action should
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner 
be a petition for recognition and enforcement of a foreign judgment.
vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent
As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The
Amended Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and
RESOLUTION
enforcement of foreign judgment alleged:

peralta, J.:
2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named
YOSHINO MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to
reverse and set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015
3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die
Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive
proceedings, a divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese
portion of the Decision states:
Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce
Japanese husband are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter
are living separately from said Japanese former husband;
5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San
Juan, Metro Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's
marriage was previously registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that
petitioner is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is
no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and disturbed by aid entry of marriage;
6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry
of the marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule
108 of the Revised Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the
aforesaid divorce decree; [and]
7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry
of her marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4
Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her
employment. Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:
1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be
sufficient in form and in substance;
2. Affidavit of Publication;
3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5,
2012, and March 6-12, 2012;
4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;
5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;
6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan
of the Notification of Divorce; and
7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5
The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.
On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the
divorce obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on
Article 15 of the New Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to
file for a divorce whether they are in the country or living abroad, if they are married to
Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their marriage in the Philippines or in
another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens of another country,
Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and duties,
together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts
and civil relations, inclusing marriages."6
On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code
of the Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce
against her Japanese husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no
longer married to the former, capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al.
V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling that the meaning of the law should be based on
the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the legislative intent behind Article 26, it would
be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to the Japanese national, who, in
turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it was Manalo who
filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v.
Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved
filed abroad by the latter.
The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.
We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.
Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of
two types: (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and
(2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full
force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following rules exist:
1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.10
2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond
between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained
abroad.13
3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective
national laws.14
4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed
to contract a subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.15
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.)
No. 209, otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on
August 3, 1988.16 Shortly thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside
from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the Family Code, a second paragraph was added to
Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by the Civil Code Revision Committee
(Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet meeting after Pres. Aquino
signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also
be valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36,
37 and 38.
Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to
remarry under Philippine law.
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a
foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a
foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a divorce case.22Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects thereof, e.g., on
custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still be
determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the
amendment is to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her
alien spouse, although the latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had
obtained a divorce abroad that is recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it
would solved the problem of many Filipino women who, under the New Civil Code, are still
considered married to their alien husbands even after the latter have already validly
divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps have already
married again.25
In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at
the time of the celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on,
one of them acquired foreign citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding,
and obtained a favorable decree. We held in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals. In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became naturalized American citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in
the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino
spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were foreigner at the
time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction absurdity
and injustice. x x x
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of
marriage, but their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen
has the capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding
abroad and obtaining a favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is
capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo pleads for the recognition of enforcement of
the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and for the cancellation of the entry
of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear anymore that she is
still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no longer
married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be
bothered and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.
We rule in the affirmative.
Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree
that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the
issues of child custody and property relation,respectively.
In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody
of their minor daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife
enforce the Agreement, alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of
their child. The trial court dismissed the action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground,
among others, that the divorce decree is binding following the "nationality rule" prevailing
in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the divorce decree
obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court
said:
Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois
court lacked jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the
divorce was obtained by his Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability .
The argument that foreigners in this jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees
is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the matter by holding that an alien spouse of a
Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad. There, we dismissed the alien
divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal property and
rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not
valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30
Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was
filed by the ex-husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an
accounting of a business that was alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared
with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved to dismiss the case on the ground that
the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the divorce proceedings that she
initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband averred that the
divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws of
the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign
court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of
jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the
alien spouse, the Court discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their
conjugal property in the Philippines. Thus:
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own
representation before said court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal
property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.31
In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse
can be recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings
in Fujiki v. Marinay, et al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33
In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was
able to obtain a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between
her and her second husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy.
In resolving the issue of whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his her spouse
and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen.
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of
reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
the Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of
this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.
the Japanese Family Court.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There
obtain divorce abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid
is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada released private
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
respondent from the marriage from standards of American law, under which divorce
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve,
dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the United States
in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These property
interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial
"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of capacity of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.
competent jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband
and wife, and to free them both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's
stone party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband,
right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights
is unknown to the law. When the law provides in the nature of penalty, that the guilty party
and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34
shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still absolutely feed from the bond
of the former marriage."
On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for
divorce, which was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for
judicial recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC denied the petition on the ground that the foreign
divorce decree and the national law of the alien spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain
a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent with Corpuz v.
Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for
appropriate action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the
pertinent factual issues.
There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this
Court recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino
spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation,
it should not stop short in a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary
consequences of absolute divorce is the right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a
mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity. When the marriage tie is severed
and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the former spouses
change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.
The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is
subject to Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree
which she obtained under Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute,
a national not of Japan, bit of the Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will
subvert not only the intention of the framers of the law, but also that of the Filipino peopl,
as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound to respect the prohibition
until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.
We beg to differ.
Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the
provision, it only requires that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the
law does not demand that the alien spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding
wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does not distinguish whether the Filipino
spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce proceeding. The Court is
bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of
lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used
words advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in
the statute. Verba legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be
departure."38
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to
mean that the divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the
Court will not follow the letter of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent
of the legislature or would otherwise yield conclusions inconsistent with the general
purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes should be so construed as
not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League of Cities of the
Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the
resulting law is couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a
statute may render it meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or
injustice. To obviate this aberration, and bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the
spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to the rule that the spirit of the law control
its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation
where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce
decree that is effective in the country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the
Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective measure is free to marry under the laws of
his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the foreign divorce proceeding or
not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his or her alien
spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without
a husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same
place and in like circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien
initiated proceeding. Therefore, the subject provision should not make a distinction. In both
instance, it is extended as a means to recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce
decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are severed by operations
of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's national law.
Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under
Article 15 of the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e
existence of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an
exception thereto. Moreover, blind adherence to the nationality principle must be
disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and oppression to certain classes of
individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have the duty to enforce
the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional.43
While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that
its decision is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification
may be subjected to judicial review.44 The deference stops where the classification
violates a fundamental right, or prejudices persons accorded special protection by the
Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as
the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter and more exacting
adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage
of a suspect class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional,
and the burden is upon the government to prove that the classification is necessary to
achieve a compelling state interest and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such
interest.47
"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection
clause are those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It
includes the right to free speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right
to travel, and the right to vote.49 On the other hand, what constitutes compelling state automatically grant the same. Besides, such proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and
interest is measured by the scale rights and powers arrayed in the Constitution and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.
calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some
individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or
It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages
the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its
Filipinos to marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of
primacy, overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the
Filipinos marrying foreign nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien
latter.52
spouses.

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies
The supposition is speculative and unfounded.
with respect to the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless
declared otherwise by the court. In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26
violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal protection clause.54 Particularly, the First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to
limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated by the alien spouse is support what he intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in
unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification. this jurisdiction. Under the rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if
uncontradicted and overcome by other evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or
wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted
A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is
from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to the law and fact, 60 that a
married to a foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between
man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful
them. Ergo, they should not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities
contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily
imposed. Without a doubt, there are political, economic cultural, and religious
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he
dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a
or she opted to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial
Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend with. More importantly,
unions are entered into out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure
while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is null and
lust or profit. Third, We take judicial notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more
void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if
forbearing and conservative in nature and that they are more often the victims or losing
made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55
end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the motive behind
Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:
On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated
a foreign divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance
Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and
of his or her alien spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are
cannot dictated on the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate
considered as Filipinos who have the same rights and obligations in a alien land. The
their lifestyle would go into the realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious
circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both
constitutional questions. The right marital privacy allows married couples to structure their
are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their wives/husbands. Hence,
marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or live apart, to have children or
to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference of whether
no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages entered into for other
they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money, status, and
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.
title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though
the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage.
Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in Other considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63
treatment because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino
citizen against his or her alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds
The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the
similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on
foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not
these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused of invoking foreign law at whim,
meant to be a general prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C.
tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with whatever law he or she
Gascon, in response to a question by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of
chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is not lost, for
the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was categorical about this point.65 Their exchange
she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with
reveal as follows:
the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the
guidance of the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in
detail what these "mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.
well as those who are similarly situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of
nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality is that there is no assurance that our courts will
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.
FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
refer specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a common child, or a child of the petitioner;
prohibition of a general law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that
the legislature cannot pass a divorce law.
b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change
religious or political affiliation;
MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was
primarily to encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage
c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or
divorce. But now that the mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to
a child of a petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption
discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.
or inducement;

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of
d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six
prohibiting a divorce law?
(6) years, even if pardoned;

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917,
g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether
Philippine courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of
in the Philippines or abroad;
the wife or concubinage on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the
Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943, pursuant to the authority conferred upon him
by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese Forces in the Philippines and with h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than
the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive Commission one's spouse during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of
promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and the spouses, a child is born to them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when
provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion the wife bears a child after being a victim of rape;
continuously for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross
insult by one spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together
i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or
impracticable, and a spouse's incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and
a child of a petitioner; and
the Commonwealth Government was restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act
No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950, upon the effectivity of Republic Act No.
836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by Filipino citizens, whether here j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more
or abroad, is no longer recognized.70 than one (1) year.

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine
society to re-institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress,
House Bill (H.B.) Nos. 11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of
representatives. In substitution of these bills, H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting
Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce
Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population
When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years,
either or both spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said
judicial decree of legal separation.
1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as
follows:

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third
Reading - with 134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for
a judicial decree of absolute divorce are as follows:
1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or
amended, as follows:
a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was
eighteen (18) years of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage
was solemnized without the consent of the parents guradian or personl having
substitute parental authority over the party, in that order, unless after attaining
the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the other and both
lived together as husband and wife;
 b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason,
freely cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party
afterwards with full knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely
cohabited with the other husband and wife;
d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence,
unless the same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely
cohabited with the other as husband and wife;
e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the
other and such incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and
f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be
serious or appears to be incurable.
Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the
marriage or supervening after the marriage.
1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the
petition for absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family
Code, whether or not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the
marriage or later;
3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from
one sex to another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the
transgender or transsexual as respondent, or vice-versa;
4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total
breakdown of the marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at
reconciliation.
To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely
to any attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs,
morals, and traditions that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their
nature of permanence,
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do
with religion, it also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause
the government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they
cause the government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the
State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a state religion.76
The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State
and the rest of the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is
sincerely believes that they are good for country.77While marriage is considered a
sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences which are governed by the Family
Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that the State has a
legitimate right and interest to regulate.
The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation
of the family and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but
must be harmonized with other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the
solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is equally mandated to actively promote its total
development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among others, the right of children to special
protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation, and other conditions
prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively enforce these
obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign
divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children
are almost always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact,
among the notable legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace
are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A.
No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A. No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood
and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No 9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act
of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-Trafficking in Persons Act of
2012").Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a basic
autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate
to value the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and
ensure the fundamental equality before the law of women and men.81
A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We
disallow a Filipino citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of
Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still require him or her to first avail of the existing
"mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent relationship that he or she would
enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the Philippine law.
Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not
only to the parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the
subject provision. The irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2,
Article XV of the Constitution is meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions
not formalized by marriage, but without denying State protection and assistance to live-in
arrangements or to families formed according to indigenous customs.82
This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the
advancement of communication and information technology, as well as the improvement
of the transportation system that almost instantly connect people from all over the world,
mixed marriages have become not too uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all
marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect humans more often than not create
imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality for some is that the
attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found and
achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of
existing marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are
rotten quality.
Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two
parties, cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered
released from the marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the
Filipino spouse should not be discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of
justice are to be served, San Luis v. San Luis85 quoted:
x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:
But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may
add, by its purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first
concern of the judge should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker.
Unquestionably, the law should never be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as
this is never within the legislative intent. An indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we
presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render justice.
Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice.
Law and justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some
laws that, while generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case
because only of our nature and functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish
obedience to their language. What we do instead is find a balance between the sord and
the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.
As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it
worded, yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and
consequence. "Courts are apt to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are
warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where these words import a policy that goes beyond
them."
xxxx
More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual
wish to render every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it
assesses the facts and the law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always
an essential ingredient of its decisions. Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law
in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was the intention if the lawmaker, to
begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86
Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would
lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be
construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of
the law.87 A statute may therefore, be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of
its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting
Manalo's petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese
court and to cancel the entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.
Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign
country. Presentation solely of the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce
must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91
x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document
must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by
the divorce decree itself. The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an
official body or tribunal of foreign country.
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)authenticated by the
seal of his office.92
In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:
In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the
Japanese Court allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the
Philippines Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and
3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner and the Japanese national.
Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b) of the Rules of
Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus, We
are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93
If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered
admissible a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce
decree was not denied by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court
impeached nor the validity of its proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an opportunity to do so.95
Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.
x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing
necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the
burden of proving the material defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. x x x
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Petitioner Doreen Grace Parilla (Doreen), a Filipino citizen, and respondent Michiyuki
Like any other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must Koike (Michiyuki), a Japanese national, were married on June 14, 2005 in Quezon City,
be exercise d with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be Philippines.4 Their union bore two children, Masato Koike, who was born on January 23,
resolved in the negative.96 2006, and Fuka Koike who was born on April 4, 2007.5

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law On June 14, 2012, Doreen and Michiyuki, pursuant to the laws of Japan, filed for
validating it, as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. divorce6 before the Mayor of Ichinomiya City, Aichi Prefecture, Japan. They were divorced
Japanese laws on persons and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino on even date as appearing in the Divorce Certificate7and the same was duly recorded in
judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. the Official Family Register ofMichiyuki Koike.8

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Seeking to have the said Divorce Certificate annotated on her Certificate of Marriage9 on
Decision and October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. file with the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, Doreen filed on February 7, 2013 a
No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for petition10 for judicial recognition of ioreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry
further proceedings and reception of evidence as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce. pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code11 before the RTC,
docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692.
SO ORDERED
At the hearing, no one appeared to oppose the petition.12 On the other hand, Doreen
presented several foreign documents, namely, "Certificate of Receiving/ Certificate of
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Acceptance of Divorce"13 and "Family Register of Michiyuki Koike"14 both issued by the
Associate Justice
Mayor of Ichinomiya City and duly authenticated by the Consul of the Republic of the
Philippines for Osaka, Japan. She also presented a certified machine copy of a document
entitled "Divorce Certificate" issued by the Consul for the Ambassador of Japan in Manila
that was authenticated by the Department of the Foreign Affairs, as well as a
Certification15 issued by the City Civil Registry Office in Manila that the original of said
divorce certificate was filed and recorded in the said Office. In addition, photocopies of the
Civil Code of Japan and their corresponding English translation, as well as two (2) books
entitled "The Civil Code of Japan 2000" 16 and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009"17 were
G.R. No. 215723 likewise submitted as proof of the existence of Japan's law on divorce.18

DOREEN GRACE PARILLA MEDINA, a.k.a. "DOREEN GRACE MEDINA The RTC Ruling
KOIKE," Petitioner 
vs.
MICHIYUKI KOIKE, THE LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON CITY, METRO In a Decision19 dated July 31, 2014, the RTC denied Doreen's petition, ruling that in an
MANILA, and THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE action for recognition of foreign divorce decree pursuant to Article 26 of the Family Code,
NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien recognizing his or her capacity
to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 2420 and 2521 of Rule 132
of the Revised Rules on Evidence. The RTC ruled that while the divorce documents
DECISION presented by Doreen were successfully proven to be public or official records of Japan,
she nonetheless fell short of proving the national law of her husband, particularly the
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.: existence of the law on divorce. The RTC observed that the "The Civil Code of Japan
2000" and "The Civil Code of Japan 2009," presented were not duly authenticated by the
Philippine Consul in Japan as required by Sections 24 and 25 of the said Rules, adding
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1are the Decision2 dated July 31, 2014 and too that the testimony of Doreen relative to the applicable provisions found therein and its
the Resolution3 dated November 28, 2014, of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, effect on the matrimonial relations was insufficient since she was not presented as a
Branch 106 (RTC), in Sp. Proc. No. Q-13-72692, denying petitioner's petition for judicial qualified expert witness nor was shown to have, at the very least, a working knowledge of
recognition of foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Article 26 the laws of Japan, particularly those on family relations and divorce. It likewise did not
of the Family Code. consider the said books as learned treatises pursuant to Section 46,22 Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules on Evidence, since no expert witness on the subject matter was presented
The Facts
and considering further that Philippine courts cannot take judicial notice of
foreignjudgments and law.23
Doreen's motion for reconsideration24 was denied in a Resolution25 dated November 28,
2014; hence, this petition.
The Issue Before the Court
The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the RTC erred in denying the
petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce.1âwphi1
The Court's Ruling
At the outset, it bears stressing that Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce;
hence, our courts cannot grant it. However, Article 26 of the Family Code - which
addresses foreign marriages or mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner -
allows a Filipino spouse to contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is validly
obtained abroad by an alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry. The provision
reads:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating
him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law. (Emphasis supplied)
Under the above-highlighted paragraph, the law confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to
extend the effect of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial
to determine the validity of the dissolution of the marriage.26
In Corpuz v. Sta. Tomas,27the Court had the occasion to rule that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws.1âwphi1 Justice
Herrera explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion
to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment
on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree
as an integral aspect of his claim or defense.28 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied;
citation omitted)
Thus, in Garcia v. Recio,29 it was pointed out that in order for a divorce obtained abroad by
the alien spouse to be recognized in our jurisdiction, it must be shown that the divorce
decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Both the divorce decree and
the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be
proven.30 Since our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law
on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must
be alleged and proven like any other fact.31
Considering that the validity of the divorce decree between Doreen and Michiyuki, as well
as the existence of pertinent laws of Japan on the matter are essentially factual that calls
for a re-evaluation of the evidence presented before the RTC, the issue raised in the
instant appeal is obviously a question of fact that is beyond the ambit of a Rule 45 petition
for review.
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual
issues is the function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received
with respect and are in fact binding subject to certain exceptions.32 In this regard, it is
settled that appeals taken from judgments or final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise
of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law should
be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of the Rules of
Court.33
Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted,
the Court may refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. -x x x
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court
submitting issues of fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or
appropriate action. The determination of the Supreme Court on whether or not issues of
fact are involved shall be final.
This, notwithstanding the express provision under Section 5 (f) thereof that an appeal
likewise "may" be dismissed when there is error irr the choice or mode of appeal.34
Since the said Rules denote discretion on the part of the Court to either dismiss the appeal
or refer the case to the CA, the question of fact involved in the instant appeal and
substantial ends of justice warrant that the case be referred to the CA for further
appropriate proceedings. It bears to stress that procedural rules were intended to ensure
proper administration of law and justice. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in
a very rigid, technical sense, for they are adopted to help secure, not override, substantial
justice. A deviation from its rigid enforcement may thus be allowed to attain its prime
objective, for after all, the dispensation of justice is the core reason for the existence of the DECISION
courts.35
MENDOZA, J.:
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice, the case is
hereby REFERRED to the Court of Appeals for appropriate action including the reception
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
of evidence to DETERMINE and RESOLVE the pertinent factual issues in accordance
assailing the March 30, 2012 Decision1 of the Shari' a District Court, 5th Shari'a District,
with this Decision.
Cotabato City (ShDC), in ShDC Appealed Case No. 2011-19. The assailed decision
affirmed the August 19, 2011 Order2 of the 1st Shari'a Circuit Court, Cotabato
SO ORDERED. City (ShCC), in ShCC Civil Case No. 2010-559, confirming the talaq3 (divorce) between
petitioner Sheryl M. Mendez (Mendez) and private respondent Dr. John O. Maliga
(Maliga); awarding the custody of their minor child to Maliga; and ordering him to give
ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
a mut'a (consolatory gift) to Mendez.
Associate Justice

The Facts
WE CONCUR:

From the records, it appears that on April 9, 2008, Mendez and Maliga were married under
MARIA LOURDES P.A. SERENO
Muslim rites. Prior to their marriage, the couple was already blessed with a daughter,
Chief Justice
Princess Fatima M. Maliga (Princess Fatima). Their marriage, however, soured shortly
Chairperson
after their wedding.

TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE On November 2, 2010, Maliga filed with the ShCC a petition4 for the judicial confirmation
LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
CASTRO of talaq from Mendez, with a prayer for the grant of probational custody of their minor child
Associate Justice
Associate Justice pending the resolution of the case. According to Maliga, Mendez was a Roman Catholic
and she only embraced the Islamic faith on the date of their marriage. Shortly after being
ALFREDO BENJAMIN S. CAGUIOA married, he claimed that he started to doubt the sincerity of his wife's submission to Islam,
Associate Justice having noticed no changes in her moral attitude and social lifestyle despite his guidance.
Maliga added that despite his pleas for her to remain faithful to the ways of Islam, she
remained defiant. He alleged that sometime in December 2008, Mendez reverted to
CERTIFICATION Christianity. Maliga went on to add that she went to Manila a few days after their wedding
and brought Princess Fatima with her without his knowledge and consent. In Manila, she
Pursuant to Section 13, Article VIII of the Constitution, I certify that the conclusions in the taught their daughter how to practice Christianity by enrolling her in a Catholic school.
above Decision had been reached in consultation before the case was assigned to the Maliga, thus, prayed for probational custody considering the unsafe religious growth and
writer of the opinion of the Court's Division. values repugnant to Islam.

MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO Before Mendez could file her answer, Maliga filed his urgent motion5 reiterating his plea to
Chief Justice be awarded temporary custody of Princess Fatima. He claimed that considering such
factors as moral values, social upliftment, behavioral growth, and religious consideration,
he should have custody of their child.
G.R. No. 201614

On November 12, 2010, the ShCC issued the order6 granting Maliga's urgent motion. The
SHERYL M. MENDEZ, Petitioner,  ShCC deemed it proper for Princess Fatima to stay with her father because of his social,
vs. financial and religious standing, and considering that she was then under his custody; that
Shari'a District Court, 5th Shari'a District, Cotabato City, Rasad G. Balindong he raised her as a good Muslim daughter as evidenced by her appearance; and that her
(Acting Presiding Judge); 1st Shari'a Circuit Court, 5th Shari'a District, Cotabato parents were married under Islamic rites.
City, Montano K. Kalimpo (Presiding Judge); and DR. JOHN O.
MALIGA, Respondents.
On November 18, 2010, Mendez filed her Answer.7 She alleged that she followed the
religion of her Muslim grandfather, and denied Maliga's allegations that she was not
sincere in her practice of Islam. She averred that she became pregnant before she
married Maliga and had been raising their daughter on her own since her birth and that he
had been totally remiss in his material and moral obligations to support her and their child.
She opposed his prayer for custody, arguing that she had been raising Princess Fatima
since she was born; that Maliga had several wives and three other children and was very
busy with his profession as a physician; and that the custody of children below seven
years old should belong to the mother.
Mendez added that on October 21, 2010, she left their daughter in Maliga' s custody for a
visit, with the understanding that he would bring her back the following day. On October
22, 2010, she went with her cousin to fetch her daughter but Maliga threatened to kill them
and displayed his bodyguards clad in police uniforms and firearms. This prompted her to
file a complaint-affidavit for kidnapping and failure to return a minor with the National
Bureau of Investigation.8
On November 22, 2010, Mendez filed her opposition9 to Maliga's urgent motion for
issuance of temporary custody. She argued that the motion did not contain the requisite
notice of hearing and was, therefore, a mere scrap of paper. She pointed out that the
motion was filed on October 9, 2010, prior to the filing of the main case on November 2,
2010. She contended that she never received the summons in connection with the urgent
motion and, furthermore, she never received a copy of the November 12, 2010 Order
granting temporary custody to Maliga, which she had only picked up from the court herself
on November 18, 2010, the day she filed her answer.
In its Order,10 dated December 3, 2010, the ShCC partially reconsidered its initial order
awarding temporary custody to Maliga by granting the right of visitation to Mendez, as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, PRINCESS FATIMA, daughter of the herein
parties is hereby ordered be placed under the CARE and CUSTODY of the Petitioner, DR.
JOHN O. MALIGA, pending the resolution of the above-entitled case, effective
immediately, WITH THE RIGHT OF VISITATION BY THE RESPONDENT, SHERYL M.
MENDEZ TO HER DAUGHTER PRINCESS FATIMA M. MALIGA, ANY REASONABLE
TIME OF THE DAY AND NIGHT, AND/OR BORROW HER (PRINCESS FATIMA M.
MALIGA) PROVIDED THAT IT MUST BE ONLY WITHIN THE VICINITY OF COTABATO
CITY AND THEREAFTER, RETURN HER TO THE PETITIONER, DR. JOHN O. MALIGA,
UPON PROPER COORDINATION AND ARRANGEMENT FROM THE ABOVE-NAMED
PETITIONER OR HIS DULY AUTHORIZED REPRESENTATIVE.
SO ORDERED.11
Mendez filed a motion for reconsideration of the December 3, 2010 order, arguing that the
question of custody was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the ShDC, and not the
Sh CC, and praying that the said order be declared null and void.12
On January 19, 2011, the ShCC constituted an Agama Arbitration Council13 which, after its
own hearing and meeting, submitted the case for hearing on the merits because the
parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement and because "the [d]ivorce was moot and
academic."14
The Ruling of the Shari 'a Circuit Court
On August 19, 2011, the Sh CC issued the order15 confirming the talaq pronounced by
Maliga against Mendez and awarded to him the care and custody of Princess Fatima. In
the same order, the ShCC granted visitation rights to Mendez and ordered Maliga to give
her a mut'a (consolatory gift) in the amount of P24,000.00. Thus:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, it is hereby ORDERED, that:
1. The pronounced Talaq (Divorce) by herein Petitioner DR. JOHN O. MALIGA
against respondent SHERYL M. MENDEZ is hereby CONFIRMED and
considering that the Iddah (cooling-off/waiting period) had long been lapsed, she
may now be allowed to use her former maiden name in all personal and official
transactions;
2. The care and custody of the PARTIES' minor daughter PRINCESS FATIMA
shall remain with Petitioner DR. JOHN O. MALIGA with a right of visitation by
respondent SHERYL M. MENDEZ any reasonable time of the day and night
and/or borrow her and thereafter, return her (PRINCESS FATIMA) to petitioner
DR. JOHN O. MALIGA, provided it is only within the vicinity of Cotabato City
and provided further that there should be a proper coordination with the above-
named Petitioner, and the petitioner is hereby ordered to observe such rights of
visitation and/ or borrow of by the respondent SHERYL M. MENDEZ; and
3. Petitioner DR. JOHN O. MALIGA is hereby ordered upon receipt hereof, to
give consolatory gift (mut'a) to respondent SHERYL M. MENDEZ in the amount
of TWENTY FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (Php. 24,000.00) as provided by law
as contained in the petitioner's prayer which amounts of money must be
coursed/ consigned to this Court.
Let the copy of this Order be furnished to the Office of the Shari'a Circuit Registrar of this
Court for record and registration purposes, and/or ANNOTATION of the PARTIES'
marriage contract as DIVORCED.
SO ORDERED.16
In its ruling, the ShCC noted that Mendez never questioned the validity of the talaq and
found that it was caused by the irreconcilable religious differences between the spouses
as to the upbringing of their daughter. For said reason, it ruled that, in the best interest of
the child in all aspects of life - economic, social and religious, the care and custody of
Princess Fatima should remain with Maliga.17
The Ruling of the Shari 'a District Court
Mendez appealed the ShCC order to the ShDC only with respect to the ruling on custody.
In her memorandum18before the ShDC, Mendez argued that the order of the ShCC was
null and void for its failure to state the facts and law on which its findings were based in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 36 of the Rules of Court. She reiterated that the urgent
motion filed by Maliga did not contain the requisite notice of hearing, and that the mother
had the right of custody if the child was under seven years of age. She asserted that the
question of custody was within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the ShDC only, and
that an order of a court not vested with jurisdiction was null and void.19
On March 30, 2012, the ShDC issued the assailed decision,20 affirming the August 19,
2011 Order of the Sh CC. Giving credence to Maliga's allegation that Mendez had
reverted to Christianity, the ShDC ruled that in Shari'a Law, a mother might be legally
disentitled to the custody of her child if she turned apostate, and disqualified until she
returned to the Islamic faith; and that the father, as a Muslim, was in a better position to
take care of the child's well-being and raise her as a Muslim. Affirming the ShCC ruling,
the ShDC found that Princess Fatima should remain with her father for her best interest in
all aspects of life, economically, socially and religiously.
Hence, this petition where Mendez argues the following:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
A. THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE OF 1 ST SHARI' A CIRCUIT, COTABATO
CITY, 5™ SHARIA [DISTRICT], MONTANO K. KALIMPO, GRAVELY AND SERIOUSLY
ERRED IN DECIDING IN FAVOR OF THE PETITIONERAPPELLEE IN SHCC CIVIL
CASE NO. 2010-559, DR. JOHN O. MALIGA FOR CARE AND CUSTODY [OF] MINOR
CHILD AGAINST HEREIN RESPONDENT-APPELLANT AS THE HONORABLE
JUDGE, GRAVELY ABUSES HIS AUTHORITY AMOUNTED TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION OVER THE CASE.
B. WERE THE ORDER OF THE HONORABLE PRESIDING JUDGE MONTANO K.
KALIMPO OF 1 ST SHARI' A CIRCUIT COURT, COTABATO CITY DATED NOVEMBER
12, 2010 AND DECEMBER 03, 2010 AWARDED THE CARE AND CUSTODY IN
FAVOR OF PETITIONER-APPELLEE SHCC CIVIL CASE NO. 2010-559 FOR BEING
UNREASONABLE, IN VIOLATION OF RULE 15, SECTIONS 4, 5, 6 REVISED RULES
OF CIVIL PROCEDURE 1997, ARTICLE 143, PAR. 1, SECTION a OF THE P.D. 1083,
ARTICLE 78, P.D. 1083 AS WELL AS JURISDICTION.
C. WERE THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE SHARI' A DISTRICT COURT, 5™
SHARI'A DISTRICT COTABATO CITY, PROMULGATED ON MARCH 30, 2011,
AFFIRMED ASSAILED ORDER DA TED AUGUST 19, 2011 OF THE SHARI'A CIRCUIT
COTABATO CITY, FOR BEING UNREASONABLE. 21
Mendez argues that the ShCC acted in excess of jurisdiction when it ruled on Maliga's
urgent motion for issuance of temporary custody, considering that the motion was a mere
scrap of paper for lack of notice of hearing. She reiterates that she never received any
summons in connection with the urgent motion. She never received a copy of the ShCC
order granting the said motion either.22
Mendez goes on to contend that the ShCC had no jurisdiction to hear, try and decide the
issue of Princess Fatima's custody, considering that under Article 143(l)(a) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1083,23 it is the ShDC which has the exclusive original jurisdiction over
all cases involving custody. She argues the rule that any decision rendered without
jurisdiction is a total nullity and may be struck down at any time, even on appeal.24
Finally, she asserts that she should have been awarded custody under Article 7 8 of P .D.
No. 1083 ,. as Princess Fatima was not above seven years old at the time the ShCC order
was promulgated. As to Maliga's claim that she was disqualified to have custody over
Princess Fatima for becoming apostate to the Islamic faith, Mendez argues that while the
same may be a ground for disinheritance under the Muslim Law, the same law does not
provide that being apostate is a ground to be denied of the care and custody of her minor
child.25 Besides, she professes that she is still a Muslim.
In the July 9, 2012 Resolution,26 the Court initially denied the subject petition for various
procedural defects.
On November 12, 2012, acting on the motion for reconsideration filed by Mendez, the
Court reinstated the petition.27Thereafter, Maliga and Mendez filed their respective
pleadings.
In his Comment,28 dated January 17, 2013, Maliga countered that a mother may be
deprived of the custody of her child below seven years of age for compelling reasons. He
alleged that Mendez was unemployed and was financially dependent on him for all the
needs of Princess Fatima since her conception. He reiterated that a Muslim mother may
be legally disentitled to the custody of her minor child if she turned apostate and should
remain disqualified until she return to the Islamic faith. Maliga noted that although the
Family Code would now apply to Mendez, who was no longer a Muslim, the application of
the Family Code would defeat the purpose of the Muslim law on disqualification to
inheritance by virtue of apostasy. Finally, he claimed that he was fit and qualified to have
custody of his child as he was a prominent medical practitioner with resources to meet all
her needs. He pointed out that, under his care, Princess Fatima's academic performance
dramatically improved from the lowest ranking to the top six in her 3rd grade class.
In her Reply,29 dated April 26, 2013, Mendez countered that Maliga only filed his petition
for talaq when he discovered that she had filed a complaint-affidavit against him for
kidnapping and failure to return a minor;30 that he had been totally remiss in his material
and moral obligations to his daughter;31 that he was unfit to take care of Princess Fatima
as his numerous wives had been confusing the child;32 and that she was not unemployed
as she was a registered nurse who could provide for all the needs of her child and who, in
fact, had cared for her from birth until she was six (6) years old and sent her to an
exclusive school, all without the assistance of Maliga.33
ISSUES
As can be gleaned from the pleadings, the issues at hand are the following:
1. Whether or not the ShCC erred in acting on Maliga's urgent motion for
issuance of temporary custody;
2. Whether or not the ShCC and the ShDC had jurisdiction to rule on the
issue of custody; and
3. Whether or not custody was properly granted to Maliga.
Opinion of Amicus Curiae
On March 11, 2014, the Court appointed Secretary-CEO Mehol K. Sadain (Secretary
Sadain) of the National Commission on Muslim Filipinos (NCMF) and Dr. Hamid A. Barra
of the King Faisal Center for Islamic, Arabic and Asian Studies, as amici curiae, and
directed them to submit their respective opinions on the matter of jurisdiction with respect
to the issue of custody,34 in view of the fact that the exclusive original jurisdiction over
divorce and custody pertains to two separate courts, namely, the ShCC and the ShDC,
respectively.
In compliance, Secretary Sadain submitted his opinion,35 calling on the Court to apply
the darurah-oriented principle of liberal construction in order to promote the objective of
securing a just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of every action and proceeding, in
accordance with the Rules of Court, which applies to P.D. No. 1083 in a suppletory
manner. He explained that Islamic law subscribes to the same objective of dispensing
speedy and equitable justice, as well as its own darurah-oriented liberal construction for
the sake of promoting equitable or weighty public interests. He elucidated that under the
doctrine of darurah (necessity), prohibited actions may be allowed or restrictive rules may
be relaxed if such would serve a greater and more primordial interest, such as the
preservation of life and property, or the higher pursuit of justice. He cited as an example
the prohibition on the eating of pork by a Muslim which could be temporarily set aside if he
was faced with the choice of starving to death or eating pork to survive. Another example
given was the allowance of the internal use of alcohol-based products if ingested in the
form of life-preserving medicine.
In consonance with the above principles, Secretary Sadain was of the view that strict
procedural requirements could be relaxed if such would result in a speedy, fair and
beneficial disposition of a pending legal question. He noted that determining the custody of
a child was an ancillary matter, which unavoidably would arise in divorce proceedings, and
would usually involve delving into matters of child welfare and interest, as well as the
fitness of the person/s seeking custody. He noted that the speedy resolution of divorce
and custody proceedings had an effect on the general welfare of the child and was in the
child's best interest. He cited that the Islamic legal jurisdiction in Pakistan had ruled that, in
guardianship proceedings, the Court exercised parental jurisdiction, and technicalities of
pleadings or strict formalities need not be enforced because the State took charge of the
rights of the child to safeguard their welfare by deciding the question of custody as
expeditiously as possible.
Secretary Sadain, thus, opined that the rule on jurisdiction under P.D. No. 1083 may be
relaxed considering that the issue of custody arose as an ancillary matter in the divorce
proceedings, which must be addressed in the same court in order to protect the welfare,
rights and interest of the child as expeditiously as possible. He also pointed out that
allowing the ShCC to decide on the matter of custody would avoid multiplicity of suits and
delay in the judicial proceedings. Lastly, he noted that because the ShDC had passed
judgment on the case appealed from the ShCC, the need for a separate case had been
moot and the jurisdictional and procedural defects had been cured.
Dr. Hamid Barra, despite repeated requests, did not submit an opinion.36
The Ruling of the Court
Appellate Jurisdiction of the Court in Shari 'a Cases
At the outset, the Court notes that this petition has been correctly instituted with this Court.
It has been recognized that decades after the 1989 enactment of the law37 creating the
Shari' a Appellate Court and after the Court authorized its creation in 1999,38 it has yet to
be organized. Pending the organization of the Shari'a Appellate Court, appeals or petitions
from final orders or decisions of the ShDC shall be filed with the Court of
Appeals (CA) and referred to a Special Division to be organized in any of the CA stations
preferably to be composed of Muslim CA Justices. For cases where only errors or
questions of law are raised or involved, the appeal shall be to this Court via a petition for
review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court pursuant to Article . VIII, Section 5
of the Constitution and Section 2 of Rule 41 of the Rules.39 As the present petition involves
only questions of law, it has been properly filed before this Court.
Jurisdiction of Shari 'a Courts
Jurisdiction is the power and authority of a court to hear, try and decide a case.40 In order
for the court to have authority to dispose of a case on the merits, it must acquire
jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties.41The Congress has the power to
define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of various courts,42 and courts are without
authority to act where jurisdiction has not been conferred by law.43 Jurisdiction is conferred
only by the Constitution or the law. It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by
the omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court, and may be
raised at any stage of the proceedings, even for the first time on appeal.44
The law which confers jurisdiction on the Shari'a courts is P.D. No. 1083. The pertinent
articles of the law as to the original jurisdiction of the Shari'a courts are as follows:
Art. 143. Original jurisdiction. -
(1) The Shari'a District Court shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over:
(a) All cases involving custody, guardianship, legitimacy, paternity and
filiation arising under this Code;
(1) All cases involving offenses defined and punished under this Code.
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or
have been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes
relating to:
(a) Marriage;
(b) Divorce recognized under this Code;

(b) All cases involving disposition, distribution and settlement of the estate of (c) Betrothal or breach of contract to marry;
deceased Muslims, probate of wills, issuance of letters of administration or
appointment of administrators or executors regardless of the nature or the
(d) Customary dower (mahr);
aggregate value of the property;

(e) Disposition and distribution of property upon divorce;

(c) Petitions for the declaration of absence and death and for the cancellation or
correction of entries in the Muslim Registries mentioned in Title VI of Book Two
of this Code; (f) Maintenance and support, and consolatory gifts, (mut'a); and

(d) All actions arising from customary contracts in which the parties are (g) Restitution of marital rights.
Muslims, if they have not specified which law shall govern their relations; and
(3) All cases involving disputes relative to communal properties.
(e) All petitions for mandamus, prohibition, injunction, certiorari, habeas corpus,
and all other auxiliary writs and processes in aid of its appellate jurisdiction.
[Emphases and Underscoring Supplied]

(2) Concurrently with existing civil courts, the Shari'a District Court shall have original
jurisdiction over:
(a) Petitions by Muslims for the constitution of a family home, change of name
and commitment of an insane person to an asylum;
(b) All other personal and real actions not mentioned in paragraph 1 (d) wherein
the parties involved are Muslims except those for forcible entry and unlawful
detainer, which shall fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Municipal
Circuit Court; and
(c) All special civil actions for interpleader or declaratory relief wherein the
parties are Muslims or the property involved belongs exclusively to Muslims.
It is clear that the ShCC has exclusive original jurisdiction over civil actions between
parties who have been married in accordance with the Muslim law, involving
disputes relating to divorce under P.D. No. 1083. There is, therefore, no doubt that the
ShCC had jurisdiction to confirm the talaq between Mendez and Maliga.
Jurisdiction in Custody Case
Article 143 above, however, clearly provides
that the ShDC has exclusive original jurisdiction over all cases
involving custody under P.D. No. 1083. Exclusive jurisdiction is the power of the court to
take cognizance of and decide certain cases to the exclusion of any other
courts.45 Original jurisdiction is the power of the court to take judicial cognizance of a case
instituted for judicial action for the first time under conditions provided by law.

xxxx On the other hand, appellate jurisdiction is the authority of a court higher in rank to re-
examine the final order of judgment of a lower court which tried the case now elevated for
judicial review.46 Since the two jurisdictions are exclusive of each other, each must be
Art. 155. Jurisdiction. - The Shari'a Circuit Courts shall have exclusive original
expressly conferred by law. One does not flow from, nor is inferred from the other.47
jurisdiction over:
Implication of Article 54
As opined by Secretary Sadain.48 the ShCC does seem to have ancillary jurisdiction over
custody issues as they relate to a divorce decree. Under Article 155, it is provided that the
SHCC shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all civil actions and proceedings
involving disputes relating to divorce. To quote once more:
Article 155. Jurisdiction. The Shari'a Circuit Court shall have exclusive original
jurisdiction over
(1) All cases involving offenses defined and punished under this Code.
(2) All civil actions and proceedings between parties who are Muslims or have
been married in accordance with Article 13 involving disputes relating to:
(a) xx x.
(b) Divorce recognized under this Code.
xxxx
Clearly, the provision above clothes the ShCC with power to hear and decide civil
actions relating to a talaq or divorce. It cannot be denied that the issue of custody is a
necessary consequence of a divorce proceeding. As Article 54 of P.D. No. 1083 provides:
Article 54. Effects of irrevocable talaq or faskh. A talaq or faskh, as soon as it
becomes irrevocable, shall have the following effects:
(a) The marriage bond shall be severed and the spouses may contract another
marriage in accordance with this Code;
(b) The spouses shall lose their mutual rights of inheritance;
(c) The custody of children shall be determined in accordance with Article
78 of this Code;
(d) The wife shall be entitled to recover from the jusband her whole dower in
case the talaq has been effected after the consummation of the marriage, or
one-half thereof if effected before its consummation;
(e) The husband shall not be discharged from his obligation to give support in
accordance with Article 67; and
(f) The conjugal partnership, if stipulated in the marriage settlements, shall be
dissolved and liquidated.
Though Article 54 does not directly confer jurisdiction to the ShCC to rule on the issue of
custody, the Court, nevertheless grants the ShCC ancillary jurisdiction to resolve
issues related to divorce. The above-quoted provision states categorically that as a
consequent effect of divorce, the custody of children shall be determined in accordance
with Article 78 of the Code. In tum, Article 78 states that the care and custody of children
below seven whose parents are divorced shall belong to the mother, and the
minor above seven but below the age of puberty may choose the parent with whom
he/she wants to stay.49
To rule that the ShCC is without jurisdiction to resolve issues on custody after it had
decided on the issue of divorce, simply because it appears to contravene Article 143 of
P.D. No. 1083, would be antithetical to the doctrine of ancillary jurisdiction. "While a court
may be expressly granted the incidental powers necessary to effectuate its jurisdiction, a
grant of jurisdiction, in the absence of prohibitive legislation, implies the necessary and
usual incidental powers essential to effectuate it, and, subject to existing laws and
constitutional provisions, every regularly constituted court has power to do all things that
are reasonably necessary for the administration of justice within the scope of its
jurisdiction and for the enforcement of its judgments and mandates. Hence, demands,
matters or questions ancillary or incidental to, or growing out of, the main action, and
coming within the above principles, may be taken cognizance of by the court and
determined, since such jurisdiction is in aid of its authority over the principal matter, even
though the court may thus be called on to consider and decide matters which, as original
causes of action, would not be within its cognizance."50
Following the doctrine, the ShCC, in cases involving divorce, possesses the power to
resolve the issue of custody, it being a related issue to the main cause of action.
At this juncture, the question must be asked: By recognizing the power of the ShCC to rule
on the issue of custody, would this effectively render Article 143 of P.D. No. 1083
meaningless, considering that the same is unequivocal in providing that the ShDC has the
exclusive original jurisdiction to decide on all cases involving custody?
The Court rules in the negative.
A distinction must be made between a case for divorce wherein the issue of custody is
an ancillary issue and a case where custody is the main issue. Jurisdiction in the former,
as discussed above, lies with the ShCC, as the main cause of action is divorce. The latter
on the other hand, where the main cause of action is one of custody, the same must be
filed with the ShDC, pursuant to Article 143 of P.D. No. 1083.
Violation of Due Process; No Notice of Hearing; and Absence of Hearing
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the award of custody to Maliga by the ShCC was void as it
was rendered in violation of the constitutional right of Mendez to due process.
Mendez pointed out that Maliga's urgent motion for issuance of temporary custody was
filed on October 9, 2010, even before the main petition for talaq was filed on November 2,
2010, and that she never received a summons pertaining to the urgent motion. Indeed, a
review of the records reveals that the date of filing was handwritten on the said motion as
"October 9, 2010." The motion itself and the registry receipt attached thereto, however,
were dated "November 9, 2010." The Court is, thus, of the view that the month "October"
was mistakenly written by the receiving clerk instead of "November," and that the motion
was filed subsequent to the main petition for talaq as an ancillary matter.
The Court, nonetheless, agrees with Mendez that the urgent motion lacked the requisite
notice of hearing. It is immediately evident from the face of the motion that it did not
contain the notice of hearing required by the Rules of Court which has suppletory
application to the present case. Section 4 of Rule 15 provides that every written motion
shall be set for hearing by the applicant. Every written motion is required to be heard and
the notice of hearing shall be served in such manner as to insure its receipt by the other
party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing, unless the court for good cause
sets the hearing on shorter notice.51 The notice of hearing is intended to prevent surprise
and to afford the adverse party a chance to be heard before the motion is resolved by the
court. A seasonable service of a copy of the motion on the adverse party with a notice of
hearing indicating the time and place of hearing is a mandatory requirement that cannot
be dispensed with as this is the minimum requirement of procedural due process.52
A motion that does not contain a notice of hearing is a mere scrap of paper and presents
no question which merits the attention and consideration of the court.1âwphi1 It is not
even a motion for it does not comply with the rules, and, hence, even the clerk has no right
to receive it.53
borrow her (PRINCESS FATIMA) provided that it is only within the vicinity of Cotabato City
and thereafter, return her, with proper coordination with Petitioner DR. JOHN O. MALIGA,
and the latter (DR. JOHN O. MALIGA) is hereby ordered to observe such rights afforded
to respondent SHERYL M. MENDEZ.54
Although the ShCC stated that, in deciding on the custody case, it scrutinized the
evidence on hand, it was remiss in its duty to state the precise factual and legal basis on
which its ruling awarding custody to Maliga was based. Section 14, Article VIII of the 1987
Constitution mandates that decisions must clearly and distinctly state the facts and the law
on which they are based. The decisions of courts must be able to address the issues
raised by the parties through the presentation of a comprehensive analysis or account of
factual and legal findings of the court.55It is evident that the ShCC failed to comply with
these requirements. It merely stated that it was in Princess Fatima's "best interest in all
aspects of life, economically, socially and religiously" that custody be awarded to her
father. There was no express finding that Mendez was unfit in any way, or a hint of an
explanation as to why Maliga was in a better position to take custody of Princess Fatima.
The ShDC, on the other hand, in affirming the findings of the ShCC, stated that Mendez
was disentitled to custody because she had turned apostate, and held that she would
remain disqualified until she return to the Islamic faith in accordance with the Muslim Law.
It appears, however, that disqualification due to apostasy under the Muslim Code pertains
to disinheritance under Article 93 of the Muslim Code,56 and not to the custody of children.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The following are
declared NULL and VOID:
1. the November 12, 2010 and December 3, 2010 Orders of the Shari'a Circuit
Court in ShCC Civil Case No. 2010-559, insofar as the ruling on custody and
visitation is concerned;

Award of Custody; No Basis

2. the August 19, 2011 Order of the Shari'a Circuit Court in ShCC Civil Case No.
2010-559, insofar as the ruling on custody is concerned; and
Not only was the award of custody violative of the constitutional right of Mendez to due
process, but also both the orders of the ShCC and the ShDC awarding custody of
3. the March 30, 2012 Decision of the Shari'a District Court in SDC Appealed
Princess Fatima to Maliga were without evidentiary basis because no hearing was actually
Case No. 2011-19, insofar as the ruling on custody is concerned.
conducted prior to the issuance of the order granting the urgent motion. Moreover, there
was no explanation given as to why the motion was resolved without notice to, or the
participation of, Mendez. In the August 19, 2011 Order of the Shari'a Circuit Court in ShCC Civil Case No. 2010-
559, confirming the pronouncement of Talaq (Divorce) by petitioner Dr. John O. Maliga
against respondent Sheryl M. Mendez and the giving of consolatory gift (mut 'a) to her in
In awarding custody to Maliga, the ShCC merely wrote:
the amount of P24,000.00 is maintained.

On the issue of CARE AND CUSTODY of the PARTIES' minor daughter PRINCESS
The records of the case are hereby ordered REMANDED to the Shari' a Circuit Court for
FATIMA, this Court after closely scrutinizing the evidence on hand, deemed it just and
appropriate proceedings on the motion of Dr. John O. Maliga for the determination of
proper and/ or is convinced that it should be under status quo, remains (sic) with Petitioner
custody of Princess Fatima M. Maliga.
DR. JOHN 0. MALIGA, for her (PRINCESS FATIMA) best interest in all aspects of life,
economically, socially and religiously etc WITHOUT prejudice of the rights of visitation of
respondent SHERYL M. MENDEZ any reasonable time of the day and right (sic), and SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA
Associate Justice
G.R. NOS. 178382-83
CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC., Petitioner, 
vs.
JOSEPH BASSO, Respondent.
DECISION
JARDELEZA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court
assailing the Decision2dated May 23, 2006 and Resolution3 dated June 19, 2007 of the
Court of Appeals in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 83938 and CA-G.R. SP No.
84281. These assailed Decision and Resolution set aside the Decision4dated November
28, 2003 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) declaring Joseph Basso's
(Basso) dismissal illegal, and ordering the payment of separation pay as alternative to
reinstatement and full backwages until the date of the Decision.
The Facts
Petitioner Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign corporation organized and
e:xisting under the laws of and domiciled in the United States of America (US). It is
licensed to do business in the Philippines.5 Basso, a US citizen, resided in the Philippines
prior to his death.6
During his visit to Manila in 1990, Mr. Keith R. Braden (Mr. Braden), Managing Director-
Asia of Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental), offered Basso the position of General
Manager of the Philippine Branch of Continental. Basso accepted the offer.7
It was not until much later that Mr. Braden, who had since returned to the US, sent Basso
the employment contract8dated February 1, 1991, which Mr. Braden had already signed.
Basso then signed the employment contract and returned it to Mr. Braden as instructed.
On November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine operations of Continental, with Basso
retaining his position as General Manager.9
On December 20, 1995, Basso received a letter from Mr. Ralph Schulz (Mr. Schulz), who
was then CMI’s Vice President of Marketing and Sales, informing Basso that he has
agreed to work in CMI as a consultant on an "as needed basis" effective February 1, 1996
to July 31, 1996. The letter also informed Basso that: (1) he will not receive any monetary
compensation but will continue being covered by the insurance provided by CMI; (2) he
will enjoy travel privileges; and (3) CMI will advance Php1,140,000.00 for the payment of
housing lease for 12 months.10
On January 11, 1996, Basso wrote a counter-proposal11 to Mr. Schulz regarding his
employment status in CMI. On March 14, 1996, Basso wrote another letter addressed to
Ms. Marty Woodward (Ms. Woodward) of CMI’s Human Resources Department inquiring
about the status of his employment.12 On the same day, Ms. Woodward responded that
pursuant to the employment contract dated February 1, 1991, Basso could be terminated
at will upon a thirty-day notice. This notice was allegedly the letter Basso received from
Mr. Schulz on December 20, 1995. Ms. Woodward also reminded Basso of the telephone
conversation between him, Mr. Schulz and Ms. Woodward on December 19, 1995, where
they informed him of the company’s decision to relieve him as General Manager. Basso,
instead, was offered the position of consultant to CMI. Ms. Woodward also informed
Basso that CMI rejected his counter-proposal and, thus, terminated his employment
effective January 31, 1996. CMI offered Basso a severance pay, in consideration of the
Php1,140,000.00 housing advance that CMI promised him13 Basso filed a Complaint for
Illegal Dismissal with Moral and Exemplary Damages against CMI on December 19,
1996.14 Alleging the presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss15 dated
February 10, 1997 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of CMI and the
subject matter of the controversy. In an Order16 dated August 27, 1997, the Labor Arbiter
granted the Motion to Dismiss. Applying the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the Labor
Arbiter held that the terms and provisions of the employment contract show that the
parties did not intend to apply our Labor Code (Presidential Decree No. 442). The Labor
Arbiter also held that no employer-employee relationship existed between Basso and the
branch office of CMI in the Philippines, but between Basso and the foreign corporation
itself.
On appeal, the NLRC remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for the determination of
certain facts to settle the issue on jurisdiction. NLRC ruled that the issue on whether the
principle of lex loci contractus or lex loci celebrationis should apply has to be further
threshed out.17
Labor Arbiter’s Ruling
Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan in his Decision18 dated September 24, 1999 dismissed
the case for lack of merit and jurisdiction.
The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was executed in the US
"since the letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance of Complainant
was returned there."19 Thus, applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply.
Also, applying lex loci contractus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to
apply Philippine laws, thus:
Although the contract does not state what law shall apply, it is obvious that Philippine laws
were not written into it. More specifically, the Philippine law on taxes and the Labor Code
were not intended by the parties to apply, otherwise Par. 7 on the payment by
Complainant U.S. Federal and Home State income taxes, and Pars. 22/23 on termination
by 30-day prior notice, will not be there. The contract was prepared in contemplation of
Texas or U.S. laws where Par. 7 is required and Pars. 22/23 is allowed.20
The Labor Arbiter also ruled that Basso was terminated for a valid cause based on the
allegations of CMI that Basso committed a series of acts that constitute breach of trust and
loss of confidence.21
The Labor Arbiter, however, found CMI to have voluntarily submitted to his office’s
jurisdiction. CMI participated in the proceedings, submitted evidence on the merits of the
case, and sought affirmative relief through a motion to dismiss.22
NLRC’s Ruling
On appeal, the NLRC Third Division promulgated its Decision23 dated November 28, 2003,
the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the decision dated 24 September 1999 is VACATED and SET ASIDE.
Respondent CMI is ordered to pay complainant the amount of US$5,416.00 for failure to
comply with the due notice requirement. The other claims are dismissed.
SO ORDERED.24
The NLRC did not agree with the pronouncement of the Labor Arbiter that his office has
no jurisdiction over the controversy. It ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction
over the case when CMI voluntarily submitted to his office’s jurisdiction by presenting
evidence, advancing arguments in support of the legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs
on the merits of the case.25
On the merits, the NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that Basso was dismissed for just
and valid causes on the ground of breach of trust and loss of confidence. The NLRC ruled
that under the applicable rules on loss of trust and confidence of a managerial employee,
such as Basso, mere existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached
the trust of his employer suffices. However, the NLRC found that CMI denied Basso the
required due process notice in his dismissal.26
Both CMI and Basso filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration dated January 15,
200427 and January 8, 2004.28 Both motions were dismissed in separate Resolutions dated
March 15, 200429 and February 27, 2004,30respectively.
Basso filed a Petition for Certiorari dated April 16, 2004 with the Court of Appeals
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83938.31 Basso imputed grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the NLRC in ruling that he was validly dismissed. CMI filed its own Petition for
Certiorari dated May 13, 2004 docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84281,32 alleging that the
NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it assumed jurisdiction over the person of CMI
and the subject matter of the case.
In its Resolution dated October 7, 2004, the Court of Appeals consolidated the two
cases33 and ordered the parties to file their respective Memoranda.
The Court of Appeal’s Decision
The Court of Appeals promulgated the now assailed Decision34 dated May 23, 2006, the
relevant dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition of Continental docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84281 is DENIED
DUE COURSE and DISMISSED.
On the other hand the petition of Basso docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83938 is GIVEN
DUE COURSE and GRANTED, and accordingly, the assailed Decision dated November
28, 2003 and Resolution dated February 27, 2004 of the NLRC are SET ASIDE and
VACATED. Instead judgment is rendered hereby declaring the dismissal of Basso illegal
and ordering Continental to pay him separation pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for
every year of service as an alternative to reinstatement. Further, ordering Continental to
pay Basso his full backwages from the date of his said illegal dismissal until date of this
decision. The claim for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees are
dismissed.35
The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the
subject matter of the case and over the parties. The Court of Appeals explained that
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the
complaint and the law. Since the case filed by Basso is a termination dispute that is
"undoubtedly cognizable by the labor tribunals", the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had
jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case. On the issue of jurisdiction over the person of
the parties, who are foreigners, the Court of Appeals ruled that jurisdiction over the person
of Basso was acquired when he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal, while jurisdiction
over the person of CMI was acquired through coercive process of service of summons to
its agent in the Philippines. The Court of Appeals also agreed that the active participation
of CMI in the case rendered moot the issue on jurisdiction.
On the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals declared that CMI illegally dismissed
Basso. The Court of Appeals found that CMI’s allegations of loss of trust and confidence
were not established. CMI "failed to prove its claim of the incidents which were its alleged
bases for loss of trust or confidence."36 While managerial employees can be dismissed for
loss of trust and confidence, there must be a basis for such loss, beyond mere whim or
caprice.
After the parties filed their Motions for Reconsideration,37 the Court of Appeals
promulgated Resolution38 dated June 19, 2007 denying CMI’s motion, while partially
granting Basso’s as to the computation of backwages.
Hence, this petition, which raises the following issues:
 I. 1. "Under the law, do I have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties
to this case?
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING THE FACTUAL
FINDINGS OF THE NLRC INSTEAD OF LIMITING ITS INQUIRY INTO WHETHER OR 2. "If the answer is yes, is this a convenient forum to the parties, in light of the
NOT THE NLRC COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION. facts?

II. 3. "If the answer is yes, what is the conflicts rule for this particular problem?

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LABOR 4. "If the conflicts rule points to a foreign law, has said law been properly
ARBITER AND THE NLRC HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY THE ILLEGAL pleaded and proved by the one invoking it?
DISMISSAL CASE.
5. "If so, is the application or enforcement of the foreign law in the forum one of
III. the basic exceptions to the application of foreign law? In short, is there any
strong policy or vital interest of the forum that is at stake in this case and which
should preclude the application of foreign law?41
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT BASSO
WAS NOT VALIDLY DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF LOSS OF TRUST OR
CONFIDENCE. Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide
cases. Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and
by the material allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is
We begin with the second issue on the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in
entitled to recover all or some of the claims or reliefs sought therein.42 It cannot be
the illegal dismissal case. The first and third issues will be discussed jointly.
acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the omission of the parties or conferred by the
acquiescence of the court.43 That the employment contract of Basso was replete with
The labor tribunals had jurisdiction references to US laws, and that it originated from and was returned to the US, do not
over the parties and the subject automatically preclude our labor tribunals from exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this
matter of the case. case.

CMI maintains that there is a conflict-of-laws issue that must be settled to determine This case stemmed from an illegal dismissal complaint. The Labor Code, under Article
proper jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the case. It also alleges that 217, clearly vests original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving
the existence of foreign elements calls for the application of US laws and the doctrines of termination disputes to the Labor Arbiter.
lex loci celebrationis (the law of the place of the ceremony), lex loci contractus (law of the
place where a contract is executed), and lex loci intentionis (the intention of the parties as
Hence, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the
to the law that should govern their agreement). CMI also invokes the application of the rule
case.
of forum non conveniens to determine the propriety of the assumption of jurisdiction by the
labor tribunals.
As regards jurisdiction over the parties, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Labor
Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the person of Basso, notwithstanding his citizenship,
We agree with CMI that there is a conflict-of-laws issue that needs to be resolved first.
when he filed his complaint against CMI. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of
Where the facts establish the existence of foreign elements, the case presents a conflict-
CMI was acquired through the coercive process of service of summons. We note that CMI
of-laws issue.39 The foreign element in a case may appear in different forms, such as in
never denied that it was served with summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily appeared and
this case, where one of the parties is an alien and the other is domiciled in another state.
participated in the proceedings before the courts. Though a foreign corporation, CMI is
licensed to do business in the Philippines and has a local business address here. The
In Hasegawa v. Kitamura,40 we stated that in the judicial resolution of conflict-of-laws purpose of the law in requiring that foreign corporations doing business in the country be
problems, three consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and licensed to do so, is to subject the foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.44
recognition and enforcement of judgments. In resolving the conflicts problem, courts
should ask the following questions:
Considering that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the parties and the
subject matter of this case, these tribunals may proceed to try the case even if the rules of
conflict-of-laws or the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum, this being an a. Foreign station allowance of forty percent (40%) using the "U.S. State
exercise of sovereign prerogative of the country where the case is filed.45 Department Index, the base being Washington, D.C."

The next question is whether the local forum is the convenient forum in light of the facts of b. Tax equalization that made Basso responsible for "federal and any home
the case. CMI contends that a Philippine court is an inconvenient forum. state income taxes."

We disagree.
Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case
may assume jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the following requisites are
met: (1) that the Philippine Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2)
that the Philippine Court is in a position to make an intelligent decision as to the law and
the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is likely to have power to enforce its
decision.46 All these requisites are present here.
Basso may conveniently resort to our labor tribunals as he and CMI had physical presence
in the Philippines during the duration of the trial. CMI has a Philippine branch, while
Basso, before his death, was residing here.
Thus, it could be reasonably expected that no extraordinary measures were needed for
the parties to make arrangements in advocating their respective cases.
The labor tribunals can make an intelligent decision as to the law and facts. The incident
subject of this case (i.e. dismissal of Basso) happened in the Philippines, the surrounding
circumstances of which can be ascertained without having to leave the Philippines. The
acts that allegedly led to loss of trust and confidence and Basso’s eventual dismissal were
committed in the Philippines. As to the law, we hold that Philippine law is the proper law of
the forum, as we shall discuss shortly. Also, the labor tribunals have the power to enforce
their judgments because they acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both parties.
c. Hardship allowance of fifteen percent (15%) of base pay based upon the
"U.S. Department of State Indexes of living costs abroad."
d. The employment arrangement is "one at will, terminable by either party
without any further liability on thirty days prior written notice."50
CMI asserts that the US law on labor relations particularly, the US Railway Labor Act
sanctions termination-at-will provisions in an employment contract. Thus, CMI concludes
that if such laws were applied, there would have been no illegal dismissal to speak of
because the termination-at-will provision in Basso’s employment contract would have
been perfectly valid.
We disagree.
In Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals,51 we emphasized that an essential element
of conflict rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact".
Choice-of-law rules invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right,
contract claim) and a connecting fact or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the
place of celebration, the place of performance, or the place of wrongdoing. Pursuant to
Saudi Arabian Airlines, we hold that the "test factors," "points of contact" or "connecting
factors" in this case are the following:
(1) The nationality, domicile or residence of Basso;

Our labor tribunals being the convenient fora, the next question is what law should apply in
(2) The seat of CMI;
resolving this case.

(3) The place where the employment contract has been made, the locus actus;
The choice-of-law issue in a conflict-of-laws case seeks to answer the following important
questions: (1) What legal system should control a given situation where some of the
significant facts occurred in two or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen (4) The place where the act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of
legal system regulate the situation.47 These questions are entirely different from the performance of contractual duties;
question of jurisdiction that only seeks to answer whether the courts of a state where the
case is initiated have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.48 As such, the power to exercise
(5) The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their
jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law.49
agreement, the lex loci intentionis; and

CMI insists that US law is the applicable choice-of-law under the principles of lex loci
(6) The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or
celebrationis and lex loci contractus. It argues that the contract of employment originated
done.52
from and was returned to the US after Basso signed it, and hence, was perfected there.
CMI further claims that the references to US law in the employment contract show the
parties’ intention to apply US law and not ours. These references are:
Applying the foregoing in this case, we conclude that Philippine law is the applicable law.
Basso, though a US citizen, was a resident here from the time he was hired by CMI until
his death during the pendency of the case. CMI, while a foreign corporation, has a license
to do business in the Philippines and maintains a branch here, where Basso was hired to
work. The contract of employment was negotiated in the Philippines. A purely consensual
contract, it was also perfected in the Philippines when Basso accepted the terms and
conditions of his employment as offered by CMI. The place of performance relative to
Basso’s contractual duties was in the Philippines. The alleged prohibited acts of Basso
that warranted his dismissal were committed in the Philippines.
Clearly, the Philippines is the state with the most significant relationship to the problem.
Thus, we hold that CMI and Basso intended Philippine law to govern, notwithstanding
some references made to US laws and the fact that this intention was not expressly stated
in the contract. We explained in Philippine Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee
Corporation v. V. P. Eusebio Construction, Inc.53 that the law selected may be implied from
such factors as substantial connection with the transaction, or the nationality or domicile of
the parties.54 We cautioned, however, that while Philippine courts would do well to adopt
the first and most basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select
the law applicable to their contract, the selection is subject to the limitation that it is not
against the law, morals, or public policy of the forum.55
Similarly, in Bank of America, NT & SA v. American Realty Corporation,56 we ruled that a
foreign law, judgment or contract contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum shall not be applied. Thus:
CMI submits that the Court of Appeals overstepped the boundaries of the limited scope of
its certiorari jurisdiction when instead of ruling on the existence of grave abuse of
discretion, it proceeded to pass upon the legality and propriety of Basso’s dismissal.
Moreover, CMI asserts that it was error on the part of the Court of Appeals to re-evaluate
the evidence and circumstances surrounding the dismissal of Basso.
We disagree.
The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via a Petition for Certiorari
under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court was settled in our decision in St. Martin
Funeral Home v. NLRC.60 The general rule is that certiorari does not lie to review errors of
judgment of the trial court, as well as that of a quasi-judicial tribunal. In certiorari
proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and assess the evidence of
the parties and to weigh their probative value.61 However, this rule admits of exceptions. In
Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores,62 we stated:
In the review of an NLRC decision through a special civil action for certiorari, resolution is
confined only to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor
tribunal. Hence, the Court refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and
agencies exercising adjudicative functions, such as the NLRC.
Occasionally, however, the Court is constrained to delve into factual matters where, as in
the instant case, the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter.

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable
injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important
function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the
fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.57
Termination-at-will is anathema to the public policies on labor protection espoused by our
laws and Constitution, which dictates that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and
authorized causes provided by law and after due process having been complied
with.58 Hence, the US Railway Labor Act, which sanctions termination-at-will, should not
be applied in this case.
Additionally, the rule is that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. As any other fact,
it must be alleged and proved.59 If the foreign law is not properly pleaded or proved, the
presumption of identity or similarity of the foreign law to our own laws, otherwise known as
processual presumption, applies. Here, US law may have been properly pleaded but it
was not proved in the labor tribunals.
Having disposed of the issue on jurisdiction, we now rule on the first and third issues.
In this instance, the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may look into the records
of the case and reexamine the questioned findings. As a corollary, this Court is clothed
with ample authority to review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their
appeal, if it finds that their consideration is necessary to arrive at a just decision of the
case. The same principles are now necessarily adhered to and are applied by the Court of
Appeals in its expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated through a petition for
certiorari; thus, we see no error on its part when it made anew a factual determination of
the matters and on that basis reversed the ruling of the NLRC.63(Citations omitted.)
Thus, the Court of Appeals may grant the petition when the factual findings complained of
are not supported by the evidence on record; when it is necessary to prevent a substantial
wrong or to do substantial justice; when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the
Labor Arbiter; and when necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case.64 To make
these findings, the Court of Appeals necessarily has to look at the evidence and make its
own factual determination.65
Since the findings of the Labor Arbiter differ with that of the NLRC, we find that the Court
of Appeals correctly exercised its power to review the evidence and the records of the
illegal dismissal case.

The Court of Appeals may review the

Basso was illegally dismissed.
factual findings of the NLRC in a
Rule 65 petition.
It is of no moment that Basso was a managerial employee of CMI. Managerial employees
enjoy security of tenure and the right of the management to dismiss must be balanced
against the managerial employee’s right to security of tenure, which is not one of the
guaranties he gives up.66
In Apo Cement Corporation v. Baptisma,67 we ruled that for an employer to validly dismiss
an employee on the ground of loss of trust and confidence under Article 282 (c) of the
Labor Code, the employer must observe the following guidelines: 1) loss of confidence
should not be simulated; 2) it should not be used as subterfuge for causes which are
improper, illegal or unjustified; 3) it may not be arbitrarily asserted in the face of
overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and 4) it must be genuine, not a mere afterthought
to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. More importantly, it must be based on a willful
breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.
We agree with the Court of Appeals that the dismissal of Basso was not founded on
clearly established facts and evidence sufficient to warrant dismissal from employment.
While proof beyond reasonable doubt is not required to establish loss of trust and
confidence, substantial evidence is required and on the employer rests the burden to
establish it.68 There must be some basis for the loss of trust, or that the employer has
reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for misconduct, which
renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.69
CMI alleges that Basso committed the following:
(1) Basso delegated too much responsibility to the General Sales Agent and
relied heavily on its judgments.70
(2) Basso excessively issued promotional tickets to his friends who had no
direct business with CMI.71
(3) The advertising agency that CMI contracted had to deal directly with Guam
because Basso was hardly available.72 Mr. Schulz discovered that Basso
exceeded the advertising budget by $76,000.00 in 1994 and by $20,000.00 in
1995.73
(4) Basso spent more time and attention to his personal businesses and was
reputed to own nightclubs in the Philippines.74
(5) Basso used free tickets and advertising money to promote his personal
business,75 such as a brochure that jointly advertised one of Basso’s nightclubs
with CMI.
We find that CMI failed to discharge its burden to prove the above acts. CMI merely
submitted affidavits of its officers, without any other corroborating evidence. Basso, on the
other hand, had adequately explained his side. On the advertising agency and budget
issues raised by CMI, he explained that these were blatant lies as the advertising needs of
CMI were centralized in its Guam office and the Philippine office was not authorized to
deal with CMI’s advertising agency, except on minor issues.76 Basso further stated that
under CMI’s existing policy, ninety percent (90%) of the advertising decisions were
delegated to the advertising firm of McCann- Ericsson in Japan and only ten percent
(10%) were left to the Philippine office.77 Basso also denied the allegations of owning
nightclubs and promoting his personal businesses and explained that it was illegal for
foreigners in the Philippines to engage in retail trade in the first place.
Apart from these accusations, CMI likewise presented the findings of the audit team
headed by Mr. Stephen D. Goepfert, showing that "for the period of 1995 and 1996,
personal passes for Continental and other airline employees were noted (sic) to be issued
for which no service charge was collected."78 The audit cited the trip pass log of a total of
10 months. The trip log does not show, however, that Basso caused all the ticket
issuances.
More, half of the trips in the log occurred from March to July of 1996,79 a period beyond
the tenure of Basso. Basso was terminated effectively on January 31, 1996 as indicated in
the letter of Ms. Woodward.80
CMI also accused Basso of making "questionable overseas phone calls". Basso, however,
adequately explained in his Reply81 that the phone calls to Italy and Portland, USA were
made for the purpose of looking for a technical maintenance personnel with US Federal
Aviation Authority qualifications, which CMI needed at that time. The calls to the US were
also made in connection with his functions as General Manager, such as inquiries on his
tax returns filed in Nevada. Basso also explained that the phone lines82 were open direct
lines that all personnel were free to use to make direct long distance calls.83
Finally, CMI alleged that Basso approved the disbursement of Php80,000.00 to cover the
transfer fee of the Manila Polo Club share from Mr. Kenneth Glover, the previous General
Manager, to him. CMI claimed that "nowhere in the said contract was it likewise indicated
that the Manila Polo Club share was part of the compensation package given by CMI to
Basso."84 CMI’s claims are not credible. Basso explained that the Manila Polo Club share
was offered to him as a bonus to entice him to leave his then employer, United Airlines. A
letter from Mr. Paul J. Casey, former president of Continental, supports Basso.85 In the
letter, Mr. Casey explained:
As a signing bonus, and a perk to attract Mr. Basso to join Continental Airlines, he was
given the Manila Polo Club share and authorized to have the share re-issued in his name.
In addition to giving Mr. Basso the Manila Polo Club share, Continental agreed to pay the
dues for a period of three years and this was embodied in his contract with Continental.
This was all done with my knowledge and approval.86
Clause 14 of the employment contract also states:
Club Memberships: The Company will locally pay annual dues for membership in a club in
Manila that your immediate supervisor and I agree is of at least that value to Continental
through you in your role as our General Manager for the Philippines.87
Taken together, the above pieces of evidence suggest that the Manila Polo Club share
was part of Basso’s compensation package and thus he validly used company funds to
pay for the transfer fees. If doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer
and the employee, the scales of justice must be tilted in favor of the latter.88
Finally, CMI violated procedural due process in terminating Basso. In King of Kings
Transport, Inc. v. Mamac89 we detailed the procedural due process steps in termination of
employment:
To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:
(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the
specific causes or grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the
employees are given the opportunity to submit their written explanation within a
reasonable period. "Reasonable opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means
every kind of assistance that management must accord to the employees to
enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be construed
as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give
the employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a
union official or lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses
they will raise against the complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the
employees to intelligently prepare their explanation and defenses, the notice
should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that will serve
as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the
charge will not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which
company rules, if any, are violated and/or which among the grounds under Art.
282 is being charged against the employees.
(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a
hearing or conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to:
(1) explain and clarify their defenses to the charge against them; (2) present
evidence in support of their defenses; and (3) rebut the evidence presented
against them by the management.
During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to
defend themselves personally, with the assistance of a representative or
counsel of their choice. Moreover, this conference or hearing could be used by
the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable settlement.
(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers
shall serve the employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all
circumstances involving the charge against the employees have been
considered; and (2) grounds have been established to justify the severance of
their employment. (Emphasis in original.)
Here, Mr. Schulz’s and Ms. Woodward’s letters dated December 19, 1995 and March 14,
1996, respectively, are not one of the valid twin notices. Neither identified the alleged acts
that CMI now claims as bases for Basso’s termination. Ms. Woodward’s letter even
stressed that the original plan was to remove Basso as General Manager but with an offer
to make him consultant. It was inconsistent of CMI to declare Basso as unworthy of its
trust and confidence and, in the same breath, offer him the position of consultant. As the
Court of Appeals pointed out:
But mark well that Basso was clearly notified that the sole ground for his dismissal was the
exercise of the termination at will clause in the employment contract. The alleged loss of
trust and confidence claimed by Continental appears to be a mere afterthought belatedly
trotted out to save the day.90
Basso is entitled to separation pay and full backwages.
Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work
shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and
to his full backwages, inclusive of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary
equivalent computed from the time his compensation was withheld up to the time of actual
reinstatement.
Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative.1âwphi1 The
payment of separation pay is in addition to payment of backwages.91 In the case of Basso,
reinstatement is no longer possible since he has already passed away. Thus, Basso’s
separation pay with full backwages shall be paid to his heirs.
As to the computation of backwages, we agree with CMI that Basso was entitled to
backwages only up to the time he reached 65 years old, the compulsory retirement age
under the law.92 This is our consistent ruling.93
When Basso was illegally dismissed on January 31, 1996, he was already 58 years
old.94 He turned 65 years old on October 2, 2002. Since backwages are granted on
grounds of equity for earnings lost by an employee due to his illegal dismissal,95 Basso
was entitled to backwages only for the period he could have worked had he not been
illegally dismissed, i.e. from January 31, 1996 to October 2, 2002.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23,
2006 and Resolution dated June 19, 2007 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No.
83938 and CA-G.R. SP No. 84281 are
AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the award of backwages. Petitioner Continental
Micronesia, Inc. is hereby ordered to pay Respondent Joseph Basso’s heirs: 1) separation
pay equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service, and 2) full backwages from
January 31, 1996, the date of his illegal dismissal, to October 2, 2002, the date of his
compulsory retirement age.
SO ORDERED.
FRANCIS H. JARDELEZA
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 193707               December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO
VAN WILSEM, Petitioner, 
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed
the criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem,
docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem
contracted marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were
blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the
instant petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree
issued by the appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18)
months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their
son in the amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the
Philippines, respondent never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan,
Cebu, and since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife
established a business known as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality
of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are
presently living in Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support
from respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5,
paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child
with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner
also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City
issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for the crime charged
against herein respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof,
states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of
Minglanilla, Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately
deprive, refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a
fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support legally due him, resulting in economic
abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order
against respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted
bail.17 Petitioner also filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which
respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the
protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of: (1) lack of
jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the
instant criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the
information do not constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the
dispositive part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute
an offense with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this
case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional
liberty is hereby cancelled (sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do
so makes him liable under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the
Philippines who are obliged to support their minor children regardless of the obligor’s
nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in
the memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since
the accused is a foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in
regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he
cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his child. Unless
it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a foreigner who fails to give support
tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law which mandates a
parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima
faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child
under Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No.
9262 for his unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition
despite the fact that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with
the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the
instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought on appeal directly to the
Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45
Petition with this Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter
situation was one that petitioners found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition
to raise only questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court clarified the three
modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ
of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or criminal action by the
RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under Rule 42,
whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction;
and (3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45.
"The first mode of appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions
of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis elevated to
the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative
value of the evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted,
and the doubt concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter.
The resolution of the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on the given set of
circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response
thereto concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts,
i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for
his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law
concerning the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions
punishable under special criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties.
The inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive
ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future cases.
Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the CA would only
waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail
over the observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious.
Nonetheless, we do not fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is
imperative that the legal obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation
to support his child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce
decree issued in relation to Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused
from complying with his obligation to support his minor child with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis
presented by petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not
obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the
New Civil Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since
Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words,
insofar as Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions of the Family Code on
support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies
to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with respect to family rights
and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties.
Since the respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-
Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is
obliged to give support to his child, as well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a
foreign land as well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the
nationality principle on the matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by
respondent does not completely show that he is notliable to give support to his son after
the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under
the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation to support his child is
specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent
states that parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is
not punishable by law, said law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank
of America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to wit:

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly
Code of the Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties
pleaded and proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the
are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even
jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not
when staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
find applicability.

It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established
son under Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant
public policy of the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
obtained in Holland. This does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to
support petitioner’s son altogether.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which
have for their object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered
In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case
ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed
has the burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily
upon in a foreign country.
concludes that being a national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the
matter of provision of and capacity to support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the
Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not obliged to support his son, he never The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in
proved the same. our jurisdiction proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent
Netherlands does not impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either
before, during or after the issuance of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of
—
Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not
or a judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the
authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and
others. Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work
proved.43
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most
important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48
doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law
involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s
the same as our local or domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands
obligation to support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is
as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in the
still duly enforceable in the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to
instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
be denied of financial support when the latter is entitled thereto.
obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance
therewith.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to
support his former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no
longerbe considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to
perform her marital duties and obligations. It held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served. (Emphasis added)50
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find
strength in petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to
Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal
laws and those of public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and
sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of public international law and to
treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged continuing acts of
respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such,
our courts have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is
likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that
there is a legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the
criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under
Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which provides that:

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe
Section 5(e) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support
in twenty (20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10)
topetitioner’s son, to wit:
years.

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a
against women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:
continuing offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the
crime charged in the instant case has clearly not prescribed.
xxxx
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which child calls for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the
the woman or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the truth and falsehood of facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this
woman or her child has the right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the case.
woman's or her child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and
the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the following acts committed with
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are
the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's movement or
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to
conduct:
conduct further proceedings based on the merits of the case.

xxxx
SO ORDERED.

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
legally due her or her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient
Associate Justice
financial support; x x x x

G.R. No. 205487               November 12, 2014

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her
child, including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of
financial support or custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51 ORION SAVINGS BANK, Petitioner, 
vs.
SHIGEKANE SUZUKI, Respondent.
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is
considered anact of violence against women and children.
 DECISION To protect his interests, Suzuki thenexecuted an Affidavit of Adverse Claim12 dated
September 8, 2003, withthe Registry of Deeds of Mandaluyong City, annotated as Entry
No. 3292/C-No. 18186 in CCT No. 18186. Suzuki then demanded the delivery of the
BRION, J.:
titles.13 Orion, (through Perez), however, refused to surrender the titles, and cited the need
to consult Orion’s legal counsel as its reason.
Before us is the Petition for Review on Certiorari1 filed by petitioner Orion Savings Bank
(Orion) under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the decision2 dated August 23, 2012
On October 14, 2003, Suzuki received a letter from Orion’s counsel dated October 9,
and the resolution3 dated January 25, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV
2003, stating that Kang obtained another loan in the amount of ₱1,800,000.00. When
No. 94104.
Kang failed to pay, he executed a Dacion en Pagodated February 2, 2003, in favorof Orion
covering Unit No. 536. Orion, however, did not register the Dacion en Pago, until October
The Factual Antecedents 15, 2003.

In the first week of August 2003, respondent Shigekane Suzuki (Suzuki), a Japanese On October 28, 2003, Suzuki executed an Affidavit of Adverse Claim over Parking Slot
national, met with Ms. Helen Soneja (Soneja) to inquire about a condominium unit and a No. 42 (covered by CCT No. 9118) and this was annotated as Entry No. 4712/C-No. 9118
parking slot at Cityland Pioneer, Mandaluyong City, allegedly owned by Yung Sam Kang in the parking lot’s title.
(Kang), a Korean national and a Special Resident Retiree's Visa (SRRV) holder.
On January 27, 2004, Suzuki filed a complaint for specific performance and damages
At the meeting, Soneja informed Suzuki that Unit No. 536 [covered by Condominium against Kang and Orion. At the pre-trial, the parties made the following admissions and
Certificate of Title (CCT) No. 18186]4 and Parking Slot No. 42 [covered by CCT No. stipulations:
9118]5 were for sale for ₱3,000,000.00. Soneja likewise assured Suzuki that the titles to
the unit and the parking slot were clean. After a brief negotiation, the parties agreed to
1. That as of August 26, 2003, Kang was the registered owner of Unit No. 536
reduce the price to ₱2,800,000.00. On August 5, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang a Bank of the
and Parking Slot No. 42;
Philippine Island (BPI) Check No. 833496 for One Hundred Thousand Pesos
(₱100,000.00) as reservation fee.7 On August 21, 2003, Suzuki issued Kang another
check, BPI Check No. 83350,8 this time for ₱2,700,000.00 representing the remaining 2. That the mortgage in favor ofOrion supposedly executed by Kang, with Entry
balance of the purchase price. Suzuki and Kang then executed a Deed of Absolute Sale No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999, was subsequently cancelled by
dated August 26, 20039covering Unit No. 536 and Parking Slot No. 42. Soon after, Suzuki Entry No. 73232/T No. 10186 dated June 16, 2000;
took possession of the condominium unit and parking lot, and commenced the renovation
of the interior of the condominium unit.
3. That the alleged Dacion en Pagowas never annotated in CCT Nos. 18186
and 9118;
Kang thereafter made several representations with Suzuki to deliver the titles to the
properties, which were then allegedly in possession of Alexander Perez (Perez, Orion’s
4. That Orion only paid the appropriate capital gains tax and the documentary
Loans Officer) for safekeeping. Despite several verbal demands, Kang failed to deliver the
stamp tax for the alleged Dacion en Pago on October 15, 2003;
documents. Suzuki later on learned that Kang had left the country, prompting Suzuki to
verify the status of the properties with the Mandaluyong City Registry of Deeds.
5. That Parking Slot No. 42, covered by CCT No. 9118, was never mortgaged to
Orion; and
Before long, Suzuki learned that CCT No. 9118 representing the title to the Parking Slot
No. 42 contained no annotations although it remained under the name of Cityland Pioneer.
This notwithstanding, Cityland Pioneer, through Assistant Vice President Rosario D. 6. That when Suzuki bought the properties, he went to Orion to obtain
Perez, certified that Kang had fully paid the purchase price of Unit. No. 53610 and Parking possession of the titles.
Slot No. 42.11 CCT No. 18186 representing the title to the condominium unit had no
existing encumbrance, except for anannotation under Entry No. 73321/C-10186 which
The RTC Ruling
provided that any conveyance or encumbrance of CCT No. 18186 shall be subject to
approval by the Philippine Retirement Authority (PRA). Although CCT No. 18186
contained Entry No. 66432/C-10186 dated February 2, 1999 representing a mortgage in In its decision14 dated June 29, 2009, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213,
favor of Orion for a ₱1,000,000.00 loan, that annotation was subsequently cancelled on Mandaluyong City ruled infavor of Suzuki and ordered Orion to deliver the CCT Nos.
June 16, 2000 by Entry No. 73232/T. No. 10186. Despite the cancellation of the mortgage 18186 and 9118 to Suzuki.
to Orion, the titles to the properties remained in possession of Perez.
The court found that Suzuki was an innocent purchaser for value whose rights over the
properties prevailed over Orion’s. The RTC further noted that Suzuki exerted efforts to
verify the status of the properties but he did not find any existing encumbrance inthe titles.
Although Orion claims to have purchased the property by way of a Dacion en Pago,
Suzuki only learned about it two (2) months after he bought the properties because Orion
never bothered to register or annotate the Dacion en Pagoin CCT Nos. 18186 and 9116.
The RTC further ordered Orion and Kang to jointly and severally pay Suzuki moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, appearance fees, expenses for litigation
and cost ofsuit. Orion timely appealed the RTC decision with the CA.
The CA Ruling
On August 23, 2012, the CA partially granted Orion’s appeal and sustained the RTC
insofar as it upheld Suzuki’s right over the properties. The CA further noted that Entry No.
73321/C-10186 pertaining to the withdrawal of investment of an SRRV only serves as a
warning to an SRRV holder about the implications of a conveyance of a property
investment. It deviated from the RTC ruling, however, by deleting the award for moral
damages, exemplary damages, attorney’s fees, expenses for litigation and cost of suit.
Orion sought a reconsideration of the CA decision but the CA denied the motion in its
January 25, 2013 resolution. Orion then filed a petition for review on certiorariunder Rule
45 with this Court.
The Petition and Comment
Orion’s petition is based on the following grounds/arguments:15
1. The Deed of Sale executed by Kang in favor of Suzuki is null and void. Under
Korean law, any conveyance of a conjugal property should be made with the
consent of both spouses;
2. Suzuki is not a buyer in good faith for he failed to check the owner’s duplicate
copies of the CCTs;
3. Knowledge of the PRA restriction under Entry No. 73321/C-10186, which
prohibits any conveyance or encumbrance of the property investment, defeats
the alleged claim of good faith by Suzuki; and
4. Orion should not be faulted for exercising due diligence.
In his Comment,16 Suzuki asserts that the issue on spousal consent was belatedly raised
on appeal. Moreover, proof of acquisition during the marital coverture is a condition sine
qua nonfor the operation of the presumption of conjugal ownership.17 Suzuki additionally
maintains that he is a purchaser in good faith, and is thus entitled to the protection of the
law.
The Court’s Ruling
We deny the petition for lack of merit.
The Court may inquire into conclusions of fact when the inference made is manifestly
mistaken
In a Rule 45 petition, the latitude of judicial review generally excludes a factual and
evidentiary re-evaluation, and the Court ordinarily abides by the uniform factual
conclusions of the trial court and the appellate court.18 In the present case, while the
courts below both arrived at the same conclusion, there appears tobe an incongruence in
their factual findings and the legal principle they applied to the attendant factual
circumstances. Thus, we are compelled to examine certain factual issues in the exercise
of our sound discretion to correct any mistaken inference that may have been made.19
Philippine Law governs the transfer of real property
Orion believes that the CA erred in not ruling on the issue of spousal consent. We cannot
uphold this position, however, because the issue of spousal consent was only raised on
appeal to the CA. It is a well-settled principle that points of law, theories, issues, and
arguments not brought to the attention of the trial court cannot be raised for the first time
on appeal and considered by a reviewing court.20 To consider these belated arguments
would violate basic principles of fairplay, justice, and due process.
Having said these, we shall nonetheless discuss the issues Orion belatedly raised, if only
to put an end to lingering doubts on the correctness of the denial of the present petition.
It is a universal principle thatreal or immovable property is exclusively subject to the laws
of the country or state where it is located.21 The reason is found in the very nature of
immovable property — its immobility. Immovables are part of the country and so closely
connected to it that all rights over them have their natural center of gravity there.22
Thus, all matters concerning the titleand disposition ofreal property are determined by
what is known as the lex loci rei sitae, which can alone prescribe the mode by which a title
canpass from one person to another, or by which an interest therein can be gained or
lost.23 This general principle includes all rules governing the descent, alienation and
transfer of immovable property and the validity, effect and construction of wills and other
conveyances.24
This principle even governs the capacity of the person making a deed relating to
immovable property, no matter what its nature may be. Thus, an instrument will be
ineffective to transfer title to land if the person making it is incapacitated by the lex loci rei
sitae, even though under the law of his domicile and by the law of the place where the
instrument is actually made, his capacity is undoubted.25
On the other hand, property relations between spouses are governed principally by the
national law of the spouses.26 However, the party invoking the application of a foreign law
has the burden of proving the foreign law. The foreign law is a question of fact to be
properly pleaded and proved as the judge cannot take judicial notice of a foreign law.27 He
is presumed to know only domestic or the law of the forum.28
To prove a foreign law, the party invoking it must present a copy thereof and comply with
Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court which reads:
SEC. 24. Proof of official record. — The record of public documents referred to in
paragraph (a) of Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an
official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of
the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines,
with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record is kept
is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country inwhich the record is
kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
SEC. 25. What attestation ofcopy must state. — Whenever a copy of a document or
record is attested for the purpose of the evidence, the attestation must state, in substance,
that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may
be. The attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or
if he be the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Accordingly, matters concerning the title and disposition of real property shall be governed
by Philippine law while issues pertaining to the conjugal natureof the property shall be
governed by South Korean law, provided it is proven as a fact.
In the present case, Orion, unfortunately failed to prove the South Korean law on the
conjugal ownership ofproperty. It merely attached a "Certification from the Embassy of the
Republic of Korea"29 to prove the existence of Korean Law. This certification, does not
qualify as sufficient proof of the conjugal nature of the property for there is no showing that
it was properly authenticated bythe seal of his office, as required under Section 24 of Rule
132.30
Accordingly, the International Law doctrine of presumed-identity approachor processual
presumption comes into play, i.e., where a foreign law is not pleaded or, evenif pleaded, is
not proven, the presumption is that foreign law is the same as Philippine Law.31
Under Philippine Law, the phrase "Yung Sam Kang ‘married to' Hyun Sook Jung" is
merely descriptive of the civil status of Kang.32 In other words, the import from the
certificates of title is that Kang is the owner of the properties as they are registered in his
name alone, and that he is married to Hyun Sook Jung.
We are not unmindful that in numerous cases we have held that registration of the
property in the name of only one spouse does not negate the possibility of it being
conjugal or community property.33 In those cases, however, there was proof that the
properties, though registered in the name of only one spouse, were indeed either conjugal
or community properties.34 Accordingly, we see no reason to declare as invalid Kang’s
conveyance in favor of Suzuki for the supposed lack of spousal consent.
The petitioner failed to adduce sufficient evidence to prove the due execution of the
Dacion en Pago
Article 1544 of the New Civil Codeof the Philippines provides that:
ART. 1544. If the same thing should have been sold to different vendees, the ownership
shall be transferred to the person who may have first taken possession thereof in good
faith, if it should be movable property.
Should it be immovable property, the ownership shall belong to the person acquiring it
who in good faith first recorded it in the Registry of Property.
Should there be no inscription, the ownership shall pertain to the person who in good faith
was first in the possession; and, in the absence thereof, to the person who presents the
oldest title, provided there is good faith.
The application of Article 1544 of the New Civil Code presupposes the existence of two or
more duly executed contracts of sale. In the present case, the Deed of Sale dated August
26, 200335 between Suzuki and Kang was admitted by Orion36 and was properly identified
by Suzuki’s witness Ms. Mary Jane Samin (Samin).37
It is not disputed, too, that the Deed of Sale dated August 26, 2003 was consummated. In
a contract of sale, the seller obligates himself to transfer the ownership of the determinate
thing sold, and to deliver the same to the buyer, who obligates himself to pay a price
certain to the seller.38 The execution of the notarized deed of saleand the actual transfer of
possession amounted to delivery that produced the legal effect of transferring ownership
to Suzuki.39
On the other hand, although Orion claims priority in right under the principle of prius
tempore, potior jure (i.e.,first in time, stronger in right), it failedto prove the existence and
due execution of the Dacion en Pagoin its favor.
At the outset, Orion offered the Dacion en Pagoas Exhibit "5"with submarkings "5-a" to "5-
c" to prove the existence of the February 6, 2003 transaction in its Formal Offer dated July
20, 2008. Orion likewise offered in evidence the supposed promissory note dated
September 4, 2002 as Exhibit "12"to prove the existence of the additional ₱800,000.00
loan. The RTC, however, denied the admission of Exhibits "5" and "12,"among others, in
its order dated August 19, 2008 "since the same [were] not identified in court by any
witness."40
Despite the exclusion of its most critical documentary evidence, Orion failed to make a
tender ofexcluded evidence, as provided under Section 40, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court. For this reason alone, we are prevented from seriously considering Exhibit "5" and
its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the present petition.
its interest and other charges shall be paid by me/us in accordance hereunder: SINGLE
PAYMENT LOANS.42 "There was thus no due and demandable loan obligation when the
alleged Dacion en Pago was executed.
Second, Perez, the supposed person who prepared the Dacion en Pago,appears to only
have a vague idea of the transaction he supposedly prepared. During his cross-
examination, he testified:
ATTY. DE CASTRO:

Moreover, even if we consider Exhibit "5" and its submarkings and Exhibit "12" in the
Q: And were you the one who prepared this [dacion en pago] Mr. witness?
present petition, the copious inconsistencies and contradictions in the testimonial and
documentary evidence of Orion, militate against the conclusion that the Dacion en
Pagowas duly executed. First, there appears to be no due and demandable obligation A: Yes, sir. I personally prepared this.
when the Dacion en Pago was executed, contrary to the allegations of Orion. Orion’s
witness Perez tried to impress upon the RTC that Kang was in default in his
xxxx
₱1,800,000.00 loan. During his direct examination, he stated:

Q: So this 1.8 million pesos is already inclusive of all the penalties, interest and
ATTY. CRUZAT:
surcharge due from Mr. Yung Sam Kang?

Q: Okay, so this loan of ₱1.8 million, what happened to this loan, Mr. Witness?
A: It’s just the principal, sir.

A: Well it became past due, there has been delayed interest payment by Mr.
Q: So you did not state the interest [and] penalties?
Kangand...

A: In the [dacion en pago], we do not include interest, sir. We may actually

Q: So what did you do after there were defaults[?]
includethat but....

A: We have to secure the money or the investment of the bank through loans
Q: Can you read the Second Whereas Clause, Mr. Witness?
and we have executed a dacion en pagobecause Mr. Kang said he has no
money. So we just execute[d] the dacion en pago rather than going through the
Foreclosure proceedings. A: Whereas the first party failed to pay the said loan to the second party and as
of February 10, 2003, the outstanding obligation which is due and demandable
principal and interest and other charges included amounts to ₱1,800,000.00
xxxx
pesos, sir.

Q: Can you tell the court when was this executed?

xxxx
41
A: February 6, 2003, your Honor.
Q: You are now changing your answer[.] [I]t now includes interest and other
charges, based on this document?
A reading of the supposed promissory note, however, shows that there was nodefault to
speak of when the supposed Dacion en Pagowas executed.
A: Yes, based on that document, sir.43

Based on the promissory note, Kang’s loan obligation wouldmature only on August 27,
Third, the Dacion en Pago,mentioned that the ₱1,800,000.00 loan was secured
2003. Neither can Orion claim that Kang had been in default in his installment payments
by a real estate mortgage. However, no document was ever presented to prove
because the wordings of the promissory note provide that "[t]he principal of this loanand
 this real estate mortgage aside from it being mentioned in the Dacion en Pago
itself.
ATTY. DE CASTRO:
Q: Would you know if there is any other document like a supplement to that
Credit Line Agreement referring to this 1.8 million peso loan by Mr. Yung Sam
Kang which says that there was a subsequent collateralization or security given
by Mr. Yung [Sam]
Kang for the loan?
xxxx
A: The [dacion en pago], sir.44
Fourth,the Dacion en Pago was first mentioned only two (2) months after Suzuki and
Samin demanded the delivery of the titles sometime in August 2003,and after Suzuki
caused the annotation of his affidavit of adverse claim. Records show that it was only on
October 9, 2003, when Orion, through its counsel, Cristobal Balbin Mapile & Associates
first spoke of the Dacion en Pago.45 Not even Perez mentioned any Dacion en Pago on
October 1, 2003, when he personally received a letter demanding the delivery of the
titles.Instead, Perez refused to accept the letter and opted to first consult with his lawyer.46
Notably, even the October 9, 2003 letter contained material inconsistencies in its recital of
facts surrounding the execution of the Dacion en Pago. In particular, it mentioned that "on
[September 4, 2002], after paying the original loan, [Kang] applied and was granted a new
Credit Line Facility by [Orion] x x x for ONE MILLION EIGHT HUNDRED THOUSAND
PESOS (₱1,800,000.00)." Perez, however, testified that there was "no cash movement" in
the original ₱1,000,000.00 loan. In his testimony, he said:
COURT:
xxxx
Q: Would you remember what was the subject matter of that real estate
mortgage for that first ₱1,000,000.00 loan?
A: It’s a condominium Unit in Cityland, sir.
xxxx
Q: Would you recall if there was any payment by Mr. Yung Sam Kang of this
₱1,000,000.00 loan?
A: None sir.
Q: No payments?
A: None sir.
Q: And from 1999 to 2002, there was no payment, either by way of payment to
the principal, by way ofpayment of interest, there was no payment by Mr. Yung
Sam Kang of this loan?
A: Literally, there was no actual cash movement, sir.
Q: There was no actual cash?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: And yet despite no payment, the bank Orion Savings Bank still extended an
₱800,000.00 additional right?
A: Yes, sir.47
Fifth, it is undisputed that notwithstanding the supposed execution of theDacion en Pago
on February 2, 2003, Kang remained in possession of the condominium unit. In fact,
nothing in the records shows that Orion even bothered to take possession of the property
even six (6) months after the supposed date of execution of the Dacion en Pago. Kang
was even able to transfer possession of the condominium unit to Suzuki, who then made
immediate improvements thereon. If Orion really purchased the condominium unit on
February 2, 2003 and claimed to be its true owner, why did it not assert its ownership
immediately after the alleged sale took place? Why did it have to assert its ownership only
after Suzuki demanded the delivery of the titles? These gaps have remained unanswered
and unfilled.
In Suntay v. CA,48 we held that the most prominent index of simulation is the complete
absence of anattempt on the part of the vendee to assert his rights of ownership over the
property in question. After the sale, the vendee should have entered the land and
occupied the premises. The absence of any attempt on the part of Orion to assert its right
of dominion over the property allegedly soldto it is a clear badge of fraud. That
notwithstanding the execution of the Dacion en Pago, Kang remained in possession of the
disputed condominium unit – from the time of the execution of the Dacion en Pagountil the
property’s subsequent transfer to Suzuki – unmistakably strengthens the fictitious nature
of the Dacion en Pago.
These circumstances, aside from the glaring inconsistencies in the documents and
testimony of Orion’s witness, indubitably prove the spurious nature of the Dacion en Pago.
The fact that the Dacion en Pago
is a notarized document does not
support the conclusion that the
sale it embodies is a true
conveyance
Public instruments are evidence of the facts that gave rise to their execution and are to be
considered as containing all the terms of the agreement.49 While a notarized document
enjoys this presumption, "the fact that a deed is notarized is not a guarantee of the validity
of its contents."50 The presumption of regularity of notarized documents is not absolute
and may be rebutted by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary.51
In the present case, the presumption cannot apply because the regularity in the execution
of the Dacion en Pago and the loan documents was challenged in the proceedings below
where their prima facievalidity was overthrown by the highly questionable circumstances
surrounding their execution.52
Effect of the PRA restriction on
the validity of Suzuki’s title to the
property
Orion argues that the PRA restriction in CCT No. 18186 affects the conveyance to Suzuki.
In particular, Orion assails the status of Suzuki as a purchaser in good faith in view of the
express PRA restriction contained in CCT No. 18186.53
We reject this suggested approachoutright because, to our mind, the PRA restriction
cannot affect the conveyance in favor of Suzuki. On this particular point, we concur
withthe following findings of the CA:
x x x the annotation merely servesas a warning to the owner who holds a Special Resident
Retiree’s Visa(SRRV) that he shall lose his visa if he disposes his property which serves
as his investment in order to qualify for such status. Section 14 of the Implementing
Investment Guidelines under Rule VIII-A of the Rules and Regulations Implementing
Executive Order No. 1037, Creating the Philippine Retirement Park System Providing
Funds Therefor and For Other Purpose ( otherwise known as the Philippine Retirement
Authority) states:
Section 14. Should the retiree-investor withdraw his investment from the Philippines, or
transfer the same to another domestic enterprise, orsell, convey or transfer his
condominium unit or units to another person, natural or juridical without the prior approval
of the Authority, the Special Resident Retiree’s Visa issued to him, and/or unmarried minor
child or children[,] may be cancelled or revoked by the Philippine Government, through the
appropriate government department or agency, upon recommendation of the Authority.54
Moreover, Orion should not be allowed to successfully assail the good faith of Suzuki on
the basis of the PRA restriction. Orion knew of the PRA restriction when it transacted with
Kang. Incidentally, Orion admitted accommodating Kang’s request to cancel the mortgage
annotation despite the lack of payment to circumvent the PRA restriction. Orion, thus, is
estopped from impugning the validity of the conveyance in favor of Suzuki on the basis of
the PRA restriction that Orion itself ignored and "attempted" to circumvent.
With the conclusion that Orion failed to prove the authenticity of the Dacion en Pago, we
see no reason for the application of the rules on double sale under Article 1544 of the New
Civil Code. Suzuki, moreover, successfully adduced sufficient evidence to establish the
validity of conveyance in his favor.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we DENY the petition for lack of merit. Costs
against petitioner Orion Savings Bank.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 195432               August 27, 2014
EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner, 
vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.
DECISION
SERENO, CJ:
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification
of the Orders dated 14 January and 8 February 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court
(R TC), Third Judicial Region, Branch 45,1 City of San Fernando, Pampanga, in Civil Case
No. 137, which dismissed the Petition for Declaratory Relief filed therein.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE
The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:
3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese
National, in a civil wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A copy of their
Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex 'A' and made an integral part
hereof.
4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly
granted under Japaneselaws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with
 petitioner. A copy of the Divorce Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-
General of Japan and duly authenticated by the Department of Foreign Affairs,
Manila, is heretoas Annex ‘B’ and made an integral part hereof. 5. Said Divorce
Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. A
copy of the Certification dated 28 October 2005 is hereto attached as Annex ‘C’
and made an integral part hereof.
6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that
by such she reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando
on 13 September 2005 in a civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A
copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto attached as Annex ‘D’ and made
an integral part hereof.
7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December
2005. A copy of the JapaneseFamily Registry Record of Kobayashi showing the
divorce he obtained and his remarriage with Ryo Miken, duly authenticated by
the Consulate-General of Japan and the Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila,
is hereto attached as Annex ‘E’ and made an integral part hereof.
8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to
indicate her surname withher husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at
the Department of Foreign Affairs that the same cannot be issued to her until
she can prove bycompetent court decision that her marriage with her said
husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.
xxxx
12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner’s marriage with her said husband
Masatomi Y. Ando musttherefore be honored, considered and declared valid,
until otherwise declared by a competent court. Consequently, and until then,
petitioner therefore is and must be declared entitled to the issuance of a
Philippine passport under the name ‘Edelina Ando y Tungol.’ Hence, this
petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.2
On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which
was later raffled off to Branch 46. She impleaded the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA)
as respondent and prayed for the following reliefs before the lower court:
WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that after proper
proceedings, judgment be rendered, as follows:
(a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner Edelina T.
Ando and her husband Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise declared by a
competent court;
(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine Passport under
the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol"; and
(c) directing the Department ofForeign Affairs to honor petitioner’s marriage to
her husband Masatomi Y. Ando and to issue a Philippine Passport to petitioner
under the name "Edelina Ando y Tungol".
Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs.3
On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of cause and action,
as well as jurisdiction, the RTC held thus:
Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioner’s marriage to Masatomi Y. Ando,
herein petitioner was married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in Candaba,
Pampanga, on September 16, 2001, and that though a divorce was obtained and granted
in Japan, with respect to the their (sic) marriage, there is no showing that petitioner herein
complied with the requirements set forth in Art. 13 of the Family Code – that is obtaining a
judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute divorce in our country.
It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein petitioner does not
have any causeof action and/or is entitled to the reliefs prayed for under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court. In the same vein, though there is other adequate remedy available to the
petitioner, such remedy is however beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this court to act
upon and grant, as it isonly the family court which is vested with such authority and
jurisdiction.4
On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated 15 November 2010. In anOrder dated 14 December 2010, the RTC granted the
motion in this wise:
WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the petitioner in
her petition and the instant Motion for Reconsideration falls within the jurisdiction of the
Special Family Court of this jurisdiction and for the interest ofsubstantial justice, the Order
of the Court dated November 15, 2010 is hereby reconsidered.
Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of the Clerk of Court for
proper endorsement to the Family Court of this jurisdiction for appropriateaction and/or
disposition.5 Thereafter, the case was raffled to Branch 45 of the RTC. On 14 January
2011, the trial court dismissed the Petition anew on the ground that petitioner had no
cause of action. The Order reads thus:
The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as valid is
already her second marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family
Codeconsidering that the first one, though allegedly terminated by virtue of the divorce
obtained by Kobayashi, was never recognized by a Philippine court, hence, petitioner is
considered as still married to Kobayashi. Accordingly, the second marriage with Ando
cannot be honored and considered asvalid at this time.
Petitioner’s allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced. The fact that no
judicial declaration of nullity of her marriage with Ando was rendered does not make the
same valid because such declaration under Article 40 ofthe Family Code is applicable
onlyin case of re-marriage. More importantly, the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity
of marriage is not even a requisite to make a marriage valid.
In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative.6
On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order
dated 14 January 2011. The motion was denied by the RTC in open court on 8
February2011, considering that neither the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) nor
respondent was furnished with copies of the motion.
On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising the sole issue of
whether or not the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.
Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is solely the
wife or the husband who can file a petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a
void marriage. Thus, as the state is not even allowed to filea direct petition for the
declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage,with even more reason can it not
collaterally attack the validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory relief. Further,
petitioner alleges that under the law, a marriage – even one that is void or voidable – shall
be deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.
Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial decree of
divorce is required under Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance therewith is a
mere irregularity in the issuance of a marriage license. Any irregularity in the formal
requisites of marriage, such as with respect to the marriage license, shall notaffect the
legality of the marriage. Petitioner further claims that all the requisites for a petition for
declaratory relief have been complied with.
With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration to
the OSG and the DFA, petitioner avers that at the time of the filing, the RTC had yet to
issue a summons to respondent; thus, it had yet to acquire jurisdiction over them.
Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the Petition. The latter raised
the following arguments: (1) the Petition was improperly verified, as the juratin the
Verification thereof only stated that the affiant had exhibited "her currentand valid proof of
identity," which proof was not properly indicated, however; (2) prior judicial recognition by
a Philippine court of a divorce decree obtained by the alien spouse is required before a
Filipino spouse can remarry and be entitled to the legal effects of remarriage; (3) petitioner
failed to show that she had first exhausted all available administrative remedies, such as
appealing to the Secretary of the DFA under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8239, or the
Philippine Passport Act of 1996, before resorting to the special civil action of declaratory
relief; and (4) petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC was a mere scrap of
paper and did not toll the running of the period to appeal. Hence, the RTC Order dated 14
January 2011 is now final.
On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment, addressing the issues
raised therein.
THE COURT’S RULING
The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.
First, with respect to her prayer tocompel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner
incorrectly filed a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first
appealed before the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was
toquestion the DFA’s refusal to issue a passport to her under her second husband’s name.
Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was adopted on
25 February 1997, the following are the additional documentary requirements before a
married woman may obtain a passport under the name of her spouse:
SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women shall be
made inaccordance with the following provisions:
a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the surname of
her husband pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must present the
original or certifiedtrue copy of her marriage contract, and one photocopy
thereof.
In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to a
foreigner, shall be required to present a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance
and Counselling Seminar conducted by the CFO when applying for a passport
for the first time.
b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified true
copy of her annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and the
Court Order effecting the annulment.
c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must
present a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the
 Philippine Embassy or consular post which has jurisdiction over the place where Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid,
the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular petitioner should have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign
mission in the Philippines. divorce from her first husband.

When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy of the
Divorce Decree or a certified true copy of the Certificate of Divorce from the Shari’ah Court
or the OCRG. d) In the event that marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband, the
applicant must present the original or certified true copy of the Death Certificate of the
husband or the Declaration of Presumptive Death by a Civil or Shari’ah Court, in which
case the applicant may choose to continue to use her husband’s surname or resume the
use of her maiden surname. From the above provisions, it is clear that for petitioner to
obtain a copy of her passport under her married name, all she needed to present were the
following: (1) the original or certified true copyof her marriage contract and one photocopy
thereof; (2) a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if
applicable; and (3) a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the
Philippine Embassy or consular post that has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce
is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.
In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine
passport under her second husband’s name.1âwphi1 Should her application for a
passport be denied, the remedies available to her are provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239,
which reads thus:
Sec. 9. Appeal. — Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the application of this Act
of the implementing rules and regulations issued by the Secretary shall have the right to
appeal to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose decision judicial review may be had
to the Courts in due course.
The IRR further provides in detail:
In Garcia v. Recio,9 we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be
recognized in our jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of
the foreigner. The presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment,
our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien
must be alleged and proven and like any other fact.10
While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court
actually constitutes a petition for declaratory relief,11 we are still unable to grant the prayer
of petitioner. As held by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence
presented on record of both the national law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the
validity of the divorce decree under that national law.12 Hence, any declaration as to the
validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete submission of evidence
proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an action instituted
in the proper forum.
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's recourse to
the proper remedies available.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Chief Justice, Chairperson

G.R. No. 188289               August 20, 2014

ARTICLE 10
Appeal
DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner, 
vs.
In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing one cancelled or
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.
restricted, the applicant or holder thereof shall have the right to appeal in writing to the
Secretary within fifteen (15) days from notice of denial, cancellation or restriction.
DECISION
Clearly, she should have filed anappeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event of the
denial of her application for a passport, after having complied with the provisions of R.A. PEREZ, J.:
8239. Petitioner’s argument that her application "cannot be said to havebeen either
denied, cancelled or restricted by [the DFA ], so as to make her an aggrieved party entitled
Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision1 of the Court of
to appeal",7 as instead she "was merely told"8 that her passport cannot be issued, does
Appeals in CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006
not persuade. The law provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the event of the denial of
Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.
her application.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

 David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December Bank of America Checking Account $8,000
1988 in Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America
(USA) where they eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children,
namely: Jerome T. Bank of America Cash Deposit

Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00

Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993.
David was engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San 4
Francisco, California. Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, annuities $56,228.00

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured
USA: a loan from a bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be
foreclosed, the couple paid a total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.

PHILIPPINES
Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In
December 2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE sell the Sampaloc property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September
2003, David abandoned his family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province.
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. located at 1085 ₱1,693,125.00 Leticia claimed that David agreed toand executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the
Norma Street, Sampaloc, Manila (Sampaloc property) presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3 December 2003 stating that: 1) the
₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall be paid to and collected
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. m. located at ₱400,000.00 by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00, which is equivalent to
Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David
shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 hectares located at ₱490,000.00
situated in the Philippines.5 David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the
Maria Aurora, Aurora
Sampaloc property, leaving an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. located at ₱175,000.00
Sabang Baler, Aurora Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with
the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted
3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin Maria Aurora, ₱750,000.00 the divorce on 24 June 2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The
Aurora California court granted to Leticia the custody of her two children, as well as all the
couple’s properties in the USA.7
USA

PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property
before the RTC of Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street, Daly City, David’s failure to comply with his obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power
California to administer all conjugal properties in the Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease
and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3) the declaration that all conjugal
$550,000.00 properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of the purchase price
(unpaid debt of $285,000.00) as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment
of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses.8
Furniture and furnishings $3,000
In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was
Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000 entered on 29 June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He
demanded that the conjugal partnership properties, which also include the USA properties,
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00 be liquidated and that all expenses of liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties
be charged against the conjugal partnership.9
The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:
1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of
abandonment and marital infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the
parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and their two (2) children.
2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California,
U.S.A. and the same can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.
3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T.
Noveras and respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture
of the latter’s property rights over their conjugal properties.
4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of
the ₱2.2 [M]illion sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-
half of the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras,
including interests and charges.
5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.
6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were
chargeable against their conjugal properties.
Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:
Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and
presumptive legitimes.10
On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:
1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared
DISSOLVED;
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the
Philippines are hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras
only, with the properties in the United States of America remaining in the sole
ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the
divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo,
United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of June 24,
2005. The titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new
titles be issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;
3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the
preceding paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor
children with petitioner LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their
presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on the titles
covering the said properties.Their share in the income from these properties
shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the first half of
January of each year, starting January 2008;
4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to
petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby
given to Jerome and Jena, her two minor children with respondent David A.
Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be annotated on
the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income
from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner
within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;
5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent
David A. Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition
to their income from their presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing, education and other needs while
they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly allowance due from the
respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the children require
and his financial capacity can afford;
6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc
property, the Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to
respondent David A. Noveras and ₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of
the respondent may be paid to him directly but the share of the two children
shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint account tobe
taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or
by their representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such
payment/deposit shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt
of a copy of this Decision, with the passbook of the joint account to be submitted
to the custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court within the same period. Said
passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the children or their
attorney-in-fact; and
7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be
shouldered by them individually.11
The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their
legal and personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties
are divorced by virtue of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’
marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the trial court considered the petition filed by
Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of property regime with the
determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of an action for
judicial separation of conjugal property.
With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s names. The
as absolute community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt
before the solemnization of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, ofa copy of this Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted to the
the trial court ruled that in accordance with the doctrine of processual presumption, custody ofthe Clerk of Court a quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by
Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take judicial notice of the US law the children or their attorney-in-fact.
since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The trial court held that as
the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial
A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:
separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of
Leticia and her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove
abandonment and infidelity with preponderant evidence. 8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia
Tacbiana (sic) the amount of ₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the
proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property.
The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is
praying for considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying
still on the principle of equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, The last paragraph shall read as follows:
subject to the payment of the children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that
under Article 89 of the Family Code, the waiver or renunciation made by David of his
Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil
property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.
registry of Quezon City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal
Building, Times Street corner EDSA, Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for
On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome Noveras and Jena Noveras.
division of the Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the
common children’s presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to
The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12
each pay their children the amount of ₱520,000.00, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the
assailedDecision dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province,
in Civil Case No. 828 are hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:
2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the
Philippines are hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and respondent David A. Noveras;
xxx
4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in
paragraph 2 shall pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their
presumptive legitimes which shall be annotated on the titles/documents
covering the said properties. Their share in the income therefrom, if any, shall
be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of January, starting
2008;
xxx
6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each
ordered to pay the amount of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and
Jena, as their presumptive legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property
inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which shall be deposited to a local bank
In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the
California Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said
judgment was part of the pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court.
David argues that allowing Leticia to share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to
unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that the latter was already granted all US
properties by the California court.
In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own
properties in the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the
Superior Court of California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in
the USA to Leticia. With respect to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition
for judicial separation ofconjugal properties.
At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the
bond of marriage between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country." This means that the foreign judgment
and its authenticity must beproven as facts under our rules on evidence, together with the
alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the alien himself or
herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically for the purpose or
in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense.14
The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the
foreigner must comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to
recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign
judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24
and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.15
Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or
tribunal may be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the
officer having the legal custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must
beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that the
attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may be issued by any of the
authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof,
asthe case may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.
Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is
attested for the purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the
copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The
attestation must be under the official seal of the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe
the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such court.
Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required
certificates to prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were
not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on
certification where we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen
she secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of
the Union, the presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the
foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient." In this case however, it appears
that there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was obtained.
Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the lower courts did with
respect to the property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a
different matter because, to begin with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens
in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of the divorce decree, it follows that the
parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court thus erred in proceeding
directly to liquidation.
As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the
celebration of marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification
isjudicially approved and refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135
and 136 of the Family Code.18
Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on
paragraphs 4 and 6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:
Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of
property:
(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which
carries with it civil interdiction;
(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;
(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed
by the court;
(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to
comply with his or her obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;
(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage
settlements has abused that power; and
(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for
at least one year and reconciliation is highly improbable.
In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final
judgment against the guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the
decree ofjudicial separation of property. (Emphasis supplied).
The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to
necessitate judicial separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family
Code. The trial court ratiocinated:
Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for
a valid cause and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has
left the conjugal dwelling without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is
prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic] abandoning spouse failed to give any
information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of three months from such
abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at
his hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him
there after the alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the
USA to visit her and their children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit
of said respondent was in October 2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by
the latter of a petition for dissolution of marriage with the California court. Such turn for the
worse of their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition can also be considered as valid
causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines.19
Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was
not tackled in the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the
petition as liquidation of the absolute community of properties.
The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed
separated for more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while
actual abandonment had not been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been
living separately since 2003 when David decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his
own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends that David has been cohabiting with
Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras. Editha Apolonio, who
worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the name of
Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form.20Third and more
significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June
2005.
Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the
petition for judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.
The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically
dissolves the absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99
ofthe Family Code, thus:
Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or
(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles
134 to 138. (Emphasis supplied).
Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute
community regime and the following procedure should apply:
Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall
apply:
(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the
absolute community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.
(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its
assets. In case of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily
liable for the unpaid balance with their separate properties in accordance with
the provisions of the second paragraph of Article 94.
(3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter
be delivered to each of them.
(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall
constitute its net assets, which shall be divided equally between husband and
wife, unless a different proportion or division was agreed upon in the marriage
settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary waiver of such share provided
in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to forfeiture in
accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the
time of the celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its
dissolution.
(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon
partition, in accordance with Article 51.
(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the
properties, the conjugal dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be
adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the majority of the common children
choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are deemed to have
chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no
such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests
of said children. At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to
the trial court. Instead, we shall adopt the modifications made by the Court of
Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect to liquidation.
We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction
over the California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code
clearly states that real property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the
country where it is situated. Thus, liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine
properties.
We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the
spouses in the absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of
their children’s presumptive legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:
Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property.1âwphi1 While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras
property, absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is
presumed to have come from the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to
reimbursement of half of the redemption money.
David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property for the benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the
amount of ₱120,000.00 incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto.
Election expenses in the amount of ₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor
cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at least the Statement of Contributions
and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No. 7166 duly received by
the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal case of
his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum,
Leticia and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of
₱120,000.00 or in the respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.
xxxx
Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate
children and descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of
the mother." The children arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the
net assets of the absolute community, which shall be annotated on the titles/documents
covering the same, as well as to their respective shares in the net proceeds from the sale
of the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps. Paringit in the amount of
₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the amount of
₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA G.R. CV No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 171914               July 23, 2014
SOLEDAD L. LAVADIA, Petitioner,  Dominican Republic, on the same date, ATTY. LUNA contracted another marriage, this
vs.
HEIRS OF JUAN LUCES LUNA, represented by GREGORIO Z. LUNA and EUGENIA
ZABALLERO-LUNA,Respondents.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Divorce between Filipinos is void and ineffectual under the nationality rule adopted by
Philippine law. Hence, any settlement of property between the parties of the first marriage
involving Filipinos submitted as an incident of a divorce obtained in a foreign country lacks
competent judicial approval, and cannot be enforceable against the assets of the husband
who contracts a subsequent marriage.
The Case
The petitioner, the second wife of the late Atty. Juan Luces Luna, appeals the adverse
decision promulgated on November 11, 2005,1 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA)
affirmed with modification the decision rendered on August 27, 2001 by the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 138, in Makati City.2 The CA thereby denied her right in the 25/100
pro indiviso share of the husband in a condominium unit, and in the law books of the
husband acquired during the second marriage.
Antecedents
The antecedent facts were summarized by the CA as follows:
ATTY. LUNA, a practicing lawyer, was at first a name partner in the prestigious law firm
Sycip, Salazar, Luna, Manalo, Hernandez & Feliciano Law Offices at that time when he
was living with his first wife, herein intervenor-appellant Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(EUGENIA), whom he initially married ina civil ceremony conducted by the Justice of the
Peace of Parañaque, Rizal on September 10, 1947 and later solemnized in a church
ceremony at the Pro-Cathedral in San Miguel, Bulacan on September 12, 1948. In ATTY.
LUNA’s marriage to EUGENIA, they begot seven (7) children, namely: Regina Maria L.
Nadal, Juan Luis Luna, Araceli Victoria L. Arellano, Ana Maria L. Tabunda, Gregorio
Macario Luna, Carolina Linda L. Tapia, and Cesar Antonio Luna. After almost two (2)
decades of marriage, ATTY. LUNA and EUGENIA eventually agreed to live apart from
each other in February 1966 and agreed to separation of property, to which end, they
entered into a written agreement entitled "AGREEMENT FOR SEPARATION AND
PROPERTY SETTLEMENT" dated November 12, 1975, whereby they agreed to live
separately and to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership of property.
On January 12, 1976, ATTY. LUNA obtained a divorce decree of his marriage with
EUGENIA from the Civil and Commercial Chamber of the First Circumscription of the
Court of First Instance of Sto. Domingo, Dominican Republic. Also in Sto.Domingo,
time with SOLEDAD. Thereafter, ATTY. LUNA and SOLEDAD returned to the Philippines
and lived together as husband and wife until 1987.
Sometime in 1977, ATTY. LUNA organized a new law firm named: Luna, Puruganan,
Sison and Ongkiko (LUPSICON) where ATTY. LUNA was the managing partner.
On February 14, 1978, LUPSICON through ATTY. LUNA purchased from Tandang Sora
Development Corporation the 6th Floor of Kalaw-Ledesma Condominium
Project(condominium unit) at Gamboa St., Makati City, consisting of 517.52 square
meters, for ₱1,449,056.00, to be paid on installment basis for 36months starting on April
15, 1978. Said condominium unit was to be usedas law office of LUPSICON. After full On August 27, 2001, the RTC rendered its decision after trial upon the aforementioned
payment, the Deed of Absolute Sale over the condominium unit was executed on July 15, facts,4 disposing thusly:
1983, and CCT No. 4779 was issued on August 10, 1983, which was registered bearing
the following names:
WHEREFORE, judgment is rendered as follows:

"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (46/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,

(a) The 24/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit located at the SIXTH
married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (25/100); GREGORIO R. PURUGANAN, married to Paz A.
FLOOR of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
Puruganan (17/100); and TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio J.M. Sison
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
(12/100) x x x" Subsequently, 8/100 share of ATTY. LUNA and 17/100 share of Atty.
SEVENTEEN (517/100) SQUARE METERS is adjudged to have been acquired
Gregorio R. Puruganan in the condominium unit was sold to Atty. Mario E. Ongkiko, for
by Juan Lucas Luna through his sole industry;
which a new CCT No. 21761 was issued on February 7, 1992 in the following names:

(b) Plaintiff has no right as owner or under any other concept over the
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna (38/100); MARIO E. ONGKIKO,
condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate of Title No.
married to Sonia P.G. Ongkiko (50/100); TERESITA CRUZ SISON, married to Antonio
21761 of the Registry of Deeds of Makati with respect to the civil status of Juan
J.M. Sison (12/100) x x x"
Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Soledad
L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia Zaballero Luna";
Sometime in 1992, LUPSICON was dissolved and the condominium unit was partitioned
by the partners but the same was still registered in common under CCT No. 21716. The
(c) Plaintiff is declared to be the owner of the books Corpus Juris, Fletcher on
parties stipulated that the interest of ATTY. LUNA over the condominium unit would be
Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme Court Reports
25/100 share. ATTY. LUNA thereafter established and headed another law firm with Atty.
found in the condominium unit and defendants are ordered to deliver them to
Renato G. Dela Cruzand used a portion of the office condominium unit as their office. The
the plaintiff as soon as appropriate arrangements have been madefor transport
said law firm lasted until the death of ATTY. JUAN on July 12, 1997.
and storage.

After the death of ATTY. JUAN, his share in the condominium unit including the lawbooks,
No pronouncement as to costs.
office furniture and equipment found therein were taken over by Gregorio Z. Luna, ATTY.
LUNA’s son of the first marriage. Gregorio Z. Luna thenleased out the 25/100 portion of
the condominium unit belonging to his father to Atty. Renato G. De la Cruz who SO ORDERED.5
established his own law firm named Renato G. De la Cruz & Associates.
Decision of the CA
The 25/100 pro-indiviso share of ATTY. Luna in the condominium unit as well as the law
books, office furniture and equipment became the subject of the complaint filed by
Both parties appealed to the CA.6
SOLEDAD against the heirs of ATTY. JUAN with the RTC of Makati City, Branch 138, on
September 10, 1999, docketed as Civil Case No. 99-1644. The complaint alleged that the
subject properties were acquired during the existence of the marriage between ATTY. On her part, the petitioner assigned the following errors to the RTC, namely:
LUNA and SOLEDAD through their joint efforts that since they had no children, SOLEDAD
became co-owner of the said properties upon the death of ATTY. LUNA to the extent of ¾
pro-indiviso share consisting of her ½ share in the said properties plus her ½ share in the I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT
net estate of ATTY. LUNA which was bequeathed to her in the latter’s last will and WAS ACQUIRED THRU THE SOLE INDUSTRY OF ATTY. JUAN LUCES
testament; and thatthe heirs of ATTY. LUNA through Gregorio Z. Luna excluded LUNA;
SOLEDAD from her share in the subject properties. The complaint prayed that SOLEDAD
be declared the owner of the ¾ portion of the subject properties;that the same be II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT PLAINTIFFAPPELLANT
partitioned; that an accounting of the rentals on the condominium unit pertaining to the DID NOT CONTRIBUTE MONEY FOR THE ACQUISITION OF THE
share of SOLEDAD be conducted; that a receiver be appointed to preserve ad administer CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
the subject properties;and that the heirs of ATTY. LUNA be ordered to pay attorney’s
feesand costs of the suit to SOLEDAD.3
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO PORTIONS OF
THE TESTIMONY OF GREGORIO LUNA, WHO HAS NO ACTUAL
Ruling of the RTC KNOWLEDGE OF THE ACQUISITION OF THE UNIT, BUT IGNORED OTHER
 PORTIONS OF HIS TESTIMONY FAVORABLE TO THE PLAINTIFF- On November 11, 2005, the CA promulgated its assailed modified decision,9 holding and
APPELLANT; ruling:

IV. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT GIVING SIGNIFICANCE TO THE EUGENIA, the first wife, was the legitimate wife of ATTY. LUNA until the latter’s death on
FACT THAT THE CONJUGAL PARTNERSHIP BETWEEN LUNA AND July 12, 1997. The absolute divorce decree obtained by ATTY. LUNA inthe Dominican
INTERVENOR-APPELLANT WAS ALREADY DISSOLVED AND LIQUIDATED Republic did not terminate his prior marriage with EUGENIA because foreign divorce
PRIOR TO THE UNION OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT AND LUNA; between Filipino citizens is not recognized in our jurisdiction. x x x10

V. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE xxxx

ABSENCE OF THE DISPOSITION OF THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT IN THE
HOLOGRAPHIC WILL OF THE PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT;
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed August 27, 2001 Decision of the RTC
of MakatiCity, Branch 138, is hereby MODIFIEDas follows:
VI. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN GIVING UNDUE SIGNIFICANCE TO THE
FACTTHAT THE NAME OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT DID NOT APPEAR IN
(a) The 25/100 pro-indiviso share in the condominium unit at the SIXTH FLOOR
THE DEED OF ABSOLUTE SALE EXECUTED BY TANDANG SORA
of the KALAW LEDESMA CONDOMINIUM PROJECT covered by
DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION OVER THE CONDOMINIUM UNIT;
Condominium Certificate of Title No. 21761 consisting of FIVE HUNDRED
SEVENTEEN (517/100) (sic) SQUARE METERS is hereby adjudged to
VII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN RULING THAT NEITHER ARTICLE 148 defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
OF THE FAMILYCODE NOR ARTICLE 144 OF THE CIVIL CODE OF THE Luna (first marriage), having been acquired from the sole funds and sole
PHILIPPINES ARE APPLICABLE; industry of Juan Luces Luna while marriage of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia
Zaballero-Luna (first marriage) was still subsisting and valid;
VIII. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE CAUSE OF
ACTION OF THE INTERVENOR-APPELLANT HAS BEEN BARRED BY (b) Plaintiff-appellant Soledad Lavadia has no right as owner or under any other
PESCRIPTION AND LACHES; and concept over the condominium unit, hence the entry in Condominium Certificate
of Title No. 21761 of the Registry of Deeds ofMakati with respect to the civil
status of Juan Luces Luna should be changed from "JUAN LUCES LUNA
IX. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT EXPUNGING/DISMISSING THE
married to Soledad L. Luna" to "JUAN LUCES LUNA married to Eugenia
INTERVENTION FOR FAILURE OF INTERVENOR-APPELLANT TO PAY
Zaballero Luna";
FILING FEE.7

(c) Defendants-appellants, the heirs of Juan Luces Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-
In contrast, the respondents attributedthe following errors to the trial court, to wit:
Luna(first marriage) are hereby declared to be the owner of the books Corpus
Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme
I. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT CERTAIN FOREIGN LAW Court Reports found in the condominium unit.
BOOKS IN THE LAW OFFICE OF ATTY. LUNA WERE BOUGHT WITH THE
USE OF PLAINTIFF’S MONEY;
No pronouncement as to costs.

II. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN HOLDING THAT PLAINTIFF PROVED BY

SO ORDERED.11
PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE (HER CLAIM OVER) THE SPECIFIED
FOREIGN LAW BOOKS FOUND IN ATTY. LUNA’S LAW OFFICE; and
On March 13, 2006,12 the CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration.13
III. THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT, ASSUMING
PLAINTIFF PAID FOR THE SAID FOREIGN LAW BOOKS, THE RIGHT TO Issues
RECOVER THEM HAD PRESCRIBED AND BARRED BY LACHES AND
ESTOPPEL.8
In this appeal, the petitioner avers in her petition for review on certiorarithat:
 A. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the Agreement for
Separation and Property Settlement executed by Luna and Respondent
Eugenia was unenforceable; hence, their conjugal partnership was not
dissolved and liquidated;
B. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in not recognizing the Dominican
Republic court’s approval of the Agreement;
C. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner failed to
adduce sufficient proof of actual contribution to the acquisition of purchase of
the subjectcondominium unit; and
D. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that Petitioner was not
entitled to the subject law books.14
The decisive question to be resolved is who among the contending parties should be
entitled to the 25/100 pro indivisoshare in the condominium unit; and to the law books (i.e.,
Corpus Juris, Fletcher on Corporation, American Jurisprudence and Federal Supreme
Court Reports).
The resolution of the decisive question requires the Court to ascertain the law that should
determine, firstly, whether the divorce between Atty. Luna and Eugenia Zaballero-Luna
(Eugenia) had validly dissolved the first marriage; and, secondly, whether the second
marriage entered into by the late Atty. Luna and the petitioner entitled the latter to any
rights in property. Ruling of the Court
We affirm the modified decision of the CA.
1. Atty. Luna’s first marriage with Eugenia
subsisted up to the time of his death
The first marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, both Filipinos, was solemnized in the
Philippines on September 10, 1947. The law in force at the time of the solemnization was
the Spanish Civil Code, which adopted the nationality rule. The Civil Codecontinued to
follow the nationality rule, to the effect that Philippine laws relating to family rights and
duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons were binding upon citizens
of the Philippines, although living abroad.15 Pursuant to the nationality rule, Philippine laws
governed thiscase by virtue of bothAtty. Luna and Eugenio having remained Filipinos until
the death of Atty. Luna on July 12, 1997 terminated their marriage.
From the time of the celebration ofthe first marriage on September 10, 1947 until the
present, absolute divorce between Filipino spouses has not been recognized in the
Philippines. The non-recognition of absolute divorce between Filipinos has remained even
under the Family Code,16 even if either or both of the spouses are residing
abroad.17 Indeed, the only two types of defective marital unions under our laws have
beenthe void and the voidable marriages. As such, the remedies against such defective
marriages have been limited to the declaration of nullity ofthe marriage and the annulment
of the marriage.
It is true that on January 12, 1976, the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Sto. Domingo in the
Dominican Republic issued the Divorce Decree dissolving the first marriage of Atty. Luna
and Eugenia.18 Conformably with the nationality rule, however, the divorce, even if
voluntarily obtained abroad, did not dissolve the marriage between Atty. Luna and
Eugenia, which subsisted up to the time of his death on July 12, 1997. This finding
conforms to the Constitution, which characterizes marriage as an inviolable social
institution,19 and regards it as a special contract of permanent union between a man and a
woman for the establishment of a conjugal and family life.20 The non-recognition of
absolute divorce in the Philippines is a manifestation of the respect for the sanctity of the
marital union especially among Filipino citizens. It affirms that the extinguishment of a
valid marriage must be grounded only upon the death of either spouse, or upon a ground
expressly provided bylaw. For as long as this public policy on marriage between Filipinos
exists, no divorce decree dissolving the marriage between them can ever be given legal or
judicial recognition and enforcement in this jurisdiction.
2. The Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
was void for lack of court approval
The petitioner insists that the Agreement for Separation and Property Settlement
(Agreement) that the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia had entered into and executed in
connection with the divorce proceedings before the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic to dissolve and liquidate their conjugal partnership was enforceable against
Eugenia. Hence, the CA committed reversible error in decreeing otherwise.
The insistence of the petitioner was unwarranted.
Considering that Atty. Luna and Eugenia had not entered into any marriage settlement
prior to their marriage on September 10, 1947, the system of relative community or
conjugal partnership of gains governed their property relations. This is because the
Spanish Civil Code, the law then in force at the time of their marriage, did not specify the
property regime of the spouses in the event that they had not entered into any marriage
settlement before or at the time of the marriage. Article 119 of the Civil Codeclearly so
provides, to wit:
Article 119. The future spouses may in the marriage settlements agree upon absolute or
relative community of property, or upon complete separation of property, or upon any
other regime. In the absence of marriage settlements, or when the same are void, the
system of relative community or conjugal partnership of gains as established in this Code,
shall govern the property relations between husband and wife.
Article 142 of the Civil Codehas defined a conjugal partnership of gains thusly:
Article 142. By means of the conjugal partnership of gains the husband and wife place in a
common fund the fruits of their separate property and the income from their work or
industry, and divide equally, upon the dissolution of the marriage or of the partnership, the
net gains or benefits obtained indiscriminately by either spouse during the marriage.
The conjugal partnership of gains subsists until terminated for any of various causes of
termination enumerated in Article 175 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 175. The conjugal partnership of gains terminates:
(1) Upon the death of either spouse;
(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;
(3) When the marriage is annulled;
(4) In case of judicial separation of property under Article 191.
The mere execution of the Agreement by Atty. Luna and Eugenia did not per sedissolve
and liquidate their conjugal partnership of gains. The approval of the Agreement by a
competent court was still required under Article 190 and Article 191 of the Civil Code, as
follows:
Article 190. In the absence of an express declaration in the marriage settlements, the
separation of property between spouses during the marriage shall not take place save in
virtue of a judicial order. (1432a)
Article 191. The husband or the wife may ask for the separation of property, and it shall be
decreed when the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries
with it civil interdiction, or has been declared absent, or when legal separation has been
granted.
xxxx
The husband and the wife may agree upon the dissolution of the conjugal partnership
during the marriage, subject to judicial approval. All the creditors of the husband and of the
wife, as well as of the conjugal partnership shall be notified of any petition for
judicialapproval or the voluntary dissolution of the conjugal partnership, so that any such
creditors may appear atthe hearing to safeguard his interests. Upon approval of the
petition for dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the court shall take such measures as
may protect the creditors and other third persons.
After dissolution of the conjugal partnership, the provisions of articles 214 and 215 shall
apply. The provisions of this Code concerning the effect of partition stated in articles 498
to 501 shall be applicable. (1433a)
But was not the approval of the Agreement by the CFI of Sto. Domingo in the Dominican
Republic sufficient in dissolving and liquidating the conjugal partnership of gains between
the late Atty. Luna and Eugenia?
The query is answered in the negative. There is no question that the approval took place
only as an incident ofthe action for divorce instituted by Atty. Luna and Eugenia, for,
indeed, the justifications for their execution of the Agreement were identical to the grounds
raised in the action for divorce.21 With the divorce not being itself valid and enforceable
under Philippine law for being contrary to Philippine public policy and public law, the
approval of the Agreement was not also legally valid and enforceable under Philippine law.
Consequently, the conjugal partnership of gains of Atty. Luna and Eugenia subsisted in
the lifetime of their marriage.
3. Atty. Luna’s marriage with Soledad, being bigamous,
was void; properties acquired during their marriage
were governed by the rules on co-ownership
What law governed the property relations of the second marriage between Atty. Luna and
Soledad?
The CA expressly declared that Atty. Luna’s subsequent marriage to Soledad on January
12, 1976 was void for being bigamous,22 on the ground that the marriage between Atty.
Luna and Eugenia had not been dissolved by the Divorce Decree rendered by the CFI of
Sto. Domingo in the Dominican Republic but had subsisted until the death of Atty. Luna on
July 12, 1997.
The Court concurs with the CA.
In the Philippines, marriages that are bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous are void.
Article 71 of the Civil Codeclearly states:
Article 71. All marriages performed outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were performed, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except bigamous, polygamous, or incestuous marriages as
determined by Philippine law.
Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or subsequent marriage
before the first marriage has been legally dissolved, or before the absent spouse has been
declared presumptively dead by means of a judgment rendered in the proper
proceedings.23 A bigamous marriage is considered void ab initio.24
Due to the second marriage between Atty. Luna and the petitioner being void ab initioby
virtue of its being bigamous, the properties acquired during the bigamous marriage were
governed by the rules on co-ownership, conformably with Article 144 of the Civil Code, viz:
Article 144. When a man and a woman live together as husband and wife, but they are not
married, ortheir marriage is void from the beginning, the property acquired by eitheror both
of them through their work or industry or their wages and salaries shall be governed by the
rules on co-ownership.(n)
In such a situation, whoever alleges co-ownership carried the burden of proof to confirm
such fact.1âwphi1 To establish co-ownership, therefore, it became imperative for the
petitioner to offer proof of her actual contributions in the acquisition of property. Her mere
allegation of co-ownership, without sufficient and competent evidence, would warrant no
relief in her favor. As the Court explained in Saguid v. Court of Appeals:25
In the cases of Agapay v. Palang, and Tumlos v. Fernandez, which involved the issue of
co-ownership ofproperties acquired by the parties to a bigamous marriage and an
adulterous relationship, respectively, we ruled that proof of actual contribution in the
acquisition of the property is essential. The claim of co-ownership of the petitioners therein
who were parties to the bigamous and adulterousunion is without basis because they
failed to substantiate their allegation that they contributed money in the purchase of the
disputed properties. Also in Adriano v. Court of Appeals, we ruled that the fact that the
controverted property was titled in the name of the parties to an adulterous relationship is
not sufficient proof of coownership absent evidence of actual contribution in the acquisition
of the property.
As in other civil cases, the burden of proof rests upon the party who, as determined by the
pleadings or the nature of the case, asserts an affirmative issue. Contentions must be
proved by competent evidence and reliance must be had on the strength of the party’s
own evidence and not upon the weakness of the opponent’s defense. This applies with
more vigor where, as in the instant case, the plaintiff was allowed to present evidence ex
parte.1âwphi1 The plaintiff is not automatically entitled to the relief prayed for. The law
gives the defendantsome measure of protection as the plaintiff must still prove the
allegations in the complaint. Favorable relief can be granted only after the court
isconvinced that the facts proven by the plaintiff warrant such relief. Indeed, the party
alleging a fact has the burden of proving it and a mereallegation is not evidence.26
The petitioner asserts herein that she sufficiently proved her actual contributions in the
purchase of the condominium unit in the aggregate amount of at least ₱306,572.00,
consisting in direct contributions of ₱159,072.00, and in repaying the loans Atty. Luna had
obtained from Premex Financing and Banco Filipino totaling ₱146,825.30;27 and that such
aggregate contributions of ₱306,572.00 corresponded to almost the entire share of Atty.
Luna in the purchase of the condominium unit amounting to ₱362,264.00 of the unit’s
purchase price of ₱1,449,056.00.28 The petitioner further asserts that the lawbooks were
paid for solely out of her personal funds, proof of which Atty. Luna had even sent her a
"thank you" note;29 that she had the financial capacity to make the contributions and
purchases; and that Atty. Luna could not acquire the properties on his own due to the
meagerness of the income derived from his law practice.
Did the petitioner discharge her burden of proof on the co-ownership?
In resolving the question, the CA entirely debunked the petitioner’s assertions on her
actual contributions through the following findings and conclusions, namely:
SOLEDAD was not able to prove by preponderance of evidence that her own independent
funds were used to buy the law office condominium and the law books subject matter in
contentionin this case – proof that was required for Article 144 of the New Civil Code and
Article 148 of the Family Code to apply – as to cases where properties were acquired by a
man and a woman living together as husband and wife but not married, or under a
marriage which was void ab initio. Under Article 144 of the New Civil Code, the rules on
co-ownership would govern. But this was not readily applicable to many situations and
thus it created a void at first because it applied only if the parties were not in any way
incapacitated or were without impediment to marry each other (for it would be absurd to
create a co-ownership where there still exists a prior conjugal partnership or absolute
community between the man and his lawful wife). This void was filled upon adoption of the
Family Code. Article 148 provided that: only the property acquired by both of the parties
through their actual joint contribution of money, property or industry shall be owned in
common and in proportion to their respective contributions. Such contributions and
corresponding shares were prima faciepresumed to be equal. However, for this
presumption to arise, proof of actual contribution was required. The same rule and
presumption was to apply to joint deposits of money and evidence of credit. If one of the
parties was validly married to another, his or her share in the co-ownership accrued to the
absolute community or conjugal partnership existing in such valid marriage. If the party
who acted in bad faith was not validly married to another, his or her share shall be
forfeited in the manner provided in the last paragraph of the Article 147. The rules on
forfeiture applied even if both parties were in bad faith. Co-ownership was the exception
while conjugal partnership of gains was the strict rule whereby marriage was an inviolable
social institution and divorce decrees are not recognized in the Philippines, as was held by
the Supreme Court in the case of Tenchavez vs. Escaño, G.R. No. L-19671, November
29, 1965, 15 SCRA 355, thus:
xxxx
As to the 25/100pro-indivisoshare of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit, SOLEDAD
failed to prove that she made an actual contribution to purchase the said property. She
failed to establish that the four (4) checks that she presented were indeed used for the
acquisition of the share of ATTY. LUNA in the condominium unit. This was aptly explained
in the Decision of the trial court, viz.:
"x x x The first check, Exhibit "M" for ₱55,000.00 payable to Atty. Teresita Cruz Sison was
issued on January 27, 1977, which was thirteen (13) months before the Memorandum of
Agreement, Exhibit "7" was signed. Another check issued on April 29, 1978 in the amount
of ₱97,588.89, Exhibit "P" was payable to Banco Filipino. According to the plaintiff,
thiswas in payment of the loan of Atty. Luna. The third check which was for ₱49,236.00
payable to PREMEX was dated May 19, 1979, also for payment of the loan of Atty. Luna.
The fourth check, Exhibit "M", for ₱4,072.00 was dated December 17, 1980. None of the
foregoing prove that the amounts delivered by plaintiff to the payees were for the
acquisition of the subject condominium unit. The connection was simply not established. x LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
x x" Associate Justice

SOLEDAD’s claim that she made a cash contribution of ₱100,000.00 is unsubstantiated. G.R. No. 189538               February 10, 2014
Clearly, there is no basis for SOLEDAD’s claim of co-ownership over the 25/100 portion of
the condominium unit and the trial court correctly found that the same was acquired
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
through the sole industry of ATTY. LUNA, thus:
vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.
"The Deed of Absolute Sale, Exhibit "9", covering the condominium unit was in the name
of Atty. Luna, together with his partners in the law firm. The name of the plaintiff does not
DECISION
appear as vendee or as the spouse of Atty. Luna. The same was acquired for the use of
the Law firm of Atty. Luna. The loans from Allied Banking Corporation and Far East Bank
and Trust Company were loans of Atty. Luna and his partners and plaintiff does not have PERALTA, J.:
evidence to show that she paid for them fully or partially. x x x"
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the
The fact that CCT No. 4779 and subsequently, CCT No. 21761 were in the name of Regional Trial Court1(RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25,
"JUAN LUCES LUNA, married to Soledad L. Luna" was no proof that SOLEDAD was a 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L.
co-owner of the condominium unit. Acquisition of title and registration thereof are two Olaybar's petition for cancellation of entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the
different acts. It is well settled that registration does not confer title but merely confirms assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner Republic of the
one already existing. The phrase "married to" preceding "Soledad L. Luna" is merely Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
descriptive of the civil status of ATTY. LUNA.
The facts of the case are as follows:
SOLEDAD, the second wife, was not even a lawyer. So it is but logical that SOLEDAD had
no participation in the law firm or in the purchase of books for the law firm. SOLEDAD
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No
failed to prove that she had anything to contribute and that she actually purchased or paid
Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of
for the law office amortization and for the law books. It is more logical to presume that it
five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain
was ATTY. LUNA who bought the law office space and the law books from his earnings
Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial
from his practice of law rather than embarrassingly beg or ask from SOLEDAD money for
Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage
use of the law firm that he headed.30
and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the
solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage certificate is not
The Court upholds the foregoing findings and conclusions by the CA both because they hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
were substantiated by the records and because we have not been shown any reason to especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
revisit and undo them. Indeed, the petitioner, as the party claiming the co-ownership, did Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.
not discharge her burden of proof. Her mere allegations on her contributions, not being
evidence,31 did not serve the purpose. In contrast, given the subsistence of the first
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have
marriage between Atty. Luna and Eugenia, the presumption that Atty. Luna acquired the
appeared before Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time
properties out of his own personal funds and effort remained. It should then be justly
the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a
concluded that the properties in litislegally pertained to their conjugal partnership of gains
medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the supposed
as of the time of his death. Consequently, the sole ownership of the 25/100 pro
husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as
indivisoshare of Atty. Luna in the condominium unit, and of the lawbooks pertained to the
she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She
respondents as the lawful heirs of Atty. Luna.
believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency,
whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on November 11, 2005; and passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an
ORDERS the petitioner to pay the costs of suit. employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was
indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was
definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature
SO ORDERED.
appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the
petitioner, Merlinda L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel
all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and
respondent Ye Son Sune.
9
SO ORDERED.
Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of
respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record
and rectify the terrible mistake.10
Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the
grounds that: (1) there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors
in the marriage contract for it to fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court;
and (2) granting the cancellation of all the entries in the wife portion of the alleged
marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab initio.11
In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration
couched in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the
Republic of the Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor
General, the petitioner’s counsel, and all concerned government agencies.
SO ORDERED.12
Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of
cases for correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court being the appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondent’s
identity was used by an unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it
would not be feasible for respondent to institute an action for declaration of nullity of
marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under Articles 35 and 36 of the Family
Code.13
Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule
45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order
based on the following grounds:
I.
RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE
ERRORS IN THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.
II.
GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF
THE ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE
VOID AB INITIO.14
Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected,
because the entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the
person who appeared and represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the
latter’s personal circumstances.15 In directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife
portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in effect, declared the marriage null and
void ab initio.16Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is actually a petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding.17
We deny the petition.
At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the
decisions and final orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised
or involved. There is a question of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a
certain state of facts, which does not call for the examination of the probative value of the
evidence of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner is whether or not the
cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the marriage may
be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries
in the civil registry, to wit:
SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order
or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the
civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any
entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the
corresponding civil registry is located.
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid
grounds, the following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected:
(a) births; (b) marriages; (c) deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of
annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of natural
children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil
interdiction; (m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a
minor; and (o) changes of name.
SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register
is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which
would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.
 SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall,
by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The
court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.
SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any
interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within
fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of
such notice, file his opposition thereto.
SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is
brought may make orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant
preliminary injunction for the preservation of the rights of the parties pending
such proceedings.
SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue
an order granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a
certified copy of the judgment shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned
who shall annotate the same in his record.
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of
entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the
correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the
procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia19 in
1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial errors in a civil registry may be
corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and the
parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has
conducted proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed,
where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s
case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.21
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed
with, and the remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special
proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a
summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the
inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the
cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to
file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition
or issue an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule
108 are followed, it is the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial
corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.22
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are
admittedly the personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her
signature was forged and she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported
husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into or if there
was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when
respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married
to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in the wife portion of
the marriage certificate.
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil
Registrar of Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-
respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule
108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the
petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the
proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent herself, the
stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a
document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With
the testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature
appearing in the subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s signature
appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.23 The court thus made a
categorical conclusion that respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers
and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition,
no such marriage was celebrated.
Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz
Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support
pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and distribution of the
properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the
Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or
correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his
marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the
existence of marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence
that no marriage was entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence.
The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of
marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108
cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we cannot nullify the
proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to well with petitioner’s parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he
contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence resides. Eventually, they lost contact with each other.
of the parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not
the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the
In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first
record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated,
marriage being dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon
in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife
City, Philippines. Maekara brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered
portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was
physical abuse from Maekara. She left Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
no marriage to speak of.

Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The
2010, Fujiki helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared
Regional Trial Court Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP.
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14
Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are AFFIRMED.
January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign
Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)." Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese
SO ORDERED. Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous marriage between Marinay
and Maekara be declared void ab initiounder Articles 35(4) and 41 of the Family Code of
the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between
Associate Justice
Marinay and Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator
and Civil Registrar General in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6
G.R. No. 196049               June 26, 2013
The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court
MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER, 
vs.
A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF
the petition and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the
QUEZON CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF
following provisions of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE,RESPONDENTS.
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC):

DECISION
Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

CARPIO, J.:
(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife.
The Case
xxxx
This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107,
Quezon City, through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city
on a pure question of law. The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the
where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to
RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying
the date of filing, or in the case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed the petition for "Judicial
the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x
Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)" based on
improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.
The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the
above provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-
The Facts
SC which provides that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be
a ground for immediate dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that
Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz only "the husband or the wife," in this case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition
Galela Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.
Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
contemplated ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage.
Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment
is a special proceeding, which "seeks to establish a status, a right or a particular
fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or protection of a right, or the
prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC sought to
establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife
and (2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the
marriage between Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner
contended that the Japanese judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family
Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine
courts.12
In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void
marriages under Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological
incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be filed solely by the husband or the
wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only the guilty parties
would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to realize
that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the
husband in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the
personality to nullify a bigamous marriage.
Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of
the Rules of Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil
Register Law (Act No. 3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil
Register Law imposes a duty on the "successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of
marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the court to the local registrar of the
municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was solemnized."17 Section 2 of
Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages," "judgments of
annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning" are
subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to
annotate the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage
between Marinay and Maekara.
Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely
erred" when, on its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated
that the RTC may be confusing the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction,
because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki
cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held that the "trial court cannot
pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the venue by motu
proprio dismissing the case."20Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should not
have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
because he substantially complied with the provision.
On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its
Resolution, the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in
effect, prays for a decree of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two
grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of personality to sue and improper venue under Sections
2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the
proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree of divorce issued by the
Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x x."23 On the
other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it
should be taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a)
x x x."24
The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The
City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental. 25 The Court in Braza ruled that
"[i]n a special proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or
Correction of Entries in the Original Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify
marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the "validity of marriages as well as legitimacy
and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action seasonably filed by the proper party,
and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for correction of entry] x x x."27
The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between
Marinay and Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss
the petition.28 Moreover, the verification and certification against forum shopping of the
petition was not authenticated as required under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of the petition under the same
provision.
The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters
of Marinay and Maekara
On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for
review.30 The public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the NSO, participated through the Office of
the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and
Motion.31
The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement
that the petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and
that the case be reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General
argued that Fujiki, as the spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to
declare the bigamous marriage between Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General
cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court explained:
[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only
discovered during the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if
the conjugal bliss had already vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit
from the bigamous marriage, it would not be expected that they would file an action to
declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the "injured spouse" who
should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The latter is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and
the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional
burden to the prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the
infidelity of the spouse and the disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected
by the Constitution.34
The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
judgment may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this
Court held that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular
fact."37 While Corpuzconcerned a foreign divorce decree, in the present case the
Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties, especially
Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.
The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to
record "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the
civil registry as required by Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires
the entry in the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences upon a
person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The Japanese Family Court judgment directly
bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should therefore be proven as a fact in a
Rule 108 proceeding.
Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a
void marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v.
Bayadog40 which declared that "[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally
attacked."41
Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for
them to comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the
fact that she was previously married to Fujiki.43Maekara also denied that he inflicted any
form of violence on Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to
oppose the petition.45 She would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say
might cause misunderstanding between her and Fujiki.46
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following legal issues:
(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
(2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize
a foreign judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her
spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy.
(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a
proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Ruling of the Court
We grant the petition.
The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a
foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife can file a declaration of nullity or
annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the petition is bigamy."48
I.
For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage
where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove
the foreign judgment as a fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the
foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132,
Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner
may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an official publication or (2) a
certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and
authenticated by the seal of office.50
To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment
would mean that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the
form and contents of the petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the
public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial
court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case anew. It will defeat the purpose of
recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation on claims and
issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the merits.
In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court
were reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause
of action, rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59
A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition
and legal capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not
automatic. To extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts
must determine if the foreign judgment is consistent with domestic public policy and other
mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides that "[l]aws relating to family rights
and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons are binding upon
citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex nationalii in
private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over
whom it exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity
of such citizen.
A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require
relitigation under a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of
nullity of marriage. Philippine courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which
the foreign judgment was rendered. They cannot substitute their judgment on the status,
condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is under the jurisdiction of another
state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign judgment as a fact according
to the rules of evidence.
provides that "[a] special proceeding is a remedy by which a party seeks to establish a
status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a remedy to rectify facts of a person’s
life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register Law or Act No. 3753.
These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage,66 which the State
has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas this Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be
made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a
particular fact."67
Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or
against a person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil
their successors in interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating
Court states that "the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." is located. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign judgments. Courts are not
allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign judgment is admitted
Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court
and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy
merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear
because the judgment concerns his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same
mistake of law or fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the
reason he has the personality to file a petition under Rule 108 to cancel the entry of
protection of party expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62
marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis of the decree of
the Japanese Family Court.
Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign
divorce decrees between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven
There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining
under the rules of evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the
the integrity of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There
recognition of a foreign divorce decree does not involve the extended procedure under
is also no doubt that he is interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary trial. While the Philippines does not have a
marriage in the civil registry, which compromises the public record of his marriage. The
divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a foreign divorce decree under the
interest derives from the substantive right of the spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve,
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a Filipino citizen to
in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but also to protect his property
remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65
interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage.69 These
property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the
There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71
Family Court judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the
ground of bigamy. While the Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court
Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a
judgment is fully consistent with Philippine public policy, as bigamous marriages are
spouse’s right in a marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III
declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the Family Code. Bigamy is a
("Rights and Obligations between Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-
crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove the existence
11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify" the substantive right of the spouse to
of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25,
maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.
preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the husband or the
wife of the union recognized by law.
II.
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting
Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it marriage to question the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On
may be made in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil the contrary, when Section 2(a) states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of
registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband
or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article 35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous
marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a bigamous marriage are
neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the prior
subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of
absolute nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the
beginning, is the civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes
bigamy. Bigamy is a public crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy
because any citizen has an interest in the prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If
anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the declaration of nullity of a bigamous
marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the husband or the wife of
a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public interest of
prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil
aspect of protecting his marriage.
When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an
injured party and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled
that the prior spouse "is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only
threatens the financial and the property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of
all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the
prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a bigamous marriage void. For this
purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the bigamous
marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the Philippines.
Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the
bigamous marriage in the civil registry.
III.
In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held
that a "trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the
"validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned only in a direct action" to nullify the
marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for recognition of foreign
judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.
Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign
country.
To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot
substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent
circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family
Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the
requirement of proving the limited grounds for the dissolution of
marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public
prosecutor to determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment
of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family
Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial
Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in
the civil registry.
However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry
entry based on the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under Philippine law, nor of the
jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A recognition of a foreign judgment is
not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine courts to recognize the
effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was already tried
and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the
jurisdiction of the foreign court.
Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect
of a foreign divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the
validity of the dissolution of the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code provides that "[w]here a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly
celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry
under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the legislative intent
of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the
effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely because the Philippines does not allow
divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits because it is tantamount to
trying a case for divorce.
The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly
that results from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a
foreign citizen, whose laws allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse
being tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or
her country. The correction is made by extending in the Philippines the effect of the foreign
divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it was rendered. The
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision
in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be
discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91
The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and
a foreign citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of
bigamy. The Filipino spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the
ground of bigamy. The principle in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he term of prescription [of the
applies because the foreign spouse, after the foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the Philippine
capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country. If the foreign judgment is not archipelago."
recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—the foreign
spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.
Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address
the questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5,
Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are respectively, of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.
empowered to correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage
while the foreign spouse is free to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the
Family Code, Philippine courts already have jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in
judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign judgment does not contravene
Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court
domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a foreign divorce decree
is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition for further proceedings in accordance with this
and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a ground for the
Decision.
nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article
35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse
has the option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage SO ORDERED.
under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her.
Philippine courts have jurisdiction to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous
Brion, Del Castillo, Perez, and Perlas-Bernabe, JJ., concur
marriage, without prejudice to a criminal prosecution for bigamy.

G. R. No. 183622               February 8, 2012

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute
their judgment on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the
"family rights and duties, or on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner, 
citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment. Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the vs.
question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines. In a LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.
foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a foreign
country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party,
under the rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code. RESOLUTION

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is
inconsistent with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any
alleging party is able to prove an extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want
of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If
there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor adequate proof to repel the judgment,
Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign judgment as part of the comity
of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the foreign judgment is
already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of the
foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for
the correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new
status, right and fact92 that needs to be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will
be an inconsistency between the recognition of the effectivity of the foreign judgment and
the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1
SERENO, J.:
Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and
Resolution2 regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of
Orlando B. Catalan.
The facts are as follows:
Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce
in the United States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage
with petitioner herein.
On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without

prejudice to prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for Dagupan City a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as
extinction of criminal liability under Articles 89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. administratrix of the intestate estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special
Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.
On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-
Lee, one of the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the
RTC docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 232.
The two cases were subsequently consolidated.
Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia,
considering that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.
On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested
person qualified to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of
Orlando. In support of her contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy
was filed against petitioner before Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and
docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.
Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted
a second marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12
December 1959.
On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.3 The trial court ruled that
since the deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not
recognized under Philippine jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not
valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the
trial court in Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It
considered the pending action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of
petitioner for the crime of bigamy.
Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to
Eusebio Bristol.
On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for
the issuance of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private
respondent. Contrary to its findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the
marriage between petitioner and Eusebio Bristol was valid and subsisting when she
married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further that her acquittal in the previous
bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that petitioner was not an
interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration.4
After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the
matter to the Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.
Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been
dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for
letters of administration may have been filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was
cured by the appearance of a real party-in-interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine
who has a better right to administer the decedent’s properties, the RTC should have first
required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled on the matter.
On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that
petitioner undertook the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review
rather than a petition for certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed
within the fifteen-day reglementary period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of
Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued to decide on the merits of the case.
Thus, it ruled in this wise:
As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to
be a ground for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at
least such as to represent the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted
and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the
two cases should be such that the judgment which may be rendered in one would,
regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the other. A petition for
letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is an application or
proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast to
an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The
only party in this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering its
nature, a subsequent petition for letters of administration can hardly be barred by a similar
pending petition involving the estate of the same decedent unless both petitions are filed
by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was not a party to the petition filed
by the private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not made a party to the
petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The contention of
the petitioner must perforce fail.
Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision
of the Rules requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an "interested party,"
inasmuch as any person, for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the
estate sought to be administered, could be appointed as administrator for as long as he
files his petition ahead of any other person, in derogation of the rights of those specifically
mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of administrator under Rule 78,
Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
x x x           x x x          x x x
The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of
administration. As a spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the
estate of Orlando B. Catalan. However, a marriage certificate, like any other public
document, is only prima facie evidence of the facts stated therein. The fact that the
petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted has not been disputed
by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a second or
subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,8 to wit:
proceedings. The deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the
said case negates the validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan
In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in
has not been disproved by her. There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to
Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against
deny the findings of the trial court. There is therefore no basis for us to make a contrary
absolute divorces, the same being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and
finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger to the estate of Orlando B.
morality. In the same case, the Court ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial court is in
provided they are valid according to their national law.
place.

x x x           x x x          x x x
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.6 She alleged that the reasoning of
the CA was illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while,
on the other hand, still holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that
with her acquittal of the crime of bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.
On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.
Hence, this Petition.
Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once
proven that respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the
divorce from petitioner, the ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and
petitioner could "very well lose her right to inherit" from him.
In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal
effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in
view of the nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be
reversed. We hold that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first
wife Paula was valid and recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx
Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia
v. Recio,9 to wit:

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A
finding of the RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence
Bristol. Thus, the trial court concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it
of a judgment is the judgment itself. The decree purports to be a written act or record of an
follows that the first marriage with Bristol still existed and was valid. By failing to take note
act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.
of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the marriage between petitioner and Bristol,
both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested party in the estate of
Orlando. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
was dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
established as early as 1985 in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we said:
seal of his office.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code,
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same
one issued by an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient;
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens
compliance with the aforementioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the divorce in Nevada
released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to
the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The
trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was
admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to
object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written act of the Family
Court of Sydney, Australia.
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992. Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the
marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts; thus,
judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence
of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those
are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters. Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating
it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.1âwphi1 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital
laws are not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their
judicial function. The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis
supplied)
It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s
divorce under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the
deceased. Thus, there is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further
reception of evidence to establish the fact of divorce.
Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has
the preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise,
letters of administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or
next of kin of the deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of
Court.
This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,10 in which we said:
Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by
Merry Lee which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad
with the legal personality to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving
spouse. However, the records show that there is insufficient evidence to prove the
validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the marriage of respondent
and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court laid down the
specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held that
presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity
and due execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or
document may be proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an
official publication or (2) a copy thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the
document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied
by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign
service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by
the seal of his office.
With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California,
U.S.A., she submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of
the Family Law Act of California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in
accordance with the said law. As stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial
notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of
evidence on the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of
respondent and Felicisimo. (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to
ascertain the rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of
Orlando B. Catalan.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The
Decision dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of
Appeals are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to
Branch 70 of the Regional Trial Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
MARIA LOURDES P. A. SERENO
Associate Justic
G.R. No. 186571               August 11, 2010
GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,  Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Laoag City, Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court (present petition).
Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian
citizenship through naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert
married respondent Daisylyn T. Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and
other professional commitments, Gerbert left for Canada soon after the wedding. He
returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise Daisylyn, but was shocked
to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and disappointed,
Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005.
The divorce decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5
Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love.
Desirous of marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig
City Civil Registry Office and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the registration of the divorce decree, an official of
the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert that the marriage between him and
Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the foreign divorce decree
must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to NSO
Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6
Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or
declaration of marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned,
Daisylyn did not file any responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized
letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in
fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was prevented by financial and
personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a party-in-
interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded
that Gerbert was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the
foreign divorce decree as he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the
Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry under Philippine law.9 Article 26
of the Family Code reads:
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the
enactment of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the
Court in Republic v. Orbecido III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."11
THE PETITION
From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13
Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar
to that filed in Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale
behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, he contends that the
provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He claims that the RTC ruling
unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the petition only to
the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper
party, vested with sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that
he might be prosecuted for bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines
since two marriage certificates, involving him, would be on file with the Civil Registry
Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their respective
Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.
Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the
recognition of a foreign divorce decree.
THE COURT’S RULING
The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code as the substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse
The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.
The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and
voidable16 marriages. In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity
or annulment of the marriage exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the
other hand, contemplates the dissolution of the lawful union for cause arising after the
marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute divorce between Filipino citizens.18
Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an
alien, President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the
Freedom Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of
the Family Code to its present wording, as follows:
Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively
incorporated into the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v.
Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s
assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s divorce decree between the alien and the
Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce had already severed the
marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v. Romillo that:
To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still
married to [the alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just.
[The Filipino spouse] should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to [the alien spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one
of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated
against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.22
As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd
situation where the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after
obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is
for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by clarifying his or her marital status, settling the
doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have his or her
marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial
recognition of the foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely
for that purpose or as a related issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to
the Filipino spouse since our laws do not recognize divorce as a mode of severing the
marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that the policy against absolute
divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign country. The
inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage
between the Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.
Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is
not limited to the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the
decree capacitated the alien spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino
spouse is likewise capacitated to contract another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction,
however, can make a similar declaration for the alien spouse (other than that already
established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are generally governed by his
national law.26
Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability
of the provision for the benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino
spouse can invoke the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien
spouse can claim no right under this provision.
The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with
legal interest to petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction
We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that
this conclusion is not sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other
words, the unavailability of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens
does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of
his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree itself, after its authenticity and
conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according to our rules of
evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign
judgments. This Section states:
SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final
order of a tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final
order is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or
final order is conclusive upon the title of the thing; and
(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final
order is presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title.
In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree
clothe a party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the
recognition of the foreign judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that
As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
the divorce obtained by an alien abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
has already recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate
the divorce is valid according to his or her national law.27
based on the mere presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally
improper; hence, the need to draw attention of the bench and the bar to what had been
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment done.
that our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera
explained that, as a rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a
Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the
judgment rendered by a tribunal of another country."28 This means that the foreign
civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in
judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts under our rules on evidence,
the civil registry of judicial decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a
together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the judgment on the
person’s legal capacity and status, i.e., those affecting "all his personal qualities and
alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically
relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily terminable at his own will, such
for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an
as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35
integral aspect of his claim or defense.

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien,
legal capacity and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on
recognizing his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign
Registry of Civil Status specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil
authority, Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section
registry:
requires proof, either by (1) official publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having
legal custody of the documents. If the copies of official records are not kept in the
Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of
diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign persons, in which shall be entered:
country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
(a) births;
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as
well as the required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the
(b) deaths;
Canadian law on divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the
petition for insufficiency of supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to
remand the case to the RTC to determine whether the divorce decree is consistent with (c) marriages;
the Canadian divorce law.
(d) annulments of marriages;
We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26
interests that will be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the
petition. A remand, at the same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the (e) divorces;
foreign judgment and overcome a petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving
want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or (f) legitimations;
fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to ensure conformity with our laws
before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once recognized, shall have the
effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules (g) adoptions;
of Court.33
(h) acknowledgment of natural children;
In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal
recognition of foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign (i) naturalization; and
judgments of divorce serves as the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for
considering the alien spouse bound by its terms. This same effect, as discussed above,
will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the substantive rule that the second (j) changes of name.
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.
 xxxx
Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices
the following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning
the civil status of persons:
(1) Birth and death register;
(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages
solemnized but also divorces and dissolved marriages.
(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization
register.
But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and
the submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s
registration. The law should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial
recognition of the foreign judgment before it can be given res judicata effect. In the context
of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists recognizing the foreign divorce decree.
Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of turn and without authority of
law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage
certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.
Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court
recognition, as it cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice
Opinion No. 181, series of 198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent
Philippine court before a foreign judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the
civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the registration of the decree. For being contrary
to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree without the requisite judicial
recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1
Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend
to the Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry
in the civil registry. A petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper
proceeding, contemplated under the Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the
civil registry.
Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or
corrected, without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil
Code by specifically providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the
civil registry may be judicially cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets
in detail the jurisdictional and procedural requirements that must be complied with before a
judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction, may be annotated in the civil registry.
It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be filed with the RTC of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located;38that the civil registrar and all
persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the proceedings;39and
that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present
case, we cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule
108 of the Rules of Court.
We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two
separate proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry –
one for recognition of the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such
as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status or right of a
party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can serve as the
appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can
be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the
October 30, 2008 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as
its February 17, 2009 order. We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further
proceedings in accordance with our ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished
the Civil Registrar General. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
ARTURO D. BRION
Associate Justice
G.R. No. 155635             November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, 
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT, respondents.
x-------------------------------------------x
G.R. No. 163979             November 7, 2008
MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner, 
vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
 The Case
Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay
Bayot impugning certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R.
SP No. 68187.
In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No.
155635, Rebecca assails and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as
reiterated in another Resolution of September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary
injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's
grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.
On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath
that she is an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living
separately; and that she is carrying a child not of Vicente.
On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City
RTC, for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged
psychological incapacity. Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria
Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled
to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also sought the dissolution of the conjugal
partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for her and Alix. Rebecca
also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for their daughter
Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the
On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of
March 25, 2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for
cause of action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage with application for support commenced by
June 5, 2001, Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for
Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2)
support pendente lite.
setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the RTC in the said case.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.
The Facts
Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose,
Greenhills, Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca,
then 26 years old, to be an American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar
Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen Corn Makapugay, American.
On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie
Josephine Alexandra or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship
seemed to have soured as the latter, sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in
the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the First Instance of the Judicial District of
Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente was duly represented by
counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No.
362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry
after completing the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship
over Alix. Over a year later, the same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling
the couple's property relations pursuant to an Agreement10 they executed on December
14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the "conjugal property which they
acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all the improvements
and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang, Muntinlupa."11
citizenship, as affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is
no valid divorce to speak of.
Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca
commenced several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed
adultery and perjury complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged
Vicente with bigamy and concubinage.
Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite
On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil
Case No. 01-094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing
as follows:
Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent
is DENIED. Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support
Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED. Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the
amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (Php
220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the proceedings
relative to the instant Petition.

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree SO ORDERED.19
No. 362/96, Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996,
with attachments, for declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378.
The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as
Rebecca, however, later moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the
bar to the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best
petition.
taken up during actual trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that
a mere allegation of adultery against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from
receiving legal support.
Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC
order, Vicente went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.
Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA
22
On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.  On April 30, 2002, the appellate
court granted, via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the
decretal portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at
bar, let the Writ of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the
respondent court from implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August
8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001, and from conducting further
proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon the posting of an injunction bond in
the amount of P250,000.00.
SO ORDERED.23
Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002
resolution. In the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued.
Rebecca also moved for reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated
September 2, 2002, denied her motion.
The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being
assailed in Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.
Ruling of the CA
Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004,
effectively dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC
issued in relation to the case. The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order
dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered DISMISSING Civil
Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No pronouncement as to
costs.
SO ORDERED.26
To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the
following premises:
(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-
admission rule applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of
action.27 Applying said rule in the light of the essential elements of a cause of
action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action against Vicente for declaration of nullity of
marriage.
(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with
Vicente declared void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996
by the foreign divorce decree she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's
capacity to contract another marriage.
(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the
time the foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her
alleged Filipino citizenship was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the
time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen. The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by
the Government of Guam also did not indicate the nationality of her father.
(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to
have that nationality status and having made representations to that effect during
momentous events of her life, such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for
divorce; and (c) when she applied for and eventually secured an American passport on
January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she initiated the first but later withdrawn
petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March 14, 1996.
(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in
Guam, USA which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion
about being an American citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from
denying her citizenship and impugning the validity of the divorce.
Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this
recourse was denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.
The Issues
In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the
allowance of her petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in
enjoining the implementation of the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support
pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-094.
In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as
follows:
 I The Court's Ruling

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND
NOT TAKING INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE
FACTS THE FACT OF PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS
CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN HER PETITION BEFORE THE
COURT A QUO.
II
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON
ANNEXES TO THE PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT
BEFORE IT.
The petition is bereft of merit.
Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case
There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained
her divorce from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of
an effective repudiation of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances
indicative of her American citizenship: (1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the
principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory granting American citizenship to
those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder of an American
passport.33

III
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER
THAT RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS
MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE
OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT ACTS.
IV
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE
WAS ABUSE OF DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH
LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and
represented herself as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown
in the marriage certificate; (2) in the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the
divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention may be made of the Affidavit of
Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.
It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of
Identification (ID) Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID
Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend to show that she has indeed been recognized as a
Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized, however, that such recognition was given
only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of Justice of Rebecca's
recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate
Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:
the success or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.
To Whom It May Concern:
Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained
abroad by an alien married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines,
This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose
provided the decree of divorce is valid according to the national law of the
photograph and thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal
foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship of the divorcing parties at
of this Office, and whose other particulars are as follows:
birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained
abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this Place of Birth:     Guam, USA       Date of Birth:     March 5, 1953
jurisdiction.32
Sex:     female                              Civil Status:     married       Color of
Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, Hair:    brown
i.e., the propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves
itself into the questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the
Color of Eyes:     brown               Distinguishing marks on face:    none
time the divorce judgment was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996;
and second, whether the judgment of divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent
legal effects?
 was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article
IV, Section 1, Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition
JBL 95-213 signed by Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6,
1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero in his
1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.
Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.
Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995
(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA
ASSO. COMMISSIONER
Official Receipt No. 5939988
issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000
From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be
deduced: (1) Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of
Recognition on October 6, 1995; (2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio
G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen was issued on June 8,
2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of recognition; and (3) ID Certificate
No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the payment of the PhP
2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.
What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by
the Bureau on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required
affirmation only on June 8, 2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration.
There seems to be no error with the date of the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by
Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice that he was the Secretary
of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a strong valid
reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.
Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require
the affirmation by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under
Executive Order No. 292, also known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its
Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ which is tasked to "provide immigration and
naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws governing citizenship and
the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of any Order of
Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.
Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen
clearly provides:
The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically
furnish the Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition
within 72 days from its date of approval by the way of indorsement for
confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice pursuant to Executive
Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the date
of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate
issued by the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently
indicate thereon the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis
ours.)
Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June
13, 2000, or five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement
confirming the order of recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this
unusual sequence of close events which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said
affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet recognized as a Filipino citizen. The
same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778 could not have been
issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no
identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of
Justice. Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a
Filipino citizen through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of
Justice Tuquero corresponds to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days
later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.
When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a
Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One
The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the
foregoing disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least
was not yet recognized as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996
judgment of divorce from the Dominican Republic.
The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew
her original petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC)
obviously because she could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In
fact, a perusal of that petition shows that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was
only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less than a month after Rebecca secured, on
February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question. Consequently, there was no
mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only documents appended as
annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract (Annex "A")
and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the
Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece
of document be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being
crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil
Case No. 01-094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from
the Bureau as attachment. What were attached consisted of the following material
documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and Divorce Decree. It was only through her
Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May 2001)36 did Rebecca attach
as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.
At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with
Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective
attachments, clearly made out a case of lack of cause of action, which we will expound
later.
Validity of Divorce Decree
Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.
First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized,
assuming for argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but
represented herself in public documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she
chose, before, during, and shortly after her divorce, her American citizenship to govern her
marital relationship. Second, she secured personally said divorce as an American citizen,
as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently declared:
IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the
jurisdiction of this court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of
temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United
States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and residing at 502
Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally
appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO,
attorney, x x x and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43
years of age, married and domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala
Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared before this court represented by DR.
ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by special power of
attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to
subscribe all the acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)
Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United
States of America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of
Vicente and Rebecca were properly adjudicated through their Agreement38executed on
December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No. 362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996,
and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on March 4, 1997. Veritably, the
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.
To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign
divorce can be recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as
valid under the national law of the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca
was clearly an American citizen when she secured the divorce and that divorce is
recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said decree is, as
here, sufficient.
It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact
admitted by both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court
nor challenge the validity of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear
mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared to have the opportunity to do so. The same
holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their conjugal property. As this Court
explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of
divorce] x x x, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had
been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39,
Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is
conclusive upon the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their
successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may be
repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign
judgment, in order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its
efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect
to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment
|merely constitutes prima facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party
and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41
As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign
divorce while Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro
Torrens, in said proceedings. As things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and
issued by the Dominican Republic court are valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca
and Vicente.
Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force
of the June 8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995
Bureau Order of Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the
foreign divorce secured by Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as
we stressed at the outset, in determining whether or not a divorce secured abroad would
come within the pale of the country's policy against absolute divorce, the reckoning point
is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is obtained.42
Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce
Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given
a res judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree
obtained, the marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they
are both freed from the bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are
no longer husband and wife to each other. As the divorce court formally pronounced:
"[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M. BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL
BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry after completing the
legal requirements."43
Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a
husband's obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with,
observe respect and fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44
The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the
Family Code, providing as follows:
Art. 26. x x x x
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated
and a divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall likewise have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by E.O. 227)
In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the
second paragraph of Art. 26, thus:
x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26
as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen
and a foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her
to remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.45
Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage
of Vicente and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship
during the valid divorce proceedings.
Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement
executed on December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property
relations. The Agreement provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only
their family home, thus:
9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired
during their marriage consists onlyof the real property and all the
improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue,
Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No. 168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990
issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered in the name
of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)
This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court
which, per its second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997,
ordered that, "THIRD: That the agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day
of December 1996 in Makati City, Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by
reference but not merged and that the parties are hereby ordered and directed to comply
with each and every provision of said agreement."47
Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is
thus estopped by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and
Vicente's conjugal property was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48
No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage
Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks,
under the premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains
the concept and elements of a cause of action, thus:
A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right
of the other. A motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically
admits the truth of the allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a
complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of action against the defendants if,
hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render a valid judgment
upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists if
the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by
whatever means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation
on the part of the named defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and
(3) an act or omission on the part of such defendant violative of the right of the
plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the defendant to the plaintiff
for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49
One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, 
Vicente's motion to dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary vs.
evidence attached therein: The petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity CIPRIANO ORBECIDO III, Respondent.
of marriage, a suit which presupposes the existence of a marriage.
DECISION
To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the
claim for relief does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is
QUISUMBING, J.:
ambiguous, indefinite, or uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca,
there is no more marital tie binding her to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be
dissolved or nullified. Given a valid marriage between two Filipino citizens, where one party is later naturalized
as a foreign citizen and obtains a valid divorce decree capacitating him or her to remarry,
can the Filipino spouse likewise remarry under Philippine law?
The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to
support the needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had
discharged his duty, albeit Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. Before us is a case of first impression that behooves the Court to make a definite ruling on
At any rate, we do note that Alix, having been born on November 27, 1982, reached the this apparently novel question, presented as a pure question of law.
majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months before her mother initiated her
petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence, the issue of back
In this petition for review, the Solicitor General assails the Decision1 dated May 15, 2002,
support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a
of the Regional Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23 and
separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix
its Resolution2 dated July 4, 2002 denying the motion for reconsideration. The court a
can be proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court
quo had declared that herein respondent Cipriano Orbecido III is capacitated to remarry.
can thus determine what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions
The fallo of the impugned Decision reads:
until the child concerned shall have finished her education.

WHEREFORE, by virtue of the provision of the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue
Code and by reason of the divorce decree obtained against him by his American wife, the
tendered in G.R. No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were,
petitioner is given the capacity to remarry under the Philippine Law.
her entitlement to that kind of support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil
Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-
094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for, and effectively mooted, the IT IS SO ORDERED.3
claim for support pendente lite.
The factual antecedents, as narrated by the trial court, are as follows.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the
ground of mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is
hereby DENIED for lack of merit. Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, On May 24, 1981, Cipriano Orbecido III married Lady Myros M. Villanueva at the United
2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs Church of Christ in the Philippines in Lam-an, Ozamis City. Their marriage was blessed
against petitioner. with a son and a daughter, Kristoffer Simbortriz V. Orbecido and Lady Kimberly V.
Orbecido.

SO ORDERED.
In 1986, Cipriano’s wife left for the United States bringing along their son Kristoffer. A few
years later, Cipriano discovered that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen.
PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.
Associate Justice
Sometime in 2000, Cipriano learned from his son that his wife had obtained a divorce
decree and then married a certain Innocent Stanley. She, Stanley and her child by him
currently live at 5566 A. Walnut Grove Avenue, San Gabriel, California.

G.R. No. 154380 October 5, 2005 Cipriano thereafter filed with the trial court a petition for authority to remarry invoking
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code. No opposition was filed. Finding merit in the
petition, the court granted the same. The Republic, herein petitioner, through the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG), sought reconsideration but it was denied.
In this petition, the OSG raises a pure question of law:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT CAN REMARRY UNDER ARTICLE 26 OF THE
FAMILY CODE4
The OSG contends that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code is not applicable to
the instant case because it only applies to a valid mixed marriage; that is, a marriage
celebrated between a Filipino citizen and an alien. The proper remedy, according to the
OSG, is to file a petition for annulment or for legal separation.5 Furthermore, the OSG
argues there is no law that governs respondent’s situation. The OSG posits that this is a
matter of legislation and not of judicial determination.6
For his part, respondent admits that Article 26 is not directly applicable to his case but
insists that when his naturalized alien wife obtained a divorce decree which capacitated
her to remarry, he is likewise capacitated by operation of law pursuant to Section 12,
Article II of the Constitution.7
At the outset, we note that the petition for authority to remarry filed before the trial court
actually constituted a petition for declaratory relief. In this connection, Section 1, Rule 63
of the Rules of Court provides:
RULE 63
DECLARATORY RELIEF AND SIMILAR REMEDIES
Section 1. Who may file petition—Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or
other written instrument, or whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or
regulation, ordinance, or other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation
thereof, bring an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question
of construction or validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
...
The requisites of a petition for declaratory relief are: (1) there must be a justiciable
controversy; (2) the controversy must be between persons whose interests are adverse;
(3) that the party seeking the relief has a legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the
issue is ripe for judicial determination.8
This case concerns the applicability of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 to a marriage between
two Filipino citizens where one later acquired alien citizenship, obtained a divorce decree,
and remarried while in the U.S.A. The interests of the parties are also adverse, as
petitioner representing the State asserts its duty to protect the institution of marriage while
respondent, a private citizen, insists on a declaration of his capacity to remarry.
Respondent, praying for relief, has legal interest in the controversy. The issue raised is
also ripe for judicial determination inasmuch as when respondent remarries, litigation
ensues and puts into question the validity of his second marriage.
Coming now to the substantive issue, does Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code
apply to the case of respondent? Necessarily, we must dwell on how this provision had
come about in the first place, and what was the intent of the legislators in its enactment?
Brief Historical Background
On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon Aquino signed into law Executive Order No. 209,
otherwise known as the "Family Code," which took effect on August 3, 1988. Article 26
thereof states:
All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in
the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in
this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35, 37, and 38.
On July 17, 1987, shortly after the signing of the original Family Code, Executive Order
No. 227 was likewise signed into law, amending Articles 26, 36, and 39 of the Family
Code. A second paragraph was added to Article 26. As so amended, it now provides:
ART. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in
force in the country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be
valid in this country, except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37
and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a
divorce is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.
(Emphasis supplied)
On its face, the foregoing provision does not appear to govern the situation presented by
the case at hand. It seems to apply only to cases where at the time of the celebration of
the marriage, the parties are a Filipino citizen and a foreigner. The instant case is one
where at the time the marriage was solemnized, the parties were two Filipino citizens, but
later on, the wife was naturalized as an American citizen and subsequently obtained a
divorce granting her capacity to remarry, and indeed she remarried an American citizen
while residing in the U.S.A.
Noteworthy, in the Report of the Public Hearings9 on the Family Code, the Catholic
Bishops’ Conference of the Philippines (CBCP) registered the following objections to
Paragraph 2 of Article 26:
1. The rule is discriminatory. It discriminates against those whose spouses are Filipinos
who divorce them abroad. These spouses who are divorced will not be able to re-marry,
while the spouses of foreigners who validly divorce them abroad can.
2. This is the beginning of the recognition of the validity of divorce even for Filipino
citizens. For those whose foreign spouses validly divorce them abroad will also be
considered to be validly divorced here and can re-marry. We propose that this be deleted
and made into law only after more widespread consultation. (Emphasis supplied.)
Legislative Intent
Records of the proceedings of the Family Code deliberations showed that the intent of
Paragraph 2 of Article 26, according to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Civil
Code Revision Committee, is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to
the Filipino spouse.
Interestingly, Paragraph 2 of Article 26 traces its origin to the 1985 case of Van Dorn v.
Romillo, Jr.10 The Van Dorn case involved a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner. The Court held therein that a divorce decree validly obtained by the alien
spouse is valid in the Philippines, and consequently, the Filipino spouse is capacitated to
remarry under Philippine law.
Does the same principle apply to a case where at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them obtains a foreign
citizenship by naturalization?
The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals.11 In Quita, the parties were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got
married. The wife became a naturalized American citizen in 1954 and obtained a divorce
in the same year. The Court therein hinted, by way of obiter dictum, that a Filipino
divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine law and
can thus remarry.
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we
hold that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties
who, at the time of the celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one
of them becomes naturalized as a foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The
Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry as if the other party were a foreigner
at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise would be to sanction
absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and
literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the
legislature, it should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as
necessary the letter of the law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within
the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or intent.12
If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce is no
longer married to the Filipino spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming
within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of Article 26.
In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 as follows:
1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a
foreigner; and
2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to
remarry.
The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating the latter to remarry.
In this case, when Cipriano’s wife was naturalized as an American citizen, there was still a
valid marriage that has been celebrated between her and Cipriano. As fate would have it,
the naturalized alien wife subsequently obtained a valid divorce capacitating her to
remarry. Clearly, the twin requisites for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 are
both present in this case. Thus Cipriano, the "divorced" Filipino spouse, should be allowed
to remarry.
We are also unable to sustain the OSG’s theory that the proper remedy of the Filipino
spouse is to file either a petition for annulment or a petition for legal separation. Annulment
would be a long and tedious process, and in this particular case, not even feasible,
considering that the marriage of the parties appears to have all the badges of validity. On
the other hand, legal separation would not be a sufficient remedy for it would not sever the
marriage tie; hence, the legally separated Filipino spouse would still remain married to the
naturalized alien spouse.
However, we note that the records are bereft of competent evidence duly submitted by
respondent concerning the divorce decree and the naturalization of respondent’s wife. It is
settled rule that one who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and mere allegation is
not evidence.13
Accordingly, for his plea to prosper, respondent herein must prove his allegation that his
wife was naturalized as an American citizen. Likewise, before a foreign divorce decree can
be recognized by our own courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.14 Such foreign law must also
be proved as our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any other fact,
such laws must be alleged and proved.15 Furthermore, respondent must also show that
the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically required in Article 26.
Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated to enter reasonable doubt of bigamy and sentenced him to a prison term of seven (7) months
into another marriage. of prision correccionalas minimum to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as
maximum. Also assailed in this petition is the resolution3 of the appellate court, dated
September 25, 2000, denying Morigo’s motion for reconsideration.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the
Family Code (E.O. No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow
a Filipino citizen, who has been divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign The facts of this case, as found by the court a quo, are as follows:
citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However, considering that in the present
petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are unable to declare,
Appellant Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete were boardmates at the house of
based on respondent’s bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an American
Catalina Tortor at Tagbilaran City, Province of Bohol, for a period of four (4)
citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is
years (from 1974-1978).
now capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon
respondent’s submission of the aforecited evidence in his favor.
After school year 1977-78, Lucio Morigo and Lucia Barrete lost contact with
each other.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition by the Republic of the Philippines is GRANTED. The
assailed Decision dated May 15, 2002, and Resolution dated July 4, 2002, of the Regional
Trial Court of Molave, Zamboanga del Sur, Branch 23, are hereby SET ASIDE. In 1984, Lucio Morigo was surprised to receive a card from Lucia Barrete from
Singapore. The former replied and after an exchange of letters, they became
sweethearts.
No pronouncement as to costs.

In 1986, Lucia returned to the Philippines but left again for Canada to work
SO ORDERED.LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
there. While in Canada, they maintained constant communication.

Associate Justice
In 1990, Lucia came back to the Philippines and proposed to petition appellant
to join her in Canada. Both agreed to get married, thus they were married on
G.R. No. 145226             February 06, 2004 August 30, 1990 at the Iglesia de Filipina Nacional at Catagdaan, Pilar, Bohol.

LUCIO MORIGO y CACHO, petitioner,  On September 8, 1990, Lucia reported back to her work in Canada leaving
vs. appellant Lucio behind.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
On August 19, 1991, Lucia filed with the Ontario Court (General Division) a
petition for divorce against appellant which was granted by the court on January
17, 1992 and to take effect on February 17, 1992.

On October 4, 1992, appellant Lucio Morigo married Maria Jececha

DECISION
Lumbago4 at the Virgen sa Barangay Parish, Tagbilaran City, Bohol.

On September 21, 1993, accused filed a complaint for judicial declaration of

nullity of marriage in the Regional Trial Court of Bohol, docketed as Civil Case
No. 6020. The complaint seek (sic) among others, the declaration of nullity of
accused’s marriage with Lucia, on the ground that no marriage ceremony
QUISUMBING, J.:
actually took place.

This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse the decision1 dated October 21, 1999
On October 19, 1993, appellant was charged with Bigamy in an
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, which affirmed the judgment2 dated
Information5 filed by the City Prosecutor of Tagbilaran [City], with the Regional
August 5, 1996 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bohol, Branch 4, in Criminal Case No.
Trial Court of Bohol.6
8688. The trial court found herein petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond
The petitioner moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that the civil case WHEREFORE, finding no error in the appealed decision, the same is hereby
for judicial nullification of his marriage with Lucia posed a prejudicial question in the AFFIRMED in toto.
bigamy case. His motion was granted, but subsequently denied upon motion for
reconsideration by the prosecution. When arraigned in the bigamy case, which was
SO ORDERED.11
docketed as Criminal Case No. 8688, herein petitioner pleaded not guilty to the charge.
Trial thereafter ensued.
In affirming the assailed judgment of conviction, the appellate court stressed that the
subsequent declaration of nullity of Lucio’s marriage to Lucia in Civil Case No. 6020 could
On August 5, 1996, the RTC of Bohol handed down its judgment in Criminal Case No.
not acquit Lucio. The reason is that what is sought to be punished by Article 34912 of the
8688, as follows:
Revised Penal Code is the act of contracting a second marriage before the first marriage
had been dissolved. Hence, the CA held, the fact that the first marriage was void from the
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Court finds accused Lucio beginning is not a valid defense in a bigamy case.
Morigo y Cacho guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Bigamy and
sentences him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment ranging from Seven (7)
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the divorce decree obtained by Lucia from the
Months of Prision Correccional as minimum to Six (6) Years and One (1) Day
Canadian court could not be accorded validity in the Philippines, pursuant to Article 1513 of
of Prision Mayoras maximum.
the Civil Code and given the fact that it is contrary to public policy in this jurisdiction. Under
Article 1714 of the Civil Code, a declaration of public policy cannot be rendered ineffectual
SO ORDERED.7 by a judgment promulgated in a foreign jurisdiction.

In convicting herein petitioner, the trial court discounted petitioner’s claim that his first
marriage to Lucia was null and void ab initio. Following Domingo v. Court of Appeals,8 the
trial court ruled that want of a valid marriage ceremony is not a defense in a charge of
bigamy. The parties to a marriage should not be allowed to assume that their marriage is
void even if such be the fact but must first secure a judicial declaration of the nullity of their
marriage before they can be allowed to marry again.
Anent the Canadian divorce obtained by Lucia, the trial court cited Ramirez v.
Gmur,9 which held that the court of a country in which neither of the spouses is domiciled
and in which one or both spouses may resort merely for the purpose of obtaining a
divorce, has no jurisdiction to determine the matrimonial status of the parties. As such, a
divorce granted by said court is not entitled to recognition anywhere. Debunking Lucio’s
defense of good faith in contracting the second marriage, the trial court stressed that
following People v. Bitdu,10 everyone is presumed to know the law, and the fact that one
does not know that his act constitutes a violation of the law does not exempt him from the
consequences thereof.
Seasonably, petitioner filed an appeal with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. CR
No. 20700.
Meanwhile, on October 23, 1997, or while CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 was pending before the
appellate court, the trial court rendered a decision in Civil Case No. 6020 declaring the
marriage between Lucio and Lucia void ab initiosince no marriage ceremony actually took
place. No appeal was taken from this decision, which then became final and executory.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the appellate court’s decision, contending that the
doctrine in Mendiola v. People,15 allows mistake upon a difficult question of law (such as
the effect of a foreign divorce decree) to be a basis for good faith.
On September 25, 2000, the appellate court denied the motion for lack of
merit.16 However, the denial was by a split vote. The ponente of the appellate court’s
original decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, Justice Eugenio S. Labitoria, joined in the
opinion prepared by Justice Bernardo P. Abesamis. The dissent observed that as the first
marriage was validly declared void ab initio, then there was no first marriage to speak of.
Since the date of the nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage and since herein
petitioner was, in the eyes of the law, never married, he cannot be convicted beyond
reasonable doubt of bigamy.
The present petition raises the following issues for our resolution:
A.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE RULE THAT IN CRIMES PENALIZED UNDER THE REVISED
PENAL CODE, CRIMINAL INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE REQUISITE.
COROLLARILY, WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
FAILING TO APPRECIATE [THE] PETITIONER’S LACK OF CRIMINAL
INTENT WHEN HE CONTRACTED THE SECOND MARRIAGE.

B.
On October 21, 1999, the appellate court decided CA-G.R. CR No. 20700 as follows:
 WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT
THE RULING IN PEOPLE VS. BITDU (58 PHIL. 817) IS APPLICABLE TO THE
CASE AT BAR.
C.
WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FAILING TO
APPLY THE RULE THAT EACH AND EVERY CIRCUMSTANCE FAVORING
THE INNOCENCE OF THE ACCUSED MUST BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.17
To our mind, the primordial issue should be whether or not petitioner committed bigamy
and if so, whether his defense of good faith is valid.
The petitioner submits that he should not be faulted for relying in good faith upon the
divorce decree of the Ontario court. He highlights the fact that he contracted the second
marriage openly and publicly, which a person intent upon bigamy would not be doing. The
petitioner further argues that his lack of criminal intent is material to a conviction or
acquittal in the instant case. The crime of bigamy, just like other felonies punished under
the Revised Penal Code, is mala in se, and hence, good faith and lack of criminal intent
are allowed as a complete defense. He stresses that there is a difference between the
intent to commit the crime and the intent to perpetrate the act. Hence, it does not
necessarily follow that his intention to contract a second marriage is tantamount to an
intent to commit bigamy.
For the respondent, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) submits that good faith in the
instant case is a convenient but flimsy excuse. The Solicitor General relies upon our ruling
in Marbella-Bobis v. Bobis,18 which held that bigamy can be successfully prosecuted
provided all the elements concur, stressing that under Article 4019 of the Family Code, a
judicial declaration of nullity is a must before a party may re-marry. Whether or not the
petitioner was aware of said Article 40 is of no account as everyone is presumed to know
the law. The OSG counters that petitioner’s contention that he was in good faith because
he relied on the divorce decree of the Ontario court is negated by his act of filing Civil
Case No. 6020, seeking a judicial declaration of nullity of his marriage to Lucia.
Before we delve into petitioner’s defense of good faith and lack of criminal intent, we must
first determine whether all the elements of bigamy are present in this case. In Marbella-
Bobis v. Bobis,20 we laid down the elements of bigamy thus:
(1) the offender has been legally married;
(2) the first marriage has not been legally dissolved, or in case his or her spouse
is absent, the absent spouse has not been judicially declared presumptively
dead;
(3) he contracts a subsequent marriage; and
(4) the subsequent marriage would have been valid had it not been for the
existence of the first.
Applying the foregoing test to the instant case, we note that during the pendency of CA-
G.R. CR No. 20700, the RTC of Bohol Branch 1, handed down the following decision in
Civil Case No. 6020, to wit:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing
the annulment of the marriage entered into by petitioner Lucio Morigo and Lucia
Barrete on August 23, 1990 in Pilar, Bohol and further directing the Local Civil
Registrar of Pilar, Bohol to effect the cancellation of the marriage contract.
SO ORDERED.21
The trial court found that there was no actual marriage ceremony performed between
Lucio and Lucia by a solemnizing officer. Instead, what transpired was a mere signing of
the marriage contract by the two, without the presence of a solemnizing officer. The trial
court thus held that the marriage is void ab initio, in accordance with Articles 322 and 423 of
the Family Code. As the dissenting opinion in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, correctly puts it,
"This simply means that there was no marriage to begin with; and that such declaration of
nullity retroacts to the date of the first marriage. In other words, for all intents and
purposes, reckoned from the date of the declaration of the first marriage as void ab
initio to the date of the celebration of the first marriage, the accused was, under the eyes
of the law, never married."24 The records show that no appeal was taken from the decision
of the trial court in Civil Case No. 6020, hence, the decision had long become final and
executory.
The first element of bigamy as a crime requires that the accused must have been legally
married. But in this case, legally speaking, the petitioner was never married to Lucia
Barrete. Thus, there is no first marriage to speak of. Under the principle of retroactivity of a
marriage being declared void ab initio, the two were never married "from the beginning."
The contract of marriage is null; it bears no legal effect. Taking this argument to its logical
conclusion, for legal purposes, petitioner was not married to Lucia at the time he
contracted the marriage with Maria Jececha. The existence and the validity of the first
marriage being an essential element of the crime of bigamy, it is but logical that a
conviction for said offense cannot be sustained where there is no first marriage to speak
of. The petitioner, must, perforce be acquitted of the instant charge.
The present case is analogous to, but must be distinguished from Mercado v. Tan.25 In the
latter case, the judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage was likewise
obtained after the second marriage was already celebrated. We held therein that:
A judicial declaration of nullity of a previous marriage is necessary before a
subsequent one can be legally contracted. One who enters into a subsequent
marriage without first obtaining such judicial declaration is guilty of bigamy. This
principle applies even if the earlier union is characterized by statutes as "void."26
It bears stressing though that in Mercado, the first marriage was actually solemnized not
just once, but twice: first before a judge where a marriage certificate was duly issued and
then again six months later before a priest in religious rites. Ostensibly, at least, the first
marriage appeared to have transpired, although later declared void ab initio.
In the instant case, however, no marriage ceremony at all was performed by a duly
authorized solemnizing officer. Petitioner and Lucia Barrete merely signed a marriage
contract on their own. The mere private act of signing a marriage contract bears no
semblance to a valid marriage and thus, needs no judicial declaration of nullity. Such act
alone, without more, cannot be deemed to constitute an ostensibly valid marriage for
which petitioner might be held liable for bigamy unless he first secures a judicial
declaration of nullity before he contracts a subsequent marriage.
The law abhors an injustice and the Court is mandated to liberally construe a penal statute
in favor of an accused and weigh every circumstance in favor of the presumption of
innocence to ensure that justice is done. Under the circumstances of the present case, we
held that petitioner has not committed bigamy. Further, we also find that we need not tarry
on the issue of the validity of his defense of good faith or lack of criminal intent, which is
now moot and academic.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The assailed decision, dated October
21, 1999 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 20700, as well as the resolution of
the appellate court dated September 25, 2000, denying herein petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration, is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner Lucio Morigo y Cacho is
ACQUITTED from the charge of BIGAMY on the ground that his guilt has not been proven
with moral certainty.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, (Chairman), Austria-Martinez, Callejo, Sr., and Tinga, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 142820            June 20, 2003
WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,  The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil
vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA,
Presiding Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.
QUISUMBING, J.:
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly
committed by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in
matters that spring from a divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.
In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated September
30, 1999 of public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of
Makati Regional Trial Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of
nullity of marriage, and (b) the order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for
reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set aside the trial court’s order dismissing
Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issues relating to the property
settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.
Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private
respondent Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany.
Their marriage was subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros
Oriental.4 Out of their union were born Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18,
1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.
On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of
marriage before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997,
petitioner filed a motion to dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 dated
May 28, 1997.
On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an
order8 dated August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the
petition and remanded the case to the RTC.
Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg-Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.
The decree provides in part:
[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled
through Judge van Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral
proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:
Registrar of Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.
The parental custody for the children
Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981
Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987
is granted to the father.
 The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9
In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the
ground that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as
a decree of divorce had already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner
and private respondent.
On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to
dismiss. Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that
the case proceed for the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the
distribution of the properties between petitioner and private respondent.
On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by
the petitioner on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case
as the marital tie between petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D.
Rodriguez had already been severed by the decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of
First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16, 1997 and in view of the fact that
said decree of divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its order of July 14,
1999, through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family
Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.
On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside
her order dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of
the spouses as well as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said
order provides:
Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14,
1999 filed by petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and
considering that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was
included as an amendment thru Executive Order 227, to avoid the absurd
situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien spouse though the
latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had obtained a
divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering
further the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation
to Article 50 and 52 of the same Code, which include the dissolution of the
property relations of the spouses, and the support and custody of their children,
the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with respect to these
matterswhich may be ventilated in this Court.
SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied
by respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12
Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the
part of respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:
1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant
case is not allowed by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13
2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial
Reconsideration had recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by
her ex-husband in Hamburg, Germany.14
3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no
conjugal assets alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the
Divorce petition, and the custody of the children had already been awarded to
Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15
Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:
1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her
order dated September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July
14, 1999; and
2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she
assumed and retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from a German court.
On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is
completely inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16,
Rules of Civil Procedure, which provides:
Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the
action or claim, deny the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.
The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the
ground relied upon is not indubitable.
In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons
therefor. (Emphasis supplied.)
Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or
claim, denying the motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.
Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated
July 14, 1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent’s
motion for reconsideration.
Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure, which provides:
 Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may
set aside the judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as
may be just, or may deny the motion. If the court finds that excessive damages
have been awarded or that the judgment or final order is contrary to the
evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order accordingly.
Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under
this Rule appear to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than
all of the matters in controversy, or only one, or less than all, of the parties to
it, the court may order a new trial or grant reconsideration as to such issues if
severable without interfering with the judgment or final order upon the rest.
(Emphasis supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a
case that has not yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion
for reconsideration within the reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14,
1999 can still be modified. Moreover, in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the
court could modify or alter a judgment even after the same has become executory
whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and inequitable, as where
certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or alteration
transpired after the judgment has become final and executory17 and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.18 In our
view, there are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment
has not yet attained finality.
Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of
discretion when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that
petitioner has already obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of
Hamburg, Germany.
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we
consistently held that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner.
Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,22 where this Court specifically
recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German citizen in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.
In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997
has not been challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental
custody, even the trial court recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby
endowing private respondent the capacity to remarry. Thus, the present controversy
mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children, Carolynne and Alexandra
Kristine, to petitioner.
As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are
recognizable in our jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and
support of the children, must still be determined by our courts.23Before our courts can give
the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment, such as the award of custody to petitioner
by the German court, it must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been
given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the
Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:
SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of
a foreign country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:
(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon
the title to the thing;
(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive
evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title; but the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of
jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law
or fact.
It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in
order for the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction,
our Rules of Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as
distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign judgment merely constitutes prima
facieevidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the
contrary.24
In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to
challenge the judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that
judgment as res judicata with regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of
their two children. The proceedings in the German court were summary. As to what was
the extent of private respondent’s participation in the proceedings in the German court, the
records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that neither has she commented
on the proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services Office.26 Unlike
petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to
assist her in said proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to
petitioner by virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple
lived separately for three years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree
did not touch on the issue as to who the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that
private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the children, the trial court was correct in
setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental custody, care, support and
education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance with the
provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the
paramount consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. 28
On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the
bounds of her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property
relations between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has
admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26,
1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent
have not acquired any conjugal or community property nor have they incurred any debts
during their marriage."29 Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic is the rule
that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof.30Given the factual
admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for,
respondent judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no
longer deemed in controversy.
In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the
custody of the two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent.
Private respondent erred, however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property
relations of the parties, which is not at issue.
WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on
September 30, 1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We
hereby declare that the trial court has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to
who has parental custody, including the care, support and education of the children,
namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records of this case be
remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
Austria-Martinez, J., on official leave
G.R. No. 138322           October 2, 2001
GRACE J. GARCIA, a.k.a. GRACE J. GARCIA-RECIO, petitioner, 
vs.
REDERICK A. RECIO, respondents.
PANGANIBAN, J.:
A divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided
such decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. However, the divorce
decree and the governing personal law of the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must
be proven. Our courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and judgment; hence, like
any other facts, both the divorce decree and the national law of the alien must be alleged
and proven according to our law on evidence.
The Case
Before us is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
the January 7, 1999 Decision1 and the March 24, 1999 Order2 of the Regional Trial Court
of Cabanatuan City, Branch 28, in Civil Case No. 3026-AF. The assailed Decision
disposed as follows:
"WHEREFORE, this Court declares the marriage between Grace J. Garcia and
Rederick A. Recio solemnized on January 12, 1994 at Cabanatuan City as
dissolved and both parties can now remarry under existing and applicable laws
to any and/or both parties."3
The assailed Order denied reconsideration of the above-quoted Decision.
The Facts
Rederick A. Recio, a Filipino, was married to Editha Samson, an Australian citizen, in
Malabon, Rizal, on March 1, 1987.4 They lived together as husband and wife in Australia.
On May 18, 1989,5 a decree of divorce, purportedly dissolving the marriage, was issued by
an Australian family court.
On June 26, 1992, respondent became an Australian citizen, as shown by a "Certificate of
Australian Citizenship" issued by the Australian government.6 Petitioner – a Filipina – and
respondent were married on January 12, 1994 in Our Lady of Perpetual Help Church in
Cabanatuan City.7 In their application for a marriage license, respondent was declared as
"single" and "Filipino."8
Starting October 22, 1995, petitioner and respondent lived separately without prior judicial
dissolution of their marriage. While the two were still in Australia, their conjugal assets
were divided on May 16, 1996, in accordance with their Statutory Declarations secured in
Australia.9
On March 3, 1998, petitioner filed a Complaint for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage10 in the
court a quo, on the ground of bigamy – respondent allegedly had a prior subsisting
marriage at the time he married her on January 12, 1994. She claimed that she learned of
respondent's marriage to Editha Samson only in November, 1997.
In his Answer, respondent averred that, as far back as 1993, he had revealed to petitioner
his prior marriage and its subsequent dissolution.11 He contended that his first marriage to
an Australian citizen had been validly dissolved by a divorce decree obtained in Australian
in 1989;12 thus, he was legally capacitated to marry petitioner in 1994.1âwphi1.nêt
On July 7, 1998 – or about five years after the couple's wedding and while the suit for the
declaration of nullity was pending – respondent was able to secure a divorce decree from
a family court in Sydney, Australia because the "marriage ha[d] irretrievably broken
down."13
Respondent prayed in his Answer that the Complained be dismissed on the ground that it
stated no cause of action.14 The Office of the Solicitor General agreed with
respondent.15 The court marked and admitted the documentary evidence of both
parties.16 After they submitted their respective memoranda, the case was submitted for
resolution.17
Thereafter, the trial court rendered the assailed Decision and Order.
Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court declared the marriage dissolved on the ground that the divorce issued in
Australia was valid and recognized in the Philippines. It deemed the marriage ended, but
not on the basis of any defect in an essential element of the marriage; that
is, respondent's alleged lack of legal capacity to remarry. Rather, it based its Decision on
the divorce decree obtained by respondent. The Australian divorce had ended the
marriage; thus, there was no more martial union to nullify or annual.
Hence, this Petition.18
Issues
Petitioner submits the following issues for our consideration:
"I
The trial court gravely erred in finding that the divorce decree obtained in
Australia by the respondent ipso facto terminated his first marriage to Editha
Samson thereby capacitating him to contract a second marriage with the
petitioner.
"2
The failure of the respondent, who is now a naturalized Australian, to present a
certificate of legal capacity to marry constitutes absence of a substantial
requisite voiding the petitioner' marriage to the respondent.
"3
The trial court seriously erred in the application of Art. 26 of the Family Code in
this case.
"4
The trial court patently and grievously erred in disregarding Arts. 11, 13, 21, 35,
40, 52 and 53 of the Family Code as the applicable provisions in this case.
"5
The trial court gravely erred in pronouncing that the divorce gravely erred in
pronouncing that the divorce decree obtained by the respondent in
Australia ipso facto capacitated the parties to remarry, without first securing a
recognition of the judgment granting the divorce decree before our courts."19
The Petition raises five issues, but for purposes of this Decision, we shall concentrate on
two pivotal ones: (1) whether the divorce between respondent and Editha Samson was
proven, and (2) whether respondent was proven to be legally capacitated to marry
petitioner. Because of our ruling on these two, there is no more necessity to take up the
rest.
The Court's Ruling
The Petition is partly meritorious.
First Issue:
Proving the Divorce Between Respondent and Editha Samson
Petitioner assails the trial court's recognition of the divorce between respondent and
Editha Samson. Citing Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,20 petitioner argues that the divorce
decree, like any other foreign judgment, may be given recognition in this jurisdiction only
upon proof of the existence of (1) the foreign law allowing absolute divorce and (2) the
alleged divorce decree itself. She adds that respondent miserably failed to establish these
elements.
Petitioner adds that, based on the first paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,
marriages solemnized abroad are governed by the law of the place where they were
celebrated (the lex loci celebrationist). In effect, the Code requires the presentation of the
foreign law to show the conformity of the marriage in question to the legal requirements of
the place where the marriage was performed.
At the outset, we lay the following basic legal principles as the take-off points for our
discussion. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot
grant it.21 A marriage between two Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by a divorce
obtained abroad, because of Articles 1522 and 1723 of the Civil Code.24 In mixed marriages
involving a Filipino and a foreigner, Article 2625 of the Family Code allows the former to
contract a subsequent marriage in case the divorce is "validly obtained abroad by the alien
spouse capacitating him or her to remarry."26 A divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who
are both aliens, may be recognized in the Philippines, provided it is consistent with their
respective national laws.27
A comparison between marriage and divorce, as far as pleading and proof are concerned,
can be made. Van Dorn v. Romillo Jr. decrees that "aliens may obtain divorces abroad,
which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their
national law."28 Therefore, before a foreign divorce decree can be recognized by our
courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact and demonstrate its
conformity to the foreign law allowing it.29 Presentation solely of the divorce decree is
insufficient.
Divorce as a Question of Fact
Petitioner insists that before a divorce decree can be admitted in evidence, it must first
comply with the registration requirements under Articles 11, 13 and 52 of the Family Code.
These articles read as follows:
"ART. 11. Where a marriage license is required, each of the contracting parties
shall file separately a sworn application for such license with the proper local
civil registrar which shall specify the following:
x x x     x x x     x x x
"(5) If previously married, how, when and where the previous marriage was
dissolved or annulled;
x x x      x x x      x x x
"ART. 13. In case either of the contracting parties has been previously married,
the applicant shall be required to furnish, instead of the birth of baptismal
certificate required in the last preceding article, the death certificate of the
deceased spouse or the judicial decree of annulment or declaration of nullity of
his or her previous marriage. x x x.
"ART. 52. The judgment of annulment or of absolute nullity of the marriage, the
partition and distribution of the properties of the spouses, and the delivery of the
children's presumptive legitimes shall be recorded in the appropriate civil
registry and registries of property; otherwise, the same shall not affect their
persons."
Respondent, on the other hand, argues that the Australian divorce decree is a public
document – a written official act of an Australian family court. Therefore, it requires no
further proof of its authenticity and due execution.
Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive
evidentiary value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence.30 A
divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence
of a judgment is the judgment itself.31 The decree purports to be a written act or record of
an act of an officially body or tribunal of a foreign country.32
Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication
or (2) a copy thereof attested33 by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the
record is not kept in the Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate
issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service
stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the
seal of his office.34
The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic
one issued by an Australian family court.35 However, appearance is not sufficient;
compliance with the aforemetioned rules on evidence must be demonstrated.
Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was
submitted in evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to
the fact that it had not been registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan
City.36 The trial court ruled that it was admissible, subject to petitioner's
qualification.37Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the judge.
Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a
written act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.38
Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary;
respondent was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian
citizenship in 1992.39 Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him
with the political and civil rights belonging to a citizen.40 Naturalized citizens, freed from the
protective cloak of their former states, don the attires of their adoptive countries. By
becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to the Philippines and
the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law
Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner,
because she is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that
petitioner was satisfied with the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the
marital laws of Australia, because she had lived and worked in that country for quite a long
time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly known by Philippine courts: thus,
judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of sound discretion.
We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with "the party who alleges the existence
of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action."41 In civil cases,
plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material allegations of the complaint when those
are denied by the answer; and defendants have the burden of proving the material
allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.42 Since the divorce was a
defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian law validating
it falls squarely upon him.
It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.43 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are
not among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial
function.44 The power of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every
reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.
Second Issue:
Respondent's Legal Capacity to Remarry
Petitioner contends that, in view of the insufficient proof of the divorce, respondent was
legally incapacitated to marry her in 1994.
Hence, she concludes that their marriage was void ab initio.
Respondent replies that the Australian divorce decree, which was validly admitted in
evidence, adequately established his legal capacity to marry under Australian law.
Respondent's contention is untenable. In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal
dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after marriage. But divorces are of different
types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii and (2) limited
divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the second
suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.45 There is no showing in the case at bar
which type of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree – a conditional or
provisional judgment of divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and
board, although an absolute divorce may follow after the lapse of the prescribed period
during which no reconciliation is effected.46
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and
practices, still restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be
limited by statute; thus, the guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of
adultery may be prohibited from remarrying again. The court may allow a remarriage only
after proof of good behavior.47
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes
absolute (unless the other party has died) commits the offence of bigamy."48
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have
been restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his
national law. Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously
assumed that the Australian divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry
despite the paucity of evidence on this matter.
We also reject the claim of respondent that the divorce decree raises a disputable
presumption or presumptive evidence as to his civil status based on Section 48, Rule
3949 of the Rules of Court, for the simple reason that no proof has been presented on the
legal effects of the divorce decree obtained under Australian laws.
Significance of the Certificate of Legal Capacity
Petitioner argues that the certificate of legal capacity required by Article 21 of the Family
Code was not submitted together with the application for a marriage license. According to
her, its absence is proof that respondent did not have legal capacity to remarry.
We clarify. To repeat, the legal capacity to contract marriage is determined by the national
law of the party concerned. The certificate mentioned in Article 21 of the Family Code
would have been sufficient to establish the legal capacity of respondent, had he duly
presented it in court. A duly authenticated and admitted certificate is prima facie evidence
of legal capacity to marry on the part of the alien applicant for a marriage license.50
As it is, however, there is absolutely no evidence that proves respondent's legal capacity
to marry petitioner. A review of the records before this Court shows that only the following
exhibits were presented before the lower court: (1) for petitioner: (a) Exhibit "A" –
Complaint;51 (b) Exhibit "B" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recto (Filipino-
Australian) and Grace J. Garcia (Filipino) on January 12, 1994 in Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija;52 (c) Exhibit "C" – Certificate of Marriage Between Rederick A. Recio (Filipino) and
Editha D. Samson (Australian) on March 1, 1987 in Malabon, Metro Manila;53 (d) Exhibit
"D" – Office of the City Registrar of Cabanatuan City Certification that no information of
annulment between Rederick A. Recto and Editha D. Samson was in its records;54 and (e)
Exhibit "E" – Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;55 (2) for
respondent: (Exhibit "1" – Amended Answer;56 (b) Exhibit "S" – Family Law Act 1975
Decree Nisi of Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia;57 (c) Exhibit "3" –
Certificate of Australian Citizenship of Rederick A. Recto;58 (d) Exhibit "4" – Decree Nisi of
Dissolution of Marriage in the Family Court of Australia Certificate;59 and Exhibit "5" –
Statutory Declaration of the Legal Separation Between Rederick A. Recto and Grace J.
Garcia Recio since October 22, 1995.60
Based on the above records, we cannot conclude that respondent, who was then a
naturalized Australian citizen, was legally capacitated to marry petitioner on January 12,
1994. We agree with petitioner's contention that the court a quo erred in finding that the
divorce decree ipso facto clothed respondent with the legal capacity to remarry without
requiring him to adduce sufficient evidence to show the Australian personal law governing
his status; or at the very least, to prove his legal capacity to contract the second marriage.
Neither can we grant petitioner's prayer to declare her marriage to respondent null and
void on the ground of bigamy. After all, it may turn out that under Australian law, he was
really capacitated to marry petitioner as a direct result of the divorce decree. Hence, we
believe that the most judicious course is to remand this case to the trial court to receive
evidence, if any, which show petitioner's legal capacity to marry petitioner. Failing in that,
then the court a quo may declare a nullity of the parties' marriage on the ground of
bigamy, there being already in evidence two existing marriage certificates, which were
both obtained in the Philippines, one in Malabon, Metro Manila dated March 1, 1987 and
the other, in Cabanatuan City dated January 12, 1994.
WHEREFORE, in the interest of orderly procedure and substantial justice,
we REMAND the case to the court a quofor the purpose of receiving evidence which
conclusively show respondent's legal capacity to marry petitioner; and failing in that, of
declaring the parties' marriage void on the ground of bigamy, as above discussed. No
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Melo, Puno, Vitug, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 80116 June 30, 1989
IMELDA MANALAYSAY PILAPIL, petitioner,  January 8, 1986, directing the filing of two complaints for adultery against the
vs.
HON. CORONA IBAY-SOMERA, in her capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXVI; HON. LUIS C. VICTOR, in his capacity as the City
Fiscal of Manila; and ERICH EKKEHARD GEILING, respondents.
REGALADO, J.:
An ill-starred marriage of a Filipina and a foreigner which ended in a foreign absolute
divorce, only to be followed by a criminal infidelity suit of the latter against the former,
provides Us the opportunity to lay down a decisional rule on what hitherto appears to be
an unresolved jurisdictional question.
On September 7, 1979, petitioner Imelda Manalaysay Pilapil, a Filipino citizen, and private
respondent Erich Ekkehard Geiling, a German national, were married before the Registrar
of Births, Marriages and Deaths at Friedensweiler in the Federal Republic of Germany.
The marriage started auspiciously enough, and the couple lived together for some time in
Malate, Manila where their only child, Isabella Pilapil Geiling, was born on April 20, 1980. 1
Thereafter, marital discord set in, with mutual recriminations between the spouses,
followed by a separation de facto between them.
After about three and a half years of marriage, such connubial disharmony eventuated in
private respondent initiating a divorce proceeding against petitioner in Germany before the
Schoneberg Local Court in January, 1983. He claimed that there was failure of their
marriage and that they had been living apart since April, 1982. 2
Petitioner, on the other hand, filed an action for legal separation, support and separation of
property before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch XXXII, on January 23, 1983
where the same is still pending as Civil Case No. 83-15866. 3
On January 15, 1986, Division 20 of the Schoneberg Local Court, Federal Republic of
Germany, promulgated a decree of divorce on the ground of failure of marriage of the
spouses. The custody of the child was granted to petitioner. The records show that under
German law said court was locally and internationally competent for the divorce
proceeding and that the dissolution of said marriage was legally founded on and
authorized by the applicable law of that foreign jurisdiction. 4
On June 27, 1986, or more than five months after the issuance of the divorce decree,
private respondent filed two complaints for adultery before the City Fiscal of Manila
alleging that, while still married to said respondent, petitioner "had an affair with a certain
William Chia as early as 1982 and with yet another man named Jesus Chua sometime in
1983". Assistant Fiscal Jacinto A. de los Reyes, Jr., after the corresponding investigation,
recommended the dismissal of the cases on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence. 5 However, upon review, the respondent city fiscal approved a resolution, dated
petitioner. 6 The complaints were accordingly filed and were eventually raffled to two
branches of the Regional Trial Court of Manila. The case entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and William Chia", docketed as Criminal Case No. 87-52435,
was assigned to Branch XXVI presided by the respondent judge; while the other
case, "People of the Philippines vs. Imelda Pilapil and James Chua", docketed as Criminal
Case No. 87-52434 went to the sala of Judge Leonardo Cruz, Branch XXV, of the same
court. 7
On March 14, 1987, petitioner filed a petition with the Secretary of Justice asking that the
aforesaid resolution of respondent fiscal be set aside and the cases against her be
dismissed. 8 A similar petition was filed by James Chua, her co-accused in Criminal Case
No. 87-52434. The Secretary of Justice, through the Chief State Prosecutor, gave due
course to both petitions and directed the respondent city fiscal to inform the Department of
Justice "if the accused have already been arraigned and if not yet arraigned, to move to
defer further proceedings" and to elevate the entire records of both cases to his office for
review. 9
Petitioner thereafter filed a motion in both criminal cases to defer her arraignment and to
suspend further proceedings thereon. 10 As a consequence, Judge Leonardo Cruz
suspended proceedings in Criminal Case No. 87-52434. On the other hand, respondent
judge merely reset the date of the arraignment in Criminal Case No. 87-52435 to April 6,
1987. Before such scheduled date, petitioner moved for the cancellation of the
arraignment and for the suspension of proceedings in said Criminal Case No. 87-52435
until after the resolution of the petition for review then pending before the Secretary of
Justice. 11 A motion to quash was also filed in the same case on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction, 12 which motion was denied by the respondent judge in an order dated
September 8, 1987. The same order also directed the arraignment of both accused
therein, that is, petitioner and William Chia. The latter entered a plea of not guilty while the
petitioner refused to be arraigned. Such refusal of the petitioner being considered by
respondent judge as direct contempt, she and her counsel were fined and the former was
ordered detained until she submitted herself for arraignment. 13 Later, private respondent
entered a plea of not guilty. 14
On October 27, 1987, petitioner filed this special civil action for certiorari and prohibition,
with a prayer for a temporary restraining order, seeking the annulment of the order of the
lower court denying her motion to quash. The petition is anchored on the main ground that
the court is without jurisdiction "to try and decide the charge of adultery, which is a private
offense that cannot be prosecuted de officio (sic), since the purported complainant, a
foreigner, does not qualify as an offended spouse having obtained a final divorce decree
under his national law prior to his filing the criminal complaint." 15
On October 21, 1987, this Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the
respondents from implementing the aforesaid order of September 8, 1987 and from further
proceeding with Criminal Case No. 87-52435. Subsequently, on March 23, 1988 Secretary
of Justice Sedfrey A. Ordoñez acted on the aforesaid petitions for review and, upholding
petitioner's ratiocinations, issued a resolution directing the respondent city fiscal to move
for the dismissal of the complaints against the petitioner. 16
We find this petition meritorious. The writs prayed for shall accordingly issue.
Under Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code, 17 the crime of adultery, as well as four other
crimes against chastity, cannot be prosecuted except upon a sworn written complaint filed
by the offended spouse. It has long since been established, with unwavering consistency,
that compliance with this rule is a jurisdictional, and not merely a formal,
requirement. 18 While in point of strict law the jurisdiction of the court over the offense is
vested in it by the Judiciary Law, the requirement for a sworn written complaint is just as
jurisdictional a mandate since it is that complaint which starts the prosecutory
proceeding 19 and without which the court cannot exercise its jurisdiction to try the case.
Now, the law specifically provides that in prosecutions for adultery and concubinage the
person who can legally file the complaint should be the offended spouse, and nobody
else. Unlike the offenses of seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, no
provision is made for the prosecution of the crimes of adultery and concubinage by the
parents, grandparents or guardian of the offended party. The so-called exclusive and
successive rule in the prosecution of the first four offenses above mentioned do not apply
to adultery and concubinage. It is significant that while the State, as parens patriae, was
added and vested by the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure with the power to initiate the
criminal action for a deceased or incapacitated victim in the aforesaid offenses of
seduction, abduction, rape and acts of lasciviousness, in default of her parents,
grandparents or guardian, such amendment did not include the crimes of adultery and
concubinage. In other words, only the offended spouse, and no other, is authorized by law
to initiate the action therefor.
Corollary to such exclusive grant of power to the offended spouse to institute the action, it
necessarily follows that such initiator must have the status, capacity or legal
representation to do so at the time of the filing of the criminal action. This is a familiar and
express rule in civil actions; in fact, lack of legal capacity to sue, as a ground for a motion
to dismiss in civil cases, is determined as of the filing of the complaint or petition.
The absence of an equivalent explicit rule in the prosecution of criminal cases does not
mean that the same requirement and rationale would not apply. Understandably, it may
not have been found necessary since criminal actions are generally and fundamentally
commenced by the State, through the People of the Philippines, the offended party being
merely the complaining witness therein. However, in the so-called "private crimes" or
those which cannot be prosecuted de oficio, and the present prosecution for adultery is of
such genre, the offended spouse assumes a more predominant role since the right to
commence the action, or to refrain therefrom, is a matter exclusively within his power and
option.
This policy was adopted out of consideration for the aggrieved party who might prefer to
suffer the outrage in silence rather than go through the scandal of a public trial. 20 Hence,
as cogently argued by petitioner, Article 344 of the Revised Penal Code thus presupposes
that the marital relationship is still subsisting at the time of the institution of the criminal
action for, adultery. This is a logical consequence since the raison d'etre of said provision
of law would be absent where the supposed offended party had ceased to be the spouse
of the alleged offender at the time of the filing of the criminal case. 21
In these cases, therefore, it is indispensable that the status and capacity of the
complainant to commence the action be definitely established and, as already
demonstrated, such status or capacity must indubitably exist as of the time he initiates the
action. It would be absurd if his capacity to bring the action would be determined by his
status beforeor subsequent to the commencement thereof, where such capacity or status
existed prior to but ceased before, or was acquired subsequent to but did not exist at the
time of, the institution of the case. We would thereby have the anomalous spectacle of a
party bringing suit at the very time when he is without the legal capacity to do so.
To repeat, there does not appear to be any local precedential jurisprudence on the specific
issue as to when precisely the status of a complainant as an offended spouse must exist
where a criminal prosecution can be commenced only by one who in law can be
categorized as possessed of such status. Stated differently and with reference to the
present case, the inquiry ;would be whether it is necessary in the commencement of a
criminal action for adultery that the marital bonds between the complainant and the
accused be unsevered and existing at the time of the institution of the action by the former
against the latter.
American jurisprudence, on cases involving statutes in that jurisdiction which are in pari
materia with ours, yields the rule that after a divorce has been decreed, the innocent
spouse no longer has the right to institute proceedings against the offenders where the
statute provides that the innocent spouse shall have the exclusive right to institute a
prosecution for adultery. Where, however, proceedings have been properly commenced, a
divorce subsequently granted can have no legal effect on the prosecution of the criminal
proceedings to a conclusion. 22
In the cited Loftus case, the Supreme Court of Iowa held that —
'No prosecution for adultery can be commenced except on the
complaint of the husband or wife.' Section 4932, Code. Though Loftus
was husband of defendant when the offense is said to have been
committed, he had ceased to be such when the prosecution was
begun; and appellant insists that his status was not such as to entitle
him to make the complaint. We have repeatedly said that the offense
is against the unoffending spouse, as well as the state, in explaining
the reason for this provision in the statute; and we are of the opinion
that the unoffending spouse must be such when the prosecution is
commenced. (Emphasis supplied.)
We see no reason why the same doctrinal rule should not apply in this case and in our
jurisdiction, considering our statutory law and jural policy on the matter. We are convinced
that in cases of such nature, the status of the complainant vis-a-vis the accused must be
determined as of the time the complaint was filed. Thus, the person who initiates the
adultery case must be an offended spouse, and by this is meant that he is still married to
the accused spouse, at the time of the filing of the complaint.
In the present case, the fact that private respondent obtained a valid divorce in his
country, the Federal Republic of Germany, is admitted. Said divorce and its legal effects
may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as private respondent is concerned 23 in view
of the nationality principle in our civil law on the matter of status of persons.
Thus, in the recent case of Van Dorn vs. Romillo, Jr., et al., 24 after a divorce was granted
by a United States court between Alice Van Dornja Filipina, and her American husband,
the latter filed a civil case in a trial court here alleging that her business concern was
conjugal property and praying that she be ordered to render an accounting and that the
plaintiff be granted the right to manage the business. Rejecting his pretensions, this Court
perspicuously demonstrated the error of such stance, thus:
There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in
any of the States of the United States. The decree is binding on
private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. ...
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15
of the Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy
against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain
divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines,
provided they are valid according to their national law. ...
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the
husband of petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case
below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. ... 25
Under the same considerations and rationale, private respondent, being no longer the
husband of petitioner, had no legal standing to commence the adultery case under the
imposture that he was the offended spouse at the time he filed suit.
The allegation of private respondent that he could not have brought this case before the
decree of divorce for lack of knowledge, even if true, is of no legal significance or
consequence in this case. When said respondent initiated the divorce proceeding, he
obviously knew that there would no longer be a family nor marriage vows to protect once a
dissolution of the marriage is decreed. Neither would there be a danger of introducing
spurious heirs into the family, which is said to be one of the reasons for the particular
formulation of our law on adultery, 26 since there would thenceforth be no spousal
relationship to speak of. The severance of the marital bond had the effect of dissociating
the former spouses from each other, hence the actuations of one would not affect or cast
obloquy on the other.
The aforecited case of United States vs. Mata cannot be successfully relied upon by
private respondent. In applying Article 433 of the old Penal Code, substantially the same
as Article 333 of the Revised Penal Code, which punished adultery "although the marriage
be afterwards declared void", the Court merely stated that "the lawmakers intended to
declare adulterous the infidelity of a married woman to her marital vows, even though it
should be made to appear that she is entitled to have her marriage contract declared null
and void, until and unless she actually secures a formal judicial declaration to that effect".
Definitely, it cannot be logically inferred therefrom that the complaint can still be filed after
the declaration of nullity because such declaration that the marriage is void ab initio is
equivalent to stating that it never existed. There being no marriage from the beginning,
any complaint for adultery filed after said declaration of nullity would no longer have a leg
to stand on. Moreover, what was consequently contemplated and within the purview of the
decision in said case is the situation where the criminal action for adultery was
filed beforethe termination of the marriage by a judicial declaration of its nullity ab initio.
The same rule and requisite would necessarily apply where the termination of the
marriage was effected, as in this case, by a valid foreign divorce.
Private respondent's invocation of Donio-Teves, et al. vs. Vamenta, hereinbefore
cited, 27 must suffer the same fate of inapplicability. A cursory reading of said case reveals
that the offended spouse therein had duly and seasonably filed a complaint for adultery,
although an issue was raised as to its sufficiency but which was resolved in favor of the
complainant. Said case did not involve a factual situation akin to the one at bar or any
issue determinative of the controversy herein.
WHEREFORE, the questioned order denying petitioner's motion to quash is SET
ASIDE and another one entered DISMISSING the complaint in Criminal Case No. 87-
52435 for lack of jurisdiction. The temporary restraining order issued in this case on
October 21, 1987 is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Melencio-Herrera, Padilla and Sarmiento, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. L-68470 October 8, 1985
ALICE REYES VAN DORN, petitioner, 
vs.
HON. MANUEL V. ROMILLO, JR., as Presiding Judge of Branch CX, Regional Trial
Court of the National Capital Region Pasay City and RICHARD UPTON respondents.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:\
In this Petition for certiorari and Prohibition, petitioner Alice Reyes Van Dorn seeks to set
aside the Orders, dated September 15, 1983 and August 3, 1984, in Civil Case No. 1075-
P, issued by respondent Judge, which denied her Motion to Dismiss said case, and her
Motion for Reconsideration of the Dismissal Order, respectively.
The basic background facts are that petitioner is a citizen of the Philippines while private
respondent is a citizen of the United States; that they were married in Hongkong in 1972;
that, after the marriage, they established their residence in the Philippines; that they begot
two children born on April 4, 1973 and December 18, 1975, respectively; that the parties
were divorced in Nevada, United States, in 1982; and that petitioner has re-married also in
Nevada, this time to Theodore Van Dorn.
Dated June 8, 1983, private respondent filed suit against petitioner in Civil Case No. 1075-
P of the Regional Trial Court, Branch CXV, in Pasay City, stating that petitioner's business
in Ermita, Manila, (the Galleon Shop, for short), is conjugal property of the parties, and
asking that petitioner be ordered to render an accounting of that business, and that private
respondent be declared with right to manage the conjugal property. Petitioner moved to
dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action is barred by previous judgment in
the divorce proceedings before the Nevada Court wherein respondent had acknowledged
that he and petitioner had "no community property" as of June 11, 1982. The Court below
denied the Motion to Dismiss in the mentioned case on the ground that the property
involved is located in the Philippines so that the Divorce Decree has no bearing in the
case. The denial is now the subject of this certiorari proceeding.
Generally, the denial of a Motion to Dismiss in a civil case is interlocutory and is not
subject to appeal. certiorari and Prohibition are neither the remedies to question the
propriety of an interlocutory order of the trial Court. However, when a grave abuse of
discretion was patently committed, or the lower Court acted capriciously and whimsically,
then it devolves upon this Court in a certiorari proceeding to exercise its supervisory
authority and to correct the error committed which, in such a case, is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. 1 Prohibition would then lie since it would be useless and a waste of time to go
ahead with the proceedings. 2 Weconsider the petition filed in this case within the
exception, and we have given it due course.
For resolution is the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their alleged conjugal
property in the Philippines.
Petitioner contends that respondent is estopped from laying claim on the alleged conjugal
property because of the representation he made in the divorce proceedings before the
American Court that they had no community of property; that the Galleon Shop was not
established through conjugal funds, and that respondent's claim is barred by prior
judgment.
For his part, respondent avers that the Divorce Decree issued by the Nevada Court cannot
prevail over the prohibitive laws of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the
acts and declaration of a foreign Court cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public
policy, divest Philippine Courts of jurisdiction to entertain matters within its jurisdiction.
For the resolution of this case, it is not necessary to determine whether the property
relations between petitioner and private respondent, after their marriage, were upon
absolute or relative community property, upon complete separation of property, or upon
any other regime. The pivotal fact in this case is the Nevada divorce of the parties.
The Nevada District Court, which decreed the divorce, had obtained jurisdiction over
petitioner who appeared in person before the Court during the trial of the case. It also
obtained jurisdiction over private respondent who, giving his address as No. 381 Bush
Street, San Francisco, California, authorized his attorneys in the divorce case, Karp &
Gradt Ltd., to agree to the divorce on the ground of incompatibility in the understanding
that there were neither community property nor community obligations. 3 As explicitly
stated in the Power of Attorney he executed in favor of the law firm of KARP & GRAD
LTD., 336 W. Liberty, Reno, Nevada, to represent him in the divorce proceedings:
xxx xxx xxx
You are hereby authorized to accept service of Summons, to file an
Answer, appear on my behalf and do an things necessary and proper
to represent me, without further contesting, subject to the following:
1. That my spouse seeks a divorce on the ground of incompatibility.
2. That there is no community of property to be adjudicated by the
Court.
3. 'I'hat there are no community obligations to be adjudicated by the
court.
 xxx xxx xxx 4 SO ORDERED.

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of Teehankee (Chairman), Plana, Relova, Gutierrez, Jr., De la Fuente and Patajo, JJ.,
the United States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. concur.
For instance, private respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the
Union. What he is contending in this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this
jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local law and public policy.

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil
Code, 5 only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the
same being considered contrary to our concept of public police and morality. However,
aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be recognized in the Philippines, provided
they are valid according to their national law. 6 In this case, the divorce in Nevada released
private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law, under
which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794, 799:

The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of

matrimony by a court of competent jurisdiction are to change the
existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free
them both from the bond. The marriage tie when thus severed as to
one party, ceases to bind either. A husband without a wife, or a wife
without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides, in
the nature of a penalty. that the guilty party shall not marry again, that
party, as well as the other, is still absolutely freed from the bond of the
former marriage.

Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of
petitioner. He would have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband
entitled to exercise control over conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his
own country's Court, which validly exercised jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he
does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own representation before said Court from
asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be
considered still married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under
Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to
live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to private respondent.
The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal
property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice
are to be served.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is granted, and respondent Judge is hereby ordered to dismiss
the Complaint filed in Civil Case No. 1075-P of his Court.

Without costs.