1

BASIC LEGAL ETHICS - CASES

CASES READ DIGESTED FULLY
UNDERSTAND
1 Presidential Commission on Good Government v.
Sandiganbayan 455 SCRA 526
2 Director of Religious Affarirs v. Bayot 74 PHIL 579
3 Del Mundo v. Capistrano, 699 SCRA 462
4 Tejana v. Baterina 748 SCRA 259 (2015)
5 Ledesma v. Climaco G.R. No. 12815 (June 28, 1974)
6 Luna v. Galarrita 762 SCRA 1 (2015)
7 Villegas v. Legaspi 113 SCRA 39
8 Cui v. Cui 11 SCRA 755
9 Alawi v. Alauya 268 SCRA 629
10 Enriquez v. Jimenez 107 PHIL 932
11 Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava 105 PHIL
173
12 Pangan v. Ramos 93 SCRA 87
13 Salcedo v. Hernandez G.R. No. 42992, August 8, 1935
14 Blanza v, Arcangel, AC No. 492, September 5, 1967
15 Ui v. Bonifacio 333 SCRA 38
16 Deles v. Aragona, A.M. No. 27 SCRA 633
17 Zoreta v. Simpliciano, A.C. No. 6492, November 18,
2004
18 A-1 Financial Services v. Valerio, A.C. 8390, July 2,
2010
19 RE: 2003 BarExamiantion B.M. No. 1222, February 4,
2004
20 Are there too many lawyers in the Philippines 262
SCRA 189
21 Legal Ethics 45 PHIL 931
22 The right to counsel 57 SCRA 481
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23 The decorum of a legal practitioner 93 SCRA 103

24 Barcenas v. Alvero 619 SCRA 1
25 Oria v. Tupaz 438 SCRA 575
26 In re: VictorioLanuevo 66 SCRA 245
27 Ecraela v. Pangalangan 769 SCRA 361
28 Umaguing v. De VeRa 749 SCRA 473
29 Alonso v. Relamida 626 SCRA 281
30 Pangan v. Ramos 93 SCRA 87
31 Madrid v. Dealca 734 SCRA 468
32 In re: Salazar 92 SCRA 1
33 Omico Mining and Idustrial Corporation v. Vallejos,
G.R. No. L-38974, March 25, 1975
34 In e Cunanan, 94 PHIL 534
35 Collantes v. Renomeron 200 SCRA 584
36 In re: Almacen 31 SCRA 562
37 In re: Argosino, B.M No. 712, March 19, 1997
38 Kurada v. Jalandoni G.R. No. L-2662, March 26, 1949
39 People v. Villanueva, G.R. No. L-19450, May 27, 1965
40 Dia-Annonuevo v. Bercacio, A.M. No. 177-MJ,
November 27, 1975
41 De Guzman v. Visayan Rapid Transit, G.R. No.
46396, September 30, 1939
42 Cayetano v. Monsod, 201 SCRA 210
43 In re: Edillon, A.C. 1928, 12/19/1980
44 Bacarro v. Pinatacan, ADM Case 559-SBC, January
31, 1984
45 Tajan v. Cusi G.R. No. L-28899, May 30, 1974
46 Alcala v. De Vera, A.C. No.620, Mar 21, 1974
47 Cantibuhan v. Cruz, G.r. No. L-51813-14, November
29, 1983
48 Hydro Resources, contractors corporation v.
Pagalilauan, G.R. No. L-62909, April 18, 1989
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49 Ramos v. Rada, A.M. N0. 202, July 22, 1975

50 Beltran v. Abad, A.M. No. 139, March 28, 1983
51 Diao v. Martinez, A.C. No.244, March 29, 1963
52 Jardeleza v. Sereno, 733 SCRA 279
53 Guarinv.Limpin 875 SCRA 459
54 A.M. No. 21-12-05-SC, In Re: Atty. Lorenzo G.
Gadon’s viral video against Ms. Raissa Robles,
January 4, 2022
55 RE: Show cause order in the Decision date May 11,
2018, A.M. No. 19-06-01-Sc, July 17, 2018
56 A.M. 17-03-09-SC Rule on Community Legal Aid
Service
57 A.M. No. 19-03-24-SC Rule 138 Law Student Practice
58 Notarial Practice (A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC, as amended)

1. Qualifications of a notary public

2. Term of office of a notary public
3. Powers and limitations
4. Notarial Register
5. Jurisdiction of notary public and place of notarization
6. Competent evidence of identity
7. Sanctions
8. Relation to Code of Professional Responsibility
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Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT

EN BANC

G.R. Nos. 151809-12. April 12, 2005

PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT (PCGG), Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN (Fifth Division), LUCIO C. TAN, CARMEN KHAO TAN, FLORENCIO T. SANTOS,
NATIVIDAD P. SANTOS, DOMINGO CHUA, TAN HUI NEE, MARIANO TAN ENG LIAN, ESTATE OF BENITO
TAN KEE HIONG (represented by TARCIANA C. TAN), FLORENCIO N. SANTOS, JR., HARRY C. TAN, TAN
ENG CHAN, CHUNG POE KEE, MARIANO KHOO, MANUEL KHOO, MIGUEL KHOO, JAIME KHOO,
ELIZABETH KHOO, CELSO RANOLA, WILLIAM T. WONG, ERNESTO B. LIM, BENJAMIN T. ALBACITA,
WILLY CO, ALLIED BANKING CORP., ALLIED LEASING AND FINANCE CORPORATION, ASIA BREWERY,
INC., BASIC HOLDINGS CORP., FOREMOST FARMS, INC., FORTUNE TOBACCO CORP., GRANDSPAN
DEVELOPMENT CORP., HIMMEL INDUSTRIES, IRIS HOLDINGS AND DEVELOPMENT CORP., JEWEL
HOLDINGS, INC., MANUFACTURING SERVICES AND TRADE CORP., MARANAW HOTELS AND RESORT
CORP., NORTHERN TOBACCO REDRYING PLANT, PROGRESSIVE FARMS, INC., SHAREHOLDINGS, INC.,
SIPALAY TRADING CORP., VIRGO HOLDINGS & DEVELOPMENT CORP., and ATTY. ESTELITO P.
MENDOZA, Respondents.

DECISION

PUNO, J.:

This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on one hand, the efforts of the
Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on the other, its effect on the right of government to
recruit competent counsel to defend its interests.

In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial difficulties. GENBANK had extended
considerable financial support to Filcapital Development Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its
current account with the Central Bank. 1 It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various
loans to directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling ₱172.3 million, of which 59% was classified as
doubtful and ₱0.505 million as uncollectible. 2 As a bailout, the Central Bank extended emergency loans to
GENBANK which reached a total of ₱310 million.3 Despite the mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its
financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and
unable to resume business with safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its
liquidation.4 A public bidding of GENBANK’s assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan
group submitted the winning bid. 5 Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a
petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the court in
GENBANK’s liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.

In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of President Corazon
C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-
gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the
PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution,
accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad P.
Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tan Eng Lian, Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong, Florencio N. Santos,
Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo,
Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim, Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking
Corporation (Allied Bank), Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery, Inc., Basic Holdings Corp.,
Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp., Himmel Industries, Iris
Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade Corp., Maranaw Hotels
and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc., Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading
Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., (collectively referred to herein as respondents Tan, et al.), then
 5

President Ferdinand E. Marcos, Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O. Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio
Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.6 In
connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on properties allegedly acquired by the
above-named persons by taking advantage of their close relationship and influence with former President Marcos.

Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify,
among others, the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. 7 After the filing of the parties’ comments, this Court
referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were docketed as Civil Case Nos.
0096-0099. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General
Estelito P. Mendoza, who has then resumed his private practice of law.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. with the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 00058 and 0096-0099.9 The motions
alleged that respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General 10 and counsel to Central Bank, "actively intervened" in
the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied
Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents
Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor General, he advised the Central Bank’s officials on
the procedure to bring about GENBANK’s liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection
with its petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK which he filed with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila and was docketed as Special Proceeding No. 107812. The motions to disqualify
invoked Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government
lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service."

On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying PCGG’s motion to

disqualify respondent Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005. 11 It found that the PCGG failed to prove the existence of an
inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as
counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on
behalf of the Central Bank during his term as Solicitor General. 12 It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s
appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of
Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said section prohibits a former
public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to
be with within one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office. 13 The PCGG did not seek
any reconsideration of the ruling.14

It appears that Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 were transferred from the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division to the
Fifth Division.15 In its resolution dated July 11, 2001, the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan denied the other
PCGG’s motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. 16 It adopted the resolution of its Second Division dated April
22, 1991, and observed that the arguments were the same in substance as the motion to disqualify filed in Civil
Case No. 0005. The PCGG sought reconsideration of the ruling but its motion was denied in its resolution dated
December 5, 2001.17

Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001
of the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan via a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure. 18 The PCGG alleged that the Fifth Division acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed resolutions contending that: 1) Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility prohibits a former government lawyer from accepting employment in connection
with any matter in which he intervened; 2) the prohibition in the Rule is not time-bound; 3) that Central Bank could
not waive the objection to respondent Mendoza’s appearance on behalf of the PCGG; and 4) the resolution in Civil
Case No. 0005 was interlocutory, thus res judicata does not apply.19

The petition at bar raises procedural and substantive issues of law. In view, however, of the import and impact of
Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility to the legal profession and the government, we shall cut our
way and forthwith resolve the substantive issue.
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I. Substantive Issue

The key issue is whether Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent Mendoza.
Again, the prohibition states: "A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service."

I.A. The history of Rule 6.03

A proper resolution of this case necessitates that we trace the historical lineage of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, ethical standards for lawyers were pervasive in England and other
parts of Europe. The early statements of standards did not resemble modern codes of conduct. They were not
detailed or collected in one source but surprisingly were comprehensive for their time. The principal thrust of the
standards was directed towards the litigation conduct of lawyers. It underscored the central duty of truth and fairness
in litigation as superior to any obligation to the client. The formulations of the litigation duties were at times intricate,
including specific pleading standards, an obligation to inform the court of falsehoods and a duty to explore
settlement alternatives. Most of the lawyer's other basic duties -- competency, diligence, loyalty, confidentiality,
reasonable fees and service to the poor -- originated in the litigation context, but ultimately had broader application
to all aspects of a lawyer's practice.

The forms of lawyer regulation in colonial and early post-revolutionary America did not differ markedly from
those in England. The colonies and early states used oaths, statutes, judicial oversight, and procedural rules to
govern attorney behavior. The difference from England was in the pervasiveness and continuity of such regulation.
The standards set in England varied over time, but the variation in early America was far greater. The American
regulation fluctuated within a single colony and differed from colony to colony. Many regulations had the effect of
setting some standards of conduct, but the regulation was sporadic, leaving gaps in the substantive standards. Only
three of the traditional core duties can be fairly characterized as pervasive in the formal, positive law of the colonial
and post-revolutionary period: the duties of litigation fairness, competency and reasonable fees. 20

The nineteenth century has been termed the "dark ages" of legal ethics in the United States. By mid-century,
American legal reformers were filling the void in two ways. First, David Dudley Field, the drafter of the highly
influential New York "Field Code," introduced a new set of uniform standards of conduct for lawyers. This concise
statement of eight statutory duties became law in several states in the second half of the nineteenth century. At the
same time, legal educators, such as David Hoffman and George Sharswood, and many other lawyers were working
to flesh out the broad outline of a lawyer's duties. These reformers wrote about legal ethics in unprecedented detail
and thus brought a new level of understanding to a lawyer's duties. A number of mid-nineteenth century laws and
statutes, other than the Field Code, governed lawyer behavior. A few forms of colonial regulations – e.g., the "do no
falsehood" oath and the deceit prohibitions -- persisted in some states. Procedural law continued to directly, or
indirectly, limit an attorney's litigation behavior. The developing law of agency recognized basic duties of
competence, loyalty and safeguarding of client property. Evidence law started to recognize with less equivocation
the attorney-client privilege and its underlying theory of confidentiality. Thus, all of the core duties, with the likely
exception of service to the poor, had some basis in formal law. Yet, as in the colonial and early post-revolutionary
periods, these standards were isolated and did not provide a comprehensive statement of a lawyer's duties. The
reformers, by contrast, were more comprehensive in their discussion of a lawyer's duties, and they actually ushered
a new era in American legal ethics.21

Toward the end of the nineteenth century, a new form of ethical standards began to guide lawyers in their practice
— the bar association code of legal ethics. The bar codes were detailed ethical standards formulated by lawyers for
lawyers. They combined the two primary sources of ethical guidance from the nineteenth century. Like the academic
discourses, the bar association codes gave detail to the statutory statements of duty and the oaths of office. Unlike
the academic lectures, however, the bar association codes retained some of the official imprimatur of the statutes
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and oaths. Over time, the bar association codes became extremely popular that states adopted them as binding
rules of law. Critical to the development of the new codes was the re-emergence of bar associations themselves.
Local bar associations formed sporadically during the colonial period, but they disbanded by the early nineteenth
century. In the late nineteenth century, bar associations began to form again, picking up where their colonial
predecessors had left off. Many of the new bar associations, most notably the Alabama State Bar Association and
the American Bar Association, assumed on the task of drafting substantive standards of conduct for their
members.22

In 1887, Alabama became the first state with a comprehensive bar association code of ethics. The 1887 Alabama
Code of Ethics was the model for several states’ codes, and it was the foundation for the American Bar
Association's (ABA) 1908 Canons of Ethics.23

In 1917, the Philippine Bar found that the oath and duties of a lawyer were insufficient to attain the full measure of
public respect to which the legal profession was entitled. In that year, the Philippine Bar Association adopted as its
own, Canons 1 to 32 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics.24

As early as 1924, some ABA members have questioned the form and function of the canons. Among their concerns
was the "revolving door" or "the process by which lawyers and others temporarily enter government service from
private life and then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and
influence garnered in government service."25 These concerns were classified as adverse-interest
conflicts" and "congruent-interest conflicts." "Adverse-interest conflicts" exist where the matter in which the
former government lawyer represents a client in private practice is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer
dealt with while employed by the government and the interests of the current and former are adverse. 26 On the other
hand, "congruent-interest representation conflicts" are unique to government lawyers and apply primarily to
former government lawyers.27 For several years, the ABA attempted to correct and update the canons through new
canons, individual amendments and interpretative opinions. In 1928, the ABA amended one canon and added
thirteen new canons.28 To deal with problems peculiar to former government lawyers, Canon 36 was minted which
disqualified them both for "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-interest representation conflicts." 29 The
rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern that the government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would
be influenced by the temptation to take action on behalf of the government client that later could be to the
advantage of parties who might later become private practice clients. 30 Canon 36 provides, viz.:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his
retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in
such office or employ.

Over the next thirty years, the ABA continued to amend many of the canons and added Canons 46 and 47 in 1933
and 1937, respectively.31

In 1946, the Philippine Bar Association again adopted as its own Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA Canons of
Professional Ethics.32

By the middle of the twentieth century, there was growing consensus that the ABA Canons needed more
meaningful revision. In 1964, the ABA President-elect Lewis Powell asked for the creation of a committee to study
the "adequacy and effectiveness" of the ABA Canons. The committee recommended that the canons needed
substantial revision, in part because the ABA Canons failed to distinguish between "the inspirational and the
proscriptive" and were thus unsuccessful in enforcement. The legal profession in the United States likewise
observed that Canon 36 of the ABA Canons of Professional Ethics resulted in unnecessary disqualification of
lawyers for negligible participation in matters during their employment with the government.
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The unfairness of Canon 36 compelled ABA to replace it in the 1969 ABA Model Code of Professional
Responsibility.33 The basic ethical principles in the Code of Professional Responsibility were supplemented by
Disciplinary Rules that defined minimum rules of conduct to which the lawyer must adhere. 34 In the case of Canon
9, DR 9-101(b)35 became the applicable supplementary norm. The drafting committee reformulated the canons into
the Model Code of Professional Responsibility, and, in August of 1969, the ABA House of Delegates approved
the Model Code.36

Despite these amendments, legal practitioners remained unsatisfied with the results and indefinite standards set
forth by DR 9-101(b) and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility as a whole. Thus, in August 1983, the
ABA adopted new Model Rules of Professional Responsibility. The Model Rules used the "restatement format,"
where the conduct standards were set-out in rules, with comments following each rule. The new format was
intended to give better guidance and clarity for enforcement "because the only enforceable standards were the
black letter Rules." The Model Rules eliminated the broad canons altogether and reduced the emphasis on narrative
discussion, by placing comments after the rules and limiting comment discussion to the content of the black letter
rules. The Model Rules made a number of substantive improvements particularly with regard to conflicts of
interests.37 In particular, the ABA did away with Canon 9, citing the hopeless dependence of the concept of
impropriety on the subjective views of anxious clients as well as the norm’s indefinite nature. 38

In cadence with these changes, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of
Professional Responsibility in 1980 which it submitted to this Court for approval. The Code was drafted to
reflect the local customs, traditions, and practices of the bar and to conform with new realities. On June 21, 1988,
this Court promulgated the Code of Professional Responsibility.39 Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility deals particularly with former government lawyers, and provides, viz.:

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility retained the general structure of paragraph 2, Canon 36 of the
Canons of Professional Ethics but replaced the expansive phrase "investigated and passed upon" with the
word "intervened." It is, therefore, properly applicable to both "adverse-interest conflicts" and "congruent-
interest conflicts."

The case at bar does not involve the "adverse interest" aspect of Rule 6.03. Respondent Mendoza, it is
conceded, has no adverse interest problem when he acted as Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 and later as
counsel of respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 before
the Sandiganbayan. Nonetheless, there remains the issue of whether there exists a "congruent-interest
conflict" sufficient to disqualify respondent Mendoza from representing respondents Tan, et al.

I.B. The "congruent interest" aspect of Rule 6.03

The key to unlock Rule 6.03 lies in comprehending first, the meaning of "matter" referred to in the rule and,
second, the metes and bounds of the "intervention" made by the former government lawyer on the "matter." The
American Bar Association in its Formal Opinion 342, defined "matter" as any discrete, isolatable act as well as
identifiable transaction or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, and not merely an act of
drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract
principles of law.

Firstly, it is critical that we pinpoint the "matter" which was the subject of intervention by respondent Mendoza
while he was the Solicitor General. The PCGG relates the following acts of respondent Mendoza as constituting
the "matter" where he intervened as a Solicitor General, viz:40

The PCGG’s Case for Atty. Mendoza’s Disqualification

The PCGG imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) in issuing the
assailed Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General, actively
 9

intervened in the closure of GENBANK by advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s
liquidation and even filing the petition for its liquidation with the CFI of Manila.

As proof thereof, the PCGG cites the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials of the
Central Bank, namely, then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then
Deputy Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P.
Valenzuela, then Asistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of Department of Commercial and
Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr., where they averred that on March 28, 1977, they had a conference with the
Solicitor General (Atty. Mendoza), who advised them on how to proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK. The
pertinent portion of the said memorandum states:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the following
procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had
been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be
reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the
bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had
been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

The PCGG further cites the Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board where it was shown that
Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with
the court the petition for assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

...

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the Director,
Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March
25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March
24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a repot on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General for his use in then CFI-praying
the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank.

Beyond doubt, therefore, the "matter" or the act of respondent Mendoza as Solicitor General involved in the case at
bar is "advising the Central Bank, on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for
its liquidation with the CFI of Manila." In fine, the Court should resolve whether his act of advising the Central Bank
 10

on the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK is included within the concept of "matter" under Rule 6.03. The
procedure of liquidation is given in black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29, viz:

The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. – Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate supervising
or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same is one of
insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, it shall be
the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary Board of the facts, and the
Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid the institution to do business in
the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a person of recognized competence in banking
or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect
and gather all the assets and administer the same for the benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary
for these purposes including, but not limited to, bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or
non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions.

...

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its depositors,
creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, order its liquidation, indicate the manner of its
liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor General, file a petition in the Court
of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and praying the assistance of the court in the
liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims
against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual
liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement
the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central
Bank, or a person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of
the receiver previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient
speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for the purpose of
paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the appropriate court to collect
and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this Section and
the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set aside by the court only if
there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith. No restraining order or injunction
shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing its actions under this Section and the
second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing proof that the action of the Monetary Board is
plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which
the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The
restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a
bond, which shall be in the form of cash or Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the
bond of the petitioner or plaintiff conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer
by the refusal or the dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as
they are applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution
of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary course of business.
Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-insolvent bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by extraordinary demands induced by financial
panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking
functions in the banking or financial community.
 11

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this Section
shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to the contrary
notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

We hold that this advice given by respondent Mendoza on the procedure to liquidate GENBANK is  not the
"matter" contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. ABA Formal Opinion No. 342 is
clear as daylight in stressing that the "drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law" are acts which do not fall within the scope of the
term "matter" and cannot disqualify.

Secondly, it can even be conceded for the sake of argument that the above act of respondent Mendoza falls within
the definition of matter per ABA Formal Opinion No. 342. Be that as it may, the said act of respondent Mendoza
which is the "matter" involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the "matter" involved in Civil
Case No. 0096. Again, the plain facts speak for themselves. It is given that respondent Mendoza had nothing to do
with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The "matter" where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK thru the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject "matter" of Sp. Proc. No. 107812, therefore, is
not the same nor is related to but is different from the subject "matter" in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No.
0096 involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged
ground that they are ill-gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale
of GENBANK to Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stock of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far
removed from the issue of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central
Bank due, among others, to the alleged banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality
of the liquidation of GENBANK is not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does
not include the dissolution and liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in
Civil Case No. 0096.

Thirdly, we now slide to the metes and bounds of the "intervention" contemplated by Rule 6.03. "Intervene"
means, viz.:

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance . . . 2: to occur, fall, or come in between
points of time or events . . . 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE . . . 4: to
occur or lie between two things (Paris, where the same city lay on both sides of an intervening river . . .) 41

On the other hand, "intervention" is defined as:

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION; 2: interference that may affect the interests of others. 42

There are, therefore, two possible interpretations of the word "intervene." Under the first interpretation, "intervene"
includes participation in a proceeding even if the intervention is irrelevant or has no effect or little influence. 43 Under
the second interpretation, "intervene" only includes an act of a person who has the power to influence the subject
proceedings.44 We hold that this second meaning is more appropriate to give to the word "intervention" under Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility in light of its history. The evils sought to be remedied by the Rule do
not exist where the government lawyer does an act which can be considered as innocuous such as "x x x drafting,
enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations or laws, or briefing abstract principles of
law."

In fine, the intervention cannot be insubstantial and insignificant. Originally, Canon 36 provided that a former
government lawyer "should not, after his retirement, accept employment in connection with any matter which he
has investigated or passed upon while in such office or employ." As aforediscussed, the broad sweep of the
phrase "which he has investigated or passed upon" resulted in unjust disqualification of former government lawyers.
The 1969 Code restricted its latitude, hence, in DR 9-101(b), the prohibition extended only to a matter in which the
lawyer, while in the government service, had "substantial responsibility." The 1983 Model Rules further
 12

constricted the reach of the rule. MR 1.11(a) provides that "a lawyer shall not represent a private client in connection
with a matter in which the lawyer participated personally and substantially as a public officer or employee."

It is, however, alleged that the intervention of respondent Mendoza in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is significant and
substantial. We disagree. For one, the petition in the special proceedings is an initiatory pleading, hence, it has to
be signed by respondent Mendoza as the then sitting Solicitor General. For another, the  record is arid as to
the actual participation of respondent Mendoza in the subsequent proceedings. Indeed, the case was in
slumberville for a long number of years. None of the parties pushed for its early termination. Moreover, we note that
the petition filed merely seeks the assistance of the court in the liquidation of GENBANK. The principal role of the
court in this type of proceedings is to assist the Central Bank in determining claims of creditors against the
GENBANK. The role of the court is not strictly as a court of justice but as an agent to assist the Central Bank in
determining the claims of creditors. In such a proceeding, the participation of the Office of the Solicitor General is
not that of the usual court litigator protecting the interest of government.

II. Balancing Policy Considerations

To be sure, Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility represents a commendable effort on the part of the
IBP to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in the government service. As aforestressed, it is a take-off from similar efforts
especially by the ABA which have not been without difficulties. To date, the legal profession in the United States is
still fine tuning its DR 9-101(b) rule.

In fathoming the depth and breadth of Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, the Court took
account of various policy considerations to assure that its interpretation and application to the case at bar will
achieve its end without necessarily prejudicing other values of equal importance. Thus, the rule was not interpreted
to cause a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent. At present, it is already difficult for
government to match compensation offered by the private sector and it is unlikely that government will be able to
reverse that situation. The observation is not inaccurate that the only card that the government may play to recruit
lawyers is have them defer present income in return for the experience and contacts that can later be exchanged for
higher income in private practice.45 Rightly, Judge Kaufman warned that the sacrifice of entering government service
would be too great for most men to endure should ethical rules prevent them from engaging in the practice of a
technical specialty which they devoted years in acquiring and cause the firm with which they become associated to
be disqualified.46 Indeed, "to make government service more difficult to exit can only make it less appealing to
enter."47

In interpreting Rule 6.03, the Court also cast a harsh eye on its use as a  litigation tactic to harass opposing
counsel as well as deprive his client of competent legal representation. The danger that the rule will be misused to
bludgeon an opposing counsel is not a mere guesswork. The Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia has
noted "the tactical use of motions to disqualify counsel in order to delay proceedings, deprive the opposing party of
counsel of its choice, and harass and embarrass the opponent," and observed that the tactic was "so prevalent in
large civil cases in recent years as to prompt frequent judicial and academic commentary." 48 Even the United States
Supreme Court found no quarrel with the Court of Appeals’ description of disqualification motions as "a dangerous
game."49 In the case at bar, the new attempt to disqualify respondent Mendoza is difficult to divine. The
disqualification of respondent Mendoza has long been a dead issue. It was resuscitated after the lapse of many
years and only after PCGG has lost many legal incidents in the hands of respondent Mendoza. For a fact, the
recycled motion for disqualification in the case at bar was filed more than four years after the filing of the petitions
for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with the Supreme Court which were subsequently remanded to
the Sandiganbayan and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099. 50 At the very least, the circumstances under
which the motion to disqualify in the case at bar were refiled put petitioner’s motive as highly suspect.

Similarly, the Court in interpreting Rule 6.03 was not unconcerned with the prejudice to the client which will
be caused by its misapplication. It cannot be doubted that granting a disqualification motion causes the client to lose
not only the law firm of choice, but probably an individual lawyer in whom the client has confidence. 51 The client with
a disqualified lawyer must start again often without the benefit of the work done by the latter. 52 The effects of this
prejudice to the right to choose an effective counsel cannot be overstated for it can result in denial of due process.
 13

The Court has to consider also the possible adverse effect of a truncated reading of the rule on the official
independence of lawyers in the government service. According to Prof. Morgan: "An individual who has the
security of knowing he or she can find private employment upon leaving the government is free to work vigorously,
challenge official positions when he or she believes them to be in error, and resist illegal demands by superiors. An
employee who lacks this assurance of private employment does not enjoy such freedom." 53 He adds: "Any system
that affects the right to take a new job affects the ability to quit the old job and any limit on the ability to quit inhibits
official independence."54 The case at bar involves the position of Solicitor General, the office once occupied by
respondent Mendoza. It cannot be overly stressed that the position of Solicitor General should be endowed
with a great degree of independence. It is this independence that allows the Solicitor General to recommend
acquittal of the innocent; it is this independence that gives him the right to refuse to defend officials who violate the
trust of their office. Any undue dimunition of the independence of the Solicitor General will have a corrosive effect on
the rule of law.

No less significant a consideration is the deprivation of the former government lawyer of the freedom to
exercise his profession. Given the current state of our law, the disqualification of a former government lawyer may
extend to all members of his law firm. 55 Former government lawyers stand in danger of becoming the lepers of the
legal profession.

It is, however, proffered that the mischief sought to be remedied by Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility is the possible appearance of impropriety and loss of public confidence in government. But as well
observed, the accuracy of gauging public perceptions is a highly speculative exercise at best 56 which can lead to
untoward results.57 No less than Judge Kaufman doubts that the lessening of restrictions as to former government
attorneys will have any detrimental effect on that free flow of information between the government-client and its
attorneys which the canons seek to protect. 58 Notably, the appearance of impropriety theory has been rejected
in the 1983 ABA Model Rules of Professional Conduct 59 and some courts have
abandoned per se disqualification based on Canons 4 and 9 when an actual conflict of interest exists, and demand
an evaluation of the interests of the defendant, government, the witnesses in the case, and the public. 60

It is also submitted that the Court should apply Rule 6.03 in all its strictness for it correctly disfavors lawyers
who "switch sides." It is claimed that "switching sides" carries the danger that former government employee
may compromise confidential official information in the process. But this concern does not cast a shadow in the
case at bar. As afore-discussed, the act of respondent Mendoza in informing the Central Bank on the procedure
how to liquidate GENBANK is a different matter from the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0005 which is about the
sequestration of the shares of respondents Tan, et al., in Allied Bank. Consequently, the danger that confidential
official information might be divulged is nil, if not inexistent. To be sure, there are no inconsistent "sides" to be
bothered about in the case at bar. For there is no question that in lawyering for respondents Tan,  et al., respondent
Mendoza is not working against the interest of Central Bank. On the contrary, he is indirectly defending the validity
of the action of Central Bank in liquidating GENBANK and selling it later to Allied Bank. Their interests coincide
instead of colliding. It is for this reason that Central Bank offered no objection to the lawyering of respondent
Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0005 in defense of respondents Tan, et al. There is no switching of sides for no two
sides are involved.

It is also urged that the Court should consider that Rule 6.03 is intended to avoid  conflict of loyalties, i.e., that a
government employee might be subject to a conflict of loyalties while still in government service. 61 The example
given by the proponents of this argument is that a lawyer who plans to work for the company that he or she is
currently charged with prosecuting might be tempted to prosecute less vigorously. 62 In the cautionary words of the
Association of the Bar Committee in 1960: "The greatest public risks arising from post employment conduct may
well occur during the period of employment through the dampening of aggressive administration of government
policies."63 Prof. Morgan, however, considers this concern as "probably excessive." 64 He opines "x x x it is hard to
imagine that a private firm would feel secure hiding someone who had just been disloyal to his or her last client –
the government. Interviews with lawyers consistently confirm that law firms want the ‘best’ government lawyers – the
ones who were hardest to beat – not the least qualified or least vigorous advocates." 65 But again, this particular
concern is a non factor in the case at bar. There is no charge against respondent Mendoza that he advised
Central Bank on how to liquidate GENBANK with an eye in later defending respondents Tan, et al. of Allied Bank.
Indeed, he continues defending both the interests of Central Bank and respondents Tan, et al. in the above cases.
 14

Likewise, the Court is nudged to consider the need to curtail what is perceived as the "excessive influence of
former officials" or their "clout."66 Prof. Morgan again warns against extending this concern too far. He explains
the rationale for his warning, viz: "Much of what appears to be an employee’s influence may actually be the power or
authority of his or her position, power that evaporates quickly upon departure from government x x x." 67 More, he
contends that the concern can be demeaning to those sitting in government. To quote him further: "x x x The idea
that, present officials make significant decisions based on friendship rather than on the merit says more about the
present officials than about their former co-worker friends. It implies a lack of will or talent, or both, in federal officials
that does not seem justified or intended, and it ignores the possibility that the officials will tend to disfavor their
friends in order to avoid even the appearance of favoritism." 68

III. The question of fairness

Mr. Justices Panganiban and Carpio are of the view, among others, that the congruent interest prong of Rule 6.03 of
the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the
rule cannot apply retroactively to respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that
(1) when respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and approved
by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the lapse of time whose length
cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if
applied without any prescriptive period and retroactively, at that. Their concern is legitimate and deserves to be
initially addressed by the IBP and our Committee on Revision of the Rules of Court.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition assailing the resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 of the Fifth
Division of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099 is denied.

No cost.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona and Garcia,
JJ., concur.

Panganiban and Tinga, JJ., Please see separate opinion.

Carpio-Morales and Callejo, Sr., JJ., Please see dissenting opinion.

Azcuna, J., I was former PCGG Chair.

Chico-Nazario, J., No part.

Footnotes

1
 Rollo, p. 240; Filcapital Development Corporation was a related interest of the Yujuico Family Group and
the directors and officers of GENBANK.

2
 Rollo, pp. 240, 242.

3
 Rollo, p. 7.

4
 Rollo, pp. 7, 108, 248.

5
 Rollo, pp. 110-114, 248.

6
 Rollo, pp. 217-218.

7
 Rollo, p. 143.
 15
8
 Rollo, pp. 216-220.

9
 Rollo, pp. 44, 221- 225.

10
 Atty. Mendoza served as Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986.

11
 Rollo, p. 63.

12
 Rollo, p. 61.

13
 Rollo, pp. 57-63.

14
 Rollo, p. 178.

15
 Rollo, pp. 42, 44; The "Motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel for petitioners" in Civil
Case Nos. 0096-0099 was filed with the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division. However, the motion was
ultimately resolved by the Sandiganbayan’s Fifth Division in its proceedings held on July 11, 2001.

16
 Rollo, p. 42.

17
 Rollo, p. 43.

18
 Rollo, pp. 2-40.

19
 Rollo, pp. 12-14.

20
 Andrews, Standards of Conduct for Lawyers: An 800-Year Revolution, 57 SMU L. Rev. 1385 (2004).

21
 Ibid.

22
 Ibid.

23
 Ibid.

24
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 24-25 (2002); In re Tagorda, 53 Phil. 37 (1927).

25
 Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 456 (1986).

26
 Id. at 457.

27
 Ibid.; The use of the word "conflict" is a misnomer; "congruent-interest representation conflicts" arguably
do not involve conflicts at all, as it prohibits lawyers from representing a private practice client even if the
interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely parallel.

28
 Supra, note 20.

29
 ABA Canons of Professional Ethics, Canon 36 (1908); ABA Model Code of Professional Responsibility
(1963), DR 9-101(b); ABA Model Rules of Professional Responsibility, MR 1.11(a) and (b) (1983).

30
 Supra, note 25 at 458.

31
 Supra, note 20.

32
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, p. 25 (2002).
 16
33
 Canon 9 was adopted to replace Canon 36 because Canon 36 "proved to be too broadly encompassing."
ABA Opinion No. 342 (1975); Canon 9 states: "A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional
impropriety."

34
 Model Code of Professional Responsibility, Preliminary Statement (1983); "The Disciplinary Rules ... are
mandatory in character. The Disciplinary Rules state the minimum level of conduct below which no lawyer
can fall without being subject to disciplinary action."

35
 DR 9-101(b): A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial
responsibility while he was a public employee.

36
 Supra, note 20.

37
 Ibid.

38
 Model Rules of Professional Conduct, Rule 1.09 comment (1984): "The other rubric formerly used for
dealing with disqualification is the appearance of impropriety proscribed in Canon 9 of the ABA Model Code
of Professional Responsibility. This rubric has a two-fold problem. First, the appearance of impropriety can
be taken to include any new client-lawyer relationship that might make a former client feel anxious. If that
meaning were adopted, disqualification would become little more than a question of subjective judgment by
the former client. Second, since ‘impropriety’ is undefined, the term appearance of impropriety is question-
begging. It therefore has to be recognized that the problem of disqualification cannot be properly
resolved . . . by the very general concept of appearance of impropriety."

39
 Supra, note 32.

40
 See Dissent of J. Callejo, Sr., pp.19-20.

41
 Webster’s Third New International Dictionary of the English Language Unabridged, p. 1183 (1993).

42
 Id.

43
 Id.; This may be inferred from the second definition of "intervene" which is "to occur, fall, or come in
between points of time or events."

44
 Id.; This may be inferred from the third definition of "intervene" which is "to come in or between by way of
hindrance or modification," and the second definition of "intervention" which is "interference that may affect
the interests of others."

45
 Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 461 (1986).

46
 Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657
(1957).

47
 Remarks of Federal Trade Commission Chairman Calvin Collier before Council on Younger Lawyers,
1976 Annual Convention of the Federal Bar Association (September 16, 1976).

48
 Koller v. Richardson-Merrell, Inc., 737 F.2d 1038, 1051 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Board of Education of New York
City v. Nyquist, 590 F.2d 1241, 1246 (2d Cir. 1979); Williamsburg Wax Museum v. Historic Figures, Inc., 501
F.Supp. 326, 331 (D.D.C. 1980).

49
 Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v. Koller, 472 U.S. 424, 436 (1985).

50
 Rollo, p. 143; The petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction were filed sometime in August 1986.
The motion for disqualification in Civil Case No. 0096-0099 was filed on February 5, 1991.
 17
51
 United States v. Brothers, 856 F. Supp. 370, 375 (M.D. Tenn. 1992).

52
 First Wis. Mortgage Trust v. First Wis. Corp., 584 F.2d 201 (7th Cir. 1978); EZ Paintr Corp. v. Padco, Inc.,
746 F.2d 1459, 1463 (Fed. Cir. 1984); Realco Serv. v. Holt, 479 F. Supp. 867, 880 (E.D. Pa. 1979).

53
 Morgan, Appropriate Limits on Participation by a former Agency Official in Matters Before an Agency,
Duke L.J., Vol. 1980, February, No. 1, p. 54.

54
 Ibid.

55
 Agpalo, Legal and Judicial Ethics, pp. 292-293; Hilado v. David, 84 Phil. 569 (1949).

56
 Wolfram, Modern Legal Ethics, p. 320 (1986).

57
 Id. at p. 321.

58
 Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv. L. Rev. 657
(1957).

59
 Supra, note 38.

60
 United States v. O'Malley, 786 F.2d 786, 789 (7th Cir. 1985); United States v. James, 708 F.2d 40, 44 (2d
Cir. 1983).

61
 Supra, note 53 at 44.

62
 Ibid.

63
 Ibid., see footnote 207 of article.

64
 Ibid.

65
 Id. at 45.

66
 Id. at 42.

67
 Id. at 42-43.

68
 Id. at 43.

CONCURRING OPINION

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:

I join Mr. Justice Reynato S. Puno in his ponencia. Motions to disqualify counsel from representing their clients must
be viewed with jaundiced eyes, for oftentimes they pose the very threat to the integrity of the judicial process. 1 Such
motions are filed to harass a particular counsel, to delay the litigation, to intimidate adversary, or for other strategic
purposes. It therefore behooves the courts to always look for the parties’ inner motivations in filing such motions.

This case illustrates the sad reality that the filing of motions for disqualification may be motivated, not by a fine
sense of ethics or sincere desire to remove from litigation an unethical practitioner, but to achieve a tactical
advantage.

The facts are undisputed.

 18

Subsequent to the downfall of President Ferdinand E. Marcos in 1986, came the first edict 2 of President Corazon C.
Aquino creating the Presidential Commission on Good Government (PCGG) to recover the ill-gotten wealth of the
Marcoses, their subordinates, and associates.

PCGG’s initial target was Lucio Tan and the above-named private respondents (Tan et al., for brevity). It issued
several writs of sequestration on their properties and business enterprises. To nullify such writs, Tan et al. filed with
this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction. On February 15, 1990, after comments thereon were
submitted, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These cases were raffled to
it Fifth Division, docketed as follows:

(a) Civil Case No. 0095 - Sipalay Trading Corp. vs. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated July
24, 1986 sequestering Lucio Tan’s shares of stocks in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation (Century Park
Sheraton Hotel);

(b) Civil Case No. 0096 – Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corp., Iris Holding and Development
Corp., Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the
PCGG’s Order dated June 19, 1986 sequestering the shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corporation held by
and/or in the name of respondents Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo
Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc.;

(c) Civil Case No. 0097 -- Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N.
Santos, Jr. and Foremost Farms, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated August 12,
1986 sequestering the shares of stocks in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen
Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and Florencio N. Santos, Jr.;

(d) Civil Case No. 0098 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad
Santos, Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. and Fortune Tabacco Corp. v. PCGG., which seeks to nullify
the PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stocks in Fortune Tobacco Corp. held by and /or
in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio
N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc.; and

(e) Civil Case No. 0099 - Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad
Santos and Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated July 24,
1986 sequestering the shares of stocks in Shareholdings, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen
Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos and Natividad Santos.

(f) Civil Case No. 0100 – Allied Banking Corp. vs. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Search and
Seizure Order dated August 13, 1986, issued on bank documents of Allied Banking Corp. 3

Civil Cases Nos. 0096 and 0100 involve Tan, et al.’s shares of stocks in the Allied Banking Corporation (Allied
Bank).

Meanwhile, on July 17, 1987, the PCGG and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed with the Sandiganbayan
a complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against Tan et al. This time, the
case was raffled to the Second Division, docketed therein as Civil Case No. 0005. Among the properties sought to
be reconveyed were Tan et al.’s shares of stocks in the Allied Bank.

Since 1987, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza has been the counsel for Tan et al. in all the above cases. But it was
not until February 5, 1991, or after four years, that the PCGG filed three (3) identical motions to disqualify
Atty. Mendoza. In Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, PCGG filed a motion to disqualify him. It filed another similar motion
in Civil Case No. 0100. The last motion was filed in Civil Case No. 0005. His disqualification was sought under Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which reads:

Rule 6.03. – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
 19

In each motion, PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza, then Solicitor General of the Marcos Administration, "actively
intervened" in the liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), subsequently acquired by Tan et al.
and became Allied Bank. PCGG’s allegations are similar in every aspect, thus:

(1) He was the former Solicitor General of the Republic of the Philippines for almost 14 years appearing on behalf of
the Republic in multitudes of cases.

(2) The records show that, as then Solicitor General, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza appeared as counsel for the Central
Bank of the Philippines in Special Proceedings No. 107812, pending before the Regional Trial Court of Manila, in
connection with the Central Bank’s Petition for assistance in the Liquidation of General bank and Trust Company
(herein called "Genbank", for brevity). The records also show that Defendant Lucio Tan and his group were the
same persons who acquired Genbank’s assets, liabilities and interest.

(3) Consequently, Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for the Defendant herein runs counter to the long-
cherished ethical canon of the legal profession which prohibits a counsel to appear in litigation adverse to the
interests of his former client. Interpreting this sanction, jurisprudence has held, that:

‘The lawyer’s obligation to represent the client with undivided fidelity and to keep his confidences, also forbid the
lawyer from accepting retainers or employment from others in matters adversely affecting any interest of the client
with respect to which confidence has been reposed in him. (Canon of Professional Ethics, 6). The prohibition stands
even if the adverse interest is very slight; neither is it material that the intention and motive of the attorney may have
been honest. (5 Am. Jur. 296).’

(4) The reason for the prohibition is obvious. Apart from the obligation to keep inviolate the prior relationship
between counsel and his former client, such counsel obtains material information in confidence. Consequently, he
should not be allowed to represent a party with adverse interest to his former client, arising out of the very
transaction subject of the former relationship.

(5) In the case at bar, it should be stressed that Defendant Lucio Tan and his group acquired the assets and
liabilities of Genbank. This manner of acquisition has been alleged to have been fraudulent, arbitrary and a product
of collusion between them and the Central Bank officials. (Refer to Criminal Case No. 005 pending before this
Honorable Court.) Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for Defendants, clearly violates the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that:

‘A lawyer shall not after leaving the government service accept engagement or employment in connection with any
matter in which he had intervened while in said service." (Code of Professional Responsibility, Canon 6, Rule 6.03)’

(6) In the liquidation of Genbank and its eventual acquisition by Lucio Tan and his group, Atty. Mendoza, as
Solicitor–General, personally advised the Central Bank officials on the procedure to bring about Genbank’s
liquidation. In the Memorandum for the Governor of the Central Bank dated March 29, 1977 (signed by the following
subordinates of then CB Governor Gregorio Licaros, namely: Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas (deceased),
Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, Deputy Governor & General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, Special Asst. to the
Governor Carlota P. Valenzuela, Asst. to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and Director Antonio T. Castro, Jr.), the
following portion disclosed Atty. Mendoza’s participation:

‘Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General (atty. Mendoza) and he
advised that the following procedure should be taken:

‘(1) Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had
been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank cannot be
reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.

‘(2) If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.
 20

(3) The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the
bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

(4) The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had
been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank."

Plainly stated, it was Atty. Mendoza who was the legal author of the closure of Genbank and the eventual
sale to Mr. Lucio Tan and his Group. Clearly, Atty. Mendoza should be disqualified in this case."

On April 22, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 4 in Civil Case No. 0005 denying PCGG’s motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza.

On May 7, 1991, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution 5 in Civil Case No. 0100 also denying PCGG’s similar
motion.

Motions for reconsideration were filed but to no avail. The PCGG took no further action. These Resolutions,
therefore, became final and executory.

Subsequently, in a Decision dated August 23, 1996, the Sandiganbayan jointly granted Tan et al.’s petitions in Civil
Cases Nos. 0095 and 0100. On March 29, 1996, this Court, in G.R. Nos. 112708-09 6 affirmed the said
Decision. The PCGG neither assigned as error nor mentioned the Sandiganbayan’s denial of its motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case No. 0100.

In the interim, the PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 remained pending
with the Sandiganbayan. It was only on July 11, 2001, or after ten (10) years, that it denied the PCGG’s motion by
merely adopting its Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 denying a similar motion, thus:

"Acting on the PCGG’s "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA AS COUNSEL FOR

PETITIONER" dated February 5,1991 which appears not to have been resolved by then Second Division of this
Court, and it appearing that (1) the motion is exactly the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case
No. 0005 as in fact, Atty. Mendoza in his ‘OPPOSITION’ dated March 5, 1991 manifested that he was just adopting
his opposition to the same motion filed by PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Court’s Order dated March
7,1991, the herein incident was taken-up jointly with the said same incident in Civil Case No. 0005 (pp.134-135,Vol.
I, Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this Division hereby reiterates and adopts the Resolution dated April 22, 1991
in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division (pp.1418-1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. 0005) denying the
said motion as its Resolution in the case at bar."7

The PCGG moved for the reconsideration of the foregoing Resolution, but was denied. In the Resolution dated
December 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan ruled:

"Acting on respondent PCGG’s ‘MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION’ dated August 1, 2001 praying for the
reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated July 12, 2001 denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P.
Mendoza as counsel for petitioners, to which petitioners have filed an ‘OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1, 2001’ dated August 29, 2001, as well as the respondent’s ‘REPLY (To
Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration)’ dated November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel in these cases was exactly the same in substance as that motion to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 (re:Republic vs. Lucio Tan, et al.) and the
resolutions of this Court (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying the main motion as well as of the
motion for reconsideration thereof had become final and executory when PCGG failed to elevate the said
resolutions to the Supreme Court, the instant motion is hereby DENIED.8

Hence, the PCGG’s present petition for certiorari and prohibition alleging that the Sandiganbayan committed
grave abuse of discretion in denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099.

Mr. Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., in his Dissent, granted the petition. On the procedural issues, he ruled that the
assailed Resolutions dated July 11 and December 5, 2001 denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza are
 21

interlocutory orders, hence, in challenging such Resolutions, certiorari is the proper remedy, not appeal, as invoked
by Tan et al. Based on the same premise, he likewise rejected Tan et al.’s claim that the Resolution dated April 22,
1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 constitutes a bar to similar motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the doctrine
of res judicata.

On the substantive aspect, Mr. Justice Callejo’s Dissent states that Atty. Mendoza violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. According to him, Atty. Mendoza’s acts of (a) advising the Central Bank on how to
proceed with the liquidation of GENBANK, and (b) filing Special Proceedings No. 107812, a petition by the Central
Bank for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK, with the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila, constitute
"intervention." And that while it may be true that his posture in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 is not adverse to the
interest of the Central Bank, still, he violated the proscription under the "congruent-interest representation conflict"
doctrine.

Crucial to the resolution of the present controversy are the following queries:

(1) Is certiorari the proper remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan Resolutions dated July 11 and December 5, 2001
denying the PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099?

(2) May Sandiganbayan Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 be considered a bar to similar
motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the doctrine of res judicata?

(3) Does Atty. Mendoza’s participation in the liquidation of GENBANK constitute intervention?

There are some important points I wish to stress at this incipient stage. I believe they should be considered if we are
to arrive at a fair resolution of this case. The scattershot manner in which the PCGG filed the various motions
to disqualify Atty. Mendoza shows its intent to harass him and Tan et al. It may be recalled that the PCGG filed
three (3) identical motions, one in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, another in Civil Case No. 0100 and the last one in
Civil Case No. 0005. Of these cases, only Civil Cases Nos. 0096, 0100 and 0005 actually involve Tan et
al.’s shares of stocks in the Allied Bank. Civil Cases Nos. 0097, 0098 and 0099 have entirely different subject
matter. Thus, insofar as these cases are concerned, the motions to disqualify lack substantive merit. Why
then would the PCGG file identical motions to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in these unrelated cases? Its intention is
suspect. To subject Tan et al. to numerous and baseless motions to disqualify their lawyer is, no doubt, a form of
harassment.

As this juncture, it is important to emphasize that in evaluating motions to disqualify a lawyer, our minds are not
bound by stringent rules. There is room for consideration of the combined effect of a party’s right to counsel of his
own choice, an attorney’s interest in representing a client, the financial burden on a client of replacing disqualified
counsel, and any tactical abuse underlying a disqualification proceeding. 9

I. Whether the PCGG’s proper

remedy to assail the Sandiganbayan

Resolutions dated July 11 and

December 5, 2001 is appeal, not

certiorari.

The bottom line of this issue lies on how we categorize an order denying a motion to disqualify an opposing party’s
counsel. Is it interlocutory or final?

An order is deemed final when it finally disposes of the pending action so that nothing more can be done with it in
the lower court.10 On the other hand, an interlocutory order is one made during the pendency of an action, which
 22

does not dispose of the case, but leaves it for further action by the trial court in order to settle and determine the
entire controversy.11

In Antonio vs. Samonte,12 this Court defined a final judgment, order or decree as "one that finally disposes of,
adjudicates, or determines the rights, or some rights or rights of the parties, either on the entire controversy or on
some definite and separate branch, thereof and which concludes them until it is reversed or set aside x x
x." In De la Cruz v. Paras, 13 it was held that a court order is final in character if "it puts an end to the particular
matter resolved or settles definitely the matter therein disposed of," such that no further questions can come
before the court except the execution of the order. In Day v. Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City,14 this Court
ruled that an order which decides an issue or issues in a complaint is final and appealable, although the other issue
or issues have not been resolved, if the latter issues are distinct and separate from others.

With the foregoing disquisition as basis, it is my view that an order denying a motion to disqualify counsel
is final and, therefore, appealable. The issue of whether or not Atty. Mendoza should be disqualified from
representing Tan et al. is separable from, independent of and collateral to the main issues in Civil Cases Nos.
0096-0099. In short, it is separable from the merits. Clearly, the present petition for certiorari, to my mind, is
dismissible.

II. Whether the Resolution dated April

22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005

constitutes a bar to similar motions to

disqualify Atty. Mendoza under the

doctrine of res judicata.

I am convinced that the factual circumstances of this case justify the application of res judicata.

The ponente refuses to apply res judicata on the ground that the Sandignbayan Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in
Civil Case No. 0005 is just an interlocutory order.

Assuming arguendo that an order denying a motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is indeed an intelocutory order, still,
I believe that res judicata applies.

It will be recalled that on August 23, 1996, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Decision granting Tan  et al.’s petitions
in Civil Cases Nos. 0095 and 0100. Such Decision reached this Court in G.R. Nos. 112708-09.15 On March 29,
1996, we affirmed it. The PCGG could have assigned or raised as error in G.R. Nos. 112708-09 the
Sandiganbayan Resolution dated May 7, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0100 denying its motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza but it did not. The fact that a final Decision therein has been promulgated by this Court renders the
Resolution dated May 7, 1991 beyond review. The PCGG may not relitigate such issue of disqualification as it
was actually litigated and finally decided in G.R. Nos. 112707-09.16 To rule otherwise is to encourage the risk of
inconsistent judicial rulings on the basis of the same set of facts. This should not be countenanced. Public policy,
judicial orderliness, economy of judicial time and the interest of litigants, as well as the peace and order of society,
all require that stability should be accorded judicial rulings and that controversies once decided shall remain in
repose, and that there be an end to litigation. 17

III. Whether Atty. Mendoza’s

participation in the liquidation of

GENBANK constitutes intervention.

 23

As stated earlier, Atty. Mendoza is sought to be disqualified under Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility which states:

Rule 6.03. – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

In determining whether Atty. Mendoza committed a breach of this Rule, certain factual predicates should be
established, thus: (a) in connection with what "matter" has Atty. Mendoza accepted an engagement or employment
after leaving the government service?; (b) in connection with what "matter" did he intervene while in government
service?; and (c) what acts did he particularly perform in "intervening" in connection with such "matter"?

The PCGG insists that Atty. Mendoza, as Solicitor General, "actively intervened" in the closure and liquidation of
GENBANK. As primary evidence of such intervention, it cited his act of filing Special Proceedings No. 107812 with
the then Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila; and the Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 of certain key officials
of the Central Bank stating that he (Atty. Mendoza) advised them of the procedure to be taken in the liquidation of
GENBANK and that he was furnished copies of pertinent documents relating to such liquidation.

Tan et al. denied Atty. Mendoza’s alleged "intervention," claiming that when he filed Special Proceedings No.
107812 with the CFI of Manila, the decision to prohibit GENBANK from doing business had already been made by
the Central Bank Monetary Board. Also, Atty. Mendoza, in appearing as their counsel in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-
0099, does not take a position adverse to his former client, the Central Bank.

The first concern in assessing the applicability of the Rule is the definition of "matter." The American Bar Association
Committee on Ethics and Professional Responsibility stated in its Formal Opinion 342 that:

"Although a precise definition of "matter" as used in the Disciplinary Rule is difficult to formulate, the term seems to
contemplate a discrete and isolatable transaction or set of transactions between identifiable parties. Perhaps
the scope of the term "matter" may be indicated by examples. The same lawsuit or litigation is the same matter. The
same issue of fact involving the same parties and the same situation or conduct is the same matter. By contrast,
work as a government employee in drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures,
regulations, or laws, or in briefing abstract principles of law, does not disqualify the lawyer under DR 9-101
(B) from subsequent private employment involving the same regulations, procedures, or points of law; the
same "matter" is not involved because there is lacking the discrete, identifiable transaction or conduct
involving a particular situation and specific parties.

In the case at bar, the Court’s task is to determine whether Special Proceedings No. 107812 falls within the concept
of "matter." This must be analyzed in relation with Civil Case No. 0096. Anent Civil Cases Nos. 0097, 0098 and
0099, there is no doubt that they do not involve the shares of stocks of Tan et al. in Allied Bank. Thus, only Special
Proceedings No. 107812 and Civil Case No. 0096 must be considered.

Special Proceedings No. 107812 is a "petition by the Central Bank for Assistance in the Liquidation of General Bank
and Trust Company" filed by Atty. Mendoza as Solicitor General. The parties therein are the Central Bank of the
Philippines and Arnulfo B. Aurellano, on the one hand, and the Worldwide Insurance & Surety Company, Midland
Insurance Corporation, Standard Insurance Co., Inc and General Bank & Trust Company, on the other. The issues,
among others, are whether or not the Central Bank acted in good faith in ordering the liquidation of GENBANK; and,
whether the bidding for GENBANK is a sham.

Civil Case No. 0096 is for the annulment of various sequestration orders issued by the PCGG over Tan et
al.’s properties. The parties therein are Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corporation, Iris Holdings &
Development Corp., Virgo Holdings & Development Corp., and Jewel Holdings, Inc., as petitioners, and the PCGG,
as respondent. The issues here are "whether the Sequestration Order issued by the PCGG on June 19, 1986 over
the shares of stocks in Allied Bank of Lucio C. Tan and his co-petitioners in Civil Case No. 0096 was issued without
notice, hearing and evidence."

A careful perusal of the above distinctions shows that the two cases are different in all aspects, such as the parties,
issues, facts and relief sought. Special Proceedings No. 107812 cannot therefore be considered a "matter" in
 24

connection with which Atty. Mendoza accepted his engagement as counsel in Civil Case No. 0096. The connection
between the two cases, if there be, is very minimal as to give rise to the application of the proscription.

As aptly stated by Justice Puno:

"But more important, the ‘matter’ involved in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is entirely different from the ‘matter’ involved
in Civil Case No. 0096. Again the bald facts speak for themselves. It is given that Atty. Mendoza had nothing to do
with the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK. It is also given that he did not participate in the sale of
GENBANK to Allied Bank. The ‘matter’ where he got himself involved was in informing Central Bank on
the procedure provided by law to liquidate GENBANK through the courts and in filing the necessary petition in Sp.
Proc. No. 107812 in the then Court of First Instance. The subject ‘matter’ Sp. Proc. No. 107812, however, is not
the same nor related to but different from the subject ‘matter’ in Civil Case No. 0096. Civil Case No. 0096
involves the sequestration of the stocks owned by Tan, et al., in Allied Bank on the alleged ground that they are
ill- gotten. The case does not involve the liquidation of GENBANK. Nor does it involve the sale of GENBANK to
Allied Bank. Whether the shares of stocks of the reorganized Allied Bank are ill-gotten is far removed from the issue
of the dissolution and liquidation of GENBANK. GENBANK was liquidated by the Central Bank due, among others,
to the banking malpractices of its owners and officers. In other words, the legality of the liquidation of GENBANK is
not an issue in the sequestration cases. Indeed, the jurisdiction of the PCGG does not include the dissolution and
liquidation of banks. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot apply
to Atty. Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 is an
intervention on a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096."

As Solicitor General, Atty. Mendoza represented the Republic of the Philippines in every case where it was involved.
As a matter of practice and procedure, he signed every pleading prepared by his Associates. Taking this into
consideration, will it be just to disqualify him in all the cases containing pleadings bearing his signature? The answer
must be in the negative. His disqualification might be too harsh a penalty for one who had served the government
during the best years of his life and with all his legal expertise.

Webster Dictionary18 defines "intervene" as "to come or happen between two points of time or events;" "to come or
be in between as something unnecessary or irrelevant;" or "to come between as an influencing force. The
ponencia defines "to intervene" as "to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or
circumstance." "Intervention" is interference that may affect the interest of others. Corollarily, the counterpart of
Rule 6.03 is the Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9-101 (B) of the American Bar Association (ABA), thus:

A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a manner in which he had "substantial responsibility" while he was
a public employee.

Substantial responsibility envisages a lawyer having such a heavy responsibility for the matter in question that it is
likely he becomes personally and substantially involve in the investigative or deliberative processes regarding the
matter.19 Since the word "intervene" has two connotations, one affecting interest of others and one done merely in
influencing others, Rule 6.03 should be read in the context of the former. To interpret it otherwise is to enlarge the
coverage of Rule 6.03. Surely, this could not have been the intention of the drafters of our Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Further, that Atty. Mendoza was furnished copies of pertinent papers relative to the liquidation of GENBANK is not
sufficient to disqualify him in Civil Case No. 0096. In Laker Airway Limited v. Pan American World Airways,20 it was
held that:

"Like the case law, policy considerations do not support the disqualification of a government attorney
merely because during his government service he had access to information about a corporation which
subsequently turned out to become an opponent in a private lawsuit. If the law were otherwise, the limiting
language of the Disciplinary Rule could be bypassed altogether by the simple claim that an attorney may have
viewed confidential information while employed by the government, and government lawyers would face perpetual
disqualification in their subsequent practices."
 25

In fine, I fully concur in Justice Puno’s Dissent that "Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility cannot
apply to Atty. Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a Solicitor General in Special Proceedings No.
107812 is an intervention in a matter different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096.

WHEREFORE, I vote to dismiss the instant petition for certiorari.

Footnotes

1
 Gregori v. Bank of America, 207 Cal.App. 3d 291 (1989); McPhearson v. Michaels Co., No. CO34390,
March 4, 2002.

2
 Executive order No. 1, issued on February 28, 1986.

3
 Resolution, at 3-4. See also Memorandum for Respondents, rollo, at 397-398.

4
 Attachment "F" of the Petition, rollo, at 57-63. Civil Case No. 0005 involved the PCGG’s and the OSG’s
complaint for "reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against Tan et al.’s shares of
stock in Allied Bank.

5
 Comment on the Petition, rollo, at 148. Civil Case No. 0100 involved Allied Bank’s petition seeking to nullify
PCGG’s Search and Seizure Order against Tan, et al.’s shares of stock.

6
 Entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by Presidential Commission on Good
Government, petitioner, vs. Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking
Corporation, respondents. 255 SCRA 438, March 29, 1996.

7
 Attachment "A" of the Petition, rollo, at 42.

8
 Attachment "A-1" of the Petition, rollo, at 43.

9
 7 Am Jur 2d §197 citing Higdon v. Superior Court (5th Dist) 227 Cal App 3d 1667, 278 Cal Rptr 588, 91
CDOS 1622, 91 Daily Journal DAR 2595.

10
 Mejia v. Alimorong, 4 Phil. 573, 1905, Insular Government v. Bishop of Nueva Segovia, 17 Phil. 487,
(1910); People v. Makaraig, 54 Phil. 904, 1930.

11
 Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 359 (2001); Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 22 SCRA
785 (1968).

12
 111 Phil. 699 (1961).

13
 69 SCRA 556, G.R. No. L-41053. February 27, 1976.

14
 191 SCRA 610, G.R. No. 79119. November 22, 1990.

15
 Entitled Republic of the Philippines, represented by Presidential Commission on Good Government, vs.
Sandiganbayan, Sipalay Trading Corporation and Allied Banking Corporation, 255 SCRA 438, March 29,
1996.

16
 46 Am Jur 2d § 516.

17
 46 Am Jur 2d § 515

18
 Second Edition, New Twentieth Century Dictionary, Unabridged, 183.
 26
19
 ABA Formal Opinion 342 (November 24, 1975.

20
 103 F.R.D. 22; 1984 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 15513, June 26, 1984.

DISSENTING OPINION

CARPIO-MORALES, J.:

While I concur in the scholarly and ably-written dissent of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., I feel compelled to write a
separate dissenting opinion to reflect the additional reasons behind my position.

Justices Artemio V. Panganiban and Angelina Sandoval-Gutierrez are of the opinion that the petition can be
dismissed on procedural grounds, they contending that the Presidential Commission on Government (PCGG) is
precluded from filing a motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza as counsel in Civil Case Nos. 0096 since the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division) had already denied PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel in
Civil Case No. 0005. In short, they are invoking the doctrines of conclusiveness of judgment and law of the case.

I believe Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Morato1 penned by the distinguished Justice Vicente V. Mendoza is instructive.

To recall, Kilosbayan, Incorporated (Kilosbayan, Inc.), et al. filed on January 28, 1994 a petition with this Court
challenging the validity of the Contract of Lease between the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) and the
Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC) on the ground that the same was made in violation of the
charter of the PCSO. This Court in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.2 invalidated the contract.

One of the issues raised before this Court in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr. was the standing of
petitioners to maintain the suit. On that score, this Court held through Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Hilario
G. Davide, Jr. that petitioners had standing to sue.

As a result of the decision in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr., PCSO and PGMC entered into negotiations
for a new agreement which would conform to the Court’s decision.

On January 25, 1995, PCSO and PGMC signed an Equipment Lease Agreement (ELA).

On February 21, 1995, Kilosbayan, Inc, et al. filed a petition against then PCSO Chair Manuel Morato seeking to
declare the ELA invalid on the ground that it was substantially the same as the Contract of Lease nullified
in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr.

Its ruling in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v. Guingona, Jr. notwithstanding, this Court in Kilosbayan, Incorporated v.
Morato ruled that the therein petitioners did not have standing to sue.

It explained that the doctrines of law of the case and conclusiveness of judgment do not pose a barrier to the
determination of petitioners’ right to maintain the suit:

Petitioners argue that inquiry into their right to bring this suit is barred by the doctrine of "law of the case." We do not
think this doctrine is applicable considering the fact that while this case is a sequel to G.R. No. 113375, it is not its
continuation: The doctrine applies only when a case is before a court a second time after a ruling by an appellate
court. Thus in People v. Pinuila, 103 Phil. 992 999 (1958), it was stated:

"‘Law of the case’ has been defined as the opinion delivered on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that
whatever is once irrevocably established as the controlling legal rule of decision between the same
parties in the same case continues to be the law of these case, whether correct on general principles or not, so
long as the facts on which such decision was predicated continue to be facts of the case before the court." (21
C.J.S. 330)
 27

"It may be stated as a rule of general application that, where the evidence on a second or succeeding appeal is
substantially the same as that on the first or preceding appeal, all matters, questions, points, or issues adjudicated
on the prior appeal are the law of the case on all subsequent appeals and will not be considered or re-adjudicated
therein. (5 C.J.S. 1267)

"In accordance with the general rule stated in Section 1821, where after a definite determination, the court has
remanded the cause for further action below, it will refuse to examine question other than those arising
subsequently to such determination and remand, or other than the propriety of the compliance with its mandate; and
if the court below has proceeded in substantial conformity to the directions of the appellate court, its action will not
be questioned on a second appeal . . .

"As a general rule a decision on a prior appeal of the same is held to be the law of the case whether that decision is
right or wrong, the remedy of the party deeming himself aggrieved to seek a rehearing. (5 C.J.S. 1276-77)

"Questions necessarily involved in the decision on a former appeal will be regarded as the law of the case on a
subsequent appeal, although the questions are not expressly treated in the opinion of the court, as the presumption
is that all the facts in the case bearing on the point decided have received due consideration whether all or none of
them are mentioned in the opinion. (5 C.J.S. 1286-87)"

As this Court explained in another case. "The law of the case, as applied to a former decision of an appellate
court, ,merely expresses the practice of the courts in refusing to reopen what has been decided. It differs from res
judicata in that the conclusive of the first judgment is not dependent upon its finality.  The first judgment is generally,
if not universally, not final, It relates entirely to questions of law, and is confined in its questions of law, and is
confined in its operation to subsequent proceedings in the same case . . . ." (Municipality of Daet v. Court of
Appeals, 93 SCRA 503, 521 (1979))

It follows that since the present case is not the same one litigated by he parties before in G.R. No. 113375, the
ruling there cannot in any sense be regarded as "the law of this case." The parties are the same but the cases are
not.

Nor is inquiry into petitioners; right to maintain this suit foreclosed by the related doctrine of "conclusiveness of
judgment."3 According to the doctrine, an issue actually and directly passed upon and determined in a former suit
cannot again be drawn in question in any future action between the same parties involving a different of action.
(Peñalosa v. Tuason, 22 Phil. 303, 313 (1912); Heirs of Roxas v. Galido, 108. 582 [1960])

It has been held that the rule on conclusiveness of judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral
estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially unrelated claims are
involved. (Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 162, 59 L. Ed. 2d 210, 222 (1979); BATOR, MELTZER,
MISHKIN AND SHAPIRO, THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 1058, n. 2 (3rd Ed., 1988))
Following this ruling it was held in Commissioner v. Sunnen, 333 U.S. 591, 92 L. Ed. 898 (1947) that where a
taxpayer assigned to his wife interest in a patent in 1928 and in a suit it was determined that the money paid to his
wife for the years 1929-1931 under the 1928 assignment was not part of his taxable income, this determination is
not preclusive in a second action for collection of taxes on amounts to his wife under another deed of assignment for
other years (1937 to 1941). For income tax purposes what is decided with respect to one contract is not conclusive
as to any other contract which was not then in issue, however similar or identical it may be. The rule on collateral
estoppel it was held, "must be confined to situations where the matter raised in the second suit is identical in all
respects with that decided in the first preceding and where the controlling facts and applicable legal rules remain
unchanged." (333 U.S. at 599-600, 92 L. Ed. at 907) Consequently, "if the relevant facts in the two cases are
separate even though they may be similar or identical, collateral estoppel does not govern the legal issues which
occur in the second case. Thus the second proceeding may involve an instrument or transaction identical with but in
a form separable form, the one dealt with in the first proceeding. In that situation a court is free in the second
proceeding to make an independent examination of the legal matters at issue. . . ." (333 U.S. at 601, 92 L. Ed. at
908)

This exception to the General Rule of the Issue Preclusion is authoritatively formulated in Restatement of the Law
2d, on Judgments, as follows:
 28

§28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the
following circumstances:

....

(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new
determination is warranted in order to take account of an intervening change in the applicable legal context or
otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws; . . .

Illustration:

....

2. A brings an action against the municipality of B for tortious injury. The court sustain B's defense of
sovereign immunity and dismisses the action. Several years later A brings the second action against B for
an unrelated tortious injury occurring after the dismissal. The judgment in the first action is not conclusive
on the question whether the defense immunity is available to B. Note: The doctrine of stare decisis may lead
the court to refuse to reconsider the question of sovereign immunity. See §29, Comment i.

The question whether the petitioners have standing to question the Equipment or ELA is a legal question. As will
presently be shown, the ELA, which the petitioners seek to declare invalid in this proceeding, is essentially different
from the 1993 Contract of lease entered into by the PCSO with the PGMC. Hence the determination in the prior
case (G.R. No. 113375) that the petitioner had standing to challenge the validity of the 1993 Contract of Lease of
the parties does not preclude determination of their standing in the present suit. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; italics in the original)

The doctrine of law of the case does not, I believe, apply to the present case for this is the first time that the issue to
disqualify Atty. Mendoza has been elevated before this Court. It is the decision in this case which will be the law of
the case. A reading of Republic v. Sandiganbayan4 cited by Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez shows that the issue
currently before this Court was not passed upon. Thus, this Court in Republic v. Sandiganbayan stated:

The key issues, in query form, are:

(1) Was the SANDIGANBAYAN’s denial of the PCGG’s motion to dismiss proper?

(2) Should the SANDIGANBAYAN have disposed first such motion to dismiss rather than resolving it as part of the
judgment?

(3) Was the nullification of the sequestration order issued against SIPALAY and of the search and seizure order
issued against ALLIED correct?

(4) Were the sequestration and search and seizure orders deemed automatically lifted for failure to bring an action
in court against SIPALAY and ALLIED within the constitutionally prescribed period? 5

I also believe that the doctrine of conclusiveness of judgment does not apply since in the case at bar, the question
of whether the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza should be granted is undoubtedly a legal question. Moreover, Civil
Case No. 005 and Civil Case No. 0096 involve two different substantially unrelated claims.

Justices Panganiban and Sandoval-Gutierrez further opine that the order of the Sandiganbayan in Civil Case No.
0005 denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is not an interlocutory order but a final order, and that as a
result, the principle of res judicata applies.

With all due respect, I believe that we cannot characterize the denial of PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
as a final order. Black’s Law Dictionary defines interlocutory in the following manner:
 29

Provisional; interim; temporary; not final. Something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit
which decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy.  An interlocutory order or
decree is one which does not finally determine a cause of action but only decides some intervening matter
pertaining to the cause, and which requires further steps to be taken in order to enable the court to
adjudicate the cause on the merits.6 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Justice Oscar M. Herrera, an authority in remedial law, distinguishes between a final judgment and interlocutory
order in this wise:

The concept of final judgment, as distinguished from one which has become final or executory as of right (final and
executory), is definite and settled. A final judgment or order is one that finally disposes of a case, leaving
nothing more to be done by the Court in respect thereto, e.g., an adjudication on the merits which, on the
basis of the evidence presented at the trial, declares categorically what the rights and obligations of the
parties are and which party is in the right; or a judgment or order that dismisses an action on the ground,
for instance, of res judicata or prescription. Once rendered, the task of the Court is ended, as far as
deciding the controversy or determining the rights and liabilities of the litigants is concerned. Nothing more
remains to be done by the Court except to await the parties’ next move (which among others, may consist of the
filing of a motion for new trial or reconsideration, or the taking of an appeal) and ultimately, of course, to cause the
execution of the judgment once it becomes final, or to use the established and more distinctive term, final and
executory. (Investment, Inc. v. Court of Appeals cited in Denso [Phils.], Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 280; see also Bank of America NT & SA, G.R. No. 78017, June 8, 1990 186 SCRA 417)

An interlocutory order refers to something between the commencement and end of the suit which decides
some point or matter but it is not the final decision of the whole controversy.7 (Bitong v. Court of Appeals,
G.R. No. 123553, July 13, 1998, 96 SCAD 205) (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Justice Florenz D. Regalado is of the same view:

An order is considered interlocutory if it does not dispose of the case  but leaves something else to be done
by the trial court on the merits of the case. An order is final, for purposes of appeal, if it disposes of the
entire case.

Where the order is interlocutory, the movant has to wait for the judgment and then appeal from the
judgment, in the course of which appeal he can assign as error the said interlocutory order. The interlocutory
order cannot be appealed from separately from the judgment. The general rule is that where the interlocutory
order was rendered without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, the remedy
is certiorari, prohibition or mandamus depending on the facts of the case.

Where the order appealed from is interlocutory, the appellate court can dismiss the appeal even if no objection
thereto was filed by the appellee in either the trial or appellate court. 8 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Another respected scholar of remedial law, Justice Jose Y. Feria, has formulated this guideline in determining
whether an order is final or interlocutory:

The test to ascertain whether or not an order or a judgment is interlocutory or final: Does it leave something to be
done in the trial court with respect to the merits of the case? If it does, it is interlocutory; if it does not, it is
final. The key test to what is interlocutory is when there is something more to be done on the merits of the
case.9 (Emphasis and underscoring)

In fact, this same test was used in Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals,10 cited by Justice Panganiban to determine
whether the trial court’s order was interlocutory or final:

In this particular instance, the test to determine whether the order of 06 January 1995 is interlocutory or final would
be: Does it leave something else to be done by the trial court on the case? If it does, it is interlocutory, if it
does not, it is final. Evidently, the trial court would still have to hear the parties on the merits of the case…
 30

xxx

Indeed, the word "interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit
which decides some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy." An interlocutory order does
not terminate nor does it finally dispose of the is (sic) case; it does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the
parties’ contentions and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other but leaves something yet to be
done by the court before the case is finally decided on its merits. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Applying the foregoing test, it is clear that the order denying PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
is interlocutory because it does not finally dispose of the case.

Interestingly enough, the U.S. Supreme Court is in agreement with Justice Callejo’s conclusion that the
Sandiganbayan’s denial of PCGG’s motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza is an interlocutory order. In  Firestone Tire &
Rubber Company v. Risjord,11 the American Court ruled that an order denying motions to disqualify the opposing
party’s counsel in a civil case are not appealable prior to final judgment in underlying litigation since such an order
does not fall within the collateral order exception of Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corporation,12 which is cited
by Justice Sandoval-Gutierrez.

Under § 1291, the courts of appeals are vested with "jurisdiction of appeals from all final decisions of the district
courts ... except where a direct review may be had in the Supreme Court." We have consistently interpreted this
language as indicating that a party may not take an appeal under this section until there has been "a decision by the
District Court that ‘ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to do but execute the
judgment.’" Coopers s & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S. 463, 467, 98 S.Ct. 2454, 2457, 57 L.Ed.2d 351 (1978),
quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233, 65 S.Ct. 631, 633, 89 L.Ed. 911 (1945). This rule, that a party
must ordinarily raise all claims of error in a single appeal following final judgment on the merits, serves a number of
important purposes. It emphasizes the deference that appellate courts owe to the trial judge as the individual initially
called upon to decide the many questions of law and fact that occur in the course of a trial. Permitting piecemeal
appeals would undermine the independence of the district judge, as well as the special role that individual plays in
our judicial system. In addition, the rule is in accordance with the sensible policy of "avoid[ing] the obstruction to just
claims that would come from permitting the harassment and cost of a succession of separate appeals from the
various rulings to which a litigation may give rise, from its initiation to entry of judgment." Cobbledick v. United
States, 309 U.S. 323, 325, 60 S.Ct. 540, 541, 84 L.Ed. 783 (1940). See DiBella v. United States, 369 U.S. 121, 124,
82 S.Ct. 654, 656, 7 L.Ed.2d 614 (1962). The rule also serves the important purpose of promoting efficient judicial
administration. Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 170, 94 S.Ct. 2140, 2149, 40 L.Ed.2d 732 (1974).

Our decisions have recognized, however, a narrow exception to the requirement that all appeals under § 1291 await
final judgment on the merits. In Cohen v. Beneficial Industrial Loan Corp., supra, we held that a "small class" of
orders that did not end the main litigation were nevertheless final and appealable pursuant to § 1291. Cohen was a
shareholder's derivative action in which the Federal District Court refused to apply a state statute requiring a plaintiff
in such a suit to post security for costs. The defendant appealed the ruling without awaiting final judgment on the
merits, and the Court of Appeals ordered the trial court to require that costs be posted. We held that the Court of
Appeals properly assumed jurisdiction of the appeal pursuant to § 1291 because the District Court's order
constituted a final determination of a claim "separable from, and collateral to," the merits of the main proceeding,
because it was "too important to be denied review," and because it was "too independent of the cause itself to
require that appellate consideration be deferred until the whole case is adjudicated." Id., at 546, 69 S.Ct. at
1225. Cohen did not establish new law; rather, it continued a tradition of giving § 1291 a "practical rather than a
technical construction." Ibid. See, e.g., United States v. River Rouge Improvement Co., 269 U.S. 411, 413-414, 46
S.Ct. 144, 70 L.Ed. 339 (1926); Bronson v. LaCrosse & Milwaukee R. Co., 67 U.S. 524-531, 2 Black 524, 530-531,
17 L.Ed. 347 (1863); Forgay v. Conrad, 47 U.S. 201, 203, 6 How. 201, 203, 12 L.Ed.2d 404 (1848); Whiting v. Bank
of the United States, 38 U.S. 6, 15, 13 Pet. 6, 15, 10 L.Ed. 33 (1839). We have recently defined this limited class of
final "collateral orders" in these terms: "[T]he order must conclusively determine the disputed question, resolve an
important issue completely separate from the merits of the action, and be effectively unreviewable on appeal from a
final judgment." Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, supra, 437 U.S. at 468, 98 S.Ct. at 2457 (footnote omitted).
See Abney v. United States, 431 U.S. 651, 658, 97 S.Ct. 2034, 2039, 52 L.Ed.2d 651 (1977).
 31

[1] Because the litigation from which the instant petition arises had not reached final judgment at the time the notice
of appeal was filed. [FN11 the order denying petitioner's motion to disqualify respondent is appealable
under § 1291 only if it falls within the Cohen doctrine. The Court of Appeals held that it does not, and 5 of the
other 10 Circuits have also reached the conclusion that denials of disqualification motions are not immediately
appealable "collateral orders." [FN12] We agree with these courts that under  Cohen such an order is not
subject to appeal prior to resolution of the merits.

FN11. Counsel for respondent represented at oral argument in this Court that the case was, at that time, in the
discovery stage. Tr. of Oral Arg. 35-36.

FN12. See n. 10, supra.

An order denying a disqualification motion meets the first part of the "collateral order" test. It "conclusively
determine[s] the disputed question," because the only issue is whether challenged counsel will be permitted to
continue his representation. In addition, we will assume, although we do not decide, that the disqualification
question "resolve [s] an important issue completely separate from the merits of the action," the second part of the
test. Nevertheless, petitioner is unable to demonstrate that an order denying disqualification is "effectively
unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment" within the meaning of our cases.

In attempting to show why the challenged order will be effectively unreviewable on final appeal, petitioner alleges
that denying immediate review will cause it irreparable harm. It is true that the finality requirement should "be
construed so as not to cause crucial collateral claims to be lost and potentially irreparable injuries to be
suffered," Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 331, n. 11, 96 S.Ct. 893, 901, n. 11, 47 L.Ed.2d 18 (1976) . In support
of its assertion that it will be irreparably harmed, petitioner hints at "the possibility that the course of the proceedings
may be indelibly stamped or shaped with the fruits of a breach of confidence or by acts or omissions prompted by a
divided loyalty," Brief for Petitioner 15, and at "the effect of such a tainted proceeding in frustrating public policy,"  id.,
at 16. But petitioner fails to supply a single concrete example of the indelible stamp or taint of which it warns. The
only ground that petitioner urged in the District Court was that respondent might shape the products-liability
plaintiffs' claims for relief in such a way as to increase the burden on petitioner. Our cases, however, require much
more before a ruling may be considered "effectively unreviewable" absent immediate appeal

[2] To be appealable as a final collateral order, the challenged order must constitute "a complete, formal
and, in the trial court, final rejection," Abney v. United States, supra, 431 U.S. at 659, 97 S.Ct. at
2040, of a claimed right "where denial of immediate review would render impossible any review
whatsoever," United States v. Ryan, 402 U.S. 530, 533, 91 S.Ct. 1580, 1582, 29 L.Ed.2d 85 (1971). Thus we have
permitted appeals prior to criminal trials when a defendant has claimed that he is about to be subjected to forbidden
double jeopardy, Abney v. United States, supra, or a violation of his constitutional right to bail, Stack v. Boyle, 342
U.S. 1, 72 S.Ct. 1, 96 L.Ed. 3 (1951) because those situations, like the posting of security for costs involved in
Cohen, "each involved an asserted right the legal and practical value of which would be destroyed if it were not
vindicated before trial." United States v. MacDonald, 435 U.S. 850, 860, 98 S.Ct. 1547, 1552, 56 L.Ed.2d 18 (1978) .
By way of contrast, we have generally denied review of pretrial discovery orders, see, e. g., United States v. Ryan,
supra; Cobbledick v. United States, supra. Our rationale has been that in the rare case when appeal after final
judgment will not cure an erroneous discovery order, a party may defy the order, permit a contempt citation to be
entered against him, and challenge the order on direct appeal of the contempt ruling. See Cobbledick v. United
States, supra, at 327, 60 S.Ct. at 542. We have also rejected immediate appealability under § 1291 of claims that
"may fairly be assessed" only after trial, United States v. MacDonald, supra, at 860, and those involving
"considerations that are ‘enmeshed in the factual and legal issues comprising the plaintiff's cause of
action.’" Coopers & Lybrand v. Livesay, 437 U.S., at 469, 98 S.Ct., at 2458, quoting Mercantile National Bank v.
Langdeau, 371 U.S. 555, 558, 83 S.Ct. 520, 522, 9 L.Ed.2d 523 (1963).

An order refusing to disqualify counsel plainly falls within the large class of orders that are indeed
reviewable on appeal after final judgment, and not within the much smaller class of those that are not. The
propriety of the district court's denial of a disqualification motion will often be difficult to assess until its impact on the
underlying litigation may be evaluated, which is normally only after final judgment. The decision whether to disqualify
an attorney ordinarily turns on the peculiar factual situation of the case then at hand, and the order embodying such
a decision will rarely, if ever, represent a final rejection of a claim of fundamental right that cannot effectively be
 32

reviewed following judgment on the merits. In the case before us, petitioner has made no showing that its
opportunity for meaningful review will perish unless immediate appeal is permitted. On the contrary, should the
Court of Appeals conclude after the trial has ended that permitting continuing representation was prejudicial error, it
would retain its usual authority to vacate the judgment appealed from and order a new trial. That remedy seems
plainly adequate should petitioner's concerns of possible injury ultimately prove well founded. As the Second Circuit
has recently observed, the potential harm that might be caused by requiring that a party await final judgment before
it may appeal even when the denial of its disqualification motion was erroneous does not "diffe[r] in any significant
way from the harm resulting from other interlocutory orders that may be erroneous, such as orders requiring
discovery over a work-product objection or orders denying motions for recusal of the trial judge." Armstrong v.
McAlpin, 625 F.2d 433, 438 (1980), cert. pending, No. 80-431. But interlocutory orders are not appealable "on
the mere ground that they may be erroneous ." Will v. United States, 389 U.S. 90, 98, n. 6, 88 S.Ct. 269, 275, n.
6, 19 L.Ed.2d 305 (1967). Permitting wholesale appeals on that ground not only would constitute an unjustified
waste of scarce judicial resources, but also would transform the limited exception carved out in  Cohen into a license
for broad disregard of the finality rule imposed by Congress in § 1291. This we decline to do. [FN13]

FN13. Although there may be situations in which a party will be irreparably damaged if forced to wait until final
resolution of the underlying litigation before securing review of an order denying its motion to disqualify opposing
counsel, it is not necessary, in order to resolve those situations, to create a general rule permitting the appeal of all
such orders. In the proper circumstances, the moving party may seek sanctions short of disqualification, such as a
protective order limiting counsel's ability to disclose or to act on purportedly confidential information. If additional
facts in support of the motion develop in the course of the litigation, the moving party might ask the trial court to
reconsider its decision. Ultimately, if dissatisfied with the result in the District Court and absolutely determined that it
will be harmed irreparably, a party may seek to have the question certified for interlocutory appellate review
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), see n. 7, supra, and, in the exceptional circumstances for which it was designed, a
writ of mandamus from the court of appeals might be available. See In re Continental Investment Corp., supra, 637
F.2d, at 7; Community Broadcasting of Boston, Inc. v. FCC, 178 U.S.App.D.C., at 262, 546 F.2d, at 1028. See
generally Comment, The Appealability of Orders Denying Motions for Disqualification of Counsel in the Federal
Courts, 45 U.Chi.L.Rev. 450, 468-480 (1978). We need not be concerned with the availability of such extraordinary
procedures in the case before us, because petitioner has made no colorable claim that the harm it might suffer if
forced to await the final outcome of the litigation before appealing the denial of its disqualification motion is any
greater than the harm suffered by any litigant forced to wait until the termination of the trial before challenging
interlocutory orders it considers erroneous.

III

[3][4][5] We hold that a district court's order denying a motion to disqualify counsel is not appealable
under § 1291 prior to final judgment in the underlying litigation. [FN14

FN14. The United States in its brief amicus curiae, has challenged petitioner's standing to attack the order
permitting respondent to continue his representation of the plaintiffs. In light of our conclusion that the Eighth Circuit
was without jurisdiction to hear petitioner's appeal, we have no occasion to address the standing issue. 13 (Emphasis
and underscoring supplied; italics in the original)

The ruling in Firestone was subsequently reiterated in Flanagan v. United States14 and Richardson-Merrell, Inc. v.
Koller.15

Justice Panganiban further suggests that the prohibition in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility is
not perpetual but merely lasts for five years primarily relying on the Civil Code provisions on prescription and the
doctrine that the right to practice law is a property right protected by the Constitution.

I do not agree with this framework of analysis. Carried to its logical conclusion, Justice Panganiban’s proposal would
mean that after five years from the termination of the attorney-client relationship, all lawyers would be able to
represent an interest in conflict with that of the former client and that they would no longer be bound by the rule on
privileged communication.

It bears emphasis that the law is not trade nor a craft but a profession, a noble profession at that.
 33

The practice of law is a profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted only to those who
are qualified and who possess good moral character. If the respect of the people in the honor and integrity of the
legal profession is to be retained, both lawyers and laymen must recognize and realize that the legal profession is a
profession and not a trade, and that the basic ideal of that profession is to render public service and secure justice
for those who seek its aid. It is not a business, using bargain counter methods to reap large profits for those who
conduct it. From the professional standpoint, it is expressive of three ideals – organization, learning and public
service. The gaining of a livelihood is not a professional but a secondary consideration. The professional spirit – the
spirit of public service – constantly curbs the urge of that instinct.

The law as a profession proceeds from the basic premise that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with
conditions and carries with it the responsibility to live up to its exacting standards and honored traditions. A person
enrolled in its ranks is called upon to aid in the performance of one of the basic purposes of the state – the
administration of justice. That the practice of law is a profession explains why lawyers repute and of eminence
welcome their designation as counsel de oficio, as an opportunity to manifest fidelity to the concept that law is a
profession.

The law must be thought of as ignoring commercial standards of success. The lawyer’s conduct is to be measured
not by the standards of trade and counting house but by those of his profession. The Code of Professional
Responsibility, particularly the ethical rule against advertising or solicitation of professional employment, rests on the
fundamental postulate that the practice of law is a profession.

In the matter of fixing his fees, an attorney should never forget that "the profession is a branch of the administration
of justice and not a mere money-making trade" and that his standing as a member of the bar "is not enhanced by
quibbling relative to just fees, equivalent to the bargaining between a prospective purchaser and a merchant in the
market before a sale is made." Law advocacy is not capital that yields profits. The returns are simple rewards for a
job done or service rendered. It is a calling that, unlike mercantile pursuits which enjoy a greater deal of freedom
from government interference, is impressed with public interest, for which it is subject to State regulation. However,
while the practice of law is a profession and an attorney is primarily an officer of the court, he is as much entitled to
protection from the against any attempt by his client to escape payment of his just fees, as the client against
exaction by his counsel of excessive fees.

To summarize, the primary characteristics which distinguish the legal profession from business are: (a) "a duty of
public service, of which emolument is a by-product, and in which one may attain the highest eminence without
making much money;" (b) "a relation as officer of the court to the administration of justice involving thorough
sincerity, integrity, and reliability;" (c) "a relation to client in the highest degree fiduciary;" and (d) "a relation to
colleagues at the bar characterized by candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current business methods of
advertising and encroachment on their practice, or dealing directly with their clients.

These characteristics make the law a noble profession, and the privilege to practice it is bestowed only upon
individuals who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. Its basic ideal is to render service and to
secure justice for those who seek its aid. If it has to remain a noble and honorable profession and attain its ideal,
those enrolled in its ranks should not only master its tenets and principles but should also, by their lives, accord
continuing fidelity to them. And because they are the vanguards of the law and the legal systems, lawyers must at
all times conduct themselves in their professional and private dealings with honesty and integrity in a manner
beyond reproach.16

Moreover, the relation of attorney and client is, however, one of trust and confidence of the highest order. It is highly
fiduciary in nature and demands utmost fidelity and good faith.

… A lawyer becomes familiar with all the facts connected with his client’s case. He learns from his client the weak
points of the action as well as the strong ones. Such knowledge must be considered sacred and guarded with
care. No opportunity must be given him to take advantage of the client’s secrets.

The rule is a rigid one designed not alone to prevent the dishonest practitioner from fraudulent conduct but as well
to preclude the honest practitioner from putting himself in a position where he may be required to choose between
conflicting duties, and to protect him from unfounded suspicion of professional misconduct. The question is
 34

not necessarily one of right of the parties but of adhere to proper professional standards. An attorney
should not only keep inviolate his client’s confidence but should likewise avoid the appearance of treachery
and double-dealing.17 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; citations omitted)

Thus, in Nakpil v. Valdes,18 this Court through Justice Reynato S. Puno held that the test to determine whether there
is a conflict of interest in the representation is probability, not certainty of conflict.19

Justice Panganiban justifies his theory on the ground that in 5 years time, the lawyer will develop a mild case of
amnesia such that "in all probability, the lapse of the said period would also naturally obscure to a reasonable extent
a lawyer’s memory of details of a specific case despite active participation in the proceedings therein." He thus cites
his own personal experience as a member of this Court:

Modesty aside, in my nearly ten (10) years in this Court, I have disposed of about a thousand cases in full-length
ponencias and countless cases by way of unsigned minute or extended Resolutions. This does not include the
thousands of other cases, assigned to other members of the Court, in which I actively took part during their
deliberations. In all honesty, I must admit that I cannot with certainty recall the details of the facts and issues in each
of these cases, especially in their earlier ones.

While it is true that over time memory does fade, the ravages of time have been mitigated with the invention of the
paper and pen and its modern offspring – the computer. It is not uncommon for lawyers to resort to note taking in
the course of handling legal matters.

The proposition that "a profession, trade or calling is a property right within the meaning of our constitutional
guarantees" is not unqualified. In JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals 20 which Justice
Panganiban relies on, this Court held:

A profession, trade or calling is a property within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. One cannot be
deprived of the right to work and the right to make a living because these rights are property rights, the arbitrary and
unwarranted deprivation of which normally constitutes an actionable wrong.

Nevertheless, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power by the state particularly
when their conduct affects either the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the preservation of
the State, the public health and welfare and public morals. According to the maxim, sic utere tuo ut alienum non
laedas, it must of course be within the legitimate range of legislative action to define the mode and manner in which
every one may so use his own property so as not to pose injury to himself or others.

In any case, where the liberty curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of
regulatory measures is certainly much wider. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied; italics in the original;
citations omitted)

Under the foregoing, the perpetual application of Rule 6.03 is clearly a valid and proper regulation.

In his ponencia, Justice Reynato S. Puno labels as insignificant the role of then Solicitor General in the liquidation of
General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), saying that "it is indubitable from the facts that Atty. Mendoza had
no iota of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK" and that his only involvement was
"advising the Central Bank on how to proceed with the said bank’s liquidation and even filing the petition for its
liquidation with the CFI of Manila." Justice Puno observes that "the procedure of liquidation is simple and is given in
black and white in Republic Act No. 265, section 29."

Atty. Mendoza’s lack of participation in the decision of the Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK is to me not material.
What is material is his role in facilitating the liquidation of GENBANK through his legal expertise. In advising the
Central Bank, Atty. Mendoza did not just mechanically point to section 29 of Republic 265. As then Solicitor General,
and as a lawyer known for his keen legal acumen, Atty. Mendoza synthesized facts, which by reason of his position
he was privy to, and law with a view to successfully liquidate the bank.
 35

Ultimately, Justice Puno advocates for a liberal interpretation of Rule 6.03 since a strict interpretation would cause
"a chilling effect on government recruitment of able legal talent."

With all due respect, I cannot subscribe to this position which is grounded on the premise that this is "the only card
that the government may play to recruit lawyers." Effectively, this is likely to result in the compromising of ethical
standards which this Court must never allow. While it is desirable to recruit competent lawyers into government
service, this does not justify the disturbance of our mores.

The canons and rules of the Code of Professional Responsibility must be strictly construed. Admittedly the salary
for serving in government often pales in comparison to that of the private sector. I submit, however, that while
financial considerations are important, they are not the sole factor affecting recruitment of lawyers to the government
sector. I would like to think that serving in government is its own reward. One needs only to look at all of us
members of this Court to know that money is not everything. All of us have, at one point in our legal careers, been
tempted by the promise of financial success that private practice usually brings. But in the end, we decided to take
the road less traveled and serve in government. And I would like to believe that each and everyone of us has made
a difference. There is more to this mortal coil than the pursuit of material wealth. As Winston Churchill puts it: "What
is the use of living if it be not to strive for noble causes and make this muddled world a better place for those who
will live in it after we are gone?"

ACCORDINGLY, concurring in the dissenting opinion of Justice Romeo J. Callejo, Sr., I vote to grant the petition
insofar as Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned, thus granting the motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza in the
said case.

Footnotes

1
 246 SCRA 540 (1995).

2
 232 SCRA 110 (1994).

3
 The doctrine of "conclusiveness of judgment" is also called "collateral estoppel" or "preclusion of issues,"
as distinguished from "preclusion of claims" or res judicata. In the Rules of Court, the first (conclusiveness of
judgment, collateral estoppel or preclusion of issues) is governed by Rule 39, §49 (c) while the second ( res
judicata or preclusion of claims) is found in Rule 39, §49 (b).

4
 255 SCRA 438 (1996).

5
 Id. at 448-449.

6
 Black’s Law Dictionary 815 [1991], 6th ed.

7
 II O. Herrera, Remedial Law 528 (2000).

8
 F. Regalado, Remedial Law Compendium 492 (1997), 6th ed.

9
 2 J. Feria & M. Noche, Civil Procedure Annotated 152 (2000).

10
 365 SCRA 359 (2001).

11
 449 U.S. 368 (1981).

12
 337 U.S. 541 (1949).

13
 449 U.S. 368, 373-380 (1981).
 36
14
 465 U.S. 259 (1984).

15
 472 U.S. 424 (1985).

16
 R. Agpalo, Comments on the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Code of Judicial Conduct 3-5
(2004).

17
 Id. at 165.

18
 286 SCRA 758 (1998).

19
 Id. at 773.

20
 260 SCRA 319 (1996).

DISSENTING OPINION

CALLEJO, SR., J.:

The Code of Professional Responsibility is not designed for Holmes’ proverbial "bad man" who wants to know just
how many corners he may cut, how close to the line he may play, without running into trouble with the law. Rather, it
is drawn for the "good man" as a beacon to assist him in navigating an ethical course through the sometimes murky
waters of professional conduct.1

With due respect, I dissent from the majority opinion. I believe that the present case behooves the Court to strictly
apply the Code of Professional Responsibility and provide an ethical compass to lawyers who, in the pursuit of the
profession, often find themselves in the unchartered sea of conflicting ideas and interests. There is certainly, without
exception, no profession in which so many temptations beset the path to swerve from the line of strict integrity; in
which so many delicate and difficult questions of duty are continually arising. 2 The Code of Professional
Responsibility establishes the norms of conduct and ethical standards in the legal profession and the Court must not
shirk from its duty to ensure that all lawyers live up to its provisions. Moreover, the Court must not tolerate any
departure from the "straight and narrow" path demanded by the ethics of the legal profession and enjoin all lawyers
to be like Caesar’s wife – to be pure and appear to be so.3

Factual and Procedural Antecedents

On July 17, 1987, pursuant to its mandate under Executive Order No. 1 4 of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the
PCGG, on behalf of the Republic of the Philippines, filed with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for "reversion,
reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" against respondents Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio
T. Santos, Natividad P. Santos, Domingo Chua, Tan Hui Nee, Mariano Tanenglian, 5 Estate of Benito Tan Kee Hiong
(represented by Tarciana C. Tan), Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Harry C. Tan, Tan Eng Chan, Chung Poe Kee, Mariano
Khoo, Manuel Khoo, Miguel Khoo, Jaime Khoo, Elizabeth Khoo, Celso Ranola, William T. Wong, Ernesto B. Lim,
Benjamin T. Albacita, Willy Co, Allied Banking Corporation, Allied Leasing and Finance Corporation, Asia Brewery,
Inc., Basic Holdings Corp., Foremost Farms, Inc., Fortune Tobacco Corporation, Grandspan Development Corp.,
Himmel Industries, Iris Holdings and Development Corp., Jewel Holdings, Inc., Manufacturing Services and Trade
Corp., Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corp., Northern Tobacco Redrying Plant, Progressive Farms, Inc.,
Shareholdings, Inc., Sipalay Trading Corp., Virgo Holdings and Development Corp. (collectively referred to herein as
respondents Tan, et al., for brevity), then President Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R. Marcos, Panfilo O.
Domingo, Cesar Zalamea, Don Ferry and Gregorio Licaros. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 of the
Sandiganbayan (Second Division). In connection therewith, the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration on
properties allegedly acquired by the above-named persons by means of taking advantage of their close relationship
and influence with former President Marcos.

Shortly thereafter, respondents Tan, et al. filed with this Court petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction
seeking to, among others, nullify the writs of sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the comments
 37

thereon, this Court referred the cases to the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) for proper disposition, docketed therein
as follows:

a. Civil Case No. 0096 – Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Allied Banking Corp., Iris Holding and Development Corp.,
Virgo Holdings Development Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order
dated June 19, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation held by and/or in the name of
respondents Lucio Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Iris Holding and Development Corp., Virgo Holdings Development
Corp. and Jewel Holdings, Inc.;

b. Civil Case No. 0097 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N. Santos,
Jr., and Foremost Farms, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated August 12, 1986
sequestering the shares of stock in Foremost Farms, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao
Tan, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos and Florencio N. Santos, Jr.;

c. Civil Case No. 0098 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos,
Florencio N. Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc. and Fortune Tobacco Corp. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the
PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the shares of stock in Fortune Tobacco Corp. held by and/or in the
name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos, Florencio N.
Santos, Jr., Shareholdings, Inc.; and

d. Civil Case No. 0099 – Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos, Natividad Santos
and Shareholdings, Inc. v. PCGG, which seeks to nullify the PCGG’s Order dated July 24, 1986 sequestering the
shares of stock in Shareholdings, Inc. held by and/or in the name of Lucio Tan, Carmen Khao Tan, Mariano
Tanenglian, Florencio T. Santos and Natividad Santos.

In all these cases, respondents Tan, et al. are represented by their counsel Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza, who served
as the Solicitor General from 1972 to 1986 during the administration of former President Marcos.

The PCGG filed with the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) a motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. The PCGG alleged that Atty. Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to the Central
Bank, "actively intervened" in the liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK), which was
subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corporation. As shown above, among
the litigated properties are the sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp. (Civil Case No. 0096).

The acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. is outlined by the PCGG as follows:

1. In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) got into financial difficulties. The Central Bank then
extended an emergency loan to GENBANK reaching a total of ₱310 million. In extending this loan, the Central Bank,
however, took control of GENBANK with the execution of an irrevocable proxy by 2/3 of GENBANK’s outstanding
shares in favor of the Central Bank and the election of seven (7) Central Bank nominees to the 11-member Board of
Directors of GENBANK. Subsequently, on March 25, 1977, the Monetary Board of the Central Bank issued a
Resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent, forbidding it to do business and placing it under receivership.

2. In the meantime, a public bidding for the sale of GENBANK assets and liabilities was scheduled at 7:00 P.M. on
March 28, 1977. Among the conditions for the bidding were: (a) submission by the bidder of a letter of credit issued
by a bank acceptable to Central Bank to guaranty payment or as collateral of the Central Bank emergency loan; and
(b) a 2-year period to repay the said Central Bank emergency loan. On March 29, 1977, the Central Bank, through a
Monetary Board Resolution, approved the bid of the group of respondents Lucio Tan and Willy Co. This bid, among
other things, offered to pay only ₱500,000.00 for GENBANK assets estimated at ₱688,201,301.45; Capital Accounts
of ₱103,984,477.55; Cash of ₱25,698,473.00; and the takeover of the GENBANK Head Office and branch offices.
The required letter of credit was also not attached to the bid. What was attached to the bid was a letter of Panfilo O.
Domingo, as PNB President, promising to open an irrevocable letter of credit to secure the advances of the Central
Bank in the amount of ₱310 million. Without this letter of commitment, the Lucio Tan bid would not have been
approved. But such letter of commitment was a fraud because it was not meant to be fulfilled. Ferdinand E. Marcos,
Gregorio Licaros and Panfilo O. Domingo conspired together in giving the Lucio Tan group undue favors such as
the doing away with the required irrevocable letter of credit, the extension of the term of payment from two years to
 38

five years, the approval of second mortgage as collateral for the Central Bank advances which was deficient by
more than ₱90 Million, and many other concessions to the great prejudice of the government and of the GENBANK
stockholders.

3. GENBANK eventually became the Allied Banking Corporation in April 1977. Respondents Lucio Tan, Willy S. Co
and Florencio T. Santos are not only incorporators and directors but they are also the major shareholders of this
new bank.6

Atty. Mendoza allegedly "intervened" in the acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. since Atty.
Mendoza, in his capacity as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank’s officials on the procedure to bring
about GENBANK’s liquidation. Further, he appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition
for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. He filed the said petition with the Court of First Instance (now
Regional Trial Court) of Manila and docketed therein as Special Proceeding No. 107812. 7

The PCGG opined that Atty. Mendoza’s present appearance as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in the case
involving the sequestered shares of stock in Allied Banking Corp. runs afoul of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility proscribing former government lawyers from accepting "engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."

Acting on the said motion, the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) issued the assailed Resolution dated July 11, 2001
stating:

Acting on the PCGG’s "MOTION TO DISQUALIFY ATTY. ESTELITO P. MENDOZA AS COUNSEL FOR
PETITIONER" dated February 5, 1991 which appears not to have been resolved by then Second Division of this
Court, and it appearing that (1) the motion is exactly the same in substance as that motion filed in Civil Case No.
0005 as in fact, Atty. Mendoza in his "OPPOSITION" dated March 5, 1991 manifested that he was just adopting his
opposition to the same motion filed by PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 and (2) in the Court’s Order dated March 7,
1991, the herein incident was taken-up jointly with the said same incident in Civil Case No. 0005 (pp. 134-135, Vol.
I, Record of Civil Case No. 0096), this Division hereby reiterates and adopts the Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in
Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division (pp. 1418-1424, Vol. III, Record of Civil Case No. 0005) denying the said
motion as its Resolution in the case at bar.8

The PCGG sought the reconsideration thereof but its motion was denied in the assailed Resolution dated December
5, 2001, which reads:

Acting on respondent PCGG’s "MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION" dated August 1, 2001 praying for the
reconsideration of the Court’s Resolution dated July 12, 2001 denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Estelito P.
Mendoza as counsel for petitioners, to which petitioners have filed an "OPPOSITION TO MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION DATED AUGUST 1, 2001" dated August 29, 2001, as well as the respondent’s "REPLY (To
Opposition to Motion for Reconsideration) dated November 16, 2001, it appearing that the main motion to disqualify
Atty. Mendoza as counsel in these cases was exactly the same in substance as that motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza filed by the PCGG in Civil Case No. 0005 (re: Republic vs. Lucio Tan, et al.) and the resolutions of this
Court (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying the main motion as well as of the motion for reconsideration
thereof had become final and executory when PCGG failed to elevate the said resolutions to the Supreme Court,
the instant motion is hereby DENIED.9

The Resolution10 dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005, which was
adopted by the Fifth Division in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099, denied the similar motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza
as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. holding, in essence, that the PCGG "has failed to prove that there exists an
inconsistency between Atty. Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor General and his present employment as counsel
of the Lucio Tan group."11 The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) explained, thus:

... It has been said that the test of inconsistency in cases of the character under consideration is not whether the
attorney has ever appeared for the party against whom he proposes to appear, but whether his accepting the new
retainer will require him, in forwarding the interests of his new client, to do anything which will injuriously affect his
former client in any matter in which he formerly represented against him, and whether he will be called upon, in his
 39

new relation, to use against his former client any knowledge or information acquired through their former
connection. Nor does the rule imposing disability on the attorney mean that he, having once been employed by a
client, shall never thereafter appear in any matter against him but merely forbids the attorney’s appearance or acting
against the client where the attorney can use, to the detriment of such client, the information and confidences
acquired during the existence of their relation as attorney and client (7 C.J.S., Pp. 828-829, cited in Primavera
Farms, Inc., et al. vs. PCGG, supra). Significantly, PCGG’s "Reply" does not controvert Atty. Mendoza’s claim that in
appearing in the instant case, he does not take a position adverse to that he had taken in behalf of the Central Bank
of the Philippines in SP No. 107812. Neither did it challenge Atty. Mendoza’s claim that the position he took as
Solicitor General in behalf of the Central Bank in 1977 when he filed the said case (SP No. 107812) has been
maintained by his successors in office. In fact, even incumbent Central Bank Governor Jose Cuisia had interposed
no objection to Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for the Lucio Tan group for as long as he maintains the
same position he has taken on behalf of the Central Bank of the Philippines as Solicitor General, which position
refers to the various resolutions of the Monetary Board and actions of the Central Bank in regard General Bank and
Trust Co. as being regular and in accordance with law (Annex "A", Rejoinder, Records, Pp. 1404-1405). 12

The Sandiganbayan (Second Division) further observed that Atty. Mendoza’s appearance as counsel for
respondents Tan, et al. was well beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section 7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713
since he ceased to be the Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said provision prohibits a former public official or
employee from practicing his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with within
one year from his resignation, retirement or separation from public office.

As earlier stated, the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) was adopted by the Fifth
Division in the resolutions now being assailed by the PCGG. Hence, the recourse to this Court by the PCGG.

Procedural Issues

The following procedural issues are raised by respondents Tan, et al.: (1) whether the assailed Sandiganbayan
(Fifth Division) Resolutions dated July 11, 2001 and December 5, 2001 are final and executory; hence, the PCGG
should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and not the instant petition
for certiorari under Rule 65 thereof; and (2) whether the instant petition is already barred by the Sandiganbayan
(Second Division) Resolution dated April 22, 1991 under the doctrine of res judicata.

In contending that the PCGG availed itself of the wrong remedy in filing the instant petition for certiorari,
respondents Tan, et al. rely on Section 1, Rule 45 of the Rules of Court which reads:

Section 1. Filing of petition with Supreme Court. - A party desiring to appeal by certiorari from a judgment or final
order or resolution of the Court of Appeals, the Sandiganbayan, the Regional Trial Court or other courts whenever
authorized by law, may file with the Supreme Court a verified petition for review on certiorari. The petition shall raise
only questions of law which must be distinctly set forth.

Section 7 of Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended by Section 3 of Rep. Act No. 7975, likewise, states:

Sec. 7. Form, Finality and Enforcement of Decisions. –

Decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan shall be appealable to the Supreme Court.

I am not persuaded by the arguments proffered by respondents Tan, et al. The above-mentioned rules do not
preclude the resort to this Court by way of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court of orders or
resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. The special civil action of certiorari may be availed of where there is no appeal or
any plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 13

In this case, the remedy of appeal is not available to the PCGG because the denial of its motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. is an interlocutory order; hence, not appealable. The word
"interlocutory" refers to "something intervening between the commencement and the end of a suit which decides
 40

some point or matter, but is not a final decision of the whole controversy." 14 An interlocutory order does not terminate
nor does it finally dispose of the case; it does not end the task of the court in adjudicating the parties’ contentions
and determining their rights and liabilities as against each other but leaves something yet to be done by the court
before the case is finally decided on the merits.15

Accordingly, this Court, in not a few cases, had taken cognizance of petitions for certiorari of resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan which were in the nature of interlocutory orders. For example, in Serapio v. Sandiganbayan,16 we
took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petition for certiorari which assailed the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan
denying the petition for bail, motion for a reinvestigation and motion to quash filed by accused Edward Serapio.
Also, in San Miguel Corporation v. Sandiganbayan,17 we took cognizance of, albeit dismissed, the petitions
for certiorari of several resolutions of the Sandiganbayan involving the sequestered shares of stock in the San
Miguel Corp.

To my mind, the PCGG properly filed the instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 to assail the resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) denying its motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al.
in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099.

With respect to the second procedural issue raised by respondents Tan, et al., i.e., the instant petition is already
barred by the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 under the
doctrine of res judicata, I submit that the doctrine of res judicata finds no application in this case.

Section 47, Rule 39 of the Revised Rules of Court reads in part:

Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders. – The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the
Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment or final order, may be as follows:

(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors-in-
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors-in-interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto.

The doctrine of res judicata comprehends two distinct concepts – (1) bar by former judgment and (2) conclusiveness
of judgment.18 Paragraph (b) embodies the doctrine of res judicata or res adjudicata or bar by prior judgment, while
paragraph (c) estoppel by judgment or conclusiveness of judgment. 19 In Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M.
Magalit,20 Justice Artemio Panganiban explained that the term "final" in the phrase judgments or final orders in the
above section has two accepted interpretations. In the first sense, it is an order that one can no longer appeal
because the period to do so has expired, or because the order has been affirmed by the highest possible tribunal
involved.21 The second sense connotes that it is an order that leaves nothing else to be done, as distinguished from
one that is interlocutory. 22 The phrase refers to a final determination as opposed to a judgment or an order that
settles only some incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action; for example, an order postponing a
trial, denying a motion to dismiss or allowing intervention. Orders that give rise to res judicata or conclusiveness of
judgment apply only to those falling under the second category. 23

For res judicata to serve as an absolute bar to a subsequent action, the following elements must concur: (1) there is
a final judgment or order; (2) the court rendering it has jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties; (3) the
judgment is one on the merits; and (4) there is, between the two cases, identity of parties, subject matter and cause
of action.24 When there is no identity of causes of action, but only an identity of issues, there exists res judicata in the
concept of conclusiveness of judgment.25
 41

In any case, whether as a bar by prior judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, the doctrine of res
judicata applies only when there is a judgment or final order which, as earlier discussed, leaves nothing else to be
done. As explained by Justice Panganiban, a judgment or an order on the merits is one rendered after a
determination of which party is upheld, as distinguished from an order rendered upon some preliminary or formal or
merely technical point.26 To reiterate, the said judgment or order is not interlocutory and does not settle only some
incidental, subsidiary or collateral matter arising in an action.

The Resolution dated April 22, 1991 of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case No. 0005 denying the
PCGG’s similar motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. therein was evidently an
interlocutory order as it did not terminate or finally dispose of the said case. It merely settled an incidental or
collateral matter arising therein. As such, it cannot operate to bar the filing of another motion to disqualify Atty.
Mendoza in the other cases because, strictly speaking, the doctrine of res judicata, whether to serve as a bar by
prior judgment or in the concept of conclusiveness of judgment, does not apply to decisions or orders adjudicating
interlocutory motions.27

Substantive Issue

The substantive issue in this case is whether the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents
Tan, et al. in Civil Cases Nos. 0096-0099 violates the interdiction embodied in Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Canon 6 of our Code of Professional Responsibility reads:

CANON 6 – THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICE IN THE DISCHARGE
OF THEIR OFFICIAL DUTIES.

Rule 6.01 – The primary duty of a lawyer in public prosecution is not to convict but to see that justice is done. The
suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of establishing the innocence of the accused is highly
reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary action.

Rule 6.02 – A lawyer in government service shall not use his public position to promote or advance his private
interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.

Rule 6.03 – A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.

A good number of the Canons in our present Code of Professional Responsibility were adopted from the Canons of
Professional Ethics of the American Bar Association (ABA). 28 Rule 6.03, in particular, is a restatement of Canon 36
of the Canons of Professional Ethics which provided:

36. RETIREMENT FROM JUDICIAL POSITION OR PUBLIC EMPLOYMENT.

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has previously
acted in a judicial capacity.

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ, should not after his retirement
accept employment in connection with any matter which he has investigated or passed upon while in such
office or employ.

Indeed, the restriction against a public official from using his public position as a vehicle to promote or advance his
private interests extends beyond his tenure on certain matters in which he intervened as a public official. 29 Rule 6.03
makes this restriction specifically applicable to lawyers who once held public office. A plain reading of the rule shows
that the interdiction (1) applies to a lawyer who once served in the government, and (2) relates to his accepting
"engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
 42

In the United States, an area of concern involving ethical considerations applicable to former government lawyers is
called the "revolving door" – the process by which lawyers temporarily enter government service from private life
then leave it for large fees in private practice, where they can exploit information, contacts, and influence garnered
in government service.30 To address this, the disqualification of a former government lawyer who has entered private
practice may be sought based either on "adverse-interest conflict" or "congruent-interest representation conflict."

In the "adverse-interest conflict," a former government lawyer is enjoined from representing a client in private
practice if the matter is substantially related to a matter that the lawyer dealt with while employed by the government
and if the interests of the current and former clients are adverse. 31 It must be observed that the "adverse-interest
conflict" applies to all lawyers in that they are generally disqualified from accepting employment in a subsequent
representation if the interests of the former client and the present client are adverse and the matters involved are
the same or substantially related.32 On the other hand, in "congruent-interest representation conflict," the
disqualification does not really involve a conflict at all, because it prohibits the lawyer from representing a private
practice client even if the interests of the former government client and the new client are entirely parallel. 33 The
"congruent-interest representation conflict," unlike the "adverse-interest conflict," is unique to former government
lawyers.

I believe that Atty. Mendoza’s present engagement as counsel for respondents Tan,  et al. in Civil Case No. 0096,
which involves the sequestered shares of stocks in Allied Banking Corp., violates the ethical precept embodied in
Rule 6.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, which is akin to the doctrine of "congruent-interest
representation conflict."

Contrary to the majority opinion, the subject

matter in Civil Case No. 0096 is connected with

or related to a "matter," i.e. the liquidation

of GENBANK, in which Atty. Mendoza had

intervened as the Solicitor General

The qualifying words or phrases that define the prohibition in Rule 6.03 are (1) "any matter" and (2) "he had
intervened" thereon while he was in the government service. 34

The United States’ ABA Formal Opinion No. 324 recognized that it is difficult to formulate a precise definition of
"matter" as used in their Disciplinary Rule (DR), nonetheless, it suggested that the term "contemplates a discrete
and isolatable transaction or set of transaction between identifiable parties." 35

There is no dispute that Atty. Mendoza, as the Solicitor General, advised the Central Bank on the procedure to bring
about the liquidation of GENBANK. It is, likewise, admitted by respondents Tan, et al. that Atty. Mendoza filed with
the then CFI of Manila, the petition for assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK (Special Proceeding No.
107812).36 GENBANK was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and became Allied Banking Corp.,
whose shares of stocks have been sequestered by the PCGG and presently subject of Civil Case No. 0096.

The majority opinion downplays the role of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he "merely advised the Central Bank on
the legal procedure to liquidate GENBANK" which procedure is "given in black and white in R.A. No. 265, section
29." This procedural advice, according to the majority opinion, "is not the matter contemplated by Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility."

On the contrary, the acts of Atty. Mendoza may be rightfully considered as falling within the contemplation of the
term "matter" within the meaning of Rule 6.03. Specifically, Atty. Mendoza’s giving counsel to the Central Bank on
the procedure to go about GENBANK’s liquidation and the filing of the petition therefor in Special Proceedings No.
107812 did not merely involve the drafting, enforcing or interpreting government or agency procedures, regulations
or laws, or briefing abstract principles of law. 37 These acts were discrete, isolatable as well as identifiable
 43

transactions or conduct involving a particular situation and specific party, i.e., the procedure for the liquidation of
GENBANK. Consequently, the same can be properly considered "matter" within the contemplation of Rule 6.03.

Moreover, contrary to the contention of respondents Tan, et al., the interdiction in Rule 6.03 does not only apply if
precisely the same legal issues are involved in each representation. 38 The Comments of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) that drafted our Code of Professional Responsibility explained that the restriction covers
"engagement or employment, which means that he cannot accept any work or employment from anyone that
will involve or relate to the matter in which he intervened as a public official." 39 The sequestration of the shares of
stock in Allied Banking Corp. in the names of respondents Tan, et al., which is subject of Civil Case No. 0096,
necessarily involves or relates to their acquisition of GENBANK upon its liquidation, in which Atty. Mendoza had
intervened as the Solicitor General.

It should be emphasized that Atty. Mendoza’s participation in GENBANK’s liquidation is sufficient to place his
present engagement as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0096 within the ambit of Rule 6.03. His
role was significant and substantial. The Memorandum dated March 29, 1977 prepared by certain key officials 40 of
the Central Bank, is revealing:

Immediately after said meeting, we had a conference with the Solicitor General and he advised that the
following procedure should be taken:

1. Management should submit a memorandum to the Monetary Board reporting that studies and evaluation had
been made since the last examination of the bank as of August 31, 1976 and it is believed that the bank can not be
reorganized or placed in a condition so that it may be permitted to resume business with safety to its depositors and
creditors and the general public.

2. If the said report is confirmed by the Monetary Board, it shall order the liquidation of the bank and indicate the
manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan.

3. The Central Bank shall inform the principal stockholders of Genbank of the foregoing decision to liquidate the
bank and the liquidation plan approved by the Monetary Board.

4. The Solicitor General shall then file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which had
been taken and praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of Genbank. 41

The Minutes No. 13 dated March 29, 1977 of the Monetary Board likewise shows that Atty. Mendoza was furnished
copies of pertinent documents relating to GENBANK in order to aid him in filing with the court the petition for
assistance in the bank’s liquidation. The pertinent portion of the said minutes reads:

The Board decided as follows:

E. To authorize Management to furnish the Solicitor General with a copy of the subject memorandum of the
Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank dated March 29, 1977, together with copies of:

1. Memorandum of the Deputy Governor, Supervision and Examination Sector, to the Monetary Board, dated March
25, 1977, containing a report on the current situation of Genbank;

2. Aide Memoire on the Antecedent Facts Re: General Bank and Trust Co., dated March 23, 1977;

3. Memorandum of the Director, Department of Commercial and Savings Bank, to the Monetary Board, dated March
24, 1977, submitting, pursuant to Section 29 of R.A. No. 265, as amended by P.D. No. 1007, a report on the state of
insolvency of Genbank, together with its attachments; and

4. Such other documents as may be necessary or needed by the Solicitor General.

 44

for his use in filing a petition in the Court of First Instance praying the assistance of the Court in the liquidation of
Genbank."42

By advising the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the liquidation of GENBANK and, more significantly,
by filing the petition for assistance in its liquidation, Atty. Mendoza had clearly intervened in the liquidation of
GENBANK and its subsequent acquisition by respondents Tan, et al.

I disagree with the ponencia’s holding that Atty. Mendoza could not be considered as having intervened as it
describes the participation of Atty. Mendoza by stating that he "had no iota of participation in the decision of the
Central Bank to liquidate GENBANK."

That the decision to declare GENBANK insolvent was made wholly by the Central Bank, without the participation of
Atty. Mendoza, is not in question. Rather, it was his participation in the proceedings taken subsequent to such
declaration, i.e., his giving advise to the Central Bank on how to proceed with GENBANK’s liquidation and his filing
of the petition in Special Proceeding No. 107812 pursuant to Section 29 43 of Rep. Act No. 265, that constitutes
"intervention" as to place him within the contemplation of Rule 6.03. To intervene means –

1: to enter or appear as an irrelevant or extraneous feature or circumstance; 2: to occur, fall or come between
points of time or events; 3: to come in or between by way of hindrance or modification: INTERPOSE; 4: to
occur or lie between two things …44

Further, "intervention" is defined as –

1: the act or fact of intervening: INTERPOSITION;

2: interference that may affect the interests of others …45

With the foregoing definitions, it is not difficult to see that by giving counsel to the Central Bank on how to proceed
with GENBANK’s liquidation and filing the necessary petition therefor with the court, Atty. Mendoza "had
intervened," "had come in," or "had interfered," in the liquidation of GENBANK and the subsequent acquisition by
respondents Tan, et al. of the said banking institution. Moreover, his acts clearly affected the interests of GENBANK
as well as its stockholders.

Contrary to the majority opinion, Rule 6.03 applies

even if Atty. Mendoza did not "switch sides" or did not

take inconsistent sides. Rule 6.03 applies even if

no conflict of interest exists between Atty. Mendoza’s

former government client (Central Bank) and

his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.)

As earlier intimated, Rule 6.03 is a restatement of Canon 36 of the ABA’s Canons of Professional Ethics, now
superseded by the ABA’s Code of Professional Responsibility. In lieu of the old Canon 36, Canon 9 of the ABA’s
Code of Professional Responsibility mandates that:

A lawyer should avoid even the appearance of professional impropriety.

Providing specificity to this general caveat, Disciplinary Rule (DR) 9–101(B) commands, thus:

A lawyer shall not accept private employment in a matter in which he had substantial responsibility while he was a
public employee.
 45

The purpose of the interdiction, as stated in the ABA Committee on Professional Ethics, Opinion No. 37, is –

"[to avoid] the manifest possibility that … [a former Government lawyer’s] action as a public legal official might be
influenced (or open to the charge that it had been influenced) by the hope of later being employed privately to
uphold or upset what he had done. 46

The old Canon 36, as well as the present Canon 9 and DR9-101(B), rest on the policy consideration that an attorney
must seek to avoid even the appearance of evil.47

Being undoubtedly of American origin, the interpretation adopted by the American courts and the ABA has
persuasive effect on the interpretation of Rule 6.03. 48 Accordingly, I find the case of General Motors Corporation v.
City of New York,49 where the pertinent ethical precepts were applied by the United States Court of Appeals (2nd
Circuit), particularly instructive. The said US court disqualified the privately retained counsel of the City of New York
in the antitrust case it filed against the General Motors Corp. because the said counsel, a former lawyer of the US
Department of Justice, had not only participated in the latter’s case against General Motors Corp. but signed the
complaint in that action.

George D. Reycraft, the counsel whose disqualification was sought in that case, served as a trial attorney assigned
at the General Litigation Services of the Antitrust Division of the US Department of Justice from 1952 to 1962.
Sometime in 1954, he participated in the investigation of the alleged monopolization by General Motors Corp. of the
city and intercity bus business. The investigation culminated with the filing of the antitrust complaint against General
Motors Corp. in 1956. Reycraft signed the said complaint but alleged that after 1958 through the time that he left the
Department of Justice in 1962, he no longer had any participation in that case.

In disqualifying Reycraft, the US Court gave short shrift to the argument that Reycraft "has not changed sides" –  i.e.
"there is nothing antithetical in the postures of the two governments in question," stating that, per Opinion No. 37 of
the ABA Commission on Professional Ethics, the ethical precepts of Canon 9 and DR9-101(B) apply irrespective of
the side chosen in private practice. The said court believed that it "is as it should be for there lurks great potential for
lucrative returns in following into private practice the course already charted with the aid of governmental
resources."50

The US Court stressed that Reycraft not only participated in the investigation, but he signed the complaint in that
action and admittedly had "substantial responsibility" in its investigatory and preparatory stages. It thus concluded
that "where the overlap of issues is so plain and the involvement while in Government employ is so direct, the
appearance of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification." 51

The General Motors case is illustrative of the "congruent-interest representation conflict" doctrine. It bears stressing
that this doctrine applies uniquely to former government lawyers and has been distinguished from the normal rule
applicable for non-government lawyers in this wise –

To illustrate the normal rule for non-government lawyers, imagine that the lawyer has represented passenger A and
has recovered substantial damages in a suit against a driver. No conflict of interest principle or rule restricts the
lawyer from later representing passenger B against the driver with respect to exactly the same accident. B may
obtain the benefits of the lawyer’s help regardless of the fact that the lawyer might be able to employ to B’s
advantage information and strategies developed in the representation of A. The critical element is that the interest of
A and B do not conflict.

The analysis does not change if we move from an area that is entirely private into one that is arguably more
connected with the public interest. Suppose a lawyer in private practice represents Small Soap Company in its suit
for damages under the federal antitrust laws against Giant Soap Company. The lawyer would not be disqualified
from representing Medium Soap Company against Giant Soap in a succeeding suit for damages based on precisely
the same conspiracy. The congruence of interests between Small Soap and Medium Soap would almost certainly
mean that the lawyer could represent both clients. In the absence of a conflict – an opposing interest between the
two clients – the existence of a substantial relationship between the matters involved in both cases is irrelevant.
 46

Now, suppose the lawyer has filed suit in behalf of the government against Giant Soap Company to force divestiture
of an acquired company on a theory that, because of the acquisition, Giant Soap has monopolized an industry in
conflict with antitrust laws. May the lawyer, after leaving government service and while in private practice, represent
Medium Soap Company against Giant Soap in a suit for damages based on the same antitrust conspiracy? Does
the absence of opposing interests between Medium Soap and the lawyer’s former government client similarly mean
that there should be no disqualification?

At this point, the rules for the former government lawyer diverge sharply from the normal former-client conflict rules:
the lawyer is disqualified from representing the successive client in private practice, despite the fact that the
interests of the client and the lawyer’s former government client are apparently aligned. All that is required for
disqualification is the relationship between the former and the succeeding representations.52

The rationale for the "congruent-interest representation conflict" doctrine has been explained, thus:

The rationale for disqualification is rooted in a concern with the impact that any other rule would have upon the
decisions and actions taken by the government lawyer during the course of the earlier representation of the
government. Both courts and commentators have expressed the fear that permitting a lawyer to take action in behalf
of a government client that later could be to the advantage of private practice client would present grave dangers
that a government lawyer’s largely discretionary actions would be wrongly influenced by the temptation to secure
private practice employment or to favor parties who might later become private practice clients …

The fear that government lawyers will misuse government power in that way is not idle. Lawyers who represent the
government often exercise enormous discretion unchecked by an actual client who oversees the lawyer’s work. For
that reason a special rule is needed to remove the incentive for government lawyers to take discretionary decisions
with an eye cast toward advantages in future, nongovernmental employment. The broad disqualification
accomplishes that and, particularly under rubrics that do not invariably require disqualification of the entire firm with
which the former government lawyer practices, does it without unnecessarily discouraging lawyers from entering
temporary public service.53

The foregoing disquisition applies to the case of Atty. Mendoza. Indeed, a textual reading of Rule 6.03 of our Code
of Professional Responsibility reveals that no conflict of interests or adverse interests is required for the interdiction
to apply. If it were so, or if conflict of interests were an element, then the general conflict of interests rule (Rule
15.03)54 would apply. Rather, the interdiction in Rule 6.03 broadly covers "engagement or employment in connection
with any matter in which he had intervened while in the said service." To reiterate, the drafters of our Code of
Professional Responsibility had construed this to mean that a lawyer "cannot accept any work or employment from
anyone that will involve or relate to the matter in which he intervened as a public official, except on behalf of the
body or authority which he served during his public employment." 55

In Civil Case No. 0096, Atty. Mendoza is certainly not representing the Central Bank but respondents Tan, et al.
Granting arguendo that the interests of his present private practice clients (respondents Tan, et al.) and former
government client (Central Bank) are apparently aligned, the interdiction in Rule 6.03 applies.

Rule 6.03 purposely does not contain an explicit

temporal limitation because cases have to be

resolved based on their peculiar circumstances

Unless the Code itself provides, the Court cannot set a prescriptive period for any of the provisions therein. That
Rule 6.03, in particular, contains no explicit temporal limitation is deliberate. It recognizes that while passage of time
is a factor to consider in determining its applicability, the peculiarities of each case have to be considered. For
example, in Control Data Corp. v. International Business Mach. Corp.,56 the US District Court of Minnesota held that
the lawyer who, 15 years earlier, while an employee of the Department of Justice had been in charge of negotiations
in antitrust case against a corporation, was not disqualified from acting as counsel for the plaintiffs suing such
corporation. On the other hand, the lawyer whose conduct was the subject of the ABA Opinion No. 37, earlier cited,
was himself 10 years removed from the matter over which he had substantial responsibility while in public employ at
 47

the time he accepted the private engagement relating to the same matter. 57 Clearly, it is the degree of involvement
or participation in the matter while in government service, not the passage of time, which is the crucial element in
Rule 6.03.

The Code of Professional Responsibility is a codification of legal ethics, that "body of principles by which the
conduct of members of the legal profession is controlled. More specifically and practically considered, legal ethics
may be defined as that branch of moral science which treats of the duties which the attorney-at-law owes to his
clients, to the courts, to the bar, and to the public." 58 In this connection, the Court has consistently characterized
disciplinary proceedings, including disqualification cases, against lawyers as sui generis, neither purely civil nor
purely criminal, thus:

[D]isciplinary proceedings against lawyers are sui generis. Neither purely civil nor pure criminal, they do not involve
a trial of an action or a suit, but are rather investigations by the Court into the conduct of one of its officers.  Not
being intended to inflict punishment, [they are] in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a
plaintiff nor a prosecutor therein. [They] may be initiated by the Court motu propio. Public interest is [their] primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person be allowed the
privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely calls upon a member of the
Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end view of preserving the purity of the legal
profession and the proper and honest administration of justice… 59

For this reason, the civil law concept of prescription of actions finds no application in disqualification cases against
lawyers.

In this case, while the liquidation of GENBANK took place in 1977, the period that had lapsed is not sufficient to
consider it far removed from the present engagement of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan,  et al. in
Civil Case No. 0096. In fact, the validity of the said liquidation is still pending with the Court. 60 The validity of the
sequestration of the shares in Allied Banking Corp., which is the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0096, is
necessarily intertwined with Special Proceeding No. 107812 involving the liquidation of GENBANK and the
acquisition thereof by respondents Tan, et al. The issues presented in the two proceedings are so overlapping and
the involvement of Atty. Mendoza while in government employ is so plain, direct and substantial, his disqualification
as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. in Civil Case No. 0095 is warranted under Rule 6.03.

Contrary to the majority opinion, the peculiar

circumstances of this case justify the strict application

of Rule 6.03

The ponencia cautions against the strict application of Rule 6.03 because it would have a "chilling effect on the right
of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its interests." This concern is similar to that raised by the City
of New York in the General Motors case where it argued that if Reycraft was disqualified, the US court would "chill
the ardor for Government service by rendering worthless the experience gained in Government employ." 61 It
appeared that the City of New York relied on the pronouncement in the earlier case of United States v. Standard Oil
Co,62 known as the Esso Export Case, thus:

If the government service will tend to sterilize an attorney in too large an area of law for too long a time, or will
prevent him from engaging in the practice of a technical specialty which he has devoted years in acquiring, and if
that sterilization will spread to the firm which he becomes associated, the sacrifice of entering government service
will be too great for most men to make.63

Addressing this argument in General Motors, the same US court, through Justice Irving F. Kaufman, also
the ponente of the Esso Export Case, distinguished the two cases. It noted that the said court denied the motion to
disqualify the former government lawyer in Esso Export Case because the lawyer therein "never investigated or
passed upon the subject matter of the pending case … never rendered or had any specific duty to render any legal
advice in relation to the regulations involved in the litigation." 64 Hence, the accommodation between maintaining high
 48

ethical standards for former Government employees, on the one hand, and encouraging entry into Government
service, on the other, was struck under far different circumstances of the Esso Export Case.

In General Motors, the admonition voiced by Justice Kaufman in his article The Former Government Attorney and
the Canons of Professional Ethics65 was considered more to the point:

If there was a likelihood that information pertaining to the pending matter reached the attorney, although he did not
"investigate" or "pass upon" it, …, there would undoubtedly be an appearance of evil if he were not disqualified. 66

Thus, it was concluded that the Esso Export Case unquestionably presented a case for the cautious application of
the "appearance-of-evil doctrine" because the former Government lawyer’s connection with the matter at issue was
the tenuous one of mere employment in the same Government agency.

In contrast, in General Motors, Reycraft, not only participated in the investigatory and preparatory stages, but
also signed the complaint in the action. Thus, according to the US court, where the overlap of issues is so plain, and
the involvement while in Government employ so direct, the resulting appearance of impropriety must be avoided
through disqualification.

From the foregoing disquisition, it can be gleaned that disqualification cases involving former government lawyers
will have to be resolved on the basis of peculiar circumstances attending each case. A balance between the two
seemingly conflicting policy considerations of maintaining high ethical standards for former Government employees,
on the one hand, and encouraging entry into Government service, on the other, must be struck based on,  inter
alia, the relationship between the former and the succeeding representations of the former government lawyer.
Likewise, as already discussed, the degree of his involvement in the matter while in Government employ is a crucial
element in determining if his present representation is within the purview of Rule 6.03.

In this case, not unlike in General Motors, the involvement of Atty. Mendoza in the liquidation of GENBANK while he
was the Solicitor General is so direct that the appearance of impropriety must be avoided through disqualification.

Conclusion

Let me just clarify that the record is free from any intimation that Atty. Mendoza was improperly influenced while in
government service or that he is guilty of any impropriety in agreeing to represent respondents Tan, et al. However,
I am constrained to vote for his disqualification in Civil Case No. 0096 in order to avoid any appearance of
impropriety lest it taint both the public and private segments of the legal profession.

ACCORDINGLY, I vote to PARTIALLY GRANT the petition. The Motion to Disqualify Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza is
GRANTED insofar as Civil Case No. 0096 is concerned.

Footnotes

1
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639 (1974).

2
 Foreword of Chief Justice Manuel V. Moran in Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics.

3
 Abragan v. Rodriguez, 380 SCRA 93 (2001).

4
 EO No. 1, promulgated on February 29, 1986, created the PCGG which was primarily tasked to recover all
ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family, relatives, subordinates and
close associates.

5
 Mariano Tan Eng Lian in some pleadings.
 49
6
 Memorandum of the PCGG, pp. 7-9.

7
 The case is now pending with this Court docketed as G.R. No. 152551.

8
 Rollo, p. 42.

9
 Id. at 43.

10
 Penned by Associate Justice Romeo M. Escareal (retired), with Associate Justices Jose S. Balajadia and
Nathanael M. Grospe, concurring; Id. at 57.

11
 Rollo, p. 61.

12
 Id. at 61-62.

13
 People v. Sandiganbayan, 408 SCRA 672 (2003).

14
 Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 365 SCRA 359 (2001); Halili v. Court of Industrial Relations, 22 SCRA 785
(1968) citing BOUVIER’S LAW DICTIONARY, 3rd Revision, Vol. I, p. 1651.

15
 Ibid.

16
 396 SCRA 443 (2003).

17
 340 SCRA 289 (2000).

18
 Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, 358 SCRA 715 (2000).

19
 FERIA, II CIVIL PROCEDURE ANNOTATED, 2001 ed., p. 123.

20
 344 SCRA 838 (2000).

21
 Ibid.

22
 Id.

23
 Id.

24
 Id.

25
 Sta. Lucia Realty and Development, Inc. v. Cabrigas, supra.

26
 Macahilig v. Heirs of Grace M. Magalit, supra.

27
 Id.

28
 The ABA first adopted the Canons of Professional Ethics on August 27, 1908. Canons 1 to 32 thereof
were adopted by the Philippine Bar Association (PBA) in 1917. In 1946, the PBA again adopted as its own
Canons 33 to 47 of the ABA’s Canons of Professional Ethics. The ABA’s Canons of Professional Ethics
were superseded by the Code of Professional Responsibility on January 1, 1970. In 1980, the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP) adopted a proposed Code of Professional Responsibility, which it later submitted to
the Supreme Court for approval. On June 21, 1988, the Supreme Court promulgated the present Code of
Professional Responsibility. (AGPALO, infra.)
 50
29
 AGPALO, COMMENTS ON THE CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AND JUDICIAL
CONDUCT, 2001 ed., p. 52.

30
 WOLFRAM, MODERN LEGAL ETHICS (1986), p. 456.

31
 Ibid.

32
 This prohibition is restated in Rule 15.03 of our Code of Professional Responsibility, thus:

A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts.

33
 WOLFRAM, supra.

34
 AGPALO, supra.

35
 WOLFRAM, supra.

36
 MEMORANDUM for Respondents Tan, et al., p. 56; Rollo, p. 446.

37
 According to the ABA Formal Opinion No. 342, these acts do not fall within the scope of the term "matter"
and do not disqualify a lawyer under DR 9-101(B) from subsequent private employment involving the same
regulations, procedures or points of law. WOLFRAM, supra.

38
 In United States v. Trafficante (328 F.2d 117 [1964]), the United States Court of Appeals (Fifth Circuit)
held that, under Canon 36, the attorney who was formerly employed in the office of the Regional Counsel of
the Internal Revenue Service and who handled the tax claims against Trafficante which resulted in stipulated
settlement in the tax court was disqualified from representing the latter in subsequent suits for foreclosure of
liens for balance due on those income taxes and for other federal taxes. The court therein rejected the
lawyer’s claim that disqualification should be ordered only if precisely the same issues were involved in each
representation.

39
 AGPALO, supra.

40
 Then Senior Deputy Governor Amado R. Brinas, then Deputy Governor Jaime C. Laya, then Deputy
Governor and General Counsel Gabriel C. Singson, then Special Assistant to the Governor Carlota P.
Valenzuela, then Assistant to the Governor Arnulfo B. Aurellano and then Director of the Department of
Commercial and Savings Bank Antonio T. Castro, Jr.

41
 RoIllo, p. 109.

42
 Id. at 113. (Emphasis supplied.)

43
 The provision reads in part:

SEC. 29. Proceedings upon insolvency. — Whenever, upon examination by the head of the appropriate

supervising or examining department or his examiners or agents into the condition of any bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, it shall be disclosed that the condition of the same
is one of insolvency, or that its continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or
creditors, it shall be the duty of the department head concerned forthwith, in writing, to inform the Monetary
Board of the facts, and the Board may, upon finding the statements of the department head to be true, forbid
the institution to do business in the Philippines and shall designate an official of the Central Bank or a
person of recognized competence in banking or finance, as receiver to immediately take charge of its assets
and liabilities, as expeditiously as possible collect and gather all the assets and administer the same for the
benefit of its creditors, exercising all the powers necessary for these purposes including, but not limited to,
 51

bringing suits and foreclosing mortgages in the name of the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions.

If the Monetary Board shall determine and confirm within the said period that the bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions is insolvent or cannot resume business with safety to its
depositors, creditors and the general public, it shall, if the public interest requires, orders its liquidation,
indicate the manner of its liquidation and approve a liquidation plan. The Central Bank shall, by the Solicitor
General, file a petition in the Court of First Instance reciting the proceedings which have been taken and
praying the assistance of the court in the liquidation of such institution. The court shall have jurisdiction in
the same proceedings to adjudicate disputed claims against the bank or non-bank financial intermediary
performing quasi-banking functions and enforce individual liabilities of the stockholders and do all that is
necessary to preserve the assets of such institution and to implement the liquidation plan approved by the
Monetary Board. The Monetary Board shall designate an official of the Central Bank, or a person of
recognized competence in banking or finance, as liquidator who shall take over the functions of the receiver
previously appointed by the Monetary Board under this Section. The liquidator shall, with all convenient
speed, convert the assets of the banking institution or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-
banking functions to money or sell, assign or otherwise dispose of the same to creditors and other parties for
the purpose of paying the debts of such institution and he may, in the name of the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions, institute such actions as may be necessary in the
appropriate court to collect and recover accounts and assets of such institution.

The provisions of any law to the contrary notwithstanding, the actions of the Monetary Board under this
Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act shall be final and executory, and can be set
aside by the court only if there is convincing proof that the action is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith.
No restraining order or injunction shall be issued by the court enjoining the Central Bank from implementing
its actions under this Section and the second paragraph of Section 34 of this Act, unless there is convincing
proof that the action of the Monetary Board is plainly arbitrary and made in bad faith and the petitioner or
plaintiff files with the clerk or judge of the court in which the action is pending a bond executed in favor of the
Central Bank, in an amount to be fixed by the court. The restraining order or injunction shall be refused or, if
granted, shall be dissolved upon filing by the Central Bank of a bond, which shall be in the form of cash or
Central Bank cashier(s) check, in an amount twice the amount of the bond of the petitioner or plaintiff
conditioned that it will pay the damages which the petitioner or plaintiff may suffer by the refusal or the
dissolution of the injunction. The provisions of Rule 58 of the New Rules of Court insofar as they are
applicable and not inconsistent with the provisions of this Section shall govern the issuance and dissolution
of the restraining order or injunction contemplated in this Section.

Insolvency, under this Act, shall be understood to mean the inability of a bank or non-bank financial
intermediary performing quasi-banking functions to pay its liabilities as they fall due in the usual and ordinary
course of business: Provided, however, That this shall not include the inability to pay of an otherwise non-
insolvent bank or non-bank financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions caused by
extraordinary demands induced by financial panic commonly evidenced by a run on the bank or non-bank
financial intermediary performing quasi-banking functions in the banking or financial community.

The appointment of a conservator under Section 28-A of this Act or the appointment of a receiver under this
Section shall be vested exclusively with the Monetary Board, the provision of any law, general or special, to
the contrary notwithstanding. (As amended by PD Nos. 72, 1007, 1771 & PD No. 1827, Jan. 16, 1981)

44
 WEBSTER’S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY (1993), p. 1183.

45
 Ibid.

46
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra.
 52
47
 Kaufman, The Former Government Attorney and the Canons of Professional Ethics, 70 Harv.L.Rev. 657
(1957).

48
 See Bañas, Jr. v. Court of Appeals, 325 SCRA 259 (2000).

49
 Supra.

50
 Id. at 650.

51
 Id. at 652.

52
 WOLFRAM, supra.

53
 Ibid.

54
 See note 32.

55
 See note 39.

56
 318 F.Supp. 145 (D.Minn.1970).

57
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra.

58
 MALCOLM, LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS ADAPTED FOR THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
(1949 ed.), p. 8.

59
 Heck v. Santos, 423 SCRA 329 (2004) citing In Re Almacen, 31 SCRA 562 (1970).

60
 See note 7.

61
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra at 651.

62
 136 F.Supp. 345 (S.D.N.Y.1955).

63
 Quoted in General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra at 651.

64
 Id.

65
 See note 42.

66
 General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, supra.

SEPARATE OPINION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The Petition in this case should be DISMISSED on two grounds: (1) res judicata, specifically, conclusiveness of
judgment; and (2) prescription.

In his Dissent, the esteemed Justice Romeo J. Callejo Sr. argues that Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza violated Rule 6.03
of the Code of Professional Responsibility, 1 because after leaving his post as solicitor general, he appeared as
counsel in a "matter in which he had intervened while he was in said service" (as solicitor general). He postulates
that the Code of Professional Responsibility should be a beacon to assist good lawyers "in navigating an ethical
 53

course through the sometimes murky waters of professional conduct," in order "to avoid any appearance of
impropriety." He adds that the Code should be strictly construed and stringently enforced.

On the other hand, the distinguished Justice Reynato S. Puno contends in his ponencia that Rule 6.03 of the Code
has been incorrectly applied by Justice Callejo, because the "procedural advice" given by Atty. Mendoza is not the
"matter" contemplated by the said Rule. The ponencia explains that an "ultra restrictive reading of the Rule" would
have "ill-effects in our jurisdiction."

With due respect to both Justices Puno and Callejo, I respectfully submit that there is no need to delve into the
question of whether Rule 6.03 has been transgressed; there is no need to discuss the merits of the questioned
Sandiganbayan Resolutions allowing Atty. Mendoza to represent private respondents in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099.
After all, a Resolution issued by the same court resolving the very same issue on the "disqualification" of Atty.
Mendoza in a case involving the same parties and the same subject matter has already become final and
immutable. It can no longer be altered or changed.

I believe that the material issue in the present controversy is whether Atty. Mendoza may still be barred from
representing these respondents despite (1) a final Order in another case resolving the very same ground for
disqualification involving the same parties and the same subject matter as the present case; and (2) the passage of
a sufficient period of time from the date he ceased to be solicitor general to the date when the supposed
disqualification (for violation of the Code) was raised.

Conclusiveness

of Judgment

The doctrine of res judicata is set forth in Section 47 of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court, the relevant part of which I
quote as follows:

"Sec. 47. Effect of judgments or final orders.

— The effect of a judgment or final order rendered by a court of the Philippines, having jurisdiction to pronounce the
judgment or final order, may be as follows:

xxxxxxxxx

"(b) In other cases, the judgment or final order is, with respect to the matter directly adjudged or as to any other
matter that could have been raised in relation thereto, conclusive between the parties and their successors in
interest by title subsequent to the commencement of the action or special proceeding, litigating for the same thing
and under the same title and in the same capacity; and

"(c) In any other litigation between the same parties or their successors in interest, that only is deemed to have been
adjudged in a former judgment or final order which appears upon its face to have been so adjudged, or which was
actually and necessarily included therein or necessary thereto."

The above provision comprehends two distinct concepts of res judicata: (1) bar by former judgment and
(2) conclusiveness of judgment. Under the first concept, res judicata serves as an absolute proscription of a
subsequent action when the following requisites concur: (1) the former judgment or order was final; (2) it adjudged
the pertinent issue or issues on their merits; (3) it was rendered by a court that had jurisdiction over the subject
matter and the parties; and (4) between the first and the second actions, there was identity of parties, of subject
matter, and of causes of action.2

In regard to the fourth requirement, if there is no identity of causes of action but only an  identity of issues, res
judicata exists under the second concept; that is, under conclusiveness of judgment. In the latter concept, the rule
bars the re-litigation of particular facts or issues involving the same parties but on different claims or causes of
 54

action.3 Such rule, however, does not have the same effect as a bar by former judgment, which prohibits the
prosecution of a second action upon the same claim, demand or cause of action.

In other words, conclusiveness of judgment finds application when a fact or question has been squarely put in issue,
judicially passed upon, and adjudged in a former suit by a court of competent jurisdiction; it has thus been
conclusively settled by a judgment or final order issued therein. Insofar as the parties to that action (and persons in
privity with them) are concerned, and while the judgment or order remains unreversed or un-vacated by a proper
authority upon a timely motion or petition, such conclusively settled fact or question cannot again be litigated in any
future or other action between the same parties or their privies, in the same or in any other court of concurrent
jurisdiction, either for the same or for a different cause of action. Thus, the only identities required for the operation
of the principle of conclusiveness of judgment is that between parties and issues.4

While it does not have the same effect as a bar by former judgment, which proscribes subsequent actions,
conclusiveness of judgment nonetheless operates as an estoppel to issues or points controverted, on which the
determination of the earlier finding or judgment has been anchored. 5 The dictum laid down in such a finding or
judgment becomes conclusive and continues to be binding between the same parties, as long as the facts on which
that judgment was predicated continue to be the facts of the case or incident before the court. The binding effect
and enforceability of that dictum can no longer be re-litigated, since the said issue or matter has already been
resolved and finally laid to rest in the earlier case.6

Relevant Antecedents

Showing the Application of the

Conclusiveness Doctrine

Let me now discuss some relevant antecedents to show the application to this case of res judicata, specifically the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment.

Pursuant to Executive Order No. 1 of then President Corazon C. Aquino, the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) issued sometime in June to August 1986 several Writs of Sequestration over certain
properties of Respondents Lucio Tan et al., properties they had supposedly acquired by taking advantage of their
close relationship with former President Ferdinand E. Marcos.

On August 17, 1987, the PCGG instituted before the Sandiganbayan a Complaint against the same respondents for
"reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and damages" vis-à-vis their sequestered properties. The
Complaint was docketed as Civil Case No. 0005 and raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan (SBN).

Meanwhile, in separate Petitions before this Court, the validity of the sequestration Writs was questioned by herein
respondents, but said Petitions were referred by the Court to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. These
cases were raffled to the SBN Fifth Division and docketed as Civil Case Nos. 0096, 0097, 0098 and 0099. Civil
Case No. 0096, in particular, involved the validity of the Writ of Sequestration issued by the PCGG over herein
private respondents’ shares of stock in Allied Banking Corporation (formerly General Bank and Trust Company or
"GenBank").

In all the above-mentioned cases, Atty. Estelito P. Mendoza was the counsel of Tan et al.

On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed in Civil Case No. 0005 a Motion 7 to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
therein Respondents Tan et al. In a Resolution 8 dated April 22, 1991, the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) denied
that Motion. The anti-graft court likewise denied the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the PCGG. 9 Because the
latter did not appeal the denial, the Resolution became final and executory.

Similarly, in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099, PCGG filed a Motion 10 to disqualify Atty. Mendoza as counsel for
Respondents Lucio Tan et al. According to respondent court, "the motion is exactly the same in substance as that
motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005"; in fact, both incidents were taken up jointly by the Second and the Fifth
Divisions of the Sandiganbayan. 11 Indeed, a perusal of both Motions reveals that, except as to their respective
 55

captions, the contents of the Motions are identically worded. Both Motions were anchored essentially on the same
ground: that by virtue of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, Atty. Mendoza was prohibited from
acting as counsel of Tan et al. in the pending cases. During his tenure as solicitor general, Atty. Mendoza had
allegedly "intervened" in the dissolution of GenBank, Allied Bank’s predecessor.

Thus, in its herein assailed July 11, 2001 Resolution, respondent court resolved to reiterate and adopt "the
Resolution dated April 22, 1991 in Civil Case No. 0005 of the Second Division x x x denying the motion."

Resolution in Civil Case

No. 0005 a Final Order

As distinguished from an interlocutory order, a final judgment or order decisively puts an end to (or disposes of) a
case or a disputed issue; in respect thereto, nothing else -- except its execution -- is left for the court to do. Once
that judgment or order is rendered, the adjudicative task of the court on the particular matter involved is likewise
ended.12 Such an order may refer to the entire controversy or to some defined and separate branch thereof. 13 On the
other hand, an order is interlocutory if its effects are merely provisional in character and still leave substantial
proceedings to be further conducted by the issuing court in order to put the issue or controversy to rest. 14

I have no quarrel with the general test -- expounded, with acknowledged authorities, in the Dissenting Opinions of
Justices Conchita Carpio Morales and Callejo -- for determining whether an order is interlocutory. Such test,
however, applies to orders that dispose of incidents or issues that are intimately related to the very cause of action
or merits of the case. The exception lies when the order refers to a "definite and separate branch" of the main
controversy, as held by the Court in Republic v. Tacloban City Ice Plant.15

Under the present factual milieu, the matter of disqualification of Atty. Mendoza as counsel for respondents is a
"defined and separate branch" of the main case for "reversion, reconveyance, and restitution" of the sequestered
properties. This matter has no direct bearing on the adjudication of the substantive issues in the principal
controversy. The final judgment resolving the main case does not depend on the determination of the particular
question raised in the Motion. The April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan (Second Division) in Civil Case
No. 0005 had finally and definitively determined the issue of Atty. Mendoza’s disqualification to act as counsel for
Tan et al. Since that Resolution was not appealed, it became final and executory. It became a conclusive judgment
insofar as that particular question was concerned.

Applying the Doctrine of

Conclusiveness of Judgment

There is no question as regards the identity of the parties involved in Civil Case Nos. 0005 and 0096. Neither has
the jurisdiction of the Second and the Fifth Divisions of the Sandiganbayan been placed at issue. Clearly, the matter
raised in the two Motions to Disqualify, though separately filed at different times in those two cases, are likewise the
same or identical. Also undisputed is the fact that no appeal or certiorari petition was taken from the April 22, 1991
Resolution of the Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005, which had denied PCGG’s Motion.

To counter the application of res judicata, Justices Morales and Callejo opine that the said April 22, 1991 Resolution
was merely interlocutory. It "merely settled an incidental or collateral matter x x x; it cannot operate to bar the filing
of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza in the other cases x x x," Justice Callejo explains. I beg to disagree.

True, there is, as yet, no final adjudication of the merits of the main issues of "reversion, reconveyance and
restitution." However, I submit that the question with respect to the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza had
nonetheless been conclusively settled. Indeed, the April 22, 1991 SBN Resolution had definitively disposed of the
Motion to Disqualify on its merits. Since no appeal was taken therefrom, it became final and executory after the
lapse of the reglementary period. 16

While it merely disposed of a question that was collateral to the main controversy, the Resolution should be
differentiated from an ordinary interlocutory order that resolves an incident arising from the very subject matter or
 56

cause of action, or one that is related to the disposition of the main substantive issues of the case itself. Such an
order is not appealable, but may still be modified or rescinded upon sufficient grounds adduced before final
judgment. Verily, res judicata would not apply therein.17

But, as illustrated earlier, the issue of the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza is separate from and independent of the
substantive issues in the main case for "reversion, reconveyance and restitution." This particular question, in relation
to Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, was finally settled in the Resolution of April 22, 1991, issued
by the SBN Second Division. In fact, I submit that this question had to be squarely resolved before trial proceeded,
so as not to prejudice the movant in case its arguments were found to be meritorious. Otherwise, the Motion would
be rendered naught.

In 2001, ten years after its filing, the identical Motion to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza in Civil Case Nos. 0096-0099
finally came up for deliberation before the Fifth Division of the Sandiganbayan. The Fifth Division correctly noted that
the pending Motion was "exactly the same in substance as that Motion filed in Civil Case No. 0005." Thus, it
resolved to reiterate and adopt the Second Division’s April 22, 1991 Resolution denying the Motion. Interestingly
and understandably, the Fifth Division of the anti-graft court no longer separately reviewed the merits of the Motion
before it, because the Second Division’s Resolution disposing of exactly the same Motion and involving the same
parties and subject matter had long attained finality. That Resolution became a conclusive judgment between the
parties with respect to the subject matter involved therein.

Exception to Application of

Conclusiveness of Judgment

Justice Morales further cites Kilosbayan v. Morato,18 in which the Court19 said that "the rule on conclusiveness of
judgment or preclusion of issues or collateral estoppel does not apply to issues of law, at least when substantially
unrelated claims are involved." Explaining further, the Court cited therein the "authoritative formulation" of the
exception in Restatement of the Law 2d, on Judgments, thus:

"§28. Although an issue is actually litigated and determined by a valid and final judgment, and the determination is
essential to the judgment, relitigation of the issue in a subsequent action between the parties is not precluded in the
following circumstances:

xxxxxxxxx

(2) The issue is one of law and (a) the two actions involve claims that are substantially unrelated, or (b) a new
determination is warranted in order to take account or an intervening change in the applicable legal context or
otherwise to avoid inequitable administration of the laws; x x x. [Emphasis and omissions in the original.]"

In accordance with the above exception to the rule, Justice Morales believes that the doctrine of conclusiveness of
judgment does not apply to this case, because the issue at bar -- disqualification of counsel -- "is undoubtedly a
legal question" and "Civil Case No. 005 and Civil Case No. 0096 involve two different substantially unrelated
claims."

I respectfully disagree with respect to her second point, which actually qualifies the exception. I believe that the two
cases involve substantially related claims. Civil Case No. 0005 seeks to recover alleged ill-gotten shares of stock of
respondents Tan et al. in Allied Bank. Civil Case No. 0096 questions the validity of the Sequestration Writ over the
same shares of stock involved in Civil Case No. 0005. In the ultimate analysis, both cases refer to the determination
of who has a valid ownership claim over said stockholdings.

In any event and as earlier discussed, in our jurisdiction, the only identities required for the principle of
conclusiveness of judgment to operate as an estoppel are those of parties and issues.20

Similar Motions in
 57

Other PCGG Cases

Parenthetically, it is worth mentioning that in their Memorandum, 21 Respondents Tan et al. aver that similar Motions
to Disqualify Atty. Mendoza were likewise filed in Sandiganbayan Civil Case Nos. 0095 and 0100. The former
case, Sipalay Trading v. PCGG, involved shares of stock of Lucio Tan in Maranaw Hotels and Resort Corporation;
the latter case, Allied Banking Corporation v. PCGG, sought the invalidation of an Order for the search and seizure
of certain documents of Allied Bank.

In both cases, the Sandiganbayan denied the separate Motions to Disqualify, as well as the Motions for
Reconsideration. No further actions were taken by the PCGG on such denials, which thus became executory.
Consequently, Atty. Mendoza was allowed to represent Lucio Tan in those cases.

On the merits of the said cases, which were consolidated, the Sandiganbayan granted both Petitions on August 23,
1993, by nullifying the Writ of Sequestration questioned in Civil Case No. 0095, as well as the Search and Seizure
Order assailed in Civil Case No. 0100. On March 29, 1996, the Supreme Court affirmed the SBN’s Decision in the
aforementioned consolidated cases.22 Consequently, now deemed res judicata are all issues raised in Civil Case
Nos. 0095 and 0100 -- principal, incidental and corollary issues, including the matter of the alleged disqualification of
Atty. Mendoza.

Presence of Identities of

Parties and Issues

As earlier discussed, the only identities required for the principle of conclusiveness of judgment to operate as an
estoppel are those of parties and issues. In the case before us, both identities are clearly present. Hence, the
principle of conclusiveness of judgment applies and bars the present Petition.

From the foregoing, I submit that this Petition should be dismissed on the ground of conclusiveness of judgment.
Parenthetically, the proper recourse to assail the July 11, 2001 and the December 5, 2001 Resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division) should have been a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. The
certiorari proceeding before this Court is apparently a substitute for a lost appeal, deserving only of outright
dismissal.23 In any event, contrary to the allegations of petitioner, respondent court did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it issued the assailed Resolutions.

Proscription

Time-Barred

True, Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility does not expressly specify the period of its applicability or
enforceability. However, I submit that one cannot infer that, ergo, the prohibition is absolute, perpetual and
permanent.

All civil actions have a prescriptive period. 24 Unless a law makes an action imprescriptible or lays down no other
period, the action is subject to a bar by prescription five (5) years after the right of action accrued. 25 Criminal
offenses -- even the most heinous ones -- as well as the penalties therefor, likewise prescribe. 26 Relatedly, even so-
called perpetual penalties and multiple sentences have maximum periods. 27

Relevantly, it is worth pointing out that Republic Act No. 6713 prohibits public officers and employees from practicing
their profession for only one year after their resignation, retirement or separation from public office, in connection
with any matter before their former office.28

Prescription is intended to suppress stale and fraudulent claims arising from transactions or facts that have been
obscured by defective memory or the lapse of time. 29 It was designed to promote justice by preventing surprises
through the revival of claims that have been allowed to slumber until relevant proofs are lost, memories faded, and
witnesses no longer available. 30 Consistent with law and jurisprudence and the purpose of statutes of limitations, the
 58

prohibition on former government attorneys from involvement in matters in which they took part long ago, pursuant
to their official functions while in public service, should likewise have an expiry or duration.

In the present case, the liquidation of GenBank, in which Atty. Mendoza purportedly participated as then solicitor
general, took place in 1977 or more than a quarter of a century ago. Since early 1986, he has ceased to be solicitor
general and has since engaged in the private practice of law. In 1987, he became counsel for Respondents Tan et
al. in Civil Case No. 0005 and, since 1990, in Civil Case Nos. 0095 to 0100. 31 At the time, at least ten (10) years had
passed since his alleged involvement in the GenBank liquidation. Moreover, in 1991 when the separate Motions to
Disqualify were filed by PCGG in these aforementioned cases, he had been outside government service for about
five (5) years, and fifteen years had gone by since the said liquidation.

Now it is already 2005. If we go by the rationale behind prescription, the extent of the individual participation of
government officials in the GenBank liquidation may indeed "have become so obscure from the lapse of time," if not
from "defective memory."

It is undeniable that government lawyers usually handle a multitude of cases simultaneously or within overlapping
periods of time. This is in fact a common remonstration, especially among prosecutors, public attorneys, solicitors,
government corporate counsels, labor arbiters, even trial and appellate judges. Yet, as dutiful public servants, they
cannot reject or shrink from assignments even if they are already overloaded with work. Similarly, lawyers in private
practice, whether by themselves or employed in law firms, are in a comparative plight.

It would not be strange or uncommon that, in a period of five years, an attorney in government service would have
handled or interfered in hundreds of legal matters involving varied parties. 32 Thousands of attorneys who have
chosen to dedicate their service to the government for some years are in such a situation. Hence, to  perpetually and
absolutely ban them from taking part in all cases involving some matter in which they have taken part in some
distant past, pursuant to their official functions then, would be unduly harsh, unreasonable and unfair. It would be
tantamount to an unwarranted deprivation of the exercise of their profession. Be it remembered that a profession,
trade or calling partakes of the nature of a property right within the meaning of our constitutional guarantees. 33

Moreover, to attribute to a former government lawyer a violation of some ethical rule because of participation in a
matter that has been forgotten in good faith due to the lapse of a long period of time and does not involve interest
adverse to the government would likewise be harsh, unreasonable and unfair.

Similarly, there are many competent private practitioners who, at some point in their long careers, would wish to
serve the government. Would their fine and wide-ranging practice and experience, which would otherwise be
beneficial to the government, likewise forever bar them from getting involved in matters that concern a party with
whom they have had dealings several years ago and whose interests are not adversely affected? In the case of
acknowledged experts in specific fields of law, of what use would their needed expertise be to the government if
they have to inhibit themselves from every case involving a party they have served in the distant past, considering
the limited number of parties that may actually be involved in a specific field (for instance, intellectual property or
bioethics law)?

I submit that the restraint on the exercise of one’s profession, or right of employment including that of attorneys
formerly in government service, must survive the test of fairness and reasonableness. The restriction should not be
as pervasive and longer than is necessary to afford a fair and reasonable protection to the interests of the
government. After all, the disqualification of government attorneys is a drastic measure, and courts should hesitate
to impose it except when necessary.34

Thus, I submit that the restriction on government lawyers -- specifically with respect to subsequent engagement or
employment in connection with matters falling under the "congruent-interest representation" -- should be allowed to
expire after a reasonable period when no further prejudice to the public may be contemplated. The duration of this
prohibition should be no more than five (5) years from retirement or separation from government service. Five years
is the prescriptive period for suits for which no period is prescribed by law. 35

It would be reasonable to assume that five years after separation from the service, one would most likely have lost
the loyalty of one’s former personal contacts, if not the loyal associates themselves, who may be able to facilitate
 59

the acquisition of important information from the former office. In all probability, the lapse of the said period would
also naturally obscure to a reasonable extent a lawyer’s memory of details of a specific case despite active
participation in the proceedings therein. This principle holds if, in the interval, one has handled countless other legal
matters as is so common among lawyers in government offices.

Consequently, after the said period, former government attorneys should be allowed to take up cases involving
matters that were brought before them during their incumbency in public office, so long as such matters do not come
within the "adverse-interest conflict" doctrine and the conflict-of-interest rule 36 applicable to all lawyers in general.

For the same reasons, the disqualification of members of the judiciary under Section 5(b) and (d) 37 of Canon 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct 38 should also prescribe in five (5) years from the time they assumed their judicial
position; or from the time they retire from or otherwise end their government service.

I realize that the application of Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and Section 5 of Canon 3 of the
New Code of Judicial Conduct is quite important to many members of the bar who have served, or who aspire to
serve, the government.

On the one hand, our rules of discipline should protect the interest of the public by discouraging attorneys in
government from so shaping their practice as to give unfair advantage to their future private clients, or from
jeopardizing confidential information learned while in government service. On the other hand, government service
should not be discouraged by overly strict ethical rules that perpetually prohibit government lawyers from later
making reasonable and appropriate use in private practice of the expertise or experience they have gained. 39

The reality is that the best lawyers will want to join the more lucrative private sector sooner or later, and the
government will hardly be able to attract them if they would later be unreasonably restricted from putting their
government experience to some use. 40 After all, government service should afford lawyers the opportunity to
improve their subsequent private employment. The nature of the job brings such lawyers into inevitable contact with
clients interested in their fields of expertise. Because the practice of law is becoming increasingly specialized, the
likely consequence of a wholesale approach to disqualification would be encouragement of a two-track professional
structure: government lawyer, private lawyer. The suspicion, and the reality, of ethical improprieties unrelated to
particular government cases would be eliminated -- but at the cost of creating an insular, static legal bureaucracy. 41

Such a pervasive, perpetual ban would deter too many competent attorneys from entering government service, to
the detriment of the public. 42 The Court must strike a balance. I believe that the adoption of the aforementioned
period of limitation would achieve the purpose behind Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well
as Section 5 of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct.

To summarize, the present Petition is barred by the principle of conclusiveness of judgment, because the April 22,
1991 Resolution of the SBN Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005 -- which resolved on the merits the very same
ground for the disqualification of Atty. Mendoza, and which involved essentially the same parties and the same
subject matter as the present case -- constituted a final and executory order, no timely appeal having been taken
therefrom.

Furthermore, the disqualification of former government lawyers from congruent-interest representation under Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be effective only for a period of five (5) years from the
retirement or the separation from government service of the official concerned. The purpose of such prescriptive
period is to prevent undue restraint on former government lawyers from the private practice of their profession,
especially in the field of expertise that they may have gained while in public office. Similarly, the disqualification of
members of the judiciary, under Section 5 (b) and (d) of Canon 3 of the New Code of Judicial Conduct should end
five (5) years after they assumed their judicial position.

Implications of the

Dissenting Opinions
 60

Endless re-litigations of the same question, as well as forum shopping, are invited by the opinion of the dissenters
that the April 22, 1991 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan’s Second Division in Civil Case No. 0005 does not bar the
filing of another motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza from other cases between the same parties. Such a holding
would effectively allow herein petitioner to file exactly the same Motion in each of other and future cases involving
the same parties or their privies and the same subject matters, even after the first Motion involving the same
question or issue will have already been finally resolved in one of like cases.

Further, it would also allow petitioner to let a contrary resolution of the incident in one case become final through
petitioner’s withholding recourse to a higher court in order to await a possible favorable ruling in one of the other
cases. As it is, absurdity already surrounds the handling of Civil Case No. 0005 and No. 0096, both of which involve
the same parties and the same subject matter.

In Civil Case No. 0005, which seeks to recover allegedly unlawfully acquired properties consisting of shares of stock
of Respondent Tan et al. in Allied Bank, Atty. Mendoza is allowed to serve as their counsel. However, in Civil Case
No. 0096, which merely questions the validity of the Writ of Sequestration issued against the shares of stock in
Allied Bank of the same respondents, he is prohibited, per the dissenters, from acting as their counsel. This is
preposterous.

Moreover, treating the first Resolution as not yet final and executory, even if no appeal or certiorari has timely been
taken therefrom, would allow the questioned counsel to act as such throughout the trial period until final judgment by
the court a quo. Thereafter, on appeal, his alleged "disqualification" may still be raised by the other party as an
issue. If the appeals court or this Tribunal ultimately finds that the said counsel is indeed disqualified on the ground
of conflict of interest or "congruent-interest representation conflict" and thus reverses the trial court’s ruling, the case
would necessarily be remanded for new trial. As a result, the entire proceedings would become naught and thereby
unnecessarily waste the precious time, effort and resources of the courts as well as the parties. Worse, the evidence
(or defense) adduced by the "disqualified" counsel through his prior connections with the government (or the
adverse party) could have already created bias in the court or in the public mind.

These are precisely the procedural absurdities abhorred by the doctrine of res judicata, the fundamental principle of
due process and of the rule proscribing forum shopping.

Having already shown that Atty. Mendoza can no longer be disqualified at this point for his alleged violation of Rule
6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, due to res judicata and prescription, I submit that there is no more
need to discuss on the merits whether indeed there was in fact such violation. Such discussion would be merely
academic and moot.

May I close this Opinion with this oft-quoted ruling of former Chief Justice Pedro L. Yap, who was himself a former
PCGG commissioner, on the soundness of upholding final judgments even "at the risk of occasional errors":

"It is a general rule common to all civilized system of jurisprudence, that the solemn and deliberate sentence of the
law, pronounced by its appointed organs, upon a disputed fact or a state of facts, should be regarded as a final and
conclusive determination of the question litigated, and should forever set the controversy at rest. Indeed, it has been
well said that this maxim is more than a mere rule of law, more than an important principle of public policy: and that
it is not too much to say that it is a fundamental concept in the organization of the jural sytem. Public policy and
sound practice demand that, at the risk of occasional errors, judgments of courts should become final at some
definite date fixed by law. The very object for which courts were constituted was to put an end to controversies." 43

WHEREFORE, I vote to DISMISS the Petition.

Footnotes

1
 "Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or employment in
connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service."
 61
2
 Sta. Lucia Realty and Development v. Cabrigas, 358 SCRA 715, June 19, 2001.

3
 Ibid.

4
 Nabus v. Court of Appeals, 193 SCRA 732, February 7, 1991 (reiterated in Calalang v. Register of
Deeds, 231 SCRA 88, March 11, 1994; and in Intestate Estate of San Pedro v. Court of Appeals, 265 SCRA
733, December 18, 1996).

5
 Camara v. Court of Appeals, 310 SCRA 608, July 20, 1999.

6
 Miranda v. Court of Appeals, 141 SCRA 302, February 11, 1986; Vda. De Sta. Romana v. Philippine
Commercial and Industrial Bank, 118 SCRA 330, November 15, 1982.

7
 Rollo, pp. 216-220.

8
 Penned by Justice Romeo M. Escareal (chairman) and concurred in by Justices Jose S. Balajadia and
Nathanael M. Grospe (members); rollo, pp. 57-63.

9
 Resolution dated July 24, 1991; rollo, pp. 233-237.

10
 Rollo, pp. 221-225.

11
 Resolution dated July 11, 2001 of the Sandiganbayan (Fifth Division), referring to the Record of Civil Case
No. 0096, Vol. I, pp. 134-135; rollo, p. 42. This unsigned Resolution was unanimously approved by Justices
Minita V. Chico-Nazario (Division chairperson, now a member of this Court), Rodolfo G. Palattao and Ma.
Cristina Cortez-Estrada (members).

12
 Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, 355 Phil. 804, August 17, 1998 (citing Investments, Inc. v. Court
of Appeals, 147 SCRA 334, January 27, 1987; and Denso [Phils.], Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 148
SCRA 280, February 27, 1987). In this case, the Court held:

"The order of the trial court dismissing petitioner’s counterclaim was a final order since the dismissal,
although based on a technicality, would require nothing else to be done by the court with respect to that
specific subject except only to await the possible filing during the reglementary period of a motion for
reconsideration or the taking of an appeal therefrom."

The Court further said that errors of judgment, as well as procedure, that do not relate to the jurisdiction of
the court or involve grave abuse of discretion are reviewable by timely appeal, not by a special civil action
for certiorari, unless for valid and compelling reasons.

13
 Tambaoan v. Court of Appeals, 417 Phil. 683, September 17, 2001 (citing Republic v. Tacloban City Ice
Plant, 258 SCRA 145, July 5, 1996; and Dela Cruz v. Paras, 69 SCRA 556, February 27, 1976).

14
 Santo Tomas University Hospital v. Surla, supra (citing Bairan v. Tan Siu Lay, 18 SCRA 1235, December
28, 1966).

15
 Supra, p. 155.

16
 Pascual v. Court of Appeals, 300 SCRA 214, December 16, 1998; Navarro v. NLRC, 327 SCRA 22,
March 1, 2000; Testate Estate of Manuel v. Biascarr, 347 SCRA 621, December 11, 2000; People v. Alay-
ay, 363 SCRA 603, August 23, 2001; Vda. de Sta. Romana v. Philippine Commercial & Industrial Bank,
supra.

17
 Manila Electric Co. v. Arciaga, 50 Phil. 144, March 18, 1927 (citing Reilly v. Perkins, 56 Pac 734).
 62
18
 246 SCRA 540, 561, July 17, 1995, per Mendoza, J.

19
 Voting here was close (5 justices fully concurred in the ponencia, 2 wrote separate concurring opinions,
while 5 dissented.)

20
 Nabus v. Court of Appeals, supra.

21
 Rollo, pp. 391-471.

22
 GR Nos. 112708-09, 255 SCRA 438, March 29, 1996.

23
 Spouses Morales v. Court of Appeals, 285 SCRA 337, January 28, 1998; Cabellan v. Court of
Appeals, 304 SCRA 119, March 3, 1999; Republic v. Court of Appeals, 322 SCRA 81, January 18, 2000.

24
 See Arts. 1140-1149, Civil Code.

25
 Tolentino v. Court of Appeals, 162 SCRA 66, June 10, 1988.

26
 Arts. 90 & 92 of the Revised Penal Code provide as follows:

"Art. 90. Prescription of crime. — Crimes punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal shall
prescribe in twenty years.

Crimes punishable by other afflictive penalties shall prescribe in fifteen years.

Those punishable by a correctional penalty shall prescribe in ten years; with the exception of those
punishable by arresto mayor, which shall prescribe in five years.

The crime of libel or other similar offenses shall prescribe in one year.

The crime of oral defamation and slander by deed shall prescribe in six months.

Light offenses prescribe in two months."

"Art. 92. When and how penalties prescribe. — The penalties imposed by final sentence prescribe as
follows:

1. Death and reclusion perpetua, in twenty years;

2. Other afflictive penalties, in fifteen years;

3. Correctional penalties, in ten years; with the exception of the penalty of arresto mayor, which prescribes in
five years;

4. Light penalties, in one year."

See also Act No. 3326, as amended.

27
 "Art. 70 [Revised Penal Code]. x x x.

"Notwithstanding the provisions of the rule next preceding, the maximum duration of the convict's sentence
shall not be more than three-fold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties
imposed upon him. No other penalty to which he may be liable shall be inflicted after the sum total of those
imposed equals the same maximum period.
 63

"Such maximum period shall in no case exceed forty years.

"In applying the provisions of this rule the duration of perpetual penalties (pena perpetua) shall be computed
at thirty years."

28
 "Sec. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. x x x.

"These prohibitions shall continue to apply for a period of one (1) year after resignation, retirement, or
separation from public office, except in the case of subparagraph (b); (2) above, but the professional
concerned cannot practice his profession in connection with any matter before the office he used to be with,
in which case the one-year prohibition shall likewise apply."

29
 Ochagabia v. Court of Appeals, 364 Phil. 233, March 11, 1999; Peñales v. IAC, 229 Phil. 245, October 27,
1986.

30
 Order of R. Telegraphers v. Railway Express Agency, Inc., 321 US 342 (1944); Alcorn v. City of Baton
Rouge, 2004 WL 3016015, December 30, 2004.

31
 Memorandum for Respondents, pp. 9-10; rollo, pp. 399-400.

32
 Modesty aside, in my nearly ten (10) years in this Court, I have disposed of about a thousand cases in full-
length ponencias and countless cases by way of unsigned minute or extended Resolutions. This does not
include the thousands of other cases, assigned to other members of the Court, in which I actively took part
during their deliberations. In all honesty, I must admit that I cannot with certainty recall the details of the facts
and issues in each of these cases, especially in the earlier ones.

33
 JMM Promotion and Management, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 329 Phil. 87, August 5, 1996.

34
 Bullock v. Carver, 910 F. Supp 551, 1995.

35
 Art. 1149, Civil Code.

36
 Rule 15.03, Code of Professional Responsibility:

"A lawyer shall not represent conflicting interests except by written consent of all concerned given after a full
disclosure of the facts."

37
 "Sec. 5. Judges shall disqualify themselves from participating in any proceedings in which they are unable
to decide the matter impartially or in which it may appear to a reasonable observer that they are unable to
decide the matter impartially. Such proceedings include, but are not limited to, instances where

xxxxxxxxx

(b) The judge previously served as lawyer or was a material witness in the matter in controversy;

xxxxxxxxx

(d) The judge served as executor, administrator, guardian, trustee or lawyer in the case or matter in
controversy, or a former associate of the judge served as counsel during their association, or the judge or
lawyer was a material witness therein;

x x x x x x x x x"

[Rule 3.12 of Canon 3 of the old Code of Judicial Conduct.]

 64
38
 AM No. 03-05-01-SC, promulgated on April 27, 2004 and effective June 1, 2004.

39
 In re Sofaer, 728 A2d 625, April 22, 1999.

40
 Brown v. District of Columbia Board of Zoning Adjustment, 486 A2d 37, December 21, 1984.

41
 Ibid. (citing Developments in the Law: Conflicts of Interest, 94 Harv.L.Rev. 1244, 1428-30 [1981]).

42
 Ibid.

43
 Legarda v. Savellano, 158 SCRA 194, February 26, 1988, per Yap, J. (later CJ).

SEPARATE OPINION

TINGA, J.:

My vote to grant the petition hinges on the reasons stated hereunder. They pertain to a significant and
material dimension to this case which deserves greater illumination.

To sustain the view that Atty. Estelito Mendoza (Atty. Mendoza) should be disqualified as counsel in Civil
Case No. 0096, as the dissenters are wont to hold, there should be a clear legal basis that would mandate
such disqualification. The dissenters would hold Atty. Mendoza liable for violating Section 6.03 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, while the ponencia disputes the assertion that the provision was indeed
transgressed. I maintain that Section 6.03 cannot be made applicable in the present case to Atty. Mendoza,
as to do so would be violative of his right to due process.

I have qualms in holding any member of the Bar liable for violating Section 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, in connection with acts that they may have engaged in as government officials before the
enactment of the said Code. In this case, at the time Atty. Mendoza entered the government service he had
no idea of the kind of inhibition proposed to be foisted on him currently. Indeed, he is being faulted for
representing the respondents in Civil Case No. 0096 notwithstanding the fact that as Solicitor General and in
the discharge of his official functions, he had advised the Central Bank on the procedure to bring about the
liquidation of General Bank and Trust Company, which was subsequently acquired by the respondents.
However, whether it be at the time then Solicitor General Mendoza participated in the process of the
dissolution of General Bank in 1977, or at sometime in 1987 when he agreed to represent the respondents,
the Code of Professional Responsibility had not yet been promulgated.

The Code of Professional Responsibility was promulgated by the Supreme Court on 21 June 1988. 1 Prior to
its official adoption, there was no similar official body of rules or guidelines enacted by the Supreme Court
other than the provisions on Legal Ethics in the Rules of Court.

I fear it would set a dangerous precedent to hinge Atty. Mendoza’s culpability on the Code of Professional
Responsibility, as it would effectively imply that the Code of Professional Responsibility has application even
as to acts performed prior to its enactment. Our laws frown upon the prospectivity of statutes. Article 4 of the
Civil Code declares that "Laws shall have no retroactive effect, unless the contrary is provided." There is no
declaration in the Code of Professional Responsibility that gives retroactive effect to its canons and rules. It
is settled that the presumption is that all laws operate prospectively absent clear contrary language in the
text,2 and that in every case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the retroactive operation of laws. 3

The Court in Co v. Court of Appeals provided an exhaustive disquisition on the scope of the rule on the
prospective application of statutes:

The principle of prospectivity of statutes, original or amendatory, has been applied in many cases. These
include: Buyco v. PNB, 961) 2 SCRA 682 (June 30, 1961), holding that Republic Act No. 1576 which
divested the Philippine National Bank of authority to accept back pay certificates in payment of loans, does
 65

not apply to an offer of payment made before effectivity of the act; Largado v. Masaganda, et al., 5 SCRA
522 (June 30, 1962), ruling that RA 2613, as amended by RA 3090 on June, 1961, granting to inferior courts
jurisdiction over guardianship cases, could not be given retroactive effect, in the absence of a saving clause;
Larga v. Ranada, Jr., 64 SCRA 18, to the effect that Sections 9 and 10 of Executive Order No. 90, amending
Section 4 of PD 1752, could have no retroactive application; People v. Que Po Lay, 94 Phil. 640, holding
that a person cannot be convicted of violating Circular No. 20 of the Central Bank, when the alleged violation
occurred before publication of the Circular in the Official Gazette; Baltazar v. C.A., 104 SCRA 619, denying
retroactive application to P.D. No. 27 decreeing the emancipation of tenants from the bondage of the soil,
and P.D. No. 316 prohibiting ejectment of tenants from rice and corn farmholdings, pending the
promulgation of rules and regulations implementing P.D. No. 27; Nilo v. Court of Appeals, 128 SCRA 519,
adjudging that RA 6389 which removed "personal cultivation" as a ground for the ejectment of a tenant
cannot be given retroactive effect in the absence of a statutory statement for retroactivity; Tac-An v. CA, 129
SCRA 319, ruling that the repeal of the old Administrative Code by RA 4252 could not be accorded
retroactive effect; Ballardo v. Borromeo, 161 SCRA 500, holding that RA 6389 should have only prospective
application; (See also Bonifacio v. Dizon, 177 SCRA 294 and Balatbat v. CA, 205 SCRA 419).

The prospectivity principle has also been made to apply to administrative rulings and circulars , to
wit: ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation v. CTA, Oct. 12, 1981, 108 SCRA 142, holding that a circular or
ruling of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue may not be given retroactive effect adversely to a taxpayer;
Sanchez v. COMELEC, 193 SCRA 317, ruling that Resolution No. 90-0590 of the Commission on Elections,
which directed the holding of recall proceedings, had no retroactive application; Romualdez v. CSC, 197
SCRA 168, where it was ruled that CSC Memorandum Circular No. 29, s. 1989 cannot be given
retrospective effect so as to entitle to permanent appointment an employee whose temporary appointment
had expired before the Circular was issued.

The principle of prospectivity has also been applied to judicial decisions which, "although in themselves not
laws, are nevertheless evidence of what the laws mean, . . . (this being) the reason why under Article 8 of
the New Civil Code, 'Judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part
of the legal system . . .’"4

I believe that there is a greater demand to ward off the retroactive application of the Code of Professional
Responsibility for the Code is the source of penal liabilities against its infringers. It is well entrenched that
generally, penal laws or those laws which define offenses and prescribe penalties for their violation operate
prospectively.5 The Constitution itself bars the enactment of ex-post facto laws.6 I do not think it necessary to
flirt with the constitutional issue whether the Code of Professional Responsibility operates as a penal statute
within the definition of an ex-post facto law, but I am satisfied with the general rules, affirmed by
jurisprudence, that abhor the retroactivity of statutes and regulations such as the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

Hence, to impute culpability on the part of Atty. Mendoza, it would be necessary to ascertain whether his
accession to represent the respondents violated any binding law or regulation at the time of the
engagement. It is but proper to frame the question in such manner, for only then could it be ascertained
whether Atty. Mendoza knew or should have known that his professional representation of the respondents
was illegal. It would also be unfair to ascribe liability to any lawyer whom, at the time he/she was in
government service, was not guided by any definitive rule prescribing the possible subsequent restrictions
on the lawyer’s professional activity as a consequence of the exercise of public office.

Ostensibly, Atty. Mendoza’s actions violated Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics, which some
authorities deemed as a source of legal ethics prior to the Code of Professional Responsibility. 7 Canon 36
states:

36. Retirement from judicial position or public employment

A lawyer should not accept employment as an advocate in any matter upon the merits of which he has
previously acted in a judicial capacity.
 66

A lawyer, having once held public office or having been in the public employ should not, after his retirement,
accept employment in connection with any matter he has investigated or passed upon while in such office or
employ.

Canon 36 would apparently cover the allegations imputed to Atty. Mendoza. However, a thorough review
should first be examined on whether Canon 36 of the Canons of Professional Ethics may be used as legal
basis in resolving this case.

The Canons of Professional Ethics originated from the American Bar Association. 8 They were adopted by
the Philippine Bar Association as its own in 1917 and in 1946. 9 There is no denying the high regard enjoyed
by the Philippine Bar Association in the legal community in its nearly one hundred years of existence.
However, there is also no denying that the Philippine Bar Association, a civic non-profit association, 10 is a
private entity of limited membership within the Philippine bar. The rules or canons it has adopted are per
se binding only on its members, and the penalties for violation of the same could affect only the status or
rights of the infringers as members of the association.

At the same time, reference has been had by this Court to the Canons of Professional Ethics in deciding
administrative cases against lawyers, especially prior to the adoption of the Code of Professional Ethics.
Hence, the belief by some commentators that the said Canons may serve as a source of legal ethics in this
country. However, I think it would be grave error to declare that the Canons of Professional Ethics, on their
own, serves as an indisputable source of obligations and basis of penalties imposable upon members of the
Philippine legal profession. This would violate the long-established constitutional principle that it is the
Supreme Court which is tasked with the promulgation of rules governing the admission to the practice of
law, as well as the pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. 11 The task of formulating ethical rules
governing the practice of law in the Philippines could not have been delegated to the Philippine Bar
Association by the Supreme Court. Neither could such rules as adopted by the private body be binding on
the Supreme Court or the members of the bar.

If provisions of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the Philippine Bar Association have jurisprudentially
been enforced, or acknowledged as basis for legal liability by the Supreme Court, they may be recognized
as a binding standard imposable upon members of the bar, but not because said Canons or the
Philippine Bar Association itself said so, but because the Supreme Court said so. This is keeping in line
with the entrenched rule, as evinced by Article 8 of the Civil Code, which states that "judicial decisions
applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution shall form a part of the legal system."

Thus, I would be willing to consider Canon 36 as binding on Atty. Mendoza when he deigned to represent
the respondents if at such time, this Court had expressly acknowledged Canon 36 as a rule or standard
which deserves obeisance by members of the bar. After all, it would only be through such process of judicial
recognition that these guidelines adopted by a private entity could be considered as a normative rule
compulsory on all practitioners. Unfortunately, no such case exists in Philippine jurisprudence.

It might be possible to concede that this principle embodied under Canon 36 or even as stated in American
case law, subsisted within that penumbra of ethical standards from which the Court could have derived a
jurisprudential rule had one been called for by a particular case. However, it remains that none such was
pronounced by this Court in jurisprudence, and indeed the prohibition under Canon 36 was not prescribed
by this Court or by statute as a norm until the enactment of the Code of Professional Responsibility in 21
June 1988. Accordingly, when Atty. Mendoza agreed to represent the respondents, there was no definitive
binding rule proscribing him from such engagement or penalizing him for such representation.

I am mindful that what the Court is called upon to decide is whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave
abuse of discretion, and not just mere error in fact or law, in denying the motion to disqualify Atty. Mendoza.
The absence of a definitive disqualificatory rule that would have guided Atty. Mendoza when he undertook
the questioned acts sufficiently justifies the Sandiganbayan’s denial of the motion.

We should not render insensate the concerns raised by the minority, arising as they do from an
understandable concern that the line dividing the professional activities and the government services
 67

rendered by lawyers should remain distinct. Yet the majority likewise demonstrates that there is no
unanimity on prevalent legal thought on the matter, and a healthy debate on the issue will result in no harm.
Still, the due process dimension, as highlighted by the absence of a definitive rule for which Atty. Mendoza
could have been held accountable, proves determinative to my mind. The Court is the enforcer of the
constitutional guarantees of due process to all persons, and my vote is but a consequence of this primordial
duty.

Footnotes

1 
R. Agpalo, The Code of Professional Responsibility for Lawyers (1st ed., 1991), at 369.

2 
R. Agpalo, Statutory Construction (5th ed., 2003), at 355; citing Iburan v. Labes, 87 Phil. 234
(1950); People v. Zeta, 98 Phil. 143 (1955); Castro v. Collector of Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 12174,
28 December 1962, 6 SCRA 886; Commissioner v. Lingayen Gulf Electric Power Co., Inc., 164
SCRA 27 (1988).

3 
Id., citing Montilla v. Agustina Corp., 24 Phil. 220 (1913); Cebu Portland Cement Co. v. Collector of
Internal Revenue, G.R. No. 20563, 29 October 1968, 25 SCRA 789 (1968).

4 
Co v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100776, October 28, 1993.

5 
Agpalo, supra note 2, at 357; citing People v. Moran, 44 Phil. 387 (1923).

6 
See Article III, Sec. 22, Constitution.

7 
See, e.g., G. Malcolm, Legal and Judicial Ethics (1949), at 9.

8 
Agpalo, supra note 1, at 381.

9 
Ibid.

10 
See Juan F. Nakpil & Sons v. Court of Appeals, 228 Phil. 564, 572 (1986).

11 
See Section 5(5), Article VIII, Constitution. See also Section 5(5), Article X, 1973 Constitution and
Section 13, Article VIII, 1935 Constitution.
 68

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. L-1117             March 20, 1944
THE DIRECTOR OF RELIGIOUS AFFAIRS, complainant,
vs.
ESTANISLAO R. BAYOT, respondent.

Office of the Solicitor General De la Costa and Solicitor Feria for complainant.
Francisco Claravall for respondent.

OZAETA, J.:

The respondent, who is an attorney-at-law, is charged with malpractice for having published an advertisement in the
Sunday Tribune of June 13, 1943, which reads as follows:

Marriage

license promptly secured thru our assistance & the annoyance of delay or publicity avoided if desired, and
marriage arranged to wishes of parties. Consultation on any matter free for the poor. Everything confidential.

Legal assistance service

12 Escolta, Manila, Room, 105
Tel. 2-41-60.

Appearing in his own behalf, respondent at first denied having published the said advertisement; but subsequently,
thru his attorney, he admitted having caused its publication and prayed for "the indulgence and mercy" of the Court,
promising "not to repeat such professional misconduct in the future and to abide himself to the strict ethical rules of
the law profession." In further mitigation he alleged that the said advertisement was published only once in
the Tribune and that he never had any case at law by reason thereof.

Upon that plea the case was submitted to the Court for decision.

It is undeniable that the advertisement in question was a flagrant violation by the respondent of the ethics of his
profession, it being a brazen solicitation of business from the public. Section 25 of Rule 127 expressly provides
among other things that "the practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or thru paid
agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice." It is highly unethical for an attorney to advertise his talents or skill as a
merchant advertises his wares. Law is a profession and not a trade. The lawyer degrades himself and his profession
who stoops to and adopts the practices of mercantilism by advertising his services or offering them to the public. As
a member of the bar, he defiles the temple of justice with mercenary activities as the money-changers of old defiled
the temple of Jehovah. "The most worth and effective advertisement possible, even for a young lawyer, . . . is the
establishment of a well-merited reputation for professional capacity and fidelity to trust. This cannot be forced but
must be the outcome of character and conduct." (Canon 27, Code of Ethics.)

In In re Tagorda, 53 Phil., the respondent attorney was suspended from the practice of law for the period of one
month for advertising his services and soliciting work from the public by writing circular letters. That case, however,
 69

was more serious than this because there the solicitations were repeatedly made and were more elaborate and
insistent.

Considering his plea for leniency and his promise not to repeat the misconduct, the Court is of the opinion and so
decided that the respondent should be, as he hereby is, reprimanded.

Yulo, C.J., Moran, Horrilleno, Paras and Bocobo, JJ., concur.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio

THIRD DIVISION

A.C. No. 6903               April 16, 2012

SUZETTE DEL MUNDO, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. ARNEL C. CAPISTRANO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:

Before the Court is an administrative complaint 1 for disbarment filed by complainant Suzette Del Mundo (Suzette)
charging respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano (Atty. Capistrano) of violating the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Facts

On January 8, 2005, Suzette and her friend Ricky S. Tuparan (Tuparan) engaged the legal services of Atty.
Capistrano to handle the judicial declaration of nullity of their respective marriages allegedly for a fee of
PhP140,000.00 each. On the same date, a Special Retainer Agreement 2 was entered into by and between Suzette
and Atty. Capistrano which required an acceptance fee of PhP30,000.00, appearance fee of PhP2,500.00 per
hearing and another PhP2,500.00 per pleading. In addition, Atty. Capistrano allegedly advised her to prepare
amounts for the following expenses:

PhP11,000.0
Filing fee
0
PhP5,000.00 Summons
PhP15,000.0
Fiscal
0
PhP30,000.0
Psychiatrist
0
PhP15,000.0
Commissioner
0

In accordance with their agreement, Suzette gave Atty. Capistrano the total amount of PhP78,500.00, to wit:

January 8, 2005 PhP30,000.00 Acceptance fee

January 15, PhP11,000.00 Filing fee
 70

2005
February 3, 2005 PhP5,000.00 Filing fee
May 4, 2005 PhP2,500.00 Filing fee
June 8, 2005 PhP30,000.00 Filing fee

For every payment that Suzette made, she would inquire from Atty. Capistrano on the status of her case. In
response, the latter made her believe that the two cases were already filed before the Regional Trial Court of
Malabon City and awaiting notice of hearing. Sometime in July 2005, when she could hardly reach Atty. Capistrano,
she verified her case from the Clerk of Court of Malabon and discovered that while the case of Tuparan had been
filed on January 27, 2005, no petition has yet been filed for her.

Hence, Suzette called for a conference, which was set on July 28, 2005, where she demanded the refund of the
total amount of PhP78,500.00, but Atty. Capistrano instead offered to return the amount of PhP63,000.00 on
staggered basis claiming to have incurred expenses in the filing of Tuparan’s case, to which she agreed. On the
same occasion, Atty. Capistrano handed to her copies of her unfiled petition, 3 Tuparan’s petition4 and his Withdrawal
of Appearance5 in Tuparan’s case with instructions to file them in court, as well as a list 6 containing the expenses he
incurred and the schedule of payment of the amount of PhP63,000.00, as follows:

PhP20,000.00 August 15, 2005

PhP20,000.00 August 29, 2005
PhP23,000.00 September 15, 2005

However, Atty. Capistrano only returned the amount of PhP5,000.00 on August 15, 2005 and thereafter, refused to
communicate with her, prompting the institution of this administrative complaint on September 7, 2005.

In his Comment/Answer7 dated November 14, 2005, Atty. Capistrano acknowledged receipt of the amount of
PhP78,500.00 from Suzette and his undertaking to return the agreed sum of PhP63,000.00. He also admitted
responsibility for his failure to file Suzette’s petition and cited as justification his heavy workload and busy schedule
as then City Legal Officer of Manila and lack of available funds to immediately refund the money received.

In the Resolution8 dated January 18, 2006, the Court resolved to refer the case to the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

The Action and Recommendation of the IBP

For failure of respondent Atty. Capistrano to appear at the mandatory conference set by Commissioner Lolita A.
Quisumbing of the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), the conference was terminated without any
admissions and stipulations of facts and the parties were ordered to file their respective position papers to which
only Atty. Capistrano complied.

In the Report and Recommendation 9 dated April 11, 2007, the IBP-CBD, through Commissioner Quisumbing, found
that Atty. Capistrano had neglected his client’s interest by his failure to inform Suzette of the status of her case and
to file the agreed petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. It also concluded that his inability to refund the
amount he had promised Suzette showed deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity and good demeanor.
Hence, he was held guilty of violating Rule 18.03, and Rule 18.04, Canon 18 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility and recommended the penalty of suspension for two years from the practice of law.

On September 19, 2007, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved the report and recommendation of
Commissioner Quisumbing through Resolution No. XVIII-2007-98 10 with modification ordering the return of the sum
of PhP140,000.00 attorney’s fees to Suzette.
 71

However, upon Atty. Capistrano’s timely motion for reconsideration, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution
No. XIX-2011-26311 on May 14, 2011 reducing the penalty of suspension from two years to one year, to wit:

RESOLVED to PARTIALLY GRANT Respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration, and unanimously MODIFY as it is
hereby MODIFIED Resolution No. XVIII-2007-98 dated 19 September 2007 and REDUCED the penalty against
Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano to SUSPENSION from the practice of law for one (1) year and Ordered to Return the
amount of One Hundred Forty Thousand Pesos (P140,000.00) to complainant with thirty (30) days from receipt of
notice.

The Issue

The sole issue before the Court is whether Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano violated the Code of Professional
Responsibility.

The Ruling of the Court

After a careful perusal of the records, the Court concurs with the findings and recommendation of the IBP-CBD but
takes exception to the amount of PhP140,000.00 recommended to be returned to Suzette.

Indisputably, Atty. Capistrano committed acts in violation of his sworn duty as a member of the bar. In his
Manifestation and Petition for Review, 12 he himself admitted liability for his failure to act on Suzette’s case as well as
to account and return the funds she entrusted to him. He only pleaded for the mitigation of his penalty citing the lack
of intention to breach his lawyer’s oath; that this is his first offense; and that his profession is the only means of his
and his family’s livelihood. He also prayed that the adjudged amount of PhP140,000.00 be reduced to
PhP73,500.00 representing the amount of PhP78,500.00 he received less his payment of the sum of PhP5,000.00.
Consequently, Commissioner Quisumbing and the IBP-CBD Board of Governors correctly recommended the
appropriate penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law for violating the pertinent provisions of the
Canons of Professional Responsibility, thus:

CANON 16 – A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY
COME INTO HIS POSSESSION.

RULE 16.01 – A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

RULE 16.02 – A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.

xxx

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxx

RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection
therewith shall render him liable.

RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.

Indeed, when a lawyer takes a client’s cause, he covenants that he will exercise due diligence in protecting the
latter’s rights. Failure to exercise that degree of vigilance and attention expected of a good father of a family makes
the lawyer unworthy of the trust reposed on him by his client and makes him answerable not just to his client but
also to the legal profession, the courts and society. 13 His workload does not justify neglect in handling one’s case
because it is settled that a lawyer must only accept cases as much as he can efficiently handle. 14
 72

Moreover, a lawyer is obliged to hold in trust money of his client that may come to his possession. As trustee of
such funds, he is bound to keep them separate and apart from his own. Money entrusted to a lawyer for a specific
purpose such as for the filing and processing of a case if not utilized, must be returned immediately upon demand.
Failure to return gives rise to a presumption that he has misappropriated it in violation of the trust reposed on him.
And the conversion of funds entrusted to him constitutes gross violation of professional ethics and betrayal of public
confidence in the legal profession.15

To stress, the practice of law is a privilege given to lawyers who meet the high standards of legal proficiency and
morality, including honesty, integrity and fair dealing. They must perform their fourfold duty to society, the legal
profession, the courts and their clients, in accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as
embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility. 16 Falling short of this standard, the Court will not hesitate to
discipline an erring lawyer by imposing an appropriate penalty based on the exercise of sound judicial discretion in
consideration of the surrounding facts.17

With the foregoing disquisition and Atty. Capistrano’s admission of his fault and negligence, the Court finds the
penalty of one year suspension from the practice of law, as recommended by the IBP-CBD, sufficient sanction for
his violation. However, the Court finds proper to modify the amount to be returned to Suzette from PhP140,000.00 to
PhP73,500.00.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Arnel C. Capistrano, having clearly violated Canons 16 and 18 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for one year with a stern warning that a
repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is ORDERED to return to Suzette Del
Mundo the full amount of PhP73,500.00 within 30 days from notice hereof and DIRECTED to submit to the Court
proof of such payment.

Let copies of this Decision be entered in the personal record of respondent as a member of the Philippine Bar and
furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the Court Administrator for
circulation to all courts in the country.

SO ORDERED.

ESTELA M. PERLAS-BERNABE
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice
Chairperson

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA ROBERTO A. ABAD

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE C. MENDOZA
Associate Justice

Footnotes
1 
Rollo, pp. 1 – 5.
2 
Id. at 6.
3 
Id. at 20 – 24.
4 
Id. at 13 – 19.
5 
Id. at 26.
6 
Id. at 25.
 73
7 
Id. at 28 – 34.
8 
Id. at 36.
9 
Id. at 117 – 121.
10 
Id. at 116.
11 
Id. at 115.
12 
Id. at 122 – 131.
13 
Valeriana Dalisay v. Atty. Melanio Mauricio Jr., A.C. No. 5655, April 22, 2005, 456 SCRA 508, 514.
14 
Dolores Pariñas v. Atty. Oscar Paguinto, A.C. No. 6297, July 13, 2004, 434 SCRA 179.
15 
Ruby Mae Barnachea v. Atty. Edwin T. Quiocho, A.C. No. 5925, March 11, 2003, 399 SCRA 1, 8.
16 
Nemesio Floran and Caridad Floran v. Atty. Roy Prule Ediza, A.C. No. 5325, October 19, 2011.
17 
Ruthie Lim-Santiago v. Atty. Carlos B. Sagucio, A.C. No. 6705, March 31, 2006, 486 SCRA 10, 25.

EN BANC
A.C. No. 8235, January 27, 2015
JOSELITO F. TEJANO, Complainant, v. ATTY. BENJAMIN F. BATERINA, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case

Before the Court is a verified administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina.

The Facts

On 26 March 2009, Joselito F. Tejano filed an Affidavit-Complaint 1 before the Office of the Court Administrator
(OCA) of the Supreme Court against Judge Dominador LL. Arquelada, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC), Vigan City, Ilocos Sur, Branch 21, and Tejano’s own counsel, Atty. Baterina.

Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of acting in conspiracy with Atty. Baterina for the former to take possession of his
(Tejano) property, which was the subject matter of litigation in the judge’s court.

The case stems from Civil Case No. 4046-V, a suit for recovery of possession and damages filed by Tejano, his
mother and sisters against the Province of Ilocos Sur. The property involved in the suit is a strip of land located at
the northern portion of Lot No. 5663 in Tamag, Vigan City. The lot was wholly owned by Tejano’s family, but the
Province of Ilocos Sur constructed an access road stretching from the provincial highway in the east to the provincial
government’s motor pool in the west without instituting the proper expropriation proceedings. 2

The case was raffled off to Branch 21 of the Vigan City RTC in October 1988. Four judges would hear the case
before Judge Arquelada became the branch’s presiding judge in 2001. 3 Prior to his appointment to the bench,
however, Judge Arquelada was one of the trial prosecutors assigned to Branch 21, and in that capacity represented
the Province of Ilocos Sur in Civil Case No. 4046-V. 4

In his Affidavit-Complaint, Tejano accused Judge Arquelada of colluding with Atty. Baterina in the former’s bid to
“take possession” of their property and was “collecting rentals from squatters who had set up their businesses inside
the whole of Lot [No.] 5663.” In support of his accusations, Tejano attached a copy of Transfer Certificate of Title
No. T-430045 covering Lot No. 5663 in the name of Karen Laderas, purportedly the daughter of Judge Arquelada;
receipts of rents paid to Terencio Florendo, 6 sheriff at Judge Arquelada’s sala at the Vigan City RTC; receipts of
rents paid to Aida Calibuso, 7 who was expressly designated by Laderas as her attorney-in-fact 8 in collecting said
rents; and receipts of rents paid to Edgar Arquelada, Judge Arquelada’s brother. 9

As to his counsel, Tejano claims that Atty. Baterina “miserably failed to advance [his] cause.” Specifically, Tejano
alleged that Atty. Baterina (1) failed to object when the trial court pronounced that he and his co-plaintiffs had
 74

waived their right to present evidence after several postponements in the  trial because his mother was ill and
confined at the hospital;10 (2) manifested in open court that he would file a motion for reconsideration of the order
declaring their presentation of evidence terminated but failed to actually do so; 11 (3) not only failed to file said motion
for reconsideration, but also declared in open court that they would not be presenting any witnesses without
consulting his clients;12 and (4) failed to comply with the trial court’s order to submit their formal offer of exhibits. 13

In a letter dated 27 March 2009, then Court Administrator (now Supreme Court Associate Justice) Jose P. Perez
informed Tejano that the OCA has no jurisdiction over Atty. Baterina since it only has administrative supervision
over officials and employees of the judiciary. However, Tejano was informed to file the complaint against his counsel
at the Office of the Bar Confidant, and that the complaint against Judge Arquelada was already “being acted upon”
by the OCA.14

In a Resolution dated 6 July 2009, the Court required Atty. Baterina  to file a Comment on the complaint within 10
days from notice.15 Failing to comply with the Court’s order, Atty. Baterina was ordered to show cause why he
should not be disciplinarily dealt with and once again ordered to comply with the Court’s 6 July 2009 Order. 16

In his Compliance dated 28 March 2010, Atty. Baterina explained that he had been recuperating from a kidney
transplant when he received a copy of the complaint. He begged the Court’s indulgence and said that his failure to
comply was “not at all intended to show disrespect to the orders of the Honorable Tribunal.” 17

Atty. Baterina also denied the allegation of bad faith and negligence in handling the Tejano case. He explained that
the reason he could not attend to the case was that in 2002, after the initial presentation of the plaintiffs’ case, he
was suspended by the Court from the practice of law for two years. 18 He alleged that this fact was made known to
Tejano’s mother and sister. However, the trial court did not order plaintiffs to secure the services of another lawyer.
On the contrary, it proceeded to hear the case, and plaintiffs were not represented by a lawyer until the termination
of the case.19 Atty. Baterina instead points to the “displayed bias” and “undue and conflict of interest” 20 of Judge
Arquelada as the culprit in Tejano’s predicament.

The Court, in its 19 July 2010 Resolution, found Atty. Baterina’s explanation “not satisfactory” and admonished him
“to be more heedful of the Court’s directives in order to avoid delay in the disposition of [the] case.” The Court also
referred the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation.

IBP Investigation, Report and Recommendation

After the proceedings, the IBP’s Commission on Bar Discipline promulgated its Report and Recommendation, 21 part
of which reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
First, it appears that respondent’s failure to appear in representation of his clients in the said civil case before the
RTC was due to his two-year suspension from the practice of law in 2001. While this is a justified reason for his non-
appearance, respondent, however, manifestly failed to properly inform the RTC of this fact. That way, the RTC
would have, in the meantime, ordered plaintiffs to seek the services of another lawyer. Respondent’s contention that
the fact of his suspension was nonetheless circularized to all courts of the Philippines including the RTC is
unavailing. Still, respondent should have exerted prudence in properly informing the RTC of his suspension in order
to protect the interests of his clients.

Moreover, while he relayed such fact of suspension to his clients, there is no showing that he explained the
consequences to them, or that he advised them to seek another counsel’s assistance in the meantime. Clearly
therefore, respondent’s inaction falls short of the diligence required of him as a lawyer.

Second, it must be recalled that the RTC in the said case required the plaintiffs therein to submit their formal offer of
evidence. However, respondent did not bother to do so, in total disregard of the RTC’s Order dated 8 November
2004. Respondent’s bare excuse that he remembers making an oral offer thereof deserves no merit because the
records of this case clearly reveal the contrary. Because of the said inaction of respondent, his clients’ case was
dismissed by the RTC.

x x x x

From the foregoing, it is clear that respondent’s acts constitute sufficient ground for disciplinary action against him.
 75

His gross negligence under the circumstances cannot be countenanced. It is, therefore, respectfully recommended
that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, and be fined in the amount of Fifty
Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00), considering that this is his second disciplinary action. x x x. 22
On 20 March 2013, the IBP Board of Governors adopted the following resolution:       
RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-237
Adm. Case No. 8235
Joselito F. Tejano vs.
Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex “A”, and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering that Respondent is guilty of gross negligence, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina
is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years. However, the Fine of Fifty Thousand Pesos
imposed on respondent is hereby deleted.23
The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts the IBP’s report and recommendation, with modification as to the penalty.

The Code of Professional Responsibility governing the conduct of lawyers states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

CANON 18 – A LAWYER SHALL SERVE HIS CLIENT WITH COMPETENCE AND DILIGENCE.

xxxx

RULE 18.03 – A lawyer shall not neglect a legal matter entrusted to him, and his negligence in connection therewith
shall render him liable.

RULE 18.04 – A lawyer shall keep the client informed of the status of his case and shall respond within a
reasonable time to the client’s request for information.
Lawyers have a “fourfold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients,” and must act “in
accordance with the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility.”24

When a lawyer agrees to take up a client’s cause, he makes a commitment to exercise due diligence in protecting
the latter’s rights. Once a lawyer’s services are engaged, “he is duty bound to serve his client with competence, and
to attend to his client’s cause with diligence, care and devotion regardless of whether he accepts it for a fee or for
free. He owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful of the trust and confidence reposed on him.” 25 A
lawyer’s acceptance to take up a case “impliedly stipulates [that he will] carry it to its termination, that is, until the
case becomes final and executory.”26

Atty. Baterina’s duty to his clients did not automatically cease with his suspension. At the very least, such
suspension gave him a concomitant responsibility to inform his clients that he would be unable to attend to their
case and advise them to retain another counsel.

A lawyer – even one suspended from practicing the profession – owes it to his client to not “sit idly by and leave the
rights of his client in a state of uncertainty.”27 The client “should never be left groping in the dark” and instead must
be “adequately and fully informed about the developments in his case.” 28

Atty. Baterina practically abandoned this duty when he allowed the proceedings to run its course without any effort
to safeguard his clients’ welfare in the meantime. His failure to file the required pleadings on his clients’ behalf
constitutes gross negligence in violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility 29 and renders him subject to
disciplinary action.30 The penalties for a lawyer’s failure to file the required brief or pleading range from warning,
reprimand, fine, suspension, or in grave cases, disbarment. 31

Further, Atty. Baterina’s reckless disregard for orders and directives of the courts is unbecoming of a member of the
Bar. His conduct has shown that he has little respect for rules, court processes, and even for the Court’s disciplinary
 76

authority. Not only did he fail to follow the trial court’s orders in his clients’ case, he even disregarded court orders in
his own disciplinary proceedings.

Considering Atty. Baterina’s medical condition at that time, a simple explanation to the Court would have sufficed.
Instead, however, he simply let the orders go unheeded, neglecting his duty to the Court.

Lawyers, as this Court has previously emphasized, “are particularly called upon to obey court orders and processes
and are expected to stand foremost in complying with court directives being themselves officers of the court.” 32 As
such, Atty. Baterina should “know that a resolution of this Court is not a mere request but an order which should be
complied with promptly and completely.”33

Proper Penalty

In Spouses Soriano v. Reyes, the Court held that “the appropriate penalty on an errant lawyer depends on the
exercise of sound judicial discretion based on the surrounding facts.” 34

The Court notes that in 2001, Atty. Baterina was also suspended for two years after being found guilty of gross
misconduct.35 In that case, Araceli Sipin-Nabor filed a complaint against Atty. Baterina for failing to file her Answer
with Counterclaim in a case for quieting of title and recovery of possession where she and her siblings were
defendants. Because of such failure, Sipin-Nabor was declared by the trial court to be in default and unable to
present her evidence, and which, in turn, resulted in a decision adverse to her.

Atty. Baterina was also found to have “convert[ed] the money of his client to his own personal use without her
consent” and “deceiv[ed] the complainant into giving him the amount of P2,000.00 purportedly to be used for filing
an answer with counterclaim,” which he never did.

The Court likewise noted in that case Atty. Baterina’s “repeated failure to comply with the resolutions of the Court
requiring him to comment on the complaint [which] indicates a high degree of irresponsibility tantamount to willful
disobedience to the lawful orders of the Supreme Court.” 36

These two disciplinary cases against Atty. Baterina show a pattern of neglecting his duty to his clients, as well as a
propensity for disrespecting the authority of the courts. Such incorrigible behavior is unacceptable and will not be
tolerated among the members of the Bar.

For this reason, the Court deems it proper to impose on Atty. Baterina a longer suspension period of five (5) years.

WHEREFORE, Atty. Benjamin F. Baterina is found GUILTY of gross negligence. He is SUSPENDED from the

practice of law for five (5) years. He is also STERNLY WARNED that a repetition of the same or a similar offense
will be dealt with more severely.

This decision shall take effect immediately and copies thereof furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be
appended to respondent’s personal record, and the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

The Office of the Court Administrator is directed to circulate copies of this decision to all courts.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, (Chief Justice), on leave.

Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, Reyes, Perlas-
Bernabe, Leonen, and Jardeleza, JJ., concur.
Carpio, J., Acting Chief Justice per Special Order No. 1914 dated 27 January 2015.
Brion, J., on official leave.

Endnotes:
 77
1
Rollo, pp. 2-10.
2
 Id. at 8.
3
 Id.
4
 Id. at 4.
5
 Id. at 61.
6
 Id. at 62.
7
 Id. at 63-69.
8
 Id. at 70-71.
9
 Id. at 65-66.
10
 Id. at 96.
11
 Id.
12
 Id. at 96-97, 120.
13
 Id. at 97.
14
 Id. at 1; Per Complainant’s Position Paper filed before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, Judge Arquelada
has retired from the judiciary. Id. at 96.
15
 Id. at 77.
16
 Id. at 79.
17
 Id. at 81.
18
 See Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, 412 Phil. 419 (2001).
19
Rollo, p. 81.
20
 Id. at 82.
21
 Id. at 154-157.
22
 Id. at 156-157.
23
 Id. at 153.
24
Del Mundo v. Capistrano, A.C. No. 6903, 16 April 2012, 669 SCRA 462, 469. Citations omitted.
25
Lad vda. De Dominguez v. Agleron, A.C. No. 5359, 10 March 2014. Citations omitted.
26
Villaflores v. Limos, 563 Phil. 453, 460 (2007).
27
Dagala v. Queseda, Jr., A.C. No. 5044, 2 December 2013, 711 SCRA 206.
28
Uy v. Tansinsin, 610 Phil. 709, 716 (2009), citing Edquibal v. Ferrer, Jr., 491 Phil. 1 (2005).
 78
29
 Supra note 26, at 463.
30
Spouses Soriano v. Reyes, 523 Phil. 1, 16 (2006).
31
 See Pangasinan Electric Cooperative I v. Atty. Montemayor, 559 Phil. 438 (2007).
32
Sibulo v. Ilagan, 486 Phil. 197, 203-204 (2004).
33
Cabauatan v. Venida, A.C. No. 10043, 20 November 2013, 710 SCRA 328.
34
 Supra note 30, at 16.
35
Sipin-Nabor v. Baterina, 412 Phil. 419 (2001).
36
 Id. at 424.

SECOND DIVISION

[G.R. No. L-23815. June 28, 1974.]

ADELINO H. LEDESMA, Petitioner, v. HON. RAFAEL C. CLIMACO, Presiding Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, Branch I, Silay City, Respondent.

Adelino E. Ledesma in his own behalf.

Hon. Rafael C. Climaco in his own behalf.

DECISION

FERNANDO, J.:

What is assailed in this certiorari proceeding is an order of respondent Judge denying a motion filed by petitioner to
be allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. 1 One of the grounds for such a motion was his allegation that with his
appointment as Election Registrar by the Commission on Elections, he was not in a position to devote full time to the
defense of the two accused. The denial by respondent Judge of such a plea, notwithstanding the conformity of the
defendants, was due "its principal effect [being] to delay this case." 2 It was likewise noted that the prosecution had
already rested and that petitioner was previously counsel de parte, his designation in the former category being
precisely to protect him in his new position without prejudicing the accused. It cannot be plausibly asserted that such
failure to allow withdrawal of de oficio counsel could ordinarily be characterized as a grave abuse of discretion
correctible by certiorari. There is, however, the overriding concern for the right to counsel of the accused that must
be taken seriously into consideration. In appropriate cases, it should tilt the balance. This is not one of them. What is
easily discernible was the obvious reluctance of petitioner to comply with the responsibilities incumbent on the
counsel de oficio. Then, too, even on the assumption that he continues in his position, his volume of work is likely to
be very much less at present. There is not now the slightest pretext for him to shirk an obligation a member of the
bar, who expects to remain in good standing, should fulfill. The petition is clearly without merit.

According to the undisputed facts, Petitioner, on October 13, 1964, was appointed Election Registrar for the
Municipality of Cadiz, Province of Negros Occidental. Then and there, he commenced to discharge its duties. As he
was counsel de parte for one of the accused in a case pending in the sala of respondent Judge, he filed a motion to
withdraw as such. Not only did respondent Judge deny such motion, but he also appointed him counsel de oficio for
 79

the two defendants. Subsequently, on November 3, 1964, petitioner filed an urgent motion to be allowed to withdraw
as counsel de oficio, premised on the policy of the Commission on Elections to require full time service as well as on
the volume or pressure of work of petitioner, which could prevent him from handling adequately the defense.
Respondent Judge, in the challenged order of November 6, 1964, denied said motion. A motion for reconsideration
having proved futile, he instituted this certiorari proceeding. 3

As noted at the outset, the petition must fail.

1. The assailed order of November 6, 1964 denying the urgent motion of petitioner to withdraw as counsel de oficio
speaks for itself. It began with a reminder that a crime was allegedly committed on February 17, 1962, with the
proceedings having started in the municipal court of Cadiz on July 11, 1962. Then respondent Judge spoke of his
order of October 16, 1964 which reads thus: "In view of the objection of the prosecution to the motion for
postponement of October 15, 1964 (alleging that counsel for the accused cannot continue appearing in this case
without the express authority of the Commission on Elections); and since according to the prosecution there are two
witnesses who are ready to take the stand, after which the government would rest, the motion for postponement is
denied. When counsel for the accused assumed office as Election Registrar on October 13, 1964, he knew since
October 2, 1964 that the trial would be resumed today. Nevertheless, in order not to prejudice the civil service status
of counsel for the accused, he is hereby designated counsel de oficio for the accused. The defense obtained
postponements on May 17, 1963, June 13, 1963, June 14, 1963, October 28, 1963, November 27, 1963, February
11, 1964, March 9, 1964, June 8, 1964, July 26, 1964, and September 7, 1964." 4 Reference was then made to
another order of February 11, 1964: "Upon petition of Atty. Adelino H. Ledesma, alleging indisposition, the
continuation of the trial of this case is hereby transferred to March 3, 1964 at 8:30 in the morning. The defense is
reminded that at its instance, this case has been postponed at least eight (8) times, and that the government
witnesses have to come all the way from Manapala." 5 After which, it was noted in such order that there was no
incompatibility between the duty of petitioner to the accused and to the court and the performance of his task as an
election registrar of the Commission on Elections and that the ends of justice "would be served by allowing and
requiring Mr. Ledesma to continue as counsel de oficio, since the prosecution has already rested its case." 6

2. What is readily apparent therefore, is that petitioner was less than duly mindful of his obligation as counsel de
oficio. He ought to have known that membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. It could be that
for some lawyers, especially the neophytes in the profession, being appointed counsel de oficio is an irksome chore.
For those holding such belief, it may come as a surprise that counsel of repute and of eminence welcome such an
opportunity. It makes even more manifest that law is indeed a profession dedicated to the ideal of service and not a
mere trade. It is understandable then why a high degree of fidelity to duty is required of one so designated. A recent
statement of the doctrine is found in People v. Daban: 7 "There is need anew in this disciplinary proceeding to lay
stress on the fundamental postulate that membership in the bar carries with it a responsibility to live up to its
exacting standard. The law is a profession, not a trade or a craft. Those enrolled in its ranks are called upon to aid in
the performance of one of the basic purposes of the State, the administration of justice. To avoid any frustration
thereof, especially in the case of an indigent defendant, a lawyer may be required to act as counsel de oficio. The
fact that his services are rendered without remuneration should not occasion a diminution in his zeal. Rather the
contrary. This is not, of course, to ignore that other pressing matters do compete for his attention. After all, he has
his practice to attend to. That circumstance possesses, high degree of relevance since a lawyer has to live; certainly
he cannot afford either to neglect his paying cases. Nonetheless, what is incumbent upon him as counsel de oficio
must be fulfilled." 8

So it has been from the 1905 decision of In re Robles Lahesa, 9 where respondent was de oficio counsel, the
opinion penned by Justice Carson making clear: "This Court should exact from its officers and subordinates the
most scrupulous performance of their official duties, especially when negligence in the performance of those duties
necessarily results in delays in the prosecution of criminal cases . . ." 10 Justice Sanchez in People v. Estebia 11
reiterated such a view in these words: "It is true that he is a court-appointed counsel. But we do say that as such
counsel de oficio, he has as high a duty to the accused as one employed and paid by defendant himself. Because,
as in the case of the latter, he must exercise his best efforts and professional ability in behalf of the person assigned
to his care. He is to render effective assistance. The accused-defendant expects of him due diligence, not mere
perfunctory representation. . . . For, indeed a lawyer who is a vanguard in the bastion of justice is expected to have
a bigger dose of social conscience and a little less of self-interest." 12

The weakness of the petition is thus quite evident.

 80

3. If respondent Judge were required to answer the petition, it was only due to the apprehension that considering
the frame of mind of a counsel loath and reluctant to fulfill his obligation, the welfare of the accused could be
prejudiced. His right to counsel could in effect be rendered nugatory. Its importance was rightfully stressed by Chief
Justice Moran in People v. Holgado in these words: "In criminal cases there can be no fair hearing unless the
accused be given an opportunity to be heard by counsel. The right to be heard would be of little avail if it does not
include the right to be heard by counsel. Even the most intelligent or educated man may have no skill in the science
of law, particularly in the rules of procedure, and, without counsel, he may be convicted not because he is guilty but
because he does not know how to establish his innocence. And this can happen more easily to persons who are
ignorant or uneducated. It is for this reason that the right to be assisted by counsel is deemed so important that it
has become a constitutional right and it is so implemented that under our rules of procedure it is not enough for the
Court to apprise an accused of his right to have an attorney, it is not enough to ask him whether he desires the aid
of an attorney, but it is essential that the court should assign one de oficio for him if he so desires and he is poor or
grant him a reasonable time to procure an attorney of his own." 13 So it was under the previous Organic Acts. 14
The present Constitution is even more emphatic. For, in addition to reiterating that the accused "shall enjoy the right
to be heard by himself and counsel," 15 there is this new provision: "Any person under investigation for the
commission of an offense shall have the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such right. No
force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any
confession obtained in violation of this section shall be inadmissible in evidence." 16

Thus is made manifest the indispensable role of a member of the Bar in the defense of an accused. Such a
consideration could have sufficed for petitioner not being allowed to withdraw as counsel de oficio. For he did betray
by his moves his lack of enthusiasm for the task entrusted to him, to put matters mildly. He did point though to his
responsibility as an election registrar. Assuming his good faith, no such excuse could be availed now. There is not
likely at present, and in the immediate future, an exorbitant demand on his time. It may likewise be assumed,
considering what has been set forth above, that petitioner would exert himself sufficiently to perform his task as
defense counsel with competence, if not with zeal, if only to erase doubts as to his fitness to remain a member of
the profession in good standing. The admonition is ever timely for those enrolled in the ranks of legal practitioners
that there are times, and this is one of them, when duty to court and to client takes precedence over the promptings
of self-interest.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.

Zaldivar (Chairman), Antonio, Fernandez and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Barredo, J., did not take part.

Endnotes:

1. Petition, Annex B.

2. Ibid, Annex C.

3. Petition, pars. 3-9.

4. Petition, Annex C.

5. Ibid.

6. Ibid.

7. L-31429, January 31, 1972, 43 SCRA 185.

8. Ibid, 186. Cf. People v. Apduhan, L-19491, Aug. 30, 1968, 24 SCRA 798; People v. Solacito, L-29209, Aug. 25, 1969, 29 SCRA 61;
People v. Serafica, L-29092-93, Aug. 28, 1969, 29 SCRA 123; People v. Englatera, L-30820, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 245; People v.
Aguilar, L-30932, Jan. 29, 1971, 37 SCRA 115; People v. Estebla, L-26868, July 29, 1971, 40 SCRA 90; People v. Flores, L-32692,
July 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 230; People v. Alincastre, L-29891, Aug. 30, 1971, 40 SCRA 391; People v. Valera, L-30039; Feb. 8, 1972, 43
SCRA 207, People v. Francisco, L-30763, June 29, 1972, 45 SCRA 451; People v. Espiña, L-33028, June 30, 1972, 45 SCRA 614;
 81

People v. Esteves, L-34811, Aug. 18, 1972, 46 SCRA 680; People v. Simeon, L-33730, Sept. 28, 1972, 47 SCRA 129; People v.
Daeng, L-34091, Jan. 30, 1973, 49 SCRA 221; People v. Ricalde, L-34673, Jan. 30, 1973, 49 SCRA 228; People v. Martinez, L-35353,
April 30, 1973, 50 SCRA 509; People v. Silvestre, L-33821, June 22, 1973, 51 SCRA 286; People v. Busa, L-32047, June 25, 1973, 51
SCRA 317; People v. Alamada, L-34594, July 13, 1973, 52 SCRA 103; People v. Andaya, L-29644, July 25, 1973, 52 SCRA 137;
People v. Duque, L-33267, Sept. 27, 1973, 53 SCRA 132; People v. Saligan, L-35792, Nov. 29, 1973, 54 SCRA 190; People v.
Bacong, L-36161, Dec. 19, 1973, 54 SCRA 288.

9. 4 Phil. 298.

10. Ibid, 300.

11. L-26868, February 27, 1969, 27 SCRA 106.

12. Ibid, 109-110. Cf. Javellana v. Lutero, L-23956, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 717; Blanza v. Arcangel, Adm. Case No. 492, Sept. 5,
1967, 21 SCRA 1.

13. 85 Phil. 752, 756-757 (1950).

14. Cf. United States v. Gimeno, 1 Phil. 236 (1902); United States v. Palisoc, 4 Phil. 207 (1905); United States v. Go-Leng, 21 Phil. 426
(1912); United States v. Laranja, 21 Phil. 500 (1912); United States v. Ramirez, 26 Phil. 616 (1914); United States v. Labial, 27 Phil. 82
(1914); United States v. Custan, 28 Phil. 19 (1914); United States v. Kilayco, 31 Phil. 371 (1915); United States v. Escalante, 36 Phil.
743 (1917); People v. Abuyen, 52 Phil. 722 (1929).

15. Cf. Article IV, Section 19.

16. Section 20.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10662 [Formerly CBD Case No. 10-2654], July 07, 2015

JUN B. LUNA, Complainant, v. ATTY. DWIGHT M. GALARRITA, Respondent.

DECISION

LEONEN, J.:

Before us is a disbarment Complaint against Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita for his failure to deliver to his client,
complainant Jun B. Luna, the P100,000.00 settlement proceeds he received after entering into a Compromise
Agreement in the foreclosure case without his client's consent.

On April 7, 2010, Jun B. Luna (Luna) filed an Affidavit-Complaint 1 against his lawyer, Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita (Atty.
Galarrita), before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.

Luna alleged that he retained Atty. Galarrita's legal services in filing a foreclosure Complaint 2 on October 14, 2002
before the Regional Trial Court of Gumaca, Quezon. 3 The Complaint against one Jose Calvario (Calvario) alleged
that Calvario borrowed P100,000.00 from Luna. This loan was secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage 4 over a
parcel of land in Quezon Province.5 Due to non-payment of the loan, Luna filed the Complaint praying for payment
of the obligation with interest, and issuance of a foreclosure decree upon Calvario's failure to fully pay within the
period.6redarclaw

The parties tried to amicably settle the case during pre-trial, followed by Luna's presentation and offer of
evidence.7redarclaw

Atty. Galarrita opted to enter into a settlement with the other party after his formal offer of evidence. 8 They submitted
the Kasunduan9 (Compromise Agreement) before the trial court on February 14, 2006. 10 It provided that Calvario
would pay Luna P105,000.00 as payment for his mortgaged land and, in turn, Luna would cause the removal of the
encumbrance annotation on the land title.11 The trial court approved12 the Compromise Agreement in its February
20, 2006 Decision.13redarclaw
 82

Luna alleged that Atty. Galarrita never informed him of this Compromise Agreement, and did not deliver to him the
P100,000.00 settlement proceeds Atty. Galarrita had received. 14redarclaw

Luna's Complaint attached a copy of the Counsel's Report 15 dated August 12, 2003 where Atty. Galarrita proposed
and provided justifications for settlement, and waived any compensation for his services in the case: 16
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

Please take note that Mr. Jose Calvario is willing, able and ready to pay you IN CASH the full amount of One
Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (Php110,000.00), no more no less. While we are aware that it's your desire to fight
this case to its ultimate legal conclusion, allow us nonetheless, to present the pros and cons of having this case be
amicably settled.

Point One: He has in his possession the original copy of the checks you issued showing that upon signing of
the Contract Of Real Estate Mortgage, he received from you Eighty Eight Thousand Pesos (Php88,000.00) only.
Meaning, he has already paid in advance his interest of 12% or the equivalent of Twelve Thousand
Pesos (Php12,000.00) when the contract was signed. Consequently, it is useless for us to argue before the court
that his principal indebtedness amounted to One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00). Hence, if you accept
the compromise settlement of One Hundred Ten Thousand Pesos (Php110,000.00), you stand to gain Twenty Two
Thousand Pesos (Php22,000.00).

....

Rest assured, your undersigned counsel leaves it to your better judgment as to whether he deserves to be paid for
his legal services regarding this case against Mr. Jose Calvario.

Repeat, I will no longer ask from you any compensation for my services regarding this case. 17 (Emphasis in the
original)
Atty. Galarrita wrote Luna the following: Counsel's Reports, Requests for Funding, and Statements of Accounts in
relation to case developments, retainer's fees, and reimbursement for expenses incurred. 18redarclaw

After learning of the settlement, Luna wrote Atty. Galarrita: "I was so surprised when you went into plea agreement
for Compromise Agreement without my knowledge [a]nd beyond to [sic] what we had discussed." 19 Atty. Galarrita
replied through the Letter20 dated January 27, 2006, stating in part:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
I entered into an amicable settlement with Mr. Jose Calvario because I am certain that in this kind of case, a
compromise is better than WINNING it.

Everything is transparent. You even told me that you are not interested to acquire the land that's why you signaled
your approval of a compromise.

I was hoping that you already understood my situation. As I have told you, I can't waste my time going to Gumaca
every now and then. Traveling time is too precious for my cases here in Metro Manila.

The point is: I did not receive any appearance fee for the numerous hearings conducted there despite sending
several statements of accounts (SOA) to your office.

If that's the case, why prolong the agony?

Why bother after all to pursue this case when indeed, you are not interested to acquire the land and you are not
bent in spending the right remuneration for your undersigned counsel?

I have nothing to hide. The money will be deposited in my savings account because I just could not handle that
amount of cash in my pocket.21
In his Letter22 dated February 27, 2006, Luna wrote:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
 83

Yes I'm not interested with that lot in Quezon, [and this is] the reason why I'm the one who propose to them [that]
[w]e settle this case on our own without any lawyer, they are the one[s] who insist to go to Court. . . . This is what we
come out to [p]ropose to them, with the right amount to cover all those only been spent including Acceptance fee.
You even waive[d] your fee on this, for every hearing which I couldn't understand, [y]et we end up that we still going
[sic] to pursue this case, it was discussed during my trip there. [This is] [t]he reason I'm too surprised with your plea
Agreement without my knowledge. 23
Luna mentioned that the delay in retainer's fee payments was due to Atty. Galarrita's negligence in handling the
case.24redarclaw

In his Letter25 of the same date, Atty. Galarrita explained: "The reason this case was archived [was] because I could
not attend several hearings for lack of meal and transport allowance going to Gumaca, Quezon. . . . that's moot and
academic because this case was not dismissed by the court, at all." 26 Atty, Galarrita then stated that "[f]or all my
shortcomings as a lawyer, I now ask forgiveness. . . . But let it not be said that I betrayed you and your
cases."27redarclaw

In August 2009, Luna received a letter from one of the heirs of Jose Calvario, Emma C. Tayag, seeking delivery of
the land title since they paid the P100,000.00 settlement amount. 28 Another heir, Lutchiare Calvario, wrote Luna in
September 2009 again demanding delivery of title. 29redarclaw

Luna alleged in his Affidavit-Complaint that Atty. Galarrita has not remitted the P100,000.00 to date. 30 He prays for
Atty. Galarrita's disbarment.31redarclaw

In his Verified Answer,32 Atty. Galarrita prays for the dismissal of the disbarment Complaint. 33 He argues that he
entered the Compromise Agreement by virtue of a Special Power of Attorney 34 that includes this purpose.35 He
regularly submitted reports to Luna on developments and possible settlement before he entered the Compromise
Agreement.36 He submits that Luna "'slept' on his rights."37redarclaw

Atty. Galarrita adds that under their General Retainership Agreement, 38 Luna shall pay him P4,000.00
monthly.39 Luna should have paid P48,000.00 as of November 17, 2006, and after four years with no revocation,
termination, or nullification, Luna's unpaid obligation amounted to P208,000.00. 40 He listed other unpaid amounts for
his legal services.41 Atty. Galairrita, thus, argues for an application of the rule on retaining lien. 42redarclaw

Atty. Galarrita also raises the two-year prescription under Rule VIII, Section 1 of the Rules of Procedure of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Commission on Bar Discipline. 43 More than four years elapsed since their last
communication in 2006 when the Compromise Agreement became final. 44redarclaw

In his December 4, 2010 Report and Recommendation, 45 the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating
Commissioner46 found that Atty. Galarrita violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility and
recommended "his suspension from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year[.]" 47redarclaw

The Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, in its April 15, 2013 Resolution No. XX-2013-
441,48 adopted and approved with modification the Investigating Commissioner's Report and Recommendation in
that Atty. Galarrita is recommended to be "suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months and [o]rdered to
[r]etum the amount of One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos to complainant without prejudice to the filing of
a collection case for retainer's fee against complainant." 49 The Board of Governors denied reconsideration in its May
3, 2014 Resolution No. XXI-2014-270.50redarclaw

The Office of the Bar Confidant reported that "no motion for reconsideration or petition for review was filed as of
November 17, 2014."51 In any case, it is this court that has the authority to discipline members of the bar. 52redarclaw

The issue for resolution is whether respondent Atty. Galarrita should be held administratively liable for entering into
a Compromise Agreement without his client complainant Luna's consent, then refusing to turn over the settlement
proceeds received.

This court acknowledges the recommendation of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, with
modification increasing the period of suspension from the practice of law to two (2) years.
 84

Those in the legal profession must always conduct themselves with honesty and integrity in all their
dealings.53redarclaw

Lawyers should maintain, at all times, "a high standard of legal proficiency, morality, honesty, integrity and fair
dealing, and must perform their four-fold duty to society, the legal profession, the courts and their clients, in
accordance with the values and norms embodied in the Code [of Professional Responsibility]." 54redarclaw

Members of the bar took their oath to conduct themselves "according to the best of [their] knowledge and discretion
with all good fidelity as well to the courts as to [their] clients[,]" 55 and to "delay no man for money or
malice[.]"56redarclaw

These mandates apply especially to dealings of lawyers with their clients considering the highly fiduciary nature of
their relationship.57 Clients entrust their causes—life, liberty, and property—to their lawyers, certain that this
confidence would not be abused.

Complainant Luna entrusted respondent Atty. Galarrita with handling the civil case involving a mortgaged land in
Quezon Province. However, without complainant Luna's consent, respondent Atty. Galarrita settled this case with
the other party.

Article 1878 of the Civil Code provides that "[s]pecial powers of attorney are necessary in the following cases: . . .
(3) To compromise, to submit questions to arbitration, to renounce the right to appeal from a judgment, to waive
objections to the venue of an action or to abandon a prescription already acquired[.]"

The Rules of Court thus requires lawyers to secure special authority from their clients when entering into a
compromise agreement that dispenses with litigation:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 23. Authority of attorneys to bind clients. - Attorneys have authority to bind their clients in any case by any
agreement in relation thereto made in writing and in taking appeals, and in all matters of ordinary judicial
procedure. But they cannot, without special authority, compromise their client's litigation, or receive anything
in discharge of a client's claim but the full amount in cash.58 (Emphasis supplied)
Atty. Galarrita contends that he holds a Special Power of Attorney to enter into compromise agreements, but as
found by the Investigating Commissioner:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
There seems to be a compelling reason to believe that Complainant had not given any authority for the
Complainant [sic] to enter into Compromise Agreement at that precise stage of the trial.  Firstly, the
Complainant was not made a party to the Compromise Agreement despite the fact that he was not abroad when the
agreement was executed. Secondly, there was no indication that he had agreed to the amount of P100,000.00 in
exchange for his withdrawal of the complaint. Thirdly, he was not seasonably informed of the execution of the
Compromise Agreement/payment of the P100,000.00 and came to know of the same only much later.

Respondent argued that Complainant had previously executed a Special Power of Attorney wherein he authorized
the former to "enter into possible amicable settlement or submit any matter to arbitration and alternative modes of
dispute resolution, simplification of the issues, the necessity of amendment to the pleadings, the possibility of
obtaining stipulations or admissions of facts and of documents to avoid unnecessary proof the limitation of the
number of witnesses, the advisability of preliminary reference of issues to a commissioner, the propriety of
rendering judgment on the pleadings, or summary judgment, or of dismissing the action should a valid ground
therefor be found to exist, the advisability of suspending the proceedings, offer matters that may properly be
considered under Rule 18 of the 1997 Rules on Civil Procedure." It would seem, however, that despite the authority
given to Respondent, the same SPA cannot justify Respondent's representation in the Compromise Agreement on
February 14, 2006. To dissect, the SPA was executed on September 16, 2002 or a month before the filing of
the Complaint for Foreclosure of Mortgage. Thus, the conclusion seems to be that the authority given
therein to Respondent to enter into a possible settlement referred only to a possible settlement that could
be secured or firmed up during the preliminary conference or pre-trial of the case. In fact, the tenor of the
SPA indicates that the SPA was precisely executed in order to constitute Respondent as Complainant's
representative during the preliminary conference or pre-trial.
 85

Assuming it can be inferred that the SPA and the authority given to Respondent can be liberally interpreted and
allowed to extend up to the time the Compromise had been executed, still the Respondent may not have faithfully
performed his sworn duty to his client. During the mandatory conference, it was established that at the time the
compromise was executed the Complainant was not abroad and, therefore, given the current information technology
it would have been easy or convenient for Respondent to have informed his client about it. Admittedly, his failure in
this regard had only given Complainant the reason to cast doubt on his real intention in agreeing to the compromise
agreement for and in his behalf.

It would seem, however, that by Complainant's act of demanding the amount from Respondent, the former may
have already ignored the issue on the lack of authority on his part thus curing the defect on the latter's authority to
enter into the same.59 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility states that "[a] lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct." 60 Members of the bar must always conduct themselves in a way that promotes "public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession." 61redarclaw

Even though complainant Luna effectively abandoned the issue on respondent Atty. Galarrita's lack of authority to
compromise the civil case when he demanded the payment of the settlement proceeds, this does not erase his acts
of abusing the trust and confidence reposed in him by complainant Luna.

II

Worse, respondent Atty. Galarrita not only failed to promptly inform complainant Luna of the former's receipt of the
P100,000.00 settlement proceeds but also refused to turn over the amount to complainant Luna.

This court has held that "any money collected for the client or other trust property coming into the lawyer's
possession should promptly be reported by him [or her]." 62 ( Rule 16.03 under Canon 6 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility provides that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
CANON 16 - A lawyer shall hold in trust all moneys and properties of his client that may come into his possession.

. . . .

Rule 16.03 - A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall
have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.
In several cases, we have disciplined lawyers who failed or refused to remit amounts received for and on behalf of
their clients. "The penalty for violation of Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility usually ranges from
suspension for six months, to suspension for one year, or two years, and even disbarment[,]" 63 depending on the
circumstances of each case.

In Villanueva v. Atty. Ishiwata, 64 respondent received four checks totalling P225,000.00 from his client's employer
after signing a Quitclaim and Release pursuant to their compromise agreement. 65 Despite full payment of settlement
award, respondent only remitted P45,000.00 to his client and refused to deliver the balance. 66 Respondent
explained that he delivered P90,000.00 to his client's wife, but his secretary misplaced the signed receipts, and he
deducted his 25% attorney's fees of P56,250.00 from the award. 67 The balance left was only P750.00. 68 This court
found Atty. Ishiwata guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the
practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered him to restitute to complainant the amount of PI54,500.00 representing
the balance after P45,000.00 and the 10% attorney's fees had been deducted from the settlement
award.69redarclaw

In Aldovino v. Atty. Pujalte, Jr., 70 respondent received P1,001,332.26 from the Branch Clerk of Court corresponding
to the six shares of his clients in the estate of their deceased mother, but respondent only delivered P751,332.26 to
his clients.71 Respondent explained that he deducted P250,000.00 as his attorney's fees, while complainants
countered that respondent could only retain P14,000.00 as they already paid him P86,000.00 for his services. 72 This
court found Atty. Pujalte, Jr. guilty of violating Canon 16 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended him
 86

from the practice of law for one (1) year, and ordered him to return to complainants the amount of
P236,000.00.73redarclaw

In Almendarez, Jr. v. Atty. Langit, 74 respondent received P255,000.00 from the Officer-in-Charge Clerk of Court
representing the monthly rentals deposited by the other party in the ejectment case respondent handled for his
client.75 Respondent did not inform his client of this transaction and failed to reply to the final demand letter for
accounting.76 Respondent did not file an Answer to the administrative Complaint despite notice, and failed to appear
at the mandatory conference. 77 This court found Atty. Langit guilty of violating Canons 1, 11, 16, and 17 of the Code
of Professional Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for two (2) years, and ordered him to restitute
to complainant the amount of P255,000.00 with 12% interest per annum. 78redarclaw

In Bayonla v. Reyes,79 respondent should have delivered to her clients the amount of P123,582.67—the net amount
of Bayonla's share in the expropriation compensation after deducting respondent's 40% share as attorney's fees—
but respondent only delivered P79,000.00 and refused to remit the P44,582.67 shortage. 80 This court found Atty.
Reyes guilty of violating Rules 16.01 and 16.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, suspended her from the
practice of law for two (2) years, ordered her to pay complainants the amount of P44,582.67 with 12% interest per
annum, and render accounting and inventory. 81redarclaw

In Jinon v. Jiz,82 respondent received P45,000.00 from his client for transfer of title expenses. 83 His client later
learned that respondent had been collecting the rentals from the property amounting to P12,000.00, yet respondent
only turned over P7,000.00. 84 Complainant terminated respondent's legal services and demanded the return of the
amounts.85 Respondent countered that his legal services covered negotiation and sale of the property for a fee of
P75,000.00.86 This court found Atty. Jiz guilty of violating Rules 16.01, 16.03, and 18.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, suspended him from the practice of law for two (2) years, and ordered him to pay complainant the
amount of P45,000.00 with 6% legal interest per annum from date of demand until finality of Decision, then 12%
until fully paid.87redarclaw

In this case, respondent Atty. Galarrita entered into the Compromise Agreement involving complainant Luna's
property without informing him. Even though complainant Luna forewent the lack of authority issue, respondent Atty.
Galarrita still continued to act in bad faith by refusing to turn over the P100,000.00 settlement amount received. The
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Investigating Commissioner found that:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
On another point, there seems no cogent proof, too, that Respondent had been advised of Complainant's supposed
agreement to Mr. Calvario's payment of P100,000.00. Despite R[es]pondent's allegations that he had informed
Complainant about his so-called counsel's report, it remains undisputed that the Complainant did not give him any
express approval of the same.

There is to the undersigned enough indicia to conclude that Respondent had committed bad faith in entering into the
Compromise Agreement. From February 2006 to November 2010, or a period of four (4) years, Respondent failed to
turn-over the P100,000.00 he had collected from Mr. Calvario to Complainant. Worse, he failed to seasonably inform
Complainant about the same. He kept the money and claimed he had the right to retain the same invoking the
counsel's right to a retaining line [sic]. He pointed out that Complainant had incurred accrued attorney's fees which
he is bound to pay under the general retainer agreement. Thus, it is not amiss to state that he entered into the said
agreement with the odious motivation to hold on to it and pave the way for the payment of his attorney's fees. In so
doing, he violated the trust reposed in him by his client and violated Rule 16.03 of the Code of [Professional
Responsibility.

As to Respondent's invocation of the lawyer's retaining lien and his retention of the money, the undersigned deems
the same unlawful. True, the Code of Professional Responsibility allows the lawyer to apply so much thereof as may
be necessary to satisfy his lawful fees and disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client." But this
provision assumes that the client agrees with the lawyer as to the amount of attorney's fees and as to the
application of the client's fund to pay his lawful fees and disbursements, in which case he may deduct what is due
him and remit the balance to his client, with full disclosure on every detail. Without the client's consent, the
lawyer has no authority to apply the client's money for his fees, but he should instead return the money to
his client, without prejudice to his filing a case to recover his unsatisfied fees.

. . . .
 87

On Respondent's argument that prescription has already set in against Complainant, suffice it to state that the rules
have already been supplanted by a new set of rules which do not anymore carry the same. 88 (Emphasis supplied,
citations omitted)
Administrative proceedings require only substantial evidence. 89 This court accepts and adopts the findings of the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines Board of Governors, but with modification increasing the period of suspension from
the practice of law to two (2) years considering that respondent Atty. Galarrita not only compromised litigation
without complainant Luna's consent, but also refused to turn over the settlement proceeds to date.

III

This court sustains the order for respondent Atty. Galarrita to return the amount of P100,000.00 to complainant
Luna.

In Ronquillo v. Atty. Cezar,90 the parties entered a Deed of Assignment after which respondent received
1*937,500.00 from complainant as partial payment for the townhouse and lot. 91 However, respondent did not turn
over this .amount to developer Crown Asia, and no copy of the Contract to Sell was given to complainant. 92 This
court suspended Atty. Cezar from the practice of law for three (3) years, but did not grant complainant's prayer for
the return of the P937,500.00. 93redarclaw

Ronquillo held that "[disciplinary proceedings against lawyers do not involve a trial of an action, but rather
investigations by the court into the conduct of one of its officers." 94 Thus, disciplinary proceedings are limited to a
determination of "whether or not the attorney is still fit to be allowed to continue as a member of the Bar." 95redarclaw

Later jurisprudence clarified that this rule excluding civil liability determination from disciplinary proceedings
"remains applicable only to claimed liabilities which are purely civil in nature — for instance, when the claim involves
moneys received by the lawyer from his client in a transaction separate and distinct [from] and not intrinsically linked
to his professional engagement." 96 This court has thus ordered in administrative proceedings the return of amounts
representing legal fees.

This court has also ordered restitution as concomitant relief in administrative proceedings when respondent's civil
liability was already established:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Although the Court renders this decision in an administrative proceeding primarily to exact the ethical responsibility
on a member of the Philippine Bar, the Court's silence about the respondent lawyer's legal obligation to restitute the
complainant will be both unfair and inequitable. No victim of gross ethical misconduct concerning the client's
funds or property should be required to still litigate in another proceeding what the administrative
proceeding has already established as the respondent's liability. That has been the reason why the Court has
required restitution of the amount involved as a concomitant relief in the cited cases of Mortem v. Pagatpatan,
supra, Almendarez, Jr. v. Langit, supra, Small v. Banares, supra.97 (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Atty. Galarrita does not deny his receipt of the P100,000.00 but justifies his refusal to turn over the
amount by invoking jurisprudence on retaining lien. 98 The Rules of Court provides for attorney's retaining lien as
follows:LawlibraryofCRAlaw
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
SEC. 37. Attorney's liens. - An attorney shall have a lien upon the funds, documents and papers of his client which
have lawfully come into his possession and may retain the same until his lawful fees and disbursements have been
paid, and may apply such funds to the satisfaction thereof. He shall also have a lien to the same extent upon all
judgments for the payment of money, and executions issued in pursuance of such judgments, which he has secured
in a litigation of his client, from and after the time when he shall have caused a statement of his claim of such lien to
be entered upon the records of the court rendering such judgment, or issuing such execution, and shall have
caused written notice thereof to be delivered to his client and to the adverse party; and he shall have the same right
and power over such judgments and executions as his client would have enforce his lien and secure the payment of
his just fees and disbursements. 99

First, "lawyer[s] [are] not entitled to unilaterally appropriate [their] clients['] money for [themselves] by the mere fact
that the client[s] [owe] [them] attorney's fees." 100 They must give prompt notice to their clients of any receipt of funds
 88

for or on behalf of their clients. 101redarclaw

Rule 16.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility provides for a lawyer's duty to "account for all money or
property collected or received for or from the client."

Respondent Atty. Galarrita refused to comply with these duties, warranting his suspension from the practice of law.

Second, the elements required for full recognition of attorney's lien are: "(1) lawyer-client relationship; (2) lawful
possession of the client's funds, documents and papers; and (3) unsatisfied claim for attorney's fees." 102redarclaw

Respondent Atty. Galarrita must prove the existence of all these elements. However, this is not the main issue in
this disbarment case against him, and the validity of his retaining lien defense was not established. Counter
evidence even exists such as respondent Atty. Galarrita's Letter dated August 12, 2003 waiving any compensation
for his services in the foreclosure case. 103 Complainant Luna also raises respondent Atty. Galarrita's negligence in
handling the case, and lack of supporting receipts for the incurred expenses respondent Atty. Galarrita seeks to
reimburse.104redarclaw

Nevertheless, we maintain that the disposition of this case is without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for
retainer's fee against complainant Luna.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Dwight M. Galarrita is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, with
a stern warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts shall be dealt with more severely. He is ORDERED to
return to complainant Jun B. Luna the amount of P100,000.00, with legal interest of 6% per annum from February
2006105 until fully paid, without prejudice to the filing of a collection case for retainer's fee against complainant Luna.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be entered into respondent Atty.
Galarrita's records as attorney. Copies shall likewise be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator for circulation to all courts concerned.

SO ORDERED.cralawlawlibrary

Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-De Castro, Peralta, Bersamin, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Mendoza, and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.

Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Brion, Reyes, and Jardeleza, JJ., on leave.

Endnotes:
1
Rollo, pp. 2-6.
2
 Id. at 7-10.
3
 Id. at 2.
4
 Id. at 11-12.
5
 Id. at 7.
6
 Id. at 8-9.
7
 Id. at 2.
8
 Id. at 3.
9
 Id. at 15.
10
 Id. at 3.
11
 Id. at 3 and 15.
12
 Id. at 3 and 17.
 89
13
 Id. at 16-17.
14
 Id. at 3.
15
 Id. at 20-21.
16
 Id. at 4.
17
 Id. at 20-21.
18
 Id. at 52-95.
19
 Id. at 18.
20
 Id. at 19.
21
 Id.
22
 Id. at 22.
23
 Id.
24
 Id.
25
 Id. at 23.
26
 Id.
27
 Id.
28
 Id. at 5 and 26.
29
 Id. at 5 and 29.
30
 Id. at 5.
31
 Id.
32
 Id. at 31-43.
33
 Id. at 41.
34
 Id. at 45.
35
 Id. at 32.
36
 Id. at 32-33.
37
 Id. at 33.
38
 Id. at 48-51.
39
 Id. at 34.
40
 Id.
41
 Id. at 36.
42
 Id. at 37-38.
43
 Id. at 39.
44
 Id. at 39-40.
45
 Id. at 240-243.
46
 The Investigating Commissioner is Commissioner Oliver A. Cachapero.
 90

47
Rollo, p. 243.
48
 Id. at 239.
49
 Id.
50
 Id. at 244.
51
 Id.
52
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 27 provides:LawlibraryofCRAlaw

SEC. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court; grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may
be disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other
gross misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience of any lawful order of a superior court, or for corruptly or wilfully appearing as an attorney for a party to
a case without authority so to do. The practice of soliciting cases at law for the purpose of gain, either personally or
through paid agents or brokers, constitutes malpractice.
53
Villanueva v. Atty. Ishiwata, 486 Phil. 1, 6 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].
54
 Jinon v. Jiz, A.C. No. 9615, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 348, 354 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc], citing Molina v.
Magat, A.C. No. 1900, June 13, 2012, 672 SCRA 1, 6 [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
55
 Attorney's Oath.
56
 Attorney's Oath.
57
 Villanueva v. Atty. Ishiwata, 486 Phil. 1, 6 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division], citing Atty.
Penticostes v. Pros. Ibañez, 363 Phil. 624, 628 (1999) [Per J. Romero, En Banc].
58
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 23.
59
Rollo, pp. 241-242.
60
See Malecdan v. Atty. Pekas, 465 Phil. 703, 716 (2004) [Per J. Callejo, Sr., En Banc].
61
 Cerdan v. Atty. Gomez, 684 Phil. 418, 428 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division].
62
 Villanueva v. Atty. hhiwata, 486 Phil. 1, 6 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division], citing Judge Angeles
v. Atty. Uy, Jr., 386 Phil. 221,233 (2000) [Per J. Panganiban, Third Division].
63
 Cerdan v. Atty. Gomez, 684 Phil. 418, 428 (2012) [Per J. Mendoza, Third Division]. '
64
 486 Phil. 1 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].
65
 Id. at 4.
66
 Id.
67
 Id. at 5.
68
 Id.
69
 Id. at 7-8.
70
 467 Phil. 556 (2004) [Per J. Sandoval-Gutierrez, Third Division].
 91

71
 Id. at 558.
72
 Id. at 558-559.
73
 Id. at 562.
74
 528 Phil. 814 (2006) [Per J. Carpio. En Banc].
75
 Id. at 817.
76
 Id. at 817-818.
77
 Id. at 818.
78
 Id. at 821-822.
79
 A.C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011, 660 SCRA490 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
80
 Id. at 499.
81
 Id. at 507.
82
 A.C. No. 9615, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 348 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc].
83
 Id. at 350.
84
 Id.
85
 Id. at 351.
86
 Id.
87
 Id. at 358.
88
Rollo, pp. 242-243.
89
 Jinon v. Jiz, A.C. No. 9615, March 5, 2013, 692 SCRA 348, 357-358 [Per J. Perlas-Bernabe, En Banc], citing
Babante-Caples v. Copies, A.M. No. HOJ-10-03, November 15, 2010, 634 SCRA 498, 502 [Per J. Nachura, Second
Division].
90
 524 Phil. 311 (2006) [Per J. Puno, En Banc].
91
 Id. at 313-314.
92
 Id. at 314.
93
 Id. at 318.
94
 Id.
95
 Id.
96
Agot v. Atty. Rivera, A.C. No. 8000, August 5, 2014
<http://sc.judiciary.gov.ph/pdf/web/viewer.html?file=/jurisprudence/2014/august2014/8000.pdf> 6 [Per J. Perlas-
Bernabe, En Banc], citing Pitcher v. Gagate, A.C. No. 9532, October 8, 2013, 707 SCRA 13, 26 [Per J. Perlas-
Bernabe, En Banc].
 92

97
 Bayonla v. Reyes, A.C. No. 4808, November 22, 2011, 660 SCRA 490, 506 [Per J. Bersamin, En Banc].
98
Rollo, pp. 37-39.
99
 RULES OF COURT, Rule 138, sec. 37.
100
 Almendarez, Jr. v. Atty. Langit, 528 Phil. 814, 819-820 (2006) [Per J. Carpio, En Banc], citing Schulz v. Atty.
Flores, 462 Phil. 601, 613 (2003) [Per J. Ynares-Santiago, First Division].
101
 Code of Professional Responsibility, rule 16.03.
102
 Miranda v. Atty. Carpio, 673 Phil. 665, 672 (2011) [Per J. Peralta, Third Division], citing Ampil v. Hon. Agrava, et
al., 145 Phil. 297, 303 (1970) [Per J. Teehankee, En Banc].
103
Rollo, pp. 47 and 243.
104
 Id. at 22.
105
 Id. at 242-243.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-53869 March 25, 1982

RAUL A. VILLEGAS, petitioner,
vs.
ASSEMBLYMAN VALENTINO L. LEGASPI, COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CEBU, BRANCH 11, presided by
HON. FRANCISCO P. BURGOS, District Judge; BRIGIDA VERA CRUZ, joined in and assisted by her
husband JOSE VERA CRUZ, and PRIMITIVO CANIA JR., respondents.

G.R. No. L-51928 March 25, 1982

EUGENIO J. PUYAT, ERWIN L. CHIONGBIAN, EDGARDO P. REYES, ANTONIO G. PUYAT, JAIME R.

BLANCO, RAFAEL R. RECTO and REYNALDO L. LARDIZABAL, petitioners,

HON. SIXTO T. J. DE GUZMAN, JR., as Associate Commissioner of the Securities & Exchange Commission,
EUSTAQUIO T. C. ACERO, R. G. VILDZIUS ENRIQUE M. BELO, MANUEL G. ABELLO, SERVILLANO DOLINA,
JUANITO MERCADO and ESTANISLAO A. FERNANDEZ, respondents.

MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:

These two cases (L-53869 and L-51928) filed in May, 1980 and September, 1979, respective, involved the
prohibition in Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Charter, which used to read:
 93

Sec. 11. No member of the National Assembly shall appear as counsel before any court inferior to a
court with appellate jurisdiction, ...

The antecedents facts follows:

L-53869

On September 27, 1979, a complaint for annulment of bank checks and damages was filed by Raul A. Villegas
against the Vera Cruz spouses and Primitivo Cania, Jr. (private respondents) before the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch XVI, then presided by Hon. Ceferino E. Dulay (Civil Case No. 431-L). An answer, dated October 11,
1979, was filed by private respondents through their counsel, Assemblyman Valentino 1. Legaspi, a member of the
Batasang Pambansa from the province of Cebu. Raul A. Villegas "challenged" the appearance of Assemblyman
Legaspi as counsel of record on the ground that he is barred under the Constitution from appearing before Courts of
First Instance, which are essentially trial Courts or Courts of First Instance, which are essentially trial Courts or
Courts of First Instance, which are essentially trial Courts or Courts of original jurisdiction. After the Opposition and
Reply to the Opposition were filed, Judge Dulay issued an Order inhibiting himself from the aforesaid case because
Assemblyman Legaspi was likewise the lawyer of his wife in two pending cases. The case was re-raffled and
redocketed as Civil Case No. R-18857, and transferred to Branch II, presided by Judged Francisco P. Burgos
(respondent Court).

In an Order, dated February 27, 1980, Judge Burgos denied the disqualification of Assemblyman Legaspi, as well
as the Motion for Reconsideration filed thereafter. Hence, this recourse to certiorari and Prohibition.

A temporary Restraining Order was issued ex-parte by this Tribunal on May 22, 1980 enjoining respondent Court
from acting in Civil Case No. R-18857 below.

L-51928

Edgardo P. Reyes filed, on July 3, 1979, Civil Case No. 33739 before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig),
Branch XXI, against N. V. Verenigde Buinzenfabrieken Excelsior-De Maas and private respondent Eustaquio T.C.
Acero to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the International Pipe Industries Corporation (IPI) to Eustaquio T.C
Acero, allegedly on the ground that, prior thereto, the same shares had already been sold to him (Reyes).
Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez entered his appearance as counsel for Excelsior. This appearance was
questioned on the ground that it was barred by Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, above-quoted.

Initially, this case (L-51928) was filed as a Supplemental Petition to L-51122 (Eugenio Puyat, et als. Hon. Sixto T.J.
de Guzman), but this Court ordered it docketed separately. And since the issue involved is on all fours with L-53869,
the Court opted to resolve Case No. L-51928 jointly with L-53869 instead of with L-51122 as originally directed.

The novel issue for determination is whether or not members of the Batasang Pambansa, like Attorneys Valentino L.
Legaspi and Estanislao A. Fernandez, can appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance.

A comparison of Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution prohibiting any Assemblyman from appearing as
counsel "before any Court inferior to a Court with appellate jurisdiction", and the "similar" provision of Section 17,
Article VI, of the 1935 Charter is elucidating. The last sentence of the latter provision reads:

... No member of the Commission on Appointments shall appear as counsel before any Court inferior
to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction.

A significant amendment is the deletion of the term "collegiate". Further, the limitation now comprehends all
members of the Batasang Pambansa, and is no longer confined to members of the Commissions on Appointments,
a body not provided for under the 1973 Constitution.

Under the amendment to Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, ratified in a national plebiscite held on April 7, 1981,
Section 11 now reads:
 94

SEC. 11. No member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court without
appellate jurisdiction, ...

The term 'collegiate" remains deleted , and the terminology is now "Court without appellate jurisdiction."

Although the cases at bar were filed prior to the aforesaid amendment, they should be resolved under the amended
provision. We abide by the proposition that "as a general rule, the provisions of a new Constitution take effect
immediately and become operative on pending litigation." 1

Clearly, what is prohibited to a Batasang Pambansa member is "appearance as counsel" "before any Court without
appellate jurisdiction.

"Appearance" has been defined as "voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction". 2 "Counsel" means "an adviser, a
person professionally engaged in the trial or management of a cause in court; a legal advocate managing a case at
law; a lawyer appointed or engaged to advise and represent in legal matters a particular client, public officer, or
public body". 3 Ballantine's Law Dictionary says a counsel is "counselor, an attorney at law; one or more attorneys
representing parties in an action". 4 Thus, "appearance as counsel" is a voluntary submission to a court's jurisdiction
by a legal advocate or advising lawyer professionally engaged to represent and plead the cause of another. This is
the common, popular connotation of this word which the Constitution must have adopted. In one case, 5 in resolving
the question of what constitutes 'appearance as an advocate," the Court held that "advocate" the Court held that
"advocate" means one who pleads the cause of another before a tribunal or judicial court, a counselor.

Judging from the prescribed criteria, there should be no question that Assemblyman Valentino L. Legaspi, in
preparing the Answer for private respondent-spouses in Civil Case No. R-18857 before the Court of First Instance of
Cebu, Branch II, appears as their counsel. Similarly, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez appears as counsel for
Excelsior in Civil Case No. 33739 of the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig), Branch XXI. They represent and
plead the cause of another before a Court of justice.

The next poser then arises: are the Courts of First Instance, where Assemblyman Legaspi and Fernandez,
respectively, appear as counsel of record, Courts with appellate jurisdiction?

There are authorities to the effect that the essential criterion of appellate jurisdiction is that it revises and corrects
the proceedings in a case already instituted and does not create that cause 6 Or, that it necessarily implies that the
subject-matter has been instated in and acted upon by some other court whose judgment or proceedings are to be
reviewed. 7 In an early Philippine case, 8 it was held to mean jurisdiction to review the judgment of an inferior court.
And, that it calls for and demands previous legitimate jurisdiction by a court of origin. 9

By law, Courts of First Instance are Courts of general original jurisdiction. 10 However, under the same statute, their
jurisdiction has been stated to be of two kinds: (a) original and (b) appellate.  11 They have appellate jurisdiction over
all cases arising in City and Municipal Courts in their respective provinces except over appeals from cases tried by
Municipal judges of provincial capatals or City Judges pursuants to the authority granted under the last paragraph of
Section 87 of the Judiciary Act. 12

It is rather clear that Courts of First Instance, by virtue of a specific bestowal by the Judiciary Act of 1948, as
amended, can be Courts with appellate jurisdiction. And, by the deliberate omission of the word "collegiate" in both
the original and amended Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, the obvious intention of the framers is that
Courts of First Instance, as appellate Tribunals, no longer fall within the ambit of the previous prohibition. They are
single-Judge Courts with appellate jurisdiction from decisions and orders of City and Municipal Courts. 13 Stated
otherwise, under the amended proviso, Courts of First Instance are not Courts without appellate jurisdiction.

It is contended, however, that the Courts of First Instance in these two cases took cognizance of the suits in the
exercise of their exclusive original and not appellate jurisdiction, hence, Assemblymen Fernandez and Legaspi are
still prohibited from appearing before said Courts as counsel. There is merit to this contention.
 95

It should be borne in mind that Courts of First Instance have dual "personality". Depending on the case before it,
said Courts can be either of appellate or original jurisdiction. The question then to be resolved is whether or not
Assemblymen can appear as counsel before Courts of First Instance in cases originally filed with them.

We are of the considered opinion that, to render effective the Constitutional provision, appearance by legislators
before Courts of First Instance should be limited to cases wherein said Courts exercise appellate jurisdiction. This is
true to the time-honored principle that whatever is necessary to render effective any provision of a Constitution,
whether the same be a prohibition or a restriction, must be deemed implied and intended in the provision itself. 14

It bears repeating that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Charter, it was provided that members of the
Commission on Appointments shall not "appear as counsel before any Court inferior to a collegiate Court of
appellate jurisdiction." The intent was clear that members of the Commission on Appointments shall not "appear as
counsel before any Court inferior to a collegiate Court of appellate jurisdiction." The intent was clear that members
of the Commission on Appointments could not appear before Courts of First Instance. Uppermost in the minds of the
framers was "appellate jurisdiction" more than Court. Under Section 11, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, the
scope of the prohibition was expanded to embrace all members of the National Assembly who were barred from
"appear(ing) as counsel before any Court without appellate jurisdiction." Consistently, the principal criterion is
"appellate jurisdiction." So that, when a legislator appears in an original case filed with a Court with "appellate
jurisdiction."

Appellate practice is all that is permitted because of the admitted predominance of lawyers in the legislature.  15 Their
office has always favored them with the influence and prestige that it carried. Today, as before, it is only "appellate
practice" that is allowed with the significant difference that, this time, the Court need not be a collegial body. This so
because with the removal of the legislative power to review appointments the source of power and influence that
members of the National Assembly could unduly exert in the exercise of the legal profession has been greatly
minimized.

This is a situation where the restricted meaning must prevail over the general because the nature of the subject
matter of the context clearly indicates that the limited sense is intended. 16 In fact, the original emandement
proposed by Antonio V. Raquiza, Delegate of the First District, Ilocos Norte, in Resolution No. 345 entitled
"Prohibiting Members of the National Assembly to Use Their Office As a Means of Promoting Sel-Interest" — was to
bar a National Assembly member from appearing as counsel before any Court. In the "Whereas" clauses, that
proposal was believed to be an "improvement" over Section 17, Article VI of the 1935 Constitution and the purpose
of the proposed amendement was explained as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

2. The Constitutional provision enumerates the kind of court or administrative cases where a
legislator cannot appear. In our proposal he is absolutely barred because it is feared that the
practice of his profession will interfere with the performance of his duties or that because the power
of his office might influence the administration of justice.

... (Emphasis supplied) 17

The co-author of Resolution No. 345. Delegate Leocadio E. Ignacio from the lone District of Isabela, and Floor
Leader of the 1971 Constitutional Convention, elucidated further on the purpose behind the prohibition when he
wrote in his Position Paper that 'The prohibition against appearing as counsel is necessary because of the under
influence which members of Congress enjoy when they practice before the Courts and especially before
administrative agencies. It is an accepted fat that our legislature is composed of a predominance of practicing
lawyers, and who are therefor expected to be naturally not averse to exerting all influence that they can muster in
the pursuit of their profession." Continuing, he said: "The inability to practice as counsel ... should be part of the
sacrifices entailed in running for the position of lawmaker. 18 The amendement proposed by Delegate Gonzalo O.
Catan, Jr. of Negros Oriental even went further: "No member of the National Assembly shall, during his term of
office, appear as counsel, directly or indirectly, in any Court or administrative body ..." 19 Delegate Emerito M. Salva
from the Second District, Ilocos Norte, substituted his own amendment, thus:
 96

Section 13. No member of the National Assembly shall, during his term of office, practice directly or
indirectly any occupation or profession or be allowed to engage directly or indirectly in any trade,
business, or industry. 20

and explained:

10.2. Explaining the substitute amendment, Delegate Salva said that the assemblymen should
render full-time service to the national. He pointed out that they should be barred from the practice of
their respective professions since they would reasonably be compensated for devoting their time to
the work of the National Assembly. 21

While Section 11, Article VIII, as finally adopted by the Constitutional Convention, did not carry the several
amendments proposed, they are reflective of the sentiment prevailing at the 1971 Constitutional Conventional, and
reinforce the condition that appearance as counsel by Assemblymen was meant to be confined to appellate practice
and not unlimited practice before Courts of First Instance. That sentiment has been carried over the amendment
ratified in the April, 1981 plebiscite. For, there is no substantial difference between "Court inferior to a Court with
appellate jurisdiction" (the original 1973 provision) and "Court without appellate jurisdiction' (the amended provision).

The objective of the prohibition, then and now, is clearly to remove any possibility of undue influence upon the
administration of justice, to eliminate the possible use of office for personal gain, to ensure impartiality in trials and
thus preserve the independence of the Judiciary. The possible influence of an Assemblyman on a signed Judge of
the Court of First Instance, though not entirely removed, is definitely diminished where the latter Court acts in the
exercise of its appellate instead of original jurisdiction. The upper hand that a party represented by an Assemblyman
by virtue of his office possesses is more felt and could be more feared in original cases than in appealed cases
because the decision or resolution appealed from the latter situation has already a presumption not only of regularity
but also of correctness in its favor.

In fine, "appellate practice" is an intended qualification dictated by principles of reason, justice and public interest.

The limited application to "appellate practice" is a view-point favored by constitutionalist of eminence, Chief Justice
Enrique M. Fernando, in his scholarly work "The Constitution of the Philippine, 22 where he said:

It is to be noted that at present he may appear as counsel in any criminal case, but he cannot do so
before any administrative body. Also, while it is only appellate practice that is allowed a member of
the National Assembly, formerly, such a limitation applied solely to a Senator or Representative who
was in the Commission on Appointments, a body abolished under the present Constitution. Those
differences should be noted (Emphasis supplied) 23

Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando also expounded on the reason behind the Constitutional prohibition, thus:

... The need for it was felt by the 1934 Constitutional Convention, a sentiment shared by the last
Constitutional Convention, because of the widespread belief that legislators found it difficult to resist,
as perhaps most men, the promptings of self-interest. Clearly, the purpose was and is to stress the
fiduciary aspect of the position. There is thus fidelity to the maxim that a public office is a public trust.
... 24

Since the respective Courts of First Instance, before which Assemblymen Legaspi and Fernandez appeared as
counsel, were acting in the exercise of original and not appellate jurisdiction, they must be held barred from
appearing as counsel before said Courts in the two cases involved herein.

WHEREFORE, granting the Writs prayed for, the Order issued on February 27, 1980 by the Court of First Instance
of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case No. R-18857, is hereby set aside, and Attorneys Estanislao A. Fernandez and
Valentino Legaspi hereby declared prohibited from appearing as counsel before the Court of First Instance of Rizal
(Pasig), Branch XXI, in Civil Case No. 33739, and before the Court of First Instance of Cebu, Branch II, in Civil Case
No. r-18857, respectively. The Restraining Order issued heretofore in L-53869 is hereby made permanent.
 97

No costs in either case.

SO ORDERED.

Fernando, C.J., Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Concepcion, Jr., Fernandez, Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro,
Ericta, Plana and Escolin, JJ., concur.

Aquino, J., took no part.

Footnotes

1 16 Am Jur., 2d. p. 219 citing Cassard v. Tracy, 52 la Ann 835, 27 So 368.

2 Pacilio vs. Scarpati, 300 N.Y.S. 473, 478.

3 Webster's Third New International Dictionary, 1966, p. 518.

4 Third Edition, 1969, p. 278.

5 Haverty Furniture Co. vs. Fausta, 124 S.N. 2d 694, 697.

6 Marbury vs. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 175, 2 L. Ed. 60; In re Constitutionality of House Bill No. 222, 90
SW2d 692, 293.

7 Ex parte Evans, 52 S.E. 419, 420.

8 U.s. vs. Atienza, 1 Phil. 737 (1903).

14 Black, on Interpretation of laws, 2nd ed., 1911, p. 29.

15 "Legislative Department, " (U.P. Law Center Constitutional Revision Project, 1970) p. 297.

16 Marcos and Concordia vs. Chief of Staff, AFP, 89 Phil. 246, 248 citing 11 Am. Jur. 680-682.

17 "Committee Reports, Vol. 33 Committee on Legis, Power, Part I, as compiled by the National
Library."

18 "Speeches and Positions Papers, V.6; Hermoso-Oliverso: Compiled by National Library, 1976.

19 Prop. Amend. No. 69 to CC/C Legis. Power Rep. 03/4-6-72; Date Submitted: 7-14-72; 5:31 P.M.

20 Prop. Amend. No 127 to CC/C Legis. Power/Rep. 03/4-6-72; Date Submitted: 8-28-72; 2:50 p.m.

21 Minutes, October 11, 1972 p. 4.

23 Under the amendment to Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution ratified in a national plebiscite held
on April 7, 1981 "no member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel ... before any court
... in any original case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office, ...". (Emphasis supplied).

24 Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, p. 205, Second Edition.

 98

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-18727             August 31, 1964

JESUS MA. CUI, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO MA. CUI, defendant-appellant,
ROMULO CUI, Intervenor-appellant.

Jose W. Diokno for plaintiff-appellee.

Jaime R. Nuevas and Hector L. Hofileña for defendant-appellant.
Romulo Cui in his own behalf as intervenor-appellants.

MAKALINTAL, J.:

This is a proving in quo warranto originally filed in the Court of First Instance of Cebu. The office in contention is that
of Administrator of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili. Judgment was rendered on 27 April 1961 in favor of the
plaintiff, Jesus Ma. Cui, and appealed to us by the defendant, Antonio Ma. Cui, and by the intervenor, Romulo Cui.

The Hospicio is a charitable institution established by the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui, now
deceased, "for the care and support, free of charge, of indigent invalids, and incapacitated and helpless persons." It
acquired corporate existence by legislation (Act No. 3239 of the Philippine Legislature passed 27 November 1925)
and endowed with extensive properties by the said spouses through a series of donations, principally the deed of
donation executed on 2 January 1926.
 99

Section 2 of Act No. 3239 gave the initial management to the founders jointly and, in case of their incapacity or
death, to "such persons as they may nominate or designate, in the order prescribed to them." Section 2 of the deed
of donation provides as follows:

Que en caso de nuestro fallecimiento o incapacidad para administrar, nos sustituyan nuestro legitime
sobrino Mariano Cui, si al tiempo de nuestra muerte o incapacidad se hallare residiendo en la caudad de
Cebu, y nuestro sobrino politico Dionisio Jakosalem. Si nuestro dicho sobrino Mariano Cui no estuviese
residiendo entonces en la caudad de Cebu, designamos en su lugar a nuestro otro sobrino legitime Mauricio
Cui. Ambos sobrinos administraran conjuntamente el HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI. A la muerte o
incapacidad de estos dos administradores, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI
pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimainente de cualquiera
de nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui y Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de
abogado, o medico, o ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos, el que pague al Estado mayor
impuesto o contribution. En igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferida el varon de mas edad descendiente
de quien tenia ultimamente la administracion. Cuando absolutamente faltare persona de estas
cualificaciones, la administracion del HOSPICIO DE SAN JOSE DE BARILI pasara al senor Obispo de
Cebu o quien sea el mayor dignatario de la Iglesia Catolica, apostolica, Romana, que tuviere asiento en la
cabecera de esta Provincia de Cebu, y en su defecto, al Gobierno Provincial de Cebu.

Don Pedro Cui died in 1926, and his widow continued to administer the Hospicio until her death in 1929. Thereupon
the administration passed to Mauricio Cui and Dionisio Jakosalem. The first died on 8 May 1931 and the second on
1 July 1931. On 2 July 1931 Dr. Teodoro Cui, only son of Mauricio Cui, became the administrator. Thereafter,
beginning in 1932, a series of controversies and court litigations ensued concerning the position of administrator, to
which, in so far as they are pertinent to the present case, reference will be made later in this decision.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui and defendant Antonio Ma. Cui are brothers, being the sons of Mariano Cui, one of the
nephews of the spouses Don Pedro Cui and Doña Benigna Cui. On 27 February 1960 the then incumbent
administrator, Dr. Teodoro Cui, resigned in favor of Antonio Ma. Cui pursuant to a "convenio" entered into between
them and embodied in a notarial document. The next day, 28 February, Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.
Jesus Ma. Cui, however, had no prior notice of either the "convenio" or of his brother's assumption of the position.

Dr. Teodoro Cui died on 27 August 1960; on 5 September 1960 the plaintiff wrote a letter to the defendant
demanding that the office be turned over to him; and on 13 September 1960, the demand not having been complied
with the plaintiff filed the complaint in this case. Romulo Cui later on intervened, claiming a right to the same office,
being a grandson of Vicente Cui, another one of the nephews mentioned by the founders of the  Hospicio in their
deed of donation.

As between Jesus and Antonio the main issue turns upon their respective qualifications to the position of
administrator. Jesus is the older of the two and therefore under equal circumstances would be preferred pursuant to
section 2 of the deed of donation. However, before the test of age may be, applied the deed gives preference to the
one, among the legitimate descendants of the nephews therein named, "que posea titulo de abogado, o medico, o
ingeniero civil, o farmaceutico, o a falta de estos titulos el que pague al estado mayor impuesto o contribucion."

The specific point in dispute is the mealing of the term "titulo de abogado." Jesus Ma. Cui holds the degree of
Bachelor of Laws from the University of Santo Tomas (Class 1926) but is not a member of the Bar, not having
passed the examinations to qualify him as one. Antonio Ma. Cui, on the other hand, is a member of the Bar and
although disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 (administrative case No. 141), was reinstated by resolution
promulgated on 10 February 1960, about two weeks before he assumed the position of administrator of
the Hospicio de Barili.

The Court a quo, in deciding this point in favor of the plaintiff, said that the phrase "titulo de abogado," taken alone,
means that of a full-fledged lawyer, but that has used in the deed of donation and considering the function or
purpose of the administrator, it should not be given a strict interpretation but a liberal one," and therefore means a
law degree or diploma of Bachelor of Laws. This ruling is assailed as erroneous both by the defendant and by the
intervenor.
 100

We are of the opinion, that whether taken alone or in context the term "titulo de abogado" means not mere
possession of the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws but membership in the Bar after due admission thereto,
qualifying one for the practice of law. In Spanish the word "titulo" is defined as "testimonies o instrumento dado para
ejercer un empleo, dignidad o profesion" (Diccionario de la Lengua Española, Real Academia Espanola, 1947 ed.,
p. 1224) and the word "abogado," as follows: "Perito en el derecho positivo que se dedica a defender en juicio, por
escrito o de palabra, los derechos o intereses de los litigantes, y tambien a dar dictmen sobre las cuestiones o
puntos legales que se le consultan (Id., p.5) A Bachelor's degree alone, conferred by a law school upon completion
of certain academic requirements, does not entitle its holder to exercise the legal profession. The English equivalent
of "abogado" is lawyer or attorney-at-law. This term has a fixed and general signification, and has reference to that
class of persons who are by license officers of the courts, empowered to appear, prosecute and defend, and upon
whom peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved by law as a consequence.

In this jurisdiction admission to the Bar and to the practice of law is under the authority of the Supreme Court.
According to Rule 138 such admission requires passing the Bar examinations, taking the lawyer's oath and
receiving a certificate from the Clerk of Court, this certificate being his license to practice the profession. The
academic degree of Bachelor of Laws in itself has little to do with admission to the Bar, except as evidence of
compliance with the requirements that an applicant to the examinations has "successfully completed all the
prescribed courses, in a law school or university, officially approved by the Secretary of Education." For this
purpose, however, possession of the degree itself is not indispensable: completion of the prescribed courses may
be shown in some other way. Indeed there are instances, particularly under the former Code of Civil Procedure,
where persons who had not gone through any formal legal education in college were allowed to take the Bar
examinations and to qualify as lawyers. (Section 14 of that code required possession of "the necessary
qualifications of learning ability.") Yet certainly it would be incorrect to say that such persons do not possess the
"titulo de abogado" because they lack the academic degree of Bachelor of Laws from some law school or university.

The founders of the Hospicio de San Jose de Barili must have established the foregoing test advisely, and provided
in the deed of donation that if not a lawyer, the administrator should be a doctor or a civil engineer or a pharmacist,
in that order; or failing all these, should be the one who pays the highest taxes among those otherwise qualified. A
lawyer, first of all, because under Act No. 3239 the managers or trustees of the Hospicio shall "make regulations for
the government of said institution (Sec. 3, b); shall "prescribe the conditions subject to which invalids and
incapacitated and destitute persons may be admitted to the institute" (Sec. 3, d); shall see to it that the rules and
conditions promulgated for admission are not in conflict with the provisions of the Act; and shall administer
properties of considerable value — for all of which work, it is to be presumed, a working knowledge of the law and a
license to practice the profession would be a distinct asset.

Under this particular criterion we hold that the plaintiff is not entitled, as against the defendant, to the office of
administrator. But it is argued that although the latter is a member of the Bar he is nevertheless disqualified by virtue
of paragraph 3 of the deed of donation, which provides that the administrator may be removed on the ground,
among others, of ineptitude in the discharge of his office or lack of evident sound moral character. Reference is
made to the fact that the defendant was disbarred by this Court on 29 March 1957 for immorality and unprofessional
conduct. It is also a fact, however, that he was reinstated on 10 February 1960, before he assumed the office of
administrator. His reinstatement is a recognition of his moral rehabilitation, upon proof no less than that required for
his admission to the Bar in the first place.

Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of facts be admitted and approved by this
Honorable Court, without prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not covered by this
stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët

Whether or not the applicant shall be reinstated rests to a great extent in the sound discretion of the court.
The court action will depend, generally speaking, on whether or not it decides that the public interest in the
orderly and impartial administration of justice will be conserved by the applicant's participation therein in the
capacity of an attorney and counselor at law. The applicant must, like a candidate for admission to the bar,
satisfy the court that he is a person of good moral character — a fit and proper person to practice law. The
court will take into consideration the applicant's character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature
and character of the charge for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment, and the
time that has elapsed between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement. (5 Am. Jur., Sec. 301,
p. 443)
 101

Evidence of reformation is required before applicant is entitled to reinstatement, notwithstanding the attorney
has received a pardon following his conviction, and the requirements for reinstatement have been held to be
the same as for original admission to the bar, except that the court may require a greater degree of proof
than in an original admission. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p. 815.)

The decisive questions on an application for reinstatement are whether applicant is "of good moral
character" in the sense in which that phrase is used when applied to attorneys-at-law and is a fit and proper
person to be entrusted with the privileges of the office of an attorney, and whether his mental qualifications
are such as to enable him to discharge efficiently his duty to the public, and the moral attributes are to be
regarded as a separate and distinct from his mental qualifications. (7 C.J.S., Attorney & Client, Sec. 41, p.
816).

As far as moral character is concerned, the standard required of one seeking reinstatement to the office of attorney
cannot be less exacting than that implied in paragraph 3 of the deed of donation as a requisite for the office which is
disputed in this case. When the defendant was restored to the roll of lawyers the restrictions and disabilities
resulting from his previous disbarment were wiped out.

This action must fail on one other ground: it is already barred by lapse of time amounting the prescription or laches.
Under Section 16 of Rule 66 (formerly sec. 16, Rule 68, taken from section 216 of Act 190), this kind of action must
be filed within one (1) year after the right of plaintiff to hold the office arose.

Plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui believed himself entitled to the office in question as long ago as 1932. On January 26 of that
year he filed a complaint in quo warranto against Dr. Teodoro Cui, who assumed the administration of
the Hospicio on 2 July 1931. Mariano Cui, the plaintiff's father and Antonio Ma. Cui came in as intervenors. The
case was dismissed by the Court of First Instance upon a demurrer by the defendant there to the complaint and
complaint in intervention. Upon appeal to the Supreme Court from the order of dismissal, the case was remanded
for further proceedings (Cui v. Cui, 60 Phil. 37, 48). The plaintiff, however, did not prosecute the case as indicated in
the decision of this Court, but acceded to an arrangement whereby Teodoro Cui continued as administrator,
Mariano Cui was named "legal adviser" and plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui accepted a position as assistant administrator.

Subsequently the plaintiff tried to get the position by a series of extra-judicial maneuvers. First he informed the
Social Welfare Commissioner, by letter dated 1 February 1950, that as of the previous 1 January he had "made
clear" his intention of occupying the office of administrator of the Hospicio." He followed that up with another letter
dated 4 February, announcing that he had taken over the administration as of 1 January 1950. Actually, however,
he took his oath of office before a notary public only on 4 March 1950, after receiving a reply of acknowledgment,
dated 2 March, from the Social Welfare Commissioner, who thought that he had already assumed the position as
stated in his communication of 4 February 1950. The rather muddled situation was referred by the Commissioner to
the Secretary of Justice, who, in an opinion dated 3 April 1950 (op. No. 45, S. 1950), correcting another opinion
previously given, in effect ruled that the plaintiff, not beings lawyer, was not entitled to the administration of
the Hospicio.

Meanwhile, the question again became the subject of a court controversy. On 4 March 1950,
the Hospicio commenced an action against the Philippine National Bank in the Court of First Instance of Cebu (Civ.
No. R-1216) because the Bank had frozen the Hospicio's deposits therein. The Bank then filed a third-party
complaint against herein plaintiff-appellee, Jesus Ma. Cui, who had, as stated above, taken oath as administrator.
On 19 October 1950, having been deprived of recognition by the opinion of the Secretary of Justice he moved to
dismiss the third-party complaint on the ground that he was relinquishing "temporarily" his claim to the
administration of the Hospicio. The motion was denied in an order dated 2 October 1953. On 6 February 1954 he
was able to take another oath of office as administrator before President Magsaysay, and soon afterward filed a
second motion to dismiss in Civil case No. R-1216. President Magsaysay, be it said, upon learning that a case was
pending in Court, stated in a telegram to his Executive Secretary that "as far as (he) was concerned the court may
disregard the oath" thus taken. The motion to dismiss was granted nevertheless and the other parties in the case
filed their notice of appeal from the order of dismissal. The plaintiff then filed an ex-parte motion to be excluded as
party in the appeal and the trial Court again granted the motion. This was on 24 November 1954. Appellants
thereupon instituted a mandamus proceeding in the Supreme Court (G.R. No. L-8540), which was decided on 28
May 1956, to the effect that Jesus Ma. Cui should be included in the appeal. That appeal, however, after it reached
 102

this Court was dismiss upon motion of the parties, who agreed that "the office of administrator and trustee of
the Hospicio ... should be ventilated in quo warranto proceedings to be initiated against the incumbent by
whomsoever is not occupying the office but believes he has a right to it" (G.R. No. L-9103). The resolution of
dismissal was issued 31 July 1956. At that time the incumbent administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, but no action
in quo warranto was filed against him by plaintiff Jesus Ma. Cui as indicated in the aforesaid motion for dismissal.

On 10 February 1960, defendant Antonio Ma. Cui was reinstated by this Court as member of the Bar, and on the
following 27 February Dr. Teodoro Cui resigned as administrator in his favor, pursuant to the "convenio" between
them executed on the same date. The next day Antonio Ma. Cui took his oath of office.

The failure of the plaintiff to prosecute his claim judicially after this Court decided the first case of  Cui v. Cui in 1934
(60 Phil. 3769), remanding it to the trial court for further proceedings; his acceptance instead of the position of
assistant administrator, allowing Dr. Teodoro Cui to continue as administrator and his failure to file an action in  quo
warranto against said Dr. Cui after 31 July 1956, when the appeal in Civil Case No. R-1216 of the Cebu Court was
dismissed upon motion of the parties precisely so that the conflicting claims of the parties could be ventilated in such
an action — all these circumstances militate against the plaintiff's present claim in view of the rule that an action
in quo warranto must be filed within one year after the right of the plaintiff to hold the office arose. The excuse that
the plaintiff did not file an action against Dr. Teodoro Cui after 31 July 1956 because of the latter's illness did not
interrupt the running of the statutory period. And the fact that this action was filed within one year of the defendant's
assumption of office in September 1960 does not make the plaintiff's position any better, for the basis of the action
is his own right to the office and it is from the time such right arose that the one-year limitation must be counted, not
from the date the incumbent began to discharge the duties of said office. Bautista v. Fajardo, 38 Phil. 624; Lim vs.
Yulo, 62 Phil. 161.

Now for the claim of intervenor and appellant Romulo Cui. This party is also a lawyer, grandson of Vicente Cui, one
of the nephews of the founders of the Hospicio mentioned by them in the deed of donation. He is further, in the line
of succession, than defendant Antonio Ma. Cui, who is a son of Mariano Cui, another one of the said nephews. The
deed of donation provides: "a la muerte o incapacidad de estos administradores (those appointed in the deed itself)
pasara a una sola persona que sera el varon, mayor de edad, que descienda legitimamente de cualquiera de
nuestros sobrinos legitimos Mariano Cui, Mauricio Cui, Vicente Cui, Victor Cui, y que posea titulo de abogado ... En
igualdad de circumstancias, sera preferido el varon de mas edad descendiente de quien tenia ultimamente la
administration." Besides being a nearer descendant than Romulo Cui, Antonio Ma. Cui is older than he and
therefore is preferred when the circumstances are otherwise equal. The intervenor contends that the intention of the
founders was to confer the administration by line and successively to the descendants of the nephews named in the
deed, in the order they are named. Thus, he argues, since the last administrator was Dr. Teodoro Cui, who
belonged to the Mauricio Cui line, the next administrator must come from the line of Vicente Cui, to whom the
intervenor belongs. This interpretation, however, is not justified by the terms of the deed of donation.

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING CONSIDERATIONS, the judgment appealed from is reversed and set aside, and
the complaint as well as the complaint in intervention are dismissed, with costs equally against plaintiff-appellee and
intervenor-appellant.

Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes and Regala, JJ., concur.
 103

THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, Complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District Court, Marawi
City, Respondent.

DECISION

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa & Partners Co.,
Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent executive clerk of court of
the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by Alauya of one
of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa & Co.); and in connection
therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation
(NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the President of
Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the Contract/Agreement
entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of
your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross
misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said
 104

contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which
made said contract an Onerous Contract prejudicial to my rights and interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds which could
evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence by the unscrupulous
sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual rescission of our contract, even
as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the contract **. I hope I do not have to resort
to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract against my interest be annulled. I was actually
fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City.
The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead at the right hand
corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President, Credit &
Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo Village, Makati City,
repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for cancellation of his housing loan
in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other
things, he said:

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the 'manipulated
contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented by its sales
agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract and unlawfully
secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the contract itself is deemed
to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud,
deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no meeting of the minds between me and the
swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous actuations of
Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15, 1996, and May 3,
1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation of his housing loan and
discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on January 18, 1996 to Ms.
Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the Chief, Finance Division, both of
this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in question, again asserting the anomalous
manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop deductions on
Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for the buy-back of **
(Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this Court a verified
complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the above mentioned
envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."1 In that complaint, she accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad
faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly use.
 105

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc." without "even a bit of
evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his imputations as irresponsible, "all
concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," and asserting that all her
dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be
dismissed from the service, or be appropriately disciplined (sic) ** "

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established usage that notices
of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of resolution in this case was
signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. 2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment" 3 in which he questioned the authority of Atty. Marasigan to require
an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst. Div. Clerk of Court investigating
an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced
the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He
also averred that the complaint had no factual basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive
Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **." 4

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious tones, 5 Alauya
requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment thereon. 6 He stated that his
acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales
agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently bound him to a housing loan contract entailing
monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was he who had
suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering,"
considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.7 He declared that there was
no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely acted in defense of his rights. He
denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00 plus transportation fare to a subordinate
whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the
envelope by some other person, an averment corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV
(subscribed and sworn to before respondent himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J); 8 and as far as he
knew, his subordinate mailed the letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters
were indeed mixed with the official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest
mistake.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with "Counsellors-at-
law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of "attorney" because
"counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial," connoting a local legislator
beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and
injured."10 He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and friend. 11 He was induced
to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed document to him later for
correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-ups" he still does not know where
the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal, Villarosa & Co. -- is situated; 12 He says
Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she promised to return it the next day, she did not
do so until after several months. He also claims that in connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi
forged his signature on such pertinent documents as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt
of the key of the house, salary deduction, none of which he ever saw. 13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of the complaint
for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and complainant Alawi having come
to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated April 19, 1996
and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of which he signed as "Atty.
 106

Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title but refers to himself as "DATU
ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous charges (against
Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting in "undue injury to (her)
and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and
abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his) rights and
interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and unlawfully secured and
pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and "concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of his rights, and
doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered "mental anguish,
sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six months, a total
of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA 6713) inter alia enunciates the
State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility in the public service. 16 Section 4 of the
Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from
doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, public safety and public
interest."17 More than once has this Court emphasized that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee
of an agency involved in the administration of justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be
circumscribed with the heavy burden of responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among
others, strict propriety and decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." 18

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or respect for the
rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be deceitful, fraudulent or
malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is evidently convinced that he has a
right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise that right with propriety, without malice or
vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent with good morals, good customs, public policy,
public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."19 Righteous indignation, or vindication of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright
name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct
more stringent than for most other government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is
abusive, offensive, scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper. 20 As a judicial employee, it is expected that he
accord respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might
perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that persons who
pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only practice law before Shari'a
courts.21 While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has been admitted to the Philippine Bar,
may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only
the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in
the study of law and successfully taken the Bar Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the
 107

Philippines and remain members thereof in good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in
this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his region, there are
pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local legislators. The ratiocination,
valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor" does not warrant his use of the title of
attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains no evidence
adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively intemperate,
insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the title of attorney; and
he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., Melo, Francisco, and Panganiban, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

a 'Annexes B, B, B-1, B-3 of Alauya's Comment dated June 5, 1996

b Annexes F and G, id.

c Annex C-2, id.

 Annexes A and A-1 of complaint; Rollo at p. 14; copies of the letter were also furnished the National Home
1

Mortgage Finance Corporation. The Finance Management and Budget Office and the Financial Division of the
Supreme Court.

2
 Resolution dated March 25, 1996

3
 Dated April 19, 1996.

4
 Rollo at p. 23.

5
 Evidently, he had since become aware of the immemorial practice that NOTICES (or communications informing) of
Resolutions adopted by the Court En Banc or any of its three (3) Divisions are sent to the parties by and over the
signature of the corresponding Clerk or Court or his Assistant, the Court's Resolutions being incorporated verbatim
in said notices.

6
 Dated April 22, 1996

7
 Rollo at p. 28.

8
 Id. at p. 60.

9
 Id. at p. 32.

10
 Id. at p. 34.
 108
11
 Id. at p. 35, et seq.

12
 Id. at p. 35.

13
 Id.

14
 See Resolution of the Court en banc dated August 21, 1996; Rollo at p. 61 et seq.

15
 SEE footnote No. 7, supra.

16
 Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275

17
 RA. No. 6713, Section 11 of the same law punishes any violation of the Act with (1) a fine not exceeding the
equivalent of six (6) months' salary, or (2) suspension not exceeding one (1) year, or (3) removal, depending on the
gravity of the offense, after due notice and hearing by the appropriate body or agency, and even if no criminal
prosecution is instituted against him.

18
 Apaga v. Ponce. 245 SCRA 233, 240, citing Callejo. Jr. v. Garcia, etc., 206 SCRA 491; Angeles v. Bantug, et
al., 209 SCRA 413; Icasiano, Jr. v. Sandiganbayan, et al., 2109 SCRA 377; Medilo, et al. v. Asodisen, etc., 233
SCRA 68; SEE also Policarpio v. Fortus, 248 SCRA 272, 275

19
 ART. 19, Civil Code

20
 Rules 8.01 and 11.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which should apply by analogy to Members of
the Shari'a Bar. The Code also proscribes behavior in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession
(Rule 7.03).

21
 Resolution of the Court En Banc dated August 5, 1993 in Bar Matter No. 681, entitled "Petition to allow Shari'a
lawyers to exercise their profession at the regular courts;" SEE Rule 138 (secs. 1, 4), Rules of Court4

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-12817. April 29, 1960.]

JULIO D. ENRIQUEZ, SR., representing the law firm of ENRIQUEZ & ENRIQUEZ, Petitioner, v. HON. PEDRO
M. GIMENEZ in his capacity as AUDITOR GENERAL OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Julio D. Enriquez, Sr. for Petitioner.

Assistant Solicitor General Florencio Villamor and Solicitor Jorge R. Coquia for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION; PROVINCIAL FISCAL; LEGAL ADVISER OF MUNICIPAL MAYOR AND

COUNCIL; WHEN DISQUALIFIED. — Under the provision of Sections 2241, 1682 and 1683 of the Revised
Administrative Code the provincial fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and council of the various municipalities of
a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is disqualified by law. When
he is disqualified to represent the municipality, the municipal council may engage the services of a special attorney.
The provincial fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and when original jurisdiction of the case
involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a party adverse to the provincial
government or to some other municipality in the same province; and when in the case involving the municipality, he,
or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.
 109

2. ID.; ID.; MUNICIPAL COUNCIL TO ENGAGE SERVICES OF SPECIAL COUNSEL; PROVINCIAL FISCAL’S
HOSTILE BELIEF ON THE CASE. — The fact that the provincial fiscal entertains a hostile belief and attitude on the
theory involved in the litigation and, therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality
with earnestness and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special
counsel. Bias or prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions
enumerated in the law and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or
disqualification.

3. ID.; ID.; BOUND TO PERFORM HIS DUTIES. — Unlike a practicing lawyer who has the right to decline
employment, a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions on grounds not provided for by law without
violating his oath of office, where he swore, among others, "that he will well and faithfully discharge to the best of his
ability the duties of the office or position upon which he is about to enter . . . .

4. ID.; ID.; REMEDY OF MUNICIPAL COUNCIL IF FISCAL DECLINES TO HANDLE CASE. — Instead of engaging
the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should have requested the Secretary of Justice to appoint
an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to handle and prosecute its case in court
pursuant to Section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code.
DECISION

PADILLA, J.:

This is a petition filed under the provisions of Rule 45 of the Rules of Court and section 2 (c) of Commonwealth Act
No. 327 for a review of a decision of the Auditor General dated 24 June 1957.

On 18 June 1955 Republic Act No. 1383 creating the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority as a public
corporation and vesting in it the ownership, jurisdiction, supervision and control over all territory embraced by the
Metropolitan Water District as well as all areas served by existing government-owned waterworks and sewerage
and drainage systems within the boundaries of cities, municipalities, and municipal districts in the Philippines, and
those served by the Waterworks and Wells and Drills Section of the Bureau of Public Works, was passed. On 19
September 1955 the President of the Philippines promulgated Executive Order No. 127 providing, among others, for
the transfer to the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority of all the records, properties, machinery,
equipment, appropriations, assets, choses in actions, liabilities, obligations, notes, bonds and all indebtedness of all
government-owned waterworks and sewerage systems in the provinces, cities, municipalities and municipal districts
(51 Off. Gaz. 4415-4417). On 31 March 1956 the municipal council of Bauan, Batangas, adopted and passed
Resolution No. 152 stating "that it is the desire of this municipality in this present administration not to submit our
local Waterworks to the provisions of the said Republic Act No. 1383." (Annex A.) On 20 April 1956 the municipal
mayor transmitted a copy of Resolution No. 152 to the Provincial Fiscal through the Provincial Board requesting him
to render an opinion on the matter treated therein and to inform the municipal council whether he would handle and
prosecute its case in court should the council decide to question and test judicially the legality of Republic Act No.
1383 and to prevent the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority from exercising its authority over the
waterworks system of the municipality (Annex B). On 2 May 1956 the provincial fiscal rendered an opinion holding
that Republic Act No. 1383 is valid and constitutional and declined to represent the municipality of Bauan in an
action to be brought against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority to test the validity and
constitutionality of the Act creating it (Annex C). On 26 May 1956 the municipal council adopted and passed
Resolution No. 201 authorizing the municipal mayor to take steps to commence an action or proceedings in court to
challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 1383 and to engage the services of a special counsel, and
appropriating the sum of P2,000 to defray the expenses of litigation and attorney’s fees (Annex D). On 2 June 1956
the municipal mayor wrote a letter to the petitioner engaging his services as counsel for the municipality in its
contemplated action against the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority (Annex F.) On 27 June 1956 the
Provincial Board of Batangas adopted and passed Resolution No. 1829 approving Resolution No. 201 of the
municipal council of Bauan (Annex E). On 28 June 1956 the petitioner wrote to the municipal mayor accepting his
offer in behalf of the municipality under the following terms and conditions: that his professional services shall
commence from the filing of the complaint up to and including the appeal, if any, to the appellate courts; that his
professional fee shall be P1,500 and payable as follows: P500 upon the filing of the complaint, P500 upon the
termination of the hearing of the case in the Court of First Instance, and P500 after judgment shall have become
 110

final or, should the judgment be appealed, after the appeal shall have been submitted for judgment to the appellate
court; and that the municipality shall defray all reasonable and necessary expenses for the prosecution of the case
in the trial and appellate courts including court and sheriff fees, transportation and subsistence of counsel and
witnesses and cost of transcripts of stenographic notes and other documents (Annex G). On the same date, 28 June
1956, the petitioner filed the necessary complaint in the Court of First Instance of Batangas (civil No. 542, Annex I).
On 9 July 1956 the municipal mayor wrote to the petitioner agreeing to the terms and conditions set forth in his (the
petitioner’s) letter of 28 June 1956 (Annex H). On 16 July 1956 the defendant filed its answer to the complaint
(Annex J). On 24 July 1956 the petitioner wrote a letter to the municipal treasurer requesting reimbursement of the
sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee and payment of the sum of P500 as initial attorney’s fee.
Attached to the letter were the pertinent supporting papers (Annex K). The municipal treasurer forwarded the
petitioner’s claim letter and enclosures to the Auditor General through channels for pre-audit. On 24 June 1957 the
Auditor General disallowed in audit the petitioner’s claim for initial attorney’s fees in the sum of P500, based upon
an opinion rendered on 10 May 1957 by the Secretary of Justice who held that the Provincial Fiscal was not
disqualified to handle and prosecute in court the case of the municipality of Bauan and that its municipal council had
no authority to engage the services of a special counsel (Annex L), but offered no objection to the refund to the
petitioner of the sum of P40 paid by him to the Court as docket fee (Annex M). On 15 August 1957 the petitioner
received notice of the decision of the Auditor General and on 11 September 1957 he filed with the Auditor General a
notice of appeal from his decision under section 4, Rule 45, of the Rules of Court (Annex N). On 13 September 1957
the petitioner filed this petition for review in this Court.

The Revised Administrative Code provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

SEC. 2241. Submission of questions to provincial fiscal. — When the council is desirous of securing a legal opinion
upon any question relative to its own powers or the constitution or attributes of the municipal government, it shall
frame such question in writing and submit the same to the provincial fiscal for decision.

SEC. 1682. Duty of fiscal as legal adviser of province and provincial subdivisions. — The provincial fiscal shall be
the legal adviser of the provincial government and its officers, including district health officers, and of the mayor and
council of the various municipalities and municipal districts of the province. As such he shall, when so requested,
submit his opinion in writing upon any legal question submitted to him by any such officer or body pertinent to the
duties thereof.

SEC. 1683. Duty of fiscal to represent provinces and provincial subdivisions in litigation. — The provincial fiscal shall
represent the province and any municipality or municipal district thereof in any court, except in cases whereof
original jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court or in cases where the municipality or municipal district in
question is a party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality or municipal district in the
same province. When the interests of a provincial government and of any political division thereof are opposed, the
provincial fiscal shall act on behalf of the province.

When the provincial fiscal is disqualified to serve any municipality or other political subdivision of a province, a
special attorney may be employed by its council.

Under the foregoing provisions of law, the Provincial Fiscal is the legal adviser of the mayor and counsel of the
various municipalities of a province and it is his duty to represent the municipality in any court except when he is
disqualified by law. When he is disqualified to represent the municipality, the municipal council may engage the
services of a special attorney. The Provincial Fiscal is disqualified to represent in court the municipality if and when
original jurisdiction of the case involving the municipality is vested in the Supreme Court; when the municipality is a
party adverse to the provincial government or to some other municipality in the same province; 1 and when in the
case involving the municipality, he, or his wife, or child, is pecuniarily involved as heir, legatee, creditor or otherwise.
2 The fact that the Provincial Fiscal in the case at bar was of the opinion that Republic Act No. 1383 was valid and
constitutional, and, therefore, would not be in a position to prosecute the case of the municipality with earnestness
and vigor, could not justify the act of the municipal council in engaging the services of a special counsel. Bias or
prejudice and animosity or hostility on the part of a fiscal not based on any of the conditions enumerated in the law
and the Rules of Court do not constitute a legal and valid excuse for inhibition or disqualification. 3 And unlike a
practising lawyer who has the right to decline employment, 4 a fiscal cannot refuse the performance of his functions
on grounds not provided for by law without violating his oath of office, where he swore, among others, "that he will
well and faithfully discharge to the best of his ability the duties of the office or position upon which he is about to
 111

enter . . . ." 5 Instead of engaging the services of a special attorney, the municipal council should have requested
the Secretary of Justice to appoint an acting provincial fiscal in place of the provincial fiscal who had declined to
handle and prosecute its case in court, pursuant to section 1679 of the Revised Administrative Code. The petitioner
claims that the municipal council could not do this because the Secretary of Justice, who has executive supervision
over the Government Corporate Counsel, who represented the National Waterworks and Sewerage Authority in the
case filed against it by the municipality of Bauan (civil No. 542, Annex J) and direct supervision and control over the
Provincial Fiscal, would be placed in an awkward and absurd position of having control of both sides of the
controversy. The petitioner’s contention is untenable. Section 83 of the Revised Administrative Code, as amended
by Executive Order No. 94, series of 1947 and further amended by Executive Order No. 392, series of 1950, 46 Off.
Gaz., 5913, 5917, provides that the Secretary of Justice shall have executive supervision over the Government
Corporate Counsel and supervision and control over Provincial Fiscals. In Mondano v. Silvosa, 97 Phil., 143; 51 Off.
Gaz., 2884, 2888, this Court distinguished supervision from control as follows:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

. . . In administrative law supervision means overseeing or the power or authority of an officer to see that
subordinate officers perform their duties. If the latter fail or neglect to fulfill them the former may take such action or
step as prescribed by law to make them perform their duties. Control on the other hand, means the power of an
officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties
and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter. . . .

The fact that the Secretary of Justice had, on several occasions, upheld the validity and constitutionality of Republic
Act No. 1383 does not exempt the municipal council of Bauan from requesting the Secretary of Justice to detail a
provincial fiscal to prosecute its case.

The services of the petitioner having been engaged by the municipal council and mayor without authority of law, the
Auditor General was correct in disallowing in audit the petitioner’s claim for payment of attorney’s fees.

The decision under review is affirmed, without pronouncement as to costs.

Bengzon, Montemayor, Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Barrera and Gutierrez David, JJ., concur.

EN BANC

[G.R. No. L-12426. February 16, 1959.]

PHILIPPINE LAWYER’S ASSOCIATION, Petitioner, v. CELEDONIO AGRAVA, in his capacity as Director of

the Philippines Patent Office, Respondent.

Arturo A. Alafriz for Petitioner.

Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS AT LAW; PRACTICE OF LAW; BEFORE PATENT OFFICE. — Practice of law in the Philippines
includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of applicants, oppositors, and other persons,
and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions thereto or the enforcement of their rights in
patent cases.

2. ID.; ID.; ID.; WITHOUT FURTHER EXAMINATION. — A member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and
training should be allowed to practice before the Patent Office, without further examination or other qualification.

3. ID.; ID.; ID.; REASON. — Under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by the Supreme Court
to practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that
 112

much of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the
patent law and other laws applicable as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved. That part of
the functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and
decision are under the law taken to the Supreme Court.

DECISION

MONTEMAYOR, J.:

This is a petition filed by the Philippine Lawyer’s Association for prohibition and injunction against Celedonio Agrava,
in his capacity as Director of the Philippines Patent Office.

On May 27, 1957, respondent Director issued a circular announcing that he had scheduled for June 27, 1957 an
examination for the purpose of determining who are qualified to practice as patent attorneys before the Philippines
Patent Office, the said examination to cover patent law and jurisprudence and the rules of practice before said
office. According to the circular, members of the Philippine Bar, engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific
and technical training are qualified to take the said examination. It would appear that heretofore, respondent
Director has been holding similar examinations.

It is the contention of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer’s Association that one of the petitioner Philippine Lawyer’s
Association that one who has passed the bar examinations and is licensed by the Supreme Court to practice law in
the Philippines and who is in good standing, is duly qualified to practice before the Philippines Patent Office, and
that consequently, the act of the respondent Director requiring members of the Philippine Bar in good standing to
take and pass an examination given by the Patent Office as a condition precedent to their being allowed to practice
before said office, such as representing applicants in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent, is in
excess of his jurisdiction and is in violation of the law.

In his answer, respondent Director, through the Solicitor General, maintains that the prosecution of patent cases
"does not involve entirely or purely the practice of law but includes the application of scientific and technical
knowledge and training, so much so that, as a matter of actual practice, the prosecution of patent cases may be
handled not only by lawyers, but also by engineers and other persons with sufficient scientific and technical training
who pass the prescribed examinations as given by the Patent Office; . . . that the Rules of Court do not prohibit the
Patent Office, or any other quasi-judicial body from requiring further condition or qualification from those who would
wish to handle cases before such bodies, as in the prosecution of patent cases before the Patent Office which, as
stated in the preceding paragraph, requires more of an application of scientific and technical knowledge than the
mere application of provisions of law; . . . that the action taken by the respondent is in accordance with Republic Act
No. 165, otherwise known as the Patent Law of the Philippines, which is similar to the United States Patent Law, in
accordance with which the United States Patent Office has also prescribed a similar examination as what prescribed
by Respondent. . . . ."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondent further contends that just as the Patent Law of the United States of America authorizes the
Commissioner of Patents to prescribe examinations to determine as to who may practice before the United States
Patent Office, the respondent, is similarly authorized to do so by our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165.

Although as already stated, the Director of Patents, in the past, would appear to have been holding tests or
examinations the passing of which was imposed as a required qualification to practice before the Patent Office, to
our knowledge, this is the first time that the right of the Director of Patents to do so, specially as regards members of
the bar, has been questioned formally, or otherwise put in issue. And we have given it careful thought and
consideration.

The Supreme Court has the exclusive and constitutional power with respect to admission to the practice of law in
the Philippines 1 and any member of the Philippine Bar in good standing may practice law anywhere and before any
entity, whether judicial or quasi-judicial or administrative, in the Philippines. Naturally, the question arises as to
whether or not appearance before the Patent Office and the preparation and prosecution of patent applications, etc.,
 113

constitutes or is included in the practice of law.

"The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of
pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of such actions and
proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general, all advice to
clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law incorporation services, assessment and
condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor’s claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings, and conducting proceedings in
attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute law practice, as do the
preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done involves the determination by the trained legal
mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions." (5 Am. Jur. p. 262, 263). (Italics supplied)

"Practice of law under modern conditions consists in no small part of work performed outside of any court and
having no immediate relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the giving of legal advice on a
large variety of subjects, and the preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an extensive field of
business and trust relations and other affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct connection with court
proceedings, they are always subject to become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a high degree
of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs, and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor at law bear an intimate relation to the
administration of justice by the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question set forth in the order, can
be drawn between that part of the work of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part which
involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is of importance to the welfare of the public that these
manifold customary functions be performed by persons possessed of adequate learning and skill, of sound moral
character, and acting at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests upon all attorneys." (Moran,
Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol. 3 (1953 ed.) , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the Justices (Mass.) , 194 N.
E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v. Automobile Service Assoc. (R. I.) 179 A. 139, 144). (Emphasis supplied)

In our opinion, the practice of law includes such appearance before the Patent Office, the representation of
applicants, oppositors, and other persons, and the prosecution of their applications for patent, their oppositions
thereto, or the enforcement of their rights in patent cases. In the first place, although the transaction of business in
the Patent Office involves the use and application of technical and scientific knowledge and training, still, all such
business has to be conducted and all orders and decisions of the Director of Patents have to be rendered in
accordance with the Patent Law, as well as other laws, including the Rules and Regulations promulgated by the
Patent Office in accordance with law. Not only this, but practice before the Patent Office involves the interpretation
and application of other laws and legal principles, as well as the existence of facts to be established in accordance
with the law of evidence and procedure. For instance: Section 8 of our Patent Law provides that an invention shall
not be patentable if it is contrary to public order or morals, or to public health or welfare. Section 9 says that an
invention shall not be considered new or patentable if it was known or used by others in the Philippines before the
invention thereof by the inventor named in the application for patent, or if it was patented or described in any printed
publication in the Philippines or any foreign country more than one year before the application for a patent therefor,
or if it had been in public use or on sale in the Philippines for more than one year before the application for the
patent therefor. Section 10 provides that the right to the patent belongs to the true and actual inventor, his heirs,
legal representatives or assigns, and Section 12 says that an application for a patent may be filed only by the
inventor, his heirs, legal representatives or assigns. Section 25 and 26 refer to correction of any mistake in a patent.
Section 28 enumerates the grounds for cancellation of a patent; that although any person may apply for such
cancellation, under Section 29, the Solicitor General is authorized to petition for the cancellation of a patent. Section
30 mentions the requirements of a petition for cancellation. Sections 31 and 32 provide for a notice of hearing of the
petition for cancellation of the patent by the Director of Patents in case the said cancellation is warranted. Under
Section 34, at any time after the expiration of three years from the day the patent was granted, any person may
apply for the grant of a license under a particular patent on several grounds, such as, if the patented invention is not
being worked in the Philippines on a commercial scale, or if the demand for the patented article in the Philippines is
not being met to an adequate extent and reasonable terms, or if by reason of the patentee’s refusal to grant a
license on reasonable terms or by reason of the conditions attached by him to the license, purchase, lease or use of
the patented article or working of the patented process or machine of production, the establishment of a new trade
or industry in the Philippines is prevented; or if the patent or invention relates to food or medicine or is necessary to
public health or public safety. All these things involve the application of laws, legal principles, practice and
procedure. They call for legal knowledge, training and experience for which a member of the bar has been
 114

prepared.

In support of the proposition that much of the business and many of the acts, orders and decisions of the Patent
Director involve questions of law or a reasonable and correct evaluation of facts, the very Patent Law, Republic Act
No. 165, Section 61, provides that:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

". . . . The applicant for a patent or for the registration of a design, any party to a proceeding to cancel a patent or to
obtain a compulsory license, and any party to any other proceeding in the Office may appeal to the Supreme Court
from any final order or decision of the Director."cralaw virtua1aw library

In other words, the appeal is taken to this Tribunal. If the transaction of business in the Patent Office and the acts,
orders and decisions of the Patent Director involved exclusively or mostly technical and scientific knowledge and
training, then logically, the appeal should be taken not to a court or judicial body, but rather to a board of scientists,
engineers or technical men, which is not the case.

Another aspect of the question involves the consideration of the nature of the functions and acts of the Head of the
Patent Office.

". . . . The Commissioner, in issuing or withholding patents, in reissues, interferences, and extensions, exercises
quasi-judicial functions. Patents are public records, and it is the duty of the Commissioner to give authenticated
copies to any person, on payment of the legal fees." (40 Am. Jur. 537). (Emphasis supplied).." . . . The
Commissioner has the only original initiatory jurisdiction that exists up to the granting and delivering of a patent, and
it is his duty to decide whether the patent is new and whether it is the proper subject of a patent; and his action in
awarding or refusing a patent is a judicial function. In passing on an application the commissioner should decide not
only questions of law, but also questions of fact, as whether there has been a prior public use or sale of the article
invented. . . . ." (60 C. J. S. 460). (Emphasis supplied).

The Director of Patents, exercising as he does judicial or quasi-judicial functions, it is reasonable to hold that a
member of the bar, because of his legal knowledge and training, should be allowed to practice before the Patent
Office, without further examination or other qualification. Of course, the Director of Patents, if he deems it advisable
or necessary, may require that members of the bar practising before him enlist the assistance of technical men and
scientists in the preparation of papers and documents, such as, the drawing or technical description of an invention
or machine sought to be patented, in the same way that a lawyer filing an application for the registration of a parcel
of land on behalf of his client, is required to submit a plan and technical description of said land, prepared by a
licensed surveyor.

But respondent Director claims that he is expressly authorized by the law to require persons desiring to practice or
to do business before him to submit to an examination, even if they are already members of the bar. He contends
that our Patent Law, Republic Act No. 165, is patterned after the United States Patent Law; and that the U. S. Patent
Office in its Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases prescribes an examination similar
to that which he (respondent) has prescribed and scheduled. He invites our attention to the following provisions of
said Rules of Practice:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"Registration of attorneys and agents. — A register of attorneys and a register of agents are kept in the Patent
Office on which are entered the names of all persons recognized as entitled to represent applicants before the
Patent Office in the preparation and prosecution of applications for patent. Registration in the Patent Office under
the provisions of these rules shall only entitle the person registered to practice before the Patent Office.

"(a) Attorneys at law. — Any attorney at law in good standing admitted to practice before any United States Court or
the highest court of any State or Territory of the United States who fulfills the requirements and complied with the
provisions of these rules may be admitted to practice before the Patent Office and have his name entered on the
register of attorneys.

x       x       x

"(c) Requirement for registration. — No person will be admitted to practice and register unless he shall apply to the
 115

Commissioner of Patents in writing on a prescribed form supplied by the Commissioner and furnish all requested
information and material; and shall establish to the satisfaction of the Commissioner that he is of good moral
character and of good repute and possessed of the legal and scientific and technical qualifications necessary to
enable him to render applicants for patent valuable service, and is otherwise competent to advise and assist him in
the presentation and prosecution of their application before the Patent Office. In order that the Commissioner may
determine whether a person seeking to have his name placed either of the registers has the qualifications specified,
satisfactory proof of good moral character and repute, and of sufficient basic training in scientific and technical
matters must be submitted and an examination which is held from time to time must be taken and passed. The
taking of an examination may be waived in the case of any person who has served for three years in the examining
corps of the Patent Office."cralaw virtua1aw library

Respondent states that the promulgation of the Rules of Practice of the United States Patent Office in Patent Cases
is authorized by the United States Patent Law itself, which reads as follows:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"The Commissioner of Patents, subject to the approval of the Secretary of Commerce may prescribe rules and
regulations governing the recognition of agents, attorneys, or other persons representing applicants or other parties
before his office, and may require of such persons, agents, or attorneys, before being recognized as representatives
of applicants or other persons, that they shall show they are of good moral character and in good repute, are
possessed of the necessary qualifications to enable them to render to applicants or other persons valuable service,
and are likewise competent to advise and assist applicants or other persons in the presentation or prosecution of
their applications or other business before the Office. The Commissioner of Patents may, after notice and
opportunity for a hearing, suspend or exclude, either generally or in any particular case, from further practice before
his office any person, agent, or attorney shown to be incompetent or disreputable, or guilty of gross misconduct, or
who refuses to comply with the said rules and regulations, or who shall, with intent to defraud in any manner,
deceive, mislead, or threaten any applicant or prospective applicant, or other person having immediate or
prospective business before the office, by word, circular, letter, or by advertising. The reasons for any such
suspension or exclusion shall be duly recorded. The action of the Commissioner may be reviewed upon the petition
of the person so refused recognition or so suspended or excluded by the district court of the United States for the
District of Columbia under such conditions and upon such proceedings as the said court may by its rules
determine." (Emphasis supplied).

Respondent Director concludes that Section 78 of Republic Act No. 165 being similar to the provisions of law just
reproduced, then he is authorized to prescribe the rules and regulations requiring that persons desiring to practice
before him should submit to and pass an examination. We reproduce said Section 78, Republic Act No. 165, for
purposes of comparison:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph

"SEC. 78. Rules and regulations. — The Director subject to the approval of the Secretary of Justice, shall
promulgate the necessary rules and regulations, not inconsistent with law, for the conduct of all business in the
Patent Office."cralaw virtua1aw library

The above provisions of Section 78 certainly and by far, are different from the provisions of the United States Patent
Law as regards authority to hold examinations to determine the qualifications of those allowed to practice before the
Patent Office. While the U. S. Patent Law authorizes the Commissioner of Patents to require attorneys to show that
they possess the necessary qualifications and competence to render valuable service to and advise and assist their
clients in patent cases, which showing may take the form of a test or examination to be held by the Commissioner,
our Patent Law, Section 78, is silent on this important point. Our attention has not been called to any express
provision of our Patent Law, giving such authority to determine the qualifications of persons allowed to practice
before the Patent Office.

Section 551 of the Revised Administrative Code authorizes every chief of bureau to prescribe forms and make
regulations or general orders not inconsistent with law, to secure the harmonious and efficient administration of his
branch of the service and to carry into full effect the laws relating to matters within the jurisdiction of his bureau.
Section 608 of Republic Act 1937, known as the Tariff and Customs Code of the Philippines, provides that the
Commissioner of Customs shall, subject to the approval of the Department Head, make all rules and regulations
necessary to enforce the provisions of said code. Section 338 of the National Internal Revenue Code,
Commonwealth Act No. 466 as amended, states that the Secretary of Finance, upon recommendation of the
Collector of Internal Revenue, shall promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the
 116

provisions of the code. We understand that rules and regulations have been promulgated not only for the Bureaus of
Customs and Internal Revenue, but also for other bureaus of the Government, to govern the transaction of business
in and to enforce the law for said bureaus.

Were we to allow the Patent Office, in the absence of an express and clear provision of law giving the necessary
sanction, to require lawyers to submit to and pass on examination prescribed by it before they are allowed to
practice before said Patent Office, then there would be no reason why other bureaus specially the Bureaus of
Internal Revenue and Customs, where the business in the same area are more or less complicated, such as the
presentation of books of accounts, balance sheets, etc., assessments exemptions, depreciation, these as regards
the Bureau of Internal Revenue, and the classification of goods, imposition of customs duties, seizures, confiscation,
etc., as regards the Bureau of Customs, may not also require that any lawyer practising before them or otherwise
transacting business with them on behalf of clients, shall first pass an examination to qualify.

In conclusion, we hold that under the present law, members of the Philippine Bar authorized by this Tribunal to
practice law, and in good standing, may practice their profession before the Patent Office, for the reason that much
of the business in said office involves the interpretation and determination of the scope and application of the Patent
Law and other laws applicable, as well as the presentation of evidence to establish facts involved; that part of the
functions of the Patent Director are judicial or quasi-judicial, so much so that appeals from his orders and decisions
are, under the law, taken to the Supreme Court.

For the foregoing reasons, the petition for prohibition is granted and the respondent Director is hereby prohibited
from requiring members of the Philippine Bar to submit to an examination or tests and pass the same before being
permitted to appear and practice before the Patent Office. No costs.

Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Padilla, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L. and Endencia, JJ.,
concur.

Endnotes:

1. In re: Albino Cunanan, 50 Off. Gaz., 1617, prom. March 18, 1954.

SECOND DIVISION

[A.C. No. 1053. August 31, 1981.]

SANTA PANGAN, Complainant, v. ATTY. DIONISIO RAMOS, Respondent.

SYNOPSIS

Complainant filed before this Court a verified complaint charging respondent lawyer with gross immorality, for having
misrepresented himself as still "single" when he started courting her, proposed marriage to her and finally
succeeded in marrying her with full consciousness that his first marriage was valid and subsisting. Simultaneously, a
criminal case was also filed by complainant against respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila which was
however dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Respondent in his answer to this administrative complaint denied
such misrepresentation, and claimed that he was threatened and forced by complainant’s brothers to celebrate the
marriage which was only a cover-up of complainant’s pregnancy, but admitted having a carnal affair with her after
the celebration of the marriage. The Solicitor General to whom the case was referred for investigation, report and
recommendation found respondent guilty as charged and recommended his suspension for three (3) years while
this Court’s Legal Officer-Investigator to whom the case was referred for reception of additional evidence
recommended suspension for five (5) years with prospect of total disbarment. Meanwhile, notwithstanding his
Court’s severe reprimand and warning for using a name other than his authorized name in the "Roll of Attorneys",
respondent repeated the same overt act, attributing the same to poor eyesight.
 117

The Supreme Court ruled that respondent’s acquittal in the criminal charge is not a bar to disbarment proceedings
and finding him guilty of grossly immoral conduct, suspended him from the practice of law for a period of three (3)
years and for another year for his willful disregard of a lawful order against his using an unauthorized name.

SYLLABUS

1. LEGAL AND JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS AT LAW; ACTS CONSTITUTING GROSSLY IMMORAL
CONDUCT; CASE AT BAR. — While in his affidavit, respondent frankly admitted having carnal relations with
complainant for several times and claimed that he was threatened and forced by complainant’s brothers to celebrate
the marriage dated June 18, 1980, in the same breath, he admitted having a carnal affair with complainant after the
celebration of the marriage. Worse still, respondent misrepresented his civil status as "single," courted complainant,
proposed marriage to her — knowing his legal impediments to marry complainant. Respondent’s motives were
clearly and grossly immoral. He won her confidence and married her while his first marriage to his present wife still
validly subsists. In Villasanta v. Peralta, this Court held: "the act of respondent of contracting the second marriage
(even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid and
existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a mockery of marriage which is a
sacred institution demanding respect and dignity." (April 30, 1957, 101 Phil. 313, see also Mortel v. Aspiras, 100
Phil. 591)

2. ID.; ID.; DUTIES UNDER THE CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS. — As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of
Judicial Ethics: "The lawyer should aid in guarding the Bar against the admission to the profession of candidates
unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold
the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession and to improve not only the law but also the administration of
justice." (Quingwa v. Puno, Adm. Case No. 389, 19 SCRA 439)

3. ID.; ID.; ACQUITTAL IN A CRIMINAL CHARGE NOT A BAR TO DISBARMENT PROCEEDINGS. — The
acquittal of respondent of the criminal charge at the Court of First Instance of Manila is not a bar to these
proceedings. The standards of legal profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of the criminal law. Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different
capacity from that which courts assume in trying criminal cases. (In re: del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399)

4. ID.; ID.; CONDUCT CONSTITUTING VIOLATION OF OATH OF OFFICE; CASE AT BAR. — Where,
notwithstanding the fact that this Court has already severely reprimanded respondent from using a name other than
his authorized name in the "Roll of Attorneys" and was warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant
his suspension or disbarment from office in the future, respondent repeated the same overt act of using
unauthorized name in two pleadings filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila, his explanation that he had
done so inadvertently because of poor eyesight appears unsatisfactory. He should have employed more caution
and prudence in filing pleadings before courts considering the fact that he had already been warned and
reprimanded by this Court. Respondent’s conduct thus, suggests lack of candor and respect in his dealing with this
Court. He has violated his oath of office of assuming the duty of good faith and honorable dealings with the court, of
being respectful to it and of being obedient to its rules and lawful orders.

RESOLUTION

DE CASTRO, J.:

On November 29, 1971, Santa Pangan filed before this Court a verified complaint charging respondent Atty.
Dionisio Ramos with gross immorality, the latter having misrepresented himself as still "single" when he started
courting complainant, proposed marriage to her and finally succeeded in marrying her even with full consciousness
that his first marriage to his first wife was still valid and subsisting. 1 (A Criminal Case for bigamy was also filed by
the complainant against the respondent in the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, docketed as Criminal
Case No. 15528).
 118

In his answer to the complaint, respondent denied the material allegations thereof for being without legal or factual
basis. He prayed for the dismissal of the complaint for failure to state cause of action against Respondent. 2

The case was referred to the Office of the Solicitor General for report, investigation and recommendation. On June
1, 1976, the Solicitor General submitted his report finding respondent Ramos guilty as charged, with a
recommendation for his suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, pursuant to Section 7,
Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. 3 Subsequently, the corresponding complaint for his suspension from the practice of
law was filed.

On September 13, 1976, respondent filed his answer to the complaint and moved for the appointment of a
commissioner to hear and take additional evidence in his behalf, which, however, was denied by the Court per its
Resolution of October 6, 1976. At the hearing of February 25, 1977, respondent, acting as counsel for his own
behalf, moved for the presentation of additional evidence, which was, however, opposed by complainant’s counsel
on the ground that respondent is resorting to dilatory tactics. At the hearing of September 2, 1977, complainant and
respondent appeared and the Court set the hearing of the case for the purpose of reception of additional evidence
before its Legal Officer-Investigator.

Meanwhile, on September 7, 1979, the Court, speaking through Justice Felix Antonio, severely REPRIMANDED
respondent Dionisio Ramos, with warning that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspension or
disbarment from the practice of law. 4 The reprimand was administered because respondent used the name "Pedro
D.D. Ramos" in connection with Criminal Case No. 35906. He averred that he had a right to do so because in his
Birth Certificate his name is "Pedro Dionisio Ramos," and his parents are Pedro Ramos and Carmen Dayaw, and
that the "D.D." in "Pedro D.D. Ramos" is but an abbreviation of "Dionisio Dayaw" his other given name and maternal
surname. The Court opined that "respondent in effect resorted to deception. He demonstrated lack of candor in
dealing with the courts."cralaw virtua1aw library

At the hearing of October 23, 1979, Solicitor Celia Reyes appeared submitting the decision of the Court of First
Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, in Criminal Case No. 15528, acquitting respondent of the charges of bigamy on
grounds of insufficiency of evidence, for having contracted the second marriage with the complainant.

On January 15, 1980, the Legal Officer-Investigator submitted his report concurring in the findings of the Solicitor
General, although he recommended a penalty of a minimum five-year suspension from the practice of law, with
prospect for the imposition of a total disbarment from the practice of law, as the Court finds fit and appropriate. 5

On February 27, 1981, counsel for complainant filed its motion to expedite disposition of the case, further alleging
that respondent Ramos is still using the name of Pedro Dionisio Ramos and P.D.D. Ramos in two pleadings filed
before the Court of First Instance of Manila, disregarding the Resolution of this Court dated September 7, 1979. 6
Commenting, respondent admitted the allegations of complainant’s counsel but alleged that he signed the pleadings
inadvertently because of poor eyesight.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

The facts, as found by the Solicitor General who investigated the case, and the Legal Officer-Investigator before
whom the additional evidence was presented, are as follows: Respondent was admitted to the Philippine Bar in
1964. He was legally married to and living with Editha Encarnado, the marriage with her having been celebrated on
September 4, 1963. Both complainant and respondent were officemates in the Office of Councilor Lito Puyat, City
Hall, Manila since 1967. With the convenience thus offered, respondent, representing himself to be "single," began
courting complainant, proposed civil marriage to her to be later followed with a church celebration after which they
will live together as husband and wife. From January 1968 to February 1971, they had carnal knowledge of each
other in various hotels in Manila, particularly the Golden Gate Motel and Salem Motel. Sometime in June 1970,
complainant informed respondent that she was pregnant. Whereupon, both agreed to get a quick marriage.
Accordingly, complainant and respondent filed their respective applications for a marriage license (Exhs. "H", "H-1"
and "H-2") and based thereon, they obtained a marriage license issued on June 16, 1970 (Exh. "D") and celebrated
their marriage before Minister Isidro L. Dizon on June 18, 1970 (Exh. "B"). After the marriage, complainant and
respondent agreed to have a church marriage before they live together as husband and wife, although they
continued to have sexual trysts. Respondent was invited by complainant to meet the latter’s mother to whom
respondent expressed his desire to marry complainant, and to which proposal complainant’s mother agreed,
provided respondent bring his parents with him to ask for complainant’s hand. Several weeks had passed and
 119

respondent failed to bring his parents to complainant’s home. Complainant and her mother became suspicious.
They made inquiries about the personal status of respondent and they ultimately discovered that respondent was
already married to one Editha Encarnado (Exhs. "C" and "E"). After discovering that respondent was a married man,
complainant resigned from her job as receptionist from the office of Councilor Lito Puyat. She stopped having
intimate relationship with respondent and because of the humiliation and embarassment she suffered before her
friends and officemates, she filed the present disbarment case.cralawnad

Upon the other hand, respondent tried to prove, through his affidavit subscribed before Asst. City Fiscal Primitivo
Peñaranda of Manila, that he never misrepresented himself to be "single" and that complainant knew at the outset of
his married status; that it was purely complainant’s wish to carry on a love affair with him as described in his
affidavit; that he was threatened and forced to sign blank marriage contract forms and applications for marriage
license by the brothers of the complainant who are allegedly notorious police characters; that his signature in the
marriage contract (Exh. B) was forged and falsified; that the marriage contract was only celebrated as a cover-up of
the pregnancy of the complainant; and that the disbarment proceedings were initiated by complainant because he
refused to elope with complainant and abandon his wife Editha Encarnado, and he stopped giving her money and
avoided seeing her again.

Upon a review of the record, We are convinced that respondent Dionisio Ramos is guilty of grossly immoral conduct
which warrants proper action from this Court. His own declarations in his affidavit corroborate this imputation of
immorality. Thus, in his affidavit subscribed before Asst. Fiscal Primitivo Peñaranda of Manila on Feb. 22, 1967,
respondent frankly admitted having carnal relations with complainant for several times. What is more, respondent
claimed that he was threatened and forced by complainant’s brothers to celebrate the marriage dated June 18,
1980, but in the same breath, he admitted having carnal affair with complainant after the celebration of the marriage.
Worse still, respondent misrepresented his civil status as "single", courted complainant, proposed marriage to her —
knowing his legal impediments to marry complainant, respondent’s motives were clearly and grossly immoral — won
her confidence and married her while his first marriage to his present wife still validly subsists.chanrobles
virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

In Villasanta v. Peralta, 7 where respondent was disbarred because he made love with complainant, procured the
preparation of a false marriage contract and arranged a false wedding with complainant while his first wife was still
alive and their marriage still valid and existing, this Court held: "the act of respondent of contracting the second
marriage (even his act in making love to another woman while his first wife is still alive and their marriage still valid
and existing) is contrary to honesty, justice, decency and morality. Respondent made a mockery of marriage which
is a sacred institution demanding respect and dignity."cralaw virtua1aw library

It is of importance that members of the ancient and learned profession of law must conform with the highest
standards of morality. As stated in paragraph 29 of the Canons of Judicial Ethics: "The lawyer should aid in guarding
the Bar against the admission to the profession of candidates unfit or unqualified because deficient in either moral
character or education. He should strive at all times to uphold the honor and to maintain the dignity of the profession
and to improve not only the law but also the administration of justice." 8

Respondent, however, submits that having been acquitted by the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch XXI, of
the charge of bigamy, the immorality charges filed against him in this disbarment case should be dismissed. The
acquittal of respondent Ramos upon the criminal charge is not a bar to these proceedings. The standards of legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal law.
Moreover, this Court in disbarment proceedings is acting in an entirely different capacity from that which courts
assume in trying criminal cases. 9

This court has already severely reprimanded respondent from using a name other than the authorized name in the
"Roll of Attorneys" and was warned that a repetition of the same overt act may warrant his suspension or
disbarment from office in the future. Notwithstanding such reprimand and warning, however, respondent repeated
the same overt act of using unauthorized name in two pleadings filed before the Court of First Instance of Manila.
His explanation that he had done so inadvertently because of poor eyesight appears unsatisfactory. He should have
employed more caution and prudence in filing pleadings before courts considering the fact that he had already been
warned and reprimanded by this Court. Respondent’s conduct, thus, suggests lack of candor and respect in his
dealing with this Court. He has violated his oath of office of assuming the duty of good faith and honorable dealings
with the court, of being respectful to it and of being obedient to its rules and lawful orders.
 120

In the light of the foregoing, the court finds that respondent committed a grossly immoral act, as found both by the
Solicitor General and this Court’s Legal Officer-Investigator, and as recommended by the Solicitor General,
respondent is hereby suspended from the practice of law for a period of three (3) years, for gross immorality, and an
additional one (1) year for his willful disregard of a lawful order against his using an unauthorized name, in serious
disrespect of this Court.

SO ORDERED.

Barredo (Chairman), Aquino, Concepcion Jr. and Guerrero *, JJ., concur.

Abad Santos, J., on leave.

Endnotes:

1. pp. 1-3, Rollo.

2. p. 21, Rollo.

3. p. 30, Rollo.

4. Adm. Case No. 1053, September 7, 1979, 93 SCRA 87.

5. pp. 305-322, Rollo.

6. p. 334, Rollo.

7. April 30, 1957, 101 Phil 313, see also Mortel v. Aspiras, 100 Phil. 591.

8. Quingwa v. Puno, Adm. Case No. 389, 19 SCRA 439. .

9. In re: del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399.

* Justice Juvenal K. Guerrero was designated to sit in with the Second Division.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

G.R. No. L-42992             August 8, 1935

FELIPE SALCEDO, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
FRANCISCO HERNANDEZ, respondent-appellee.
In re contempt proceedings against Attorney VICENTE J. FRANCISCO.

Vicente J. Francisco in his own behalf.

DIAZ, J.:
 121

In a motion filed in this case, which is pending resolution because the second motion for reconsideration of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco, who represents the herein petitioner, has not been acted upon to date, for the reason that the
question whether or not the decision which has already been promulgated should be reconsidered by virtue of the
first assignment of error relied upon in said petitioner's brief, has not yet been determined, for which purpose the
case was set for hearing on August 5, 1935, said attorney inserted a paragraph the translation of which reads as
follows:

We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying our
motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner
Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within out power in order that this error may be corrected by the
very court which has committed it, because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of
the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the
judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to
safeguard the prestige of this honorable court and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the
public. But, at the same time we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the
affected party and his thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of
"sakdalism" and make the public lose confidence in the administration of justice.

When the court's attention was called to said paragraph, it required Attorney Vicente J. Francisco to show cause, if
any, why he should not be found guilty of contempt, giving him a period of ten days for that purpose. In this answer
attorney Vicente J. Francisco, far from regretting having employed the phrases contained in said paragraph in his
motion, reiterated them several times contending that they did not constitute contempt because, according to him it
is not contempt to tell the truth.

The phrases:

. . . and constitutes an outrage to the rights of the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will
expressed at the polls . . . .

. . . because we should not want that some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong,
Tayabas, resort to the press publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage . . . .

and ... we wish to state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his
thousands of voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of "sakdalism" and make the
public lose confidence in the administration of justice", disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable
disrespect of the authority of the court and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby
charged with no less than having proceed in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the
untoward consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney
Vicente J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the words "outrage" and
"mockery" used therein are derived, mean exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary of the
Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th ed.,
pages 132 and 513).

The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many years a member of
the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in order to call the attention of the court
in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many
reasons stated in his said motion were sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to
reason and justice, it is highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco has done, because both means are annoying and good practice can never sanction them by reason of
their natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment, particularly in
judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.

There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more or less veiled
threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course which the voters of Tiaong
should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the press for the purpose of denouncing, what he
 122

claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has been the victim; and because he states in a threatening
manner with the intention of predisposing the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of
prejudices against it in order to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his
motion promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of  sakdalism, a movement with
seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public knowledge, occurred in this country a
few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority
thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense
of justice that, if he did not resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be
proven, with good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.

As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is in duty bound
to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it has conferred upon him the high
privilege, not á right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what he now is : a priest of justice (In
re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St. Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing, he neither creates nor promotes distrust in
the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many
cases, is the source of disorder, thus undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power
to which those who are aggrieved turn for protection and relief.

It is right and plausible that an attorney, in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so with all the
fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so for him to exercise said right by resorting
to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which the dignity of the courts require. The reason for
this is that respect of the courts guarantees the stability of their institution. Without such guaranty, said institution
would be resting on a very shaky foundation.

At this juncture, it is not amiss to invite attention to the provisions of rule 1 of Chapter 2 of Legal Ethics, which reads
as follows:

It is the duty of the lawyer to maintain towards the courts a respectful attitude, not for the sake of the
temporary incumbent of the judicial office, but for the maintenance of its importance. Judges, not being
wholly free to defend themselves, are peculiarly entitled to receive the support of the bar against unjust
criticism and clamor. Whenever there is proper ground for serious complaint of a judicial officer, it is the right
and duty of the lawyer to submit his grievances to the proper authorities. In such cases but not otherwise,
such charges should be encouraged and the person making them should be protected.

In his defense, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco states that it was not his intention to offend the court or to be recreant
to the respect thereto but, unfortunately, there are his phrases which need no further comment. Furthermore, it is a
well settled rule in all places where the same conditions and practice as those in this jurisdiction obtain, that want of
intention is no excuse from liability (13 C.J., 45). Neither is the fact that the phrases employed are justified by the
facts a valid defense:

"Where the matter is abusive or insulting, evidence that the language used was justified by the facts is not
admissible as a defense. Respect for the judicial office should always be observed and enforced." (In re Stewart,
118 La., 827; 43 S., 455.) Said lack or want of intention constitutes at most an extenuation of liability in this case,
taking into consideration Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's state of mind, according to him when he prepared said
motion. This court is disposed to make such concession. However, in order to avoid a recurrence thereof and to
prevent others by following the bad example, from taking the same course, this court considers it imperative to treat
the case of said attorney with the justice it deserves.

Briefly, this court is of the opinion and so holds that the act committed by Attorney Vicente J. Francisco constitutes a
contempt in the face of the court (in facie curiae) and, reiterating what this court said on another occasion that the
power to punish for contempt is inherent in the courts in order that there be due administration of justice ( In re Kelly,
35 Phil., 944), and so that the institution of the courts of justice may be stable and said courts may not fail in their
mission, said attorney is ordered to pay a fine of P200 within the period of ten days, and to be reprimanded, and he
is hereby reprimanded; and it is ordered that the entire paragraph of his motion containing the phrases which as has
been stated, constitute contempt of court be stricken from the record de oficio. So ordered.
 123

Avanceña, C.J., Villa-Real, Abad Santos, Hull Imperial, Butte, and Goddard, JJ., concur.

Separate Opinions

MALCOLM, J., dissenting:

From 1918 when in the case of the United States vs. Bustos (37 Phil., 731), it was declared that "The guaranties of
a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct", until the present, I have consistently
and steadfastly stood for the fullest expression of freedom of speech. I stand for the application of that basic
principle now.

The language which the majority of the court finds contemptuous and punishes as such is found in a second motion
of reconsideration in an election case, a class of cases out of which arise more bitter feelings than any other. The
motion is phrased in vigorous language, in fact vigorous and convincing enough to induce the granting of a
rehearing on the merits. It is hardly necessary to add that that action was taken entirely uninfluenced by the
peroration of the motion here judicially penalized.

Following microscopic examination in the majority opinion of the paragraph, attention is directed to words which
prophesy the loss of public confidence in the courts and the growth of Sakdalism. If, however, the passage flowing
from the pen of Mr. Francisco be set side by side with passages written by the late Mr. Justice Johnson in the case
of Garchitorena vs. Crescini and Imperial ( [1918, 39 Phil., 258), little difference in phraseology will be noted. One
came from a lawyer and is condemned; the other came from a judge and is accepted.

The main burden of the charge is that threats against this court were made by the respondent. Admittedly a lawyer
should maintain a respectful attitude towards the courts. Any attempt on the part of a lawyer to influence the action
of the court by intimidation will justify not alone punishment for contempt but also disbarment. But does anyone
believe that the action taken in this case has been obtained by coercion or could be obtained by such methods?
Judges are of sterner stuff than weak plants which bend with every wind.1avvphil.ñet

The lawyer possesses the privilege of standing up for his rights even in the face of a hostile court. He owes entire
devotion to the interests of his client. His zeal when a case is lost, which he thinks should have been won, may
induce intemperate outbursts. Courts will do well charitably to overlook professional improprieties of the moment
induced by chagrin at losing a case.

So that it may not be assumed that the position taken by me is isolated or peculiar, permit me to offer a few
corroborative authorities.

Mr. Chief Justice Sharswood of the Supreme Court of Pennsylvania was the pioneer authority in the subject of
professional ethics. Speaking for the court in one case, he said: "No class of the community ought to be allowed
freer scope in the expression or publication of opinions as to the capacity, impartiality or integrity of judges than
members of the bar. ... To say that an attorney can only act or speak on this subject under liability to be called to
account and to be deprived of his profession and livelihood by the very judge or judges whom he may consider it his
duty to attack and expose, is a position too monstrous to be entertained for a moment under our present system."
(Ex parte Steinman [1880], 40 Am. Rep., 637.)

Mr. Justice Brewer was first a member of the Supreme Court of Kansas and subsequently was elevated to the
Supreme Court of the United States. In the former capacity, in sustaining a contempt of court, he nevertheless
observed: "We remark again, that a judge will generally and wisely pass unnoticed any mere hasty and unguarded
expression of passion, or at least pass it with simply a reproof. It is so that, in every case where a judge decides for
one party, he decides against another; and ofttimes both parties are beforehand equally confident and sanguine.
The disappointment, therefore, is great, and it is not in human nature that there should be other than bitter feeling,
which often reaches to the judge as the cause of the supposed wrong. A judge, therefore, ought to be patient, and
tolerate everything which appears but the momentary outbreak of disappointment. A second thought will generally
make a party ashamed of such outbreak, and the dignity of the court will suffer none by passing it in silence." (In
re Pryor [1877], 26 Am. Rep., 747.)
 124

The late Mr. Justice Holmes of the Supreme Court of the United States was until recently the leader of progressive
thought in American jurisprudence. In a dissenting opinion in a famous case, he said: "When it considered how
contrary if is to our practice and ways of thinking for the same person to be accuser and sole judge in a matter
which, if he be sensitive, may involve strong personal feeling, I should expect the power to be limited by the
necessities of the case 'to insure order and decorum in their presence'. ... I confess that I cannot find in all this or in
the evidence in the case anything that would have affected a mind of reasonable fortitude, and still less can I find
there anything that obstructed the administration of justice in any sense that I possibly can give to those words."
(Toledo Newspaper Co. vs. United States [1917], 247 U.S., 402.)

In 1922 Attorney Feliciano Gomez was charged with having said in effect that the Supreme Court had decided the
election protest in favor of Cailles because Governor-General Wood, out of friendship for Cailles, had invited
members of the court to Malacañang previous to formulating the decision, and there, following a secret conference,
had offered them a banquet. The proceedings for contempt initiated against the respondent by the Attorney-General
were halted by the court. In he opinion it was said: "We doubt very much if any one would think for a moment that
memory of the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands would sell their birthright of judicial integrity for a social
courtesy and the favor of the Chief Executive. ... We feel also, that litigants and lawyers should not be held to too
strict an account for words said in the heat of the moment, because of chagrin at losing cases, and that the big way
is for the court to condone even contemptuous language." (In re Gomez [1922], 43 Phil., 376.)

To punish for direct contempt of the Supreme Court is a jurisdiction to be exercised with scrupulous care. The
members of the court sit as prosecutors and as judges. Human sensitiveness to an attorney's unjust aspersions on
judicial character may induce too drastic action. It may result in the long run in making of lawyers weak exponents of
their clients' causes. Respect for the courts can better be obtained by following a calm and impartial course from the
bench than by an attempt to compel respect for the judiciary by chastising a lawyer for a too vigorous or injudicious
exposition of his side of a case. The Philippines needs lawyers of independent thought and courageous bearing,
jealous of the interests of their clients and unafraid of any court, high or low, and the courts will do well tolerantly to
overlook occasional intemperate language soon to be regretted by the lawyer which affects in no way the outcome
of a case.

Mr. Francisco assures us that it has not been his intention to be recreant to the respect and consideration which he
has always shown the highest tribunal in the Philippines, and that the language of the last paragraph of his motion
of June 19 was not meant to offend the dignity of the court. I do not think that the language found in Mr. Francisco's
motion constitutes contempt of court, but conceding that it did require explanation, I would accept his disavowal of
wrong intent at its face value. I would not mark the record of a member of the bar of long and honorable standing
with this blemish. With due deference to the opinion of the majority, I must strongly dissent therefrom.

Vickers, J., concurs

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
EN BANC

[A.C. No. 492. September 5, 1967.]

OLEGARIA BLANZA and MARIA PASION, Complainants, v. ATTY. AGUSTIN ARCANGEL, Respondent.

SYLLABUS

1. ATTORNEYS-AT-LAW; SERVICE OFFERED VOLUNTARILY; EFFECT. — Where counsel voluntarily offered his
professional services, he was not legally entitled to recover fees. But having established the attorney-client
relationship voluntarily, he was bound to attend to complainant’s claim with all diligence.

2. ID.; FAILURE TO RETURN PAPERS WHEN DEMANDED; FAILURE OF CLAIMANTS TO PAY

PHOTOSTATING COSTS; EFFECT. — Where claimants agreed to shoulder the photostating expenses of the
documents they handed to counsel and they failed to give him the necessary expenses for the purpose, they cannot
 125

blame counsel for the delay of the turning over of the said documents to them for the same cannot be released by
the photostat service without payment of the corresponding costs.

3. ID.; ROLE OF ATTORNEY-AT-LAW IN THE COMMUNITY. — A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in
the community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is
necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par
excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he vollunteers his professional services. Respondent has not lived
up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their
pension claims. Upon their refusal to cooperate, respondent should have forthwith terminated their professional
relationship instead of keeping them hanging indefinitely.

DECISION

BENGZON, J.P., J.:

Complainants Olegaria Blanza and Maria Pasion ask this Court to take disciplinary action against respondent Atty.
Agustin Arcangel for professional non-feasance. They complain that way back in April, 1955, respondent
volunteered to help them in their respective pension claims in connection with the deaths of their husbands, both
P.C. soldiers, and for this purpose, they handed over to him the pertinent documents and also affixed their
signatures on blank papers. But subsequently, they noticed that since then, respondent had lost interest in the
progress of their claims and when they finally asked for the return of their papers six years later, respondent refused
to surrender them.

Respondent answered these accusations before Fiscal Raña to whom this case was referred by the Solicitor
General for investigation, report and recommendation. He admitted having received the documents from
complainants but explained that it was for photostating purposes only. His failure to immediately return them, he
said, was due to complainants’ refusal to hand him the money to pay for the photostating costs which prevented him
from withdrawing said documents from the photostat service. Anyway, he had already advanced the expenses
himself and turned over, on December 13, 1961, the documents, their respective photostats and the photostat
service receipt to the fiscal.

Finding respondent’s explanation satisfactory and considering that he charged complainants nothing for his
services, Fiscal Raña recommended the former’s exoneration, on at most, that he be reprimanded only. The
Solicitor General, however, feels that respondent deserves at least a severe reprimand considering (1) his failure to
attend to the complainants’ pension claims for six years: (2) his failure to immediately return the documents despite
repeated demands upon him, and (3) his failure to return to complainant Pasion, allegedly, all of her documents.

At the hearing of the case before this Court on October 21, 1963, only respondent, thru counsel, appeared. In lieu of
oral arguments, therefore, respondent submitted his memorandum, annexing therewith an affidavit executed by
Olegaria Blanza asking for the dismissal of the administrative case. 1

Respondent first submits that he was not obliged to follow up complainants’ pension claims since there was no
agreement for his compensation as their counsel. Respondent however overlooks the fact that he volunteered his
professional services and thus, was not legally entitled to recover fees. 2 But having established the attorney-client
relationship voluntarily, he was bound to attend to complainants’ claims with all due diligence.

Nevertheless, We find the evidence adduced insufficient to warrant the taking of disciplinary action against
respondent attorney. There is no clear preponderance of evidence substantiating the accusations against him. 3

Respondent’s explanation for the delay in filing the claims and in returning the documents has not been
controverted by complainants. On the contrary, they admitted 4 that respondent asked them to shoulder the
photostating expenses but they did not give him any money therefor. Moreover, the documents and their photostats
 126

were actually returned by respondent during the fiscal’s investigation with him paying for the photostating costs
himself. And the condition of the photostats themselves — they appear to have been in existence for quite some
times 5 — supports respondent’s allegation that they remained in possession of the photostat service for the failure
of the owners (respondent and/or complainants) to withdraw the same upon payment of the corresponding costs.
Hence, complainants themselves are partly to blame for the delay in filing their respective claims.

As for the alleged failure of respondent to return all her documents to complainant Pasion, the former denies this.
Fiscal Raña made no findings on the matter. The affidavit of Mrs. Blanza pardoning respondent cannot prejudice
complainant Pasion because res inter alios acta alteri nocere non debet. Still, there is equiponderance of evidence
which must necessarily redound to respondent’s benefit. Complainant Pasion had another opportunity to
substantiate her charges in the hearing set for October 21, 1963 but she let it go. Neither she nor her counsel of
record appeared.

But while We are constrained to dismiss the charges against respondent, for being legally insufficient, yet, We
cannot but counsel against his actuations as a member of the bar. A lawyer has a more dynamic and positive role in
the community than merely complying with the minimal technicalities of the statute. As a man of law, he is
necessarily a leader of the community, looked up to as a model citizen. His conduct must, perforce, be par
excellence, especially so when, as in this case, he volunteers his professional services. Respondent here has not
lived up to that ideal standard. It was unnecessary to have complainants wait, and hope, for six long years on their
pension claims. Upon their refusal to co-operate, respondent should have forthwith terminated their professional
relationship instead of keeping them hanging indefinitely. And altho We voted that he not be reprimanded, in a legal
sense, let this be a reminder to Atty. Arcangel of what the high standards of his chosen profession require of him.

Accordingly, the case against respondent is dismissed. So ordered.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L. Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro, Angeles and Fernando, JJ., concur.

SECOND DIVISION

ADM. CASE No. 3319               June 8, 2000

LESLIE UI, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. IRIS BONIFACIO, respondent.

DE LEON, JR., J.:

Before us is an administrative complaint for disbarment against Atty. Iris Bonifacio for allegedly carrying on an
immoral relationship with Carlos L. Ui, husband of complainant, Leslie Ui.

The relevant facts are:

On January 24, 1971 complainant Leslie Ui married Carlos L. Ui at the Our Lady of Lourdes Church in Quezon
City1 and as a result of their marital union, they had four (4) children, namely, Leilani, Lianni, Lindsay and Carl Cavin,
 127

all surnamed Ui. Sometime in December 1987, however, complainant found out that her husband. Carlos Ui, was
carrying on an illicit relationship with respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio with whom he begot a daughter sometime in
1986, and that they had been living together at No. 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang Village in Muntinlupa City.
Respondent who is a graduate of the College of Law of the University of the Philippines was admitted to the
Philippine Bar in 1982.

Carlos Ui admitted to complainant his relationship with the respondent. Complainant then visited respondent at her
office in the later part of June 1988 and introduced herself as the legal wife of Carlos Ui. Whereupon, respondent
admitted to her that she has a child with Carlos Ui and alleged, however; that everything was over between her and
Carlos Ui. Complainant believed the representations of respondent and thought things would turn out well from then
on and that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent would come to an end.

However, complainant again discovered that the illicit relationship between her husband and respondent continued,
and that sometime in December 1988, respondent and her husband, Carlos Ui, had a second child. Complainant
then met again with respondent sometime in March 1989 and pleaded with respondent to discontinue her illicit
relationship with Carlos Ui but to no avail. The illicit relationship persisted and complainant even came to know later
on that respondent had been employed by her husband in his company.

A complaint for disbarment, docketed as Adm. Case No. 3319, was then filed on August 11, 1989 by the
complainant against respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio before the Commission on Bar Discipline of the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (hereinafter, Commission) on the ground of immorality, more particularly, for carrying on an illicit
relationship with the complainant's husband, Carlos Ui. In her Answer, 2 respondent averred that she met Carlos Ui
sometime in 1983 and had known him all along to be a bachelor, with the knowledge, however, that Carlos Ui had
children by a Chinese woman in Amoy, China, from whom he had long been estranged. She stated that during one
of their trips abroad, Carlos Ui formalized his intention to marry her and they in fact got married in Hawaii, USA in
19853 . Upon their return to Manila, respondent did not live with Carlos Ui. The latter continued to live with his
children in their Greenhills residence because respondent and Carlos Ui wanted to let the children gradually to know
and accept the fact of his second marriage before they would live together. 4

In 1986, respondent left the country and stayed in Honolulu, Hawaii and she would only return occasionally to the
Philippines to update her law practice and renew legal ties. During one of her trips to Manila sometime in June
1988, she was confronted by a woman who insisted that she was the lawful wife of Carlos Ui. Hurt and desolate
upon her discovery of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, respondent then left for Honolulu, Hawaii sometime in July
1988 and returned only in March 1989 with her two (2) children. On March 20, 1989, a few days after she reported
to work with the law firm 5 she was connected with, the woman who represented herself to be the wife of Carlos Ui
again came to her office, demanding to know if Carlos Ui has been communicating with her.

It is respondent's contention that her relationship with Carlos Ui is not illicit because they were married abroad and
that after June 1988, when respondent discovered Carlos Ui's true civil status, she cut off all her ties with him.
Respondent averred that Carlos Ui never lived with her in Alabang, and that he resided at 26 Potsdam Street,
Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila. It was respondent who lived in Alabang in a house which belonged to her
mother, Rosalinda L. Bonifacio; and that the said house was built exclusively from her parents' funds. 6 By way of
counterclaim, respondent sought moral damages in the amount of Ten Million Pesos (Php10,000,000.00) against
complainant for having filed the present allegedly malicious and groundless disbarment case against respondent.

In her Reply7 dated April 6, 1990, complainant states, among others, that respondent knew perfectly well that Carlos
Ui was married to complainant and had children with her even at the start of her relationship with Carlos Ui, and that
the reason respondent went abroad was to give birth to her two (2) children with Carlos Ui.

During the pendency of the proceedings before the Integrated Bar, complainant also charged her husband, Carlos
Ui, and respondent with the crime of Concubinage before the Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal, docketed as
I.S. No. 89-5247, but the same was dismissed for insufficiency of evidence to establish probable cause for the
offense charged. The resolution dismissing the criminal complaint against respondent reads:

Complainant's evidence had prima facie established the existence of the "illicit relationship" between the
respondents allegedly discovered by the complainant in December 1987. The same evidence however show
 128

that respondent Carlos Ui was still living with complainant up to the latter part of 1988 and/or the early part
of 1989.

It would therefore be logical and safe to state that the "relationship" of respondents started and was
discovered by complainant sometime in 1987 when she and respondent Carlos were still living at No. 26
Potsdam Street, Northeast Greenhills, San Juan, Metro Manila and they, admittedly, continued to live
together at their conjugal home up to early (sic) part of 1989 or later 1988, when respondent Carlos left the
same.

From the above, it would not be amiss to conclude that altho (sic) the relationship, illicit as complainant puts
it, had been prima facie established by complainant's evidence, this same evidence had failed to
even prima facie establish the "fact of respondent's cohabitation in the concept of husband and wife at the
527 San Carlos St., Ayala Alabang house, proof of which is necessary and indispensable to at least create
probable cause for the offense charged. The statement alone of complainant, worse, a statement only of a
conclusion respecting the fact of cohabitation does not make the complainant's evidence thereto any
better/stronger (U.S. vs. Casipong and Mongoy, 20 Phil. 178).

It is worth stating that the evidence submitted by respondents in support of their respective positions on the
matter support and bolster the foregoing conclusion/recommendation.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that the instant complaint be dismissed for want of
evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged.

RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED.8

Complainant appealed the said Resolution of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal to the Secretary of Justice, but the same
was dismissed9 on the ground of insufficiency of evidence to prove her allegation that respondent and Carlos Ui
lived together as husband and wife at 527 San Carlos Street, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila.

In the proceedings before the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline, complainant filed a Motion to Cite Respondent in
Contempt of the Commission 10 wherein she charged respondent with making false allegations in her Answer and for
submitting a supporting document which was altered and intercalated. She alleged that in the Answer of respondent
filed before the Integrated Bar, respondent averred, among others, that she was married to Carlos Ui on October 22,
1985 and attached a Certificate of Marriage to substantiate her averment. However, the Certificate of
Marriage 11 duly certified by the State Registrar as a true copy of the record on file in the Hawaii State Department of
Health, and duly authenticated by the Philippine Consulate General in Honolulu, Hawaii, USA revealed that the date
of marriage between Carlos Ui and respondent Atty. Iris Bonifacio was October 22, 1987, and not October 22, 1985
as claimed by respondent in her Answer. According to complainant, the reason for that false allegation was because
respondent wanted to impress upon the said IBP that the birth of her first child by Carlos Ui was within the
wedlock. 12 It is the contention of complainant that such act constitutes a violation of Articles 183 13 and 184 14 of the
Revised Penal Code, and also contempt of the Commission; and that the act of respondent in making false
allegations in her Answer and submitting an altered/intercalated document are indicative of her moral perversity and
lack of integrity which make her unworthy to be a member of the Philippine Bar.

In her Opposition (To Motion To Cite Respondent in Contempt), 15 respondent averred that she did not have the
original copy of the marriage certificate because the same was in the possession of Carlos Ui, and that she annexed
such copy because she relied in good faith on what appeared on the copy of the marriage certificate in her
possession.

Respondent filed her Memorandum 16 on February 22, 1995 and raised the lone issue of whether or not she has
conducted herself in an immoral manner for which she deserves to be barred from the practice of law. Respondent
averred that the complaint should be dismissed on two (2) grounds, namely:

(i) Respondent conducted herself in a manner consistent with the requirement of good moral character for
the practice of the legal profession; and
 129

(ii) Complainant failed to prove her allegation that respondent conducted herself in an immoral manner.

In her defense, respondent contends, among others, that it was she who was the victim in this case and not Leslie
Ui because she did not know that Carlos Ui was already married, and that upon learning of this fact, respondent
immediately cut-off all her ties with Carlos Ui. She stated that there was no reason for her to doubt at that time that
the civil status of Carlos Ui was that of a bachelor because he spent so much time with her, and he was so open in
his courtship. 18

On the issue of the falsified marriage certificate, respondent alleged that it was highly incredible for her to have
knowingly attached such marriage certificate to her Answer had she known that the same was altered. Respondent
reiterated that there was no compelling reason for her to make it appear that her marriage to Carlos Ui took place
either in 1985 or 1987, because the fact remains that respondent and Carlos Ui got married before complainant
confronted respondent and informed the latter of her earlier marriage to Carlos Ui in June 1988. Further, respondent
stated that it was Carlos Ui who testified and admitted that he was the person responsible for changing the date of
the marriage certificate from 1987 to 1985, and complainant did not present evidence to rebut the testimony of
Carlos Ui on this matter.

Respondent posits that complainant's evidence, consisting of the pictures of respondent with a child, pictures of
respondent with Carlos Ui, a picture of a garage with cars, a picture of a light colored car with Plate No. PNS 313, a
picture of the same car, and portion of the house and ground, and another picture of the same car bearing Plate No.
PNS 313 and a picture of the house and the garage, 19 does not prove that she acted in an immoral manner. They
have no evidentiary value according to her. The pictures were taken by a photographer from a private security
agency and who was not presented during the hearings. Further, the respondent presented the Resolution of the
Provincial Fiscal of Pasig in I.S. Case No. 89-5427 dismissing the complaint filed by Leslie Ui against respondent for
lack of evidence to establish probable cause for the offense charged 20 and the dismissal of the appeal by the
Department of Justice21 to bolster her argument that she was not guilty of any immoral or illegal act because of her
relationship with Carlos Ui. In fine, respondent claims that she entered the relationship with Carlos Ui in good faith
and that her conduct cannot be considered as willful, flagrant, or shameless, nor can it suggest moral indifference.
She fell in love with Carlos Ui whom she believed to be single, and, that upon her discovery of his true civil status,
she parted ways with him.

In the Memorandum 22 filed on March 20, 1995 by complainant Leslie Ui, she prayed for the disbarment of Atty. Iris
Bonifacio and reiterated that respondent committed immorality by having intimate relations with a married man
which resulted in the birth of two (2) children. Complainant testified that respondent's mother, Mrs. Linda Bonifacio,
personally knew complainant and her husband since the late 1970s because they were clients of the bank where
Mrs. Bonifacio was the Branch Manager. 23 It was thus highly improbable that respondent, who was living with her
parents as of 1986, would not have been informed by her own mother that Carlos Ui was a married man.
Complainant likewise averred that respondent committed disrespect towards the Commission for submitting a
photocopy of a document containing an intercalated date.

In her Reply to Complainant's Memorandum 24 , respondent stated that complainant miserably failed to show
sufficient proof to warrant her disbarment. Respondent insists that contrary to the allegations of complainant, there
is no showing that respondent had knowledge of the fact of marriage of Carlos Ui to complainant. The allegation that
her mother knew Carlos Ui to be a married man does not prove that such information was made known to
respondent.

Hearing on the case ensued, after which the Commission on Bar Discipline submitted its Report and
Recommendation, finding that:

In the case at bar, it is alleged that at the time respondent was courted by Carlos Ui, the latter represented
himself to be single. The Commission does not find said claim too difficult to believe in the light of
contemporary human experience.

Almost always, when a married man courts a single woman, he represents himself to be single, separated,
or without any firm commitment to another woman. The reason therefor is not hard to fathom. By their very
nature, single women prefer single men.
 130

The records will show that when respondent became aware the (sic) true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left for
the United States (in July of 1988). She broke off all contacts with him. When she returned to the Philippines
in March of 1989, she lived with her brother, Atty. Teodoro Bonifacio, Jr. Carlos Ui and respondent only
talked to each other because of the children whom he was allowed to visit. At no time did they live together.

Under the foregoing circumstances, the Commission fails to find any act on the part of respondent that can
be considered as unprincipled or disgraceful as to be reprehensible to a high degree. To be sure, she was
more of a victim that (sic) anything else and should deserve compassion rather than condemnation. Without
cavil, this sad episode destroyed her chance of having a normal and happy family life, a dream cherished by
every single girl.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Thereafter, the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued a Notice of Resolution dated
December 13, 1997, the dispositive portion of which reads as follows:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A", and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on
record and the applicable laws and rules, the complaint for Gross Immorality against Respondent is
DISMISSED for lack of merit. Atty. Iris Bonifacio is REPRIMANDED for knowingly and willfully attaching to
her Answer a falsified Certificate of Marriage with a stern warning that a repetition of the same will merit a
more severe penalty.

We agree with the findings aforequoted.

The practice of law is a privilege. A bar candidate does not have the right to enjoy the practice of the legal
profession simply by passing the bar examinations. It is a privilege that can be revoked, subject to the mandate of
due process, once a lawyer violates his oath and the dictates of legal ethics. The requisites for admission to the
practice of law are:

a. he must be a citizen of the Philippines;

b. a resident thereof;

c. at least twenty-one (21) years of age;

d. a person of good moral character;

e. he must show that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, are filed or pending in court;

f. possess the required educational qualifications; and

g. pass the bar examinations. 25 (Emphasis supplied)

Clear from the foregoing is that one of the conditions prior to admission to the bar is that an applicant must possess
good moral character. More importantly, possession of good moral character must be continuous as a requirement
to the enjoyment of the privilege of law practice, otherwise, the loss thereof is a ground for the revocation of such
privilege. It has been held —

If good moral character is a sine qua non for admission to the bar, then the continued possession of good
moral character is also a requisite for retaining membership in the legal profession. Membership in the bar
may be terminated when a lawyer ceases to have good moral character. (Royong vs. Oblena, 117 Phil.
865).
 131

A lawyer may be disbarred for "grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude". A member of the bar should have moral integrity in addition to professional probity.

It is difficult to state with precision and to fix an inflexible standard as to what is "grossly immoral conduct" or
to specify the moral delinquency and obliquity which render a lawyer unworthy of continuing as a member of
the bar. The rule implies that what appears to be unconventional behavior to the straight-laced may not be
the immoral conduct that warrants disbarment.

Immoral conduct has been defined as "that conduct which is willful, flagrant, or shameless, and which shows
a moral indifference to the opinion of the good and respectable members of the community." (7 C.J.S.
959). 26

In the case at bar, it is the claim of respondent Atty. Bonifacio that when she met Carlos Ui, she knew and believed
him to be single. Respondent fell in love with him and they got married and as a result of such marriage, she gave
birth to two (2) children. Upon her knowledge of the true civil status of Carlos Ui, she left him.

Simple as the facts of the case may sound, the effects of the actuations of respondent are not only far from simple,
they will have a rippling effect on how the standard norms of our legal practitioners should be defined. Perhaps
morality in our liberal society today is a far cry from what it used to be before. This permissiveness notwithstanding,
lawyers, as keepers of public faith, are burdened with a higher degree of social responsibility and thus must handle
their personal affairs with greater caution. The facts of this case lead us to believe that perhaps respondent would
not have found herself in such a compromising situation had she exercised prudence and been more vigilant in
finding out more about Carlos Ui's personal background prior to her intimate involvement with him.

Surely, circumstances existed which should have at least aroused respondent's suspicion that something was amiss
in her relationship with Carlos Ui, and moved her to ask probing questions. For instance, respondent admitted that
she knew that Carlos Ui had children with a woman from Amoy, China, yet it appeared that she never exerted the
slightest effort to find out if Carlos Ui and this woman were indeed unmarried. Also, despite their marriage in 1987,
Carlos Ui never lived with respondent and their first child, a circumstance that is simply incomprehensible
considering respondent's allegation that Carlos Ui was very open in courting her.

All these taken together leads to the inescapable conclusion that respondent was imprudent in managing her
personal affairs. However, the fact remains that her relationship with Carlos Ui, clothed as it was with what
respondent believed was a valid marriage, cannot be considered immoral. For immorality connotes conduct that
shows indifference to the moral norms of society and the opinion of good and respectable members of the
community. 27 Moreover, for such conduct to warrant disciplinary action, the same must be "grossly immoral," that is,
it must be so corrupt and false as to constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high
degree. 28

We have held that "a member of the Bar and officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous
relationships . . . but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the belief that he is
flouting those moral standards." 29 Respondent's act of immediately distancing herself from Carlos Ui upon
discovering his true civil status belies just that alleged moral indifference and proves that she had no intention of
flaunting the law and the high moral standard of the legal profession. Complainant's bare assertions to the contrary
deserve no credit. After all, the burden of proof rests upon the complainant, and the Court will exercise its
disciplinary powers only if she establishes her case by clear, convincing and satisfactory evidence.  30 This, herein
complainant miserably failed to do.

On the matter of the falsified Certificate of Marriage attached by respondent to her Answer, we find improbable to
believe the averment of respondent that she merely relied on the photocopy of the Marriage Certificate which was
provided her by Carlos Ui. For an event as significant as a marriage ceremony, any normal bride would verily recall
the date and year of her marriage. It is difficult to fathom how a bride, especially a lawyer as in the case at bar, can
forget the year when she got married. Simply stated, it is contrary to human experience and highly improbable.
 132

Furthermore, any prudent lawyer would verify the information contained in an attachment to her pleading, especially
so when she has personal knowledge of the facts and circumstances contained therein. In attaching such Marriage
Certificate with an intercalated date, the defense of good faith of respondent on that point cannot stand.

It is the bounden duty of lawyers to adhere unwaveringly to the highest standards of morality. 1avvphi1 The legal
profession exacts from its members nothing less. Lawyers are called upon to safeguard the integrity of the Bar, free
from misdeeds and acts constitutive of malpractice. Their exalted positions as officers of the court demand no less
than the highest degree of morality.

WHEREFORE, the complaint for disbarment against respondent Atty. Iris L. Bonifacio, for alleged immorality, is
hereby DISMISSED.

However, respondent is hereby REPRIMANDED for attaching to her Answer a photocopy of her Marriage
Certificate, with an altered or intercalated date thereof, with a STERN WARNING that a more severe sanction will be
imposed on her for any repetition of the same or similar offense in the future.

SO ORDERED.

Bellosillo, Mendoza, Quisumbing and Buena, JJ., concur.

Footnotes

1 
Records, Vol. I, p. 5.

2 
Records, Vol. III, p. 8.

3 
Records, Vol. III, p. 17.

4 
Records, Vol. III, pp. 10-11.

5 
Rilloraza Africa De Ocampo & Africa Law Offices.

6 
Records, Vol. III, p. 12.

7 
Records, Vol. III, p. 26.

8 
Records, Vol. III, pp. 71, 73-74.

9 
Records, Vol. III, pp. 75-78.

10 
Records, Vol. III, pp. 113-117.

11 
Records, Vol. III, pp. 125-126.

12 
Records, Vol. III, pp. 114-115.

13 
Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation. — The penalty of arresto
mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon any
person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not being included in the provisions of the next
preceding articles, shall testify under oath, or make an affidavit, upon any material matter before a
competent person authorized to administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires.
 133

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an oath, shall commit any of the
falsehoods mentioned in this and the three preceding articles of this section, shall suffer respective
penalties provided therein.

14 
Art. 184. Offering false testimony in evidence. — Any person who shall knowingly offer in evidence a false
witness or testimony in any judicial or official proceeding, shall be punished as guilty of false testimony and
shall suffer the respective penalties provided in this section.

15 
Records, Vol. III, p. 133.

16 
Records, Vol. III, pp. 265 - 287.

17 
Records, Vol. III, pp. 275, 281.

18 
Records, p. 278 citing TSN dated January 22, 1993, p. 52.

19 
Records, Vol. III, pp. 52, 54-56.

20 
Records, Vol. III, pp. 71-74.

21 
Resolution No. 030, Series of 1992 of the Department of Justice dated December 18, 1991, Records, Vol.
III, pp. 75-78.

22 
Records, Vol. III, pp. 289 - 300.

23 
Records, Vol. III, p. 296.

24 
Records, Vol. III, pp. 317-321.

25 
Ruben E. Agpalo, Legal Ethics, (1985).

26 
Arciga vs. Maniwang, 106 SCRA 591, 594 (1981).

27 
Narag vs. Narag, 291 SCRA 454, 464 (1998).

28 
Reyes vs. Wong, 63 SCRA 667, 673 citing Section 27, Rule 138, New Rules of Court; Soberano vs.
Villanueva, 6 SCRA 893, 895; Mortel vs. Aspiras, December 28, 1956, 100 Phil. 587, 591-593; Royong vs.
Oblena, April 30, 1963, 7 SCRA 869-870; Bolivar vs. Simbol, April 29, 1966, 16 SCRA 623, 630; and
Quingwa vs. Puno, February 28, 1967, 19 SCRA 439-440, 444-445).

29 
Ibid.

30 
Ibid

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 598               March 28, 1969

 134

AURORA SORIANO DELES, complainant,

vs.
VICENTE E. ARAGONA, JR., respondent.

Vicente E. Aragona, Jr. in his own behalf.

Office of the Solicitor General for the Government.

CASTRO, J.:

  This is a disbarment proceeding against Vicente E. Aragona, Jr.  1 upon a verified letter-complaint of Aurora Soriano
Deles filed with this Court on November 6, 19637 charging the former with having made, under oath, false and
unfounded allegations against her in a motion filed in Court of Agrarian Relations cases 1254 and 1255 Iloilo, which
allegedly caused her great mental, torture and moral suffering.

  On November 13, 1963 this Court required the respondent to answer the complaint. On December 10, 1963 the
respondent filed his answer, affirming the truth of the allegations in the questioned motion, but claiming in his
defense that in preparing it, he relied not only upon information received but also upon other matters of public
record. He also averred that the complainant had made a similar charge against him in a counter-motion to declare
him in contempt of court filed in the same C.A.R. case which was however dismissed together with the
complainant's counterclaims when the main cases were dismissed; that the complainant failed to move for the
reconsideration of the said dismissal or to appeal therefrom; and that during the few years that he has been a
member of the bar, he has always comforted himself correctly, and has adhered steadfastly to his conviction that the
practice of law is a sacred trust in the interest of truth.

  This Court, on December 14, 1963, referred the case to the Solicitor General for investigation, report, and
recommendation. Because both parties reside in Iloilo City, the Solicitor General in turn referred the case to the City
Fiscal of Iloilo for investigation and reception of evidence. Both the petitioner and the respondent adduced evidence
in the investigation which was conducted. Thereafter, the City Fiscal forwarded to the Solicitor General the record of
the investigation, including the recommendation of the assistant city fiscal who personally conducted the
investigation that the petition for disbarment be dismissed. The Solicitor General thereafter filed with this Court his
report, concurring in the recommendation of the assistant city fiscal.

  Aurora Soriano Deles (hereinafter referred to as the complainant) is the administratrix of the intestate estate of the
late Joaquina Ganzon (the deceased mother of Aurora and Enrique Soriano, Sr. who are heirs of the estate
concurrently with other forced heirs) in special proceeding 128 of the Court of First Instance of Iloilo.

  On July 26, 1961, upon motion of Enrique Soriano, Sr. and over and above the opposition of the complainant, the
intestate court issued an order denying a proposed lease of ten hectares of the estate by the complainant to one
Carlos Fuentes and sustaining the possession of Enrique as lessee of the said land. In effect, the order likewise
sustained the possession by the brothers Federico and Carlos Aglinao of a portion of the said land being tenanted
by them upon authority of the lessee, Enrique Soriano, Sr.

  In disregard of the abovementioned order, the complainant attempted to take possession of the landholdings by
placing thereon her own tenants. Predictably, the Aglinao brothers, to protect their rights, countered by filing against
a the complainant two petitions with the Court of Agrarian relations in Iloilo (hereinafter referred to as the agrarian
court), docketed therein as C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 (hereinafter referred to as the C.A.R. cases). They alleged
in their respective petitions that they have been tenants of Enrique Soriano, Sr. since 1960 on a parcel of riceland
located in barrio Malapoc, Balasan Iloilo, held by the complainant as administratrix of the intestate estate of the
deceased Joaquina Ganzon; and that they had started to plow their leaseholds consisting of two hectares each at
the start of the agricultural year 1962-63 when "on March 7, 1962, the respondent [complainant herein] ordered one
Bonifacio Margarejo to harrow the plowed land without the knowledge and consent" of the petitioners.
Consequently, they prayed for the issuance of an interlocutory order enjoining the complainant and her
representatives from interfering with their peaceful cultivation of the lands in question pending determination of the
merits of their petitions. However, consideration of the petitioners' prayer for the issuance of an interlocutory order of
injunction pendente lite was considerably delayed not only by reason of several postponements granted at the
behest of the complainant but also because of the assurance made by her through counsel in open court at the
 135

hearing of June 16, 1962, that neither she nor any of her men would disturb or interfere with the petitioner's
possession of their leaseholds until their petitions shall have been finally resolved.

  But on June 18, 1962, barely two days after the abovementioned hearing, the complainant's men again entered the
land in question and planted rice thereon. This unauthorized entry prompted the Aglinao brothers, through their
counsel, the herein respondent Atty. Vicente Aragona, Jr. (hereinafter referred to as the respondent), to file on June
20, 1962 an "Urgent Motion for Issuance of Interlocutory Order." There being no objection by the complainant
against the said motion, and finding the same meritorious, the agrarian court issued on June 21, 1962 the
interlocutory order prayed for, directing "the respondent, her agent, or any person acting for and in her behalf to
refrain from molesting or in any way interfering with the work of the petitioners in their respective landholdings."

  On June 24, 1962, upon the agrarian court's direction, the PC detachment stationed in Sara, Iloilo, served copies
of the order on the complainant's men, Bonifacio Margarejo and Carlos Fuentes, and restored the Aglinao brothers
to the possession of their landholdings. On the same day, Margarejo and Fuentes informed their landlord, the
complainant, about the said order.lawphi1.ñet

  For several months thereafter nothing of significance happened in the C.A.R. cases until the palay planted on the
land in question became ripe and ready for harvest.

  Then on October 2, 1962 Enrique Soriano, Sr. showed to the respondent in Iloilo City a telegram  2 which reads as
follows:

BALASAN OCT 2 62

GILDA ACOLADO

ILOILO AMERICAN SCHOOL MARIA CLARA AVENUE ILOILO CITY

TELL DADDY COMMUNICATE ARAGONA IMMEDIATELY ALBERT HARVEST TODAY....

MAMANG

  The sender of the telegram was Mrs. Isabel Soriano, wife of Enrique, the addressee Gilda Acolado, their daughter.

  After reading the telegram, the respondent asked Soriano whether his wife (Mrs. Soriano) was coming to Iloilo City;
when informed that she was arriving, he decided to wait for her. Mrs. Soriano arrived from Balasan in the afternoon
of that same day, October 2, 1962. She went to see the respondent, and informed the latter that it was she who had
sent the telegram upon request of the Aglinao brothers; that she was personally present when one Albert, a tenant
of the complainant, accompanied by many armed men, went to the land in question and harvested the palay
thereon over the protests of the Aglinao brothers; that upon inquiring why the said Albert and his armed companions
harvested the palay, she was told that they were acting upon orders of the complainant; and that instead of filing a
complaint with the chief of police as she originally planned, she decided instead to see the respondent without
delay.

  Possessed of the above information, the respondent promptly prepared and filed with the agrarian court, on
October 3, 1962, a verified "Urgent Motion to Declare Respondent in Contempt of Court" (hereinafter referred to as
motion for contempt), praying that the complainant and "her armed goons" be declared in, and punished for,
contempt of court for violating the interlocutory order of June 21, 1962. This motion for contempt elicited, on the very
same day it was filed, an instant reply from the complainant who moved to strike it out from the, records claiming
that the allegations therein libeled her, and that it was the respondent who should be punished for contempt for
deliberately misleading the agrarian court. Moreover, not content with this reply and countermotion for contempt the
complainant also lodged on October 4, 1962 a criminal complaint for libel against the respondent with the City Fiscal
of Iloilo, based on the same allegedly libelous allegations made against her by the respondent in the latter's motion
for contempt filed in the C.A.R. cases. However, after preliminarily investigating the said complaint, the assistant city
fiscal to whom it was assigned dismissed the same on the ground that the allegations of the motion for contempt
 136

were privileged communications. The complainant did not appeal from the, said dismissal to the city fiscal; neither
did she elevate the same for review to the Department of Justice.

  Meanwhile, no action was taken by the agrarian court in the C.A.R. cases on the motion for contempt filed by the
respondent against the complainant, as well as on the latter's countermotion, also for contempt, against the formal
instead, by order dated October 24, 1963, the agrarian court dismissed C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255, including the
complainant's counterclaims therein, for lack of interest to prosecute on the part of the petitioners, the Aglinao
brothers. As a matter of course, the dismissal of the main cases carried with it the dismissed of all incidents therein,
including the motion for contempt and counter-motion for contempt. Again, the complainant did not ask for
reconsideration of the order of dismissal, nor did she appeal therefrom. She filed instead the present administrative
complaint against the respondent.

  The only issue raised in the present disbarment proceeding is whether the respondent, Atty. Vicente E. Aragona,
Jr., should be disciplined or disbarred for having prepared and filed under oath the "Urgent Motion to Declare
Respondent in Contempt of Court" in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255-Iloilo, which allegedly contains false and libelous
imputations injurious to the honor of the complainant.

  For easy reference, the motion for contempt is hereunder reproduced in toto.

  COMES NOW the undersigned, in behalf of the petitioners in each of the above-entitled cases, and to this
Honorable Court respectfully states that:

1. Upon urgent and verified motion of the undersigned dated June 20, 1962, this Honorable Court issued an
interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962, the dispositive part of which is as follows:

  WHEREFORE, finding the motion meritorious, an interlocutory order is hereby issued ordering the
respondent, her agent, or any person acting for and in her behalf, to refrain from molesting or in any
way interfering with the work of the petitioners in their respective landholdings, situated at Barrio
Malapoc Balasan Iloilo, with an area of 2 hectares for each of them, in these two cases, pending the
bearing of these cases on the merits.

  The Commanding Officer of the Constabulary Detachment of the 56th PC Company stationed at
Sara, Iloilo, or his duly authorized representative, is hereby ordered to implement this order and to
report to this Court his proceedings in this particular within a week from the date of his
implementation of this order.

SO ORDERED.           
Iloilo City, June 21, 1962.
(SGD.) JUAN C. TERUEL
Commissioner

2. Pursuant to the above-quoted order, the Commanding Officer of the 56th PC Company stationed at Sara,
Iloilo, ordered the respondent and her men not to enter the landholdings in question and to refrain from
molesting or in any way interfering with the work of petitioners in their respective landholdings; the report of
said Commanding Officer is now on file with the records of the above-entitled cases;

3. On this date, the undersigned was just surprised when he received a telegram from the petitioners,
through Mrs. Isabel Soriano, copy of which is thereto attached as Annex "A" and made part hereof,
informing the undersigned that respondent, thru a certain Albert, with the aid of armed goons, harvested the
palay of the petitioners yesterday despite the vehement opposition of the petitioners not to enter their
landholdings;

4. The said acts of respondents and her men in harvesting the palay of the petitioners, knowing fully well the
existence and implementation of the interlocutory order of this Court dated June 21, 1962, is a gross and
open defiance and disobedience of said order and a challenge to the legal processes and authority of this
Court in the peaceful administration of justice;
 137

5. This rebellious and seditious conduct of the respondent and her men against the authority of this Court
constitutes wanton resistance and contumacious contempt of court;

6. Unless the respondent and her armed goons are declared in contempt of Court and duly punished, the
lawful orders, processes and authority of this Court would be a mockery and rendered useless by the
stubborn resistance and defiance of the respondent.

  IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Court that respondent and her
armed goons be declared and punished for contempt of Court until such time that she turns over the
produce of the landholdings in question which she harvested illegally and until such time that she fully
complies with the interlocutory order of this Court.

  Petitioners pray for such other relief and remedies just and equitable under the premises.

  Iloilo City, October 3, 1962.

E. I. Soriano Jr. and V. E. Aragona

Counsel for the Petitioners
Lopez Bros. Bldg., Iznart Street
Iloilo City

By:

(sgd.) VICENTE E. ARAGONA JR.

  The complainant's testimony is to the effect that (1) on October 2, 1962 she was not in Balasan but in Iloilo City
where she testified at the trial of C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 after which she left for her home which is situated
also in Iloilo City; (2) the distance between Balasan and Iloilo City is 135 kilometers, and to reach Balasan from Iloilo
City one has to travel four hours by car or six hours by bus; (3) although she knows that the person Albert,
mentioned in the motion, is Alberto Boneta, a helper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants she had placed on the
lands involved in the C.A.R. cases she never met or saw Boneta or Fuentes from the time she was informed of the
interlocutory order dated June 21, 1962 in the aforesaid cases, until October 2, 1962 when the said Alberto Boneta
and several armed men allegedly harvested the crops on the lands in question; (4) she did not order Boneta to
harvest the said crops; and (5) she never visited the aforesaid lands in 1962. Her uncontradicted testimony lends
credence to her claim that she did not order Alberto Boneta to harvest, with the aid of armed men, the crops on the
Aglinao brothers' landholdings.

  Nonetheless, this Court is loath to uphold the view that the preparation and the filing of the questioned motion for
contempt, furnish sufficient basis for disciplinary action against the respondent.

  In People vs. Aquino 3 this Court laid down the decisional authority that

[S]tatement made in the course of judicial proceedings are absolutely privileged — that is, privileged
regardless of defamatory tenor and of the presence of malice — if the same are relevant, pertinent or
material to the cause in hand or subject of the inquiry. And that, in view of this, the person who makes
them — such as a judge, lawyer, or witness — does not thereby incur the risk of being found liable
thereon in a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of damages. (emphasis supplied)

  Since there is no doubt that the allegations made by the respondent in the questioned motion for contempt are
statements made in the course of a judicial proceeding — i.e., in C.A.R. cases 1254 and 1255 — besides being
relevant, pertinent or material to the subject-matter of the said cases, they are absolutely privileged, thereby
precluding any liability on the part of the respondent.

  To be sure, the charges levelled by the respondent against the complainant in the questioned pleading lack
sufficient factual basis. But even this circumstance will not strengthen the complainant's position. "The privilege is
 138

not affected by factual or legal inaccuracies in the utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings."  4 In fact,
"Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the
charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still cover the mistake of the individual .... The privilege is
not defeated by the mere fact that the communication is made in intemperate terms .... A privileged communication
should not be subjected to microscopic examination to discover grounds of malice or falsity. Such excessive scrutiny
would defeat the protection which the law throws over privileged communications. The ultimate test is that of  bona
fides." 5

  Indeed, the actuations of the respondent were motivated by the legitimate desire to serve the interests of his
clients. For, contrary to the complainant's claim, the respondent did not rely merely on Mrs. Soriano's telegram (exh.
5) when he prepared the motion for contempt. According to his unrebutted testimony, when Mr. Soriano brought to
him the said telegram on October 2, 1962, he asked the former whether his wife, the sender of the telegram, was
coming to Iloilo City, and, when informed that she was arriving, he waited for her. True enough Mrs. Soriano saw the
respondent in the afternoon of that same day and informed him that she was personally present when one Albert, a
tenant of the complainant, accompanied by several armed men, went to the landholdings of the Aglinao brothers
and, against the objections of the latter, harvested the palay crop thereon, and that upon her inquiry, she was
informed that they were acting upon orders of the complainant.

  Considering that the foregoing information which impelled the respondent to file the questioned motion for
contempt, was obtained by him first-hand from someone who claimed to have actually witnessed the incident in
question, coupled with the complainants own admission that the Albert referred to by Mrs. Soriano was indeed a
helper of Carlos Fuentes, one of the tenants whom she had illegally placed once on the landholdings of the Aglinao
brothers, it was not unseemly for the respondent to assume that Albert did act at the behest of the complainant.
After all, the complainant had, in the past, committed the same forcible act of entering the said landholdings on June
18, 1963, only two days after she had assured the agrarian court that she would not disturb or interfere with the
Aglinao brothers' possession, pending final resolution of the petitions filed by them against her. In truth it is precisely
such forcible entry into the said lands that precipitated the issuance of the very interlocutory order dated June 21,
1962 which the respondent accused her of disobeying in his motion for contempt. Unquestionably, the aforenarrated
circumstances provided the respondent a probable cause for belief in the truthfulness of the allegations which he
couched in rather intemperate language in his motion for contempt. He had merely acted in righteous indignation
over the wrong supposedly done to his aggrieved clients — believing as he did in the truth of his charges — without
deliberate intention whatsoever to malign and villify the complainant.

  The doctrine of privileged communication is not an idle and empty principle. It has been distilled from wisdom and
experience. "The privilege is not intended so much for the protection of those engaged in the public service and in
the enactment and administration of law, as for the promotion of the public welfare, the purpose being that members
of the legislature, judges of courts, jurors, lawyers, and witnesses may speak their minds freely and exercise their
respective functions without incurring the risk of a criminal prosecution or an action for the recovery of
damages." 6 Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of pertinent comment in the furtherance of
the causes they uphold, and for felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some infelicities of language.  7

  The object of a disbarment proceeding is not so much to punish the individual attorney himself, as to safeguard the
administration of justice by protecting the court and the public from the misconduct of officers of the court, and to
remove from the profession of law persons whose disregard for their oath of office have proved them unfit to
continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the bar.  8 Thus, the power to disbar attorneys ought
always to be exercised with great caution, and only in clear cases of misconduct which seriously affects the standing
and character of the lawyer as an officer of the court and member of the bar.  9

  In this case, there is no evidence whatsoever tending to prove unfitness of the respondent to continue in the
practice of law and remain an officer of the court.

  ACCORDINGLY, the administrative complaint against the respondent is hereby dismissed.

Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez, Fernando, Capistrano, Teehankee and
Barredo, JJ., concur.
 139

Footnotes

1
Admitted to the Bar in 1960.

2
Exhibit 5.

3
L-23908, Oct. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 555, 558.

4
Sison vs. David, L-11268, Jan. 28, 1961, 1 SCRA 60.

5
U.S. vs. Bustos, 37 Phil. 731, 743.

6
People vs. Aquino, supra; Sison vs. David, supra quoting 33 Am. Jur. 123-124.

7
Dorado vs. Pilar, 104 Phil. 743, 748.

8
In re Montagne and Dominguez, 3 Phil. 577; In re McDougall, 3 Phil. 70; 5 Am. Jur. 411; see also
Re Caughan, 24 ALR 858, 189 Cal. 491, 209 P 353; Re Rotchrock, 131 ALR 226, 16 Cal. 2d 449, 160 P2d
907; Re Keenan, 996 ALR 679, 287 Mass. 577, 192 NE 65; Re Kerl, 8 ALR 1259, 32 Idaho 737, 188 P 40.

9
Ex Parte Wall, 107 U.S. 265, 2 S Ct 569; 27 L Ed 552.

EN BANC

A.C. No. 6492             November 18, 2004

 140

MELANIO L. ZORETA, complainant,
vs.
ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G. SIMPLICIANO, respondent.

DECISION

CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

This is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano for allegedly notarizing several
documents during the year 2002 after his commission as notary public had expired.

Complainant Melanio L. Zoreta alleged that on 02 August 2001, he filed before Branch 4 of the Regional Trial Court
of Antipolo City, a complaint for Breach of Contract and Damages against Security Pacific Assurance Corporation
(SPAC) dated 22 June 2001 due to the latter's failure to honor SPAC's Commercial Vehicle Policy No. 94286, where
respondent Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano was the latter's counsel. In said cases, respondent who was not a
duly commissioned Notary Public in 2002 per Certifications 1 issued by the Clerk of Court of Quezon City Mercedes
S. Gatmaytan, performed acts of notarization, as evidenced by the following documents, viz:

1. Verification2 executed by Aurora C. Galvez, President of defendant SPAC, subscribed and sworn to

before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on February 18, 2002 as alleged notary public, in Quezon City
and attached to defendants' Very Urgent Motion (1) To Lift the Order of Default; and (2) To defer Plaintiff's
Presentation of Evidence Ex-Parte dated February 18, 2002;

2. Affidavits of Merit3 signed by Aurora Galvez attached to the pleading mentioned in par. 1 hereof, likewise
notarized by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as alleged "Notary Public" in Quezon City, on February 18,
2002;

3. The Affidavit of Service4 signed by a certain Renee L. Ramos, a Legal Assistant in Simpliciano and
Capela Law Office, and subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on February
19, 2002 as alleged "Notary Public" in Quezon City. Said Affidavit of Service was attached to the pleading
mentioned in Par. 1 hereof;

4. The Affidavit of Service5 of one Nestor Abayon, another Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law
Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 01 April 2002 at Quezon
City, as "Notary Public." This Affidavit of Service was attached to defendants' Motion (1) For
Reconsideration of the Order dated 05 March 2002; and (2) To allow defendants to Present Defensive
Evidence dated 27 March 2002.

5. The Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping 6 signed this time by a certain Celso N. Sarto,
as affiant, "notarized" on 16 August 2002 by Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano. This Verification and
Certification Against Forum Shopping was attached to defendant's Motion For Extension of Time To File
Petition Under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals;

6. The Affidavit of Service7 signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, another Legal Assistant in Simpliciano
and Capela Law Office subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano as "Notary
Public" on 16 August 2002. This Affidavit of Service signed by Aganan was also attached to that Motion For
Extension of Time To File Petition under Rule 65 before the Court of Appeals;

7. Verification and Certification Against Forum Shopping 8 executed by one Celso N. Sarto, alleged Executive
Vice President and Claims Manager of defendant SPAC and "notarized" by Atty. Heherson Alnor G.
Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, attached to the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, etc., filed before the
Court of Appeals; and
 141

8. Affidavit of Service9 signed by a certain Joseph B. Aganan, Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela
Law Office, subscribed and sworn to before Atty. Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano on 19 August 2002, as
alleged "Notary Public" for Quezon City with notarized commission to expire by December 31, 2002.

On 23 April 2003, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) of Pasig required respondent Atty. Simpliciano to
submit his answer within fifteen (15) days from receipt of the Order. 10

On 26 May 2003, counsel of respondent filed an ex-parte motion 11 for extension of time to file answer.

On 30 June 2003, petitioner filed a motion 12 to resolve the complaint after the extension requested by respondent
ended on 30 May 2003, and almost a month had lapsed from 30 May 2003, with no comment or pleading filed by
respondent.

On 17 July 2003, Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro issued an order, 13 giving respondent a last chance to file his
answer, otherwise the case shall be deemed submitted for resolution. Respondent failed to do so.

Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro submitted her report and recommendation 14 dated 12 February 2004, pertinent
portions of which read:

A careful examination and evaluation of the evidence submitted by the petitioner showed that respondent
notarized up to Document No. 590, Page 118, Book No. II, Series of 2002 and his commission expires
December 31, 2002 which referred to the Affidavit of Service signed and executed by Joseph B. Aganan
Legal Assistant of Simpliciano and Capela Law Office subscribed and sworn to before Notary Public
Heherson Alnor G. Simpliciano whose commission expires December 31, 2002.

All the other documents aforementioned were entered in Book II of respondent's alleged notarial book which
reflected that his commission expires on December 31, 2002 as notary public.

However, the Clerk of Court of Quezon City in her certification dated October 4, 2002 stated that as per
records on file with their office respondent was not duly commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City
for the year 2002.

Another certification issued by the Clerk of Court of RTC Quezon City dated April 15, 2003 showed that as
per records on file with their office respondent was commissioned notary public for and in Quezon City from
January 14, 2000 to December 31, 2001 and for the year 2002 and 2003 he did not apply for notarial
commission for Quezon City.

It is evident from the foregoing that when respondent notarized the aforementioned documents, he was not
commissioned as notary public, which was in violation of the Notarial Law; for having notarized the 590
documents after the expiration of his commission as notary public without having renewed said commission
amounting to gross misconduct as a member of the legal profession.

Wherefore, in view of the foregoing the Undersigned respectfully recommends the revocation of
respondent's commission as notary public permanently if he is commissioned as such at present and his
suspension from the practice of law for a period of three (3) months from receipt hereof furnishing the IBP
Chapter where he is a registered member a copy hereof for implementation should this recommendation be
approved by the Honorable members of the Board of Governors. 15

Per Resolution No. XVI-2004-236 dated 16 April 2004, the Board of Governors modified the report and
recommendation of Commissioner Navarro of suspension of three (3) months to a suspension of six (6) months. 16

We concur in the finding of the Investigating Commissioner that respondent Atty. Simpliciano did not have a
commission as notary public in 2002 when he notarized the assailed documents as evidenced by the two (2)
certifications issued by the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City dated 04 October
2002.17 Records also show, and as confirmed by IBP Commissioner Navarro, that as of 02 August 2002, respondent
 142

had already notarized a total of 590 documents. 18 The evidence presented by complainant conclusively establishes
the misconduct imputed to respondent.

The eight (8) notarized documents for the year 2002 submitted by complainant, consisting of affidavits of merit,
certifications and verifications against non-forum shopping, and affidavits of service, were used and presented in the
Regional Trial Court of Antipolo City, Branch 74, in Civil Case No. 01-6240, and in respondent's petition
for certiorari filed in the Court of Appeals.

Against the evidence presented by complainant, respondent did not even attempt to present any evidence. His
counsel filed an ex-parte motion for extension to file answer, which was granted, but no answer was forthcoming.
Still, Hearing Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro gave respondent a last chance to file his answer; which was again
unheeded. Thus, respondent was unable to rebut complainant's evidence that he was not so commissioned for the
year in question. His lack of interest and indifference in presenting his defense to the charge and the evidence
against him can only mean he has no strong and valid defense to offer. Conclusively, respondent Atty. Simpliciano
is not a duly commissioned Notary Public for and in Quezon City for the year 2002.

At the threshold, it is worth stressing that the practice of law is not a right but a privilege bestowed by the State on
those who show that they possess, and continue to possess, the qualifications required by law for the conferment of
such privilege.19 Membership in the bar is a privilege burdened with conditions. A lawyer has the privilege and right
to practice law only during good behavior and can only be deprived of it for misconduct ascertained and declared by
judgment of the court after opportunity to be heard has been afforded him. Without invading any constitutional
privilege or right, an attorney's right to practice law may be resolved by a proceeding to suspend him, based on
conduct rendering him unfit to hold a license or to exercise the duties and responsibilities of an attorney. It must be
understood that the purpose of suspending or disbarring him as an attorney is to remove from the profession a
person whose misconduct has proved him unfit to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities belonging to an
office of attorney, and thus to protect the public and those charged with the administration of justice, rather than to
punish an attorney.20 Elaborating on this, we said in Maligsa v. Cabanting21 that "[t]he bar should maintain a high
standard of legal proficiency as well as of honesty and fair dealing. A lawyer brings honor to the legal profession by
faithfully performing his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. To this end a member of the
legal fraternity should refrain from doing any act which might lessen in any degree the confidence and trust reposed
by the public in the fidelity, honesty and integrity of the legal profession." 22 Towards this end, an attorney may be
disbarred, or suspended for any violation of his oath or of his duties as an attorney and counselor, which include
statutory grounds enumerated in Section 27, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, all of these being broad enough to
cover practically any misconduct of a lawyer in his professional or private capacity. 23

Apropos to the case at bar, it has been emphatically stressed that notarization is not an empty, meaningless,
routinary act. It is invested with substantive public interest, such that only those who are qualified or authorized may
act as notaries public. The protection of that interest necessarily requires that those not qualified or authorized to act
must be prevented from imposing upon the public, the courts, and the administrative offices in general. It must be
underscored that the notarization by a notary public converts a private document into a public document making that
document admissible in evidence without further proof of authenticity. A notarial document is by law entitled to full
faith and credit upon its face. For this reason, notaries public must observe with utmost care the basic requirements
in the performance of their duties.24

The requirements for the issuance of a commission as notary public must not be treated as a mere casual formality.
The Court has characterized a lawyer's act of notarizing documents without the requisite commission therefore as
"reprehensible, constituting as it does not only malpractice but also x x x the crime of falsification of public
documents."25 For such reprehensible conduct, the Court has sanctioned erring lawyers by suspension from the
practice of law, revocation of the notarial commission and disqualification from acting as such, and even
disbarment.26

In the case of Nunga v. Viray,27 the Court had occasion to state that where the notarization of a document is done by
a member of the Philippine Bar at a time when he has no authorization or commission to do so, the offender may be
subjected to disciplinary action. For one, performing a notarial without such commission is a violation of the lawyer's
oath to obey the laws, more specifically, the Notarial Law. Then, too, by making it appear that he is duly
commissioned when he is not, he is, for all legal intents and purposes, indulging in deliberate falsehood, which the
 143

lawyer's oath similarly proscribes. These violations fall squarely within the prohibition of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides: "A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct."

By such misconduct as a notary public, the lawyer likewise violates Canon 7 of the same Code, which directs every
lawyer to uphold at all times the integrity and dignity of the legal profession.

On different occasions, this Court had disbarred or suspended lawyers for notarizing documents with an expired
commission:

1. In Flores v. Lozada,28 the court disbarred a lawyer who notarized six documents such as the extrajudicial
partition of an estate, deed of sale with right of repurchase, and four (4) deeds of absolute sale - all involving
unregistered lands, after his commission as Notary Public expired;

2. In Joson v. Baltazar,29 the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) months since only one (1) instance of
unauthorized notarization of a deed of sale was involved.

3. In Nunga v. Viray,30 the court suspended the lawyer for three (3) years when he notarized an absolute
deed of sale of the buyer minor, who was his son and, at the same time, he was a stockholder and legal
counsel of the vendor bank, and when he entered in his notarial registry an annotation of the cancellation of
the loan in favor of a certain bank, at a time when he was not commissioned as a Notary Public. What
aggravated respondent's unlawful notarization was the fact that the transaction involved was in favor of his
son, who was then only eighteen years old and, therefore, a minor.

4. In Buensuceso v. Barrera,31 the lawyer was suspended for one (1) year when he notarized five (5)
documents such as a complaint for ejectment, affidavit, supplemental affidavit, a deed of sale and a contract
to sell, after his commission as Notary Public expired.

Needless to state, respondent cannot escape from disciplinary action in his capacity as a notary public and as a
member of the Philippine Bar. However, the penalty recommended by the Board of Governors of the IBP must be
increased. Respondent must be barred from being commissioned as a notary public permanently and suspended
from the practice of law for two (2) years.

WHEREFORE, this Court hereby adopts the findings of Investigating Commissioner Lydia A. Navarro, which the
Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines adopted and approved, but hereby MODIFIES the
penalty recommended by the Board of Governors. As modified, respondent ATTY. HEHERSON ALNOR G.
SIMPLICIANO is hereby BARRED PERMANENTLY from being commissioned as Notary Public. He is furthermore
SUSPENDED from the practice of law for two (2) years, effective upon receipt of a copy of this Decision.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished all the courts of the land through the Court Administrator as well as the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Office of the Bar Confidant, and recorded in the personal files of respondent
himself.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Puno, Panganiban, Quisumbing, Ynares-Santiago, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez,
Carpio-Morales, Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, and Garcia, JJ., concur.
Corona, J., on leave.

Footnotes

1 
Rollo, p. 78.
2 
Rollo, pp. 15-24.
3 
Rollo, pp. 25-27.
4 
Rollo, p. 28.
5 
Rollo, p. 37.
 144
6 
Rollo, pp. 43-44.
7 
Rollo, p. 45.
8 
Rollo, p. 75.
9 
Rollo, p. 77.
10 
Rollo, p. 82.
11 
Rollo, pp. 83-86
12 
Rollo, pp. 88-89.
13 
Rollo, p. 92.
14 
Rollo, pp. 96-102.
15 
Rollo, pp. 100-102.
16 
Rollo, p. 95.
17 
Rollo, pp. 78-80.
18 
Rollo, p. 101.
19 
Bongalonta v. Castillo, CBD Case No. 176, 20 January 1995, 240 SCRA 310.
20 
Marcelo v. Javier, Sr., A.C. No. 3248, 18 September 1992, 214 SCRA 1.
21 
A.C. No. 4539, 14 May 1997, 272 SCRA 408.
22 
Id. at 413.
23 
Ibid.
24 
Ibid.; Arrieta v. Llosa, A.C. No. 4369, 28 November 1997, 282 SCRA 248, cited in Nunga v. Viray, A.C. No. 4758, 30 April
1999, 306 SCRA 487.
25 
Buensuceso v. Barrera, A.C. No. 3727, 11 December 1992, 216 SCRA 309, 312.
26 
Heinz R. Heck v. Judge Anthony E. Santos, Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan de Oro City, A.M. No. RTJ-01-1657,
23 February 2004.
27 
Supra.
28 
A.C. No. 546, 18 December 1967, 21 SCRA 1267.
29 
A.C. No. 575, 14 February 1991, 194 SCRA 114.
30 
Supra.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 145

EN BANC

A.C. No. 8390               July 2, 2010

[Formerly CBD 06-1641]

A-1 FINANCIAL SERVICES, INC., Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. LAARNI N. VALERIO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint 1 dated January 18, 2006 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Laarni N. Valerio
filed by A-1 Financial Services, Inc., represented by Diego S. Reunilla, its account officer, with the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD), docketed as CBD Case No. 06-1642, now A.C. No. 8390,
for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 (B.P. 22) and non-payment of debt.

On November 13, 2001, A-1 Financial Services, Inc., a financing corporation, granted the loan application of Atty.
Valerio amounting to ₱50,000.00. To secure the payment of the loan obligation, Atty. Valerio issued a postdated
check, to wit: Check No. 0000012725; dated April 1, 2002, in the amount: ₱50,000.00. 2 However, upon presentation
at the bank for payment on its maturity date, the check was dishonored due to insufficient funds. As of the filing of
the instant case, despite repeated demands to pay her obligation, Atty. Valerio failed to pay the whole amount of her
obligation.

Thus, on November 10, 2003, complainant filed a B.P. 22 case against Atty. Valerio, docketed as Criminal Case No.
124779. Atty. Valerio’s arraignment was scheduled for August 31, 2004; however, she failed to appear despite due
notice.3 Subsequently, a Warrant of Arrest 4 was issued but Atty. Valerio posted no bail. On November 22, 2004,
complainant sent a letter 5 to Atty. Valerio calling her attention to the issuance of the Warrant of Arrest against her
and requested her to submit to the jurisdiction of the court by posting bail. The said letter was received by Atty.
Valerio, as evidenced by the postal registry return cards. 6 Despite court orders and notices, Atty. Valerio refused to
abide.

On January 18, 2006, complainant filed an administrative complaint against Atty. Valerio before the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines (IBP). On January 26, 2006, the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) required Atty.
Valerio to file an answer, but she did not file any responsive pleading at all. However, in a letter 7 dated March 16,
2006, respondent’s mother, Gorgonia N. Valerio (Mrs. Valerio), explained that her daughter had been diagnosed
with schizophrenia; thus, could not properly respond to the complaint against her. Futhermore, Mrs. Valerio
undertook to personally settle her daughter’s obligation.

On September 13, 2007, the IBP-CBD directed Atty. Valerio to appear before the mandatory conference. Atty.
Valerio, again, failed to attend the conference. Subsequently, in an Order dated November 15, 2007, the IBP
ordered the parties to submit their position papers. No position paper was submitted by Atty. Valerio.

Thus, in its Report and Recommendation dated September 16, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Valerio
be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two (2) years, having found her guilty of gross misconduct.

The IBP-CBD gave no credence to the medical certificate submitted by Atty. Valerio’s mother, in view of the latter’s
failure to appear before the IBP-CBD hearings to affirm the truthfulness thereof or present the physician who issued
the same. The IBP-CBD, further, pointed out that Atty. Valerio’s failure to obey court processes, more particularly
her failure to appear at her arraignment despite due notice and to surrender to the Court despite the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, showed her lack of respect for authority and, thus, rendered her morally unfit to be a member of
the bar.8
 146

On December 11, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved with modification the report and
recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Atty. Valerio was instead ordered suspended from the practice of law for a period
of one (1) year.

Nevertheless, to provide Atty. Valerio further opportunity to explain her side, the Court, in a Resolution dated
December 15, 2010, directed Atty. Valerio and/or her mother, to submit a duly notarized medical certificate issued
by a duly licensed physician and/or certified copies of medical records to support the claim of  schizophrenia on the
part of Atty. Valerio within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from receipt hereof.

However, despite the lapse of considerable time after the receipt of notice 9 to comply with the said Resolution, no
medical certificate or medical records were submitted to this Court by either respondent and/or her mother. Thus,
this resolution.

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.

In Barrientos v. Libiran-Meteoro,10 we held that:

x x x [the] deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for
which a lawyer may be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. Lawyers are instruments for the
administration of justice and vanguards of our legal system. They are expected to maintain not only legal proficiency
but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that the people’s faith and confidence in
the judicial system is ensured. They must at all times faithfully perform their duties to society, to the bar, the courts
and to their clients, which include prompt payment of financial obligations. They must conduct themselves in a
manner that reflects the values and norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Canon 1 and Rule 1.01 explicitly states that:

Canon 1— A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and for
legal processes.

Rule 1.01—A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

In the instant case, there is no denial of the existence of the loan obligation despite respondent’s failure to
cooperate before any proceedings in relation to the complaint. Prior to the filing of the complaint against her, Atty.
Valerio’s act of making partial payments of the loan and interest suffices as proof that indeed there is an obligation
to pay on her part. Respondent’s mother, Mrs. Valerio, likewise, acknowledged her daughter’s obligation.

The Court, likewise, finds unmeritorious Mrs. Valerio’s justification that her daughter, Atty. Valerio, is suffering from a
health condition, i.e. schizophrenia, which has prevented her from properly answering the complaint against her.
Indeed, we cannot take the "medical certificate" on its face, considering Mrs. Valerio’s failure to prove the contents
of the certificate or present the physician who issued it.

Atty. Valerio’s conduct in the course of the IBP and court proceedings is also a matter of serious concern. She failed
to answer the complaint against her. Despite due notice, she failed to attend the disciplinary hearings set by the IBP.
She also ignored the proceedings before the court as she likewise failed to both answer the complaint against her
and appear during her arraignment, despite orders and notices from the court. Clearly, this conduct runs counter to
the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility and violates the lawyer’s oath which imposes upon every
member of the Bar the duty to delay no man for money or malice. Atty. Valerio has failed to live up to the values and
norms of the legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.1avvphil

In Ngayan v. Tugade,11 we ruled that "[a lawyer’s] failure to answer the complaint against him and his failure to
appear at the investigation are evidence of his flouting resistance to lawful orders of the court and illustrate his
despiciency for his oath of office in violation of Section 3, Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

 147

In Lao v. Medel,12 we held that the deliberate failure to pay just debts and the issuance of worthless checks
constitute gross misconduct for which a lawyer may be sanctioned with one-year suspension from the practice of
law. The same sanction was imposed on the respondent-lawyer in Rangwani v. Dino,13 having found guilty of gross
misconduct for issuing bad checks in payment of a piece of property, the title to which was only entrusted to him by
the complainant.

However, in this case, we deem it reasonable to affirm the sanction imposed by the IBP-CBD, i.e., Atty. Valerio was
ordered suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years, 14 because, aside from issuing worthless checks and
failing to pay her debts, she has also shown wanton disregard of the IBP’s and Court Orders in the course of the
proceedings.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-647 dated December 11, 2008 of the IBP, which found respondent Atty.
Laarni N. Valerio guilty of gross misconduct and violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility, is AFFIRMED
with MODIFICATION. She is hereby SUSPENDED for two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the
receipt of this Decision. She is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of
Atty. Valerio as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

DIOSDADO M. PERALTA
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

RENATO C. CORONA
Chief Justice

ANTONIO T. CARPIO CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES

Associate Justice Associate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR. ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

On Leave
TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO
ARTURO D. BRION*
Associate Justice
Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN MARIANO C. DEL CASTILLO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ROBERTO A. ABAD MARTIN S. VILLARAMA, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

JOSE PORTUGAL PEREZ JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

Footnotes
 148

* On leave.

1
 Rollo, pp. 1-2.

2
 Id. at 5.

3
 Id. at 6.

4
 Id. at 7.

5
 Id. at 8.

6
 Id. at 9.

7
 Id. at 11-12.

8
 Id.

9
 The Resolution dated December 15, 2009 was received on January 6, 2010.

10
 480 Phil. 661, 671 (2004).

11
 A.C. No. 2490, February 7, 1991, 193 SCRA 779, 784.

12
 453 Phil. 115, 121, citing Co v. Bernardino, 285 SCRA 102 (1998).

13
 486 Phil. 8 (2004).

14
 Wong v. Atty. Moya, A.C. No. 6972, October 17, 2008, 569 SCRA 256.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
 149

EN BANC

B.M. No. 1222               April 24, 2009

RE: 2003 BAR EXAMINATIONS

x - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -x

ATTY. DANILO DE GUZMAN, Petitioner,

RESOLUTION

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

This treats the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion dated November 10, 2008 filed by petitioner Danilo
de Guzman. He prays that this Honorable Court "in the exercise of equity and compassion, grant petitioner’s plea for
judicial clemency, and thereupon, order his reinstatement as a member in good standing of the Philippine Bar." 1

To recall, on February 4, 2004, the Court promulgated a Resolution, in B.M. No. 1222, the dispositive portion of
which reads in part:

WHEREFORE, the Court, acting on the recommendations of the Investigating Committee, hereby resolves to —

(1) DISBAR Atty. DANILO DE GUZMAN from the practice of law effective upon his receipt of this RESOLUTION;

xxxx

The subject of the Resolution is the leakage of questions in Mercantile Law during the 2003 Bar Examinations.
Petitioner at that time was employed as an assistant lawyer in the law firm of Balgos & Perez, one of whose
partners, Marcial Balgos, was the examiner for Mercantile Law during the said bar examinations. The Court had
adopted the findings of the Investigating Committee, which identified petitioner as the person who had downloaded
the test questions from the computer of Balgos and faxed them to other persons.

The Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) has favorably recommended the reinstatement of petitioner in the Philippine
Bar. In a Report dated January 6, 2009, the OBC rendered its assessment of the petition, the relevant portions of
which we quote hereunder:

Petitioner narrated that he had labored to become a lawyer to fulfill his father’s childhood dream to become one.
This task was not particularly easy for him and his family but he willed to endure the same in order to pay tribute to
his parents.

Petitioner added that even at a very young age, he already imposed upon himself the duty of rendering service to
his fellowmen. At 19 years, he started his exposure to public service when he was elected Chairman of the
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) of Barangay Tuktukan, Taguig City. During this time, he initiated several projects
benefiting the youth in their barangay.

Thereafter, petitioner focused on his studies, taking up Bachelor of Arts in Political Science and eventually pursuing
Bachelor of Laws. In his second year in law school, he was elected as the President of the Student Council of the
Institute of Law of the Far Eastern University (FEU). Here, he spearheaded various activities including the conduct
of seminars for law students as well as the holding of bar operations for bar examinees.

Despite his many extra-curricular activities as a youth and student leader, petitioner still managed to excel in his
studies. Thus, he was conferred an Academic Excellence Award upon his graduation in Bachelor of Laws.
 150

Upon admission to the bar in April 1999, petitioner immediately entered government service as a Legal Officer
assigned at the Sangguniang Bayan of Taguig. Simultaneously, he also rendered free legal services to less
fortunate residents of Taguig City who were then in need of legal assistance.

In March 2000, petitioner was hired as one of the Associate Lawyers at the Balgos and Perez Law Offices. It was
during his stay with this firm when his craft as a lawyer was polished and developed. Despite having entered private
practice, he continued to render free legal services to his fellow Taguigeños.

Then in February 2004, by a sudden twist of fate, petitioner’s flourishing career was cut short as he was stripped of
his license to practice law for his alleged involvement in the leakage in the 2003 Bar Examinations.

Devastated, petitioner then practically locked himself inside his house to avoid the rather unavoidable
consequences of his disbarment.

On March 2004, however, petitioner was given a new lease in life when he was taken as a consultant by the City
Government of Taguig. Later, he was designated as a member of the Secretariat of the People’s Law Enforcement
Board (PLEB). For the next five (5) years, petitioner concentrated mainly on rendering public service.

Petitioner humbly acknowledged the damaging impact of his act which unfortunately, compromised the integrity of
the bar examinations. As could be borne from the records of the investigation, he cooperated fully in the
investigation conducted and took personal responsibility for his actions. Also, he has offered his sincerest apologies
to Atty. Balgos, to the Court as well as to all the 2003 bar examinees for the unforeseen and unintended effects of
his actions.

Petitioner averred that he has since learned from his mistakes and has taken the said humbling experience to make
him a better person.

Meanwhile, as part of his Petition, petitioner submitted the following testimonials and endorsements of various
individuals and entities all attesting to his good moral character:

1) Resolution No. 101, Series of 2007, "Resolution Expressing Full Support to Danilo G. De Guzman in his
Application for Judicial Clemency, Endorsing his Competence and Fitness to be Reinstated as a Member of
the Philippine Bar and for Other Purposes" dated 4 June 2007 of the Sangguniang Panlungsod, City of
Taguig;

2) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Southeast People’s Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA) kay
Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-
susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1
June 2007 of the Southeast People’s Village Homeowners Association, Inc. (SEPHVOA), Ibayo-Tipas, City
of Taguig;

3) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC) kay G. Danilo G.
De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 1 June 2007
of the Samahang Residente ng Mauling Creek, Inc. (SAREMAC), Lower Bicutan, City of Taguig;

4) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood Association, Inc.
(SAMANA) kay G. Danilo G. De Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang
Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang
Abogado" dated 1 June 2007 of the Samahan ng mga Maralita (PULONG KENDI) Neighborhood
Association, Inc. (SAMANA), Sta. Ana, City of Taguig;
 151

5) "An Open Letter Attesting Personally to the Competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman as to
Warrant the Grant of Judicial Clemency and his Reinstatement as Member of the Philippine Bar" dated 8
June 2007 of Miguelito Nazareno V. Llantino, Laogan, Trespeses and Llantino Law Offices;

6) "Testimonial to the Moral and Spiritual Competence of Danilo G. De Guzman to be Truly Deserving of
Judicial Clemency and Compassion" dated 5 July 2007 of Rev. Fr. Paul G. Balagtas, Parish Priest,
Archdiocesan Shrine of St. Anne;

7) "Testimonial Letter" dated 18 February 2008 of Atty. Loreto C. Ata, President, Far Eastern University Law
Alumni Association (FEULAA), Far Eastern University (FEU);

8) "Isang Bukas na Liham na Naglalayong Iparating sa Kataas-Taasang Hukuman ang Buong Suporta ng
Pamunuan at mga Kasapi ng Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA) kay G. Danilo G. De
Guzman sa Kanyang Petisyong Magawaran ng Kapatawaran at ang Boluntaryong Pag-susulong sa
Kanyang Kakayahan Upang Maibalik sa Kanya ang mga Pribilehiyo ng Isang Abogado" dated 8 July 2008 of
the Samahang Bisig Kamay sa Kaunlaran, Inc. (SABISKA);

9) Board Resolution No. 02, Series of 2008, "A Resolution Recognizing the Contributions of Danilo G. De
Guzman to the People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB) – Taguig City, Attesting to his Utmost Dedication
and Commitment to the Call of Civic and Social Duty and for Other Purposes" dated 11 July 2008 of the
People’s Law Enforcement Board (PLEB);

10) "A Personal Appeal for the Grant of Judicial Forgiveness and Compassion in Favor of Danilo G. De
Guzman" dated 14 July 2008 of Atty. Edwin R. Sandoval, Professor, College of Law, San Sebastian College
– Recoletos;

11) "An Open Letter Personally Attesting to the Moral competence and Fitness of Danilo G. De Guzman"
dated 5 September 2008 of Mr. Nixon F. Faderog, Deputy Grand [Kn]ight, Knights of Columbus and
President, General Parent-Teacher Association, Taguig National High School, Lower Bicutan, Taguig City;

12) "Testimonial Letter" dated 5 September 2008 of Atty. Primitivo C. Cruz, President, Taguig Lawyers
League, Inc., Tuktukan, Taguig City;

13) "Testimonial Letter" dated 21 October 2008 of Judge Hilario L. Laqui, Presiding Judge, Regional Trail
Court (RTC), Branch 218, Quezon City; and

14) "Testimonial Letter" dated 28 October 2008 of Justice Oscar M. Herrera, former Justice, Court of
Appeals and former Dean, Institute of Law, Far Eastern University (FEU).

Citing the case of In Re: Carlos S. Basa, petitioner pleaded that he be afforded the same kindness and compassion
in order that, like Atty. Basa, his promising future may not be perpetually foreclosed. In the said case, the Court had
the occasion to say:

Carlos S. Basa is a young man about 29 years of age, admitted to the bars of California and the Philippine Islands.
Recently, he was charged in the Court of First Instance of the City of Manila with the crime of abduction with
consent, was found guilty in a decision rendered by the Honorable M.V. De Rosario, Judge of First Instance, and
was sentenced to be imprisoned for a period of two years, eleven months and eleven days of prision correccional.
On appeal, this decision was affirmed in a judgment handed down by the second division of the Supreme Court.

xxxx

When come next, as we must, to determine the exact action which should be taken by the court, we do so regretfully
and reluctantly. On the one hand, the violation of the criminal law by the respondent attorney cannot be lightly
passed over. On the other hand, we are willing to strain the limits of our compassion to the uttermost in order that so
promising a career may not be utterly ruined.
 152

Petitioner promised to commit himself to be more circumspect in his actions and solemnly pledged to exert all efforts
to atone for his misdeeds.

There may be a reasonable ground to consider the herein Petition.

In the case of Re: Petition of Al Argosino to Take the Lawyer’s Oath (Bar Matter 712), which may be applied in the
instant case, the Court said:

After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's
oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and practice the legal profession with the following admonition:

In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer’s oath, the Court recognizes that Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad
moral fiber. On the contrary, the various certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for
civic duties and public service.

The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts, to atone for the death of Raul Camaligan. We are
prepared to give him the benefit of the doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.

xxxx

Meanwhile, in the case of Rodolfo M. Bernardo vs. Atty. Ismael F. Mejia (Administrative Case No. 2984), the Court
[in] deciding whether or not to reinstate Atty. Mejia to the practice of law stated:

The Court will take into consideration the applicant’s character and standing prior to the disbarment, the nature and
character of the charge/s for which he was disbarred, his conduct subsequent to the disbarment and the time that
has elapsed in between the disbarment and the application for reinstatement.

Petitioner was barely thirty (30) years old and had only been in the practice of law for five (5) years when he was
disbarred from the practice of law. It is of no doubt that petitioner had a promising future ahead of him where it not
for the decision of the Court stripping off his license.

Petitioner is also of good moral repute, not only before but likewise, after his disbarment, as attested to
overwhelmingly by his constituents, colleagues as well as people of known probity in the community and society.

Way before the petitioner was even admitted to the bar, he had already manifested his intense desire to render
public service as evidenced by his active involvement and participation in several social and civic projects and
activities. Likewise, even during and after his disbarment, which could be perceived by some as a debilitating
circumstance, petitioner still managed to continue extending his assistance to others in whatever means possible.
This only proves petitioner’s strength of character and positive moral fiber.

However, still, it is of no question that petitioner’s act in copying the examination questions from Atty. Balgos’
computer without the latter’s knowledge and consent, and which questions later turned out to be the bar
examinations questions in Mercantile Law in the 2003 Bar Examinations, is not at all commendable. While we do
believe that petitioner sincerely did not intend to cause the damage that his action ensued, still, he must be
sanctioned for unduly compromising the integrity of the bar examinations as well as of this Court.

We are convinced, however, that petitioner has since reformed and has sincerely reflected on his transgressions.
Thus, in view of the circumstances and likewise for humanitarian considerations, the penalty of disbarment may now
be commuted to suspension. Considering the fact, however, that petitioner had already been disbarred for more
than five (5) years, the same may be considered as proper service of said commuted penalty and thus, may now be
allowed to resume practice of law.

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, it is respectfully recommended that the instant Petition for Judicial
Clemency and Compassion dated 10 November 2008 of petitioner DANILO G. DE GUZMAN be GRANTED.
 153

Petitioner’s disbarment is now commuted to suspension, which suspension is considered as served in view of the
petitioner’s five (5) year disbarment. Hence, petitioner may now be allowed to resume practice of law.

The recommendation of the Office of the Bar Confidant is well-taken in part.1avvphi1.zw+ We deem petitioner
worthy of clemency to the extent of commuting his penalty to seven (7) years suspension from the practice of law,
inclusive of the five (5) years he has already served his disbarment.

Penalties, such as disbarment, are imposed not to punish but to correct offenders. 2 While the Court is ever mindful
of its duty to discipline its erring officers, it also knows how to show compassion when the penalty imposed has
already served its purpose.3

In cases where we have deigned to lift or commute the supreme penalty of disbarment imposed on the lawyer, we
have taken into account the remorse of the disbarred lawyer 4 and the conduct of his public life during his years
outside of the bar.5 For example, in Valencia v. Antiniw, we held:

However, the record shows that the long period of respondent's disbarment gave him the chance to purge himself of
his misconduct, to show his remorse and repentance, and to demonstrate his willingness and capacity to live up
once again to the exacting standards of conduct demanded of every member of the bar and officer of the court.
During respondent's disbarment for more than fifteen (15) years to date for his professional infraction, he has been
persistent in reiterating his apologies and pleas for reinstatement to the practice of law and unrelenting in his efforts
to show that he has regained his worthiness to practice law, by his civic and humanitarian activities and
unblemished record as an elected public servant, as attested to by numerous civic and professional organizations,
government institutions, public officials and members of the judiciary. 6

And in Bernardo v. Atty. Mejia, 7 we noted:

Although the Court does not lightly take the bases for Mejia’s disbarment, it also cannot close its eyes to the fact
that Mejia is already of advanced years. While the age of the petitioner and the length of time during which he has
endured the ignominy of disbarment are not the sole measure in allowing a petition for reinstatement, the Court
takes cognizance of the rehabilitation of Mejia. Since his disbarment in 1992, no other transgression has been
attributed to him, and he has shown remorse. Obviously, he has learned his lesson from this experience, and his
punishment has lasted long enough. x x x

Petitioner has sufficiently demonstrated the remorse expected of him considering the gravity of his transgressions.
Even more to his favor, petitioner has redirected focus since his disbarment towards public service, particularly with
the People’s Law Enforcement Board. The attestations submitted by his peers in the community and other
esteemed members of the legal profession, such as retired Court of Appeals Associate Justice Oscar Herrera,
Judge Hilario Laqui, Professor Edwin Sandoval and Atty. Lorenzo Ata, and the ecclesiastical community such as
Rev. Fr. Paul Balagtas testify to his positive impact on society at large since the unfortunate events of 2003.

Petitioner’s subsequent track record in public service affords the Court some hope that if he were to reacquire
membership in the Philippine bar, his achievements as a lawyer would redound to the general good and more than
mitigate the stain on his record. Compassion to the petitioner is warranted. Nonetheless, we wish to impart to him
the following stern warning:

"Of all classes and professions, the lawyer is most sacredly bound to uphold the laws. He is their sworn servant; and
for him, of all men in the world, to repudiate and override the laws, to trample them underfoot and to ignore the very
bands of society, argues recreancy to his position and office and sets a pernicious example to the insubordinate and
dangerous elements of the body politic."8

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion is hereby GRANTED IN
PART. The disbarment of DANILO G. DE GUZMAN from the practice of law is hereby  COMMUTED to SEVEN (7)
YEARS SUSPENSION FROM THE PRACTICE OF LAW, reckoned from February 4, 2004.

SO ORDERED.
 154

CONSUELO YNARES-SANTIAGO
Associate Justice

WE CONCUR:

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING ANTONIO T. CARPIO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MA. ALICIA AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ RENATO C. CORONA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

MINITA V. CHICO-NAZARIO PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ANTONIO EDUARDO B. NACHURA TERESITA J. LEONARDO-DE CASTRO

Associate Justice Associate Justice

ARTURO D. BRION DIOSDADO M. PERALTA

Associate Justice Associate Justice

LUCAS P. BERSAMIN
Associate Justice

Footnotes
* On official leave.
1
 Petition for Judicial Clemency and Compassion (hereinafter, Petition), p. 26.
2
 Bernardo v. Mejia, A.C. No. 2984, August 31, 2007, 531 SCRA 639.
3
 Id.
4
 See Adez Realty, Incorporated v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 100643, December 12, 1995, 251 SCRA 201.
5
 A.C. No. 1302, 1391, 1543, June 30, 2008, 556 SCRA 503.
6
 Id. at 515.
7
 Supra note 2 at 643.
8
 Barrios v. Martinez, A.C. No. 4585, November 12, 2004, 442 SCRA 324, 341.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Baguio City

EN BANC
 155

A.C. No. 8159 : April 23, 2010

(Formerly CBD 05-1452)

REYNARIA BARCENAS, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANORLITO A. ALVERO, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint1c�fa dated May 17, 2005 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero
filed by Reynaria Barcenas with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD),
docketed as CBD Case No. 05-1452, now Administrative Case (A.C.) No. 8159.

The facts as culled from the records are as follows:

On May 7, 2004, Barcenas, through her employee Rodolfo San Antonio (San Antonio), entrusted to Atty. Alvero the
amount of P300,000.00, which the latter was supposed to give to a certain Amanda Gasta to redeem the rights of
his deceased father as tenant of a ricefield located in Barangay San Benito, Victoria, Laguna. The receipt of the
money was evidenced by an acknowledgment receipt 2c�fa dated May 7, 2004. In the said receipt, Atty. Alvero said
that he would deposit the money in court because Amanda Gasta refused to accept the same. 3cräläwvirtualibräry

Later, Barcenas found out that Atty. Alvero was losing a lot of money in cockfights. To check if the money they gave
Atty. Alvero was still intact, Barcenas pretended to borrow P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00 and promised to return
the amount when needed or as soon as the case was set for hearing. However, Atty. Alvero allegedly replied,
"Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na?" Subsequently, Barcenas discovered that Atty. Alvero
did not deposit the money in court, but instead converted and used the same for his personal needs.

In his letters dated August 18, 2004 4c�fa and August 25, 2004, 5c�fa Atty. Atty. Alvero admitted the receipt of
the P300,000.00 and promised to return the money. The pertinent portions of said letters are quoted as follows:

Dahil sa kagustuhan ng iyong amo na maibalik ko ang perang tinanggap ko sa iyo, lumakad ako agad at
pilit kong kinukuha kahit iyon man lang na hiniram sa akin na P80,000.00 pero hindi karakapraka ang lumikom
ng gayong halaga. Pero tiniyak sa akin na sa Martes, ika-24 ng buwan ay ibibigay sa akin.

Bukas ay tutungo ako sa amin upang lumikom pa ng karagdagang halaga upang maisauli ko ang
buong P300,000.00. Nakikiusap ako sa iyo dahil sa ikaw ang nagbigay sa akin ng pera na bigyan mo ako ng
kaunting panahon upang malikom ko ang pera na ipinagkatiwala mo sa akin, hanggang ika-25 ng Agosto,
2004. x x x"6c�fa

Maya-mayang alas nuwebe (9:00) titingnan ang lupang aking ipinagbibili ng Dalawang Milyon. Gustong-gusto ng
bibili gusto lang makita ang lupa dahil malayo, nasa Cavinti. Kung ok na sa bibili pinakamatagal na ang Friday
ang bayaran.

Iyong aking sinisingil na isang P344,000.00 at isang P258,000.00 na utang ng taga-Liliw ay darating sa akin

ngayong umaga bago mag alas otso. Kung maydala ng pambayad kahit magkano ay ibibigay ko sa iyo
ngayong hapon.

xxx

Lahat ng pagkakaperahan ko ay aking ginagawa, pati anak ko ay tinawagan ko na. Pakihintay muna lang ng
kauting panahon pa, hindi matatapos ang linggong ito, tapos ang problema ko sa iyo. Pasensiya ka na."7

However, as of the filing of the instant complaint, despite repeated demands, Atty. Alvero failed to return the same.
Thus, Barcenas prayed that Atty. Alvero be disbarred for being a disgrace to the legal profession.
 156

On March 30, 2005, the IBP-CBD ordered Atty. Alvero to submit his Answer to the complaint. 8cräläwvirtualibräry

In compliance, in his Answer 9c�fa dated April 18, 2005, Atty. Alvero claimed that he did not know Barcenas prior to
the filing of the instant complaint nor did he know that San Antonio was an employee of Barcenas. He alleged that
he came to know Barcenas only when the latter went to him to borrow P60,000.00 "from the amount entrusted to
Rodolfo San Antonio" who entrusted to respondent. At that time, Atty. Alvero claimed that San Antonio was reluctant
to grant the request because it might jeopardize the main and principal cause of action of the Department of
Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) case. Atty. Alvero, however, admitted that he received an amount
of P300,000.00 from San Antonio, though he claimed that said money was the principal cause of action in the
reconveyance action.10cräläwvirtualibräry

Atty. Alvero stressed that there was no lawyer-client relationship between him and Barcenas. He, however, insisted
that the lawyer-client relationship between him and San Antonio still subsisted as his service was never severed by
the latter. He further emphasized that he had not breached the trust of his client, since he had, in fact, manifested
his willingness to return the said amount as long as his lawyer-client relationship with San Antonio subsisted. Finally,
Atty. Alvero prayed that the instant complaint be dismissed.

On June 20, 2005, the IBP-CBD notified the parties to appear for the mandatory conference. 11cräläwvirtualibräry

Meanwhile, in a separate Affidavit 12c�fa dated September 19, 2005, San Antonio narrated that he indeed sought
Atty. Alvero's professional services concerning an agricultural land dispute. He claimed that Atty. Alvero made him
believe that he needed to provide an amount of P300,000.00 in order to file his complaint, as the same would be
deposited in court. San Antonio quoted Atty. Alvero as saying: "Hindi pwedeng hindi kasabay ang pera sa pagpa-file
ng papel dahil tubusan yan, kung sakaling ipatubos ay nasa korte na ang pera."  Believing that it was the truth, San
Antonio was forced to borrow money from Barcenas in the amount of P300,000.00. Subsequently, San Antonio
gave the said amount to Atty. Alvero, in addition to the professional fees, as shown by an acknowledgment
receipt.13cräläwvirtualibräry

San Antonio further corroborated Barcenas' allegation that they tried to borrow  P80,000.00 from the P300,000.00
they gave to Atty. Alvero after they found out that the latter lost a big amount of money in cockfighting. He reiterated
that Atty. Alvero declined and stated, "Akala nyo ba ay madali kunin ang pera pag nasa korte na." Later on, they
found out that Atty. Atty. Alvero lied to them since the money was never deposited in court but was instead used for
his personal needs. For several times, Atty. Alvero promised to return the money to them, but consistently failed to
do so. San Antonio submitted Atty. Atty. Alvero's letters dated August 18, 2004 14c�fa and August 25,
200415c�fa showing the latter's promises to return the amount of P300,000.00.

During the mandatory conference, Atty. Alvero failed to attend despite notice. Thus, he was deemed to have waived
his right to participate in the mandatory conference.

In its Report and Recommendation dated May 21, 2008, the IBP-CBD recommended that Atty. Alvero be suspended
from the practice of law for a period of one (1) year for gross misconduct. Atty. Alvero was, likewise, ordered to
immediately account for and return the amount of P300,000.00 to Barcenas and/or Rodolfo San Antonio. The
pertinent portion thereof reads:

The record does not show and no evidence was presented by respondent to prove that the amount
of P300,000 which was entrusted to him was already returned to complainant or Rodolfo San Antonio, by
way of justifying his non-return of the money, respondent claims in his Answer that the  P300,000 "was the source of
the principal cause of action of the petitioner, Rodolfo San Antonio, in the above-cited DARAB Case No. R-0403-
0011-04 as shown by a copy of the Amended Petition, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex "1" and made an
integral part hereof.

A review of Annex 1, which in the Amended Petition dated October 31, 2004 and filed on November 3, 2004, will
show that the Petitioner Rodolfo San Antonio is praying that he be allowed to cultivate the land after the  P300,000 is
consigned by Petitioner to the Honorable Adjudication Board. Up to the time of the filing of the instant
complaint, no such deposit or consignment took place and no evidence was presented that respondent
deposited the amount in court.
 157

The fact is respondent promised to return the amount (Annex "B" and "C" of the Complaint), but he failed to
do so. The failure therefore of respondent to account for and return the amount of P300,000 entrusted or
given to him by his client constitute gross misconduct and would subject him to disciplinary action under
the Code.16

In Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors adopted and approved
with modification as to penalty the Report and Recommendation of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it ordered that Atty. Alvero
be suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years and, likewise, ordered him to account for and return the
amount of P300,000.00 to complainants within thirty (30) days from receipt of notice.

The Office of the Bar Confidant redocketed the instant case as a regular administrative complaint against Atty.
Alvero and, subsequently, recommended that this Court issue an extended resolution for the final disposition of the
case.

We sustain the findings and recommendations of the IBP-CBD.

Undoubtedly, Atty. Alvero breached Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rules 16.01, 16.02 and 16.03 of Canon 16 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility, which read:

CANON 1.

A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESS.

Rule 1.01. A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

CANON 16.

A LAWYER SHALL HOLD IN TRUST ALL MONEYS AND PROPERTIES OF HIS CLIENT THAT MAY COME
INTO HIS POSSESSION.

Rule 16.01. A lawyer shall account for all money or property collected or received for or from the client.

Rule 16.02. A lawyer shall keep the funds of each client separate and apart from his own and those of others kept
by him.

Rule 16.03. A lawyer shall deliver the funds and property of his client when due or upon demand. However, he shall
have a lien over the funds and may apply so much thereof as may be necessary to satisfy his unlawful fees and
disbursements, giving notice promptly thereafter to his client. He shall also have a lien to the same extent on all
judgments and executions he has secured for his client as provided for in the Rules of Court.

In the instant case, Atty. Alvero admitted to having received the amount of P300,000.00 from San Antonio,
specifically for the purpose of depositing it in court. However, as found by the IBP-CBD, Atty. Alvero presented no
evidence that he had indeed deposited the amount in or consigned it to the court. Neither was there any evidence
that he had returned the amount to Barcenas or San Antonio.

From the records of the case, there is likewise a clear breach of lawyer-client relations. When a lawyer receives
money from a client for a particular purpose, the lawyer is bound to render an accounting to the client showing that
the money was spent for a particular purpose. And if he does not use the money for the intended purpose, the
lawyer must immediately return the money to his client. 17c�fa These, Atty. Alvero failed to do.

Jurisprudence dictates that a lawyer who obtains possession of the funds and properties of his client in the course
of his professional employment shall deliver the same to his client (a) when they become due, or (b) upon demand.
In the instant case, respondent failed to account for and return the P300,000.00 despite complainant's repeated
demands.18cräläwvirtualibräry
 158

Atty. Alvero cannot take refuge in his claim that there existed no attorney-client relationship between him and
Barcenas. Even if it were true that no attorney-client relationship existed between them, case law has it that an
attorney may be removed, or otherwise disciplined, not only for malpractice and dishonesty in the profession, but
also for gross misconduct not connected with his professional duties, making him unfit for the office and unworthy of
the privileges which his license and the law confer upon him. 19cräläwvirtualibräry

Atty. Alvero's failure to immediately account for and return the money when due and upon demand violated the trust
reposed in him, demonstrated his lack of integrity and moral soundness, and warranted the imposition of disciplinary
action. It gave rise to the presumption that he converted the money for his own use, and this act constituted a gross
violation of professional ethics and a betrayal of public confidence in the legal profession. 20c�fa They constitute
gross misconduct and gross unethical behavior for which he may be suspended, following Section 27, Rule 138 of
the Rules of Court, which provides:

Sec. 27. Disbarment or suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds therefor. - A member of the bar may be
disbarred or suspended from his office as attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice, or other gross
misconduct in such office, grossly immoral conduct, or by reason of his conviction of a crime involving moral
turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take before the admission to practice, or for a willful
disobedience appearing as attorney for a party without authority to do so.

We come to the penalty imposable in this case.

In Small v. Banares,21the respondent was suspended for two years for violating Canon 16 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, particularly for failing to file a case for which the amount of P80,000.00 was given him
by the client, and for failing to return the said amount upon demand. Considering that similar circumstances are
attendant in this case, the Court finds the Resolution of the IBP imposing on respondent a two-year suspension to
be in order.

As a final note, we reiterate: the practice of law is not a right, but a privilege. It is granted only to those of good moral
character. The Bar must maintain a high standard of honesty and fair dealing. 22c�fa For the practice of law is a
profession, a form of public trust, the performance of which is entrusted to those who are qualified and who possess
good moral character. Those who are unable or unwilling to comply with the responsibilities and meet the standards
of the profession are unworthy of the privilege to practice law. 23cräläwvirtualibräry

WHEREFORE, Notice of Resolution No. XVIII-2008-342 dated July 17, 2008 of the IBP-CBD Board of Governors,
which found respondent Atty. Anorlito A. Alvero GUILTY of gross misconduct, is AFFIRMED. He is
hereby SUSPENDED for a period of two (2) years from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this
Decision. He is warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of
Atty. Alvero as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court Administrator
for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

[A.C. NO. 5131 : September 22, 2004]

JOSE E. ORIA, Complainant, v. ATTY. ANTONIO K. TUPAZ, Respondent.

DECISION
 159

YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

In a Letter-Complaint1 dated September 1, 1999, respondent Atty. Antonio K. Tupaz was charged with negligence in
the performance of his duties as counsel to complainant Jose E. Oria.

Complainant Oria avers that his wife, Viola Luna Oria authorized him to institute legal action to recover her
unirrigated ricelands located at Barangay Banuyo, Gasan, Marinduque, with an area of 1.2121 hectares, which were
transferred, by virtue of the Operation Land Transfer of the Agrarian Reform Program, to the alleged tenants in
connivance with Lourdes Argosino and Linda Rey, field personnel of the Marinduque Agrarian Office (MARO).

Sometime in 1988, complainant went to the MARO and informed the Chief of the Complaints Section of the illegal
transfer. Subsequently, the spouses Oria discovered that Emancipation Patents were issued to the so-called
tenants.

Mr. Oria sought the assistance of then Agrarian Reform Secretary Miriam Defensor Santiago, who ordered Legal
Officer Pablo F. Reyes to investigate the matter. The latter recommended that the Emancipation Patents be
cancelled and the property returned to Mrs. Oria.

On May 6, 1991, the Provincial Agrarian Reform Officer (PARO), Herminiano C. Echiverri, Jr., sent Mrs. Oria a
notice that her children were eligible for Retention. However, she did not file an application for Retention because
she was awaiting the Investigation Report of Legal Officer Reyes.

On April 21, 1993, the Chief of the Legal Division, Ibra D. Omar Al Haj sent a letter to complainant's wife stating that
the case had been forwarded to respondent Atty. Antonio K. Tupaz, Chief of the Litigation Division of the Bureau of
Agrarian Legal Assistance (BALA) in Quezon City.

Thereafter, complainant consulted the respondent regarding the case and he gave the amount of P5,000.00 to the
latter, promising a bigger amount after the termination of the case. He also assured the respondent that a fixed
amount of P1,000.00 as traveling expenses would be given every time the latter will go to Marinduque. Complainant
kept on reminding respondent to follow up the case but the latter was always unavailable. Finally, complainant's wife
visited respondent's office and she was told that additional money was needed for expenses. Hence, Mrs. Oria
made a bank-to-bank deposit of P5,000.00 to the account of respondent. She later learned that he had already
retired and was engaged in private practice.

Complainant further alleged that when he went to the Litigation Division of the DAR on August 31, 1999, he was told
by Atty. Ibra D. Omar Al Haj, that the files of the agrarian case of his wife were missing from the office. Thus, he filed
the instant complaint.

In his Comment,2 respondent avers that he met complainant during his tenure as Chief of the Litigation Division of
the DAR, in relation to a dispute over the ownership of an agricultural riceland in Marinduque that was covered by
the Operation Land Transfer of the Agrarian Reform Program. He also alleged that due to the volume of work and
pending cases handled by the legal officers in the office, he did the evaluation and secured the necessary
documents to support the first endorsement. It was only sometime in October 1993 when his office received the
partial records of the case and a copy of the Investigation Report dated November 14, 1993, recommending the
cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued in favor of the tenant-farmers. Finally, in 1994, he was able to
secure the documents relevant to the case, including copies of the Emancipation Patents, by going to Boac,
Marinduque on two occasions.

Respondent further alleged that he caused the preparation of a possible petition for the cancellation of the
Emancipation Patents and recommended its filing to the Office of the BALA, DAR Central Office. Thereafter, he was
informed that the matter was referred to the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Legal Affairs because one of the
party-defendants would be the Secretary of Agrarian Reform.

Respondent avers that he had no discretion over the matter since the filing of the case has to be approved not only
by the Director of BALA but also by the Assistant Secretary for Legal Affairs of the DAR. His duty was only to
evaluate the legal remedy to be availed of which the BALA then endorses for official action to the department. He
further alleged that he informed complainant of these incidents and the action taken regarding the case pending
before the DAR.
 160

Finally, respondent denies that he received P5,000.00 from complainant during his tenure as Chief of the Litigation
Division. He avers that he engaged in private practice upon his retirement and that sometime in December 1997, he
was requested by complainant to handle the agrarian case, and they agreed on the amount of P25,000.00 as
attorney's fees and P5,000.00 as appearance fee including roundtrip tickets from Manila to Marinduque per hearing.
He admits receiving the said amount only in January 1998, which was sent to his account as partial payment of the
agreed attorney's fees.

Respondent states that he should not be penalized for merely doing his job as a foot soldier of the government and
that he should not be blamed for something that was already a fait accompli as a result of government's desire to
implement social legislation. He promised to help complainant regardless of monetary consideration with the filing of
the case for the cancellation of the Emancipation Patents issued to the latter's tenants. 3

Based on the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala, the Board of Governors of
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines issued Resolution No. XV-2003-349 dated June 21, 2003 which reads:

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby ADOPTED and APPROVED, the Report and
Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner of the above-entitled case, herein made part of this
Resolution/Decision as Annex "A"; and, finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and
the applicable laws and rules, and considering that the Commission finds respondent negligent in his duties to his
client-complainant, Atty. Antonio K. Tupaz is hereby SUSPENDED from the practice of law for six (6) months.

On August 12, 2003, respondent filed a motion for reconsideration reiterating the arguments in his comment.

We agree with the recommendation of the IBP.

There is no dispute that a lawyer-client relationship existed between the parties. After respondent retired from the
government service, he agreed to represent complainant as private counsel. He charged the amount of P25,000.00
as acceptance fee and received P5,000.00 as partial payment.

Respondent cannot justify his failure to help complainant by stating that "after receipt of part of the acceptance fee
he did not hear anymore from complainant or his wife". The persistence displayed by the latter in prosecuting this
complaint belies the lack of enthusiasm alleged by respondent. Records show that complainant exhausted all
available remedies to recover his property. It was, in fact, the loss of the latter's file in the Office of the Litigation
Division and the Legal Division of the DAR that prompted him to file this instant petition.

As ruled in the case of Rabanal v. Tugade:4

Once he agrees to take up the cause of a client, the lawyer owes fidelity to such cause and must always be mindful
of the trust and confidence reposed in him. He must serve the client with competence and diligence, and champion
the latter's cause with wholehearted fidelity, care, and devotion. Elsewise stated, he owes entire devotion to the
interest of the client, warm zeal in the maintenance and defense of his client's rights, and the exertion of his utmost
learning and ability to the end that nothing be taken or withheld from his client, save by the rules of law, legally
applied. This simply means that his client is entitled to the benefit of any and every remedy and defense that is
authorized by the law of the land and he may expect his lawyer to assert every such remedy or defense. If much is
demanded from an attorney, it is because the entrusted privilege to practice law carries with it the correlative duties
not only to the client but also to the court, to the bar, and to the public. A lawyer who performs his duty with diligence
and candor not only protects the interest of his client; he also serves the ends of justice, does honor to the bar, and
helps maintain the respect of the community to the legal profession.
 161

The records show that respondent handled complainant's case since 1993 and there has been no progress in the
case since then. Respondent not only deceived his client, but also failed to perform the undertaking to help
complainant in filing the case for cancellation of the Emancipation Patents. He pledged to assist complainant in filing
a petition for cancellation of the Emancipation Patents even without monetary consideration; yet to this day,
complainant has not recovered his property nor was any petition filed by respondent.

Respondent is required by his oath to conduct himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. The lawyer's oath is a source of obligations and
violation thereof is a ground for suspension, disbarment, or other disciplinary action. 5 Any departure from the path
which a lawyer must follow as demanded by the virtues of his profession shall not be tolerated by this Court as the
disciplining authority.6

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XV-2003-349 of the Board of Governors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
finding respondent negligent in his duties to his client is AFFIRMED. Atty. Antonio K. Tupaz is SUSPENDED from
the practice of law for six (6) months. He is further warned that a repetition of this or similar acts will be dealt with
more severely.

SO ORDERED.

Davide, Jr., C.J., Quisumbing, Carpio, and Azcuna, JJ., concur.

Endnotes:

1
 Rollo, pp. 1-2.

2
 Rollo, pp. 24-33.

3
 Rollo, pp. 29-30.

4
 Adm. Case No. 1372, 27 June 2002, 383 SCRA 484, 490; citing Ramos v. Jacoba, Adm. Case No. 5505, 27
September 2001, 366 SCRA 91.

5
 De Guzman v. De Dios, Adm. Case No. 4943, 26 January 2001, 350 SCRA 320, 325.

6
 Ong v. Grijaldo, Adm. Case No. 4724, 30 April 2003, 402 SCRA 1, 11.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC 

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.
 162

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL
MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions
during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation
of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967
Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court
to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one
reason or another, before the bar results were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was
confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar
Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in
other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the
release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar
candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no
reason why they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary
to due process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades
were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient reason for
the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of admission to the
bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found
that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal
Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which,
however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records
revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%,
68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which
was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the
1971 bar examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo
and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter, with which request they
complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five examination
notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or
re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the
notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant Lanuevo that he has
the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing.
 163

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court required, in a
resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.).
Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court
likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice  why his name
should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners concerned
were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10) days from notice why  no disciplinary action should
be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents
Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 60-63,
32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47,
rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp.
106-110,) rec.).

In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or
re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of examinee
Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise,
who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political Law and Public
International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty.
Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo
remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public International
Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be
owned by another successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the
discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the
change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful
candidate by the name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to
testify in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias Ramon E.
Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with
the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino F. de Vera, another
student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21,
32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having been charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this fact which he is
required under the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October 2, 1973.
Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo, Galang and
Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia, where he is
believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only his oral testimony,
submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the affidavits and
answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for their cross-examination.
 164

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the investigation
conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-evaluated
and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C.
Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination
notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar
examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he
finds that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in
another, he will bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of
grade;

3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I  re-
evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon
verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same
standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades
of 7% each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8%
to 10% (emphasis supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following
additional statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to make
the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1,
2 and 10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the
identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities
of the examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to
do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship
between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that with respect to the
correction of the examination booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him
and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules and policy of the Honorable
Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take his
words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as

reflecting the real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any
 165

more to get the consent and permission of the Chairman of the Bar Committee.
Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the Supreme Court
and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as
a bar examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and as
proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was
not the one who made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and Public
International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:

On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two
hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record
was on February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel
of the Supreme Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's
notebook bearing code number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was
possible for me to review and re-examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee
obtained a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained
higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had
submitted the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same
was still within my control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been
identified or that the code number decode and the examinee's name was revealed . The Bar
Confidant told me that the name of the examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had
not been identified or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I had given a particularly
low grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was
humanly possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the
same, carefully read the answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used
throughout the grading of the entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an
increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades,
and as he had assured me that the code number of the examinee in question had not been decoded
and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and the grade card
attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item
No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my personal copy thereof, and the Bar
Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other
copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo
adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in additional alleged
that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered
661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the
resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him
personally, and that I have never met him even up to the present;
 166

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had
repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so
assured of my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity
revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the
regular course of express prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and
the Bar Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as
possible from frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my
residence, I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that
his representations were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the
official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which
was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same
hour that he used to see me:

xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted the
same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I
committed an error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject . I considered it
entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December
31, 1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had
obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall
correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the
examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code
numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%.
Still, the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the
examinee pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was that
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject
would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first
meeting, we still did not know the names of the candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the
motives of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned
nor had I any kind of contract with him before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my
residence at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and
was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought
back to me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the
passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a
few points to 75% then he would make the general passing average.
 167

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember
correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the
mark in the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
69, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in
good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to now remains a
total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:

xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal.
He produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and
submitted to him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the
said notebook. He requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that
I had previously given. He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects,
but that because of the comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general
average was short of passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed
I might find the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo
particularly called my attention to the fact in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and
in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me that whether I would reconsider the
grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a
request to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded
tore-read and re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-
evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items,
and maintained the same grades in other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had
totalled the new grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few
points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his sworn statement,
adding the following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the
examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith.
It may well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of
Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however,
pleads in attenuation of such omission, that —

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not
having been apprised otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or suggest that the grade of a particular
examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right to presume,
owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the
request was legitimate.
 168

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent

carefully evaluated each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answers by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving the said examinee the
benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that
particular subject that the said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced
that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him,
but that he did not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the
passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in reappraising the answers,
herein respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the
examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations
were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this
particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing
a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate I
decided to increase his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn statement of April 17,
1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the

examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in
direct compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners
Committee that where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a
re-evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation that
notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on
the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led
 169

me to scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis
of the memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of
language and soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-
checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the
examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their
notebooks. Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by their professors.
Eventually some of them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right
now, we have some 19 of such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the
Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because
the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those
notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the
same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust
reposed in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that
neither did he act in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation
was inorder was left alone to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not
remember having made the alleged misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the
attention of the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained
a passing general average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed
to remove the disqualification by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent brought the
notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling the
said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la
Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as
would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in
addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the
examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the
notebooks in question were submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all
good faith that they so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked
as Exh. 1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all
the examiners earlier, leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in
order,
 170

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on
my way back to the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake
ticket. I have always made it a point that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a
number from any object and the first number that comes into my sight becomes the
basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954"
boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO)
attached to a post standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the
Supreme Court building from San Marcelino street and almost adjacent to the south-
eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph of the number
'954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is
attached is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as
Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).

With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket
that would contain such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought,
whose last three digits corresponded to "954". This number became doubly
impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket number was "27",
a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively
to link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning
code numbers on the Master List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of
the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I either started with the number "27"
(or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and marked as
Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo;
1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list,
as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the
beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life,
to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and was
hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be recalled, the
last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the
hospital, our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13,
1941 resulting in many casualties. From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as
the beginning of a new life for me having been saved from the possibility of being
among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army
byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since
then we begot children the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my
work which at the time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I
came upon the notebooks bearing the office code number "954". As the number was
still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry into the contents of
the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the apparent
soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)
that they merited re-evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the
respective examiners for possible review recalling to them the said Confidential
Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases
which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and which the Committee
agreed to refer back to the respective examines, namely:
 171

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade
below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office
Code No. 110, identified and marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in
Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original grade of 4%
increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a
grade below 60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having
inadvertently left in the office the data thereon. It turned out that the subject was
Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (The
notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as
Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and International Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 661 with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-
evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and International Law is
precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst. Solicitor
General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or
notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political
and International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the
Committee and pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to
the examiners concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some 19,
or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and
that the increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the
outcome since the subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth.
In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent Galang,
because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as he "was going over those
notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In his affidavit of
August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the
notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never
met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers
necessary for taking the bar examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after
the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation
where the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in
the ordinary course of official business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to
which respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973,
had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are
stated in particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had
the herein respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
 172

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution,
which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent,
these questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar
Examination Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper
of the other bar candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's
grades was done among those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the
Committee to increase the percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the
insinuation that only respondent's papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's
actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having
caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in former's behalf? To assume this could be
disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the members of the Bar Examination
Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work that year,
as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the
resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of credence, or
consideration.

xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or
answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar
Examiners implying the existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The
evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of
their duties and that they should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated
and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of respondent Galang by
deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior authority
from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar
Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before Christmas day,
respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the process of correcting
examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the
grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high
grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for
re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian
an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned the particular
notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said
examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent Lanuevo's word and under
the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said
subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and
with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian
did not know the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-
Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil Law. After
such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of 75% for
admission to the Bar.
 173

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the
residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal, with an examinee's
notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo
then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly to reconsider the grade given,
explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done
well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo
in Remedial Law, the general average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made
the remark and observation that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find
the examinee deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of
respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good English.
Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential
Memorandum that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and
ability to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers,
substantial weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of reconsideration was entirely
within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the
authority to make such request and further believing that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the
examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the examinee's grade in that particular
subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes
made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead
of 310 as earlier mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
(Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing grade due to his
failing marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to
respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and Public
International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's
Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing respondent Pablo that particular
examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political Law and
Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least
75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible —
the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are
failing in just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just
leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the
re-evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the
corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook with
Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the passing grade,
because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent
Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then helping in the
correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already finished correcting the
examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee who owns that particular
notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would
be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing grade. Accepting the words of
respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure of
the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark
and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code
 174

Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang
(Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when the latter
approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a
candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy of the Court,
leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that he was
provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-evaluation requested by
respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing grade because of
his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee Galang's notebook in
Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing
authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would review the
notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo,
Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed by respondent
Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made during the
meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made
known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent
Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent
Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to
71%. The matter was not however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs.
A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee failed only in
his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the said paper  (Vol.
V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance he remembers, which is
substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after he had submitted his
report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner
Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent Pardo
riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two companions. According to
respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of the Bar
Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing
Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review
and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns
that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law.
After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the
answers of the examine concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number
1622 as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

A
 175

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E.

GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners concerned to re-
evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in the increase of
Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more
or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of the Court making 74% the
passing average for that year's examination without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang
thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had no authority from the Court or the
Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed only in their
respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his actuations on
the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm.
Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed to the members of the Bar
Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but
on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner
because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh.
2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum was intended
solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a basis for
him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23,
rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose declarations on
the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo, are clear and consistent as
well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified
by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases show how respondent
Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar
Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and
confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the
trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent
Galang in five subjects that resulted in the increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a
member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-
calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned to the effect that
the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects
while his general average was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it be honestly
claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first
notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing
mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and
individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:

BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
 176

BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under
the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to 74.15% or an increase
of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the
disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang, with the possible addition of
examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the
latter who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation or
reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their notebooks are
submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only
function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and thereafter compute the general
average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in
relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the Court and on the basis of which the Court
will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the
answers of the examinees and cannot assume the functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for
re-evaluation should be done by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can
validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby
compromises his position as well as the image of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of betraying the trust
and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the
incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the papers of more than ninety
(90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47,
101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent
Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For
certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the
cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to
 177

do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the
1971 Bar examinations, especially the said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent
Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after
the said re-evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good
faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the
notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a semblance of
impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than Galang would not give him
away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement
of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned fails only in
one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the
first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp.
45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it
was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95)
months after he filed his answer on March 19, 1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.),
showing that it was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS
GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO QUITALEG'S
NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN
THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law
and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were
referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two cases were officially
brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to
refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the case of Quitaleg and to remove the
disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that
the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the
Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was
made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and
record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to
him, he left them inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the
Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in
the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162,
p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in Mercantile Law
which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.).
According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela
Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is
authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent Lanuevo presented in
evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit
9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the
initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII,
p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.
 178

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee presented to the
Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee agreed to refer back to the
Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot
recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is
not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one
subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang)
which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner concerned. The day
following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo
handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular notebook with Office Code Number
954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was taken up by the
Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo declared
that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that involved Political Law. He re-
evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by respondent Lanuevo to
him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of the Committee
that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose subject the
examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-
Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back to Examiner
Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as
follows:

BA

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)
 179

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the
disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law,
violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due to the
misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be
said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time of said referral,
which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in
Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was considered 75% under the
Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-
evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.

Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and confidence
reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and undermining public
faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll
of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding investigation
conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off the Roll of
Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major
subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
 180

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which necessarily
involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether these facts are
governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534,
544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required passing grade certainly involves
discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of a member of the
Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8) bar subjects
with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on
one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant who is at the same time
a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in
the admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court
and must always be subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is
primarily confidential as the designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar
examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5)
subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the Court,
a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-
evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a
complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of
examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-
evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the
examinee benefited was in connivance or a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings
or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the character
requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as a member of the
Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character, and that
no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in the Philippines."
Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court
satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both rules, every applicant is duty bound
to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court
to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is
for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal
record — whether he was criminally indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending —
becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court
beginning the year 1965 require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending
against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the
application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly require
the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show
satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his involvement in
any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his moral
character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the Court will be in a better position to
consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's involvement in any criminal
case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the
second and third time, respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required
the applicant to declare under oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By
1966, when Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use
of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In
paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with any
 181

offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or
tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p.
56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal case of
slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly
omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and withholding
from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and
in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal
case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang
was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that he had been
charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law is well —
settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the
board of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission,
information respecting so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the
court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for
admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge
would have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 —
710).

The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the clerk of court
the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In
the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending
to show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes.
The finding of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion,
were facts which should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available.
Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104;
emphasis supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his having been
apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name of the victim
in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon),
and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up to the present time,
indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of
becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him to explain why
his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August, 1973,
apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for
such omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the
Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other alternative but to
 182

order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE
said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a
privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the
criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as
an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to
hold himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case is not without any
precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the admission of successful bar
candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false
pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the
Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the
Court Investigators contained in their report and recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA
475-478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar
examinations [People vs. Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People
vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades
of Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.

IV

RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon
Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel
Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers
in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however, professed good faith;
and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee
who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any consideration or expectation of any. These
the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed the respondents-
examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the Bar, the
respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and should
have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have
asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred the matter to the Supreme Court.
At least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the
complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in
their respective and particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the
examinee concerned was really so circumstances. This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar
examinations could have been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath that the answers
of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo in connection
with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and
Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective subject solely because of the
misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one
paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60
something, I cannot remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing
average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see
also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent
Pablo: "... he told me that this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and
that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will
pass the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice used to
 183

be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and
said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was to go over the book
and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I did was to
be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78
instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45,
rec.; emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents Pamatian,
Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they gave were
deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the misrepresentation and deception
committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such
information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33,
rec.; see also allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh.
B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the
borderline and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I
re-evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 55, rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to
do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo —

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated
each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the
Court, and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation
that it was only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became
convinced that the said examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did
not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo —

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that
 184

the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in
Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners
to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-evaluation effected by them
was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence
notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the said re-
evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which were earlier
quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in five (5) subjects
do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory.
Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their participation in the admission
of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the
proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their
duties relative thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-
examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support thereto ... was
motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend
— a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as Oscar Landicho and who, the records
will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice Ramon
Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations. Respondent
Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and
deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the
latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being
intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not
invite belief; because he does not impugn the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang
in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed
in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking his help in
connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971
Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to Landicho that an examination booklet
was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though
such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an
indecorous act, hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations
demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the
bar examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable
Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.

A
 185

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release of the 1971
Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk
of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house
and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of
sale was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however,
respondent Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in
favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage —
P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20,
1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only
P17,000.00, which according to him is equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of
P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while
the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by
him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-
3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not
fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which
he filed on January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of
only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of
P1,011.00, which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement
under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00
receivable listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction
therein involved did not push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo
from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in Okinawa
is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in
his 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note
which he allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented
by respondent during the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of
payment was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo
promised to furnish the Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not
fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who has a
family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him,
the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or
undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to
the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of
instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in
favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently cancelled
on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor
of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled
on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS
remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the
monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month, but that since May of 1973, he was
unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities, which he filed in connection
with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot declared as part of his
assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in the same
statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets
and Liabilities).
 186

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued
at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972
could be inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and
liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets,
excluding receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November,
1972) Statement, his listed total assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the
said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the
acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the
illegal machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's
examination papers or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the
above properties came from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.

During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious
irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact, after
Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court,
respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the end in view of retiring
from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed
of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent
Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case value
thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof
as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9
of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation
of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with
the official duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit
such violation or offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or
judicial functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged
with the grant of licenses or permits or other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once it is determined
that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer or employee and to his
other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act
3019).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities
were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are part of the records of
this Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his
father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
 187

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of the Philippine
Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ Educational
Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was
connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted with the affairs of our
veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo
successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims Investigator, Supervising Veterans
Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of
time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of
Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July
31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the availment of the
said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ Educational
Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was
employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during
the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It
appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ
Educational Institution on the approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ
Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished
to respondent Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow
up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He does not also
know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine
Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But respondent Galang admits that he
had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the
neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the
GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he investigated claims for
the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not remember,
however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E.
Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met
him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at Zambales and
then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the guerrilla
movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the Philippine Veterans
Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese
occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with other guerrilla
organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not remember
having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board. He is
not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac,
Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial
Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on
December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46,
rec.).
 188

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the
Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942 and was given the
rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div.,
US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th Division, US army stationed at
Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December
1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the
same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court. Consequently, this
Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No.
1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY

DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY
LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and Aquino, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Antonio, J., is on official leave.

Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.C. No. 10676               September 8, 2015

 189

ATTY. ROY B. ECRAELA, Complainant,

vs.
ATTY. IAN RAYMOND A. PANGALANGAN, Respondent.

DECISION

PER CURIAM:

The Case

Before the Court is a Petition for Disbarment 1 filed by Atty. Roy B. Ecraela with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) on April 12, 2007 against Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan for his illicit
relations, chronic womanizing, abuse of authority as an educator, and "other unscrupulous activities" which cause
"undue embarrassment to the legal profession." Complainant claims that respondent's actions involve deceit,
malpractice, gross misconduct and grossly immoral conduct in violation of the Lawyer's Oath.

The Facts

Complainant and respondent were best friends and both graduated from the University of the Philippines (UP)
College of Law in 1990, where they were part of a peer group or barkada with several of their classmates. After
passing the bar examinations and being admitted as members of the Bar in 1991, they were both registered with the
IBP Quezon City.

Respondent was formerly married to Sheila P. Jardiolin (Jardiolin) with whom he has three (3) children. Complainant
avers that while married to Jardiolin, respondent had a series of adulterous and illicit relations with married and
unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007. These alleged illicit relations involved:

a. AAA,2 who is the spouse of a colleague in the UP College of Law, from 1990 to 1992, which complainant
had personal knowledge of such illicit relations;

b. BBB, sometime during the period from 1992 to 1994 or from 1994 to 1996, despite being already married
to Jardiolin;

c. CCC, despite being married to Jardiolin and while also being romantically involved with DDD;

d. DDD, sometime during the period from 2000 to 2002, despite still being married to Jardiolin and while still
being romantically .involved with CCC;

e. EEE, who is related to complainant, sometime during the period from May 2004 until the filing of the
Petition, while still being romantically involved with CCC.3

Complainant claims that respondent, with malice and without remorse, deceived CCC and DDD by representing
himself to be a bachelor, thereby convincing the two women to start a love affair with him, when in. truth, he was
then still married to Jardiolin.4

Aside from these illicit affairs, complainant avers that sometime during the period of 1998 to 2000, respondent, as a
lawyer of the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC), represented the interest of Manila International
Airport Authority (MIAA) in cancellation proceedings filed by MIAA against Kendrick Development Corporation
(KOC). However, despite being a public officer and a government counsel, respondent conspired with Atty.
Abraham Espejo, legal counsel of KDC, and assisted KDC in its case, thereby sabotaging MIAA's case, and, in
effect, that of the Philippine Government.5

Complainant further claims that respondent even attempted to bribe then Solicitor Rolando Martin of the Office of
the Solicitor General (OSG) in exchange for the latter's cooperation in the dismissal of the cancellation proceedings
in favor of KDC. In return for his "earnest efforts" in assisting KDC in its case, respondent was allegedly rewarded
 190

with a Toyota Corolla XL with plate number ULS-835 by Atty. Espejo. The vehicle was seen several times by
respondent's classmates and officemates being driven and parked by respondent in his own home and in the OGCC
premises itself.6

In connection with his involvement in the MIAA case, complainant claims that respondent was summoned in a
Senate inquiry concerning rampant faking of land titles in the Philippines, which included an investigation of the
alleged spurious land titles of KDC. In Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice
& Human Rights Committees recommended that respondent be investigated and prosecuted by the Office of the
Ombudsman (Ombudsman) for graft and corruption, as well as disbarment or disciplinary sanction by this Court for
grave misconduct or violation of the Revised Penal Code. 7

It was further alleged that, during the pendency of the Senate Inquiry, respondent even attempted to conceal the
evidence by requesting complainant's parents, spouses Marcelo F. Ecraela and Visitacion B. Ecraela, to have the
Toyota Corolla XL parked in their residence in Cainta, Rizal, for an indefinite period of time. Respondent's request,
however, was refused by the spouses when they learned that the vehicle was the subject of the Senate Inquiry. 8

It appears from the documents presented by complainant that the Ombudsman issued a Resolution finding probable
cause against respondent, and an Information was thereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan for violation of Section 3
(b) of Republic Act No. (RA) 3019. 9 Complainant also claims that respondent abused his authority as an educator in
Manuel L. Quezon University, San Sebastian College, College of St. Benilde, and Maryknoll College, where
respondent induced his male students to engage in "nocturnal preoccupations" and entertained the romantic
gestures of his female students in exchange for passing grades. 10 The Petition was docketed as CBD Case No. 07-
1973.

In an Order11 dated April 16, 2007, the Director for Bar Discipline, Honorable Rogelio A. Vinluan, required
respondent to file his verified answer.

In his undated Answer,12 respondent opted not to present any counter-statement of facts in supp01i of his defense.
Instead, respondent simply argued that the petition suffers from procedural and substantive infirmities, claiming that
petitioner failed to substantiate the allegations or charges against him. Respondent pointed out that Annex "J" of the
Petition entitled "Arguments in Support of the Disbarment" lacked formal requirements, and thus, should be treated
as a mere scrap of paper. Respondent also asserts that the e-mail messages attached to the petition were
inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of the Rules on Electronic Evidence. 13 He claims that the identities
of the owners of the e-mail messages, as well as the allegations of illicit relations and abuse of authority, were not
properly established. Respondent further argues that the statements of complainant's witnesses were merely self-
serving and deserved scant consideration.

Complainant filed a Comment (to the Respondent's Answer), 14 stating that the allegations in the complaint were
deemed admitted by reason of respondent's failure to make specific or even general denials of such in his Answer.

In his Reply (to the Comment filed by Complainant), 15 respondent simply denied all of complainant's accusations in
the petition, allegedly for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity
thereof."16

On August 3, 2007, IBP-CBD Investigating Commissioner Leland R. Villadolid, Jr. (Commissioner Villadolid) set the
case for mandatory conference on August 28, 2007, 17 which respondent failed to attend. It appears that respondent
filed a Motion to Cancel Hearing, 18 praying for the resetting of the mandatory conference allegedly due to a
previously scheduled hearing on the same date. Respondent's motion was opposed by complainant and eventually
denied by Commissioner Villadolid in his Order 19 dated August 28, 2007. In the same order, complainant's
Manifestation20 praying that subpoenas be issued to several persons who shall be complainant's hostile witnesses
was granted by Commissioner Villadolid. Accordingly, the case was scheduled for the presentation of complainant's
witnesses on September 11, 2007 and the respective subpoenas 21 were issued.

A day before the scheduled hearing, the IBP-CBD received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration, 22 praying that
the Order dated August 28, 2007 be set aside and that the hearing be reset to sometime during the third week of
October. In said motion, respondent informed the IBP-CBD that he has viral conjunctivitis or more commonly known
 191

as "sore eyes" and has been ordered by the doctor to rest for at least one to two weeks while his eyes are being
treated. Attached to his motion were photocopies of two medical certificates, stating that a certain R. Pangalangan
was suffering from sore eyes.

During the scheduled hearing on September 11, 2007, complainant opposed petitioner's motion, arguing that based
on his personal verification with the court personnel of Branch 77 of Metropolitan Trial Court (MTC) of Parafiaque
City, there was no case calendared for hearing on the date of the previous setting. Complainant also argued that
this is another ploy of respondent to delay the proceedings because he knew that complainant worked overseas and
was only in the country for a limited period of time. Finding merit in complainant's opposition, respondent's motion
was denied and complainant was allowed to present his witnesses. 23 Complainant presented his witnesses, as
follows: Assistant Solicitor General Karl Miranda (ASG Miranda), Ms. Laarni Morallos (Ms. Morallos), Atty. Glenda T.
Litong (Atty. Litong), Atty. Emelyn W. Corpus (Atty. Corpus), Mr. Marcelo Ecraela, and Mrs. Visitacion Ecraela.

ASG Miranda testified on his participation in the KDC case as reflected in the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee
Report, as well as on his recollection that the Senate Report had recommended the disbarment of respondent.

Ms. Morallos, Atty. Litong, and Atty. Corpus were presented to establish that the email messages submitted by
complainant indeed originated from respondent based on their familiarity with respondent, paiiicularly, the email
messages which contained references to his daughter, his relationship with complainant, and respondent's high
blood pressure.

Atty. Litong further testified that respondent personally introduced DDD to her as his girlfriend and that sometime in
2002 or 2003, she saw respondent with another girl in Glorietta despite still being married to his wife. Atty. Litong
also recalled encountering respondent at a party sometime in 2007 where he was with CCC, whom she perceived to
be respondent's girlfriend at that time. She also confirmed that respondent had, in more than one occasion, brought
with him his students during their drinking sessions and had even one student driving for him.

For her testimony, Atty. Corpus corroborated Atty. Litong's statements about respondent's preoccupations with his
students. Atty. Corpus also testified that ODD called her at her office sometime in 2000 or 2001 to inform her that
the latter had broken up with respondent upon learning that he was actually married. Atty. Corpus surmised based
on her telephone conversation with DDD that respondent did not tell the latter his actual marital status. Aside from
this, Atty. Corpus also recalled that during complainant's farewell party in February 2007, respondent introduced
CCC as his girlfriend of six years, or since the year 2000 or 2001.

To expedite the hearing, the spouses Ecraela were made to affirm the execution of their affidavits since their
testimonies were based on the affidavits that complainant included in his petition.

Once complainant's presentation of witnesses was concluded, the mandatory conference/hearing was terminated
and the parties were directed to submit their respective verified position papers with supporting documentary
evidence within thi1iy (30) days from receipt of the transcript of stenographic notes. After which, the case was
considered submitted for report and recommendation.

On September 18, 2007, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Manifestation (with Comments), 24 pertaining to
respondent's Motion to Cancel Hearing and praying for the IBP-CBD to formally request for records from Branch 77
of MTC, Parañaque City to verify respondent's claim that he had a hearing in said court during the first scheduled
mandatory conference. On the same date, the IBP-CBD also received complainant's Compliance (with
Comments),25 submitting the certified photo copies of the Senate Committee Final Report No. 367, the Resolution
dated January 22, 2001 of the Ombudsman, and the Information dated June 30, 2003 filed with the Sandiganbayan.

On January 8, 2008, the IBP-CBD received complainant's Position Paper. 26 Complainant thereafter filed two
Manifestations,27 asserting that respondent is already barred from submitting his verified position paper and that any
decision or judgment would have to be based solely on complainant's Verified Position Paper. 28

Findings of the IBP Investigating Commissioner

 192

After the case was submitted for report and recommendation, Commissioner Villadolid rendered a Report, 29 finding
that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing respondent's gross misconduct affecting his standing and
moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar.

On the issue of respondent's alleged violations of the Revised Penal Code 30 and/or RA 301931 as reflected in the
Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and the Information, Commissioner Villadolid found that despite
respondent's denials, complainant was able to present certified true copies of the relevant documents which support
his allegations in the petition.

As for the alleged illicit affairs of respondent, Commissioner Villadolid discredited complainant's asse1iion that
respondent is guilty of gross immoral conduct for his alleged adulterous relations with EEE. Based on the Rep01i,
complainant was not able to discharge the burden of proving the authenticity of the email messages pertaining to
this adulterous affair; thus, they were deemed inadmissible. However, Commissioner Villadolid found merit in
complainant's claim that respondent committed grossly immoral conduct by having illicit relations with ODD, CCC,
and BBB, all while still married to Jardiolin, to wit:

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws. which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987
Constitution, specifically Article XV. Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution.
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the state.

xxxx

4.23 Moreover. Respondent violated Rule 1.01 of Canon I, and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that .. a lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct"'
nor shall a lawyer "engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in
public or private life. behave in scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession". 32

Accordingly, the IBP-CBD reached and gave the following conclusion and recommendation: V.
Conclusion/Recommendations

5.1 In view of the foregoing, and considering that there is more than sufficient evidence establishing Respondent's
gross misconduct affecting his standing and moral character as an officer of the court and member of the bar, this
Commissioner respectfully recommends that Respondent be suspended from the practice of law for a period of two
(2) years with a STERN WARNING that Respondent should reform his conduct in a manner consistent with the
norms prescribed by the Canons of Professional Responsibility. 33

Findings of the IBP Board of Governors

On March 20, 2013, the Board of Governors of the IBP issued a Resolution 34 adopting and approving, with
modification, the Report and Recommendation of Commissioner Villadolid. As modified, the Board of Governors
disbarred respondent, thus:

RESOLUTION NO. XX-2013-280

CBD Case No. 07-1973

Atty. Roy B. Ecraela vs.

Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan

RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE, as it is hereby unanimously ADOPTED and APPROVED, with modification,
the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner in the above-entitled case, herein made part of
this Resolution as Annex "A", and finding the recommendation fully supported by the evidence on record and the
applicable laws and rules and considering Respondent's violations of Article XV of the 1987 Constitution, Section 2,
Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 and Rule 7.03 of Canon 7 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath,
Atty. Ian Raymundo A. Pangalangan is hereby DISBARRED and his name Ordered Stricken Off from the Roll of
Attorneys.
 193

On July 9, 2013, the IBP received respondent's Motion for Reconsideration 35 dated July 3, 2013, to which
complainant was required to submit his comment.36

For his part, complainant filed a Motion for Reconsideration (of the IBP-CBD Report dated June 28, 2012) 37 dated
August 17, 2013. Similarly, respondent was required to comment on complainant's motion in an Order 38 dated
August 27, 2013. On the same date, complainant filed his Comment and/or Opposition (to the Respondent's Motion
for Reconsideration).39 Subsequently, respondent filed a Comment on/Opposition to the Motion for Reconsideration
with Leave40 dated September 12, 2013, as well as a Reply to the Comment and/or Opposition 41 dated September
20, 2013.

On May 3, 2014, the Board of Governors of the IBP passed a resolution denying respondent's motion for
reconsideration.42 Thereafter, the Director for Bar Discipline forwarded the records of this case to this Court on
November 11, 2014.43

The Issue

The issue in this case is whether the respondent committed gross immoral conduct, which would warrant his
disbarment.

The Court's Ruling

After a thorough examination of the records, the Court agrees with the Board of Governors' resolution finding that
Atty. Pangalangan's grossly immoral conduct was fully supported by the evidences offered.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 1 - A LA WYER SHALL UPHOLD THE CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES.

Rule 1.01 - A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful conduct.

xxxx

CANON 7 - A LA WYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR. Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not
engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice law, nor shall he, whether in public or private life.
behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

The practice of law is a privilege given to those who possess and continue to possess the legal qualifications for the
profession.44 Good moral character is not only required for admission to the Bar, but must also be retained in order
to maintain one's good standing in this exclusive and honored fraternity. 45

We are not unmindful of the serious consequences of disbarment or suspension proceedings against a member of
the Bar. Thus, the Court has consistently held that clearly preponderant evidence is necessary to justify the
imposition of administrative penalties on a member of the Bar. This, We explained in Aba v. De Guzman, Jr.:

Preponderance of evidence means that the evidence adduced by one side is, as a whole, superior to or has greater
weight than that of the other. It means evidence which is more convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that
which is offered in opposition thereto. Under Section I of Rule 133, in determining whether or not there is
preponderance of evidence, the court may consider the following: (a) all the facts and circumstances of the case; (b)
the witnesses' manner of testifying, their intelligence, their means and opportunity of knowing the facts to which they
are testifying. the nature of the facts to which they testify, the probability or improbability of their testimony; (c) the
witnesses' interest or want of interest. and also their personal credibility so far as the same may ultimately appear in
the trial; and (d) the number of witnesses, although it does not mean that preponderance is necessarily with the
greater number.
 194

When the evidence of the parties are evenly balanced or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates,
the decision should be against the party with the burden of proof, according to the equipoise doctrine.

To summarize, the Court has consistently held that in suspension or disbarment proceedings against lawyers, the
lawyer enjoys the presumption of innocence, and the burden of proof rests upon the complainant to prove the
allegations in his complaint. The evidence required in suspension or disbarment proceedings is preponderance of
evidence. In case the evidence of the parties are equally balanced, the equipoise doctrine mandates a decision in
favor of the respondent.46

The IBP-CBD Report sufficiently showed by preponderant evidence the grounds by which respondent has been
found committing gross immorality in the conduct of his personal affairs. This Court has, in numerous occasions,
revoked the licenses of lawyers who were proven to have not only failed to retain good moral character in their
professional and personal lives, but have also made a mockery of the institution of marriage by maintaining illicit
affairs.

In Guevarra v. Eala, respondent Atty. Eala was disbarred because he showed disrespect for an institution held
sacred by the law, by having an extramarital affair with the wife of the complainant. In doing so, he betrayed his
unfitness to be a lawyer.47

A year later, Atty. Arnobit met the same fate as Atty. Eala when the Court revoked his privilege to practice law after
his philandering ways was proven by preponderant evidence in Arnobit v. Arnobit. 48 We ruled:

As officers of the court, lawyers must not only in fact be of good moral character but must also be seen to be of
good moral character and leading lives in accordance with the highest moral standards of the community. A member
of the bar and an officer of the court is not only required to refrain from adulterous relationships or keeping a
mistress but must also so behave himself as to avoid scandalizing the public by creating the impression that he is
flouting those moral standards.

xxxx

The fact that respondent s philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession would not save the
day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct which, albeit unrelated to the actual
practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the office and unworthy of the privileges with which his
license and the law invest him. To borrow from Orbe v. Adaw, "[t]he grounds expressed in Section 27, Rule 138. of
the Rules of Court are not !imitative and are broad enough to. cover any misconduct x x x of a lawyer in his
professional or private capacity." To reiterate, possession of good moral character is not only a condition precedent
to the practice of law, but a continuing qualification for all members of the bar. 49

Similarly, in the more recent case of Dr. Elmar O. Perez v. Atty. Tristan Catindig, 50 the Court disbarred respondent
Atty. Catindig for blatantly and purposefully disregarding our laws on marriage by resorting to various legal
strategies to render a facade of validity to his invalid second marriage, despite the existence of his first marriage.
We said:

The moral delinquency that affects the fitness of a member of the bar to continue as such includes conduct that
outrages the generally accepted moral standards of the community, conduct for instance. which makes 'a mockery
of the inviolable social institution of marriage." In various cases, the Court has held that disbarment is warranted
when a lawyer abandons his lawful wife and maintains an illicit relationship with another woman who has borne him
a child.51 (emphasis ours.)

In the present case, complainant alleged that respondent carried on several adulterous and illicit relations with both
married and unmarried women between the years 1990 to 2007, including complainant's own wife. Through
documentary evidences in the form of email messages, as well as the corroborating testimonies of the witnesses
presented, complainant was able to establish respondent's illicit relations with DOD and CCC by preponderant
evidence. Respondent's main defense against the alleged illicit relations was that the same were not sufficiently
established. In his answer, respondent simply argued that complainant's petition contains self-serving averments not
supported by evidence. Respondent did not specifically deny complainant's allegations and, instead, questioned the
 195

admissibility of the supporting documents.1âwphi1 Due to respondent's own failure to attend the hearings and even
submit his own position paper, the existence of respondent's illicit relations with DDD and CCC remain
uncontroverted.

The IBP-CBD Report was correct when it found that respondent violated Article XV, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:

4.21 In engaging in such illicit relationships, Respondent disregarded the sanctity of marriage and the marital vows
protected by the Constitution and affirmed by our laws, which as a lawyer he swore under oath to protect. The 1987
Constitution, specifically A1iicle XV, Section 2 thereof clearly provides that marriage, an inviolable social institution,
is the foundation of the family and shall be protected by the State. 52 (emphasis in the original.)

Aside from respondent's illicit relations, We agree with Commissioner Villadolid' s findings that respondent violated
Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, as well as Rule I 0.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof.

The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

CANON 10 - A LA WYER OWES CANDOR, FAIRNESS AND GOOD FAITH TO THE COURT. Rule 10.01 -A lawyer
shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be
misled by any artifice.

xxx

Rule 10.03 - A lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse them to defeat the ends of justice.

In the Petition, complainant alleged that respondent was the subject of a Senate Inquiry and had a pending case for
graft and corruption against him with the Sandiganbayan, to wit:

13. Respondent has been recommended by the Senate Blue Ribbon and Justice & Human Rights Committees to be
investigated and prosecuted by the Ombudsman, the same as contained in their "Committee Final Report No. 367"
herein attached as Annex D;

14. Respondent has also been recommended by the abovementioned committees to suffer the penalty of
disbarment, among others, as evidenced by the herein attached Annex D-1, and it is believed that a case for graft
and corruption against him is still pending with the Sandiganbayan." 53

Instead of refuting these claims, respondent merely pointed out in his Answer that complainant failed to adduce
additional evidence that a case had been filed against him, and that complainant's statements were merely self-
serving averments not substantiated by any evidence. In his Reply, respondent even specifically denied
complainant's averments for "lack of knowledge and information sufficient to form a belief as to the truth or falsity
thereof."

We agree with Commissioner Villadolid's findings in the IBP-CBD Report, viz:

4.8 It (sic) is thus indisputable that Respondent's pretensions in his Answer were made in attempt to mislead this
Commission. Respondent could have easily admitted or denied said allegations or explained the same, as he (sic)
clearly had knowledge thereof, however, he (sic) chose to take advantage of Complainant's position of being not
present in the country and not being able to acquire the necessary documents, skirt the issue, and mislead the
Commission. In doing so, he has violated Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which provides that
"a lawyer owes candor, fairness and good faith to the court" as well as Rule 10.01 and Rule 10.03 thereof which
states that "a lawyer should do no falsehood nor consent to the doing of any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow
the court to be misled by any artifice" and that "a lawyer shall observe the rules of procedure and shall not misuse
them to defeat the ends of justice."
 196

4.9 Courts [as well as this Commission] are entitled to expect only complete candor and honesty from the lawyers
appearing and pleading before them. Respondent, through his actuations, has been lacking in the candor required
of him not only as a member of the Bar but also as an officer of the Court. In view of the foregoing, the Commission
finds that Respondent has violated Canon 10, Rule 10.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, for which he
should be disciplined.54 (emphasis in the original.)

In denying complainant's allegations, respondent had no other intention but to mislead the IBP, which intention was
more so established because complainant was able to submit supporting documents in the form of certified true
copies of the Senate Report, the Ombudsman's Resolution, and Information.

We also agree with Commissioner Villadolid's finding that respondent violated the lawyer's oath which he took
before admission to the Bar, which states:

I, __________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines: I will support its
Constitution and obey laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no
falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any court; I will not wittingly nor willingly promote or sue any groundless, false
or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the same: I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct
myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to the courts
as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of
evasion. So help me God.

In all, Atty. Pangalangan displayed deplorable arrogance by making a mockery out of the institution of marriage, and
taking advantage of his legal skills by attacking the Petition through technicalities and refusing to participate in the
proceedings. His actions showed that he lacked the degree of morality required of him as a member of the bar, thus
warranting the penalty of disbarment.

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing, the Court resolves to ADOPT the resolution of the IBP Board of
Governors approving and adopting, with modification, the Report and Recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner. Accordingly, respondent Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan is found GUILTY of gross immorality
and of violating Section 2 of A1iicle XV of the 1987 Constitution, Canon 1 and Rule 1.01, Canon 7 and Rule 7.03,
and Rule 10.01 of Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and the Lawyer's Oath and is hereby
DISBARRED from the practice of law.

Let a copy of this Decision be entered into the personal records of Atty. Ian Raymond A. Pangalangan with the
Office of the Bar Confidant and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys. Likewise, let copies
of this Decision be furnished to all chapters of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and circulated by the Cou1i
Administrator to all the cou1is in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision takes effect immediately.

SO ORDERED.

FIRST DIVISION

A.C. No. 10451, February 04, 2015

SPOUSES WILLIE AND AMELIA UMAGUING, Complainants, v. ATTY. WALLEN R. DE VERA, Respondents.

DECISION

PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
 197

This administrative case stemmed from a Complaint 1 for the alleged betrayal of trust, incompetence, and gross
misconduct of respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (Atty. De Vera) in his handling of the election protest case
involving the candidacy of MariecrisUmaguing (Umaguing), daughter of Sps. Willie and Amelia Umaguing
(complainants), for the SangguniangKabataan (SK) Elections, instituted before the Metropolitan Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 36 (MeTC), docketed as ELEC. CASE No. 07-1279. 2chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The Facts

As alleged in the Complaint, Umaguing ran for the position of SK Chairman in the SK Elections for the year 2007 but
lost to her rival Jose Gabriel Bungag by one (1) vote. 3 Because of this, complainants lodged an election protest and
enlisted the services of Atty. De Vera. On November 7, 2007, complainants were asked by Atty. De Vera to pay his
acceptance fee of P30,000.00, plus various court appearance fees and miscellaneous expenses in the amount of
P30,000.00.4 According to the complainants, Atty. De Vera had more than enough time to prepare and file the case
but the former moved at a glacial pace and only took action when the November 8, 2008 deadline was
looming.5 Atty. De Vera then rushed the preparation of the necessary documents and attachments for the election
protest. Two (2) of these attachments are the Affidavits 6 of material witnesses Mark Anthony Lachica (Lachica) and
Angela Almera (Almera), which was personally prepared by Atty. De Vera. At the time that the aforesaid affidavits
were needed to be signed by Lachica and Almera, they were unfortunately unavailable. To remedy this, Atty. De
Vera allegedly instructed AbethLalong-Isip (Lalong-Isip) and Hendricson Fielding (Fielding) to look for the nearest
kin or relatives of Lachica and Almera and ask them to sign over the names. 7 The signing over of Lachica’s and
Almera’s names were done by Christina Papin (Papin) and Elsa Almera-Almacen, respectively. Atty. De Vera then
had all the documents notarized before one Atty. DonatoManguiat (Atty. Manguiat). 8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

Later, however, Lachica discovered the falsification and immediately disowned the signature affixed in the affidavit
and submitted his own Affidavit,9 declaring that he did not authorize Papin to sign the document on his behalf.
Lachica’s affidavit was presented to the MeTC and drew the ire of Presiding Judge Edgardo Belosillo (Judge
Belosillo), who ruled that the affidavits filed by Atty. De Vera were falsified. Judge Belosillo pointed out that while
Atty. De Vera filed a pleading to rectify this error (i.e., an Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, 10 seeking,
among others, the withdrawal of Lachica’s and Almera’s affidavits), it was observed that such was a mere flimsy
excuse since Atty. De Vera had ample amount of time to have the affidavits personally signed by the affiants but still
hastily filed the election protest with full knowledge that the affidavits at hand were
falsified.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In further breach of his oath as a lawyer, the complainants pointed out that Atty. De Vera did not appear before the
MeTC, although promptly notified, for a certain December 11, 2007 hearing; and did not offer any explanation as to
why he was not able to attend. 12chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

The complainants then confronted Atty. De Vera and asked for an explanation regarding his non-appearance in the
court. Atty. De Vera explained that he was hesitant in handling the particular case because of the alleged favoritism
of Judge Belosillo. According to Atty. De Vera, Judge Belosillo received P60,000.00 from the defense counsel, Atty.
Carmelo Culvera, in order to acquire a favorable decision for his client. Atty. De Vera averred that he would only
appear for the case if the complainants would give him P80,000.00, which he would in turn, give to Judge Belosillo
to secure a favorable decision for Umaguing. 13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On December 12, 2007, for lack of trust and confidence in the integrity and competency of Atty. De Vera, as well as
his breach of fiduciary relations, the complainants asked the former to withdraw as their counsel and to reimburse
them the P60,000.00 in excessive fees he collected from them, considering that he only appeared twice for the
case.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In view of the foregoing, complainants sought Atty. De Vera’s disbarment. 15chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In his Counter-Affidavit, 16 Atty. De Vera vehemently denied all the accusations lodged against him by complainants.
He averred that he merely prepared the essential documents for election protest based on the statements of his
clients.17 Atty. De Vera then explained that the signing of Lachica’s falsified Affidavit was done without his
knowledge and likewise stated that it was Christina Papin who should be indicted and charged with the
corresponding criminal offense. He added that he actually sought to rectify his mistakes by filing the aforementioned
Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion in order to withdraw the affidavits of Lachica and Almera. As he
 198

supposedly felt that he could no longer serve complainants with his loyalty and devotion in view of the
aforementioned signing incident, Atty. De Vera then withdrew from the case. 18 To add, he pointed out that along with
his Formal Notice of Withdrawal of Counsel, complainants executed a document entitled “Release Waiver &
Discharge,”19 which, to him, discharges him and his law firm from all causes of action that complainants may have
against him, including the instant administrative case.

After the conduct of the mandatory conference/hearing before the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
Commission on Bar Discipline, the matter was submitted for report and recommendation.

The Report and Recommendation of the IBP

In a Report and Recommendation 20 dated December 5, 2009, the IBP Commissioner found the administrative action
to be impressed with merit, and thus recommended that Atty. De Vera be suspended from the practice of law for a
period of two (2) months.21chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

While no sufficient evidence was found to support the allegation that Atty. De Vera participated in the falsification of
Lachica’s affidavit, the IBP Commissioner ruled oppositely with respect to the falsification of Almera’s affidavit, to
which issue Atty. De Vera deliberately omitted to comment on. The Investigating Commissioner pointed out that the
testimony of Elsa Almera-Almacen, Almera’s sister – attesting that Lalong-Isip approached her and asked if she
could sign the affidavit, and her vivid recollection that Atty. De Vera was present during its signing, and that Lalong-
Isip declared to Atty. De Vera that she was not Almera – was found to be credible as it was too straightforward and
hard to ignore.22 It was also observed that the backdrop in which the allegations were made,  i.e., that the signing of
the affidavits was done on November 7, 2007, or one day before the deadline for the filing of the election protest,
showed that Atty. De Vera was really pressed for time and, hence, his resort to the odious act of advising his client’s
campaigners Lalong-Isip and Fielding to look for kin and relatives of the affiants for and in their behalf in his earnest
desire to beat the deadline set for the filing of the election protest. 23 To this, the IBP Investigating Commissioner
remarked that the lawyer’s first duty is not to his client but to the administration of justice, and therefore, his conduct
ought to and must always be scrupulously observant of the law and ethics of the
profession.24chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

In a Resolution25 dated December 14, 2012, the Board of Governors of the IBP resolved to adopt the findings of the
IBP Commissioner. Hence, for knowingly submitting a falsified document in court, a two (2) month suspension was
imposed against Atty. De Vera.

On reconsideration,26 however, the IBP Board of Governors issued a Resolution 27 dated February 11, 2014,
affirming with modification their December 14, 2012 Resolution, decreasing the period of suspension from two (2)
months to one (1) month.

The Issue Before the Court

The sole issue in this case is whether or not Atty. De Vera should be held administratively liable.

The Court’s Ruling

The Court adopts and approves the findings of the IBP, as the same were duly substantiated by the records.
However, the Court finds it apt to increase the period of suspension to six (6) months.

Fundamental is the rule that in his dealings with his client and with the courts, every lawyer is expected to be
honest, imbued with integrity, and trustworthy. These expectations, though high and demanding, are the
professional and ethical burdens of every member of the Philippine Bar, for they have been given full expression in
the Lawyer’s Oath that every lawyer of this country has taken upon admission as a bona fide member of the Law
Profession, thus:28
I, ___________________, do solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines; I will
support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will
do no falsehood, nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any
groundless, false or unlawful suit, nor give aid nor consent to the same. I will delay no man for money or malice, and
will conduct myself as a lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity as well to
 199

the courts as to my clients; and I impose upon myself this voluntary obligation without any mental reservation or
purpose of evasion. So help me God.29 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The Lawyer’s Oath enjoins every lawyer not only to obey the laws of the land but also to refrain from doing any
falsehood in or out of court or from consenting to the doing of any in court, and to conduct himself according to the
best of his knowledge and discretion with all good fidelity to the courts as well as to his clients. Every lawyer is a
servant of the law, and has to observe and maintain the rule of law as well as be an exemplar worthy of emulation
by others. It is by no means a coincidence, therefore, that the core values of honesty, integrity, and trustworthiness
are emphatically reiterated by the Code of Professional Responsibility. 30 In this light, Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility provides that “[a] lawyer shall not do any falsehood, nor consent to the doing of
any in Court; nor shall he mislead, or allow the Court to be misled by any artifice.”

After an assiduous examination of the records, the Court finds itself in complete agreement with the IBP
Investigating Commissioner, who was affirmed by the IBP Board of Governors, in holding that Atty. De Vera
sanctioned the submission of a falsified affidavit, i.e.,Almera’s affidavit, before the court in his desire to beat the
November 8, 2008 deadline for filing the election protest of Umaguing. To this, the Court is wont to sustain the IBP
Investigating Commissioner’s appreciation of Elsa Almera-Almacen’s credibility as a witness given that nothing
appears on record to seriously belie the same, and in recognition too of the fact that the IBP and its officers are in
the best position to assess the witness’s credibility during disciplinary proceedings, as they – similar to trial courts –
are given the opportunity to first-hand observe their demeanor and comportment. The assertion that Atty. De Vera
authorized the falsification of Almera’s affidavit is rendered more believable by the absence of Atty. De Vera’s
comment on the same. In fact, in his Motion for Reconsideration of the IBP Board of Governors’ Resolution dated
December 14, 2012, no specific denial was proffered by Atty. De Vera on this score. Instead, he only asserted that
he was not the one who notarized the subject affidavits but another notary public, who he does not even know or
has seen in his entire life, 31 and that he had no knowledge of the falsification of the impugned documents, much less
of the participation in using the same. 32 Unfortunately for Atty. De Vera, the Court views the same to be a mere
general denial which cannot overcome Elsa Almera-Almacen’s positive testimony that he indeed participated in the
procurement of her signature and the signing of the affidavit, all in support of the claim of falsification.

The final lining to it all – for which the IBP Board of Governors rendered its recommendation – is that Almera’s
affidavit was submitted to the MeTC in the election protest case. The belated retraction of the questioned affidavits,
through the Answer to Counterclaim with Omnibus Motion, does not, for this Court, merit significant consideration as
its submission appears to be a mere afterthought, prompted only by the discovery of the falsification. Truth be told, it
is highly improbable for Atty. De Vera to have remained in the dark about the authenticity of the documents he
himself submitted to the court when his professional duty requires him to represent his client with zeal and within the
bounds of the law.33 Likewise, he is prohibited from handling any legal matter without adequate preparation 34 or
allow his client to dictate the procedure in handling the case. 35chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

On a related point, the Court deems it apt to clarify that the document captioned “Release Waiver & Discharge”
which Atty. De Vera, in his Counter-Affidavit, claimed to have discharged him from all causes of action that
complainants may have against him, such as the present case, would not deny the Court its power to sanction him
administratively. It was held in Ylaya v. Gacott36 that:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary
A case of suspension or disbarment may proceed regardless of interest or lack of interest of the complainant. What
matters is whether, on the basis of the facts borne out by the record, the charge of deceit and grossly immoral
conduct has been proven. This rule is premised on the nature of disciplinary proceedings. A proceeding for
suspension or disbarment is not a civil action where the complainant is a plaintiff and the respondent lawyer is a
defendant. Disciplinary proceedings involve no private interest and afford no redress for private grievance. They are
undertaken and prosecuted solely for the public welfare. They are undertaken for the purpose of preserving courts
of justice from the official administration of persons unfit to practice in them. The attorney is called to answer to the
court for his conduct as an officer of the court. The complainant or the person who called the attention of the court to
the attorney’s alleged misconduct is in no sense a party, and has generally no interest in the outcome except as all
good citizens may have in the proper administration of justice.37
All told, Atty. De Vera is found guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility by submitting a falsified document before a court.

As for the penalty, the Court, in the case of Samonte v. Atty. Abellana38 (Samonte), suspended the lawyer therein
from the practice of law for six (6) months for filing a spurious document in court. In view of the antecedents in this
case, the Court finds it appropriate to impose the same here.
 200

Likewise, the Court grants the prayer for reimbursement 39 for the return of the amount of P60,000.00,40 comprised of
Atty. De Vera’s acceptance fee and other legal expenses intrinsically related to his professional engagement, 41 for
he had actually admitted his receipt thereof in his Answer before the IBP. 42chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary

As a final word, the Court echoes its unwavering exhortation in Samonte:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Disciplinary proceedings against lawyers are designed to ensure that whoever is granted the privilege to practice
law in this country should remain faithful to the Lawyer’s Oath. Only thereby can lawyers preserve their fitness to
remain as members of the Law Profession. Any resort to falsehood or deception, including adopting artifices to
cover up one’s misdeeds committed against clients and the rest of the trusting public, evinces an unworthiness to
continue enjoying the privilege to practice law and highlights the unfitness to remain a member of the Law
Profession. It deserves for the guilty lawyer stern disciplinary sanctions. 43
WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Wallen R. De Vera (respondent) is found GUILTY of violating the Lawyer’s Oath
and Rule 10.01, Canon 10 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. Accordingly, he is SUSPENDED for six (6)
months from the practice of law, effective upon receipt of this Decision, with a stern warning that any repetition of
the same or similar acts will be punished more severely.

Moreover, respondent is ORDERED to return to complainants Spouses Willie and Amelia Umaguing the amount of
P60,000.00 which he admittedly received from the latter as fees intrinsically linked to his professional engagement
within ninety (90) days from the finality of this Decision. Failure to comply with the foregoing directive will warrant the
imposition of further administrative penalties.

Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to respondent’s personal
record as attorney. Further, let copies of this Decision be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and the
Office of the Court Administrator, which is directed to circulate them to all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

Sereno, C. J., (Chairperson), Leonardo-De Castro, Bersamin, and Perez, JJ., concur.cralawlawlibrary

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
 201

A.C. No. 8481               August 3, 2010

[Formerly B.M. No. 1524]

ATTY. JOSABETH V. ALONSO and SHALIMAR P. LAZATIN, Complainants,

vs.
ATTY. IBARO B. RELAMIDA, JR., Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before us is a Complaint1 dated October 13, 2005 for disciplinary action against respondent Atty. Ibaro B. Relamida,
Jr. filed by Attys. Josabeth V. Alonso and Shalimar P. Lazatin, counsel of Servier Philippines, Incorporated for
violating the rules on forum shopping and res judicata.

The antecedent facts of the case are as follows:

In March 2001, Jennifer Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier Philippines, Incorporated
(Servier) docketed as NLRC-NCR-Case No. 30-03-01583-01, alleging constructive dismissal with prayer for
reinstatement or payment of separation pay, backwages, moral and exemplary damages.

On July 5, 2002, the Labor Arbiter ruled in favor of Servier. 2 It held that Ebanen voluntarily resigned from Servier
and was, therefore, not illegally dismissed.

Ebanen appealed at the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). On March 31, 2003, the NLRC-Third
Division affirmed the Decision of the Labor Arbiter. 3

Thus, Ebanen moved for reconsideration. However, the NLRC denied the same in a Resolution 4 dated May 5, 2003.

Unsatisfied, Ebanen filed a Petition for Certiorari before the Court of Appeals which was docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 77968. In a Decision 5 dated January 16, 2004, the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the findings of the NLRC that
Ebanen voluntarily resigned and that there was no constructive dismissal. Ebanen moved anew for reconsideration,
but was denied in a Resolution6 dated April 30, 2004.

Unrelenting, Ebanen filed a Petition for Review before the Supreme Court. However, in a Resolution 7 dated August
4, 2004, the Court found no reversible error on the part of the CA, thus, denied said petition. Ebanen filed a motion
for reconsideration, but was denied with finality in a Resolution 8 dated October 11, 2004.

Ebanen filed a Motion for Leave to Admit Second Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolutions dated August 4,
2004 and October 11, 2004, respectively. On January 19, 2005, the Court denied her motion. 9

Persistent, Ebanen filed a Motion to Admit a Third Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated January 19,
2005. On April 20, 2005, the Court denied her motion for being a prohibited pleading and noted without action
Ebanen’s third motion for reconsideration.10

On July 27, 2005, the Second Division of the Supreme Court noted without action Ebanen’s Motion for Leave to
Admit Supplemental Third Motion for Reconsideration dated June 1, 2005, in view of the entry of judgment on
February 17, 2005.11

On February 17, 2005, the Court’s Resolution dated August 4, 2004 has already become final and executory; thus,
a corresponding Entry of Judgment 12 has been issued.

However, despite said entry of judgment, Ebanen, thru her counsel, Atty. Relamida, filed a second complaint on
August 5, 2005 for illegal dismissal based on the same cause of action of constructive dismissal against Servier,
now docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-08-07222-05.
 202

Thus, on October 13, 2005, Servier, thru counsel, filed a letter-complaint addressed to the then Chief Justice Hilario
Davide, Jr., praying that respondents be disciplinary sanctioned for violation of the rules on forum shopping and res
judicata.

Subsequently, in a Resolution 13 dated November 15, 2005, the Court required both Ebanen and Atty. Relamida to
comment on the letter-complaint against them.

On January 16, 2006, respondents filed their Comments. 14 Both respondents admitted the filing of the second
complaint against Servier. They claimed that the judgment rendered by the Labor Arbiter was null and void for want
of due process, since the motion for the issuance of subpoena duces tecum for the production of vital documents
filed by the complainant was ignored by the Labor Arbiter. They opined that the dismissal did not amount to  res
judicata, since the decision was null and void for lack of due process. As a result, they claimed that there was also
no violation of the rule on forum shopping.15

On February 7, 2006, the Court referred the instant bar matter to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. 16

On January 22, 2007, the Labor Arbiter dismissed the second complaint on the grounds of res judicata and forum
shopping. It further reiterated that Ebanen voluntarily resigned from employment and was not constructively
dismissed.

On March 14, 2008, during the mandatory conference before the IBP, complainants failed to appear. Ebanen
manifested that she is not a lawyer.

Both parties were required to submit their respective position papers.

Atty. Relamida reiterated that Ebanen is not a lawyer and that she is the daughter of Atty. Leonardo Aurelio (Atty.
Aurelio), the senior partner of A.M. Sison Jr. and Partners Law Offices where he is employed as associate lawyer.

He narrated that on March 28, 2001, Ebanen filed a Complaint for illegal dismissal against Servier. He claimed that
in the beginning, Atty. Aurelio was the one who prepared and reviewed all the pleadings and it was Atty. Lapulapu
Osoteo who stood as counsel for Ebanen in the said labor case. Atty. Relamida admitted, however, that during the
filing of the second complaint he took over as counsel of Ebanen, as requested by Atty. Aurelio. 17 He also admitted
that during the pendency of the first complaint, he occasionally examined pleadings and signed as counsel for
Ebanen.18

Atty. Relamida reasoned out that as a courtesy to Atty. Aurelio and Ebanen, he had no choice but to represent the
latter. Moreover, he stressed that his client was denied of her right to due process due to the denial of her motion for
the issuance of a subpoena duces tecum. He then argued that the decision of the Labor Arbiter was null and void;
thus, there was no res judicata.19 He maintained that he did not violate the lawyer’s oath by serving the interest of
his client.

Servier, on the other hand, argued that the filing of the second complaint is a violation of the rights of Servier, since
the issue has already attained finality. It contended that Atty. Relamida violated the rules on forum shopping for the
same act of filing a second complaint. As a consequence, they are being made to defend themselves in a case that
has been settled before the labor tribunals and courts. Likewise, Servier insisted that the filing of the second
complaint was also a blatant violation of the rule on res judicata. Hence, Servier prayed that Atty. Relamida be
disciplinary dealt with due to his abuse of the processes of the courts.

On April 19, 2008, the IBP-Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) recommended that respondent Atty. Relamida
be suspended from the practice of law for six (6) months. It imposed no sanction on Ebanen for being a non-lawyer.

In its Report, the IBP found that by filing the second complaint, Atty. Relamida was guilty of violating the rules on res
judicata and forum shopping. It concluded that Atty. Relamida abused his right of recourse to the courts by filing a
complaint for a cause that had been previously rejected by the courts.
 203

On June 5, 2008, the IBP Board of Governors resolved to adopt and approve with modification as to penalty the
report of the IBP-CBD. Instead, it recommended that Atty. Relamida be suspended from the practice of law for one
(1) month for his violation of the rules on res judicata and forum shopping.

On December 7, 2009, the Office of the Bar Confidant recommended that the instant complaint be re-docketed as a
regular administrative case against Atty. Relamida.

We sustain the findings of the IBP-CBD.

All lawyers must bear in mind that their oaths are neither mere words nor an empty formality. When they take their
oath as lawyers, they dedicate their lives to the pursuit of justice. They accept the sacred trust to uphold the laws of
the land. As the first Canon of the Code of Professional Responsibility states, "[a] lawyer shall uphold the
Constitution, obey the laws of the land and promote respect for law and legal processes." Moreover, according to
the lawyer’s oath they took, lawyers should "not wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or
unlawful suit, nor give aid or consent to the same."20

In the instant case, it is clear that Atty. Relamida is guilty of forum shopping and violation of the rule on res judicata.
Atty. Relamida should have refrained from filing the second complaint against Servier. He ought to have known that
the previous dismissal was with prejudice, since it had the effect of an adjudication on the merits. He was aware of
all the proceedings which the first complaint went through as by his own admission, he participated in the
preparation of the pleadings and even signed as counsel of Ebanen occasionally. 21 He knew that the decision in the
subject case had already attained finality. Atty. Relamida was well aware that when he filed the second complaint, it
involved the same parties and same cause of action, albeit, he justified the same on the ground of nullity of the
previous dismissal.

His allegation that he was not the original counsel of Ebanen and that his intention was only to protect the rights of
his clients whom he believed were not properly addressed in the prior complaint deserves scant consideration. He
should know that once a case is decided with finality, the controversy is settled and the matter is laid to rest. The
prevailing party is entitled to enjoy the fruits of his victory, while the other party is obliged to respect the court’s
verdict and to comply with it.22

The essence of forum shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment. It exists when, as a result
of an adverse opinion in one forum, a party seeks a favorable opinion in another, or when he institutes two or more
actions or proceedings grounded on the same cause to increase the chances of obtaining a favorable decision. An
important factor in determining its existence is the vexation caused to the courts and the parties-litigants by the filing
of similar cases to claim substantially the same reliefs. Forum shopping exists where the elements of litis
pendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in another. Thus, the
following requisites should concur:23

x x x (a) identity of parties, or at least such parties as represent the same interests in both actions, (b) identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of the two
preceding particulars is such that any judgment rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is
successful, amount to res judicata in the action under consideration.

A lawyer owes fidelity to the cause of his client, but not at the expense of truth and the administration of justice. The
filing of multiple petitions constitutes abuse of the court’s processes and improper conduct that tends to impede,
obstruct and degrade the administration of justice and will be punished as contempt of court. Needless to state, the
lawyer who files such multiple or repetitious petitions (which obviously delays the execution of a final and executory
judgment) subjects himself to disciplinary action for incompetence (for not knowing any better) or for willful violation
of his duties as an attorney to act with all good fidelity to the courts, and to maintain only such actions as appear to
him to be just and are consistent with truth and honor. 24

The filing of another action concerning the same subject matter, in violation of the doctrine of res judicata, runs
contrary to Canon 12 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, which requires a lawyer to exert every effort and
consider it his duty to assist in the speedy and efficient administration of justice. By his actuations, respondent also
 204

violated Rule 12.02 and Rule 12.04 of the Code, as well as a lawyer’s mandate "to delay no man for money or
malice."25

The Court has, time and again, warned lawyers not to resort to forum shopping for this practice clogs the court
dockets. Their primary duty is to assist the courts in the administration of justice. Any conduct which tends to delay,
impede or obstruct the administration of justice contravenes such lawyer’s duty. 26 This we will not tolerate.1avvphi1

In cases of similar nature, 27 the penalty imposed by this Court was six (6) months suspension from the practice of
law. Thus, consistent with the existing jurisprudence, we find that, in this case, the suspension of six (6) months
from practice of law is proper.

WHEREFORE, Resolution No. XVIII-2008-286, dated June 5, 2008, of the IBP, which found respondent Atty. Ibaro
B. Relamida, Jr. guilty of violating the Rules on Res Judicata and Forum Shopping, is AFFIRMED. Atty. Relaminda
is hereby SUSPENDED for six (6) months from the practice of law, effective upon the receipt of this Decision. He is
warned that a repetition of the same or a similar act will be dealt with more severely.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant, to be appended to the personal record of
Atty. Relamida as a member of the Bar; the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and the Office of the Court
Administrator, for circulation to all courts in the country for their information and guidance.

This Decision shall be immediately executory.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC
 205

A.C. No. 7474               September 9, 2014

PRESIDING JUDGE JOSE L. MADRID, REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH 51, SORSOGON
CITY, Complainant,
vs.
ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Complainant Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court has had enough of the respondent, a law practitioner, who
had engaged in the unethical practice of filing frivolous administrative cases against judges and personnel of the
courts because the latter filed a motion to inhibit the complainant from hearing a pending case. Hence, the
complainant has initiated this complaint for the disbarment of respondent on the ground of gross misconduct and
gross violation of the Code of Professional Responsibility.

Antecedents

On February 7, 2007, Atty. Juan S.Dealca entered his appearance in Criminal Case No. 2006-6795, entitled "People
of the Philippines v. Philip William Arsenault" then pending in Branch 51 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in
Sorsogon City, presided by complainant Judge Jose L. Madrid. 1 Atty. Dealca sought to replace Atty. Vicente Judar
who had filed a motion to withdraw as counsel for the accused. But aside from entering his appearance as counsel
for the accused, Atty. Dealca also moved that Criminal Case No. 2006-6795 be re-raffled to another Branch of the
RTC "[c]onsidering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned," where" he
does not appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, and the latter does not also hear cases handled by the
undersigned."2

Judge Madrid denied Atty. Dealca’s motion to re-raffle through an order issued on February 14, 2007, 3 viz:

xxxx

This Court will not allow that a case be removed from it just because of the personal sentiments of counsel who was
not even the original counsel of the litigant.

Moreover, the motion of Atty. Dealca is an affront to the integrity of this Court and the other Courts in this province
as hewould like it to appear that jurisdiction over a Family Court case is based on his whimsical dictates.

This was so because Atty. Dealca had filed Administrative as well as criminal cases against this Presiding Judge
which were all dismissed by the Hon. Supreme Court for utter lack ofmerit. This is why he should not have accepted
this particular case so as not to derail the smooth proceedings in this Court with his baseless motions for inhibition.
It is the lawyer’s duty to appear on behalf of a client in a case but not to appear for a client to remove a case from
the Court. This is unethical practice in the first order.

WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the Motion of Atty. Juan S. Dealca is hereby DENIED. Relative to the Motion
to Withdraw as Counsel for the Accused filed by Atty. Vicente C. Judar dated January 29, 2007, the same is hereby
DENIED for being violative of the provisions of Section 26 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.

So also, the Appearance of Atty. Juan S. Dealca as new counsel for accused Philip William Arsenault is likewise
DENIED.

SO ORDERED.
 206

Consequently, Judge Madrid filed a letter complaint 4 in the Office of the Bar Confidant citing Atty. Dealca’sunethical
practice of entering his appearance and then moving for the inhibition of the presiding judge on the pretext of
previous adverse incidents between them.

On April 10, 2007, we treated the complaint as a regular administrative complaint, and required Atty. Dealca to
submit his comment.5

In his comment-complaint,6 Atty. Dealca asserted that Judge Madrid’s issuance of the February 14, 2007 order
unconstitutionally and unlawfully deprived the accused of the right to counsel, to due process, and to a fair and
impartial trial; that Judge Madrid exhibited bias in failing to act on the motion to lift and set aside the warrant ofarrest
issued against the accused; and that it should be Judge Madrid himself who should be disbarred and accordingly
dismissed from the Judiciary for gross ignorance of the law.

On July 17, 2007, the Court referred the matter to the IBP for appropriate investigation,report and
recommendation.7 Several months thereafter, the Court also indorsed pertinent documents in connection with A.M.
OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ, entitled "Joseph Yap III v. Judge Jose L. Madrid and Court Stenographer MerlynD.
Dominguez, both of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Branch 51, Sorsogon City" (Yap v. Judge Madrid). 8

On June 6, 2007, the Court in Yap v. Judge Madriddismissed for its lack of merit the administrative complaint
against Judge Madrid for allegedly falsifying the transcript of stenographic notes of the hearing on March 4, 2005 in
Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled Joseph D. Yap V, et al. v. Joseph H. Yap III, but referred to the Integrated Bar of
the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report and recommendation the propensity of Atty. Dealca to file
administrative or criminal complaints against judges and court personnel whenever decisions, orders or processes
were issued adversely to him and his clients.9

In compliance with the referral,the IBP-Sorsogon Chapter submitted its report with the following findings and
recommendation:10

xxxx

The documentary evidence offered by complainants show that respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca filed by himself (1)
Bar Matter No. 1197 and acting as counsel for the complainants (2) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ; (3)
OMB-L-C-05-0478-E;(4) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ and (5) Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ.
These five (5) cases are factual evidence of the cases that respondent had filed by himself and as counsel for the
complainants against court officers, judges and personnel as a consequence of the IBP Election and incidents in
cases that respondent had handled as counselfor the parties in the said cases.

It will be noted that in Bar Matter No. 1197, the respondents were judges (Judge Jose L. Madrid & Judge Honesto A.
Villamor) and lawyers in IBP Sorsogon Chapters, who are no doubt officers of the court, and the case aroused (sic)
out ofthe unfavorable consensus of the IBP chapter members that was adverse to the position of the respondent.
The other four (4) cases aroused [sic] out of the cases handled by respondent for the complainants who failed to
secure a favorable action from the court.

Specifically, Adm. Matter OCA IPI No. 04-2113-RTJ was a result of the case before the sala of Judge Jose L.
Madrid (RTC 51) entitled "Alita P. Gomez vs. Rodrigo Jarabo, et al.," for: Accion Publiciana and Damages, that was
handled by respondent for the complainant Alita Gomez. OMB-L-C-0478-E was an off shoot of Civil Case No. 2001-
6842 entitled "Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for: Support pending before the sala
ofcomplainant Judge Jose L. Madrid (RTC 51). Respondent, after an unfavorable decision against defendant
Joseph H. Yap III, entered his appearance and pleaded for the latter. As a result of an adverse order, this
ombudsman case arose.

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2191-RTJ was also a result of the Civil Case No. 5403 entitled "Salve Dealca
Latosa vs. Atty. Henry Amado Roxas, with Our Lady’s Village Foundation and Most Reverend Arnulfo Arcilla, DD as
third party defendant that was heard, tried, decided and pending execution before the sala of Judge Honesto A.
Villamor (RTC 52).
 207

Administrative Matter OCA IPI No. 05-2385-RTJ was also a consequence of Civil Case No. 2001-6842 entitled
"Marilyn D. Yap, Joseph D. Yap V, et al., vs. Joseph H. Yap III" for Support pending before the sala of complainant
JudgeJose L. Madrid (RTC 51).

All these four (4) cases are precipitated by the adverse ruling rendered by the court against the clients of the
respondent that instead of resorting to the remedies available under the Rules of Procedure, respondent assisted
his clients in filing administrative and criminal case against the judges and personnel of the court.

The other documentary evidence of the complainants such as the (a) VERIFIED COMPLAINT dated March 7, 2003
in Civil Service Case entitled "EDNA GOROSPE-DEALCA vs. JULIANA ENCINASCARINO, et al.; (b) NOTICE OF
RESOLUTION on October 22, 2005 in Adm. Case No. 6334 entitled "SOFIAJAO vs. ATTY. EPIFANIA RUBY
VELACRUZ-OIDA" passed by the Board ofGovernors of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines which Resolution No.
XVII-2005-92 provides: "RESOLVED to ADOPT and APPROVE the Report and Recommendation of the
Investigating Commissioner dismissing the case for lacks (sic) merit; (c) RESOLUTION of the Third Division of the
Supreme Court dated February 1, 2006 in Administrative Case No. 6334 (Sofia Jao vs. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-
Oida) – The notice of resolution dated October 22, 2005 ofthe Integrated Bar ofthe Philippines (IBP) dismissing the
case for lack of merit; (d) VERIFIED COMPLAINT in Adm. Case No. 6334 dated February 17, 2004 entitled "Sofia
Jao vs. Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida" for: Malpractice (Forum Shopping), and (e) ORDER dated January 18,
2007 by Acting Presiding Judge RAUL E. DE LEON in Criminal Cases Nos. 2451 to 2454 entitled "People of the
Philippines vs. Cynthia Marcial, et al. For: Falsification of Medical Records" which provides for the dismissal of the
cases against all the accused, do not show participation on the part of the respondent that he signed the pleadings,
although the verified complaint is one executed by the wife of the respondent. Moreover, these cases are pertaining
to persons other than judges and personnel of the court that are not squarely covered by the present investigation
against respondent, although, it is an undeniable fact that respondent had appeared for and in behalf of his wife, the
rest of the complainants in the Civil Service Case and Sofia Jao against Land Bank of the Philippines, the latter case
resulted in the administrative case of Atty. Epifania Ruby Velacruz-Oida, respondent’s sister member of the Bar. All
these documentary evidence from (a) to (e) are helpful in determining the "PROPENSITY" of the respondent as a
member of the bar in resorting to harassment cases instead of going through the procedures provided for by the
Rules of Court in the event of adverse ruling, order or decision of the court.

xxxx

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully recommended that in view of the above-foregoings [sic], a penalty of
SUSPENSION in the practice of law for a period of six (6) monthsfrom finality of the decision be ordered against
respondent Atty. Juan S. Dealca.

Findings and Recommendation of the IBP

IBP Commissioner Salvador B. Hababag ultimately submitted his Report and Recommendation 11 finding Atty.
Dealca guilty of violating the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility by filing frivolous
administrative and criminalcomplaints; and recommending that Atty. Dealca be suspended from the practice of law
for one year because his motion to inhibit Judge Madrid was devoid of factual or legal basis, and was grounded on
purely personal whims.

In Resolution No. XVIII-2008-41, 12 the IBP Board of Governors modified the recommendation and dismissed the
administrative complaint for its lack of merit, thus:

RESOLVED to AMEND, as it is hereby AMENDED, the Recommendation of the Investigating Commissioner, and
APPROVE the DISMISSAL of the above-entitled case for lack of merit. Judge Madrid filed a petition, 13 which the IBP
Board of Governors treated as a motion for reconsideration, and soon denied through its Resolution No. XX-2012-
545.14

Issues

(1) Did Atty. Dealca file frivolousadministrative and criminal complaints against judges and court personnel
in violation of the Lawyer’s Oath and the Code of Professional Responsibility?
 208

(2) Was Atty. Dealca guilty of unethical practice in seeking the inhibition of Judge Madrid in Criminal Case
No. 2006-6795?

Ruling of the Court

We REVERSE Resolution No. XX-2012-545.

Atty. Dealca must guard against his own impulse of initiating unfounded suits

Atty. Dealca insists on the propriety of the administrative and criminal cases he filed against judges and court
personnel, including Judge Madrid. He argues that as a vigilant lawyer, he was duty bound to bring and prosecute
cases against unscrupulous and corrupt judges and court personnel. 15

We see no merit in Atty. Dealca’s arguments.

Although the Court always admires members of the Bar who are imbued with a high sense of vigilance to weed out
from the Judiciary the undesirable judges and inefficient or undeserving court personnel, any acts taken in that
direction should be unsullied by any taint of insincerity or self interest. The noble cause of cleansing the ranks of the
Judiciary is not advanced otherwise. It is for that reason that Atty. Dealca’s complaint against Judge Madrid has
failed our judicious scrutiny, for the Court cannot find any trace of idealism or altruismin the motivations for initiating
it. Instead, Atty. Dealca exhibited his proclivity for vindictiveness and penchant for harassment, considering that, as
IBP Commissioner Hababag pointed out, 16 his bringing of charges against judges, court personnel and even his
colleagues in the Law Profession had all stemmed from decisions or rulings being adverse to his clients or his side.
He well knew, therefore, that he was thereby crossing the line of propriety, because neither vindictiveness nor
harassment could be a substitute for resorting tothe appropriate legal remedies. He should now be reminded that
the aim of every lawsuit should be to render justice to the parties according to law, not to harass them. 17

The Lawyer’s Oath is a source ofobligations and duties for every lawyer, and any violation thereof by an attorney
constitutes a ground for disbarment, suspension, or other disciplinary action. 18 The oath exhorts upon the members
of the Bar not to "wittingly or willingly promote or sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit." These are not mere
facile words, drift and hollow, but a sacred trust that must be upheld and keep inviolable. 19

As a lawyer, therefore, Atty. Dealca was aware of his duty under his Lawyer’s Oath not to initiate groundless, false
or unlawful suits. The duty has also been expressly embodied inRule 1.03, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility thuswise:

Rule 1.03 – A lawyer shall not, for any corrupt motive or interest, encourage any suit or proceeding or delay any
man’s cause.

His being an officer of the court should have impelled him to see to it that the orderly administration of justice must
not be unduly impeded. Indeed, as he must resist the whims and caprices ofhis clients and temper his clients’
propensities to litigate,20 so must he equally guard himself against his own impulses of initiating unfounded suits.
While it is the Court’s duty to investigate and uncover the truth behindcharges against judges and lawyers, it is
equally its duty to shield them from unfounded suits that are intended to vex and harass them, among other things. 21

Moreover, Atty. Dealca must be mindful of his mission to assist the courts in the proper administration of justice. He
disregarded his mission because his filing of the unfounded complaints, including this one against Judge Madrid,
increased the workload of the Judiciary. Although no person should be penalized for the exercise ofthe right to
litigate, the right must nonetheless be exercised in good faith. 22 Atty. Dealca’s bringing of the numerous
administrative and criminal complaints against judges, court personnel and his fellow lawyers did not evince any
good faith on his part, considering that he made allegations against them therein that he could not substantially
prove, and are rightfully deemed frivolous and unworthy of the Court’s precious time and serious consideration.
 209

Repeatedly denying any wrongdoing in filing the various complaints, Atty. Dealca had the temerity to confront even
the Court with the following arrogant tirade, to wit:

With due respect, what could be WRONG was the summary dismissal of cases filed against erring judges and court
personnel ‘for lack of merit’, i.e. without even discussing the facts and the law of the case. 23

Atty. Dealca was apparently referring to the minute resolutions the Court could have promulgated in frequently
dismissing his unmeritorious petitions. His arrogant posturing would not advance his cause now. He thereby
demonstrated his plain ignorance of the rules of procedure applicable to the Court.The minute resolutions have
been issued for the prompt dispatch of the actions by the Court. 24 Whenever the Court then dismisses a petition for
review for its lack of merit through a minute resolution, it is understood that the challenged decision or order,
together with all its findings of fact and law, is deemed sustained or upheld, 25 and the minute resolution then
constitutes the actual adjudication on the merits of the case. The dismissal of the petition, or itsdenial of due course
indicates the Court’s agreement with and its adoption of the findings and conclusions of the court a quo. 26

The requirement for stating the facts and the law does not apply to the minute resolutions that the Court issuesin
disposing of a case. The Court explained why in Borromeo v. Court of Appeals: 27

The [Supreme] Court x x x disposes of the bulk of its cases by minute resolutions and decrees them as final and
executory, as where a case is patently without merit, where the issues raised are factual in nature, where the
decision appealed from is supported by substantial evidence and is in accord with the facts of the case and the
applicable laws, where it is clear from the records that the petition is filed merely to forestall the early execution of
judgment and for non-compliance with the rules. The resolution denying due course or dismissing the petition
always gives the legal basis.

xxxx

The Court is not ‘duty bound’ to render signed Decisions all the time. It has ample discretion to formulate Decisions
and/or Minute Resolutions, provided a legal basis is given, depending on its evaluation of a case.

The constitutionality of the minute resolutions was the issue raised in Komatsu Industries (Phils.), Inc. v. Court of
Appeals.28 The petitioner contended that the minute resolutions violated Section 14, 29 Article VIII of the Constitution.
The Court, throughJustice Regalado, declared that resolutions were not decisions withinthe constitutional
contemplation, for the former "merely hold that the petition for review should not be entertained and even ordinary
lawyers have all this time so understood it; and the petition to review the decisionof the Court of Appeals is not a
matter of right but of sound judicial discretion, hence there is no need to fully explain the Court’s denial since, for
one thing, the facts and the law are already mentioned in the Court of Appeal’s decision." It pointed out that the
constitutional mandate was applicable only in cases submitted for decision, i.e., given due course to and after the
filing of briefs or memoranda and/or other pleadings, but not where the petition was being refused due course, with
the resolutions for that purpose stating the legal basis of the refusal. Thus, when the Court, after deliberating on the
petition and the subsequent pleadings, decided to deny due course to the petition and stated that the questions
raised were factual, or there was no reversible error in the lower court’s decision, there was a sufficient compliance
with the constitutional requirement.30

II

Atty. Dealca violated Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility

Atty. Dealca maintains that Judge Madrid should have "in good grace inhibited himself" upon his motion toinhibit in
order to preserve "confidence in the impartiality of the judiciary." 31 However, IBP Commissioner Hababag has
recommended that Atty. Dealca be sanctioned for filing the motion to inhibit considering that the motion, being
purely based on his personal whims, was bereft of factual and legal bases. 32

The recommendation of IBP Commissioner Hababag is warranted.

 210

Lawyers are licensed officers of the courts empowered to appear, prosecute and defend the legal causes for their
clients. As a consequence, peculiar duties, responsibilities and liabilities are devolved upon them by law. Verily, their
membership in the Bar imposes certain obligations upon them. 33

In this regard, Canon 11 and Rule 11.04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility pertinently state:

Canon 11 — A lawyer shall observe and maintain the respect due to the courts and to the judicial officers and
should insist on similar conduct by others.

xxxx

Rule 11.04 — A lawyer shall not attribute to a Judge motives not supported by the record or haveno materiality to
the case.1âwphi1

In light of the foregoing canons, all lawyers are bound to uphold the dignity and authority of the courts, and to
promote confidence in the fair administration of justice. It is the respect for the courts that guarantees the stability of
the judicial institution; elsewise, the institution would be resting on a very shaky foundation. 34

The motion to inhibit filed by Atty. Dealca contained the following averment, to wit:

Considering the adverse incidents between the incumbent Presiding Judge and the undersigned, he does not
appear before the incumbent Presiding Judge, andthe latter does not also hear cases handled by the undersignedx
x x.35 (Bold emphasis supplied)

Atty. Dealca’s averment that Judge Madrid did not hear cases being handled by him directly insinuated that judges
could choose the cases they heard, and could refuse to hear the cases in which hostility existed between the judges
and the litigants or their counsel. Such averment, if true at all, should have been assiduously substantiated by him
because it put in bad light not only Judge Madrid but all judges in general. Yet, he did not even include any
particulars that could have validated the averment. Nor did he attach any document to support it.

Worth stressing, too, is that the right of a party to seek the inhibition or disqualification of a judge who does not
appear to be wholly free, disinterested, impartial and independent in handling the case must be balanced with the
latter’s sacred duty to decide cases without fear of repression. Thus, it was incumbent upon Atty. Dealca to establish
by clear and convincing evidence the ground of bias and prejudice in order to disqualify Judge Madrid from
participating in a particular trial in which Atty. Dealca was participating as a counsel. 36 The latter’s bare allegations of
Judge Madrid’s partiality or hostility did not suffice, 37 because the presumption that Judge Madrid would undertake
his noble role to dispense justice according to law and the evidence and without fear or favor should only be
overcome by clear and convincing evidence to the contrary. 38 As such, Atty. Dealca clearly contravened his duties
as a lawyer as expressly stated in Canon 11 and Rule 11.04, supra.

On a final note, it cannot escape our attention that this is not the first administrative complaint to be ever brought
against Atty. Dealca.1avvphi1 In Montano v. Integrated Bar of the Philippines, 39 we reprimanded him for violating
Canon 22 and Rule 20.4, Canon 20 of the Code of Professional Responsibility, and warned him that a repetition of
the same offense would be dealt with more severely. Accordingly, based on the penalties the Court imposed on
erring lawyers found violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03, 40 and Canon 11, Rule 11.04 41 of the Code, we deem appropriate
to suspend Atty. Dealca from the practice of law for a period one year. ACCORDINGLY, the Court FINDS and
DECLARES respondent ATTY. JUAN S. DEALCA GUILTY of violating Canon 1, Rule 1.03 and Canon 11, Rule 11.
04 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and SUSPENDS him from the practice of law for one year effective
from notice of this decision, with a STERN WARNING that any similar infraction in the future will be dealt with more
severely.

Let copies of this decision be furnished to the Office of the Bar Confidant to be appended to Atty. Dealca's personal
record as an attorney; to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines; and to all courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.
211