In the Matter of the Integration of the Bar of
the Philippines January 9, 1973
PER CURIAM:
FACTS:
(December 1, 1972 – Commission on Bar Integration
submitted a report with the earnest
recommendation that “ this Honorable Court ordain
the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines as soon
as possible through the adoption and promulgation
of an appropriate Court Rule”)
- Adm. Case No. 526 formally prays the
Court to order the integration of the Philippine Bar,
after due hearing, giving recognition as far as
possible and practicable to existing provincial and
other local Bar associations
- 1970 – the court created the Commission on
Bar Integration for ascertaining the advisability of
unifying the Philippine Bar
- September 1971 – Congress passed House
Bill No. 3277 entitled “An Act Providing for the
Integration of the Philippine Bar, and Appropriating
Funds therefore”
- Sept. 17, 1971 – President Marcos signed
the measure
- Reports of the Commission abounds with
argument on the constitutionality of Bar Integration
and contains all necessary factual data bearing on
the advisability (practicability and necessity) of Bar
Integration
ISSUES:
1. Does the Court have the power to integrate the
Philippine Bar?
2. Would the integration of the Bar be
constitutional?
3. Should the Court ordain the Integration of the Bar
at this time?
HELD:
1. YES. Article VIII, Sec. 13 of the Constitution
provides that: “ to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts, and
the admission to the rule of law”
- it is an inherent part of the Court’s
constitutional authority over the Bar
- RA 6307, in providing that the SC may
adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippines Bar, neither confers a new power nor
restricts the court’s inherent power it is a mere
legislative declaration that the Integration of the
Bar will promote public interest
2. YES. Courts have inherent power to supervise and
regulate the practice
- the practice of law is not a vested right,
but a privilege moreover, clothed with public
interest, because a lawyer owes duties not only to his
brethren in the profession, to the courts and to the
nation
- because it is a privilege clothed with public
interest, it is far and just that the exercise of that
privilege be regulated to assure compliance with the
lawyer’s public responsibilities
3. YES. The Court is fully convinced that the
integration of the bar is “perfectly constitutional and
legally unobjectionable” within the context of
contemporary conditions in the Philippines, has
become an imperative means to raise the standards
of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public
responsibility fully and effectively
IN RE CUNANAN 94 PHIL 534 MARCH 18, 1954
FACTS
Congress passed Rep. Act No. 972, or what is known
as the Bar Flunkers Act, in 1952. Under the Rules of
Court governing admission to the bar, "in order that
a candidate (for admission to the Bar) may be
deemed to have passed his examinations
successfully, he must have obtained a general
average of 75 per cent in all subjects, without falling
below 50 per cent in any subject."(Rule 127, sec. 14,
Rules of Court).
Believing themselves as fully qualified to practice
law as those reconsidered and passed by this court,
and feeling conscious of having been discriminated
against (See Explanatory Note to R. A. No. 972),
unsuccessful candidates who obtained averages of a
few percentage lower than those admitted to the Bar
agitated in Congress for, and secured in 1951 the
passage of Senate Bill No. 12 which, among others,
reduced the passing general average in bar
examinations to 70 per cent effective since 1946.
The President requested the views of the court on
the bill. Complying with that request, seven
members of the court subscribed to and submitted
written comments adverse thereto, and shortly
thereafter the President vetoed it. Congress did not
override the veto. Instead, it approved Senate Bill
No. 371 which is an Act to fix the passing marks for
bar examinations from nineteen hundred and forty-
six up to and including nineteen Hundred and fifty-
five, embodying substantially the provisions of the
vetoed bill.
Republic Act 972 has for its object, according to its
author, to admit to the Bar those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparations. By and large, the law is
contrary to public interest since it qualifies 1,094
law graduates who had inadequate preparation for
the practice of law profession, as evidenced by their
failure in the exams.
After its approval, many of the unsuccessful postwar
candidates filed petitions for admission to the bar
invoking its provisions, while others whose motions
for the revision of their examination papers were
still pending also invoked the aforesaid law as an
additional ground for admission. To avoid injustice
to individual petitioners, the court first reviewed the
motions for reconsideration, irrespective of whether
or not they had invoked Republic Act No. 972.
Unfortunately, the court has found no reason to
revise their grades. If they are to be admitted to the
bar, it must be pursuant to Republic Act No. 972
which, if declared valid, should be applied equally to
all concerned whether they have filed petitions or
not.
ISSUE: Whether or Not RA No. 972 is constitutional
and valid.
HELD: RA No. 972 has for its object, according to its
author, to admit to the Bar, those candidates who
suffered from insufficiency of reading materials and
inadequate preparation.
In the judicial system from which ours has been
evolved, the admission, suspension, disbarment and
reinstatement of attorneys at law in the practice of
the profession and their supervision have been
indisputably a judicial function and responsibility.
We have said that in the judicial system from which
ours has been derived, the admission, suspension,
disbarment or reinstatement of attorneys at law in
the practice of the profession is concededly judicial.
On this matter, there is certainly a clear distinction
between the functions of the judicial and legislative
departments of the government.
It is obvious, therefore, that the ultimate power to
grant license for the practice of law belongs
exclusively to this Court, and the law passed by
Congress on the matter is of permissive character,
or as other authorities may say, merely to fix the
minimum conditions for the license.
Reasons for Unconstitutionality: 1. There was a
manifest encroachment on the constitutional
responsibility of the Supreme Court. 2. It is in effect
a judgment revoking the resolution of the court, and
only the S.C. may revise or alter them, in attempting
to do so R.A. 972 violated the Constitution. 3. That
congress has exceeded its power to repeal, alter, and
supplement the rules on admission to the bar (since
the rules made by congress must elevate the
profession, and those rules promulgated are
considered the bare minimum.) 4. It is a class
legislation 5. Art. 2 of R.A. 972 is not embraced in
the title of the law, contrary to what the constitution
enjoins, and being inseparable from the provisions of
art. 1, the entire law is void.
Republic Act Number 972 is held to be
unconstitutional.
Cayetano v. Monsod, G.R. No. 100113
Subject matter: Definition of the Practice of Law
FACTS:
• Respondent, Christian Monsod was
nominated by President Corazon C. Aquino to the
position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter
received by the Secretariat of the Commission on
Appointments on April 25, 1991.
• Petitioner opposed the nomination because
allegedly Monsod does not possess the required
qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.
• On June 5, 1991, the Commission on
Appointments confirmed the nomination of Monsod
as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18, 1991,
he took his oath of office. On the same day, he
assumed office as Chairman of the COMELEC.
• Challenging the validity of the confirmation
by the Commission on Appointments of Monsod's
nomination, petitioner as a citizen and taxpayer,
filed the instant petition for certiorari and
Prohibition praying that said confirmation and the
consequent appointment of Monsod as Chairman of
the Commission on Elections be declared null and
void.
ISSUE:
WON Respondent, Christian Monsod possesses the
10 year practice of law qualification to be
CHAIRMAN of COMELEC.
RULING: YES.
• First, laying down the qualifications
provided by 1987 Const. Under Sec. 1, Par. 1, Art.
IX-C;
- COMELEC composed of a chairman and 6
commissioners who shall be natural born citizens of
the PH
- At the time of appointment 35 years old
- Holders of any college degree
- Not have been candidates of any elective
position in the immediately preceding elections.
- CHAIRMAN and the MAJORITY shall be
MEMBERS OF THE PH B AR who have been
engaged in the practice of LAW for at
least 10 years.
• Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the
Philippine Bar, having passed the bar examinations
of 1960 with a grade of 86.55%. He has been a dues
paying member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines since its inception in 1972-73. He has
also been paying his professional license fees as
lawyer for more than ten years. Atty. Monsod’s past
work experiences as a lawyer-economist, a lawyer-
manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-
legislator of both the rich and the poor, verily more
than satisfy the constitutional requirement that he
has been engaged in the practice of law for at least
ten years.
• The practice of law is not limited to the
conduct of cases in court. A person is also considered
to be in the practice of law when he: “. . . for valuable
consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their
rights under the law, or appears in a representative
capacity as an advocate in proceedings pending or
prospective, before any court, commissioner, referee,
board, body, committee, or commission constituted
by law or authorized to settle controversies.
Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative
capacity, engages in the business of advising clients
as to their rights under the law, or while so engaged
performs any act or acts either in court or outside of
court for that purpose, is engaged in the practice of
law.”
IN RE PETITION TO SIGN THE ROLL OF
ATTORNEYS, MICHAEL MEDADO
FACTS:
● Michael Medado graduated from the
University of the Philippines with the
degree of Bachelor of Laws in 1979 and the
same year, he passed the Bar exams (82.7
GWA)
● May 7, 1980 – he took the Attorney’s Oath
at the PICC
● May 13, 1980 - He was scheduled to sign in
the Roll of Atorneys but failed to do so,
allegedly because he had misplaced the
Notice to Sign the ROA given by the Bar
Office
● Years later, he found the Notice to sign the
ROA and was then that he realized that he
had not signed the roll and that what he
signed was the attendance at the entrance
of the PICC
● By the time he found the notice, he was
already working, doing corporate and
taxation work and that he was not actively
involved in litigation practice
● In 2005, when Medado attended the
Mandatory Continuing Legal Education
(MCLE) seminars, he was required to
provide his roll number in order for his
MCLE compliances to be credited but was
not able to because he did not sign the roll
of attorneys
● Feb 6, 202, Medado filed an instant petition
praying that he be allowed to sign in the
ROA
 ● Office of the Bar confidant conducted a
clarificatory conference and recommended
that the petition be denied for petitioner’s
gross negligence, gross misconduct and
utter lack of merit
ISSUE: WON Medado may sign the Roll of
Attorneys
HELD: YES
● Not allowing Medado to sign in the ROA
would be akin to imposing upon him the
ultimate penalty of disbarment.
● Petitioner demonstrated good faith and
good moral character when he finally filed
the instant petition as he himself
acknowledged his own lapse, even after 30
years had passed
● Petitioner has not been subject to any
action for disqualification from the practice
of law, which shows that he adhered to the
requirements of ethics of the profession
● While the practice of law is not a right but
a privilege, this Court will not
unwarrantedly withhold this privilege from
individuals who have shown mental fitness
and moral fiber to withstand the rigors of
the profession
● Under the Rules of Court, the unauthorized
practice of law by one’s assuming to be an
attorney of officer of the court, and acting as
such without authority, may constitute
indirect contempt of court
● Knowingly engaging in unauthorized
practice of law likewise transgress Canon 9,
CPR: “A lawyer shall not, directly or
indirectly, assist in the unauthorized
practice of law.”
● Canon 9 warrants the penalty of
Suspension from the practice of law
● As Medado is not yet a full-fledged lawyer,
we cannot suspend him from practice of law
! we see it fit to impose upon him a penalty
akin to suspension by allowing him to sign
in the ROA 1 year after receipt of this
resolution
PAGUIA VS. OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
FACTS:
Petitioner Alan F. Paguia (petitioner), as citizen and
taxpayer, filed this original action for the writ of
certiorari to invalidate President Gloria Macapagal-
Arroyo’s nomination of respondent former Chief
Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr. (respondent Davide)
as Permanent Representative to the United Nations
(UN) for violation of Section 23 of Republic Act No.
7157 (RA 7157), thePhilippine Foreign Service Act
of 1991.
To this effect, Atty. Allan F. Paguia, herein
petitioner questioned the said appointment alleging
that due to Davide’s age, this disqualifies him from
holding his post. Petitioner argues that respondent
Davide’s age at that time of his nomination in March
2006, 70, disqualifies him from holding his post.
Petitioner grounds his argument on Section 23 of RA
7157 pegging the mandatory retirement age of all
officers and employees of the Department of Foreign
Affairs (DFA) at 65. Petitioner theorizes that Section
23 imposes an absolute rule for all DFA employees,
career or non-career; thus, respondent Davide’s
entry into the DFA ranks discriminates against the
rest of the DFA officials and employees.
To the defense of Mr. Davide, The Office of the
President, and the Secretary of Foreign affairs,
question Paguia’s capacity to sue, alleging that: (a)
Petitioner’s citizenship and taxpayer status do not
clothe him with standing to bring suit; (b) Petitioner
is incapacitated to bring legal actions due to his
suspension from the practice of law.
ISSUE:
1. WON Paguia has capacity to sue as a
citizen and taxpayer
2. WON that suspension of Paguia from the
practice of law renders him incapacitated
from bringing legal actions.
Ruling:
The SC held that access to citizen suits is granted on
the narrowest ground, when what is raised are
issues of “transcendental” importance calling urgent
resolution. The parameters for the determination of
allowing third party suits which are: (1) Character
of the funds or assets involved in the controversy; (2)
Clear disregard of constitutional and statutory
prohibition; and (3) Lack of any other party with a
more direct and specific interest to bring suit. None
of the foregoing is present in this case.
An incapacity to bring legal actions peculiar to
petitioner also obtains. Petitioner’s suspension from
the practice of law bars him from performing "any
activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge,
training and experience." Certainly, preparing a
petition raising carefully crafted arguments on
equal protection grounds and employing highly
legalistic rules of statutory construction to parse
Section 23 of RA 7157 falls within the proscribed
conduct.A supervening event has rendered this case
academic and the relief prayed for moot. Respondent
Davide resigned his post at the UN on 1 April 2010.

Petitioner Paguia is incapacitated to bring legal

actions. Paguia’s suspension from the practice of the
law bars him from performing “any activity, in or out
of court, which requires the application of law, legal
procedure, knowledge, training and experience.”
Petitioner’s act of preparing a petition raising
carefully crafted arguments on equal protection
grounds and employing highly legalistic rules of
statutory construction falls within the proscribed
conduct.

WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.