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Is.15656.2006 0 PDF
Is.15656.2006 0 PDF
IS 15656:2006
Indian Standard
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND
RISK ANALYSIS — CODE OF PRACTICE
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Ics 13.100
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0 BIS 2006
BUREAU OF INDIAN STANDARDS
MANAK BHAVAN, 9 BAHADUR SHAH ZAFAR MARG
NEW DELHI 110002
L@ 2006
Price Group 9
Occupational Safety and Health and Chemical Hazards Sectional Committee, CHD 8
FOREWORD
This Indian Standard “wasadopted by the Bureau of Indian Standards after the draft finalized by Occupational Safety
and Health and Chemical Hazards Sectional Committee had been approved by the Chemical Division Council. I
With the progressive advances in technology, the continuing trend towards larger and more highly integrated production
units, and the ever-increasing demand by governmental and public bodies for improved safety and environmental
standards, hitherto conventional methods of design based on established principles and Codes of practice are no longer
adequate in themselves for ensuring acceptable standard of safety in process industry. A-sa preventive measure of
minimizing the chance of accident to occur in hazardous installations and thereby reducing the possibility of injury,
loss of material and degradation of the environment, it is necessary to use more searching and systematic methods for
risk control to supplement existing procedures. The inherent property of material used in the process and the processes
themselves pose the potential hazard in any hazardous installation and a comprehensive risk assessment is needed for
effective management of risk, which needs to be identified, assessed and eliminated or controlled. The techniques
should be used from the conception of a project and must be used periodically throughout the life of an installation to
the point of decommissioning. The assessment of hazards is carried out by combination of hazard analysis, consequence
analysis and probability calculations.
I
Prevention of human and property losses is integral to the operation and management of chemical process plants. This
may be achieved through the selection of a technology that is inherently safe. Alternatively safety of plant design and/
or operation can be audited by the application of hazard identification and risk analysis techniques, and adopting
measures suggested by the analysis. The latter approach constitutes Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA).
This Code of practice is intended for safety professionals and engineers in the areas of chemical plant safety to upgrade
safety performance of the plants and covers the methods of identi~ing, assessing and reducing hazards including
evaluation and selection of methods for particular applications. A few useful techniques are elaborated with worked out
examples.
In the formulation of this standard, considerable assistance has been derived fi-omthe following publications:
a) Guidelines for Hazard Evaluation Procedures, Centre for Chemical Process Safety, American Institute of
Chemical Engineers, 1992. I
b) Guidelines for Chemical Process Quantitative Risk Analysis, Centre for Chemical Process Safety, American
Institute of Chemical Engineers, 2000.
c) The Mend Index, Imperial Chemical Industries (ICI) PLC, 1993.
d) DOW’s Fire and Explosion Index - Hazard Classification Guide, American Institute of Chemical Engineers,
1994.
e) DOW’s Chemical Exposure Index Guide, American Institute of Chemical Engineers, 1994.
f) Methods for Determination of Possible Damage to People and Objects Resulting from Release of Hazardous
Materials — Committee for the Prevention of Disasters caused by Dangerous Substances, The Hague, 1992,
TNO.
g) Methods for Calculation of Physical Effects — Committee for the Prevention ofDisasters caused by Dangerous
Substances, The Hague, 1997, TNO.
The composition of the technical committee responsible for formulating this standard is given at Annex G.
I
For the purpose of deciding whether a particular requirement of this standard is compl ied with, the final value, observed
or calculated, expressing the result of a test or analysis, shall be rounded off in accordance with 1S2: 1960 ‘Rules for
rounding off numerical values (revised)’. The number of significant places retained in the rounded off value shall be
the same as that of the specified value in this standard.
I
IS 15656:2006
Indian Standard
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND
RISK ANALYSIS — CODE OF PRACTICE
This Code describes the essential nature of each of the 2.11 Probability — An expression for the likelihood of
above sequence of steps and describes a variety of occurrence of an event or an event sequence during an
techniques for identi~ing hazards and the quantification interval of time or the likelihood of the success or failure
of accident consequence and the t?equency towards the of an event on test or on demand.
final risk estimation.
u 2.12 Risk — A measure of potential economic loss or
The Quantitative Risk Analysis (QRA) is most applicable human injury in terms of the probability of the loss or
and provides meaningfid results when a plant is built, injury occurring and the magnitude of the loss or inju~-if
operated and maintained as per design intent and good it occurs.
engineering practices.
2.13 Top Event — The unwanted event or incident at the
2 TERMINOLOGY top of a fault tree that is traced downward to more basic
failures using logic gates to determine its causes and
For the purpose of this Code, the following technical terms
likelihood
used are interpreted and understood as given below.
2.14 Worst Case Consequence — A conservative (high)
2.1 Accident — A specific unplanned event or sequence estimate of the consequences of the most severe accident
of events that has undesirable consequences. identified.
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IS 15656:2006
HAZARD IDENTIFICATION
I
QUANTIFICATION OF
HAZARD
4
ESTIMATE CONSEQUENCES
< ----~
YES
NO
ESTIMATE FREQUENCY OF
OCCURRENCE
1 ESTIMATE RISK
I
~
t
PRIORITIZE AND REDUCE RISK
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IS 15656:2006
3.1.2 Location, Layout, Process Parameters Table 1 Plant Stages vis-ri-vis Hazard Identification
The information on plant location, the layout of equipment, and Hazard Analysis Techniques
the process conditions, etc, is required for the risk analysis.
S1No. -Project Stage Hazard ldentitication/
> Hazard Analysis Techniques
3.1.3 Hazard Identification (1) (2) (3)
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IS 15656:2006
considering: (a) form in which chemicals are stored or 5.1.1.4 Preliminary hazard analysis
processed, (b) nature of hazard it poses, and (c) quantity Purpose For early identification of hazards.
of the material contained. The hazard identification
methods may be categorized as comparative methods and Applicability In preliminary design phase to provide
fundamental methods. These techniques are also described guidance for final design.
in A-2. Data required Plant design criteria, hazardous
materials involved and major plant I
5.1.1 Comparative Methods equipment.
These techniques are based on hazard identification by Results List of hazards (related to available
comparing with standards. The various methods are design details) with recommendation to
checklist, safety audit, hazard indices and preliminary designers to aid hazard reduction.
hazard analysis.
5.1.2 Fundamental Methods
5.1.1.1 Checklist These techniques are a structured way of stimulating .a
Purpose For quick identification of hazards. group of people to apply foresight along with their
knowledge to the task of identi~ing the hazards mainly
Applicability In all phases — design construction,
by raising a series of questions. These methods have the
commissioning,
shutdown.
operation and
advantage that they can be used whether or not the Codes
of’practice are available for a particular process. Three
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Data required Checklist is prepared from prior main techniques are available in this family of methods
experiencelstandard procedure that is What-if Analysis, Failure Modes and Effects
manual/ knowledge of system or plant. Analysis, (FMEA) and Hazard and Operability Study
Results Essentially qualitative in nature and (HAZOP).
leads to “yes-or-no” decision with
respect to compliance with the standard 5.1.2.1 What-if analysis
procedure set forth. Purpose Identifying possible event sequences
related to hazards.
5.1.1.2 Safety audit Applicability During plant changes, development
Purpose For ensuring that procedures match stage or at pre start-up stage.
design intent.
Data required Detailed documentation of the plant, the
Applicability In all phases of the plant and periodicity process and the operating procedure.
.of review depending on the level of Tabular listing of accident scenarios,
Results
hazard.
their consequences and possible risk
Data required Applicable codes and guides, plant flow reduction methods.
sheet, P & I diagrams, start-up/
shutdown procedure, emergency 5.1.2.2 Failure modes and effects analysis
control, injury report, testing and Purpose Identi@ing equipment failure modes and
inspection report, material properties. their effects
Results Qualitative in nature — the inspection Applicability In design, construction -and operation
teams report deviation from design and phases, useftil for plant modification.
planned procedures and recommends
Data required Knowledge of equipment/system/plant
additional safety features.
timctions.
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P&I drawing and operating procedure rate of discharge, the total quantity discharged, the duration
for batch process. of discharge, and the state of discharge, that is liquid,
Results Identification of hazards and operating vapour or two-phase flow. Evaporation models are
> subsequently used to calculate the rate at which the material
problems, recommends change in
design, procedure and further study. becomes air-borne.
5.2 Hazard Analysis Next a dispersion model is used to describe how the
material is transported downwind and dispersed to
The principle techniques are fault tree analysis (FTA) and specified concentration levels. For flammable releases, fue
event tree analysis (ETA). These techniques are also and explosion models convert the source model
described in.A-3. information on the release into energy hazard such as
thermal radiation flux and explosion overpressures.
5.2.1 Fault Tree Analysis Finally effect models convert these incident specific results
Purpose Identi~ing how basic events lead to an into effects on people and structures. Environmental
accident event. impacts could also be considered but these are beyond the
Applicability In design and operation phases of the scope of the present Code.
plant to uncover the failure modes.
In this Code a brief introduction to the methods of
Data required Knowledge of plant/system finction,
consequence analysis is provided. Annex F shows the steps
plantk.ystem failure modes and effects
to be followed inconsequence analysis, These models are
on plantisystem.
also described in A-4.
Results Listing of set of equipment or operator
failures that can result in specific -6.1 Source Models
accidents.
Source models are used to quantitatively define the loss
of containment scenario by estimating the discharge rate,
5,2.2 Event Tree Analysis
total quantity released, release duration, extent of flash
Purpose Identi@ing the event sequences from and evaporation from a liquid pool and aerosol formation
initiating event to accident scenarios. and conversion of source term outputs to concentration
Applicability In design/operating plants to assess fields.
adequacy of existing safety features.
6.1.1 Discharge Rate Models
Data required Knowledge of initiating events and
safety system/emergency procedure. Purpose Evaluation of discharge of material.
Results Provides the event sequence that result Applicabili~ First stage in developing the
in an accident following the occurrence consequence estimates.
of an initiating event. Data required a) Physical condition of storage.
b) Phase at discharge.
6 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS METHODOLOGIES c) Path of the discharge (hole size).
All processes have a risk potential and in order to manage Results a) Discharge rate of the gas/liquid/
risks effectively, they must be estimated. Since risk is a two-phase flow.
combination of frequency and consequence, consequence b) Duration of release.
(or impact) analysis is a necessary step in risk analysis. c) Phase change during release.
This section provides an overview of consequence and
effect models commonly used in risk analysis. 6.1.2 Flash and Evaporation Models
Purpose Estimation of the total vapour.
An accident begins with an incident, which usually
results in loss of containment of material. The material Applicability During spillage of liquid on surface
may possess hazardous properties such as flammability, because of loss of containment.
explosivity, toxicity, etc. Typical incidents might include Data required a) Heat capacity, latent heat, boiling
the rupture of a pipeline, a hole in a tank or pipe, runaway point of liquid.
reaction, external fire impinging on the vessel and b) Leak rate, pool area, wind velocity,
heating it. temperature.
c) Vapour pressure, mass transfer
Once the incident is defined source models are selected to coefficient.
describe how materials are discharged from the d) Viscosity, density, a turbulent
containment. Source models provide a description of the friction coei%cient.
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IS 15656:2006
Results a) Amount of vapour from a liquid As the release height increases, the ground level
discharge. concentration decreases since the resulting plume has more
b) Tme dependent mass rate of boiling. distance to mix with fi-eshair prior to contacting the ground.
c) Radius or radial spread velocity of
the pool. 6.1.3.1 Positively buoyant or neutral dispersion model
Purpose Prediction of average concentration —
6.1.3 Dispersion Models time profile.
Accurate prediction of the atmospheric dispersion of Applicability Used .in prediction of atmospheric
vapours is central to consequence analysis. Typically, the dispersion of lighter gases than air.
dispersion calculations provide an estimate of the
geographical area affected and the average vapour Data required Discharge rate, release duration,
concentrations expected. The simplest calculations require stability class, wind speed, location,
an estimate of the released rate of the gas, the atmospheric averaging time, roughness factor.
conditions, surface roughness, temperature, pressure and Results Downwind concentration, area affected,
release diameter. Two types of dispersion models are duration of exposure.
usutilly considered:
a) Positively buoyant or neutrally buoyant, and 6.1.3.2 Negative~ buoyant or dense gas model
Purpose Prediction of average concentration —
b) Negatively buoyant or dense gas.
time protile.
The dispersion of gases that are lighter than or equal to Applicability Used in prediction of atmospheric
the density of dispersing medium are considered as dispersion denser than air.
positively buoyant and the gases with higher density at Data required Discharge rate, release duration, density
the point of dispersion is considered as negatively buoyant of air, density of fluid, location.
or dense gas. The dispersion is tiwther categorized into
Results Downwind concentration, area affected,
puff model that is, instantaneous release or plume model
duration of exposure.
that is continuous release or time varying continuous
release.
6.2 Fires and Explosions Models
A large number ofparameters affect the dispersion ofgases. These models are used only when the material released is
These include atmospheric stability, wind speed, local fla~able and the vapour cloud concentration is within
terrain effects, height of the release above the ground, the flammable range. The various types of fire and
release geometry, that is, point, line or area source, explosion models are:
momentum of the material released and the buoyancy of a) Pool fires,
the material released.
b) Jet fires,
Annex C gives the meteorological conditions defining the c) Flash tires,
Pasquill-Gifford Stability Classes denoted by letters A to
d) Vapour cloud explosions,
F, which correlate to wind-speed and cloud cover. The
stability is commonly defined in terms of atmospheric e) Boiling liquid expanding vapour explosions
vertical temperature gradient, For local application, the (BLEVE), and
wind speed and cloud cover should be taken from o Physical explosions.
meteorological records. For practical purpose two stability
conditions given below can be used to find the dispersion 6.2.1 Pool Fire Model
pattern: Purpose Calculation of thermal radiation.
Normal: ‘D’ at wind velocity of 5 m/s (Windy day time Applicability Fire resulting from burning of pools of
condition), and Extreme calm: ‘F’ at wind velocity of flammable liquid spilled.
2 mh (Still night-time condition). Data required Quantity, pool diameter, heat of
combustion and vaporization, density of
Annex D gives the terrain characteristics that affect the air, temperature, view factor, etc.
mixing of the released gas and air as they flow over the
ground; thus the dispersion over a lake would be different Results Thermal radiation flux at a distance.
from that over a tall building. Values of the surface 6.2.2 Jet Fire Model
roughness vary from 10 m for highly urban area to
0.0001 m over sea. For most practical purposes flat rural Purpose Calculation of thermal radiation.
terrain (Few -trees, long grass, fairly level grass plains) Applicability Fire resulting from combustion of
with surface roughness value of 0.1 is used. material as it is being released from
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IS 15656:2006
6.2.5 Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion 7.1 Risk can be defined as a measure of economic loss,
(BLEVE) Model human injury or environmental damage both in terms of
likelihood and magnitude of loss, injury or damage. In
Purpose Calculation of thermal radiation. this document only the property damage, that is, economic
Applicability Release of a large mass of pressurized loss and human loss have been considered. Risk is
superheated liquid to the atmosphere. expressed as the product of tlequency of an event aad the
Data required Mass involved in fire ball, radiative magnitude of the consequences that result each time the
fraction of heat of combustion, heat of event occurs. The mathematical expression for risk is:
combustion for unit mass, atmospheric R=FC
transrnissivity.
where
Results Thermal radiation flux from the surface
R = risk (loss or injury per year);
of fireball.
F = frequency (event per year); and
6.2.6 Physical Explosion Model C = consequence (loss or injury per event),
Purpose Calculation of missile damage 7.2 In many cases the hazard cannot be completely
Applicability Vessel rupture resulting in release of eliminated though the probability of occurrence can be
stored energy producing a shock wave. reduced with addition of safety measures and at a financial
Data required Pressure, volume, heat capacity, mass cost.
of container, ratio of heat capacities,
7.3 The basic approach for estimating frequency has been
temperature.
discussed in 5.2.
Results Overpressure at a distance, fragment
size and velocity 7.4 The consequence in terms of deaths/year or in terms
of monetary loss per year can be estimatedby the methods
6.3 Effect Model of consequence analysis described in 6,
This model is described in A-5.
7.5 Risk Criteria
Applicability Method of assessing property damage
and human injury/fatality due to: Risk criteria are the acceptable levels of risk that can be
tolerated under a particular situation, ‘In many countries
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IS 1-5656:2006
the acceptable risk criteria has been defined for industrial d) In specific instances, the risk analysis method may
installations and are shown in Annex E. These criteria are require consideration of the external events as
yet to be defined in the Indian context, but values employed probable causative factors in large-scale hazardous
in other countries can be used for comparison. chemical releases.
e) Wherever feasible the risk analysis for a process
8 GUIDELINES FOR APPLICATION OF RISK plant should incorporate possible environmental
ANALYSIS TECHNIQUES consequences as well as possible human health
This Code essentially outlines the various approaches and
techniques that may be used during the risk analysis of a
effects that are immediate and/or delayed. I
f) Risk analysis need be undertaken newly in the event
process plant. This concluding section enumerates some of any major changes introduced in the plant
of the critical features of the methodology of risk analysis configuration. It must also be updated periodically
so as to aid the prospective users apply the Code most whenever improved plant operational information
effectively: and equipment/human failure data becomes
a) While undertaking a risk analysis, careful available. Further, it is advisable to improve risk
consideration of the various possible approaches/ calculations using newer analytical methods as and
techniques is necessary, since each have their when they are developed.
individual strengths and limitations.
With the techniques used for the analysis large number of
b) The method of risk analysis requires realistic results based on numbers of accident scenarios used, the
accident scenario assumptions as well as various weather classes chosen, the assumptions in
comprehensive plant operational information and, calculating each cases would be available, But finally it is
in particular, reliable data pertaining to component
system failure frequencies, human error rates, etc.
very important to summarize all the results in one format
providing clearly what factor appear to be important in
I
In the event of any uncertainties relating to the overall analysis. A format has to be chosen for presenting
relevant information and data, the use of experience the results of the analysis and acceptability is to be
and judgment would be critical to obtaining risk established either in terms of ‘risk criteria’ or ‘distance
estimates that provide reliable support to subsequent under consideration which face the consequence’ or ‘“/o
decision-making. darnage up to a distance under consideration’.
c) All assumptions applied during a risk analysis
exercise need be documented with clarity, so as to One typical format for reporting the analysis is given in
enable better comparison and communication. Annex B.
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ANNEX A
(Clauses 5.1,5.2 and 6)
A-1 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND RISK A processor system checklist can be applied to evaluating
ANALYSIS SEQUENCE equipment, material, or procedures and can be used during
The purpose of hazard identification and risk analysis is any stage of a project to guide the user through common
to identi~ possible accidents and estimate their frequency hazards by using standard procedures.
and consequences. Conceivably the initiating event could
be the only event but usually it is not and as a matter of A-2.2 Safety Audit
fact there a number of events between the initiating event It is an intensive plant inspection intended to identi@ the
and the consequence and these events -are the responses plant conditions or operating procedures that could lead
of the systems and the operators. Different responses to to accidents or significant losses of life and property. It is
the same initiating event will oflen lead to different used to ensure that the implemented safety/risk
accident sequences with varying magnitude of management programs meet the original expectations and
consequences. standards. It is also called ‘Safety review’, ‘Process
review’, and ‘Loss prevention review’. In essence, safety
While identifying the hazard(s) a filtering process is carried audit is a critical -appraisal of effectiveness of the existing
and only portions with potential risk are “involvedfor risk safety programme in a plant.
analysis. Hazard is not considered for further analysis, if
(a) it is unrealizable, and(b) if it is not very significant. In The review looks for major hazardous situation and brings
many cases, once the hazard has been identified the out the areas that need improvement. The steps for the
solution is obvious. In some more cases the solution is identification process are:
obtained from experience. In many other cases it is taken a) Obtaining response from plant on a pre-audit
care of by Codes of practice or statutory requirement. questionnaire;
b) Preparation of checklist, inspection and interview
A-2 HAZARD IDENTIFICATION AND
plant personnel; and
QUANTIFICATION
c) Preparation of safety audit report in the form of
A-2.1 Checklist recommendation.
These are simple and quick means of applying the The results are qualitative in nature. The review seeks to
experience to designs or situations to ensure that the identifi inadequacy in design, operating procedures that
features appearing in the list are not overlooked. Checklists need to be revised and to evaluate the adequacy of
are used to indicate compliance with the standard equipment maintenance or replacement. Assigning grades
procedure. It is intended for standard evaluation of plant for effectiveness of safety management of the plant in the
hazards and a convenient means of communicating the areas such as organization, operating procedures,
minimal acceptable level of hazard evaluation that is monitoring, maintenance, etc is possible, a score card can
required for any job generally leading to ‘yes-or-no’ be prepared to get an appraisal of safety status of plant.
situation.
While this technique is most commonly appIied to
The checklist is frequently a form for approval by various operating plants it is equally applicable to pilot plants,
staff and management fhnctions before a project can move storage facilities or support functions.
from one stage to the next. It serves both as a means of
communication and as a form of control and can highlight The periodicity of such studies depends on the risk
a lack of basic information or a situation that requires a involved in the process and the commitment of the
detailed evaluation. management. It usually varies tlom once in a year to one
in seven years.
Checklists are qualitative in nature; limited to the
experience base of the author of the checklist, hence, A-2.3 Hazard Endices
should be audited and updated regularly. It is a widely Hazard indices can be used for relative ranking of process
used basic safety tool and can be applied at any stage of a plants fi-omthe point of view of their hazard potentials.
project or plant development. Accordingly it is named as The most well known techniques are: ‘DOW fire and
Process checklist, System checklist, Design checklist, etc. explosion index’, ‘Mend tire, Explosion and toxicity index’
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IS 15656:2006
and ‘C-heroicalexposure index’. All these methods provide accident, Credits are assigned to plant safety features that
a direct and easy approach to a relative ranking of the can mitigate the effects of an incident. These penalties
risks in a process plant. The methods assign penalties and and credits are combined to derive an index that is relative
credits based on plant features. Penalties are assigned to ranking of the plant risk. The following chart describes
.
process materials and conditions that can contribute to an the use of such indices:
If ratings are high then review input data, refine where possible and try alternatives
1
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The detailed methodology of using the Mend and the DOW The effects of these causes can be:
indices for the hazard identification are not provided in
a) Injury/Fatality to persons inside the plant or nearby
this standard, for which users may look at different guides
areas, and
[see Foreword (c) and (d)].
b) Damage of property due to explosion.
The Chemical exposure index (CEI) method is a further
developed technique derived tlom DOW F & E indices, Safety measures/corrective actions provided to minimize
usefid for identification of hazards arising out of toxic effect:
chemicals present in a plant. It is also a tool to find out the a) Whether less toxic material can be used;
requirement for further hazard assessment for such b) Minimizing the inventory for the storage of the
chemicals. material;
It provides a simple method of rating the relative acute c) Procedure for safe storage of the gas with enclosure
health hazards potential to people in the neighborhood system;
plants or communities from possible chemical release d) Provision of plant warning system;
incidents. The methodology utilizes expression for e) Training for operators .on properties, effect of
estimating airborne quantity released ffom hazardous material; and
chemicals. The CEI system provides-a method of ranking
one hazard relative to other hazard but it is neither intended f) Informing neighboring localities about the toxic
effect.
to define a particular design as safehmsafe nor to quanti~/
determine absolute measurement of risk. Flammability and The final results of the identification process can be
explosion hazards are not included in this index, recorded as:
A-2.4 Preliminary Process Hazard Analysis Hazard Causes .Effects Preventive Measures
Itis used during the conceptual, early development, early
A-2.5 Failure Modes and Effects Analysis’
design phase, of a plant. The method is intended for use
only in the preliminary phase of plant development for The method is a tabulation of system/plant equipment, their
cases where past experience provides little or no insight failure modes, and each failure mode’s effect on system/
into potential safety problems, for example, a new plant plant. It is a description of how equipment fails (open,
with new process. Early identification of most of the closed, on, off, leaks, etc) and the potential effects of each
hazards could be possible resulting in effective saving in failure mode. The technique is oriented towards equipment
cost that could otherwise result from major plant redesigns rather than process parameters. FMEA identifies single
if hazards are discovered at a later stage. It is very useful failure modes that either directly result in or contribute
for ‘site selection’. It does not preclude the need for further significantly to an important accident. Human/operator
hazard assessment; instead it is a precursor to subsequent errors are generally not examined in a FMEA; however,
hazard analysis. Items for consideration consist of the effects of a real-operation are usually described by an
meticulous preparation of a list of hazards: equipment failure mode. The technique is not efllcient for
identi~ing combinations of equipment failures that lead
a) Raw materials, intermediates, by-products, final
to accidents. A multidisciplinary team of professionals can
products;
perform FMEA.
b) Plant equipment (high pressure systems);
c) Interface among system components (material FMEA has following six main steps:
interactions, fire); a) Determining the level of resolution,
d) Environment (earthquake, vibration, extreme b) Developing a consistent format,
temperature); and
c) Defining the problem and the boundary conditions,
e) Operations (test maintenance and emergency
d) Listing various failure modes,
procedure) Safety equipment.
e) Each effects of the failure mode, and
Example: o .Completing the FMEA table.
Toxic gas ‘A’ is one of the components used in process;
causes for the dangers: The level of resolution depends on the requirement of the
plant, namely ‘plant level’, ‘system level’ or in other words
a) The hazards due to storing the gas;
whether the study is for a whole plant or a portion of plant
b) Hazards from the excess gas after the use; or a particular system or individual equipment. Marking
c) Lines supplying the gas ‘A’; and the portion of study on the drawing can indicate the
d) Leakage during the receipt of the gas etc. physical system boundaries and stating the operating
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IS 15656:2006
conditions at the interface. Identification of the equipment hazard identification process. The guidewords are used to
is necessary to distinguish between two or more similar generate deviations from the design intent. The team then
equipment by any number and description of the equipment identifies cause and ~onsequences of the deviations.
is required to give brief details about process or system.
HAZOP guidewords and their meanings:
All the failure modes consistent with the equipment
description are to be listed considering the equipment’s Guidewords Meaning
normal operating conditions.
No Negation of Design Intent
Less Quantitative Decrease
Example of various failure modes of a normally operating
pump is: More Quantitative Increase
a) Fails to open or fails to close when required, Part of Qualitative Decrease
As well as Qualitative Increase
b) Transfers to a closed position,
Reverse Logical Opposite to Intent
c) Valve body rupture,
Other than Complete Substitution
d) Leak of seal, and
e) Leak of casing. The HAZOP-study requires that the plant be examined for
every line. The method applies all the guidewords in turn
The effects for each failure mode, for example, the effects and outcome is recorded for the deviation with its causes
of ‘the fails to open condition for the pump’ is: (a) loss of and consequences.
process fluid in a particular equipment, and(b) overheating
of the equipment. The effect of pump seal leak is a spill in Example:
the area of the pump; if the fluid is flammable a fire could a) For a particular line,
be expected, and so on.
b) Taking any guide word for example ‘No;
The analyst may also note the expected response of any c) Deviation in process parameters, namely flow/
applicable safety systems that could mitigate the effect, temperature,
d) For each deviation the causes for such deviations,
Example of the tabulated format may be:
e) Consequences may be several C 1, C2, C3, etc, and
Plant
f) Measures to recti@ the root cause for deviation.
System
Boundary Condition The tabulation of the results is made as follows:
Reference
I Guideword Deviation Causes Consequences Action I
Equipment Description Failure modes Effect
A-2.7 What-I fAnalysis
A-2.6 Hazard and Operability Study(HAZOP) What-if analysis is used to conduct a thorough and
The HAZOP study is made to identi~ hazards in a process systematic examination of a process or-operation by asking
plant and operability problems, which could compromise questions that begins with What-If. The questioning usually
the.plant’s ability to achieve design intent. The approach starts at the input to the process and follows the flow of
taken is to form a multi-disciplinary team that works to the process. Alternately the questions can centre on a
identi~ hazards by searching for deviations from design particular consequence category, for example, personnel
intents. The following terms are used for the process for safety or public safety. The findings are usually accident
analysis: event sequences. Effective application of the technique
requires in-depth experience of plant operation.
a) Intentions — Intention defines how the plant is
expected to operate,
Two types of boundaries that maybe defined in a “What-
b) Deviations — These are departures from intentions, If’ study are: (a) Consequence category being investigated,
c) Causes — These are reasons why deviations might and (b) Physical system boundary. The consequence
occur, and categories are mainly: (a) public risk, (b) worker risk,
d) Consequences — Results of deviations should they and (c) economic risk, for specific plant, The purpose of
occur. physical boundaries is to keep the investigating team
focused on a particular portion of a plant in which
The method uses guidewords, which are used to quantiQ consequence of concern could occur. The typical
or qualifi the intention in order to guide and stimulate the information required for What-if analysis is:
12
IS 15656:2006
13
-—.— —, ———- ., -......
—..
-—. — . ...
1
IS 15656:2006
I
NO NATURAL LIGHT
GI I
NO ARTIFICIAL LIGHT
G2 I
OR
oo
NIGHT TIME :
NO LIGHT
BI
HEAW
CLOUD
COVER
FIG.
B2
2
@@@
in room on demand” and the mathematical expression for event and develops the following-sequences of events that
that top event is describe potential accidents accounting for: (i) successes,
T ‘-G1x G2 and (ii) failures of the available “safety function” as the
= (B1 +B2) X(B3 +B4+B5) accident progresses. The “safety function” includes
operator response or safety system response to the initiating
=-B1B3+B2B3 +B1B4+B2B4 +B1”B5+B2B5
event. The general procedure for the event tree analysis
(6 minimal cut sets) has four major steps:
This indicates the occurrence of either of basic events a) Identi@ing an initiating event of interest,
B 1 or B2 along with occurrence of any of the basic events b) Identi@ing safety fi.mctions designed to deal with
B3, B4 & B5 would lead to top event T (see Chart on the identi@ing event,
page 15).
c) Construction of the event tree, and
In Fig. 3 the logic structure is mathematically transformed d) Results of accident event sequence.
using Boolean Algebra into a minimal cut Fault tree.
A-3.2. 1 Identl@ing an Initiating Event
T= G1XG2
This identification of the event depends on the process
= (Bl + G3) + (B2+G4) involved and describes the system or equipment failure,
= [Bl + (B3 XB4)] X(B2+B5+B6) human error or any other process upset that can result in
other events. I
which shows that any of the basic events B 1-B6 should be
in combinations as in the above expression to cause failure A-3.2.2 ldent@ing Safety Functions
of the top event. The safety fi.mctions/safety systems available to mitigate
14
IS 15656:2006
Q
NO FLOW FROM REACTOR INLET VALVE
QUENCH TANK REMAINS OPEN
G1 G2
A A
OR OR
o QUENCH
TANK EMPTY
B1
QUENCH TANK
VALVE DOES
NOT OPEN
G3
OPERATOR
FAILS TO
CLOSE INLET
VALVE
G4
oNLET VALVE
FAILS TO
CLOSE
B2
@e&@ FIG. 3 FAULTTREE FOR DAMAGE TO REACTOR DUE TO HIGH PROC+XS TEMPERATURE
the situation and deal with the identifying event include A-3.2.4 Results of Accident Event Sequence
automatic shut down system, alarm system that alert the The sequences of the constructed event tree represent a
operator, operator action, contaimnent method, etc. The variety of outcomes that can follow the initiating event.
analyst needs to identi~ all safety functions that can One or more of the sequences may represent the safe
influence the sequence of events following the initiating recovery and return to normal operation while the others
event. The successes and the failures of the safety functions may lead to shut down of the plant or an accident. Once
are accounted in the event tree. the sequences are described the analyst can rank the
accidents based on severity of the outcome. The structure
A-3.2.3 Construction of the Event Tree of the event tree also helps the analyst in specifying where
The event tree describes the chronological development additional procedures or safety systems are -needed in
of the accidents beginning with the ‘initiating event’. mitigating the accidents or reducing its frequency.
Considering each safety functions to deal with the initiating
event one nodal point is generated with the two alternatives Example:
(Al andA2) that is the ‘success’ ~d ‘failure’ of the safety
system. At the first nodal point two alternatives are found In the fo}lowing figure the initiating event is assigned the
to consider the second safety systemlcomponent to deal symbol A, and safety functions the symbols B, C, D. The
with the event. The success and failure of the second sequences are represented by symbols (A, B, C, D) of the
safety system also give branching to the two alternatives events that fail and cause that particular accident. For
A3 and A4. example an error is simply labelled ‘A’ to interpret the
15
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-~1--
B c SEQUENCE DESCRIPTIONS
‘i;?%’
INITIATING EVENT :
Loss of cooling water
to oxidation reactor
WE
runaway reaction,
A operatoraware of
problem
Unstablecondition,
processshutdown
success
~
Unsafe condition,
nmawayreaction,
+ operatorunawareof
problem
Failure
‘initiating event’ occurring with no subsequent failure of Superheated liquid stored under pressure at tttempekWure
the safety functions B, C and D. Similarly the sequence above its normal boiling point, will flash partially or fblly
ACD represents combination of initiating event with to vapour when released to the atmospheric pressure. The
success of safety function B and failure of safety fimctions vapour produced may entrain a significant quantity of
C and D. liquids as droplets. The amount of vapour and liquid that
are produced during flashing of a superheated liquid can
A-4 CONSEQUENCE ANALYSIS METHODO- be calculated tlom thermodynamics considerations.
LOGIES A significant fkaction of liquid may remain suspended as
a tine aerosol.
A-4.1 Discharge Rate Models
Hazardous incidents start with a discharge of a flammable The major use of flash and evaporation models is to
or toxic material from its normal containment. Discharge provide an initial prediction of cloud mass — the source
-can take place from a crack or fi-acture of process vessels term for further analysis.
or pipe work, an open valve or from an emergency vent.
The release may be in the form of gas, liquid, or two- A-4.3 Dispersion Models
phase flashing of gas-liquid.
A-4.3.1 Neutral/Positively Buoyant Plume and Puff
The discharge rate models provide basic input for the
Models
following models:
Neutral and positively buoyant plume or puff models are
a) Flash and evaporation model to estimate the fraction
used to predict concentration and time profiles of
of a liquid release that forms a cloud for use as
flammable or toxic materials downwind of a source based
input to dispersion models, and
on the concept of Gaussian dispersion. Atmospheric
b) Dispersion model to calculate the consequences for difision is a random mixing process driven by turbulence
atmospheric dispersion of the released gas/liquid. in the atmosphere. Gaussian dispersion models are
extensively used in the prediction of atmospheric
A-4.2 Flash and Evaporation Models dispersion of pollutants, The Gaussian models represent
The purpose of flash and evaporation model is to estimate -the random nature of turbulence. Input requirements for
the total vapour or vapour rate that forms a cloud. Gaussian plume or puff modelling are straightforward.
16
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Pasquill and Smith provide description of plume and puff from fires over pools of liquid or ftom pressurized releases
discharges [see Foreword (b)] and, that with a risk analysis or gas rind/or liquid. They tend to be localised in effect
orientation is given by TNO, and are mainly of concern in establishing potential for
. in dispersion model the averaging time for the domino effects and employee safety. Models are available
concentration profile is important and generally the to calculate various components — burning rate, pool-
prediction relate to 10 min averages (equivalent to 10 min size, flame height, flame tilt and drag, flame surface emitted
sampling times). power, atmospheric transmissivity, thermal flux, etc.
A-4.3.2 Dense Gas Dispersion Models In jet fire modelling the steps followed for the thermal
effects are calculation of the estimated discharge rate, total
The importance of dense gas dispersion has become heat released, radiant fraction/source view fraction,
recognized for some time and many field experiments have transmissivity and thermal flux and thermal effects.
confirmed that the mechanisms of dense gas dispersion
differ markedly from neutrally buoyant clouds. Two A-5 METHODS FOR DETERMINING
distinct modelling approaches have been attempted for CONSEQUENCE EFFECTS
dense gas dispersion: mathematical and physical.
Methods are available to assess the consequences of the
Detailed descriptions of the mechanisms of dense gas incident outcomes, For assessing the effects -on human
dispersion and the specific implementations for a wide beings, consequences may be expressed in terms of injuries
variety of mathematical models are not given in the and the effects on equipment/property in terms ofmonetary
standard but one may look for in the available guide [see loss. The effect of the consequences for release of toxic
Foreword (b)]. The major strength of most of the dense substances and/or tire can be categorized as:
gas models is their rigorous inclusion of the important
mechanisms of gravity slumping, air entrainment, and heat a) .Damage caused by heat radiation on material
transfer processes. and people,
b) Damage caused by explosion on structure
A-4.4 Fires and Explosions Models and people, and
c) Damage caused by toxic exposure.
A-4.4. 1 VapourCloudtiplosions (UVCE) and Flash Fire
When gaseous flammable material is released a vapour The consequences of an incident outcome are assessed in
cloud forms and if it is ignited before it is diluted below the direct effect model, which predicts the effects on people
its lower explosive limit, a vapour cloud explosion or a or structures based on predetermined criteria. The method
flash fire will occur. Insignificant level of confinement increasingly used for probability of personal injury .or
will result in flash fire. The vapour cloud explosion will damage is given in Probit analysis.
result in overpressures.
The Probit is a random variable with a mean 5 and variance
A-4.4.2 Physical Explosion 1 and the probability (range O-1) is generally replaced in
When a vessel containing a pressurized gas/liquid ruptures, Probit work by a percentage (range 0-100) and the general
the resulting stored energy is released. This produces a simplified form of Probit finction is:
shockwave and accelerated vessel fragments. If the
Pr=a+bln V
contents are flammable then the ignition of the released
gas could result in fire and explosion. The method Where Probit Pr is a measure of percentage of variable
calculates overpressure. resource, which sustains injury or damage and variable V
is a measure intensity of causative factor which harms the
A-4.4.3 BLEVE and Fireball vulnerable resource.
A Boiling Liquid Expanding Vapour Explosion (BLEVE)
occurs when there is a sudden loss of containment of a The causative factor K
pressure vessel containing a superheated liquid or liquified a) for fwe is thermal intensity and time,
gas. It is sudden release of large mass of pressurized
b) for explosion is overpressure, and
superheated liquid to atmosphere. The primary cause may
be external flame impinging on the shell above liquid level c) for toxic gas release is toxic dose.
weakening the vessel and leading to shell rupture.
Calculations are done for diameter and duration of fueball The constants a and b are calculated tlom the experimental
and the incident therrnaI flux. data, which are also available in methods for determination
of possible damage to people and objects resulting from
A-4.4,4 Pool Fire and Jet Fire release of hazardous materials [see Foreword (0], The
Pool tires and jet fires are common fire types resulting percentage of fatality with the Probit value (1%)calculated
17
. .
1
IS 15656:2006
fi-omthe equation can reobtained using the chart and table duration is important for determining the effects on
given in the methods for determination of possible damage structures. The positive pressure phase can last for 10 to
[see Foreword (f)]. 250 milliseconds. The same overpressure can have
markedly different effect depending on duration.
A-5.1 Effect of Fire The explosion overpressures of interest are:
The effect of fire on a human beings is in the form of a) 1.7 bar: Bursting of lung,
bums, There are three categories of bums such as ‘first
degree’, ‘second degree’ and ‘third degree’ bum. Duration b) 0.3 bar: Major damage to plant equipment structure,
of exposure, escape time, clothing and other enclosures c) 0.2 bar: Minor damage to steel frames,
play active role while calculating the effect of fire, d) 0.1 bar.Repairable damage to plant equipment and
however, the primary considerations are duration of structure,
exposure and thermal intensity level.
.e) 0.07 ba~ Shattering of glass, and
The heat radiation levels of interest are: o 0.01 ban Crack in glass.
a) 4 kW/m2: Causes pain if unable to reach cover
The Probit equation can be applied for calculating the
within 20s,
percentage of damage to structure or human beings, the
b) 4.7 kW/m2: Accepted value to represent injury, constants a and b being available for various types of
c) 10 kW/m2: Second degree bum afier 25 s, structures and the causative factor Vdepending on the peak
d) 12.5 kW/m2: Minimum energy required for melting overpressure, P,. The Probit equation for the overpressure
of plastic, is:
P,= a + b In(P,)
e) 25 kw/m2: Minimum energy required to ignite
wood,
A-5.3 Toxic Effect
o 37.5 kW/m2: Sufllcient to cause damage to the
The critical toxicity values which should be considered
equipment,
for evaluating effect on humans in the event of release of
g) 125 KJ/m2: causing first degree bum, chemicals are:
h) 250 “KJ/m2:causing second degree bum, and a) Permissible exposure limits.
j) 375 KJ/m2: causing third degree bum. b) Emergency response planning guidelines.
c) Lethal dose levels.
The thermal effect can be calculated with the help of Probit
equation for which constants a and b are available. The
thermal intensity and duration of exposure gives the value A-5.3.1 Threshold Limit Values (TL V) — Short Term
Exposure Limit Values (STEL)
of Z The general equation for the Probit fimction is:
These are the limits on exposure excursions lasting up to
Pr = a + b in t14n,t is duration of exposure and 1 is thermal 15 min and should not be used to evaluate the toxic
intensity. potential or exposure lasting up to 30 min. TLV-STEL
limits are used in evolving measures to protect workers
A-5.2 Effect of Explosion from acute effects such as irritation and narcosis resulting
from exposure to chemicals. Use of STEL may be
The effect of overpressure on human beings is twofold:
considered if the study is based on injury.
a) Direct effect of overpressure on human organs, and
b) Effect of debris from structure damage affecting A-5.3.2 Immediately Dangerous toLije and~eath (IDLH)
human. The maximum air borne concentration of a substance to
which a worker is exposed for as long as 30 min and still
Direct ejlect of overpmsure on human organ: When the
be able to escape without loss of life or irreversible organ
pressure change is sudden, a pressure difference arises
system damage. IDLH values also take into consideration
which can lead to damage of some organs. Extent of
acute toxic reaction, such as severe eye irritation that could
damage varies with the overpressure along with factors
hinder escape.
such as position of the person, protection inside a shelter,
body weight as well as duration of .overpressure. The
A-5.3.3 Emergency Exposure Guidance Levels (EEGL)
organs prone to get affected by overpressure are ear drum
and lung. EEGL is defined as an amount of gas, vapour and aerosol
that isjudged to be acceptable and that will allow exposed
Effect of overpressure on structure/effect of debris from individuals to perform specific task during emergency
structure damage affecting human: The overpressure conditions lasting from 1 to 24 h.
18
IS 15656:2006
A-5.3.4 Short Term Public Emergency Guidance Levels a) Predictions of toxic gas concentration and duration
(SPEGL) of exposure.
These are defined as the acceptable concentration for b) Toxic criteria for specific health effects for
exposures of members of general public. SPEGLS are particular toxic gas.
generally set at 10-50 percent of EEGL.
The causative factor V, depends on the above two factors.
Substances for which IDLH values are unavailable an The concentration and exposure time can be estimated
estimated level of concern can be estimated for median using dispersion models:
lethal concentration (LC,,) or median lethal dose (LDS,)
levels reported for mammalian species. The LCSOand LDS, P,= a + b In(C”r,)
are concentrations or the dose that kill 50 percent of the where
exposed laboratory animals in controlled experiments.
Lowest reported lethal concentration (LCLO) or lethal C = concentration in ppm by volume, in ppm;
dose level(LDLO) can also be used as levels of concern. t,= exposure time in rein; and
n = characteristic constant for that chemical.
Probit equations estimate the injury or mortality rate with
inputs at two levels:
ANNEX B
(Ckwse 8)
19
ANNEX C
(Clause 6.1 .3)
PASQUILL-GIFFORD STABILITY CLASSES
C-1 Insolation category is determined from the table below:
Daytime
insolation Night Time Conditions Anytime
Surface
Whrd Strong Moderate Slight Thin ~ 3/8 Heavy
Speed, m/s Overcastof cloudiness overcast
> 4/8 IOW
cloud
<2 A A-B B, F F D
2-3 A-B B c E F D
3-4 B B-c c D E D
4-6 c C-D D D D D
>6 c D D D D D
..- ——
-
A: Extremely unstableconditions.
D: Neutral conditions.
B Moderately unstableconditions.
E : Slightly stable conditions.
c Slightly unstableconditions.
F : Moderately stable conditions,
ANNEX D
(Clause 6.1 .3)
Highly urban Cerrtresof cities with tall buildings, very hilly or mountainousarea 3-1o
21
IS 156”56:2006
ANNEX F
(Clause 6)
NEUTRALLY BUOYANT
I
I
●
I_E!&cd
FLAMMABLE TOXIC
i 1
I I
SELECTION OF FIRE AND EXPLOSION
MODEL 1
● TNT EQUIVALENCE EFFECT MODEL POSSIBLE RESULTS
● MULTI ENERGY
* ● TOXIC RESPONSE
● FIRE BALL PROBIT MODEL ● NUMBER AFFECTED
RESULTS: ● PROPERTY DAMAGE
● RADIATION HEAT FLUX
● BIJkST OVER PRESSURE t
MITIGATION FACTORS
* ESCAPE/ ESCAPE ROUTES
* EMERGENCY RESPONSE
* SHELTER IN PLACE, DIKES,
CONTAINMENTS, ETC.
22
I
IS 15656:2006
ANNEX G
(Foreword)
COMMITTEE COMPOSITION
Occupational Safety and Health and Chemical Hazards Sectional Committee, CHD 8
Organization Representative(s)
REPRESENTATIVE
I
Century Rayon, Thane SHJUH. G UTTAMCHANDANI
StrruS. K. MISHRA(Alternate)
*.
I
I
IS 15656:2006
Organization Representative(s)
DR H. R. RAJMOHAN
I
National Institute of Occupational Health, Ahmedabad
(Alternate)
DR A. K. MUKHERJEE
NOCIL,-Mumbai DR B. V. BAPAT
SHRIV. R. NARLA (Alternate)
Oil Industry Safety Directorate (Ministry of Petroleum& Natural Gas), SHRIS. K. CHAXRABARTI
(Alternate)
SHRIV. K. SRJVASTAVA
Delhi
Member Secretary
Shri V. K. Diundi
Director (CHD), BIS
I
24
IS 15656:2006
Organization Represenfafive(s)
Directorate General Factory Advice Services & Labour Institute, Mumbai DR A. K. MAJUMDAR
SHRIS. P. RANA (Ahernate)
25
d
Bureau of Indian Standards
BIS is a statutory institution established under the Bureau of /ndian Standards Act, 1986 to promcXe
harmonious development of the activities of standardization, marking and quality certification of
goods and attending to connected matters in the country.
Copyright
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of implementing the standard, of necessary details, such as symbols and sizes, type or grade
j’
designations. Enquiries relating to copyright be addressed to the Director (Publication), BIS.
Amendments are issued to standards as the need arises on the basis of comments. Standards are also
reviewed periodically; a standard along with amendments is reaffirmed when such review indicates that
no changes are needed; if the review indicates that changes are needed, it is taken up for revision. .,
.i
Users of Indian Standards should ascertain that they are in possession of the latest amendments or .s
edition by referring to the latest issue of ‘BIS ‘Catalogue’ and ‘Standards: Monthly Additions’.
This Indian Standard has been developed from Dot: No. CHD 8 (1 129).
-4?
Amendments Issued Since Publication
. . ..
Amend No. Date of Issue Text Affected
,.
I
?’
,
-.