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People vs. Magallanes
G.R. Nos. 118013-14 October 11, 1995
FACTS: In the evening of August 7, 1992, the Spouses Dumancas, under
the direction and cooperation of P/Col. Nicolas Torres who took
advantage of his position as station commander of the PNP, with Police
Inspector Abeto’s cooperation, induced other police officers, namely:
Canuday, Pahayupan, Lamis, civilian agents: Fernandez, Divinagracia,
Delgado and Gargallano, to abduct kidnap and detain, Rufino Gargar
and Danilo Lumangyao, with the use of a motor vehicle and then shot
and killed the victims with evident premeditation, treachery and
nocturnity. The other accused secretly buried the victims in a makeshift
shallow grave to conceal the crime of murder for a fee of P500.00 each.
The cases were consolidated and the accused pleaded not guilty
and filed motions for bail. The prosecution presented Moises Grandeza,
the alleged lone eyewitness and co-conspirator in the offense. After the
prosecution rested its case, the trial court received evidence for the
accused, but the reception of evidence was suspended because of the
motions for inhibition of judge Garvilles filed by several accused. Garvilles
voluntarily inhibited himself and the case was re-raffled. However, the
prosecution moved for the transmittal of the recors to the Sandiganbayan
because the offenses charged were committed in relation to the office of
the accused PNP officers. The trial court ruled that the Sandiganbayan
does not have jurisdiction because the informations do not state that the
offenses were committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP
officers and denied the Motion for the Transfer of Records to
Sandiganbayan. The prosecution moved to reconsider but the same was
denied.
The reception of evidence was resumed but the judge later
inhibited himself. The cases were then re-raffled to Branch 49 of tne
Regional Trial Court of Bacolod. The prosecution filed a petition for
certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with a prayer for a temporary
restraining order, challenging the refusal of the judge to transfer the cases
to the Sandiganbayan. The private respondents were required to
comment on the petition and issued a temporary restraining order
enjoining the respondent judge to desist from proceeding with the trial of
the case.
ISSUE: Whether the offenses were committed in relation to the office of
the accused PNP officers
HELD: The jurisdiction of a court may be determined by the law in force
at the time of the commencement of the action. When the informations in
the cases were filed, the law governing the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan was P.D. 1861 , which provides that the Sandiganbayan
shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over cases involving: 1) violations
of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; 2) offenses committed by
public officers in relation to their office, where the penalty prescribed is
higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six (6) years, or a fine
of P 6,000.00.
If the penalty for the offense charged does not exceed
imprisonment of six (6) years or a fine of P6,000.00, it shall be tried by
the Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
or the Municipal Circuit Trial Court.
Jurisdiction is also determined by the allegations in the complaint
or information and not by the result of the evidence after the trial. In the
present case, the Sandiganbayan has not yet acquired jurisdiction over
the cases. The allegations in the complaint or information of “taking
advantage of his position” is not sufficient to bring the offenses within the
definition of “offenses committed in relation to public office.” It is
considered merely as an aggravating circumstance.
Moreover, the Sandiganbayan has partly lost its jurisdiction over
cases involving violations of R.A. 3019, as amended in R.A. 1379 because it
only retains jurisdiction on cases enumerated in subsection (a) when the
public officers rank is classified as Grade “27” or higher. In the case at bar,
none of the PNP officers involved occupy a position classified as Grade
“27” or higher. Accused Torres, who is highest in rank among the accused,
only has a rank classified as Grade “18”.
Lastly, the courts cannot be divested of jurisdiction which was
already acquired before the subsequent enactment of R.A. 7975 which
limited the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction to officers whose rank is Grade
“27” or higher, be4cause the courts retain its jurisdiction until the end of
litigation. Hence, cases already under the jurisdiction of the courts at the
time of the enactment of R.A. 7975 are only referred to the proper courts
if trial has not yet begun at that time. Petition is DENIED and the
challenged orders are AFFIRMED.
 Page |2

Cuyos vs. Garcia
G.R. No. L-46934 April 15, 1988
FACTS: Petitioner Alfredo Cuyos was charged with homicide with
multiple serious physical injuries and damage to proeperty through
reckless imprudence before the Municipal Court of San Fernando,
Pampanga. Cuyos entered a plea of not guilty at the arraignment and
the judge set the case for trial, but before it could commence, petitioner
filed a Motion to Remand the Case to the Court of First Instance. Cuyos
claimed that there is lack of jurisdiction on the part of the Municipal Court
and contended that the damages suffered by the Volkswagen he hit
amounted to P18,000.00. He argued that under Art. 365, par. 3 of the
Revised Penal Code, the crime would carry a fine in an amount ranging
from the amount of the damage to three times the value of the damage
alleged (i.e. 3 x P18,000.00=P54,000.00).
Under §87 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, the Municipal Court of
Pampanga only has jurisdiction over offenses punishable by a fine not
exceeding P6,000.00. Cuyos filed an Urgent Motion to Postpone the Trial.
The municipal judge denied the motion to transfer and set the case for
trial. Cuyos’ verbal motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, the
present petition for certiorari.
the amount fixed shall be imposed, but if there is also physical injuries,
there should be an additional penalty for the latter.
The applicable rule on allocation of jurisdiction on cases involving
cases of reckless imprudence resulting in homicide or physical injuries is
summarized by justice Barrera. Barrera stated that in such cases, Art. 48
of the Revised Penal Code is applicable, but there may be cases when the
imposable penalty is within the jurisdiction of the Municipal Court, while
the fine is under the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance. Since the
information cannot be split into two, the jurisdiction of the court is
determined by the fine imposable for the damage to property resulting
from the reckless imprudence. The maximum fine imposable for the crime
in this case is P54,000.00 and the maximum imprisonment for homicide is
six (6) years. Therefore, the criminal charge falls outside the jurisdiction of
the Municipal Court and within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court.
The order of the Municipal Court is SET ASIDE as null and void
and the Temporary Restraining Order is made PERMANENT.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent Municipal Court of San Fernando,

Pampanga has jurisdiction to try the case against Cuyos

HELD: The Court agrees with the position of the Solicitor General that the
Municipal Court has no jurisdiction to try the present case. The case at bar
involves a complex crime of homicide, multiple serious physical injuries
and damage to property resulting from reckless imprudence. Art. 365,
par.2 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the penalty imposable
upon petitioner, if found guilty of homicide through reckless imprudence,
would be prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods. At the
time the complaint was filed, the Municipal Court had jurisdiction to
impose a penalty of imprisonment not exceeding six
(6) years or a fine not exceeding P6,000.00 or both.
Thus, because the penalty for damage to property through
imprudence or negligence as provided in Art. 365 of the Revised Penal
Code is, “a fine ranging from the amount equal to the value of damages
to three times such value, the case must be forwarded to the Court of First
Instance. Art. 365 simply means that if there is only damage to property,

Buaya vs. Polo
G.R. No. 75079 January 26, 1989
FACTS: Petitioner Solemnidad Buaya was an insurance agent of Country
Bankers Insurance Corporation (CBIC) and was authorized to collect
premiums for and in behalf of CBIC then make a report and accounting
of the transactions and remit the same to the principal office of CBIC in
Manila. However, an audit of Buaya’s account showed that there was a
shortage in the amount of P358,850.7. As a result, she was charged with
estafa before the Regional Trial Court of Manila.
Buaya filed a Motion to Dismiss, claiming that the Regional Trial
Court of Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City, but
the same was denied by respondent judge Polo. The subsequent motion
for reconsideration was likewise denied. Hence, the present petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Regional Trial Court of Manila has jurisdiction
to try the criminal case against petitioner Buaya
HELD: The allegations in the complaint or information determine the
jurisdiction of the court in criminal cases. §14(a) of Rule 110 provides that
the action in all criminal prosecutions shall be instituted and tried in the
court of the municipality or province where the offense was committed or
where any of its essential elements took place. The subject information
charges Buaya with estafa committed during the period of 1980 to June
15, 1982 inclusive in the City of Manila, Philippines. The claim of Buaya
that RTC Manila has no jurisdiction because she is based in Cebu City is
without merit.
Clearly, RTC Manila has jurisdiction since the respondent’s
principal place of business is in Manila and Buaya’s failure to remit the
premiums caused damage and prejudice to respondent in manila.
Besides, estafa is a continuing offense which may be prosecuted at any
place where any of the essential elements of the crime took place.
Petition is DISMISSED.
Page |3
Zaldivia V. Reyes, Jr.
GR No. 102342/ July 3, 1992
Facts:
Petitioner was charged before the Municipal Trial Court on October 2,
1990 for violation of a Municipal Ordinance, allegedly committed on May
11, 1990.
Petitioner moved to quash the said charge on the ground that it had
already prescribed, but the Municipal Trial Court denied the motion
forcing the petitioner to raise it to the Regional Trial Court wherein the
respondent sustained the decision invoking Section 1, Rule 110 of the 1985
Rules of Criminal Procedure, particularly emphasizing the last paragraph
of the said rule, stating that it applies in all cases.
Petitioner however contends the decision and files a petition for review of
certiorari before the high court invoking Sections 1 and 2 of the Rule on
Summary Procedure and Sections 1, 2, and 3 of Act No. 3326 as the
provisions that governs the charge against her being a violation of a
municipal ordinance.
Issue:
Whether or not the said offense is covered by the Rules on Criminal
Procedure or covered by the Rule of Summary Procedure.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the rule emphasized by the respondent judge only
governs cases that fall under the Rules of Criminal Procedure and is not
applicable to all cases as the said section had begun with for all cases no
subject to the rule on summary procedure in special cases.
Thus, the respondent judges’ erred in denying the said motion on the
ground that the offense is governed by section 1, rule 110 of the rules of
criminal procedure.

People vs. Guillen
No. L-1477, January 18, 1950
Facts
Guillen was charged with the crime of murder of Simeon Varela (Barrela)
and to multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas, Alfredo Eva, Jose
Fabio, Pedro Carrillo and Emilio Maglalang who were the injured parties,
as the information filed against him provided.
Guillen pleaded not guilty to the crime charged against him, but was
later found after duly admitting his intention to kill the President, the
lower court found him guilty beyond reasonable doubt and was
sentenced with the highest capital punishment, for the murder of Simeon
Varela (Barrela) and to the multiple frustrated murder of President Roxas
and company.
Issue:
Whether or not the court erred in finding Guillen guilty of the said crime.
Ruling:
The court ruled that the lower court erred in finding the accused guilty of
the crime of multiple frustrated murderer because the act of Guillen was
not fully realized when the bomb was kicked out of the stage, preventing
him from fulfilling his act of assassinating the President. Therefore, Guillen
is not guilty of the crime of multiple frustrated murder but of the crime of
multiple attempted murder.
CASE: People vs. Uganap
G.R. No. 130605 June 19,2001
FACTS:
The victim and some of the accused were close relatives. Accused
Tirso Arang is the half-brother of the victim, while accused-appellant Felix
Uganap is also the victim’s cousin. Accused Faustino Uganap is the
brother-in-law of the victim, being brother of the latter’s wife, Leilani
Asang.
Page |4
The lone eye witness, Samuel Arang, cousin of the victim,that at
around 8:30 in the evening, he was walking home when he stopped near
the house of Salvador Uganap. He peeped through a hole in the wall of
the house and saw the (5) five accused, Felix Uganap had a .38 revolver,
while Nonoy Panday had a pistolized carbine. The room was illuminated
by a lamp. Samuel Arang moved away from the house and hid behind a
coconut tree. The accused went to the house of Pedro Arang, which was
30 meters away from where the witness was. Samuel stated that he saw
Felix immediately shoot Pedro when the latter opened the door. Samuel
fled because they were afraid.
Nolly Luchavez also testified that all of the accused was a member of
vigilante religious group called Ituman. That he was also recruited when
he was 14 years old. Felix Uganap was the group’s designated commander
as “Commander Matador”. Luchavez left the group.
Luchavez revealed that the plan to kill Pedro Arang was proposed by
Faustino Uganap at a coffee shop. Faustino paid Felix P 3,000.00 for the
purpose. The group intended to effect the killing on December 24, but
aborted because Pedro left the town to visit his wife. Hence, the plan was
set to January 6. Luchavez was unable to go with the group because he
had a fever.
ISSUES:
Whether or not there is conspiracy and;
Whether or not the price or reward as an aggravating
circumstance will be appreciated.
HELD:
Salvador Uganap died before he could be arrested. The accused
appellant was convicted while the other accused were acquitted, by RTC.
The review of criminal cases necessitates a re-examination of the
entire evidence on record. The Court is likewise not prohibited from
instituting a finding of conspiracy, in reversal of the findings of the lower
court, when its existence is manifest from the evidence at hand. In the
instant case, however, nothing less than direct proof of a previous
agreement to kill the victim, plus an eyewitness account of how the
conspirators effected their plan, was submitted into evidence but
disregarded by the trial court.
The information alleges that the crime was attended treachery
and evident premeditation. Evidence fall short of treachery, but the
evident premeditation is present. Court also observes that another

aggravating circumstance was proven by evidence. Luchavez’s testimony
that the taking of Pedro Arang’s life carried the price of P3, 000.00 was
categorical, credible and unrebutted.
However, because under the Rules of Criminal Procedure as
revised on Dec.1, 2000, generic aggravating circumstances must be
specifically named in the information, the Court will allow for this
amendment to retroact for the benefit of accused appellant. Hence, the
aggravating circumstance of price or reward shall not be appreciated.
Reclusion Perpetua is applicable and award of damages are the same.
CASE: People vs. Nuevo
G.R. No. 132169 October 26, 2001
FACTS:
Roberta Cido recalled that about 9:00 o’clock in the evening of
December 4, 1994, Nuevo passed in their house and invited her husband
for the drinking spree at Anselmo Sr., his father. She was left at home with
her 10 month old daughter and her 9 years old niece. At around 11:00 pm,
appellant returned and entered their room. She was awakened when
appellant held her neck, pinned down her arms and took off her clothing.
She struggled to extricate herself but to no avail.
Appellant lay on top of her and proceeded forcibly to have
sexual intercourse with her, Gemma Atis who was present, witnessed what
was being done to her. Appellant threatened her and her niece. Roberta
testified that she did not see him because it was very dark that night, she
identified him through his voice.
His husband corroborated part of his wife’s story. He saw Sanico
left his father’s place at around 11:00 pm and returned only at around
1:00 pm. Dr. Esmeralda Nadela testified that there is no fresh injury found
on the victim, that only old lacerations were present.
Sanico Nuevo, declared that he knew Roberta since they were
schoolmates in grade school and she was a former neighbor. He denied,
he invited Anselmo Jr. He denied raping Roberta. Trial court finds the
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt with aggravating circumstances.
The accused was sentenced to suffer the maximum penalty of death.
ISSUES:
Whether or not appellant was sufficiently identified by the
offended party based only on her recognition of the sound of
Page |5
his voice;
Whether or not the prosecution’s evidence suffices for the
conviction of rape and the imposition of the death penalty
on him.
HELD:
In People vs. Reyes, once a person gained familiarity with
another, identification becomes quite an easy talk even from a
considerable distance. In a number of cases, it is ruled that the sound of
the voice of a person is an acceptable means of identification where the
witness and the accused knew each other personally and closely for a
number of years.
In People vs. Amadore, it is held that the attendance of any of
the circumstances under the provisions of Section 11 of R.A. No.7659,
mandating the death penalty are in the nature of qualifying
circumstances and the absence of proper averment thereof in the
complaint will bar the imposition of that extreme penalty.
While the decision of the trial court held that dwelling and the
use of a deadly weapon aggravated the crime committed, court find that
these were not averted in the information. Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, effective December 1, 2000, provides that every complaint or
information must state not only the qualifying but also the aggravating
circumstances with specifity. This requirement has retroactive effect.
The result is that the crime committed by appellant is only simple
rape, which under Article 335 of the Revised Penal Code amended by
R.A. 7659, the law prevailing at the time of commission thereof, is
punished only with Reclusion Perpetua.
 Page |6

CASE: Casupanan vs. Laroya
G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
FACTS:
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Laroya and the
other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo and driven by petitioner
Avelino Casupanan, figured in an accident. Two cases were filed, with the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Capas , Tarlac. Laroya filed a criminal case
against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case
against Laroya for quasi-delict.
When civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its
preliminary investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a
motion to dismiss the case on the ground of forum-shopping considering
the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion and
dismiss the civil case.
Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a motion for reconsideration.
They insisted that the civil case is a separate civil action which can proceed
independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied the motion for
reconsideration. Casupanan and Capitulo, filed a petition for certiorari
under Rule 65 before the RTC and still it was denied for lack of merit.
They f iled a Motion for Reconsideration but RTC denied the same.
dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper
remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous. The essence of forum-
shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively. It is present
when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights
of action and relief sought. There is no forum-shopping in the instant case
because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of separate civil
action which can proceed independently.
Under Section 1 of the Rule 111, what is “deemed instituted” with the
criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the
crime or ex-delito. All other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of
the Civil Code are no longer deemed instituted and may be filed separately
and independently even without reservation.
In no case, however, may the “offended party recover damages
twice for the same act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly,
Section 3 of Rule 111 refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not
the accused.

ISSUES:

Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless

imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and
independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against
the private complainant in the criminal case;
Whether or not there is forum-shopping.

HELD:
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the
ground of forum-shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular
No. 04-94. MCTC did not state in its order of dismissal that the dismissal
was with prejudice. Thus, the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent on the matter,
is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 41 provides that an order dismissing an action
without prejudice is not appealable. Clearly, the Capas RTC’s order

Alvarez vs. Court of First Instance of Tayabas
FACTS:
On June 3 1936, Judge Eduardo Gutierrez David of the Court of First
Instance of Tayabas issued a search warrant on the basis of affidavit of
Agent Mariano Almeda in whose oath he declared that he had no
personal knowledge but through information from a reliable source. In
other words, the applicant's knowledge of facts is based on a mere
hearsay.
In the affidavit presented to the judge, the description is as follows:
"That there are being kept is said premises books documents, receipts,
lists chits, and other papers used by him in connection with his activities as
money lender, charging a usurious rate of interests, in violation of the
law."
At 7 pm on June 4, by virtue of the warrant, several agents of the
Anti-Usury Board enterd the store and residence of Narciso Alvarez seized
some articles such as internal revenue license, ledger, journals. cash bonds,
check stubs, memorandums, blackboards, contracts, inventories, bill of
lading, credit receipts, correspondence, receipt books, promissory notes
and checks.
On July 8, Alvarez filed a petition alleging that the search was illegal
based on the lack of personal knowledge, that it was made at night and
for non compliance in the particularity description rule in issuing warrant.
On September 10, the Court of First Instance ruled against the Alvarez
and upheld the validity of the search warrant.
ISSUES:
(1) W/N the search warrant is legal when the affidavit is based on hearsay.
(2) W/N a search warrant can be made at night.
(3) W/N the search warrant satisfies the particularity of description as
required by the law.
RULING:
(1) No. The search warrant is ILLEGAL because the affidavit is based on
mere hearsay.
RATIO: The general rule is that when the affidavit of the applicant or
Page |7
complainant contains sufficient facts within his personal and direct
knowledge, it is sufficient if the judge is satisfied that there exists probable
cause.
But when the applicant's knowledge of the facts is mere hearsay, the
affidavit of one or more witnesses having personal knowledge of facts is
necessary. The Court held that the warrant is illegal because it is based
on the affidavit of an agent who had no personal knowledge of the facts.
The true test of sufficiency of a deposition or affidavit to warrant issuance
of a search warrant is whether it has been drawn in such a manner that
perjury could be charged thereon and affiant be held liable for damages
caused.
(2) Yes, the search can be made at night.
RATIO: Section 101 of General Orders number 58 authorizs a search made
at night when it is positively asserted that the property is on the person or
in the place ordered to be searched. However, since the search warrant is
declared illegal (RULING 1), such search could not be legally made at
night.
(3) Yes, it satisfied the requirement of particularity of description.
RATIO: Article III of the Constitution and section 97 of General Orders
Number 58 requires that the affidavit must contain a particular
description of the placed to be searched and the person or thing to be
seized.
But, where, by the nature of the goods to be seized, their description
must be rather general, it is not required that technical description be
given, as this would mean that no warrant could issue.
Based on the description of the affidavit, and taking into consideration
the nature of the articles as described it is clear that no other more
adequate and detailed description could have been given, particularly
because it is difficult to give a particular description of the contents
thereof.
The description so made substantially complies with the legal provisions
because the officer of the law who executed the warrant was thereby
placed in a position enabiling him to identify the articles in question,
which he did.

BURGOS, SR. VS. CHIEF OF STAFF, AFP
No. L-64261
December 26, 1984
Escolin, J.:
Facts:
Assailed in this petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus
with preliminary mandatory and prohibitory injunction is the validity of 2
search warrants issued on December 7, 1982 by respondent Judge Ernani
Cruz-Pano, Executive Judge of the then Court of First Instance of Rizal,
under which the premises known as No. 19, Road 3, Project 6, Quezon
City, and 784 Units C & D, RMS Building, Quezon Avenue, Quezon City,
business addresses of the “Metropolitan Mail” and “We Forum”
newspapers, respectively, were searched, and office and printing
machines, equipment, paraphernalia, motor vehicles and other articles
used in the printing, publication and distribution of the said newspapers,
as well as numerous papers, documents, books and other written
literature alleged to be in the possession and control of petitioner Jose
Burgos, Jr. Publisher-editor of the “We Forum” newspaper, were seized.
Issue:
Whether there was a valid search warrant?
Ruling:
The two search warrants were issued wihout probable cause. To
satisfy the requirement of probable cause a specific offense must be
alleged in the application; abstract averments will not suffice. In the case
at bar, nothing specifically subversive has been alleged; stated only is the
claim that certain objects were being used as instruments and means of
committing the offense of subversion punishable under P. D. No. 885, as
amended. There is no mention of any specific provision of the decree. In
the words of Chief Justice Concepcion, “It would be legal heresy, of the
highest order, to convict anybody” of violating the decree without
reference to any determinate provision thereof.
Page |8
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney- General
GR. No. 6287, December 1, 1911 20 Phil 523
Facts:
The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the Court
of First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain
real estate in said complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. After
the filling of the complaint, the plaintiff took possession of the lands
described therein, building its line, stations and terminals and put the
same in operation. Commissioners were appointed to appraise the value
of the lands so taken. They held several sessions, took a considerable
amount of evidence, and finally made their report. After the said report
had been made and fled with the court, the plaintiff gave notice to the
defendants that on a certain date it would make a motion to the court to
dismiss action, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter, having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff that the
lands sought to be condemned were situated in the Province of Nueva
Ecija instead of the Province of Tarlac as alleged in the complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one province has the
power and authority to take cognizance of an action by a railroad
company for the condemnation of real estate located in another province.
Held:
The condemnation of a real estate by a railroad corporation is
governed by the special acts relating thereto, and the provisions of Section
377 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have to do with the venue of an
action in condemnation proceedings generally are not applicable to the
proceedings by a railroad company to condemn lands. Section 377 was
intended to cover simply actions relating to the condemnation of real
estate where the land involved is. It was not intended to meet a situation
presented by an action to condemn lands extending contiguously form
one end of the country to the other.
 Page |9

In an action taken by a railroad company to condemn lands,

while, with the consent of defendants, express or implied, the venue may
be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff, it
being one in which the lands sought to be condemned is located,
nevertheless, the defendants who have lands lying in another province, or
any one of such defendants, may by timely application to the court,
require the venue as to their, if one, his lands to be changed to the
province where their lands lie. In such case, the action as to all of the
defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally
begun, but would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered
continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces.
Wherefore, the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
with discretion to proceed with the action according to law.
Dela Cruz vs. Moya
G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838
Facts:
Issue: Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Held:
In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979.
On such date, General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977 published in the
Official Gazette, states that military tribunals created under General
Order No. 8 can exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed
by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the
performance of their duties. Clearly PD. 1822 and PD. 1822-A were
promulgated after the filling of the complaint however, General Order 59
was enacted before the commission of the crime.

On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the The court held that PD. 1822 and PD 1822-A are inapplicable to
Armed Forces of the Philippines was assigned to the Intelligence and the case however, General Order No. 59 shall apply. Wherefore, the
Operations Section and together with other PC men they received an petition was GRANTED.
order mission to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas, Davao for
the purpose of verifying and apprehending person who are allegedly
engaged in the illegal cockfighting. In compliance with the said mission,
they caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting but they
resisted the arrest. They left the place but brought with them pieces of
evidence such as gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal
cockfighting, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldier
on their way to the Headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela
Cruz shot Cabilto.

As a result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged of homicide

in the Court of First Instance of Davao. However, while the case is pending
trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President on
January 16, 1981, vesting in court – martial jurisdiction over crimes
committed by the members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine
Constabulary in the performance of their duty.

People vs. Chupeco
G.R. No. L- 19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640
Facts:
On February 2, 1951 Jose Chupeco was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for executing a Chattel Mortgage of the SAWMILL
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT in favor of Agricultural and Industrial
Bank located in Bataan whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and
chooses in action were subsequently transferred to Rehabilitation Finance
Corp. herein complainant with principal office in Manila.
Thereafter, without having fully satisfied the mortgage and
during the term without the consent of the mortgagee bank and with
intent to defraud Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and
encumber the said property to one Mateo Pinile. Accused moved to
quash the information on the ground that more than one offense is
charged and that the court had no jurisdiction
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction
over the case
Held:
An essential element common to the two acts punishable by
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed or
repledged should be the same or identical property that was mortgaged
or pledged before such removal of repledging. In the instant case,
evidence fails to show that the properties mortgaged to the bank are the
same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile.
On the evidence presented, there is no showing that properties
listed in the information as exhibit D (properties mortgaged to the bank)
are the same properties listed in exhibit E (properties pledge to Mateo
Pinile). With these findings Jose Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court
P a g e | 10
of First Instance of Manila still has jurisdiction over the case. The court held
that jurisdiction of court once vested is not lost by subsequent amendment
or stipulation.
Manila Railroad Co. vs. Attorney- General
GR. No. 6287, December 1, 1911 20 Phil 523
Facts:
The plaintiff, a railroad company, began an action in the Court
of First Instance of the province of Tarlac for the condemnation of certain
real estate in said complaint to be located in the Province of Tarlac. After
the filling of the complaint, the plaintiff took possession of the lands
described therein, building its line, stations and terminals and put the
same in operation. Commissioners were appointed to appraise the value
of the lands so taken. They held several sessions, took a considerable
amount of evidence, and finally made their report. After the said report
had been made and fled with the court, the plaintiff gave notice to the
defendants that on a certain date it would make a motion to the court to
dismiss action, upon the ground that the court had no jurisdiction of the
subject matter, having been recently ascertained by the plaintiff that the
lands sought to be condemned were situated in the Province of Nueva
Ecija instead of the Province of Tarlac as alleged in the complaint.
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of one province has the
power and authority to take cognizance of an action by a railroad
company for the condemnation of real estate located in another province.
Held:
The condemnation of a real estate by a railroad corporation is
governed by the special acts relating thereto, and the provisions of Section
377 of the Code of Civil Procedure which have to do with the venue of an
action in condemnation proceedings generally are not applicable to the
proceedings by a railroad company to condemn lands. Section 377 was
intended to cover simply actions relating to the condemnation of real
estate where the land involved is. It was not intended to meet a situation
presented by an action to condemn lands extending contiguously form

one end of the country to the other.
In an action taken by a railroad company to condemn lands,
while, with the consent of defendants, express or implied, the venue may
be laid and the action tried in any province selected by the plaintiff, it
being one in which the lands sought to be condemned is located,
nevertheless, the defendants who have lands lying in another province, or
any one of such defendants, may by timely application to the court,
require the venue as to their, if one, his lands to be changed to the
province where their lands lie. In such case, the action as to all of the
defendants not objecting would continue in the province where originally
begun, but would be severed as to the objecting defendants and ordered
continued before the court of the appropriate province or provinces.
Wherefore, the case was remanded to the Court of First Instance of Tarlac
with discretion to proceed with the action according to law.
Dela Cruz vs. Moya
G.R. No. L- 65192, April 27, 1998 160SCRA 838
Facts:
On February 23, 1979, Rodolfo Dela Cruz, a member of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines was assigned to the Intelligence and
Operations Section and together with other PC men they received an
order mission to proceed to Barangay Pangi, Maco Sto. Tomas, Davao for
the purpose of verifying and apprehending person who are allegedly
engaged in the illegal cockfighting. In compliance with the said mission,
they caught in flagrante the operators of said illegal cockfighting but they
resisted the arrest. They left the place but brought with them pieces of
evidence such as gaffs and fighting cocks. The operators of the illegal
cockfighting, including the deceased Eusebio Cabilto followed the soldier
on their way to the Headquarters. Fighting ensued and in the scuffle, Dela
Cruz shot Cabilto.
As a result, on August 2, 1979, Dela Cruz was charged of homicide
in the Court of First Instance of Davao. However, while the case is pending
trial, PD. Nos. 1822 and 1822-A were promulgated by the President on
January 16, 1981, vesting in court – martial jurisdiction over crimes
committed by the members of the Armed Forces or of the Philippine
Constabulary in the performance of their duty.
P a g e | 11
Issue: Whether or not civil courts have jurisdiction over the subject
matter.
Held:
In the instant case, the information was filed on August 2, 1979.
On such date, General Order No. 59, dated June 24, 1977 published in the
Official Gazette, states that military tribunals created under General
Order No. 8 can exercise exclusive jurisdiction over all offenses committed
by military personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines while in the
performance of their duties. Clearly PD. 1822 and PD. 1822-A were
promulgated after the filling of the complaint however, General Order 59
was enacted before the commission of the crime.
The court held that PD. 1822 and PD 1822-A are inapplicable to
the case however, General Order No. 59 shall apply. Wherefore, the
petition was GRANTED.
People vs. Chupeco
G.R. No. L-
19568, March 31, 1964 10 SCRA 640
Facts:
On February 2, 1951 Jose Chupeco was charged in the Court of
First Instance of Manila for executing a Chattel Mortgage of the SAWMILL
MACHINERY AND EQUIPMENT in favor of Agricultural and Industrial
Bank located in Bataan whose capital, assets, accounts, contracts and
chooses in action were subsequently transferred to Rehabilitation Finance
Corp. herein complainant with principal office in Manila.
Thereafter, without having fully satisfied the mortgage and
during the term without the consent of the mortgagee bank and with
intent to defraud Rehabilitation Finance Corporation, pledge and
encumber the said property to one Mateo Pinile. Accused moved to
quash the information on the ground that more than one offense is
charged and that the court had no jurisdiction
Issue: Whether or not the Court of First Instance of Manila has jurisdiction

over the case
Held:
An essential element common to the two acts punishable by
Article 319 of the Revised Penal Code is that the property removed or
repledged should be the same or identical property that was mortgaged
or pledged before such removal of repledging. In the instant case,
evidence fails to show that the properties mortgaged to the bank are the
same ones encumbered afterwards to Mateo Pinile.
On the evidence presented, there is no showing that properties
listed in the information as exhibit D (properties mortgaged to the bank)
are the same properties listed in exhibit E (properties pledge to Mateo
Pinile). With these findings Jose Chupeco was acquitted. However, Court
of First Instance of Manila still has jurisdiction over the case. The court held
that jurisdiction of court once vested is not lost by subsequent amendment
or stipulation.
CALEON V AGUS DEVELOPMENT CORP.
FACTS:
Agus Development Corporation is the owner of a parcel of land
denominated at Lealtad, Sampaloc, Manila, which it leased to petitioner
Rita Caleon for a monthly rental of P180.00. Petitioner constructed on the
lot leased a 4-door apartment building. Without the consent of the
private respondent, the petitioner sub-leased two of the four doors of the
apartment to Rolando Guevarra and Felicisima Estrada for a monthly
rental of P350.00 each. Upon learning of the sub-lease, private
respondent through counsel demanded in writing that the petitioner
vacate the leased premises.
Agus filed a complaint for ejectment MTC of Manila, against the
petitioner citing as ground therefor the provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg.
25, Section 5, which is the unauthorized sub-leasing of part of the leased
premises to third persons without securing the consent of the lessor within
the required sixty (60)-day period from the promulgation of the new law
(B.P. 25).
Petitioner argued that Batas Pambansa Blg. 25 cannot be applied in this
case because there is a perfected contract of lease without any express
prohibition on subleasing which had been in effect between petitioner
P a g e | 12
and private respondent long before the enactment of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 25. Therefore, the application of said law to the case at bar is
unconstitutional as an impairment of the obligation of contracts.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Petitioner’s contention is correct?
RULING:
The Supreme Court Ruled that the petitioners contention is untenable. It
is well settled that all presumptions are indulged in favor of
constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging unconstitutionality
must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt. In fact, this Court
does not decide questions of a constitutional nature unless that question is
properly raised and presented in appropriate cases and is necessary to a
determination of the case. In any event, it is now beyond question that
the constitutional guaranty of non-impairment of obligations of contract
is limited by and subject to the exercise of police power of the state in the
interest of public health, safety, morals and general welfare
WHEREFORE, the Petition is Denied for lack of merit.
20TH CENTURY FOX FILM CORPORATION vs. CA
FACTS:
In a letter-complaint dated August 26, 1985, petitioner 20th Century Fox
Film Corporation through counsel sought the National Bureau of
Investigation's (NBI) assistance in the conduct of searches and seizures in
connection with the latter's anti-film piracy campaign. Specifically, the
letter-complaint alleged that certain videotape outlets all over Metro
Manila are engaged in the unauthorized sale and renting out of
copyrighted films in videotape form which constitute a flagrant violation
of Presidential Decree No. 49 (otherwise known as the Decree on the
Protection of Intellectual Property).
Acting on the letter-complaint, the NBI conducted surveillance and
investigation of the outlets pinpointed by the petitioner and subsequently
filed three (3) applications for search warrants. On September 4, 1985, the
lower court issued the desired search warrants. The NBI accompanied by
the petitioner's agents, raided the video outlets and seized the items
described therein. An inventory of the items seized was made and left
with the private respondents. The lower court later on lifted the 3 search

warrants and ordered the NBI to return the properties that were seized.
Hence this petition.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the judge properly lifted the search warrants he issued
earlier upon the application of the National Bureau of Investigation on
the basis of the complaint filed by the petitioner.
RULING:
The Supreme Court dismissed the petition.
The NBI agents who acted as witnesses did not have personal knowledge
of the subject matter of their testimony which was the alleged commission
of the offense by the private respondents. Only the petitioner's counsel
who was also a witness during the application for the issuance of the
search warrants stated that he had personal knowledge that the
confiscated tapes owned by the private respondents were pirated tapes
taken from master tapes belonging to the petitioner. However, the lower
court did not give much credence to his testimony in view of the fact that
the master tapes of the allegedly pirated tapes were not shown to the
court during the application.
Witnesses in the hearing for an application for search warrants must have
personal knowledge of the subject matter of their testimony as to the
alleged commission of the offense. Also, the sear warrant must contain a
specific description of the articles to be seized. General warrants are
constitutionally objectionable.
People vs. Gano
Facts
On December 31, 1994 at around 7:00 in the morning Sr.
Inspector Ernesto Garcia received a report of a massacre at a residence in
San Mateo Rizal. At the crime scene Garcia saw the body of Pociano
Salen and was thereafter informed the identity of the suspect. The
suspect in the name of Castanito Gano a.k.a. Allan Gano or Jerry Perez or
several other known aliases was arrested and detained in Butuan City
after having tried to escape from the authorities. On their way back to
Manila Garcia disclosed that the accused confessed to him his responsibility
for the triple killing and robbery.
Upon arraignment, the accused Castanito Gano made a
qualified admission by admitting the killing of the three (3) victims but
P a g e | 13
denying the charge of robbery. Considering that what is charged is a
complex crime with a single penalty, the accused with the assistance of his
counsel entered a plea of not guilty.
Issue
WON the voluntary confession being conditional could be mitigating?
Ruling
NO. The Court ruled that if the voluntary confession is conditional or
qualified, it is NOT mitigating. The accused was merely confessing to the
crime of homicide but NOT to robbery with homicide, a considerably
graver offence. For voluntary confession to be appreciated as an
extenuating circumstance, the same must not only be made
unconditionally but the accused must admit to the offense charged, i.e.
robbery with homicide and not to either robbery or homicide only. Hence,
if the voluntary confession is conditional or qualified, it is not mitigating.
People vs. Yaoto
Facts
Accused-appellant Eduardo Yaoto was charged with two (2)
counts of rape and pleaded “not guilty” to both counts. In her medico-
genital examination, Dr. Armie Umil certified that Angeline Yaoto, 17
years old, suffered genital and extragenital injuries. It was found that
Angeline was not only sexually abused but was also physically assaulted.
Accused Yaoto assails the credibility of Angeline and denied having raped
her twice. He also assailed Angeline’s testimony that he had bolo and an
ice pick with which he threatened her considering that the prosecution
failed to produce said items in evidence.
Issue
WON the testimony of witnesses in the lower court be admitted by the
SC?
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses and

their testimonies is a matter best undertaken by the trial court because of
its unique opportunity to observe the witnesses and their demeanor,
conduct and attitude especially under cross-examination. Ordinarily, the
Court will not disturb the findings of the trial court as to the credibility of
the witness considering that it is in a better position to observe her candor
and behavior on the witness stand.
People vs. Bernabe
Facts
On or about October 29, 1998 in Pasay City Virgilio Bernabe by
means of force and intimidation employed upon Maria Esnelia Bernabe,
his daughter, a 17 year old minor, unlawfully have carnal knowledge with
said victim against her will and consent. Upon arraignment the accused
pleaded “not guilty”.
During trial accused denied having raped his own daughter. He
testified that Maria Esnelia charged him with rape because he resented
her boyfriend who for sometime slept in their house. He also depicted his
daughter as a rebel and neglected her studies. Accused also claimed that
his two sisters assisted his daughter in filing the rape case against him
because of a land dispute between them.
Issue
WON the testimony of witnesses in the lower court be admitted by the
SC?
Ruling
Yes. The Court ruled that when it comes to the issue of credibility the
Supreme Court as any other appellate court, would ordinarily defer to the
assessment and evaluation given by the trial court, for only trial courts are
in so unique a position as to be able to observe that elusive and
insurmountable evidence of the witness’ deportment on the witness stand
while testifying.
Gr no. 123340 August 29, 2002
P a g e | 14
Lutgarda Cruz, petitioner, vs. The Court of Appeals, et. al.,
respondents
Facts:
The City Prosecutor of Manila charged Cruz with the crime of estafa
though falsification of public documents before the RTC of
Manila. Allegedly, Cruz executed an Affidavit of Self-adjucation
of a parcel of land when she knew that there were other
surviving heirs. The offended party did not reserve the right to file
a separate civil action. Hence, it was tried together with the
criminal case.
The RTC acquitted Cruz. On the civil aspect, the court ordered the
return of the parcel of land to the surviving heirs.
Cruz filed by registered mail a motion for reconsideration. This was
denied by the trial court. A petition for certiorari and mandamus
was filed with the CA. This was also dismissed by the appellate
court. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Issues:
Whether the CA erred in finding that the RTC of Manila had
jurisdiction to render judgment on the civil aspect of the criminal
case, involving a property in Bulacan.
Decision:
Case Remanded.
There are 3 important requisites which must be present before
the court can acquire criminal jurisdiction. The court must have
jurisdiction before the subject matter, the territory where the offense was
committed, and over the person of the accused. In this case, the court has
jurisdiction over the subject matter as the law has conferred on the court
the power to hear and decide cases involving estafa though falsification of
public document. The court also had jurisdiction over the offense charged
since the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction. The court
also has acquire jurisdiction over the accused because whe voluntarily
submitted to the court’s authority.
Art. 100 of the RPC provides that “every person criminally liable
for a felony is also civilly liable.” Art. 104 of the same Code provides that
“civil liability xxx includes restitution.” In this case, the civil liability is

deemed instituted with the criminal action since the offended party did
not reserve the civil acton. Though Cruz was acquitted, this did not
dissolve the civil aspect of the case.
GR no. 127107 October 12, 1998
Peter Paul Dimatulac and Veronica Dimatulac, petitioners vs.
Hon. Sensinando Villon, et. al., respondents.
Facts:
SP03 Virgilio Dimatulac was shot dead at his residence in Pampanga.
A complaint for murder was filed in the MTC and after
preliminary investigation, Judge Designate David issued warrants
of arrest against the accused.
Only David, Mandap, Magat, and Yambao were arrested and it was
only Yambao who submitted his counter-affidavit. Judge David
then issued a resolution finding reasonable ground that the crime
of murder has been committed and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof.
Though it was not clear whether Pampanga Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor Sylvia Alfonso-Flores acted motu proprio, or upon
motion of the private respondents, she conducted a
reinvestigation and resolved that the Yabuts and Danny were in
conspiracy, along with the other accused, and committed
homicide.
Before the information for homicide was filed, the Petitioner
appealed the resolution of Alfonso-Flores to the Secretary of
Justice. However, Provincial Proseutor Maranag ordered for the
release of David, Mandap, Magat, and Naguit. An information
for homicide was also filed before the Regional Trial Court.
Judge Raura approved the cash bonds of the Yabuts and recalled the
warrants of arrest against them.
Private Prosecutor Amado Valdez then filed a Motion to issue hold
departure order and Urgent Motion to defer proceedings. Judge
Roura deferred the resolution of the first Motion and denied the
second. He also set the arraignment of the accused.
The petitioners filed a Motion to inhibit Judge Roura for hastily setting
the date for arraignment pending the appeal in the DOJ and for
prejudging the matter. They also filed a Petition for prohibition
with the Court of Appeals.
Public Prosecutor Datu filed a Manifestation and Comment with the
P a g e | 15
trial court and opposed the inhibition of Roura. He also stated
that he will no longer allow the private prosecutor to participate.
Judge Roura voluntarily inhibited himself and was replaced by
Judge Villon.
The Petitioners filed with the RTC a Manifestation submitting
documentary evidence to support their contention that the
offense committed was murder.
Judge Villon ordered for the resetting of the arraignment. The Yabuts
entered a plea of not guilty. The petitioners then filed a Urgent
Motion to set aside arraignment.
Secretary Guingona of the DOJ resolved the appeal in favor of the
petitioners. He also ruled that treachery was present.
The Yabuts opposed the Manifestation because they have already
been arraigned and they would be put under double jeopardy.
The Secretary of Justice then set aside his order and the appeal was
held not and academic due to the previous arraignment of the
accused for homicide.
Judge Villon denied the Motion to set aside arraignment. The motion
for reconsideration was also denied. Hence, this petition for
certiorari/prohibition and mandamus.
Issues:
Whether the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor committed grave
abuse of discretion in reinvestigating the case without having the
respondents within the custody of the law and for filing the
information pending the appeal of the resolution with the DOJ.
Whether Hon. Villon acted with grave abuse of discretion in
proceeding with the arraignment and for denying the Motions to
set aside the arraignment.
Whether the Secretary of Justice committed grave abuse of discretion
in reconsidering his order.
Decision:
Petition is GRANTED.
Alfonso-Reyes was guilty of having acted with grave abuse of
discretion for conducting a reinvestigation despite the fact that the Yabuts
were still at large. Though Sec. 5, Rule 112 states that the prosecutor is not
bound by the findings of the judge who conducted the investigation, the
 P a g e | 16

resolution should be based on the review of the record and evidence

transmitted. Hence, she should have sustained the recommendation since
all the accused, except Yambao, failed to file their counter-affidavits. It is
impossible for Alfonso-Reyes to not have known the appeal filed with the
DOJ. The filing of an appeal is provided in Sec. 4, Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court. There is nothing in the law which prohibits the filing of an appeal
once an information is filed.

Judge Roura acted with grave abuse of discretion for deferring

the resolution to the motion for a hold departure order. Since the accused
were out on bail, the Motion should have been granted since they could
have easily fled. Though he is not bound to the resolution of the DOJ, he
should have perused the documents submitted.

The DOJ was also in grave abuse of its discretion for setting aside
its order. In doing so, it has relinquished its power of control and
supervision of the Public Prosecutor. The state has been deprived of due
process. Hence, the dismissal of the case is null and void and double
jeopardy cannot be invoked by the accused.

G.R. No. 104392 February 20, 1996
RUBEN MANIAGO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS (First Division) HON. RUBEN C.
AYSON, in his capacity as Acting Presiding Judge, Regional
Trial Court, Branch IV, Baguio City, and ALFREDO
BOADO, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
Petitioner Ruben Maniago was the owner of shuttle buses which were
used in transporting employees of the Texas Instruments, (Phils.), Inc. from
Baguio City Loakan, Baguio City.roper to its plant site
one of his buses figured in a vehicular accident with a passenger jeepney
owned by private respondent Alfredo Boado. As a result of the accident,
a criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property
and multiple physical injuries was filed against petitioner's driver,
Herminio Andaya, with the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City. A month
later, a civil case for damages was filed by private respondent Boado
against petitioner himself. The complaint was assigned to Branch IV of the
same court.
Petitioner moved for the suspension of the proceedings in the civil case
against him, citing the pendency of the criminal case against his driver.
But the trial court denied petitioner's motion on the ground that pursuant
to the Civil Code, the action could proceed independently of the criminal
action, in addition to the fact that the petitioner was not the accused in
the criminal case.
Petitioner took the matter on certiorari and prohibition to the Court of
Appeals, maintaining that the civil action could not proceed
independently of the criminal case because no reservation of the right to
bring it separately had been made in the criminal case.
The Court of Appeals dismissed his petition which it held allowed a civil
action for damages to be filed independently of the criminal action even
though no reservation to file the same has been made.
Issue:
The question is whether despite the absence of such reservation, private
respondent may nonetheless bring an action for damages against
petitioner under Art. 2176, 2180, 2177 of the Civil Code:
P a g e | 17
Held:
The right to bring an action for damages under the Civil Code must be
reserved as required by Rule III, §1, otherwise it should be dismissed.
a reservation must be made to institute separately all civil actions for the
recovery of civil liability, otherwise they will be deemed to have been
instituted with the criminal case. the right of the injured party to sue
separately for the recovery of the civil liability whether arising from crimes
(ex delicto) or from quasi delict under Art. 2176 of the Civil Code must be
reserved otherwise they will be deemed instituted with the criminal
action.
Indeed the question on whether the criminal action and the action for
recovery of the civil liability must be tried in a single proceeding has
always been regarded a matter of procedure and, since the rule making
power has been conferred by the Constitution on this Court, it is in the
keeping of this Court.
In the present case, the criminal action was filed against the employee,
bus driver. Had the driver been convicted and found insolvent, his
employer would have been held subsidiarily liable for damages. The rule
requiring reservation in the end serves to implement the prohibition
against double recovery for the same act or omission. As held in Barredo
v. Garcia, the injured party must choose which of the available causes of
action for damages he will bring. If he fails to reserve the filing of a
separate civil action he will be deemed to have elected to recover
damages from the bus driver on the basis of the crime. In such a case his
cause of action against the employer will be limited to the recovery of the
latter's subsidiary liability under Art. 103 of the Revised Penal Code.
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is REVERSED and the
complaint against petitioner is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and
Natural Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Facts:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City
dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of
plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant
Marvin Hill, for the killing by Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named
Agapito Elcano, of which, when criminally prosecuted, the said accused
was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal, because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal
Case No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial,
he was acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of
"lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake." And so, when appellants filed
their complaint against appellees Reginald and his father, Atty. Marvin
Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees filed the motion to
dismiss.
Issues:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of
Reginald in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not
reversed?
Held:
The issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and
further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation.
a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have
been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and
for which, after such a conviction, he could have been
sued for this civil liability arising from his crime.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is
thus that although he could have been criminally
P a g e | 18
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his
criminal negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded
damages in an independent civil action for fault or
negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
acquittal from an accusation of criminal negligence, whether on
reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action,
not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages due
to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article forestalls a double
recovery.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal
act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or
acquitted, provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is
actually charged also criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and
would be entitled in such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other words, the
extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished even by a declaration in
the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not happened or has
not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in
reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case
has not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is
not a bar to the instant action against him.

G.R. No. 129282 November 29, 2001
DMPI EMPLOYEES CREDIT COOPERATIVE, INC., (DMPI-
ECCI), petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALEJANDRO M. VELEZ, as Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Misamis Oriental, Br. 20, and ERIBERTA VILLEGAS, respondents.
Facts:
On February 18, 1994, the prosecuting attorney filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Misamis Oriental, an information for estafa against Carmen
Mandawe for alleged failure to account to respondent Eriberta Villegas
the amount of P608,532.46. Respondent Villegas entrusted this amount to
Carmen Mandawe, an employee of petitioner DMPI-ECCI, for deposit
with the teller of petitioner.
respondent Eriberta Villegas filed with the Regional Trial Court, Misamis
Oriental, a complaint against Carmen Mandawe and petitioner DMPI-
ECCI for a sum of money and damages with preliminary attachment
arising out of the same transaction. In time, petitioner sought the dismissal
of the civil case on the grounds that there is a pending criminal case in
RTC Branch 37, arising from the same facts, and that the complaint failed
to contain a certification against forum shopping.
the trial court issued an order dismissing the Civil Case. Respondent filed a
motion for reconsideration of the order and the trial court granted
respondent's, thereby recalling the dismissal of the case.
Hence, this petition.
The Issues
whether the civil case could proceed independently of the criminal case
for estafa without having reserved the filing of the civil action.
Held:
as a general rule, "every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly
liable." This is the law governing the recovery of civil liability arising from
the commission of an offense. Civil liability includes restitution, reparation
for damage caused, and indemnification of consequential damages.
The offended party may prove the civil liability of an accused arising from
the commission of the offense in the criminal case since the civil action is
either deemed instituted with the criminal action or is separately
instituted.
only the civil liability arising from the offense charged is deemed instituted
with the criminal action unless the offended party waives the civil action,
P a g e | 19
reserves his right to institute it separately, or institutes the civil action prior
to the criminal action.
There is no more need for a reservation of the right to file the
independent civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil
Code of the Philippines. "The reservation and waiver referred to refers
only to the civil action for the recovery of the civil liability arising from the
offense charged. This does not include recovery of civil liability under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from
the same act or omission which may be prosecuted separately even
without a reservation."
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition.
GO VS. CA
FEBRUARY 11, 1992
FELICIANO, J.
FACTS:
Maguan was driving the opposite direction of a one-way street in
San Juan, Metro Manila. Rolito Go’s car and Maguan nearly bumped into
each other in an intersection. Because of this, Go shot Maguan and left the
scene. A security guard of a nearby restaurant saw the incident and took
down the plate number of Go’s car. Police investigators were able to get
Go’s picture through the credit card that Go used when he dined in
restaurant near the crime scene the witness positively identified Go as the
gunman. Hence, a manhunt was launched. Several days thereafter, Go
went to the police station where the witness identified him as the suspect.
The police detained Go. A complaint for frustrated homicide was filed by
the police to the Provincial prosecutor. Go was informed of his right to
demand preliminary investigation provided he waives the Article 125 of
the Revised Penal Code. Go refused to execute such waiver. Meanwhile,
Maguan died. Hence, prosecutor filed am information of murder without
conducting preliminary investigation. Go posted cash bond and was
released after approval of the same by the court. The prosecutor filed for
leave of court to conduct preliminary investigation and to prayed for the
suspension of court proceedings pending the preliminary investigation. The
same was granted and arraignment of Go was suspended. The following
day, the court recalled its approval and cancelled the bail of Go. Hence,
Go filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus before the
SC, which was remanded to CA. Arraignment took place as scheduled
and Go refused to enter his plea. Hence, a plea of not guilty was entered

for him. Then, CA issued its decision dismissing the petition of Go on the
grounds that Go was validly arrested without a warrant and Go already
waived his right to preliminary investigation. Hence, this petition for
review on certiorari.
ISSUE 1:
Where or not Go was validly arrested without a warrant.
HELD:
NO. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure
provides, among others, that a peace officer or private person may
without warrant, arrest a person when an offense has in fact just been
committed, and the arresting person has personal knowledge of facts and
circumstances indicating that the person to be arrested has committed it.
In the case at bar, Go was arrested 6 days after the incident.
Hence, at the time of his arrest, the crime has not just “been committed”.
It would have been different if Go committed a continuing crime. In
addition, the police officers had no personal knowledge of facts indicating
that Go was he gunman. The police arrested Go by relying on the
statement of the witness. Finally, the plate number of the car that was
taken down by the witness did not point to Go’s car but to his wife.
ISSUE 2:
Whether or not Go waived his right to preliminary investigation.
HELD:
NO. While the right to preliminary investigation is statutory and
not constitutional, it is a component of due process of criminal justice. It is
a substantive right. To deprive an accused of this right is to deny due
process. Generally, said right is invoked before entering a plea; failure to
invoke the same amounts to waiver.
In this case, Go insisted that a preliminary investigation be
conducted upon the filing of the information before the court. The fact
that he posted bail did not amount to waiver of said right as he asked for
it when he filed for the approval of the cash bond. The court granted his
prayer for preliminary investigation before the approval of the bond. Go
even filed before the CA for such relief. Hence, Go was entitled to a
preliminary investigation. But since the trial had already commenced, the
trial should be suspended and preliminary investigation should be
conducted. Participation of Go during the trial did not amount to waiver
also as he was merely forced to do so to avail his other rights.
P a g e | 20
KENNETH ROY SAVAGE/ K ANGELIN EXPORT TRADING VS.
TAYPIN
331 SCRA 697 Bellosillo, J.
FACTS:
Acting on a complaint lodged by private respondent Eric Ng
Mendoza, president and general manager of Mendco Dev’t Corp., the NBI
filed an application for search warrant with the RTC of Cebu City, to
search the premises of petitioner located in Talisay Cebu, and to seize the
wrought iropn furniture found therein which had allegedly been the
object of unfair competition involving design patents, punishable by Art
189 of the RPC, as the petitioner manufactured wrought iron furniture
similar to that patented by the Mendco without securing any license or
patent for the same. Seized in the premises were the said pieces of
furniture. Petitioners moved to quash the warrant alleging, among others,
that (a) respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter, and
(b) the crime they are accused of does not exist. The denial of the motion
prompted petitioners to come to this court.
ISSUE:
W/N the petitioners’ contention is of merit
HELD:
(a) No. The Court has consistently ruled that that a search warrant is
merely a process issued by the court in the exercise of its ancillary
jurisdiction and not a criminal action which it may entertain in pursuant
to its original jurisdiction. The authority to issue search warrants is inherent
in all courts and may be effected outside their territorial jurisdiction. In the
instant case, the premises searched located in Talisay Cebu are well within
the territorial jurisdiction of the respondent court. SC AO 113-95 merely
specified which courts could ‘try and decide’ cases involving violations of
IPR. The power to issue search warrants in violations of IPR has not been
exclusively vested in the courts enumerated in SC Administrative Order.
(b) Yes. The issue referred to in Art. 189 of RPC had been rendered moot
and academic. Said article has already been repealed by the Intellectual
Property Right Code. Further, the acts complained of does not fall under
any of the provisions of the IPR Code. There being no crime to speak of,
the search warrant does not even begin to fulfill the constitutional
requirements of such, and is therefore defective on its face. Since the
warrants are null and void, all the seized properties must be returned to
petitioners.
P a g e | 21

La Chemise Lacoste S.A. vs. Fernandez
GR. Nos. L-63796-97 May 21, 1984
Ponente: Gutierrez, Jr.
Facts:
La Chemise Lacoste SA is a foreign corporation, organized and
existing under the laws of France and not doing business in the Philippines.
It is undeniable from the records that it is the actual owner of the
trademarks “LACOSTE,” “CHEMISE LACOSTE,” “CROCODILE DEVICE”
and a composite mark consisting of the word “LACOSTE” and a
representation of a crocodile/alligator, used on clothing’s and other goods
specifically sporting apparels sold in many parts of the world and which
have been marketed in the Philippines since 1964. In 1975, Hemandas &
Co., a duly licensed domestic firm applied for and was issued Reg. SR-2225
(SR stands for Supplemental Register) for the trademark “CHEMISE
LACOSTE & CROCODILE DEVICE” by the Philippine Patent Office for use
on T-shirts, sportswear and other garment products of the company. Two
years later, it applied for the registration of the same trademark under
the Principal Register. The Patent Office eventually issued an order dated
3 March 1977 allowing the application and holding the registrant to be
presumed the owner of the mark until after the registration is declared
cancelled. Thereafter, Hemandas & Co. assigned to Gobindram
Hemandas all rights, title, and interest in the trademark “CHEMISE
LACOSTE & DEVICE”. On 21 November 1980, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed
its application for registration of the trademark “Crocodile Device”
(Application Serial 43242) and “Lacoste” (Application Serial 43241). The
former was approved for publication while the latter was opposed by
Games and Garments in Inter Partes Case 1658. In 1982, La Chemise
Lacoste SA filed a Petition for the Cancellation of Reg. SR-2225 docketed
as Inter Partes Case 1689.
On 21 March 1983, La Chemise Lacoste SA filed with the National
Bureau of Investigation (NBI) a letter-complaint alleging therein the acts
of unfair competition being committed by Hemandas and requesting
their assistance in his apprehension and prosecution. The NBI conducted
an investigation and subsequently filed with the trial court (RTC Manila,
Branch XLIX, National Capital Judicial Region) two applications for the
issuance of search warrants which would authorize the search of the
premises used and occupied by the Lacoste Sports Center and Games and
Garments both owned and operated by Hemandas. The court issued
Search Warrant 83-128 and 83-129 for violation of Article 189 of the
P a g e | 22
Revised Penal Code. The NBI agents executed the two search warrants
and as a result of the search found and seized various goods and articles
described in the warrants. Hemandas filed a motion to quash the search
warrants alleging that the trademark used by him was different from La
Chemise Lacoste’s trademark and that pending the resolution of IPC 1658
before the Patent Office, any criminal or civil action on the same subject
matter and between the same parties would be premature. La Chemise
Lacoste filed its opposition. The State Prosecutor likewise filed his
opposition. The court was, however, convinced that there was no
probable cause to justify the issuance of the search warrants. Thus, in its
order dated 22 March 1983, the search warrants were recalled and set
aside and the NBI agents or officers in custody of the seized items were
ordered to return the same to Hemandas
The Supreme Court granted the petition in GR 63797-97,
reversing and setting the order dated 22 April 1983 of the RTC, and made
permanent the Temporary Restraining Order dated 29 April 1983. The
Court, on the other hand, denied due course to the petition in GR 65659
for lack of merit, and thus lifting and setting aside the Temporary
Restraining Order dated 5 December 1983.
Ruling:
Determination of probable cause mandatory for the
issuance of a valid search warrant; Probable cause
defined
As a mandatory requirement for the issuance of a valid search
warrant, the Constitution requires in no uncertain terms the
determination of probable cause by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce
(Constitution, Art IV, Sec. 3). Probable cause has traditionally meant such
facts and circumstances antecedent to the issuance of the warrant that
are in themselves sufficient to induce a cautious man to rely upon them
and act in pursuance thereof (People v. Sy Juco, 64 Phil. 667).
Determination of probable cause; No general formula or
fixed rule
The concept of probable cause was amplified and modified by
our ruling in Stonehill v. Diokno, (20 SCRA 383) that probable cause
“presupposes the introduction of competent proof that the party against
whom it is sought has performed particular acts, or committed specific
omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws.” The question of

whether or not probable cause exists is one which must be decided in the
light of the conditions obtaining in given situations (Central Bank v.
Morfe, 20 SCRA 507). There is no general formula or fixed rule for the
determination of the existence of probable cause since the existence
depends to a large degree upon the finding or opinion of the judge
conducting the examination (Luna v. Plaza, 26 SCRA 310),. However, the
findings of the judge should not disregard the facts before him nor run
counter to the clear dictates of reason, more so it is plain that our
country’s ability to abide by international commitments is at stake.
Correction of errors must be based on sound and valid
grounds
Herein, the court complied with the constitutional and statutory
requirements for the issuance of a valid search warrant when at that
point in time; it was fully convinced that there existed probable cause. But
after hearing the motion to quash and the oppositions thereto, the court
executed a complete turnabout and declared that there was no probable
cause to justify its earlier issuance of the warrants. Although the lower
court should be given the opportunity to correct its errors, if there be any,
but the rectification must be based on sound and valid grounds. The
allegation that vital facts were deliberately suppressed or concealed by La
Chemise Lacoste should have been assessed more carefully because the
object of the quashal was the return of items already seized and easily
examined by the court. The items were alleged to be fake and quite
obviously would be needed as evidence in the criminal prosecution.
Application for a search warrant is heard ex parte
An application for a search warrant is heard ex parte. It is neither
a trial nor a part of the trial. Action on these applications must be
expedited for time is of the essence. Great reliance has to be accorded by
the judge to the testimonies under oath of the complainant and the
witnesses. Herein, the allegation of Hemandas that the applicant withheld
information from the court was clearly no basis to order the return of the
seized items.
Manalili vs. Court of Appeals G.R. No. 113447
October 9, 1997
FACTS:
P a g e | 23
The Anti-Narcotics Unit of the Kalookan City Police was conducting
surveillance in front of the Kalookan City Cemetary due to reports of drug
addicts frequenting the area. They observed Alain Manalili in the area,
with reddish eyes and walking in a swaying manner, signs of being high on
drugs. They stopped Manalili and asked for the contents of his hands,
which turned out to be a wallet. Inside the wallet, police officers found
what later on turned out to be crushed marijuana. He was charged with
Illegal Possession of Marijuana under the Dangerous Drugs Act. Manalili
claimed the charges were “trumped up” and that the police officers had
blackmailed him. In addition, petitioner asserts that the evidence seized
was inadmissible against him, as fruits of an illegal seizure. On the other
hand, the Solicitor General counters that the search and seizure was valid,
but regardless of its validity, its defense had been waived by petitioner
since it was not raised in the lower court.
ISSUES:
1) Was the search of Manalili and seizure of marijuana valid?
2) May petitioner raise this defense for the first time on appeal?
RULING:
The General Rule is that a search and seizure must be validated by a
judicial warrant, otherwise, such search and seizure is unconstitutional.
However, there are exceptions to the rule: 1) search incidental to a lawful
arrest, 2) search of a moving vehicle, 3) seizure in plain view, 4) customs
search and 5) waiver by the accused. The court added another exception,
the stop-and frisk, which is the right of a police officer to stop a citizen on
the street, interrogate him and pat him for weapons. This is for the safety
of police officers and the general public. Of course, the stop-and-frisk
must be grounded on probable cause that the accused has committed an
offense. As such, the court ruled that the search and seizure was valid and
admissible as evidence. In addition, Manalili had effectively waived the
defense of an invalid search since this issue was not raised during the trial.
Such issues may not be raised for the first time on appeal.

Mata vs. Judge Bayona et. Al.
GR No. L-50720 March 26, 1985
Ponente: De Castro
Facts:
An information was filed against Soriano Mata, petitioner,
alleging that he offered, took and arranged bets on Jai Alai game by
selling illegal tickets known as ‘Masiao tickets’ without any authority from
the Philippine Jai Alai & Amusement Corporation or from the
government authorities concerned. Thereafter, a search warrant was
issued by the respondent Judge against him for violation under PD 810, as
amended by PD 1306.
Petitioner claims that during the hearing of the case, he
discovered that nowhere from the records of the said case could be found
the search warrant and other pertinent papers connected to the issuance
of the same, so that he had to inquire from the City Fiscal its whereabouts
and to which inquiry respondent Judge replied, “it is with the court”. This
led petitioner to file a motion to quash and annul the search warrant and
for the return of the articles seized, citing and invoking, among others,
Section 4 of Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Court.
The motion was denied by respondent Judge stating that the
court has made a thorough investigation and examination under oath of
private respondents and that the fact that documents relating to search
warrant were not attached immediately to the record of the criminal case
is of no moment, considering that the rule does not specify when these
documents are to be attached to the records.
Issue:
W/N the search warrant issued by respondent Judge were valid.
Ruling:
The search warrant is tainted with illegality for being violative of
the Constitution and the Rules of Court.
Section 4 of Rule 126 provides that the judge must before issuing
the warrant personally examine on oath or affirmation the complainant
or witnesses he may produce and take their depositions in writing, and
attach them to the record, in addition to any affidavits presented to him.
Mere affidavits of the complainant and his witnesses are thus not
sufficient.
P a g e | 24
Therefore, the search warrant is tainted with illegality by failure
of the Judge to conform with the essential requisites of taking the
depositions in writing and attaching them to the record. However,
illegality of search warrant does not call for return of things seized which
are prohibited.
Orquinaza vs. People
Facts:
On Feb 5, 2003, Edilyn Arida, an employee of Calamba Model Makers
factory, together with her witness, Julio Espinili, executed a sworn
statement regarding the allege act of Orquinaza, the general manager
of the said factory, of kissing her and touching her breasts while she was
taking a nap. The case was referred as a case of sexual harassment.
Orquinaza filed a petition to dismiss the complaint arguing that it does
not contain allegation to constitute the crime of sexual harassment. The
assistant city prosecutor filed with the MTC an information charging the
petitioner with acts of lasciviousness. A warrant of arrest was issued
against Orquinaza. Orquinaza filed an omnibus motion praying that the
warrant be recalled, the information be quashed, the arraignment be
invalidated and the case be dismissed. He also claims that he was
deprived of his right to due process since the information for acts of
lasciviousness was void as the preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor was for sexual harassment and not for acts of lasciviousness.
The motion was denied. He again filed for a motion for reconsideration
which was again denied. He filed a petition for certiorari.
Issue:
Should the case be dismissed on the ground of lack of preliminary
investigation?
Held:
Based on the affidavits submitted by the parties, the assistant city
prosecutor concluded that the more proper charge should be acts of
lasciviousness. The conduct of another preliminary investigation for the
offense of acts of lasciviousness would be futile because the complainant
would be presenting the same evidence which have already been studied
by the prosecutor. The lack of preliminary investigation would still not be
a ground to quash the information against the accused much less does it
affect the court’s jurisdiction. The remedy of the accused is to call the
 P a g e | 25

attention of the court to the lack of preliminary investigation and

demand as a matter of right that one be conducted.

No. L-47448 May 17, 1978
The People of the Philippines, petitioner vs. Hon. Emeterio
Ocaya, et. al., respondents
Facts:
The Office of the Provincial Fiscal filed an information in the court of
Hon. Ocaya charging Esterlina Marapao, Letitia Marapao, and
Diosdado Marapao of the crime of serious physical injuries.
Records show that neither the arraignment nor the trial was made on
merit and no warrats of arrest were issued. Instead, the
respondent judge held that the respondents should be charged of
either slight or less serious physical injuries only. This is so, even if
the affidavits show that Lolita Ares, the victim, was incapacitated
for more than 30 days and a scar was left on her face, deforming
it.
Hon. Ocaya, motu proprio, ordered the dismissal of the case since the
crime or slight or less physical injuries is not within the jurisdiction
of the court.
The fiscal’s motion for reconsideration was denied by Hon. Ocaya.
Accordingly, the respondent judge evaluated the case without
hearing the parties nor the witnesses, nor having received their
evidence, as well as ruling against the deformity on the basis of
the medical certificate.
The Provincial Fiscal then filed the petition at bar for the nullification
of Hon. Ocaya’s orders.
Issue:
Whether Hon. Oaya acted with grave abuse of discretion for
dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
Decision:
The orders of the respondent judge was held NULL & VOID.
The jurisdiction of the court in a criminal case is determined by
the allegations in the information or criminal complaint, and not by the
result of the evidence presented at the trial, nor the trial judge’s personal
P a g e | 26
appraisal of the affidavits and exhibits without hearing the parties and
their witnesses. Moreover, once jurisdiction has attached to the person and
subject-matter, the subsequent happening of events, though it may have
prevented jurisdiction from attaching in the first instance, will not divest
the court of jurisdiction already attached.
People vs Agbulos
Facts:
Angelita Bangit filed a complaint against Joselito Agbulos, charging him
with Forcible abduction with rape. Agbulos was arraigned on January 23,
1981 where he pleaded guilty. On April 25, 1984, the prosecution rested its
case. On August 13,1984, a warrant of arrest was issued against Agbulos,
but was later on recalled because it was issued to the wrong bonding
company, thus the hearing was reset on November 5, 1984,. On the said
date, Agbulos failed to appear before the court. The bonding company
was given 30 days to produce the person of the accused and show the
cause why judgement should not be rendered against them. The bonding
company fails to surrender the accused and the court issued an order
stating that upon motion of fiscal, judgement will issue against the full
amount of the bond. Trial was further reset to January 30, 1985 and still
the accused failed to appear. Pursuant to the order of the court on the
judgement on the bond, accused was deemed to have waived his right to
present evidence, thus, Defense counsel just manifested that they were
adopting the testimony of prosecution witness Ernesto Tamayo,
thereafter; the defense rested its case. On July 11 1985, judgement was
rendered against the bonding company, and on June 15 1985, accused was
found guilty of forcible abduction with rape, sentenced to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and indemnification. On August 16, counsel
for accused appealed.
Issue: Was the trial in absentia valid? Whether or not the accused may
appeal?
Held:
Yes, it was perfectly valid in accordance with the constitution. The old case
of people vs Avanceña required the presence of the accused at certain
stages of the trial. This only results in the discontinuance of the trial as long
as the defendant would not reappear or remain at large. This rule would
work for the fugitive’s advantage. This rule is now modified by the bill of
rights which allows trial in absentia. The prisoner cannot simply escape
and thwart the continuance of prosecution and conviction against him
 P a g e | 27

provided that he has been arraigned, duly notified, and his failure to
appear unjustified. By the same rule, the accused forfeits his right to
appeal. Rule 124, section 8 of the 1985 rules on criminal procedure
provide that the court may, upon motion of the appellee,
dismiss the appeal if the appellant escapes from prison or
confinement, or jumps bail or flees to a foreign country during
the pendency of the appeal. Therefore, the appeal is dismissed.

People vs Baao
Facts:
Rowena Frederico is a thirteen year old school drop out, finishing
only grade 1 and of limited native intelligence. She claims she was raped
five times by accused appellant Baao; three times in December 1982, done
in the bathroom of accused-appellant’s house in Dasmariñas Cavite, and
twice in February 1983, the fourth done in the backyard while the fifth
was done in the living room. On March 4 1983, Rowena decided to tell her
mother about the offenses. She said that the first three rapes were done
at 8am on dates of December she could not recall, while the fourth was at
about 10 pm on Feb 17, and the fifth at noon of Feb 23. She claimed that
all rapes were done through force and threat of death and that the first
rape caused laceration of her hymen and there was full penetration and
pain in all instances. The victim was subjected to physical examinations
under Dr. Maximo Reyes, medico-legal officer of the NBI. According to Dr.
Reyes findings, Rowena underwent intercourse for not more than five
times, and that the findings were compatible with the testimony of the
victim. Lucia Federico, the victim’s mother, also testified that after she
came to know of the rapes, the accused-appellant’s wife approached her
and offered her 2000 Php so she would withraw the charges.
The Accused-appellant relied mainly on denial and alibi. He claims that
he was just being set up because he once caught the girl sealing soft drinks
from his sari sari store and had scolded her. He also claims that at the
times stated by Rowena on which dates she was supposedly raped, he was
with his daughter at her house near Manila International Airport in
Baclaran, to do some carpentry work. His daughter testified and said the
same thing. He also argued that the complaint was filed to extort money
from him, an amount of 15,000 which was later reduced to 8000. The
Trial Judge rejected the charges on the second, third and fifth rapes. This
leads the defense to invoke falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus, claiming that
since the three charges were rejected, the rest should also be rejected.
Issue:
Whether or not this was merely a tale concocted by Rowena.
Whether or not the two charges of rape should also be rejected
since the other three were rejected by the court.
Held:
P a g e | 28
Accused-Appellant was held guilty of the crime charged. His
contentions were rejected. His alibi of being in Baclaran on December is
not enough to relieve him of the charges because he couldn’t show that
he did not have any opportunity to go back to Dasmarinas during that
month. Also, considering the demeanour of the victim, she couldn’t have
made up such a story on her own. Alibi is an inherently weak defense.
On the contention that all charges should be rejected since three were
rejected, it could also conversely be argued that since truth was found on
the first and fourth rapes, accused should also be held liable for all five
rapes and be convicted. The choice really is whether it should be total
acquittal or total conviction for all five charges of rape.
People vs. Doria
Facts:
Florencio Doria @ “Jun” was a seller of illegal drugs. Upon a tip of an
informant, PO3 Manlangit together with the informant posed as a buyer
of marijuana, PO1 Badua tagged along as support in the whole
operation. PO3 Manlangit was able to give the marked bills worth P1600
to Florencio, left and after sometime returned with the 1 brick marijuana
at hand. They were able to arrest Florencio inflagrante delicto in selling
the marijuana to them, when asked where the marked bills where
Florencio replied that it was at the place of “Neneth.” The group went to
the house of the so called “Neneth,” when there they saw the person
whose name was Violeta Gadao carrying water to her house, they
questioned her where the marked bills were. At this time also a box with a
flap open was seen by the PO3 Manlangit, his suspicion peeked because
he saw at the open flap the same wrappings as the 1 brick he got from
Florencio at that time. PO3 Manlangit open the box and found 10 bricks
of the same marijuana. Simultaneously PO1 Badua was able to get the
marked bills out of Violeta and arrested her. The RTC ruled in favour of
the police and imposed upon Florencio and Violeta the penalty of Death,
the 11 bricks of marijuana were destroyed. The case went to the SC for
automatic review.
Issue:
W/N Florencio is guilty of the sale/possession of illegal drugs
W/N Violeta is guilty of the sale/possession of illegal drugs

Held:
Florencio is guilty, he was caught inflagrante delicto, and the law
authorizes such arrest without a warrant in such cases.
The law authorizes entrapment, that is the police conducts an operation
against the accused without inducing him to commit the said crime.
The law authorizes the mix of both subjective and objective test in
determining if there is entrapment in a case. The subjective test looks
on the daily practice, background and life of the accused in
determining if the crime is indeed committed out of his volition and
without inducement. The objective test looks into the conduct of the
police in trying to plan and execute the entrapment against the
accused, if it has no inducement in the whole of its process.
Entrapment there is no inducement and the accused did the crime out of
his volition. Instigation the crime was committed with inducement by
the police and the accused did the crime not of his volition.
Sec 5 Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on criminal procedure enumerate the valid
Arrests without a warrant:
When, in his prescence, the person to be arrested has committed,
is actually committing, or is attempting to commit the
offense.
When an offense has in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
When the prisoner to be arrested is a prisoner who escaped from
a penal establishment or place he is serving final judgement
or temporarily confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one confinement to
another.
No, Violeta can’t be guilty of selling illegal drugs because the drugs were
illegally seized from her house. The marked bills found in her person
also didn’t prove her participation in the sale of drugs by Florencio
The 5 instances where a search and seizure without a warrant is valid
when:
Search incident to a lawful arrest
Search of moving motor vehicle
Search in violation of customs laws
Seizure of evidence in plain view
When the accused himself waives his right against unreasonable
P a g e | 29
searches and seizure
Option b, c, and e can be immediately disposed of as a reason.
Since the arrest of Violeta was without a warrant and doesn’t fall among
the exceptions provided in Sec 5 Rule 113 of the 1985 Rules on criminal
procedure, the search and seizure can’t be the first exception to a
valid warrantless search and seizure. As to (a) it was not in hot
pursuit, and as to (b) there’s no probable cause.
The search and seizure can’t also be considered in plainview, because PO3
Manlangit himself admitted that the items in the box could have
been other items. That marijuana can’t be readily identified with just
the flap open and the plastic pack sticking out.
Florencio was convicted with Reclusion Perpetua and a fine of P500,000
While Violeta was acquitted
PEOPLE VS. MONTILLA
G. R. No. 123872
Jan. 30, 1998
Regalado, J.:
Facts:
Ruben Montilla, alias “Joy” was charged for violating Section 4,
Article 2 of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, R. A. No. 6425, as amended
by R. A. No. 7659 in an information which alleges: “That on or about 20th
day of June 1994, at Brgy. Salitran, Dasmarinas, Cavite, xxx the above-
named accused, not being authorized by law, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously, administer, transport and deliver 28 kilos of
dried marijuana leaves which are considered prohibited drugs.
Issue:
Whether the warrantless search conducted on appellant
invalidates the evidence obtained from him?
Ruling:
A legitimate warrantless arrest necessarily cloaks the arresting
officer with authority to validly search and seize from the offender (1)
dangerous weapons; and (2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense. On the defense argument that the warrantless
search conducted on appellant invalidates the evidence obtained from
him, still the search on his belongings and the consequent confiscation of
the illegal drugs as a result thereof was justified as a search incidental to a
lawful arrest under Section 5 (a) Rule 113 of the Rules of Court.
 P a g e | 30

which goes into the competence of the court to hear and pass judgement
People vs. Nitafan on the cause.
The right to file a motion to quash belongs only to the accused. There is
Facts: nothing in the rules which authorizes the court or judge to motu proprio
On January 9, 1992, three criminal informations for violation of Section 4 initiate a motion to quash if no such motion was filed by the accused.
of Central Bank Circular No. 960, as amended, in relation to Section 34 of
Republic Act No. 265 were filed against private respondent Imelda R.
Marcos. After arraignment, Marcos pleaded not guilty. Petitioners filed PRUDENTE V DAYRIT
motions for the consolidation of the three informations with the 21 other PADILLA; December 14, 1989
remaining cases pending before the RTC. The Solicitor General alleged in
its motion that “the indictable acts under the three informations form part NATURE
of and is related to the transaction complained”. RTC granted the Petition for certiorari
consolidation and the 3 infornations were re-raffled and re-assigned to
Branch 52-Manila presided public respondent Judge Nitafan. Without any FACTS
motion from the accused, Judge Nitafan issued an order requiring - On 31 October 1987, P/Major Alladin Dimagmaliw, Chief of the
petitioners to show cause why the cases should not be dismissed on the
Intelligence Special Action Division (ISAD) of the Western Police District
ground that it violates Marcos’ right against ex post facto law and the two
(WPD), filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 33,
other informations on the ground that private respondent’s right against
presided over by respondent Judge Abelardo Dayrit, now Associate Justice
double jeopardy was violated. On August 7, 1992, respondent judge issued
of the CA, an application1 for the issuance of a search warrant, for
an order dismissing the 1st criminal case on the ground of ex post facto law
violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.). Dimagmaliw
and also dismissed the two remaining criminal cases on the ground of
alleged, among others that: That he has been informed and has good and
violation of private respondent’s right against double jeopardy.
sufficient reasons to believe that Nemesio Prudente who may be found at
Prosecution filed for a motion for reconsideration but was denied.
the Polytechnic University of the Philippines (PUP), Anonas St., Sta., Mesa,
Petitioner filed a petition for certiorari.
Sampaloc, Manila, has in his control or possession firearms, explosives,
handgrenades and ammuntion which are illegally possessed or intended
Issue:
to be used as the means of committing an offense which the said Nemesio
Whether a judge can motu proprio inititate a motion to quash an
Prudente is keeping and concealing at the premises of the PUP. In
information?
support of the application for issuance of search warrant, P/Lt. Florenio C.
Angeles, OIC of the Intelligence Section of ISAD, executed a "Deposition of
Held:
Witness"2 dated 31 October 1987, subscribed and sworn to before
In the case at bench. Private respondent pleaded to the charges without
respondent Judge.
filing any motion to quash and as such she has deemed to have waived
- On 1 Nov 1987, a Sunday and All Saints Day, the search warrant was
and abandon her right to avail any legal ground which she may have
enforced by some 200 WPD operatives led by P/Col. Edgar Dula Torre,
properly and timely invoked to challenge the complaint or information. If
and P/Major Romeo Maganto, Precinct 8 Commander. They found in the
the judge initiates the motion to quash, then he is not only pre-judging
drawer of a cabinet inside the wash room of Dr. Prudente's office a
the case but also takes the side of the accused. It is clear that the only
bulging brown envelope with 3 live fragmentation hand grenades
grounds which the court may consider in resolving a motion to quash an
separately wrapped with old newspapers.
information or complaint are (1) those ground stated in the motion and
- On 6 Nov 1987, petitioner Prudente moved to quash the search warrant.
(2) the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged. Pursuant to
He claimed that (1) the complainant's lone witness, Lt. Florenio C. Angeles,
the Rules, the sole exception is lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged
had no personal knowledge of the facts which formed the basis for the

issuance of the search warrant; (2) the examination of the said witness
was not in the form of searching questions and answers; (3) the search
warrant was a general warrant, for the reason that it did not particularly
describe the place to be searched and that it failed to charge one specific
offense; and (4) the search warrant was issued in violation of Circular No.
19 of the Supreme Court in that the complainant failed to allege under
oath that the issuance of the search warrant on a Saturday was urgent.
Respondent Judge issued denied the petitioner's motion and supplemental
motion to quash. Petitioner's motion for reconsideration was likewise
denied. Hence, this present recourse.
ISSUES
1. WON the Search Warrant is invalid as it does not show a probable cause
since it was issued on the basis of facts and circumstances which were not
within the personal knowledge of the applicant and his witness but based
on hearsay evidence
2. WON the Search Warrant is invalid on the ground that it failed to
particularly describe the place to be searched, contending that there were
several rooms at the ground floor and the second floor of the PUP
3. WON the Search Warrant is invalid on the ground that it was issued in
violation of the rule that a search warrant can be issued only in
connection with one specific offense
HELD
1. YES
Ratio The "probable cause" for a valid search warrant must be shown to
be within the personal knowledge of the complainant or the witnesses he
may produce and not based on mere hearsay.
Reasoning
[a] In his application for search warrant, Dimagmaliw stated that "he has
been informed" that Prudente "has in his control and possession" the
firearms and explosives described therein, and that he "has verified the
report and found it to be a fact." In his supporting deposition, Angeles
declared that, as a result of their continuous surveillance for several days,
they "gathered informations from verified sources" that the holders of the
said firearms and explosives are not licensed to possess them. In other
words, the applicant and his witness had no personal knowledge of the
facts and circumstances which became the basis for issuing the questioned
search warrant, but acquired knowledge thereof only through
P a g e | 31
information from other sources or persons. [b] What the records show is
the deposition of witness, Angeles, as the only support to Dimagmaliw's
application, and the said deposition is based on hearsay. Evidently, the
allegations contained in the application of Dimagmaliw and the
declaration of Angeles in his deposition were insufficient basis for the
issuance of a valid search warrant. As held in the Alvarez case: "The oath
required must refer to the truth of the facts within the personal
knowledge of the petitioner or his witnesses, because the purpose thereof
is to convince the committing magistrate, not the individual making the
affidavit and seeking the issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause."
2. NO
Ratio A description of a place to be searched is sufficient if the officer
with the warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the
place intended.
Reasoning
- In the case at bar, the application for search warrant and the search
warrant itself described the place to be searched as the premises of the
Polytechnic University of the Philippines, located at Anonas St., Sta. Mesa,
Sampaloc, Manila, more particularly, the offices of the Department of
Military Science and Tactics at the ground floor, and the Office of the
President, Dr. Nemesio Prudente, at PUP, Second Floor and other rooms
at the second floor. The designation of the places to be searched
sufficiently complied with the constitutional injunction that a search
warrant must particularly describe the place to be searched, even if there
were several rooms at the ground floor and second floor of the PUP.
3. NO
Ratio The application for search warrant which was captioned: "For
Violation of PD No. 1866 (Illegal Possession of Firearms, etc.)." means that
it was issued for the specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and
explosives.
Reasoning
[a] While the said decree punishes several offenses, the alleged violation in
this case was, qualified by the phrase "illegal possession of firearms, etc." As
explained by respondent Judge, the term "etc." referred to ammunitions
and explosives. In other words, the search warrant was issued for the
specific offense of illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Hence, the
failure of the search warrant to mention the particular provision of PD
No. 1866 that was violated is not of such a gravity as to call for its
invalidation on this score.

[b] The Constitution as well as the Rules of Criminal Procedure does not
recognize the issuance of one search warrant for illegal possession of
firearms, one warrant for illegal possession of ammunitions, and another
for illegal possession of explosives. Neither is the filing of three different
informations for each of the above offenses sanctioned by the Rules of
Court. The usual practice adopted by the courts is to file a single
information for illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions.
Disposition Petition is GRANTED. The Search Warrant No. 87-14
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE.
Sapiera vs Court of Appeals
Facts:
Remedios Nota Sapiera, a sari-sari store owner, on several
occasions, purchased from Monrico Mart grocery items, mostly cigarettes
and paid for them with checks issued by one Arturo de Guzman. These
checks were signed by Sapiera on the back. When they were presented for
payment, the checks were dishonoured because the drawer’s account was
already closed. Respondent Ramon Samua informed Arturo de Guzman
and petitioner but both failed to pay. Hence, four charges of Estafa were
filed against Sapiera while two counts of BP 22 was filed against Arturo
de Guzman. These cases were consolidated. On December 27 1999, the
RTC Dagupan city acquitted Sapiera of all charges of Estafa but did not
rule on the civil aspect of the case. Arturo de Guzman was held liable for
the 2 BP 22 cases and was ordered to pay Sua 167,150 Php as civil
indemnity and was sentenced for imprisonment of 6 months and 1 day.
Respondent Sua appealed regarding the civil aspect of Sapiera’s case but
the courtdenied it saying that the acquittal of petitioner was absolute.
Respondent filed a petition for mandamus with the Court of Appeals
praying that the appeal be given due course, this was granted. On
January 1996, CA rendered a decision ordering Sapiera to pay 335000
php to Sua. Sapiera filed a motion for reconsideration. The CA the issued
a resolution noting that the admission of both parties that Sua already
collected 125000 for the 2 check paid by De Guzman on the BP 22 cases.
It appears that the payment should be deducted on her liability as they
involved the same two checks which Sapiera was involved in. the CA
deducted the liability to 210,000 Php. Hence this petition by Sapiera
claiming that the CA erred in rendering such decision because she was
P a g e | 32
acquitted and the fact from which the civil liability exists did not exist.
Issue: Whether or not Sapiera could be held civilly liable when she was
acquitted in the criminal charges against her.
Held:
Yes. Sec. 2 of rule 111 of the rules of court provides that extinction
of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil, unless
this shows that the fact from which the civil liability is based is proven to
not have existed because of such acquittal. Civil liability is not
extinguished where: (a) the acquittal is not based on reasonable doubt.
(b) Where the court expressly declares that the liability is not criminal but
only civil, (c) where the civil liability is not derived from or based on the
criminal act. The decision of the case would show that the acquittal was
based on failure of the prosecution to present sufficient evidence showing
conspiracy between her and De Guzman. Since all checks were signed by
Sapiera on the back, sec 17 of Negotiable instruments law says that she
would be considered an indorser of the bill of exchange and under section
66 thereof would be held liable for breach of warranty and is held liable
to pay the holder who may be compelled to pay the instrument.
Stonehill vs. Diokno L-19550 June 19, 1967
FACTS:
Respondent judges issued a total of 42 search warrants against the
corporate offices and private residences of the accused. The warrants
directed police officers to seize and take possession of various items of
personal property such as “books of accounts, financial records, vouchers,
correspondence, etc.” The warrants were based on alleged violations of
Central Bank Laws, Tariff Laws, and the like. Petitioners assailed the
validity of the warrants as such warrants did not describe with
particularity the things to be seized. In addition, petitioners assert that
other items not included in the warrants, such as cash, were also seized.
They filed petitions with the court, seeking the quashal of the warrants
and the return of their seized property. On the other hand, public
respondents claimed the warrants were valid, and any defects were cured
by consent of the petitioners. They also claim that such evidence,
regardless of the validity of the warrants, were admissible as evidence in
court.

ISSUES:
1) Are the 42 search warrants valid?
2) Are the documents and other effects admissible as evidence
against respondents?
RULING:
The seized items were taken from two kinds of locations: the offices of the
petitioners and their residences. With regards to the seized items from the
offices, petitioners have no cause of action since only the corporation, as a
separate juridical personality, may question the validity of the warrants.
As the petitioners filed the objection in their personal capacities, the court
cannot act on the petition. As to the effects seized from the homes of
petitioners, it is clear that the warrants were “General Warrants,” issued
on the basis of no specific offense and with no particular definition of the
items to be seized. General Warrants are prohibited by the Consititution
since there are clearly issued to conduct fishing expeditions, and not on the
basis of actual probable cause. The Constitution provides that items to be
seized must be “particularly described” and probable cause can only be
found “in connection with one specific offense.” Since these items were
seized on the basis of an invalid warrant, they are to be deemed fruits of
a poisonous tree. As such, they may not be used as evidence against the
petitioners.
VENUS VS DESIERTO
OCTOBER 21, 1998
J. DAVIDE
FACTS:
Eriberto Venus (Venus) was the mayor of New Washington,
Aklan. The Sangguniang Bayan (SB) of said municipality issued a
Resolution authorizing Venus to negotiate with the Board of Liquidators
in the purchase of a lot in the municipality. Hence, Venus went to Manila
and submitted with the Board of Liquidators the resolution and a letter-
proposal for the purchase of the lot. The proposal was rejected by the
board and set bidding on Sept. 19, 1988. Venus informed the SB of the
denial. Then, Venus sought the opinion of the Provincial Auditor as to the
requirements of bidding in order that the municipality may validly
participate. The Provincial Auditor opined that it would be impossible to
participate as it would need a resolution from the SB. And that the funds
P a g e | 33
would be pre-audited before its release, which would take at least 2
weeks. This means that the funds will not be available on the day of
bidding. Using his personal funds, Venus went to Manila and asked for the
postponement of the bidding but it was denied. Hence, Venus bid and got
the property, being the highest bidder, using his own money. The lot was
used as garage for the municipality’s fire truck free of charge. Nearly four
years after the sale, SB members Mars Regalado and Harry Abayon filed
a complaint before the Provincial Prosecutor charging Venus with
violation of paragraph H, Sec. 3 RA 3019 (anti-graft and corrupt practices
act). It was forwarded to the Deputy Ombudsman of Cebu and was
dismissed. Ombudsman Vasquez disapproved the dismissal and the case
was re-raffled to Deputy Ombudsman Tanco who recommended the
filing of information against Venus. Upon review, Special Prosecutor Ines
found reasonable ground for filing of information against Venus.
Ombudsman Desierto approved the resolution recommending the filing of
information against Venus. The information was filed with the
Sandiganbayan. Upon his surrender to the Sandiganbayan, it was found
out that Venus was not given the opportunity to file a motion for
reconsideration of the resolution recommending the filing of information.
Sandiganbayan then granted him time to file a motion for
reconsideration. A motion for reconsideration was filed before the Office
of Special Prosecutor. Said prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the
case for lack of probable cause. Desierto disapproved the
recommendation. Meanwhile, Sandiganbayan set Venus’ arraignment.
Hence, this petition for prohibition with prayer for temporary restraining
order and writ of preliminary injunction.
ISSUE:
Whether or not arraignment may be restrained with injunction or
writ of prohibition.
HELD:
YES. Generally, criminal prosecutions may no be restrained
through injunction or prohibition as the determination of probable cause
for the filing of information is within the discretion of ombudsman or
prosecutor. However, in the case of Brocka vs. Enrile, the Supreme Court
provided exceptions to the above-mentioned rule. Among those
enumerated is when there is clearly no prima facie case against the
accused and a motion to quash on that ground has been denied.
In the case at bar, the Deputy Ombudsman found no ground to
believe that Venus violated RA 3019 but the Ombudsman and the other

Deputy Ombudsman disagreed. In the motion for reconsideration, the
special Prosecutor recommended the dismissal of the case. In human
relations, good faith is always presumed. He who charges bad faith has
the burden of proving the same. In not finding facts constituting bad faith,
it was an error for the ombudsman to pass on the duty of finding bad
faith to Sandiganbayan. There was no bad faith in the actuations of
Venus. The resolution issued by the SB was for him to negotiate with the
Board of Liquidators for the sale of the lot. Venus did as he was
mandated and returned with the denial of their offer. The municipality
did not intend to participate in the bidding as shown by the absence of a
resolution to that effect and the absence of the funds for the occasion.
Venus faithfully performed his duty and this duty ended when he asked
for postponement even if it was denied. Further, RA 3019 requires that
bad faith must be EVIDENT. In finding no bad faith, logically there could
be no evident bad faith. Hence, there was no prima facie case against
Venus.
In finding the manifest innocence of Venus, the Supreme Court
ordered Sandiganbayan to dismiss the case.
Villaflor vs. Vivar
Facts:
An information for slight physical injuries was filed agaist Dindo Vivar for
beating Gian Paulo Vivar outside the Fat Tueasday Bar. On his way out,
Gian met Dindo who told that next time, I will use my gun on you. The
injuries sustained by Gian turned out to be more serious than they had
appeared so an Information for serious physical injuries was filed and the
charge for slight physical injuries was withdrawn. Another Information for
grave threats was filed against Vivar. Vivar, instead of filing a counter
affidavit, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information for grave threats
since it was made in connection with the charge of serious physical injuries
should have been absorbed by the latter, and because the court did not
acquire jurisdiction over it. MTC denied the motion to quash. Vivar filed
for a motion for reconsideration which was again denied. He was
arraigned and pleaded not guilty. Vivar filed a petition for certiorari in
the RTC RTC granted the motion to quash and denied the motion for
reconsideration filed by Villaflor. Villaflor filed a petiton for certiorari with
the Supreme Court.
P a g e | 34
Issues:
Can the court motu proprio order the dismissal of the case on the
ground of lack of preliminary investigation?
Should the failure of the public prosecutor to conduct preliminary
investigation be considered a ground to quash the informations?
Held:
The Court ruled that the absence of a preliminary investigation does
not impair the validity of the information. In the case a bar, a
preliminary investigation was for slight physical injuries was
conducted by the assistant city prosecutor. But the Information
was however amended when petitioner’s injuries turned out to
be more serious. However the change in the information was only
a formal amendment and did not violate the right of Vivar
against hasty, malicious and oppressive prosecution, since it still
involves the same facts.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
the grounds on which an accused can move to quash the
complaint or information. Nowhere in the rule mention of a lack
of preliminary investigation as a ground for a motion to quash.
When accused failed to assert any ground for a motion to quash
before arraignment, he has deemed waived his right.
Washington Distillers, Inc. Vs Ca
Facts:
On the basis of a search warrant issued by the Judge of the RTC of Manila,
314, 289 pieces of 350cc round white flint bottles were seized by the NBI
from the premises of petitioners in San Fernando, Pampanga for alleged
violation of RA 623, otherwise known as An act to regulate the use of duly
stamped or marked bottles, boxes, casks, kegs, barrels, and other similar
containers, as amended by RA 5700. Petitioners filed a motion to quash
on the ground that the RTC of Manila has no jurisdiction to issue a
warrant to be executed in Pampanga, which was granted. A motion for
reconsideration was issued my private respondents but was denied.
 P a g e | 35

Thereafter, private respondents filed a petition for certiorari with the

Court of Appeals and CA set aside the decision of RTC ruling that a search
warrant may be enforced outside the territorial jurisdiction of RTC of
Manila

Issue:

Whether or not the search warrant issued against petitioners is valid.

Held:

No. The search warrant issued against petitioners lost its validity as a
result of the failure of the NBI to commence criminal prosecution and the
bottles seized from them should be returned to petitioners in the absence
of any civil action for their recovery.

What is noticeable about this case is the that possession of the bottles was
transferred to private respondents through the expediency of a search
warrant, so that instead of merely being an ancillary writ issued either as
an incident of criminal proceedings, the proceeding for search warrant
have become, for all intents and purposes, the main proceedings by which
private respondents have been able to obtain possession of what it claims
to be its property. There was neither complaint by which the petitioners
could have been informed of the charge against them nor answer by
which they could have heard in the defense, before property claimed by
them was taken from them and given to private respondents.