Cases For Consti 2

9. G.R. No.
204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD DEVELOPMENT
CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 204934
ALLIANCE FOR THE FAMILY FOUNDATION PHILIPPINES, INC. [ALFI], represented by its President, Maria
Concepcion S. Noche, Spouses Reynaldo S. Luistro & Rosie B . Luistro, Jose S. Sandejas & Elenita S.A.
Sandejas, Arturo M. Gorrez & Marietta C. Gorrez, Salvador S. Mante, Jr. & Hazeleen L. Mante, Rolando
M. Bautista & Maria Felisa S. Bautista, Desiderio Racho & Traquilina Racho, F emand Antonio A. Tansingco
& Carol Anne C. Tansingco for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Therese Antonette C.
Tansingco, Lorenzo Jose C. Tansingco, Miguel F emando C. Tangsingco, Carlo Josemaria C. Tansingco &
Juan Paolo C. Tansingco, Spouses Mariano V. Araneta & Eileen Z. Araneta for themselves and on behalf
of their minor children, Ramon Carlos Z. Araneta & Maya Angelica Z. Araneta, Spouses Renato C. Castor
& Mildred C. Castor for themselves and on behalf of their minor children, Renz Jeffrey C. Castor, Joseph
Ramil C. Castor, John Paul C. Castor & Raphael C. Castor, Spouses Alexander R. Racho & Zara Z. Racho for
themselves and on behalf of their minor children Margarita Racho, Mikaela Racho, Martin Racho, Mari
Racho & Manolo Racho, Spouses Alfred R. Racho & Francine V. Racho for themselves and on behalf of
their minor children Michael Racho, Mariana Racho, Rafael Racho, Maxi Racho, Chessie Racho & Laura
Racho, Spouses David R. Racho & Armilyn A. Racho for themselves and on behalf of their minor child
Gabriel Racho, Mindy M. Juatas and on behalf of her minor children Elijah Gerald Juatas and Elian Gabriel
Juatas, Salvacion M. Monteiro, Emily R. Laws, Joseph R . Laws & Katrina R. Laws, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of
Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports, HON.
CORAZON SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare and Development, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS
II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ARSENIO M. BALISACAN, Socio-Economic Planning
Secretary and NEDA Director-General, THE PHILIPPINE COMMISSION ON WOMEN, represented by its
Chairperson, Remedios lgnacio-Rikken, THE PHILIPPINE HEALTH INSURANCE CORPORATION, represented
by its President Eduardo Banzon, THE LEAGUE OF PROVINCES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its
President Alfonso Umali, THE LEAGUE OF CITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President Oscar
Rodriguez, and THE LEAGUE OF MUNICIPALITIES OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by its President
Donato Marcos, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204957
TASK FORCE FOR FAMILY AND LIFE VISAYAS, INC. and VALERIANO S. AVILA, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of
Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Education; and HON.
MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 204988
SERVE LIFE CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, INC., represented by Dr. Nestor B. Lumicao, M.D., as President and in
his personal capacity, ROSEVALE FOUNDATION INC., represented by Dr. Rodrigo M. Alenton, M.D., as
member of the school board and in his personal capacity, ROSEMARIE R. ALENTON, IMELDA G. IBARRA,
CPA, LOVENIAP. NACES, Phd., ANTHONY G. NAGAC, EARL ANTHONY C. GAMBE and MARLON I. YAP,
Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health; HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.
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G.R. No. 205003
EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. SENATE PRESIDENT, HON.
SPEAKER OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES and HON. SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205043
EDUARDO B. OLAGUER and THE CATHOLIC XYBRSPACE APOSTOLATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioners,
vs.
DOH SECRETARY ENRIQUE T. ONA, FDA DIRECTOR SUZETTE H. LAZO, DBM SECRETARY FLORENCIO B.
ABAD, DILG SECRETARY MANUELA. ROXAS II, DECS SECRETARY ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205138
PHILIPPINE ALLIANCE OF XSEMINARIANS, INC. (PAX), herein represented by its National President, Atty.
Ricardo M . Ribo, and in his own behalf, Atty. Lino E.A. Dumas, Romeo B. Almonte, Osmundo C. Orlanes,
Arsenio Z. Menor, Samuel J. Yap, Jaime F. Mateo, Rolly Siguan, Dante E. Magdangal, Michael Eugenio O.
Plana, Bienvenido C. Miguel, Jr., Landrito M. Diokno and Baldomero Falcone, Petitioners,
vs.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of
Interior and Local Government, HON. CORAZON J. SOLIMAN, Secretary, Department of Social Welfare
and Development, HON. ARSENIO BALISACAN, Director-General, National Economic and Development
Authority, HON. SUZETTE H. LAZO, Director-General, Food and Drugs Administration, THE BOARD OF
DIRECTORS, Philippine Health Insurance Corporation, and THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS, Philippine
Commission on Women, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205478

REYNALDO J. ECHAVEZ, M.D., JACQUELINE H. KING, M.D., CYNTHIA T. DOMINGO, M.D., AND JOSEPHINE
MILLADO-LUMITAO, M.D., collectively known as Doctors For Life, and ANTHONY PEREZ, MICHAEL
ANTHONY G. MAPA, CARLOS ANTONIO PALAD, WILFREDO JOSE, CLAIRE NAVARRO, ANNA COSIO, and
GABRIEL DY LIACCO collectively known as Filipinos For Life, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary; HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary of the
Department of Budget and Management; HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department of Health;
HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary of the Department of Education; and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
Secretary of the Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205491
SPOUSES FRANCISCO S. TATAD AND MARIA FENNY C. TATAD & ALA F. PAGUIA, for themselves, their
Posterity, and the rest of Filipino posterity, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT of the Republic of the Philippines, Respondent.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 205720
PRO-LIFE PHILIPPINES FOUNDATION, Inc., represented by Loma Melegrito, as Executive Director, and in
her personal capacity, JOSELYN B. BASILIO, ROBERT Z. CORTES, ARIEL A. CRISOSTOMO, JEREMY I.
GATDULA, CRISTINA A. MONTES, RAUL ANTONIO A. NIDOY, WINSTON CONRAD B. PADOJINOG, RUFINO
L. POLICARPIO III, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, SENATE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, HON. PAQUITO
N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary, Department of Budget and
Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,
Secretary, Department of Education and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior
and Local Government, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 206355
MILLENNIUM SAINT FOUNDATION, INC., ATTY. RAMON PEDROSA, ATTY. CITA BORROMEO-GARCIA,
STELLAACEDERA, ATTY. BERTENI CATALUNA CAUSING, Petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, OFFICE OF THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH,
DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, Respondents.
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207111
JOHN WALTER B. JUAT, MARY M. IMBONG, ANTHONY VICTORIO B. LUMICAO, JOSEPH MARTIN Q.
VERDEJO, ANTONIA EMMA R. ROXAS and LOTA LAT-GUERRERO, Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO ABAD, Secretary, Department of
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUEL A. ROXAS II,
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207172
COUPLES FOR CHRIST FOUNDATION, INC., SPOUSES JUAN CARLOS ARTADI SARMIENTO AND FRANCESCA
ISABELLE BESINGA-SARMIENTO, AND SPOUSES LUIS FRANCIS A. RODRIGO, JR. and DEBORAH MARIE
VERONICA N. RODRIGO, Petitioners,
vs.
LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA. ROXAS II,
x---------------------------------x
G.R. No. 207563
ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary of the Department
of Health, and HON. ARMIN A. LUISTRO,Secretary of the Department of Budget and Management,
Respondents.
D E C I S I O N
MENDOZA, J.:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court
has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs
, and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good."1
To this day, poverty is still a major stumbling block to the nation's emergence as a developed country,
leaving our people beleaguered in a state of hunger, illiteracy and unemployment. While governmental
policies have been geared towards the revitalization of the economy, the bludgeoning dearth in social
services remains to be a problem that concerns not only the poor, but every member of society. The
government continues to tread on a trying path to the realization of its very purpose, that is, the general
welfare of the Filipino people and the development of the country as a whole. The legislative branch, as
the main facet of a representative government, endeavors to enact laws and policies that aim to remedy
looming societal woes, while the executive is closed set to fully implement these measures and bring
concrete and substantial solutions within the reach of Juan dela Cruz. Seemingly distant is the judicial
branch, oftentimes regarded as an inert governmental body that merely casts its watchful eyes on
clashing stakeholders until it is called upon to adjudicate. Passive, yet reflexive when called into action,
the Judiciary then willingly embarks on its solemn duty to interpret legislation vis-a-vis the most vital and
enduring principle that holds Philippine society together - the supremacy of the Philippine Constitution.
Nothing has polarized the nation more in recent years than the issues of population growth control,
abortion and contraception. As in every democratic society, diametrically opposed views on the subjects
and their perceived consequences freely circulate in various media. From television debates2 to sticker
campaigns,3 from rallies by socio-political activists to mass gatherings organized by members of the
clergy4 - the clash between the seemingly antithetical ideologies of the religious conservatives and
progressive liberals has caused a deep division in every level of the society. Despite calls to withhold
support thereto, however, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible
Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21,
2012.
Shortly after the President placed his imprimatur on the said law, challengers from various sectors of
society came knocking on the doors of the Court, beckoning it to wield the sword that strikes down
constitutional disobedience. Aware of the profound and lasting impact that its decision may produce, the
Court now faces the iuris controversy, as presented in fourteen (14) petitions and two (2) petitions- in-
intervention, to wit:
(1) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,5 filed by spouses Attys. James M. Imbong and Lovely Ann C.
Imbong, in their personal capacities as citizens, lawyers and taxpayers and on behalf of their minor
children; and the Magnificat Child Leaming Center, Inc., a domestic, privately-owned educational
institution (Jmbong);
(2) Petition for Prohibition,6 filed by the Alliance for the Family Foundation Philippines, Inc., through its
president, Atty. Maria Concepcion S. Noche7 and several others8 in their personal capacities as citizens
and on behalf of the generations unborn (ALFI);
(3) Petition for Certiorari,9 filed by the Task Force for Family and Life Visayas, Inc., and Valeriano S. Avila,
in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Task Force Family);
(4) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,10 filed by Serve Life Cagayan De Oro City, Inc.,11 Rosevale
Foundation, Inc.,12 a domestic, privately-owned educational institution, and several others,13 in their
capacities as citizens (Serve Life);
(5) Petition,14 filed by Expedito A. Bugarin, Jr. in his capacity as a citizen (Bugarin);
(6) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,15 filed by Eduardo Olaguer and the Catholic Xybrspace
Apostolate of the Philippines,16 in their capacities as a citizens and taxpayers (Olaguer);
(7) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,17 filed by the Philippine Alliance of Xseminarians Inc.,18 and
several others19 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers (PAX);
(8) Petition,20 filed by Reynaldo J. Echavez, M.D. and several others,21 in their capacities as citizens and
taxpayers (Echavez);
(9) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,22 filed by spouses Francisco and Maria Fenny C. Tatad and Atty.
Alan F. Paguia, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers and on behalf of those yet unborn. Atty. Alan F.
Paguia is also proceeding in his capacity as a member of the Bar (Tatad);
(10) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,23 filed by Pro-Life Philippines Foundation Inc.24 and several
others,25 in their capacities as citizens and taxpayers and on behalf of its associates who are members of
the Bar (Pro-Life);
(11) Petition for Prohibition,26 filed by Millennium Saint Foundation, Inc.,27 Attys. Ramon Pedrosa, Cita
Borromeo-Garcia, Stella Acedera, and Berteni Catalufia Causing, in their capacities as citizens, taxpayers
and members of the Bar (MSF);
(12) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,28 filed by John Walter B. Juat and several others,29 in their
capacities as citizens (Juat) ;
(13) Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition,30 filed by Couples for Christ Foundation, Inc. and several
others,31 in their capacities as citizens (CFC);
(14) Petition for Prohibition32 filed by Almarim Centi Tillah and Abdulhussein M. Kashim in their
capacities as citizens and taxpayers (Tillah); and
(15) Petition-In-Intervention,33 filed by Atty. Samson S. Alcantara in his capacity as a citizen and a
taxpayer (Alcantara); and
(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political

party.
A perusal of the foregoing petitions shows that the petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH
Law on the following GROUNDS: Commented [1]: ground 1
• The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn. According to the petitioners, notwithstanding its Commented [2]: 1
declared policy against abortion, the implementation of the RH Law would authorize the purchase of
hormonal contraceptives, intra-uterine devices and injectables which are abortives, in violation of Section
12, Article II of the Constitution which guarantees protection of both the life of the mother and the life Commented [3]: 1
of the unborn from conception.35
• The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products. The Commented [4]: 2
petitioners posit that the RH Law provides universal access to contraceptives which are hazardous to
one's health, as it causes cancer and other health problems.36
• The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom. The petitioners contend that the RH Law violates Commented [5]: 3
the constitutional guarantee respecting religion as it authorizes the use of public funds for the
procurement of contraceptives. For the petitioners, the use of public funds for purposes that are believed
to be contrary to their beliefs is included in the constitutional mandate ensuring religious freedom.37
It is also contended that the RH Law threatens conscientious objectors of criminal prosecution, Commented [6]: 4
imprisonment and other forms of punishment, as it compels medical practitioners 1] to refer patients
who seek advice on reproductive health programs to other doctors; and 2] to provide full and correct
information on reproductive health programs and service, although it is against their religious beliefs and
convictions.38
In this connection, Section 5 .23 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Law (RH-IRR),39
provides that skilled health professionals who are public officers such as, but not limited to, Provincial,
City, or Municipal Health Officers, medical officers, medical specialists, rural health physicians, hospital
staff nurses, public health nurses, or rural health midwives, who are specifically charged with the duty to
implement these Rules, cannot be considered as conscientious objectors.40
It is also argued that the RH Law providing for the formulation of mandatory sex education in schools Commented [7]: ground 2
should not be allowed as it is an affront to their religious beliefs.41
While the petit10ners recognize that the guarantee of religious freedom is not absolute, they argue that
the RH Law fails to satisfy the "clear and present danger test" and the "compelling state interest test" to
justify the regulation of the right to free exercise of religion and the right to free speech.42
• The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude. According to the petitioners, Commented [8]: 3
the RH Law subjects medical practitioners to involuntary servitude because, to be accredited under the
PhilHealth program, they are compelled to provide forty-eight (48) hours of pro bona services for indigent
women, under threat of criminal prosecution, imprisonment and other forms of punishment.43
The petitioners explain that since a majority of patients are covered by PhilHealth, a medical practitioner
would effectively be forced to render reproductive health services since the lack of PhilHealth
accreditation would mean that the majority of the public would no longer be able to avail of the
practitioners services.44
• The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law. It is claimed that the RH Law discriminates Commented [9]: 4
against the poor as it makes them the primary target of the government program that promotes
contraceptive use. The petitioners argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among the
poor, the RH Law seeks to introduce contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the
poor.45
• The RH Law is "void-for-vagueness" in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution. In Commented [10]: 6
imposing the penalty of imprisonment and/or fine for "any violation," it is vague because it does not
define the type of conduct to be treated as "violation" of the RH Law.46
In this connection, it is claimed that "Section 7 of the RH Law violates the right to due process by removing
from them (the people) the right to manage their own affairs and to decide what kind of health facility
they shall be and what kind of services they shall offer."47 It ignores the management prerogative
inherent in corporations for employers to conduct their affairs in accordance with their own discretion
and judgment.
• The RH Law violates the right to free speech. To compel a person to explain a full range of family Commented [11]: 4
planning methods is plainly to curtail his right to expound only his own preferred way of family planning.
The petitioners note that although exemption is granted to institutions owned and operated by religious
groups, they are still forced to refer their patients to another healthcare facility willing to perform the
service or procedure.48
• The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one's family protected by the Constitution. It is Commented [12]: 5
contended that the RH Law providing for mandatory reproductive health education intrudes upon their
constitutional right to raise their children in accordance with their beliefs.49
It is claimed that, by giving absolute authority to the person who will undergo reproductive health
procedure, the RH Law forsakes any real dialogue between the spouses and impedes the right of spouses
to mutually decide on matters pertaining to the overall well-being of their family. In the same breath, it
is also claimed that the parents of a child who has suffered a miscarriage are deprived of parental
authority to determine whether their child should use contraceptives.50
• The RH Law violates the constitutional principle of non-delegation of legislative authority. The
petitioners question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine whether a product
is non-abortifacient and to be included in the Emergency Drugs List (EDL).51
• The RH Law violates the one subject/one bill rule provision under Section 26( 1 ), Article VI of the
Constitution.52
• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53
• The RH Law violates the principle of Autonomy of Local Government Units (LGUs) and the Autonomous
Region of Muslim Mindanao {ARMM). It is contended that the RH Law, providing for reproductive health
measures at the local government level and the ARMM, infringes upon the powers devolved to LGUs and
the ARMM under the Local Government Code and R.A . No. 9054.54
Various parties also sought and were granted leave to file their respective comments-in-intervention in
defense of the constitutionality of the RH Law. Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) which
commented on the petitions in behalf of the respondents,55 Congressman Edcel C. Lagman,56 former
officials of the Department of Health Dr. Esperanza I. Cabral, Jamie Galvez-Tan, and Dr. Alberto G.
Romualdez,57 the Filipino Catholic Voices for Reproductive Health (C4RH),58 Ana Theresa "Risa"
Hontiveros,59 and Atty. Joan De Venecia60 also filed their respective Comments-in-Intervention in
conjunction with several others. On June 4, 2013, Senator Pia Juliana S. Cayetano was also granted leave
to intervene.61
The respondents, aside from traversing the substantive arguments of the petitioners, pray for the
dismissal of the petitions for the principal reasons that 1] there is no actual case or controversy and,
therefore, the issues are not yet ripe for judicial determination.; 2] some petitioners lack standing to
question the RH Law; and 3] the petitions are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over which the
Court has no original jurisdiction.
Meanwhile, on March 15, 2013, the RH-IRR for the enforcement of the assailed legislation took effect.
On March 19, 2013, after considering the issues and arguments raised, the Court issued the Status Quo
Ante Order (SQAO), enjoining the effects and implementation of the assailed legislation for a period of
one hundred and twenty (120) days, or until July 17, 2013.62
On May 30, 2013, the Court held a preliminary conference with the counsels of the parties to determine
and/or identify the pertinent issues raised by the parties and the sequence by which these ismsues were
to be discussed in the oral arguments. On July 9 and 23, 2013, and on August 6, 13, and 27, 2013, the
cases were heard on oral argument. On July 16, 2013, the SQAO was ordered extended until further
orders of the Court.63
Thereafter, the Court directed the parties to submit their respective memoranda within sixty (60) days
and, at the same time posed several questions for their clarification on some contentions of the parties.64
The Status Quo Ante
(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws
Prior to the RH Law
Long before the incipience of the RH Law, the country has allowed the sale, dispensation and distribution
of contraceptive drugs and devices. As far back as June 18, 1966, the country enacted R.A. No. 4729
entitled "An Act to Regu,late the Sale, Dispensation, and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and
Devices." Although contraceptive drugs and devices were allowed, they could not be sold, dispensed or
distributed "unless such sale, dispensation and distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or
pharmaceutical company and with the prescription of a qualified medical practitioner."65
In addition, R.A. No. 5921,66 approved on June 21, 1969, contained provisions relative to "dispensing of
abortifacients or anti-conceptional substances and devices." Under Section 37 thereof, it was provided
that "no drug or chemical product or device capable of provoking abortion or preventing conception as
classified by the Food and Drug Administration shall be delivered or sold to any person without a proper
prescription by a duly licensed physician."
On December 11, 1967, the Philippines, adhering to the UN Declaration on Population, which recognized
that the population problem should be considered as the principal element for long-term economic
development, enacted measures that promoted male vasectomy and tubal ligation to mitigate
population growth.67 Among these measures included R.A. No. 6365, approved on August 16, 1971,
entitled "An Act Establishing a National Policy on Population, Creating the Commission on Population and
for Other Purposes. " The law envisioned that "family planning will be made part of a broad educational
program; safe and effective means will be provided to couples desiring to space or limit family size;
mortality and morbidity rates will be further reduced."
To further strengthen R.A. No. 6365, then President Ferdinand E . Marcos issued Presidential Decree.
(P.D.) No. 79,68 dated December 8, 1972, which, among others, made "family planning a part of a broad
educational program," provided "family planning services as a part of over-all health care," and made
"available all acceptable methods of contraception, except abortion, to all Filipino citizens desirous of
spacing, limiting or preventing pregnancies."
Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods evolved from being
a component of demographic management, to one centered on the promotion of public health,
particularly, reproductive health.69 Under that policy, the country gave priority to one's right to freely
choose the method of family planning to be adopted, in conformity with its adherence to the
commitments made in the International Conference on Population and Development.70 Thus, on August
14, 2009, the country enacted R.A. No. 9710 or "The Magna Carta for Women, " which, among others,
mandated the State to provide for comprehensive health services and programs for women, including
family planning and sex education.71
The RH Law
Despite the foregoing legislative measures, the population of the country kept on galloping at an
uncontrollable pace. From a paltry number of just over 27 million Filipinos in 1960, the population of the
country reached over 76 million in the year 2000 and over 92 million in 2010.72 The executive and the
legislative, thus, felt that the measures were still not adequate. To rein in the problem, the RH Law was
enacted to provide Filipinos, especially the poor and the marginalized, access and information to the full
range of modem family planning methods, and to ensure that its objective to provide for the peoples'
right to reproductive health be achieved. To make it more effective, the RH Law made it mandatory for
health providers to provide information on the full range of modem family planning methods, supplies
and services, and for schools to provide reproductive health education. To put teeth to it, the RH Law
criminalizes certain acts of refusals to carry out its mandates.
Stated differently, the RH Law is an enhancement measure to fortify and make effective the current laws
on contraception, women's health and population control.
Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo
The petitioners are one in praying that the entire RH Law be declared unconstitutional. Petitioner ALFI,
in particular, argues that the government sponsored contraception program, the very essence of the RH
Law, violates the right to health of women and the sanctity of life, which the State is mandated to protect
and promote. Thus, ALFI prays that "the status quo ante - the situation prior to the passage of the RH Law
- must be maintained."73 It explains:
x x x. The instant Petition does not question contraception and contraceptives per se. As provided under
Republic Act No. 5921 and Republic Act No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are
prohibited unless dispensed by a prescription duly licensed by a physician. What the Petitioners find
deplorable and repugnant under the RH Law is the role that the State and its agencies - the entire
bureaucracy, from the cabinet secretaries down to the barangay officials in the remotest areas of the
country - is made to play in the implementation of the contraception program to the fullest extent
possible using taxpayers' money. The State then will be the funder and provider of all forms of family
planning methods and the implementer of the program by ensuring the widespread dissemination of,
and universal access to, a full range of family planning methods, devices and supplies.74
ISSUES
After a scrutiny of the various arguments and contentions of the parties, the Court has synthesized and
refined them to the following principal issues:
I. PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
1] Power of Judicial Review
2] Actual Case or Controversy
3] Facial Challenge
4] Locus Standi
5] Declaratory Relief
6] One Subject/One Title Rule
II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:
1] Right to Life
2] Right to Health
3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech
4] The Family
5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom
6] Due Process
7] Equal Protection
8] Involuntary Servitude
9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA
10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM
DISCUSSION
Before delving into the constitutionality of the RH Law and its implementing rules, it behooves the Court
to resolve some procedural impediments.
I. PROCEDURAL ISSUE: Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.
The Power of Judicial Review
In its attempt to persuade the Court to stay its judicial hand, the OSG asserts that it should submit to the
Qqlegislative and political wisdom of Congress and qqrespect the compromises made in the crafting of
the RH Law, it being "a product of a majoritarian democratic process"75 and "characterized by an
inordinate amount of transparency."76 The OSG posits that the authority of the Court to review social
legislation like the RH Law by certiorari is "weak," since the Constitution vests the discretion to implement
the constitutional policies and positive norms with the political departments, in 00p0particular, with
Congress.77 It further asserts that in view of the Court's ruling in Southern Hemisphere v. Anti-Terrorism
Council,78 the remedies of certiorari and prohibition utilized by the petitioners are improper to assail the
validity of the acts of the legislature.79
Moreover, the OSG submits that as an "as applied challenge," it cannot prosper considering that the
assailed law has yet to be enforced and applied to the petitioners, and that the government has yet to
distribute reproductive health devices that are abortive. It claims that the RH Law cannot be challenged
"on its face" as it is not a speech-regulating measure.80
In many cases involving the determination of the constitutionality of the actions of the Executive and the
Legislature, it is often sought that the Court temper its exercise of judicial power and accord due respect
to the wisdom of its co-equal branch on the basis of the principle of separation of powers. To be clear,
the separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government, which obtains not
through express provision but by actual division in our Constitution. Each department of the government
has exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.81
Thus, the 1987 Constitution provides that: (a) the legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines;82 (b) the executive power shall be vested in the President of the Philippines;83 and (c) the
judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be established by
law.84 The Constitution has truly blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, the allotment of powers
among the three branches of government.85
In its relationship with its co-equals, the Judiciary recognizes the doctrine of separation of powers which
imposes upon the courts proper restraint, born of the nature of their functions and of their respect for
the other branches of government, in striking down the acts of the Executive or the Legislature as
unconstitutional. Verily, the policy is a harmonious blend of courtesy and caution.86
It has also long been observed, however, that in times of social disquietude or political instability, the
great landmarks of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated.87 In
order to address this, the Constitution impresses upon the Court to respect the acts performed by a co-
equal branch done within its sphere of competence and authority, but at the same time, allows it to cross
the line of separation - but only at a very limited and specific point - to determine whether the acts of
the executive and the legislative branches are null because they were undertaken with grave abuse of
discretion.88 Thus, while the Court may not pass upon questions of wisdom, justice or expediency of the
RH Law, it may do so where an attendant unconstitutionality or grave abuse of discretion results.89 The
Court must demonstrate its unflinching commitment to protect those cherished rights and principles
embodied in the Constitution.
In this connection, it bears adding that while the scope of judicial power of review may be limited, the
Constitution makes no distinction as to the kind of legislation that may be subject to judicial scrutiny, be
it in the form of social legislation or otherwise. The reason is simple and goes back to the earlier point.
The Court may pass upon the constitutionality of acts of the legislative and the executive branches, since
its duty is not to review their collective wisdom but, rather, to make sure that they have acted in
consonance with their respective authorities and rights as mandated of them by the Constitution. If
after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority
of proscribing the actions under review.90 This is in line with Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution
which expressly provides:
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government. [Emphases supplied]
As far back as Tanada v. Angara,91 the Court has unequivocally declared that certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and to review and/or prohibit/nullify,
when proper, acts of legislative and executive officials, as there is no other plain, speedy or adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. This ruling was later on applied in Macalintal v. COMELEC,92 Aldaba
v. COMELEC,93 Magallona v. Ermita,94 and countless others. In Tanada, the Court wrote:
In seeking to nullify an act of the Philippine Senate on the ground that it contravenes the Constitution,
the petition no doubt raises a justiciable controversy. Where an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it becomes not only the right but in fact the duty of
the judiciary to settle the dispute. "The question thus posed is judicial rather than political. The duty (to
adjudicate) remains to assure that the supremacy of the Constitution is upheld. " Once a "controversy
as to the application or interpretation of constitutional provision is raised before this Court (as in the
instant case), it becomes a legal issue which the Court is bound by constitutional mandate to decide.
[Emphasis supplied]
In the scholarly estimation of former Supreme Court Justice Florentino Feliciano, "judicial review is
essential for the maintenance and enforcement of the separation of powers and the balancing of powers
among the three great departments of government through the definition and maintenance of the
boundaries of authority and control between them. To him, judicial review is the chief, indeed the only,
medium of participation - or instrument of intervention - of the judiciary in that balancing operation.95
Lest it be misunderstood, it bears emphasizing that the Court does not have the unbridled authority to
rule on just any and every claim of constitutional violation. Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the
power of judicial review is limited by four exacting requisites, viz : (a) there must be an actual case or
controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be
raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the
case.96
Actual Case or Controversy
Proponents of the RH Law submit that the subject petitions do not present any actual case or controversy
because the RH Law has yet to be implemented.97 They claim that the questions raised by the petitions
are not yet concrete and ripe for adjudication since no one has been charged with violating any of its
provisions and that there is no showing that any of the petitioners' rights has been adversely affected by
its operation.98 In short, it is contended that judicial review of the RH Law is premature.
An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory
opinion.99 The rule is that courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly
interest, however intellectually challenging. The controversy must be justiciable-definite and concrete,
touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests. In other words, the pleadings
must show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof, on the
other; that is, it must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought
to be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in
nature, as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of
facts.100
Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A

question is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may come into the
picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as
a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of
sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained of102
In The Province of North Cotabato v. The Government of the Republic of the Philippines,103 where the
constitutionality of an unimplemented Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD)
was put in question, it was argued that the Court has no authority to pass upon the issues raised as there
was yet no concrete act performed that could possibly violate the petitioners' and the intervenors' rights.
Citing precedents, the Court ruled that the fact of the law or act in question being not yet effective does
not negate ripeness. Concrete acts under a law are not necessary to render the controversy ripe. Even
a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty.
In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken
effect and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that
the subject petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative
branch is seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty
of the Judiciary to settle the dispute.104
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical
providers are in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof,
particularly public health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture
of retirement and other benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter NOW.
Facial Challenge
The OSG also assails the propriety of the facial challenge lodged by the subject petitions, contending that
the RH Law cannot be challenged "on its face" as it is not a speech regulating measure.105
The Court is not persuaded.
In United States (US) constitutional law, a facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge,
is one that is launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
other rights in the First Amendment.106 These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances.107
After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but
component rights of the right to one's freedom of expression, as they are modes which one's thoughts
are externalized.
In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained,
albeit with some modifications. While this Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues,108 it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech,
but also those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights.109 The underlying reason for
this modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded
jurisdiction, is mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of the Government.110 Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive
Judiciary, ever vigilant with its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.
Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional
human rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been
violated by the assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions
and to determine if the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the
simple expedient that there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive
branch of government, acting only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment
of the Filipino people.
Locus Standi
The OSG also attacks the legal personality of the petitioners to file their respective petitions. It contends
that the "as applied challenge" lodged by the petitioners cannot prosper as the assailed law has yet to be
enforced and applied against them,111 and the government has yet to distribute reproductive health
devices that are abortive.112
The petitioners, for their part, invariably invoke the "transcendental importance" doctrine and their
status as citizens and taxpayers in establishing the requisite locus standi.
Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such that the party
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act.113 It requires a
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which sharpens
the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.114
In relation to locus standi, the "as applied challenge" embodies the rule that one can challenge the
constitutionality of a statute only if he asserts a violation of his own rights. The rule prohibits one from
challenging the constitutionality of the statute grounded on a violation of the rights of third persons not
before the court. This rule is also known as the prohibition against third-party standing.115
Transcendental Importance
Notwithstanding, the Court leans on the doctrine that "the rule on standing is a matter of procedure,
hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators when
the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of
overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public interest."116
In Coconut Oil Refiners Association, Inc. v. Torres,117 the Court held that in cases of paramount
importance where serious constitutional questions are involved, the standing requirement may be
relaxed and a suit may be allowed to prosper even where there is no direct injury to the party claiming
the right of judicial review. In the first Emergency Powers Cases,118 ordinary citizens and taxpayers were
allowed to question the constitutionality of several executive orders although they had only an indirect
and general interest shared in common with the public.
With these said, even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an "as-applied
challenge, still, the Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus s tandi requirement. It has
accorded certain individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest
affected by a Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked.
The rule on locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one
occasion, waived or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens,
taxpayers, voters or legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured
by the operation of a law or any other government act. As held in Jaworski v. PAGCOR:119
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the technical
defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised
herein have potentially pervasive influence on the social and moral well being of this nation, specially
the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is an imperative need. This is in accordance with
the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay,
but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their strict and rigid application, which would
result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote substantial justice, must always be
eschewed. (Emphasis supplied)
In view of the seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents, not only to the public, but also to the bench
and bar, the issues raised must be resolved for the guidance of all. After all, the RH Law drastically affects
the constitutional provisions on the right to life and health, the freedom of religion and expression and
other constitutional rights. Mindful of all these and the fact that the issues of contraception and
reproductive health have already caused deep division among a broad spectrum of society, the Court
entertains no doubt that the petitions raise issues of transcendental importance warranting immediate
court adjudication. More importantly, considering that it is the right to life of the mother and the unborn
which is primarily at issue, the Court need not wait for a life to be taken away before taking action.
The Court cannot, and should not, exercise judicial restraint at this time when rights enshrined in the
Constitution are being imperilled to be violated. To do so, when the life of either the mother or her child
is at stake, would lead to irreparable consequences.
Declaratory Relief
The respondents also assail the petitions because they are essentially petitions for declaratory relief over
which the Court has no original jurisdiction.120 Suffice it to state that most of the petitions are praying
for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule
65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-reaching implications and prays for
injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for prohibition under Rule 65.121
One Subject-One Title
The petitioners also question the constitutionality of the RH Law, claiming that it violates Section 26(1 ),
Article VI of the Constitution,122 prescribing the one subject-one title rule. According to them, being one
for reproductive health with responsible parenthood, the assailed legislation violates the constitutional
standards of due process by concealing its true intent - to act as a population control measure.123
To belittle the challenge, the respondents insist that the RH Law is not a birth or population control
measure,124 and that the concepts of "responsible parenthood" and "reproductive health" are both
interrelated as they are inseparable.125
Despite efforts to push the RH Law as a reproductive health law, the Court sees it as principally a
population control measure. The corpus of the RH Law is geared towards the reduction of the country's
population. While it claims to save lives and keep our women and children healthy, it also promotes
pregnancy-preventing products. As stated earlier, the RH Law emphasizes the need to provide Filipinos,
especially the poor and the marginalized, with access to information on the full range of modem family
planning products and methods. These family planning methods, natural or modem, however, are clearly
geared towards the prevention of pregnancy.
For said reason, the manifest underlying objective of the RH Law is to reduce the number of births in the
country.
It cannot be denied that the measure also seeks to provide pre-natal and post-natal care as well. A large
portion of the law, however, covers the dissemination of information and provisions on access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive health care
services, methods, devices, and supplies, which are all intended to prevent pregnancy.
The Court, thus, agrees with the petitioners' contention that the whole idea of contraception pervades
the entire RH Law. It is, in fact, the central idea of the RH Law.126 Indeed, remove the provisions that
refer to contraception or are related to it and the RH Law loses its very foundation.127 As earlier
explained, "the other positive provisions such as skilled birth attendance, maternal care including pre-
and post-natal services, prevention and management of reproductive tract infections including HIV/AIDS
are already provided for in the Magna Carta for Women."128
Be that as it may, the RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In Benjamin E. Cawaling, Jr.
v. The Commission on Elections and Rep. Francis Joseph G Escudero, it was written:
It is well-settled that the "one title-one subject" rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title
of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to
include the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested
are informed of the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover,
this Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule "so as not to
cripple or impede legislation." [Emphases supplied]
In this case, a textual analysis of the various provisions of the law shows that both "reproductive health"
and "responsible parenthood" are interrelated and germane to the overriding objective to control the
population growth. As expressed in the first paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons
including their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human
development, the right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and
information, and the right to choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be "so uncertain
that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on
inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where
another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the
real subject or scope of the act."129
Considering the close intimacy between "reproductive health" and "responsible parenthood" which bears
to the attainment of the goal of achieving "sustainable human development" as stated under its terms,
the Court finds no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the
contents of the assailed legislation.
II - SUBSTANTIVE ISSUES:
1-The Right to Life

Position of the Petitioners
The petitioners assail the RH Law because it violates the right to life and health of the unborn child under
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. The assailed legislation allowing access to
abortifacients/abortives effectively sanctions abortion.130
According to the petitioners, despite its express terms prohibiting abortion, Section 4(a) of the RH Law
considers contraceptives that prevent the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb as an abortifacient; thus, sanctioning contraceptives that take effect after fertilization and prior to
implantation, contrary to the intent of the Framers of the Constitution to afford protection to the
fertilized ovum which already has life.
They argue that even if Section 9 of the RH Law allows only "non-abortifacient" hormonal contraceptives,
intrauterine devices, injectables and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies, medical research shows that contraceptives use results in abortion as they operate
to kill the fertilized ovum which already has life.131
As it opposes the initiation of life, which is a fundamental human good, the petitioners assert that the
State sanction of contraceptive use contravenes natural law and is an affront to the dignity of man.132
Finally, it is contended that since Section 9 of the RH Law requires the Food and Drug Administration
(FDA) to certify that the product or supply is not to be used as an abortifacient, the assailed legislation
effectively confirms that abortifacients are not prohibited. Also considering that the FDA is not the agency
that will actually supervise or administer the use of these products and supplies to prospective patients,
there is no way it can truthfully make a certification that it shall not be used for abortifacient
purposes.133
Position of the Respondents
For their part, the defenders of the RH Law point out that the intent of the Framers of the Constitution
was simply the prohibition of abortion. They contend that the RH Law does not violate the Constitution
since the said law emphasizes that only "non-abortifacient" reproductive health care services, methods,
devices products and supplies shall be made accessible to the public.134
According to the OSG, Congress has made a legislative determination that contraceptives are not
abortifacients by enacting the RH Law. As the RH Law was enacted with due consideration to various
studies and consultations with the World Health Organization (WHO) and other experts in the medical
field, it is asserted that the Court afford deference and respect to such a determination and pass judgment
only when a particular drug or device is later on determined as an abortive.135
For his part, respondent Lagman argues that the constitutional protection of one's right to life is not
violated considering that various studies of the WHO show that life begins from the implantation of the
fertilized ovum. Consequently, he argues that the RH Law is constitutional since the law specifically
provides that only contraceptives that do not prevent the implantation of the fertilized ovum are
allowed.136
The Court's Position
It is a universally accepted principle that every human being enjoys the right to life.137
Even if not formally established, the right to life, being grounded on natural law, is inherent and,
therefore, not a creation of, or dependent upon a particular law, custom, or belief. It precedes and
transcends any authority or the laws of men.
In this jurisdiction, the right to life is given more than ample protection. Section 1, Article III of the
Constitution provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
As expounded earlier, the use of contraceptives and family planning methods in the Philippines is not of
recent vintage. From the enactment of R.A. No. 4729, entitled "An Act To Regulate The Sale, Dispensation,
and/or Distribution of Contraceptive Drugs and Devices "on June 18, 1966, prescribing rules on
contraceptive drugs and devices which prevent fertilization,138 to the promotion of male vasectomy and
tubal ligation,139 and the ratification of numerous international agreements, the country has long
recognized the need to promote population control through the use of contraceptives in order to achieve
long-term economic development. Through the years, however, the use of contraceptives and other
family planning methods evolved from being a component of demographic management, to one centered
on the promotion of public health, particularly, reproductive health.140
This has resulted in the enactment of various measures promoting women's rights and health and the
overall promotion of the family's well-being. Thus, aside from R.A. No. 4729, R.A. No. 6365 or "The
Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the "The Magna Carta of
Women" were legislated. Notwithstanding this paradigm shift, the Philippine national population
program has always been grounded two cornerstone principles: "principle of no-abortion" and the
"principle of non-coercion."141 As will be discussed later, these principles are not merely grounded on
administrative policy, but rather, originates from the constitutional protection expressly provided to
afford protection to life and guarantee religious freedom.
When Life Begins*
Majority of the Members of the Court are of the position that the question of when life begins is a
scientific and medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and
evidence. During the deliberation, however, it was agreed upon that the individual members of the Court
could express their own views on this matter.
In this regard, the ponente, is of the strong view that life begins at fertilization.
In answering the question of when life begins, focus should be made on the particular phrase of Section
12 which reads:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth
for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.
Textually, the Constitution affords protection to the unborn from conception. This is undisputable
because before conception, there is no unborn to speak of. For said reason, it is no surprise that the
Constitution is mute as to any proscription prior to conception or when life begins. The problem has
arisen because, amazingly, there are quarters who have conveniently disregarded the scientific fact that
conception is reckoned from fertilization. They are waving the view that life begins at implantation.
Hence, the issue of when life begins.
In a nutshell, those opposing the RH Law contend that conception is synonymous with "fertilization" of
the female ovum by the male sperm.142 On the other side of the spectrum are those who assert that
conception refers to the "implantation" of the fertilized ovum in the uterus.143
Plain and Legal Meaning
It is a canon in statutory construction that the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in their
plain and ordinary meaning. As held in the recent case of Chavez v. Judicial Bar Council:144
One of the primary and basic rules in statutory construction is that where the words of a statute are clear,
plain, and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without attempted
interpretation. It is a well-settled principle of constitutional construction that the language employed in
the Constitution must be given their ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed. As
much as possible, the words of the Constitution should be understood in the sense they have in common
use. What it says according to the text of the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates
the power of the courts to alter it, based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what
they say. Verba legis non est recedendum - from the words of a statute there should be no departure.
The raison d' etre for the rule is essentially two-fold: First, because it is assumed that the words in which
constitutional provisions are couched express the objective sought to be attained; and second, because
the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer's document but essentially that of the people, in whose
consciousness it should ever be present as an important condition for the rule of law to prevail.
In conformity with the above principle, the traditional meaning of the word "conception" which, as
described and defined by all reliable and reputable sources, means that life begins at fertilization.
Webster's Third New International Dictionary describes it as the act of becoming pregnant, formation of
a viable zygote; the fertilization that results in a new entity capable of developing into a being like its
parents.145
Black's Law Dictionary gives legal meaning to the term "conception" as the fecundation of the female
ovum by the male spermatozoon resulting in human life capable of survival and maturation under normal
conditions.146
Even in jurisprudence, an unborn child has already a legal personality. In Continental Steel Manufacturing
Corporation v. Hon. Accredited Voluntary Arbitrator Allan S. Montano,147 it was written:
Life is not synonymous with civil personality. One need not acquire civil personality first before he/she
could die. Even a child inside the womb already has life. No less than the Constitution recognizes the life
of the unborn from conception, that the State must protect equally with the life of the mother. If the
unborn already has life, then the cessation thereof even prior to the child being delivered, qualifies as
death. [Emphases in the original]
In Gonzales v. Carhart,148 Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the US Supreme Court, said that the State
"has respect for human life at all stages in the pregnancy" and "a legitimate and substantial interest in
preserving and promoting fetal life." Invariably, in the decision, the fetus was referred to, or cited, as a
baby or a child.149
Intent of the Framers
Records of the Constitutional Convention also shed light on the intention of the Framers regarding the
term "conception" used in Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. From their deliberations, it clearly
refers to the moment of "fertilization." The records reflect the followingu sentence which reads:
"The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception."
When is the moment of conception?
xxx
Mr. Villegas: As I explained in the sponsorship speech, it is when the ovum is fertilized by the sperm that
there is human life. x x x.150
xxx
As to why conception is reckoned from fertilization and, as such, the beginning of human life, it was
explained:
Mr. Villegas: I propose to review this issue in a biological manner. The first question that needs to be
answered is: Is the fertilized ovum alive? Biologically categorically says yes, the fertilized ovum is alive.
First of all, like all living organisms, it takes in nutrients which it processes by itself. It begins doing this
upon fertilization. Secondly, as it takes in these nutrients, it grows from within. Thirdly, it multiplies itself
at a geometric rate in the continuous process of cell division. All these processes are vital signs of life.
Therefore, there is no question that biologically the fertilized ovum has life.
The second question: Is it human? Genetics gives an equally categorical "yes." At the moment of
conception, the nuclei of the ovum and the sperm rupture. As this happens 23 chromosomes from the
ovum combine with 23 chromosomes of the sperm to form a total of 46 chromosomes. A chromosome
count of 46 is found only - and I repeat, only in human cells. Therefore, the fertilized ovum is human.
Since these questions have been answered affirmatively, we must conclude that if the fertilized ovum is
both alive and human, then, as night follows day, it must be human life. Its nature is human.151
Why the Constitution used the phrase "from the moment of conception" and not "from the moment of
fertilization" was not because of doubt when human life begins, but rather, because:
Mr. Tingson: x x x x the phrase from the moment of conception" was described by us here before with
the scientific phrase "fertilized ovum" may be beyond the comprehension of some people; we want to
use the simpler phrase "from the moment of conception."152
Thus, in order to ensure that the fertilized ovum is given ample protection under the Constitution, it was
discussed:
Rev. Rigos: Yes, we think that the word "unborn" is sufficient for the purpose of writing a Constitution,
without specifying "from the moment of conception."
Mr. Davide: I would not subscribe to that particular view because according to the Commissioner's own
admission, he would leave it to Congress to define when life begins. So, Congress can define life to begin
from six months after fertilization; and that would really be very, very, dangerous. It is now determined
by science that life begins from the moment of conception. There can be no doubt about it. So we should
not give any doubt to Congress, too.153
Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Gascon: Mr. Presiding Officer, I would like to ask a question on that point. Actually, that is one of the
questions I was going to raise during the period of interpellations but it has been expressed already. The
provision, as proposed right now states:
The State shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the unborn from the moment of
conception.
When it speaks of "from the moment of conception," does this mean when the egg meets the sperm?
Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.
Mr. Gascon: Therefore that does not leave to Congress the right to determine whether certain
contraceptives that we know today are abortifacient or not because it is a fact that some of the so-called
contraceptives deter the rooting of the ovum in the uterus. If fertilization has already occurred, the next
process is for the fertilized ovum to travel towards the uterus and to take root. What happens with some
contraceptives is that they stop the opportunity for the fertilized ovum to reach the uterus. Therefore, if
we take the provision as it is proposed, these so called contraceptives should be banned.
Mr. Villegas: Yes, if that physical fact is established, then that is what is called abortifacient and, therefore,
would be unconstitutional and should be banned under this provision.
Mr. Gascon: Yes. So my point is that I do not think it is up to Congress to state whether or not these
certain contraceptives are abortifacient. Scientifically and based on the provision as it is now proposed,
they are already considered abortifacient.154
From the deliberations above-quoted, it is apparent that the Framers of the Constitution emphasized that
the State shall provide equal protection to both the mother and the unborn child from the earliest
opportunity of life, that is, upon fertilization or upon the union of the male sperm and the female ovum.
It is also apparent is that the Framers of the Constitution intended that to prohibit Congress from enacting
measures that would allow it determine when life begins.
Equally apparent, however, is that the Framers of the Constitution did not intend to ban all contraceptives
for being unconstitutional. In fact, Commissioner Bernardo Villegas, spearheading the need to have a
constitutional provision on the right to life, recognized that the determination of whether a contraceptive
device is an abortifacient is a question of fact which should be left to the courts to decide on based on
established evidence.155
From the discussions above, contraceptives that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum should be deemed an
abortive and thus prohibited. Conversely, contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male
sperm and the female ovum, and those that similarly take action prior to fertilization should be deemed
non-abortive, and thus, constitutionally permissible.
As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:
x x x x x x x x x
Mr. Gascon: xx xx. As I mentioned in my speech on the US bases, I am pro-life, to the point that I would
like not only to protect the life of the unborn, but also the lives of the millions of people in the world by
fighting for a nuclear-free world. I would just like to be assured of the legal and pragmatic implications of
the term "protection of the life of the unborn from the moment of conception." I raised some of these
implications this afternoon when I interjected in the interpellation of Commissioner Regalado. I would
like to ask that question again for a categorical answer.
I mentioned that if we institutionalize the term "the life of the unborn from the moment of conception"
we are also actually saying "no," not "maybe," to certain contraceptives which are already being
encouraged at this point in time. Is that the sense of the committee or does it disagree with me?
Mr. Azcuna: No, Mr. Presiding Officer, because contraceptives would be preventive. There is no unborn
yet. That is yet unshaped.
Mr. Gascon: Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer, but I was speaking more about some contraceptives, such as the
intra-uterine device which actually stops the egg which has already been fertilized from taking route to
the uterus. So if we say "from the moment of conception," what really occurs is that some of these
contraceptives will have to be unconstitutionalized.
Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.
Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156
The fact that not all contraceptives are prohibited by the 1987 Constitution is even admitted by
petitioners during the oral arguments. There it was conceded that tubal ligation, vasectomy, even
condoms are not classified as abortifacients.157
Atty. Noche:
Before the union of the eggs, egg and the sperm, there is no life yet.
Justice Bersamin:
There is no life.
Atty. Noche:
So, there is no life to be protected.
Justice Bersamin:
To be protected.
Atty. Noche:
Under Section 12, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
So you have no objection to condoms?
Atty. Noche:
Not under Section 12, Article II.
Justice Bersamin:
Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?
Atty. Noche:
Well, yes, Your Honor, there are scientific findings to that effect, Your Honor, but I am discussing here
Section 12, Article II, Your Honor, yes.
Justice Bersamin:
Alright.
Atty. Noche:
And it's not, I have to admit it's not an abortifacient, Your Honor.158
Medical Meaning
That conception begins at fertilization is not bereft of medical foundation. Mosby s Medical, Nursing, and
Allied Health Dictionary defines conception as "the beginning of pregnancy usually taken to be the instant
a spermatozoon enters an ovum and forms a viable zygote."159
It describes fertilization as "the union of male and female gametes to form a zygote from which the
embryo develops."160
The Textbook of Obstetrics (Physiological & Pathological Obstetrics),161 used by medical schools in the
Philippines, also concludes that human life (human person) begins at the moment of fertilization with the
union of the egg and the sperm resulting in the formation of a new individual, with a unique genetic
composition that dictates all developmental stages that ensue.
Similarly, recent medical research on the matter also reveals that: "Human development begins after the
union of male and female gametes or germ cells during a process known as fertilization (conception).
Fertilization is a sequence of events that begins with the contact of a sperm (spermatozoon) with a
secondary oocyte (ovum) and ends with the fusion of their pronuclei (the haploid nuclei of the sperm and
ovum) and the mingling of their chromosomes to form a new cell. This fertilized ovum, known as a zygote,
is a large diploid cell that is the beginning, or primordium, of a human being."162
The authors of Human Embryology & Teratology163 mirror the same position. They wrote: "Although life
is a continuous process, fertilization is a critical landmark because, under ordinary circumstances, a new,
genetically distinct human organism is thereby formed.... The combination of 23 chromosomes present
in each pronucleus results in 46 chromosomes in the zygote. Thus the diploid number is restored and the
embryonic genome is formed. The embryo now exists as a genetic unity."
In support of the RH Bill, The Philippine Medical Association came out with a "Paper on the Reproductive
Health Bill (Responsible Parenthood Bill)" and therein concluded that:
CONCLUSION
The PMA throws its full weight in supporting the RH Bill at the same time that PMA maintains its strong
position that fertilization is sacred because it is at this stage that conception, and thus human life, begins.
Human lives are sacred from the moment of conception, and that destroying those new lives is never licit,
no matter what the purported good outcome would be. In terms of biology and human embryology, a
human being begins immediately at fertilization and after that, there is no point along the continuous
line of human embryogenesis where only a "potential" human being can be posited. Any philosophical,
legal, or political conclusion cannot escape this objective scientific fact.
The scientific evidence supports the conclusion that a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a
new human being commences at a scientifically well defined "moment of conception." This conclusion is
objective, consistent with the factual evidence, and independent of any specific ethical, moral, political,
or religious view of human life or of human embryos.164
Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

Fertilization
In all, whether it be taken from a plain meaning, or understood under medical parlance, and more
importantly, following the intention of the Framers of the Constitution, the undeniable conclusion is that
a zygote is a human organism and that the life of a new human being commences at a scientifically well-
defined moment of conception, that is, upon fertilization.
For the above reasons, the Court cannot subscribe to the theory advocated by Hon. Lagman that life
begins at implantation.165 According to him, "fertilization and conception are two distinct and successive
stages in the reproductive process. They are not identical and synonymous."166 Citing a letter of the
WHO, he wrote that "medical authorities confirm that the implantation of the fertilized ovum is the
commencement of conception and it is only after implantation that pregnancy can be medically
detected."167
This theory of implantation as the beginning of life is devoid of any legal or scientific mooring. It does not
pertain to the beginning of life but to the viability of the fetus. The fertilized ovum/zygote is not an
inanimate object - it is a living human being complete with DNA and 46 chromosomes.168 Implantation
has been conceptualized only for convenience by those who had population control in mind. To adopt it
would constitute textual infidelity not only to the RH Law but also to the Constitution.
Not surprisingly, even the OSG does not support this position.
If such theory would be accepted, it would unnervingly legitimize the utilization of any drug or device that
would prevent the implantation of the fetus at the uterine wall. It would be provocative and further
aggravate religious-based divisiveness.
It would legally permit what the Constitution proscribes - abortion and abortifacients.
The RH Law and Abortion
The clear and unequivocal intent of the Framers of the 1987 Constitution in protecting the life of the
unborn from conception was to prevent the Legislature from enacting a measure legalizing abortion. It
was so clear that even the Court cannot interpret it otherwise. This intent of the Framers was captured
in the record of the proceedings of the 1986 Constitutional Commission. Commissioner Bernardo Villegas,
the principal proponent of the protection of the unborn from conception, explained:
The intention .. .is to make sure that there would be no pro-abortion laws ever passed by Congress or any
pro-abortion decision passed by the Supreme Court.169
A reading of the RH Law would show that it is in line with this intent and actually proscribes abortion.
While the Court has opted not to make any determination, at this stage, when life begins, it finds that the
RH Law itself clearly mandates that protection be afforded from the moment of fertilization. As pointed
out by Justice Carpio, the RH Law is replete with provisions that embody the policy of the law to protect
to the fertilized ovum and that it should be afforded safe travel to the uterus for implantation.170
Moreover, the RH Law recognizes that abortion is a crime under Article 256 of the Revised Penal Code,
which penalizes the destruction or expulsion of the fertilized ovum. Thus:
1] xx x.
Section 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as
follows:
xxx.
(q) Reproductive health care refers to the access to a full range of methods, facilities, services and supplies
that contribute to reproductive health and well-being by addressing reproductive health-related
problems. It also includes sexual health, the purpose of which is the enhancement of life and personal
relations. The elements of reproductive health care include the following:
xxx.
(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;
xxx.
2] xx x.
Section 4. x x x.
(s) Reproductive health rights refers to the rights of individuals and couples, to decide freely and
responsibly whether or not to have children; the number, spacing and timing of their children; to make
other decisions concerning reproduction, free of discrimination, coercion and violence; to have the
information and means to do so; and to attain the highest standard of sexual health and reproductive
health: Provided, however, That reproductive health rights do not include abortion, and access to
abortifacients.
3] xx x.
SEC. 29. Repealing Clause. - Except for prevailing laws against abortion, any law, presidential decree or
issuance, executive order, letter of instruction, administrative order, rule or regulation contrary to or is
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act including Republic Act No. 7392, otherwise known as the
Midwifery Act, is hereby repealed, modified or amended accordingly.
The RH Law and Abortifacients
In carrying out its declared policy, the RH Law is consistent in prohibiting abortifacients. To be clear,
Section 4(a) of the RH Law defines an abortifacient as:
Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb upon determination of the FDA.
As stated above, the RH Law mandates that protection must be afforded from the moment of fertilization.
By using the word " or," the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation, but
also those that induce abortion and those that induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's
womb. Thus, an abortifacient is any drug or device that either:
(a) Induces abortion; or
(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or
(c) Prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, upon determination of
the FDA.
Contrary to the assertions made by the petitioners, the Court finds that the RH Law, consistent with the
Constitution, recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounden duty
to protect it. The conclusion becomes clear because the RH Law, first, prohibits any drug or device that
induces abortion (first kind), which, as discussed exhaustively above, refers to that which induces the
killing or the destruction of the fertilized ovum, and, second, prohibits any drug or device the fertilized
ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb (third kind).
By expressly declaring that any drug or device that prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted
in the mother's womb is an abortifacient (third kind), the RH Law does not intend to mean at all that life
only begins only at implantation, as Hon. Lagman suggests. It also does not declare either that protection
will only be given upon implantation, as the petitioners likewise suggest. Rather, it recognizes that: one,
there is a need to protect the fertilized ovum which already has life, and two, the fertilized ovum must
be protected the moment it becomes existent - all the way until it reaches and implants in the mother's
womb. After all, if life is only recognized and afforded protection from the moment the fertilized ovum
implants - there is nothing to prevent any drug or device from killing or destroying the fertilized ovum
prior to implantation.
From the foregoing, the Court finds that inasmuch as it affords protection to the fertilized ovum, the RH
Law does not sanction abortion. To repeat, it is the Court's position that life begins at fertilization, not at
implantation. When a fertilized ovum is implanted in the uterine wall , its viability is sustained but that
instance of implantation is not the point of beginning of life. It started earlier. And as defined by the RH
Law, any drug or device that induces abortion, that is, which kills or destroys the fertilized ovum or
prevents the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, is an abortifacient.
Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law
This notwithstanding, the Court finds that the proviso under Section 9 of the law that "any product or
supply included or to be included in the EDL must have a certification from the FDA that said product and
supply is made available on the condition that it is not to be used as an abortifacient" as empty as it is
absurd. The FDA, with all its expertise, cannot fully attest that a drug or device will not all be used as an
abortifacient, since the agency cannot be present in every instance when the contraceptive product or
supply will be used.171
Pursuant to its declared policy of providing access only to safe, legal and non-abortifacient
contraceptives, however, the Court finds that the proviso of Section 9, as worded, should bend to the
legislative intent and mean that "any product or supply included or to be included in the EDL must have
a certification from the FDA that said product and supply is made available on the condition that it cannot
be used as abortifacient." Such a construction is consistent with the proviso under the second paragraph
of the same section that provides:
Provided, further, That the foregoing offices shall not purchase or acquire by any means emergency
contraceptive pills, postcoital pills, abortifacients that will be used for such purpose and their other forms
or equivalent.
Abortifacients under the RH-IRR
At this juncture, the Court agrees with ALFI that the authors of the RH-IRR gravely abused their office
when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient. The RH Law defines "abortifacient" as follows:
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - For the purpose of this Act, the following terms shall be defined as follows:
(a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside
the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's
womb upon determination of the FDA.
Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:
Section 3.01 For purposes of these Rules, the terms shall be defined as follows:
a) Abortifacient refers to any drug or device that primarily induces abortion or the destruction of a fetus
inside the mother's womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the
mother's womb upon determination of the Food and Drug Administration (FDA). [Emphasis supplied]
Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz:
j) Contraceptive refers to any safe, legal, effective and scientifically proven modern family planning
method, device, or health product, whether natural or artificial, that prevents pregnancy but does not
primarily destroy a fertilized ovum or prevent a fertilized ovum from being implanted in the mother's
womb in doses of its approved indication as determined by the Food and Drug Administration (FDA).
The above-mentioned section of the RH-IRR allows "contraceptives" and recognizes as "abortifacient"
only those that primarily induce abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the
prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb.172
This cannot be done.
In this regard, the observations of Justice Brion and Justice Del Castillo are well taken. As they pointed
out, with the insertion of the word "primarily," Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR173 must be struck
down for being ultra vires.
Evidently, with the addition of the word "primarily," in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR is indeed ultra
vires. It contravenes Section 4(a) of the RH Law and should, therefore, be declared invalid. There is danger
that the insertion of the qualifier "primarily" will pave the way for the approval of contraceptives which
may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section
12 of the Constitution. With such qualification in the RH-IRR, it appears to insinuate that a contraceptive
will only be considered as an "abortifacient" if its sole known effect is abortion or, as pertinent here, the
prevention of the implantation of the fertilized ovum.
For the same reason, this definition of "contraceptive" would permit the approval of contraceptives which
are actually abortifacients because of their fail-safe mechanism.174
Also, as discussed earlier, Section 9 calls for the certification by the FDA that these contraceptives cannot
act as abortive. With this, together with the definition of an abortifacient under Section 4 (a) of the RH
Law and its declared policy against abortion, the undeniable conclusion is that contraceptives to be
included in the PNDFS and the EDL will not only be those contraceptives that do not have the primary
action of causing abortion or the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb or the prevention of
the fertilized ovum to reach and be implanted in the mother's womb, but also those that do not have the
secondary action of acting the same way.
Indeed, consistent with the constitutional policy prohibiting abortion, and in line with the principle that
laws should be construed in a manner that its constitutionality is sustained, the RH Law and its
implementing rules must be consistent with each other in prohibiting abortion. Thus, the word "
primarily" in Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR should be declared void. To uphold the validity of
Section 3.0l(a) and G) of the RH-IRR and prohibit only those contraceptives that have the primary effect
of being an abortive would effectively "open the floodgates to the approval of contraceptives which may
harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization in violation of Article II, Section 12 of
the Constitution."175
To repeat and emphasize, in all cases, the "principle of no abortion" embodied in the constitutional
protection of life must be upheld.
2-The Right to Health
The petitioners claim that the RH Law violates the right to health because it requires the inclusion of
hormonal contraceptives, intrauterine devices, injectables and family products and supplies in the
National Drug Formulary and the inclusion of the same in the regular purchase of essential medicines and
supplies of all national hospitals.176 Citing various studies on the matter, the petitioners posit that the
risk of developing breast and cervical cancer is greatly increased in women who use oral contraceptives
as compared to women who never use them. They point out that the risk is decreased when the use of
contraceptives is discontinued. Further, it is contended that the use of combined oral contraceptive pills
is associated with a threefold increased risk of venous thromboembolism, a twofold increased risk of
ischematic stroke, and an indeterminate effect on risk of myocardial infarction.177 Given the definition
of "reproductive health" and "sexual health" under Sections 4(p)178 and (w)179 of the RH Law, the
petitioners assert that the assailed legislation only seeks to ensure that women have pleasurable and
satisfying sex lives.180
The OSG, however, points out that Section 15, Article II of the Constitution is not self-executory, it being
a mere statement of the administration's principle and policy. Even if it were self-executory, the OSG
posits that medical authorities refute the claim that contraceptive pose a danger to the health of
women.181
A component to the right to life is the constitutional right to health. In this regard, the Constitution is
replete with provisions protecting and promoting the right to health. Section 15, Article II of the
Constitution provides:
Section 15. The State shall protect and promote the right to health of the people and instill health
consciousness among them.
A portion of Article XIII also specifically provides for the States' duty to provide for the health of the
people, viz:
HEALTH
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people
at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
Section 12. The State shall establish and maintain an effective food and drug regulatory system and
undertake appropriate health, manpower development, and research, responsive to the country's health
needs and problems.
Section 13. The State shall establish a special agency for disabled person for their rehabilitation, self-
development, and self-reliance, and their integration into the mainstream of society.
Finally, Section 9, Article XVI provides:
Section 9. The State shall protect consumers from trade malpractices and from substandard or hazardous
products.
Contrary to the respondent's notion, however, these provisions are self-executing. Unless the provisions
clearly express the contrary, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-executory.
There is no need for legislation to implement these self-executing provisions.182 In Manila Prince Hotel
v. GSIS,183 it was stated:
x x x Hence, unless it is expressly provided that a legislative act is necessary to enforce a constitutional
mandate, the presumption now is that all provisions of the constitution are self-executing. If the
constitutional provisions are treated as requiring legislation instead of self-executing, the legislature
would have the power to ignore and practically nullify the mandate of the fundamental law. This can be
cataclysmic. That is why the prevailing view is, as it has always been, that –
... in case of doubt, the Constitution should be considered self-executing rather than non-self-executing.
. . . Unless the contrary is clearly intended, the provisions of the Constitution should be considered self-
executing, as a contrary rule would give the legislature discretion to determine when, or whether, they
shall be effective. These provisions would be subordinated to the will of the lawmaking body, which could
make them entirely meaningless by simply refusing to pass the needed implementing statute. (Emphases
supplied)
This notwithstanding, it bears mentioning that the petitioners, particularly ALFI, do not question
contraception and contraceptives per se.184 In fact, ALFI prays that the status quo - under R.A. No. 5921
and R.A. No. 4729, the sale and distribution of contraceptives are not prohibited when they are dispensed
by a prescription of a duly licensed by a physician - be maintained.185
The legislative intent in the enactment of the RH Law in this regard is to leave intact the provisions of R.A.
No. 4729. There is no intention at all to do away with it. It is still a good law and its requirements are still
in to be complied with. Thus, the Court agrees with the observation of respondent Lagman that the
effectivity of the RH Law will not lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives since the sale,
distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices will still require the prescription of a
licensed physician. With R.A. No. 4729 in place, there exists adequate safeguards to ensure the public
that only contraceptives that are safe are made available to the public. As aptly explained by respondent
Lagman:
D. Contraceptives cannot be
dispensed and used without
prescription
108. As an added protection to voluntary users of contraceptives, the same cannot be dispensed and
used without prescription.
109. Republic Act No. 4729 or "An Act to Regulate the Sale, Dispensation, and/ or Distribution of
Contraceptive Drugs and Devices" and Republic Act No. 5921 or "An Act Regulating the Practice of
Pharmacy and Setting Standards of Pharmaceutical Education in the Philippines and for Other Purposes"
are not repealed by the RH Law and the provisions of said Acts are not inconsistent with the RH Law.
110. Consequently, the sale, distribution and dispensation of contraceptive drugs and devices are
particularly governed by RA No. 4729 which provides in full:
"Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, partnership, or corporation, to sell, dispense or otherwise
distribute whether for or without consideration, any contraceptive drug or device, unless such sale,
dispensation or distribution is by a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and with the
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.
"Sec. 2 . For the purpose of this Act:
"(a) "Contraceptive drug" is any medicine, drug, chemical, or portion which is used exclusively for the
purpose of preventing fertilization of the female ovum: and
"(b) "Contraceptive device" is any instrument, device, material, or agent introduced into the female
reproductive system for the primary purpose of preventing conception.
"Sec. 3 Any person, partnership, or corporation, violating the provisions of this Act shall be punished with
a fine of not more than five hundred pesos or an imprisonment of not less than six months or more than
one year or both in the discretion of the Court.
"This Act shall take effect upon its approval.
"Approved: June 18, 1966"
111. Of the same import, but in a general manner, Section 25 of RA No. 5921 provides:
"Section 25. Sale of medicine, pharmaceuticals, drugs and devices. No medicine, pharmaceutical, or drug
of whatever nature and kind or device shall be compounded, dispensed, sold or resold, or otherwise be
made available to the consuming public except through a prescription drugstore or hospital pharmacy,
duly established in accordance with the provisions of this Act.
112. With all of the foregoing safeguards, as provided for in the RH Law and other relevant statutes, the
pretension of the petitioners that the RH Law will lead to the unmitigated proliferation of contraceptives,
whether harmful or not, is completely unwarranted and baseless.186 [Emphases in the Original.
Underlining supplied.]
In Re: Section 10 of the RH Law:
The foregoing safeguards should be read in connection with Section 10 of the RH Law which provides:
SEC. 10. Procurement and Distribution of Family Planning Supplies. - The DOH shall procure, distribute to
LGUs and monitor the usage of family planning supplies for the whole country. The DOH shall coordinate
with all appropriate local government bodies to plan and implement this procurement and distribution
program. The supply and budget allotments shall be based on, among others, the current levels and
projections of the following:
(a) Number of women of reproductive age and couples who want to space or limit their children;
(b) Contraceptive prevalence rate, by type of method used; and
(c) Cost of family planning supplies.
Provided, That LGUs may implement its own procurement, distribution and monitoring program
consistent with the overall provisions of this Act and the guidelines of the DOH.
Thus, in the distribution by the DOH of contraceptive drugs and devices, it must consider the provisions
of R.A. No. 4729, which is still in effect, and ensure that the contraceptives that it will procure shall be
from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical company and that the actual dispensation of these
contraceptive drugs and devices will done following a prescription of a qualified medical practitioner. The
distribution of contraceptive drugs and devices must not be indiscriminately done. The public health must
be protected by all possible means. As pointed out by Justice De Castro, a heavy responsibility and burden
are assumed by the government in supplying contraceptive drugs and devices, for it may be held
accountable for any injury, illness or loss of life resulting from or incidental to their use.187
At any rate, it bears pointing out that not a single contraceptive has yet been submitted to the FDA
pursuant to the RH Law. It behooves the Court to await its determination which drugs or devices are
declared by the FDA as safe, it being the agency tasked to ensure that food and medicines available to
the public are safe for public consumption. Consequently, the Court finds that, at this point, the attack
on the RH Law on this ground is premature. Indeed, the various kinds of contraceptives must first be
measured up to the constitutional yardstick as expounded herein, to be determined as the case presents
itself.
At this point, the Court is of the strong view that Congress cannot legislate that hormonal contraceptives
and intra-uterine devices are safe and non-abortifacient. The first sentence of Section 9 that ordains their
inclusion by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL by using the mandatory "shall" is to be construed as
operative only after they have been tested, evaluated, and approved by the FDA. The FDA, not Congress,
has the expertise to determine whether a particular hormonal contraceptive or intrauterine device is safe
and non-abortifacient. The provision of the third sentence concerning the requirements for the inclusion
or removal of a particular family planning supply from the EDL supports this construction.
Stated differently, the provision in Section 9 covering the inclusion of hormonal contraceptives, intra-
uterine devices, injectables, and other safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies by the National Drug Formulary in the EDL is not mandatory. There must first be a
determination by the FDA that they are in fact safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective family planning
products and supplies. There can be no predetermination by Congress that the gamut of contraceptives
are "safe, legal, non-abortifacient and effective" without the proper scientific examination.
3 -Freedom of Religion
and the Right to Free Speech
Position of the Petitioners:
1. On Contraception
While contraceptives and procedures like vasectomy and tubal ligation are not covered by the
constitutional proscription, there are those who, because of their religious education and background,
sincerely believe that contraceptives, whether abortifacient or not, are evil. Some of these are medical
practitioners who essentially claim that their beliefs prohibit not only the use of contraceptives but also
the willing participation and cooperation in all things dealing with contraceptive use. Petitioner PAX
explained that "contraception is gravely opposed to marital chastity, it is contrary to the good of the
transmission of life, and to the reciprocal self-giving of the spouses; it harms true love and denies the
sovereign rule of God in the transmission of Human life."188
The petitioners question the State-sponsored procurement of contraceptives, arguing that the
expenditure of their taxes on contraceptives violates the guarantee of religious freedom since
contraceptives contravene their religious beliefs.189
2. On Religious Accommodation and

The Duty to Refer
Petitioners Imbong and Luat note that while the RH Law attempts to address religious sentiments by
making provisions for a conscientious objector, the constitutional guarantee is nonetheless violated
because the law also imposes upon the conscientious objector the duty to refer the patient seeking
reproductive health services to another medical practitioner who would be able to provide for the
patient's needs. For the petitioners, this amounts to requiring the conscientious objector to cooperate
with the very thing he refuses to do without violating his/her religious beliefs.190
They further argue that even if the conscientious objector's duty to refer is recognized, the recognition is
unduly limited, because although it allows a conscientious objector in Section 23 (a)(3) the option to refer
a patient seeking reproductive health services and information - no escape is afforded the conscientious
objector in Section 23 (a)(l) and (2), i.e. against a patient seeking reproductive health procedures. They
claim that the right of other individuals to conscientiously object, such as: a) those working in public
health facilities referred to in Section 7; b) public officers involved in the implementation of the law
referred to in Section 23(b ); and c) teachers in public schools referred to in Section 14 of the RH Law, are
also not recognize.191
Petitioner Echavez and the other medical practitioners meanwhile, contend that the requirement to refer
the matter to another health care service provider is still considered a compulsion on those objecting
healthcare service providers. They add that compelling them to do the act against their will violates the
Doctrine of Benevolent Neutrality. Sections 9, 14 and 1 7 of the law are too secular that they tend to
disregard the religion of Filipinos. Authorizing the use of contraceptives with abortive effects,
mandatory sex education, mandatory pro-bono reproductive health services to indigents encroach
upon the religious freedom of those upon whom they are required.192
Petitioner CFC also argues that the requirement for a conscientious objector to refer the person seeking
reproductive health care services to another provider infringes on one's freedom of religion as it forces
the objector to become an unwilling participant in the commission of a serious sin under Catholic
teachings. While the right to act on one's belief may be regulated by the State, the acts prohibited by the
RH Law are passive acts which produce neither harm nor injury to the public.193
Petitioner CFC adds that the RH Law does not show compelling state interest to justify regulation of
religious freedom because it mentions no emergency, risk or threat that endangers state interests. It does
not explain how the rights of the people (to equality, non-discrimination of rights, sustainable human
development, health, education, information, choice and to make decisions according to religious
convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs and the demands of responsible parenthood) are being threatened or
are not being met as to justify the impairment of religious freedom.194
Finally, the petitioners also question Section 15 of the RH Law requiring would-be couples to attend family
planning and responsible parenthood seminars and to obtain a certificate of compliance. They claim that
the provision forces individuals to participate in the implementation of the RH Law even if it contravenes
their religious beliefs.195 As the assailed law dangles the threat of penalty of fine and/or imprisonment
in case of non-compliance with its provisions, the petitioners claim that the RH Law forcing them to
provide, support and facilitate access and information to contraception against their beliefs must be
struck down as it runs afoul to the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.
The Respondents' Positions
The respondents, on the other hand, contend that the RH Law does not provide that a specific mode or
type of contraceptives be used, be it natural or artificial. It neither imposes nor sanctions any religion or
belief.196 They point out that the RH Law only seeks to serve the public interest by providing accessible,
effective and quality reproductive health services to ensure maternal and child health, in line with the
State's duty to bring to reality the social justice health guarantees of the Constitution,197 and that what
the law only prohibits are those acts or practices, which deprive others of their right to reproductive
health.198 They assert that the assailed law only seeks to guarantee informed choice, which is an
assurance that no one will be compelled to violate his religion against his free will.199
The respondents add that by asserting that only natural family planning should be allowed, the
petitioners are effectively going against the constitutional right to religious freedom, the same right they
invoked to assail the constitutionality of the RH Law.200 In other words, by seeking the declaration that
the RH Law is unconstitutional, the petitioners are asking that the Court recognize only the Catholic
Church's sanctioned natural family planning methods and impose this on the entire citizenry.201
With respect to the duty to refer, the respondents insist that the same does not violate the constitutional
guarantee of religious freedom, it being a carefully balanced compromise between the interests of the
religious objector, on one hand, who is allowed to keep silent but is required to refer -and that of the
citizen who needs access to information and who has the right to expect that the health care professional
in front of her will act professionally. For the respondents, the concession given by the State under Section
7 and 23(a)(3) is sufficient accommodation to the right to freely exercise one's religion without
unnecessarily infringing on the rights of others.202
Whatever burden is placed on the petitioner's religious freedom is minimal as the duty to refer is limited
in duration, location and impact.203
Regarding mandatory family planning seminars under Section 15 , the respondents claim that it is a
reasonable regulation providing an opportunity for would-be couples to have access to information
regarding parenthood, family planning, breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It is argued that those who
object to any information received on account of their attendance in the required seminars are not
compelled to accept information given to them. They are completely free to reject any information they
do not agree with and retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without intervention of the
State.204
For their part, respondents De Venecia et al., dispute the notion that natural family planning is the only
method acceptable to Catholics and the Catholic hierarchy. Citing various studies and surveys on the
matter, they highlight the changing stand of the Catholic Church on contraception throughout the years
and note the general acceptance of the benefits of contraceptives by its followers in planning their
families.
The Church and The State
At the outset, it cannot be denied that we all live in a heterogeneous society. It is made up of people of
diverse ethnic, cultural and religious beliefs and backgrounds. History has shown us that our government,
in law and in practice, has allowed these various religious, cultural, social and racial groups to thrive in a
single society together. It has embraced minority groups and is tolerant towards all - the religious people
of different sects and the non-believers. The undisputed fact is that our people generally believe in a
deity, whatever they conceived Him to be, and to whom they call for guidance and enlightenment in
crafting our fundamental law. Thus, the preamble of the present Constitution reads:
We, the sovereign Filipino people, imploring the aid of Almighty God, in order to build a just and humane
society, and establish a Government that shall embody our ideals and aspirations, promote the common
good, conserve and develop our patrimony, and secure to ourselves and our posterity, the blessings of
independence and democracy under the rule of law and a regime of truth, justice, freedom, love, equality,
and peace, do ordain and promulgate this Constitution.
The Filipino people in "imploring the aid of Almighty God " manifested their spirituality innate in our
nature and consciousness as a people, shaped by tradition and historical experience. As this is embodied
in the preamble, it means that the State recognizes with respect the influence of religion in so far as it
instills into the mind the purest principles of morality.205 Moreover, in recognition of the contributions
of religion to society, the 1935, 1973 and 1987 constitutions contain benevolent and accommodating
provisions towards religions such as tax exemption of church property, salary of religious officers in
government institutions, and optional religious instructions in public schools.
The Framers, however, felt the need to put up a strong barrier so that the State would not encroach into
the affairs of the church, and vice-versa. The principle of separation of Church and State was, thus,
enshrined in Article II, Section 6 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
Section 6. The separation of Church and State shall be inviolable.
Verily, the principle of separation of Church and State is based on mutual respect.1âwphi1 Generally, the
State cannot meddle in the internal affairs of the church, much less question its faith and dogmas or
dictate upon it. It cannot favor one religion and discriminate against another. On the other hand, the
church cannot impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of the citizenry. It cannot
demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it sincerely believes that they are good for the country.
Consistent with the principle that not any one religion should ever be preferred over another, the
Constitution in the above-cited provision utilizes the term "church" in its generic sense, which refers to a
temple, a mosque, an iglesia, or any other house of God which metaphorically symbolizes a religious
organization. Thus, the "Church" means the religious congregations collectively.
Balancing the benefits that religion affords and the need to provide an ample barrier to protect the State
from the pursuit of its secular objectives, the Constitution lays down the following mandate in Article III,
Section 5 and Article VI, Section 29 (2), of the 1987 Constitution:
Section. 5. No law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof. The free exercise and enjoyment of religious profession and worship, without discrimination or
preference, shall forever be allowed. No religious test shall be required for the exercise of civil or political
rights.
Section 29.
xxx.
No public money or property shall be appropriated, applied, paid, or employed, directly or indirectly, for
the use, benefit, or support of any sect, church, denomination, sectarian institution, or system of religion,
or of any priest, preacher, minister, other religious teacher, or dignitary as such, except when such priest,
preacher, minister, or dignitary is assigned to the armed forces, or to any penal institution, or government
orphanage or leprosarium.
In short, the constitutional assurance of religious freedom provides two guarantees: the Establishment
Clause and the Free Exercise Clause.
The establishment clause "principally prohibits the State from sponsoring any religion or favoring any
religion as against other religions. It mandates a strict neutrality in affairs among religious groups."206
Essentially, it prohibits the establishment of a state religion and the use of public resources for the
support or prohibition of a religion.
On the other hand, the basis of the free exercise clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human
conscience.207 Under this part of religious freedom guarantee, the State is prohibited from unduly
interfering with the outside manifestations of one's belief and faith.208 Explaining the concept of
religious freedom, the Court, in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers Union209 wrote:
The constitutional provisions not only prohibits legislation for the support of any religious tenets or the
modes of worship of any sect, thus forestalling compulsion by law of the acceptance of any creed or the
practice of any form of worship (U.S. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 88 L. ed. 1148, 1153), but also assures the free
exercise of one's chosen form of religion within limits of utmost amplitude. It has been said that the
religion clauses of the Constitution are all designed to protect the broadest possible liberty of conscience,
to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs, and to live as he believes he
ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common good. Any legislation whose
effect or purpose is to impede the observance of one or all religions, or to discriminate invidiously
between the religions, is invalid, even though the burden may be characterized as being only indirect.
(Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 10 L.ed.2d 965, 83 S. Ct. 1970) But if the state regulates conduct by
enacting, within its power, a general law which has for its purpose and effect to advance the state's
secular goals, the statute is valid despite its indirect burden on religious observance, unless the state can
accomplish its purpose without imposing such burden. (Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 6 Led. 2d. 563,
81 S. Ct. 144; McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 444-5 and 449).
As expounded in Escritor,
The establishment and free exercise clauses were not designed to serve contradictory purposes. They
have a single goal-to promote freedom of individual religious beliefs and practices. In simplest terms, the
free exercise clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious beliefs with penalties for religious
beliefs and practice, while the establishment clause prohibits government from inhibiting religious belief
with rewards for religious beliefs and practices. In other words, the two religion clauses were intended
to deny government the power to use either the carrot or the stick to influence individual religious beliefs
and practices.210
Corollary to the guarantee of free exercise of one's religion is the principle that the guarantee of religious
freedom is comprised of two parts: the freedom to believe, and the freedom to act on one's belief. The
first part is absolute. As explained in Gerona v. Secretary of Education:211
The realm of belief and creed is infinite and limitless bounded only by one's imagination and thought. So
is the freedom of belief, including religious belief, limitless and without bounds. One may believe in most
anything, however strange, bizarre and unreasonable the same may appear to others, even heretical
when weighed in the scales of orthodoxy or doctrinal standards. But between the freedom of belief and
the exercise of said belief, there is quite a stretch of road to travel.212
The second part however, is limited and subject to the awesome power of the State and can be enjoyed
only with proper regard to the rights of others. It is "subject to regulation where the belief is translated
into external acts that affect the public welfare."213
Legislative Acts and the
Free Exercise Clause
Thus, in case of conflict between the free exercise clause and the State, the Court adheres to the doctrine
of benevolent neutrality. This has been clearly decided by the Court in Estrada v. Escritor, (Escritor)214
where it was stated "that benevolent neutrality-accommodation, whether mandatory or permissive, is
the spirit, intent and framework underlying the Philippine Constitution."215 In the same case, it was
further explained that"
The benevolent neutrality theory believes that with respect to these governmental actions,
accommodation of religion may be allowed, not to promote the government's favored form of religion,
but to allow individuals and groups to exercise their religion without hindrance. "The purpose of
accommodation is to remove a burden on, or facilitate the exercise of, a person's or institution's
religion."216 "What is sought under the theory of accommodation is not a declaration of
unconstitutionality of a facially neutral law, but an exemption from its application or its 'burdensome
effect,' whether by the legislature or the courts."217
In ascertaining the limits of the exercise of religious freedom, the compelling state interest test is
proper.218 Underlying the compelling state interest test is the notion that free exercise is a fundamental
right and that laws burdening it should be subject to strict scrutiny.219 In Escritor, it was written:
Philippine jurisprudence articulates several tests to determine these limits. Beginning with the first case
on the Free Exercise Clause, American Bible Society, the Court mentioned the "clear and present danger"
test but did not employ it. Nevertheless, this test continued to be cited in subsequent cases on religious
liberty. The Gerona case then pronounced that the test of permissibility of religious freedom is whether
it violates the established institutions of society and law. The Victoriano case mentioned the "immediate
and grave danger" test as well as the doctrine that a law of general applicability may burden religious
exercise provided the law is the least restrictive means to accomplish the goal of the law. The case also
used, albeit inappropriately, the "compelling state interest" test. After Victoriano , German went back to
the Gerona rule. Ebralinag then employed the "grave and immediate danger" test and overruled the
Gerona test. The fairly recent case of Iglesia ni Cristo went back to the " clear and present danger" test in
the maiden case of A merican Bible Society. Not surprisingly, all the cases which employed the "clear and
present danger" or "grave and immediate danger" test involved, in one form or another, religious speech
as this test is often used in cases on freedom of expression. On the other hand, the Gerona and German
cases set the rule that religious freedom will not prevail over established institutions of society and law.
Gerona, however, which was the authority cited by German has been overruled by Ebralinag which
employed the "grave and immediate danger" test . Victoriano was the only case that employed the
"compelling state interest" test, but as explained previously, the use of the test was inappropriate to the
facts of the case.
The case at bar does not involve speech as in A merican Bible Society, Ebralinag and Iglesia ni Cristo where
the "clear and present danger" and "grave and immediate danger" tests were appropriate as speech has
easily discernible or immediate effects. The Gerona and German doctrine, aside from having been
overruled, is not congruent with the benevolent neutrality approach, thus not appropriate in this
jurisdiction. Similar to Victoriano, the present case involves purely conduct arising from religious belief.
The "compelling state interest" test is proper where conduct is involved for the whole gamut of human
conduct has different effects on the state's interests: some effects may be immediate and short-term
while others delayed and far-reaching. A test that would protect the interests of the state in preventing
a substantive evil, whether immediate or delayed, is therefore necessary. However, not any interest of
the state would suffice to prevail over the right to religious freedom as this is a fundamental right that
enjoys a preferred position in the hierarchy of rights - "the most inalienable and sacred of all human
rights", in the words of Jefferson. This right is sacred for an invocation of the Free Exercise Clause is an
appeal to a higher sovereignty. The entire constitutional order of limited government is premised upon
an acknowledgment of such higher sovereignty, thus the Filipinos implore the "aid of Almighty God in
order to build a just and humane society and establish a government." As held in Sherbert, only the
gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests can limit this fundamental right. A mere balancing of
interests which balances a right with just a colorable state interest is therefore not appropriate. Instead,
only a compelling interest of the state can prevail over the fundamental right to religious liberty. The test
requires the state to carry a heavy burden, a compelling one, for to do otherwise would allow the state
to batter religion, especially the less powerful ones until they are destroyed. In determining which shall
prevail between the state's interest and religious liberty, reasonableness shall be the guide. The
"compelling state interest" serves the purpose of revering religious liberty while at the same time
affording protection to the paramount interests of the state. This was the test used in Sherbert which
involved conduct, i.e. refusal to work on Saturdays. In the end, the "compelling state interest" test, by
upholding the paramount interests of the state, seeks to protect the very state, without which, religious
liberty will not be preserved. [Emphases in the original. Underlining supplied.]
In the case at bench, it is not within the province of the Court to determine whether the use of
contraceptives or one's participation in the support of modem reproductive health measures is moral
from a religious standpoint or whether the same is right or wrong according to one's dogma or belief. For
the Court has declared that matters dealing with "faith, practice, doctrine, form of worship, ecclesiastical
law, custom and rule of a church ... are unquestionably ecclesiastical matters which are outside the
province of the civil courts."220 The jurisdiction of the Court extends only to public and secular morality.
Whatever pronouncement the Court makes in the case at bench should be understood only in this realm
where it has authority. Stated otherwise, while the Court stands without authority to rule on ecclesiastical
matters, as vanguard of the Constitution, it does have authority to determine whether the RH Law
contravenes the guarantee of religious freedom.
At first blush, it appears that the RH Law recognizes and respects religion and religious beliefs and
convictions. It is replete with assurances the no one can be compelled to violate the tenets of his religion
or defy his religious convictions against his free will. Provisions in the RH Law respecting religious freedom
are the following:
1. The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including their right to equality
and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the right to health
which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to choose and
make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural beliefs, and
the demands of responsible parenthood. [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
2 . The State recognizes marriage as an inviolable social institution and the foundation of the family which
in turn is the foundation of the nation. Pursuant thereto, the State shall defend:
(a) The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands
of responsible parenthood." [Section 2, Declaration of Policy]
3. The State shall promote and provide information and access, without bias, to all methods of family
planning, including effective natural and modern methods which have been proven medically safe, legal,
non-abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research
standards such as those registered and approved by the FDA for the poor and marginalized as identified
through the NHTS-PR and other government measures of identifying marginalization: Provided, That the
State shall also provide funding support to promote modern natural methods of family planning,
especially the Billings Ovulation Method, consistent with the needs of acceptors and their religious
convictions. [Section 3(e), Declaration of Policy]
4. The State shall promote programs that: (1) enable individuals and couples to have the number of
children they desire with due consideration to the health, particularly of women, and the resources
available and affordable to them and in accordance with existing laws, public morals and their religious
convictions. [Section 3CDJ
5. The State shall respect individuals' preferences and choice of family planning methods that are in
accordance with their religious convictions and cultural beliefs, taking into consideration the State's
obligations under various human rights instruments. [Section 3(h)]
6. Active participation by nongovernment organizations (NGOs) , women's and people's organizations,

civil society, faith-based organizations, the religious sector and communities is crucial to ensure that
reproductive health and population and development policies, plans, and programs will address the
priority needs of women, the poor, and the marginalized. [Section 3(i)]
7. Responsible parenthood refers to the will and ability of a parent to respond to the needs and
aspirations of the family and children. It is likewise a shared responsibility between parents to determine
and achieve the desired number of children, spacing and timing of their children according to their own
family life aspirations, taking into account psychological preparedness, health status, sociocultural and
economic concerns consistent with their religious convictions. [Section 4(v)] (Emphases supplied)
While the Constitution prohibits abortion, laws were enacted allowing the use of contraceptives. To some
medical practitioners, however, the whole idea of using contraceptives is an anathema. Consistent with
the principle of benevolent neutrality, their beliefs should be respected.
The Establishment Clause
and Contraceptives
In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or cannot do with the government. They can neither cause the
government to adopt their particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they not cause the
government to restrict other groups. To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a
particular religion and, thus, establishing a state religion.
Consequently, the petitioners are misguided in their supposition that the State cannot enhance its
population control program through the RH Law simply because the promotion of contraceptive use is
contrary to their religious beliefs. Indeed, the State is not precluded to pursue its legitimate secular
objectives without being dictated upon by the policies of any one religion. One cannot refuse to pay his
taxes simply because it will cloud his conscience. The demarcation line between Church and State
demands that one render unto Caesar the things that are Caesar's and unto God the things that are
God's.221
The Free Exercise Clause and the Duty to Refer

lui
While the RH Law, in espousing state policy to promote reproductive health manifestly respects diverse
religious beliefs in line with the Non-Establishment Clause, the same conclusion cannot be reached with
respect to Sections 7, 23 and 24 thereof. The said provisions commonly mandate that a hospital or a
medical practitioner to immediately refer a person seeking health care and services under the law to
another accessible healthcare provider despite their conscientious objections based on religious or
ethical beliefs.
In a situation where the free exercise of religion is allegedly burdened by government legislation or
practice, the compelling state interest test in line with the Court's espousal of the Doctrine of Benevolent
Neutrality in Escritor, finds application. In this case, the conscientious objector's claim to religious
freedom would warrant an exemption from obligations under the RH Law, unless the government
succeeds in demonstrating a more compelling state interest in the accomplishment of an important
secular objective. Necessarily so, the plea of conscientious objectors for exemption from the RH Law
deserves no less than strict scrutiny.
In applying the test, the first inquiry is whether a conscientious objector's right to religious freedom has
been burdened. As in Escritor, there is no doubt that an intense tug-of-war plagues a conscientious
objector. One side coaxes him into obedience to the law and the abandonment of his religious beliefs,
while the other entices him to a clean conscience yet under the pain of penalty. The scenario is an
illustration of the predicament of medical practitioners whose religious beliefs are incongruent with what
the RH Law promotes.
The Court is of the view that the obligation to refer imposed by the RH Law violates the religious belief
and conviction of a conscientious objector. Once the medical practitioner, against his will, refers a patient
seeking information on modem reproductive health products, services, procedures and methods, his
conscience is immediately burdened as he has been compelled to perform an act against his beliefs. As
Commissioner Joaquin A. Bernas (Commissioner Bernas) has written, "at the basis of the free exercise
clause is the respect for the inviolability of the human conscience.222
Though it has been said that the act of referral is an opt-out clause, it is, however, a false compromise
because it makes pro-life health providers complicit in the performance of an act that they find morally
repugnant or offensive. They cannot, in conscience, do indirectly what they cannot do directly. One may
not be the principal, but he is equally guilty if he abets the offensive act by indirect participation.
Moreover, the guarantee of religious freedom is necessarily intertwined with the right to free speech, it
being an externalization of one's thought and conscience. This in turn includes the right to be silent. With
the constitutional guarantee of religious freedom follows the protection that should be afforded to
individuals in communicating their beliefs to others as well as the protection for simply being silent. The
Bill of Rights guarantees the liberty of the individual to utter what is in his mind and the liberty not to
utter what is not in his mind.223 While the RH Law seeks to provide freedom of choice through informed
consent, freedom of choice guarantees the liberty of the religious conscience and prohibits any degree
of compulsion or burden, whether direct or indirect, in the practice of one's religion.224
In case of conflict between the religious beliefs and moral convictions of individuals, on one hand, and
the interest of the State, on the other, to provide access and information on reproductive health
products, services, procedures and methods to enable the people to determine the timing, number and
spacing of the birth of their children, the Court is of the strong view that the religious freedom of health
providers, whether public or private, should be accorded primacy. Accordingly, a conscientious objector
should be exempt from compliance with the mandates of the RH Law. If he would be compelled to act
contrary to his religious belief and conviction, it would be violative of "the principle of non-coercion"
enshrined in the constitutional right to free exercise of religion.
Interestingly, on April 24, 2013, Scotland's Inner House of the Court of Session, found in the case of
Doogan and Wood v. NHS Greater Glasgow and Clyde Health Board,225 that the midwives claiming to be
conscientious objectors under the provisions of Scotland's Abortion Act of 1967, could not be required to
delegate, supervise or support staff on their labor ward who were involved in abortions.226 The Inner
House stated "that if 'participation' were defined according to whether the person was taking part
'directly' or ' indirectly' this would actually mean more complexity and uncertainty."227
While the said case did not cover the act of referral, the applicable principle was the same - they could
not be forced to assist abortions if it would be against their conscience or will.
Institutional Health Providers
The same holds true with respect to non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated
by a religious group and health care service providers. Considering that Section 24 of the RH Law penalizes
such institutions should they fail or refuse to comply with their duty to refer under Section 7 and Section
23(a)(3), the Court deems that it must be struck down for being violative of the freedom of religion. The
same applies to Section 23(a)(l) and (a)(2) in relation to Section 24, considering that in the dissemination
of information regarding programs and services and in the performance of reproductive health
procedures, the religious freedom of health care service providers should be respected.
In the case of Islamic Da'wah Council of the Philippines, Inc. v. Office of the Executive Secretary228 it was
stressed:
Freedom of religion was accorded preferred status by the framers of our fundamental law. And this Court
has consistently affirmed this preferred status, well aware that it is "designed to protect the broadest
possible liberty of conscience, to allow each man to believe as his conscience directs, to profess his beliefs,
and to live as he believes he ought to live, consistent with the liberty of others and with the common
good."10
The Court is not oblivious to the view that penalties provided by law endeavour to ensure compliance.
Without set consequences for either an active violation or mere inaction, a law tends to be toothless and
ineffectual. Nonetheless, when what is bartered for an effective implementation of a law is a
constitutionally-protected right the Court firmly chooses to stamp its disapproval. The punishment of a
healthcare service provider, who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient to another, or who declines to
perform reproductive health procedure on a patient because incompatible religious beliefs, is a clear
inhibition of a constitutional guarantee which the Court cannot allow.
The Implementing Rules and Regulation (RH-IRR)
The last paragraph of Section 5.24 of the RH-IRR reads:
Provided, That skilled health professional such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chiefs of
hospital, head nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically
charged with the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered
as conscientious objectors.
This is discriminatory and violative of the equal protection clause. The conscientious objection clause
should be equally protective of the religious belief of public health officers. There is no perceptible
distinction why they should not be considered exempt from the mandates of the law. The protection
accorded to other conscientious objectors should equally apply to all medical practitioners without
distinction whether they belong to the public or private sector. After all, the freedom to believe is intrinsic
in every individual and the protective robe that guarantees its free exercise is not taken off even if one
acquires employment in the government.
It should be stressed that intellectual liberty occupies a place inferior to none in the hierarchy of human
values. The mind must be free to think what it wills, whether in the secular or religious sphere, to give
expression to its beliefs by oral discourse or through the media and, thus, seek other candid views in
occasions or gatherings or in more permanent aggrupation. Embraced in such concept then are freedom
of religion, freedom of speech, of the press, assembly and petition, and freedom of association.229
The discriminatory provision is void not only because no such exception is stated in the RH Law itself but
also because it is violative of the equal protection clause in the Constitution. Quoting respondent Lagman,
if there is any conflict between the RH-IRR and the RH Law, the law must prevail.
Justice Mendoza:
I'll go to another point. The RH law .. .in your Comment- in-Intervention on page 52, you mentioned RH
Law is replete with provisions in upholding the freedom of religion and respecting religious convictions.
Earlier, you affirmed this with qualifications. Now, you have read, I presumed you have read the IRR-
Implementing Rules and Regulations of the RH Bill?
Congressman Lagman:
Yes, Your Honor, I have read but I have to admit, it's a long IRR and I have not thoroughly dissected the
nuances of the provisions.
Justice Mendoza:
I will read to you one provision. It's Section 5.24. This I cannot find in the RH Law. But in the IRR it says: "
.... skilled health professionals such as provincial, city or municipal health officers, chief of hospitals, head
nurses, supervising midwives, among others, who by virtue of their office are specifically charged with
the duty to implement the provisions of the RPRH Act and these Rules, cannot be considered as
conscientious objectors." Do you agree with this?
Congressman Lagman:
I will have to go over again the provisions, Your Honor.
Justice Mendoza:
In other words, public health officers in contrast to the private practitioners who can be conscientious
objectors, skilled health professionals cannot be considered conscientious objectors. Do you agree with
this? Is this not against the constitutional right to the religious belief?
Congressman Lagman:
Your Honor, if there is any conflict between the IRR and the law, the law must prevail.230
Compelling State Interest
The foregoing discussion then begets the question on whether the respondents, in defense of the subject
provisions, were able to: 1] demonstrate a more compelling state interest to restrain conscientious
objectors in their choice of services to render; and 2] discharge the burden of proof that the obligatory
character of the law is the least intrusive means to achieve the objectives of the law.
Unfortunately, a deep scrutiny of the respondents' submissions proved to be in vain. The OSG was
curiously silent in the establishment of a more compelling state interest that would rationalize the curbing
of a conscientious objector's right not to adhere to an action contrary to his religious convictions. During
the oral arguments, the OSG maintained the same silence and evasion. The Transcripts of the
Stenographic Notes disclose the following:
Justice De Castro:
Let's go back to the duty of the conscientious objector to refer. ..
Senior State Solicitor Hilbay:
Yes, Justice.
Justice De Castro:
... which you are discussing awhile ago with Justice Abad. What is the compelling State interest in
imposing this duty to refer to a conscientious objector which refuses to do so because of his religious
belief?
Ahh, Your Honor, ..
Justice De Castro:
What is the compelling State interest to impose this burden?
In the first place, Your Honor, I don't believe that the standard is a compelling State interest, this is an
ordinary health legislation involving professionals. This is not a free speech matter or a pure free exercise
matter. This is a regulation by the State of the relationship between medical doctors and their
patients.231
Resultantly, the Court finds no compelling state interest which would limit the free exercise clause of the
conscientious objectors, however few in number. Only the prevention of an immediate and grave danger
to the security and welfare of the community can justify the infringement of religious freedom. If the
government fails to show the seriousness and immediacy of the threat, State intrusion is constitutionally
unacceptable.232
Freedom of religion means more than just the freedom to believe. It also means the freedom to act or
not to act according to what one believes. And this freedom is violated when one is compelled to act
against one's belief or is prevented from acting according to one's belief.233
Apparently, in these cases, there is no immediate danger to the life or health of an individual in the
perceived scenario of the subject provisions. After all, a couple who plans the timing, number and spacing
of the birth of their children refers to a future event that is contingent on whether or not the mother
decides to adopt or use the information, product, method or supply given to her or whether she even
decides to become pregnant at all. On the other hand, the burden placed upon those who object to
contraceptive use is immediate and occurs the moment a patient seeks consultation on reproductive
health matters.
Moreover, granting that a compelling interest exists to justify the infringement of the conscientious
objector's religious freedom, the respondents have failed to demonstrate "the gravest abuses,
endangering paramount interests" which could limit or override a person's fundamental right to religious
freedom. Also, the respondents have not presented any government effort exerted to show that the
means it takes to achieve its legitimate state objective is the least intrusive means.234 Other than the
assertion that the act of referring would only be momentary, considering that the act of referral by a
conscientious objector is the very action being contested as violative of religious freedom, it behooves
the respondents to demonstrate that no other means can be undertaken by the State to achieve its
objective without violating the rights of the conscientious objector. The health concerns of women may
still be addressed by other practitioners who may perform reproductive health-related procedures with
open willingness and motivation. Suffice it to say, a person who is forced to perform an act in utter
reluctance deserves the protection of the Court as the last vanguard of constitutional freedoms.
At any rate, there are other secular steps already taken by the Legislature to ensure that the right to
health is protected. Considering other legislations as they stand now, R.A . No. 4 729 or the Contraceptive
Act, R.A. No. 6365 or "The Population Act of the Philippines" and R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as "The
Magna Carta of Women," amply cater to the needs of women in relation to health services and programs.
The pertinent provision of Magna Carta on comprehensive health services and programs for women, in
fact, reads:
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a) Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all times,
provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive, and gender-responsive health services and programs
covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which addresses the major causes of women's mortality
and morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for comprehensive health services, due respect shall be
accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of the spouses to found a family in accordance with
their religious convictions, and the demands of responsible parenthood, and the right of women to
protection from hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal services to address pregnancy and infant health and
nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth sexuality education and health services without prejudice to
the primary right and duty of parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of reproductive tract infections, including sexually transmitted diseases,
HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of reproductive tract cancers like breast and cervical cancers, and other
gynecological conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and children, women and children victims and survivors shall be
provided with comprehensive health services that include psychosocial, therapeutic, medical, and legal
interventions and assistance towards healing, recovery, and empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical norms and
medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention of mental health problems of women and girls. In
addition, healthy lifestyle activities are encouraged and promoted through programs and projects as
strategies in the prevention of diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. - The State shall provide women in all sectors with
appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information and education on all the above-stated aspects
of women's health in government education and training programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth and the development of
moral character and the right of children to be brought up in an atmosphere of morality and rectitude for
the enrichment and strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family planning methods including fertility awareness.
As an afterthought, Asst. Solicitor General Hilbay eventually replied that the compelling state interest was
"Fifteen maternal deaths per day, hundreds of thousands of unintended pregnancies, lives changed, x x
x."235 He, however, failed to substantiate this point by concrete facts and figures from reputable sources.
The undisputed fact, however, is that the World Health Organization reported that the Filipino maternal
mortality rate dropped to 48 percent from 1990 to 2008, 236 although there was still no RH Law at that
time. Despite such revelation, the proponents still insist that such number of maternal deaths constitute
a compelling state interest.
Granting that there are still deficiencies and flaws in the delivery of social healthcare programs for Filipino
women, they could not be solved by a measure that puts an unwarrantable stranglehold on religious
beliefs in exchange for blind conformity.
Exception: Life Threatening Cases
All this notwithstanding, the Court properly recognizes a valid exception set forth in the law. While
generally healthcare service providers cannot be forced to render reproductive health care procedures if
doing it would contravene their religious beliefs, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases
that require the performance of emergency procedures. In these situations, the right to life of the mother
should be given preference, considering that a referral by a medical practitioner would amount to a denial
of service, resulting to unnecessarily placing the life of a mother in grave danger. Thus, during the oral
arguments, Atty. Liban, representing CFC, manifested: "the forced referral clause that we are objecting
on grounds of violation of freedom of religion does not contemplate an emergency."237
In a conflict situation between the life of the mother and the life of a child, the doctor is morally obliged
always to try to save both lives. If, however, it is impossible, the resulting death to one should not be
deliberate. Atty. Noche explained:
Principle of Double-Effect. - May we please remind the principal author of the RH Bill in the House of
Representatives of the principle of double-effect wherein intentional harm on the life of either the
mother of the child is never justified to bring about a "good" effect. In a conflict situation between the
life of the child and the life of the mother, the doctor is morally obliged always to try to save both lives.
However, he can act in favor of one (not necessarily the mother) when it is medically impossible to save
both, provided that no direct harm is intended to the other. If the above principles are observed, the loss
of the child's life or the mother's life is not intentional and, therefore, unavoidable. Hence, the doctor
would not be guilty of abortion or murder. The mother is never pitted against the child because both their
lives are equally valuable.238
Accordingly, if it is necessary to save the life of a mother, procedures endangering the life of the child
may be resorted to even if is against the religious sentiments of the medical practitioner. As quoted
above, whatever burden imposed upon a medical practitioner in this case would have been more than
justified considering the life he would be able to save.
Family Planning Seminars
Anent the requirement imposed under Section 15239 as a condition for the issuance of a marriage license,
the Court finds the same to be a reasonable exercise of police power by the government. A cursory
reading of the assailed provision bares that the religious freedom of the petitioners is not at all violated.
All the law requires is for would-be spouses to attend a seminar on parenthood, family planning
breastfeeding and infant nutrition. It does not even mandate the type of family planning methods to be
included in the seminar, whether they be natural or artificial. As correctly noted by the OSG, those who
receive any information during their attendance in the required seminars are not compelled to accept
the information given to them, are completely free to reject the information they find unacceptable, and
retain the freedom to decide on matters of family life without the intervention of the State.
4-The Family and the Right to Privacy

Petitioner CFC assails the RH Law because Section 23(a) (2) (i) thereof violates the provisions of the
Constitution by intruding into marital privacy and autonomy. It argues that it cultivates disunity and
fosters animosity in the family rather than promote its solidarity and total development.240
The Court cannot but agree.
The 1987 Constitution is replete with provisions strengthening the family as it is the basic social
institution. In fact, one article, Article XV, is devoted entirely to the family.
ARTICLE XV
THE FAMILY
Section 1. The State recognizes the Filipino family as the foundation of the nation. Accordingly, it shall
strengthen its solidarity and actively promote its total development.
Section 2. Marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of the family and shall be
protected by the State.
Section 3. The State shall defend:
The right of spouses to found a family in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of
responsible parenthood;
The right of children to assistance, including proper care and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation and other conditions prejudicial to their development;
The right of the family to a family living wage and income; and
The right of families or family assoc1at1ons to participate in the planning and implementation of policies
and programs that affect them.
In this case, the RH Law, in its not-so-hidden desire to control population growth, contains provisions
which tend to wreck the family as a solid social institution. It bars the husband and/or the father from
participating in the decision making process regarding their common future progeny. It likewise deprives
the parents of their authority over their minor daughter simply because she is already a parent or had
suffered a miscarriage.
The Family and Spousal Consent
Section 23(a) (2) (i) of the RH Law states:
The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall: ...
(2) refuse to perform legal and medically-safe reproductive health procedures on any person of legal age
on the ground of lack of consent or authorization of the following persons in the following instances:
(i) Spousal consent in case of married persons: provided, That in case of disagreement, the decision of
the one undergoing the procedures shall prevail. [Emphasis supplied]
The above provision refers to reproductive health procedures like tubal litigation and vasectomy which,
by their very nature, should require mutual consent and decision between the husband and the wife as
they affect issues intimately related to the founding of a family. Section 3, Art. XV of the Constitution
espouses that the State shall defend the "right of the spouses to found a family." One person cannot
found a family. The right, therefore, is shared by both spouses. In the same Section 3, their right "to
participate in the planning and implementation of policies and programs that affect them " is equally
recognized.
The RH Law cannot be allowed to infringe upon this mutual decision-making. By giving absolute authority
to the spouse who would undergo a procedure, and barring the other spouse from participating in the
decision would drive a wedge between the husband and wife, possibly result in bitter animosity, and
endanger the marriage and the family, all for the sake of reducing the population. This would be a marked
departure from the policy of the State to protect marriage as an inviolable social institution.241
Decision-making involving a reproductive health procedure is a private matter which belongs to the
couple, not just one of them. Any decision they would reach would affect their future as a family because
the size of the family or the number of their children significantly matters. The decision whether or not
to undergo the procedure belongs exclusively to, and shared by, both spouses as one cohesive unit as
they chart their own destiny. It is a constitutionally guaranteed private right. Unless it prejudices the
State, which has not shown any compelling interest, the State should see to it that they chart their destiny
together as one family.
As highlighted by Justice Leonardo-De Castro, Section 19( c) of R.A. No. 9710, otherwise known as the
"Magna Carta for Women," provides that women shall have equal rights in all matters relating to marriage
and family relations, including the joint decision on the number and spacing of their children. Indeed,
responsible parenthood, as Section 3(v) of the RH Law states, is a shared responsibility between parents.
Section 23(a)(2)(i) of the RH Law should not be allowed to betray the constitutional mandate to protect
and strengthen the family by giving to only one spouse the absolute authority to decide whether to
undergo reproductive health procedure.242
The right to chart their own destiny together falls within the protected zone of marital privacy and such
state intervention would encroach into the zones of spousal privacy guaranteed by the Constitution. In
our jurisdiction, the right to privacy was first recognized in Marje v. Mutuc,243 where the Court, speaking
through Chief Justice Fernando, held that "the right to privacy as such is accorded recognition
independently of its identification with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional
protection."244 Marje adopted the ruling of the US Supreme Court in Griswold v. Connecticut,245 where
Justice William O. Douglas wrote:
We deal with a right of privacy older than the Bill of Rights -older than our political parties, older than our
school system. Marriage is a coming together for better or for worse, hopefully enduring, and intimate
to the degree of being sacred. It is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes; a harmony in
living, not political faiths; a bilateral loyalty, not commercial or social projects. Yet it is an association for
as noble a purpose as any involved in our prior decisions.
Ironically, Griswold invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal
offense on the ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right to privacy of married
persons. Nevertheless, it recognized the zone of privacy rightfully enjoyed by couples. Justice Douglas in
Grisworld wrote that "specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations
from those guarantees that help give them life and substance. Various guarantees create zones of
privacy."246
At any rate, in case of conflict between the couple, the courts will decide.
The Family and Parental Consent
Equally deplorable is the debarment of parental consent in cases where the minor, who will be
undergoing a procedure, is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Section 7 of the RH law provides:
SEC. 7. Access to Family Planning. – x x x.
No person shall be denied information and access to family planning services, whether natural or artificial:
Provided, That minors will not be allowed access to modern methods of family planning without written
consent from their parents or guardian/s except when the minor is already a parent or has had a
miscarriage.
There can be no other interpretation of this provision except that when a minor is already a parent or has
had a miscarriage, the parents are excluded from the decision making process of the minor with regard
to family planning. Even if she is not yet emancipated, the parental authority is already cut off just
because there is a need to tame population growth.
It is precisely in such situations when a minor parent needs the comfort, care, advice, and guidance of
her own parents. The State cannot replace her natural mother and father when it comes to providing her
needs and comfort. To say that their consent is no longer relevant is clearly anti-family. It does not
promote unity in the family. It is an affront to the constitutional mandate to protect and strengthen the
family as an inviolable social institution.
More alarmingly, it disregards and disobeys the constitutional mandate that "the natural and primary
right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral
character shall receive the support of the Government."247 In this regard, Commissioner Bernas wrote:
The 1987 provision has added the adjective "primary" to modify the right of parents. It imports the
assertion that the right of parents is superior to that of the State.248 [Emphases supplied]
To insist on a rule that interferes with the right of parents to exercise parental control over their minor-
child or the right of the spouses to mutually decide on matters which very well affect the very purpose of
marriage, that is, the establishment of conjugal and family life, would result in the violation of one's
privacy with respect to his family. It would be dismissive of the unique and strongly-held Filipino tradition
of maintaining close family ties and violative of the recognition that the State affords couples entering
into the special contract of marriage to as one unit in forming the foundation of the family and society.
The State cannot, without a compelling state interest, take over the role of parents in the care and
custody of a minor child, whether or not the latter is already a parent or has had a miscarriage. Only a
compelling state interest can justify a state substitution of their parental authority.
First Exception: Access to Information
Whether with respect to the minor referred to under the exception provided in the second paragraph of
Section 7 or with respect to the consenting spouse under Section 23(a)(2)(i), a distinction must be made.
There must be a differentiation between access to information about family planning services, on one
hand, and access to the reproductive health procedures and modern family planning methods
themselves, on the other. Insofar as access to information is concerned, the Court finds no constitutional
objection to the acquisition of information by the minor referred to under the exception in the second
paragraph of Section 7 that would enable her to take proper care of her own body and that of her unborn
child. After all, Section 12, Article II of the Constitution mandates the State to protect both the life of the
mother as that of the unborn child. Considering that information to enable a person to make informed
decisions is essential in the protection and maintenance of ones' health, access to such information with
respect to reproductive health must be allowed. In this situation, the fear that parents might be deprived
of their parental control is unfounded because they are not prohibited to exercise parental guidance and
control over their minor child and assist her in deciding whether to accept or reject the information
received.
Second Exception: Life Threatening Cases
As in the case of the conscientious objector, an exception must be made in life-threatening cases that
require the performance of emergency procedures. In such cases, the life of the minor who has already
suffered a miscarriage and that of the spouse should not be put at grave risk simply for lack of consent.
It should be emphasized that no person should be denied the appropriate medical care urgently needed
to preserve the primordial right, that is, the right to life.
In this connection, the second sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii)249 should be struck down. By effectively
limiting the requirement of parental consent to "only in elective surgical procedures," it denies the
parents their right of parental authority in cases where what is involved are "non-surgical procedures."
Save for the two exceptions discussed above, and in the case of an abused child as provided in the first
sentence of Section 23(a)(2)(ii), the parents should not be deprived of their constitutional right of
parental authority. To deny them of this right would be an affront to the constitutional mandate to
protect and strengthen the family.
5 - Academic Freedom
It is asserted that Section 14 of the RH Law, in relation to Section 24 thereof, mandating the teaching of
Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education under threat of fine and/or
imprisonment violates the principle of academic freedom . According to the petitioners, these provisions
effectively force educational institutions to teach reproductive health education even if they believe that
the same is not suitable to be taught to their students.250 Citing various studies conducted in the United
States and statistical data gathered in the country, the petitioners aver that the prevalence of
contraceptives has led to an increase of out-of-wedlock births; divorce and breakdown of families; the
acceptance of abortion and euthanasia; the "feminization of poverty"; the aging of society; and
promotion of promiscuity among the youth.251
At this point, suffice it to state that any attack on the validity of Section 14 of the RH Law is premature
because the Department of Education, Culture and Sports has yet to formulate a curriculum on age-
appropriate reproductive health education. One can only speculate on the content, manner and medium
of instruction that will be used to educate the adolescents and whether they will contradict the religious
beliefs of the petitioners and validate their apprehensions. Thus, considering the premature nature of
this particular issue, the Court declines to rule on its constitutionality or validity.
At any rate, Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution provides that the natural and primary right and
duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for civic efficiency and development of moral character shall
receive the support of the Government. Like the 1973 Constitution and the 1935 Constitution, the 1987
Constitution affirms the State recognition of the invaluable role of parents in preparing the youth to
become productive members of society. Notably, it places more importance on the role of parents in the
development of their children by recognizing that said role shall be "primary," that is, that the right of
parents in upbringing the youth is superior to that of the State.252
It is also the inherent right of the State to act as parens patriae to aid parents in the moral development
of the youth. Indeed, the Constitution makes mention of the importance of developing the youth and
their important role in nation building.253 Considering that Section 14 provides not only for the age-
appropriate-reproductive health education, but also for values formation; the development of knowledge
and skills in self-protection against discrimination; sexual abuse and violence against women and children
and other forms of gender based violence and teen pregnancy; physical, social and emotional changes in
adolescents; women's rights and children's rights; responsible teenage behavior; gender and
development; and responsible parenthood, and that Rule 10, Section 11.01 of the RH-IRR and Section 4(t)
of the RH Law itself provides for the teaching of responsible teenage behavior, gender sensitivity and
physical and emotional changes among adolescents - the Court finds that the legal mandate provided
under the assailed provision supplements, rather than supplants, the rights and duties of the parents in
the moral development of their children.
Furthermore, as Section 14 also mandates that the mandatory reproductive health education program
shall be developed in conjunction with parent-teacher-community associations, school officials and other
interest groups, it could very well be said that it will be in line with the religious beliefs of the petitioners.
By imposing such a condition, it becomes apparent that the petitioners' contention that Section 14
violates Article XV, Section 3(1) of the Constitution is without merit.254
While the Court notes the possibility that educators might raise their objection to their participation in
the reproductive health education program provided under Section 14 of the RH Law on the ground that
the same violates their religious beliefs, the Court reserves its judgment should an actual case be filed
before it.
6 - Due Process
The petitioners contend that the RH Law suffers from vagueness and, thus violates the due process clause
of the Constitution. According to them, Section 23 (a)(l) mentions a "private health service provider"
among those who may be held punishable but does not define who is a "private health care service
provider." They argue that confusion further results since Section 7 only makes reference to a "private
health care institution."
The petitioners also point out that Section 7 of the assailed legislation exempts hospitals operated by
religious groups from rendering reproductive health service and modern family planning methods. It is
unclear, however, if these institutions are also exempt from giving reproductive health information under
Section 23(a)(l), or from rendering reproductive health procedures under Section 23(a)(2).
Finally, it is averred that the RH Law punishes the withholding, restricting and providing of incorrect
information, but at the same time fails to define "incorrect information."
The arguments fail to persuade.
A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant
to the Constitution in two respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the
parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled
discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.255
Moreover, in determining whether the words used in a statute are vague, words must not only be taken
in accordance with their plain meaning alone, but also in relation to other parts of the statute. It is a rule
that every part of the statute must be interpreted with reference to the context, that is, every part of it
must be construed together with the other parts and kept subservient to the general intent of the whole
enactment.256
As correctly noted by the OSG, in determining the definition of "private health care service provider,"
reference must be made to Section 4(n) of the RH Law which defines a "public health service provider,"
viz:
(n) Public health care service provider refers to: (1) public health care institution, which is duly licensed
and accredited and devoted primarily to the maintenance and operation of facilities for health
promotion, disease prevention, diagnosis, treatment and care of individuals suffering from illness,
disease, injury, disability or deformity, or in need of obstetrical or other medical and nursing care; (2)
public health care professional, who is a doctor of medicine, a nurse or a midvvife; (3) public health
worker engaged in the delivery of health care services; or (4) barangay health worker who has undergone
training programs under any accredited government and NGO and who voluntarily renders primarily
health care services in the community after having been accredited to function as such by the local health
board in accordance with the guidelines promulgated by the Department of Health (DOH) .
Further, the use of the term "private health care institution" in Section 7 of the law, instead of "private
health care service provider," should not be a cause of confusion for the obvious reason that they are
used synonymously.
The Court need not belabor the issue of whether the right to be exempt from being obligated to render
reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, includes exemption from being
obligated to give reproductive health information and to render reproductive health procedures. Clearly,
subject to the qualifications and exemptions earlier discussed, the right to be exempt from being
obligated to render reproductive health service and modem family planning methods, necessarily
includes exemption from being obligated to give reproductive health information and to render
reproductive health procedures. The terms "service" and "methods" are broad enough to include the
providing of information and the rendering of medical procedures.
The same can be said with respect to the contention that the RH Law punishes health care service
providers who intentionally withhold, restrict and provide incorrect information regarding reproductive
health programs and services. For ready reference, the assailed provision is hereby quoted as follows:
SEC. 23. Prohibited Acts. - The following acts are prohibited:
(a) Any health care service provider, whether public or private, who shall:
(1) Knowingly withhold information or restrict the dissemination thereof, and/ or intentionally provide
incorrect information regarding programs and services on reproductive health including the right to
informed choice and access to a full range of legal, medically-safe, non-abortifacient and effective family
planning methods;
From its plain meaning, the word "incorrect" here denotes failing to agree with a copy or model or with
established rules; inaccurate, faulty; failing to agree with the requirements of duty, morality or propriety;
and failing to coincide with the truth. 257 On the other hand, the word "knowingly" means with
awareness or deliberateness that is intentional.258 Used together in relation to Section 23(a)(l), they
connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as to the nature and effect
of programs and services on reproductive health. Public health and safety demand that health care
service providers give their honest and correct medical information in accordance with what is acceptable
in medical practice. While health care service providers are not barred from expressing their own
personal opinions regarding the programs and services on reproductive health, their right must be
tempered with the need to provide public health and safety. The public deserves no less.
7-Egual Protection
The petitioners also claim that the RH Law violates the equal protection clause under the Constitution as
it discriminates against the poor because it makes them the primary target of the government program
that promotes contraceptive use . They argue that, rather than promoting reproductive health among
the poor, the RH Law introduces contraceptives that would effectively reduce the number of the poor.
Their bases are the various provisions in the RH Law dealing with the poor, especially those mentioned in
the guiding principles259 and definition of terms260 of the law.
They add that the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program imposed by the RH Law renders it unconstitutional.
In Biraogo v. Philippine Truth Commission,261 the Court had the occasion to expound on the concept of
equal protection. Thus:
One of the basic principles on which this government was founded is that of the equality of right which
is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987 Constitution. The equal protection of the laws is embraced
in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair
play. It has been embodied in a separate clause, however, to provide for a more specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
"According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed." It "requires
public bodies and inst itutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner." "The purpose of
the equal protection clause is to secure every person within a state's jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper
execution through the state's duly constituted authorities." "In other words, the concept of equal justice
under the law requires the state to govern impartially, and it may not draw distinctions between
individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective."
The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken.
It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without
distinction. What it simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid
classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to
be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on
substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do
not make for a valid classification."
For a classification to meet the requirements of constitutionality, it must include or embrace all persons
who naturally belong to the class. "The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not similarly treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed. It is not necessary
that the classification be made with absolute symmetry, in the sense that the members of the class should
possess the same characteristics in equal degree. Substantial similarity will suffice; and as long as this is
achieved, all those covered by the classification are to be treated equally. The mere fact that an individual
belonging to a class differs from the other members, as long as that class is substantially distinguishable
from all others, does not justify the non-application of the law to him."
The classification must not be based on existing circumstances only, or so constituted as to preclude
addition to the number included in the class. It must be of such a nature as to embrace all those who may
thereafter be in similar circumstances and conditions. It must not leave out or "underinclude" those that
should otherwise fall into a certain classification. [Emphases supplied; citations excluded]
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government's reproductive health care program
is not a violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution which recognizes the distinct necessity to address the needs of the underprivileged by
providing that they be given priority in addressing the health development of the people. Thus:
Section 11. The State shall adopt an integrated and comprehensive approach to health development
which shall endeavor to make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people
at affordable cost. There shall be priority for the needs of the underprivileged, sick, elderly, disabled,
women, and children. The State shall endeavor to provide free medical care to paupers.
It should be noted that Section 7 of the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are
suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. There is, therefore, no merit to the contention
that the RH Law only seeks to target the poor to reduce their number. While the RH Law admits the use
of contraceptives, it does not, as elucidated above, sanction abortion. As Section 3(1) explains, the
"promotion and/or stabilization of the population growth rate is incidental to the advancement of
reproductive health."
Moreover, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. While the petitioners surmise that the assailed law
seeks to charge couples with the duty to have children only if they would raise them in a truly humane
way, a deeper look into its provisions shows that what the law seeks to do is to simply provide priority to
the poor in the implementation of government programs to promote basic reproductive health care.
With respect to the exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory reproductive health
education program under Section 14, suffice it to state that the mere fact that the children of those who
are less fortunate attend public educational institutions does not amount to substantial distinction
sufficient to annul the assailed provision. On the other hand, substantial distinction rests between public
educational institutions and private educational institutions, particularly because there is a need to
recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with respect to religious
instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
8-Involuntary Servitude
The petitioners also aver that the RH Law is constitutionally infirm as it violates the constitutional
prohibition against involuntary servitude. They posit that Section 17 of the assailed legislation requiring
private and non-government health care service providers to render forty-eight (48) hours of pro bono
reproductive health services, actually amounts to involuntary servitude because it requires medical
practitioners to perform acts against their will.262
The OSG counters that the rendition of pro bono services envisioned in Section 17 can hardly be
considered as forced labor analogous to slavery, as reproductive health care service providers have the
discretion as to the manner and time of giving pro bono services. Moreover, the OSG points out that the
imposition is within the powers of the government, the accreditation of medical practitioners with
PhilHealth being a privilege and not a right.
The point of the OSG is well-taken.
It should first be mentioned that the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that
it is both a power and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the
public welfare. Like the legal profession, the practice of medicine is not a right but a privileged burdened
with conditions as it directly involves the very lives of the people. A fortiori, this power includes the power
of Congress263 to prescribe the qualifications for the practice of professions or trades which affect the
public welfare, the public health, the public morals, and the public safety; and to regulate or control such
professions or trades, even to the point of revoking such right altogether.264
Moreover, as some petitioners put it, the notion of involuntary servitude connotes the presence of force,
threats, intimidation or other similar means of coercion and compulsion.265 A reading of the assailed
provision, however, reveals that it only encourages private and non- government reproductive healthcare
service providers to render pro bono service. Other than non-accreditation with PhilHealth, no penalty is
imposed should they choose to do otherwise. Private and non-government reproductive healthcare
service providers also enjoy the liberty to choose which kind of health service they wish to provide, when,
where and how to provide it or whether to provide it all. Clearly, therefore, no compulsion, force or threat
is made upon them to render pro bono service against their will. While the rendering of such service was
made a prerequisite to accreditation with PhilHealth, the Court does not consider the same to be an
unreasonable burden, but rather, a necessary incentive imposed by Congress in the furtherance of a
perceived legitimate state interest.
Consistent with what the Court had earlier discussed, however, it should be emphasized that
conscientious objectors are exempt from this provision as long as their religious beliefs and convictions
do not allow them to render reproductive health service, pro bona or otherwise.
9-Delegation of Authority to the FDA
The petitioners likewise question the delegation by Congress to the FDA of the power to determine
whether or not a supply or product is to be included in the Essential Drugs List (EDL).266
The Court finds nothing wrong with the delegation. The FDA does not only have the power but also the
competency to evaluate, register and cover health services and methods. It is the only government entity
empowered to render such services and highly proficient to do so. It should be understood that health
services and methods fall under the gamut of terms that are associated with what is ordinarily understood
as "health products."
In this connection, Section 4 of R.A. No. 3 720, as amended by R.A. No. 9711 reads:
SEC. 4. To carry out the provisions of this Act, there is hereby created an office to be called the Food and
Drug Administration (FDA) in the Department of Health (DOH). Said Administration shall be under the
Office of the Secretary and shall have the following functions, powers and duties:
"(a) To administer the effective implementation of this Act and of the rules and regulations issued
pursuant to the same;
"(b) To assume primary jurisdiction in the collection of samples of health products;
"(c) To analyze and inspect health products in connection with the implementation of this Act;
"(d) To establish analytical data to serve as basis for the preparation of health products standards, and to
recommend standards of identity, purity, safety, efficacy, quality and fill of container;
"(e) To issue certificates of compliance with technical requirements to serve as basis for the issuance of
appropriate authorization and spot-check for compliance with regulations regarding operation of
manufacturers, importers, exporters, distributors, wholesalers, drug outlets, and other establishments
and facilities of health products, as determined by the FDA;
"x x x
"(h) To conduct appropriate tests on all applicable health products prior to the issuance of appropriate
authorizations to ensure safety, efficacy, purity, and quality;
"(i) To require all manufacturers, traders, distributors, importers, exporters, wholesalers, retailers,
consumers, and non-consumer users of health products to report to the FDA any incident that reasonably
indicates that said product has caused or contributed to the death, serious illness or serious injury to a
consumer, a patient, or any person;
"(j) To issue cease and desist orders motu propio or upon verified complaint for health products, whether
or not registered with the FDA Provided, That for registered health products, the cease and desist order
is valid for thirty (30) days and may be extended for sixty ( 60) days only after due process has been
observed;
"(k) After due process, to order the ban, recall, and/or withdrawal of any health product found to have
caused death, serious illness or serious injury to a consumer or patient, or is found to be imminently
injurious, unsafe, dangerous, or grossly deceptive, and to require all concerned to implement the risk
management plan which is a requirement for the issuance of the appropriate authorization;
x x x.
As can be gleaned from the above, the functions, powers and duties of the FDA are specific to enable the
agency to carry out the mandates of the law. Being the country's premiere and sole agency that ensures
the safety of food and medicines available to the public, the FDA was equipped with the necessary powers
and functions to make it effective. Pursuant to the principle of necessary implication, the mandate by
Congress to the FDA to ensure public health and safety by permitting only food and medicines that are
safe includes "service" and "methods." From the declared policy of the RH Law, it is clear that Congress
intended that the public be given only those medicines that are proven medically safe, legal, non-
abortifacient, and effective in accordance with scientific and evidence-based medical research standards.
The philosophy behind the permitted delegation was explained in Echagaray v. Secretary of Justice,267
as follows:
The reason is the increasing complexity of the task of the government and the growing inability of the
legislature to cope directly with the many problems demanding its attention. The growth of society has
ramified its activities and created peculiar and sophisticated problems that the legislature cannot be
expected reasonably to comprehend. Specialization even in legislation has become necessary. To many
of the problems attendant upon present day undertakings, the legislature may not have the competence,
let alone the interest and the time, to provide the required direct and efficacious, not to say specific
solutions.
10- Autonomy of Local Governments and the Autonomous Region of Muslim Mindanao (ARMM)
As for the autonomy of local governments, the petitioners claim that the RH Law infringes upon the
powers devolved to local government units (LGUs) under Section 17 of the Local Government Code. Said
Section 17 vested upon the LGUs the duties and functions pertaining to the delivery of basic services and
facilities, as follows:
SECTION 17. Basic Services and Facilities. –
(a) Local government units shall endeavor to be self-reliant and shall continue exercising the powers and
discharging the duties and functions currently vested upon them. They shall also discharge the functions
and responsibilities of national agencies and offices devolved to them pursuant to this Code. Local
government units shall likewise exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and
responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic
services and facilities enumerated herein.
(b) Such basic services and facilities include, but are not limited to, x x x.
While the aforementioned provision charges the LGUs to take on the functions and responsibilities that
have already been devolved upon them from the national agencies on the aspect of providing for basic
services and facilities in their respective jurisdictions, paragraph (c) of the same provision provides a
categorical exception of cases involving nationally-funded projects, facilities, programs and services.268
Thus:
(c) Notwithstanding the provisions of subsection (b) hereof, public works and infrastructure projects and
other facilities, programs and services funded by the National Government under the annual General
Appropriations Act, other special laws, pertinent executive orders, and those wholly or partially funded
from foreign sources, are not covered under this Section, except in those cases where the local
government unit concerned is duly designated as the implementing agency for such projects, facilities,
programs and services. [Emphases supplied]
The essence of this express reservation of power by the national government is that, unless an LGU is
particularly designated as the implementing agency, it has no power over a program for which funding
has been provided by the national government under the annual general appropriations act, even if the
program involves the delivery of basic services within the jurisdiction of the LGU.269 A complete
relinquishment of central government powers on the matter of providing basic facilities and services
cannot be implied as the Local Government Code itself weighs against it.270
In this case, a reading of the RH Law clearly shows that whether it pertains to the establishment of health
care facilities,271 the hiring of skilled health professionals,272 or the training of barangay health
workers,273 it will be the national government that will provide for the funding of its implementation.
Local autonomy is not absolute. The national government still has the say when it comes to national
priority programs which the local government is called upon to implement like the RH Law.
Moreover, from the use of the word "endeavor," the LG Us are merely encouraged to provide these
services. There is nothing in the wording of the law which can be construed as making the availability of
these services mandatory for the LGUs. For said reason, it cannot be said that the RH Law amounts to an
undue encroachment by the national government upon the autonomy enjoyed by the local governments.
The ARMM
The fact that the RH Law does not intrude in the autonomy of local governments can be equally applied
to the ARMM. The RH Law does not infringe upon its autonomy. Moreover, Article III, Sections 6, 10 and
11 of R.A. No. 9054, or the organic act of the ARMM, alluded to by petitioner Tillah to justify the
exemption of the operation of the RH Law in the autonomous region, refer to the policy statements for
the guidance of the regional government. These provisions relied upon by the petitioners simply
delineate the powers that may be exercised by the regional government, which can, in no manner, be
characterized as an abdication by the State of its power to enact legislation that would benefit the general
welfare. After all, despite the veritable autonomy granted the ARMM, the Constitution and the
supporting jurisprudence, as they now stand, reject the notion of imperium et imperio in the relationship
between the national and the regional governments.274 Except for the express and implied limitations
imposed on it by the Constitution, Congress cannot be restricted to exercise its inherent and plenary
power to legislate on all subjects which extends to all matters of general concern or common interest.275
11 - Natural Law
With respect to the argument that the RH Law violates natural law,276 suffice it to say that the Court
does not duly recognize it as a legal basis for upholding or invalidating a law. Our only guidepost is the
Constitution. While every law enacted by man emanated from what is perceived as natural law, the Court
is not obliged to see if a statute, executive issuance or ordinance is in conformity to it. To begin with, it is
not enacted by an acceptable legitimate body. Moreover, natural laws are mere thoughts and notions on
inherent rights espoused by theorists, philosophers and theologists. The jurists of the philosophical school
are interested in the law as an abstraction, rather than in the actual law of the past or present.277 Unless,
a natural right has been transformed into a written law, it cannot serve as a basis to strike down a law. In
Republic v. Sandiganbayan,278 the very case cited by the petitioners, it was explained that the Court is
not duty-bound to examine every law or action and whether it conforms with both the Constitution and
natural law. Rather, natural law is to be used sparingly only in the most peculiar of circumstances involving
rights inherent to man where no law is applicable.279
At any rate, as earlier expounded, the RH Law does not sanction the taking away of life. It does not allow
abortion in any shape or form. It only seeks to enhance the population control program of the
government by providing information and making non-abortifacient contraceptives more readily
available to the public, especially to the poor.
Facts and Fallacies
and the Wisdom of the Law
In general, the Court does not find the RH Law as unconstitutional insofar as it seeks to provide access to
medically-safe, non-abortifacient, effective, legal, affordable, and quality reproductive healthcare
services, methods, devices, and supplies. As earlier pointed out, however, the religious freedom of some
sectors of society cannot be trampled upon in pursuit of what the law hopes to achieve. After all, the
Constitutional safeguard to religious freedom is a recognition that man stands accountable to an
authority higher than the State.
In conformity with the principle of separation of Church and State, one religious group cannot be allowed
to impose its beliefs on the rest of the society. Philippine modem society leaves enough room for diversity
and pluralism. As such, everyone should be tolerant and open-minded so that peace and harmony may
continue to reign as we exist alongside each other.
As healthful as the intention of the RH Law may be, the idea does not escape the Court that what it seeks
to address is the problem of rising poverty and unemployment in the country. Let it be said that the cause
of these perennial issues is not the large population but the unequal distribution of wealth. Even if
population growth is controlled, poverty will remain as long as the country's wealth remains in the hands
of the very few.
At any rate, population control may not be beneficial for the country in the long run. The European and
Asian countries, which embarked on such a program generations ago , are now burdened with ageing
populations. The number of their young workers is dwindling with adverse effects on their economy.
These young workers represent a significant human capital which could have helped them invigorate,
innovate and fuel their economy. These countries are now trying to reverse their programs, but they are
still struggling. For one, Singapore, even with incentives, is failing.
And in this country, the economy is being propped up by remittances from our Overseas Filipino Workers.
This is because we have an ample supply of young able-bodied workers. What would happen if the
country would be weighed down by an ageing population and the fewer younger generation would not
be able to support them? This would be the situation when our total fertility rate would go down below
the replacement level of two (2) children per woman.280
Indeed, at the present, the country has a population problem, but the State should not use coercive
measures (like the penal provisions of the RH Law against conscientious objectors) to solve it.
Nonetheless, the policy of the Court is non-interference in the wisdom of a law.
x x x. But this Court cannot go beyond what the legislature has laid down. Its duty is to say what the law
is as enacted by the lawmaking body. That is not the same as saying what the law should be or what is
the correct rule in a given set of circumstances. It is not the province of the judiciary to look into the
wisdom of the law nor to question the policies adopted by the legislative branch. Nor is it the business of
this Tribunal to remedy every unjust situation that may arise from the application of a particular law. It is
for the legislature to enact remedial legislation if that would be necessary in the premises. But as always,
with apt judicial caution and cold neutrality, the Court must carry out the delicate function of interpreting
the law, guided by the Constitution and existing legislation and mindful of settled jurisprudence. The
Court's function is therefore limited, and accordingly, must confine itself to the judicial task of saying
what the law is, as enacted by the lawmaking body.281
Be that as it may, it bears reiterating that the RH Law is a mere compilation and enhancement of the prior
existing contraceptive and reproductive health laws, but with coercive measures. Even if the Court
decrees the RH Law as entirely unconstitutional, there will still be the Population Act (R.A. No. 6365), the
Contraceptive Act (R.A. No. 4729) and the reproductive health for women or The Magna Carta of Women
(R.A. No. 9710), sans the coercive provisions of the assailed legislation. All the same, the principle of "no-
abortion" and "non-coercion" in the adoption of any family planning method should be maintained.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are PARTIALLY GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as
NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the following provisions which are declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health
facilities and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to
refer patients, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
another health facility which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have
suffered a miscarriage access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their
parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information
regarding programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to
undergo reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement
of parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof,
insofar as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in
an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care
service provider within the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her
religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act
that hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious
beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier "primarily" in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening
Section 4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
The Status Quo Ante Order issued by the Court on March 19, 2013 as extended by its Order, dated July
16, 2013 , is hereby LIFTED, insofar as the provisions of R.A. No. 10354 which have been herein declared
as constitutional.
SO ORDERED.
JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice
10. G.R. No. L-14078, March 7, 1919
RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes), plaintiffs, vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO, defendant.
D. R. Williams & Filemon Sotto for plaintiff. Office of the Solicitor-General Paredes for defendant.
MALCOLM, J.:
In one of the cases which denote a landmark in American Constitutional History (Worcester vs. Georgia
[1832], 6 Pet., 515), Chief Justice Marshall, the first luminary of American jurisprudence, began his opinion
(relating to the status of an Indian) with words which, with a slight change in phraseology, can be made
to introduce the present opinion — This cause, in every point of view in which it can be placed, is of the
deepest interest. The legislative power of state, the controlling power of the constitution and laws, the
rights if they have any, the political existence of a people, the personal liberty of a citizen, are all involved
in the subject now to be considered.
To imitate still further the opinion of the Chief Justice, we adopt his outline and proceed first, to introduce
the facts and the issues, next to give a history of the so called "non-Christians," next to compare the status
of the "non-Christians" with that of the American Indians, and, lastly, to resolve the constitutional
questions presented.
I. INTRODUCTION.
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro.
It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of
that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the
reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under
the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away from the reservation.
The return of the Solicitor-General alleges:
1. That on February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which is as
follows:
The provincial governor, Hon. Juan Morente, Jr., presented the following resolution:
"Whereas several attempts and schemes have been made for the advancement of the non-
Christian people of Mindoro, which were all a failure,
"Whereas it has been found out and proved that unless some other measure is taken for the
Mangyan work of this province, no successful result will be obtained toward educating these
people.
"Whereas it is deemed necessary to oblige them to live in one place in order to make a
permanent settlement,
"Whereas the provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian inhabitants are
found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order,
to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to
be selected by him and approved by the provincial board.
"Whereas the provincial governor is of the opinion that the sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is
a place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on, Now, therefore be it
"Resolved, that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of public land
in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of
Mangyanes in Mindoro subject to the approval of the Honorable Secretary of the Interior,
and
"Resolved further, That Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing
that said homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor."
2. That said resolution No. 25 (series 1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro was approved by the
Secretary of the Interior of February 21, 1917.
3. That on December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2 which
says:
"Whereas the provincial board, by Resolution No. 25, current series, has selected a site in the
sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
"Whereas said resolution has been duly approved by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior,
on February 21, 1917.
"Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the provisions
of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all the Mangyans in the
townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in the
districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
"Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned
not exceeding sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code."
4. That the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro copied in paragraph 1 and the executive
order of the governor of the same province copied in paragraph 3, were necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
5. That Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of
Tigbao and are liable to be punished in accordance with section 2759 of Act No. 2711.
6. That the undersigned has no information that Doroteo Dabalos is being detained by the sheriff of
Mindoro but if he is so detained it must be by virtue of the provisions of articles Nos. 2145 and 2759
of Act No. 2711.
It thus appears that the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake Naujan, selected
by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board. The action was taken in accordance
with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917, and was duly approved by the Secretary of the
Interior as required by said action. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the
Administrative Code. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon
to decide.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 reads as follows:
SEC. 2145. Establishment of non-Christians upon sites selected by provincial governor. — With the
prior approval of the Department Head, the provincial governor of any province in which non-
Christian inhabitants are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest
of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public
lands to be selected by him and approved by the provincial board. In connection with the above-
quoted provisions, there should be noted section 2759 of the same Code, which read as follows:
SEC. 2759. Refusal of a non-Christian to take up appointed habitation. — Any non-Christian who shall
refuse to comply with the directions lawfully given by a provincial governor, pursuant to section two
thousand one hundred and forty-five of this Code, to take up habitation upon a site designated by
said governor shall upon conviction be imprisoned for a period not exceeding sixty days.
The substance of what is now found in said section 2145 is not new to Philippine law. The genealogical
tree of this section, if we may be permitted to use such terminology, would read: Section 2077,
Administrative Code of 1916; section 62, Act No. 1397; section 2 of various special provincial laws, notably
of Act No. 547, specifically relating to the Manguianes; section 69, Act No. 387.
Section 2145 and its antecedent laws make use of the term "non-Christians." This word, as will later be
disclosed, is also found in varying forms in other laws of the Philippine Islands. In order to put the phrase
in its proper category, and in order to understand the policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands
with reference to the uncivilized elements of the Islands, it is well first of all to set down a skeleton history
of the attitude assumed by the authorities towards these "non-Christians," with particular regard for the
legislation on the subject.
II. HISTORY.
A. BEFORE ACQUISITION OF THE PHILIPPINE BY THE UNITED STATES.
The most important of the laws of the Indies having reference to the subject at hand are compiled in
Book VI, Title III, in the following language.
LAW I.
The Emperor Charles and the Prince, the governor, at Cigales, on March 21, 1551. Philip II at Toledo,
on February 19, 1560. In the forest of Segovia on September 13, 1565. In the Escorial on November
10, 1568. Ordinance 149 of the poblaciones of 1573. In San Lorenzo, on May 20, 1578,
THAT THE "INDIOS" BE REDUCED INTO "POBLACIONES" (COMMUNITIES).
In order that the indios may be instructed in the Sacred Catholic Faith and the evangelical law, and in
order that they may forget the blunders of their ancient rites and ceremonies to the end that they
may live in harmony and in a civilized manner, it has always been endeavored, with great care and
special attention, to use all the means most convenient to the attainment of these purposes. To carry
out this work with success, our Council of the Indies and other religious persons met at various times;
the prelates of new Spain assembled by order of Emperor Charles V of glorious memory in the year
one thousand five hundred and forty-six — all of which meetings were actuated with a desire to serve
God an our Kingdom. At these meetings it was resolved that indios be made to live in communities,
and not to live in places divided and separated from one another by sierras and mountains, wherein
they are deprived of all spiritual and temporal benefits and wherein they cannot profit from the aid
of our ministers and from that which gives rise to those human necessities which men are obliged to
give one another. Having realized that convenience of this resolution, our kings, our predecessors, by
different orders, have entrusted and ordered the viceroys, presidents, and governors to execute with
great care and moderation the concentration of the indios into reducciones; and to deal with their
doctrine with such forbearance and gentleness, without causing inconveniences, so that those who
would not presently settle and who would see the good treatment and the protection of those
already in settlements would, of their own accord, present themselves, and it is ordained that they
be not required to pay taxes more than what is ordered. Because the above has been executed in the
greater part of our Indies, we hereby order and decree that the same be complied with in all the
remaining parts of the Indies, and the encomederos shall entreat compliance thereof in the manner
and form prescribed by the laws of this title.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW VIII.
Philip II at the Pardo, on December 1, 1573. Philip III at Madrid, October 10, 1618.
THE "REDUCCIONES" BE MADE IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE CONDITIONS OF THIS LAW.
The places wherein the pueblos and reducciones shall be formed should have the facilities of waters,
lands, and mountains, ingress and egress, husbandry and passageway of one league long, wherein
the indios can have their live stock that they may not be mixed with those of the Spaniards.
LAW IX.
Philip II at Toledo, on February 19, 1956.
THAT THE "INDIOS" IN "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT DEPRIVED OF THE LANDS PREVIOUSLY HELD BY THEM.
With more good-will and promptness, the indios shall be concentrated in reducciones. Provided they
shall not be deprived of the lands and granaries which they may have in the places left by them. We
hereby order that no change shall be made in this respect, and that they be allowed to retain the
lands held by them previously so that they may cultivate them and profit therefrom.
xxx xxx xxx
LAW XIII.
THE SAME AS ABOVE.
THAT THE "REDUCCIONES" BE NOT REMOVED WITHOUT ORDER OF THE KING, VICEROY, OR COURT.
No governor, or magistrate, or alcalde mayor, or any other court, has the right to alter or to remove
the pueblos or the reducciones once constituted and founded, without our express order or that of
the viceroy, president, or the royal district court, provided, however, that the encomenderos, priests,
or indios request such a change or consent to it by offering or giving information to that end. And,
because these claims are often made for private interests and not for those of the indios, we hereby
order that this law be always complied with, otherwise the change will be considered fraudulently
obtained. The penalty of one thousand pesos shall be imposed upon the judge or encomendero who
should violate this law.
LAW XV.
Philip III at Madrid, on October 10, 1618.
THAT THERE BE MAYORS AND ALDERMEN IN THE "REDUCTIONES," WHO SHALL BE "INDIOS."
We order that in each town and reduccion there be a mayor, who should be an indio of the same
reduccion; if there be more than eighty houses, there should be two mayors and two aldermen, also
indios; and, even if the town be a big one, there should, nevertheless, be more than two mayors and
four aldermen, If there be less than eighty indios but not less than forty, there should be not more
than one mayor and one alderman, who should annually elect nine others, in the presence of the
priests , as is the practice in town inhabited by Spaniards and indios.
LAW XXI.
Philip II, in Madrid, On May 2, 1563, and on November 25, 1578. At Tomar, on May 8, 1581. At Madrid,
on January 10, 1589. Philip III, at Todesillas, on July 12, 1600. Philip IV, at Madrid, on October 1 and
December 17, 1646. For this law and the one following, see Law I, Tit. 4, Book 7.
THAT IN THE TOWNS OF THE "INDIOS," THERE SHALL LIVE NO SPANIARDS, NEGROES, "MESTIZOS,"
AND MULATTOES.
We hereby prohibit and forbid Spaniards, negroes, mulattores, or mestizos to live in the reducciones
and towns of the indios, because it has been found that some Spaniards who deal, trade, live, and
associate with the indios are men of troublesome nature, of dirty ways of living; robbers, gamblers,
and vicious and useless men; and, to avoid the wrongs done them, the indios would leave their towns
and provinces; and the negroes, mestizos, and mulattoes, besides maltreating them and utilizing their
services, contaminate them with their bad customs, idleness, and also some of their blunders and
vices which may corrupt and pervert the goal which we desire to reach with regard to their salvation,
increase, and tranquility. We hereby order the imposition of grave penalties upon the commission of
the acts above-mentioned which should not be tolerated in the towns, and that the viceroys,
presidents, governors, and courts take great care in executing the law within their powers and avail
themselves of the cooperation of the ministers who are truly honest. As regards the mestizos and
Indian and Chinese half-breeds (zambaigos), who are children of indias and born among them, and
who are to inherit their houses and haciendas, they shall not be affected by this law, it appearing to
be a harsh thing to separate them from their parents. (Law of the Indies, vol. 2, pp. 228, 229, 230,
231.)
A clear exposition of the purposes of the Spanish government, in its efforts to improve the condition of
the less advanced inhabitants of the Islands by concentrating them in "reducciones," is found in the
Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippine Islands of January 14, 1881, reading as follows:
It is a legal principle as well as a national right that every inhabitant of a territory recognized as an
integral part of a nation should respect and obey the laws in force therein; while, on other hand, it is
the duty to conscience and to humanity for all governments to civilize those backward races that
might exist in the nation, and which living in the obscurity of ignorance, lack of all the nations which
enable them to grasp the moral and material advantages that may be acquired in those towns under
the protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws.
It is equally highly depressive to our national honor to tolerate any longer the separation and isolation
of the non-Christian races from the social life of the civilized and Christian towns; to allow any longer
the commission of depredations, precisely in the Island of Luzon wherein is located the seat of the
representative of the Government of the metropolis.
It is but just to admit the fact that all the governments have occupied themselves with this most
important question, and that much has been heretofore accomplished with the help and self-denial
of the missionary fathers who have even sacrificed their lives to the end that those degenerate races
might be brought to the principles of Christianity, but the means and the preaching employed to
allure them have been insufficient to complete the work undertaken. Neither have the punishments
imposed been sufficient in certain cases and in those which have not been guarded against, thus
giving and customs of isolation.
As it is impossible to consent to the continuation of such a lamentable state of things, taking into
account the prestige which the country demands and the inevitable duty which every government
has in enforcing respect and obedience to the national laws on the part of all who reside within the
territory under its control, I have proceeded in the premises by giving the most careful study of this
serious question which involves important interests for civilization, from the moral and material as
well as the political standpoints. After hearing the illustrious opinions of all the local authorities,
ecclesiastics, and missionaries of the provinces of Northern Luzon, and also after finding the
unanimous conformity of the meeting held with the Archbishop of Manila, the Bishops of Jaro and
Cebu, and the provincial prelates of the orders of the Dominicans, Agustinians, Recoletos,
Franciscans, and Jesuits as also of the meeting of the Council of Authorities, held for the object so
indicated, I have arrived at an intimate conviction of the inevitable necessity of proceeding in a
practical manner for the submission of the said pagan and isolated races, as well as of the manner
and the only form of accomplishing such a task.
For the reasons above stated and for the purpose of carrying out these objects, I hereby promulgate
the following:
DECREE.
1. All the indian inhabitants (indios) of the Islands of Luzon are, from this date, to be governed by the
common law, save those exceptions prescribed in this decree which are bases upon the differences
of instructions, of the customs, and of the necessities of the different pagan races which occupy a
part of its territory.
2. The diverse rules which should be promulgated for each of these races — which may be divided
into three classes; one, which comprises those which live isolated and roaming about without forming
a town nor a home; another, made up of those subdued pagans who have not as yet entered
completely the social life; and the third, of those mountain and rebellious pagans — shall be
published in their respective dialects, and the officials, priests, and missionaries of the provinces
wherein they are found are hereby entrusted in the work of having these races learn these rules.
These rules shall have executive character, beginning with the first day of next April, and, as to their
compliance, they must be observed in the manner prescribed below.
3. The provincial authorities in conjunction with the priests shall proceed, from now on, with all the
means which their zeal may suggest to them, to the taking of the census of the inhabitants of the
towns or settlement already subdued, and shall adopt the necessary regulations for the appointment
of local authorities, if there be none as yet; for the construction of courts and schools, and for the
opening or fixing up of means of communication, endeavoring, as regards the administrative
organization of the said towns or settlements, that this be finished before the first day of next July,
so that at the beginning of the fiscal year they shall have the same rights and obligations which affect
the remaining towns of the archipelago, with the only exception that in the first two years they shall
not be obliged to render personal services other than those previously indicated.
4. So long as these subdued towns or settlements are located infertile lands appropriate for
cultivation, the inhabitants thereof shall not be obliged to move their dwelling-houses; and only in
case of absolute necessity shall a new residence be fixed for them, choosing for this purpose the place
most convenient for them and which prejudices the least their interest; and, in either of these cases,
an effort must be made to establish their homes with the reach of the sound of the bell.
5. For the protection and defense of these new towns, there shall be established an armed force
composed precisely of native Christian, the organization and service of which shall be determined in
a regulations based upon that of the abolished Tercios de Policia (division of the Guardia Civil).
6. The authorities shall see to it that the inhabitants of the new towns understand all the rights and
duties affecting them and the liberty which they have as to where and now they shall till their lands
and sell the products thereof, with the only exception of the tobacco which shall be bought by the
Hacienda at the same price and conditions allowed other producers, and with the prohibition against
these new towns as well as the others from engaging in commerce of any other transaction with the
rebellious indios, the violation of which shall be punished with deportation.
7. In order to properly carry out this express prohibition, the limits of the territory of the rebellious
indios shall be fixed; and whoever should go beyond the said limits shall be detained and assigned
governmentally wherever convenient.
8. For the purpose of assisting in the conversion of the pagans into the fraternity of the Catholic
Church, all by this fact along be exempt for eight years from rendering personal labor.
9. The authorities shall offer in the name of the State to the races not subdued (aetas and mountains
igorrots) the following advantages in returns for their voluntary submission: to live in towns; unity
among their families; concession of good lands and the right to cultivate them in the manner they
wish and in the way them deem most productive; support during a year, and clothes upon effecting
submission; respect for their habits and customs in so far as the same are not opposed to natural law;
freedom to decide of their own accord as to whether they want to be Christians or not; the
establishment of missions and families of recognized honesty who shall teach, direct, protect, and
give them security and trust them; the purchase or facility of the sale of their harvests; the exemption
from contributions and tributes for ten years and from the quintas (a kind of tax) for twenty years;
and lastly, that those who are governed by the local authorities as the ones who elect such officials
under the direct charge of the authorities of the province or district.
10. The races indicated in the preceding article, who voluntarily admit the advantages offered, shall,
in return, have the obligation of constituting their new towns, of constructing their town hall, schools,
and country roads which place them in communication with one another and with the Christians;
provided, the location of these towns be distant from their actual residences, when the latter do not
have the good conditions of location and cultivations, and provided further the putting of families in
a place so selected by them be authorized in the towns already constituted.
11. The armed force shall proceed to the prosecution and punishment of the tribes, that, disregarding
the peace, protection, and advantages offered them, continue in their rebellious attitude on the first
of next April, committing from now on the crimes and vexations against the Christian towns; and for
the this purposes, the Captain General's Office shall proceed with the organization of the divisions of
the Army which, in conjunction with the rural guards (cuadrilleros), shall have to enter the territory
of such tribes. On the expiration of the term, they shall destroy their dwelling-houses, labors, and
implements, and confiscate their products and cattle. Such a punishment shall necessarily be
repeated twice a year, and for this purpose the military headquarters shall immediately order a
detachment of the military staff to study the zones where such operations shall take place and
everything conducive to the successful accomplishment of the same.
12. The chiefs of provinces, priests, and missionaries, local authorities, and other subordinates to my
authority, civil as well as military authorities, shall give the most effective aid and cooperation to the
said forces in all that is within the attributes and the scope of the authority of each.
13. With respect to the reduccion of the pagan races found in some of the provinces in the southern
part of the Archipelago, which I intend to visit, the preceding provisions shall conveniently be applied
to them.
14. There shall be created, under my presidency as Governor-General, Vice-Royal Patron, a council
or permanent commission which shall attend to and decide all the questions relative to the
application of the foregoing regulations that may be brought to it for consultations by the chiefs of
provinces and priests and missionaries.
15. The secondary provisions which may be necessary, as a complement to the foregoing, in bringing
about due compliance with this decree, shall be promulgated by the respective official centers within
their respective jurisdictions. (Gaceta de Manila, No. 15) (Diccionario de la Administracion, vol. 7, pp.
128-134.)
B. AFTER ACQUISITON OF THE PHILIPPINES BY THE UNITED STATES.
Ever since the acquisition of the Philippine Islands by the United States, the question as to the best
method for dealing with the primitive inhabitants has been a perplexing one.
1. Organic law.
The first order of an organic character after the inauguration of the American Government in the
Philippines was President McKinley's Instructions to the Commission of April 7, 1900, later expressly
approved and ratified by section 1 of the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902. Portions of
these instructions have remained undisturbed by subsequent congressional legislation. One paragraph
of particular interest should here be quoted, namely:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government and under which many of these tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
governments should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.
Next comes the Philippine Bill, the Act of Congress of July 1, 1902, in the nature of an Organic Act for the
Philippines. The purpose of section 7 of the Philippine Bill was to provide for a legislative body and, with
this end in view, to name the prerequisites for the organization of the Philippine Assembly. The Philippine
Legislature, composed of the Philippine Commission and the Philippine Assembly, was to have jurisdiction
over the Christian portion of the Islands. The Philippine Commission was to retain exclusive jurisdiction
of that part of said Islands inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
The latest Act of Congress, nearest to a Constitution for the Philippines, is the Act of Congress of August
29, 1916, commonly known as the Jones Law. This transferred the exclusive legislative jurisdiction and
authority theretofore exercised by the Philippine Commission, to the Philippine Legislature (sec. 12). It
divided the Philippine Islands into twelve senatorial districts, the twelfth district to be composed of the
Mountain Province, Baguio, Nueva Vizcaya, and the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The Governor-
General of the Philippine Islands was authorized to appoint senators and representatives for the territory
which, at the time of the passage of the Jones Law, was not represented in the Philippine Assembly, that
is, for the twelfth district (sec. 16). The law established a bureau to be known as the "Bureau of non-
Christian Tribes" which shall have general supervision over the public affairs of the inhabitants which are
represented in the Legislature by appointed senators and representatives (sec. 22).
Philippine organic law may, therefore, be said to recognize a dividing line between the territory not
inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes, and the territory which s inhabited by Moros or other
non-Christian tribes.
2. Statute law.
Local governments in the Philippines have been provided for by various acts of the Philippine Commission
and Legislature. The most notable are Acts Nos. 48 and 49 concerning the Province of Benguet and the
Igorots; Act NO. 82, the Municipal Code; Act no. 83, the Provincial Government Act; Act No. 183, the
Charter of the city of Manila; Act No. 7887, providing for the organization and government of the Moro
Province; Act No. 1396, the Special Provincial Government Act; Act No. 1397, the Township Government
Act; Act No. 1667, relating to the organization of settlements; Act No. 1963, the Baguio CharTer; and Act
No. 2408, the Organic Act of the Department of Mindanao and Sulu. The major portion of these laws have
been carried forward into the Administrative Codes of 1916 and 1917.
Of more particular interest are certain special laws concerning the government of the primitive peoples.
Beginning with Act No. 387, sections 68-71, enacted on April 9, 1902, by the United States Philippine
Commission, having reference to the Province of Nueva Vizcaya, Acts Nos. 411, 422, 445, 500, 547, 548,
549, 550, 579, 753, 855, 1113, 1145, 1268, 1306 were enacted for the provinces of Abra, Antique, Bataan,
Ilocos Norte, Ilocos Sur, Isabela, Lepanto-Bontoc, Mindoro, Misamis, Nueva Vizcaya, Pangasinan, Paragua
(Palawan), Tarlac, Tayabas, and Zambales. As an example of these laws, because referring to the
Manguianes, we insert Act No. 547:
No. 547. — AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ESTABLISHMENT OF LOCAL CIVIL GOVERNMENTS FOR THE
MANGUIANES IN THE PROVINCE OF MINDORO.
By authority of the United States, be it enacted by the Philippine Commission, that:
SECTION 1. Whereas the Manguianes of the Provinces of Mindoro have not progressed sufficiently in
civilization to make it practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government, the
provincial governor is authorized, subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, in dealing
with these Manguianes to appoint officers from among them, to fix their designations and badges of
office, and to prescribe their powers and duties: Provided, That the powers and duties thus prescribed
shall not be in excess of those conferred upon township officers by Act Numbered Three hundred
and eighty-seven entitled "An Act providing for the establishment of local civil Governments in the
townships and settlements of Nueva Vizcaya."
SEC. 2. Subject to the approval of the Secretary of the Interior, the provincial governor is further
authorized, when he deems such a course necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such
Manguianes to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board. Manguianes who refuse to comply with such directions shall upon
conviction be imprisonment for a period not exceeding sixty days.
SEC. 3. The constant aim of the governor shall be to aid the Manguianes of his province to acquire
the knowledge and experience necessary for successful local popular government, and his
supervision and control over them shall be exercised to this end, and to the end that law and order
and individual freedom shall be maintained.
SEC. 4. When in the opinion of the provincial board of Mindoro any settlement of Manguianes has
advanced sufficiently to make such a course practicable, it may be organized under the provisions of
sections one to sixty-seven, inclusive, of Act Numbered three hundred and eighty-seven, as a
township, and the geographical limits of such township shall be fixed by the provincial board.
SEC. 5. The public good requiring the speedy enactment of this bill, the passage of the same is hereby
expedited in accordance with section two of 'An Act prescribing the order of procedure by the
Commission in the enactment of laws,' passed September twenty-sixth, nineteen hundred.
SEC. 6. This Act shall take effect on its passage.
Enacted, December 4, 1902.
All of these special laws, with the exception of Act No. 1306, were repealed by Act Nos. 1396 and 1397.
The last named Act incorporated and embodied the provisions in general language. In turn, Act No. 1397
was repealed by the Administrative Code of 1916. The two Administrative Codes retained the provisions
in question.
These different laws, if they mean anything, denote an anxious regard for the welfare of the non-Christian
inhabitants of the Philippines and a settled and consistent practice with reference to the methods to be
followed for their advancement.
C. TERMINOLOGY.
The terms made use of by these laws, organic and statutory, are found in varying forms.
"Uncivilized tribes" is the denomination in President McKinley's instruction to the Commission.
The most commonly accepted usage has sanctioned the term "non-Christian tribes." These words are to
be found in section 7 of the Philippine Bill and in section 22 of the Jones Law. They are also to be found
in Act No. 253 of the Philippines Commission, establishing a Bureau of non-Christian Tribes and in Act No.
2674 of the Philippine Legislature, carried forward into sections 701-705 of the Administrative Code of
1917, reestablishing this Bureau. Among other laws which contain the phrase, there can be mentioned
Acts Nos. 127, 128, 387, 547, 548, 549, 550, 1397, 1639, and 2551.
"Non-Christian people," "non-Christian inhabitants," and "non-Christian Filipinos" have been the
favorite nomenclature, in lieu of the unpopular word "tribes," since the coming into being of a
Filipinized legislature. These terms can be found in sections 2076, 2077, 2390, 2394, Administrative
Code of 1916; sections 701-705, 2145, 2422, 2426, Administrative Code of 1917; and in Acts Nos.
2404, 2435, 2444, 2674 of the Philippine Legislatures, as well as in Act No. 1667 of the Philippine
Commission.
The Administrative Code specifically provides that the term "non-Christian" shall include
Mohammedans and pagans. (Sec. 2576, Administrative Code of 1917; sec. 2561, Administrative Code
of 1916, taken from Act No. 2408, sec. 3.)
D. MEANING OF TERM "NON-CHRISTIAN."
If we were to follow the literal meaning of the word "non-Christian," it would of course result in giving to
it a religious signification. Obviously, Christian would be those who profess the Christian religion, and
non-Christians, would be those who do not profess the Christian religion. In partial corroboration of this
view, there could also be cited section 2576 of the last Administrative Code and certain well-known
authorities, as Zuniga, "Estadismo de las Islas Filipinas," Professor Ferdinand Blumentritt, "Philippine
Tribes and Languages," and Dr. N. M. Saleeby, "The Origin of Malayan Filipinos." (See Blair & Robertson,
"The Philippine Islands," 1493-1898, vol. III, p. 300, note; Craig-Benitez, "Philippine Progress prior to
1898," vol. I. p. 107.)
Not content with the apparent definition of the word, we shall investigate further to ascertain what is its
true meaning.
In one sense, the word can have a geographical signification. This is plainly to be seen by the provisions
of many laws. Thus, according to the Philippine Bill, the authority of the Philippine Assembly was
recognized in the "territory" of the Islands not inhabited by Moros or other non-Christian tribes. Again,
the Jones Law confers similar recognition in the authorization of the twelfth senatorial district for the
"territory not now represented in the Philippine Assembly." The Philippines Legislature has, time and
again, adopted acts making certain other acts applicable to that "part" of the Philippine Islands inhabited
by Moros or other non-Christian tribes.
Section 2145, is found in article XII of the Provincial Law of the Administrative Code. The first section of
this article, preceding section 2145, makes the provisions of the article applicable only in specially
organized provinces. The specially organized provinces are the Mountain Province, Nueva Vizcaya,
Mindoro, Batanes, and Palawan. These are the provinces to which the Philippine Legislature has never
seen fit to give all the powers of local self-government. They do not, however, exactly coincide with the
portion of the Philippines which is not granted popular representation. Nevertheless, it is still a
geographical description.
It is well-known that within the specially organized provinces, there live persons some of whom are
Christians and some of whom are not Christians. In fact, the law specifically recognizes this. ( Sec. 2422,
Administrative Code of 1917, etc.)
If the religious conception is not satisfactory, so against the geographical conception is likewise
inadequate. The reason is that the motive of the law relates not to a particular people, because of their
religion, or to a particular province because of its location, but the whole intent of the law is predicated
on the civilization or lack of civilization of the inhabitants.
At most, "non-Christian" is an awkward and unsatisfactory word. Apologetic words usually introduce the
term. "The so-called non-Christian" is a favorite expression. The Secretary of the Interior who for so many
years had these people under his jurisdiction, recognizing the difficulty of selecting an exact designation,
speaks of the "backward Philippine peoples, commonly known as the 'non-Christian tribes."' (See
Hearings before the Committee on the Philippines, United States Senate, Sixty-third Congress, third
session on H.R. 18459, An Act to declare the purpose of the People of the United States as to the future
political status of the Philippine Islands and to provide a more autonomous government for the Islands,
pp. 346, 351; letter of the Secretary of the Interior of June 30, 1906, circulated by the Executive Secretary.)
The idea that the term "non-Christian" is intended to relate to degree of civilization, is substantiated
by reference to legislative, judicial, and executive authority.
The legislative intent is borne out by Acts Nos. 48, 253, 387, 1667, and 2674, and sections 701 et seq, and
sections 2422 et seq, of the Administrative Code of 1917. For instance, Act No. 253 charged the Bureau
of non-Christian tribes to conduct "systematic investigations with reference to non-Christian tribes . . .
with special view to determining the most practicable means for bringing about their advancement in
civilization and material property prosperity."
As authority of a judicial nature is the decision of the Supreme Court in the case of United States vs.
Tubban [Kalinga] ([1915], 29, Phil., 434). The question here arose as to the effect of a tribal marriage in
connection with article 423 of the Penal code concerning the husband who surprises his wife in the act
of adultery. In discussing the point, the court makes use of the following language:
. . . we are not advised of any provision of law which recognizes as legal a tribal marriage of so-called
non-Christians or members of uncivilized tribes, celebrated within that province without compliance
with the requisites prescribed by General Orders no. 68. . . We hold also that the fact that the accused
is shown to be a member of an uncivilized tribe, of a low order of intelligence, uncultured and
uneducated, should be taken into consideration as a second marked extenuating circumstance.
Of much more moment is the uniform construction of executive officials who have been called upon to
interpret and enforce the law. The official who, as a member of the Philippine Commission, drafted much
of the legislation relating to the so-called Christians and who had these people under his authority, was
the former Secretary of the Interior. Under date of June 30, 1906, this official addressed a letter to all
governor of provinces, organized under the Special Provincial Government Act, a letter which later
received recognition by the Governor-General and was circulated by the Executive Secretary, reading as
follows:
Sir: Within the past few months, the question has arisen as to whether people who were originally
non-Christian but have recently been baptized or who are children of persons who have been recently
baptized are, for the purposes of Act 1396 and 1397, to be considered Christian or non-Christians.
It has been extremely difficult, in framing legislation for the tribes in these islands which are not
advanced far in civilization, to hit upon any suitable designation which will fit all cases. The number
of individual tribes is so great that it is almost out of the question to enumerate all of them in an Act.
It was finally decided to adopt the designation 'non-Christians' as the one most satisfactory, but the
real purpose of the Commission was not so much to legislate for people having any particular religious
belief as for those lacking sufficient advancement so that they could, to their own advantage, be
brought under the Provincial Government Act and the Municipal Code.
The mere act of baptism does not, of course, in itself change the degree of civilization to which the
person baptized has attained at the time the act of baptism is performed. For practical purposes,
therefore, you will give the member of so-called "wild tribes" of your province the benefit of the
doubt even though they may recently have embraced Christianity.
The determining factor in deciding whether they are to be allowed to remain under the jurisdiction
of regularly organized municipalities or what form of government shall be afforded to them should
be the degree of civilization to which they have attained and you are requested to govern yourself
accordingly.
I have discussed this matter with the Honorable, the Governor-General, who concurs in the opinion
above expressed and who will have the necessary instructions given to the governors of the provinces
organized under the Provincial Government Act. (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214.)
The present Secretary of the Interior, in a memorandum furnished a member of this court, has the
following to say on the subject:
As far as names are concerned the classification is indeed unfortunate, but while no other better
classification has as yet been made the present classification should be allowed to stand . . . I believe
the term carries the same meaning as that expressed in the letter of the Secretary of the Interior (of
June 30, 1906, herein quoted). It is indicative of the degree of civilization rather than of religious
denomination, for the hold that it is indicative of religious denomination will make the law invalid
as against that Constitutional guaranty of religious freedom.
Another official who was concerned with the status of the non-Christians, was the Collector of Internal
Revenue. The question arose for ruling relatives to the cedula taxation of the Manobos and the Aetas.
Thereupon, the view of the Secretary of the Interior was requested on the point, who, by return
indorsement, agreed with the interpretation of the Collector of Internal Revenue. This Construction of
the Collector of Internal Revenue can be found in circular letter No. 188 of the Bureau of Internal
Revenue, dated June 11, 1907, reading as follows (Internal Revenue Manual, p. 214):
The internal revenue law exempts "members of non-Christian tribes" from the payment of cedula
taxes. The Collector of Internal Revenue has interpreted this provision of law to mean not that
persons who profess some form of Christian worship are alone subject to the cedula tax, and that all
other person are exempt; he has interpreted it to mean that all persons preserving tribal relations
with the so-called non-Christian tribes are exempt from the cedula tax, and that all others, including
Jews, Mohammedans, Confucians, Buddists, etc., are subject to said tax so long as they live in cities
or towns, or in the country in a civilized condition. In other words, it is not so much a matter of a
man's form of religious worship or profession that decides whether or not he is subject to the
cedula tax; it is more dependent on whether he is living in a civilized manner or is associated with
the mountain tribes, either as a member thereof or as a recruit. So far, this question has not come
up as to whether a Christian, maintaining his religious belief, but throwing his lot and living with a
non-Christian tribe, would or would not be subject to the cedula tax. On one occasion a prominent
Hebrew of Manila claimed to this office that he was exempt from the cedula tax, inasmuch as he was
not a Christian. This Office, however, continued to collect cedula taxes from all the Jews, East Indians,
Arabs, Chinamen, etc., residing in Manila. Quite a large proportion of the cedula taxes paid in this city
are paid by men belonging to the nationalities mentioned. Chinamen, Arabs and others are quite
widely scattered throughout the Islands, and a condition similar to that which exist in Manila also
exists in most of the large provincial towns. Cedula taxes are therefore being collected by this Office
in all parts of these Islands on the broad ground that civilized people are subject to such taxes, and
non-civilized people preserving their tribal relations are not subject thereto.
(Sgd.) JNO. S. HORD,
Collector of Internal Revenue.
On September 17, 1910, the Collector of Internal Revenue addressed circular letter No. 327, approved by
the Secretary of Finance and Justice, to all provincial treasurers. This letter in part reads:
In view of the many questions that have been raised by provincial treasurers regarding cedula taxes
due from members of non-Christian tribes when they come in from the hills for the purposes of
settling down and becoming members of the body politic of the Philippine Islands, the following
clarification of the laws governing such questions and digest of rulings thereunder is hereby published
for the information of all concerned:
Non-Christian inhabitants of the Philippine Islands are so classed, not by reason of the fact that they
do not profess Christianity, but because of their uncivilized mode of life and low state of
development. All inhabitants of the Philippine Islands classed as members of non-Christian tribes may
be divided into three classes in so far as the cedula tax law is concerned . . .
Whenever any member of a non-Christian tribe leaves his wild and uncivilized mode of life, severs
whatever tribal relations he may have had and attaches himself to some civilized community,
becoming a member of the body politic, he thereby makes himself subject to precisely the same law
that governs the other members of that community and from and after the date when he so attaches
himself to the community the same cedula and other taxes are due from him as from other members
thereof. If he comes in after the expiration of the delinquency period the same rule should apply to
him as to persons arriving from foreign countries or reaching the age of eighteen subsequent to the
expiration of such period, and a regular class A, D, F, or H cedula, as the case may be, should be
furnished him without penalty and without requiring him to pay the tax for former years.
In conclusion, it should be borne in mind that the prime factors in determining whether or not a man
is subject to the regular cedula tax is not the circumstance that he does or does not profess
Christianity, nor even his maintenance of or failure to maintain tribal relations with some of the well
known wild tribes, but his mode of life, degree of advancement in civilization and connection or
lack of connection with some civilized community. For this reason so called "Remontados" and
"Montescos" will be classed by this office as members of non-Christian tribes in so far as the
application of the Internal Revenue Law is concerned, since, even though they belong to no well
recognized tribe, their mode of life, degree of advancement and so forth are practically the same as
those of the Igorrots and members of other recognized non-Christina tribes.
Very respectfully,
(Sgd.) ELLIS CROMWELL,
Collector of Internal Revenue,
Approved:
(Sgd.) GREGORIO ARANETA,
Secretary of Finance and Justice.
The two circulars above quoted have since been repealed by Bureau of Internal Revenue Regulations No.
1, promulgated by Venancio Concepcion, Acting Collector of Internal Revenue, and approved on April 16,
1915, by Honorable Victorino Mapa, Secretary of Finance and Justice. Section 30 of the regulations is
practically a transcript of Circular Letter No. 327.
The subject has come before the Attorney-General for consideration. The Chief of Constabulary request
the opinion of the Attorney-General as to the status of a non-Christian who has been baptized by a
minister of the Gospel. The precise questions were these: "Does he remain non-Christian or is he entitled
to the privileges of a Christian? By purchasing intoxicating liquors, does he commit an infraction of the
law and does the person selling same lay himself liable under the provision of Act No. 1639?" The opinion
of Attorney-General Avanceña, after quoting the same authorities hereinbefore set out, concludes:
In conformity with the above quoted constructions, it is probable that the person in question remains
a non-Christian, so that, in purchasing intoxicating liquors both he and the person selling the same
make themselves liable to prosecution under the provisions of Act No. 1639. At least, I advise you
that these should be the constructions placed upon the law until a court shall hold otherwise.
Solicitor-General Paredes in his brief in this case says:
With respect to the meaning which the phrase non-Christian inhabitants has in the provisions of the
Administrative code which we are studying, we submit that said phrase does not have its natural
meaning which would include all non-Christian inhabitants of the Islands, whether Filipino or
strangers, civilized or uncivilized, but simply refers to those uncivilized members of the non-
Christian tribes of the Philippines who, living without home or fixed residence, roam in the
mountains, beyond the reach of law and order . . .
The Philippine Commission in denominating in its laws that portion of the inhabitants of the
Philippines which live in tribes as non-Christian tribes, as distinguished from the common Filipinos
which carry on a social and civilized life, did not intended to establish a distinction based on the
religious beliefs of the individual, but, without dwelling on the difficulties which later would be
occasioned by the phrase, adopted the expression which the Spanish legislation employed to
designate the uncivilized portion of the inhabitants of the Philippines.
The phrase 'non-Christian inhabitants' used in the provisions of articles 2077 and 2741 of Act No.
2657 (articles 2145 and 2759) should be understood as equivalent to members of uncivilized tribes
of the Philippines, not only because this is the evident intention of the law, but because to give it
its lateral meaning would make the law null and unconstitutional as making distinctions based on
the religion of the individual.
The Official Census of 1903, in the portion written by no less an authority than De. David P. Barrows, then
"Chief of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes," divides the population into Christian or Civilized Tribes, and
non-Christian or Wild Tribes. (Census of the Philippine Islands [1903], vol. 1, pp. 411 et seq.) The present
Director of the Census, Hon. Ignacio Villamor, writes that the classification likely to be used in the Census
now being taken is: "Filipinos and Primitive Filipinos." In a Pronouncing Gazetteer and Geographical
Dictionary of the Philippine Islands, prepared in the Bureau of Insular Affairs, War Department, a
subdivision under the title non-Christian tribes is, "Physical and Political Characteristics of the non-
Christian Tribes," which sufficiently shows that the terms refers to culture and not to religion.
In resume, therefore, the Legislature and the Judiciary, inferentially, and different executive officials,
specifically, join in the proposition that the term "non-Christian" refers, not to religious belief, but, in a
way , to geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a law grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities.
E. THE MANGUIANES.
The so-called non-Christians are in various stages approaching civilization. The Philippine Census of 1903
divided them into four classes. Of the third class, are the Manguianes (or Mangyans) of Mindoro.
Of the derivation of the name "Manguian" Dr. T. H. Pardo de Tavera in his Etimilogia de los nombres de
Rozas de Filipinas, says:
In Tagalog, Bicol, and Visaya, Manguian signifies "savage," "mountainer," "pagan," "negro." It may be
that the use of this word is applicable to a great number of Filipinos, but nevertheless it has been
applied only to certain inhabitants of Mindoro. Even in primitive times without doubt this name was
given to those of that island who bear it to-day, but its employment in three Filipino languages shows
that the radical ngian had in all these languages a sense to-day forgotten. In Pampango this ending
still exists and signifies "ancient," from which we can deduce that the name was applied to men
considered to be the ancient inhabitants, and that these men were pushed back into the interior by
the modern invaders, in whose language they were called the "ancients."
The Manguianes are very low in culture. They have considerable Negrito blood and have not advanced
beyond the Negritos in civilization. They are a peaceful, timid, primitive, semi-nomadic people. They
number approximately 15,000. The manguianes have shown no desire for community life, and, as
indicated in the preamble to Act No. 547, have not progressed sufficiently in civilization to make it
practicable to bring them under any form of municipal government. (See Census of the Philippine (Islands
[1903], vol. I, pp. 22, 23, 460.)
III. COMPARATIVE — THE AMERICAN INDIANS.
Reference was made in the Presidents' instructions to the Commission to the policy adopted by the
United States for the Indian Tribes. The methods followed by the Government of the Philippines Islands
in its dealings with the so-called non-Christian people is said, on argument, to be practically identical with
that followed by the United States Government in its dealings with the Indian tribes. Valuable lessons, it
is insisted, can be derived by an investigation of the American-Indian policy.
From the beginning of the United States, and even before, the Indians have been treated as "in a state
of pupilage." The recognized relation between the Government of the United States and the Indians
may be described as that of guardian and ward. It is for the Congress to determine when and how the
guardianship shall be terminated. The Indians are always subject to the plenary authority of the United
States.
Chief Justice Marshall in his opinion in Worcester vs. Georgia, hereinbefore mentioned, tells how the
Congress passed an Act in 1819 "for promoting those humane designs of civilizing the neighboring
Indians." After quoting the Act, the opinion goes on — "This act avowedly contemplates the preservation
of the Indian nations as an object sought by the United States, and proposes to effect this object by
civilizing and converting them from hunters into agriculturists."
A leading case which discusses the status of the Indians is that of the United States vs. Kagama ([1886],
118 U.S., 375). Reference is herein made to the clause of the United States Constitution which gives
Congress "power to regulate commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the
Indian tribes." The court then proceeds to indicate a brief history of the position of the Indians in the
United States (a more extended account of which can be found in Marshall's opinion in Worcester vs.
Georgia, supra), as follows:
The relation of the Indian tribes living within the borders of the United States, both before and since
the Revolution, to the people of the United States, has always been an anomalous one and of a
complex character.
Following the policy of the European Governments in the discovery of American towards the Indians
who were found here, the colonies before the Revolution and the States and the United States since,
have recognized in the Indians a possessory right to the soil over which they roamed and hunted and
established occasional villages. But they asserted an ultimate title in the land itself, by which the
Indian tribes were forbidden to sell or transfer it to other nations or peoples without the consent of
this paramount authority. When a tribe wished to dispose of its lands, or any part of it, or the State
or the United States wished to purchase it, a treaty with the tribe was the only mode in which this
could be done. The United States recognized no right in private persons, or in other nations, to make
such a purchase by treaty or otherwise. With the Indians themselves these relation are equally
difficult to define. They were, and always have been, regarded as having a semi-independent position
when they preserved their tribal relations; not as States, not as nations, not as possessed of the full
attributes of sovereignty, but as a separate people, with the power of regulating their internal and
social relations, and thus far not brought under the laws of the Union or of the State within whose
limits they resided.
The opinion then continues:
It seems to us that this (effect of the law) is within the competency of Congress. These Indian tribes
are the wards of the nation. They are communities dependent on the United States. Dependent
largely for their daily food. Dependent for their political rights. They owe no allegiance to the States,
and receive from them no protection. Because of the local ill feeling, the people of the States where
they are found are often their deadliest enemies. From their very weakness and helplessness, so
largely due to the course of dealing of the Federal Government with them and the treaties in which
it has been promised, there arise the duty of protection, and with it the power. This has always been
recognized by the Executive and by Congress, and by this court, whenever the question has arisen . .
. The power of the General Government over these remnants of race once powerful, now weak and
diminished in numbers, is necessary to their protection, as well as to the safety of those among whom
they dwell. It must exist in that government, because it never has existed anywhere else, because the
theater of its exercise is within the geographical limits of the United States, because it has never been
denied, and because it alone can enforce its laws on all the tribes.
In the later case of United States vs. Sandoval ([1913], 231 U.S., 28) the question to be considered was
whether the status of the Pueblo Indians and their lands was such that Congress could prohibit the
introduction of intoxicating liquor into those lands notwithstanding the admission of New Mexico to
statehood. The court looked to the reports of the different superintendents charged with guarding their
interests and found that these Indians are dependent upon the fostering care and protection of the
government "like reservation Indians in general." Continuing, the court said "that during the Spanish
dominion, the Indians of the pueblos were treated as wards requiring special protection, were subjected
to restraints and official supervisions in the alienation of their property." And finally, we note the
following: "Not only does the Constitution expressly authorize Congress to regulate commerce with the
Indians tribes, but long-continued legislative and executive usage and an unbroken current of judicial
decisions have attributed to the United States as a superior and civilized nation the power and the duty
of exercising a fostering care and protection over all dependent Indian communities within its borders,
whether within its original territory or territory subsequently acquired, and whether within or without
the limits of a state."
With reference to laws affecting the Indians, it has been held that it is not within the power of the
courts to overrule the judgment of Congress. For very good reason, the subject has always been deemed
political in nature, not subject to the jurisdiction of the judicial department of the government. (Matter
of Heff [1905], 197 U.S., 488; U.S. vs. Celestine [1909], 215 U.S., 278; U.S. vs. Sandoval, supra; Worcester
vs. Georgia, supra; U.S. vs. Rogers [1846], 4 How., 567; the Cherokee Tobacco [1871], 11 Wall, 616; Roff
vs. Burney [1897], 168 U.S., 218; Thomas vs. Gay [1898], 169 U.S.., 264; Lone Wolf vs. Hitchcock[1903],
187 U.S., 553; Wallace vs. Adams [1907], 204 U.S., 415; Conley vs. Bollinger [1910], 216 U.S., 84; Tiger vs.
Western Invest. Co. [1911], 221 U.S., 286; U.S. vs. Lane [1913], 232 U.S.., 598; Cyr vs. Walker (1911], 29
Okla, 281; 35 L.R.A. [N. S.], 795.) Whenever, therefore, the United States sets apart any public land as an
Indian reservation, it has full authority to pass such laws and authorize such measures as may be
necessary to give to the Indians thereon full protection in their persons and property. (U.S. vs. Thomas
[1894], 151 U.S., 577.)
All this borne out by long-continued legislative and executive usage, and an unbroken line of judicial
decisions.
The only case which is even remotely in point and which, if followed literally, might result in the issuance
of habeas corpus, is that of United States vs. Crook ([1879], Fed. Cas. No. 14891). This was a hearing
upon return to a writ of habeas corpus issued against Brigadier General George Crook at the relation of
Standing Bear and other Indians, formerly belonging to the Ponca Tribe of Indians. The petition alleged
in substance that the relators are Indians who have formerly belonged to the Ponca tribe of Indians, now
located in the Indian Territory; that they had some time previously withdrawn from the tribe, and
completely severed their tribal relations therewith, and had adopted the general habits of the whites,
and were then endeavoring to maintain themselves by their own exertions, and without aid or assistance
from the general government; that whilst they were thus engaged, and without being guilty of violating
any of the laws of the United States, they were arrested and restrained of their liberty by order of the
respondent, George Crook. The substance of the return to the writ was that the relators are individual
members of, and connected with, the Ponca tribe of Indians; that they had fled or escaped form a
reservation situated some place within the limits of the Indian Territory — had departed therefrom
without permission from the Government; and, at the request of the Secretary of the Interior, the General
of the Army had issued an order which required the respondent to arrest and return the relators to their
tribe in the Indian Territory, and that, pursuant to the said order, he had caused the relators to be arrested
on the Omaha Indian Territory.
The first question was whether an Indian can test the validity of an illegal imprisonment by habeas corpus.
The second question, of much greater importance, related to the right of the Government to arrest and
hold the relators for a time, for the purpose of being returned to the Indian Territory from which it was
alleged the Indian escaped. In discussing this question, the court reviewed the policy the Government
had adopted in its dealing with the friendly tribe of Poncas. Then, continuing, the court said: "Laws passed
for the government of the Indian country, and for the purpose of regulating trade and intercourse with
the Indian tribes, confer upon certain officers of the Government almost unlimited power over the
persons who go upon the reservations without lawful authority . . . Whether such an extensive
discretionary power is wisely vested in the commissioner of Indian affairs or not, need not be
questioned. It is enough to know that the power rightfully exists, and, where existing, the exercise of
the power must be upheld." The decision concluded as follows:
The reasoning advanced in support of my views, leads me to conclude:
1. that an Indian is a 'person' within the meaning of the laws of the United States, and has, therefore,
the right to sue out a writ of habeas corpus in a federal court, or before a federal judge, in all cases
where he may be confined or in custody under color of authority of the United States or where he is
restrained of liberty in violation of the constitution or laws of the United States.
2. That General George Crook, the respondent, being commander of the military department of the
Platte, has the custody of the relators, under color of authority of the United States, and in violation
of the laws therefore.
3. That no rightful authority exists for removing by force any of the relators to the Indian Territory,
as the respondent has been directed to do.
4. that the Indians possess the inherent right of expatriation, as well as the more fortunate white
race, and have the inalienable right to "life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness," so long as they
obey the laws and do not trespass on forbidden ground. And,
5. Being restrained of liberty under color of authority of the United States, and in violation of the laws
thereof, the relators must be discharged from custody, and it is so ordered.
As far as the first point is concerned, the decision just quoted could be used as authority to determine
that Rubi, the Manguian petitioner, a Filipino, and a citizen of the Philippine Islands, is a "person" within
the meaning of the Habeas Corpus Act, and as such, entitled to sue out a writ in the Philippine courts.
(See also In re Race Horse [1895], 70 Fed., 598.) We so decide.
As to the second point the facts in the Standing Bear case and the Rubi case are not exactly identical. But
ev
en admitting similarity of facts, yet it is known to all that Indian reservations do exist in the United States,
that Indians have been taken from different parts of the country and placed on these reservations,
without any previous consultation as to their own wishes, and that, when once so located, they have
been made to remain on the reservation for their own good and for the general good of the country. If
any lesson can be drawn from the Indian policy of the United States, it is that the determination of this
policy is for the legislative and executive branches of the government and that when once so decided
upon, the courts should not interfere to upset a carefully planned governmental system. Perhaps, just
as many forceful reasons exists for the segregation of the Manguianes in Mindoro as existed for the
segregation of the different Indian tribes in the United States.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL QUESTIONS.
A. DELEGATION OF LEGISLATIVE POWER.
The first constitutional objection which confronts us is that the Legislature could not delegate this power
to provincial authorities. In so attempting, it is contended, the Philippine Legislature has abdicated its
authority and avoided its full responsibility.
That the maxim of Constitutional Law forbidding the delegation of legislative power should be zealously
protected, we agree. An understanding of the rule will, however, disclose that it has not been violated in
this instance.
The rule has nowhere been better stated than in the early Ohio case decided by Judge Ranney, and since
followed in a multitude of case, namely: "The true distinction therefore is between the delegation of
power to make the law, which necessarily involves a discretion as to what it shall be, and conferring an
authority or discretion as to its execution, to be exercised under and in pursuance of the law. The first
cannot be done; to the latter no valid objection can be made." (Cincinnati, W. & Z. R. Co. vs. Comm'rs.
Clinton County [1852], 1 Ohio S.t, 88.) Discretion, as held by Chief Justice Marshall in Wayman vs.
Southard ([1825], 10 Wheat., 1) may be committed by the Legislature to an executive department or
official. The Legislature may make decisions of executive departments of subordinate officials thereof, to
whom it has committed the execution of certain acts, final on questions of fact. (U.S. vs. Kinkead [1918],
248 Fed., 141.) The growing tendency in the decisions is to give prominence to the "necessity" of the
case.
Is not all this exactly what the Legislature has attempted to accomplish by the enactment of section 2145
of the Administrative Code? Has not the Legislature merely conferred upon the provincial governor, with
the approval of the provincial board and the Department Head, discretionary authority as to the
execution of the law? Is not this "necessary"?
The case of West vs. Hitchock, ([1906], 205 U.S., 80) was a petition for mandamus to require the Secretary
of the Interior to approve the selection and taking of one hundred and sixty acres by the relator out of
the lands ceded to the United States by the Wichita and affiliated bands of Indians. Section 463 of the
United States Revised Statutes provided: "The Commissioner of Indian Affairs shall, under the direction
of the Secretary of the Interior, and agreeably to such regulations as the President may prescribe, have
the management of all Indian affairs, and of all matters arising out to the Indian relations." Justice Holmes
said: "We should hesitate a good deal, especially in view of the long established practice of the
Department, before saying that this language was not broad enough to warrant a regulation obviously
made for the welfare of the rather helpless people concerned. The power of Congress is not doubted.
The Indians have been treated as wards of the nation. Some such supervision was necessary, and has
been exercised. In the absence of special provisions naturally it would be exercised by the Indian
Department." (See also as corroborative authority, if any is needed, Union Bridge Co. vs. U.S. [1907], 204
U.S.., 364, reviewing the previous decisions of the United States Supreme Court: U.S. vs. Lane [1914], 232
U.S., 598.)
There is another aspect of the question, which once accepted, is decisive. An exception to the general
rule, sanctioned by immemorial practice, permits the central legislative body to delegate legislative
powers to local authorities. The Philippine Legislature has here conferred authority upon the Province of
Mindoro, to be exercised by the provincial governor and the provincial board.
Who but the provincial governor and the provincial board, as the official representatives of the province,
are better qualified to judge "when such as course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order?"
As officials charged with the administration of the province and the protection of its inhabitants, who
but they are better fitted to select sites which have the conditions most favorable for improving the
people who have the misfortune of being in a backward state?
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is not an unlawful delegation of legislative power by the
Philippine Legislature to provincial official and a department head.
B. RELIGIOUS DISCRIMINATION
The attorney de officio, for petitioners, in a truly remarkable brief, submitted on behalf of his unknown
clients, says that — "The statute is perfectly clear and unambiguous. In limpid English, and in words as
plain and unequivocal as language can express, it provides for the segregation of 'non-Christians' and
none other." The inevitable result, then, is that the law "constitutes an attempt by the Legislature to
discriminate between individuals because of their religious beliefs, and is, consequently,
unconstitutional."
Counsel's premise once being conceded, his arguments is answerable — the Legislature must be
understood to mean what it has plainly expressed; judicial construction is then excluded; religious
equality is demanded by the Organic Law; the statute has violated this constitutional guaranty, and Q. E.
D. is invalid. But, as hereinbefore stated, we do not feel free to discard the long continued meaning given
to a common expression, especially as classification of inhabitants according to religious belief leads the
court to what it should avoid, the nullification of legislative action. We hold that the term "non-Christian"
refers to natives of the Philippines Islands of a low grade of civilization, and that section 2145 of the
Administrative Code of 1917, does not discriminate between individuals an account of religious
differences.
C. LIBERTY; DUE PROCESS OF LAW; EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAWS.
The third constitutional argument is grounded on those portions of the President's instructions to the
Commission, the Philippine Bill, and the Jones Law, providing "That no law shall be enacted in said Islands
which shall deprive any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, or deny to any
person therein the equal protection of the laws." This constitutional limitation is derived from the
Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution — and these provisions, it has been said "are
universal in their application, to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without regard to any
differences of race, of color, or of nationality." (Yick Wo vs. Hopkins [1886], 118 U.S., 356.) The protection
afforded the individual is then as much for the non-Christian as for the Christian.
The conception of civil liberty has been variously expressed thus:
Every man may claim the fullest liberty to exercise his faculties, compatible with the possession
of like liberty by every other. (Spencer, Social Statistics, p. 94.)
Liberty is the creature of law, essentially different from that authorized licentiousness that
trespasses on right. It is a legal and a refined idea, the offspring of high civilization, which the
savage never understood, and never can understand. Liberty exists in proportion to wholesome
restraint; the more restraint on others to keep off from us, the more liberty we have . . . that
man is free who is protected from injury. (II Webster's Works, p. 393.)
Liberty consists in the ability to do what one ought to desire and in not being forced to do what
one ought not do desire. (Montesque, spirit of the Laws.)
Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is no unrestricted license to act according to one's
own will. It is only freedom from restraint under conditions essential to the equal enjoyment
of the same right by others. (Field, J., in Crowley vs. Christensen [1890], 137 U.S., 86.)
Liberty does not import "an absolute right in each person to be, at all times and in all
circumstances, wholly freed from restraint. There are manifold restraints to which every person
is necessarily subject for the common good. On any other basis, organized society could not exist
with safety to its members. Society based on the rule that each one is a law unto himself would
soon be confronted with disorder and anarchy. Real liberty for all could not exist under the
operation of a principle which recognizes the right of each individual person to use his own,
whether in respect of his person or his property, regardless of the injury that may be done to
others . . . There is, of course, a sphere with which the individual may assert the supremacy of his
own will, and rightfully dispute the authority of any human government — especially of any free
government existing under a written Constitution — to interfere with the exercise of that will.
But it is equally true that in very well-ordered society charged with the duty of conserving the
safety of its members, the rights of the individual in respect of his liberty may at times, under
the pressure of great dangers, be subjected to such restraint to be enforced by reasonable
regulations, as the safety of the general public may demand." (Harlan, J., In Jacobson vs.
Massachusetts [1905] 197 U.S., 11.)
Liberty is freedom to do right and never wrong; it is ever guided by reason and the upright and
honorable conscience of the individual. (Apolinario Mabini.)
Civil Liberty may be said to mean that measure of freedom which may be enjoyed in a civilized
community, consistently with the peaceful enjoyment of like freedom in others. The right to Liberty
guaranteed by the Constitution includes the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary
personal restraint or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint
of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of man to enjoy the faculties with
which he has been endowed by this Creator, subject only to such restraints as are necessary for the
common welfare. As enunciated in a long array of authorities including epoch-making decisions of the
United States Supreme Court, Liberty includes the right of the citizens to be free to use his faculties in
all lawful ways; to live and work where he will; to earn his livelihood by any lawful calling; to pursue any
avocations, and for that purpose, to enter into all contracts which may be proper, necessary, and essential
to his carrying out these purposes to a successful conclusion. The chief elements of the guaranty are the
right to contract, the right to choose one's employment, the right to labor, and the right of locomotion.
In general, it may be said that Liberty means the opportunity to do those things which are ordinarily done
by free men. (There can be noted Cummings vs. Missouri [1866], 4 Wall, 277; Wilkinson vs. Leland [1829],
2 Pet., 627; Williams vs. Fears [1900], 179 U.S., 274; Allgeyer vs. Louisiana [1896], 165, U.S., 578; State vs.
Kreutzberg [1902], 114 Wis., 530. See 6 R.C.L., 258, 261.)
One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of Liberty is plainly apparent. It is this:
"Liberty" as understood in democracies, is not license; it is "Liberty regulated by law." Implied in the
term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order
of society and the general well-being. No man can do exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce
unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general
law for the common good. Whenever and wherever the natural rights of citizen would, if exercises
without restraint, deprive other citizens of rights which are also and equally natural, such assumed
rights must yield to the regulation of law. The Liberty of the citizens may be restrained in the interest
of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the
police power. (See Hall vs. Geiger-Jones [1916], 242 U.S., 539; Hardie-Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz
[1914], 189 Al., 66.)
None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. Daniel Webster, in the
course of the argument in the Dartmouth College Case before the United States Supreme Court, since a
classic in forensic literature, said that the meaning of "due process of law" is, that "every citizen shall
hold his life, liberty, property, and immunities under the protection of the general rules which govern
society." To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true
where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular
cases. (See McGehee, Due Process of Law, p. 371.) Neither is due process a stationary and blind sentinel
of liberty. "Any legal proceeding enforced by public authority, whether sanctioned by age and customs,
or newly devised in the discretion of the legislative power, in furtherance of the public good, which
regards and preserves these principles of liberty and justice, must be held to be due process of law."
(Hurtado vs. California [1883], 110, U.S., 516.) "Due process of law" means simply . . . "first, that there
shall be a law prescribed in harmony with the general powers of the legislative department of the
Government; second, that this law shall be reasonable in its operation; third, that it shall be enforced
according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and fourth, that it shall be applicable alike
to all the citizens of the state or to all of a class." (U.S. vs. Ling Su Fan [1908], 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on
appeal to the United States Supreme Court. 1) "What is due process of law depends on circumstances.
It varies with the subject-matter and necessities of the situation." (Moyer vs. Peablody [1909], 212 U.
S., 82.)
The pledge that no person shall be denied the equal protection of the laws is not infringed by a statute
which is applicable to all of a class. The classification must have a reasonable basis and cannot be purely
arbitrary in nature.
We break off with the foregoing statement, leaving the logical deductions to be made later on.
D. SLAVERY AND INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.
The fourth constitutional contention of petitioner relates to the Thirteen Amendment to the United
States Constitution particularly as found in those portions of Philippine Organic Law providing "That
slavery shall not exist in said Islands; nor shall involuntary servitude exist except as a punishment for
crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted." It is quite possible that the Thirteenth
Amendment, since reaching to "any place subject to" the "jurisdiction" of the United States, has force in
the Philippine. However this may be, the Philippine Legislature has, by adoption, with necessary
modifications, of sections 268 to 271 inclusive of the United States Criminal Code, prescribed the
punishment for these crimes. Slavery and involuntary servitude, together with their corollary, peonage,
all denote "a condition of enforced, compulsory service of one to another." (Hodges vs. U.S. [1906], 203
U.S., 1.) The term of broadest scope is possibly involuntary servitude. It has been applied to any servitude
in fact involuntary, no matter under what form such servitude may have been disguised. (Bailey vs.
Alabama [1910], 219 U.S., 219.)
So much for an analysis of those constitutional provisions on which petitioners rely for their freedom.
Next must come a description of the police power under which the State must act if section 2145 is to be
held valid.
E. THE POLICE POWER.

Not attempting to phrase a definition of police power, all that it is necessary to note at this moment is
the far-reaching scope of the power, that it has become almost possible to limit its weep, and that among
its purposes is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, peace, morals, education, and
good order of the people, and to legislate so as to increase the industries of the State, develop its
resources and add to is wealth and prosperity. (See Barbier vs. Connolly [1884], 113 U.S., 27.) What we
are not interested in is the right of the government to restrain liberty by the exercise of the police power.
"The police power of the State," one court has said, . . . "is a power coextensive with self-protection, and
is not inaptly termed the 'law of overruling necessity.' It may be said to be that inherent and plenary
power in the State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety and welfare of
society." (Lake View vs. Rose Hill Cemetery Co. [1873], 70 Ill., 191.) Carried onward by the current of
legislation, the judiciary rarely attempt to dam the on rushing power of legislative discretion, provided
the purposes of the law do not go beyond the great principles that mean security for the public welfare
or do not arbitrarily interfere with the right of the individual.
The Government of the Philippine Islands has both on reason and authority the right to exercise the
sovereign police power in the promotion of the general welfare and the public interest. "There can be
not doubt that the exercise of the police power of the Philippine Government belongs to the Legislature
and that this power is limited only by the Acts of Congress and those fundamental principles which lie at
the foundation of all republican forms of government." (Churchill and Tait vs. Rafferty [1915], 32 Phil.,
580; U.S. vs. Pompeya [1915], 31 Phil., 245.)
With the foregoing approximation of the applicable basic principles before us, before finally deciding
whether any constitutional provision has indeed been violated by section 2145 of the Administrative
Code, we should endeavor to ascertain the intention of the Legislature in enacting this section. If legally
possible, such legislative intention should be effectuated.
F. LEGISLATIVE INTENT.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation,
it will be remembered, assigned as reasons for the action, the following: (1) The failure of former attempts
for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only successfully method
for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General
adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes.
The present Secretary of the Interior says of the Tigbao reservation and of the motives for its selection,
the following:
To inform himself of the conditions of those Manguianes who were taken together to Tigbao, the
Secretary of the Interior on June 10 to 13, 1918, made a trip to the place. There he found that the
site selected is a good one; that creditable progress has been made in the clearing of forests,
construction of buildings, etc., that there appears to be encouraging reaction by the boys to the work
of the school the requirements of which they appear to meet with enthusiastic interest after the first
weeks which are necessarily a somewhat trying period for children wholly unaccustomed to orderly
behaviour and habit of life. He also gathered the impression that the results obtained during the
period of less than one year since the beginning of the institution definitely justify its continuance
and development.
Of course, there were many who were protesting against that segregation. Such was naturally to be
expected. But the Secretary of the Interior, upon his return to Manila, made the following statement
to the press:
"It is not deemed wise to abandon the present policy over those who prefer to live a nomadic life
and evade the influence of civilization. The Government will follow its policy to organize them
into political communities and to educate their children with the object of making them useful
citizens of this country. To permit them to live a wayfaring life will ultimately result in a burden
to the state and on account of their ignorance, they will commit crimes and make depredation,
or if not they will be subject to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them."
The Secretary of the Interior, who is the official charged with the supervision of all the non-Christian
people, has adopted as the polaris of his administration — "the advancement of the non-Christian
elements of our population to equality and unification with the highly civilized Christian inhabitants." This
is carried on by the adoption of the following measures:
(a) Pursuance of the closer settlement policy whereby people of seminomadic race are induced to
leave their wild habitat and settle in organized communities.
(b) The extension of the public school system and the system of public health throughout the regions
inhabited by the non-Christian people.
(c) The extension of public works throughout the Mohammedan regions to facilitate their
development and the extention of government control.
(d) Construction of roads and trials between one place and another among non-Christians, to
promote social and commercial intercourse and maintain amicable relations among them and with
the Christian people.
(e) Pursuance of the development of natural economic resources, especially agriculture.
(f) The encouragement of immigration into, and of the investment of private capital in, the fertile
regions of Mindanao and Sulu.
The Secretary adds:
To attain the end desired, work of a civilizing influence have been continued among the non-Christian
people. These people are being taught and guided to improve their living conditions in order that
they may fully appreciate the benefits of civilization. Those of them who are still given to nomadic
habits are being persuaded to abandon their wild habitat and settle in organized settlements. They
are being made to understand that it is the purpose of the Government to organize them politically
into fixed and permanent communities, thus bringing them under the control of the Government, to
aid them to live and work, protect them from involuntary servitude and abuse, educate their children,
and show them the advantages of leading a civilized life with their civilized brothers. In short, they
are being impressed with the purposes and objectives of the Government of leading them to
economic, social, and political equality, and unification with the more highly civilized inhabitants of
the country. (See Report of the Department for 1917.)
The fundamental objective of governmental policy is to establish friendly relations with the so-called
non-Christians, and to promote their educational, agricultural, industrial, and economic development
and advancement in civilization. (Note Acts Nos. 2208, 2404, 2444.) Act No. 2674 in reestablishing the
Bureau of non-Christian Tribes, defines the aim of the Government towards the non-Christian people in
the following unequivocal terms:
It shall be the duty of the Bureau of non-Christian Tribes to continue the work for advancement and
liberty in favor of the region inhabited by non-Christian Filipinos and foster by all adequate means
and in a systematical, rapid, and complete manner the moral, material, economic, social, and political
development of those regions, always having in view the aim of rendering permanent the mutual
intelligence between, and complete fusion of, all the Christian and non-Christian elements populating
the provinces of the Archipelago. (Sec. 3.)
May the Manguianes not be considered, as are the Indians in the United States, proper wards of the
Filipino people? By the fostering care of a wise Government, may not these unfortunates advance in the
"habits and arts of civilization?" Would it be advisable for the courts to intrude upon a plan, carefully
formulated, and apparently working out for the ultimate good of these people?
In so far as the Manguianes themselves are concerned, the purpose of the Government is evident. Here,
we have on the Island of Mindoro, the Manguianes, leading a nomadic life, making depredations on their
more fortunate neighbors, uneducated in the ways of civilization, and doing nothing for the advancement
of the Philippine Islands. What the Government wished to do by bringing than into a reservation was to
gather together the children for educational purposes, and to improve the health and morals — was in
fine, to begin the process of civilization. this method was termed in Spanish times, "bringing under the
bells." The same idea adapted to the existing situation, has been followed with reference to the
Manguianes and other peoples of the same class, because it required, if they are to be improved, that
they be gathered together. On these few reservations there live under restraint in some cases, and in
other instances voluntarily, a few thousands of the uncivilized people. Segregation really constitutes
protection for the Manguianes.
Theoretically, one may assert that all men are created free and equal. Practically, we know that the
axiom is not precisely accurate. The Manguianes, for instance, are not free, as civilized men are free, and
they are not the equals of their more fortunate brothers. True, indeed, they are citizens, with many but
not all the rights which citizenship implies. And true, indeed, they are Filipinos. But just as surely, the
Manguianes are citizens of a low degree of intelligence, and Filipinos who are a drag upon the progress
of the State.
In so far as the relation of the Manguianes to the State is concerned, the purposes of the Legislature in
enacting the law, and of the executive branch in enforcing it, are again plain. Settlers in Mindoro must
have their crops and persons protected from predatory men, or they will leave the country. It is no
argument to say that such crimes are punished by the Penal Code, because these penalties are imposed
after commission of the offense and not before. If immigrants are to be encouraged to develop the
resources of the great Islands of Mindoro, and its, as yet, unproductive regions, the Government must be
in a position to guarantee peace and order.
Waste lands do not produce wealth. Waste people do not advance the interest of the State. Illiteracy
and thriftlessness are not conducive to homogeneity. The State to protect itself from destruction must
prod on the laggard and the sluggard. The great law of overwhelming necessity is all convincing.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes)
are engaged in the works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests and making illegal
caiñgins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its interests,
what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve and for
which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the State and
on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not they will be
subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people has not a right conception of liberty and does not
practice liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will — going
from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal
caiñgins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they
are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx xxx xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do
not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to
what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any measures
looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean that this
people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery without even the
remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense.
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in
the alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter
measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
xxx xxx xxx
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards
the education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those
people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times point
to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what has already
been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward people, shall we
give up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their personal interests
would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the authority of the
Government to lead this people in the path of civilization? Shall we, after expending sweat, treasure,
and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and superstition, now
willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that Constitutional guaranty
that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? To allow them to
successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the Government without
recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful citizens. They will thus be
left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to attack by those who doubt,
nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward brothers.
The Manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being
taught and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that the
object of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They
are being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially established
for them. In short, everything is being done for them in order that their advancement in civilization
and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does not make them
slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not work for anybody
but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under
penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living a
nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one place
to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving about is
the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from one place
to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to concentrate them
in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam all over the entire
territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner of the lands about
which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and objectives of the
government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to return to the
mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provided for, you can not make them
live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them politically will come to
naught.
G. APPLICATION AND CONCLUSION.
Our exhaustive study should have left us in a position to answer specific objections and to reach a general
conclusion.
In the first place, it is argued that the citizen has the right, generally speaking, to go where he pleases.
Could be not, however, be kept away from certain localities? To furnish an example from the Indian
legislation. The early Act of Congress of 1802 (2 U.S. Stat. at L., p. 141) Indian reservation. Those citizens
certainly did not possess absolute freedom of locomotion. Again the same law provided for the
apprehension of marauding Indians. Without any doubt, this law and other similar were accepted and
followed time and again without question.
It is said that, if we hold this section to be constitutional, we leave this weak and defenseless people
confined as in a prison at the mercy of unscrupulous official. What, it is asked, would be the remedy of
any oppressed Manguian? The answer would naturally be that the official into whose hands are given the
enforcement of the law would have little or no motive to oppress these people; on the contrary, the
presumption would all be that they would endeavor to carry out the purposes of the law intelligently and
patriotically. If, indeed, they did ill-treat any person thus confined, there always exists the power of
removal in the hands of superior officers, and the courts are always open for a redress of grievances.
When, however, only the validity of the law is generally challenged and no particular case of oppression
is called to the attention of the courts, it would seem that the Judiciary should not unnecessarily hamper
the Government in the accomplishment of its laudable purpose.
The question is above all one of sociology. How far, consistently with freedom, may the right and
liberties of the individual members of society be subordinated to the will of the Government? It is a
question which has assailed the very existence of government from the beginning of time. Not now purely
an ethical or philosophical subject, nor now to be decided by force, it has been transferred to the peaceful
forum of the Judiciary. In resolving such an issue, the Judiciary must realize that the very existence of
government renders imperatives a power to restrain the individual to some extent, dependent, of course,
on the necessities of the class attempted to be benefited. As to the particular degree to which the
Legislature and the Executive can go in interfering with the rights of the citizen, this is, and for a long time
to come will be, impossible for the courts to determine.
The doctrines of laissez faire and of unrestricted freedom of the individual, as axioms of economics and
political theory, are of the past. The modern period has shown as widespread belief in the amplest
possible demonstration of governmental activity. The courts unfortunately have sometimes seemed to
trail after the other two branches of the government in this progressive march.
Considered, therefore, purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the
Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great
malady requires an equally drastic remedy.
Further, one cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are restrained for their own good and the general
good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not been followed. To go back to
our definition of due process of law and equal protection of the law, there exists a law; the law seems
to be reasonable; it is enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed; and it applies
alike to all of a class.
As a point which has been left for the end of this decision and which, in case of doubt, would lead to the
determination that section 2145 is valid, is the attitude which the courts should assume towards the
settled policy of the Government. In a late decision with which we are in full accord, Gambles vs.
Vanderbilt University (200 Southwestern Reporter, 510) the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court of
Tennessee writes:
We can see no objection to the application of public policy as a ratio decidendi. Every really new
question that comes before the courts is, in the last analysis, determined on that theory, when
not determined by differentiation of the principle of a prior case or line of cases, or by the aid of
analogies furnished by such prior case. In balancing conflicting solutions, that one is perceived to
tip the scales which the court believes will best promote the public welfare in its probable
operation as a general rule or principle. But public policy is not a thing inflexible. No court is wise
enough to forecast its influence in all possible contingencies. Distinctions must be made from
time to time as sound reason and a true sense of justice may dictate."
Our attempt at giving a brief history of the Philippines with reference to the so-called non-Christians has
been in vain, if we fail to realize that a consistent governmental policy has been effective in the Philippines
from early days to the present. The idea is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may
approach the highest conception of nationality. If all are to be equal before the law, all must be
approximately equal in intelligence. If the Philippines is to be a rich and powerful country, Mindoro must
be populated, and its fertile regions must be developed. The public policy of the Government of the
Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in
order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own
good and the good of the country.
Most cautiously should the power of this court to overrule the judgment of the Philippine Legislature, a
coordinate branch, be exercised. The whole tendency of the best considered cases is toward non-
interference on the part of the courts whenever political ideas are the moving consideration. Justice
Holmes, in one of the aphorisms for which he is justly famous, said that "constitutional law, like other
mortal contrivances, has to take some chances." (Blinn vs. Nelson [1911], 222 U.S., 1.) If in the final
decision of the many grave questions which this case presents, the courts must take "a chance," it should
be with a view to upholding the law, with a view to the effectuation of the general governmental policy,
and with a view to the court's performing its duty in no narrow and bigoted sense, but with that broad
conception which will make the courts as progressive and effective a force as are the other departments
of the Government.
We are of the opinion that action pursuant to section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive
a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the
laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery
and involuntary servitude. We are further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code
is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United
States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
Petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore,
not issue. This is the true ruling of the court. Costs shall be taxed against petitioners. So ordered.
11. TERRACE v. THOMPSON 263 US 197
Argued: Decided: November 12, 1923
[263 U.S. 197, 198] Mr. James B. Howe, of Seattle, Wash., for appellants.
[263 U.S. 197, 205] Mr. Lindsay L. Thompson, of Olympia, Wash, for appellee.
[263 U.S. 197, 211]
Mr. Justice BUTLER delivered the opinion of the Court.
Appellants brought this suit to enjoin the Attorney General of Washington from enforcing the Anti-
Alien Land Law of that state (chapter 50, Laws 1921), on the grounds that it is in conflict with
the due process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, with the treaty
between the United States and Japan, and with certain provisions of the Constitution of the state.
The appellants are residents of Washington. The Terraces are citizens of the United States and
of Washington. Nakatsuka was born in Japan of Japanese parents and is a subject of the emperor
of Japan. The Terraces are the owners of a tract of land in King county which is particularly
adapted to raising vegetables, and which for a number of years had been devoted to
that and other agricultural purposes. The complaint alleges that Nakatsuka is a capable farmer
and will be a desirable tenant of the land, that the Terraces desire to lease their land to him for
the period of five years, that he desires to accept such lease, and that the lease would be made
but [263 U.S. 197, 212] for the act complained of; and it is alleged that the defendant, as Attorney
General, has threatened to and will take steps to enforce the act against the appellants if they
enter into such lease, and will treat the leasehold interest as forfeited to the state, and will
prosecute the appellants criminally for violation of the act; that the act is so drastic and the
penalties attached to its violation are so great that neither of the appellants may make the lease
even to test the constitutionality of the act; and that, unless the court shall determine its validity
in this suit, the appellants will be compelled to submit to it, whether valid or invalid, and thereby
will be deprived of their property without due process of law and denied the equal protection of
the laws.
The Attorney General made a motion to dismiss the amended complaint upon the ground that it
did not state any matters of equity or facts sufficient to entitle the appellants to relief. The District
Court granted the motion and entered a decree of dismissal on the merits. The case is here on
appeal from that decree.
Section 331 of article 2 of the Constitution of Washington prohibits the ownership of land by aliens
other than those who in good faith have declared intention to become citizens of the United
States, except in certain [263 U.S. 197, 213] instances not here involved. The act2 provides in
substance that any such alien shall not own, take, have or hold the legal or equitable title, or right
to any benefit of any land as defined in the act, and that land conveyed to or for the use of aliens
in violation of the state constitution or of the act shall thereby be forfeited to the state, and it is
made a gross misdemeanor, punishable by fine or imprisonment or both, knowingly to transfer
land or the right to the control, possession or use of land to such an alien. It is also made a gross
misdemeanor for any such alien having title to such land or the control, possession or use thereof,
to refuse to disclose to the Attorney General or the prosecuting attorney the nature and extent of
his interest in the land. The Attorney General and the prosecuting attorneys of the several
counties are charged with the enforcement of the act. [263 U.S. 197, 214]
1. The Attorney General questions the jurisdiction of the court to grant equitable relief even if the
statute be unconstitutional. He contends that the appellants have a plain, adequate and speedy
remedy at law; that the case involves but a single transaction, and that, if the proposed lease is
made, the only remedy which the state has, so far as civil proceedings
are concerned, is an escheat proceeding in which the validity of the law complained of may be
finally determined; that an acquittal of the Terraces of the criminal offense created by the statute
would protect them from further prosecution, and that Nakatsuka is liable criminally only upon his
failure to disclose the fact that he holds an interest in the land.
The unconstitutionality of a state law is not of itself ground for equitable relief in the courts of the
United States. That a suit in equity does not lie where there is a plain adequate and complete
remedy at law is so well understood as not to require the citation of authorities. But the legal
remedy must be as complete, practical
and efficient as that which equity could afford. Boise Artesian Water Co. v. Boise City, 213 U.S.
276, 281 , 29 S. Sup. Ct. 426; Walla Walla v. Walla Walla Water Co., 172 U.S. 1, 11 , 12 S., 19
Sup. Ct. 77. Equity jurisdiction will be exercised to enjoin the threatened enforcement of a state
law which contravenes the federal Constitution wherever it is essential in order effectually to
protect property rights and the rights of persons against injuries otherwise irremediable; and in
such a case a person, who is an officer of the state is clothed with the duty of enforcing its laws
and who threatens and is about to commence proceedings, either civil or criminal, to enforce
such a law against parties affected, may be enjoined from such action by a Federal court of
equity. Cavanaugh v. Looney, 248 U.S. 453, 456 , 39 S. Sup. Ct. 142; Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S.
33, 37 , 38 S., 36 Sup. Ct. 7, L. R. A. 1916D, 545, Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283. See also Ex parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123, 155 , 162 S., 28 Sup. Ct. 441, 13 L. R. A. (N. S.) 932, 14 Ann. Cas. 764;
Adams v. Tanner, 244 U.S. 590, 592 , 37 S. Sup. Ct. 662, L. R. A. 1917F, 1163, Ann. Cas. 1917D,
973; Greene v. Louisville & Interurban [263 U.S. 197, 215] Railroad Co., 244 U.S. 499, 506 , 37
S. Sup. Ct. 673, Ann. Cas. 1917E, 88; Home Telephone & Telegraph Co. v. Los Angeles, 227
U.S. 278, 293 , 33 S. Sup. Ct. 312; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, 223 U.S. 605, 621 , 32 S. Sup.
Ct. 340; Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Andrews, 216 U.S. 165 , 30 Sup. Ct. 286; Dobbins v.
Los Angeles, 195 U.S. 223, 241 , 25 S. Sup. Ct. 18; Davis & Farnum Mfg. Co. v. Los Angel es,
189 U.S. 207, 217 , 23 S. Sup. Ct. 498.
The Terraces' property rights in the land include the right to use, lease and dispose of it for lawful
purposes (Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U.S. 60, 74 , 38 S. Sup. Ct. 16, L. R. A. 1918C, 210, Ann.
Cas. 1918A, 1201), and the Constitution protects these essential attributes of property (Holden
v. Hardy, 169 U.S. 366, 391 , 18 S. Sup. Ct. 383), and also protects Nakatsuka in his right to earn
a livelihood by following the ordinary occupations of life (Truax v. Raich, supra; Meyer v. State of
Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 , 43 Sup. Ct. 625). If, as claimed, the state act is repugnant to the due
process and equal protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, then its enforcement will
deprive the owners of their right to lease their land to Nakatsuka, and deprive him of his right to
pursue the occupation of farmer, and the threat to enforce it constitutes a continuing unlawful
restriction upon and infringement of the rights of appellants, as to which they have no remedy at
law which is as practical, efficient or adequate as the remedy in equity. And assuming, as
suggested by the Attorney General, that after the making of the lease the validity of the law might
be determined in proceedings to declare a forfeiture of the property to the state or in criminal
proceedings to punish the owners, it does not follow that they may not appeal to equity for relief.
No action at law can be initiated against them until after the consummation of the proposed lease.
The threatened enforcement of the law deters them. In order to obtain a remedy at law, the
owners, even if they would take the risk of fine, imprisonment and loss of property must continue
to suffer deprivation of their right to dispose of or lease their land to any such alien until one is
found who will join them [263 U.S. 197, 216] in violating the terms of the enactment and take
the risk of forfeiture. Similarly Nakatsuka must continue to be deprived of his right to follow his
occupation as farmer until a land owner is found who is willing to make a forbidden transfer of
land and take the risk of punishment. The owners have an interest in the freedom of the alien,
and he has an interest in their freedom, to make the lease. The state act purports to operate
directly upon the consummation of the proposed transaction between them, and the threat and
purpose of the Attorney General to enforce the punishments and forfeiture prescribed prevents
each from dealing with the other. Truax v. Raich, supra. They are not obliged to take the risk of
prosecution, fines and imprisonment and loss of property in order to secure an adjudication of
their rights. The complaint presents a case in which equitable relief may be had, if the law
complained of is shown to be in contravention of the federal Constitution.
2. Is the act repugnant to the due process clause or the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment?
Appellants contend that the act contravenes the due process clause in that it prohibits the owners
from making lawful disposition or use of their land, and makes it a criminal offense for them to
lease it to the alien, and prohibits him from following the occupation of farmer; and they contend
that it is repugnant to the equal protection clause in that aliens are divided into two classes,-those
who may and those who may not become citizens, one class being permitted, while the other is
forbidden, to own and as defined.
Alien inhabitants of a state, as well as all other persons within its jurisdiction, may invoke the
protection of these clauses. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 , 6 S. Sup. Ct. 1064; Truax
v. Raich, supra, 239 U.S. 39 , 36 Sup. Ct. 7, L. R. A. 1916D, 545 Ann. Cas. 1917B, 283. The
Fourteenth Amendment, as against the arbitrary and capricious or unjustly discriminatory action
of the state, protects the owners in their [263 U.S. 197, 217] right to lease and dispose of their
land for lawful purposes and the alien resident in his right to earn a living by following ordinary
occupations of the community, but it does not take away from the state those powers of police
that were reserved at the time of the adoption of the Constitution. Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U.S.
27, 31 , 5 S. Sup. Ct. 357; Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 663 , 8 S. Sup. Ct. 273; Powell v.
Pennsylvania, 127 U.S. 678, 683 , 8 S. Sup. Ct. 992, 1257; In re Kemmler, 136 U.S. 436, 449 ,
10 S. Sup. Ct. 930; Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 136 , 14 S. Sup. Ct. 499; Phillips v. Mobile,
208 U.S. 472, 479 , 28 S. Sup. Ct. 370; Hendrick v. Maryland, 235 U.S. 610, 622 , 623 S., 35
Sup. Ct. 140. And in the exercise of such powers the state has wide discretion in determining its
own public policy and what measures are necessary for its own protection and properly to
promote the safety, peace and good order of its people.
And, while Congress has exclusive jurisdiction over immigration, naturalization and the disposal
of the public domain, each state, in the absence of any treaty provision to the contrary, has power
to deny to aliens the right to own land within its borders. Hauenstein v. Lynham, 100 U.S. 483,
484 , 488 S.; Blythe v. Hinckley, 180 U.S. 333, 340 , 21 S. Sup. Ct. 390; Mr. Justice Field,
speaking for this court ( Phillips v. Moore, 100 U.S. 208 , at page 212), said:
'By the common law, an alien cannot acquire real property by operation of law, but may
take it by act of the grantor, and hold it until office found; that is, until the fact of alienage
is authoritatively established by a public officer, upon an inquest held at the instance of
the government.' 3 [263 U.S. 197, 218] State legislation applying alike and equally to
all aliens, withholding from them the right to own land, cannot be said to be capricious or
to amount to an arbitrary deprivation of liberty or property, or to transgress the due
process clause.
This brings us to a consideration of appellants' contention that the act contravenes the equal
protection clause. That clause secures equal protection to all in the enjoyment of their rights
under like circumstances. In re Kemmler, supra; Giozza v. Tiernan, 148 U.S. 657, 662 , 13 S.
Sup. Ct. 721. But this does not forbid every distinction in the law of a state between citizens and
aliens resident therein. In Truax v. Corrigan, 257 U.S. 312 , at page 337, 42 Sup. Ct. 124, at page
131 (66 L. Ed. 254), this court said:
'In adjusting legislation to the need of the people of a state, the legislature has a wide
discretion and it may be fully conceded that perfect uniformity of treatment of all persons
is neither practical nor desirable, that classification of persons is constantly necessary .
... Classification is the most inveterate of our reasoning processes. We can scarcely think
or speak without consciously or unconsciously exercising it. It must therefore obtain in
and determine legislation; but it must regard real resemblances and real differences
between things, and persons, and class them in accordance with their pertinence to the
purpose in hand.'
The rights, privileges and duties of aliens differ widely from those of citizens; and those of alien
declarants differ substantially from those of nondeclarants. Formerly in many of the states the
right to vote and hold office was extended to declarants, and many important offices have been
held by them. But these rights have not been granted to nondeclarants. By various acts of
Congress,4 [263 U.S. 197, 219] declarants have been made liable to military duty, but no act
has imposed that duty on nondeclarants. The fourth paragraph of article 1 of the treaty (37 Stat.
1504), invoked by the appellants, provides that the citizens or subjects of each shall be exempt
in the territories of the
other from compulsory military service either on land or sea, in the regular forces, or in the
national guard, or in the militia; also from all contributions imposed in lieu of personal service,
and from all forced loans or military exactions or contributions. The alien's formally declared bona
fide intention to renounce forever all allegiance and fidelity to the sovereignty to which he lately
has been a subject, and to become a citizen of the United States and permanently reside therein
markedly distinguishes him from an ineligible alien or an eligible alien who has not so declared.
By the statute in question all aliens who have not in good faith declared intention to become
citizens of the United States, as specified in section 1(a), are called 'aliens,' and it is provided
that they shall not 'own' 'land,' as defined in clauses (d) and (b) of section 1 respectively. The
class so created includes all, but is not limited to, aliens not eligible to become citizens. Eligible
aliens who have not declared their intention to become citizens are included, and the act provides
that unless declarants be admitted to citizenship within seven years after the declaration is made,
bad faith will be presumed. This leaves the class permitted so to own land made up of citizens
and aliens who may, and who intend to, become citizens, and who in good faith have made the
declaration required by the naturalization laws. The inclusion of good faith declarants in the same
class with citizens does not unjustly discriminate against aliens who are ineligible or [263 U.S.
197, 220] against eligible aliens who have failed to declare their intention. The classification is
based on eligibility and purpose to naturalize. Eligible aliens are free white persons and persons
of African nativity or descent. 6 Congress is not trammeled, and it may grant or withhold the
privilege of naturalization upon any grounds or without any reason, as it sees fit. But it is not to
be supposed that its acts defining eligibility are arbitrary or unsupported by reasonable
consideration of public policy.
The state properly may assume that the considerations upon which Congress made such
classification are substantial and reasonable. Generally speaking, the natives of European
countries are eligible. Japanese, Chinese and Malays are not. Appellants' contention that the
state act discriminates arbitrarily against Nakatsuka and other ineligible aliens because of their
race and color is without foundation. All persons of whatever color or race who have not declared
their intention in good faith to become citizens are prohibited from so owning agricultural lands.
Two classes of aliens inevitably result from the naturalization laws-those who may and those who
may not become citizens. The rule established by Congress on this subject, in and of itself,
furnishes a reasonable basis for classification in a state law withholding from aliens the privilege
of land ownership as defined in the act. We agree with the court below (274 Fed. 841, 846) that:
'It is obvious that one who is not a citizen and cannot become one lacks an interest in,
and the power to effectually work for the welfare of, the state, and, so lacking, the state
may rightfully deny him the right to own and lease real estate within its boundaries. If one
incapable of citizenship may lease or own real estate, it is within the [263 U.S. 197, 221]
realm of possibility that every foot of land within the state might pass to the ownership or
possession of noncitizens.'
And we think it is clearly within the power of the state to include non declarant eligible aliens and
ineligible aliens in the same prohibited class. Reasons supporting discrimination against aliens
who may but who will not naturalize are obvious.
Truax v. Raich, supra, does not support the appellants' contention. In that case the court held to
be repugnant to the Fourteenth Amendment an act of the Legislature of Arizona making it a
criminal offense for an employer of more than five workers at any one time, regardless of kind or
class of work, or sex of workers, to employ less than 80 per cent. qualified electors or native-born
citizens of the United States. In the
opinion it was pointed out that the legislation there in question did not relate to the devolution of
real property, but that the discrimination was imposed upon the conduct of ordinary private
enterprise covering the entire field of industry with the exception of enterprises that were relatively
very small. It was said that the right to work for a living in the common occupations of the
community is a part of the freedom which it was the purpose of the Fourteenth Amendment to
secure.
In the case before us, the thing forbidden is very different. It is not an opportunity to earn a living
in common occupations of the community, but it is the privilege of owning or controlling
agricultural land within the state. The quality and allegiance of those who own, occupy and use
the farm lands within its borders are matters of highest importance and affect the safety and
power of the state itself.
The Terraces, who are citizens, have no right safeguarded by the Fourteenth Amendment to
lease their land to aliens lawfully forbidden to take or have such lease. [263 U.S. 197, 222] The
state act is not repugnant to the equal protection clause and does not contravene the Fourteenth
Amendment.
3. The state act, in our opinion, is not in conflict with the treaty between the United States and
Japan. The preamble declares it to be 'a treaty of commerce and navigation,' and indicates that
it was entered into for the purpose of establishing the rules to govern commercial intercourse
between the countries.
The only provision that relates to owning or leasing land is in the first paragraph of article 1, which
is as follows:
'The citizens or subjects of each of the high contracting parties shall have liberty to enter,
travel and reside in the territories of the other to carry on trade, wholesale and retail, to
own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories, warehouses and shops, to employ
agents of their choice, to lease land for residential and commercial purposes, and
generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native
citizens or subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there established.'
For the purpose of bringing Nakatsuka within the protection of the treaty, the amended complaint
alleges that, in addition to being a capable farmer, he is engaged in the business of trading,
wholesale and retail, in farm products and shipping the same in intrastate, interstate and foreign
commerce, and, instead of purchasing such farm products, he has produced, and desires to
continue to produce, his own farm products for the purpose of selling them in such wholesale and
retail trade, and if he is prevented from leasing land for the purpose of producing farm products
for such trade he will be prevented from engaging in trade and the incidents to trade, as he is
authorized to do under the treaty. [263 U.S. 197, 223] To prevail on this point, appellants must
show conflict between the state act and the treaty. Each state, in the absence of any treaty
provision conferring the right may enact laws prohibiting aliens from owning land within its
borders. Unless the right to own or lease land is given by the treaty, no question of conflict can
arise. We think that the treaty not only contains no provision giving Japanese the right to own or
lease land for agricultural purposes, but, when viewed in the light of the negotiations leading up
to its consummation, the language shows that the high contracting parties respectively intended
to withhold a treaty grant of that right to the citizens or subjects of either in the territories of the
other. The right to 'carry on trade' or 'to own or lease and occupy houses, manufactories,
warehouses and shops,' or 'to lease land for residential and commercial purposes,' or 'to do
anything incident to or necessary for trade' cannot be said to include the right to own or lease or
to have any title to or interest in land for agricultural purposes. The enumeration of rights to own
or lease for other specified purposes impliedly negatives the right to own or lease land for these
purposes. A careful reading of the treaty suffices in our opinion to negative the claim asserted by
appellant that it conflicts with the state act.
But if the language left the meaning of its provisions doubtful or obscure, the circumstances of
the making of the treaty, as set forth in the opinion of the District Court (supra, 274 Fed. 844,
845), would resolve all doubts against the appellants' contention. The letter of Secretary of State
Bryan to Viscount Chinda, July 16, 1913, shows that, in accordance with the desire of Japan, the
right to own land was not conferred. And it appears that the right to lease land for other than
residential and commercial purposes was deliberately withheld by substituting the words of the
treaty, 'to lease land for residential and commercial purposes,' for a more comprehensive clause
[263 U.S. 197, 224] contained in an earlier draft of the instrument, namely, 'to lease land for
residential, commercial, industrial, manufacturing and other lawful purposes.'
4. The act complained of is not repugnant to section 33 of article 2 of the state Constitution.
That section provides that 'the ownership of lands by aliens ... is prohibited in this state. ...'
Appellants assert that the proposed lease of farm land for five years is not 'ownership,' and is not
prohibited by that clause of the state Constitution and cannot be forbidden by the state
Legislature. That position is untenable. In State v. O'Connell, 121 Wash. 542, 209 Pac. 865, a
suit for the purpose of escheating to the state an undivided one-half interest in land, or the
proceeds thereof, held in trust for the benefit of an alien, a subject of the British empire, decided
since this appeal was taken, the Supreme Court of Washington held that the statute in question
did not contravene this provision of the Constitution of that state. The question whether or not a
state statute conflicts with the Constitution of the state is settled by the decision of its highest
court. Carstairs v. Cochran, 193 U.S. 10, 16 , 24 S. Sup. Ct. 318. This court 'is without authority
to review and revise the construction affixed to a state statute as to a state matter by the court of
last resort of the state.' Quong Ham Wah Co. v. Industrial Commission, 255 U.S. 445, 448 , 41
S. Sup. Ct. 373, 374 (65 L. Ed. 723), and cases cited.
The decree of the District Court is affirmed.
Mr. Justice McREYNOLDS and Mr. Justice BRANDEIS think there is no justiciable question
involved and that the case should have been dismissed on that ground.
Mr. Justice SUTHERLAND took no part in the consideration or decision of this case.
Footnotes
[ Footnote 1 ] Section 33. The ownership of lands by aliens, other than those who in good faith
have declared their intention to become citizens of the United States, is prohibited in this state,
except where acquired by inheritance, under mortgage or in good faith in the ordinary course of
justice in the collection of debts; and all conveyances of lands hereafter made to any alien directly
or in trust for such alien, shall be void: Provided, that the provisions of this section shall not apply
to lands containing valuable deposits of minerals, metals, iron, coal, or fire clay, and the
necessary land for mills and machinery to be used in the development thereof and the
manufacture of the products therefrom. Every corporation, the majority of the capital stock of
which is owned by aliens, shall be considered an alien for the purposes of this prohibition.
[ Footnote 2 ] Section 1. In this act, unless the context otherwise requires.
(a) 'Alien' does not include an alien who has in good faith declared his intention to become a
citizen of the United States, but does include all other aliens and all corporations and other
organized groups of persons a majority of whose capital stock is owned or controlled by aliens
or a majority of whose members are aliens;
(b) 'Land' does not include lands containing valuable deposits of minerals, metals, iron, coal or
fire clay or the necessary land for mills and machinery to be used in the development thereof and
the manufacture of the products therefrom, but does include every other kind of land and every
interest therein and right to the control, possession, use, enjoyment, rents, issues or profits
thereof. ...
(d) To 'own' means to have the legal or equitable title to or the right to any benefit of;
(e) 'Title' includes every kind of legal or equitable title. ...
Section 2. An alien shall not own land or take or hold title thereto. No person shall take or hold
land or title to land for an alien. Land now held by or for aliens in violation of the constitution of
the state is forfeited to and declared to be the property of the state. Land hereafter conveyed to
or for the use of aliens in violation of the constitution or of this act shall thereby be forfeited to
and become the property of the state.
14. G.R. No. 77859 May 25, 1988
CENTURY TEXTILE MILLS, INC. and ALFREDO T. ESCAÑO, petitioners,
vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, HON. LABOR ARBITER FELIPE P. PATI, and EDUARDO
CALANGI, respondents.
Melanio L. Zoreta for petitioners.
The Solicitor General for public respondent.
Alfonso P. Ancheta, Jr. for private respondent.
FELICIANO, J.:
Since 13 December 1974, private respondent Eduardo Calangi had been employed at the factory of
petitioner Century Textile Mills, Inc. where he worked initially as an apprentice and later on as a
machine operator in the Finishing Department. Effective 10 June 1983, however, petitioner
Corporation, acting through its company officers, 1 placed him under preventive suspension and, on 27
July 1983, completely terminated his services with the company. Private respondent Calangi was
accused of having masterminded a criminal plot against Melchor Meliton and Antonio Santos, two of
his supervisors at his place of work.
The events that led to private respondent's dismissal are as follows:
According to Rodolfo Marin (a factory co-worker of private respondent Calangi), at around 12:15 a.m.
on 4 June 1983 and within company premises, he chanced upon "Gatchie" Torrena (a machine operator
at petitioner's factory) and noticed the latter mixing some substance with the drinking water contained
in a pitcher from which Meliton and Santos regularly drank. Before anyone could take a drink from the
pitcher, Marin reported what he had observed to Meliton who, in turn, informed Santos of the same.
Soon after, Meliton and Santos took possession of the pitcher of water and filed a formal report of the
incident with company management. 2 The contents of the pitcher were subsequently brought to and
analyzed by chemists at the Philippine Constabulary Crime Laboratory at Camp Crame, Quezon City
who found the presence of a toxic chemical (formaldehyde) therein. 3
In the police investigation that followed, Torrena confessed that private respondent Calangi personally
instructed him, and he agreed, to place formaldehyde in the pitcher of water. Torrena also admitted
that he and private respondent were then motivated by a desire to avenge themselves upon Meliton
and Santos, both of whom had instigated their (i.e., Torrena's and private respondent's) suspension
from work several times in the past. 4 These circumstances moved petitioner Corporation preventively
to suspend Torrena and private respondent Calangi, and eventually to dismiss them from its employ.
Additionally, criminal charges for attempted murder were filed against these two employees with the
Office of the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal.
On 11 October 1983, private respondent Calangi filed a Complaint 5 for illegal dismissal (docketed as
Case No. NLRC-NCR-10-4518-83) with the Arbitration Branch, National Capital Region, of the then
Ministry of Labor and Employment. Among other things, private respondent alleged in his complaint
that "[p]rior to his preventive suspension neither the company nor any of its officers furnished him
[with] a copy of their charges, if any, nor afforded him the opportunity to answer the same and defend
himself." Hence, private respondent claimed entitlement to the following:
A. Moral damages P50,000.00
Actual damages
a) Wages for 3 years P6,520.80
b) ECOLA for 3 years 3, 841.60
c) 13th month pay for
3 years 903.60
d) Vacation and Sick
Leave of 15 days each 627.00 11,893.00
Exemplary damages 25,000.00
Attorney's fees 17,398.60
TOTAL P104,291.60
A prayer for "such other reliefs and remedies consequent upon the premises" was likewise set out in
the complaint.
In a Decision 6 dated 16 August 1984, the Labor Arbiter dismissed private respondent's Complaint. The
Labor Arbiter found that not only was the evidence against private respondent Calangi "so
overwhelming" and "sufficient enough" to justify his dismissal, but that private respondent had himself
failed inexplicably to deny or controvert the charges against him.
An appeal was brought by private respondent Calangi before the public respondent National Labor
Relations Commission, which agency, on 3 December 1985, rendered a Decision, 7 the dispositive
portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, with all the foregoing considerations, let the appealed decision dated 27 August 1984 be,
as it is hereby REVERSED. Accordingly, complainant's dismissal is hereby declared to be illegal, and
consequently, respondents [petitioners] are hereby ordered to reinstate Eduardo Calangi to his former
or equivalent position without loss of seniority and other benefits, with full backwages from 27 July
1983 until he is actually reinstated.
SO ORDERED.
Petitioner Corporations' Motion for Reconsideration was denied on 4 April 1986. Sometime in
November of 1986, the Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution directing petitioners to pay private
respondent Calangi the amount of P54,747.74 representing the latter's backwages, 13th month pay,
living allowance, and vacation and sick leave — i.e., actual damages.
The present Petition for certiorari with Preliminary Injunction or Restraining Order was filed with this
Court on 3 April 1987. The Court issued a Temporary Restraining Orders 8 on 8 April 1987 and, on 24
August 1987, issued a Resolution 9 giving due course to the Petition and directing the parties to submit
their respective memoranda.
The Petition at bar raises the following issues for consideration: (1) whether or not private respondent
Calangi was illegally dismissed from his job as a machine operator; and (2) assuming he was illegally
dismissed, whether or not petitioner Corporation can be ordered legally (a) to reinstate private
respondent Calangi to his former position in the company, with full backwages and without loss of
seniority rights and other benefits, considering that such relief had not been sought by private
respondent in his complaint, and (b) to pay private respondent an amount for actual damages in excess
of what had been claimed by the latter in his Complaint.
We sustain the ruling of public respondent Commission that private respondent Calangi had been
dismissed without just cause from his employment by petitioner Corporation.
Public respondent Commission found that private respondent Calangi was effectively denied his right
to due process in that, prior to his preventive suspension and the termination of his services, he had
not been given the opportunity either to affirm or refute the charges proffered against him by
petitioner Corporation. Petitioners allege however that private respondent Calangi had been
previously informed of and given the chance to answer the company's accusations against him, but
that he had "kept silent" all the while. The following Memorandum issued by petitioner's Personnel
Manager on 10 June 1983 (Calangi's first day of preventive suspension) was cited in this connection:
MEMO: TO ALL CONCERNED
SUBJ.: Under Preventive Suspension Employees. Please be advised that the following employees are
under preventive suspension (indefinite) namely:
1. Eduardo Calangi--effective June 10, 1983
2. Gatchie Torrena--effective June 10, 1983
GROUND
Policy Instruction No. 10 of the New Labor Code of the Philippines, Revised Edition 1982.
NOTE: Decision about the indebtedness suspension of concerned employees was reached after the
meeting between the union and the management.
Be guided accordingly.
MANAGEMENT
(SGD.) Jovencio G. Tolentino
Personnel Manager
Petitioners contend that the above Memorandum "clearly shows that prior investigation and
consultation with the union was made," and "will therefore negate the theory of respondents that
respondent Calangi was not afforded the chance to present his side for the memo itself speaks
otherwise."
The procedure that an employer wishing to terminate the services of an employee must follow, is
spelled out in the Labor Code:
ART. 278. Miscellaneous provisions. —
xxx xxx xxx
However, the employer shall furnish the worker whose employment is sought to be terminated a
written notice containing a statement of the causes for termination and shall afford the latter ample
opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative if he so desires
in accordance with company rules and regulations promulgated pursuant to guidelines set by the
[Department] of Labor and Employment. Any decision taken by the employer shall be without
prejudice to the right of the worker to contest the validity and legality of his dismissing by filing a
complaint with the regional branch of the National Labor Relations Commission. The burden of proving
that the termination was for a valid or authorized cause shall rest on the employer. The [Department]
may suspend the effects of the termination pending resolution of the case in the event of a prima facie
finding by the Ministry that the termination may cause a serious labor dispute or is in implementation
of a mass lay-off.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
Rule XIV, Book V of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Labor Code reiterates the above
requirements:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 2. Notice of dismissal. — Any employer who seeks to dismiss a worker shall furnish him a written
notice stating the particular acts or omission constituting the grounds for his dismissal. In case of
abandonment of work, the notice shall be served at the worker's last known address.
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 5. Answer and hearing. — The worker may answer the allegations stated against him in the notice
of dismissal within a reasonable period from receipt of such notice. The employer shall afford the
worker ample opportunity to be heard and to defend himself with the assistance of his representative,
if he so desires.
SEC. 6. Decision to dismiss. — The employer shall immediately notify a worker in writing of a decision
to dismiss him stating clearly the reasons therefor.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The twin requirements of notice and hearing constitute essential elements of due process in cases of
employee dismissal: the requirement of notice is intended to inform the employee concerned of the
employer's intent to dismiss and the reason for the proposed dismissal; upon the other hand, the
requirement of hearing affords the employee an opportunity to answer his employer's charges against
him and accordingly to defend himself therefrom before dismissal is effected. Neither of these two
requirements can be dispensed with without running afoul of the due process requirement of the 1987
Constitution.
The record of this case is bereft of any indication that a hearing or other gathering was in fact held
where private respondent Calangi was given a reasonable opportunity to confront his accuser(s) and
to defend against the charges made by the latter. Petitioner Corporation's "prior consultation" with
the labor union with which private respondent Calangi was affiliated, was legally insufficient. So far as
the record shows, neither petitioner nor the labor union actually advised Calangi of the matters at
issue. The Memorandum of petitioner's Personnel Manager certainly offered no helpful particulars. It
is important to stress that the rights of an employee whose services are sought to be terminated to be
informed beforehand of his proposed dismissal (or suspension) as well as of the reasons therefor, and
to be afforded an adequate opportunity to defend himself from the charges levelled against him, are
rights personal to the employee. Those rights were not satisfied by petitioner Corporation's obtaining
the consent of or consulting with the labor union; such consultation or consent was not a substitute for
actual observance of those rights of private respondent Calangi. The employee can waive those rights,
if he so chooses, but the union cannot waive them for him. That the private respondent simply 'kept
silent" all the while, is not adequate to show an effective waiver of his rights. Notice and opportunity
to be heard must be accorded by an employer even though the employee does not affirmatively
demand them.
Investigation of the alleged attempt to poison the drinking water of the two (2) supervisors of the
private respondent was conducted by the Cainta police authorities. These authorities interrogated and
took the sworn statements of Messrs. Marin, Torrena, Meliton and Santos who, in one way or another,
had been involved in such incident. Petitioners argue that the decision to place private respondent
Calangi under preventive suspension and subsequently to terminate his services was arrived at only
after the incident complained of, and Mr. Calangi, had been investigated by the company. There is,
once again, nothing in the record to show that private respondent Calangi been interrogated by the
Cainta police authorities or by anyone else; indeed, it appears that practically everybody, save Calangi,
was so interrogated by the police. If petitioner Corporation did notify and investigate private
respondent and did hold a hearing, petitioners have succeeded in keeping such facts off the record. It
needs no documentation, but perhaps it should be stressed, that this Court can act only on the basis of
matters which have been submitted in evidence and made a part of the record.
Additionally, the Court notes that the application filed by petitioner Corporation with the Ministry of
Labor and Employment for clearance to suspend or terminate the services of Mr. Calangi, cited as
ground therefor "[Calangi's] frustrated plan to poison Mr. Antonio Santos and Mr. Melchor Meliton
last June 5, 1983." This ground, so far as can be gathered from the allegations of petitioners in their
pleadings and from the evidence of record, both in the public respondent Commission and in this Court,
is anchored mainly, if not wholly on Mr. Torrena's sworn statement, given to the Cainta police
authorities, that both he (Torrena) and private respondent had conspired with each other to inflict
physical harm upon the persons of Messrs. Meliton and Santos. A finding of private respondent's
participation in the alleged criminal conspiracy cannot, however, be made to rest solely on the
unilateral declaration of Mr. Torrena himself a confirmed "co-conspirator." Such declaration must be
corroborated by other competent and convincing evidence. In. the absence of such other evidence, Mr.
Torrena's "confession" implicating Mr. Calangi must be received with considerable caution. The very
least that petitioner Corporation should have done was to confront private respondent with Torrena's
sworn statement; the record does not show that petitioner Corporation did so. The burden of showing
the existence of a just cause for terminating the services of private respondent Calangi lay on the
petitioners. Petitioners have not discharged that burden.
It remains only to note that the criminal complaint for attempted murder against Mr. Calangi was
dismissed by the Provincial Fiscal of Rizal. 10
Coming now to the second issue raised by petitioners in their Pleadings, Article 280 of the Labor Code,
as amended states:
Art. 280. -Security of Tenure. — In case of regular employment, the employer shall not terminate the
services of an employee except for a just cause or when authorized by this Title. An employee who is
unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and to
his backwages computed from the time his compensation was withheld from him up to the time of his
reinstatement. (Emphasis supplied)
We have held in the past that both reinstatement without loss of seniority rights, and payment of
backwages are the normal consequences of a finding that an employee has been illegally dismissed,
and which remedies together make the dismissed employee whole. 11 A finding of illegal dismissal
having been correctly made in this case by public respondent Commission, private respondent is, as a
matter of right, entitled to receive both types of relief made available in Article 280 of the Labor Code,
as amended. It matters not that private respondent Calangi had omitted in his complaint filed in Case
No. NLRC-NCR-10-4518-83 a claim for reinstatement without loss of seniority rights for he is entitled to
such relief as the facts alleged and proved warrant. 12
In view of the finding of illegal dismissal in this case, petitioner Corporation is liable to private
respondent Calangi for payment of the latter's backwages for three (3) years, without qualification and
deduction. Considering the circumstances of this case, however, the Court believes that reinstatement
of private respondent to his former position—or to any other equivalent position in the company —
will not serve the best interests of the parties involved. Petitioner Corporation should not be compelled
to take back in its fold an employee who, at least in the minds of his employers, poses a significant
threat to the lives and safety of company workers. Consequently, we hold that private respondent
should be given his separation pay in lieu of such reinstatement. The amount of separation pay shall
be equal to private respondent's one-half (1/2) month's salary for every year of service, to be computed
from 13 December 1974 (date of first employment) until 10 June 1986 (three years after date of illegal
dismissal). 13
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. The Temporary Restraining Order and the
Resolutions issued on 8 April 1987 and 24 August 1987, respectively, by the Court in this case are
WITHDRAWN. The Decision of public rAshville respondent Commission in Case No. NLRC-NCR-10-4518-
83 is hereby AFFIRMED, subject the modifications that petitioners shall pay private respondent Calangi:
(a) three (3) years back wages without qualification or deduction, and (b) separation pay, computed as
above indicated, in lieu of reinstatement. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
16. G.R. No. L-11390 March 26, 1918
EL BANCO ESPAÑOL-FILIPINO, plaintiff-appellant, vs. VICENTE PALANCA, administrator of the estate

of Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, defendant-appellant.
Aitken and DeSelms for appellant. Hartigan and Welch for appellee.
STREET, J.:
This action was instituted upon March 31, 1908, by "El Banco Espanol-Filipino" to foreclose a
mortgage upon various parcels of real property situated in the city of Manila. The mortgage in
question is dated June 16, 1906, and was executed by the original defendant herein, Engracio Palanca
Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, as security for a debt owing by him to the bank. Upon March 31, 1906,
the debt amounted to P218,294.10 and was drawing interest at the rate of 8 per centum per annum,
payable at the end of each quarter. It appears that the parties to this mortgage at that time estimated
the value of the property in question at P292,558, which was about P75,000 in excess of the
indebtedness. After the execution of this instrument by the mortgagor, he returned to China which
appears to have been his native country; and he there died, upon January 29, 1810, without again
returning to the Philippine Islands.
As the defendant was a nonresident at the time of the institution of the present action, it was
necessary for the plaintiff in the foreclosure proceeding to give notice to the defendant by publication
pursuant to section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure. An order for publication was accordingly
obtained from the court, and publication was made in due form in a newspaper of the city of Manila.
At the same time that the order of the court should deposit in the post office in a stamped envelope
a copy of the summons and complaint directed to the defendant at his last place of residence, to wit,
the city of Amoy, in the Empire of China. This order was made pursuant to the following provision
contained in section 399 of the Code of Civil Procedure:
In case of publication, where the residence of a nonresident or absent defendant is known,

the judge must direct a copy of the summons and complaint to be forthwith deposited by the
clerk in the post-office, postage prepaid, directed to the person to be served, at his place of
residence
Whether the clerk complied with this order does not affirmatively appear. There is, however, among
the papers pertaining to this case, an affidavit, dated April 4, 1908, signed by Bernardo Chan y Garcia,
an employee of the attorneys of the bank, showing that upon that date he had deposited in the
Manila post-office a registered letter, addressed to Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng, at Manila,
containing copies of the complaint, the plaintiff's affidavit, the summons, and the order of the court
directing publication as aforesaid. It appears from the postmaster's receipt that Bernardo probably
used an envelope obtained from the clerk's office, as the receipt purports to show that the letter
emanated from the office.
The cause proceeded in usual course in the Court of First Instance; and the defendant not having
appeared, judgment was, upon July 2, 1908, taken against him by default. Upon July 3, 1908, a
decision was rendered in favor of the plaintiff. In this decision it was recited that publication had been
properly made in a periodical, but nothing was said about this notice having been given mail. The
court, upon this occasion, found that the indebtedness of the defendant amounted to P249,355. 32,
with interest from March 31, 1908. Accordingly it was ordered that the defendant should, on or
before July 6, 1908, deliver said amount to the clerk of the court to be applied to the satisfaction of
the judgment, and it was declared that in case of the failure of the defendant to satisfy the judgment
within such period, the mortgage property located in the city of Manila should be exposed to public
sale. The payment contemplated in said order was never made; and upon July 8, 1908, the court
ordered the sale of the property. The sale took place upon July 30, 1908, and the property was bought
in by the bank for the sum of P110,200. Upon August 7, 1908, this sale was confirmed by the court.
About seven years after the confirmation of this sale, or to the precise, upon June 25, 1915, a motion
was made in this cause by Vicente Palanca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant,
Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, wherein the applicant requested the court to set aside
the order of default of July 2, 1908, and the judgment rendered upon July 3, 1908, and to vacate all
the proceedings subsequent thereto. The basis of this application, as set forth in the motion itself,
was that the order of default and the judgment rendered thereon were void because the court had
never acquired jurisdiction over the defendant or over the subject of the action.
At the hearing in the court below the application to vacate the judgment was denied, and from this
action of the court Vicente Planca, as administrator of the estate of the original defendant, has
appealed. No other feature of the case is here under consideration than such as related to the action
of the court upon said motion.
The case presents several questions of importance, which will be discussed in what appears to be the
sequence of most convenient development. In the first part of this opinion we shall, for the purpose
of argument, assume that the clerk of the Court of First Instance did not obey the order of the court
in the matter of mailing the papers which he was directed to send to the defendant in Amoy; and in
this connection we shall consider, first, whether the court acquired the necessary jurisdiction to
enable it to proceed with the foreclosure of the mortgage and, secondly, whether[m1] those
proceedings were conducted in such manner as to constitute due process of law.
The word "jurisdiction," as applied to the faculty of exercising judicial power, is used in several
different, though related, senses since it may have reference (1) to the authority of the court to
entertain a particular kind of action or to administer a particular kind of relief, or it may refer to the
power of the court over the parties, or (2) over the property which is the subject to the litigation.
The sovereign authority which organizes a court determines the nature and extent of its powers in
general and thus fixes its competency or jurisdiction with reference to the actions which it may
entertain and the relief it may grant.
Jurisdiction over the person is acquired by the voluntary appearance of a party in court and his
submission to its authority, or it is acquired by the coercive power of legal process exerted over the
person.
Jurisdiction over the property which is the subject of the litigation may result either from a seizure of
the property under legal process, whereby it is brought into the actual custody of the law, or it may
result from the institution of legal proceedings wherein, under special provisions of law, the power
of the court over the property is recognized and made effective. In the latter case the property,
though at all times within the potential power of the court, may never be taken into actual custody
at all. An illustration of the jurisdiction acquired by actual seizure is found in attachment
proceedings, where the property is seized at the beginning of the action, or some subsequent stage
of its progress, and held to abide the final event of the litigation. An illustration of what we term
potential jurisdiction over the res, is found in the proceeding to register the title of land under our
system for the registration of land. Here the court, without taking actual physical control over the
property assumes, at the instance of some person claiming to be owner, to exercise a jurisdiction
in rem over the property and to adjudicate the title in favor of the petitioner against all the world.
In the terminology of American law the action to foreclose a mortgage is said to be a proceeding
quasi in rem, by which is expressed the idea that while it is not strictly speaking an action in rem
yet it partakes of that nature and is substantially such. The expression "action in rem" is, in its
narrow application, used only with reference to certain proceedings in courts of admiralty wherein
the property alone is treated as responsible for the claim or obligation upon which the proceedings
are based. The action quasi rem differs from the true action in rem in the circumstance that in the
former an individual is named as defendant, and the purpose of the proceeding is to subject his
interest therein to the obligation or lien burdening the property. All proceedings having for their
sole object the sale or other disposition of the property of the defendant, whether by attachment,
foreclosure, or other form of remedy, are in a general way thus designated. The judgment entered
in these proceedings is conclusive only between the parties.
In speaking of the proceeding to foreclose a mortgage the author of a well known treaties, has said:
Though nominally against person, such suits are to vindicate liens; they proceed upon seizure;
they treat property as primarily indebted; and, with the qualification above-mentioned, they
are substantially property actions. In the civil law, they are styled hypothecary actions, and
their sole object is the enforcement of the lien against the res; in the common law, they
would be different in chancery did not treat the conditional conveyance as a mere
hypothecation, and the creditor's right ass an equitable lien; so, in both, the suit is real action
so far as it is against property, and seeks the judicial recognition of a property debt, and an
order for the sale of the res. (Waples, Proceedings In Rem. sec. 607.)
It is true that in proceedings of this character, if the defendant for whom publication is made appears,
the action becomes as to him a personal action and is conducted as such. This, however, does not
affect the proposition that where the defendant fails to appear the action is quasi in rem; and it
should therefore be considered with reference to the principles governing actions in rem.
There is an instructive analogy between the foreclosure proceeding and an action of attachment,
concerning which the Supreme Court of the United States has used the following language:
If the defendant appears, the cause becomes mainly a suit in personam, with the added
incident, that the property attached remains liable, under the control of the court, to answer
to any demand which may be established against the defendant by the final judgment of the
court. But, if there is no appearance of the defendant, and no service of process on him, the
case becomes, in its essential nature, a proceeding in rem, the only effect of which is to
subject the property attached to the payment of the defendant which the court may find to
be due to the plaintiff. (Cooper vs. Reynolds, 10 Wall., 308.)
In an ordinary attachment proceeding, if the defendant is not personally served, the preliminary
seizure is to, be considered necessary in order to confer jurisdiction upon the court. In this case the
lien on the property is acquired by the seizure; and the purpose of the proceedings is to subject the
property to that lien. If a lien already exists, whether created by mortgage, contract, or statute, the
preliminary seizure is not necessary; and the court proceeds to enforce such lien in the manner
provided by law precisely as though the property had been seized upon attachment. (Roller vs. Holly,
176 U. S., 398, 405; 44 L. ed., 520.) It results that the mere circumstance that in an attachment the
property may be seized at the inception of the proceedings, while in the foreclosure suit it is not
taken into legal custody until the time comes for the sale, does not materially affect the fundamental
principle involved in both cases, which is that the court is here exercising a jurisdiction over the
property in a proceeding directed essentially in rem.
Passing now to a consideration of the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance in a mortgage
foreclosure, it is evident that the court derives its authority to entertain the action primarily from the
statutes organizing the court. The jurisdiction of the court, in this most general sense, over the cause
of action is obvious and requires no comment. Jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, if
acquired at all in such an action, is obtained by the voluntary submission of the defendant or by the
personal service of process upon him within the territory where the process is valid. If, however, the
defendant is a nonresident and, remaining beyond the range of the personal process of the court,
refuses to come in voluntarily, the court never acquires jurisdiction over the person at all. Here the
property itself is in fact the sole thing which is impleaded and is the responsible object which is the
subject of the exercise of judicial power. It follows that the jurisdiction of the court in such case is
based exclusively on the power which, under the law, it possesses over the property; and any
discussion relative to the jurisdiction of the court over the person of the defendant is entirely apart
from the case. The jurisdiction of the court over the property, considered as the exclusive object of
such action, is evidently based upon the following conditions and considerations, namely: (1) that the
property is located within the district; (2) that the purpose of the litigation is to subject the property
by sale to an obligation fixed upon it by the mortgage; and (3) that the court at a proper stage of the
proceedings takes the property into custody, if necessary, and expose it to sale for the purpose of
satisfying the mortgage debt. An obvious corollary is that no other relief can be granted in this
proceeding than such as can be enforced against the property.
We may then, from what has been stated, formulated the following proposition relative to the
foreclosure proceeding against the property of a nonresident mortgagor who fails to come in and
submit himself personally to the jurisdiction of the court: (I) That the jurisdiction of the court is
derived from the power which it possesses over the property; (II) that jurisdiction over the person is
not acquired and is nonessential; (III) that the relief granted by the court must be limited to such as
can be enforced against the property itself.
It is important that the bearing of these propositions be clearly apprehended, for there are many
expressions in the American reports from which it might be inferred that the court acquires personal
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant by publication and notice; but such is not the case. In
truth the proposition that jurisdiction over the person of a nonresident cannot be acquired by
publication and notice was never clearly understood even in the American courts until after the
decision had been rendered by the Supreme Court of the United States in the leading case of
Pennoyer vs. Neff (95 U. S. 714; 24 L. ed., 565). In the light of that decision, and of other decisions
which have subsequently been rendered in that and other courts, the proposition that jurisdiction
over the person cannot be thus acquired by publication and notice is no longer open to question; and
it is now fully established that a personal judgment upon constructive or substituted service against
a nonresident who does not appear is wholly invalid. This doctrine applies to all kinds of constructive
or substituted process, including service by publication and personal service outside of the
jurisdiction in which the judgment is rendered; and the only exception seems to be found in the case
where the nonresident defendant has expressly or impliedly consented to the mode of service. (Note
to Raher vs. Raher, 35 L. R. A. [N. S. ], 292; see also 50 L .R. A., 585; 35 L. R. A. [N. S.], 312
The idea upon which the decision in Pennoyer vs. Neff (supra) proceeds is that the process from the
tribunals of one State cannot run into other States or countries and that due process of law requires
that the defendant shall be brought under the power of the court by service of process within the
State, or by his voluntary appearance, in order to authorize the court to pass upon the question of
his personal liability. The doctrine established by the Supreme Court of the United States on this
point, being based upon the constitutional conception of due process of law, is binding upon the
courts of the Philippine Islands. Involved in this decision is the principle that in proceedings in rem or
quasi in rem against a nonresident who is not served personally within the state, and who does not
appear, the relief must be confined to the res, and the court cannot lawfully render a personal
judgment against him. (Dewey vs. Des Moines, 173 U. S., 193; 43 L. ed., 665; Heidritter vs. Elizabeth
Oil Cloth Co., 112 U. S., 294; 28 L. ed., 729.) Therefore in an action to foreclose a mortgage against a
nonresident, upon whom service has been effected exclusively by publication, no personal judgment
for the deficiency can be entered. (Latta vs. Tutton, 122 Cal., 279; Blumberg vs. Birch, 99 Cal., 416.)
It is suggested in the brief of the appellant that the judgment entered in the court below offends
against the principle just stated and that this judgment is void because the court in fact entered[m2]
a personal judgment against the absent debtor for the full amount of the indebtedness secured by
the mortgage. We do not so interpret the judgment.
In a foreclosure proceeding against a nonresident owner it is necessary for the court, as in all cases
of foreclosure, to ascertain the amount due, as prescribed in section 256 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, and to make an order requiring the defendant to pay the money into court. This step is a
necessary precursor of the order of sale. In the present case the judgment which was entered
contains the following words:
Because it is declared that the said defendant Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco,
is indebted in the amount of P249,355.32, plus the interest, to the 'Banco Espanol-Filipino' .
. . therefore said appellant is ordered to deliver the above amount etc., etc.
This is not the language of a personal judgment. Instead it is clearly intended merely as a compliance
with the requirement that the amount due shall be ascertained and that the evidence of this it may
be observed that according to the Code of Civil Procedure a personal judgment against the debtor
for the deficiency is not to be rendered until after the property has been sold and the proceeds
applied to the mortgage debt. (sec. 260).
The conclusion upon this phase of the case is that whatever may be the effect in other respects of
the failure of the clerk of the Court of First Instance to mail the proper papers to the defendant in
Amoy, China, such irregularity could in no wise impair or defeat the jurisdiction of the court, for in
our opinion that jurisdiction rest upon a basis much more secure than would be supplied by any
form of notice that could be given to a resident of a foreign country.
Before leaving this branch of the case, we wish to observe that we are fully aware that many reported
cases can be cited in which it is assumed that the question of the sufficiency of publication or notice
in a case of this kind is a question affecting the jurisdiction of the court, and the court is sometimes
said to acquire jurisdiction by virtue of the publication. This phraseology was undoubtedly originally
adopted by the court because of the analogy between service by the publication and personal service
of process upon the defendant; and, as has already been suggested, prior to the decision of Pennoyer
vs. Neff (supra) the difference between the legal effects of the two forms of service was obscure. It
is accordingly not surprising that the modes of expression which had already been molded into legal
tradition before that case was decided have been brought down to the present day. But it is clear
that the legal principle here involved is not effected by the peculiar language in which the courts have
expounded their ideas.
We now proceed to a discussion of the question whether the supposed irregularity in the proceedings
was of such gravity as to amount to a denial of that "due process of law" which was secured by the
Act of Congress in force in these Islands at the time this mortgage was foreclosed. (Act of July 1, 1902,
sec. 5.) In dealing with questions involving the application of the constitutional provisions relating to
due process of law the Supreme Court of the United States has refrained from attempting to define
with precision the meaning of that expression, the reason being that the idea expressed therein is
applicable under so many diverse conditions as to make any attempt ay precise definition hazardous
and unprofitable. As applied to a judicial proceeding, however, it may be laid down with certainty
that the requirement of due process is satisfied if the following conditions are present, namely; (1)
There must be a court or tribunal clothed with judicial power to hear and determine the matter
before it; (2) jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or over the
property which is the subject of the proceeding; (3) the defendant must be given an opportunity to
be heard; and (4) judgment must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
Passing at once to the requisite that the defendant shall have an opportunity to be heard, we observe
that in a foreclosure case some notification of the proceedings to the nonresident owner, prescribing
the time within which appearance must be made, is everywhere recognized as essential. To answer
this necessity the statutes generally provide for publication, and usually in addition thereto, for the
mailing of notice to the defendant, if his residence is known. Though commonly called constructive,
or substituted service of process in any true sense. It is merely a means provided by law whereby the
owner may be admonished that his property is the subject of judicial proceedings and that it is
incumbent upon him to take such steps as he sees fit to protect it. In speaking of notice of this
character a distinguish master of constitutional law has used the following language:
. . . if the owners are named in the proceedings, and personal notice is provided for, it is
rather from tenderness to their interests, and in order to make sure that the opportunity for
a hearing shall not be lost to them, than from any necessity that the case shall assume that
form. (Cooley on Taxation [2d. ed.], 527, quoted in Leigh vs. Green, 193 U. S., 79, 80.)
It will be observed that this mode of notification does not involve any absolute assurance that the
absent owner shall thereby receive actual notice. The periodical containing the publication may never
in fact come to his hands, and the chances that he should discover the notice may often be very slight.
Even where notice is sent by mail the probability of his receiving it, though much increased, is
dependent upon the correctness of the address to which it is forwarded as well as upon the regularity
and security of the mail service. It will be noted, furthermore, that the provision of our law relative
to the mailing of notice does not absolutely require the mailing of notice unconditionally and in every
event, but only in the case where the defendant's residence is known. In the light of all these facts, it
is evident that actual notice to the defendant in cases of this kind is not, under the law, to be
considered absolutely necessary.
The idea upon which the law proceeds in recognizing the efficacy of a means of notification which
may fall short of actual notice is apparently this: Property is always assumed to be in the possession
of its owner, in person or by agent; and he may be safely held, under certain conditions, to be affected
with knowledge that proceedings have been instituted for its condemnation and sale.
It is the duty of the owner of real estate, who is a nonresident, to take measures that in some
way he shall be represented when his property is called into requisition, and if he fails to do
this, and fails to get notice by the ordinary publications which have usually been required in
such cases, it is his misfortune, and he must abide the consequences. (6 R. C. L., sec. 445 [p.
450]).
It has been well said by an American court:
If property of a nonresident cannot be reached by legal process upon the constructive notice,
then our statutes were passed in vain, and are mere empty legislative declarations, without
either force, or meaning; for if the person is not within the jurisdiction of the court, no
personal judgment can be rendered, and if the judgment cannot operate upon the property,
then no effective judgment at all can be rendered, so that the result would be that the courts
would be powerless to assist a citizen against a nonresident. Such a result would be a
deplorable one. (Quarl vs. Abbett, 102 Ind., 233; 52 Am. Rep., 662, 667.)
It is, of course universally recognized that the statutory provisions relative to publication or other
form of notice against a nonresident owner should be complied with; and in respect to the publication
of notice in the newspaper it may be stated that strict compliance with the requirements of the law
has been held to be essential. In Guaranty Trust etc. Co. vs. Green Cove etc., Railroad Co. (139 U. S.,
137, 138), it was held that where newspaper publication was made for 19 weeks, when the statute
required 20, the publication was insufficient.
With respect to the provisions of our own statute, relative to the sending of notice by mail, the
requirement is that the judge shall direct that the notice be deposited in the mail by the clerk of the
court, and it is not in terms declared that the notice must be deposited in the mail. We consider this
to be of some significance; and it seems to us that, having due regard to the principles upon which
the giving of such notice is required, the absent owner of the mortgaged property must, so far as the
due process of law is concerned, take the risk incident to the possible failure of the clerk to perform
his duty, somewhat as he takes the risk that the mail clerk or the mail carrier might possibly lose or
destroy the parcel or envelope containing the notice before it should reach its destination and be
delivered to him. This idea seems to be strengthened by the consideration that placing upon the clerk
the duty of sending notice by mail, the performance of that act is put effectually beyond the control
of the plaintiff in the litigation. At any rate it is obvious that so much of section 399 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as relates to the sending of notice by mail was complied with when the court made
the order. The question as to what may be the consequences of the failure of the record to show the
proof of compliance with that requirement will be discussed by us further on.
The observations which have just been made lead to the conclusion that the failure of the clerk to
mail the notice, if in fact he did so fail in his duty, is not such an irregularity, as amounts to a denial
of due process of law; and hence in our opinion that irregularity, if proved, would not avoid the
judgment in this case. Notice was given by publication in a newspaper and this is the only form of
notice which the law unconditionally requires. This in our opinion is all that was absolutely necessary
to sustain the proceedings.
It will be observed that in considering the effect of this irregularity, it makes a difference whether it
be viewed as a question involving jurisdiction or as a question involving due process of law. In the
matter of jurisdiction there can be no distinction between the much and the little. The court either
has jurisdiction or it has not; and if the requirement as to the mailing of notice should be considered
as a step antecedent to the acquiring of jurisdiction, there could be no escape from the conclusion
that the failure to take that step was fatal to the validity of the judgment. In the application of the
idea of due process of law, on the other hand, it is clearly unnecessary to be so rigorous. The
jurisdiction being once established, all that due process of law thereafter requires is an opportunity
for the defendant to be heard; and as publication was duly made in the newspaper, it would seem
highly unreasonable to hold that failure to mail the notice was fatal. We think that in applying the
requirement of due process of law, it is permissible to reflect upon the purposes of the provision
which is supposed to have been violated and the principle underlying the exercise of judicial power
in these proceedings. Judge in the light of these conceptions, we think that the provision of Act of
Congress declaring that no person shall be deprived of his property without due process of law has
not been infringed.
In the progress of this discussion we have stated the two conclusions; (1) that the failure of the clerk
to send the notice to the defendant by mail did not destroy the jurisdiction of the court and (2) that
such irregularity did not infringe the requirement of due process of law. As a consequence of these
conclusions the irregularity in question is in some measure shorn of its potency. It is still necessary,
however, to consider its effect considered as a simple irregularity of procedure; and it would be idle
to pretend that even in this aspect the irregularity is not grave enough. From this point of view,
however, it is obvious that any motion to vacate the judgment on the ground of the irregularity in
question must fail unless it shows that the defendant was prejudiced by that irregularity. The least,
therefore, that can be required of the proponent of such a motion is to show that he had a good
defense against the action to foreclose the mortgage. Nothing of the kind is, however, shown either
in the motion or in the affidavit which accompanies the motion.
An application to open or vacate a judgment because of an irregularity or defect in the proceedings

is usually required to be supported by an affidavit showing the grounds on which the relief is sought,
and in addition to this showing also a meritorious defense to the action. It is held that a general
statement that a party has a good defense to the action is insufficient. The necessary facts must be
averred. Of course if a judgment is void upon its face a showing of the existence of a meritorious
defense is not necessary. (10 R. C. L., 718.)
The lapse of time is also a circumstance deeply affecting this aspect of the case. In this connection
we quote the following passage from the encyclopedic treatise now in course of publication:
Where, however, the judgment is not void on its face, and may therefore be enforced if
permitted to stand on the record, courts in many instances refuse to exercise their quasi
equitable powers to vacate a judgement after the lapse of the term ay which it was entered,
except in clear cases, to promote the ends of justice, and where it appears that the party
making the application is himself without fault and has acted in good faith and with ordinary
diligence. Laches on the part of the applicant, if unexplained, is deemed sufficient ground for
refusing the relief to which he might otherwise be entitled. Something is due to the finality
of judgments, and acquiescence or unnecessary delay is fatal to motions of this character,
since courts are always reluctant to interfere with judgments, and especially where they have
been executed or satisfied. The moving party has the burden of showing diligence, and unless
it is shown affirmatively the court will not ordinarily exercise its discretion in his favor. (15 R.
C. L., 694, 695.)
It is stated in the affidavit that the defendant, Engracio Palanca Tanquinyeng y Limquingco, died
January 29, 1910. The mortgage under which the property was sold was executed far back in 1906;
and the proceedings in the foreclosure were closed by the order of court confirming the sale dated
August 7, 1908. It passes the rational bounds of human credulity to suppose that a man who had
placed a mortgage upon property worth nearly P300,000 and had then gone away from the scene of
his life activities to end his days in the city of Amoy, China, should have long remained in ignorance
of the fact that the mortgage had been foreclosed and the property sold, even supposing that he had
no knowledge of those proceedings while they were being conducted. It is more in keeping with the
ordinary course of things that he should have acquired information as to what was transpiring in his
affairs at Manila; and upon the basis of this rational assumption we are authorized, in the absence of
proof to the contrary, to presume that he did have, or soon acquired, information as to the sale of
his property.
The Code of Civil Procedure, indeed, expressly declares that there is a presumption that things have
happened according to the ordinary habits of life (sec. 334 [26]); and we cannot conceive of a
situation more appropriate than this for applying the presumption thus defined by the lawgiver. In
support of this presumption, as applied to the present case, it is permissible to consider the
probability that the defendant may have received actual notice of these proceedings from the
unofficial notice addressed to him in Manila which was mailed by an employee of the bank's
attorneys. Adopting almost the exact words used by the Supreme Court of the United States in
Grannis vs. Ordeans (234 U. S., 385; 58 L. ed., 1363), we may say that in view of the well-known skill
of postal officials and employees in making proper delivery of letters defectively addressed, we think
the presumption is clear and strong that this notice reached the defendant, there being no proof that
it was ever returned by the postal officials as undelivered. And if it was delivered in Manila, instead
of being forwarded to Amoy, China, there is a probability that the recipient was a person sufficiently
interested in his affairs to send it or communicate its contents to him.
Of course if the jurisdiction of the court or the sufficiency of the process of law depended upon the
mailing of the notice by the clerk, the reflections in which we are now indulging would be idle and
frivolous; but the considerations mentioned are introduced in order to show the propriety of applying
to this situation the legal presumption to which allusion has been made. Upon that presumption,
supported by the circumstances of this case, ,we do not hesitate to found the conclusion that the
defendant voluntarily abandoned all thought of saving his property from the obligation which he had
placed upon it; that knowledge of the proceedings should be imputed to him; and that he acquiesced
in the consequences of those proceedings after they had been accomplished. Under these
circumstances it is clear that the merit of this motion is, as we have already stated, adversely affected
in a high degree by the delay in asking for relief. Nor is it an adequate reply to say that the proponent
of this motion is an administrator who only qualified a few months before this motion was made. No
disability on the part of the defendant himself existed from the time when the foreclosure was
effected until his death; and we believe that the delay in the appointment of the administrator and
institution of this action is a circumstance which is imputable to the parties in interest whoever they
may have been. Of course if the minor heirs had instituted an action in their own right to recover the
property, it would have been different.
It is, however, argued that the defendant has suffered prejudice by reason of the fact that the bank
became the purchaser of the property at the foreclosure sale for a price greatly below that which had
been agreed upon in the mortgage as the upset price of the property. In this connection, it appears
that in article nine of the mortgage which was the subject of this foreclosure, as amended by the
notarial document of July 19, 1906, the parties to this mortgage made a stipulation to the effect that
the value therein placed upon the mortgaged properties should serve as a basis of sale in case the
debt should remain unpaid and the bank should proceed to a foreclosure. The upset price stated in
that stipulation for all the parcels involved in this foreclosure was P286,000. It is said in behalf of the
appellant that when the bank bought in the property for the sum of P110,200 it violated that
stipulation.
It has been held by this court that a clause in a mortgage providing for a tipo, or upset price, does not
prevent a foreclosure, nor affect the validity of a sale made in the foreclosure proceedings. (Yangco
vs. Cruz Herrera and Wy Piaco, 11 Phil. Rep., 402; Banco-Español Filipino vs. Donaldson, Sim and Co.,
5 Phil. Rep., 418.) In both the cases here cited the property was purchased at the foreclosure sale,
not by the creditor or mortgagee, but by a third party. Whether the same rule should be applied in a
case where the mortgagee himself becomes the purchaser has apparently not been decided by this
court in any reported decision, and this question need not here be considered, since it is evident that
if any liability was incurred by the bank by purchasing for a price below that fixed in the stipulation,
its liability was a personal liability derived from the contract of mortgage; and as we have already
demonstrated such a liability could not be the subject of adjudication in an action where the court
had no jurisdiction over the person of the defendant. If the plaintiff bank became liable to account
for the difference between the upset price and the price at which in bought in the property, that
liability remains unaffected by the disposition which the court made of this case; and the fact that
the bank may have violated such an obligation can in no wise affect the validity of the judgment
entered in the Court of First Instance.
In connection with the entire failure of the motion to show either a meritorious defense to the action
or that the defendant had suffered any prejudice of which the law can take notice, we may be
permitted to add that in our opinion a motion of this kind, which proposes to unsettle judicial
proceedings long ago closed, can not be considered with favor, unless based upon grounds which
appeal to the conscience of the court. Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld. The
maximum here applicable is non quieta movere. As was once said by Judge Brewer, afterwards a
member of the Supreme Court of the United States:
Public policy requires that judicial proceedings be upheld, and that titles obtained in those
proceedings be safe from the ruthless hand of collateral attack. If technical defects are
adjudged potent to destroy such titles, a judicial sale will never realize that value of the
property, for no prudent man will risk his money in bidding for and buying that title which he
has reason to fear may years thereafter be swept away through some occult and not readily
discoverable defect. (Martin vs. Pond, 30 Fed., 15.)
In the case where that language was used an attempt was made to annul certain foreclosure
proceedings on the ground that the affidavit upon which the order of publication was based
erroneously stated that the State of Kansas, when he was in fact residing in another State. It was held
that this mistake did not affect the validity of the proceedings.
In the preceding discussion we have assumed that the clerk failed to send the notice by post as
required by the order of the court. We now proceed to consider whether this is a proper assumption;
and the proposition which we propose to establish is that there is a legal presumption that the clerk
performed his duty as the ministerial officer of the court, which presumption is not overcome by any
other facts appearing in the cause.
In subsection 14 of section 334 of the Code of Civil Procedure it is declared that there is a presumption
"that official duty has been regularly performed;" and in subsection 18 it is declared that there is a
presumption "that the ordinary course of business has been followed." These presumptions are of
course in no sense novelties, as they express ideas which have always been recognized. Omnia
presumuntur rite et solemniter esse acta donec probetur in contrarium. There is therefore clearly a
legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty about mailing this notice; and we think that
strong considerations of policy require that this presumption should be allowed to operate with full
force under the circumstances of this case. A party to an action has no control over the clerk of the
court; and has no right to meddle unduly with the business of the clerk in the performance of his
duties. Having no control over this officer, the litigant must depend upon the court to see that the
duties imposed on the clerk are performed.
Other considerations no less potent contribute to strengthen the conclusion just stated. There is no
principle of law better settled than that after jurisdiction has once been required, every act of a court
of general jurisdiction shall be presumed to have been rightly done. This rule is applied to every
judgment or decree rendered in the various stages of the proceedings from their initiation to their
completion (Voorhees vs. United States Bank, 10 Pet., 314; 35 U. S., 449); and if the record is silent
with respect to any fact which must have been established before the court could have rightly acted,
it will be presumed that such fact was properly brought to its knowledge. (The Lessee of Grignon vs.
Astor, 2 How., 319; 11 L. ed., 283.)
In making the order of sale [of the real state of a decedent] the court are presumed to have
adjudged every question necessary to justify such order or decree, viz: The death of the
owners; that the petitioners were his administrators; that the personal estate was insufficient
to pay the debts of the deceased; that the private acts of Assembly, as to the manner of sale,
were within the constitutional power of the Legislature, and that all the provisions of the law
as to notices which are directory to the administrators have been complied with. . . . The
court is not bound to enter upon the record the evidence on which any fact was decided.
(Florentine vs. Barton, 2 Wall., 210; 17 L. ed., 785.) Especially does all this apply after long
lapse of time.
Applegate vs. Lexington and Carter County Mining Co. (117 U. S., 255) contains an instructive
discussion in a case analogous to that which is now before us. It there appeared that in order to
foreclose a mortgage in the State of Kentucky against a nonresident debtor it was necessary that
publication should be made in a newspaper for a specified period of time, also be posted at the front
door of the court house and be published on some Sunday, immediately after divine service, in such
church as the court should direct. In a certain action judgment had been entered against a
nonresident, after publication in pursuance of these provisions. Many years later the validity of the
proceedings was called in question in another action. It was proved from the files of an ancient
periodical that publication had been made in its columns as required by law; but no proof was offered
to show the publication of the order at the church, or the posting of it at the front door of the court-
house. It was insisted by one of the parties that the judgment of the court was void for lack of
jurisdiction. But the Supreme Court of the United States said:
The court which made the decree . . . was a court of general jurisdiction. Therefore every
presumption not inconsistent with the record is to be indulged in favor of its jurisdiction. . . .
It is to be presumed that the court before making its decree took care of to see that its order
for constructive service, on which its right to make the decree depended, had been obeyed.
It is true that in this case the former judgment was the subject of collateral , or indirect attack, while
in the case at bar the motion to vacate the judgment is direct proceeding for relief against it. The
same general presumption, however, is indulged in favor of the judgment of a court of general
jurisdiction, whether it is the subject of direct or indirect attack the only difference being that in case
of indirect attack the judgment is conclusively presumed to be valid unless the record affirmatively
shows it to be void, while in case of direct attack the presumption in favor of its validity may in certain
cases be overcome by proof extrinsic to the record.
The presumption that the clerk performed his duty and that the court made its decree with the
knowledge that the requirements of law had been complied with appear to be amply sufficient to
support the conclusion that the notice was sent by the clerk as required by the order. It is true that
there ought to be found among the papers on file in this cause an affidavit, as required by section
400 of the Code of Civil Procedure, showing that the order was in fact so sent by the clerk; and no
such affidavit appears. The record is therefore silent where it ought to speak. But the very purpose
of the law in recognizing these presumptions is to enable the court to sustain a prior judgment in the
face of such an omission. If we were to hold that the judgment in this case is void because the proper
affidavit is not present in the file of papers which we call the record, the result would be that in the
future every title in the Islands resting upon a judgment like that now before us would depend, for
its continued security, upon the presence of such affidavit among the papers and would be liable at
any moment to be destroyed by the disappearance of that piece of paper. We think that no court,
with a proper regard for the security of judicial proceedings and for the interests which have by law
been confided to the courts, would incline to favor such a conclusion. In our opinion the proper
course in a case of this kind is to hold that the legal presumption that the clerk performed his duty
still maintains notwithstanding the absence from the record of the proper proof of that fact.
In this connection it is important to bear in mind that under the practice prevailing in the Philippine
Islands the word "record" is used in a loose and broad sense, as indicating the collective mass of
papers which contain the history of all the successive steps taken in a case and which are finally
deposited in the archives of the clerk's office as a memorial of the litigation. It is a matter of general
information that no judgment roll, or book of final record, is commonly kept in our courts for the
purpose of recording the pleadings and principal proceedings in actions which have been terminated;
and in particular, no such record is kept in the Court of First Instance of the city of Manila. There is,
indeed, a section of the Code of Civil Procedure which directs that such a book of final record shall be
kept; but this provision has, as a matter of common knowledge, been generally ignored. The result is
that in the present case we do not have the assistance of the recitals of such a record to enable us to
pass upon the validity of this judgment and as already stated the question must be determined by
examining the papers contained in the entire file.
But it is insisted by counsel for this motion that the affidavit of Bernardo Chan y Garcia showing that
upon April 4, 1908, he sent a notification through the mail addressed to the defendant at Manila,
Philippine Islands, should be accepted as affirmative proof that the clerk of the court failed in his duty
and that, instead of himself sending the requisite notice through the mail, he relied upon Bernardo
to send it for him. We do not think that this is by any means a necessary inference. Of course if it had
affirmatively appeared that the clerk himself had attempted to comply with this order and had
directed the notification to Manila when he should have directed it to Amoy, this would be conclusive
that he had failed to comply with the exact terms of the order; but such is not this case. That the clerk
of the attorneys for the plaintiff erroneously sent a notification to the defendant at a mistaken
address affords in our opinion very slight basis for supposing that the clerk may not have sent notice
to the right address.
There is undoubtedly good authority to support the position that when the record states the evidence
or makes an averment with reference to a jurisdictional fact, it will not be presumed that there was
other or different evidence respecting the fact, or that the fact was otherwise than stated. If, to give
an illustration, it appears from the return of the officer that the summons was served at a particular
place or in a particular manner, it will not be presumed that service was also made at another place
or in a different manner; or if it appears that service was made upon a person other than the
defendant, it will not be presumed, in the silence of the record, that it was made upon the defendant
also (Galpin vs. Page, 18 Wall., 350, 366; Settlemier vs. Sullivan, 97 U. S., 444, 449). While we believe
that these propositions are entirely correct as applied to the case where the person making the return
is the officer who is by law required to make the return, we do not think that it is properly applicable
where, as in the present case, the affidavit was made by a person who, so far as the provisions of law
are concerned, was a mere intermeddler.
The last question of importance which we propose to consider is whether a motion in the cause is
admissible as a proceeding to obtain relief in such a case as this. If the motion prevails the judgment
of July 2, 1908, and all subsequent proceedings will be set aside, and the litigation will be renewed,
proceeding again from the date mentioned as if the progress of the action had not been interrupted.
The proponent of the motion does not ask the favor of being permitted to interpose a defense. His
purpose is merely to annul the effective judgment of the court, to the end that the litigation may
again resume its regular course.
There is only one section of the Code of Civil Procedure which expressly recognizes the authority of
a Court of First Instance to set aside a final judgment and permit a renewal of the litigation in the
same cause. This is as follows:
SEC. 113. Upon such terms as may be just the court may relieve a party or legal representative
from the judgment, order, or other proceeding taken against him through his mistake,
inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect; Provided, That application thereof be made
within a reasonable time, but in no case exceeding six months after such judgment, order, or
proceeding was taken.
An additional remedy by petition to the Supreme Court is supplied by section 513 of the same Code.
The first paragraph of this section, in so far as pertinent to this discussion, provides as follows:
When a judgment is rendered by a Court of First Instance upon default, and a party thereto
is unjustly deprived of a hearing by fraud, accident, mistake or excusable negligence, and the
Court of First Instance which rendered the judgment has finally adjourned so that no
adequate remedy exists in that court, the party so deprived of a hearing may present his
petition to the Supreme Court within sixty days after he first learns of the rendition of such
judgment, and not thereafter, setting forth the facts and praying to have judgment set aside.
...
It is evident that the proceeding contemplated in this section is intended to supplement the remedy
provided by section 113; and we believe the conclusion irresistible that there is no other means
recognized by law whereby a defeated party can, by a proceeding in the same cause, procure a
judgment to be set aside, with a view to the renewal of the litigation.
The Code of Civil Procedure purports to be a complete system of practice in civil causes, and it
contains provisions describing with much fullness the various steps to be taken in the conduct of such
proceedings. To this end it defines with precision the method of beginning, conducting, and
concluding the civil action of whatever species; and by section 795 of the same Code it is declared
that the procedure in all civil action shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code. We are
therefore of the opinion that the remedies prescribed in sections 113 and 513 are exclusive of all
others, so far as relates to the opening and continuation of a litigation which has been once
concluded.
The motion in the present case does not conform to the requirements of either of these provisions;
and the consequence is that in our opinion the action of the Court of First Instance in dismissing the
motion was proper.
If the question were admittedly one relating merely to an irregularity of procedure, we cannot
suppose that this proceeding[m3] would have taken the form of a motion in the cause, since it is
clear that, if based on such an error, the came to late for relief in the Court of First Instance. But as
we have already seen, the motion attacks the judgment of the court as void for want of jurisdiction
over the defendant. The idea underlying the motion therefore is that inasmuch as the judgment is a
nullity it can be attacked in any way and at any time. If the judgment were in fact void upon its face,
that is, if it were shown to be a nullity by virtue of its own recitals, there might possibly be something
in this. Where a judgment or judicial order is void in this sense it may be said to be a lawless thing,
which can be treated as an outlaw and slain at sight, or ignored wherever and whenever it exhibits
its head.
But the judgment in question is not void in any such sense. It is entirely regular in form, and the
alleged defect is one which is not apparent upon its face. It follows that even if the judgment could
be shown to be void for want of jurisdiction, or for lack of due process of law, the party aggrieved
thereby is bound to resort to some appropriate proceeding to obtain relief. Under accepted principles
of law and practice, long recognized in American courts, a proper remedy in such case, after the time
for appeal or review has passed, is for the aggrieved party to bring an action to enjoin the judgment,
if not already carried into effect; or if the property has already been disposed of he may institute suit
to recover it. In every situation of this character an appropriate remedy is at hand; and if property
has been taken without due process, the law concedes due process to recover it. We accordingly old
that, assuming the judgment to have been void as alleged by the proponent of this motion, the proper
remedy was by an original proceeding and not by motion in the cause. As we have already seen our
Code of Civil Procedure defines the conditions under which relief against a judgment may be
productive of conclusion for this court to recognize such a proceeding as proper under conditions
different from those defined by law. Upon the point of procedure here involved, we refer to the case
of People vs. Harrison (84 Cal., 607) wherein it was held that a motion will not lie to vacate a judgment
after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and in all cases,
after the lapse of the time limited by statute if the judgment is not void on its face; and all cases, after
the lapse of such time, when an attempt is made to vacate the judgment by a proceeding in court for
that purpose an action regularly brought is preferable, and should be required. It will be noted taken
verbatim from the California Code (sec. 473).
The conclusions stated in this opinion indicate that the judgment appealed from is without error, and
the same is accordingly affirmed, with costs. So ordered.
[m1]2 issues
[m2]Issue on personal judgment of the case,
Pero answered ra na directly
[m3]Ruling nga gi consolidate sa SC,
17. G.R. No. L-46496 February 27, 1940
ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and
NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
Office of the Solicitor-General Ozaeta and Assistant Attorney Barcelona for the Court of Industrial
Relations.
Antonio D. Paguia for National Labor Unon.
Claro M. Recto for petitioner "Ang Tibay".
Jose M. Casal for National Workers' Brotherhood.
LAUREL, J.:
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case
has filed a motion for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we
reconsider the following legal conclusions of the majority opinion of this Court:
1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual comocolectivo, sin terminofijo de duracion o que no
sea para una determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cadavez que
ilega el plazofijado para el pago de los salariosseguncostumbreen la localidad o cunado se
termine la obra;
2. Que los obreros de una empresafabril, que hancelebradocontrato, ya individual

yacolectivamente, con ell, sin tiempofijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesaren sus tarbajos por
habersedeclarandoparoforzosoen la fabricaen la cualtarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros
de la misma;
3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contratocolectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros
sin tiempofijo de duracion y sin ser para una obradetermiminada y que se niega a readmitir a
dichosobreros que cesaroncomoconsecuencia de un paroforzoso, no es culpable de
practicainjusta in incurreen la sancion penal del articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth,
aunquesunegativa a readmitir se deba a que dichosobrerospertenecen a un
determinadoorganismoobrero, puesto que tales yahandejadodeserempleadossuyos por
terminacion del contratoenvirtud del paro.
The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement
rendered by the majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations
for a new trial, and avers:
1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles
in ANG TIBAY making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National
Labor Union Inc., is entirely false and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and
the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.
2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to
systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the
Philippine Army.
3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed
delay of leather soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the
forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.
4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union
dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548,
petitioner's printed memorandum, p. 25.)
5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and
elective representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5,
Commonwealth Act No. 213.)
6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of
dissensions and continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in
interpreting and applying the salutary provisions of a modern labor legislation of American
origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.
7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating
against the National Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers'
Brotherhood.
8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as
evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations.
9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect
that their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment
rendered herein.
The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc.
In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a
new trial of the respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to
pass upon the motion for reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the
motion for new trial of the respondent labor union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in
the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in interest of orderly procedure in cases of this
nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of the Court of Industrial
Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases brought
before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial
Relations in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers
here was due to their union affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired
during the hearing and is more of a record of contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing
counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is evident that these statements and
expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.
The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its
creation (Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial
system of the nation. It is not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government.Unlikea court of
justice which is essentially passive, acting only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases
that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of the Court of Industrial Relations, as will
appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It not only exercises
judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees
but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions
are far more comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider,
investigate, decide, and settle any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or
affecting employers and employees or laborers, and regulate the relations between them, subject to, and
in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103 (section 1). It shall take cognizance or
purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or agricultural dispute
causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants
or farm-laborers, provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved
exceeds thirty, and such industrial or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of
Labor or by any or both of the parties to the controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing
and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and proper to be dealt with by the Court for the
sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute and in the course of such
hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable agreement.
(Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and
study all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and
fairness of fixing and adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or, share of laborers or
tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners.
(Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration in the settlement of industrial disputes;
may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more effective system of official
investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between labor and
capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions,
which is a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.
In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13,
1939, we had occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673,
promulgated September 13, 1939, we had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is
not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure, and the Act requires it to "act according to
justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to technicalities or legal forms and
shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technical rules of
legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by
the parties to the industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any
matter or determination which may be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the
dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of
this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated by the rules recently
promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed
legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from
the rigidity of certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it,
entirely ignore or disregard the fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and
investigations of an administrative character. There are primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character:
(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested
or affected to present his own c
and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S., 304
U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be
protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play.
(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence
tending to establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence
presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.)
In the language of this court in Edwards vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence,
without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is
conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it
aside without notice or consideration."
(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a
necessity which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity,
a place when directly attached." (Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the
more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant
and a limitation upon power.
(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs.
Agustin, G.R. No. 45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence
must be "substantial." (Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations
Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct. 648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as
a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v.
National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National Labor Relations Board v.
Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence
prevailing in courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and
similar provisions is to free administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that
the mere admission of matter which would be deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings
would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce Commission v. Baird, 194
U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v. Louisville and
Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and
Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in
administrative procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having
rational probative force. Mere uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial
evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed.
No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"
(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained
in the record and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N.
R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S. Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal
to the evidence disclosed to the parties, can the latter be protected in their right to know and
meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract from their duty actively to see that
the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods of securing
evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry
may be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case,
but their report and decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The
Court of Industrial Relations may refer any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under
its consideration or advisement to a local board of inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the
peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for investigation, report and
recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and functions
as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect
the exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)
(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own
independent consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the
views of a subordinate in arriving at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it
is literally Relations personally to decide all controversies coming before them. In the United
States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory authority authorizing examiners or
other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or commission, but
in our case there is no such statutory authority.
(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in
such a manner that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the
reasons for the decision rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority
conferred upon it.
In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the
alleged agreement between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the
record is barren and does not satisfy the thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national
way, a conclusion of law.
This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent
National Labor Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro
was but a scheme adopted to systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc.,
from work" and this avernment is desired to be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau
of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather"; that "the National Workers
Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio Teodoro, the
existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits
attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that
even within the exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered
as evidence in the Court of Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of
such far reaching importance and effect that their admission would necessarily mean the modification
and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its
arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we have come to the
conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be
relevant to the main issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and
under which it acts is new. The failure to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely
attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire
record of this case shall be remanded to the Court of IndustrRelations, with instruction that it reopen
the case, receive all such evidence as may be relevant proceed in accordance with ts. SO
ORDEREDp18. G.R. No. 90660-61 June 21, 1991
UTE PATEROK, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
BUREAU OF CUSTOMS and HON. SALVADOR N. MISON, respondents-appellees.
Untalan, Trinidad, Razon, Santos & Associate Law Offices for petitioner-appellant.
SARMIENTO, J.:
Before us is a special civil action for certiorari filed by Ute Paterok the petitioner herein, seeking the
annulment of the decision1 rendered by the public respondent, the Bureau of Customs, through its
Commissioner, the Hon. Salvador N. Mison, approving the order2 of forfeiture issued by the District
Collector of Customs against the shipment of one (1) unit of Mercedes Benz of the petitioner in favor of
the government.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
In March 1986, the petitioner shipped from Germany to the Philippines two (2) containers, one with used
household goods and the other with two (2) used automobiles (one Bourgetti and one Mercedes Benz
450 SLC). The first container was released by the Bureau of Customs and later on, the Bourgetti car, too.
The Mercedes Benz, however, remained under the custody of the said Bureau.
In December 1987, after earnest efforts to secure the release of the said Mercedes Benz, the petitioner
received a notice of hearing from the legal officer of the Manila International Container Port, Bureau of
Customs informing the former that seizure proceedings were being initiated against the said Mercedes
Benz for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 73 in relation to Section 2530(F) of the Tariff and Customs Code
of the Philippines (TCCP), as amended, and Central Bank Circular (CBC) 1069.
While the said case was pending, the petitioner received only on April, 1988, a letter informing her that
a decision ordering the forfeiture of her Mercedes Benz had been rendered on December 16, 1986 by the
District Collector of Customs. The petitioner had not been informed that a separate seizure case was
filed on the same Mercedes Benz in question before the said District Collector, an office likewise under
the Bureau of Customs.
The petitioner later found out that on November 13, 1986, a Notice of Hearing set on December 2, 1986,
concerning the said Mercedes Benz, was posted on the bulletin board of the Bureau of Customs at Port
Area, Manila.
The petitioner, thereafter, filed a motion for new trial5 before the Collector of Customs, Port of Manila,
but the latter, in an order6 dated May 30, 1988, denied the same, invoking the failure of the former to
appear in the said hearing despite the posting of the notice on the bulletin board.
Moreover, the Collector of Customs contended that a reopening of the case was an exercise in futility
considering that the forfeited property, a Mercedes Benz 450 SLC, had an engine displacement of more
than 2800 cubic centimeters and therefore was under the category of prohibited importation pursuant
to B.P. Blg. 73.
Subsequently, the petitioner filed a petition for review7 with the Department of Finance, which petition
the latter referred to the public respondent. The petitioner likewise addressed a letter8 to the Hon.
Cancio Garcia, the Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs, Office of the President, Malacañang,
requesting the latter's assistance for a speedy resolution of the said petition.
Finally, the public respondent rendered a decision on September 22, 1989 affirming the previous order
of the Collector of Customs for the Forfeiture of the Mercedes Benz in question in favor of the
government.
Hence, this petition for certiorari alleging that:

III-1. THE RESPONDENT-APPELLEE (Bureau of Customs) ERRED IN THE RULING THAT A NOTICE OF
HEARING POSTED IN [sic] THE BULLETIN BOARD IS SUFFICIENT NOTICE AND FAILURE OF PETITIONER-
APPELLANT TO APPEAR CAUSED HER DECLARATION IN DEFAULT;
III-2. ERRED IN RULING THAT THEIR OFFICE WAS LEFT WITH NO ALTERNATIVE BUT TO FORFEIT THE
SHIPMENT AS MANDATED BY BATAS PAMBANSA BLG. 73;
III-3. ERRED IN RULING THAT THE RESPONDENT OF OFFICE FINDS THE RE-OPENING OF THE CASE AN
EXERCISE IN FUTILITY AND THAT THERE IS NO POINT IN DISTURBING THE DECISION DECREEING THE
FORFEITURE OF THE SHIPMENT.9
As regards the first assignment of error, we agree with the petitioner that a notice of hearing posted on
the bulletin board of the public respondent in a forfeiture proceeding where the owner of the alleged
prohibited article is known does not constitute sufficient compliance with proper service of notice and
procedural due process.
Time and again, the Court has emphasized the imperative necessity for administrative agencies to
observe the elementary rules of due process.10 And no rule is better established under the due process
clause of the Constitution than that which requires notice and opportunity to be heard before any
person can be lawfully deprived of his rights.11
In the present case, although there was a notice of hearing posted on the bulletin board, the said
procedure is premised on the ground that the party or owner of the property in question is unknown.
This is clear from the provisions of the TCCP relied upon by the public respondent, namely, Sections 2304
and 2306, captioned "Notification of Unknown Owner and "Proceedings in Case of Property Belonging to
Unknown Parties," respectively, wherein the posting of the notice of hearing on the bulletin board is
specifically allowed.
But in the case at bar, the facts evidently show that the petitioner could not have been unknown. The
petitioner had previous transactions with the Bureau of Customs and in fact, the latter had earlier
released the first container consisting of household goods and the Bourgetti car to the former at her
address (as stated in the Bill of Lading). Moreover, there was a similar seizure case12 that had been
instituted by the Manila International Container Port, docketed as S.I. No. 86-224, covering the same
Mercedes Benz in question and involving the same owner, the petitioner herein.
If only the public respondents had exercised some reasonable diligence to ascertain from their own
records the identity and address of the petitioner as the owner and the consignee of the property in
question, the necessary information could have been easily obtained which would have assured the
sending of the notice of hearing properly and legally. Then, the petitioner would have been afforded the
opportunity to be heard and to present her defense which is the essence of procedural due process.
But the public respondent regrettably failed to perform such basic duty.
Notwithstanding the procedural infirmity aforementioned, for which the Court expresses its rebuke,
the petition nonetheless can not be granted.
This brings us to the second and third assignments of error raised by the petitioner.
Batas Pambansa Blg. 73, a law intended to promote energy conservation, provides that:
Sec. 3. Towards the same end and to develop a more dynamic and effective program for the rational use
of energy, the following acts are hereby prohibited:
(a) The importation, manufacture or assembling of gasoline-powered passenger motor cars with engine
displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters or Kerbweight exceeding 1,500 kilograms, including
accessories.13
The petitioner does not dispute the fact that the motor car in question, a Mercedes Benz 450 SLC, has an
engine displacement of over 2,800 cubic centimeters which clearly falls within the prohibited importation
specified in the law aforequoted and as such, is liable for seizure and forfeiture by the public respondents.
On the other hand, the petitioner claims that the said prohibition involves only "direct" and not 'indirect"
importation as when both the shipper and the consignee are one and the same person which is the case
at bar. Be that as it may, the law is clear and when it does not make any distinction on the term
"importation", we likewise must not distinguish. "Ubi lex non distinguit nec nos distinguiere debemus."
Finally, the petitioner invokes Sec. 2307 of the TCCP, as amended by Executive Order No. 38, dated August
6, 1986, which provides an alternative in lieu of the forfeiture of the property in question, that is, the
payment of fine or redemption of the forfeited property. But the last paragraph of the said section, as
amended, categorically states that:
Redemption of forfeited property shall not be allowed in any case where the importation is absolutely
prohibited or where the surrender of the property to the person offering to redeem the same would
be contrary to law. (Emphasis ours)14
Inasmuch as it would be contrary to law, i.e., B.P. Blg. 73, to allow the petitioner to redeem the Mercedes
Benz in question, there is therefore no alternative, as correctly claimed by the public respondents, but to
forfeit the same.
We can not agree with the proposition that the Collector of Customs is authorized to release the motor
vehicle in question to the petitioner which, in effect, would absolve the latter from any liability.
In the matter of disposing of contrabands, Section 2609(c) of the Tariff and Customs Code specifically
provides that the prerogative of the Collector of Customs is not the release of the contraband like the
Mercedes Benz in question but its sale, which presupposes a prior custody pursuant to forfeiture and
seizure proceedings as in the case at bar.
As thus worded:
Sec. 2609. Disposition of Contraband. — Article of prohibited importation or exportation, known as

contraband, shall, in the absence of special provision, be dealt with as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Other contraband of commercial value and capable of legitimate use may be sold under such
restrictions as will insure its use for legitimate purposes only . . .
There is nothing in the Code that authorizes the Collector to release the contraband in favor of an
importer.1âwphi1 The Code, on the other hand, is clear that the thing may be disposed of by sale alone
"under such restrictions as will insure its use for legitimate purposes." To be sure, the restrictions to be
prescribed by the Collector must coincide with the purpose underlying Batas Blg. 73, that is, to conserve
energy. Hence, he can not allow its use (after sale), in this case a Mercedes Benz with an engine
displacement of more than 2,800 cubic centimeters, that would set at naught that purpose. He must
make sure that the engine is changed before it is allowed to ply Philippine soil.
In all cases, forfeiture is a must.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
19. G.R. No. 150732 August 31, 2004
TOMAS G. VELASQUEZ, Officer-In-Charge, Office of the School Superintendent, DECS – Division of

Abra; MARIETTA BERSALONA, Chairperson, DECS – Fact Finding Committee; EDUARDO RUPERTO,
JOAQUIN PILIEN and LUZ CURBI, Members, DECS – Fact Finding Committee, petitioners
vs.
HELEN B. HERNANDEZ, respondent.
G.R. No. 151095 August 31, 2004
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, petitioner, vs. HELEN B. HERNANDEZ, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
Subject of the consolidated petitions is the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61081,
entitled Helen B. Hernandez v. Tomas G. Velasquez, promulgated on 07 November 2001.1 The assailed
Decision annulled and set aside the twin resolutions issued by the Civil Service Commission (CSC for
brevity), in Administrative Case No. 97-45 filed against respondent Hernandez. The CSC, in its Resolution
No. 00-1375 dated 13 June 2000, found respondent Hernandez guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct
and ordered her dismissal from the service, with all the accessory penalties including her perpetual
disqualification from holding public office. In Resolution No. 00-2064 dated 07 September 2000, the CSC
denied respondent's motion for reconsideration of Resolution No. 00-1375.
Stripped of non-essentials, the following are the factual antecedents:

In a letter dated 25 September 1996, the Assistant Schools Division Superintendent of the DECS-CAR,
(Cordillera Administrative Region) sent a letter to petitioner (in G.R. No. 150732) Tomas G. Velasquez,
informing him of the alleged infractions committed by respondent, Helen B. Hernandez, such as soliciting,
accepting, and receiving sums of money, in exchange for transfer or promotion of complainant teachers.
Acting on the letter, petitioner Velasquez convened a fact-finding committee to determine the veracity
of the alleged violations of respondent and to render a formal report and recommendations.
On 26 September 1996, the Committee composed of members assigned at the DECS-Division of Abra,
summoned to a meeting the teachers who have grievances against respondent. Based on the sworn
statements of the teachers, namely: Elena Princena, Myrna Bayabos, Mildred Millare, Ofrina Benabese,
Emilia Beralde, Ruby Bringas, Regina Potolin, spouses Ernesto Callena, Jr. and Ma. Louisa Callena, Irene
Bermudez, Francisco Castillo, Elizabeth Castillo, Maribel Medrano, Benigna Bulda, Irenea Viado, Cecilia
Turqueza, Catherine Badere, Rosalinda Bilgera, Nardita Tuscano, Henry Bisquera, Melba Linggayo, and
Maritess Navarro, it appears that respondent demanded and/or received money in various amounts from
the teachers in consideration of their appointment, promotion, and transfer from one school to another.
On 15 November 1996, the Committee issued an Investigation Report recommending the filing of
administrative and criminal complaints against respondent. On 14 March 1997, a formal charge for Grave
Misconduct, Conduct Grossly Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service, Abuse of Authority, and
Violation of Section 22 (k) Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of E.O. 292 and other related laws was
filed against respondent.
On 24 March 1997, respondent filed her Answer to the charges. In the main, she contended that the
charges are brazen fabrications and falsehoods made by parties with ulterior motives which are designed
to harass her in a systematic campaign to discredit her. Respondent likewise alleged that the preparation
and taking of the statements of the supposed 23 counts of irregularity leveled against her were attended
by coercion and fraud.
Meanwhile, the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Abra issued a Resolution in I.S. No. 97-003 entitled,
"People of the Philippines v. Helen Hernandez, et.al." This Resolution, which arose from the sworn
complaints filed by the complaining teachers, indicted respondent and a certain Luzviminda de la Cruz
for violation of Section 3(b), Republic Act No. 3019 otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act. The Resolution of the Provincial Prosecutor was affirmed with modification by the Office of
the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon in its Review Action dated 6 November 1997. Under the modified
indictment, respondent and dela Cruz were charged with direct bribery. However, upon motion filed by
respondent and her co-accused, the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman in its Order dated 24 February
1998, reconsidered and set aside its Review Action dated 6 November 1997, and ordered the withdrawal
of Informations for direct bribery filed against respondent and de la Cruz.
After due proceedings, the CSC issued Resolution No. 00-1375, dated 13 June 2000, finding respondent
guilty of the charges against her and ordering her dismissal from the service. The motion for
reconsideration filed by respondent was denied by the CSC in its Resolution No. 00-2064 dated 7
September 2000.
Respondent appealed to the Court of Appeals raising the following issues:
1) Whether or not the CSC erred in assuming jurisdiction and/or in rendering judgment adverse to her;
2) Whether or not the CSC erred in rendering judgment against her in violation of her right to due process
in administrative proceedings;
3) Whether or not the CSC erred in its appreciation of the evidence on record and;
4) Whether or not the CSC erred in imposing the penalty of dismissal.2
The appellate court, in its now assailed Decision, reversed the resolutions of the CSC. It opined that when
petitioners filed a formal charge against respondent, it was incumbent upon them to inform the Civil
Service Commission that another case was filed before the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon
considering that the facts and circumstances from which both complaints stem are the same. Citing
Section 13 (1) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, and Section 19 and 21 of Republic Act No. 6770, the
appellate court added that the CSC and the Office of the Ombudsman have concurrent original
jurisdiction over administrative cases filed against any government employee. Thus, it ruled that the
effects of res judicata or litis pendentia may not be avoided by varying the designation of the parties,
changing the form of the action, or adopting a different mode of presenting one's case.
Anent the issue of violation of respondent's right to due process, the appellate court stressed that it is
not enough that the twin requirements of notice and hearing be present. It is important that the tribunal
hearing the case must be unbiased; indeed, if a government official or employee under investigation is
not afforded the opportunity to present his case before a fair, independent, and impartial tribunal, the
hearing would be futile. Considering that the composition of the fact-finding Committee is in question,
the appellate court concluded that it cannot properly be said that there was a fair and impartial hearing
of the petitioner's case.
The appellate court also ruled that petitioner failed to discharge the burden of proving by substantial
evidence the averments of the complaint because it appears that some affiants who executed sworn
statements to support the charges against respondent later retracted their statements and executed new
statements, alleging that they were merely induced to testify against respondent. It also noted that some
of the complaining teachers even failed to appear in the investigation to confirm their respective sworn
statements. The appellate court, therefore, annulled and set aside the Resolutions of the CSC and ordered
the payment of backwages to respondent.
Separate appeals via petition for review were filed before this Court by petitioner Velasquez, in his
capacity as Officer-in Charge, Office of the School Superintendent, DECS-Division of Abra (G.R.
No.150732) and the Civil Service Commission (G.R. No. 151095), assailing the decision of the appellate
court. The two petitions were ordered consolidated in a Resolution of this Court dated 25 June 2002. G.R.
No. 150732, assigned to the Third Division of this Court, was ordered consolidated with G.R. No. 151095,
an En Banc case even if the first mentioned petition has a lower docket number considering that both
cases involve resolutions of the Civil Service Commission.
The issues in both petitions are substantially the same.
In G.R. No. 150732, petitioner raised the following issues:
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE FORMAL CHARGE WHICH WAS FILED
BY THE CSC AGAINST THE RESPONDENT SHOULD CONTAIN A CERTIFICATION OF NON-FORUM SHOPPING.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT RESPONDENT'S RIGHT TO

ADMINISTRATIVE DUE PROCESS WAS VIOLATED.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN DECLARING THAT THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE RESPONDENT
WAS INSUFFICIENT.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN ORDERING THE REINSTATEMENT OF THE RESPONDENT AND
THE PAYMENT OF HER BACKWAGES.3
On the other hand, the following issues were raised by the CSC in G.R. No. 151095:
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE FORMAL CHARGE SHOULD CONTAIN A CERTIFICATE AGAINST FORUM SHOPPING;
II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CSC ERRED IN RENDERING JUDGMENT AGAINST RESPONDENT IN VIOLATION OF
THE LATTER'S RIGHT TO DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS;
III.
WHETHER OR NOT THE CSC ERRED IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD AND FINDING
RESPONDENT GUILTY OF THE OFFENSES CHARGED.4
In both cases, petitioners asseverate that under Section 21 of the Uniform Rules of Procedure in the
Conduct of Administrative Investigations (CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, dated 31 August 1999), it is the
complaint and not the formal charge which should contain a certification of non-forum shopping. The
Office of the Solicitor General strongly argues that the formal charge was filed, not by the complaining
teachers or the DECS Fact-Finding Committee, but by the CSC-CAR and it would thus be unnecessary to
require a certification of non-forum shopping considering that the CSC is the sole arbiter of all contests
relating to the Civil Service and it would be absurd for the CSC-CAR to file the same administrative case
against respondent in another forum. The OSG added that there was no need for the CSC-CAR to inform
the CSC about the criminal action for Direct Bribery in OMB-1-96-2757 because the said action was not
filed by the CSC-CAR.
The CSC on the other hand, argues that what was filed with the Office of the Ombudsman is a criminal
case and while the facts therein may be similar to the pending administrative case, the Office of the
Ombudsman and the CSC will not rule on the same cause of action or grant the same relief. According to
the CSC, there is no possibility of having conflicting decisions as the two cases are distinct from each
other.
Petitioners dispute the Court of Appeals' finding that respondent's right to administrative due process
was violated. Respondent can hardly be said to have been deprived of due process as she was given the
chance to answer the charges, to submit countervailing evidence, and to cross-examine the witnesses
against her. The mere fact that respondent questioned the impartiality of the fact finding committee will
not automatically result in a denial of due process because what matters is that respondent had actively
participated in the proceedings against her. Petitioners add that respondent's culpability was not based
solely on the report of the fact-finding committee, but also on the evidence submitted by the respondent
which, unfortunately, was found wanting.
Succinctly, petitioners argue that the appellate court erred in holding that the evidence they presented
to establish the culpability of the respondent is insufficient. The finding is based merely on the retraction
of the sworn statements of some three teachers and the failure of three others to appear during the
formal investigation. Petitioners stress that a majority of the complainant teachers remained consistent
in their claim that respondent actually and directly received from them various amounts of money in
exchange for their appointment, promotion, or transfer. They add that the dismissal of the criminal action
against respondent in OMB-1-96-2757 cannot be treated as a bar to the administrative case primarily
because administrative liability is distinct from penal liability. In conclusion, petitioners fault the appellate
court for reversing the factual findings of the CSC, ordering the reinstatement of respondent, and
awarding backwages in her favor.
Upon the other hand, respondent would have the Court sustain the Decision of the appellate court
exonerating her of all the charges in the administrative case. Citing CSC Resolution No. 95-3099,
respondent argues that even on the assumption that a certificate of non-forum shopping is not necessary
in the formal charge, petitioners nevertheless failed to show that the complaint filed by the teachers
contained the required certification of non-forum shopping. She theorizes that since it is the CSC-CAR
which filed the formal charge against her, it would be difficult to imagine that the CSC will make a turn
around and take a position contrary to its earlier findings that a prima facie case against her exists.
Respondent insists that to allow the CSC to exercise jurisdiction over the case would be similar to allowing
one person to act as prosecutor and judge at the same time.
In support of the appellate court's Decision, respondent maintains that it correctly ruled that there was
no fair and impartial hearing of her case before the fact-finding committee. She contends that the
integrity of the fact-finding committee is questionable considering that the chairperson of the committee
is a relative of one of the complainant teachers, Ms. Immaculada Bringas, who incidentally would be the
next in rank if she is ousted from her position. Finally, she adds that petitioners are urging this Court to
review the factual findings of the appellate court which cannot be done in the instant petition which must
raise only questions of law.
The Court rules for the petitioners.
CSC Resolution No. 95-3099 dated 9 May 1995 (Further Amended by CSC Resolution No. 99-1936, dated
31 August 1999), amending Section 4 of CSC Resolution No. 94-0521, Series of 1994, provides:
"Section 4. Complaint in Writing and Under Oath - No complaint against a civil servant shall be given due
course, unless the same is in writing and under oath.
The complaint should be written in a clear, simple and concise language and in a systematic manner as
to apprise the civil servant concerned of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and to enable
him to intelligently prepare his defense or answer.
The complaint shall also contain the following:
(a) xxx xxx xxx xxx
(b) xxx xxx xxx xxx
(c) xxx xxx xxx xxx
(d) a statement that no other administrative action or complaint against the same party involving the
same acts or omissions and issues, has been filed before another agency or administrative tribunal. In the
absence of any one of the requirements therein stated, the complaint shall be dismissed. (Underscoring
supplied)
The appellate court placed much reliance on the above-quoted provision of CSC Resolution No. 95-3099
in relation to Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, when it ruled that it was incumbent
upon petitioner (in G.R. No. 150732) to inform that another case was filed before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon. Strikingly, the appellate court failed to state in its Decision the person or entity
which petitioner must notify of the pending case with the Ombudsman. The appellate court then cited a
litany of cases on forum shopping and concluded that petitioner's failure to state in the formal charge
that there is no other action or complaint pending against herein respondent constitutes a violation of
the rule against forum shopping that merited the dismissal of the complaint. It ratiocinated that since the
facts and circumstances from which both complaints stem from are the same, petitioners should have
attached in their complaint the certificate of non-forum shopping. Inconsistently, however, the appellate
court was quick to add that the cause of action in the CSC and the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman are
distinct; nevertheless, it said that in order to obviate the risk of violating the rule, petitioners should have
attached the certification against non-forum shopping.
The Court finds the above disquisition unsound.
Forum shopping consists of filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action,
either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.5 It may also
consist in a party against whom an adverse judgment has been rendered in one forum, seeking another
and possibly favorable opinion in another forum other than by appeal or special civil action of certiorari.6
The most important factor in determining the existence of forum shopping is the vexation caused the
courts and parties-litigants by a party who asks different courts to rule on the same or related causes or
grant the same or substantially the same reliefs. A party, however, cannot be said to have sought to
improve his chances of obtaining a favorable decision or action where no unfavorable decision has ever
been rendered against him in any of the cases he has brought before the courts. 7
In not a few cases, this Court has laid down the yardstick to determine whether a party violated the rule
against forum shopping as where the elements of litis pendentia are present or where a final judgment
in one case will amount to res judicata in the other.8 Stated differently, there must be between the two
cases (a) identity of parties; (b) identity of rights asserted and reliefs prayed for, the relief being founded
on the same facts; and (c) that the identity of the two preceding particulars is such that any judgment
rendered in the other action will, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
action under consideration.9
It is significant to note that the action filed before the CSC-CAR is administrative in nature, dealing as it
does with the proper administrative liability, if any, which may have been incurred by respondent for the
commission of the acts complained of. In stark contrast, the case filed before the Office of the Deputy
Ombudsman for Luzon, which incidentally was not initiated by herein petitioners but by the complainant
teachers, deals with the criminal accountability of the respondent for violation of the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act. Unmistakably, the rule on forum shopping would find no proper application since
the two cases although based on the same essential facts and circumstances do not raise identical causes
of action and issues.10 It would, therefore, be absurd to require the certification of forum shopping to be
attached to the formal charges filed before the CSC, for the evil sought to be curbed by the proscription
against forum shopping is simply not extant in the instant case.
On the issue of her having been denied administrative due process, the Court likewise finds respondent's
claim untenable.
The essence of due process is that a party be afforded a reasonable opportunity to be heard and to
present any evidence he may have in support of his defense or simply an opportunity to be heard;11 or as
applied to administrative proceedings, an opportunity to seek a reconsideration of the action of ruling
complained of.12 One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many
times more creditably than oral argument, through pleadings. Technical rules of procedure and evidence
are not strictly applied to administrative proceedings, and administrative due process cannot be fully
equated to due process in its strict judicial sense. 13
In fact in Pefianco v. Moral,14 the Court had the occasion to rule that a respondent in an administrative
case is not entitled to be informed of the findings and recommendations of any investigating committee
created to inquire into charges filed against him – he is entitled only to the administrative decision based
on substantial evidence made of record, and a reasonable opportunity to meet the charges and the
evidence presented against him during the hearing of the investigation committee. It is the administrative
resolution, not the investigation report, which should be the basis of any further remedies that the losing
party in an administrative case might wish to pursue.
Respondent had been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard. She was required to answer the
formal charge against her and given the chance to present evidence on her behalf. She actively
participated in the proceedings and even cross-examined the witnesses against her. Clearly, based on the
above jurisprudential pronouncements the appellate court's finding that respondent was denied due
process is utterly without basis.
Administrative proceedings are governed by the "substantial evidence rule."15 A finding of guilt in an
administrative case would have to be sustained for as long as it is supported by substantial evidence that
the respondent has committed the acts stated in the complaint or formal charge. As defined, substantial
evidence is such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind may accept as adequate to support a
conclusion.16 This is different from the quantum of proof required in criminal proceedings which
necessitates a finding of guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The Ombudsman, in ordering the
withdrawal of the criminal complaints against respondent was simply saying that there is no evidence
sufficient to establish her guilt beyond reasonable doubt which is a condition sine qua non for conviction.
Ergo, the dismissal of the criminal case will not foreclose administrative action against respondent.
In the instant case, this Court is of the view that the sworn complaints of the twenty remaining
complainants coupled with their positive testimonies in the proceedings below, more than adequately
complies with the standard of proof required in administrative cases. The desistance executed by three
(3) out of the twenty-three(23) original complainants is of no moment since administrative actions cannot
be made to depend upon the will of every complainant who may, for one reason or another, condone a
detestable act.17
All told, the Court holds that respondent's guilt in the administrative case has been sufficiently
established and pursuant to existing Civil Service Rules and Regulations,18 her dismissal from the service
is warranted.
WHEREFORE, the instant consolidated petitions are hereby GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Costs against the respondent.
SO ORDERED.
20. G. R. No. 166809 Erece v Macalingay
[G.R. NO. 166809 : April 22, 2008]
ATTY. ROMEO L. ERECE, Petitioner, v. LYN B. MACALINGAY, JOCELYN BASTIAN, LYMAN B.

SALVADOR, BIENVENIDO L. REANO, BRIGIDA CECILIA R. ABRATIQUE, JEAN CORTEZ-MARZAN,
FRANCISCO M. BILOG, ROSA P. ESPIRITU, ROLANDO EBREO, YANIE A. PITLONGAY, and
VIRGILIO MAGPOC, Respondents.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari of the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on
1
January 7, 2005 affirming the Decision of the Civil Service Commission (CSC) which found petitioner Atty.
Romeo L. Erece guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service.
The facts are as follows:
Petitioner is the Regional Director of the Commission on Human Rights (CHR) Region I, whose office is located
in San Fernando City, La Union. Respondent employees of the CHR Region I filed an Affidavit-Complaint dated
October 2, 1998 against petitioner alleging that he denied them the use of the office vehicle assigned to
petitioner, that petitioner still claimed transportation allowance even if he was using the said vehicle, and that
he certified that he did not use any government vehicle, when in fact he did, in order to collect transportation
allowance.
The Affidavit-Complaint reads:
xxx
4. That on September 10, 1998, we, Atty. Lynn Macalingay and Mr. Lyman Salvador were
denied the use of the office vehicle as evidenced by the hereto attached copy of our denied
Itinerary of Travel marked as Annex 'B';
5. That on August 5, 1998, I, Brigida Abratique requested for the use of the government vehicle
but the same was denied by Atty. Erece for the reason that we would be using the same to
Teachers Camp as evidenced by a copy of the denied trip ticket with the marginal notes of Atty.
Erece hereto attached as Annex 'C';
6. That on May 29, 1998, the request of Brigida Cecilia Abratique and Francisco Bilog to use the
vehicle within the City for field work purposes was again denied by Atty. Erece as he will
accordingly use the same;
7. That on April 20, 1998, a proposed trip was likewise postponed by Atty. Erece on the ground
that he will be using the vehicle as evidenced by a copy of the proposed Itinerary of Travel with
marginal note of Atty. Erece xxx;
8. That on April, 1997, I, Atty. Jocelyn Bastian requested for the use of the vehicle as I need[ed]
to go to the Benguet Provincial Jail but I was instructed to commute because he will use the
vehicle. To my dismay, I found him still in the office when I returned from the Provincial Jail;
9. That such denials of the use of the vehicle are not isolated cases but were just a few of the
numerous instances of conflicts of schedules regarding the use of the government vehicle and
where we found ourselves always at the losing end because we are the subordinate employees;
xxx
13. That Atty. Erece regularly receives and liquidates his Representation and Transportation
Allowances (RATA) which at present is in the amount of FOUR THOUSAND PESOS (P4,000.00),
the payroll of such and its liquidation could be made available upon request by an authority to
the Resident Auditor but his liquidations for the month of April 1998 and September 1998 [are]
hereto attached xxx;
14. That despite regular receipt of his RATA, Atty. Erece still prioritizes himself in the use of the
office vehicle to the detriment of the public service;
15. That to compound things, he certifies in his monthly liquidation of his RATA that 'HE DID
NOT USE ANY GOVERNMENT VEHICLE FOR THE SAID MONTH' xxx which is a big lie because as
already stated, he is the regular user of the government vehicle issued to CHR, Region I;
16. That I, Rolando C. Ebreo, the disbursing officer of the Regional Field Office hereby attest to
the fact that no deductions in the RATA of Atty. Romeo L. Erece was ever done in connection
with his regular use of the government vehicle x x x."2
The CSC-Cordillera Administrative Region issued an Order dated October 9, 1998, directing petitioner to
comment on the complaint.
In compliance, petitioner countered, thus:
xxx
4. In relation to paragraphs 2-D, 2-E and 2-G above cited, it is among the duties as per
management supervisory function of the Regional HR Director to approve use or non-use of the
official vehicle of the Region as it was memorandum receipted to him and the non-approval of
the use of the same if it is not arbitrary and for justifiable reasons; said function of approval
and disapproval rests on the Regional Human Rights Director and that function is not merely
ministerial;
5. That I have issued a guideline that the official vehicle will not be used for the Mountain
Provinces and Halsema Highway/Mountain Trail because of the poor road condition and to
prevent breakdown and early deterioration of same xxx;
6. That Atty. Lynn B. Macalingay, one of the complainants had gone to Mt. Province to attend
the Provincial Peace and Order Council meetings, conduct jail visitations and follow-up cases on
many occasions using the regular bus trips in the spirit of the policy as mentioned in paragraph
4 xxx;
7. That all employees had used the vehicle on official business without exception, all
complainants included xxx;
8. On September 10, 1998, Atty. Lynn Macalingay and Lyman Salvador had the use of the
vehicle disapproved for the reasons conforming to paragraph 4 xxx;
9. On August 5, 1998, Atty. Erece disapproved the use of vehicle for use of Brigida Abratique
because:
'a) The vehicle was available since July 30, 1998 for use in Happy Hallow but not
utilized earlier xxx;
b) On August 6, 1998, a DECS-CHR Seminar on Use Human Rights Exemplar was

held at the Teacher's Camp Baguio City and the vehicle was used to transport HR
materials, overhead projector and for the overall use of the seminar upon the
request of the Public Information and Education Office, Central Office,
Commission on Human Rights through Susan Nuguid of CHR, Manila;
xxx
d) That Mrs. Abratique and Co. were asked to explain the unreasonable delay to
attend to the case of Cherry Esteban which was subject of the disapproved travel;'
10. On April 20, 1998, the itinerary of travel of Lyman Salvador was RESCHEDULED from April
22 & 23, 1998 to April 23 & 24, 1998 as the vehicle was used by Atty. Erece on an important
travel to Manila upon order of no less than the Honorable Chairperson, Aurora Navarette-
ReciÃ±a of Commission on Human Rights xxx;
xxx
12. As to the use of the vehicle by the Regional HR Director, same shall be subject to the
allowance/disallowance of the COA Resident Auditor, likewise the Regional HR Director in all his
travels outside Baguio City, he does not claim bus and taxi fares per certification of Danilo
Balino, the Administrative Officer Designate and Mr. Rolando Ebreo, the Cash Disbursing Officer,
Annex 'Z';
13. In many cases, Atty. Romeo L. Erece has to maintain the vehicle including car washing
thereof, garage parking at his residence to maintain and upkeep the vehicle and same is still in
premium condition to the satisfaction of the office at no extra cost to the Commission;
xxx
15. In support thereof, we move to dismiss this case as pure question on supervisory and
management prerogative, which is reserved for the Office Head and a harassment move by
disgruntled employees who are counter-charged hereof;
16. Annexes 'E' and 'F' of the complaint [are] misplaced and misleading because a clear and
cognate reading of same does not reflect that I checked/marked the use of government vehicle
in the certification and as such no dishonesty is involved; the documents speak for themselves.
x x x Annex 'E' is for the month of April, 1998 where the check marks are clear. On Annex 'F'
of the complaint, no reference is made as to the fact that I did not use the government vehicle,
if so, no allegation as to when I did use same for my personal use."3
After a fact-finding investigation, the CSC Proper in CSC Resolution No. 99-1360 dated July 1, 1999 charged
petitioner with Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct for using a government vehicle in spite of his receipt of the
monthly transportation allowance and for certifying that he did not use any government vehicle, when in fact,
he did, in order to receive the transportation allowance.
Pertinent portions of the formal charge read:
1. That despite the regular receipt of Erece of his monthly Representation and Transportation
Allowance (RATA) in the amount of P4,000.00, he still prioritizes himself in the use of the office
vehicle (Tamaraw FX) in spite of the directive from the Central Office that he cannot use the
service vehicle for official purposes and at the same time receive his transportation allowance;
2. That Erece did not comply with the directive of the Central Office addressed to all Regional
Human Rights Directors, as follows: 'to regularize your receipt of the transportation allowance
component of the RATA to which you are entitled monthly, you are hereby directed to
immediately transfer to any of your staff, preferably one of your lawyers, the memorandum
receipt of the vehicle(s) now still in your name;'
3. That he certified in his monthly liquidation of his RATA that he did not use any government
vehicle for the corresponding month, which is not true because he is a regular user of the
government vehicle issued to CHR-Region I.
The foregoing facts and circumstances indicate that government service has been prejudiced
by the acts of Erece.
WHEREFORE, Romeo L. Erece is hereby formally charged with Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct. Accordingly, he is given five (5) days from receipt hereof to submit his Answer
under oath and affidavits of his witnesses, if any, to the Civil Service Commission-Cordillera
Administrative Region (CSC-CAR). On his Answer, he should indicate whether he elects a formal
investigation or waives his right thereto. Any Motion to Dismiss, request for clarification or Bills
of Particulars shall not be entertained by the Commission. Any of these pleadings interposed by
the respondent shall be considered as an Answer and shall be evaluated as such. Likewise, he
is advised of his right to the assistance of counsel of his choice. 4
After a formal investigation of the case, the CSC issued Resolution No. 020124, dated January 24. 2002,
finding petitioner guilty of dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and penalizing
him with dismissal from the service.
Petitioner filed a Petition for Review of the CSC Resolution with the CA.
In the Decision promulgated on January 7, 2005, the CA upheld the CSC Resolution, the dispositive portion
of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is DENIED and the assailed Resolutions of
the Civil Service Commission are hereby AFFIRMED.5
Hence, this petition.
Petitioner raises these issues:
1. Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that petitioner was not denied due process despite the
admitted facts that respondents failed to identify and testify on their Affidavit-Complaint and that petitioner
was denied of his right to cross-examine respondents on their Affidavit-Complaint.
2. Whether or not the Court of Appeals was correct in adopting in toto the conclusions of the CSC although
they were based on mere assumptions.
Petitioner contends that he was denied due process as he was not afforded the right to cross-examine his
accusers and their witnesses. He stated that at his instance, in order to prevent delay in the disposition of
the case, he was allowed to present evidence to support the allegations in his Counter-Affidavit. After he
rested his case, respondents did not present their evidence, but moved to submit their position paper and
formal offer of evidence, which motion was granted by the CSC over his (petitioner's) objection. Respondents
then submitted their Position Paper and Formal Offer of Exhibits.
Petitioner submits that although he was allowed to present evidence first, it should not be construed as a
waiver of his right to cross-examine the complainants. Although the order of presentation of evidence was
not in conformity with the procedure, still petitioner should not be deemed to have lost his right to cross-
examine his accusers and their witnesses. This may be allowed only if he expressly waived said right.
The Court agrees with the CA that petitioner was not denied due process when he failed to cross-examine the
complainants and their witnesses since he was given the opportunity to be heard and present his evidence.
In administrative proceedings, the essence of due process is simply the opportunity to explain one's side. 6
Velez v. De Vera7 held:
Due process of law in administrative cases is not identical with "judicial process" for a trial in
court is not always essential to due process. While a day in court is a matter of right in judicial
proceedings, it is otherwise in administrative proceedings since they rest upon different
principles. The due process clause guarantees no particular form of procedure and its
requirements are not technical. Thus, in certain proceedings of administrative character, the
right to a notice or hearing are not essential to due process of law. The constitutional
requirement of due process is met by a fair hearing before a regularly established administrative
agency or tribunal. It is not essential that hearings be had before the making of a determination
if thereafter, there is available trial and tribunal before which all objections and defenses to the
making of such determination may be raised and considered. One adequate hearing is all that
due process requires. . . .
The right to cross-examine is not an indispensable aspect of due process. Nor is an

actual hearing always essential. . . .8
Next, petitioner contends that the CA erred in adopting in toto the conclusions of the CSC.
Petitioner contends that the conclusion of the CSC proceeded from the premise that the petitioner was using
the subject vehicle as his service vehicle, which he disputes, because he did not use the vehicle regularly.
The evidence showed that the service vehicle was being used by the employees of the regional office for
official purposes. He argues that although the service vehicle is still in his name, it should not be concluded
that it is assigned to him as his service vehicle, thus disqualifying him from receiving transportation allowance.
The Court is not persuaded. The pertinent conclusion of the CSC referred to by petitioner reads:
At the outset, it must be stated that the entitlement to transportation allowance by certain
officials and employees pursuant to RA 6688 presupposes that they are not assigned
government vehicles. This was clarified by the Supreme Court in the case of Aida Domingo v.
COA, G.R. No. 112371, October 7, 1998, where it ruled, as follows:
'The provision of law in point is found in Section 28 of Republic Act 6688,

otherwise known as the General Appropriations Act of 1989, to wit:
Sec. 28. Representation and Transportation Allowances. ... The transportation

allowance herein authorized shall not be granted to officials who are assigned a
government vehicle or use government motor transportation, except as may be
approved by the President of the Philippines. Unless otherwise provided by law,
no amount appropriated in this Act shall be used to pay for representation and/or
transportation allowances, whether commutable or reimbursable, which exceed
the rates authorized under this Section. Previous administrative authorization not
consistent with the rates and conditions herein specified shall no longer be valid
and payment shall not be allowed.
xxx
In the case of Bustamante v. Commission on Audit, 216 SCRA 134, decided by

this Court on November 27, 1992, COA also disallowed the claim for
transportation allowance of the legal counsel of National Power Corporation
because he was already issued a government vehicle. Involving the circular
aforementioned and almost the same facts as in this case, it was therein held
that COA Circular No. 75-6 is categorical in prohibiting the use of government
vehicles by officials receiving transportation allowance and in stressing that the
use of government motor vehicle and claim for transportation allowance are
mutually exclusive and incompatible.
The issue need no longer be belabored for no less than this Court ruled in the
aforesaid case that a government official, to whom a motor vehicle has been
assigned, cannot, at the same time, claim transportation allowance.
(Underscoring supplied) cralawlibr ary
It is clear from the records that Director Edmundo S. Ancog, CHR-Central office (Field
Operations office), issued a Memorandum dated February 27, 1998, addressed to all CHR
Regional Directors in respect to Transportation Allowance. The Memorandum states that
transportation allowance shall not be granted to Regional Directors whenever a government
vehicle or use of government motor transportation is already assigned to them. It further
emphasized that should they want to "avail regularization of their RATA," the Regional Directors
must immediately transfer the vehicle to any of their staff/lawyer.
Records show that Erece was issued a government vehicle since August 10, 1997 and he did
not transfer the vehicle to any of his staff. Notwithstanding this fact and the said memorandum,
he received transportation allowance particularly for the months of April and September 1998,
as reflected in the Certification/s signed by him. This clearly resulted in undue prejudice to the
best interest of the service.
The foregoing facts logically lead to the conclusion that the act of Erece in certifying that he has
not used any government vehicle and consequently collecting Transportation Allowance despite
the fact that a government vehicle was assigned to him constitutes the offenses of Dishonesty
and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of the Service.9
The above conclusion,as well as the Memorandum dated February 27, 1998 issued by Director Ancog to the
CHR Regional Directors, are both very clear. Once a vehicle is assigned to a regional director, like petitioner,
he is no longer entitled to transportation allowance unless he assigns the vehicle to another staff/lawyer.
Since petitioner did not assign the subject vehicle assigned to him to someone else, he is not entitled to
transportation allowance.
Contrary to the argument of petitioner, there is no qualification that the assigned vehicle should be for the
exclusive use of the service vehicle of the regional director alone to disqualify him from receiving
transportation allowance.
Since the records show that petitioner collected transportation allowance even if a government vehicle had
been assigned to him, the CA did not err in sustaining the decision of the CSC finding petitioner guilty of
dishonesty and conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and penalizing him with dismissal from
the service.
WHEREFORE, the petition is denied. The Decision of the Court of Appeals promulgated on January 7, 2005
is AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
21. G.R. No. 140356 March 20, 2001
DOLORES FAJARDO, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and REXIE EFREN A. BUGARING, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 4, 1999
and its resolution dated September 30, 1999 in CA-G.R. SP No. 49866 entitled "Dolores S. Fajardo vs. Hon.
Percival M. Lopez, RTC, Branch 78, Quezon City, and Rexie Efren A. Bugaring."
This case originated from a complaint filed by respondent Rexie Efren A. Bugaring before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City against petitioner Dolores Fajardo for collection of attorney's fees. The
complaint alleged that petitioner engaged the services of respondent to represent her in several civil and
criminal cases pending before various courts. However, despite successful termination of some of these
cases and subsequent demands made by respondent upon petitioner, the latter refused to pay
respondent's fees. Respondent prayed that petitioner be ordered to pay his unpaid attorney's fees and
other legal service fees, plus interest, moral damages, exemplary damages, and other litigation expenses
and costs.1
Respondent was allowed to present evidence ex parte after the trial court declared petitioner as in
default for failure to appear during the pre-trial.
After the presentation of evidence, the trial court rendered a decision dated October 15, 1997 in favor of
respondent. The dispositive portion stated:
"ACCORDINGLY, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, Efren Rexie Bugaring and against
defendant Dolores Fajardo, ordering the latter to pay plaintiff in the amount of THREE MILLION FIVE
HUNDRED THIRTY TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY (P3,532,170.00) PESOS for plaintiff's
attorney's fees covering Civil Case No. B-3472 and Civil Case No. B-3896 plus legal interest reckoned from
the time of the filing of this instant case, as actual and compensatory damages; plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."2
On December 10, 1997, respondent filed before the trial court a motion for correction of judgment.
On February 3, 1998, petitioner, alleging that she received a copy of the trial court's decision on January
19, 1998, filed a notice of appeal.
On the same day, the trial court denied the notice of appeal for being premature, considering that there
was a pending motion for correction of the decision dated October 15, 1997. 3
On February 13, 1998, the trial court issued an order granting respondent's motion for correction. It
revised the dispositive portion of the decision which now reads:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff, Efren C. Bugaring and against defendant
Dolores Fajardo, ordering the latter to pay plaintiff in the amount of THREE MILLION FIVE HUNDRED
THIRTY TWO THOUSAND ONE HUNDRED SEVENTY (P3,532,170.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency, for
plaintiffs unpaid attorney's fees covering the legal cases which he handled in favor of defendant, as actual
and compensatory damages; plus costs of suit.
SO ORDERED."4
Respondent subsequently filed a motion for issuance of a writ of execution which was granted by the trial
court in its resolution dated September 28, 1998.5
On December 11, 1998, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari seeking the
annulment of: (1) Order dated February 3, 1998, (2) Order dated February 13, 1998, and (3) Resolution
dated September 28, 1998, all issued by the trial court. She contended that the trial court acted with
grave abuse of discretion in holding that the notice of appeal was premature because of the pendency of
respondent's motion for correction. She argued that said motion for correction was a mere scrap of paper
because first, she was not furnished a copy thereof, and second, it contained no notice of hearing. She
claimed that the filing of the notice of appeal perfected the appeal and consequently, the trial court no
longer had jurisdiction over the case when it issued the order dated February 13, 1998 and resolution
dated September 28, 1998.6
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and affirmed the resolution of the trial court dated
September 28, 1998 directing the issuance of a writ of execution. It held that the decision of the trial
court became final and executory when petitioner failed to file a notice of appeal after she received a
copy of the order amending its dispositive portion. The notice of appeal filed by petitioner on February
3, 1998 was not sufficient to elevate the case to the Court of Appeals as it was filed prematurely due to
the pendency of the motion for correction filed by respondent. The Court of Appeals further ruled that
even if the court considered the notice of appeal as an appeal from the original decision dated October
15, 1997, the same should still be dismissed for being late. Relying on the certification issued by Ms.
Melina D. Oliva, Chief of Records Section, Philippine Postal Corporation, stating that a copy of the decision
was received by petitioner on December 15, 1997, the Court of Appeals ruled that the notice of appeal
submitted by petitioner on February 3, 1998 was filed out of time.7
The Court of Appeals likewise denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration.8
Petitioner filed the instant petition with the following assignment of errors:
"I. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in finding that Branch 78 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City acted within its jurisdiction in issuing an amended decision after perfection of the appeal.
II. The Court of Appeals committed reversible error in finding that Branch 78 of the Regional Trial Court
of Quezon City acted within its jurisdiction in issuing Orders dated February 3 and 13, 1998 and Resolution
dated September 28, 1998 after perfection of the appeal."9
The petition is impressed with merit.
The Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the decision of the trial court dated October 15, 1997 as
amended by its order dated February 13, 1998 became final and executory when petitioner failed to
appeal therefrom within the reglementary period, and subsequently sustaining the validity of the order
of execution issued by the trial court. It appears from the record that petitioner filed a notice of appeal
from the decision of the lower court dated October 15, 1997 on February 3, 1998.10 The pendency of
petitioner's appeal tolled the finality of the assailed decision. Consequently, the resolution of the trial
court ordering the execution of the assailed judgment was without basis.
The lower court ruled that petitioner's notice of appeal was premature due to the pendency of
respondent's motion for correction of judgment. It subsequently issued an order amending the original
decision. We, however, find that these orders of the trial court were rendered without jurisdiction. These
orders were issued in consideration of the motion for correction of judgment filed by respondent with
the trial court. It appears, however, that said motion was defective as it did not have a proper notice of
hearing. It did not specify the date and time of the hearing on the motion. This fact was never
controverted by respondent. Such defect reduced the motion to a mere scrap of paper which may not be
taken cognizance of by the court.
The Rules of Court require that every written motion be set for hearing by the movant, except those
motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing the rights of the adverse party. The notice of
hearing must be addressed to all parties and must specify the time and date of the hearing. Sections 4
and 5 of Rule 15 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provide:
"SECTION 4. Hearing of motion. — Except for motions which the court may act upon without prejudicing
the rights of the adverse party, every written motion shall be set for hearing by the applicant.
Every written motion required to be heard and the notice of the hearing thereof shall be served in such
a manner as to ensure its receipt by the other party at least three (3) days before the date of hearing,
unless the court for good cause sets the hearing on shorter notice.
SECTION 5. Notice of hearing. — The notice of hearing shall be addressed to all parties concerned, and
shall specify the time and date of the hearing which must not be later than ten (10) days after the filing
of the motion."
A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap of paper. It presents no question which
the court could decide. The court has no reason to consider it and the clerk has no right to receive it. The
rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time and place of hearing, the court will be
unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects to the motion, and if he objects, to hear
him on his objection.11 The objective of the rule is to avoid a capricious change of mind in order to
provide due process to both parties and ensure impartiality in the trial.12
Hence, the orders dated February 3, 1998 and February 13, 1998 issued by the trial court based on a pro
forma motion are of no force and effect.
Respondent asserts that petitioner's appeal was ineffective as she failed to pay the appeal docket fee.
The argument is not well-taken. A party's omission to pay the appeal docket fee does not automatically
result in the dismissal of the appeal. The failure to pay the appellate court docket fee within the
reglementary period confers a discretionary, and not mandatory, power to dismiss the proposed appeal.
Such power should be used in the exercise of the court's sound judgment in accordance with the tenets
of justice and fair play and with great deal of circumspection, considering all attendant circumstances.
Said discretion must be exercised wisely and prudently, never capriciously, with a view to substantial
justice.13
As regards the timeliness of petitioner's notice of appeal, we find that the same was properly filed within
the reglementary period. While it is true that the Chief of the Records Section of the Quezon City Central
Post Office did certify that a copy of the decision was received by a certain Gloria Fajardo at petitioner's
given address on December 15, 1997, 14 the registry return receipt shows that a copy of the decision was
received by petitioner's counsel only on January 19, 1998. 15 The appeal should be taken within fifteen
(15) days from notice of the judgment appealed from. 16 The fifteen-day period for filing the appeal
should be counted from the date when petitioner's counsel received a copy of said judgment because
that is the effective service of the decision, not the service upon petitioner herself. When a party is
represented by counsel, service of process must be made on counsel, not on the party. 17 Thus, counting
from the date of receipt of the decision by petitioner's counsel on January 19, 1998, we find that the
notice of appeal filed on February 3, 1998 was timely.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 4, 1999
and its Resolution dated September 30, 1999 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Order dated February 3,
1998, Order dated February 13, 1998, and Resolution dated September 28, 1998, all issued by the trial
court are likewise SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to the trial court for proper disposition.
SO ORDERED.
22. 293 SCRA 606
CESAR B. MERIS v. JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA +
JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan, was charged with
various administrative offenses contained in two (2) separate complaints, in addition to several others
previously filed against him, as will be discussed hereunder.
A.M. No. RTJ-1390On 16 May 1996 respondent Judge issued Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 against a
certain Thomas Jay of Lalakhan, Sta. Maria, Bulacan, for illegal possession of 3,000 board feet of narra
lumber valued more or less at P360,000.00 in violation of Sec. 68, PD 705, as amended by EO 277,
otherwise known as the Revised Forestry Code of the Philippines. The warrant was served immediately
the following day. On 20 May 1996 EIIB Operation Officer Baltazar B. Dulalia filed a Return, Compliance
and Inventory (re search warrant).
On 21 May 1996 Thomas Jay filed a Motion to Quash Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 on the ground that
the facts charged did not constitute an offense and that the warrant contained averments which if true
would make up legal excuses or justifications. Appended to the motion were photocopies of the
following documents: (a) Certificate of Transport Agreement issued by CENRO, Bayombong, Nueva
Viscaya, dated 22 January 1996, re conveyance of the narra lumber (Annex "4"); [1] (b) Certificate of
Lumber Origin issued by CENRO, Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, in favor of Remitans Enterprises, 12
Agueda St., Project 8, Q.C., for 11,754 bd. ft. = 27.71 cu. M. under Auxiliary Invoice No. 180795 and
Official Receipt No. 4529171 dated 22 January 1996 issued by DENR-CENRO, Bayongbong, Nueva
Voscaya (annexes "5" and "5-1");[2] (c) Certificate of Registration of Business Name No. 0298450 issued
by the Department of Trade and industry, NCR, on 26 September 1955, for TJ Furniture owned by Tomas
Jay (Annex "1");[3] (d) Mayor's Permit No. 16840 issued by the Office of the City Mayor of Manila on 18
January 1996 (Annex "2");[4] (e) Delivery Receipt for narra lumber dated 21 March 1996 issued by
Remitans Enterprises to TJ Furniture (Annex "3");[5] and, (f) Tally Sheets of narra lumber (Annexes "7",
"7-1", "7-2" and "7-3").[6]
The motion to quash was set for hearing on 31 May 1996 at 8:30 in the morning. However, on 21 May
1996 Jay, through his counsel, Atty. Romeo Y. De Jesus, moved to have the hearing advanced to 28 May
1996 on the ground that, according to him, he was informed that "the calendar of the Court is not
available;" consequently, he requested for 28 May 1996 at 8:30 in the morning, undertaking at the
same time to "notify the parties concerned." But counsel for respondent, despite his undertaking,
failed to notify complainant Cesar B. Meris, Regional Director, EIIB, who as a result failed to appear on
28 May 1996.
On 27 May 1996 Atty. Salome T. Cansino, Special Counsel of the Department of Justice, filed an
opposition to the motion to quash the search warrant contending that (a) the pieces of narra lumber
seized were not covered by any legal documents required by the Revised Forestry Code of the
Philippines; (b) the documents submitted by Jay did not cover the lumber seized; and, (c) a criminal
complaint had already been filed against Jay by the DENR for Illegal Possession of Forest Products in
violation of Sec. 68, PD 705, as amended by EO 277.
On 28 May 1996, despite the opposition of the special counsel of the Department of Justice, respondent
Judge granted the motion to quash and ordered the immediate release of the narra lumber seized from
Thomas Jay. The explanation of respondent was that the pieces of lumber seized were owned by a
legitimate enterprise and covered by proper documents, emphasizing that he took into consideration
not only the opposition of the Department of Justice but also the deteriorating condition of the pieces
of lumber which were already long exposed to the elements.
On 5 June 1996 complainant, in his capacity as Regional Director for Region III of EIIB, wrote a letter to
Chief Justice Andres R. Narvasa which is textually quoted hereunder -
THE HONORABLE ANDRES R. NARVASA
Chief Justice
Supreme Court
Sir:
I wish to report to HIS HONOR about the actuation of Honorable Judge Carlos Ofilada, regional trial
Court, Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan which is prejudicial to the interest of the government by issuing an
Order of Release of Seized/Confiscated Narra Lumber with a commercial value of P150,000.00 by virtue
of Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 for violation of Section 68, PD 705 as amended by Executive Order No.
277 without hearing of the case on the merits.
Records show that respondent/owner of seized narra lumber thru Counsel filed a Motion to Quash
Search Warrant before the Court and set the case for hearing on May 31, 1996 at 8:30 in the morning.
It is sad to note, however, Honorable Judge Carlos Ofilada quashed the Search Warrant on May 28,
1996 motu propio and ordered the release of seized narra lumber to the respondent herein, which is
two (2) days prior to the scheduled hearing, May 31, 1996.
That Economic intelligence and Investigation Bureau (EIIB) Region III represented by the Regional
Director ATTY. CESAR B. MERIS as Counsel attended the scheduled hearing of the Motion to Quash on
May 31, 1996 but sad to note Judge Ofilada already quashed to Search Warrant No. 20-M-96 on May
28, 1996 without affording a day in Court on the part of the Government. Attached hereto are xerox
copies of Search Warrant No. 20-M-96, application for Search Warrant, marked as Annex "A" and "B,"
Motion to Quash filed by respondent thru counsel marked as ANNEX "C," Court Order Quashing Search
Warrant No. 20-M-96 dated May 28, 1996 marked as ANNEX "D," Motion for reconsideration marked
as ANNEX "E."
May I request your Honor to look into the matter with the aim in view to enhance the good image of
the Judiciary. Likewise, to encourage the public to report erring Judges to Supreme Court and not to
the media xxxx
Very respectfully yours,
ATTY. CESAR B. MERIS
Regional Director, Counsel for EIIB3
Cabanatuan City
On 3 July 1996 Regional Director Cesar B. Meris, who was also acting as counsel for EIIB, filed an Answer
(actually an opposition to the motion to quash search warrant). On 10 July 1996 he filed his motion for
reconsideration (of the order quashing the search warrant) where he claimed that he attended the
hearing on the motion to quash previously scheduled on 31 May 1996 only to be informed that
respondent Judge had already quashed the search warrant on 28 May 1996 even without the presence
of either the complainant EIIB Regional Director or the Special Counsel representing the Government.
His motion for reconsideration and that of Special Counsel Salome T. Cansino, who protested the
hearing of the motion without proper service and notice, were denied by respondent Judge.
Complainant claims that by ordering the release of the confiscated narra lumber without hearing the
case on the merits and without affording the prosecution a day in court, respondent Judge committed
rave abuse of authority prejudicial to the interest of the Government. Section 5, Rule 15, of the Rules
of Court states-
Sec. 5. Contents of notice. - The notice shall directed to the parties concerned, and shall state the time
and place for the hearing of the motion. [7]
A perusal of the request for advanced resetting of the motion to quash search warrant would show
that although it stated the time and date of hearing, it failed to comply with Sec. 5 of Rule 15 as the
notice was addressed only to the clerk of court and not to the parties concerned as required.[8] Neither
was there proof of service of the motion on the adverse party despite the undertaking of counsel for
movant to notify the public prosecutor of the request as required by Sec. 6 of Rule 15 -
Sec. 6. Proof of service, to filed with motion. - No motion shall be acted upon by the court, without
proof of service of the notice thereof, except when the court is satisfied that the rights of te adverse
party or parties are not affected.[9]
In Manakil v. Revilla[10] we held that the court will not act on the motion if there is no proper notice
and/or proof of service of the notice on the adverse party. It is nothing but a useless piece of paper
filed with the court. It is not motion. It presents no question which the court could decide. The court
has no reason to consider it and the clerk had no right to receive it without that compliance with the
rules. Harsh as they may seem, these rules were introduced to avoid a capricious change of mind in
order to provide due process to both parties and ensure impartiality in the trial.
Due process demands proper obedience to procedural rules especially when the subject matter of
motion to quash is search warrant. Since searches are in derogation of the inviolable right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects, [11] it necessarily follows that the applicant
should rely on the strength of his evidence to support the application or the subsequent legal custody
of the seized articles. Otherwise, upon prima facie proof that the movant for the quashal of the warrant
was the owner of the seized lumber and that he lawfully acquired them, he is entitled to the quashal
of the search warrant and the restoration to him of the seized articles. [12] It is clear therefore that the
exception in Sec. 6, Rule 15, of the Rules of Court cannot apply in a motion to quash search warrant.
For without the proper notice of hearing and proof of service thereof, the rights of either party will be
adversely affected. Moreover, the ground invoked by movant was that the warrant charged no offense.
The fundamental test in considering motion to quash on this ground is whether the facts alleged, if
hypothetically admitted, will establish the essential elements of the offense as defined by the law.[13]
A cursory examination of the search warrant will disclose that the essential elements of the offense
charge are sufficiently alleged. It is not right; therefore, to resolve the charges at the very outset
without any notice of hearing, or to hear the motion ex parte. The issues require a fuller examination
especially since a criminal complaint had already been filed in court. The prosecution, too, must be
given its day in court - the burden of proof thereof being placed squarely on its shoulders. A prudent
judge would, in the absence of the opposing party in the hearing of a motion as pivotal as a motion to
quash, inquire from the other party or verify from the records the proof of service of notice rather than
proceed with the hearing. This is but an elementary notion of fair play. He should not rely on a party's
undertaking to notify the adverse party of a scheduled hearing. The judge must demand what the rule
requires, i.e., proof of such notice on the adverse party, otherwise, a contentious motion, as the motion
to quash in the case before respondent Judge, should be considered a mere scrap of paper which should
not have even been received for filing.
Respondent's culpability is further compounded by his misrepresentation in the order he issued on 14

August 1996 (denying the motion of the public prosecutor for reconsideration) that he was on extended
leave of absence from 29 May 1996 to 22 July 1996 when the records show that he actually applied for
leave only from 29 May 1996 to 3 July 1996 (not up to 22 July 1996).
A.M. No. RTJ-981411 : On 18 April 1994 an Information for murder was filed with the Regional Trial
Court of Bulacan against four (4) accused, namely, Rolando Garcia, Lopito Gumasing, Eric Gumasing and
Eduardo Gumasing. The Information stated that all the accused were at large. No bail was
recommended. On 22 April 1994 warrants of arrest were issued against the four (4) accused.
On 7 June 1995, or more than one (1) year that the accused remained at large, Atty. Eufrocio Marquez
appeared before the trail court as counsel for the accused and submitted a "Motion to Voluntarily
Surrender the Accused with Motion to Bail" praying that the accused be allowed to post bail in the
amount of P10,000.00 each in cash. At the bottom of page 2 of the motion, the public prosecutor
manifested in writing that he was submitting the matter to the sound discretion of the court provided
that the bail be increased to P15,000 in cash for each accused.
On 16 June 1995 respondent Judge granted the motion and allowed the four (4) accused to post bail in
the amount of P10,000.00 each. After the accused had posted bail, respondent Judge lifted the warrant
of arrest and set the arraignment on 16 August 1995.
At the hearing of 17 July 1995, which does not appear on record to have been previously scheduled,
respondent Judge issued an order citing as grounds for the grant of bail (a) voluntary surrender of the
accused; (b) no evidence was presented by the public prosecutor that the evidence of guilt was strong;
(c) the public prosecutor did not object to the granting of bail; and, (d) the complainant, wife of the
victim, had submitted an affidavit of desistance. The four (4) accused were later arraigned, and the
affidavit of desistance executed by the complainant was marked during the pre-trial.
After the prosecution rested, the defense manifested its intention to file demurrer to evidence. In an
order dated 20 January 1997, respondent Judge gave the accused five (5) days within which to file the
intended demurrer and the prosecution the same period to comment thereon.
In an order dated 30 January 1997 respondent Judge admitted the demurrer filed by the accused and
submitted the same for resolution there being no comment from the public prosecutor.
On 20 February 1997 respondent Judge granted the demurrer to evidence and acquitted all four (4)
accused for failure of the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently,
on 19 March 1997 respondent Judge ordered the release of the cash bond posted by the accused for
their provisional liberty.
Francisco R. Hernandez, uncle of the deceased victim, filed a complaint-affidavit before this Court
charging respondent Judge with knowingly rendering unjust orders and for improperly granting bail,
manifest bias and partiality in favor of the accused in the conduct of the proceedings. After respondent
Judge filed his comment to the complaint, we referred the case to Associate Justice Fermin A. Martin
Jr. of the Court of Appeals for investigation, report and recommendation.
In his report dated 1 June 1998 Justice Martin found respondent Judge guilty of gross incompetence
and recommended that he be meted the penalty of suspension for six (6) months with stern warning
that commission of similar offense in the future would be dealt with more severely.
The actuations of respondent Judge in Crim. Case No. 1441-M-94 showed his utter disregard of the
rules and settled jurisprudence thus constituting gross ignorance of the law. In granting the motion for
application of bail which did not contain a notice of hearing directed to the parties and where the
accused had never been placed under the custody of the court, respondent Judge again demonstrated
his lack of knowledge and understanding of the basic principles of law and procedures. A perusal of the
"Motion to Voluntarily Surrender the Accused with Motion to Bail" shows that the notice of hearing
was directly solely to the clerk of court and did not contain a place and time of hearing. A motion that
does not meet the requirements of Secs. 4 and 5 of Rule 15 of the Rules of Court, particularly that the
notice be directed to the parties concerned and stating the time and place for the hearing of the
motion, is a worthless piece of paper which the clerk of court has no right to receive and the court has
no authority to act upon.[14]
The records shows that respondents Judge had not been as zealous as he should been observing the
standard and fundamental procedure mandated by the Rules of Court in criminal cases. In granting bail
to the four (4) accused who were at large, respondent Judge violated the rule that bail is unavailing to
the accused who has not voluntarily surrendered or to one who has yet to be placed under legal
custody.[15]
The refusal of the prosecution to adduce evidence that the guilt of the accused was strong or its failure
to interpose an objection to the motion for bail was not a justifiable reason for respondent Judge to
grant bail. It is still mandatory for the court to conduct a hearing and ask searching and clarificatory
questions[16] for the purpose of determining the existence of a strong evidence against the accused. [17]
On the face of his orders dated 16 June 1995 [18] July 1995[19] which granted bail to the accused,
respondent Judge did not make any finding that the evidence against the accused was not strong as to
warrant the grant of bail. Hence, the order should not be sustained or given any semblance of
validity.[20]
Conclusion : The unseemly haste with which respondent Judge granted the motions filed y the accused
(a) to quash search warrant ex parte in A.M. No. RTJ-98-1411 and (b) for bail in A.M. No. RTJ-97- 1390
and (b) for bail in A.M. No. RTJ-981411 is indicative of his patent injustice, partiality, nay, his gross
ignorance of the law bordering on incompetence. It should be mentioned that respondent Judge was
previously charged with eight (8) other administrative cases ranging from gross ignorance of the law,
grave abuse of authority and discretion , incompetence, dishonesty, dereliction of duty, misconduct,
conduct unbecoming of a judge, oppression and direct bribery. Although seven (7) of the eighth (8)
cases were dismissed without hearing for various reasons, in Santos v. Ofilada,[21] the Court through
Senior Associate Justice Florence D. Regalado found the same respondent Judge to have whimsically
and arbitrarily granted bail in Crim. Case No. 1433-M-94 for murder and in Crim. Case No. 1434-M-94
for illegal possession of firearm without notice to the prosecution in both cases, for which he was fined
P20,000.00 and sternly warned that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future would
definitely warrant a more severe sanction. Those administrative cases are also enumerated in the
Report and Recommendation of the Office of the Court Administrator dated 15 July 1996 thus-
It is also worthy to inform the Honorable Court that there are at least eight (8) administrative
complaints filed against herein respondents Judge charging him with gross ignorance of the law, grave
abuse of authority and discretion, incompetence, dishonesty, dereliction of duty, misconduct, conduct
unbecoming (of a Judge), oppression and direct bribery (RTJ-90-588, RTJ-91-639, RTJ-92-882, RTJ-93-
1040, RTJ-93-1219, RTJ-94-1250, RTJ-94-1267 and RTJ-94-1281). However , these complaints were
subsequently dismissed by this Court. But in RTJ-94-1217 respondent Judge was charged with
incompetence, gross ignorance of the law, oppression and grave misconduct relative to criminal cases
filed before this Court wherein he granted bail to the accused without hearing. In the Resolution of the
Court En Banc dated June 16, 1995, the Court imposed on Judge Carlos C. Ofilada a FINE of P20,000.00
with aw STERN WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts in the future shall be dealt with
more seriously.
It may also be worth to mention that on 17 March 1998 another sworn administrative complaint was
filed before this Court against respondent Judge for gross ignorance of the law and conduct
unbecoming of a member of the bench. [22] Thereafter, in an endorsement dated 14 April 1998 by
Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon Jesus P. Guerrero, another complaint which was filed with the
Ombudsman against respondent Judge for violation of the Anti Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and Art.
315 of the Revised Penal Code was referred to this Court for appropriate action. [23] Respondent has yet
to submit his comments on both charges against him.
Be that as it may, this Court finds that respondent Judge has failed to conduct himself in a manner that
will justify his continued stay in the judiciary. The Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins a judge to perform
his official duties competently, honestly , with diligence and impartially. Regretfully, respondent Judge
is found miserably short of the standards set for appropriate judicial conduct, which leaves the Court
no choice but to cut short his membership in and terminate his official relations with the judiciary.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court finds respondents JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 15, Malolos, Bulacan, GUILTY in A.M. No. RTJ-97-1390 for grave abuse of authority and evident
partiality, and in A.M. No. RTJ-98-1411, for gross incompetence, ignorance of the law and evident
partially, all prejudicial to the interest of the Government and the judicial service. These being his
second and third offenses, respondent is ordered DISMISSED immediately from the service with
forfeiture of all his retirement benefits and leave credits with prejudice to his reemployment in any
public office including any government owned or controlled corporation.
JUDGE CARLOS C. OFILADA is directed to immediately cease and desist from performing the functions
of the Office of Regional Trial Court judge of Malolos, Bulacan, and to turn over all records and property
responsibilities to the Clerk of Court of that court who shall issue that corresponding receipt thereof.
SO ORDERED.
23 A.M. No. MTJ-01-1377 June 17, 2004
(Formerly OCA-IPI-99-650-MTJ)
MERIAM BALAGTAS, complainant,
vs.
OLEGARIO R. SARMIENTO, JR., Judge, MTCC, Branch 2 Cebu City, respondent.
DECISION
TINGA, J.:
The essence of due process is the right to be heard. Therefore, every motion which may prejudice the
rights of a party should be set for hearing. The intendment of the law will never be achieved if notice is
not served, such as in this case.
On November 27, 1998, the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) received the sworn Letter-Complaint1
of Ms. Meriam Balagtas (Balagtas) dated November 11, 1998 accusing Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr.,
MTCC, Branch 2, Cebu City, of knowingly rendering an unjust interlocutory order, gross ignorance of the
law and serious irregularities in the performance of judicial duties in connection with Criminal Cases
Nos. 82863-R and 83186-R, entitled "People of the Philippines versus Hermann Peith," for violation of
B.P. 22.
Balagtas was the private complainant in the aforementioned criminal cases.
In the Letter-Complaint she submitted, Balagtas alleges that on May 25, 1998, accused Hermann Peith
(Peith) filed an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad2 which was granted by the respondent judge
on the same day it was filed without notice to her or the prosecution.3 Moreover, as shown in the Order4
dated May 25, 1998, the respondent judge granted the motion simply because Peith executed a Deed of
Real Estate Mortgage covering the value of the bounced checks.
Consequently, Balagtas filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration of the Order Dated May 25, 1998
dated May 26, 1998, arguing that the fact that Peith executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage to secure
the payment of the checks is of no consequence, the cases being criminal in nature.5 Besides, Peith cannot
own real properties in the Philippines since he is a foreigner.6
The respondent judge denied the motion for reconsideration in his Order7 dated May 28, 1998.
Balagtas then filed a Motion for the Inhibition of Judge Olegario Sarmiento8 dated August 24, 1998 on
grounds of bias and partiality. She claimed therein that she filed a Motion for the Issuance of a Hold
Departure Order against Peith which the respondent judge did not act upon. However, in a move evincing
bias in favor of Peith, the respondent judge granted his Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad.
The respondent judge granted the motion for inhibition in his Order9 dated August 31, 1998. In the same
Order, he stated that he cannot act upon Balagtas’ Motion for the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order
against Peith since he is prohibited from doing so by Circular No. 39-97 of the Supreme Court which limits
such authority to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of second level courts. Moreover, Balagtas had
already foreclosed Peith’s property and the value of the bounced checks had already been satisfied. He
further remarked that "[H]erein judge is responsibly informed that the herein parties have had a special
personal relationship only that accused married another woman. This Court does not want to be an
instrument of the misgivings, sourgrapings and importunings of complainant."10
Balagtas now asserts that the respondent judge’s Orders dated May 25, 1998 and August 31, 1998 are
unjust and amount to gross ignorance of the law. She also claims that the respondent judge committed
serious irregularities in the performance of his duties.
Balagtas essentially contends that the respondent judge should not have allowed Peith to leave the
country since, as the accused in two criminal cases, he is not only liable for the amount of the checks that
bounced but also for the imposable penalty for violation of the Bouncing Checks Law. She likewise objects
to what she claims to be derogatory remarks made by the respondent judge against her in his Order of
August 31, 1998.
In his Letter-Comment11 dated May 24, 1999, the respondent judge explains that he allowed Peith to
leave the country for one month to avail of his retirement benefits in Switzerland for the following
reasons: (a) Peith has properties, family and a reputation to maintain in Cebu City; (b) he was appreciative
of Peith’s gesture of asking permission to travel because Peith need not have done so; (c) he was hoping
that Peith can bring in money to pay his obligation under the checks; (d) Peith had already been arraigned;
hence, he may be tried in absentia; and (e) Peith executed a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage in favor of
Balagtas to secure the payment of his obligation. Besides, Balagtas had allegedly already foreclosed
Peith’s property and the value of the bounced checks had already been satisfied.
The respondent judge also claims that the case is already before another judge since he inhibited himself
from hearing the cases in his Order dated August 31, 1998. Lastly, the respondent judge avers that
Balagtas "can push through with her personal agenda of vendetta without unnecessarily dragging" him
into it once Peith sets foot on Philippine soil.12 He further states that he "cannot act as ‘Berdugo’ for
complainant’s personal ill motive and selfish interest."13
In her Letter-Reply14 dated June 26, 1999, Balagtas insists that had she been notified of Peith’s motion,
she could have opposed the motion with the following points, to wit: Peith has no legal wife but only a
live-in-partner in Cebu; as a foreigner, Peith cannot own real property anywhere in the Philippines; and
the value of the mortgaged real estate is not sufficient to satisfy Peith’s monetary obligation. She adds
that the respondent judge delved into irrelevant issues when he stated in his August 31, 1998 Order that
he was "informed that the herein parties have had a special personal relationship only that the accused
married another woman."15
In a R E S O L U T I O N16 dated September 17, 2001, the Court referred the complaint to Executive Judge
Galicano C. Arriesgado of RTC, Cebu City for investigation, report and recommendation. During the
pendency of the investigation, Judge Pampio A. Abarintos took over from Judge Arriesgado as Executive
Judge. Thus, Judges Abarintos and Arriesgado conducted the investigation with 1st Vice Executive Judge
Isaias P. Dicdican.
The investigating judges submitted their report and recommendation17 dated August 1, 2003 to the OCA
finding as follows: (1) as a first level court judge, the respondent is not authorized to issue hold departure
orders as this power is vested in a Regional Trial Court judge; (2) Balagtas erred in filing her Motion for
the Issuance of a Hold Departure Order against Peith before the respondent judge’s court, hence, she is
not entirely blameless; (3) upon the inhibition of the respondent judge, the cases were transferred to
MTCC, Branch 5, Cebu City, presided over by Judge Oscar D. Andrino, who rendered a judgment on the
cases on November 11, 2002; and (4) Peith was acquitted but was ordered to indemnify Balagtas for the
face value of the checks with interest thereon. In view of these findings, the investigating judges
recommend that the charges against the respondent judge be dismissed and the case considered closed
and terminated.
In its Memorandum18 dated March 16, 2004, the OCA sustains with modification the findings and
recommendation of the investigating judges. The OCA notes that since Peith was charged with two counts
of violation of B.P. 22, which is under the exclusive jurisdiction of first level courts and not among the
criminal cases covered by Circular No. 39-97 dated June 19, 1997 of this Court where hold departure
orders may be issued, the respondent judge may not deny his Urgent Ex-parte Motion to Leave for Abroad
or grant Balagtas’ Motion for Issuance of a Hold Departure Order against him. The OCA, therefore,
recommends the dismissal of the case against the respondent judge but admonishes him to refrain
from resorting to insulting and offensive language in his future judicial actions.
The Court agrees that the remark of the respondent judge in his Order dated August 31, 1998, aside from
being totally irrelevant, was improper, offensive and uncalled for. He insinuated that the reason for
Balagtas’ filing of criminal cases against Peith was she was incensed for being dumped by the latter in
favor of another woman. The respondent judge repeated his tirade against Balagtas in his Letter-
Comment19 dated May 24, 1999 where he stated that Balagtas has a "personal agenda of vendetta"
against Peith and that she was motivated by "personal ill motive and selfish interest."
The respondent judge deserves the sternest reproof for making these remarks. Judges should refrain
from expressing irrelevant opinions in their decisions which may only reflect unfavorably upon their
competence and the propriety of their judicial actuations.20 Moreover, intemperate speech detracts from
the equanimity and judiciousness that should be the constant hallmarks of a dispenser of justice. 21
The Court, however, deviates from the conclusion of both the OCA and the investigating judges that
the respondent judge should not be held liable for gross ignorance of the law.
The OCA and the investigating judges overlooked the fact that when Peith requested permission to leave
for abroad on May 25, 1998, the latter filed a motion without the required notice to the parties. The
Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad attached as Annex "A" to the Letter-Complaint even states
that the motion was to be submitted for resolution of the court "without further argument."22 This was
never denied by the respondent judge.
Considering the litigious nature of Peith’s motion and the fact that the criminal and civil aspects of the
cases were simultaneously instituted, the public prosecutor and the private offended party should have
been notified, failing which, the respondent judge should not have acted upon the motion.
The Rules of Court is explicit on this point.23 A motion without notice of hearing is pro forma, a mere scrap
of paper. It presents no question which the court could decide. The court has no reason to consider it and
the clerk has no right to receive it. The rationale behind the rule is plain: unless the movant sets the time
and place of hearing, the court will be unable to determine whether the adverse party agrees or objects
to the motion, and if he objects, to hear him on his objection. The objective of the rule is to avoid a
capricious change of mind in order to provide due process to both parties and to ensure impartiality in
the trial.24
In granting Peith’s Urgent Ex-Parte Motion to Leave for Abroad, the respondent judge violated a basic
and fundamental constitutional principle, due process. When the law is elementary, not to be aware of
it constitutes gross ignorance thereof. After all, judges are expected to have more than just a modicum
of acquaintance with the statutes and procedural rules.25 Hence, the respondent judge is guilty of gross
ignorance of the law.
Gross ignorance of the law is classified as a serious charge26 for which any of the following sanctions may
be imposed: (a) dismissal from service with forfeiture of benefits and disqualification from reinstatement
or appointment to any public office including a government-owned or controlled corporation; (b)
suspension for three to six months without salary and benefits; or (c) a fine of not less than ₱20,000.00
but not more than ₱40,000.00.27 However, in the case of De Jesus v. Obnamia, Jr.28 where the respondent
judge failed to ensure compliance with the three (3)-day notice rule, the Court ordered him to pay a fine
of Three Thousand Pesos (₱3,000.00) with a warning that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be
dealt with more severely. This Court finds the respondent judge herein similarly situated.
ACCORDINGLY, respondent Judge Olegario R. Sarmiento, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities, Branch 2, Cebu City, is hereby ordered to pay a FINE in the amount of THREE THOUSAND
PESOS (₱3,000.00) and ADMONISHED to refrain from resorting to insulting and offensive language in
his future judicial actions, with a WARNING that a repetition of the same or similar acts will be dealt
with more severely.
SO ORDERED.
Puno, Quisumbing, Austria-Martinez, and Callejo, Sr., JJ., concur.
24. G.R. No. 126620, April 17, 2002

PRODUCERS BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, PETITIONER,
VS.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, ASIA TRUST DEVELOPMENT BANK, RAINELDA A. ANDREWS, SAMSON
FLORES, ALFONSO LEONG, JR., RHODORA D. LANDRITO, JOSEPH CHUA, RAMON YU, EDUARDO G.
ESCOBAR, MILAGROS B. NAYVE, ELIZABETH C. GARCIA, ALBERTO LIMJOCO, SR., GLORIA E. MENPIN AND
ESPERANZA FLORENDO, RESPONDENTS.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
In this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, petitioner
Producer’s Bank of the Philippines (“petitioner” for brevity) assails the September 19, 1996 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 50016 which dismissed petitioner’s appeal for being filed out of
time. The Court of Appeals decreed thus:
“WHEREFORE, finding the Motion to Dismiss Appeal to be meritorious, the same is granted. The appeal
is DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.”
The Antecedent Facts
On March 29, 1988, petitioner through its former counsel, Atty. Antonio M. Pery, filed a Complaint to
recover the sum of P11,420,000.00 from Asia Trust Development Bank (“Asiatrust” for brevity) and the
Central Bank of the Philippines (“CBP” for brevity) before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 147
(“RTC” for brevity). Thereafter, petitioner filed an amended complaint, impleading additional defendants.
Petitioner sought to recover the proceeds of several treasury bills amounting to P11,420,000.00.
According to petitioner, said proceeds were fraudulently credited to the demand deposit account of
Asiatrust with the CBP and withdrawn by Milagros B. Nayve, Elizabeth C. Garcia and Alberto Limjoco, Sr.
It appears that petitioner owned several treasury bills. On the respective maturity dates of these bills,
petitioner caused these bills to be delivered to the CBP. The bills were initially received by Manuel B. Ala,
petitioner’s rediscounting clerk together with a letter of transmittal and a receipt for the bills addressed
to the CBP. Mr. Ala turned over the bills together with the accompanying documents to Rogelio Carrera
for delivery to the CBP. Alberto Limjoco, Sr., Elizabeth C. Garcia and Milagros B. Nayve came into
possession of these bills which they in turn delivered to Rainelda A. Andrews and Rhodora B. Landrito.
Petitioner alleged that Andrews and Landrito failed to ascertain the lawful ownership of the bills, and
caused their transmittal and delivery to the CBP, through a letter signed by Eduardo G. Escobar and
Alfonso Leong, Jr.. The proceeds of the bills were credited to the account of Asiatrust which approved
the manager’s check applications and facilitated payment to the bearers of the bills. Petitioner discovered
that the proceeds of the bills were not credited to its demand deposit account with the CBP. Upon such
discovery, petitioner informed the CBP which furnished petitioner with a copy of the acknowledgment
from Asiatrust of receipt of the bills and that the proceeds were credited to the account of Asiatrust.
Petitioner claimed that Rainelda A. Andrews, Samson Flores, Alfonso Leong, Jr., Rhodora D. Landrito,
Joseph Chua, Ramon Yu and Eduardo G. Escobar were negligent in the performance of their duties and
responsibilities as officers of Asiatrust as they failed to exercise reasonable care and caution to determine
the true ownership of the bills before allowing the proceeds to be paid to Milagros B. Nayve, Elizabeth C.
Garcia and Alberto Limjoco, Sr. Petitioner sought to hold Asiatrust solidarily liable with the other
defendants for the payment of the value of the treasury bills and for damages. Subsequently, the
complaint was dismissed as against the CBP on motion of petitioner on the ground that the latter had
lifted petitioner’s conservatorship and allowed the return of the management and assets to petitioner’s
Board of Directors. The CBP’s lifting of the conservatorship was conditioned upon petitioner’s dropping
of all its cases pending against the CBP.
The defendants filed their respective Answers, after which the issues were joined and trial on the merits
ensued.
On August 30, 1993, the law firm of Quisumbing, Torres and Evangelista (“QTE” for brevity) entered its
appearance for petitioner in substitution of Atty. Antonio M. Pery.
Petitioner’s handling counsel, Atty. Alvin Agustin T. Ignacio (“Atty. Ignacio” for brevity) of QTE arrived late
during the hearing held on May 17, 1995. On motion of Asiatrust’s counsel, the RTC issued an Order on
the same day dismissing the case for lack of interest to prosecute.
On June 9, 1995, Atty. Ignacio filed a motion to reconsider the Order dated May 17, 1995, explaining that
his late arrival at the hearing was due to the unexpected heavy traffic at Roxas Boulevard in front of
Baclaran Church. He also offered his apologies to the RTC for his unintended tardiness. QTE received a
copy of the Order dated August 1, 1995 denying the motion for reconsideration on August 11, 1995. At
that time, Atty. Ignacio was indisposed for allegedly suffering from “fatigue and stress”. It was only on
August 25, 1995 that Atty. Ignacio found out that the Order denying the motion for reconsideration was
received by the law firm on August 11, 1995. He filed a Notice of Appeal on August 25, 1995.
On November 13, 1995, Asiatrust, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss Appeal with the Court of Appeals. On
March 8, 1996, QTE filed its Comment to the Motion to Dismiss Appeal.
In the Resolution dated September 19, 1996, the Court of Appeals granted the motion to dismiss
petitioner’s appeal.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
In granting the motion to dismiss appeal, the Court of Appeals held in part:
“xxx. We hold that the failure of plaintiff-appellant to file the Notice of Appeal on time was inexcusable
negligence. These are the reasons:
One. In paragraph 7.28 of the Comment (to the Motion to Dismiss), plaintiff-appellant states that –
“On 11 August 1995 at 3:00 pm., plaintiff-appellant received a copy of the Order dated 1 August 1995
denying its motion for reconsideration of the dismissed order.”
Since, the last day for plaintiff-appellant to file the Notice of Appeal was August 12, 1995, why did it not
file the Notice of Appeal right away considering that its preparation and mailing could not take two hours?
If counsel for plaintiff-appellant did not take advantage of the two remaining office hours on August 11,
1995, why did it not file the Notice of Appeal at anytime, the following day, August 12? In failing to do
that, the law firm counsel was guilty of gross and inexcusable negligence.
TWO. If the counsel for plaintiff-appellant did not know that the last day to file the Notice of Appeal was
on August 12, 1995, why did it not ask the handling lawyer about it? There was no impediment to do that
because the handling lawyer was not comatose. The counsel was inexcusably negligent for failing to make
that inquiry.
THREE. The handling lawyer knew that if the Motion for Reconsideration would be denied – as in fact it
was – he would have only a day after receipt of the order of denial to file a notice of appeal. Why did he
not forewarn his law firm about such fact so that even in his absence, the latter could file said notice?
Assuming that the handling lawyer was really sick, his ailment which was allegedly just “fatigue and
stress” was not at all serious much less incapacitating. In fact he was not even hospitalized for he was just
advised to rest for at least two weeks. With all the communication facilities in Metro-Manila, there was
no reason for said counsel – even if sick – not to have gotten in touch with his law firm to check on the
result of his Motion for Reconsideration. It was, therefore, inexcusable negligence for him to have failed
doing that which an ordinarily prudent lawyer would have done.
The inexcusable negligence of plaintiff-appellant’s counsel is made more glaring by the fact that the
Notice of Appeal was late not only by 2 or 4 days but all of 13 days.
We are not unaware of the rule that technicality should not smother the right of a litigant to a day in
court. But the Supreme Court instructs us that strict adherence to reglementary periods fixed in the Rules
of Court is necessary to ensure the efficient and orderly disposition of cases (Panes v. Court of Appeals,
120 SCRA 509). We cannot also close Our eyes to the rule that perfecting an appeal within the period
permitted by law is not only mandatory but jurisdictional and the failure to perfect the appeal on time
renders the judgment of the court final and executory. (Bank of America, Gerochi, Jr. 230 SCRA 9;
Philippine Commercial International Bank v. Court of Appeals, 229 SCRA 560). Well rooted is the principle
that once a decision becomes final the appellate court is without jurisdiction to entertain the appeal
(Sumbillo v. IAC, 165 SCRA 232; Hensy Zoilo Llido v. Marquez, 166 SCRA 61).”
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
Petitioner now comes before us with the following assignment of error:

THE RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACTS OF PETITIONER’S PREVIOUS
COUNSEL, QUISUMBING, TORRES AND EVANGELISTA, SHOULD BIND THE PETITIONER, DESPITE THE
FINDINGS IN ITS RESOLUTION THAT THE LAW FIRM COUNSEL WAS GROSSLY AND INEXCUSABLY
NEGLIGENT.
The threshold issue in this petition for review on certiorari is whether the Court of Appeals erred in
dismissing an appeal that was filed 13 days late despite its own findings that petitioner’s counsel was
grossly negligent.
Petitioner argues that a client should not be bound by counsel’s gross and inexcusable negligence.
Petitioner admits that its handling counsel, Atty. Ignacio of QTE, committed two blunders: first, he failed
to arrive on time during one of the hearings allegedly due to the traffic at Roxas Boulevard in front of
Baclaran Church; second, he failed to file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period due to
“fatigue and stress”. Petitioner further admits that Atty. Ignacio offered a “flimsy excuse” for his tardiness
and an “out of this world excuse” for his failure to file the notice of appeal on time. Petitioner, however,
submits that such gross negligence and mistake of counsel should not bind the client in line with the case
of Legarda vs. Court of Appeals. Petitioner enumerates the similarities between the Legarda case and its
own, as follows:
“First, like the petitioner in the Legarda case, petitioner herein was not negligent in choosing a counsel
to represent them in the case. The former engaged the services of former law school dean, Dean Antonio
Coronel, while the latter engaged the service of the well known and reputable law firm, Quisumbing,
Torres and Evangelista which is associated with Baker and McKenzie of the United States, as counsels to
their respective cases.
In fact, the diligence of petitioner can be shown by the fact that it even replaced it’s first counsel, Atty.
Antonio Pery in favor of Quisumbing, Torres and Evangelista, hoping that by hiring the services of that
law firm the case would be handled better and would have a better chance of winning. Unfortunately,
such hope was dampened by the gross negligence and blunders committed by the law firm.
Second, just like in the case of Legarda, the previous counsel of the petitioner committed two blunders.
In the case of the former, counsel failed to file an answer in the trial court and failed to timely appeal the
case to the appellate courts, while in the latter case, counsel caused the dismissal of the case by arriving
late at the trial date and also by failing to timely perfect an appeal to the Court of Appeals.
Third, in both cases the Court of Appeals has found that both counsels committed negligence. The only
difference would be that in the case of Legarda, the Court of Appeals only held that there was only pure
and simple negligence on the part of Dean Antonio Coronel, while in the case at bar, the Court of Appeals
found that there was gross and inexcusable negligence on the part of Quisumbing, Torres and Evangelista
Law Firm.
Thus, the Court of Appeals committed an error in stating that: “The plaintiff appellant has to bite the
bullet for it cannot shake itself of the inexcusable negligence of its counsel” (Alabanza. vs. Intermediate
Appellate Court, 204 SCRA 304), because of it’s own findings that there was a gross and inexcusable
negligence on the part of the previous counsel. The applicable decision of the Supreme Court to the case
at bar should be the case of Legarda vs. Court of Appeals. (195 SCRA 418).”
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS DENIED OF DUE PROCESS.

The Court’s Ruling
NO. HE WAS NOT DENIED DUE PROCESS.
The petition is bereft of merit. We uphold the dismissal of the appeal by the Court of Appeals.
The general rule is that a client is bound by the acts, even mistakes, of his counsel in the realm of
procedural technique. The exception to this rule is when the negligence of counsel is so gross, reckless
and inexcusable that the client is deprived of his day in court. In which case, the remedy then is to reopen
the case and allow the party who was denied his day in court to adduce his evidence. However, a thorough
review of the instant case reveals that petitioner cannot seek refuge or obtain reprieve under these
principles.
Legarda case is not applicable
Petitioner’s reliance on the Legarda case which was promulgated on March 18, 1991 is clearly misplaced.
In said case, the Court declared that petitioner’s counsel, Atty. Antonio Coronel, a well-known practicing
lawyer and dean of a law school, committed not just ordinary or simple negligence, but reckless and gross
negligence which deprived his client of her property without due process of law. According to the Legarda
decision-
“xxx, the negligence of the then counsel for petitioner when he failed to file the proper motion to dismiss
or to draw a compromise agreement if it was true that they agreed on a settlement of the case; or in
simply filing an answer; and that after having been furnished a copy of the decision by the court he failed
to appeal therefrom or to file a petition for relief from the order declaring petitioner in default.”
was so gross and inexcusable that it should not bind his client. The Court declared that the counsel’s acts
or omissions “consigned (the client) to penury” because “her lawyer appeared to have abandoned her
case not once but repeatedly.” The Court noted that counsel’s “lack of devotion to duty is so gross and
palpable that this Court must come to the aid of his distraught client.” Thus, the Court held as null and
void the decisions of the trial and appellate courts against Atty. Coronel’s client and ordered, among other
things, the reconveyance of the property in her favor.
However, the decision in said case was not yet final in 1991. The private respondent therein filed a timely
motion for reconsideration. In granting the motion for reconsideration, the Court en banc held:
“Under the Gancayco ruling, the order of reconveyance was premised on the alleged gross negligence of
Legarda’s counsel which should not be allowed to bind her as she was deprived of her property `without
due process of law.’
It is, however, basic that as long as a party was given the opportunity to defend her interests in due
course, she cannot be said to have been denied due process of law, for this opportunity to be heard is
the very essence of due process. The chronology of events shows that the case took its regular course in
the trial and appellate courts but Legarda’s counsel failed to act as any ordinary counsel should have
acted, his negligence every step of the way amounting to “abandonment, ” in the words of the Gancayco
decision. Yet, it cannot be denied that the proceedings which led to the filing of this case were not
attended by any irregularity. The judgment by default was valid, so was the ensuing sale at public auction.
If Cabrera was adjudged highest bidder in said auction sale, it was not through any machination on his
part. All of his actuations that led to the final registration of the title in his name were aboveboard,
untainted by any irregularity.”
xxx
Neither Cathay nor Cabrera should be made to suffer for the gross negligence of Legarda’s counsel. If she
may be said to be “innocent” because she was ignorant of the acts of negligence of her counsel, with
more reason are respondents truly “innocent.” As between two parties who may lose due to the
negligence or incompetence of the counsel of one, the party who was responsible for making it happen
should suffer the consequences. This reflects the basic common law maxim, so succinctly stated by Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, that “. . . (B)etween two innocent parties, the one who made it possible for the wrong to be
done should be the one to bear the resulting loss.” In this case, it was not respondents, but Legarda, who
misjudged and hired the services of the lawyer who practically abandoned her case and who continued
to retain him even after his proven apathy and negligence.
The Gancayco decision makes much of the fact that Legarda is now “consigned to penury” and, therefore,
this Court “must come to the aid of the distraught client.” It must be remembered that this Court renders
decisions, not on the basis of emotions but on its sound judgment, applying the relevant, appropriate
law. Much as it may pity Legarda, or any losing litigant for that matter, it cannot play the role of a “knight
in shining armor” coming to the aid of someone, who through her weakness, ignorance or misjudgment
may have been bested in a legal joust which complied with all the rules of legal proceedings.”
In sum, the court did not relieve the client from the consequences of her counsel’s negligence and
mistakes considering that she was given an opportunity to defend her interests in due course. Certainly,
it cannot be said that she was denied due process. Consequently, the Legarda case does not support
petitioner’s cause.
No Denial of Due Process
Contrary to petitioner’s stance, the Legarda case supports the view that petitioner was not denied its day
in court. The Constitution mandates that “(n)o person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property
without due process of law x x x .”The right to due process of law has been interpreted to mean as
follows:
“The essence of due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any
evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. `To be heard' does not mean only verbal arguments
in court; one may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of due process.” (Emphasis supplied)
Verily, so long as a party is given the opportunity to advocate her cause or defend her interest in due
course, it cannot be said that there was denial of due process. In petitioner’s case as in the Legarda case,
the chronology of events shows that the case took its regular course in the trial court.
On December 8, 1992, petitioner presented its first witness, Mr. Manuel B. Ala, the Accounting Clerk of
its Accounting Department. He was cross-examined by CBP, Nayve and Garcia on February 10, 1993. On
March 1, 1993, petitioner presented its second witness, Ms. Josie Fernandez, the Security Custodian of
its Treasury Bills. On July 5, 1993, petitioner presented its third witness, Atty. Leopoldo Cotaco, head of
its Department of Security and Internal Affairs. At this hearing, only counsels of Nayve and Garcia were
present. The counsels of CBP and Asiatrust were absent. On August 25, 1993, the direct testimony of Atty.
Leopoldo Cotaco was terminated. On August 30, 1993, QTE entered its appearance in substitution of Atty.
Antonio M. Pery. On September 8, 1993, QTE moved for the postponement of the cross-examination of
Atty. Cotaco since it had only recently entered its appearance. On September 16, 1993, petitioner moved
to dismiss the complaint against CBP on the ground that the latter had lifted the conservatorship and
allowed the return of the management and assets to petitioner’s Board of Directors. The motion was
granted in an Order dated September 28, 1993. The hearings on November 17 and 24, 1993 were
postponed upon petitioner’s motion since former counsel, Atty. Antonio M. Pery, refused to turn over
the records and files of the case due to a dispute over legal fees. The hearings were reset to February 21
and March 9 and 16, 1994. On February 18, 1994, petitioner again moved that the hearing scheduled on
February 21, 1994 be reset for the same reason. The hearings on March 9 and 16, 1994 were likewise
postponed due to former counsel’s adamant refusal to turn over the files. The hearings were reset to
May 18 and 25, 1994. By May 18, 1994, petitioner’s former counsel still refused to turn over the files of
the case, prompting petitioner to request for another postponement. The hearings were reset to July 6,
20 and August 15, 1994. The hearing scheduled on July 6, 1994 was postponed on the ground that there
was no proof of service of the notice of hearing to counsels for the defendants. The hearing scheduled
on July 20, 1994 was postponed by Asiatrust on the ground that its counsel was not available for said
hearing. The hearings were reset to August 31 and September 19, 1994. The hearing scheduled on August
15, 1994 was cancelled. The hearing on August 31, 1994 was reset to September 19, 1995 because there
was no proof of service of the notice of hearing on counsels. The hearing on September 19, 1994 was also
reset to November 21, 1994 for lack of proof that the contending counsels received the notice of hearing
for said date. On November 16, 1994, Asiatrust filed an urgent motion to postpone the hearing on
November 21, 1994, due to unavailability of its counsel. Consequently, the hearings were reset to January
30 and February 15, 1995. However, the hearing on said dates were cancelled since the presiding judge
was indisposed, and reset to May 17, 1995. As mentioned earlier, petitioner’s handling lawyer, Atty.
Ignacio of QTE arrived late during the hearing on May 17, 1995 allegedly due to the unexpectedly heavy
traffic on Roxas Boulevard in front of Baclaran Church. On motion of Asiatrust’s counsel, the trial court
issued the Order dismissing the case for lack of interest to prosecute.
Upon said dismissal, petitioner’s counsel filed a timely motion for reconsideration. The same was denied
by the trial court. However, it must be emphasized that petitioner was not left without any relief. Upon
the denial thereof, the situation could have been easily remedied by filling a notice of appeal within the
reglementary period considering that a dismissal for failure to prosecute is an adjudication on the merits.
As correctly pointed out by Asiatrust, all that is required is a singled-paged, pro forma notice of appeal,
the accomplishment of which does not require a high degree of legal skill. Despite this, counsel failed to
file its notice of appeal on time and the proffered excuse that he was suffering from “stress and fatigue”
while highly unacceptable, does not amount to gross, palpable, pervasive and reckless negligence so as
to deprive counsel’s client its day in court. As the proceedings in the trial court all the way up to the
appellate court would show, petitioner was not deprived of due process.
Indeed, by failing to file its appeal within the reglementary period, it could not be successfully argued
that petitioner was deprived of its day in court.
Time and again it has been held that the right to appeal is not a natural right or a part of due process, it
is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in accordance with the
provisions of the law. The party who seeks to avail of the same must comply with the requirements of
the rules. Failing to do so, the right to appeal is lost.
The Court has had several occasions to hold that “rules of procedure, especially those prescribing the
time within which certain acts must be done, have oft been held as absolutely indispensable to the
prevention of needless delays and to the orderly and speedy discharge of business. The reason for rules
of this nature is because the dispatch of business by courts would be impossible, and intolerable delays
would result, without rules governing practice. Such rules are a necessary incident to the proper, efficient
and orderly discharge of judicial functions. Thus, we have held that the failure to perfect an appeal within
the prescribed reglementary period is not a mere technicality, but jurisdictional.
Neither could petitioner plead leniency in the application of the rules considering that the period to
appeal is prescribed not only by the Rules of Court but also by statute, particularly Sec. 39 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 which provides –
Sec. 39. Appeals. – The period for appeal from final orders, resolutions, awards, judgments, or decisions
of any court in all cases shall be fifteen (15) days counted from the notice of the final order, resolution,
award, judgment, or decision appealed from: Provided, however, That habeas corpus, the period for
appeal shall be forty-eight (48) hours from the notice of the judgment appealed from x x x x
Clearly, the perfection of an appeal in the manner and within the period prescribed by law is not only
mandatory but jurisdictional, and failure to perfect an appeal has the effect of rendering the judgment
final and executory. Public policy and sound practice demand that judgments of courts should become
final and irrevocable at some definite date fixed by law.”
Counsel for petitioner committed simple negligence
We also find that the negligence of the law firm engaged by the petitioner to litigate its cause was not
gross but simple negligence. Petitioner capitalizes on the following “blunders” of the law firm to establish
gross negligence: (1) arriving late during the hearing on May 17, 1995 and (2) filing the notice of appeal
thirteen (13) days late. Tardiness is plain and simple negligence. On the other hand, counsel’s failure to
file the notice of appeal within the reglementary period did not deprive petitioner of due process of law.
We also do not miss the fact that petitioners were represented by a law firm which meant that any of its
members could lawfully act as their counsel during the trial.” As such, “[w]hen a client employs the
services of a law firm, he does not employ the services of the lawyer who is assigned to personally handle
the case. Rather, he employs the entire law firm. In the event that the counsel appearing for the client
resigns, the firm is bound to provide a replacement.”Petitioner cannot now complain of counsel’s errors.
It has been held that “[l]itigants, represented by counsel, should not expect that all they need to do is sit
back, relax and await the outcome of their case. x x x.” Especially in this case, where petitioner has a legal
department to monitor its pending cases and to liaise with its retained counsel. To agree with petitioner’s
stance would enable every party to render inutile any adverse order or decision through the simple
expedient of alleging gross negligence on the part of its counsel. The Court will not countenance such a
farce which contradicts long-settled doctrines of trial and procedure.
Hence, there is no justifiable reason to exempt petitioner from the general rule that clients should suffer
the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of the counsel whom they themselves
hired and had the full authority to fire at any time and replace with another even without any justifiable
reason.
In sum, this is not a case where the negligence of counsel is one that is so gross, palpable, pervasive and
reckless which is the type of negligence that deprives a party of his or her day in court. For this reason,
the Court need no longer concern itself with the merits of petitioner’s causes of action nor consider the
propriety of the dismissal of the case by the trial court for lack of interest to prosecute. The Court is bound
by the trial court’s judgment which had become final and executory due to the simple negligence of the
petitioner’s counsel in allowing the reglementary period to lapse without perfecting the appeal.
WHEREFORE, there being no reversible error committed by the Court of Appeals, the petition for review
on certiorari is DENIED and the assailed Resolution dated September 19, 1996 dismissing the appeal is
AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Vitug, (Acting Chairman), Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez, JJ., concur.
Melo, J., (Chairman), abroad, on official leave.

25. G.R. No. 136726. September 24, 2003
(note: facts-yellow, issue-purple, ruling-green)
PANFILO V. VILLARUEL, JR.,, Petitioner, v. REYNALDO D. FERNANDO, MODESTO ABARCA, JR. and
MARILOU M. CLEOFAS, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This petition for review on certiorari1 seeks to reverse the Decision2 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP
No. 482333 dated 30 September 1998 denying due course to the petition for certiorari4 filed by Panfilo V.
Villaruel, Jr. and the Resolution dated 3 December 1998 denying the motion for reconsideration.
The Facts
Petitioner Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr. (petitioner) is the former Assistant Secretary of the Air Transportation
Office (ATO), Department of Transportation and Communication (DOTC). Respondents Reynaldo D.
Fernando, Modesto E. Abarca, Jr. (Abarca), and Marilou M. Cleofas are the Chief, Chief Administrative
Assistant, and Administrative Assistant, respectively, of the Civil Aviation Training Center (CATC). The
CATC is an adjunct agency of the ATO tasked to train air traffic controllers, airway communicators and
related civil aviation personnel for the local aviation industry as well as for the Southeast Asian and Pacific
region.
Petitioner issued a memorandum dated 27 April 1995 addressed to the respondents, detailing them to
the Office of DOTC Undersecretary Primitivo C. Cal effective 2 May 1995.
On 29 April 1995, respondents wrote to DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia and Undersecretary Josefina T.
Lichauco through petitioner requesting for reconsideration of the detail order.
On 7 May 1995, in compliance with the detail order, respondents reported to the Office of Undersecretary
Cal at DOTC.
Without acting on respondents request for reconsideration, petitioner issued a memorandum on 19 July
1995 addressed to Abarca placing him under preventive suspension for 90 days without pay pending
investigation for alleged grave misconduct.
On 10 August 1995, respondents requested Secretary Garcia to lift the detail order and to order their
return to their mother unit since more than 90 days had already lapsed. Respondents also sought the
intervention of the Ombudsman in their case. As a result, the Ombudsman inquired from Secretary Garcia
the action taken on respondents request for reconsideration of the detail order.
On 22 November 1995, Secretary Garcia replied to the Ombudsman that he had issued a memorandum
dated 9 November 1995 directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother unit. Secretary Garcia
declared that the law does not sanction the continuous detail of respondents.
Despite repeated demands by respondents, petitioner failed and refused to reinstate respondents to
their mother unit.
On 24 January 1996, respondents filed a Petition for Mandamus and Damages with Prayer for a
Preliminary Mandatory Injunction against petitioner with the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City docketed
as Civil Case No. 96-0139. Respondents prayed for the following:
PRAYER
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners herein respectfully pray of this Honorable Court that:
1. Pending the determination of the merits of this petition, a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction be
issued ex-parte directing respondent Panfilo V. Villaruel, Jr., to recall the petitioners herein within twenty
four (24) hours from receipt hereof to their mother unit, the Civil Aviation Training Center, Air
Transportation Office, DOTC, and to forthwith allow them to assume, perform and discharge the
functions, duties and responsibilities inherent, appurtenant and incident to their respective offices.
2. After hearing on the merits, judgment be rendered confirming the writ of preliminary mandatory
injunction earlier issued by this Honorable Court and declaring the same permanent, and ordering the
respondent Panfilo Villaruel, Jr., to pay petitioners herein the following damages, to wit:
a) to pay petitioner Reynaldo D. Fernando the amount of P50,000 as actual and compensatory damages;
b) to pay petitioners herein moral, exemplary and temperate damages, in such amounts as may hereafter
be proven in the course of trial, which petitioners herein are leaving to the sound discretion of this
Honorable Court to determine and adjudge;
c) to pay petitioners herein attorneys fees in the amount of P100,000;
d) to pay petitioners herein the costs of suit.
Petitioners herein pray for such other and further relief as may be just and equitable in the
premises.5cräläwvirtualibräry
On 23 February 1996, the trial court granted respondents prayer for a preliminary mandatory injunction.
Meanwhile, Judge Aurora Navarette-Recia of the trial court was appointed Chairman of the Commission
on Human Rights. Consequently, the case was re-raffled and assigned to Branch 231 of the Regional Trial
Court, Pasay City.6cräläwvirtualibräry
On 12 April 1996, the trial court issued an order modifying the 23 February 1996 order of Judge Recia.
The trial court issued a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction ordering petitioner to comply with the
9 November 1995 order of Secretary Garcia directing petitioner to recall respondents to their mother
unit until further orders by the trial court.
For petitioners continued failure to comply with the writ of preliminary injunction, respondents moved
to cite petitioner in contempt. Respondents also moved to declare petitioner in default for not filing an
answer within the period prescribed in the trial courts order of 26 January 1996.
On 28 May 1996, the trial court granted the motion and declared petitioner guilty of indirect contempt.
The trial court issued a bench warrant against petitioner.
Petitioner, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed a special civil action for certiorari with
the Court of Appeals7 assailing the trial courts order finding petitioner guilty of indirect contempt. The
case was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 41263.
Meanwhile, the trial court declared petitioner in default for his failure to file an answer to the petition
for mandamus and damages. Accordingly, respondents adduced their evidence ex-parte before the Clerk
of Court.
On 11 July 1996, the trial court rendered a Decision the dispositive portion of which reads:
Wherefore, considering the foregoing premises, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioners
and against the respondent declaring mandamus permanent and thereby ordering respondent Panfilo V.
Villaruel, Jr., to pay the following:
(1) One hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00) each as moral damages;
(2) Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) each as exemplary damages;
(3) Twenty five thousand pesos (P25,000.00) each as temperate damages, and;
(4) Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) as attorneys fees.
SO ORDERED.8cräläwvirtualibräry
Aggrieved, Petitioner, represented by the OSG, appealed to the Court of Appeals. The appeal was
docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 42447.9 With the filing of the appeal, the Court of Appeals granted
respondents motion for the dismissal of the petition for certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No. 41263 for being moot
and academic.
The Court of Appeals granted the OSG a non-extendible extension until 13 December 1996 within which
to file petitioners memorandum. However, the OSG failed to file the memorandum. Subsequently,
Solicitor Restituto Tuando, Jr. who w
as handling the case was appointed Regional Trial Court judge of Dumaguete City. The case was re-
assigned to Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr. On 13 March 1997, the Court of Appeals issued a
Resolution dismissing petitioners appeal for failure to file the required memorandum. The OSG, through
Assistant Solicitor Luciano Joson, Jr., filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the Court of Appeals denied
the same. The Resolution became final and executory on 14 June 1997.
Consequently, the respondents filed a Motion for Execution with the trial court. Although served a copy
of the motion for execution, the OSG did not file any opposition.
Acting on the motion for execution, the trial court issued a Writ of Execution on 22 September 1997. On
3 February 1998, the Sheriff issued a Notice of Sheriffs Sale setting on 23 February 1998 the sale of
petitioners real property covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 83030.
On 17 February 1998, Petitioner, through his new counsel,10 filed a Motion to Quash the Writ of Execution
and to Suspend Sheriffs Sale. In his motion, petitioner alleged that the trial courts decision never became
final and executory as the trial court deprived him of his right to due process. Petitioner claimed that the
OSG failed to file petitioners memorandum in CA-G.R. SP No. 42447 resulting in the dismissal of his
appeal. Furthermore, petitioner alleged that the OSG failed to inform him of the dismissal of his appeal
and of the trial courts order granting respondents motion for execution. Petitioner further asserted that
the Resolution of the Ombudsman in OMB-ADM 0-96-009011 superseded the decision of the trial court.
The Ombudsmans Resolution approved the following recommendation of the reviewing Assistant
Ombudsman:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, respondent MODESTO ABARCA, JR., is hereby found GUILTY of violation of
Section 7(d) of Republic Act 6713, for which the penalty of Suspension Without Pay for Six (6) Months is
hereby recommended pursuant to Section 10(b), Rule III of Administrative Order No. 07, in relation to
Section 25(2) of Republic Act No. 6770.
It is also respectfully recommended that the charge against respondents REYNALDO FERNANDO and
MARY LOU CLEOFAS be DISMISSED.12cräläwvirtualibräry
On 23 February 1998, the trial court issued an Order quashing the Writ of Execution because the Sheriff
failed to follow Section 9, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. The trial court, however, issued an Alias Writ of
Execution. Petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the trial court denied the same on 28 April
1998.
Dissatisfied with the trial courts orders, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court
of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 48233 assailing the execution of the trial courts decision of 11 July
1996. The Court of Appeals denied due course to the petition for certiorari and dismissed the same in the
Decision dated 30 September 1998. Petitioner moved for reconsideration but the appellate court denied
the motion in a Resolution of 3 December 1998.
Hence, the instant petition.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner raised before the Court of Appeals the following issues:
1. THE TRIAL COURTS DECISION DATED JULY 11, 1996 IS VOID FOR LACK OF DUE PROCESS AND
COULD NOT HAVE BECOME FINAL AND EXECUTORY.
2. SUPERVENING FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES HAVE TRANSPIRED WHICH RENDERED EXECUTION
OF THE JUDGMENT UNJUST AND INEQUITABLE.13cräläwvirtualibräry
On the first issue, the Court of Appeals ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner
of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from becoming final and
executory. In short, the OSGs negligence binds petitioner.
The Court of Appeals admonished petitioner for his failure to ascertain periodically from the OSG or from
the Court of Appeals the status of his appeal. The appellate court cited Reyes v. Court of Appeals,14 which
held that it is the duty of a party litigant to make inquiries to his counsel on matters concerning his case.
A party litigant bears the responsibility of contacting his lawyer periodically to apprise himself of the
progress of the case. A lawyers negligence binds a party litigant who must suffer the consequences of
such negligence. The Court of Appeals further held that there was no proof that the OSG failed to inform
petitioner of the dismissal of his appeal.
On the second issue, the Court of Appeals concurred with the trial courts ruling that the nature of the
case before the Ombudsman is different from the case before the trial court. The former deals with a
violation of Republic Act No. 6713 (RA 6713)15 punished with suspension from office while the latter deals
with an ultra vires act punished with damages. The appellate court ruled that the findings of the
Ombudsman had nothing to do with the findings of the trial court, as the two forums are separate and
distinct from each other.
Moreover, the Court of Appeals opined that petitioner failed to prove that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion to warrant the writ of certiorari. The appellate court ruled that the trial court acted
in accord with law and prevailing jurisprudence in issuing the questioned orders.
The Issues
Petitioner presents the following issues for resolution of this Court:16

1. Whether the award of moral, exemplary and temperate damages to respondents has legal
basis.
2. Whether the trial court correctly ruled that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve
petitioner of the effects of such negligence and prevent the decision of the trial court from
becoming final and executory.
3. Whether petitioner was denied of his right to due process when the appellate court dismissed
his appeal for failure of the OSG to file the memorandum.
4. Whether the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Modesto Abarca, Jr. guilty of violating
Section 7 of RA 6713 rendered the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and inequitable.
The main issue to resolve is whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing the petition for certiorari
assailing the trial courts orders dated 23 February 1998 and 28 April 1998. Resolving this issue necessarily
determines the validity of the questioned orders. This in turn resolves the questions of whether the trial
court denied petitioner of his right to due process and whether the Ombudsmans resolution rendered
the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and inequitable.
We can no longer resolve the issue regarding the validity and reasonableness of the award of damages
for three reasons. First, the decision of the trial court dated 11 July 1996 is already final and executory.
Second, the petition for certiorari filed by petitioner was simply a direct consequence of the trial courts
issuance of the writ of execution and notice of sheriffs sale. In other words, petitioner merely questioned
the execution of the trial courts decision in his petition for certiorari. Third, petitioner did not raise the
issue of the validity and reasonableness of the award of damages before the Court of Appeals. 17
The Courts Ruling

The petition has no merit.
We begin by pointing out that petitioner failed to allege the essential requisites under Section 1, Rule 65
of the Rules of Court for a petition for certiorari to prosper. Specifically, petitioner never alleged that the
trial court acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction in issuing the questioned orders. Neither did
petitioner allege that the trial court gravely abused its discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of
law. In other words, there is no issue that the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in handing down the questioned orders. On this score alone, the dismissal
of the petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals is in order. However, in disposing of the instant
case, we shall still resolve the principal issues raised by petitioner.
No Denial of Petitioners Right to Due Process
Petitioner essentially contends that the judgment of the trial court in Civil Case No. 96-0139 is void for
lack of due process. Petitioner alleges that the trial court never gave him the chance to be heard and to
submit his evidence. Petitioner, formerly represented by the OSG, failed to file an answer to respondents
petition for mandamus and damages. Consequently, the trial court declared petitioner in default. While
the OSG filed a notice of appeal of the judgment by default, it failed to file with the Court of Appeals the
required memorandum resulting in the dismissal of the appeal. In petitioners words, the OSG virtually
abandoned18 his case. Petitioner argues that the inexcusable negligence of the OSG did not bind him and
prevented the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory.
We do not agree.
Due process, in essence, is simply an opportunity to be heard 19 and this opportunity was not denied
petitioner. Throughout the proceedings in the trial court as well as in the Court of Appeals, petitioner had
the opportunity to present his side but he failed to do so. Clearly, petitioners former counsel, the OSG,
was negligent. This negligence, however, binds petitioner. The trial and appellate courts correctly ruled
that the negligence of the OSG could not relieve petitioner of the effects such negligence20 and prevent
the decision of the trial court from becoming final and executory.
In Villa Rhecar Bus v. De la Cruz,21 which petitioner himself cited, the Court ruled:
It is unfortunate that the lawyer of the petitioner neglected his responsibilities to his client. This
negligence ultimately resulted in a judgment adverse to the client. Be that as it may, such mistake binds
the client, the herein petitioner. As a general rule, a client is bound by the mistakes of his counsel. Only
when the application of the general rule would result in serious injustice should an exception thereto
be called for. Under the circumstances obtaining in this case, no undue prejudice against the petitioner
has been satisfactorily demonstrated. At most, there is only an unsupported claim that the petitioner had
been prejudiced by the negligence of its counsel, without an explanation to that effect. (Emphasis
supplied)
In the present case, there was no proof that petitioner suffered serious injustice to exempt him from the
general rule that the negligence of the counsel binds the client. Petitioner did not even attempt to refute
the respondents allegations in the petition for mandamus and damages.
Moreover, petitioner is not entirely blameless for the dismissal of his appeal. After the OSGs failure to file
the answer to the petition for mandamus and damages and to have the order declaring petitioner in
default lifted, petitioner should have already replaced the OSG with another lawyer. However, petitioner
still retained the services of the OSG, despite its apparent lack of interest in petitioners case, until the
trial courts decision became final. In Salva v. Court of Appeals,22 the Court declared:
Respondents reliance on Legarda is inapropos. Notably, the decision in said case was not yet final in 1991.
The private respondent therein then filed a timely motion for reconsideration. In granting the motion for
reconsideration, the Court en banc held:
xxx
Neither Cathay nor Cabrera should be made to suffer for the gross negligence of Legardas counsel. If she
may be said to be innocent because she was ignorant of the acts of negligence of her counsel, with more
reason are respondents truly innocent. xxx In this case, it was not respondents, but Legarda, who
misjudged and hired the services of the lawyer who practically abandoned her case and who continued
to retain him even after his proven apathy and negligence.
At any rate, we find that respondent Governor Sato, as well as the Province of Occidental Mindoro which
she represents, were not denied their day in court. Responsive pleadings were filed before the lower
courts, and respondent was given all the opportunities to prove her case. Her chosen counsel did not
diligently exhaust all legal remedies to advance respondents cause, yet respondent did not terminate
his services. She was aware of the repeated negligence of her counsel and cannot now complain of
counsels errors. Hence, there is no justifiable reason to exempt her from the general rule that clients
should suffer the consequences of the negligence, mistake or lack of competence of the counsel whom
they themselves hired and had the full authority to fire at any time and replace with another even
without justifiable reason. (Emphasis supplied)
Furthermore, petitioner cannot now complain of the OSGs errors. Petitioner should have taken the
initiative of making periodic inquiries from the OSG and the appellate court about the status of his case.23
Litigants represented by counsel should not expect that all they need to do is sit back, relax and await the
outcome of their case.24 To agree with petitioners stance would enable every party to render inutile any
adverse order or decision through the simple expedient of alleging negligence on the part of his counsel.25
The Court will not countenance such ill-founded argument which contradicts long-settled doctrines of
trial and procedure.26
The Ombudsmans Resolution Does Not Render the Execution
of the Trial Courts Decision Unjust and Inequitable
Petitioner contends that the Ombudsmans Resolution finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA
6713 superseded the trial courts decision finding petitioner liable for damages. Petitioner insists that the
Ombudsmans resolution rendered the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and inequitable.
We are not persuaded.
Settled is the rule that a judgment that has acquired finality becomes immutable and unalterable and
27
may no longer be modified in any respect except only to correct clerical errors or mistakes. True, this
rule admits of certain exceptions. One of these exceptions is whenever circumstances transpire after the
finality of the decision rendering its execution unjust and inequitable.28 This, however, is not the case
here. In the present case, the Ombudsman issued his Resolution prior to the finality of the trial courts
decision. The Ombudsman issued his Resolution on 22 January 1997 while the trial courts decision
became final and executory on 14 June 1997. Therefore, the resolution of the Ombudsman is not a
supervening event to warrant the stay of the execution of the decision of the trial court.
Furthermore, the resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713
did not and could not supersede the decision of the trial court holding petitioner liable for damages. The
action filed by the petitioner before the Ombudsman is completely different from the action instituted
by respondents before the trial court. The two actions, which are clearly separate and distinct from each
other, presented two different causes of action. Petitioners cause of action arose from respondents
alleged violation of certain provisions of RA 6713 whereas respondents cause of action resulted from
petitioners refusal to recall respondents to their mother unit at CATC. In the administrative case before
the Ombudsman, the issue was whether respondents were guilty of violating RA 6713. In contrast, the
issue in the civil action before the trial court was whether respondents were entitled to the issuance of
the writ of mandamus and damages.
The findings of the Ombudsman did not render the execution of the trial courts decision unjust and
inequitable. The resolution of the Ombudsman finding Abarca guilty of violating Section 7(d) of RA 6713
did not state that petitioner had a valid reason to detail respondents to the Office of Undersecretary Cal.
In fact, the Ombudsman dismissed the charges against Reynaldo Fernando and Mary Lou Cleofas. Thus,
the trial court correctly awarded damages to respondents. Contrary to petitioners contention, awarding
damages to respondents does not amount to rewarding respondents for their alleged wrongdoing. The
award merely compensates respondents for petitioners own unlawful acts. Clearly illegal were
petitioners acts of unjustifiably detailing respondents to the office of DOTC Undersecretary Cal and
refusing to comply with the 9 November 1995 directive of Secretary Garcia to recall immediately
respondents to their mother unit.
WHEREFORE, we DENY the instant petition. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 48233
dated 30 September 1998 and the Resolution dated 3 December 1998 are AFFIRMED. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
26. G.R. No. 157036 June 9, 2004
FRANCISCO I. CHAVEZ Petitioner,
vs.
HON. ALBERTO G. ROMULO, IN HIS CAPACITY AS EXECUTIVE SECRETARY; DIRECTOR GENERAL

HERMOGENES E. EBDANE, JR., IN HIS CAPACITY AS THE CHIEF OF THE PNP, ET. AL., respondents.
DECISION
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J.:
The right of individuals to bear arms is not absolute, but is subject to regulation. The maintenance of
peace and order1 and the protection of the people against violence are constitutional duties of the State,
and the right to bear arms is to be construed in connection and in harmony with these constitutional
duties.
Before us is a petition for prohibition and injunction seeking to enjoin the implementation of the
"Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence"2
(Guidelines) issued on January 31, 2003, by respondent Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr., Chief of the Philippine
National Police (PNP).
The facts are undisputed:
In January 2003, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo delivered a speech before the members of the PNP
stressing the need for a nationwide gun ban in all public places to avert the rising crime incidents. She
directed the then PNP Chief, respondent Ebdane, to suspend the issuance of Permits to Carry Firearms
Outside of Residence (PTCFOR), thus:
"THERE IS ALSO NEED TO FOCUS ON THE HIGH PROFILE CRIMES THAT TEND TO DISTURB THE
PSYCHOLOGICAL PERIMETERS OF THE COMMUNITY – THE LATEST BEING THE KILLING OF FORMER NPA
LEADER ROLLY KINTANAR. I UNDERSTAND WE ALREADY HAVE THE IDENTITY OF THE CULPRIT. LET US
BRING THEM TO THE BAR OF JUSTICE.
THE NPA WILL FIND IT MORE DIFFICULT TO CARRY OUT THEIR PLOTS IF OUR LAW ENFORCEMENT
AGENCIES CAN RID THEMSELVES OF RASCALS IN UNIFORM, AND ALSO IF WE ENFORCE A GUN BAN IN
PUBLIC PLACES.
THUS, I AM DIRECTING THE PNP CHIEF TO SUSPEND INDEFINITELY THE ISSUANCE OF PERMIT TO CARRY
FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES. THE ISSUANCE OF PERMITS WILL NOW BE LIMITED ONLY TO OWNERSHIP
AND POSSESSION OF GUNS AND NOT TO CARRYING THEM IN PUBLIC PLACES. FROM NOW ON, ONLY THE
UNIFORMED MEN IN THE MILITARY AND AUTHORIZED LAW ENFORCEMENT OFFICERS CAN CARRY
FIREARMS IN PUBLIC PLACES, AND ONLY PURSUANT TO EXISTING LAW. CIVILIAN OWNERS MAY NO
LONGER BRING THEIR FIREARMS OUTSIDE THEIR RESIDENCES. THOSE WHO WANT TO USE THEIR GUNS
FOR TARGET PRACTICE WILL BE GIVEN SPECIAL AND TEMPORARY PERMITS FROM TIME TO TIME ONLY
FOR THAT PURPOSE. AND THEY MAY NOT LOAD THEIR GUNS WITH BULLETS UNTIL THEY ARE IN THE
PREMISES OF THE FIRING RANGE.
WE CANNOT DISREGARD THE PARAMOUNT NEED FOR LAW AND ORDER. JUST AS WE CANNOT BE
HEEDLESS OF OUR PEOPLE’S ASPIRATIONS FOR PEACE."
Acting on President Arroyo’s directive, respondent Ebdane issued the assailed Guidelines quoted as
follows:
"TO : All Concerned
FROM : Chief, PNP
SUBJECT : Guidelines in the Implementation of the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms Outside of Residence.
DATE : January 31, 2003
1. Reference: PD 1866 dated June 29, 1983 and its Implementing Rules and Regulations.
2. General:
The possession and carrying of firearms outside of residence is a privilege granted by the State to its
citizens for their individual protection against all threats of lawlessness and security.
As a rule, persons who are lawful holders of firearms (regular license, special permit, certificate of
registration or MR) are prohibited from carrying their firearms outside of residence. However, the Chief,
Philippine National Police may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under conditions as he
may impose, authorize such person or persons to carry firearms outside of residence.
3. Purposes:
This Memorandum prescribes the guidelines in the implementation of the ban on the carrying of firearms
outside of residence as provided for in the Implementing Rules and Regulations, Presidential Decree No.
1866, dated June 29, 1983 and as directed by PGMA. It also prescribes the conditions, requirements and
procedures under which exemption from the ban may be granted.
4. Specific Instructions on the Ban on the Carrying of Firearms:
a. All PTCFOR are hereby revoked. Authorized holders of licensed firearms covered with valid PTCFOR
may re-apply for a new PTCFOR in accordance with the conditions hereinafter prescribed.
b. All holders of licensed or government firearms are hereby prohibited from carrying their firearms
outside their residence except those covered with mission/letter orders and duty detail orders issued by
competent authority pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that the said exception shall pertain
only to organic and regular employees.
5. The following persons may be authorized to carry firearms outside of residence.
a. All persons whose application for a new PTCFOR has been approved, provided, that the persons and
security of those so authorized are under actual threat, or by the nature of their position, occupation and
profession are under imminent danger.
b. All organic and regular employees with Mission/Letter Orders granted by their respective agencies so
authorized pursuant to Section 5, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such Mission/Letter Orders is valid only
for the duration of the official mission which in no case shall be more than ten (10) days.
c. All guards covered with Duty Detail Orders granted by their respective security agencies so authorized
pursuant to Section 4, IRR, PD 1866, provided, that such DDO shall in no case exceed 24-hour duration.
d. Members of duly recognized Gun Clubs issued Permit to Transport (PTT) by the PNP for purposes of
practice and competition, provided, that such firearms while in transit must not be loaded with
ammunition and secured in an appropriate box or case detached from the person. e. Authorized members
of the Diplomatic Corps. 6. Requirements for issuance of new PTCFOR: a. Written request by the applicant
addressed to Chief, PNP stating his qualification to possess firearm and the reasons why he needs to carry
firearm outside of residence. b. Xerox copy of current firearm license duly authenticated by Records
Branch, FED; c. Proof of actual threat, the details of which should be issued by the Chief of
Police/Provincial or City Directors and duly validated by C, RIID; d. Copy of Drug Test Clearance, duly
authenticated by the Drug Testing Center, if photocopied; e. Copy of DI/ RIID clearance, duly
authenticated by ODI/RIID, if photocopied; f. Copy of Neuro-Psychiatric Clearance duly authenticated by
NP Testing Center, if photocopied; g. Copy of Certificate of Attendance to a Gun Safety Seminar, duly
validated by Chief, Operations Branch, FED; h. NBI Clearance; i. Two (2) ID pictures (2" x 2") taken not
earlier than one (1) year from date of filing of application; and j. Proof of Payment
7. Procedures: a. Applications may be filed directly to the Office of the PTCFOR Secretariat in Camp Crame.
In the provinces, the applications may also be submitted to the Police Regional Offices (PROs) and
Provincial/City Police Offices (P/CPOs) for initial processing before they are forwarded to the office of the
PTCFOR Secretariat. The processors, after ascertaining that the documentary requirements are in order,
shall issue the Order of Payment (OP) indicating the amount of fees payable by the applicant, who in turn
shall pay the fees to the Land Bank. b. Applications, which are duly processed and prepared in accordance
with existing rules and regulations, shall be forwarded to the OCPNP for approval. c. Upon approval of
the application, OCPNP will issue PTCFOR valid for one (1) year from date of issue. d. Applications for
renewal of PTCFOR shall be processed in accordance with the provisions of par. 6 above. e. Application
for possession and carrying of firearms by diplomats in the Philippines shall be processed in accordance
with NHQ PNP Memo dated September 25, 2000, with Subj: Possession and Carrying of Firearms by
Diplomats in the Philippines. 8. Restrictions in the Carrying of Firearms: a. The firearm must not be
displayed or exposed to public view, except those authorized in uniform and in the performance of their
official duties. b. The firearm shall not be brought inside public drinking and amusement places, and all
other commercial or public establishments."
Petitioner Francisco I. Chavez, a licensed gun owner to whom a PTCFOR has been issued, requested the
Department of Interior and Local Government (DILG) to reconsider the implementation of the assailed
Guidelines. However, his request was denied. Thus, he filed the present petition impleading public
respondents Ebdane, as Chief of PNP; Alberto G. Romulo, as Executive Secretary; and Gerry L. Barias, as
Chief of the PNP-Firearms and Explosives Division. He anchored his petition on the following grounds:
"I
THE PRESIDENT HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY – MUCH LESS BY A MERE SPEECH – TO ALTER, MODIFY
OR AMEND THE LAW ON FIREARMS BY IMPOSING A GUN BAN AND CANCELING EXISTING PERMITS FOR
GUNS TO BE CARRIED OUTSIDE RESIDENCES.
II
OFFICIALLY, THERE IS NO PRESIDENTIAL ISSUANCE ON THE GUN BAN; THE PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH NEVER
INVOKED POLICE POWER TO JUSTIFY THE GUN BAN; THE PRESIDENT’S VERBAL DECLARATION ON GUN
BAN VIOLATED THE PEOPLE’S RIGHT TO PROTECT LIFE AND THEIR PROPERTY RIGHT TO CARRY FIREARMS.
III
THE PNP CHIEF HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES BECAUSE:
1) THERE IS NO LAW, STATUTE OR EXECUTIVE ORDER WHICH GRANTS THE PNP CHIEF THE AUTHORITY TO
PROMULGATE THE PNP GUIDELINES.
2) THE IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS OF PD 1866 CANNOT BE THE SUBJECT OF ANOTHER
SET OF IMPLEMENTING GUIDELINES.
3) THE PRESIDENT’S SPEECH CANNOT BE A BASIS FOR THE PROMULGATION OF IMPLEMENTNG

GUIDELINES ON THE GUN BAN.
IV
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES IMPLEMENT PD 1866, AND THE AMENDMENTS
THERETO, THE PNP CHIEF STILL HAS NO POWER OR AUTHORITY TO ISSUE THE SAME BECAUSE –
1) PER SEC 6, RA 8294, WHICH AMENDS PD 1866, THE IRR SHALL BE PROMULGATED JOINTLY BY THE DOJ
AND THE DILG.
2) SEC. 8, PD 1866 STATES THAT THE IRR SHALL BE PROMULGATED BY THE CHIEF OF THE PHILIPPINE
CONSTABULARY.
THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE:
1) THE RIGHT TO OWN AND CARRY A FIREARM IS NECESSARILY INTERTWINED WITH THE PEOPLE’S
INHERENT RIGHT TO LIFE AND TO PROTECT LIFE. THUS, THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF
THIS RIGHT WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW FOR:
A) THE PNP GUIDELINES DEPRIVE PETITIONER OF HIS MOST POTENT, IF NOT HIS ONLY, MEANS TO DEFEND
HIMSELF.
B) THE QUESTIONED GUIDELINES STRIPPED PETITIONER OF HIS MEANS OF PROTECTION AGAINST CRIME
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THE STATE COULD NOT POSSIBLY PROTECT ITS CITIZENS DUE TO THE
INADEQUACY AND INEFFICIENCY OF THE POLICE FORCE.
2) THE OWNESHIP AND CARRYING OF FIREARMS ARE CONSTITUTIONALLY PROTECTED PROPERTY RIGHTS
WHICH CANNOT BE TAKEN AWAY WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW AND WITHOUT JUST CAUSE.
VI
ASSUMING ARGUENDO, THAT THE PNP GUIDELINES WERE ISSUED IN THE EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER,
THE SAME IS AN INVALID EXERCISE THEREOF SINCE THE MEANS USED THEREFOR ARE UNREASONABLE
AND UNNCESSARY FOR THE ACCOMPLISHMENT OF ITS PURPOSE – TO DETER AND PREVENT CRIME –
THEREBY BECOMING UNDULY OPPRESSIVE TO LAW-ABIDING GUN-OWNERS.
VII
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE AND CONFISCATORY SINCE IT REVOKED ALL EXISTING
PERMITS TO CARRY WITHOUT, HOWEVER, REFUNDING THE PAYMENT THE PNP RECEIVED FROM THOSE
WHO ALREADY PAID THEREFOR.
VIII
THE PNP GUIDELINES VIOLATE THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION BECAUSE THEY
ARE DIRECTED AT AND OPPRESSIVE ONLY TO LAW-ABIDING GUN OWNERS WHILE LEAVING OTHER GUN-
OWNERS – THE LAWBREAKERS (KIDNAPPERS, ROBBERS, HOLD-UPPERS, MNLF, MILF, ABU SAYYAF
COLLECTIVELY, AND NPA) – UNTOUCHED.
IX
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE UNJUST, OPPRESSIVE AND UNFAIR BECAUSE THEY WERE IMPLEMENTED LONG
BEFORE THEY WERE PUBLISHED.
X
THE PNP GUIDELINES ARE EFFECTIVELY AN EX POST FACTO LAW SINCE THEY APPLY RETROACTIVELY AND
PUNISH ALL THOSE WHO WERE ALREADY GRANTED PERMITS TO CARRY OUTSIDE OF RESIDENCE LONG
BEFORE THEIR PROMULGATION."
Petitioner’s submissions may be synthesized into five (5) major issues:
First, whether respondent Ebdane is authorized to issue the assailed Guidelines;
Second, whether the citizens’ right to bear arms is a constitutional right?;
Third, whether the revocation of petitioner’s PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines is a violation of
his right to property?;
Fourth, whether the issuance of the assailed Guidelines is a valid exercise of police power?; and
Fifth, whether the assailed Guidelines constitute an ex post facto law?
The Solicitor General seeks the dismissal of the petition pursuant to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.
Nonetheless, in refutation of petitioner’s arguments, he contends that: (1) the PNP Chief is authorized to
issue the assailed Guidelines; (2) petitioner does not have a constitutional right to own and carry firearms;
(3) the assailed Guidelines do not violate the due process clause of the Constitution; and (4) the assailed
Guidelines do not constitute an ex post facto law.
Initially, we must resolve the procedural barrier.
On the alleged breach of the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, suffice it to say that the doctrine is not an
iron-clad dictum. In several instances where this Court was confronted with cases of national interest and
of serious implications, it never hesitated to set aside the rule and proceed with the judicial determination
of the cases.3 The case at bar is of similar import as it involves the citizens’ right to bear arms.
Authority of the PNP Chief
Relying on the principle of separation of powers, petitioner argues that only Congress can withhold his
right to bear arms. In revoking all existing PTCFOR, President Arroyo and respondent Ebdane transgressed
the settled principle and arrogated upon themselves a power they do not possess – the legislative power.
We are not persuaded.
It is true that under our constitutional system, the powers of government are distributed among three
coordinate and substantially independent departments: the legislative, the executive and the judiciary.
Each has exclusive cognizance of the matters within its jurisdiction and is supreme within its own sphere.4
Pertinently, the power to make laws – the legislative power – is vested in Congress.5 Congress may not
escape its duties and responsibilities by delegating that power to any other body or authority. Any
attempt to abdicate the power is unconstitutional and void, on the principle that "delegata potestas non
potest delegari" – "delegated power may not be delegated."6
The rule which forbids the delegation of legislative power, however, is not absolute and inflexible. It
admits of exceptions. An exception sanctioned by immemorial practice permits the legislative body to
delegate its licensing power to certain persons, municipal corporations, towns, boards, councils,
commissions, commissioners, auditors, bureaus and directors.7 Such licensing power includes the power
to promulgate necessary rules and regulations.8
The evolution of our laws on firearms shows that since the early days of our Republic, the legislature’s
tendency was always towards the delegation of power. Act No. 1780,9 delegated upon the Governor-
General (now the President) the authority (1) to approve or disapprove applications of any person for a
license to deal in firearms or to possess the same for personal protection, hunting and other lawful
purposes; and (2) to revoke such license any time.10 Further, it authorized him to issue regulations which
he may deem necessary for the proper enforcement of the Act.11 With the enactment of Act No. 2711,
the "Revised Administrative Code of 1917," the laws on firearms were integrated.12 The Act retained the
authority of the Governor General provided in Act No. 1780. Subsequently, the growing complexity in the
Office of the Governor-General resulted in the delegation of his authority to the Chief of the Constabulary.
On January 21, 1919, Acting Governor-General Charles E. Yeater issued Executive Order No. 813
authorizing and directing the Chief of Constabulary to act on his behalf in approving and disapproving
applications for personal, special and hunting licenses. This was followed by Executive Order No. 6114
designating the Philippine Constabulary (PC) as the government custodian of all firearms, ammunitions
and explosives. Executive Order No. 215,15 issued by President Diosdado Macapagal on December 3,
1965, granted the Chief of the Constabulary, not only the authority to approve or disapprove applications
for personal, special and hunting license, but also the authority to revoke the same. With the foregoing
developments, it is accurate to say that the Chief of the Constabulary had exercised the authority for a
long time. In fact, subsequent issuances such as Sections 2 and 3 of the Implementing Rules and
Regulations of Presidential Decree No. 186616 perpetuate such authority of the Chief of the
Constabulary. Section 2 specifically provides that any person or entity desiring to possess any firearm
"shall first secure the necessary permit/license/authority from the Chief of the Constabulary." With
regard to the issuance of PTCFOR, Section 3 imparts: "The Chief of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases
as determined by him and under such conditions as he may impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms
to carry them outside of residence." These provisions are issued pursuant to the general power granted
by P.D. No. 1866 empowering him to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation
of the decree.17 At this juncture, it bears emphasis that P.D. No. 1866 is the chief law governing
possession of firearms in the Philippines and that it was issued by President Ferdinand E. Marcos in the
exercise of his legislative power.18 In an attempt to evade the application of the above-mentioned laws
and regulations, petitioner argues that the "Chief of the PNP" is not the same as the "Chief of the
Constabulary," the PC being a mere unit or component of the newly established PNP. He contends further
that Republic Act No. 829419 amended P.D. No. 1866 such that the authority to issue rules and
regulations regarding firearms is now jointly vested in the Department of Justice and the DILG, not the
Chief of the Constabulary.20
Petitioner’s submission is bereft of merit.
By virtue of Republic Act No. 6975,21 the Philippine National Police (PNP) absorbed the Philippine
Constabulary (PC). Consequently, the PNP Chief succeeded the Chief of the Constabulary and, therefore,
assumed the latter’s licensing authority. Section 24 thereof specifies, as one of PNP’s powers, the
issuance of licenses for the possession of firearms and explosives in accordance with law.22 This is in
conjunction with the PNP Chief’s "power to issue detailed implementing policies and instructions" on
such "matters as may be necessary to effectively carry out the functions, powers and duties" of the
PNP.23
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, R.A. No. 8294 does not divest the Chief of the Constabulary (now the
PNP Chief) of his authority to promulgate rules and regulations for the effective implementation of P.D.
No. 1866. For one, R.A. No. 8294 did not repeal entirely P.D. No. 1866. It merely provides for the reduction
of penalties for illegal possession of firearms. Thus, the provision of P.D. No. 1866 granting to the Chief
of the Constabulary the authority to issue rules and regulations regarding firearms remains effective.
Correspondingly, the Implementing Rules and Regulations dated September 15, 1997 jointly issued by
the Department of Justice and the DILG pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 8294 deal only with the
automatic review, by the Director of the Bureau of Corrections or the Warden of a provincial or city jail,
of the records of convicts for violations of P.D. No. 1866. The Rules seek to give effect to the beneficent
provisions of R.A. No. 8294, thereby ensuring the early release and reintegration of the convicts into the
community.
Clearly, both P.D. No. 1866 and R.A. No. 6975 authorize the PNP Chief to issue the assailed guidelines.
Corollarily, petitioner disputes President Arroyo’s declaration of a nationwide gun ban, arguing that "she
has no authority to alter, modify, or amend the law on firearms through a mere speech."
First, it must be emphasized that President Arroyo’s speech was just an expression of her policy and a
directive to her subordinate. It cannot, therefore, be argued that President Arroyo enacted a law through
a mere speech.
Second, at the apex of the entire executive officialdom is the President. Section 17, Article VII of the
Constitution specifies his power as Chief Executive, thus: "The President shall have control of all the
executive departments, bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed." As
Chief Executive, President Arroyo holds the steering wheel that controls the course of her government.
She lays down policies in the execution of her plans and programs. Whatever policy she chooses, she has
her subordinates to implement them. In short, she has the power of control. Whenever a specific function
is entrusted by law or regulation to her subordinate, she may act directly or merely direct the
performance of a duty.24 Thus, when President Arroyo directed respondent Ebdane to suspend the
issuance of PTCFOR, she was just directing a subordinate to perform an assigned duty. Such act is well
within the prerogative of her office.
II
Right to bear arms: Constitutional or Statutory?
Petitioner earnestly contends that his right to bear arms is a constitutionally-protected right. This, he
mainly anchors on various American authorities. We therefore find it imperative to determine the nature
of the right in light of American jurisprudence.
The bearing of arms is a tradition deeply rooted in the English and American society. It antedates not only
the American Constitution but also the discovery of firearms.25
A provision commonly invoked by the American people to justify their possession of firearms is the
Second Amendment of the Constitution of the United States of America, which reads:
"A well regulated militia, being necessary for the security of free state, the right of the people to keep
and bear Arms, shall not be infringed."
An examination of the historical background of the foregoing provision shows that it pertains to the
citizens’ "collective right" to take arms in defense of the State, not to the citizens’ "individual right" to
own and possess arms. The setting under which the right was contemplated has a profound connection
with the keeping and maintenance of a militia or an armed citizenry. That this is how the right was
construed is evident in early American cases.
The first case involving the interpretation of the Second Amendment that reached the United States
Supreme Court is United States vs. Miller.26 Here, the indictment charged the defendants with
transporting an unregistered "Stevens shotgun" without the required stamped written order, contrary to
the National Firearms Act. The defendants filed a demurrer challenging the facial validity of the
indictment on the ground that the National Firearms Act offends the inhibition of the Second
Amendment. The District Court sustained the demurrer and quashed the indictment. On appeal, the
Supreme Court interpreted the right to bear arms under the Second Amendment as referring to the
collective right of those comprising the Militia – a body of citizens enrolled for military discipline. It does
not pertain to the individual right of citizen to bear arm. Miller expresses its holding as follows:
"In the absence of any evidence tending to show that possession or use of a ‘shotgun having a barrel of
less than eighteen inches in length’ at this time has some reasonable relationship to the preservation or
efficiency of a well regulated militia, we cannot say that the Second Amendment guarantees the right to
keep and bear such an instrument. Certainly it is not within judicial notice that this weapon is any part of
the ordinary military equipment or that its use could contribute to the common defense.
The same doctrine was re-echoed in Cases vs. United States.27 Here, the Circuit Court of Appeals held
that the Federal Firearms Act, as applied to appellant, does not conflict with the Second Amendment. It
ruled that:
"While [appellant’s] weapon may be capable of military use, or while at least familiarity with it might be
regarded as of value in training a person to use a comparable weapon of military type and caliber, still
there is no evidence that the appellant was or ever had been a member of any military organization or
that his use of the weapon under the circumstances disclosed was in preparation for a military career. In
fact, the only inference possible is that the appellant at the time charged in the indictment was in
possession of, transporting, and using the firearm and ammunition purely and simply on a frolic of his
own and without any thought or intention of contributing to the efficiency of the well regulated militia
which the Second amendment was designed to foster as necessary to the security of a free state."
With the foregoing jurisprudence, it is erroneous to assume that the US Constitution grants upon the
American people the right to bear arms. In a more explicit language, the United States vs. Cruikshank28
decreed: "The right of the people to keep and bear arms is not a right granted by the Constitution. Neither
is it in any way dependent upon that instrument." Likewise, in People vs. Persce,29 the Court of Appeals
said: "Neither is there any constitutional provision securing the right to bear arms which prohibits
legislation with reference to such weapons as are specifically before us for consideration. The provision
in the Constitution of the United States that the right of the people to keep and bear arms shall not be
infringed is not designed to control legislation by the state."
With more reason, the right to bear arms cannot be classified as fundamental under the 1987 Philippine
Constitution. Our Constitution contains no provision similar to the Second Amendment, as we aptly
observed in the early case of United States vs. Villareal:30
"The only contention of counsel which would appear to necessitate comment is the claim that the statute
penalizing the carrying of concealed weapons and prohibiting the keeping and the use of firearms without
a license, is in violation of the provisions of section 5 of the Philippine Bill of Rights.
Counsel does not expressly rely upon the prohibition in the United States Constitution against the
infringement of the right of the people of the United States to keep and bear arms (U. S. Constitution,
amendment 2), which is not included in the Philippine Bill. But it may be well, in passing, to point out that
in no event could this constitutional guaranty have any bearing on the case at bar, not only because it has
not been expressly extended to the Philippine Islands, but also because it has been uniformly held that
both this and similar provisions in State constitutions apply only to arms used in civilized warfare (see
cases cited in 40 Cyc., 853, note 18); x x x."
Evidently, possession of firearms by the citizens in the Philippines is the exception, not the rule. The right
to bear arms is a mere statutory privilege, not a constitutional right. It is a mere statutory creation. What
then are the laws that grant such right to the Filipinos? The first real firearm law is Act No. 1780 enacted
by the Philippine Commission on October 12, 1907. It was passed to regulate the importation, acquisition,
possession, use and transfer of firearms. Section 9 thereof provides:
"SECTION 9. Any person desiring to possess one or more firearms for personal protection, or for use in
hunting or other lawful purposes only, and ammunition therefor, shall make application for a license to
possess such firearm or firearms or ammunition as hereinafter provided. Upon making such application,
and before receiving the license, the applicant shall make a cash deposit in the postal savings bank in the
sum of one hundred pesos for each firearm for which the license is to be issued, or in lieu thereof he may
give a bond in such form as the Governor-General may prescribe, payable to the Government of the
Philippine Islands, in the sum of two hundred pesos for each such firearm: PROVIDED, HOWEVER, That
persons who are actually members of gun clubs, duly formed and organized at the time of the passage of
this Act, who at such time have a license to possess firearms, shall not be required to make the deposit
or give the bond prescribed by this section, and the bond duly executed by such person in accordance
with existing law shall continue to be security for the safekeeping of such arms."
The foregoing provision was restated in Section 88731 of Act No. 2711 that integrated the firearm laws.
Thereafter, President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued P.D. No. 1866. It codified the laws on illegal possession,
manufacture, dealing in, acquisition of firearms, ammunitions or explosives and imposed stiffer penalties
for their violation. R.A. No. 8294 amended some of the provisions of P.D. No. 1866 by reducing the
imposable penalties. Being a mere statutory creation, the right to bear arms cannot be considered an
inalienable or absolute right.
III
Vested Property Right
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law." Petitioner invokes this provision, asserting that the revocation of
his PTCFOR pursuant to the assailed Guidelines deprived him of his "vested property right" without due
process of law and in violation of the equal protection of law.
Petitioner cannot find solace to the above-quoted Constitutional provision.
In evaluating a due process claim, the first and foremost consideration must be whether life, liberty or
property interest exists.32 The bulk of jurisprudence is that a license authorizing a person to enjoy a
certain privilege is neither a property nor property right. In Tan vs. The Director of Forestry,33 we ruled
that "a license is merely a permit or privilege to do what otherwise would be unlawful, and is not a
contract between the authority granting it and the person to whom it is granted; neither is it property or
a property right, nor does it create a vested right." In a more emphatic pronouncement, we held in Oposa
vs. Factoran, Jr.34 that:
"Needless to say, all licenses may thus be revoked or rescinded by executive action. It is not a contract,
property or a property right protected by the due process clause of the Constitution."
Petitioner, in arguing that his PTCFOR is a constitutionally protected property right, relied heavily on Bell
vs. Burson35 wherein the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that "once a license is issued, continued possession
may become essential in the pursuit of livelihood. Suspension of issued licenses thus involves state action
that adjudicates important interest of the licensees."
Petitioner’s reliance on Bell is misplaced. This case involves a driver’s license, not a license to bear arms.
The catena of American jurisprudence involving license to bear arms is perfectly in accord with our ruling
that a PTCFOR is neither a property nor a property right. In Erdelyi vs. O’Brien,36 the plaintiff who was
denied a license to carry a firearm brought suit against the defendant who was the Chief of Police of the
City of Manhattan Beach, on the ground that the denial violated her constitutional rights to due process
and equal protection of the laws. The United States Court of Appeals Ninth Circuit ruled that Erdelyi did
not have a property interest in obtaining a license to carry a firearm, ratiocinating as follows:
"Property interests protected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment do not arise
whenever a person has only ‘an abstract need or desire for’, or ‘unilateral expectation of a benefit. x x x
Rather, they arise from ‘legitimate claims of entitlement… defined by existing rules or understanding that
stem from an independent source, such as state law. x x x Concealed weapons are closely regulated by
the State of California. x x x Whether the statute creates a property interest in concealed weapons
licenses depends ‘largely upon the extent to which the statute contains mandatory language that restricts
the discretion of the [issuing authority] to deny licenses to applicants who claim to meet the minimum
eligibility requirements. x x x Where state law gives the issuing authority broad discretion to grant or deny
license application in a closely regulated field, initial applicants do not have a property right in such
licenses protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Jacobson, supra, 627 F.2d at 180 (gaming license
under Nevada law);"
Similar doctrine was announced in Potts vs. City of Philadelphia,37 Conway vs. King,38 Nichols vs. County
of Sta. Clara,39 and Gross vs. Norton.40 These cases enunciated that the test whether the statute creates
a property right or interest depends largely on the extent of discretion granted to the issuing authority.
In our jurisdiction, the PNP Chief is granted broad discretion in the issuance of PTCFOR. This is evident
from the tenor of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. No. 1866 which state that "the Chief
of Constabulary may, in meritorious cases as determined by him and under such conditions as he may
impose, authorize lawful holders of firearms to carry them outside of residence." Following the American
doctrine, it is indeed logical to say that a PTCFOR does not constitute a property right protected under
our Constitution.
Consequently, a PTCFOR, just like ordinary licenses in other regulated fields, may be revoked any time. It
does not confer an absolute right, but only a personal privilege to be exercised under existing restrictions,
and such as may thereafter be reasonably imposed.41 A licensee takes his license subject to such
conditions as the Legislature sees fit to impose, and one of the statutory conditions of this license is that
it might be revoked by the selectmen at their pleasure. Such a license is not a contract, and a revocation
of it does not deprive the defendant of any property, immunity, or privilege within the meaning of these
words in the Declaration of Rights.42 The US Supreme Court, in Doyle vs. Continental Ins. Co,43 held:
"The correlative power to revoke or recall a permission is a necessary consequence of the main power. A
mere license by the State is always revocable."
The foregoing jurisprudence has been resonating in the Philippines as early as 1908. Thus, in The
Government of the Philippine Islands vs. Amechazurra44 we ruled:
"x x x no private person is bound to keep arms. Whether he does or not is entirely optional with himself,
but if, for his own convenience or pleasure, he desires to possess arms, he must do so upon such terms
as the Government sees fit to impose, for the right to keep and bear arms is not secured to him by law.
The Government can impose upon him such terms as it pleases. If he is not satisfied with the terms
imposed, he should decline to accept them, but, if for the purpose of securing possession of the arms he
does agree to such conditions, he must fulfill them."
IV
Police Power
At any rate, assuming that petitioner’s PTCFOR constitutes a property right protected by the Constitution,
the same cannot be considered as absolute as to be placed beyond the reach of the State’s police power.
All property in the state is held subject to its general regulations, necessary to the common good and
general welfare.
In a number of cases, we laid down the test to determine the validity of a police measure, thus:
(1) The interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
exercise of the police power; and
(2) The means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals.
Deeper reflection will reveal that the test merely reiterates the essence of the constitutional guarantees
of substantive due process, equal protection, and non-impairment of property rights.
It is apparent from the assailed Guidelines that the basis for its issuance was the need for peace and order
in the society. Owing to the proliferation of crimes, particularly those committed by the New People’s
Army (NPA), which tends to disturb the peace of the community, President Arroyo deemed it best to
impose a nationwide gun ban. Undeniably, the motivating factor in the issuance of the assailed Guidelines
is the interest of the public in general.
The only question that can then arise is whether the means employed are appropriate and reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not unduly oppressive. In the instant case, the
assailed Guidelines do not entirely prohibit possession of firearms. What they proscribe is merely the
carrying of firearms outside of residence. However, those who wish to carry their firearms outside of their
residences may re-apply for a new PTCFOR. This we believe is a reasonable regulation. If the carrying of
firearms is regulated, necessarily, crime incidents will be curtailed. Criminals carry their weapon to hunt
for their victims; they do not wait in the comfort of their homes. With the revocation of all PTCFOR, it
would be difficult for criminals to roam around with their guns. On the other hand, it would be easier for
the PNP to apprehend them.
Notably, laws regulating the acquisition or possession of guns have frequently been upheld as reasonable
exercise of the police power.45 In State vs. Reams,46 it was held that the legislature may regulate the
right to bear arms in a manner conducive to the public peace. With the promotion of public peace as its
objective and the revocation of all PTCFOR as the means, we are convinced that the issuance of the
assailed Guidelines constitutes a reasonable exercise of police power. The ruling in United States vs.
Villareal,47 is relevant, thus:
"We think there can be no question as to the reasonableness of a statutory regulation prohibiting the
carrying of concealed weapons as a police measure well calculated to restrict the too frequent resort to
such weapons in moments of anger and excitement. We do not doubt that the strict enforcement of such
a regulation would tend to increase the security of life and limb, and to suppress crime and lawlessness,
in any community wherein the practice of carrying concealed weapons prevails, and this without being
unduly oppressive upon the individual owners of these weapons. It follows that its enactment by the
legislature is a proper and legitimate exercise of the police power of the state."
Ex post facto law
In Mekin vs. Wolfe,48 an ex post facto law has been defined as one – (a) which makes an action done
before the passing of the law and which was innocent when done criminal, and punishes such action; or
(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than it was when committed; or (c) which changes the
punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when it was committed;
or (d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and receives less or different testimony than the law
required at the time of the commission of the offense in order to convict the defendant.
We see no reason to devote much discussion on the matter. Ex post facto law prohibits retrospectivity of
penal laws.49 The assailed Guidelines cannot be considered as an ex post facto law because it is
prospective in its application. Contrary to petitioner’s argument, it would not result in the punishment of
acts previously committed.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
27. G.R. No. L-35434 November 9, 1988
ISRAEL ANTONIO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. COURT OF APPEALS, respondent.
Feliciano C. Tumale for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondent.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the validity of the order of the respondent court dismissing the
petitioner's appeal for failure to file the appellant's brief on time.
The petitioner had been convicted of qualified theft in the Court of First Instance of Quezon City * on
February 26, 1968. He seasonably elevated his conviction to the Court of Appeals which in due time sent
him notices to file his brief, thus:
On September 17, 1971, the notice was sent by registered mail to his counsel of record, Atty. Nicanor
Lapuz, at Room 410, EMA Building, 111 Evangelists, Quiapo, Manila, the address indicated in his
pleadings. The notice was returned unclaimed, after the third registry notice to the addressee.
On October 16, 1971, another notice to file brief was sent, this time directly to the petitioner himself, at
his given address at 1958, Interior 2, Daang-Bakal, Tayuman, Tondo, Manila. This notice was also returned
unclaimed.
On November 18, 1971, a third notice was sent to the petitioner, now through his bondsman, the
Philippine Motor Assurance Corporation, at its address at the 3rd Floor, Cardinal Building, Herran corner
F. Agoncillo St., Ermita, Manila. Again the notice was returned unclaimed. 4
In view of the above developments, the respondent court issued a resolution ** on December 9, 1971,
reading as follows:
It appearing that the Notice of this Court requiring accused-appellant to file his brief, although correctly
addressed to his counsel and then to his bondsman, Phil. Motors Assurance Corporation, was returned
unclaimed, the Court RESOLVED to REQUIRE the accused-appellant to SHOW CAUSE, within ten (10) days
from receipt of copy hereof, why his appeal should not be dismissed. (Original Records, p. 60)
This was followed by a resolution dated February 1, 1972, in which the Court of Appeals declared:
It appearing that the copies of the Resolution of this court of December 9, 1971, requiring accused-
appellant to show cause why his appeal should not be dismissed for failure to file his brief, although
correctly addressed to the accused-appellant himself and to appellant's counsel, was returned unclaimed,
the Court RESOLVED to DISMISS the appeal interposed by the accused-appellant. (Original Records, p. 63)
On March 4, 1972, the order of dismissal became final and executory. On August 11, 1972, the Court of
First Instance issued an order for the execution of the judgment against the petitioner. It was only then
that the petitioner suddenly surfaced, out of the blue, as it were.
On August 21, 1972, after his long absence and silence, the petitioner appeared by a new counsel and
filed an urgent ex parte motion to reinstate the appeal and recall the records. His reason was that he had
not received the notices to file brief and so was denied due process when his appeal was dismissed. Not
surprisingly, the motion was denied.
The petitioner now asks us to rectify what he submits was a serious error of the Court of Appeals.
According to him, the first notice to file brief sent to his original counsel was never delivered because
Atty. Lapuz had closed his office and retired due to old age and an hernia condition. The petitioner claims
he was unaware of these facts then.
The second notice, sent to him this time, was also not received because the postman could not locate his
address in the squatter area. The gate in front of the railroad tracks leading to his house was closed by
the Philippine National Railway, making it necessary for the letter-carrier to take the longer route from
the opposite direction.
No explanation was offered for the alleged non-receipt of the notice sent to the petitioner's bonding
company.
It is the petitioner's contention that the notices sent by the Court of Appeals should not be considered as
halving been received by the addressees under Rule 13, Section 8, of the Rules of Court because that rule
requires actual receipt of the registry notice. The said section provides as follows:
SEC. 8. Completeness of service.—Personal service is complete upon actual delivery. Service by ordinary
mail is complete upon the expiration of five (5) days after mailing, unless the court otherwise provides.
Service by registered mail is complete upon actual receipt by the addressee; but if he fails to claim his
mail from the post office within five (5) days from the date of first notice of the postmaster, service shall
take effect at the expiration of such time.
The petitioner argues that, not having actually received the registry notice, he could not possibly have
claimed the notice to file the appellant's brief. Hence, service thereof could not have taken effect after
the five-day period mentioned in the rule.
We do not think so.
Ordinarily, the petitioner's interpretation of the above rule would be acceptable. In fact, the presumption
that official duty has been regularly performed and that a letter duly directed and mailed was received
in the regular course of the mails are not applicable here. As we held in Santos v. Tuazon, it is necessary
under this rule to present conclusive proof that the registry notice was received by or at least served on
the addressee before the 5-day period can begin to run.
However, this requirement presupposes that the notice is sent to the correct address as indicated in the
records of the court. It does not apply where, as in the case at bar, the notice was sent to the lawyer's
given address but did not reach him because he had moved therefrom without informing the court of his
new location. The service at the old address should be considered valid. Otherwise, no process can be
served on the client through his lawyer if the latter has simply disappeared without leaving a forwarding
address. There is no need to stress that service on the lawyer, if valid, is also valid service on the client he
represents. The rule in fact is that it is on the lawyer and not the client that the service should first be
made.
Moreover, it appears from the particular circumstances of this case that the petitioner himself, as the
vanishing lawyer's client, exhibited an exceptional lack of interest in his own appeal, an absence of
diligence in prosecuting it that clearly smacks of bad faith. The doctrine announced in Santos will apply
only when good faith can be presumed and not when the addressee, like the herein petitioner, is
obviously hiding from the mails.
The petitioner also invokes the case of Espiritu v. Valero, where service was also made at the old address
of the lawyer who had not informed the other party or the Court that he had moved to another office.
That case is not exactly in point either. In the first place, the appeal therein had not yet been dismissed
unlike in the present case. Secondly, and more importantly, what was not filed in that case was the
appellee's brief, because the petitioner had not received the appellant's brief. The Court allowed the
appellee to file his brief just the same as no substantial prejudice would be caused the appellant. At the
same time, the petitioner's counsel was warned against repetition of his negligence in not informing the
Court of his change of address.
The Court was disposed to be lenient in that case because it was the appellee and not the appellant who
was negligent. The appellee plays only a passive part in any appeal because the decision sought to be
reversed is in his favor anyway. Since he is not interested in disturbing the judgment, the appellee is
naturally not expected to be as vigilant as the appellant in the prosecution of the appeal.
By contrast, what was allegedly not served in the case at bar was the notice to file the appellant's brief.
It was through this pleading that the petitioner as appellant was expected to demonstrate the errors of
the trial court and so persuade the Court of Appeals to reverse his conviction. Obviously, the sooner this
was done, the better for the appellant's liberty and reputation and his peace of mind as well. Hence, it
was incumbent upon him, if his appeal was really sincere, to see to it that it was proceeding in due course
and, if not, to take the needed steps to expedite it.
But what the petitioner did was exactly nothing. After entrusting to his lawyer the appeal of his conviction
on February 28, 1968, he apparently forgot all about the matter. It does not appear that he even
occasionally checked with his lawyer about the progress of the case; indeed, he claims now that he was
not even aware that the latter had retired.
Neither has it been shown that during the period his appeal was pending, the petitioner made inquiries
with the respondent court about any development in his case. In fact, it was only after all of 170 days
from the time the dismissal of his appeal became final and executory that it occurred to him to make his
appearance at last. This was on August 21, 1972. Suspiciously, he re-emerged only ten days after the
issuance by the trial court of the order for the execution of the judgment against him.
The petitioner now invokes due process and complains that the dismissal of his appeal has deprived him
of his day in court. Even assuming his negligence, he argues, the ground for the dismissal was merely
procedural and therefore should be waived to afford him substantial justice.kno
There is no denial of due process as long as the person has been given an opportunity to be heard, which
was done in this case. If it is true that the notices were never actually received by him or his lawyer, the
omission was due to their own carelessness. The lawyer never informed the respondent court of his
change of address. The petitioner himself never followed up his appeal with the respondent court or with
his lawyer. Surely, he cannot now seriously argue that the respondent court has acted arbitrarily against
him. The simple fact is that he was given the chance to file his brief but he did not do so, negligently, or
perhaps even deliberately.
It is the common practice of litigants who have no excuse for not observing the procedural rules to
minimize the same as mere technicalities. Then they cry for due process. These procedural rules are in
fact intended to ensure an orderly administration of justice precisely to guarantee the enjoyment of
substantive rights.
Notably, the petitioner's indifference to his own appeal was also demonstrated quite clearly in the
proceeding before this Court. After receiving on December 16, 1972, the notice to file the appellant's
brief, he finally did so only on April 28, 1973, after five extensions covering more than four months. He
did not file a reply brief. Required to manifest if the petitioner was still interested in prosecuting this case,
his lawyer declared he had lost contact with his client and did not know where to find him. The Court
then sent the same inquiry directly to the petitioner after ascertaining his present address, where it was
served but not received. No word has been heard from him since his last pleading nor has he indicated
any further interest in these proceedings.
The petitioner's conduct in this case strongly suggests that he filed his appeal only for dilatory reasons,
to prevent the enforcement of the judgment against him as long as he could. Absent here is an earnest
desire to question the decision, which was left pending in the Court of Appeals while the appellant and
his lawyer unaccountably disappeared. What is especially intriguing is that it was only when the order for
the execution of the judgment was issued by the trial court that he finally showed up-after all the while
ignoring the processes of the respondent court-to plaintively voice his wounded protests.
We see no blood or bruises here. The Court is not persuaded by the sham injury or the crocodile tears.
The petitioner's deception is as patent as it is reprehensible and will not relieve him now of the sentence
he would challenge.
As the appeal was correctly dismissed by the respondent court, it is not necessary to deal with the other
issues raised.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, with cost against the petitioner. The temporary restraining order
dated December 12, 1972, is LIFTED. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Jk28. G.R. Nos. 79690-707 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN and HONORABLE RAUL M.
GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution,
respondents.
G.R. No. 80578 October 7, 1988
ENRIQUE A. ZALDIVAR, petitioner, vs. HON. RAUL M. GONZALEZ, claiming to be and acting as
Tanodbayan-Ombudsman ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution, respondent.
PER CURIAM:
The following are the subjects of this Resolution:
1) a Motion, dated 9 February 1988, to Cite in Contempt filed by petitioner Enrique A. Zaldivar against
public respondent Special Prosecutor (formerly Tanodbayan) Raul M. Gonzalez, in connection with G.R.
Nos. 79690-707 and G.R. No. 80578. and 2) a Resolution of this Court dated 2 May 1988 requiring
respondent Hon. Raul Gonzalez to show cause why he should not be punished for contempt and/or
subjected to administrative sanctions for making certain public statements.
The pertinent facts are as follows:
Petitioner Zaldivar is one of several defendants in Criminal Cases Nos.12159-12161 and 12163-12177 (for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act) pending before the Sandiganbayan. The Office of
the Tanodbayan conducted the preliminary investigation and filed the criminal informations in those
cases (originally TBP Case No. 86-00778).
On 10 September 1987, petitioner filed with this Court a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and
mandamus (G.R. Nos. 79690-707) naming as respondents both the Sandiganbayan and Hon. Raul M.
Gonzalez. Among other things, petitioner assailed: (1) the 5 February 1987 Resolution of the
"Tanodbayan" recommending the filing of criminal informations against petitioner Zaldivar and his co-
accused in TBP Case No. 86-00778; and (2) the 1 September 1987 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in
Criminal Cases Nos. 12159-12161 and 1216312177 denying his Motion to Quash the criminal
informations filed in those cases by the "Tanodbayan." In this respect, petitioner alleged that respondent
Gonzalez, as Tanodbayan and under the provisions of the 1987 Constitution, was no longer vested with
power and authority independently to investigate and to institute criminal cases for graft and corruption
against public officials and employees, and hence that the informations filed in Criminal Cases Nos.
12159-12161 and 12163-12177 were all null and void.
On 11 September 1987, this Court issued a Resolution, which read:
G.R. Nos. 79690-707 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. The Honorable Sandiganbayan and Honorable Raul M.
Gonzalez, Claiming To Be and Acting as Tanodbayan-Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution ).—
Acting on the special civil action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus under Rule 65 of the Rules
of Court, with urgent motion for preliminary elimination injunction, the Court Resolved, without
giving due course to the petition, to require the respondents to COMMENT thereon, within ten (10)
days from notice.
The Court further Resolved to ISSUE a TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER, effective immediately and
continuing until further orders from this Court, ordering respondent Sandiganbayan to CEASE and
DESIST from hearing and trying Criminal Cases Nos. 12159 to 12161 and 12163 to 12177 insofar as
petitioner Enrique Zaldivar is concerned and from hearing and resolving the Special Prosecutor's
motion to suspend dated September 3, 1987.
The parties later filed their respective pleadings.

Petitioner Zaldivar filed with this Court a second Petition for certiorari and Prohibition (G.R. No. 80578)
on 19 November 1987, initially naming only Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez as respondent. That Petition assailed
the 24 September 1987 Resolution of the "Tanodbayan" in TBP Case No. 87- 01304 recommending that
additional criminal charges for graft and corruption be filed against petitioner Zaldivar and five (5) other
individuals. Once again, petitioner raised the argument of the Tanodbayan's lack of authority under the
1987 Constitution to file such criminal cases and to investigate the same. Petitioner also moved for the
consolidation of that petition with G.R. No. 79690-707.
In a Resolution dated 24 November 1987, this Court, without giving due course to the second petition:
(1) required respondent Gonzalez to submit a comment thereon: and (2) issued a temporary restraining
order "ordering respondent Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case
No. 87-01394 ... and particularly, from filing the criminal information consequent thereof and from
conducting preliminary investigation therein." In a separate resolution of the same date, G.R. Nos. 79690-
707 and G.R. No. 80578 were ordered consolidated by the Court.
In the meantime, however, on 20 November 1987 or four (4) days prior to issuance by this Court of a
temporary restraining order in G.R. No. 80578, the Office of the Tanodbayan instituted Criminal Case No.
12570 with the Sandiganbayan which issued on 23 November 1987 an Order of Arrest for petitioner
Zaldivar and his co-accused in Criminal Case No. 12570. Upon Motion of petitioner Zaldivar, this Court
issued the following Resolution on 8 December 1987:
G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A. Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan). The motion filed
by the Solicitor General for respondents for an extension of thirty (30) days from the expiration of
the original period within which to file comment on the petition for certiorari and prohibition with
prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction or restraining order is GRANTED.
Acting on the manifestation with motion to treat the Sandiganbayan as party-respondent, the Court
Resolved to (a) Consider IMPLEADED the Sandiganbayan as party respondent; and (b) In pursuance
of and supplementing the Temporary Restraining Order of November 24, 1987 "ordering respondent
Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez to CEASE and DESIST from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-01304 entitled,
"Commission on Audit vs. Gov. Enrique Zaldivar, et al." and particularly, from filing the criminal
information consequent thereof and from conducting preliminary investigation therein" ISSUE a
TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER effective immediately and continuing until further orders from
this Court, ordering respondents Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez and Sandiganbayan to CEASE and DESIST
from further acting in Criminal Case No. 12570, entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Enrique M.
Zaldivar, et al." and from enforcing the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan in said case.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment on the petition in G.R. No. 80578, and we required the petitioner
to submit a Reply thereto.
On 9 February 1988, petitioner Zaldivar filed with the Court a Motion to Cite in Contempt directed at
respondent Gonzalez. The Motion cited as bases the acts of respondent Gonzalez in: (1) having caused
the filing of the information against petitioner in Criminal Case No. 12570 before the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) issuing certain allegedly contemptuous statements to the media in relation to the proceedings in G.R.
No. 80578. In respect of the latter, petitioner annexed to his Motion a photocopy of a news article,
reproduced here in toto, which appeared in the 30 November 1987 issue of the "Philippine Daily Globe:"
Tanod Scores SC for Quashing Graft Case
TANODBAYAN Justice Raul M. Gonzalez said yesterday the Supreme Court order stopping him from
investigating graft cases involving Antique Gov. Enrique Zaldivar can aggravate the thought that
affluent persons "can prevent the progress of a trial."
What I am afraid of (with the issuance of the order) is that it appears that while rich and influential
persons get favorable actions from the Supreme Court, it is difficult for an ordinary litigant to get his
petition to be given due course. Gonzalez told the Daily Globe in an exclusive interview.
Gonzalez said the high tribunal's order "heightens the people's apprehension over the justice system
in this country, especially because the people have been thinking that only the small fly can get it while
big fishes go scot-free."
Gonzalez was reacting to an order issued by the tribunal last week after Zaldivar petitioned the court
to stop the Tanodbayan from investigating graft cases filed against him.
Zaldivar had charged that Gonzalez was biased in his investigations because the latter wanted to help
promote the political fortunes of a friend from Antique, lawyer Bonifacio Alentajan.
Acting on Zaldivar's petition, the high court stopped Gonzalez from investigating a graft charge
against the governor, and from instituting any complaint with the Sandiganbayan.
While President Aquino had been prodding me to prosecute graft cases even if they involve the high
and mighty, the Supreme Court had been restraining me. Gonzalez said.
In accordance with the President's order, Gonzalez said he had filed graft cases against two "very
powerful" officials of the Aquino government-Commissioner Quintin Doromal of the Presidential
Commission on Good Government and Secretary Jiamil I.M. Dianlan of the Office of Muslim Affairs
and Cultural Communities.
While I don't wish to discuss the merits of the Zaldivar petition before the Supreme Court, I am a little
bit disturbed that (the order) can aggravate the thinking of some people that affluent persons can
prevent the progress of a trial, he said.
He disclosed that he had a talk with the Chief Executive over the weekend and that while she
symphatizes with local officials who are charged in court during election time, 'She said that it might
be a disservice to the people and the voters who are entitled to know their candidates.
Gonzalez said that while some cases filed against local officials during election time could be mere
harassment suits, the Constitution makes it a right of every citizen to be informed of the character of
tile candidate, who should be subject to scrutiny. (Emphasis supplied)
Acting on petitioner's Motion to Cite in Contempt, the Court on 16 February 1988 required respondent
Gonzalez "to COMMENT on aforesaid Motion within ten (10) days from notice." On 27 April 1988, the
Court rendered its Decision (per curiam) in the Consolidated Petitions. The dispositive portion thereof
read:
WHEREFORE, We hereby:
(1) GRANT the consolidated petitions filed by petitioner Zaldivar and hereby NULLIFY the criminal
informations filed against him in the Sandiganbayan; and
(2) ORDER respondent Raul Gonzalez to cease and desist from conducting investigations and filing
criminal cases with the Sandiganbayan or otherwise exercising the powers and functions of the
Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED.
A Motion for Reconsideration was filed by respondent Gonzalez the next day, 28 April 1988. In his Motion,
respondent Gonzalez, after having argued the legal merits of his position, made the following statements
totally unrelated to any legal issue raised either in the Court's Decision or in his own Motion:
1. That he "ha(d) been approached twice by a leading member of the court ... and he was asked to
'go slow on Zaldivar and 'not to be too hard on him;' "
2. That he "was approached and asked to refrain from investigating the COA report on illegal
disbursements in the Supreme Court because 'it will embarass the Court;" and
3. That "(i)n several instances, the undersigned respondent was called over the phone by a leading
member of the Court and was asked to dismiss the cases against (two Members of the Court)."
Respondent Gonzalez also attached three (3) handwritten notes which he claimed were sent by "some
members of this Honorable Court, interceeding for cases pending before this office (i.e., the
Tanodbayan)." He either released his Motion for Reconsideration with facsimiles of said notes to the
press or repeated to the press the above extraneous statements: the metropolitan papers for the next
several days carried long reports on those statements and variations and embellishments thereof On 2
May 1988, the Court issued the following Resolution in the Consolidated Petitions:
G.R. No. 79690-707 (Enrique Zaldivar vs. The Hon. Sandiganbayan, et al. G.R. No. 80578 (Enrique A.
Zaldivar vs. Hon. Raul M. Gonzalez, etc).
1. Acting on the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Gonzalez under date of April 28,
1988, the Court Resolved to REQUIRE the petitioner to COMMENT thereon within ten (10) days from
notice hereof.
2. It appearing that respondent Raul M. Gonzalez has made public statements to the media which
not only deal with matters subjudice but also appear offensive to and disrespectful of the Court and
its individual members and calculated, directly or indirectly, to bring the Court into disrepute,
discredit and ridicule and to denigrate and degrade the administration of justice, the Court Resolved
to require respondent Gonzalez to explain in writing within ten (10) days from notice hereof, why he
should not be punished for contempt of court and/or subjected to administrative sanctions for
making such public statements reported in the media, among others, in the issues of the "Daily
Inquirer," the "Journal," the "Manila Times," the "Philippine Star," the "Manila Chronicle" the "Daily
Globe" and the "Manila Standard" of April 29 and 30, and May 1, 1988, to wit:
(a) That the Court resolution in question is merely "an offshoot of the position he had taken that
the SC Justices cannot claim immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors or
motivated by a desire to stop him 'from investigating cases against some of their proteges or
friends;"
(b) That no less than six of the members of the Court "interceded for and on behalf of persons
with pending cases before the Tanodbayan," or sought "to pressure him to render decisions
favorable to their colleagues and friends;"
(c) That attempts were made to influence him to go slow on Zaldivar and not to be too hard on
him and to refrain from investigating the Commission on Audit report on illegal disbursements in
the Supreme Court because it will embarass the Court;
(d) That there were also attempts to cause the dismissal of cases against two Associate Justices;
and
(e) That the Court had dismissed judges' without rhyme or reason' and disbarred lawyers 'without
due process.
3. It further appearing that three (3) affidavits relative to the purpose of and circumstances attendant
upon the notes written to said public respondent by three (3) members of the Court have since been
submitted to the Court and now form part of its official records, the Court further Resolved to require
the Clerk of Court to ATTACH to this Resolution copies of said sworn statements and the annexes
thereto appended, and to DIRECT respondent Gonzalez also to comment thereon within the same
period of ten (10) days.
4. It finally appearing that notice of the Resolution of February 16, 1988 addressed to respondent
Gonzalez was misdelivered and therefore not served on him, the Court Resolved to require the Clerk
of Court to CAUSE SERVICE of said Resolution on the respondent and to REQUIRE the latter to comply
therewith.
Respondent Gonzalez subsequently filed with this Court on 9 May 1988 an Omnibus Motion for Extension
and Inhibition alleging, among other things: that the above quoted 2 May 1988 Resolution of the Court
"appears to have overturned that presumption [of innocence] against him:" and that "he gravely doubts
whether that 'cold neutrality [of an impartial judge] is still available to him" there being allegedly "at least
4 members of this Tribunal who will not be able to sit in judgment with substantial sobriety and
neutrality." Respondent Gonzalez closed out his pleading with a prayer that the four (4) Members of the
Court Identified and referred to there by him inhibit themselves in the deliberation and resolution of the
Motion to Cite in Contempt.
On 19 May 1988 after receipt of respondent's Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration, this Court in an
extended per curiam Resolution denied the Motion and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration. That
denial was made "final and immediately executory.
Respondent Gonzalez has since then filed the following pleadings of record:
1. Manifestation with Supplemental Motion to Inhibition dated 23 May 1988;
2. Motion to Transfer Administrative Proceedures to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines dated 20
May 1988
3. Urgent Motion for Additional Extension of Time to File Explanation Ex Abundante Cautelam, dated
26 May 1988;
4. Urgent Ex-Parte Omnibus Motion
(a) For Extension of Time
(b) For Inhibition and
(c) For Transfer of Administrative Proceedings to the IBP, Under Rule 139-B dated 4 June 1988 (with
Annex "A;" an anonymous letter dated 27 May 1988 from the alleged Concerned Employees of the
Supreme Court and addressed to respondent):
5. Ex-Parte Manifestation dated 7 June 1988;
6. Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Reconsideration 1988; and
7. Urgent Ex-Parte Manifestation with Motion member 1988.
In compliance with the 2 May 1988 Resolution of this Court quoted earlier, respondent Gonzalez
submitted on 17 June 1988 an Answer with Explanation and Comment offering respondent's legal
arguments and defenses against the contempt and disciplinary charges presently pending before this
Court. Attached to that pleading as Annex "A" thereof was respondent's own personal
Explanation/Compliance second explanation called "Compliance," with annexes, was also submitted by
respondent on 22 July 1988.
II
We begin by referring to the authority of the Supreme Court to discipline officers of the court and
members of the Bar. The Supreme Court, as regulator and guardian of the legal profession, has plenary
disciplinary authority over attorneys. The authority to discipline lawyers stems from the Court's
constitutional mandate to regulate admission to the practice of law, which includes as well authority to
regulate the practice itself of law. Quite apart from this constitutional mandate, the disciplinary authority
of the Supreme Court over members of the Bar is an inherent power incidental to the proper
administration of justice and essential to an orderly discharge of judicial functions. Moreover, the
Supreme Court has inherent power to punish for contempt, to control in the furtherance of justice the
conduct of ministerial officers of the Court including lawyers and all other persons connected in any
manner with a case before the Court. The power to punish for contempt is "necessary for its own
protection against an improper interference with the due administration of justice," "(it) is not
dependent upon the complaint of any of the parties litigant.
There are, in other words, two (2) related powers which come into play in cases like that before us here;
the Court's inherent power to discipline attorneys and the contempt power. The disciplinary authority
of the Court over members of the Bar is broader than the power to punish for contempt. Contempt of
court may be committed both by lawyers and non-lawyers, both in and out of court. Frequently, where
the contemnor is a lawyer, the contumacious conduct also constitutes professional misconduct which
calls into play the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Where the respondent is a lawyer,
however, the Supreme Court's disciplinary authority over lawyers may come into play whether or not the
misconduct with which the respondent is charged also constitutes contempt of court. The power to
punish for contempt of court does not exhaust the scope of disciplinary authority of the Court over
lawyers. The disciplinary authority of the Court over members of the Bar is but corollary to the Court's
exclusive power of admission to the Bar. A lawyer is not merely a professional but also an officer of the
court and as such, he is called upon to share in the task and responsibility of dispensing justice and
resolving disputes in society. Any act on his part which visibly tends to obstruct, pervert, or impede and
degrade the administration of justice constitutes both professional misconduct calling for the exercise
of disciplinary action against him, and contumacious conduct warranting application of the contempt
power.
It is sometimes asserted that in the exercise of the power to punish for contempt or of the disciplinary
authority of the Court over members of the Bar, the Court is acting as offended party, prosecutor and
arbiter at one and the same time. Thus, in the present case, respondent Gonzalez first sought to get
some members of the Court to inhibit themselves in the resolution of this case for alleged bias and
prejudice against him. A little later, he in effect asked the whole Court to inhibit itself from passing upon
the issues involved in this proceeding and to pass on responsibility for this matter to the Integrated Bar
of the Philippines, upon the ground that respondent cannot expect due process from this Court, that the
Court has become incapable of judging him impartially and fairly. Respondent Gonzalez misconceives the
nature of the proceeding at bar as well as the function of the members of the Court in such proceeding.
Respondent's contention is scarcely an original one. In In Re Almacen, then Associate (later Chief) Justice
Fred Fruiz Castro had occasion to deal with this contention in the following lucid manner:
xxx xxx xxx
It is not accurate to say, nor is it an obstacle to the exercise of our authority in the premises, that, as
Atty. Almacen would have it appear, the members of the Court are the 'complainants, prosecutors
and judges' all rolled up into one in this instance. This is an utter misapprehension, if not a total
distortion, not only of the nature of the proceeding at hand but also of our role therein.
Accent should be laid on the fact that disciplinary proceedings like the present are sui generis. Neither
purely civil nor purely criminal, this proceeding is not—and does not involve—a trial of an action or a
suit, but is rather an investigation by the Court into the conduct of its officers. Not being intended to
inflict punishment, it is in no sense a criminal prosecution. Accordingly, there is neither a plaintiff nor
a prosecutor therein. It may be initiated by the Court motu proprio. Public interest is its primary
objective, and the real question for determination is whether or not the attorney is still a fit person to
be allowed the privileges as such. Hence, in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court merely
calls upon a member of the Bar to account for his actuations as an officer of the Court with the end in
view of preserving the purity of the legal profession and the property and honest administration of
justice by purging the profession of members who by their misconduct have proved themselves no
longer worthy to be entrusted with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to the office of an
attorney. In such posture, there can thus be no occasion to speak of a complainant or a prosecutor.
Undeniably, the members of the Court are, to a certain degree, aggrieved parties. Any tirade against
the Court as a body is necessarily and inextricably as much so against the individual members thereof.
But in the exercise of its disciplinary powers, the Court acts as an entity separate and distinct from the
individual personalities of its members. Consistently with the intrinsic nature of a collegiate court, the
individual members act not as such individuals but only as a duly constituted court. The distinct
individualities are lost in the majesty of their office. So that, in a very real sense, if there be any
complainant in the case at bar, it can only be the Court itself, not the individual members thereof—as
well as the people themselves whose rights, fortunes and properties, nay, even lives, would be placed
at grave hazard should the administration of justice be threatened by the retention in the Bar of men
unfit to discharge the solemn responsibilities of membership in the legal fraternity.
Finally, the power to exclude persons from the practice of law is but a necessary incident of the
power to admit persons to said practice. By constitutional precept, this power is vested exclusively in
this Court. This duty it cannot abdicate just as much as it cannot unilaterally renounce jurisdiction
legally invested upon it. So that even if it be conceded that the members collectively are in a sense
the aggrieved parties, that fact alone does not and cannot disqualify them from the exercise of the
power because public policy demands that they, acting as a Court, exercise the power in all cases
which call for disciplinary action. The present is such a case. In the end, the imagined anomaly of the
merger in one entity of the personalities of complainant, prosecutor and judge is absolutely inexistent.
xxx xxx xxx.
It should not be necessary for the members of this Court expressly to disclaim any bias or prejudice
against the respondent that would prevent them from acting in accordance with the exacting
requirements of their oaths of office. It also appears to the Court that for all the members to inhibit
themselves from sitting on this case is to abdicate the responsibility with which the Constitution has
burdened them. Reference of complaints against attorneys either to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
or to the Solicitor General is not mandatory upon the Supreme Court; such reference to the Integrated
Bar of the Philippines or to the Solicitor General is certainly not an exclusive procedure under the terms
of Rule 139-B of the Revised Rules of Court, especially where the charge consists of acts done before the
Supreme Court. There is no need for further investigation of facts in the present case for it is not
substantially disputed by respondent Gonzalez that he uttered or wrote certain statements attributed to
him. In any case, respondent has had the amplest opportunity to present his defense; his defense is not
that he did not make the statements ascribed to him but that those statements give rise to no liability on
his part, having been made in the exercise of his freedom of speech. The issues which thus need to be
resolved here are issues of law and of basic policy and the Court, not any other agency, is compelled to
resolve such issues.
III
It is necessary to become very explicit as to what respondent Gonzalez was saying in his statements set
out above. Respondent has not denied making the above statements; indeed, he acknowledges that the
newspaper reports of the statements attributed to him are substantially correct.
Respondent Gonzalez was in effect saying, firstly, that the Supreme Court deliberately rendered an
erroneous or wrong decision when it rendered its per curiam Decision dated 27 April 1988 in G.R. Nos.
79690-707 and 80578. That decision according to respondent Gonzalez, was issued as an act of retaliation
by the Court against him for the position he had taken "that the (Supreme Court) Justices cannot claim
immunity from suit or investigation by government prosecutors," and in order to stop respondent from
investigating against "some of (the) proteges or friends (of some Supreme Court Justices)." The Court
cannot, of course, and will not debate the correctness of its Decision of 27 April 1988 and of its Resolution
dated 19 May 1988 (denying respondent Gonzalez Motion for Reconsideration) in the consolidated
Zaldivar cases. Respondent Gonzalez, and anyone else for that matter, is free intellectually to accept or
not to accept the reasoning of the Court set out in its per curiam Decision and Resolution in the
consolidated Zaldivar cases. This should not, however, obscure the seriousness of the assault thus
undertaken by respondent against the Court and the appalling implications of such assault for the
integrity of the system of administration of justice in our country. Respondent has said that the Court
rendered its Decision and Resolution without regard to the legal merits of the Zaldivar cases and had
used the judicial process to impose private punishment upon respondent for positions he had taken
(unrelated to the Zaldivar cases) in carrying out his duties. It is very difficult to imagine a more serious
affront to, or a greater outrage upon, the honour and dignity of this Court than this. Respondent's
statement is also totally baseless. Respondent's statements were made in complete disregard of the fact
that his continuing authority to act as Tanodbayan or Ombudsman after the effectivity of the 1987
Constitution, had been questioned before this Court as early as 10 September 1987 in the Petition for
Certiorari, Prohibition and mandamus filed against him in these consolidated Petitions that is, more than
seven (7) months before the Court rendered its Decision. Respondent also ignores the fact that one day
later, this Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order effective immediately ordering the Sandiganbayan
to cease and desist from hearing the criminal cases filed against petitioner Zaldivar by respondent
Gonzalez. Respondent also disregards the fact that on 24 November 1987, upon the filing of a second
Petition for certiorari for Prohibition by Mr. Zaldivar, the Court issued a Temporary Restraining Order this
time requiring the respondent to cease and desist from further acting in TBP Case No. 87-0934. Thus, the
decision finally reached by this Court in April 1988 on the constitutional law issue pending before the
Court for the preceding eight (8) months, could scarcely have been invented as a reprisal simply against
respondent.
A second charge that respondent Gonzalez hurled against members of the Supreme Court is that they
have improperly "pressured" him to render decisions favorable to their "colleagues and friends,"
including dismissal of "cases" against two (2) members of the Court. This particularly deplorable charge
too is entirely baseless, as even a cursory examination of the contents of the handwritten notes of three
(3) members of this Court addressed to respondent (which respondent attached to his Motion for
Reconsideration of the Decision of this Court of 27 April 1988 in the consolidated Petitions) will show. It
is clear, and respondent Gonzalez does not pretend otherwise, that the subject matters of the said notes
had no relation at all to the issues in G.R. Nos. 79690-707 and 80578. This charge appears to have been
made in order to try to impart some substance (at least in the mind of respondent) to the first accusation
made by respondent that the Court had deliberately rendered a wrong decision to get even with
respondent who had, with great fortitude, resisted "pressure" from some members of the Court. Once
again, in total effect, the statements made by respondent appear designed to cast the Court into gross
disrepute, and to cause among the general public scorn for and distrust in the Supreme Court and, more
generally, the judicial institutions of the Republic.
Respondent Gonzalez has also asserted that the Court was preventing him from prosecuting "rich and
powerful persons," that the Court was in effect discriminating between the rich and powerful on the one
hand and the poor and defenseless upon the other, and allowing "rich and powerful" accused persons to
go "scot-free" while presumably allowing or affirming the conviction of poor and small offenders. This
accusation can only be regarded as calculated to present the Court in an extremely bad light. It may be
seen as intended to foment hatred against the Supreme Court; it is also suggestive of the divisive tactics
of revolutionary class war.
Respondent, finally, assailed the Court for having allegedly "dismissed judges 'without rhyme or reason'
and disbarred lawyers 'without due process.'" The Court notes that this last attack is not without relation
to the other statements made by respondent against the Court. The total picture that respondent clearly
was trying to paint of the Court is that of an "unjudicial" institution able and willing to render "clearly
erroneous" decisions by way of reprisal against its critics, as a body that acts arbitrarily and capriciously
denying judges and lawyers due process of law. Once again, the purport of respondent's attack against
the Court as an institution unworthy of the people's faith and trust, is unmistakable. Had respondent
undertaken to examine the records 'of the two (2) judges and the attorney he later Identified in one of
his Explanations, he would have discovered that the respondents in those administrative cases had ample
opportunity to explain their side and submit evidence in support thereof. He would have also found that
there were both strong reasons for and an insistent rhyme in the disciplinary measures there
administered by the Court in the continuing effort to strengthen the judiciary and upgrade the
membership of the Bar. It is appropriate to recall in this connection that due process as a constitutional
precept does not, always and in all situations, require the trial-type proceeding, that the essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and to submit any evidence one
may have in support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments or
pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.
As noted earlier, respondent Gonzalez was required by the Court to explain why he should not be
punished for contempt and/or subjected to administrative discipline for making the statements adverted
to above. In his subsequent pleadings where he asked the full Court to inhibit itself and to transfer the
administrative proceedings to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, respondent made, among others, the
following allegations:
(a) That the Members of the Court "should inhibit [themselves] in the contempt and administrative
charges against the respondent, in the light of the manifest prejudice and anger they hold against
respondent as shown in the language of the resolution on the Motion for Reconsideration;"
(b) That "the entire membership of the court has already lost that 'cold neutrality of an impartial
judge' [to] be able to allow fairness and due process in the contempt citation as well as in the possible
administrative charge;
(c) That "respondent honestly feels that this court as angry and prejudiced as it is, respondent has no
china man's chance to get fair hearing in the contempt and possible administrative charges;"
(d) That one must consider "the milieu before this Tribunal with, perhaps passion and obfuscation
running riot;"
(e) That respondent, "after having been castigated with such venom by the entire Court in its decision
denying the Motion for Reconsideration, does not have confidence in the impartiality of the entire
Court" and that he "finds it extremely difficult to believe that the members of this Tribunal can still
act with unbiased demeanor towards him;" and
(f) That "the Tribunal is determined to disbar [respondent] without due process" and that a
specified Member of the Court "has been tasked to be the ponente, or at least prepare the decision."
(Underscoring in the original)
Thus, instead of explaining or seeking to mitigate his statements earlier made, respondent sought to heap
still more opprobrium upon the Court, accusing it of being incapable of judging his acts and statements
justly and according to law. Once again, he paints this Court as a body not only capable of acting without
regard to due process but indeed determined so to act. A grand design to hold up this Court to public
scorn and disrespect as an unworthy tribunal, one obfuscated by passion and anger at respondent,
emerges once more. It is very difficult for members of this Court to understand how respondent Gonzalez
could suppose that judges on the highest tribunal of the land would be ready and willing to violate their
most solemn oath of office merely to gratify any imagined private feelings aroused by respondent. The
universe of the Court revolves around the daily demands of law and justice and duty, not around
respondent nor any other person or group of persons.
Whether or not the statements made by respondent Gonzalez may reasonably be regarded by this Court
as contumacious or as warranting exercise of the disciplinary authority of this Court over members of the
Bar, may best be assayed by examining samples of the kinds of statements which have been held in our
jurisdiction as constituting contempt or otherwise warranting the exercise of the Court's authority.
1. In Montecillo v. Gica, Atty. Quirico del Mar as counsel for Montecillo, who was accused in a slander
case, moved to reconsider a decision of the Court of Appeals in favor of the complainant with a veiled
threat that he should interpose his next appeal to the President of the Philippines. In his Motion for
Reconsideration, he referred to the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on "knowingly rendering an
unjust judgment," and "judgment rendered through negligence" and implied that the Court of Appeals
had allowed itself to be deceived. Atty. del Mar was held guilty of contempt of court by the Court of
Appeals. He then sued the three (3) justices of the Court of Appeals for damages before the Court of First
Instance of Cebu, seeking to hold them liable for their decision in the appealed slander case. This suit was
terminated, however, by compromise agreement after Atty. del Mar apologized to the Court of Appeals
and the justices concerned and agreed to pay moral damages to the justices. Atty. del Mar some time
later filed with this Court a Petition for Review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals in a
slander case. This Court denied the Petition for Review. Atty. del Mar then filed a Motion for
Reconsideration and addressed a letter to the Clerk of the Supreme Court asking for the names of the
justices of this Court who had voted in favor of and those who had voted against his Motion for
Reconsideration. After his Motion for Reconsideration was denied for lack of merit, Atty. del Mar filed a
Manifestation in this Court saying:
I can at this time reveal to you that, had your Clerk of Court furnished me with certified true copies
of the last two Resolutions of the Supreme Court confirming the decision of the Court of Appeals in
the case entitled Francisco M. Gica vs. Jorge Montecillo, I would have filed against the Justices
supporting the same, civil and criminal suits as I did to the Justices of the Court of Appeals who,
rewarding the abhorent falsification committed by Mr. Gica, reversed for him the decisions of the
City Court and the Court of First Instance of Cebu, not with a view to obtaining a favorable judgment
therein but for the purpose of exposing to the people the corroding evils extant in our Government, so
that they may well know them and work for their extermination. (60 SCRA at 240;emphasis supplied)
Counsel was asked to explain why he should not be administratively dealt with for making the above
statements. In his additional explanation, Atty. del Mar made the following statements:
... Graft, corruption and injustice are rampant in and outside of the Government. It is this state of
things that convinced me that all human efforts to correct and/or reform the said evils will be fruitless
and, as stated in my manifestation to you, I have already decided to retire from a life of militancy to
a life of seclusion, leaving to God the filling up deficiencies. (60 SCRA at 242)
The Court suspended Atty. del Mar, "until further orders," from the practice of law saying:
... Respondent is utilizing what exists in his mind as state of graft, corruption and injustice allegedly
rampant in and outside of the government as justification for his contemptuous statements. In other
words, he already assumed by his own contemptuous utterances that because there is an alleged
existence of rampant corruption, graft and injustice in and out of the government, We, by Our act in
G.R. No. L-36800, are among the corrupt, the grafters and those allegedly committing injustice. We
are at a complete loss to follow respondent del Mar's logic ...
xxx xxx xxx
To aged brethren of the bar it may appear belated to remind them that second only to the duty of
maintaining allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and to support the Constitution and obey
the laws of the Philippines, is the duty of all attorneys to observe and maintain the respect due to
the courts of justice and judicial officers (Sec. 20 (b) Rule 138, Rules of Court). But We do remind
them of said duty to emphasize to their younger brethren its paramount importance. A lawyer must
always remember that he is an officer of the court exercising a high privilege and serving in the
noble mission of administering justice.
xxx xxx xxx.
As already stated, the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A G.R. No. 46504-R was based on its
evaluation of the evidence on only one specific issue. We in turn denied in G.R. No. L-36800 the
petition for review on certiorari of the decision because We found no reason for disturbing the
appellate court's finding and conclusion. In both instances, both the Court of Appeals and this Court
exercised judicial discretion in a case under their respective jurisdiction. The intemperate and
imprudent act of respondent del Mar in resorting to veiled threats to make both Courts reconsider
their respective stand in the decision and the resolution that spelled disaster for his client cannot be
anything but pure contumely for aid tribunals.
It is manifest that respondent del Mar has scant respect for the two highest Court of the land when
on the flimsy ground of alleged error in deciding a case, he proceeded to challenge the integrity of
both Courts by claiming that they knowingly rendered unjust judgment. In short, his allegation is that
they acted with intent and malice, if not with gross ignorance of the law, in disposing of the case of
his client.
xxx xxx xxx
... To those who are in the practice of law and those who in the future will choose to enter this
profession, We wish to point to this case as a reminder for them to imprint in their hearts and minds
that an attorney owes it to himself to respect the courts of justice and its officers as a fealty for the
stability of our democratic institutions. (60 SCRA at 242-247: emphasis supplied)
2. In Surigao Mineral Reservation Board v. Cloribel, four (4) members of the bar, acting as counsel for
MacArthur International Minerals Company were required by this Court to explain certain statements
made in MacArthur's third Motion for Reconsideration:
d. ...; and I the Supreme Court I has overlooked the applicable law due to the mis-representation and
obfuscation of the petitioners' counsel. (Last sentence, par. 1, Third Motion for Reconsideration
dated Sept. 10, 1968).
e. ... Never has any civilized democratic tribunal ruled that such a gimmick (referring to the "right to
reject any and all bids") can be used by vulturous executives to cover up and excuse losses to the
public, a government agency or just plain fraud ... and it is thus difficult, in the light of our upbringing
and schooling, even under many of the incumbent justices, that the Honorable Supreme Court
intends to create a decision that in effect does precisely that in a most absolute manner. (Second
sentence, par. 7, Third Motion for Reconsideration dated Sept. 10, 1968). (31 SCRA at 6)
They were also asked to explain the statements made in their Motion to Inhibit filed on 21 September
1968 asking
Mr. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion and Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro to inhibit themselves from
considering, judging and resolving the case or any issue or aspect thereof retroactive to January 11,
1967. The motion charges "It that the brother of the Honorable Associate Justice Castro is a vice-
president of the favored party who is the chief beneficiary of the false, erroneous and illegal decision
dated January 31, 1968" and the ex-parte preliminary injunction rendered in the above-entitled case,
the latter in effect prejudging and predetermining this case even before the joining of an issue. As to
the Chief Justice, the motion states [t]hat the son of the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion
was given a significant appointment in the Philippine Government by the President a short time
before the decision of July 31, 1968 was rendered in this case. The appointment referred to was as
secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments. The motion presents a lengthy discourse on
judicial ethics, and makes a number of side comments projecting what is claimed to be the patent
wrongfulness of the July 31, 1968 decision. It enumerates "incidents" which, according to the motion,
brought about respondent MacArthur's belief that unjudicial prejudice had been caused it and that
there was 'unjudicial favoritism' in favor of 'petitioners, their appointing authority and a favored party
directly benefited by the said decision
(31 SCRA at 6-7)
Another attorney entered his appearance as new counsel for MacArthur and filed a fourth Motion for
Reconsideration without leave of court, which Motion contained the following paragraphs:
4. The said decision is illegal because it was penned by the Honorable Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion when in fact he was outside the borders of the Republic of the Philippines at the time of
the Oral Argument of the above-entitled case—which condition is prohibited by the New Rules of
Court—Section 1, Rule 51, and we quote: "Justices; who may take part—... . Only those members
present when any matter is submitted for oral argument will take part in its consideration and
adjudication ... ." This requirement is especially significant in the present instance because the
member who penned the decision was the very member who was absent for approximately four
months or more. This provision also applies to the Honorable Justices Claudio Teehankee and Antonio
Barredo.
xxx xxx xxx
6. That if the respondent MacArthur International Minerals Company abandons its quest for justice
in the Judiciary of the Philippine Government, it will inevitably either raise the graft and corruption
of Philippine Government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965, required by the Nickel Law to
determine the operator of the Surigao nickel deposits, to the World Court on grounds of deprivation
of justice and confiscation of property and/or to the United States Government, either its executive
or judicial branches or both, on the grounds of confiscation of respondent's proprietary vested rights
by the Philippine Government without either compensation or due process of law and invoking the
Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to the Philippine
Government, including the sugar price premium, amounting to more than fifty million dollars
annually, until restitution or compensation is made. (31 SCRA at 10-11)
Finding their explanations unsatisfactory, the Court, speaking through Mr. Justice Sanchez, held three (3)
attorneys guilty of contempt:
1. We start with the case of Atty. Vicente L. Santiago. In his third motion for reconsideration, we,
indeed, find language that is not to be expected of an officer of the courts. He pictures petitioners as
'vulturous executives.' He speaks of this Court as a 'civilized, democratic tribunal,' but by innuendo
would suggest that it is not.
In his motion to inhibit, his first paragraph categorizes our decision of July 31, 1968 as 'false,
erroneous and illegal' in a presumptuous manner. He then charges that the ex parte preliminary
injunction we issued in this case prejudiced and predetermined the case even before the joining of
an issue. He accuses in a reckless manner two justices of this Court for being interested in the decision
of this case: Associate Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, because his brother is the vice president of the favored
party who is the chief beneficiary of the decision, and Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion, whose son
was appointed secretary of the newly-created Board of Investments, 'a significant appointment in
the Philippine Government by the President, a short time before the decision of July 31, 1968 was
rendered.' In this backdrop, he proceeds to state that 'it would seem that the principles thus
established [the moral and ethical guidelines for inhibition of any judicial authority by the Honorable
Supreme Court should first apply to itself.' He puts forth the claim that lesser and further removed
conditions have been known to create favoritism, only to conclude that there is no reason for a belief
that the conditions obtaining in the case of the Chief Justice and Justice Castro would be less likely to
engender favoritism and prejudice for or against a particular cause or party.' Implicit in this at least is
that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro are insensible to delicadeza, which could make their actuation
suspect. He makes it plain in the motion that the Chief Justice and Justice Castro not only were not
free from the appearance of impropriety but did arouse suspicion that their relationship did affect
their judgment. He points out that courts must be above suspicion at all times like Ceasar's wife,
warns that loss of confidence for the Tribunal or a member thereof should not be allowed to happen
in our country, 'although the process has already begun.
xxx xxx xxx
What is disconcerting is that Atty. Santiago's accusations have no basis in fact and in law. The slur
made is not limited to the Chief Justice and Mr. Justice Castro. It sweepingly casts aspersion on the
whole court. For, inhibition is also asked if, we repeated any other justices who have received favors
or benefits directly or indirectly from any of the petitioners or any members of any board-petitioner
or their agents or principals, including the president.' The absurdity of this posture is at once apparent.
For one thing, the justices of this Court are appointed by the President and in that sense may be
considered to have each received a favor from the President. Should these justices inhibit themselves
every time a case involving the Administration crops up? Such a thought may not certainly be
entertained. The consequence thereof would be to paralyze the machinery of this Court. We would
in fact, be wreaking havoc on the tripartite system of government operating in this country. Counsel
is presumed to know this. But why the unfounded charge? There is the not too-well concealed effort
on the part of a losing litigant's attorney to downgrade this Court.
The mischief that stems from all of the foregoing gross disrespect is easy to discern. Such disrespect
detracts much from the dignity of a court of justice. Decidedly not an expression of faith, counsel's
words are intended to create an atmosphere of distrust, of disbelief.
xxx xxx xxx
The precepts, the teachings, the injunctions just recited are not unfamiliar to lawyers. and yet, this
Court finds in the language of Atty. Santiago a style that undermines and degrades the administration
of justice. The stricture in Section 3 (d) of Rule 71 of the Rules against improper conduct tending to
degrade the administration of justice is thus transgressed. Atty. Santiago is guilty of contempt of
court.
xxx xxx xxx

Third. The motion contained an express threat to take the case to the World Court and/or the United
States government. It must be remembered that respondent MacArthur at that time was still trying
to overturn the decision of this Court of July 31, 1968. In doing so, unnecessary statements were
injected. More specifically, the motion announced that McArthur 'will inevitably ... raise the graft and
corruption of the Philippine government officials in the bidding of May 12, 1965 ... to the World Court'
and would invoke 'the Hickenlooper Amendment requiring the cutting off of all aid and benefits to
the Philippine Government, including the sugar price premium, amount to more than fifty million
dollars annually ...
This is a clear attempt to influence or bend the blind of this Court to decide the case' in its favor. A
notice of appeal to the World Court has even been embodied in Meads return. There is a gross
inconsistency between the appeal and the move to reconsider the decision. An appeal from a decision
presupposes that a party has already abandoned any move to reconsider that decision. And yet, it
would appear that the appeal to the World Court is being dangled as a threat to effect a change of
the decision of this Court. Such act has no aboveboard explanation.
xxx xxx xxx
The dignity of the Court, experience teaches, can never be protected where infraction of ethics meets
with complacency rather than punishment. The people should not be given cause to break faith with
the belief that a judge is the epitome of honor amongst men. To preserve its dignity, a court of justice
should not yield to the assaults of disrespect. Punctilio of honor, we prefer to think, is a standard of
behavior so desirable in a lawyer pleading a cause before a court of justice. (31 SCRA at 13-23;
emphasis supplied)
3. In In re Almacen, supra, Atty. Vicente Raul Almacen, in protest against what he asserted was "a great
injustice committed against his client by the Supreme Court," filed a Petition to Surrender Lawyer's
Certificate of Title. He alleged that his client was deeply aggrieved by this Court's "unjust judgment," and
had become "one of the sacrificial victims before the altar of hypocrisy," saying that "justice as
administered by the present members of the Supreme Court [was) not only blind, but also deaf and
dumb." Atty. Almacen vowed to argue the cause of his client "in the people's forum" so that "the people
may know of this silent injustice committed by this Court' and that "whatever mistakes, wrongs and
injustices that were committed [may] never be repeated." Atty. Almacen released to the press the
contents of his Petition and on 26 September 1967, the "Manila Times" published statements attributed
to him as follows:
Vicente Raul Almacen, in an unprecedented petition, said he did not expose the tribunal's
'unconstitutional and obnoxious' practice of arbitrarily denying petitions or appeals without any
reason.
Because of the tribunal's 'short-cut justice.' Almacen deplored, his client was condemned to pay
P120,000, without knowing why he lost the case.
xxx xxx xxx
There is no use continuing his law practice, Almacen said in this petition, 'where our Supreme Court
is composed of men who are calloused to our pleas of justice, who ignore without reason their own
applicable decisions and commit culpable violations of the Constitution with impunity.'
xxx xxx xxx
He expressed the hope that by divesting himself of his title by which he earns his living, the present
members of the Supreme Court 'will become responsible to all cases brought to its attention without
discrimination, and will purge itself of those unconstitutional and obnoxious "lack of merit' or "denied
resolutions. (31 SCRA at 565566; emphasis supplied)
Atty. Almacen was required by this Court to show cause why disciplinary action should not be taken
against him. His explanation, which in part read:
xxx xxx xxx
The phrase, Justice is blind is symbolized in paintings that can be found in all courts and government
offices. We have added only two more symbols, that it is also deaf and dumb. Deaf in the sense that
no members of this Court has ever heard our cries for charity, generosity, fairness, understanding,
sympathy and for justice; dumb in the sense, that inspire of our beggings, supplications, and pleadings
to give us reasons why our appeals has been DENIED, not one word was spoken or given ... We refer
to no human defect or ailment in the above statement. We only described the impersonal state of
Things and nothing more.
xxx xxx xxx
As we have stated, we have lost our faith and confidence in the members of this Court and for which
reason we offered to surrender our lawyer's certificate, IN TRUST ONLY. Because what has been lost
today may be regained tomorrow. As the offer was intended as our self-imposed sacrifice, then we
alone may decide as to when we must end our self- sacrifice. If we have to choose between forcing
ourselves to have faith and confidence in the members of the Court but disregard our Constitution and
to uphold the Constitution and be condemned by the members of this Court, there is no choice, we
must uphold the latter. (31 SCRA at 572; emphasis supplied)
was found by the Court to be "undignified and cynical" and rejected. The Court indefinitely suspended
Almacen from the practice of law holding, through Mr. Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, that Almacen had
exceeded the boundaries of "fair criticism."
4. In Paragas V. Cruz, Counsel, whose Petition for Ceriorari was dismissed by this Court, made the
following statements in his Motion for Reconsideration:
The petitioner respectfully prays for a reconsideration of the resolution of this Honorable Court dated
April 20,1966 on the ground that it constitutes a violation of Section 14 of Rule 11 2 of the Rules of
Court promulgated by this very Hon. Supreme Court, and on the further ground that it is likewise a
violation of the most important right in the Bill of Rights of the Constitution of the Philippines, a
culpable violation which is a ground for impeachment.
... The rule of law in a democracy should always be upheld and protected by all means, because the
rule of law creates and preserves peace and order and gives satisfaction and contentment to all
concerned. But when the laws and the rules are violated, the victims resort, sometimes, to armed
force and to the ways of the cavemen We do not want Verzosa and Reyes repeated again and again,
killed in the premises of the Supreme Court and in those of the City Hall of Manila. Educated people
should keep their temper under control at all times! But justice should be done to all concerned to
perpetuate the very life of Democracy on the face of the earth. (14 SCRA at 810; emphasis supplied)
The Court considered the above statements as derogatory to the dignity of the Court and required
counsel to show cause why administrative action should not be taken against him. Counsel later explained
that he had merely related factual events (i.e., the killing of Verzosa and Reyes) and to express his desire
to avoid repetition of such acts. The Court, through Mr. Justice J.B.L. Reyes, found these explanations
unsatisfactory and the above statements contumacious.
... The expressions contained in the motion for reconsideration ... are plainly contemptuous and
disrespectful, and reference to the recent killing of two employees is but a covert threat upon the
members of the Court. ... That such threats and disrespectful language contained in a pleading filed
in courts are constitutive of direct contempt has been repeatedly decided (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, 61
Phil. 724; People vs. Venturanza, 52 Off. Gaz. 769; Medina vs. Rivera, 66 Phil. 151; De Joya vs. Court
of First Instance of Rizal, 1, 9785, September 19,1956; Sison vs. Sandejas L- 9270, April 29,1959;
Lualhati vs. Albert, 57 Phil. 86). What makes the present case more deplorable is that the guilty party
is a member of the bar; for, as remarked in People vs. Carillo, 77 Phil. 580-
Counsel should conduct himself towards the judges who try his cases with that courtesy all have a
right to expect. As an officer of the court, it is his sworn and moral duty to help build and not destroy
unnecessarily that high esteem and regard towards the courts so essential to the proper
administration of justice.
It is lrght and plausible that an attorney in defending the cause and rights of his client, should do so
with all the fervor and energy of which he is capable, but it is not, and never will be so, for him to
exercise said right by resorting to intimidation or proceeding without the propriety and respect which
the dignity of the courts require. (Salcedo vs. Hernandez, [In re Francisco], 61 Phil. 729)' (1 4 SCRA at
811-812; emphasis supplied)
5. In In re Sotto, a newspaper reporter, Mr. Angel Parazo, invoking the Press Freedom Law, refused to
divulge the source of the news item which carried his by-line and was sent to jail for so refusing. Atty.
Vicente Sotto, a senator and author of said law, caused the publication of the following item in a number
of daily newspapers in Manila:
As author of the Press Freedom Law (Republic Act No. 53), interpreted by the Supreme Court in the
case of Angel Parazo, reporter of a local daily, who now has to suffer 30 days imprisonment, for his
refusal to divulge the source of a news published in his paper, I regret to say that our High Tribunal
has not only erroneously interpreted said law, but that it is once more putting in evidence the
incompetency or narrow mindedness of the majority of its members. In the wake of so many blunders
and injustices deliberately committed during these last years, I believe that the only remedy to put an
end to so much evil, is to change the members of the Supreme Court. To this effect, I announce that
one of the first measures, which I will introduce in the coming congressional sessions, will have as its
object the complete reorganization of the Supreme Court. As it is now constituted, the Supreme Court
of today constitutes a constant peril to liberty and democracy. It need be said loudly, very loudly, so
that even the deaf may hear: The Supreme Court of today is a far cry from the impregnable bulwark
of Justice of those memorable times of Cayetano Arellano, Victorino Mapa, Manuel Araullo and other
learned jurists who were the honor and glory of the Philippine Judiciary. (82 Phil. at 597-598;
emphasis supplied)
In finding Atty. Sotto in contempt, despite his avowals of good faith and his invocation of the
constitutional guarantee of free speech and in requiring him to show cause why he should not be
disbarred, the Court, through Mr. Justice Feria, said-To hurl the false charge that this Court has been
for the last years committing deliberately so many blunders and injustices that is to say, that it has
been deciding in favor of one party knowing that the law and justice is on the part of the adverse party
and not on the one in whose favor the decision was rendered, in many cases decided during the last
years, would tend necessarily to undermine the coincidence of the people in the honesty and integrity
of the members of this Court, and consequently to lower and degrade the administration of justice by
this Court. The Supreme Court of the Philippines is, under the Constitution, the last bulwark to which
the Filipino people may repair to obtain relief for their grievances or protection of their rights when
these are trampled upon, and if the people lose their confidence in the honesty and integrity of the
members of this Court and believe that they cannot expect justice therefrom, they might be driven
to take the law into their hands, and disorder and perhaps chaos might be the result. As a member
of the bar and an officer of the courts Atty. Vicente Sotto, like any other, is in duty bound to uphold
the dignity and authority of this Court, to which he owes fidelity according to the oath he has taken
as such attorney, and not to promote distrust in the administration of justice. Respect to the courts
guarantees the stability of other institutions, which without such guaranty would be resting on a
very shaky foundation. (82 Phil. at 601-602; emphasis supplied)
6. In Salcedo v. Hernandez, Atty. Vicente Francisco filed a Motion before the Supreme Court which
contained the following paragraph (in translation):
We should like frankly and respectfully to make it of record that the resolution of this court, denying
our motion for reconsideration, is absolutely erroneous and constitutes an outrage to the rights of
the petitioner Felipe Salcedo and a mockery of the popular will expressed at the polls in the
municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas. We wish to exhaust all the means within our power in order that this
error may be corrected by the very court which has committed it, because we should not want that
some citizen, particularly some voter of the municipality of Tiaong, Tayabas, resort to the press
publicly to denounce, as he has a right to do, the judicial outrage of which the herein petitioner has
been the victim, and because it is our utmost desire to safeguard the prestige of this honorable court
and of each and every member thereof in the eyes of the public. But, at the same time we wish to
state sincerely that erroneous decisions like these, which the affected party and his thousands of
voters will necessarily consider unjust, increase the proselytes of sakdalism and make the public lose
confidence in the administration of justice. (61 Phil. at 726; emphasis supplied)
When required by the Court to show cause why he should not be declared in contempt, Atty. Francisco
responded by saying that it was not contempt to tell the truth. Examining the statements made above,
the Court held:
... [they] disclose, in the opinion of this court, an inexcusable disrespect of the authority of the court
and an intentional contempt of its dignity, because the court is thereby charged with no less than
having proceeded in utter disregard of the laws, the rights of the parties, and of the untoward
consequences, or with having abused its power and mocked and flouted the rights of Attorney Vicente
J. Francisco's client, because the acts of outraging and mocking from which the words 'outrage' and
mockery' used therein are derived, means exactly the same as all these, according to the Dictionary
of the Spanish Language published by the Spanish Academy (Dictionary of the Spanish Language, 15th
ed., pages 132-513).
The insertion of the phrases in question in said motion of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, for many
years a member of the Philippine bar, was neither justified nor in the least necessary, because in
order to call the attention of the court in a special way to the essential points relied upon in his
argument and to emphasize the force thereof, the many reasons stated in his said motion were
sufficient and the phrases in question were superfluous. In order to appeal to reason and justice, it is
highly improper and amiss to make trouble and resort to threats, as Attorney Vicente J. Francisco has
done, because both means are annoying and good practice can ever sanction them by reason of their
natural tendency to disturb and hinder the free exercise of a serene and impartial judgment,
particularly in judicial matters, in the consideration of questions submitted for resolution.
There is no question that said paragraph of Attorney Vicente J. Francisco's motion contains a more
or less veiled threat to the court because it is insinuated therein, after the author shows the course
which the voters of Tiaong should follow in case he fails in his attempt, that they will resort to the
press for the purpose of denouncing, what he claims to be a judicial outrage of which his client has
been the victim; and because he states in a threatening manner with the intention of predisposing
the mind of the reader against the court, thus creating an atmosphere of prejudices against it in order
to make it odious in the public eye, that decisions of the nature of that referred to in his motion to
promote distrust in the administration of justice and increase the proselytes of sakdalism a
movement with seditious and revolutionary tendencies the activities of which, as is of public
knowledge, occurred in this country a few days ago. This cannot mean otherwise than contempt of
the dignity of the court and disrespect of the authority thereof on the part of Attorney Vicente J.
Francisco, because he presumes that the court is so devoid of the sense of justice that, if he did not
resort to intimidation, it would maintain its error notwithstanding the fact that it may be proven, with
good reasons, that it has acted erroneously.
As a member of the bar and an officer of this court, Attorney Vicente J. Francisco, as any attorney, is
in duty bound to uphold its dignity and authority and to defend its integrity, not only because it had
conferred upon him the high privilege, not a right (Malcolm, Legal Ethics, 158 and 160), of being what
he now is: a priest of justice (In re Thatcher, 80 Ohio St., Rep., 492, 669), but also because in so doing,
he neither creates nor promotes distrust in the administration of justice, and prevents anybody from
harboring and encouraging discontent which, in many cases, is the source of disorder, thus
undermining the foundation upon which rests that bulwark called judicial power to which those who
are aggrieved turn for protection and relief (61 Phil. at 727-728; emphasis supplied)
It should not be supposed that the six (6) cases above discussed exhaust our case law on this matter. In
the following cases, among others, the Supreme Court punished for contempt or administratively
disciplined lawyers who had made statements not very different from those made in the cases discussed
above:
1) In re Wenceslao Laureta, 148 SCRA 382 (1987);
2) Borromeo v. Court of appeals, 87 SCRA 67 (1978);
3) Rheem of the Philippines v. Ferrer, 20 SCRA 441 (1967);
4) Malolos v. Reyes, 1 SCRA 559 (1961);
5) De Joya, et al. v. Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasay City Branch, 99 Phil. 907 (1956);
6) People v. Venturanza, et al., 98 Phil. 211 (1956);
7) In re Suzano A. Velasquez, per curiam Resolution (unreported), Promulgated 29 April 1955;
8) Cornejo v. Tan, 85 Phil. 772 (1950);
9) People v. Carillon, 77 Phil. 572 (1946);
10) Intestate Estate of Rosario 0lba; Contempt Proceedings against Antonio Franco, 67 Phil. 312
(1939); and
11) Lualhati v. Albert, 57 Phil. 86 (1932).
Considering the kinds of statements of lawyers discussed above which the Court has in the past penalized
as contemptuous or as warranting application of disciplinary sanctions, this Court is compelled to hold
that the statements here made by respondent Gonzalez clearly constitute contempt and call for the
exercise of the disciplinary authority of the Supreme Court. Respondent's statements, especially the
charge that the Court deliberately rendered an erroneous and unjust decision in the Consolidated
Petitions, necessarily implying that the justices of this Court betrayed their oath of office, merely to wreak
vengeance upon the respondent here, constitute the grossest kind of disrespect for the Court. Such
statements very clearly debase and degrade the Supreme Court and, through the Court, the entire system
of administration of justice in the country. That respondent's baseless charges have had some impact
outside the internal world of subjective intent, is clearly demonstrated by the filing of a complaint for
impeachment of thirteen (13) out of the then fourteen (14) incumbent members of this Court, a
complaint the centerpiece of which is a repetition of the appalling claim of respondent that this Court
deliberately rendered a wrong decision as an act of reprisal against the respondent.
IV
The principal defense of respondent Gonzalez is that he was merely exercising his constitutional right of
free speech. He also invokes the related doctrines of qualified privileged communications and fair
criticism in the public interest.
Respondent Gonzalez is entitled to the constitutional guarantee of free speech. No one seeks to deny
him that right, least of all this Court. What respondent seems unaware of is that freedom of speech and
of expression, like all constitutional freedoms, is not absolute and that freedom of expression needs
on occasion to be adjusted to and accommodated with the requirements of equally important public
interests. One of these fundamental public interests is the maintenance of the integrity and orderly
functioning of the administration of justice. There is no antinomy between free expression and the
integrity of the system of administering justice. For the protection and maintenance of freedom of
expression itself can be secured only within the context of a functioning and orderly system of dispensing
justice, within the context, in other words, of viable independent institutions for delivery of justice which
are accepted by the general community. As Mr. Justice Frankfurter put it:
... A free press is not to be preferred to an independent judiciary, nor an independent judiciary to
a free press. Neither has primacy over the other; both are indispensable to a free society. The
freedom of the press in itself presupposes an independent judiciary through which that freedom may,
if necessary be vindicated. And one of the potent means for assuring judges their independence is a
free press.
Mr. Justice Malcolm of this Court expressed the same thought in the following terms:
The Organic Act wisely guarantees freedom of speech and press. This constitutional right must be
protected in its fullest extent. The Court has heretofore given evidence of its tolerant regard for
charges under the Libel Law which come dangerously close to its violation. We shall continue in this
chosen path. The liberty of the citizens must be preserved in all of its completeness. But license or
abuse of liberty of the press and of the citizens should not be confused with liberty in its true sense.
As important as is the maintenance of an unmuzzled press and the free exercise of the rights of the
citizens is the maintenance of the independence of the Judiciary. Respect for the Judiciary cannot be
had if persons are privileged to scorn a resolution of the court adopted for good purposes, and if such
persons are to be permitted by subterranean means to diffuse inaccurate accounts of confidential
proceedings to the embarrassment of the parties and the courts. (Emphasis supplied)
Only slightly (if at all) less important is the public interest in the capacity of the Court effectively to prevent
and control professional misconduct on the part of lawyers who are, first and foremost, indispensable
participants in the task of rendering justice to every man. Some courts have held, persuasively it appears
to us, that a lawyer's right of free expression may have to be more limited than that of a layman.
It is well to recall that respondent Gonzalez, apart from being a lawyer and an officer of the court, is also
a Special Prosecutor who owes duties of fidelity and respect to the Republic and to this Court as the
embodiment and the repository of the judicial power in the government of the Republic. The
responsibility of the respondent "to uphold the dignity and authority of this Court" and "not to promote
distrust in the administration of justice" is heavier than that of a private practicing lawyer.
Respondent Gonzalez claims to be and he is, of course, entitled to criticize the rulings of this Court, to
point out where he feels the Court may have lapsed into error. Once more, however, the right of criticism
is not unlimited. Its limits were marked out by Mr. Justice Castro in In re Almacen which are worth noting
But it is the cardinal condition of all such criticism that it shall be bona fide and shall not spill over
the walls of decency and propriety. A wide chasm exists between fair criticism, on the one hand, and
abuse and slander of courts and the judges thereof, on the other. Intemperate and unfair criticism
is a gross violation of the duty of respect to courts. It is such a misconduct that subjects a lawyer to
disciplinary action.
The lawyer's duty to render respectful subordination to the courts is essential to the orderly
administration of justice. Hence, in the assertion of their clients' rights, lawyers even those gifted
with superior intellect are enjoined to rein up their tempers.
xxx xxx xxx
(Emphasis supplied)
The instant proceeding is not addressed to the fact that respondent has criticized the Court; it is
addressed rather to the nature of that criticism or comment and the manner in which it was carried out.
Respondent Gonzalez disclaims an intent to attack and denigrate the Court. The subjectivities of the
respondent are irrelevant so far as characterization of his conduct or misconduct is concerned. He will
not, however, be allowed to disclaim the natural and plain import of his words and acts. It is upon the
other hand, not irrelevant to point out that respondent offered no apology in his two (2) explanations
and exhibited no repentance.
Respondent Gonzalez also defends himself contending that no injury to the judiciary has been shown,
and points to the fact that this Court denied his Motion for Reconsideration of its per curiam Decision of
27 April 1988 and reiterated and amplified that Decision in its Resolution of 19 May 1988. In the first
place, proof of actual damage sustained by a court or the judiciary in general is not essential for a
finding of contempt or for the application of the disciplinary authority of the Court. Insofar as the
Consolidated Petitions are concerned, this Court after careful review of the bases of its 27 April 1988
Decision, denied respondent's Motion for Reconsideration thereof and rejected the public pressures
brought to bear upon this Court by the respondent through his much publicized acts and statements for
which he is here being required to account. Obstructing the free and undisturbed resolution of a
particular case is not the only species of injury that the Court has a right and a duty to prevent and redress.
What is at stake in cases of this kind is the integrity of the judicial institutions of the country in general
and of the Supreme Court in particular. Damage to such institutions might not be quantifiable at a given
moment in time but damage there will surely be if acts like those of respondent Gonzalez are not
effectively stopped and countered. The level of trust and confidence of the general public in the courts,
including the court of last resort, is not easily measured; but few will dispute that a high level of such
trust and confidence is critical for the stability of democratic government.
Respondent Gonzalez lastly suggests that punishment for contempt is not the proper remedy in this case
and suggests that the members of this Court have recourse to libel suits against him. While the remedy
of libel suits by individual members of this Court may well be available against respondent Gonzalez, such
is by no means an exclusive remedy. Moreover, where, as in the instant case, it is not only the individual
members of the Court but the Court itself as an institution that has been falsely attacked, libel suits
cannot be an adequate remedy.
The Court concludes that respondent Gonzalez is guilty both of contempt of court in facie curiae and of
gross misconduct as an officer of the court and member of the Bar.
ACCORDINGLY, the Court Resolved to SUSPEND Atty. Raul M. Gonzalez from the practice of law
indefinitely and until further orders from this Court, the suspension to take effect immediately.
Let copies of this Resolution be furnished the Sandiganbayan, the Ombudsman, the Secretary of Justice,
the Solicitor General and the Court of Appeals for their information and guidance.
30-31 [G.R. No. 85439. January 13, 1992.]
KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN

NG MUNTINLUPA, INC., (KBMBPM), TERESITA A. FAJARDO, NADYESDA B. PONSONES, MA. FE V.
BOMBASE, LOIDA D. LUCES, MARIO S. FRANCISCO, AMADO V. MANUEL, and ROLANDO G.
GARCIA, incumbent members of the Board; AMADO G. PEREZ and MA. FE V. BOMBASE, incumbent
General Manager and Secretary-Treasurer, respectively, Petitioners, v. HON. CARLOS G.
DOMINGUEZ, Secretary of Agriculture, Regional Director of Region IV of the Department of
Agriculture, ROGELIO P. MADRIAGA, RECTO CORONADO and Municipal Mayor IGNACIO R.
BUNYE, both in his capacity as Municipal Mayor of Muntinlupa, Metro Manila and as Presiding
Officer of Sangguniang Bayan ng Muntinlupa and John Does, Respondents.
[G.R. No. 91927. January 13, 1992.]
IGNACIO R. BUNYE, JAIME R. FRESNEDI, CARLOS G. TENSUAN, VICTOR E. AGUINALDO,

ALEJANDRO I. MARTINEZ, EPIFANIO A. ESPELETA, REY E. BULAY, LUCIO B. CONSTANTINO,
ROMAN E. NIEFES, NEMESIO O. MOZO, ROGER SMITH, RUFINO B. JOAQUIN, NOLASCO I. DIAZ,
RUFINO IBE and NESTOR SANTOS, Petitioners, v. THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE OMBUDSMAN, and
ROGER C. BERBANO, Special Prosecutor III, Respondents.
Jose O. Villanueva and Roberto B. Romanillos for petitioners in G.R. No. 85439.
Alampay & Manhit Law Offices for petitioners in G.R. No. 91927.
SYLLABUS
1. THE PRINCIPLE OF EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES DOES NOT APPLY TO ACTS

OF THE DEPARTMENT SECRETARY. — As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is
well-settled that this requirement does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary
whose acts, as an alter ego of the President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually
disapproved by him. This doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts
when most needed, There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President;
recourse to the courts could be had immediately.
2. THE AUTHORITY OF THE SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE UNDER P.D. NO. 175 TO SUPERVISE AND
REGULATE COOPERATIVES DOES NOT INCLUDE THE POWER TO REMOVE THE DIRECTORS AND
OFFICERS OFF COOPERATIVES. — Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto himself the
power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the petitioning
directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which grants him
authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him that right. An
administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily
implied in the exercise thereof. These powers should not be extended by implication beyond what
may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution.
3. ADMINISTRATIVE SUPERVISION AND CONTROL, WHAT IT INCLUDES. — Supervision and control

include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific function is entrusted by law or
regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the commission of acts;
(c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate officials or units; (d)
determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and (e) prescribe standards,
guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is limited to the authority
of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations of such agencies and
insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but without interference
with day-to-day activities; (2) require the submission of reports and cause the conduct of
management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine compliance with policies,
standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as may be necessary for the
proper performance of official functions, including rectification of violations, abuses and other
forms of mal-administration; (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such agencies but may
not increase or add to them.
4. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IN ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS INCLUDES RIGHT TO A

HEARING. — Due process is guaranteed by the Constitution and extends to administrative
proceedings. In the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, this Court, through
Justice Laurel, laid down the cardinal primary requirements of due process in administrative
proceedings, foremost of which is the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s
case and submit evidence in support thereof The need for notice and the opportunity to be heard
is the heart of procedural due process, be it in either judicial or administrative proceedings.
5. DENIAL OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS IS CURED BY THE OPPORTUNITY TO BE HEARD ON A
SUBSEQUENT MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION. — Nevertheless, a plea of a denial of procedural
due process does not lie where a defect consisting in an absence of notice of hearing was
thereafter cured by the aggrieved party himself as when he had the opportunity to be heard on a
subsequent motion for reconsideration. This is consistent with the principle that what the law
prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute absence thereof and lack of an
opportunity to be heard.
6. LACK OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATION NOT A GROUND TO QUASH COMPLAINT OR

INFORMATION. — If not waived, absence thereof may amount to a denial of due process. However,
lack of preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash or dismiss a complaint or information.
Much less does it affect the court’s jurisdiction. In People v. Casiano, this Court ruled:
"Independently of the foregoing, the absence of such investigation [preliminary] did not impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect the
jurisdiction of the court of first instance over the present case. Hence, had the defendant-appellee
been entitled to another preliminary investigation, and had his plea of not guilty upon arraignment
not implied a waiver of said right, the court of first instance should have, either conducted such
preliminary investigation, or ordered the Provincial Fiscal to make it, in pursuance of section 1687
of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 732), or remanded the record
for said investigation to the justice of the peace court, instead of dismissing the case, as it did in
the order appealed from." cralaw virt ua1aw librar y
7. THE INFORMATION MAY BE AMENDED WITHOUT LEAVE OF COURT BEFORE ARRAIGNMENT;

RELIANCE ON DOROMAL V. SANDIGANBAYAN (177 SCRA 354) IN THIS CASE IS MISPLACED. —
The prosecution may amend the information without leave of court before arraignment, and such
does not prejudice the accused. Reliance on the pronouncements in Doromal v. Sandiganbayan is
misplaced as what obtained therein was the preparation of an entirely new information as
contrasted with mere amendments introduced in the amended information, which also charges
petitioners with violating Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Law.
DECISION
DAVIDE, JR., J.:
These cases have been consolidated because they are closely linked with each other as to factual
antecedents and issues. cralaw nad
The first case, G.R. No. 85439 (hereinafter referred to as the Kilusang Bayan case), questions the
validity of the Order of 28 October 1988 of then Secretary of Agriculture Hon. Carlos G. Dominguez
which ordered: (1) the take-over by the Department of Agriculture of the management of the
petitioner Kilusang Bayan sa Paglilingkod Ng Mga Magtitinda Ng Bagong Pamilihang Bayan ng
Muntinlupa, Inc. (KBMBPM) pursuant to the Department’s regulatory and supervisory powers
under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No. 13, (2) the
creation of a Management Committee which shall assume the management of KBMBPM upon
receipt of the order, (3) the disbandment of the Board of Directors, and (4) the turn over of all
assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM to the Management Committee.
The second case, G.R. No. 91927 (hereinafter referred to as the Bunye case), seeks the
nullification of the Resolution of 4 January 1990 of the Sandiganbayan admitting the Amended
Information against petitioners in Criminal Case No. 13966 and denying their motion to order or
direct preliminary investigation, and its Resolution of 1 February 1990 denying the motion to
reconsider the former.
The procedural and factual antecedents are not disputed.
On 2 September 1985, the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa (hereinafter, Municipality), Metro

Manila, thru its then Mayor Santiago Carlos, Jr., entered into a contract with the KILUSANG BAYAN
SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA SA BAGONG PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC.
(KBMBPM) represented by its General Manager, Amado Perez, for the latter’s management and
operation of the new Muntinlupa public market. The contract provides for a twenty-five (25) year
term commencing on 2 September 1985, renewable for a like period, unless sooner terminated
and/or rescinded by mutual agreement of the parties, at a monthly consideration of Thirty-Five
Thousand Pesos (P35,000) to be paid by the KBMBPM within the first five (5) days of each month
which shall, however, be increased by ten percent (10%) each year during the first five (5) years
only. 1
The KBMBPM is a service cooperative organized by and composed of vendors occupying the New
Muntinlupa Public Market in Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 175 and Letter of Implementation No. 23; its articles of incorporation and by-laws were
registered with the then Office of the Bureau of Cooperatives Development (thereafter the Bureau
of Agricultural Cooperatives Development or BACOD and now the Cooperative Development
Authority). 2
Following his assumption into office as the new mayor succeeding Santiago Carlos, Jr., petitioner
Ignacio Bunye, claiming to be particularly scandalized by the "virtual 50-year term of the
agreement, contrary to the provision of Section 143, paragraph 3 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 337,"
and the "patently inequitable rental," directed a review of the aforesaid contract. 3 He sought
opinions from both the Commission on Audit and the Metro Manila Commission (MMC) on the
validity of the instrument. In separate letters, these agencies urged that appropriate legal steps
be taken towards its rescission. The letter of Hon. Elfren Cruz of the MMC even granted the
Municipality authority "to take the necessary legal steps for the cancellation/rescission of the
above cited contract and make representations with KBMBPM for the immediate transfer/takeover
of the possession, management and operation of the New Muntinlupa Market to the Municipal
Government of Muntinlupa." 4
Consequently, upon representations made by Bunye with the Municipal Council, the latter
approved on 1 August 1988 Resolution No. 45 abrogating the contract. To implement this
resolution, Bunye, together with his co-petitioners and elements of the Capital Command of the
Philippine Constabulary, proceeded, on 19 August 1986, to the public market and announced to
the general public and the stallholders thereat that the Municipality was taking over the
management and operation of the facility, and that the stallholders should thenceforth pay their
market fees to the Municipality, thru the Market Commission, and no longer to the KBMBPM. 5
On 22 August 1988, the KBMBPM filed with Branch 13 of the Regional Trial Court of Makati a
complaint for breach of contract, specific performance and damages with prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction against the Municipality and its officers, which was docketed as Civil Case
No. 88-1702. 6 The complaint was premised on the alleged illegal take-over of the public market
effected "in excess of his (Bunye’s) alleged authority" and thus "constitutes breach of contract
and duty as a public official."
cralaw virt ua1aw li brar y
The writ applied for having been denied, 7 the KBMBPM officers resisted the attempts of Bunye
and company to complete the take-over; they continued holding office in the KBS building, under
their respective official capacities. The matter having been elevated to this Court by way of
certiorari, 8 We remanded the same to the Court of Appeals which docketed it as C.A.-G.R. No. L-
16930. 9
On 26 August 1988, Amado Perez filed with the Office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint
charging Bunye and his co-petitioners with oppression, harassment, abuse of authority and
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act 10 for taking over the management and
operation of the public market from KBMBPM. 11
In a subpoena dated 7 October 1988, prosecutor Mothalib C. Onos of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor directed Bunye and his co-petitioners to submit within ten (10) days from receipt
thereof counter-affidavits, affidavits of their witnesses and other supporting documents. 12 The
subpoena and letter-complaint were received on 12 October 1988.
On 20 October 1988, two (2) days before the expiration of the period granted to file said
documents, Bunye, Et. Al. filed by mail an urgent motion for extension of "at least fifteen (15)
days from October 22, 1988" within which to comply 13 with the subpoena.
Thereafter, the following transpired which subsequently gave rise to these petitions: chanrob1es virt ual 1aw libr ary
G.R. No. 85439

In the early morning of 29 October 1988, a Saturday, respondent Madriaga and Coronado,
allegedly accompanied by Mayor Bunye and the latters’ heavily armed men, both in uniform and
in civilian clothes, together with other civilians, namely: Romulo Bunye II, Alfredo Bunye, Tomas
Osias, Reynaldo Camilon, Benjamin Taguibao, Banjamin Bulos and other unidentified persons,
allegedly through force, violence and intimidation, forcibly broke open the doors of the offices of
petitioners located at the second floor of the KBS Building, new Muntinlupa Public Market,
purportedly to serve upon petitioners the Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture dated 28
October 1988, and to implement the same, by talking over and assuming the management of
KBMBPM, disbanding the then incumbent Board of Directors for that purpose and excluding and
prohibiting the General Manager and the other officers from exercising their lawful functions as
such. 14 The Order of the Secretary reads as follows: 15
"O R D E R
WHEREAS, the KILUSANG BAYAN SA PAGLILINGKOD NG MGA MAGTITINDA NG BAGONG

PAMILIHANG BAYAN NG MUNTINLUPA, INC., (KBMBPM), Alabang, Muntinlupa, Metro Manila is a
Cooperative registered under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 175, as amended;
WHEREAS, the Department of Agriculture is empowered to regulate and supervise cooperatives

registered under the provisions of Presidential Decree No. 175, as amended: chanrob1es virtual 1aw li bra ry
WHEREAS, the general membership of the KBMBPM has petitioned the Department of Agriculture
for assistance in the removal of the members of the Board of Directors who were not elected by
the general membership of said cooperative;
WHEREAS, the on-going financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors
show (sic) that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance
with P.D. 175, LOI No. 23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions of the by-laws of
KBMBPM;
WHEREAS, the interest of the public so demanding it is evident and urgently necessary that the
KBMBPM MUST BE PLACED UNDER MANAGEMENT TAKE-OVER of the Department of Agriculture in
order to preserve the financial interest of the members of the cooperative and to enhance the
cooperative development program of the government;
WHEREAS, it is ordered that the Department of Agriculture in the exercise of its regulatory and
supervisory powers under Section 8 of PD 175, as amended, and Section 4 of Executive Order No.
113, take over the management of KBMBPM, under the following directives: chanr ob1es virt ual 1aw libr ar y
1. THAT a Management Committee is hereby created composed of the following: chanrob1es virt ual 1aw li br ary
a) Reg. Dir. or OIC RD — DA Region IV
b) Atty. Rogelio P. Madriaga — BACOD
c) Mr. Recto Coronado — KBMBPM
d) Mrs. Nadjaida Ponsones — KBMBPM
e) One (1) from the Municipal Government of Muntinlupa to be designated by the Sangguniang
Pambayan ng Muntinlupa.
2. THAT the Management Committee shall, upon receipt of this Order, assume the management of
KBMBPM;
3. THAT the present Board of Directors is hereby disbanded and the officers and Manager of the
KBMBPM are hereby directed to turnover all assets, properties and records of the KBMBPM to the
Management Committee herein created: chanrob1es virt ual 1aw libr ary
4. THAT the Management Committee is hereby empowered to promulgate rules of procedure to

govern its workings as a body;
5. THAT the Management Committee shall submit to the undersigned thru the Director of BACOD
monthly reports on the operations of KBMBPM;
6. THAT the Management Committee shall call a General Assembly of all registered members of
the KBMBPM within Ninety (90) days from date of this Order to decide such matters affecting the
KBMBPM, including the election of a new set of Board of Director (sic).
This Order takes effect immediately and shall continue to be in force until the members of the
Board of Directors shall have been duly elected and qualified.
Done this 28th day of October, 1988 at Quezon City." cralaw virtua1aw libr ary
As claimed by petitioners, the Order served on them was not written on the stationery of the
Department, does not bear its seal and is a mere xerox copy.
The so-called petition upon which the Order is based appears to be an unverified petition dated
10 October 1988 signed, according to Mayor Bunye, 16 by 371 members of the KBMBPM.
On 2 November 1988, petitioners filed the petition in this case alleging, inter alia, that: chanrob1es virt ual 1aw li br ary
(a) Respondent Secretary acted without or in excess of jurisdiction in issuing the Order for he
arrogated unto himself a judicial function by determining the alleged guilt of petitioners on the
strength of a mere unverified petition; the disbandment of the Board of Directors was done without
authority of law since under Letter of Implementation No. 23, removal of officers, directors or
committee members could be done only by the majority of the members entitled to vote at an
annual or special general assembly and only after an opportunity to be heard at said assembly.
(b) Respondent Secretary acted in a capricious, whimsical, arbitrary and despotic manner, so
patent and gross that it amounted to a grave abuse of discretion.
(c) The Order is a clear violation of the By-Laws of KBMBPM and is likewise illegal and unlawful
for it allows or tolerates the violation of the penal provisions under paragraph (c), Section 9 of
P.D. No. 175.
(d) The Order is a clear violation of the constitutional right of the individual petitioners to be
heard. 17
They pray that upon the filing of the petition, Respondents, their agents, representatives or
persons acting on their behalf be ordered to refrain, cease and desist from enforcing and
implementing the questioned Order or from excluding the individual petitioners from the exercise
of their rights as such officers and, in the event that said acts sought to be restrained were
allegedly partially or wholly done, to immediately restore the management and operation of the
public market to petitioners, order respondents to vacate the premises and, thereafter, preserve
the status quo; and that, finally, the challenged Order be declared null and void.
In the Resolution of 9 October 1988, 18 We required the respondents to Comment on the petition.
Before any Comment could be filed, petitioners filed on 2 January 1989 an Urgent Ex-Parte Motion
praying that respondent Atty. Rogelio Madriaga, who had assumed the position of Chairman of the
Management Committee, be ordered to stop and or cancel the scheduled elections of the officers
of the KBMBPM on 6 January 1989 and, henceforth, desist from scheduling any election of officers
or Members of the Board of Directors thereof until further orders of the Court. 19 The elections
were, nevertheless, held and a new board of directors was elected. So, on 19 January 1989,
petitioners filed a supplemental motion 20 praying that respondent Madriaga and the "newly
elected Board of Directors be ordered to cease and desist from assuming, performing or exercising
powers as such, and or from removing or replacing the counsels of petitioners as counsels for
KBMBPM and for Atty. Fernando Aquino, Jr., to cease and desist from unduly interfering with the
affairs and business of the cooperative.
Respondent Bunye, by himself, filed his Comment on 23 January 1989. 21 He denies the factual
allegations in the petition and claims that petitioners failed to exhaust administrative remedies. A
reply thereto was filed by petitioners on 7 February 1989. 22
Respondent Recto Coronado filed two (2) Comments. The first was filed on 6 February 1989 23 by
his counsel, Atty. Fernando Aquino, Jr., and the second, which is for both him and Atty. Madriaga,
was filed by the latter on 10 February 1989. 24
On 20 February 1989, petitioners filed a Reply to the first Comment of Coronado 25 and an Ex-
Parte Motion for the immediate issuance of a cease and desist order 26 praying that the so-called
new directors and officers of KBMBPM, namely: Tomas M. Osias, Ildefonso B. Reyes, Paulino
Moldez, Fortunato M. Medina, Aurora P. del Rosario, Moises Abrenica, and Lamberto Casalla, be
ordered to immediately cease and desist from filing notices of withdrawals or motions to dismiss
cases filed by the Cooperative now pending before the courts, administrative offices and the
Ombudsman and Tanodbayan, and that if such motions or notices were already filed, to
immediately withdraw and desist from further pursuing the same until further orders of this Court.
The latter was precipitated by the Resolution No. 19 of the "new" board of directors withdrawing
all cases filed by its predecessors against Bunye, Et Al., and more particularly the following cases:
(a) G.R. No. 85439 (the instant petition), (b) Civil Case No. 88-1702, (c) OSP Case No. 88-2110
before the Ombudsman, (d) IBP Case No. 88-0119 before the Tanodbayan, and Civil Case No. 88-
118 for Mandamus. 27
On 1 March 1989, We required the Solicitor General to file his Comment to the petition and the
urgent motion for the immediate issuance of a cease and desist order. 28
A motion to dismiss the instant petition was filed on 30 March 1989. 29 On 19 April 1989, We
resolved to dismiss the case and consider it closed and terminated. 30 Thereupon, after some
petitioners filed a motion for clarification and reconsideration, We set aside the dismissal order
and required the new directors to comment on the Opposition to Motion to Dismiss filed by the
former. 31
The new board, on 14 June 1989, prayed that its Manifestation of 6 June 1989 and Opposition
dated 9 June 1989, earlier submitted in response to petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the
order dismissing the instant petition, be treated as its Comment. 32 Both parties then continued
their legal fencing, serving several pleadings on each other.
In Our Resolution of 9 August 1989, 33 We gave the petition due course and required the parties
to submit their respective Memoranda.
On 14 August 1989, petitioners filed an urgent ex-parte motion for the immediate issuance of a
cease and desist order 34 in view of the new board’s plan to enter into a new management
contract; the motion was noted by this Court on 23 August 1989. A second ex-parte motion, noted
on 18 October 1989, was filed on 19 September 1989 asking this Court to consider the "Invitation
to pre-qualify and bid" for a new contract published by respondent Bunye. 35
In a belated Comment 36 for the respondent Secretary of Agriculture filed on 22 September 1989,
the Office of the Solicitor General asserts that individual petitioners, who were not allegedly
elected by the members or duly designated by the BACOD Director, have no right or authority to
file this case; the assailed Order of the Secretary was issued pursuant to P.D. No. 175, more
particularly Section 8 thereof which authorizes him" (d) to suspend the operation or cancel the
registration of any cooperative after hearing and when in its judgment and based on findings, such
cooperative is operating in violation of this Decree, rules and regulations, existing laws as well as
the by-laws of the cooperative itself;" the Order is reasonably necessary to correct serious flaws
in the cooperative and provide interim measures until election of regular members to the board
and the officers thereof; the elections conducted on 6 January 1989 are valid; and that the motion
to dismiss filed by the new board of directors binds the cooperative. It prays for the dismissal of
the petition.
Respondent Secretary of Agriculture manifested on 22 September 1989 that he is adopting the

Comment submitted by the Office of the Solicitor General as his memorandum; 37 petitioners and
respondents Coronado and Madriaga filed their separate Memoranda on 6 November 1989; 38
while the new board of directors submitted its Memorandum on 11 December 1989. 39
The new KBMBPM board submitted additional pleadings on 16 February 1990 which it deemed
relevant to the issues involved herein. Reacting, petitioners filed a motion to strike out improper
and inadmissible pleadings and annexes and sought to have the pleaders cited for contempt.
Although We required respondents to comment, the latter did not comply.
Nevertheless, a manifestation was filed by the same board on 25 February 1991 40 informing this
Court of the holding, on 9 January 1991, of its annual general assembly and election of its board
of directors for 1991. It then reiterates the prayer that the instant petition be considered
withdrawn and dismissed. Petitioners filed a counter manifestation alleging that the instant
petition was already given due course on 9 August 1989. 41 In its traverse to the counter
manifestation, the new board insists that it "did not derive authority from the October 28, 1988
Order, the acts of the Management Committee, nor (sic) from the elections held in (sic) January
6, 1989," but rather from the members of the cooperative who elected them into office during the
elections.
Petitioners filed a rejoinder asserting that the election of new directors is not a supervening event
independent of the main issue in the present petition and that to subscribe to the argument that
the issues in the instant petition became moot with their assumption into office is to reward a
wrong done.
G.R. No. 91927
Petitioners claim that without ruling on their 20 October 1988 motion for an extension of at least
15 days from 22 October 1988 within which to file their counter-affidavits, which was received by
the Office of the Special Prosecutor on 3 November 1988, Special Prosecutor Onos promulgated
on 11 November 1988 a Resolution finding the evidence on hand sufficient to establish a prima
facie case against respondents (herein petitioners) and recommending the filing of the
corresponding information against them before the Sandiganbayan. 42 Petitioners also claim that
they submitted their counter-affidavits on 9 November 1988. 43
In their motion dated 2 December 1988, petitioners move for a reconsideration of the above
Resolution, 44 which was denied by Onos 45 in his 18 January 1989 Order. The information against
the petitioners was attached to this order.
Upon submission of the records for his approval, the Ombudsman issued a first indorsement on 4
April 1989 referring to "Judge Gualberto J. de la Llana, Acting Director, IEO/RSSO, this Office, the
within records of OSP Case No. 88-02110 . . . for further preliminary investigation . . ." 46
Thereafter, on 28 April 1989, Bunye and company received a subpoena from de la Llana requiring
them to appear before the latter on 25 April 1989, 47 submit a report and file comment. After
being granted an extension, Bunye and company submitted their comment on 18 May 1989. 48
On 22 August 1989, de la Llana recommended the filing of an information for violation of section
3 (e) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. 49 The case was referred to special prosecuting
officer Jose Parentela, Jr. who, in his Memorandum 50 to the Ombudsman through the Acting
Special Prosecutor, likewise urged that an information be filed against herein petitioners. On 3
October 1989, the Ombudsman signed his conformity to the Memorandum and approved the 18
January information prepared by Onos, which was then filed with the Sandiganbayan.
Consequently, Bunye, Et. Al. were served arrest warrants issued by the Sandiganbayan. Detained
at the NBI on 9 October 1989, they claim to have discovered only then the existence of documents
recommending and approving the filing of the complaint and a memorandum by special prosecutor
Bernardita G. Erum proposing the dismissal of the same. 51
Arraignment was set for 18 October 1989. 52
However, on 14 October 1989, petitioners filed with the Sandiganbayan an "Omnibus Motion to
Remand to the Office of the Ombudsman; to Defer Arraignment and to Suspend Proceedings." 53
Subsequently, through new counsel, petitioners filed on 17 October 1989 a Consolidated

Manifestation and Supplemental Motion 54 praying, inter alia, for the quashal of the information
on the ground that they were deprived of their right to a preliminary investigation and that the
information did not charge an offense.
The Sandiganbayan issued an order on 18 October 1989 deferring arraignment and directing the
parties to submit their respective memoranda, 55 which petitioners complied with on 2 November
1989. 56 On 16 November 1989, Special Prosecutor Berbano filed a motion to admit amended
information. 57
On 17 November 1989, the Sandiganbayan handed down a Resolution 58 denying for lack of merit
the Omnibus Motion to Remand the Case To The Office of the Ombudsman, to Defer Arraignment
and to Suspend Proceedings. Petitioners then filed a motion to order a preliminary investigation
59 on the basis of the introduction by the amended information of new, material and substantive
allegations, which the special prosecutor opposed, 60 thereby precipitating a rejoinder filed by
petitioners. 61
On 4 January 1990, the Sandiganbayan handed down a Resolution 62 admitting the Amended
Information and denying the motion to direct preliminary investigation. Their motion to reconsider
this Resolution having been denied in the Resolution of 1 February 1990, 63 petitioners filed the
instant petition on 12 February 1990.
Petitioners claim that respondent Sandiganbayan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with
manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in denying petitioners their
right to preliminary investigation and in admitting the Amended Information.
They then pray that: (a) the 4 January and 1 February 1990 Resolutions of the Sandiganbayan,
admitting the amended information and denying the motion for reconsideration respectively, be
annulled; (b) a writ be issued enjoining the Sandiganbayan from proceeding further in Criminal
Case No. 13966; and (c) respondents be enjoined from pursuing further actions in the graft case.
We required the respondents to Comment on the petition.
On 21 February 1990, petitioners’ counsel filed a motion to drop Epifanio Espeleta and Rey E. Dulay
as petitioners, 64 and in the Comment they filed on 30 March 1990, in compliance with Our
Resolution of 1 March 1990, they state that they do not interpose any objection to the motion.
On 20 March 1990, the Office of the Solicitor General moved that it be excused from filing comment
for the respondents as it cannot subscribe to the position taken by the latter with respect to the
questions of law involved. 65 We granted this motion in the resolution of 8 May 1990.
Respondent Berbano filed his comment on 10 September 1991 and petitioners replied on 20
December 1990, Berbano subsequently filed a Rejoinder thereto on 11 January 1991. 66 The
Sandiganbayan then filed a manifestation proposing that it be excused from filing comment as its
position on the matters in issue is adequately stated in the resolutions sought to be annulled. 67
On 7 March 1991, We resolved to note the manifestation and order the instant petition
consolidated with G.R. No. 85439.
The present dispute revolves around the validity of the antecedent proceedings which led to the
filing of the original information on 18 January 1989 and the amended information afterwards.
THE ISSUES AND THEIR RESOLUTION
1. G.R. No. 85439
As adverted to in the introductory portion of this Decision, the principal issue in G.R. No. 85439 is
the validity of the 28 October 1988 Order of respondent Secretary of Agriculture. The exordium of
said Order unerringly indicates that its basis is the alleged petition of the general membership of
the KBMBPM requesting the Department for assistance "in the removal of the members of the
Board of Directors who were not elected by the general membership" of the cooperative and that
the "ongoing financial and management audit of the Department of Agriculture auditors show (sic)
that the management of the KBMBPM is not operating that cooperative in accordance with P.D.
175, LOI 23, the Circulars issued by DA/BACOD and the provisions and by-laws of KBMBPM." It is
also professed therein that the Order was issued by the Department "in the exercise of its
regulatory and supervisory powers under Section 8 of P.D. 175, as amended, and Section 4 of
Executive Order No. 113." cralaw virt ua1aw librar y
Respondents challenge the personality of the petitioners to bring this action, set up the defense
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, and assert that the Order was lawfully and validly
issued under the above decree and Executive Order.
We find merit in the petition and the defenses interposed do not persuade Us.
Petitioners have the personality to file the instant petition and ask, in effect, for their
reinstatement as Section 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, defining an action for mandamus,
permits a person who has been excluded from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which
he is entitled, to file suit. 68 Petitioners, as ousted directors of the KBMBPM, are questioning
precisely the act of respondent Secretary in disbanding the board of directors; they then pray that
this Court restore them to their prior stations.
As to failure to exhaust administrative remedies, the rule is well-settled that this requirement
does not apply where the respondent is a department secretary whose acts, as an alter ego of the
President, bear the implied approval of the latter, unless actually disapproved by him. 69 This
doctrine of qualified political agency ensures speedy access to the courts when most needed,
There was no need then to appeal the decision to the office of the President; recourse to the courts
could be had immediately. Moreover, the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies also
yields to other exceptions, such as when the question involved is purely legal, as in the instant
case, 70 or where the questioned act is patently illegal, arbitrary or oppressive. 71 Such is the
claim of petitioners which, as hereinafter shown, is correct.
And now on the validity of the assailed Order.
Regulation 34 of Letter of Implementation No. 23 (implementing P.D. No. 175) provides the
procedure for the removal of directors or officers of cooperatives, thus: jgc:c hanr obles.c om.ph
"An elected officer, director or committee member may be removed by a vote of majority of the
members entitled to vote at an annual or special general assembly. The person involved shall have
an opportunity to be heard." cralaw virtua1aw li brar y
A substantially identical provision, found in Section 17, Article III of the KBMBPM’s by-laws,
reads:jgc:c hanrobles.c om. ph
"SECTION 17. Removal of Directors and Committee Members. — Any elected director or committee
member may be removed from office for cause by a majority vote of the members In good standing
present at the annual or special general assembly called for the purpose after having been given
the opportunity to be heard at the assembly." cralaw virtua1aw libr ary
Under the same article are found the requirements for the holding of both the annual general
assembly and a special general assembly.
Indubitably then, there is an established procedure for the removal of directors and officers of
cooperatives. It is likewise manifest that the right to due process is respected by the express
provision on the opportunity to be heard. But even without said provision, petitioners cannot be
deprived of that right.
The procedure was not followed in this case. Respondent Secretary of Agriculture arrogated unto
himself the power of the members of the KBMBPM who are authorized to vote to remove the
petitioning directors and officers. He cannot take refuge under Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 which
grants him authority to supervise and regulate all cooperatives. This section does not give him
that right.
An administrative officer has only such powers as are expressly granted to him and those
necessarily implied in the exercise thereof. 72 These powers should not be extended by implication
beyond what may be necessary for their just and reasonable execution. 73
Supervision and control include only the authority to: (a) act directly whenever a specific function
is entrusted by law or regulation to a subordinate; (b) direct the performance of duty; restrain the
commission of acts; (c) review, approve, reverse or modify acts and decisions of subordinate
officials or units; (d) determine priorities in the execution of plans and programs; and (e)
prescribe standards, guidelines, plans and programs. Specifically, administrative supervision is
limited to the authority of the department or its equivalent to: (1) generally oversee the operations
of such agencies and insure that they are managed effectively, efficiently and economically but
without interference with day-to-day activities; (2) require the submission of reports and cause
the conduct of management audit, performance evaluation and inspection to determine
compliance with policies, standards and guidelines of the department; (3) take such action as may
be necessary for the proper performance of official functions, including rectification of violations,
abuses and other forms of mal-administration; (4) review and pass upon budget proposals of such
agencies but may not increase or add to them. 74
The power to summarily disband the board of directors may not be inferred from any of the
foregoing as both P.D. No. 1?5 and the by-laws of the KBMBPM explicitly mandate the manner by
which directors and officers are to be removed. The Secretary should have known better than to
disregard these procedures and rely on a mere petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM
and an on-going audit by Department of Agriculture auditors in exercising a power which he does
not have, expressly or impliedly. We cannot concede to the proposition of the Office of the Solicitor
General that the Secretary’s power under paragraph (d), Section 8 of P.D. No. 175 above quoted
to suspend the operation or cancel the registration of any cooperative includes the "milder
authority of suspending officers and calling for the election of new officers." Firstly, neither
suspension nor cancellation includes the take-over and ouster of incumbent directors and officers,
otherwise the law itself would have expressly so stated. Secondly, even granting that the law
intended such as postulated, there is the requirement of a hearing. None was conducted.
Likewise, even if We grant, for the sake of argument, that said power includes the power to
disband the board of directors and remove the officers of the KBMBPM, and that a hearing was not
expressly required in the law, still the Order can be validly issued only after giving due process to
the affected parties, herein petitioners.
Due process is guaranteed by the Constitution 75 and extends to administrative proceedings. In

the landmark case of Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations, 76 this Court, through Justice
Laurel, laid down the cardinal primary requirements of due process in administrative proceedings,
foremost of which is the right to a hearing, which includes the right to present one’s case and
submit evidence in support thereof The need for notice and the opportunity to be heard is the
heart of procedural due process, be it in either judicial or administrative proceedings. 77
Nevertheless, a plea of a denial of procedural due process does not lie where a defect consisting
in an absence of notice of hearing was thereafter cured by the aggrieved party himself as when
he had the opportunity to be heard on a subsequent motion for reconsideration. This is consistent
with the principle that what the law prohibits is not the absence of previous notice but the absolute
absence thereof and lack of an opportunity to be heard. 78
In the instant case, there was no notice of a hearing on the alleged petition of the general
membership of the KBMBPM; there was, as well, not even a semblance of a hearing. The Order
was based solely on an alleged petition by the general membership of the KBMBPM. There was
then a clear denial of due process. It is most unfortunate that it was done after democracy was
restored through the peaceful people revolt at EDSA and the overwhelming ratification of a new
Constitution thereafter, which preserves for the generations to come the gains of that historic
struggle which earned for this Republic universal admiration.
If there were genuine grievances against petitioners, the affected members should have timely
raise these issues in the annual general assembly or in a special general assembly. Or, if such a
remedy would be futile for some reason or another, judicial recourse was available.
Be that as it may, petitioners cannot, however, be restored to their positions. Their terms expired
in 1989, thereby rendering their prayer for reinstatement moot and academic. Pursuant to Section
13 of the by-laws, during the election at the first annual general assembly after registration, one-
half plus one (4) of the directors obtaining the highest number of votes shall serve for two years,
and the remaining directors (3) for one year; thereafter, all shall be elected for a term of two
years. Hence, in 1988, when the board was disbanded, there was a number of directors whose
terms would have expired the next year (1989) and a number whose terms would have expired
two years after (1990). Reversion to the status quo preceding 29 October 1988 would not be
feasible in view of this turn of events. Besides, elections were held in 1990 and 1991. 79 The
affairs of the cooperative are presently being managed by a new board of directors duly elected
in accordance with the cooperative’s by-laws. chanrobl esvirt ual awlibrar y
2. G.R. No. 91927
The right of an accused to a preliminary investigation is not among the rights guaranteed him in
the Bill of Rights. As stated in Marcos, Et. Al. v. Cruz, 80 "the preliminary investigation in criminal
cases is not a creation of the Constitution; its origin is statutory and it exists and the right thereto
can be invoked when so established and granted by law." It is so specifically granted by procedural
law. 81 If not waived, absence thereof may amount to a denial of due process. 82 However, lack
of preliminary investigation is not a ground to quash or dismiss a complaint or information. Much
less does it affect the court’s jurisdiction. In People v. Casiano, 83 this Court ruled:jgc:c hanr obles.c om. ph
"Independently of the foregoing, the absence of such investigation [preliminary] did not impair
the validity of the information or otherwise render it defective. Much less did it affect the
jurisdiction of the court of first instance over the present case. Hence, had the defendant-appellee
been entitled to another preliminary investigation, and had his plea of not guilty upon arraignment
not implied a waiver of said right, the court of first instance should have, either conducted such
preliminary investigation, or ordered the Provincial Fiscal to make it, in pursuance of section 1687
of the Revised Administrative Code (as amended by Republic Act No. 732), or remanded the record
for said investigation to the justice of the peace court, instead of dismissing the case, as it did in
the order appealed from." cralaw virt ua1aw librar y
This doctrine was thereafter reiterated or affirmed in several cases. 84
In the instant case, even if it is to be conceded for argument’s sake that there was in fact no
preliminary investigation, the Sandiganbayan, per Doromal v. Sandiganbayan, 85 "should merely
suspend or hold in abeyance proceedings upon the questioned Amended Information and remand
the case to the Office of the Ombudsman for him to conduct a preliminary investigation." cralaw virtua1aw librar y
It is Our view, however, that petitioners were not denied the right to preliminary investigation.
They, nevertheless, insist that the preliminary investigation conducted by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor existed more in form than in substance. This is anchored on the failure by prosecutor
Onos to consider the counter-affidavits filed by petitioners. The same sin of omission is ascribed
to Acting Director de la Llana who purportedly failed to consider the comments submitted by the
petitioners pursuant to a subpoena dated 13 April 1989. The failure of special prosecutor Berbano
to conduct a preliminary investigation before amending the information is also challenged.
It is finally urged that the Sandiganbayan completely disregarded the "glaring anomaly that on its
face the Information filed by the Office of the Special Prosecutor" was prepared and subscribed
on 18 January 1989, while the records indicate that the preliminary investigation was concluded
on 3 October 1989.
In his Comment, respondent Berbano dispassionately traces the genesis of the criminal
information filed before the Sandiganbayan. His assessment that a preliminary investigation
sufficient in substance and manner was conducted prior to the filing of the information reflects
the view of the Sandiganbayan, maintained in both the 17 November 1989 and 4 January 1990
resolutions, that there was compliance with the requirements of due process.
Petitioners were provided a reasonable period within which to submit their counter-affidavits;
they did not avail of the original period; they moved for an extension of at least fifteen (15) days
from 22 October 1988. Despite the urgency of its nature, the motion was sent by mail. The
extension prayed for was good up to 6 November 1988. But, as admitted by them, they filed the
Counter-Affidavits only on 9 November 1988. Yet, they blamed Prosecutor Onos for promulgating
the 11 November 1989 Resolution and for, allegedly, not acting on the motion. Petitioners then
should not lay the blame on Onos; they should blame themselves for presuming that the motion
would be granted.
This notwithstanding, petitioners were able to file a Motion for Reconsideration on 13 December
1988 requesting that the reviewing prosecutor consider the belatedly filed documents; 86 thus,
there is the recommendation of prosecutor Bernardita Erum calling for the dismissal of the charges
on 2 March 1989, which, however, was not sustained upon subsequent review. The
Sandiganbayan, in its 17 November 1989 Resolution, succinctly summed up the matter when it
asserted that "even granting, for the sake of argument, that prosecutor Onos . . . failed to consider
accused-movants’ counter-affidavits, such defect was cured when a ‘Motion for Reconsideration’
was filed, and which . . . de la Llana took into account upon review." cralaw virt ua1aw li brar y
It may not then be successfully asserted that the counter-affidavits were not considered by the
Ombudsman in approving the information. Perusal of the factual antecedents reveals that a second
investigation was conducted upon the "1st Indorsement" of the Ombudsman of 4 April 1989. As a
result, subpoenas were issued and comments were asked to be submitted, which petitioners did,
but only after a further extension of fifteen (15) days from the expiration of the original deadline.
From this submission the matter underwent further review.
Moreover, in the 18 January 1989 Order of prosecutor Onos, there was an ample discussion of the
defenses raised by the petitioners in their counter-affidavits, thus negating the charge that the
issues raised by them were not considered at all. 87
It is indisputable that the respondents were not remiss in their duty to afford the petitioners the
opportunity to contest the charges thrown their way. Due process does not require that the
accused actually file his counter-affidavits before the preliminary investigation is deemed
completed. All that is required is that he be given the opportunity to submit such if he is so minded.
88
In any event, petitioners did in fact, although belatedly, submit their counter-affidavits and as a
result thereof, the prosecutors concerned considered them in subsequent reviews of the
information, particularly in the re-investigation ordered by the Ombudsman.
And now, as to the protestation of lack of preliminary investigation prior to the filing of the
Amended Information. The prosecution may amend the information without leave of court before
arraignment, 89 and such does not prejudice the accused. 90 Reliance on the pronouncements in
Doromal v. Sandiganbayan 91 is misplaced as what obtained therein was the preparation of an
entirely new information as contrasted with mere amendments introduced in the amended
information, which also charges petitioners with violating Section 3 (e) of the Anti-Graft Law.
In Gaspar v. Sandiganbayan, 92 We held that there is no rule or law requiring the Tanodbayan to
conduct another preliminary investigation of a case under review by it. On the contrary, under
P.D. No. 911, in relation to Rule 12, Administrative Order No. VII, the Tanodbayan may, upon
review, reverse the findings of the investigator and thereafter "where he finds a prima facie case,
to cause the filing of an information in court against the respondent, based on the same sworn
statements or evidence submitted, without the necessity of conducting another preliminary
investigation." cralaw virtua1aw li bra ry
Respondent Sandiganbayan did not then commit any grave abuse of discretion in respect to its
Resolutions of 4 January 1990 and 1 February 1990. chanr obles virtual lawli bra ry
The petition then must fail.
CONCLUSION
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered:.
1. GRANTING the petition in G.R. No. 85439; declaring null and void the challenged Order of 28
October 1988 of the respondent Secretary of Agriculture; but denying, for having become moot
and academic, the prayer of petitioners that they be restored to their positions in the KBMBPM.
2. DISMISSING, for lack of merit, the petition in G.R. No. 91927.
No pronouncement as to costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
33. G.R. No. L-52304 January 28, 1980

(95 SCRA 763)
RAMON B. CENIZA, FEDERICO C. CABILAO, JR., NELSON J. ROSAL and ALEJANDRO R. ALINSUG, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, COMMISSION ON AUDIT, and NATIONAL TREASURER, respondents.
CONCEPCION JR., J.:
Petition for prohibition and mandamus moth a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction.
On December 22. 1979, the Interim Batasang Pambansa enacted Batas Blg. 51 providing for local elections
on January 30, 1980. Section of the statute provides:
SEC. 3. Cities. — There shall be in each city such elective local officials as provided in their respective
charters, including the city mayor, the city vice-mayor, and the elective members of the sangguniang
panglungsod, all of whom shall' be elected by the qualified voters in the city. In addition thereto, there
shall be appointive sangguniang panglungsod members consisting of the of the city association of
barangay councils, the President of the city federation of the kabataang barangay, and one representative
each from the agricultural and industrial labor sectors who shall be appointed by the President (Prime
Minister) whenever, as de by the sangguniang panglungsod, said sectors are of sufficient number in the
city to warrant representation.
Until cities are reclassified into highly urbanized and component cities in accordance with the standards
established in the Local Government Code as provided for in Article XI, Section 4(1) of the Constitution.
any city now existing with an annual regular derived from infrastructure and general funds of not less
than forty million pesos (P40,000,000.00) at the time of the approval of this Act shall be classified as a
highly urbanized city. All other cities shall be considered components of the provinces where they are
geographically located.
The City of Baguio, because of its special functions as the summer capital of the Philippines, shall be
classified as a highly urbanized city irrespective of its income.
The registered voters of a component city may be entitled to vote in the election of the officials of the
province of which that city is a component, if its charter so provides. However, voters registered in a
highly urbanized city, as hereinabove defined shall not participate nor vote in the election of the officials
of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located.
To implement this Act, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC, for short) adopted Resolution No. 1421,
which reads as follows:
WHEREAS, Batas Pambansa Blg. 51 in calling for the election of the provincial governor, provincial vice-
governor and members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan in each province classified the chartered cities
of the Philippines into "highly urbanized" and "component" cities based on the annual regular income of
each city, and provided that "the registered voter of a component city may be entitled to vote in the
election of the officials of the province of which that city is a component, if its charter provides", but that
"voters registered in a highly urbanized city, shall not participate nor vote in the election of the officials
of the province in which the highly urbanized city is geographically located";
WHEREAS, inasmuch as the charters of the different cities vary with respect to the right of their registered
voters to vote for the provincial officials of the provinces where they are located, there is need to study
the various charters of the cities and determine what cities shall and shall not vote for provincial officials
pursuant to Batas Pambansa Blg. 51;
WHEREAS, the voters in the cities should be accordingly informed if they are going to vote for provincial
officials or not, for their proper guidance;
NOW, THEREFORE, the Commission on Elections, by virtue of the powers conferred upon it by the
Constitution, the 1978 Election Code and Batas Pambansa Blg. 52 (51) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES,
that the qualified voters in each city shall or shall not be entitled to vote for the provincial officials of the
province where they are geographically located, to wit:
A. Cities not entitled to participate in the election of pro- provincial officials
1. Baguio 11. Mandaue
2. Bais 12. Manila
3. Canlaon 13. Naga
4. Caloocan 14. Ormoc
5. Cebu 15. Oroquieta
6. Cotabato 16. Ozamis
7. Dagupan 17. Pasay
8. Davao 18. Quezon
9. General Santo 19. San Carlos (Pangasinan)
10. Iloilo 20. Zamboanga
Because the City of Cebu has an income of P51,603,147,64, it is classified as a highly urbanized city and
the voters thereof cannot take part in the election of the elective provincial officials of the province of
Cebu, although the Charter of Cebu City 1 allows the qualified voters of the city to vote in the election of
the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu.
The City of Mandaue, not having an annual regular income of not less than ?40 million, is classified as a
component city. But the registered voters of the city cannot vote for the provincial elective officials
because its Charter 2 expressly provides that the registered voters of the city cannot participate in the
election of the provincial officials of the Province of Cebu, except to be a candidate therefor.
The petitioners filed the instant suit as taxpayers and registered voters in the Cities of Cebu and
Mandaue. They are members of a civic and non-partisan group known as D-O-E-R-S (an accronym for
"DEMOCRACY OR EXTINCTION: RESOLVED TO SUCCEED) which counts lawyers among its members, and
extends free legal assistance to citizens regardless of economic and social status in meritorious cases
involving violation of civil liberties and basic human rights. They vigorously assail Section 3 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 51, which uses the annual income of a given city as the basis for classification of whether
or not a particular city is a highly urbanized city whose voters may not participate in the election of
provincial officials of the province where the city is geographically located; and Republic Act No. 5519,
otherwise known as the Charter of Mandaue City, which went into effect without the benefit of
ratification by the residents of Mandaue in a plebiscite or referendum. They pray that upon filing of the
instant petition, a restraining order be issued "temporarily prohibiting the holding of election for
Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials in the province where the 18 cities listed by the
respondent COMELEC are located, particularly Cebu City and Mandaue City, and temporarily prohibiting
the National Treasurer to release public funds and the COA to pass in audit said funds in connection with
and for the purpose of holding local elections in said provinces; and after hearing, to make the injunction
permanent declaring unconstitutional and therefore void Section 96, Art. XVIII of the Charter of
Mandaue, otherwise known as RA 5519," and should the stopping of the provincial elections in the
provinces concerned be not possible, the respondent COMELEC be directed "to allow the qualified
registered voters in the cities listed by said respondent, particularly Cebu City and Mandaue City, to
participate in the election of, and vote for, the Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials
and preparing the corresponding official ballots for this purpose which shall provide spaces therein for
Provincial Governor and other elective provincial officials of the provinces concerned, particularly the
province of Cebu."
The petitioners contend that "Section 3 of Batas Blg. 885 3 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu city
as highly urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is
inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial distinctions
germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the exercise of the right of
suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a denial of equal protection."
We find no merit in the petition. The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of
local government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that "The state shall
guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units, especially the barrio, to ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities." 4 To this end, the Constitution directs the National
Assembly to "enact a local government code which may not thereafter be amended except by the
majority vote of all its members, defining a more responsive and accountable local government structure
with an effective system of recall, allocating among the different local governments their powers,
responsibilities, and resources, and providing for the qualifications, election and removal, term, salaries,
powers, functions, and duties of local officials, and all other matters relating to the organization and
operation of local government units," 5 and empowered local government units "to create its own
sources of revenue and to levy taxes, subject to limitations as may be provided by law." 6 Art. XI, Section
4(1) of the said Constitution places highly urbanized cities outside the supervisory power of the
province where they are geographically located. This is as it should be because of the complex and
varied problems in a highly urbanized city due to a bigger population and greater economic activity
which require greater autonomy.
Corollary to independence however, is the concomitant loss of the right to participate in provincial
affairs, more particularly the selection of elective provincial officials since these provincial officials have
ceased to exercise any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city. Thus, in the case of Teves
vs. Commission on Election 7 this Court, in holding that the registered voters of the City of Dumaguete
cannot vote for the provincial officials of Negros Oriental because the charter of the city does not
expressly allow the voters in the city to do so, ruled:
The creation of Dumaguete City has made it a political entity separate from and independent of the
province of Negros Oriental. The purpose of an election is to enable the electorate to choose the men
that will run their government, whether national, provincial, municipal or city. It so, no useful end will be
served by allowing — in the absence of express legislative preference — the voters of a city to ceased to
have any governmental jurisdiction and authority over said city.
To confirm our view that the city of Dumaguete has been segregated from the province of Oriental Negros
for purposes of provincial elections, we should point to the penultimate section of the charter providing
that "until otherwise provided by law, the City of Dumaguete shall continue as part of the first
representative district of the Province of Oriental Negros." This is an express exception to the general
effect of separation — an exception that serves to reiterate or even establish the rule. In other words,
the Congress meant that the inhabitants of the city may not vote for provincial officials, but may vote for
their representative in Congress.
The classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their regular
annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would show whether or not it
is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent social, economic, and political unit.
It would also show whether the city has sufficient economic or industrial activity as to warrant its
independence from the province where it is geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the
continued support of the provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters
in the election of provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since
the voters in other component cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without
merit. The practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying
the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion which violates
neither the Constitution nor the voter's right of suffrage. In the case of Teves v. Commission on Election
8 the Court said.
Petitioners' contention is that, as the Charter of Dumaguete City is silent as to the right of its qualified
voters to participate in the election of provincial officials of Negros Oriental and as said voters are
residents of the province, they are clearly entitled to vote for said provincial officials.
The charters of other recently formed cities are articulate on the matter. Thus, in the case of Bacolod,
Cabanatuan Legaspi Naga, and Ormoc, their charters expressly prohibit the residents therein from voting
for provincial officials of the province to which said cities formerly belonged. Upon the other hand, the
charters of Cagayan de Oro, Butuan, Cavite, Iloilo, Calbayog Lipa San Pablo, and Dagupan contain
provisions extending their part in the election of the provincial official cities were previously included.
The question that presents itself has reference to the effect of the omission in the charter of Dumaguete
City of an express provision on the right of its residents to vote for provincial officials of Negros Oriental,
in the light of the legislative practice that, when desired, the right is either recognized or withdrawn
expressly. We are inclined to overrule petitioners' position.
The equal protection of the law contemplates equality in the enjoyment of similar rights and privileges
granted by law. It would have been discriminatory and a denial of the equal protection of the law if the
statute prohibited an individual or group of voters in the city from voting for provincial officials while
granting it to another individual or groups of voters in the same city.
Neither can it be considered an infringement upon the petitioners' rights of suffrage since the
Constitution confers no right to a voter in a city to vote for the provincial officials of the province where
the city is located. Their right is limited to the right to vote for elective city officials in local elections which
the questioned statues neither withdraw nor restrict.
The petitioners further claim that to prohibit the voters in a city from voting for elective provincial officials
would impose a substantial requirement on the exercise of suffrage and would violate the sanctity of the
ballot, contrary to the provisions of Art. VI, Section 1 of the Constitution. The prohibition contemplated
in the Constitution, however, has reference to such requirements, as the Virginia poll tax, invalidated in
Harper vs. Virginia Board of Elections, 9 or the New York requirement that to be eligible to vote in a school
district, one must be a parent of a child enrolled in a local public school, nullified in Kramer vs. Union Free
School District, 395 U.S. 621, which impose burdens on the right of suffrage without achieving permissible
estate objectives. In this particular case, no such burdens are imposed upon the voters of the cities of
Cebu and Mandaue. They are free to exercise their rights without any other requirement, save that of
being registered voters in the cities where they reside and the sanctity of their ballot is maintained.
It is also contended that the prohibition would subvert the principle of republicanism as it would deprive
a citizen his right to participate in the conduct of the affairs of the government unit through the exercise
of his right of suffrage. It has been pointed out, however, that the provincial government has no
governmental supervision over highly urbanized cities. These cities are independent of the province in
the administration of their affairs. Such being the case, it is but just and proper to limit the selection
and election of the provincial officials to the voters of the province whose interests are vitally affected
and exclude therefrom the voters of highly urbanized cities.
Petitioners assail the charter of the City of Mandaue as unconstitutional for not having been ratified by
the residents of the city in a plebiscite. This contention is untenable. The Constitutional requirement that
the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city, municipality, or
barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite in the
governmental unit or units affected 10 is a new requirement that came into being only with the 1973
Constitution. It is prospective 11 in character and therefore cannot affect the creation of the City of
Mandaue which came into existence on June 21, 1969.
Finally, the petitioners claim that political and gerrymandering motives were behind the passage of Batas
Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend that the Province of Cebu is
politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and of the total 952,716 registered voters in
the province, 234,582 are from Cebu City and 44,358 come from Mandaue City, so that 278,940 electors,
or close to one-third (1/3) of the entire province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial
officials of the province of Cebu. Such charge has no factual and legal basis. "Gerrymandering" is a "term
employed to describe an apportionment of representative districts so contrived as to give an unfair
advantage to the party in power. 12 The questioned statutes in this particular case do not apportion
representative districts. The said representative districts remain the same. Nor has it been shown that
there is an unfair advantage in favor of the candidates of the party in power. As the Solicitor General
pointed out, it may even be that the majority of the city voters are supporters of the administration
candidates, so that the enactment of the questioned statutes will work to their disadvantage.
WHEREFORE, the petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED
34. G.R. No. L-59329 July 19, 1985
EASTERN BROADCASTING CORPORATION (DYRE) petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. JOSE P. DANS, JR., MINISTER OF TRANSPORTATION & COMMUNICATIONS, THE
HON. CEFERINO S. CARREON, COMMISSIONER, NATIONAL TELECOM., COMMISSION, ET
AL., respondents.
RESOLUTION
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This petition was filed to compel the respondents to allow the reopening of Radio Station DYRE which
had been summarily closed on grounds of national security.
The petitioner contended that it was denied due process when it was closed on the mere allegation
that the radio station was used to incite people to sedition. it alleged that no hearing was held and not
a bit of proof was submitted to establish a factual basis for the closure. The petitioner was not informed
beforehand why administrative action which closed the radio station was taken against it. No action
was taken by the respondents to entertain a motion seeking reconsideration of the closure action. The
petitioner also raised the issue of freedom of speech. It appears from the records that the respondents'
general charge of "inciting people to commit acts of sedition" arose from the petitioner's shift towards
what it stated was the coverage of public events and the airing of programs geared towards public
affairs.
On March 25, 1985, before the Court could promulgate a decision squarely passing upon all the issues
raised, the petitioner through its president, Mr. Rene G. Espina suddenly filed a motion to withdraw
or dismiss the petition.
The petitioner alleged:
1. Petitioner Eastern Broadcasting Corporation has already sold its radio broadcasting station in
favor of Manuel B. Pastrana as well as its rights and interest in the radio station DYRE in Cebu
including its right to operate and its equipment;
2. Respondent National Telecommunications Commission has expressed its willingness to grant to

the said new owner Manuel B. Pastrana the requisite license and franchise to operate the said radio
station and to approve the sale of the radio transmitter of said station DYRE;
3. In view of the foregoing, petitioner has no longer any interest in said case, and the new owner,
Manuel B. Pastrana is likewise not interested in pursuing the case any further. The case, therefore,
has become moot and academic. However, for the guidance of inferior courts and administrative
tribunals exercising quasi-judicial functions, the Court issues the following guidelines:
(1) The cardinal primary requirements in administrative proceedings laid down by this Court in
Ang Tibay v. Court of Industrial Relations (69 Phil. 635) should be followed before a broadcast
station may be closed or its operations curtailed.
(2) It is necessary to reiterate that while there is no controlling and precise definition of due
process, it furnishes an unavoidable standard to which government action must conform in order that
any deprivation of life, liberty, or property, in each appropriate case, may be valid (Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association v. City Mayor, 20 SCRA 849).
(3) All forms of media, whether print or broadcast, are entitled to the broad protection of the
freedom of speech and expression clause. The test for limitations on freedom of expression continues
to be the clear and present danger rule — that words are used in such circumstances and are of such
a nature as to create a clear and present danger that they will bring about the substantive evils that
the lawmaker has a right to prevent, In his Constitution of the Philippines (2nd Edition, pp. 569-570)
Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando cites at least nine of our decisions which apply the test —
(Primicias v. Fugoso [80 Phil. 71], American Bible Society v. City of Manila [101 Phil. 386], Cabansag
v. Fernandez [102 Phil. 152], Vera v. Arca [28 SCRA 351], Navarro v. Villegas [31 SCRA 931], Imbong
v. Ferrer [35 SCRA 28], Badoy v. Commission on Elections [35 SCRA 285], People v. Ferrer [48
SCRA 382], and the Philippine Blooming Mills Employees Organization v. Philippine Blooming Mills
Co., Inc. [51 SCRA 189]. More recently, the clear and present danger test was applied in J.B.L. Reyes
in behalf of the Anti-Bases Coalition v. Bagatsing [125 SCRA 553].
(4) The clear and present danger test, however, does not lend itself to a simplistic and all
embracing interpretation applicable to all utterances in all forums.
Broadcasting has to be licensed. Airwave frequencies have to be allocated among qualified users. A
broadcast corporation cannot simply appropriate a certain frequency without regard for government
regulation or for the rights of others.
All forms of communication are entitled to the broad protection of freedom of expression clause.
Necessarily, however, the freedom of television and radio broadcasting is somewhat lesser in scope
than the freedom accorded to newspaper and print media.
The American Court in Federal Communications Commission v. Pacifica Foundation (438 U.S.
726), confronted with a patently offensive and indecent regular radio program, explained why radio
broadcasting, more than other forms of communications, receives the most limited protection from the
free expression clause. First, broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the
lives of all citizens, Material presented over the airwaves confronts the citizen, not only in public, but
in the privacy of his home. Second, broadcasting is uniquely accessible to children. Bookstores and
motion picture theaters may be prohibited from making certain material available to children, but the
same selectivity cannot be done in radio or television, where the listener or viewer is constantly tuning
in and out.
Similar considerations apply in the area of national security.
The broadcast media have established a uniquely pervasive presence in the lives of all Filipinos,
Newspapers and current books are found only in metropolitan areas and in the poblaciones of
municipalities accessible to fast and regular transportation. Even here, there are low income masses
who find the cost of books, newspapers, and magazines beyond their humble means. Basic needs
like food and shelter perforce enjoy high priorities.
On the other hand, the transistor radio is found everywhere. The television set is also becoming
universal. Their message may be simultaneously received by a national or regional audience of
listeners including the indifferent or unwilling who happen to be within reach of a blaring radio or
television set. The materials broadcast over the airwaves reach every person of every age, persons
of varying susceptibilities to persuasion, persons of different I.Q.s and mental capabilities, persons
whose reactions to inflammatory or offensive speech would be difficult to monitor or predict. The
impact of the vibrant speech is forceful and immediate. Unlike readers of the printed work, the radio
audience has lesser opportunity to cogitate analyze, and reject the utterance.
(5) The clear and present danger test, therefore, must take the particular circumstances of
broadcast media into account. The supervision of radio stations-whether by government or through
self-regulation by the industry itself calls for thoughtful, intelligent and sophisticated handling.
The government has a right to be protected against broadcasts which incite the listeners to violently
overthrow it. Radio and television may not be used to organize a rebellion or to signal the start of
widespread uprising. At the same time, the people have a right to be informed. Radio and television
would have little reason for existence if broadcasts are limited to bland, obsequious, or pleasantly
entertaining utterances. Since they are the most convenient and popular means of disseminating
varying views on public issues, they also deserve special protection.
(6) The freedom to comment on public affairs is essential to the vitality of a representative democracy.
In the 1918 case of United States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) this Court was already stressing that.
The interest of society and the maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public
affairs. Complete liberty to comment on the conduct of public men is a scalpel in the case of free
speech. The sharp incision of its probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom. Men in public life may
suffer under a hostile and an unjust accusation; the wound can be assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience. A public officer must not be too thin-skinned with reference to comment upon his official
acts. Only thus can the intelligence and dignity of the individual be exalted.
(7) Broadcast stations deserve the special protection given to all forms of media by the due
process and freedom of expression clauses of the Constitution.
WHEREFORE, the case having become moot and academic, the petitioner's motion to withdraw or
dismiss the petition is hereby GRANTED.
SO ORDERED.
37. G.R. No. L-7995 May 31, 1957
LAO H. ICHONG, in his own behalf and in behalf of other alien residents, corporations
and partnerships adversely affected. by Republic Act No. 1180, petitioner,
vs.
JAIME HERNANDEZ, Secretary of Finance, and MARCELINO SARMIENTO, City

Treasurer of Manila, respondents.
Ozaeta, Lichauco and Picazo and Sycip, Quisumbing, Salazar and Associates for petitioner.
Office of the Solicitor General Ambrosio Padilla and Solicitor Pacifico P. de Castro for
respondent Secretary of Finance.
City Fiscal Eugenio Angeles and Assistant City Fiscal Eulogio S. Serrano for respondent
City Treasurer.
Dionisio Reyes as Amicus Curiae.
Marcial G. Mendiola as Amicus Curiae.
Emiliano R. Navarro as Amicus Curiae.
LABRADOR, J.:
I. The case and issue, in general
This Court has before it the delicate task of passing upon the validity and constitutionality of
a legislative enactment, fundamental and far-reaching in significance. The enactment poses
questions of due process, police power and equal protection of the laws. It also poses an
important issue of fact, that is whether the conditions which the disputed law purports to
remedy really or actually exist. Admittedly springing from a deep, militant, and positive
nationalistic impulse, the law purports to protect citizen and country from the alien retailer.
Through it, and within the field of economy it regulates, Congress attempts to translate
national aspirations for economic independence and national security, rooted in the drive
and urge for national survival and welfare, into a concrete and tangible measures designed
to free the national retailer from the competing dominance of the alien, so that the country
and the nation may be free from a supposed economic dependence and bondage. Do the
facts and circumstances justify the enactment?
II. Pertinent provisions of Republic Act No. 1180
Republic Act No. 1180 is entitled "An Act to Regulate the Retail Business." In effect it
nationalizes the retail trade business. The main provisions of the Act are: (1) a prohibition
against persons, not citizens of the Philippines, and against associations, partnerships, or
corporations the capital of which are not wholly owned by citizens of the Philippines, from
engaging directly or indirectly in the retail trade; (2) an exception from the above prohibition
in favor of aliens actually engaged in said business on May 15, 1954, who are allowed to
continue to engaged therein, unless their licenses are forfeited in accordance with the law,
until their death or voluntary retirement in case of natural persons, and for ten years after the
approval of the Act or until the expiration of term in case of juridical persons; (3) an
exception therefrom in favor of citizens and juridical entities of the United States; (4) a
provision for the forfeiture of licenses (to engage in the retail business) for violation of the
laws on nationalization, control weights and measures and labor and other laws relating to
trade, commerce and industry; (5) a prohibition against the establishment or opening by
aliens actually engaged in the retail business of additional stores or branches of retail
business, (6) a provision requiring aliens actually engaged in the retail business to present
for registration with the proper authorities a verified statement concerning their businesses,
giving, among other matters, the nature of the business, their assets and liabilities and their
offices and principal offices of judicial entities; and (7) a provision allowing the heirs of aliens
now engaged in the retail business who die, to continue such business for a period of six
months for purposes of liquidation.
III. Grounds upon which petition is based-Answer thereto
Petitioner, for and in his own behalf and on behalf of other alien residents corporations and
partnerships adversely affected by the provisions of Republic Act. No. 1180, brought this
action to obtain a judicial declaration that said Act is unconstitutional, and to enjoin the
Secretary of Finance and all other persons acting under him, particularly city and municipal
treasurers, from enforcing its provisions. Petitioner attacks the constitutionality of the Act,
contending that: (1) it denies to alien residents the equal protection of the laws and deprives
of their liberty and property without due process of law ; (2) the subject of the Act is not
expressed or comprehended in the title thereof; (3) the Act violates international and treaty
obligations of the Republic of the Philippines; (4) the provisions of the Act against the
transmission by aliens of their retail business thru hereditary succession, and those requiring
100% Filipino capitalization for a corporation or entity to entitle it to engage in the retail
business, violate the spirit of Sections 1 and 5, Article XIII and Section 8 of Article XIV of the
Constitution.
In answer, the Solicitor-General and the Fiscal of the City of Manila contend that: (1) the Act
was passed in the valid exercise of the police power of the State, which exercise is
authorized in the Constitution in the interest of national economic survival; (2) the Act has
only one subject embraced in the title; (3) no treaty or international obligations are infringed;
(4) as regards hereditary succession, only the form is affected but the value of the property
is not impaired, and the institution of inheritance is only of statutory origin.
IV. Preliminary consideration of legal principles involved
a. The police power. —
There is no question that the Act was approved in the exercise of the police power, but
petitioner claims that its exercise in this instance is attended by a violation of the
constitutional requirements of due process and equal protection of the laws. But before
proceeding to the consideration and resolution of the ultimate issue involved, it would be
well to bear in mind certain basic and fundamental, albeit preliminary, considerations in the
determination of the ever recurrent conflict between police power and the guarantees of due
process and equal protection of the laws. What is the scope of police power, and how are
the due process and equal protection clauses related to it? What is the province and power
of the legislature, and what is the function and duty of the courts? These consideration must
be clearly and correctly understood that their application to the facts of the case may be
brought forth with clarity and the issue accordingly resolved.
It has been said the police power is so far - reaching in scope, that it has become almost
impossible to limit its sweep. As it derives its existence from the very existence of the State
itself, it does not need to be expressed or defined in its scope; it is said to be co-extensive
with self-protection and survival, and as such it is the most positive and active of all
governmental processes, the most essential, insistent and illimitable. Especially is it so
under a modern democratic framework where the demands of society and of nations have
multiplied to almost unimaginable proportions; the field and scope of police power has
become almost boundless, just as the fields of public interest and public welfare have
become almost all-embracing and have transcended human foresight. Otherwise stated, as
we cannot foresee the needs and demands of public interest and welfare in this constantly
changing and progressive world, so we cannot delimit beforehand the extent or scope of
police power by which and through which the State seeks to attain or achieve interest or
welfare. So it is that Constitutions do not define the scope or extent of the police power of
the State; what they do is to set forth the limitations thereof. The most important of these are
the due process clause and the equal protection clause.
b. Limitations on police power. —

The basic limitations of due process and equal protection are found in the following
provisions of our Constitution:
SECTION 1.(1) No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law, nor any person be denied the equal protection of the laws. (Article III, Phil. Constitution)
These constitutional guarantees which embody the essence of individual liberty and freedom
in democracies, are not limited to citizens alone but are admittedly universal in their
application, without regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality. (Yick Wo vs.
Hopkins, 30, L. ed. 220, 226.)
c. The, equal protection clause. —
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class
privilege, as well as hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to
prohibit legislation, which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory
within which is to operate. It does not demand absolute equality among residents; it merely
requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. The equal protection clause is not
infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class, if
it applies alike to all persons within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a
distinction between those who fall within such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley,
Constitutional Limitations, 824-825.)
d. The due process clause. —
The due process clause has to do with the reasonableness of legislation enacted in
pursuance of the police power. Is there public interest, a public purpose; is public welfare
involved? Is the Act reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the legislature's
purpose; is it not unreasonable, arbitrary or oppressive? Is there sufficient foundation or
reason in connection with the matter involved; or has there not been a capricious use of the
legislative power? Can the aims conceived be achieved by the means used, or is it not
merely an unjustified interference with private interest? These are the questions that we ask
when the due process test is applied.
The conflict, therefore, between police power and the guarantees of due process and equal
protection of the laws is more apparent than real. Properly related, the power and the
guarantees are supposed to coexist. The balancing is the essence or, shall it be said, the
indispensable means for the attainment of legitimate aspirations of any democratic society.
There can be no absolute power, whoever exercise it, for that would be tyranny. Yet there
can neither be absolute liberty, for that would mean license and anarchy. So the State can
deprive persons of life, liberty and property, provided there is due process of law; and
persons may be classified into classes and groups, provided everyone is given the equal
protection of the law. The test or standard, as always, is reason. The police power legislation
must be firmly grounded on public interest and welfare, and a reasonable relation must exist
between purposes and means. And if distinction and classification has been made, there
must be a reasonable basis for said distinction.
e. Legislative discretion not subject to judicial review. —
Now, in this matter of equitable balancing, what is the proper place and role of the courts? It
must not be overlooked, in the first place, that the legislature, which is the constitutional
repository of police power and exercises the prerogative of determining the policy of the
State, is by force of circumstances primarily the judge of necessity, adequacy or
reasonableness and wisdom, of any law promulgated in the exercise of the police power, or
of the measures adopted to implement the public policy or to achieve public interest. On the
other hand, courts, although zealous guardians of individual liberty and right, have
nevertheless evinced a reluctance to interfere with the exercise of the legislative prerogative.
They have done so early where there has been a clear, patent or palpable arbitrary and
unreasonable abuse of the legislative prerogative. Moreover, courts are not supposed to
override legitimate policy, and courts never inquire into the wisdom of the law.
V. Economic problems sought to be remedied
With the above considerations in mind, we will now proceed to delve directly into the issue
involved. If the disputed legislation were merely a regulation, as its title indicates, there
would be no question that it falls within the legitimate scope of legislative power. But it goes
further and prohibits a group of residents, the aliens, from engaging therein. The problem
becomes more complex because its subject is a common, trade or occupation, as old as
society itself, which from the immemorial has always been open to residents, irrespective of
race, color or citizenship.
a. Importance of retail trade in the economy of the nation. —
In a primitive economy where families produce all that they consume and consume all that
they produce, the dealer, of course, is unknown. But as group life develops and families
begin to live in communities producing more than what they consume and needing an
infinite number of things they do not produce, the dealer comes into existence. As villages
develop into big communities and specialization in production begins, the dealer's
importance is enhanced. Under modern conditions and standards of living, in which man's
needs have multiplied and diversified to unlimited extents and proportions, the retailer
comes as essential as the producer, because thru him the infinite variety of articles, goods
and needed for daily life are placed within the easy reach of consumers. Retail dealers
perform the functions of capillaries in the human body, thru which all the needed food and
supplies are ministered to members of the communities comprising the nation.
There cannot be any question about the importance of the retailer in the life of the
community. He ministers to the resident's daily needs, food in all its increasing forms, and
the various little gadgets and things needed for home and daily life. He provides his
customers around his store with the rice or corn, the fish, the salt, the vinegar, the spices
needed for the daily cooking. He has cloths to sell, even the needle and the thread to sew
them or darn the clothes that wear out. The retailer, therefore, from the lowly peddler, the
owner of a small sari-sari store, to the operator of a department store or, a supermarket is so
much a part of day-to-day existence.
b. The alien retailer's trait. —
The alien retailer must have started plying his trades in this country in the bigger centers of
population (Time there was when he was unknown in provincial towns and villages). Slowly
but gradually be invaded towns and villages; now he predominates in the cities and big
centers of population. He even pioneers, in far away nooks where the beginnings of
community life appear, ministering to the daily needs of the residents and purchasing their
agricultural produce for sale in the towns. It is an undeniable fact that in many communities
the alien has replaced the native retailer. He has shown in this trade, industry without limit,
and the patience and forbearance of a slave.
Derogatory epithets are hurled at him, but he laughs these off without murmur; insults of ill-
bred and insolent neighbors and customers are made in his face, but he heeds them not,
and he forgets and forgives. The community takes note of him, as he appears to be
harmless and extremely useful.
c. Alleged alien control and dominance. —
There is a general feeling on the part of the public, which appears to be true to fact, about
the controlling and dominant position that the alien retailer holds in the nation's economy.
Food and other essentials, clothing, almost all articles of daily life reach the residents mostly
through him. In big cities and centers of population he has acquired not only predominance,
but apparent control over distribution of almost all kinds of goods, such as lumber, hardware,
textiles, groceries, drugs, sugar, flour, garlic, and scores of other goods and articles. And
were it not for some national corporations like the Naric, the Namarco, the Facomas and the
Acefa, his control over principal foods and products would easily become full and complete.
Petitioner denies that there is alien predominance and control in the retail trade. In one
breath it is said that the fear is unfounded and the threat is imagined; in another, it is
charged that the law is merely the result of radicalism and pure and unabashed nationalism.
Alienage, it is said, is not an element of control; also so many unmanageable factors in the
retail business make control virtually impossible. The first argument which brings up an
issue of fact merits serious consideration. The others are matters of opinion within the
exclusive competence of the legislature and beyond our prerogative to pass upon and
decide.
The best evidence are the statistics on the retail trade, which put down the figures in black
and white. Between the constitutional convention year (1935), when the fear of alien
domination and control of the retail trade already filled the minds of our leaders with fears
and misgivings, and the year of the enactment of the nationalization of the retail trade act
(1954), official statistics unmistakably point out to the ever-increasing dominance and control
by the alien of the retail trade, as witness the following tables:
Assets Gross Sales
Year and No.- Pesos Per cent Pesos Per cent

Retailers Establishments Distribution Distribution
Nationality
1941:
Filipino 106,671 200,323,138 55.82 174,181,924 51.74

..........
Chinese 15,356 118,348,692 32.98 148,813,239 44.21

...........
Others 1,646 40,187,090 11.20 13,630,239 4.05

............
1947:
Filipino 111,107 208,658,946 65.05 279,583,333 57.03

..........
Chinese 13,774 106,156,218 33.56 205,701,134 41.96

...........
Others 354 8,761,260 .49 4,927,168 1.01

...........
1948: (Census)
Filipino 113,631 213,342,264 67.30 467,161,667 60.51

..........
Chinese 12,087 93,155,459 29.38 294,894,227 38.20
..........
Others 422 10,514,675 3.32 9,995,402 1.29

..........
1949:
Filipino 113,659 213,451,602 60.89 462,532,901 53.47

..........
Chinese 16,248 125,223,336 35.72 392,414,875 45.36

..........
Others 486 12,056,365 3.39 10,078,364 1.17

..........
1951:
Filipino 119,352 224,053,620 61.09 466,058,052 53.07

.........
Chinese 17,429 134,325,303 36.60 404,481,384 46.06

..........
Others 347 8,614,025 2.31 7,645,327 87

..........
AVERAGE
ASSETS AND GROSS SALES

PER ESTABLISHMENT
Year and Retailer's Item Gross

Sales
Nationality Assets
(Pesos)
(Pesos)
1941:
Filipino 1,878 1,633

.............................................
Chinese 7,707 9,691

..............................................
Others 24,415 8,281
...............................................
1947:

.............................................
Chinese 7,707 14,934

...........................................
Others 24,749 13,919

..............................................
1948: (Census)

.............................................
Chinese 7,707 24,398

.............................................
Others 24,916 23,686

..............................................
1949:

.............................................
Chinese 7,707 24,152

..............................................
Others 24,807 20,737

..............................................
1951:

.............................................
Chinese 7,707 33,207

.............................................
Others 24,824 22,033

...............................................
(Estimated Assets and Gross Sales of Retail Establishments, By Year and Nationality of
Owners, Benchmark: 1948 Census, issued by the Bureau of Census and Statistics,
Department of Commerce and Industry; pp. 18-19 of Answer.)
The above statistics do not include corporations and partnerships, while the figures on
Filipino establishments already include mere market vendors, whose capital is necessarily
small..
The above figures reveal that in percentage distribution of assests and gross sales, alien
participation has steadily increased during the years. It is true, of course, that Filipinos have
the edge in the number of retailers, but aliens more than make up for the numerical gap
through their assests and gross sales which average between six and seven times those of
the very many Filipino retailers. Numbers in retailers, here, do not imply superiority; the alien
invests more capital, buys and sells six to seven times more, and gains much more. The
same official report, pointing out to the known predominance of foreign elements in the retail
trade, remarks that the Filipino retailers were largely engaged in minor retailer enterprises.
As observed by respondents, the native investment is thinly spread, and the Filipino retailer
is practically helpless in matters of capital, credit, price and supply.
d. Alien control and threat, subject of apprehension in Constitutional convention. —
It is this domination and control, which we believe has been sufficiently shown to exist, that
is the legislature's target in the enactment of the disputed nationalization would never have
been adopted. The framers of our Constitution also believed in the existence of this alien
dominance and control when they approved a resolution categorically declaring among other
things, that "it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the
nationalization of the retail trade; . . . ." (II Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, 662-663, quoted on page 67 of Petitioner.) That was twenty-two years ago; and
the events since then have not been either pleasant or comforting. Dean Sinco of the
University of the Philippines College of Law, commenting on the patrimony clause of the
Preamble opines that the fathers of our Constitution were merely translating the general
preoccupation of Filipinos "of the dangers from alien interests that had already brought
under their control the commercial and other economic activities of the country" (Sinco, Phil.
Political Law, 10th ed., p. 114); and analyzing the concern of the members of the
constitutional convention for the economic life of the citizens, in connection with the
nationalistic provisions of the Constitution, he says:
But there has been a general feeling that alien dominance over the economic life of the
country is not desirable and that if such a situation should remain, political independence
alone is no guarantee to national stability and strength. Filipino private capital is not big
enough to wrest from alien hands the control of the national economy. Moreover, it is but of
recent formation and hence, largely inexperienced, timid and hesitant. Under such
conditions, the government as the instrumentality of the national will, has to step in and
assume the initiative, if not the leadership, in the struggle for the economic freedom of the
nation in somewhat the same way that it did in the crusade for political freedom. Thus . . . it
(the Constitution) envisages an organized movement for the protection of the nation not only
against the possibilities of armed invasion but also against its economic subjugation by alien
interests in the economic field. (Phil. Political Law by Sinco, 10th ed., p. 476.)
Belief in the existence of alien control and predominance is felt in other quarters. Filipino
businessmen, manufacturers and producers believe so; they fear the dangers coming from
alien control, and they express sentiments of economic independence. Witness thereto is
Resolution No. 1, approved on July 18, 1953, of the Fifth National convention of Filipino
Businessmen, and a similar resolution, approved on March 20, 1954, of the Second National
Convention of Manufacturers and Producers. The man in the street also believes, and fears,
alien predominance and control; so our newspapers, which have editorially pointed out not
only to control but to alien stranglehold. We, therefore, find alien domination and control to
be a fact, a reality proved by official statistics, and felt by all the sections and groups that
compose the Filipino community.
e. Dangers of alien control and dominance in retail. —

But the dangers arising from alien participation in the retail trade does not seem to lie in the
predominance alone; there is a prevailing feeling that such predominance may truly
endanger the national interest. With ample capital, unity of purpose and action and thorough
organization, alien retailers and merchants can act in such complete unison and concert on
such vital matters as the fixing of prices, the determination of the amount of goods or articles
to be made available in the market, and even the choice of the goods or articles they would
or would not patronize or distribute, that fears of dislocation of the national economy and of
the complete subservience of national economy and of the consuming public are not entirely
unfounded. Nationals, producers and consumers alike can be placed completely at their
mercy. This is easily illustrated. Suppose an article of daily use is desired to be prescribed
by the aliens, because the producer or importer does not offer them sufficient profits, or
because a new competing article offers bigger profits for its introduction. All that aliens
would do is to agree to refuse to sell the first article, eliminating it from their stocks, offering
the new one as a substitute. Hence, the producers or importers of the prescribed article, or
its consumers, find the article suddenly out of the prescribed article, or its consumers, find
the article suddenly out of circulation. Freedom of trade is thus curtailed and free enterprise
correspondingly suppressed.
We can even go farther than theoretical illustrations to show the pernicious influences of
alien domination. Grave abuses have characterized the exercise of the retail trade by aliens.
It is a fact within judicial notice, which courts of justice may not properly overlook or ignore in
the interests of truth and justice, that there exists a general feeling on the part of the public
that alien participation in the retail trade has been attended by a pernicious and intolerable
practices, the mention of a few of which would suffice for our purposes; that at some time or
other they have cornered the market of essential commodities, like corn and rice, creating
artificial scarcities to justify and enhance profits to unreasonable proportions; that they have
hoarded essential foods to the inconvenience and prejudice of the consuming public, so
much so that the Government has had to establish the National Rice and Corn Corporation
to save the public from their continuous hoarding practices and tendencies; that they have
violated price control laws, especially on foods and essential commodities, such that the
legislature had to enact a law (Sec. 9, Republic Act No. 1168), authorizing their immediate
and automatic deportation for price control convictions; that they have secret combinations
among themselves to control prices, cheating the operation of the law of supply and
demand; that they have connived to boycott honest merchants and traders who would not
cater or yield to their demands, in unlawful restraint of freedom of trade and enterprise. They
are believed by the public to have evaded tax laws, smuggled goods and money into and
out of the land, violated import and export prohibitions, control laws and the like, in derision
and contempt of lawful authority. It is also believed that they have engaged in corrupting
public officials with fabulous bribes, indirectly causing the prevalence of graft and corruption
in the Government. As a matter of fact appeals to unscrupulous aliens have been made both
by the Government and by their own lawful diplomatic representatives, action which
impliedly admits a prevailing feeling about the existence of many of the above practices.
The circumstances above set forth create well founded fears that worse things may come in
the future. The present dominance of the alien retailer, especially in the big centers of
population, therefore, becomes a potential source of danger on occasions of war or other
calamity. We do not have here in this country isolated groups of harmless aliens retailing
goods among nationals; what we have are well organized and powerful groups that
dominate the distribution of goods and commodities in the communities and big centers of
population. They owe no allegiance or loyalty to the State, and the State cannot rely upon
them in times of crisis or emergency. While the national holds his life, his person and his
property subject to the needs of his country, the alien may even become the potential enemy
of the State.
f. Law enacted in interest of national economic survival and security. —
We are fully satisfied upon a consideration of all the facts and circumstances that the
disputed law is not the product of racial hostility, prejudice or discrimination, but the
expression of the legitimate desire and determination of the people, thru their authorized
representatives, to free the nation from the economic situation that has unfortunately been
saddled upon it rightly or wrongly, to its disadvantage. The law is clearly in the interest of the
public, nay of the national security itself, and indisputably falls within the scope of police
power, thru which and by which the State insures its existence and security and the
supreme welfare of its citizens.
VI. The Equal Protection Limitation
a. Objections to alien participation in retail trade. — The next question that now poses
solution is, Does the law deny the equal protection of the laws? As pointed out above, the
mere fact of alienage is the root and cause of the distinction between the alien and the
national as a trader. The alien resident owes allegiance to the country of his birth or his
adopted country; his stay here is for personal convenience; he is attracted by the lure of gain
and profit. His aim or purpose of stay, we admit, is neither illegitimate nor immoral, but he is
naturally lacking in that spirit of loyalty and enthusiasm for this country where he temporarily
stays and makes his living, or of that spirit of regard, sympathy and consideration for his
Filipino customers as would prevent him from taking advantage of their weakness and
exploiting them. The faster he makes his pile, the earlier can the alien go back to his
beloved country and his beloved kin and countrymen. The experience of the country is that
the alien retailer has shown such utter disregard for his customers and the people on whom
he makes his profit, that it has been found necessary to adopt the legislation, radical as it
may seem.
Another objection to the alien retailer in this country is that he never really makes a genuine
contribution to national income and wealth. He undoubtedly contributes to general
distribution, but the gains and profits he makes are not invested in industries that would help
the country's economy and increase national wealth. The alien's interest in this country
being merely transient and temporary, it would indeed be ill-advised to continue entrusting
the very important function of retail distribution to his hands.
The practices resorted to by aliens in the control of distribution, as already pointed out
above, their secret manipulations of stocks of commodities and prices, their utter disregard
of the welfare of their customers and of the ultimate happiness of the people of the nation of
which they are mere guests, which practices, manipulations and disregard do not attend the
exercise of the trade by the nationals, show the existence of real and actual, positive and
fundamental differences between an alien and a national which fully justify the legislative
classification adopted in the retail trade measure. These differences are certainly a valid
reason for the State to prefer the national over the alien in the retail trade. We would be
doing violence to fact and reality were we to hold that no reason or ground for a legitimate
distinction can be found between one and the other.
b. Difference in alien aims and purposes sufficient basis for distinction. —
The above objectionable characteristics of the exercise of the retail trade by the aliens,
which are actual and real, furnish sufficient grounds for legislative classification of retail
traders into nationals and aliens. Some may disagree with the wisdom of the legislature's
classification. To this we answer, that this is the prerogative of the law-making power. Since
the Court finds that the classification is actual, real and reasonable, and all persons of one
class are treated alike, and as it cannot be said that the classification is patently
unreasonable and unfounded, it is in duty bound to declare that the legislature acted within
its legitimate prerogative and it can not declare that the act transcends the limit of equal
protection established by the Constitution.
Broadly speaking, the power of the legislature to make distinctions and classifications
among persons is not curtailed or denied by the equal protection of the laws clause. The
legislative power admits of a wide scope of discretion, and a law can be violative of the
constitutional limitation only when the classification is without reasonable basis. In addition
to the authorities we have earlier cited, we can also refer to the case of Linsey vs. Natural
Carbonic Fas Co. (1911), 55 L. ed., 369, which clearly and succinctly defined the application
of equal protection clause to a law sought to be voided as contrary thereto:
. . . . "1. The equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment does not take from the
state the power to classify in the adoption of police laws, but admits of the exercise of the
wide scope of discretion in that regard, and avoids what is done only when it is without any
reasonable basis, and therefore is purely arbitrary. 2. A classification having some
reasonable basis does not offend against that clause merely because it is not made with
mathematical nicety, or because in practice it results in some inequality. 3. When the
classification in such a law is called in question, if any state of facts reasonably can be
conceived that would sustain it, the existence of that state of facts at the time the law was
enacted must be assumed. 4. One who assails the classification in such a law must carry
the burden of showing that it does not rest upon any reasonable basis but is essentially
arbitrary."
c. Authorities recognizing citizenship as basis for classification. —
The question as to whether or not citizenship is a legal and valid ground for classification
has already been affirmatively decided in this jurisdiction as well as in various courts in the
United States. In the case of Smith Bell & Co. vs. Natividad, 40 Phil. 136, where the validity
of Act No. 2761 of the Philippine Legislature was in issue, because of a condition therein
limiting the ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to corporations formed by
citizens of the Philippine Islands or the United States, thus denying the right to aliens, it was
held that the Philippine Legislature did not violate the equal protection clause of the
Philippine Bill of Rights. The legislature in enacting the law had as ultimate purpose the
encouragement of Philippine shipbuilding and the safety for these Islands from foreign
interlopers. We held that this was a valid exercise of the police power, and all presumptions
are in favor of its constitutionality. In substance, we held that the limitation of domestic
ownership of vessels engaged in coastwise trade to citizens of the Philippines does not
violate the equal protection of the law and due process or law clauses of the Philippine Bill of
Rights. In rendering said decision we quoted with approval the concurring opinion of Justice
Johnson in the case of Gibbons vs. Ogden, 9 Wheat., I, as follows:
"Licensing acts, in fact, in legislation, are universally restraining acts; as, for example, acts
licensing gaming houses, retailers of spirituous liquors, etc. The act, in this instance, is
distinctly of that character, and forms part of an extensive system, the object of which is to
encourage American shipping, and place them on an equal footing with the shipping of other
nations. Almost every commercial nation reserves to its own subjects a monopoly of its
coasting trade; and a countervailing privilege in favor of American shipping is contemplated,
in the whole legislation of the United States on this subject. It is not to give the vessel an
American character, that the license is granted; that effect has been correctly attributed to
the act of her enrollment. But it is to confer on her American privileges, as contra
distinguished from foreign; and to preserve the Government from fraud by foreigners; in
surreptitiously intruding themselves into the American commercial marine, as well as frauds
upon the revenue in the trade coastwise, that this whole system is projected."
The rule in general is as follows:
Aliens are under no special constitutional protection which forbids a classification otherwise
justified simply because the limitation of the class falls along the lines of nationality. That
would be requiring a higher degree of protection for aliens as a class than for similar classes
than for similar classes of American citizens. Broadly speaking, the difference in status
between citizens and aliens constitutes a basis for reasonable classification in the exercise
of police power. (2 Am., Jur. 468-469.)
In Commonwealth vs. Hana, 81 N. E. 149 (Massachusetts, 1907), a statute on the licensing

of hawkers and peddlers, which provided that no one can obtain a license unless he is, or
has declared his intention, to become a citizen of the United States, was held valid, for the
following reason: It may seem wise to the legislature to limit the business of those who are
supposed to have regard for the welfare, good order and happiness of the community, and
the court cannot question this judgment and conclusion. In Bloomfield vs. State, 99 N. E.
309 (Ohio, 1912), a statute which prevented certain persons, among them aliens, from
engaging in the traffic of liquors, was found not to be the result of race hatred, or in
hospitality, or a deliberate purpose to discriminate, but was based on the belief that an alien
cannot be sufficiently acquainted with "our institutions and our life as to enable him to
appreciate the relation of this particular business to our entire social fabric", and was not,
therefore, invalid. In Ohio ex rel. Clarke vs. Deckebach, 274 U. S. 392, 71 L. ed. 115 (1926),
the U.S. Supreme Court had under consideration an ordinance of the city of Cincinnati
prohibiting the issuance of licenses (pools and billiard rooms) to aliens. It held that plainly
irrational discrimination against aliens is prohibited, but it does not follow that alien race and
allegiance may not bear in some instances such a relation to a legitimate object of
legislation as to be made the basis of permitted classification, and that it could not state that
the legislation is clearly wrong; and that latitude must be allowed for the legislative
appraisement of local conditions and for the legislative choice of methods for controlling an
apprehended evil. The case of State vs. Carrol, 124 N. E. 129 (Ohio, 1919) is a parallel case
to the one at bar. In Asakura vs. City of Seattle, 210 P. 30 (Washington, 1922), the business
of pawn brooking was considered as having tendencies injuring public interest, and limiting it
to citizens is within the scope of police power. A similar statute denying aliens the right to
engage in auctioneering was also sustained in Wright vs. May, L.R.A., 1915 P. 151
(Minnesota, 1914). So also in Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340 (Oregon, 1924), the court
said that aliens are judicially known to have different interests, knowledge, attitude,
psychology and loyalty, hence the prohibitions of issuance of licenses to them for the
business of pawnbroker, pool, billiard, card room, dance hall, is not an infringement of
constitutional rights. In Templar vs. Michigan State Board of Examiners, 90 N.W. 1058
(Michigan, 1902), a law prohibiting the licensing of aliens as barbers was held void, but the
reason for the decision was the court's findings that the exercise of the business by the
aliens does not in any way affect the morals, the health, or even the convenience of the
community. In Takahashi vs. Fish and Game Commission, 92 L. ed. 1479 (1947), a
California statute banning the issuance of commercial fishing licenses to person ineligible to
citizenship was held void, because the law conflicts with Federal power over immigration,
and because there is no public interest in the mere claim of ownership of the waters and the
fish in them, so there was no adequate justification for the discrimination. It further added
that the law was the outgrowth of antagonism toward the persons of Japanese ancestry.
However, two Justices dissented on the theory that fishing rights have been treated
traditionally as natural resources. In Fraser vs. McConway & Tarley Co., 82 Fed. 257
(Pennsylvania, 1897), a state law which imposed a tax on every employer of foreign-born
unnaturalized male persons over 21 years of age, was declared void because the court
found that there was no reason for the classification and the tax was an arbitrary deduction
from the daily wage of an employee.
d. Authorities contra explained. —
It is true that some decisions of the Federal court and of the State courts in the United
States hold that the distinction between aliens and citizens is not a valid ground for
classification. But in this decision the laws declared invalid were found to be either arbitrary,
unreasonable or capricious, or were the result or product of racial antagonism and hostility,
and there was no question of public interest involved or pursued. In Yu Cong Eng vs.
Trinidad, 70 L. ed. 1059 (1925), the United States Supreme Court declared invalid a
Philippine law making unlawful the keeping of books of account in any language other than
English, Spanish or any other local dialect, but the main reasons for the decisions are: (1)
that if Chinese were driven out of business there would be no other system of distribution,
and (2) that the Chinese would fall prey to all kinds of fraud, because they would be
deprived of their right to be advised of their business and to direct its conduct. The real
reason for the decision, therefore, is the court's belief that no public benefit would be derived
from the operations of the law and on the other hand it would deprive Chinese of something
indispensable for carrying on their business. In Yick Wo vs. Hopkins, 30 L. ed 220 (1885) an
ordinance conferring powers on officials to withhold consent in the operation of laundries
both as to persons and place, was declared invalid, but the court said that the power granted
was arbitrary, that there was no reason for the discrimination which attended the
administration and implementation of the law, and that the motive thereof was mere racial
hostility. In State vs. Montgomery, 47 A. 165 (Maine, 1900), a law prohibiting aliens to
engage as hawkers and peddlers was declared void, because the discrimination bore no
reasonable and just relation to the act in respect to which the classification was proposed.
The case at bar is radically different, and the facts make them so. As we already have said,
aliens do not naturally possess the sympathetic consideration and regard for the customers
with whom they come in daily contact, nor the patriotic desire to help bolster the nation's
economy, except in so far as it enhances their profit, nor the loyalty and allegiance which the
national owes to the land. These limitations on the qualifications of the aliens have been
shown on many occasions and instances, especially in times of crisis and emergency. We
can do no better than borrow the language of Anton vs. Van Winkle, 297 F. 340, 342, to
drive home the reality and significance of the distinction between the alien and the national,
thus:
. . . . It may be judicially known, however, that alien coming into this country are without the
intimate knowledge of our laws, customs, and usages that our own people have. So it is
likewise known that certain classes of aliens are of different psychology from our fellow
countrymen. Furthermore, it is natural and reasonable to suppose that the foreign born,
whose allegiance is first to their own country, and whose ideals of governmental
environment and control have been engendered and formed under entirely different regimes
and political systems, have not the same inspiration for the public weal, nor are they as well
disposed toward the United States, as those who by citizenship, are a part of the
government itself. Further enlargement, is unnecessary. I have said enough so that
obviously it cannot be affirmed with absolute confidence that the Legislature was without
plausible reason for making the classification, and therefore appropriate discriminations
against aliens as it relates to the subject of legislation. . . . .
VII. The Due Process of Law Limitation.
a. Reasonability, the test of the limitation; determination by legislature decisive. —
We now come to due process as a limitation on the exercise of the police power. It has been
stated by the highest authority in the United States that:
. . . . And the guaranty of due process, as has often been held, demands only that the law
shall not be unreasonable, arbitrary or capricious, and that the means selected shall have a
real and substantial relation to the subject sought to be attained. . . . .
xxx xxx xxx
So far as the requirement of due process is concerned and in the absence of other
constitutional restriction a state is free to adopt whatever economic policy may reasonably
be deemed to promote public welfare, and to enforce that policy by legislation adapted to its
purpose. The courts are without authority either to declare such policy, or, when it is
declared by the legislature, to override it. If the laws passed are seen to have a reasonable
relation to a proper legislative purpose, and are neither arbitrary nor discriminatory, the
requirements of due process are satisfied, and judicial determination to that effect renders a
court functus officio. . . . (Nebbia vs. New York, 78 L. ed. 940, 950, 957.)
Another authority states the principle thus:
. . . . Too much significance cannot be given to the word "reasonable" in considering the
scope of the police power in a constitutional sense, for the test used to determine the
constitutionality of the means employed by the legislature is to inquire whether the restriction
it imposes on rights secured to individuals by the Bill of Rights are unreasonable, and not
whether it imposes any restrictions on such rights. . . .
xxx xxx xxx
. . . . A statute to be within this power must also be reasonable in its operation upon the
persons whom it affects, must not be for the annoyance of a particular class, and must not
be unduly oppressive. (11 Am. Jur. Sec. 302., 1:1)- 1074-1075.)
In the case of Lawton vs. Steele, 38 L. ed. 385, 388. it was also held:
. . . . To justify the state in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must
appear, first, that the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class, require such interference; and second, that the means are reasonably
necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
individuals. . . .
Prata Undertaking Co. vs. State Board of Embalming, 104 ALR, 389, 395, fixes this test of
constitutionality:
In determining whether a given act of the Legislature, passed in the exercise of the police
power to regulate the operation of a business, is or is not constitutional, one of the first
questions to be considered by the court is whether the power as exercised has a sufficient
foundation in reason in connection with the matter involved, or is an arbitrary, oppressive,
and capricious use of that power, without substantial relation to the health, safety, morals,
comfort, and general welfare of the public.
b. Petitioner's argument considered. —
Petitioner's main argument is that retail is a common, ordinary occupation, one of those
privileges long ago recognized as essential to the orderly pursuant of happiness by free
men; that it is a gainful and honest occupation and therefore beyond the power of the
legislature to prohibit and penalized. This arguments overlooks fact and reality and rests on
an incorrect assumption and premise, i.e., that in this country where the occupation is
engaged in by petitioner, it has been so engaged by him, by the alien in an honest creditable
and unimpeachable manner, without harm or injury to the citizens and without ultimate
danger to their economic peace, tranquility and welfare. But the Legislature has found, as
we have also found and indicated, that the privilege has been so grossly abused by the
alien, thru the illegitimate use of pernicious designs and practices, that he now enjoys a
monopolistic control of the occupation and threatens a deadly stranglehold on the nation's
economy endangering the national security in times of crisis and emergency.
The real question at issue, therefore, is not that posed by petitioner, which overlooks and
ignores the facts and circumstances, but this, Is the exclusion in the future of aliens from the
retail trade unreasonable. Arbitrary capricious, taking into account the illegitimate and
pernicious form and manner in which the aliens have heretofore engaged therein? As thus
correctly stated the answer is clear. The law in question is deemed absolutely necessary to
bring about the desired legislative objective, i.e., to free national economy from alien control
and dominance. It is not necessarily unreasonable because it affects private rights and
privileges (11 Am. Jur. pp. 1080-1081.) The test of reasonableness of a law is the
appropriateness or adequacy under all circumstances of the means adopted to carry out its
purpose into effect (Id.) Judged by this test, disputed legislation, which is not merely
reasonable but actually necessary, must be considered not to have infringed the
constitutional limitation of reasonableness.
The necessity of the law in question is explained in the explanatory note that accompanied
the bill, which later was enacted into law:
This bill proposes to regulate the retail business. Its purpose is to prevent persons who are
not citizens of the Philippines from having a strangle hold upon our economic life. If the
persons who control this vital artery of our economic life are the ones who owe no allegiance
to this Republic, who have no profound devotion to our free institutions, and who have no
permanent stake in our people's welfare, we are not really the masters of our destiny. All
aspects of our life, even our national security, will be at the mercy of other people.
In seeking to accomplish the foregoing purpose, we do not propose to deprive persons who
are not citizens of the Philippines of their means of livelihood. While this bill seeks to take
away from the hands of persons who are not citizens of the Philippines a power that can be
wielded to paralyze all aspects of our national life and endanger our national security it
respects existing rights.
The approval of this bill is necessary for our national survival.
If political independence is a legitimate aspiration of a people, then economic independence

is none the less legitimate. Freedom and liberty are not real and positive if the people are
subject to the economic control and domination of others, especially if not of their own race
or country. The removal and eradication of the shackles of foreign economic control and
domination, is one of the noblest motives that a national legislature may pursue. It is
impossible to conceive that legislation that seeks to bring it about can infringe the
constitutional limitation of due process. The attainment of a legitimate aspiration of a people
can never be beyond the limits of legislative authority.
c. Law expressly held by Constitutional Convention to be within the sphere of legislative
action. —
The framers of the Constitution could not have intended to impose the constitutional
restrictions of due process on the attainment of such a noble motive as freedom from
economic control and domination, thru the exercise of the police power. The fathers of the
Constitution must have given to the legislature full authority and power to enact legislation
that would promote the supreme happiness of the people, their freedom and liberty. On the
precise issue now before us, they expressly made their voice clear; they adopted a
resolution expressing their belief that the legislation in question is within the scope of the
legislative power. Thus they declared the their Resolution:
That it is the sense of the Convention that the public interest requires the nationalization of
retail trade; but it abstain from approving the amendment introduced by the Delegate for
Manila, Mr. Araneta, and others on this matter because it is convinced that the National
Assembly is authorized to promulgate a law which limits to Filipino and American citizens
the privilege to engage in the retail trade. (11 Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine
Constitution, quoted on pages 66 and 67 of the Memorandum for the Petitioner.)
It would do well to refer to the nationalistic tendency manifested in various provisions of the
Constitution. Thus in the preamble, a principle objective is the conservation of the patrimony
of the nation and as corollary the provision limiting to citizens of the Philippines the
exploitation, development and utilization of its natural resources. And in Section 8 of Article
XIV, it is provided that "no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for the
operation of the public utility shall be granted except to citizens of the Philippines." The
nationalization of the retail trade is only a continuance of the nationalistic protective policy
laid down as a primary objective of the Constitution. Can it be said that a law imbued with
the same purpose and spirit underlying many of the provisions of the Constitution is
unreasonable, invalid and unconstitutional?
The seriousness of the Legislature's concern for the plight of the nationals as manifested in
the approval of the radical measures is, therefore, fully justified. It would have been recreant
to its duties towards the country and its people would it view the sorry plight of the nationals
with the complacency and refuse or neglect to adopt a remedy commensurate with the
demands of public interest and national survival. As the repository of the sovereign power of
legislation, the Legislature was in duty bound to face the problem and meet, through
adequate measures, the danger and threat that alien domination of retail trade poses to
national economy.
d. Provisions of law not unreasonable. —
A cursory study of the provisions of the law immediately reveals how tolerant, how
reasonable the Legislature has been. The law is made prospective and recognizes the right
and privilege of those already engaged in the occupation to continue therein during the rest
of their lives; and similar recognition of the right to continue is accorded associations of
aliens. The right or privilege is denied to those only upon conviction of certain offenses. In
the deliberations of the Court on this case, attention was called to the fact that the privilege
should not have been denied to children and heirs of aliens now engaged in the retail trade.
Such provision would defeat the law itself, its aims and purposes. Beside, the exercise of
legislative discretion is not subject to judicial review. It is well settled that the Court will not
inquire into the motives of the Legislature, nor pass upon general matters of legislative
judgment. The Legislature is primarily the judge of the necessity of an enactment or of any
of its provisions, and every presumption is in favor of its validity, and though the Court may
hold views inconsistent with the wisdom of the law, it may not annul the legislation if not
palpably in excess of the legislative power. Furthermore, the test of the validity of a law
attacked as a violation of due process, is not its reasonableness, but its unreasonableness,
and we find the provisions are not unreasonable. These principles also answer various other
arguments raised against the law, some of which are: that the law does not promote general
welfare; that thousands of aliens would be thrown out of employment; that prices will
increase because of the elimination of competition; that there is no need for the legislation;
that adequate replacement is problematical; that there may be general breakdown; that
there would be repercussions from foreigners; etc. Many of these arguments are directed
against the supposed wisdom of the law which lies solely within the legislative prerogative;
they do not import invalidity.
VIII. Alleged defect in the title of the law
A subordinate ground or reason for the alleged invalidity of the law is the claim that the title
thereof is misleading or deceptive, as it conceals the real purpose of the bill which is to
nationalize the retail business and prohibit aliens from engaging therein. The constitutional
provision which is claimed to be violated in Section 21 (1) of Article VI, which reads:
No bill which may be enacted in the law shall embrace more than one subject which shall be
expressed in the title of the bill.
What the above provision prohibits is duplicity, that is, if its title completely fails to appraise
the legislators or the public of the nature, scope and consequences of the law or its
operation (I Sutherland, Statutory Construction, Sec. 1707, p. 297.) A cursory consideration
of the title and the provisions of the bill fails to show the presence of duplicity. It is true that
the term "regulate" does not and may not readily and at first glance convey the idea of
"nationalization" and "prohibition", which terms express the two main purposes and
objectives of the law. But "regulate" is a broader term than either prohibition or
nationalization. Both of these have always been included within the term regulation.
Under the title of an act to "regulate", the sale of intoxicating liquors, the Legislature may
prohibit the sale of intoxicating liquors. (Sweet vs. City of Wabash, 41 Ind., 7; quoted in page
41 of Answer.)
Within the meaning of the Constitution requiring that the subject of every act of the
Legislature shall be stated in the tale, the title to regulate the sale of intoxicating liquors,
etc." sufficiently expresses the subject of an act prohibiting the sale of such liquors to minors
and to persons in the habit of getting intoxicated; such matters being properly included
within the subject of regulating the sale. (Williams vs. State, 48 Ind. 306, 308, quoted in p.
42 of Answer.)
The word "regulate" is of broad import, and necessarily implies some degree of restraint and
prohibition of acts usually done in connection with the thing to be regulated. While word
regulate does not ordinarily convey meaning of prohibit, there is no absolute reason why it
should not have such meaning when used in delegating police power in connection with a
thing the best or only efficacious regulation of which involves suppression. (State vs. Morton,
162 So. 718, 182 La. 887, quoted in p. 42 of Answer.)
The general rule is for the use of general terms in the title of a bill; it has also been said that
the title need not be an index to the entire contents of the law (I Sutherland, Statutory
Construction, See. 4803, p. 345.)law pur The above rule was followed the title of the Act in
question adopted the more general term "regulate" instead of "nationalize" or "prohibit".
Furthermore, the law also contains other rules for the regulation of the retail trade which may
not be included in the terms "nationalization" or "prohibition"; so were the title changed from
"regulate" to "nationalize" or "prohibit", there would have been many provisions not falling
within the scope of the title which would have made the Act invalid. The use of the term
"regulate", therefore, is in accord with the principle governing the drafting of statutes, under
which a simple or general term should be adopted in the title, which would include all other
provisions found in the body of the Act.
One purpose of the constitutional directive that the subject of a bill should be embraced in its
title is to apprise the legislators of the purposes, the nature and scope of its provisions, and
prevent the enactment into law of matters which have received the notice, action and study
of the legislators or of the public. In the case at bar it cannot be claimed that the legislators
have been appraised of the nature of the law, especially the nationalization and the
prohibition provisions. The legislators took active interest in the discussion of the law, and a
great many of the persons affected by the prohibitions in the law conducted a campaign
against its approval. It cannot be claimed, therefore, that the reasons for declaring the law
invalid ever existed. The objection must therefore, be overruled.
IX. Alleged violation of international treaties and obligations
Another subordinate argument against the validity of the law is the supposed violation
thereby of the Charter of the United Nations and of the Declaration of the Human Rights
adopted by the United Nations General Assembly. We find no merit in the Nations Charter
imposes no strict or legal obligations regarding the rights and freedom of their subjects
(Hans Kelsen, The Law of the United Nations, 1951 ed. pp. 29-32), and the Declaration of
Human Rights contains nothing more than a mere recommendation or a common standard
of achievement for all peoples and all nations (Id. p. 39.) That such is the import of the
United Nations Charter aid of the Declaration of Human Rights can be inferred the fact that
members of the United Nations Organizations, such as Norway and Denmark, prohibit
foreigners from engaging in retail trade, and in most nations of the world laws against
foreigners engaged in domestic trade are adopted.
The Treaty of Amity between the Republic of the Philippines and the Republic of China of
April 18, 1947 is also claimed to be violated by the law in question. All that the treaty
guarantees is equality of treatment to the Chinese nationals "upon the same terms as the
nationals of any other country." But the nationals of China are not discriminating against
because nationals of all other countries, except those of the United States, who are granted
special rights by the Constitution, are all prohibited from engaging in the retail trade. But
even supposing that the law infringes upon the said treaty, the treaty is always subject to
qualification or amendment by a subsequent law (U. S. vs. Thompson, 258, Fed. 257, 260),
and the same may never curtail or restrict the scope of the police power of the State (plaston
vs. Pennsylvania, 58 L. ed. 539.)
X. Conclusion
Resuming what we have set forth above we hold that the disputed law was enacted to
remedy a real actual threat and danger to national economy posed by alien dominance and
control of the retail business and free citizens and country from dominance and control; that
the enactment clearly falls within the scope of the police power of the State, thru which and
by which it protects its own personality and insures its security and future; that the law does
not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution because sufficient grounds exist
for the distinction between alien and citizen in the exercise of the occupation regulated, nor
the due process of law clause, because the law is prospective in operation and recognizes
the privilege of aliens already engaged in the occupation and reasonably protects their
privilege; that the wisdom and efficacy of the law to carry out its objectives appear to us to
be plainly evident — as a matter of fact it seems not only appropriate but actually necessary
— and that in any case such matter falls within the prerogative of the Legislature, with
whose power and discretion the Judicial department of the Government may not interfere;
that the provisions of the law are clearly embraced in the title, and this suffers from no
duplicity and has not misled the legislators or the segment of the population affected; and
that it cannot be said to be void for supposed conflict with treaty obligations because no
treaty has actually been entered into on the subject and the police power may not be
curtailed or surrendered by any treaty or any other conventional agreement.
Some members of the Court are of the opinion that the radical effects of the law could have
been made less harsh in its impact on the aliens. Thus it is stated that the more time should
have been given in the law for the liquidation of existing businesses when the time comes
for them to close. Our legal duty, however, is merely to determine if the law falls within the
scope of legislative authority and does not transcend the limitations of due process and
equal protection guaranteed in the Constitution. Remedies against the harshness of the law
should be addressed to the Legislature; they are beyond our power and jurisdiction.
The petition is hereby denied, with costs against petitioner.

38. G.R. No. 160756 March 9, 2010
CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS' ASSOCIATIONS, INC., Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY ALBERTO ROMULO, THE HON. ACTING

SECRETARY OF FINANCE JUANITA D. AMATONG, and THE HON. COMMISSIONER OF
INTERNAL REVENUE GUILLERMO PARAYNO, JR., Respondents.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
In this original petition for certiorari and mandamus,1 petitioner Chamber of Real Estate and
Builders’ Associations, Inc. is questioning the constitutionality of Section 27 (E) of Republic Act
(RA) 84242 and the revenue regulations (RRs) issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR)
to implement said provision and those involving creditable withholding taxes. 3
Petitioner is an association of real estate developers and builders in the Philippines. It impleaded
former Executive Secretary Alberto Romulo, then acting Secretary of Finance Juanita D.
Amatong and then Commissioner of Internal Revenue Guillermo Parayno, Jr. as respondents.
Petitioner assails the validity of the imposition of minimum corporate income tax (MCIT) on
corporations and creditable withholding tax (CWT) on sales of real properties classified as
ordinary assets.
Section 27(E) of RA 8424 provides for MCIT on domestic corporations and is implemented by
RR 9-98. Petitioner argues that the MCIT violates the due process clause because it levies
income tax even if there is no realized gain.
Petitioner also seeks to nullify Sections 2.57.2(J) (as amended by RR 6-2001) and 2.58.2 of RR
2-98, and Section 4(a)(ii) and (c)(ii) of RR 7-2003, all of which prescribe the rules and procedures
for the collection of CWT on the sale of real properties categorized as ordinary assets. Petitioner
contends that these revenue regulations are contrary to law for two reasons: first, they ignore the
different treatment by RA 8424 of ordinary assets and capital assets and second, respondent
Secretary of Finance has no authority to collect CWT, much less, to base the CWT on the gross
selling price or fair market value of the real properties classified as ordinary assets.
Petitioner also asserts that the enumerated provisions of the subject revenue regulations violate
the due process clause because, like the MCIT, the government collects income tax even when
the net income has not yet been determined. They contravene the equal protection clause as
well because the CWT is being levied upon real estate enterprises but not on other business
enterprises, more particularly those in the manufacturing sector.
The issues to be resolved are as follows:
(1) whether or not this Court should take cognizance of the present case;
(2) whether or not the imposition of the MCIT on domestic corporations is unconstitutional
and
(3) whether or not the imposition of CWT on income from sales of real properties classified
as ordinary assets under RRs 2-98, 6-2001 and 7-2003, is unconstitutional.
Overview of the Assailed Provisions
Under the MCIT scheme, a corporation, beginning on its fourth year of operation, is assessed an
MCIT of 2% of its gross income when such MCIT is greater than the normal corporate income
tax imposed under Section 27(A). 4 If the regular income tax is higher than the MCIT, the
corporation does not pay the MCIT. Any excess of the MCIT over the normal tax shall be carried
forward and credited against the normal income tax for the three immediately succeeding taxable
years. Section 27(E) of RA 8424 provides:
Section 27 (E). [MCIT] on Domestic Corporations. -
(1) Imposition of Tax. – A [MCIT] of two percent (2%) of the gross income as of the end
of the taxable year, as defined herein, is hereby imposed on a corporation taxable under
this Title, beginning on the fourth taxable year immediately following the year in which
such corporation commenced its business operations, when the minimum income tax is
greater than the tax computed under Subsection (A) of this Section for the taxable year.
(2) Carry Forward of Excess Minimum Tax. – Any excess of the [MCIT] over the normal
income tax as computed under Subsection (A) of this Section shall be carried forward and
credited against the normal income tax for the three (3) immediately succeeding taxable
years.
(3) Relief from the [MCIT] under certain conditions. – The Secretary of Finance is hereby
authorized to suspend the imposition of the [MCIT] on any corporation which suffers
losses on account of prolonged labor dispute, or because of force majeure, or because
of legitimate business reverses.
The Secretary of Finance is hereby authorized to promulgate, upon recommendation of

the Commissioner, the necessary rules and regulations that shall define the terms and
conditions under which he may suspend the imposition of the [MCIT] in a meritorious
case.
(4) Gross Income Defined. – For purposes of applying the [MCIT] provided under
Subsection (E) hereof, the term ‘gross income’ shall mean gross sales less sales returns,
discounts and allowances and cost of goods sold. "Cost of goods sold" shall include all
business expenses directly incurred to produce the merchandise to bring them to their
present location and use.
For trading or merchandising concern, "cost of goods sold" shall include the invoice cost of the
goods sold, plus import duties, freight in transporting the goods to the place where the goods are
actually sold including insurance while the goods are in transit.
For a manufacturing concern, "cost of goods manufactured and sold" shall include all costs of
production of finished goods, such as raw materials used, direct labor and manufacturing
overhead, freight cost, insurance premiums and other costs incurred to bring the raw materials
to the factory or warehouse.
In the case of taxpayers engaged in the sale of service, "gross income" means gross receipts
less sales returns, allowances, discounts and cost of services. "Cost of services" shall mean all
direct costs and expenses necessarily incurred to provide the services required by the customers
and clients including (A) salaries and employee benefits of personnel, consultants and specialists
directly rendering the service and (B) cost of facilities directly utilized in providing the service such
as depreciation or rental of equipment used and cost of supplies: Provided, however, that in the
case of banks, "cost of services" shall include interest expense.
On August 25, 1998, respondent Secretary of Finance (Secretary), on the recommendation of

the Commissioner of Internal Revenue (CIR), promulgated RR 9-98 implementing Section 27(E).5
The pertinent portions thereof read:
Sec. 2.27(E) [MCIT] on Domestic Corporations. –
(1) Imposition of the Tax. – A [MCIT] of two percent (2%) of the gross income as of the end of
the taxable year (whether calendar or fiscal year, depending on the accounting period employed)
is hereby imposed upon any domestic corporation beginning the fourth (4th) taxable year
immediately following the taxable year in which such corporation commenced its business
operations. The MCIT shall be imposed whenever such corporation has zero or negative taxable
income or whenever the amount of minimum corporate income tax is greater than the normal
income tax due from such corporation.
For purposes of these Regulations, the term, "normal income tax" means the income tax rates
prescribed under Sec. 27(A) and Sec. 28(A)(1) of the Code xxx at 32% effective January 1, 2000
and thereafter.
xxx xxx xxx
(2) Carry forward of excess [MCIT]. – Any excess of the [MCIT] over the normal income tax as
computed under Sec. 27(A) of the Code shall be carried forward on an annual basis and credited
against the normal income tax for the three (3) immediately succeeding taxable years.
xxx xxx xxx
Meanwhile, on April 17, 1998, respondent Secretary, upon recommendation of respondent CIR,
promulgated RR 2-98 implementing certain provisions of RA 8424 involving the withholding of
taxes.6 Under Section 2.57.2(J) of RR No. 2-98, income payments from the sale, exchange or
transfer of real property, other than capital assets, by persons residing in the Philippines and
habitually engaged in the real estate business were subjected to CWT:
Sec. 2.57.2. Income payment subject to [CWT] and rates prescribed thereon:
xxx xxx xxx
(J) Gross selling price or total amount of consideration or its equivalent paid to the seller/owner
for the sale, exchange or transfer of. – Real property, other than capital assets, sold by an
individual, corporation, estate, trust, trust fund or pension fund and the seller/transferor is
habitually engaged in the real estate business in accordance with the following schedule –
Those which are exempt Exempt

from a withholding tax at
source as prescribed in Sec.
2.57.5 of these regulations.
With a selling price of five 1.5%

hundred thousand pesos
(₱500,000.00) or less.
With a selling price of more 3.0%

than five hundred thousand
pesos (₱500,000.00) but not
more than two million pesos
(₱2,000,000.00).
With selling price of more 5.0%

than two million pesos
(₱2,000,000.00)
xxx xxx xxx
Gross selling price shall mean the consideration stated in the sales document or the fair market
value determined in accordance with Section 6 (E) of the Code, as amended, whichever is higher.
In an exchange, the fair market value of the property received in exchange, as determined in the
Income Tax Regulations shall be used.
Where the consideration or part thereof is payable on installment, no withholding tax is required
to be made on the periodic installment payments where the buyer is an individual not engaged
in trade or business. In such a case, the applicable rate of tax based on the entire consideration
shall be withheld on the last installment or installments to be paid to the seller.
However, if the buyer is engaged in trade or business, whether a corporation or otherwise, the
tax shall be deducted and withheld by the buyer on every installment.
This provision was amended by RR 6-2001 on July 31, 2001:
Sec. 2.57.2. Income payment subject to [CWT] and rates prescribed thereon:
xxx xxx xxx
(J) Gross selling price or total amount of consideration or its equivalent paid to the seller/owner
for the sale, exchange or transfer of real property classified as ordinary asset. - A [CWT] based
on the gross selling price/total amount of consideration or the fair market value determined in
accordance with Section 6(E) of the Code, whichever is higher, paid to the seller/owner for the
sale, transfer or exchange of real property, other than capital asset, shall be imposed upon the
withholding agent,/buyer, in accordance with the following schedule:
Where the seller/transferor is exempt from Exempt

[CWT] in accordance with Sec. 2.57.5 of these
regulations.
Upon the following values of real property,

where the seller/transferor is habitually
engaged in the real estate business.
With a selling price of Five Hundred Thousand 1.5%

Pesos (₱500,000.00) or less.
With a selling price of more than Five Hundred 3.0%

Thousand Pesos (₱500,000.00) but not more
than Two Million Pesos (₱2,000,000.00).
With a selling price of more than two Million 5.0%

Pesos (₱2,000,000.00).
xxx xxx xxx
Gross selling price shall remain the consideration stated in the sales document or the fair market
value determined in accordance with Section 6 (E) of the Code, as amended, whichever is higher.
In an exchange, the fair market value of the property received in exchange shall be considered
as the consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
However, if the buyer is engaged in trade or business, whether a corporation or otherwise, these
rules shall apply:
(i) If the sale is a sale of property on the installment plan (that is, payments in the year of sale do
not exceed 25% of the selling price), the tax shall be deducted and withheld by the buyer on
every installment.
(ii) If, on the other hand, the sale is on a "cash basis" or is a "deferred-payment sale not on the
installment plan" (that is, payments in the year of sale exceed 25% of the selling price), the buyer
shall withhold the tax based on the gross selling price or fair market value of the property,
whichever is higher, on the first installment.
In any case, no Certificate Authorizing Registration (CAR) shall be issued to the buyer unless the
[CWT] due on the sale, transfer or exchange of real property other than capital asset has been
fully paid. (Underlined amendments in the original)
Section 2.58.2 of RR 2-98 implementing Section 58(E) of RA 8424 provides that any sale, barter
or exchange subject to the CWT will not be recorded by the Registry of Deeds until the CIR has
certified that such transfers and conveyances have been reported and the taxes thereof have
been duly paid:7
Sec. 2.58.2. Registration with the Register of Deeds. – Deeds of conveyances of land or land
and building/improvement thereon arising from sales, barters, or exchanges subject to the
creditable expanded withholding tax shall not be recorded by the Register of Deeds unless the
[CIR] or his duly authorized representative has certified that such transfers and conveyances
have been reported and the expanded withholding tax, inclusive of the documentary stamp tax,
due thereon have been fully paid xxxx.
On February 11, 2003, RR No. 7-20038 was promulgated, providing for the guidelines in
determining whether a particular real property is a capital or an ordinary asset for purposes of
imposing the MCIT, among others. The pertinent portions thereof state:
Section 4. Applicable taxes on sale, exchange or other disposition of real property. -

Gains/Income derived from sale, exchange, or other disposition of real properties shall, unless
otherwise exempt, be subject to applicable taxes imposed under the Code, depending on whether
the subject properties are classified as capital assets or ordinary assets;
a. In the case of individual citizen (including estates and trusts), resident aliens, and non-resident
aliens engaged in trade or business in the Philippines;
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) The sale of real property located in the Philippines, classified as ordinary assets, shall be
subject to the [CWT] (expanded) under Sec. 2.57..2(J) of [RR 2-98], as amended, based on the
gross selling price or current fair market value as determined in accordance with Section 6(E) of
the Code, whichever is higher, and consequently, to the ordinary income tax imposed under Sec.
24(A)(1)(c) or 25(A)(1) of the Code, as the case may be, based on net taxable income.
xxx xxx xxx
c. In the case of domestic corporations. –
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) The sale of land and/or building classified as ordinary asset and other real property (other
than land and/or building treated as capital asset), regardless of the classification thereof, all of
which are located in the Philippines, shall be subject to the [CWT] (expanded) under Sec.
2.57.2(J) of [RR 2-98], as amended, and consequently, to the ordinary income tax under Sec.
27(A) of the Code. In lieu of the ordinary income tax, however, domestic corporations may
become subject to the [MCIT] under Sec. 27(E) of the Code, whichever is applicable.
xxx xxx xxx
We shall now tackle the issues raised.

Existence of a Justiciable Controversy
Courts will not assume jurisdiction over a constitutional question unless the following requisites
are satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case calling for the exercise of judicial review; (2) the
question before the court must be ripe for adjudication; (3) the person challenging the validity of
the act must have standing to do so; (4) the question of constitutionality must have been raised
at the earliest opportunity and (5) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis mota of the
case.9
Respondents aver that the first three requisites are absent in this case. According to them, there
is no actual case calling for the exercise of judicial power and it is not yet ripe for adjudication
because
[petitioner] did not allege that CREBA, as a corporate entity, or any of its members, has been
assessed by the BIR for the payment of [MCIT] or [CWT] on sales of real property. Neither did
petitioner allege that its members have shut down their businesses as a result of the payment of
the MCIT or CWT. Petitioner has raised concerns in mere abstract and hypothetical form without
any actual, specific and concrete instances cited that the assailed law and revenue regulations
have actually and adversely affected it. Lacking empirical data on which to base any conclusion,
any discussion on the constitutionality of the MCIT or CWT on sales of real property is essentially
an academic exercise.
Perceived or alleged hardship to taxpayers alone is not an adequate justification for adjudicating
abstract issues. Otherwise, adjudication would be no different from the giving of advisory opinion
that does not really settle legal issues.10
An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights or an assertion of opposite legal
claims which is susceptible of judicial resolution as distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract
difference or dispute.11 On the other hand, a question is considered ripe for adjudication when
the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. 12
Contrary to respondents’ assertion, we do not have to wait until petitioner’s members have shut
down their operations as a result of the MCIT or CWT. The assailed provisions are already being
implemented. As we stated in Didipio Earth-Savers’ Multi-Purpose Association, Incorporated
(DESAMA) v. Gozun:13
By the mere enactment of the questioned law or the approval of the challenged act, the dispute
is said to have ripened into a judicial controversy even without any other overt act. Indeed, even
a singular violation of the Constitution and/or the law is enough to awaken judicial duty. 14
If the assailed provisions are indeed unconstitutional, there is no better time than the present to
settle such question once and for all.
Respondents next argue that petitioner has no legal standing to sue:
Petitioner is an association of some of the real estate developers and builders in the Philippines.
Petitioners did not allege that [it] itself is in the real estate business. It did not allege any material
interest or any wrong that it may suffer from the enforcement of [the assailed provisions].15
Legal standing or locus standi is a party’s personal and substantial interest in a case such that it
has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act being challenged.16
In Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor,17 we held that the association had legal
standing because its members stood to be injured by the enforcement of the assailed provisions:
Petitioner association has the legal standing to institute the instant petition xxx. There is no
dispute that the individual members of petitioner association are residents of the NGC. As such
they are covered and stand to be either benefited or injured by the enforcement of the IRR,
particularly as regards the selection process of beneficiaries and lot allocation to qualified
beneficiaries. Thus, petitioner association may assail those provisions in the IRR which it believes
to be unfavorable to the rights of its members. xxx Certainly, petitioner and its members have
sustained direct injury arising from the enforcement of the IRR in that they have been disqualified
and eliminated from the selection process.18
In any event, this Court has the discretion to take cognizance of a suit which does not satisfy the
requirements of an actual case, ripeness or legal standing when paramount public interest is
involved.19 The questioned MCIT and CWT affect not only petitioners but practically all domestic
corporate taxpayers in our country. The transcendental importance of the issues raised and their
overreaching significance to society make it proper for us to take cognizance of this petition.20
Concept and Rationale of the MCIT
The MCIT on domestic corporations is a new concept introduced by RA 8424 to the Philippine
taxation system. It came about as a result of the perceived inadequacy of the self-assessment
system in capturing the true income of corporations.21 It was devised as a relatively simple and
effective revenue-raising instrument compared to the normal income tax which is more difficult to
control and enforce. It is a means to ensure that everyone will make some minimum contribution
to the support of the public sector. The congressional deliberations on this are illuminating:
Senator Enrile. Mr. President, we are not unmindful of the practice of certain corporations of
reporting constantly a loss in their operations to avoid the payment of taxes, and thus avoid
sharing in the cost of government. In this regard, the Tax Reform Act introduces for the first time
a new concept called the [MCIT] so as to minimize tax evasion, tax avoidance, tax manipulation
in the country and for administrative convenience. … This will go a long way in ensuring that
corporations will pay their just share in supporting our public life and our economic
advancement.22
Domestic corporations owe their corporate existence and their privilege to do business to the
government. They also benefit from the efforts of the government to improve the financial market
and to ensure a favorable business climate. It is therefore fair for the government to require them
to make a reasonable contribution to the public expenses.
Congress intended to put a stop to the practice of corporations which, while having large turn-
overs, report minimal or negative net income resulting in minimal or zero income taxes year in
and year out, through under-declaration of income or over-deduction of expenses otherwise
called tax shelters.23
Mr. Javier (E.) … [This] is what the Finance Dept. is trying to remedy, that is why they have
proposed the [MCIT]. Because from experience too, you have corporations which have been
losing year in and year out and paid no tax. So, if the corporation has been losing for the past
five years to ten years, then that corporation has no business to be in business. It is dead. Why
continue if you are losing year in and year out? So, we have this provision to avoid this type of
tax shelters, Your Honor.24
The primary purpose of any legitimate business is to earn a profit. Continued and repeated losses
after operations of a corporation or consistent reports of minimal net income render its financial
statements and its tax payments suspect. For sure, certain tax avoidance schemes resorted to
by corporations are allowed in our jurisdiction. The MCIT serves to put a cap on such tax shelters.
As a tax on gross income, it prevents tax evasion and minimizes tax avoidance schemes
achieved through sophisticated and artful manipulations of deductions and other stratagems.
Since the tax base was broader, the tax rate was lowered.
To further emphasize the corrective nature of the MCIT, the following safeguards were
incorporated into the law:
First, recognizing the birth pangs of businesses and the reality of the need to recoup initial major
capital expenditures, the imposition of the MCIT commences only on the fourth taxable year
immediately following the year in which the corporation commenced its operations.25 This grace
period allows a new business to stabilize first and make its ventures viable before it is subjected
to the MCIT.26
Second, the law allows the carrying forward of any excess of the MCIT paid over the normal
income tax which shall be credited against the normal income tax for the three immediately
succeeding years.27
Third, since certain businesses may be incurring genuine repeated losses, the law authorizes the
Secretary of Finance to suspend the imposition of MCIT if a corporation suffers losses due to
prolonged labor dispute, force majeure and legitimate business reverses.28
Even before the legislature introduced the MCIT to the Philippine taxation system, several other
countries already had their own system of minimum corporate income taxation. Our lawmakers
noted that most developing countries, particularly Latin American and Asian countries, have the
same form of safeguards as we do. As pointed out during the committee hearings:
[Mr. Medalla:] Note that most developing countries where you have of course quite a bit of room
for underdeclaration of gross receipts have this same form of safeguards.
In the case of Thailand, half a percent (0.5%), there’s a minimum of income tax of half a percent
(0.5%) of gross assessable income. In Korea a 25% of taxable income before deductions and
exemptions. Of course the different countries have different basis for that minimum income tax.
The other thing you’ll notice is the preponderance of Latin American countries that employed this
method. Okay, those are additional Latin American countries. 29
At present, the United States of America, Mexico, Argentina, Tunisia, Panama and Hungary have
their own versions of the MCIT.30
MCIT Is Not Violative of Due Process
Petitioner claims that the MCIT under Section 27(E) of RA 8424 is unconstitutional because it is
highly oppressive, arbitrary and confiscatory which amounts to deprivation of property without
due process of law. It explains that gross income as defined under said provision only considers
the cost of goods sold and other direct expenses; other major expenditures, such as
administrative and interest expenses which are equally necessary to produce gross income, were
not taken into account.31 Thus, pegging the tax base of the MCIT to a corporation’s gross income
is tantamount to a confiscation of capital because gross income, unlike net income, is not
"realized gain."32
We disagree.
Taxes are the lifeblood of the government. Without taxes, the government can neither exist nor
endure. The exercise of taxing power derives its source from the very existence of the State
whose social contract with its citizens obliges it to promote public interest and the common
good.33
Taxation is an inherent attribute of sovereignty.34 It is a power that is purely legislative.35

Essentially, this means that in the legislature primarily lies the discretion to determine the nature
(kind), object (purpose), extent (rate), coverage (subjects) and situs (place) of taxation. 36 It has
the authority to prescribe a certain tax at a specific rate for a particular public purpose on persons
or things within its jurisdiction. In other words, the legislature wields the power to define what tax
shall be imposed, why it should be imposed, how much tax shall be imposed, against whom (or
what) it shall be imposed and where it shall be imposed.
As a general rule, the power to tax is plenary and unlimited in its range, acknowledging in its very
nature no limits, so that the principal check against its abuse is to be found only in the
responsibility of the legislature (which imposes the tax) to its constituency who are to pay it. 37
Nevertheless, it is circumscribed by constitutional limitations. At the same time, like any other
statute, tax legislation carries a presumption of constitutionality.
The constitutional safeguard of due process is embodied in the fiat "[no] person shall be deprived
of life, liberty or property without due process of law." In Sison, Jr. v. Ancheta, et al.,38 we held
that the due process clause may properly be invoked to invalidate, in appropriate cases, a
revenue measure39 when it amounts to a confiscation of property.40 But in the same case, we
also explained that we will not strike down a revenue measure as unconstitutional (for being
violative of the due process clause) on the mere allegation of arbitrariness by the taxpayer. 41
There must be a factual foundation to such an unconstitutional taint.42 This merely adheres to the
authoritative doctrine that, where the due process clause is invoked, considering that it is not a
fixed rule but rather a broad standard, there is a need for proof of such persuasive character. 43
Petitioner is correct in saying that income is distinct from capital. 44 Income means all the wealth
which flows into the taxpayer other than a mere return on capital. Capital is a fund or property
existing at one distinct point in time while income denotes a flow of wealth during a definite period
of time.45 Income is gain derived and severed from capital. 46 For income to be taxable, the
following requisites must exist:
(1) there must be gain;
(2) the gain must be realized or received and
(3) the gain must not be excluded by law or treaty from taxation. 47
Certainly, an income tax is arbitrary and confiscatory if it taxes capital because capital is not
income. In other words, it is income, not capital, which is subject to income tax. However, the
MCIT is not a tax on capital.
The MCIT is imposed on gross income which is arrived at by deducting the capital spent by a
corporation in the sale of its goods, i.e., the cost of goods48 and other direct expenses from gross
sales. Clearly, the capital is not being taxed.
Furthermore, the MCIT is not an additional tax imposition. It is imposed in lieu of the normal net
income tax, and only if the normal income tax is suspiciously low. The MCIT merely approximates
the amount of net income tax due from a corporation, pegging the rate at a very much reduced
2% and uses as the base the corporation’s gross income.
Besides, there is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable income by eliminating all
deductible items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate.49
Statutes taxing the gross "receipts," "earnings," or "income" of particular corporations are
found in many jurisdictions. Tax thereon is generally held to be within the power of a state to
impose; or constitutional, unless it interferes with interstate commerce or violates the requirement
as to uniformity of taxation.50
The United States has a similar alternative minimum tax (AMT) system which is generally
characterized by a lower tax rate but a broader tax base. 51 Since our income tax laws are of
American origin, interpretations by American courts of our parallel tax laws have persuasive effect
on the interpretation of these laws. 52 Although our MCIT is not exactly the same as the AMT, the
policy behind them and the procedure of their implementation are comparable. On the question
of the AMT’s constitutionality, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit stated in
Okin v. Commissioner:53
In enacting the minimum tax, Congress attempted to remedy general taxpayer distrust of the
system growing from large numbers of taxpayers with large incomes who were yet paying no
taxes.
xxx xxx xxx
We thus join a number of other courts in upholding the constitutionality of the [AMT]. xxx [It] is a
rational means of obtaining a broad-based tax, and therefore is constitutional.54
The U.S. Court declared that the congressional intent to ensure that corporate taxpayers would
contribute a minimum amount of taxes was a legitimate governmental end to which the AMT bore
a reasonable relation.55
American courts have also emphasized that Congress has the power to condition, limit or deny
deductions from gross income in order to arrive at the net that it chooses to tax. 56 This is because
deductions are a matter of legislative grace.57
Absent any other valid objection, the assignment of gross income, instead of net income, as the
tax base of the MCIT, taken with the reduction of the tax rate from 32% to 2%, is not
constitutionally objectionable.
Moreover, petitioner does not cite any actual, specific and concrete negative experiences of its
members nor does it present empirical data to show that the implementation of the MCIT resulted
in the confiscation of their property.
In sum, petitioner failed to support, by any factual or legal basis, its allegation that the MCIT is
arbitrary and confiscatory. The Court cannot strike down a law as unconstitutional simply because
of its yokes.58 Taxation is necessarily burdensome because, by its nature, it adversely affects
property rights.59 The party alleging the law’s unconstitutionality has the burden to demonstrate
the supposed violations in understandable terms.60
RR 9-98 Merely Clarifies Section 27(E) of RA 8424
Petitioner alleges that RR 9-98 is a deprivation of property without due process of law because
the MCIT is being imposed and collected even when there is actually a loss, or a zero or negative
taxable income:
Sec. 2.27(E) [MCIT] on Domestic Corporations. —
(1) Imposition of the Tax. — xxx The MCIT shall be imposed whenever such corporation has zero
or negative taxable income or whenever the amount of [MCIT] is greater than the normal
income tax due from such corporation. (Emphasis supplied)
RR 9-98, in declaring that MCIT should be imposed whenever such corporation has zero or
negative taxable income, merely defines the coverage of Section 27(E). This means that even if
a corporation incurs a net loss in its business operations or reports zero income after deducting
its expenses, it is still subject to an MCIT of 2% of its gross income. This is consistent with the
law which imposes the MCIT on gross income notwithstanding the amount of the net income. But
the law also states that the MCIT is to be paid only if it is greater than the normal net income.
Obviously, it may well be the case that the MCIT would be less than the net income of the
corporation which posts a zero or negative taxable income.
We now proceed to the issues involving the CWT.
The withholding tax system is a procedure through which taxes (including income taxes) are
collected.61 Under Section 57 of RA 8424, the types of income subject to withholding tax are
divided into three categories: (a) withholding of final tax on certain incomes; (b) withholding of
creditable tax at source and (c) tax-free covenant bonds. Petitioner is concerned with the second
category (CWT) and maintains that the revenue regulations on the collection of CWT on sale of
real estate categorized as ordinary assets are unconstitutional.
Petitioner, after enumerating the distinctions between capital and ordinary assets under RA 8424,
contends that Sections 2.57.2(J) and 2.58.2 of RR 2-98 and Sections 4(a)(ii) and (c)(ii) of RR 7-
2003 were promulgated "with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction" and
"patently in contravention of law"62 because they ignore such distinctions. Petitioner’s conclusion
is based on the following premises: (a) the revenue regulations use gross selling price (GSP) or
fair market value (FMV) of the real estate as basis for determining the income tax for the sale of
real estate classified as ordinary assets and (b) they mandate the collection of income tax on a
per transaction basis, i.e., upon consummation of the sale via the CWT, contrary to RA 8424
which calls for the payment of the net income at the end of the taxable period. 63
Petitioner theorizes that since RA 8424 treats capital assets and ordinary assets differently,
respondents cannot disregard the distinctions set by the legislators as regards the tax base,
modes of collection and payment of taxes on income from the sale of capital and ordinary assets.
Petitioner’s arguments have no merit.
Authority of the Secretary of Finance to Order the Collection of CWT on Sales of Real
Property Considered as Ordinary Assets
The Secretary of Finance is granted, under Section 244 of RA 8424, the authority to promulgate
the necessary rules and regulations for the effective enforcement of the provisions of the law.
Such authority is subject to the limitation that the rules and regulations must not override, but
must remain consistent and in harmony with, the law they seek to apply and implement. 64 It is
well-settled that an administrative agency cannot amend an act of Congress. 65
We have long recognized that the method of withholding tax at source is a procedure of collecting
income tax which is sanctioned by our tax laws. 66 The withholding tax system was devised for
three primary reasons: first, to provide the taxpayer a convenient manner to meet his probable
income tax liability; second, to ensure the collection of income tax which can otherwise be lost or
substantially reduced through failure to file the corresponding returns and third, to improve the
government’s cash flow.67 This results in administrative savings, prompt and efficient collection
of taxes, prevention of delinquencies and reduction of governmental effort to collect taxes through
more complicated means and remedies.68
Respondent Secretary has the authority to require the withholding of a tax on items of income
payable to any person, national or juridical, residing in the Philippines. Such authority is derived
from Section 57(B) of RA 8424 which provides:
SEC. 57. Withholding of Tax at Source. –
xxx xxx xxx
(B) Withholding of Creditable Tax at Source. The [Secretary] may, upon the recommendation of
the [CIR], require the withholding of a tax on the items of income payable to natural or juridical
persons, residing in the Philippines, by payor-corporation/persons as provided for by law, at the
rate of not less than one percent (1%) but not more than thirty-two percent (32%) thereof, which
shall be credited against the income tax liability of the taxpayer for the taxable year.
The questioned provisions of RR 2-98, as amended, are well within the authority given by Section
57(B) to the Secretary, i.e., the graduated rate of 1.5%-5% is between the 1%-32% range; the
withholding tax is imposed on the income payable and the tax is creditable against the income
tax liability of the taxpayer for the taxable year.
Effect of RRs on the Tax Base for the Income Tax of Individuals or Corporations Engaged
in the Real Estate Business
Petitioner maintains that RR 2-98, as amended, arbitrarily shifted the tax base of a real estate
business’ income tax from net income to GSP or FMV of the property sold.
Petitioner is wrong.
The taxes withheld are in the nature of advance tax payments by a taxpayer in order to extinguish
its possible tax obligation. 69 They are installments on the annual tax which may be due at the
end of the taxable year.70
Under RR 2-98, the tax base of the income tax from the sale of real property classified as ordinary
assets remains to be the entity’s net income imposed under Section 24 (resident individuals) or
Section 27 (domestic corporations) in relation to Section 31 of RA 8424, i.e. gross income less
allowable deductions. The CWT is to be deducted from the net income tax payable by the
taxpayer at the end of the taxable year.71 Precisely, Section 4(a)(ii) and (c)(ii) of RR 7-2003
reiterate that the tax base for the sale of real property classified as ordinary assets remains to be
the net taxable income:
Section 4. – Applicable taxes on sale, exchange or other disposition of real property. -

Gains/Income derived from sale, exchange, or other disposition of real properties shall unless
otherwise exempt, be subject to applicable taxes imposed under the Code, depending on whether
the subject properties are classified as capital assets or ordinary assets;
xxx xxx xxx
a. In the case of individual citizens (including estates and trusts), resident aliens, and non-
resident aliens engaged in trade or business in the Philippines;
xxx xxx xxx
(ii) The sale of real property located in the Philippines, classified as ordinary assets, shall be
subject to the [CWT] (expanded) under Sec. 2.57.2(j) of [RR 2-98], as amended, based on the
[GSP] or current [FMV] as determined in accordance with Section 6(E) of the Code, whichever is
higher, and consequently, to the ordinary income tax imposed under Sec. 24(A)(1)(c) or
25(A)(1) of the Code, as the case may be, based on net taxable income.
xxx xxx xxx
c. In the case of domestic corporations.
The sale of land and/or building classified as ordinary asset and other real property (other than
land and/or building treated as capital asset), regardless of the classification thereof, all of which
are located in the Philippines, shall be subject to the [CWT] (expanded) under Sec. 2.57.2(J) of
[RR 2-98], as amended, and consequently, to the ordinary income tax under Sec. 27(A) of the
Code. In lieu of the ordinary income tax, however, domestic corporations may become subject to
the [MCIT] under Sec. 27(E) of the same Code, whichever is applicable. (Emphasis supplied)
Accordingly, at the end of the year, the taxpayer/seller shall file its income tax return and credit
the taxes withheld (by the withholding agent/buyer) against its tax due. If the tax due is greater
than the tax withheld, then the taxpayer shall pay the difference. If, on the other hand, the tax
due is less than the tax withheld, the taxpayer will be entitled to a refund or tax credit.
Undoubtedly, the taxpayer is taxed on its net income.
The use of the GSP/FMV as basis to determine the withholding taxes is evidently for purposes
of practicality and convenience. Obviously, the withholding agent/buyer who is obligated to
withhold the tax does not know, nor is he privy to, how much the taxpayer/seller will have as its
net income at the end of the taxable year. Instead, said withholding agent’s knowledge and privity
are limited only to the particular transaction in which he is a party. In such a case, his basis can
only be the GSP or FMV as these are the only factors reasonably known or knowable by him in
connection with the performance of his duties as a withholding agent.
No Blurring of Distinctions Between Ordinary Assets and Capital Assets
RR 2-98 imposes a graduated CWT on income based on the GSP or FMV of the real property
categorized as ordinary assets. On the other hand, Section 27(D)(5) of RA 8424 imposes a final
tax and flat rate of 6% on the gain presumed to be realized from the sale of a capital asset based
on its GSP or FMV. This final tax is also withheld at source.72
The differences between the two forms of withholding tax, i.e., creditable and final, show that
ordinary assets are not treated in the same manner as capital assets. Final withholding tax (FWT)
and CWT are distinguished as follows:
FWT CWT
a) The amount of income tax a) Taxes withheld on certain
withheld by the withholding income payments are intended
agent is constituted as a full and to equal or at least approximate
final payment of the income tax the tax due of the payee on said
due from the payee on the said income.
income.
b)The liability for payment of the b) Payee of income is required

tax rests primarily on the payor to report the income and/or pay
as a withholding agent. the difference between the tax
withheld and the tax due on the
income. The payee also has the
right to ask for a refund if the tax
withheld is more than the tax
due.
c) The payee is not required to c) The income recipient is still

file an income tax return for the required to file an income tax
particular income.73 return, as prescribed in Sec. 51 and
Sec. 52 of the NIRC, as amended.74
As previously stated, FWT is imposed on the sale of capital assets. On the other hand, CWT is imposed on
the sale of ordinary assets. The inherent and substantial differences between FWT and CWT disprove
petitioner’s contention that ordinary assets are being lumped together with, and treated similarly as,
capital assets in contravention of the pertinent provisions of RA 8424.
Petitioner insists that the levy, collection and payment of CWT at the time of transaction are contrary to
the provisions of RA 8424 on the manner and time of filing of the return, payment and assessment of
income tax involving ordinary assets.75
The fact that the tax is withheld at source does not automatically mean that it is treated exactly
the same way as capital gains. As aforementioned, the mechanics of the FWT are distinct from
those of the CWT. The withholding agent/buyer’s act of collecting the tax at the time of the
transaction by withholding the tax due from the income payable is the essence of the withholding
tax method of tax collection.
No Rule that Only Passive
Incomes Can Be Subject to CWT
Petitioner submits that only passive income can be subjected to withholding tax, whether final or
creditable. According to petitioner, the whole of Section 57 governs the withholding of income tax
on passive income. The enumeration in Section 57(A) refers to passive income being subjected
to FWT. It follows that Section 57(B) on CWT should also be limited to passive income:
SEC. 57. Withholding of Tax at Source. —
(A) Withholding of Final Tax on Certain Incomes. — Subject to rules and regulations, the
[Secretary] may promulgate, upon the recommendation of the [CIR], requiring the filing of
income tax return by certain income payees, the tax imposed or prescribed by
Sections 24(B)(1), 24(B)(2), 24(C), 24(D)(1); 25(A)(2), 25(A)(3), 25(B), 25(C), 25(D),
25(E); 27(D)(1), 27(D)(2), 27(D)(3), 27(D)(5); 28(A)(4), 28(A)(5), 28(A)(7)(a), 28(A)(7)(b),
28(A)(7)(c), 28(B)(1), 28(B)(2), 28(B)(3), 28(B)(4), 28(B)(5)(a), 28(B)(5)(b), 28(B)(5)(c);
33; and 282 of this Code on specified items of income shall be withheld by payor-
corporation and/or person and paid in the same manner and subject to the same
conditions as provided in Section 58 of this Code.
(B) Withholding of Creditable Tax at Source. — The [Secretary] may, upon the
recommendation of the [CIR], require the withholding of a tax on the items of income
payable to natural or juridical persons, residing in the Philippines, by payor-
corporation/persons as provided for by law, at the rate of not less than one percent (1%)
but not more than thirty-two percent (32%) thereof, which shall be credited against the
income tax liability of the taxpayer for the taxable year. (Emphasis supplied)
This line of reasoning is non sequitur.
Section 57(A) expressly states that final tax can be imposed on certain kinds of income and
enumerates these as passive income. The BIR defines passive income by stating what it is not:
…if the income is generated in the active pursuit and performance of the corporation’s primary
purposes, the same is not passive income…76
It is income generated by the taxpayer’s assets. These assets can be in the form of real properties
that return rental income, shares of stock in a corporation that earn dividends or interest income
received from savings.
On the other hand, Section 57(B) provides that the Secretary can require a CWT on "income
payable to natural or juridical persons, residing in the Philippines." There is no requirement that
this income be passive income. If that were the intent of Congress, it could have easily said so.
Indeed, Section 57(A) and (B) are distinct. Section 57(A) refers to FWT while Section 57(B)
pertains to CWT. The former covers the kinds of passive income enumerated therein and the
latter encompasses any income other than those listed in 57(A). Since the law itself makes
distinctions, it is wrong to regard 57(A) and 57(B) in the same way.
To repeat, the assailed provisions of RR 2-98, as amended, do not modify or deviate from the
text of Section 57(B). RR 2-98 merely implements the law by specifying what income is subject
to CWT. It has been held that, where a statute does not require any particular procedure to be
followed by an administrative agency, the agency may adopt any reasonable method to carry out
its functions.77 Similarly, considering that the law uses the general term "income," the Secretary
and CIR may specify the kinds of income the rules will apply to based on what is feasible. In
addition, administrative rules and regulations ordinarily deserve to be given weight and respect
by the courts78 in view of the rule-making authority given to those who formulate them and their
specific expertise in their respective fields.
No Deprivation of Property Without Due Process
Petitioner avers that the imposition of CWT on GSP/FMV of real estate classified as ordinary
assets deprives its members of their property without due process of law because, in their line of
business, gain is never assured by mere receipt of the selling price. As a result, the government
is collecting tax from net income not yet gained or earned.
Again, it is stressed that the CWT is creditable against the tax due from the seller of the property
at the end of the taxable year. The seller will be able to claim a tax refund if its net income is less
than the taxes withheld. Nothing is taken that is not due so there is no confiscation of property
repugnant to the constitutional guarantee of due process. More importantly, the due process
requirement applies to the power to tax. 79 The CWT does not impose new taxes nor does it
increase taxes.80 It relates entirely to the method and time of payment.
Petitioner protests that the refund remedy does not make the CWT less burdensome because
taxpayers have to wait years and may even resort to litigation before they are granted a refund. 81
This argument is misleading. The practical problems encountered in claiming a tax refund do not
affect the constitutionality and validity of the CWT as a method of collecting the tax.1avvphi1
Petitioner complains that the amount withheld would have otherwise been used by the enterprise
to pay labor wages, materials, cost of money and other expenses which can then save the entity
from having to obtain loans entailing considerable interest expense. Petitioner also lists the
expenses and pitfalls of the trade which add to the burden of the realty industry: huge investments
and borrowings; long gestation period; sudden and unpredictable interest rate surges; continually
spiraling development/construction costs; heavy taxes and prohibitive "up-front" regulatory fees
from at least 20 government agencies.82
Petitioner’s lamentations will not support its attack on the constitutionality of the CWT. Petitioner’s
complaints are essentially matters of policy best addressed to the executive and legislative
branches of the government. Besides, the CWT is applied only on the amounts actually received
or receivable by the real estate entity. Sales on installment are taxed on a per-installment basis.83
Petitioner’s desire to utilize for its operational and capital expenses money earmarked for the
payment of taxes may be a practical business option but it is not a fundamental right which can
be demanded from the court or from the government.
No Violation of Equal Protection
Petitioner claims that the revenue regulations are violative of the equal protection clause because
the CWT is being levied only on real estate enterprises. Specifically, petitioner points out that
manufacturing enterprises are not similarly imposed a CWT on their sales, even if their manner
of doing business is not much different from that of a real estate enterprise. Like a manufacturing
concern, a real estate business is involved in a continuous process of production and it incurs
costs and expenditures on a regular basis. The only difference is that "goods" produced by the
real estate business are house and lot units. 84
Again, we disagree.
The equal protection clause under the Constitution means that "no person or class of persons
shall be deprived of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other
classes in the same place and in like circumstances." 85 Stated differently, all persons belonging
to the same class shall be taxed alike. It follows that the guaranty of the equal protection of the
laws is not violated by legislation based on a reasonable classification. Classification, to be valid,
must (1) rest on substantial distinctions; (2) be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) not be
limited to existing conditions only and (4) apply equally to all members of the same class. 86
The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable classifications for purposes of taxation. 87
Inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption,
infringe no constitutional limitation.88 The real estate industry is, by itself, a class and can be
validly treated differently from other business enterprises.
Petitioner, in insisting that its industry should be treated similarly as manufacturing enterprises,
fails to realize that what distinguishes the real estate business from other manufacturing
enterprises, for purposes of the imposition of the CWT, is not their production processes but the
prices of their goods sold and the number of transactions involved. The income from the sale of
a real property is bigger and its frequency of transaction limited, making it less cumbersome for
the parties to comply with the withholding tax scheme.
On the other hand, each manufacturing enterprise may have tens of thousands of transactions
with several thousand customers every month involving both minimal and substantial amounts.
To require the customers of manufacturing enterprises, at present, to withhold the taxes on each
of their transactions with their tens or hundreds of suppliers may result in an inefficient and
unmanageable system of taxation and may well defeat the purpose of the withholding tax system.
Petitioner counters that there are other businesses wherein expensive items are also sold
infrequently, e.g. heavy equipment, jewelry, furniture, appliance and other capital goods yet these
are not similarly subjected to the CWT.89 As already discussed, the Secretary may adopt any
reasonable method to carry out its functions.90 Under Section 57(B), it may choose what to
subject to CWT.
A reading of Section 2.57.2 (M) of RR 2-98 will also show that petitioner’s argument is not
accurate. The sales of manufacturers who have clients within the top 5,000 corporations, as
specified by the BIR, are also subject to CWT for their transactions with said 5,000 corporations. 91
Section 2.58.2 of RR No. 2-98 Merely Implements Section 58 of RA 8424
Lastly, petitioner assails Section 2.58.2 of RR 2-98, which provides that the Registry of Deeds
should not effect the regisration of any document transferring real property unless a certification
is issued by the CIR that the withholding tax has been paid. Petitioner proffers hardly any reason
to strike down this rule except to rely on its contention that the CWT is unconstitutional. We have
ruled that it is not. Furthermore, this provision uses almost exactly the same wording as Section
58(E) of RA 8424 and is unquestionably in accordance with it:
Sec. 58. Returns and Payment of Taxes Withheld at Source. –
(E) Registration with Register of Deeds. - No registration of any document transferring real
property shall be effected by the Register of Deeds unless the [CIR] or his duly authorized
representative has certified that such transfer has been reported, and the capital gains or
[CWT], if any, has been paid: xxxx any violation of this provision by the Register of Deeds shall
be subject to the penalties imposed under Section 269 of this Code. (Emphasis supplied)
Conclusion
The renowned genius Albert Einstein was once quoted as saying "[the] hardest thing in the world
to understand is the income tax."92 When a party questions the constitutionality of an income tax
measure, it has to contend not only with Einstein’s observation but also with the vast and well-
established jurisprudence in support of the plenary powers of Congress to impose taxes.
Petitioner has miserably failed to discharge its burden of convincing the Court that the imposition
of MCIT and CWT is unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
39. G.R. No. L-45987 May 5, 1939

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. CAYAT, Defendant-Appellant.
Sinai Hamada y Cari�o for appellant.
Office of the Solicitor-General Tuason for appellee.
MORAN, J.: chanrobles virtual law library
Prosecuted for violation of Act No. 1639 (secs. 2 and 3), the accused, Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet,
Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the peace court of Baguio to pay a fine of five pesos
(P5) or suffer subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency. On appeal of the Court of First Instance,
the following information was filed against him:
That on or about the 25th day of January, 1937, in the City of Baguio, Commonwealth of the Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this court, the above-named accused, Cayat, being a member of the non-
Christian tribes, did then and there willfully, unlawfully, and illegally receive, acquire, and have in his
possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating liquor, other than
the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Accused interposed a demurrer which was overruled. At the trial, he admitted all the facts alleged in
the information, but pleaded not guilty to the charge for the reasons adduced in his demurrer and
submitted the case on the pleadings. The trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to pay a fine of fifty pesos (P50) or supper subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The case is now before this court on appeal. Sections 2 and 3 of Act No. 1639 read:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-Christian
tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven, to buy, receive,
have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind,
other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been
accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act, except as provided in section one
hereof; and it shall be the duty of any police officer or other duly authorized agent of the Insular or any
provincial, municipal or township government to seize and forthwith destroy any such liquors found
unlawfully in the possession of any member of a non-Christian tribe. virtual law library
SEC. 3. Any person violating the provisions of section one or section two of this Act shall, upon
conviction thereof, be punishable for each offense by a fine of not exceeding two hundred pesos or by
imprisonment for a term not exceeding six months, in the discretion of the court.
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
(1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
(2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state. virtual law library
ISSUE:
WHETHER OR NOT ACT NO. 1639 VIOLATES THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
Counsel for the appellant holds out his brief as the "brief for the non-Christian tribes." It is said that as
these less civilized elements of the Filipino population are "jealous of their rights in a democracy," any
attempt to treat them with discrimination or "mark them as inferior or less capable rate or less
entitled" will meet with their instant challenge. As the constitutionality of the Act here involved is
questioned for purposes thus mentioned, it becomes imperative to examine and resolve the issues
raised in the light of the policy of the government towards the non-Christian tribes adopted and
consistently followed from the Spanish times to the present, more often with sacrifice and tribulation
but always with conscience and humanity. virtual law library
As early as 1551, the Spanish Government had assumed an unvarying solicitous attitude toward these
inhabitants, and in the different laws of the Indies, their concentration in so-called "reducciones"
(communities) have been persistently attempted with the end in view of according them the "spiritual
and temporal benefits" of civilized life. Throughout the Spanish regime, it had been regarded by the
Spanish Government as a sacred "duty to conscience and humanity" to civilize these less fortunate
people living "in the obscurity of ignorance" and to accord them the "the moral and material
advantages" of community life and the "protection and vigilance afforded them by the same laws."
(Decree of the Governor-General of the Philippines, Jan. 14, 1887.) This policy had not been deflected
from during the American period. President McKinley in his instructions to the Philippine Commission
of April 7, 1900, said:
In dealing with the uncivilized tribes of the Islands, the Commission should adopt the same course
followed by Congress in permitting the tribes of our North American Indians to maintain their tribal
organization and government, and under which many of those tribes are now living in peace and
contentment, surrounded by civilization to which they are unable or unwilling to conform. Such tribal
government should, however, be subjected to wise and firm regulation; and, without undue or petty
interference, constant and active effort should be exercised to prevent barbarous practices and
introduce civilized customs.
Since then and up to the present, the government has been constantly vexed with the problem of
determining "those practicable means of bringing about their advancement in civilization and material
prosperity." ( See, Act No. 253.) "Placed in an alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them
in the path of civilization," the present government "has chosen to adopt the latter measure as one
more in accord with humanity and with the national conscience." (Memorandum of Secretary of the
Interior, quoted in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660, 714.) To this end, their homes
and firesides have been brought in contact with civilized communities through a network of highways
and communications; the benefits of public education have to them been extended; and more lately,
even the right of suffrage. And to complement this policy of attraction and assimilation, the Legislature
has passed Act No. 1639 undoubtedly to secure for them the blessings of peace and harmony; to
facilitate, and not to mar, their rapid and steady march to civilization and culture. It is, therefore, in
this light that the Act must be understood and applied. law library
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws
is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification.
And the classification, to be reasonable:
(1) must rest on substantial distinctions;

(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
(Borgnis vs. Falk Co., 133 N.W., 209; Lindsley vs. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61; 55 Law. ed.,
Rubi vs. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil., 660; People and Hongkong & Shanghai Banking
Corporation vs. Vera and Cu Unjieng, 37 Off. Gaz ., 187.)chanrobles virtual law library
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements.
The classification rests on real and substantial, not merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not
based upon "accident of birth or parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree
of civilization and culture. "The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way,
to the geographical area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of
civilization, usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." (Rubi vs. Provincial
Board of Mindoro, supra.) This distinction is unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to
meet the peculiar conditions existing in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain
members thereof who at present have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian
brothers, cannot affect the reasonableness of the classification thus established. law library
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive, have in
his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any kind, other
than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed
themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably designed to insure peace and
order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad experience of the past, as the
observations of the lower court disclose, that the free use of highly intoxicating liquors by the non-
Christian tribes have often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the
government to raise their standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is intended
to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist. The Act was not predicated, as counsel for
appellant asserts, upon the assumption that the non-Christians are "impermeable to any civilizing
influence." On the contrary, the Legislature understood that the civilization of a people is a slow
process and that hand in hand with it must go measures of protection and security.
Finally, that the Act applies equally to all members of the class is evident from a perusal thereof. That
it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their degree of
culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
Appellants contends that that provision of the law empowering any police officer or other duly
authorized agent of the government to seize and forthwith destroy any prohibited liquors found
unlawfully in the possession of any member of the non-Christian tribes is violative of the due process
of law provided in the Constitution. But this provision is not involved in the case at bar. Besides, to
constitute due process of law, notice and hearing are not always necessary. This rule is especially true
where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officials in applying a law to particular
cases. (McGehee, Due Process of Law p. 371, cited with approval in Rubi vs. Provincial Board of
Mindoro, supra.) Due process of law means simply: (1) that there shall be a law prescribed in harmony
with the general powers of the legislative department of the government; (2) that it shall be reasonable
in its operation; (3) that it shall be enforced according to the regular methods of procedure prescribed;
and (4) that it shall be applicable alike to all citizens of the state or to all of the class. (U.S. vs. Ling Su
Fan, 10 Phil., 104, affirmed on appeal by the United States Supreme Court, 218 U.S., 302: 54 Law. ed.,
1049.) Thus, a person's property may be seized by the government in payment of taxes without judicial
hearing; or property used in violation of law may be confiscated (U.S. vs. Surla, 20 Phil., 163, 167), or
when the property constitutes corpus delicti, as in the instant case (Moreno vs. Ago Chi, 12 Phil., 439,
442).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Neither is the Act an improper exercise of the police power of the state. It has been said that the police
power is the most insistent and least limitable of all powers of the government. It has been aptly
described as a power co-extensive with self-protection and constitutes the law of overruling necessity.
Any measure intended to promote the health, peace, morals, education and good order of the people
or to increase the industries of the state, develop its resources and add to its wealth and prosperity
(Barbier vs. Connolly, 113 U.S., 27), is a legitimate exercise of the police power, unless shown to be
whimsical or capricious as to unduly interfere with the rights of an individual, the same must be
upheld.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Act No. 1639, as above stated, is designed to promote peace and order in the non-Christian tribes so as
to remove all obstacles to their moral and intellectual growth and, eventually, to hasten their
equalization and unification with the rest of their Christian brothers. Its ultimate purpose can be no
other than to unify the Filipino people with a view to a greater Philippines.chanroblesvirtualawlibrary
chanrobles virtual law library
The law, then, does not seek to mark the non-Christian tribes as "an inferior or less capable race." On
the contrary, all measures thus far adopted in the promotion of the public policy towards them rest
upon a recognition of their inherent right to equality in tht enjoyment of those privileges now enjoyed
by their Christian brothers. But as there can be no true equality before the law, if there is, in fact, no
equality in education, the government has endeavored, by appropriate measures, to raise their culture
and civilization and secure for them the benefits of their progress, with the ultimate end in view of
placing them with their Christian brothers on the basis of true equality. It is indeed gratifying that the
non-Christian tribes "far from retrograding, are definitely asserting themselves in a competitive world,"
as appellant's attorney impressively avers, and that they are "a virile, up-and -coming people eager to
take their place in the world's social scheme." As a matter of fact, there are now lawyers, doctors and
other professionals educated in the best institutions here and in America. Their active participation in
the multifarious welfare activities of community life or in the delicate duties of government is certainly
a source of pride and gratification to people of the Philippines. But whether conditions have so changed
as to warrant a partial or complete abrogation of the law, is a matter which rests exclusively within the
prerogative of the National Assembly to determine. In the constitutional scheme of our government,
this court can go no farther than to inquire whether the Legislature had the power to enact the law. If
the power exists, and we hold it does exist, the wisdom of the policy adopted, and the adequacy under
existing conditions of the measures enacted to forward it, are matters which this court has no authority
to pass upon. And, if in the application of the law, the educated non-Christians shall incidentally suffer,
the justification still exists in the all-comprehending principle of salus populi suprema est lex. When
the public safety or the public morals require the discontinuance of a certain practice by certain class
of persons, the hand of the Legislature cannot be stayed from providing for its discontinuance by any
incidental inconvenience which some members of the class may suffer. The private interests of such
members must yield to the paramount interests of the nation (Cf. Boston Beer Co. vs. Mass., 97 U.S.,
25; 24 law. ed., 989).chanroblesvirtualawlibrary chanrobles virtual law library
Judgment is affirmed, with costs against appellant.
42. G.R. 91649 May 14, 1991
ATTORNEYS HUMBERTO BASCO, EDILBERTO BALCE, SOCRATES MARANAN AND LORENZO SANCHEZ,
petitioners,
vs.
PHILIPPINE AMUSEMENTS AND GAMING CORPORATION (PAGCOR), respondent.
H.B. Basco & Associates for petitioners.
Valmonte Law Offices collaborating counsel for petitioners.
Aguirre, Laborte and Capule for respondent PAGCOR.
PARAS, J.:
A TV ad proudly announces:
"The new PAGCOR — responding through responsible gaming."
But the petitioners think otherwise, that is why, they filed the instant petition seeking to annul the
Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) Charter — PD 1869, because it is allegedly
contrary to morals, public policy and order, and because —
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law. It
waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded into
the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention of the
constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR — conducted
gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with prostitution, drug trafficking
and other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony
economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
In their Second Amended Petition, petitioners also claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the declared national
policy of the "new restored democracy" and the people's will as expressed in the 1987 Constitution. The
decree is said to have a "gambling objective" and therefore is contrary to Sections 11, 12 and 13 of Article
II, Sec. 1 of Article VIII and Section 3 (2) of Article XIV, of the present Constitution (p. 3, Second Amended
Petition; p. 21, Rollo).
The procedural issue is whether petitioners, as taxpayers and practicing lawyers (petitioner Basco being
also the Chairman of the Committee on Laws of the City Council of Manila), can question and seek the
annulment of PD 1869 on the alleged grounds mentioned above.
The Philippine Amusements and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by virtue of P.D. 1067-A
dated January 1, 1977 and was granted a franchise under P.D. 1067-B also dated January 1, 1977 "to
establish, operate and maintain gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of
the Philippines." Its operation was originally conducted in the well known floating casino "Philippine
Tourist." The operation was considered a success for it proved to be a potential source of revenue to fund
infrastructure and socio-economic projects, thus, P.D. 1399 was passed on June 2, 1978 for PAGCOR to
fully attain this objective.
Subsequently, on July 11, 1983, PAGCOR was created under P.D. 1869 to enable the Government to
regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law, under
the following declared policy —
Sec. 1. Declaration of Policy. — It is hereby declared to be the policy of the State to centralize and
integrate all games of chance not heretofore authorized by existing franchises or permitted by law in
order to attain the following objectives:
(a) To centralize and integrate the right and authority to operate and conduct games of chance into
one corporate entity to be controlled, administered and supervised by the Government.
(b) To establish and operate clubs and casinos, for amusement and recreation, including sports
gaming pools, (basketball, football, lotteries, etc.) and such other forms of amusement and recreation
including games of chance, which may be allowed by law within the territorial jurisdiction of the
Philippines and which will: (1) generate sources of additional revenue to fund infrastructure and socio-
civic projects, such as flood control programs, beautification, sewerage and sewage projects, Tulungan
ng Bayan Centers, Nutritional Programs, Population Control and such other essential public services; (2)
create recreation and integrated facilities which will expand and improve the country's existing tourist
attractions; and (3) minimize, if not totally eradicate, all the evils, malpractices and corruptions that are
normally prevalent on the conduct and operation of gambling clubs and casinos without direct
government involvement. (Section 1, P.D. 1869)
To attain these objectives PAGCOR is given territorial jurisdiction all over the Philippines. Under its
Charter's repealing clause, all laws, decrees, executive orders, rules and regulations, inconsistent
therewith, are accordingly repealed, amended or modified.
It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue, next to the Bureau of
Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR earned P3.43 Billion, and directly
remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion in form of franchise tax, government's income
share, the President's Social Fund and Host Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-
cultural and charitable projects on its own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and
other private associations and organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present
administration, PAGCOR remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989,
PAGCOR was employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the
livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
But the petitioners, are questioning the validity of P.D. No. 1869. They allege that the same is "null and
void" for being "contrary to morals, public policy and public order," monopolistic and tends toward "crony
economy", and is violative of the equal protection clause and local autonomy as well as for running
counter to the state policies enunciated in Sections 11 (Personal Dignity and Human Rights), 12 (Family)
and 13 (Role of Youth) of Article II, Section 1 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational
Values) of Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution.
This challenge to P.D. No. 1869 deserves a searching and thorough scrutiny and the most deliberate
consideration by the Court, involving as it does the exercise of what has been described as "the highest
and most delicate function which belongs to the judicial department of the government." (State v.
Manuel, 20 N.C. 144; Lozano v. Martinez, 146 SCRA 323).
As We enter upon the task of passing on the validity of an act of a co-equal and coordinate branch of the
government We need not be reminded of the time-honored principle, deeply ingrained in our
jurisprudence, that a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must be indulged in favor of its
constitutionality. This is not to say that We approach Our task with diffidence or timidity. Where it is clear
that the legislature or the executive for that matter, has over-stepped the limits of its authority under the
constitution, We should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall heavily, as fall it must, on the offending
statute (Lozano v. Martinez, supra).
In Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union, et al, 59 SCRA 54, the Court thru Mr. Justice Zaldivar
underscored the —
. . . thoroughly established principle which must be followed in all cases where questions of
constitutionality as obtain in the instant cases are involved. All presumptions are indulged in favor of
constitutionality; one who attacks a statute alleging unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond
a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship does not render it unconstitutional; that if any
reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the statute, it will be upheld and the challenger must
negate all possible basis; that the courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy or expediency
of a statute and that a liberal interpretation of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of
legislation should be adopted. (Danner v. Hass, 194 N.W. 2nd 534, 539; Spurbeck v. Statton, 106 N.W.
2nd 660, 663; 59 SCRA 66; see also e.g. Salas v. Jarencio, 46 SCRA 734, 739 [1970]; Peralta v. Commission
on Elections, 82 SCRA 30, 55 [1978]; and Heirs of Ordona v. Reyes, 125 SCRA 220, 241-242 [1983] cited in
Citizens Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521, 540)
Of course, there is first, the procedural issue. The respondents are questioning the legal personality of
petitioners to file the instant petition.
Considering however the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in keeping with the Court's
duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of government have
kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused the
discretion given to them, the Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken
cognizance of this petition. (Kapatiran ng mga Naglilingkod sa Pamahalaan ng Pilipinas Inc. v. Tan, 163
SCRA 371)
With particular regard to the requirement of proper party as applied in the cases before us, We hold that
the same is satisfied by the petitioners and intervenors because each of them has sustained or is in danger
of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or measures complained of. And even if, strictly
speaking they are not covered by the definition, it is still within the wide discretion of the Court to waive
the requirement and so remove the impediment to its addressing and resolving the serious constitutional
questions raised.
In the first Emergency Powers Cases, ordinary citizens and taxpayers were allowed to question the
constitutionality of several executive orders issued by President Quirino although they were involving
only an indirect and general interest shared in common with the public. The Court dismissed the objection
that they were not proper parties and ruled that "the transcendental importance to the public of these
cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely, brushing aside, if we must technicalities of
procedure." We have since then applied the exception in many other cases. (Association of Small
Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. v. Sec. of Agrarian Reform, 175 SCRA 343).
Having disposed of the procedural issue, We will now discuss the substantive issues raised.
Gambling in all its forms, unless allowed by law, is generally prohibited. But the prohibition of gambling
does not mean that the Government cannot regulate it in the exercise of its police power.
The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state
authority to enact legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the
general welfare." (Edu v. Ericta, 35 SCRA 481, 487) As defined, it consists of (1) an imposition or restraint
upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace. (Philippine
Association of Service Exporters, Inc. v. Drilon, 163 SCRA 386).
Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could
be done, provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances
thus assuming the greatest benefits. (Edu v. Ericta, supra)
It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the charter.
Along with the taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and
sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of government that has enabled it to perform the most vital
functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has been credited, refers to it succinctly as
the plenary power of the state "to govern its citizens". (Tribe, American Constitutional Law, 323, 1978).
The police power of the State is a power co-extensive with self-protection and is most aptly termed the
"law of overwhelming necessity." (Rubi v. Provincial Board of Mindoro, 39 Phil. 660, 708) It is "the most
essential, insistent, and illimitable of powers." (Smith Bell & Co. v. National, 40 Phil. 136) It is a dynamic
force that enables the state to meet the agencies of the winds of change.
What was the reason behind the enactment of P.D. 1869?
P.D. 1869 was enacted pursuant to the policy of the government to "regulate and centralize thru an
appropriate institution all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or permitted by law" (1st
whereas clause, PD 1869). As was subsequently proved, regulating and centralizing gambling operations
in one corporate entity — the PAGCOR, was beneficial not just to the Government but to society in
general. It is a reliable source of much needed revenue for the cash strapped Government. It provided
funds for social impact projects and subjected gambling to "close scrutiny, regulation, supervision and
control of the Government" (4th Whereas Clause, PD 1869). With the creation of PAGCOR and the direct
intervention of the Government, the evil practices and corruptions that go with gambling will be
minimized if not totally eradicated. Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of PD 1896.
Petitioners contend that P.D. 1869 constitutes a waiver of the right of the City of Manila to impose taxes
and legal fees; that the exemption clause in P.D. 1869 is violative of the principle of local autonomy. They
must be referring to Section 13 par. (2) of P.D. 1869 which exempts PAGCOR, as the franchise holder from
paying any "tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise, as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever
nature, whether National or Local."
(2) Income and other taxes. — a) Franchise Holder: No tax of any kind or form, income or otherwise
as well as fees, charges or levies of whatever nature, whether National or Local, shall be assessed and
collected under this franchise from the Corporation; nor shall any form or tax or charge attach in any way
to the earnings of the Corporation, except a franchise tax of five (5%) percent of the gross revenues or
earnings derived by the Corporation from its operations under this franchise. Such tax shall be due and
payable quarterly to the National Government and shall be in lieu of all kinds of taxes, levies, fees or
assessments of any kind, nature or description, levied, established or collected by any municipal,
provincial or national government authority (Section 13 [2]).
Their contention stated hereinabove is without merit for the following reasons:
(a) The City of Manila, being a mere Municipal corporation has no inherent right to impose taxes
(Icard v. City of Baguio, 83 Phil. 870; City of Iloilo v. Villanueva, 105 Phil. 337; Santos v. Municipality of
Caloocan, 7 SCRA 643). Thus, "the Charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or
the municipality cannot assume it" (Medina v. City of Baguio, 12 SCRA 62). Its "power to tax" therefore
must always yield to a legislative act which is superior having been passed upon by the state itself which
has the "inherent power to tax" (Bernas, the Revised [1973] Philippine Constitution, Vol. 1, 1983 ed. p.
445).
(b) The Charter of the City of Manila is subject to control by Congress. It should be stressed that
"municipal corporations are mere creatures of Congress" (Unson v. Lacson, G.R. No. 7909, January 18,
1957) which has the power to "create and abolish municipal corporations" due to its "general legislative
powers" (Asuncion v. Yriantes, 28 Phil. 67; Merdanillo v. Orandia, 5 SCRA 541). Congress, therefore, has
the power of control over Local governments (Hebron v. Reyes, G.R. No. 9124, July 2, 1950). And if
Congress can grant the City of Manila the power to tax certain matters, it can also provide for exemptions
or even take back the power.
(c) The City of Manila's power to impose license fees on gambling, has long been revoked. As early
as 1975, the power of local governments to regulate gambling thru the grant of "franchise, licenses or
permits" was withdrawn by P.D. No. 771 and was vested exclusively on the National Government, thus:
Sec. 1. Any provision of law to the contrary notwithstanding, the authority of chartered cities and other
local governments to issue license, permit or other form of franchise to operate, maintain and establish
horse and dog race tracks, jai-alai and other forms of gambling is hereby revoked.
Sec. 2. Hereafter, all permits or franchises to operate, maintain and establish, horse and dog race tracks,
jai-alai and other forms of gambling shall be issued by the national government upon proper application
and verification of the qualification of the applicant . . .
Therefore, only the National Government has the power to issue "licenses or permits" for the operation
of gambling. Necessarily, the power to demand or collect license fees which is a consequence of the
issuance of "licenses or permits" is no longer vested in the City of Manila.
(d) Local governments have no power to tax instrumentalities of the National Government. PAGCOR
is a government owned or controlled corporation with an original charter, PD 1869. All of its shares of
stocks are owned by the National Government. In addition to its corporate powers (Sec. 3, Title II, PD
1869) it also exercises regulatory powers thus:
Sec. 9. Regulatory Power. — The Corporation shall maintain a Registry of the affiliated entities, and shall
exercise all the powers, authority and the responsibilities vested in the Securities and Exchange
Commission over such affiliating entities mentioned under the preceding section, including, but not
limited to amendments of Articles of Incorporation and By-Laws, changes in corporate term, structure,
capitalization and other matters concerning the operation of the affiliated entities, the provisions of the
Corporation Code of the Philippines to the contrary notwithstanding, except only with respect to original
incorporation.
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is governmental,
which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the Government. Being an
instrumentality of the Government, PAGCOR should be and actually is exempt from local taxes.
Otherwise, its operation might be burdened, impeded or subjected to control by a mere Local
government.
The states have no power by taxation or otherwise, to retard, impede, burden or in any manner control
the operation of constitutional laws enacted by Congress to carry into execution the powers vested in
the federal government. (MC Culloch v. Marland, 4 Wheat 316, 4 L Ed. 579)
This doctrine emanates from the "supremacy" of the National Government over local governments.
Justice Holmes, speaking for the Supreme Court, made reference to the entire absence of power on the
part of the States to touch, in that way (taxation) at least, the instrumentalities of the United States
(Johnson v. Maryland, 254 US 51) and it can be agreed that no state or political subdivision can regulate
a federal instrumentality in such a way as to prevent it from consummating its federal responsibilities, or
even to seriously burden it in the accomplishment of them. (Antieau, Modern Constitutional Law, Vol. 2,
p. 140, emphasis supplied)
Otherwise, mere creatures of the State can defeat National policies thru extermination of what local
authorities may perceive to be undesirable activities or enterprise using the power to tax as "a tool for
regulation" (U.S. v. Sanchez, 340 US 42).
The power to tax which was called by Justice Marshall as the "power to destroy" (Mc Culloch v. Maryland,
supra) cannot be allowed to defeat an instrumentality or creation of the very entity which has the
inherent power to wield it.
(e) Petitioners also argue that the Local Autonomy Clause of the Constitution will be violated by P.D.
1869. This is a pointless argument. Article X of the 1987 Constitution (on Local Autonomy) provides:
Sec. 5. Each local government unit shall have the power to create its own source of revenue and to levy
taxes, fees, and other charges subject to such guidelines and limitation as the congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy on local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively
to the local government. (emphasis supplied)
The power of local government to "impose taxes and fees" is always subject to "limitations" which
Congress may provide by law. Since PD 1869 remains an "operative" law until "amended, repealed or
revoked" (Sec. 3, Art. XVIII, 1987 Constitution), its "exemption clause" remains as an exception to the
exercise of the power of local governments to impose taxes and fees. It cannot therefore be violative but
rather is consistent with the principle of local autonomy.
Besides, the principle of local autonomy under the 1987 Constitution simply means "decentralization" (III
Records of the 1987 Constitutional Commission, pp. 435-436, as cited in Bernas, The Constitution of the
Republic of the Philippines, Vol. II, First Ed., 1988, p. 374). It does not make local governments sovereign
within the state or an "imperium in imperio."
Local Government has been described as a political subdivision of a nation or state which is constituted
by law and has substantial control of local affairs. In a unitary system of government, such as the
government under the Philippine Constitution, local governments can only be an intra sovereign
subdivision of one sovereign nation, it cannot be an imperium in imperio. Local government in such a
system can only mean a measure of decentralization of the function of government. (emphasis supplied)
As to what state powers should be "decentralized" and what may be delegated to local government units
remains a matter of policy, which concerns wisdom. It is therefore a political question. (Citizens Alliance
for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 539).
What is settled is that the matter of regulating, taxing or otherwise dealing with gambling is a State
concern and hence, it is the sole prerogative of the State to retain it or delegate it to local governments.
As gambling is usually an offense against the State, legislative grant or express charter power is generally
necessary to empower the local corporation to deal with the subject. . . . In the absence of express grant
of power to enact, ordinance provisions on this subject which are inconsistent with the state laws are void.
(Ligan v. Gadsden, Ala App. 107 So. 733 Ex-Parte Solomon, 9, Cals. 440, 27 PAC 757 following in re Ah You,
88 Cal. 99, 25 PAC 974, 22 Am St. Rep. 280, 11 LRA 480, as cited in Mc Quinllan Vol. 3 Ibid, p. 548, emphasis
supplied)
Petitioners next contend that P.D. 1869 violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution, because
"it legalized PAGCOR — conducted gambling, while most gambling are outlawed together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices" (p. 82, Rollo).
We, likewise, find no valid ground to sustain this contention. The petitioners' posture ignores the well-
accepted meaning of the clause "equal protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification
of individuals who may be accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not
unreasonable or arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal
force on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v. San
Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or
objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43 O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not
require situations which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same
(Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
Just how P.D. 1869 in legalizing gambling conducted by PAGCOR is violative of the equal protection is not
clearly explained in the petition. The mere fact that some gambling activities like cockfighting (P.D 449)
horse racing (R.A. 306 as amended by RA 983), sweepstakes, lotteries and races (RA 1169 as amended by
B.P. 42) are legalized under certain conditions, while others are prohibited, does not render the applicable
laws, P.D. 1869 for one, unconstitutional.
If the law presumably hits the evil where it is most felt, it is not to be overthrown because there are other
instances to which it might have been applied. (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827)
The equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment does not mean that all occupations called by the
same name must be treated the same way; the state may do what it can to prevent which is deemed as
evil and stop short of those cases in which harm to the few concerned is not less than the harm to the
public that would insure if the rule laid down were made mathematically exact. (Dominican Hotel v.
Arizona, 249 US 2651).
Anent petitioners' claim that PD 1869 is contrary to the "avowed trend of the Cory Government away
from monopolies and crony economy and toward free enterprise and privatization" suffice it to state that
this is not a ground for this Court to nullify P.D. 1869. If, indeed, PD 1869 runs counter to the government's
policies then it is for the Executive Department to recommend to Congress its repeal or amendment.
The judiciary does not settle policy issues. The Court can only declare what the law is and not what the
law should be. Under our system of government, policy issues are within the domain of the political
branches of government and of the people themselves as the repository of all state power. (Valmonte v.
Belmonte, Jr., 170 SCRA 256).
On the issue of "monopoly," however, the Constitution provides that:
Sec. 19. The State shall regulate or prohibit monopolies when public interest so requires. No
combinations in restraint of trade or unfair competition shall be allowed. (Art. XII, National Economy and
Patrimony)
It should be noted that, as the provision is worded, monopolies are not necessarily prohibited by the
Constitution. The state must still decide whether public interest demands that monopolies be regulated
or prohibited. Again, this is a matter of policy for the Legislature to decide.
On petitioners' allegation that P.D. 1869 violates Sections 11 (Personality Dignity) 12 (Family) and 13 (Role
of Youth) of Article II; Section 13 (Social Justice) of Article XIII and Section 2 (Educational Values) of Article
XIV of the 1987 Constitution, suffice it to state also that these are merely statements of principles and,
policies. As such, they are basically not self-executing, meaning a law should be passed by Congress to
clearly define and effectuate such principles.
In general, therefore, the 1935 provisions were not intended to be self-executing principles ready for
enforcement through the courts. They were rather directives addressed to the executive and the
legislature. If the executive and the legislature failed to heed the directives of the articles the available
remedy was not judicial or political. The electorate could express their displeasure with the failure of the
executive and the legislature through the language of the ballot. (Bernas, Vol. II, p. 2)
Every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality (Yu Cong Eng v. Trinidad, 47 Phil. 387; Salas
v. Jarencio, 48 SCRA 734; Peralta v. Comelec, 82 SCRA 30; Abbas v. Comelec, 179 SCRA 287). Therefore,
for PD 1869 to be nullified, it must be shown that there is a clear and unequivocal breach of the
Constitution, not merely a doubtful and equivocal one. In other words, the grounds for nullity must be
clear and beyond reasonable doubt. (Peralta v. Comelec, supra) Those who petition this Court to declare
a law, or parts thereof, unconstitutional must clearly establish the basis for such a declaration. Otherwise,
their petition must fail. Based on the grounds raised by petitioners to challenge the constitutionality of
P.D. 1869, the Court finds that petitioners have failed to overcome the presumption. The dismissal of this
petition is therefore, inevitable. But as to whether P.D. 1869 remains a wise legislation considering the
issues of "morality, monopoly, trend to free enterprise, privatization as well as the state principles on
social justice, role of youth and educational values" being raised, is up for Congress to determine.
As this Court held in Citizens' Alliance for Consumer Protection v. Energy Regulatory Board, 162 SCRA 521
—
Presidential Decree No. 1956, as amended by Executive Order No. 137 has, in any case, in its favor the
presumption of validity and constitutionality which petitioners Valmonte and the KMU have not
overturned. Petitioners have not undertaken to identify the provisions in the Constitution which they
claim to have been violated by that statute. This Court, however, is not compelled to speculate and to
imagine how the assailed legislation may possibly offend some provision of the Constitution. The Court
notes, further, in this respect that petitioners have in the main put in question the wisdom, justice and
expediency of the establishment of the OPSF, issues which are not properly addressed to this Court and
which this Court may not constitutionally pass upon. Those issues should be addressed rather to the
political departments of government: the President and the Congress.
Parenthetically, We wish to state that gambling is generally immoral, and this is precisely so when the
gambling resorted to is excessive. This excessiveness necessarily depends not only on the financial
resources of the gambler and his family but also on his mental, social, and spiritual outlook on life.
However, the mere fact that some persons may have lost their material fortunes, mental control, physical
health, or even their lives does not necessarily mean that the same are directly attributable to gambling.
Gambling may have been the antecedent, but certainly not necessarily the cause. For the same
consequences could have been preceded by an overdose of food, drink, exercise, work, and even sex.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
43. G.R. No. 92389 September 11, 1991
HON. JEJOMAR C. BINAY and the MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, petitioners, vs. HON. EUFEMIO DOMINGO
and the COMMISSION ON AUDIT, respondents.
Jejomar C. Binay for himself and for his co-petitioner. Manuel D. Tamase and Rafael C. Marquez for
respondents.
PARAS, J.:
The only pivotal issue before Us is whether or not Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No.
243, of the Municipality of Makati is a valid exercise of police power under the general welfare clause.
The pertinent facts are:
On September 27, 1988, petitioner Municipality, through its Council, approved Resolution No. 60 which
reads:
A RESOLUTION TO CONFIRM AND/OR RATIFY THE ONGOING BURIAL ASSISTANCE PROGRAM

INITIATED BY THE OFFICE OF THE MAYOR, OF EXTENDING FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE OF FIVE
HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) TO A BEREAVED FAMILY, FUNDS TO BE TAKEN OUT OF
UNAPPROPRIATED AVAILABLE FUNDS EXISTING IN THE MUNICIPAL TREASURY. (Rollo, Annnex "A"
p. 39)
Qualified beneficiaries, under the Burial Assistance Program, are bereaved families of Makati whose
gross family income does not exceed two thousand pesos (P2,000.00) a month. The beneficiaries, upon
fulfillment of other requirements, would receive the amount of five hundred pesos (P500.00) cash relief
from the Municipality of Makati. (Reno, Annex "13", p. 41)
Metro Manila Commission approved Resolution No. 60. Thereafter, the municipal secretary certified a
disbursement fired of four hundred thousand pesos (P400,000.00) for the implementation of the Burial
Assistance Program. (Rollo, Annex "C", p. 43).
Resolution No. 60 was referred to respondent Commission on Audit (COA) for its expected allowance in
audit. Based on its preliminary findings, respondent COA disapproved Resolution No. 60 and disallowed
in audit the disbursement of finds for the implementation thereof. (Rollo, Annex "D", P. 44)
Two letters for reconsideration (Annexes "E" and "F", Rollo, pp. 45 and 48, respectively) filed by
petitioners Mayor Jejomar Binay, were denied by respondent in its Decision No. 1159, in the following
manner:
Your request for reconsideration is predicated on the following grounds, to wit:
1. Subject Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, of the Municipal Council of Makati and the intended
disbursements fall within the twin principles of 'police power' and 'parens patriae' and
2. The Metropolitan Manila Commission (MMC), under a Certification, dated June 5, 1989, has
already appropriated the amount of P400,000.00 to implement the said Resolution, and the only
function of COA on the matter is to allow the financial assistance in question.
The first contention is believed untenable. Suffice it to state that:
'a statute or ordinance must have a real substantial, or rational relation to the public
safety, health, morals, or general welfare to be sustained as a legitimate exercise of the
police power. The mere assertion by the legislature that a statute relates to the public
health, safety, or welfare does not in itself bring the statute within the police power of
a state for there must always be an obvious and real connection between the actual
provisions of a police regulations and its avowed purpose, and the regulation adopted
must be reasonably adapted to accomplish the end sought to be attained. 16 Am. Jur
2d, pp. 542-543; emphasis supplied).
Here, we see no perceptible connection or relation between the objective sought to be attained
under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety, general welfare, etc. of the
inhabitants of Makati.
Anent the second contention, let it be stressed that Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the
limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, i.e., that the
disbursement of the amount of P500.00 as burial assistance to a bereaved family of the
Municipality of Makati, or a total of P400,000.00 appropriated under the Resolution, should be
for the benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for
the benefit of only a few individuals as in the present case. On this point government funds or
property shall be spent or used solely for public purposes. (Cf. Section 4[2], P.D. 1445). (pp. 50-
51, Rollo)
Bent on pursuing the Burial Assistance Program the Municipality of Makati, through its Council, passed
Resolution No. 243, re-affirming Resolution No. 60 (Rollo, Annex "H", p. 52).
However, the Burial Assistance Program has been stayed by COA Decision No. 1159. Petitioner, through
its Mayor, was constrained to file this special civil action of certiorari praying that COA Decision No. 1159
be set aside as null and void.
The police power is a governmental function, an inherent attribute of sovereignty, which was born with
civilized government. It is founded largely on the maxims, "Sic utere tuo et ahenum non laedas" and
"Salus populi est suprema lex". Its fundamental purpose is securing the general welfare, comfort and
convenience of the people.
Police power is inherent in the state but not in municipal corporations (Balacuit v. CFI of Agusan del
Norte, 163 SCRA 182). Before a municipal corporation may exercise such power, there must be a valid
delegation of such power by the legislature which is the repository of the inherent powers of the State.
A valid delegation of police power may arise from express delegation, or be inferred from the mere
fact of the creation of the municipal corporation; and as a general rule, municipal corporations may
exercise police powers within the fair intent and purpose of their creation which are reasonably proper
to give effect to the powers expressly granted, and statutes conferring powers on public corporations
have been construed as empowering them to do the things essential to the enjoyment of life and
desirable for the safety of the people. (62 C.J.S., p. 277). The so-called inferred police powers of such
corporations are as much delegated powers as are those conferred in express terms, the inference of
their delegation growing out of the fact of the creation of the municipal corporation and the additional
fact that the corporation can only fully accomplish the objects of its creation by exercising such powers.
(Crawfordsville vs. Braden, 28 N.E. 849). Furthermore, municipal corporations, as governmental agencies,
must have such measures of the power as are necessary to enable them to perform their governmental
functions. The power is a continuing one, founded on public necessity. (62 C.J.S. p. 273) Thus, not only
does the State effectuate its purposes through the exercise of the police power but the municipality does
also. (U.S. v. Salaveria, 39 Phil. 102).
Municipal governments exercise this power under the general welfare clause: pursuant thereto they
are clothed with authority to "enact such ordinances and issue such regulations as may be necessary
to carry out and discharge the responsibilities conferred upon it by law, and such as shall be necessary
and proper to provide for the health, safety, comfort and convenience, maintain peace and order,
improve public morals, promote the prosperity and general welfare of the municipality and the
inhabitants thereof, and insure the protection of property therein." (Sections 91, 149, 177 and 208, BP
337). And under Section 7 of BP 337, "every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary and proper for governance
such as to promote health and safety, enhance prosperity, improve morals, and maintain peace and order
in the local government unit, and preserve the comfort and convenience of the inhabitants therein."
Police power is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, education,
good order or safety and general welfare of the people. It is the most essential, insistent, and illimitable
of powers. In a sense it is the greatest and most powerful attribute of the government. It is elastic and
must be responsive to various social conditions. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, 176 SCRA 719). On it depends
the security of social order, the life and health of the citizen, the comfort of an existence in a thickly
populated community, the enjoyment of private and social life, and the beneficial use of property, and it
has been said to be the very foundation on which our social system rests. (16 C.J.S., P. 896) However, it
is not confined within narrow circumstances of precedents resting on past conditions; it must follow the
legal progress of a democratic way of life. (Sangalang, et al. vs. IAC, supra).
In the case at bar, COA is of the position that there is "no perceptible connection or relation between the
objective sought to be attained under Resolution No. 60, s. 1988, supra, and the alleged public safety,
general welfare. etc. of the inhabitants of Makati." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
Apparently, COA tries to re-define the scope of police power by circumscribing its exercise to "public
safety, general welfare, etc. of the inhabitants of Makati."
In the case of Sangalang vs. IAC, supra, We ruled that police power is not capable of an exact definition
but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all comprehensiveness. Its scope, over-
expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus
assuring the greatest benefits.
The police power of a municipal corporation is broad, and has been said to be commensurate with, but
not to exceed, the duty to provide for the real needs of the people in their health, safety, comfort, and
convenience as consistently as may be with private rights. It extends to all the great public needs, and, in
a broad sense includes all legislation and almost every function of the municipal government. It covers
a wide scope of subjects, and, while it is especially occupied with whatever affects the peace, security,
health, morals, and general welfare of the community, it is not limited thereto, but is broadened to deal
with conditions which exists so as to bring out of them the greatest welfare of the people by promoting
public convenience or general prosperity, and to everything worthwhile for the preservation of comfort
of the inhabitants of the corporation (62 C.J.S. Sec. 128). Thus, it is deemed inadvisable to attempt to
frame any definition which shall absolutely indicate the limits of police power.
COA's additional objection is based on its contention that "Resolution No. 60 is still subject to the
limitation that the expenditure covered thereby should be for a public purpose, ... should be for the
benefit of the whole, if not the majority, of the inhabitants of the Municipality and not for the benefit of
only a few individuals as in the present case." (Rollo, Annex "G", p. 51).
COA is not attuned to the changing of the times. Public purpose is not unconstitutional merely because
it incidentally benefits a limited number of persons. As correctly pointed out by the Office of the Solicitor
General, "the drift is towards social welfare legislation geared towards state policies to provide adequate
social services (Section 9, Art. II, Constitution), the promotion of the general welfare (Section 5, Ibid)
social justice (Section 10, Ibid) as well as human dignity and respect for human rights. (Section 11, Ibid."
(Comment, p. 12)
The care for the poor is generally recognized as a public duty. The support for the poor has long been an
accepted exercise of police power in the promotion of the common good.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause in classifying paupers as subject of legislation.
Paupers may be reasonably classified. Different groups may receive varying treatment. Precious to the
hearts of our legislators, down to our local councilors, is the welfare of the paupers. Thus, statutes have
been passed giving rights and benefits to the disabled, emancipating the tenant-farmer from the bondage
of the soil, housing the urban poor, etc.
Resolution No. 60, re-enacted under Resolution No. 243, of the Municipality of Makati is a paragon of
the continuing program of our government towards social justice. The Burial Assistance Program is a
relief of pauperism, though not complete. The loss of a member of a family is a painful experience, and
it is more painful for the poor to be financially burdened by such death. Resolution No. 60 vivifies the
very words of the late President Ramon Magsaysay 'those who have less in life, should have more in law."
This decision, however must not be taken as a precedent, or as an official go-signal for municipal
governments to embark on a philanthropic orgy of inordinate dole-outs for motives political or otherwise.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, and with the afore-mentioned caveat, this petition is hereby GRANTED and the
Commission on Audit's Decision No. 1159 is hereby SET ASIDE. SO ORDERED.
44. G.R. No. 78164 Tablarin vs. Gutierrez July 31, 1987
TERESITA TABLARIN, MA, LUZ CIRIACO, MA NIMFA B. ROVIRA, EVANGELINA S. LABAO,

in their behalf and in behalf of applicants for admission into the Medical Colleges during the
school year 1987-88 and future years who have not taken or successfully hurdled tile National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT). petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE JUDGE ANGELINA S. GUTIERREZ, Presiding Judge of Branch XXXVII of

the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital Judicial Region with seat at Manila, THE
HONORABLE SECRETARY LOURDES QUISUMBING, in her capacity as Chairman of the
BOARD OF MEDICAL EDUCATION, and THE CENTER FOR EDUCATIONAL
MEASUREMENT (CEM), respondents.
FELICIANO, J.:
The petitioners sought admission into colleges or schools of medicine for the school year 1987-
1988. However, the petitioners either did not take or did not successfully take the National
Medical Admission Test (NMAT) required by the Board of Medical Education, one of the public
respondents, and administered by the private respondent, the Center for Educational
Measurement (CEM).
On 5 March 1987, the petitioners filed with the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial
Region, a Petition for Declaratory Judgment and Prohibition with a prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order and Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners sought to enjoin the Secretary of
Education, Culture and Sports, the Board of Medical Education and the Center for Educational
Measurement from enforcing Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, series of 1985, dated 23 August 1985 and from requiring the taking and
passing of the NMAT as a condition for securing certificates of eligibility for admission, from
proceeding with accepting applications for taking the NMAT and from administering the NMAT
as scheduled on 26 April 1987 and in the future. After hearing on the petition for issuance of
preliminary injunction, the trial court denied said petition on 20 April 1987. The NMAT was
conducted and administered as previously scheduled.
Petitioners accordingly filed this Special Civil Action for certiorari with this Court to set aside the
Order of the respondent judge denying the petition for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
Republic Act 2382, as amended by Republic Acts Nos. 4224 and 5946, known as the "Medical
Act of 1959" defines its basic objectives in the following manner:
Section 1. Objectives. — This Act provides for and shall govern (a) the standardization
and regulation of medical education (b) the examination for registration of physicians;
and (c) the supervision, control and regulation of the practice of medicine in the
Philippines. (Underscoring supplied)
The statute, among other things, created a Board of Medical Education which is composed of
(a) the Secretary of Education, Culture and Sports or his duly authorized representative, as
Chairman; (b) the Secretary of Health or his duly authorized representative; (c) the Director of
Higher Education or his duly authorized representative; (d) the Chairman of the Medical Board
or his duly authorized representative; (e) a representative of the Philippine Medical Association;
(f) the Dean of the College of Medicine, University of the Philippines; (g) a representative of the
Council of Deans of Philippine Medical Schools; and (h) a representative of the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges, as members. The functions of the Board of Medical Education
specified in Section 5 of the statute include the following:
(a) To determine and prescribe requirements for admission into a recognized college of
medicine;
(b) To determine and prescribe requirements for minimum physical facilities of colleges
of medicine, to wit: buildings, including hospitals, equipment and supplies, apparatus,
instruments, appliances, laboratories, bed capacity for instruction purposes, operating
and delivery rooms, facilities for outpatient services, and others, used for didactic and
practical instruction in accordance with modern trends;
(c) To determine and prescribe the minimum number and minimum qualifications of
teaching personnel, including student-teachers ratio;
(d) To determine and prescribe the minimum required curriculum leading to the degree
of Doctor of Medicine;
(e) To authorize the implementation of experimental medical curriculum in a medical

school that has exceptional faculty and instrumental facilities. Such an experimental
curriculum may prescribe admission and graduation requirements other than those
prescribed in this Act; Provided, That only exceptional students shall be enrolled in the
experimental curriculum;
(f) To accept applications for certification for admission to a medical school and keep a
register of those issued said certificate; and to collect from said applicants the amount of
twenty-five pesos each which shall accrue to the operating fund of the Board of Medical
Education;
(g) To select, determine and approve hospitals or some departments of the hospitals for
training which comply with the minimum specific physical facilities as provided in
subparagraph (b) hereof; and
(h) To promulgate and prescribe and enforce the necessary rules and regulations for the
proper implementation of the foregoing functions. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 7 prescribes certain minimum requirements for applicants to medical schools:
Admission requirements. — The medical college may admit any student who has not
been convicted by any court of competent jurisdiction of any offense involving moral
turpitude and who presents (a) a record of completion of a bachelor's degree in science
or arts; (b) a certificate of eligibility for entrance to a medical school from the Board of
Medical Education; (c) a certificate of good moral character issued by two former
professors in the college of liberal arts; and (d) birth certificate. Nothing in this act shall
be construed to inhibit any college of medicine from establishing, in addition to the
preceding, other entrance requirements that may be deemed admissible.
xxx xxx x x x (Emphasis supplied)
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, issued by the then Minister of Education, Culture and Sports and
dated 23 August 1985, established a uniform admission test called the National Medical
Admission Test (NMAT) as an additional requirement for issuance of a certificate of eligibility for
admission into medical schools of the Philippines, beginning with the school year 1986-1987.
This Order goes on to state that:
2. The NMAT, an aptitude test, is considered as an instrument toward upgrading the

selection of applicants for admission into the medical schools and its calculated to
improve the quality of medical education in the country. The cutoff score for the
successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall be determined every
year by the Board of Medical Education after consultation with the Association of
Philippine Medical Colleges. The NMAT rating of each applicant, together with the other
admission requirements as presently called for under existing rules, shall serve as a
basis for the issuance of the prescribed certificate of elegibility for admission into the
medical colleges.
3. Subject to the prior approval of the Board of Medical Education, each medical college
may give other tests for applicants who have been issued a corresponding certificate of
eligibility for admission that will yield information on other aspects of the applicant's
personality to complement the information derived from the NMAT.
xxx xxx xxx
8. No applicant shall be issued the requisite Certificate of Eligibility for Admission (CEA),
or admitted for enrollment as first year student in any medical college, beginning the
school year, 1986-87, without the required NMAT qualification as called for under this
Order. (Underscoring supplied)
Pursuant to MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, the private respondent Center conducted NMATs for
entrance to medical colleges during the school year 1986-1987. In December 1986 and in April
1987, respondent Center conducted the NMATs for admission to medical colleges during the
school year 1987.1988.1avvphi1
Petitioners raise the question of whether or not a writ of preliminary injunction may be issued to
enjoin the enforcement of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act No. 2382, as amended, and
MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, pending resolution of the issue of constitutionality of the assailed
statute and administrative order. We regard this issue as entirely peripheral in nature. It
scarcely needs documentation that a court would issue a writ of preliminary injunction only
when the petitioner assailing a statute or administrative order has made out a case of
unconstitutionality strong enough to overcome, in the mind of the judge, the presumption of
constitutionality, aside from showing a clear legal right to the remedy sought. The fundamental
issue is of course the constitutionality of the statute or order assailed.
1. The petitioners invoke a number of provisions of the 1987 Constitution which are, in their
assertion, violated by the continued implementation of Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act
2381, as amended, and MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985. The provisions invoked read as follows:
(a) Article 11, Section 11: "The state values the dignity of every human person and
guarantees full respect of human rights. "
(b) ArticleII, Section l3: "The State recognizes the vital role of the youth in nation
building and shall promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual, intellectual and
social well being. It shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and nationalism, and
encourage their involvement in public and civic affairs."
(c) Article II, Section 17: "The State shall give priority to education, science and
technology, arts, culture and sports to foster patriotism and nationalism, accelerate
social progress and to promote total human liberation and development. "
(d) Article XIV, Section l: "The State shall protect and promote the right of all citizens to
quality education at all levels and take appropriate steps to make such education
accessible to all. "
(e) Article XIV, Section 5 (3): "Every citizen has a right to select a profession or course
of study, subject to fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic
requirements."
Article II of the 1987 Constitution sets forth in its second half certain "State policies" which the
government is enjoined to pursue and promote. The petitioners here have not seriously
undertaken to demonstrate to what extent or in what manner the statute and the administrative
order they assail collide with the State policies embodied in Sections 11, 13 and 17. They have
not, in other words, discharged the burden of proof which lies upon them. This burden is heavy
enough where the constitutional provision invoked is relatively specific, rather than abstract, in
character and cast in behavioral or operational terms. That burden of proof becomes of
necessity heavier where the constitutional provision invoked is cast, as the second portion of
Article II is cast, in language descriptive of basic policies, or more precisely, of basic objectives
of State policy and therefore highly generalized in tenor. The petitioners have not made their
case, even a prima facie case, and we are not compelled to speculate and to imagine how the
legislation and regulation impugned as unconstitutional could possibly offend the constitutional
provisions pointed to by the petitioners.
Turning to Article XIV, Section 1, of the 1987 Constitution, we note that once more petitioners
have failed to demonstrate that the statute and regulation they assail in fact clash with that
provision. On the contrary we may note-in anticipation of discussion infra — that the statute and
the regulation which petitioners attack are in fact designed to promote "quality education" at the
level of professional schools. When one reads Section 1 in relation to Section 5 (3) of Article
XIV as one must one cannot but note that the latter phrase of Section 1 is not to be read with
absolute literalness. The State is not really enjoined to take appropriate steps to make quality
education " accessible to all who might for any number of reasons wish to enroll in a
professional school but rather merely to make such education accessible to all who
qualify under "fair, reasonable and equitable admission and academic requirements. "
2. In the trial court, petitioners had made the argument that Section 5 (a) and (f) of Republic Act
No. 2382, as amended, offend against the constitutional principle which forbids the undue
delegation of legislative power, by failing to establish the necessary standard to be followed by
the delegate, the Board of Medical Education. The general principle of non-delegation of
legislative power, which both flows from the reinforces the more fundamental rule of the
separation and allocation of powers among the three great departments of government,1 must
be applied with circumspection in respect of statutes which like the Medical Act of 1959, deal
with subjects as obviously complex and technical as medical education and the practice of
medicine in our present day world. Mr. Justice Laurel stressed this point 47 years ago in
Pangasinan Transportation Co., Inc. vs. The Public Service Commission:2
One thing, however, is apparent in the development of the principle of separation of

powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegare or delegate
potestas non potest delegare, adopted this practice (Delegibus et Consuetudiniis Anglia
edited by G.E. Woodbine, Yale University Press, 1922, Vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also
recognized in principle in the Roman Law (d. 17.18.3) has been made to adapt itself to
the complexities of modern government, giving rise to the adoption, within certain limits
of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in the United States and England
but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and Osmena [68 Phil.
318, 1939]. Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of
the subjects of governmental regulation and the increased difficulty of administering the
laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater power by
the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the courts." 3
The standards set for subordinate legislation in the exercise of rule making authority by an
administrative agency like the Board of Medical Education are necessarily broad and highly
abstract. As explained by then Mr. Justice Fernando in Edu v. Ericta4 —
The standard may be either expressed or implied. If the former, the non-delegation
objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be spelled out
specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole. In the Reflector Law, clearly the legislative objective is public safety. What is
sought to be attained as in Calalang v. Williams is "safe transit upon the roads. 5
We believe and so hold that the necessary standards are set forth in Section 1 of the 1959
Medical Act: "the standardization and regulation of medical education" and in Section 5 (a) and
7 of the same Act, the body of the statute itself, and that these considered together are
sufficient compliance with the requirements of the non-delegation principle.
3. The petitioners also urge that the NMAT prescribed in MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is an
"unfair, unreasonable and inequitable requirement," which results in a denial of due process.
Again, petitioners have failed to specify just what factors or features of the NMAT render it
"unfair" and "unreasonable" or "inequitable." They appear to suggest that passing the NMAT is
an unnecessary requirement when added on top of the admission requirements set out in
Section 7 of the Medical Act of 1959, and other admission requirements established by internal
regulations of the various medical schools, public or private. Petitioners arguments thus appear
to relate to utility and wisdom or desirability of the NMAT requirement. But constitutionality is
essentially a question of power or authority: this Court has neither commission or competence
to pass upon questions of the desirability or wisdom or utility of legislation or administrative
regulation. Those questions must be address to the political departments of the government not
to the courts.
There is another reason why the petitioners' arguments must fail: the legislative and
administrative provisions impugned by them constitute, to the mind of the Court, a valid
exercise of the police power of the state. The police power, it is commonplace learning, is the
pervasive and non-waivable power and authority of the sovereign to secure and promote an the
important interests and needs — in a word, the public order — of the general community.6 An
important component of that public order is the health and physical safety and well being of the
population, the securing of which no one can deny is a legitimate objective of governmental
effort and regulation.7
Perhaps the only issue that needs some consideration is whether there is some reasonable
relation between the prescribing of passing the NMAT as a condition for admission to medical
school on the one hand, and the securing of the health and safety of the general community, on
the other hand. This question is perhaps most usefully approached by recalling that the
regulation of the practice of medicine in all its branches has long been recognized as a
reasonable method of protecting the health and safety of the public.8 That the power to
regulate and control the practice of medicine includes the power to regulate admission to the
ranks of those authorized to practice medicine, is also well recognized. thus, legislation and
administrative regulations requiring those who wish to practice medicine first to take and pass
medical board examinations have long ago been recognized as valid exercises of governmental
power.9 Similarly, the establishment of minimum medical educational requirements — i.e., the
completion of prescribed courses in a recognized medical school — for admission to the
medical profession, has also been sustained as a legitimate exercise of the regulatory authority
of the state.10 What we have before us in the instant case is closely related: the regulation of
access to medical schools. MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, as noted earlier, articulates the
rationale of regulation of this type: the improvement of the professional and technical quality of
the graduates of medical schools, by upgrading the quality of those admitted to the student
body of the medical schools. That upgrading is sought by selectivity in the process of
admission, selectivity consisting, among other things, of limiting admission to those who exhibit
in the required degree the aptitude for medical studies and eventually for medical practice. The
need to maintain, and the difficulties of maintaining, high standards in our professional schools
in general, and medical schools in particular, in the current stage of our social and economic
development, are widely known.
We believe that the government is entitled to prescribe an admission test like the NMAT as a
means for achieving its stated objective of "upgrading the selection of applicants into [our]
medical schools" and of "improv[ing] the quality of medical education in the country." Given the
widespread use today of such admission tests in, for instance, medical schools in the United
States of America (the Medical College Admission Test [MCAT]11 and quite probably in other
countries with far more developed educational resources than our own, and taking into account
the failure or inability of the petitioners to even attempt to prove otherwise, we are entitled to
hold that the NMAT is reasonably related to the securing of the ultimate end of legislation and
regulation in this area. That end, it is useful to recall, is the protection of the public from the
potentially deadly effects of incompetence and ignorance in those who would undertake to treat
our bodies and minds for disease or trauma.
4. Petitioners have contended, finally, that MECS Order No. 52, s. 1985, is in conflict with the
equal protection clause of the Constitution. More specifically, petitioners assert that that portion
of the MECS Order which provides that
the cutoff score for the successful applicants, based on the scores on the NMAT, shall
be determined every-year by the Board of Medical 11 Education after consultation with
the Association of Philippine Medical Colleges. (Emphasis supplied)
infringes the requirements of equal protection. They assert, in other words, that students
seeking admission during a given school year, e.g., 1987-1988, when subjected to a different
cutoff score than that established for an, e.g., earlier school year, are discriminated against and
that this renders the MECS Order "arbitrary and capricious." The force of this argument is more
apparent than real. Different cutoff scores for different school years may be dictated by differing
conditions obtaining during those years. Thus, the appropriate cutoff score for a given year may
be a function of such factors as the number of students who have reached the cutoff score
established the preceding year; the number of places available in medical schools during the
current year; the average score attained during the current year; the level of difficulty of the test
given during the current year, and so forth. To establish a permanent and immutable cutoff
score regardless of changes in circumstances from year to year, may wen result in an
unreasonable rigidity. The above language in MECS Order No. 52, far from being arbitrary or
capricious, leaves the Board of Medical Education with the measure of flexibility needed to
meet circumstances as they change.
We conclude that prescribing the NMAT and requiring certain minimum scores therein as a
condition for admission to medical schools in the Philippines, do not constitute an
unconstitutional imposition.
WHEREFORE, the Petition for certiorari is DISMISSED and the Order of the respondent trial
court denying the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction is AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, C.J., Yap, Fernan, Narvasa, Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras,
Gancayco, Padilla, Bidin, Sarmiento and Cortes, JJ., concur.
45. G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-
President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila,
ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding
Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig,
Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE
PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its
President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL
JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and
in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and
Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE
POSTAL CORP., respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the
petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here
challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that
should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system of government, however, it
cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other office has the authority to do
so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal
Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals,
the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land
Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.
The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be
prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken
common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of requisite notices in
registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces
more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in
both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the
members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and encroaches on the independence of the
Judiciary.
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the
constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive,
every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be constitutional
before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is constitutionally flawed, the
attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
I
We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every
bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title
thereof."
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent
surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no
intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
(3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of legislative proceedings as is usually made,
of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may have opportunity of being
heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking
privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.
R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers,
Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes
Connected Therewith."
The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to
addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the unhampered

flow or exchange of postal matters between nations;
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing needs,
including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the overall
cost of providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion
and continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under
Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation
may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice
President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates
the Constitution.
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as
to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general
subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the
legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the constitutional requirement. 2
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the
statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation
impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained:
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the
subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may
properly be included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the
act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way
of its execution. If such matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is
unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170
Fed. 725).
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a
given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and
therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the
subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more germane to an act and to the object to be
accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected therewith."4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject
of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in
its title.5 As observed in one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was
never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by implication must be mentioned in the
title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the Constitution, nor
practicable.
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the
accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient
and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause,
Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of the said law.
II
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking
privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in
the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in
the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution,
reading as follows:
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days
before its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to
meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be
allowed, and the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered
in the Journal.
The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled
by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any
disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not have been validly added
as an amendment.
These argument are unacceptable.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between
the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is
described thus:
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving
the precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule
limited in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter
can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected
results, results beyond its mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict
limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of
conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to
and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was
enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of
the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by both Houses of Congress. It was then
presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the
approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez7 laid
down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be
entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of the
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still
valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said,
clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the
Philippine Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent
department of the Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the
Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was
made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in
its final form were not distributed among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the
legislative journals certify that the measure was duly enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec.
26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a coordinate department of
the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
III
The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from
the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the
Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections;
former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and Statistics Office; and the general public
in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers.10
The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been
withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National
Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation; the National
Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies
Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special
Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City
Assessors; and the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. 11
The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in
a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against
any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government. Arbitrariness in general may be
challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed partakes of an
unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar
subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or
things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for
example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of
the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause requires is equality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the grouping of persons or
things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
13
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege
extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of
the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of the importance
or status of the grantee or because of its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-
mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the selection?
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully
deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect,
however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting
withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that
the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the
major and equal departments the government. The same observations are made if the importance or
status of the grantee was the criterion used for the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed
by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of
justice.
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need
of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the
Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of communication between the
government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the
Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major
branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents
themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the distinction on the basis precisely of
this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while extending it to others less
deserving.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show
that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of
this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of
judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman,
amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and
those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents'
conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege
must be withdrawn from it.
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should
be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents)
but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may
be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary but not an operation that can save his
life.
If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it
seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not
need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially
where there is no substantial distinction between those favored, which may or may not need it at all,
and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn,
Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the
need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there
is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary
for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed
Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court
should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National
Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need
is not recognized in the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from
the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the
Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation,

was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may
have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain
functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise extended to it by the government
and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter.14 Among the services it should be prepared to
extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in
the discharge of their own public functions.
We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55%
of which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources
enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the
franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the
withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume
of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the
courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and litigants as part of the
judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget compared to the
Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than
1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts
if they have to affix a purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial
functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid
exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing
clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws
guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction made by the law is superficial. It
is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary and the
grantees of the franking privilege.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of
arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct.
IV
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that
it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the
law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of
the equal protection of laws."
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While
ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination
through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial
conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that we are prepared to accept..
As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases before us as law
imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from
the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the
National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege
shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
46. G.R. 133676 April 14, 1999
TUPAY T. LOONG, Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS and ABDUSAKUR TAN, Respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In a bid to improve our elections, Congress enacted R.A. No. 8436 on December 22, 1997 prescribing
the adoption of an automated election system. The new system was used in the May 11, 1998 regular
elections held in the Autonomous Region in Muslim Mindanao (ARMM) which includes the Province
of Sulu. Atty. Jose Tolentino, Jr. headed the COMELEC Task Force to have administrative oversight of
the elections in Sulu.chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The voting in Sulu was relatively peaceful and orderly. 1 The problem started during the automated
counting of votes for the local officials of Sulu at the Sulu State College. At about 6 a.m. of May 12,
1998, some election inspectors and watchers informed Atty. Tolentino, Jr. of discrepancies between
the election returns and the votes cast for the mayoralty candidates in the municipality of Pata. Some
ballots picked at random by Atty. Tolentino, Jr. confirmed that votes in favor of a mayoralty candidate
were not reflected in the printed election returns. He suspended the automated counting of ballots
in Pata and immediately communicated the problem to the technical experts of COMELEC and the
suppliers of the automated machine. After consultations, the experts told him that the problem was
caused by the misalignment of the ovals opposite the names of candidates in the local ballots. They
found nothing wrong with the automated machines. The error was in the printing of the local ballots,
as a consequence of which, the automated machines failed to read them correctly.
At 12:30 p.m. of the same day, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. called for an emergency meeting of the local
candidates and the military-police officials overseeing the Sulu elections. Those who attended were
the various candidates for governor, namely, petitioner Tupay Loong, private respondent Abdusakur
Tan, intervenor Yusop Jikiri and Kimar Tulawie. Also in attendance were Brig. Gen. Edgardo
Espinosa, AFP, Marine forces, Southern Philippines, Brig. Gen. Percival Subala, AFP, 3rd Marine
Brigade, Supt. Charlemagne Alejandrino, Provincial Director, Sulu, PNP Command and
congressional candidate Bensandi Tulawie.
The meeting discussed how the ballots in Pata should be counted in light of the misaligned ovals.
There was lack of agreement. Those who recommended a shift to manual count were Brig. Generals
Espinosa and Subala, PNP Director Alejandrino, gubernatorial candidates Tan and Tulawie and
congressional candidate Bensandi Tulawie. Those who insisted on an automated count were
gubernatorial candidates Loong and Jikiri. In view of their differences in opinion, Atty. Tolentino, Jr.
requested the parties to submit their written position papers.
Reports that the automated counting of ballots in other municipalities in Sulu was not working well
were received by the COMELEC Task Force. Local ballots in five (5) municipalities were rejected by
the automated machines. These municipalities were Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and Jolo. The
ballots were rejected because they had the wrong sequence code.
Private respondent Tan and Atty. Tolentino, Jr. sent separate communications to the COMELEC en
banc in Manila. Still, on May 12, 1998, Tan requested for the suspension of the automated counting
of ballots throughout the Sulu province. 6 On the same day, COMELEC issued Minute Resolution No.
98-1747 ordering a manual count but only in the municipality of Pata. The resolution reads:
"x x x
"In the matter of the Petition dated May 12, 1998 of Abdusakur Tan, Governor, Sulu, to suspend or
stop counting of ballots through automation (sic) machines for the following grounds, quoted to wit:
‘1. The Election Returns for the Municipality of Pata, Province of Sulu-District II do not reflect or reveal
the mandate of the voters:
‘DISCUSSIONS
‘That the watchers called the attention of our political leaders and candidates regarding their
discovery that the election returns generated after the last ballots for a precinct is scanned revealed
that some candidates obtained zero votes, among others the Provincial Board Members, Mayor, Vice-
Mayor, and the councilors for the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP;
‘That the top ballot, however, reveals that the ballots contained votes for Anton Burahan, candidate
for Municipal Mayor while the Election Return shows zero vote;
‘That further review of the Election Return reveals that John Masillam, candidate for Mayor under
the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP-MNLF obtains (sic) 100% votes of the total number of voters who actually
voted;
‘The foregoing discrepancies were likewise noted and confirmed by the chairmen, poll clerks and
members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI) such as Rena Jawan, Matanka Hajirul, Dulba Kadil,
Teddy Mirajuli, Rainer Talcon, Mike Jupakal, Armina Akmad, Romulo Roldan and Lerma Marawali to
mention some;
‘The Pata incident can be confirmed by no less than Atty. Jose Tolentino, Head, Task Force Sulu,
whose attention was called regarding the discrepancies;
‘The foregoing is a clear evidence that the automated machine (scanner) cannot be relied upon as to
truly reflect the contents of the ballots. If such happened in the Municipality of Pata, it is very possible
that the same is happening in the counting of votes in the other municipalities of this province. If this
will not be suspended or stopped, the use of automated machines will serve as a vehicle to frustrate
the will of the sovereign people of Sulu;
‘Wherefore, the foregoing premises considered and in the interest of an honest and orderly election,
it is respectfully prayed of this Honorable Commission that an Order be issued immediately
suspending or stopping the use of the automated machine (scanner) in the counting of votes for all
the eighteen (18) municipalities in the Province of Sulu and in lieu thereof, to avoid delay, counting
be done through the usual way and known and tested by us.’
"While the commission does not agree with the conclusions stated in the petition, and the failure of
the machine to read the votes may have been occasioned by other factors, a matter that requires
immediate investigation, but in the public interest, the Commission,
‘RESOLVED to grant the Petition dated May 12, 1998 and to Order that the counting of votes shall be
done manually in the Municipality of PATA, the only place in Sulu where the automated machine
failed to read the ballots, subject to notice to all parties concerned."
Before midnight of May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino, Jr. was able to send to the COMELEC en banc his
report and recommendation, urging the use of the manual count in the entire Province of Sulu, viz:
"The undersigned stopped the counting in the municipality of Pata since he discovered that votes for
a candidate for mayor was credited in favor of the other candidate. Verification with the Sulu
Technical Staff, including Pat Squires of ES & S, reveals that the cause of the error is the way the ballot
was printed. Aside from misalignment of the ovals and use of codes assigned to another municipality
(which caused the rejection of all local ballots in one precinct in Talipao), error messages appeared
on the screen although the actual condition of the ballots would have shown a different message.
Because of these, the undersigned directed that counting for all ballots in Sulu be stopped to enable
the Commission to determine the problem and rectify the same. It is submitted that stopping the
counting is more in consonance with the Commission’s mandate than proceeding with an automated
but inaccurate count.
"In view of the error discovered in Pata and the undersigned’s order to suspend the counting, the
following documents were submitted to him.
"1. Unsigned letter dated May 12, 1998 submitted by Congressman Tulawie for manual counting and
canvassing;
"2. Petition of Governor Sakur Tan for manual counting;
"3. Position paper of Tupay Loong, Benjamin Loong, and Asani Tamang for automated count;
"4. MNLF Position for automated count; and
"5. Recommendation of General E. V. Espinosa, General PM Subala, and PD CS Alejandrino for manual
count;
"Additional marines have been deployed at the SSC. The undersigned is not sure if it is merely
intended to tame a disorderly crowd, inside and outside SSC, or a show of force.
"It is submitted that since an error was discovered in a machine which is supposed to have an error
rate of 1:1,000,000, not a few people would believe that this error in Pata would extend to the other
municipalities. Whether or not this is true, it would be more prudent to stay away from a lifeless thing
that has sown tension and anxiety among and between the voters of Sulu.
Respectfully submitted:
12 May 1998
(SGD.) JOSE M. TOLENTINO, JR."
The next day, May 13, 1998, COMELEC issued Resolution No. 98-1750 approving Atty. Tolentino, Jr.’s
recommendation and the manner of its implementation as suggested by Executive Director
Resurreccion Z. Borra. The Resolution reads:
"In the matter of the Memorandum dated 13 May 1998 of Executive Director Resurreccion Z. Borra,
pertinent portion of which is quoted as follows:
"In connection with Min. Res. No. 98-1747 promulgated May 12, 1998 which resolved to order that
the counting of votes shall be done manually in the municipality of Pata, the only place in Sulu where
the automated counting machine failed to read the ballots, subject to notice to all parties concerned,
please find the following:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"1. Handwritten Memo of Director Jose M. Tolentino, Jr., Task Force Head, Sulu, addressed to the
Executive Director on the subject counting and canvassing in the municipality of Pata due to the
errors of the counting of votes by the machine brought about by the error in the printing of the ballot,
causing misalignment of ovals and use of codes assigned to another municipality.
He recommended to revert to the manual counting of votes in the whole of Sulu. He attached the
stand of Congressman Tulawie, Governor Sakur Tan and recommendation of Brigadier General
Edgardo Espinosa, General Percival Subala, P/Supt. Charlemagne Alejandrino for manual counting.
The position paper of former Governor Tupay Loong, Mr. Benjamin Loong and Mr. Asani S. Tamang,
who are candidates for Governor and Congressman of 1st and 2nd Districts respectively, who wanted
the continuation of the automated counting.
"While the forces of AFP are ready to provide arm (sic) security to our Comelec officials, BEIs and
other deputies, the political tensions and imminent violence and bloodshed may not be prevented,
as per report received, the MNLF forces are readying their forces to surround the venue for
automated counting and canvassing in Sulu in order that the automation process will continue.
"Director Borra recommends, that while he supports Minute Resolution No. 98-1747,
implementation thereof shall be done as follows:
"1. That all the counting machines from Jolo, Sulu be transported back by C130 to Manila and be
located at the available space at PICC for purposes of both automated and manual operations. This
approach will keep the COMELEC officials away from violence and bloodshed between the two camps
who are determined to slug each other as above mentioned in Jolo, Sulu. Only authorized political
party and candidate watchers will be allowed in PICC with proper security, both inside and outside
the perimeters of the venue at PICC.
"2. With this process, there will be an objective analysis and supervision of the automated and manual
operations by both the MIS and Technical Expert of the ES & S away from the thundering mortars and
the sounds of sophisticated heavy weapons from both sides of the warning factions.
"3. Lastly, it will be directly under the close supervision and control of Commission on Elections En
Banc.
"RESOLVED:
"1. To transport all counting machines from Jolo, Sulu by C130 to Manila for purposes of both
automated and manual operations, with notice to all parties concerned;
"2. To authorize the official travel of the board of canvassers concerned for the conduct of the
automated and manual operations of the counting of votes at PICC under the close supervision and
control of the Commission En Banc. For this purpose, to make available a designated space at the
PICC;
"3. To authorize the presence of only the duly authorized representative of the political parties
concerned and the candidates watchers both outside and inside the perimeters of the venue at PICC."
Atty. Tolentino, Jr. furnished the parties with copies of Minute Resolution No. 98-1750 and called for
another meeting the next day, May 14, 1998, to discuss the implementation of the resolution. 10 The
meeting was attended by the parties, by Lt. Gen. Joselin Nazareno, then the Chief of the AFP Southern
Command, the NAMFREL, media, and the public. Especially discussed was the manner of transporting
the ballots and the counting machines to the PICC in Manila. They agreed to allow each political party
to have at least one (1) escort/watcher for every municipality to accompany the flight. Two C130s
were used for the purpose.
On May 15, 1998, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 98-1796 laying down the rules
for the manual count, viz:
"In the matter of the Memorandum dated 15 May 1998 of Executive Director Resurreccion Z. Borra,
quoted to wit:
‘In the implementation of COMELEC Min. Resolution No. 98-1750 promulgated 13 May 1998 in the
manual counting of votes of Pata, Sulu, and in view of the arrival of the counting machines, ballot
boxes, documents and other election paraphernalia for the whole province of Sulu now stored in
PICC, as well as the arrival of the Municipal Board of Canvassers of said Municipality in Sulu, and after
conference with some members of the Senior Staff and Technical Committee of this Commission, the
following are hereby respectfully recommended:
‘1. Manual counting of the local ballots of the automated election system in Pata, Sulu;
‘2. Automated counting of the national ballots considering that there are no questions raised on the
National Elective Officials as pre-printed in the mark-sensed ballots;
‘3. The creation of the following Special Boards of Inspectors under the supervision of Atty. Jose M.
Tolentino, Jr., Task Force Head, Sulu, namely:
a) Atty. Mamasapunod M. Aguam
Ms. Gloria Fernandez
Ms. Esperanza Nicolas
b) Director Ester L. Villaflor-Roxas
Ms. Celia Romero
Ms. Rebecca Macaraya
c) Atty. Zenaida S. Soriano
Ms. Jocelyn Guiang
Ma. Jacelyn Tan
d) Atty. Erlinda C. Echavia

Ms. Theresa A. Torralba
Ms. Ma. Carmen Llamas
e) Director Estrella P. de Mesa
Ms. Teresita Velasco
Ms. Nelly Jaena
‘4. Additional Special Board of Inspectors may be created when necessary.
‘5. The Provincial Board of Canvassers which by standing Resolution is headed by the Task Force Sulu
Head shall consolidate the manual and automated results as submitted by the Municipal Boards of
Canvassers of the whole province with two members composed of Directors Estrella P. de Mesa and
Ester L. Villaflor-Roxas;
‘6. The political parties and the candidates in Sulu as well as the Party-List Candidates are authorized
to appoint their own watchers upon approval of the Commission’,
‘RESOLVED to approve the foregoing recommendations in the implementation of Min. Resolution No.
98-1750 promulgated on 13 May 1998 providing for the manual counting of votes in the municipality
of Pata, Sulu.
‘RESOLVED, moreover, considering the recommendation of Comm. Manolo B. Gorospe,

Commissioner-In-Charge, ARMM, to conduct a parallel manual counting on all 18 municipalities of
Sulu as a final guidance of the reliability of the counting machine which will serve as basis for the
proclamation of the winning candidates and for future reference on the use of the automated
counting machine." ‘
On May 18, 1998, petitioner filed his objection to Minute Resolution No. 98-1796, viz:
"1. The minute resolution under agenda No. 98-1796 violates the provisions of Republic Act No.
8436 providing for an automated counting of the ballots in the Autonomous Region in Muslim
Mindanao. The automated counting is mandatory and could not be substituted by a manual
counting. Where the machines are allegedly defective, the only remedy provided for by law is to
replace the machine. Manual counting is prohibited by law;
"2. There are strong indications that in the municipality of Pata the ballots of the said municipality
were rejected by the counting machine because the ballots were tampered and/or the texture of
the ballots fed to the counting machine are not the official ballots of the Comelec;
"3. The automated counting machines of the Comelec have been designed in such a way that only
genuine official ballots could be read and counted by the machine;
"4. The counting machines in the other municipalities are in order. In fact, the automated counting
has already started. The automated counting in the municipalities of Lugus and Panglima Tahil has
been completed. There is no legal basis for the ‘parallel manual counting’ ordained in the disputed
minute resolution."
Nonetheless, COMELEC started the manual count on the same date, May 18, 1998.
On May 25, 1998, petitioner filed with this Court a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule
65 of the Rules of Court. He contended that: (a) COMELEC issued Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1747,
98-1750, and 98-1798 without prior notice and hearing to him; (b) the order for manual counting
violated R.A. No. 8436; (c) manual counting gave "opportunity to the following election cheating,"
namely.
"(a) The counting by human hands of the tampered, fake and counterfeit ballots which the counting
machines have been programmed to reject (Section 7, 8 & 9 of Rep. Act 8436).
"(b) The opportunity to substitute the ballots all stored at the PICC. In fact, no less than the head
of the COMELEC Task Force of Sulu, Atty. Jose M. Tolentino, Jr. who recommended to the COMELEC
the anomalous manual counting, had approached the watchers of petitioners to allow the retrieval
of the ballots, saying "tayo, tayo lang mga watchers, pag-usapan natin," clearly indicating overtures
of possible bribery of the watchers of petitioner (ANNEX E).
"(c) With the creation by the COMELEC of only 22 Boards of Election Inspectors to manually count
the 1,194 precincts, the manipulators are given sufficient time to change and tamper the ballots to
be manually counted.
"(d) There is the opportunity of delaying the proclamation of the winning candidates through the
usually dilatory moves in a pre-proclamation controversy because the returns and certificates of
canvass are already human (sic) made. In the automated counting there is no room for any dilatory
pre-proclamation controversy because the returns and the MBC and PBC certificates of canvass are
machine made and immediate proclamation is ordained thereafter."
Petitioner then prayed:
"WHEREFORE, it is most especially prayed of the Honorable Court that:
"1. upon filing of this petition, a temporary restraining order be issued enjoining the COMELEC from
conducting a manual counting of the ballots of the 1,194 precincts of the 18 municipalities of the
Province of Sulu but instead proceed with the automated counting of the ballots, preparation of the
election returns and MBC, PBC certificates of canvass and proclaim the winning candidates on the
basis of the automated counting and consolidation of results;
"2. this petition be given due course and the respondents be required to answer;
"3. after due hearing, the questioned COMELEC En Banc Minute Resolutions of May 12, 13, 15, and
17, 1998 be all declared null and void ab initio for having been issued without jurisdiction and/or with
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction and for being in violation of due process
of law;
"4. the winning candidates of the Province of Sulu be proclaimed on the basis of the results of the
automated counting, automated election returns, automated MBC and PBC certificates of canvass;
"x x x."
On June 8, 1998, private respondent Tan was proclaimed governor-elect of Sulu on the basis of the
manual counting. 14 Private respondent garnered 43,573 votes. Petitioner was third with 35,452
votes or a difference of 8,121 votes.
On June 23, 1998, this Court required the respondents to file their Comment to the petition and
directed the parties "to maintain the status quo prevailing at the time of the filing of the petition."
15 The vice-governor elect was allowed to temporarily discharge the powers and functions of
governor.
On August 20, 1998, Yusop Jikiri, the LAKAS-NUCD-UMDP-MNLF candidate for governor filed a
motion for intervention and a Memorandum in Intervention. 16 The result of the manual count
showed he received 38,993 votes and placed second. Similarly, he alleged denial of due process,
lack of factual basis of the COMELEC resolutions and illegality of manual count in light of R.A. No.
8436. The Court noted his intervention. A similar petition for intervention[m1] filed by Abdulwahid
Sahidulla, a candidate for vice-governor, on October 7, 1998 was denied as it was filed too late.
In due time, the parties filed their respective Comments. On September 25, 1998, the Court heard
the parties in oral argument 18 which was followed by the submission of their written
memoranda.wlibrary
The issues for resolution are the following:
1. Whether or not a petition for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court is the
appropriate remedy to invalidate the disputed COMELEC resolutions.
2. Assuming the appropriateness of the remedy, whether or not COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction in ordering a manual count.
2.a. Is there a legal basis for the manual count?
2.b. Are its factual bases reasonable?
2.c. Were the petitioner and the intervenor denied due process by the COMELEC when it ordered a
manual count?
3. Assuming the manual count is illegal and that its result is unreliable, whether or not it is proper to
call for a special election for the position of governor of Sulu.
We shall resolve the issues in seriatim.
First. We hold that certiorari is the proper remedy of the petitioner. Section 7, Article IX (A) of the 1987
Constitution states[m2] that "unless provided by this Constitution or by law, any decision, order or ruling
of each Commission may be brought to the Supreme Court on certiorari by the aggrieved party within
thirty days from receipt of a copy thereof." We have interpreted this provision to mean final orders,
rulings and decisions of the COMELEC rendered in the exercise of its adjudicatory or quasi-judicial powers.
19 Contrariwise, administrative orders of the COMELEC are not, as a general rule, fit subjects of a petition
for certiorari. The main issue in the case at bar is whether the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion
when it ordered a manual count of the 1998 Sulu local elections. A resolution of the issue will involve an
interpretation of R.A. No. 8436 on automated election in relation to the broad power of the COMELEC
under Section 2(1), Article IX(C) of the Constitution "to enforce and administer all laws and regulations
relative to the conduct of an election . . ." The issue is not only legal but one of first impression and
undoubtedly suffused with significance to the entire nation. It is adjudicatory of the right of the petitioner,
the private respondent and the intervenor to the position of governor of Sulu. These are enough
considerations to call for an exercise of the certiorari jurisdiction of this Court.
Second. The big issue, one of first impression, is whether the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion[m3] amounting to lack of jurisdiction when it ordered a manual count in light of R.A. No.
P8436. The post election realities on ground will show that the order for a manual count cannot be
characterized as arbitrary, capricious or whimsical.
a. It is well established that the automated machines failed to read correctly the ballots in the[m4]
municipality of Pata. A mayoralty candidate, Mr. Anton Burahan, obtained zero votes despite the
representations of the Chairman of the Board of Election Inspectors and others that they voted for him.
Another candidate garnered 100% of the votes.
b. It is likewise conceded that the automated machines rejected and would not count the local ballots
in the municipalities of Talipao, Siasi, Indanan, Tapal and Jolo.
c. These flaws in the automated counting of local ballots in the municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi,
Indanan, Tapal and Jolo were carefully analyzed by the Technical experts of COMELEC and the supplier
of the automated machines. All of them found nothing wrong with the automated machines. They
traced the problem to the printing of local ballots by the National Printing Office. In the case of the
municipality of Pata, it was discovered that the ovals of the local ballots were misaligned and could not
be read correctly by the automated machines. In the case of the municipalities of Talipao, Siasi,
Indanan, Tapal and Jolo, it turned out that the local ballots contained the wrong sequence code. Each
municipality was assigned a sequence code as a security measure. Ballots with the wrong sequence
code were programmed to be rejected by the automated machines.
d. It is plain that to continue with the automated count in these five (5) municipalities would result
in a grossly erroneous count. It cannot also be gainsaid that the count in these five (5) municipalities
will affect the local elections in Sulu. There was no need for more sampling of local ballots in these
municipalities as they suffered from the same defects. All local ballots in Pata with misaligned ovals
will be erroneously read by the automated machines. Similarly, all local ballots in Talipao, Siasi,
Indanan, Tapal and Jolo with wrong sequence codes are certain to be rejected by the automated
machines. There is no showing in the records that the local ballots in these five (5) municipalities are
dissimilar which could justify the call for their greater sampling.
Third. These failures[m5] of automated counting created post election tension in Sulu, a province with
a history of violent elections. COMELEC had to act decisively in view of the fast deteriorating peace and
order situation caused by the delay in the counting of votes. The evidence of this fragile peace and order
cannot be downgraded. In his handwritten report to the COMELEC dated May 12, 1998, Atty. Tolentino,
Jr. stated:
"x x x
"Additional marines have been deployed at the SSC. The undersigned is not sure if it is merely intended
to tame a disorderly crowd inside and outside SSC, or a show of force.
"It is submitted that since an error was discovered in a machine which is supposed to have an error rate
of 1:1,000,000, not a few people would believe that this error in Pata would extend to the other
municipalities. Whether or not this is true, it would be more prudent to stay away from a lifeless thing
that has sown tension and anxiety among and between the voters of Sulu."
Executive Director Resurreccion Z. Borra, Task Force Head, ARMM in his May 13, 1998 Memorandum to
the COMELEC likewise stated:
x x x
"While the forces of AFP are ready to provide arm (sic) security to our COMELEC officials, BEI’s and
other deputies, the political tensions and imminent violence and bloodshed may not be prevented,
as per report received, the MNLF forces are readying their forces to surround the venue for
automated counting and canvassing in Sulu in order that automation process will continue."
Last but not the least, the military and the police authorities unanimously recommended manual
counting to preserve peace and order. Brig. Gen. Edgardo V. Espinosa, Commanding General, Marine
Forces Southern Philippines, Brig. Gen. Percival M. Subala, Commanding General, 3rd Marine Brigade,
and Supt. Charlemagne S. Alejandrino, Provincial Director, Sulu PNP Command explained that it." . .
will not only serve the interest of majority of the political parties involved in the electoral process but
also serve the interest of the military and police forces in maintaining peace and order throughout
the province of Sulu."
An automated count of the local votes in Sulu would have resulted in a wrong count, a travesty of
the sovereignty of the electorate. Its aftermath could have been a blood bath. COMELEC avoided
this imminent probability by ordering a manual count of the votes. It would be the height of irony
if the Court Condemns COMELEC for aborting violence in the Sulu elections.
Fourth. We also find that petitioner Loong and intervenor Jikiri were not denied due process. The
Tolentino memorandum clearly shows that they were given every[m6] opportunity to oppose the manual
count of the local ballots in Sulu. They were orally heard. They later submitted written position papers.
Their representatives escorted the transfer of the ballots and the automated machines from Sulu to
Manila. Their watchers observed the manual count from beginning to end. We quote the Tolentino
memorandum, viz:
"x x x
"On or about 6:00 a.m. of May 12, 1998, while automated counting of all the ballots for the province of
Sulu was being conducted at the counting center located at the Sulu State College, the COMELEC Sulu
Task Force Head (TF Head) proceeded to the room where the counting machine assigned to the
municipality of Pata was installed to verify the cause of the commotion therein.
"During the interview conducted by the TF Head, the members of the Board of Election Inspectors (BEI)
and watchers present in said room stated that the counting machine assigned to the municipality of Pata
did not reflect the true results of the voting thereat. The members of the BEI complained that their votes
were not reflected in the printout of the election returns since per election returns of their precincts, the
candidate they voted for obtained "zero." After verifying the printout of some election returns as against
the official ballots, the TF Head discovered that votes cast in every of a mayoralty candidate were credited
in favor of his opponent.
"In his attempt to remedy the situation, the TF Head suspended the counting of all ballots for said
municipality to enable COMELEC field technicians to determine the cause of the technical error, rectify
the same, and thereafter proceed with automated counting. In the meantime, the counting of the ballots
for the other municipalities proceeded under the automated system.
"Technical experts of the supplier based in Manila were informed of the problem and after numerous
consultations through long distance calls, the technical experts concluded that the cause of the error was
in the manner the ballots for local positions were printed by the National Printing Office (NPO), namely,
that the ovals opposite the names of the candidates were not properly aligned. As regards the ballots for
national positions, no error was found.
"Since the problem was not machine-related, it was obvious that the use of counting machines from other
municipalities to count the ballots of the municipality of Pata would still result in the same erroneous
count. Thus, it was found necessary to determine the extent of the error in the ballot printing process
before proceeding with the automated counting.
"To avoid a situation where proceeding with automation will result in an erroneous count, the TF Head,
on or about 11:45 a.m. ordered the suspension of the counting of all ballots in the province to enable him
to call a meeting with the heads of the political parties which fielded candidates in the province, inform
them of the technical error, and find solutions to the problem.
On or about 12:30 p.m., the TF Head presided over a conference at Camp General Bautista (3rd Marine
Brigade) to discuss the process by which the will of the electorate could be determined. Present during
the meeting were:
1. Brig. Gen. Edgardo Espinoza
Marine Forces, Southern Philippines
2. Brig. Gen. Percival Subala
3rd Marine Brigade
3. Provincial Dir. Charlemagne Alejandrino
Sulu PNP Command
4. Gubernatorial Candidate Tupay Loong
LAKAS-NUCD Loong Wing
5. Gubernatorial Candidate Abdusakur Tan
LAKAS-NUCD Tan Wing

6. Gubernatorial Candidate Yusop Jikiri
LAKAS-NUCD-MNLF Wing
7. Gubernatorial Candidate Kimar Tulawie
LAMMP
8. Congressional Candidate Bensaudi Tulawie
LAMMP
"During said meeting, all of the above parties verbally advanced their respective positions. Those in favor
of a manual count were:
1. Brig. Gen. Edgardo Espinoza
2. Brig. Gen. Percival Subala
3. Provincial Dir. Charlemagne Alejandrino
4. Gubernatorial Candidate Abdusakur Tan
5. Gubernatorial Candidate Kimar Tulawie
6. Congressional Candidate Bensaudi Tulawie
and those in favor of an automated count were:chanrob1es virtual
1. Gubernatorial Candidate Tupay Loong
2. Gubernatorial Candidate Yusop Jikiri
"Said parties were then requested by the TF Head to submit their respective position papers so that the
same may be forwarded to the Commission en banc, together with the recommendations of the TF Head.
"The TF Head returned to the counting center at the Sulu State College and called his technical staff to
determine the extent of the technical error and to enable him to submit the appropriate recommendation
to the Commission en banc.
"Upon consultation with the technical staff, it was discovered that in the Municipality of Talipao, some of
the local ballots were rejected by the machine. Verification showed that while the ballots were genuine,
ballot paper bearing a wrong "sequence code" was used by the NPO during the printing process.
Briefly, the following is the manner by which a "sequence code" determined genuineness of a ballot. A
municipality is assigned a specific machine (except for Jolo, which was assigned two (2) machines, and
sharing of one (1) machine by two (2) municipalities, namely, H.P. Tahil and Maimbung, Pandami and K.
Caluang, Pata and Tongkil and Panamao and Lugus). A machine is then assigned a specific "sequence
code" as one of the security features to detect whether the ballots passing through it are genuine. Since
a counting machine is programmed to read the specific "sequence code" assigned to it, ballots which bear
a "sequence code" assigned to another machine/municipality, even if said ballots were genuine, will be
rejected by the machine.
"Other municipalities, such as Siasi, Indanan, Tapul and Jolo also had the same problem of rejected
ballots. However, since the machine operators were not aware that one of the reasons for rejection of
ballots is the use of wrong "sequence code", they failed to determine whether the cause for rejection of
ballots for said municipalities was the same as that for the municipality of Talipao.
"In the case of ‘misaligned ovals’, the counting machine will not reject the ballot because all the security
features, such as "sequence code", are present in the ballot, however, since the oval is misaligned or not
placed in its proper position, the machine will credit the shaded oval for the position where the machine
is programmed to "read" the oval. Thus, instead of rejecting the ballot, the machine will credit the votes
of a candidate in favor of his opponent, or in the adjacent space where the oval should be properly placed.
"It could not be determined if the other municipalities also had the same technical error in their official
ballots since the "misaligned ovals" were discovered only after members of the Board of Election
Inspectors of the Municipality of Pata complained that their votes were not reflected in the printout of
the election returns.
"As the extent or coverage of the technical errors could not be determined, the TF Head, upon
consultation with his technical staff, was of the belief that it would be more prudent to count the ballots
manually than to proceed with an automated system which will result in an erroneous count.
"The TF Head thus ordered the indefinite suspension of counting of ballots until such time as the
Commission shall have resolved the petition/position papers to be submitted by the parties. The TF Head
and his staff returned to Camp General Bautista to await the submission of the position papers of the
parties concerned.
"Upon receipt of the position papers of the parties, the TF Head faxed the same in the evening of May
12, 1998, together with his handwritten recommendation to proceed with a manual count. Attached are
copies of the recommendations of the TF Head (Annex "1"), and the position papers of the Philippine
Marines and Philippine National Police (Annex "2"), LAKAS-NUCD Tan Wing Annex (Annex "3"), Lakas-
NUCD Loong Wing (Annex "4"), LAKAS-NUCD-MNLF Wing (Annex "5") and LAMMP (Annex "6"). Said
recommendations and position papers were the bases for the promulgation of COMELEC Minute
Resolution No. 98-1750 dated May 13, 1998 (Annex "7"), directing, among other things, that the ballots
and counting machines be transported by C130 to Manila for both automated and manual operations.
"Minute Resolution No. 98-1750 was received by the TF Head through fax on or about 5:30 in the evening
of May 13, 1998. Copies were then served through personal delivery to the heads of the political parties,
with notice to them that another conference will be conducted at the 3rd Marine Brigade on May 14,
1998 at 9:00 o’clock in the morning, this time, with Lt. General Joselin Nazareno, then AFP Commander,
Southern Command. Attached is a copy of said notice (Annex "8") bearing the signatures of candidates
Tan (Annex "8-A") and Loong (Annex "8-B"), and the representatives of candidates Tulawie (Annex "8-C")
and Jikiri (Annex "8-D").
"On May 14, 1998, the TF Head presided over said conference in the presence of the heads of the political
parties of Sulu, together with their counsel, including Lt. Gen. Nazareno, Brig. Gen. Subala,
representatives of the NAMFREL, media and the public.
"After hearing the sides of all parties concerned, including that of NAMFREL, the procedure by which the
ballots and counting machines were to be transported to Manila was finalized, with each political party
authorized to send at least one (1) escort/watcher for every municipality to accompany the ballot boxes
and counting machines from the counting center at the Sulu State College to the Sulu Airport up to the
PICC, where the COMELEC was then conducting its Senatorial Canvass. There being four parties, a total
of seventy-two (72) escorts/watchers accompanied the ballots and counting machines.
"Two C130s left Sulu on May 15, 1998 to transport all the ballot boxes and counting machines,
accompanied by all the authorized escorts. Said ballots boxes reached the PICC on the same day, with all
the escorts/watchers allowed to station themselves at the ballot box storage area. On May 17, 1998,
another C130 left Sulu to ferry the members of the board of canvassers."
Fifth. The evidence is clear that the integrity of the local ballots was safeguarded when they were
transferred from Sulu to Manila and when they were manually counted.
As shown by the Tolentino memorandum, representatives of the political parties escorted the transfer of
ballots from Sulu to PICC. Indeed, in his May 14, 1992 letter to Atty. Tolentino, Jr., petitioner Tupay Loong
himself submitted the names of his representatives who would accompany the ballot boxes and other
election paraphernalia, viz:
"Dear Atty. Tolentino:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"Submitted herewith are the names of escort(s) to accompany the ballot boxes and other election
paraphernalia to be transported to COMELEC, Manila, to wit:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
1 Jolo Joseph Lu
2. Patikul Fathie B. Loong
3. Indanan Dixon Jadi
4. Siasi Jamal Ismael
5. K. Kaluang Enjimar Abam
6. Pata Marvin Hassan
7. Parang Saying Loong
8. Pangutaran Hji. Nasser Loong
9. Marunggas Taib Mangkabong
10. Luuk Jun Arbison
11. Pandami Orkan Osman
12. Tongkil Usman Sahidulla
13. Tapul Alphawanis Tupay
14. Lugus Patta Alih
15. Maimbong Mike Bangahan
16. P. Estino Yasir Ibba
17. Panamao Hamba Loong
18. Talipao Ismael Sali
"Hoping for your kind and (sic) consideration for approval on this matter.
Thank you.
Very truly yours,
(Sgd.) Tupay T. Loong
(Sgd.) Asani S. Tamang"
The ballot boxes were consistently under the watchful eyes of the parties’ representatives. They were
placed in an open space at the PICC. The watchers stationed themselves some five (5) meters away from
the ballot boxes. They watched 24 hours a day and slept at the PICC.
The parties’ watchers again accompanied the transfer of the ballot boxes from PICC to the public schools
of Pasay City where the ballots were counted. After the counting, they once more escorted the return of
the ballot boxes to PICC.
In fine, petitioner’s charge that the ballots could have been tampered with before the manual counting
is totally unfounded.
Sixth. The evidence also reveals that the result of the manual count is reliable.
It bears stressing that the ballots used in the case at bar were specially made to suit an automated
election. The ballots were uncomplicated. They had fairly large ovals opposite the names of candidates.
A voter needed only to check the oval opposite the name of his candidate. When the COMELEC ordered
a manual count of the votes, it issued special rules as the counting involved a different kind of ballot,
albeit, more simple ballots. The Omnibus Election Code rules on appreciation of ballots cannot apply for
they only apply to elections where the names of candidates are handwritten in the ballots. The rules were
spelled out in Minute Resolution 98-1798, viz:
"In the matter of the Memorandum dated 17 May 1998 of Executive Director Resurreccion Z. Borra, re
procedure of the counting of votes for Sulu for the convening of the Board of Election Inspectors, the
Municipal Board of Canvassers and the Provincial Board of Canvassers on May, 18, 1998 at 9:00 a.m. at
the Philippine International Convention Center (PICC),
‘RESOLVED to approve the following procedure for the counting of votes for Sulu at the PICC:chanrob1es
I. Common Provisions:
‘1. Open the ballot box, retrieve the Minutes of Voting and the uncounted ballots or the envelope
containing the counted ballots as the case may be;
‘2. Segregate the national ballots from the local ballots;
‘3. Count the number of pieces of both the national and local ballots and compare the same with the
number of votes who actually voted as stated in the Minutes of Voting:chanrob1es virtual
— If there is no Minutes of Voting, refer to the Voting Records at the back of the VRRs to determine the
number of voters who actually voted.
— If there are more ballots than the number of voters who actually voted, the poll clerk shall draw out
as many local and national ballots as may be equal to the excess and place them in the envelope for
excess ballots.
‘II. Counting of Votes
‘A. National Ballots:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘1. If the national ballots have already been counted, return the same inside the envelope for counted
ballots, reseal and place the envelope inside the ballot box;
‘2. If the national ballots have not yet been counted, place them inside an envelope and give the envelope
through a liaison officer to the machine operator concerned for counting and printing of the election
returns;
‘3. The machine operator shall affix his signature and thumbmark thereon, and return the same to the
members of the BEI concerned for their signatures and thumbmarks;
‘4. The said returns shall then be placed in corresponding envelopes for distribution;
‘B. Local Ballots:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
‘1. Group the local ballots in piles of fifty (50);
‘2. The Chairman shall read the votes while the poll clerk and the third member shall simultaneously
accomplish the election returns and the tally board respectively.
‘If the voters shaded more ovals than the number of positions to be voted for, no vote shall be counted
in favor of any candidate.
‘3. After all the local ballots shall have been manually counted, the same shall be given to the machine
operator concerned for counting by the scanning machine. The machine operator shall then save the
results in a diskette and print out the election returns for COMELEC reference.
‘4. The BEI shall accomplish the certification portion of the election returns and announce the results;
‘5. Place the election returns in their respective envelopes and distribute them accordingly;
‘6. Return all pertinent election documents and paraphernalia inside the ballot box.
‘III. Consolidation of Results
‘A. National Ballots
‘1. The results of the counting for the national ballots for each municipality shall be consolidated by using
the ERs of the automated election system;
‘2. After the consolidation, the Machine Operator shall print the certificate of canvass by municipality and
statement of votes by precinct.
‘3. To consolidate the provincial results, the MO shall load all the diskettes used in the scanner to the ERs;
‘4. The MO shall print the provincial certificate of canvass and the SOV by municipality;
‘5. In case there is system failure in the counting and/or consolidation of the results, the POBC/MOBC
shall revert to manual consolidation.
‘B. Local Ballots
‘1. The consolidation of votes shall be done manually by the Provincial/Municipal Board of Canvassers;
‘2. The proclamation of winning candidates shall be based on the manual consolidation.
‘RESOLVED, moreover, that the pertinent provisions of COMELEC Resolution Nos. 2971 and 3030 shall
apply.
‘Let the Executive Director implement this resolution." ‘
As aforestated, five (5) Special Boards were initially created under Atty. Tolentino, Jr. to undertake the
manual counting, 24 viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"a) Atty. Mamasapunod M. Aguam
Ms. Gloria Fernandez
Ms. Esperanza Nicolas
b) Director Ester L. Villaflor-Roxas
Ms. Celia Romero
Ms. Rebecca Macaraya
c) Atty. Zenaida S. Soriano
Ms. Jocelyn Guiang
Ma. Jocelyn Tan
d) Atty. Erlinda C. Echavia

Ms. Teresa A. Torralba
Ms. Ma. Carmen Llamas
e) Director Estrella P. de Mesa
Ms. Teresita Velasco
Ms. Nelly Jaena"
Later, the COMELEC utilized the services of 600 public school teachers from Pasay City to do the
manual counting. Five (5) elementary schools served as the venues of the counting, viz:
"1. Gotamco Elementary School, Gotamco Street, Pasay City — for the municipalities of Indanan,
Pangutaran, Panglima Tahil, Maimbung;
"2. Zamora Elementary School, Zamora Street, Pasay City — for the municipalities of Jolo, Talipao,
Panglima Estino, and Tapul;
"3. Epifanio Elementary School, Tramo Street, Pasay City — for the municipalities of Parang, Lugus,
Panamao;
"4. Burgos Elementary School, Burgos Street, Pasay City — for the municipalities of Luuk and Tongkil;
"5. Palma Elementary School — for the municipalities of Siasi and Kalingalang Caluang."cralaw
virtua1aw library
From beginning to end, the manual counting was done with the watchers of the parties concerned
in attendance. Thereafter, the certificates of canvass were prepared and signed by the
City/Municipal Board of Canvassers composed of the Chairman, Vice-Chairman, and Secretary.
They were also signed by the parties watchers.
The correctness of the manual count cannot therefore be doubted. There was no need for an expert
to count the votes. The naked eye could see the check marks opposite the big ovals. Indeed, nobody
complained that the votes could not be read and counted. The COMELEC representatives had no
difficulty counting the votes. The 600 public school teachers of Pasay City had no difficulty. The
watchers of the parties had no difficulty. Petitioner did not object to the rules on manual count on
the ground that the ballots cannot be manually counted. Indeed, in his original Petition, petitioner
did not complain that the local ballots could not be counted by a layman. Neither did the intervenor
complain in his petition for intervention. The allegation that it will take a trained eye to read the
ballots is more imagined than real.
This is not all. As private respondent Tan alleged, the manual count could not have been manipulated
in his favor because the results show that most of his political opponents won. Thus, "the official
results show that the two congressional seats in Sulu were won by Congressman Hussin Amin of the
LAKAS-MNLF Wing for the 1st District and Congressman Asani Tammang of the LAKAS-Loong Wing
for the 2nd District. In the provincial level, of the eight (8) seats for the Sangguniang Panlalawigan,
two (2) were won by the camp of respondent Tan; three (3) by the camp of petitioner Loong; two (2)
by the MNLF; and one (1) by LAMMP. In the mayoral race, seven (7) out of eighteen (18) victorious
municipal mayors were identified with respondent Tan; four (4) with petitioner Loong; three (3) with
the MNLF; two (2) with LAMMP and one (1) with REPORMA." 27 There is logic to private respondent
Tan’s contention that if the manual count was tampered, his candidates would not have miserably
lost.
Seventh. We further hold that petitioner cannot insist on automated counting under R.A. No. 8436 after
the machines misread or rejected the local ballots in five (5) municipalities in Sulu. Section 9 of R.A. No.
8436 provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 9. Systems Breakdown in the Counting Center. — In the event of a systems breakdown of all
assigned machines in the counting center, the Commission shall use any available machine or any
component thereof from another city/municipality upon approval of the Commission En Banc or any
of its divisions.chanroblesvirtual|awlibrary
The transfer of such machines or any component thereof shall be undertaken in the presence of
representatives of political parties and citizens’ arm of the Commission who shall be notified by the
election officer of such transfer.
There is a systems breakdown in the counting center when the machine fails to read the ballots or fails
to store/save results or fails to print the results after it has read the ballots; or when the computer fails
to consolidate election results/reports or fails to print election results-reports after consolidation."cralaw
As the facts show, it was inutile for the COMELEC to use other machines to count the local votes in Sulu.
The errors in counting were due to the misprinting of ovals and the use of wrong sequence codes in the
local ballots. The errors were not machine-related. Needless to state, to grant petitioner’s prayer to
continue the machine count of the local ballots will certainly result in an erroneous count and subvert
the will of the electorate.
Eight. In enacting R.A. No. 8436, Congress obviously failed to provide a remedy where the error in
counting is not machine-related for human foresight is not all-seeing. We hold, however, that the vacuum
in the law cannot prevent the COMELEC from levitating above the problem. Section 2(1) of Article IX(C)
of the Constitution gives the COMELEC the broad power "to enforce and administer all laws and
regulations relative to the conduct of an election, plebiscite, initiative, referendum and recall."
Undoubtedly, the text and intent of this provision is to give COMELEC all the necessary and incidental
powers for it to achieve the objective of holding free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Congruent to this intent, this Court has not been niggardly in defining the parameters of powers of
COMELEC in the conduct of our elections. Thus, we held in Sumulong v. COMELEC:
"Politics is a practical matter, and political questions must be dealt with realistically — not from the
standpoint of pure theory. The Commission on Elections, because of its fact-finding facilities, its contacts
with political strategists, and its knowledge derived from actual experience in dealing with political
controversies, is in a peculiarly advantageous position to decide complex political questions . . . There are
no ready made formulas for solving public problems. Time and experience are necessary to evolve
patterns that will serve the ends of good government. In the matter of the administration of laws relative
to the conduct of election, . . . we must not by any excessive zeal take away from the Commission on
Elections the initiative which by constitutional and legal mandates properly belongs to it."cralaw
virtua1aw library
In the case at bar, the COMELEC order for a manual count was not only reasonable. It was the only way
to count the decisive local votes in the six (6) municipalities of Pata, Talipao, Siasi, Tudanan, Tapul and
Jolo. The bottom line is that by means of the manual count, the will of the voters of Sulu was honestly
determined. We cannot kick away the will of the people by giving a literal interpretation to R.A. 8436.
R.A. 8436 did not prohibit manual counting when machine count does not work. Counting is part and
parcel of the conduct of an election which is under the control and supervision of the COMELEC. It
ought to be self-evident that the Constitution did not envision a COMELEC that cannot count the result
of an election.
Ninth. Our elections are not conducted under laboratory conditions. In running for public offices,
candidates do not follow the rules of Emily Post. Too often, COMELEC has to make snap judgments to
meet unforeseen circumstances that threaten to subvert the will of our voters. In the process, the actions
of COMELEC may not be impeccable, indeed, may even be debatable. We cannot, however, engage in a
swivel chair criticism of these actions often taken under very difficult circumstances. Even more, we
cannot order a special election unless demanded by exceptional circumstances. Thus, the plea for this
Court to call a special election for the governorship of Sulu is completely off-line. The plea can only be
grounded on failure of election. Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code tells us when there is a failure of
election, viz:
"SECTION 6. Failure of Election. — If, on account of force majeure, terrorism, fraud, or other analogous
causes, the election in any polling place has not been held on the date fixed, or had been suspended
before the hour fixed by law for the closing of the voting or after the voting and during the preparation
and the transmission of the election returns or in the custody or canvass thereof, such election results
in a failure to elect, and in any of such cases the failure or suspension of election would affect the result
of the election, the Commission shall on the basis of a verified petition by any interested party and
after due notice and hearing, call for the holding or continuation of the election, not held, suspended
or which resulted in a failure to elect but not later than thirty days after the cessation of the cause of
such postponement or suspension of the election or failure to elect."cralaw virtua1aw library
To begin with, the plea for a special election must be addressed to the COMELEC and not to this Court.
Section 6 of the Omnibus Election Code should be read in relation to Section 4 of R.A. No. 7166 which
provides:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"SECTION 4. Postponement, Failure of Election and Special Elections. — The postponement, declaration
of failure of elections and the calling of special elections as provided in Sections 5, 6, and 7 of the Omnibus
Election Code shall be decided by the Commission en banc by a majority vote of its members. The causes
for the declaration of a failure of election may occur before or after casting of votes or on the day of the
election."
The grounds for failure of election — force majeure, terrorism, fraud or other analogous causes — clearly
involve questions of fact. It is for this reason that they can only be determined by the COMELEC en banc
after due notice and hearing to the parties. In the case at bar, petitioner never asked the COMELEC en
banc to call for a special election in Sulu. Even in his original petition with this Court, petitioner did not
pray for a special election. His plea for a special election is a mere afterthought. Too late in the day and
too unprocedural. Worse, the grounds for failure of election are inexistent. The records show that the
voters of Sulu were able to cast their votes freely and fairly. Their votes were counted correctly, albeit
manually. The people have spoken. Their sovereign will has to be obeyed.
There is another reason why a special election cannot be ordered by this Court. To hold a special election
only for the position of Governor will be discriminatory and will violate the right of private respondent to
equal protection of the law[m7] . The records show that all elected officials in Sulu have been proclaimed
and are now discharging their powers and duties. Thus, two (2) congressmen, a vice-governor, eight (8)
members of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan and eighteen (18) mayors, numerous vice-mayors and
municipal councilors are now servicing in their official capacities. These officials were proclaimed on the
basis of the same manually counted votes of Sulu. If manual counting is illegal, their assumption of office
cannot also be countenanced. Private respondent’s election cannot be singled out as invalid for alike
cannot be treated unalike.
A final word. Our decision merely reinforces our collective efforts to endow COMELEC with enough power
to hold free, honest, orderly, and credible elections. A quick flashback of its history is necessary lest our
efforts be lost in the labyrinth of time.
The COMELEC was organized under Commonwealth Act No. 607 enacted on August 22, 1940. The power
to enforce election laws was originally vested in the President and exercised through the Department of
Interior. According to Dean Sinco, 29 the view ultimately emerged that an independent body could better
protect the right of suffrage of our people. Hence, the enforcement of our election laws, while an
executive power, was transferred to the COMELEC.
From a statutory creation, the COMELEC was transformed to a constitutional body by virtue of the 1940
amendments to the 1935 Constitution which took effect on December 2, 1940. COMELEC was generously
granted the power to "have exclusive charge of the enforcement and administration of all laws relative
to the conduct of elections . . ."
Then came the 1973 Constitution. It further broadened the powers of COMELEC by making it the sole
judge of all election contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of members of the
national legislature and elective provincial and city officials. 31 In fine, the COMELEC was given judicial
power aside from its traditional administrative and executive functions.
The 1987 Constitution quickened this trend of strengthening the COMELEC. Today, COMELEC enforces
and administers all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of elections, plebiscites, initiatives,
referenda and recalls. Election contests involving regional, provincial and city elective officials are under
its exclusive original jurisdiction. All contests involving elective municipal and barangay officials are under
its appellate jurisdiction.
Our decisions have been in cadence with the movement towards empowering the COMELEC in order that
it can more effectively perform its duty of safeguarding the sanctity of our elections. In Cauton v.
COMELEC, 33 we laid down this liberal approach, viz:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
"x x x
"The purpose of the Revised Election Code is to protect the integrity of elections and to suppress all evils
that may violate its purity and defeat the will of the voters. The purity of the elections is one of the most
fundamental requisites of popular government. The Commission on Elections, by constitutional mandate,
must do everything in its power to secure a fair and honest canvass of the votes cast in the elections. In
the performance of its duties, the Commission must be given a considerable latitude in adopting means
and methods that will insure the accomplishment of the great objective for which it was created — to
promote free, orderly, and honest elections. The choice of means taken by the Commission on Elections,
unless they are clearly illegal or constitute grave abuse of discretion, should not be interfered
with."cralaw virtua1aw library
In Pacis v. COMELEC, 34 we reiterated the guiding principle that "clean elections control the
appropriateness of the remedy." The dissent, for all its depth, is out of step with this movement. It
condemns the COMELEC for exercising its discretion to resort to manual count when this was its only
viable alternative. It would set aside the results of the manual count even when the results are free from
fraud and irregularity. Worse, it would set aside the judgment of the people electing the private
respondent as Governor. Upholding the sovereignty of the people is what democracy is all about. When
the sovereignty of the people expressed thru the ballot is at stake, it is not enough for this Court to make
a statement but it should do everything to have that sovereignty obeyed by all. Well done is always better
than well said.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition of Tupay Loong and the petition in intervention of Yusop Jikiri are
dismissed[m8] , there being no showing that public respondent gravely abused its discretion in issuing
Minute Resolution Nos. 98-1748, 98-1750, 98-1796 and 98-1798. Our status quo order of June 23, 1998
is lifted. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
[m1]The fourth issue, na they were denied of due process
[m2]Sa first issue
[m3]Second issue
[m4]Ang naka bold mga sub issues sa issue no. 2
[m5]Issue no. 3
[m6]Fourth issue ruling
[m7]Kini nga part mo relate sa topic which is the equal protection clause…
[m8]Consolidated ruling sa SC
47. G.R. No. 128845 June 1, 2000
INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner, vs. HON. LEONARDO A.

QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON. CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO
in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN MACCAULEY in his capacity as
the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL, INC., respondents.
KAPUNAN, J.:
Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly
Filipinos, cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of
course, beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a
principle long honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the
principle we uphold today. 1âwphi1.nêt
Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Preside ntial Decree 732, is a
domestic educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and
other temporary residents.1 To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and
improve its standard of instruction, Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own
teaching and management personnel selected by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other
nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable laws and regulations attending their
employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of employees.
Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same
into two: (1) foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty
member should be classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:
a. What is one's domicile?
b. Where is one's home economy?
c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?
d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible
for bringing that individual to the Philippines? 2
Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local
hire; otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.
The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires. These include housing,
1avvphi1
transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary
rate twenty-five percent (25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant
economic disadvantages" foreign-hires have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited
tenure. The School explains:
A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and
friends, and take the risk of deviating from a promising career path — all for the purpose of pursuing
his profession as an educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with
economic realities: decent abode for oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of
transportation, allowance for the education of one's children, adequate insurance against illness and
death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement compensation.
Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term:
that he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty
of obtaining suitable employment after along period in a foreign land.
The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international
level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education.3
When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School
Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members" 4 of
the School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question
of whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between
the parties.
On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board
to bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume
jurisdiction over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order
resolving the parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing
subsequently denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks
relief in this Court.
Petitioner claims that [WON] the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to
Filipinos and that the grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.
The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities
other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires. 5 The Acting Secretary of Labor found that
these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires.
The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to
tell, there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires. 6
The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:
The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case. The international
character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different
cultures, among the student population.
We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired
personnel which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to
these people in order to entice them to render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain
competitive in the international market.
Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local
hires who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require
parity in other terms and conditions of employment which include the employment which include the
employment contract.
A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional
compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:
All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof
provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate
teachers from abroad, under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international
practice.
Appendix C of said CBA further provides:
The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary
schedule. The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and
contracted status of the OSRS as differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff
(LRS).
To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types
of employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established
principle of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation
or private covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on
substantial distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction
between foreign hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their
own in the Philippines and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the
teaching faculty of the School.7
We cannot agree.
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws
reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution 8 in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights
exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of
all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of
the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to]
act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith.
International law, which springs from general principles of law, 9 likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles
of law include principles of equity, 10 i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is
reasonable. 11 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 12 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and
Cultural Rights, 13 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14 the
Convention against Discrimination in Education, 15 the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of
Employment and Occupation 16 — all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of
fairness and justice. The Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national
laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and
discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution 17 specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees.
The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor
Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be
an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and
ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment. 20
Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits
and penalizes 21 the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of
equal value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order
to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:
(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of
any kind, in particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to
those enjoyed by men, with equal pay for equal work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries. 22 This rule applies to the School, its "international character"
notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-
hires. 23 The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank,
the presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human
experience. If the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he
receives less or why the others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has
discriminated against that employee; it is for the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.
The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform
25% more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which
they perform under similar working conditions.
The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction
in salary rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.
"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for service s performed."
Similarly, the Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular
intervals for the rendering of services." In Songco v. National Labor Relations Commission, 24 we said that:
"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another
man's business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the
Roman soldier, it carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered.
(Emphasis supplied.)
While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to
the prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the
same salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also
cannot serve as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-
hires are adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local -hires, such as
housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.
The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25 "to afford labor full
protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. 27 These
relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining
agreements included, must yield to the common good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary
to public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.
In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary
rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the
services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-
hires contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court. 1avvphi1
We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.
A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire
body of employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the
reciprocal rights and duties of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law." 29 The factors
in determining the appropriate collective bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2)
affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of
compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining
history; and (4) similarity of employment status. 30 The basic test of an asserted bargaining unit's acceptability
is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees the exercise of
their collective bargaining rights. 31
It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes
of collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always
treated separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires
perform similar functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain
benefits not granted to local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home
leave travel allowance, are reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former
from the latter. To include foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise
of their respective collective bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of
the Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and
SET ASIDE insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries
than local-hires.
SO ORDERED.
48. 347 U.S. 483 (May 17, 1954)
[NOTE: Guys dili ko sure kung mao ni ang full text sa case. Mao ra ni ako nakit.an. Kindly search or double
check nalang please. Thanks.]
*U.S. Supreme Court
BROWN v. BOARD OF EDUCATION, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)
347 U.S. 483
BROWN ET AL. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF TOPEKA ET AL.
APPEAL FROM THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF KANSAS. * No. 1.
Argued December 9, 1952. Reargued December 8, 1953. Decided May 17, 1954.
Segregation of white and Negro children in the public schools of a State solely on the basis of
race, pursuant to state laws permitting or requiring such segregation, denies to Negro children the
equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment - even though the physical
facilities and other "tangible" factors of white and Negro schools may be equal. Pp. 486-496.
(a) The history of the Fourteenth Amendment is inconclusive as to its intended effect on public
education. Pp. 489-490.
(b) The question presented in these cases must be determined, not on the basis of conditions
existing when the Fourteenth Amendment was adopted, but in the light of the full development
of public education and its present place in American life throughout the Nation. Pp. 492-493.
(c) Where a State has undertaken to provide an opportunity for an education in its public schools,
such an opportunity is a right which must be made available to all on equal terms. P. 493.
(d) Segregation of children in public schools solely on the basis of race deprives children of the
minority group of equal educational opportunities, even though the physical facilities and other
"tangible" factors may be equal. Pp. 493-494.
(e) The "separate but equal" doctrine adopted in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 , has no place
in the field of public education. P. 495. [347 U.S. 483, 484]
(f) The cases are restored to the docket for further argument on specified questions relating to
the forms of the decrees. Pp. 495-496.
[ Footnote * ] Together with No. 2, Briggs et al. v. Elliott et al., on appeal from the United States
District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, argued December 9-10, 1952, reargued
December 7-8, 1953; No. 4, Davis et al. v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, Virginia,
et al., on appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, argued
December 10, 1952, reargued December 7-8, 1953; and No. 10, Gebhart et al. v. Belton et al., on
certiorari to the Supreme Court of Delaware, argued December 11, 1952, reargued December 9,
1953.
Robert L. Carter argued the cause for appellants in No. 1 on the original argument and on the
reargument. Thurgood Marshall argued the cause for appellants in No. 2 on the original argument
and Spottswood W. Robinson, III, for appellants in No. 4 on the original argument, and both
argued the causes for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. Louis L. Redding and Jack
Greenberg argued the cause for respondents in No. 10 on the original argument and Jack Greenberg
and Thurgood Marshall on the reargument.
On the briefs were Robert L. Carter, Thurgood Marshall, Spottswood W. Robinson, III, Louis L.
Redding, Jack Greenberg, George E. C. Hayes, William R. Ming, Jr., Constance Baker Motley, James
M. Nabrit, Jr., Charles S. Scott, Frank D. Reeves, Harold R. Boulware and Oliver W. Hill for
appellants in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and respondents in No. 10; George M. Johnson for appellants in
Nos. 1, 2 and 4; and Loren Miller for appellants in Nos. 2 and 4. Arthur D. Shores and A. T.
Walden were on the Statement as to Jurisdiction and a brief opposing a Motion to Dismiss or
Affirm in No. 2.
Paul E. Wilson, Assistant Attorney General of Kansas, argued the cause for appellees in No. 1 on
the original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was Harold R. Fatzer,
Attorney General.
John W. Davis argued the cause for appellees in No. 2 on the original argument and for appellees
in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument. With him on the briefs in No. 2 were T. C. Callison, Attorney
General of South Carolina, Robert McC. Figg, Jr., S. E. Rogers, William R. Meagher and Taggart
Whipple. [347 U.S. 483, 485]
J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore argued the cause for
appellees in No. 4 on the original argument and for appellees in Nos. 2 and 4 on the reargument.
On the briefs in No. 4 were J. Lindsay Almond, Jr., Attorney General, and Henry T. Wickham,
Special Assistant Attorney General, for the State of Virginia, and T. Justin Moore, Archibald G.
Robertson, John W. Riely and T. Justin Moore, Jr. for the Prince Edward County School Authorities,
appellees.
H. Albert Young, Attorney General of Delaware, argued the cause for petitioners in No. 10 on the
original argument and on the reargument. With him on the briefs was Louis J. Finger, Special
Deputy Attorney General.
By special leave of Court, Assistant Attorney General Rankin argued the cause for the United States
on the reargument, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No.
10. With him on the brief were Attorney General Brownell, Philip Elman, Leon Ulman, William J.
Lamont and M. Magdelena Schoch. James P. McGranery, then Attorney General, and Philip Elman
filed a brief for the United States on the original argument, as amicus curiae, urging reversal in
Nos. 1, 2 and 4 and affirmance in No. 10.
Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 were filed by Shad Polier, Will Maslow and
Joseph B. Robison for the American Jewish Congress; by Edwin J. Lukas, Arnold Forster, Arthur
Garfield Hays, Frank E. Karelsen, Leonard Haas, Saburo Kido and Theodore Leskes for the American
Civil Liberties Union et al.; and by John Ligtenberg and Selma M. Borchardt for the American
Federation of Teachers. Briefs of amici curiae supporting appellants in No. 1 and respondents in
No. 10 were filed by Arthur J. Goldberg and Thomas E. Harris [347 U.S. 483, 486] for the
Congress of Industrial Organizations and by Phineas Indritz for the American Veterans Committee,
Inc.
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE WARREN delivered the opinion of the Court.
These cases come to us from the States of Kansas, South Carolina, Virginia, and Delaware. They
are premised on different facts and different local conditions, but a common legal question justifies
their consideration together in this consolidated opinion. 1 [347 U.S. 483, 487]
In each of the cases, minors of the Negro race, through their legal representatives, seek the aid
of the courts in obtaining admission to the public schools of their community on a nonsegregated
basis. In each instance, [347 U.S. 483, 488] they had been denied admission to schools attended
by white children under laws requiring or permitting segregation according to race. This segregation
was alleged to deprive the plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws under the Fourteenth
Amendment. In each of the cases other than the Delaware case, a three-judge federal district
court denied relief to the plaintiffs on the so-called "separate but equal" doctrine announced by
this Court in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 . Under that doctrine, equality of treatment is
accorded when the races are provided substantially equal facilities, even though these facilities be
separate. In the Delaware case, the Supreme Court of Delaware adhered to that doctrine, but
ordered that the plaintiffs be admitted to the white schools because of their superiority to the
Negro schools.
The plaintiffs contend that segregated public schools are not "equal" and cannot be made "equal,"
and that hence they are deprived of the equal protection of the laws. Because of the obvious
importance of the question presented, the Court took jurisdiction. 2 Argument was heard in the
1952 Term, and reargument was heard this Term on certain questions propounded by the Court.
3 [347 U.S. 483, 489]
Reargument was largely devoted to the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the Fourteenth
Amendment in 1868. It covered exhaustively consideration of the Amendment in Congress,
ratification by the states, then existing practices in racial segregation, and the views of proponents
and opponents of the Amendment. This discussion and our own investigation convince us that,
although these sources cast some light, it is not enough to resolve the problem with which we
are faced. At best, they are inconclusive. The most avid proponents of the post-War Amendments
undoubtedly intended them to remove all legal distinctions among "all persons born or naturalized
in the United States." Their opponents, just as certainly, were antagonistic to both the letter and
the spirit of the Amendments and wished them to have the most limited effect. What others in
Congress and the state legislatures had in mind cannot be determined with any degree of certainty.
An additional reason for the inconclusive nature of the Amendment's history, with respect to
segregated schools, is the status of public education at that time. 4 In the South, the movement
toward free common schools, supported [347 U.S. 483, 490] by general taxation, had not yet
taken hold. Education of white children was largely in the hands of private groups. Education of
Negroes was almost nonexistent, and practically all of the race were illiterate. In fact, any education
of Negroes was forbidden by law in some states. Today, in contrast, many Negroes have achieved
outstanding success in the arts and sciences as well as in the business and professional world. It
is true that public school education at the time of the Amendment had advanced further in the
North, but the effect of the Amendment on Northern States was generally ignored in the
congressional debates. Even in the North, the conditions of public education did not approximate
those existing today. The curriculum was usually rudimentary; ungraded schools were common in
rural areas; the school term was but three months a year in many states; and compulsory school
attendance was virtually unknown. As a consequence, it is not surprising that there should be so
little in the history of the Fourteenth Amendment relating to its intended effect on public
education.
In the first cases in this Court construing the Fourteenth Amendment, decided shortly after its
adoption, the Court interpreted it as proscribing all state-imposed discriminations against the Negro
race. 5 The doctrine of [347 U.S. 483, 491] "separate but equal" did not make its appearance
in this Court until 1896 in the case of Plessy v. Ferguson, supra, involving not education but
transportation. 6 American courts have since labored with the doctrine for over half a century. In
this Court, there have been six cases involving the "separate but equal" doctrine in the field of
public education. 7 In Cumming v. County Board of Education, 175 U.S. 528 , and Gong Lum v.
Rice, 275 U.S. 78 , the validity of the doctrine itself was not challenged. 8 In more recent cases,
all on the graduate school [347 U.S. 483, 492] level, inequality was found in that specific benefits
enjoyed by white students were denied to Negro students of the same educational qualifications.
Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 ; Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 ; Sweatt v.
Painter, 339 U.S. 629 ; McLaurin v. Oklahoma State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 . In none of these
cases was it necessary to re-examine the doctrine to grant relief to the Negro plaintiff. And in
Sweatt v. Painter, supra, the Court expressly reserved decision on the question whether Plessy v.
Ferguson should be held inapplicable to public education.
In the instant cases, that question is directly presented. Here, unlike Sweatt v. Painter, there are
findings below that the Negro and white schools involved have been equalized, or are being
equalized, with respect to buildings, curricula, qualifications and salaries of teachers, and other
"tangible" factors. 9 Our decision, therefore, cannot turn on merely a comparison of these tangible
factors in the Negro and white schools involved in each of the cases. We must look instead to
the effect of segregation itself on public education.
In approaching this problem, we cannot turn the clock back to 1868 when the Amendment was
adopted, or even to 1896 when Plessy v. Ferguson was written. We must consider public education
in the light of its full development and its present place in American life throughout [347 U.S.
483, 493] the Nation. Only in this way can it be determined if segregation in public schools
deprives these plaintiffs of the equal protection of the laws.
Today, education is perhaps the most important function of state and local governments.
Compulsory school attendance laws and the great expenditures for education both demonstrate
our recognition of the importance of education to our democratic society. It is required in the
performance of our most basic public responsibilities, even service in the armed forces. It is the
very foundation of good citizenship. Today it is a principal instrument in awakening the child to
cultural values, in preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment. In these days, it is doubtful that any child may reasonably be
expected to succeed in life if he is denied the opportunity of an education. Such an opportunity,
where the state has undertaken to provide it, is a right which must be made available to all on
equal terms.
We come then to the question presented: Does segregation of children in public schools solely on
the basis of race, even though the physical facilities and other "tangible" factors may be equal,
deprive the children of the minority group of equal educational opportunities? We believe that it
does.
In Sweatt v. Painter, supra, in finding that a segregated law school for Negroes could not provide
them equal educational opportunities, this Court relied in large part on "those qualities which are
incapable of objective measurement but which make for greatness in a law school." In McLaurin
v. Oklahoma State Regents, supra, the Court, in requiring that a Negro admitted to a white
graduate school be treated like all other students, again resorted to intangible considerations: ". .
. his ability to study, to engage in discussions and exchange views with other students, and, in
general, to learn his profession." [347 U.S. 483, 494] Such considerations apply with added force
to children in grade and high schools. To separate them from others of similar age and
qualifications solely because of their race generates a feeling of inferiority as to their status in
the community that may affect their hearts and minds in a way unlikely ever to be undone.
The effect of this separation on their educational opportunities was well stated by a finding in
the Kansas case by a court which nevertheless felt compelled to rule against the Negro plaintiffs:
"Segregation of white and colored children in public schools has a detrimental effect upon the
colored children. The impact is greater when it has the sanction of the law; for the policy of
separating the races is usually interpreted as denoting the inferiority of the negro group. A
sense of inferiority affects the motivation of a child to learn. Segregation with the sanction of
law, therefore, has a tendency to [retard] the educational and mental development of negro
children and to deprive them of some of the benefits they would receive in a racial[ly] integrated
school system." 10
Whatever may have been the extent of psychological knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson,
this finding is amply supported by modern authority. 11 Any language [347 U.S. 483, 495] in
Plessy v. Ferguson contrary to this finding is rejected.
We conclude that in the field of public education the doctrine of "separate but equal" has no
place. Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal. Therefore, we hold that the plaintiffs
and others similarly situated for whom the actions have been brought are, by reason of the
segregation complained of, deprived of the equal protection of the laws guaranteed by the
Fourteenth Amendment. This disposition makes unnecessary any discussion whether such
segregation also violates the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. 12
Because these are class actions, because of the wide applicability of this decision, and because of
the great variety of local conditions, the formulation of decrees in these cases presents problems
of considerable complexity. On reargument, the consideration of appropriate relief was necessarily
subordinated to the primary question - the constitutionality of segregation in public education. We
have now announced that such segregation is a denial of the equal protection of the laws. In
order that we may have the full assistance of the parties in formulating decrees, the cases will
be restored to the docket, and the parties are requested to present further argument on Questions
4 and 5 previously propounded by the Court for the reargument this Term. 13 The Attorney
General [347 U.S. 483, 496] of the United States is again invited to participate. The Attorneys
General of the states requiring or permitting segregation in public education will also be permitted
to appear as amici curiae upon request to do so by September 15, 1954, and submission of briefs
by October 1, 1954. 14
It is so ordered.
49. G.R. No. 148208 December 15, 2004
CENTRAL BANK (now Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas) EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION, INC.,

petitioner,
vs.
BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS and the EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, respondents.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its
continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of
the subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions
(GFIs), the continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 7653, constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko
Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP).
I.
The Case
First the facts.
On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central
Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central Bank
(now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the Executive
Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the last
proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15. Exercise of Authority - In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection, hiring,
appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall aim to establish
professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in accordance with sound principles
of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the
Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko Sentral's human
resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall make its own system
conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary
Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That compensation and wage structure of employees
whose positions fall under salary grade 19 and below shall be in accordance with the rates
prescribed under Republic Act No. 6758. [emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut
between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the
coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary
Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class).
It is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's
position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A.
No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in
1
the BSP. Petitioner offers the following sub-set of arguments:
a. the legislative history of R.A. No. 7653 shows that the questioned proviso does not appear in the
original and amended versions of House Bill No. 7037, nor in the original version of Senate Bill No.
2
1235;
b. subjecting the compensation of the BSP rank-and-file employees to the rate prescribed by the SSL
3
actually defeats the purpose of the law of establishing professionalism and excellence at all levels
4
in the BSP; (emphasis supplied)
c. the assailed proviso was the product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of Senate
Bill No. 1235, without showing its relevance to the objectives of the law, and even admitted by one
5
senator as discriminatory against low-salaried employees of the BSP;
d. GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS personnel are all exempted from the coverage of the SSL; thus within
the class of rank-and-file personnel of government financial institutions (GFIs), the BSP rank-and-file
6
are also discriminated upon; and
e. the assailed proviso has caused the demoralization among the BSP rank-and-file and resulted in
7
the gross disparity between their compensation and that of the BSP officers'.
In sum, petitioner posits that the classification is not reasonable but arbitrary and capricious, and
8
violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner also stresses: (a) that R.A. No.
7653 has a separability clause, which will allow the declaration of the unconstitutionality of the proviso
in question without affecting the other provisions; and (b) the urgency and propriety of the petition, as
some 2,994 BSP rank-and-file employees have been prejudiced since 1994 when the proviso was
implemented. Petitioner concludes that: (1) since the inequitable proviso has no force and effect of
law, respondents' implementation of such amounts to lack of jurisdiction; and (2) it has no appeal nor
any other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary course except through this petition for
prohibition, which this Court should take cognizance of, considering the transcendental importance of
9
the legal issue involved.
10
Respondent BSP, in its comment, contends that the provision does not violate the equal protection
clause and can stand the constitutional test, provided it is construed in harmony with other provisions
of the same law, such as "fiscal and administrative autonomy of BSP," and the mandate of the
Monetary Board to "establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in accordance with sound
principles of management."
The Solicitor General, on behalf of respondent Executive Secretary, also defends the validity of the
provision. Quite simplistically, he argues that the classification is based on actual and real
differentiation, even as it adheres to the enunciated policy of R.A. No. 7653 to establish
professionalism and excellence within the BSP subject to prevailing laws and policies of the national
11
government.
II.
Issue
Thus, the sole - albeit significant - issue to be resolved in this case is whether the last paragraph of
Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the constitutional mandate that "No person
12
shall be. . . denied the equal protection of the laws."
III.
Ruling
A. UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION,
SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification
created by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the Legislature
from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate - so long
13
as the classification is not unreasonable. As held in Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union,
14
and reiterated in a long line of cases:
The guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not a guarantee of equality in the application of the
laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the constitutional
prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be affected alike by a statute.
Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such,
but on persons according to the circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity
of rights. The Constitution does not require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things
that are different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is
directed or by territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification in law,
as in other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of thin gs in speculation or practice
because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not invalid because of simple
inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes without saying that the
mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that is required of
a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which means that the classification should be based on
substantial distinctions which make for real differences, that it must be germane to the purpose of the
law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each
member of the class. This Court has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction
is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary.
In the exercise of its power to make classifications for the purpose of enacting laws over matters within
its jurisdiction, the state is recognized as enjoying a wide range of discretion. It is not necessary that
the classification be based on scientific or marked differences of things or in their relation. Neither is
it necessary that the classification be made with mathematical nicety. Hence, legislative classification
may in many cases properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guarantee does not
preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils
as they may appear. (citations omitted)
15
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified
16
class. If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one
17
class may be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be
18
germane to the purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20 and
above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of attracting
competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the rank-and-file. If the
end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the rank-and-file in terms
of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and is not palpably,
19
purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the Senate Bill
20
does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases, this Court
has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law, on
the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted
by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be resolved in
21
favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature, approved by the executive, is
22
presumed to be within constitutional limitations. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be
23
a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.
B. THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS -
EXEMPTING ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES
OF GFIs FROM THE SSL - RENDERS THE CONTINUED
APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION
A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
While R.A. No. 7653 started as a valid measure well within the legislature's power, we hold that the
enactment of subsequent laws exempting all rank-and-file employees of other GFIs leeched
all validity out of the challenged proviso.
1. The concept of relative constitutionality.
The constitutionality of a statute cannot, in every instance, be determined by a mere comparison of

its provisions with applicable provisions of the Constitution, since the statute may be constitutionally
24
valid as applied to one set of facts and invalid in its application to another.
25
A statute valid at one time may become void at another time because of altered circumstances.
Thus, if a statute in its practical operation becomes arbitrary or confiscatory, its validity, even though
affirmed by a former adjudication, is open to inquiry and investigation in the light of changed
26
conditions.
27
Demonstrative of this doctrine is Vernon Park Realty v. City of Mount Vernon, where the Court
of Appeals of New York declared as unreasonable and arbitrary a zoning ordinance which placed the
plaintiff's property in a residential district, although it was located in the center of a business area.
Later amendments to the ordinance then prohibited the use of the property except for parking and
storage of automobiles, and service station within a parking area. The Court found the ordinance to
constitute an invasion of property rights which was contrary to constitutional due process. It ruled:
While the common council has the unquestioned right to enact zoning laws respecting the use of
property in accordance with a well-considered and comprehensive plan designed to promote public
health, safety and general welfare, such power is subject to the constitutional limitation that it may not
be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably and this is so whenever the zoning ordinance precludes the
use of the property for any purpose for which it is reasonably adapted. By the same token, an
ordinance valid when adopted will nevertheless be stricken down as invalid when, at a later
time, its operation under changed conditions proves confiscatory such, for instance, as when
28
the greater part of its value is destroyed, for which the courts will afford relief in an appropriate case.
(citations omitted, emphasis supplied)
In the Philippine setting, this Court declared the continued enforcement of a valid law as
29
unconstitutional as a consequence of significant changes in circumstances. Rutter v. Esteban
upheld the constitutionality of the moratorium law - its enactment and operation being a valid exercise
30
by the State of its police power - but also ruled that the continued enforcement of an otherwise
valid law would be unreasonable and oppressive. It noted the subsequent changes in the
country's business, industry and agriculture. Thus, the law was set aside because its continued
operation would be grossly discriminatory and lead to the oppression of the creditors. The landmark
31
ruling states:
The question now to be determined is, is the period of eight (8) years which Republic Act No. 342
grants to debtors of a monetary obligation contracted before the last global war and who is a war
sufferer with a claim duly approved by the Philippine War Damage Commission reasonable under the
present circumstances?
It should be noted that Republic Act No. 342 only extends relief to debtors of prewar obligations who
suffered from the ravages of the last war and who filed a claim for their losses with the Philippine War
Damage Commission. It is therein provided that said obligation shall not be due and demandable for
a period of eight (8) years from and after settlement of the claim filed by the debtor with said
Commission. The purpose of the law is to afford to prewar debtors an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves by giving them a reasonable time within which to pay their prewar debts so as to prevent
them from being victimized by their creditors. While it is admitted in said law that since liberation
conditions have gradually returned to normal, this is not so with regard to those who have suffered
the ravages of war and so it was therein declared as a policy that as to them the debt moratorium
should be continued in force (Section 1).
But we should not lose sight of the fact that these obligations had been pending since 1945 as a result
of the issuance of Executive Orders Nos. 25 and 32 and at present their enforcement is still inhibited
because of the enactment of Republic Act No. 342 and would continue to be unenforceable during
the eight-year period granted to prewar debtors to afford them an opportunity to rehabilitate
themselves, which in plain language means that the creditors would have to observe a vigil of at least
twelve (12) years before they could effect a liquidation of their investment dating as far back as 1941.
his period seems to us unreasonable, if not oppressive. While the purpose of Congress is plausible,
and should be commended, the relief accorded works injustice to creditors who are practically left at
the mercy of the debtors. Their hope to effect collection becomes extremely remote, more so if the
credits are unsecured. And the injustice is more patent when, under the law, the debtor is not even
required to pay interest during the operation of the relief, unlike similar statutes in the United States.
xxx xxx xxx
In the face of the foregoing observations, and consistent with what we believe to be as the only course
dictated by justice, fairness and righteousness, we feel that the only way open to us under the present
circumstances is to declare that the continued operation and enforcement of Republic Act No.
342 at the present time is unreasonable and oppressive, and should not be prolonged a minute
longer, and, therefore, the same should be declared null and void and without effect. (emphasis
supplied, citations omitted)
2. Applicability of the equal protection clause.
32
In the realm of equal protection, the U.S. case of Atlantic Coast Line R. Co. v. Ivey is
illuminating. The Supreme Court of Florida ruled against the continued application of statutes
authorizing the recovery of double damages plus attorney's fees against railroad companies, for
animals killed on unfenced railroad right of way without proof of negligence. Competitive motor
carriers, though creating greater hazards, were not subjected to similar liability because they were
not yet in existence when the statutes were enacted. The Court ruled that the statutes became
invalid as denying "equal protection of the law," in view of changed conditions since their
enactment.
33
In another U.S. case, Louisville & N.R. Co. v. Faulkner, the Court of Appeals of Kentucky
declared unconstitutional a provision of a statute which imposes a duty upon a railroad company of
proving that it was free from negligence in the killing or injury of cattle by its engine or cars. This,
notwithstanding that the constitutionality of the statute, enacted in 1893, had been previously
sustained. Ruled the Court:
The constitutionality of such legislation was sustained because it applied to all similar corporations
and had for its object the safety of persons on a train and the protection of property…. Of course,
there were no automobiles in those days. The subsequent inauguration and development of
transportation by motor vehicles on the public highways by common carriers of freight and passengers
created even greater risks to the safety of occupants of the vehicles and of danger of injury and death
of domestic animals. Yet, under the law the operators of that mode of competitive transportation are
not subject to the same extraordinary legal responsibility for killing such animals on the public roads
as are railroad companies for killing them on their private rights of way.
The Supreme Court, speaking through Justice Brandeis in Nashville, C. & St. L. Ry. Co. v. Walters,
294 U.S. 405, 55 S.Ct. 486, 488, 79 L.Ed. 949, stated, "A statute valid when enacted may become
invalid by change in the conditions to which it is applied. The police power is subject to the
constitutional limitation that it may not be exerted arbitrarily or unreasonably." A number of prior
opinions of that court are cited in support of the statement. The State of Florida for many years had a
statute, F.S.A. § 356.01 et seq. imposing extraordinary and special duties upon railroad companies,
among which was that a railroad company was liable for double damages and an attorney's fee for
killing livestock by a train without the owner having to prove any act of negligence on the part of the
carrier in the operation of its train. In Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co. v. Ivey, it was held that the
changed conditions brought about by motor vehicle transportation rendered the statute
unconstitutional since if a common carrier by motor vehicle had killed the same animal, the owner
would have been required to prove negligence in the operation of its equipment. Said the court, "This
34
certainly is not equal protection of the law." (emphasis supplied)
Echoes of these rulings resonate in our case law, viz:
Courts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining whether that
statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly
discriminatory in its operation. Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance,
yet, if it is applied and administered by public authority with an evil eye and an unequal hand, so as
practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between persons in similar circumstances,
35
material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the Constitution.
(emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
[W]e see no difference between a law which denies equal protection and a law which permits
of such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it permits
of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition….. In other words, statutes
may be adjudged unconstitutional because of their effect in operation…. If a law has the effect of
36
denying the equal protection of the law it is unconstitutional. …. (emphasis supplied, citations
omitted
3. Enactment of R.A. Nos. 7907 + 8282 + 8289 + 8291 + 8523 + 8763
+ 9302 = consequential unconstitutionality of challenged proviso.
According to petitioner, the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653 is also violative of
the equal protection clause because after it was enacted, the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and
SSS were also amended, but the personnel of the latter GFIs were all exempted from the coverage
37
of the SSL. Thus, within the class of rank-and-file personnel of GFIs, the BSP rank-and-file are
also discriminated upon.
Indeed, we take judicial notice that after the new BSP charter was enacted in 1993, Congress also
undertook the amendment of the charters of the GSIS, LBP, DBP and SSS, and three other GFIs,
from 1995 to 2004, viz:
1. R.A. No. 7907 (1995) for Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP);
2. R.A. No. 8282 (1997) for Social Security System (SSS);
3. R.A. No. 8289 (1997) for Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation, (SBGFC);
4. R.A. No. 8291 (1997) for Government Service Insurance System (GSIS);
5. R.A. No. 8523 (1998) for Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP);
38
6. R.A. No. 8763 (2000) for Home Guaranty Corporation (HGC); and
7. R.A. No. 9302 (2004) for Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC).
It is noteworthy, as petitioner points out, that the subsequent charters of the seven other GFIs
share this common proviso: a blanket exemption of all their employees from the coverage of the
SSL, expressly or impliedly, as illustrated below:
1. LBP (R.A. No. 7907)
Section 10. Section 90 of [R.A. No. 3844] is hereby amended to read as follows:
Section 90. Personnel. -
xxx xxx xxx
All positions in the Bank shall be governed by a compensation, position classification system and
qualification standards approved by the Bank's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job
analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The compensation plan shall be comparable
with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and shall be subject to periodic review by
the Board no more than once every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases
based on productivity and profitability. The Bank shall therefore be exempt from existing laws,
rules and regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It
shall however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under
Republic Act No. 6758. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
2. SSS (R.A. No. 8282)
Section 1. [Amending R.A. No. 1161, Section 3(c)]:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)The Commission, upon the recommendation of the SSS President shall appoint an actuary and
such other personnel as may [be] deemed necessary; fix their reasonable compensation, allowances
and other benefits; prescribe their duties and establish such methods and procedures as may be
necessary to insure the efficient, honest and economical administration of the provisions and
purposes of this Act: Provided, however, That the personnel of the SSS below the rank of Vice
President shall be appointed by the SSS President: Provided, further, That the personnel appointed
by the SSS President, except those below the rank of assistant manager, shall be subject to the
confirmation by the Commission; Provided further, That the personnel of the SSS shall be selected
only from civil service eligibles and be subject to civil service rules and regulations: Provided, finally,
That the SSS shall be exempt from the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758 and Republic Act
No. 7430. (emphasis supplied)
3. SBGFC (R.A. No. 8289)
Section 8. [Amending R.A. No. 6977, Section 11]:
xxx xxx xxx
The Small Business Guarantee and Finance Corporation shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) notwithstanding the provisions of Republic Act No. 6758, and Compensation Circular No.
10, series of 1989 issued by the Department of Budget and Management, the Board of Directors
of SBGFC shall have the authority to extend to the employees and personnel thereof the
allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently enjoyed by the
employees and personnel of other government financial institutions. (emphases supplied)
4. GSIS (R.A. No. 8291)
Section 1. [Amending Section 43(d)].
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 43. Powers and Functions of the Board of Trustees. - The Board of Trustees shall have the
following powers and functions:
xxx xxx xxx
(d) upon the recommendation of the President and General Manager, to approve the GSIS'
organizational and administrative structures and staffing pattern, and to establish, fix, review, revise
and adjust the appropriate compensation package for the officers and employees of the GSIS with
reasonable allowances, incentives, bonuses, privileges and other benefits as may be necessary or
proper for the effective management, operation and administration of the GSIS, which shall be
exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law and
Republic Act No. 7430, otherwise known as the Attrition Law. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
5. DBP (R.A. No. 8523)
Section 6. [Amending E.O. No. 81, Section 13]:
Section 13. Other Officers and Employees. - The Board of Directors shall provide for an organization
and staff of officers and employees of the Bank and upon recommendation of the President of the
Bank, fix their remunerations and other emoluments. All positions in the Bank shall be governed by
the compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board
of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector
and shall be subject to periodic review by the Board of Directors once every two (2) years, without
prejudice to yearly merit or increases based on the Bank's productivity and profitability. The Bank
shall, therefore, be exempt from existing laws, rules, and regulations on compensation,
position classification and qualification standards. The Bank shall however, endeavor to make
its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No. 6758, as amended). (emphasis supplied)
6. HGC (R.A. No. 8763)
Section 9. Powers, Functions and Duties of the Board of Directors. - The Board shall have the
following powers, functions and duties:
xxx xxx xxx
(e) To create offices or positions necessary for the efficient management, operation and
administration of the Corporation: Provided, That all positions in the Home Guaranty Corporation
(HGC) shall be governed by a compensation and position classification system and qualifications
standards approved by the Corporation's Board of Directors based on a comprehensive job analysis
and audit of actual duties and responsibilities: Provided, further, That the compensation plan shall
be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans in the private sector and which shall
be exempt from Republic Act No. 6758, otherwise known as the Salary Standardization Law,
and from other laws, rules and regulations on salaries and compensations; and to establish a
Provident Fund and determine the Corporation's and the employee's contributions to the Fund;
(emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
7. PDIC (R.A. No. 9302)
Section 2. Section 2 of [Republic Act No. 3591, as amended] is hereby further amended to read:
xxx xxx xxx
3.
xxx xxx xxx
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject to the
Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Corporation's human resource
development program: Provided, That all positions in the Corporation shall be governed by a
compensation, position classification system and qualification standards approved by the Board
based on a comprehensive job analysis and audit of actual duties and responsibilities. The
compensation plan shall be comparable with the prevailing compensation plans of other
government financial institutions and shall be subject to review by the Board no more than once
every two (2) years without prejudice to yearly merit reviews or increases based on productivity and
profitability. The Corporation shall therefore be exempt from existing laws, rules and
regulations on compensation, position classification and qualification standards. It shall
however endeavor to make its system conform as closely as possible with the principles under
Republic Act No. 6758, as amended. (emphases supplied)
Thus, eleven years after the amendment of the BSP charter, the rank-and-file of seven other
GFIs were granted the exemption that was specifically denied to the rank-and-file of the BSP.
And as if to add insult to petitioner's injury, even the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was
39
granted the same blanket exemption from the SSL in 2000!
The prior view on the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7653 was confined to an evaluation of its
classification between the rank-and-file and the officers of the BSP, found reasonable because
there were substantial distinctions that make real differences between the two classes.
The above-mentioned subsequent enactments, however, constitute significant changes in

circumstance that considerably alter the reasonability of the continued operation of the last
proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653, thereby exposing the proviso to
more serious scrutiny. This time, the scrutiny relates to the constitutionality of the classification -
albeit made indirectly as a consequence of the passage of eight other laws - between the rank-and-
file of the BSP and the seven other GFIs. The classification must not only be reasonable, but must
also apply equally to all members of the class. The proviso may be fair on its face and impartial in
appearance but it cannot be grossly discriminatory in its operation, so as practically to make
40
unjust distinctions between persons who are without differences.
Stated differently, the second level of inquiry deals with the following questions: Given that Congress
chose to exempt other GFIs (aside the BSP) from the coverage of the SSL, can the exclusion of the
rank-and-file employees of the BSP stand constitutional scrutiny in the light of the fact that Congress
did not exclude the rank-and-file employees of the other GFIs? Is Congress' power to classify so
unbridled as to sanction unequal and discriminatory treatment, simply because the inequity
manifested itself, not instantly through a single overt act, but gradually and progressively, through
seven separate acts of Congress? Is the right to equal protection of the law bounded in time and
space that: (a) the right can only be invoked against a classification made directly and deliberately,
as opposed to a discrimination that arises indirectly, or as a consequence of several other acts; and
(b) is the legal analysis confined to determining the validity within the parameters of the statute or
ordinance (where the inclusion or exclusion is articulated), thereby proscribing any evaluation vis-à-
vis the grouping, or the lack thereof, among several similar enactments made over a period of time?
In this second level of scrutiny, the inequality of treatment cannot be justified on the mere assertion
that each exemption (granted to the seven other GFIs) rests "on a policy determination by the
legislature." All legislative enactments necessarily rest on a policy determination - even those
that have been declared to contravene the Constitution. Verily, if this could serve as a magic wand to
sustain the validity of a statute, then no due process and equal protection challenges would ever
prosper. There is nothing inherently sacrosanct in a policy determination made by Congress or by the
Executive; it cannot run riot and overrun the ramparts of protection of the Constitution.
In fine, the "policy determination" argument may support the inequality of treatment between the rank-
and-file and the officers of the BSP, but it cannot justify the inequality of treatment between BSP rank-
and-file and other GFIs' who are similarly situated. It fails to appreciate that what is at issue in the
second level of scrutiny is not the declared policy of each law per se, but the oppressive results
of Congress' inconsistent and unequal policy towards the BSP rank-and-file and those of the
seven other GFIs. At bottom, the second challenge to the constitutionality of Section 15(c), Article II
of Republic Act No. 7653 is premised precisely on the irrational discriminatory policy adopted
by Congress in its treatment of persons similarly situated. In the field of equal protection, the
guarantee that "no person shall be … denied the equal protection of the laws" includes the prohibition
against enacting laws that allow invidious discrimination, directly or indirectly. If a law has the effect
41
of denying the equal protection of the law, or permits such denial, it is unconstitutional.
It is against this standard that the disparate treatment of the BSP rank-and-file from the other GFIs
cannot stand judicial scrutiny. For as regards the exemption from the coverage of the SSL, there
exists no substantial distinctions so as to differentiate, the BSP rank-and-file from the other rank-and-
file of the seven GFIs. On the contrary, our legal history shows that GFIs have long been
recognized as comprising one distinct class, separate from other governmental entities.
Before the SSL, Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 985 (1976) declared it as a State policy (1) to provide
equal pay for substantially equal work, and (2) to base differences in pay upon substantive differences
in duties and responsibilities, and qualification requirements of the positions. P.D. No. 985 was passed
to address disparities in pay among similar or comparable positions which had given rise to dissension
among government employees. But even then, GFIs and government-owned and/or controlled
corporations (GOCCs) were already identified as a distinct class among government
employees. Thus, Section 2 also provided, "[t]hat notwithstanding a standardized salary system
established for all employees, additional financial incentives may be established by government
corporation and financial institutions for their employees to be supported fully from their corporate
funds and for such technical positions as may be approved by the President in critical government
42
agencies."
The same favored treatment is made for the GFIs and GOCCs under the SSL. Section 3(b) provides
that one of the principles governing the Compensation and Position Classification System of the
Government is that: "[b]asic compensation for all personnel in the government and government-
owned or controlled corporations and financial institutions shall generally be comparable with those
in the private sector doing comparable work, and must be in accordance with prevailing laws on
minimum wages."
Thus, the BSP and all other GFIs and GOCCs were under the unified Compensation and Position
43
Classification System of the SSL, but rates of pay under the SSL were determined on the basis of,
among others, prevailing rates in the private sector for comparable work. Notably, the Compensation
and Position Classification System was to be governed by the following principles: (a) just and
equitable wages, with the ratio of compensation between pay distinctions maintained at equitable
44
levels; and (b) basic compensation generally comparable with the private sector, in accordance
45
with prevailing laws on minimum wages. Also, the Department of Budget and Management was
directed to use, as a guide for preparing the Index of Occupational Services, the Benchmark Position
46
Schedule, and the following factors:
(1) the education and experience required to perform the duties and responsibilities of the positions;
(2) the nature and complexity of the work to be performed;
(3) the kind of supervision received;
(4) mental and/or physical strain required in the completion of the work;
(5) nature and extent of internal and external relationships;
(6) kind of supervision exercised;
(7) decision-making responsibility;
(8) responsibility for accuracy of records and reports;
(9) accountability for funds, properties and equipment; and
(10) hardship, hazard and personal risk involved in the job.
The Benchmark Position Schedule enumerates the position titles that fall within Salary Grades 1 to
20.
Clearly, under R.A. No. 6758, the rank-and-file of all GFIs were similarly situated in all aspects
pertaining to compensation and position classification, in consonance with Section 5, Article IX-B of
47
the 1997 Constitution.
Then came the enactment of the amended charter of the BSP, implicitly exempting the Monetary
Board from the SSL by giving it express authority to determine and institute its own compensation
and wage structure. However, employees whose positions fall under SG 19 and below were
specifically limited to the rates prescribed under the SSL.
Subsequent amendments to the charters of other GFIs followed. Significantly, each government
financial institution (GFI) was not only expressly authorized to determine and institute its own
compensation and wage structure, but also explicitly exempted - without distinction as to salary
grade or position - all employees of the GFI from the SSL.
It has been proffered that legislative deliberations justify the grant or withdrawal of exemption from
the SSL, based on the perceived need "to fulfill the mandate of the institution concerned considering,
among others, that: (1) the GOCC or GFI is essentially proprietary in character; (2) the GOCC or GFI
is in direct competition with their [sic] counterparts in the private sector, not only in terms of the
provisions of goods or services, but also in terms of hiring and retaining competent personnel; and (3)
the GOCC or GFI are or were [sic] experiencing difficulties filling up plantilla positions with competent
personnel and/or retaining these personnel. The need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies
with the particular circumstances of each institution, and the corresponding variance in the benefits
received by the employees is merely incidental."
48
The fragility of this argument is manifest. First, the BSP is the central monetary authority, and
49
the banker of the government and all its political subdivisions. It has the sole power and
50
authority to issue currency; provide policy directions in the areas of money, banking, and credit;
and supervise banks and regulate finance companies and non-bank financial institutions performing
51
quasi-banking functions, including the exempted GFIs. Hence, the argument that the rank-and-
file employees of the seven GFIs were exempted because of the importance of their institution's
mandate cannot stand any more than an empty sack can stand.
Second, it is certainly misleading to say that "the need for the scope of exemption necessarily varies
with the particular circumstances of each institution." Nowhere in the deliberations is there a cogent
basis for the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file from the exemption which was granted to the rank-
and-file of the other GFIs and the SEC. As point in fact, the BSP and the seven GFIs are similarly
situated in so far as Congress deemed it necessary for these institutions to be exempted from the
SSL. True, the SSL-exemption of the BSP and the seven GFIs was granted in the amended charters
of each GFI, enacted separately and over a period of time. But it bears emphasis that, while each GFI
has a mandate different and distinct from that of another, the deliberations show that the raison d'être
of the SSL-exemption was inextricably linked to and for the most part based on factors common to
the eight GFIs, i.e., (1) the pivotal role they play in the economy; (2) the necessity of hiring and
retaining qualified and effective personnel to carry out the GFI's mandate; and (3) the recognition that
the compensation package of these GFIs is not competitive, and fall substantially below industry
standards. Considering further that (a) the BSP was the first GFI granted SSL exemption; and (b) the
subsequent exemptions of other GFIs did not distinguish between the officers and the rank-and-file;
it is patent that the classification made between the BSP rank-and-file and those of the other
seven GFIs was inadvertent, and NOT intended, i.e., it was not based on any substantial distinction
vis-à-vis the particular circumstances of each GFI. Moreover, the exemption granted to two GFIs
makes express reference to allowance and fringe benefits similar to those extended to and currently
52
enjoyed by the employees and personnel of other GFIs, underscoring that GFIs are a particular
class within the realm of government entities.
It is precisely this unpremeditated discrepancy in the treatment of the rank-and-file of the BSP - made
manifest and glaring with each and every consequential grant of blanket exemption from the SSL to
the other GFIs - that cannot be rationalized or justified. Even more so, when the SEC - which is not a
GFI - was given leave to have a compensation plan that "shall be comparable with the prevailing
53
compensation plan in the [BSP] and other [GFIs]," then granted a blanket exemption from the SSL,
and its rank-and-file endowed a more preferred treatment than the rank-and-file of the BSP.
The violation of the equal protection clause becomes even more pronounced when we are faced with
this undeniable truth: that if Congress had enacted a law for the sole purpose of exempting the eight
GFIs from the coverage of the SSL, the exclusion of the BSP rank-and-file employees would have
been devoid of any substantial or material basis. It bears no moment, therefore, that the unlawful
discrimination was not a direct result arising from one law. "Nemo potest facere per alium quod non
potest facere per directum." No one is allowed to do indirectly what he is prohibited to do directly.
It has also been proffered that "similarities alone are not sufficient to support the conclusion that rank-
and-file employees of the BSP may be lumped together with similar employees of the other GOCCs
for purposes of compensation, position classification and qualification standards. The fact that certain
persons have some attributes in common does not automatically make them members of the same
54
class with respect to a legislative classification." Cited is the ruling in Johnson v. Robinson: "this
finding of similarity ignores that a common characteristic shared by beneficiaries and nonbeneficiaries
alike, is not sufficient to invalidate a statute when other characteristics peculiar to only one group
rationally explain the statute's different treatment of the two groups."
The reference to Johnson is inapropos. In Johnson, the US Court sustained the validity of the
classification as there were quantitative and qualitative distinctions, expressly recognized by
Congress, which formed a rational basis for the classification limiting educational benefits to
military service veterans as a means of helping them readjust to civilian life. The Court listed the
peculiar characteristics as follows:
First, the disruption caused by military service is quantitatively greater than that caused by alternative
civilian service. A conscientious objector performing alternative service is obligated to work for two
years. Service in the Armed Forces, on the other hand, involves a six-year commitment…
xxx xxx xxx
Second, the disruptions suffered by military veterans and alternative service performers are
qualitatively different. Military veterans suffer a far greater loss of personal freedom during their
service careers. Uprooted from civilian life, the military veteran becomes part of the military
establishment, subject to its discipline and potentially hazardous duty. Congress was acutely aware
of the peculiar disabilities caused by military service, in consequence of which military servicemen
55
have a special need for readjustment benefits… (citations omitted)
In the case at bar, it is precisely the fact that as regards the exemption from the SSL, there are no
characteristics peculiar only to the seven GFIs or their rank-and-file so as to justify the
exemption which BSP rank-and-file employees were denied (not to mention the anomaly of the
56
SEC getting one). The distinction made by the law is not only superficial, but also arbitrary. It is
not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the BSP rank-and-file and
the seven other GFIs.
Moreover, the issue in this case is not - as the dissenting opinion of Mme. Justice Carpio-Morales
would put it - whether "being an employee of a GOCC or GFI is reasonable and sufficient basis for
exemption" from R.A. No. 6758. It is Congress itself that distinguished the GFIs from other
government agencies, not once but eight times, through the enactment of R.A. Nos. 7653, 7907,
8282, 8289, 8291, 8523, 8763, and 9302. These laws may have created a "preferred sub-class within
government employees," but the present challenge is not directed at the wisdom of these laws.
Rather, it is a legal conundrum involving the exercise of legislative power, the validity of which must
be measured not only by looking at the specific exercise in and by itself (R.A. No. 7653), but also as
to the legal effects brought about by seven separate exercises - albeit indirectly and without intent.
Thus, even if petitioner had not alleged "a comparable change in the factual milieu as regards the
compensation, position classification and qualification standards of the employees of the BSP
(whether of the executive level or of the rank-and-file) since the enactment of the new Central Bank
57
Act" is of no moment. In GSIS v. Montesclaros, this Court resolved the issue of constitutionality
notwithstanding that claimant had manifested that she was no longer interested in pursuing the case,
and even when the constitutionality of the said provision was not squarely raised as an issue, because
the issue involved not only the claimant but also others similarly situated and whose claims GSIS
would also deny based on the challenged proviso. The Court held that social justice and public interest
demanded the resolution of the constitutionality of the proviso. And so it is with the challenged proviso
in the case at bar.
It bears stressing that the exemption from the SSL is a "privilege" fully within the legislative
prerogative to give or deny. However, its subsequent grant to the rank-and-file of the seven other
GFIs and continued denial to the BSP rank-and-file employees breached the latter's right to equal
protection. In other words, while the granting of a privilege per se is a matter of policy exclusively
within the domain and prerogative of Congress, the validity or legality of the exercise of this
58
prerogative is subject to judicial review. So when the distinction made is superficial, and not based
on substantial distinctions that make real differences between those included and excluded, it
59
becomes a matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and the power to correct. As held in
60
the United Kingdom case of Hooper v. Secretary of State for Work and Pensions, once the
State has chosen to confer benefits, "discrimination" contrary to law may occur where favorable
treatment already afforded to one group is refused to another, even though the State is under no
61
obligation to provide that favorable treatment.
The disparity of treatment between BSP rank-and-file and the rank-and-file of the other seven GFIs
definitely bears the unmistakable badge of invidious discrimination - no one can, with candor and
fairness, deny the discriminatory character of the subsequent blanket and total exemption of the seven
other GFIs from the SSL when such was withheld from the BSP. Alikes are being treated as
unalikes without any rational basis.
Again, it must be emphasized that the equal protection clause does not demand absolute equality but
it requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and conditions both
as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be
allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to every person under
circumstances which, if not identical, are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or
charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion; whatever restrictions
62
cast on some in the group is equally binding on the rest.
In light of the lack of real and substantial distinctions that would justify the unequal treatment between
the rank-and-file of BSP from the seven other GFIs, it is clear that the enactment of the seven
subsequent charters has rendered the continued application of the challenged proviso anathema to
the equal protection of the law, and the same should be declared as an outlaw.
IV.
Equal Protection Under International Lens
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have
63
followed the "rational basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications
and a reluctance to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of
64
the Constitution.
A. Equal Protection in the United States
In contrast, jurisprudence in the U.S. has gone beyond the static "rational basis" test. Professor
65
Gunther highlights the development in equal protection jurisprudential analysis, to wit:
Traditionally, equal protection supported only minimal judicial intervention in most contexts.
Ordinarily, the command of equal protection was only that government must not impose differences
in treatment "except upon some reasonable differentiation fairly related to the object of regulation."
The old variety of equal protection scrutiny focused solely on the means used by the legislature: it
insisted merely that the classification in the statute reasonably relates to the legislative purpose.
Unlike substantive due process, equal protection scrutiny was not typically concerned with identifying
"fundamental values" and restraining legislative ends. And usually the rational classification
requirement was readily satisfied: the courts did not demand a tight fit between classification and
purpose; perfect congruence between means and ends was not required.
xxx xxx xxx
[From marginal intervention to major cutting edge: The Warren Court's "new equal protection"
and the two-tier approach.]
From its traditional modest role, equal protection burgeoned into a major intervention tool during
the Warren era, especially in the 1960s. The Warren Court did not abandon the deferential
ingredients of the old equal protection: in most areas of economic and social legislation, the demands
imposed by equal protection remained as minimal as ever…But the Court launched an equal
protection revolution by finding large new areas for strict rather than deferential scrutiny. A sharply
differentiated two-tier approach evolved by the late 1960s: in addition to the deferential "old" equal
protection, a "new" equal protection, connoting strict scrutiny, arose…. The intensive review
associated with the new equal protection imposed two demands - a demand not only as to means
but also one as to ends. Legislation qualifying for strict scrutiny required a far closer fit between
classification and statutory purpose than the rough and ready flexibility traditionally tolerated by the
old equal protection: means had to be shown "necessary" to achieve statutory ends, not merely
"reasonably related" ones. Moreover, equal protection became a source of ends scrutiny as well:
legislation in the areas of the new equal protection had to be justified by "compelling" state interests,
not merely the wide spectrum of "legitimate" state ends.
The Warren Court identified the areas appropriate for strict scrutiny by searching for two
characteristics: the presence of a "suspect" classification; or an impact on "fundamental" rights or
interests. In the category of "suspect classifications," the Warren Court's major contribution was to
intensify the strict scrutiny in the traditionally interventionist area of racial classifications. But other
cases also suggested that there might be more other suspect categories as well: illegitimacy and
wealth for example. But it was the 'fundamental interests" ingredient of the new equal protection that
proved particularly dynamic, open-ended, and amorphous….. [Other fundamental interests included
voting, criminal appeals, and the right of interstate travel ….]
xxx xxx xxx
The Burger Court and Equal Protection.
The Burger Court was reluctant to expand the scope of the new equal protection, although its
best established ingredient retains vitality. There was also mounting discontent with the rigid two-
tier formulations of the Warren Court's equal protection doctrine. It was prepared to use the clause as
an interventionist tool without resorting to the strict language of the new equal protection…. [Among
the fundamental interests identified during this time were voting and access to the ballot, while
"suspect" classifications included sex, alienage and illegitimacy.]
xxx xxx xxx
Even while the two-tier scheme has often been adhered to in form, there has also been an increasingly
noticeable resistance to the sharp difference between deferential "old" and interventionist "new" equal
protection. A number of justices sought formulations that would blur the sharp distinctions of the two-
tiered approach or that would narrow the gap between strict scrutiny and deferential review. The most
elaborate attack came from Justice Marshall, whose frequently stated position was developed most
66
elaborately in his dissent in the Rodriguez case:
The Court apparently seeks to establish [that] equal protection cases fall into one of two neat
categories which dictate the appropriate standard of review - strict scrutiny or mere rationality. But
this (sic) Court's [decisions] defy such easy categorization. A principled reading of what this Court has
done reveals that it has applied a spectrum of standards in reviewing discrimination allegedly violative
of the equal protection clause. This spectrum clearly comprehends variations in the degree of care
with which the Court will scrutinize particular classifications, depending, I believe, on the constitutional
and societal importance of the interest adversely affected and the recognized invidiousness of the
basis upon which the particular classification is drawn.
Justice Marshall's "sliding scale" approach describes many of the modern decisions, although it is
a formulation that the majority refused to embrace. But the Burger Court's results indicate at least
two significant changes in equal protection law: First, invocation of the "old" equal protection
formula no longer signals, as it did with the Warren Court, an extreme deference to legislative
classifications and a virtually automatic validation of challenged statutes. Instead, several cases, even
while voicing the minimal "rationality" "hands-off" standards of the old equal protection, proceed to
find the statute unconstitutional. Second, in some areas the modern Court has put forth standards
for equal protection review that, while clearly more intensive than the deference of the "old" equal
protection, are less demanding than the strictness of the "new" equal protection. Sex discrimination
is the best established example of an "intermediate" level of review. Thus, in one case, the Court
said that "classifications by gender must serve important governmental objectives and must be
substantially related to achievement of those objectives." That standard is "intermediate" with
respect to both ends and means: where ends must be "compelling" to survive strict scrutiny and
merely "legitimate" under the "old" mode, "important" objectives are required here; and where means
must be "necessary" under the "new" equal protection, and merely "rationally related" under the "old"
equal protection, they must be "substantially related" to survive the "intermediate" level of review.
(emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
B. Equal Protection in Europe
The United Kingdom and other members of the European Community have also gone forward in
discriminatory legislation and jurisprudence. Within the United Kingdom domestic law, the most
extensive list of protected grounds can be found in Article 14 of the European Convention on
Human Rights (ECHR). It prohibits discrimination on grounds such as "sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national minority,
property, birth or other status." This list is illustrative and not exhaustive. Discrimination on the basis
of race, sex and religion is regarded as grounds that require strict scrutiny. A further indication
that certain forms of discrimination are regarded as particularly suspect under the Covenant can be
gleaned from Article 4, which, while allowing states to derogate from certain Covenant articles in times
of national emergency, prohibits derogation by measures that discriminate solely on the grounds of
67
"race, colour, language, religion or social origin."
Moreover, the European Court of Human Rights has developed a test of justification which varies
68
with the ground of discrimination. In the Belgian Linguistics case the European Court set the
standard of justification at a low level: discrimination would contravene the Convention only if it had
no legitimate aim, or there was no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
69
employed and the aim sought to be realised. But over the years, the European Court has
developed a hierarchy of grounds covered by Article 14 of the ECHR, a much higher level of
justification being required in respect of those regarded as "suspect" (sex, race, nationality,
70
illegitimacy, or sexual orientation) than of others. Thus, in Abdulaziz, the European Court
declared that:
. . . [t]he advancement of the equality of the sexes is today a major goal in the member States of the
Council of Europe. This means that very weighty reasons would have to be advanced before a
difference of treatment on the ground of sex could be regarded as compatible with the Convention.
71
And in Gaygusuz v. Austria, the European Court held that "very weighty reasons would have
to be put forward before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the
72
ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention." The European Court will then permit
States a very much narrower margin of appreciation in relation to discrimination on grounds of
sex, race, etc., in the application of the Convention rights than it will in relation to distinctions drawn
73
by states between, for example, large and small land-owners.
C. Equality under International Law
The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the law
74
without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection of human rights.
Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on discrimination
75
and/or provisions about equality. The general international provisions pertinent to discrimination
76
and/or equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International
77
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on
the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the
Rights of the Child (CRC).
In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as
78
the American Convention on Human Rights; the African Charter on Human and People's
79 80
Rights; the European Convention on Human Rights; the European Social Charter of 1961 and
revised Social Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance
to European states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on
81
Human Rights in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the League.
The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional "first
generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than
requiring State action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective
protection against discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions
oblige States Parties "to ensure ... the full and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] ... without any
82
discrimination" and to "secure without discrimination" the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed.
These provisions impose a measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to
eradicate discrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of
83
discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR and in a very large number of Conventions
84
administered by the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations body. Additionally, many
of the other international and regional human rights instruments have specific provisions relating to
85
employment.
The United Nations Human Rights Committee has also gone beyond the earlier tendency to
86
view the prohibition against discrimination (Article 26) as confined to the ICCPR rights. In
87 88
Broeks and Zwaan-de Vries, the issue before the Committee was whether discriminatory
provisions in the Dutch Unemployment Benefits Act (WWV) fell within the scope of Article 26. The
Dutch government submitted that discrimination in social security benefit provision was not within the
scope of Article 26, as the right was contained in the ICESCR and not the ICCPR. They accepted that
Article 26 could go beyond the rights contained in the Covenant to other civil and political rights, such
as discrimination in the field of taxation, but contended that Article 26 did not extend to the social,
economic, and cultural rights contained in ICESCR. The Committee rejected this argument. In its
view, Article 26 applied to rights beyond the Covenant including the rights in other international treaties
such as the right to social security found in ICESCR:
Although Article 26 requires that legislation should prohibit discrimination, it does not of itself contain
any obligation with respect to the matters that may be provided for by legislation. Thus it does not, for
example, require any state to enact legislation to provide for social security. However, when such
legislation is adopted in the exercise of a State's sovereign power, then such legislation must comply
89
with Article 26 of the Covenant.
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be struck
down if it has the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection. International law
90
recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights Committee took into
account the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring that:
. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction, exclusion,
restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status, and which has the
purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise by all
91
persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms. (emphasis supplied)
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its
conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance
with the progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no
hesitation in using the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable
irrational discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution,
92
coupled with the special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.
Apropos the special protection afforded to labor under our Constitution and international law, we held
93
in International School Alliance of Educators v. Quisumbing:
That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and
laws reflect the policy against these evils. The Constitution in Article on Social Justice and Human
Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest priority to the enactment of measures that protect and
enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social, economic, and political inequalities."
The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of his rights and in
the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and
good faith."
International law, which springs from general principles of law, likewise proscribes discrimination.
General principles of law include principles of equity, i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice,
based on the test of what is reasonable. The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the International
Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, the International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, the Convention against Discrimination in Education, the
Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and Occupation - all
embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The
Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.
In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital,
inequality and discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.
The Constitution specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These
conditions are not restricted to the physical workplace - the factory, the office or the field - but include
as well the manner in which employers treat their employees.
The Constitution also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all."
Similarly, the Labor Code provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of
sex, race or creed." It would be an affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State,
in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its
eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of employment.
xxx xxx xxx
Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, in Article 7 thereof,
provides:
The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just
and [favorable] conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:
a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

i. Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with equal
pay for equal work;
xxx xxx xxx
The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism
of "equal pay for equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort
and responsibility, under similar conditions, should be paid similar salaries. (citations omitted)
Congress retains its wide discretion in providing for a valid classification, and its policies should be
accorded recognition and respect by the courts of justice except when they run afoul of the
94
Constitution. The difference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or
prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution. When these violations
arise, this Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and
require a stricter and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations. Rational basis
should not suffice.
Admittedly, the view that prejudice to persons accorded special protection by the Constitution requires
a stricter judicial scrutiny finds no support in American or English jurisprudence. Nevertheless, these
foreign decisions and authorities are not per se controlling in this jurisdiction. At best, they are
95
persuasive and have been used to support many of our decisions. We should not place undue and
fawning reliance upon them and regard them as indispensable mental crutches without which we
cannot come to our own decisions through the employment of our own endowments. We live in a
different ambience and must decide our own problems in the light of our own interests and needs,
and of our qualities and even idiosyncrasies as a people, and always with our own concept of law and
96
justice. Our laws must be construed in accordance with the intention of our own lawmakers and
such intent may be deduced from the language of each law and the context of other local legislation
related thereto. More importantly, they must be construed to serve our own public interest which is
the be-all and the end-all of all our laws. And it need not be stressed that our public interest is distinct
97
and different from others.
In the 2003 case of Francisco v. House of Representatives, this Court has stated that: "[A]merican
jurisprudence and authorities, much less the American Constitution, are of dubious application for
these are no longer controlling within our jurisdiction and have only limited persuasive merit insofar
as Philippine constitutional law is concerned....[I]n resolving constitutional disputes, [this Court] should
not be beguiled by foreign jurisprudence some of which are hardly applicable because they have been
98
dictated by different constitutional settings and needs." Indeed, although the Philippine
Constitution can trace its origins to that of the United States, their paths of development have long
99
since diverged.
Further, the quest for a better and more "equal" world calls for the use of equal protection as a tool of
effective judicial intervention.
Equality is one ideal which cries out for bold attention and action in the Constitution. The Preamble
proclaims "equality" as an ideal precisely in protest against crushing inequities in Philippine society.
The command to promote social justice in Article II, Section 10, in "all phases of national
development," further explicitated in Article XIII, are clear commands to the State to take affirmative
action in the direction of greater equality.… [T]here is thus in the Philippine Constitution no lack of
doctrinal support for a more vigorous state effort towards achieving a reasonable measure of
100
equality.
Our present Constitution has gone further in guaranteeing vital social and economic rights to
101
marginalized groups of society, including labor. Under the policy of social justice, the law bends
over backwards to accommodate the interests of the working class on the humane justification that
102
those with less privilege in life should have more in law. And the obligation to afford protection to
labor is incumbent not only on the legislative and executive branches but also on the judiciary to
103
translate this pledge into a living reality. Social justice calls for the humanization of laws and the
equalization of social and economic forces by the State so that justice in its rational and objectively
104
secular conception may at least be approximated.
V.
A Final Word
Finally, concerns have been raised as to the propriety of a ruling voiding the challenged provision. It
has been proffered that the remedy of petitioner is not with this Court, but with Congress, which alone
has the power to erase any inequities perpetrated by R.A. No. 7653. Indeed, a bill proposing the
exemption of the BSP rank-and-file from the SSL has supposedly been filed.
Under most circumstances, the Court will exercise judicial restraint in deciding questions of
constitutionality, recognizing the broad discretion given to Congress in exercising its legislative power.
Judicial scrutiny would be based on the "rational basis" test, and the legislative discretion would be
105
given deferential treatment.
But if the challenge to the statute is premised on the denial of a fundamental right, or the
perpetuation of prejudice against persons favored by the Constitution with special protection,
judicial scrutiny ought to be more strict. A weak and watered down view would call for the
abdication of this Court's solemn duty to strike down any law repugnant to the Constitution and the
rights it enshrines. This is true whether the actor committing the unconstitutional act is a private person
or the government itself or one of its instrumentalities. Oppressive acts will be struck down regardless
106
of the character or nature of the actor.
Accordingly, when the grant of power is qualified, conditional or subject to limitations, the issue on
whether or not the prescribed qualifications or conditions have been met, or the limitations respected,
is justiciable or non-political, the crux of the problem being one of legality or validity of the contested
act, not its wisdom. Otherwise, said qualifications, conditions or limitations - particularly those
prescribed or imposed by the Constitution - would be set at naught. What is more, the judicial inquiry
into such issue and the settlement thereof are the main functions of courts of justice under the
Presidential form of government adopted in our 1935 Constitution, and the system of checks and
balances, one of its basic predicates. As a consequence, We have neither the authority nor the
discretion to decline passing upon said issue, but are under the ineluctable obligation - made
particularly more exacting and peremptory by our oath, as members of the highest Court of
the land, to support and defend the Constitution - to settle it. This explains why, in Miller v.
Johnson, it was held that courts have a "duty, rather than a power", to determine whether another
branch of the government has "kept within constitutional limits." Not satisfied with this postulate, the
court went farther and stressed that, if the Constitution provides how it may be amended - as it is in
our 1935 Constitution - "then, unless the manner is followed, the judiciary as the interpreter of that
constitution, will declare the amendment invalid." In fact, this very Court - speaking through Justice
Laurel, an outstanding authority on Philippine Constitutional Law, as well as one of the highly
respected and foremost leaders of the Convention that drafted the 1935 Constitution - declared, as
early as July 15, 1936, that "(i)n times of social disquietude or political excitement, the great landmarks
of the Constitution are apt to be forgotten or marred, if not entirely obliterated. In cases of conflict, the
judicial department is the only constitutional organ which can be called upon to determine the proper
107
allocation of powers between the several departments" of the government. (citations omitted;
emphasis supplied)
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or officer-
employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher
grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now
receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer, low-
salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite
disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank - possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career
advancement - are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that
majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life
are less and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they - and not the officers -
who have the real economic and financial need for the adjustment This is in accord with the
policy of the Constitution "to free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend
108
to them a decent standard of living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress
that runs counter to this constitutional desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court
before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They
represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the
private sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better
terms and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices.
Not only are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A.
No. 7653 effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP
rank-and-file employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled
to seek a political solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited
for many years for the legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination
cannot be given any waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere
platitude, it is the Court's duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last proviso of
Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
50. [G.R. NO. 158359 - March 23, 2004]
ABDULLAH D. DIMAPORO, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and ABDULLAH S. MANGOTARA, Respondents.
Before the Court is a petition brought by Congressman Abdullah D. Dimaporo

(Dimaporo), as petitioner, seeking to nullify the twin Resolutions1 of the House of
Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) which denied his Motion for Technical
Evaluation of the Thumbmarks and Signatures Affixed in the Voters Registration
Records and Voting Records 2 and Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 03-
408 Denying the Motion for Technical Examination of Voting Records .3
A brief factual background is in order.
On July 20, 2001, Dimaporo was proclaimed a Member of the House of

Representatives, representing the 2nd Legislative District of Lanao del Norte.
Pursuant to the 1998 Rules of the HRET (HRET Rules), 4 congressional candidate
Abdullah S. Mangotara (Mangotara) filed on July 30, 2001 a Petition of Protest (Ad
Cautelam), 5 seeking, among others, the technical examination of the signatures and
thumbmarks appearing on the Voters Registration Records (VRRs) /Book of Voters
and the List of Voters with Voting Records in all the protested precincts of the
municipality of Sultan Naga Dimaporo (SND). Mangotara alleged that the massive
substitution of voters and other electoral irregularities perpetrated by Dimaporos
supporters will be uncovered and proven by the revision of ballots and the
comparison between the signatures and thumbmarks appearing in the VRRs/Book of
Voters and those appearing in the List of Voters with Voting Records used on election
day or those affixed at the back of the VRRs. From this and other premises, he
concluded that he is the duly-elected representative of the 2nd District of Lanao del
Norte.
On October 10, 2001, Dimaporo filed an Answer with Counter-Protest6 impugning all
the ballots and votes counted in favor of Mangotara in all precincts of all the 15
municipalities of Lanao del Norte, except SND. He alleged that irregularities and
electoral frauds, consisting of massive substitute voting, i.e., persons other than the
registered voters voted in favor of Mangotara, were committed in the counter-
protested precincts. Moreover, pairs or groups of ballots written by only one person
were counted in favor of Mangotara. Accordingly, Dimaporo prayed for, among
others, the technical examination of the signatures and thumbmarks of the voters
who allegedly voted in the questioned precincts.
Before revision proceedings were conducted, Mangotara filed an Urgent Motion for
Technical Examination7 dated May 3, 2002, praying for the technical examination of
the signatures and thumbmarks appearing on the Registration Records/Book of
Voters and List of Voters with Voting Records in all the precincts of SND. According
to him, the fire that gutted all the ballot boxes used in SND made the revision of
ballots in the said municipality physically impossible. Hence, technical examination
was the only means by which the HRET can determine Mangotaras claim of massive
substitute voting. Mangotara also argued that the Commission on Elections
(Comelec) had started retrieving the election records needed for the forthcoming
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) elections. There was no assurance that the integrity of
these records will be preserved. Thus, there was an urgent need for technical
examination of the election records. Moreover, Mangotara averred that the results
of the technical examination are determinative of the final resolution of the election
protest in view of the fact that Dimaporos presumptive lead over him was only 5,487
votes.
Dimaporo filed an Opposition to the Motion for Technical Examination on May 24,
2002.
Noting that "the Tribunal cannot evaluate the questioned ballots because there are
no ballots but only election documents to consider," the HRET granted Mangotaras
motion and permitted the latter "to engage an expert to assist him in the prosecution
of his case." 8 Accordingly, the National Bureau of Investigation conducted the
technical examination of the signatures and thumbmarks of the voters of SND affixed
in their VRRs and other voting records.
After the completion of the revision of ballots, Dimaporo filed on November 11, 2002
a Motion for Technical Examination of the Thumbmarks and Signatures Affixed in the
Voters Registration Records and Voting Records9 of: (a) 198 revised pilot counter-
protested precincts; (b) 47 pilot counter-protested precincts; and (c) 36 precincts of
the municipality of Tangcal (Tangcal). The motion was filed allegedly in order to
substantiate Dimaporos claims that pairs or groups of ballots were written by only
one person and that there was massive substitute voting in the counter-protested
precincts. Dimaporo further alleged that, upon opening 47 ballot boxes of the 47
counter-protested precincts, it was discovered that the boxes did not contain any
ballot. Hence, no revision could be made. Likewise, the ballots for 36 precincts of
Tangcal could no longer be revised because the ballot boxes had been burned. Citing
these circumstances as akin to those mentioned by Mangotara in his motion,
Dimaporo moved that his request for technical examination be granted.
The HRET denied Dimaporos motion in its assailed Resolution No. 03-408.10 The
Tribunal declared that Dimaporos allegations that pairs or groups of ballots were
written by only one person and that substitute voting took place in the first and
second groups of precincts are matters which are "well within the judicial
determination of the Tribunal and which may be determined without resort to
technical examination."11 As regards the 36 precincts of Tangcal, the HRET found it
physically impossible to conduct a technical examination of the signatures and
thumbmarks of voters as found in the VRRs and Book of Voters due to the destruction
of the pertinent election documents. In its questioned Resolution No. 03-166,12 the
Tribunal denied Dimaporos Motion for Reconsideration of Resolution No. 03-408
Denying the Motion for Technical Examination of Voting Records.13
Hence, Dimaporo filed the instant Petition for Certiorari and/or Mandamus with
Prayer for the Issuance of a Writ of Preliminary Injunction on June 8, 2003.14
Dimaporo claims that the HRET deprived him of equal protection when the latter
denied his motion for technical examination even as it had previously granted
Mangotaras similar motion. According to him, his motion should have been granted
because there is no valid distinction between the counter-protested precincts and
the precincts in SND subject of Mangotaras motion since, in both instances, the
ballots were no longer available for revision. He also asserts that the denial of his
motion deprived him of procedural due process or the right to present scientific
evidence to show the massive substitute voting committed in the counter-protested
precincts.
On July 21, 2003, Mangotara filed his Comment15 averring that the petition is an
obvious dilatory tactic to render the election protest moot and academic by the
expiration of the term involved. He points out that there are substantial differences
between his own motion for technical examination and that of petitioner. For
instance, in SND, all the ballot boxes were destroyed by fire, whereas those of the
47 counter-protested precincts were not. In fact, except for the ballots themselves,
the election documents and other paraphernalia remained intact. Another difference
is that Mangotara specifically contested16 the election results in SND on the ground
of substitution of voters, whereas massive substitute voting was allegedly a mere
general averment in Dimaporos counter-protest. Moreover, Mangotara moved for
technical examination even before the revision proceedings, whereas Dimaporos
motion was anchored on Rule 4217 of the HRET Rules and was filed only after the
revision of ballots. As regards the counter-protested precincts of Tangcal, Mangotara
avers that destruction of the ballot boxes is not among the grounds for technical
examination under Rule 42 of the HRET Rules, the provision cited by Dimaporo.
Mangotara further claims that the former cannot ask for technical examination under
Rule 42 of the HRET Rules in order to substantiate allegations of substitute voting
because this was not cited as a ground for objection in the course of the revision of
ballots. Rule 42 of the HRET Rules provides that the party moving for technical
examination must specify the objections made in the course of the revision of ballots
which the movant intends to substantiate with the results of the technical
examination. Furthermore, Dimaporo was not deprived of his right to present
evidence because the questioned Resolution No. 03-408 itself states that all election
documents "are still subject to the scrutiny of the Tribunal during the appreciation of
evidence." Hence, at the appropriate time and in accordance with HRET Rules,
Dimaporo will be given an opportunity to present his evidence.
The Solicitor General filed a Comment18 on July 29, 2003 arguing that there is a
distinction between the motions filed by Mangotara and Dimaporo. Whereas
Mangotaras motion was filed before the completion of the reviefore the completion
of the reviro was filed after the revision of ballots. The HRET acted within the confines
of its discretion. Hence, there is no need for this Court to exercise its extraordinary
power of certiorari .
Dimaporo filed a Consolidated Reply to the Comments of the Public and Private
Respondent19 on August 12, 2003. Thereafter, the parties filed their respective
Memoranda20 as required by the Court.
We are not prepared to conclude that the assailed Resolutions of the HRET offend
the equal protection clause. Equal protection simply means that all persons and
things similarly situated must be treated alike both as to the rights conferred and
the liabilities imposed.21 It follows that the existence of a valid and substantial
distinction justifies divergent treatment.
It should be mentioned that Dimaporo does not question the HRET Rules but only
the Tribunals exercise or implementation thereof as manifested in the questioned
Resolutions. According to him, since the ballot boxes subject of his petition and that
of Mangotara were both unavailable for revision, his motion, like Mangotaras, should
be granted.
This argument is rather simplistic. Purposely or not, it fails to take into account the
distinctions extant in Mangotaras protest vis-à-vis Dimaporos counter-protest which
validate the grant of Mangotaras motion and the denial of Dimaporos.
First. The election results in SND were the sole subjects of Mangotaras protest. The
opposite is true with regard to Dimaporos counter-protest as he contested the
election results in all municipalities but SND.
Significantly, the results of the technical examination of the election records of SND
are determinative of the final outcome of the election protest against Dimaporo. The
same cannot be said of the precincts subject of Dimaporos motion.
The election results show that Mangotara won over Dimaporo in 10 out of 15
municipalities of Lanao del Norte. Dimaporo prevailed only in five (5) municipalities,
including SND. His winning margin in four (4) of these municipalities was small, but
in SND, Dimaporo obtained 22,358 votes as opposed to Mangotaras 477 votes. This
means that Dimaporo won by a margin of 21,881 votes over Mangotara in SND.
Further, the election results show that Mangotara was credited with zero (0) vote in
73 out of 130 precincts of the said municipality. That Dimaporo won the elections by
a margin of 5,487 votes establishes the fact that the results of the election in SND
handed the victory to him.22
The technical examination of the election records of SND and the consequent
determination of the true will of the electorate therein, therefore, serves the interest
not only of the parties but also of the constituency of the 2nd District of Lanao del
Norte.
Second. Mangotara filed a motion for technical examination before the start of the
revision proceedings on the ground that the destruction of the ballot boxes of all
precincts of SND rendered revision physically impossible. The urgency of technical
examination was due to the impending SK elections and the resultant need for the
Comelec to retrieve the election records of the municipality.
On the other hand, Dimaporo filed a motion for technical examination after the
revision of ballots. No circumstance of necessity or urgency was averred in the
motion.
Third. The HRET was informed and it is not disputed that the ballot boxes and other
election documents pertaining to Tangcal were totally gutted by fire making technical
examination an impossibility.23
On the other hand, although the ballot boxes of the precincts of SND were also
destroyed by fire, the other election records, e.g., Lists of Voters with Voting Records
and Voters Affidavits contained in the Book of Voters, were not. Thus, technical
examination of the available election records could still be had.
Fourth. With regard to the other counter-protested precincts, the HRET correctly
pointed out that Dimaporos claims that pairs or groups of ballots were written by
only one person and that massive substitute voting took place may be resolved by
the Tribunal without need for technical examination. Although no ballots were found
inside the ballot boxes of 47 counter-protested precincts, the election returns and
tally boards were still intact. These documents may yet be considered by the Tribunal
in its resolution of the election protest. Thus, technical examination was uncalled for
as it was not absolutely necessary.
It should be emphasized that the grant of a motion for technical examination is

subject to the sound discretion of the HRET.24 In this case, the Tribunal deemed it
useful in the conduct of the revision proceedings to grant Mangotaras motion for
technical examination. Conversely, it found Dimaporos motion unpersuasive and
accordingly denied the same. In so doing, the HRET merely acted within the bounds
of its Constitutionally-granted jurisdiction.25 After all, the Constitution confers full
authority on the electoral tribunals of the House of Representatives and the Senate
as the sole judges of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications
of their respective members. Such jurisdiction is original and exclusive.26
Anent Dimaporos contention that the assailed Resolutions denied him the right to
procedural due process and to present evidence to substantiate his claim of massive
substitute voting committed in the counter-protested precincts, suffice it to state
that the HRET itself may ascertain the validity of Dimaporos allegations without
resort to technical examination. To this end, the Tribunal declared that the ballots,
election documents and other election paraphernalia are still subject to its scrutiny
in the appreciation of evidence.27
Moreover, it should be noted that the records are replete with evidence, documentary
and testimonial, presented by Dimaporo. He has, in fact, already filed a Formal Offer
of Evidence on January 29, 200428 to which Mangotara filed a Comment29 on
February 4, 2004. Hence, Dimaporos allegation of denial of due process is an
indefensible pretense.
For the reasons above-mentioned, we are not convinced that the Tribunal committed
grave abuse of discretion, much less exceeded its jurisdiction in issuing the
questioned Resolutions.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. SO ORDERED.

52. G.R. No. 129099 July 20, 2006
MA. CHONA M. DIMAYUGA, FELIPE T. AGUINALDO, AND NOEL C. INUMERABLE, petitioners,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, respondent.
DECISION
AZCUNA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari with a plea for temporary restraining order and writ of preliminary
injunction. Petitioners, Ma. Chona M. Dimayuga, Felipe T. Aguinaldo and Noel C. Inumerable, seek to
enjoin respondent, Office of the Ombudsman, from conducting a preliminary investigation and any
further proceedings in OMB 0-95-0430. Petitioners likewise seek to annul the following: an order dated
June 27, 1996, which denied a motion for the suspension of the preliminary investigation; 1 an order
dated November 18, 1996, which denied a motion for reconsideration of the earlier order; 2 and an
order dated March 13, 1997, which denied a letter-appeal questioning the last mentioned order.3
The factual antecedents are not in dispute:
Petitioners Maria Chona Dimayuga, Noel Inumerable and Felipe Aguinaldo were employees of the
Traffic Regulatory Board (TRB) of [the] Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH). Petitioner
Dimayuga used to be the TRB’s executive director.
In June 1992, an anonymous complaint was filed against petitioners concerning certain transactions of
the TRB from 1989 to May 1992. Consequently, a special audit was conducted by the Special Audit
Office (SAO) of the Commission on Audit (COA).
The SAO report, detailing the audit of selected transactions of the TRB was finalized on November 4,
1994. As a consequence of said report, certain irregularities were uncovered, in which petitioners were
implicated. It therefore recommended appropriate action against petitioners.
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of said report on February 28, 1995. The COA Chairman,
however, denied the same on August 30, 1995. Undaunted, petitioners then filed a Notice of Appeal
with a corresponding Motion for Extension of Time to File Memorandum on Appeal before the COA
Chairman. In a letter addressed to petitioner Dimayuga, the COA Chairman acknowledged receipt of
said documents and granted petitioners’ request for extension of time to file their Memorandum on
Appeal. Petitioners filed said Memorandum on Appeal on November 20, 1995.
Meanwhile, the audit report was forwarded to the DPWH Secretary, who then indorsed the same to
respondent Ombudsman for appropriate action on February 16, 1995. Accordingly, petitioners were
charged with violation of the Anti-Graft Law or Republic Act 3019, docketed as OMB 0-95-0430. On
June 15, 1995, respondent Ombudsman required state auditors Eleanor M. Tejada and Jose Rey
Binamira of the COA’s Special Action Team to submit their sworn complaint on the basis of their report
for purposes of initiating the preliminary investigation, which was set on June 28, 1995. In view of this,
petitioners filed a Motion for Suspension of Preliminary Investigation on June 26, 1996 with the
Evaluation and Preliminary Investigation Bureau of respondent. In said motion, petitioners argue that
the SAO report was not yet final, considering that their appeal with the Commission had not yet been
resolved.
Respondent, however, denied petitioners’ motion for reconsideration on June 27, 1996 x x x.
xxx
Unsatisfied with the said Order, petitioners filed an "Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration" dated June
27, 1996, reiterating as ground therefor, the pendency of their appeal before the Comission. In arguing
for the suspension of the preliminary investigation before respondent, petitioners cited the supposedly
similar case of COA v. Gabor, OMB-0-93-0718. The COA on the other hand, through the Special Audit
Office, filed a Manifestation with Motion dated September 9, 1996, concurring with the position of
respondent Ombudsman, denying the previous Motion for Reconsideration of petitioners.
On November 18, 1996, respondent denied petitioners’ Omnibus Motion x x x.
xxx
Subsequent to these Motions, petitioners likewise filed a "Letter-Appeal" dated December 5, 1996,
addressed to Ombudsman Aniano Desierto, based on the same grounds stated in previous motions.
Respondent denied said "Letter-Appeal" in an Order dated March 13, 1997 x x x.4
On May 27, 1997, petitioners filed this petition. This Court issued a temporary restraining order on
August 20, 1997 enjoining respondent from conducting a preliminary investigation and any further
proceedings in OMB 0-95-0430.5
Petitioners raise the following issues:
I
The investigation of the charges in the complaint filed by the SAO-COA against petitioners is premature,
because their appeal from the findings of the SAO-COA is still pending resolution before the
Commission Proper. In the exactly similar case of COA v. Gabor, OMB 0-93-0714, respondent
Ombudsman had dismissed and considered undocketed the complaint on the same grounds.
II
Respondent Ombudsman violated petitioners’ constitutional right to equal protection of the laws,
guaranteed under Section 1 of Article II of the Constitution, in not affording petitioners the same relief
it afforded to the public official involved in COA v. Gabor, supra.6
As to the first issue: In deference to the virtually unlimited investigatory and prosecutorial powers
granted to the Ombudsman by the Constitution and by law, the Court has maintained a policy of non-
interference with such powers. Sections 12 and 13, Article XI of the Constitution provide:
Sec. 12. The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on
complaints filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government–owned or controlled
corporations, and shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and results
thereof.
Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
Section 15 of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 states:
Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.—The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions and duties:
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in
the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency
of government, the investigation of such cases;
x x x.7
This Court in Quiambao v. Desierto8 stated that:
As a rule, we have consistently adopted a policy of non-interference in the conduct of preliminary

investigations and provided sufficient latitude of discretion to the investigating prosecutor to
determine what constitutes sufficient evidence as will establish probable cause. As we held in the case
of The Presidential Ad-Hoc Fact Finding Committee on Behest Loans v. Ombudsman Aniano Desierto
(418 Phil. 715; 362 SCRA 730, 735-736 [2001]):
The prosecution of offenses committed by public officers is vested in the Office of the Ombudsman. To
insulate the Office from outside pressure and improper influence, the Constitution as well as R.A. 6770
has endowed it with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutor[ial] powers virtually free from
legislative, executive or judicial intervention. This court consistently refrains from interfering with the
exercise of its powers, and respects the initiative and independence inherent in the Ombudsman who,
"beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and the preserver of the integrity of the public
service.9
In Kara-an v. Office of the Ombudsman,10 this Court further expounded, thus:
x x x The consistent policy of the Court is not to interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his
investigatory and prosecutory powers. We held in Alba v. Nitorreda that:
x x x this Court has consistently refrained from interfering with the exercise by the Ombudsman of his
constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutor[ial] powers. Otherwise stated, it is beyond the
ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or dismissing
a complaint filed before it. Such initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who,
beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people and preserver of the integrity of the public
service.
The Court explained the rationale underlying its policy of non-interference in this wise:
x x x The rule is based not only upon respect for the investigatory and prosecutor[ial] powers granted
by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman but upon practicality as well. Otherwise, the
functions of the courts will be grievously hampered by innumerable petitions assailing the dismissal of
investigatory proceedings conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman with regard to complaints filed
before it, in much the same way that the courts would be extremely swamped if they would be
compelled to review the exercise of discretion on the part of the fiscals or prosecuting attorneys each
time they decide to file an information in court or dismiss a complaint by a private complainant. 11
It is thus the practice of this Court to uphold the constitutionally conferred investigatory and
prosecutorial independence of the Ombudsman. It is precisely this independence that allows the Office
of the Ombudsman to achieve its constitutional purpose and objective.
Furthermore, although the Commission on Audit (COA) report may aid the Office of the Ombudsman
in conducting its preliminary investigation, such report is not a prerequisite. Both the Constitution and
the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state that the Office of the Ombudsman may undertake an investigation
on complaint or on its own initiative. Therefore, with or without the report from COA, the Ombudsman
can conduct a preliminary investigation. This Court has declared that the findings in a COA report or
the finality or lack of finality of such report is irrelevant to the investigation of the Office of the
Ombudsman in its determination of probable cause. In Cabrera v. Marcelo,12 this Court declared:
Petitioners cannot fault the Ombudsman for relying on the COA Audit Report, notwithstanding that it
had not yet attained finality. The initial basis for the Ombudsman's investigation was not the COA Audit
Report, but the complaints filed by Casanova. While the allegations in the complaint happened to be
similar with those contained in the COA Audit Report, the Ombudsman could very well conduct an
independent investigation based on the complaints for the purpose of whether criminal charges should
be filed against the petitioners. The Ombudsman is reposed with broad investigatory powers in the
pursuit and of its constitutional mandate as protector of the people and investigator of complaints filed
against public officials. It is even empowered to request from any government agency such as the COA,
the information necessary in the discharge of its responsibilities and to examine, if necessary, pertinent
records and documents.
It should be borne in mind that the interest of the COA is solely administrative, and that its investigation
does not foreclose the Ombudsman's authority to investigate and determine whether there is a crime
to be prosecuted for which a public official is answerable. In Ramos v. Aquino, the Court ruled that the
fact that petitioners' accounts and vouchers had passed in audit is not a ground for enjoining the
provincial fiscal from conducting a preliminary investigation for the purpose of determining the
criminal liability of petitioners for malversation. Clearly then, a finding of probable cause does not
derive its veracity from the findings of the COA, but from the independent determination of the
Ombudsman.13
Further, this Court in Aguinaldo v. Sandiganbayan14 said:
Therefore, as correctly stated by the Sandiganbayan in its order of April 12, 1996, while the COA may
assist in gathering evidence to substantiate a charge of malversation, any determination made by it
will not be conclusive as to whether adequate cause exists to prosecute a case. This is so because the
Ombudsman is given the power to investigate on its own an illegal act or omission of a public official.15
And Layus v. Sandiganbayan16 pronounced:
The contention that a prior COA Report is necessary to determine LAYUS' culpability is without merit.
Under R.A. No. 6770, the Ombudsman has the power to investigate and prosecute individuals on
matters and complaints referred to or filed before it. Such power is plenary.
We likewise disagree with LAYUS' reliance on the regularity of her COA Report. A COA approval of a
government official's disbursement only relates to the administrative aspect of his accountability, but
it does not foreclose the Ombudsman's authority to investigate and determine whether there is a crime
to be prosecuted for which such official may be answerable. For, while the COA may regard a
government official to have substantially complied with its accounting rules, this fact is not sufficient
to dismiss the criminal case.17
Therefore, the investigation of the charges in the complaint filed by the Special Audit Office-COA
against petitioners is not premature.
Regarding the second issue:
As stated, the Office of the Ombudsman has been granted virtually plenary investigatory powers by
the Constitution and by law. Thus, as a rule, the Office of the Ombudsman may, for every particular
investigation, whether instigated by a complaint or on its own initiative, decide how best to pursue
each investigation. This power gives the Office of the Ombudsman the discretion to dismiss without
prejudice a preliminary investigation if it finds that the final decision of COA is necessary for its
investigation and the future prosecution of the case. In another case with similar factual antecedents,
it may pursue the investigation because it realizes that the decision of COA is irrelevant or unnecessary
to the investigation and prosecution of the case. Since the Office of the Ombudsman is granted such
latitude, its varying treatment of similarly situated investigations cannot by itself be considered a
violation of any of the parties’ rights to the equal protection of the laws.
Thus, petitioners have not shown that respondent committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in denying their motions to dismiss the case or to suspend the
proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED and the prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction is DENIED.
The temporary restraining order issued through the resolution dated August 20, 1997 is LIFTED and
respondent Office of the Ombudsman may proceed with the preliminary investigation and/or any
further proceedings in OMB 0-95-0430 entitled Commission on Audit v. Chona Dimayuga, et al.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
54. G.R. No. 123936. March 4, 1999
RONALD SORIANO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS; HON. RODOLFO V. TOLEDANO, Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 69, Third Judicial Region, Iba, Zambales; THE PROVINCIAL SHERIFF,
Third Judicial Region, Iba, Zambales; Ms. NELDA DA MAYCONG, Supervising Parole and Probation
Officer and Officer-in-Charge, Zambales Parole and Probation Office; and THE PEOPLE OF THE
PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
DECISION
QUISUMBING, J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A. G.R. SP No.
35550,1 which upheld the trial courts orders holding petitioner in contempt and revoking his probation.
The facts of the case are as follows:
Petitioner Ronald Soriano was convicted of the crime of Reckless Imprudence resulting to homicide,
serious physical injuries and damage to property on December 7, 1993.2 His application for probation
was granted on March 8, 1994, and among the terms and conditions imposed by the trial court were
the following:3
"x x x
7. He shall meet his family responsibilities.
8. He shall devote himself to a specific employment and shall not change employment without prior
notice to the supervising officer; and/or shall pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training.
xxx
11. He is to indemnify the heirs of the victim Isidrino Daluyong in the amount of P98,560.00 as ordered
by the Court.
xxx
On April 26, 1994, Assistant Prosecutor Benjamin A. Fadera filed a motion to cancel petitioner’s
probation due to his failure to satisfy his civil liability to the heirs of the victim, and a supplemental
motion alleging petitioner’s commission of another crime for which at that time he was awaiting
arraignment. The Zambales Parole and Probation Office filed a comment recommending that petitioner
be allowed to continue with his probation and that he be required instead to submit a program of
payment of his civil liability.
On June 20, 1994, the trial court denied the prosecutors motion and directed petitioner to submit a
program of payment of the civil liability imposed upon him.
Thereafter, probation officer Nelda Da Maycong received information that petitioners father, who
owned the vehicle involved in the accident which killed Daluyong, received P16,500.00 as insurance
payment. This amount was not turned over to the heirs of Daluyong and Da Maycong considered this
a violation of the terms and conditions of the probation. She submitted a manifestation to the trial
court praying that petitioner be made to explain his non-compliance with the courts order of June 20,
1994, or that he be cited for contempt for such non-compliance. Da Maycong also asked that petitioner
be made to submit a program of payment as soon as possible. The trial court granted her prayers in an
order dated August 15, 1994. Petitioner was once again ordered to submit his program of payment.
Petitioner instead filed a motion for reconsideration explaining that he did not receive any notice of
the order dated June 20, 1994. His counsel received a copy of said order on June 23, 1994 but failed to
notify petitioner. Thus, the latter failed to comply with said order.
On October 4, 1994, the trial court issued an order declaring petitioner in contempt of court for his
failure to comply with its orders of June 20, 1994 and August 15, 1994. The court likewise revoked the
grant of probation to petitioner and ordered that he be arrested to serve the sentence originally
imposed upon him. According to the trial court, among the violations committed by petitioner as
regards his probation are his failure to (1) meet his responsibilities to his family, (2) engage in a specific
employment, and (3) cooperate with his program of supervision.
Petitioner then filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Court of Appeals. He claimed that
respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of, or in excess of, jurisdiction
in holding petitioner in contempt and revoking his probation. The Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition, holding that petitioners stubborn unwillingness to comply with the orders of the trial court
shows his refusal to reform himself and to correct a wrong.4cräläwvirtualibräry
According to the Court of Appeals:
Where probation was approved and probationer has proven to be unrepentant and disrespectful and
even showed clear defiance to two lawful court orders, as in the case of herein petitioner, the court is
not barred from revoking the same.5cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was likewise denied by the Court of Appeals for lack of merit.
Hence, this petition for review, in which petitioner makes the following assignment of
errors:6cräläwvirtualibräry
1. Respondent Court of Appeals erred in failing to rule that respondent judge committed grave abuse
of discretion in finding that there was deliberate refusal on the part of petitioner to comply with his
orders dated June 20, 1994 and August 15, 1994 and subsequently declaring petitioner in contempt.
of discretion in revoking the probation order he earlier issued in favor of petitioner on the ground that
petitioner failed to satisfy the award of civil indemnity for the heirs of the accident victim.
of discretion in revoking the probation order he earlier issued in favor of petitioner on the ground that
the latter violated the conditions of his probation three times.
Petitioner asserts that he had no intention to ignore the orders of the trial court. The courts order of
June 20, 1994 was received by his counsel who, however, did not notify petitioner. Petitioner says that
his former counsels irresponsible delay (in informing him of the order) should not prejudice
him.7cräläwvirtualibräry
He explains that his non-compliance with the order to submit a program of payment of his civil liability
is, ultimately, due to his poor financial condition. He only relies on his parents for support. He claims
that it is impossible for him to formulate a payment program because, in the first place, he is in no
position to comply with the same.
Petitioner avers that to require him to satisfy his civil liability in order to continue to avail of the
benefits of probation is to violate the constitutional proscription against unequal protection of the law.
He says only moneyed probationers will be able to benefit from probation if satisfaction of civil liability
is made a condition.
Petitioner contends that his enjoyment of probation should not be made to depend on the satisfaction
of his civil liability. He invokes the separate opinion of Justice Isagani A. Cruz in Salgado v. Court of
Appeals,8 particularly Justice Cruz reservation about the validity of imposing satisfaction of civil liability
as a condition for probation. Based on this opinion, petitioner claims that such an imposition is in the
nature of an amendment of the decision of the trial court in the criminal case against him, which cannot
be allowed since the decision is already final and executory. He further invokes the majority decision
in Salgado and asserts that any program of payment of civil liability must take into consideration the
needs and capacity of petitioner.9cräläwvirtualibräry
Petitioner claims that his failure to meet his responsibilities to his family and to engage in gainful
employment is not deliberate but is due to his poverty. He adds that his being unskilled, with a criminal
record to his name, does not exactly enhance his chances for employment.
Finally, petitioner cites our decision in Baclayon v. Mutia:10
x x x Conditions should be interpreted with flexibility in their application and each case should be
judged on its own merits -- on the basis of the problems, needs and capacity of the probationer. The
very liberality of the probation should not be made a tool by trial courts to stipulate instead unrealistic
terms.11
In his comment, the Solicitor General asks for the dismissal of the petition. The only issue to be resolved
according to him is whether or not petitioner has violated the terms and conditions of his probation as
to warrant its revocation. The Solicitor General argues that petitioner has committed violations, thus
justifying the trial courts revocation of the grant of probation. He further points out that our ruling in
Salgado is inapplicable to the case of petitioner since what was involved in Salgado was a program of
payment already imposed upon petitioner therein. In this case, however, it is petitioner who is being
asked to submit his own program of payment and he had not submitted any such program.
The only issue for us to resolve in this case is whether or not the revocation of petitioners probation is
lawful and proper.
Petitioner asserts that his non-compliance with the orders of the trial court requiring him to submit a
program of payment was not deliberate. To our mind, his refusal to comply with said orders cannot be
anything but deliberate. He had notice of both orders, although the notice of the order of June 20, 1994
came belatedly. He has, up to this point, refused to comply with the trial courts directive, by
questioning instead the constitutionality of the requirement imposed and harping on his alleged
poverty as the reason for his failure to comply.
Contrary to his assertion, this requirement is not violative of the equal protection clause of the
Constitution. Note that payment of the civil liability is not made a condition precedent to probation. If
it were, then perhaps there might be some basis to petitioners assertion that only moneyed convicts
may avail of the benefits of probation. In this case, however, petitioners application for probation had
already been granted. Satisfaction of his civil liability was not made a requirement before he could avail
of probation, but was a condition for his continued enjoyment of the same.
The trial court could not have done away with imposing payment of civil liability as a condition for
probation, as petitioner suggests. This is not an arbitrary imposition but one required by law. It is a
consequence of petitioners having been convicted of a crime, 12 and petitioner is bound to satisfy this
obligation regardless of whether or not he is placed under probation.
We fail to see why petitioner cannot comply with a simple order to furnish the trial court with a
program of payment of his civil liability. He may, indeed, be poor, but this is precisely the reason why
the trial court gave him the chance to make his own program of payment. Knowing his own financial
condition, he is in the best position to formulate a program of payment that fits his needs and capacity.
Petitioner blames his former counsels irresponsible delay in informing him of the trial courts order to
come up with a program of payment for his failure to make such a program. Petitioner wants to take
exception to the rule that notice to counsel is notice to client.
We find no reason to make an exception in this case. Petitioners counsel has not been shown to be
grossly irresponsible as to cause prejudice to petitioner’s rights. 13 Moreover, we note that petitioner
later on discovered that such a court order was received by his counsel. He could have endeavored to
comply with the order then. In the June 20, 1994 order, he was given 10 days from receipt of the order
within which to comply. The same period was given him in the order of August 15, 1994. Petitioner
does not claim that he failed to receive notice of the latter order. In fact, he submitted a motion for
reconsideration of said order, but still without the required program of payment.
No justifiable reason has been given by petitioner for ignoring those two orders. The trial court could
not be faulted for citing him in contempt for his failure to comply with its orders. Nor did it abuse
gravely its discretion in issuing said orders. Hence, we are in full agreement with respondent appellate
court’s decision as well.
Moreover, petitioner’s continued refusal to submit a program of payment, along with his prayer for
the deletion of the requirement of payment of civil liability from his probation order, creates the
impression that he wants to completely avoid paying his civil liability. This he cannot do. He cannot
escape payment of his civil liability, with or without a program of payment.
Petitioner’s reliance on Salgado is misplaced. In that case, the trial court itself formulated the manner
by which Salgado was to satisfy his civil liability. He was able to comply for a few months. When he
started skipping his payments, his victim sought the issuance of a writ of execution to enforce full
payment of the civil liability. The trial court granted this motion and it was sustained by the Court of
Appeals which ruled that the program of payment amounted to an amendment of the decision of the
trial court ordering payment of civil liability but without a program of payment. Since the trial courts
decision had already become final, it can no longer be amended by imposing a program of payment, in
installments, of the civil liability.
We held in Salgado that the program of payment is not an amendment of the decision of the trial court
because it does not increase or decrease the liability and the obligation to pay is to be fulfilled during
the period of probation.
Unlike in Salgado, herein petitioner was being asked to make a program of payment. But he failed to
do so. Hence, in this case, there is yet no program of payment to speak of, because of petitioner’s
stubborn refusal and delay as well as failure to abide by the trial courts orders.
Petitioners reliance on Baclayon is likewise misplaced. In that case, what was being assailed as an
unrealistic condition was the trial courts requirement that petitioner therein, a teacher convicted of
Serious Oral Defamation, refrain from exercising her profession. This condition was deemed
unreasonable because teaching was the only profession she knew and it appeared that she excelled in
teaching. No unrealistic condition similar to the one in Baclayon has been imposed upon petitioner
herein.
As regards the other violations committed by petitioner, the question of whether or not petitioner has,
indeed, violated the terms and conditions of his probation is evidently a factual one which had already
been passed upon by both the trial court and the Court of Appeals. Settled is the rule in this jurisdiction
that findings of fact of the trial court are entitled to great weight, more so when they are affirmed by
the Court of Appeals,14 as in this case.
Besides, petitioner himself admits in his petition that he is unemployed and only depends on his
parents for support. He can barely support his family. 15 Petitioner ought to be reminded of what is
incumbent on a probationer, including those requirements that the trial court may set.
As Section 10 of the Probation Law states:
SEC. 10. Conditions of Probation. -- xxx
The court may also require the probationer to:
(a) Cooperate with a program of supervision;
(b) Meet his family responsibilities;
(c) Devote himself to a specific employment and not to change said employment without the prior
written approval of the probation officer;
xxx
(e) Pursue a prescribed secular study or vocational training;
x x x 16cräläwvirtualibräry
Clearly, these conditions are not whims of the trial court but are requirements laid down by statute.
They are among the conditions that the trial court is empowered to impose and the petitioner, as
probationer, is required to follow. Only by satisfying these conditions may the purposes of probation
be fulfilled. These include promoting the correction and rehabilitation of an offender by providing him
with individualized treatment, and providing an opportunity for the reformation of a penitent offender
which might be less probable if he were to serve a prison sentence.16a Failure to comply will result in
the revocation of the order granting probation, pursuant to the Probation Law:
SEC. 11. Effectivity of Probation Order. -- A probation order shall take effect upon its issuance, at which
time the court shall inform the offender of the consequences thereof and explain that upon his failure
to comply with any of the conditions prescribed in the said order or his commission of another offense,
he shall serve the penalty imposed for the offense under which he was placed on probation.16b
(Emphasis supplied.)
Probation is not an absolute right. It is a mere privilege whose grant rests upon the discretion of the
trial court.17 Its grant is subject to certain terms and conditions that may be imposed by the trial court.
Having the power to grant probation, it follows that the trial court also has the power to order its
revocation in a proper case and under appropriate circumstances.
Moreover, having admittedly violated the terms and conditions of his probation, petitioner cannot now
assail the revocation of his probation. Regrettably, he has squandered the opportunity granted him by
the trial court to remain outside prison bars, and must now suffer the consequences of those aforecited
violations.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed decision of the Court of Appeals in C.A.
G.R. SP No. 35550 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Bellosillo, (Chairman), Puno, Mendoza, and Buena, JJ., concur.
55. G.R. No. L-59431 July 25, 1984
(note: facts-yellow, issue-purple, maroon-important points, green-ruling)
ANTERO M. SISON, JR., petitioner,
vs.
RUBEN B. ANCHETA, Acting Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; ROMULO VILLA, Deputy
Commissioner, Bureau of Internal Revenue; TOMAS TOLEDO Deputy Commissioner, Bureau of Internal
Revenue; MANUEL ALBA, Minister of Budget, FRANCISCO TANTUICO, Chairman, Commissioner on
Audit, and CESAR E. A. VIRATA, Minister of Finance, respondents.
Antero Sison for petitioner and for his own behalf.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FERNANDO, C.J.:
The success of the challenge posed in this suit for declaratory relief or prohibition proceeding 1 on the
validity of Section I of Batas Pambansa Blg. 135 depends upon a showing of its constitutional infirmity.
The assailed provision further amends Section 21 of the National Internal Revenue Code of 1977, which
provides for rates of tax on citizens or residents on (a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net
income, (c) royalties, prizes, and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other
monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements, (e) dividends
and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted gross income. 2
Petitioner 3 as taxpayer alleges that by virtue thereof, "he would be unduly discriminated against by the
imposition of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those
which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers. 4 He characterizes the above sction
as arbitrary amounting to class legislation, oppressive and capricious in character 5 For petitioner,
therefore, there is a transgression of both the equal protection and due process clauses 6 of the
Constitution as well as of the rule requiring uniformity in taxation. 7
The Court, in a resolution of January 26, 1982, required respondents to file an answer within 10 days from
notice. Such an answer, after two extensions were granted the Office of the Solicitor General, was filed
on May 28, 1982. 8 The facts as alleged were admitted but not the allegations which to their mind are
"mere arguments, opinions or conclusions on the part of the petitioner, the truth [for them] being those
stated [in their] Special and Affirmative Defenses." 9 The answer then affirmed: "Batas Pambansa Big. 135
is a valid exercise of the State's power to tax. The authorities and cases cited while correctly quoted or
paraghraph do not support petitioner's stand." 10 The prayer is for the dismissal of the petition for lack
of merit.
This Court finds such a plea more than justified. The petition must be dismissed.
1. It is manifest that the field of state activity has assumed a much wider scope, The reason was so clearly
set forth by retired Chief Justice Makalintal thus: "The areas which used to be left to private enterprise
and initiative and which the government was called upon to enter optionally, and only 'because it was
better equipped to administer for the public welfare than is any private individual or group of individuals,'
continue to lose their well-defined boundaries and to be absorbed within activities that the government
must undertake in its sovereign capacity if it is to meet the increasing social challenges of the times." 11
Hence the need for more revenues. The power to tax, an inherent prerogative, has to be availed of to
assure the performance of vital state functions. It is the source of the bulk of public funds. To praphrase
a recent decision, taxes being the lifeblood of the government, their prompt and certain availability is of
the essence. 12
2. The power to tax moreover, to borrow from Justice Malcolm, "is an attribute of sovereignty. It is the
strongest of all the powers of of government." 13 It is, of course, to be admitted that for all its plenitude
'the power to tax is not unconfined. There are restrictions. The Constitution sets forth such limits .
Adversely affecting as it does properly rights, both the due process and equal protection clauses inay
properly be invoked, all petitioner does, to invalidate in appropriate cases a revenue measure. if it were
otherwise, there would -be truth to the 1803 dictum of Chief Justice Marshall that "the power to tax
involves the power to destroy." 14 In a separate opinion in Graves v. New York, 15 Justice Frankfurter,
after referring to it as an 1, unfortunate remark characterized it as "a flourish of rhetoric [attributable to]
the intellectual fashion of the times following] a free use of absolutes." 16 This is merely to emphasize
that it is riot and there cannot be such a constitutional mandate. Justice Frankfurter could rightfully
conclude: "The web of unreality spun from Marshall's famous dictum was brushed away by one stroke of
Mr. Justice Holmess pen: 'The power to tax is not the power to destroy while this Court sits." 17 So it is
in the Philippines.
3. This Court then is left with no choice. The Constitution as the fundamental law overrides any legislative
or executive, act that runs counter to it. In any case therefore where it can be demonstrated that the
challenged statutory provision — as petitioner here alleges — fails to abide by its command, then this
Court must so declare and adjudge it null. The injury thus is centered on the question of whether the
imposition of a higher tax rate on taxable net income derived from business or profession than on
compensation is constitutionally infirm.
4, The difficulty confronting petitioner is thus apparent. He alleges arbitrariness. A mere allegation, as
here. does not suffice. There must be a factual foundation of such unconstitutional taint. Considering that
petitioner here would condemn such a provision as void or its face, he has not made out a case. This is
merely to adhere to the authoritative doctrine that were the due process and equal protection clauses
are invoked, considering that they arc not fixed rules but rather broad standards, there is a need for of
such persuasive character as would lead to such a conclusion. Absent such a showing, the presumption
of validity must prevail. 18
5. It is undoubted that the due process clause may be invoked where a taxing statute is so arbitrary that
it finds no support in the Constitution. An obvious example is where it can be shown to amount to the
confiscation of property. That would be a clear abuse of power. It then becomes the duty of this Court to
say that such an arbitrary act amounted to the exercise of an authority not conferred. That properly calls
for the application of the Holmes dictum. It has also been held that where the assailed tax measure is
beyond the jurisdiction of the state, or is not for a public purpose, or, in case of a retroactive statute is so
harsh and unreasonable, it is subject to attack on due process grounds. 19
6. Now for equal protection. The applicable standard to avoid the charge that there is a denial of this
constitutional mandate whether the assailed act is in the exercise of the police power or the power of
eminent domain is to demonstrated that the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the
attainment of the common weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination
that finds no support in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons
under similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not
being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue
preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security shall be given to
every person under circumtances which if not Identical are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of
burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated in the same fashion, whatever
restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the rest." 20 That same formulation applies as
well to taxation measures. The equal protection clause is, of course, inspired by the noble concept of
approximating the Ideal of the laws benefits being available to all and the affairs of men being governed
by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the Idea of law. There is, however,
wisdom, as well as realism in these words of Justice Frankfurter: "The equality at which the 'equal
protection' clause aims is not a disembodied equality. The Fourteenth Amendment enjoins 'the equal
protection of the laws,' and laws are not abstract propositions. They do not relate to abstract units A, B
and C, but are expressions of policy arising out of specific difficulties, address to the attainment of specific
ends by the use of specific remedies. The Constitution does not require things which are different in fact
or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same." 21 Hence the constant reiteration of the
view that classification if rational in character is allowable. As a matter of fact, in a leading case of Lutz V.
Araneta, 22 this Court, through Justice J.B.L. Reyes, went so far as to hold "at any rate, it is inherent in the
power to tax that a state be free to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that
'inequalities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation.'" 23
7. Petitioner likewise invoked the kindred concept of uniformity. According to the Constitution: "The rule
of taxation shag be uniform and equitable." 24 This requirement is met according to Justice Laurel in
Philippine Trust Company v. Yatco,25 decided in 1940, when the tax "operates with the same force and
effect in every place where the subject may be found. " 26 He likewise added: "The rule of uniformity does
not call for perfect uniformity or perfect equality, because this is hardly attainable." 27 The problem of
classification did not present itself in that case. It did not arise until nine years later, when the Supreme
Court held: "Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles or kinds of property of the
same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has the authority to make reasonable and
natural classifications for purposes of taxation, ... . 28 As clarified by Justice Tuason, where "the
differentiation" complained of "conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is not
discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform." 29 There is quite a similarity
then to the standard of equal protection for all that is required is that the tax "applies equally to all
persons, firms and corporations placed in similar situation."30
8. Further on this point. Apparently, what misled petitioner is his failure to take into consideration the
distinction between a tax rate and a tax base. There is no legal objection to a broader tax base or taxable
income by eliminating all deductible items and at the same time reducing the applicable tax rate.
Taxpayers may be classified into different categories. To repeat, it. is enough that the classification must
rest upon substantial distinctions that make real differences. In the case of the gross income taxation
embodied in Batas Pambansa Blg. 135, the, discernible basis of classification is the susceptibility of the
income to the application of generalized rules removing all deductible items for all taxpayers within the
class and fixing a set of reduced tax rates to be applied to all of them. Taxpayers who are recipients of
compensation income are set apart as a class. As there is practically no overhead expense, these
taxpayers are e not entitled to make deductions for income tax purposes because they are in the same
situation more or less. On the other hand, in the case of professionals in the practice of their calling and
businessmen, there is no uniformity in the costs or expenses necessary to produce their income. It would
not be just then to disregard the disparities by giving all of them zero deduction and indiscriminately
impose on all alike the same tax rates on the basis of gross income. There is ample justification then for
the Batasang Pambansa to adopt the gross system of income taxation to compensation income, while
continuing the system of net income taxation as regards professional and business income.
9. Nothing can be clearer, therefore, than that the petition is without merit, considering the (1) lack of
factual foundation to show the arbitrary character of the assailed provision; 31 (2) the force of controlling
doctrines on due process, equal protection, and uniformity in taxation and (3) the reasonableness of the
distinction between compensation and taxable net income of professionals and businessman certainly
not a suspect classification,
WHEREFORE, the petition is dismissed. Costs against petitioner.
56. G.R. Nos. 122250 & 122258 July 21, 1997
EDGARDO C. NOLASCO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, MUNICIPAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS, MEYCAUAYAN,

BULACAN, and EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.
FLORENTINO P. BLANCO, petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, and EDUARDO A. ALARILLA, respondents.
PUNO, J.:
First, we rewind the facts. The election for mayor of Meycauayan, Bulacan was held on May 8,
1995. The principal protagonists were petitioner Florentino P. Blanco and private respondent
Eduardo A. Alarilla. Blanco received 29,753 votes, while Alarilla got 23,038 votes.1 Edgardo
Nolasco was elected Vice-Mayor with 37,240 votes.
On May 9, 1995, Alarilla filed with the COMELEC a petition to disqualify Blanco. He alleged:
xxx xxx xxx
4. Based on intelligence reports that respondent was maintaining his own "private army" at
his aforesaid resident, P/Insp. Ronaldo O. Lee of the Philippine National Police assigned with the
Intelligence Command at Camp Crame, applied for and was granted search warrant no. 95-147
by Branch 37 of the Regional Trial Court of Manila on 5 May 1995. A copy of the said search
warrant is attached as Annex "A" hereof.
5. In compliance with said search warrant no. 95-147, an elite composite team of the PNP
Intelligence Command, Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), and Bulacan Provincial Command,
backed up by the Philippine National Police Special Action Force, accompanied by mediamen
who witnessed and recorded the search by video and still cameras, raided the house of
respondent Florentino Blanco at his stated address at Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan.
6. Enclosed as Annex "A-1" is a video tape taken of the proceedings during the raid.
7. The composite team was able to enter the said premises of respondent Florentino Blanco
where they conducted a search of the subject firearms and ammunition.
8. The search resulted in the arrest of six (6) men who were found carrying various high
powered firearms without any license or authority to use or possess such long arms. These
persons composing respondent's "private army," and the unlicensed firearms are as follows:
A. Virgilio Luna y Valderama —
1 PYTHOM (sic) Cal . 347 SN 26946
with six (6) Rounds of Ammo.
2 INGRAM M10 Cal. 45 MP with
Suppressor SN: 45457 with two
(2) Mags and 54 Rounds of Ammo.
B. Raymundo Bahala y Pon —
1. HKMP5 Sn. C334644 with two (2)
Mags and 47 Rounds of Ammo.
C. Roberto Santos y Sacris —
1. Smith and Wesson 357 Magnum Sn:
522218 with six (6) Rounds of
Ammo.
D. Melchor Cabanero y Oreil —
1. Armscor 12 Gauge with three (3)
Rounds of Ammo.
E. Edgardo Orteza y Asuncion —
1. Paltik Cal. 38 Rev with six (6)
Rounds of Ammo.
F. Francisco Libari y Calimag —
1. Paltik Cal. 38 SN: 36869
Copies of the inventory receipts are hereto attached as Annexes "B" to "B-5" hereof.
9. During the search, members of the composite team saw through a large clear glass
window, respondent's Galil assault rifle on a sofa inside a closed room of the subject premises.
10. Not allowed entry thereto by respondent and his wife, the members of the composite
police-military team applied for the issuance of a second search warrant (Annex "B-6") so that
they could enter the said room to seize the said firearm.
11. While waiting for the issuance of the second search warrant, respondent's wife and
respondent's brother, Mariano Blanco, claiming to be the campaign manager of respondent in
the Nationalist People's Coalition Party, asked permission to enter the locked room so they could
withdraw money in a vault inside the locked room to pay their watchers, and the teachers of
Meycauayan in the 8 May 1995 elections.
12. For reasons not known to petitioner, Mrs. Florentino Blanco and Mariano Blanco, were
allowed to withdraw ten (10) large plastic bags from the vault.
13. When the said PNP composite team examined the ten (10) black plastic bags, they found
out that each bag contained ten (10) shoe boxes. Each shoe box when examined contained 200
pay envelopes, and each pay envelope when opened contained the amount of P1,000.00. When
questioned, respondent's brother Mariano Blanco and respondent's wife, admitted to the raiding
team that the total amount of money in the ten (10) plastic bags is P10,000,000.00.
14. The labels found in the envelope shows that the money were intended as respondent's
bribe money to the teachers of Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "C" is the cover of one of the
shoe boxes containing the inscription that it is intended to the teachers of Brgy. Lawa,
Meycauayan, Bulacan.
15. On election day 8 May 1995, respondent perpetrated the most massive vote-buying
activity ever in the history of Meycauayan politics. Attached as Annex "D" is the envelope where
this P10,000,000.00 was placed in 100 peso denominations totalling one thousand pesos per
envelope with the inscription "VOTE!!! TINOY."
This massive vote-buying activity was engineered by the respondent through his organization
called "MTB" or "MOVEMENT FOR TINOY BLANCO VOLUNTEERS." The chairman of this
movement is respondent's brother, Mariano P. Blanco, who admitted to the police during the raid
that these money were for the teachers and watchers of Meycauayan, Bulacan.
Attached as Annex "E" hereof is an MTB ID issued to one Armando Bulan of Precinct 77-A, Brgy.
Jasmin, Bancal, Meycauayan, Bulacan. You will note that the ID is perforated in the middle. The
purpose is for the voter to tear the office copy and return it to respondent's headquarters to
receive the balance of the P500.00 of the bribe money after voting for respondent during the
elections. The voter will initially be given a down-payment of 500.00.
16. This massive vote-buying was also perpetrated by respondent thru the familiar use of
flying voters. Attached as Annex "F" hereof is a copy of the Police Blotter dated 8 May 1995
showing that six (6) flying voters were caught in different precincts of Meycauayan, Bulacan, who
admitted after being caught and arrested that they were paid P200.00 to P300.00 by respondent
and his followers, to vote for other voters in the voter's list.
17. Not satisfied, and with his overflowing supply of money, respondent used another scheme
as follows. Respondent's paid voter will identify his target from the list of voter and will
impersonate said voter in the list and falsify his signature.
Attached as Annex "G" hereof is the Minutes of Voting and Counting of Votes in Precinct No. 26,
Brgy. Calvario, Meycauayan, Bulacan. Annex "G-1" is the statement of one Ma. Luisa de los
Reyes Cruz stating that when she went to her precinct to vote, her name was already voted upon
by another person. This entry was noted by Leticia T. Villanco, Poll Chairman; Estelita Artajo, —
Poll Clerk; and Nelson John Nito — Poll Member.
18. Earlier before the election, respondent used his tremendous money to get in the good
graces of the local Comelec Registrar, who was replaced by this Office upon the petition of the
people of Meycauayan. Attached as Annex "H" hereof is an article in the 3 May 1995 issue of
Abante entitled "1 M Suhol sa Comelec Registrar."
19. The second search warrant on respondent's residence yielded to more firearms and
thousands of rounds of ammunition. These guns were used by respondent to terrorize the
population and make the people afraid to complain against respondent's massive vote buying
and cheating in today's elections. Respondent's bribery of the teachers ensured the
implementation of his vote buying ballot box switching, impersonations, and other cheating
schemes.
Attached as Annexes "I-1" to "I-2" are the pertinent Receipts of the guns and ammunitions seized
from respondent. Attached as Annex "J" is a Certification to the same effect.
20. The above acts committed by respondent are clear grounds for disqualification under Sec.
68 of the Omnibus Election Code for giving money to influence, induce or corrupt the voters or
public officials performing election functions; for committing acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; and for spending in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by the
Election Code. There are only 97,000 registered voters in Meycauayan versus respondent's
expenses of at least P10,000,000.00 as admitted above. (Emphasis supplied).
On May 15, 1995, Alarilla filed a Very Urgent Ex Parte Motion to Suspend Proclamation. The
COMELEC (First Division) granted the motion after finding that there was a "probable commission
of election offenses which are grounds for disqualification pursuant to the provisions of section
68 of the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), and the evidence in support of disqualification is
strong." It directed the Municipal Board of Canvassers "to complete the canvassing of election
returns of the municipality of Meycauayan, but to suspend proclamation of respondent Florentino
P. Blanco should he obtain the winning number of votes for the position of Mayor of Meycauayan,
Bulacan until such time when the petitions for disqualification against him shall have been
resolved."
On May 25, 1995, Blanco filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order suspending his
proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify him.
On May 30, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) heard the petition to disqualify Blanco. The
parties thereafter submitted their position papers.2 Blanco even replied to the position paper of
Alarilla on June 9, 1995.
On August 15, 1995, the COMELEC (First Division) disqualified Blanco on the ground of vote-
buying, viz.:3
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVES to

DISQUALIFY Respondent Florentino P. Blanco as a candidate for the Office of Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan in the May 8, 1995 elections for having violated Section 261 (a) of the
Omnibus Election Code. The Order suspending the proclamation of herein Respondent is now
made PERMANENT. The Municipal Board of Canvassers of Meycauayan, Bulacan shall
immediately reconvene and, on the basis of the completed canvass of the election returns,
determine the winner out of the remaining qualified candidates who shall be immediately
proclaimed.
SO ORDERED.
Blanco moved for reconsideration on August 19, 1995 in the COMELEC en banc. Nolasco, as
vice mayor, intervened in the proceedings.4 He moved for reconsideration of that part of the
resolution directing the Municipal Board of Canvassers to "immediately reconvene and, on the
basis of the completed canvass of the election returns, determine the winner out of the remaining
qualified candidates who shall be immediately proclaimed." He urged that as vice-mayor he
should be declared mayor in the event Blanco was finally disqualified. The motions were heard
on September 7, 1995. The parties were allowed to file their memoranda with right of reply. On
October 23, 1995, the COMELEC en banc denied the motions for reconsideration.
In this petition for certiorari,5 Blanco contends:
xxx xxx xxx
18. Respondent COMELEC En Banc committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction and acted arbitrarily in affirming en toto and adopting as its own the
majority decision of the First Division in that:
18.1 It upheld the validity of the May 17, 1995 order suspending proclamation of Petitioner
Blanco herein as the winning candidate for Mayor of Meycauayan without the benefit of any notice
or hearing in gross and palpable violation of Blanco's constitutional right to due process of law.
18.2 It violated the provisions of COMELEC Res. No. 2050 as amended, prescribing the
procedure for disposing of disqualification cases arising out of the prohibited acts mentioned in
Sec. 68 of the Omnibus Election Code, which Resolution this Honorable Tribunal explicitly
sanctioned in the case of Lozano vs. Yorac. Moreover, it (COMELEC) violated Blanco's right to
equal protection of the laws by setting him apart from other respondents facing similar
disqualification suits whose case were referred by COMELEC to the Law Department pursuant
to Com. Res. No. 2050 and ordering their proclamation — an act which evidently discriminated
against Petitioner Blanco herein.
18.3 It decided Petitioner Blanco's disqualification case in a SUMMARY PROCEEDING in

violation of law and the precedents which consistently hold that questions of VOTE-BUYING,
terrorism and similar such acts should be resolve in a formal election protest where the issue of
vote buying is subjected to a full-dress hearing instead of disposing of the issue in a summary
proceeding;
18.4 It declared Petitioner Blanco as having been involved in a conspiracy to engage in VOTE-
BUYING without that minimum quantum of proof required to establish a disputable presumption
of vote-buying in gross and palpable violation of the provisions of Section 28, Rep. Act. 6646;
18.5 It ordered the proclamation of a SECOND PLACER as the duly elected Mayor of
Meycauayan, Bulacan, in gross violation and utter disregard of the doctrine laid down by this
Honorable Supreme Court in the case of LABO vs. COMELEC which was reiterated only recently
in the case of Aquino vs. Syjuco.
On the other hand, Nolasco contends in his petition for certiorari6 that he should be declared as
Mayor in view of the disqualification of Blanco. He cites section 44 of R.A. No. 7160 otherwise
known as the Local Government Code of 1991 and our decision in Labo vs. COMELEC.7
We shall first resolve the Blanco petition.
Blanco was not denied due process when the COMELEC (First Division) suspended his
proclamation as mayor pending determination of the petition for disqualification against him.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 and sections 4 and 5 of the Rule 25 of the Comelec Rules of Procedure
merely require that evidence of guilt should be strong to justify the COMELEC in suspending a
winning candidate's proclamation. It ought to be emphasized that the suspension order is
provisional in nature and can be lifted when the evidence so warrants. It is akin to a temporary
restraining order which a court can issue ex-parte under exigent circumstances.
In any event, Blanco was given all the opportunity to prove that the evidence on his
disqualification was not strong. On May 25, 1995, he filed a Motion to Lift or Set Aside the Order
suspending his proclamation. On May 29, 1995, he filed his Answer to the petition to disqualify
him. The COMELEC heard the petition. Blanco thereafter submitted his position paper and reply
to Alarilla's position paper. The COMELEC considered the evidence of the parties and their
arguments and thereafter affirmed his disqualification. The hoary rule is that due process does
not mean prior hearing but only an opportunity to be heard. The COMELEC gave Blanco all the
opportunity to be heard. Petitions for disqualification are subject to summary hearings.8
Blanco also faults the COMELEC for departing from the procedure laid down in COMELEC
Resolution 2050 as amended, in disqualification cases. The resolution pertinently provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Where a similar complaint is filed after election but before proclamation of the respondent
candidate the complaint shall, nevertheless, be dismissed as a disqualification case. However,
the complaint shall be referred for preliminary investigation to the Law Department. If, before
proclamation, the Law Department makes a prima facie finding of guilt and the corresponding
information has been filed with the appropriate trial court, the complainant may file a petition for
suspension of the proclamation of the respondent with the court before which the criminal case
is pending and the said court may order the suspension of the proclamation if the evidence of
guilt is strong.
It is alleged that the violation is fatal as it deprived Blanco of equal protection of our laws.
We do not agree. It cannot be denied that the COMELEC has jurisdiction over proclamation and
disqualification cases. Article IX-C, section 2 of the Constitution endows the COMELEC the all
encompassing power to "enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct
of an
election . . . ." We have long ruled that this broad power includes the power to cancel
proclamations.9 Our laws are no less explicit on the matter. Section 68 of B.P. Blg. 881 (Omnibus
Election Code) provides:
Sec. 68. Disqualifications. — Any candidate who, in an action or protest in which he is a

party is declared by final decision of a competent court guilty of, or found by the Commission of
having (a) given money or other material consideration to influence, induce or corrupt the voters
or public officials performing electoral functions; (b) committed acts of terrorism to enhance his
candidacy; (c) spent in his election campaign an amount in excess of that allowed by this Code;
(d) solicited, received or made any contribution prohibited under Sections 89, 95, 96, 97 and 104;
or (e) violated any of Sections 80, 83, 85, 86 and 261, paragraphs d, e, k, v, and cc, sub-
paragraph 6, shall be disqualified from continuing as a candidate, or if he has been elected, from
holding the office. Any person who is a permanent resident of or an immigrant to a foreign country
shall not be qualified to run for an elective office under this Code, unless said person has waived
his status as permanent resident or immigrant of a foreign country in accordance with the
residence requirement provided for in the elections laws.
Section 6 of R.A. No. 6646 likewise provides:
Sec. 6. Effect of Disqualification Case — Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment
to be disqualified shall not be voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any
reason a candidate is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he
is voted for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or Commission
shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry or protest and, upon motion of the
complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency thereof order the suspension of the
proclamation of such candidate whenever the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Despite these laws and existing jurisprudence, Blanco contends that COMELEC must follow the
procedure in Resolution No. 2050 as amended. We hold that COMELEC cannot always be
straitjacketed by this procedural rule. The COMELEC has explained that the resolution was
passed to take care of the proliferation of disqualification cases at that time. It deemed it wise to
delegate its authority to its Law Department as partial solution to the problem. The May 8, 1995
elections, however, did not result in a surfeit of disqualification cases which the COMELEC
cannot handle. Hence, its decision to resolve the disqualification case of Blanco directly and
without referring it to its Law Department is within its authority, a sound exercise of its discretion.
The action of the COMELEC is in accord with Section 28 of R.A. No. 6646, viz:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 28. Prosecution of Vote-Buying and Vote-selling. — The presentation of a complaint

for violations of paragraph (a) or (b) of Section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881 supported by
affidavits of complaining witness attesting to the offer or promise by or of the voter's acceptance
of money or other consideration from the relatives, leaders or sympathizers of a candidate, shall
be sufficient basis for an investigation to be immediately conducted by the Commission, directly
or through its duly authorized legal officers under Section 68 or Section 265 of said Batas
Pambansa Blg. 881. (emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Indeed, even Commissioner Maambong who dissented from the majority ruling, clings to the view
that "Resolution No. 2050 cannot divest the Commission of its duty to resolve disqualification
cases under the clear provision of section 6 of R.A. No. 6646."10 Clearly too, Blanco's contention
that he was denied equal protection of the law is off-line. He was not the object of any invidious
discrimination. COMELEC assumed direct jurisdiction over his disqualification case not to favor
anybody but to discharge its constitutional duty of disposing the case in a fair and as fast a
manner as possible.
Blanco also urges that COMELEC erred in using summary proceedings to resolve his
disqualification case. Again, the COMELEC action is safely anchored on section 4 of its Rules of
Procedure which expressly provides that petitions for disqualification "shall be heard summarily
after due notice." Vote-buying has its criminal and electoral aspects. Its criminal aspect to
determine the guilt or innocence of the accused cannot be the subject of summary hearing.
However, its electoral aspect to ascertain whether the offender should be disqualified from office
can be determined in an administrative proceeding that is summary in character.
The next issue is whether there is substantial evidence to prove the vote buying activities of
Blanco.
The factual findings of the COMELEC (First Division) are as follows:11
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent argues that the claim of vote-buying has no factual basis because the affidavits and
sworn statements admitted as evidence against him are products of hearsay; inadmissible
because of the illegal searches; they violate the Rule of Res Inter Alios Acta and the offense of
vote-buying requires consummation.
We are not impressed.
A studied reading of the affidavits [Respondent's affidavit is unsigned] attached to the Reply of
the Respondent to the Position Paper of the Petitioner [Annexes 1, 2 and 3] would reveal that
they are in the nature of general denials emanating from individuals closely associated or related
to respondent Blanco.
The same holds true with the affidavits attached to Respondent's Position Paper [Annexes 1, 2,
3 and 4]. Said affidavits were executed by Blanco's political leaders and private secretary.
On the other hand, the affidavit of Romeo Burgos [Exhibit "E-1"] is rich in detail as to how the
alleged vote-buying was conducted.
Moreover, the same is corroborated by object evidence in the nature of MTB [Movement for Tinoy
Blanco] cards which were in the possession of the affiants and allegedly used as a means to
facilitate the vote-buying scheme.
There are also admissions of certain individuals who received money to vote for Respondent
[Annexes "E-2", "E-3" , "E-4" , "E-5" ,"E-6", "E-7", "E-8", "E-9" and "E-10"].
On the day of the elections, two individuals were apprehended for attempting to vote for
Respondent when they allegedly are not registered voters of Meycauayan. A criminal complaint
for violation of section 261 [2] of BP 881 was filed by P/Sr. Inspector Alfred S. Corpus on May 9,
1995 with the Municipal Trial Court of Bulacan. The same was docketed as Criminal Case 95-
16996 [Exhibit F-2].
Again, similar pay envelopes with money inside them were found in the possession of the
suspected flying voters.
The incident was corroborated by Adriano Llorente in his affidavit narrating the same [Exhibit "F-
1"]. Llorente, a poll watcher of Petitioner, was the one who accosted the two suspected flying
voters when the latter attempted to vote despite failing to locate their names in the voter's list.
From this rich backdrop of detail, We are disappointed by the general denial offered by
Respondent. In People of the Philippines vs. Navarro, G.R. No. 96251, May 11, 1993, 222 SCRA
684, the Supreme Court noted that "Denial is the weakest defense" [page 692].
In People of the Philippines vs. Rolando Precioso, et al., G.R. No. 95890, May 12, 1993, 221
SCRA 1993, the Supreme Court observed that,
We have consistently ruled that denials if unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence are
negative and self-serving evidence which deserves no weight in law and cannot be given greater
evidentiary weight over the testimony of credible witnesses. Ergo, as between the positive
declarations of the prosecution witness and the negative statements of the accused, the former
deserves more credence. [page 754].
However, Respondent conveniently resorts to section 33, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court
which states that a declaration of an accused acknowledging his guilt of the offense charged, or
of any offense necessarily included herein, may be given in evidence against him [affiants who
executed Exhibits E-1 to E-10] but not against Respondent.
There is no merit in this contention.
The affiants are not the accused. Their participation in the herein case is in the nature of
witnesses who have assumed the risk of being subsequently charged with violating Section 261
[1] of BP 881. In fact, their affidavits were sought by the Petitioner and not by any law enforcement
agency. Even Respondent admits this finding when he filed his Reply to Petitioner's Position
Paper and Motion to Refer for Preliminary Investigation and Filing of Information in Court against
the Persons Who Executed Exhibits E-1l to E-10 for Having Admitted Commission of Election
Offense. If they were the accused, why file the motion? Would not this be redundant if not
irrelevant?
xxx xxx xxx
Another telling blow is the unexplained money destined for the teachers. Why such a huge
amount? Why should the Respondent, a mayoralty candidate, and according to his own
admission, be giving money to teachers a day before the elections? What were the peso bills
doing in pay envelopes with the inscription "VOTE!!! TINOY", and kept in shoe boxes with the
word "Teachers" written on the covers thereof ?
There is also something wrong with the issuance of the aforementioned MTB cards when one
considers the testimony of Burgos that more or less 50,000 of these cards, which is equivalent
to more or less 52% of the 97,000 registered voters of Meycauayan, Bulacan, were printed by
respondent; that there are only 443 precincts in Meycauayan; that under the law, a candidate is
allowed only one watcher per polling place and canvassing area; and, finally, that there is no
explanation at all by the respondent as to what these "watchers" did in order to get paid P300.00
each.
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent also avers that for an allegation of vote-buying to prosper, the act of giving must be
consummated.
Section 281 [a] of BP 881 states "any person who gives, offers, or promises money . . ." Section
28 of RA 6646 also states that "the giver, offeror, the promisor as well as the solicitor, recipient
and conspirator referred to in paragraphs [a] and [b] of section 261 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 881
shall be liable as principals: . . . .
While the giving must be consummated, the mere act of offering or promising something in
consideration for someone's vote constitutes the offense of vote-buying.
In the case at bar, the acts of offering and promising money in consideration for the votes of said
affiants is sufficient for a finding of the commission of the offense of vote-buying.
These factual findings were affirmed by the COMELEC en banc against the lone dissent of
Commissioner Maambong.
There is an attempt to discredit these findings. Immediately obvious in the effort is the resort to
our technical rules of evidence. Again, our ingrained jurisprudence is that technical rules of
evidence should not be rigorously applied in administrative proceedings especially where the law
calls for the proceeding to be summary in character. More importantly, we cannot depart from
the settled norm of reviewing decisions of the COMELEC, i.e., that "this Court cannot review the
factual findings of the COMELEC absent a grave abuse of discretion and a showing of
arbitrariness in its decision, order or resolution."12
We now come to the petition of Nolasco that he should be declared as mayor in the event Blanco
is finally disqualified.13 We sustain the plea. Section 44, Chapter 2 of the Local Government
Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160) is unequivocal, thus:
xxx xxx xxx
Sec. 44. Permanent Vacancies in the Offices of the Governor, Vice Governor, Mayor, and
Vice Mayor. — (a) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice
governor or vice mayor concerned shall become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking
sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor, as the
case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the other
sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined herein.
(b) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the punong barangay, the highest ranking
sanggunian barangay member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall become the punong barangay.
(c) A tie between or among the highest ranking sangguniang members shall be resolved by
the drawing of lots.
(d) The successors as defined herein shall serve only the unexpired terms of their
predecessors.
For purposes of this Chapter, a permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a
higher vacant office, refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office,
voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his
office.
For purposes of succession as provided in this Chapter, ranking in the sanggunian shall be
determined on the basis of the proportion of votes obtained by each winning candidate to the
total number of registered voters in each distribution the immediately preceding election.
In the same vein, Article 83 of the Rules and Regulations Implementing, the Local Government
Code of 1991 provides:
xxx xxx xxx
Art. 83. Vacancies and Succession of Elective Local Officials. — (a) What constitutes permanent
vacancy — A permanent vacancy arises when an elective local official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from office, voluntarily resigns, or is
otherwise permanently incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
(b) Permanent vacancies in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor and vice mayor
—
(1) If a permanent vacancy occurs in the office of the governor or mayor, the vice governor
or vice mayor concerned shall ipso facto become the governor or mayor. If a permanent vacancy
occurs in the offices of the governor, vice governor, mayor, or vice mayor, the highest ranking
sanggunian member or, in case of his permanent inability, the second highest ranking
sanggunian member, shall ipso facto become the governor, vice governor, mayor or vice mayor,
as the case may be. Subsequent vacancies in the said office shall be filled automatically by the
other sanggunian members according to their ranking as defined in this Article.
Our case law is now settled that in a mayoralty election, the candidate who obtained the second
highest number of votes, in this case Alarilla, cannot be proclaimed winner in case the winning
candidate is disqualified. Thus, we reiterated the rule in the fairly recent case of Reyes v.
COMELEC,14 viz:
xxx xxx xxx
We likewise find no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the COMELEC in denying petitioner
Julius O. Garcia's petition to be proclaimed mayor in view of the disqualification of Renato U.
Reyes.
That the candidate who obtains the second highest number of votes may not be proclaimed
winner in case the winning candidate is disqualified is now settled. The doctrinal instability caused
by see-sawing rulings has since been removed. In the latest ruling on the question, this Court
said:
To simplistically assume that the second placer would have received the other votes would be to
substitute our judgment for the mind of the voter. The second placer is just that, a second placer.
He lost the elections. He was repudiated by either a majority or plurality of voters. He could not
be considered the first among qualified candidates because in a field which excludes the
disqualified candidate, the conditions would have substantially changed. We are not prepared to
extrapolate the results under the circumstances.
Garcia's plea that the votes cast for Reyes be invalidated is without merit. The votes cast for
Reyes are presumed to have been cast in the belief that Reyes was qualified and for that reason
can not be treated as stray, void, or meaningless. The subsequent finding that he is disqualified
cannot retroact to the date of the elections so as to invalidate the votes cast for him.
Consequently, respondent COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion insofar as it failed to

follow the above doctrine, a descendant of our ruling in Labo v. COMELEC.15
A final word. The dispute at bar involves more than the mayoralty of the municipality of
Meycauayan, Bulacan. It concerns the right of suffrage which is the bedrock of republicanism.
Suffrage is the means by which our people express their sovereign judgment. Its free exercise
must be protected especially against the purchasing power of the peso. As we succinctly held in
People v. San Juan,16 "each time the enfranchised citizen goes to the polls to assert this
sovereign will, that abiding credo of republicanism is translated into living reality. If that will must
remain undefiled at the starting level of its expression and application, every assumption must be
indulged in and every guarantee adopted to assure the unmolested exercise of the citizen's free
choice. For to impede, without authority valid in law, the free and orderly exercise of the right of
suffrage, is to inflict the ultimate indignity on the democratic process."
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the resolution of the respondent COMELEC en banc dated October 23,
1995 is affirmed with the modification that petitioner Edgardo C. Nolasco is adjudged as Mayor
of Meycauyan, Bulacan in view of the disqualification of Florentino P. Blanco. No costs.
SO ORDERED.

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9. G.R. No.

204819 April 8, 2014

G.R. No. 204934

G.R. No. 204957

G.R. No. 205003

EXPEDITO A. BUGARIN, JR., Petitioner,

G.R. No. 205043

G.R. No. 205138

G.R. No. 205478

G.R. No. 205491

G.R. No. 205720

G.R. No. 206355

G.R. No. 207111

G.R. No. 207172

G.R. No. 207563

ALMARIM CENTI TILLAH and ABDULHUSSEIN M. KASHIM, Petitioners,

(16) Petition-In-Intervention,34 filed by Buhay Hayaang Yumabong (B UHAY) , an accredited political

• The RH Law violates Natural Law.53

The Status Quo Ante

(Population, Contraceptive and Reproductive Health Laws

Prior to the RH Law

Prayer of the Petitioners - Maintain the Status Quo

1] Power of Judicial Review

2] Actual Case or Controversy

6] One Subject/One Title Rule

II. SUBSTANTIVE: Whether the RH law is unconstitutional:

3] Freedom of Religion and the Right to Free Speech

5] Freedom of Expression and Academic Freedom

9] Delegation of Authority to the FDA

10] Autonomy of Local Govemments/ARMM

The Power of Judicial Review

Actual Case or Controversy

Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness.101 A

The Court is not persuaded.

One Subject-One Title

1-The Right to Life

Position of the Respondents

The Court's Position

Plain and Legal Meaning

Intent of the Framers

When is the moment of conception?

Upon further inquiry, it was asked:

Mr. Villegas: Yes, the ovum is fertilized by the sperm.

As emphasized by the Framers of the Constitution:

Mr. Azcuna: Yes, to the extent that it is after the fertilization.

Mr. Gascon: Thank you, Mr. Presiding Officer.156

So, there is no life to be protected.

Under Section 12, yes.

So you have no objection to condoms?

Not under Section 12, Article II.

Even if there is already information that condoms sometimes have porosity?

Conclusion: The Moment of Conception is Reckoned from

The RH Law and Abortion

(3) Proscription of abortion and management of abortion complications;

The RH Law and Abortifacients

Section 4. Definition of Terms - x x x x

(a) Induces abortion; or

(b) Induces the destruction of a fetus inside the mother's womb; or

Proviso Under Section 9 of the RH Law

Abortifacients under the RH-IRR

Section 3.0l (a) of the IRR, however, redefines "abortifacient" as:

Again in Section 3.0lG) of the RH-IRR, "contraceptive," is redefined, viz: