Journal of Personality and Social Psychology Copyright 1991 by ihe American Psychological Associaiion, Inc.

1991, Vol.60, No. 2, 241-253 0022-3514/91/S3.O0

Close Relationships as Including Other in the Self

Arthur Aron, Elaine N. Aron, Michael Tudor, and Greg Nelson
University of California, Santa Cruz

The cognitive significance of being in a close relationship is described in terms of including other in
the self (in Lewin's sense of overlapping regions of the life space and in James's sense of the self as
resources, perspectives, and characteristics). Experiment 1, adapting Liebrand's (1984) decom-
posed-game procedures, found less self/other difference in allocations of money to a friend than to
a stranger, regardless of whether Ss expected other to know their allocations. Experiment 2, adapt-
ing Lord's (1987) procedures, found that Ss recalled fewer nouns previously imaged with self or
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mother than nouns imaged with a nonclose other, suggesting that mother was processed more like
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self than a stranger. Experiment 3, adapting self-schema, reaction-time procedures (eg., Markus,
1977), found longer latencies when making "me/not me" decisions for traits that were different
between self and spouse versus traits that were similar for both, suggesting a self/other confusion
with spouse.

During the 1980s, close-relationship research expanded rap-
idly, rating its own Handbook (Duck, 1988) and its own Annual
Review of Psychology chapter (Clark & Reis, 1988). Much of the
research in this area does not explicitly define what is meant by
a close relationship. However, the behavioral, systemic defini-
tion offered by Kelley et al. (1983) has been widely influential.
It focuses on mutual influence, interdependence, and degree of
interconnectedness of activities. This approach recently served
as the basis for the development of a measure of interpersonal-
closeness behavior (Berscheid, Snyder, & Omoto, 1989a,
1989b), which focuses on time spent together, diversity of shared
activities, and perceived influence of other over one's own deci-
sions. (Maxwell, 1985, also developed a behavioral measure of
closeness, which is based on a more general review of the close-
relationship literature.)
There has been much less consensus about the cognitive sig-
nificance of such behavioral interdependence for each person
in a close relationship. Yet a number of relevant phenomena
have been observed, mostly falling into one of three overlap-
ping categories:
1. Closeness as a changed resource allocation strategy. Kelley
and Thibaut (1978; Kelley, 1983) saw the cognitive conse-
quences for the members of a close relationship as a transforma-
Preliminary analyses of some of the data in this article were pre-
sented at the 1987 meeting of the Western Psychological Association in
Long Beach, California; the 1987 Iowa Conference on Personal Rela-
tionships in Iowa City; the 1988 meeting of the Western Psychological
Association in San Francisco; the 1988 International Conference on
Interaction and Close Relationships in Nags Head, North Carolina;
and the 1988 International Conference on Personal Relationships in
Vancouver, British Columbia, Canada.
We are grateful to Jennifer Collins, Mary Dundon, Frank Myers,
Elena Quintana, Paul Sanders, David Verdugo, and Tanya Webber for
their assistance in conducting this research and to Anthony Pratkanis
for his suggestions on the article.
Correspondence concerning this article should be addressed to
Arthur Aron, Kerr Hall, University of California, Santa Cruz, Califor-
nia 95064.
241
tion of each member's two-person outcome matrix (that is, how
rewards or costs to partner are expected to affect self). Specifi-
cally, Kelley and Thibaut argued that members of a close rela-
tionship each have a pattern of perceived interdependence of
outcomes in which partner's and joint benefits are expected in
the long run to benefit self. Similarly, Clark and Mills (1979)
described a close relationship as having a communal character,
in which the partners are each motivated to act for the needs of
the other, regardless of the expected reciprocal outcome for the
self. This general approach is also similar to the empathy model
for explaining prosocial behavior andfindingsshowing greater
helping for those with whom the person is in a close relation-
ship (e.g., Clark, 1983). Wegner (1980) suggested that empathy
may "stem in part from a basic confusion between ourselves
and others" (p. 133), which he considered may arise from an
initial lack of differentiation between self and caregiver in in-
fancy (Hoffman, 1976).
2. Closeness as a changed actor/observer perspective. Several
current social psychological approaches emphasize differences
between the perspective people have of their own versus others'
behavior; some of the associated research suggests that such
differences are less when other is in a close relationship to self.
For example, actor-observer discrepancies in attributional pro-
cesses (Jones & Nisbett, 1971) appear to be less when other is in
a close relationship to self (e.g., Sande, Goethals, & Radloff,
1988). Another approach emphasizes the categorization of self
and close other(s) into a single cognitive category (e.g., Hogg &
Turner, 1987), extending ideas originally developed in the con-
text of the in-group/out-group distinction in intergroup rela-
tions. A number of otherfindingsalso suggest a change in per-
spective regarding memory processes. Brenner (1973) found
that memory of a mate's or romantic partner's performance in a
laboratory task was intermediate between memory of one's
own and memory of a stranger's performance. Bower and Gilli-
gan (1979) found that associating trait adjectives with remem-
bered episodes in one's mother's life facilitated later recall
equally well as when they were associated with remembered
episodes in one's own life and that a comparison between associ-
ating traits with Walter Cronkite versus with self yielded much
 242 ARON, ARON, TUDOR, AND NELSON
better recall for the self condition. Festinger, Pepitone, and
Newcomb (1952) found that ability to distinguish who said what
when remembering a group interaction is poorer when one is
ego involved in the group interaction. The more general idea
that people in close relationships experience a sense of we-ness
(eg., Hatfield, 1982; McDonald, 1981), an idea reminiscent of
Heider's (1958) concept of a cognitive "unit relation" is also
relevant.
3. Closeness as vicariously sharing other's characteristics.
This idea is traditionally emphasized in Freudian notions of
identification. Although identification is mainly associated
with parent-child closeness, it has also been used in other con-
texts. For example, Bank and Kahn (1982) used identification
to describe lifelong sibling relationships, and Reik (1944) ar-
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gued that people seek romantic partners who possess those
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characteristics lacking in their own ego ideal to attain those
characteristics indirectly. In conceptually related social psycho-
logical work, Tesser (1988) showed that under conditions in
which one is not competing with one's partner, one is more
likely to reflect the pleasure of a partner's achievement if that
partner is "close." And Deutsch and Mackesy (1985) interpreted
the established findings of self-partner similarities in close re-
lationships as because of mutual influence on each other's self-
schemata, creating an overlap of traits between them.
In the preceding attempt to extract the existing literature's
understanding of cognition in close relationships, we found ei-
ther approaches that emphasize interaction in close relation-
ships, with cognition as a secondary focus, or approaches that
emphasize social cognition more generally, with cognition rele-
vant to close relationships as a secondary focus. These ap-
proaches represent a considerable diversity of methodologies
and theoretical orientations. Yet, although it has not been recog-
nized or articulated, there is a remarkable overarching commu-
nality of theme: In each case, these approaches yield results or
descriptions regarding close relationships that fall on a contin-
uum, with their findings about self-cognition or typical de-
scriptions of self-cognition at one end and their findings or
typical descriptions of cognitions about strangers at the other.
These in-between results and descriptions arise, we think, be-
cause much of our cognition about the other in a close relation-
ship is cognition in which the other is treated as self or confused
with self—the underlying reason being a self/other merging or,
as Aron and Aron (1986) put it, "including others in the self"
(P. 19).
Of course, this general idea has been expressed by a variety of
theorists. For example, the idea of close relationships as includ-
ing other in the self is elegantly expressed in Levinger and
Snoek's (1972) Venn diagrams, an adapted version of which is
shown in Figure 1. A more complex version was proposed by
Lewin (1948, p. 90), who diagrammed relationships within the
life space in terms of differing degrees of overlap between the
differentiated region that represents the self and the region that
to the self represents the partner.
This general notion of overlapping selves involves an under-
standing similar to what Greenwald and Pratkanis (1984) call
the "collective" aspect of self. It is also related to Ickes, Tookc,
Stinson, Baker, and Bissonnette's (1988) idea of "intersubjec-
tivity," which Ickes and his colleagues made vivid by citing
Merleau-Ponty's (1945) description of a close relationship as a
Figure 1. Pictorial representation of including other in the self in a
close relationship. Adapted from Attraction in Relationship: A New
Look at Interpersonal Attraction (p. 5) by G Levinger and J. D. Snoek,
1972, Marristown, New Jersey: General Learning Press. Copyright
1972 by Levinger and Snoek. Adapted by permission.
"double being" and Schutz's (1970) reference to two people "liv-
ing in each other's subjective contexts of meaning" (p. 167). In a
similar vein, Bakan (1966) wrote about "communion" in the
context of his expansion on Buber's (1937) "I-thou" relation-
ship.
The principle is that in a close relationship, the person acts as
if some or all aspects of the partner are partially the person's
own. (There may in addition be some sense of a general in-
crease of fusion of self and other.) Aron and Aron (1986) empha-
sized that three aspects of self seem to be involved in this pro-
cess: resources, perspectives, and characteristics. This categori-
zation relies in part on James's (1890/1948) influential division
of the "empirical self " into material, social, and spiritual—the
latter meaning typical styles of thinking or what Greenwald
and Pratkanis (1984) described as self-processes or procedural
knowledge. These three categories of aspects of self correspond
in a general way to the three categories of cognitive implications
of closeness suggested in the previous literature, as reviewed
earlier. Specifically, to the extent a partner is perceived as part
of one's self, allocation of resources is communal (because bene-
fiting other is benefiting self), actor/observer perspective differ-
ences are lessened, and other's characteristics become
one's own.
This approach is also generally consistent with much current
work on intimacy, a concept often considered virtually synony-
mous with closeness (e.g., Helgeson, Shaver, & Dyer, 1987). For
example, Reis and Shaver's (1988) integration of previous re-
search findings emphasized the centrality of the exchange of
self-relevant information, and McAdam's (1988) integration ar-
gued that most definitions of intimacy "converge on the central
idea of sharing that which is inmost with others" (p. 18).
More generally still, a wide variety of thinkers on close rela-
tionships use metaphors such as union and attachment. Bataille
(1962) expressed it dramatically: "Between one being and an-
other there is a gulf, a discontinuity" (p. 12). "What we desire is
to bring into a world founded on discontinuity all the continuity
such a world can sustain" (p. 19). Jung (1925/1959) emphasized
the role of relationship partners as providing unavailable
aspects of self, so as to help make the self whole. Maslow(1967)
took it for granted that "beloved people can be incorporated
into the self " (p. 103). And McCall (1974) described attachment
as "incorporation of . . . [the other's] actions and reac-
 CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS AS INCLUDING OTHER IN THE SELF
tions . . . into the content of one's various conceptions of the
self" (p. 219). Finally, the related notion of "possessing" the
other (you are mine; I am yours) has been part of classic system-
atic treatments of love (e.g., Berl, 1924; Freud, 1921/1951;
Grant, 1976). As Reik (1949) put it, when we love we desire "to
own the other person" (p. 73).
Clearly there is ample precedent for thinking of close rela-
tionships as including other in the self. However, this idea has
not been made explicit and treated seriously as a conceptual
framework for either forming an integrated understanding of
existing relevant social psychology research or for generation of
new research.
In fact, in spite of the many roots of the idea and the large
body of data consistent with it, this understanding of close rela-
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tionships as including other in the self represents a radically
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different approach from the exchange, psychoanalytic, role and
systems approaches that have overwhelmingly dominated
thinking in thefield(see Aron & Aron, 1986, for a review). And
the data cited earlier that are consistent with this view were
from studies not explicitly designed to examine hypotheses de-
rived from this position and were each conducted and under-
stood within the confines of particular, different methodologi-
cal traditions. Thus the purpose of the present article is to illus-
trate the fruitfulness of this approach of considering close
relationships in terms of including other in the self: to demon-
strate its ability to generate original hypotheses that can be
rigorously operationalized using highly diverse methodologies
and its ability to yield results supportive of those hypotheses.
The present research effort was originally suggested by Aron
and Aron's (1986) self-expansion model, which holds that peo-
ple are motivated to enter and maintain close relationships to
expand the self by including the resources, perspectives, and
characteristics of the other in the self. The model is primarily
motivational; previous research on the model (Aron, Aron, &
Allen, 1989; Aron, Dutton, Aron, & Iverson, 1989; McKenna,
1989; Paris, 1990; Rousar, 1990) has examined its implications
in this context. Nevertheless, the model also clearly implies that
a cognitive inclusion of other in the self actually occurs and
shapes the way information is processed about the develop-
ment, maintenance, and dissolution of relationships. However,
this article is not specifically focused on the self-expansion
model but on the general paradigm of viewing close relation-
ships in terms of including other in the self.
The precise nature of what it means to have included other
into self, in terms of cognitive structure, is probably multifold.
For example, cognitive representations of self and other might
contain common elements or might occupy overlapping re-
gions of a cognitive matrix, and access to them might follow
similar pathways. However, before sorting out these particulars
of how including other in the self comes about or even about its
precise cognitive structure, thefirststep is to consider whether
an inclusion of other in the self—in the general sense we have
described of a lessened self/other distinction influencing behav-
ior and cognition—actually occurs when examined with studies
specifically designed for the purpose and using very diverse
methodologies. It was to this end that the present research was
addressed.
The experiments reported in this article focused on each of
the three general aspects of the partner that Aron and Aron
243
(1986) and others suggest to be included in the self in close
relationships: resources, perspective, and characteristics. In
each case, we took a particular successful existing research par-
adigm that emphasized self/other differences and adapted it to
test whether the self/other difference was reduced when self and
other were in a close relationship. Also, different types of close
relationships (friendship, parent-child, marriage) were used in
the several experiments.
Thus, Experiment 1 used a modified version of Liebrand's
(1984) decomposed-game measure, comparing allocations of
money to self or other under conditions in which other was
either a stranger, a friendly acquaintance, or a best friend. Ex-
periment 2 adapted Lord's (1987) procedure, comparing free
recall of nouns originally imaged in connection with either self,
mother, or a nonclose other. (Lord, 1987, conceptualized self/
other differences in his paradigm as resulting from habitual
differences infigure/groundperspective, so that our prediction
was that mother-imaged words would function most like self-
imaged words.) Finally, Experiment 3 adapted the reaction-time
procedure used by Markus (1977), Rogers, Kuiper, and Kirker
(1977), and others to compare latencies in making me/not me
choices for trait adjectives differentially relevant to self, spouse,
and a nonclose other. (The idea was that there should be more
confusions, hence slower reaction times, for traits that are true
of spouse but not of self or true of self but not of spouse.)
Although it may seem possible to interpret the results of any
one of these experiments within a narrower theoretical context,
it is the set of studies as a whole that is intended to show the
utility of the inclusion-of-other-in-the-self approach.
Experiment 1
We argued earlier that to the extent other is included in the
self, other's resources are self *s resources. Thus people in a close
relationship should make less of a distinction between self and
other when allocating resources between self and other. Further-
more, because this lessened self/other difference is suggested to
result from perceiving other's resources as one's own (as op-
posed to expecting direct reciprocation of benefits), it should
occur regardless of whether self believes other will be aware of
the choices self makes.
Experiment 1 explored these proposals using a modified ver-
sion of a procedure originally developed by Liebrand (1984).
Liebrand^ decomposed-game procedure was intended to ex-
tract the key elements of typical social psychology game inter-
action tasks. On a computer screen, subjects were presented
with a series of binary choices involving allocating money to
themselves or another person. Each choice was between two
scenarios, each scenario involving an allocation to self and
other. For example, thefirstcomputer screen might show Alter-
native A as self gaining $14.50 and other losing $3.90 and Alter-
native B as self gaining $16.00 and other losing $7.50. The series
of choices included a balanced set of alternatives presented in a
randomized order.
Using this procedure, Liebrand (1984) found that people clas-
sified into different groups on the basis of their relative alloca-
tions to self and other behaved in the ways predicted from his
theory in laboratory 7-person and 20-person social dilemma
situations involving real money and a considerable amount of
 244 ARON, ARON, TUDOR, AND NELSON
experimental realism. In another study, Liebrand, Jansen, Rij-
ken, and Suhre (1986) found that subjects in different groupings
behaved in predicted ways regarding reciprocation of an other's
strategy and emphasis on morality (vs. power) in a series of
ratings of self and other. Other researchers (e.g., Kuhlman &
Marshello, 1975) also used simplified game procedures with
successful results.
Our adaptation of Liebrand's (1984) procedure did not use
his classifications but instead emphasized differences between
experimental conditions in which identifications of who the
other was and whether the other would know the subject's
choices were systematically manipulated. Following the logic
noted earlier, we expected that the difference between self- and
other-allocations would be least when other was their best
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friend, intermediate when other was a friendly acquaintance,
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and greatest when other was a stranger. We also expected that
the pattern would be largely unaffected by whether subjects
assumed other would or would not know the subject^ choices.
Method
Twenty-four students participated in the experiment in return for
research participation credit for a lower division psychology course.
The computer presentation was based on a 24-choice version of the
decomposed-game procedure provided to us by Liebrand in the form
of a Pascal program on a computer disk. We modified the program
slightly, so that the entire series was presented six times {each time with
the 24 choices in a different random order). Prior to each series, sub-
jects were instructed about whom to think of as the other in their
choices—either their best friend, a particular friendly acquaintance,
or a stranger—and whether they should assume this other would or
would not know their allocation choices. Thus each subject completed
an entire set of 24 binary choices six times, making a 3 (other is close
friend, friendly acquaintance, or stranger) X 2 (other would or would
not know subject's choices) within-subject design. Six sequences were
used: They included all the permutations of the 3 x 2 design that also
fitted the requirement (to minimize subjects' confusion) that subjects
first always completed a friend, an acquaintance, and a stranger series
(the order of the three varying over subjects), all three with other know-
ing (or other not knowing), then completed the remaining three series,
keeping friend, acquaintance, and stranger in the same order, for other
does not know (or other does know). Subjects were randomly assigned
to sequences with the restriction that each of the six sequences was
completed by two men and two women.
Results and Discussion
None of the various tests for order or gender interactions with
the main independent variables were significant. Thus all fur-
ther analyses were combined over order and gender, yielding a
3 x 2 repeated measures analysis of variance. The dependent
variable was allocations to self minus allocations to other. (Us-
ing alternative measures—allocations to other alone, to self
alone, or Liebrand's, 1984, "angle vector" measure—all yielded
the same patterns of means and statistical significance as the
self-minus-other measure used here.)
Means are shown in Table 1. There was a clear main effect for
type of other, F(2, 21) = 14.60, p < .01. Bonferroni ts (Dunn's
test) confirmed the predicted pattern of least difference be-
tween self and best friend, intermediate difference between self
and friendly acquaintance, and greatest difference between self
Table 1
Mean Allocations to Self Minus Allocations to Other
Target person
Best Friendly Disliked
Condition friend acquaintance Stranger other
Experiment 1
Other will know -2.95 6.14 12.76
Other will not know -0.54 8.50 13.72
Follow-Up 1
Other will know -1.05 15.16
Other will not know -0.74 18.81
Follow-Up 2
Other will not know 2.92 20.52 24.64
Note. The conditions varied regarding whether other would or would
not know subject's allocations. For Experiment 1, n = 24. Follow-Up 1
involved real money (n = 13). Follow-Up 2 involved a disliked other
and stranger. Also as expected, neither the main effect nor in-
teraction was statistically significant (both Fs < 1) for whether
or not the other was assumed to know the subject's choices.
(Dawes's, 1980, review of the social dilemmas literature noted
that some game-type studies have reported greater cooperation
for public-disclosure than for anonymous conditions, but
Dawes also noted that such differences were typically small.)
That these results were consistent with the expected pattern
was particularly encouraging as a first examination of the util-
ity of the inclusion-of-other-in-self approach to closeness be-
cause a continuum over three levels of closeness had been dem-
onstrated. Nevertheless, the procedures used were somewhat
abstract. Although scores on the Liebrand measure and related
procedures have correlated with appropriate behaviors under
somewhat more realistic conditions, on the surface at least the
procedure is fairly far removed from interactions involving real
and significant resources. Furthermore, the manipulation of
whether other knows may have been weak, and there was no
check of whether it was understood by the subjects.
Follow-Up Experiment Using Real Money
To address these issues, we attempted to replicate the experi-
ment under more realistic conditions—specifically, using allo-
cations of real money to real others—plus giving more empha-
sis to the instructions involving the manipulation of other
knows or not, and we included checks on whether subjects un-
derstood the manipulation instructions.
The procedures used were identical to the original experi-
ment except for the followingfivechanges. First, subjects were
informed at the outset that their choices involved real money,
and various tactics were used to assure that subjects believed
the payment would be made. (Subjects at the end of the study
were paid an average of $8.84 and the money sent to friends
averaged $5.10 per friend.) Second, to simplify the experiment,
the friendly acquaintance conditions were not included. Third,
we used an elaborate procedure to make the manipulation for
other would know or other would not know more realistic. At
the outset, each subject addressed an envelope to his or her best
 CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS AS INCLUDING OTHER IN THE SELF
friend living out of town. The experimenter then carefully ex-
plained to the subject that after the experiment this best friend
would be mailed a check with a letter breaking the total amount
into (a) the amount the subject allocated to the best friend in the
condition in which the subject was told the friend would know
how much was allocated to the friend, (b) an amount allocated
to the friend by another subject who did not know this friend
(this would be another subject's stranger-will-know condition),
and (c) an amount consisting of the sum of own friend-will-not-
know and another subject's stranger-will-not-know conditions,
which would be described in the letter as coming from two
subjects in the experiment, (The letters and checks were all
subsequently sent as promised.) Fourth, to reemphasize the real-
ity of the situation, the instructions prior to each series actually
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included the name of either their best friend or, in the stranger
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condition, the best friend of another subject (we checked to be
sure the subject did not know this person). Finally,fifth,checks
were made on whether the subject understood and believed the
instructions. After each series, the instructions included a ques-
tion about whether on the previous series, the other would or
would not know how much the subject had allocated to him or
her. (Every subject gave the correct answer on each trial to this
question.) Subjects were also telephoned a week later, before
their friends were sent the letters and money. (All said they had
understood and believed what they had been told during the
experiment.)
As in the main experiment, there were no significant order or
gender effects or interactions. And again, as shown in the mid-
dle rows of Table 1, the pattern of means was as predicted.
There was a main effect for best friend versus stranger, F(\,
12) = 25.55, p < .001, with no significant main or interaction
effect for whether other would or would not know their choices
(bothi%<l).
These data show that the suggested pattern holds using more
realistic conditions. They also give some added support to the
assumption that subjects actually understood and believed that
the other would or would not know their decisions.
Of course, allocating a greater share of money to friends than
strangers is also consistent with findings generated in the con-
text of other theoretical orientations, such as the equity and
exchange approaches (e.g., Austin, 1980; Benton, 1971; Curtis,
1979; Greenberg, 1978,1983; Lerner, 1974). However, in none
of the previous studies we were able to locate did the subject
make allocations to real friends under conditions in which the
other would not know their choices. Furthermore, these studies
were mostly with children and were conducted in the context of
allocating rewards for performance or as part of negotiation.
In any case, the theoretical rationale in studies of this kind
usually either (a) suggest that greater rewards to other result
from other's potential reciprocity (an idea that does not seem to
explain our data, in light of the failure to find any effects for
expecting other to know of one's allocations) or (b) emphasizes a
desire to maintain equity (which also does not seem a reason-
able explanation for our results, because the other in our experi-
ment was not perceived to have exerted any effort in the study).
(Some researchers have also invoked a very unequity-like con-
cept of identification with other as an explanation—an idea
quite consistent with the inclusion-of-other-in-self paradigm.)
However, another logic implicit in some of these studies is that
245
liking or similarity should somehow produce greater alloca-
tions to other. Another follow-up experiment addressed this
issue.
Follow-Up Experiment Using a Disliked Other
We reasoned that if our results were due to the friend being
better liked or more similar, then a disliked other should be
allocated as much less as a liked other is rewarded more. (Given
Rosenbaum's, 1986, findings that dissimilarity has more nega-
tive impact on attraction than similarity has positive impact,
theories associating reward allocation with similarity might
well predict a greater difference between a dissimilar versus
neutral other than between a similar versus neutral other.) On
the other hand, if more money is allocated to a friend because
the friend is included in the self, then there should be little
difference between a disliked other and a stranger, neither of
whom are very much part of the self. Thus we conducted an
experiment comparing allocations to a friend, stranger, and a
disliked other.
In this experiment, we first had subjects select "the person
with whom you can work least well,** following the instructions
in Fiedler and Chemers's (1974) Least Preferred Coworker
Scale. Subjects then completed the scale, to make this least
preferred other vivid. Then, when subjects came to the disliked-
other condition in the experiment, they were again reminded of
this person, were asked to write this person's initials, and were
asked to complete the next set of computerized allocation deci-
sions about this person. The only remaining difference from the
original experiment was that to save time, only the other-will-
not-know conditions were used. This created a three-condition
(friend vs. stranger vs. disliked other) within-subject design.
The results of this follow-up experiment are shown in the
bottom row of Table 1. Again, there were no interactions of the
target-person factor with order or sex. And, again, there was a
clear overall main effect for who the other was, F(2, 100) -
79.63, p < .001. Also, all differences among the three means
were significant. However, clearly consistent with the inclusion-
of-other-in-the-self idea, but not so obviously with theories that
emphasize liking or similarity, the difference between friend
and stranger was much greater than the difference between
disliked other and stranger, /(54) = 7,47, p < .001. The magni-
tude of the difference is particularly evident if one compares
effect sizes. Using the mean difference divided by the standard
deviation of the difference scores gives an effect size of 1.31 for
the friend-versus-stranger comparison and an effect size of .37
for the disliked-other-versus-stranger comparison. Using pro-
portion of variance accounted for as a measure of effect size
yieldedfiguresof .64 versus .12.
There may well be other alternatives we have not considered.
Nor is this second follow-up study itself free of alternative expla-
nations. For example, the friends may be liked more than least
preferred coworkers are disliked—though it seems unlikely
there would be as much difference as was seen in the effect-size
comparisons. Also, as noted earlier, there are reasons to expect
generally greater impacts of disliking than liking. More gener-
ally, it is never made explicit, either in the present studies or in
the equity-type studies cited earlier, why liking or feeling simi-
 246 ARON, ARON, TUDOR, AND NELSON
lar to someone should make us want to give them more money
when they do not even know we are giving it. It seems most
reasonable that liked or similar others are perceived as some-
how more closely associated with the self and that the enhance-
ment of the other enhances the self.
In any case, taking the original and the two follow-up experi-
ments together appears to give a reasonable basis of support for
the notion that for whatever reason, we treat close others as if
their resources were, to some extent, our own. Furthermore,
what makes these studies particularly salient and novel is that
in conjunction with Experiments 2 and 3, which are quite dif-
ferent in methods, they all converge on this inclusion-of-other-
in-the-self theme.
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Experiment 2
As noted in the Introduction, one aspect of including other in
the self in a close relationship is viewing the world from the
perspective of the other (Aron & Aron, 1986); several theoreti-
cal notions and some data support this view. For example, Nis-
bett, Caputo, Legant, and Marecek (1973, Study 3) found that
the extent that people were willing to make dispositional attri-
butions about their friends was less the longer their relationship
with the close friend (r = —.45, p < .01). Another, more recent
study of actor/observer attributional differences, conducted by
Sande et al. (1988). bears even more directly on the inclusion-
of-other-in-self approach. These researchers first demonstrated
an actor/observer difference in which people more often attrib-
uted to themselves than to others both poles of pairs of opposite
traits (serious/carefree, energetic/relaxed, etc.) when given a
choice of the first, the second, both, or neither. They then pro-
ceeded to show that this self/other distinction was less when
other was liked than when other was disliked. (Sande et al. also
compared familiar versus unfamiliar others. There wasa differ-
ence between familiar and unfamiliar when both were liked but
not when both were disliked.) We replicated Sande et al.'s proce-
dure in our own lab, modifying it to permit a comparison of self
to others that represented different degrees of liking (as op-
posed to liking versus disliking). The 24 subjects we tested
(using the 11 adjective pairs in Sande et al.'s Experiment 2) chose
both poles for a mean of 4.50 adjective pairs for themselves,
3.46 for their best friend, and 2.71 for a friendly acquaintance,
F(2, 4 6 ) - 6 . 0 2 , p<.0\.
However, none of the existing studies relate as directly to
closeness as might be desired for the present purposes (which
they were not intended to serve). Furthermore, we felt that
showing a decrease in a different and perhaps less obvious ac-
tor/observer discrepancy would be a stronger demonstration of
the usefulness of the idea that in a close relationship the other's
perspective is included in the self. Lord's (1980,1987) paradigm
seemed tofitthis description. Lord showed that nouns remem-
bered by constructing imagined scenes in which the self inter-
acts with the object the noun represents are recalled less well
than nouns remembered by constructing such scenes involving
someone else.
Specifically, Lord (1980, Experiment 2; 1987) presented sub-
jects with a series of 60 concrete nouns (taken from Craik &
Tulving's, 1975, experiment) projected on the screen for 10 s
each, during which time subjects were instructed to "form as
vivid and interesting a mental image as possible of yourself [or a
target person] interacting with" (1987, p. 447) what the noun
referred to (for example, a mule). After the 10 s, the screen went
blank, and subjects wrote down their image for 20 s before the
next slide appeared. Subjects followed along on a sheet which
told them for each slide what target person to associate with the
slide (the order of target persons was randomized over subjects).
After the entire series was presented, the sheet and the images
they wrote down were removed, and subjects were given 5 min
to write down, in any order, as many of the nouns as they could
recall. Lord found that nouns imaged interacting with self were
recalled significantly less well than nouns imaged interacting
with a well-known other such as Johnny Carson or then-presi-
dent Ronald Reagan.
Lord (1980,1987) interpreted these results in terms of a fig-
ure/ground difference between one's experience of self and
other when acting in the world. Of course, if this difference
were entirely perceptual (as suggested, for example, by Storms's,
1973, study), then there would be no reason to expect that even
a person with whom one was extremely close would be per-
ceived differently than a prominent entertainment or political
personality. However, we reasoned that if this figure/ground
difference represented a different way of understanding and
appreciating the world, then if other were included in one's
inner world, other should become more like ground and less
like figure—that is, more like the self. Thus this figure/ground
idea seems to capture very well the notion of including other's
perspective in the self.
Actually, in Lord's original study (1980, Experiment 2) one of
the targets that subjects used was their father. The mean recall
of father-associated nouns was intermediate between self and
Walter Cronkite, as the inclusion-of-other-in-self paradigm
would suggest, but this difference was not statistically signifi-
cant. However, we felt that father was not an ideal operational-
ization of a close other (nor had Lord intended it as such, of
course), because college-student subjects in general may not be
very close to their father (\buniss & Smollar, 1985), particularly
in an era in which a great many of them may have been raised in
mother-only households. Thus we reasoned that if a target per-
son were closer, the difference between a media personality and
the close person might prove significant.
Therefore, Experiment 2 attempted to replicate Lord's (1980,
1987) procedures using as targets the subject's self, a prominent
entertainment personality, and their mother—a person who
should be highly close for most subjects. And because college-
age women are likely to be closer to their mother than are
college-age men (Youniss & Smollar, 1985), only women were
used. To further ensure closeness, we used only women who
had been living at home with their mother in the last 1.5 years
(the study was conducted in the fall quarter withfirst-and sec-
ond-year students). The singer and movie actress Cher was se-
lected as the entertainment personality, since she was a woman
and about the same age as most of the subjects' mothers. Cher
had performed in several successful recent movies and had won
an Academy Award that year. None of the lower division under-
graduate women we pretested had any difficulty forming an
image of Cher.
 CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS AS INCLUDING OTHER IN THE SELF
Method
Twenty female students served as subjects in return for research par-
ticipation credit for their introductory psychology course. All proce-
dures were identical to those used by Lord (1987; personal correspon-
dence, April 1988), except that the three target persons, as noted in the
previous paragraph, were self, mother, and Cher. Also, at the outset,
subjects were asked if they were familiar with Cher and how she
looked. (All said they were.)
Results and Discussion
Order of presentation did not interact with target person.
The pattern of means for the different target persons was as
predicted, with Cher (8.95 nouns recalled) greater than mother
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(7.15 recalled), f(19) = 2.43, p < .05. Also, the difference be-
This document is copyrighted by the American Psychological Association or one of its allied publishers.
tween mother and self (6.80 recalled) was so small that it was not
statistically significant (/ < 1).
Follow-Up Experiment
One potential alternative explanation is that more nouns
were recalled in the Cher condition because she is a more vivid
image than one's mother. We were also interested in whether
the degree of mother/nonclose other difference would correlate
with degree of perceived closeness to mother and whether any
such relation could be sorted out from degree of perceived famil-
iarity with or similarity to mother.
Thus we conducted a follow-up experiment in which subjects
formed images of self, mother, and, instead of Cher, "a female
friend or relative of your mother's who is about your mother's
age and to whom you are not very close." Also, at the end of this
experiment, subjects completed a brief questionnaire in which
they indicated how close, familiar, and similar they felt to their
mother, each recorded on a 13-point scale ranging from very
distant to very close (or very unfamiliar to very familiar, etc.) The
experiment was conducted during a regular class meeting of a
summer session lower division psychology class. Everyone in
the class volunteered to participate (2 subjects, however, were
not included because their mothers were deceased). In all other
respects (instructions, nouns, times, randomization of target-
person orders, etc.), the procedures were identical to the origi-
nal experiment.
Of the 14 subjects who participated, 7 had lived with their
mother within the last 2 years. The pattern of means for these 7
subjects was about the same as for the original experiment:
friend of mother (6.86 nouns recalled) greater than mother (4.86
recalled), ?(6) = 2.90, p < .05; no significant difference between
mother and self (5.14 recalled; t < 1).
The mother/mother's friend difference in nouns recalled
tended to be strongly correlated with rated closeness to mother
(r = .56, p <. 10) but only weakly correlated with similarity (r =
. 13) or familiarity (r= .16) with mother.
The possibility that the results of these experiments were due
to familiarity bears some further discussion. Although Lord
did not conceptualize his results as due to familiarity, the idea
has played a role in other studies, including the Sande et al.
(1988) study noted earlier. The low correlation of rated mother
familiarity with the Cher/mother differences in words recalled
247
makes such explanations unlikely but does not completely rule
them out—both because of the small sample size, which makes
the difference between the correlations only marginally signifi-
cant, and because self-ratings of familiarity may not be accu-
rate. On the other hand, one possible explanation for why famil-
iarity might create differences in the Lord task is that a familiar
other would require less effort to image and therefore nouns
associated with the familiar other would be less well recalled.
This explanation, however, seems unlikely to us because it
should be easiest to form a vivid image of the entertainment
personality who is known primarily as an image object (indeed
this is why the follow-up experiment was conducted). Another
possible familiarity explanation is that one's mother is easier to
image because she has been observed more often in familiar
surroundings. However, this explanation also seems unlikely
because in the follow-up experiment, the comparison was to
mother's friend, who presumably would have been viewed in
the same familiar settings as the mother. Nevertheless, the fa-
miliarity explanation can probably not be discounted entirely
on the basis of the existing data. Of course, from the general
point of view of demonstrating the usefulness of conceptualiz-
ing closeness as including other in the self, it does not matter
whether any such pattern is due to familiarity, because familiar-
ity is an almost universal concomitant of closeness. On the
other hand, the likelihood in our view that familiarity does not
explain the present results suggests that closeness may operate
more directly on cognitive processing.
In any case, these follow-up results together with the original
Experiment 2 data suggest, once again, that subjects treated
someone with whom they were in a close relationship more as if
that person were somehow themselves. Moreover, this result is
particularly interesting because it is about a nonobvious phe-
nomenon that emphasizes the figure/ground difference be-
tween self's and other's perspective.
Experiment 3
The third aspect of the other suggested to be included in the
self in a close relationship is the other's characteristics. A num-
ber of studies support the idea that the self is a highly organized
cognitive structure, in part by demonstrating that in a reaction-
time situation, traits that are highly self-descriptive are recog-
nized as self-descriptive more quickly than are traits that are of
neutral self-descriptiveness (e.g., Markus, 1977). Similarly,
Kuiper (1981) demonstrated that adjectives that were very true
and very untrue of self were recognized as such more rapidly
than terms that were more intermediate. One standard proce-
dure in these kinds of studies is that people rate a list of adjec-
tives for their descriptive ness of themselves, take part in a dis-
tracting filler task, then make a series of me/not me reaction-
time choices (or yes/no choices regarding self-relevance). The
effect of faster reaction times for recognizing self-descriptive
traits as true of self has been labeled a descriptiveness effect.
However, another line of research using similar methods (e.g.,
Mueller, Ross, & Heesacker, 1984; Ross, Mueller, & de la Torre,
1986) found that traits that are distinctive to self are recognized
as self-descriptive more slowly than traits that are shared with
others in general (e.g., most students). This has been called a
 248 ARON, AROK, TUDOR, AND NELSON
distinctiveness effect. One study by Mueller, Thompson, and
Dugan (1986) demonstrated that both the descriptiveness and
distinctiveness effects operated independently (i.e., additively).
A possible explanation of the distinctiveness effect is that the
cognitive structure of the self overlaps with the cognitive struc-
ture about the other (or, in the studies in the previous para-
graph, overlaps with the cognitive structure held for people in
general). Thus when a trait is descriptive of self but not other,
there is a bit of confusion in deciding whether it actually repre-
sents the self. We take this line of reasoning one step further. In
the case of a close relationship, in which we suggest other's traits
are included in the self to a substantial extent, there should be a
greater overlap of cognitive structures—hence more confusion
and slower response times.
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Experiment 3 examined this suggestion of slower reaction
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times for traits distinctive from close others. We adapted proce-
dures from the various studies cited earlier of response times to
self-referent traits. Subjects first rated a series of trait adjectives
for their descriptiveness of themselves, their spouse, and an
entertainment personality. After a distracting intermediate
task, they made a series of me/not me reaction-time choices to
these trait words. The prediction was that there would be most
confusion, thus longer response latencies, for trait words that
were different between self and spouse. (Note that in this study,
all responses in the reaction-time task were in the context of
self. This should not be confused with a number of previous
studies, e.g., Keenan & Baillet, 1980, which compared reaction
times for words in which the context of the choice was some-
times self and sometimes some other person.)
Testing this prediction required dividing traits into groups
according to whether they were descriptive or not of self,
spouse, and the entertainment personality. Of the eight possible
combinations of true and false of each of the three people, four
combinations were of interest: (a) traits that were rated as true of
self and spouse but not of entertainment personality (TTF), (b)
traits that were true of self, false of spouse, and true of the
entertainment personality (TFT), (c) traits that were false of self
and spouse but true of the entertainment personality (FFT),
and (d) traits that were false of self, true of spouse, and false of
the entertainment personality (FTF). (The other four combina-
tions—TTT, FFE TFF; and FTT—were not of interest because
they confounded whether a trait was true or false of spouse with
whether it was true or false of the entertainment personality)
The prediction was that subjects would have more confusion,
hence slower reaction time, for the traits in which they differed
from spouse: (b) TFT and (d) FTF.
Method
Subjects were married graduate students attending a social psychol-
ogy seminar at a freestanding psychology professional school. The
research was presented as a nonrequircd opportunity to experience
social cognition research methods. There were 17 students in the semi-
nar, of which all 13 who were married agreed to participate. Their
mean age was 38.4; they had been married a mean of 6.45 years.
Participants first completed an initial questionnaire as they were
waiting for the seminar to begin. Sometime after (allowing 15 min to 2
hr of seminar interaction, functioning as a distracting task), students
were called out of the seminar individually and sent to another room
where they completed the reaction-time portion of the task at a com-
puter terminal.
The initial questionnaire had subjects rate on separate pages each of
three target persons for how much each of 90 traits applied to that
person. The trait adjectives were selected from Anderson's (1968)
norms. They included 20 with likableness ratings above 4.5, 30 with
ratings between 2.0 and 3.8, and 30 with ratings below 1.7. The 90 were
randomly ordered on the page. Subjects responded to each item on a
7-point scale from extremely like {\) the target person to unhkeil). The
target persons were self, spouse, and Bill Cosby. Questionnaires using
the three possible orders of target persons were randomly assigned to
subjects. (However, each subject's order of response was accidentally
not recorded when the response pages were reordered to facilitate data
entry, so no tests of order effects could be conducted for this experi-
ment.)
The computer instructions explained to subjects that they would be
presented with a series of descriptors. Their task was to decide as
quickly as possible for each trait whether that trait applied to them-
selves or not by pressing the A key for "me" or the L key for "not me."
Ten example adjectives were given, then the set of 90 adjectives was
presented three times, each time in a different random order. Each
adjective remained on the screen until the subject pressed one of the
keys. The computer recorded responses and latencies.
Results and Discussion
Adjective ratings were divided at the median, so that those
with ratings of 4 or higher were considered not descriptive (or
false) of the target person and those less than 4 as descriptive (or
true) of the target person. Next the adjectives for each subject
were divided into categories according to their pattern of trues
and falses for the three target persons. Ten (2 men and 8
women) of the 13 subjects had usable responses to at least one of
the traits in each of the four critical categories. Average re-
sponse latencies to traits in each of these four categories were
then computed for each of these subjects.
Table 2 contains the mean response latencies in each cate-
gory. A 2 X 2 repeated measures analysis of variance yielded a
main effect for true versus false, F(l, 9) = 7.82, p < .05, but no
significant interaction, (F < 1). This main effect indicates that
subjects were faster at responding to traits that were true of
themselves than ones that were false of themselves. This is con-
sistent with previous research (Kuiper, 1981; Mueller et aL,
Table 2
Mean Response Times and Errors for Traits Differing
in Their Descriptiveness of Selfand Spouse
Trait
Response time (ms) Proportion of errors
Descriptiveness Same Different Same Different
For self
True 1,023 1,096 .069 .177
False 1,094 1.150 .252 .438
Total 1,059 1,123 .161 .308
Note. Same and different refer to descriptiveness of trait for self and
spouse.
 CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS AS INCLUDING OTHER IN THE SELF
1986). Because there was no interaction, the overall analysis
relevant to our predictions about including the other in the self
could be collapsed into a t test for dependent means between
response latencies to traits in which self and spouse were similar
(TTF and FFT) versus not similar (TFT and FTF). The result,
/(9) = 2.21, p < .05, indicates that subjects were slower respond-
ing to traits that differed between self and spouse. This finding
is consistent with the prediction and can be interpreted as
showing that self and spouse are more closely integrated cogni-
tively than are self and the entertainment personality.
We also analyzed the data for response errors. (A response
was counted as an error if the way the subject had rated it as
self-descriptive or not on the questionnaire received the oppo-
site corresponding me or not me key press.) The analyses for
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response errors (means are shown in Table 2) yielded the same
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pattern of findings as the response latency data: a true-versus-
false-of-self main effect, F(l,9)= 14.85, p< .01; no significant
interaction (F < 1) and a significant difference between traits in
which self was similar versus different from spouse. t(9) = 2.45,
p < .05. This last finding means that there were more errors in
responding to traits on which self and spouse differed—again
consistent with the notion that self and spouse are more closely
integrated cognitively, leading to confusions, than are self and
the entertainment personality.
Note again that these results are different from the findings
demonstrating better memory or faster reaction time for words
associated with close others than with more distant others
(Bower & Gilligan, 1979; Ferguson, Rule, & Carlson, 1983;
Keenan & Baillet, 1980; Kuiper & Rogers, 1979). Although the
results of those studies are also generally consistent with the
closeness-as-inclusion-of-other-in-self paradigm, the present
findings make a more direct case for an actual overlap or confu-
sion of cognitive structures.
Note also that the present findings cannot be accounted for
by there being more positive traits among those attributed to
spouse. The product of Anderson's (1968) likableness norms by
subjects' ratings for each of the 90 traits yielded no significant
difference between spouse and entertainment personality
</<l).
Nor can these findings be accounted for by the traits in the
spouse-similar categories having more extreme ratings of de-
scriptiveness of self. (This would be a confound, because
Mueller et al., 1986, found faster reaction times in self-descrip-
tive situations for words that were previously rated as either very
descriptive or very nondescriptive of self.) If this pattern held,
then a 2 X 2 repeated measures analysis of variance comparing
the self-ratings of the words in the four crucial categories should
have yielded a significant True/False X Similarity-to-Spouse
interaction effect. In fact, the interaction was not significant
(F<i).
More generally, the question arises as to whether these results
could be due to some other difference in subjects' responses to
the different trait adjectives. For example, those traits rated as
similar to spouse might be more mundane than those rated as
similar to the entertainment personality, and greater mundane-
ness might lead to faster decisions. However, to have influenced
the results of Experiment 3, any characteristic of traits that was
consistently associated with self/spouse similarity would also
249
have had to be one in which (a) the high similarity traits were
more likely to be rated as similar both in terms of their presence
and their absence (because both the FFTs and the TTFs
counted as similar) and (b) the difference between traits with
high and low self/spouse similarity was not due to ratings on the
low similarity traits being less reliable (because in all four pat-
terns used in the comparisons there were two Ts and one F or
one T and two Fs). For example, the possibility that traits se-
lected as more similar between self and spouse are more mun-
dane does not seem to fit with criterion (a): A subject may well
be more likely to have mundane traits that their spouse also has,
but if so they should be less likely to be similar in the sense of
not having mundane traits that their partner also does not have.
(This mundaneness argument, in particular, also seems un-
likely because all the traits were common adjectives.) Indeed, it
is difficult to think of any possible characteristics of trait adjec-
tives that would meet these criteria and still make the adjectives
likely to be rated as similar between self and spouse and that
could be reasonably related to reaction-time responses.
Follow-Up Experiment
An alternative interpretation that did particularly concern us
was the possibility that the present results could have benefited
from using a population of clinical psychology graduate stu-
dents who might be unusually sensitive to trait similarities and
differences with their spouse. Also, we wanted to examine
whether the degree of response-time difference between
spouse-similar and spouse-different traits would vary in rela-
tion to perceived closeness to spouse. Finally, we were con-
cerned that the present results might somehow be dependent on
using an entertainment personality for the nonclose-other trait
ratings.
Thus we conducted a follow-up experiment using a different
population, included a measure of closeness, and used friend of
spouse for the nonclose-other ratings. For this experiment we
contacted people who had responded to a newspaper survey
about marital activities (McKenna, 1989) and who had included
a note with their survey response indicating a willingness to
participate in further research (a recruiting procedure sug-
gested by Shaver & Rubenstein, 1983). Sixteen of those who
responded and came to our laboratory for testing had been
married at least a year and were in either their first or second
marriage. Of these, 10 (6 men and 4 women; mean age, 47.0
years; mean length of marriage, 16.1 years) had usable re-
sponses to at least one trait in each of the four critical catego-
ries. The only other difference from the procedures of the origi-
nal experiment was that because of practical limitations in the
circumstances of testing, we were able to include only a brief
distractor task (completing a questionnaire).
The pattern of means on response times was the same as in
the original experiment. And again, the main effect for true/
false was significant, F(\, 9) = 5.48, p < .05; and the interaction
with whether or not the trait was similar for self and spouse was
not significant (F < 1). The comparison between traits in which
self and spouse were similar versus dissimilar approached but
did not quite attain statistical significance, t(9) = 1.58, p < . 10.
Of course, given the small sample size, this result had a substan-
 250 ARON, ARON, TUDOR, AND NELSON
tial effect size (the mean difference divided by the standard
deviation of the difference scores was .50). It also represented a
replication of an earlier experiment (the effect size for the corre-
sponding comparison was .70), Thus, it seemed not unreason-
able to consider the overall set of results to be supportive of the
prediction and to conclude that with regard to response laten-
cies, it probably did not matter a great deal whether the sample
was a group of psychologists or not or whether the nonclose
other was an entertainment personality or not. It may matter,
however, whether the sample included mostly women. In the
original experiment, 8 of 10 were women; in the follow-up, only
4 of 10 were women. Considering just the women in the follow-
up experiment, even with only 4 subjects, there was a clearly
significant effect (in the expected direction) for response time to
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traits in which spouse and self were similar versus dissimilar,
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t(5) = 3.53, p < .05. On the other hand, there was no obvious
theoretical rationale for expecting a gender difference in this
case, so that the slight statistical tendencies were probably best
not taken very seriously unless subsequent studies replicate the
pattern.
In this follow-up experiment, we also administered the Inclu-
sion of Other in the Self (IOS) Scale (Aron, Aron, & Smolan,
1990), which measures perceived closeness. The IOS Scale asks
subjects to select one of seven diagrams of overlapping circles
(like Figure 1), representing different degrees of overlap, as
most descriptive of their relationship. Aron et al. (1990) found
that the IOS Scale had high levels of reliability, correlated with
other measures of closeness, and predicted whether dating cou-
ples would break up 3 months later. McKenna (1989) and Grif-
fin (1990) both reported that the IOS Scale also correlates
highly with standard measures of marital quality, even after
controlling for measures of social desirability.
Including the IOS Scale permitted us to correlate the self/
spouse similar/dissimilar difference in response times with per-
ceived closeness. The resulting correlation of r = .59, p < .05,
suggests that the more perceived closeness, the greater the over-
lap of cognitive structures between self and spouse—again, a
result quite consistent with the inclusion-of-other-in-self per-
spective. Finally, we examined response errors. This time the
similar/dissimilar difference, although in the predicted direc-
tion, did not even approach statistical significance (/ < 1). Nor
could this result be explained by the smaller number of women
in the sample. However, there was a tendency for closeness to be
correlated in the expected direction with the self/spouse simi-
lar/dissimilar error differences (r - .50, p <. 10). Thus, subjects
in the follow-up may not have been as close to their spouse as
were those in the original experiment. Or this inconsistency
with the original experiment may be due to subjects in the
follow-up going almost immediately from the rating task to the
reaction-time task, so that they were more likely to try to re-
member their responses on the rating tasks. Finally; this group,
which did not consist of psychology graduate students, did
make more errors overall; these may have been largely caused
by unfamiliarity with the traits themselves, so that these errors
masked the systematic distribution of errors by target person.
In considering both Experiment 3 and its follow-up, the ques-
tion of the possible role of familiarity arises again here, as it did
in discussing the results of Experiment 2. Familiarity might
seem particularly salient in this case because familiarity is used
to explain thefindingsin other studies for self-and-other-trait-
rating reaction times (e.g., Kuiper & Rogers, 1979). Also, Srull
and Gaelick (1983) used familiarity to explain their findings,
which are conceptually related to the present study. Srull and
Gaelick assessed the degree of symmetry between similarity
ratings when self versus other is the reference point (how similar
is other to you vs. how similar are you to other). In one of their
studies, they found that symmetry was greater when the self/
other similarity ratings were for mother or father than when
they were for a media personality In their study, familiarity was
a quite reasonable explanation because the greater information
available about a familiar other makes it easier (as compared
with a stranger) for unique differences to come to mind when
other is thefocusand harder for unique differences to come to
mind when self is the focus.
In the present case, the potential influence of familiarity
would seem to be less clear. One reasonable possibility might be
that familiar/familiar comparisons could be more difficult,
making decisions slower, with more errors. Note, however, that
this way of thinking implies that when deciding on whether a
trait is true or not of themselves, subjects implicitly made a
comparison with their spouse.
Thus, this kind of familiarity explanation implies a rather
special cognitive relationship between self and other that goes
beyond the models of mere familiarity proposed in some
previous studies.
In sum, Experiment 3 and its follow-up seem to provide yet
another illustration of the potential hypothesis-generating
value of considering that in a close relationship, people process
information as if the other is partially included in the self. The
present experiment is especially interesting because it applied
the reaction-time social-cognition approach to a topic that had
in the past been studied mainly in the context of clinical theory
and personality testing. And even among studies that focus on
reaction-time or memory differences in relation to own and
other's traits, it was thefirstto look directly at implicit compari-
sons or selfybther confusions when making only self-ratings—
an approach we suspect would not have been generated within
the theoretical atmosphere in which most social-cognition stud-
ies have been conducted.
General Discussion
Taken together, these various studies, applying a variety of
methods and using different types of close relationships, illus-
trate the utility of viewing close relationships as including other
in the self. The results of Experiment 1 and its follow-up experi-
ments suggest that regardless of whether the other will know of
self's decision, differences in allocation of money to self and
other decrease as other is closer to the self, comparing others
who are best friend, acquaintance, and stranger. The results of
Experiment 2 and its follow-up suggest that differences in mem-
ory that is based on images of self versus others interacting with
an object noun to be remembered are less when other is close to
self. (Other was varied by comparing images made with mother
versus either an entertainment personality or a friend of one's
mother.) The results of Experiment 3 and its follow-up suggest
that cognitive representations of self and other are more closely
interconnected when other is in a close relationship, as shown
 CLOSE RELATIONSHIPS AS INCLUDING OTHER IN THE SELF
by patterns of response latencies in making me/not me deci-
sions about traits previously rated as descriptive of self, spouse,
or either an entertainment personality or a friend of spouse.
Together thesefindingslend support to the idea that the cogni-
tive implications of being in a close relationship are that other is
included in self, taking into account the three central aspects of
self originally emphasized by James (1890/1948) and described
by Aron and Aron (1986) in terms of resources, perspectives,
and characteristics. We want to emphasize that what is impor-
tant here is not so much the results of each study individually,
but of the set as a whole.
The procedures used in the experiments reported here also
suggest new ways to look at closeness—as cognitive closeness,
rather than objective interaction patterns (Berscheid et al.,
This article is intended solely for the personal use of the individual user and is not to be disseminated broadly.
1989a, 1989b; Maxwell, 1985). They also provide theoretically
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meaningful experimental procedures that could serve as crite-
ria for validity testing of measures of closeness. Finally, we hope
that this study will inspire a larger number of researchers to
respond to Clark and Reis's (1988) call for more experiments
that use laboratory methods in the study of ongoing close rela-
tionships.
The inclusion-of-other-in-the-self approach to closeness sug-
gests many other hypotheses that might be tested in further
research. Obviously many more self/other discrepancies in the
social psychology research literature could be examined to see
if the discrepancy was less when other was in a close relation-
ship to self. But numerous, less obvious implications could also
be tested: For example, we are currently conducting studies of
the cognitive effects of the loss of a close relationship, of the
difference in the cognitive significance of the use of the terms
loving and being in love, and of fear of intimacy in relation to
self-boundaries.
Future research might also examine more closely the specific
cognitive mechanisms through which other is included in the
self. The model of including other in the self as used in the
experiments reported here might be best described in Lewin's
(1948) terms as overlapping differentiated regions within the
life space. A more precise notion, of overlapping prototypes (or
schemata) of self and other is also attractive and seems likely to
be at least a subclass of the general idea of including other in the
self. But as Greenwald and Pratkanis (1984) note, there seem to
be more aspects to the self than can be fully accounted for by
the cognitive representation approach. One such area of diffi-
culty involves the issue of identity: Do people actually confuse
their own identity with the close other (or, alternately, base their
identity on that other)? Yet another line of research would focus
on the process by which other becomes included in the self (or
even by which we see ourselves as included in the other).
Afinalpoint about the idea of closeness as including other in
the self: In some cases, being in a close relationship might well
make one appear to treat the other as more different from self
rather than less. For example, Tesser (1988) showed that when
self and other are competing for an outcome relevant to one's
self-esteem, one is more likely to be jealous of someone with
whom one is close than with a stranger (although Tesser's defini-
tion of closeness in his various studies overlaps with similarity).
More generally, to the extent the other is highly salient in the life
space of the individual, other's characteristics are especially
available for social comparison. For example, in a marriage in
251
which both partners initially saw themselves as similar in terms
of liking the outdoors (because compared with most people,
they know they both feel largely the same way), after living
together some years, any slight difference between them might
repeatedly show itself, for example, one might always want to go
camping, but the other might always resist it. Thus this small
difference could become identified in the world of the couple as
a major point of conflict. However, such situations arise, in our
view, precisely because the self/other merging in close relation-
ships makes any self/other differences both more likely to be
noticed and more likely to matter. More generally, we would
expect self/other differences in close relationships to operate
like contradictions among one's own behaviors and characteris-
tics. This idea is implicit in cognitive dissonance theorizing.
Dissimilarity between self and a friend's attitudes is considered
dissonant in the same way that holding opposite attitudes
within oneself is considered dissonant—and, we would add, the
degree of dissonance should be a function of the closeness of
the relationship (i.e., the degree to which the other is included in
the self). It is certainly a testable point, as is the implication
from a more psychodynamic perspective, that if the other is
included in the self and if self/other differences in close relation-
ships function like self/self conflicts, then the closer the rela-
tionship, the more self/other differences should be either (a)
highly emotionally charged or (b) very uncharged (because of
their being integrated into an understanding that sees them no
longer really contradictory but as complementary). In other
words, in close relationships, we would expect greater variance
in emotional charge associated with self/other differences.
Thus the present experiments only begin to explore the cog-
nitive structure of close relationships in terms of the self. But
they are a beginning, we hope, that illustrates the potential
utility of the approach as a complement to those that have as-
sisted the study of close relationships up to now.
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