G.R. No.

187587 June 5, 2013

NAGKAKAISANG MARALITA NG SITIO MASIGASIG, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 187654

WESTERN BICUTAN LOT OWNERS ASSOCIATION, INC., represented by its Board of

Directors, Petitioner,
vs.
MILITARY SHRINE SERVICES - PHILIPPINE VETERANS AFFAIRS OFFICE, DEPARTMENT OF
NATIONAL DEFENSE, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ.:

Before us are consolidated Petitions for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Decision1 promulgated on 29 April 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 97925.

THE FACTS

The facts, as culled from the records, are as follows:

On 12 July 1957, by virtue of Proclamation No. 423, President Carlos P. Garcia reserved parcels of
land in the Municipalities of Pasig, Taguig, Parañaque, Province of Rizal and Pasay City for a military
reservation. The military reservation, then known as Fort William McKinley, was later on renamed Fort
Andres Bonifacio (Fort Bonifacio).

On 28 May 1967, President Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) issued Proclamation No. 208,
amending Proclamation No. 423, which excluded a certain area of Fort Bonifacio and reserved it for a
national shrine. The excluded area is now known as Libingan ng mga Bayani, which is under the
administration of herein respondent Military Shrine Services – Philippine Veterans Affairs Office (MSS-
PVAO).

Again, on 7 January 1986, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 2476, further amending
Proclamation No. 423, which excluded barangaysLower Bicutan, Upper Bicutan and Signal Village from
the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared it open for disposition under the provisions of
Republic Act Nos. (R.A.) 274 and 730.

At the bottom of Proclamation No. 2476, President Marcos made a handwritten addendum, which
reads:

"P.S. – This includes Western Bicutan

(SGD.) Ferdinand E. Marcos"2

The crux of the controversy started when Proclamation No. 2476 was published in the Official
Gazette3 on 3 February 1986, without the above-quoted addendum.

Years later, on 16 October 1987, President Corazon C. Aquino (President Aquino) issued Proclamation
No. 172 which substantially reiterated Proclamation No. 2476, as published, but this time excluded Lots
1 and 2 of Western Bicutan from the operation of Proclamation No. 423 and declared the said lots open
for disposition under the provisions of R.A. 274 and 730.

Memorandum Order No. 119, implementing Proclamation No. 172, was issued on the same day.

Through the years, informal settlers increased and occupied some areas of Fort Bonifacio including
portions of the Libingan ng mga Bayani. Thus, Brigadier General Fredelito Bautista issued General
Order No. 1323 creating Task Force Bantay (TFB), primarily to prevent further unauthorized occupation
and to cause the demolition of illegal structures at Fort Bonifacio.

On 27 August 1999, members of petitioner Nagkakaisang Maralita ng Sitio Masigasig, Inc. (NMSMI)
filed a Petition with the Commission on Settlement of Land Problems (COSLAP), where it was docketed
as COSLAP Case No. 99-434. The Petition prayed for the following: (1) the reclassification of the areas
they occupied, covering Lot 3 of SWO-13-000-298 of Western Bicutan, from public land to alienable
and disposable land pursuant to Proclamation No. 2476; (2) the subdivision of the subject lot by the
Director of Lands; and (3) the Land Management Bureau’s facilitation of the distribution and sale of the
subject lot to its bona fide occupants.4

On 1 September 2000, petitioner Western Bicutan Lot Owners Association, Inc. (WBLOAI) filed a
Petition-in-Intervention substantially praying for the same reliefs as those prayed for by NMSMI with
regard to the area the former then occupied covering Lot 7 of SWO-00-001302 in Western Bicutan.5

Thus, on 1 September 2006, COSLAP issued a Resolution6 granting the Petition and declaring the
portions of land in question alienable and disposable, with Associate Commissioner Lina Aguilar-
General dissenting.7

The COSLAP ruled that the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was an integral part of
Proclamation No. 2476, and was therefore, controlling. The intention of the President could not be
defeated by the negligence or inadvertence of others. Further, considering that Proclamation

No. 2476 was done while the former President was exercising legislative powers, it could not be
amended, repealed or superseded, by a mere executive enactment. Thus, Proclamation No. 172 could
not have superseded much less displaced Proclamation No. 2476, as the latter was issued on October
16, 1987 when President Aquino’s legislative power had ceased.

In her Dissenting Opinion, Associate Commissioner Lina AguilarGeneral stressed that pursuant to
Article 2 of the Civil Code, publication is indispensable in every case. Likewise, she held that when the
provision of the law is clear and unambiguous so that there is no occasion for the court to look into
legislative intent, the law must be taken as it is, devoid of judicial addition or subtraction. 8 Finally, she
maintained that the Commission had no authority to supply the addendum originally omitted in the
published version of Proclamation No. 2476, as to do so would be tantamount to encroaching on the
field of the legislature.

Herein respondent MSS-PVAO filed a Motion for Reconsideration,9 which was denied by the COSLAP
in a Resolution dated 24 January 2007.10
MSS-PVAO filed a Petition with the Court of Appeals seeking to reverse the COSLAP Resolutions
dated 1 September 2006 and 24 January 2007.

Thus, on 29 April 2009, the then Court of Appeals First Division rendered the assailed Decision
granting MSS-PVAO’s Petition, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated
September 1, 2006 and January 24, 2007 issued by the Commission on the Settlement of Land
Problems in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. In lieu thereof, the
petitions of respondents in COSLAP Case No. 99-434 are DISMISSED, for lack of merit, as discussed
herein. Further, pending urgent motions filed by respondents are likewise

DENIED. SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis in the original)

Both NMSMI12 and WBLOAI13 appealed the said Decision by filing their respective Petitions for Review
with this Court under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

THE ISSUES

Petitioner NMSMI raises the following issues:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING

THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 DID NOT INCLUDE ANY PORTION OF WESTERN BICUTAN AS
THE HANDWRITTEN NOTATION BY PRESIDENT MARCOS ON THE SAID PROCLAMATION WAS
NOT PUBLISHED IN THE OFFICIAL GAZETTE.

II

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN RULING

THAT PROCLAMATION NO. 172 LIKEWISE EXCLUDED THE PORTION OF LAND OCCUPIED BY
MEMBER OF HEREIN PETITIONER.

III

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING

THAT THE HON. COSLAP HAS BROAD POWERS TO RECOMMEND TO THE PRESIDENT
>INNOVATIVE MEASURES TO RESOLVE EXPEDITIOUSLY VARIOUS LAND CASES.14

On the other hand, petitioner WBLOAI raises this sole issue:

WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS NOT DECLARED ALIENABLE AND DISPOSABLE BY VIRTUE OF
PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 BECAUSE THE HANDWRITTEN ADDENDUM OF PRESIDENT
FERDINAND E. MARCOS INCLUDING WESTERN BICUTAN IN PROCLAMATION NO. 2476 WAS
NOT INCLUDED IN THE PUBLICATION.15

Both Petitions boil down to the principal issue of whether the Court of Appeals erred in ruling that the
subject lots were not alienable and disposable by virtue of Proclamation No. 2476 on the ground that
the handwritten addendum of President Marcos was not included in the publication of the said law.
 THE COURT’S RULING

We deny the Petitions for lack of merit.

Considering that petitioners were occupying Lots 3 and 7 of Western Bicutan (subject lots), their claims
were anchored on the handwritten addendum of President Marcos to Proclamation No. 2476. They
allege that the former President intended to include all Western Bicutan in the reclassification of
portions of Fort Bonifacio as disposable public land when he made a notation just below the printed
version of Proclamation No. 2476.

However, it is undisputed that the handwritten addendum was not included when Proclamation No.
2476 was published in the Official Gazette.

The resolution of whether the subject lots were declared as reclassified and disposable lies in the
determination of whether the handwritten addendum of President Marcos has the force and effect of
law. In relation thereto, Article 2 of the Civil Code expressly provides:

ART. 2. Laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette, unless it is otherwise provided. This Code shall take effect one year after such
publication.

Under the above provision, the requirement of publication is indispensable to give effect to the law,
unless the law itself has otherwise provided. The phrase "unless otherwise provided" refers to a
different effectivity date other than after fifteen days following the completion of the law’s publication in
the Official Gazette, but does not imply that the requirement of publication may be dispensed with. The
issue of the requirement of publication was already settled in the landmark case Tañada v. Hon.
Tuvera,16 in which we had the occasion to rule thus:

Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. An example, as pointed out by the present Chief
Justice in his separate concurrence in the original decision, is the Civil Code which did not become
effective after fifteen days from its publication in the Official Gazette but "one year after such
publication." The general rule did not apply because it was "otherwise provided."

It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may be dispensed with altogether. The
reason is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the public knowledge of
the laws that are supposed to govern it. Surely, if the legislature could validly provide that a law shall
become effective immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of publication (or after an
unreasonably short period after publication), it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result; and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with it but simply
because they did not know of its existence. Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is
commonly supposed. One can think of many non-penal measures, like a law on prescription, which
must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they can begin to operate.

xxxx

The term "laws" should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking
all laws relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. An
example is a law granting citizenship to a particular individual, like a relative of President Marcos who
was decreed instant naturalization. It surely cannot be said that such a law does not affect the public
although it unquestionably does not apply directly to all the people. The subject of such law is a matter
of public interest which any member of the body politic may question in the political forums or, if he is a
proper party, even in the courts of justice. In fact, a law without any bearing on the public would be
invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra vires act of the legislature. To be
valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest even if it might be directly applicable only to one
individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a whole.

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature or, at present,
directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be published if
their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.

xxxx

Accordingly, even the charter of a city must be published notwithstanding that it applies to only a
portion of the national territory and directly affects only the inhabitants of that place. All presidential
decrees must be published, including even, say, those naming a public place after a favored individual
or exempting him from certain prohibitions or requirements. The circulars issued by the Monetary Board
must be published if they are meant not merely to interpret but to "fill in the details" of the Central Bank
Act which that body is supposed to enforce.

xxxx

We agree that the publication must be in full or it is no publication at all since its purpose is to inform
the public of the contents of the laws. As correctly pointed out by the petitioners, the mere mention of
the number of the presidential decree, the title of such decree, its whereabouts (e.g., "with Secretary
Tuvera"), the supposed date of effectivity, and in a mere supplement of the Official Gazette cannot
satisfy the publication requirement.1âwphi1 This is not even substantial compliance. This was the
manner, incidentally, in which the General Appropriations Act for FY 1975, a presidential decree
undeniably of general applicability and interest, was "published" by the Marcos administration. The
evident purpose was to withhold rather than disclose information on this vital law.

xxxx

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn. (Emphases supplied)

Applying the foregoing ruling to the instant case, this Court cannot rely on a handwritten note that was
not part of Proclamation No. 2476 as published. Without publication, the note never had any legal force
and effect.

Furthermore, under Section 24, Chapter 6, Book I of the Administrative Code, "the publication of any
law, resolution or other official documents in the Official Gazette shall be prima facie evidence of its
authority." Thus, whether or not President Marcos intended to include Western Bicutan is not only
irrelevant but speculative. Simply put, the courts may not speculate as to the probable intent of the
legislature apart from the words appearing in the law.17 This Court cannot rule that a word appears in
the law when, evidently, there is none. In Pagpalain Haulers, Inc. v. Hon. Trajano,18 we ruled that
"under Article 8 of the Civil Code, 'judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws or the Constitution
shall form a part of the legal system of the Philippines.' This does not mean, however, that courts can
create law. The courts exist for interpreting the law, not for enacting it. To allow otherwise would be
violative of the principle of separation of powers, inasmuch as the sole function of our courts is to apply
or interpret the laws, particularly where gaps or lacunae exist or where ambiguities becloud issues, but
it will not arrogate unto itself the task of legislating." The remedy sought in these Petitions is not judicial
interpretation, but another legislation that would amend the law ‘to include petitioners' lots in the
reclassification.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petitions are hereby DENIED for lack of merit. The
assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV No. 97925 dated 29 April 2009 is AFFIRMED
in toto. Accordingly, this Court's status quo order dated 17 June 2009 is hereby LIFTED. Likewise, all
pending motions to cite respondent in contempt is DENIED, having been rendered moot. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 180705 November 27, 2012

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Of the several coconut levy appealed cases that stemmed from certain issuances of the
Sandiganbayan in its Civil Case No. 0033, the present recourse proves to be one of the most difficult.

In particular, the instant petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assails and seeks to
annul a portion of the Partial Summary Judgment dated July 11, 2003, as affirmed in a Resolution of
December 28, 2004, both rendered by the Sandiganbayan in its Civil Case ("CC") No. 0033-A (the
judgment shall hereinafter be referred to as "PSJ-A"), entitled "Republic of the Philippines, Plaintiff, v.
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., et al., Defendants, COCOFED, et al., BALLARES, et al., Class Action
Movants." CC No. 0033-A is the result of the splitting into eight (8) amended complaints of CC No.
0033 entitled, "Republic of the Philippines v. Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., et al.," a suit for recovery of ill-
gotten wealth commenced by the Presidential Commission on Good Government ("PCGG"), for the
Republic of the Philippines ("Republic"), against Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. ("Cojuangco") and several
individuals, among them, Ferdinand E. Marcos, Maria Clara Lobregat ("Lobregat"), and Danilo S. Ursua
("Ursua"). Each of the eight (8) subdivided complaints, CC No. 0033-A to CC No. 0033-H,
correspondingly impleaded as defendants only the alleged participants in the transaction/s subject of
the suit, or who are averred as owner/s of the assets involved.

Apart from this recourse, We clarify right off that PSJ-A was challenged in two other separate but
consolidated petitions for review, one commenced by COCOFED et al., docketed as G.R. Nos. 177857-
58, and the other, interposed by Danilo S. Ursua, and docketed as G.R. No. 178193.

By Decision dated January 24, 2012, in the aforesaid G.R. Nos. 177857-58 (COCOFED et al. v.
Republic) and G.R. No. 178193 (Ursua v. Republic) consolidated cases1 (hereinafter collectively
referred to as "COCOFED v. Republic"), the Court addressed and resolved all key matters elevated to it
in relation to PSJ-A, except for the issues raised in the instant petition which have not yet been
resolved therein. In the same decision, We made clear that: (1) PSJ-A is subject of another petition for
review interposed by Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., in G.R. No. 180705, entitled Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
v. Republic of the Philippines, which shall be decided separately by the Court,2 and (2) the issues
raised in the instant petition should not be affected by the earlier decision "save for determinatively
legal issues directly addressed therein."3

For a better perspective, the instant recourse seeks to reverse the Partial Summary Judgment 4 of the
anti-graft court dated July 11, 2003, as reiterated in a Resolution5 of December 28, 2004, denying
COCOFED’s motion for reconsideration, and the May 11, 2007 Resolution6 denying

COCOFED’s motion to set case for trial and declaring the partial summary judgment final and
appealable, all issued in PSJ-A. In our adverted January 24, 2012 Decision in COCOFED v. Republic,
we affirmed with modification PSJ-A of the Sandiganbayan, and its Partial Summary Judgment in Civil
Case No. 0033-F, dated May 7, 2004 (hereinafter referred to as "PSJ-F’).7

More specifically, We upheld the Sandiganbayan’s ruling that the coconut levy funds are special public
funds of the Government. Consequently, We affirmed the Sandiganbayan’s declaration that Sections 1
and 2 of Presidential Decree ("P.D.") 755, Section 3, Article III of P.D. 961 and Section 3, Article III of
P.D. 1468, as well as the pertinent implementing regulations of the Philippine Coconut Authority
("PCA"), are unconstitutional for allowing the use and/or the distribution of properties acquired through
the coconut levy funds to private individuals for their own direct benefit and absolute ownership. The
Decision also affirmed the Government’s ownership of the six CIIF companies, the fourteen holding
companies, and the CIIF block of San Miguel Corporation shares of stock, for having likewise been
acquired using the coconut levy funds. Accordingly, the properties subject of the January 24, 2012
Decision were declared owned by and ordered reconveyed to the Government, to be used only for the
benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut industry.

By Resolution of September 4, 2012,8 the Court affirmed the above-stated Decision promulgated on
January 24, 2012.

It bears to stress at this juncture that the only portion of the appealed Partial Summary Judgment dated
July 11, 2003 ("PSJ-A") which remains at issue revolves around the following decretal holdings of that
court relating to the "compensation" paid to petitioner for exercising his personal and exclusive option to
acquire the FUB/UCPB shares.9 It will be recalled that the Sandiganbayan declared the Agreement
between the PCA and Cojuangco containing the assailed "compensation" null and void for not having
the required valuable consideration. Consequently, the UCPB shares of stocks that are subject of the
Agreement were declared conclusively owned by the Government. It also held that the Agreement did
not have the effect of law as it was not published as part of P.D. 755, even if Section 1 thereof made
reference to the same.

Facts

We reproduce, below, portions of the statement of facts in COCOFED v. Republic relevant to the
present case:10

In 1971, Republic Act No. ("R.A.") 6260 was enacted creating the Coconut Investment Company
("CIC") to administer the Coconut Investment Fund ("CIF"), which, under Section 8 thereof, was to be
sourced from a PhP 0.55 levy on the sale of every 100 kg. of copra. Of the PhP 0.55 levy of which the
copra seller was – or ought to be – issued COCOFUND receipts, PhP 0.02 was placed at the
disposition of COCOFED, the national association of coconut producers declared by the

Philippine Coconut Administration ("PHILCOA" now "PCA") as having the largest membership.
The declaration of martial law in September 1972 saw the issuance of several presidential decrees
("P.D.") purportedly designed to improve the coconut industry through the collection and use of the
coconut levy fund. While coming generally from impositions on the first sale of copra, the coconut levy
fund came under various names x x x. Charged with the duty of collecting and administering the Fund
was PCA. Like COCOFED with which it had a legal linkage, the PCA, by statutory provisions scattered
in different coco levy decrees, had its share of the coco levy.

The following were some of the issuances on the coco levy, its collection and utilization, how the
proceeds of the levy will be managed and by whom and the purpose it was supposed to serve:

1. P.D. No. 276 established the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund ("CCSF") and
declared the proceeds of the CCSF levy as trust fund, to be utilized to subsidize the sale
of coconut-based products, thus stabilizing the price of edible oil.

2. P.D. No. 582 created the Coconut Industry Development Fund ("CIDF") to finance the
operation of a hybrid coconut seed farm.

3. Then came P.D. No. 755 providing under its Section 1 the following:

It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide readily available
credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates; that this policy can be
expeditiously and efficiently realized by the implementation of the "Agreement for
the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the benefit of Coconut Farmers"
executed by the PCA…; and that the PCA is hereby authorized to distribute, for
free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired to the coconut farmers….

Towards achieving the policy thus declared, P.D. No. 755, under its Section 2,
authorized PCA to utilize the CCSF and the CIDF collections to acquire a
commercial bank and deposit the CCSF levy collections in said bank interest
free, the deposit withdrawable only when the bank has attained a certain level of
sufficiency in its equity capital. The same section also decreed that all levies PCA
is authorized to collect shall not be considered as special and/or fiduciary funds
or form part of the general funds of the government within the contemplation of
P.D. No. 711.

4. P.D. No. 961 codified the various laws relating to the development of coconut/palm oil
industries.

5. The relevant provisions of P.D. No. 961, as later amended by P.D. No. 1468 (Revised
Coconut Industry Code), read:

ARTICLE III
Levies

Section 1. Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy. — The PCA is hereby

empowered to impose and collect … the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund
Levy, ….

….

Section 5. Exemption. — The CCSF and theCIDF as well as all disbursements

as herein authorized, shall not be construed … as special and/or fiduciary funds,
 or as part of the general funds of the national government within the
contemplation of PD 711; … the intention being that said Fund and the
disbursements thereof as herein authorized for the benefit of the coconut farmers
shall be owned by them in their private capacities: …. (Emphasis supplied)

6. Letter of Instructions No. ("LOI") 926, s. of 1979, made reference to the creation, out
of other coco levy funds, of the Coconut Industry Investment Fund ("CIIF") in P.D. No.
1468 and entrusted a portion of the CIIF levy to UCPB for investment, on behalf of
coconut farmers, in oil mills and other private corporations, with the following equity
ownership structure:

Section 2. Organization of the Cooperative Endeavor. – The UCPB, in its

capacity as the investment arm of the coconut farmers thru the CIIF … is hereby
directed to invest, on behalf of the coconut farmers, such portion of the CIIF … in
private corporations … under the following guidelines:

a) The coconut farmers shall own or control at least … (50%) of the outstanding
voting capital stock of the private corporation acquired thru the CIIF and/or
corporation owned or controlled by the farmers thru the CIIF …. (Words in
bracket added.)

Through the years, a part of the coconut levy funds went directly or indirectly to finance
various projects and/or was converted into various assets or investments.11 Relevant to
the present petition is the acquisition of the First United Bank ("FUB"), which was
subsequently renamed as United Coconut Planters Bank ("UCPB").12

Apropos the intended acquisition of a commercial bank for the purpose stated earlier, it
would appear that FUB was the bank of choice which Pedro Cojuangco’s group
(collectively, "Pedro Cojuangco") had control of. The plan, then, was for PCA to buy all
of Pedro Cojuangco’s shares in FUB. However, as later events unfolded, a simple direct
sale from the seller (Pedro) to PCA did not ensue as it was made to appear that
Cojuangco had the exclusive option to acquire the former’s FUB controlling interests.
Emerging from this elaborate, circuitous arrangement were two deeds. The first one was
simply denominated as Agreement, dated May 1975, entered into by and between
Cojuangco for and in his behalf and in behalf of "certain other buyers", and Pedro
Cojuangco in which the former was purportedly accorded the option to buy 72.2% of
FUB’s outstanding capital stock, or 137,866 shares (the "option shares," for brevity), at
PhP 200 per share. On its face, this agreement does not mention the word "option."

The second but related contract, dated May 25, 1975, was denominated as Agreement
for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers of the
Philippines. It had PCA, for itself and for the benefit of the coconut farmers, purchase
from Cojuangco the shares of stock subject of the First Agreement for PhP200.00 per
share. As additional consideration for PCA’s buy-out of what Cojuangco would later
claim to be his exclusive and personal option, it was stipulated that, from PCA,
Cojuangco shall receive equity in FUB amounting to 10%, or 7.22%, of the 72.2%, or
fully paid shares. And so as not to dilute Cojuangco’s equity position in FUB, later
UCPB, the PCA agreed under paragraph 6 (b) of the second agreement to cede over to
the former a number of fully paid FUB shares out of the shares it (PCA) undertakes to
eventually subscribe. It was further stipulated that Cojuangco would act as bank
president for an extendible period of 5 years.
 Apart from the aforementioned 72.2%, PCA purchased from other FUB shareholders
6,534 shares of which Cojuangco, as may be gathered from the records, got 10%..

While the 64.98% portion of the option shares (72.2% – 7.22% = 64.98%) ostensibly
pertained to the farmers, the corresponding stock certificates supposedly representing
the farmers’ equity were in the name of and delivered to PCA. There were, however,
shares forming part of the aforesaid 64.98% portion, which ended up in the hands of
non-farmers. The remaining 27.8% of the FUB capital stock were not covered by any of
the agreements.

Under paragraph # 8 of the second agreement, PCA agreed to expeditiously distribute

the FUB shares purchased to such "coconut farmers holding registered COCOFUND
receipts" on equitable basis.

As found by the Sandiganbayan, the PCA appropriated, out of its own fund, an amount
for the purchase of the said 72.2% equity, albeit it would later reimburse itself from the
coconut levy fund.

And per Cojuangco’s own admission, PCA paid, out of the CCSF, the entire acquisition price for the
72.2% option shares.13

As of June 30, 1975, the list of FUB stockholders included Cojuangco with 14,440 shares and PCA with
129,955 shares.14 It would appear later that, pursuant to the stipulation on maintaining Cojuangco’s
equity position in the bank, PCA would cede to him 10% of its subscriptions to (a) the authorized but
unissued shares of FUB and (b) the increase in FUB’s capital stock (the equivalent of 158,840 and
649,800 shares, respectively). In all, from the "mother" PCA shares, Cojuangco would receive a total of
95,304 FUB (UCPB) shares broken down as follows: 14,440 shares + 10% (158,840 shares) + 10%
(649,800 shares) = 95,304.15

We further quote, from COCOFED v. Republic, facts relevant to the instant case:16

Shortly after the execution of the PCA – Cojuangco Agreement, President Marcos issued, on July 29,
1975, P.D. No. 755 directing x x x as narrated, PCA to use the CCSF and CIDF to acquire a
commercial bank to provide coco farmers with "readily available credit facilities at preferential rate" x x
x.

Then came the 1986 EDSA event. One of the priorities of then President Corazon C. Aquino’s
revolutionary government was the recovery of ill-gotten wealth reportedly amassed by the Marcos
family and close relatives, their nominees and associates. Apropos thereto, she issued Executive Order
Nos. (EO) 1, 2 and 14, as amended by E.O. 14-A, all series of 1986. E.O. 1 created the PCGG and
provided it with the tools and processes it may avail of in the recovery efforts;17 E.O. No. 2 asserted that
the ill-gotten assets and properties come in the form of shares of stocks, etc., while E.O. No. 14
conferred on the Sandiganbayan exclusive and original jurisdiction over ill-gotten wealth cases, with the
proviso that "technical rules of procedure and evidence shall not be applied strictly" to the civil cases
filed under the EO. Pursuant to these issuances, the PCGG issued numerous orders of sequestration,
among which were those handed out x x x against shares of stock in UCPB purportedly owned by or
registered in the names of (a) the more than a million coconut farmers, (b) the CIIF companies and (c)
Cojuangco, Jr., including the SMC shares held by the CIIF companies. On July 31, 1987, the PCGG
instituted before the Sandiganbayan a recovery suit docketed thereat as CC No. 0033.

xxxx
3. Civil Case 0033 x x x would be subdivided into eight complaints, docketed as CC 0033-A to CC
0033-H.

xxxx

5. By Decision of December 14, 2001, in G.R. Nos. 147062-64 (Republic v. COCOFED),18 the Court
declared the coco levy funds as prima facie public funds. And purchased as the sequestered UCPB
shares were by such funds, beneficial ownership thereon and the corollary voting rights prima facie
pertain, according to the Court, to the government.

xxxx

Correlatively, the Republic, on the strength of the December 14, 2001 ruling in Republic v. COCOFED
and on the argument, among others, that the claim of COCOFED and Ballares et al., over the subject
UCPB shares is based solely on the supposed COCOFUND receipts issued for payment of the RA
6260 CIF levy, filed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment RE: COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.
dated April 22, 2002, praying that a summary judgment be rendered declaring:

a. That Section 2 of [PD] 755, Section 5, Article III of P.D. 961 and Section 5, Article III of
P.D. No. 1468 are unconstitutional;

b. That x x x (CIF) payments under x x x (R.A.) No. 6260 are not valid and legal bases
for ownership claims over UCPB shares; and

c. That COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al. have not legally and validly obtained title
over the subject UCPB shares.

Right after it filed the Motion for Partial Summary Judgment RE: COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al.,
the Republic interposed a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment Re: Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.,
praying that a summary judgment be rendered:

a. Declaring that Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 is unconstitutional insofar as it validates the
provisions in the "PCA-Cojuangco Agreement x x x" dated May 25, 1975 providing payment of
ten percent (10%) commission to defendant Cojuangco with respect to the FUB, now UCPB
shares subject matter thereof;

b. Declaring that x x x Cojuangco, Jr. and his fronts, nominees and dummies, including x x x
and Danilo S. Ursua, have not legally and validly obtained title over the subject UCPB shares;
and

c. Declaring that the government is the lawful and true owner of the subject UCPB shares
registered in the names of … Cojuangco, Jr. and the entities and persons above-enumerated,
for the benefit of all coconut farmers. x x x

Following an exchange of pleadings, the Republic filed its sur-rejoinder praying that it be conclusively
declared the true and absolute owner of the coconut levy funds and the UCPB shares acquired
therefrom.19

We quote from COCOFED v. Republic:20

A joint hearing on the separate motions for summary judgment to determine what material facts exist
with or without controversy then ensued. By Order of March 11, 2003, the Sandiganbayan detailed,
based on this Court’s ruling in related ill-gotten cases, the parties’ manifestations made in open court
and the pleadings and evidence on record, the facts it found to be without substantial controversy,
together with the admissions and/or extent of the admission made by the parties respecting relevant
facts, as follows:

As culled from the exhaustive discussions and manifestations of the parties in open court of their
respective pleadings and evidence on record, the facts which exist without any substantial controversy
are set forth hereunder, together with the admissions and/or the extent or scope of the admissions
made by the parties relating to the relevant facts:

1. The late President Ferdinand E. Marcos was President x x x for two terms under the
1935 Constitution and, during the second term, he declared Martial Law through
Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972.

2. On January 17, 1973, he issued Proclamation No. 1102 announcing the ratification of
the 1973 Constitution.

3. From January 17, 1973 to April 7, 1981, he x x x exercised the powers and
prerogative of President under the 1935 Constitution and the powers and prerogative of
President x x x the 1973 Constitution.

He x x x promulgated various P.D.s, among which were P.D. No. 232, P.D. No. 276,
P.D. No. 414, P.D. No. 755, P.D. No. 961 and P.D. No. 1468.

4. On April 17, 1981, amendments to the 1973 Constitution were effected and, on June
30, 1981, he, after being elected President, "reassumed the title and exercised the
powers of the President until 25 February 1986."

5. Defendants Maria Clara Lobregat and Jose R. Eleazar, Jr. were PCA Directors x x x
during the period 1970 to 1986 x x x.

6. Plaintiff admits the existence of the following agreements which are attached as
Annexes "A" and "B" to the Opposition dated October 10, 2002 of defendant Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. to the above-cited Motion for Partial Summary Judgment:

a) "This Agreement made and entered into this ______ day of May, 1975 at
Makati, Rizal, Philippines, by and between:

PEDRO COJUANGCO, Filipino, of legal age and with residence at 1575

Princeton St., Mandaluyong, Rizal, for and in his own behalf and in behalf of
certain other stockholders of First United Bank listed in Annex "A" attached
hereto (hereinafter collectively called the SELLERS);

– and –

EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR., Filipino, of legal age and with residence at 136
9th Street corner Balete Drive, Quezon City, represented in this act by his duly
authorized attorney-in-fact, EDGARDO J. ANGARA, for and in his own behalf
and in behalf of certain other buyers, (hereinafter collectively called the
BUYERS)";

WITNESSETH: That
WHEREAS, the SELLERS own of record and beneficially a total of 137,866
shares of stock, with a par value of P100.00 each, of the common stock of the
First United Bank (the "Bank"), a commercial banking corporation existing under
the laws of the Philippines;

WHEREAS, the BUYERS desire to purchase, and the SELLERS are willing to
sell, the aforementioned shares of stock totaling 137,866 shares (hereinafter
called the "Contract Shares") owned by the SELLERS due to their special
relationship to EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR.;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the premises and the mutual
covenants herein contained, the parties agree as follows:

1. Sale and Purchase of Contract Shares

Subject to the terms and conditions of this Agreement, the SELLERS

hereby sell, assign, transfer and convey unto the BUYERS, and the
BUYERS hereby purchase and acquire, the Contract Shares free and
clear of all liens and encumbrances thereon.

2. Contract Price

The purchase price per share of the Contract Shares payable by the
BUYERS is P200.00 or an aggregate price of P27,573,200.00 (the
"Contract Price").

3. Delivery of, and payment for, stock certificates

Upon the execution of this Agreement, (i) the SELLERS shall deliver to
the BUYERS the stock certificates representing the Contract Shares, free
and clear of all liens, encumbrances, obligations, liabilities and other
burdens in favor of the Bank or third parties, duly endorsed in blank or
with stock powers sufficient to transfer the shares to bearer; and (ii)
BUYERS shall deliver to the SELLERS P27,511,295.50 representing the
Contract Price less the amount of stock transfer taxes payable by the
SELLERS, which the BUYERS undertake to remit to the appropriate
authorities. (Emphasis added.)

4. Representation and Warranties of Sellers

The SELLERS respectively and independently of each other represent

and warrant that:

(a) The SELLERS are the lawful owners of, with good marketable
title to, the Contract Shares and that (i) the certificates to be
delivered pursuant thereto have been validly issued and are fully
paid and non-assessable; (ii) the Contract Shares are free and
clear of all liens, encumbrances, obligations, liabilities and other
burdens in favor of the Bank or third parties x x x.
 This representation shall survive the execution and delivery of this
Agreement and the consummation or transfer hereby
contemplated.

(b) The execution, delivery and performance of this Agreement by

the SELLERS does not conflict with or constitute any breach of
any provision in any agreement to which they are a party or by
which they may be bound.

(c) They have complied with the condition set forth in Article X of
the Amended Articles of Incorporation of the Bank.

5. Representation of BUYERS

xxxx

6. Implementation

The parties hereto hereby agree to execute or cause to be executed such

documents and instruments as may be required in order to carry out the
intent and purpose of this Agreement.

7. Notices

xxxx

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have hereunto set their hands at the
place and on the date first above written.

PEDRO COJUANGCO EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR.

(on his own behalf and in (on his own behalf and in behalf
behalf of the other Sellers of the other Buyers)
listed in Annex "A" hereof) (BUYERS)
(SELLERS)

By:

EDGARDO J. ANGARA
Attorney-in-Fact

xxxx

b) "Agreement for the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut
Farmers of the Philippines, made and entered into this 25th day of May 1975 at Makati,
Rizal, Philippines, by and between:

EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR., Filipino, of legal age, with business address

at 10th Floor, Sikatuna Building, Ayala Avenue, Makati, Rizal, hereinafter
referred to as the SELLER;

– and –
PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY, a public corporation created by
Presidential Decree No. 232, as amended, for itself and for the benefit of the
coconut farmers of the Philippines, (hereinafter called the BUYER)"

WITNESSETH: That

WHEREAS, on May 17, 1975, the Philippine Coconut Producers Federation

("PCPF"), through its Board of Directors, expressed the desire of the coconut
farmers to own a commercial bank which will be an effective instrument to solve
the perennial credit problems and, for that purpose, passed a resolution
requesting the PCA to negotiate with the SELLER for the transfer to the coconut
farmers of the SELLER’s option to buy the First United Bank (the "Bank") under
such terms and conditions as BUYER may deem to be in the best interest of the
coconut farmers and instructed Mrs. Maria Clara Lobregat to convey such
request to the BUYER;

WHEREAS, the PCPF further instructed Mrs. Maria Clara Lobregat to make
representations with the BUYER to utilize its funds to finance the purchase of the
Bank;

WHEREAS, the SELLER has the exclusive and personal option to buy 144,400
shares (the "Option Shares") of the Bank, constituting 72.2% of the present
outstanding shares of stock of the Bank, at the price of P200.00 per share, which
option only the SELLER can validly exercise;

WHEREAS, in response to the representations made by the coconut farmers, the

BUYER has requested the SELLER to exercise his personal option for the
benefit of the coconut farmers;

WHEREAS, the SELLER is willing to transfer the Option Shares to the BUYER at
a price equal to his option price of P200 per share;

WHEREAS, recognizing that ownership by the coconut farmers of a commercial

bank is a permanent solution to their perennial credit problems, that it will
accelerate the growth and development of the coconut industry and that the
policy of the state which the BUYER is required to implement is to achieve
vertical integration thereof so that coconut farmers will become participants in,
and beneficiaries of the development and growth of the coconut industry, the
BUYER approved the request of PCPF that it acquire a commercial bank to be
owned by the coconut farmers and, appropriated, for that purpose, the sum of
P150 Million to enable the farmers to buy the Bank and capitalize the Bank to
such an extension as to be in a position to adopt a credit policy for the coconut
farmers at preferential rates;

WHEREAS, x x x the BUYER is willing to subscribe to additional shares

("Subscribed Shares") and place the Bank in a more favorable financial position
to extend loans and credit facilities to coconut farmers at preferential rates;

NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the
other terms and conditions hereinafter contained, the parties hereby declare and
affirm that their principal contractual intent is (1) to ensure that the coconut
farmers own at least 60% of the outstanding capital stock of the Bank; and (2)
that the SELLER shall receive compensation for exercising his personal and
exclusive option to acquire the Option Shares, for transferring such shares to the
coconut farmers at the option price of P200 per share, and for performing the
management services required of him hereunder.

1. To ensure that the transfer to the coconut farmers of the Option Shares
is effected with the least possible delay and to provide for the faithful
performance of the obligations of the parties hereunder, the parties
hereby appoint the Philippine National Bank as their escrow agent (the
"Escrow Agent").

Upon execution of this Agreement, the BUYER shall deposit with the
Escrow Agent such amount as may be necessary to implement the terms
of this Agreement x x x.

2. As promptly as practicable after execution of this Agreement, the

SELLER shall exercise his option to acquire the Option Share and
SELLER shall immediately thereafter deliver and turn over to the Escrow
Agent such stock certificates as are herein provided to be received from
the existing stockholders of the Bank by virtue of the exercise on the
aforementioned option x x x.

3. To ensure the stability of the Bank and continuity of management and

credit policies to be adopted for the benefit of the coconut farmers, the
parties undertake to cause the stockholders and the Board of Directors of
the Bank to authorize and approve a management contract between the
Bank and the SELLER under the following terms:

(a) The management contract shall be for a period of five (5)

years, renewable for another five (5) years by mutual agreement
of the SELLER and the Bank;

(b) The SELLER shall be elected President and shall hold office at
the pleasure of the Board of Directors. While serving in such
capacity, he shall be entitled to such salaries and emoluments as
the Board of Directors may determine;

(c) The SELLER shall recruit and develop a professional

management team to manage and operate the Bank under the
control and supervision of the Board of Directors of the Bank;

(d) The BUYER undertakes to cause three (3) persons designated

by the SELLER to be elected to the Board of Directors of the
Bank;

(e) The SELLER shall receive no compensation for managing the

Bank, other than such salaries or emoluments to which he may be
entitled by virtue of the discharge of his function and duties as
President, provided x x x and

(f) The management contract may be assigned to a management

company owned and controlled by the SELLER.
4. As compensation for exercising his personal and exclusive option to
acquire the Option Shares and for transferring such shares to the coconut
farmers, as well as for performing the management services required of
him, SELLER shall receive equity in the Bank amounting, in the
aggregate, to 95,304 fully paid shares in accordance with the procedure
set forth in paragraph 6 below;

5. In order to comply with the Central Bank program for increased

capitalization of banks and to ensure that the Bank will be in a more
favorable financial position to attain its objective to extend to the coconut
farmers loans and credit facilities, the BUYER undertakes to subscribe to
shares with an aggregate par value of P80,864,000 (the "Subscribed
Shares"). The obligation of the BUYER with respect to the Subscribed
Shares shall be as follows:

(a) The BUYER undertakes to subscribe, for the benefit of the

coconut farmers, to shares with an aggregate par value of
P15,884,000 from the present authorized but unissued shares of
the Bank; and

(b) The BUYER undertakes to subscribe, for the benefit of the

coconut farmers, to shares with an aggregate par value of
P64,980,000 from the increased capital stock of the Bank, which
subscriptions shall be deemed made upon the approval by the
stockholders of the increase of the authorized capital stock of the
Bank from P50 Million to P140 Million.

The parties undertake to declare stock dividends of P8 Million out of the

present authorized but unissued capital stock of P30 Million.

6. To carry into effect the agreement of the parties that the SELLER shall
receive as his compensation 95,304 shares:

(a) The Escrow Agent shall, upon receipt from the SELLER of the
stock certificates representing the Option Shares, duly endorsed
in blank or with stock powers sufficient to transfer the same to
bearer, present such stock certificates to the Transfer Agent of the
Bank and shall cause such Transfer Agent to issue stock
certificates of the Bank in the following ratio: one share in the
name of the SELLER for every nine shares in the name of the
BUYER.

(b) With respect to the Subscribed Shares, the BUYER

undertakes, in order to prevent the dilution of SELLER’s equity
position, that it shall cede over to the SELLER 64,980 fully-paid
shares out of the Subscribed Shares. Such undertaking shall be
complied with in the following manner: upon receipt of advice that
the BUYER has subscribed to the Subscribed Shares upon
approval by the stockholders of the increase of the authorized
capital stock of the Bank, the Escrow Agent shall thereupon issue
a check in favor of the Bank covering the total payment for the
Subscribed Shares. The Escrow Agent shall thereafter cause the
Transfer Agent to issue a stock certificates of the Bank in the
 following ratio: one share in the name of the SELLER for every
nine shares in the name of the BUYER.

7. The parties further undertake that the Board of Directors and management of the
Bank shall establish and implement a loan policy for the Bank of making available for
loans at preferential rates of interest to the coconut farmers x x x.

8. The BUYER shall expeditiously distribute from time to time the shares of the Bank,
that shall be held by it for the benefit of the coconut farmers of the Philippines under the
provisions of this Agreement, to such, coconut farmers holding registered COCOFUND
receipts on such equitable basis as may be determine by the BUYER in its sound
discretion.

9. x x x x

10. To ensure that not only existing but future coconut farmers shall be participants in
and beneficiaries of the credit policies, and shall be entitled to the benefit of loans and
credit facilities to be extended by the Bank to coconut farmers at preferential rates, the
shares held by the coconut farmers shall not be entitled to pre-emptive rights with
respect to the unissued portion of the authorized capital stock or any increase thereof.

11. After the parties shall have acquired two-thirds (2/3) of the outstanding shares of the
Bank, the parties shall call a special stockholders’ meeting of the Bank:

(a) To classify the present authorized capital stock of P50,000,000 divided into
500,000 shares, with a par value of P100.00 per share into: 361,000 Class A
shares, with an aggregate par value of P36,100,000 and 139,000 Class B
shares, with an aggregate par value of P13,900,000. All of the Option Shares
constituting 72.2% of the outstanding shares, shall be classified as Class A
shares and the balance of the outstanding shares, constituting 27.8% of the
outstanding shares, as Class B shares;

(b) To amend the articles of incorporation of the Bank to effect the following
changes:

(i) change of corporate name to First United Coconut Bank;

(ii) replace the present provision restricting the transferability of the

shares with a limitation on ownership by any individual or entity to not
more than 10% of the outstanding shares of the Bank;

(iii) provide that the holders of Class A shares shall not be entitled to pre-
emptive rights with respect to the unissued portion of the authorized
capital stock or any increase thereof; and

(iv) provide that the holders of Class B shares shall be absolutely entitled
to pre-emptive rights, with respect to the unissued portion of Class B
shares comprising part of the authorized capital stock or any increase
thereof, to subscribe to Class B shares in proportion t the subscriptions of
Class A shares, and to pay for their subscriptions to Class B shares within
a period of five (5) years from the call of the Board of Directors.
 (c) To increase the authorized capital stock of the Bank from P50 Million to P140
Million, divided into 1,010,800 Class A shares and 389,200 Class B shares, each
with a par value of P100 per share;

(d) To declare a stock dividend of P8 Million payable to the SELLER, the BUYER
and other stockholders of the Bank out of the present authorized but unissued
capital stock of P30 Million;

(e) To amend the by-laws of the Bank accordingly; and

(f) To authorize and approve the management contract provided in paragraph 2

above.

The parties agree that they shall vote their shares and take all the necessary corporate
action in order to carry into effect the foregoing provisions of this paragraph 11, including
such other amendments of the articles of incorporation and by-laws of the Bank as are
necessary in order to implement the intention of the parties with respect thereto.

12. It is the contemplation of the parties that the Bank shall achieve a financial and
equity position to be able to lend to the coconut farmers at preferential rates.

In order to achieve such objective, the parties shall cause the Bank to adopt a policy of
reinvestment, by way of stock dividends, of such percentage of the profits of the Bank as
may be necessary.

13. The parties agree to execute or cause to be executed such documents and
instruments as may be required in order to carry out the intent and purpose of this
Agreement.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF x x x

PHILIPPINE COCONUT AUTHORITY

(BUYER)

By:

EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR. MARIA CLARA L. LOBREGAT

(SELLER)

xxxx

7. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the x x x (PCA) was
the "other buyers" represented by defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. in the May 1975 Agreement
entered into between Pedro Cojuangco (on his own behalf and in behalf of other sellers listed in Annex
"A"of the agreement) and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. (on his own behalf and in behalf of the
other buyers). Defendant Cojuangco insists he was the "only buyer" under the aforesaid Agreement.

8. Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. did not own any share in the x x x (FUB) prior to the execution
of the two Agreements x x x.

9. Defendants Lobregat, et al., and COCOFED, et al., and Ballares, et al. admit that in addition to the
137,866 FUB shares of Pedro Cojuangco, et al. covered by the Agreement, other FUB stockholders
sold their shares to PCA such that the total number of FUB shares purchased by PCA … increased
from 137,866 shares to 144,400 shares, the OPTION SHARES referred to in the Agreement of May 25,
1975. Defendant Cojuangco did not make said admission as to the said 6,534 shares in excess of the
137,866 shares covered by the Agreement with Pedro Cojuangco.

10. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the Agreement,
described in Section 1 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 755 dated July 29, 1975 as the "Agreement for
the Acquisition of a Commercial Bank for the Benefit of Coconut Farmers" executed by the Philippine
Coconut Authority" and incorporated in Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 by reference, refers to the
"AGREEMENT FOR THE ACQUISITION OF A COMMERCIAL BANK FOR THE BENEFIT OF THE
COCONUT FARMERS OF THE PHILIPPINES" dated May 25, 1975 between defendant Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr. and the PCA (Annex "B" for defendant Cojuangco’s OPPOSITION TO PLAINTIFF’S
MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT RE: EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR. dated
September 18, 2002).

Plaintiff refused to make the same admission.

11. As to whether P.D. No. 755 and the text of the agreement described therein was published, the
Court takes judicial notice that P.D. No. 755 was published in x x x volume 71 of the Official Gazette but
the text of the agreement x x x was not so published with P.D. No. 755.

12. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the PCA used
public funds x x x in the total amount of P150 million, to purchase the FUB shares amounting to 72.2%
of the authorized capital stock of the FUB, although the PCA was later reimbursed from the coconut
levy funds and that the PCA subscription in the increased capitalization of the FUB, which was later
renamed the x x x (UCPB), came from the said coconut levy funds x x x.

13. Pursuant to the May 25, 1975 Agreement, out of the 72.2% shares of the authorized and the
increased capital stock of the FUB (later UCPB), entirely paid for by PCA, 64.98% of the shares were
placed in the name of the "PCA for the benefit of the coconut farmers" and 7,22% were given to
defendant Cojuangco. The remaining 27.8% shares of stock in the FUB which later became the UCPB
were not covered by the two (2) agreements referred to in item no. 6, par. (a) and (b) above. "There
were shares forming part of the aforementioned 64.98% which were later sold or transferred to non-
coconut farmers.

14. Under the May 27, 1975 Agreement, defendant Cojuangco’s equity in the FUB (now UCPB) was
ten percent (10%) of the shares of stock acquired by the PCA for the benefit of the coconut farmers.

15. That the fully paid 95.304 shares of the FUB, later the UCPB, acquired by defendant x x x
Cojuangco, Jr. pursuant to the May 25, 1975 Agreement were paid for by the PCA in accordance with
the terms and conditions provided in the said Agreement. 16. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and
COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. admit that the affidavits of the coconut farmers (specifically,
Exhibit "1-Farmer" to "70-Farmer") uniformly state that:

a. they are coconut farmers who sold coconut products;

b. in the sale thereof, they received COCOFUND receipts pursuant to R.A. No. 6260;

c. they registered the said COCOFUND receipts; and

d. by virtue thereof, and under R.A. No. 6260, P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468, they are
allegedly entitled to the subject UCPB shares.
but subject to the following qualifications:

a. there were other coconut farmers who received UCPB shares although they did not
present said COCOFUND receipt because the PCA distributed the unclaimed UCPB
shares not only to those who already received their UCPB shares in exchange for their
COCOFUND receipts but also to the coconut farmers determined by a national census
conducted pursuant to PCA administrative issuances;

b. there were other affidavits executed by Lobregat, Eleazar, Ballares and Aldeguer
relative to the said distribution of the unclaimed UCPB shares; and

c. the coconut farmers claim the UCPB shares by virtue of their compliance not only with
the laws mentioned in item (d) above but also with the relevant issuances of the PCA
such as, PCA Administrative Order No. 1, dated August 20, 1975 (Exh. "298-Farmer");
PCA Resolution No. 033-78 dated February 16, 1978….

The plaintiff did not make any admission as to the foregoing qualifications.

17. Defendants Lobregat, et al. and COCOFED, et al. and Ballares, et al. claim that the UCPB shares
in question have legitimately become the private properties of the 1,405,366 coconut farmers solely on
the basis of their having acquired said shares in compliance with R.A. No. 6260, P.D. Nos. 755, 961
and 1468 and the administrative issuances of the PCA cited above.

18. On the other hand, defendant … Cojuangco, Jr. claims ownership of the UCPB shares, which he
holds, solely on the basis of the two Agreements…. (Emphasis and words in brackets added.)

On July 11, 2003, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed PSJ-A, ruling in favor of the Republic,
disposing insofar as pertinent as follows:21

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, we rule as follows:

xxxx

C. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.)
dated September 18, 2002 filed by plaintiff.

1. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 755 did not validate the Agreement between PCA and defendant Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975 nor did it give the Agreement the binding force of a law
because of the non-publication of the said Agreement.

2. Regarding the questioned transfer of the shares of stock of FUB (later UCPB) by PCA to
defendant Cojuangco or the so-called "Cojuangco UCPB shares" which cost the PCA more than
Ten Million Pesos in CCSF in 1975, we declare, that the transfer of the following FUB/UCPB
shares to defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. was not supported by valuable consideration,
and therefore null and void:

a. The 14,400 shares from the "Option Shares";

b. Additional Bank Shares Subscribed and Paid by PCA, consisting of:

1. Fifteen Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Four (15,884) shares out of the

authorized but unissued shares of the bank, subscribed and paid by PCA;
 2. Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty (64,980) shares of the increased
capital stock subscribed and paid by PCA; and

3. Stock dividends declared pursuant to paragraph 5 and paragraph 11 (iv) (d) of

the Agreement.

3. The above-mentioned shares of stock of the FUB/UCPB transferred to defendant Cojuangco

are hereby declared conclusively owned by the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines.

4. The UCPB shares of stock of the alleged fronts, nominees and dummies of defendant
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. which form part of the 72.2% shares of the FUB/UCPB paid for by
the

PCA with public funds later charged to the coconut levy funds, particularly the CCSF, belong to the
plaintiff Republic of the Philippines as their true and beneficial owner.

Let trial of this Civil Case proceed with respect to the issues which have not been disposed of in this
Partial Summary Judgment. For this purpose, the plaintiff’s Motion Ad Cautelam to Present

Additional Evidence dated March 28, 2001 is hereby GRANTED.22 (Emphasis and underlining added.)

As earlier explained, the core issue in this instant petition is Part C of the dispositive portion in PSJ-A
declaring the 7.22% FUB (now UCPB) shares transferred to Cojuangco, plus the other shares paid by
the PCA as "conclusively" owned by the Republic. Parts A and B of the same dispositive portion have
already been finally resolved and adjudicated by this Court in COCOFED v. Republic on January 24,
2012.23

From PSJ-A, Cojuangco moved for partial reconsideration but the Sandiganbayan, by Resolution24 of
December 28, 2004, denied the motion.

Hence, the instant petition.

The Issues

Cojuangco’s petition formulates the issues in question form, as follows:25

a. Is the acquisition of the so-called Cojuangco, Jr. UCPB shares by petitioner Cojuangco x x x
"not supported by valuable consideration and, therefore, null and void"?

b. Did the Sandiganbayan have jurisdiction, in Civil Case No. 0033-A, an "ill-gotten wealth" case
brought under EO Nos. 1 and 2, to declare the Cojuangco UCPB shares acquired by virtue of
the Pedro Cojuangco, et al. Agreement and/or the PCA Agreement null and void because "not
supported by valuable consideration"?

c. Was the claim that the acquisition by petitioner Cojuangco of shares representing 7.2% of the
outstanding capital stock of FUB (later UCPB) "not supported by valuable consideration", a
"claim" pleaded in the complaint and may therefore be the basis of a "summary judgment" under
Section 1, Rule 35 of the Rules of Court?

d. By declaring the Cojuangco UCPB shares as "not supported by valuable consideration, and
therefore, null and void", did the Sandiganbayan effectively nullify the PCA Agreement? May the
Sandiganbayan nullify the PCA Agreement when the parties to the Agreement, namely: x x x
 concede its validity? If the PCA Agreement be deemed "null and void", should not the FUB (later
UCPB) shares revert to petitioner Cojuangco (under the PCA Agreement) or to Pedro
Cojuangco, et al. x x x? Would there be a basis then, even assuming the absence of
consideration x x x, to declare 7.2% UCPB shares of petitioner Cojuangco as "conclusively
owned by the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines"?26

The Court’s Ruling

THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS JURISDICTION OVER THE SUBJECT MATTER OF THE SUBDIVIDED
AMENDED COMPLAINTS, INCLUDING THE SHARES ALLEGEDLY ACQUIRED BY COJUANGCO
BY VIRTUE OF THE PCA AGREEMENTS.

The issue of jurisdiction over the subject matter of the subdivided amended complaints has
peremptorily been put to rest by the Court in its January 24, 2012 Decision in COCOFED v. Republic.
There, the Court, citing Regalado27 and settled jurisprudence, stressed the following interlocking
precepts: Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law, not by the consent or acquiescence of any or
all of the parties. In turn, the issue on whether a suit comes within the penumbra of a statutory
conferment is determined by the allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the suitor will
be entitled to recover upon all or part of the claims asserted.

The Republic’s material averments in its complaint subdivided in CC No. 0033-A included the following:

CC No. 0033-A

12. Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. served as a public officer during the Marcos administration.
During the period of his incumbency as a public officer, he acquired assets, funds and other property
grossly and manifestly disproportionate to his salaries, lawful income and income from legitimately
acquired property.

13. Defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr., taking undue advantage of his association, influence,
connection, and acting in unlawful concert with Defendants Ferdinand E. Marcos and Imelda R.
Marcos, AND THE INDIVIDUAL DEFENDANTS, embarked upon devices, schemes and stratagems, to
unjustly enrich themselves at the expense of Plaintiff and the Filipino people, such as when he –

a) manipulated, beginning the year 1975 with the active collaboration of Defendants x x x Maria
Clara Lobregat, Danilo Ursua etc., the purchase by . . . (PCA) of 72.2% of the outstanding
capital stock of the x x x (FUB) which was subsequently converted into a universal bank named
x x x (UCPB) through the use of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund (CCSF) being
initially in the amount of P85,773,100.00 in a manner contrary to law and to the specific
purposes for which said coconut levy funds were imposed and collected under P.D. 276, and
with sinister designs and under anomalous circumstances, to wit:

(i) Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. coveted the coconut levy funds as a cheap,
lucrative and risk-free source of funds with which to exercise his private option to buy the
controlling interest in FUB; thus, claiming that the 72.2% of the outstanding capital stock
of FUB could only be purchased and transferred through the exercise of his "personal
and exclusive action option to acquire the 144,000 shares" of the bank, Defendant
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. and PCA, x x x executed on May 26, 1975 a purchase
agreement which provides, among others, for the payment to him in fully paid shares as
compensation thereof 95,384 shares worth P1,444,000.00 with the further condition that
he shall manage and control the bank as Director and President for a term of five (5)
 years renewable for another five (5) years and to designate three (3) persons of his
choice who shall be elected as members of the Board of Directors of the Bank;

(ii) to legitimize a posteriori his highly anomalous and irregular use and diversion of
government funds to advance his own private and commercial interests, Defendant
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. caused the issuance by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos of PD
755 (a) declaring that the coconut levy funds shall not be considered special and
fiduciary and trust funds and do not form part of the general funds of the National
Government, conveniently repealing for that purpose a series of previous decrees, PDs
276 and 414, establishing the character of the coconut levy funds as special, fiduciary,
trust and governmental funds; (b) confirming the agreement between Defendant
Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and PCA on the purchase of FUB by incorporating by reference
said private commercial agreement in PD 755;

(iii)To further consolidate his hold on UCPB, Defendant Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. imposed
as consideration and conditions for the purchase that (a) he gets one out of every nine
shares given to PCA, and (b) he gets to manage and control UCPB as president for a
term of five (5) years renewable for another five (5) years;

(iv) To perpetuate his opportunity to deal with and make use of the coconut levy funds x
x x Cojuangco, Jr. caused the issuance by Defendant Ferdinand E. Marcos of an
unconstitutional decree (PD 1468) requiring the deposit of all coconut levy funds with
UCPB, interest free to the prejudice of the government.

(v) In gross violation of their fiduciary positions and in contravention of the goal to create
a bank for the coconut farmers of the country, the capital stock of UCPB as of February
25, 1986 was actually held by the defendants, their lawyers, factotum and business
associates, thereby finally gaining control of the UCPB by misusing the names and
identities of the so-called "more than one million coconut farmers."

14. The acts of Defendants, singly or collectively, and/or in unlawful concert with one another,
constitute gross abuse of official position and authority, flagrant breach of public trust and
fiduciary obligations, brazen abuse of right and power, and unjust enrichment, violation of the
constitution and laws of the Republic of the Philippines, to the grave and irreparable damage of
Plaintiff and the Filipino people.28

In no uncertain terms, the Court has upheld the Sandiganbayan’s assumption of jurisdiction over the
subject matter of Civil Case Nos. 0033-A and 0033-F.29 The Court wrote:

Judging from the allegations of the defendants’ illegal acts thereat made, it is fairly obvious that both
CC Nos. 0033-A and CC 0033-F partake, in the context of EO Nos. 1, 2 and 14, series of 1986, the
nature of ill-gotten wealth suits. Both deal with the recovery of sequestered shares, property or
business enterprises claimed, as alleged in the corresponding basic complaints, to be ill-gotten assets
of President Marcos, his cronies and nominees and acquired by taking undue advantage of
relationships or influence and/or through or as a result of improper use, conversion or diversion of
government funds or property. Recovery of these assets––determined as shall hereinafter be
discussed as prima facie ill-gotten––falls within the unquestionable jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30

P.D. No. 1606, as amended by R.A. 7975 and E.O. No. 14, Series of 1986, vests the Sandiganbayan
with, among others, original jurisdiction over civil and criminal cases instituted pursuant to and in
connection with E.O. Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A. Correlatively, the PCGG Rules and Regulations defines
the term "Ill-Gotten Wealth" as "any asset, property, business enterprise or material possession of
persons within the purview of E.O. Nos. 1 and 2, acquired by them directly, or indirectly thru dummies,
nominees, agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any of the following means or similar
schemes":

(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse or malversation of public funds or raids on the
public treasury;

(2) x x x x

(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the government
or any of its subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities or government-owned or controlled
corporations;

(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any
other form of interest or participation in any business enterprise or undertaking;

(5) Through the establishment of agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other

combination and/or by the issuance, promulgation and/or implementation of decrees and orders
intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; and

(6) By taking undue advantage of official position, authority, relationship or influence for
personal gain or benefit. (Emphasis supplied)

Section 2(a) of E.O. No. 1 charged the PCGG with the task of assisting the President in "The recovery
of all ill-gotten wealth accumulated by former … President Marcos, his immediate family, relatives,
subordinates and close associates … including the takeover or sequestration of all business
enterprises and entities owned or controlled by them, during his administration, directly or through
nominees, by taking undue advantage of their public office and/or using their powers, authority,
influence, connections or relationship." Complementing the aforesaid Section 2(a) is Section 1 of E.O.
No. 2 decreeing the freezing of all assets "in which the Marcoses their close relatives, subordinates,
business associates, dummies, agents or nominees have any interest or participation."

The Republic’s averments in the amended complaints, particularly those detailing the alleged wrongful
acts of the defendants, sufficiently reveal that the subject matter thereof comprises the recovery by the
Government of ill-gotten wealth acquired by then President Marcos, his cronies or their associates and
dummies through the unlawful, improper utilization or diversion of coconut levy funds aided by P.D. No.
755 and other sister decrees. President Marcos himself issued these decrees in a brazen bid to legalize
what amounts to private taking of the said public funds.

xxxx

There was no actual need for Republic, as plaintiff a quo, to adduce evidence to show that the
Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaints as it leaned on the averments
in the initiatory pleadings to make visible the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over the ill-gotten wealth
complaints. As previously discussed, a perusal of the allegations easily reveals the sufficiency of the
statement of matters disclosing the claim of the government against the coco levy funds and the assets
acquired directly or indirectly through said funds as ill-gotten wealth. Moreover, the Court finds no rule
that directs the plaintiff to first prove the subject matter jurisdiction of the court before which the
complaint is filed. Rather, such burden falls on the shoulders of defendant in the hearing of a motion to
dismiss anchored on said ground or a preliminary hearing thereon when such ground is alleged in the
answer.

xxxx
Lest it be overlooked, this Court has already decided that the sequestered shares are prima facie ill-
gotten wealth rendering the issue of the validity of their sequestration and of the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan over the case beyond doubt. In the case of COCOFED v. PCGG, We stated that:

It is of course not for this Court to pass upon the factual issues thus raised. That function pertains to the
Sandiganbayan in the first instance. For purposes of this proceeding, all that the Court needs to
determine is whether or not there is prima facie justification for the sequestration ordered by the PCGG.
The Court is satisfied that there is. The cited incidents, given the public character of the coconut levy
funds, place petitioners COCOFED and its leaders and officials, at least prima facie, squarely within the
purview of Executive Orders Nos. 1, 2 and 14, as construed and applied in BASECO, to wit:

"1. that ill-gotten properties (were) amassed by the leaders and supporters of the previous regime;

"a. more particularly, that ‘(i) Ill-gotten wealth was accumulated by x x x Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives, subordinates and close associates, x x x (and) business enterprises and entities (came to be)
owned or controlled by them, during x x x (the Marcos) administration, directly or through nominees, by
taking undue advantage of their public office and using their powers, authority, influence, connections
or relationships’;

"b. otherwise stated, that ‘there are assets and properties purportedly pertaining to the Marcoses, their
close relatives, subordinates, business associates, dummies, agents or nominees which had been or
were acquired by them directly or indirectly, through or as a result of the improper or illegal use of funds
or properties owned by the Government x x x or any of its branches, instrumentalities, enterprises,
banks or financial institutions, or by taking undue advantage of their office, authority, influence,
connections or relationship, resulting in their unjust enrichment x x x;

xxxx

2. The petitioners’ claim that the assets acquired with the coconut levy funds are privately owned by the
coconut farmers is founded on certain provisions of law, to wit Sec. 7, RA 6260 and Sec. 5, Art. III, PD
1468… (Words in bracket added; italics in the original).

xxxx

E.O. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, it bears to stress, were issued precisely to effect the recovery of ill-gotten
assets amassed by the Marcoses, their associates, subordinates and cronies, or through their
nominees. Be that as it may, it stands to reason that persons listed as associated with the Marcoses
refer to those in possession of such ill-gotten wealth but holding the same in behalf of the actual, albeit
undisclosed owner, to prevent discovery and consequently recovery. Certainly, it is well-nigh
inconceivable that ill-gotten assets would be distributed to and left in the hands of individuals or entities
with obvious traceable connections to Mr. Marcos and his cronies. The Court can take, as it has in fact
taken, judicial notice of schemes and machinations that have been put in place to keep ill-gotten assets
under wraps. These would include the setting up of layers after layers of shell or dummy, but controlled,
corporations31 or manipulated instruments calculated to confuse if not altogether mislead would-be
investigators from recovering wealth deceitfully amassed at the expense of the people or simply the
fruits thereof. Transferring the illegal assets to third parties not readily perceived as Marcos cronies
would be another. So it was that in PCGG v. Pena, the Court, describing the rule of Marcos as a "well
entrenched plundering regime of twenty years," noted the magnitude of the past regime’s organized
pillage and the ingenuity of the plunderers and pillagers with the assistance of experts and the best
legal minds in the market.32

Prescinding from the foregoing premises, there can no longer be any serious challenge as to the
Sandiganbayan’s subject matter jurisdiction. And in connection therewith, the Court wrote in COCOFED
v. Republic, that the instant petition shall be decided separately and should not be affected by the
January 24, 2012 Decision, "save for determinatively legal issues directly addressed" therein.33 Thus:

We clarify that PSJ-A is subject of another petition for review interposed by Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr., in
G.R. No. 180705 entitled, Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. v. Republic of the Philippines, which shall be
decided separately by this Court. Said petition should accordingly not be affected by this Decision save
for determinatively legal issues directly addressed herein.34 (Emphasis Ours.)

We, therefore, reiterate our holding in COCOFED v. Republic respecting the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case No. 0033-A, including those matters whose
adjudication We shall resolve in the present case.

II

PRELIMINARILY, THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE PCA AND EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.
DATED MAY 25, 1975 CANNOT BE ACCORDED THE STATUS OF A LAW FOR THE LACK OF THE
REQUISITE PUBLICATION.

It will be recalled that Cojuangco’s claim of ownership over the UCPB shares is hinged on two contract
documents the respective contents of which formed part of and reproduced in their entirety in the
aforecited Order35 of the Sandiganbayan dated March 11, 2003. The first contract refers to the
agreement entered into by and between Pedro Cojuangco and his group, on one hand, and Eduardo M.
Cojuangco, Jr., on the other, bearing date "May 1975"36 (hereinafter referred to as "PC-ECJ
Agreement"), while the second relates to the accord between the PCA and Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.
dated May 25, 1975 (hereinafter referred to as "PCA-Cojuangco Agreement"). The PC-ECJ Agreement
allegedly contains, inter alia, Cojuangco’s personal and exclusive option to acquire the FUB ("UCPB")
shares from Pedro and his group. The PCA-Cojuangco Agreement shows PCA’s acquisition of the said
option from Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr.

Section 1 of P.D. No. 755 incorporated, by reference, the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a
Commercial Bank for the Benefit of the Coconut Farmers" executed by the PCA. Particularly, Section 1
states:

Section 1. Declaration of National Policy. It is hereby declared that the policy of the State is to provide
readily available credit facilities to the coconut farmers at preferential rates; that this policy can be
expeditiously and efficiently realized by the implementation of the "Agreement for the Acquisition of a
Commercial Bank for the benefit of the Coconut Farmers" executed by the Philippine Coconut
Authority, the terms of which "Agreement" are hereby incorporated by reference; and that the Philippine
Coconut Authority is hereby authorized to distribute, for free, the shares of stock of the bank it acquired
to the coconut farmers under such rules and regulations it may promulgate. (Emphasis Ours.)

It bears to stress at this point that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement referred to above in Section 1 of P.D.
755 was not reproduced or attached as an annex to the same law. And it is well-settled that laws must
be published to be valid. In fact, publication is an indispensable condition for the effectivity of a law.
Tañada v. Tuvera37 said as much:

Publication of the law is indispensable in every case x x x.

xxxx

We note at this point the conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course
presupposes that the law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all.
It is no less important to remember that Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes "the right of the
people to information on matters of public concern," and this certainly applies to, among others, and
indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.

xxxx

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication unless a
different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the President in the
exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the legislature, or, at
present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and regulations must also be
published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law pursuant also to a valid delegation.38

We even went further in Tañada to say that:

Laws must come out in the open in the clear light of the sun instead of skulking in the shadows with
their dark, deep secrets. Mysterious pronouncements and rumored rules cannot be recognized as
binding unless their existence and contents are confirmed by a valid publication intended to make full
disclosure and give proper notice to the people. The furtive law is like a scabbarded saber that cannot
feint, parry or cut unless the naked blade is drawn.39

The publication, as further held in Tañada, must be of the full text of the law since the purpose of
publication is to inform the public of the contents of the law. Mere referencing the number of the
presidential decree, its title or whereabouts and its supposed date of effectivity would not satisfy the
publication requirement.40

In this case, while it incorporated the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement by reference, Section 1 of P.D. 755
did not in any way reproduce the exact terms of the contract in the decree. Neither was acopy thereof
attached to the decree when published. We cannot, therefore, extend to the said

Agreement the status of a law. Consequently, We join the Sandiganbayan in its holding that the PCA-
Cojuangco Agreement shall be treated as an ordinary transaction between agreeing minds to be
governed by contract law under the Civil Code.

III

THE PCA-COJUANGCO AGREEMENT IS A VALID CONTRACT FOR HAVING THE REQUISITE

CONSIDERATION.

In PSJ-A, the Sandiganbayan struck down the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement as void for lack of
consideration/cause as required under Article 1318, paragraph 3 in relation to Article 1409, paragraph 3
of the Civil Code. The Sandiganbayan stated:

In sum, the evidence on record relied upon by defendant Cojuangco negates the presence of: (1) his
claimed personal and exclusive option to buy the 137,866 FUB shares; and (2) any pecuniary
advantage to the government of the said option, which could compensate for generous payment to him
by PCA of valuable shares of stock, as stipulated in the May 25, 1975 Agreement between him and the
PCA.41

On the other hand, the aforementioned provisions of the Civil Code state:
Art. 1318. There is no contract unless the following requisites concur:

(1) Consent of the contracting parties;

(2) Object certain which is the subject matter of the contract;

(3) Cause of the obligation which is established. (Emphasis supplied)42

Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

xxxx

(3) Those whose cause or object did not exist at the time of the transaction;43

The Sandiganbayan found and so tagged the alleged cause for the agreement in question, i.e.,
Cojuangco’s "personal and exclusive option to acquire the Option Shares," as fictitious. A reading of the
purchase agreement between Cojuangco and PCA, so the Sandiganbayan ruled, would show that
Cojuangco was not the only seller; thus, the option was, as to him, neither personal nor exclusive as he
claimed it to be. Moreover, as the Sandiganbayan deduced, that option was inexistent on the day of
execution of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement as the Special Power of Attorney executed by Cojuangco
in favor of now Senator Edgardo J. Angara, for the latter to sign the PC-ECJ Agreement, was dated
May 25, 1975 while the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement was also signed on May 25, 1975. Thus, the
Sandiganbayan believed that when the parties affixed their signatures on the second Agreement,
Cojuangco’s option to purchase the FUB shares of stock did not yet exist. The Sandiganbayan further
ruled that there was no justification in the second Agreement for the compensation of Cojuangco of
14,400 shares, which it viewed as exorbitant. Additionally, the Sandiganbayan ruled that PCA could not
validly enter, in behalf of FUB/UCPB, into a veritable bank management contract with Cojuangco, PCA
having a personality separate and distinct from that of FUB. As such, the Sandiganbayan concluded
that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement was null and void. Correspondingly, the Sandiganbayan also ruled
that the sequestered FUB (UCPB) shares of stock in the name of Cojuangco are conclusively owned by
the Republic.

After a circumspect study, the Court finds as inconclusive the evidence relied upon by Sandiganbayan
to support its ruling that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement is devoid of sufficient consideration. We shall
explain.

Rule 131, Section 3(r) of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 3. Disputable presumptions.—The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but

may be contradicted and overcome by other evidence:

xxxx

(r) That there was a sufficient consideration for a contract;

The Court had the occasion to explain the reach of the above provision in Surtida v. Rural Bank of
Malinao (Albay), Inc.,44 to wit:

Under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following are disputable presumptions: (1) private
transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary course of business has been followed; and (3)
there was sufficient consideration for a contract. A presumption may operate against an adversary who
has not introduced proof to rebut it. The effect of a legal presumption upon a burden of proof is to
create the necessity of presenting evidence to meet the legal presumption or the prima facie case
created thereby, and which if no proof to the contrary is presented and offered, will prevail. The burden
of proof remains where it is, but by the presumption, the one who has that burden is relieved for the
time being from introducing evidence in support of the averment, because the presumption stands in
the place of evidence unless rebutted.

The presumption that a contract has sufficient consideration cannot be overthrown by the bare
uncorroborated and self-serving assertion of petitioners that it has no consideration. To overcome the
presumption of consideration, the alleged lack of consideration must be shown by preponderance of
evidence. Petitioners failed to discharge this burden x x x. (Emphasis Ours.)

The assumption that ample consideration is present in a contract is further elucidated in Pentacapital
Investment Corporation v. Mahinay:45

Under Article 1354 of the Civil Code, it is presumed that consideration exists and is lawful unless the
debtor proves the contrary. Moreover, under Section 3, Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, the following
are disputable presumptions: (1) private transactions have been fair and regular; (2) the ordinary
course of business has been followed; and (3) there was sufficient consideration for a contract. A
presumption may operate against an adversary who has not introduced proof to rebut it. The effect of a
legal presumption upon a burden of proof is to create the necessity of presenting evidence to meet the
legal presumption or the prima facie case created thereby, and which, if no proof to the contrary is
presented and offered, will prevail. The burden of proof remains where it is, but by the presumption, the
one who has that burden is relieved for the time being from introducing evidence in support of the
averment, because the presumption stands in the place of evidence unless rebutted.46 (Emphasis
supplied.)

The rule then is that the party who stands to profit from a declaration of the nullity of a contract on the
ground of insufficiency of consideration––which would necessarily refer to one who asserts such
nullity––has the burden of overthrowing the presumption offered by the aforequoted Section 3(r).
Obviously then, the presumption contextually operates in favor of Cojuangco and against the Republic,
as plaintiff a quo, which then had the burden to prove that indeed there was no sufficient consideration
for the Second Agreement. The Sandiganbayan’s stated observation, therefore, that based on the
wordings of the Second Agreement, Cojuangco had no personal and exclusive option to purchase the
FUB shares from Pedro Cojuangco had really little to commend itself for acceptance. This, as opposed
to the fact that such sale and purchase agreement is memorialized in a notarized document whereby
both Eduardo Cojuangco, Jr. and Pedro Cojuangco attested to the correctness of the provisions
thereof, among which was that Eduardo had such option to purchase. A notarized document, Lazaro v.
Agustin47 teaches, "generally carries the evidentiary weight conferred upon it with respect to its due
execution, and documents acknowledged before a notary public have in their favor the disputable
presumption of regularity."

In Samanilla v. Cajucom,48 the Court clarified that the presumption of a valid consideration cannot be
discarded on a simple claim of absence of consideration, especially when the contract itself states that
consideration was given:

x x x This presumption appellants cannot overcome by a simple assertion of lack of consideration.

Especially may not the presumption be so lightly set aside when the contract itself states that
consideration was given, and the same has been reduced into a public instrument will all due
formalities and solemnities as in this case. (Emphasis ours.)

A perusal of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement disclosed an express statement of consideration for the
transaction:
NOW, THEREFORE, for and in consideration of the foregoing premises and the other terms and
conditions hereinafter contained, the parties hereby declare and affirm that their principal contractual
intent is (1) to ensure that the coconut farmers own at least 60% of the outstanding capital stock of the
Bank, and (2) that the SELLER shall receive compensation for exercising his personal and exclusive
option to acquire the Option Shares, for transferring such shares to the coconut farmers at the option
price of P200 per share, and for performing the management services required of him hereunder.

xxxx

4. As compensation for exercising his personal and exclusive option to acquire the Option
ShareApplying Samanilla to the case at bar, the express and positive declaration by the parties of the
presence of adequate consideration in the contract makes conclusive the presumption of sufficient
consideration in the PCA Agreement. Moreover, the option to purchase shares and management
services for UCPB was already availed of by petitioner Cojuangco for the benefit of the PCA. The
exercise of such right resulted in the execution of the PC-ECJ Agreement, which fact is not disputed.
The document itself is incontrovertible proof and hard evidence that petitioner Cojuangco had the right
to purchase the subject FUB (now UCPB) shares. Res ipsa loquitur.

The Sandiganbayan, however, pointed to the perceived "lack of any pecuniary value or advantage to
the government of the said option, which could compensate for the generous payment to him by PCA of
valuable shares of stock, as stipulated in the May 25, 1975 Agreement between him and the PCA."49

Inadequacy of the consideration, however, does not render a contract void under Article 1355 of the
Civil Code:

Art. 1355. Except in cases specified by law, lesion or inadequacy of cause shall not invalidate a
contract, unless there has been fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Emphasis supplied.)

Alsua-Betts v. Court of Appeals50 is instructive that lack of ample consideration does not nullify the
contract:

Inadequacy of consideration does not vitiate a contract unless it is proven which in the case at bar was
not, that there was fraud, mistake or undue influence. (Article 1355, New Civil Code). We do not find
the stipulated price as so inadequate to shock the court’s conscience, considering that the price paid
was much higher than the assessed value of the subject properties and considering that the sales were
effected by a father to her daughter in which case filial love must be taken into account. (Emphasis
supplied.)s and for transferring such shares to the coconut farmers, as well as for performing the
management services required of him, SELLER shall receive equity in the Bank amounting, in the
aggregate, to 95,304 fully paid shares in accordance with the procedure set forth in paragraph 6 below.
(Emphasis supplied.)

Vales v. Villa51 elucidates why a bad transaction cannot serve as basis for voiding a contract:

x x x Courts cannot follow one every step of his life and extricate him from bad bargains, protect him
from unwise investments, relieve him from one-sided contracts, or annul the effects of foolish acts. x x x
Men may do foolish things, make ridiculous contracts, use miserable judgment, and lose money by
them – indeed, all they have in the world; but not for that alone can the law intervene and restore.
There must be, in addition, a violation of law, the commission of what the law knows as an actionable
wrong, before the courts are authorized to lay hold of the situation and remedy it. (Emphasis ours.)

While one may posit that the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement puts PCA and the coconut farmers at a
disadvantage, the facts do not make out a clear case of violation of any law that will necessitate the
recall of said contract. Indeed, the anti-graft court has not put forward any specific stipulation therein
that is at war with any law, or the Constitution, for that matter. It is even clear as day that none of the
parties who entered into the two agreements with petitioner Cojuangco contested nor sought the
nullification of said agreements, more particularly the PCA who is always provided legal advice in said
transactions by the Government corporate counsel, and a battery of lawyers and presumably the COA
auditor assigned to said agency. A government agency, like the PCA, stoops down to level of an
ordinary citizen when it enters into a private transaction with private individuals. In this setting, PCA is
bound by the law on contracts and is bound to comply with the terms of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement
which is the law between the parties. With the silence of PCA not to challenge the validity of the PCA-
Cojuangco Agreement and the inability of government to demonstrate the lack of ample consideration
in the transaction, the Court is left with no other choice but to uphold the validity of said agreements.

While consideration is usually in the form of money or property, it need not be monetary. This is clear
from Article 1350 which reads:

Art. 1350. In onerous contracts the cause is understood to be, for each contracting party, the prestation
or promise of a thing or service by the other; in remuneratory ones, the service or benefit which is
remunerated; and in contracts of pure beneficence, the mere liability of the benefactor. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Gabriel v. Monte de Piedad y Caja de Ahorros52 tells us of the meaning of consideration:

x x x A consideration, in the legal sense of the word, is some right, interest, benefit, or advantage
conferred upon the promisor, to which he is otherwise not lawfully entitled, or any detriment, prejudice,
loss, or disadvantage suffered or undertaken by the promisee other than to such as he is at the time of
consent bound to suffer. (Emphasis Ours.)

The Court rules that the transfer of the subject UCPB shares is clearly supported by valuable
consideration.

To justify the nullification of the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement, the Sandiganbayan centered on the
alleged imaginary option claimed by petitioner to buy the FUB shares from the Pedro Cojuangco group.
It relied on the phrase "in behalf of certain other buyers" mentioned in the PC-ECJ Agreement as basis
for the finding that petitioner’s option is neither personal nor exclusive. The pertinent portion of said
agreement reads:

EDUARDO COJUANGCO, JR., Filipino, of legal age and with residence at 136 9th Street corner Balete
Drive, Quezon City, represented in this act by his duly authorized attorney-in-fact, EDGARDO J.
ANGARA, for and in his own behalf and in behalf of certain other buyers, (hereinafter collectively called
the "BUYERS"); x x x.

A plain reading of the aforequoted description of petitioner as a party to the PC-ECJ Agreement reveals
that petitioner is not only the buyer. He is the named buyer and there are other buyers who were
unnamed. This is clear from the word "BUYERS." If petitioner is the only buyer, then his description as
a party to the sale would only be "BUYER." It may be true that petitioner intended to include other
buyers. The fact remains, however, that the identities of the unnamed buyers were not revealed up to
the present day. While one can conjure or speculate that PCA may be one of the buyers, the fact that
PCA entered into an agreement to purchase the FUB shares with petitioner militates against such
conjecture since there would be no need at all to enter into the second agreement if PCA was already a
buyer of the shares in the first contract. It is only the parties to the PC-ECJ Agreement that can
plausibly shed light on the import of the phrase "certain other buyers" but, unfortunately, petitioner was
no longer allowed to testify on the matter and was precluded from explaining the transactions because
of the motion for partial summary judgment and the eventual promulgation of the July 11, 2003 Partial
Summary Judgment.
Even if conceding for the sake of argument that PCA is one of the buyers of the FUB shares in the PC-
ECJ Agreement, still it does not necessarily follow that petitioner had no option to buy said shares from
the group of Pedro Cojuangco. In fact, the very execution of the first agreement undeniably shows that
he had the rights or option to buy said shares from the Pedro Cojuangco group. Otherwise, the PC-ECJ
Agreement could not have been consummated and enforced. The conclusion is incontestable that
petitioner indeed had the right or option to buy the FUB shares as buttressed by the execution and
enforcement of the very document itself.

We can opt to treat the PC-ECJ Agreement as a totally separate agreement from the PCA-Cojuangco
Agreement but it will not detract from the fact that petitioner actually acquired the rights to the
ownership of the FUB shares from the Pedro Cojuangco group. The consequence is he can legally sell
the shares to PCA. In this scenario, he would resell the shares to PCA for a profit and PCA would still
end up paying a higher price for the FUB shares. The "profit" that will accrue to petitioner may just be
equal to the value of the shares that were given to petitioner as commission. Still we can only speculate
as to the true intentions of the parties. Without any evidence adduced on this issue, the Court will not
venture on any unproven conclusion or finding which should be avoided in judicial adjudication.

The anti-graft court also inferred from the date of execution of the special power of attorney in favor of
now Senator Edgardo J. Angara, which is May 25, 1975, that the PC-ECJ Agreement appears to have
been executed on the same day as the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement (dated May 25, 1975). The
coincidence on the dates casts "doubts as to the existence of defendant Cojuangco’s prior ‘personal
and exclusive’ option to the FUB shares."

The fact that the execution of the SPA and the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement occurred sequentially on
the same day cannot, without more, be the basis for the conclusion as to the non-existence of the
option of petitioner. Such conjecture cannot prevail over the fact that without petitioner Cojuangco,
none of the two agreements in question would have been executed and implemented and the FUB
shares could not have been successfully conveyed to PCA.

Again, only the parties can explain the reasons behind the execution of the two agreements and the
SPA on the same day. They were, however, precluded from elucidating the reasons behind such
occurrence. In the absence of such illuminating proof, the proposition that the option does not exist has
no leg to stand on.

More importantly, the fact that the PC-ECJ Agreement was executed not earlier than May 25, 1975
proves that petitioner Cojuangco had an option to buy the FUB shares prior to that date. Again, it must
be emphasized that from its terms, the first Agreement did not create the option.It, however, proved the
exercise of the option by petitioner.

The execution of the PC-ECJ Agreement on the same day as the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement more
than satisfies paragraph 2 thereof which requires petitioner to exercise his option to purchase the FUB
shares as promptly as practicable after, and not before, the execution of the second agreement, thus:

2. As promptly as practicable after execution of this Agreement, the SELLER shall exercise his option
to acquire the Option Shares and SELLER shall immediately thereafter deliver and turn over to the
Escrow Agent such stock certificates as are herein provided to be received from the existing
stockholders of the bank by virtue of the exercise on the aforementioned option. The Escrow Agent
shall thereupon issue its check in favor of the SELLER covering the purchase price for the shares
delivered. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Sandiganbayan viewed the compensation of petitioner of 14,400 FUB shares as exorbitant. In the
absence of proof to the contrary and considering the absence of any complaint of illegality or fraud from
any of the contracting parties, then the presumption that "private transactions have been fair and
regular"53 must apply.

Lastly, respondent interjects the thesis that PCA could not validly enter into a bank management
agreement with petitioner since PCA has a personality separate and distinct from that of FUB.
Evidently, it is PCA which has the right to challenge the stipulations on the management contract as
unenforceable. However, PCA chose not to assail said stipulations and instead even complied with and
implemented its prestations contained in said stipulations by installing petitioner as Chairman of UCPB.
Thus, PCA has waived and forfeited its right to nullify said stipulations and is now estopped from
questioning the same.

In view of the foregoing, the Court is left with no option but to uphold the validity of the two agreements
in question.

IV

COJUANGCO IS NOT ENTITLED TO THE UCPB SHARES WHICH WERE BOUGHT WITH PUBLIC
FUNDS AND HENCE, ARE PUBLIC PROPERTY.

The coconut levy funds were exacted for a

special public purpose. Consequently, any
use or transfer of the funds that directly
benefits private individuals should be
invalidated.

The issue of whether or not taxpayers’ money, or funds and property acquired through the imposition of
taxes may be used to benefit a private individual is once again posed. Preliminarily, the instant case
inquires whether the coconut levy funds, and accordingly, the UCPB shares acquired using the coconut
levy funds are public funds. Indeed, the very same issue took center stage, discussed and was directly
addressed in COCOFED v. Republic. And there is hardly any question about the subject funds’ public
and special character. The following excerpts from COCOFED v. Republic,54 citing Republic v.
COCOFED and related cases, settle once and for all this core, determinative issue:

Indeed, We have hitherto discussed, the coconut levy was imposed in the exercise of the State’s
inherent power of taxation. As We wrote in Republic v. COCOFED:

Indeed, coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes, which, in general, are enforced proportional
contributions from persons and properties, exacted by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the
support of government and for all public needs.

Based on its definition, a tax has three elements, namely: a) it is an enforced proportional contribution
from persons and properties; b) it is imposed by the State by virtue of its sovereignty; and c) it is levied
for the support of the government. The coconut levy funds fall squarely into these elements for the
following reasons:

(a) They were generated by virtue of statutory enactments imposed on the coconut farmers requiring
the payment of prescribed amounts. Thus, PD No. 276, which created the … (CCSF), mandated the
following:

"a. A levy, initially, of P15.00 per 100 kilograms of copra resecada or its equivalent in other coconut
products, shall be imposed on every first sale, in accordance with the mechanics established under RA
6260, effective at the start of business hours on August 10, 1973.
"The proceeds from the levy shall be deposited with the Philippine National Bank or any other
government bank to the account of the Coconut Consumers Stabilization Fund, as a separate trust fund
which shall not form part of the general fund of the government."

The coco levies were further clarified in amendatory laws, specifically PD No. 961 and PD No. 1468 –
in this wise:

"The Authority (PCA) is hereby empowered to impose and collect a levy, to be known as the Coconut
Consumers Stabilization Fund Levy, on every one hundred kilos of copra resecada, or its equivalent …
delivered to, and/or purchased by, copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators and other end-users of copra
or its equivalent in other coconut products. The levy shall be paid by such copra exporters, oil millers,
desiccators and other end-users of copra or its equivalent in other coconut products under such rules
and regulations as the Authority may prescribe. Until otherwise prescribed by the Authority, the current
levy being collected shall be continued."

Like other tax measures, they were not voluntary payments or donations by the people. They were
enforced contributions exacted on pain of penal sanctions, as provided under PD No. 276:

"3. Any person or firm who violates any provision of this Decree or the rules and regulations
promulgated thereunder, shall, in addition to penalties already prescribed under existing administrative
and special law, pay a fine of not less than P2, 500 or more than P10,000, or suffer cancellation of
licenses to operate, or both, at the discretion of the Court."

Such penalties were later amended thus: ….

(b) The coconut levies were imposed pursuant to the laws enacted by the proper legislative authorities
of the State. Indeed, the CCSF was collected under PD No. 276, …."

(c) They were clearly imposed for a public purpose. There is absolutely no question that they were
collected to advance the government’s avowed policy of protecting the coconut industry.

This Court takes judicial notice of the fact that the coconut industry is one of the great economic pillars
of our nation, and coconuts and their byproducts occupy a leading position among the country’s export
products; ….

Taxation is done not merely to raise revenues to support the government, but also to provide means for
the rehabilitation and the stabilization of a threatened industry, which is so affected with public interest
as to be within the police power of the State ….

Even if the money is allocated for a special purpose and raised by special means, it is still public in
character…. In Cocofed v. PCGG, the Court observed that certain agencies or enterprises "were
organized and financed with revenues derived from coconut levies imposed under a succession of law
of the late dictatorship … with deposed Ferdinand Marcos and his cronies as the suspected authors
and chief beneficiaries of the resulting coconut industry monopoly." The Court continued: "…. It cannot
be denied that the coconut industry is one of the major industries supporting the national economy. It is,
therefore, the State’s concern to make it a strong and secure source not only of the livelihood of a
significant segment of the population, but also of export earnings the sustained growth of which is one
of the imperatives of economic stability. (Emphasis Ours.)

The following parallel doctrinal lines from Pambansang Koalisyon ng mga Samahang Magsasaka at
Manggagawa sa Niyugan (PKSMMN) v. Executive Secretary55 came next:
The Court was satisfied that the coco-levy funds were raised pursuant to law to support a proper
governmental purpose. They were raised with the use of the police and taxing powers of the State for
the benefit of the coconut industry and its farmers in general. The COA reviewed the use of the funds.
The Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) treated them as public funds and the very laws governing
coconut levies recognize their public character.

The Court has also recently declared that the coco-levy funds are in the nature of taxes and can only
be used for public purpose. Taxes are enforced proportional contributions from persons and property,
levied by the State by virtue of its sovereignty for the support of the government and for all its public
needs. Here, the coco-levy funds were imposed pursuant to law, namely, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276. The
funds were collected and managed by the PCA, an independent government corporation directly under
the President. And, as the respondent public officials pointed out, the pertinent laws used the term levy,
which means to tax, in describing the exaction.

Of course, unlike ordinary revenue laws, R.A. 6260 and P.D. 276 did not raise money to boost the
government’s general funds but to provide means for the rehabilitation and stabilization of a threatened
industry, the coconut industry, which is so affected with public interest as to be within the police power
of the State. The funds sought to support the coconut industry, one of the main economic backbones of
the country, and to secure economic benefits for the coconut farmers and far workers. The subject laws
are akin to the sugar liens imposed by Sec. 7(b) of P.D. 388, and the oil price stabilization funds under
P.D. 1956, as amended by E.O. 137.

From the foregoing, it is at once apparent that any property acquired by means of the coconut levy
funds, such as the subject UCPB shares, should be treated as public funds or public property, subject
to the burdens and restrictions attached by law to such property. COCOFED v. Republic, delved into
such limitations, thusly:

We have ruled time and again that taxes are imposed only for a public purpose. "They cannot be used
for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons." When a law imposes taxes
or levies from the public, with the intent to give undue benefit or advantage to private persons, or the
promotion of private enterprises, that law cannot be said to satisfy the requirement of public purpose. In
Gaston v. Republic Planters Bank, the petitioning sugar producers, sugarcane planters and millers
sought the distribution of the shares of stock of the Republic Planters Bank (RPB), alleging that they
are the true beneficial owners thereof. In that case, the investment, i.e., the purchase of RPB, was
funded by the deduction of PhP 1.00 per picul from the sugar proceeds of the sugar producers pursuant
to P.D. No. 388. In ruling against the petitioners, the Court held that to rule in their favor would
contravene the general principle that revenues received from the imposition of taxes or levies "cannot
be used for purely private purposes or for the exclusive benefit of private persons." The Court amply
reasoned that the sugar stabilization fund is to "be utilized for the benefit of the entire sugar industry,
and all its components, stabilization of the domestic market including foreign market, the industry being
of vital importance to the country’s economy and to national interest."

Similarly in this case, the coconut levy funds were sourced from forced exactions decreed under P.D.
Nos. 232, 276 and 582, among others, with the end-goal of developing the entire coconut industry.
Clearly, to hold therefore, even by law, that the revenues received from the imposition of the coconut
levies be used purely for private purposes to be owned by private individuals in their private capacity
and for their benefit, would contravene the rationale behind the imposition of taxes or levies.

Needless to stress, courts do not, as they cannot, allow by judicial fiat the conversion of special funds
into a private fund for the benefit of private individuals. In the same vein, We cannot subscribe to the
idea of what appears to be an indirect – if not exactly direct – conversion of special funds into private
funds, i.e., by using special funds to purchase shares of stocks, which in turn would be distributed for
free to private individuals. Even if these private individuals belong to, or are a part of the coconut
industry, the free distribution of shares of stocks purchased with special public funds to them,
nevertheless cannot be justified. The ratio in Gaston, as articulated below, applies mutatis mutandis to
this case:

The stabilization fees in question are levied by the State … for a special purpose – that of "financing the
growth and development of the sugar industry and all its components, stabilization of the domestic
market including the foreign market." The fact that the State has taken possession of moneys pursuant
to law is sufficient to constitute them as state funds even though they are held for a special purpose….

That the fees were collected from sugar producers etc., and that the funds were channeled to the
purchase of shares of stock in respondent Bank do not convert the funds into a trust fund for their
benefit nor make them the beneficial owners of the shares so purchased. It is but rational that the fees
be collected from them since it is also they who are benefited from the expenditure of the funds derived
from it. ….56

In this case, the coconut levy funds were being exacted from copra exporters, oil millers, desiccators
and other end-users of copra or its equivalent in other coconut products.57 Likewise so, the funds here
were channeled to the purchase of the shares of stock in UCPB. Drawing a clear parallelism between
Gaston and this case, the fact that the coconut levy funds were collected from the persons or entities in
the coconut industry, among others, does not and cannot entitle them to be beneficial owners of the
subject funds – or more bluntly, owners thereof in their private capacity. Parenthetically, the said private
individuals cannot own the UCPB shares of stocks so purchased using the said special funds of the
government.58 (Emphasis Ours.)

As the coconut levy funds partake of the nature of taxes and can only be used for public purpose, and
importantly, for the purpose for which it was exacted, i.e., the development, rehabilitation and
stabilization of the coconut industry, they cannot be used to benefit––whether directly or indirectly––
private individuals, be it by way of a commission, or as the subject Agreement interestingly words it,
compensation. Consequently, Cojuangco cannot stand to benefit by receiving, in his private capacity,
7.22% of the FUB shares without violating the constitutional caveat that public funds can only be used
for public purpose. Accordingly, the 7.22% FUB (UCPB) shares that were given to Cojuangco shall be
returned to the Government, to be used "only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the
development of the coconut industry."59

The ensuing are the underlying rationale for declaring, as unconstitutional, provisions that convert
public property into private funds to be used ultimately for personal benefit:

… not only were the laws unconstitutional for decreeing the distribution of the shares of stock for free to
the coconut farmers and therefore negating the public purposed declared by P.D. No. 276, i.e., to
stabilize the price of edible oil and to protect the coconut industry. They likewise reclassified the
coconut levy fund as private fund, to be owned by private individuals in their private capacities, contrary
to the original purpose for the creation of such fund. To compound the situation, the offending
provisions effectively removed the coconut levy fund away from the cavil of public funds which normally
can be paid out only pursuant to an appropriation made by law. The conversion of public funds into
private assets was illegally allowed, in fact mandated, by these provisions. Clearly therefore, the
pertinent provisions of P.D. Nos. 755, 961 and 1468 are unconstitutional for violating Article VI, Section
29 (3) of the Constitution. In this context, the distribution by PCA of the UCPB shares purchased by
means of the coconut levy fund – a special fund of the government – to the coconut farmers is,
therefore, void.60

It is precisely for the foregoing that impels the Court to strike down as unconstitutional the provisions of
the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement that allow petitioner Cojuangco to personally and exclusively own
public funds or property, the disbursement of which We so greatly protect if only to give light and
meaning to the mandates of the Constitution.

As heretofore amply discussed, taxes are imposed only for a public purpose.61 They must, therefore, be
used for the benefit of the public and not for the exclusive profit or gain of private persons.62 Otherwise,
grave injustice is inflicted not only upon the Government but most especially upon the citizenry––the
taxpayers––to whom We owe a great deal of accountability.

In this case, out of the 72.2% FUB (now UCPB) shares of stocks PCA purchased using the coconut
levy funds, the May 25, 1975 Agreement between the PCA and Cojuangco provided for the transfer to
the latter, by way of compensation, of 10% of the shares subject of the agreement, or a total of 7.22%
fully paid shares. In sum, Cojuangco received public assets – in the form of FUB (UCPB) shares with a
value then of ten million eight hundred eighty-six thousand pesos (PhP 10,886,000) in 1975, paid by
coconut levy funds. In effect, Cojuangco received the aforementioned asset as a result of the PCA-
Cojuangco Agreement, and exclusively benefited himself by owning property acquired using solely
public funds. Cojuangco, no less, admitted that the PCA paid, out of the CCSF, the entire acquisition
price for the 72.2% option shares.63 This is in clear violation of the prohibition, which the Court seeks to
uphold.1âwphi1

We, therefore, affirm, on this ground, the decision of the Sandiganbayan nullifying the shares of stock
transfer to Cojuangco. Accordingly, the UCPB shares of stock representing the 7.22% fully paid shares
subject of the instant petition, with all dividends declared, paid or issued thereon, as well as any
increments thereto arising from, but not limited to, the exercise of pre-emptive rights, shall be
reconveyed to the Government of the Republic of the Philippines, which as We previously clarified,
shall "be used only for the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut
industry."64

But apart from the stipulation in the PCA-Cojuangco Agreement, more specifically paragraph 4 in
relation to paragraph 6 thereof, providing for the transfer to Cojuangco for the UCPB shares adverted to
immediately above, other provisions are valid and shall be enforced, or shall be respected, if the
corresponding prestation had already been performed. Invalid stipulations that are independent of, and
divisible from, the rest of the agreement and which can easily be separated therefrom without doing
violence to the manifest intention of the contracting minds do not nullify the entire contract.65

WHEREFORE, Part C of the appealed Partial Summary Judgment in Sandiganbayan Civil Case No.
0033-A is AFFIRMED with modification. As MODIFIED, the dispositive portion in Part C of the
Sandiganbayan’s Partial Summary Judgment in Civil Case No. 0033-A, shall read as follows:

C. Re: MOTION FOR PARTIAL SUMMARY JUDGMENT (RE: EDUARDO M. COJUANGCO, JR.)
dated September 18, 2002 filed by Plaintiff.

1. Sec. 1 of P.D. No. 755 did not validate the Agreement between PCA and defendant Eduardo
M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975 nor did it give the Agreement the binding force of a law
because of the non-publication of the said Agreement.

2. The Agreement between PCA and defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. dated May 25, 1975
is a valid contract for having the requisite consideration under Article 1318 of the Civil Code.

3. The transfer by PCA to defendant Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. of 14,400 shares of stock of
FUB (later UCPB) from the "Option Shares" and the additional FUB shares subscribed and paid
by PCA, consisting of
 a. Fifteen Thousand Eight Hundred Eighty-Four (15,884) shares out of the authorized
but unissued shares of the bank, subscribed and paid by PCA;

b. Sixty Four Thousand Nine Hundred Eighty (64,980) shares of the increased capital
stock subscribed and paid by PCA; and

c. Stock dividends declared pursuant to paragraph 5 and paragraph 11 (iv) (d) of the
PCA-Cojuangco Agreement dated May 25, 1975. or the so-called "Cojuangco-UCPB
shares" is declared unconstitutional, hence null and void.1âwphi1

4. The above-mentioned shares of stock of the FUB/UCPB transferred to defendant Cojuangco

are hereby declared conclusively owned by the Republic of the Philippines to be used only for
the benefit of all coconut farmers and for the development of the coconut industry, and ordered
reconveyed to the Government.

5. The UCPB shares of stock of the alleged fronts, nominees and dummies of defendant
Eduardo M. Cojuangco, Jr. which form part of the 72.2% shares of the FUB/UCPB paid for by
the PCA with public funds later charged to the coconut levy funds, particularly the CCSF, belong
to the plaintiff Republic of the Philippines as their true and beneficial owner.

Accordingly, the instant petition is hereby DENIED.

Costs against petitioner Cojuangco.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 164026 December 23, 2008

SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION, petitioner,

vs.
GMA NETWORK, INC., respondent.

DECISION

TINGA, J.:

Petitioner Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) assails the Decision1 dated February 20, 2004
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68163, which directed that SEC Memorandum Circular No.
1, Series of 1986 should be the basis for computing the filing fee relative to GMA Network, Inc.’s
(GMA’s) application for the amendment of its articles of incorporation for purposes of extending its
corporate term.

The undisputed facts as narrated by the appellate court are as follows:

On August 19, 1995, the petitioner, GMA NETWORK, INC., (GMA, for brevity), a domestic
corporation, filed an application for collective approval of various amendments to its Articles of
Incorporation and By-Laws with the respondent Securities and Exchange Commission, (SEC,
for brevity). The amendments applied for include, among others, the change in the corporate
name of petitioner from "Republic Broadcasting System, Inc." to "GMA Network, Inc." as well as
the extension of the corporate term for another fifty (50) years from and after June 16, 2000.
 Upon such filing, the petitioner had been assessed by the SEC’s Corporate and Legal
Department a separate filing fee for the application for extension of corporate term equivalent to
1/10 of 1% of its authorized capital stock plus 20% thereof or an amount of P1,212,200.00.

On September 26, 1995, the petitioner informed the SEC of its intention to contest the legality
and propriety of the said assessment. However, the petitioner requested the SEC to approve
the other amendments being requested by the petitioner without being deemed to have
withdrawn its application for extension of corporate term.

On October 20, 1995, the petitioner formally protested the assessment amounting
to P1,212,200.00 for its application for extension of corporate term.

On February 20, 1996, the SEC approved the other amendments to the petitioner’s Articles of
Incorporation, specifically Article 1 thereof referring to the corporate name of the petitioner as
well as Article 2 thereof referring to the principal purpose for which the petitioner was formed.

On March 19, 1996, the petitioner requested for an official opinion/ruling from the SEC on the
validity and propriety of the assessment for application for extension of its corporate term.

Consequently, the respondent SEC, through Associate Commissioner Fe Eloisa C. Gloria, on

April 18, 1996, issued its ruling upholding the validity of the questioned assessment, the
dispositive portion of which states:

"In light of the foregoing, we believe that the questioned assessment is in accordance
with law. Accordingly, you are hereby required to comply with the required filing fee."

An appeal from the aforequoted ruling of the respondent SEC was subsequently taken by the
petitioner on the ground that the assessment of filing fees for the petitioner’s application for
extension of corporate term equivalent to 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock plus 20%
thereof is not in accordance with law.

On September 26, 2001, following three (3) motions for early resolution filed by the petitioner,
the respondent SEC En Banc issued the assailed order dismissing the petitioner’s appeal, the
dispositive portion of which provides as follows:

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the instant Appeal is hereby dismissed.

SO ORDERED.2

In its petition for review3 with the Court of Appeals, GMA argued that its application for the extension of
its corporate term is akin to an amendment and not to a filing of new articles of incorporation. It further
averred that SEC Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994, which the SEC used as basis for
assessing P1,212,200.00 as filing fee for the extension of GMA’s corporate term, is not valid.

The appellate court agreed with the SEC’s submission that an extension of the corporate term is a
grant of a fresh license for a corporation to act as a juridical being endowed with the powers expressly
bestowed by the State. As such, it is not an ordinary amendment but is analogous to the filing of new
articles of incorporation.

However, the Court of Appeals ruled that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is legally invalid
and ineffective for not having been published in accordance with law. The challenged memorandum
circular, according to the appellate court, is not merely an internal or interpretative rule, but affects the
public in general. Hence, its publication is required for its effectivity.

The appellate court denied reconsideration in a Resolution4 dated June 9, 2004.

In its Memorandum5 dated September 6, 2005, the SEC argues that it issued the questioned
memorandum circular in the exercise of its delegated legislative power to fix fees and charges. The
filing fees required by it are allegedly uniformly imposed on the transacting public and are essential to
its supervisory and regulatory functions. The fees are not a form of penalty or sanction and, therefore,
require no publication.

For its part, GMA points out in its Memorandum,6 dated September 23, 2005, that SEC Memorandum
Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing fees for amended articles of incorporation where the
amendment consists of extending the term of corporate existence. The questioned circular, on the other
hand, refers only to filing fees for articles of incorporation. Thus, GMA argues that the former circular,
being the one that specifically treats of applications for the extension of corporate term, should apply to
its case.

Assuming that Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994 is applicable, GMA avers that the latter did
not take effect and cannot be the basis for the imposition of the fees stated therein for the reasons that
it was neither filed with the University of the Philippines Law Center nor published either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation as required under existing laws.

It should be mentioned at the outset that the authority of the SEC to collect and receive fees as
authorized by law is not in question.7 Its power to collect fees for examining and filing articles of
incorporation and by-laws and amendments thereto, certificates of increase or decrease of the capital
stock, among others, is recognized. Likewise established is its power under Sec. 7 of P.D. No. 902-A to
recommend to the President the revision, alteration, amendment or adjustment of the charges which it
is authorized to collect.

The subject of the present inquiry is not the authority of the SEC to collect and receive fees and
charges, but rather the validity of its imposition on the basis of a memorandum circular which, the Court
of Appeals held, is ineffective.

Republic Act No. 3531 (R.A. No. 3531) provides that where the amendment consists in extending the
term of corporate existence, the SEC "shall be entitled to collect and receive for the filing of the
amended articles of incorporation the same fees collectible under existing law as the filing of articles of
incorporation."8 As is clearly the import of this law, the SEC shall be entitled to collect and receive the
same fees it assesses and collects both for the filing of articles of incorporation and the filing of an
amended articles of incorporation for purposes of extending the term of corporate existence.

The SEC, effectuating its mandate under the aforequoted law and other pertinent laws, 9 issued SEC
Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986, imposing the filing fee of 1/10 of 1% of the authorized
capital stock but not less than P300.00 nor more than P100,000.00 for stock corporations, and 1/10 of
1% of the authorized capital stock but not less than P200.00 nor more than P100,000.00 for stock
corporations without par value, for the filing of amended articles of incorporation where the amendment
consists of extending the term of corporate existence.

Several years after, the SEC issued Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994, imposing new fees
and charges and deleting the maximum filing fee set forth in SEC Circular No. 1, Series of 1986, such
that the fee for the filing of articles of incorporation became 1/10 of 1% of the authorized capital stock
plus 20% thereof but not less than P500.00.
A reading of the two circulars readily reveals that they indeed pertain to different matters, as GMA
points out. SEC Memorandum Circular No. 1, Series of 1986 refers to the filing fee for the amendment
of articles of incorporation to extend corporate life, while Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1994
pertains to the filing fee for articles of incorporation. Thus, as GMA argues, the former circular, being
squarely applicable and, more importantly, being more favorable to it, should be followed.

What this proposition fails to consider, however, is the clear directive of R.A. No. 3531 to impose the
same fees for the filing of articles of incorporation and the filing of amended articles of incorporation to
reflect an extension of corporate term. R.A. No. 3531 provides an unmistakable standard which should
guide the SEC in fixing and imposing its rates and fees. If such mandate were the only consideration,
the Court would have been inclined to rule that the SEC was correct in imposing the filing fees as
outlined in the questioned memorandum circular, GMA’s argument notwithstanding.

However, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the questioned memorandum circular is invalid as it
does not appear from the records that it has been published in the Official Gazette or in a newspaper of
general circulation. Executive Order No. 200, which repealed Art. 2 of the Civil Code, provides that
"laws shall take effect after fifteen days following the completion of their publication either in the Official
Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, unless it is otherwise provided."

In Tañada v. Tuvera,10 the Court, expounding on the publication requirement, held:

We hold therefore that all statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be
published as a condition for their effectivity, which shall begin fifteen days after publication
unless a different effectivity date is fixed by the legislature.

Covered by this rule are presidential decrees and executive orders promulgated by the
President in the exercise of legislative powers whenever the same are validly delegated by the
legislature, or, at present, directly conferred by the Constitution. Administrative rules and
regulations must also be published if their purpose is to enforce or implement existing law
pursuant also to a valid delegation.

Interpretative regulations and those merely internal in nature, that is, regulating only the
personnel of the administrative agency and not the public, need not be published. Neither is
publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of
their duties.11

The questioned memorandum circular, furthermore, has not been filed with the Office of the National
Administrative Register of the University of the Philippines Law Center as required in the Administrative
Code of 1987.12

In Philsa International Placement and Services Corp. v. Secretary of Labor and

Employment,13 Memorandum Circular No. 2, Series of 1983 of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, which provided for the schedule of placement and documentation fees for private
employment agencies or authority holders, was struck down as it was not published or filed with the
National Administrative Register.

The questioned memorandum circular, it should be emphasized, cannot be construed as simply

interpretative of R.A. No. 3531. This administrative issuance is an implementation of the mandate of
R.A.
No. 3531 and indubitably regulates and affects the public at large. It cannot, therefore, be considered a
mere internal rule or regulation, nor an interpretation of the law, but a rule which must be declared
ineffective as it was neither published nor filed with the Office of the National Administrative Register.

A related factor which precludes consideration of the questioned issuance as interpretative in nature
merely is the fact the SEC’s assessment amounting to P1,212,200.00 is exceedingly unreasonable and
amounts to an imposition. A filing fee, by legal definition, is that charged by a public official to accept a
document for processing. The fee should be just, fair, and proportionate to the service for which the fee
is being collected, in this case, the examination and verification of the documents submitted by GMA to
warrant an extension of its corporate term.

Rate-fixing is a legislative function which concededly has been delegated to the SEC by R.A. No. 3531
and other pertinent laws. The due process clause, however, permits the courts to determine whether
the regulation issued by the SEC is reasonable and within the bounds of its rate-fixing authority and to
strike it down when it arbitrarily infringes on a person’s right to property.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 68163,
dated February 20, 2004, and its Resolution, dated June 9, 2004, are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189607

RENATO A. CASTILLO, Petitioner,

vs.
LEA P. DE LEON CASTILLO, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

Before this Court is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing
the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 in CA-GR. CV No. 90153 and the Resolution2 that affirmed the
same. The CA reversed the Decision3 dated 23 March 2007 issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Quezon City, Branch 84.

The RTC had granted the Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage between the parties on the
ground that respondent had a previous valid marriage before she married petitioner. The CA believes
on the other hand, that respondent was not prevented from contracting a second marriage if the first
one was an absolutely nullity, and for this purpose she did not have to await a final decree of nullity of
the first marriage.

The only issue that must be resolved by the Court is whether the CA was correct in holding thus and
consequentially reversing the RTC's declaration of nullity of the second marriage.

FACTUAL ANTECEDENTS

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. De Leon Castillo (Lea) married Benjamin Bautista (Bautista). On 6
January 1979, respondent married herein petitioner Renato A. Castillo (Renato).
On 28 May 2001, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,4 praying
that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista and her
psychological incapacity under Article 36 of the Family Code. The CA states in its Decision that
petitioner did not pursue the ground of psychological incapacity in the RTC. The reason for this finding
by the CA while unclear, is irrelevant in this Petition.

Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended among others that her marriage to Bautista was null
and void as they had not secured any license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.5

On 3 January 2002, respondent filed an action to declare her first marriage to Baustista void. On 22
January 2003, the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque City, Branch 260 rendered its Decision6 declaring
that Lea's first marriage to Bautista was indeed null and void ab initio. Thereafter, the same court
issued a Certificate of Finality saying that the Decision dated 22 January 2003 had become final and
executory. 7

On 12 August 2004, respondent filed a Demurrer to Evidence8 claiming that the proof adduced by
petitioner was insufficient to warrant a declaration of nullity of their marriage on the ground that it was
bigamous. In his Opposition, 9 petitioner countered that whether or not the first marriage of respondent
was valid, and regardless of the fact that she had belatedly managed to obtain a judicial declaration of
nullity, she still could not deny that at the time she entered into marriage with him, her previous
marriage was valid and subsisting. The RTC thereafter denied respondent's demurrer in its
Order 10 dated 8 March 2005.

In a Decision 11 dated 23 March 2007, the RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and
respondent null and void ab initio on the ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Article 41 of the
Family Code. 12 The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, the Court hereby declares the marriage
between RENATO A. CASTILLO and LEA P. DE LEON-CASTILLO contracted on January 6, 1979, at
the Mary the Queen Parish Church, San Juan, Metro Manila, is hereby declared NULL AND VOID AB
INITIO based on bigamous marriage, under Article 41 of the Family Code. 13

The RTC said that the fact that Lea's marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on
6 January 1979, makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower
court dismissed Lea's argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume
the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration
exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing. Lastly, it also said that even if respondent eventually had
her first marriage judicially declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriage were
subsisting before the first marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity
for her first marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato. 14

Petitioner moved for reconsideration insofar as the distribution of their properties were
concerned. 15 His motion, however, was denied by the RTC in its Order16 dated 6 September 2007.
Thereafter, both petitioner17 and Respondent18 filed their respective Notices of Appeal.

In a Decision19 dated 20 April 2009, the CA reversed and set aside the RTC's Decision and Order and
upheld the validity of the parties' marriage. In reversing the RTC, the CA said that since Lea's
marriages were solemnized in 1972 and in 1979, or prior to the effectivity of the Family Code on 3
August 1988, the Civil Code is the applicable law since it is the law in effect at the time the marriages
were celebrated, and not the Family Code.20 Furthermore, the CA ruled that the Civil Code does not
state that a judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage. 21
Petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the CA's Decision was likewise denied in the questioned CA
Resolution22 dated 16 September 2009.

Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

Respondent filed her Comment23 praying that the CA Decision finding her marriage to petitioner valid
be affirmed in toto, and that all properties acquired by the spouses during their marriage be declared
conjugal. In his Reply to the Comment,24 petitioner reiterated the allegations in his Petition.

OUR RULING

We deny the Petition.

The validity of a marriage and all its incidents must be determined in accordance with the law in effect
at the time of its celebration.25 In this case, the law in force at the time Lea contracted both marriages
was the Civil Code. The children of the parties were also born while the Civil Code was in effect i.e. in
1979, 1981, and 1985. Hence, the Court must resolve this case using the provisions under the Civil
Code on void marriages, in particular, Articles 80,26 81,27 82,28 and 83 (first paragraph);29 and those on
voidable marriages are Articles 83 (second paragraph),30 8531 and 86.32

Under the Civil Code, a void marriage differs from a voidable marriage in the following ways: (1) a void
marriage is nonexistent - i.e., there was no marriage from the beginning - while in a voidable marriage,
the marriage is valid until annulled by a competent court; (2) a void marriage cannot be ratified, while a
voidable marriage can be ratified by cohabitation; (3) being nonexistent, a void marriage can be
collaterally attacked, while a voidable marriage cannot be collaterally attacked; (4) in a void marriage,
there is no conjugal partnership and the offspring are natural children by legal fiction, while in voidable
marriage there is conjugal partnership and the children conceived before the decree of annulment are
considered legitimate; and (5) "in a void marriage no judicial decree to establish the invalidity is
necessary," while in a voidable marriage there must be a judicial decree.33

Emphasizing the fifth difference, this Court has held in the cases
of People v. Mendoza, 34 People v. Aragon, 35 and Odayat v. Amante, 36 that the Civil Code contains no
express provision on the necessity of a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage. 37

In Mendoza (1954), appellant contracted three marriages in 1936, 1941, and 1949. The second
marriage was contracted in the belief that the first wife was already dead, while the third marriage was
contracted after the death of the second wife. The Court ruled that the first marriage was deemed valid
until annulled, which made the second marriage null and void for being bigamous. Thus, the third
marriage was valid, as the second marriage was void from its performance, hence, nonexistent without
the need of a judicial decree declaring it to be so.

This doctrine was reiterated in Aragon (1957), which involved substantially the same factual
antecedents. In Odayat ( 1977), citing Mendoza and Aragon, the Court likewise ruled that no judicial
decree was necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages under Article 80 of the Civil Code.

It must be emphasized that the enactment of the Family Code rendered the rulings in Odayat,
Mendoza, and Aragon inapplicable to marriages celebrated after 3 August 1988. A judicial declaration
of absolute nullity of marriage is now expressly required where the nullity of a previous marriage is
invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage. 38 A second marriage contracted prior to the
issuance of this declaration of nullity is thus considered bigamous and void. 39 In Domingo v. Court of
Appeals, we explained the policy behind the institution of this requirement:
Marriage, a sacrosanct institution, declared by the Constitution as an "inviolable social institution, is the
foundation of the family;" as such, it "shall be protected by the State." In more explicit terms, the Family
Code characterizes it as "a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman entered
into in accordance with law for the establishment of conjugal and family life." So crucial are marriage
and the family to the stability and peace of the nation that their "nature, consequences, and incidents
are governed by law and not subject to stipulation." As a matter of policy, therefore, the nullification
of a marriage for the purpose of contracting another cannot be accomplished merely on the
basis of the perception of both parties or of one that their union is so defective with respect to
the essential requisites of a contract of marriage as to render it void ipso jure and with no legal
effect - and nothing more. Were this so, this inviolable social institution would be reduced to a
mockery and would rest on very shaky foundations indeed. And the grounds for nullifying marriage
would be as diverse and far-ranging as human ingenuity and fancy could conceive. For such a
socially significant institution, an official state pronouncement through the courts, and nothing
less, will satisfy the exacting norms of society. Not only would such an open and public
declaration by the courts definitively confirm the nullity of the contract of marriage, but the
same would be easily verifiable through records accessible to everyone.40 (Emphases
supplied)1âwphi1

However, as this Court clarified in Apiag v. Cantero41 and Ty v. Court of Appeals, 42 the requirement of
a judicial decree of nullity does not apply to marriages that were celebrated before the effectivity of the
Family Code, particularly if the children of the parties were born while the Civil Code was in force.
In Ty, this Court clarified that those cases continue to be governed by Odayat, Mendoza, and
Aragon, which embodied the then-prevailing rule:

x x x. In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997) the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering
into a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced
into marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the
children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code,
there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondent's second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v.
Court of Appeals, the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights. In
the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent x x x.
(Citations omitted)

As earlier explained, the rule in Odayat, Mendoza, and Aragon is applicable to this case. The Court
thus concludes that the subsequent marriage of Lea to Renato is valid in view of the invalidity of her
first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That there was no judicial
declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second marriage was contracted is
immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code. Nonetheless, the subsequent Decision of
the RTC of Parañaque City declaring the nullity of Lea's first marriage only serves to strengthen the
conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.
In view of the foregoing, it is evident that the CA did not err in upholding the validity of the marriage
between petitioner and respondent. Hence, we find no reason to disturb its ruling.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision dated 20
April 2009 and Resolution dated 16 September 2009 in CA-G.R. CV No. 90153 are AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 158298 August 11, 2010

ISIDRO ABLAZA, Petitioner,

vs.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

DECISION

BERSAMIN, J.:

Whether a person may bring an action for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage of his
deceased brother solemnized under the regime of the old Civil Code is the legal issue to be determined
in this appeal brought by the petitioner whose action for that purpose has been dismissed by the lower
courts on the ground that he, not being a party in the assailed marriage, had no right to bring the action.

Antecedents

On October 17, 2000, the petitioner filed in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cataingan, Masbate a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of the marriage contracted on December 26, 1949
between his late brother Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato.1 The case was docketed as Special
Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between Cresenciano Ablaza
and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner.

The petitioner alleged that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila had been celebrated without
a marriage license, due to such license being issued only on January 9, 1950, thereby rendering the
marriage void ab initio for having been solemnized without a marriage license. He insisted that his
being the surviving brother of Cresenciano who had died without any issue entitled him to one-half of
the real properties acquired by Cresenciano before his death, thereby making him a real party in
interest; and that any person, himself included, could impugn the validity of the marriage between
Cresenciano and Leonila at any time, even after the death of Cresenciano, due to the marriage being
void ab initio.2

Ruling of the RTC

On October 18, 2000, 3 the RTC dismissed the petition, stating:

Considering the petition for annulment of marriage filed, the Court hereby resolved to DISMISS the
petition for the following reasons: 1) petition is filed out of time (action had long prescribed) and 2)
petitioner is not a party to the marriage (contracted between Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Nonato
on December 26, 1949 and solemnized by Rev. Fr. Eusebio B. Calolot).

SO ORDERED.
The petitioner seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration, but the RTC denied the motion for
reconsideration on November 14, 2000.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The petitioner appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), assigning the lone error that:

The trial court erred in dismissing the petition for being filed out of time and that the petitioner is not a
party to the marriage.

In its decision dated January 30, 2003,4 however, the CA affirmed the dismissal order of the RTC, thus:

While an action to declare the nullity of a marriage considered void from the beginning does not
prescribe, the law nonetheless requires that the same action must be filed by the proper party, which in
this case should be filed by any of the parties to the marriage. In the instant case, the petition was filed
by Isidro Ablaza, a brother of the deceased-spouse, who is not a party to the marriage contracted by
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato. The contention of petitioner-appellant that he is considered a
real party in interest under Section 2, Rule 3 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as he stands to be
benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, is simply misplaced. Actions for annulment of marriage
will not prosper if persons other than those specified in the law file the case.

Certainly, a surviving brother of the deceased spouse is not the proper party to file the subject petition.
More so that the surviving wife, who stands to be prejudiced, was not even impleaded as a party to said
case.

WHEREFORE, finding no reversible error therefrom, the Orders now on appeal are hereby AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner-appellant.

SO ORDERED.5

Hence, this appeal.

Issues

The petitioner raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THIS HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-

G.R. CV. NO. 69684 AFFIRMING THE ORDER OF DISMISSAL OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT, BRANCH 49 AT CATAINGAN, MASBATE IN SPECIAL PROCEEDING NO. 117 IS IN
ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE LAWS AND JURISPRUDENCE;

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE DECISION OF THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IN CA-

G.R. CV NO. 69684 (SHOULD) BE REVERSED BASED ON EXECUTIVE ORDER NO. 209
AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE.

The issues, rephrased, boil down to whether the petitioner is a real party in interest in the action to seek
the declaration of nullity of the marriage of his deceased brother.
 Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

A valid marriage is essential in order to create the relation of husband and wife and to give rise to the
mutual rights, duties, and liabilities arising out of such relation. The law prescribes the requisites of a
valid marriage. Hence, the validity of a marriage is tested according to the law in force at the time the
marriage is contracted.6 As a general rule, the nature of the marriage already celebrated cannot be
changed by a subsequent amendment of the governing law.7 To illustrate, a marriage between a
stepbrother and a stepsister was void under the Civil Code, but is not anymore prohibited under the
Family Code; yet, the intervening effectivity of the Family Code does not affect the void nature of a
marriage between a stepbrother and a stepsister solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code. The
Civil Code marriage remains void, considering that the validity of a marriage is governed by the law in
force at the time of the marriage ceremony.8

Before anything more, the Court has to clarify the impact to the issue posed herein of Administrative
Matter (A.M.) No. 02-11-10-SC (Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and
Annulment of Voidable Marriages), which took effect on March 15, 2003.

Section 2, paragraph (a), of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC explicitly provides the limitation that a petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the husband or wife. Such
limitation demarcates a line to distinguish between marriages covered by the Family Code and those
solemnized under the regime of the Civil Code.9 Specifically, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC extends only to
marriages covered by the Family Code, which took effect on August 3, 1988, but, being a procedural
rule that is prospective in application, is confined only to proceedings commenced after March 15,
2003.10

Based on Carlos v. Sandoval,11 the following actions for declaration of absolute nullity of a marriage are
excepted from the limitation, to wit:

1. Those commenced before March 15, 2003, the effectivity date of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC; and

2. Those filed vis-à-vis marriages celebrated during the effectivity of the Civil Code and, those
celebrated under the regime of the Family Code prior to March 15, 2003.

Considering that the marriage between Cresenciano and Leonila was contracted on December 26,
1949, the applicable law was the old Civil Code, the law in effect at the time of the celebration of the
marriage. Hence, the rule on the exclusivity of the parties to the marriage as having the right to initiate
the action for declaration of nullity of the marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC had absolutely no
application to the petitioner.

The old and new Civil Codes contain no provision on who can file a petition to declare the nullity of a
marriage, and when. Accordingly, in Niñal v. Bayadog,12 the children were allowed to file after the death
of their father a petition for the declaration of the nullity of their father’s marriage to their stepmother
contracted on December 11, 1986 due to lack of a marriage license. There, the Court distinguished
between a void marriage and a voidable one, and explained how and when each might be impugned,
thuswise:

Jurisprudence under the Civil Code states that no judicial decree is necessary in order to establish the
nullity of a marriage. "A void marriage does not require a judicial decree to restore the parties to their
original rights or to make the marriage void but though no sentence of avoidance be absolutely
necessary, yet as well for the sake of good order of society as for the peace of mind of all concerned, it
is expedient that the nullity of the marriage should be ascertained and declared by the decree of a court
of competent jurisdiction." "Under ordinary circumstances, the effect of a void marriage, so far as
concerns the conferring of legal rights upon the parties, is as though no marriage had ever taken place.
And therefore, being good for no legal purpose, its invalidity can be maintained in any proceeding in
which the fact of marriage may be material, either direct or collateral, in any civil court between any
parties at any time, whether before or after the death of either or both the husband and the wife, and
upon mere proof of the facts rendering such marriage void, it will be disregarded or treated as non-
existent by the courts." It is not like a voidable marriage which cannot be collaterally attacked except in
direct proceeding instituted during the lifetime of the parties so that on the death of either, the marriage
cannot be impeached, and is made good ab initio. But Article 40 of the Family Code expressly provides
that there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage, though void, before a party
can enter into a second marriage and such absolute nullity can be based only on a final judgment to
that effect. For the same reason, the law makes either the action or defense for the declaration of
absolute nullity of marriage imprescriptible. Corollarily, if the death of either party would extinguish the
cause of action or the ground for defense, then the same cannot be considered imprescriptible.

However, other than for purposes of remarriage, no judicial action is necessary to declare a marriage
an absolute nullity. For other purposes, such as but not limited to determination of heirship, legitimacy
or illegitimacy of a child, settlement of estate, dissolution of property regime, or a criminal case for that
matter, the court may pass upon the validity of marriage even in a suit not directly instituted to question
the same so long as it is essential to the determination of the case. This is without prejudice to any
issue that may arise in the case. When such need arises, a final judgment of declaration of nullity is
necessary even if the purpose is other than to remarry. The clause "on the basis of a final judgment
declaring such previous marriage void" in Article 40 of the Family Code connotes that such final
judgment need not be obtained only for purpose of remarriage.13

It is clarified, however, that the absence of a provision in the old and new Civil Codes cannot be
construed as giving a license to just any person to bring an action to declare the absolute nullity of a
marriage. According to Carlos v. Sandoval,14 the plaintiff must still be the party who stands to be
benefited by the suit, or the party entitled to the avails of the suit, for it is basic in procedural law that
every action must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party in interest.15 Thus, only the
party who can demonstrate a "proper interest" can file the action.16 Interest within the meaning of the
rule means material interest, or an interest in issue to be affected by the decree or judgment of the
case, as distinguished from mere curiosity about the question involved or a mere incidental interest.
One having no material interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as plaintiff in an
action. When the plaintiff is not the real party in interest, the case is dismissible on the ground of lack of
cause of action.17

Here, the petitioner alleged himself to be the late Cresenciano’s brother and surviving heir. Assuming
that the petitioner was as he claimed himself to be, then he has a material interest in the estate of
Cresenciano that will be adversely affected by any judgment in the suit. Indeed, a brother like the
petitioner, albeit not a compulsory heir under the laws of succession, has the right to succeed to the
estate of a deceased brother under the conditions stated in Article 1001 and Article 1003 of the Civil
Code, as follows:

Article 1001. Should brothers and sisters or their children survive with the widow or widower, the latter
shall be entitled to one half of the inheritance and the brothers and sisters or their children to the other
half.

Article 1003. If there are no descendants, ascendants, illegitimate children, or a surviving spouse, the
collateral relatives shall succeed to the entire estate of the deceased in accordance with the following
articles.
Pursuant to these provisions, the presence of descendants, ascendants, or illegitimate children of the
deceased excludes collateral relatives like the petitioner from succeeding to the deceased’s
estate.18 Necessarily, therefore, the right of the petitioner to bring the action hinges upon a prior
determination of whether Cresenciano had any descendants, ascendants, or children (legitimate or
illegitimate), and of whether the petitioner was the late Cresenciano’s surviving heir. Such prior
determination must be made by the trial court, for the inquiry thereon involves questions of fact.

As can be seen, both the RTC and the CA erroneously resolved the issue presented in this case. We
reverse their error, in order that the substantial right of the petitioner, if any, may not be prejudiced.

Nevertheless, we note that the petitioner did not implead Leonila, who, as the late Cresenciano’s
surviving wife,19 stood to be benefited or prejudiced by the nullification of her own marriage. It is
relevant to observe, moreover, that not all marriages celebrated under the old Civil Code required

a marriage license for their validity;20 hence, her participation in this action is made all the more
necessary in order to shed light on whether the marriage had been celebrated without a marriage
license and whether the marriage might have been a marriage excepted from the requirement of a
marriage license. She was truly an indispensable party who must be joined herein:

xxx under any and all conditions, [her] presence being a sine qua non for the exercise of judicial
power.1avvphi1 It is precisely "when an indispensable party is not before the court [that] the action
should be dismissed." The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the
court null and void for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties but even as to those
present.21

We take note, too, that the petitioner and Leonila were parties in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 entitled Heirs
of Cresenciano Ablaza, namely: Leonila G. Ablaza and Leila Ablaza Jasul v. Spouses Isidro and
Casilda Ablaza, an action to determine who between the parties were the legal owners of the property
involved therein. Apparently, C.A.-G.R. CV No. 91025 was decided on November 26, 2009, and the
petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 23, 2010. As a defendant in that action, the
petitioner is reasonably presumed to have knowledge that the therein plaintiffs, Leonila and Leila, were
the wife and daughter, respectively, of the late Cresenciano. As such, Leila was another indispensable
party whose substantial right any judgment in this action will definitely affect. The petitioner should
likewise implead Leila.

The omission to implead Leonila and Leila was not immediately fatal to the present action, however,
considering that Section 11,22 Rule 3, Rules of Court, states that neither misjoinder nor non-joinder of
parties is a ground for the dismissal of an action. The petitioner can still amend his initiatory pleading in
order to implead her, for under the same rule, such amendment to implead an indispensable party may
be made "on motion of any party or on (the trial court’s) own initiative at any stage of the action and on
such terms as are just."

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is granted.

We reverse and set aside the decision dated January 30, 2003 rendered by the Court of Appeals.

Special Case No. 117 entitled In Re: Petition for Nullification of Marriage Contract between
Cresenciano Ablaza and Leonila Honato; Isidro Ablaza, petitioner, is reinstated, and its records are
returned to the Regional Trial Court, Branch 49, in Cataingan, Masbate, for further proceedings, with
instructions to first require the petitioner to amend his initiatory pleading in order to implead Leonila
Honato and her daughter Leila Ablaza Jasul as parties-defendants; then to determine whether the late
Cresenciano Ablaza had any ascendants, descendants, or children (legitimate or illegitimate) at the
time of his death as well as whether the petitioner was the brother and surviving heir of the late
Cresenciano Ablaza entitled to succeed to the estate of said deceased; and thereafter to proceed
accordingly.

No costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 140500 January 21, 2002

ERNESTINA BERNABE, petitioner,

vs.
CAROLINA ALEJO as guardian ad litem for the minor ADRIAN BERNABE, respondent.

DECISION

PANGANIBAN, J.:

The right to seek recognition granted by the Civil Code to illegitimate children who were still minors at
the time the Family Code took effect cannot be impaired or taken away. The minors have up to four
years from attaining majority age within which to file an action for recognition.

Statement of the Case

Before us is a Petition1 for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, praying for (1) the
nullification of the July 7, 1999 Court of Appeals2 (CA) Decision3 in CA-GR CV No. 51919 and the
October 14, 1999 CA Resolution4 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration, as well as (2) the
reinstatement of the two Orders issued by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City (Branch 109)
concerning the same case. The dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads as follows:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered, the order of the lower court dismissing Civil Case No. 94-0562 is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let the records of this case be remanded to the lower court for trial on
the merits."5

The Facts

The undisputed facts are summarized by the Court of Appeals in this wise:

"The late Fiscal Ernesto A. Bernabe allegedly fathered a son with his secretary of twenty-three (23)
years, herein plaintiff-appellant Carolina Alejo. The son was born on September 18, 1981 and was
named Adrian Bernabe. Fiscal Bernabe died on August 13, 1993, while his wife Rosalina died on
December 3 of the same year, leaving Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.

"On May 16, 1994, Carolina, in behalf of Adrian, filed the aforesaid complaint praying that Adrian be
declared an acknowledged illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe and as such he (Adrian) be given his
share in Fiscal Bernabe’s estate, which is now being held by Ernestina as the sole surviving heir.

"On July 16, 1995, the Regional Trial Court dismissed the complaint, ruling that under the provisions of
the Family Code as well as the case of Uyguangco vs. Court of Appeals, the complaint is now barred x
x x."6

Orders of the Trial Court

In an Order dated July 26, 1995, the trial court granted Ernestina Bernabe’s Motion for Reconsideration
of the trial court’s Decision and ordered the dismissal of the Complaint for recognition. Citing Article 175
of the Family Code, the RTC held that the death of the putative father had barred the action.

In its Order dated October 6, 1995, the trial court added that since the putative father had not
acknowledged or recognized Adrian Bernabe in writing, the action for recognition should have been
filed during the lifetime of the alleged father to give him the opportunity to either affirm or deny the
child’s filiation.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

On the other hand, the Court of Appeals ruled that in the interest of justice, Adrian should be allowed to
prove that he was the illegitimate son of Fiscal Bernabe. Because the boy was born in 1981, his rights
are governed by Article 285 of the Civil Code, which allows an action for recognition to be filed within
four years after the child has attained the age of majority. The subsequent enactment of the Family
Code did not take away that right.

Hence, this appeal.7

Issues

In her Memorandum,8 petitioner raises the following issues for our consideration:

"Whether or not respondent has a cause of action to file a case against petitioner, the legitimate
daughter of the putative father, for recognition and partition with accounting after the putative father’s
death in the absence of any written acknowledgment of paternity by the latter.

II

"Whether or not the Honorable Court of Appeals erred in ruling that respondents had four years from
the attainment of minority to file an action for recognition as provided in Art. 285 of the Civil Code, in
complete disregard of its repeal by the [express] provisions of the Family Code and the applicable
jurisprudence as held by the Honorable Court of Appeals.

III

"Whether or not the petition for certiorari filed by the petition[er] is fatally defective for failure to implead
the Court of Appeals as one of the respondents."9

The Court’s Ruling

The Petition has no merit.

First and Second Issues: Period to File Action for Recognition

Because the first and the second issues are interrelated, we shall discuss them jointly.

Petitioner contends that respondent is barred from filing an action for recognition, because Article 285
of the Civil Code has been supplanted by the provisions of the Family Code. She argues that the latter
Code should be given retroactive effect, since no vested right would be impaired. We do not agree.
Article 285 of the Civil Code provides the period for filing an action for recognition as follows:

"ART. 285. The action for the recognition of natural children may be brought only during the lifetime of
the presumed parents, except in the following cases:

(1) If the father or mother died during the minority of the child, in which case the latter may file
the action before the expiration of four years from the attainment of his majority;

(2) If after the death of the father or of the mother a document should appear of which nothing
had been heard and in which either or both parents recognize the child.

"In this case, the action must be commenced within four years from the finding of the document."

The two exceptions provided under the foregoing provision, have however been omitted by Articles
172, 173 and 175 of the Family Code, which we quote:

"ART. 172. The filiation of legitimate children is established by any of the following:

(1) The record of birth appearing in the civil register or a final judgment; or

(2) An admission of legitimate filiation in a public document or a private handwritten instrument

and signed by the parent concerned.

"In the absence of the foregoing evidence, the legitimate filiation shall be proved by:

(1) The open and continuous possession of the status of a legitimate child; or

(2) Any other means allowed by the Rules of Court and special laws."

"ART. 173. The action to claim legitimacy may be brought by the child during his or her lifetime and
shall be transmitted to the heirs should the child die during minority or in a state of insanity. In these
cases, the heirs shall have a period of five years within which to institute the action.

"The action already commenced by the child shall survive notwithstanding the death of either or both of
the parties."

"ART. 175. Illegitimate children may establish their illegitimate filiation in the same way and on the
same, evidence as legitimate children.

"The action must be brought within the same period specified in Article 173, except when the action is
based on the second paragraph of Article 172, in which case the action may be brought during the
lifetime of the alleged parent."

Under the new law, an action for the recognition of an illegitimate child must be brought within the
lifetime of the alleged parent. The Family Code makes no distinction on whether the former was still a
minor when the latter died. Thus, the putative parent is given by the new Code a chance to dispute the
claim, considering that "illegitimate children are usually begotten and raised in secrecy and without the
legitimate family being aware of their existence. x x x The putative parent should thus be given the
opportunity to affirm or deny the child’s filiation, and this, he or she cannot do if he or she is already
dead."10
Nonetheless, the Family Code provides the caveat that rights that have already vested prior to its
enactment should not be prejudiced or impaired as follows:

"ART. 255. This Code shall have retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or
acquired rights in accordance with the Civil Code or other laws."

The crucial issue to be resolved therefore is whether Adrian’s right to an action for recognition, which
was granted by Article 285 of the Civil Code, had already vested prior to the enactment of the Family
Code. Our answer is affirmative.

A vested right is defined as "one which is absolute, complete and unconditional, to the exercise of
which no obstacle exists, and which is immediate and perfect in itself and not dependent upon a
contingency x x x."11 Respondent however contends that the filing of an action for recognition is
procedural in nature and that "as a general rule, no vested right may attach to [or] arise from procedural
laws."12

Bustos v. Lucero13 distinguished substantive from procedural law in these words:

"x x x. Substantive law creates substantive rights and the two terms in this respect may be said to be
synonymous. Substantive rights is a term which includes those rights which one enjoys under the legal
system prior to the disturbance of normal relations. Substantive law is that part of the law which
creates, defines and regulates rights, or which regulates the rights and duties which give rise to a cause
of action; that part of the law which courts are established to administer; as opposed to adjective or
remedial law, which prescribes the method of enforcing rights or obtains redress for their
invasion."14 (Citations omitted)

Recently, in Fabian v. Desierto,15 the Court laid down the test for determining whether a rule is
procedural or substantive:

"[I]n determining whether a rule prescribed by the Supreme Court, for the practice and procedure of the
lower courts, abridges, enlarges, or modifies any substantive right, the test is whether the rule really
regulates procedure, that is, the judicial process for enforcing rights and duties recognized by
substantive law and for justly administering remedy and redress for a disregard or infraction of them. If
the rule takes away a vested right, it is not procedural. If the rule creates a right such as the right to
appeal, it may be classified as a substantive matter; but if it operates as a means of implementing an
existing right then the rule deals merely with procedure."16

Applying the foregoing jurisprudence, we hold that Article 285 of the Civil Code is a substantive law, as
it gives Adrian the right to file his petition for recognition within four years from attaining majority age.
Therefore, the Family Code cannot impair or take Adrian’s right to file an action for recognition,
because that right had already vested prior to its enactment.

Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals17 is not applicable to the case at bar, because the plaintiff therein
sought recognition as an illegitimate child when he was no longer a minor. On the other hand,
in Aruego Jr. v. Court of Appeals18 the Court ruled that an action for recognition filed while the Civil
Code was in effect should not be affected by the subsequent enactment of the Family Code, because
the right had already vested.

Not Limited to Natural Children

To be sure, Article 285 of the Civil Code refers to the action for recognition of "natural" children. Thus,
petitioner contends that the provision cannot be availed of by respondent, because at the time of his
conception, his parents were impeded from marrying each other. In other words, he is not
a natural child.

A "natural child" is one whose parents, at the time of conception, were not disqualified by any legal
impediment from marrying each other. Thus, in De Santos v. Angeles,19 the Court explained:

"A child’s parents should not have been disqualified to marry each other at the time of conception for
him to qualify as a ‘natural child.’"20

A strict and literal interpretation of Article 285 has already been frowned upon by this Court in the
aforesaid case of Aruego, which allowed minors to file a case for recognition even if their parents were
disqualified from marrying each other. There, the Complaint averred that the late Jose Aruego Sr., a
married man, had an extramarital liason with Luz Fabian. Out of this relationship were born two
illegitimate children who in 1983 filed an action for recognition. The two children were born in 1962 and
1963, while the alleged putative father died in 1982. In short, at the time of their conception, the two
children’s parents were legally disqualified from marrying each other. The Court allowed the Complaint
to prosper, even though it had been filed almost a year after the death of the presumed father. At the
time of his death, both children were still minors.

Moreover, in the earlier case Divinagracia v. Rovira,21 the Court said that the rules on voluntary and
compulsory acknowledgment of natural children, as well as the prescriptive period for filing such action,
may likewise be applied to spurious children. Pertinent portions of the case are quoted hereunder:

"The so-called spurious children, or illegitimate children other than natural children, commonly known
as bastards, include those adulterous children or those born out of wedlock to a married woman
cohabiting with a man other than her husband or to a married man cohabiting with a woman other than
his wife. They are entitled to support and successional rights. But their filiation must be duly proven.

"How should their filiation be proven? Article 289 of the Civil Code allows the investigation of the
paternity or maternity or spurious children under the circumstances specified in articles 283 and 284 of
the Civil Code. The implication is that the rules on compulsory recognition of natural children are
applicable to spurious children.

"Spurious children should not be in a better position than natural children. The rules on proof of filiation
of natural children or the rules on voluntary and compulsory acknowledgment for natural children may
be applied to spurious children.

"That does not mean that spurious children should be acknowledged, as that term is used with respect
to natural children. What is simply meant is that the grounds or instances for the acknowledgment of
natural children are utilized to establish the filiation of spurious children.

"A spurious child may prove his filiation by means of a record of birth, a will, a statement before a court
of record, or in any authentic writing. These are the modes of voluntary recognition of natural children.

"In case there is no evidence on the voluntary recognition of the spurious child, then his filiation may be
established by means of the circumstances or grounds for compulsory recognition prescribed in the
aforementioned articles 283 and 284.

"The prescriptive period for filing the action for compulsory recognition in the case of natural children,
as provided for in article 285 of the Civil Code, applies to spurious children."22 (Citations omitted, italics
supplied)
Thus, under the Civil Code, natural children have superior successional rights over spurious
ones.23 However, Rovira treats them as equals with respect to other rights, including the right to
recognition granted by Article 285.

To emphasize, illegitimate children who were still minors at the time the Family Code took effect and
whose putative parent died during their minority are thus given the right to seek recognition (under
Article 285 of the Civil Code) for a period of up to four years from attaining majority age. This vested
right was not impaired or taken away by the passage of the Family Code.

Indeed, our overriding consideration is to protect the vested rights of minors who could not have filed
suit, on their own, during the lifetime of their putative parents. As respondent aptly points out in his
Memorandum,24 the State as parens patriae should protect a minor’s right. Born in 1981, Adrian was
only seven years old when the Family Code took effect and only twelve when his alleged father died in
1993. The minor must be given his day in court.

Third Issue: Failure to Implead the CA

Under Section 4(a) of Rule 45 of the current Rules of Court, it is no longer required to implead "the
lower courts or judges x x x either as petitioners or respondents." Under Section 3, however, the lower
tribunal should still be furnished a copy of the petition. Hence, the failure of petitioner to implead the
Court of Appeals as a party is not a reversible error; it is in fact the correct procedure.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DENIED and the assailed Decision and
Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 127406 November 27, 2000

OFELIA P. TY, petitioner,

vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, and EDGARDO M. REYES, respondents.

DECISION

QUISUMBING, J.:

This appeal seeks the reversal of the decision dated July 24, 1996, of the Court of Appeals in C.A. –
G.R. CV 37897, which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 160, declaring
the marriage contract between private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes and petitioner Ofelia P. Ty null
and void ab initio. It also ordered private respondent to pay P15,000.00 as monthly support for their
children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes.

As shown in the records of the case, private respondent married Anna Maria Regina Villanueva in a
civil ceremony on March 29, 1977, in Manila. Then they had a church wedding on August 27, 1977.
However, on August 4, 1980, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City declared their
marriage null and void ab initio for lack of a valid marriage license. The church wedding on August 27,
1977, was also declared null and void ab initio for lack of consent of the parties.

Even before the decree was issued nullifying his marriage to Anna Maria, private respondent wed
Ofelia P. Ty, herein petitioner, on April 4, 1979, in ceremonies officiated by the judge of the City Court
of Pasay. On April 4, 1982, they also had a church wedding in Makati, Metro Manila.
On January 3, 1991, private respondent filed a Civil Case 1853-J with the RTC of Pasig, Branch 160,
praying that his marriage to petitioner be declared null and void. He alleged that they had no marriage
license when they got married. He also averred that at the time he married petitioner, he was still
married to Anna Maria. He stated that at the time he married petitioner the decree of nullity of his
marriage to Anna Maria had not been issued. The decree of nullity of his marriage to Anna Maria was
rendered only on August 4, 1980, while his civil marriage to petitioner took place on April 4, 1979.

Petitioner, in defending her marriage to private respondent, pointed out that his claim that their
marriage was contracted without a valid license is untrue. She submitted their Marriage License No.
5739990 issued at Rosario, Cavite on April 3, 1979, as Exh. 11, 12 and 12-A. He did not question this
document when it was submitted in evidence. Petitioner also submitted the decision of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations Court of Quezon City dated August 4, 1980, which declared null and void his civil
marriage to Anna Maria Regina Villanueva celebrated on March 29, 1977, and his church marriage to
said Anna Maria on August 27, 1977. These documents were submitted as evidence during trial and,
according to petitioner, are therefore deemed sufficient proof of the facts therein. The fact that the civil
marriage of private respondent and petitioner took place on April 4, 1979, before the judgment
declaring his prior marriage as null and void is undisputed. It also appears indisputable that private
respondent and petitioner had a church wedding ceremony on April 4, 1982.1

The Pasig RTC sustained private respondent’s civil suit and declared his marriage to herein petitioner
null and void ab initio in its decision dated November 4, 1991. Both parties appealed to respondent
Court of Appeals. On July 24, 1996, the appellate court affirmed the trial court’s decision. It ruled that a
judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage (to Anna Maria) must first be secured before a
subsequent marriage could be validly contracted. Said the appellate court:

We can accept, without difficulty, the doctrine cited by defendant’s counsel that ‘no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the invalidity of void marriages.’ It does not say, however, that a second
marriage may proceed even without a judicial decree. While it is true that if a marriage is null and
void, ab initio, there is in fact no subsisting marriage, we are unwilling to rule that the matter of whether
a marriage is valid or not is for each married spouse to determine for himself – for this would be the
consequence of allowing a spouse to proceed to a second marriage even before a competent court
issues a judicial decree of nullity of his first marriage. The results would be disquieting, to say the least,
and could not have been the intendment of even the now-repealed provisions of the Civil Code on
marriage.

xxx

WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing ratiocination, We modify the appealed Decision in this wise:

1. The marriage contracted by plaintiff-appellant [herein private respondent] Eduardo M. Reyes

and defendant-appellant [herein petitioner] Ofelia P. Ty is declared null and void ab initio;

2. Plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes is ordered to give monthly support in the amount of

P15,000.00 to his children Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes from November 4, 1991;
and

3. Cost against plaintiff-appellant Eduardo M. Reyes.

SO ORDERED.2

Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied. Hence, this instant petition asserting that the Court
of Appeals erred:
 I.

BOTH IN THE DECISION AND THE RESOLUTION, IN REQUIRING FOR THE VALIDITY OF
PETITIONER’S MARRIAGE TO RESPONDENT, A JUDICIAL DECREE NOT REQUIRED BY
LAW.

II

IN THE RESOLUTION, IN APPLYING THE RULING IN DOMINGO VS. COURT OF APPEALS.

III

IN BOTH THE DECISION AND RESOLUTION IN NOT CONSIDERING THE CIVIL EFFECTS
OF THE RELIGIOUS RATIFICATION WHICH USED THE SAME MARRIAGE LICENSE.

IV

IN THE DECISION NOT GRANTING MORAL AND EXEMPLARY DAMAGES TO THE

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

The principal issue in this case is whether the decree of nullity of the first marriage is required before a
subsequent marriage can be entered into validly? To resolve this question, we shall go over applicable
laws and pertinent cases to shed light on the assigned errors, particularly the first and the second which
we shall discuss jointly.

In sustaining the trial court, the Court of Appeals declared the marriage of petitioner to private
respondent null and void for lack of a prior judicial decree of nullity of the marriage between private
respondent and Villanueva. The appellate court rejected petitioner’s claim that People v.
Mendoza3 and People v. Aragon4 are applicable in this case. For these cases held that where a
marriage is void from its performance, no judicial decree is necessary to establish its invalidity. But the
appellate court said these cases, decided before the enactment of the Family Code (E.O. No. 209 as
amended by E.O No. 227), no longer control. A binding decree is now needed and must be read into
the provisions of law previously obtaining.5

In refusing to consider petitioner’s appeal favorably, the appellate court also said:

Terre v. Attorney Terre, Adm. Case No. 2349, 3 July 1992 is mandatory precedent for this case.
Although decided by the High Court in 1992, the facts situate it within the regime of the now-repealed
provisions of the Civil Code, as in the instant case.

xxx

For purposes of determining whether a person is legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial
declaration that the first marriage was null and void ab initio is essential. . . .6

At the outset, we must note that private respondent’s first and second marriages contracted in 1977
and 1979, respectively, are governed by the provisions of the Civil Code. The present case differs
significantly from the recent cases of Bobis v. Bobis7 and Mercado v. Tan,8 both involving
a criminal case for bigamy where the bigamous marriage was contracted during the effectivity of the
Family Code,9 under which a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is clearly required.

Pertinent to the present controversy, Article 83 of the Civil Code provides that:
Art. 83. Any marriage subsequently contracted by any person during the lifetime of the first spouse of
such person with any person other than such first spouse shall be illegal and void from its performance,
unless:

(1) The first marriage was annulled or dissolved; or

(2) The first spouse had been absent for seven consecutive years at the time of the second
marriage without the spouse present having news of the absentee being alive, or if the
absentee, though he has been absent for less than seven years, is generally considered as
dead and before any person believed to be so by the spouse present at the time of contracting
such subsequent marriage, or if the absentee is presumed dead according to articles 390 and
391. The marriage so contracted shall be valid in any of the three cases until declared null and
void by a competent court.

As to whether a judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary, the Civil Code contains no
express provision to that effect. Jurisprudence on the matter, however, appears to be conflicting.

Originally, in People v. Mendoza,10 and People v. Aragon,11 this Court held that no judicial decree is
necessary to establish the nullity of a void marriage. Both cases involved the same factual milieu.
Accused contracted a second marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. After the death of
his first wife, accused contracted a third marriage during the subsistence of the second marriage. The
second wife initiated a complaint for bigamy. The Court acquitted accused on the ground that the
second marriage is void, having been contracted during the existence of the first marriage. There is no
need for a judicial declaration that said second marriage is void. Since the second marriage is void, and
the first one terminated by the death of his wife, there are no two subsisting valid marriages. Hence,
there can be no bigamy. Justice Alex Reyes dissented in both cases, saying that it is not for the
spouses but the court to judge whether a marriage is void or not.

In Gomez v. Lipana,12 and Consuegra v. Consuegra,13 however, we recognized the right of the second
wife who entered into the marriage in good faith, to share in their acquired estate and in proceeds of the
retirement insurance of the husband. The Court observed that although the second marriage can be
presumed to be void ab initio as it was celebrated while the first marriage was still subsisting, still there
was a need for judicial declaration of such nullity (of the second marriage). And since the death of the
husband supervened before such declaration, we upheld the right of the second wife to share in the
estate they acquired, on grounds of justice and equity.14

But in Odayat v. Amante (1977),15 the Court adverted to Aragon and Mendoza as precedents. We
exonerated a clerk of court of the charge of immorality on the ground that his marriage to Filomena
Abella in October of 1948 was void, since she was already previously married to one Eliseo Portales in
February of the same year. The Court held that no judicial decree is necessary to establish the
invalidity of void marriages. This ruling was affirmed in Tolentino v. Paras.16

Yet again in Wiegel v. Sempio-Diy (1986),17 the Court held that there is a need for a judicial declaration
of nullity of a void marriage. In Wiegel, Lilia married Maxion in 1972. In 1978, she married another man,
Wiegel. Wiegel filed a petition with the Juvenile Domestic Relations Court to declare his marriage to
Lilia as void on the ground of her previous valid marriage. The Court, expressly relying on Consuegra,
concluded that:18

There is likewise no need of introducing evidence about the existing prior marriage of her first husband
at the time they married each other, for then such a marriage though void still needs according to this
Court a judicial declaration (citing Consuegra) of such fact and for all legal intents and purposes she
would still be regarded as a married woman at the time she contracted her marriage with respondent
Karl Heinz Wiegel; accordingly, the marriage of petitioner and respondent would be regarded VOID
under the law. (Emphasis supplied).

In Yap v. Court of Appeals,19 however, the Court found the second marriage void without need of
judicial declaration, thus reverting to the Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon rulings.

At any rate, the confusion under the Civil Code was put to rest under the Family Code. Our rulings
in Gomez, Consuegra, and Wiegel were eventually embodied in Article 40 of the Family Code.20 Article
40 of said Code expressly required a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage –

Art. 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

In Terre v. Terre (1992)21 the Court, applying Gomez, Consuegra and Wiegel, categorically stated that a
judicial declaration of nullity of a void marriage is necessary. Thus, we disbarred a lawyer for
contracting a bigamous marriage during the subsistence of his first marriage. He claimed that his first
marriage in 1977 was void since his first wife was already married in 1968. We held that Atty. Terre
should have known that the prevailing case law is that "for purposes of determining whether a person is
legally free to contract a second marriage, a judicial declaration that the first marriage was null and
void ab initio is essential."

The Court applied this ruling in subsequent cases. In Domingo v. Court of Appeals (1993),22 the Court
held:

Came the Family Code which settled once and for all the conflicting jurisprudence on the matter. A
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is now explicitly required either as a cause of action or a
ground for defense. (Art. 39 of the Family Code). Where the absolute nullity of a previous marriage is
sought to be invoked for purposes of contracting a second marriage, the sole basis acceptable in law
for said projected marriage to be free from legal infirmity is a final judgment declaring the previous
marriage void. (Family Code, Art. 40; See also arts. 11, 13, 42, 44, 48, 50, 52, 54, 86, 99, 147, 148). 23

However, a recent case applied the old rule because of the peculiar circumstances of the case.
In Apiag v. Cantero, (1997)24 the first wife charged a municipal trial judge of immorality for entering into
a second marriage. The judge claimed that his first marriage was void since he was merely forced into
marrying his first wife whom he got pregnant. On the issue of nullity of the first marriage, we
applied Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. We held that since the second marriage took place and all the
children thereunder were born before the promulgation of Wiegel and the effectivity of the Family Code,
there is no need for a judicial declaration of nullity of the first marriage pursuant to prevailing
jurisprudence at that time.

Similarly, in the present case, the second marriage of private respondent was entered into in 1979,
before Wiegel. At that time, the prevailing rule was found in Odayat, Mendoza and Aragon. The first
marriage of private respondent being void for lack of license and consent, there was no need for judicial
declaration of its nullity before he could contract a second marriage. In this case, therefore, we
conclude that private respondent’s second marriage to petitioner is valid.

Moreover, we find that the provisions of the Family Code cannot be retroactively applied to the present
case, for to do so would prejudice the vested rights of petitioner and of her children. As held in Jison v.
Court of Appeals,25 the Family Code has retroactive effect unless there be impairment of vested rights.
In the present case, that impairment of vested rights of petitioner and the children is patent.
Additionally, we are not quite prepared to give assent to the appellate court’s finding that despite private
respondent’s "deceit and perfidy" in contracting marriage with petitioner, he could benefit from her
silence on the issue. Thus, coming now to the civil effects of the church ceremony wherein petitioner
married private respondent using the marriage license used three years earlier in the civil ceremony,
we find that petitioner now has raised this matter properly. Earlier petitioner claimed as untruthful
private respondent’s allegation that he wed petitioner but they lacked a marriage license. Indeed we
find there was a marriage license, though it was the same license issued on April 3, 1979 and used in
both the civil and the church rites. Obviously, the church ceremony was confirmatory of their civil
marriage. As petitioner contends, the appellate court erred when it refused to recognize the validity and
salutary effects of said canonical marriage on a technicality, i.e. that petitioner had failed to raise this
matter as affirmative defense during trial. She argues that such failure does not prevent the appellate
court from giving her defense due consideration and weight. She adds that the interest of the State in
protecting the inviolability of marriage, as a legal and social institution, outweighs such technicality. In
our view, petitioner and private respondent had complied with all the essential and formal requisites for
a valid marriage, including the requirement of a valid license in the first of the two ceremonies. That this
license was used legally in the celebration of the civil ceremony does not detract from the ceremonial
use thereof in the church wedding of the same parties to the marriage, for we hold that the latter rites
served not only to ratify but also to fortify the first. The appellate court might have its reasons for
brushing aside this possible defense of the defendant below which undoubtedly could have tendered a
valid issue, but which was not timely interposed by her before the trial court. But we are now persuaded
we cannot play blind to the absurdity, if not inequity, of letting the wrongdoer profit from what the CA
calls "his own deceit and perfidy."

On the matter of petitioner’s counterclaim for damages and attorney’s fees.1âwphi1 Although the
appellate court admitted that they found private respondent acted "duplicitously and craftily" in marrying
petitioner, it did not award moral damages because the latter did not adduce evidence to support her
claim.26

Like the lower courts, we are also of the view that no damages should be awarded in the present case,
but for another reason. Petitioner wants her marriage to private respondent held valid and subsisting.
She is suing to maintain her status as legitimate wife. In the same breath, she asks for damages from
her husband for filing a baseless complaint for annulment of their marriage which caused her mental
anguish, anxiety, besmirched reputation, social humiliation and alienation from her parents. Should we
grant her prayer, we would have a situation where the husband pays the wife damages from conjugal
or common funds. To do so, would make the application of the law absurd. Logic, if not common sense,
militates against such incongruity. Moreover, our laws do not comprehend an action for damages
between husband and wife merely because of breach of a marital obligation.27 There are other
remedies.28

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated July 24,
1996 and its Resolution dated November 7, 1996, are reversed partially, so that the marriage of
petitioner Ofelia P. Ty and private respondent Edgardo M. Reyes is hereby DECLARED VALID AND
SUBSISTING; and the award of the amount of P15,000.00 is RATIFIED and MAINTAINED as monthly
support to their two children, Faye Eloise Reyes and Rachel Anne Reyes, for as long as they are of
minor age or otherwise legally entitled thereto. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

A.M. No. MTJ-92-706 March 29, 1995

LUPO ALMODIEL ATIENZA, complainant,

vs.
JUDGE FRANCISCO F. BRILLANTES, JR., Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 28,
Manila, respondent.
QUIASON, J.:

This is a complaint by Lupo A. Atienza for Gross Immorality and Appearance of Impropriety against
Judge Francisco Brillantes, Jr., Presiding Judge of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 20, Manila.

Complainant alleges that he has two children with Yolanda De Castro, who are living together at No. 34
Galaxy Street, Bel-Air Subdivision, Makati, Metro Manila. He stays in said house, which he purchased
in 1987, whenever he is in Manila.

In December 1991, upon opening the door to his bedroom, he saw respondent sleeping on his
(complainant's) bed. Upon inquiry, he was told by the houseboy that respondent had been cohabiting
with De Castro. Complainant did not bother to wake up respondent and instead left the house after
giving instructions to his houseboy to take care of his children.

Thereafter, respondent prevented him from visiting his children and even alienated the affection of his
children for him.

Complainant claims that respondent is married to one Zenaida Ongkiko with whom he has five children,
as appearing in his 1986 and 1991 sworn statements of assets and liabilities. Furthermore, he alleges
that respondent caused his arrest on January 13, 1992, after he had a heated argument with De Castro
inside the latter's office.

For his part, respondent alleges that complainant was not married to De Castro and that the filing of the
administrative action was related to complainant's claim on the Bel-Air residence, which was disputed
by De Castro.

Respondent denies that he caused complainant's arrest and claims that he was even a witness to the
withdrawal of the complaint for Grave Slander filed by De Castro against complainant. According to
him, it was the sister of De Castro who called the police to arrest complainant.

Respondent also denies having been married to Ongkiko, although he admits having five children with
her. He alleges that while he and Ongkiko went through a marriage ceremony before a Nueva Ecija
town mayor on April 25, 1965, the same was not a valid marriage for lack of a marriage license. Upon
the request of the parents of Ongkiko, respondent went through another marriage ceremony with her in
Manila on June 5, 1965. Again, neither party applied for a marriage license. Ongkiko abandoned
respondent 17 years ago, leaving their children to his care and custody as a single parent.

Respondent claims that when he married De Castro in civil rites in Los Angeles, California on
December 4, 1991, he believed, in all good faith and for all legal intents and purposes, that he was
single because his first marriage was solemnized without a license.

Under the Family Code, there must be a judicial declaration of the nullity of a previous marriage before
a party thereto can enter into a second marriage. Article 40 of said Code provides:

The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for the purposes of
remarriage on the basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.

Respondent argues that the provision of Article 40 of the Family Code does not apply to him
considering that his first marriage took place in 1965 and was governed by the Civil Code of the
Philippines; while the second marriage took place in 1991 and governed by the Family Code.
Article 40 is applicable to remarriages entered into after the effectivity of the Family Code on August 3,
1988 regardless of the date of the first marriage. Besides, under Article 256 of the Family Code, said
Article is given "retroactive effect insofar as it does not prejudice or impair vested or acquired rights in
accordance with the Civil Code or other laws." This is particularly true with Article 40, which is a rule of
procedure. Respondent has not shown any vested right that was impaired by the application of Article
40 to his case.

The fact that procedural statutes may somehow affect the litigants' rights may not preclude their
retroactive application to pending actions. The retroactive application of procedural laws is not violative
of any right of a person who may feel that he is adversely affected (Gregorio v. Court of Appeals, 26
SCRA 229 [1968]). The reason is that as a general rule no vested right may attach to, nor arise from,
procedural laws (Billones v. Court of Industrial Relations, 14 SCRA 674 [1965]).

Respondent is the last person allowed to invoke good faith. He made a mockery of the institution of
marriage and employed deceit to be able to cohabit with a woman, who beget him five children.

Respondent passed the Bar examinations in 1962 and was admitted to the practice of law in 1963. At
the time he went through the two marriage ceremonies with Ongkiko, he was already a lawyer. Yet, he
never secured any marriage license. Any law student would know that a marriage license is necessary
before one can get married. Respondent was given an opportunity to correct the flaw in his first
marriage when he and Ongkiko were married for the second time. His failure to secure a marriage
license on these two occasions betrays his sinister motives and bad faith.

It is evident that respondent failed to meet the standard of moral fitness for membership in the legal
profession.

While the deceit employed by respondent existed prior to his appointment as a Metropolitan Trial
Judge, his immoral and illegal act of cohabiting with De Castro began and continued when he was
already in the judiciary.

The Code of Judicial Ethics mandates that the conduct of a judge must be free of a whiff of impropriety,
not only with respect to his performance of his judicial duties but also as to his behavior as a private
individual. There is no duality of morality. A public figure is also judged by his private life. A judge, in
order to promote public confidence in the integrity and impartiality of the judiciary, must behave with
propriety at all times, in the performance of his judicial duties and in his everyday life. These are judicial
guideposts too self-evident to be overlooked. No position exacts a greater demand on moral
righteousness and uprightness of an individual than a seat in the judiciary (Imbing v. Tiongzon, 229
SCRA 690 [1994]).

WHEREFORE, respondent is DISMISSED from the service with forfeiture of all leave and retirement
benefits and with prejudice to reappointment in any branch, instrumentality, or agency of the
government, including government-owned and controlled corporations. This decision is immediately
executory.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 226727

UNIVERSITY OF THE EAST and DR. ESTER GARCIA, Petitioners

vs
VERONICA M. MASANGKAY and GERTRUDO R. REGONDOLA, Respondents
 DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking the reversal and
setting aside of the February 19, 2016 Decision1 and August 26, 2016 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 132774, entitled "Veronica M Masangkay and Gertruda R. Regondola
v. University of the East, Dr. Ester Garcia and The National Labor Relations Commission."

Respondents Veronica M. Masangkay (Masangkay) and Gertrudo R. Regondola (Regondola) were

regular faculty members, Associate Professors, and Associate Deans of petitioner University of the
East (UE) - Caloocan Campus, prior to their dismissal on November 26, 2007.

While holding said positions at UE, respondents submitted three (3) manuals, namely: Mechanics,
Statics, and Dynamics, requesting said manuals' temporary adoption as instructional materials.
Respondents represented themselves to be the rightful authors thereof, together with their co-author, a
certain Adelia F. Rocamora (Rocamora). Accompanying said requests are certifications under oath,
signed by respondents, declaring under pain of perjury, and openly certifying that the manuals are
entirely original and free from plagiarism. Said certification reads:

We hereby certify that the contents of the manual MECHANICS FOR ECE AND COE by Gertruda R.
Regondola, et al. to be used in the subjects ECE 311N are entirely original and free from plagiarism.

(SGD.)

Gertruda R.
Regondola.

(SGD.)
Veronica Masangkay2

After review, UE approved the requests for use of said manuals by students of the College of
Engineering.

Thereafter, petitioners received two (2) complaint-letters via electronic mail (e-mail) from a certain Harry
H. Chenoweth and Lucy Singer Block. Chenoweth arid Block's father are authors, respectively, of three
books, namely: Applied Engineering Mechanics, Engineering Mechanics, 2nd Edition, 1954, and
Engineering Mechanics: Statics & Dynamics, 3rd Edition, 1975. They categorically denied giving
respondents permission to copy, reproduce, imitate, or alter said books, and asked for assistance from
UE to stop the alleged unlawful acts and deal with this academic dishonesty.

Prompted by the seriousness of the allegations, UE investigated the matter. After a thorough evaluation
of the alleged plagiarized portions, petitioner conducted an investigation in which respondents actively
participated and filed their Answer. Eventually, UE's Board of Trustees issued Resolution No. 2007-11-
84 dismissing respondents. Notices of Dismissal effective November 26, 2007 were sent to
respondents and Rocamora via registered mail.

Unlike herein respondents, Rocamora sought reconsideration of the decision to the Board of Trustees.
Respondents, however, did not appeal the decision terminating them and instead opted to claim their
benefits due them, which consisted of leave credits, sick leave, holiday pay, bonuses, shares in tuition
fee increase, COLA, and RAT A. For her part, respondent Masangkay requested that a portion of her
benefits be applied to her existing car loan. For the amounts that they received, they signed vouchers
and pay slips. These were duly acted upon by UE.

Rocamora's case

It appears that after the Board of Trustees denied reconsideration of Rocamora's dismissal, the latter
filed a case against UE for illegal dismissal. Eventually reaching this Court, the illegality of her dismissal
was upheld by the Court through a resolution in University of the East and Dr. Ester Garcia v. Adelia
Rocamora, G.R. No. 199959, February 6, 2012.

Meanwhile, almost three years after having been dismissed from service and after collecting their
accrued benefits, respondents then filed a complaint for illegal dismissal on July 20, 2010, docketed as
NLRC NCR No. 07-09924-10, entitled "Veronica M. Masangkay and Gertruda R. Re gondola v.
University of the East (UE), President Ester Garcia."

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

In its February 28, 2011 ruling,3 the labor arbiter held that respondents were illegally dismissed and
ordered their reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and full backwages
inclusive of allowances until actual reinstatement. UE was directed to pay a total of ₱4,623,873.34
representing both respondents' backwages, allowances, 13th month pay, moral and exemplary
damages. Thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding complainants to have been
ILLEGALLY DISMISSED. Respondents are ordered 10 immediately reinstate complainants to their
position without loss of seniority rights and other benefits and full backwages inclusive of allowances
until actual reinstatement. Respondent University of the East is directed 10 pay complainants the
following:

VERONICA M. MASANGKAY
1. BACKWAGES:
11/1/07 - 2/28/11
50,000 x 39.93 = ₱ 1,996,500.00
13th MO. PAY:
₱1,996,500/12 = ₱ 166,375.00
ALLOWANCE: 41741
₱3,000.00 X 39.93 = ₱ 119,790.00 ₱ 2,282, 665.
00
2. 13th MO. PAY
7/20/2007 - 10/31/2007
₱50,000 x 3.40 / 12 = ₱ 14, 166.67
3. MORAL DAMAGES ₱ 50,000.00
4. EXEMPLARY DAMAGE ₱ 25,000.00
TOTAL: ₱ 2,371,831.67
 GERTRUDO R. REGONDOLA
5. BACKWAGES: November 1, 2007 - February 28,
2011
50,000.00 x 39.93 = ₱1,996,500.00
13th MO. PAY:
₱1,996,500/12 = ₱166,375.00
ALLOWANCE:
₱3,000.00 X 39.93 = ₱2, 162,875.00
6. 13th MO. PAY
July 20, 2007 - October 31, 2007
₱50,000 x 3.40 I 12 = ₱ 14, 166.67
7. MORAL DAMAGES ₱ 50,000.00
8. EXEMPLARY DAMAGE ₱ 25,000.00
10% Attorney's Fees 462,287.33
GRAND TOTAL: ₱4,623,873.34

SO ORDERED.4

NLRC Decision

The case reached the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), where the Commission reversed
the labor arbiter's ruling and disposed of the case in this wise:

WHEREFORE, the appeal of respondents is GRANTED and the labor arbiter's Decision is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The instant complaint is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.5

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, 6 respondents elevated the case to the CA.

CA Ruling

The appellate court reinstated the labor arbiter's ruling that petitioners failed to prove that indeed a just
cause for respondents' dismissal exists. Too, it emphasized, among others, that the instant petition is
bound by this Court's Decision in the Rocamora case, calling for the application of the doctrine of stare
decisis. The CA thus disposed of the case in this manner:

IN VIEW OF ALL THESE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision dated June 29, 2012 and
Resolution dated September 17, 2013 of public respondent National Labor Relations Commission are
SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 28, 2011 of the Labor Arbiter is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.
The CA denied reconsideration of the questioned Decision in the assailed Resolution of August 26,
2016, prompting petitioners to file the instant petition, raising the following issues, to wit:

1) Whether or not respondents' misrepresentation, dishonesty, plagiarism and/or copyright

infringement which is considered academic dishonesty tantamount to serious misconduct is a
just and valid cause for their dismissal.

2) Whether or not the CA erroneously applied the principle of stare decisis.

3) Whether or not respondents are entitled to reinstatement with full backwages, and other
monetary awards despite the fact that they were dismissed for valid cause under the Labor
Code.

4) Whether or not the award of damages and attorney's fees have factual and legal basis.

Petitioners argue, among others, that the instant case cannot be bound by the Rocamora case via
application of the doctrine of stare decisis because of substantial differences in Rocamora's situation
and in that of respondents, as noted by the NLRC. Too, petitioners maintain that plagiarism, a form of
academic dishonesty, is a serious misconduct that justly warrants herein respondents' dismissal.

This Court's Ruling

We resolve to grant the petition.

The principle of stare decisis requires that once a case has been decided one way, the rule is settled
that any other case involving exactly the same point at issue should be decided in the same
manner. 7 It simply means that for the sake of certainty, a conclusion reached in one case should be
applied to those that follow if the facts are substantially the same, even though the parties may be
different. It proceeds from the first principle of justice that, absent any powerful countervailing
considerations, like cases ought to be decided alike. Thus, where the same questions relating to the
same event have been put forward by the parties similarly situated as in a previous case litigated and
decided by a competent court, the rule of stare dee is is is a bar to any attempt to relitigate the same
issue. 8

Applying said principle, the CA held that Our ruling in University of the East v. Adelia Rocamora9 is a
preceμent to the case at bar, involving, as it does, herein respondents' co-author and tackling the same
violation-the alleged plagiarism of the very same materials subject of the instant case.

In this petition, UE, however, asserts that the case of respondents substantially varies from Rocamora
so as not to warrant the application of said rule.

Indeed, the CA erred when it relied on Our ruling in University of the East v. Adelia Rocamora in
resolving the present dispute. Our decision in Rocamora, rendered via a Minute Resolution, is not a
precedent to the case at bar even though it tackles the same violation-the alleged plagiarism of the very
same materials subject of the instant case, which was initiated by respondents' co-author. This is so
since respondents are simply not similarly situated with Rocamora so as to warrant the application of
the doctrine of stare decisis.

A legal precedent is a principle or rule established in a previous case that is either binding on or
persuasive for a court or other tribunal when deciding subsequent cases with similar issues or facts.
Here, We find that the Rocamora case is not on all fours with the present dispute, thereby removing it
from the application of the principle of stare decisis. First, herein respondents categorically represented
to UE under oath that the Manuals were free from plagiarism-an act in which their co-author Rocamora
did not participate. Second, respondents benefited financially from the sale of the Manuals while
Rocamora did not. Third, respondents acquiesced to UE's decision to terminate their services and even
requested the release of and thereafter claimed the benefits due them.

Aside from these, respondents executed a Certification categorically stating under oath and declaring
under pain of perjury that the manuals are entirely original and free from plagiarism. To reiterate:

We hereby certify that the contents of the manual MECHANICS FOR ECE AND COE by Gertrude R.
Regondola, et al. to be used in the subjects ECE 31 IN are entirely original and free from plagiarism.

(SGD.)
Gertruda R. Regondola

(SGD.)
Veronica Masangka10

As correctly noted by the NLRC in its September 17, 2013 Resolution, 11 Rocarwra made no such
undertaking with respect to the subject materials. This Certification is crucial in determining the guilt of
herein respondents and cannot simply be disregarded.

By expressly guaranteeing to UE that their Manuals were entirely original, coupled by their omission to
attribute the copied portions to the original authors thereof, as per the Memorandum submitted by
Chancellor Celso D. Benologa, it is apparent that respondents represented said copied portions as their
own.

More importantly, We find that the CA erred in disregarding the evidence presented by petitioner as
regards the issue of plagiarism.

In the assailed ruling, the CA held that petitioner UE failed to prove that respondents were indeed guilty
of the charge of misconduct or dishonesty through plagiarism-a form of academic dishonesty. It found
that the evidence does not show that respondents were motivated with wrongful intent in publishing the
manuals.12 In ruling thus, the appellate court heavily relied on the approval of the manual by the
Textbook Evaluation and Publishing Office (TEPO) and the Board of Trustees in exculpating
respondents from liability.

The CA also found that their act of allegedly plagiarizing the books of Chenoweth and Singer was not
duly proven since the two (2) e-mails from Chenoweth and Block were not verified such that, therefore,
such e-mails afford no assurance of their authenticity and reliability. 13 The CA went on to state that
"[h]aving issues on their authenticity and reliability, the allegations in the e-mails are mere speculations
that, therefore, such fact renders such emails inadmissible in evidence against petitioners."14

The CA, in its Resolution, thereafter ruled that the evidence charging respondents with plagiarism was
inadmissible, viz:

Be that as it may, We reiterate that private respondents failed to sufficiently prove that petitioners were
guilty of plagiarism that would warrant the latter's dismissal from service. In order to prove petitioners'
act of plagiarizing the books of Chenoweth and Ferdinand Singer, private respondents only presented
the following: unauthenticated and unverified e-mails from Chenoweth and Block and the Lecture
Guides/Manuals. The e-mails from Chenoweth and Block, being unauthenticated, are, therefore,
inadmissible in evidence against petitioners. Private respondents cannot merely rely on the Lecture
Guides/Manuals in order to show that petitioners were guilty of plagiarism. The reason is that such
Lecture Guides/Manuals were duly scrutinized and evaluated by the TEPO, through its Board of
Textbooks Review, and were eventually approved by the UE Board of Trustees. It would be absurd for
private respondents to declare the Lecture Guides/Manuals as plagiarized documents when in the first
place, private respondents, through TEPO and the UE Board of Trustees, had initially scrutinized and
approved the same. 15

In labor cases, the deciding authority should use every reasonable means to ascertain speedily and
objectively the facts, without regard to technicalities of law and procedure. Technical rules of evidence
are not strictly binding in labor cases such as the instant one. 16 Thus, it was error on the part of the CA
to disregard the evidence presented by petitioners to establish the act of plagiarism committed by
respondents.

It is worthy to note that the CA failed to examine the actual text written in the manual and compare the
same with the work claimed to have been plagiarized. However, after a thorough review of the records
of the case, the Court finds that respondents, indeed, plagiarized the works of Chenoweth and Singer.
It is glaring from a comparison of the subject text that respondents heavily lifted portions of the said
books, as reported in the Memorandum submitted by Chancellor Celso F. Bebologa, 17 thus:

FINDINGS:

1. In his Memorandum dated March 15, 2007, Dean Constantino T. Yap verified Mr.
Chenoweth's claim that he is one of the authors of the textbook "Applied Engineering
Mechanics". (EXHIBIT "1")

2. At least three (3) books containing the names of Masangkay, Rocamora, Regondola,
and Tolentino were copied verbatim or with slight modifications from the following
original engineering books:

- Engineering Mechanics, Second Edition, by Ferdinand L. Singer

- Applied Engineering Mechanics, Metric Edition, by Alfred Jensen, Harry H.

Chenoweth, adapted by David N. Watkins

Another author, Hibbeler, is also mentioned as a source of the "reproduction" but the
specific book is not identified (EXHIBITS "2," "3" "4" & "5")

Tolentino's name appeared only in one of the three books copied from the original
(EXHIBITS "6" TO "6-B," "7" TO "7-B" & "8" TO "8- B").

3. No publisher is indicated in the "copied" volumes which are made of low quality paper.

OTHER INFORMATION

- "Reproduced" copies are sold to students. Copies bought by students are retrieved by
professors at the end of the school term. Records of students who failed to return the
"reproduced" copies bought by them are marked LFR and/or NC.

- Students interested to buy the "reproduced" book are referred to specific bookstores. A
bookstore - Special & Journal - with address at No. 76 Samson Road, Caloocan City is
selling the "reproduced" books.
 - Some professors reportedly own or operate printing press facilities. Others are holding
personal review classes or having their own review centers.

- There are pending lapsed applications for removal of LFR at the Engineering
Department.1âwphi1 Professors alleged their class records

In a letter requiring respondents to provide the basis of their appeal of their dismissal, Dr. Ester A
Garcia quoted the findings of the Faculty Disciplinary Board:

SUMMARY OF FINDINGS

1. From the books of Singer, 558 sentences/figures were plagiarized and used in
the manuals of Respondents, either verbatim or with modification; while from the
book of Jensen-Chenoweth, 52 sentences and figures were likewise taken and
used in Respondents' manuals.

2. Respondents did not mention, as required in Section 184 of the Intellectual Property
Law, the sources and the names of the authors of the textbooks from where they lifted
passages, illustrations, and tables used in their manuals.

3. In their request to TEPO for temporary adoption of the manuals, Respondents

certified under oath that the manuals are all original and free from plagiarism. Other
investigation, however, shows otherwise. (emphasis ours)

To this Court, the bulk of the copied text vis-a-vis the said Certification clearly shows wrongful intent on
the part of respondents. We cannot subscribe to the CA ruling that respondents were in good faith
since, being the principal authors thereof, they had full knowledge as to what they were including in
their written work. In other words, they knew which portions were truly original and which were not.

From the foregoing, the Court finds that there is sufficient basis for dismissing respondents from
service, considering the highest integrity and morality which the profession requires from its teachers.
Respondents plagiarized the works of Chenoweth and Singer by lifting large portions of the text of the
works of said writers without properly attributing the copied text, and, to make matters worse, they
represented under oath that no portion of the Manuals were plagiarized when, in truth and in fact, huge
portions thereof were improperly lifted from other materials.

Lastly, it is well to emphasize that Rocamora strongly opposed her dismissal from service as contained
in her December 3, 2007 Letter, 18 where she invoked denial of due process in her termination, denied
having committed plagiarism or benefiting from the printing of the materials in question, and '"sincerely
hop[ing] that the [Board of Trustees] xx x, will see the injustice [she] got which ought to be reversed and
reconsidered."19

Such, however, is not so for herein respondents. It is well to emphasize that in her June 2, 2008
Letter,20 respondent Masangkay requested the recomputation of the amounts due in her favor after said
termination, as well as the application of said amounts to her car loan balance. She was even
cooperative with the procedure, asking the management to advise her should there be a need for her to
prepare and accomplish her time records for purposes of recomputing her salary.

As to Regondola, aside from the cash and check vouchers21 that he signed after receiving the amounts
due him after said termination, it does not appear that he made any similar letter request or appeal,
unlike Masangkay or Rocamora, respectively.
Indeed, rights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals,
or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right to be recognized by law.22 Within the
context of a termination dispute, waivers are generally looked upon with disfavor and are commonly
frowned upon as contrary to public policy and ineffective to bar claims for the measure of a worker's
legal rights. If (a) there is clear proof that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible
person; or (b) the terms of the settlement are unconscionable, and on their face invalid, such quitclaims
must be struck down as invalid or illegal.23

Thus, not all waivers and quitclaims are invalid as against public policy. If the agreement was
voluntarily entered into and represents a reasonable settlement, it is binding on the parties and
may not later be disowned simply because of a change of mind. It is only where there is clear proof
that the waiver was wangled from an unsuspecting or gullible person, or the terms of settlement are
unconscionable on its face, that the law will step in to annul the questionable transaction. But where it is
shown that the person making the waiver did so voluntarily, with full understanding of what he was
doing, and the consideration for the quitclaim is credible and reasonable, the transaction must be
recognized as a valid and binding undertaking. 24

In the case at bar, We find no reason to rule that respondents did not waive their right to contest UE's
decision.1âwphi1 Based on their actuations subsequent to their termination, it is clear that they were
amenable to UE's decision of terminating their services on the ground of academic dishonesty.
Nowhere can we find any indication of unwillingness or lack of cooperation on respondents' part with
regard to the events that transpired so as to convince Us that they were indeed constrained to forego
their right to question the management's decision. Neither do we find any sign of coercion nor
intimidation, subtle or otherwise, which could have forced them to simp1y accept said decision. In fact,
based on their qualifications, this Court cannot say that respondents and UE do not stand on equal
footing so as to force respondents to simply yield to UE's decision. Furthermore, there is no showing
that respondents did not receive or received less than what is legally due them in said termination.

In sum, We are of the view that their acceptance of UE's decision is voluntary and with full
understanding thereof, tantamount to a waiver of their right to question the management's decision to
terminate their services for academic dishonesty. It is as though they have waived any and all claims
against UE when they knowingly and willingly acquiesced to their dismissal and opted to receive the
benefits due them instead.

We also find that they genuinely accepted petitioner University's decision at that time and that their
filing of the complaint almost three (3) years later was a mere afterthought and, in their own words,
inspired by their colleague's victory.25

In the light of the foregoing, the Rocamora case cannot be used as a precedent to the case at bar. In
view of the substantial evidence presented by petitioner UE that respondents committed plagiarism,
then the complaint for illegal dismissal must, therefore, be dismissed for utter lack of basis.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated February 19,
2016 in CA-G.R. SP No. 132774 and its August 26, 2016 Resolution are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The complaint for illegal dismissal is hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 211273

RAYMOND A. SON, RAYMOND S. ANTIOLA, and WILFREDO E. POLLARCO, Petitioners

vs
UNIVERSITY OF SANTO TOMAS, FR. ROLANDO DELA ROSA, DR. CLARITA CARILLO, DR.
CYTHIA LOZA, FR. EDGARDO ALAURIN, and the COLLEGE OF FINE ARTS AND DESIGN
FACULTY COUNCIL, Respondents

DECISION

DEL CASTILLO, J.:

This Petition for Review on Certiorari1 seeks to set aside the September 27, 2013 Decision2 of the
Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 128666 setting aside the August 10, 2011 Decision3 and
October 30, 2012 Decision4 and January 22, 2013 Resolution5 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) in NLRC LAC Case No. 04-001131-11 and reinstating the March 26, 2012
Decision6 of the NLRC, as well as the CA's January 29, 2014 Resolution7 denying petitioners' Motion
for Reconsideration.8

Factual Antecedents

Respondent University of Santo Tomas (UST) is an educational institution operating under the authority
of the Commission on Higher Education (CHED). The rest of the herein respondents are impleaded as
officers and administrators of the school.

Petitioners Raymond A. Son (Son), Raymond S. Antiola (Antiola), and Wilfredo E. Pollarco (Pollarco)
are full time professors of the UST Colleges of Fine Arts and Design and Philosophy, and are members
of the UST Faculty Union, with which UST at the time had a Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA).

Son and Antiola were hired in June, 2005, while Pollarco was employed earlier, or in June, 2004. Under
their respective appointment papers, petitioners were designated as "faculty member[s] on
PROBATIONARY status," whose "accession to tenure status is conditioned by [sic] your meeting all the
requirements provided under existing University rules and regulations and other applicable laws
including, among others, possession of the (prerequisite] graduate degree before the expiration of the
probationary period and by your satisfactory performance of the duties and responsibilities set forth in
the job description hereto attached."9

The UST-UST Faculty Union CBA provided that –

ARTICLE XV
TENURE

Section 1.Tenured Faculty Member. - He is:

a. Teaching Faculty member, given a tenure track appointment upon hiring who has rendered six (6)
consecutive semesters of satisfactory service on a full-time basis, carrying fifteen-unit load (15) or
more. Although a master's degree is an entry requirement, a faculty member admitted to serve the
University without a master's degree shall finish his master's degree in five (5) semesters. If he does
not finish his degree in five (5) semesters, he shall be separated from service at the end of the fifth
semester; however, if he is made to serve the University further, in spite of the lack of a master's
degree, he shall be deemed to have attained tenure.10

The CBA provision relative to the requirement of a Master's degree in the faculty member's field of
instruction is in line with the requirement laid down in the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for
Private Schools issued by then Department of Education, Culture, and Sports (DECS), and the CHED's
Memorandum Order No. 40-08 - or Manual of Regulations for Private Higher Education of 2008 -
stating that:
Section 35. Minimum Faculty Qualifications. - The minimum qualifications of a faculty in a higher
education institution shall be as follows:

1. For undergraduate program

a. Holder of a master's degree; to teach mainly in his major field and where applicable, a holder of
appropriate professional license requiring at least a bachelor's degree for the professional courses.
However, in specific fields where there is dearth of holders of Master's degree, or a holder of a
professional license requiring at least a bachelor's degree may be qualified to teach. Any deviation from
this requirement will be subject to regulation by the Commission.

Petitioners did not possess the required Master's degree, but were nonetheless hired by UST on the
condition that they fulfill the requirement within the prescribed period. Petitioners enrolled in the
Master's program, but were unable to finish the same. In spite of their failure to obtain the required
Master's degree, they continued to teach even beyond the period given for completion thereof.

On March 3, 2010, then CHED Chairman Emmanuel Angeles issued a Memorandum11 addressed to
the Presidents of public and private higher education institutions, directing the strict implementation of
the minimum qualification for faculty members of undergraduate programs, particularly the Master's
degree and licensure requirements, as mandated by Memorandum Order No. 40-08, "to ensure the
highest qualification of their faculty."

Acting on the March 3, 2010 Memorandum, UST wrote the petitioners and other affected faculty
members, informing them of the university's decision to cease re-appointment of those who failed to
complete their Master's degrees, but allow a written appeal from the concerned faculty members who
are due for thesis defense/completion of their Master's degrees.12

Petitioners did not make a written appeal, operating under the belief that they have been vested tenure
under the CBA for their continued employment despite failure to obtain the required Master's degree.13

On June 11, 2010, petitioners received termination/thank you letters14 signed by respondent Dr.
Cynthia Loza, Dean of the College of Fine Arts and Design. The reason given for non-renewal of their
appointments is their failure to obtain the required Master's degree.

Ruling of the Labor Arbiter

Petitioners filed a labor case against the respondents for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal, and
recovery of money claims. In their joint Position Paper and other pleadings,15 petitioners claimed that
since they have already acquired tenure by default pursuant to the tenure provision in the CBA, they
could not be dismissed for failure to complete their respective Master's degrees; that the UST-UST
Faculty Union CBA is the law between the parties, and its provisions should be observed; that in spite
of the CBA provision on tenure, respondents illegally terminated their employment; that they were
illegally terminated for their refusal to send the prescribed appeal letter, which is tantamount to an
undue waiver and unlawful surrender of their tenurial rights, and is against the law and public policy;
that in terminating their employment, respondents did not comply with the required "twin-notice rule";
that respondents are guilty of bad faith and unfair labor practice on account of their violation of the
CBA; that respondents are guilty of bad faith when they re-hired the other professors even when they
did not possess the required Master's degree, while they (petitioners) were discriminated against and
terminated from work just because they did not file the prescribed appeal letter; and that they should be
paid backwages and other money claims. Thus, petitioners prayed for reinstatement with full
backwages, allowances and other benefits; moral and exemplary damages, and attorney's fees and
costs of suit.
In their joint Position Paper and other pleadings16 respondents countered that there is no unfair labor
practice committed, because the CBA provision adverted to is not an economic provision; that the
implementation of Memorandum Order No. 40-08 takes legal precedence over the parties' CBA; that
the CBA provision granting tenure by default may no longer be enforced on account of the requirement
under Memorandum Order No. 40-08, an administrative regulation that is equivalent to law and has the
effect of abrogating the tenure provision of the CBA; that Memorandum Order No. 40-08 is a police
power measure for the protection and promotion of quality education, and as such, the CBA should
yield to the same and to the broader interests of the State; that

petitioners could not have acquired tenure since they did not possess the minimum qualification - a
Master's degree - prescribed under Memorandum Order No. 4008; that the CBA provision on tenure by
default has become illegal as it is contrary to law, and for this reason, it may not be enforced; that said
CBA provision, being contrary to law, car not be the object of estopppel, and produces no effect
whatsoever and need not be set aside nor declared ineffective by judicial action; that in not renewing
petitioners' probationary appointments, respondents observed due process and the provisions of the
Labor Code, particularly Article 281, which provides that a probationary employee may be terminated
from work "when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards
made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement"; that petitioners are not
entitled to monetary awards as they were dismissed for cause, paid their correct salaries, and are not
entitled to damages and attorney's fees; and that the case against the individual respondents should be
dismissed as well, as they were acting within their official capacities. Thus, they prayed for the
dismissal of petitioners'complaint.

On March 17, 2011, Labor Arbiter Joel S. Lustria rendered his Decision17 in NLRC Case Nos. NCR-07-
09179-10, 07-09180-10, and 07-09181-10, finding for petitioners and declaring respondents guilty of
illegal dismissal and unfair labor practice, as well as malice and bad faith in illegally dismissing the
former. The Labor Arbiter upheld the CBA provision granting tenure by default to petitioners, and
declared that petitioners were not accorded due process prior to dismissal. Thus, petitioners were
awarded money claims, damages, and attorney's fees.

Ruling of the National Labor Relations Commission

Respondents appealed before the NLRC. On August 10, 2011, the NLRC issued its Decision
dismissing the appeal for lack of merit and affirming the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It held that the UST-
UST Faculty Union CBA took precedence over CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08; that by said CBA
provision, petitioners acquired tenure by default; that UST continued to hire faculty members without
the required Master's degree in their field of instruction even after petitioners were dismissed from
work; and that the only cause for petitioners' dismissal was their refusal to submit a written appeal,
which is not a valid ground for dismissal or non-renewal of their appointment.

Respondents moved for reconsideration. The case was re-opened as the handling Commissioners
inhibited themselves from the case.

On March 26, 2012, the Special Division of the NLRC issued a new Decision which set aside the earlier
August 10, 2011 Decision and dismissed petitioners’ labor case. It held that CHED Memorandum Order
No. 40-08 took precedence over the parties' CBA; that the CBA should conform to the said
Memorandum, which had the force and effect of law; and that since the CBA provision on tenure by
default did not conform to the CHED Memorandum, it is null and void.

Petitioners moved to reconsider.18 Meanwhile, the case was re-assigned to the Second Division of the
NLRC which, on October 30, 2012, promulgated a Decision granting petitioners' motion for
reconsideration. It set aside the March 26, 2012 Decision of the Special Division and reinstated the
Labor Arbiter's Decision. It held that the CBA superseded the CHED Memorandum; that CHED
Memorandum Order No. 40-08 requiring a Master's degree of professors in the undergraduate
programs is merely directory, and did not provide that the lack of a Master's degree was a ground to
terminate the professor's services; that CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 was issued only in 2008,
while the CBA was concluded in 2006 - thus, it may not be retroactively applied in the absence of a
specific provision authorizing retroactivity; and consequently, petitioners acquired tenure.

Respondents filed their Motion for Reconsideration,19 but in a January 22, 2013 Resolution,20 the NLRC
denied the motion for lack of merit.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

In a Petition for Certiorari21 before the CA, respondents questioned the adverse NLRC dispositions and
prayed for dismissal of the labor case or NLRC Case Nos. NCR-07-09179-10, 07-09180-10 and 07-
09181-10.

On September 27, 2013, the CA rendered the assailed Decision granting the Petition, decreeing thus:

Private respondents22 contend that they already attained tenureship by reason of their continuous
employment service on a probationary status to petitioner University, invoking the provision of the
2006-2011 Faculty Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA), particularly Article XV, Section 1 thereof,
which was signed on July 18, 2008. According to them, when the petitioner University and the UST
Faculty Union of which private respondents are members agreed to the terms and conditions set forth
in the UST Faculty CBA, the former explicitly and unequivocally intended to vest tenure to those
professors without master's degrees who served for at least six (6) semesters.

Private respondents' reliance on the collective bargaining agreement is not tenable. While every
individual has autonomy to enter into any contract, the contractual stipulations, however, must not be
contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy. In a case involving the observance
of a collective bargaining agreement, the Supreme Court, in Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan
(LMM) vs. Abiera, had the occasion to pronounce:

'It is a fundamental postulate that however broad the freedom of contracting parties may be, it does not
go so far as to countenance disrespect for or failure to observe a legal prescription. The statute takes
precedence; a stipulation in a collective bargaining agreement must yield to it. That is to adhere to the
rule of law.'

The above principle was likewise reiterated in Escorpizo, et al. vs. University of Baguio, et al., from
which We quote:

"...Indeed, provisions of a CBA must be respected since its terms and conditions constitute the law
between the contracting parties. Those who are entitled to its benefits can invoke its provisions. And in
the event that an obligation therein imposed is not fulfilled, the aggrieved party has the right to go to
court for redress. XXX XXX XXX

...Nevertheless, the aforecited CBA provision must be read in conjunction with statutory and
administrative regulations governing faculty qualifications. It is settled that an existing law enters into
and forms part of a valid contract without the need for the parties expressly making reference to it.
Further, while contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions as they
may see fit, such right to contract is subject to limitation that the agreement must not be contrary to law
or public policy."
It should be borne in mind that the operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The
government has a right to ensure that only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic
knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this
field of human activity is desirable for protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from ill-
prepared teachers, who are lacking in the required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be
required to take an examination or to possess postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment.

In the instant case, there is no doubt that private respondents failed to meet the standards for regular
employment provided under Memorandum Order No. 040-08 issued by CHED. The termination of their
contract was based on their failure to obtain (a) master's degree and cannot, therefore, be regarded as
illegal. In fact, the services of an employee hired on probationary basis may be terminated when he
fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards made known by the
employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. There is nothing that would hinder the
employer from extending a regular or permanent appointment to an employee once the employer finds
that the employee is qualified for a regular employment even before the expiration of the probationary
period. Conversely, if the purpose sought by the employer is neither attained nor attainable within the
said period, the law does not preclude the employer from terminating the probationary employment on
justifiable ground. Here, no vested right to tenureship had yet accrued in private respondents' favor
since they had not complied, during their probation, with the prerequisites necessary for the acquisition
of permanent status. It must be stressed that herein private respondents were given more than ample
opportunities to obtain their respective master's degree since their first appointment in 2004 or 2005 as
a prerequisite to tenure status. But they did not take advantage of such opportunities. Justice, fairness,
and due process demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had little or
no participation or control.

In addition, the petitioner University as an educational institution enjoys academic freedom - a

guarantee that enjoys protection from the Constitution. Section 5(2), Article XIV of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees all institutions of higher learning academic freedom. This institutional academic freedom
includes the right of the school or college to decide for itself, its aims and objectives, and how best to
attain them free from outside coercion or interference save possibly when the overriding public welfare
calls for some restraint. Indeed, the Constitution allows merely the State's regulation and supervision of
educational institutions, and not the deprivation of their rights.

The essential freedoms subsumed in the term 'academic freedom encompasses the freedom to
determine for itself on academic grounds: (1) Who may teach, (2) What may be taught, (3) How it shall
be taught, and (4) Who may be admitted to study. Undeniably, the school's prerogative to provide
standards for its teachers and to determine whether or not these standards have been met is in
accordance with academic freedom that gives the educational institution the right to choose who should
teach. In Peña v. National Labor Relations Commission, the Supreme Court emphasized:

"It is the prerogative of the school to set high standards of efficiency for its teachers since quality
education is a mandate of the Constitution. As long as the standards fixed are reasonable and not
arbitrary, courts are not at liberty to set them aside."

The authority to choose whom to hire is likewise covered and protected by its management prerogative
- the right of an employer to regulate all aspects of employment, such as hiring, the freedom to
prescribe work assignments, working methods, process to be followed, regulation regarding transfer of
employees, supervision of their work, lay-off and discipline, and dismissal and recall of workers. This
Court was more emphatic in holding that in protecting the rights of the laborer, it cannot authorize the
oppression or self-destruction of the employer.

All told, We are satisfied that private respondents' termination from employment was valid and legal.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decisions dated August 10, 2011 and October 30, 2012
as well as the Resolution dated January 22, 2013 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
in NLRC-LAC Case No. 04-001131-11 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Consequently, the Decision
dated March 26, 2012 that dismissed the complaints of herein private respondents is hereby
REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.23 (Citations omitted)

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration, but the CA denied the same via its January 29, 2014
Resolution. Hence, the instant Petition.

In a February 3, 2016 Resolution,24 the Court resolved to give due course to the Petition.

Issue

Petitioners claim simply that the CA erred in ruling that they were not illegally dismissed.

Petitioners' Arguments

In their Petition and Reply 25 seeking reversal of the assailed CA dispositions and, in lieu thereof, the
reinstatement of the August 10, 2011 and October 30, 2012 NLRC Decisions and the January 22, 2013
NLRC Resolution, petitioners insist that they were illegally dismissed; that the CBA and its provision on
tenure by default prevail over CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08, as they constitute the law between
the parties; that since they acquired tenure by application of the CBA provision, they may not be
removed except for cause; that contrary to the provisions of said CHED Memorandum, respondents
were never prohibited from maintaining faculty members without a master's degree, as in fact they
continued to hire such faculty even after they were separated from UST; that respondents' continued
hiring of non-Master's degree holders constitutes estoppel - respondents are estopped from claiming
that they (petitioners) are not qualified to teach in UST, and so should not have been dismissed
therefrom; that instead of treating their respective cases with harshness, respondents should have
instead allowed them to finish their Master's degrees, since the only requirement missing is their thesis
defense; that the true reason for their removal is their obstinate refusal to make the required appeal
letter in waiver of their acquired tenure, which manifestly indicates respondents' malice and bad faith in
dealing with petitioners - especially considering that they (petitioners) were the only professors whose
appointments were not renewed out of the 70 faculty members without Master's degrees who were
notified of the strict implementation of CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 and required to file a
written appeal; that respondents violated the twin-notice rule as petitioners were not given notice and
an opportunity to be heard prior to their separation; that the right of academic freedom does not give
respondents the unbridled right to undermine petitioners' right to security of tenure; and finally, that the
CHED itself did not direct the removal of faculty members without Master's degrees, but only the strict
implementation of the schools' faculty development programs.

Respondents' Arguments

In their joint Comment26 to the Petition, respondents argue that a Master's degree in the undergraduate
program professor's field of instruction is a mandatory requirement that may not be the subject of
agreement between the school and the professor, citing Herrera-Manaois v. St. Scholastica's
College,27 where the Court held that full-time faculty status may be extended only to those who
possess, among others, a master's degree in the field of instruction, and this is neither subject to the
prerogative of the school nor the agreement of the parties, and this requirement is deemed impliedly
written in the employment contracts between private educational institutions and prospective faculty
members; that the Herrera-Manaois doctrine was reiterated in University of the East v.
Pepanio,28 where it was held that government had a right to ensure that only qualified individuals with
sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills are allowed to teach in educational institutions,
whose operation involves public interest; that the CBA provision on tenure by default has been
superseded by CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08, which for all intents and purposes is deemed law
to which the CBA must yield as it conflicts with the former, that the non-impairment clause of the
Constitution must yield to the loftier purposes of government, as into every contract is read the
provisions of existing law; that the operation of educational institutions involves public interest, and to
this end, these institutions have the obligation to the public to ensure that only those individuals who
possess the required academic knowledge, training, and qualifications may teach; that CHED
Memorandum Order No. 40-08 is a police power measure which may impair the CBA provision on
tenure by default for the protection of the public; that the strict implementation of CHED Memorandum
Order No. 40-08 is not subject to compromise or leniency, contrary to what petitioners believe - in
claiming that they should be allowed to finish their master's degrees even while the Memorandum is
already in effect, which places UST in a precarious position of active violation of law; that petitioners
cannot claim tenure as they remained probationary teachers even if their appointments/contracts were
repeatedly renewed - so long as they do not obtain their master's degrees, they continue to remain
probationary employees of the university; that petitioners were given ample opportunity to finish their
master's degrees, but they did not do so; and that UST's decision not to renew petitioner's
appointments is a valid exercise of academic freedom and management prerogative. Thus,
respondents pray for denial of the instant Petition.

Our Ruling

The Court denies the Petition.

As early as in 1992, the requirement of a Master's degree in the undergraduate program professor's
field of instruction has been in place, through DECS Order 92 (series of 1992, August 10, 1992) or the
Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. Article IX, Section 44, paragraph 1 (a) thereof
provides that college faculty members must have a master's degree in their field of instruction as a
minimum qualification for teaching in a private educational institution and acquiring regular status
therein.

DECS Order 92, Series of 1992 was promulgated by the DECS in the exercise of its rule-making power
as provided for under Section 70 of Batas PambansaBlg. 232, otherwise known as the Education Act of
1982.29 As such, it has the force and effect of law.30 In University of the East v. Pepanio,31 the
requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers was held to be not unreasonable but
rather in accord with the public interest.

Thus, when the CBA was executed between the parties in 2006, they had no right to include therein the
provision relative to the acquisition of tenure by default, because it is contrary to, and thus violative of
the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools that was in effect at the time. As such,
said CBA provision is null and void, and can have no effect as between the parties. "A void contract is
equivalent to nothing; it produces no civil effect; and it does not create, modify or extinguish a juridical
relation."32 Under the Civil Code,

Art. 1409. The following contracts are inexistent and void from the beginning:

(1) Those whose cause, object or purpose is contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order or
public policy;

XXXX

When CHED Memorandum Order No. 40-08 came out, it merely carried over the requirement of a
masteral degree for faculty members of undergraduate programs contained in the 1992 Revised
Manual of Regulations for Private Schools. It cannot therefore be said that the requirement of a
master's degree was retroactively applied in petitioners' case, because it was already the prevailing rule
with the issuance of the 1992 Revised Manual of Regulations for Private Schools.

Thus, going by the requirements of law, it is plain to see that petitioners are not qualified to teach in the
undergraduate programs of UST. And while they were given ample time and opportunity to satisfy the
requirements by obtaining their respective master's degrees, they failed in the endeavor. Petitioners
knew this - that they cannot continue to teach for failure to secure their master's degrees - and needed
no reminding of this fact; "those who are seeking to be educators are presumed to know these
mandated qualifications."33

From a strict legal viewpoint, the parties are both in violation of the law: respondents, for maintaining
professors without the mandated masteral degrees, and for petitioners, agreeing to be employed
despite knowledge of their lack of the necessary qualifications. Petitioners cannot therefore insist to be
employed by UST since they still do not possess the required master's degrees; the fact that UST
continues to hire and maintain professors without the necessary master's degrees is not a ground for
claiming illegal dismissal, or even reinstatement. As far as the law is concerned, respondents are in
violation of the CHED regulations for continuing the practice of hiring unqualified teaching personnel;
but the law cannot come to the aid of petitioners on this sole ground. As between the parties herein,
they are in pari delicto.

Latin for 'in equal fault,' in pari delicto connotes that two or more people are at fault or are guilty of a
crime. Neither courts of law nor equity will interpose to grant relief to the parties, when an illegal
agreement has been made, and both parties stand in pari delicto. Under the pari delicto doctrine, the
parties to a controversy are equally culpable or guilty, they shall have no action against each other, and
it shall leave the parties where it finds them. This doctrine finds expression in the maxims "ex dolo malo
nonoritur actio" and "in pari delicto potior est conditio defendentis."

XXXX

As a doctrine in civil law, the rule on pari delicto is principally governed by Articles 1411 and 1412 of the
Civil Code, which state that:

Article 1411. When the nullity proceeds from the illegality of the cause or object of the contract, and the
act constitutes a criminal offense, both parties being in pari delicto, they shall have no action against
each other, and both shall be prosecuted.

xxxx

Article 1412. If the act in which the unlawful or forbidden cause consists does not constitute a criminal
offense, the following rules shall be observed:

XXXX

1. When the fault is on the part of both contracting parties, neither may recover what he has given by
virtue of the contract, or demand the performance of the other's undertaking;

x x x x.34 (Citations omitted)

The minimum requirement of a master's degree in the undergraduate teacher's field of instruction has
been cemented in DECS Order 92, Series of 1992. Both petitioners and respondents have been
violating it. The fact that government has not cracked down on violators, or that it chose not to strictly
implement the provision, does not erase the violations committed by erring educational institutions,
including the parties herein; it simply means that government will not punish these violations for the
meantime. The parties cannot escape its concomitant effects, nonetheless. And if respondents knew
the overwhelming importance of the said provision and the public interest involved - as they now
fiercely advocate to their favor - they should have complied with the same as soon as it was
promulgated.

It cannot be said either that by agreeing to the tenure by default provision in the CBA, respondents are
deemed to be in estoppel or have waived the application of the requirement under CHED Memorandum
Order No. 40-08. Such a waiver is precisely contrary to law. Moreover, a waiver would prejudice the
rights of the students and the public, who have a right to expect that UST is acting within the bounds of
the law, and provides quality education by hiring only qualified teaching personnel. Under Article 6 of
the Civil Code, "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy,
morals, or good customs, or prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law." On the other
hand, there could be no acquiescence - amounting to estoppel - with respect to acts which constitute a
violation of law. "The doctrine of estoppel cannot operate to give effect to an act which is otherwise null
and void or ultra vires."35 "[N]o estoppel can be predicated on an illegal act."36

It cannot be said either that in requiring petitioners to file a written appeal, respondents are guilty of bad
faith and malice for practically forcing the former to renounce their tenure. There is no tenure to speak
of in the first place.

Just the same, as correctly argued by the respondents, the crucial issues in this case have been
settled. In the case of University of the East v. Pepanio,37 the Court held that –

Three. Respondents argue that UE hired them in 1997 and 2000, when what was in force was the 1994
CBA between UE and the faculty union. Since that CBA did not yet require a master's degree for
acquiring a regular status and since respondents had already complied with the three requirements of
the CBA, namely, (a) that they served full-time; (b) that they renderedthree consecutive years of
service; and (c) that their services were satisfactory, they should be regarded as having attained
permanent or regular status.

But the policy requiring postgraduate degrees of college teachers was provided in the Manual of
Regulations as early as 1992. Indeed, recognizing this, the 1994 CBA provided even then that UE was
to extend only semester-to-semester appointments to college faculty staffs, like respondents, who did
not possess the minimum qualifications for their positions.

Besides, as the Court held in Escorpizo v. University of Baguio, a school CBA must be read in
conjunction with statutory and administrative regulations governing faculty qualifications. Such
regulations form part of a valid CBA without need for the parties to make express reference to it. While
the contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and conditions, as they may see
fit, the right to contract is still subject to the limitation that the agreement must not be contrary to law or
public policy.

The State through Batas Pambansa Bilang 232 (The Education Act of 1982) delegated the
administration of the education system and the supervision and regulation of educational institutions to
the Ministry of Education, Culture and Sports (now Department of Education). Accordingly, in
promulgating the Manual of Regulations, DECS was exercising its power of regulation over educational
institutions, which includes prescribing the minimum academic qualifications for teaching personnel.

In 1994 the legislature transferred the power to prescribe such qualifications to the Commission on
Higher Education (CHED). CHED's charter authorized it to set minimum standards for programs and
institutions of higher learning. The Manual of Regulations continued to apply to colleges and
universities and suppletorily the Joint Order until 2010 when CHED issued a Revised Manual of
Regulations which specifically applies only to institutions involved in tertiary education.

The requirement of a masteral degree for tertiary education teachers is not unreasonable. The
operation of educational institutions involves public interest. The government has a right to ensure that
only qualified persons, in possession of sufficient academic knowledge and teaching skills, are allowed
to teach in such institutions. Government regulation in this field of human activity is desirable for
protecting, not only the students, but the public as well from illprepared teachers, who are lacking in the
required scientific or technical knowledge. They may be required to take an examination or to possess
postgraduate degrees as prerequisite to employment.

Respondents were each given only semester-to-semester appointments from the beginning of their
employment with UE precisely because they lacked the required master's degree. It was only when UE
and the faculty union signed their 2001 CBA that the school extended petitioners a conditional
probationary status subject to their obtaining a master's degree within their probationary period. It is
clear, therefore, that the parties intended to subject respondents permanent status appointments to the
standards set by the law and the university.

Here, UE gave respondents Bueno and Pepanio more than ample opportunities to acquire the
postgraduate degree required of them. But they did not take advantage of such opportunities. Justice,
fairness, and due process demand that an employer should not be penalized for situations where it had
little or no participation or control. (Citations omitted)38

In addition, the Court already held in Herrera-Manaois v. St. Scholastica's College39 that –

Notwithstanding the existence of the SSC Faculty Manual, Manaois still cannot legally acquire a
permanent status of employment. Private educational institutions must still supplementarily refer to the
prevailing standards, qualifications, and conditions set by the appropriate government agencies
(presently the Department of Education, the Commission on Higher Education, and the Technical
Education and Skills Development Authority). This limitation on the right of private schools, colleges,
and universities to select and determine the employment status of their academic personnel has been
imposed by the state in view of the public interest nature of educational institutions, so as to ensure the
quality and competency of our schools and educators.

The applicable guidebook at the time petitioner was engaged as a probationary full-time instructor for
the school year 2000 to 2003 is the 1992 Manual of Regulations for Private Schools (1992 Manual). It
provides the following conditions of a probationary employment:

Section 89.Conditions of Employment. Every private school shall promote the improvement of the
economic, social and professional status of all its personnel.

In recognition of their special employment status and their special role in the advancement of
knowledge, the employment of teaching and non-teaching academic personnel shall be governed by
such rules as may from time to time be promulgated, in coordination with one another, by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports and the Department of Labor and Employment.

Conditions of employment of non-academic nonteaching school personnel, including compensation,

hours of work, security of tenure and labor relations, shall be governed by the appropriate labor laws
and regulations.

Section 92.Probationary Period. Subject in all instances to compliance with Department and school
requirements, the probationary period for academic personnel shall not be more than three (3)
consecutive years of satisfactory servicefor those in the elementary and secondary levels, six (6)
consecutive regular semesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level, and nine (9)
consecutive trimesters of satisfactory service for those in the tertiary level where collegiate courses are
offered on the trimester basis.

Section 93. Regular or Permanent Status. Those who have served the probationary period shall be
made regular or permanent.1âwphi1 Fulltime teachers who have satisfactorily completed their
probationary period shall be considered regular or permanent.

Considering that petitioner ultimately sought for the position of a permanent full-time instructor, we must
further look into the following provisions under the 1992 Manual, which set out the minimum
requirements for such status:

Section 44. Minimum Faculty Qualifications. The minimum qualifications for faculty for the different
grades and levels of instruction duly supported by appropriate credentials on filein the school shall be
as follows:

xxxx

c. Tertiary

(1) For undergraduate courses, other than vocational:

(a) Holder of a master's degree, to teach largely in his major field; or, for professional courses, holder of
the appropriate professional license required for at least a bachelor's degree. Any deviation from this
requirement will be subject to regulation by the Department

Section 45.Full-time and Part-time Faculty. As a general rule, all private schools shall employ full-time
academic personnel consistent with the levels of instruction.

Full-time academic personnel are those meeting all the following requirements:

a. Who possess at least the minimum academic qualifications prescribed by the Department under this
Manual for all academic personnel;

xxxx

All teaching personnel who do not meet the foregoing qualifications are considered part-time.

XXXX

Thus, pursuant to the 1992 Manual, private educational institutions in the tertiary level may extend -full-
time faculty' status only to those who possess, inter alia, a master's degree in the field of study that will
be taught. This minimum requirement is neither subject to the prerogative of the school nor to the
agreement between the parties. For all intents and purposes, this qualification must be deemed
impliedly written in the employment contracts between private educational institutions and prospective
faculty members. The issue of whether probationers were informed of this academic requirement
before they were engaged as probationary employees is thus no longer material, as those who are
seeking to be educators are presumed to know these mandated qualifications. Thus, all those who fail
to meet the criteria under the 1992 Manual cannot legally attain the status of permanent full-time faculty
members, even if they have completed three years of satisfactory service.
In the light of the failure of Manaois to satisfy the academic requirements for the position, she may only
be considered as a part-time instructor pursuant to Section 45 of the 1992 Manual. In turn, as we have
enunciated in a line of cases, a part-time member of the academic personnel cannot acquire
permanence of employment and security of tenure under the Manual of Regulations in relation to the
Labor Code. (Citations omitted)

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The September 27, 2013 Decision and January 29, 2014
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CAG.R. SP No. 128666 are AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 166562 March 31, 2009

BENJAMIN G. TING, Petitioner,

vs.
CARMEN M. VELEZ-TING, Respondent.

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Before us is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to set aside the November 17, 2003 Amended
Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA), and its December 13, 2004 Resolution2 in CA-G.R. CV No.
59903. The appellate court, in its assailed decision and resolution, affirmed the January 9, 1998
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 23, Cebu City, declaring the marriage between
petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio pursuant to Article 36 of the Family Code. 4

The facts follow.

Petitioner Benjamin Ting (Benjamin) and respondent Carmen Velez-Ting (Carmen) first met in 1972
while they were classmates in medical school.5 They fell in love, and they were wed on July 26, 1975 in
Cebu City when respondent was already pregnant with their first child.

At first, they resided at Benjamin’s family home in Maguikay, Mandaue City.6 When their second child
was born, the couple decided to move to Carmen’s family home in Cebu City.7 In September 1975,
Benjamin passed the medical board examinations8 and thereafter proceeded to take a residency
program to become a surgeon but shifted to anesthesiology after two years. By 1979, Benjamin
completed the preceptorship program for the said field9 and, in 1980, he began working for Velez
Hospital, owned by Carmen’s family, as member of its active staff,10 while Carmen worked as the
hospital’s Treasurer.11

The couple begot six (6) children, namely Dennis, born on December 9, 1975; James Louis, born on
August 25, 1977; Agnes Irene, born on April 5, 1981; Charles Laurence, born on July 21, 1986; Myles
Vincent, born on July 19, 1988; and Marie Corinne, born on June 16, 1991.12

On October 21, 1993, after being married for more than 18 years to petitioner and while their youngest
child was only two years old, Carmen filed a verified petition before the RTC of Cebu City praying for
the declaration of nullity of their marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code. She claimed that
Benjamin suffered from psychological incapacity even at the time of the celebration of their marriage,
which, however, only became manifest thereafter. 13
In her complaint, Carmen stated that prior to their marriage, she was already aware that Benjamin used
to drink and gamble occasionally with his friends.14 But after they were married, petitioner continued to
drink regularly and would go home at about midnight or sometimes in the wee hours of the morning
drunk and violent. He would confront and insult respondent, physically assault her and force her to
have sex with him. There were also instances when Benjamin used his gun and shot the gate of their
house.15 Because of his drinking habit, Benjamin’s job as anesthesiologist was affected to the point that
he often had to refuse to answer the call of his fellow doctors and to pass the task to other
anesthesiologists. Some surgeons even stopped calling him for his services because they perceived
petitioner to be unreliable. Respondent tried to talk to her husband about the latter’s drinking problem,
but Benjamin refused to acknowledge the same.16

Carmen also complained that petitioner deliberately refused to give financial support to their family and
would even get angry at her whenever she asked for money for their children. Instead of providing
support, Benjamin would spend his money on drinking and gambling and would even buy expensive
equipment for his hobby.17 He rarely stayed home18 and even neglected his obligation to his children.19

Aside from this, Benjamin also engaged in compulsive gambling.20 He would gamble two or three times
a week and would borrow from his friends, brothers, or from loan sharks whenever he had no money.
Sometimes, Benjamin would pawn his wife’s own jewelry to finance his gambling.21 There was also an
instance when the spouses had to sell their family car and even a portion of the lot Benjamin inherited
from his father just to be able to pay off his gambling debts.22 Benjamin only stopped going to the
casinos in 1986 after he was banned therefrom for having caused trouble, an act which he said he
purposely committed so that he would be banned from the gambling establishments.23

In sum, Carmen’s allegations of Benjamin’s psychological incapacity consisted of the following

manifestations:

1. Benjamin’s alcoholism, which adversely affected his family relationship and his profession;

2. Benjamin’s violent nature brought about by his excessive and regular drinking;

3. His compulsive gambling habit, as a result of which Benjamin found it necessary to sell the
family car twice and the property he inherited from his father in order to pay off his debts,
because he no longer had money to pay the same; and

4. Benjamin’s irresponsibility and immaturity as shown by his failure and refusal to give regular
financial support to his family.24

In his answer, Benjamin denied being psychologically incapacitated. He maintained that he is a

respectable person, as his peers would confirm. He said that he is an active member of social and
athletic clubs and would drink and gamble only for social reasons and for leisure. He also denied being
a violent person, except when provoked by circumstances.25 As for his alleged failure to support his
family financially, Benjamin claimed that it was Carmen herself who would collect his professional fees
from Velez Hospital when he was still serving there as practicing anesthesiologist.26 In his testimony,
Benjamin also insisted that he gave his family financial support within his means whenever he could
and would only get angry at respondent for lavishly spending his hard-earned money on unnecessary
things.27 He also pointed out that it was he who often comforted and took care of their children, while
Carmen played mahjong with her friends twice a week.28

During the trial, Carmen’s testimony regarding Benjamin’s drinking and gambling habits and violent
behavior was corroborated by Susana Wasawas, who served as nanny to the spouses’ children from
1987 to 1992.29 Wasawas stated that she personally witnessed instances when Benjamin maltreated
Carmen even in front of their children.30
Carmen also presented as witness Dr. Pureza Trinidad-Oñate, a psychiatrist.31 Instead of the usual
personal interview, however, Dr. Oñate’s evaluation of Benjamin was limited to the transcript of
stenographic notes taken during Benjamin’s deposition because the latter had already gone to work as
an anesthesiologist in a hospital in South Africa. After reading the transcript of stenographic notes, Dr.
Oñate concluded that Benjamin’s compulsive drinking, compulsive gambling and physical abuse of
respondent are clear indications that petitioner suffers from a personality disorder.32

To refute Dr. Oñate’s opinion, petitioner presented Dr. Renato D. Obra, a psychiatrist and a consultant
at the Department of Psychiatry in Don Vicente Sotto Memorial Medical Center, as his expert
witness.33 Dr. Obra evaluated Benjamin’s psychological behavior based on the transcript of
stenographic notes, as well as the psychiatric evaluation report prepared by Dr. A.J.L. Pentz, a
psychiatrist from the University of Pretoria in South Africa, and his (Dr. Obra’s) interview with
Benjamin’s brothers.34 Contrary to Dr. Oñate’s findings, Dr. Obra observed that there is nothing wrong
with petitioner’s personality, considering the latter’s good relationship with his fellow doctors and his
good track record as anesthesiologist.35

On January 9, 1998, the lower court rendered its Decision36 declaring the marriage between petitioner
and respondent null and void. The RTC gave credence to Dr. Oñate’s findings and the admissions
made by Benjamin in the course of his deposition, and found him to be psychologically incapacitated to
comply with the essential obligations of marriage. Specifically, the trial court found Benjamin an
excessive drinker, a compulsive gambler, someone who prefers his extra-curricular activities to his
family, and a person with violent tendencies, which character traits find root in a personality defect
existing even before his marriage to Carmen. The decretal portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, judgment is hereby rendered declaring the marriage
between plaintiff and defendant null and void ab initio pursuant to Art. 36 of the Family Code. x x x

xxxx

SO ORDERED.37

Aggrieved, petitioner appealed to the CA. On October 19, 2000, the CA rendered a
Decision38 reversing the trial court’s ruling. It faulted the trial court’s finding, stating that no proof was
adduced to support the conclusion that Benjamin was psychologically incapacitated at the time he
married Carmen since Dr. Oñate’s conclusion was based only on theories and not on established
fact,39 contrary to the guidelines set forth in Santos v. Court of Appeals40 and in Rep. of the Phils. v.
Court of Appeals and Molina.41

Because of this, Carmen filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that the Molina guidelines should
not be applied to this case since the Molina decision was promulgated only on February 13, 1997, or
more than five years after she had filed her petition with the RTC.42 She claimed that the Molina ruling
could not be made to apply retroactively, as it would run counter to the principle of stare decisis.
Initially, the CA denied the motion for reconsideration for having been filed beyond the prescribed
period. Respondent thereafter filed a manifestation explaining compliance with the prescriptive period
but the same was likewise denied for lack of merit. Undaunted, respondent filed a petition for
certiorari43 with this Court. In a Resolution44 dated March 5, 2003, this Court granted the petition and
directed the CA to resolve Carmen’s motion for reconsideration.45 On review, the CA decided to
reconsider its previous ruling. Thus, on November 17, 2003, it issued an Amended Decision46 reversing
its first ruling and sustaining the trial court’s decision.47

A motion for reconsideration was filed, this time by Benjamin, but the same was denied by the CA in its
December 13, 2004 Resolution.48
Hence, this petition.

For our resolution are the following issues:

I. Whether the CA violated the rule on stare decisis when it refused to follow the guidelines set
forth under the Santos and Molina cases;

II. Whether the CA correctly ruled that the requirement of proof of psychological incapacity for
the declaration of absolute nullity of marriage based on Article 36 of the Family Code has been
liberalized; and

III. Whether the CA’s decision declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null
and void [is] in accordance with law and jurisprudence.

We find merit in the petition.

I. On the issue of stare decisis.

The principle of stare decisis enjoins adherence by lower courts to doctrinal rules established by this
Court in its final decisions. It is based on the principle that once a question of law has been examined
and decided, it should be deemed settled and closed to further argument.49 Basically, it is a bar to any
attempt to relitigate the same issues,50 necessary for two simple reasons: economy and stability. In our
jurisdiction, the principle is entrenched in Article 8 of the Civil Code.51

This doctrine of adherence to precedents or stare decisis was applied by the English courts and was
later adopted by the United States. Associate Justice (now Chief Justice) Reynato S. Puno’s discussion
on the historical development of this legal principle in his dissenting opinion in Lambino v. Commission
on Elections52 is enlightening:

The latin phrase stare decisis et non quieta movere means "stand by the thing and do not disturb the
calm." The doctrine started with the English Courts. Blackstone observed that at the beginning of the
18th century, "it is an established rule to abide by former precedents where the same points come
again in litigation." As the rule evolved, early limits to its application were recognized: (1) it would not be
followed if it were "plainly unreasonable"; (2) where courts of equal authority developed conflicting
decisions; and, (3) the binding force of the decision was the "actual principle or principles necessary for
the decision; not the words or reasoning used to reach the decision."

The doctrine migrated to the United States. It was recognized by the framers of the U.S. Constitution.
According to Hamilton, "strict rules and precedents" are necessary to prevent "arbitrary discretion in the
courts." Madison agreed but stressed that "x x x once the precedent ventures into the realm of altering
or repealing the law, it should be rejected." Prof. Consovoy well noted that Hamilton and Madison
"disagree about the countervailing policy considerations that would allow a judge to abandon a
precedent." He added that their ideas "reveal a deep internal conflict between the concreteness
required by the rule of law and the flexibility demanded in error correction. It is this internal conflict that
the Supreme Court has attempted to deal with for over two centuries."

Indeed, two centuries of American case law will confirm Prof. Consovoy's observation although stare
decisis developed its own life in the United States. Two strains of stare decisis have been isolated by
legal scholars. The first, known as vertical stare decisis deals with the duty of lower courts to apply the
decisions of the higher courts to cases involving the same facts. The second, known as horizontal stare
decisis requires that high courts must follow its own precedents. Prof. Consovoy correctly observes that
vertical stare decisis has been viewed as an obligation, while horizontal stare decisis, has been viewed
as a policy, imposing choice but not a command. Indeed, stare decisis is not one of the precepts set in
stone in our Constitution.

It is also instructive to distinguish the two kinds of horizontal stare decisis — constitutional stare decisis
and statutory stare decisis. Constitutional stare decisis involves judicial interpretations of the
Constitution while statutory stare decisis involves interpretations of statutes. The distinction is important
for courts enjoy more flexibility in refusing to apply stare decisis in constitutional litigations. Justice
Brandeis' view on the binding effect of the doctrine in constitutional litigations still holds sway today. In
soothing prose, Brandeis stated: "Stare decisis is not . . . a universal and inexorable command. The
rule of stare decisis is not inflexible. Whether it shall be followed or departed from, is a question entirely
within the discretion of the court, which is again called upon to consider a question once decided." In
the same vein, the venerable Justice Frankfurter opined: "the ultimate touchstone of constitutionality is
the Constitution itself and not what we have said about it." In contrast, the application of stare decisis
on judicial interpretation of statutes is more inflexible. As Justice Stevens explains: "after a statute has
been construed, either by this Court or by a consistent course of decision by other federal judges and
agencies, it acquires a meaning that should be as clear as if the judicial gloss had been drafted by the
Congress itself." This stance reflects both respect for Congress' role and the need to preserve the
courts' limited resources.

In general, courts follow the stare decisis rule for an ensemble of reasons, viz.: (1) it legitimizes judicial
institutions; (2) it promotes judicial economy; and, (3) it allows for predictability. Contrariwise, courts
refuse to be bound by the stare decisis rule where (1) its application perpetuates illegitimate and
unconstitutional holdings; (2) it cannot accommodate changing social and political understandings; (3) it
leaves the power to overturn bad constitutional law solely in the hands of Congress; and, (4) activist
judges can dictate the policy for future courts while judges that respect stare decisis are stuck agreeing
with them.

In its 200-year history, the U.S. Supreme Court has refused to follow the stare decisis rule and reversed
its decisions in 192 cases. The most famous of these reversals is Brown v. Board of Education which
junked Plessy v. Ferguson's "separate but equal doctrine." Plessy upheld as constitutional a state law
requirement that races be segregated on public transportation. In Brown, the U.S. Supreme Court,
unanimously held that "separate . . . is inherently unequal." Thus, by freeing itself from the shackles of
stare decisis, the U.S. Supreme Court freed the colored Americans from the chains of inequality. In the
Philippine setting, this Court has likewise refused to be straitjacketed by the stare decisis rule in order
to promote public welfare. In La Bugal-B'laan Tribal Association, Inc. v. Ramos, we reversed our
original ruling that certain provisions of the Mining Law are unconstitutional. Similarly, in Secretary of
Justice v. Lantion, we overturned our first ruling and held, on motion for reconsideration, that a private
respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.

An examination of decisions on stare decisis in major countries will show that courts are agreed on the
factors that should be considered before overturning prior rulings. These are workability, reliance,
intervening developments in the law and changes in fact. In addition, courts put in the balance the
following determinants: closeness of the voting, age of the prior decision and its merits.

The leading case in deciding whether a court should follow the stare decisis rule in constitutional
litigations is Planned Parenthood v. Casey. It established a 4-pronged test. The court should (1)
determine whether the rule has proved to be intolerable simply in defying practical workability; (2)
consider whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that would lend a special hardship to the
consequences of overruling and add inequity to the cost of repudiation; (3) determine whether related
principles of law have so far developed as to have the old rule no more than a remnant of an
abandoned doctrine; and, (4) find out whether facts have so changed or come to be seen differently, as
to have robbed the old rule of significant application or justification.53
To be forthright, respondent’s argument that the doctrinal guidelines prescribed in Santos and Molina
should not be applied retroactively for being contrary to the principle of stare decisis is no longer new.
The same argument was also raised but was struck down in Pesca v. Pesca,54 and again in Antonio v.
Reyes.55 In these cases, we explained that the interpretation or construction of a law by courts
constitutes a part of the law as of the date the statute is enacted. It is only when a prior ruling of this
Court is overruled, and a different view is adopted, that the new doctrine may have to be applied
prospectively in favor of parties who have relied on the old doctrine and have acted in good faith, in
accordance therewith under the familiar rule of "lex prospicit, non respicit."

II. On liberalizing the required proof for the declaration of nullity of marriage under Article 36.

Now, petitioner wants to know if we have abandoned the Molina doctrine.

We have not.

In Edward Kenneth Ngo Te v. Rowena Ong Gutierrez Yu-Te,56 we declared that, in hindsight, it may
have been inappropriate for the Court to impose a rigid set of rules, as the one in Molina, in resolving all
cases of psychological incapacity. We said that instead of serving as a guideline, Molina unintentionally
became a straightjacket, forcing all cases involving psychological incapacity to fit into and be bound by
it, which is not only contrary to the intention of the law but unrealistic as well because, with respect to
psychological incapacity, no case can be considered as on "all fours" with another.57

By the very nature of cases involving the application of Article 36, it is logical and understandable to
give weight to the expert opinions furnished by psychologists regarding the psychological temperament
of parties in order to determine the root cause, juridical antecedence, gravity and incurability of the
psychological incapacity. However, such opinions, while highly advisable, are not conditions sine qua
non in granting petitions for declaration of nullity of marriage.58 At best, courts must treat such opinions
as decisive but not indispensable evidence in determining the merits of a given case. In fact, if the
totality of evidence presented is enough to sustain a finding of psychological incapacity, then actual
medical or psychological examination of the person concerned need not be resorted to.59 The trial
court, as in any other given case presented before it, must always base its decision not solely on the
expert opinions furnished by the parties but also on the totality of evidence adduced in the course of the
proceedings.

It was for this reason that we found it necessary to emphasize in Ngo Te that each case involving the
application of Article 36 must be treated distinctly and judged not on the basis of a priori assumptions,
predilections or generalizations but according to its own attendant facts. Courts should interpret the
provision on a case-to-case basis, guided by experience, the findings of experts and researchers in
psychological disciplines, and by decisions of church tribunals.

Far from abandoning Molina, we simply suggested the relaxation of the stringent requirements set forth
therein, cognizant of the explanation given by the Committee on the Revision of the Rules on the
rationale of the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable
Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC), viz.:

To require the petitioner to allege in the petition the particular root cause of the psychological incapacity
and to attach thereto the verified written report of an accredited psychologist or psychiatrist have
proved to be too expensive for the parties. They adversely affect access to justice o poor litigants. It is
also a fact that there are provinces where these experts are not available. Thus, the Committee
deemed it necessary to relax this stringent requirement enunciated in the Molina Case. The need for
the examination of a party or parties by a psychiatrist or clinical psychologist and the presentation of
psychiatric experts shall now be determined by the court during the pre-trial conference.60
But where, as in this case, the parties had the full opportunity to present professional and expert
opinions of psychiatrists tracing the root cause, gravity and incurability of a party’s alleged
psychological incapacity, then such expert opinion should be presented and, accordingly, be weighed
by the court in deciding whether to grant a petition for nullity of marriage.

III. On petitioner’s psychological incapacity.

Coming now to the main issue, we find the totality of evidence adduced by respondent insufficient to
prove that petitioner is psychologically unfit to discharge the duties expected of him as a husband, and
more particularly, that he suffered from such psychological incapacity as of the date of the marriage
eighteen (18) years ago. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s and the appellate court’s rulings
declaring the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio.

The intendment of the law has been to confine the application of Article 36 to the most serious cases of
personality disorders clearly demonstrative of an utter insensitivity or inability to give meaning and
significance to the marriage.61 The psychological illness that must have afflicted a party at the inception
of the marriage should be a malady so grave and permanent as to deprive one of awareness of the
duties and responsibilities of the matrimonial bond he or she is about to assume.621avvphi1.zw+

In this case, respondent failed to prove that petitioner’s "defects" were present at the time of the
celebration of their marriage. She merely cited that prior to their marriage, she already knew that
petitioner would occasionally drink and gamble with his friends; but such statement, by itself, is
insufficient to prove any pre-existing psychological defect on the part of her husband. Neither did the
evidence adduced prove such "defects" to be incurable.

The evaluation of the two psychiatrists should have been the decisive evidence in determining whether
to declare the marriage between the parties null and void. Sadly, however, we are not convinced that
the opinions provided by these experts strengthened respondent’s allegation of psychological
incapacity. The two experts provided diametrically contradicting psychological evaluations: Dr. Oñate
testified that petitioner’s behavior is a positive indication of a personality disorder,63 while Dr. Obra
maintained that there is nothing wrong with petitioner’s personality. Moreover, there appears to be
greater weight in Dr. Obra’s opinion because, aside from analyzing the transcript of Benjamin’s
deposition similar to what Dr. Oñate did, Dr. Obra also took into consideration the psychological
evaluation report furnished by another psychiatrist in South Africa who personally examined Benjamin,
as well as his (Dr. Obra’s) personal interview with Benjamin’s brothers.64 Logically, therefore, the
balance tilts in favor of Dr. Obra’s findings.

Lest it be misunderstood, we are not condoning petitioner’s drinking and gambling problems, or his
violent outbursts against his wife. There is no valid excuse to justify such a behavior. Petitioner must
remember that he owes love, respect, and fidelity to his spouse as much as the latter owes the same to
him. Unfortunately, this court finds respondent’s testimony, as well as the totality of evidence presented
by the respondent, to be too inadequate to declare him psychologically unfit pursuant to Article 36.

It should be remembered that the presumption is always in favor of the validity of marriage. Semper
praesumitur pro matrimonio.65 In this case, the presumption has not been amply rebutted and must,
perforce, prevail.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition for review on certiorari is GRANTED. The November
17, 2003 Amended Decision and the December 13, 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 59903 are accordingly REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 221029

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner

vs
MARELYN TANEDO MANALO, Respondent

RESOLUTION

PERALTA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to reverse and
set aside the September 18, 2014 Decision1 and October 12, 2015 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 100076. The dispositive portion of the Decision states:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is GRANTED. The Decision dated 15 October 2012 of the Regional
Trial Court of Dagupan City, First Judicial Region, Branch 43, in SPEC. PROC. NO. 2012-0005
is REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

Let a copy of this Decision be served on the Local Civil Registrar of San Juan, Metro Manila.

SO ORDERED.3

The facts are undisputed.

On January 10, 2012, respondent Marelyn Tanedo Manalo (Manalo) filed a petition for cancellation of

Entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan , Metro Manila, by virtueof a judgment of divorce
Japanese court.

Finding the petition to be sufficient in form and in substance, Branch 43 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Dagupan City set the case for initial hearing on April 25, 2012. The petition and the notice of
initial hearing were published once a week for three consecutive weeks in newspaper of general
circulation. During the initial hearing, counsel for Manalo marked the documentary evidence (consisting
of the trial courts Order dated January 25, 2012, affidavit of publication, and issues of the Northern
Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March 6-12, 2012) for purposes
of compliance with the jurisdictional requirements.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for petitioner Republic of the
Philippines authorizing the Office of the City Prosecutor of Dagupan to appear on its behalf. Likewise, a
Manifestation and Motion was filed questioning the title and/or caption of the petition considering that
based on the allegations therein, the proper action should be a petition for recognition and enforcement
of a foreign judgment.

As a result, Manalo moved to admit an Amended Petition, which the court granted. The Amended
Petition, which captioned that if it is also a petition for recognition and enforcement of foreign judgment
alleged:

2. That petitioner is previously married in the Philippines to a Japanese national named YOSHINO
MINORO as shown by their Marriage Contract xxx;

3. That recently, a case for divorce was filed by herein [petitioner] in Japan and after die proceedings, a
divorce decree dated December 6, 2011 was rendered by the Japanese Court x x x;
4. That at present, by virtue of the said divorce decree, petitioner and her divorce Japanese husband
are no longer living together and in fact, petitioner and her daughter are living separately from said
Japanese former husband;

5. That there is an imperative need to have the entry of marriage in Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro
Manila cancelled, where the petitioner and the former Japanese husband's marriage was previously
registered, in order that it would not appear anymore that petitioner is still married to the said Japanese
national who is no longer her husband or is no longer married to her, she shall not be bothered and
disturbed by aid entry of marriage;

6. That this petition is filed principally for the purpose of causing the cancellation of entry of the
marriage between the petitioner and the said Japanese national, pursuant to Rule 108 of the Revised
Rules of Court, which marriage was already dissolved by virtue of the aforesaid divorce decree; [and]

7. That petitioner prays, among others, that together with the cancellation of the said entry of her
marriage, that she be allowed to return and use her maiden surname, MANALO.4

Manalo was allowed to testify in advance as she was scheduled to leave for Japan for her employment.
Among the documents that were offered and admitted were:

1. Court Order dated January 25, 2012, finding the petition and its attachments to be sufficient in form
and in substance;

2. Affidavit of Publication;

3. Issues of the Northern Journal dated February 21-27, 2012, February 28 - March 5, 2012, and March
6-12, 2012;

4. Certificate of Marriage between Manalo and her former Japanese husband;

5. Divorce Decree of Japanese court;

6. Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippine Consulate General in Osaka, Japan of the

Notification of Divorce; and

7. Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce.5

The OSG did not present any controverting evidence to rebut the allegations of Manalo.

On October 15, 2012, the trial court denied the petition for lack of merit. In ruling that the divorce
obtained by Manalo in Japan should not be recognized, it opined that, based on Article 15 of the New
Civil Code, the Philippine law "does not afford Filipinos the right to file for a divorce whether they are in
the country or living abroad, if they are married to Filipinos or to foreigners, or if they celebrated their
marriage in the Philippines or in another country" and that unless Filipinos "are naturalized as citizens
of another country, Philippine laws shall have control over issues related to Filipinos' family rights and
duties, together with the determination of their condition and legal capacity to enter into contracts and
civil relations, inclusing marriages."6

On appeal, the CA overturned the RTC decision. It held that Article 26 of the Family Code of the
Philippines (Family Code) is applicable even if it was Manalo who filed for divorce against her Japanese
husband because the decree may obtained makes the latter no longer married to the former,
capacitating him to remarry. Conformably with Navarro, et al. V. Exec. Secretary Ermita, et al.7 ruling
that the meaning of the law should be based on the intent of the lawmakers and in view of the
legislative intent behind Article 26, it would be height of injustice to consider Manalo as still married to
the Japanese national, who, in turn, is no longer married to her. For the appellate court, the fact that it
was Manalo who filed the divorce case is inconsequential. Cited as similar to this case was Van Dorn v.
Judge Romilo, Jr.8 where the mariage between a foreigner an a Filipino was dissolved filed abroad by
the latter.

The OSG filed a motion for reconsideration, but it was denied; hence, this petition.

We deny the petition and partially affirm the CA decision.

Divorce, the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after the marriage, are of two types:
(1) absolute divorce or a vinculo matrimonii, which terminates the marriage, and (2) limited divorce or a
mensa et thoro, which suspends it and leaves the bond in full force.9 In this jurisdiction, the following
rules exist:

1. Philippine law does not provide for absolute divorce; hence, our courts cannot grant it.10

2. Consistent with Articles 1511 and 1712 of the New Civil Code, the marital bond between two
Filipinos cannot be dissolved even by an absolute divorce obtained abroad.13

3. An absolute divorce obtained abroad by a couple, who both aliens, may be recognized in the
Philippines, provided it is consistent with their respective national laws.14

4. In mixed marriages involving a Filipino and a foreigner, the former is allowed to contract a
subsequent marriage in case the absolute divorce is validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry.15

On July 6, 1987, then President Corazon C. Aquino signed into law Executive Order (E.O.) No. 209,
otherwise known as the Family Code of the Philippines, which took effect on August 3, 1988.16 Shortly
thereafter , E.O. No. 227 was issued on July 17, 1987.17 Aside from amending Articles 36 and 39 of the
Family Code, a second paragraph was added to Article 26.18 This provision was originally deleted by
the Civil Code Revision Committee (Committee),but it was presented and approved at a Cabinet
meeting after Pres. Aquino signed E.O. No. 209.19 As modified, Article 26 now states:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
where country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country,
except those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him her to remarry under Philippine
law.

Paragraph 2 of Article 26 confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage.20 It authorizes our courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce.21 Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a divorce case.22 Under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction
recognizes a valid divorce obtained by the spouse of foreign nationality, but the legal effects
thereof, e.g., on custody, care and support of the children or property relations of the spouses, must still
be determined by our courts.23
According to Judge Alicia Sempio-Diy, a member of the Committee, the idea of the amendment is to
avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as still being married to his or her alien spouse, although the
latter is no longer married to the former because he or she had obtained a divorce abroad that is
recognized by his or national law.24 The aim was that it would solved the problem of many Filipino
women who, under the New Civil Code, are still considered married to their alien husbands even after
the latter have already validly divorced them under their (the husbands') national laws and perhaps
have already married again.25

In 2005, this Court concluded that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 applies to a case where, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage, the parties were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them acquired foreign
citizenship by naturalization, initiated a divorce proceeding, and obtained a favorable decree. We held
in Republic of the Phils. v. Orbecido III:26

The jurisprudential answer lies latent in the 1998 case of Quita v. Court of Appeals. In Quita, the parties
were, as in this case, Filipino citizens when they got married. The wife became naturalized American
citizen n 1954 and obtained a divorce in the same year. The court therein hinted, by the way of obiter
dictum, that a Filipino divorced by his naturalized foreign spouse is no longer married under Philippine
law and can thus remarry.

Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as
foreign citizen and obtains divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. x x x

If we are to give meaning to the legislative intent to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who after obtaining a divorce is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse, then the instant case must be deemed as coming within the contemplation of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26.

In view of the foregoing, we state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as
follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner; and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of marriage, but
their citizenship at the time valid divorced obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating the latter to
remarry.

Now, the Court is tasked to resolve whether, under the same provision, a Filipino citizen has the
capacity to remarry under Philippine law after initiating a divorce proceeding abroad and obtaining a
favorable judgment against his or her alien spouse who is capacitated to remarry. Specifically, Manalo
pleads for the recognition of enforcement of the divorced decree rendered by the Japanese court and
for the cancellation of the entry of marriage in the local civil registry " in order that it would not appear
anymore that she is still married to the said Japanese national who is no longer her husband or is no
longer married to her; [and], in the event that [she] decides to be remarried, she shall not be bothered
and disturbed by said entry of marriage," and to use her maiden surname.

We rule in the affirmative.

Both Dacasin v. Dacasin28 and Van Dorn29 already recognized a foreign divorce decree that was
initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and extended its legal effects on the issues of child
custody and property relation, respectively.

In Dacasin, post-divorce, the former spouses executed an Agreement for the joint custody of their minor
daughter. Later on, the husband who is a US citizen, sued his Filipino wife enforce the Agreement,
alleging that it was only the latter who exercised sole custody of their child. The trial court dismissed the
action for lack of jurisdiction, on the ground, among others, that the divorce decree is binding following
the "nationality rule" prevailing in this jurisdiction. The husband moved to reconsider, arguing that the
divorce decree obtained by his former wife is void, but it was denied. In ruling that the trial court has
jurisdiction to entertain the suit bu not to enforce the Agreement, which is void, this Court said:

Nor can petitioner rely on the divorce decree's alleged invalidity - not because the Illinois court lacked
jurisdiction or that the divorced decree violated Illinois law, but because the divorce was obtained by his
Filipino spouse - to support the Agreement's enforceability . The argument that foreigners in this
jurisdiction are not bound by foreign divorce decrees is hardly novel. Van Dron v. Romillo settled the
matter by holding that an alien spouse of a Filipino is bound by a divorce decree obtained abroad.
There, we dismissed the alien divorcee's Philippine suit for accounting of alleged post-divorce conjugal
property and rejected his submission that the foreign divorce (obtained by the Filipino spouse) is not
valid in this jurisdiction x x x.30

Van Dorn was decided before the Family Code took into effect. There, a complaint was filed by the ex-
husband , who is a US citizen, against his Filipino wife to render an accounting of a business that was
alleged to be a conjugal property and to be declared with right to manage the same. Van Dorn moved
to dismiss the case on the ground that the cause of action was barred by previous judgment in the
divorce proceedings that she initiated, but the trial court denied the motion. On his part, her ex-husband
averred that the divorce decree issued by the Nevada court could not prevail over the prohibitive laws
of the Philippines and its declared national policy; that the acts and declaration of a foreign court
cannot, especially if the same is contrary to public policy, divest Philippine courts of jurisdiction to
entertain matters within its jurisdiction . In dismissing the case filed by the alien spouse, the Court
discussed the effect of the foreign divorce on the parties and their conjugal property in the Philippines.
Thus:

There can be no question as to the validity of that Nevada divorce in any of the States of the United
States. The decree is binding on private respondent as an American citizen. For instance, private
respondent cannot sue petitioner, as her husband, in any State of the Union. What he is contending in
this case is that the divorce is not valid and binding in this jurisdiction, the same being contrary to local
law and public policy.

Is it true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorce abroad, which
may be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from standards of American
law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. As stated by the Federal Supreme Court of the
United States in Atherton vs. Atherton, 45 L. Ed. 794,799:

"The purpose and effect of a decree of divorce from the bond of matrimony by a court of competent
jurisdiction are to change the existing status or domestic relation of husband and wife, and to free them
both from the bond. The marriage tie, when thus severed as stone party, ceases to bind either. A
husband without a wife, or a wife without a husband, is unknown to the law. When the law provides in
the nature of penalty, that the guilty party shall not marry again, that party, as well as the other, is still
absolutely feed from the bond of the former marriage."
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is estopped by his own representation before said court from asserting his right
over the alleged conjugal property.

To maintain, as private respondent does, that under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.31

In addition, the fact that a validity obtained foreign divorce initiated by the Filipino spouse can be
recognized and given legal effects in the Philippines is implied from Our rulings in Fujiki v. Marinay, et
al.32 and Medina v. Koike.33

In Fujiki, the Filipino wife, with the help of her husband, who is a Japanese national, was able to obtain
a judgment from Japan's family court. Which declared the marriage between her and her second
husband, who is a Japanese national, void on the ground of bigamy. In resolving the issue of whether a
husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign judgment nullifying the
subsequent marriage between his her spouse and a foreign citizen on the ground of bigamy, We ruled:

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity
of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances) his most intimate human relation, but also
to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts marriage. These
property interests in marriage included the right to be supported "in keeping with the financial capacity
of the family" and preserving the property regime of the marriage.

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution, but a spouse's right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between
Husband and Wife") of the Family Code. x x x34

On the other hand, in Medina, the Filipino wife and her Japanese husband jointly filed for divorce, which
was granted.1âwphi1 Subsequently, she filed a petition before the RTC for judicial recognition of
foreign divorce and declaration of capacity to remarry pursuant to Paragraph 2 of Article 26. The RTC
denied the petition on the ground that the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien
spouse recognizing his capacity to obtain a divorce must be proven in accordance with Sections 24 and
25 of Rule 132 of the Revised Rules on Evidence. This Court agreed and ruled that, consistent
with Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas, et al.35 and Garcia v. Recio,36 the divorce decree and the national law of the
alien spouse must be proven. Instead of dismissing the case, We referred it to the CA for appropriate
action including the reception of evidence to determine and resolve the pertinent factual issues.

There is no compelling reason to deviate from the above-mentioned rulings. When this Court
recognized a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by the Filipino spouse and
extended its legal effects on the issues of child custody and property relation, it should not stop short in
a likewise acknowledging that one of the usual and necessary consequences of absolute divorce is the
right to remarry. Indeed, there is no longer a mutual obligation to live together and observe fidelity.
When the marriage tie is severed and ceased to exist, the civil status and the domestic relation of the
former spouses change as both of them are freed from the marital bond.

The dissent is of the view that, under the nationality principle, Manalo's personal status is subject to
Philippine law, which prohibits absolute divorce. Hence, the divorce decree which she obtained under
Japanese law cannot be given effect, as she is, without dispute, a national not of Japan, bit of the
Philippines. It is said that that a contrary ruling will subvert not only the intention of the framers of the
law, but also that of the Filipino peopl, as expressed in the Constitution. The Court is, therefore, bound
to respect the prohibition until the legislature deems it fit to lift the same.

We beg to differ.

Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 speaksof "a divorce x x x validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouth of
lawmakers.37 The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words to have used words
advisely and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words if a statute there should be departure."38

Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act.39 Law have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes.40 As held in League
of Cities of the Phils. et al. v. COMELEC et. al.:41

The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
the rule that the spirit of the law control its letter.

To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure is free to marry under the laws of his or her countr.42 Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstances as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to
recognize the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on a Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien
spouses are severed by operations of their alien spouses are severed by operation on the latter's
national law.

Conveniently invoking the nationality principle is erroneous. Such principle, found under Article 15 of
the City Code, is not an absolute and unbending rule. In fact, the mer e existence of Paragraph 2 of
Article 26 is a testament that the State may provide for an exception thereto. Moreover, blind
adherence to the nationality principle must be disallowed if it would cause unjust discrimination and
oppression to certain classes of individuals whose rights are equally protected by law. The courts have
the duty to enforce the laws of divorce as written by the Legislature only if they are constitutional. 43

While the Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification and that its decision
is accorded recognition and respect by the court of justice, such classification may be subjected to
judicial review.44 The deference stops where the classification violates a fundamental right, or
prejudices persons accorded special protection by the Constitution.45 When these violations arise, this
Court must discharge its primary role as the vanguard of constitutional guaranties, and require a stricter
and more exacting adherence to constitutional limitations.46 If a legislative classification impermissibly
interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect
class strict judicial scrutiny is required since it is presumed unconstitutional, and the burden is upon the
government to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state interest and that
it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.47

"Fundamental rights" whose infringement leads to strict scrutiny under the equal protection clause are
those basic liberties explicitly or implicitly guaranteed in the Constitution.48 It includes the right to free
speech, political expression, press, assembly, and forth, the right to travel, and the right to vote. 49 On
the other hand, what constitutes compelling state interest is measured by the scale rights and powers
arrayed in the Constitution and calibrated by history.50 It is akin to the paramount interest of the state for
which some individual liberties must give way, such as the promotion of public interest, public safety or
the general welfare.51 It essentially involves a public right or interest that, because of its primacy,
overrides individual rights, and allows the former to take precedence over the latter.52

Although the Family Code was not enacted by the Congress, the same principle applies with respect to
the acts of the President which have the force and effect of law unless declared otherwise by the court.
In this case, We find that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 violates one of the essential requisites53 of the equal
protection clause.54 Particularly, the limitation of the provision only to a foreign divorce decree initiated
by the alien spouse is unreasonable as it is based on superficial, arbitrary, and whimsical classification.

A Filipino who is married to another Filipino is not similarly situated with a Filipino who is married to a
foreign citizen. There are real, material and substantial differences between them. Ergo, they should
not be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and liabilities imposed. Without a doubt, there are
political, economic cultural, and religious dissimilarities as well as varying legal systems and
procedures, all too unfamiliar, that a Filipino national who is married to an alien spouse has to contend
with. More importantly, while a divorce decree obtained abroad by a Filipino against another Filipino is
null and void, a divorce decree obtained by an alien against his her Filipino spouse is recognized if
made in accordance with the national law of the foreigner.55

On the contrary, there is no real and substantial difference between a Filipino who initiated a foreign
divorce proceedings a Filipino who obtained a divorce decree upon the instance of his or her alien
spouse . In the eyes of the Philippine and foreign laws, both are considered as Filipinos who have the
same rights and obligations in a alien land. The circumstances surrounding them are alike. Were it not
for Paragraph 2 of Article 26, both are still married to their foreigner spouses who are no longer their
wives/husbands. Hence, to make a distinction between them based merely on the superficial difference
of whether they initiated the divorce proceedings or not is utterly unfair. Indeed, the treatment gives
undue favor to one and unjustly discriminate against the other.

Further, the differentiation in Paragraph 2 Article 26 is arbitrary. There is inequality in treatment

because a foreign divorce decree that was initiated and obtained by a Filipino citizen against his or her
alien spouse would not be recognized even if based on grounds similar to Articles 35, 36, 37 and 38 of
the Family Code.56 In filing for divorce based on these grounds, the Filipino spouse cannot be accused
of invoking foreign law at whim, tantamount to insisting that he or she should be governed with
whatever law he or she chooses. The dissent's comment that Manalo should be "reminded that all is
not lost, for she may still pray for the severance of her martial ties before the RTC in accordance with
the mechanism now existing under the Family Code" is anything but comforting. For the guidance of
the bench and the bar, it would have been better if the dissent discussed in detail what these
"mechanism" are and how they specifically apply in Manalo's case as well as those who are similarly
situated. If the dissent refers to a petition for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage, the reality
is that there is no assurance that our courts will automatically grant the same. Besides, such
proceeding is duplicitous, costly, and protracted. All to the prejudice of our kababayan.

It is argued that the Court's liberal interpretation of Paragraph 2 of Artilce 26 encourages Filipinos to
marry foreigners, opening the floodgate to the indiscriminate practice of Filipinos marrying foreign
nationals or initiating divorce proceedings against their alien spouses.

The supposition is speculative and unfounded.

First, the dissent falls into a hasty generalization as no data whatsoever was sworn to support what he
intends to prove. Second, We adhere to the presumption of good faith in this jurisdiction. Under the
rules on evidence, it is disputable presumed (i.e., satisfactory if uncontradicted and overcome by other
evidence) that a person is innocent of crime or wrong,57 that a person takes ordinary care of his
concerns,59 that acquiescence resulted from a belief that the thing acquiesced in was conformable to
the law and fact, 60 that a man and woman deporting themselves as husband and wife have entered
into a lawful contract of marriage,61 and that the law has been obeyed.62 It is whimsical to easily
attribute any illegal, irregular or immoral conduct on the part of a Filipino just because he or she opted
to marry a foreigner instead of a fellow Filipino. It is presumed that interracial unions are entered into
out of genuine love and affection, rather than prompted by pure lust or profit. Third, We take judicial
notice of the fact that Filipinos are relatively more forbearing and conservative in nature and that they
are more often the victims or losing end of mixed marriages. And Fourth, it is not for Us to prejudge the
motive behind Filipino's decision to marry an alien national. In one case, it was said:

Motive for entering into a marriage are varied and complex. The State does not and cannot dictated on
the kind of life that a couple chooses to lead. Any attempt to regulate their lifestyle would go into the
realm of their right to privacy and would raise serious constitutional questions. The right marital privacy
allows married couples to structure their marriages in almost any way they see it fit, to live together or
live apart, to have children or no children, to love one another or not, and so on. Thus, marriages
entered into for other purposes, limited or otherwise, such as convenience, companionship, money,
status, and title, provided that they comply with all the legal requisites, are equally valid. Love, though
the ideal consideration in a marriage contract, is not the only valid cause for marriage. Other
considerations, not precluded by law, may validly support a marriage.63

The 1987 Constitution expresses that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is the foundation of
the family and shall be protected by the State.64 Nevertheless, it was not meant to be a general
prohibition on divorce because Commissioner Jose Luis Martin C. Gascon, in response to a question
by Father Joaquin G. Bernas during the deliberations of the 1986 Constitutional Commission, was
categorical about this point.65 Their exchange reveal as follows:

MR. RAMA. Mr. Presiding Officer, may I ask that Commissioner Bernas be recognized.

THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Colayco). Commissioner Bernas is recognized.

FR. BERNAS. Just one question, and I am not sure if it has been categorically answered. I refer
specifically to the proposal of Commissioner Gascon. Is this be understood as a prohibition of a general
law on divorce? His intention is to make this a prohibition so that the legislature cannot pass a divorce
law.

MR. GASCON. Mr. Presding Officer, that was not primarily my intention. My intention was primarily to
encourage the social institution of marriage, but not necessarily discourage divorce. But now that the
mentioned the issue of divorce, my personal opinion is to discourage it. Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. No my question is more categorical. Does this carry the meaning of prohibiting a divorce
law?

MR. GASCON. No Mr. Presiding Officer.

FR. BERNAS. Thank you.66

Notably, a law on absolute divorce is not new in our country. Effectivity March 11, 1917, Philippine
courts could grant an absolute divorce in the grounds of adultery on the part of the wife or concubinage
on the part of the husband by virtue of Act No. 2710 of the Philippine Legislature.67 On March 25, 1943,
pursuant to the authority conferred upon him by the Commander-in-Chief fo the Imperial Japanese
Forces in the Philippines and with the approval of the latter, the Chairman of the Philippine Executive
Commission promulgated an E.O. No. 141 ("New Divorce Law"), which repealed Act No. 2710 and
provided eleven ground for absolute divorce, such as intentional or unjustified desertion continuously
for at least one year prior to the filing of the action, slander by deed or gross insult by one spouse
against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable, and a spouse's
incurable insanity.68 When the Philippines was liberated and the Commonwealth Government was
restored, it ceased to have force and effect and Act No. 2710 again prevailed.69 From August 30, 1950,
upon the effectivity of Republic Act No. 836 or the New Civil Code, an absolute divorce obatined by
Filipino citizens, whether here or abroad, is no longer recognized.70

Through the years, there has been constant clamor from various sectors of the Philippine society to re-
institute absolute divorce. As a matte of fcat, in the currnet 17th Congress, House Bill (H.B.) Nos.
11671 106272 238073 and 602774 were filed in the House of representatives. In substitution of these bills,
H.B. No. 7303 entitled "An Act Instituting Absolute Divorce and Dissolution of Marriage in the
Philippines" or the Absolute Divorce Act of 2018 was submitted by the House Committee on Population

And Family Relations of February 8, 2018. It was approved on March 19, 2018 on Third Reading - with
134 in favor, 57 against, and 2 absentations. Under the bill, the grounds for a judicial decree of absolute
divorce are as follows:

1. The grounds for legal separation under Article 55 of the Family Code, modified or amended, as
follows:

a. Physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a common child,
or a child of the petitioner;

b. Physical violence or moral pressure to compel the petitioner to change religious or political
affiliation;

c. Attempt of respondent to corrupt or induce the petitioner, a common child, or a child of a

petitioner, to engage in prostitution, or connivance in such corruption or inducement;

d. Final judgment sentencing the respondent to imprisonment of more than six (6) years, even if
pardoned;
 e. Drug addiction or habitual alchoholism ro chronic gambling of respondent;

f. Homosexuality of the respondent;

g. Contracting by the respondent of a subsequent bigamous marriage, whether in the

Philippines or abroad;

h. Marital infidelity or perversion or having a child with another person other than one's spouse
during the marriage, except when upon the mutual agreement of the spouses, a child is born to
them by in vitro or a similar procedure or when the wife bears a child after being a victim of
rape;

i. attempt by the respondent against the life of the petitioner, a common child or a child of a
petitioner; and

j. Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one (1) year.

When the spouses are legally separated by judicial decree for more thath two (2) years, either or both
spouses can petition the proper court for an absolute divorce based on said judicial decree of legal
separation.

1. Grounds for annulment of marriage under Article 45 of the Family Code restated as follows:

a. The party in whose behalf it is sought to have the marriage annulled was eighteen (18) years
of age or over but below twety-one (21), and the marriage was solemnized without the consent
of the parents guradian or personl having substitute parental authority over the party, in that
order, unless after attaining the age of twenty-one (21) such party freely cohabited with the
other and both lived together as husband and wife;

b. either party was of unsound mind, unless such party after coming to reason, freely cohabited
with the other as husband and wife;

c. The consent of either party was obtained by fraud, unless such party afterwards with full
knowledge of the facts constituting the fraud, freely cohabited with the other husband and wife;

d. consent of either party was obtained by force, intimidation or undue influence, unless the
same having disappeared or ceased, such party thereafter freely cohabited with the other as
husband and wife;

e. Either party was physically incapable of consummating the marriage with the other and such
incapacity continues or appears to be incurable; and

f. Either part was afflicted with the sexually transmissible infection found to be serious or
appears to be incurable.

Provided, That the ground mentioned in b, e and f existed either at the time of the marriage or
supervening after the marriage.

1. When the spouses have been separated in fact for at least five (5) years at the time the petition for
absolute divorce is filed, and the reconciliation is highly improbable;
2. Psychological incapacity of either spouse as provided for in Article 36 of the Family Code, whether or
not the incapacity was present at the time of the celebration of the marriage or later;

3. When one of the spouses undergoes a gender reassignment surgery or transition from one sex to
another, the other spouse is entitled to petition for absolute divorce with the transgender or transsexual
as respondent, or vice-versa;

4. Irreconcilable marital differences and conflicts which have resulted in the total breakdown of the
marriage beyond repair, despite earnest and repeated efforts at reconciliation.

To be sure, a good number of Filipinos led by the Roman Catholic Church react adversely to any
attempt to enact a law on absolute divorce, viewing it as contrary to our customs, morals, and traditions
that has looked upon marriage and family as an institution and their nature of permanence,

In the same breath that the establishment clause restricts what the government can do with religion, it
also limits what religious sects can or cannot do. They can neither cause the government to adopt their
particular doctrines as policy for everyone, nor can they cause the government to restrict other groups.
To do so, in simple terms, would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion and, thus establish a
state religion.76

The Roman Catholic Church can neither impose its beliefs and convictions on the State and the rest of
the citizenry nor can it demand that the nation follow its beliefs, even if it is sincerely believes that they
are good for country.77 While marriage is considered a sacrament, it has civil and legal consequences
which are governed by the Family Code.78 It is in this aspect, bereft of any ecclesiastical overtone, that
the State has a legitimate right and interest to regulate.

The declared State policy that marriage, as an inviolable social institution, is a foundation of the family
and shall be protected by the State, should not be read in total isolation but must be harmonized with
other constitutional provision. Aside from strengthening the solidarity of the Filipino family, the State is
equally mandated to actively promote its total development.79 It is also obligated to defend, among
others, the right of children to special protection from all forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty, exploitation,
and other conditions prejudicial to their development.80 To Our mind, the State cannot effectively
enforce these obligation s if We limit the application of Paragraph 2 or Article 26 only those foreign
divorce initiated by the alien spouse. It is not amiss to point that the women and children are almost
always the helpless victims of all forms of domestic abuse and violence. In fact, among the notable
legislation passed in order to minimize, if not eradicate, the menace are R.A. No. 9262 ("Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004") R.A. No. 9710 ("The Magna Carta of Women"), R.A.
No 10354 ("The Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act of 2012") and R.A. No
9208 ("Anti-Trafficking in Person Act of 2003"), as amended by R.A. No. 10364 ("ExpandedAnti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012"). Moreover, in protecting and strengthening the Filipino family as a
basic autonomous social institution, the Court must not lose sight of the constitutional mandate to value
the dignity of every human person, guarantee full respect for human rights, and ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.81

A prohibitive view of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 would do more harm than good. If We disallow a Filipino
citizen who initiated and obtained a foreign divorce from the coverage of Paragraph 2 Article 26 and still
require him or her to first avail of the existing "mechanisms" under the Family Code, any subsequent
relationship that he or she would enter in the meantime shall be considered as illicit in the eyes of the
Philippine law. Worse, any child born out such "extra-marital" affair has to suffer the stigma of being
branded as illegitimate. Surely, these are just but a few of the adverse consequences, not only to the
parent but also to the child, if We are to hold a restrictive interpretation of the subject provision. The
irony is that the principle of inviolability of marriage under Section 2, Article XV of the Constitution is
meant to be tilted in favor of marriage and against unions not formalized by marriage, but without
denying State protection and assistance to live-in arrangements or to families formed according to
indigenous customs.82

This Court should not turn a blind eye to the realities of the present time. With the advancement of
communication and information technology, as well as the improvement of the transportation system
that almost instantly connect people from all over the world, mixed marriages have become not too
uncommon. Likewise, it is recognized that not all marriages are made in heaven and that imperfect
humans more often than not create imperfect unions.83 Living in a flawed world, the unfortunate reality
for some is that the attainment of the individual's full human potential and self fulfillment is not found
and achieved in the context of a marriage. Thus it is hypocritical to safeguard the quantity of existing
marriages and, at the same time, brush aside the truth that some of them are rotten quality.

Going back, we hold that marriage, being a mutual and shared commitment between two parties,
cannot possibly be productive of any good to the society where one is considered released from the
marital bond while the other remains bound to it.84 In reiterating that the Filipino spouse should not be
discriminated against in his or her own country if the ends of justice are to be served, San Luis v. San
Luis85 quoted:

x x x In Alonzo v. Intermediate Applellate Court, the Court stated:

But as has also been aptly observed, we test a law by its results: and likewise, we may add, by its
purposes. It is a cardinal rule that, in seeking the meaning of the law, the first concern of the judge
should be to discover in its provisions the intent of the lawmaker. Unquestionably, the law should never
be interpreted in such a way as to cause injustice as this is never within the legislative intent. An
indispensable part of that intent, in fact, for we presume the good motives of the legislature, is to render
justice.

Thus, we interpret and apply the law not independently of but in consonance with justice. Law and
justice are inseparable, and we must keep them so. To be sure, there are some laws that, while
generally valid, may seem arbitrary when applied in a particular case because only of our nature and
functions, to apply them just the same, in slavish obedience to their language. What we do instead is
find a balance between the sord and the will, that justice may be done even as the law is obeyed.

As judges, we are not automatons. We do not and must not unfeelingly apply the law as it worded,
yielding like robots to the literal command without regard to its cause and consequence. "Courts are apt
to err by sticking too closely to the words of law," so we are warned, by Justice Holmes agaian, "where
these words import a policy that goes beyond them."

xxxx

More that twenty centuries ago, Justinian defined justice "as the constant and perpetual wish to render
every one of his due." That wish continues to motivate this Court when it assesses the facts and the
law in ever case brought to it for decisions. Justice is always an essential ingredient of its decisions.
Thus when the facts warrant, we interpret the law in a way that will render justice, presuming that it was
the intention if the lawmaker, to begin with, that the law be dispensed with justice.86

Indeed, where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact and literal import would lead to
mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it should be construed according
to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the law.87 A statute may therefore,
be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as they come within its spirit or
intent.88
The foregoing notwithstanding, We cannot yet write finis to this controversy by granting Manalo's
petition to recognize and enforce the divorce decree rendered by the Japanese court and to cancel the
entry of marriage in the Civil Registry of San Juan, Metro Manila.

Jurisprudence has set guidelines before the Philippine courts recognize a foreign judgment relating to
the status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of foreign country. Presentation solely of
the divorce decree will not suffice.89 The fact of divorce must still first be proven.90 Before a a foreign
divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove the divorce as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.91

x x x Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary value, the document must first be
presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is proven by the divorce decree itself.
The decree purports to be written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and
(b)authenticated by the seal of his office.92

In granting Manalo's petition, the CA noted:

In this case, Petitioner was able to submit before the court a quo the 1) Decision of the Japanese Court
allowing the divorce; 2) the Authentication/Certificate issued by the Philippines Consulate General in
Osaka, Japan of the Decree of Divorce; and 3) Acceptance of Certificate of Divorce byu the Petitioner
and the Japanese national. Under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48 (b)
of the Rules of Court, these documents sufficiently prove the subject Divorce Decree as a fact. Thus,
We are constrained to recognize the Japanese Court's judgment decreeing the divorce.93

If the opposing party fails to properly object, as in this case, the divorce decree is rendered admissible
a a written act of the foreign court.94 As it appears, the existence of the divorce decree was not denied
by the OSG; neither was the jurisdiction of the divorce court impeached nor the validity of its
proceedings challenged on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit an
opportunity to do so.95

Nonetheless, the Japanese law on divorce must still be proved.

x x x The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or thing necessary in
the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of proving the material
defendants have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new
matters. x x x

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws. Like any
other facts, they must alleged and proved. x x x The power of judicial notice must be exercise d with
caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should be resolved in the negative.96

Since the divorce was raised by Manalo, the burden of proving the pertinent Japanese law validating it,
as well as her former husband's capacity to remarry, fall squarely upon her. Japanese laws on persons
and family relations are not among those matters that Filipino judges are supposed to know by reason
of their judicial function.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is DENIED. The September 18, 2014 Decision and
October 12, 2015 Resolution if the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV. No. 100076, are AFFIRMED IN
PART. The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for further proceedings and reception of evidence
as to the relevant Japanese law on divorce.

SO ORDERED

G.R. No. 206284

REDANTE SARTO Y MISALUCHA, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

DECISION

MARTIRES, J.:

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the 31 July 2012
Decision1 and the 6 March 2013 Resolution2 of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CR No. 32635,
which affirmed the 18 May 2009 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City (RTC), in
Criminal Case No. 2007-0400 finding petitioner Redante Sarto y Misalucha (Redante) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Bigamy

THE FACTS

On 3 October 2007, Redante was charged with the crime of bigamy for allegedly contracting two (2)
marriages: the first, with Maria Socorro G. Negrete (Maria Socorro), and the second, without having the
first one legally terminated, with private complainant Fe R. Aguila (Fe). The charge stemmed from a
criminal complaint filed by Fe against Redante on 4 June 2007. The accusatory portion of the
Information reads:

That on or about December 29, 1998, in the City of Naga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, having been previously united in lawful marriage with one
Ma. Socorro G. Negrete, as evidenced by hereto attached Certificate of Marriage mark as Annex "A,"
and without said marriage having been legally dissolved, did then and there, willfully and feloniously
contract a second marriage with FE R. AGUILA-SARTO, herein complaining witness, to her damage
and prejudice.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

During his arraignment on 3 December 2007, Redante entered a plea of "not guilty." Pre-trial ensued
wherein Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages but interposed the defense that his
first marriage had been legally dissolved by divorce obtained in a foreign country.

On 22 May 2008, the defense filed a motion to allow the taking of Maria Socorro's deposition
considering that she was set to leave the country on the first week of June 2008.5 This was granted by
the RTC in its Order,6 dated 26 May 2008. Maria Socorro's deposition was taken on 28 May 2008.

On 22 August 2008, the prosecution moved for a modified or reverse trial on the basis of Redante's
admissions.7 The RTC granted the motion in its Order,8 dated 27 August 2008, wherein the defense
was directed to present its case ahead of the prosecution.
Evidence for the Defense

The defense presented Redante and Maria Socorro as witnesses. Their testimonies, taken together,
tended to establish the following:

Redante and Maria Socorro, both natives of Buhi, Camarines Sur, were married on 31 August 1984 in a
ceremony held in Angono, Rizal.9 Sometime thereafter, Maria Socorro left for Canada to work as a
nurse. While in Canada, she applied for Canadian citizenship. The application was eventually granted
and Ma. Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship on 1 April 1988.10 Maria Socorro then filed for divorce
in British Columbia, Canada, to sever her marital ties with Redante. The divorce was eventually granted
by the Supreme Court of British Columbia on 1st of November1988.11

Maria Socorro came back to Buhi, Camarines Sur, sometime in 1992 for a vacation. While there
Redante' s mother and grandparents, who were against the divorce, convinced her and Redante to give
their marriage a second chance to which they acceded. Their attempts to rekindle their romance
resulted in the birth of their daughter on 8 March 1993 in Mandaluyong City. In spite of this, Redante
and Maria Socorro's efforts to save their marriage were futile.12

Sometime in February 1998, Redante met Fe to whom he admitted that he was previously married to
Maria Socorro who, however, divorced him.13 Despite this admission, their romance blossomed and
culminated in their marriage on 29 December 1998 at the Pefiafrancia Basilica Minore in Naga
City.14 They established a conjugal home in Pasay City and had two children. Their relationship,
however, turned sour when Ma. Socorro returned to the Philippines and met with Redante to persuade
him to allow their daughter to apply for Canadian citizenship. After learning of Redante and Maria
Socorro's meeting and believing that they had reconciled, Fe decided to leave their conjugal home on
31 May 2007.15 On 4 June 2007, Fe filed a complaint for bigamy against Redante.16

Meanwhile, Maria Socorro married a certain Douglas Alexander Campbell, on 5 August 2000, in
Chilliwack, British Columbia, Canada.17

The defense presented a Certificate of Divorce18 issued on 14 January 2008, to prove the fact of
divorce.

Evidence for the Prosecution

The prosecution waived the presentation of testimonial evidence and presented instead, the Marriage
Contract19 between Redante and Maria Socorro, to prove the solemnization of their marriage on 31
August 1984, in Angono, Rizal; and the Marriage Contract20 of Redante and Fe to prove the
solemnization of Redante's second marriage on 29 December 1998, in Naga City. The prosecution also
adopted the Certificate of Divorce21 as its own exhibit for the purpose of proving that the same was
secured only on 14 January 2008.

The RTC Ruling

In its judgment, the RTC found Redante guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of bigamy. The
trial court ratiocinated that Redante's conviction is the only reasonable conclusion for the case because
of his failure to present competent evidence proving the alleged divorce decree; his failure to establish
the naturalization of Maria Socorro; and his admission that he did not seek judicial recognition of the
alleged divorce decree. The dispositive portion of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, finding the accused Redante Sarto y Misalucha guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the
crime of Bigamy punishable under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code, and after applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, this Court hereby sentenced him an imprisonment of two (2) years, four
(4) months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.22

Aggrieved, Redante appealed before the CA.

The CA Ruling

In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the RTC's Judgment. The appellate court ratiocinated that
assuming the authenticity and due execution of the Certificate of Divorce, since the order of divorce or
the divorce decree was not presented, it could not ascertain whether said divorce capacitated Maria
Socorro, and consequently Redante, to remarry. It continued that Redante failed to present evidence
that he had filed and had secured a judicial declaration that his first marriage had been dissolved in
accordance with Philippine laws prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe. The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision provides:

WHEREFORE, the Judgment of the Regional Trial Court convicting appellant Redante Sarto y
Misalucha of Bigamy in Criminal Case No. 2007-0400, is AFFIRMED.23

Redante moved for reconsideration, but the same was denied by the CA in its 6 March 2013 resolution.

Hence, the present petition.

On 26 June 2013, the Court issued a Resolution24 requiring the respondent Republic of the Philippines
to file its comment.

The OSG's Manifestation

In compliance with this Court's resolution, the respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed its Manifestation (in lieu of Comment)25 advocating Redante's acquittal. The OSG argued
that the RTC had convicted Redante solely because of his failure to provide evidence concerning the
date when Maria Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship. It observed that Maria Socorro failed to
provide the exact date when she acquired Canadian citizenship because of the loss of her citizenship
certificate at the time she took the witness stand. The OSG claimed, however, that Redante was able to
submit, although belatedly, a photocopy of Maria Socorro's Canadian citizenship certificate as an
attachment to his appellant's brief. The said certificate stated that Maria Socorro was already a
Canadian citizen as early as 1 April 1988; hence, the divorce decree which took effect on 1 November
1988 is valid. The OSG further averred that substantial rights must prevail over the application of
procedural rules.

ISSUE

WHETHER THE TRIAL AND APPELLATE COURTS ERRED WHEN THEY FOUND PETITIONER
REDANTE SARTO y MISALUCHA GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF BIGAMY.

THE COURT'S RULING

The petition is bereft of merit.

Elements of bigamy; burden of

proving the termination of the
first marriage.
For a person to be convicted of bigamy, the following elements must concur: (1) that the offender has
been legally married; (2) that the first marriage has not been legally dissolved or, in case of an
absentee spouse, the absent spouse could not yet be presumed dead according to the provisions of
the Civil Code; (3) that the offender contracts a second or subsequent marriage; and (4) that the
second or subsequent marriage has all the essential requisites for validity.26

Redante admitted that he had contracted two marriages. He, however, put forth the defense of the
termination of his first marriage as a result of the divorce obtained abroad by his alien spouse.

It is a fundamental principle in this jurisdiction that the burden of proof lies with the party who alleges
the existence of a fact or thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action.27 Since the divorce
was a defense raised by Redante, it is incumbent upon him to show that it was validly obtained in
accordance with Maria Socorro's country's national law.28 Stated differently, Redante has the burden of
proving the termination of the first marriage prior to the celebration of the second.29

Redante failed to prove his capacity

to contract a subsequent marriage.

A divorce decree obtained abroad by an alien spouse is a foreign judgment relating to the status of a
marriage. As in any other foreign judgment, a divorce decree does not have an automatic effect in the
Philippines. Consequently, recognition by Philippine courts may be required before the effects of a
divorce decree could be extended in this jurisdiction.30 Recognition of the divorce decree, however,
need not be obtained in a separate petition filed solely for that purpose. Philippine courts may
recognize the foreign divorce decree when such was invoked by a party as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense.31

Before the divorce decree can be recognized by our courts, the party pleading it must prove it as a fact
and demonstrate its conformity to the foreign law allowing it.1âшphi1 Proving the foreign law under
which the divorce was secured is mandatory considering that Philippine courts cannot and could not be
expected to take judicial notice of foreign laws.32 For the purpose of establishing divorce as a fact, a
copy of the divorce decree itself must be presented and admitted in evidence. This is in consonance
with the rule that a foreign judgment may be given presumptive evidentiary value only after it is
presented and admitted in evidence.33

In particular, to prove the divorce and the foreign law allowing it, the party invoking them must present
copies thereof and comply with Sections 24 and 25, Rule 132 of the Revised Rules of Court.34 Pursuant
to these rules, the divorce decree and foreign law may be proven through (1) an official publication or
(2) or copies thereof attested to by the officer having legal custody of said documents. If the office
which has custody is in a foreign country, the copies of said documents must be (a) accompanied by a
certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed
in the foreign country in which the record is kept; and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.35

Applying the foregoing, the Court is convinced that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce
as a fact or that it was validly obtained prior to the celebration of his subsequent marriage to Fe.

Aside from the testimonies of Redante and Maria Socorro, the only piece of evidence presented by the
defense to prove the divorce, is the certificate of divorce allegedly issued by the registrar of the
Supreme Court of British Columbia on 14 January 2008. Said certificate provides:

In the Supreme Court of British Columbia

Certificate of Divorce
This is to certify that Ma. Socorro Negrete SARTO and Redante M SARTO who were married at
ANGONO, RIZAL, PHILIPPINES on August 31, 1984 were divorced under the Divorce Act (Canada) by
an order of this Court which took effect and dissolved the marriage on November 1, 1988.

Given under my hand and the Seal of this Court

January 14, 2008

(SGD.)
REGISTRAR

This certificate of divorce, however, is utterly insufficient to rebut the charge against Redante. First, the
certificate of divorce is not the divorce decree required by the rules and jurisprudence. As discussed
previously, the divorce decree required to prove the fact of divorce is the judgment itself as rendered by
the foreign court and not a mere certification. Second, assuming the certificate of divorce may be
considered as the divorce decree, it was not accompanied by a certification issued by the proper
Philippine diplomatic or consular officer stationed in Canada, as required under Section 24 of Rule
132. Lastly, no copy of the alleged Canadian law was presented by the defense. Thus, it could not be
reasonably determined whether the subject divorce decree was in accord with Maria Socorro's national
law.

Further, since neither the divorce decree nor the alleged Canadian law was satisfactorily demonstrated,
the type of divorce supposedly secured by Maria Socorro - whether an absolute divorce which
terminates the marriage or a limited divorce which merely suspends it36 - and whether such divorce
capacitated her to remarry could not also be ascertained. As such, Redante failed to prove his defense
that he had the capacity to remarry when he contracted a subsequent marriage to Fe. His liability for
bigamy is, therefore, now beyond question.

This Court is not unmindful of the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. Indeed,
in Republic v. Orbecido,37 a case invoked by Redante to support his cause, the Court recognized that
the legislative intent behind the said provision is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse
remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse under the laws of his or her country. The Court is also not oblivious of the fact that Maria
Socorro had already remarried in Canada on 5 August 2000. These circumstances, however, can never
justify the reversal of Redante's conviction.

In Orbecido, as in Redante's case, the alien spouse divorced her Filipino spouse and remarried
another. The Filipino spouse then filed a petition for authority to remarry under paragraph 2 of Article
26. His petition was granted by the RTC. However, this Court set aside said decision by the trial court
after finding that the records were bereft of competent evidence concerning the divorce decree and the
naturalization of the alien spouse. The Court reiterated therein the rules regarding the recognition of the
foreign divorce decree and the foreign law allowing it, as well as the necessity to show that the divorce
decree capacitated his former spouse to remarry.38

Finally, the Court notes that the OSG was miserably misguided when it claimed that the sole reason for
the RTC's judgment of conviction was Redante's failure to provide evidence, during trial, of the date
Maria Socorro acquired Canadian citizenship.

An examination of the 18 May 2009 judgment would reveal that the trial court rendered the said
decision after finding that there was lack of any competent evidence with regard to the divorce
decree39 and the national law governing his first wife,40 not merely because of the lack of evidence
concerning the effectivity date of Maria Socorro's naturalization. Thus, even if the Court were to indulge
the OSG and consider Maria Socorro's citizenship certificate, which was a mere photocopy and filed
belatedly, it would not have any effect significant enough to produce a judgment of acquittal. The fact
that Redante failed to prove the existence of the divorce and that it was validly acquired prior to the
celebration of the second marriage still subsists.

WHEREFORE, the present petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Decision, dated 31 July
2012, of the Court of Appeals in CAG. R. CR No. 32635 which affirmed the 18 May 2009 Judgment of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 26, Naga City, in Criminal Case No. 2007- 0400 is
hereby AFFIRMED. Petitioner Redante Sarto y Misalucha is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of bigamy and is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of two (2) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day
of prision mayor, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. NOS. 178382-83

CONTINENTAL MICRONESIA, INC., Petitioner,

vs.
JOSEPH BASSO, Respondent.

DECISION

JARDELEZA, J.:

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Revised Rules of Court assailing the
Decision2 dated May 23, 2006 and Resolution3 dated June 19, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in the
consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 83938 and CA-G.R. SP No. 84281. These assailed Decision and
Resolution set aside the Decision4 dated November 28, 2003 of the National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) declaring Joseph Basso's (Basso) dismissal illegal, and ordering the payment of
separation pay as alternative to reinstatement and full backwages until the date of the Decision.

The Facts

Petitioner Continental Micronesia, Inc. (CMI) is a foreign corporation organized and e:xisting under the
laws of and domiciled in the United States of America (US). It is licensed to do business in the
Philippines.5 Basso, a US citizen, resided in the Philippines prior to his death.6

During his visit to Manila in 1990, Mr. Keith R. Braden (Mr. Braden), Managing Director-Asia of
Continental Airlines, Inc. (Continental), offered Basso the position of General Manager of the Philippine
Branch of Continental. Basso accepted the offer.7

It was not until much later that Mr. Braden, who had since returned to the US, sent Basso the
employment contract8 dated February 1, 1991, which Mr. Braden had already signed. Basso then
signed the employment contract and returned it to Mr. Braden as instructed.

On November 7, 1992, CMI took over the Philippine operations of Continental, with Basso retaining his
position as General Manager.9

On December 20, 1995, Basso received a letter from Mr. Ralph Schulz (Mr. Schulz), who was then
CMI’s Vice President of Marketing and Sales, informing Basso that he has agreed to work in CMI as a
consultant on an "as needed basis" effective February 1, 1996 to July 31, 1996. The letter also
informed Basso that: (1) he will not receive any monetary compensation but will continue being covered
by the insurance provided by CMI; (2) he will enjoy travel privileges; and (3) CMI will advance
Php1,140,000.00 for the payment of housing lease for 12 months.10

On January 11, 1996, Basso wrote a counter-proposal11 to Mr. Schulz regarding his employment status
in CMI. On March 14, 1996, Basso wrote another letter addressed to Ms. Marty Woodward (Ms.
Woodward) of CMI’s Human Resources Department inquiring about the status of his employment.12 On
the same day, Ms. Woodward responded that pursuant to the employment contract dated February 1,
1991, Basso could be terminated at will upon a thirty-day notice. This notice was allegedly the letter
Basso received from Mr. Schulz on December 20, 1995. Ms. Woodward also reminded Basso of the
telephone conversation between him, Mr. Schulz and Ms. Woodward on December 19, 1995, where
they informed him of the company’s decision to relieve him as General Manager. Basso, instead, was
offered the position of consultant to CMI. Ms. Woodward also informed Basso that CMI rejected his
counter-proposal and, thus, terminated his employment effective January 31, 1996. CMI offered Basso
a severance pay, in consideration of the Php1,140,000.00 housing advance that CMI promised
him13 Basso filed a Complaint for Illegal Dismissal with Moral and Exemplary Damages against CMI on
December 19, 1996.14 Alleging the presence of foreign elements, CMI filed a Motion to Dismiss15 dated
February 10, 1997 on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of CMI and the subject matter of
the controversy. In an Order16 dated August 27, 1997, the Labor Arbiter granted the Motion to Dismiss.
Applying the doctrine of lex loci contractus, the Labor Arbiter held that the terms and provisions of the
employment contract show that the parties did not intend to apply our Labor Code (Presidential Decree
No. 442). The Labor Arbiter also held that no employer-employee relationship existed between Basso
and the branch office of CMI in the Philippines, but between Basso and the foreign corporation itself.

On appeal, the NLRC remanded the case to the Labor Arbiter for the determination of certain facts to
settle the issue on jurisdiction. NLRC ruled that the issue on whether the principle of lex loci contractus
or lex loci celebrationis should apply has to be further threshed out.17

Labor Arbiter’s Ruling

Labor Arbiter Madjayran H. Ajan in his Decision18 dated September 24, 1999 dismissed the case for
lack of merit and jurisdiction.

The Labor Arbiter agreed with CMI that the employment contract was executed in the US "since the
letter-offer was under the Texas letterhead and the acceptance of Complainant was returned
there."19 Thus, applying the doctrine of lex loci celebrationis, US laws apply. Also, applying lex loci
contractus, the Labor Arbiter ruled that the parties did not intend to apply Philippine laws, thus:

Although the contract does not state what law shall apply, it is obvious that Philippine laws were not
written into it. More specifically, the Philippine law on taxes and the Labor Code were not intended by
the parties to apply, otherwise Par. 7 on the payment by Complainant U.S. Federal and Home State
income taxes, and Pars. 22/23 on termination by 30-day prior notice, will not be there. The contract was
prepared in contemplation of Texas or U.S. laws where Par. 7 is required and Pars. 22/23 is allowed.20

The Labor Arbiter also ruled that Basso was terminated for a valid cause based on the allegations of
CMI that Basso committed a series of acts that constitute breach of trust and loss of confidence. 21

The Labor Arbiter, however, found CMI to have voluntarily submitted to his office’s jurisdiction. CMI
participated in the proceedings, submitted evidence on the merits of the case, and sought affirmative
relief through a motion to dismiss.22

NLRC’s Ruling
On appeal, the NLRC Third Division promulgated its Decision23 dated November 28, 2003, the decretal
portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the decision dated 24 September 1999 is VACATED and SET ASIDE. Respondent CMI
is ordered to pay complainant the amount of US$5,416.00 for failure to comply with the due notice
requirement. The other claims are dismissed.

SO ORDERED.24

The NLRC did not agree with the pronouncement of the Labor Arbiter that his office has no jurisdiction
over the controversy. It ruled that the Labor Arbiter acquired jurisdiction over the case when CMI
voluntarily submitted to his office’s jurisdiction by presenting evidence, advancing arguments in support
of the legality of its acts, and praying for reliefs on the merits of the case.25

On the merits, the NLRC agreed with the Labor Arbiter that Basso was dismissed for just and valid
causes on the ground of breach of trust and loss of confidence. The NLRC ruled that under the
applicable rules on loss of trust and confidence of a managerial employee, such as Basso, mere
existence of a basis for believing that such employee has breached the trust of his employer suffices.
However, the NLRC found that CMI denied Basso the required due process notice in his dismissal.26

Both CMI and Basso filed their respective Motions for Reconsideration dated January 15, 200427 and
January 8, 2004.28 Both motions were dismissed in separate Resolutions dated March 15, 200429 and
February 27, 2004,30 respectively.

Basso filed a Petition for Certiorari dated April 16, 2004 with the Court of Appeals docketed as CA-G.R.
SP No. 83938.31 Basso imputed grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NLRC in ruling that he was
validly dismissed. CMI filed its own Petition for Certiorari dated May 13, 2004 docketed as CA-G.R. SP
No. 84281,32 alleging that the NLRC gravely abused its discretion when it assumed jurisdiction over the
person of CMI and the subject matter of the case.

In its Resolution dated October 7, 2004, the Court of Appeals consolidated the two cases33 and ordered
the parties to file their respective Memoranda.

The Court of Appeal’s Decision

The Court of Appeals promulgated the now assailed Decision34 dated May 23, 2006, the relevant
dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, the petition of Continental docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 84281 is DENIED DUE
COURSE and DISMISSED.

On the other hand the petition of Basso docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 83938 is GIVEN DUE COURSE
and GRANTED, and accordingly, the assailed Decision dated November 28, 2003 and Resolution
dated February 27, 2004 of the NLRC are SET ASIDE and VACATED. Instead judgment is rendered
hereby declaring the dismissal of Basso illegal and ordering Continental to pay him separation pay
equivalent to one (1) month pay for every year of service as an alternative to reinstatement. Further,
ordering Continental to pay Basso his full backwages from the date of his said illegal dismissal until
date of this decision. The claim for moral and exemplary damages as well as attorney’s fees are
dismissed.35

The Court of Appeals ruled that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction over the subject matter
of the case and over the parties. The Court of Appeals explained that jurisdiction over the subject
matter of the action is determined by the allegations of the complaint and the law. Since the case filed
by Basso is a termination dispute that is "undoubtedly cognizable by the labor tribunals", the Labor
Arbiter and the NLRC had jurisdiction to rule on the merits of the case. On the issue of jurisdiction over
the person of the parties, who are foreigners, the Court of Appeals ruled that jurisdiction over the
person of Basso was acquired when he filed the complaint for illegal dismissal, while jurisdiction over
the person of CMI was acquired through coercive process of service of summons to its agent in the
Philippines. The Court of Appeals also agreed that the active participation of CMI in the case rendered
moot the issue on jurisdiction.

On the merits of the case, the Court of Appeals declared that CMI illegally dismissed Basso. The Court
of Appeals found that CMI’s allegations of loss of trust and confidence were not established. CMI "failed
to prove its claim of the incidents which were its alleged bases for loss of trust or confidence."36 While
managerial employees can be dismissed for loss of trust and confidence, there must be a basis for
such loss, beyond mere whim or caprice.

After the parties filed their Motions for Reconsideration,37 the Court of Appeals promulgated
Resolution38 dated June 19, 2007 denying CMI’s motion, while partially granting Basso’s as to the
computation of backwages.

Hence, this petition, which raises the following issues:

I.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN REVIEWING THE FACTUAL FINDINGS
OF THE NLRC INSTEAD OF LIMITING ITS INQUIRY INTO WHETHER OR NOT THE NLRC
COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION.

II.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT THE LABOR ARBITER
AND THE NLRC HAD JURISDICTION TO HEAR AND TRY THE ILLEGAL DISMISSAL CASE.

III.

WHETHER OR NOT THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN FINDING THAT BASSO WAS NOT
VALIDLY DISMISSED ON THE GROUND OF LOSS OF TRUST OR CONFIDENCE.

We begin with the second issue on the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC in the illegal
dismissal case. The first and third issues will be discussed jointly.

The labor tribunals had jurisdiction

over the parties and the subject
matter of the case.

CMI maintains that there is a conflict-of-laws issue that must be settled to determine proper jurisdiction
over the parties and the subject matter of the case. It also alleges that the existence of foreign elements
calls for the application of US laws and the doctrines of lex loci celebrationis (the law of the place of the
ceremony), lex loci contractus (law of the place where a contract is executed), and lex loci intentionis
(the intention of the parties as to the law that should govern their agreement). CMI also invokes the
application of the rule of forum non conveniens to determine the propriety of the assumption of
jurisdiction by the labor tribunals.
We agree with CMI that there is a conflict-of-laws issue that needs to be resolved first. Where the facts
establish the existence of foreign elements, the case presents a conflict-of-laws issue.39 The foreign
element in a case may appear in different forms, such as in this case, where one of the parties is an
alien and the other is domiciled in another state.

In Hasegawa v. Kitamura,40 we stated that in the judicial resolution of conflict-of-laws problems, three
consecutive phases are involved: jurisdiction, choice of law, and recognition and enforcement of
judgments. In resolving the conflicts problem, courts should ask the following questions:

1. "Under the law, do I have jurisdiction over the subject matter and the parties to this case?

2. "If the answer is yes, is this a convenient forum to the parties, in light of the facts?

3. "If the answer is yes, what is the conflicts rule for this particular problem?

4. "If the conflicts rule points to a foreign law, has said law been properly pleaded and proved by
the one invoking it?

5. "If so, is the application or enforcement of the foreign law in the forum one of the basic
exceptions to the application of foreign law? In short, is there any strong policy or vital interest of
the forum that is at stake in this case and which should preclude the application of foreign
law?41

Jurisdiction is defined as the power and authority of the courts to hear, try and decide cases.
Jurisdiction over the subject matter is conferred by the Constitution or by law and by the material
allegations in the complaint, regardless of whether or not the plaintiff is entitled to recover all or some of
the claims or reliefs sought therein.42 It cannot be acquired through a waiver or enlarged by the
omission of the parties or conferred by the acquiescence of the court.43 That the employment contract
of Basso was replete with references to US laws, and that it originated from and was returned to the
US, do not automatically preclude our labor tribunals from exercising jurisdiction to hear and try this
case.

This case stemmed from an illegal dismissal complaint. The Labor Code, under Article 217, clearly
vests original and exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide cases involving termination disputes to the
Labor Arbiter.

Hence, the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the subject matter of the case.

As regards jurisdiction over the parties, we agree with the Court of Appeals that the Labor Arbiter
acquired jurisdiction over the person of Basso, notwithstanding his citizenship, when he filed his
complaint against CMI. On the other hand, jurisdiction over the person of CMI was acquired through the
coercive process of service of summons. We note that CMI never denied that it was served with
summons. CMI has, in fact, voluntarily appeared and participated in the proceedings before the courts.
Though a foreign corporation, CMI is licensed to do business in the Philippines and has a local
business address here. The purpose of the law in requiring that foreign corporations doing business in
the country be licensed to do so, is to subject the foreign corporations to the jurisdiction of our courts.44

Considering that the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC have jurisdiction over the parties and the subject
matter of this case, these tribunals may proceed to try the case even if the rules of conflict-of-laws or
the convenience of the parties point to a foreign forum, this being an exercise of sovereign prerogative
of the country where the case is filed.45
The next question is whether the local forum is the convenient forum in light of the facts of the case.
CMI contends that a Philippine court is an inconvenient forum.

We disagree.

Under the doctrine of forum non conveniens, a Philippine court in a conflict-of-laws case may assume
jurisdiction if it chooses to do so, provided, that the following requisites are met: (1) that the Philippine
Court is one to which the parties may conveniently resort to; (2) that the Philippine Court is in a position
to make an intelligent decision as to the law and the facts; and (3) that the Philippine Court has or is
likely to have power to enforce its decision.46 All these requisites are present here.

Basso may conveniently resort to our labor tribunals as he and CMI had physical presence in the
Philippines during the duration of the trial. CMI has a Philippine branch, while Basso, before his death,
was residing here.

Thus, it could be reasonably expected that no extraordinary measures were needed for the parties to
make arrangements in advocating their respective cases.

The labor tribunals can make an intelligent decision as to the law and facts. The incident subject of this
case (i.e. dismissal of Basso) happened in the Philippines, the surrounding circumstances of which can
be ascertained without having to leave the Philippines. The acts that allegedly led to loss of trust and
confidence and Basso’s eventual dismissal were committed in the Philippines. As to the law, we hold
that Philippine law is the proper law of the forum, as we shall discuss shortly. Also, the labor tribunals
have the power to enforce their judgments because they acquired jurisdiction over the persons of both
parties.

Our labor tribunals being the convenient fora, the next question is what law should apply in resolving
this case.

The choice-of-law issue in a conflict-of-laws case seeks to answer the following important questions: (1)
What legal system should control a given situation where some of the significant facts occurred in two
or more states; and (2) to what extent should the chosen legal system regulate the situation. 47 These
questions are entirely different from the question of jurisdiction that only seeks to answer whether the
courts of a state where the case is initiated have jurisdiction to enter a judgment.48 As such, the power
to exercise jurisdiction does not automatically give a state constitutional authority to apply forum law. 49

CMI insists that US law is the applicable choice-of-law under the principles of lex loci celebrationis and
lex loci contractus. It argues that the contract of employment originated from and was returned to the
US after Basso signed it, and hence, was perfected there. CMI further claims that the references to US
law in the employment contract show the parties’ intention to apply US law and not ours. These
references are:

a. Foreign station allowance of forty percent (40%) using the "U.S. State Department Index, the
base being Washington, D.C."

b. Tax equalization that made Basso responsible for "federal and any home state income
taxes."

c. Hardship allowance of fifteen percent (15%) of base pay based upon the "U.S. Department of
State Indexes of living costs abroad."
 d. The employment arrangement is "one at will, terminable by either party without any further
liability on thirty days prior written notice."50

CMI asserts that the US law on labor relations particularly, the US Railway Labor Act sanctions
termination-at-will provisions in an employment contract. Thus, CMI concludes that if such laws were
applied, there would have been no illegal dismissal to speak of because the termination-at-will provision
in Basso’s employment contract would have been perfectly valid.

We disagree.

In Saudi Arabian Airlines v. Court of Appeals,51 we emphasized that an essential element of conflict
rules is the indication of a "test" or "connecting factor" or "point of contact". Choice-of-law rules
invariably consist of a factual relationship (such as property right, contract claim) and a connecting fact
or point of contact, such as the situs of the res, the place of celebration, the place of performance, or
the place of wrongdoing. Pursuant to Saudi Arabian Airlines, we hold that the "test factors," "points of
contact" or "connecting factors" in this case are the following:

(1) The nationality, domicile or residence of Basso;

(2) The seat of CMI;

(3) The place where the employment contract has been made, the locus actus;

(4) The place where the act is intended to come into effect, e.g., the place of performance of
contractual duties;

(5) The intention of the contracting parties as to the law that should govern their agreement, the
lex loci intentionis; and

(6) The place where judicial or administrative proceedings are instituted or done.52

Applying the foregoing in this case, we conclude that Philippine law is the applicable law. Basso,
though a US citizen, was a resident here from the time he was hired by CMI until his death during the
pendency of the case. CMI, while a foreign corporation, has a license to do business in the Philippines
and maintains a branch here, where Basso was hired to work. The contract of employment was
negotiated in the Philippines. A purely consensual contract, it was also perfected in the Philippines
when Basso accepted the terms and conditions of his employment as offered by CMI. The place of
performance relative to Basso’s contractual duties was in the Philippines. The alleged prohibited acts of
Basso that warranted his dismissal were committed in the Philippines.

Clearly, the Philippines is the state with the most significant relationship to the problem. Thus, we hold
that CMI and Basso intended Philippine law to govern, notwithstanding some references made to US
laws and the fact that this intention was not expressly stated in the contract. We explained in Philippine
Export and Foreign Loan Guarantee Corporation v. V. P. Eusebio Construction, Inc.53 that the law
selected may be implied from such factors as substantial connection with the transaction, or the
nationality or domicile of the parties.54 We cautioned, however, that while Philippine courts would do
well to adopt the first and most basic rule in most legal systems, namely, to allow the parties to select
the law applicable to their contract, the selection is subject to the limitation that it is not against the law,
morals, or public policy of the forum.55
Similarly, in Bank of America, NT & SA v. American Realty Corporation,56 we ruled that a foreign law,
judgment or contract contrary to a sound and established public policy of the forum shall not be applied.
Thus:

Moreover, foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the
citizens or residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or
judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws. 57

Termination-at-will is anathema to the public policies on labor protection espoused by our laws and
Constitution, which dictates that no worker shall be dismissed except for just and authorized causes
provided by law and after due process having been complied with.58 Hence, the US Railway Labor Act,
which sanctions termination-at-will, should not be applied in this case.

Additionally, the rule is that there is no judicial notice of any foreign law. As any other fact, it must be
alleged and proved.59 If the foreign law is not properly pleaded or proved, the presumption of identity or
similarity of the foreign law to our own laws, otherwise known as processual presumption, applies.
Here, US law may have been properly pleaded but it was not proved in the labor tribunals.

Having disposed of the issue on jurisdiction, we now rule on the first and third issues.

The Court of Appeals may review the

factual findings of the NLRC in a
Rule 65 petition.

CMI submits that the Court of Appeals overstepped the boundaries of the limited scope of its certiorari
jurisdiction when instead of ruling on the existence of grave abuse of discretion, it proceeded to pass
upon the legality and propriety of Basso’s dismissal. Moreover, CMI asserts that it was error on the part
of the Court of Appeals to re-evaluate the evidence and circumstances surrounding the dismissal of
Basso.

We disagree.

The power of the Court of Appeals to review NLRC decisions via a Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
of the Revised Rules of Court was settled in our decision in St. Martin Funeral Home v. NLRC.60 The
general rule is that certiorari does not lie to review errors of judgment of the trial court, as well as that of
a quasi-judicial tribunal. In certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not go as far as to examine and
assess the evidence of the parties and to weigh their probative value.61 However, this rule admits of
exceptions. In Globe Telecom, Inc. v. Florendo-Flores,62 we stated:

In the review of an NLRC decision through a special civil action for certiorari, resolution is confined only
to issues of jurisdiction and grave abuse of discretion on the part of the labor tribunal. Hence, the Court
refrains from reviewing factual assessments of lower courts and agencies exercising adjudicative
functions, such as the NLRC.

Occasionally, however, the Court is constrained to delve into factual matters where, as in the instant
case, the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter.

In this instance, the Court in the exercise of its equity jurisdiction may look into the records of the case
and reexamine the questioned findings. As a corollary, this Court is clothed with ample authority to
review matters, even if they are not assigned as errors in their appeal, if it finds that their consideration
is necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case. The same principles are now necessarily adhered
to and are applied by the Court of Appeals in its expanded jurisdiction over labor cases elevated
through a petition for certiorari; thus, we see no error on its part when it made anew a factual
determination of the matters and on that basis reversed the ruling of the NLRC.63 (Citations omitted.)

Thus, the Court of Appeals may grant the petition when the factual findings complained of are not
supported by the evidence on record; when it is necessary to prevent a substantial wrong or to do
substantial justice; when the findings of the NLRC contradict those of the Labor Arbiter; and when
necessary to arrive at a just decision of the case.64 To make these findings, the Court of Appeals
necessarily has to look at the evidence and make its own factual determination.65

Since the findings of the Labor Arbiter differ with that of the NLRC, we find that the Court of Appeals
correctly exercised its power to review the evidence and the records of the illegal dismissal case.

Basso was illegally dismissed.

It is of no moment that Basso was a managerial employee of CMI. Managerial employees enjoy
security of tenure and the right of the management to dismiss must be balanced against the managerial
employee’s right to security of tenure, which is not one of the guaranties he gives up.66

In Apo Cement Corporation v. Baptisma,67 we ruled that for an employer to validly dismiss an employee
on the ground of loss of trust and confidence under Article 282 (c) of the Labor Code, the employer
must observe the following guidelines: 1) loss of confidence should not be simulated; 2) it should not be
used as subterfuge for causes which are improper, illegal or unjustified; 3) it may not be arbitrarily
asserted in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary; and 4) it must be genuine, not a mere
afterthought to justify earlier action taken in bad faith. More importantly, it must be based on a willful
breach of trust and founded on clearly established facts.

We agree with the Court of Appeals that the dismissal of Basso was not founded on clearly established
facts and evidence sufficient to warrant dismissal from employment. While proof beyond reasonable
doubt is not required to establish loss of trust and confidence, substantial evidence is required and on
the employer rests the burden to establish it.68 There must be some basis for the loss of trust, or that
the employer has reasonable ground to believe that the employee is responsible for misconduct, which
renders him unworthy of the trust and confidence demanded by his position.69

CMI alleges that Basso committed the following:

(1) Basso delegated too much responsibility to the General Sales Agent and relied heavily on its
judgments.70

(2) Basso excessively issued promotional tickets to his friends who had no direct business with
CMI.71

(3) The advertising agency that CMI contracted had to deal directly with Guam because Basso
was hardly available.72 Mr. Schulz discovered that Basso exceeded the advertising budget by
$76,000.00 in 1994 and by $20,000.00 in 1995.73

(4) Basso spent more time and attention to his personal businesses and was reputed to own
nightclubs in the Philippines.74

(5) Basso used free tickets and advertising money to promote his personal business,75 such as
a brochure that jointly advertised one of Basso’s nightclubs with CMI.
We find that CMI failed to discharge its burden to prove the above acts. CMI merely submitted affidavits
of its officers, without any other corroborating evidence. Basso, on the other hand, had adequately
explained his side. On the advertising agency and budget issues raised by CMI, he explained that
these were blatant lies as the advertising needs of CMI were centralized in its Guam office and the
Philippine office was not authorized to deal with CMI’s advertising agency, except on minor
issues.76 Basso further stated that under CMI’s existing policy, ninety percent (90%) of the advertising
decisions were delegated to the advertising firm of McCann- Ericsson in Japan and only ten percent
(10%) were left to the Philippine office.77 Basso also denied the allegations of owning nightclubs and
promoting his personal businesses and explained that it was illegal for foreigners in the Philippines to
engage in retail trade in the first place.

Apart from these accusations, CMI likewise presented the findings of the audit team headed by Mr.
Stephen D. Goepfert, showing that "for the period of 1995 and 1996, personal passes for Continental
and other airline employees were noted (sic) to be issued for which no service charge was
collected."78 The audit cited the trip pass log of a total of 10 months. The trip log does not show,
however, that Basso caused all the ticket issuances.

More, half of the trips in the log occurred from March to July of 1996,79 a period beyond the tenure of
Basso. Basso was terminated effectively on January 31, 1996 as indicated in the letter of Ms.
Woodward.80

CMI also accused Basso of making "questionable overseas phone calls". Basso, however, adequately
explained in his Reply81 that the phone calls to Italy and Portland, USA were made for the purpose of
looking for a technical maintenance personnel with US Federal Aviation Authority qualifications, which
CMI needed at that time. The calls to the US were also made in connection with his functions as
General Manager, such as inquiries on his tax returns filed in Nevada. Basso also explained that the
phone lines82 were open direct lines that all personnel were free to use to make direct long distance
calls.83

Finally, CMI alleged that Basso approved the disbursement of Php80,000.00 to cover the transfer fee of
the Manila Polo Club share from Mr. Kenneth Glover, the previous General Manager, to him. CMI
claimed that "nowhere in the said contract was it likewise indicated that the Manila Polo Club share was
part of the compensation package given by CMI to Basso."84 CMI’s claims are not credible. Basso
explained that the Manila Polo Club share was offered to him as a bonus to entice him to leave his then
employer, United Airlines. A letter from Mr. Paul J. Casey, former president of Continental, supports
Basso.85 In the letter, Mr. Casey explained:

As a signing bonus, and a perk to attract Mr. Basso to join Continental Airlines, he was given the Manila
Polo Club share and authorized to have the share re-issued in his name. In addition to giving Mr. Basso
the Manila Polo Club share, Continental agreed to pay the dues for a period of three years and this was
embodied in his contract with Continental. This was all done with my knowledge and approval.86

Clause 14 of the employment contract also states:

Club Memberships: The Company will locally pay annual dues for membership in a club in Manila that
your immediate supervisor and I agree is of at least that value to Continental through you in your role
as our General Manager for the Philippines.87

Taken together, the above pieces of evidence suggest that the Manila Polo Club share was part of
Basso’s compensation package and thus he validly used company funds to pay for the transfer fees. If
doubts exist between the evidence presented by the employer and the employee, the scales of justice
must be tilted in favor of the latter.88
Finally, CMI violated procedural due process in terminating Basso. In King of Kings Transport, Inc. v.
Mamac89 we detailed the procedural due process steps in termination of employment:

To clarify, the following should be considered in terminating the services of employees:

(1) The first written notice to be served on the employees should contain the specific causes or
grounds for termination against them, and a directive that the employees are given the
opportunity to submit their written explanation within a reasonable period. "Reasonable
opportunity" under the Omnibus Rules means every kind of assistance that management must
accord to the employees to enable them to prepare adequately for their defense. This should be
construed as a period of at least five (5) calendar days from receipt of the notice to give the
employees an opportunity to study the accusation against them, consult a union official or
lawyer, gather data and evidence, and decide on the defenses they will raise against the
complaint. Moreover, in order to enable the employees to intelligently prepare their explanation
and defenses, the notice should contain a detailed narration of the facts and circumstances that
will serve as basis for the charge against the employees. A general description of the charge will
not suffice. Lastly, the notice should specifically mention which company rules, if any, are
violated and/or which among the grounds under Art. 282 is being charged against the
employees.

(2) After serving the first notice, the employers should schedule and conduct a hearing or
conference wherein the employees will be given the opportunity to: (1) explain and clarify their
defenses to the charge against them; (2) present evidence in support of their defenses; and (3)
rebut the evidence presented against them by the management.

During the hearing or conference, the employees are given the chance to defend themselves
personally, with the assistance of a representative or counsel of their choice. Moreover, this
conference or hearing could be used by the parties as an opportunity to come to an amicable
settlement.

(3) After determining that termination of employment is justified, the employers shall serve the
employees a written notice of termination indicating that: (1) all circumstances involving the
charge against the employees have been considered; and (2) grounds have been established to
justify the severance of their employment. (Emphasis in original.)

Here, Mr. Schulz’s and Ms. Woodward’s letters dated December 19, 1995 and March 14, 1996,
respectively, are not one of the valid twin notices. Neither identified the alleged acts that CMI now
claims as bases for Basso’s termination. Ms. Woodward’s letter even stressed that the original plan
was to remove Basso as General Manager but with an offer to make him consultant. It was inconsistent
of CMI to declare Basso as unworthy of its trust and confidence and, in the same breath, offer him the
position of consultant. As the Court of Appeals pointed out:

But mark well that Basso was clearly notified that the sole ground for his dismissal was the exercise of
the termination at will clause in the employment contract. The alleged loss of trust and confidence
claimed by Continental appears to be a mere afterthought belatedly trotted out to save the day. 90

Basso is entitled to separation pay and full backwages.

Under Article 279 of the Labor Code, an employee who is unjustly dismissed from work shall be entitled
to reinstatement without loss of seniority rights and other privileges, and to his full backwages, inclusive
of allowances and to his other benefits or their monetary equivalent computed from the time his
compensation was withheld up to the time of actual reinstatement.
Where reinstatement is no longer viable as an option, separation pay equivalent to one (1) month
salary for every year of service should be awarded as an alternative.1âwphi1 The payment of
separation pay is in addition to payment of backwages.91 In the case of Basso, reinstatement is no
longer possible since he has already passed away. Thus, Basso’s separation pay with full backwages
shall be paid to his heirs.

As to the computation of backwages, we agree with CMI that Basso was entitled to backwages only up
to the time he reached 65 years old, the compulsory retirement age under the law.92 This is our
consistent ruling.93

When Basso was illegally dismissed on January 31, 1996, he was already 58 years old.94 He turned 65
years old on October 2, 2002. Since backwages are granted on grounds of equity for earnings lost by
an employee due to his illegal dismissal,95 Basso was entitled to backwages only for the period he
could have worked had he not been illegally dismissed, i.e. from January 31, 1996 to October 2, 2002.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated May 23, 2006 and
Resolution dated June 19, 2007 in the consolidated cases CA-G.R. SP No. 83938 and CA-G.R. SP No.
84281 are

AFFIRMED, with MODIFICATION as to the award of backwages. Petitioner Continental Micronesia,

Inc. is hereby ordered to pay Respondent Joseph Basso’s heirs: 1) separation pay equivalent to one (1)
month pay for every year of service, and 2) full backwages from January 31, 1996, the date of his illegal
dismissal, to October 2, 2002, the date of his compulsory retirement age.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014

NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN WILSEM, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to
reverse and set aside the Orders1 dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010, respectively, of the
Regional Trial Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the criminal case entitled People of the
Philippines v. Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-85503, for
violation of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004.

The following facts are culled from the records:

Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted
marriage in Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994, they were blessed with a son
named Roderigo Norjo Van Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant petition was sixteen (16)
years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19, 1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter,
petitioner and her son came home to the Philippines.6

According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to provide monthly support to their son in the
amount of Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to Php17,500.00 more or
less).7 However, since the arrival of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent never gave
support to the son, Roderigo.8

Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and
since then, have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new wife established a business known
as Paree Catering, located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all
the parties, including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in Cebu City.11

On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel, sent a letter demanding for support from
respondent. However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12

Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed a complaint affidavit with the Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5, paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262
for the latter’s unjust refusal to support his minor child with petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his
counter-affidavit thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-affidavit.14 Thereafter, the
Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an information for
the crime charged against herein respondent.

The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:

That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present, more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive, refuse and still continue to
deprive his son RODERIGO NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of financial support
legally due him, resulting in economic abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15

Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16 Consequently, respondent was arrested and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also
filed a Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to which respondent filed his
Opposition.18 Pending the resolution thereof, respondent was arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the
RTC-Cebu having resolved the application of the protection order, respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss
on the ground of: (1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2) prescription of the crime
charged.20

On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant
criminal case against respondent on the ground that the facts charged in the information do not
constitute an offense with respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive part of which
states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in the information do not constitute an offense
with respect to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly, orders this case DISMISSED.

The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby
cancelled (sic) and ordered released.

SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22

Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s obligation to
support their child under Article 19523 of the Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable under
R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support their
minor children regardless of the obligor’s nationality."24

On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:

x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a rehash of those advanced earlier in the
memorandum of the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its ruling that since the accused is a
foreign national he is not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in regard to a parent’s duty and
obligation to givesupport to his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of violating R.A. 9262 for his
alleged failure to support his child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262 applies to a
foreigner who fails to give support tohis child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our domestic law
which mandates a parent to give such support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no prima
faciecase exists against the accused herein, hence, the case should be dismissed.

WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.

Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari raising the following issues:

1. Whether or not a foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine
law; and

2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27

At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact
that the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court, consistent with the ruling in Republic v.
Sunvar Realty Development Corporation,28 which lays down the instances when a ruling of the trial
court may be brought on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating the doctrine of hierarchy
of courts, to wit:

x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this
Court, in case only questions of law are raised or involved. This latter situation was one that petitioners
found themselves in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only questions of law. In Republic v.
Malabanan, the Court clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the RTC, to wit: (1) by
ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in a civil or
criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under
Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and
(3) by a petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of
appeal is taken to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed questions of fact and law. The
second mode of appeal is brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed questions of fact and
law. The third mode of appealis elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law." (Emphasis
supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call for an examination of the probative value of the
evidence presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being admitted, and the doubt concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of the issue must rest solely
on what the law provides on the given set of circumstances.29

Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve questions of law – the response thereto
concerns the correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a
foreign national has an obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law; and whether or not he
can be held criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.

It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition highlights a novel question of law concerning
the liability of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and omissions punishable under special
criminal laws, specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The inimitability of the factual milieu of
the present case, therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court, which will eventually serve as a
guidepost for future cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and remanding the same to the
CA would only waste the time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the present case,
considerations of efficiency and economy in the administration of justice should prevail over the
observance of the hierarchy of courts.

Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not
fully agree with petitioner’s contentions.

To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the
legal obligation to support exists.

Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code, which provides the parent’s obligation to support his
child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to
Article 26 of the Family Code,31 respondent is not excused from complying with his obligation to support
his minor child with petitioner.

On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no sufficient and clear basis presented by
petitioner that she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial support.32 Respondent also added
that by reason of the Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any financial support.33

On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil
Code in demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil
Code stresses the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as Philippine laws are concerned,
specifically the provisions of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to Filipino citizens. By
analogy, the same principle applies to foreigners such that they are governed by their national law with
respect to family rights and duties.36

The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that falls under family rights and duties. Since the
respondent is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to
the laws of his country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged to give support to his child, as
well as the consequences of his failure to do so.37

In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –

Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights and duties are governed by their
personal law, i.e.,the laws of the nation to which they belong even when staying in a foreign country (cf.
Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son under
Article195 of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce Covenant obtained in Holland. This
does not, however, mean that respondent is not obliged to support petitioner’s son altogether.

In international law, the party who wants to have a foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the
burden of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case, respondent hastily concludes that being a
national of the Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter of provision of and capacity to
support.41 While respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in advancing his position that he is not
obliged to support his son, he never proved the same.

It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that the national law of the Netherlands does not
impose upon the parents the obligation to support their child (either before, during or after the issuance
of a divorce decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has already enunciated that:

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must be alleged and proved.43

In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been
properly pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law,
which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing the non-compliance
therewith.

Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera,45 the Court held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as
well as its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in view of the nationality principle on the
matter of status of persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent does not completely show
that he is notliable to give support to his son after the divorce decree was issued. Emphasis is placed
on petitioner’s allegation that under the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s obligation
to support his child is specifically stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.

We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding that the national law of respondent states that
parents have no obligation to support their children or that such obligation is not punishable by law, said
law would still not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of America, NT and SA v. American
Realty Corporation,47 to wit:

In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law on the matter were properly pleaded and
proved in accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court and the jurisprudence laid down
in Yao Kee, et al. vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find applicability.

Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary to a sound and established public policy of
the forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.

Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their acts or property, and those which have for their
object public order, public policy and good customs shall not be rendered ineffective by laws or
judgments promulgated, or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a foreign country.

The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.

Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is pertinent

—

If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the same cause of action, the filing of one or a
judgment upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for the dismissal of the others. Moreover,
foreign law should not be applied when its application would work undeniable injustice to the citizens or
residents of the forum. To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a law, or judgment
or contract that is obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.48

Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in
the Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the child to be denied of financial support when
the latter is entitled thereto.

We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself, respondent is no longer liable to support his
former wife, in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,49 to wit:

As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the Court ruled that she should no longerbe
considered marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be required to perform her marital
duties and obligations. It held:

To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis added)50

Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e)
and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give support topetitioner’s son, to wit:

SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their Children.- The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through any of the following acts:

xxxx

(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her child to engage in conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which the woman or her child has the
right to engage in, or attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her child's freedom of
movement or conduct by force or threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of physical or other
harm, or intimidation directed against the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to, the
following acts committed with the purpose or effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or her
child's movement or conduct:

xxxx

(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her children of financial support legally due her or
her family, or deliberately providing the woman's children insufficient financial support; x x x x

(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and denial of financial support or
custody of minor childrenof access to the woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial of financial support to the child is considered
anact of violence against women and children.

In addition, considering that respondent is currently living in the Philippines, we find strength in
petitioner’s claim that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation to Article 14 of the New Civil
Code, applies to the instant case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of public security and
safety shall be obligatory upon all who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the principle of
public international law and to treaty stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the alleged
continuing acts of respondent in refusing to support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts
have territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that
jurisdiction over the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.

Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that granting, but not admitting, that there is a
legal basis for charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case, the criminal liability has been
extinguished on the ground of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No. 9262, which
provides that:

SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty
(20) years. Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in ten (10) years.

The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the
instant case has clearly not prescribed.

Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent has provided support to petitioner’s child calls
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence presented, and the truth and falsehood of
facts being admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this issue to the RTC-Cebu which has
jurisdiction over the case.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders dated February 19, 2010 and September 1,
2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further proceedings based on the merits
of the case.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 195432 August 27, 2014

EDELINA T. ANDO, Petitioner,

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Respondent.

DECISION

SERENO, CJ:

This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the nullification of the Orders
dated 14 January and 8 February 2011 issued by the Regional Trial Court (R TC), Third Judicial
Region, Branch 45,1 City of San Fernando, Pampanga, in Civil Case No. 137, which dismissed the
Petition for Declaratory Relief filed therein.
 STATEMENT OF THE FACTS AND OF THE CASE

The pertinent facts of the case, as alleged by petitioner, are as follows:

3. On 16 September 2001, petitioner married Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in a civil

wedding solemnized at Candaba, Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto
attached as Annex 'A' and made an integral part hereof.

4. On 16 September 2004, Yuichiro Kobayashi sought in Japan, and was validly granted under
Japaneselaws, a divorce in respect of his marriage with petitioner. A copy of the Divorce
Certificate duly issued by the Consulate-General of Japan and duly authenticated by the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, is heretoas Annex ‘B’ and made an integral part hereof.
5. Said Divorce Certificate was duly registered with the Office of the Civil Registry of Manila. A
copy of the Certification dated 28 October 2005 is hereto attached as Annex ‘C’ and made an
integral part hereof.

6. Believing in good faith that said divorce capacitated her to remarry and that by such she
reverted to her single status, petitioner married Masatomi Y. Ando on 13 September 2005 in a
civil wedding celebrated in Sta. Ana, Pampanga. A copy of their Certificate of Marriage is hereto
attached as Annex ‘D’ and made an integral part hereof.

7. In the meantime, Yuichiro Kobayashi married Ryo Miken on 27 December 2005. A copy of
the JapaneseFamily Registry Record of Kobayashi showing the divorce he obtained and his
remarriage with Ryo Miken, duly authenticated by the Consulate-General of Japan and the
Department of Foreign Affairs, Manila, is hereto attached as Annex ‘E’ and made an integral
part hereof.

8. Recently, petitioner applied for the renewal of her Philippine passport to indicate her surname
withher husband Masatomi Y. Ando but she was told at the Department of Foreign Affairs that
the same cannot be issued to her until she can prove bycompetent court decision that her
marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y. Ando is valid until otherwise declared.

xxxx

12. Prescinding from the foregoing, petitioner’s marriage with her said husband Masatomi Y.
Ando musttherefore be honored, considered and declared valid, until otherwise declared by a
competent court. Consequently, and until then, petitioner therefore is and must be declared
entitled to the issuance of a Philippine passport under the name ‘Edelina Ando y Tungol.’
Hence, this petitioner pursuant to Rule 63 of the Rules of Court.2

On 29 October 2010, petitioner filed with the RTC a Petition for Declaratory Relief, which was later
raffled off to Branch 46. She impleaded the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) as respondent and
prayed for the following reliefs before the lower court:

WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectfully prays of this Honorable Court that after proper proceedings,
judgment be rendered, as follows:

(a) declaring as valid and subsisting the marriage between petitioner Edelina T. Ando and her
husband Masatomi Y. Ando until otherwise declared by a competent court;

(b) declaring petitioner entitled to the issuance of a Philippine Passport under the name "Edelina
Ando y Tungol"; and
 (c) directing the Department ofForeign Affairs to honor petitioner’s marriage to her husband
Masatomi Y. Ando and to issue a Philippine Passport to petitioner under the name "Edelina
Ando y Tungol".

Petitioner prays for such other just and equitable reliefs.3

On 15 November 2010, in an Order dismissing the Petition for want of cause and action, as well as
jurisdiction, the RTC held thus:

Records of the case would reveal that prior to petitioner’s marriage to Masatomi Y. Ando, herein
petitioner was married to Yuichiro Kobayashi, a Japanese National, in Candaba, Pampanga, on
September 16, 2001, and that though a divorce was obtained and granted in Japan, with respect to the
their (sic) marriage, there is no showing that petitioner herein complied with the requirements set forth
in Art. 13 of the Family Code – that is obtaining a judicial recognition of the foreign decree of absolute
divorce in our country.

It is therefore evident, under the foregoing circumstances, that herein petitioner does not have any
causeof action and/or is entitled to the reliefs prayed for under Rule 63 of the Rules of Court. In the
same vein, though there is other adequate remedy available to the petitioner, such remedy is however
beyond the authority and jurisdiction of this court to act upon and grant, as it isonly the family court
which is vested with such authority and jurisdiction.4

On 3 December 2010, petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 15
November 2010. In anOrder dated 14 December 2010, the RTC granted the motion in this wise:

WHEREFORE, considering that the allegations and reliefs prayed for by the petitioner in her petition
and the instant Motion for Reconsideration falls within the jurisdiction of the Special Family Court of this
jurisdiction and for the interest ofsubstantial justice, the Order of the Court dated November 15, 2010 is
hereby reconsidered.

Let the record of this case be therefore referred back to the Office of the Clerk of Court for proper
endorsement to the Family Court of this jurisdiction for appropriateaction and/or
disposition.5 Thereafter, the case was raffled to Branch 45 of the RTC. On 14 January 2011, the trial
court dismissed the Petition anew on the ground that petitioner had no cause of action. The Order
reads thus:

The petition specifically admits that the marriage she seeks to be declared as valid is already her
second marriage, a bigamous marriage under Article 35(4) of the Family Codeconsidering that the first
one, though allegedly terminated by virtue of the divorce obtained by Kobayashi, was never recognized
by a Philippine court, hence, petitioner is considered as still married to Kobayashi. Accordingly, the
second marriage with Ando cannot be honored and considered asvalid at this time.

Petitioner’s allegation of Sec. 2 (a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is misplaced. The fact that no judicial
declaration of nullity of her marriage with Ando was rendered does not make the same valid because
such declaration under Article 40 ofthe Family Code is applicable onlyin case of re-marriage. More
importantly, the absence of a judicial declaration of nullity of marriage is not even a requisite to make a
marriage valid.

In view of the foregoing, the dismissal of this case is imperative.6

On 1 February 2011,petitioner filed an Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration of the Order dated 14

January 2011. The motion was denied by the RTC in open court on 8 February2011, considering that
neither the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) nor respondent was furnished with copies of the
motion.

On 24 March 2011, petitioner filed the instant Petition for Review, raising the sole issue of whether or
not the RTC erred in ruling that she had no cause of action.

Petitioner argues that under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, or the Rule on the Declaration of Absolute Nullity of
Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, it is solely the wife or the husband who can file a
petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage. Thus, as the state is not even
allowed to filea direct petition for the declaration of the absolute nullity of a void marriage,with even
more reason can it not collaterally attack the validity of a marriage, as in a petition for declaratory relief.
Further, petitioner alleges that under the law, a marriage – even one that is void or voidable – shall be
deemed valid until declared otherwise in a judicial proceeding.

Petitioner also argues that assuming a court judgment recognizing a judicial decree of divorce is
required under Article 13 of the Family Code, noncompliance therewith is a mere irregularity in the
issuance of a marriage license. Any irregularity in the formal requisites of marriage, such as with
respect to the marriage license, shall notaffect the legality of the marriage. Petitioner further claims that
all the requisites for a petition for declaratory relief have been complied with.

With respect to the failure to furnish a copy of the Ex ParteMotion for Reconsideration to the OSG and
the DFA, petitioner avers that at the time of the filing, the RTC had yet to issue a summons to
respondent; thus, it had yet to acquire jurisdiction over them.

Thereafter, the DFA, through the OSG, filed a Comment on the Petition. The latter raised the following
arguments: (1) the Petition was improperly verified, as the juratin the Verification thereof only stated
that the affiant had exhibited "her currentand valid proof of identity," which proof was not properly
indicated, however; (2) prior judicial recognition by a Philippine court of a divorce decree obtained by
the alien spouse is required before a Filipino spouse can remarry and be entitled to the legal effects of
remarriage; (3) petitioner failed to show that she had first exhausted all available administrative
remedies, such as appealing to the Secretary of the DFA under Republic Act No. (R.A.) 8239, or the
Philippine Passport Act of 1996, before resorting to the special civil action of declaratory relief; and (4)
petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration before the RTC was a mere scrap of paper and did not toll the
running of the period to appeal. Hence, the RTC Order dated 14 January 2011 is now final.

On 29 November 2011, petitioner filed her Reply to the Comment, addressing the issues raised therein.

THE COURT’S RULING

The Court finds the Petition to be without merit.

First, with respect to her prayer tocompel the DFA to issue her passport, petitioner incorrectly filed a
petition for declaratory relief before the RTC. She should have first appealed before the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs, since her ultimate entreaty was toquestion the DFA’s refusal to issue a passport to her
under her second husband’s name.

Under the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. 8239, which was adopted on 25 February
1997, the following are the additional documentary requirements before a married woman may obtain a
passport under the name of her spouse:

SECTION 2. The issuance of passports to married, divorced or widowed women shall be made
inaccordance with the following provisions:
 a) In case of a woman who is married and who decides to adopt the surname of her husband
pursuant to Art. 370 of Republic Act No. 386, she must present the original or certifiedtrue copy
of her marriage contract, and one photocopy thereof.

In addition thereto, a Filipino who contracts marriage in the Philippines to a foreigner, shall be
required to present a Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counselling Seminar
conducted by the CFO when applying for a passport for the first time.

b) In case of annulment of marriage, the applicant must present a certified true copy of her
annotated Marriage Contract or Certificate of Registration and the Court Order effecting the
annulment.

c) In case of a woman who was divorced by her alien husband, she must present a certified true
copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post
which has jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign
diplomatic or consular mission in the Philippines.

When the divorcee is a Filipino Muslim, she must present a certified true copy of the Divorce Decree or
a certified true copy of the Certificate of Divorce from the Shari’ah Court or the OCRG. d) In the event
that marriage is dissolved by the death of the husband, the applicant must present the original or
certified true copy of the Death Certificate of the husband or the Declaration of Presumptive Death by a
Civil or Shari’ah Court, in which case the applicant may choose to continue to use her husband’s
surname or resume the use of her maiden surname. From the above provisions, it is clear that for
petitioner to obtain a copy of her passport under her married name, all she needed to present were the
following: (1) the original or certified true copyof her marriage contract and one photocopy thereof; (2) a
Certificate of Attendance in a Guidance and Counseling Seminar, if applicable; and (3) a certified true
copy of the Divorce Decree duly authenticated by the Philippine Embassy or consular post that has
jurisdiction over the place where the divorce is obtained or by the concerned foreign diplomatic or
consular mission in the Philippines.

In this case, petitioner was allegedly told that she would not be issued a Philippine passport under her
second husband’s name.1âwphi1 Should her application for a passport be denied, the remedies
available to her are provided in Section 9 of R.A. 8239, which reads thus:

Sec. 9. Appeal. — Any person who feels aggrieved as a result of the application of this Act of the
implementing rules and regulations issued by the Secretary shall have the right to appeal to the
Secretary of Foreign Affairs from whose decision judicial review may be had to the Courts in due
course.

The IRR further provides in detail:

ARTICLE 10
Appeal

In the event that an application for a passport is denied, or an existing one cancelled or restricted, the
applicant or holder thereof shall have the right to appeal in writing to the Secretary within fifteen (15)
days from notice of denial, cancellation or restriction.

Clearly, she should have filed anappeal with the Secretary of the DFA in the event of the denial of her
application for a passport, after having complied with the provisions of R.A. 8239. Petitioner’s argument
that her application "cannot be said to havebeen either denied, cancelled or restricted by [the DFA ], so
as to make her an aggrieved party entitled to appeal",7 as instead she "was merely told"8 that her
passport cannot be issued, does not persuade. The law provides a direct recourse for petitioner in the
event of the denial of her application.

Second, with respect to her prayer for the recognition of her second marriage as valid, petitioner should
have filed, instead, a petition for the judicial recognition of her foreign divorce from her first husband.

In Garcia v. Recio,9 we ruled that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our
jurisdiction, provided the decree is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. The presentation
solely of the divorce decree is insufficient; both the divorce decree and the governing personal law of
the alien spouse who obtained the divorce must be proven. Because our courts do not take judicial
notice of foreign laws and judgment, our law on evidence requires that both the divorce decree and the
national law of the alien must be alleged and proven and like any other fact.10

While it has been ruled that a petition for the authority to remarry filed before a trial court actually
constitutes a petition for declaratory relief,11 we are still unable to grant the prayer of petitioner. As held
by the RTC, there appears to be insufficient proof or evidence presented on record of both the national
law of her first husband, Kobayashi, and of the validity of the divorce decree under that national
law.12 Hence, any declaration as to the validity of the divorce can only be made upon her complete
submission of evidence proving the divorce decree and the national law of her alien spouse, in an
action instituted in the proper forum.

WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is DENIED without prejudice to petitioner's recourse to the proper
remedies available.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 188289 August 20, 2014

DAVID A. NOVERAS, Petitioner,

vs.
LETICIA T. NOVERAS, Respondent.

DECISION

PEREZ, J.:

Before the Court is a petition for review assailing the 9 May 2008 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R .. CV No. 88686, which affirmed in part the 8 December 2006 Decision2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Baler, Aurora, Branch 96.

The factual antecedents are as follow:

David A. Noveras (David) and Leticia T. Noveras (Leticia) were married on 3 December 1988 in
Quezon City, Philippines. They resided in California, United States of America (USA) where they
eventually acquired American citizenship. They then begot two children, namely: Jerome T.

Noveras, who was born on 4 November 1990 and JenaT. Noveras, born on 2 May 1993. David was
engaged in courier service business while Leticia worked as a nurse in San Francisco, California.

During the marriage, they acquired the following properties in the Philippines and in the USA:
 PHILIPPINES
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot with an area of 150 sq. m. ₱1,693,125.00
located at 1085 Norma Street, Sampaloc,
Manila (Sampaloc property)
Agricultural land with an area of 20,742 sq. ₱400,000.00
m. located at Laboy, Dipaculao, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 2.5 ₱490,000.00
hectares located at Maria Aurora, Aurora
A parcel of land with an area of 175 sq.m. ₱175,000.00 3

located at Sabang Baler, Aurora

3-has. coconut plantation in San Joaquin ₱750,000.00
Maria Aurora, Aurora
USA
PROPERTY FAIR MARKET VALUE
House and Lot at 1155 Hanover Street,
Daly City, California
$550,000.00
(unpaid debt of
$285,000.00)
Furniture and furnishings $3,000
Jewelries (ring and watch) $9,000
2000 Nissan Frontier 4x4 pickup truck $13,770.00
Bank of America Checking Account $8,000
Bank of America Cash Deposit
Life Insurance (Cash Value) $100,000.00
4
Retirement, pension, profit-sharing, $56,228.00
annuities

The Sampaloc property used to beowned by David’s parents. The parties herein secured a loan from a
bank and mortgaged the property. When said property was about to be foreclosed, the couple paid a
total of ₱1.5 Million for the redemption of the same.

Due to business reverses, David left the USA and returned to the Philippines in 2001. In December
2002,Leticia executed a Special Power of Attorney (SPA) authorizing David to sell the Sampaloc
property for ₱2.2 Million. According to Leticia, sometime in September 2003, David abandoned his
family and lived with Estrellita Martinez in Aurora province. Leticia claimed that David agreed toand
executed a Joint Affidavit with Leticia in the presence of David’s father, Atty. Isaias Noveras, on 3
December 2003 stating that: 1) the ₱1.1Million proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property shall
be paid to and collected by Leticia; 2) that David shall return and pay to Leticia ₱750,000.00, which is
equivalent to half of the amount of the redemption price of the Sampaloc property; and 3) that David
shall renounce and forfeit all his rights and interest in the conjugal and real properties situated in the
Philippines.5 David was able to collect ₱1,790,000.00 from the sale of the Sampaloc property, leaving
an unpaid balance of ₱410,000.00.

Upon learning that David had an extra-marital affair, Leticia filed a petition for divorce with the Superior
Court of California, County of San Mateo, USA. The California court granted the divorce on 24 June
2005 and judgment was duly entered on 29 June 2005.6 The California court granted to Leticia the
custody of her two children, as well as all the couple’s properties in the USA.7

On 8 August 2005, Leticia filed a petition for Judicial Separation of Conjugal Property before the RTC of
Baler, Aurora. She relied on the 3 December 2003 Joint Affidavit and David’s failure to comply with his
obligation under the same. She prayed for: 1) the power to administer all conjugal properties in the
Philippines; 2) David and his partner to cease and desist from selling the subject conjugal properties; 3)
the declaration that all conjugal properties be forfeited in favor of her children; 4) David to remit half of
the purchase price as share of Leticia from the sale of the Sampaloc property; and 5) the payment
of₱50,000.00 and ₱100,000.00 litigation expenses.8

In his Answer, David stated that a judgment for the dissolution of their marriage was entered on 29
June 2005 by the Superior Court of California, County of San Mateo. He demanded that the conjugal
partnership properties, which also include the USA properties, be liquidated and that all expenses of
liquidation, including attorney’s fees of both parties be charged against the conjugal partnership.9

The RTC of Baler, Aurora simplified the issues as follow:

1. Whether or not respondent David A. Noveras committed acts of abandonment and marital
infidelity which can result intothe forfeiture of the parties’ properties in favor of the petitioner and
their two (2) children.

2. Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction over the properties in California, U.S.A. and the
same can be included in the judicial separation prayed for.

3. Whether or not the "Joint Affidavit" x x x executed by petitioner Leticia T. Noveras and
respondent David A. Noveras will amount to a waiver or forfeiture of the latter’s property rights
over their conjugal properties.

4. Whether or not Leticia T. Noveras isentitled to reimbursement of onehalf of the ₱2.2 [M]illion
sales proceeds of their property in Sampaloc, Manila and one-half of the ₱1.5 [M]illion used to
redeem the property of Atty. Isaias Noveras, including interests and charges.

5. How the absolute community properties should be distributed.

6. Whether or not the attorney’s feesand litigation expenses of the parties were chargeable
against their conjugal properties.

Corollary to the aboveis the issue of:

Whether or not the two common children of the parties are entitled to support and presumptive
legitimes.10

On 8 December 2006, the RTC rendered judgment as follows:

1. The absolute community of property of the parties is hereby declared DISSOLVED;

 2. The net assets of the absolute community of property ofthe parties in the Philippines are
hereby ordered to be awarded to respondent David A. Noveras only, with the properties in the
United States of America remaining in the sole ownership of petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a.
Leticia Tacbiana pursuant to the divorce decree issuedby the Superior Court of California,
County of San Mateo, United States of America, dissolving the marriage of the parties as of
June 24, 2005. The titles presently covering said properties shall be cancelled and new titles be
issued in the name of the party to whom said properties are awarded;

3. One-half of the properties awarded to respondent David A. Noveras in the preceding

paragraph are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, his two minor children with petitioner
LeticiaNoveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana as their presumptive legitimes and said legitimes must be
annotated on the titles covering the said properties.Their share in the income from these
properties shall be remitted to them annually by the respondent within the first half of January of
each year, starting January 2008;

4. One-half of the properties in the United States of America awarded to petitioner Leticia
Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana in paragraph 2 are hereby given to Jerome and Jena, her two
minor children with respondent David A. Noveras as their presumptive legitimes and said
legitimes must be annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in
the income from these properties, if any, shall be remitted to them annually by the petitioner
within the first half of January of each year, starting January 2008;

5. For the support of their two (2) minor children, Jerome and Jena, respondent David A.
Noveras shall give them US$100.00 as monthly allowance in addition to their income from their
presumptive legitimes, while petitioner Leticia Tacbiana shall take care of their food, clothing,
education and other needs while they are in her custody in the USA. The monthly allowance
due from the respondent shall be increased in the future as the needs of the children require
and his financial capacity can afford;

6. Of the unpaid amount of ₱410,000.00 on the purchase price of the Sampaloc property, the
Paringit Spouses are hereby ordered to pay ₱5,000.00 to respondent David A. Noveras and
₱405,000.00 to the two children. The share of the respondent may be paid to him directly but
the share of the two children shall be deposited with a local bank in Baler, Aurora, in a joint
account tobe taken out in their names, withdrawal from which shall only be made by them or by
their representative duly authorized with a Special Power of Attorney. Such payment/deposit
shall be made withinthe period of thirty (30) days after receipt of a copy of this Decision, with the
passbook of the joint account to be submitted to the custody of the Clerk of Court of this Court
within the same period. Said passbook can be withdrawn from the Clerk of Court only by the
children or their attorney-in-fact; and

7. The litigation expenses and attorney’s fees incurred by the parties shall be shouldered by
them individually.11

The trial court recognized that since the parties are US citizens, the laws that cover their legal and
personalstatus are those of the USA. With respect to their marriage, the parties are divorced by virtue
of the decree of dissolution of their marriage issued by the Superior Court of California, County of San
Mateo on 24June 2005. Under their law, the parties’ marriage had already been dissolved. Thus, the
trial court considered the petition filed by Leticia as one for liquidation of the absolute community of
property regime with the determination of the legitimes, support and custody of the children, instead of
an action for judicial separation of conjugal property.

With respect to their property relations, the trial court first classified their property regime as absolute
community of property because they did not execute any marriage settlement before the solemnization
of their marriage pursuant to Article 75 of the Family Code. Then, the trial court ruled that in accordance
with the doctrine of processual presumption, Philippine law should apply because the court cannot take
judicial notice of the US law since the parties did not submit any proof of their national law. The trial
court held that as the instant petition does not fall under the provisions of the law for the grant of judicial
separation of properties, the absolute community properties cannot beforfeited in favor of Leticia and
her children. Moreover, the trial court observed that Leticia failed to prove abandonment and infidelity
with preponderant evidence.

The trial court however ruled that Leticia is not entitled to the reimbursements she is praying for
considering that she already acquired all of the properties in the USA. Relying still on the principle of
equity, the Court also adjudicated the Philippine properties to David, subject to the payment of the
children’s presumptive legitimes. The trial court held that under Article 89 of the Family Code, the
waiver or renunciation made by David of his property rights in the Joint Affidavit is void.

On appeal, the Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s Decision by directing the equal division of the
Philippine properties between the spouses. Moreover with respect to the common children’s
presumptive legitime, the appellate court ordered both spouses to each pay their children the amount of
₱520,000.00, thus:

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is PARTLY GRANTED. Numbers 2, 4 and 6 of the assailedDecision
dated December 8, 2006 of Branch 96, RTC of Baler, Aurora Province, in Civil Case No. 828 are
hereby MODIFIED to read as follows:

2. The net assets of the absolute community of property of the parties in the Philippines are
hereby divided equally between petitioner Leticia Noveras a.k.a. Leticia Tacbiana (sic) and
respondent David A. Noveras;

xxx

4. One-half of the properties awarded to petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) in paragraph 2 shall
pertain to her minor children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive legitimes which shall be
annotated on the titles/documents covering the said properties. Their share in the income
therefrom, if any, shall be remitted to them by petitioner annually within the first half of January,
starting 2008;

xxx

6. Respondent David A. Noveras and petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) are each ordered to pay
the amount of₱520,000.00 to their two children, Jerome and Jena, as their presumptive
legitimes from the sale of the Sampaloc property inclusive of the receivables therefrom, which
shall be deposited to a local bank of Baler, Aurora, under a joint account in the latter’s names.
The payment/deposit shall be made within a period of thirty (30) days from receipt ofa copy of
this Decision and the corresponding passbook entrusted to the custody ofthe Clerk of Court a
quowithin the same period, withdrawable only by the children or their attorney-in-fact.

A number 8 is hereby added, which shall read as follows:

8. Respondent David A. Noveras is hereby ordered to pay petitioner Leticia Tacbiana (sic) the
amount of ₱1,040,000.00 representing her share in the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc
property.

The last paragraph shall read as follows:

Send a copy of this Decision to the local civil registry of Baler, Aurora; the local civil registry of Quezon
City; the Civil RegistrarGeneral, National Statistics Office, Vibal Building, Times Street corner EDSA,
Quezon City; the Office of the Registry of Deeds for the Province of Aurora; and to the children, Jerome
Noveras and Jena Noveras.

The rest of the Decision is AFFIRMED.12

In the present petition, David insists that the Court of Appeals should have recognized the California
Judgment which awarded the Philippine properties to him because said judgment was part of the
pleading presented and offered in evidence before the trial court. David argues that allowing Leticia to
share in the Philippine properties is tantamount to unjust enrichment in favor of Leticia considering that
the latter was already granted all US properties by the California court.

In summary and review, the basic facts are: David and Leticia are US citizens who own properties in
the USA and in the Philippines. Leticia obtained a decree of divorce from the Superior Court of
California in June 2005 wherein the court awarded all the properties in the USA to Leticia. With respect
to their properties in the Philippines, Leticiafiled a petition for judicial separation ofconjugal properties.

At the outset, the trial court erred in recognizing the divorce decree which severed the bond of marriage
between the parties. In Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas,13 we stated that:

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must beproven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.14

The requirements of presenting the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the foreigner must
comply with our Rules of Evidence. Specifically, for Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment
relating to the status of a marriage, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in evidence and
proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules
of Court.15

Under Section 24 of Rule 132, the record of public documents of a sovereign authority or tribunal may
be proved by: (1) an official publication thereof or (2) a copy attested by the officer having the legal
custody thereof. Such official publication or copy must beaccompanied, if the record is not kept in the
Philippines, with a certificate that the attesting officer has the legal custody thereof. The certificate may
be issued by any of the authorized Philippine embassy or consular officials stationed in the foreign
country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office. The attestation must
state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the original, or a specific part thereof, asthe case
may be, and must be under the official seal of the attesting officer.

Section 25 of the same Rule states that whenever a copy of a document or record is attested for the
purpose of evidence, the attestation must state, in substance, that the copy is a correct copy of the
original, or a specific part thereof, as the case may be. The attestation must be under the official seal of
the attesting officer, if there be any, or if hebe the clerk of a court having a seal, under the seal of such
court.

Based on the records, only the divorce decree was presented in evidence. The required certificates to
prove its authenticity, as well as the pertinent California law on divorce were not presented.
It may be noted that in Bayot v. Court of Appeals,16 we relaxed the requirement on certification where
we held that "[petitioner therein] was clearly an American citizenwhen she secured the divorce and that
divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union, the presentation of a copy of
foreign divorce decree duly authenticatedby the foreign court issuing said decree is, as here, sufficient."
In this case however, it appears that there is no seal from the office where the divorce decree was
obtained.

Even if we apply the doctrine of processual presumption17 as the lower courts did with respect to the
property regime of the parties, the recognition of divorce is entirely a different matter because, to begin
with, divorce is not recognized between Filipino citizens in the Philippines. Absent a valid recognition of
the divorce decree, it follows that the parties are still legally married in the Philippines. The trial court
thus erred in proceeding directly to liquidation.

As a general rule, any modification in the marriage settlements must be made before the celebration of
marriage. An exception to this rule is allowed provided that the modification isjudicially approved and
refers only to the instances provided in Articles 66,67, 128, 135 and 136 of the Family Code.18

Leticia anchored the filing of the instant petition for judicial separation of property on paragraphs 4 and
6 of Article 135 of the Family Code, to wit:

Art. 135. Any of the following shall be considered sufficient cause for judicial separation of property:

(1) That the spouse of the petitioner has been sentenced to a penalty which carries with it civil
interdiction;

(2) That the spouse of the petitioner has been judicially declared an absentee;

(3) That loss of parental authority ofthe spouse of petitioner has been decreed by the court;

(4) That the spouse of the petitioner has abandoned the latter or failed to comply with his or her
obligations to the family as provided for in Article 101;

(5) That the spouse granted the power of administration in the marriage settlements has abused
that power; and

(6) That at the time of the petition, the spouses have been separated in fact for at least one year
and reconciliation is highly improbable.

In the cases provided for in Numbers (1), (2), and (3), the presentation of the final judgment against the
guiltyor absent spouse shall be enough basis for the grant of the decree ofjudicial separation of
property. (Emphasis supplied).

The trial court had categorically ruled that there was no abandonment in this case to necessitate judicial
separation of properties under paragraph 4 of Article 135 of the Family Code. The trial court
ratiocinated:

Moreover, abandonment, under Article 101 of the Family Code quoted above, must be for a valid cause
and the spouse is deemed to have abandoned the other when he/she has left the conjugal dwelling
without intention of returning. The intention of not returning is prima facie presumed if the allegedly [sic]
abandoning spouse failed to give any information as to his or her whereabouts within the period of
three months from such abandonment.
In the instant case, the petitioner knows that the respondent has returned to and stayed at his
hometown in Maria Aurora, Philippines, as she even went several times to visit him there after the
alleged abandonment. Also, the respondent has been going back to the USA to visit her and their
children until the relations between them worsened. The last visit of said respondent was in October
2004 when he and the petitioner discussed the filing by the latter of a petition for dissolution of marriage
with the California court. Such turn for the worse of their relationship and the filing of the saidpetition
can also be considered as valid causes for the respondent to stay in the Philippines.19

Separation in fact for one year as a ground to grant a judicial separation of property was not tackled in
the trial court’s decision because, the trial court erroneously treated the petition as liquidation of the
absolute community of properties.

The records of this case are replete with evidence that Leticia and David had indeed separated for
more than a year and that reconciliation is highly improbable. First, while actual abandonment had not
been proven, it is undisputed that the spouses had been living separately since 2003 when David
decided to go back to the Philippines to set up his own business. Second, Leticia heard from her friends
that David has been cohabiting with Estrellita Martinez, who represented herself as Estrellita Noveras.
Editha Apolonio, who worked in the hospital where David was once confined, testified that she saw the
name of Estrellita listed as the wife of David in the Consent for Operation form.20 Third and more
significantly, they had filed for divorce and it was granted by the California court in June 2005.

Having established that Leticia and David had actually separated for at least one year, the petition for
judicial separation of absolute community of property should be granted.

The grant of the judicial separation of the absolute community property automatically dissolves the
absolute community regime, as stated in the 4th paragraph of Article 99 ofthe Family Code, thus:

Art. 99. The absolute community terminates:

(1) Upon the death of either spouse;

(2) When there is a decree of legal separation;

(3) When the marriage is annulled or declared void; or

(4) In case of judicial separation of property during the marriage under Articles 134 to 138.
(Emphasis supplied).

Under Article 102 of the same Code, liquidation follows the dissolution of the absolute community
regime and the following procedure should apply:

Art. 102. Upon dissolution of the absolute community regime, the following procedure shall apply:

(1) An inventory shall be prepared, listing separately all the properties of the absolute
community and the exclusive properties of each spouse.

(2) The debts and obligations of the absolute community shall be paid out of its assets. In case
of insufficiency of said assets, the spouses shall be solidarily liable for the unpaid balance with
their separate properties in accordance with the provisions of the second paragraph of Article
94.
 (3) Whatever remains of the exclusive properties of the spouses shall thereafter be delivered to
each of them.

(4) The net remainder of the properties of the absolute community shall constitute its net assets,
which shall be divided equally between husband and wife, unless a different proportion or
division was agreed upon in the marriage settlements, or unless there has been a voluntary
waiver of such share provided in this Code. For purposes of computing the net profits subject to
forfeiture in accordance with Articles 43, No. (2) and 63, No. (2),the said profits shall be the
increase in value between the market value of the community property at the time of the
celebration of the marriage and the market value at the time of its dissolution.

(5) The presumptive legitimes of the common children shall be delivered upon partition, in
accordance with Article 51.

(6) Unless otherwise agreed upon by the parties, in the partition of the properties, the conjugal
dwelling and the lot on which it is situated shall be adjudicated tothe spouse with whom the
majority of the common children choose to remain. Children below the age of seven years are
deemed to have chosen the mother, unless the court has decided otherwise. In case there is no
such majority, the court shall decide, taking into consideration the best interests of said children.
At the risk of being repetitious, we will not remand the case to the trial court. Instead, we shall
adopt the modifications made by the Court of Appeals on the trial court’s Decision with respect
to liquidation.

We agree with the appellate court that the Philippine courts did not acquire jurisdiction over the
California properties of David and Leticia. Indeed, Article 16 of the Civil Code clearly states that real
property as well as personal property is subject to the law of the country where it is situated. Thus,
liquidation shall only be limited to the Philippine properties.

We affirm the modification madeby the Court of Appeals with respect to the share of the spouses in the
absolutecommunity properties in the Philippines, as well as the payment of their children’s presumptive
legitimes, which the appellate court explained in this wise:

Leticia and David shall likewise have an equal share in the proceeds of the Sampaloc
property.1âwphi1 While both claimed to have contributed to the redemption of the Noveras property,
absent a clear showing where their contributions came from, the same is presumed to have come from
the community property. Thus, Leticia is not entitled to reimbursement of half of the redemption money.

David's allegation that he used part of the proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property for the
benefit of the absolute community cannot be given full credence. Only the amount of ₱120,000.00
incurred in going to and from the U.S.A. may be charged thereto. Election expenses in the amount of
₱300,000.00 when he ran as municipal councilor cannot be allowed in the absence of receipts or at
least the Statement of Contributions and Expenditures required under Section 14 of Republic Act No.
7166 duly received by the Commission on Elections. Likewise, expenses incurred to settle the criminal
case of his personal driver is not deductible as the same had not benefited the family. In sum, Leticia
and David shall share equally in the proceeds of the sale net of the amount of ₱120,000.00 or in the
respective amounts of ₱1,040,000.00.

xxxx

Under the first paragraph of Article 888 of the Civil Code, "(t)he legitime of legitimate children and
descendants consists of one-half or the hereditary estate of the father and of the mother." The children
arc therefore entitled to half of the share of each spouse in the net assets of the absolute community,
which shall be annotated on the titles/documents covering the same, as well as to their respective
shares in the net proceeds from the sale of the Sampaloc property including the receivables from Sps.
Paringit in the amount of ₱410,000.00. Consequently, David and Leticia should each pay them the
amount of ₱520,000.00 as their presumptive legitimes therefrom.21

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. CV
No. 88686 is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 189538 February 10, 2014

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,

vs.
MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, Respondent.

DECISION

PERALTA, J.:

Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court are the Regional
Trial Court1 (RTC) Decision2 dated May 5, 2009 and Order3 dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No.
16519-CEB. The assailed decision granted respondent Merlinda L. Olaybar's petition for cancellation of
entries in the latter's marriage contract; while the assailed order denied the motion for reconsideration
filed by petitioner Republic of the Philippines through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).

The facts of the case are as follows:

Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage
(CENOMAR) as one of the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt
thereof, she discovered that she was already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on
June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She
denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not know the alleged husband; she
did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the marriage
certificate is not hers.4 She, thus, filed a Petition for Cancellation of Entries in the Marriage Contract,
especially the entries in the wife portion thereof.5 Respondent impleaded the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband, as parties to the case.

During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before
Judge Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly
celebrated, because she was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She
completely denied having known the supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the
named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them while she was working as a receptionist in
Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain Johnny Singh, who owned a
travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a
passport.6 Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC,
Branch 1, who confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but
claimed that the alleged wife who appeared was definitely not respondent.7 Lastly, a document
examiner testified that the signature appearing in the marriage contract was forged.8

On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, the petition is granted in favor of the petitioner, Merlinda
L. Olaybar. The Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City is directed to cancel all the entries in the WIFE
portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and respondent Ye Son Sune.

SO ORDERED.9

Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of respondent, the
court found basis in granting the latter’s prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible mistake. 10

Petitioner, however, moved for the reconsideration of the assailed Decision on the grounds that: (1)
there was no clerical spelling, typographical and other innocuous errors in the marriage contract for it to
fall within the provisions of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court; and (2) granting the cancellation of all the
entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract is, in effect, declaring the marriage void ab
initio.11

In an Order dated August 25, 2009, the RTC denied petitioner’s motion for reconsideration couched in
this wise:

WHEREFORE, the court hereby denies the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Republic of the
Philippines. Furnish copies of this order to the Office of the Solicitor General, the petitioner’s counsel,
and all concerned government agencies.

SO ORDERED.12

Contrary to petitioner’s stand, the RTC held that it had jurisdiction to take cognizance of cases for
correction of entries even on substantial errors under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court being the
appropriate adversary proceeding required. Considering that respondent’s identity was used by an
unknown person to contract marriage with a Korean national, it would not be feasible for respondent to
institute an action for declaration of nullity of marriage since it is not one of the void marriages under
Articles 35 and 36 of the Family Code.13

Petitioner now comes before the Court in this Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court seeking the reversal of the assailed RTC Decision and Order based on the following
grounds:

I.

RULE 108 OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT APPLIES ONLY WHEN THERE ARE ERRORS IN
THE ENTRIES SOUGHT TO BE CANCELLED OR CORRECTED.

II.

GRANTING THE CANCELLATION OF "ALL THE ENTRIES IN THE WIFE PORTION OF THE
ALLEGED MARRIAGE CONTRACT," IS IN EFFECT DECLARING THE MARRIAGE VOID AB
INITIO.14

Petitioner claims that there are no errors in the entries sought to be cancelled or corrected, because the
entries made in the certificate of marriage are the ones provided by the person who appeared and
represented herself as Merlinda L. Olaybar and are, in fact, the latter’s personal circumstances.15 In
directing the cancellation of the entries in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage, the RTC, in
effect, declared the marriage null and void ab initio.16 Thus, the petition instituted by respondent is
actually a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage in the guise of a Rule 108 proceeding. 17
We deny the petition.

At the outset, it is necessary to stress that a direct recourse to this Court from the decisions and final
orders of the RTC may be taken where only questions of law are raised or involved. There is a question
of law when the doubt arises as to what the law is on a certain state of facts, which does not call for the
examination of the probative value of the evidence of the parties.18 Here, the issue raised by petitioner
is whether or not the cancellation of entries in the marriage contract which, in effect, nullifies the
marriage may be undertaken in a Rule 108 proceeding. Verily, petitioner raised a pure question of law.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry, to wit:

SEC. 1. Who may file petition. – Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a
verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional
Trial Court of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. – Upon good and valid grounds, the
following entries in the civil register may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c)
deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of marriage; (f) judgments declaring
marriages void from the beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments of
natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction;
(m) judicial determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (o) changes of
name.

SEC. 3. Parties. – When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the
civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby
shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and Publication. – Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix
the time and place for the hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given
to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once
a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition. – The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under
the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15) days from notice of
the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto.

SEC. 6. Expediting proceedings. – The court in which the proceedings is brought may make
orders expediting the proceedings, and may also grant preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.

SEC. 7. Order. – After hearing, the court may either dismiss the petition or issue an order
granting the cancellation or correction prayed for. In either case, a certified copy of the judgment
shall be served upon the civil registrar concerned who shall annotate the same in his record.

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry. The proceedings may either be summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the
procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality
of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted is adversary. Since the
promulgation of Republic v. Valencia19 in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts
established and the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial
proceeding."20 An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted
proceedings where all relevant facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel
have been given opportunity to demolish the opposite party’s case, and where the evidence has been
thoroughly weighed and considered.21

It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the
remedy [is] granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always
summary. The procedure laid down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires
publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion as parties of all persons who may claim interest
which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also requires the civil registrar and any
person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court may make orders
expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue an
order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is
the appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil
register.22

In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the
personal circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and
she was not the one who contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims
that no such marriage was entered into or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such
contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it
appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the cancellation of entries in
the wife portion of the marriage certificate.

In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of
Cebu City, as well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise
undisputed that the procedural requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the
Solicitor General was likewise notified of the petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City
Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly, trial was conducted where respondent
herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was conducted, as well as a
document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the
testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the
subject marriage certificate was different from respondent’s signature appearing in some of her
government issued identification cards.23 The court thus made a categorical conclusion that
respondent’s signature in the marriage certificate was not hers and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it
was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was celebrated.

Indeed the Court made a pronouncement in the recent case of Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela
Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the Administrator and Civil
Registrar General of the National Statistics Office24 that:

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for
an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition and
distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine
collusion. A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent
circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act
No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the
Regional Trial Court where the corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen
cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil
registry.
Aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to show the existence of
marriage.1âwphi1 Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was
entered into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary
evidence clearly established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a
forgery. While we maintain that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, we
cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity
to contest the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the
parties had already been admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of
marriage as there was no marriage to speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to
reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise stated, in allowing the correction of the subject
certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial court did not, in any way, declare
the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The Regional Trial Court
Decision dated May 5, 2009 and Order dated August 25, 2009 in SP. Proc. No. 16519-CEB, are
AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 196049 June 26, 2013

MINORU FUJIKI, PETITIONER,

vs.
MARIA PAZ GALELA MARINAY, SHINICHI MAEKARA, LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF QUEZON
CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL
STATISTICS OFFICE, RESPONDENTS.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

This is a direct recourse to this Court from the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 107, Quezon City,
through a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court on a pure question of law.
The petition assails the Order1 dated 31 January 2011 of the RTC in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582 and its
Resolution dated 2 March 2011 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC dismissed
the petition for "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)"
based on improper venue and the lack of personality of petitioner, Minoru Fujiki, to file the petition.

The Facts

Petitioner Minoru Fujiki (Fujiki) is a Japanese national who married respondent Maria Paz Galela
Marinay (Marinay) in the Philippines2 on 23 January 2004. The marriage did not sit well with petitioner’s
parents. Thus, Fujiki could not bring his wife to Japan where he resides. Eventually, they lost contact
with each other.

In 2008, Marinay met another Japanese, Shinichi Maekara (Maekara). Without the first marriage being
dissolved, Marinay and Maekara were married on 15 May 2008 in Quezon City, Philippines. Maekara
brought Marinay to Japan. However, Marinay allegedly suffered physical abuse from Maekara. She left
Maekara and started to contact Fujiki.3
Fujiki and Marinay met in Japan and they were able to reestablish their relationship. In 2010, Fujiki
helped Marinay obtain a judgment from a family court in Japan which declared the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void on the ground of bigamy.4 On 14 January 2011, Fujiki filed a petition in the
RTC entitled: "Judicial Recognition of Foreign Judgment (or Decree of Absolute Nullity of Marriage)."
Fujiki prayed that (1) the Japanese Family Court judgment be recognized; (2) that the bigamous
marriage between Marinay and Maekara be declared void ab initio under Articles 35(4) and 41 of the
Family Code of the Philippines;5 and (3) for the RTC to direct the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City to
annotate the Japanese Family Court judgment on the Certificate of Marriage between Marinay and
Maekara and to endorse such annotation to the Office of the Administrator and Civil Registrar General
in the National Statistics Office (NSO).6

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

A few days after the filing of the petition, the RTC immediately issued an Order dismissing the petition
and withdrawing the case from its active civil docket.7 The RTC cited the following provisions of the
Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages (A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC):

Sec. 2. Petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages. –

(a) Who may file. – A petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by
the husband or the wife.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Venue. – The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or city where the
petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing, or in the
case of a non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the
petitioner. x x x

The RTC ruled, without further explanation, that the petition was in "gross violation" of the above
provisions. The trial court based its dismissal on Section 5(4) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC which provides
that "[f]ailure to comply with any of the preceding requirements may be a ground for immediate
dismissal of the petition."8 Apparently, the RTC took the view that only "the husband or the wife," in this
case either Maekara or Marinay, can file the petition to declare their marriage void, and not Fujiki.

Fujiki moved that the Order be reconsidered. He argued that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC contemplated
ordinary civil actions for declaration of nullity and annulment of marriage. Thus, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC
does not apply. A petition for recognition of foreign judgment is a special proceeding, which "seeks to
establish a status, a right or a particular fact,"9 and not a civil action which is "for the enforcement or
protection of a right, or the prevention or redress of a wrong."10 In other words, the petition in the RTC
sought to establish (1) the status and concomitant rights of Fujiki and Marinay as husband and wife and
(2) the fact of the rendition of the Japanese Family Court judgment declaring the marriage between
Marinay and Maekara as void on the ground of bigamy. The petitioner contended that the Japanese
judgment was consistent with Article 35(4) of the Family Code of the Philippines11 on bigamy and was
therefore entitled to recognition by Philippine courts.12

In any case, it was also Fujiki’s view that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applied only to void marriages under
Article 36 of the Family Code on the ground of psychological incapacity.13 Thus, Section 2(a) of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC provides that "a petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriages may be
filed solely by the husband or the wife." To apply Section 2(a) in bigamy would be absurd because only
the guilty parties would be permitted to sue. In the words of Fujiki, "[i]t is not, of course, difficult to
realize that the party interested in having a bigamous marriage declared a nullity would be the husband
in the prior, pre-existing marriage."14 Fujiki had material interest and therefore the personality to nullify a
bigamous marriage.

Fujiki argued that Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Civil Registry) of the Rules of
Court is applicable. Rule 108 is the "procedural implementation" of the Civil Register Law (Act No.
3753)15 in relation to Article 413 of the Civil Code.16 The Civil Register Law imposes a duty on the
"successful petitioner for divorce or annulment of marriage to send a copy of the final decree of the
court to the local registrar of the municipality where the dissolved or annulled marriage was
solemnized."17 Section 2 of Rule 108 provides that entries in the civil registry relating to "marriages,"
"judgments of annulments of marriage" and "judgments declaring marriages void from the beginning"
are subject to cancellation or correction.18 The petition in the RTC sought (among others) to annotate
the judgment of the Japanese Family Court on the certificate of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara.

Fujiki’s motion for reconsideration in the RTC also asserted that the trial court "gravely erred" when, on
its own, it dismissed the petition based on improper venue. Fujiki stated that the RTC may be confusing
the concept of venue with the concept of jurisdiction, because it is lack of jurisdiction which allows a
court to dismiss a case on its own. Fujiki cited Dacoycoy v. Intermediate Appellate Court19 which held
that the "trial court cannot pre-empt the defendant’s prerogative to object to the improper laying of the
venue by motu proprio dismissing the case."20 Moreover, petitioner alleged that the trial court should
not have "immediately dismissed" the petition under Section 5 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC because he
substantially complied with the provision.

On 2 March 2011, the RTC resolved to deny petitioner’s motion for reconsideration. In its Resolution,
the RTC stated that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies because the petitioner, in effect, prays for a decree
of absolute nullity of marriage.21 The trial court reiterated its two grounds for dismissal, i.e. lack of
personality to sue and improper venue under Sections 2(a) and 4 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. The RTC
considered Fujiki as a "third person"22 in the proceeding because he "is not the husband in the decree
of divorce issued by the Japanese Family Court, which he now seeks to be judicially recognized, x x
x."23 On the other hand, the RTC did not explain its ground of impropriety of venue. It only said that
"[a]lthough the Court cited Sec. 4 (Venue) x x x as a ground for dismissal of this case[,] it should be
taken together with the other ground cited by the Court x x x which is Sec. 2(a) x x x."24

The RTC further justified its motu proprio dismissal of the petition based on Braza v. The City Civil
Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental.25 The Court in Braza ruled that "[i]n a special
proceeding for correction of entry under Rule 108 (Cancellation or Correction of Entries in the Original
Registry), the trial court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages x x x."26 Braza emphasized that the
"validity of marriages as well as legitimacy and filiation can be questioned only in a direct action
seasonably filed by the proper party, and not through a collateral attack such as [a] petition [for
correction of entry] x x x."27

The RTC considered the petition as a collateral attack on the validity of marriage between Marinay and
Maekara. The trial court held that this is a "jurisdictional ground" to dismiss the petition.28 Moreover, the
verification and certification against forum shopping of the petition was not authenticated as required
under Section 529 of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC. Hence, this also warranted the "immediate dismissal" of
the petition under the same provision.

The Manifestation and Motion of the Office of the Solicitor General and the Letters of Marinay
and Maekara

On 30 May 2011, the Court required respondents to file their comment on the petition for review. 30 The
public respondents, the Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City and the Administrator and Civil Registrar
General of the NSO, participated through the Office of the Solicitor General. Instead of a comment, the
Solicitor General filed a Manifestation and Motion.31

The Solicitor General agreed with the petition. He prayed that the RTC’s "pronouncement that the
petitioner failed to comply with x x x A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC x x x be set aside" and that the case be
reinstated in the trial court for further proceedings.32 The Solicitor General argued that Fujiki, as the
spouse of the first marriage, is an injured party who can sue to declare the bigamous marriage between
Marinay and Maekara void. The Solicitor General cited Juliano-Llave v. Republic33 which held that
Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply in cases of bigamy. In Juliano-Llave, this Court
explained:

[t]he subsequent spouse may only be expected to take action if he or she had only discovered during
the connubial period that the marriage was bigamous, and especially if the conjugal bliss had already
vanished. Should parties in a subsequent marriage benefit from the bigamous marriage, it would not be
expected that they would file an action to declare the marriage void and thus, in such circumstance, the
"injured spouse" who should be given a legal remedy is the one in a subsisting previous marriage. The
latter is clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the
property ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the
prior spouse. The subsequent marriage will always be a reminder of the infidelity of the spouse and the
disregard of the prior marriage which sanctity is protected by the Constitution.34

The Solicitor General contended that the petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment
may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding.35 In Corpuz v. Santo Tomas,36 this Court held that "[t]he
recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as the object of
special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to establish the status
or right of a party or a particular fact."37 While Corpuz concerned a foreign divorce decree, in the
present case the Japanese Family Court judgment also affected the civil status of the parties,
especially Marinay, who is a Filipino citizen.

The Solicitor General asserted that Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is the procedure to record "[a]cts,
events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons" in the civil registry as required by
Article 407 of the Civil Code. In other words, "[t]he law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences upon a person’s legal capacity and status x x x."38 The
Japanese Family Court judgment directly bears on the civil status of a Filipino citizen and should
therefore be proven as a fact in a Rule 108 proceeding.

Moreover, the Solicitor General argued that there is no jurisdictional infirmity in assailing a void
marriage under Rule 108, citing De Castro v. De Castro39 and Niñal v. Bayadog40 which declared that
"[t]he validity of a void marriage may be collaterally attacked."41

Marinay and Maekara individually sent letters to the Court to comply with the directive for them to
comment on the petition.42 Maekara wrote that Marinay concealed from him the fact that she was
previously married to Fujiki.43 Maekara also denied that he inflicted any form of violence on
Marinay.44 On the other hand, Marinay wrote that she had no reason to oppose the petition.45 She
would like to maintain her silence for fear that anything she say might cause misunderstanding between
her and Fujiki.46

The Issues

Petitioner raises the following legal issues:

(1) Whether the Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of
Voidable Marriages (A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) is applicable.
 (2) Whether a husband or wife of a prior marriage can file a petition to recognize a foreign
judgment nullifying the subsequent marriage between his or her spouse and a foreign citizen on
the ground of bigamy.

(3) Whether the Regional Trial Court can recognize the foreign judgment in a proceeding for
cancellation or correction of entries in the Civil Registry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.

The Ruling of the Court

We grant the petition.

The Rule on Declaration of Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages
(A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC) does not apply in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the
status of a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of a foreign country. Moreover, in Juliano-
Llave v. Republic,47 this Court held that the rule in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC that only the husband or wife
can file a declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage "does not apply if the reason behind the
petition is bigamy."48

I.

For Philippine courts to recognize a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage where one of
the parties is a citizen of a foreign country, the petitioner only needs to prove the foreign judgment as a
fact under the Rules of Court. To be more specific, a copy of the foreign judgment may be admitted in
evidence and proven as a fact under Rule 132, Sections 24 and 25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b)
of the Rules of Court.49 Petitioner may prove the Japanese Family Court judgment through (1) an
official publication or (2) a certification or copy attested by the officer who has custody of the judgment.
If the office which has custody is in a foreign country such as Japan, the certification may be made by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer of the Philippine foreign service in Japan and authenticated by
the seal of office.50

To hold that A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC applies to a petition for recognition of foreign judgment would mean
that the trial court and the parties should follow its provisions, including the form and contents of the
petition,51 the service of summons,52 the investigation of the public prosecutor,53 the setting of pre-
trial,54 the trial55 and the judgment of the trial court.56 This is absurd because it will litigate the case
anew. It will defeat the purpose of recognizing foreign judgments, which is "to limit repetitive litigation
on claims and issues."57 The interpretation of the RTC is tantamount to relitigating the case on the
merits. In Mijares v. Rañada,58 this Court explained that "[i]f every judgment of a foreign court were
reviewable on the merits, the plaintiff would be forced back on his/her original cause of action,
rendering immaterial the previously concluded litigation."59

A foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage affects the civil status, condition and legal
capacity of its parties. However, the effect of a foreign judgment is not automatic. To extend the effect
of a foreign judgment in the Philippines, Philippine courts must determine if the foreign judgment is
consistent with domestic public policy and other mandatory laws.60 Article 15 of the Civil Code provides
that "[l]aws relating to family rights and duties, or to the status, condition and legal capacity of persons
are binding upon citizens of the Philippines, even though living abroad." This is the rule of lex
nationalii in private international law. Thus, the Philippine State may require, for effectivity in the
Philippines, recognition by Philippine courts of a foreign judgment affecting its citizen, over whom it
exercises personal jurisdiction relating to the status, condition and legal capacity of such citizen.

A petition to recognize a foreign judgment declaring a marriage void does not require relitigation under
a Philippine court of the case as if it were a new petition for declaration of nullity of marriage. Philippine
courts cannot presume to know the foreign laws under which the foreign judgment was rendered. They
cannot substitute their judgment on the status, condition and legal capacity of the foreign citizen who is
under the jurisdiction of another state. Thus, Philippine courts can only recognize the foreign
judgment as a fact according to the rules of evidence.

Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court provides that a foreign judgment or final order against a
person creates a "presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in
interest by a subsequent title." Moreover, Section 48 of the Rules of Court states that "the judgment or
final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion,
fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact." Thus, Philippine courts exercise limited review on foreign
judgments. Courts are not allowed to delve into the merits of a foreign judgment. Once a foreign
judgment is admitted and proven in a Philippine court, it can only be repelled on grounds external to its
merits, i.e. , "want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or
fact." The rule on limited review embodies the policy of efficiency and the protection of party
expectations,61 as well as respecting the jurisdiction of other states.62

Since 1922 in Adong v. Cheong Seng Gee,63 Philippine courts have recognized foreign divorce decrees
between a Filipino and a foreign citizen if they are successfully proven under the rules of
evidence.64 Divorce involves the dissolution of a marriage, but the recognition of a foreign divorce
decree does not involve the extended procedure under A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the rules of ordinary
trial. While the Philippines does not have a divorce law, Philippine courts may, however, recognize a
foreign divorce decree under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, to capacitate a
Filipino citizen to remarry when his or her foreign spouse obtained a divorce decree abroad.65

There is therefore no reason to disallow Fujiki to simply prove as a fact the Japanese Family Court
judgment nullifying the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy. While the
Philippines has no divorce law, the Japanese Family Court judgment is fully consistent with Philippine
public policy, as bigamous marriages are declared void from the beginning under Article 35(4) of the
Family Code. Bigamy is a crime under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. Thus, Fujiki can prove
the existence of the Japanese Family Court judgment in accordance with Rule 132, Sections 24 and
25, in relation to Rule 39, Section 48(b) of the Rules of Court.

II.

Since the recognition of a foreign judgment only requires proof of fact of the judgment, it may be made
in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry under Rule 108 of the
Rules of Court. Rule 1, Section 3 of the Rules of Court provides that "[a] special proceeding is a
remedy by which a party seeks to establish a status, a right, or a particular fact." Rule 108 creates a
remedy to rectify facts of a person’s life which are recorded by the State pursuant to the Civil Register
Law or Act No. 3753. These are facts of public consequence such as birth, death or marriage, 66 which
the State has an interest in recording. As noted by the Solicitor General, in Corpuz v. Sto. Tomas this
Court declared that "[t]he recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108
proceeding itself, as the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court)
is precisely to establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact."67

Rule 108, Section 1 of the Rules of Court states:

Sec. 1. Who may file petition. — Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning
the civil status of persons which has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition
for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the Regional Trial Court of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located. (Emphasis supplied)

Fujiki has the personality to file a petition to recognize the Japanese Family Court judgment nullifying
the marriage between Marinay and Maekara on the ground of bigamy because the judgment concerns
his civil status as married to Marinay. For the same reason he has the personality to file a petition under
Rule 108 to cancel the entry of marriage between Marinay and Maekara in the civil registry on the basis
of the decree of the Japanese Family Court.

There is no doubt that the prior spouse has a personal and material interest in maintaining the integrity
of the marriage he contracted and the property relations arising from it. There is also no doubt that he is
interested in the cancellation of an entry of a bigamous marriage in the civil registry, which
compromises the public record of his marriage. The interest derives from the substantive right of the
spouse not only to preserve (or dissolve, in limited instances68) his most intimate human relation, but
also to protect his property interests that arise by operation of law the moment he contracts
marriage.69 These property interests in marriage include the right to be supported "in keeping with the
financial capacity of the family"70 and preserving the property regime of the marriage.71

Property rights are already substantive rights protected by the Constitution,72 but a spouse’s right in a
marriage extends further to relational rights recognized under Title III ("Rights and Obligations between
Husband and Wife") of the Family Code.73 A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC cannot "diminish, increase, or modify"
the substantive right of the spouse to maintain the integrity of his marriage.74 In any case, Section 2(a)
of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC preserves this substantive right by limiting the personality to sue to the
husband or the wife of the union recognized by law.

Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not preclude a spouse of a subsisting marriage to question
the validity of a subsequent marriage on the ground of bigamy. On the contrary, when Section 2(a)
states that "[a] petition for declaration of absolute nullity of void marriage may be filed solely by the
husband or the wife"75—it refers to the husband or the wife of the subsisting marriage. Under Article
35(4) of the Family Code, bigamous marriages are void from the beginning. Thus, the parties in a
bigamous marriage are neither the husband nor the wife under the law. The husband or the wife of the
prior subsisting marriage is the one who has the personality to file a petition for declaration of absolute
nullity of void marriage under Section 2(a) of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

Article 35(4) of the Family Code, which declares bigamous marriages void from the beginning, is the
civil aspect of Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code,76 which penalizes bigamy. Bigamy is a public
crime. Thus, anyone can initiate prosecution for bigamy because any citizen has an interest in the
prosecution and prevention of crimes.77 If anyone can file a criminal action which leads to the
declaration of nullity of a bigamous marriage,78 there is more reason to confer personality to sue on the
husband or the wife of a subsisting marriage. The prior spouse does not only share in the public
interest of prosecuting and preventing crimes, he is also personally interested in the purely civil aspect
of protecting his marriage.

When the right of the spouse to protect his marriage is violated, the spouse is clearly an injured party
and is therefore interested in the judgment of the suit.79 Juliano-Llave ruled that the prior spouse "is
clearly the aggrieved party as the bigamous marriage not only threatens the financial and the property
ownership aspect of the prior marriage but most of all, it causes an emotional burden to the prior
spouse."80 Being a real party in interest, the prior spouse is entitled to sue in order to declare a
bigamous marriage void. For this purpose, he can petition a court to recognize a foreign judgment
nullifying the bigamous marriage and judicially declare as a fact that such judgment is effective in the
Philippines. Once established, there should be no more impediment to cancel the entry of the bigamous
marriage in the civil registry.

III.

In Braza v. The City Civil Registrar of Himamaylan City, Negros Occidental, this Court held that a "trial
court has no jurisdiction to nullify marriages" in a special proceeding for cancellation or correction of
entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.81 Thus, the "validity of marriage[] x x x can be questioned
only in a direct action" to nullify the marriage.82 The RTC relied on Braza in dismissing the petition for
recognition of foreign judgment as a collateral attack on the marriage between Marinay and Maekara.

Braza is not applicable because Braza does not involve a recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a
bigamous marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the foreign country.

To be sure, a petition for correction or cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for
an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is necessary to prevent circumvention of the
substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code, A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and
other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited grounds for the
dissolution of marriage,83 support pendente lite of the spouses and children,84 the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses,85 and the investigation of the public prosecutor to
determine collusion.86 A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also
necessary to prevent circumvention of the jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act
of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry
may be filed in the Regional Trial Court "where the corresponding civil registry is located."87 In other
words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere expedient of changing his entry of
marriage in the civil registry.

However, this does not apply in a petition for correction or cancellation of a civil registry entry based on
the recognition of a foreign judgment annulling a marriage where one of the parties is a citizen of the
foreign country. There is neither circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of
marriage under Philippine law, nor of the jurisdiction of Family Courts under R.A. No. 8369. A
recognition of a foreign judgment is not an action to nullify a marriage. It is an action for Philippine
courts to recognize the effectivity of a foreign judgment, which presupposes a case which was
already tried and decided under foreign law. The procedure in A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC does not apply
in a petition to recognize a foreign judgment annulling a bigamous marriage where one of the parties is
a citizen of the foreign country. Neither can R.A. No. 8369 define the jurisdiction of the foreign court.

Article 26 of the Family Code confers jurisdiction on Philippine courts to extend the effect of a foreign
divorce decree to a Filipino spouse without undergoing trial to determine the validity of the dissolution of
the marriage. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides that "[w]here a marriage
between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is thereafter validly
obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino spouse shall have
capacity to remarry under Philippine law." In Republic v. Orbecido,88 this Court recognized the
legislative intent of the second paragraph of Article 26 which is "to avoid the absurd situation where the
Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married
to the Filipino spouse"89 under the laws of his or her country. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code only authorizes Philippine courts to adopt the effects of a foreign divorce decree precisely
because the Philippines does not allow divorce. Philippine courts cannot try the case on the merits
because it is tantamount to trying a case for divorce.

The second paragraph of Article 26 is only a corrective measure to address the anomaly that results
from a marriage between a Filipino, whose laws do not allow divorce, and a foreign citizen, whose laws
allow divorce. The anomaly consists in the Filipino spouse being tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. The correction is made by extending in the
Philippines the effect of the foreign divorce decree, which is already effective in the country where it
was rendered. The second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is based on this Court’s decision
in Van Dorn v. Romillo90 which declared that the Filipino spouse "should not be discriminated against in
her own country if the ends of justice are to be served."91

The principle in Article 26 of the Family Code applies in a marriage between a Filipino and a foreign
citizen who obtains a foreign judgment nullifying the marriage on the ground of bigamy. The Filipino
spouse may file a petition abroad to declare the marriage void on the ground of bigamy. The principle in
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code applies because the foreign spouse, after the
foreign judgment nullifying the marriage, is capacitated to remarry under the laws of his or her country.
If the foreign judgment is not recognized in the Philippines, the Filipino spouse will be discriminated—
the foreign spouse can remarry while the Filipino spouse cannot remarry.

Under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts are empowered to
correct a situation where the Filipino spouse is still tied to the marriage while the foreign spouse is free
to marry. Moreover, notwithstanding Article 26 of the Family Code, Philippine courts already have
jurisdiction to extend the effect of a foreign judgment in the Philippines to the extent that the foreign
judgment does not contravene domestic public policy. A critical difference between the case of a
foreign divorce decree and a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is that bigamy, as a
ground for the nullity of marriage, is fully consistent with Philippine public policy as expressed in Article
35(4) of the Family Code and Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code. The Filipino spouse has the
option to undergo full trial by filing a petition for declaration of nullity of marriage under A.M. No. 02-11-
10-SC, but this is not the only remedy available to him or her. Philippine courts have jurisdiction to
recognize a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage, without prejudice to a criminal
prosecution for bigamy.

In the recognition of foreign judgments, Philippine courts are incompetent to substitute their judgment
on how a case was decided under foreign law. They cannot decide on the "family rights and duties, or
on the status, condition and legal capacity" of the foreign citizen who is a party to the foreign judgment.
Thus, Philippine courts are limited to the question of whether to extend the effect of a foreign judgment
in the Philippines. In a foreign judgment relating to the status of a marriage involving a citizen of a
foreign country, Philippine courts only decide whether to extend its effect to the Filipino party, under the
rule of lex nationalii expressed in Article 15 of the Civil Code.

For this purpose, Philippine courts will only determine (1) whether the foreign judgment is inconsistent
with an overriding public policy in the Philippines; and (2) whether any alleging party is able to prove an
extrinsic ground to repel the foreign judgment, i.e. want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. If there is neither inconsistency with public policy nor
adequate proof to repel the judgment, Philippine courts should, by default, recognize the foreign
judgment as part of the comity of nations. Section 48(b), Rule 39 of the Rules of Court states that the
foreign judgment is already "presumptive evidence of a right between the parties." Upon recognition of
the foreign judgment, this right becomes conclusive and the judgment serves as the basis for the
correction or cancellation of entry in the civil registry. The recognition of the foreign judgment nullifying
a bigamous marriage is a subsequent event that establishes a new status, right and fact92 that needs to
be reflected in the civil registry. Otherwise, there will be an inconsistency between the recognition of the
effectivity of the foreign judgment and the public records in the Philippines.1âwphi1

However, the recognition of a foreign judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is without prejudice to
prosecution for bigamy under Article 349 of the Revised Penal Code.93 The recognition of a foreign
judgment nullifying a bigamous marriage is not a ground for extinction of criminal liability under Articles
89 and 94 of the Revised Penal Code. Moreover, under Article 91 of the Revised Penal Code, "[t]he
term of prescription [of the crime of bigamy] shall not run when the offender is absent from the
Philippine archipelago."

Since A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC is inapplicable, the Court no longer sees the need to address the
questions on venue and the contents and form of the petition under Sections 4 and 5, respectively, of
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition. The Order dated 31 January 2011 and the Resolution dated 2
March 2011 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 107, Quezon City, in Civil Case No. Q-11-68582
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to REINSTATE the petition
for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G. R. No. 183622 February 8, 2012

MEROPE ENRIQUEZ VDA. DE CATALAN, Petitioner,

vs.
LOUELLA A. CATALAN-LEE, Respondent.

RESOLUTION

SERENO, J.:

Before us is a Petition for Review assailing the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 and
Resolution2 regarding the issuance of letters of administration of the intestate estate of Orlando B.
Catalan.

The facts are as follows:

Orlando B. Catalan was a naturalized American citizen. After allegedly obtaining a divorce in the United
States from his first wife, Felicitas Amor, he contracted a second marriage with petitioner herein.

On 18 November 2004, Orlando died intestate in the Philippines.

Thereafter, on 28 February 2005, petitioner filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City a
Petition for the issuance of letters of administration for her appointment as administratrix of the intestate
estate of Orlando. The case was docketed as Special Proceedings (Spec. Proc.) No. 228.

On 3 March 2005, while Spec. Proc. No. 228 was pending, respondent Louella A. Catalan-Lee, one of
the children of Orlando from his first marriage, filed a similar petition with the RTC docketed as Spec.
Proc. No. 232.

The two cases were subsequently consolidated.

Petitioner prayed for the dismissal of Spec. Proc. No. 232 on the ground of litis pendentia, considering
that Spec. Proc. No. 228 covering the same estate was already pending.

On the other hand, respondent alleged that petitioner was not considered an interested person qualified
to file a petition for the issuance of letters of administration of the estate of Orlando. In support of her
contention, respondent alleged that a criminal case for bigamy was filed against petitioner before
Branch 54 of the RTC of Alaminos, Pangasinan, and docketed as Crim. Case No. 2699-A.

Apparently, Felicitas Amor filed a Complaint for bigamy, alleging that petitioner contracted a second
marriage to Orlando despite having been married to one Eusebio Bristol on 12 December 1959.

On 6 August 1998, the RTC had acquitted petitioner of bigamy.3 The trial court ruled that since the
deceased was a divorced American citizen, and since that divorce was not recognized under Philippine
jurisdiction, the marriage between him and petitioner was not valid.
Furthermore, it took note of the action for declaration of nullity then pending action with the trial court in
Dagupan City filed by Felicitas Amor against the deceased and petitioner. It considered the pending
action to be a prejudicial question in determining the guilt of petitioner for the crime of bigamy.

Finally, the trial court found that, in the first place, petitioner had never been married to Eusebio Bristol.

On 26 June 2006, Branch 70 of the RTC of Burgos, Pangasinan dismissed the Petition for the issuance
of letters of administration filed by petitioner and granted that of private respondent. Contrary to its
findings in Crim. Case No. 2699-A, the RTC held that the marriage between petitioner and Eusebio
Bristol was valid and subsisting when she married Orlando. Without expounding, it reasoned further
that her acquittal in the previous bigamy case was fatal to her cause. Thus, the trial court held that
petitioner was not an interested party who may file a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration.4

After the subsequent denial of her Motion for Reconsideration, petitioner elevated the matter to the
Court of Appeals (CA) via her Petition for Certiorari, alleging grave abuse of discretion on the part of the
RTC in dismissing her Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.

Petitioner reiterated before the CA that the Petition filed by respondent should have been dismissed on
the ground of litis pendentia. She also insisted that, while a petition for letters of administration may
have been filed by an "uninterested person," the defect was cured by the appearance of a real party-in-
interest. Thus, she insisted that, to determine who has a better right to administer the decedent’s
properties, the RTC should have first required the parties to present their evidence before it ruled on
the matter.

On 18 October 2007, the CA promulgated the assailed Decision. First, it held that petitioner undertook
the wrong remedy. She should have instead filed a petition for review rather than a petition for
certiorari. Nevertheless, since the Petition for Certiorari was filed within the fifteen-day reglementary
period for filing a petition for review under Sec. 4 of Rule 43, the CA allowed the Petition and continued
to decide on the merits of the case. Thus, it ruled in this wise:

As to the issue of litis pendentia, we find it not applicable in the case. For litis pendentia to be a ground
for the dismissal of an action, there must be: (a) identity of the parties or at least such as to represent
the same interest in both actions; (b) identity of rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being
founded on the same acts, and (c) the identity in the two cases should be such that the judgment which
may be rendered in one would, regardless of which party is successful, amount to res judicata in the
other. A petition for letters of administration is a special proceeding. A special proceeding is an
application or proceeding to establish the status or right of a party, or a particular fact. And, in contrast
to an ordinary civil action, a special proceeding involves no defendant or respondent. The only party in
this kind of proceeding is the petitioner of the applicant. Considering its nature, a subsequent petition
for letters of administration can hardly be barred by a similar pending petition involving the estate of the
same decedent unless both petitions are filed by the same person. In the case at bar, the petitioner was
not a party to the petition filed by the private respondent, in the same manner that the latter was not
made a party to the petition filed by the former. The first element of litis pendentia is wanting. The
contention of the petitioner must perforce fail.

Moreover, to yield to the contention of the petitioner would render nugatory the provision of the Rules
requiring a petitioner for letters of administration to be an "interested party," inasmuch as any person,
for that matter, regardless of whether he has valid interest in the estate sought to be administered,
could be appointed as administrator for as long as he files his petition ahead of any other person, in
derogation of the rights of those specifically mentioned in the order of preference in the appointment of
administrator under Rule 78, Section 6 of the Revised Rules of Court, which provides:
 xxx xxx xxx

The petitioner, armed with a marriage certificate, filed her petition for letters of administration. As a
spouse, the petitioner would have been preferred to administer the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.
However, a marriage certificate, like any other public document, is only prima facie evidence of the
facts stated therein. The fact that the petitioner had been charged with bigamy and was acquitted
has not been disputed by the petitioner. Bigamy is an illegal marriage committed by contracting a
second or subsequent marriage before the first marriage has been dissolved or before the absent
spouse has been declared presumptively dead by a judgment rendered in a proper proceedings. The
deduction of the trial court that the acquittal of the petitioner in the said case negates the
validity of her subsequent marriage with Orlando B. Catalan has not been disproved by her.
There was not even an attempt from the petitioner to deny the findings of the trial court. There is
therefore no basis for us to make a contrary finding. Thus, not being an interested party and a stranger
to the estate of Orlando B. Catalan, the dismissal of her petition for letters of administration by the trial
court is in place.

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit. No pronouncement
as to costs.

SO ORDERED.5 (Emphasis supplied)

Petitioner moved for a reconsideration of this Decision.6 She alleged that the reasoning of the CA was
illogical in stating, on the one hand, that she was acquitted of bigamy, while, on the other hand, still
holding that her marriage with Orlando was invalid. She insists that with her acquittal of the crime of
bigamy, the marriage enjoys the presumption of validity.

On 20 June 2008, the CA denied her motion.

Hence, this Petition.

At the outset, it seems that the RTC in the special proceedings failed to appreciate the finding of the
RTC in Crim. Case No. 2699-A that petitioner was never married to Eusebio Bristol. Thus, the trial court
concluded that, because petitioner was acquitted of bigamy, it follows that the first marriage with Bristol
still existed and was valid. By failing to take note of the findings of fact on the nonexistence of the
marriage between petitioner and Bristol, both the RTC and CA held that petitioner was not an interested
party in the estate of Orlando.

Second, it is imperative to note that at the time the bigamy case in Crim. Case No. 2699-A was
dismissed, we had already ruled that under the principles of comity, our jurisdiction recognizes a valid
divorce obtained by a spouse of foreign nationality. This doctrine was established as early as 1985 in
Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.7 wherein we said:

It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces[,] the same being considered contrary to
our concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may
be recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this
case, the divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards
of American law, under which divorce dissolves the marriage. xxx

We reiterated this principle in Llorente v. Court of Appeals,8 to wit:

In Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr. we held that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the
Civil Code, only Philippine nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces, the same
being considered contrary to our concept of public policy and morality. In the same case, the Court
ruled that aliens may obtain divorces abroad, provided they are valid according to their national
law.

Citing this landmark case, the Court held in Quita v. Court of Appeals, that once proven that
respondent was no longer a Filipino citizen when he obtained the divorce from petitioner, the
ruling in Van Dorn would become applicable and petitioner could "very well lose her right to
inherit" from him.

In Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, we recognized the divorce obtained by the respondent in his country, the
Federal Republic of Germany. There, we stated that divorce and its legal effects may be
recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the nationality
principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

For failing to apply these doctrines, the decision of the Court of Appeals must be reversed. We hold
that the divorce obtained by Lorenzo H. Llorente from his first wife Paula was valid and
recognized in this jurisdiction as a matter of comity. xxx

Nonetheless, the fact of divorce must still first be proven as we have enunciated in Garcia v. Recio,9 to
wit:

Respondent is getting ahead of himself. Before a foreign judgment is given presumptive evidentiary
value, the document must first be presented and admitted in evidence. A divorce obtained abroad is
proven by the divorce decree itself. Indeed the best evidence of a judgment is the judgment itself. The
decree purports to be a written act or record of an act of an official body or tribunal of a foreign country.

Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, on the other hand, a writing or document may be proven as a
public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy thereof
attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the Philippines,
such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or consular officer
in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept and (b)
authenticated by the seal of his office.

The divorce decree between respondent and Editha Samson appears to be an authentic one issued by
an Australian family court. However, appearance is not sufficient; compliance with the aforementioned
rules on evidence must be demonstrated.

Fortunately for respondent's cause, when the divorce decree of May 18, 1989 was submitted in
evidence, counsel for petitioner objected, not to its admissibility, but only to the fact that it had not been
registered in the Local Civil Registry of Cabanatuan City. The trial court ruled that it was admissible,
subject to petitioner's qualification. Hence, it was admitted in evidence and accorded weight by the
judge. Indeed, petitioner's failure to object properly rendered the divorce decree admissible as a written
act of the Family Court of Sydney, Australia.

Compliance with the quoted articles (11, 13 and 52) of the Family Code is not necessary; respondent
was no longer bound by Philippine personal laws after he acquired Australian citizenship in 1992.
Naturalization is the legal act of adopting an alien and clothing him with the political and civil rights
belonging to a citizen. Naturalized citizens, freed from the protective cloak of their former states, don
the attires of their adoptive countries. By becoming an Australian, respondent severed his allegiance to
the Philippines and the vinculum juris that had tied him to Philippine personal laws.
Burden of Proving Australian Law

Respondent contends that the burden to prove Australian divorce law falls upon petitioner, because she
is the party challenging the validity of a foreign judgment. He contends that petitioner was satisfied with
the original of the divorce decree and was cognizant of the marital laws of Australia, because she had
lived and worked in that country for quite a long time. Besides, the Australian divorce law is allegedly
known by Philippine courts; thus, judges may take judicial notice of foreign laws in the exercise of
sound discretion.

We are not persuaded. The burden of proof lies with the "party who alleges the existence of a fact or
thing necessary in the prosecution or defense of an action." In civil cases, plaintiffs have the burden of
proving the material allegations of the complaint when those are denied by the answer; and defendants
have the burden of proving the material allegations in their answer when they introduce new matters.
Since the divorce was a defense raised by respondent, the burden of proving the pertinent Australian
law validating it falls squarely upon him.

It is well-settled in our jurisdiction that our courts cannot take judicial notice of foreign
laws.1âwphi1 Like any other facts, they must be alleged and proved. Australian marital laws are not
among those matters that judges are supposed to know by reason of their judicial function. The power
of judicial notice must be exercised with caution, and every reasonable doubt upon the subject should
be resolved in the negative. (Emphasis supplied)

It appears that the trial court no longer required petitioner to prove the validity of Orlando’s divorce
under the laws of the United States and the marriage between petitioner and the deceased. Thus, there
is a need to remand the proceedings to the trial court for further reception of evidence to establish the
fact of divorce.

Should petitioner prove the validity of the divorce and the subsequent marriage, she has the
preferential right to be issued the letters of administration over the estate. Otherwise, letters of
administration may be issued to respondent, who is undisputedly the daughter or next of kin of the
deceased, in accordance with Sec. 6 of Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court.

This is consistent with our ruling in San Luis v. San Luis,10 in which we said:

Applying the above doctrine in the instant case, the divorce decree allegedly obtained by Merry Lee
which absolutely allowed Felicisimo to remarry, would have vested Felicidad with the legal personality
to file the present petition as Felicisimo's surviving spouse. However, the records show that there is
insufficient evidence to prove the validity of the divorce obtained by Merry Lee as well as the
marriage of respondent and Felicisimo under the laws of the U.S.A. In Garcia v. Recio, the Court
laid down the specific guidelines for pleading and proving foreign law and divorce judgments. It held
that presentation solely of the divorce decree is insufficient and that proof of its authenticity and due
execution must be presented. Under Sections 24 and 25 of Rule 132, a writing or document may be
proven as a public or official record of a foreign country by either (1) an official publication or (2) a copy
thereof attested by the officer having legal custody of the document. If the record is not kept in the
Philippines, such copy must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by the proper diplomatic or
consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country in which the record is
kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.

With regard to respondent's marriage to Felicisimo allegedly solemnized in California, U.S.A., she
submitted photocopies of the Marriage Certificate and the annotated text of the Family Law Act of
California which purportedly show that their marriage was done in accordance with the said law. As
stated in Garcia, however, the Court cannot take judicial notice of foreign laws as they must be alleged
and proved.
Therefore, this case should be remanded to the trial court for further reception of evidence on
the divorce decree obtained by Merry Lee and the marriage of respondent and Felicisimo.
(Emphasis supplied)

Thus, it is imperative for the trial court to first determine the validity of the divorce to ascertain the
rightful party to be issued the letters of administration over the estate of Orlando B. Catalan.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is hereby PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Decision
dated 18 October 2007 and the Resolution dated 20 June 2008 of the Court of Appeals are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Let this case be REMANDED to Branch 70 of the Regional Trial
Court of Burgos, Pangasinan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 186571 August 11, 2010

GERBERT R. CORPUZ, Petitioner,

vs.
DAISYLYN TIROL STO. TOMAS and The SOLICITOR GENERAL, Respondents.

DECISION

BRION, J.:

Before the Court is a direct appeal from the decision1 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Laoag City,
Branch 11, elevated via a petition for review on certiorari2 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (present
petition).

Petitioner Gerbert R. Corpuz was a former Filipino citizen who acquired Canadian citizenship through
naturalization on November 29, 2000.3 On January 18, 2005, Gerbert married respondent Daisylyn T.
Sto. Tomas, a Filipina, in Pasig City.4 Due to work and other professional commitments, Gerbert left for
Canada soon after the wedding. He returned to the Philippines sometime in April 2005 to surprise
Daisylyn, but was shocked to discover that his wife was having an affair with another man. Hurt and
disappointed, Gerbert returned to Canada and filed a petition for divorce. The Superior Court of Justice,
Windsor, Ontario, Canada granted Gerbert’s petition for divorce on December 8, 2005. The divorce
decree took effect a month later, on January 8, 2006.5

Two years after the divorce, Gerbert has moved on and has found another Filipina to love. Desirous of
marrying his new Filipina fiancée in the Philippines, Gerbert went to the Pasig City Civil Registry Office
and registered the Canadian divorce decree on his and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate. Despite the
registration of the divorce decree, an official of the National Statistics Office (NSO) informed Gerbert
that the marriage between him and Daisylyn still subsists under Philippine law; to be enforceable, the
foreign divorce decree must first be judicially recognized by a competent Philippine court, pursuant to
NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982.6

Accordingly, Gerbert filed a petition for judicial recognition of foreign divorce and/or declaration of
marriage as dissolved (petition) with the RTC. Although summoned, Daisylyn did not file any
responsive pleading but submitted instead a notarized letter/manifestation to the trial court. She offered
no opposition to Gerbert’s petition and, in fact, alleged her desire to file a similar case herself but was
prevented by financial and personal circumstances. She, thus, requested that she be considered as a
party-in-interest with a similar prayer to Gerbert’s.
In its October 30, 2008 decision,7 the RTC denied Gerbert’s petition. The RTC concluded that Gerbert
was not the proper party to institute the action for judicial recognition of the foreign divorce decree as
he is a naturalized Canadian citizen. It ruled that only the Filipino spouse can avail of the remedy, under
the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code,8 in order for him or her to be able to remarry
under Philippine law.9 Article 26 of the Family Code reads:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

This conclusion, the RTC stated, is consistent with the legislative intent behind the enactment of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, as determined by the Court in Republic v. Orbecido
III;10 the provision was enacted to "avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino spouse remains
married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer married to the Filipino
spouse."11

THE PETITION

From the RTC’s ruling,12 Gerbert filed the present petition.13

Gerbert asserts that his petition before the RTC is essentially for declaratory relief, similar to that filed in
Orbecido; he, thus, similarly asks for a determination of his rights under the second paragraph of Article
26 of the Family Code. Taking into account the rationale behind the second paragraph of Article 26 of
the Family Code, he contends that the provision applies as well to the benefit of the alien spouse. He
claims that the RTC ruling unduly stretched the doctrine in Orbecido by limiting the standing to file the
petition only to the Filipino spouse – an interpretation he claims to be contrary to the essence of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code. He considers himself as a proper party, vested with
sufficient legal interest, to institute the case, as there is a possibility that he might be prosecuted for
bigamy if he marries his Filipina fiancée in the Philippines since two marriage certificates, involving him,
would be on file with the Civil Registry Office. The Office of the Solicitor General and Daisylyn, in their
respective Comments,14 both support Gerbert’s position.

Essentially, the petition raises the issue of whether the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family
Code extends to aliens the right to petition a court of this jurisdiction for the recognition of a foreign
divorce decree.

THE COURT’S RULING

The alien spouse can claim no right under the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code as the
substantive right it establishes is in favor of the Filipino spouse

The resolution of the issue requires a review of the legislative history and intent behind the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code.

The Family Code recognizes only two types of defective marriages – void15 and voidable16 marriages.
In both cases, the basis for the judicial declaration of absolute nullity or annulment of the marriage
exists before or at the time of the marriage. Divorce, on the other hand, contemplates the dissolution of
the lawful union for cause arising after the marriage.17 Our family laws do not recognize absolute
divorce between Filipino citizens.18

Recognizing the reality that divorce is a possibility in marriages between a Filipino and an alien,
President Corazon C. Aquino, in the exercise of her legislative powers under the Freedom
Constitution,19 enacted Executive Order No. (EO) 227, amending Article 26 of the Family Code to its
present wording, as follows:

Art. 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines, in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35(1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.

Through the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, EO 227 effectively incorporated into
the law this Court’s holding in Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.20 and Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera.21 In both cases, the
Court refused to acknowledge the alien spouse’s assertion of marital rights after a foreign court’s
divorce decree between the alien and the Filipino. The Court, thus, recognized that the foreign divorce
had already severed the marital bond between the spouses. The Court reasoned in Van Dorn v.
Romillo that:

To maintain x x x that, under our laws, [the Filipino spouse] has to be considered still married to [the
alien spouse] and still subject to a wife's obligations x x x cannot be just. [The Filipino spouse] should
not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to [the alien
spouse]. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own country if the ends of justice are to be served.22

As the RTC correctly stated, the provision was included in the law "to avoid the absurd situation where
the Filipino spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after obtaining a divorce, is no longer
married to the Filipino spouse."23 The legislative intent is for the benefit of the Filipino spouse, by
clarifying his or her marital status, settling the doubts created by the divorce decree. Essentially, the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provided the Filipino spouse a substantive right to
have his or her marriage to the alien spouse considered as dissolved, capacitating him or her to
remarry.24 Without the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code, the judicial recognition of the
foreign decree of divorce, whether in a proceeding instituted precisely for that purpose or as a related
issue in another proceeding, would be of no significance to the Filipino spouse since our laws do not
recognize divorce as a mode of severing the marital bond;25 Article 17 of the Civil Code provides that
the policy against absolute divorces cannot be subverted by judgments promulgated in a foreign
country. The inclusion of the second paragraph in Article 26 of the Family Code provides the direct
exception to this rule and serves as basis for recognizing the dissolution of the marriage between the
Filipino spouse and his or her alien spouse.

Additionally, an action based on the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code is not limited to
the recognition of the foreign divorce decree. If the court finds that the decree capacitated the alien
spouse to remarry, the courts can declare that the Filipino spouse is likewise capacitated to contract
another marriage. No court in this jurisdiction, however, can make a similar declaration for the alien
spouse (other than that already established by the decree), whose status and legal capacity are
generally governed by his national law.26

Given the rationale and intent behind the enactment, and the purpose of the second paragraph of
Article 26 of the Family Code, the RTC was correct in limiting the applicability of the provision for the
benefit of the Filipino spouse. In other words, only the Filipino spouse can invoke the second paragraph
of Article 26 of the Family Code; the alien spouse can claim no right under this provision.

The foreign divorce decree is presumptive evidence of a right that clothes the party with legal interest to
petition for its recognition in this jurisdiction

We qualify our above conclusion – i.e., that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
bestows no rights in favor of aliens – with the complementary statement that this conclusion is not
sufficient basis to dismiss Gerbert’s petition before the RTC. In other words, the unavailability of the
second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code to aliens does not necessarily strip Gerbert of legal
interest to petition the RTC for the recognition of his foreign divorce decree. The foreign divorce decree
itself, after its authenticity and conformity with the alien’s national law have been duly proven according
to our rules of evidence, serves as a presumptive evidence of right in favor of Gerbert, pursuant to
Section 48, Rule 39 of the Rules of Court which provides for the effect of foreign judgments. This
Section states:

SEC. 48. Effect of foreign judgments or final orders.—The effect of a judgment or final order of a
tribunal of a foreign country, having jurisdiction to render the judgment or final order is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment or final order upon a specific thing, the judgment or final order is
conclusive upon the title of the thing; and

(b) In case of a judgment or final order against a person, the judgment or final order is
presumptive evidence of a right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a
subsequent title.

In either case, the judgment or final order may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of
notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

To our mind, direct involvement or being the subject of the foreign judgment is sufficient to clothe a
party with the requisite interest to institute an action before our courts for the recognition of the foreign
judgment. In a divorce situation, we have declared, no less, that the divorce obtained by an alien
abroad may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the divorce is valid according to his or her
national law.27

The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country."28 This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien’s applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself.29 The recognition may be made in an action instituted
specifically for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral
aspect of his claim or defense.

In Gerbert’s case, since both the foreign divorce decree and the national law of the alien, recognizing
his or her capacity to obtain a divorce, purport to be official acts of a sovereign authority, Section 24,
Rule 132 of the Rules of Court comes into play. This Section requires proof, either by (1) official
publications or (2) copies attested by the officer having legal custody of the documents. If the copies of
official records are not kept in the Philippines, these must be (a) accompanied by a certificate issued by
the proper diplomatic or consular officer in the Philippine foreign service stationed in the foreign country
in which the record is kept and (b) authenticated by the seal of his office.
The records show that Gerbert attached to his petition a copy of the divorce decree, as well as the
required certificates proving its authenticity,30 but failed to include a copy of the Canadian law on
divorce.31 Under this situation, we can, at this point, simply dismiss the petition for insufficiency of
supporting evidence, unless we deem it more appropriate to remand the case to the RTC to determine
whether the divorce decree is consistent with the Canadian divorce law.

We deem it more appropriate to take this latter course of action, given the Article 26 interests that will
be served and the Filipina wife’s (Daisylyn’s) obvious conformity with the petition. A remand, at the
same time, will allow other interested parties to oppose the foreign judgment and overcome a
petitioner’s presumptive evidence of a right by proving want of jurisdiction, want of notice to a party,
collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact. Needless to state, every precaution must be taken to
ensure conformity with our laws before a recognition is made, as the foreign judgment, once
recognized, shall have the effect of res judicata32 between the parties, as provided in Section 48, Rule
39 of the Rules of Court.33

In fact, more than the principle of comity that is served by the practice of reciprocal recognition of
foreign judgments between nations, the res judicata effect of the foreign judgments of divorce serves as
the deeper basis for extending judicial recognition and for considering the alien spouse bound by its
terms. This same effect, as discussed above, will not obtain for the Filipino spouse were it not for the
substantive rule that the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code provides.

Considerations beyond the recognition of the foreign divorce decree

As a matter of "housekeeping" concern, we note that the Pasig City Civil Registry Office has already
recorded the divorce decree on Gerbert and Daisylyn’s marriage certificate based on the mere
presentation of the decree.34 We consider the recording to be legally improper; hence, the need to draw
attention of the bench and the bar to what had been done.

Article 407 of the Civil Code states that "[a]cts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of
persons shall be recorded in the civil register." The law requires the entry in the civil registry of judicial
decrees that produce legal consequences touching upon a person’s legal capacity and status, i.e.,
those affecting "all his personal qualities and relations, more or less permanent in nature, not ordinarily
terminable at his own will, such as his being legitimate or illegitimate, or his being married or not."35

A judgment of divorce is a judicial decree, although a foreign one, affecting a person’s legal capacity
and status that must be recorded. In fact, Act No. 3753 or the Law on Registry of Civil Status
specifically requires the registration of divorce decrees in the civil registry:

Sec. 1. Civil Register. – A civil register is established for recording the civil status of persons, in which
shall be entered:

(a) births;

(b) deaths;

(c) marriages;

(d) annulments of marriages;

(e) divorces;

(f) legitimations;
 (g) adoptions;

(h) acknowledgment of natural children;

(i) naturalization; and

(j) changes of name.

xxxx

Sec. 4. Civil Register Books. — The local registrars shall keep and preserve in their offices the
following books, in which they shall, respectively make the proper entries concerning the civil status of
persons:

(1) Birth and death register;

(2) Marriage register, in which shall be entered not only the marriages solemnized but also
divorces and dissolved marriages.

(3) Legitimation, acknowledgment, adoption, change of name and naturalization register.

But while the law requires the entry of the divorce decree in the civil registry, the law and the
submission of the decree by themselves do not ipso facto authorize the decree’s registration. The law
should be read in relation with the requirement of a judicial recognition of the foreign judgment before it
can be given res judicata effect. In the context of the present case, no judicial order as yet exists
recognizing the foreign divorce decree. Thus, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office acted totally out of
turn and without authority of law when it annotated the Canadian divorce decree on Gerbert and
Daisylyn’s marriage certificate, on the strength alone of the foreign decree presented by Gerbert.

Evidently, the Pasig City Civil Registry Office was aware of the requirement of a court recognition, as it
cited NSO Circular No. 4, series of 1982,36 and Department of Justice Opinion No. 181, series of
198237 – both of which required a final order from a competent Philippine court before a foreign
judgment, dissolving a marriage, can be registered in the civil registry, but it, nonetheless, allowed the
registration of the decree. For being contrary to law, the registration of the foreign divorce decree
without the requisite judicial recognition is patently void and cannot produce any legal effect.1avvphi1

Another point we wish to draw attention to is that the recognition that the RTC may extend to the
Canadian divorce decree does not, by itself, authorize the cancellation of the entry in the civil registry. A
petition for recognition of a foreign judgment is not the proper proceeding, contemplated under the
Rules of Court, for the cancellation of entries in the civil registry.

Article 412 of the Civil Code declares that "no entry in a civil register shall be changed or corrected,
without judicial order." The Rules of Court supplements Article 412 of the Civil Code by specifically
providing for a special remedial proceeding by which entries in the civil registry may be judicially
cancelled or corrected. Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets in detail the jurisdictional and procedural
requirements that must be complied with before a judgment, authorizing the cancellation or correction,
may be annotated in the civil registry. It also requires, among others, that the verified petition must be
filed with the RTC of the province where the corresponding civil registry is located; 38 that the civil
registrar and all persons who have or claim any interest must be made parties to the
proceedings;39 and that the time and place for hearing must be published in a newspaper of general
circulation.40 As these basic jurisdictional requirements have not been met in the present case, we
cannot consider the petition Gerbert filed with the RTC as one filed under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court.

We hasten to point out, however, that this ruling should not be construed as requiring two separate
proceedings for the registration of a foreign divorce decree in the civil registry – one for recognition of
the foreign decree and another specifically for cancellation of the entry under Rule 108 of the Rules of
Court. The recognition of the foreign divorce decree may be made in a Rule 108 proceeding itself, as
the object of special proceedings (such as that in Rule 108 of the Rules of Court) is precisely to
establish the status or right of a party or a particular fact. Moreover, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court can
serve as the appropriate adversarial proceeding41 by which the applicability of the foreign judgment can
be measured and tested in terms of jurisdictional infirmities, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud,
or clear mistake of law or fact.

WHEREFORE, we GRANT the petition for review on certiorari, and REVERSE the October 30, 2008
decision of the Regional Trial Court of Laoag City, Branch 11, as well as its February 17, 2009 order.
We order the REMAND of the case to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance with our
ruling above. Let a copy of this Decision be furnished the Civil Registrar General. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 155635 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondents.

x-------------------------------------------x

G.R. No. 163979 November 7, 2008

MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT, petitioner,

vs.
VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, respondent.

DECISION

VELASCO, JR., J.:

The Case

Before us are these two petitions interposed by petitioner Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot impugning
certain issuances handed out by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

In the first, a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 65 and docketed as G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca assails
and seeks to nullify the April 30, 2002 Resolution2 of the CA, as reiterated in another Resolution of
September 2, 2002,3 granting a writ of preliminary injunction in favor of private respondent Vicente
Madrigal Bayot staving off the trial court's grant of support pendente lite to Rebecca.

The second, a petition for review under Rule 45,4 docketed G.R. No. 163979, assails the March 25,
2004 Decision5 of the CA, (1) dismissing Civil Case No. 01-094, a suit for declaration of absolute nullity
of marriage with application for support commenced by Rebecca against Vicente before the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) in Muntinlupa City; and (2) setting aside certain orders and a resolution issued by the
RTC in the said case.

Per its Resolution of August 11, 2004, the Court ordered the consolidation of both cases.

The Facts

Vicente and Rebecca were married on April 20, 1979 in Sanctuario de San Jose, Greenhills,
Mandaluyong City. On its face, the Marriage Certificate6 identified Rebecca, then 26 years old, to be an
American citizen7 born in Agaña, Guam, USA to Cesar Tanchiong Makapugay, American, and Helen
Corn Makapugay, American.

On November 27, 1982 in San Francisco, California, Rebecca gave birth to Marie Josephine Alexandra
or Alix. From then on, Vicente and Rebecca's marital relationship seemed to have soured as the latter,
sometime in 1996, initiated divorce proceedings in the Dominican Republic. Before the Court of the
First Instance of the Judicial District of Santo Domingo, Rebecca personally appeared, while Vicente
was duly represented by counsel. On February 22, 1996, the Dominican court issued Civil Decree No.
362/96,8 ordering the dissolution of the couple's marriage and "leaving them to remarry after completing
the legal requirements," but giving them joint custody and guardianship over Alix. Over a year later, the
same court would issue Civil Decree No. 406/97,9 settling the couple's property relations pursuant to
an Agreement10 they executed on December 14, 1996. Said agreement specifically stated that the
"conjugal property which they acquired during their marriage consist[s] only of the real property and all
the improvements and personal properties therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Alabang,
Muntinlupa."11

Meanwhile, on March 14, 1996, or less than a month from the issuance of Civil Decree No. 362/96,
Rebecca filed with the Makati City RTC a petition12 dated January 26, 1996, with attachments, for
declaration of nullity of marriage, docketed as Civil Case No. 96-378. Rebecca, however, later
moved13 and secured approval14 of the motion to withdraw the petition.

On May 29, 1996, Rebecca executed an Affidavit of Acknowledgment15 stating under oath that she is
an American citizen; that, since 1993, she and Vicente have been living separately; and that she is
carrying a child not of Vicente.

On March 21, 2001, Rebecca filed another petition, this time before the Muntinlupa City RTC, for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage16 on the ground of Vicente's alleged psychological incapacity.
Docketed as Civil Case No. 01-094 and entitled as Maria Rebecca Makapugay Bayot v. Vicente
Madrigal Bayot, the petition was eventually raffled to Branch 256 of the court. In it, Rebecca also
sought the dissolution of the conjugal partnership of gains with application for support pendente lite for
her and Alix. Rebecca also prayed that Vicente be ordered to pay a permanent monthly support for
their daughter Alix in the amount of PhP 220,000.

On June 8, 2001, Vicente filed a Motion to Dismiss17 on, inter alia, the grounds of lack of cause of
action and that the petition is barred by the prior judgment of divorce. Earlier, on June 5, 2001,
Rebecca filed and moved for the allowance of her application for support pendente lite.

To the motion to dismiss, Rebecca interposed an opposition, insisting on her Filipino citizenship, as
affirmed by the Department of Justice (DOJ), and that, therefore, there is no valid divorce to speak of.

Meanwhile, Vicente, who had in the interim contracted another marriage, and Rebecca commenced
several criminal complaints against each other. Specifically, Vicente filed adultery and perjury
complaints against Rebecca. Rebecca, on the other hand, charged Vicente with bigamy and
concubinage.
 Ruling of the RTC on the Motion to Dismiss
and Motion for Support Pendente Lite

On August 8, 2001, the RTC issued an Order18 denying Vicente's motion to dismiss Civil Case No. 01-
094 and granting Rebecca's application for support pendente lite, disposing as follows:

Wherefore, premises considered, the Motion to Dismiss filed by the respondent is DENIED.
Petitioner's Application in Support of the Motion for Support Pendente Lite is hereby GRANTED.
Respondent is hereby ordered to remit the amount of TWO HUNDRED AND TWENTY
THOUSAND PESOS (Php 220,000.00) a month to Petitioner as support for the duration of the
proceedings relative to the instant Petition.

SO ORDERED.19

The RTC declared, among other things, that the divorce judgment invoked by Vicente as bar to the
petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage is a matter of defense best taken up during actual
trial. As to the grant of support pendente lite, the trial court held that a mere allegation of adultery
against Rebecca does not operate to preclude her from receiving legal support.

Following the denial20 of his motion for reconsideration of the above August 8, 2001 RTC order, Vicente
went to the CA on a petition for certiorari, with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
(TRO) and/or writ of preliminary injunction.21 His petition was docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 68187.

Grant of Writ of Preliminary Injunction by the CA

On January 9, 2002, the CA issued the desired TRO.22 On April 30, 2002, the appellate court granted,
via a Resolution, the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction, the decretal portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, pending final resolution of the petition at bar, let the Writ
of Preliminary Injunction be ISSUED in this case, enjoining the respondent court from
implementing the assailed Omnibus Order dated August 8, 2001 and the Order dated
November 20, 2001, and from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 01-094, upon
the posting of an injunction bond in the amount of P250,000.00.

SO ORDERED.23

Rebecca moved24 but was denied reconsideration of the aforementioned April 30, 2002 resolution. In
the meantime, on May 20, 2002, the preliminary injunctive writ25 was issued. Rebecca also moved for
reconsideration of this issuance, but the CA, by Resolution dated September 2, 2002, denied her
motion.

The adverted CA resolutions of April 30, 2002 and September 2, 2002 are presently being assailed in
Rebecca's petition for certiorari, docketed under G.R. No. 155635.

Ruling of the CA

Pending resolution of G.R. No. 155635, the CA, by a Decision dated March 25, 2004, effectively
dismissed Civil Case No. 01-094, and set aside incidental orders the RTC issued in relation to the case.
The fallo of the presently assailed CA Decision reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The Omnibus Order dated August 8,
2001 and the Order dated November 20, 2001 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one
 entered DISMISSING Civil Case No. 01-094, for failure to state a cause of action. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.26

To the CA, the RTC ought to have granted Vicente's motion to dismiss on the basis of the following
premises:

(1) As held in China Road and Bridge Corporation v. Court of Appeals, the hypothetical-admission rule
applies in determining whether a complaint or petition states a cause of action.27 Applying said rule in
the light of the essential elements of a cause of action,28 Rebecca had no cause of action against
Vicente for declaration of nullity of marriage.

(2) Rebecca no longer had a legal right in this jurisdiction to have her marriage with Vicente declared
void, the union having previously been dissolved on February 22, 1996 by the foreign divorce decree
she personally secured as an American citizen. Pursuant to the second paragraph of Article 26 of the
Family Code, such divorce restored Vicente's capacity to contract another marriage.

(3) Rebecca's contention about the nullity of a divorce, she being a Filipino citizen at the time the
foreign divorce decree was rendered, was dubious. Her allegation as to her alleged Filipino citizenship
was also doubtful as it was not shown that her father, at the time of her birth, was still a Filipino citizen.
The Certification of Birth of Rebecca issued by the Government of Guam also did not indicate the
nationality of her father.

(4) Rebecca was estopped from denying her American citizenship, having professed to have that
nationality status and having made representations to that effect during momentous events of her life,
such as: (a) during her marriage; (b) when she applied for divorce; and (c) when she applied for and
eventually secured an American passport on January 18, 1995, or a little over a year before she
initiated the first but later withdrawn petition for nullity of her marriage (Civil Case No. 96-378) on March
14, 1996.

(5) Assuming that she had dual citizenship, being born of a purportedly Filipino father in Guam, USA
which follows the jus soli principle, Rebecca's representation and assertion about being an American
citizen when she secured her foreign divorce precluded her from denying her citizenship and impugning
the validity of the divorce.

Rebecca seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration of the above Decision, but this recourse was
denied in the equally assailed June 4, 2004 Resolution.29 Hence, Rebecca's Petition for Review on
Certiorari under Rule 45, docketed under G.R. No. 163979.

The Issues

In G.R. No. 155635, Rebecca raises four (4) assignments of errors as grounds for the allowance of her
petition, all of which converged on the proposition that the CA erred in enjoining the implementation of
the RTC's orders which would have entitled her to support pending final resolution of Civil Case No. 01-
094.

In G.R. No. 163979, Rebecca urges the reversal of the assailed CA decision submitting as follows:

I
 THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT MENTIONING AND NOT TAKING
INTO CONSIDERATION IN ITS APPRECIATION OF THE FACTS THE FACT OF
PETITIONER'S FILIPINO CITIZENSHIP AS CATEGORICALLY STATED AND ALLEGED IN
HER PETITION BEFORE THE COURT A QUO.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RELYING ONLY ON ANNEXES TO THE

PETITION IN RESOLVING THE MATTERS BROUGHT BEFORE IT.

III

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN FAILING TO CONSIDER THAT

RESPONDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM CLAIMING THAT HIS MARRIAGE TO PETITIONER
HAD ALREADY BEEN DISSOLVED BY VIRTUE OF HIS SUBSEQUENT AND CONCURRENT
ACTS.

IV

THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN RULING THAT THERE WAS ABUSE OF
DISCRETION ON THE PART OF THE TRIAL COURT, MUCH LESS A GRAVE ABUSE.30

We shall first address the petition in G.R. No. 163979, its outcome being determinative of the success
or failure of the petition in G.R. No. 155635.

Three legal premises need to be underscored at the outset. First, a divorce obtained abroad by an alien
married to a Philippine national may be recognized in the Philippines, provided the decree of divorce is
valid according to the national law of the foreigner.31 Second, the reckoning point is not the citizenship
of the divorcing parties at birth or at the time of marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce
is obtained abroad. And third, an absolute divorce secured by a Filipino married to another Filipino is
contrary to our concept of public policy and morality and shall not be recognized in this jurisdiction.32

Given the foregoing perspective, the determinative issue tendered in G.R. No. 155635, i.e., the
propriety of the granting of the motion to dismiss by the appellate court, resolves itself into the
questions of: first, whether petitioner Rebecca was a Filipino citizen at the time the divorce judgment
was rendered in the Dominican Republic on February 22, 1996; and second, whether the judgment of
divorce is valid and, if so, what are its consequent legal effects?

The Court's Ruling

The petition is bereft of merit.

Rebecca an American Citizen in the Purview of This Case

There can be no serious dispute that Rebecca, at the time she applied for and obtained her divorce
from Vicente, was an American citizen and remains to be one, absent proof of an effective repudiation
of such citizenship. The following are compelling circumstances indicative of her American citizenship:
(1) she was born in Agaña, Guam, USA; (2) the principle of jus soli is followed in this American territory
granting American citizenship to those who are born there; and (3) she was, and may still be, a holder
of an American passport.33
And as aptly found by the CA, Rebecca had consistently professed, asserted, and represented herself
as an American citizen, particularly: (1) during her marriage as shown in the marriage certificate; (2) in
the birth certificate of Alix; and (3) when she secured the divorce from the Dominican Republic. Mention
may be made of the Affidavit of Acknowledgment34 in which she stated being an American citizen.

It is true that Rebecca had been issued by the Bureau of Immigration (Bureau) of Identification (ID)
Certificate No. RC 9778 and a Philippine Passport. On its face, ID Certificate No. RC 9778 would tend
to show that she has indeed been recognized as a Filipino citizen. It cannot be over-emphasized,
however, that such recognition was given only on June 8, 2000 upon the affirmation by the Secretary of
Justice of Rebecca's recognition pursuant to the Order of Recognition issued by Bureau Associate
Commissioner Edgar L. Mendoza.

For clarity, we reproduce in full the contents of ID Certificate No. RC 9778:

To Whom It May Concern:

This is to certify that *MARIA REBECCA MAKAPUGAY BAYOT* whose photograph and
thumbprints are affixed hereto and partially covered by the seal of this Office, and whose other
particulars are as follows:

Place of Birth: Guam, USA Date of Birth: March 5, 1953

Sex: female Civil Status: married Color of Hair: brown

Color of Eyes: brown Distinguishing marks on face: none

was - r e c o g n i z e d - as a citizen of the Philippines as per pursuant to Article IV, Section 1,

Paragraph 3 of the 1935 Constitution per order of Recognition JBL 95-213 signed by Associate
Commissioner Jose B. Lopez dated October 6, 1995, and duly affirmed by Secretary of Justice
Artemio G. Tuquero in his 1st Indorsement dated June 8, 2000.

Issued for identification purposes only. NOT VALID for travel purposes.

Given under my hand and seal this 11th day of October, 1995

(SGD) EDGAR L. MENDOZA

ASSO. COMMISSIONER

Official Receipt No. 5939988

issued at Manila
dated Oct. 10, 1995 for P 2,000

From the text of ID Certificate No. RC 9778, the following material facts and dates may be deduced: (1)
Bureau Associate Commissioner Jose B. Lopez issued the Order of Recognition on October 6, 1995;
(2) the 1st Indorsement of Secretary of Justice Artemio G. Tuquero affirming Rebecca's recognition as a
Filipino citizen was issued on June 8, 2000 or almost five years from the date of the order of
recognition; and (3) ID Certificate No. RC 9778 was purportedly issued on October 11, 1995 after the
payment of the PhP 2,000 fee on October 10, 1995 per OR No. 5939988.

What begs the question is, however, how the above certificate could have been issued by the Bureau
on October 11, 1995 when the Secretary of Justice issued the required affirmation only on June 8,
2000. No explanation was given for this patent aberration. There seems to be no error with the date of
the issuance of the 1st Indorsement by Secretary of Justice Tuquero as this Court takes judicial notice
that he was the Secretary of Justice from February 16, 2000 to January 22, 2001. There is, thus, a
strong valid reason to conclude that the certificate in question must be spurious.

Under extant immigration rules, applications for recognition of Filipino citizenship require the affirmation
by the DOJ of the Order of Recognition issued by the Bureau. Under Executive Order No. 292, also
known as the 1987 Administrative Code, specifically in its Title III, Chapter 1, Sec. 3(6), it is the DOJ
which is tasked to "provide immigration and naturalization regulatory services and implement the laws
governing citizenship and the admission and stay of aliens." Thus, the confirmation by the DOJ of
any Order of Recognition for Filipino citizenship issued by the Bureau is required.

Pertinently, Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-00235 on Recognition as a Filipino Citizen clearly
provides:

The Bureau [of Immigration] through its Records Section shall automatically furnish the
Department of Justice an official copy of its Order of Recognition within 72 days from its date of
approval by the way of indorsement for confirmation of the Order by the Secretary of Justice
pursuant to Executive Order No. 292. No Identification Certificate shall be issued before the
date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice and any Identification Certificate issued by
the Bureau pursuant to an Order of Recognition shall prominently indicate thereon the date of
confirmation by the Secretary of Justice. (Emphasis ours.)

Not lost on the Court is the acquisition by Rebecca of her Philippine passport only on June 13, 2000, or
five days after then Secretary of Justice Tuquero issued the 1st Indorsement confirming the order of
recognition. It may be too much to attribute to coincidence this unusual sequence of close events
which, to us, clearly suggests that prior to said affirmation or confirmation, Rebecca was not yet
recognized as a Filipino citizen. The same sequence would also imply that ID Certificate No. RC 9778
could not have been issued in 1995, as Bureau Law Instruction No. RBR-99-002 mandates that no
identification certificate shall be issued before the date of confirmation by the Secretary of Justice.
Logically, therefore, the affirmation or confirmation of Rebecca's recognition as a Filipino citizen
through the 1st Indorsement issued only on June 8, 2000 by Secretary of Justice Tuquero corresponds
to the eventual issuance of Rebecca's passport a few days later, or on June 13, 2000 to be exact.

When Divorce Was Granted Rebecca, She Was not a

Filipino Citizen and Was not Yet Recognized as One

The Court can assume hypothetically that Rebecca is now a Filipino citizen. But from the foregoing
disquisition, it is indubitable that Rebecca did not have that status of, or at least was not yet recognized
as, a Filipino citizen when she secured the February 22, 1996 judgment of divorce from the Dominican
Republic.

The Court notes and at this juncture wishes to point out that Rebecca voluntarily withdrew her original
petition for declaration of nullity (Civil Case No. 96-378 of the Makati City RTC) obviously because she
could not show proof of her alleged Filipino citizenship then. In fact, a perusal of that petition shows
that, while bearing the date January 26, 1996, it was only filed with the RTC on March 14, 1996 or less
than a month after Rebecca secured, on February 22, 1996, the foreign divorce decree in question.
Consequently, there was no mention about said divorce in the petition. Significantly, the only
documents appended as annexes to said original petition were: the Vicente-Rebecca Marriage Contract
(Annex "A") and Birth Certificate of Alix (Annex "B"). If indeed ID Certificate No. RC 9778 from the
Bureau was truly issued on October 11, 1995, is it not but logical to expect that this piece of document
be appended to form part of the petition, the question of her citizenship being crucial to her case?
As may be noted, the petition for declaration of absolute nullity of marriage under Civil Case No. 01-
094, like the withdrawn first petition, also did not have the ID Certificate from the Bureau as attachment.
What were attached consisted of the following material documents: Marriage Contract (Annex "A") and
Divorce Decree. It was only through her Opposition (To Respondent's Motion to Dismiss dated 31 May
2001)36 did Rebecca attach as Annex "C" ID Certificate No. RC 9778.

At any rate, the CA was correct in holding that the RTC had sufficient basis to dismiss the petition for
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage as said petition, taken together with Vicente's motion to
dismiss and Rebecca's opposition to motion, with their respective attachments, clearly made out a case
of lack of cause of action, which we will expound later.

Validity of Divorce Decree

Going to the second core issue, we find Civil Decree Nos. 362/96 and 406/97 valid.

First, at the time of the divorce, as above elucidated, Rebecca was still to be recognized, assuming for
argument that she was in fact later recognized, as a Filipino citizen, but represented herself in public
documents as an American citizen. At the very least, she chose, before, during, and shortly after her
divorce, her American citizenship to govern her marital relationship. Second, she secured personally
said divorce as an American citizen, as is evident in the text of the Civil Decrees, which pertinently
declared:

IN THIS ACTION FOR DIVORCE in which the parties expressly submit to the jurisdiction of this
court, by reason of the existing incompatibility of temperaments x x x. The parties MARIA
REBECCA M. BAYOT, of United States nationality, 42 years of age, married, domiciled and
residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Philippines, x x x, who personally
appeared before this court, accompanied by DR. JUAN ESTEBAN OLIVERO, attorney, x x x
and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT, of Philippine nationality, of 43 years of age, married and
domiciled and residing at 502 Acacia Ave., Ayala Alabang, Muntin Lupa, Filipino, appeared
before this court represented by DR. ALEJANDRO TORRENS, attorney, x x x, revalidated by
special power of attorney given the 19th of February of 1996, signed before the Notary Public
Enrico L. Espanol of the City of Manila, duly legalized and authorizing him to subscribe all the
acts concerning this case.37 (Emphasis ours.)

Third, being an American citizen, Rebecca was bound by the national laws of the United States of
America, a country which allows divorce. Fourth, the property relations of Vicente and Rebecca were
properly adjudicated through their Agreement38 executed on December 14, 1996 after Civil Decree No.
362/96 was rendered on February 22, 1996, and duly affirmed by Civil Decree No. 406/97 issued on
March 4, 1997. Veritably, the foreign divorce secured by Rebecca was valid.

To be sure, the Court has taken stock of the holding in Garcia v. Recio that a foreign divorce can be
recognized here, provided the divorce decree is proven as a fact and as valid under the national law of
the alien spouse.39 Be this as it may, the fact that Rebecca was clearly an American citizen when she
secured the divorce and that divorce is recognized and allowed in any of the States of the Union,40 the
presentation of a copy of foreign divorce decree duly authenticated by the foreign court issuing said
decree is, as here, sufficient.

It bears to stress that the existence of the divorce decree has not been denied, but in fact admitted by
both parties. And neither did they impeach the jurisdiction of the divorce court nor challenge the validity
of its proceedings on the ground of collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of fact or law, albeit both appeared
to have the opportunity to do so. The same holds true with respect to the decree of partition of their
conjugal property. As this Court explained in Roehr v. Rodriguez:
 Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment [of divorce] x x x, it
must be shown that the parties opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to
do so on grounds allowed under Rule 39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39,
Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments.--The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign

country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title
to the thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a

right as between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but
the judgment may be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the
party, collusion, fraud, or clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for
the court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of
Court clearly provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in
rem, a foreign judgment |merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of
a party and, as such, is subject to proof to the contrary.41

As the records show, Rebecca, assisted by counsel, personally secured the foreign divorce while
Vicente was duly represented by his counsel, a certain Dr. Alejandro Torrens, in said proceedings. As
things stand, the foreign divorce decrees rendered and issued by the Dominican Republic court are
valid and, consequently, bind both Rebecca and Vicente.

Finally, the fact that Rebecca may have been duly recognized as a Filipino citizen by force of the June
8, 2000 affirmation by Secretary of Justice Tuquero of the October 6, 1995 Bureau Order of
Recognition will not, standing alone, work to nullify or invalidate the foreign divorce secured by
Rebecca as an American citizen on February 22, 1996. For as we stressed at the outset, in determining
whether or not a divorce secured abroad would come within the pale of the country's policy against
absolute divorce, the reckoning point is the citizenship of the parties at the time a valid divorce is
obtained.42

Legal Effects of the Valid Divorce

Given the validity and efficacy of divorce secured by Rebecca, the same shall be given a res
judicata effect in this jurisdiction. As an obvious result of the divorce decree obtained, the
marital vinculum between Rebecca and Vicente is considered severed; they are both freed from the
bond of matrimony. In plain language, Vicente and Rebecca are no longer husband and wife to each
other. As the divorce court formally pronounced: "[T]hat the marriage between MARIA REBECCA M.
BAYOT and VICENTE MADRIGAL BAYOT is hereby dissolved x x x leaving them free to remarry
after completing the legal requirements."43

Consequent to the dissolution of the marriage, Vicente could no longer be subject to a husband's
obligation under the Civil Code. He cannot, for instance, be obliged to live with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to Rebecca.44

The divorce decree in question also brings into play the second paragraph of Art. 26 of the Family
Code, providing as follows:
 Art. 26. x x x x

Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce
is thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the
Filipino spouse shall likewise have capacity to remarry under Philippine law. (As amended by
E.O. 227)

In Republic v. Orbecido III, we spelled out the twin elements for the applicability of the second
paragraph of Art. 26, thus:

x x x [W]e state the twin elements for the application of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 as follows:

1. There is a valid marriage that has been celebrated between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner;
and

2. A valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry.

The reckoning point is not the citizenship of the parties at the time of the celebration of the
marriage, but their citizenship at the time a valid divorce is obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating the latter to remarry.45

Both elements obtain in the instant case. We need not belabor further the fact of marriage of Vicente
and Rebecca, their citizenship when they wed, and their professed citizenship during the valid divorce
proceedings.

Not to be overlooked of course is the fact that Civil Decree No. 406/97 and the Agreement executed on
December 14, 1996 bind both Rebecca and Vicente as regards their property relations. The Agreement
provided that the ex-couple's conjugal property consisted only their family home, thus:

9. That the parties stipulate that the conjugal property which they acquired during their
marriage consists only of the real property and all the improvements and personal properties
therein contained at 502 Acacia Avenue, Ayala Alabang, Muntinlupa, covered by TCT No.
168301 dated Feb. 7, 1990 issued by the Register of Deeds of Makati, Metro Manila registered
in the name of Vicente M. Bayot, married to Rebecca M. Bayot, x x x.46 (Emphasis ours.)

This property settlement embodied in the Agreement was affirmed by the divorce court which, per its
second divorce decree, Civil Decree No. 406/97 dated March 4, 1997, ordered that, "THIRD: That the
agreement entered into between the parties dated 14th day of December 1996 in Makati City,
Philippines shall survive in this Judgment of divorce by reference but not merged and that the parties
are hereby ordered and directed to comply with each and every provision of said agreement."47

Rebecca has not repudiated the property settlement contained in the Agreement. She is thus estopped
by her representation before the divorce court from asserting that her and Vicente's conjugal property
was not limited to their family home in Ayala Alabang.48

No Cause of Action in the Petition for Nullity of Marriage

Upon the foregoing disquisitions, it is abundantly clear to the Court that Rebecca lacks, under the
premises, cause of action. Philippine Bank of Communications v. Trazo explains the concept and
elements of a cause of action, thus:
 A cause of action is an act or omission of one party in violation of the legal right of the other. A
motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action hypothetically admits the truth of the
allegations in the complaint. The allegations in a complaint are sufficient to constitute a cause of
action against the defendants if, hypothetically admitting the facts alleged, the court can render
a valid judgment upon the same in accordance with the prayer therein. A cause of action exists
if the following elements are present, namely: (1) a right in favor of the plaintiff by whatever
means and under whatever law it arises or is created; (2) an obligation on the part of the named
defendant to respect or not to violate such right; and (3) an act or omission on the part of such
defendant violative of the right of the plaintiff or constituting a breach of the obligation of the
defendant to the plaintiff for which the latter may maintain an action for recovery of damages.49

One thing is clear from a perusal of Rebecca's underlying petition before the RTC, Vicente's motion to
dismiss and Rebecca's opposition thereof, with the documentary evidence attached therein: The
petitioner lacks a cause of action for declaration of nullity of marriage, a suit which presupposes the
existence of a marriage.

To sustain a motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action, the movant must show that the claim for relief
does not exist rather than that a claim has been defectively stated or is ambiguous, indefinite, or
uncertain.50 With the valid foreign divorce secured by Rebecca, there is no more marital tie binding her
to Vicente. There is in fine no more marriage to be dissolved or nullified.

The Court to be sure does not lose sight of the legal obligation of Vicente and Rebecca to support the
needs of their daughter, Alix. The records do not clearly show how he had discharged his duty, albeit
Rebecca alleged that the support given had been insufficient. At any rate, we do note that Alix, having
been born on November 27, 1982, reached the majority age on November 27, 2000, or four months
before her mother initiated her petition for declaration of nullity. She would now be 26 years old. Hence,
the issue of back support, which allegedly had been partly shouldered by Rebecca, is best litigated in a
separate civil action for reimbursement. In this way, the actual figure for the support of Alix can be
proved as well as the earning capacity of both Vicente and Rebecca. The trial court can thus determine
what Vicente owes, if any, considering that support includes provisions until the child concerned shall
have finished her education.

Upon the foregoing considerations, the Court no longer need to delve into the issue tendered in G.R.
No. 155635, that is, Rebecca's right to support pendente lite. As it were, her entitlement to that kind of
support hinges on the tenability of her petition under Civil Case No. 01-094 for declaration of nullity of
marriage. The dismissal of Civil Case No. 01-094 by the CA veritably removed any legal anchorage for,
and effectively mooted, the claim for support pendente lite.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari in G.R. No. 155635 is hereby DISMISSED on the ground of
mootness, while the petition for review in G.R. No. 163979 is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Accordingly, the March 25, 2004 Decision and June 4, 2004 Resolution of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
68187 are hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 142820 June 20, 2003

WOLFGANG O. ROEHR, petitioner,

vs.
MARIA CARMEN D. RODRIGUEZ, HON. JUDGE JOSEFINA GUEVARA-SALONGA, Presiding
Judge of Makati RTC, Branch 149, respondents.

QUISUMBING, J.:
At the core of the present controversy are issues of (a) grave abuse of discretion allegedly committed
by public respondent and (b) lack of jurisdiction of the regional trial court, in matters that spring from a
divorce decree obtained abroad by petitioner.

In this special civil action for certiorari, petitioner assails (a) the order1 dated September 30, 1999 of
public respondent Judge Josefina Guevara-Salonga, Presiding Judge of Makati Regional Trial
Court,2 Branch 149, in Civil Case No. 96-1389 for declaration of nullity of marriage, and (b) the
order3 dated March 31, 2000 denying his motion for reconsideration. The assailed orders partially set
aside the trial court’s order dismissing Civil Case No. 96-1389, for the purpose of resolving issues
relating to the property settlement of the spouses and the custody of their children.

Petitioner Wolfgang O. Roehr, a German citizen and resident of Germany, married private respondent
Carmen Rodriguez, a Filipina, on December 11, 1980 in Hamburg, Germany. Their marriage was
subsequently ratified on February 14, 1981 in Tayasan, Negros Oriental.4 Out of their union were born
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine on November 18, 1981 and October 25, 1987, respectively.

On August 28, 1996, private respondent filed a petition5 for declaration of nullity of marriage before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati City. On February 6, 1997, petitioner filed a motion to
dismiss,6 but it was denied by the trial court in its order7 dated May 28, 1997.

On June 5, 1997, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration, but was also denied in an order8 dated
August 13, 1997. On September 5, 1997, petitioner filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of
Appeals. On November 27, 1998, the appellate court denied the petition and remanded the case to the
RTC.

Meanwhile, petitioner obtained a decree of divorce from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg-
Blankenese, promulgated on December 16, 1997.

The decree provides in part:

[T]he Court of First Instance, Hamburg-Blankenese, Branch 513, has ruled through Judge van
Buiren of the Court of First Instance on the basis of the oral proceedings held on 4 Nov. 1997:

The marriage of the Parties contracted on 11 December 1980 before the Civil Registrar of
Hamburg-Altona is hereby dissolved.

The parental custody for the children

Carolynne Roehr, born 18 November 1981

Alexandra Kristine Roehr, born on 25 October 1987

is granted to the father.

The litigation expenses shall be assumed by the Parties.9

In view of said decree, petitioner filed a Second Motion to Dismiss on May 20, 1999 on the ground that
the trial court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the action or suit as a decree of divorce had
already been promulgated dissolving the marriage of petitioner and private respondent.

On July 14, 1999, Judge Guevara-Salonga issued an order granting petitioner’s motion to dismiss.
Private respondent filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration, with a prayer that the case proceed for
the purpose of determining the issues of custody of children and the distribution of the properties
between petitioner and private respondent.

On August 18, 1999, an Opposition to the Motion for Partial Reconsideration was filed by the petitioner
on the ground that there is nothing to be done anymore in the instant case as the marital tie between
petitioner Wolfgang Roehr and respondent Ma. Carmen D. Rodriguez had already been severed by the
decree of divorce promulgated by the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany on December 16,
1997 and in view of the fact that said decree of divorce had already been recognized by the RTC in its
order of July 14, 1999, through the implementation of the mandate of Article 26 of the Family
Code,10 endowing the petitioner with the capacity to remarry under the Philippine law.

On September 30, 1999, respondent judge issued the assailed order partially setting aside her order
dated July 14, 1999 for the purpose of tackling the issues of property relations of the spouses as well
as support and custody of their children. The pertinent portion of said order provides:

Acting on the Motion for Partial Reconsideration of the Order dated July 14, 1999 filed by
petitioner thru counsel which was opposed by respondent and considering that the second
paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code was included as an amendment thru Executive
Order 227, to avoid the absurd situation of a Filipino as being still married to his or her alien
spouse though the latter is no longer married to the Filipino spouse because he/she had
obtained a divorce abroad which is recognized by his/her national law, and considering further
the effects of the termination of the marriage under Article 43 in relation to Article 50 and 52 of
the same Code, which include the dissolution of the property relations of the spouses, and the
support and custody of their children, the Order dismissing this case is partially set aside with
respect to these matters which may be ventilated in this Court.

SO ORDERED.11 (Emphasis supplied.)

Petitioner filed a timely motion for reconsideration on October 19, 1999, which was denied by
respondent judge in an order dated March 31, 2000.12

Petitioner ascribes lack of jurisdiction of the trial court and grave abuse of discretion on the part of
respondent judge. He cites as grounds for his petition the following:

1. Partially setting aside the order dated July 14, 1999 dismissing the instant case is not allowed
by 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.13

2. Respondent Maria Carmen Rodriguez by her motion for Partial Reconsideration had
recognized and admitted the Divorce Decision obtained by her ex-husband in Hamburg,
Germany.14

3. There is nothing left to be tackled by the Honorable Court as there are no conjugal assets
alleged in the Petition for Annulment of Marriage and in the Divorce petition, and the custody of
the children had already been awarded to Petitioner Wolfgang Roehr.15

Pertinent in this case before us are the following issues:

1. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing her order dated
September 30, 1999, which partially modified her order dated July 14, 1999; and
 2. Whether or not respondent judge gravely abused her discretion when she assumed and
retained jurisdiction over the present case despite the fact that petitioner has already obtained a
divorce decree from a German court.

On the first issue, petitioner asserts that the assailed order of respondent judge is completely
inconsistent with her previous order and is contrary to Section 3, Rule 16, Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides:

Sec. 3. Resolution of motion - After the hearing, the court may dismiss the action or claim, deny
the motion, or order the amendment of the pleading.

The court shall not defer the resolution of the motion for the reason that the ground relied upon
is not indubitable.

In every case, the resolution shall state clearly and distinctly the reasons therefor. (Emphasis
supplied.)

Petitioner avers that a court’s action on a motion is limited to dismissing the action or claim, denying the
motion, or ordering the amendment of the pleading.

Private respondent, on her part, argues that the RTC can validly reconsider its order dated July 14,
1999 because it had not yet attained finality, given the timely filing of respondent’s motion for
reconsideration.

Pertinent to this issue is Section 3 in relation to Section 7, Rule 37 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure,
which provides:

Sec. 3. Action upon motion for new trial or reconsideration.—The trial court may set aside the
judgment or final order and grant a new trial, upon such terms as may be just, or may deny the
motion. If the court finds that excessive damages have been awarded or that the judgment or
final order is contrary to the evidence or law, it may amend such judgment or final order
accordingly.

Sec. 7. Partial new trial or reconsideration.—If the grounds for a motion under this Rule appear
to the court to affect the issues as to only a part, or less than all of the matters in controversy, or
only one, or less than all, of the parties to it, the court may order a new trial or grant
reconsideration as to such issues if severable without interfering with the judgment or final order
upon the rest. (Emphasis supplied.)

It is clear from the foregoing rules that a judge can order a partial reconsideration of a case that has not
yet attained finality. Considering that private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration within the
reglementary period, the trial court's decision of July 14, 1999 can still be modified. Moreover,
in Sañado v. Court of Appeals,16 we held that the court could modify or alter a judgment even after the
same has become executory whenever circumstances transpire rendering its decision unjust and
inequitable, as where certain facts and circumstances justifying or requiring such modification or
alteration transpired after the judgment has become final and executory17 and when it becomes
imperative in the higher interest of justice or when supervening events warrant it.18 In our view, there
are even more compelling reasons to do so when, as in this case, judgment has not yet attained finality.

Anent the second issue, petitioner claims that respondent judge committed grave abuse of discretion
when she partially set aside her order dated July 14, 1999, despite the fact that petitioner has already
obtained a divorce decree from the Court of First Instance of Hamburg, Germany.
In Garcia v. Recio,19 Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.,20 and Llorente v. Court of Appeals,21 we consistently held
that a divorce obtained abroad by an alien may be recognized in our jurisdiction, provided such decree
is valid according to the national law of the foreigner. Relevant to the present case is Pilapil v. Ibay-
Somera,22 where this Court specifically recognized the validity of a divorce obtained by a German
citizen in his country, the Federal Republic of Germany. We held in Pilapil that a foreign divorce and its
legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines insofar as respondent is concerned in view of the
nationality principle in our civil law on the status of persons.

In this case, the divorce decree issued by the German court dated December 16, 1997 has not been
challenged by either of the parties. In fact, save for the issue of parental custody, even the trial court
recognized said decree to be valid and binding, thereby endowing private respondent the capacity to
remarry. Thus, the present controversy mainly relates to the award of the custody of their two children,
Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine, to petitioner.

As a general rule, divorce decrees obtained by foreigners in other countries are recognizable in our
jurisdiction, but the legal effects thereof, e.g. on custody, care and support of the children, must still be
determined by our courts.23 Before our courts can give the effect of res judicata to a foreign judgment,
such as the award of custody to petitioner by the German court, it must be shown that the parties
opposed to the judgment had been given ample opportunity to do so on grounds allowed under Rule
39, Section 50 of the Rules of Court (now Rule 39, Section 48, 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure), to wit:

SEC. 50. Effect of foreign judgments. - The effect of a judgment of a tribunal of a foreign
country, having jurisdiction to pronounce the judgment is as follows:

(a) In case of a judgment upon a specific thing, the judgment is conclusive upon the title to the
thing;

(b) In case of a judgment against a person, the judgment is presumptive evidence of a right as
between the parties and their successors in interest by a subsequent title; but the judgment may
be repelled by evidence of a want of jurisdiction, want of notice to the party, collusion, fraud, or
clear mistake of law or fact.

It is essential that there should be an opportunity to challenge the foreign judgment, in order for the
court in this jurisdiction to properly determine its efficacy. In this jurisdiction, our Rules of Court clearly
provide that with respect to actions in personam, as distinguished from actions in rem, a foreign
judgment merely constitutes prima facie evidence of the justness of the claim of a party and, as such, is
subject to proof to the contrary.24

In the present case, it cannot be said that private respondent was given the opportunity to challenge the
judgment of the German court so that there is basis for declaring that judgment as res judicata with
regard to the rights of petitioner to have parental custody of their two children. The proceedings in the
German court were summary. As to what was the extent of private respondent’s participation in the
proceedings in the German court, the records remain unclear. The divorce decree itself states that
neither has she commented on the proceedings25 nor has she given her opinion to the Social Services
Office.26 Unlike petitioner who was represented by two lawyers, private respondent had no counsel to
assist her in said proceedings.27 More importantly, the divorce judgment was issued to petitioner by
virtue of the German Civil Code provision to the effect that when a couple lived separately for three
years, the marriage is deemed irrefutably dissolved. The decree did not touch on the issue as to who
the offending spouse was. Absent any finding that private respondent is unfit to obtain custody of the
children, the trial court was correct in setting the issue for hearing to determine the issue of parental
custody, care, support and education mindful of the best interests of the children. This is in consonance
with the provision in the Child and Youth Welfare Code that the child’s welfare is always the paramount
consideration in all questions concerning his care and custody. 28
On the matter of property relations, petitioner asserts that public respondent exceeded the bounds of
her jurisdiction when she claimed cognizance of the issue concerning property relations between
petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent herself has admitted in Par. 14 of her petition for
declaration of nullity of marriage dated August 26, 1996 filed with the RTC of Makati, subject of this
case, that: "[p]etitioner and respondent have not acquired any conjugal or community property nor have
they incurred any debts during their marriage."29 Herein petitioner did not contest this averment. Basic
is the rule that a court shall grant relief warranted by the allegations and the proof.30 Given the factual
admission by the parties in their pleadings that there is no property to be accounted for, respondent
judge has no basis to assert jurisdiction in this case to resolve a matter no longer deemed in
controversy.

In sum, we find that respondent judge may proceed to determine the issue regarding the custody of the
two children born of the union between petitioner and private respondent. Private respondent erred,
however, in claiming cognizance to settle the matter of property relations of the parties, which is not at
issue.

WHEREFORE, the orders of the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 149, issued on September 30,
1999 and March 31, 2000 are AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. We hereby declare that the trial court
has jurisdiction over the issue between the parties as to who has parental custody, including the care,
support and education of the children, namely Carolynne and Alexandra Kristine Roehr. Let the records
of this case be remanded promptly to the trial court for continuation of appropriate proceedings. No
pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.