People v Bongcarawan
106 came and told ADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE AGAINST
Facts: That on or about March 13, 1999, in
the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
said accused, without authority of law, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, custody
and control eight (8) packs of
Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a
regulated drug commonly known as Shabu,
weighing approximately 400 grams, without
the corresponding license or prescription.
The accused testified and proffered his own
version. On March 11, 1999, at about
10:00 p.m., he was in Quiapo, Manila where
he met Alican "Alex" Macapudi, a neighbor
who has a store in Marawi City. He was
requested by Macapudi to bring a Samsonite
suitcase containing sunglasses and watches
to Iligan City, and to give it to Macapudi's
brother at the Iligan port. He boarded the
M/V Super Ferry 5 on the same night,
carrying a big luggage full of clothes, a
small luggage or "maleta" containing the
sunglasses and brushes he bought from
Manila, and the Samsonite suitcase of
Macapudi. 11 He stayed at cabin no. 106. At
about 4:00 a.m. of March 13,
1999, as the vessel was about to dock at the
Iligan port, he took his baggage and
positioned himself at the economy section to
be able to disembark ahead of the other
passengers. There, he met a friend, Ansari
Ambor. While they were conversing, five
(5) members of the vessel security force and
a woman whom he recognized as his co-
passenger at cabin no.
him that he was suspected of stealing
jewelry. He voluntarily went with the group
back to cabin no. 106 where he was frisked.
Subsequently, he was asked to get his
baggage, so he went back to the economy
section and took the big luggage and
Macapudi's Samsonite suitcase. He left the
small "maleta" containing sunglasses and
brushes for fear that they would be
confiscated by the security personnel. When
requested, he voluntarily opened the big
luggage, but refused to do the same to the
Samsonite suitcase which he claimed was
not his and had a secret combination lock.
The security personnel forcibly opened the
suitcase and found packs of white crystalline
substance inside which they suspected to be
"shabu ." They took pictures of him with the
merchandise, and asked him to sign a turn
over receipt which was later given to the
Philippine Coast Guard, then to the
PAOCTF.
Hence, this appeal where the accused raises
the errors
Issue: THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN
SO HOLDING THAT THE DRUG
CONFISCATED IS ADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE AGAINST THE
ACCUSED/APPELLANT.
THE COURT A QUO ERRED IN SO
HOLDING THAT THE APPELLANT
OWNED THE CONFISCATED
EVIDENCE AND THEREFORE
HIM."
Ruling: The petition is denied.
On the first assignment of error, the
accused-appellant contends that the
Samsonite suitcase containing the
methamphetamine hydrochloride or "shabu"
was forcibly opened and searched without
his consent, and hence, in violation of his
constitutional right against unreasonable
search and seizure. Any evidence acquired
pursuant to such unlawful search and
seizure, he claims, is inadmissible in
evidence against him. He also contends that
People v. Marti 15 is not applicable in this
case because a vessel security personnel is
deemed to perform the duties of a
policeman.
The right against unreasonable search and
seizure is a fundamental right protected by
the Constitution. 16 Evidence acquired in
violation of this right shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding. 17
Whenever this right is challenged, an
individual may choose between invoking the
constitutional protection or waiving his right
by giving consent to the search and seizure.
It should be stressed, however, that
protection is against transgression
committed by the government or its agent.
As held by this Court in the case of People
v. Marti , 18 "[i]n the absence of
governmental interference, liberties
guaranteed by the Constitution cannot be
invoked against the State."The constitutional
1
proscription against unlawful searches and
seizures applies as a restraint directed only
against the government and its agencies
tasked with the enforcement of the law.
Thus, it could only be invoked against the
State to whom the restraint against arbitrary
and unreasonable exercise of power is
imposed.
In the case before us, the baggage of the
accused-appellant was searched by the
vessel security personnel. It was only after
they found "shabu " inside the suitcase that
they called the Philippine Coast Guard for
assistance. The search and seizure of the
suitcase and the contraband items was
therefore carried out without government
intervention, and hence, the constitutional
protection against unreasonable search and
seizure does not apply.
There is no merit in the contention of the
accused-appellant that the search and seizure
performed by the vessel security personnel
should be considered as one conducted by
the police authorities for like the latter, the
former are armed and tasked to maintain
peace and order. The vessel security officer
in the case at bar is a private employee and
does not discharge any governmental
function. In contrast, police officers are
agents of the state tasked with the sovereign
function of enforcement of the law.
Historically and until now, it is against them
and other agents of the state that the
protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures may be invoked.
People v Chua
Facts: That on or about the 3rd day of
October 1998, in the City of Manila,
Philippines, the said accused without being
authorized by law to possess or use any
regulated drug, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully, knowingly and jointly have in
their possession and under their custody and
control the following, to wit:
A sealed plastic bag containing two three
four point five (234.5) grams of white
crystalline substance;
*Four (4) separate sealed plastic bags
containing six point two two four three
(6.2243) grams of white crystalline
substance;
*Sixteen (16) separate sealed plastic bags
containing twenty point three six seven three
(20.3673) grams of white crystalline
substance; or a total of 261.0916 grams, and;
*An improvised tooter with traces of
crystalline substance known as "SHABU"
containing methamphetamine hydrochloride,
a regulated drug, without the corresponding
license or prescription thereof. Contrary to
law
During the enforcement of the warrant, there
were three (3) persons inside the apartment,
namely, appellants Tiu Won and Qui Yaling,
and a housemaid. The search was conducted
on the sala and in the three (3) bedrooms of
Unit 4-B. On top of a table inside the
master's bedroom, one (1) big pack,
containing 234.5 grams of shabu, was found
inside a black leather man's handbag
supposedly owned by Tiu Won, while
sixteen (16) small packs of shabu weighing
20.3673 grams were found inside a lady's
handbag allegedly owned by Qui Yaling.
Also contained in the inventory were the
following items: an improvised tooter, a
weighing scale, animprovised burner and
one rolled tissue paper. 5 The authorities
also searched a Honda Civic car bearing
Plate No. WCP 157, parked along
Masangkay Street, registered in the name of
the wife of Tiu Won and found four (4)
plastic bags containing 6.2243 grams of
shabu , which were likewise confiscated. A
gun in the possession of Tiu Won was also
seized and made subject of a separate
criminal case
The defense presented appellants Tiu Won
and Qui Yaling. They denied that Timothy
Tiu and Tiu Won Chua are one and the same
person. They presented papers and
documents to prove that appellant is Tiu
Won Chua and not Timothy Tiu, as stated in
the search warrant. Tiu Won also claimed
that he does not live in the apartment subject
of the search warrant, alleging that he is
married to a certain Emily Tan and is a
resident of No. 864 Alvarado St., Binondo,
Manila. Nonetheless, he admitted that his
co-appellant, Qui Yaling, is his mistress
with whom he has two children. Qui Yaling
admitted being the occupant of the
apartment, but alleged that she only
occupied one room, while two other persons,
a certain Lim and a certain Uy, occupied the
other rooms. Both appellants denied that
2
they were engaged in the sale or possession
of shabu . They asserted that they are in the
jewelry business and that at the time the
search and arrest were made, the third
person, whom the prosecution identified as a
housemaid, was actually a certain Chin, who
was there to look at some of the pieces of
jewelry sold by Tiu Won. They also denied
that a gun was found in the possession of
Tiu Won
Issue: W/N there is legality of the search
warrant and the search and arrest conducted
pursuant thereto, and the correctness of the
judgment of conviction imposed by the
RTC.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
There are only four requisites for a valid
warrant, i .e,: (1) it must be issued upon
"probable cause"; (2) probable cause must
be determined personally by the judge; (3)
such judge must examine under oath or
affirmation the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce; and (4) the
warrant must particularly describe the place
to be searched and the persons or things to
be seized.
As correctly argued by the Solicitor General,
a mistake in the name of the person to be
searched does not invalidate the warrant,
especially since in this case, the authorities
had personal knowledge of the drug-related
activities of the accused. In fact, a "John
Doe" warrant satisfies the requirements so
long as it contains a descriptio personae
such as will enable the officer to identify the
accused. We have also held that a mistake in
the identification of the owner of the place
does not invalidate the warrant provided the
place to be searched is properly described
Thus, even if the search warrant used by the
police authorities did not contain the correct
name of Tiu Won or the name of Qui
Yaling, that defect did not invalidate it
because the place to be searched was
described properly. Besides, the authorities
conducted surveillance and a test-buy
operation before obtaining the search
warrant and subsequently implementing it.
They can therefore be presumed to have
personal knowledge of the identity of the
persons and the place to be searched
although they may not have specifically
known the names of the accused. Armed
with the warrant, a valid search of Unit 4-B
was conducted
We affirm, however, the illegality of the
search conducted on the car, on the ground
that it was not part of the description of the
place to be searched mentioned in the
warrant. It is mandatory that for the search
to be valid, it must be directed at the place
particularly described in the warrant. 12
Moreover, the search of the car was not
incidental to a lawful arrest. To be valid,
such warrantless search must be limited to
that point within the reach or control of the
person arrested, or that which may furnish
him with the means of committing violence
or of escaping. In this case, appellants were
arrested inside the apartment, whereas the
car was parked a few meters away from the
building
In his testimony, Tiu Won admitted
ownership of the man's handbag where
234.5 grams of shabu were found.
Qui Yaling, in her appellant's brief, denied
owning the handbag where 20.3673 grams
of shabu were discovered. However, during
her testimony, she admitted its ownership
An admission is an act or declaration of a
party as to the existence of a relevant fact
which may be used in evidence against him.
19 These admissions, provided they are
voluntary, can be used against appellants
because it is fair to presume that they
correspond with the truth, and it is their fault
if they do not.
Qui Yaling likewise argues that the lower
court erred in attributing ownership of the
handbag to her considering that there was
another girl present at the apartment during
the search. She contends that since the
prosecution was not able to establish the
ownership of the bag, then such could have
also been owned by Chin.
We do not subscribe to this argument. The
defense failed to bring Chin to court,
although during the course of the
presentation of their evidence, they
manifested their intention to present her
3
testimony. Furthermore, a visitor does not
normally leave her bag lying anywhere,
much more in the master's bedroom. Being
the occupant of the apartment, it is more
logical to presume that the handbag belongs
to Qui Yaling. The failure of the prosecution
to present the bags and proofs that the bags
belong to the appellants is immaterial
because the bags, the license of Tiu Won
found inside the man's handbag and the
passport of Qui Yaling found inside the
ladies' handbag are not illegal. Having no
relation to the use or possession of shabu ,
the authorities could not confiscate them for
they did not have the authority to do so since
the warrant authorized them to seize only
articles in relation to the illegal possession
of shabu . Not within their control, they
could not have been presented in court
People v Del Norte
Facts: Before us is an appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Caloocan City, Branch 28, finding appellant
Priscilla del Norte guilty of th e crime of
illegal possession of drugs
SPO1 Lumabas testified that on August 1,
1997, their group was tasked to serve a
search warrant against a certain Ising
Gutierrez Diwa residing at No. 275 North
Service Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong
Barrio, Caloocan City, for alleged violation
of Republic Act No. 6425. They were
ordered to "forthwith seize and take
possession of an undetermined quantity of
shabu and marijuana leaves." They
coordinated with the barangay officials and
proceeded to the house pointed out to them
by the local officials. Upon reaching the
house, its door was opened by a woman.
SPO3 De Leon introduced themselves as
policemen to the woman who opened the
door, whom they later identified in court as
the appellant. 4 They informed her they had
a search warrant, but appellant suddenly
closed and locked the door. It was only after
some prodding by the barangay officials that
she reopened the door. The authorities then
conducted the search. They found a bundle
of marijuana wrapped in Manila paper under
the bed and inside the room. They asked
appellant who owned the marijuana. She
cried and said she had no means of
livelihood. Appellant was brought to the
police headquarters for further investigation.
Both SPO1 Lumabas and SPO3 De Leon
identified the confiscated five (5) bundles of
marijuana in court.
Appellant assailed the validity of the search
warrant against her. She contended that she
lived at 376 Dama de Noche, Barangay
Baesa, Caloocan City, 13 and that on August
1, 1997, she was merely visiting a friend,
Marlyn, who lived at 275 North Service
Road corner Cruzada St., Bagong Barrio,
Caloocan City. She went to Marlyn's house
to borrow money. Marlyn was out and she
waited. While appellant was seated near the
door, several people introduced themselves
as policemen, made her sign a white paper
and entered the house. She heard them say
"we already got Ising," and was surprised
why they suddenly arrested her. She saw
Ising, her sister, at a house two steps away
from the house where she was arrested.
Despite her claim that she was not Ising, the
policemen brought her to the police station
Appellant contends that the prosecution
failed to establish who owned the house
where the search was conducted, and avers
that her mere presence therein did not
automatically make her the owner of the
marijuana found therein. She likewise
argues that the search warrant specified the
name of Ising Gutierrez as the owner of the
house to be searched, and that since she is
not Ising Gutierrez, the lower court erred in
admitting the confiscated drugs as evidence
against her.
The Solicitor General contends that "the
totality of the evidence demonstrates
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt."
19 He cites the case of United States vs.
Gan Lian Po , 20 that when illegal drugs are
found in the premises occupied by a certain
person, such person is presumed to be in
possession of the prohibited articles. It then
becomes the accused's burden to prove the
absence of animus possidendi
Ruling: The petition is granted.
Appellant argues that the marijuana seized
as a result of the search is inadmissible due
to the irregularity of the search warrant
which contained the name Ising Gutierrez
Diwa and not Priscilla del Norte. She alleges
4
that Ising is her sister. During her arrest, she
claimed she saw Ising nearby and pointed
her to the authorities, but her efforts were
futile — the authorities arrested her.
The Constitution requires search warrants to
particularly describe not only the place to be
searched, but also the persons to be arrested.
We have ruled in rare instances that
mistakes in the name of the person subject
of the search warrant do not invalidate the
warrant, provided the place to be searched is
properly described. In People v. Tiu Won
Chua , we upheld the validity of the search
warrant despite the mistake in the name of
the persons to be searched. In the cited case,
the authorities conducted surveillance and a
test-buy operation before obtaining the
search warrant and subsequently
implementing it. They had personal
knowledge of the identity of the persons and
the place to be searched although they did
not specifically know the names of the
accused.
The case at bar is different. We cannot
countenance the irregularity of the search
warrant. The authorities did not have
personal knowledge of the circumstances
surrounding the search. They did not
conduct surveillance before obtaining the
warrant. It was only when they implemented
the warrant that they coordinated with the
barangay officials. One of the barangay
officials informed SPO3 De Leon that Ising
Gutierrez Diwa and Priscilla Del Norte are
one and the same person, but said barangay
official was not presented in court. The
authorities based their knowledge on pure
hearsay.
On the merits, we believe the prosecution
failed to discharge its burden of proving
appellant's guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
The prosecution's witnesses failed to
establish appellant's ownership of the house
where the prohibited drugs were discovered.
Except for their bare testimonies, no other
proof was presented.
This is in contrast to appellant's proof of her
residence. The prosecution did not contest
the punong barangay's certification, 24
Christina's school ID 25 and the rental
receipt, 26 all of which show that appellant
and her family live at 376 Dama de Noche
St. There being no substantial contrary
evidence offered, we conclude that appellant
does not own the house subject of the
search.
The prosecution likewise failed to prove that
appellant was in actual possession of the
prohibited articles at the time of her arrest.
In fact, it seems that the authorities had
difficulty looking for the drugs which were
not in plain view
In all criminal cases, it is appellant's
constitutional right to be presumed innocent
until the contrary is proved beyond
reasonable doubt. 30 In the case at bar, we
hold that the prosecution's evidence treads
on shaky ground. We detest drug addiction
in our society. However, we have the duty to
protect appellant where the evidence
presented show "insufficient factual nexus"
of her participation in the commission of the
offense charged.
Microsoft Corp. v Maxicorp Inc.
Facts: On 25 July 1996, National Bureau of
Investigation ("NBI") Agent Dominador
Samiano, Jr. ("NBI Agent Samiano") filed
several applications for search warrants in
the RTC against Maxicorp for alleged
violation of Section 29 of PD 49 and Article
189 of the RPC. After conducting a
preliminary examination of the applicant
and his witnesses, Judge William M.
Bayhon issued Search Warrants Nos. 96-
451, 96-452, 96-453 and 96-454, all dated
25 July 1996, against Maxicorp
Armed with the search warrants, NBI agents
conducted on 25 July 1996 a search of
Maxicorp's premises and seized property
fitting the description stated in the search
warrants
On 2 September 1996, Maxicorp filed a
motion to quash the search warrants alleging
that there was no probable cause for their
issuance and that the warrants are in the
form of "general warrants." The RTC denied
Maxicorp's motion on 22 January 1997. The
RTC also denied Maxicorp's motion for
reconsideration.
The RTC found probable cause to issue the
search warrants after examining NBI
5
Agent Samiano, John Benedict Sacriz
("Sacriz"), and computer technician
Felixberto Pante ("Pante"). The three
testified on what they discovered during
their respective visits to Maxicorp. NBI
Agent Samiano also presented certifications
from petitioners that they have not
authorized Maxicorp to perform the
witnessed activities using petitioners'
products.
On 24 July 1997, Maxicorp filed a petition
for certiorari with the Court of Appeals
seeking to set aside the RTC's order. On 23
December 1998, the Court of Appeals
reversed the RTC's order denying
Maxicorp's motion to quash the search
warrants. Petitioners moved for
reconsideration. The Court of Appeals
denied petitioners' motion on 29 November
1999. The Court of Appeals held that NBI
Agent Samiano failed to present during the
preliminary examination conclusive
evidence that Maxicorp produced or sold the
counterfeit products. The Court of Appeals
pointed out that the sales receipt NBI Agent
Samiano presented as evidence that he
bought the products from Maxicorp was in
the name of a certain "Joel Diaz."
Issue:
WHETHER THERE WAS PROBABLE
CAUSE TO ISSUE THE SEARCH
WARRANTS;
WHETHER THE SEARCH WARRANTS
ARE "GENERAL WARRANTS.
Ruling: The petition is granted.
On Whether there was Probable Cause to
Issue the Search Warrants
Petitioners argue that the Court of Appeals
erred in reversing the RTC based on the fact
that the sales receipt was not in the name of
NBI Agent Samiano. Petitioners point out
that the Court of Appeals disregarded the
overwhelming evidence that the RTC
considered in determining the existence of
probable cause. Maxicorp counters that the
Court of Appeals did not err in reversing the
RTC. Maxicorp maintains that the entire
preliminary examination that the RTC
conducted was defective.
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on
two factual findings of the RTC. First, the
fact that the sales receipt presented by NBI
Agent Samiano as proof that he bought
counterfeit goods from Maxicorp was in the
name of a certain "Joel Diaz." Second, the
fact that petitioners' other witness, John
Benedict Sacriz, admitted that he did not
buy counterfeit goods from Maxicorp.
We rule that the Court of Appeals erred in
reversing the RTC's findings
Probable cause means "such reasons,
supported by facts and circumstances as will
warrant a cautious man in the belief that his
action and the means taken in prosecuting it
are legally just and proper."Thus, probable
cause for a search warrant requires such
facts and circumstances that would lead a
reasonably prudent man to believe that an
offense has been committed and the objects
sought in connection with that offense are in
the place to be searched.
The judge determining probable cause must
do so only after personally examining under
oath the complainant and his witnesses. The
oath required must refer to "the truth of the
facts within the personal knowledge of the
petitioner or his witnesses, because the
purpose thereof is to convince the
committing magistrate, not the individual
making the affidavit and seeking the
issuance of the warrant, of the existence of
probable cause." The applicant must have
personal knowledge of the circumstances.
"Reliable information" is insufficient. Mere
affidavits are not enough, and the judge
must depose in writing the complainant and
his witnesses
The offense charged against Maxicorp is
copyright infringement under Section 29 of
PD 49 and unfair competition under Article
189 of the RPC. To support these charges,
petitioners presented the testimonies of NBI
Agent Samiano, computer technician Pante,
and Sacriz, a civilian. The offenses that
petitioners charged Maxicorp contemplate
several overt acts. The sale of counterfeit
products is but one of these acts. Both NBI
Agent Samiano and Sacriz related to the
RTC how they personally saw Maxicorp
commit acts of infringement and unfair
competition.
6
During the preliminary examination, the
RTC subjected the testimonies of the
witnesses to the requisite examination. NBI
Agent Samiano testified that he saw
Maxicorp display and offer for sale
counterfeit software in its premises. He also
saw how the counterfeit software were
produced and packaged within Maxicorp's
premises. NBI Agent Samiano categorically
stated that he was certain the products were
counterfeit because Maxicorp sold them to
its customers without giving the
accompanying ownership manuals, license
agreements and certificates of authenticity.
Sacriz testified that during his visits to
Maxicorp, he witnessed several instances
when Maxicorp installed petitioners'
software into computers it had assembled.
Sacriz also testified that he saw the sale of
petitioners' software within Maxicorp's
premises. Petitioners never authorized
Maxicorp to install or sell their software.
The testimonies of these two witnesses,
coupled with the object and documentary
evidence they presented, are sufficient to
establish the existence of probable cause.
From what they have witnessed, there is
reason to believe that Maxicorp engaged
in copyright infringement and unfair
competition to the prejudice of petitioners.
The determination of probable cause does
not call for the application of rules and
standards of proof that a judgment of
conviction requires after trial on the merits.
As implied by the words themselves,
"probable cause" is concerned with
probability, not absolute or even moral
certainty. The prosecution need not present
at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt.
The standards of judgment are those of a
reasonably prudent man, 24 not the exacting
calibrations of a judge after a fullblown trial.
No law or rule states that probable cause
requires a specific kind of evidence. No
formula or fixed rule for its determination
exists. Probable cause is determined in the
light of conditions obtaining in a given
situation. 26 Thus, it was improper for the
Court of Appeals to reverse the RTC's
findings simply because the sales receipt
evidencing NBI Agent Samiano's purchase
of counterfeit goods is not in his name
For purposes of determining probable cause,
the sales receipt is not the only proof that the
sale of petitioners' software occurred.
During the search warrant application
proceedings, NBI Agent Samiano presented
to the judge the computer unit that he
purchased from Maxicorp, in which
computer unit Maxicorp had preinstalled
petitioners' software. Sacriz, who was
present when NBI Agent Samiano
purchased the computer unit, affirmed that
NBI Agent Samiano purchased the computer
unit. Pante, the computer technician,
demonstrated to the judge the presence of
petitioners' software on the same computer
unit. There was a comparison between
petitioners' genuine software and Maxicorp's
software preinstalled in the computer unit
that NBI Agent Sambiano purchased. Even
if we disregard the sales receipt issued in the
name of "Joel Diaz," which petitioners
explained was the alias NBI Agent Samiano
used in the operation, there still remains
more than sufficient evidence to establish
probable cause for the issuance of the search
warrants.
This also applies to the Court of Appeals'
ruling on Sacriz's testimony. The fact that
Sacriz did not actually purchase counterfeit
software from Maxicorp does not eliminate
the existence of probable cause. Copyright
infringement and unfair competition are not
limited to the act of selling counterfeit
goods. They cover a whole range of acts,
from copying, assembling, packaging to
marketing, including the mere offering for
sale of the counterfeit goods. The clear and
firm testimonies of petitioners' witnesses on
such other acts stand untarnished. The
Constitution and the Rules of Court only
require that the judge examine personally
and thoroughly the applicant for the warrant
and his witnesses to determine probable
cause. The RTC complied adequately with
the requirement of the Constitution and the
Rules of Court.
Probable cause is dependent largely on the
opinion and findings of the judge who
conducted the examination and who had the
opportunity to question the applicant
and his witnesses. 31 For this reason, the
findings of the judge deserve great weight.
7
The reviewing court should overturn such
findings only upon proof that the judge
disregarded the facts before him or ignored
the clear dictates of reason. Nothing in the
records of the preliminary examination
proceedings reveal any impropriety on the
part of the judge in this case.
On Whether the Search Warrants are in the
Nature of General Warrants
A search warrant must state particularly the
place to be searched and the objects to be
seized. The evident purpose for this
requirement is to limit the articles to be
seized only to those particularly described in
the search warrant. This is a protection
against potential abuse. It is necessary to
leave the officers of the law with no
discretion regarding what articles they shall
seize, to the end that no unreasonable
searches and seizures be committed.
In addition, under Section 4, Rule 126 of the
Rules of Criminal Procedure, a search
warrant shall issue "in connection with one
specific offense." The articles described
must bear a direct relation to the offense for
which the warrant is issued. 34 Thus, this
rule requires that the warrant must state that
the articles subject of the search and seizure
are used or intended for use in the
commission of a specific offense.
After examining the wording of the warrants
issued, the Court of Appeals ruled in favor
of Maxicorp and reversed the RTC's Order
The Court of Appeals based its reversal on
its perceived infirmity of paragraph (e) of
the search warrants the RTC issued. The
appellate court found that similarly worded
warrants, all of which noticeably employ the
phrase "used or intended to be used," were
previously held void by this Court.
It is only required that a search warrant be
specific as far as the circumstances will
ordinarily allow. The description of the
property to be seized need not be technically
accurate or precise. The nature of the
description should vary according to
whether the identity of the property or its
character is a matter of concern. Measured
against this standard we find that paragraph
(e) is not a general warrant. The articles to
be seized were not only sufficiently
identified physically, they were also
specifically identified by stating their
relation to the offense charged. Paragraph
(e) specifically refers to those articles used
or intended for use in the illegal and
unauthorized copying of petitioners'
software. This language meets the test of
specificity
The cases cited by the Court of Appeals are
inapplicable. In those cases, the Court found
the warrants too broad because of particular
circumstances, not because of the mere use
of the phrase "used or intended to be used."
In Columbia Pictures, Inc. v. Flores, the
warrants ordering the seizure of "television
sets, video cassette recorders, rewinders and
tape cleaners . . ." were found too broad
since the defendant there was a licensed
distributor of video tapes. The mere
presence of counterfeit video tapes in the
defendant's store does not mean that the
machines were used to produce the
counterfeit tapes. The situation in this case is
different. Maxicorp is not a licensed
distributor of petitioners. In Bache & Co.
(Phil .), Inc., et al . v. Judge Ruiz, et al ., the
Court voided the warrants because they
authorized the seizure of records pertaining
to "all business transactions" of the
defendant. And in 20th Century Fox Film
Corp . v. Court of Appeals, the Court
quashed the warrant because it merely gave
a list of articles to be seized, aggravated by
the fact that such appliances are "generally
connected with the legitimate business of
renting out betamax tapes
However, we find paragraph (c) of the
search warrants lacking in particularity
The scope of this description is all-
embracing since it covers property used for
personal or other purposes not related to
copyright infringement or unfair
competition. Moreover, the description
covers property that Maxicorp may have
bought legitimately from Microsoft or its
licensed distributors. Paragraph (c) simply
calls for the seizure of all items bearing the
Microsoft logo, whether legitimately
possessed or not. Neither does it limit the
seizure to products used in copyright
infringement or unfair competition
8
Still, no provision of law exists which
requires that a warrant, partially defective in
specifying some items sought to be seized
yet particular with respect to the other items,
should be nullified as a whole. A partially
defective warrant remains valid as to the
items specifically described in the warrant.
A search warrant is severable, the items not
sufficiently described may be cut off without
destroying the whole warrant. The
exclusionary rule found in Section 3(2) of
Article III of the Constitution renders
inadmissible in any proceeding all evidence
obtained through unreasonable searches
and seizure. Thus, all items seized under
paragraph (c) of the search warrants, not
falling under paragraphs a, b, d, e or f,
should be returned to Maxicorp.
People v Canton
Facts: Appellant Susan Canton (hereafter
SUSAN) was charged before the Regional
Trial Court of Pasay City with the violation
of Section 16 of Article III of the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425),
as amended
The evidence for the prosecution established
that on 12 February 1998, at about 1:30
p.m., SUSAN was at the Ninoy Aquino
International Airport (NAIA), being a
departing passenger bound for Saigon,
Vietnam. 2 When she passed through the
metal detector booth, a beeping sound was
emitted. Consequently, Mylene
Cabunoc, a civilian employee of the
National Action Committee on Hijacking
and Terrorism (NACHT) and the frisker on
duty at that time, called her attention, saying
"Excuse me ma'am, can I search you?" Upon
frisking SUSAN, Mylene felt something
bulging at her abdominal area. Mylene
inserted her hand under the skirt of SUSAN,
pinched the package several times and
noticed that the package contained what felt
like rice granules. When Mylene passed her
hand, she felt similar packages in front of
SUSAN's genital area and thighs. She asked
SUSAN tobring out the packages, but the
latter refused and said: "Money, money
only." Mylene forthwith reported the matter
to SPO4 Victorio de los Reyes, her
supervisor on duty
SPO4 De los Reyes instructed Mylene to
call Customs Examiner Lorna Jalac and
bring SUSAN to a comfort room for a
thorough physical examination. Upon
further frisking in the ladies' room, Mylene
touched something in front of SUSAN's sex
organ. She directed SUSAN to remove her
skirt, girdles and panty. SUSAN obliged.
Mylene and Lorna discovered three
packages individually wrapped and sealed in
gray colored packing tape, which SUSAN
voluntarily handed to them. The first was
taken from SUSAN's abdominal area; the
second, from in front of her genital area; and
the third, from her right thigh. Mylene
turned over the packages to SPO4 De los
Reyes. 8 The latter forthwith informed his
superior officer Police Superintendent
Daniel Santos about the incident. Together
with SUSAN, they brought the gray plastic
packs to the customs examination table,
opened the same and found that they
contained white crystalline substances
which, when submitted for laboratory
examination, yielded positive results for
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu ,
a regulated drug.
For the defense, SPO2 Jerome Cause, an
investigator of the First Regional Aviation
Office, testified that no investigation was
ever conducted on SUSAN.However,
SUSAN signed a receipt of the following
articles seized from her: (1) three bags of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu
approximately 1,100 grams; (2) one
American passport bearing Number
700389994; (3) one Continental Micronesia
plane ticket with stock control number
0414381077; and (4) two panty girdles. 12
He said that he informed SUSAN of her
constitutional rights but admitted that she
did not have a counsel when she signed the
receipt. Yet he told her that she had the
option to sign or not to sign the receipt
After consideration of the evidence
presented, the trial court rendered a decision
finding SUSAN guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of violation of Section
16 of Article III of Republic Act No. 6425,
as amended, and sentencing her to suffer the
penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a
fine of P1 million
After conducting a hearing on 24 November
2000 to resolve appellant's Motion for
9
Reconsideration and/or New Trial, as well
as the Motion to Inhibit the Judge, the trial
court issued an order 19 on 26 November
2001 denying the motions. According to the
trial judge (1) he explained to SUSAN's
counsel the effects of the filing of a motion
for reconsideration, but the latter chose to
magnify the judge's statement which was
uttered in jest; (2) SUSAN's conviction was
not based on the medical report which was
not presented in court; (3) there was no
violation of SUSAN's constitutional rights
because she was never interrogated during
her detention without counsel; and (4) the
specimens seized from her were found after
a routine frisk at the airport and were
therefore acquired legitimately pursuant to
airport security procedures.
Issue:
(1) In justifying the warrantless search
against her based on the alleged existence of
probable cause;
(2) In holding that she was caught flagrante
delicto and that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest;
(3) In not ruling that the frisker went beyond
the limits of the "Terry search" doctrine;
(4) In not ruling that SUSAN was under
custodial investigation without counsel;
(5) In admitting to the records of the case
the report of Dr. Ma. Bernadette Arcena,
which was not testified on or offered in
evidence, and using the same in determining
her guilt;
(6) In justifying under the rule on judicial
notice its cognizance of the medical report
that has not been offered in evidence; and
(7) in applying the ruling in People v.
Johnson
For assigned errors nos. 1 and 2, SUSAN
asserts that the strip search conducted on her
in the ladies' room was constitutionally
infirmed because it was not "incidental to an
arrest." The arrest could not be said to have
been made before the search because at the
time of the strip search, the arresting officers
could not have known what was inside the
plastic containers hidden on her body, which
were wrapped and sealed with gray tape. At
that point then, they could not have
determined whether SUSAN was actually
committing a crime. The strip search was
therefore nothing but a fishing expedition.
Verily, it is erroneous to say that she was
caught flagrante delicto and that the
warrantless search was incidental to a lawful
arrest.
For assigned error no. 3, SUSAN maintains
that, following the doctrine enunciated
i n Terry v. Ohio , such stop and frisk
search should have been limited to the
patting of her outer garments in order to
determine whether she was armed or
dangerous and therefore a threat to the
security of the aircraft.
For assigned error no. 4, SUSAN alleges
that from the moment frisker Mylene felt a
package at her abdominal area, started
inquiring about the contents thereof,
detained her, and decided to submit her to a
strip search in the ladies' room, she was
under custodial investigation without
counsel, which was violative of Section 12,
Article III of the Constitution.
For assigned errors nos. 5 and 6, SUSAN
assails the propriety of the admission of the
medical report executed by Dr. Ma.
Bernadette Arcena on the ground that it was
neither testified on nor offered in evidence.
Lastly, SUSAN questions the application of
People v. Johnson because of its sweeping
statement allowing searches and seizures of
departing passengers in airports in view of
the gravity of the safety interests involved.
She stresses that the pertinent case should
have been Katz v. United States , which
upholds the Fourth Amendment of the
United States of America that "protects
people and not places
Ruling: The petition is denied.
Sections 2 and 3(2) of Article III of the 1987
Constitution provides:
Sec.2. The right of the people to be secure in
their persons, houses, papers and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or
10
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
What constitutes a reasonable or
unreasonable search in any particular case is
a judicial question, determinable from a
consideration of the circumstances involved.
The rule is that the Constitution bars State
intrusions to a person's body, personal
effects or residence except if conducted by
virtue of a valid search warrant issued in
compliance with the procedure outlined in
the Constitution and reiterated in the Rules
of Court.
The interdiction against warrantless searches
and seizures is not absolute. The recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence are
(1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in
plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver
or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search ); and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest.
The search conducted on SUSAN was not
incidental to a lawful arrest
We do not agree with the trial court and the
OSG that the search and seizure conducted
in this case were incidental to a lawful
arrest. SUSAN's arrest did not precede the
search. When the metal detector alarmed
while SUSAN was passing through it, the
lady frisker on duty forthwith made a pat
down search on the former. In the process,
the latter felt a bulge on SUSAN's abdomen.
The strip search that followed was for the
purpose of ascertaining what were the
packages concealed on SUSAN's body. If
ever at the time SUSAN was deprived of her
will and liberty, such restraint did not
amount to an arrest. Under Section 1 of Rule
113 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, as amended, arrest is the "taking
of a person into custody in order that he may
be bound to answer for the commission of
an offense.
As pointed out by the appellant, prior to the
strip search in the ladies' room, the airport
security personnel had no knowledge yet of
what were hidden on SUSAN's body; hence,
they did not know yet whether a crime was
being committed. It was only after the strip
search upon the discovery by the police
officers of the white crystalline substances
inside the packages, which they believed to
be shabu , that SUSAN was arrested. The
search cannot, therefore, be said to have
been done incidental to a lawful arrest. In a
search incidental to a lawful arrest, the law
requires that there be first a lawful arrest
before a search can be made; the process
cannot be reversed.
The scope of a search pursuant to airport
security procedure is not confined only to
search for weapons under the "Terry
search" doctrine.
The Terry search or the "stop and frisk"
situation refers to a case where a police
officer approaches a person who is acting
suspiciously, for purposes of investigating
possibly criminal behavior in line with the
general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection. To assure himself
that the person with whom he is dealing is
not armed with a weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against
him, he could validly conduct a carefully
limited search of the outer clothing of such
person to discover weapons which might be
used to assault him.
In the present case, the search was made
pursuant to routine airport security
procedure, which is allowed under Section 9
of Republic Act No. 6235
In this case, after the metal detector alarmed
SUSAN consented to be frisked, which
resulted in the discovery of packages on her
body. It was too late in the day for her to
refuse to be further searched because the
discovery of the packages whose contents
felt like rice granules, coupled by her
apprehensiveness and her obviously false
statement that the packages contained only
money, aroused the suspicion of the frisker
that SUSAN was hiding something illegal. It
must be repeated that R.A. No. 6235
authorizes search for prohibited materials or
substances. To limit the action of the airport
11
security personnel to simply refusing her
entry into the aircraft and sending her home
(as suggested by appellant), and thereby
depriving them of "the ability and facility to
act accordingly, including to further search
without warrant, in light of such
circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectivity in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society."
Thus, the strip search in the ladies' room was
justified under the circumstances.
The ruling in People v. Johnson is
applicable to the instant case.
Persons may lose the protection of the
search and seizure clause by exposure of
their persons or property to the public in a
manner reflecting a lack of subjective
expectation of privacy, which expectation
society is prepared to recognize as
reasonable. Such recognition is implicit in
airport security procedures. With increased
concern over airplane hijacking and
terrorism has come increased security at the
nation's airports. Passengers attempting to
board an aircraft routinely pass through
metal detectors; their carry-on baggage as
well as checked luggage are routinely
subjected to xray scans. Should these
procedures suggest the presence of
suspicious objects, physical searches are
conducted to determine what the objects are.
There is little question that such searches are
reasonable, given their minimal
intrusiveness, the gravity of the safety
interests involved, and the reduced privacy
expectations associated with airline travel.
Indeed, travelers are often notified through
airport public address systems, signs, and
notices in their airline tickets that they are
subject to search and, if any prohibited
materials or substances are found, such
would be subject to seizure. These
announcements place passengers on notice
that ordinary constitutional protections
against warrantless searches and seizures do
not apply to routine airport procedures.
The appellant, having been caught
flagrante delicto, was lawfully arrested
without a warrant.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court
SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has just been committed
and he has probable cause to believe based
on personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or is temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases failing under paragraphs (a) and
(b) above, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail and shall be
proceeded against in accordance with
Section 7 of Rule 112.
The present case falls under paragraph (a) of
the afore-quoted Section. The search
conducted on SUSAN resulted in the
discovery and recovery of three packages
containing white crystalline substances,
which upon examination yielded positive
results for methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu . As discussed earlier, such
warrantless search and seizure were legal.
Armed with the knowledge that SUSAN was
committing a crime, the airport security
personnel and police authorities were duty-
bound to arrest her. As held in People v.
Johnson , her subsequent arrest without a
warrant was justified, since it was effected
upon the discovery and recovery of shabu in
her person flagrante delicto.
The constitutional right to counsel
afforded an accused undercustodial
investigation was not violated
Entrenched is the rule that the rights
provided in Section 12, Article III of the
Constitution may be invoked only when a
person is under "custodial investigation" or
is "in custody interrogation." 31 Custodial
12
investigation refers to the "questioning
initiated by law enforcement officers after a
person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way." This presupposes
that he is suspected of having committed a
crime and that the investigator is trying to
elicit information or a confession from him.
And the right to counsel attaches upon the
start of such investigation. 34 The objective
is to prohibit "incommunicado"
interrogation of individuals in a police-
dominated atmosphere, resulting in self-
incriminating statements without full
warnings of constitutional rights.
In this case, as testified to by the lone
witness for the defense, SPO2 Jerome
Cause, no custodial investigation was
conducted after SUSAN's arrest. She affixed
her signature to the receipt of the articles
seized from her, but before she did so, she
was told that she had the option to sign or
not to sign it. In any event, her signature to
the packages was not relied upon by the
prosecution to prove its case. Moreover, no
statement was taken from her during her
detention and used in evidence against her.
Hence, her claim of violation of her right to
counsel has no leg to stand on
The other items seized from the appellant
should be returned to her.
The confiscation of the following: SEC. 3.
Personal property to be seized. — A search
warrant may be issued for the search and
seizure of personal property:
(a) Subject of the offense;
(b) Stolen or embezzled and other proceeds,
or fruits of the offense; or
(c) Used or intended to be used as the means
of committing an offense.
Clearly, the seizure of SUSAN's passport,
plane tickets, and girdles exceeded the
limits of the afore-quoted provision. They,
therefore, have to be returned to her
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; RIGHT
AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES; THE
CONSTITUTION BARS STATE
INTRUSIONS TO A PERSON'S BODY,
PERSONAL EFFECTS OR RESIDENCE
EXCEPT THRU A VALID SEARCH
WARRANT. — What constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search in any
particular case is a judicial question,
determinable from a consideration of the
circumstances involved. The rule is that the
Constitution bars State intrusions to a
person's body, personal effects or residence
except if conducted by virtue of a valid
search warrant issued in compliance with the
procedure outlined in the Constitution and
reiterated in the Rules of Court.
EXCEPTIONS TO RULE. — The
interdiction against warrantless searches and
seizures is not absolute. The recognized
exceptions established by jurisprudence are
(1) search of moving vehicles; (2) seizure in
plain view; (3) customs searches; (4) waiver
or consented searches; (5) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search); and (6) search
incidental to a lawful arrest.
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL
ARREST; THELAW REQUIRES THAT
THERE BE FIRST A LAWFUL ARREST
BEFORE A SEARCH CAN BE MADE. —
SUSAN's arrest did not precede the search.
When the metal detector alarmed while
SUSAN was passing through it, the lady
frisker on duty forthwith
made a pat down search on the former. In
the process, the latter felt a bulge on
SUSAN's abdomen. The strip search that
followed was for the purpose of ascertaining
what were the packages concealed on
SUSAN's body. If ever at the time SUSAN
was deprived of her will and liberty, such
restraint did not amount to an arrest. Under
Section 1 of Rule 113 of the Revised Rules
of Criminal Procedure, as amended, arrest is
the "taking of a person into custody in order
that he may be bound to answer for the
commission of an offense." As pointed out
by the appellant, prior to the strip search in
the ladies' room, the airport security
personnel had no knowledge yet of what
were hidden on SUSAN's body; hence, they
did not know yet whether a crime was being
committed. It was only after the strip search
upon the discovery by the police officers of
the white crystalline substances inside the
packages, which they believed to be shabu ,
that SUSAN was arrested. The search
13
cannot, therefore, be said to have been done
incidental to a lawful arrest. In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, the law requires
that there be first a lawful arrest before a
search can be made; the process cannot be
reversed.
STOP AND FRISK SITUATIONS OR
TERRY SEARCH,DEFINED. — The Terry
search or the "stop and frisk" situation refers
to a case where a police officer approaches a
person who is acting suspiciously, for
purposes of investigating possibly criminal
behavior in line with the general interest of
effective crime prevention and detection. To
assure himself that the person with whom he
is dealing is not armed with a weapon that
could unexpectedly and fatally be used
against him, he could validly conduct a
carefully limited search of the outer clothing
of such person to discover weapons which
might be used to assault him.
SEARCH MADE PURSUANT TO
ROUTINE AIRPORT SECURITY
PROCEDURE; SEARCH OF
PROHIBITED MATERIALS OR
SUBSTANCES; CASE AT BAR. — In the
present case, the search was made pursuant
to routine airport security procedure, which
is allowed under Section 9 of Republic Act
No. 6235 reading as follows: "SEC. 9. Every
ticket issued to a passenger by the airline or
air carrier concerned shall contain among
others the following condition printed
thereon: 'Holder hereof and his hand-carried
luggage(s) are subject to search for, and
seizure of, prohibited materials or
substances. Holder refusing to be searched
shall not be allowed to board the aircraft ,'
which shall constitute a part of the contract
between the passenger and the air carrier."
This constitutes another exception to the
proscription against warrantless searches
and seizures. As admitted by SUSAN and
shown in Annex "D" of her Brief, the afore-
quoted provision is stated in the "Notice to
All Passengers" located at the final security
checkpoint at the departure lounge. From the
said provision, it is clear that the search,
unlike in the Terry search, is not limited to
weapons. Passengers are also subject to
search for prohibited materials or
substances. . . . To limit the action of the
airport security personnel to simply refusing
her entry into the aircraft and sending her
home (as suggested by appellant), and
thereby depriving them of "the ability and
facility to act accordingly, including to
further search without warrant, in light of
such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society."
Thus, the strip search in the ladies' room was
justified under the circumstances.
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTIONAL
LAW; BILL OF RIGHTS; CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION, DEFINED; RIGHT TO
COUNSEL AFFORDED AN ACCUSED
UNDER CUSTODIAL INVESTIGATION,
NOT VIOLATED IN CASE AT BAR. —
The rights provided in Section 12, Article III
of the Constitution may be invoked only
when a person is under "custodial
investigation" or is "in custody
interrogation." Custodial investigation refers
to the "questioning initiated by law
enforcement officers after a person has been
taken into custody or otherwise deprived of
his freedom of action in any significant
way." This presupposes that he is suspected
of having committed a crime and that the
investigator is trying to elicit information or
a confession from him. And the right to
counsel attaches upon the start of such
investigation. The objective is to prohibit
"incommunicado" interrogation of
individuals in a policedominated
atmosphere, resulting in self-incriminating
statements without full warnings of
constitutional rights. In this case, as testified
to by the lone witness for the defense, SPO2
Jerome Cause, no custodial investigation
was conducted after SUSAN's arrest. She
affixed her signature to the receipt of the
articles seized from her, but before she did
so, she was told that she had the option to
sign or not to sign. it. In any event, her
signature to the packages was not relied
upon by the prosecution to prove its case.
Moreover, no statement was taken from her
during her detention and used in evidence
against her. Hence, her claim of violation of
her right to counsel has no leg to stand on.
14
People v Libnao
Facts: Before us is an appeal from the
Decision dated November 19, 1998 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 65, Tarlac
City, finding appellant Agpanga Libnao and
her coaccused Rosita Nunga guilty of
violating Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No.
6425, otherwise known as the Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972. 1 For their conviction,
each was sentenced to suffer an
imprisonment of reclusion perpetua and to
pay a fine of two million pesos
At about 1:00 o'clock in the morning of the
following day, SPO1 Gamotea and PO3
Ferrer flagged down a passing tricycle. It
had two female passengers seated inside,
who were later identified as the appellant
Agpanga Libnao and her co-accused
Rosita Nunga. 3 In front of them was a black
bag. Suspicious of the black bag and the
two's uneasy behavior when asked about its
ownership and content, the officers invited
them to Kabayan Center No. 2 located at the
same barangay. They brought with them the
black bag.
Upon reaching the center, PO3 Ferrer
fetched Barangay Captain Roy Pascual to
witness the opening of the black bag. In the
meantime, the two women and the bag were
turned over to the investigator on duty,
SPO3 Arthur Antonio. As soon as the
barangay captain arrived, the black bag was
opened in the presence of the appellant, her
co-accused and personnel of the center.
Found inside it were eight bricks of leaves
sealed in plastic bags and covered with
newspaper. The leaves were suspected to be
marijuana.
To determine who owns the bag and its
contents, SPO3 Antonio interrogated the
two. Rosita Nunga stated that it was owned
by the appellant. The latter, in turn, disputed
this allegation. Thereafter, they were made
to sign a confiscation receipt without the
assistance of any counsel, as they were not
informed of their right to have one. During
the course of the investigation, not even
close relatives of theirs were present.
Issue:
1. The Honorable Regional Trial Court
failed to appreciate the contention of the
defense that the right of accused against
illegal and unwarranted arrest and search
was violated by the police officers who
arrested both accused.
2. The Honorable Court failed to appreciate
the contention of the defense that the right of
the accused to custodial investigation was
deliberately violated by the peace officers
who apprehended and investigated the
accused.
3. The Honorable Court miserably failed to
evaluate the material inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution's witnesses
which inconsistencies cast doubt and make
incredible the contention and version of the
prosecution.
4. The Honorable Court gravely abused its
discretion when it appreciated and
considered the documentary and object
evidence of the prosecution not formally
offered amounting to ignorance of the law."
Ruling: The petition is denied.
In arguing that her arrest was unlawful,
appellant capitalizes on the absence of a
warrant for her arrest. She contends that at
the time she was apprehended by the
police officers, she was not committing any
offense but was merely riding a tricycle.
In the same manner, she impugns the search
made on her belongings as illegal as it was
done without a valid warrant or under
circumstances when warrantless search is
permissible. Consequently, any evidence
obtained therein is inadmissible against her.
These arguments fail to impress. The
general rule is that a search may be
conducted by law enforcers only on the
strength of a search warrant validly issued
by a judge as provided in Article III, Section
2 of the 1987 Constitution
The constitutional guarantee is not a blanket
prohibition against all searches and seizures
as it operates only against "unreasonable"
searches and seizures. Searches and seizures
are as a rule unreasonable unless authorized
by a validly issued search warrant or warrant
of arrest. Thus, the fundamental protection
accorded by the search and seizure clause is
that between persons and police must stand
the protective authority of a magistrate
clothed with power to issue or refuse to
issue search warrants and warrants of arrest
15
Be that as it may, the requirement that a
judicial warrant must be obtained prior to
the carrying out of a search and seizure is
not absolute. There are certain familiar
exceptions to the rule, one of which relates
to search of moving vehicles.
Warrantless search and seizure of moving
vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under
said circumstances as the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought. Peace officers in such cases,
however, are limited to routine checks
where the examination of the vehicle is
limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle
is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains as item,
article or object which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction
The warrantless search in the case at bench
is not bereft of a probable cause. The
Tarlac Police Intelligence Division had been
conducting surveillance operation for three
months in the area. The surveillance yielded
the information that once a month, appellant
and her co-accused Rosita Nunga transport
drugs in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October
19, 1996, the police received a tip that the
two will be transporting drugs that night
riding a tricycle. Surely, the two were
intercepted three hours later, riding a
tricycle and carrying a suspicious-looking
black bag, which possibly contained the
drugs in bulk. When they were asked who
owned it and what its content was, both
became uneasy. Under these circumstances,
the warrantless search and seizure of
appellant's bag was not illegal.
It is also clear that at the time she was
apprehended, she was committing a criminal
offense. She was making a delivery or
transporting prohibited drugs in violation of
Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425.
Under the Rules of Court, one of the
instances a police officer is permitted to
carry out a warrantless arrest is when the
person to be arrested is caught committing a
crime in flagrante delicto
"Section 5. Arrest without Warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has probable cause to
believe based on personal knowledge of
facts or circumstances that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
Appellant also takes issue of the fact that she
was not assisted by a lawyer when police
officers interrogated her. She claimed that
she was not duly informed of her right to
remain silent and to have competent counsel
of her choice. Hence, she argues that the
confession or admission obtained therein
should be considered inadmissible in
evidence against her.
These contentions deserve scant attention.
Appellant did not make any confession
during her custodial investigation. In
determining the guilt of the appellant and
her co-accused, the trial court based its
decision on the testimonies of prosecution
witnesses and on the existence of the
confiscated marijuana
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
UNREASONABLE UNLESS
AUTHORIZED BY A VALIDLY ISSUED
SEARCH WARRANT OR WARRANT OF
ARREST, AS A RULE. — The general rule
is that a search may be conducted by law
enforcers only on the strength of a search
warrant validly issued by a judge as
provided in Article III, Section 2 of the 1987
Constitution, thus: "The right of the people
to be secure in their persons, houses, papers
and effects against unreasonable searches
16
and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant and warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized." The constitutional
guarantee is not a blanket prohibition against
all searches and seizures as it operates only
against "unreasonable" searches and
seizures. Searches and seizures are as a rule
unreasonable unless authorized by a validly
issued search warrant or warrant of arrest.
Thus, the fundamental protection accorded
by the search and seizure clause is that
between persons and police must stand the
protective authority of a magistrate clothed
with power to issue or refuse to issue search
warrants and warrants of arrest.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE OF MOVING
VEHICLE AS AN EXCEPTION;
RATIONALE. — Be that as it may, the
requirement that a judicial warrant must be
obtained prior to the carrying out of a search
and seizure is not absolute. There are certain
familiar exceptions to the rule, one of which
relates to search of moving vehicles.
Warrantless search and seizure of moving
vehicles are allowed in recognition of the
impracticability of securing a warrant under
said circumstances as the vehicle can be
quickly moved out of the locality or
jurisdiction in which the warrant may be
sought. Peace officers in such cases,
however, are limited to routine checks
where the examination of the vehicle is
limited to visual inspection. When a vehicle
is stopped and subjected to an extensive
search, such would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers made it upon
probable cause, i.e., upon a belief,
reasonably arising out of circumstances
known to the seizing officer, that an
automobile or other vehicle contains as item,
article or object which by law is subject to
seizure and destruction.
PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — The
warrantless search in the case at bench is not
bereft of a probable cause. The Tarlac Police
Intelligence Division had been conducting
surveillance operation for three months in
the area. The surveillance yielded the
information that once a month, appellant and
her coaccused Rosita Nunga transport drugs
in big bulks. At 10:00 pm of October 19,
1996, the police received a tip that the two
will be transporting drugs that night riding a
tricycle. Surely, the two were intercepted
three hours later, riding a tricycle and
carrying a suspicious-looking black bag,
which possibly contained the drugs in bulk.
When they were asked who owned it and
what its content was, both became uneasy.
Under these circumstances, the warrantless
search and seizure of appellant's bag was not
illegal. It is also clear that at the time she
was apprehended, she was committing a
criminal offense. She was making a delivery
or transporting prohibited drugs in violation
of Article II, Section 4 of R.A. No. 6425.
Under the Rules of Court, one of the
instances a police officer is permitted to
carry out a warrantless arrest is when the
person to be arrested is caught committing a
crime in flagrante delicto.
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; NOT
AFFECTED BY INCONSISTENCIES
ON MINOR DETAILS; APPLICATION IN
CASE AT BAR. — The alleged
inconsistencies she mentions refer only to
minor details and not to material points
regarding the basic elements of the crime.
They are inconsequential that they do not
affect the credibility of the witnesses nor
detract from the established fact that
appellant and her co-accused were
transporting marijuana. Testimonies of
witnesses need only corroborate each other
on important and relevant details concerning
the principal occurrence. The identity of the
person who opened the bag is clearly
immaterial to the guilt of the appellant.
Besides, it is to be expected that the
testimony of witnesses regarding the same
incident may be inconsistent in some aspects
because different persons may have different
recollections of the same incident.
CREDENCE MAY BE PROPERLY
ACCORDED TO TESTIMONIES OF
POLICE OFFICERS WHO EXHIBITED
NO IMPROPER MOTIVE TO ARREST
THE APPELLANT. — To be sure, credence
was properly accorded to the testimonies of
prosecution witnesses, who are law
17
enforcers. When police officers have no
motive to testify falsely against the accused,
courts are inclined to uphold this
presumption. In this case, no evidence has
been presented to suggest any improper
motive on the part of the police enforcers in
attesting the appellant.
DENIAL AND ALIBI, AS DEFENSE;
CANNOT STAND AGAINST CREDIBLE
POSITIVE TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESS. — Against the
credible positive testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses, appellant's defense of
denial and alibi cannot stand. The defense of
denial and alibi has been invariably viewed
by the courts with disfavor for it can just as
easily be concocted and is a common and
standard defense ploy in most cases
involving violation of the Dangerous Drugs
Act. It has to be substantiated by clear and
convincing evidence. The sole proof
presented in the lower court by the appellant
to support her claim of denial and alibi was
a sworn statement, which was not even
affirmed on the witness stand by the affiant
People v Nuevas
Facts: Jesus Nuevas y Garcia (Nuevas) was
charged 1 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Olongapo City, Branch 75, with
illegal possession of marijuana in violation
of Section 8, Article II of Republic Act No.
6425
Upon arraignment, Nuevas, Din and
Inocencio pleaded not guilty to the charges.
As the evidence in the cases was common
and the prosecution would utilize the same
witnesses, the cases were consolidated
PO3 Teofilo B. Fami (Fami) testified that in
the morning of 27 September 1997, he and
SPO3 Cesar B. Cabling (Cabling) conducted
a stationary surveillance and monitoring of
illegal drug trafficking along Perimeter
Street, Barangay Pag-asa, Olongapo City.
They had received information that a certain
male person, more or less 5'4" in height, 25
to 30 years old, with a tattoo mark on the
upper right hand, and usually wearing a
sando and maong pants, would make a
delivery of marijuana dried leaves. While
stationed thereat, they saw a male person
who fit the description, carrying a plastic
bag, later identified as Nuevas, alight from a
motor vehicle. They accosted Nuevas and
informed him that they are police officers.
Fami asked Nuevas where he was going.
Nuevas answered arrogantly but afterwards,
calmed down. Nuevas and Fami conversed
in the Waray dialect. Nuevas informed him
that there were other stuff in the possession
of a certain Vangie, an associate, and two
other male persons. Later on, Nuevas
voluntarily pointed to the police officers a
plastic bag which, when opened, contained
marijuana dried leaves and bricks wrapped
in a blue cloth. Shortly, in his bid to escape
charges, Nuevas disclosed where the two (2)
other male persons would make the delivery
of marijuana weighing more or less five (5)
kilos.
Fami and Cabling, together with Nuevas,
then proceeded to Purok 12, Old Cabalan,
Olongapo City, which according to Nuevas
was where his two (2) companions, Din and
Inocencio, could be located. From there,
they saw and approached two (2) persons
along the National Highway, introducing
themselves as police officers. Din was
carrying a light blue plastic bag. When
asked, Din disclosed that the bag belonged
to Nuevas. Fami then took the bag and upon
inspection found inside it "marijuana packed
in newspaper and wrapped therein." 8 After
confiscating the items, Fami and Cabling
brought Nuevas, Din and Inocencio to the
police office at Purok III for proper
documentation. 9 Fami further testified that
a receipt for the property seized was issued
by Cabling and that a field test was duly
conducted on the confiscated items. All
three accused were likewise physically
examined on the basis of which
corresponding medical certificates were
issued. The corresponding booking sheets
and arrest report were also accomplished.
Fami stated that he and Cabling executed a
joint affidavit in connection with the arrest
of all the accused and the confiscation of the
items.
On cross-examination, Fami revealed that
when the receipt of evidence seized was
prepared, all three (3) accused were not
represented by counsel. He likewise
disclosed that he was the one who escorted
all the accused during their physical
examination. He also escorted all three to
18
the Fiscal's office where the latter were
informed of the charges against them.
Cabling corroborated Fami's testimony. He,
however, testified that after he and Fami had
introduced themselves as police officers,
Din and Inocencio voluntarily handed to
Fami the marijuana dried leaves.
On cross-examination, Cabling testified that
the arrest of Nuevas was the result of a tip
from Fami's informant, conceding though
that the name of Nuevas was not included in
the list of persons under surveillance. Fami
then relayed the tip to Cabling. Cabling
restated that Nuevas had voluntarily
submitted the plastic bag he was holding and
that after Nuevas had been informed of the
violation of law attributed to him, he
admitted his willingness to cooperate and
point to his other cohorts. When Fami and
Cabling proceeded to the identified location
of Nuevas's cohorts, they chanced upon Din
and Inocencio along the road. Din was
holding a bag while Inocencio was looking
into its contents. 15 Cabling averred that Din
voluntarily handed the plastic bag he was
holding to the police officers.
All three were found guilty as charged and
the judgment of conviction was elevated to
the Court for automatic review. However, on
14 July 2003, Nuevas filed a manifestation
and motion to withdraw appeal. 20 The
Court granted Nuevas's withdrawal of
appeal and considered the case closed and
terminated as to him, in a Resolution 21
dated 25 August 2003.
Appellants maintain that there was no basis
for their questioning and the subsequent
inspection of the plastic bags of Nuevas and
Din, as they were not doing anything illegal
at the time
Ruling: The petition is granted.
Our Constitution states that a search and
seizure must be carried through or with a
judicial warrant; otherwise, such search and
seizure becomes "unreasonable" and any
evidence obtained therefrom is inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding.
The constitutional proscription, however, is
not absolute but admits of exceptions,
namely:
1. Warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest . (Sec. 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court and prevailing jurisprudence);
2. Search of evidence in "plain view." The
elements are: (a) a prior valid intrusion
based on the valid warrantless arrest in
which the police are legally present in the
pursuit of their official duties; (b) the
evidence was inadvertently discovered by
the police who have the right to be where
they are; (c) the evidence must be
immediately apparent; (d) "plain view"
justified mere seizure of evidence without
further search;
3. Search of a moving vehicle. Highly
regulated by the government, the vehicle's
inherent mobility reduces expectation of
privacy especially when its transit in public
thoroughfares furnishes a highly reasonable
suspicion amounting to probable cause that
the occupant committed a criminal activity;
4. Consented warrantless search;
5. Customs search;
6. Stop and Frisk; and
7. Exigent and emergency circumstances
In the instances where a warrant is not
necessary to effect a valid search or seizure,
or when the latter cannot be performed
except without a warrant, what constitutes a
reasonable or unreasonable search or seizure
is purely a judicial question, determinable
from the uniqueness of the circumstances
involved, including the purpose of the
search or seizure, the presence or absence of
probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or
thing searched and the character of the
articles procured.
The courts below anchor appellants'
conviction on the ground that the searches
and seizure conducted in the instant case
based on a tip from an informant fall under
one of the exceptions as Nuevas, Din and
Inocencio all allegedly voluntarily
surrendered the plastic bags containing
marijuana to the police officers.
First, the Court holds that the searches
and seizures conducted do not fall under
the first exception, warrantless searches
incidental to lawful arrests.
19

A search incidental to a lawful arrest is
sanctioned by the Rules of Court. Recent
jurisprudence holds that the arrest must
precede the search; the process cannot be
reversed as in this case where the search
preceded the arrest. Nevertheless, a search
substantially contemporaneous with an
arrest can precede the arrest if the police
have probable cause to make the arrest at the
outset of the search.
In this case, Nuevas, Din and Inocencio
were not committing a crime in the presence
of the police officers. Moreover, police
officers Fami and Cabling did not have
personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the persons to be arrested had
committed an offense. The searches
conducted on the plastic bag then cannot be
said to be merely incidental to a lawful
arrest. Reliable information alone is not
sufficient to justify a warrantless arrest
under Section 5 (a), Rule 113. The rule
requires, in addition, that the accused
perform some overt act that would indicate
that he "has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense."
Secondly, neither could the searches be
justified under the plain view doctrine.
An object is in plain view if it is plainly
exposed to sight. Where the object seized
was inside a closed package, the object itself
is not in plain view and therefore cannot be
seized without a warrant. However, if the
package proclaims its contents, whether by
its distinctive configuration, its
transparency, or if its contents are obvious to
an observer, then the contents are in plain
view and may be seized. In other words, if
the package is such that an experienced
observer could infer from its appearance that
it contains the prohibited article, then the
article is deemed in plain view. It must be
immediately apparent to the police that the
items that they observe may be evidence of a
crime, contraband or otherwise subject to
seizure. Records show that the dried
marijuana leaves were inside the plastic bags
that Nuevas and Din were carrying and were
not readily apparent or transparent to the
police officers. In Nuevas's case, the dried
marijuana leaves found inside the plastic bag
were wrapped inside a blue cloth. 43 In
Din's case, the marijuana found upon
inspection of the plastic bag was "packed in
newspaper and wrapped therein." It cannot
be therefore said the items were in plain
view which could have justified mere
seizure of the articles without further search.
On the other hand, the Court finds that the
search conducted in Nuevas's case was made
with his consent. In Din's case, there was
none.
Indeed, the constitutional immunity against
unreasonable searches and seizures is a
personal right which may be waived.
However, it must be seen that the consent to
the search was voluntary in order to validate
an otherwise illegal detention and search,
i.e., the consent was unequivocal, specific,
and intelligently given, uncontaminated by
any duress or coercion. The consent to a
search is not to be lightly inferred, but must
be shown by clear and convincing evidence.
The question whether a consent to a search
was in fact voluntary is a question of fact to
be determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent
and the environment in which consent is
given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether he was in a public or secluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the
nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took
place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It
is the State which has the burden of proving,
by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it
was freely and voluntarily given
In Nuevas's case, the Court is convinced that
he indeed voluntarily surrendered the
incriminating bag to the police officers
There is reason to believe that Nuevas
indeed willingly submitted the plastic bag
with the incriminating contents to the police
20
officers. It can be seen that in his desperate
attempt to exculpate himself from any
criminal liability, Nuevas cooperated with
the police, gave them the plastic bag and
even revealed his 'associates,' offering
himself as an informant. His actuations were
consistent with the lamentable human
inclination to find excuses, blame others and
save oneself even at the cost of others' lives.
Thus, the Court would have affirmed
Nuevas's conviction had he not withdrawn
his appeal
However, with respect to the search
conducted in the case of Din, the Court finds
that no such consent had actually been given
The police officers gave inconsistent,
dissimilar testimonies regarding the manner
by which they got hold of the bag. This
already raises serious doubts on the
voluntariness of Din's submission of the
plastic bag. Jurisprudence requires that in
case of consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute
a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the
right exists; (2) the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right; and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right
The prosecution failed to clearly show that
Din intentionally surrendered his right
against unreasonable searches. While it may
not be contrary to human nature for one to
be jolted into surrendering something
incriminating to authorities, Fami's and
Cabling's testimonies do not show that Din
was in such a state of mind or condition.
Fami and Cabling did not testify on Din's
composure — whether he felt surprised or
frightened at the time — which fact we find
necessary to provide basis for the surrender
of the bag. There was no mention of any
permission made by the police officers to
get or search the bag or of any consent given
by Din for the officers to search it. It is
worthy to note that in cases where the Court
upheld the validity of consented search, the
police authorities expressly asked, in no
uncertain terms, for the consent of the
accused to be searched. And the consent of
the accused was established by clear and
positive proof.
Neither can Din's silence at the time be
construed as an implied acquiescence to the
warrantless search
Without the dried marijuana leaves as
evidence, Din's conviction cannot be
sustained based on the remaining evidence.
The Court has repeatedly declared that the
conviction of the accused must rest not on
the weakness of the defense but on the
strength of the prosecution. As such, Din
deserves an acquittal.
In this case, an acquittal is warranted despite
the prosecution's insistence that the
appellants have effectively waived any
defect in their arrest by entering their plea
and by their active participation in the trial
of the case. Be it stressed that the legality of
an arrest affects only the jurisdiction of the
court over the person of the accused. Inspite
of any alleged waiver, the dried marijuana
leaves cannot be admitted in evidence
against the appellants, Din more
specifically, as they were seized during a
warrantless search which was not lawful. A
waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does
not also mean a waiver of the inadmissibility
of evidence seized during an illegal
warrantless arrest.
Turning to Inocencio's case, the Court
likewise finds that he was wrongly
convicted of the crime charged. Inocencio's
supposed possession of the dried marijuana
leaves was sought to be shown through his
act of looking into the plastic bag that Din
was carrying. Taking a look at an object,
more so in this case peeping into a bag while
held by another, is not the same as taking
possession thereof. To behold is not to hold.
Indeed, the act attributed to Inocencio is
insufficient to establish illegal possession of
the drugs or even conspiracy to illegally
possess the same. The prosecution failed to
show by convincing proof that Inocencio
knew of the contents of the bag and that he
conspired with Din to possess the illegal
items. Inocencio was firm and unshakeable
in his testimony that he had no part in any
delivery of marijuana dried leaves.
21
People v Del Rosario
Facts: ON AUTOMATIC REVIEW is the
decision of the court a quo finding accused
Joselito del Rosario y Pascual guilty as co-
principal in the crime of Robbery with
Homicide and sentencing him to death, and
to pay the heirs of victim Virginia Bernas
P550,000.00 as actual damages and
P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages.
While accused Joselito del Rosario pleaded
not guilty, 3 Virgilio "Boy" Santos and
John Doe alias "Dodong" remained at large.
Ernesto "Jun" Marquez was killed in a
police encounter. Only Joselito del Rosario
was tried.
These facts were established by the
prosecution from the eyewitness account of
tricycle driver Paul Vincent Alonzo: On 13
May 1996 between 6:00 and 6:30 in the
evening, Alonzo stopped his tricycle by the
side of Nita's Drugstore, General Luna St.,
Cabanatuan City, when three women
flagged him. Parked at a distance of about
one and a-half (1½) meters in front of him
was a tricycle driven by accused Joselito del
Rosario. At that point, Alonzo saw two (2)
men and a woman grappling for possession
of a bag. After taking hold of the bag one of
the two men armed with a gun started
chasing a man who was trying to help the
woman, while the other snatcher kicked the
woman sending her to the ground. Soon
after, the armed man returned and while the
woman was still on the ground he shot her
on the head. The bag taken by the man was
brought to the tricycle of accused del
Rosario where someone inside received the
bag. The armed man then sat behind the
driver while his companion entered the
sidecar. When the tricycle sped away
Alonzo gave chase and was able to get the
plate number of the tricycle. He also
recognized the driver, after which he went to
the nearest police headquarters and reported
the incident
Accused Joselito del Rosario gave his own
version of the incident: At around 5:30 in
the afternoon he was hired for P120.00 by a
certain "Boy" Santos, 6 his coaccused.
Their original agreement was that he would
drive him to a cockpit at the Blas Edward
Coliseum. However despite their earlier
arrangement Boy Santos directed him to
proceed to the market place to fetch "Jun"
Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya.
The latter then accosted the victim Virginia
Bernas and grappled with her for the
possession of her bag. Jun Marquez alighted
from the tricycle to help "Dodong" Bisaya.
Accused del Rosario tried to leave and seek
help but "Boy Santos" who stayed inside the
tricycle prevented him from leaving and
threatened in fact to shoot him.
While inside his tricycle, del Rosario
overheard his passengers saying that they
would throw the bag at Zulueta St. where
there were cogon grasses. 11 Upon arriving
at Dicarma, the three (3) men alighted and
warned del Rosario not to inform the police
authorities about the incident otherwise he
and his family would be harmed. Del
Rosario then went home. 13 Because of the
threat, however, he did not report the matter
to the owner of the tricycle nor to the
barangay captain and the police.
Issue:
The court erred in the following:
(1) Not finding the presence of threat and
irresistible force employed upon him by his
co-accused Virgilio "Boy" Santos, Ernesto
"Jun" Marquez and "Dodong" Bisaya;
(2) Not considering his defense that he was
not part of the conspiracy among co-accused
"Boy" Santos, "Jun" Marquez and "Dodong"
Bisaya to commit the crime of Robbery with
Homicide;
(3) Not considering the violations on his
constitutional rights as an accused; and, (4)
Not considering that there was no lawful
warrantless arrest within the meaning of
Sec. 5, Rule 113, of the Rules of
Court.
Ruling: The petition is granted.
Del Rosario further contends that there was
violation of his right to remain silent, right
to have competent and independent counsel
preferably of his own choice, and right to be
informed of these rights as enshrined and
guaranteed in the Bill of Rights. As testified
to by SPO4 Geronimo de Leon, the
prosecution witness who was the team
leader of the policemen who investigated the
22
13 May incident, during his cross-
examination
A further perusal of the transcript reveals
that during the encounter at Brgy. Dicarma,
del Rosario was handcuffed by the police
because allegedly they had already gathered
enough evidence against him and they were
afraid that he might attempt to escape.
Custodial investigation is the stage where
the police investigation is no longer a
general inquiry into an unsolved crime but
has begun to focus on a particular suspect
taken into custody by the police who carry
out a process of interrogation that lends
itself to elicit incriminating statements. It is
well-settled that it encompasses any
question initiated by law enforcers after a
person has been taken into custody or
otherwise deprived of his freedom of action
in any significant way. This concept of
custodial investigation has been broadened
by RA 7438 42 to include "the practice of
issuing an 'invitation' to a person who is
investigated in connection with an offense
he is suspected to have committed."Section
2 of the same Act
From the foregoing, it is clear that del
Rosario was deprived of his rights during
custodial investigation. From the time he
was "invited" for questioning at the house of
the barangay captain, he was already under
effective custodial investigation, but he was
not apprised nor made aware thereof by the
investigating officers. The police already
knew the name of the tricycle driver and the
latter was already a suspect in the robbing
and senseless slaying of Virginia Bernas.
Since the prosecution failed to establish that
del Rosario had waived his right to remain
silent, his verbal admissions on his
participation in the crime even before his
actual arrest were inadmissible against him,
as the same transgressed the safeguards
provided by law and the Bill of Rights.
Del Rosario also avers that his arrest was
unlawful since there was no warrant
therefor. Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of
Court
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
— A peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact been
committed and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and,
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
It must be recalled that del Rosario was
arrested by SPO4 De Leon during the police
raid at the place of "Jun" Marquez at Brgy.
Dicarma on 14 May 1996. In People vs.
Sucro 44 we held that when a police officer
sees the offense, although at a distance,
or hears the disturbances created thereby,
and proceeds at once to the scene
thereof, he may effect an arrest without a
warrant on the basis of Sec. 5, par. (a),
Rule 113, since the offense is deemed
committed in his presence or within his
view. In essence, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113,
requires that the accused be caught in
flagrante delicto or caught immediately after
the consummation of the act. The arrest of
del Rosario is obviously outside the purview
of the aforequoted rule since he was arrested
on the day following the commission of the
robbery with homicide.
On the other hand, Sec. 5, par. (b), Rule 113,
necessitates two (2) stringent requirements
before a warrantless arrest can be effected:
(1) an offense has just been committed; and,
(2) the person making the arrest has personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested had committed it.
Hence, there must be a large measure of
immediacy between the time the offense was
committed and the time of the arrest, and if
there was an appreciable lapse of time
between the arrest and the commission of
the crime, a warrant of arrest must be
secured. Aside from the sense of immediacy,
it is also mandatory that the person making
the arrest must have personal knowledge of
certain facts indicating that the person to be
23
taken into custody has committed the crime.
Again, the arrest of del Rosario does not
comply with these requirements since, as
earlier explained, the arrest came a day after
the consummation of the crime and not
immediately thereafter. As such, the crime
had not been "just committed'' at the time
the accused was arrested. Likewise, the
arresting officers had no personal
knowledge of facts indicating that the person
to be arrested had committed the offense
since they were not present and were not
actual eyewitnesses to the crime, and they
became aware of his identity as the driver of
the getaway tricycle only during the
custodial investigation.
However, the conspicuous illegality of del
Rosario's arrest cannot affect the jurisdiction
of the court a quo because even in instances
not allowed by law, a warrantless arrest is
not a jurisdictional defect and any objection
thereto is waived when the person arrested
submits to arraignment without any
objection, as in this case.
People v Salanguit
Facts: Charges against accused-appellant
for violations of R.A. No. 6425
On December 26, 1995, Sr. Insp. Aguilar
applied for a warrant 5 in the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 90, Dasmariñas, Cavite, to
search the residence of accused-appellant
Robert Salanguit y Ko on Binhagan St.,
Novaliches, Quezon City. He presented as
his witness SPO1 Edmund Badua, who
testified that as a poseur-buyer, he was able
to purchase 2.12 grams of shabu from
accused-appellant. The sale took place in
accused-appellant's room, and Badua saw
that the shabu was taken by accused-
appellant from a cabinet inside his room.
The application was granted, and a search
warrant was later issued by Presiding Judge
Dolores L. Español.
The police operatives knocked on accused-
appellant's door, but nobody opened it.
They heard people inside the house,
apparently panicking. The police operatives
then forced the door open and entered the
house.
After showing the search warrant to the
occupants of the house, Lt. Cortes and his
group started searching the house. 8 They
found 12 small heat-sealed transparent
plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance, a paper clip box also containing a
white crystalline substance, and two bricks
of dried leaves which appeared to be
marijuana wrapped in newsprint 9 having a
total weight of approximately 1,255 grams.
A receipt of the items seized was prepared,
but the accused-appellant refused to sign it.
After the search, the police operatives took
accused-appellant with them to Station
10, EDSA, Kamuning, Quezon City, along
with the items they had seized.
Issue: First, the admissibility of the shabu
allegedly recovered from his residence as
evidence against him on the ground that the
warrant used in obtaining it was invalid.
Second, the admissibility in evidence of the
marijuana allegedly seized from accused-
appellant pursuant to the "plain view"
doctrine.
Third, the employment of unnecessary force
by the police in the execution of the warrant
Ruling: The petition is denied.
First . Rule 126, §4 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure 21 provides that a
search warrant shall not issue except upon
probable cause in connection with one
specific offense to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
things to be seized which may be anywhere
in the Philippines.
In issuing a search warrant, judges must
comply strictly with the requirements of the
Constitution and the Rules of Criminal
Procedure. No presumption of regularity can
be invoked in aid of the process when an
officer undertakes to justify its issuance.
Nothing can justify the issuance of the
search warrant unless all the legal requisites
are fulfilled.
Accused-appellant assails the validity of the
warrant on three grounds: (1) that there was
24
no probable cause to search for drug
paraphernalia; (2) that the search warrant
was issued for more than one specific
offense; and (3) that the place to be searched
was not described with sufficient
particularity.
Existence of Probable Cause
The warrant authorized the seizure of
"undetermined quantity of shabu and drug
paraphernalia." Evidence was presented
showing probable cause of the existence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu .
Accused-appellant contends, however, that
the search warrant issued is void because no
evidence was presented showing the
existence of drug paraphernalia and the
same should not have been ordered to be
seized by the trial court
The contention has no merit. To be sure,
SPO1 Edmund Badua, the intelligence
officer who acted as a poseur-buyer, did not
testify in the proceedings for the issuance of
a search warrant on anything about drug
paraphernalia
However, the fact that there was no probable
cause to support the application for the
seizure of drug paraphernalia does not
warrant the conclusion that the search
warrant is void. This fact would be material
only if drug paraphernalia was in fact seized
by the police. The fact is that none was
taken by virtue of the search warrant issued.
If at all, therefore, the search warrant is void
only insofar as it authorized the seizure of
drug paraphernalia, but it is valid as to the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
as to which evidence was presented showing
probable cause as to its existence.
It would be a drastic remedy indeed if a
warrant, which was issued on probable
cause and particularly describing the items
to be seized on the basis thereof, is to be
invalidated in toto because the judge erred in
authorizing a search for other items not
supported by the evidence. Accordingly, we
hold that the first part of the search warrant,
authorizing the search of accused-appellant's
house for an undetermined quantity of shabu
, is valid, even though the second part, with
respect to the search for drug paraphernalia,
is not.
Specificity of the Offense Charged
Accused-appellant contends that the warrant
was issued for more than one specific
offense because possession or use of
methamphetamine hydrochloride and
possession of drug paraphernalia are
punished under two different provisions of
R.A. No. 6425.
Iin People v . Dichoso 29 the search warrant
was also for "Violation of R.A. 6425,"
without specifying what provisions of the
law were violated, and it authorized the
search and seizure of "dried marijuana
leaves and methamphetamine hydrochloride
(shabu ) and sets of paraphernalias
Particularity of the Place
Accused-appellant contends that the search
warrant failed to indicate the place to be
searched with sufficient particularity.
This contention is without merit
The rule is that a description of the place to
be searched is sufficient if the officer with
the warrant can, with reasonable effort,
ascertain and identify the place intended to
be searched. 33 For example, a search
warrant authorized a search of Apartment
Number 3 of a building at 83 Pleasant
Street, Malborough, Massachusetts. As it
turned out, there were five apartments in the
basement and six apartments on both the
ground and top floors and that there was an
Apartment Number 3 on each floor.
However, the description was made
determinate by a reference to the affidavit
supporting the warrant that the apartment
was occupied by the accused "Morris
Ferrante of 83 Pleasant Street, Malboro
Mass." In this case, the location of accused-
appellant's house being indicated by the
evidence on record, there can be no doubt
that the warrant described the place to be
searched with sufficient particularity
Second. The search warrant authorized the
seizure of methamphetamine hydrochloride
or shabu but not marijuana. However,
seizure of the latter drug is being justified on
the ground that the drug was seized within
25
the "plain view" of the searching party. This
is contested by accused-appellant
Under the "plain view doctrine," unlawful
objects within the "plain view" of an officer
who has the right to be in the position to
have that view are subject to seizure and
may be presented in evidence. For this
doctrine to apply, there must be: (a) prior
justification; (b) inadvertent discovery of the
evidence; and (c) immediate apparent
illegality of the evidence before the police.
The question is whether these requisites
were complied with by the authorities in
seizing the marijuana in this case.
Prior Justification and Discovery by
Inadvertence
Because the location of the shabu was
indicated in the warrant and thus known to
the police operatives, it is reasonable to
assume that the police found the packets of
the shabu first. Once the valid portion of the
search warrant has been executed, the "plain
view doctrine" can no longer provide any
basis for admitting the other items
subsequently found.
The only other possible justification for an
intrusion by the police is the conduct of a
search pursuant to accused-appellant's
lawful arrest for possession of shabu .
However, a search incident to a lawful arrest
is limited to the person of the one arrested
and the premises within his immediate
control. The rationale for permitting such a
search is to prevent the person arrested from
obtaining a weapon to commit violence, or
to reach for incriminatory evidence and
destroy it.
The police failed to allege in this case the
time when the marijuana was found, i .e.,
whether prior to, or contemporaneous with,
the shabu subject of the warrant, or whether
it was recovered on accused-appellant's
person or in an area within his immediate
control. Its recovery, therefore, presumably
during the search conducted after the shabu
had been recovered from the cabinet, as
attested to by SPO1 Badua in his deposition,
was invalid.
Apparent Illegality of the Evidence
The marijuana bricks were wrapped in
newsprint. There was no apparent illegality
to justify their seizure. This case is similar to
People v. Musa in which we declared
inadmissible the marijuana recovered by
NARCOM agents because the said drugs
were contained in a plastic bag which gave
no indication of its contents
No presumption of regularity may be
invoked by an officer in aid of the process
when he undertakes to justify an
encroachment of rights secured by the
Constitution. In this case, the marijuana
allegedly found in the possession of
accused-appellant was in the form of two
bricks wrapped in newsprint. Not being in a
transparent container, the contents wrapped
in newsprint could not have been readily
discernible as marijuana. Nor was there
mention of the time or manner these items
were discovered. Accordingly, for failure of
the prosecution to prove that the seizure of
the marijuana without a warrant was
conducted in accordance with the "plain
view doctrine," we hold that the marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence against accused-
appellant. However, the confiscation of the
drug must be upheld.
Third. Accused-appellant claims that undue
and unnecessary force was employed by the
searching party in effecting the raid.
Rule 126, §7 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure
Right to break door or window to effect
search . — The officer, if refused admittance
to the place of directed search after giving
notice of his purpose and authority, may
break open any outer or inner door or
window of a house or any part of a house or
anything therein to execute the warrant or
liberate himself or any person lawfully
aiding him when unlawfully detained
therein. Accused-appellant's claim that the
policemen had clambered up the roof of his
house to gain entry and had broken doors
and windows in the process is unsupported
by reliable and competent proof. No
affidavit or sworn statement of disinterested
persons, like the barangay officials or
neighbors, has been presented by accused-
appellant to attest to the truth of his claim.
26
People v Caballes
Facts:
Rudy Caballes y Taiño, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of theft
That on or about the 28th day of June, 1989,
in the Municipality of Pagsanjan, and/or
elsewhere in the Province of Laguna
Did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously take, steal and carry away about
630-kg of Aluminum Cable Conductors,
valued at P27,450.00,
Petitioner pleaded not guilty
Sgt. Victorino Noceja and Pat. Alex
de Castro, while on a routine patrol in
Barangay Sampalucan, Pagsanjan,
Laguna, spotted a passenger jeep unusually
covered with "kakawati" leaves.
Suspecting that the jeep was loaded with
smuggled goods
With appellant's consent. The police officers
checked the cargo and they discovered
bundles of 3.08 mm aluminum/galvanized
conductor wires exclusively owned by
National Power Corporation (NPC).
In defense, appellant interposed denial and
alibi. He testified that he is a driver and
resident of Pagsanjan, Laguna
Since January, 1988 although his
identification card (ID) has already expired.
In the afternoon of June 28, 1989, while he
was driving a passenger jeepney, he was
stopped by one Resty Fernandez who
requested him to transport in his jeepney
conductor wires which were in Cavinti,
Laguna.
On his way to Santa Cruz, Laguna, he
dropped by the NARCOM headquarters and
informed his superior, Sgt. Callos, that
something unlawful was going to happen.
The loading was done by about five (5)
masked men. He was promised P1,000.00
for the job. Upon crossing a bridge, the two
vehicles separated but in his case, he was
intercepted by Sgt. Noceja and Pat. De
Castro.
Court a quo rendered judgment the
dispositive portion of which reads:
Finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Theft of
property
Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of
conviction but deleted the award for
damages on the ground that the stolen
materials were recovered and modified the
penalty imposed
Issue:
(a) Whether or not the constitutional right of
petitioner was violated when the police
officers searched his vehicle and seized the
wires found therein without a search warrant
and when samples of the wires and
references to them were admitted in
evidence as basis for his conviction;
(b) Whether or not respondent Court erred in
rejecting petitioner's defense that he was
engaged in an entrapment operation and in
indulging in speculation and conjecture in
rejecting said defense; and
(c) Whether or not the evidence of the
prosecution failed to establish the
guilt of petitioner beyond reasonable doubt
and thus failed to overcome the
constitutional right of petitioner to
presumption of innocence."
Ruling: The petition is granted.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES; EXCLUSIONARY RULE;
BARS ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION OF THE
RIGHT; EXCEPTIONS. — Enshrined in
our Constitution is the inviolable right of the
people to be secure in their persons and
properties against unreasonable searches and
seizures, as defined under Section 2, Article
III thereof. The exclusionary rule under
Section 3(2), Article III of the
Constitution bars the admission of evidence
obtained in violation of such right. The
constitutional proscription against
warrantless searches and seizures is not
absolute but admits of certain exceptions,
namely: (1) warrantless search incidental to
27
a lawful arrest recognized under Section 12,
Rule 126 of the Rules of Court and by
prevailing jurisprudence; (2) seizure of
evidence in plain view; (3) search of moving
vehicles; (4) consented warrantless search;
(5) customs search; (6) stop and frisk
situations (Terry search); and (7) exigent
and emergency circumstances.
WARRANTLESS SEARCH OF MOVING
VEHICLES; ALLOWED PROVIDED THE
SAME WAS MADE AT CONSTRUCTIVE
BORDERS. — Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity.
Thus, the rules governing search and seizure
have over the years been steadily liberalized
whenever a moving vehicle is the object of
the search on the basis of practicality. This
is so considering that before a warrant could
be obtained, the place, things and persons to
be searched must be described to the
satisfaction of the issuing judge — a
requirement which borders on the
impossible in the case of smuggling effected
by the use of a moving vehicle that can
transport contraband from one place to
another with impunity. We might add that a
warrantless search of a moving vehicle is
justified on the ground that it is not
practicable to secure a warrant because the
vehicle can be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant
must be sought. Searches without warrant of
automobiles is also allowed for the purpose
of preventing violations of smuggling or
immigration laws, provided such searches
are made at borders or 'constructive borders'
like checkpoints near the boundary lines of
the State.
REQUIRES PROBABLE CAUSE;
EXISTENCE OF PROBABLE CAUSE
NOT DETERMINED BY FIXED
FORMULA BUT IS RESOLVED
ACCORDING TO THE FACTS OF EACH
CASE. — The mere mobility of these
vehicles, however, does not give the police
officers unlimited discretion to conduct
indiscriminate searches without warrants if
made within the interior of the territory and
in the absence of probable cause. Still and
all, the important thing is that there was
probable cause to conduct the warrantless
search, which must still be present in such a
case. Although the term eludes exact
definition, probable cause signifies a
reasonable ground of suspicion supported by
circumstances sufficiently strong in
themselves to warrant a cautious man's
belief that the person accused is guilty of the
offense with which he is charged; or the
existence of such facts and circumstances
which could lead a reasonably discreet and
prudent man to believe that an offense has
been committed and that the items, articles
or objects sought in connection with said
offense or subject to seizure and destruction
by law is in the place to be searched. The
required probable cause that will justify a
warrantless search and seizure is not
determined by a fixed formula but is
resolved according to the facts of each case.
STOP-AND-SEARCH" AT POLICE
CHECKPOINTS; NOT ILLEGAL
PER SE ; ROUTINE INSPECTIONS; NOT
VIOLATIVE OF RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES;
LIMITATIONS; CASE AT BAR. — One
such form of search of moving vehicles is
the "stop-and-search" without warrant at
military or police checkpoints which has
been declared to be not illegal per se, for as
long as it is warranted by the exigencies of
public order and conducted in a way least
intrusive to motorists. A checkpoint may
either be a mere routine inspection or it may
involve an extensive search. Routine
inspections are not regarded as violative of
an individual's right against unreasonable
search. The search which is normally
permissible in this instance is limited to the
following instances: (1) where the officer
merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant
vehicle which is parked on the public fair
grounds; (2) simply looks into a vehicle; (3)
flashes a light therein without opening the
car's doors; (4) where the occupants are not
subjected to a physical or body search; (5)
where the inspection of the vehicles is
limited to a visual search or visual
inspection; and (6) where the routine check
is conducted in a fixed area. None of the
foregoing circumstances is obtaining in the
case at bar. The police officers did not
merely conduct a visual search or visual
28
inspection of herein petitioner's vehicle.
They had to reach inside the vehicle, lift the
kakawati leaves and look inside the sacks
before they were able to see the cable wires.
It cannot be considered a simple routine
check.
EXTENSIVE CHECK OF VEHICLE,
WHEN PERMISSIBLE. — In the case of
United States vs. Pierre, the Court held that
the physical intrusion of a part of the body
of an agent into the vehicle goes beyond the
area protected by the Fourth Amendment, to
wit: "The Agent . . . stuck his head through
the driver's side window. The agent thus
effected a physical intrusion into the vehicle
. . . [W]e are aware of no case holding that
an officer did not conduct a search when he
physically intruded part of his body into a
space in which the suspect had a reasonable
expectation of privacy. [The] Agent['s] . . .
physical intrusion allowed him to see and to
smell things he could not see or smell from
outside the vehicle . . . In doing so, his
inspection went beyond that portion of the
vehicle which may be viewed from outside
the vehicle by either inquisitive passersby or
diligent police officers, and into the area
protected by the Fourth amendment, just as
much as if he had stuck his head inside the
open window of a home." On the other
hand, when a vehicle is stopped and
subjected to an extensive search, such a
warrantless search would be constitutionally
permissible only if the officers conducting
the search have reasonable or probable cause
to believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender or they will find
the instrumentality or evidence pertaining to
a crime in the vehicle to be searched. This
Court has in the past found probable cause
to conduct without a judicial warrant an
extensive search of moving vehicles in
situations where (1) there had emanated
from a package the distinctive smell of
marijuana; (2) agents of the Narcotics
Command ("Narcom") of the Philippine
National Police ("PNP") had received a
confidential report from informers that a
sizeable volume of marijuana would be
transported along the route where the search
was conducted; (3) Narcom agents had
received information that a Caucasian
coming from Sagada, Mountain Province,
had in his possession prohibited drugs and
when the Narcom agents confronted the
accused Caucasian, because of a
conspicuous bulge in his waistline, he failed
to present his passport and other
identification papers when requested to do
so; (4) Narcom agents had received
confidential information that a woman
having the same physical appearance as that
of the accused would be transporting
marijuana; (5) the accused who were riding
a jeepney were stopped and searched by
policemen who had earlier received
confidential reports that said accused would
transport a large quantity of marijuana; and
(6) where the moving vehicle was stopped
and searched on the basis of intelligence
information and clandestine reports by a
deep penetration agent or spy — one who
participated in the drug smuggling activities
of the syndicate to which the accused
belonged — that said accused were bringing
prohibited drugs into the country.
FACT THAT VEHICLE LOOKS
SUSPICIOUS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE
PROBABLE CAUSE. — In the case at bar,
the vehicle of the petitioner was flagged
down because the police officers who were
on routine patrol became suspicious when
they saw that the back of the vehicle was
covered with kakawati leaves which,
according to them, was unusual and
uncommon. We hold that the fact that the
vehicle looked suspicious simply because it
is not common for such to be covered with
kakawati leaves does not constitute
"probable cause" as would justify the
conduct of a search without a warrant.
TIPPED INFORMATION; A SUFFICIENT
CAUSE TO EFFECT WARRANTLESS
SEARCH AND SEIZURE. — In People vs .
Chua Ho San , we held that the fact that the
watercraft used by the accused was different
in appearance from the usual fishing boats
that commonly cruise over the Bacnotan
seas coupled with the suspicious behavior of
the accused when he attempted to flee from
the police authorities do not sufficiently
establish probable cause. In addition, the
police authorities do not claim to have
received any confidential report or tipped
information that petitioner was carrying
stolen cable wires in his vehicle which could
otherwise have sustained their suspicion.
Our jurisprudence is replete with cases
29
where tipped information has become a
sufficient probable cause to effect a
warrantless search and seizure.
Unfortunately, none exists in this case.
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE; OBJECT
ITSELF IS PLAINLY EXPOSED TO
SIGHT; CASE AT BAR. — It cannot
likewise be said that the cable wires found in
petitioner's vehicle were in plain view,
making its warrantless seizure valid.
Jurisprudence is to the effect that an object
is in plain view if the object itself is plainly
exposed to sight. Where the object seized
was inside a closed package, the object itself
is not in plain view and therefore cannot be
seized without a warrant.
However, if the package proclaims its
contents, whether by its distinctive
configuration, its transparency, or if its
contents are obvious to an observer, then the
contents are in plain view and may be
seized. In other words, if the package is such
that an experienced observer could infer
from its appearance that it contains the
prohibited article, then the article is deemed
in plain view. It must be immediately
apparent to the police that the items that they
observe may be evidence of a crime,
contraband or otherwise subject to seizure. It
is clear from the records of this case that the
cable wires were not exposed to sight
because they were placed in sacks and
covered with leaves. The articles were
neither transparent nor immediately apparent
to the police authorities. They had no clue as
to what was hidden underneath the leaves
and branches. As a matter of fact, they had
to ask petitioner what was loaded in his
vehicle. In such a case, it has been held that
the object is not in plain view which could
have justified mere seizure of the articles
without further search.
CONSENTED WARRANTLESS
SEARCHES AND SEIZURE;
CONSENT MUST BE VOLUNTARY
AND MUST BE SHOWN BY CLEAR
AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE;
BURDEN OF PROOF LIES ON THE
STATE. — Doubtless, the constitutional
immunity against unreasonable searches and
seizures is a personal right which may be
waived. The consent must be voluntary in
order to validate an otherwise illegal
detention and search, i .e., the consent is
unequivocal, specific, and intelligently
given, uncontaminated by any duress or
coercion. Hence, consent to a search is not
to be lightly inferred, but must be shown by
clear and convincing evidence. The question
whether a consent to a search was in fact
voluntary is a question of fact to be
determined from the totality of all the
circumstances. Relevant to this
determination are the following
characteristics of the person giving consent
and the environment in which consent is
given: (1) the age of the defendant; (2)
whether he was in a public or secluded
location; (3) whether he objected to the
search or passively looked on; (4) the
education and intelligence of the defendant;
(5) the presence of coercive police
procedures; (6) the defendant's belief that no
incriminating evidence will be found; (7) the
nature of the police questioning; (8) the
environment in which the questioning took
place; and (9) the possibly vulnerable
subjective state of the person consenting. It
is the State which has the burden of proving,
by clear and positive testimony, that the
necessary consent was obtained and that it
was freely and voluntarily given. This Court
is not unmindful of cases upholding the
validity of consented warrantless searches
and seizure. But in these cases, the police
officers' request to search personnel effects
was orally articulated to the accused and in
such language that left no room for doubt
that the latter fully understood what was
requested. In some instance, the accused
even verbally replied to the request
demonstrating that he also understood the
nature and consequences of such request.
CASES UPHOLDING VALIDITY
THEREOF, CITED. — In Asuncion vs.
Court of Appeals, the apprehending officers
sought the permission of petitioner to search
the car, to which the latter agreed. Petitioner
therein himself freely gave his consent to
said search. In People vs . Lacerna, the
appellants who were riding in a taxi were
stopped by two policemen who asked
permission to search the vehicle and the
appellants readily agreed. In upholding the
validity of the consented search, the Court
held that appellant himself who was
"urbanized in mannerism and speech
expressly said that he was consenting to the
30
search as he allegedly had nothing to hide
and had done nothing wrong. In People vs.
Cuizon , the accused admitted that they
signed a written permission stating that they
freely consented to the search of their
luggage by the NBI agents to determine if
they were carrying shabu . In People vs .
Montilla, it was held that the accused
spontaneously performed affirmative acts of
volition by himself opening the bag without
being forced or intimidated to do so, which
acts should properly be construed as a clear
waiver of his right. In People vs . Omaweng,
the police officers asked the accused if they
could see the contents of his bag to which
the accused said "you can see the contents
but those are only clothings." Then the
policemen asked if they could open and see
it, and accused answered "you can see it."
The Court said there was a valid consented
search.
WAIVER OF CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE AGAINST OBTRUSIVE
SEARCHES; REQUISITES; CONSENT
GIVEN UNDER COERCIVE
CIRCUMSTANCES IS NO CONSENT
WITHIN THE CONSTITUTIONAL
GUARANTEE; CASE AT BAR. — In case
of consented searches or waiver of the
constitutional guarantee against obtrusive
searches, it is fundamental that to constitute
a waiver, it must first appear that (1) the
right exists; (2) that the person involved had
knowledge, either actual or constructive, of
the existence of such right, and (3) the said
person had an actual intention to relinquish
the right. In the case at bar, the evidence is
lacking that the petitioner intentionally
surrendered his right against unreasonable
searches. The manner by which the two
police officers allegedly obtained the
consent of petitioner for them to conduct the
search leaves much to be desired. When
petitioner's vehicle was flagged down, Sgt.
Noceja approached petitioner and "told him
I will look at the contents of his vehicle and
he answered in the positive." We are hard
put to believe that by uttering those words,
the police officers were asking or requesting
for permission that they be allowed to search
the vehicle of petitioner. For all intents and
purposes, they were informing, nay,
imposing upon herein petitioner that they
will search his vehicle. The "consent" given
under intimidating or coercive
circumstances is no consent within the
purview of the constitutional guaranty.
Umil v Ramos
Facts: These are eight (8) petitions for
habeas corpus filed before the Court, which
have been consolidated because of the
similarity of issues raised, praying for the
issuance of the writ of habeas corpus,
ordering the respective respondents to
produce the bodies of the persons named
therein and to explain why they should not
be set at liberty without further delay
The Court has carefully reviewed the
contentions of the parties in their respective
pleadings, and it finds that the persons
detained have not been illegally arrested nor
arbitrarily deprived of their constitutional
right to liberty, and that the circumstances
attending these cases do not warrant their
release on habeas corpus.
Section 5, Rule 113 of the Rules of Court,
"Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit en
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7."
An arrest without a warrant of arrest, under
Section 5 paragraphs (a) and (b) of Rule 113
of the Rules of Court, as amended, is
31
justified when the person arrested is caught
in flagranti delicto, viz., in the act of
committing an offense; or when an offense
has just been committed and the person
making the arrest has personal knowledge of
the facts indicating that the person arrested
has committed it. The rationale behind
lawful arrests, without warrant, was stated
by this Court in the case of People vs. Kagui
Malasugui
"To hold that no criminal can, in any case,
be arrested and searched for the evidence
and tokens of his crime without a warrant,
would be to leave society, to a large extent,
at the mercy of the shrewdest, the most
expert, and the most depraved of criminals,
facilitating their escape in many instances."
Ruling: The petition is denied.
It is to be noted that, in all the petitions here
considered, criminal charges have been filed
in the proper courts against the petitioners.
The rule is, that if a person alleged to be
restrained of his liberty is in the custody of
an officer under process issued by a court or
judge, and that the court or judge had
jurisdiction to issue the process or make the
order, or if such person is charged before
any court, the writ of habeas corpus will not
be allowed. Section 4, Rule 102, Rules of
Court
At this point, we refer to petitioners' plea for
the Court to re-examine and, thereafter,
abandon its pronouncement in Ilagan vs.
Enrile, that a writ of habeas corpus is no
longer available after an information is filed
against the person detained and a warrant of
arrest or an order of commitment is issued
by the court where said information has
been filed. 14 The petitioners claim that the
said ruling, which was handed down during
the past dictatorial regime to enforce and
strengthen said regime, has no place under
the present democratic dispensation and
collides with the basic, fundamental, and
constitutional rights of the people.
We find, however, no compelling reason to
abandon the said doctrine. It is based upon
express provision of the Rules of Court and
the exigencies served by the law. The fears
expressed by the petitioners are not really
unremediable. As the Court sees it, re-
examination or reappraisal, with a view to
its abandonment, of the Ilagan case doctrine
is not the answer. The answer and the better
practice would be, not to limit the function
of habeas corpus to a mere inquiry as to
whether or not the court which issued the
process, judgment or order of commitment
or before whom the detained person is
charged, had jurisdiction or not to issue the
process, judgment or order or to take
cognizance of the case, but rather, as the
Court itself states in Morales, Jr. vs. Enrile,
in all petitions for habeas corpus the court
must inquire into every phase and aspect of
petitioner's detention — from the moment
petitioner was taken into custody up to the
moment the court passes upon the merits of
the petition;" and "only after such a scrutiny
can the court satisfy itself that the due
process clause of our Constitution has in fact
been satisfied."
In short, all cases involving deprivation of
individual liberty should be promptly
brought to the courts for their immediate
scrutiny and disposition
Espano v CA
Facts: This is a petition for review of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
CR No. 13976 dated January 16, 1995, 1
which affirmed in toto the judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 1,
convicting petitioner Rodolfo Espano for
violation of Article II, Section 8 of Republic
Act No. 6425 as amended, otherwise
known as the Dangerous Drugs Act.
The evidence for the prosecution, based on
the testimony of Pat. Romeo Pagilagan,
shows that on July 14, 1991, at about 12:30
a.m., he and other police officers, namely,
Pat. Wilfredo Aquilino, Simplicio Rivera,
and Erlindo Lumboy of the Western
Police District (WPD), Narcotics Division
went to Zamora and Pandacan Streets,
Manila to confirm reports of drug pushing in
the area. They saw petitioner selling
"something" to another person. After the
alleged buyer left, they approached
petitioner, identified themselves as
policemen, and frisked him. The search
yielded two plastic cellophane tea bags of
marijuana . When asked if he had more
marijuana, he replied that there was more in
32
his house. The policemen went to his
residence where they found ten more
cellophane tea bags of marijuana. Petitioner
was brought to the police headquarters
where he was charged with possession of
prohibited drugs. On July 24, 1991,
petitioner posted bail 3 and the trial court
issued his order of release on July 29, 1991.
Issue:
(a) the pieces of evidence seized were
inadmissible;
(b) the superiority of his constitutional right
to be presumed innocent over the doctrine of
presumption of regularity;
(c) he was denied the constitutional right of
confrontation and to compulsory process;
and
(d) his conviction was based on evidence
which was irrelevant and not properly
identified.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
The issue on the admissibility of the
marijuana seized should likewise be ruled
upon. Rule 113 Section 5(a) of the Rules of
Court provides: "A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person: a. when, in his presence, the person
to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense
Petitioner's arrest falls squarely under the
aforecited rule. He was caught in flagranti as
a result of a buy-bust operation conducted
by police officers on the basis of
information received regarding the illegal
trade of drugs within the area of Zamora and
Pandacan Streets, Manila. The police officer
saw petitioner handing over something to an
alleged buyer. After the buyer left, they
searched him and discovered two
cellophanes of marijuana. His arrest was,
therefore, lawful and the two cellophane
bags of marijuana seized were admissible in
evidence, being the fruits of the crime.
As for the ten cellophane bags of marijuana
found at petitioner's residence, however, the
same inadmissible in evidence
The 1987 Constitution guarantees freedom
against unreasonable searches and seizures
under Article III, Section 2 which provides:
"The right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purposes shall
be inviolable, and no search warrant or
warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.".
An exception to the said rule is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest for
dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of an
offense. It may extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control.
In this case, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioner's house after
his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do
not fall under the said exceptions.
The articles seized from petitioner during his
arrest were valid under the doctrine of
search made incidental to a lawful arrest.
The warrantless search made in his house,
however, which yielded ten cellophane bags
of marijuana became unlawful since the
police officers were not armed with a search
warrant at the time. Moreover, it was
beyond the reach and control of petitioner.
CLAIM OF FRAME-UP, LIKE ALIBI, IS
A DEFENSE THAT HAS BEEN
INVARIABLY VIEWED BY THE COURT
WITH DISFAVOR; CASE AT BAR. —
The defense set up by petitioner does not
deserve any consideration. He simply
contended that he was in his house sleeping
at the time of the incident. This court has
consistently held that alibi is the weakest of
all defenses; and for it to prosper, the
accused has the burden of proving that he
was not at the scene of the crime at the time
of its commission and that it was physically
impossible for him to be there. Moreover,
the "claim of 'frame-up,' like alibi, is a
defense that has been invariably viewed by
the Court with disfavor for it can just as
easily be concocted but difficult to prove,
and is a common and standard line of
33
defense in most prosecutions arising from
violations of the Dangerous Drugs Act." No
clear and convincing evidence was
presented by petitioner to prove his defense
of alibi.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
WARRANTLESS ARREST; THE
MARIJUANA SEIZED FROM
PETITIONER'S HOUSE AFTER HIS
ARREST IS INADMISSIBLE IN
EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. — The 1987
Constitution guarantees freedom against
unreasonable searches and seizures under
Article III, Section 2 which provides: "The
right of the people to be secure in their
persons, houses, papers and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized." An
exception to the said rule is a warrantless
search incidental to a lawful arrest of
dangerous weapons or anything which may
be used as proof of the commission of an
offense. It may extend beyond the person of
the one arrested to include the premises or
surroundings under his immediate control.
In this case, the ten cellophane bags of
marijuana seized at petitioner's house after
his arrest at Pandacan and Zamora Streets do
not fall under the said exceptions. . . . The
articles seized from petitioner during his
arrest were valid under the doctrine of
search made incidental to a lawful arrest.
The warrantless search made in his house,
however, which yielded ten cellophane bags
of marijuana became unlawful since the
police officers were not armed with a search
warrant at the time. Moreover, it was
beyond the reach and control of petitioner.
People v Solayao
Facts:
Accused-appellant Nilo Solayao was
charged before the Regional Trial Court of
Naval, Biliran, Branch 16, with the crime of
illegal possession of firearm and
ammunition 1 defined and penalized under
Presidential Decree No. 1866.
CAFGU members They were to conduct an
intelligence patrol as required of them by
their intelligence officer to verify reports on
the presence of armed persons roaming
around the barangays of Caibiran.
From Barangay Caulangohan, the team of
Police Officer Niño proceeded to Barangay
Onion where they met the group of accused-
appellant Nilo Solayao numbering five
Accused-appellant's companions, upon
seeing the government agents, fled. 3
Police Officer Niño told accused-appellant
not to run away and introduced himself as
"PC," after which he seized the dried
coconut leaves which the latter was carrying
and found wrapped in it a 49-inch long
homemade firearm locally known as
"latong." When he asked accused-appellant
who issued him a license to carry said
firearm or whether he was connected with
the military or any intelligence group, the
latter answered that he had no permission to
possess the same. Thereupon, SPO3 Niño
confiscated the firearm and turned him over
to the custody of the policemen of Caibiran
who subsequently investigated him and
charged him with illegal possession of
firearm.
Accused-appellant, in his defense, did not
contest the confiscation of the shotgun but
averred that this was only given to him by
one of his companions, Hermogenes
Cenining, when it was still wrapped in
coconut leaves. He claimed that he was not
aware that there was a shotgun concealed
inside the coconut leaves since they were
using the coconut leaves as a torch. He
further claimed that this was the third torch
handed to him after the others had been used
up. 5 Accused-appellant's claim was
corroborated by one Pedro Balano that he
indeed received a torch from Hermogenes
Cenining which turned out to be a shotgun
wrapped in coconut leaves
Ruling: The petition is denied.
In assigning the first error, accused-
appellant argued that the trial court
erred in admitting the subject firearm in
evidence as it was the product of an
34
unlawful warrantless search. He maintained
that the search made on his person violated
his constitutional right to be secure in his
person and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. Not only was the
search made without a warrant but it did not
fall under any of the circumstances
enumerated under Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
Accused-appellant's arguments follow the
line of reasoning in People v . Cuizon, et al .
where this Court declared: ". . . emphasis is
to be laid on the fact that the law requires
that the search be incident to a lawful arrest,
in order that the search itself may likewise
be considered legal. Therefore, it is beyond
cavil that a lawful arrest must precede the
search of a person and his belongings. Were
a search first undertaken, then an arrest
effected based on evidence produced by the
search, both such search and arrest would be
unlawful, for being contrary to law."
The circumstances in this case are similar to
those obtaining in Posadas v . Court of
Appeals 15 where this Court held that "at
the time the peace officers identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner
as he attempted to flee, they did not know
that he had committed, or was actually
committing the offense of illegal possession
of firearm and ammunitions. They just
suspected that he was hiding something in
the buri bag. They did not know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did
not justify an arrest without a warrant."
This Court, nevertheless, ruled that the
search and seizure in the Posadas case
brought about by the suspicious conduct of
Posadas himself can be likened to a "stop
and frisk" situation. There was probable
cause to conduct a search even before an
arrest could be made.
In the present case, after SPO3 Niño told
accused-appellant not to run away, the
former identified himself as a government
agent. The peace officers did not know that
he had committed, or was actually
committing, the offense of illegal possession
of firearm. Tasked with verifying the report
that there were armed men roaming in the
barangays surrounding Caibiran, their
attention was understandably drawn to the
group that had aroused their suspicion. They
could not have known that the object
wrapped in coconut leaves which accused-
appellant was carrying hid a firearm.
As with Posadas, the case at bar constitutes
an instance where a search and seizure may
be effected without first making an arrest.
There was justifiable cause to "stop and
frisk" accused-appellant when his
companions fled upon seeing the
government agents. Under the
circumstances, the government agents could
not possibly have procured a search warrant
first.
Thus, there was no violation of the
constitutional guarantee against
unreasonable searches and seizures. Nor was
there error on the part of the trial court when
it admitted the homemade firearm as
evidence
As to the question of whether or not the
prosecution was able to prove the second
element, that is, the absence of a license or
permit to possess the subject firearm, this
Court agrees with the Office of the Solicitor
General which pointed out that the
prosecution failed to prove that accused-
appellant lacked the necessary permit or
license to possess the subject firearm.
Undoubtedly, it is the constitutional
presumption of innocence that lays such
burden upon the prosecution. The absence of
such license and legal authority constitutes
an essential ingredient of the offense of
illegal possession of firearm, and every
ingredient or essential element of an offense
must be shown by the prosecution by proof
beyond reasonable doubt
In the case at bar, the prosecution was only
able to prove by testimonial evidence that
accused-appellant admitted before Police
Officer Niño at the time that he was
accosted that he did not have any authority
or license to carry the subject firearm when
he was asked if he had one. In other words,
the prosecution relied on accused-appellant's
admission to prove the second element.
Whether an admission by the accused-
appellant can take the place of any
evidentiary means establishing beyond
35
reasonable doubt the fact averred in the
negative in the pleading and which forms an
essential ingredient of the crime charged.
This Court answers both questions in the
negative. By its very nature, an "admission
is the mere acknowledgment of a fact or of
circumstances from which guilt may be
inferred, tending to incriminate the speaker,
but not sufficient of itself to establish his
guilt." 22 In other words, it is a "statement
by defendant of fact or facts pertinent to
issues pending, in connection with proof of
other facts or circumstances, to prove guilt,
but which is, of itself, insufficient to
authorize conviction." 23 From the above
principles, this Court can infer that an
admission in criminal cases is insufficient to
prove beyond reasonable doubt the
commission of the crime charged
Moreover, said admission is extra-judicial in
nature. As such, it does not fall under
Section 4 of Rule 129 of the Revised Rules
of Court which states:
"An admission, verbal or written, made by a
party in the course of the trial or other
proceedings in the same case does not
require proof
Not being a judicial admission, said
statement by accused-appellant does not
prove beyond reasonable doubt the second
element of illegal possession of firearm. It
does not even establish a prima facie case. It
merely bolsters the case for the prosecution
but does not stand as proof of the fact of
absence or lack of a license.
Posadas v CA
Facts:
The validity of a warrantless search on the
person of petitioner is put into issue in this
case.
Integrated National Police (INP) of the
Davao Metrodiscom assigned with the
Intelligence Task Force, were conducting a
surveillance along Magallanes Street, Davao
City. While they were within the premises of
the Rizal Memorial Colleges they spotted
petitioner carrying a "buri" bag and they
noticed him to be acting suspiciously
They then checked the "buri" bag of the
petitioner where they found one (1) caliber
.38 Smith & Wesson revolver with Serial
No. 770196 1 two (2) rounds of live
ammunition for a .38 caliber gun, 2 a smoke
(tear gas) grenade 3 a and two (2) live
ammunitions for a .22 caliber gun. 4 They
brought the petitioner to the police station
for further investigation. In the course of the
same, the petitioner was asked to show the
necessary license or authority to possess
firearms and ammunitions found in his
possession but he failed to do so.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
The Solicitor General, in justifying the
warrantless search of the buri bag then
carried by the petitioner, argues that under
Section 12, Rule 126 of the Rules of
Court a person lawfully arrested may be
searched for dangerous weapons or anything
used as proof of a commission of an offense
without a search warrant. It is further alleged
that the arrest without a warrant of the
petitioner was lawful under the
circumstances. Section 5, Rule 113 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)"
36
From the foregoing provision of law it is
clear that an arrest without a warrant may be
effected by a peace officer or private person,
among others, when in his presence the
person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense; or when an offense has
in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of the facts indicating
that the person arrested has committed it.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; WARRANTLESS SEARCH
AND SEIZURE; NOT INCIDENTAL TO A
LAWFUL ARREST IN THE CASE AT
BAR. — The Solicitor General, in justifying
the warrantless search and seizure of the
buri bag then carried by the petitioner,
argued that when the two policemen
approached the petitioner, he was actually
committing or had just committed the
offense of illegal possession of firearms and
ammunitions in the presence of the police
officers and consequently the search and
seizure of the contraband was incidental to
the lawful arrest in accordance with Section
12, Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal
Procedure. We disagree. At the time the
peace officers in this case identified
themselves and apprehended the petitioner
as he attempted to flee they did not know
that he had committed, or was actually
committing the offense of illegal possession
of firearms and ammunitions. They just
suspected that he was hiding something in
the buri bag. They did now know what its
contents were. The said circumstances did
not justify an arrest without a warrant.
CAN BE VALIDLY EFFECTED
WITHOUT BEING PRECEDED BY AN
ARREST; CASE AT BAR. — However,
there are many instances where a warrant
and seizure can be effected without
necessarily being preceded by an arrest,
foremost of which is the "stop and search"
without a search warrant at military or
police checkpoints, the constitutionality or
validity of which has been upheld by this
Court in Valmonte vs. de Villa . As between
a warrantless search and seizure conducted
at military or police checkpoints and the
search thereat in the case at bar, there is no
question that, indeed, the latter is more
reasonable considering that unlike in the
former, it was effected on the basis of a
probable cause. The probable cause is that
when the petitioner acted suspiciously and
attempted to flee with the buri bag there was
a probable cause that he was concealing
something illegal in the bag and it was the
right and duty of the police officers to
inspect the same. It is too much indeed to
require the police officers to search the bag
in the possession of the petitioner only after
they shall have obtained a search warrant for
the purpose. Such an exercise may prove to
be useless, futile and much too late.
People v Aminudin
Facts: The accused-appellant claimed his
business was selling watches but he was
nonetheless arrested, tried and found guilty
of illegally transporting marijuana. The trial
court, disbelieving him, held it was high
time to put him away and sentenced him to
life imprisonment plus a fine of P20,000.00.
Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25,
1984, shortly after disembarking from the
M/V Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening,
in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in
fact waiting for him simply accosted him,
inspected his bag and finding what looked
liked marijuana leaves took him to their
headquarters for investigation. The two
bundles of suspect articles were confiscated
from him and later taken to the NBI
laboratory for examination. When they were
verified as marijuana leaves, an information
for violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act
was filed against him
The trial court was unconvinced, noting
from its own examination of the accused
that he claimed to have come to Iloilo City
to sell watches but carried only two watches
at the time, traveling from Jolo for that
purpose and spending P107.00 for fare, not
to mention his other expenses. Aminnudin
testified that he kept the two watches in a
secret pocket below his belt but, strangely,
they were not discovered when he was
bodily searched by the arresting officers nor
were they damaged as a result of his
manhandling. He also said he sold one of the
watches for P400.00 and gave away the
other, although the watches belonged not to
him but to his cousin, to a friend whose full
name he said did not even know. The trial
37
court also rejected his allegations of
maltreatment, observing that he had not
sufficiently proved the injuries sustained by
him
Ruling: The petition is granted.
It is Aminnudin's claim that he was arrested
and searched without warrant, making the
marijuana allegedly found in his possession
inadmissible in evidence against him under
the Bill of Rights. The decision did not even
discuss this point. For his part, the Solicitor
General dismissed this after an all-too-short
argument that the arrest of Aminnudin was
valid because it came under Rule 113,
Section 6(b) of the Rules of Court on
warrantless arrests. This made the search
also valid as incidental to a lawful arrest.
The mandate of the Bill of Rights is clear:
"Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized."
In the case at bar, there was no warrant of
arrest or search warrant issued by a judge
after personal determination by him of the
existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, the accused-
appellant was not caught in flagrante nor
was a crime about to be committed or had
just been committed to justify the
warrantless arrest allowed under Rule 113 of
the Rules of Court. Even expediency could
not be invoked to dispense with the
obtention of the warrant as in the case of
Roldan v. Arca , 24 for example. Here it was
held that vessels and aircraft are subject to
warrantless searches and seizures for
violation of the customs law because these
vehicles may be quickly moved out of the
locality or jurisdiction before the warrant
can be secured.
The present case presented no such urgency.
From the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least
two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search
Aminnudin who was coming to Iloilo on the
M/V Wilcon 9. His name was known. The
vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival
was certain. And from the information they
had received, they could have persuaded a
judge that there was probable cause, indeed,
to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they
did nothing. No effort was made to comply
with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who
was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that "search
warrant was not necessary.
To use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase.
The search was not an incident of a lawful
arrest because there was no warrant of arrest
and the warrantless arrest did not come
under the exceptions allowed by the Rules
of Court. Hence, the warrantless search was
also illegal and the evidence obtained
thereby was inadmissible.
ACCUSED IN CASE AT BAR WAS NOT
COMMITTING A CRIME WHEN HE
WAS ARRESTED. — In the case at bar, the
accused-appellant was not, at the moment of
his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he
had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from
the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect
and so subject to apprehension. It was the
furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification by the informer was the
probable cause as determined by the officers
(and not a judge) that authorized them to
pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately
arrest him.
38
People v Figueroa
Facts: Arturo Figueroa was charged with
Illegal Possession of Firearm and
Ammunition in an information
Willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
in his possession and control one (1) pistol
cal. 45 with defaced serial number with one
magazine and seven (7) live ammunitions
for the said firearm without first having
obtained the necessary permit or license
from competent authority to possess the
same."
When arraigned, the accused entered a plea
of "Not Guilty"; thereupon, trial ensued.
This appeal is interposed by Arturo Figueroa
(a) reiterating his argument against the
admissibility against him of evidence seized
following a warrantless search and (b)
challenging anew the credibility of the
prosecution witnesses.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
The .45 caliber pistol, magazine and rounds
of ammunition were not unlawfully
obtained. While we might concede difficulty
in readily accepting the statement of the
prosecution that the search was conducted
with consent freely given by appellant and
members of his household, it should be
pointed out, in any case, that the search and
seizure was done admittedly on the occasion
of a lawful arrest. A significant exception
from the necessity for a search warrant is
when the search and seizure is effected as an
incident to a lawful arrest 4 and so, in
People vs. Musa, 5 this Court elaborated;
thus —
"The warrantless search and seizure, as an
incident to a suspect's lawful arrest, may
extend beyond the person of the one arrested
to include the premises or surrounding
under his immediate control. Objects in the
'plain view' of an officer who has the right to
be in the position to have that view are
subject to seizure and may be presented as
evidence."
TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES;
CREDIBILITY THEREOF; NOT
AFFECTED BY INCONSISTENCIES ON
MINOR DETAILS; CASE AT BAR. —
Appellant faults the trial court for giving
credence to the testimony given by
witnesses for the prosecution despite what
he claims to be inconsistencies in their
declarations. Appellant particularly calls
attention to the assertion of prosecution
witness Sgt. Atas, to the effect that appellant
was with a companion inside a room when
arrested and that the seized firearm was
found under the cushion of the bed, against
the statement of Capt. Rosario, another
prosecution witness, that appellant was
alone when arrested and that the gun was
found under appellant's bed. We do not
consider these discrepancies to be so major
as to warrant a complete rejection of their
questioned testimony. It is not unnatural for
witnesses of the same incident to somehow
perceive differently and to thereby vary in
their respective accounts of the event. The
contradiction of witnesses on minor details
is nothing unusual and should be expected.
We see no cogent reason for not according
due respect to the findings of the trial court
on the credibility of the witnesses.
PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY
HAS BEEN REGULARLY PERFORMED;
APPLICABLE IN CASE AT BAR. — It is
claimed that appellant was just "framed-up."
The conduct of the appellant following his
arrest would belie this allegation. Appellant
himself admitted that he failed to complain
about this matter when he was apprehended.
Neither did he report the so called "planting
of the gun" to the police authorities nor did
he bring it up before the Metropolitan Trial
Judge when he appeared for preliminary
investigation. In fact, it would seem that the
only time appellant mentioned the alleged
"frame-up" was when he testified at the trial
of this case. No plausible reason was given
by appellant that would have prompted
police authorities to falsely impute a serious
crime against him. Absent a strong showing
to the contrary, we must accept the
presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duty.
39
People v Mengote
Facts: Accused-appellant Rogelio Mengote
was convicted of illegal possession of
firearms on the strength mainly of the stolen
pistol found on his person at the moment of
his warrantless arrest
Police District received a telephone call
from an informer that there were three
suspicious-looking persons at the corner of
Juan Luna and North Bay Boulevard in
Tondo, Manila. A surveillance team of
plainclothesmen was forthwith dispatched to
the place. As later narrated at the trial by
Patrolmen Rolando Mercado and Alberto
Juan, they there saw two men "looking from
side to side," one of whom was holding his
abdomen. They approached these persons
and identified themselves as policemen,
whereupon the two tried to run away but
were unable to escape because the other
lawmen had surrounded them. The suspects
were then searched. One of them, who
turned out to be the accused-appellant, was
found with a .38 caliber Smith and Wesson
revolver with six live bullets in the chamber.
His companion, later identified as Nicanor
Morellos, had a fan knife secreted in his
front right pants pocket. The weapons were
taken from them. Mengote and Morellos
were then turned over to police headquarters
for investigation by the Intelligence
Division.
Besides the police officers, one other
witness presented by the prosecution was
Rigoberto Danganan, who identified the
subject weapon as among the articles stolen
from him during the robbery in his house in
Malabon on June 13, 1987. He pointed to
Mengote as one of the robbers. He had duly
reported the robbery to the police, indicating
the articles stolen from him, including the
revolver. 2 For his part, Mengote made no
effort to prove that he owned the firearm or
that he was licensed to possess it and
claimed instead that the weapon had been
"planted" on him at the time of his arrest
Ruling: The petition is granted.
The following are the pertinent provision of
the Bill of Rights:
Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure
in their persons, houses, papers, and effects
against unreasonable searches and seizures
of whatever nature and for any purpose
shall be inviolable, and no search warrant
or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon
probable cause to be determined personally
by the judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized.
Sec. 3 (1). The privacy of communication
and correspondence shall be inviolable
except upon lawful order of the court, or
when public safety or order requires
otherwise as prescribed by law.
(2) Any evidence obtained in violation of
this or the preceding section shall be
inadmissible for any purpose in any
proceeding.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST ILLEGAL
SEARCH AND SEIZURE; EVIDENCE
OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF;
EFFECT; CASE AT BAR. — It is
submitted in the Appellant's Brief that the
revolver should not have been admitted in
evidence because of its illegal seizure, no
warrant therefor having been previously
obtained. Neither could it have been seized
as an incident of a lawful arrest because the
arrest of Mengote was itself unlawful,
having been also effected without a warrant.
The defense also contends that the testimony
regarding the alleged robbery in Danganan's
house was irrelevant and should also have
been disregarded by the trial court. There is
no question that evidence obtained as a
result of an illegal search or seizure is
inadmissible in any proceeding for any
purpose. That is the absolute prohibition of
Article III, Section 3(2), of the Constitution.
This is the celebrated exclusionary rule
based on the justification given by Judge
Learned Hand that "only in case the
prosecution which itself controls the seizing
officials, knows that it cannot profit by their
wrong will the wrong be repressed."
The Solicitor General, while conceding the
rule, maintains that it is not applicable in the
case at bar. His reason is that the arrest and
40
search of Mengote and the seizure of the
revolver from him were lawful under Rule
113, Section 5, of the Rules of Court
Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful.
— A peace officer or private person may
without a warrant, arrest a person: Cdpr
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and
(b) hereof, the person arrested without a
warrant shall be forthwith delivered to the
nearest police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE; ARREST WITHOUT
WARRANT; WHEN LAWFUL;
REQUISITES; NOT ESTABLISHED IN
CASE AT BAR. — The Solicitor General,
while conceding the rule, maintains that it is
not applicable in the case at bar. His reason
is that the arrest and search of Mengote and
the seizure of the revolver from him were
lawful under Rule 113, Section 5, of the
Rules of Court. We have carefully examined
the wording of this rule and cannot see how
we can agree with the prosecution. Par. (c)
of Section 5 is obviously inapplicable as
Mengote was not an escapee from a penal
institution when he was arrested. We
therefore confine ourselves to determining
the lawfulness of his arrest under either Par.
(a) or Par. (b) of this section. Par. (a)
requires that the person be arrested (1) after
he has committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to
commit an offense, (2) in the presence of the
arresting officer. These requirements have
not been established in the case at bar. At
the time of the arrest in question, the
accused-appellant was merely "looking from
side to side" and "holding his abdomen,"
according to the arresting officers
themselves. There was apparently no offense
that had just been committed or was being
actually committed or at least being
attempted by Mengote in their presence. Par.
(b) is no less applicable because its no less
stringent requirements have also not been
satisfied. The prosecution has not shown
that at the time of Mengote's arrest an
offense had in fact just been committed and
that the arresting officers had personal
knowledge of facts indicating that Mengote
had committed it. All they had was hearsay
information from the telephone caller, and
about a crime that had yet to be committed.
People v Rodriguez
Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch XVIII,
Tabaco, Albay, in Criminal Case No. T-
1374, finding appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4,
Article II of the Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972 (R.A. No. 6425 as amended by B.P.
No. 179).
At the ground floor of the Tabaco Bus
Terminal, Municipality of Tabaco, Province
of Albay, Philippines did then and there
willfully, unlawfully, feloniously and with
deliberate intent to violate the law had in his
possession and control dried Marijuana
leaves and seeds, sell, deliver and distribute
sticks of Marijuana
Appellant assisted by his counsel, pleaded
not guilty to the information.
Issue:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED
ON THE CONJECTURAL AND
CONFLICTING TESTIMONIES OF THE
PROSECUTION.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED
ON THE MARIJUANA SEIZED BY THE
ARRESTING OFFICERS WITHOUT
WARRANT.
41
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED
ON HIS SILENCE.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
SWORN STATEMENT OF GREGORIO
ABRERA, WHO DID NOT TAKE THE
WITNESS STAND, DESPITE HAVING
BEEN LISTED AS ONE OF THE
PROSECUTION WITNESSES.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED BASED
ON THE PRESUMPTION THAT
OFFICIAL DUTY HAS BEEN
REGULARLY PERFORMED.
Ruling: The petition is granted.
In his brief, the Solicitor General agreed
with appellant's posture that the prosecution
failed to establish the act of unlawfully
selling, distributing and delivering
marijuana as alleged in the Information
(Brief for Plaintiff-Appellee, p. 7; Rollo p.
96). But he claimed that the prosecution's
evidence indubitably established that
appellant, having been caught in flagrante
delicto in possession of marijuana
committed the crime of illegal possession of
marijuana under Section 8, Article II of
R. A. No. 6425, as amended
We agree with the Solicitor General's
assertion that the prosecution failed to
establish that appellant sold, distributed and
delivered marijuana.
The records show that the two prosecution
witnesses did not actually see appellant
transact any business dealing with
marijuana.
PRESUMPTION THAT EVIDENCE
WITHHELD IS FOR SINISTER MOTIVE.
— We have held that ". . ., when a party has
it in his possession or power to produce the
best evidence of which the case in its nature
is susceptible and withholds it, the fair
presumption is that the evidence is withheld
for some sinister motive and that its
production would thwart his evil or
fraudulent purpose (Ching Sui Yong v.
Intermediate Appellate Court , 191 SCRA
187 [1990]).
HEARSAY; SWORN STATEMENT OF
AFFIANT WHO DID NOT TESTIFY.
— The sworn statement executed by Abrera,
(Exh. D) pointing to appellant as the person
who gave him a tinfoil of marijuana is
inadmissible in evidence and has no
probative value. The failure of the
prosecution to present Abrera in court
although he was named as one of the
prosecution witnesses deprived the accused
the opportunity to cross-examine his
accuser. ". . . [C]ross-examination is an
indispensable instrument of criminal justice
to give substance and meaning to the
constitutional right of the accused to
confront the witnesses against him and to
show that the presumption of innocence has
remained steadfast and firm (People v. Pido,
200 SCRA 45 [1991]).
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; SEARCH;
OBJECTS SEIZED UNDER AN
UNLAWFUL ARREST, INADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE; CASE AT BAR. —
Admittedly, Pat. Gonzales searched
appellant without a warrant. It is contended
however that the warrantless search was
incidental to a lawful arrest. The arrest of
appellant itself was also made without a
warrant of arrest. In such a case, the arrest
can be justified only if there was a crime
committed in the presence of the arresting
officers. The marijuana supposedly
confiscated from appellant is therefore
inadmissible in evidence for having been
taken in violation of his constitutional right
against unreasonable searches and seizures.
WHEN MAY A PERSON BE SUBJECTED
THERETO. — The cardinal rule is that no
person may be subjected by the police to a
search of his house, body or personal
belonging except by virtue of a search
warrant or on the occasion of a lawful arrest
(People v. De la Cruz, 184 SCRA 416
[1990]).
EFFECTS OF ILLEGAL SEARCH ON
OBJECTS SEIZED. — "If a person is
searched without a warrant, or under
circumstances other than those justifying an
arrest without warrant in accordance with
law, merely on suspicion that he is engaged
42
in some felonious enterprise, and in order to
discover if he has indeed committed a crime,
it is not only the arrest which is illegal but
also, the search on the occasion thereof as
BEING 'the fruit of the poisonous tree'"
(Guazon v. De Villa, 181 SCRA 623 [1990];
People v. Aminnudin , 163 SCRA 402
[1988]; U.S. v. Santos, 36 Phil. 853 [1917];
U.S. v. Hachaw, 21 Phil. 514 [1912]). In that
event, any evidence taken, even if
confirmatory of the initial suspicion, is
inadmissible "for any purpose in any
proceeding" (Nolasco v. Paño , 147 SCRA
509 [1987]; People v. Burgos, 144 SCRA 1
[1986])
People v Tangliben
Facts: This is an appeal from the decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41, Third
Judicial Region at San Fernando, Pampanga,
Branch 41, finding appellant Medel
Tangliben y Bernardino guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4,
Article II of Republic Act 6425 (Dangerous
Drugs Act of 1972 as amended) and
sentencing him to life imprisonment, to pay
a fine of P20,000 and to pay the costs.
In the municipality of San Fernando,
Province of Pampanga, Philippines did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession, control
and custody one (1) bag of dried marijuana
leaves with an approximate weight of one
(1) kilo and to transport (sic) the same to
Olongapo City, without authority of law to
do so.
Only the accused testified in his defense.
Through his testimony
The accused declared that he got married on
October 25, 1981 and his wife begot a child
on June 10, 1982; that he was formerly
employed in the poultry farm of his uncle
Alejandro Caluma in Antipolo, Rizal; that
he is engaged in the business of selling
poultry medicine and feeds, including
chicks, and used to conduct his business at
Taytay, Rizal; that he goes to Subic at times
in connection with his business and
whenever he is in Subic, he used to buy C-
rations from one Nena Ballon and dispose
the same in Manila. Because he had a
drinking spree with Nena's son; that he tried
to catch the 8:00 o'clock trip to Manila from
Olongapo City but he failed and was able to
take the bus only by 9:00 o'clock that
evening; that it was a Victory Liner
Bus that he rode and because he was tipsy,
he did not notice that the bus was only
bound for San Fernando Pampanga; that
upon alighting at the Victory Liner
Compound at San Fernando, Pampanga he
crossed the street to wait for a bus going to
Manila; that while thus waiting for a bus, a
man whom he came to know later as Pat.
Punzalan, approached him and asked him if
he has any residence certificate; that when
he took out his wallet, Pat. Punzalan got the
wallet and took all the money inside the
wallet amounting to P545.00; that Pat.
Punzalan told him that he'll be taken to the
municipal building for verification as he
may be an NPA member
That he was thereafter placed under
detention and somebody told him that he is
being charged with possession of marijuana
and if he would like to be bailed out,
somebody is willing to help him; and, that
when he was visited by his wife, he told his
wife that Patrolman Silverio Quevedo took
away all his money but he told his wife not
to complain anymore as it would be
useless."
Ruling: The petition is denied.
It is contended that the marijuana allegedly
seized from the accused was a product of an
unlawful search without a warrant and is
therefore inadmissible in evidence.
This contention is devoid of merit
REMEDIAL LAW; 1985 RULES ON
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; EXCEPTIONS
TO THE REQUIRING SEARCH
WARRANT; CASE AT BAR. — One of the
exceptions to the general rule requiring a
search warrant is a search incident to a
lawful arrest. Thus, Section 12 of Rule 126
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure
provides: "Section 12. Search incident to a
lawful arrest. A person lawfully arrested
may be searched for dangerous weapons or
anything which may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense, without a search
warrant." Meanwhile, Rule 113, Sec. 5(a)
provides:
". . . A peace officer or a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person: (a)
43
When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense." Accused was caught in flagrante,
since he was carrying marijuana at the time
of his arrest. This case presented an urgency
therefore falls squarely within the exception.
The warrantless search was incident to a
lawful arrest and is consequently valid.
Although the trial court's decision did not
mention it, the transcript of stenographic
notes reveals that there was an informer who
pointed to the accused-appellant as carrying
marijuana. (TSN, pp. 52-53) Faced with
such on-the-spot information, the police
officers had to act quickly. There was not
enough time to secure a search warrant. We
cannot therefore apply the ruling i n
Aminnudin to the case at bar. To require
search warrants during on-the-spot
apprehensions of drug pushers, illegal
possessors of firearms, jueteng collectors,
smugglers of contraband goods, robbers, etc.
would make it extremely difficult, if not
impossible to contain the crimes with which
these persons are associated.
EVIDENCE; CREDIBILITY OF
WITNESS; TRIAL COURT'S FINDING;
ENTITLED TO GREAT RESPECT AND
ACCORDED THE HIGHEST
CONSIDERATION. —As to doubtfulness
of evidence, well-settled is the rule that
findings of the trial court on the issue of
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies
are entitled to great respect and accorded the
highest consideration by the appellate court.
Since credibility is a matter that is peculiarly
within the province of the trial judge, who
had first hand opportunity to watch and
observe the demeanor and behavior of
witnesses both for the prosecution and the
defense at the time of their testimony
(People v. Tejada, G.R. No. 81520, February
21, 1989; People v. Turla, 167 SCRA
278), we find no reason to disturb the
following findings.
REGULARITY OF OFFICIAL ACTS
RELATIVE TO ADMISSIBILITY OF
STATEMENT TAKEN DURING IN-
CUSTODY INTERROGATION, MUST BE
PROVED DURING TRIAL. — The alleged
extrajudicial confession of the accused
which, on the other hand, he categorically
denied in court, that he is transporting the
marijuana leaves to Olongapo City cannot
be relied upon. Even assuming it to be true,
the extrajudicial confession cannot be
admitted because it does not appear in the
records that the accused, during custodial
investigation, was apprised of his rights to
remain silent and to counsel and to be
informed of such rights. In People v. Duero ,
104 SCRA 379 [1981], the Court
pronounced that "inasmuch as the
prosecution failed to prove that before
Duero made his alleged oral confession he
was informed of his rights to remain silent
and to have counsel and because there is no
proof that he knowingly and intelligently
waived those rights, his confession is
inadmissible in evidence. This ruling was
reiterated in People v. Tolentino , 145
SCRA 597 [1986], where the Court added
that: "In effect, the Court not only abrogated
the rule on presumption of regularity of
official acts relative to admissibility of
statements taken during in-custody
interrogation but likewise dispelled any
doubt as to the full adoption of the Miranda
doctrine in this jurisdiction It is now
incumbent upon the prosecution to prove
during a trial that prior to questioning, the
confessant was warned of his
constitutionally protected rights."
DANGEROUS DRUG ACT (R.A. 6425);
PROPER AUTHENTICATION OF
MARIJUANA LEAVES SEIZED;
SUFFICIENTLY COMPLIED IN CASE
AT BAR. — Accusedappellant likewise
asserts that the package of marijuana leaves
supposedly seized from him was never
authenticated and therefore should not have
been admitted as evidence. He capitalizes on
the fact that the marijuana package brought
by Patrolman Roberto Quevedo to the PC
Crime Laboratory for examination did not
contain a tag bearing the name of the
accused. We rule, however, that since
Patrolman Quevedo testified that he gave the
marijuana package together with a letter-
request for examination, and the forensic
chemist Marilene Salangad likewise testified
that she received the marijuana together with
the letter-request and said letter-request bore
the name of the accused, then the
requirements of proper authentication of
evidence were sufficiently complied with.
The marijuana package examined by the
44
forensic chemist was satisfactorily identified
as the one seized from accused. Even
assuming arguendo that the marijuana sent
to the PC Crime Laboratory was not
properly authenticated, still, we cannot
discount the separate field test conducted by
witness Roberto Quevedo which yielded
positive results for marijuana.
NON-PRESENTATION OF INFORMER
NOT FATAL TO PROSECUTION'S
CASE. — Lastly, the appellant claims that
the evidence upon which he was convicted
was insufficient and doubtful and that the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt. In
attacking the sufficiency of evidence, the
appellant avers that the informer should
have been presented before the lower court.
We discard this argument as a futile attempt
to revive an already settled issue. This Court
has ruled in several cases that non-
presentation of the informer, where his
testimony would be merely corroborative or
cumulative, is not fatal to the prosecution's
case. (People v. Asio, G.R. No. 84960,
September 1, 1989; People v. Viola, G.R.
No. 64262, March 16, 1989; People v.
Capulong, 160 SCRA 533 [1988]; People v.
Cerelegia, 147 SCRA 538).
ACTUAL POSSESSION OF MARIJUANA
LEAVES; PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT. — The trial judge
likewise found the marijuana to weigh one
kilo, more or less, and from this finding
extracted a clear intent to transport the
marijuana leaves. It may be pointed out,
however, that although the information
stated the weight to be approximately one
kilo, the forensic chemist who examined the
marijuana leaves testified that the marijuana
weighed only 600 grams. Such amount is
not a considerable quantity as to
conclusively confer upon the accused an
intent to transport the marijuana leaves. Nor
can it be said that the intent to transport is
clearly established from the fact that the
accused was arrested at San Fernando,
Pampanga, a place which is not his
residence. Conviction of a crime with an
extremely severe penalty must be based on
evidence which is clearer and more
convincing than the inferences in this case.
What was therefore proved beyond
reasonable doubt is not his intent to
transport the marijuana leaves but his actual
possession.
Soliven v Makasiar
Facts: Subsequent events have rendered the
first issue moot and academic. On March 30,
1988, the Secretary of Justice denied
petitioners' motion for reconsideration and
upheld the resolution of the Undersecretary
of Justice sustaining the City Fiscal's finding
of a prima facie case against petitioners. A
second motion for reconsideration filed by
petitioner Beltran was denied by the
Secretary of Justice on April 7, 1988. On
appeal, the President, through the Executive
Secretary, affirmed the resolution of the
Secretary of Justice on May 2, 1988. The
motion for reconsideration was denied by
the Executive Secretary on May 16,
1988. With these developments, petitioner's
contention that they have been denied the
administrative remedies available under the
law has lost factual support.
It may also be added that with respect to
petitioner Beltran, the allegation of denial of
due process of law in the preliminary
investigation is negated by the fact that
instead of submitting his counter-affidavits,
he filed a "Motion to Declare Proceeding
Closed", in effect waiving his right to refute
the complaint by filing counter-affidavits.
Due process of law does not require that the
respondent in a criminal case actually file
his counter affidavits before the preliminary
investigation completed. All that is required
is that the respondent be given the
opportunity to submit counter-affidavits if
he is so minded.
Issue: (1) whether or not petitioners were
denied due process when informations for
libel were filed against them although the
finding of the existence of a prima facie case
was still under review by the Secretary of
Justice and, subsequently, by the President;
(2) whether or not the constitutional rights
of Beltran were violated when respondent
RTC judge issued a warrant for his arrest
without personally examining the
complainant and the witnesses, if any, to
determine probable cause;
(3) Whether or not the President of the
Philippines, under the Constitution, may
initiate criminal proceedings against the
45
petitioners through the filing of a complaint-
affidavit.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
The second issue, raised by petitioner
Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the
constitutional provision on the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision
reads:
Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search
warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue
except upon probable cause to be
determined personally by the judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the
complainant and the witnesses he may
produce, and particularly describing the
place to be searched and the persons or
things to be seized.
The addition of the word "personally" after
the word "determined" and the deletion of
the grant of authority by the 1973
Constitution to issue warrants to "other
responsible officers as may be authorized by
law", has apparently convinced petitioner
Beltran that the Constitution now requires
the judge to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses determination
of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate
interpretation.
What the Constitution underscores is the
exclusive and personal responsibility of the
issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence
of probable cause. In satisfying himself of
the existence of probable cause for the
issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is
not required to personally examine the
complainant and his witnesses. Following
established doctrine and procedure, he shall:
(1) personally evaluate the report and the
supporting documents submitted by the
fiscal regarding the existence of probable
cause and, on the basis thereof, issue a
warrant of arrest;
(2) If on the basis thereof he finds no
probable cause, he may disregard the fiscal's
report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him
in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence
of probable cause.
Sound policy dictates this procedure,
otherwise judges would be unduly laden
with the preliminary examination and
investigation of criminal complaints instead
of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.
On June 30, 1987, the Supreme Court
unanimously adopted Circular No. 12,
setting down guidelines for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. The procedure therein
provided is reiterated and clarified in this
resolution.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; DUE PROCESS OF LAW;
RESPONDENT IN A CRIMINAL CASE
NEED NOT FILE HIS COUNTER-
AFFIDAVITS BEFORE PRELIMINARY
INVESTIGATION IS DEEMED
COMPLETED. — Due process of law does
not require that the respondent in a criminal
case actually file his counter-affidavits
before the preliminary investigation is
deemed completed. All that is required is
that the respondent be given the opportunity
to submit counter-affidavits if he is so
minded.
RIGHT OF THE PEOPLE TO BE SECURE
IN THEIR PERSONS, HOUSES, PAPERS
AND EFFECTS; ISSUANCE OF
WARRANT OF ARREST; PROBABLE
CAUSE; THE JUDGE HAS EXCLUSIVE
AND PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY TO
DETERMINE EXISTENCE OF; THE
PRESIDENT. — This case is not a simple
prosecution for libel. We have as
complainant a powerful and popular
President who heads the investigation and
prosecution service and appoints members
of appellate courts but who feels so terribly
maligned that she has taken the unorthodox
step of going to court inspite of the
invocations of freedom of the press which
would inevitably follow.
HARASSMENT INHERENT IN ANY
CRIMINAL PROSECUTION; SUPREME
COURT SHOULD DRAW THE
DEMARCATION LINE WHERE
HARASSMENT GOES BEYOND
USUAL DIFFICULTIES ENCOUNTERED
BY ANY ACCUSED. — There is always
46
bound to be harassment inherent in any
criminal prosecution. Where the harassment
goes beyond the usual difficulties
encountered by any accused and results in
an unwillingness of media to freely criticize
government or to question government
handling of sensitive issues and public
affairs, this Court and not a lower tribunal
should draw the demarcation line.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; FREEDOM OF SPEECH;
WHILE DEFAMATION IS NOT
AUTHORIZED, CRITICISM IS TO BE
EXPECTED AND SHOULD BE BORNE
FOR THE COMMON GOOD. — As early
as March 8, 1918, the decision in United
States v. Bustos (37 Phil. 731) stated that
"(c)omplete liberty to comment on the
conduct of public men is a scalpel in the
case of free speech. The sharp incision of its
probe relieves the abscesses of officialdom.
Men in public life may suffer under a hostile
and unjust accusation; the wound can be
assuaged with the balm of a clear
conscience." The Court pointed out that
while defamation is not authorized, criticism
is to be expected and should be borne for the
common good.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE; PROSECUTION OF
OFFENSES; LIBEL; RULES THEREON
SHOULD BE EXAMINED FROM
VARIOUS PERSPECTIVES IF
DIRECTED AT A HIGH GOVERNMENT
OFFICIAL; THE SUPREME COURT
SHOULD DRAW A FINE LINE INSTEAD
OF LEAVING IT TO A LOWER
TRIBUNAL. — In fact, the Court observed
that high official position, instead of
affording immunity from slanderous and
libelous charges would actually invite
attacks by those who desire to create
sensation. It would seem that what would
ordinarily be slander if directed at the
typical person should be examined from
various perspectives if directed at a high
government official. Again, the Supreme
Court should draw this fine line instead of
leaving it to lower tribunals.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION;
SAFEGUARDS IN THE NAME
THEREOF SHOULD BE FAITHFULLY
APPLIED IN TRIAL OF LIBEL CASE. —
In the trial of the libel case against the
petitioners, the safeguards in the name of
freedom of expression should be faithfully
applied.
Guazon v De Villa
Facts: This is a petition for prohibition with
preliminary injunction to prohibit the
military and police officers represented by
public respondents from conducting "Areal
Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives" in
Metro Manila.
According to the petitioners, the "areal
target zonings" or "saturation drives" are in
critical areas pinpointed by the military and
police as places where the subversives are
hiding. The arrests range from seven (7)
persons during the July 20 saturation drive
in Bangkusay, Tondo to one thousand five
hundred (1,500) allegedly apprehended on
November 3 during the drive at Lower
Maricaban, Pasay City. The petitioners
claim that the saturation drives follow a
common pattern of human rights abuses.
Insofar as the legal basis for saturation
drives is concerned, the respondents cite
Article VII, Section 17 of the Constitution
which provides: "The President shall have
control of all the executive departments,
bureaus and offices. He shall ensure that the
laws be faithfully executed
They also cite Section 18 of the same Article
which provides: "The President shall be the
Commander-in-Chief of all armed forces of
the Philippines and whenever it becomes
necessary, he may call out such armed
forces to prevent or suppress lawless
violence, invasion or rebellion.
Ruling: The petition is granted
There is, of course, nothing in the
Constitution which denies the authority of
the Chief Executive, invoked by the
Solicitor General, to order police actions to
stop unabated criminality, rising
lawlessness, and alarming communist
activities. The Constitution grants to
Government the power to seek and cripple
subversive movements which would bring
down constituted authority and substitute a
regime where individual liberties are
47
suppressed as a matter of policy in the name
of security of the State. However, all police
actions are governed by the limitations of
the Bill of Rights. The Government cannot
adopt the same reprehensible methods of
authoritarian systems both of the right and
of the left, the enlargement of whose spheres
of influence it is trying hard to suppress. Our
democratic institutions may still be fragile
but they are not in the least bit strengthened
through violations of the constitutional
protections which are their distinguishing
features.
In Roan v. Gonzales One of the most
precious rights of the citizen in a free society
is the right to be left alone in the privacy of
his own house and that right is guaranty
under the constitution
The decision of the United States Supreme
Court in Rochin v. California, (342 US
165; 96 L. Ed. 183 [1952]) emphasizes
clearly that police actions should not be
characterized by methods that offend a sense
of justice.
It is significant that it is not the police action
per se which is impermissible and which
should be prohibited. Rather, it is the
procedure used or in the words of the court,
methods which "offend even hardened
sensibilities." In Breithaupt v. Abram
(352 US 432, 1 L. Ed. 2nd 448 [1957]), the
same court validated the use of evidence, in
this case blood samples involuntarily taken
from the petitioner, where there was nothing
brutal or offensive in the taking
The individual's right to immunity from
such invasion of his body was considered as
"far outweighed by the value of its deterrent
effect" on the evil sought to be avoided by
the police action.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW;
SATURATION DRIVE; CONSIDERED
UNLAWFUL IN CASE AT BAR. — The
facts that on twelve occasions between
March and November, 1987 the military
conducted the saturation drives in question
is a fact open to no question. The Solicitor
General admits that they, the saturation
drives, had been done, except that they had
been done "with due regard to human
rights." "Not only that," so he states: . . .
they were intelligently and carefully planned
months ahead of the actual operation. They
were executed in coordination with
barangay officials who pleaded with their
constituents to submit themselves
voluntarily for character and personal
verification. Local and foreign
correspondents, who had joined these
operations, witnessed, and reported the
events that transpired relative thereto. (After
Operation Reports: November 5, 1987,
Annex 12; November 20, 1987, Annex 13;
November 24, 1987, Annex 14). That is why
in all the drives so far conducted, the alleged
victims who numbered thousands had not
themselves complained. The question, then,
is purely one of law: Are the saturation
drives in question lawful and legitimate? It
is also a question that is nothing novel: No,
because the arrests were not accompanied by
a judicial warrant. Therefore, the fact that
they had been carefully planned, executed in
coordination with Tondo's barangay
officials, and undertaken with due courtesy
and politeness (which I doubt), will not
validate them. The lack of a warrant makes
them, per se, illegal. I find allusions to the
last aborted coup d'etat inapt. In that case,
our men in uniform had all the right to act
amidst crimes being committed in flagrante.
The instant case is quite different.
There are no offenses being committed, but
rather, police officers fishing for evidence of
offenses that may have been committed. As
I said, in that event, a court warrant is
indispensable.
SHOW OF FORCE" IN THE ABSENCE
OF JUDICIAL WARRANT;
CONSIDERED A VIOLATION OF
HUMAN RIGHT. — According to the
majority, "the remedy is not to stop all
police actions, including the essential and
legitimate ones . . . [w]e see nothing wrong
in police making their presence visibly felt
in troubled areas . . . " But the petitioners
have not come to court to "stop all police
actions" but rather, the saturation drives,
which are, undoubtedly, beyond police
power. That " [a] show of force is
sometimes necessary as long as the rights of
people are protected and not violated" is a
contradiction in terms. A "show of force"
(by way of saturation drives) is a violation
48
of human rights because it is not covered by
a judicial warrant. In all candor, I can not
swallow what I find is a complete
exaggeration of the issues: . . . A show of
force is sometimes necessary as long as the
rights of people are protected and not
violated. A blanket prohibition such as that
sought by the petitioners would limit all
police actions to one on one confrontations
where search warrants and warrants of
arrests against specific individuals are easily
procured. Anarchy may reign if the military
and the police decide to sit down in their
offices because all concerted drives where a
show of force is present are totally
prohibited. As a general rule, a peace officer
can not act unless he is possessed of the
proper arrest or search warrant. The
exception is when a criminal offense is
unfolding before him, in which case, action
is justified and necessary. The majority
would have the exception to be simply, the
general rule.
FALLS WITHIN THE JURISDICTION OF
SUPREME COURT. — That "the problem
is not initially for the Supreme Court " is to
me, an abdication of judicial duty. As I
indicated, the controversy is purely one of
law — the facts being undisputed. Law,
needless to say, is the problem of the
Supreme Court, not the Executive. Worse, it
is passing the buck. The petitioners,
precisely, have a grievance to raise, arising
from abuses they pinpoint to the lower
offices of the Executive (which presumably
has its imprimatur). To make it an executive
problem, so I hold, is to make the Executive
judge and jury of its own acts, and hardly, a
neutral arbiter. I am also taken aback by
references to "[w]ell meaning citizens with
only second hand knowledge of the events . .
. keep[ing] on indiscriminately tossing
problems of the Executive, the military, and
the police to the Supreme Court as if we are
the repository of all remedies for all evils."
First, the facts are not "secondhand", they
are undisputed: There had been saturation
drives. Second, the petitioners have trooped
to the highest court with a legitimate
grievance against the Executive (and
military).
Malacat v CA
Facts: In an Information 1 filed on 30
August 1990, in Criminal Case No. 90-
86748 before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 5, petitioner
Sammy Malacat y Mandar was charged with
violating Section 3 of Presidential Decree
No. 1866,
Willfully, unlawfully and knowingly keep,
possess and/or acquire a hand grenade,
without first securing the necessary license
and/or permit therefor from the proper
authorities.
At arraignment 3 on 9 October 1990,
petitioner, assisted by counsel de officio,
entered a plea of not guilty.
At trial on the merits, the prosecution
presented the following police officers as its
witnesses: Rodolfo Yu, the arresting officer;
Josefino C. Serapio, the investigating
officer; and Orlando Ramilo, who examined
the grenade.
Yu and his companions positioned
themselves at strategic points and observed
both groups for about thirty minutes. The
police officers then approached one group of
men, who then fled in different directions.
As the policemen gave chase, Yu caught up
with and apprehended petitioner. Upon
searching petitioner, Yu found a
fragmentation grenade tucked inside
petitioner's "front waist line." 7 Yu's
companion, police officer Rogelio
Malibiran, apprehended Abdul Casan from
whom a .38 caliber revolver was recovered.
Petitioner and Casan were then brought to
Police Station No. 3 where Yu placed an
"X" mark at the bottom of the grenade and
thereafter gave it to his commander
On cross-examination, Serapio admitted that
he took petitioner's confession knowing it
was inadmissible in evidence
Petitioner denied the charges and explained
that he only recently arrived in Manila.
However, several other police officers
mauled him, hitting him with benches and
guns. Petitioner was once again searched,
but nothing was found on him. He saw the
grenade only in court when it was presented.
In its decision 19 dated 10 February 1994
but promulgated on 15 February 1994, the
49
trial court thus found petitioner guilty of the
crime of illegal possession of explosives
under Section 3 of P.D. No. 1866.
In its decision of 24 January 1996, 25 the
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court,
Finally, the Court of Appeals held that the
rule laid down in People v . Mengote, which
petitioner relied upon, was inapplicable in
light of "[c]rucial differences," to
wit:
[In Mengote] the police officers never
received any intelligence report that
someone [at] the corner of a busy street
[would] be in possession of a prohibited
article. Here the police officers were
responding to a [sic] public clamor to put a
check on the series of terroristic bombings
in the Metropolis, and, after receiving
intelligence reports about a bomb threat
aimed at the vicinity of the historically
notorious Plaza Miranda, they conducted
foot patrols for about seven days to observe
suspicious movements in the area.
Furthermore, in Mengote, the police officers
[had] no personal knowledge that the person
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense. Here, PO3 Yu [had] personal
knowledge of the fact that he chased
Malacat in Plaza Miranda two days before
he finally succeeded in apprehending him.
Issue: 1. THE RESPONDENT COURT
ERRED IN AFFIRMING THE FINDING
OF THE TRIAL COURT THAT THE
WARRANTLESS ARREST OF
PETITIONER WAS VALID AND LEGAL.
2. THE RESPONDENT COURT ERRED
IN HOLDING THAT THE RULING IN
PEOPLE VS. MENGOTE DOES NOT
FIND APPLICATION IN THE
INSTANT CASE.
Ruling: The petition is granted.
Petitioner's Notice of Appeal indicated that
he was appealing from the trial court's
decision to this Court, yet the trial court
transmitted the record to the Court of
Appeals and the latter proceeded to resolve
the appeal.
We then set aside the decision of the Court
of Appeals for having been rendered without
jurisdiction, and consider the appeal as
having been directly brought to us,
Even assuming that petitioner admitted
possession of the grenade during his
custodial investigation by police officer
Serapio, such admission was inadmissible
in evidence for it was taken in palpable
violation of Section 12(1) and (3) of Article
III of the Constitution, which provide as
follows:
SEC. 12 (1). Any person under investigation
for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to be informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the
services of counsel, he must be provided
with one. These rights cannot be waived
except in writing and in the presence of
counsel.
(3) Any confession or admission obtained in
violation of this or Section
17 hereof shall be inadmissible in evidence
against him.
Serapio conducted the custodial
investigation on petitioner the day following
his arrest. No lawyer was present and
Serapio could not have requested a lawyer to
assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer was then
available. Thus, even if petitioner consented
to the investigation and waived his rights to
remain silent and to counsel, the waiver was
invalid as it was not in writing, neither was
it executed in the presence of counsel.
Even granting ex gratia that petitioner was
in possession of a grenade, the arrest and
search of petitioner were invalid
The general rule as regards arrests, searches
and seizures is that a warrant is needed in
order to validly effect the same. The
Constitutional prohibition against
unreasonable arrests, searches and seizures
refers to those effected without a validly
issued warrant, 32 subject to certain
exceptions. As regards valid warrantless
arrests, these are found in Section 5, Rule
113 of the Rules of Court,
50
Sec. 5. Arrest, without warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a private
person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped
A warrantless arrest under the circumstances
contemplated under Section 5(a) has been
denominated as one "in flagrante delicto,"
while that under Section 5(b) has been
described as a "hot pursuit" arrest.
Turning to valid warrantless searches, they
are limited to the following: (1) customs
searches; (2) search of moving vehicles; (3)
seizure of evidence in plain view; (4)
consent searches; 33 (5) a search incidental
to a lawful arrest; 34 and (6) a "stop and
frisk."
At the outset, we note that the trial court
confused the concepts of a "stop-and frisk"
and of a search incidental to a lawful arrest.
These two types of warrantless searches
differ in terms of the requisite quantum of
proof before they may be validly effected
and in their allowable scope.
WARRANTLESS ARREST; LACK OF
PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE ON THE
PART OF THE ARRESTING OFFICER
OR AN OVERT PHYSICAL ACT ON THE
PART OF THE ACCUSED, INDICATING
THAT THE CRIME HAD JUST BEEN
COMMITTED, OR WAS GOING TO BE
COMMITTED, MAKES THE SEARCH
CONDUCTED ON THE ACCUSED NOT
ONE INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL
ARREST; CASE AT BAR. — In a search
incidental to a lawful arrest, as the precedent
arrest determines the validity of the
incidental search, the legality of the arrest is
questioned in a large majority of these cases,
e.g., whether an arrest was merely used as a
pretext for conducting a search. In this
instance, the law requires that there first be a
lawful arrest before a search can be made —
the process cannot be reversed. At bottom,
assuming a valid arrest, the arresting officer
may search the person of the arrestee and the
area within which the latter may reach for a
weapon or for evidence to destroy, and seize
any money or property found which was
used in the commission of the crime, or the
fruit of the crime, or that which may be used
as evidence, or which might furnish the
arrestee with the means of escaping or
committing violence. Here, there could have
been no valid in flagrante delicto or hot
pursuit arrest preceding the search in light of
the lack of personal knowledge on the part
of Yu, the arresting officer, or an overt
physical act, on the part of petitioner,
indicating that a crime had just been
committed, was being committed or was
going to be committed. Having thus shown
the invalidity of the warrantless arrest in this
case, plainly, the search conducted on
petitioner could not have been one incidental
to a lawful arrest.
STOP AND FRISK" AS A "LIMITED
PROTECTIVE SEARCH OF OUTER
CLOTHING FOR WEAPONS
JUSTIFICATION FOR AND
ALLOWABLE SCOPE THEREOF. — We
now proceed to the justification for and
allowable scope of a "stop and- frisk" as a
"limited protective search of outer clothing
for weapons," as laid down in Terry, thus:
We merely hold today that where a police
officer observes unusual conduct which
leads him reasonably to conclude in light of
his experience that criminal activity may be
afoot and that the persons with whom he is
dealing may be armed and presently
dangerous, where in the course of
investigating this behavior he identifies
himself as a policeman and makes
reasonable inquiries, and where nothing in
the initial stages of the encounter serves to
dispel his reasonable fear for his own or
others' safety, he is entitled for the
protection of himself and others in the area
to conduct a carefully limited search of the
outer clothing of such persons in an attempt
to discover weapons which might be used to
assault him. Such a search is a reasonable
search under the Fourth Amendment . . .
Other notable points of Terry are that while
probable cause is not required to conduct a
"stop and frisk," it nevertheless holds that
51
mere suspicion or a hunch will not validate a
"stop and frisk." A genuine reason must
exist, in light of the police officer's
experience and surrounding conditions, to
warrant the belief that the person detained
has weapons concealed about him. Finally, a
"stop-and-frisk" serves a two-fold interest:
the general interest of effective crime
prevention and detection, which underlies
the recognition that a police officer may,
under appropriate circumstances and in an
appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal
behavior even without probable cause; and
(2) the more pressing interest of safety and
self-preservation which permit the police
officer to take steps to assure himself that
the person with whom he deals is not armed
with a deadly weapon that could
unexpectedly and fatally be used against the
police officer.
Here, there are at least three (3) reasons why
the "stop-and-frisk" was invalid:
First, we harbor grave doubts as to Yu's
claim that petitioner was a member of the
group which attempted to bomb Plaza
Miranda two days earlier. This claim is
neither supported by any police report or
record nor corroborated by any other police
officer who allegedly chased that group
Second, there was nothing in petitioner's
behavior or conduct which could have
reasonably elicited even mere suspicion
other than that his eyes were "moving very
fast"
Third, there was at all no ground, probable
or otherwise, to believe that petitioner was
armed with a deadly weapon. None was
visible to Yu, for as he admitted, the alleged
grenade was "discovered" "inside the front
waistline
What is unequivocal then in this case are
blatant violations of petitioner's rights
solemnly guaranteed in Sections 2 and 12(1)
of Article III of the Constitution
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE; APPEAL TO THE
SUPREME COURT; FOR PURPOSES OF
DETERMINING APPELLATE
JURISDICTION OF THE SUPREME
COURT IN CRIMINAL CASES, THE
MAXIMUM OF THE PENALTY
IMPOSABLE BY LAW IS TAKEN INTO
ACCOUNT AND NOT THE MINIMUM.
— For purposes of determining appellate
jurisdiction in criminal cases, the maximum
of the penalty, and not the minimum, is
taken into account. Since the maximum of
the penalty is reclusion perpetua, the appeal
therefrom should have been to Supreme
Court, and not the Court of Appeals,
pursuant to Section 9(3) of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980 (B.P. Blg. 129),
in relation to Section 17 of the Judiciary Act
of 1948, Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution and Section 3(c) of Rule 122 of
the Rules of Court. The term life
imprisonment as used in Section 9 of B.P.
Blg. 129, the Judiciary Act of 1948, and
Section 3 of Rule 122 must be deemed to
include reclusion perpetua in view of
Section 5(2) of Article VIII of the
Constitution.
RIGHTS OF THE ACCUSED;
PETITIONER'S ADMISSION OF
POSSESSION OF THE GRENADE
DURING CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION, WITHOUT THE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL,
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. — Even
assuming that petitioner admitted possession
of the grenade during his custodial
investigation by police officer Serapio, such
admission was inadmissible in evidence for
it was taken in palpable violation of Section
12(1) and (3) of Article III of the
Constitution. Serapio conducted the
custodial investigation on petitioner the day
following his arrest. No lawyer was present
and Serapio could not have requested a
lawyer to assist petitioner as no PAO lawyer
was then available. Thus, even if petitioner
consented to the investigation and waived
his rights to remain silent and to counsel, the
waiver was invalid as it was not in writing,
neither was it executed in the presence of
counsel.
52
People v Maspil
Facts: This petition is an appeal from the
decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Baguio City, Branch 5, the dispositive
portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, the Court finds and declare
the accuse MOISES MASPIL, JR. y
WAYWAY and SALCEDO BAGKING y
ALTAKI guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crime of illegal transportation of
marijuana as charged and hereby sentences
EACH of them to suffer LIFE
IMPRISONMENT; to pay a fine of
P20,000.00, without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to
pay their proportionate shares in the costs.
"According to Jerry Veleroso, Sgt. Amador
Ablang and Sgt. Florentino Baillo, all
members of the First Narcotics Regional
Unit of the Narcotics Command stationed in
Baguio City, (See also Exhibit "I") on
October 30, 1986, they established a
checkpoint in front of the Municipal Hall at
Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, which is along
the Halsema Highway, to check on vehicles
proceeding to Baguio City because their
Commanding Officer, Maj. Basilio
Cablayan, had been earlier tipped off by
some confidential informers that the herein
accused Maspil and Bagking would be
transporting a large volume of marijuana to
Baguio City. The informers went along with
the operatives to Sayangan.
"At about 2:00 o'clock in the early morning
of November 1, the operatives intercepted a
Sarao type jeep driven by Maspil with
Bagking as his companion. Upon inspection,
the jeep was found loaded with two (2)
plastic sacks (Exhibits "B" and "D"), one (1)
jute sack (Exhibit "C") and three (3) big
round tin cans (Exhibits "E", "F" and "G")
which, when opened contained several
bundles of suspected dried marijuana leaves
The main defense of the appellants is their
claim that the prohibited drugs belonged to
their two passengers who loaded them in the
jeep as paying cargo without the appellants
knowing that the cargo was marijuana.
In the second and third assignment of errors,
the appellants claim that the trial court erred
in not appreciating their version of the facts.
The appellants state that the trial court's
reliance on Sgt. Baillo's testimony that they
were the only ones in the jeep cannot be
given credence as Sgt. Baillo's testimony is
full of inconsistencies.
The appellants cite Sgt. Baillo's
inconsistencies as to the time of the arrest
whether morning or afternoon, the time the
checkpoint was removed and the persons
who were with him at the time of arrest.
It has been ruled that inconsistencies in the
testimonies of the prosecution witnesses not
on material points is not fatal. Moreover,
minor inconsistencies are to be expected but
must be disregarded if they do not affect the
basic credibility of the evidence as a whole.
(People v. Marcos, G.R. No. 83325, May 8,
1990)
Issue:
I
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED
MARIJUANA AS CHARGED IN THE
INFORMATION IS DIFFERENT FROM
THAT PRESENTED FOR LABORATORY
EXAMINATION.
II
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THERE WERE ONLY
TWO OCCUPANTS, THE APPELLANTS,
IN THE VEHICLE WHERE THE
ALLEGED MARIJUANA WAS
CONFISCATED.
III
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED KNEW
THAT THE CARGO THEY WERE
TRANSPORTING WAS MARIJUANA.
IV
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
ADMITTING IN EVIDENCE THE
ALLEGED CONFISCATED
MARIJUANA.
V
THAT THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
SHIFTING FROM THE PROSECUTION
THE BURDEN OF PROVING THE
COMMISSION OF THE OFFENSE
53
CHARGED TO THE APPELLANTS TO
PROVE THEIR INNOCENCE.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE;
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES; MINOR
INCONSISTENCIES DO NOT AFFECT
CREDIBILITY. — It has been ruled that
inconsistencies in the testimonies of the
prosecution witnesses not on material points
is not fatal. Moreover, minor inconsistencies
are to be expected but must be disregarded if
they do not affect the basic credibility of the
evidence as a whole. (People v. Marcos,
G.R. No. 83325, May 8, 1990)
The trial court gave credence to the positive
and categorical statement of Sgt. Baillo that
there were only two occupants, and these
were the appellants inside the jeepney at the
time (T.S.N., June 30, 1987, p. 18). We see
no cogent reason to reverse this finding of
fact.
The appellants put forward the testimony of
Lawrence Balonglong which corroborates
and affirms their stand that there were,
indeed, passengers in then jeepney.
However, a close perusal of said testimony
reveals no such corroboration
In their brief, the appellants even admit that
"he (Balonglong) did not see the passengers"
and it was just his impression that there were
other people present.
The appellants maintain that they did not
know what was in the cargo. Their main
concern was in going back to Baguio City
and they saw no need to question their two
passengers on why flowers were being kept
in closed cans and sacks. They were
apprehended after midnight. They traversed
a lonely and reputedly dangerous portion of
the mountain highway.
The appellants' version is not believable
It is likewise incredible that the appellants
did not show the slightest curiousity as to
why flowers were being kept in closed tin
cans and sealed sacks and cellophane.
On the other hand, the appellants had clear
knowledge that Luisa Mendoza was
transporting cartons containing dried fish
and canned goods on the trip out of
Baguio. It is contrary to human experience
that the appellants would inquire about the
name of the passenger and the cargo she was
loading on their jeep and not doing the same
about another who would transport goods on
a midnight trip.
Well-settled is the rule that evidence to be
believed, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be
credible itself. No better test has yet been
found to measure the value of a witness than
its conformity to the knowledge and
common experience of mankind. (People v.
Maribung , 149 SCRA 292, 297
[1987]; People v. Aldana , G.R. No. 81817,
July 27, 1989; People v. Pascua , G.R. No.
82303, December 21, 1989)
PRESUMPTION THAT OFFICIAL DUTY
WAS PERFORMED APPLICABLE TO
CASE AT BAR. — There is nothing in the
records to suggest that the arrest was
motivated by any reason other than the
desire of the police officers to accomplish
their mission. Courts generally give full
faith and credit to police officers when the
facts and circumstances surrounding then
acts sustain the presumption that they have
performed their duties in a regular manner.
CREDIBILITY OF WITNESSES;
TESTIMONY MUST CONFORM TO
HUMAN EXPERIENCE; CASE AT BAR.
— While the appellants maintain that they
did not know what was in the cargo. Their
main concern was in going back to Baguio
City and they saw no need to question their
two passengers on why flowers were being
kept in closed cans and sacks, the appellants'
version is not believable. It is inconceivable
that the appellants would not even bother to
ask the names of the strangers who
approached them in a restaurant at night
wanting to hire their jeepney, considering
that they were familiar with the identity of
the passenger, Luisa Mendoza, who hired
them to transport her goods to Abatan,
Buguias, Benguet. It is likewise incredible
that the appellants did not show the slightest
curiousity as to why flowers were being kept
in closed tin cans and sealed sacks and
54
cellophane. On the other hand, the
appellants had clear knowledge that Luisa
Mendoza was transporting cartons
containing dried fish and canned goods on
the trip out of Baguio. It is contrary to
human experience that the appellants would
inquire about the name of the passenger and
the cargo she was loading on their jeep and
not doing the same about another who
would transport goods on a midnight trip.
Wells ettled is the rule that evidence to be
believed, must not only proceed from the
mouth of a credible witness but it must be
credible itself. No better test has yet been
found to measure the value of a witness than
its conformity to the knowledge and
common experience of mankind.
ADMISSIBILITY; SLIGHT
DISCREPANCY IN THE WEIGHT IN
KILOS OF MARIJUANA, NOT
MATERIAL IN CASE AT BAR. — While
there is a discrepancy of 3.76 between the
number of kilos stated in the information
(111.9 kilos) and in the report of the forensic
chemist (115.66 kilos), the marijuana
examined by the forensic chemist, which
was contained in three big round tin cans,
two jute sacks (there was really only one
jute sack colored light green which was
confiscated but since one of the plastic sacks
[green] appeared to be tattered, some of its
contents were transferred to a white jute
sack), (T.S.N., June 23, 1987, p. 5) and two
plastic bags colored yellow and green
(T.S.N., June 23, 1987, p. 3), was positively
identified to be the same as those
confiscated from the appellants. Lt.
Valeroso testified that Exhibits "B" (yellow
plastic bag), "C" light green jute sack, "D"
(green plastic bag), "E" (one big can), "F"
(second can), "G" (third can) were, indeed,
the same articles which he saw at the back
of the jeepney of the appellants. (T.S.N.,
September 16, 1987, p. 5) One of the
appellants, Moises Maspil, even admitted
that the articles identified by Lt. Valeroso in
his testimony were indeed, the same articles
confiscated from their jeepney at Sayangan,
Atok, Benguet. (T.S.N., February 24, 1988,
pp. 34-35) Moreover, the words "more or
less" following the weight in kilos of the
marijuana in the questioned information
declare that the number of kilos stated
therein is just an approximation. It can
therefore be a little lighter or heavier. The
slight discrepancy is not material.
SEARCH WITHOUT WARRANT AT
CHECKPOINTS; VALIDITY THEREOF;
CASE AT BAR. — Upon inspection at a
checkpoint in front of the Municipal
Hall at Sayangan, Atok, Benguet, the jeep
driven by Maspil with Bagking as his
companion was found loaded with suspected
dried marijuana leaves. The appellants were
arrested as a consequence and the suspected
marijuana leaves were confiscated. The
search was conducted within reasonable
limits. There was information that a sizeable
volume of marijuana will be transported to
take advantage of the All Saints Day holiday
wherein there will be a lot of people going
to and from Baguio City (T.S.N., September
16, 1987, p. 6). In fact, during the three day
(October 30, 1986 to November 1, 1986)
duration of the checkpoint, there were also
other drug related arrests made aside from
that of the two appellants. As held in the
case of Valmonte vs. de Villa, G.R. No.
83988, September 29, 1989, checkpoints
during these abnormal times, when
conducted within reasonable limits are part
of the price we pay for an orderly society
and a peaceful community. But even without
the Valmonte ruling, the search would still
be valid. This case involves a search
incident to a lawful arrest which is one of
the exceptions to the general rule requiring a
search warrant. This exception is embodied
in Section 12 of Rule 126 of the 1985 Rules
on Criminal Procedure. The appellants were
caught in flagrante delicto since they were
transporting the prohibited drugs at the time
of their arrest. (People v. Tangliben, G.R.
No. 63630, April 6, 1990) A crime was
actually being committed.
NO SUFFICIENT TIME FOR POLICE
OFFICERS TO OBTAIN A WARRANT IN
CASE AT BAR. — The appellants,
however, cite the case of People v.
Aminnudin, (163 SCRA 402 [1988]). In said
case, the PC officers received information
that the accused-appellant, on board a vessel
bound for Iloilo City, was carrying
marijuana. When the accused-appellant was
descending the gangplank, the
PC officers detained him and inspected the
bag that he was carrying and found
marijuana. The Court ruled that since the
55
marijuana was seized illegally, it is
inadmissible in evidence. There are certain
facts of the said case which are not present
in the case before us. In the Aminnudin case,
the records showed that there was sufficient
time and adequate information for the PC
officers to have obtained a warrant. The
officers knew the name of the accused, that
the accused was on board M/V Wilcon 9,
bound to Iloilo and the exact date of the
arrival of the said vessel. On the other hand,
in this case there was no information as to
the exact description of the vehicle and no
definite time of the arrival. A jeepney cannot
be equated with a passenger ship on the high
seas. The ruling in the Aminnudin case, is
not applicable to the case at bar.
People v Malmstedt
Facts: In an information dated 15 June
1989, accused-appellant Mikael Malmstedt
(hereinafter referred to as the accused) was
charged before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of La Trinidad, Benguet, Branch 10,
in Criminal Case No. 89-CR-0663, for
violation of Section 4, Art. II of Republic
Act 6425, as amended, otherwise known as
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as
amended.
Accused Mikael Malmstedt, a Swedish
national, entered the Philippines for the third
time in December 1988 as a tourist. He had
visited the country sometime in 1982 and
1985.
In the evening of 7 May 1989, accused left
for Baguio City. Upon his arrival thereat
in the morning of the following day, he took
a bus to Sagada and stayed in that place for
two (2) days.
At about 8:00 o'clock in the morning of that
same day (11 May 1989), Captain Alen
Vasco, the Commanding Officer of the First
Regional Command (NARCOM) stationed
at Camp Dangwa, ordered his men to set up
a temporary checkpoint at Kilometer 14,
Acop, Tublay, Mountain Province, for the
purpose of checking all vehicles coming
from the Cordillera Region. The order to
establish a checkpoint in the said area was
prompted by persistent reports that vehicles
coming from Sagada were transporting
marijuana and other prohibited drugs.
Moreover, information was received by the
Commanding Officer of NARCOM, that
same morning, that a Caucasian coming
from Sagada had in his possession
prohibited drugs
During the inspection, CIC Galutan noticed
a bulge on accused's waist. Suspecting the
bulge on accused's waist to be a gun, the
officer asked for accused's passport and
other identification papers. When accused
failed to comply, the officer required him to
bring out whatever it was that was bulging
on his waist. The bulging object turned out
to be a pouch bag and when accused opened
the same bag, as ordered, the officer noticed
four (4) suspicious-looking objects wrapped
in brown packing tape, prompting the officer
to open one of the wrapped objects. The
wrapped objects turned out to contain
hashish, a derivative of marijuana.
Thereafter, accused was invited outside the
bus for questioning. But before he alighted
from the bus, accused stopped to get two (2)
travelling bags from the luggage carrier.
Upon stepping out of the bus, the officers
got the bags and opened them. A teddy bear
was found in each bag. Feeling the teddy
bears, the officer noticed that there were
bulges inside the same which did not feel
like foam stuffing. It was only after the
officers had opened the bags that accused
finally presented his passport.
Accused was then brought to the
headquarters of the NARCOM at Camp
Dangwa, La Trinidad, Benguet for further
investigation. At the investigation room, the
officers opened the teddy bears and they
were found to also contain hashish.
Representative samples were taken from the
hashish found among the personal effects of
accused and the same were brought to the
PC Crime Laboratory for chemical analysis.
During the arraignment, accused entered a
plea of "not guilty." For his defense, he
raised the issue of illegal search of his
personal effects. He also claimed that the
hashish was planted by the NARCOM
officers in his pouch bag and that the two (2)
travelling bags were not owned by him, but
were merely entrusted to him by an
56
Australian couple whom he met in Sagada.
He further claimed that the Australian
couple intended to take the same bus with
him but because there were no more seats
available in said bus, they decided to take
the next ride and asked accused to take
charge of the bags, and that they would meet
each other at the Dangwa Station.
The trial court did not give credence to
accused's defense.
The claim of the accused that the hashish
was planted by the NARCOM officers, was
belied by his failure to raise such defense at
the earliest opportunity. When accused was
investigated at the Provincial Fiscal's Office,
he did not inform the Fiscal or his lawyer
that the hashish was planted by the
NARCOM officers in his bag. It was only
two (2) months after said investigation when
he told his lawyer about said claim, denying
ownership of the two (2) travelling bags as
well as having hashish in his pouch bag.
Seeking the reversal of the decision of the
trial court finding him guilty of the crime
charged, accused argues that the search of
his personal effects was illegal because it
was made without a search warrant and,
therefore, the prohibited drugs which were
discovered during the illegal search are not
admissible as evidence against him.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
The Constitution guarantees the right of the
people to be secure in their persons, houses,
papers and effects against unreasonable
searches and seizures. 5 However, where the
search is made pursuant to a lawful arrest,
there is no need to obtain a search warrant.
A lawful arrest without a warrant may be
made by a peace officer or a private person
under the following circumstances.
"SEC. 5. Arrest without warrant; when
lawful. — A peace officer or a
private person may, without a warrant, arrest
a person:
(a) When, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense;
(b) When an offense has in fact just been
committed, and he has personal knowledge
of facts indicating that the person to be
arrested has committed it; and
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
In cases falling under paragraphs (a) and (b)
hereof, the person arrested without a warrant
shall be forthwith delivered to the nearest
police station or jail, and he shall be
proceeded against in accordance with Rule
112, Section 7. (6a, 17a)."
Accused was searched and arrested while
transporting prohibited drugs (hashish). A
crime was actually being committed by the
accused and he was caught in flagrante
delicto. Thus, the search made upon his
personal effects falls squarely under
paragraph (1) of the foregoing provisions of
law, which allow a warrantless search
incident to a lawful arrest
While it is true that the NARCOM officers
were not armed with a search warrant when
the search was made over the personal
effects of accused, however, under the
circumstances of the case, there was
sufficient probable cause for said officers to
believe that accused was then and there
committing a crime.
Probable cause has been defined as such
facts and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed,
and that the objects sought in connection
with the offense are in the place sought to be
searched. The required probable cause that
will justify a warrantless search and seizure
is not determined by any fixed formula but
is resolved according to the facts of each
case.
The receipt of information by NARCOM
that a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession, plus the
suspicious failure of the accused to produce
his passport, taken together as a whole, led
57
the NARCOM officers to reasonably believe
that the accused was trying to hide
something illegal from the authorities. From
these circumstances arose a probable cause
which justified the warrantless search that
was made on the personal effects of the
accused. In other words, the acts of the
NARCOM officers in requiring the accused
to open his pouch bag and in opening one of
the wrapped objects found inside said bag
(which was discovered to contain hashish)
as well as the two (2) travelling bags
containing two (2) teddy bears with hashish
stuffed inside them, were prompted by
accused's own attempt to hide his identity by
refusing to present his passport, and by the
information received by the NARCOM that
a Caucasian coming from Sagada had
prohibited drugs in his possession. To
deprive the NARCOM agents of the ability
and facility to act accordingly, including, to
search even without warrant, in the light of
such circumstances, would be to sanction
impotence and ineffectiveness in law
enforcement, to the detriment of society.
People v Molina
Facts: For automatic review is the Decision
2 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City,
Branch 17, in Criminal Case No. 37,264-96,
finding accused-appellants Nasario
Molina y Manamat alias "Bobong" and
Gregorio Mula y Malagura alias "Boboy,"
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation
of Section 8, 3 of the Dangerous Drugs
Act of 1972 (Republic Act No. 6425), as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, 4 and
sentencing them to suffer the supreme
penalty of death.
Upon arraignment on September 4, 1996,
accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the
accusation against them. 6 Trial ensued,
wherein the prosecution presented Police
Superintendent Eriel Mallorca, SPO1
Leonardo Y. Pamplona, Jr., and SPO1
Marino S. Paguidopon, Jr. as witnesses.
Sometime in June 1996, SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon, then a member of the
Philippine National Police detailed at
Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City,
received an information regarding the
presence of an alleged marijuana pusher in
Davao City. The first time he came to see
the said marijuana pusher in person was
during the first week of July 1996. SPO1
Paguidopon was then with his informer
when a motorcycle passed by. His informer
pointed to the motorcycle driver, accused-
appellant Mula, as the pusher. As to
accused-appellant Molina, SPO1
Paguidopon had no occasion to see him
before the arrest. Moreover, the names and
addresses of the accused-appellants came to
the knowledge of SPO1 Paguidopon only
after they were arrested.
At about 7:30 in the morning of August 8,
1996, SPO1 Paguidopon received an
information that the alleged pusher will be
passing at NHA, Maa, Davao City any time
that morning.
Consequently, at around 8:00 A.M. of the
same day, he called for assistance at the
PNP, Precinct No. 3, Matina, Davao City,
which immediately dispatched the team
At around 9:30 in the morning of August 8,
1996, while the team were positioned in the
house of SPO1 Paguidopon, a "trisikad"
carrying the accused-appellants passed by.
At that instance, SPO1 Paguidopon pointed
to the accused-appellants as the pushers.
Thereupon, the team boarded their vehicle
and overtook the "trisikad." SPO1
Paguidopon was left in his house, thirty
meters from where the accused-appellants
were accosted.
The police officers then ordered the
"trisikad" to stop. At that point,
accusedappellant Mula who was holding a
black bag handed the same to accused-
appellant Molina. Subsequently, SPO1
Pamplona introduced himself as a police
officer and asked accused-appellant Molina
to open the bag. Molina replied, "Boss, if
possible we will settle this." SPO1
Pamplona insisted on opening the bag,
which revealed dried marijuana leaves
inside. Thereafter, accused-appellants Mula
and Molina were handcuffed by the police
officers.
On December 6, 1996, accused-appellants,
through counsel, jointly filed a Demurrer to
Evidence, contending that the marijuana
allegedly seized from them is inadmissible
as evidence for having been obtained in
58
violation of their constitutional right against
unreasonable searches and seizures. The
demurrer was denied by the trial court. A
motion for reconsideration was filed by
accused-appellants, but this was likewise
denied. Accused-appellants waived
presentation of evidence and opted to file a
joint memorandum.
Issue:
I. THAT THE MARIJUANA IS
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE FOR
HAVING BEEN SEIZED IN VIOLATION
OF APPELLANTS' CONSTITUTIONAL
RIGHTS AGAINST UNREASONABLE
SEARCHES AND SEIZURES;
II.
THAT ASSUMING IT IS ADMISSIBLE
IN EVIDENCE, THE GOVERNMENT
HAS NOT OTHERWISE PROVED THEIR
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT; AND
III.
THAT, FINALLY, ASSUMING THEIR
GUILT HAS BEEN PROVED BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, THE
IMPOSABLE PENALTY FOR
VIOLATION OF SEC. 8
OF RA No. 7659 (sic ), IN THE ABSENCE
OF ANY AGGRAVATING
CIRCUMSTANCE, IS LIFE
IMPRISONMENT, NOT DEATH.
Ruling:
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURE: EXCLUSIONARY RULE;
RATIONALE FOR THE RULE. —
The fundamental law of the land mandates
that searches and seizures be carried
out in a reasonable fashion, that is, by virtue
or on the strength of a search warrant
predicated upon the existence of a probable
cause. The pertinent provision of the
Constitution provides: SEC. 2. The right of
the people to be secure in their persons,
houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of
whatever nature and for any purpose shall be
inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant
of arrest shall issue except upon probable
cause to be determined personally by the
judge after examination under oath or
affirmation of the complainant and the
witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the
persons or things to be seized
Complementary to the foregoing provision
is the exclusionary rule enshrined under
Article III, Section 3, paragraph 2, which
bolsters and solidifies the protection against
unreasonable searches and seizures Thus:
Any evidence obtained in violation of this or
the preceding section shall be inadmissible
for any purpose in any proceeding Without
this rule, the right to privacy would be a
form, of words, valueless and undeserving
of mention in a perpetual charter of
inestimable human liberties; so too, without
this rule, the freedom from state invasions of
privacy would be so ephemeral and so
neatly severed from its conceptual nexus
with the freedom from all brutish means of
coercing evidence as not to merit this
Court's high regard as a freedom implicit in
the concept of ordered liberty.
EXCEPTIONS. — The constitutional
proscription, however, is not without
exceptions. Search and seizure may be made
without a warrant and the evidence obtained
therefrom may be admissible in the
following instances: (1) search incident to a
lawful arrest; (2) search of a moving motor
vehicle; (3) search in violation of customs
laws; (4) seizure of evidence in plain view;
(5) when the accused himself waives his
right against unreasonable searches and
seizures; and (6) stop and frisk situations
(Terry search).
A SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO LAWFUL
ARREST; A LAWFUL ARREST MUST
PRECEDE THE SEARCH; PERMISSIBLE
WARRANTLESS ARREST. — The first
exception (search incidental to a lawful
arrest) includes a valid warrantless search
and seizure pursuant to an equally valid
warrantless arrest which must precede the
search. In this instance, the law requires that
there be first a lawful arrest before a search
can be made — the process cannot be
reversed. As a rule, an arrest is considered
legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of
arrest. The Rules of Court, however,
recognizes permissible warrantless arrests.
Thus, a peace officer or a private person
may, without warrant, arrest a person: (a)
when, in his presence, the person to be
arrested has committed, is actually
59
committing, or is attempting to commit an
offense (arrest in flagrante delicto); (b) when
an offense has just been committed and he
has probable cause to believe based on
personal knowledge of facts or
circumstances that the person to be arrested
has committed it (arrest effected in hot
pursuit); and (c) when the person to be
arrested is a prisoner who has escaped from
a penal establishment or a place where he is
serving final judgment or is temporarily
confined while his case is pending, or has
escaped while being transferred from one
confinement to another (arrest of escaped
prisoners).
NO WAIVER OF THE RIGHT WHERE
IMPLIED ACQUIESCENCE TO
THE SEARCH WAS GIVEN UNDER
COERCIVE CIRCUMSTANCES. —
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-
appellants waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any,
could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee
ILLEGALITY OF THE SEARCH
RENDERS ARTICLES SEIZED
INADMISSIBLE IN EVIDENCE. —
Withal, the Court holds that the arrest of
accusedappellants does not fall under the
exceptions allowed by the rules. Hence, the
search conducted on their person was
likewise illegal. Consequently, the
marijuana seized by the peace officers could
not be admitted as evidence against
accusedappellants, and the Court is thus, left
with no choice but to find in favor of
accusedappellant.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE; ARREST; IN
FLAGRANTE DELICTO ARREST. — In
People v. Chua Ho San , the Court held that
in cases of in flagrante delicto arrests, a
peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense. The
arresting officer, therefore, must have
personal knowledge of such fact or, as
recent case law adverts to, personal
knowledge of facts or circumstances
convincingly indicative or constitutive of
probable cause. As discussed in People v.
Doria , probable cause means an actual
belief or reasonable grounds of suspicion.
The grounds of suspicion are reasonable
when, in the absence of actual belief of the
arresting officers, the suspicion that the
person to be arrested is probably guilty of
committing the offense, is based on actual
facts, i.e., supported by circumstances
sufficiently strong in themselves to create
the probable cause of guilt of the person to
be arrested. A reasonable suspicion therefore
must be founded on probable cause, coupled
with good faith on the part of the peace
officers making the arrest.
RELIABLE INFORMATION ALONE
NOT SUFFICIENT TO CONSTITUTE
PROBABLE CAUSE. — As applied to in
flagrante delicto arrests, it is settled that
"reliable information" alone, absent any
overt act indicative of a felonious enterprise
in the presence and within the view of the
arresting officers, are not sufficient to
constitute probable cause that would justify
an in flagrante delicto arrest. Thus, in People
v. Aminnudin , it was held that "the
accused-appellant was not, at the moment of
his arrest, committing a crime nor was it
shown that he was about to do so or that he
had just done so. What he was doing was
descending the gangplank of the M/V
Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all
appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from
the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the
marijuana that he suddenly became suspect
and so subject to apprehension."
REQUISITES TO BE VALID. — Clearly,
to constitute a valid in flagrante delicto
arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the
person to be arrested must execute an overt
act indicating that he has just committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is
done in the presence or within the view of
the arresting officer.
60
NOT PRESENT IN CASE AT BAR. — In
the case at bar, accused-appellants
manifested no outward indication that would
justify their arrest. In holding a bag on board
a trisikad, accused-appellants could not be
said to be committing, attempting to commit
or have committed a crime. It matters not
that accused-appellant Molina responded
"Boss, if possible we will settle this" to the
request of SPO1 Pamplona to open the bag.
Such response which allegedly reinforced
the "suspicion" of the arresting officers that
accused-appellants were committing a
crime, is an equivocal statement which
standing alone will not constitute probable
cause to effect an in flagrante delicto arrest.
Note that were it not for SPO1 Marino
Paguidopon (who did not participate in the
arrest but merely pointed accused-appellants
to the arresting officers), accused-appellants
could not be the subject of any suspicion,
reasonable or otherwise.
While SPO1 Paguidopon claimed that he
and his informer conducted a surveillance of
accused-appellant Mula, SPO1 Paguidopon,
however, admitted that he only learned
Mula's name and address after the arrest.
What is more, it is doubtful if SPO1
Paguidopon indeed recognized accused-
appellant Mula. It is worthy to note that,
before the arrest, he was able to see Mula in
person only once, pinpointed to him by his
informer while they were on the side of the
road. These circumstances could not have
afforded SPO1 Paguidopon a closer look at
accused-appellant Mula, considering that the
latter was then driving a motorcycle when
SPO1 Paguidopon caught a glimpse of him.
With respect to accused-appellant Molina,
SPO1 Paguidopon admitted that he had
never seen him before the arrest.
The testimony of SPO1 Pamplona,
therefore, is entirely baseless. SPO1
Pamplona could not have learned the name
of accused-appellants from SPO1
Paguipodon because Paguipodon himself,
who allegedly conducted the surveillance,
was not even aware of accused-appellants'
name and address prior to the arrest.
Evidently, SPO1 Paguipodon, who acted as
informer of the arresting officers, more so
the arresting officers themselves, could not
have been certain of accusedappellants'
identity, and were, from all indications,
merely fishing for evidence at the time of
the arrest.
Compared to People v . Encinada, the
arresting officer in the said case knew
appellant Encinada even before the arrest
because of the latter's illegal gambling
activities, thus, lending at least a semblance
of validity on the arrest effected by the
peace officers. Nevertheless, the Court
declared in said case that the warrantless
arrest and the consequent search were
illegal, holding that "[t]he prosecution's
evidence did not show any suspicious
behavior when the appellant disembarked
from the ship or while he rode the motorela.
No act or fact demonstrating a felonious
enterprise could be ascribed to appellant
under such bare circumstances."
Moreover, it could not be said that accused-
appellants waived their right against
unreasonable searches and seizure. Implied
acquiescence to the search, if there was any,
could not have been more than mere passive
conformity given under intimidating or
coercive circumstances and is thus
considered no consent at all within the
purview of the constitutional guarantee.
People v Montilla
Facts: Accused-Appellant Ruben Montilla y
Gatdula, alias "Joy," was charged on August
27, 1994 for violating Section 4, Article II of
the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, Republic
Act No. 6425, as amended by Republic Act
No. 7659, before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 90, of Dasmariñas, Cavite
Did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously, administer, transport, and
deliver twenty-eight (28) kilos of dried
marijuana leaves, which are considered
prohibited drugs, in violation of the
provisions of R.A. 6425 thereby causing
damage and prejudice to the public interest
Appellant was apprehended by members of
the Cavite PNP transporting 28 marijuana
bricks contained in a traveling bag and a
carton box weighing 28 kilograms. The PNP
officers alleged that they acted on a tip-off
by an informant that a drug courier would be
61
arriving from Baguio City with an
undetermined amount of marijuana.
Appellant during the trial disavowed
ownership of the prohibited drugs. He
admitted coming all the way from Baguio
and proceeded to Dasmariñas, Cavite, but
denied carrying any luggage with him. The
trial culminated in a verdict of guilty beyond
reasonable doubt in a decision of the trial
court which imposed the extreme penalty of
death on appellant.
Ruling:
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE;
CREDIBILITY; FINDINGS OF FACT OF
THE TRIAL COURT GENERALLY NOT
DISTURBED ON APPEAL. — In the
present appellate review, appellant disputes
the trial court's finding that he was legally
caught in flagrante transporting the
prohibited drugs. This Court, after an
objective and exhaustive review of the
evidence on record, discerns no reversible
error in the factual findings of the trial court.
It finds unassailable the reliance of the lower
court on the positive testimonies of the
police officers to whom no ill motives can
be attributed, and its rejection of appellant's
fragile defense of denial which is evidently
self-serving in nature.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE; WHERE AN
OFFENSE MAY BE COMMITTED IN
DIFFERENT MODES, AN INDICTMENT
WOULD SUFFICE IF THE OFFENSE IS
COMMITTED IN ANY MODES
SPECIFIED THEREIN. — The governing
rule with respect to an offense which may be
committed in any of the different modes
provided by law is that an indictment would
suffice if the offense is alleged to have been
committed in one, two or more modes
specified therein. This is so as allegations in
the information of the various ways of
committing the offense should be considered
as a description of only one offense and the
information cannot be dismissed on the
ground of multifariousness.
CORROBORATED EVIDENCE; COULD
BE DISPENSED WITH BY THE
PROSECUTION. — For one, the testimony
of said informer would have been, at best,
merely corroborative of the declarations of
SPO1 Talingting and SPO1 Clarin before
the trial court, which testimonies are not
hearsay as both testified upon matters in
which they had personally taken part. As
such, the testimony of the informer could be
dispensed with by the prosecution, more so
where what he would have corroborated are
the narrations of law enforcers on whose
performance of duties regularity is the
prevailing legal presumption.
INFORMANTS ARE GENERALLY NOT
PRESENTED IN COURT. —Informants are
generally not presented in court because of
the need to hide their identities and preserve
their invaluable services to the police.
PRESENTATION OF WITNESSES FOR
THE PEOPLE PREROGATIVE OF
THE PROSECUTION. — Moreover, it is up
to the prosecution whom to present in court
as its witnesses, and not for the defense to
dictate that course.
APPELLANT CAN RESORT TO
COERCIVE PROCESS TO COMPEL
EYEWITNESS TO APPEAR. — Appellant
could very well have resorted to the coercive
process of subpoena to compel that
eyewitness to appear before the court below,
but which remedy was not availed of by
him.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES CONSTRUED. — Section 2,
Article III of the Constitution lays down the
general rule that a search and seizure must
be carried out through or on the strength of a
judicial warrant, absent which such search
and seizure becomes "unreasonable" within
the meaning of said constitutional provision.
Evidence secured on the occasion of such an
unreasonable search and seizure is tainted
and should be excluded for being the
proverbial fruit of a poisonous tree.
INSTANCES WHERE SEARCH AND
SEIZURE WITHOUT WARRANT
ALLOWED. — In the language of the
fundamental law, it shall be inadmissible in
evidence for any purpose in any proceeding.
This exclusionary rule is not, however, an
62
absolute and rigid proscription. Thus, (1)
customs searches; (2) searches of moving
vehicles; (3) seizure of evidence in plain
view; (4) consented searches; (5) searches
incidental to a lawful arrest; and (6) "stop
and frisk" measures have been invariably
recognized as the traditional exceptions.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE; SEARCH AND SEIZURE;
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO A LAWFUL
ARREST, LEGAL; CASE AT BAR. — On
the defense argument that the warrantless
search conducted on appellant invalidates
the evidence obtained from him, still the
search on his belongings and the consequent
confiscation of the illegal drugs as a result
thereof was justified as a search incidental to
a lawful arrest under Section 5(a), Rule 113
of the Rules of Court. Under that provision,
a peace officer or a private person may,
without a warrant, arrest a person when, in
his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit an offense.
PROBABLE CAUSE, REQUIRED. — A
legitimate warrantless arrest, as above
contemplated, necessarily cloaks the
arresting police officer with authority to
validly search and seize from the offender
(1) dangerous weapons, and
(2) those that may be used as proof of the
commission of an offense. On the other
hand, the apprehending officer must have
been spurred by probable cause in effecting
an arrest which could be classified as one in
cadence with the instances of permissible
arrests set out in Section 5(a). These
instances have been applied to arrests
carried out on persons caught in flagrante
delicto.
PROBABLE CAUSE, CONSTRUED. —
The conventional view is that probable
cause, while largely a relative term the
determination of which must be resolved
according to the facts of each case, is
understood as having reference to such facts
and circumstances which could lead a
reasonable, discreet, and prudent man to
believe and conclude as to the commission
of an offense, and that the objects sought in
connection with the offense are in the place
sought to be searched.
EVIDENCE; EVIDENTIARY MEASURE
FOR PROPRIETY OF FILING
CRIMINAL CHARGES AND FOR
EFFECTION OF A WARRANTLESS
ARREST, LIBERALIZED. —
Parenthetically, if we may digress, it is time
to observe that the evidentiary measure for
the propriety of filing criminal charges and,
correlatively, for effecting a warrantless
arrest, has been reduced and liberalized. In
the past, our statutory rules and
jurisprudence required prima facie evidence,
which was of a higher degree or quantum,
and was even used with dubiety as
equivalent to "probable cause." Yet, even in
the American jurisdiction from which we
derived the term and its concept, probable
cause is understood to merely mean a
reasonable ground for belief in the existence
of facts warranting the proceedings
complained of, or an apparent state of facts
found to exist upon reasonable inquiry
which would induce a reasonably intelligent
and prudent man to believe that the accused
person had committed the crime.
Felicitously, those problems and confusing
concepts were clarified and set aright, at
least on the issue under discussion, by the
1985 amendment of the Rules of Court
which provides in Rule 112 thereof that the
quantum of evidence required in preliminary
investigation is such evidence as suffices to
"engender a well founded belief" as to the
fact of the commission of a crime and the
respondent's probable guilt thereof. It has
the same meaning as the related phraseology
used in other parts of the same Rule, that is,
that the investigating fiscal "finds cause to
hold the respondent for trial," or where "a
probable cause exists." It should, therefore,
be in that sense, wherein the right to effect a
warrantless arrest should be considered as
legally authorized.
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE;
WARRANTLESS ARREST AND
SEARCH VALID WHERE ACCUSED
WAS CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO . — In the case at bar, as soon as
appellant had alighted from the passenger
jeepney the informer at once indicated to the
officers that their suspect was at hand by
pointing to him from the waiting shed. SPO1
Clarin recounted that the informer told them
that the marijuana was likely hidden inside
63
the traveling bag and carton box which
appellant was carrying at the time. The
officers thus realized that he was their man
even if he was simply carrying a seemingly
innocent looking pair of luggage for
personal effects. Accordingly, they
approached appellant, introduced themselves
as policemen, and requested him to open and
show them the contents of the traveling bag,
which appellant voluntarily and readily did.
Upon cursory inspection by SPO1 Clarin,
the bag yielded the prohibited drugs, so,
without bothering to further search the box,
they brought appellant and his luggage to
their headquarters for questioning. Here,
there were sufficient facts antecedent to the
search and seizure that, at the point prior to
the search, were already constitutive of
probable cause, and which by themselves
could properly create in the minds of the
officers a wellgrounded and reasonable
belief that appellant was in the act of
violating the law. The search yielded
affirmance both of that probable cause and
the actuality that appellant was then actually
committing a crime by illegally transporting
prohibited drugs. With these attendant facts,
it is ineluctable that appellant was caught in
flagrante delicto, hence his arrest and the
search of his belongings without the
requisite warrant were both justified.
SEARCH AND SEIZURE; WHEN AN
INDIVIDUAL VOLUNTARILY SUBMITS
TO A SEARCH, HE IS PRECLUDED
FROM LATER COMPLAINING
THEREOF.— Furthermore, that appellant
also consented to the search is borne out by
the evidence. To repeat, when the officers
approached appellant and introduced
themselves as policemen, they asked him
about the contents of his luggage, and after
he replied that they contained personal
effects, the officers asked him to open the
traveling bag. Appellant readily acceded
presumably or in all likelihood resigned to
the fact that the law had caught up with his
criminal activities. When an individual
voluntarily submits to a search or consents
to have the same conducted upon his person
or premises, he is precluded from later
complaining thereof.
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW; BILL OF
RIGHTS; RIGHT AGAINST
UNREASONABLE SEARCHES AND
SEIZURES; MAY BE WAIVED
EXPRESSLY OR IMPLIEDLY. — After
all, the right to be secure from unreasonable
search may, like other rights, be waived
either expressly or impliedly. Thus, while it
has been held that the silence of the accused
during a warrantless search should not be
taken to mean consent to the search but as a
demonstration of that person's regard for the
supremacy of the law, the case of herein
appellant is evidently different for, here, he
spontaneously performed affirmative acts of
volition by himself opening the bag without
being forced or intimidated to do so, which
acts should properly be construed as a clear
waiver of his right.
RIGHTS OF A PERSON ARRESTED,
DETAINED OR UNDER CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION; NON-OBSERVANCE
WILL NOT STRIKE DOWN
PROCEEDINGS IN THE LOWER COURT
WHERE APPELLANT DID NOT
CONFESS DURING CUSTODIAL
INVESTIGATION AND WHERE HIS
GUILT WAS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED
BY OTHER EVIDENCE. — Appellant
questions the interrogation conducted by the
police authorities, claiming that he was not
allowed to communicate with anybody, and
that he was not duly informed of his right to
remain silent and to have competent and
independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. Indeed, appellant has a point. The
police authorities here could possibly have
violated the provision of Republic Act No.
7438 which defines certain rights of persons
arrested, detained, or under custodial
investigation, as well as the duties of the
arresting, detaining, and investigating
officers, and providing corresponding
penalties for violations thereof. Assuming
the existence of such irregularities, however,
the proceedings in the lower court will not
necessarily be struck down. Firstly,
appellant never admitted or confessed
anything during his custodial investigation.
Thus, no incriminatory evidence in the
nature of a compelled or involuntary
confession or admission was elicited from
him which would otherwise have been
inadmissible in evidence. Secondly and
more importantly, the guilt of appellant was
clearly established by other evidence
64
adduced by the prosecution, particularly the
testimonies of the arresting officers together
with the documentary and object evidence
which were formally offered and admitted in
evidence in the court below.
Robin Padilla v CA
Facts: On October 26, 1992, high-powered
firearms with live ammunitions were found
in the possession of petitioner Robin @
Robinhood Padilla, i.e.: "(1) One .357
Caliber revolver, Smith and Wesson, SN-
32919 with six (6) live ammunitions;
"(2) One M-16 Baby Armalite rifle, SN-RP
131120 with four (4) long and one (1) short
magazine with ammunitions; "(3) One .380
Pietro Beretta, SN-A 35723 Y with clip and
eight (8) ammunitions; and
"(4) Six additional live double action
ammunitions of .38 caliber revolver." 1
Petitioner was correspondingly charged on
December 3, 1992, before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City with illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions
under P.D. 1866
The lower court then ordered the arrest of
petitioner, 5 but granted his application for
bail.During the arraignment on January 20,
1993, a plea of not guilty was entered for
petitioner after he refused, upon advice of
counsel, 8 to make any plea. Petitioner
waived in writing his right to be present in
any and all stages of the case
"SPO2 Borja and SPO2 Miranda alighted
from Mobile No. 3 (p. 12, TSN, February
23, 1993). SPO2 Miranda went to the
vehicle with plate number PMA 777 and
instructed its driver to alight (p. 12, ibid.).
The driver rolled down the window and put
his head out while raising both his hands.
They recognized the driver as Robin
C. Padilla, appellant in this case (p. 13,
ibid.). There was no one else with himinside
the vehicle (p. 24). At that moment, Borja
noticed that Manarang arrived and stopped
his motorcycle behind the vehicle of
appellant (p. 14, ibid). SPO2 Miranda told
appellant to alight to which appellant
complied. Appellant was wearing a short
leather jacket (p. 16, TSN, March 8, 1993)
such that when he alighted with both his
hands raised, a gun (Exhibit 'C') tucked on
the left side of his waist was revealed (p. 15;
TSN, February 23, 1993), its butt protruding
(p. 15, ibid.). SPO2 Borja made the move to
confiscate the gun but appellant held the
former' s hand alleging that the gun was
covered by legal papers (p. 16, ibid.).
SPO2 Borja, however, insisted that if the
gun really was covered by legal papers, it
would have to be shown in the office (p. 16,
ibid.). After disarming appellant,
SPO2 Borja told him about the hit and run
incident which was angrily denied by
appellant (p. 17, ibid.). By that time, a
crowd had formed at the place (p. 19, ibid.).
SPO2 Borja checked the cylinder of the gun
and find six (6) live bullets inside (p. 20,
ibid).
"While SPO2 Borja and appellant were
arguing, Mobile No. 7 with SPO Ruben
Mercado, SPO3 Tan and SPO2 Odejar on
board arrived (pp. 11-12, TSN, March 8,
1993). As the most senior police officer in
the group, SPO Mercado took over the
matter and informed appellant that he was
being arrested for the hit and run incident (p.
13, ibid.). He pointed out to appellant the
fact that the plate number of his vehicle was
dangling and the railing and the hood were
dented (p. 12, ibid.).
Appellant, however, arrogantly denied his
misdeed and, instead, played with the crowd
by holding their hands with one hand and
pointing to SPO2 Borja with his right hand
saying 'iyan, kinuha ang baril ko' (pp. 13-15,
ibid.). Because appellant's
jacket was short, his gesture exposed a long
magazine of an armalite rifle tucked in
appellant's back right pocket (p. 16, ibid.).
SPO Mercado saw this and so when
appellant turned around as he was talking
and proceeding to his vehicle, Mercado
confiscated the magazine from appellant
(pp. 16-17, ibid.). Suspecting that appellant
could also be carrying a rifle inside the
vehicle since he had a magazine, SPO2
Mercado prevented appellant from going
back to his vehicle by opening himself the
door of appellant's vehicle (16-17, ibid.). He
saw a baby armalite rifle (Exhibit D) lying
horizontally at the front by the driver's seat.
It had a long magazine filled with live
bullets in a semi-automatic mode (pp. 17-21,
ibid.). He asked appellant for the papers
covering the rifle and appellant answered
angrily that they were at his home (pp. 26-
65
27, ibid.). SPO Mercado modified the arrest
of appellant by including as its ground
illegal possession of firearms (p. 28, ibid.).
SPO Mercado then read to appellant his
constitutional rights (pp. 28-29, ibid).
"The police officers brought appellant to the
Traffic Division at Jake Gonzales
Boulevard (pp. 31-32, ibid.) where appellant
voluntarily surrendered a third firearm, a
pietro berreta pistol (Exhibit 'L') with a
single round in its chamber and a magazine
(pp. 33-35, ibid.) loaded with seven (7) other
live bullets. Appellant also voluntarily
surrendered a black bag containing two
additional long magazines and one short
magazine (Exhibits M, N, and O, pp. 36-37,
ibid.) After appellant had been interrogated
by the Chief of the Traffic Division, he was
transferred to the Police Investigation
Division at Sto. Rosario Street beside the
City Hall Building where he and the
firearms and ammunitions were turned over
to SPO2 Rene Jesus Gregorio (pp. 5-10,
TSN, July 13, 1993) During the
investigation, appellant admitted possession
of the firearms stating that he used them for
shooting (p. 14, ibid.). He was not able to
produce any permit to carry or memorandum
receipt to cover the three firearms (pp. 16-
18, TSN, January 25, 1994).
"On November 28, 1992, a certification
(Exhibit 'F') was issued by Captain, Senior
Inspector Mario Espino, PNP, Chief, Record
Branch of the Firearms and Explosives
Office (pp. 7-8, TSN, March 4, 1993). The
Certification stated that the three firearms
confiscated from appellant, an M-16 Baby
armalite rifle SN-RP 1312 80, a .357 caliber
revolver Smith and Wesson SN 32919 and a
.380 Pietro Beretta SNA35720, were not
registered in the name of Robin C. Padilla
(p. 6, ibid.). A second Certification dated
December 11, 1992 issued by Captain
Espino stated that the three firearms were
not also registered in the name of
Robinhood C. Padilla (p. 10, ibid)."
Petitioner's defenses are as follows: (1) that
his arrest was illegal and consequently, the
firearms and ammunitions taken in the
course thereof are inadmissible in evidence
under the exclusionary rule; (2) that he is a
confidential agent authorized, under a
Mission Order and Memorandum Receipt, to
carry the subject firearms; and (3) that the
penalty for simple illegal possession
constitutes excessive and cruel punishment
proscribed by the 1987 Constitution.
Ruling: The petition is denied.
REMEDIAL LAW; CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE; ARREST;
WARRANTLESS ARREST; GROUNDS.
— Warrantless arrests are sanctioned in the
following instances: "Sec. 5. Arrest without
warrant ; when lawful. — A peace officer or
a private person may, without a warrant,
arrest a person: (a) When, in his presence,
the person to be arrested has committed, is
actually committing, or is attempting to
commit an offense., (b) When an offense has
in fact just been committed, and he has
personal knowledge of facts indicating that
the person to be arrested has committed it;
(c) When the person to be arrested is a
prisoner who has escaped from a penal
establishment or place where he is serving
final judgment or temporarily confined
while his case is pending, or has escaped
while being transferred from one
confinement to another.
PRESENCE OF ARRESTING OFFICER
OR PRIVATE PERSON"; PRESENCE
DOES NOT ONLY REQUIRE THE
PERSON TO SEE THE OFFENSE BUT
ALSO WHEN HE "HEARS THE
DISTURBANCE CREATED AND
PROCEEDS AT ONCE TO THE SCENE";
CASE AT BAR. — Paragraph (a) requires
that the person be arrested (i) after he has
committed or while he is actually
committing or is at least attempting to
commit an offense, (ii) in the presence of the
arresting officer or private person. Both
elements concurred here, as it has been
established that petitioner's vehicle figured
in a hit and run — an offense committed in
the "presence" of Manarang, a private
person, who then sought to arrest petitioner.
It must be stressed at this point that
"presence" does not only require
that the arresting person sees the offense, but
also when he "hears the disturbance
created thereby AND proceeds at once to the
scene." As testified to by Manarang, he
heard the screeching of tires followed by a
thud, saw the sideswiped victim (balut
vendor), reported the incident to the police
66
and thereafter gave chase to the erring
Pajero vehicle using his motorcycle in order
to apprehend its driver. After having sent a
radio report to the PNP for assistance,
Manarang proceeded to the Abacan bridge
where he found responding policemen SPO2
Borja and SPO2 Miranda already positioned
near the bridge who effected the actual
arrest of petitioner.
RATIONALE. — It is appropriate to state at
this juncture that a suspect, like petitioner
herein, cannot defeat the arrest which has
been set in motion in a public place for want
of a warrant as the police was confronted by
an urgent need to render aid or take action.
The exigent circumstances of hot pursuit, a
fleeing suspect, a moving vehicle, the public
place and the raining nighttime all created a
situation in which speed is essential and
delay improvident. The court acknowledges
police authority to make the forcible stop
since they had more than mere "reasonable
and articulable" suspicion that the occupant
of the vehicle has been engaged in criminal
activity.
WHEN CAUGHT IN FLAGRANTE
DELICTO. — When caught in flagrante
delicto with possession of an unlicensed arm
(Smith & Wesson) and ammunition (M-16
magazine), petitioner's warrantless arrest
was proper as he was again actually
committing another offense (illegal
possession of firearm and ammunitions) and
this time in the presence of a peace officer.
Besides, the policemen's warrantless arrest
of petitioner could likewise be justified
under paragraph (b) as he had in fact just
committed an offense. There was no
supervening event or a considerable lapse of
time between the hit and run and the actual
apprehension. Moreover, after having
stationed themselves at the Abacan bridge in
response to Manarang's report, the
policemen saw for themselves the fast
approaching Pajero of petitioner, its
dangling plate number (PMA 777 as
reported by Manarang), and the dented hood
and railings thereof. These formed part of
the arresting police officer's personal
knowledge of the facts indicating that,
petitioner's Pajero was indeed the vehicle
involved in the hit and run accident. Verily
their, the arresting police officers acted upon
verified personal knowledge and not on
unreliable hearsay information.
OBJECTION, DEFECT OR
IRREGULARITY MUST BE MADE
BEFORE PLEA. — Any objection, defect
or irregularity attending an arrest must be
made before the accused enters his plea.
Petitioner's belated challenge thereto aside
from his failure to quash the information, his
participation in the trial and by presenting
his evidence, placed him in estoppel to assail
the legality of his arrest. Likewise, by
applying for bail, petitioner patently waived
such irregularities and defects.
WARRANTLESS SEARCH AND
SEIZURE OF PROPERTY; WHEN
VALID. — The five (5) well-settled
instances when a warrantless search and
seizure of property is valid, are as follows:
1. warrantless search incidental to a lawful
arrest recognized under Section 12, Rule
126 of the Rules of Court and by prevailing
jurisprudence. 2. Seizure of evidence in
"plain view," the elements of which are: (a).
a prior valid intrusion based on the valid
warrantless arrest in which the police are
legally present in the pursuit of their official
duties; (b). the evidence was inadvertently
discovered by the police who had the right
to be where they are; (c). the evidence must
be immediately apparent, and (d). "plain
view" justified mere seizure of evidence
without further search. 3.search of a moving
vehicle. Highly regulated by the
government, the vehicle's inherent mobility
reduces expectation of privacy especially
when its transit in public thoroughfares
furnishes a highly reasonable suspicion
amounting to probable cause that the
occupant committed a criminal activity. 4.
consented warrantless search, and 5.
customs search.
PLAINVIEW" DOCTRINE; APPLIED IN
CASE AT BAR. — The seizure of the
Smith & Wesson revolver and an M-16 rifle
magazine was justified for they came within
"plain view" of the policemen who
inadvertently discovered the revolver and
magazine tucked in petitioner's waist and
back pocket respectively, when he raised his
hands after alighting from his Pajero. The
same justification applies to the confiscation
of the M-16 armalite rifle which was
67
immediately apparent to the policemen as
they took a casual glance at the Pajero and
saw said rifle lying horizontally near the
driver's seat. Thus, it has been held that:
"(W)hen in pursuing an illegal action or in
the commission of a criminal offense, the . .
. police officers should happen to discover a
criminal offense being committed by any
person, they are not precluded from
performing their duties as police officers for
the apprehension of the guilty person and
the taking of the corpus delicti."
VOLUNTARY SURRENDER OF
FIREARM AND ASSORTED
MAGAZINE, WAIVER OF RIGHT
AGAINST ILLEGAL SEARCH AND
SEIZURE. — With respect to the
Berreta pistol and a black bag containing
assorted magazines, petitioner voluntarily
surrendered them to the police. This latter
gesture of petitioner indicated a waiver of
his right against the alleged search and
seizure, and that his failure to quash the
information estopped him from assailing any
purported defect.
SEARCH INCIDENTAL TO AN ARREST.
— Even assuming that the firearms and
ammunitions were products of an active
search done by the authorities on the person
and vehicle of petitioner, their seizure
without a search warrant nonetheless can
still be justified under a search incidental to
a lawful arrest (first instance). Once the
lawful arrest was effected, the police may
undertake a protective search of the
passenger compartment and containers in
the vehicle which are within petitioner's
grabbing distance regardless of the nature of
the offense. This satisfied the two-tiered test
of an incidental search: (i) the item to be
searched (vehicle) was within the arrestee's
custody or area of immediate control and (ii)
the search was contemporaneous with the
arrest. The products of that search are
admissible evidence not excluded by the
exclusionary rule. Another justification is a
search of a moving vehicle (third instance).
In connection therewith, a warrantless
search is constitutionally permissible when,
as in this case, the officers conducting the
search have reasonable or probable cause to
believe, before the search, that either the
motorist is a law-offender (like herein
petitioner with respect to the hit and run) or
the contents or cargo of the vehicle are or
have been instruments or the subject matter
or the proceeds of some criminal offense.
CRIMINAL LAW; ILLEGAL
POSSESSION OF FIREARM;
REQUISITES. — In crimes involving
illegal possession of firearm, two requisites
must be established, viz.: (1) the existence
of the subject firearm and, (2) the fact that
the accused who owned or possessed the
firearm does not have the corresponding
license permit to possess.
CASE AT BAR. — The first element is
beyond dispute as the subject firearms and
ammunitions were seized from petitioner's
possession via a valid warrantless search,
identified and offered in evidence during
trial. As to the second element, the same was
convincingly proven by the prosecution.
Indeed, petitioner's purported Mission Order
and Memorandum Receipt are inferior in the
face of the more formidable evidence for the
prosecution as our meticulous review of the
records reveals that the Mission Order and
Memorandum Receipt were mere
afterthoughts contrived and issued under
suspicious circumstances.
TESTIMONY OF REPRESENTATIVE OR
CERTIFICATION FROM PNP-FEO
THAT A PERSON IS NOT A LICENSEE
OF ANY FIREARM, SUFFICIENT TO
PROVE SECOND ELEMENT. — In
several occasions, the Court has ruled that
either the testimony of a representative of, or
a certification from, the PNP Firearms and
Explosives Office (FEO) attesting that a
person is not a licensee of any firearm would
suffice to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
second element of illegal possession of
firearm. In People vs. Tobias, we reiterated
that such certification is sufficient to show
that a person has in fact no license.
REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE;
FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE TRIAL
COURT, GENERALLY ACCORDED
RESPECT AND FINALITY ON APPEAL.
— The fact that petitioner does not have the
license or permit to possess was
overwhelmingly proven by the prosecution.
The certification may even be dispensed
68
with in the light of the evidence that an M-
16 rifle and any short firearm higher than a
.38 caliber pistol, akin to the confiscated
firearms cannot be licensed to a civilian, as
in the case of petitioner. The Court
entertains no doubt in affirming petitioner's
conviction especially as we find no plausible
reason, and none was presented, to depart
from the factual findings of both the trial
court and respondent court which, as a rule,
are accorded by the Court with respect and
finality.
CRIMINAL LAW, OFFENSES, COURTS
ARE BOUND TO APPLY GOVERNING
LAW AT THE TIME OF COMMISSION
OF OFFENSE. — The trial court and the
respondent court are bound to apply the
governing law at the time of appellant's
commission of the offense for it is a rule that
laws are repealed only by subsequent ones.
Indeed, it is the duty of judicial officers to
respect and apply the law as it stands. And
until its repeal, respondent court can not be
faulted for applying P.D. 1866 which
abrogated the previous statutes adverted to
by petitioner.
POLITICAL LAW; CONSTITUTION;
BILL OF RIGHTS; CRUEL AND
UNUSUAL PUNISHMENT; PENALTY
FOR ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS, NOT EMBRACED
THEREIN. — Equally lacking in merit is
appellant's allegation that the penalty for
simple illegal possession is unconstitutional.
The penalty for simple possession of
firearm, it should be stressed, ranges from
reclusion temporal maximum to reclusion Just recently, the Court declared that "the
perpetua contrary to appellant's erroneous pertinent laws on illegal possession of
averment. The severity of a penalty does not firearms [are not] contrary to any provision
ipso facto make the same cruel and of the Constitution. . ."
excessive. "It takes more than merely being
harsh, excessive, out of proportion, or severe REMEDIAL LAW; COURT; NOT
for a penalty to be obnoxious to the CONCERNED WITH THE WISDOM OR
Constitution. 'The fact that the punishment MORALITY OF LAWS. — Appellant's
authorized by the statute is severe does not grievance on the wisdom of the prescribed
make it cruel and unusual.' (24 C.J.S., 1187- penalty should not be addressed to us.
1188). Expressed in other terms, it has been Courts are not concerned with the wisdom,
held that to come under the ban, the efficacy or morality of laws.
punishment must be 'flagrantly and plainly That question falls exclusively within the
oppressive,' wholly disproportionate to the province of Congress which enacts them and
nature of the offense as to shock the moral the Chief Executive who approves or vetoes
sense of the community.'" It is well-settled them. The only function of the courts, we
that as far as the constitutional prohibition reiterate, is to interpret and apply the laws.
goes, it is not so much the extent as the
nature of the punishment that determines
whether it is, or is not, cruel and unusual and
that sentences of imprisonment, though
perceived to be harsh, are not cruel or
unusual if within statutory limits.
LAWS ON ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF
FIREARMS, CONSTITUTIONAL. —
Every law has in its favor the presumption
of constitutionality. The burden of proving
the invalidity of the statute in question lies
with the appellant which burden, we note,
was not convincingly discharged. To justify
nullification of the law, there must be a clear
and unequivocal breach of the Constitution,
not a doubtful and argumentative
implication, as in this case. In fact, the
constitutionality of P.D. 1866 has been
upheld twice by this Court.
69