Equal Protection

G.R. No.
197676, February 04, 2014
REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. AND CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS’

ASSOCIATION, Petitioners, v. PROFESSIONAL REGULATORY BOARD OF REAL ESTATE SERVICE
AND PROFESSIONAL REGULATION COMMISSION, Respondents.
DECISION
VILLARAMA, JR., J.:
Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to declare as unconstitutional Sections 28(a),
29 and 32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646.
R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the “Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines” was signed into law
on June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal–Arroyo. It aims to professionalize the real estate
service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration and supervision of real estate service
practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants and salespersons) in the country.
Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in
the exercise of its consumer regulation functions. Such authority is now transferred to the Professional
Regulation Commission (PRC) through the Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service
(PRBRES) created under the new law.
The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated on July 21, 2010 by
the PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.
On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real
Estate and Builders’ Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10–124776 in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 42. Petitioners sought to declare as void and unconstitutional the following provisions
of R.A. No. 9646: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service. – The provisions of
this Act and its rules and regulations shall not apply to the following:
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself the acts mentioned in
Section 3 hereof with reference to his/her or its own property, except real estate developers;
xxx
SEC. 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service . – No person shall practice
or offer to practice real estate service in the Philippines or offer himself/herself as real estate service
practitioner, or use the title, word, letter, figure or any sign tending to convey the impression that one is
a real estate service practitioner, or advertise or indicate in any manner whatsoever that one is qualified
to practice the profession, or be appointed as real property appraiser or assessor in any national
government entity or local government unit, unless he/she has satisfactorily passed the licensure
examination given by the Board, except as otherwise provided in this Act, a holder of a valid
certificate of registration, and professional identification card or a valid special/temporary
permit duly issued to him/her by the Board and the Commission, and in the case of real estate brokers
and private appraisers, they have paid the required bond as hereto provided.
xxx
SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service . – (a) No partnership or corporation shall engage
in the business of real estate service unless it is duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the persons authorized to act for the partnership or corporation are all
duly registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants, as the case may be.
The partnership or corporation shall regularly submit a list of its real estate service practitioners to the
Commission and to the SEC as part of its annual reportorial requirements. There shall at least be one (1)
licensed real estate broker for every twenty (20) accredited salespersons.
(b) Divisions or departments of partnerships and corporations engaged in marketing or selling any real
estate development project in the regular course of business must be headed by full–time registered
and licensed real estate brokers.
(c) Branch offices of real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants must be manned by a duly licensed
real estate broker, appraiser or consultant as the case may be.
In case of resignation or termination from employment of a real estate service practitioner, the same
shall be reported by the employer to the Board within a period not to exceed fifteen (15) days from the
date of effectivity of the resignation or termination.
Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code, a corporation or partnership may hire the services of
registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants on commission basis to perform
real estate services and the latter shall be deemed independent contractors and not employees of such
corporations. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.) chan rob lesvi rtualaw lib rary
According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because (1) it violates Article VI, Section
26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that “[e]very bill passed by Congress shall
embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof”; (2) it is in direct conflict with
Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Housing
Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate trade and business to the Human Settlements Commission,
now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which authority includes the issuance of
license to sell of subdivision owners and developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957; (3)
it violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers’ most basic ownership
rights, the right to use and dispose property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of the Civil Code; and (4)
Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646 violates the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist
between real estate developers and the exempted group mentioned since both are property owners
dealing with their own property.
Additionally, petitioners contended that the lofty goal of nurturing and developing a “corps of technically
competent, reasonable and respected professional real estate service practitioners” is not served by
curtailing the right of real estate developers to conduct their business of selling properties. On the
contrary, these restrictions would have disastrous effects on the real estate industry as the additional
cost of commissions would affect the pricing and affordability of real estate packages. When that
happens, petitioners claimed that the millions of jobs and billions in revenues that the real estate
industry generates for the government will be a thing of the past.
After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary
injunction.
On July 12, 2011, the trial court rendered its Decision2 denying the petition. The trial court held that the
assailed provisions are relevant to the title of the law as they are intended to regulate the practice of
real estate service in the country by ensuring that those who engage in it shall either be a licensed real
estate broker, or under the latter’s supervision. It likewise found no real discord between E.O. No. 648
and R.A. No. 9646 as the latter does not render nugatory the license to sell granted by the HLURB to
real estate developers, which license would still subsist. The only difference is that by virtue of the new
law, real estate developers will now be compelled to hire the services of one licensed real estate broker
for every twenty salespersons to guide and supervise the coterie of salespersons under the employ of
the real estate developers.
On the issue of due process, the trial court said that the questioned provisions do not preclude property
owners from using, enjoying, or disposing of their own property because they can still develop and sell
their properties except that they have to secure the services of a licensed real estate broker who shall
oversee the actions of the unlicensed real estate practitioners under their employ. Since the subject
provisions merely prescribe the requirements for the regulation of the practice of real estate services,
these are consistent with a valid exercise of the State’s police power. The trial court further ruled that
Section 28(a) does not violate the equal protection clause because the exemption of real estate
developers was anchored on reasonable classification aimed at protecting the buying public from the
rampant misrepresentations often committed by unlicensed real estate practitioners, and to prevent
unscrupulous and unethical real estate practices from flourishing considering the large number of
consumers in the regular course of business compared to isolated sale transactions made by private
individuals selling their own property.
Hence, this appeal on the following questions of law: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry
1. Whether there is a justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to adjudicate;
2. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the “one title–one subject” rule
under Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution;
3. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with
respect to the exclusive jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate developers;
4. Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the rights
of real estate developers, are unconstitutional for violating substantive due process;
and
5. Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other
natural or juridical persons who directly perform acts of real estate service with
reference to their own property, is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection
clause.3
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Justiciable Controversy
The Constitution4 requires as a condition precedent for the exercise of judicial power the existence of an
actual controversy between litigants. An actual case or controversy involves a conflict of legal rights, an
assertion of opposite legal claims susceptible to judicial resolution.5 The controversy must be justiciable
– definite and concrete – touching on the legal relations of parties having adverse legal interests, which
may be resolved by a court of law through the application of a law.6 In other words, the pleadings must
show an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right, on the one hand, and a denial thereof on the
other; that is, it must concern a real and not a merely theoretical question or issue. There ought to be
an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature,
as distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts.7 An
actual case is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has a direct adverse effect on the
individual challenging it.8
c ralawlawl ibra ry
There is no question here that petitioners who are real estate developers are entities directly affected by
the prohibition on performing acts constituting practice of real estate service without first complying with
the registration and licensing requirements for brokers and agents under R.A. No. 9646. The possibility
of criminal sanctions for disobeying the mandate of the new law is likewise real. Asserting that the
prohibition violates their rights as property owners to dispose of their properties, petitioners challenged
on constitutional grounds the implementation of R.A. No. 9646 which the respondents defended as a
valid legislation pursuant to the State’s police power. The Court thus finds a justiciable controversy that
calls for immediate resolution.
No Violation of One–Title One–Subject Rule
Section 26(1), Article VI of the Constitution states: chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary
SEC. 26 (1). Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed
in the title thereof.
In Fariñas v. The Executive Secretary,9 the Court explained the provision as follows: chanRoble svirtual Lawli bra ry
The proscription is aimed against the evils of the so–called omnibus bills and log–rolling legislation as
well as surreptitious and/or unconsidered encroaches. The provision merely calls for all parts of an act
relating to its subject finding expression in its title.
To determine whether there has been compliance with the constitutional requirement that the subject of
an act shall be expressed in its title, the Court laid down the rule that –
Constitutional provisions relating to the subject matter and titles of statutes should not be so narrowly
construed as to cripple or impede the power of legislation. The requirement that the subject of an
act shall be expressed in its title should receive a reasonable and not a technical construction.
It is sufficient if the title be comprehensive enough reasonably to include the general object
which a statute seeks to effect, without expressing each and every end and means necessary
or convenient for the accomplishing of that object. Mere details need not be set forth. The title
need not be an abstract or index of the Act.10 (Emphasis supplied.) c han roblesv irt ualawli bra ry
The Court has previously ruled that the one–subject requirement under the Constitution is satisfied if all
the parts of the statute are related, and are germane to the subject matter expressed in the title, or as
long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject and title.11 An act having a single
general subject, indicated in the title, may contain any number of provisions, no matter how diverse
they may be, so long as they are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general subject, and may be
considered in furtherance of such subject by providing for the method and means of carrying out the
general object.12
It is also well–settled that the “one title–one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in
the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the
contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is
comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks to effect.13 Indeed, this
Court has invariably adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple
or impede legislation.”14
R.A. No. 9646 is entitled “An Act Regulating the Practice of Real Estate Service in the Philippines,
Creating for the Purpose a Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and For Other Purposes.” Aside from provisions establishing a regulatory system for the
professionalization of the real estate service sector, the new law extended its coverage to real estate
developers with respect to their own properties. Henceforth, real estate developers are prohibited from
performing acts or transactions constituting real estate service practice without first complying with
registration and licensing requirements for their business, brokers or agents, appraisers, consultants and
salespersons.
Petitioners point out that since partnerships or corporations engaged in marketing or selling any real
estate development project in the regular course of business are now required to be headed by full–
time, registered and licensed real estate brokers, this requirement constitutes limitations on the
property rights and business prerogatives of real estate developers which are not all reflected in the title
of R.A. No. 9646. Neither are real estate developers, who are already regulated under a different law,
P.D. No. 957, included in the definition of real estate service practitioners.
We hold that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the one–title, one–subject rule.
The primary objective of R.A. No. 9646 is expressed as follows: c hanRoblesv irtual Lawlib rary
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes the vital role of real estate service practitioners in
the social, political, economic development and progress of the country by promoting the real estate
market, stimulating economic activity and enhancing government income from real property–based
transactions. Hence, it shall develop and nurture through proper and effective regulation and supervision
a corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners
whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the
real estate industry.
We find that the inclusion of real estate developers is germane to the law’s primary goal of developing “a
corps of technically competent, responsible and respected professional real estate service practitioners
whose standards of practice and service shall be globally competitive and will promote the growth of the
real estate industry.” Since the marketing aspect of real estate development projects entails the
performance of those acts and transactions defined as real estate service practices under Section 3(g) of
R.A. No. 9646, it is logically covered by the regulatory scheme to professionalize the entire real estate
service sector.
No Conflict Between R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No. 648
Petitioners argue that the assailed provisions still cannot be sustained because they conflict with P.D.
No. 957 which decreed that the NHA shall have “exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade
and business.” Such jurisdiction includes the authority to issue a license to sell to real estate developers
and to register real estate dealers, brokers or salesmen upon their fulfillment of certain requirements
under the law. By imposing limitations on real estate developers’ property rights, petitioners contend
that R.A. No. 9646 undermines the licenses to sell issued by the NHA (now the HLURB) to real estate
developers allowing them to sell subdivision lots or condominium units directly to the public. Because
the HLURB has been divested of its exclusive jurisdiction over real estate developers, the result is an
implied repeal of P.D. No. 957 as amended by E.O. No. 648, which is not favored in law.
It is a well–settled rule of statutory construction that repeals by implication are not favored. In order to
effect a repeal by implication, the later statute must be so irreconcilably inconsistent and repugnant with
the existing law that they cannot be made to reconcile and stand together. The clearest case possible
must be made before the inference of implied repeal may be drawn, for inconsistency is never
presumed. There must be a showing of repugnance clear and convincing in character. The language
used in the later statute must be such as to render it irreconcilable with what had been formerly
enacted. An inconsistency that falls short of that standard does not suffice.15 Moreover, t he failure to
add a specific repealing clause indicates that the intent was not to repeal any existing law, unless an
irreconcilable inconsistency and repugnancy exist in the terms of the new and old laws.16
There is nothing in R.A. No. 9646 that repeals any provision of P.D. No. 957, as amended by E.O. No.
648. P.D. No. 957, otherwise known as “ The Subdivision and Condominium Buyers’ Protective
Decree,”17 vested the NHA with exclusive jurisdiction to regulate the real estate trade and business in
accordance with its provisions. It empowered the NHA to register, approve and monitor real estate
development projects and issue licenses to sell to real estate owners and developers. It further granted
the NHA the authority to register and issue/revoke licenses of brokers, dealers and salesmen engaged in
the selling of subdivision lots and condominium units.
E.O. No. 648, issued on February 7, 1981, reorganized the Human Settlements Regulatory Commission
(HSRC) and transferred the regulatory functions of the NHA under P.D. 957 to the HSRC. Among these
regulatory functions were the (1) regulation of the real estate trade and business; (2) registration of
subdivision lots and condominium projects; (3) issuance of license to sell subdivision lots and
condominium units in the registered units; (4) approval of performance bond and the suspension of
license to sell; (5) registration of dealers, brokers and salesman engaged in the business of selling
subdivision lots or condominium units; and (6) revocation of registration of dealers, brokers and
salesmen.18
E.O. No. 90, issued on December 17, 1986, renamed the HSRC as the Housing and Land Use Regulatory
Board (HLURB) and was designated as the regulatory body for housing and land development under the
Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council (HUDCC). To date, HLURB continues to carry out
its mandate to register real estate brokers and salesmen dealing in condominium, memorial parks and
subdivision projects pursuant to Section 11 of P.D. No. 957, which reads: chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
SECTION 11. Registration of Dealers, Brokers and Salesmen. – No real estate dealer, broker or salesman
shall engage in the business of selling subdivision lots or condominium units unless he has registered
himself with the Authority in accordance with the provisions of this section.
If the Authority shall find that the applicant is of good repute and has complied with the applicable rules
of the Authority, including the payment of the prescribed fee, he shall register such applicant as a
dealer, broker or salesman upon filing a bond, or other security in lieu thereof, in such sum as may be
fixed by the Authority conditioned upon his faithful compliance with the provisions of this Decree:
Provided, that the registration of a salesman shall cease upon the termination of his employment with a
dealer or broker.
Every registration under this section shall expire on the thirty–first day of December of each year.
Renewal of registration for the succeeding year shall be granted upon written application therefore made
not less than thirty nor more than sixty days before the first day of the ensuing year and upon payment
of the prescribed fee, without the necessity of filing further statements or information, unless specifically
required by the Authority. All applications filed beyond said period shall be treated as original
applications.
The names and addresses of all persons registered as dealers, brokers, or salesmen shall be recorded in
a Register of Brokers, Dealers and Salesmen kept in the Authority which shall be open to public
inspection.
On the other hand, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 requires as a condition precedent for all persons who will
engage in acts constituting real estate service, including advertising in any manner one’s qualifications
as a real estate service practitioner, compliance with licensure examination and other registration
requirements including the filing of a bond for real estate brokers and private appraisers. While Section
11 of P.D. No. 957 imposes registration requirements for dealers, brokers and salespersons engaged in
the selling of subdivision lots and condominium units, Section 29 of R.A. No. 9646 regulates all real
estate service practitioners whether private or government. While P.D. No. 957 seeks to supervise
brokers and dealers who are engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium units, R.A. No.
9646 aims to regulate the real estate service sector in general by professionalizing their ranks and
raising the level of ethical standards for licensed real estate professionals.
There is no conflict of jurisdiction because the HLURB supervises only those real estate service
practitioners engaged in the sale of subdivision lots and condominium projects, specifically for violations
of the provisions of P.D. No. 957, and not the entire real estate service sector which is now under the
regulatory powers of the PRBRES. HLURB’s supervision of brokers and dealers to effectively implement
the provisions of P.D. No. 957 does not foreclose regulation of the real estate service as a profession.
Real estate developers already regulated by the HLURB are now further required to comply with the
professional licensure requirements under R.A. No. 9646, as provided in Sections 28, 29 and 32. Plainly,
there is no inconsistency or contradiction in the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 and P.D. No. 957,
as amended.
The rule is that every statute must be interpreted and brought into accord with other laws in a way that
will form a uniform system of jurisprudence. The legislature is presumed to have known existing laws on
the subject and not to have enacted conflicting laws.19 Congress, therefore, could not be presumed to
have intended Sections 28, 29 and 32 of R.A. No. 9646 to run counter to P.D. No. 957.
No Violation of Due Process
Petitioners contend that the assailed provisions of R.A. No. 9646 are unduly oppressive and infringe the
constitutional rule against deprivation of property without due process of law. They stress that real
estate developers are now burdened by law to employ licensed real estate brokers to sell, market and
dispose of their properties. Despite having invested a lot of money, time and resources in their projects,
petitioners aver that real estate developers will still have less control in managing their business and will
be burdened with additional expenses.
The contention has no basis. There is no deprivation of property as no restriction on their use and
enjoyment of property is caused by the implementation of R.A. No. 9646. If petitioners as property
owners feel burdened by the new requirement of engaging the services of only licensed real estate
professionals in the sale and marketing of their properties, such is an unavoidable consequence of a
reasonable regulatory measure.
Indeed, no right is absolute, and the proper regulation of a profession, calling, business or trade has
always been upheld as a legitimate subject of a valid exercise of the police power of the State
particularly when their conduct affects the execution of legitimate governmental functions, the
preservation of the State, public health and welfare and public morals.20 In any case, wh ere the liberty
curtailed affects at most the rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is certainly
much wider. To pretend that licensing or accreditation requirements violate the due process clause is to
ignore the settled practice, under the mantle of police power, of regulating entry to the practice of
various trades or professions.21
Here, the legislature recognized the importance of professionalizing the ranks of real estate practitioners
by increasing their competence and raising ethical standards as real property transactions are
“susceptible to manipulation and corruption, especially if they are in the hands of unqualified persons
working under an ineffective regulatory system.” The new regulatory regime aimed to fully tap the vast
potential of the real estate sector for greater contribution to our gross domestic income, and real estate
practitioners “serve a vital role in spearheading the continuous flow of capital, in boosting investor
confidence, and in promoting overall national progress.”22
We thus find R.A. No. 9646 a valid exercise of the State’s police power. As we said in another case
challenging the constitutionality of a law granting discounts to senior citizens:cha nRoblesvi rt ual Lawlib rary
The law is a legitimate exercise of police power which, similar to the power of eminent domain, has
general welfare for its object. Police power is not capable of an exact definition, but has been purposely
veiled in general terms to underscore its comprehensiveness to meet all exigencies and provide enough
room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances, thus assuring the greatest
benefits. Accordingly, it has been described as “the most essential, insistent and the least limitable of
powers, extending as it does to all the great public needs.” It is “[t]he power vested in the legislature by
the constitution to make, ordain, and establish all manner of wholesome and reasonable laws, statutes,
and ordinances, either with penalties or without, not repugnant to the constitution, as they shall judge
to be for the good and welfare of the commonwealth, and of the subjects of the same.”
For this reason, when the conditions so demand as determined by the legislature, property rights must
bow to the primacy of police power because property rights, though sheltered by due process,
must yield to general welfare.
Police power as an attribute to promote the common good would be diluted considerably if on the mere
plea of petitioners that they will suffer loss of earnings and capital, the questioned provision is
invalidated. Moreover, in the absence of evidence demonstrating the alleged confiscatory effect of the
provision in question, there is no basis for its nullification in view of the presumption of validity which
every law has in its favor.23 (Emphasis supplied.) cha nrob lesvi rtua lawlib rary
No Violation of Equal Protection Clause
Section 28 of R.A. No. 9646 exempts from its coverage natural and juridical persons dealing with their
own property, and other persons such as receivers, trustees or assignees in insolvency or bankruptcy
proceedings. However, real estate developers are specifically mentioned as an exception from those
enumerated therein. Petitioners argue that this provision violates the equal protection clause because it
unjustifiably treats real estate developers differently from those exempted persons who also own
properties and desire to sell them. They insist that no substantial distinctions exist between ordinary
property owners and real estate developers as the latter, in fact, are more capable of entering into real
estate transactions and do not need the services of licensed real estate brokers. They assail the RTC
decision in citing the reported fraudulent practices as basis for the exclusion of real estate developers
from the exempted group of persons under Section 28(a).
We sustain the trial court’s ruling that R.A. No. 9646 does not violate the equal protection clause.
In Ichong v. Hernandez,24 the concept of equal protection was explained as follows: chanRoble svirt ual Lawlib rary
The equal protection of the law clause is against undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality. It is not intended to prohibit legislation, which is
limited either in the object to which it is directed or by territory within which it is to operate. It does not
demand absolute equality among residents; it merely requires that all persons shall be treated
alike, under like circumstances and conditions both as to privileges conferred and liabilities enforced.
The equal protection clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling
within such class, and reasonable grounds exists for making a distinction between those who fall within
such class and those who do not. (2 Cooley, Constitutional Limitations, 824–825).25 ChanRoblesVirt ualawlib rary
Although the equal protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative
that the classification should be based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to
the subject of the particular legislation.26 If classification is germane to the purpose of the law, concerns
all members of the class, and applies equally to present and future conditions, the classification does not
violate the equal protection guarantee.27
R.A. No. 9646 was intended to provide institutionalized government support for the development of “a
corps of highly respected, technically competent, and disciplined real estate service practitioners,
knowledgeable of internationally accepted standards and practice of the profession.”28 Real estate
developers at present constitute a sector that hires or employs the largest number of brokers,
salespersons, appraisers and consultants due to the sheer number of products (lots, houses and
condominium units) they advertise and sell nationwide. As early as in the ‘70s, there has been a
proliferation of errant developers, operators or sellers who have reneged on their representation and
obligations to comply with government regulations such as the provision and maintenance of subdivision
roads, drainage, sewerage, water system and other basic requirements. To protect the interest of home
and lot buyers from fraudulent acts and manipulations perpetrated by these unscrupulous subdivision
and condominium sellers and operators, P.D. No. 957 was issued to strictly regulate housing and real
estate development projects. Hence, in approving R.A. No. 9646, the legislature rightfully recognized the
necessity of imposing the new licensure requirements to all real estate service practitioners, including
and more importantly, those real estate service practitioners working for real estate developers. Unlike
individuals or entities having isolated transactions over their own property, real estate developers sell
lots, houses and condominium units in the ordinary course of business, a business which is highly
regulated by the State to ensure the health and safety of home and lot buyers.
The foregoing shows that substantial distinctions do exist between ordinary property owners exempted
under Section 28(a) and real estate developers like petitioners, and the classification enshrined in R.A.
No. 9646 is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court thus rules that R.A. No. 9646 is
valid and constitutional.
Since every law is presumed valid, the presumption of constitutionality can be overcome only by the
clearest showing that there was indeed an infraction of the Constitution, and only when such a
conclusion is reached by the required majority may the Court pronounce, in the discharge of the duty it
cannot escape, that the challenged act must be struck down.29
Indeed, “all presumptions are indulged in favor of constitutionality; one who attacks a statute, alleging
unconstitutionality must prove its invalidity beyond a reasonable doubt; that a law may work hardship
does not render it unconstitutional; that if any reasonable basis may be conceived which supports the
statute, it will be upheld, and the challenger must negate all possible bases; that the courts are not
concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a statute; and that a liberal interpretation
of the constitution in favor of the constitutionality of legislation should be adopted.”30
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 42 in Civil Case No. 10–124776 is hereby AFFIRMED and UPHELD.
No pronouncement as to costs.
G.R. No. 192531 November 12, 2014
BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

vs.
SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM and SCANMAR MARITIME SERVICES, INC., Respondents.
DECISION
VELASCO, JR., J.:
Nature of the Case
This Appeal, filed under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, seeks to annul the March 17, 2010
Decision1 of the Employees Compensation Commission (ECC) in ECC Case No. SL-18483-
0218-10, entitled Bernardina P. Bartolome v. Social Security System (SSS) [Scanmar Maritime
Services, Inc.}, declaring that petitioner is not a beneficiary of the deceased employee under
Presidential Decree No. (PD) 442, otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines, as
amended by PD 626.2
The Facts
John Colcol (John), born on June 9, 1983, was employed as electrician by Scanmar Maritime
Services, Inc., on board the vessel Maersk Danville, since February 2008. As such, he was
enrolled under the government's Employees' Compensation Program (ECP).3 Unfortunately, on
June 2, 2008, an accident occurred on board the vessel whereby steel plates fell on John, which
led to his untimely death the following day.4
John was, at the time of his death, childless and unmarried. Thus, petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome, John’s biological mother and, allegedly, sole remaining beneficiary, filed a claim for
death benefits under PD 626 with the Social Security System (SSS) at San Fernando City, La
Union. However, the SSS La Union office, in a letter dated June 10, 20095 addressed to
petitioner, denied the claim, stating:
We regret to inform you that wecannot give due course to your claim because you are no longer
considered as the parent of JOHN COLCOL as he was legally adopted by CORNELIO COLCOL
based on documents you submitted to us.
The denial was appealed tothe Employees’ Compensation Commission (ECC), which affirmed
the ruling of the SSS La Union Branch through the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of
which reads:
WHEREFORE, the appealed decision is AFFIRMED and the claim is hereby dismissed for lack
of merit.
SO ORDERED.6
In denying the claim, both the SSS La Union branch and the ECC ruled against petitioner’s
entitlement to the death benefits sought after under PD 626 on the ground she can no longer be
considered John’s primary beneficiary. As culled from the records, John and his sister Elizabeth
were adopted by their great grandfather, petitioner’s grandfather, Cornelio Colcol (Cornelio), by
virtue of the Decision7 in Spec. Proc. No. 8220-XII of the Regional Trial Court in Laoag City dated
February 4, 1985, which decree of adoption attained finality.8 Consequently, as argued by the
agencies, it is Cornelio who qualifies as John’s primary beneficiary, not petitioner. Neither, the
ECC reasoned, would petitioner qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary even if it wereproven
that Cornelio has already passed away. As the ECC ratiocinated:
Under Article 167 (j) of P.D. 626, as amended, provides (sic) that beneficiaries are the
"dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who are the primary beneficiaries.
In their absence, the dependent parentsand subject to the restrictions imposed on dependent
children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are the secondary
beneficiaries; Provided; that the dependent acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a
primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and eligible for
monthly income benefit."
The dependent parent referred to by the above provision relates to the legitimate parent of the
covered member, as provided for by Rule XV, Section 1 (c) (1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation. This Commission believes that the appellant is not considered a
legitimate parent of the deceased, having given up the latter for adoption to Mr. Cornelio C.
Colcol. Thus, in effect, the adoption divested her of the statusas the legitimate parent of the
deceased.
xxxx
In effect, the rights which previously belong [sic] to the biological parent of the adopted child shall
now be upon the adopting parent. Hence, in this case, the legal parent referred to by P.D. 626,
as amended, as the beneficiary, who has the right to file the claim, is the adoptive father of the
deceased and not herein appellant.9 (Emphasis supplied)
Aggrieved, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which was likewise denied by the
ECC.10 Hence, the instant petition.
The Issues
Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:
ASSIGNMENT OF ERRORS
I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.
II. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse in denying the just, due and lawful claims
of the petitioner as a lawful beneficiary of her deceased biological son.
III. The Honorable ECC committed grave abuse of discretion in not giving due
course/denying petitioner’s otherwise meritorious motion for reconsideration.11
In resolving the case, the pivotal issue is this: Are the biological parents of the covered, but
legally adopted, employee considered secondary beneficiaries and, thus, entitled, in appropriate
cases, to receive the benefits under the ECP?
The Court's Ruling
The petition is meritorious.
The ECC’s factual findings are not consistent with the evidence on record
To recall, one of the primary reasons why the ECC denied petitioner’s claim for death benefits is
that eventhough she is John’s biological mother, it was allegedly not proven that his adoptive
parent, Cornelio, was no longer alive. As intimated by the ECC:
Moreover, there had been no allegation in the records as to whether the legally adoptive parent,
Mr. Colcol, is dead, which would immediately qualify the appellant [petitioner] for Social Security
benefits. Hence, absent such proof of death of the adoptive father, this Commission will presume
him to be alive and well, and as such, is the one entitled to claim the benefit being the primary
beneficiary of the deaceased. Thus, assuming that appellant is indeed a qualified beneficiary
under the Social Security law, in view of her status as other beneficiary, she cannot claim the
benefit legally provided by law to the primary beneficiary, in this case the adoptive father since he
is still alive.
We disagree with the factual finding of the ECC on this point.
Generally, findings of fact by administrative agencies are generally accorded great respect, if not
finality, by the courts by reason of the special knowledge and expertise of said administrative
agenciesover matters falling under their jurisdiction.12 However, in the extant case, the ECC had
overlooked a crucial piece of evidence offered by the petitioner – Cornelio’s death certificate.13
Based on Cornelio’s death certificate, it appears that John’s adoptive father died on October 26,
1987,14 or only less than three (3) years since the decree of adoption on February 4, 1985, which
attained finality.15 As such, it was error for the ECC to have ruled that it was not duly proven that
the adoptive parent, Cornelio, has already passed away.
The rule limiting death benefits claims to the legitimate parents is contrary to law
This brings us to the question of whether or not petitioner is entitled to the death benefits claim in
view of John’s work-related demise. The pertinent provision, in this regard, is Article 167 (j) of the
Labor Code, as amended, which reads:
ART. 167. Definition of terms. - Asused in this Title unless the context indicates otherwise:
xxxx
(j) 'Beneficiaries' means the dependent spouse until he remarries and dependent children, who
are the primary beneficiaries. In their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the
restrictions imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants
who are the secondary beneficiaries; Provided, that the dependent acknowledged natural child
shall be considered as a primary beneficiary when there are no other dependent children who
are qualified and eligible for monthly income benefit. (Emphasis supplied)
Concurrently, pursuant to the succeeding Article 177(c) supervising the ECC "[T]o approve rules
and regulations governing the processing of claims and the settlement of disputes arising
therefrom as prescribed by the System," the ECC has issued the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation, interpreting the above-cited provision as follows:
RULE XV – BENEFICIARIES
SECTION 1. Definition. (a) Beneficiaries shall be either primary or secondary, and determined
atthe time of employee’s death.
(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:
(1) The legitimate spouse living with the employee at the time of the
employee’s death until he remarries; and
(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural

children, who are unmarried not gainfully employed, not over 21 years of
age, or over 21 years of age provided that he is incapacitated and
incapable of self - support due to physicalor mental defect which is
congenital or acquired during minority; Provided, further, that a dependent
acknowledged natural child shall be considered as a primary beneficiary
only when there are no other dependent children who are qualified and
eligible for monthly income benefit; provided finally, that if there are two or
more acknowledged natural children, they shall be counted from the
youngest and without substitution, but not exceeding five.
(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:
(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for

regular support;
(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are

unmarried, not gainfully employed, and not over 21 years of age, or over
21 years of age providedthat he is incapacitated and incapable of self -
support dueto physical or mental defect which is congenital or acquired
during minority. (Emphasis supplied)
Guilty of reiteration, the ECC denied petitioner’s claim on the ground that she is no longer the
deceased’s legitimate parent, as required by the implementing rules. As held by the ECC, the
adoption decree severed the relation between John and petitioner, effectively divesting her of the
status of a legitimate parent, and, consequently, that of being a secondary beneficiary.
We disagree.
a. Rule XV, Sec. 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation deviates from the
clear language of Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as amended
Examining the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation in light of the Labor Code, as
amended, it is at once apparent that the ECC indulged in an unauthorized administrative
legislation. In net effect, the ECC read into Art. 167 of the Code an interpretation not
contemplated by the provision. Pertinent in elucidating on this point isArticle 7 of the Civil Code of
the Philippines, which reads:
Article 7. Laws are repealed only by subsequent ones, and their violation or non-observance
shall not beexcused by disuse, or custom or practice to the contrary.
When the courts declared a law to be inconsistent with the Constitution, the former shall be void
and the latter shall govern.
Administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations shall be valid only when they are not
contrary to the laws or the Constitution.(Emphasis supplied)
As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco

Corporation16 that:
As we have previously declared, rule-making power must be confined to details for regulating the
mode or proceedings in order to carry into effect the law as it has been enacted, and it cannot be
extended to amend or expand the statutory requirements or to embrace matters not covered by
the statute. Administrative regulations must always be in harmony with the provisions of the law
because any resulting discrepancy between the two will always be resolved in favor of the basic
law. (Emphasis supplied)
Guided by this doctrine, We find that Rule XV of the Amended Rules on Employees’
Compensation is patently a wayward restriction of and a substantial deviation from Article 167 (j)
of the Labor Code when it interpreted the phrase "dependent parents" to refer to "legitimate
parents."
It bears stressing that a similar issue in statutory construction was resolved by this Court in Diaz
v. Intermediate Appellate Court17 in this wise:
It is Our shared view that the word "relatives" should be construed in its general acceptation.
Amicus curiae Prof. Ruben Balane has this to say:
The term relatives, although used many times in the Code, is not defined by it. In
accordancetherefore with the canons of statutory interpretation, it should beunderstood to have a
general and inclusive scope, inasmuch as the term is a general one. Generalia verba sunt
generaliter intelligenda. That the law does not make a distinction prevents us from making one:
Ubi lex non distinguit, nec nos distinguera debemus. xxx
According to Prof. Balane, to interpret the term relatives in Article 992 in a more restrictive sense
thanit is used and intended is not warranted by any rule ofinterpretation. Besides, he further
states that when the law intends to use the termin a more restrictive sense, it qualifies the term
with the word collateral, as in Articles 1003 and 1009 of the New Civil Code.
Thus, the word "relatives" is a general term and when used in a statute it embraces not only
collateral relatives but also all the kindred of the person spoken of, unless the context indicates
that it was used in a more restrictive or limited sense — which as already discussed earlier, is not
so in the case at bar. (Emphasis supplied)
In the same vein, the term "parents" in the phrase "dependent parents" in the afore-quoted
Article 167 (j) of the Labor Code is usedand ought to be taken in its general sense and cannot be
unduly limited to "legitimate parents" as what the ECC did. The phrase "dependent parents"
should, therefore, include all parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate and whether by nature or
by adoption. When the law does not distinguish, one should not distinguish. Plainly, "dependent
parents" are parents, whether legitimate or illegitimate, biological or by adoption,who are in need
of support or assistance.
Moreover, the same Article 167 (j),as couched, clearly shows that Congress did not intend to limit
the phrase "dependent parents" to solely legitimate parents. At the risk of being repetitive, Article
167 provides that "in their absence, the dependent parents and subject to the restrictions
imposed on dependent children, the illegitimate children and legitimate descendants who are
secondary beneficiaries." Had the lawmakers contemplated "dependent parents" to mean
legitimate parents, then it would have simply said descendants and not "legitimate descendants."
The manner by which the provision in question was crafted undeniably show that the phrase
"dependent parents" was intended to cover all parents – legitimate, illegitimate or parents by
nature or adoption.
b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in

contravention of the equal protection clause
To insist that the ECC validly interpreted the Labor Code provision is an affront to the
Constitutional guarantee of equal protection under the laws for the rule, as worded, prevents the
parents of an illegitimate child from claiming benefits under Art. 167 (j) of the Labor Code, as
amended by PD 626. To Our mind, such postulation cannot be countenanced.
As jurisprudence elucidates, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly
situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It
requires public bodies and institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar
manner.18 In other words, the concept of equal justice under the law requires the state to govern
impartially, and it may not drawdistinctions between individuals solely on differences that are
irrelevant to a legitimate governmental objective.19
The concept of equal protection, however, does not require the universal application of the laws
to all persons or things without distinction. What it simply requires isequality among equals as
determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection clause permits
classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness.
The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is
germane tothe purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It
applies equally to all members of the same class. "Superficial differences do not make for a valid
classification."20
In the instant case, there is no compelling reasonable basis to discriminate against illegitimate
parents. Simply put, the above-cited rule promulgated by the ECC that limits the claim of benefits
to the legitimate parents miserably failed the test of reasonableness since the classification is not
germane to the law being implemented. We see no pressing government concern or interest that
requires protection so as to warrant balancing the rights of unmarried parents on one hand and
the rationale behind the law on the other. On the contrary, the SSS can better fulfill its mandate,
and the policy of PD 626 – that employees and their dependents may promptly secure adequate
benefits in the event of work-connected disability or death - will be better served if Article 167 (j)
of the Labor Code is not so narrowly interpreted.
There being no justification for limiting secondary parent beneficiaries to the legitimate ones,
there can be no other course of action to take other than to strikedown as unconstitutional the
phrase "illegitimate" as appearing in Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on
Employees’ Compensation.
Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent
In attempting to cure the glaring constitutional violation of the adverted rule, the ECC extended
illegitimate parents an opportunity to file claims for and receive death benefitsby equating
dependency and legitimacy to the exercise of parental authority. Thus, as insinuated by the ECC
in its assailed Decision, had petitioner not given up John for adoption, she could have still
claimed death benefits under the law.
To begin with, nowhere in the law nor in the rules does it say that "legitimate parents" pertain to
those who exercise parental authority over the employee enrolled under the ECP. Itwas only in
the assailed Decision wherein such qualification was made. In addition, assuming arguendothat
the ECC did not overstep its boundaries in limiting the adverted Labor Code provision to the
deceased’s legitimate parents, and that the commission properly equated legitimacy to parental
authority, petitioner can still qualify as John’s secondary beneficiary.
True, when Cornelio, in 1985, adoptedJohn, then about two (2) years old, petitioner’s parental
authority over John was severed. However, lest it be overlooked, one key detail the ECC missed,
aside from Cornelio’s death, was that when the adoptive parent died less than three (3) years
after the adoption decree, John was still a minor, at about four (4) years of age.
John’s minority at the time of his adopter’s death is a significant factor in the case at bar. Under
such circumstance, parental authority should be deemed to have reverted in favor of the
biological parents. Otherwise, taking into account Our consistent ruling that adoption is a
personal relationship and that there are no collateral relatives by virtue of adoption,21 who was
then left to care for the minor adopted child if the adopter passed away?
To be sure, reversion of parental authority and legal custody in favor of the biological parents is
not a novel concept. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 855222 (RA 8552), otherwise known as the
Domestic Adoption Act, provides:
Section 20. Effects of Rescission.– If the petition [for rescission of adoption] is granted, the
parental authority of the adoptee's biological parent(s), if known, or the legal custody of the
Department shall be restored if the adoptee is still a minoror incapacitated. The reciprocal rights
and obligations of the adopter(s) and the adoptee to each other shall be extinguished. (emphasis
added)
The provision adverted to is applicable herein by analogy insofar as the restoration of custody is
concerned. The manner herein of terminating the adopter’s parental authority, unlike the
1âwphi1
grounds for rescission,23 justifies the retention of vested rights and obligations between the
adopter and the adoptee, while the consequent restoration of parental authority in favor of the
biological parents, simultaneously, ensures that the adoptee, who is still a minor, is not left to
fend for himself at such a tender age.
To emphasize, We can only apply the rule by analogy, especially since RA 8552 was enacted
after Cornelio’s death. Truth be told, there is a lacuna in the law as to which provision shall
govern contingencies in all fours with the factual milieu of the instant petition. Nevertheless, We
are guided by the catena of cases and the state policies behind RA 855224 wherein the
paramount consideration is the best interest of the child, which We invoke to justify this
disposition. It is, after all, for the best interest of the child that someone will remain charged for
his welfare and upbringing should his or her adopter fail or is rendered incapacitated to perform
his duties as a parent at a time the adoptee isstill in his formative years, and, to Our mind, in the
absence or, as in this case, death of the adopter, no one else could reasonably be expected to
perform the role of a parent other than the adoptee’s biological one.
Moreover, this ruling finds support on the fact that even though parental authority is severed by
virtue of adoption, the ties between the adoptee and the biological parents are not entirely
eliminated. To demonstrate, the biological parents, insome instances, are able to inherit from the
adopted, as can be gleaned from Art. 190 of the Family Code:
Art. 190. Legal or intestate succession to the estate of the adopted shall be governed by the
following rules:
xxx
(2) When the parents, legitimate or illegitimate, or the legitimate ascendants of the adopted
concur withthe adopter, they shall divide the entire estate, one-half tobe inherited by the parents
or ascendants and the other half, by the adopters;
xxx
(6) When only collateral blood relatives of the adopted survive, then the ordinary rules of legal or
intestate succession shall apply.
Similarly, at the time of Cornelio Colcol’s death, which was prior to the effectivity of the Family
Code, the governing provision is Art. 984 of the New Civil Code, which provides:
Art. 984. In case of the death of an adopted child, leaving no children or descendants, his
parents and relatives by consanguinity and not by adoption, shall be his legal heirs.
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the biological parents retain their rights of succession tothe
estate of their child who was the subject of adoption. While the benefits arising from the death of
an SSS covered employee do not form part of the estateof the adopted child, the pertinent
provision on legal or intestate succession at least reveals the policy on the rights of the biological
parents and those by adoption vis-à-vis the right to receive benefits from the adopted. In the
same way that certain rights still attach by virtue of the blood relation, so too should certain
obligations, which, We rule, include the exercise of parental authority, in the event of the untimely
passing of their minor offspring’s adoptive parent. We cannot leave undetermined the fate of a
minor child whose second chance ata better life under the care of the adoptive parents was
snatched from him by death’s cruel grasp. Otherwise, the adopted child’s quality of life might
have been better off not being adopted at all if he would only find himself orphaned in the end.
Thus, We hold that Cornelio’s death at the time of John’sminority resulted in the restoration of
petitioner’s parental authority over the adopted child.
On top of this restoration of parental authority, the fact of petitioner’s dependence on John can
be established from the documentary evidence submitted to the ECC. As it appears in the
records, petitioner, prior to John’s adoption, was a housekeeper. Her late husband died in 1984,
leaving her to care for their seven (7) children. But since she was unable to "give a bright future
to her growing children" as a housekeeper, she consented to Cornelio’s adoption of Johnand
Elizabeth in 1985.
Following Cornelio’s death in 1987, so records reveal, both petitioner and John repeatedly
reported "Brgy. Capurictan, Solsona, Ilocos Norte" as their residence. In fact, this veryaddress
was used in John’s Death Certificate25 executed in Brazil, and in the Report of Personal Injury or
Loss of Life accomplished by the master of the vessel boarded by John.26 Likewise, this is John’s
known address as per the ECC’s assailed Decision.27 Similarly, this same address was used by
petitioner in filing her claim before the SSS La Union branch and, thereafter, in her appeal with
the ECC. Hence, it can be assumed that aside from having been restored parental authority over
John, petitioner indeed actually execised the same, and that they lived together under one roof.
Moreover, John, in his SSS application,28 named petitioner as one of his beneficiaries for his
benefits under RA 8282, otherwise known as the "Social Security Law." While RA 8282 does not
cover compensation for work-related deaths or injury and expressly allows the designation of
beneficiaries who are not related by blood to the member unlike in PD 626, John’s deliberate act
of indicating petitioner as his beneficiary at least evinces that he, in a way, considered petitioner
as his dependent. Consequently, the confluence of circumstances – from Cornelio’s death during
John’s minority, the restoration ofpetitioner’s parental authority, the documents showing
singularity of address, and John’s clear intention to designate petitioner as a beneficiary -
effectively made petitioner, to Our mind, entitled to death benefit claims as a secondary
beneficiary under PD 626 as a dependent parent.
All told, the Decision of the ECC dated March 17, 2010 is bereft of legal basis. Cornelio’s
adoption of John, without more, does not deprive petitioner of the right to receive the benefits
stemming from John’s death as a dependent parent given Cornelio’s untimely demise during
John’s minority. Since the parent by adoption already died, then the death benefits under the
Employees' Compensation Program shall accrue solely to herein petitioner, John's sole
remaining beneficiary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The March 17, 2010 Decision of the
Employees' Compensation Commission, in ECC Case No. SL-18483-0218-10, is REVERSED
and SET ASIDE. The ECC is hereby directed to release the benefits due to a secondary
beneficiary of the deceased covered employee John Colcol to petitioner Bernardina P.
Bartolome.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015
JOSE J. FERRER, JR., Petitioner, v. CITY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, CITY COUNCIL OF
QUEZON CITY, CITY TREASURER OF QUEZON CITY, AND CITY ASSESSOR OF QUEZON
CITY, Respondents.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before this Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) seeking to declare unconstitutional and illegal
Ordinance Nos. SP-2095, S-2011 and SP-2235, S-2013 on the Socialized Housing Tax and Garbage Fee,
respectively, which are being imposed by the respondents.
The Case
On October 17, 2011,1 respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, S-2011,2 or
the Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City, Section 3 of which provides:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry
SECTION 3. IMPOSITION. A special assessment equivalent to one-half percent (0.5%) on the assessed
value of land in excess of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (Php100,000.00) shall be collected by the City
Treasurer which shall accrue to the Socialized Housing Programs of the Quezon City Government. The
special assessment shall accrue to the General Fund under a special account to be established for the
purpose.
chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Effective for five (5) years, the Socialized Housing Tax (SHT) shall be utilized by the Quezon City
Government for the following projects: (a) land purchase/land banking; (b) improvement of
current/existing socialized housing facilities; (c) land development; (d) construction of core houses,
sanitary cores, medium-rise buildings and other similar structures; and (e) financing of public-private
partnership agreement of the Quezon City Government and National Housing Authority (NHA) with the
private sector.3 Under certain conditions, a tax credit shall be enjoyed by taxpayers regularly paying the
special assessment:
SECTION 7. TAX CREDIT. Taxpayers dutifully paying the special assessment tax as imposed by this
ordinance shall enjoy a tax credit. The tax credit may be availed of only after five (5) years of
continue[d] payment. Further, the taxpayer availing this tax credit must be a taxpayer in good standing
as certified by the City Treasurer and City Assessor.
The tax credit to be granted shall be equivalent to the total amount of the special assessment paid by
the property owner, which shall be given as follows:
1. 6th year - 20%
2. 7th year - 20%
3. 8th year - 20%
4. 9th year - 20%
5. 10th year -
20%
Furthermore, only the registered owners may avail of the tax credit and may not be continued by the
subsequent property owners even if they are buyers in good faith, heirs or possessor of a right in
whatever legal capacity over the subject property.4
On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-20135 was enacted on December 16, 2013 and took
effect ten days after when it was approved by respondent City Mayor.6 The proceeds collected from the
garbage fees on residential properties shall be deposited solely and exclusively in an earmarked special
account under the general fund to be utilized for garbage collections.7 Section 1 of the Ordinance set
forth the schedule and manner for the collection of garbage fees:
SECTION 1. The City Government of Quezon City in conformity with and in relation to Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991 HEREBY IMPOSES THE FOLLOWING
SCHEDULE AND MANNER FOR THE ANNUAL COLLECTION OF GARBAGE FEES, AS FOLLOWS:
On all domestic households in Quezon City;

LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE
Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00
201 sq. m. – 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00
501 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
1,001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00
1,501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m. or more PHP 500.00
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;
FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

Less than 40 sq. m. PHP25.00
41 sq. m. – 60 sq. m. PHP50.00
61 sq. m. – 100 sq. m. PHP75.00
101 sq. m. – 150 sq. m. PHP100.00
151 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or more PHP200.00
On high-rise Condominium Units
a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high- rise

condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total size of
the entire condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional
garbage fee shall be collected based on area occupied for every unit
already sold or being amortized.
b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall

pay the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the entire
apartment and an additional garbage fee based on the schedule
prescribed herein for every unit occupied.
The collection of the garbage fee shall accrue on the first day of January and shall be paid
simultaneously with the payment of the real property tax, but not later than the first quarter
installment.8 In case a household owner refuses to pay, a penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due, plus
an interest of 2% per month or a fraction thereof, shall be charged.9 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
Petitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter residential property in Quezon

City which is covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 216288, and that, on January 7, 2014, he
paid his realty tax which already included the garbage fee in the sum of Php100.00.10 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
The instant petition was filed on January 17, 2014. We issued a TRO on February 5, 2014, which
enjoined the enforcement of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235 and required respondents to
comment on the petition without necessarily giving due course thereto.11 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Respondents filed their Comment12 with urgent motion to dissolve the TRO on February 17, 2014.
Thereafter, petitioner filed a Reply and a Memorandum on March 3, 2014 and September 8, 2014,
respectively.
Procedural Matters
A. Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari
Respondents are of the view that this petition for certiorari is improper since they are not tribunals,
boards or officers exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Petitioner, however, counters that in
enacting Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235, the Quezon City Council exercised quasi-judicial function
because the ordinances ruled against the property owners who must pay the SHT and the garbage fee,
exacting from them funds for basic essential public services that they should not be held liable. Even if a
Rule 65 petition is improper, petitioner still asserts that this Court, in a number of cases like in Rosario
v. Court of Appeals,13 has taken cognizance of an improper remedy in the interest of justice.
We agree that respondents neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor arrogated unto
themselves any judicial or quasi-judicial prerogatives.
A respondent is said to be exercising judicial function where he has the power to determine what the law
is and what the legal rights of the parties are, and then undertakes to determine these questions and
adjudicate upon the rights of the parties.
Quasi-judicial function, on the other hand, is “a term which applies to the actions, discretion, etc., of
public administrative officers or bodies … required to investigate facts or ascertain the existence of facts,
hold hearings, and draw conclusions from them as a basis for their official action and to exercise
discretion of a judicial nature.”
Before a tribunal, board, or officer may exercise judicial or quasi-judicial acts, it is necessary that there
be a law that gives rise to some specific rights of persons or property under which adverse claims to
such rights are made, and the controversy ensuing therefrom is brought before a tribunal, board, or
officer clothed with power and authority to determine the law and adjudicate the respective rights of the
contending parties.14
For a writ of certiorari to issue, the following requisites must concur: (1) it must be directed against a
tribunal, board, or officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions; (2) the tribunal, board, or officer
must have acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction; and (3) there is no appeal or any plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the
ordinary course of law. The enactment by the Quezon City Council of the assailed ordinances was done
in the exercise of its legislative, not judicial or quasi-judicial, function. Under Republic Act (R.A.) No.
7160, or the Local Government Code of 1991 (LGC), local legislative power shall be exercised by
the Sangguniang Panlungsod for the city.15 Said law likewise is specific in providing that the power to
impose a tax, fee, or charge, or to generate revenue shall be exercised by the sanggunian of the local
government unit concerned through an appropriate ordinance.16 ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary
Also, although the instant petition is styled as a petition for certiorari, it essentially seeks to declare the
unconstitutionality and illegality of the questioned ordinances. It, thus, partakes of the nature of a
petition for declaratory relief over which this Court has only appellate, not original, jurisdiction.17 ChanRo bles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Despite these, a petition for declaratory relief may be treated as one for prohibition or mandamus, over
which We exercise original jurisdiction, in cases with far-reaching implications or one which raises
transcendental issues or questions that need to be resolved for the public good.18 The judicial policy is
that this Court will entertain direct resort to it when the redress sought cannot be obtained in the proper
courts or when exceptional and compelling circumstances warrant availment of a remedy within and
calling for the exercise of Our primary jurisdiction.19 ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry
Section 2, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court lay down under what circumstances a petition for prohibition
may be filed:
SEC. 2. Petition for prohibition. - When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board, officer or
person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without or in excess of its
or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and
there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a
person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty
and praying that judgment be rendered commanding the respondent to desist from further proceeding in
the action or matter specified therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice
may require.
In a petition for prohibition against any tribunal, corporation, board, or person – whether exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions – who has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or
with grave abuse of discretion, the petitioner prays that judgment be rendered, commanding the
respondents to desist from further proceeding in the action or matter specified in the petition. In this
case, petitioner's primary intention is to prevent respondents from implementing Ordinance Nos. SP-
2095 and SP-2235. Obviously, the writ being sought is in the nature of a prohibition, commanding
desistance.
We consider that respondents City Mayor, City Treasurer, and City Assessor are
performing ministerial functions. A ministerial function is one that an officer or tribunal performs in the
context of a given set of facts, in a prescribed manner and without regard for the exercise of his or its
own judgment, upon the propriety or impropriety of the act done.20 Respondent Mayor, as chief
executive of the city government, exercises such powers and performs such duties and functions as
provided for by the LGC and other laws.21 Particularly, he has the duty to ensure that all taxes and other
revenues of the city are collected, and that city funds are applied to the payment of expenses and
settlement of obligations of the city, in accordance with law or ordinance.22 On the other hand, under the
LGC, all local taxes, fees, and charges shall be collected by the provincial, city, municipal, or barangay
treasurer, or their duly-authorized deputies, while the assessor shall take charge, among others, of
ensuring that all laws and policies governing the appraisal and assessment of real properties for taxation
purposes are properly executed.23 Anent the SHT, the Department of Finance (DOF) Local Finance
Circular No. 1-97, dated April 16, 1997, is more specific:
6.3 The Assessor’s office of the Id.ntified LGU shall:
a. immediately undertake an inventory of lands within its jurisdiction which shall be

subject to the levy of the Social Housing Tax (SHT) by the local sanggunian concerned;
b. inform the affected registered owners of the effectivity of the SHT; a list of the lands
and registered owners shall also be posted in 3 conspicuous places in the
city/municipality;
c. furnish the Treasurer’s office and the local sanggunian concerned of the list of lands
affected;
6.4 The Treasurer’s office shall:

a. collect the Social Housing Tax on top of the Real Property Tax, SEF Tax and other
special assessments;
b. report to the DOF, thru the Bureau of Local Government Finance, and the Mayor’s office
the monthly collections on Social Housing Tax (SHT). An annual report should likewise
be submitted to the HUDCC on the total revenues raised during the year pursuant to
Sec. 43, R.A. 7279 and the manner in which the same was disbursed.
Petitioner has adduced special and important reasons as to why direct recourse to Us should be allowed.
Aside from presenting a novel question of law, this case calls for immediate resolution since the
challenged ordinances adversely affect the property interests of all paying constituents of Quezon City.
As well, this petition serves as a test case for the guidance of other local government units (LGUs).
Indeed, the petition at bar is of transcendental importance warranting a relaxation of the doctrine of
hierarchy of courts. In Social Justice Society (SJS) Officers, et al. v. Lim,24 the Court cited the case
of Senator Jaworski v. Phil. Amusement & Gaming Corp.,25 where We ratiocinated:
Granting arguendo that the present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the
transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case warrants that we set aside the
technical defects and take primary jurisdiction over the petition at bar. x x x This is in
accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not inflexible tools
designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather
than promote substantial justice, must always be eschewed.26
B. Locus Standi of Petitioner
Respondents challenge petitioner’s legal standing to file this case on the ground that, in relation to
Section 3 of Ordinance No. SP-2095, petitioner failed to allege his ownership of a property that has an
assessed value of more than Php100,000.00 and, with respect to Ordinance No. SP-2335, by what
standing or personality he filed the case to nullify the same. According to respondents, the petition is not
a class suit, and that, for not having specifically alleged that petitioner filed the case as a taxpayer, it
could only be surmised whether he is a party-in-interest who stands to be directly benefited or injured
by the judgment in this case.
It is a general rule that every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party-in-
interest, who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or the party entitled to the
avails of the suit.
Jurisprudence defines interest as "material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the
decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest. By
real interest is meant a present substantial interest, as distinguished from a mere expectancy or a
future, contingent, subordinate, or consequential interest." "To qualify a person to be a real party-in-
interest in whose name an action must be prosecuted, he must appear to be the present real owner of
the right sought to be enforced."27
“Legal standing” or locus standi calls for more than just a generalized grievance.28 The concept has been
defined as a personal and substantial interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will
sustain direct injury as a result of the governmental act that is being challenged.29 The gist of the
question of standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as
to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court
depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.30 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
A party challenging the constitutionality of a law, act, or statute must show “not only that the law is
invalid, but also that he has sustained or is in immediate, or imminent danger of sustaining some direct
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that he suffers thereby in some indefinite way.” It
must be shown that he has been, or is about to be, denied some right or privilege to which he is lawfully
entitled, or that he is about to be subjected to some burdens or penalties by reason of the statute
complained of.31 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Tested by the foregoing, petitioner in this case clearly has legal standing to file the petition. He is a real
party-in-interest to assail the constitutionality and legality of Ordinance Nos. SP-2095 and SP-2235
because respondents did not dispute that he is a registered co-owner of a residential property in Quezon
City and that he paid property tax which already included the SHT and the garbage fee. He has
substantial right to seek a refund of the payments he made and to stop future imposition. While he is a
lone petitioner, his cause of action to declare the validity of the subject ordinances is substantial and of
paramount interest to similarly situated property owners in Quezon City.
C. Litis Pendentia
Respondents move for the dismissal of this petition on the ground of litis pendentia. They claim that, as
early as February 22, 2012, a case entitled Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners, Inc., et al., v. Hon.
Herbert Bautista, et al., docketed as Civil Case No. Q-12-7-820, has been pending in the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, Branch 104, which assails the legality of Ordinance No. SP-2095. Relying on City of
Makati, et al. v. Municipality (now City) of Taguig, et al.,32 respondents assert that there is substantial
identity of parties between the two cases because petitioner herein and plaintiffs in the civil case filed
their respective cases as taxpayers of Quezon City.
For petitioner, however, respondents’ contention is untenable since he is not a party in Alliance and does
not even have the remotest identity or association with the plaintiffs in said civil case. Moreover,
respondents’ arguments would deprive this Court of its jurisdiction to determine the constitutionality of
laws under Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution.33 ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
Litis pendentia is a Latin term which literally means “a pending suit” and is variously referred to in some
decisions as lis pendens and auter action pendant.34 While it is normally connected with the control
which the court has on a property involved in a suit during the continuance proceedings, it is more
interposed as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action pending in court.35 In Film Development Council
of the Philippines v. SM Prime Holdings, Inc.,36 We elucidated:
Litis pendentia, as a ground for the dismissal of a civil action, refers to a situation where two actions are
pending between the same parties for the same cause of action, so that one of them becomes
unnecessary and vexatious. It is based on the policy against multiplicity of suit and authorizes a court to
dismiss a case motu proprio.
xxxx
The requisites in order that an action may be dismissed on the ground of litis pendentia are: (a) the
identity of parties, or at least such as representing the same interest in both actions; (b) the identity of
rights asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (c) the identity of
the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is successful, would amount to res
judicata in the other.
xxxx
The underlying principle of litis pendentia is the theory that a party is not allowed to vex another more
than once regarding the same subject matter and for the same cause of action. This theory is founded
on the public policy that the same subject matter should not be the subject of controversy in courts
more than once, in order that possible conflicting judgments may be avoided for the sake of the stability
of the rights and status of persons, and also to avoid the costs and expenses incident to numerous suits.
Among the several tests resorted to in ascertaining whether two suits relate to a single or common
cause of action are: (1) whether the same evidence would support and sustain both the first and second
causes of action; and (2) whether the defenses in one case may be used to substantiate the complaint in
the other.
The determination of whether there is an identity of causes of action for purposes of litis pendentia is
inextricably linked with that of res judicata, each constituting an element of the other. In either case,
both relate to the sound practice of including, in a single litigation, the disposition of all issues relating to
a cause of action that is before a court.37
There is substantial identity of the parties when there is a community of interest between a party in the
first case and a party in the second case albeit the latter was not impleaded in the first case.38 Moreover,
the fact that the positions of the parties are reversed, i.e., the plaintiffs in the first case are the
defendants in the second case or vice-versa, does not negate the identity of parties for purposes of
determining whether the case is dismissible on the ground of litis pendentia.39 ChanRob les Vi rtualawl ib rary
In this case, it is notable that respondents failed to attach any pleading connected with the alleged civil
case pending before the Quezon City trial court. Granting that there is substantial identity of parties
between said case and this petition, dismissal on the ground of litis pendentia still cannot be had in view
of the absence of the second and third requisites. There is no way for Us to determine whether both
cases are based on the same set of facts that require the presentation of the same evidence. Even if
founded on the same set of facts, the rights asserted and reliefs prayed for could be different. Moreover,
there is no basis to rule that the two cases are intimately related and/or intertwined with one another
such that the judgment that may be rendered in one, regardless of which party would be successful,
would amount to res judicata in the other.
D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies
Respondents contend that petitioner failed to exhaust administrative remedies for his non-compliance
with Section 187 of the LGC, which mandates:
Section 187. Procedure for Approval and Effectivity of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures;
Mandatory Public Hearings. – The procedure for approval of local tax ordinances and revenue measures
shall be in accordance with the provisions of this Code: Provided, That public hearings shall be
conducted for the purpose prior to the enactment thereof: Provided, further, That any question on the
constitutionality or legality of tax ordinances or revenue measures may be raised on appeal within thirty
(30) days from the effectivity thereof to the Secretary of Justice who shall render a decision within sixty
(60) days from the date of receipt of the appeal: Provided, however, That such appeal shall not have the
effect of suspending the effectivity of the ordinance and the accrual and payment of the tax, fee, or
charge levied therein: Provided, finally, That within thirty (30) days after receipt of the decision or the
lapse of the sixty-day period without the Secretary of Justice acting upon the appeal, the aggrieved
party may file appropriate proceedings with a court of competent jurisdiction.
The provision, the constitutionality of which was sustained in Drilon v. Lim,40 has been construed as
mandatory41 considering that –
A municipal tax ordinance empowers a local government unit to impose taxes. The power to tax is the
most effective instrument to raise needed revenues to finance and support the myriad activities of local
government units for the delivery of basic services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and
enhancement of peace, progress, and prosperity of the people. Consequently, any delay in implementing
tax measures would be to the detriment of the public. It is for this reason that protests over tax
ordinances are required to be done within certain time frames. x x x.42
The obligatory nature of Section 187 was underscored in Hagonoy Market Vendor Asso. v. Municipality of
Hagonoy:43 cralawlawl ibra ry
x x x [T]he timeframe fixed by law for parties to avail of their legal remedies before competent courts is
not a “mere technicality” that can be easily brushed aside. The periods stated in Section 187 of the Local
Government Code are mandatory. x x x Being its lifeblood, collection of revenues by the government is
of paramount importance. The funds for the operation of its agencies and provision of basic services to
its inhabitants are largely derived from its revenues and collections. Thus, it is essential that the validity
of revenue measures is not left uncertain for a considerable length of time. Hence, the law provided a
time limit for an aggrieved party to assail the legality of revenue measures and tax ordinances.”44
Despite these cases, the Court, in Ongsuco, et al. v. Hon. Malones,45 held that there was no need for
petitioners therein to exhaust administrative remedies before resorting to the courts, considering that
there was only a pure question of law, the parties did not dispute any factual matter on which they had
to present evidence. Likewise, in Cagayan Electric Power and Light Co., Inc. v. City of Cagayan de
Oro,46 We relaxed the application of the rules in view of the more substantive matters. For the same
reasons, this petition is an exception to the general rule.
Substantive Issues
Petitioner asserts that the protection of real properties from informal settlers and the collection of
garbage are basic and essential duties and functions of the Quezon City Government. By imposing the
SHT and the garbage fee, the latter has shown a penchant and pattern to collect taxes to pay for public
services that could be covered by its revenues from taxes imposed on property, idle land, business,
transfer, amusement, etc., as well as the Internal Revenue Allotment (IRA) from the National
Government. For petitioner, it is noteworthy that respondents did not raise the issue that the Quezon
City Government is in dire financial state and desperately needs money to fund housing for informal
settlers and to pay for garbage collection. In fact, it has not denied that its revenue collection in 2012 is
in the sum of P13.69 billion.
Moreover, the imposition of the SHT and the garbage fee cannot be justified by the Quezon City
Government as an exercise of its power to create sources of income under Section 5, Article X of the
1987 Constitution.47 According to petitioner, the constitutional provision is not a carte blanche for the
LGU to tax everything under its territorial and political jurisdiction as the provision itself admits of
guidelines and limitations.
Petitioner further claims that the annual property tax is an ad valorem tax, a percentage of the assessed
value of the property, which is subject to revision every three (3) years in order to reflect an increase in
the market value of the property. The SHT and the garbage fee are actually increases in the property tax
which are not based on the assessed value of the property or its reassessment every three years;
hence, in violation of Sections 232 and 233 of the LGC.48 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
For their part, respondents relied on the presumption in favor of the constitutionality of Ordinance Nos.
SP-2095 and SP-2235, invoking Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,49People v.
Siton, et al.,50 and Hon. Ermita v. Hon. Aldecoa-Delorino.51 They argue that the burden of establishing
the invalidity of an ordinance rests heavily upon the party challenging its constitutionality. They insist
that the questioned ordinances are proper exercises of police power similar to Telecom. & Broadcast
Attys. of the Phils., Inc. v. COMELEC52 and Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.53 and
that their enactment finds basis in the social justice principle enshrined in Section 9,54 Article II of the
1987 Constitution.
As to the issue of publication, respondents argue that where the law provides for its own effectivity,
publication in the Official Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not punitive in character,
citing Balbuna, et al. v. Hon. Secretary of Education, et al.55 and Askay v. Cosalan.56 Thus, Ordinance
No. SP-2095 took effect after its publication, while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective after its
approval on December 26, 2013.
Additionally, the parties articulate the following positions:
On the Socialized Housing Tax
Respondents emphasize that the SHT is pursuant to the social justice principle found in Sections 1 and
2, Article XIII57 of the 1987 Constitution and Sections 2 (a)58 and 4359 of R.A. No. 7279, or the “Urban
Development and Housing Act of 1992 (UDHA).
Relying on Manila Race Horse Trainers Assn., Inc. v. De La Fuente,60 and Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v.
Municipality of Victorias, etc.,61 respondents assert that Ordinance No. SP-2095 applies equally to all real
property owners without discrimination. There is no way that the ordinance could violate the equal
protection clause because real property owners and informal settlers do not belong to the same class.
Ordinance No. SP-2095 is also not oppressive since the tax rate being imposed is consistent with the
UDHA. While the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on properties with an assessed value of more than
P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers properties with an assessed value exceeding
P100,000.00. As well, the ordinance provides for a tax credit equivalent to the total amount of the
special assessment paid by the property owner beginning in the sixth (6th) year of the effectivity of the
ordinance.
On the contrary, petitioner claims that the collection of the SHT is tantamount to a penalty imposed on
real property owners due to the failure of respondent Quezon City Mayor and Council to perform their
duty to secure and protect real property owners from informal settlers, thereby burdening them with the
expenses to provide funds for housing. For petitioner, the SHT cannot be viewed as a “charity” from real
property owners since it is forced, not voluntary.
Also, petitioner argues that the collection of the SHT is a kind of class legislation that violates the right
of property owners to equal protection of the laws since it favors informal settlers who occupy property
not their own and pay no taxes over law-abiding real property owners who pay income and realty taxes.
Petitioner further contends that respondents’ characterization of the SHT as “nothing more than an
advance payment on the real property tax” has no statutory basis. Allegedly, property tax cannot be
collected before it is due because, under the LGC, chartered cities are authorized to impose property tax
based on the assessed value and the general revision of assessment that is made every three (3) years.
As to the rationale of SHT stated in Ordinance No. SP-2095, which, in turn, was based on Section 43 of
the UDHA, petitioner asserts that there is no specific provision in the 1987 Constitution stating that the
ownership and enjoyment of property bear a social function. And even if there is, it is seriously doubtful
and far-fetched that the principle means that property owners should provide funds for the housing of
informal settlers and for home site development. Social justice and police power, petitioner believes,
does not mean imposing a tax on one, or that one has to give up something, for the benefit of another.
At best, the principle that property ownership and enjoyment bear a social function is but a reiteration of
the Civil Law principle that property should not be enjoyed and abused to the injury of other properties
and the community, and that the use of the property may be restricted by police power, the exercise of
which is not involved in this case.
Finally, petitioner alleges that 6 Bistekvilles will be constructed out of the SHT collected. Bistek is the
monicker of respondent City Mayor. The Bistekvilles makes it clear, therefore, that politicians will take
the credit for the tax imposed on real property owners.
On the Garbage Fee
Respondents claim that Ordinance No. S-2235, which is an exercise of police power, collects on the
average from every household a garbage fee in the meager amount of thirty-three (33) centavos per
day compared with the sum of P1,659.83 that the Quezon City Government annually spends for every
household for garbage collection and waste management.62 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
In addition, there is no double taxation because the ordinance involves a fee. Even assuming that the
garbage fee is a tax, the same cannot be a direct duplicate tax as it is imposed on a different subject
matter and is of a different kind or character. Based on Villanueva, et al. v. City of Iloilo63 and Victorias
Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, etc.,64 there is no “taxing twice” because the real property
tax is imposed on ownership based on its assessed value, while the garbage fee is required on the
domestic household. The only reference to the property is the determination of the applicable rate and
the facility of collection.
Petitioner argues, however, that Ordinance No. S-2235 cannot be justified as an exercise of police
power. The cases of Calalang v. Williams,65Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals,66 and Social Justice Society
(SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.,67 which were cited by respondents, are inapplicable since the assailed
ordinance is a revenue measure and does not regulate the disposal or other aspect of garbage.
The subject ordinance, for petitioner, is discriminatory as it collects garbage fee only from domestic
households and not from restaurants, food courts, fast food chains, and other commercial dining places
that spew garbage much more than residential property owners.
Petitioner likewise contends that the imposition of garbage fee is tantamount to double taxation because
garbage collection is a basic and essential public service that should be paid out from property tax,
business tax, transfer tax, amusement tax, community tax certificate, other taxes, and the IRA of the
Quezon City Government. To bolster the claim, he states that the revenue collection of the Quezon City
Government reached Php13.69 billion in 2012. A small portion of said amount could be spent for
garbage collection and other essential services.
It is further noted that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under Section 4768 of
R.A. No. 9003, or the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000, which authorizes LGUs to impose
fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste
management plan, and that LGUs have access to the Solid Waste Management (SWM) Fund created
under Section 4669 of the same law. Also, according to petitioner, it is evident that Ordinance No. S-
2235 is inconsistent with R.A. No. 9003 for while the law encourages segregation, composting, and
recycling of waste, the ordinance only emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage fee; while the
law calls for an active involvement of the barangay in the collection, segregation, and recycling of
garbage, the ordinance skips such mandate.
Lastly, in challenging the ordinance, petitioner avers that the garbage fee was collected even if the
required publication of its approval had not yet elapsed. He notes that on January 7, 2014, he paid his
realty tax which already included the garbage fee.
The Court’s Ruling
Respondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid.

An ordinance carries with it the presumption of validity. The question of reasonableness though is open
to judicial inquiry. Much should be left thus to the discretion of municipal authorities. Courts will go slow
in writing off an ordinance as unreasonable unless the amount is so excessive as to be prohibitive,
arbitrary, unreasonable, oppressive, or confiscatory. A rule which has gained acceptance is that factors
relevant to such an inquiry are the municipal conditions as a whole and the nature of the business made
subject to imposition.70
For an ordinance to be valid though, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the LGU to enact
and must be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law, it should also conform to the
following requirements: (1) not contrary to the Constitution or any statute; (2) not unfair or oppressive;
(3) not partial or discriminatory; (4) not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) general and consistent with
public policy; and (6) not unreasonable.71 As jurisprudence indicates, the tests are divided into the
formal (i.e., whether the ordinance was enacted within the corporate powers of the LGU and whether it
was passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law), and the substantive (i.e., involving
inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations under the Constitution and the
statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its consistency with public
policy).72 ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary
An ordinance must pass muster under the test of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the
prevailing laws.73 If not, it is void.74 Ordinance should uphold the principle of the supremacy of the
Constitution.75 As to conformity with existing statutes, Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals76 has
this to say:
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws
of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is
universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal
authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state
law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a
municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general law.
In the language of Justice Isagani Cruz (ret.), this Court, in Magtajas vs. Pryce Properties Corp., Inc.,
ruled that:
The rationale of the requirement that the ordinances should not contravene a statute is obvious.
Municipal governments are only agents of the national government. Local councils exercise only
delegated legislative powers conferred on them by Congress as the national lawmaking body. The
delegate cannot be superior to the principal or exercise powers higher than those of the latter. It is a
heresy to suggest that the local government units can undo the acts of Congress, from which they have
derived their power in the first place, and negate by mere ordinance the mandate of the statute.
Municipal corporations owe their origin to, and derive their powers and rights wholly from the
legislature. It breathes into them the breath of life, without which they cannot exist. As it creates, so it
may destroy. As it may destroy, it may abridge and control. Unless there is some constitutional
limitation on the right, the legislature might, by a single act, and if we can suppose it capable of so great
a folly and so great a wrong, sweep from existence all of the municipal corporations in the State, and
the corporation could not prevent it. We know of no limitation on the right so far as to the corporation
themselves are concerned. They are, so to phrase it, the mere tenants at will of the legislature.
This basic relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been
enfeebled by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. Without
meaning to detract from that policy, we here confirm that Congress retains control of the local
government units although in significantly reduced degree now than under our previous Constitutions.
The power to create still includes the power to destroy. The power to grant still includes the power to
withhold or recall. True, there are certain notable innovations in the Constitution, like the direct
conferment on the local government units of the power to tax, which cannot now be withdrawn by mere
statute. By and large, however, the national legislature is still the principal of the local government
units, which cannot defy its will or modify or violate it.77
LGUs must be reminded that they merely form part of the whole; that the policy of ensuring the
autonomy of local governments was never intended by the drafters of the 1987 Constitution to create
an imperium in imperio and install an intra-sovereign political subdivision independent of a single
sovereign state.78 “[M]unicipal corporations are bodies politic and corporate, created not only as local
units of local self-government, but as governmental agencies of the state. The legislature, by
establishing a municipal corporation, does not divest the State of any of its sovereignty; absolve itself
from its right and duty to administer the public affairs of the entire state; or divest itself of any power
over the inhabitants of the district which it possesses before the charter was granted.”79 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
LGUs are able to legislate only by virtue of a valid delegation of legislative power from the national
legislature; they are mere agents vested with what is called the power of subordinate
legislation.80 “Congress enacted the LGC as the implementing law for the delegation to the various LGUs
of the State’s great powers, namely: the police power, the power of eminent domain, and the power of
taxation. The LGC was fashioned to delineate the specific parameters and limitations to be complied with
by each LGU in the exercise of these delegated powers with the view of making each LGU a fully
functioning subdivision of the State subject to the constitutional and statutory limitations.”81 ChanRoblesVirt ualawli bra ry
Specifically, with regard to the power of taxation, it is indubitably the most effective instrument to raise
needed revenues in financing and supporting myriad activities of the LGUs for the delivery of basic
services essential to the promotion of the general welfare and the enhancement of peace, progress, and
prosperity of the people.82 As this Court opined in National Power Corp. v. City of Cabanatuan:83 cralawlawli bra ry
In recent years, the increasing social challenges of the times expanded the scope of state activity, and
taxation has become a tool to realize social justice and the equitable distribution of wealth, economic
progress and the protection of local industries as well as public welfare and similar objectives. Taxation
assumes even greater significance with the ratification of the 1987 Constitution. Thenceforth, the power
to tax is no longer vested exclusively on Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority
to levy taxes, fees and other charges pursuant to Article X, Section 5 of the 1987 Constitution, viz:
“Section 5. Each Local Government unit shall have the power to create its own sources of revenue, to
levy taxes, fees and charges subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide,
consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy. Such taxes, fees and charges shall accrue exclusively
to the local governments.”
This paradigm shift results from the realization that genuine development can be achieved only by
strengthening local autonomy and promoting decentralization of governance. For a long time, the
country’s highly centralized government structure has bred a culture of dependence among local
government leaders upon the national leadership. It has also “dampened the spirit of initiative,
innovation and imaginative resilience in matters of local development on the part of local government
leaders.” The only way to shatter this culture of dependence is to give the LGUs a wider role in the
delivery of basic services, and confer them sufficient powers to generate their own sources for the
purpose. To achieve this goal, Section 3 of Article X of the 1987 Constitution mandates Congress to
enact a local government code that will, consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, set the
guidelines and limitations to this grant of taxing powers x x x84
Fairly recently, We also stated in Pelizloy Realty Corporation v. Province of Benguet85 that:
The rule governing the taxing power of provinces, cities, municipalities and barangays is summarized
in Icard v. City Council of Baguio:
It is settled that a municipal corporation unlike a sovereign state is clothed with no inherent power of
taxation. The charter or statute must plainly show an intent to confer that power or the municipality,
cannot assume it. And the power when granted is to be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or
ambiguity arising out of the term used in granting that power must be resolved against the municipality.
Inferences, implications, deductions – all these – have no place in the interpretation of the taxing power
of a municipal corporation. [Underscoring supplied]
xxxx
Per Section 5, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, “the power to tax is no longer vested exclusively on
Congress; local legislative bodies are now given direct authority to levy taxes, fees and other charges.”
Nevertheless, such authority is “subject to such guidelines and limitations as the Congress may provide.”
In conformity with Section 3, Article X of the 1987 Constitution, Congress enacted Republic Act No.
7160, otherwise known as the Local Government Code of 1991. Book II of the LGC governs local
taxation and fiscal matters.86
Indeed, LGUs have no inherent power to tax except to the extent that such power might be delegated to
them either by the basic law or by the statute.87 “Under the now prevailing Constitution, where there is
neither a grant nor a prohibition by statute, the tax power must be deemed to exist although Congress
may provide statutory limitations and guidelines. The basic rationale for the current rule is to safeguard
the viability and self-sufficiency of local government units by directly granting them general and broad
tax powers. Nevertheless, the fundamental law did not intend the delegation to be absolute and
unconditional; the constitutional objective obviously is to ensure that, while the local government units
are being strengthened and made more autonomous, the legislature must still see to it that (a) the
taxpayer will not be over-burdened or saddled with multiple and unreasonable impositions; (b) each
local government unit will have its fair share of available resources; (c) the resources of the national
government will not be unduly disturbed; and (d) local taxation will be fair, uniform, and just.”88 ChanRoblesVirtualawli bra ry
Subject to the provisions of the LGC and consistent with the basic policy of local autonomy, every LGU is
now empowered and authorized to create its own sources of revenue and to levy taxes, fees, and
charges which shall accrue exclusively to the local government unit as well as to apply its resources and
assets for productive, developmental, or welfare purposes, in the exercise or furtherance of their
governmental or proprietary powers and functions.89 The relevant provisions of the LGC which establish
the parameters of the taxing power of the LGUs are as follows:
SECTION 130. Fundamental Principles. – The following fundamental principles shall govern the exercise
of the taxing and other revenue-raising powers of local government units:
(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;
(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:

(1) be equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay;
(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;
(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;

(4) not be contrary to law, public policy, national economic policy, or in restraint of trade;
(c) The collection of local taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall in no case be let to any private
person;
(d) The revenue collected pursuant to the provisions of this Code shall inure solely to the benefit of, and
be subject to the disposition by, the local government unit levying the tax, fee, charge or other
imposition unless otherwise specifically provided herein; and,
(e) Each local government unit shall, as far as practicable, evolve a progressive system of taxation.
SECTION 133. Common Limitations on the Taxing Powers of Local Government Units. – Unless otherwise
provided herein, the exercise of the taxing powers of provinces, cities, municipalities, and barangays
shall not extend to the levy of the following:
(a) Income tax, except when levied on banks and other financial institutions;
(b) Documentary stamp tax;
(c) Taxes on estates, inheritance, gifts, legacies and other acquisitions mortis causa, except as
otherwise provided herein;
(d) Customs duties, registration fees of vessel and wharfage on wharves, tonnage dues, and all other
kinds of customs fees, charges and dues except wharfage on wharves constructed and maintained by
the local government unit concerned;
(e) Taxes, fees, and charges and other impositions upon goods carried into or out of, or passing
through, the territorial jurisdictions of local government units in the guise of charges for wharfage, tolls
for bridges or otherwise, or other taxes, fees, or charges in any form whatsoever upon such goods or
merchandise;
(f) Taxes, fees or charges on agricultural and aquatic products when sold by marginal farmers or
fishermen;
(g) Taxes on business enterprises certified to by the Board of Investments as pioneer or non-pioneer for
a period of six (6) and four (4) years, respectively from the date of registration;
(h) Excise taxes on articles enumerated under the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, and
taxes, fees or charges on petroleum products;
(i) Percentage or value-added tax (VAT) on sales, barters or exchanges or similar transactions on goods
or services except as otherwise provided herein;
(j) Taxes on the gross receipts of transportation contractors and persons engaged in the transportation
of passengers or freight by hire and common carriers by air, land or water, except as provided in this
Code;
(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;
(l) Taxes, fees or charges for the registration of motor vehicles and for the issuance of all kinds of
licenses or permits for the driving thereof, except tricycles;
(m) Taxes, fees, or other charges on Philippine products actually exported, except as otherwise provided
herein;
(n) Taxes, fees, or charges, on Countryside and Barangay Business Enterprises and cooperatives duly
registered under R.A. No. 6810 and Republic Act Numbered Sixty-nine hundred thirty-eight (R.A. No.
6938) otherwise known as the “Cooperative Code of the Philippines” respectively; and
(o) Taxes, fees or charges of any kind on the National Government, its agencies and instrumentalities,
and local government units.
SECTION 151. Scope of Taxing Powers. – Except as otherwise provided in this Code, the city, may levy
the taxes, fees, and charges which the province or municipality may impose: Provided, however, That
the taxes, fees and charges levied and collected by highly urbanized and independent component cities
shall accrue to them and distributed in accordance with the provisions of this Code.
The rates of taxes that the city may levy may exceed the maximum rates allowed for the province or
municipality by not more than fifty percent (50%) except the rates of professional and amusement
taxes.
SECTION 186. Power To Levy Other Taxes, Fees or Charges. – Local government units may exercise the
power to levy taxes, fees or charges on any base or subject not otherwise specifically enumerated herein
or taxed under the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended, or other applicable
laws: Provided, That the taxes, fees, or charges shall not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, confiscatory
or contrary to declared national policy: Provided, further, That the ordinance levying such taxes, fees or
charges shall not be enacted without any prior public hearing conducted for the purpose.
On the Socialized Housing Tax
Contrary to petitioner’s submission, the 1987 Constitution explicitly espouses the view that the use of
property bears a social function and that all economic agents shall contribute to the common good.90 The
Court already recognized this in Social Justice Society (SJS), et al. v. Hon. Atienza, Jr.:91 cra lawlawlib rary
Property has not only an individual function, insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the owner, but
also a social function insofar as it has to provide for the needs of the other members of society. The
principle is this:
Police power proceeds from the principle that every holder of property, however absolute and unqualified
may be his title, holds it under the implied liability that his use of it shall not be injurious to the equal
enjoyment of others having an equal right to the enjoyment of their property, nor injurious to the right
of the community. Rights of property, like all other social and conventional rights, are subject to
reasonable limitations in their enjoyment as shall prevent them from being injurious, and to such
reasonable restraints and regulations established by law as the legislature, under the governing and
controlling power vested in them by the constitution, may think necessary and expedient.92
Police power, which flows from the recognition that salus populi est suprema lex (the welfare of the
people is the supreme law), is the plenary power vested in the legislature to make statutes and
ordinances to promote the health, morals, peace, education, good order or safety and general welfare of
the people.93 Property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to fulfill
the objectives of the government in the exercise of police power. 94 In this jurisdiction, it is well-
entrenched that taxation may be made the implement of the state’s police power.95 ChanRoble sVirt ualawlib rary
Ordinance No. SP-2095 imposes a Socialized Housing Tax equivalent to 0.5% on the assessed value of
land in excess of Php100,000.00. This special assessment is the same tax referred to in R.A. No. 7279 or
the UDHA.96 The SHT is one of the sources of funds for urban development and housing
program.97 Section 43 of the law provides:
Sec. 43. Socialized Housing Tax. – Consistent with the constitutional principle that the ownership and
enjoyment of property bear a social function and to raise funds for the Program, all local government
units are hereby authorized to impose an additional one-half percent (0.5%) tax on the assessed value
of all lands in urban areas in excess of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00).
The rationale of the SHT is found in the preambular clauses of the subject ordinance, to wit:
WHEREAS, the imposition of additional tax is intended to provide the City Government with sufficient
funds to initiate, implement and undertake Socialized Housing Projects and other related preliminary
activities;
WHEREAS, the imposition of 0.5% tax will benefit the Socialized Housing Programs and Projects of the
City Government, specifically the marginalized sector through the acquisition of properties for human
settlements;
WHEREAS, the removal of the urban blight will definitely increase fair market value of properties in the
city[.]
The above-quoted are consistent with the UDHA, which the LGUs are charged to implement in their
respective localities in coordination with the Housing and Urban Development Coordinating Council, the
national housing agencies, the Presidential Commission for the Urban Poor, the private sector, and other
non-government organizations.98 It is the declared policy of the State to undertake a comprehensive and
continuing urban development and housing program that shall, among others, uplift the conditions of
the underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban areas and in resettlement areas, and provide for the
rational use and development of urban land in order to bring about, among others, reduction in urban
dysfunctions, particularly those that adversely affect public health, safety and ecology, and access to
land and housing by the underprivileged and homeless citizens.99 Urban renewal and resettlement shall
include the rehabilitation and development of blighted and slum areas100 and the resettlement of
program beneficiaries in accordance with the provisions of the UDHA.101 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
Under the UDHA, socialized housing102 shall be the primary strategy in providing shelter for the
underprivileged and homeless.103 The LGU or the NHA, in cooperation with the private developers and
concerned agencies, shall provide socialized housing or resettlement areas with basic services and
facilities such as potable water, power and electricity, and an adequate power distribution system,
sewerage facilities, and an efficient and adequate solid waste disposal system; and access to primary
roads and transportation facilities.104 The provisions for health, education, communications, security,
recreation, relief and welfare shall also be planned and be given priority for implementation by the LGU
and concerned agencies in cooperation with the private sector and the beneficiaries themselves.105 ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
Moreover, within two years from the effectivity of the UDHA, the LGUs, in coordination with the NHA, are
directed to implement the relocation and resettlement of persons living in danger areas such as esteros,
railroad tracks, garbage dumps, riverbanks, shorelines, waterways, and other public places like
sidewalks, roads, parks, and playgrounds.106 In coordination with the NHA, the LGUs shall provide
relocation or resettlement sites with basic services and facilities and access to employment and
livelihood opportunities sufficient to meet the basic needs of the affected families.107 ChanR obles Virtualawl ibra ry
Clearly, the SHT charged by the Quezon City Government is a tax which is within its power to impose.
Aside from the specific authority vested by Section 43 of the UDHA, cities are allowed to exercise such
other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities as are necessary, appropriate, or
incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and facilities which include, among
others, programs and projects for low-cost housing and other mass dwellings.108 The collections made
accrue to its socialized housing programs and projects. The tax is not a pure exercise of taxing power or
merely to raise revenue; it is levied with a regulatory purpose. The levy is primarily in the exercise of
the police power for the general welfare of the entire city. It is greatly imbued with public interest.
Removing slum areas in Quezon City is not only beneficial to the underprivileged and homeless
constituents but advantageous to the real property owners as well. The situation will improve the value
of the their property investments, fully enjoying the same in view of an orderly, secure, and safe
community, and will enhance the quality of life of the poor, making them law-abiding constituents and
better consumers of business products.
Though broad and far-reaching, police power is subordinate to constitutional limitations and is subject to
the requirement that its exercise must be reasonable and for the public good.109 In the words of City of
Manila v. Hon. Laguio, Jr.:110 cralawlaw lib rary
The police power granted to local government units must always be exercised with utmost observance of
the rights of the people to due process and equal protection of the law. Such power cannot be exercised
whimsically, arbitrarily or despotically as its exercise is subject to a qualification, limitation or restriction
demanded by the respect and regard due to the prescription of the fundamental law, particularly those
forming part of the Bill of Rights. Individual rights, it bears emphasis, may be adversely affected only to
the extent that may fairly be required by the legitimate demands of public interest or public welfare. Due
process requires the intrinsic validity of the law in interfering with the rights of the person to his life,
liberty and property.
xxxx
To successfully invoke the exercise of police power as the rationale for the enactment of the Ordinance,
and to free it from the imputation of constitutional infirmity, not only must it appear that the interests of
the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require an interference with
private rights, but the means adopted must be reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. It must be evident that no other alternative for the
accomplishment of the purpose less intrusive of private rights can work. A reasonable relation must exist
between the purposes of the police measure and the means employed for its accomplishment, for even
under the guise of protecting the public interest, personal rights and those pertaining to private property
will not be permitted to be arbitrarily invaded.
Lacking a concurrence of these two requisites, the police measure shall be struck down as an arbitrary
intrusion into private rights – a violation of the due process clause.111
As with the State, LGUs may be considered as having properly exercised their police power only if there
is a lawful subject and a lawful method or, to be precise, if the following requisites are met: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require its exercise
and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.112 ChanRobles Vi rt ualawlib ra ry
In this case, petitioner argues that the SHT is a penalty imposed on real property owners because it
burdens them with expenses to provide funds for the housing of informal settlers, and that it is a class
legislation since it favors the latter who occupy properties which is not their own and pay no taxes.
We disagree.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to
rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.113 The guarantee means that no person or class of persons
shall be denied the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances.114 Similar subjects should not be treated differently so as to give undue favor to some
and unjustly discriminate against others.115 The law may, therefore, treat and regulate one class
differently from another class provided there are real and substantial differences to distinguish one class
from another.116 ChanRoblesVirtualawli bra ry
An ordinance based on reasonable classification does not violate the constitutional guaranty of the equal
protection of the law. The requirements for a valid and reasonable classification are: (1) it must rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to
existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally to all members of the same class.117 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
For the purpose of undertaking a comprehensive and continuing urban development and housing
program, the disparities between a real property owner and an informal settler as two distinct classes
are too obvious and need not be discussed at length. The differentiation conforms to the practical
dictates of justice and equity and is not discriminatory within the meaning of the Constitution. Notably,
the public purpose of a tax may legally exist even if the motive which impelled the legislature to impose
the tax was to favor one over another.118 It is inherent in the power to tax that a State is free to select
the subjects of taxation.119 Inequities which result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation
or exemption infringe no constitutional limitation.120 ChanRob les Virtualawl ibra ry
Further, the reasonableness of Ordinance No. SP-2095 cannot be disputed. It is not confiscatory or
oppressive since the tax being imposed therein is below what the UDHA actually allows. As pointed out
by respondents, while the law authorizes LGUs to collect SHT on lands with an assessed value of more
than P50,000.00, the questioned ordinance only covers lands with an assessed value exceeding
P100,000.00. Even better, on certain conditions, the ordinance grants a tax credit equivalent to the total
amount of the special assessment paid beginning in the sixth (6th) year of its effectivity. Far from being
obnoxious, the provisions of the subject ordinance are fair and just.
On the Garbage Fee
In the United States of America, it has been held that the authority of a municipality to regulate garbage
falls within its police power to protect public health, safety, and welfare.121 As opined, the purposes and
policy underpinnings of the police power to regulate the collection and disposal of solid waste are: (1) to
preserve and protect the public health and welfare as well as the environment by minimizing or
eliminating a source of disease and preventing and abating nuisances; and (2) to defray costs and
ensure financial stability of the system for the benefit of the entire community, with the sum of all
charges marshalled and designed to pay for the expense of a systemic refuse disposal scheme.122 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
Ordinances regulating waste removal carry a strong presumption of validity.123 Not surprisingly, the
overwhelming majority of U.S. cases addressing a city's authority to impose mandatory garbage service
and fees have upheld the ordinances against constitutional and statutory challenges.124 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
A municipality has an affirmative duty to supervise and control the collection of garbage within its
corporate limits.125 The LGC specifically assigns the responsibility of regulation and oversight of solid
waste to local governing bodies because the Legislature determined that such bodies were in the best
position to develop efficient waste management programs.126 To impose on local governments the
responsibility to regulate solid waste but not grant them the authority necessary to fulfill the same would
lead to an absurd result.”127 As held in one U.S. case:
x x x When a municipality has general authority to regulate a particular subject matter, the manner and
means of exercising those powers, where not specifically prescribed by the legislature, are left to the
discretion of the municipal authorities. x x x Leaving the manner of exercising municipal powers to the
discretion of municipal authorities "implies a range of reasonableness within which a municipality's
exercise of discretion will not be interfered with or upset by the judiciary."128
In this jurisdiction, pursuant to Section 16 of the LGC and in the proper exercise of its corporate powers
under Section 22 of the same, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Quezon City, like other local legislative
bodies, is empowered to enact ordinances, approve resolutions, and appropriate funds for the general
welfare of the city and its inhabitants.129 Section 16 of the LGC provides:
SECTION 16. General Welfare. – Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly
granted, those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for
its efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support,
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
The general welfare clause is the delegation in statutory form of the police power of the State to
LGUs.130 The provisions related thereto are liberally interpreted to give more powers to LGUs in
accelerating economic development and upgrading the quality of life for the people in the
community.131 Wide discretion is vested on the legislative authority to determine not only what the
interests of the public require but also what measures are necessary for the protection of such interests
since the Sanggunian is in the best position to determine the needs of its constituents.132 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
One of the operative principles of decentralization is that, subject to the provisions of the LGC and
national policies, the LGUs shall share with the national government the responsibility in the
management and maintenance of ecological balance within their territorial jurisdiction.133 In this regard,
cities are allowed to exercise such other powers and discharge such other functions and responsibilities
as are necessary, appropriate, or incidental to efficient and effective provision of the basic services and
facilities which include, among others, solid waste disposal system or environmental management
system and services or facilities related to general hygiene and sanitation.134 R.A. No. 9003, or
the Ecological Solid Waste Management Act of 2000,135 affirms this authority as it expresses that the
LGUs shall be primarily responsible for the implementation and enforcement of its provisions within their
respective jurisdictions while establishing a cooperative effort among the national government, other
local government units, non-government organizations, and the private sector.136 ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
Necessarily, LGUs are statutorily sanctioned to impose and collect such reasonable fees and charges for
services rendered.137 “Charges” refer to pecuniary liability, as rents or fees against persons or property,
while “Fee” means a charge fixed by law or ordinance for the regulation or inspection of a business or
activity.138 ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
The fee imposed for garbage collections under Ordinance No. SP-2235 is a charge fixed for the
regulation of an activity. The basis for this could be discerned from the foreword of said Ordinance, to
wit:
WHEREAS, Quezon City being the largest and premiere city in the Philippines in terms of population and
urban geographical areas, apart from being competent and efficient in the delivery of public service,
apparently requires a big budgetary allocation in order to address the problems relative and connected
to the prompt and efficient delivery of basic services such as the effective system of waste management,
public information programs on proper garbage and proper waste disposal, including the imposition of
waste regulatory measures;
WHEREAS, to help augment the funds to be spent for the city’s waste management system, the City
Government through the Sangguniang Panlungsod deems it necessary to impose a schedule of
reasonable fees or charges for the garbage collection services for residential (domestic household) that it
renders to the public.
Certainly, as opposed to petitioner’s opinion, the garbage fee is not a tax. In Smart Communications,
Inc. v. Municipality of Malvar, Batangas,139 the Court had the occasion to distinguish these two concepts:
In Progressive Development Corporation v. Quezon City, the Court declared that “if the generating of
revenue is the primary purpose and regulation is merely incidental, the imposition is a tax; but if
regulation is the primary purpose, the fact that incidentally revenue is also obtained does not make the
imposition a tax.”
In Victorias Milling Co., Inc. v. Municipality of Victorias, the Court reiterated that the purpose and effect
of the imposition determine whether it is a tax or a fee, and that the lack of any standards for such
imposition gives the presumption that the same is a tax.
We accordingly say that the designation given by the municipal authorities does not decide whether the
imposition is properly a license tax or a license fee. The determining factors are the purpose and effect
of the imposition as may be apparent from the provisions of the ordinance. Thus, “[w]hen no police
inspection, supervision, or regulation is provided, nor any standard set for the applicant to establish, or
that he agrees to attain or maintain, but any and all persons engaged in the business designated,
without qualification or hindrance, may come, and a license on payment of the stipulated sum will issue,
to do business, subject to no prescribed rule of conduct and under no guardian eye, but according to the
unrestrained judgment or fancy of the applicant and licensee, the presumption is strong that the power
of taxation, and not the police power, is being exercised.”
In Georgia, U.S.A., assessments for garbage collection services have been consistently treated as a fee
and not a tax.140 In another U.S. case,141 the garbage fee was considered as a "service charge" rather
than a tax as it was actually a fee for a service given by the city which had previously been provided at
no cost to its citizens.
Hence, not being a tax, the contention that the garbage fee under Ordinance No. SP-2235 violates the
rule on double taxation142 must necessarily fail.
Nonetheless, although a special charge, tax, or assessment may be imposed by a municipal corporation,
it must be reasonably commensurate to the cost of providing the garbage service.143 To pass judicial
scrutiny, a regulatory fee must not produce revenue in excess of the cost of the regulation because such
fee will be construed as an illegal tax when the revenue generated by the regulation exceeds the cost of
the regulation.144 ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
Petitioner argues that the Quezon City Government already collects garbage fee under Section 47 of R.A.
No. 9003, which authorizes LGUs to impose fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing,
adopting, and implementing a solid waste management plan, and that it has access to the SWM Fund
under Section 46 of the same law. Moreover, Ordinance No. S-2235 is inconsistent with R.A. No. 9003,
because the ordinance emphasizes the collection and payment of garbage fee with no concern for
segregation, composting and recycling of wastes. It also skips the mandate of the law calling for the
active involvement of the barangay in the collection, segregation, and recycling of garbage.
We now turn to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9003.
Under R.A. No. 9003, it is the declared policy of the State to adopt a systematic, comprehensive and
ecological solid waste management program which shall, among others, ensure the proper segregation,
collection, transport, storage, treatment and disposal of solid waste through the formulation and
adoption of the best environmental practices in ecological waste management.145 The law provides that
segregation and collection of solid waste shall be conducted at the barangay level, specifically for
biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes, while the collection of non-recyclable materials and
special wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality or city.146 Mandatory segregation of solid
wastes shall primarily be conducted at the source, to include household, institutional, industrial,
commercial and agricultural sources.147Segregation at source refers to a solid waste management
practice of separating, at the point of origin, different materials found in solid waste in order to promote
recycling and re-use of resources and to reduce the volume of waste for collection and disposal.148 Based
on Rule XVII of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Administrative Order No.
2001-34, Series of 2001,149 which is the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9003, barangays shall be responsible for the collection, segregation, and recycling of biodegradable,
recyclable, compostable and reusable wastes.150 For the purpose, a Materials Recovery Facility (MRF),
which shall receive biodegradable wastes for composting and mixed non-biodegradable wastes for final
segregation, re-use and recycling, is to be established in every barangay or cluster of barangays.151 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
According to R.A. 9003, an LGU, through its local solid waste management board, is mandated by law to
prepare a 10-year solid waste management plan consistent with the National Solid Waste Management
Framework.152 The plan shall be for the re-use, recycling and composting of wastes generated in its
jurisdiction; ensure the efficient management of solid waste generated within its jurisdiction; and place
primary emphasis on implementation of all feasible re-use, recycling, and composting programs while
identifying the amount of landfill and transformation capacity that will be needed for solid waste which
cannot be re-used, recycled, or composted.153 One of the components of the solid waste management
plan is source reduction:
(e) Source reduction – The source reduction component shall include a program and implementation
schedule which shows the methods by which the LGU will, in combination with the recycling and
composting components, reduce a sufficient amount of solid waste disposed of in accordance with the
diversion requirements of Section 20.
The source reduction component shall describe the following:
(1) strategies in reducing the volume of solid waste generated at source;
(2) measures for implementing such strategies and the resources necessary to carry out such activities;
(3) other appropriate waste reduction technologies that may also be considered, provided that such
technologies conform with the standards set pursuant to this Act;
(4) the types of wastes to be reduced pursuant to Section 15 of this Act;
(5) the methods that the LGU will use to determine the categories of solid wastes to be diverted from
disposal at a disposal facility through re-use, recycling and composting; and
(6) new facilities and of expansion of existing facilities which will be needed to implement re-use,
recycling and composting.
The LGU source reduction component shall include the evaluation and identification of rate structures
and fees for the purpose of reducing the amount of waste generated, and other source reduction
strategies, including but not limited to, programs and economic incentives provided under Sec. 45 of this
Act to reduce the use of non-recyclable materials, replace disposable materials and products with
reusable materials and products, reduce packaging, and increase the efficiency of the use of paper,
cardboard, glass, metal, and other materials. The waste reduction activities of the community shall also
take into account, among others, local capability, economic viability, technical requirements, social
concerns, disposition of residual waste and environmental impact: Provided, That, projection of future
facilities needed and estimated cost shall be incorporated in the plan. x x x154
The solid waste management plan shall also include an implementation schedule for solid waste
diversion:
SEC. 20. Establishing Mandatory Solid Waste Diversion. – Each LGU plan shall include an implementation
schedule which shows that within five (5) years after the effectivity of this Act, the LGU shall divert at
least 25% of all solid waste from waste disposal facilities through re-use, recycling, and composting
activities and other resource recovery activities: Provided, That the waste diversion goals shall be
increased every three (3) years thereafter: Provided, further, That nothing in this Section prohibits a
local government unit from implementing re-use, recycling, and composting activities designed to
exceed the goal.
The baseline for the twenty-five percent (25%) shall be derived from the waste characterization
result155 that each LGU is mandated to undertake.156 ChanRoblesVi rtualaw lib rary
In accordance with Section 46 of R.A. No. 9003, the LGUs are entitled to avail of the SWM Fund on the
basis of their approved solid waste management plan. Aside from this, they may also impose SWM Fees
under Section 47 of the law, which states:
SEC. 47. Authority to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees – The local government unit shall impose
fees in amounts sufficient to pay the costs of preparing, adopting, and implementing a solid waste
management plan prepared pursuant to this Act. The fees shall be based on the following minimum
factors:
(a) types of solid waste;
(b) amount/volume of waste; and
(c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility.

The fees shall be used to pay the actual costs incurred by the LGU in collecting the local fees. In
determining the amounts of the fees, an LGU shall include only those costs directly related to the
adoption and implementation of the plan and the setting and collection of the local fees.
Rule XVII of the IRR of R.A. No. 9003 sets forth the details:
Section 1. Power to Collect Solid Waste Management Fees. – The Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster
Board shall impose fees on the SWM services provided for by the LGU and/or any authorized
organization or unit. In determining the amounts of the fees, a Local SWM Board/Local SWM Cluster
Board shall include only those costs directly related to the adoption and implementation of the SWM Plan
and the setting and collection of the local fees. This power to impose fees may be ceded to the private
sector and civil society groups which have been duly accredited by the Local SWM Board/Local SWM
Cluster Board; provided, the SWM fees shall be covered by a Contract or Memorandum of Agreement
between the respective board and the private sector or civil society group.
The fees shall pay for the costs of preparing, adopting and implementing a SWM Plan prepared pursuant
to the Act. Further, the fees shall also be used to pay the actual costs incurred in collecting the local fees
and for project sustainability.
Section 2. Basis of SWM Service Fees
Reasonable SWM service fees shall be computed based on but not limited to the following minimum
factors:
a) Types of solid waste to include special waste

b) amount/volume of waste
c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility
d) capacity or type of LGU constituency
e) cost of construction
f) cost of management
g) type of technology
Section 3. Collection of Fees. – Fees may be collected corresponding to the following levels:
a) Barangay – The Barangay may impose fees for collection and segregation of biodegradable,
compostable and reusable wastes from households, commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and
for the use of Barangay MRFs. The computation of the fees shall be established by the respective SWM
boards. The manner of collection of the fees shall be dependent on the style of administration of
respective Barangay Councils. However, all transactions shall follow the Commission on Audit rules on
collection of fees.
b) Municipality – The municipal and city councils may impose fees on the barangay MRFs for the
collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of these into the
sanitary landfill. The level and procedure for exacting fees shall be defined by the Local SWM
Board/Local SWM Cluster Board and supported by LGU ordinances, however, payments shall be
consistent with the accounting system of government.
c) Private Sector/Civil Society Group – On the basis of the stipulations of contract or Memorandum of
Agreement, the private sector or civil society group shall impose fees for collection, transport and tipping
in their SLFs. Receipts and invoices shall be issued to the paying public or to the government.
From the afore-quoted provisions, it is clear that the authority of a municipality or city to impose fees is
limited to the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes and for the disposal of
these into the sanitary landfill. Barangays, on the other hand, have the authority to impose fees for the
collection and segregation of biodegradable, compostable and reusable wastes from households,
commerce, other sources of domestic wastes, and for the use of barangay MRFs. This is but consistent
with Section 10 of R.A. No. 9003 directing that segregation and collection of biodegradable, compostable
and reusable wastes shall be conducted at the barangay level, while the collection of non-recyclable
materials and special wastes shall be the responsibility of the municipality or city.
In this case, the alleged bases of Ordinance No. S-2235 in imposing the garbage fee is the volume of
waste currently generated by each person in Quezon City, which purportedly stands at 0.66 kilogram per
day, and the increasing trend of waste generation for the past three years.157 Respondents did not
elaborate any further. The figure presented does not reflect the specific types of wastes generated –
whether residential, market, commercial, industrial, construction/demolition, street waste, agricultural,
agro-industrial, institutional, etc. It is reasonable, therefore, for the Court to presume that such amount
pertains to the totality of wastes, without any distinction, generated by Quezon City constituents. To
reiterate, however, the authority of a municipality or city to impose fees extends only to those related to
the collection and transport of non-recyclable and special wastes.
Granting, for the sake of argument, that the 0.66 kilogram of solid waste per day refers only to non-
recyclable and special wastes, still, We cannot sustain the validity of Ordinance No. S-2235. It violates
the equal protection clause of the Constitution and the provisions of the LGC that an ordinance must be
equitable and based as far as practicable on the taxpayer’s ability to pay, and not unjust, excessive,
oppressive, confiscatory.158 ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
In the subject ordinance, the rates of the imposable fee depend on land or floor area and whether the
payee is an occupant of a lot, condominium, social housing project or apartment. For easy reference, the
relevant provision is again quoted below:
On all domestic households in Quezon City;
LAND AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

Less than 200 sq. m. PHP 100.00
201 sq. m. – 500 sq. m. PHP 200.00
501 sq. m. – 1,000 sq. m. PHP 300.00
1,001 sq. m. – 1,500 sq. m. PHP 400.00
1,501 sq. m. – 2,000 sq. m.
PHP 500.00
or more
On all condominium unit and socialized housing projects/units in Quezon City;
FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

Less than 40 sq. m. PHP25.00
41 sq. m. – 60 sq. m. PHP50.00
61 sq. m. – 100 sq. m. PHP75.00
101 sq. m. – 150 sq. m. PHP100.00
151 sq. m. – 200 sq. [m.] or
PHP200.00
more
On high-rise Condominium Units
a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high rise

condominiums shall pay the annual garbage fee on the total size of
the entire condominium and socialized Housing Unit and an additional
garbage fee shall be collected based on area occupied for every unit
already sold or being amortized.
b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall

pay the annual garbage fee on the total lot size of the entire
apartment and an additional garbage fee based on the schedule
prescribed herein for every unit occupied.
For the purpose of garbage collection, there is, in fact, no substantial distinction between an occupant of
a lot, on one hand, and an occupant of a unit in a condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, on the other hand. Most likely, garbage output produced by these types of occupants is
uniform and does not vary to a large degree; thus, a similar schedule of fee is both just and
equitable.159 ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary
The rates being charged by the ordinance are unjust and inequitable: a resident of a 200 sq. m. unit in a
condominium or socialized housing project has to pay twice the amount than a resident of a lot similar in
size; unlike unit occupants, all occupants of a lot with an area of 200 sq. m. and less have to pay a fixed
rate of Php100.00; and the same amount of garbage fee is imposed regardless of whether the resident
is from a condominium or from a socialized housing project.
Indeed, the classifications under Ordinance No. S-2235 are not germane to its declared purpose of
“promoting shared responsibility with the residents to attack their common mindless attitude in over-
consuming the present resources and in generating waste.”160 Instead of simplistically categorizing the
payee into land or floor occupant of a lot or unit of a condominium, socialized housing project or
apartment, respondent City Council should have considered factors that could truly measure the amount
of wastes generated and the appropriate fee for its collection. Factors include, among others, household
age and size, accessibility to waste collection, population density of the barangay or district, capacity to
pay, and actual occupancy of the property. R.A. No. 9003 may also be looked into for guidance. Under
said law, SWM service fees may be computed based on minimum factors such as types of solid waste to
include special waste, amount/volume of waste, distance of the transfer station to the waste
management facility, capacity or type of LGU constituency, cost of construction, cost of management,
and type of technology. With respect to utility rates set by municipalities, a municipality has the right to
classify consumers under reasonable classifications based upon factors such as the cost of service, the
purpose for which the service or the product is received, the quantity or the amount received, the
different character of the service furnished, the time of its use or any other matter which presents a
substantial difference as a ground of distinction.161 c ralawlawli bra ry
[A] lack of uniformity in the rate charged is not necessarily unlawful discrimination. The establishment of
classifications and the charging of different rates for the several classes is not unreasonable and does
not violate the requirements of equality and uniformity. Discrimination to be unlawful must draw an
unfair line or strike an unfair balance between those in like circumstances having equal rights and
privileges. Discrimination with respect to rates charged does not vitiate unless it is arbitrary and without
a reasonable fact basis or justification.162
On top of an unreasonable classification, the penalty clause of Ordinance No. SP-2235, which states:
SECTION 3. Penalty Clause – A penalty of 25% of the garbage fee due plus an interest of 2% per month
or a fraction thereof (interest) shall be charged against a household owner who refuses to pay the
garbage fee herein imposed.
lacks the limitation required by Section 168 of the LGC, which provides:
SECTION 168. Surcharges and Penalties on Unpaid Taxes, Fees, or Charges. – The sanggunian may
impose a surcharge not exceeding twenty-five (25%) of the amount of taxes, fees or charges not paid
on time and an interest at the rate not exceeding two percent (2%) per month of the unpaid taxes, fees
or charges including surcharges, until such amount is fully paid but in no case shall the total interest
on the unpaid amount or portion thereof exceed thirty-six (36) months. (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, on the issue of publication of the two challenged ordinances.
Petitioner argues that the garbage fee was collected even if the required publication of its approval had
not yet elapsed. He notes that he paid his realty tax on January 7, 2014 which already included the
garbage fee. Respondents counter that if the law provides for its own effectivity, publication in the
Official Gazette is not necessary so long as it is not penal in nature. Allegedly, Ordinance No. SP-2095
took effect after its publication while Ordinance No. SP-2235 became effective after its approval on
December 26, 2013.
The pertinent provisions of the LGC state:
SECTION 59. Effectivity of Ordinances or Resolutions. – (a) Unless otherwise stated in the
ordinance or the resolution approving the local development plan and public investment program, the
same shall take effect after ten (10) days from the date a copy thereof is posted in a bulletin
board at the entrance of the provincial capitol or city, municipal, or barangay hall, as the case may be,
and in at least two (2) other conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned.
(b) The secretary to the sanggunian concerned shall cause the posting of an ordinance or resolution in
the bulletin board at the entrance of the provincial capitol and the city, municipal, or barangay hall in at
least two (2) conspicuous places in the local government unit concerned not later than five (5) days
after approval thereof.
The text of the ordinance or resolution shall be disseminated and posted in Filipino or English and in the
language or dialect understood by the majority of the people in the local government unit concerned,
and the secretary to the sanggunian shall record such fact in a book kept for the purpose, stating the
dates of approval and posting.
(c) The gist of all ordinances with penal sanctions shall be published in a newspaper of general
circulation within the province where the local legislative body concerned belongs. In the absence of any
newspaper of general circulation within the province, posting of such ordinances shall be made in all
municipalities and cities of the province where the sanggunian of origin is situated.
(d) In the case of highly urbanized and independent component cities, the main features of the
ordinance or resolution duly enacted or adopted shall, in addition to being posted, be published
once in a local newspaper of general circulation within the city: Provided, That in the absence
thereof the ordinance or resolution shall be published in any newspaper of general
circulation.
SECTION 188. Publication of Tax Ordinances and Revenue Measures. – Within ten (10) days after
their approval, certified true copies of all provincial, city, and municipal tax ordinances or revenue
measures shall be published in full for three (3) consecutive days in a newspaper of local
circulation: Provided, however, That in provinces, cities and municipalities where there are no
newspapers of local circulation, the same may be posted in at least two (2) conspicuous and publicly
accessible places. (Emphasis supplied)
On October 17, 2011, respondent Quezon City Council enacted Ordinance No. SP-2095, which provides
that it would take effect after its publication in a newspaper of general circulation.163 On the other hand,
Ordinance No. SP-2235, which was passed by the City Council on December 16, 2013, provides that it
would be effective upon its approval.164 Ten (10) days after its enactment, or on December 26, 2013,
respondent City Mayor approved the same.165 ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
The case records are bereft of any evidence to prove petitioner’s negative allegation that respondents did not
comply with the posting and publication requirements of the law. Thus, We are constrained not to give credit to
his unsupported claim.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The constitutionality and legality of Ordinance No. SP-
2095, S-2011, or the “Socialized Housing Tax of Quezon City,” is SUSTAINED for being consistent with
Section 43 of Republic Act No. 7279. On the other hand, Ordinance No. SP-2235, S-2013, which collects an
annual garbage fee on all domestic households in Quezon City, is hereby declared as UNCONSTITUTIONAL
AND ILLEGAL. Respondents are DIRECTED to REFUND with reasonable dispatch the sums of money
collected relative to its enforcement.
The temporary restraining order issued by the Court on February 5, 2014 is LIFTED with respect to Ordinance
No. SP-2095. In contrast, respondents are PERMANENTLY ENJOINED from taking any further action to
enforce Ordinance No. SP. 2235.
SO ORDERED. cralawlawlibra ry
G.R. No. 211833, April 07, 2015
FERDINAND R. VILLANUEVA, PRESIDING JUDGE, MCTC, COMPOSTELA-NEW BATAAN,

COMPOSTELA VALLEY PROVINCE, Petitioner, v. JUDICIAL AND BAR COUNCIL, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva (petitioner) directly came to this Court via a Petition for
Prohibition, Mandamus, and Certiorari, and Declaratory Relief1 under Rules 65 and 63 of the Rules of
Court, respectively, with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or writ of
preliminary injunction, to assail the policy of the Judicial and Bar Council (JBC), requiring five years of
service as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts, on the
ground that it is unconstitutional, and was issued with grave abuse of discretion. chanRoblesvi rt ualLaw lib rary
The Facts
The petitioner was appointed on September 18, 2012 as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial
Court, Compostela-New Bataan, Poblacion, Compostela Valley Province, Region XI, which is a first-level
court. On September 27, 2013, he applied for the vacant position of Presiding Judge in the following
Regional Trial Courts (RTCs): Branch 31, Tagum City; Branch 13, Davao City; and Branch 6,
Prosperidad, Agusan Del Sur.
In a letter2 dated December 18, 2013, JBC's Office of Recruitment, Selection and Nomination, informed
the petitioner that he was not included in the list of candidates for the said stations. On the same date,
the petitioner sent a letter, through electronic mail, seeking reconsideration of his non-inclusion in the
list of considered applicants and protesting the inclusion of applicants who did not pass the prejudicature
examination.
The petitioner was informed by the JBC Executive Officer, through a letter3 dated February 3, 2014, that
his protest and reconsideration was duly noted by the JBC en banc. However, its decision not to include
his name in the list of applicants was upheld due to the JBC's long-standing policy of opening the chance
for promotion to second-level courts to, among others, incumbent judges who have served in their
current position for at least five years, and since the petitioner has been a judge only for more than a
year, he was excluded from the list. This caused the petitioner to take recourse to this Court.
In his petition, he argued that: (1) the Constitution already prescribed the qualifications of an RTC
judge, and the JBC could add no more; (2) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the equal protection
and due process clauses of the Constitution; and (3) the JBC's five-year requirement violates the
constitutional provision on Social Justice and Human Rights for Equal Opportunity of Employment. The
petitioner also asserted that the requirement of the Prejudicature Program mandated by Section 104 of
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 85575 should not be merely directory and should be fully implemented. He
further alleged that he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the Constitution and by
Congress, since he has already complied with the requirement of 10 years of practice of law.
In compliance with the Court's Resolution6 dated April 22, 2014, the JBC7 and the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG)8separately submitted their Comments. Summing up the arguments of the JBC and the
OSG, they essentially stated that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the assailed policy does not
violate the equal protection and due process clauses. They posited that: (1) the writ of certiorari and
prohibition cannot issue to prevent the JBC from performing its principal function under the Constitution
to recommend appointees to the Judiciary because the JBC is not a tribunal exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial function; (2) the remedy of mandamus and declaratory relief will not lie because the petitioner
has no clear legal right that needs to be protected; (3) the equal protection clause is not violated
because the classification of lower court judges who have served at least five years and those who have
served less than five years is valid as it is performance and experience based; and (4) there is no
violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in nature. chanRoblesvirtual Lawlib ra ry
The Issue
The crux of this petition is whether or not the policy of JBC requiring five years of service as judges of
first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to second-level courts is constitutional.
Ruling of the Court

Procedural Issues:
Before resolving the substantive issues, the Court considers it necessary to first determine whether or
not the action for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus, and declaratory relief commenced by the
petitioner was proper.
One. The remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable. "The present Rules of Court uses two
special civil actions for determining and correcting grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction. These are the special civil actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by
Rule 65."9 As discussed in the case of Maria Carolina P. Araullo, etc., et al. v. Benigno Simeon C. Aquino
III, etc., et al.,10 this Court explained that:
chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily broader in
scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct errors of jurisdiction
committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or instrumentality of the Government, even if
the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly
authorized by the text of the second paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional issues and
to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.11 (Citation omitted)
In this case, it is clear that the JBC does not fall within the scope of a tribunal, board, or officer
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions. In the process of selecting and screening applicants, the
JBC neither acted in any judicial or quasi-judicial capacity nor assumed unto itself any performance of
judicial or quasi-judicial prerogative. However, since the formulation of guidelines and criteria, including
the policy that the petitioner now assails, is necessary and incidental to the exercise of the JBC's
constitutional mandate, a determination must be made on whether the JBC has acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing and enforcing the said policy.
Besides, the Court can appropriately take cognizance of this case by virtue of the Court's power of
supervision over the JBC. Jurisprudence provides that the power of supervision is the power of oversight,
or the authority to see that subordinate officers perform their duties. It ensures that the laws and the
rules governing the conduct of a government entity are observed and complied with. Supervising
officials see to it that rules are followed, but they themselves do not lay down such rules, nor do they
have the discretion to modify or replace them. If the rules are not observed, they may order the work
done or redone, but only to conform to such rules. They may not prescribe their own manner of
execution of the act. They have no discretion on this matter except to see to it that the rules are
followed.12
Following this definition, the supervisory authority of the Court over the JBC is to see to it that the JBC
complies with its own rules and procedures. Thus, when the policies of the JBC are being attacked, then
the Court, through its supervisory authority over the JBC, has the duty to inquire about the matter and
ensure that the JBC complies with its own rules.
Two. The remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner in assailing JBC's policy. The
petitioner insisted that mandamus is proper because his right was violated when he was not included in
the list of candidates for the RTC courts he applied for. He said that his non-inclusion in the list of
candidates for these stations has caused him direct injury.
It is essential to the issuance of a writ of mandamus that the applicant should have a clear legal right to
the thing demanded and it must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required.13 The petitioner bears the burden to show that there is such a clear legal right to the
performance of the act, and a corresponding compelling duty on the part of the respondent to perform
the act. The remedy of mandamus, as an extraordinary writ, lies only to compel an officer to perform a
ministerial duty, not a discretionary one.14 Clearly, the use of discretion and the performance of a
ministerial act are mutually exclusive.
The writ of mandamus does not issue to control or review the exercise of discretion or to compel a
course of conduct, which, it quickly seems to us, was what the petitioner would have the JBC do in his
favor. The function of the JBC to select and recommend nominees for vacant judicial positions is
discretionary, not ministerial. Moreso, the petitioner cannot claim any legal right to be included in the list
of nominees for judicial vacancies. Possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list
of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the list of the candidates depends on the
discretion of the JBC, thus:chanroblesv i rtual lawlib rary
The fact that an individual possesses the constitutional and statutory qualifications for appointment to
the Judiciary does not create an entitlement or expectation that his or her name be included in the list of
candidates for a judicial vacancy. By submitting an application or accepting a recommendation, one
submits to the authority of the JBC to subject the former to the search, screening, and selection process,
and to use its discretion in deciding whether or not one should be included in the list. Indeed, assuming
that if one has the legal right to be included in the list of candidates simply because he or she possesses
the constitutional and statutory qualifications, then the application process would then be reduced to a
mere mechanical function of the JBC; and the search, screening, and selection process would not only be
unnecessary, but also improper. However, this is clearly not the constitutional intent. One's inclusion
in the list of candidates is subject to the discretion of the JBC over the selection of nominees
for a particular judicial post. Such candidate's inclusion is not, therefore, a legally demandable right,
but simply a privilege the conferment of which is subject to the JBC's sound discretion.
Moreover, petitioner is essentially seeking a promotional appointment, that is, a promotion from a first-
level court to a second level court. There is no law, however, that grants him the right to a
promotion to second-level courts.15 (Emphasis in the original)
Clearly, to be included as an applicant to second-level judge is not properly compellable by mandamus
inasmuch as it involves the exercise of sound discretion by the JBC.
Three. The petition for declaratory relief is improper. "An action for declaratory relief should be filed by
a person interested under a deed, a will, a contract or other written instrument, and whose rights are
affected by a statute, an executive order, a regulation or an ordinance. The relief sought under this
remedy includes the interpretation and determination of the validity of the written instrument and the
judicial declaration of the parties' rights or duties thereunder."16 "[T]he purpose of the action is to secure
an authoritative statement of the rights and obligations of the parties under a statute, deed,
contract, etc., for their guidance in its enforcement or compliance and not to settle issues arising from
its alleged breach."17
In this case, the petition for declaratory relief did not involve an unsound policy. Rather, the petition
specifically sought a judicial declaration that the petitioner has the right to be included in the list of
applicants although he failed to meet JBC's five-year requirement policy. Again, the Court reiterates that
no person possesses a legal right under the Constitution to be included in the list of nominees for vacant
judicial positions. The opportunity of appointment to judicial office is a mere privilege, and not a
judicially enforceable right that may be properly claimed by any person. The inclusion in the list of
candidates, which is one of the incidents of such appointment, is not a right either. Thus, the petitioner
cannot claim any right that could have been affected by the assailed policy.
Furthermore, the instant petition must necessarily fail because this Court does not have original
jurisdiction over a petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved.18 The special
civil action of declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the appropriate RTC pursuant to
Section 1919 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended by R.A.No. 7691.20
Therefore, by virtue of the Court's supervisory duty over the JBC and in the exercise of its expanded
judicial power, the Court assumes jurisdiction over the present petition. But in any event, even if the
Court will set aside procedural infirmities, the instant petition should still be dismissed. chanRoblesv irt ual Lawlib rary
Substantive Issues
As an offspring of the 1987 Constitution, the JBC is mandated to recommend appointees to the judiciary
and only those nominated by the JBC in a list officially transmitted to the President may be appointed by
the latter as justice or judge in the judiciary. Thus, the JBC is burdened with a great responsibility that is
imbued with public interest as it determines the men and women who will sit on the judicial bench.
While the 1987 Constitution has provided the qualifications of members of the judiciary, this does not
preclude the JBC from having its own set of rules and procedures and providing policies to effectively
ensure its mandate.
The functions of searching, screening, and selecting are necessary and incidental to the JBC's principal
function of choosing and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary for appointment by the
President. However, the Constitution did not lay down in precise terms the process that the JBC shall
follow in determining applicants' qualifications. In carrying out its main function, the JBC has the
authority to set the standards/criteria in choosing its nominees for every vacancy in the judiciary,
subject only to the minimum qualifications required by the Constitution and law for every position. The
search for these long held qualities necessarily requires a degree of flexibility in order to determine who
is most fit among the applicants. Thus, the JBC has sufficient but not unbridled license to act in
performing its duties.
JBC's ultimate goal is to recommend nominees and not simply to fill up judicial vacancies in order to
promote an effective and efficient administration of justice. Given this pragmatic situation, the JBC had
to establish a set of uniform criteria in order to ascertain whether an applicant meets the minimum
constitutional qualifications and possesses the qualities expected of him and his office. Thus, the
adoption of the five-year requirement policy applied by JBC to the petitioner's case is necessary and
incidental to the function conferred by the Constitution to the JBC.
Equal Protection
There is no question that JBC employs standards to have a rational basis to screen applicants who
cannot be all accommodated and appointed to a vacancy in the judiciary, to determine who is best
qualified among the applicants, and not to discriminate against any particular individual or class.
The equal protection clause of the Constitution does not require the universal application of the laws to
all persons or things without distinction; what it requires is simply equality among equals as determined
according to a valid classification. Hence, the Court has affirmed that if a law neither burdens a
fundamental right nor targets a suspect class, the classification stands as long as it bears a rational
relationship to some legitimate government end.21 ChanRobles Virtualawl ibra ry
"The equal protection clause, therefore, does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is reasonable and not
arbitrary."22 "The mere fact that the legislative classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every classification of persons or things for regulation by
law produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid."23
That is the situation here. In issuing the assailed policy, the JBC merely exercised its discretion in
accordance with the constitutional requirement and its rules that a member of the Judiciary must be of
proven competence, integrity, probity and independence.24"To ensure the fulfillment of these standards
in every member of the Judiciary, the JBC has been tasked to screen aspiring judges and justices,
among others, making certain that the nominees submitted to the President are all qualified and suitably
best for appointment. In this way, the appointing process itself is shielded from the possibility of
extending judicial appointment to the undeserving and mediocre and, more importantly, to the ineligible
or disqualified."25
Consideration of experience by JBC as one factor in choosing recommended appointees does not
constitute a violation of the equal protection clause. The JBC does not discriminate when it employs
number of years of service to screen and differentiate applicants from the competition. The number of
years of service provides a relevant basis to determine proven competence which may be measured by
experience, among other factors. The difference in treatment between lower court judges who have
served at least five years and those who have served less than five years, on the other hand, was
rationalized by JBC as follows: chan roblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
Formulating policies which streamline the selection process falls squarely under the purview of the JBC.
No other constitutional body is bestowed with the mandate and competency to set criteria for applicants
that refer to the more general categories of probity, integrity and independence.
The assailed criterion or consideration for promotion to a second-level court, which is five years
experience as judge of a first-level court, is a direct adherence to the qualities prescribed by the
Constitution. Placing a premium on many years of judicial experience, the JBC is merely applying one of
the stringent constitutional standards requiring that a member of the judiciary be of "proven
competence." In determining competence, the JBC considers, among other
qualifications, experience and performance.
Based on the JBC's collective judgment, those who have been judges of first-level courts for five (5)
years are better qualified for promotion to second-level courts. It deems length of experience as a judge
as indicative of conversance with the law and court procedure. Five years is considered as a sufficient
span of time for one to acquire professional skills for the next level court, declog the dockets, put in
place improved procedures and an efficient case management system, adjust to the work environment,
and gain extensive experience in the judicial process.
A five-year stint in the Judiciary can also provide evidence of the integrity,
probity, and independence of judges seeking promotion. To merit JBC's nomination for their
promotion, they must have had a "record of, and reputation for, honesty, integrity, incorruptibility,
irreproachable conduct, and fidelity to sound moral and ethical standards." Likewise, their decisions
must be reflective of the soundness of their judgment, courage, rectitude, cold neutrality and strength of
character.
Hence, for the purpose of determining whether judges are worthy of promotion to the next level court, it
would be premature or difficult to assess their merit if they have had less than one year of service on
the bench.26 (Citations omitted and emphasis in the original)
At any rate, five years of service as a lower court judge is not the only factor that determines the
selection of candidates for RTC judge to be appointed by the President. Persons with this qualification
are neither automatically selected nor do they automatically become nominees. The applicants are
chosen based on an array of factors and are evaluated based on their individual merits. Thus, it cannot
be said that the questioned policy was arbitrary, capricious, or made without any basis.
Clearly, the classification created by the challenged policy satisfies the rational basis test. The foregoing
shows that substantial distinctions do exist between lower court judges with five year experience and
those with less than five years of experience, like the petitioner, and the classification enshrined in the
assailed policy is reasonable and relevant to its legitimate purpose. The Court, thus, rules that the
questioned policy does not infringe on the equal protection clause as it is based on reasonable
classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants. Therefore, the said policy is
valid and constitutional.
Due Process
The petitioner averred that the assailed policy violates procedural due process for lack of publication and
non-submission to the University of the Philippines Law Center Office of the National Administrative
Register (ONAR). The petitioner said that the assailed policy will affect all applying judges, thus, the said
policy should have been published.
Contrary to the petitioner's contention, the assailed JBC policy need not be filed in the ONAR because
the publication requirement in the ONAR is confined to issuances of administrative agencies under the
Executive branch of the government.27 Since the JBC is a body under the supervision of the Supreme
Court,28 it is not covered by the publication requirements of the Administrative Code.
Nevertheless, the assailed JBC policy requiring five years of service as judges of first-level courts before
they can qualify as applicants to second-level courts should have been published. As a general rule,
publication is indispensable in order that all statutes, including administrative rules that are intended to
enforce or implement existing laws, attain binding force and effect. There are, however, several
exceptions to the requirement of publication, such as interpretative regulations and those merely
internal in nature, which regulate only the personnel of the administrative agency and not the public.
Neither is publication required of the so-called letters of instructions issued by administrative superiors
concerning the rules or guidelines to be followed by their subordinates in the performance of their
duties.29
Here, the assailed JBC policy does not fall within the administrative rules and regulations exempted from
the publication requirement. The assailed policy involves a qualification standard by which the JBC shall
determine proven competence of an applicant. It is not an internal regulation, because if it were, it
would regulate and affect only the members of the JBC and their staff. Notably, the selection process
involves a call to lawyers who meet the qualifications in the Constitution and are willing to serve in the
Judiciary to apply to these vacant positions. Thus, it is but a natural consequence thereof that potential
applicants be informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they would be able to
prepare for and comply with them.
The Court also noted the fact that in JBC-009, otherwise known as the Rules of the Judicial and Bar
Council, the JBC had put its criteria in writing and listed the guidelines in determining competence,
independence, integrity and probity. Section 1, Paragraph 1 of Rule 9 expressly provides that applicants
for the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan, should, as a general rule, have at least five years of
experience as an RTC judge, thus: chanrob lesvi rtual lawlib rary
RULE 9 - SPECIAL GUIDELINES FOR NOMINATION TO A VACANCY IN THE COURT OF APPEALS AND
SANDIGANBAYAN
Section 1. Additional criteria for nomination to the Court of Appeals and the Sandiganbayan. - In
addition to the foregoing guidelines the Council should consider the following in evaluating the merits of
applicants for a vacancy in the Court of Appeals and Sandiganbayan:
1. As a general rule, he must have at least five years of experience as a judge of Regional Trial
Court, except when he has in his favor outstanding credentials, as evidenced by, inter alia, impressive
scholastic or educational record and performance in the Bar examinations, excellent reputation for
honesty, integrity, probity and independence of mind; at least very satisfactory performance rating for
three (3) years preceding the filing of his application for nomination; and excellent potentials for
appellate judgeship.
x x x x (Emphasis ours)
The express declaration of these guidelines in JBC-009, which have been duly published on the website
of the JBC and in a newspaper of general circulation suggests that the JBC is aware that these are not
mere internal rules, but are rules implementing the Constitution that should be published. Thus, if the
JBC were so-minded to add special guidelines for determining competence of applicants for RTC judges,
then it could and should have amended its rules and published the same. This, the JBC did not do as
JBC-009 and its amendatory rule do not have special guidelines for applicants to the RTC.
Moreover, jurisprudence has held that rules implementing a statute should be published. Thus, by
analogy, publication is also required for the five-year requirement because it seeks to implement a
constitutional provision requiring proven competence from members of the judiciary.
Nonetheless, the JBC's failure to publish the assailed policy has not prejudiced the petitioner's private
interest. At the risk of being repetitive, the petitioner has no legal right to be included in the list of
nominees for judicial vacancies since the possession of the constitutional and statutory qualifications for
appointment to the Judiciary may not be used to legally demand that one's name be included in the list
of candidates for a judicial vacancy. One's inclusion in the shortlist is strictly within the discretion of the
JBC.30
As to the issue that the JBC failed or refused to implement the completion of the prejudicature program
as a requirement for appointment or promotion in the judiciary under R.A. No. 8557, this ground of the
petition, being unsubstantiated, was unfounded. Clearly, it cannot be said that JBC unlawfully neglects
the performance of a duty enjoined by law.
Finally, the petitioner argued but failed to establish that the assailed policy violates the constitutional
provision under social justice and human rights for equal opportunity of employment. The OSG
explained: c hanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
[T]he questioned policy does not violate equality of employment opportunities. The constitutional
provision does not call for appointment to the Judiciary of all who might, for any number of reasons,
wish to apply. As with all professions, it is regulated by the State. The office of a judge is no ordinary
office. It is imbued with public interest and is central in the administration of justice x x x. Applicants
who meet the constitutional and legal qualifications must vie and withstand the competition and rigorous
screening and selection process. They must submit themselves to the selection criteria, processes and
discretion of respondent JBC, which has the constitutional mandate of screening and selecting
candidates whose names will be in the list to be submitted to the President. So long as a fair opportunity
is available for all applicants who are evaluated on the basis of their individual merits and abilities, the
questioned policy cannot be struck down as unconstitutional.31 (Citations omitted)
From the foregoing, it is apparent that the petitioner has not established a clear legal right to justify the
issuance of a preliminary injunction. The petitioner has merely filed an application with the JBC for the
position of RTC judge, and he has no clear legal right to be nominated for that office nor to be selected
and included in the list to be submitted to the President which is subject to the discretion of the JBC. The
JBC has the power to determine who shall be recommended to the judicial post. To be included in the
list of applicants is a privilege as one can only be chosen under existing criteria imposed by the JBC
itself. As such, prospective applicants, including the petitioner, cannot claim any demandable right to
take part in it if they fail to meet these criteria. Hence, in the absence of a clear legal right, the issuance
of an injunctive writ is not justified.
As the constitutional body granted with the power of searching for, screening, and selecting applicants
relative to recommending appointees to the Judiciary, the JBC has the authority to determine how best
to perform such constitutional mandate. Pursuant to this authority, the JBC issues various policies
setting forth the guidelines to be observed in the evaluation of applicants, and formulates rules and
guidelines in order to ensure that the rules are updated to respond to existing circumstances. Its
discretion is freed from legislative, executive or judicial intervention to ensure that the JBC is shielded
from any outside pressure and improper influence. Limiting qualified applicants in this case to those
judges with five years of experience was an exercise of discretion by the JBC. The potential applicants,
however, should have been informed of the requirements to the judicial positions, so that they could
properly prepare for and comply with them. Hence, unless there are good and compelling reasons to do
so, the Court will refrain from interfering with the exercise of JBC's powers, and will respect the initiative
and independence inherent in the latter. cralawred
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED. The Court, however, DIRECTS that
the Judicial and Bar Council comply with the publication requirement of (1) the assailed policy requiring
five years of experience as judges of first-level courts before they can qualify as applicant to the
Regional Trial Court, and (2) other special guidelines that the Judicial and Bar Council is or will be
implementing.
SO ORDERED. chanroblesvi rtua llawli bra ry

G.R. No. 206020, April 14, 2015
1-UNITED TRANSPORT KOALISYON (1-UTAK), Petitioner, v. COMMISSION ON

ELECTIONS, Respondent.
DECISION
REYES, J.:
The right to participate in electoral processes is a basic and fundamental right in any democracy. It
includes not only the right to vote, but also the right to urge others to vote for a particular candidate.
The right to express one's preference for a candidate is likewise part of the fundamental right to free
speech. Thus, any governmental restriction on the right to convince others to vote for a candidate
carries with it a heavy presumption of invalidity.
This is a petition for certiorari1 under Rule 64 and Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by 1-United
Transport Koalisyon (petitioner), a party-list organization, assailing Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 96152 of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC).
The Facts
On February 12, 2001, Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9006, otherwise known as the "Fair Elections Act", was
passed. Section 9 thereof provides:
Sec. 9. Posting of Campaign Materials. - The COMELEC may authorize political parties and party-list
groups to erect common poster areas for their candidates in not more than ten (10) public places such
as plazas, markets, barangay centers and the like, wherein candidates can post, display or exhibit
election propaganda: Provided that the size of the poster areas shall not exceed twelve (12) by sixteen
(16) feet or its equivalent.
Independent candidates with no political parties may likewise be authorized to erect common poster
areas in not more than ten (10) public places, the size of which shall not exceed four (4) by six (6) feet
or its equivalent.
Candidates may post any lawful propaganda material in private places with the consent of the owner
thereof, and in public places or property which shall be allocated equitably and impartially among the
candidates.
On January 15, 2013, the COMELEC promulgated Resolution No. 9615, which provided for the rules
implementing R.A. No. 9006 in connection with the May 13, 2013 national and local elections and
subsequent elections. Section 7 thereof, which enumerates the prohibited forms of election propaganda,
pertinently provides:
SEC. 7. Prohibited Forms of Election Propaganda. - During the campaign period, it is unlawful:
xxxx
(f) To post, display or exhibit any election campaign or propaganda material outside of authorized
common poster areas, in public places, or in private properties without the consent of the owner thereof.
(g) Public places referred to in the previous subsection (f) include any of the following:
xxxx
5. Public utility vehicles such as buses, jeepneys, trains, taxi cabs, ferries, pedicabs and tricycles,
whether motorized or not;
6. Within the premises of public transport terminals, such as bus terminals, airports, seaports, docks,
piers, train stations, and the like.
The violation of items [5 and 6] under subsection (g) shall be a cause for the revocation of the public
utility franchise and will make the owner and/or operator of the transportation service and/or terminal
liable for an election offense under Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9006 as implemented by Section 18 (n)
of these Rules.3
In its letter4 dated January 30, 2013, the petitioner, through its president, Melencio F. Vargas, sought
clarification from the COMELEC as regards the application of Resolution No. 9615, particularly Section
7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), vis-a-vis privately owned public utility vehicles (PUVs)
and transport terminals. The petitioner explained that the prohibition stated in the aforementioned
provisions impedes the right to free speech of the private owners of PUVs and transport terminals. The
petitioner then requested the COMELEC to reconsider the implementation of the assailed provisions and
allow private owners of PUVs and transport terminals to post election campaign materials on their
vehicles and transport terminals.
On February 5, 2013, the COMELEC en banc issued Minute Resolution No. 13-0214,5 which denied the
petitioner's request to reconsider the implementation of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to
Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615. The COMELEC en banc, adopting the recommendation of
Commissioner Christian Robert S. Lim, opined that:
From the foregoing, x x x the primary fact in consideration here is actually whether 1 -UTAK or any
other [PUV] owners in the same position do in fact possess a franchise and/or certificate of public
convenience and operate as a public utility. If it does not, then the ruling in Adiong applies
squarely. If it does, then its operations, pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, will be
placed directly under the supervision and regulation of the Commission for the duration of the election
period so as to ensure equality of opportunity, time, and space for all candidates in the placement of
political advertisements. Having placed their property for use by the general public and having secured a
license or permit to do so, 1-UTAK and other PUV owners, as well as transport terminal owners, cannot
now complain that their property is subject to regulation by the State. Securing a franchise or a
certificate of public convenience in their favor does not exempt them from the burdens imposed by the
Constitution, Republic Act No. 9006 x x x, and other related statutes. It must be stressed that the
Constitution itself, under Section 6, Article XII, commands that the use of property bears a social
function and all economic agents shall contribute to the common good; and there is no higher
Common good than that as espoused in R.A. No. 9006 - the equalization of opportunities for all
candidates for political office during elections - a policy which Res. No. 9615 merely implements.
As required in Adiong, and in compliance with the O'Brien standards, the prohibition furthers two
important and substantial governmental interests - equalizing opportunity, time, and space for all
candidates, and putting to a stop excessive campaign spending. The regulation bears a clear and
reasonable nexus with these Constitutionally- and statutorily-sanctioned objectives, and the
infringement of freedom is merely incidental and limited as to time. The Commission has not taken away
all avenues of expression available to PUV and transport terminal owners. They may express their
political preferences elsewhere.
The exact purpose for placing political advertisements on a PUV or in transport terminals is exactly
because it is public and can be seen by all; and although it is true that private vehicles ply the same
route as public vehicles, the exposure of a [PUV] servicing the general, riding public is much more
compared to private vehicles. Categorizing PUVs and transport terminals as 'public places' under
Section 7 (f) of Reso. No. 9615 is therefore logical. The same reasoning for limiting political
advertisements in print media, in radio, and in television therefore holds true for political advertisements
in PUVs and transport terminals.6
Hence, the instant petition.
Arguments of the Petitioner
The petitioner maintains that Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 violate the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals; that the prohibition
curtails their ideas of who should be voted by the public. The petitioner also claims that there is no
substantial public interest threatened by the posting of political advertisements on PUVs and transport
terminals to warrant the prohibition imposed by the COMELEC. Further, the petitioner posits that the
ownership of the PUVs per se, as well as the transport terminals, remains private and, hence, the
owners thereof could not be prohibited by the COMELEC from expressing their political opinion lest their
property rights be unduly intruded upon.
Further, assuming that substantial public interest exists in the said prohibition imposed under Resolution
No. 9615, the petitioner claims that the curtailment of the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs
and transport terminals is much greater than is necessary to achieve the desired governmental
purpose, i.e., ensuring equality of opportunity to all candidates in elective office.
Arguments of COMELEC
On the other hand, the COMELEC posits that privately-owned PUVs and transport terminals are public
spaces that are subject to its regulation. It explains that under the Constitution, the COMELEC has the
power to enforce and administer all laws and regulations relative to the conduct of an election, including
the power to regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all franchises and permits for the operation of
transportation utilities.
The COMELEC points out that PUVs and private transport terminals hold a captive audience - the
commuters, who have no choice but be subjected to the blare of political propaganda. Thus, the
COMELEC avers, it is within its constitutional authority to prevent privately-owned PUVs and transport
terminals from concurrently serving campaign materials to the captive audience that they transport.
The COMELEC further claims that Resolution No. 9615 is a valid content-neutral regulation and, thus,
does not impinge on the constitutional right to freedom of speech. It avers that the assailed regulation is
within the constitutional power of the COMELEC pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution.
The COMELEC alleges that the regulation simply aims to ensure equal campaign opportunity, time, and
space for all candidates - an important and substantial governmental interest, which is totally unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; that any restriction on free speech is merely incidental and is no
greater than is essential to the furtherance of the said governmental interest.
The Issue
The petitioner presents the following issues for the Court's resolution:
I. [WHETHER] RESOLUTION NO. 9615 VIOLATES THE RIGHT TO FREE SPEECH OF THE OWNERS OF
[PUVs] AND TRANSPORT TERMINALS.
II. [WHETHER] RESOLUTION NO. 9615 IS VOID AS A RESTRAINT TO FREE SPEECH AND EXPRESSION
FOR FAILURE TO SATISFY THE O'BRIEN TEST.
III. [WHETHER] THE CONSTITUTIONAL OBJECTIVE TO GIVE AN EQUAL OPPORTUNITY TO INFORM THE
ELECTORATE IS NOT IMPAIRED BY POSTING POLITICAL ADVERTISEMENTS ON PUVs AND TRANSPORT
TERMINALS.
IV. [WHETHER] THE OWNERSHIP OF FACILITIES IS DIFFERENT AND INDEPENDENT FROM THE
FRANCHISE OR OPERATION OF THE PUBLIC UTILITY, THE FORMER BEING BEYOND THE POWER OF
REGULATION BY THE COMELEC.7
In sum, the issue presented for the Court's resolution is whether Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in
relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615, which prohibits the posting of any election campaign or
propaganda material, inter alia, in PUVs and public transport terminals are valid regulations.
Ruling of the Court
The petition is meritorious.
Resolution No. 9615, which was promulgated pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution and
the provisions of R.A. No. 9006, lays down the administrative rules relative to the COMELEC's exercise of
its supervisory and regulatory powers over all franchises and permits for the operation of transportation
and other public utilities, media of communication or information, and all grants, special privileges, or
concessions granted by the Government.
Like any other administrative regulations, Resolution No. 9615, or any part thereof, must not run
counter to the Constitution. It is basic that if a law or an administrative rule violates any norm of the
Constitution, that issuance is null and void and has no effect. The Constitution is the basic law to which
all laws must conform; no act shall be valid if it conflicts with the Constitution.8 In this regard, an
administrative regulation, even if it purports to advance a legitimate governmental interest, may not be
permitted to run roughshod over the cherished rights of the people enshrined in the Constitution.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in

relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615 are prior restraints on speech.
Free speech may be identified with the liberty to discuss publicly and truthfully any matter of public
concern without prior restraint or censorship and subsequent punishment.9 Prior restraint refers to
official governmental restrictions on the press or other forms of expression in advance of actual
publication or dissemination. Freedom from prior restraint is largely freedom from government
censorship of publications, whatever the form of censorship, and regardless of whether it is wielded by
the executive, legislative or judicial branch of the government.10 Any system of prior restraints of
expression comes to this Court bearing a heavy presumption against its validity.11
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 unduly infringe on the
fundamental right of the people to freedom of speech. Central to the prohibition is the freedom of
individuals, i.e., the owners of PUVs and private transport terminals, to express their preference,
through the posting of election campaign material in their property, and convince others to agree with
them.
Pursuant to the assailed provisions of Resolution No. 9615, posting an election campaign material during
an election period in PUVs and transport terminals carries with it the penalty of revocation of the public
utility franchise and shall make the owner thereof liable for an election offense.
The prohibition constitutes a clear prior restraint on the right to free expression of the owners of PUVs
and transport terminals. As a result of the prohibition, owners of PUVs and transport terminals are
forcefully and effectively inhibited from expressing their preferences under the pain of indictment for an
election offense and the revocation of their franchise or permit to operate.
It is now deeply embedded in our jurisprudence that freedom of speech and of the press enjoys a
preferred status in our hierarchy of rights. The rationale is that the preservation of other rights depends
on how well we protect our freedom of speech and of the press.12 It has been our constant holding that
this preferred freedom calls all the more for utmost respect when what may be curtailed is the
dissemination of information to make more meaningful the equally vital right of suffrage.13
Thus, in Adiong v. COMELEC,14 the Court struck down the COMELEC's prohibition against the posting of
decals and stickers on "mobile places." The Court ratiocinated that:
Significantly, the freedom of expression curtailed by the questioned prohibition is not so much that of
the candidate or the political party. The regulation strikes at the freedom of an individual to
express his preference and, by displaying it on his car, to convince others to agree with him. A
sticker may be furnished by a candidate but once the car owner agrees to have it placed on his private
vehicle, the expression becomes a statement by the owner, primarily his own and not of anybody else.
If, in the National Press Club case, the Court was careful to rule out restrictions on reporting by
newspaper or radio and television stations and commentators or columnists as long as these are not
correctly paid-for advertisements or purchased opinions with less reason can we sanction the
prohibition against a sincere manifestation of support and a proclamation of belief by an
individual person who pastes a sticker or decal on his private property.15 (Emphases ours)
The assailed prohibition on posting

election campaign materials is an
invalid content-neutral regulation
repugnant to the free speech clause.
The COMELEC claims that while Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 may incidentally
restrict the right to free speech of owners of PUVs and transport terminals, the same is nevertheless
constitutionally permissible since it is a valid content-neutral regulation. The Court does not agree.
A content-neutral regulation, i.e., which is merely concerned with the incidents of the speech, or one
that merely controls the time, place or manner, and under well-defined standards,16 is constitutionally
permissible, even if it restricts the right to free speech, provided that the following requisites
concur: first, the government regulation is within the constitutional power of the Government; second, it
furthers an important or substantial governmental interest; third, the governmental interest is unrelated
to the suppression of free expression; and fourth, the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.17
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are content-neutral regulations since they merely
control the place where election campaign materials may be posted. However, the prohibition is still
repugnant to the free speech clause as it fails to satisfy all of the requisites for a valid content-neutral
regulation.
It is conceded that Resolution No. 9615, including the herein assailed provisions, furthers an important
and substantial governmental interest, i.e., ensuring equal opportunity, time and space among
candidates aimed at the holding of free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections. It is further
conceded that the governmental interest in imposing the said prohibition is unrelated to the suppression
of free expression. However, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No.
9615, are not within the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C
of the Constitution. Also, there is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right to free speech of the
owners of PUVs and transport terminals.
The COMELEC may only regulate

the franchise or permit to operate and
not the ownership per se of PUVs
and transport terminals.
The prohibition under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615
is not within the COMELEC's constitutionally delegated power of supervision or regulation. It is not
disputed that the COMELEC has the power to supervise or regulate the enjoyment or utilization of all
franchises or permits for the operation of transportation utilities during an election period. Section 4,
Article IX-C of the Constitution, thus provides:
Section 4. The Commission may, during the election period, supervise or regulate the enjoyment or
utilization of all franchises or permits for the operation of transportation and other public utilities, media
of communication or information, all grants, special privileges, or concessions granted by the
Government or any subdivision, agency, or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation or its subsidiary. Such supervision or regulation shall aim to ensure equal
opportunity, time, and space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for
public information campaigns and forums among candidates in connection with the objective of holding
free, orderly, honest, peaceful, and credible elections.
Nevertheless, the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC over
franchises and permits to operate, though seemingly unrestrained, has its limits. Notwithstanding the
ostensibly broad supervisory and regulatory powers granted to the COMELEC during an election period
under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, the Court had previously set out the limitations
thereon. In Adiong, the Court, while recognizing that the COMELEC has supervisory power vis-a-vis the
conduct and manner of elections under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, nevertheless held that
such supervisory power does not extend to the very freedom of an individual to express his preference
of candidates in an election by placing election campaign stickers on his vehicle.
In National Press Club v. COMELEC,18 while the Court upheld the constitutionality of a prohibition on the
selling or giving free of charge, except to the COMELEC, of advertising space and commercial time
during an election period, it was emphasized that the grant of supervisory and regulatory powers to the
COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution, is limited to ensuring equal opportunity,
time, space, and the right to reply among candidates.
Further, in Social Weather Stations, Inc. v. COMELEC,19 the Court, notwithstanding the grant of
supervisory and regulatory powers to the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution,
declared unconstitutional a regulation prohibiting the release of election surveys prior to the election
since it "actually suppresses a whole class of expression, while allowing the expression of opinion
concerning the same subject matter by newspaper columnists, radio and [television (TV)]
commentators, armchair theorists, and other opinion makers."20
In the instant case, the Court further delineates the constitutional grant of supervisory and regulatory
powers to the COMELEC during an election period. As worded, Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution
only grants COMELEC supervisory and regulatory powers over the enjoyment or utilization "of all
franchises or permits for the operation," inter alia, of transportation and other public utilities. The
COMELEC's constitutionally delegated powers of supervision and regulation do not extend to the
ownership per se of PUVs and transport terminals, but only to the franchise or permit to operate the
same.
There is a marked difference between the franchise or permit to operate transportation for the use of the
public and the ownership per se of the vehicles used for public transport. Thus, in Tatad v. Garcia,
Jr.,21 the Court explained that:
What private respondent owns are the rail tracks, rolling stocks like the coaches, rail stations, terminals
and the power plant, not a public utility. While a franchise is needed to operate these facilities to serve
the public, they do not by themselves constitute a public utility. What constitutes a public utility is not
their ownership but their use to serve the public x x x.
The Constitution, in no uncertain terms, requires a franchise for the operation of a public utility.
However, it does not require a franchise before one can own the facilities needed to operate a public
utility so long as it does not operate them to serve the public.
xxxx
In law, there is a clear distinction between the "operation" of a public utility and the
ownership of the facilities and equipment used to serve the public.
xxxx
The right to operate a public utility may exist independently and separately from the
ownership of the facilities thereof. One can own said facilities without operating them as a
public utility, or conversely, one may operate a public utility without owning the facilities
used to serve the public. The devotion of property to serve the public may be done by the owner or
by the person in control thereof who may not necessarily be the owner thereof.
This dichotomy between the operation of a public utility and the ownership of the facilities used to serve
the public can be very well appreciated when we consider the transportation industry. Enfranchised
airline and shipping companies may lease their aircraft and vessels instead of owning them
themselves.22 (Emphases ours)
The franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities is a privilege granted to certain persons to
engage in the business of transporting people or goods; it does not refer to the ownership of the
vehicle per se. Ownership is a relation in private law by virtue of which a thing pertaining to one person
is completely subjected to his will in everything not prohibited by public law or the concurrence with the
rights of another.23 Thus, the owner of a thing has the right to enjoy and dispose of a thing, without
other limitations than those established by law.24
One such limitation established by law, as regards PUVs, is the franchise or permit to operate. However,
a franchise or permit to operate a PUV is a limitation only on certain aspects of the ownership of the
vehicle pertinent to the franchise or permit granted, but not on the totality of the rights of the owner
over the vehicle. Otherwise stated, a restriction on the franchise or permit to operate transportation
utilities is necessarily a limitation on ownership, but a limitation on the rights of ownership over the PUV
is not necessarily a regulation on the franchise or permit to operate the same.
A franchise or permit to operate transportation utilities pertains to considerations affecting the operation
of the PUV as such, e.g., safety of the passengers, routes or zones of operation, maintenance of the
vehicle, of reasonable fares, rates, and other charges, or, in certain cases, nationality.25 Thus, a
government issuance, which purports to regulate a franchise or permit to operate PUVs, must pertain to
the considerations affecting its operation as such. Otherwise, it becomes a regulation or supervision not
on the franchise or permit to operate, but on the very ownership of the vehicle used for public transport.
The expression of ideas or opinion of an owner of a PUV, through the posting of election campaign
materials on the vehicle, does not affect considerations pertinent to the operation of the PUV. Surely,
posting a decal expressing support for a certain candidate in an election will not in any manner affect the
operation of the PUV as such. Regulating the expression of ideas or opinion in a PUV, through the
posting of an election campaign material thereon, is not a regulation of the franchise or permit to
operate, but a regulation on the very ownership of the vehicle.
The dichotomy between the regulation of the franchise or permit to operate of a PUV and that of the
very ownership thereof is better exemplified in the case of commercial advertisements posted on the
vehicle. A prohibition on the posting of commercial advertisements on a PUV is considered a regulation
on the ownership of the vehicle per se; the restriction on the enjoyment of the ownership of the vehicle
does not have any relation to its operation as a PUV.
On the other hand, prohibitions on the posting of commercial advertisements on windows of buses,
because it hinders police authorities from seeing whether the passengers inside are safe, is a regulation
on the franchise or permit to operate. It has a direct relation to the operation of the vehicle as a
PUV, i.e., the safety of the passengers.
In the same manner, the COMELEC does not have the constitutional power to regulate public transport
terminals owned by private persons. The ownership of transport terminals, even if made available for
use by the public commuters, likewise remains private. Although owners of public transport terminals
may be required by local governments to obtain permits in order to operate, the permit only pertains to
circumstances affecting the operation of the transport terminal as such. The regulation of such permit to
operate should similarly be limited to circumstances affecting the operation of the transport terminal. A
regulation of public transport terminals based on extraneous circumstances, such as prohibiting the
posting of election campaign materials thereon, amounts to regulating the ownership of the transport
terminal and not merely the permit to operate the same.
Accordingly, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 are not within the constitutionally
delegated power of the COMELEC to supervise or regulate the franchise or permit to operate of
transportation utilities. The posting of election campaign material on vehicles used for public transport or
on transport terminals is not only a form of political expression, but also an act of ownership - it has
nothing to do with the franchise or permit to operate the PUV or transport terminal.
The rulings in National Press Club

and Osmena v. COMELEC26
find no application to this case.
The COMELEC pointed out that the issue presented in the instant case is akin to the Court's rulings
in National Press Club and Osmeña. It explained that in both cases, the Court sustained Section II(b) of
R.A. No. 6646 or the Electoral Reforms Law of 1997, which prohibits newspapers, radio broadcasting or
TV stations, and other mass media from selling or giving print space or airtime for campaign or other
political purposes, except to the COMELEC, during the election campaign. The COMELEC averred that if
the legislature can empower it to impose an advertising ban on mass media, it could likewise empower it
to impose a similar ban on PUVs and transport terminals.
The Court does not agree.
The restriction imposed under Section ll(b) of R.A. No. 6646 has a direct relation to the enjoyment and
utilization of the franchise or permit to operate of newspapers, radio broadcasting and TV stations, and
other mass media, which the COMELEC has the power to regulate pursuant to Section 4, Article IX-C of
the Constitution. The print space or airtime is an integral part of the franchise or permit to operate of
mass media utilities. Thus, the restriction under Section ll(b) of R.A. No. 6646 is within the confines of
the constitutionally delegated power of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution.
On the other hand, the prohibition on the posting of election campaign materials under Section 7(g)
items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615, as already explained, does not have any relation to the
franchise or permit of PUVs and transport terminals to operate as such and, hence, is beyond the power
of the COMELEC under Section 4, Article IX-C of the Constitution.
The restriction on free speech of

owners of PUVs and transport
terminals is not necessary to
further the stated governmental
interest.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 likewise failed to satisfy the fourth requisite of a
valid content-neutral regulation, i.e., the incidental restriction on freedom of expression is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest. There is absolutely no necessity to restrict the right
of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals to free speech to further the governmental interest. While
ensuring equality of time, space, and opportunity to candidates is an important and substantial
governmental interest and is essential to the conduct of an orderly election, this lofty aim may be
achieved sans any intrusion on the fundamental right of expression.
First, while Resolution No. 9615 was promulgated by the COMELEC to implement the provisions of R.A.
No. 9006, the prohibition on posting of election campaign materials on PUVs and transport terminals was
not provided for therein.
Second, there are more than sufficient provisions in our present election laws that would ensure equal
time, space, and opportunity to candidates in elections. Section 6 of R.A. No. 9006 mandates that "all
registered parties and bona fide candidates shall have equal access to media time and space" and
outlines the guidelines to be observed in the implementation thereof, viz:
Section 6. Equal Access to Media Time and Space. - All registered parties and bona fide candidates shall
have equal access to media time and space. The following guidelines may be amplified on by the
COMELEC:
6.1 Print advertisements shall not exceed one-fourth (1/4) page in broadsheet and one-half (1/2) page
in tabloids thrice a week per newspaper, magazine or other publications, during the campaign period.
6.2 a. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a nationally elective office shall be
entitled to not more than one hundred twenty (120) minutes of television advertisement and one
hundred eighty (180) minutes of radio advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
b. Each bona fide candidate or registered political party for a locally elective office shall be entitled to not
more than sixty (60) minutes of television advertisement and ninety (90) minutes of radio
advertisement whether by purchase or donation.
For this purpose, the COMELEC shall require any broadcast station or entity to submit to the COMELEC a
copy of its broadcast logs and certificates of performance for the review and verification of the
frequency, date, time and duration of advertisements broadcast for any candidate or political party.
6.3 All mass media entities shall furnish the COMELEC with a copy of all contracts for advertising,
promoting or opposing any political party or the candidacy of any person for public office within five (5)
days after its signing. In every case, it shall be signed by the donor, the candidate concerned or by the
duly authorized representative of the political party.
6.4 No franchise or permit to operate a radio or television station shall be granted or issued, suspended
or cancelled during the election period. In all instances, the COMELEC shall supervise the use and
employment of press, radio and television facilities insofar as the placement of political advertisements
is concerned to ensure that candidates are given equal opportunities under equal circumstances to make
known their qualifications and their stand on public issues within the limits set forth in the Omnibus
Election Code and Republic Act No. 7166 on election spending.
The COMELEC shall ensure that radio or television or cable television broadcasting entities shall not allow
the scheduling of any program or permit any sponsor to manifestly favor or oppose any candidate or
political party by unduly or repeatedly referring to or including said candidate and/or political party in
such program respecting, however, in all instances the right of said broadcast entities to air accounts of
significant news or news worthy events and views on matters of public interest.
6.5 All members of media, television, radio or print, shall scrupulously report and interpret the news,
taking care not to suppress essential facts nor to distort the truth by omission or improper emphasis.
They shall recognize the duty to air the other side and the duty to correct substantive errors promptly.
6.6 Any mass media columnist, commentator, announcer, reporter, on-air correspondent or personality
who is a candidate for any elective public office or is a campaign volunteer for or employed or retained
in any capacity by any candidate or political party shall be deemed resigned, if so required by their
employer, or shall take a leave of absence from his/her work as such during the campaign period:
Provided, That any media practitioner who is an official of a political party or a member of the campaign
staff of a candidate or political party shall not use his/her time or space to favor any candidate or
political party.
6.7 No movie, cinematograph or documentary portraying the life or biography of a candidate shall be
publicly exhibited in a theater, television station or any public forum during the campaign period.
6.8 No movie, cinematograph or documentary portrayed by an actor or media personality who is himself
a candidate shall likewise be publicly exhibited in a theater or any public forum during the campaign
period.
Section 9 of R.A. No. 9006 authorizes political parties and party-list groups and independent candidates
to erect common poster areas and candidates to post lawful election campaign materials in private
places, with the consent of the owner thereof, and in public places or property, which are allocated
equitably and impartially.
Further, Section 1327 of R.A. No. 716628 provides for the authorized expenses of registered political
parties and candidates for every voter; it affords candidates equal opportunity in their election campaign
by regulating the amount that should be spent for each voter. Likewise, Section 1429 of R.A. No. 7166
requires all candidates and treasurers of registered political parties to submit a statement of all
contributions and expenditures in connection with the election. Section 14 is a post-audit measure that
aims to ensure that the candidates did not overspend in their election campaign, thereby enforcing the
grant of equal opportunity to candidates under Section 13.
A strict implementation of the foregoing provisions of law would suffice to achieve the governmental
interest of ensuring equal time, space, and opportunity for candidates in elections. There is thus no
necessity of still curtailing the right to free speech of the owners of PUVs and transport terminals by
prohibiting them from posting election campaign materials on their properties.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of
Resolution No. 9615 are not justified under
the captive-audience doctrine.
The COMELEC further points out that PUVs and transport terminals hold a "captive audience" -
commuters who have no choice but be subjected to the blare of political propaganda. The COMELEC
further claims that while owners of privately owned PUVs and transport terminals have a right to express
their views to those who wish to listen, they have no right to force their message upon an audience
incapable of declining to receive it.
The COMELEC's claim is untenable.
The captive-audience doctrine states that when a listener cannot, as a practical matter, escape from
intrusive speech, the speech can be restricted.30 The "captive-audience" doctrine recognizes that a
listener has a right not to be exposed to an unwanted message in circumstances in which the
communication cannot be avoided.31
A regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine is in the guise of censorship, which undertakes
selectively to shield the public from some kinds of speech on the ground that they are more offensive
than others. Such selective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker intrudes on the privacy
of the home or the degree of captivity makes it either impossible or impractical for the unwilling viewer
or auditor to avoid exposure.32
In Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Service Commission,33 the Supreme Court of the United States of
America (U.S. Supreme Court) struck down the order of New York Public Service Commission, which
prohibits public utility companies from including inserts in monthly bills discussing controversial issues of
public policy. The U.S. Supreme Court held that "[t]he prohibition cannot be justified as being necessary
to avoid forcing appellant's views on a captive audience, since customers may escape exposure to
objectionable material simply by throwing the bill insert into a wastebasket."34
Similarly, in Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonville,35 the U.S. Supreme Court nullified a city ordinance, which
made it a public nuisance and a punishable offense for a drive-in movie theater to exhibit films
containing nudity, when the screen is visible from a public street or place. The U.S. Supreme Court
opined that the degree of captivity is not so great as to make it impracticable for an unwilling viewer to
avoid exposure, thus:
The Jacksonville ordinance discriminates among movies solely on the basis of content. Its effect is to
deter drive-in theaters from showing movies containing any nudity, however innocent or even
educational. This discrimination cannot be justified as a means of preventing significant intrusions on
privacy. The ordinance seeks only to keep these films from being seen from public streets and places
where the offended viewer readily can avert his eyes. In short, the screen of a drive-in theater is
not "so obtrusive as to make it impossible for an unwilling individual to avoid exposure to
it." x x x Thus, we conclude that the limited privacy interest of persons on the public streets cannot
justify this censorship of otherwise protected speech on the basis of its content.36 (Emphasis ours)
Thus, a government regulation based on the captive-audience doctrine may not be justified if the
supposed "captive audience" may avoid exposure to the otherwise intrusive speech. The prohibition
under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not justified under the captive-audience
doctrine; the commuters are not forced or compelled to read the election campaign materials posted on
PUVs and transport terminals. Nor are they incapable of declining to receive the messages contained in
the posted election campaign materials since they may simply avert their eyes if they find the same
unbearably intrusive.
The COMELEC, in insisting that it has the right to restrict the posting of election campaign materials on
PUVs and transport terminals, cites Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights,37 a case decided by the U.S.
Supreme Court. In Lehman, a policy of the city government, which prohibits political advertisements on
government-run buses, was upheld by the U.S. Supreme Court. The U.S. Supreme Court held that the
advertising space on the buses was not a public forum, pointing out that advertisement space on
government-run buses, "although incidental to the provision of public transportation, is a part of
commercial venture."38 In the same way that other commercial ventures need not accept every proffer
of advertising from the general public, the city's transit system has the discretion on the type of
advertising that may be displayed on its vehicles.
Concurring in the judgment, Justice Douglas opined that while Lehman, a candidate for state office who
sought to avail himself of advertising space on government-run buses, "clearly has a right to express his
views to those who wish to listen, he has no right to force his message upon an audience incapable of
declining to receive it."39 Justice Douglas concluded: "the right of the commuters to be free from forced
intrusions on their privacy precludes the city from transforming its vehicles of public transportation into
forums for the dissemination of ideas upon this captive audience."40
The COMELEC's reliance on Lehman is utterly misplaced.
In Lehman, the political advertisement was intended for PUVs owned by the city government; the city
government, as owner of the buses, had the right to decide which type of advertisements would be
placed on its buses. The U.S. Supreme Court gave primacy to the city government's exercise of its
managerial decision, viz:
Revenue earned from long-term commercial advertising could be jeopardized by a requirement that
short-term candidacy or issue-oriented advertisements be displayed on car cards. Users would be
subjected to the blare of political propaganda. There could be lurking doubts about favoritism, and sticky
administrative problems might arise in parceling out limited space to eager politicians. In these
circumstances, the managerial decision to limit car card space to innocuous and less
controversial commercial and service-oriented advertising does not rise to the dignity of First
Amendment violation. Were we to hold to the contrary, display cases in public hospitals, libraries,
office buildings, military compounds, and other public facilities immediately would become Hyde Parks
open to every would be pamphleteer and politician. This the Constitution does not require.41 (Emphasis
ours)
Lehman actually upholds the freedom of the owner of the utility vehicles, i.e., the city government, in
choosing the types of advertisements that would be placed on its properties. In stark contrast, Section
7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 curtail the choice of the owners of PUVs and transport
terminals on the advertisements that may be posted on their properties.
Also, the city government in Lehman had the right, nay the duty, to refuse political advertisements on
their buses. Considering that what were involved were facilities owned by the city government,
impartiality, or the appearance thereof, was a necessity. In the instant case, the ownership of PUVs and
transport terminals remains private; there exists no valid reason to suppress their political views by
proscribing the posting of election campaign materials on their properties.
Prohibiting owners of PUVs and transport

terminals from posting election campaign
materials violates the equal protection
clause.
Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 do not only run afoul of the free speech clause,
but also of the equal protection clause. One of the basic principles on which this government was
founded is that of the equality of right, which is embodied in Section 1, Article III of the 1987
Constitution.42 "Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words, should
not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others."43
"The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its
inhibitions cover all the departments of the government including the political and executive
departments, and extend to all actions of a state denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever
agency or whatever guise is taken."44
Nevertheless, the guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application
of the laws to all citizens of the state. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean their
indiscriminate operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require that
things, which are different in fact, be treated in law as though they were the same. The equal protection
clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different.45
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental act may pass the
constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four requisites of valid classification be
complied with, namely: (1) it must be based upon substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purposes of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply equally
to all members of the class.46
It is conceded that the classification under Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 is not
limited to existing conditions and applies equally to the members of the purported class. However, the
classification remains constitutionally impermissible since it is not based on substantial distinction and is
not germane to the purpose of the law.
A distinction exists between PUVs and transport terminals and private vehicles and other properties in
that the former, to be considered as such, needs to secure from the government either a franchise or a
permit to operate. Nevertheless, as pointed out earlier, the prohibition imposed under Section 7(g) items
(5) and (6) of Resolution No. 9615 regulates the ownership per se of the PUV and transport terminals;
the prohibition does not in any manner affect the franchise or permit to operate of the PUV and
transport terminals.
As regards ownership, there is no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport
terminals and owners of private vehicles and other properties. As already explained, the ownership of
PUVs and transport terminals, though made available for use by the public, remains private. If owners of
private vehicles and other properties are allowed to express their political ideas and opinion by posting
election campaign materials on their properties, there is no cogent reason to deny the same preferred
right to owners of PUVs and transport terminals. In terms of ownership, the distinction between owners
of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private vehicles and properties is merely superficial.
Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.47
The fact that PUVs and transport terminals are made available for use by the public is likewise not
substantial justification to set them apart from private vehicles and other properties. Admittedly, any
election campaign material that would be posted on PUVs and transport terminals would be seen by
many people. However, election campaign materials posted on private vehicles and other places
frequented by the public, e.g., commercial establishments, would also be seen by many people. Thus,
there is no reason to single out owners of PUVs and transport terminals in the prohibition against posting
of election campaign materials.
Further, classifying owners of PUVs and transport terminals apart from owners of private vehicles and
other properties bears no relation to the stated purpose of Section 7(g) items (5) and (6) of Resolution
No. 9615, i.e., to provide equal time, space and opportunity to candidates in elections. To stress, PUVs
and transport terminals are private properties. Indeed, the nexus between the restriction on the
freedom of expression of owners of PUVs and transport terminals and the government's interest in
ensuring equal time, space, and opportunity for candidates in elections was not established by the
COMELEC.
In sum, Section 7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 violate the
free speech clause; they are content-neutral regulations, which are not within the constitutional power
of the COMELEC issue and are not necessary to further the objective of ensuring equal time, space and
opportunity to the candidates. They are not only repugnant to the free speech clause, but are also
violative of the equal protection clause, as there is
no substantial distinction between owners of PUVs and transport terminals and owners of private
vehicles and other properties.
On a final note, it bears stressing that the freedom to advertise one's political candidacy is clearly a
significant part of our freedom of expression. A restriction on this freedom without rhyme or reason is a
violation of the most valuable feature of the democratic way of life.48
WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing disquisitions, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED. Section
7(g) items (5) and (6), in relation to Section 7(f), of Resolution No. 9615 issued by the Commission on
Elections are hereby declared NULL and VOID for being repugnant to Sections 1 and 4, Article III of the
1987 Constitution.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 189185, August 16, 2016
WILFREDO MOSQUEDA, MARCELO VILLAGANES, JULIETA LAWAGON, CRISPIN ALCOMENDRAS,

CORAZON SABINADA, VIRGINIA CATA-AG, FLORENCIA SABANDON, AND LEDEVINA
ADLAWAN, Petitioners, v. PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS & EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION, INC.,
DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, AND LAPANDAY AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION, Respondents.
G.R. No. 189305
CITY GOVERNMENT OF DAVAO, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS, PILIPINO BANANA GROWERS

& EXPORTERS ASSOCIATION (PBGEA), DAVAO FRUITS CORPORATION, AND LAPANDAY
AGRICULTURAL AND DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
This appeal through the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari assails the decision promulgated
on January 9, 20091 whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) reversed and set aside the judgment rendered
on September 22, 2007 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 17, in Davao City upholding the
validity and constitutionality of Davao City Ordinance No. 0309-07, to wit: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appeal is GRANTED. The assailed September 22, 2007
Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), 11th Judicial Region, Branch 17, Davao City, upholding the
validity and constitutionality of Davao City Ordinance No. 0309-07, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE.
FURTHER, the Writ of Preliminary Injunction dated 28 January 2008 enjoining the City Government of
Davao, and any other person or entity acting in its behalf, from enforcing and implementing City
Ordinance No. 0309-07, is hereby made permanent.
SO ORDERED.
Antecedents
After several committee hearings and consultations with various stakeholders, the
Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City enacted Ordinance No. 0309, Series of 2007, to impose a ban
against aerial spraying as an agricultural practice by all agricultural entities within Davao City, viz.: ChanRoblesVirtualawl ibra ry
ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07

Series of 2007
AN ORDINANCE BANNING AERIAL SPRAYING AS AN AGRICULTURAL PRACTICE IN ALL AGRICULTURAL

ACTIVITIES BY ALL AGRICULTURAL ENTITIES IN DAVAO CITY
Be it enacted by the Sangguniang Panlungsod of Davao City in session assembled that:
SECTION 1. TITLE. This Ordinance shall be known as "An Ordinance Banning Aerial Spraying as an
Agricultural Practice in all Agricultural Activities by all Agricultural Entities in Davao City";
SECTION 2. POLICY OF THE CITY. It shall be the policy of the City of Davao to eliminate the method of
aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all entities within Davao City;
SECTION 3. DEFINITION OF TERMS:
a. Aerial Spraying - refers to application of substances through the use of aircraft of any form which
dispenses the substances in the air.
b. Agricultural Practices - refer to the practices conducted by agricultural entities in relation to their
agricultural activities;
c. Agricultural Activities - refer to activities that include, but not limited to, land preparation, seeding,
planting, cultivation, harvesting and bagging;
d. Agricultural Entities - refer to persons, natural or juridical, involved in agricultural activities
e. Buffer Zone - is an identified 30-meter zone within and around the boundaries of agricultural
farms/plantations that need special monitoring to avoid or minimize harm to the environment and
inhabitants pursuant to policies and guidelines set forth in this Ordinance and other government
regulations. It is an area of land that must lie within the property which does not include public lands,
public thoroughfares or adjacent private properties. It must be planted with diversified trees that grow
taller than what are usually planted and grown in the plantation to protect those within the adjacent
fields, neighboring farms, residential area, schools and workplaces.
SECTION 4. SCOPE AND APPLICABILITY - The provisions of this Ordinance shall apply to all agricultural
entities within the territorial jurisdiction of Davao City;
SECTION 5. BAN OF AERIAL SPRAYING - A ban on aerial spraying shall be strictly enforced in the
territorial jurisdiction of Davao City three (3) months after the effectivity of this Ordinance.
SECTION 6. BUFFER ZONE - Consistent with national legislation and government regulations, all
agricultural entities must provide for a thirty (30) meter buffer zone within the boundaries of their
agricultural farms/plantations. This buffer zone must be properly identified through Global Positioning
System (GPS) survey. A survey plan showing the metes and bounds of each agricultural farm/plantation
must be submitted to the City Mayor's Office, with the buffer zone clearly identified therein;
SECTION 7. PENAL PROVISION - Violation of any provision of this Ordinance shall be punished as
follows:
a. First Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not less than one (1) month but not more
than three (3) months;
b. Second Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not less than three (3) months but not more
than six (6) months and suspension of City-issued permits and licenses for one (1) year;
c. Third Offense: Fine of P5,000.00 and imprisonment of not less than six (6) months but not more than
one (1) year and perpetual cancellation of City issued permits and licenses;
Provided, that in case the violation has been committed by a juridical person, the person in charge of
the management thereof shall be held liable;
SECTION 8. REPEALING CLAUSE - Any Ordinance that is contrary to or inconsistent with any of the
provisions of this Ordinance shall be deemed amended or repealed accordingly.
SECTION 9. EFFECTIVITY - This Ordinance shall take effect thirty (30) days from its publication in a
newspaper of general circulation in Davao City;
ENACTED, January 23, 2007 by a majority vote of all the Members of the Sangguniang Panlungsod.2 chanroblesv irt uallawl ibra ry
City Mayor Rodrigo Duterte approved the ordinance on February 9, 2007. The ordinance took effect on 3
March 23, 2007 after its publication in the newspaper Mindanao Pioneer.4 Pursuant to Section 5 of the
ordinance, the ban against aerial spraying would be strictly enforced three months thereafter.
The Pilipino Banana Growers and Exporters Association, Inc. (PBGEA) and two of its members, namely:
Davao Fruits Corporation and Lapanday Agricultural and Development Corporation (PBGEA, et al.), filed
their petition in the RTC to challenge the constitutionality of the ordinance, and to seek the issuance of
provisional reliefs through a temporary restraining order (TRO) and/or writ of preliminary
injunction.5 They alleged that the ordinance exemplified the unreasonable exercise of police power;
violated the equal protection clause; amounted to the confiscation of property without due process of
law; and lacked publication pursuant] to Section 5116 of Republic Act No. 7160 (Local Government
Code).
On May 8, 2007, the residents living within and adjacent to banana plantations in Davao City led by
Wilfredo Mosqueda,7 joined by other residents of Davao City,8 (Mosqueda, et al.) submitted their Motion
for Leave to Intervene and Opposition to the Issuance of a Preliminary Injunction.9 The RTC granted
their motion on June 4, 2007.10 chan robles law
On June 20, 2007, the RTC granted the prayer for issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction, and
subsequently issued the writ.11 chan robles law
Judgment of the RTC
On September 22, 2007, after trial, the RTC rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 valid
and constitutional, decreeing thusly: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
WHEREFORE, finding the subject [O]rdinance No. 0309-07 valid and constitutional in all aspect of the
grounds assailed by the petitioner, said [C]ity [O]rdinance No. 0309-07, is sustained of its validity and
constitutionality.
Accordingly, the order of this court dated June 20, 2007, granting the writ of preliminary injunction as
prayed for by petitioner is ordered cancelled and set aside as a result of this decision.
SO ORDERED.12 chanroblesv irtuallawl ib rary
The RTC opined that the City of Davao had validly exercised police power13 under the General Welfare
Clause of the Local Government Code;14 that the ordinance, being based on a valid classification, was
consistent with the Equal Protection Clause; that aerial spraying was distinct from other methods of
pesticides application because it exposed the residents to a higher degree of health risk caused by aerial
drift;15 and that the ordinance enjoyed the presumption of constitutionality, and could be invalidated
only upon a clear showing that it had violated the Constitution.16 chan roble slaw
However, the RTC, recognizing the impracticability of the 3-month transition period under Section 5 of
Ordinance No. 0309-07, recommended the parties to agree on an extended transition period.17 c hanro bles law
Decision of the CA
PBGEA, et al. appealed,18 and applied for injunctive relief from the CA,19 which granted the
application20 and consequently issued a TRO to meanwhile enjoin the effectivity of the ordinance.21 chan roble slaw
On January 9, 2009, the CA promulgated its assailed decision reversing the judgment of the RTC.22 It
declared Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 as void and unconstitutional for being unreasonable and
oppressive; found the three-month transition period impractical and oppressive in view of the
engineering and technical requirements of switching from aerial spraying to truck-mounted boom
spraying; and opined that the ban ran afoul with the Equal Protection Clause inasmuch as Section 3(a)
of the ordinance - which defined the term aerial spraying - did not make reasonable distinction between
the hazards, safety and beneficial effects of liquid substances that were being applied aerially; the
different classes of pesticides or fungicides; and the levels of concentration of these substances that
could be beneficial and could enhance agricultural production.
The CA did not see any established relation between the purpose of protecting the public and the
environment against the harmful effects of aerial spraying, on one hand, and the imposition of the ban
against aerial spraying of all forms of substances, on the other. It ruled that the maintenance of the 30-
meter buffer zone within and around the agricultural plantations under Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-
07 constituted taking of property without due process because the landowners were thereby compelled
to cede portions of their property without just compensation; that the exercise of police power to require
the buffer zone was invalid because there was no finding that the 30-meter surrounding belt was
obnoxious to the public welfare; and that, accordingly, Ordinance No. 0309-07 was unconstitutional
because of the absence of a separability clause.
The City of Davao and the intervenors filed their respective motions for reconsideration, but the CA
denied the motions on August 7, 2009.23 chanrob leslaw
Hence, the separate, but now consolidated, appeals by petition for review on certiorari.
Issues
In G.R. No. 189185, petitioners Mosqueda, et al. rely on the following grounds, namely: ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
THE COURT OF APPEALS IGNORED FUNDAMENTAL PRECEPTS AND CONCEPTS OF LAW WHICH,
PROPERLY CONSIDERED, NECESSARILY LEAD TO THE CONCLUSION THAT THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS
CONSTITUTIONAL AND VALID
II
THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS CONSISTENT WITH THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE
III
THE MEANS EMPLOYED BY THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS MORE THAN REASONABLY RELATED TO THE
PURPOSE IT SEEKS TO ACHIEVE
IV
THE DAVAO ORDINANCE IS VALID, BEING DEMONSTRABLY REASONABLE AND FAIR
THE REQUIREMENT RELATING TO THE 30-METER BUFFER ZONE ARE [SIC] CONSISTENT WITH DUE
PROCESS OF LAW, BEING A VALID EXERCISE OF POLICE POWER
Mosqueda, et al. state that the CA ignored well-established precepts like the primacy of human rights
over property rights and the presumption of validity in favor of the ordinance; that the CA preferred the
preservation of the profits of respondents PBGEA, et al. to the residents' right to life, health and
ecology,24 thereby disregarding the benevolent purpose of the ordinance; that the CA assumed the
functions of the lawmaker when it set aside the wisdom behind the enactment of the ordinance; that the
CA failed to apply the precautionary principle, by which the State was allowed to take positive actions to
prevent harm to the environment and to human health despite the lack of scientific certainty; that the
CA erred in applying the "strict scrutiny method" in holding that the ordinance violated the Equal
Protection Clause because it only thereby applied in reviewing classifications that affected fundamental
rights; that there was nothing wrong with prohibiting aerial spraying per se considering that even the
aerial spraying of water produced drift that could affect unwilling neighbors whose, constitutional right to
a clean and healthy environment might be impinged;25 that as far as the three-month period was
c ralawre d
concerned, the CA should have considered that manual spraying could be conducted while the PBGEA, et
al. laid down the preparations for the conduct of boom spraying;26 that "reasonableness" could be more
appropriately weighed by balancing the interests of the parties against the protection of basic rights, like
the right to life, to health, and to a balanced and healthful ecology;27 that PBGEA, et al. did not
substantiate their claim of potential profit losses that would result from the shift; that business profits
should remain inferior and subordinate to their fundamental rights as residents of Davao City, which
were the rights that the assailed ordinance has sought to protect;28 that PBGEA, et al. did not explore
other modes of pesticide treatment either as a stop-gap or as a temporary measure while shifting to
truck mounted boom spraying;29 that the imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone was a valid exercise of
police power that necessarily flowed from the protection afforded by the ordinance from the unwanted
effects of ground spraying; that the imposition of the buffer zone did not constitute compensable taking
under police power, pursuant to the pronouncements in Seng Kee & Co. v. Earnshaw and
Piatt30Patalinghug v. Court of Appeals,31 and Social Justice Society (SJS) v. Atienza, Jr.;32 and that the
30-meter buffer zone conformed with the ISO 1400033 and the DENR Environmental Compliance
Certificate (ECC) requirement.34 chanrob leslaw
In G.R. No. 189305, petitioner City of Davao submits the following as the issues to be considered and
resolved, to wit:
ChanRob les Vi rtualaw lib rary
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT SECTION 5 OF
ORDINANCE NO. 0309-07, SERIES OF 2007 IS OPPRESSIVE AND AN UNREASONABLE EXERCISE OF
DELEGATED POLICE POWER
II
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ORDINANCE NO.
0309-07 IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION;
III
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT ORDINANCE NO.
0309-07 CONSTITUTES TAKING OF PROPERTY WITHOUT COMPENSATION, THUS, VIOLATIVE OF THE
DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION
IV
WHETHER OR NOT AERIAL SPRAYING OF FUNGICIDES IS SAFE TO THE PEOPLE AND THE ENVIRONMENT
The City of Davao explains that it had the authority to enact the assailed ordinance because it would
thereby protect the environment and regulate property and business in the interest of the general
welfare pursuant to Section 458 of the Local Government Code;35 that the ordinance was enacted to
carry out its mandate of promoting the public welfare under the General Welfare Clause (Section 16 of
the Local Government Code); that the ordinance did not violate the Equal Protection Clause because the
distinction lies in aerial spray as a method of application being more deleterious than other modes; that
aerial spraying produces more drift that causes discomfort, and an extremely offensive and obnoxious
experience the part of the residents; that spray drift cannot be controlled even with use by the
respondents of highly advanced apparatus, such as the Differential Global Positioning System, Micronair
Rotary Drift Control Atomizers, Intellimap, Intelliflow Spray Valve System, Control and Display Unit and
the Target Flow Spray Valve Switch System;36 that because of the inherent toxicity of Mancozeb (the
fungicide aerially applied by the respondents), there is no need to provide for a substantial distinction
based on the level of concentration;37 that as soon as fungicides are released in the air, they become air
pollutants pursuant to Section 5 of Republic Act No. 8749 (Philippine Clean Air Act of 1999),38 and the
activity thus falls under the authority of the local government units to ban; and that the ordinance does
not only seek to protect and promote human health but also serves as a measure against air pollution.
The City of Davao insists that it validly exercised police power because it does not thereby oblige the
shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying; that the respondents only choose boom spraying to
justify the alleged impracticability of the transition period by erroneously adding the months required for
each of the stages without considering other steps that may be simultaneously undertaken;39 that the
Court should apply its ruling in Social Justice Society v. Atienza, Jr.,40 by which the six-month period for
the folding-up of business operations was declared a legitimate exercise of police power; that the
respondents did not present any documentary evidence on the feasibility of adopting other
methods;41 that only 1,800 hectares out of 5,200 hectares of plantations owned and operated by
PBGEA's members use aerial spraying, hence, the perceived ominous consequence of imposing a ban on
aerial spray to the banana industry is entirely misleading;42 that the urgency of prohibiting aerial spray
justifies the three-month transition period; that the complaints of the community residents - ranging
from skin itchiness, contraction and/or tightening in the chest, nausea, appetite loss and difficulty in
breathing after exposure to spray mist - only prove that aerial spraying brings discomfort and harm to
the residents; that considering that the testimony of Dr. Lynn Crisanta R. Panganiban, a pharmacologist
and toxicologist, established that fungicides could cause debilitating effects on the human body once
inhaled or digested, the CA erred in holding that there was no correlation between aerial application and
the complaints of the residents; that given that aerial spray produces more drift and is uncontrollable
compared to the other methods of applying fungicides, the ordinance becomes reasonable;43 and that
the medical-related complaints of the residents need not be proven by medical records considering that
these were based on personal knowledge.44 cha nrob leslaw
The City of Davao contends that the imposition of the 30-meter buffer zone is a valid exercise of police
power, rendering the claim for just compensation untenable; that the maintenance of the buffer zone
does not require the respondents to cede a portion of their landholdings; that the planting of diversified
trees within the buffer zone will serve to insulate the residents from spray drift; that such buffer zone
does not deprive the landowners of the lawful and beneficial use of their property;45 and that the buffer
zone is consistent with the Constitution, which reminds property owners that the use of property bears a
social function.46
chanro bleslaw
In their comment, the respondents posit that the petition of the City; of Davao should be dismissed for
failure to attach material portions of the records, and for raising factual errors that are not within the
realm of this appeal by petition for review on certiorari;47 that the CA correctly declared the ordinance as
unreasonable due to the impossibility of complying with the three-month transition period; that shifting
from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying will take at least three years and entails careful planning,
equipment and machineries, civil works, and capital funding of at least P400,000,000.00;48 that the
Court could rely on its ruling in City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,49 where an ordinance directing an existing
establishment to wind up or to transfer its business was declared as confiscatory in nature, and,
therefore, unconstitutional;50 that the total ban against aerial sprayig, coupled with the inadequate time
to shift to truck-mounted boom spraying, effectively deprives the respondents with an efficient means to
control the spread of the Black Sigatoka disease that threatens the banana plantations; that the
ordinance will only expose the plantations to the virulent disease that is capable of infecting 60% of the
plantations on a single cycle51 missed;52 that compared with other modes of application, aerial spraying
is more cost-efficient, safe and accurate; that truck-mounted boom spraying, for instance, requires 80-
200 liters of solution per hectare,53 while manual spraying uses 200-300 liters of solution per hectare;
that aerial spraying oily requires 30 liters per hectare; that in terms of safety and accuracy, manual
spraying is the least safe and accurate,54 and produces more drift than aerial spraying;55 that due to the
300-liter solution required, the workers will be more exposed to the solution during manual application
and such application will thus be more in conflict with the purpose of the ordinance to prevent human
exposure;56 that the respondents also find the irrigation sprinklers suggested by the City of Davao as
wasteful, unsafe and impractical because it cannot provide the needed coverage for application of the
solution to effectively control. the Black Sigatoka disease; that in contrast, aerial application, coupled
with the latest state of the art technology and equipment, ensures accuracy, effectiveness, efficiency
and safety compared to the other methods of application; that the respondents vouch for the safety of
the fungicides they use by virtue of such fungicides having been registered with the Fertilizer and
Pesticide Authority (FPA) and classified as Category IV,57 and found to be mild; and that oral ingestion in
large doses is required before any adverse effects to humans may result.58 chanro bles law
The respondents lament that the ban was imposed without any scientific basis; that the
report59 prepared by a fact-finding team (composed of the Vice Mayor, the City Health Officer, The City
Planning and Development Coordinator and the Assistance City Planning and Development Coordinator)
organized by the City of Davao revealed that there was no scientific evidence to support the clamor for
the ban against aerial spraying; that furthermore, national government agencies like the Department of
Agriculture (DA), Department of Health (DOR) and the Department of Trade and Industry (DTI) similarly
concluded that there was no scientific evidence to support the ban;60 that for four decades since the
adoption of aerial spraying, there has been no reported outbreak or any predisposition to ailment
connected with the pesticides applied; that the testimonies of the residents during the trial were mere
"emotional anecdotal evidence" that did not establish any scientific or medical bases of any causal
connection between the alleged health conditions complained of and the fungicides applied during aerial
spraying;61 that the allegations of health and environmental harm brought by the pesticides used to
treat the banana plantations were unfounded; that the 2001 study of the International Agency for
Research on Cancer showed that, contrary to the claim of Dra. Panganiban, the by-product of Mancozeb
(Ethylenethiourea or ETU) was "non-genotoxic" and not expected to produce thyroid cancer;62 that
Carlos Mendoza, a geo-hydrologist and geophysicist, testified that underground water contamination
through aerial spraying would be impossible because of the presence of latex, thick layers of clay and
underlying rock formations;63 that even the study conducted by the Philippine Coconut Authority (PCA)
showed that the rhinoceros beetle infestation in coconut plantations adjacent to the banana plantations
was due to the farmer's failure to observe phyto-sanitary measures, not to aerial spraying;64 that
furthermore, aerial spraying is internationally accepted as a "Good Agricultural Practice" (GAP)65 under
the International Code of Conduct on the Distribution and Use of Pesticides by the United Nations-Food
and Agricultural Organization (UN-FAO); that as such, they observe the standards laid down by the UN-
FAO, and utilize aerial spraying equipment that will ensure accuracy, safety and efficiency in applying
the substances, and which more than complies with the requirement under the Guidelines on Good
Practice for Aerial Application of Pesticides (Rome 2001);66 that in addition, they strictly observe
standard operating procedures prior to take-off,67 in-flight68 and post-flight;69 that they substantially
invested in state-of-the-art technology and equipment designed to ensure safety, accuracy, and
effectiveness of aerial spraying operations, to avoid aerial drift;70 that their equipment include: wind
meters (to measure the wind velocity in a specific area), wind cones (to determine the wind direction,
and whether the wind is a headwind, tailwind or a crosswind); central weather station (to measure wind
speed, the temperature and relative humidity), Differential Global Positioning System
(DGPS),71 Intellimap,72 Control and Display Unit,73 Micronair Rotary Drift Control Atomizers (AU 5000
Low-Drift model),74 Intelliflow Spray Valve System,75 and Target Flow Spray Valve Switch System;76 and
that they want to minimize, if not, eliminate the occurrence of spray drift in order to minimize wastage
of resources and reduced efficiency of spraying programs implemented to control the Black Sigatoka
disease.77chan roble slaw
The respondents maintain that Ordinance No. 0309-07 will regulate aerial spraying as a method of
application, instead of the substances being used therein; that the prohibition is overbroad in light of
other available reasonable measures that may be resorted to by the local government; that the
ordinance is unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, and tantamount to a restriction or prohibition of
trade;78 that the ordinance will effectively impose a prohibition against all pesticides, including fungicides
that fall under the mildest type of substance; that as such, the petitioner has disregarded existing valid
and substantive classifications established and recognized by the World Health Organization (WHO) that
are adopted by the FPA; that the FPA is the national agency armed with the professional competence,
technical expertise, and legal mandate to deal with the issue of use and application of pesticides in our
country; that the fungicides they administer are duly registered with the FPA, and with other more
developed countries that have observed a stricter environmental and public health regulation such as
the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and the European Union (EU); that as such,
the City of Davao has disregarded valid, substantial and significant distinctions between levels of
concentration of the fungicides in the water solution aerially sprayed; that it is the FPA that regulates
the level of concentration of agricultural chemicals prior to commercial distribution and use in the
country; that the members of PBGEA only spray a water solution (water cocktail) containing 0.1 liter to
1.5 liters of the active ingredient of fungicide in a 30-liter water solution per hectare that has undergone
rigorous testing and .evaluation prior to registration by the FPA; that the active ingredients of the
fungicide are so diluted that no harm may be posed to public health or to the environment through aerial
application;79 that the ordinance was so broad that it prohibits aerial application of any substance,
including water;80 and that aside from fungicides, the respondents also aerially apply vitamins, minerals
and organic fertilizers.81 chan rob leslaw
The respondents submit that the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 5 of the
ordinance constitutes an improper exercise of police power; that the ordinance will require all
landholdings to maintain the buffer zone, thereby diminishing to a mere 1,600 square meters of usable
and productive land for every hectare of the plantation bounding residential areas, with the zone being
reserved for planting "diversified trees;" that this requirement amounts to taking without just
compensation or due process; and that the imposition of the buffer zone unduly deprives all landowners
within the City of Davao the beneficial use of their property;82 that the precautionary principle cannot be
applied blindly, because its application still requires some scientific basis; that the principle is also based
on a mere declaration that has not even reached the level of customary international law, not on a
treaty binding on the Government.83 chanrob leslaw
The respondents argue that the illegality of the transition period results in the invalidity of the ordinance
as it does not carry a separability clause; and that the absence of such clause signifies the intention of
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of City of Davao to make the ordinance effective as a whole.84 chan roble slaw
The main issue is whether or not Ordinance No. 0309-07 is unconstitutional on due process and equal
protection grounds for being unreasonable and oppressive, and an invalid exercise of police power: (a)
in imposing a ban on aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in Davao City under Section 5; (b) in
decreeing a 3-month transition-period to shift to other modes of pesticide application under Section 5;
and (c) in requiring the maintenance of the 30-meter buffer zone under Section 6 thereof in all
agricultural lands in Davao City.
Ruling of the Court
We deny the petitions for review for their lack of merit.
I
Preliminary considerations:
The significant role of the banana industry
in ensuring economic stability and food security
There is no question that the implementation of Ordinance No. 0309-07, although the ordinance
concerns the imposition of the ban against aerial spraying in all agricultural lands within Davao City, will
inevitably have a considerable impact on the country's banana industry, particularly on export trading.
Banana exportation plays a significant role in the maintenance of the country's economic, stability and
food security. Banana is a consistent dollar earner and the fourth largest produced commodity in the
Philippines.85 In 2010, the Philippines figured among the top three banana producing countries in the
world.86 In 2014, fresh bananas accounted for 17% of the country's top agricultural export commodities,
gaining a close second to coconut oil with 18%.87 The Davao Region (Region XI)88 was the top banana
producing region in 2013, with a production growth rate of 16.4%, and 33.76% share in the total
agricultural output of the Region.89 chan roble slaw
Despite these optimistic statistics, the banana industry players struggle to keep up with the demands of
the trade by combatting the main threat to production posed by two major fungal diseases: the Panama
Disease Tropical Race 4 (Fusarium oxysprum f.sp. cubense) and the Black Sigatoka leaf spot disease
(Mycosphaerella ffiensis morelet). Pesticides have proven to be effective only against the Black Sigatoka
disease. There is yet no known cure for the Panama disease.90 chanrob leslaw
The menace of the Black Sigatoka disease cannot be taken lightly. The disease causes destruction of the
plant by significantly reducing the leaf area, leading to premature ripening of the produce and resulting
in yield losses of at least 50%.91 Due to its effects on banana export trading, the disease has emerged
as a global concern that has correspondingly forced banana producers to increase the use of chemical
pesticides.92 Protectant fungicides such as Mancozeb, chlorothalonil and Propiconazole are applied to
combat the disease.93 These agricultural chemicals are aerially applied by the respondents in the banana
plantations within the jurisdiction of Davao City to arrest the proliferation of the disease.
Considering that banana export plantations exist in vast monocultures, effective treatment of the Black
Sigatoka disease is done by frequent aerial application of fungicides. This is an expensive practice
because it requires permanent landing strips, facilities for the mixing and loading of fungicides, and high
recurring expense of spray materials.94 The cost of aerial spraying accounts to 15-20% of the final retail
price of the crop, making the technology essentially unavailable to small landholdings that are more
vulnerable to the disease.95 cha nrob le slaw
Aerial spraying has become an agricultural practice in Davao City since the establishment of the banana
plantations in 1960.96 Out of the 5,205 hectares of commercial plantations devoted to Cavendish banana
being operated by the respondents in Davao City,97 around 1,800 hectares receive treatment through
aerial application. These plantations are situated in Barangays Sirib, Manuel Guianga, Tamayong,
Subasta Dacudao, Lasang, Mandug, Waan, Tigatto and Callawa,98 and are affected by the ban imposed
by Ordinance No. 0309-07. The DTI has issued a statement to the effect that the ban against aerial
spraying in banana plantations "is expected to kill the banana industry," affects the socio-economic
development of the barangays hosting the affected plantations, and has a disastrous impact on export
trading. The DTI has forecasted that the ban would discourage the entry of new players in the locality,
which would have a potential drawback in employment generation.99 chan roble slaw
II
The Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City
enacted Ordinance No. 0309-07
under its corporate powers
The petitioners assert that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid act of the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao
City- pursuant to its delegated authority to exercise police power in the furtherance of public welfare and
in ensuring a sound and balanced environment for its constituents. The respondents negate this
assertion, describing the ordinance as unreasonable, discriminatory and oppressive.
The petitioners' assertion of its authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07 is upheld.
To be considered as a valid police power measure, an ordinance must pass a two-pronged test:
the formal (i.e., whether the ordinance is enacted within the corporate powers of the local government
unit, and whether it is passed in accordance with the procedure prescribed by law); and
the substantive (i.e., involving inherent merit, like the conformity of the ordinance with the limitations
under the Constitution and the statutes, as well as with the requirements of fairness and reason, and its
consistency with public policy).100
chan roble slaw
The formalities in enacting an ordinance are laid down in Section 53101 and Section 54102 of The Local
Government Code. These provisions require the ordinance to be passed by the majority of the members
of the sanggunian concerned, and to be presented to the mayor for approval. With no issues regarding
quorum during its deliberation having been raised, and with its approval of by City Mayor Duterte not
being disputed, we see no reason to strike down Ordinance No. 0309-07 for non-compliance with the
formal requisites under the Local Government Code.
We next ascertain whether the City of Davao acted within the limits of its corporate powers in enacting
Ordinance No. 0309-07.
The corporate powers of the local government unit confer the basic authority to enact legislation that
may interfere with personal liberty, property, lawful businesses and occupations in order to promote the
general welfare.103 Such legislative powers spring from the delegation thereof by Congress through
either the Local Government Code or a special law. The General Welfare Clause in Section 16 of
the Local Government Code embodies the legislative grant that enables the local government unit to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of its creation, and to promote and maintain
local autonomy.104 Section 16 reads: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Sec. 16. General Welfare. — Every local government unit shall exercise the powers expressly granted,
those necessarily implied therefrom, as well as powers necessary, appropriate, or incidental for its
efficient and effective governance, and those which are essential to the promotion of the general
welfare. Within their respective territorial jurisdictions, local government units shall ensure and support
among other things, the preservation and enrichment of culture, promote health and safety, enhance
the right of the people to a balanced ecology, encourage and support the development of appropriate
and self-reliant scientific and technological capabilities, improve public morals, enhance economic
prosperity and social justice, promote full employment among their residents, maintain peace and order,
and preserve the comfort and convenience of their inhabitants.
Section 16 comprehends two branches of delegated powers, namely: the general legislative power and
the police power proper. General legislative power refers to the power delegated by Congress to the
local legislative body, or the Sangguniang Panlungsod in the case of Dayao City,105 to enable the local
legislative body to enact ordinances and make regulations. This power is limited in that the enacted
ordinances must not be repugnant to law, and the power must be exercised to effectuate and discharge
the powers and duties legally conferred to the local legislative body. The police power proper, on the
other hand, authorizes the local government unit to enact ordinances necessary and proper for the
health and safety, prosperity, morals, peace, good order, comfort, and convenience of the local
government unit and its constituents, and for the protection of their property.106 chan roble slaw
Section 458 of the Local Government Code explicitly vests the local government unit with the authority
to enact legislation .aimed at promoting the general welfare, viz.: ChanRobles Vi rtual awlib rary
Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation. — (a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the
legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions and appropriate funds for the
general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code and in the proper
exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code. x x x
In terms of the right of the citizens to health and to a balanced and healthful ecology, the local
government unit takes its cue from Section 15 and Section 16, Article II of the 1987 Constitution.
Following the provisions of the Local Government Code and the Constitution, the acts of the local
government unit designed to ensure the health and lives of its constituents and to promote a balanced
and healthful ecology are well within the corporate powers vested in the local government unit.
Accordingly, the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City is vested with the requisite authority to enact an
ordinance that seeks to protect the health and well-being of its constituents.
The respondents pose a challenge against Ordinance No. 0309-07 on the ground that the Sangguniang
Bayan of Davao City has disregarded the health of the plantation workers, contending that by imposing
the ban against aerial spraying the ordinance would place the plantation workers at a higher health risk
because the alternatives of either manual or truck-boom spraying method would be adopted; and that
exposing the workers to the same risk sought to be prevented by the ordinance would defeat its
purported purpose.
We disagree with the respondents.
With or without the ban against aerial spraying, the health and safety of plantation workers are secured
by existing state policies, rules and regulations implemented by the FPA, among others, which the
respondents are lawfully bound to comply with. The respondents even manifested their strict compliance
with these rules, including those in the UN-FAO Guidelines on Good Practice for Aerial Application of
Pesticides (Rome 2001). We should note that the Rome 2001 guidelines require the pesticide applicators
to observe the standards provided therein to ensure the health and safety of plantation workers. As
such, there cannot be any imbalance between the right to health of the residents vis-a-vis the workers
even if a ban will be imposed against aerial spraying and the consequent adoption of other modes of
pesticide treatment.
Furthermore, the constitutional right to health and maintaining environmental integrity are privileges
that do not only advance the interests of a group of individuals. The benefits of protecting human health
and the environment transcend geographical locations and even generations. This is the essence of
Sections 15 and 16, Article II of the Constitution. In Oposa v. Factoran, Jr.107 we declared that the right
to a balanced and healthful ecology under Section 16 is an issue of transcendental importance with
intergenerational implications. It is under this milieu that the questioned ordinance should be
appreciated.
Advancing the interests of the residents who are vulnerable to the alleged health risks due to their
exposure to pesticide drift justifies the motivation behind the enactment of the ordinance. The City of
Davao has the authority to enact pieces of legislation that will promote the general welfare, specifically
the health of its constituents. Such authority should not be construed, however, as a valid license for the
City of Davao to enact any ordinance it deems fit to discharge its mandate. A thin but well-defined line
separates authority to enact legislations from the method of accomplishing the same.
By distinguishing authority from method we face this question: Is a prohibition against aerial spraying a
lawfully permissible method that the local government unit of Davao City may adopt to prevent the
purported effects of aerial drift? To resolve this question, the Court must dig deeper into the intricate
issues arising from these petitions.
II
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Due Process Clause
A valid ordinance must not only be enacted within the corporate powers of the local government and
passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.108 In order to declare it as a valid piece of local
legislation, it must also comply with the following substantive requirements, namely: (1) it must not
contravene the Constitution or any statute; (2) it must be fair, not oppressive; (3) it must not be partial
or discriminatory; (4) it must not prohibit but may regulate trade; (5) it must be general and consistent
with public policy; and (6) it must not be unreasonable.109 chan roble slaw
In the State's exercise of police power, the property rights of individuals may be subjected to restraints
and burdens in order to fulfill the objectives of the Government.110 A local government unit is considered
to have properly exercised its police powers only if it satisfies the following requisites, to wit: (1) the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require the
interference of the State; and (2) the means employed are reasonably necessary for the attainment of
the object sought to be accomplished and not unduly oppressive.111 The first requirement refers to the
Equal Protection Clause of the Constitution; the second, to the Due Process Clause of the
Constitution.112
chanrob leslaw
Substantive due process requires that a valid ordinance must have a sufficient justification for the
Government's action.113 This means that in exercising police power the local government unit must not
arbitrarily, whimsically or despotically enact the ordinance regardless of its salutary purpose. So long as
the ordinance realistically serves a legitimate public purpose, and it employs means that are reasonably
necessary to achieve that purpose without unduly oppressing the individuals regulated, the ordinance
must survive a due process challenge.114 cha nrob leslaw
The respondents challenge Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for being unreasonable and oppressive in
that it sets the effectivity of the ban at three months after publication of the ordinance. They allege that
three months will be inadequate time to shift from aerial to truck-mounted boom spraying, and
effectively deprives them of efficient means to combat the Black Sigatoka disease.
The petitioners counter that the period is justified considering the urgency of protecting the health of the
residents.
We find for the respondents.
The impossibility of carrying out a shift to another mode of pesticide application within three months can
readily be appreciated given the vast area of the affected plantations and the corresponding resources
required therefor. To recall, even the RTC recognized the impracticality of attaining a full-shift to other
modes of spraying within three months in view of the costly financial and civil works required for the
conversion.115 In the assailed decision, the CA appropriately observed: Cha nRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
There appears to be three (3) forms of ground spraying, as distinguished from aerial spraying, which
are: 1. "Truck-mounted boom spraying;" 2. "manual or backpack spraying." and 3. "sprinkler spraying."
Petitioners-appellants claim that it was physically impossible for them to shift to "truck-mounted boom
spraying" within three (3) months before the aerial spraying ban is actually enforced. They cited the
testimony of Dr. Maria Emilia Rita G. Fabregar, Ph.D, PBGEA Chairperson, to the effect that since banana
plantations in Davao City were configured for aerial spraying, the same lack the road network to make
"truck-mounted boom spraying" possible. According to Dr. Fabregar, it was impossible to construct such
road networks in a span of three (3) months. Engr. Magno P. Porticos, Jr., confirmed that the shift
demands the construction of three hundred sixty (360) linear kilometers of road which cannot be
completed in three (3) months.
In their separate testimonies, Dr. Fabregar and Engr. Porticos explained that a shift to "truck-mounted
boom spraying" requires the following steps which may be completed in three (3) years: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
1. six (6) months for planning the reconfiguration of banana plantations to ensure effective truck-
mounted boom spraying for the adequate protections of the plantations from the Black Sigatoka fungus
and other diseases, while maximizing land use;
2. two (2) months to secure government permits for infrastructure works to be undertaken thereon;
3. clearing banana plants and dismantling or reconstructing fixed infrastructures, such as roads, drains,
cable ways, and irrigation facilities, which phase may be completed in eighteen (18) months;
4. importation and purchase of trucks mounted with boom spraying, nurse trucks and protective gears.
The placing of orders and delivery of these equipments, including the training [of] the personnel who
would man the same, would take six (6) months; and cralawlawlibra ry
5. securing the needed capitalization to finance these undertakings would take six (6) months to a year.
Ms. Maria Victoria E. Sembrano, CPA, Chairperson of the PBGEA Finance Committee, testified that her
committee and the Technical Committee and Engineering Group of PBGEA conducted a feasibility study
to determine the cost in undertaking the shift to ground spraying. Their findings fixed the estimated cost
for the purpose at Php 400 Million.
xxxx
Both appellees failed to rebut the foregoing testimonies with empirical findings to the contrary.
xxxx
Thus, in view of the infrastructural requirements as methodically explained, We are convinced that it
was physically impossible for petitioners-appellants to carry out a carefully planned configuration of vast
hectares of banana plantations and be able to actually adopt "truck-mounted boom spraying" within
three (3) months. To compel petitioners-appellants to abandon aerial spraying in favor of "manual or
backpack spraying" or "sprinkler spraying" within 3 months puts petitioners-appellants in a vicious
dilemma between protecting its investments and the health of its workers, on the one hand, and the
threat of prosecution if they refuse to comply with the imposition. We even find the 3-months transition
period insufficient, not only in acquiring and gearing-up the plantation workers of safety appurtenances,
but more importantly in reviewing safety procedures for "manual or backpack spraying" and in training
such workers for the purpose. Additionally, the engineering works for a sprinkler system in vast hectares
of banana plantations could not possibly be completed within such period, considering that safety and
efficiency factors need to be considered in its structural re-designing.
xxxx
Respondent-appellee argues that the Ordinance merely banned an agricultural practice and did not
actually prohibit the operation of banana plantations; hence, it is not oppressive. While We agree that
the measure did not impose a closure of a lawful enterprise, the proviso in Section 5, however, compels
petitioners-appellants to abandon aerial spraying without affording them enough time to convert and
adopt other spraying practices. This would preclude petitioners-appellants from being able to fertilize
their plantations with essential vitamins and minerals substances, aside from applying thereon the
needed fungicides or pesticides to control, if not eliminate the threat of, plant diseases. Such an
apparent eventuality would prejudice the operation of the plantations, and the economic repercussions
thereof would just be akin to shutting down the venture.
This Court, therefore, finds Section 5 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 an invalid provision because the
compulsion thereunder to abandon aerial spraying within an impracticable period of "three (3) months
after the effectivity of this Ordinance" is "unreasonable, oppressive and impossible to comply with."116 chanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
The required civil works for the conversion to truck-mounted boom spraying alone will consume
considerable time and financial resources given the topography and geographical features of the
plantations.117 As such, the conversion could not be completed within the short timeframe of three
months. Requiring the respondents and other affected individuals to comply with the consequences of
the ban within the three-month period under pain of penalty like fine, imprisonment and even
cancellation of business permits would definitely be oppressive as to constitute abuse of police power.
The respondents posit that the requirement of maintaining a buffer zone under Section 6 of the
ordinance violates due process for being confiscatory; and that the imposition unduly deprives all
agricultural landowners within Davao City of the beneficial use of their property that amounts to taking
without just compensation.
The position of the respondents is untenable.

In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.,118 we have thoroughly explained that taking only becomes confiscatory if
it substantially divests the owner of the beneficial use of its property, viz.:
ChanRob les Vi rtualawl ib rary
An ordinance which permanently restricts the use of property that it cannot be used for any reasonable
purpose goes beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property without just
compensation. It is intrusive and violative of the private property rights of individuals.
The Constitution expressly provides in Article III, Section 9, that "private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation." The provision is the most important protection of property rights
in the Constitution. This is a restriction on the general power of the government to take property. The
constitutional provision is about ensuring that the government does not confiscate the property of some
to give it to others. In part too, it is about loss spreading. If the government takes away a person's
property to benefit society, then society should pay. The principal purpose of the guarantee is "to bar
the Government from forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice,
should be borne by the public as a whole.
There are two different types of taking that can be identified. A "possessory" taking occurs when the
government confiscates or physically occupies property. A "regulatory" taking occurs when the
government's regulation leaves no reasonable economically viable use of the property.
In the landmark case of Pennsylvania Coal v. Mahon, it was held that a taking also could be found if
government regulation of the use of property went "too far." When regulation reaches a certain
magnitude, in most if not in all cases there must be an exercise of eminent domain and compensation to
support the act. While property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it will be
recognized as a taking.
No formula or rule can be devised to answer the questions of what is too far and when regulation
becomes a taking. In Mahon, Justice Holmes recognized that it was "a question of degree and therefore
cannot be disposed of by general propositions." On many other occasions as well, the U.S. Supreme
Court has said that the issue of when regulation constitutes a taking is a matter of considering the facts
in each case. The Court asks whether justice and fairness require that the economic loss caused by
public action must be compensated by the government and thus borne by the public as a whole, or
whether the loss should remain concentrated on those few persons subject to the public action.
What is crucial in judicial consideration of regulatory takings is that government regulation is a taking if
it leaves no reasonable economically viable use of property in a manner that interferes with reasonable
expectations for use. A regulation that permanently denies all economically beneficial or productive use
of land is, from the owner's point of view, equivalent to a "taking" unless principles of nuisance or
property law that existed when the owner acquired the land make the use prohibitable. When the owner
of real property has been called upon to sacrifice all economically beneficial uses in the name of the
common good, that is, to leave his property economically idle, he has suffered a taking.
A regulation which denies all economically beneficial or productive use of land will require compensation
under the takings clause. Where a regulation places limitations on land that fall short of eliminating all
economically beneficial use, a taking nonetheless may have occurred, depending on a complex of factors
including the regulation's economic effect on the landowner, the extent to which the regulation interferes
with reasonable investment-backed expectations and the character of government action. These
inquiries are informed by the purpose of the takings clause which is to prevent the government from
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, should be borne by
the public as a whole.
A restriction on use of property may also constitute a "taking" if not reasonably necessary to the
effectuation of a substantial public purpose or if it has an unduly harsh impact on the distinct
investment-backed expectations of the owner. (bold Emphasis supplied)
The establishment of the buffer zone is required for the purpose of minimizing the effects of aerial
spraying within and near the plantations. Although Section 3(e) of the ordinance requires the planting of
diversified trees within the identified buffer zone, the requirement cannot be construed and deemed as
confiscatory requiring payment of just compensation. A landowner may only be entitled to compensation
if the taking amounts to a permanent denial of all economically beneficial or productive uses of the land.
The respondents cannot be said to be permanently and completely deprived of their landholdings
because they can still cultivate or make other productive uses of the areas to be identified as the buffer
zones.
III
Ordinance No. 0309-07 violates the Equal Protection Clause
A serious challenge being posed against Ordinance No. 0309-07 rests on its supposed collision with the
Equal Protection Clause. The respondents submit that the ordinance transgresses this constitutional
guaranty on two counts, to wit: (1) by prohibiting aerial spraying per se, regardless of the substance or
the level of concentration of the chemicals to be applied; and (2) by imposing the 30-meter buffer zone
in all agricultural lands in Davao City regardless of the sizes of the landholding.
The constitutional right to equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The guaranty equal protection
secures every person within the State's jurisdiction against intentional and arbitrary discrimination,
whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its improper execution through the State's
duly constituted authorities. The concept of equal justice under the law demands that the State governs
impartially, and not to draw distinctions between individuals solely on differences that are irrelevant to
the legitimate governmental objective.119 chan robles law
Equal treatment neither requires universal application of laws to all persons or things without
distinction,120 nor intends to prohibit legislation by limiting the object to which it is directed or by the
territory in which it is to operate.121 The guaranty of equal protection envisions equality among equals
determined according to a valid classification.122 If the groupings are characterized by substantial
distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and regulated differently from
another.123 In other word, a valid classification must be: (1) based on substantial distinctions; (2)
germane to the purposes of the law; (3) not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) equally
applicable to all members of the class.124 chanrob leslaw
Based on these parameters, we find for the respondents.
The reasonability of a distinction and sufficiency of the justification given by the Government for its
conduct is gauged by using the means-end test.125 This test requires analysis of: (1) the interests of the
public that generally require its exercise, as distinguished from those of a particular class; and (2) the
means employed that are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the purpose and are not
unduly oppressive upon individuals.126 To determine the propriety of the classification, courts resort to
three levels of scrutiny, viz: the rational scrutiny, intermediate scrutiny and strict scrutiny.
The rational basis scrutiny (also known as the rational relation test or rational basis test) demands that
the classification reasonably relate to the legislative purpose.127 The rational basis test often applies in
cases involving economics or social welfare,128 or to any other case not involving a suspect class.129 chanrob leslaw
When the classification puts a quasi-suspect class at a disadvantage, it will be treated under
intermediate or heightened review. Classifications based on gender or illegitimacy receives intermediate
scrutiny.130 To survive intermediate scrutiny, the law must not only further an important governmental
interest and be substantially related to that interest, but the justification for the classification must be
genuine and must not depend on broad generalizations.131 chan roble slaw
The strict scrutiny review applies when a legislative classification impermissibly interferes with the
exercise of a fundamental right or operates to the peculiar class disadvantage of a suspect class. The
Government carries the burden to prove that the classification is necessary to achieve a compelling state
interest, and that it is the least restrictive means to protect such interest.132 chan robles law
The petitioners advocate the rational basis test. In particular, the petitioning residents of Davao City
argue that the CA erroneously applied the strict scrutiny approach when it declared that the ordinance
violated the Equal Protection Clause because the ban included all substances including water and
vitamins. The respondents agree with the CA, however, and add that the ordinance does not rest on a
valid distinction because it has lacked scientific basis and has ignored the classifications of pesticides
observed by the FPA.
We partly agree with both parties.
In our view, the petitioners correctly argue that the rational basis approach appropriately applies herein.
Under the rational basis test, we shall: (1) discern the reasonable relationship between the means and
the purpose of the ordinance; and (2) examine whether the means or the prohibition against aerial
spraying is based on a substantial or reasonable distinction. A reasonable classification includes all
persons or things similarly situated with respect to the purpose of the law.133 chanrobles law
Applying the test, the established classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 is to be viewed in relation
to the group of individuals similarly situated with respect to the avowed purpose. This gives rise to two
classes, namely: (1) the classification under Ordinance No. 0309-07 (legislative classification); and (2)
the classification based on purpose (elimination of the mischief). The legislative classification found in
Section 4 of the ordinance refers to "all agricultural entities" within Davao City. Meanwhile, the
classification based on the purpose of the ordinance cannot be easily discerned because the ordinance
does not make any express or implied reference to it. We have to search the voluminous records of this
case to divine the animus behind the action of the Sangguniang Panglungsod in prohibiting aerial
spraying as an agricultural activity. The effort has led uS to the following proposed resolution of the
Sangguniang Panglungsod,134viz.: ChanRoble sVirtualawl ibra ry
RESOLUTION NO. ____

Series of 2007
A RESOLUTION TO ENACT AN ORDINANCE BANNING AERIAL SPRAYING AS AN AGRICULTURAL

PRACTICE IN ALL AGRICULTURAL ENTITIES IN DAVAO CITY
WHEREAS, the City of Davao, with fertile lands and ideal climactic condition, hosts various large farms
planted with different crops;
WHEREAS, these farms, lay adjacent to other agricultural businesses and that residential areas abuts
these farm boundaries;
WHEREAS, aerial spraying as a mode of applying chemical substances such as fungicides and pesticides
is being used by investors/companies over large agricultural plantations in Davao City;
WHEREAS, the Davao City watersheds and ground water sources, located within and adjacent to Mount
Apo may be affected by the aerial spraying of chemical substances on the agricultural farms and
plantations therein;
WHEREAS, the effects of aerial spraying are found to be detrimental to the health of the residents of
Davao City most especially the inhabitants nearby agricultural plantations practicing aerials spraying;
WHEREAS, the unstable wind direction during the conduct of aerial spray application of these chemical
substances pose health hazards to people, animals, other crops and ground water sources;
WHEREAS, in order to achieve sustainable development, politics must be based on the Precautionary
Principle. Environment measures must anticipate, prevent, and attack the causes of environmental
degradation. Where there are threats of serious, irreversible damage, lack of scientific certainty should
not be used as a reason for postponing measures to prevent environmental degradation;
WHEREAS, it is the policy of the City of Davao to ensure the safety of its inhabitants from all forms of
hazards, especially if such hazards come from development activities that are supposed to be beneficial
to everybody;
WHEREAS, pesticides are by its nature poisonous, it is all the more dangerous when dispensed aerially
through aircraft because of unstable wind conditions which in turn makes aerial spray drifting to
unintended targets a commonplace.
WHEREAS, aerial spraying of pesticides is undeniably a nuisance.
WHEREAS, looking at the plight of the complainants and other stakeholders opposed to aerial spraying,
the issue of aerial spraying of pesticides is in all fours a nuisance. Given the vastness of the reach of
aerial spraying, the said form of dispensation falls into the category of a public nuisance. Public nuisance
is defined by the New Civil Code as one which affects a community or neighborhood or any considerable
number of persons, although the extent of the annoyance, danger or damage upon individuals may be
unequal.
WHEREAS, the General Welfare Clause of the Local Government Code empowers Local Government Units
to enact ordinances that provide for the health and safety, promote the comfort and convenience of the
City and the inhabitants thereof.
NOW THEREFORE, BE IT RESOLVED AS IT IS HEREBY RESOLVED, that for the health, safety and
peace of mind of all the inhabitants of Davao City, let an ordinance be enacted banning aerial spraying
as an agricultural practice in all agricultural entities in Davao City.
xxxx
The proposed resolution identified aerial spraying of pesticides as a nuisance because of the unstable
wind direction during the aerial application, which (1) could potentially contaminate the Davao City
watersheds and ground water sources; (2) was detrimental to the health of Davao City residents, most
especially those living in the. nearby plantations; and (3) posed a hazard to animals and other crops.
Plainly, the mischief that the prohibition sought to address was the fungicide drift resulting from the
aerial application; hence, the classification based on the intent of the proposed ordinance covered all
agricultural entities conducting aerial spraying of fungicides that caused drift.
The assailed ordinance thus becomes riddled with several distinction issues.
A brief discussion on the occurrence of the drift that the ordinance seeks to address is necessary.
Pesticide treatment is based on the use of different methods of application and equipment,135 the choice
of which methods depend largely on the objective of distributing the correct dose to a defined target
with the minimum of wastage due to "drift."136 The term "drift" refers to the movement of airborne spray
droplets, vapors, or dust particles away from the target area during pesticide application.137 Inevitably,
any method of application causes drift, which may either be primary or secondary. As fittingly described
by scholars:138
Primary drift is the off-site movement of spray droplets at, or very close to, the time of application. For
example, a field application using a boom in a gusty wind situation could easily lead to a primary
drift. Primary spray drift is not product specific, and the active ingredients do not differ in their potential
to drift. However, the type of formulation, surfactant, or other adjuvant may affect spray drift potential.
Secondary drift is associated with pesticide vapor. Pesticide vapor drift is the movement of the gas that
forms when an active ingredient evaporates from plants, soil, or other surfaces. And while vapor drift is
an important issue, it only pertains to certain volatile products. Vapor drift and other forms
of secondary drift are product specific. Water-based sprays will volatize more quickly than oil-based
sprays. However, oil-based sprays can drift farther, especially above 95°F, because they are lighter.
Understandably, aerial drift occurs using any method of application, be it through airplanes, ground
sprayers, airblast sprayers or irrigation systems.139 Several factors contribute to the occurrence of drift
depending on the method of application, viz.: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
AERIAL AIRBLAST GROUND CHEMIGATION

Crop Application
Droplet size Droplet size
canopy height
Boom
Application height Droplet size Wind speed
height
Wind speed Wind speed Wind speed
Swath adjustment
Canopy
Boom length
Tank mix physical
properties
Source: F.M. Fishel and J.A. Ferrell, "Managing Pesticide Drift," available at http://edis.ifas.edu/pi232.
citing Pesticide Notes, MSU Extension.
The four most common pesticide treatment methods adopted in Davao City are aerial, truck-mounted
boom, truck-mounted mechanical, and manual spraying.140 However, Ordinance No. 0309-07 imposes
the prohibition only against aerial spraying.
Davao City justifies the prohibition against aerial spraying by insisting that the occurrence of drift causes
inconvenience and harm to the residents and degrades the environment. Given this justification, does
the ordinance satisfy the requirement that the classification must rest on substantial distinction?
We answer in the negative.
The occurrence of pesticide drift is not limited to aerial spraying but results from the conduct of any
mode of pesticide application. Even manual spraying or truck-mounted boom spraying produces drift
that may bring about the same inconvenience, discomfort and alleged health risks to the community and
to the environment.141 A ban against aerial spraying does not weed out the harm that the ordinance
seeks to achieve.142 In the process, the ordinance suffers from being "underinclusive" because the
classification does not include all individuals tainted with the same mischief that the law seeks to
eliminate.143 A classification that is drastically underinclusive with respect to the purpose or end appears
as an irrational means to the legislative end because it poorly serves the intended purpose of the
law.144
chan robles law
The claim that aerial spraying produces more aerial drift cannot likewise be sustained in view of the
petitioners' failure to substantiate the same. The respondents have refuted this claim, and have
maintained that on the contrary, manual spraying produces more drift than aerial treatment145 As such,
the decision of prohibiting only aerial spraying is tainted with arbitrariness.
Aside from its being underinclusive, the assailed ordinance also tends to be "overinclusive" because its
.impending implementation will affect groups that have no relation to the accomplishment of the
legislative purpose. Its implementation will unnecessarily impose a burden on a wider range of
individuals than those included in the intended class based on the purpose of the law.146 chan robles law
It can be noted that the imposition of the ban is too broad because the ordinance applies irrespective of
the substance to be aerially applied and irrespective of the agricultural activity to be conducted. The
respondents admit that they aerially treat their plantations not only with pesticides but also vitamins and
other substances. The imposition of the ban against aerial spraying of substances other than fungicides
and regardless of the agricultural activity being performed becomes unreasonable inasmuch as it
patently bears no relation to the purported inconvenience, discomfort, health risk and environmental
danger which the ordinance, seeks to address. The burden now will become more onerous to various
entities including the respondents and even others with no connection whatsoever to the intended
purpose of the ordinance.
In this respect, the CA correctly observed: ChanRob les Vi rtualawl ib rary
Ordinance No. 0309-07 defines "aerial spraying" as the "application of substances through the use of
aircraft of any form which dispenses the substances in the air." Inevitably, the ban imposed therein
encompasses aerial application of practically all substances, not only pesticides or fungicides but
including water and all forms of chemicals, regardless of its elements, composition, or degree of safety.
Going along with respondent-appellee's ratiocination that the prohibition in the Ordinance refers to aerial
spraying as a method of spraying pesticides or fungicides, there appears to be a need to single out
pesticides or fungicides in imposing such a ban because there is a striking distinction between such
chemicals and other substances (including water), particularly with respect to its safety implications to
the public welfare and ecology.
xxxx
We are, therefore, convinced that the total ban on aerial spraying runs afoul with the equal protection
clause because it does not classify which substances are prohibited from being applied aerially even as
reasonable distinctions should be made in terms of the hazards, safety or beneficial effects of liquid
substances to the public health, livelihood and the environment.147 chanro blesvi rtua llawli bra ry
We clarify that the CA did not thereby apply the strict scrutiny approach but only evaluated the
classification established by the ordinance in relation to the purpose. This is the essence of the rational
basis approach.
The petitioners should be made aware that the rational basis scrutiny is not based on a simple means-
purpose correlation; nor does the rational basis scrutiny automatically result in a presumption of validity
of the ordinance or deference to the wisdom of the local legislature.148 To reiterate, aside from
ascertaining that the means and purpose of the ordinance are reasonably related, the classification
should be based on a substantial distinction.
However, we do not subscribe to the respondents' position that there must be a distinction based on the
level of concentration or the classification imposed by the FPA on pesticides. This strenuous requirement
cannot be expected from a local government unit that should only be concerned with general policies in
local administration and should not be restricted by technical concerns that are best left to agencies
vested with the appropriate special competencies. The disregard of the pesticide classification is not an
equal protection issue but is more relevant in another aspect of delegated police power that we consider
to be more appropriate in a later discussion.
The overinclusiveness of Ordinance No. 0309-07 may also be traced to its Section 6 by virtue of its
requirement for the maintenance of the 30- meter buffer zone. This requirement applies regardless of
the area of the agricultural landholding, geographical location, topography, crops grown and other
distinguishing characteristics that ideally should bear a reasonable relation to the evil sought to be
avoided. As earlier discussed, only large banana plantations could rely on aerial technology because of
the financial capital required therefor.
The establishment and maintenance of the buffer zone will become more burdensome to the small
agricultural landholders because: (1) they have to reserve the 30-meter belt surrounding their property;
(2) that will have to be identified through GPS; (3) the metes and bounds of the buffer zone will have to
be plotted in a survey plan for submission to the local government unit; and (4) will be limited as to the
crops that may be cultivated therein based on the mandate that the zone shall be devoted to "diversified
trees" taller than what are being grown therein.149 The arbitrariness of Section 6 all the more becomes
evident when the land is presently devoted to the cultivation of root crops and vegetables, and trees or
plants slightly taller than the root crops and vegetables are then to be planted. It is seriously to be
doubted whether such circumstance will prevent the occurrence of the drift to the nearby residential
areas.
Section 6 also subjects to the 30-meter buffer zone requirement agricultural entities engaging in organic
farming, and' do not contribute to the occurrence of pesticide drift. The classification indisputably
becomes arbitrary and whimsical.
A substantially overinclusive or underinclusive classification tends to undercut the governmental claim

that the classification serves legitimate political ends.150 Where overinclusiveness is the problem, the
vice is that the law has a greater discriminatory or burdensome effect than necessary.151 In this light, we
strike down Section 5 and Section 6 of Ordinance No. 0309-07 for carrying an invidious classification,
and for thereby violating the Equal Protection Clause.
The discriminatory nature of the ordinance can be seen from its policy as stated in its Section 2, to
wit:ChanRoble sVi rt ualawlib ra ry
Section 2. POLICY OF THE CITY. It shall be the policy of the City of Davao to eliminate the method of
aerial spraying as an agricultural practice in all agricultural activities by all entities within Davao City.
Evidently, the ordinance discriminates against large farmholdings that are the only ideal venues for the
investment of machineries and equipment capable of aerial spraying. It effectively denies the affected
individuals the technology aimed at efficient and cost-effective operations and cultivation not only of
banana but of other crops as well. The prohibition against aerial spraying will seriously hamper the
operations of the banana plantations that depend on aerial technology to arrest the spread of the Black
Sigatoka disease and other menaces that threaten their production and harvest. As earlier shown, the
effect of the ban will not be limited to Davao City in view of the significant contribution of banana export
trading to the country's economy.
The discriminatory character of the ordinance makes it oppressive and unreasonable in light of the
existence and availability of more permissible and practical alternatives that will not overburden the
respondents and those dependent on their operations as well as those who stand to be affected by the
ordinance. In the view of Regional Director Roger C. Chio of DA Regional Field Unit XI, the alleged harm
caused by aerial spraying may be addressed by following the GAP that the DA has been promoting
among plantation operators. He explained his view thusly: ChanRobles Vi rtualaw lib rary
The allegation that aerial spraying is hazardous to animal and human being remains an allegation and
assumptions until otherwise scientifically proven by concerned authorities and agencies. This issue can
be addressed by following Good Agricultural Practices, which DA is promoting among fruit and vegetable
growers/plantations. Any method of agri-chemical application whether aerial or non-aerial if not properly
done in accordance with established procedures and code of good agricultural practices and if the
chemical applicators and or handlers lack of necessary competency, certainly it could be hazardous. For
the assurance that commercial applicators/aerial applicators possessed the competency and
responsibility of handling agri-chemical, such applicators are required under Article III, Paragraph 2 of
FPA Rules and Regulation No. 1 to secure license from FPA.
Furthermore users and applicators of agri-chemicals are also guided by Section 6 Paragraph 2 and 3
under column of Pesticides and Other agricultural Chemicals of PD 11445 which stated: "FPA shall
establish and enforce tolerance levels and good agricultural practices in raw agricultural commodities; to
restrict or ban the use of any chemical or the formulation of certain pesticides in specific areas or during
certain period upon evidence that the pesticide is eminent [sic] hazards has caused, or is causing
widespread serious damage to crops, fish, livestock or to public health and environment."
Besides the aforecited policy, rules and regulation enforced by DA, there are other laws and regulations
protecting and preserving the environment. If the implementation and monitoring of all these laws and
regulation are closely coordinated with concerned LGUs, Gas and NGAs and other private sectors,
perhaps we can maintain a sound and health environment x x x.152 chanroble svirtual lawlib rary
Indeed, based on the Summary Report on the Assessment and Factfinding Activities on the Issue of
Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations,153 submitted by the fact-finding team organized by Davao City,
only three out of the 13 barangays consulted by the fact-finding team opposed the conduct of aerial
spraying; and of the three barangays, aerial spraying was conducted only in Barangay Subasta. In fact,
the fact-finding team found that the residents in those barangays were generally in favor of the
operations of the banana plantations, and did not oppose the conduct of aerial spraying.
IV
The Precautionary Principle still requires scientific basis
The petitioners finally plead that the Court should look at the merits of the ordinance based on the
precautionary principle. They argue that under the precautionary principle, the City of Davao is justified
in enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 in order to prevent harm to the environment and human health
despite the lack of scientific certainty.
The petitioners' plea and argument cannot be sustained.
The principle of precaution originated as a social planning principle in Germany. In the 1980s, the
Federal Republic of Germany used the Vorsogeprinzip ("foresight principle") to justify the
implementation of vigorous policies to tackle acid rain, global warming and pollution of the North
Sea.154 It has since emerged from a need to protect humans and the environment from increasingly
unpredictable, uncertain, and unquantifiable but possibly catastrophic risks such as those associated
with Genetically Modified Organisms and climate change,155 among others. The oft-cited Principle 15 of
the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development (1992 Rio Agenda), first embodied this
principle, as follows: ChanRoble sVirt ualawli bra ry
Principle 15
In order to protect the environment, the precautionary approach shall be widely applied by States
according to their capabilities. Where there are threats of serious or irreversible damage, lack of full
scientific certainty shall not be used as a reason for postponing cost-effective measures to prevent
environmental degradation.
In this jurisdiction, the principle of precaution appearing in the Rules of Procedure for Environmental
Cases (A.M. No. 09-6-8-SC) involves matters of evidence in cases where there is lack of full scientific
certainty in establishing a causal link between human activity and environmental effect.156 In such an
event, the courts may construe a set of facts as warranting either judicial action or inaction with the goal
of preserving and protecting the environment.157 chan roble slaw
It is notable, therefore, that the precautionary principle shall only be relevant if there is concurrence of
three elements, namely: uncertainty, threat of environmental damage and serious or irreversible harm.
In situations where the threat is relatively certain, or that the causal link between an action and
environmental damage can be established, or the probability of occurrence can be calculated, only
preventive, not precautionary measures, may be taken. Neither will the precautionary principle apply if
there is no indication of a threat of environmental harm; or if the threatened harm is trivial or easily
reversible.158
c han robles law
We cannot see the presence of all the elements. To begin with, there has been no scientific study.
Although the precautionary principle allows lack of full scientific certainty in establishing a connection
between the serious or irreversible harm and the human activity, its application is still premised on
empirical studies. Scientific analysis is still a necessary basis for effective policy choices under the
precautionary principle.159 chan rob leslaw
Precaution is a risk management principle invoked after scientific inquiry takes place. This scientific
stage is often considered synonympus with risk assessment.160 As such, resort to the principle shall not
be based on anxiety or emotion, but from a rational decision rule, based in ethics.161 As much as
possible, a complete and objective scientific evaluation of the risk to the environment or health should
be conducted and made available to decision-makers for them to choose the most appropriate course of
action.162 Furthermore, the positive and negative effects of an activity is also important in the application
of the principle. The potential harm resulting from certain activities should always be judged in view of
the potential benefits they offer, while the positive and negative effects of potential precautionary
measures should be considered.163 cha nrob leslaw
The only study conducted to validate the effects of aerial spraying appears to be the Summary Report on
the Assessment and Fact-Finding Activities on the Issue of Aerial Spraying in Banana Plantations.164 Yet,
the fact-finding team that generated the report was not a scientific study that could justify the resort to
the .precautionary principle. In fact, the Sangguniang Bayan ignored the findings and conclusions of the
fact-finding team that recommended only a regulation, not a ban, against aerial spraying. The
recommendation was in line with the advocacy of judicious handling and application of chemical
pesticides by the DOH-Center for Health Development in the Davao Region in view of the scarcity of
scientific studies to support the ban against aerial spraying.165 chan robles law
We should not apply the precautionary approach in sustaining the ban against aerial spraying if little or
nothing is known of the exact or potential dangers that aerial spraying may bring to the health of the
residents within and near the plantations and to the integrity and balance of the environment. It is
dangerous to quickly presume that the effects of aerial spraying would be adverse even in the absence
of evidence. Accordingly, for lack of scientific data supporting a ban on aerial spraying, Ordinance No.
0309-07 should be struck down for being unreasonable.
V
Ordinance No. 0309-07 is an ultra vires act
The Court further holds that in addition to its unconstitutionality for carrying an unwarranted
classification that contravenes the Equal Protection Clause, Ordinance No. 0309-07 suffers from another
legal infirmity.
The petitioners represent that Ordinance No. 0309-07 is a valid exercise of legislative and police powers
by the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City pursuant to Section 458 in relation to Section 16 both of
the Local Government Code. The respondents counter that Davao City thereby disregarded the
regulations implemented by the Fertilizer and Pesticide Authority (FPA), including its identification and
classification of safe pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.
We uphold the respondents.
An ordinance enjoys the presumption of validity on the basis that: ChanRoblesVi rtua lawlib rary
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must,
in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all
the facts and circumstances which surround the subject, and necessities of their particular municipality
and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject, and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential
to the well-being of the people.166c hanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Section 5(c) of the Local Government Code accords a liberal interpretation to its general welfare
provisions. The policy of liberal construction is consistent with the spirit of local autonomy that endows
local government units with sufficient power and discretion to accelerate their economic development
and uplift the quality of life for their constituents.
Verily, the Court has championed the cause of public welfare on several occasions. In so doing, it has
accorded liberality to the general welfare provisions of the Local Government Code by upholding the
validity of local ordinances enacted for the common good. For instance, in Social Justice Society (SJS) v.
Atienza, Jr.,167 the Court validated a zoning ordinance that reclassified areas covered by a large oil depot
from industrial to commercial in order to ensure the life, health and property of the inhabitants residing
within the periphery of the oil depot. Another instance is Gancayco v. City Government of Quezon
City,168 where the Court declared as valid a city ordinance ordering the construction of arcades that
would ensure the health and safety of the city and its inhabitants, improvement of their morals, peace,
good order, comfort and convenience, as well as the promotion of their prosperity. Even in its early
years, the Court already extended liberality towards the exercise by the local government units; of their
legislative powers in order to promote the general welfare of their communities. This was exemplified
in United States v. Salaveria,169 wherein gambling was characterized as "an act beyond the pale of good
morals" that the local legislative council could validly suppress to protect the well-being of its
constituents; and in United States v. Abendan,170 whereby the right of the then Municipality of Cebu to
enact an ordinance relating to sanitation and public health was upheld.
The power to legislate under the General Welfare Clause is not meant to be an invincible authority. In
fact, Salaveria and Abendan emphasized the reasonableness and consistency of the exercise by the local
government units with the laws or policies of the State.171 More importantly, because the police power of
the local government units flows from the express delegation of the power by Congress, its exercise is to
be construed in strictissimi juris. Any doubt or ambiguity arising out of the terms used in granting the
power should be construed against the local legislative units.172 Judicial scrutiny comes into play
whenever the exercise of police power affects life, liberty or property.173 The presumption of validity and
the policy of liberality are not restraints on the power of judicial review in the face of questions about
whether an ordinance conforms with the Constitution, the laws or public policy, or if it is unreasonable,
oppressive, partial, discriminating or in derogation of a common right. The ordinance must pass the test
of constitutionality and the test of consistency with the prevailing laws.174 chan robles law
Although the Local Government Code vests the municipal corporations with sufficient power to govern
themselves and manage their affairs and activities, they definitely have no right to enact ordinances
dissonant with the State's laws and policy. The Local Government Code has been fashioned to delineate
the specific parameters and limitations to guide each local government unit in exercising its delegated
powers with the view of making the local government unit a fully functioning subdivision of the State
within the constitutional and statutory restraints.175 The Local Government Code is not intended to vest
in the local government unit the blanket authority to legislate upon any subject that it finds proper to
legislate upon in the guise of serving the common good.
The function of pesticides control, regulation and development is within the jurisdiction of the FPA under
Presidential Decree No. 1144.176 The FPA was established in recognition of the need for a technically
oriented government entity177 that will protect the public from the risks inherent in the use of
pesticides.178 To perform its mandate, it was given under Section 6 of Presidential Decree No. 1144 the
following powers and functions with respect to pesticides and other agricultural chemicals, viz.: ChanRobles Vi rtua lawlib rary
Section 6. Powers and functions. The FPA shall have jurisdiction, on over all existing handlers of
pesticides, fertilizers and other agricultural chemical inputs. The FPA shall have the following powers and
functions:
chanRoble svirtual Lawlib ra ry xxxx
III. Pesticides and Other Agricultural Chemicals
1. To determine specific uses or manners of use for each pesticide or pesticide formulation;
2. To establish and enforce levels and good agricultural practices for use of pesticides in raw agricultural
commodities;
3. To restrict or ban the use of any pesticide or the formulation of certain pesticides in specific areas or
during certain periods upon evidence that the pesticide is an imminent hazard, has caused, or is causing
widespread serious damage to crops, fish or livestock, or to public health and environment;
xxxx
5. To inspect the establishment and premises of pesticide handlers to insure that industrial health and
safety rules and anti-pollution regulations are followed;
6. To enter and inspect farmers' fields to ensure that only the recommended pesticides are used in
specific crops in accordance with good agricultural practice;
x x x x (Emphasis supplied).
Evidently, the FPA was responsible for ensuring the compatibility between the usage and the application
of pesticides in agricultural activities and the demands for human health and environmental safety. This
responsibility includes not only the identification of safe and unsafe pesticides, but also the prescription
of the safe modes of application in keeping with the standard of good agricultural practices.
On the other hand, the enumerated devolved functions to the local government units do not include the
regulation and control of pesticides and other agricultural chemicals.179 The non-inclusion should
preclude the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City from enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07, for otherwise it
would be arrogating unto itself the authority to prohibit the aerial application of pesticides in derogation
of the authority expressly vested in the FPA by Presidential Decree No. 1144.
In enacting Ordinance No. 0309-07 without the inherent and explicit authority to do so, the City of
Davao performed an ultra vires act. As a local government unit, the City of Davao could act only as an
agent of Congress, and its every act should always conform to and reflect the will of its principal.180 As
clarified in Batangas CATV, Inc. v. Court of Appeals:181
[W]here the state legislature has made provision for the regulation of conduct, it has manifested its
intention that the subject matter shall be fully covered by the statute, and that a municipality, under its
general powers, cannot regulate the same conduct. In Keller vs. State, it was held that: "Where there is
no express power in the charter of a municipality authorizing it to adopt ordinances regulating certain
matters which are specifically covered by a general statute, a municipal ordinance, insofar as it attempts
to regulate the subject which is completely covered by a general statute of the legislature, may be
rendered invalid. x x x Where the subject is of statewide concern, and the legislature has appropriated
the field and declared the rule, its declaration is binding throughout the State." A reason advanced for
this view is that such ordinances are in excess of the powers granted to the municipal corporation.
Since E.O. No. 205, a general law, mandates that the regulation of CATV operations shall be exercised
by the NTC, an LGU cannot enact an ordinance or approve a resolution in violation of the said law.
It is a fundamental principle that municipal ordinances are inferior in status and subordinate to the laws
of the state. An ordinance in conflict with a state law of general character and statewide application is
universally held to be invalid. The principle is frequently expressed in the declaration that municipal
authorities, under a general grant of power, cannot adopt ordinances which infringe the spirit of a state
law or repugnant to the general policy of the state. In every power to pass ordinances given to a
municipality, there is an implied restriction that the ordinances shall be consistent with the general
law.182 (Emphasis ours)
For sure, every local government unit only derives its legislative authority from Congress. In no instance
can the local government unit rise above its source of authority. As such, its ordinance cannot run
against or contravene existing laws, precisely because its authority is only by virtue of the valid
delegation from Congress. As emphasized in City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr.:183
The requirement that the enactment must not violate existing law gives stress to the precept that local
government units are able to legislate only by virtue of their derivative legislative power, a delegation of
legislative power from the national legislature. The delegate cannot be superior to the principal or
exercise powers higher than those of the latter.
This relationship between the national legislature and the local government units has not been enfeebled
by the new provisions in the Constitution strengthening the policy of local autonomy. The national
legislature is still the principal of the local government units, which cannot defy its will or modify or
violate it.184
c hanro blesvi rt uallawl ibra ry
Moreover, Ordinance No. 0309-07 proposes to prohibit an activity already covered by the jurisdiction of
the FPA, which has issued its own regulations under its Memorandum Circular No. 02, Series of 2009,
entitled Good Agricultural Practices for Aerial Spraying of Fungicide in Banana Plantations.185 While
Ordinance No. 0309-07 prohibits aerial spraying in banana plantations within the City of Davao,
Memorandum Circular No. 02 seeks to regulate the conduct of aerial spraying in banana
plantations186 pursuant to Section 6, Presidential Decree No. 1144, and in conformity with the standard
of Good Agricultural Practices (GAP). Memorandum Circular No. 02 covers safety
procedures,187 handling188 and post-application,189 including the qualifications of applicators,190 storing of
fungicides,191 safety and equipment of plantation personnel,192 all of which are incompatible with the
prohibition against aerial spraying under Ordinance No. 0309-07.
Although Memorandum Circular No. 02 and Ordinance No. 0309-07 both require the maintenance of the
buffer zone, they differ as to their treatment and maintenance of the buffer zone. Under Memorandum
Circular No. 02, a 50-meter "no-spray boundary" buffer zone should be observed by the spray
pilots,193 and the observance of the zone should be recorded in the Aerial Spray Final Report (ASFR) as a
post-application safety measure.194 On the other hand, Ordinance No. 0309-07 requires the maintenance
of the 30-meter buffer zone to be planted with diversified trees.195 cha nrob leslaw
Devoid of the specific delegation to its local legislative body, the City of Davao exceeded its delegated
authority to enact Ordinance No. 0309-07. Hence, Ordinance No. 0309-07 must be struck down also for
being an ultra vires act on the part of the Sangguniang Bayan of Davao City.
We must emphasize that our ruling herein does not seek to deprive the LGUs their right to regulate
activities within their jurisdiction. They are empowered under Section 16 of the Local Government
Code to promote the general welfare of the people through regulatory, not prohibitive, ordinances that
conform with the policy directions of the National Government. Ordinance No. 0309-07 failed to pass this
test as it contravenes the specific regulatory policy on aerial spraying in banana plantations on a
nationwide scale of the National Government, through the FPA.
Finally, the unconstitutionality of the ban renders nugatory Ordinance No. 0309-07 in its entirety.
Consequently, any discussion on the lack of the separability clause becomes entirely irrelevant.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari for their lack of
merit; AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on January 9, 2009 in C.A.-G.R. CV No. 01389-MIN.
declaring Ordinance No. 0309-07 UNCONSTITUTIONAL; PERMANENTLY ENJOINS respondent City of
Davao, and all persons or entities acting in its behalf or under its authority, from enforcing and
implementing Ordinance No. 0309-07; and ORDERS the petitioners to pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED. chanRoblesvirt ual Lawlib rary

G.R. No. 225442, August 08, 2017
SAMAHAN NG MGA PROGRESIBONG KABATAAN (SPARK),* JOANNE ROSE SACE LIM, JOHN
ARVIN NAVARRO BUENAAGUA, RONEL BACCUTAN, MARK LEO DELOS REYES, AND CLARISSA
JOYCE VILLEGAS, MINOR, FOR HERSELF AND AS REPRESENTED BY HER FATHER, JULIAN
VILLEGAS, JR., Petitioners, v. QUEZON CITY, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA,
CITY OF MANILA, AS REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOSEPH ESTRADA, AND NAVOTAS CITY, AS
REPRESENTED BY MAYOR JOHN REY TIANGCO, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
This petition for certiorari and prohibition1 assails the constitutionality of the curfew ordinances issued by
the local governments of Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas. The petition prays that a temporary
restraining order (TRO) be issued ordering respondents Herbert Bautista, Joseph Estrada, and John Rey
Tiangco, as Mayors of their respective local governments, to prohibit, refrain, and desist from
implementing and enforcing these issuances, pending resolution of this case, and eventually, declare the
City of Manila's ordinance as ultra vires for being contrary to Republic Act No. (RA) 9344,2 or the
"Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act," as amended, and all curfew ordinances as unconstitutional for
violating the constitutional right of minors to travel, as well as the right of parents to rear their children.
The Facts
Following the campaign of President Rodrigo Roa Duterte to implement a nationwide curfew for minors,
several local governments in Metro Manila started to strictly implement their curfew ordinances on
minors through police operations which were publicly known as part of "Oplan Rody."3
Among those local governments that implemented curfew ordinances were respondents: (a) Navotas
City, through Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 99-02,4 dated August 26, 1999, entitled "Nagtatakda ng
'Curfew' ng mga Kabataan na Wala Pang Labing Walong (18) Taong Gulang sa Bayan ng Navotas,
Kalakhang Maynila," as amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13,5 dated June 6, 2002 (Navotas
Ordinance); (b) City of Manila, through Ordinance No. 80466 entitled "An Ordinance Declaring the Hours
from 10:00 P.M. to 4:00A.M. of the Following Day as 'Barangay Curfew Hours' for Children and Youths
Below Eighteen (18) Years of Age; Prescribing Penalties Therefor; and for Other Purposes" dated
October 14, 2002 (Manila Ordinance); and (c) Quezon City, through Ordinance No. SP-2301,7 Series of
2014, entitled "An Ordinance Setting for a [sic] Disciplinary Hours in Quezon City for Minors from 10:00
P.M. to 5:00A.M., Providing Penalties for Parent/Guardian, for Violation Thereof and for Other Purposes"
dated July 31, 2014 (Quezon City Ordinance; collectively, Curfew Ordinances).8
Petitioners,9 spearheaded by the Samahan ng mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK)- an association of

young adults and minors that aims to forward a free and just society, in particular the protection of the
rights and welfare of the youth and minors10 - filed this present petition, arguing that the Curfew
Ordinances are unconstitutional because they: (a) result in arbitrary and discriminatory enforcement,
and thus, fall under the void for vagueness doctrine; (b) suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or
impairing legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours; (c) deprive minors of the right to liberty
and the right to travel without substantive due process; and (d) deprive parents of their natural and
primary right in rearing the youth without substantive due process.11 In addition, petitioners assert that
the Manila Ordinance contravenes RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630.12
More specifically, petitioners posit that the Curfew Ordinances encourage arbitrary and discriminatory
enforcement as there are no clear provisions or detailed standards on how law enforcers should
apprehend and properly determine the age of the alleged curfew violators.13 They further argue that the
law enforcer's apprehension depends only on his physical assessment, and, thus, subjective and based
only on the law enforcer's visual assessment of the alleged curfew violator.14
While petitioners recognize that the Curfew Ordinances contain provisions indicating the activities
exempted from the operation of the imposed curfews, i.e., exemption of working students or students
with evening class, they contend that the lists of exemptions do not cover the range and breadth of
legitimate activities or reasons as to why minors would be out at night, and, hence, proscribe or impair
the legitimate activities of minors during curfew hours.15
Petitioners likewise proffer that the Curfew Ordinances: (a) are unconstitutional as they deprive minors
of the right to liberty and the right to travel without substantive due process;16 and (b) fail to pass the
strict scrutiny test, for not being narrowly tailored and for employing means that bear no reasonable
relation to their purpose.17 They argue that the prohibition of minors on streets during curfew hours will
not per se protect and promote the social and moral welfare of children of the community.18
Furthermore, petitioners claim that the Manila Ordinance, particularly Section 419 thereof, contravenes
Section 57-A20 of RA 9344, as amended, given that the cited curfew provision imposes on minors the
penalties of imprisonment, reprimand, and admonition. They contend that the imposition of penalties
contravenes RA 9344's express command that no penalty shall be imposed on minors for curfew
violations.21
Lastly, petitioners submit that there is no compelling State interest to impose curfews contrary to the
parents' prerogative to impose them in the exercise of their natural and primary right in the rearing of
the youth, and that even if a compelling interest exists, less restrictive means are available to achieve
the same. In this regard, they suggest massive street lighting programs, installation of CCTVs (closed-
circuit televisions) in public streets, and regular visible patrols by law enforcers as other viable means of
protecting children and preventing crimes at night. They further opine that the government can impose
more reasonable sanctions, i.e., mandatory parental counseling and education seminars informing the
parents of the reasons behind the curfew, and that imprisonment is too harsh a penalty for parents who
allowed their children to be out during curfew hours.22
The Issue Before the Court
The primordial issue for the Court's resolution in this case is whether or not the Curfew Ordinances are
unconstitutional.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly granted.
I.
At the onset, the Court addresses the procedural issues raised in this case. Respondents seek the
dismissal of the petition, questioning: (a) the propriety of certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances; (b) petitioners' direct resort to
the Court, contrary to the hierarchy of courts doctrine; and (c) the lack of actual controversy and
standing to warrant judicial review.23
A. Propriety of the Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition.
Under the 1987 Constitution, judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice not only "to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable," but also "to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government."24 Section 1, Article VIII of
the 1987 Constitution reads:
ARTICLE VIII
JUDICIAL DEPARTMENT
Section 1. The judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights
which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentalitv of the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Case law explains that the present Constitution has "expanded the concept of judicial power, which up to
then was confined to its traditional ambit of settling actual controversies involving rights that were
legally demandable and enforceable."25
In Araullo v. Aquino III,26 it was held that petitions for certiorari and prohibition filed before the Court
"are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined under the
Constitution."27 It was explained that "[w]ith respect to the Court, x x x the remedies of certiorari and
prohibition are necessarily broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be
issued to correct errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer
exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, but also to set right, undo[,] and restrain
any act of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch
or instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, [Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution cited above]."28
In Association of Medical Clinics for Overseas Workers, Inc. v. GCC Approved Medical Centers
Association, Inc.,29 it was expounded that "[m]eanwhile that no specific procedural rule has been
promulgated to enforce [the] 'expanded' constitutional definition of judicial power and because of the
commonality of 'grave abuse of discretion' as a ground for review under Rule 65 and the courts'
expanded jurisdiction, the Supreme Court - based on its power to relax its rules - allowed Rule 65 to be
used as the medium for petitions invoking the courts' expanded jurisdiction[.]"30
In this case, petitioners question the issuance of the Curfew Ordinances by the legislative councils of
Quezon City, Manila, and Navotas in the exercise of their delegated legislative powers on the ground
that these ordinances violate the Constitution, specifically, the provisions pertaining to the right to travel
of minors, and the right of parents to rear their children. They also claim that the Manila Ordinance, by
imposing penalties against minors, conflicts with RA 9344, as amended, which prohibits the imposition of
penalties on minors for status offenses. It has been held that "[t]here is grave abuse of discretion when
an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically,
capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or personal bias."31 In light of the foregoing, petitioners
correctly availed of the remedies of certiorari and prohibition, although these governmental actions were
not made pursuant to any judicial or quasi-judicial function.
B. Direct Resort to the Court.
Since petitions for certiorari and prohibition are allowed as remedies to assail the constitutionality of
legislative and executive enactments, the next question to be resolved is whether or not petitioners'
direct resort to this Court is justified.
The doctrine of hierarchy of courts "[r]equires that recourse must first be made to the lower-ranked
court exercising concurrent jurisdiction with a higher court. The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
over petitions for certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, and habeas corpus. While this
jurisdiction is shared with the Court of Appeals [(CA)] and the [Regional Trial Courts], a direct
invocation of this Court's jurisdiction is allowed when there are special and important reasons
therefor, clearly and especially set out in the petition[.]"32 This Court is tasked to resolve "the
issue of constitutionality of a law or regulation at the first instance [if it] is of paramount
importance and immediately affects the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
people,"33 as in this case. Hence, petitioners' direct resort to the Court is justified.
C. Requisites of Judicial Review.
"The prevailing rule in constitutional litigation is that no question involving the constitutionality or
validity of a law or governmental act may be heard and decided by the Court unless there is compliance
with the legal requisites for judicial inquiry, namely: (a) there must be anactual case or
controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (b) the person challenging the act must have
the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; (c) the question of constitutionality
must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case."34 In this case, respondents assail the existence of the first two (2) requisites.
1. Actual Case or Controversy.
"Basic in the exercise of judicial power — whether under the traditional or in the expanded setting — is
the presence of an actual case or controversy."35 "[A]n actual case or controversy is one which 'involves
a conflict of legal rights, an assertion of opposite legal claims, susceptible of judicial resolution as
distinguished from a hypothetical or abstract difference or dispute.' In other words, 'there must be a
contrariety of legal rights that can be interpreted and enforced on the basis of existing law
and jurisprudence."'36 According to recent jurisprudence, in the Court's exercise of its expanded
jurisdiction under the 1987 Constitution, this requirement is simplified "by merely requiring a prima
facie showing of grave abuse of discretion in the assailed governmental act."37
"Corollary to the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question
is ripe for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act complained
of."38
Applying these precepts, this Court finds that there exists an actual justiciable controversy in this case
given the evident clash of the parties' legal claims, particularly on whether the Curfew Ordinances impair
the minors' and parents' constitutional rights, and whether the Manila Ordinance goes against the
provisions of RA 9344. Based on their asseverations, petitioners have - as will be gleaned from the
substantive discussions below - conveyed a prima facie case of grave abuse of discretion, which perforce
impels this Court to exercise its expanded jurisdiction. The case is likewise ripe for adjudication,
considering that the Curfew Ordinances were being implemented until the Court issued the
TRO39 enjoining their enforcement. The purported threat or incidence of injury is, therefore, not merely
speculative or hypothetical but rather, real and apparent.
2. Legal Standing.
"The question of locus standi or legal standing focuses on the determination of whether those assailing
the governmental act have the right of appearance to bring the matter to the court for adjudication.
[Petitioners] must show that they have a personal and substantial interest in the case, such that
they have sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining, some direct injury as a
consequence of the enforcement of the challenged governmental act."40 "'[I]nterest' in the
question involved must be material — an interest that is in issue and will be affected by the official act —
as distinguished from being merely incidental or general."41
"The gist of the question of [legal] standing is whether a party alleges such personal stake in the
outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court depends for illumination of difficult constitutional
questions. Unless a person is injuriously affected in any of his constitutional rights by the operation of
statute or ordinance, he has no standing."42
As abovementioned, the petition is anchored on the alleged breach of two (2) constitutional rights,
namely: (1) the right of minors to freely travel within their respective localities; and (2) the primary
right of parents to rear their children. Related to the first is the purported conflict between RA 9344, as
amended, and the penal provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Among the five (5) individual petitioners, only Clarissa Joyce Villegas (Clarissa) has legal standing to
raise the issue affecting the minor's right to travel,43 because: (a) she was still a minor at the time the
petition was filed before this Court,44 and, hence, a proper subject of the Curfew Ordinances; and (b) as
alleged, she travels from Manila to Quezon City at night after school and is, thus, in imminent danger of
apprehension by virtue of the Curfew Ordinances. On the other hand, petitioners Joanne Rose Sace Lim,
John Arvin Navarro Buenaagua, Ronel Baccutan (Ronel), and Mark Leo Delos Reyes (Mark Leo) admitted
in the petition that they are all of legal age, and therefore, beyond the ordinances' coverage. Thus, they
are not proper subjects of the Curfew Ordinances, for which they could base any direct injury as a
consequence thereof.
None of them, however, has standing to raise the issue of whether the Curfew Ordinances violate the
parents' right to rear their children as they have not shown that they stand before this Court as parent/s
and/or guardian/s whose constitutional parental right has been infringed. It should be noted that
Clarissa is represented by her father, Julian Villegas, Jr. (Mr. Villegas), who could have properly filed the
petition for himself for the alleged violation of his parental right. But Mr. Villegas did not question the
Curfew Ordinances based on his primary right as a parent as he only stands as the representative of his
minor child, Clarissa, whose right to travel was supposedly infringed.
As for SPARK, it is an unincorporated association and, consequently, has no legal personality to bring an
action in court.45 Even assuming that it has the capacity to sue, SPARK still has no standing as it failed
to allege that it was authorized by its members who were affected by the Curfew Ordinances, i.e., the
minors, to file this case on their behalf.
Hence, save for Clarissa, petitioners do not have the required personal interest in the controversy. More
particularly, Clarissa has standing only on the issue of the alleged violation of the minors' right to travel,
but not on the alleged violation of the parents' right.
These notwithstanding, this Court finds it proper to relax the standing requirement insofar as all the
petitioners are concerned, in view of the transcendental importance of the issues involved in this case.
"In a number of cases, this Court has taken a liberal stance towards the requirement of legal standing,
especially when paramount interest is involved. Indeed, when those who challenge the official act
are able to craft an issue of transcendental significance to the people, the Court may exercise
its sound discretion and take cognizance of the suit. It may do so in spite of the inability of the
petitioners to show that they have been personally injured by the operation of a law or any other
government act."46
This is a case of first impression in which the constitutionality of juvenile curfew ordinances is placed
under judicial review. Not only is this Court asked to determine the impact of these issuances on the
right of parents to rear their children and the right of minors to travel, it is also requested to determine
the extent of the State's authority to regulate these rights in the interest of general welfare. Accordingly,
this case is of overarching significance to the public, which, therefore, impels a relaxation of procedural
rules, including, among others, the standing requirement.
That being said, this Court now proceeds to the substantive aspect of this case.
II.
A. Void for Vagueness.
Before resolving the issues pertaining to the rights of minors to travel and of parents to rear their
children, this Court must first tackle petitioners' contention that the Curfew Ordinances are void for
vagueness.
In particular, petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are void for not containing sufficient
enforcement parameters, which leaves the enforcing authorities with unbridled discretion to carry out
their provisions. They claim that the lack of procedural guidelines in these issuances led to the
questioning of petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, even though they were already of legal age. They
maintain that the enforcing authorities apprehended the suspected curfew offenders based only on their
physical appearances and, thus, acted arbitrarily. Meanwhile, although they conceded that the Quezon
City Ordinance requires enforcers to determine the age of the child, they submit that nowhere does the
said ordinance require the law enforcers to ask for proof or identification of the child to show his age.47
The arguments are untenable.
"A statute or act suffers from the defect of vagueness when it lacks comprehensible standards that men
of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is
repugnant to the Constitution in two (2) respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord
persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the conduct to avoid; and (2) it
leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle."48
In this case, petitioners' invocation of the void for vagueness doctrine is improper, considering that they
do not properly identify any provision in any of the Curfew Ordinances, which, because of its vague
terminology, fails to provide fair warning and notice to the public of what is prohibited or required so
that one may act accordingly.49The void for vagueness doctrine is premised on due process
considerations, which are absent from this particular claim. In one case, it was opined that:
[T]he vagueness doctrine is a specie of "unconstitutional uncertainty," which may involve "procedural
due process uncertainty cases" and "substantive due process uncertainty cases." "Procedural due
process uncertainty" involves cases where the statutory language was so obscure that it failed to give
adequate warning to those subject to its prohibitions as well as to provide proper standards for
adjudication. Such a definition encompasses the vagueness doctrine. This perspective rightly integrates
the vagueness doctrine with the due process clause, a necessary interrelation since there is no
constitutional provision that explicitly bars statutes that are "void-for-vagueness."50
Essentially, petitioners only bewail the lack of enforcement parameters to guide the local authorities in
the proper apprehension of suspected curfew offenders. They do not assert any confusion as to
what conduct the subject ordinances prohibit or not prohibit but only point to the ordinances'
lack of enforcement guidelines. The mechanisms related to the implementation of the Curfew
Ordinances are, however, matters of policy that are best left for the political branches of government to
resolve. Verily, the objective of curbing unbridled enforcement is not the sole consideration in a void for
vagueness analysis; rather, petitioners must show that this perceived danger of unbridled enforcement
stems from an ambiguous provision in the law that allows enforcement authorities to second-guess if a
particular conduct is prohibited or not prohibited. In this regard, that ambiguous provision of law
contravenes due process because agents of the government cannot reasonably decipher what conduct
the law permits and/or forbids. In Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown,51 it was ratiocinated that:
A vague law impermissibly delegates basic policy matters to policemen, judges, and juries for resolution
on ad hoc and subjective basis, and vague standards result in erratic and arbitrary application based on
individual impressions and personal predilections.52
As above-mentioned, petitioners fail to point out any ambiguous standard in any of the provisions of the
Curfew Ordinances, but rather, lament the lack of detail on how the age of a suspected minor would be
determined. Thus, without any correlation to any vague legal provision, the Curfew Ordinances cannot
be stricken down under the void for vagueness doctrine.
Besides, petitioners are mistaken in claiming that there are no sufficient standards to identify suspected
curfew violators. While it is true that the Curfew Ordinances do not explicitly state these parameters, law
enforcement agents are still bound to follow the prescribed measures found in statutory law when
implementing ordinances. Specifically, RA 9344, as amended, provides:
Section 7. Determination of Age. - x x x The age of a child may be determinedfrom the child's birth
certificate, baptismal certificate or any other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the child himself/herself, testimonies of
other persons, the physical appearance of the child and other relevant evidence. (Emphases
supplied)
This provision should be read in conjunction with the Curfew Ordinances because RA 10630 (the law that
amended RA 9344) repeals all ordinances inconsistent with statutory law.53 Pursuant to Section 57-A of
RA 9344, as amended by RA 10630,54minors caught in violation of curfew ordinances are children
at risk and, therefore, covered by its provisions.55 It is a long-standing principle that "[c]onformity
with law is one of the essential requisites for the validity of a municipal ordinance."56 Hence,
by necessary implication, ordinances should be read and implemented in conjunction with related
statutory law.
Applying the foregoing, any person, such as petitioners Ronel and Mark Leo, who was perceived to be a
minor violating the curfew, may therefore prove that he is beyond the application of the Curfew
Ordinances by simply presenting any competent proof of identification establishing their majority age. In
the absence of such proof, the law authorizes enforcement authorities to conduct a visual assessment of
the suspect, which - needless to state - should be done ethically and judiciously under the
circumstances. Should law enforcers disregard these rules, the remedy is to pursue the appropriate
action against the erring enforcing authority, and not to have the ordinances invalidated.
All told, petitioners' prayer to declare the Curfew Ordinances as void for vagueness is denied.
B. Right of Parents to Rear their Children.
Petitioners submit that the Curfew Ordinances are unconstitutional because they deprive parents of their
natural and primary right in the rearing of the youth without substantive due process. In this regard,
they assert that this right includes the right to determine whether minors will be required to go home at
a certain time or will be allowed to stay late outdoors. Given that the right to impose curfews is primarily
with parents and not with the State, the latter's interest in imposing curfews cannot logically be
compelling.57
Petitioners' stance cannot be sustained.
Section 12, Article II of the 1987 Constitution articulates the State's policy relative to the rights of
parents in the rearing of their children:
Section 12. The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall protect and strengthen the family as
a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the mother and the life of the
unborn from conception. The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the
youth for civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of
the Government. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
As may be gleaned from this provision, the rearing of children (i.e., referred to as the "youth") for civic
efficiency and the development of their moral character are characterized not only as parental rights,
but also as parental duties. This means that parents are not only given the privilege of exercising their
authority over their children; they are equally obliged to exercise this authority conscientiously. The duty
aspect of this provision is a reflection of the State's independent interest to ensure that the youth would
eventually grow into free, independent, and well-developed citizens of this nation. For indeed, it is
during childhood that minors are prepared for additional obligations to society. "[T]he duty to prepare
the child for these [obligations] must be read to include the inculcation of moral standards,
religious beliefs, and elements of good citizenship."58 "This affirmative process of teaching,
guiding, and inspiring by precept and example is essential to the growth of young people into mature,
socially responsible citizens."59
By history and tradition, "the parental role implies a substantial measure of authority over one's
children."60 In Ginsberg v. New York,61 the Supreme Court of the United States (US) remarked that
"constitutional interpretation has consistently recognized that the parents' claim to authority in their own
household to direct the rearing of their children is basic in the structure of our society."62 As in our
Constitution, the right and duty of parents to rear their children is not only described as "natural," but
also as "primary." The qualifier "primary" connotes the parents' superior right over the State in
the upbringing of their children.63 The rationale for the State's deference to parental control over
their children was explained by the US Supreme Court in Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti),64 as follows:
[T]he guiding role of parents in their upbringing of their children justifies limitations on the freedoms of
minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action and from their own
immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by minors. But an
additional and more important justification for state deference to parental control over
children is that "the child is not [a] mere creature of the State; those who nurture him and
direct his destiny have the right, coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations."65 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
While parents have the primary role in child-rearing, it should be stressed that "when actions
concerning the child have a relation to the public welfare or the well-being of the child, the
[S]tate may act to promote these legitimate interests."66 Thus, "[i]n cases in which harm to
the physical or mental health of the child or to public safety, peace, order, or welfare is
demonstrated, these legitimate state interests may override the parents' qualified right to
control the upbringing of their children."67
As our Constitution itself provides, the State is mandated to support parents in the exercise of these
rights and duties. State authority is therefore, not exclusive of, but rather, complementary to
parental supervision. In Nery v. Lorenzo,68 this Court acknowledged the State's role as parens
patriae in protecting minors, viz.:
[W]here minors are involved, the State acts as parens patriae. To it is cast the duty of
protecting the rights of persons or individual who because of age or incapacity are in an
unfavorable position, vis-a vis other parties. Unable as they are to take due care of what concerns
them, they have the political community to look after their welfare. This obligation the state must live up
to. It cannot be recreant to such a trust. As was set forth in an opinion of the United States Supreme
Court: "This prerogative of parens patriae is inherent in the supreme power of every State, x x
x."69 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
As parens patriae, the State has the inherent right and duty to aid parents in the moral
development of their children,70 and, thus, assumes a supporting role for parents to fulfill their
parental obligations. In Bellotti, it was held that "[l]egal restriction on minors, especially those
supportive of the parental role, may be important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity
that make eventual participation in a free society meaningful and rewarding. Under the Constitution,
the State can properly conclude that parents and others, teachers for example, who have the
primary responsibility for children's well-being are entitled to the support of the laws
designed to aid discharge of that responsibility."71
The Curfew Ordinances are but examples of legal restrictions designed to aid parents in their role of
promoting their children's well-being. As will be later discussed at greater length, these ordinances
further compelling State interests (particularly, the promotion of juvenile safety and the prevention of
juvenile crime), which necessarily entail limitations on the primary right of parents to rear their children.
Minors, because of their peculiar vulnerability and lack of experience, are not only more exposed to
potential physical harm by criminal elements that operate during the night; their moral well-being is
likewise imperiled as minor children are prone to making detrimental decisions during this time.72
At this juncture, it should be emphasized that the Curfew Ordinances apply only when the minors are
not - whether actually or constructively (as will be later discussed) - accompanied by their parents. This
serves as an explicit recognition of the State's deference to the primary nature of parental authority and
the importance of parents' role in child-rearing. Parents are effectively given unfettered authority over
their children's conduct during curfew hours when they are able to supervise them. Thus, in all
actuality, the only aspect of parenting that the Curfew Ordinances affects is the parents'
prerogative to allow minors to remain in public places without parental accompaniment
during the curfew hours.73 In this respect, the ordinances neither dictate an over-all plan of
discipline for the parents to apply to their minors nor force parents to abdicate their authority
to influence or control their minors' activities.74 As such, the Curfew Ordinances only amount to a
minimal - albeit reasonable - infringement upon a parent's right to bring up his or her child.
Finally, it may be well to point out that the Curfew Ordinances positively influence children to spend
more time at home. Consequently, this situation provides parents with better opportunities to take a
more active role in their children's upbringing. In Schleifer v. City of Charlottesvillle (Schleifer),75 the US
court observed that the city government "was entitled to believe x x x that a nocturnal curfew would
promote parental involvement in a child's upbringing. A curfew aids the efforts of parents who desire to
protect their children from the perils of the street but are unable to control the nocturnal behavior of
those children."76 Curfews may also aid the "efforts of parents who prefer their children to spend time on
their studies than on the streets."77 Reason dictates that these realities observed in Schleifer are no less
applicable to our local context. Hence, these are additional reasons which justify the impact of the
nocturnal curfews on parental rights.
In fine, the Curfew Ordinances should not be declared unconstitutional for violating the parents' right to
rear their children.
C. Right to Travel.
Petitioners further assail the constitutionality of the Curfew Ordinances based on the minors' right to
travel. They claim that the liberty to travel is a fundamental right, which, therefore, necessitates the
application of the strict scrutiny test. Further, they submit that even if there exists a compelling State
interest, such as the prevention of juvenile crime and the protection of minors from crime, there are
other less restrictive means for achieving the government's interest.78 In addition, they posit that the
Curfew Ordinances suffer from overbreadth by proscribing or impairing legitimate activities of minors
during curfew hours.79
Petitioner's submissions are partly meritorious.
At the outset, the Court rejects petitioners' invocation of the overbreadth doctrine, considering that
petitioners have not claimed any transgression of their rights to free speech or any inhibition of speech-
related conduct. In Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council (Southern
Hemisphere),80 this Court explained that "the application of the overbreadth doctrine is limited to a facial
kind of challenge and, owing to the given rationale of a facial challenge, applicable only to free speech
cases,"81viz.:
By its nature, the overbreadth doctrine has to necessarily apply a facial type of invalidation in
order to plot areas of protected speech, inevitably almost always under situations not before the
court, that are impermissibly swept by the substantially overbroad regulation. Otherwise stated, a
statute cannot be properly analyzed for being substantially overbroad if the court confines itself only to
facts as applied to the litigants.
The most distinctive feature of the overbreadth technique is that it marks an exception to some of the
usual rules of constitutional litigation. Ordinarily, a particular litigant claims that a statute is
unconstitutional as applied to him or her; if the litigant prevails, the courts carve away the
unconstitutional aspects of the law by invalidating its improper applications on a case to case basis.
Moreover, challengers to a law are not permitted to raise the rights of third parties and can only assert
their own interests. In overbreadth analysis, those rules give way; challenges are permitted to raise the
rights of third parties; and the court invalidates the entire statute "on its face," not merely "as applied
for" so that the overbroad law becomes unenforceable until a properly authorized court construes it
more narrowly. The factor that motivates courts to depart from the normal adjudicatory rules is
the concern with the "chilling;" deterrent effect of the overbroad statute on third parties not
courageous enough to bring suit. The Court assumes that an overbroad law's "very existence may
cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected speech or expression." An
overbreadth ruling is designed to remove that deterrent effect on the speech of those third
parties.82 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
In the same case, it was further pointed out that "[i]n restricting the overbreadth doctrine to free speech
claims, the Court, in at least two [(2)] cases, observed that the US Supreme Court has not recognized
an overbreadth doctrine outside the limited context of the First Amendment,83 and that claims of facial
overbreadth have been entertained in cases involving statutes which, by their terms, seek to regulate
only spoken words. In Virginia v. Hicks,84 it was held that rarely, if ever, will an overbreadth challenge
succeed against a law or regulation that is not specifically addressed to speech or speech-related
conduct. Attacks on overly broad statutes are justified by the 'transcendent value to all society of
constitutionally protected expression."'85
In the more recent case of Spouses Imbong v. Ochoa, Jr.,86 it was opined that "[f]acial challenges can
only be raised on the basis of overbreadth and not on vagueness. Southern Hemisphere
demonstrated how vagueness relates to violations of due process rights, whereas facial challenges
are raised on the basis of overbreadth and limited to the realm of freedom of expression."87
That being said, this Court finds it improper to undertake an overbreadth analysis in this case, there
being no claimed curtailment of free speech. On the contrary, however, this Court finds proper to
examine the assailed regulations under the strict scrutiny test.
The right to travel is recognized and guaranteed as a fundamental right88 under Section 6, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution, to wit:
Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be
impaired except upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except
in the interest of national security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.
(Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Jurisprudence provides that this right refers to the right to move freely from the Philippines to other
countries or within the Philippines.89 It is a right embraced within the general concept of liberty.90 Liberty
- a birthright of every person - includes the power of locomotion91 and the right of citizens to be free to
use their faculties in lawful ways and to live and work where they desire or where they can best pursue
the ends of life.92
The right to travel is essential as it enables individuals to access and exercise their other rights, such as
the rights to education, free expression, assembly, association, and religion.93 The inter-relation of the
right to travel with other fundamental rights was briefly rationalized in City of Maquoketa v. Russell,94 as
follows:
Whenever the First Amendment rights of freedom of religion, speech, assembly, and association require
one to move about, such movement must necessarily be protected under the First
Amendment. Restricting movement in those circumstances to the extent that First Amendment
Rights cannot be exercised without violating the law is equivalent to a denial of those rights.
One court has eloquently pointed this out:
We would not deny the relatedness of the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to
freedom of travel and movement. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to their church,
their freedom to worship is impaired. If, for any reason, people cannot walk or drive to the meeting hall,
freedom of assembly is effectively blocked. If, for any reason, people cannot safely walk the sidewalks or
drive the streets of a community, opportunities for freedom of speech are sharply limited. Freedom of
movement is inextricably involved with freedoms set forth in the First Amendment. (Emphases
supplied)
Nevertheless, grave and overriding considerations of public interest justify restrictions even if made
against fundamental rights. Specifically on the freedom to move from one place to another,
jurisprudence provides that this right is not absolute.95 As the 1987 Constitution itself reads, the
State96 may impose limitations on the exercise of this right, provided that they: (1) serve the interest
of national security, public safety, or public health; and (2) are provided by law.97
The stated purposes of the Curfew Ordinances, specifically the promotion of juvenile safety and
prevention of juvenile crime, inarguably serve the interest of public safety. The restriction on the minor's
movement and activities within the confines of their residences and their immediate vicinity during the
curfew period is perceived to reduce the probability of the minor becoming victims of or getting involved
in crimes and criminal activities. As to the second requirement, i.e., that the limitation "be provided by
law," our legal system is replete with laws emphasizing the State's duty to afford special protection to
children, i.e., RA 7610,98 as amended, RA 9775,99 RA 9262,100 RA 9851, 101 RA 9344,102 RA 10364,103 RA
9211,104 RA 8980,105 RA 9288,106 and Presidential Decree (PD) 603,107 as amended.
Particularly relevant to this case is Article 139 of PD 603, which explicitly authorizes local government
units, through their city or municipal councils, to set curfew hours for children. It reads:
Article 139. Curfew Hours for Children. - City or municipal councils may prescribe such curfew
hours for children as may be warranted by local conditions. The duty to enforce curfew
ordinances shall devolve upon the parents or guardians and the local authorities.
x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As explicitly worded, city councils are authorized to enact curfew ordinances (as what respondents have
done in this case) and enforce the same through their local officials. In other words, PD 603 provides
sufficient statutory basis - as required by the Constitution - to restrict the minors' exercise of the right to
travel.
The restrictions set by the Curfew Ordinances that apply solely to minors are likewise constitutionally
permissible. In this relation, this Court recognizes that minors do possess and enjoy constitutional
rights,108but the exercise of these rights is not co-extensive as those of adults.109 They are
always subject to the authority or custody of another, such as their parent/s and/or guardian/s, and the
State.110 As parens patriae, the State regulates and, to a certain extent, restricts the minors' exercise of
their rights, such as in their affairs concerning the right to vote,111 the right to execute contracts,112 and
the right to engage in gainful employment.113 With respect to the right to travel, minors are required by
law to obtain a clearance from the Department of Social Welfare and Development before they can
travel to a foreign country by themselves or with a person other than their parents.114 These limitations
demonstrate that the State has broader authority over the minors' activities than over similar actions of
adults,115 and overall, reflect the State's general interest in the well-being of minors.116 Thus, the State
may impose limitations on the minors' exercise of rights even though these limitations do not generally
apply to adults.
In Bellotti,117 the US Supreme Court identified three (3) justifications for the differential treatment of the
minors' constitutional rights. These are:first, the peculiar vulnerability of children; second, their
inability to make critical decisions in an informed and mature manner; and third, the
importance of the parental role in child rearing:118
[On the first reason,] our cases show that although children generally are protected by the same
constitutional guarantees against governmental deprivations as are adults, the State is entitled to
adjust its legal system to account for children's vulnerability and their needs for 'concern,
...sympathy, and ... paternal attention. x x x.
[On the second reason, this Court's rulings are] grounded [on] the recognition that, during the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment
to recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them. x x x.
xxxx
[On the third reason,] the guiding role of parents in the upbringing of their children justifies limitations
on the freedoms of minors. The State commonly protects its youth from adverse governmental action
and from their own immaturity by requiring parental consent to or involvement in important decisions by
minors. x x x.
xxxx
x x x Legal restrictions on minors, especially those supportive of the parental role, may be
important to the child's chances for the full growth and maturity that make eventual participation
in a free society meaningful and rewarding.119 (Emphases and underscoring supplied)
Moreover, in Prince v. Massachusetts,120 the US Supreme Court acknowledged the heightened dangers
on the streets to minors, as compared to adults:
A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy, well-rounded growth of young people
into full maturity as citizens, with all that implies. It may secure this against impeding restraints and
dangers within a broad range of selection. Among evils most appropriate for such action are the crippling
effects of child employment, more especially in public places, and the possible harms arising from
other activities subject to all the diverse influences of the [streets]. It is too late now to doubt
that legislation appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state's police power, whether
against the parent's claim to control of the child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.
It is true children have rights, in common with older people, in the primary use of highways. But even in
such use streets afford dangers for them not affecting adults. And in other uses, whether in
work or in other things, this difference may be magnified.121 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
For these reasons, the State is justified in setting restrictions on the minors' exercise of their travel
rights, provided, they are singled out on reasonable grounds.
Philippine jurisprudence has developed three (3) tests of judicial scrutiny to determine the
reasonableness of classifications.122 The strict scrutiny test applies when a classification either (i)
interferes with the exercise of fundamental rights, including the basic liberties guaranteed under the
Constitution, or (ii) burdens suspect classes.123 The intermediate scrutiny test applies when a
classification does not involve suspect classes or fundamental rights, but requires heightened scrutiny,
such as in classifications based on gender and legitimacy.124 Lastly, the rational basis test applies to all
other subjects not covered by the first two tests.125
Considering that the right to travel is a fundamental right in our legal system guaranteed no less by our
Constitution, the strict scrutiny test126 is the applicable test.127 At this juncture, it should be emphasized
that minors enjoy the same constitutional rights as adults; the fact that the State has broader authority
over minors than over adults does not trigger the application of a lower level of scrutiny.128 In Nunez v.
City of San Diego (Nunez),129 the US court illumined that:
Although many federal courts have recognized that juvenile curfews implicate the fundamental rights of
minors, the parties dispute whether strict scrutiny review is necessary. The Supreme Court teaches
that rights are no less "fundamental" for minors than adults, but that the analysis of those
rights may differ:
Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-
defined age of majority. Minors, as well as adults, are protected by the Constitution and possess
constitutional rights. The Court[,] indeed, however, [has long] recognized that the State has
somewhat broader authority to regulate the activities of children than of adults. x x x. Thus, minors'
rights are not coextensive with the rights of adults because the state has a greater range of
interests that justify the infringement of minors' rights.
The Supreme Court has articulated three specific factors that, when applicable, warrant differential
analysis of the constitutional rights of minors and adults: x x x. The Bellotti test [however] does not
establish a lower level of scrutiny for the constitutional rights of minors in the context of a
juvenile curfew. Rather, the Bellotti framework enables courts to determine whether the state has a
compelling state interest justifying greater restrictions on minors than on adults. x x x.
x x x Although the state may have a compelling interest in regulating minors differently than
adults, we do not believe that [a] lesser degree of scrutiny is appropriate to review burdens
on minors' fundamental rights. x x x.
Accordingly, we apply strict scrutiny to our review of the ordinance. x x x.130 (Emphases supplied)
The strict scrutiny test as applied to minors entails a consideration of the peculiar circumstances of
minors as enumerated in Bellotti vis-a-vis the State's duty as parens patriae to protect and preserve
their well-being with the compelling State interests justifying the assailed government act. Under the
strict scrutiny test, a legislative classification that interferes with the exercise of a fundamental right or
operates to the disadvantage of a suspect class is presumed unconstitutional.131 Thus, the
government has the burden of proving that the classification (i) is necessary to achieve
a compelling State interest, and (ii) is the least restrictive means to protect such interest or
the means chosen is narrowly tailored to accomplish the interest.132
a. Compelling State Interest.

Jurisprudence holds that compelling State interests include constitutionally declared policies.133This
Court has ruled that children's welfare and the State's mandate to protect and care for them
as parens patriae constitute compelling interests to justify regulations by the State.134 It is
akin to the paramount interest of the state for which some individual liberties must give way.135 As
explained in Nunez, the Bellotti framework shows that the State has a compelling interest in imposing
greater restrictions on minors than on adults. The limitations on minors under Philippine laws also
highlight this compelling interest of the State to protect and care for their welfare.
In this case, respondents have sufficiently established that the ultimate objective of the Curfew
Ordinances is to keep unsupervised minors during the late hours of night time off of public areas, so as
to reduce - if not totally eliminate - their exposure to potential harm, and to insulate them against
criminal pressure and influences which may even include themselves. As denoted in the "whereas
clauses" of the Quezon City Ordinance, the State, in imposing nocturnal curfews on minors, recognizes
that:
[b] x x x children, particularly the minors, appear to be neglected of their proper care and guidance,
education, and moral development, which [lead] them into exploitation, drug addiction, and become
vulnerable to and at the risk of committing criminal offenses;
xxxx
[d] as a consequence, most of minor children become out-of-school youth, unproductive by-standers,
street children, and member of notorious gangs who stay, roam around or meander in public or private
roads, streets or other public places, whether singly or in groups without lawful purpose or justification;
xxxx
[f] reports of barangay officials and law enforcement agencies reveal that minor children roaming
around, loitering or wandering in the evening are the frequent personalities involved in various
infractions of city ordinances and national laws;
[g] it is necessary in the interest of public order and safety to regulate the movement of minor children
during night time by setting disciplinary hours, protect them from neglect, abuse or cruelty and
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial or detrimental to their development;
[h] to strengthen and support parental control on these minor children, there is a need to put a restraint
on the tendency of growing number of youth spending their nocturnal activities wastefully, especially in
the face of the unabated rise of criminality and to ensure that the dissident elements of society are not
provided with potent avenues for furthering their nefarious activities[.]136
The US court's judicial demeanor in Schleifer,137 as regards the information gathered by the City Council
to support its passage of the curfew ordinance subject of that case, may serve as a guidepost to our own
treatment of the present case. Significantly, in Schleifer, the US court recognized the entitlement of
elected bodies to implement policies for a safer community, in relation to the proclivity of children to
make dangerous and potentially life-shaping decisions when left unsupervised during the late hours of
night:
Charlottesville was constitutionally justified in believing that its curfew would materially assist its first
stated interest—that of reducing juvenile violence and crime. The City Council acted on the basis of
information from many sources, including records from Charlottesville's police department, a survey of
public opinion, news reports, data from the United States Department of Justice, national crime reports,
and police reports from other localities. On the basis of such evidence, elected bodies are entitled
to conclude that keeping unsupervised juveniles off the streets late at night will make for a
safer community. The same streets may have a more volatile and less wholesome character
at night than during the day. Alone on the streets at night children face a series of dangerous
and potentially life-shaping decisions. Drug dealers may lure them to use narcotics or aid in their
sale. Gangs may pressure them into membership or participation in violence. "[D]uring the formative
years of childhood and adolescence, minors often lack the experience, perspective, and judgment to
recognize and avoid choices that could be detrimental to them." Those who succumb to these
criminal influences at an early age may persist in their criminal conduct as adults. Whether we
as judges subscribe to these theories is beside the point. Those elected officials with their finger on the
pulse of their home community clearly did. In attempting to reduce through its curfew the opportunities
for children to come into contact with criminal influences,the City was directly advancing its first
objective of reducing juvenile violence and crime.138 (Emphases and underscoring supplied;
citations omitted)
Similar to the City of Charlottesville in Schleifer, the local governments of Quezon City and Manila
presented statistical data in their respective pleadings showing the alarming prevalence of crimes
involving juveniles, either as victims or perpetrators, in their respective localities.139
Based on these findings, their city councils found it necessary to enact curfew ordinances pursuant to
their police power under the general welfare clause.140 In this light, the Court thus finds that the local
governments have not only conveyed but, in fact, attempted to substantiate legitimate
concerns on public welfare, especially with respect to minors. As such, a compelling State
interest exists for the enactment and enforcement of the Curfew Ordinances.
With the first requirement of the strict scrutiny test satisfied, the Court now proceeds to determine if the
restrictions set forth in the Curfew Ordinances are narrowly tailored or provide the least restrictive
means to address the cited compelling State interest - the second requirement of the strict scrutiny test.
b. Least Restrictive Means/ Narrowly Drawn.
The second requirement of the strict scrutiny test stems from the fundamental premise that citizens
should not be hampered from pursuing legitimate activities in the exercise of their constitutional rights.
While rights may be restricted, the restrictions must be minimal or only to the extent necessary to
achieve the purpose or to address the State's compelling interest. When it is possible for
governmental regulations to be more narrowly drawn to avoid conflicts with constitutional
rights, then they must be so narrowly drawn.141
Although treated differently from adults, the foregoing standard applies to regulations on minors as they
are still accorded the freedom to participate in any legitimate activity, whether it be social, religious, or
civic.142 Thus, in the present case, each of the ordinances must be narrowly tailored as to ensure
minimal constraint not only on the minors' right to travel but also on their other constitutional rights.143
In In Re Mosier,144 a US court declared a curfew ordinance unconstitutional impliedly for not being
narrowly drawn, resulting in unnecessary curtailment of minors' rights to freely exercise their religion
and to free speech.145 It observed that:
The ordinance prohibits the older minor from attending alone Christmas Eve Midnight Mass at
the local Roman Catholic Church or Christmas Eve services at the various local Protestant
Churches. It would likewise prohibit them from attending the New [Year's] Eve watch services at the
various churches. Likewise it would prohibit grandparents, uncles, aunts or adult brothers and sisters
from taking their minor relatives of any age to the above mentioned services. x x x.
xxxx
Under the ordinance, during nine months of the year a minor could not even attend the city council
meetings if they ran past 10:30 (which they frequently do) to express his views on the necessity to
repeal the curfew ordinance, clearly a deprivation of his First Amendment right to freedom of
speech.
xxxx
[In contrast, the ordinance in Bykofsky v. Borough of Middletown (supra note 52)] was [a] very narrowly
drawn ordinance of many pages with eleven exceptions and was very carefully drafted in an attempt to
pass constitutional muster. It specifically excepted [the] exercise of First Amendment rights,
travel in a motor vehicle and returning home by a direct route from religious, school, or
voluntary association activities. (Emphases supplied)
After a thorough evaluation of the ordinances' respective provisions, this Court finds that only the
Quezon City Ordinance meets the above-discussed requirement, while the Manila and Navotas
Ordinances do not.
The Manila Ordinance cites only four (4) exemptions from the coverage of the curfew, namely: (a)
minors accompanied by their parents, family members of legal age, or guardian; (b) those running
lawful errands such as buying of medicines, using of telecommunication facilities for emergency
purposes and the like; (c) night school students and those who, by virtue of their employment, are
required in the streets or outside their residence after 10:00 p.m.; and (d) those working at night.146
For its part, the Navotas Ordinance provides more exceptions, to wit: (a) minors with night classes; (b)
those working at night; (c) those who attended a school or church activity, in coordination with a specific
barangay office; (d) those traveling towards home during the curfew hours; (e) those running errands
under the supervision of their parents, guardians, or persons of legal age having authority over them;
(f) those involved in accidents, calamities, and the like. It also exempts minors from the curfew during
these specific occasions: Christmas eve, Christmas day, New Year's eve, New Year's day, the night
before the barangay fiesta, the day of the fiesta, All Saints' and All Souls' Day, Holy Thursday, Good
Friday, Black Saturday, and Easter Sunday.147
This Court observes that these two ordinances are not narrowly drawn in that their exceptions are
inadequate and therefore, run the risk of overly restricting the minors' fundamental freedoms. To be
fair, both ordinances protect the rights to education, to gainful employment, and to travel at night from
school or work.148 However, even with those safeguards, the Navotas Ordinance and, to a greater
extent, the Manila Ordinance still do not account for the reasonable exercise of the minors' rights of
association, free exercise of religion, rights to peaceably assemble, and of free expression, among
others.
The exceptions under the Manila Ordinance are too limited, and thus, unduly trample upon protected
liberties. The Navotas Ordinance is apparently more protective of constitutional rights than the Manila
Ordinance; nonetheless, it still provides insufficient safeguards as discussed in detail below:
First, although it allows minors to engage in school or church activities, it hinders them from engaging
in legitimate non-school or non-church activities in the streets or going to and from such activities; thus,
their freedom of association is effectively curtailed. It bears stressing that participation in legitimate
activities of organizations, other than school or church, also contributes to the minors' social, emotional,
and intellectual development, yet, such participation is not exempted under the Navotas Ordinance.
Second, although the Navotas Ordinance does not impose the curfew during Christmas Eve and
Christmas day, it effectively prohibits minors from attending traditional religious activities (such
as simbang gabi) at night without accompanying adults, similar to the scenario depicted
in Mosier.149 This legitimate activity done pursuant to the minors' right to freely exercise their religion is
therefore effectively curtailed.
Third, the Navotas Ordinance does not accommodate avenues for minors to engage in political rallies or
attend city council meetings to voice out their concerns in line with their right to peaceably assemble
and to free expression.
Certainly, minors are allowed under the Navotas Ordinance to engage in these activities outside curfew
hours, but the Court finds no reason to prohibit them from participating in these legitimate activities
during curfew hours. Such proscription does not advance the State's compelling interest to protect
minors from the dangers of the streets at night, such as becoming prey or instruments of criminal
activity. These legitimate activities are merely hindered without any reasonable relation to the State's
interest; hence, the Navotas Ordinance is not narrowly drawn. More so, the Manila Ordinance, with its
limited exceptions, is also not narrowly drawn.
In sum, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances should be completely stricken down since their exceptions,
which are essentially determinative of the scope and breadth of the curfew regulations, are inadequate
to ensure protection of the above-mentioned fundamental rights. While some provisions may be valid,
the same are merely ancillary thereto; as such, they cannot subsist independently despite the
presence150 of any separability clause.151
The Quezon City Ordinance stands in stark contrast to the first two (2) ordinances as it sufficiently
safeguards the minors' constitutional rights. It provides the following exceptions:
Section 4. EXEMPTIONS - Minor children under the following circumstances shall not be covered by the
provisions of this ordinance;
(a) Those accompanied by their parents or guardian;

(b) Those on their way to or from a party, graduation ceremony,
religious mass, and/or other extra-curricular activities of
their school or organization wherein their attendance are
required or otherwise indispensable, or when such minors are
out and unable to go home early due to circumstances beyond
their control as verified by the proper authorities concerned;
and
(c) Those attending to, or in experience of, an emergency situation such
as conflagration, earthquake, hospitalization, road accident, law
enforcers encounter, and similar incidents[;]
(d) When the minor is engaged in an authorized employment activity, or
going to or returning home from the same place of employment
activity without any detour or stop;
(e) When the minor is in [a] motor vehicle or other travel accompanied
by an adult in no violation of this Ordinance;
(f) When the minor is involved in an emergency;
(g) When the minor is out of his/her residence attending an
official school, religious, recreational, educational, social,
communitv or other similar private activity sponsored by the
city, barangay, school, or other similar private civic/religious
organization/group (recognized by the community) that
supervises the activity or when the minor is going to or
returning home from such activity, without any detour or
stop; and
(h) When the minor can present papers certifying that he/she is a
student and was dismissed from his/her class/es in the evening or
that he/she is a working student.152 (Emphases and underscoring
supplied)
As compared to the first two (2) ordinances, the list of exceptions under the Quezon City Ordinance is
more narrowly drawn to sufficiently protect the minors' rights of association, free exercise of religion,
travel, to peaceably assemble, and of free expression.
Specifically, the inclusion of items (b) and (g) in the list of exceptions guarantees the protection of these
aforementioned rights. These items uphold the right of association by enabling minors to attend
both official and extra-curricular activities not only of their school or church but also of other
legitimate organizations. The rights to peaceably assemble and of free expression are also
covered by these items given that the minors' attendance in the official activities of civic or
religious organizations are allowed during the curfew hours. Unlike in the Navotas Ordinance, the
right to the free exercise of religion is sufficiently safeguarded in the Quezon City Ordinance by
exempting attendance at religious masses even during curfew hours. In relation to their right to
travel, the ordinance allows the minor-participants to move to and from the places where these
activities are held. Thus, with these numerous exceptions, the Quezon City Ordinance, in truth,
only prohibits unsupervised activities that hardly contribute to the well-being of minors who
publicly loaf and loiter within the locality at a time where danger is perceivably more
prominent.
To note, there is no lack of supervision when a parent duly authorizes his/her minor child to run lawful
errands or engage in legitimate activities during the night, notwithstanding curfew hours. As astutely
observed by Senior Associate Justice Antonio T. Carpio and Associate Justice Marvic M.V.F. Leonen
during the deliberations on this case, parental permission is implicitly considered as an exception found
in Section 4, item (a) of the Quezon City Ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or
guardian", as accompaniment should be understood not only in its actual but also in its constructive
sense. As the Court sees it, this should be the reasonable construction of this exception so as to
reconcile the juvenile curfew measure with the basic premise that State interference is not superior but
only complementary to parental supervision. After all, as the Constitution itself prescribes, the parents'
right to rear their children is not only natural but primary.
Ultimately, it is important to highlight that this Court, in passing judgment on these ordinances, is
dealing with the welfare of minors who are presumed by law to be incapable of giving proper consent
due to their incapability to fully understand the import and consequences of their actions. In one case it
was observed that:
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily
be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who,
because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care of themselves fully. Those of tender years
deserve its protection.153
Under our legal system's own recognition of a minor's inherent lack of full rational capacity, and
balancing the same against the State's compelling interest to promote juvenile safety and prevent
juvenile crime, this Court finds that the curfew imposed under the Quezon City Ordinance is reasonably
justified with its narrowly drawn exceptions and hence, constitutional. Needless to say, these exceptions
are in no way limited or restricted, as the State, in accordance with the lawful exercise of its police
power, is not precluded from crafting, adding, or modifying exceptions in similar laws/ordinances for as
long as the regulation, overall, passes the parameters of scrutiny as applied in this case.
D. Penal Provisions of the Manila Ordinance.
Going back to the Manila Ordinance, this Court deems it proper - as it was raised- to further discuss the
validity of its penal provisions in relation to RA 9344, as amended.
To recount, the Quezon City Ordinance, while penalizing the parentis or guardian under Section 8
thereof,154 does not impose any penalty on the minors. For its part, the Navotas Ordinance requires the
minor, along with his or her parent/s or guardian/s, to render social civic duty and community service
either in lieu of - should the parent/s or guardian/s of the minor be unable to pay the fine imposed - or
in addition to the fine imposed therein.155Meanwhile, the Manila Ordinance imposed various
sanctions to the minor based on the age and frequency of violations, to wit:
SEC. 4. Sanctions and Penalties for Violation. Any child or youth violating this ordinance shall be
sanctioned/punished as follows:
(a) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and below, the sanction shall consist of a
REPRIMAND for the youth offender and ADMONITION to the offender's parent, guardian or person
exercising parental authority.
(b) If the offender is Fifteen (15) years of age and under Eighteen (18) years of age, the
sanction/penalty shall be:
1. For the FIRST OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition;

2. For the SECOND OFFENSE, Reprimand and Admonition, and a warning
about the legal impostitions in case of a third and subsequent violation; and
3. For the THIRD AND SUBSEQUENT OFFENSES, Imprisonment of one (1) day
to ten (10) days, or a Fine of TWO THOUSAND PESOS (Php2,000.00), or
both at the discretion of the Court, PROVIDED, That the complaint shall be
filed by the Punong Barangay with the office of the City
Prosecutor.156 (Emphases and underscoring supplied).
Thus springs the question of whether local governments could validly impose on minors these sanctions
- i.e., (a) community service; (b) reprimand and admonition; (c) fine; and (d)
imprisonment. Pertinently, Sections 57 and 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, prohibit the
imposition of penalties on minors for status offenses such as curfew violations, viz.:
SEC. 57. Status Offenses. — Any conduct not considered an offense or not penalized if
committed by an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not be punished if
committed by a child.
SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. — Ordinances enacted by local governments concerning
juvenile status offenses such as, but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy, parental
disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-drinking laws, as well as light offenses and misdemeanors against
public order or safety such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct, public scandal, harassment,
drunkenness, public intoxication, criminal nuisance, vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering, public
urination, and trespassing, shall be for the protection of children. No penalty shall be imposed
on children for said violations, and they shall instead be brought to their residence or to any
barangay official at the barangay hall to be released to the custody of their parents. Appropriate
intervention programs shall be provided for in such ordinances. The child shall also be recorded
as a "child at risk" and not as a "child in conflict with the law." The ordinance shall also provide for
intervention programs, such as counseling, attendance in group activities for children, and for the
parents, attendance in parenting education seminars. (Emphases and underscoring supplied.)
To clarify, these provisions do not prohibit the enactment of regulations that curtail the conduct of
minors, when the similar conduct of adults are not considered as an offense or penalized (i.e., status
offenses). Instead, what they prohibit is the imposition of penalties on minors for violations of these
regulations. Consequently, the enactment of curfew ordinances on minors, without penalizing them for
violations thereof, is not violative of Section 57-A.
"Penalty" 157 is defined as "[p]unishment imposed on a wrongdoer usually in the form of imprisonment
or fine";158 "[p]unishment imposed by lawful authority upon a person who commits a deliberate or
negligent act."159 Punishment, in turn, is defined as "[a] sanction - such as fine, penalty, confinement, or
loss of property, right, or privilege - assessed against a person who has violated the law."160
The provisions of RA 9344, as amended, should not be read to mean that all the actions of the minor in
violation of the regulations are without legal consequences. Section 57-A thereof empowers local
governments to adopt appropriate intervention programs, such as community-based
programs161 recognized under Section 54162 of the same law.
In this regard, requiring the minor to perform community service is a valid form of intervention program
that a local government (such as Navotas City in this case) could appropriately adopt in an ordinance to
promote the welfare of minors. For one, the community service programs provide minors an alternative
mode of rehabilitation as they promote accountability for their delinquent acts without the moral and
social stigma caused by jail detention. In the same light, these programs help inculcate discipline and
compliance with the law and legal orders. More importantly, they give them the opportunity to become
productive members of society and thereby promote their integration to and solidarity with their
community.
The sanction of admonition imposed by the City of Manila is likewise consistent with Sections 57 and
57-A of RA 9344 as it is merely a formal way of giving warnings and expressing disapproval to the
minor's misdemeanor. Admonition is generally defined as a "gentle or friendly reproof' or "counsel or
warning against fault or oversight."163 The Black's Law Dictionary defines admonition as "[a]n
authoritatively issued warning or censure";164 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "gentle
or friendly reproof, a mild rebuke, warning or reminder, [counseling], on a fault, error or oversight, an
expression of authoritative advice or warning."165 Notably, the Revised Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service (RRACCS) and our jurisprudence in administrative cases explicitly declare that "a
warning or admonition shall not be considered a penalty."166
In other words, the disciplinary measures of community-based programs and admonition are clearly not
penalties - as they are not punitive in nature - and are generally less intrusive on the rights and conduct
of the minor. To be clear, their objectives are to formally inform and educate the minor, and for the
latter to understand, what actions must be avoided so as to aid him in his future conduct.
A different conclusion, however, is reached with regard to reprimand and fines and/or imprisonment
imposed by the City of Manila on the minor. Reprimand is generally defined as "a severe or formal
reproof."167 The Black's Law Dictionary defines it as "a mild form of lawyer discipline that does not
restrict the lawyer's ability to practice law";168 while the Philippine Law Dictionary defines it as a "public
and formal censure or severe reproof, administered to a person in fault by his superior officer or body to
which he belongs. It is more than just a warning or admonition."169 In other words, reprimand is a
formal and public pronouncement made to denounce the error or violation committed, to sharply criticize
and rebuke the erring individual, and to sternly warn the erring individual including the public against
repeating or committing the same, and thus, may unwittingly subject the erring individual or violator to
unwarranted censure or sharp disapproval from others. In fact, the RRACCS and our jurisprudence
explicitly indicate that reprimand is a penalty,170 hence, prohibited by Section 57-A of RA 9344, as
amended.
Fines and/or imprisonment, on the other hand, undeniably constitute penalties - as provided in our
various criminal and administrative laws and jurisprudence - that Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended,
evidently prohibits.
As worded, the prohibition in Section 57-A is clear, categorical, and unambiguous. It states that "[n]o
penalty shall be imposed on children for x x x violations [of] juvenile status offenses]." Thus,
for imposing the sanctions of reprimand, fine, and/or imprisonment on minors for curfew violations,
portions of Section 4 of the Manila Ordinance directly and irreconcilably conflict with the clear language
of Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended, and hence, invalid. On the other hand, the impositions of
community service programs and admonition on the minors are allowed as they do not constitute
penalties.
CONCLUSION
In sum, while the Court finds that all three Curfew Ordinances have passed the first prong of the strict
scrutiny test - that is, that the State has sufficiently shown a compelling interest to promote juvenile
safety and prevent juvenile crime in the concerned localities, only the Quezon City Ordinance has passed
the second prong of the strict scrutiny test, as it is the only issuance out of the three which provides for
the least restrictive means to achieve this interest. In particular, the Quezon City Ordinance provides for
adequate exceptions that enable minors to freely exercise their fundamental rights during the prescribed
curfew hours, and therefore, narrowly drawn to achieve the State's purpose. Section 4 (a) of the said
ordinance, i.e., "[t]hose accompanied by their parents or guardian", has also been construed to include
parental permission as a constructive form of accompaniment and hence, an allowable exception to the
curfew measure; the manner of enforcement, however, is left to the discretion of the local government
unit.
In fine, the Manila and Navotas Ordinances are declared unconstitutional and thus, null and void, while
the Quezon City Ordinance is declared as constitutional and thus, valid in accordance with this Decision.
For another, the Court has determined that the Manila Ordinance's penal provisions imposing reprimand
and fines/imprisonment on minors conflict with Section 57-A of RA 9344, as amended. Hence, following
the rule that ordinances should always conform with the law, these provisions must be struck down as
invalid.
WHEREFORE, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Court hereby declares Ordinance No. 8046,
issued by the local government of the City of Manila, and Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. No. 99-02, as
amended by Pambayang Ordinansa Blg. 2002-13 issued by the local government of Navotas
City, UNCONSTITUTIONAL and, thus, NULL and VOID; while Ordinance No. SP-2301, Series of 2014,
issued by the local government of the Quezon City is declared CONSTITUTIONAL and, thus,VALID in
accordance with this Decision.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 228087, January 24, 2018
H. VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., HL VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., HRV VILLARICA

PAWNSHOP, INC. AND VILLARICA PAWNSHOP, INC., Petitioners, v. SOCIAL SECURITY
COMMISSION, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM, AMADOR M. MONTEIRO, SANTIAGO DIONISIO R.
AGDEPPA, MA. LUZ N. BARROS-MAGSINO, MILAGROS N. CASUGA AND JOCELYN Q.
GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
GESMUNDO, J.:
Condonation statutes—being an act of liberality on the part of the State—are strictly construed against
the applicants unless the laws themselves clearly state a contrary rule of interpretation.
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners H.
Villarica Pawnshop, Inc., HL Villarica Pawnshop, Inc., HRV Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. and Villarica
Pawnshop, Inc., (petitioners) seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision1 dated February 26, 2016
and Resolution2 dated November 2, 2016, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 140916, which
affirmed the Resolution3 dated November 6, 2013, and Order4 dated January 21,2015, of the Social
Security Commission (SSC) denying petitioners' claim for refund.
The Antecedents
Petitioners are private corporations engaged in the pawnshop business and are compulsorily registered
with the Social Security System (SSS) under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8282,5 otherwise known as
the Social Security Law of 1997.6
In 2009, petitioners paid their delinquent contributions and accrued penalties with the different branches
of the SSS in the following manner:
AMOUNT PAID
DELINQUENCY DATE
PETITIONER (Contribution and
PERIOD PAID
Penalty)
H. Villarica Jan. 2006 - Oct.
Pawnshop, Inc. 2006 Apr. 23,
P1,461,640.24
Jul. 2007 - Dec. 2009
2007
Apr. 2007- Jun.
2007 May 1,
P710,199.08.
Mar. 2008 - Dec. 2009
2008
H.L. Villarica Sept. 2005 - Dec. P2,544,525.28 Jun. 20,
Pawnshop, Inc. 2006 2009
HRV Villarica Jan. 2009 - May P132,176.32 May 18,
Pawnshop, Inc. 2009 2009
Villarica Pawnshop, Mar. 2000 - Jun. P68,922.03 Feb. 20,
Inc. 2000 2009
Jan. 2000 - Jun. P21,353.70 Feb. 26,
2000 2009
Jan. 2005 - Aug. P699,850.34 Mar. 2,
2005 2009
Jan. 1997 - Jan. P2,491,998.08 Apr. 7,
2009 20097
On January 7, 2010, Congress enacted R.A. No. 9903, otherwise known as the Social Security
Condonation Law of 2009, which took effect on February 1, 2010. The said law offered delinquent
employers the opportunity to settle, without penalty, their accountabilities or overdue contributions
within six (6) months from the date of its effectivity.8
Consequently, petitioners thru its President and General Manager Atty. Henry P. Villarica, sent separate
Letters,9 all dated July 26, 2010, to the different branches of the SSS seeking reimbursement of the
accrued penalties, which they have paid in 2009, thus:
Amount Claimed
1. Diliman Branch P860,452.6210
2. Manila Branch P1,005,805.2811
3. Caloocan Branch P5,376.3212
4. San Francisco Del Monte Branch P3,119,400.1513
Invoking Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903 and Section 2 (f) of the SSC Circular No. 2010-004 or the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of R.A. No. 9903 (IRR), petitioners claimed that the benefits of the
condonation program extend to all employers who have settled their arrears or unpaid contributions
even prior to the effectivity of the law.14
In a Letter15 dated August 16, 2010, the SSS - San Francisco Del Monte Branch denied petitioner
Villarica Pawnshop, Inc.'s request for refund amounting to P3,119,400.15 stating that there was no
provision under R.A. No. 9903 allowing reimbursement of penalties paid before its effectivity.16
In another Letter17 dated September 16, 2010, petitioner HRV Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. was likewise
informed that its application for the refund of the accrued penalty had been denied because R.A. No.
9903 does not cover accountabilities settled prior to its effectivity.18
In like manner, the applications for refund filed by petitioners H. Villarica Pawnshop, Inc. and HL Villarica
Pawnshop, Inc. were both denied in separate letters dated October 4, 201019 and October 15,
2010,20 respectively, for the same reason of being filed outside the coverage of R.A. No. 9903.21
As a result, petitioners filed their respective Petitions22 before the SSC seeking reimbursement of the 3%
per month penalties they paid in 2009 essentially claiming that they were entitled to avail of the benefits
under R.A. No. 9903 by reason of equity because "one of the purposes of the law is to favor employers,
regardless of the reason for the non-payment of the arrears in contribution;" and that the interpretation
of the SSS "is manifestly contrary to the principle that, in enacting a statute, the legislature intended
right and justice to prevail."
In its Answer23 dated March 14, 2012, the SSS prayed for the dismissal of the petitions for utter lack of
merit. It maintained that petitioners were not entitled to avail of the condonation program under R.A.
No. 9903 because they were not considered delinquent at the time the law took effect in 2010; and that
there was nothing more to condone on the part of petitioners for they have settled their obligations even
before the enactment of the law. The SSS explained that the term "accrued penalties" had been properly
defined as unpaid penalties under the IRR and, considering that laws granting condonation constitute
acts of benevolence on the part of the State, they should be strictly construed against the applicant.24
The SSC Ruling
In its Resolution25 dated November 6, 2013, the SSC denied all the petitions for lack of merit. It ruled
that petitioners were not entitled to the benefits of the condonation program under R.A. No. 9903 in
view of the full payment of their unpaid obligations prior to the effectivity of the law on February 1,
2010. As petitioners did not have unpaid contributions at the time the law took effect, the SSC held that
there could be no remission or refund in their favor. The dispositive portion of the said resolution states:
WHEREFORE, all four (4) petitions filed by petitioners against the SSS are hereby DENIED for lack of
merit.
SO ORDERED.26
Petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the SSC in an Order27 dated January
21, 2015.
Undeterred, petitioners appealed before the CA.
The CA Ruling
In its decision dated February 26, 2016, the CA affirmed the ruling of the SSC. It held that the intent of
the legislature in enacting R.A. No. 9903 was the remission of the three percent (3%) per month penalty
imposed upon delinquent contributions of employers as a necessary consequence of the late payment or
non-remittance of SSS contributions. The CA found that the IRR of R.A. No. 9903 used the word
"unpaid" to emphasize the accrued penalty that may be waived therein, thus, it presupposes that there
was still an outstanding obligation at the time of the effectivity of the law, which may be extinguished
through remission. It highlighted that lawmakers did not include within the sphere of R.A. No. 9903
those employers whose penalties have already been paid prior to its effectivity. The CA added that it
would be absurd for obligations that have already been extinguished to be subjected to condonation.
Citing Mendoza v. People28(Mendoza), the CA further ruled that there was no violation of the equal
protection clause because there was a substantial distinction between those delinquent employers who
paid within the six (6) month period from the effectivity of the law and those who paid outside of the
said availment period. It underscored that only the former class was expressly covered by R.A. No.
9903. The CA concluded that petitioners' stand, that those who paid prior to the effectivity of R.A. No.
9903 can avail of the condonation and refund, would open the floodgates to numerous claims for
reimbursement before the SSS, which could lead to a depletion of its resources to the detriment of the
public's best interest. The fallo of the CA ruling reads:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED. The Resolution dated
November 6, 2013 and the Order dated January 21, 2015 of the Social Security Commission in SSC
Case Nos. 11-19521-11, 11-19522-11, 11-19523-11 and 11-19524-11 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.29
Petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied by the CA in its resolution dated November 2,
2016.30
Hence, this petition anchored on the following grounds:
A. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RA NO. 9903 DOES
NOT INCLUDE PETITIONERS IN ITS COVERAGE, CONSIDERING THAT:
1. SECTION 4 OF RA NO. 9903 EXPRESSLY INCLUDES EMPLOYERS, SUCH AS

PETITIONERS, WHO SETTLED (THEIR) ARREARS IN CONTRIBUTIONS BEFORE THE
EFFECTIVITY OF THE LAW AND THUS, ARE ENTITLED TO A WAIVER OF THEIR ACCRUED
PENALTIES.
2. PRIOR TO RA NO. 9903, EMPLOYERS ARE REQUIRED TO SETTLE THEIR ARREARS IN

CONTRIBUTIONS SIMULTANEOUSLY WITH PAYMENT OF THE PENALTY, THUS
RENDERING IT IMPOSSIBLE FOR PETITIONERS TO PAY THEIR ARREARS WITHOUT
PAYING THE PENALTY
B. WITH ALL DUE RESPECT, THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT RESPONDENT SSC
CORRECTLY INTERPRETED THE TERM 'ACCRUED' UNDER THE SSS CONDONATION LAW OF 2009
TO MEAN UNPAID. IF THIS INTERPRETATION WERE TO BE UPHELD, THOSE WHO HAVE UNPAID
ACCRUED PENALTIES WOULD BE IN A BETTER POSITION THAN THOSE WHO DECIDED TO
SETTLE BOTH THE ARREARS IN CONTRIBUTION AND THE ACCRUED PENALTIES. CERTAINLY,
THE LAW NEVER INTENDED INJUSTICE.31
Petitioners argue that the last proviso of Section 4 of R. A. No. 9903 "clearly extends the benefit of the
waiver" to employers who have settled their arrears before the effectivity of the law, hence, to allow the
refund of the corresponding penalties paid;32 that the "equity provision" in Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903
should be interpreted to include a refund of penalties already paid if such law is to be given any
effect;33 and that a refund should be allowed because there is no substantial distinction between
employers who paid their accrued penalties before and after the effectivity of the R.A. No. 9903.34
In its Comment,35 the SSC counters that since petitioners have already paid their unremitted
contributions and accrued penalties before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9903, there is nothing left to be
condoned or waived; that, at the time of their payment, there was no remission of accrued penalty yet;
that R.A. No. 9903 does not contain a provision allowing the reimbursement of accrued penalty which
was paid prior to its effectivity; that the CA correctly interpreted the term "accrued penalty" to mean
"unpaid" by using the definition provided in Section 1 (d) of the IRR; and that the ruling in Mendoza had
already recognized that Congress refused to allow a sweeping, non-discriminatory condonation to all
delinquent employers when it provided a fixed period for the availment of the condonation program
under R.A. No. 9903. 36
In its Comment,37 the SSS avers that the payments made by petitioners before the effectivity of R.A.
No. 9903 are valid payments which cannot be the subject of reimbursement; that petitioners are no
longer considered delinquent employers when R.A. No. 9903 took effect; that petitioners erroneously
interpreted the "equity provision" to include a right to a refund of penalties paid; and that laws granting
condonation constitute an act of benevolence and should be strictly construed against the applicant.38
The Court's Ruling
The petition is bereft of merit.
Sections 2 and 4 of the R.A. No. 9903 specifically provide:
Section 2. Condonation of Penalty. — Any employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all
contributions due and payable to the Social Security System (SSS), including those with pending cases
either before the Social Security Commission, courts or Office of the Prosecutor involving collection of
contributions and/or penalties, may within six (6) months from the effectivity of this Act:
(a) remit said contributions; or
(b) submit a proposal to pay the same in installments, subject to the implementing rules and
regulations which the Social Security Commission may prescribe: Provided, That the delinquent
employer submits the corresponding collection lists together with the remittance or proposal to pay
installments: Provided, further, That upon approval and payment in full or in installments of
contributions due and payable to the SSS, all such pending cases filed against the employer shall be
withdrawn without prejudice to the refiling of the case in the event the employer fails to remit in full the
required delinquent contributions or defaults in the payment of any installment under the approved
proposal.
xxxx
Section 4. Effectivity of Condonation. — The penalty provided under Section 22 (a) of Republic Act No.
8282 shall be condoned by virtue of this Act when and until all the delinquent contributions are remitted
by the employer to the SSS: Provided, That, in case the employer fails to remit in full the required
delinquent contributions, or defaults in the payment of any installment under the approved proposal,
within the availment period provided in this Act, the penalties are deemed reimposed from the time the
contributions first become due, to accrue until the delinquent account is paid in full: Provided, further,
That for reason of equity, employers who settled arrears in contributions before the
effectivity of this Act shall likewise have their accrued penalties waived. [emphases supplied]
On the other hand, Sections 1 and 2 of the IRR of R.A. No. 9903 state:
Section 1. Definition of Terms. — Unless the context of a certain provision of this Circular clearly
indicates otherwise, the term:
xxx
(d) "Accrued penalty" refers to the unpaid three percent (3%) penalty imposed upon any delayed
remittance of contribution m accordance with Section 22 (a) of R.A. No. 1161, as amended.
Section 2. Who may avail of the Program. — Any employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all
contributions due and payable to the SSS may avail of the Program, including the following:
(a) Those not yet registered with the SSS
(b) Those with pending or approved proposal under the Installment Payment Scheme of the SSS
(Circular No. 9-P) pursuant to SSC Resolution No. 380 dated 10 June 2002;
(c) Those with pending or approved application under the Program for Acceptance of Properties Offered
Through Dacion En Pago of the SSS (Circular No. 6-P) pursuant to SSC Resolution No. 29 dated 16
January 2002;
(d) Those with cases pending before the SSC, Courts or Office of the Prosecutor involving collection of
contributions and/or penalties;
(e) Those against whom judgment had been rendered involving collection of contributions and/or
penalties but have not complied with the judgment, and;
(f) Those who, before the effectivity of the Act, have settled all contributions but with accrued
penalty. [emphasis supplied]
Under R.A. No. 9903 and its IRR, an employer who is delinquent or has not remitted all contributions
due and payable to the SSS may avail of the condonation program provided that the delinquent
employer will remit the full amount of the unpaid contributions or would submit a proposal to pay the
delinquent contributions in installment within the six (6)-month period set by law.
Under Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903, once an employer pays all its delinquent contributions within the six
month period, the accrued penalties due thereon shall be deemed waived. In the last proviso thereof,
those employers who have settled their delinquent contributions before the effectivity of the law but still
have existing accrued penalties shall also benefit from the condonation program. In that situation, there
is still something to condone because there are existing accrued penalties at the time of the effectivity of
the law. Section 1 (d) of the IRR defines accrued penalties as those that refer to the unpaid three
percent (3%) penalty imposed upon any delayed remittance of contribution.
Accordingly, R.A. No. 9903 covers those employers who (1) have existing delinquent
contributions and/or (2) have accrued penalties at the time of its effectivity.
Evidently, there is nothing in R.A. No. 9903, particularly Section 4 thereof, that benefits an employer
who has settled their delinquent contributions and/or their accrued penalties prior to the effectivity of
the law. Once an employer pays all his delinquent contributions and accrued penalties before the
effectivity of R.A. No. 9903, it cannot avail of the condonation program because there is no existing
obligation anymore. It is the clear intent of the law to limit the benefit of the condonation program to
the delinquent employers.39
Also, the provisions of R.A. No. 9903 and its IRR state that employers may be accorded the benefit of
having their accrued penalties waived provided that they either remit their delinquent
contributions or submit a proposal to pay their delinquencies in installments (on the condition that there
will be no default in subsequent payments) within the "availment period" spanning six (6) months from
R.A. No. 9903's effectivity.
The Court finds that employers who have paid their unremitted contributions and already settled their
delinquent contributions as well as their corresponding penalties before R.A. No. 9903's effectivity do
not have a right to be refunded of the penalties already paid, which shall be discussed in seriatim.
Verba legis interpretation of R.A. No. 9903
It is the duty of the Court to apply the law the way it is worded.40 Basic is the rule of statutory
construction that when the law is clear and unambiguous, the court is left with no alternative but to
apply the same according to its clear language.41 The courts can only pronounce what the law is and
what the rights of the parties thereunder are.42 Fidelity to such a task precludes construction or
interpretation, unless application is impossible or inadequate without it.43 Thus, it is only when the law is
ambiguous or of doubtful meaning may the court interpret or construe its true intent.44
Parenthetically, the "plain meaning rule" or verba legis in statutory construction enjoins that if the
statute is clear, plain and free from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without
interpretation.45 This rule of interpretation is in deference to the plenary power of Congress to make,
alter and repeal laws as this power is an embodiment of the People's sovereign will.46 Accordingly, when
the words of a statute are clear and unambiguous, courts cannot deviate from the text of the law and
resort to interpretation lest they end up betraying their solemn duty to uphold the law and worse,
violating the constitutional principle of separation of powers.
Concomitantly, condonation or remission of debt is an act of liberality, by virtue of which, without

receiving any equivalent, the creditor renounces the enforcement of the obligation, which is extinguished
in its entirety or in that part or aspect of the same to which the remission refers.47 It is essentially
gratuitous for no equivalent is received for the benefit given.48 Relatedly, waiver is defined as a
voluntary and intentional relinquishment or abandonment of a known existing legal right, advantage,
benefit, claim or privilege, which except for such waiver the party would have enjoyed; the voluntary
abandonment or surrender, by a capable person, of a right known by him to exist, with the intent that
such right shall be surrendered and such person forever deprived of its benefit; or such conduct as
warrants an inference of the relinquishment of such right; or the intentional doing of an act inconsistent
with claiming it.49 On the other hand, refund is an act of giving back or returning what was received.50 In
cases of monetary obligations, a claim for refund exists only after the payment has been made and, in
the act of doing so, the debtor either delivered excess funds or there exists no obligation to pay in the
first place. This right arises either by virtue of solutio indebiti as provided for in Articles 2154 to 2163 of
the Civil Code or by provision of another positive law, such as tax laws or amnesty laws.51
A plain reading of Section 4 of R.A. No. 9903 shows that it does not give employers who have already
settled their delinquent contributions as well as their corresponding penalties the right to a refund of the
penalties paid. What was waived here was the amount of accrued penalties that have not been
paid prior to the law's effectivity—it does not include those that have already been settled.
The words "condoned", "waived" and "accrued" are unambiguous enough to be understood and directly
applied without any resulting confusion. As discussed earlier, the word ''condonation" is the creditor's act
of extinguishing an obligation by renunciation and the word "waive" is an abandonment or
relinquishment of an existing legal right. On the other hand, the term "accrue" in legal parlance means
"to come into existence as an enforceable claim."52 Thus, the phrases "shall be condoned" and "shall
likewise have their accrued penalties waived" under Section 4 of the R.A. No. 9903 can only mean that,
at the time of its effectivity, only existing penalties may be extinguished or relinquished. No further
interpretation is necessary to clarify the law's applicability.
Prospective application of R.A. No. 9903
Statutes are generally applied prospectively unless they expressly allow a retroactive application. It is a
basic principle that laws should only be applied prospectively unless the legislative intent to give them
retroactive effect is expressly declared or is necessarily implied from the language used.53 Absent a clear
contrary language in the text and, that in every case of doubt, the doubt will be resolved against the
retroactive operation of laws.54
Here, R.A. No. 9903 does not provide that, prior to its effectivity, penalties already paid are deemed
condoned or waived. What Section 2 of the law provides instead is an availment period of six (6) months
after its effectivity within which to pay the delinquent contributions for the existing and corresponding
penalties to be waived or condoned. This only means that Congress intends R.A. No. 9903 to apply
prospectively only after its effectivity and until its expiration.
Interpretation in favor of social justice
Even if there is doubt as to the import of the term "accrued penalties," condonation laws—especially
those relating to social security funds—are construed strictly against the applicants.
Social justice in the case of the laborers means compassionate justice or an implementation of the policy
that those who have less in life should have more in law.55 And since it is the State's policy to "promote
social justice and provide meaningful protection to [SSS] members and their beneficiaries against the
hazards of disability, sickness, maternity, old age, death, and other contingencies resulting in loss of
income or financial burden,"56 Court should adopt a rule of statutory interpretation which ensures the
financial viability of the SSS.
Here, the State stands to lose its resources in the form of receivables whenever it condones or forgoes
the collection of its receivables or unpaid penalties. Since a loss of funds ultimately results in the
Government being deprived of its means to pursue its objectives, all monetary claims based on
condonation should be construed strictly against the applicants. In the case of SSS funds, the Court
in Social Security System v. Commission on Audit57 had emphatically explained in this wise:
THE FUNDS contributed to the Social Security System (SSS) are not only imbued with public interest,
they are part and parcel of the fruits of the workers' labors pooled into one enormous trust fund under
the administration of the System designed to insure against the vicissitudes and hazards of their working
lives. In a very real sense, the trust funds are the workers' property which they could turn to when
necessity beckons and are thus more personal to them than the taxes they pay. It is therefore only fair
and proper that charges against the trust fund be strictly scrutinized for every lawful and
judicious opportunity to keep it intact and viable in the interest of enhancing the welfare of
their true and ultimate beneficiaries. [emphasis supplied]
To this end, the Court upholds and abides by this canon of interpretation against applicants of the
benefits of R.A. No. 9903 as a recognition to the constitutional policies of freeing the people from
poverty through policies that provide adequate social services58 and affording full protection to labor.59 It
is consistent with the congressional intent of placing a primary importance in helping the SSS increase
its funds through stimulating cash inflows by encouraging delinquent employers to settle their
accountabilities.60 Thus, R.A. No. 9903 shall be understood as not to include a refund of penalties paid
before its effectivity.
It is the essence of judicial duty to construe statutes so as to avoid such a deplorable result of
injustice.61 Simply put, courts are not to give words meanings that would lead to absurd or unreasonable
consequences.62 This is to preserve the intention of Congress—the branch which possesses the plenary
power for all purposes of civil government.63
Logically, only existing obligations can be extinguished either by payment, loss of the thing due,
remission or condonation, confusion or merger or rights, compensation, novation, annulment of
contract, rescission, fulfillment of a resolutory condition, or prescription. Interpreting R.A. No. 9903 in
such a way that it extinguishes an obligation which is already extinguished is simply absurd and
unreasonable.
Rule-making power of the SSS
The SSS (through the SSC)64 is empowered to issue the necessary rules and regulations for the effective
implementation of R.A. No. 9903.65 Quasi-legislative power is exercised by administrative agencies
through the promulgation of rules and regulations within the confines of the granting statute and the
doctrine of non-delegation of powers from the separation of the branches of the government.66
Accordingly, with the growing complexity of modem life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulations, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, the rigidity of the
theory of separation of governmental powers has, to a large extent, been relaxed by permitting the
delegation of greater powers by the legislative and vesting a larger amount of discretion in
administrative and executive officials, not only in the execution of the laws, but also in the promulgation
of certain rules and regulations calculated to promote public interest.67 Stated differently, administrative
agencies are necessarily authorized to fill in the gaps of a statute for its proper and effective
implementation. Hence, the need to delegate to administrative bodies—the principal agencies tasked to
execute laws in their specialized fields—the authority to promulgate rules and regulations to implement
a given statute and effectuate its policies.68
In the instant case, Section 30 of the R.A. No. 8282 and Section 5 of R.A. No. 9903 gave the SSS the
power to promulgate rules and regulations to define the terms of social security-related laws that may
have a likelihood of being subjected to several interpretations. This is exactly what the SSS did when it
defined the term "accrued penalties'' to mean "unpaid penalties" so as to make it unequivocal and
prevent confusion as to the applicability of R.A. No. 9903. More importantly, since the ascription of the
meaning of "unpaid penalties" to "accrued penalties" bear a reasonable semblance and justifiable
connection, it should not be disturbed and altered by the courts.
Delinquent contributions and penalties may be paid separately
There is no existing statutory or regulatory provision which requires the simultaneous or joint payment
of corresponding penalties along with the payment of delinquent contributions. Consequently, it is
possible that a class of employers who have settled their delinquent contributions but have not paid the
corresponding penalties before the effectivity of R.A. No. 9903, may exist. As adequately pointed out by
the SSC:69
It is worthy to note that there is no provision in RA 8282, as amended, nor in any SSS Circular
or Office Order that requires employers to settle their arrears in contributions simultaneously
with payment of the penalty. On the contrary, in its sincere effort to be a partner in nation[-]building,
along with the State's declared policy to establish, develop, promote and perfect a sound and viable tax-
exempt social security system suitable to the needs of the Philippines, the SSS is empowered to accept,
process and approve applications for installment proposal evincing that employers are not required to
settle their arrears in contributions simultaneously with the payment of the penalty. [emphasis supplied]
The Court finds that the aforementioned assertion of the SSC is not without any legal basis as Section 4
(c) of the R.A. No. 8282 provides:
Section 4. Powers and Duties of the Commission and SSS. -
xxxx
(6) To compromise or release, in whole or in part, any interest,

penalty or any civil liability to SSS in connection with the
investments authorized under Section 26 hereof, under such terms
and conditions as it may prescribe and approved by the President of
the Philippines; and xxx (emphasis supplied)
Based on the foregoing, the SSS—through the SSC—is authorized to address any act that may
undermine the collection of penalties due from delinquent employers subject only to the condition in
Section 26 of the same law that the potential revenues being compromised "are not needed to meet the
current administrative and operational expenses." Thus, petitioners' claim that "a class of employers
who simply paid the arrears in contribution but did not settle their penalties due does not exist"70 is
erroneous.
There is no violation of the equal protection clause
There is a substantial distinction between employers who paid prior and subsequent to R.A. No. 9903's
effectivity. The equal protection clause guarantees that no person or class of persons shall be deprived
of the same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in the same place and
in like circumstances.71 However, the concept of equal protection does not require a universal application
of the laws to all persons or things without distinction; what it simply requires is equality among equals
as determined according to a valid classification.72
In other words, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be
treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.73It does not forbid
discrimination as to things that are different.74 Neither is it necessary that the classification be
made with mathematical nicety.75 Congress is given a wide leeway in providing for a valid
classification;76 especially when social or economic legislation is at issue.77 Hence, legislative
classification may properly rest on narrow distinctions, for the equal protection guaranty does not
preclude the legislature from recognizing degrees of evil or harm, and legislation is addressed to evils as
they may appear.78
Correspondingly, the primordial duty of the Court is merely to apply the law in such a way that it shall
not usurp legislative powers by judicial legislation and that in the course of such application or
construction, it should not make or supervise legislation, or under the guise of interpretation, modify,
revise, amend, distort, remodel, or rewrite the law, or give the law a construction which is repugnant to
its terms.79 In enacting a law, it is the sole prerogative of Congress—not the Judiciary—to determine
what subjects or activities it intends to govern limited only by the provisions set forth in the
Constitution.
Significantly, petitioners have already paid not only their delinquent contributions but also their
corresponding penalties before the enactment and effectivity of R.A. No. 9903. Because of this
observation, petitioners cannot anymore be considered as "delinquent" under the purview of
R.A. No. 9903 and are not within the class of "delinquent employers."80 Simply put, they are not
similarly situated with other employers who are delinquent at the time of the law's effectivity.
Accordingly, Congress may treat petitioners differently from all other employers who may have been
delinquent.
Verily, this Court cannot—in the guise of interpretation—modify the explicit language of R.A. No. 9903 in
waiving the collection of accrued penalties to also include claims for refund. It obviously violates
the Trias Politica Principle entrenched in the very fabric of democracy itself. While violation of the equal
protection clause may be a compelling ground for this Court to nullify an arbitrary or unreasonable
legislative classification, it may not be used as a basis to extend the scope of a law to classes not
intended to be covered.81 Therefore, R.A. No. 9903, which waived outstanding penalties, cannot be
expanded to allow a refund of those which were already settled before the law's effectivity.
Final note
Settling the contributions in arrears within the availment period only entitles delinquent employers to a
remission of their corresponding accrued and outstanding penalties—not a refund of the penalties which
have already been paid. There is nothing in R.A. No. 9903 which explicitly imposes or even implicitly
recognizes a positive or natural obligation on the part of the SSS to return the penalties which have
already been settled before its effectivity.
It is absurd to revive obligations that have already been extinguished by payment or performance just to
be re-extinguished by condonation or remission so that it may create a resulting obligation on the basis
of solutio indebiti. More importantly, there is no violation of the equal protection clause because there is
a substantial distinction in the classes of employers. Therefore, the Court deems it fitting to deny
petitioners' claim for refund for lack of substantial and legal basis.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The February 26, 2016 Decision and November 2, 2016
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 140916 are AFFIRMED in toto.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 202408, June 27, 2018
FAROUK B. ABUBAKAR, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202409

ULAMA S. BARAGUIR Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 202412
DATUKAN M. GUIANI Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
The rules on competitive public bidding and those concerning the disbursement of public funds are
imbued with public interest. Government officials whose work relates to these matters are expected to
exercise greater responsibility in ensuring compliance with the pertinent rules and regulations. The
doctrine allowing heads of offices to rely in good faith on the acts of their subordinates is inapplicable in
a situation where there are circumstances that should have prompted the government officials to make
further inquiries.
For this Court's resolution are three (3) consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari1 concerning
alleged anomalies in the implementation of infrastructure projects within the Autonomous Region of
Muslim Mindanao (ARMM). The Petitions, separately docketed as G.R. Nos. 202408,2 202409,3 and
202412,4 question the Sandiganbayan's December 8, 2011 Decision5 and June 19, 2012 Resolution6 in
Criminal Case Nos. 24963-24983. The assailed judgments declared Farouk B. Abubakar (Abubakar)
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 10 counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, and
Ulama S. Baraguir (Baraguir) and Datukan M. Guiani (Guiani) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of 17
counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.7
Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani were public officials of the Department of Public Works and Highways in
ARMM (DPWH-ARMM) when the offenses were allegedly committed. Abubakar held the position of
Director III, Administrative, Finance Management Service. Baraguir was the Director of the Bureau of
Construction, Materials and Equipment, and a member of the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards
Committee, while Guiani was the DPWH-ARMM Regional Secretary.8
Guiani v. Sandiganbayan9 is the procedural antecedent of this case.
After the creation of ARMM, the national government earmarked P615,000,000.00 for the
implementation of regional and provincial infrastructure projects. In 1991, the funds were transferred to
the Office of the ARMM Regional Governor. Later, a portion of the funds was then transferred to DPWH-
ARMM.10
During the incumbency of then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos), the Office of the President
received reports of irregularities attending the implementation of the DPWH-ARMM infrastructure
projects. The Commission on Audit was directed to conduct an investigation.11
Acting upon then President Ramos' instruction, the Commission on Audit created a special audit team
headed by Heidi L. Mendoza (Mendoza) to look into the implementation of four (4) road concreting
projects, namely: (1) the Cotabato-Lanao Road, Sections 1-13; (2) the Awang-Nuro Road; (3) the
Highway Linek-Kusiong Road; and (4) the Highway Simuay Seashore Road.12 Physical inspections were
conducted on October 15, 1992 to validate the existence of the projects and the extent of their
development.13
The audit team made the following findings:14
First, an overpayment amounting to P17,684,000.00 was incurred on nine (9) road sections. The audit
team discovered the existence of bloated accomplishment reports that allowed contractors to
prematurely claim on their progress billings.15
Second, advance payments totaling P14,400,000.00 were given to nine (9) contractors for the
procurement of aggregate sub-base course in violation of Section 88(l) of Presidential Decree No.
1445.16
Third, public bidding for the Cotabato-Lanao Road Project was done without a detailed engineering
survey.17 The bidding was reportedly conducted on January 14, 1992. However, the engineering survey
was only completed sometime in August 1992. The audit team also observed bidding irregularities in the
Awang-Nuro Road Project and in six (6) road sections of the Cotabato-Lanao Road Project. Public bidding
for the two (2) projects was reportedly conducted on January 14, 1992 but records disclose that the
contractors already mobilized their equipment as early as January 4 to 7, 1992.18
Lastly, the engineering survey for the centerline relocation and profiling of the Cotabato-Lanao Road,
which cost P200,000.00, appeared to be unnecessary due to the existence of a previous engineering
survey. Furthermore, advance payment was given to the contractor in excess of the limit provided under
the implementing rules and regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1594.19
Based on the report submitted by the Commission on Audit, the Office of the Ombudsman conducted a
preliminary investigation and found probable cause to indict the regional officials of DPWH-ARMM for
violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 or the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act. On July
31, 1998, 21 separate Informations were filed against Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and other officials of
DPWH-ARMM. The consolidated cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 24963-24983.20
Charged in Criminal Case Nos. 24963 to 24969 were Guiani, Baraguir, and several other DPWH-ARMM
officials for allegedly awarding projects to contractors without the required public bidding.21
Abubakar, Guiani, Baraguir, and two (2) employees of DPWH-ARMM were charged in Criminal Case No.
24970 for allegedly awarding excessive mobilization fees to Arce Engineering Services.22
Guiani was charged in Criminal Case No. 24971 for entering into an unnecessary contract with Arce
Engineering Services for the conduct of another detailed engineering survey.23
Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and two (2) other officials of DPWH-ARMM were charged in Criminal Case
Nos. 24972, 24975 to 24980, and 24982 to 24983 for allegedly advancing P14,400,000.00 to several
contractors for sub-base aggregates.24
Lastly, Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and several other DPWH-ARMM officials were charged in Criminal
Case Nos. 24973, 24974, and 24981 for allegedly causing overpayment on several projects due to
bloated accomplishment reports.25
All the Informations charged the accused with conspiracy except for Criminal Case No. 24971.26
Upon arraignment, Abubakar, Baraguir, Guiani, and some of their co-accused entered a plea of not
guilty. Seven (7) of their co-accused remained at large while one (1) died prior to the scheduled
arraignment.27
During trial, the prosecution presented Leodivina A. De Leon (De Leon) and Mendoza to testify on the
findings of the Commission on Audit.28
De Leon testified on the alleged irregularities attending the bidding procedure. She explained that some
contractors were allowed to mobilize their equipment even before the conduct of the bidding and the
perfection of the contracts for six (6) road sections of the Cotabato-Lanao Road and the Awang-Nuro
Road Projects.29
Mendoza testified on the alleged irregular payment scheme for the procurement of sub-base aggregates.
She stated that the concerned DPWH-ARMM officials made it appear that they were requesting for the
pre-payment of cement. However, the disbursement vouchers indicate that the payment was made for
the procurement of sub-base aggregates. The words "sub-base aggregates" were superimposed on the
disbursement vouchers.30
After the prosecution rested its case, several of the accused filed their respective Motions for Leave to
file Demurrer to Evidence. These Motions were denied by the Sandiganbayan in its March 18, 2008
Resolution. The defense then proceeded to the presentation of its evidence.31
Presented as witnesses for the defense were some of the accused: (1) Nelfa M. Suasin (Suasin), an
accountant of DPWH-ARMM; (2) Guialoson A. Mamogkat (Mamogkat), the DPWH-ARMM Director for
Operations; (3) Taungan S. Masadag (Masandag), the DPWH-ARMM Regional Assistant Secretary and
the designated Chair of the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee; (4) Abubakar; and (5)
Baraguir. Commission on Audit's Records Custodian Nenita V. Rama was also presented as a defense
witness.32
Suasin testified that she consulted her superiors, particularly Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani, regarding
the 30% mobilization fees awarded to Arce Engineering Services. They explained to her that the
mobilization fee was increased as no other surveyor was willing to undertake the work due to the peace
and order situation in the area. Suasin raised the same defense on the P14,400,000.00 advance
payment. She claimed that she signed the disbursement vouchers after seeking approval from her
superiors. She also testified that the item typewritten on the disbursement vouchers was "cement" and
not "sub-base aggregates."33
Mamogkat testified that DPWH-ARMM had to re-survey some areas of the Cotabato-Lanao Road Project
because they could no longer locate the reference points marked in the original survey. He denied the
charge that some contractors were overpaid, and attributed the discrepancy between the audit team's
report and DPWH-ARMM's report on several factors. He pointed out, among others, that the physical
inspection conducted by the DPWH-ARMM team was more extensive compared to the audit team's one
(1)-day inspection.34
Masandag insisted that the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards Committee followed the bidding procedure
laid down in Presidential Decree No. 1594. He denied knowledge and participation on the alleged early
mobilization of contractors, and claimed that it was the Regional Secretary who authorized the issuance
of the certificates of mobilization.35
Abubakar claimed that he was only implicated due to the presence of his signature in the disbursement
vouchers. He asserted that he examined the supporting documents and the certifications made by the
technical experts before affixing his signature.36
Last to testify for the defense was Baraguir. He claimed that some contractors took the risk of mobilizing
their equipment before the conduct of public bidding on the expectation that the winning bidders would
sub-lease their equipment. He also testified that construction immediately began on some projects after
the engineering survey to fast track the implementation of the projects.37
On December 8, 2011, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment38 finding Guiani, Baraguir, and Masandag
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019
in Criminal Case Nos. 24963 to 24969.39
The Sandiganbayan held that Guiani, Baraguir, and Masandag conspired with each other and gave
unwarranted benefits, preference, and advantage to seven (7) contractors by allowing them to deploy
their equipment before the scheduled public bidding. Records show that the public bidding for the
Cotabato-Lanao Road and Awang-Nuro Road Projects was conducted after the issuance of the
certificates of mobilization:40
Project
Contractor
Date of Certification
Date of Bidding
Date of Contract
Awang-Nuro Road
HMB Construction and Supply
Jan. 7, 1992
Jan. 14, 1992
Jan. 16, 1992
Cotabato-Lanao Road Section 8
Kutawato Construction
Jan. 5, 1992
[Jan. 14, 1992]
[Jan. 16, 1992]
[Cotabato-Lanao Road] Section 7
Al Mohandiz Construction
Jan. 5, 1992
[Jan. 14, 1992]
[Jan. 16, 1992]
JM Construction
Jan. 7, 1992
[Jan. 14, 1992]
[Jan. 16, 1992]
PMA Construction
Jan. 6, 1992
[Jan. 14, 1992]
Jan. 20, 1992
Al-Aziz-Engineering
Jan. 4, 1992
[Jan. 14, 1992]
Jan. 8, 1992
MGL Construction
Jan. 5, 1992
[Jan. 14, 1992]
Jan. 15, 199241
According to the Sandiganbayan, HMB Construction and Supply, Kutawato Construction, Al Mohandiz
Construction, JM Construction, PMA Construction, Al-Aziz-Engineering, and MGL Construction were
already identified as contractors for the abovementioned projects even before the scheduled public
bidding. For instance, the certification issued to HMB Construction and Supply stated:
CERTIFICATION
THIS IS TO CERTIFY that HMB CONSTRUCTION AND SUPPLY, Contractor for the construction
of AWANG-NURO, UPI ROAD, had already mobilized a minimum number of equipments (sic)
necessary for the implementation of the said project.
This certification is being issued to HMB CONSTRUCTION AND SUPPLY in connection with his legal claim
under P.D. 1594 as stated for the payment of fifteen (15) percent mobilization fee.
Issued this 7th day of January, 1992.42 (Emphasis in the original)

Similar certifications were issued to Kutawato Construction, Al Mohandiz Construction, JM Construction,
PMA Construction, Al-Aziz Engineering, and MGL Construction.43
The Sandiganbayan rejected the defense's justification regarding the early mobilization of these
contractors, and underscored that no contractor would risk mobilizing its equipment without any
assurance that the projects would be awarded to it. Although a public bidding was actually conducted,
the Sandiganbayan believed that it was done as a mere formality.44
Accused Guiani, Mamogkat, Abubakar, Baraguir, and Suasin were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt
of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for causing the disbursement of30% of the
mobilization fees or advance payment to Arce Engineering Services.45
Accused Guiani was acquitted in Criminal Case No. 24971 for his alleged act of entering into a second
detailed engineering survey. The Sandiganbayan held that the second survey was indispensable because
the reference points in the original survey could no longer be found. The prosecution failed to prove that
accused Guiani exhibited manifest partiality, evident bad faith, or gross inexcusable negligence in hiring
Arce Engineering Services.46
The Sandiganbayan convicted accused Guiani, Mamogkat, Abubakar, Baraguir, and Suasin of nine (9)
counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 for facilitating the advance payment for the
procurement of sub-base aggregates.47 It characterized the P14,400,000.00 disbursement as an
advance payment and not as pre-payment for construction materials. First, the disbursement was given
directly to the contractor and not to the suppliers. Second, there were no written requests from the
contractors who wished to avail of the pre-payment facility. Third, under Department Order No. 42 of
the Department of Public Works and Highways, only cement, reinforcing steel bars, and asphalt may be
procured under a pre-payment scheme.48 Thus, the P14,400,000.00 disbursement could not be
considered as pre-payment for construction materials.
The Sandiganbayan concluded that the disbursement was an advance payment and declared it illegal
because there were no documents to prove that the items were actually delivered. It cited Section 88(1)
of Presidential Decree No. 1445 as legal basis.49
Guiani, Baraguir, Abubakar, and Mamogkat were acquitted in Criminal Case Nos. 24973, 24974, and
24981 for allegedly causing the overpayment on several projects due to bloated accomplishment
reports. The Sandiganbayan gave more credence to DPWH-ARMM's accomplishment report over the
audit team's report. First, the standards used by each team varied. Second, DPWH-ARMM's inspection
was more extensive.50
The dispositive portion of the Sandiganbayan's December 8, 2011 Decision stated:

WHEREFORE, IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment as follows:
1. In Criminal Cases No. 24963, No. 24964, No. 24965, No. 24966, No. 24967, No. 24968 and No.
24969, the Court finds accused DATUKAN M. GUIANI, TAUNGAN S. MASANDAG and ULAMA S.
BARAGUIR GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of seven (7) counts of violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019,
and pursuant to Section 9 thereof, are hereby sentenced to suffer for each count the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum, up to ten (10) years as
maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.
2. In Criminal Case No. 24970, the Court finds accused DATUKAN M. GUIANI, GUIALOSON A.
MAMOGKAT, FAROUK B. ABUBAKAR, ULAMA S. BARAGUIR AND NELFA M. SUASIN GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019, and hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) month as minimum, up to ten (10) years as
maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public office.
3. In Criminal Case No. 24971, for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
accused DATUKAN M. GUIANI is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense of violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019.
Considering that the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise did not exist, no civil
liability may be assessed against the accused.
The hold departure order issued against him by reason of this case is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE,
and his bond ordered RELEASED.
4. In Criminal Cases No. 24972, No. 24975, No. 24976, No. 24977, No. 24978, No. 24979, No. 24980,
No. 24982 and No. 24983, the Court finds accused DATUKAN M. GUIANI, GUIALOSON A. MAMOGKAT,
FAROUK B. ABUBAKAR, ULAMA S. BARAGUIR and NELFA M. SUASIN GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of nine (9) counts of violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 and, pursuant to Section 9 thereof, are hereby
sentenced to suffer for each count the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of six (6) years and one
(1) month as minimum, up to ten (10) years as maximum, with perpetual disqualification from public
office.
5. In Criminal Case No. 24973, for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt, accused DATUKAN M. GUIANI, ULAMA S. BARAGUIR, FAROUK B. ABUBAKAR, GUIALOSON A.
MAMOGKAT, NASSER G. SINARIMBO, MANGONDA YA A. MADID and SALIK ALI are
hereby ACQUITTED of the offense of violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019.
The hold departure order issued against them by reason of this case is hereby LIFTED and SET ASIDE,
and their bonds ordered RELEASED.
doubt, accused DATUKAN M. GUIANI, TAUNGAN S. MASANDAG, ULAMA S. BARAGUIR, FAROUK B.
ABUBAKAR, GUIALOSON A. MAMOGKAT, MANGONDA YA A. MADID, SALIK ALI, NASSER G. SINARIMBO,
EMRAN B. BUISAN, BEVERLY GRACE D. VILLAR and ROMMEL A. GALINDO are hereby ACQUITTED of
the offense of violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019.
doubt, accused DATUKAN M. GUIANI, FAROUK B. ABUBAKAR, ULAMA S. BARAGUIR, GUIALOSON A.
MAMOGKAT, BAHAMA A. ANDAR, PENDATUN JAUHALI, EMRAN B. BUISAN, NAZER P. EBUS and RONEL
C. QUESADA are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense of violation of Sec. 3 (e) RA 3019.
....
SO ORDERED.51 (Emphasis in the original)

Abubakar and Baraguir filed their respective motions for new trial and reconsideration on separate
dates. They anchored their prayer for new trial on the alleged incompetence of their former counsel.
Guiani, Suasin, and Mamogkat also moved for reconsideration.52 In their motions, accused Guiani and
Baraguir invoked the application of the Arias53 doctrine.54
On June 19, 2012, the Sandiganbayan rendered a Resolution55 denying the motions for new trial and
reconsideration for lack of merit.56
Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani filed their respective Petitions for Review before this Court questioning
the December 8, 2011 Decision and June 19, 2012 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan. The petitions were
consolidated on January 21, 2013.57
Respondents the Honorable Sandiganbayan, the People of the Philippines, and the Office of the Special
Prosecutor filed, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, their consolidated Comment,58 to which
petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir filed their respective Replies.59 Due to petitioner Guiani's repeated
failure to submit the required reply, this Court dispensed with its filing.
Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir maintain that they are entitled to a new trial due to their former
counsel's incompetence and negligence. They claim that aside from simply adopting the evidence
submitted by their co-accused, their former counsel also failed to present and to formally offer relevant
evidence that would exonerate them from liability. Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir believe that they
were deprived of the opportunity to fully present their case60 and to claim that the following documents
should have been presented before the Sandiganbayan:
(1)
Original copies of the assailed disbursement vouchers proving that the entries were for cement and not
for sub-base aggregates;61
(2)
The testimony of handwriting experts who would confirm their defense;62
(3)
Written requests of contractors who wished to avail of the prepayment scheme for the procurement of
cement to prove compliance with DPWH Department Order No. 42;63
(4)
Original copy of the February 17, 1992 DPWH Memorandum issued by the former DPWH Regional
Secretary requiring petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir to sign Box 3 of the disbursement vouchers;64
(5)
The Personnel Data Files of petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir, the Contract of Services of petitioner
Abubakar, and the Appointment of petitioner Baraguir to prove that their employment was temporary or
contractual in nature, and to prove that their duties did not require "the exercise of judgment or
discretion";65 and
(6)
The Department of Trade and Industry Certification on the scarcity of cement to prove that pre-payment
was necessary.66
Petitioner Abubakar adds that copies of several disbursement vouchers should have been presented to
prove that his signatures were unnecessary.67 These disbursement vouchers,68 which do not bear his
name or signature, should have been formally offered in Criminal Case Nos. 24972, 24979, 24980,
24982, and 24983.69
Petitioner Baraguir believes that other documents should have been formally offered, including:
[a] The invitation to bid to prove that the projects were published for public bidding;
[b] The actual bids to prove that an actual bidding took place;
[c] The Notices of Award issued by the Regional Secretary to prove that the projects were awarded to
the lowest bidders;
[d] The Notices to Commence issued by the Regional Secretary to prove that the winning contractor
cannot start the project yet until the latter has received the same.70
On the other hand, respondents, through the Office of the Special Prosecutor, assert that petitioners
Abubakar and Baraguir are not entitled to a new trial. As a rule, clients are bound by the acts of their
counsel. Mistakes committed due to a counsel's incompetence or inexperience cannot justify the grant of
a new trial. Otherwise, there would be no end to litigation.71
Aside from this, petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir assert that their right to equal protection was
violated due to "selective prosecution." Only a handful of DPWH-ARMM officials were charged of violation
of Republic Act No. 3019. Several employees who allegedly participated in the preparation of project
documents were not indicted.72
Respondents counter that petitioners' claim of selective prosecution will not prosper as there is no proof
of "clear showing of intentional discrimination" against them.73
With regard to the alleged early mobilization of contractors prior to the scheduled public bidding,
petitioner Baraguir asserts that he has neither favored nor given arty unwarranted benefit to any
contractor. He asserts that the risk-taking strategy of some contractors in choosing to mobilize their
equipment ahead of public bidding is beyond the control of the Pre-Qualification Bids and Awards
Committee. Furthermore, he did not prepare the certificates of mobilization.74 Petitioner Guiani also
denies giving unwarranted benefits to certain parties.75 He claims that the certificates of mobilization, on
which the prosecution heavily relies, prove nothing.76
Further, petitioner Abubakar argues that the Contract for Survey Work executed by petitioner Guiani and
a certain Engineer Ricardo Arce served as the basis for the advance payment given to Arce Engineering
Services. The Contract for Survey Work explicitly stated that Arce Engineering Services would
immediately be entitled to 30% of the contract price upon the contract's execution. Thus, he had no
other choice but to approve the disbursement. Furthermore, he claims that petitioner Guiani's acquittal
in Criminal Case No. 24971 should be considered in his favor.77 Petitioner Baraguir raises a similar
defense. He argues that he relied in good faith on the contract entered into by petitioner Guiani with
Arce Engineering Services.78
Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir add that they are entitled to the justifying circumstance under Article
11(6) of the Revised Penal Code for relying on the Contract for Survey Work.79
As to the P14,400,000.00 disbursement for sub-base aggregates, petitioner Abubakar argues that his
signatures on the disbursement vouchers have no bearing and were affixed on them as a formality
pursuant to DPWHARMM Memorandum80 dated February 17, 1992.81 Petitioner Baraguir, on the other
hand, insists that "cement" was indicated on the disbursement vouchers and that there were no traces
of alterations or superimpositions at the time he affixed his signature.82
Throughout their pleadings, petitioners invoke good faith as a defense. They claim that they relied on
the representations and assurances of their subordinates who were more versed on technical
matters.83 Petitioner Guiani, in particular, asserts that the Sandiganbayan should have applied the Arias
doctrine in this case. He should not have been penalized for relying on the acts of his subordinates,
which he presumed were done in accordance with law.84
Respondents disagree and claim that the Arias doctrine is inapplicable. They assert that petitioners
cannot claim good faith as they were fully aware of the bidding irregularities. The evidence presented by
the prosecution show that certificates of mobilization were issued prior to the conduct of actual public
bidding. Further, petitioners cannot claim good faith in allowing Arce Engineering Services to claim 30%
as advance payment considering that they knew of the 15% limitation.85
Meanwhile, petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir assert that the government did not suffer undue injury
considering that the projects in dispute have already been completed. They argue that undue injury, in
the context of Republic Act No. 3019, has been equated by this Court with the civil law concept of actual
damages. They believe that the prosecution failed to substantiate the actual injury sustained by the
government.86
Respondents, on the other hand, argue that a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 may be
committed in two (2) ways, namely: by causing any undue injury to a party, or by giving unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference to any party.87
This case presents the following issues for this Court's resolution:
First, whether or not petitioners Farouk B. Abubakar and Ulama S. Baraguir are entitled to a new trial for
the alleged incompetence of their former counsel;
Second, whether or not the right of petitioners Farouk B. Abubakar and Ulama S. Baraguir to the equal
protection of the laws was violated due to "selective prosecution";
Third, whether or not the prosecution was able to establish petitioners Farouk B. Abubakar, Ulama S.
Baraguir, and Datukan M. Guiani 's guilt beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019; and
Finally, whether or not petitioners Farouk B. Abubakar, Ulama S. Baraguir, and Datukan M. Guiani
should be exonerated from criminal liability based on the Arias doctrine.
Lawyers act on behalf of their clients with binding effect.88 This is the necessary consequence of the
fiduciary relationship created between a lawyer and a client. Once engaged, a counsel holds "the implied
authority to do all acts which are necessary or, at least, incidental to the prosecution and management
of the suit."89 The acts of counsel are deemed acts of the client.
Thus, as a rule, parties are bound by the acts, omissions, and mistakes of their counsel.90 To adopt a
contrary principle may lead to unnecessary delays, indefinite court proceedings, and possibly no end to
litigation for all that a defeated party would do is to claim .that his or her counsel acted negligently.91 An
exception to this is when the gross and inexcusable negligence of counsel deprives the latter's client of
his or her day in court. The allegation of gross and inexcusable negligence, however, must be
substantiated.92 In determining whether the case falls under the exception, courts should always be
guided by the principle that parties must be "given the fullest opportunity to establish the merits of
[their] action or defense."93
The general rule on the binding effect of counsel's acts and omissions has been applied with respect to
applications for a new trial. In U.S. v. Umali:94
In criminal as well as in civil cases, it has frequently been held that the fact that blunders and mistakes
may have been made in the conduct of the proceedings in the trial court, as a result of the ignorance,
inexperience, or incompetence of counsel, does not furnish a ground for a new trial.
....
So it has been held that mistakes of attorneys as to the competency of a witness, the sufficiency,
relevancy, materiality, or immateriality of certain evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof
are not proper grounds for a new trial; and in general the client is bound by the action of his counsel in
the conduct of his case, and can not be heard to complain that the result of the litigation might have
been different had counsel proceeded differently.95 (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)
Liberality has been applied in criminal cases but under exceptional circumstances. Given that a person's
liberty is at stake in a criminal case, Umali concedes that the strict application of the general rule may
lead to a manifest miscarriage of justice.96 Thus, appropriate relief may be accorded to a defendant who
has shown a meritorious defense and who has satisfied the court that acquittal would follow after the
introduction of omitted evidence:
It must be admitted, however, that courts of last resort have occasionally relaxed the strict application
of this rule in criminal cases, where the defendants, having otherwise a good case, were able to satisfy
the court that acquittal would in all probability have followed the introduction of certain testimony, which
was not submitted at the trial under improper or injudicious advice of incompetent counsel.97
In De Guzman v. Sandiganbayan,98 the accused was convicted based solely on the testimony of the
prosecution's witness. The accused was unable to present any evidence due to his counsel's insistence in
filing a demurrer to evidence despite the Sandiganbayan's denial of the motion for leave to file it.99 This
was considered by this Court as gross negligence:
Petitioner's present dilemma is certainly not something reducible to pesos and centavos. No less than his
liberty is at stake here. And he is just about to lose it simply because his former lawyers pursued a
carelessly contrived procedural strategy of insisting on what has already become an imprudent remedy,
as aforediscussed, which thus forbade petitioner from offering his evidence all the while available for
presentation before the Sandiganbayan. Under the circumstances, higher interests of justice and equity
demand that petitioner be not penalized for the costly importunings of his previous lawyers based on the
same principles why this Court had, on many occasions where it granted new trial, excused parties from
the negligence or mistakes of counsel. To cling to the general rule in this case is only to condone rather
than rectify a serious injustice to petitioners whose only fault was to repose his faith and entrust his
innocence to his previous lawyers. Consequently, the receipts and other documents constituting his
evidence which he failed to present in the Sandiganbayan are entitled to be appreciated, however, by
that forum and not this Court, for the general rule is that we are not triers of facts. Without prejudging
the result of such appreciation, petitioner's documentary evidences prima facie appear strong when
reckoned with the lone prosecution witness Angeles' testimony, indicating that official training programs
were indeed actually conducted and that the P200,000.00 cash advance he received were spent entirely
for those programs.100 (Citation omitted)
Similarly, in Callangan v. People of the Philippines,101 the accused was unable to present any evidence.
This Court, in granting new trial, characterized the "chronic inaction of [the accused's] counsel on
important incidents and stages of the criminal proceedings" as a denial of due process:102
The omissions of petitioner's counsel amounted to an abandonment or total disregard of her case. They
show conscious indifference to or utter disregard of the possible repercussions to his client. Thus, the
chronic inaction of petitioner's counsel on important incidents and stages of the criminal proceedings
constituted gross negligence.
The RTC itself found that petitioner never had the chance to present her defense because of the
nonfeasance (malfeasance, even) of her counsel. It also concluded that, effectively, she was without
counsel. Considering these findings, to deprive petitioner of her liberty without affording her the right to
be assisted by counsel is to deny her due process.103
In one occasion, this Court allowed the presentation of additional evidence even if the accused initially
adduced evidence during trial. This level ofliberality, however, is conditioned upon a finding that the
introduction of omitted evidence would probably alter the result of the case.
In Abrajano v. Court of Appeals,104 this Court remanded the case to the trial court for the conduct of new
trial to allow the accused to present additional evidence. The same standard in Umali was applied:
Nevertheless, courts of last resort have occasionally relaxed the strict application of the rule that the
acts of counsel bind the client in criminal cases, where the defendants, having otherwise a good case
were able to satisfy the Court that acquittal would in all probability have followed the introduction of
certain testimonies, which were not submitted at the trial under improper or injudicious advi[c]e of
incompetent counsel. While conceding that these cases are extremely rare, the Court, in United States
v. Umali, allowed for the relaxation of the rule. Where there are very exceptional circumstances, and
where a review of the whole record taken together with the evidence improvidently omitted would
clearly justify the conclusion that the omission had resulted in the conviction of one innocent of the
crime charged, a new trial may be granted.
....
In the case at bar, the circumstance that petitioner allegedly used the name "Carmen" in her first
marriage instead ofCarmelita, together with the affidavits she submitted, particularly those of Mrs.
Priscila Alimagno, supposedly a witness to Carmen's marriage to Mauro Espinosa, and petitioner's sister
Jocelyn Gilbuena, who attested that Carmen is indeed their half-sister, would in our mind probably alter
the result of this case. A new trial is therefore necessary if justice is to be served.105 (Citations omitted)
Given this standard, this Court holds that petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir are not entitled to a new
trial.
First, they failed to convince this Court that they have a meritorious defense and that the evidence they
seek to introduce would probably lead to their acquittal.
The present case does not involve the same factual circumstances in De Guzman or in Callangan where
the accused were absolutely denied the opportunity to present evidence due to the actuations of their
counsels. In those cases, it was just and reasonable for this Court to take a much more liberal stance
considering that there was a denial of due process. The same kind of liberality, however, cannot be
applied here. Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir, through counsel, presented their evidence and made
out their case before the Sandiganbayan. Based on Umali and Abrajano, it is incumbent upon them to
present a meritorious defense and to convince this Court that the evidence omitted by their former
counsel would probably alter the results of the case. They cannot simply allege that they were deprived
of due process or that their defense was not fully threshed out during trial.
Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir failed to discharge this burden.
Petitioners seek to introduce as evidence their personnel data files, contracts of service, and
appointment papers to prove that they were engaged in a temporary capacity. These documents would
certainly not alter the results of the case. Regardless of the nature of their employment, petitioners are
required to abide by the rules and regulations on public bidding and disbursement of public funds.
Testimony of handwriting experts, original copies of disbursement vouchers, and written requests of
contractors who wished to avail of the prepayment scheme under DPWH Department Order No. 42
would probably not change the finding on the irregularities pertaining to the P14,400,000.00
disbursement for sub-base aggregates.
The disbursement vouchers106 that petitioner Abubakar seeks to introduce would not exonerate him from
liability in Criminal Case Nos. 24972, 24979, 24980, 24982, and 24983, where the disbursement
vouchers are not relevant. The disbursement vouchers relate to the payment of the balance of
mobilization fees to contractors. The criminal cases cited by Abubakar, on the other hand, pertain to the
alleged advance payment for sub-base aggregates.
Likewise, the evidence cited by petitioner Baraguir would not affect the result of the case against him.
There is no reason to introduce pieces of evidence to prove the publication of the invitation to bid and
the conduct of actual bidding. The occurrence of these events was not disputed by the parties.
Meanwhile, the Notices of Award and Notices to Commence, even if admitted, would not change the
finding that certain contractors deployed their equipment ahead of public bidding. The pieces of evidence
that petitioner Baraguir ought to have presented are those tending to prove that the contractors only
mobilized after they won the bidding. This would have destroyed the prosecution's theory and the basis
for the criminal charge.107
Second, petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir's former counsel was not grossly negligent. Their former
counsel may have failed to present other pieces of evidence in addition to what their co-accused had
presented. He may have also failed to incorporate other arguments in the record of the case. However,
these cannot be considered as grossly negligent acts.
Assessments regarding the materiality or relevancy of evidence, competency of witnesses, and
procedural technique generally fall within the expertise and control of counsel.108 This Court has held
that for a claim of gross negligence to prosper, "nothing short of clear abandonment of the client's cause
must be shown."109
Litigants cannot always be assured that their expectations regarding their counsel's competence would
be met. In Ong Lay Hin v. Court of Appeals:110
The state does not guarantee to the client that they will receive the kind of service that they expect.
Through this court, we set the standard on competence and integrity through the application
requirements and our disciplinary powers. Whether counsel discharges his or her role to the satisfaction
of the client is a matter that will ideally be necessarily monitored but, at present, is too impractical.
Besides, finding good counsel is also the responsibility of the client especially when he or she can afford
to do so. Upholding client autonomy in these choices is infinitely a better policy choice than assuming
that the state is omniscient. Some degree of error must, therefore, be borne by the client who does
have the capacity to make choices.
This is one of the bases of the doctrine that the error of counsel visits the client. This court will cease to
perform its social functions if it provides succor to all who are not satisfied with the services of their
counsel.111
Furthermore, in Aguila v. Court of First Instance of Batangas:112
Persons are allowed to practice law only after they shall have passed the bar examinations, which
merely determine if they have the minimum requirements to engage in the exercise of the legal
profession. This is no guaranty, of course, that they will discharge their duties with full fidelity to their
clients or with unfailing mastery or at least appreciation of the law. The law, to be fair, is not really all
that simple; there are parts that are rather complicated and may challenge the skills of many lawyers.
By and large, however, the practice of the law should not present much difficulty unless by some
unfortunate quirk of fate, the lawyer has been allowed to enter the bar despite his lack of preparation,
or, while familiar with the intricacies of his calling, is nevertheless neglectful of his duties and does not
pay proper attention to his work.113
II
The prosecution of offenses is generally addressed to the sound discretion of the fiscal. A claim of
"selective prosecution"114 may only prosper if there is extrinsic evidence of "clear showing of intentional
discrimination."115 The prosecution of one person to the exclusion of others who may be just as guilty
does not automatically entail a violation of the equal protection clause.
Selective prosecution is a concept that is foreign to this jurisdiction. It originated from United States v.
Armstrong,116 a 1996 case decided by the United States Supreme Court.117 A case for selective
prosecution arises when a prosecutor charges defendants based on "constitutionally prohibited standards
such as race, religion or other arbitrary classification."118 Essentially, a selective prosecution claim rests
upon an alleged violation of the equal protection clause.119
Although "selective prosecution" has not been formally adopted in this jurisdiction, there are cases that
have been decided by this Court recognizing the possibility of defendants being unduly discriminated
against through the prosecutorial process. The burden lies on the defendant to show discriminatory
intent through extrinsic evidence.
In People v. Dela Piedra,120 the accused was charged and convicted of large-scale illegal
recruitment.121 Among the arguments she raised in her appeal was the violation of the equal protection
clause as she was the only person who was charged. She pointed out that a certain Jasmine Alejandro
(Alejandro), the person who handed out application forms, was not indicted. She concluded that the
prosecution discriminated against her based on "regional origins." She was a Cebuana while Alejandro
was a Zamboangueña.122
In rejecting the accused's argument, this Court held that the prosecution of one person to the exclusion
of others who may be just as guilty does not automatically entail a violation of the equal protection
clause.123 There must be a showing of discriminatory intent or "clear and intentional discrimination,"
which can only be established through extrinsic evidence. In Dela Piedra:
Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or
mistaken performance of the statutory duty. although a violation of the statute, is not without more a
denial of the equal protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its
face, resulting in its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of
equal protection unless there is shown to be present in it an element
of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken with respect
to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a
discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose
is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination." Appellant has failed
to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on
the part of the prosecuting officials.
The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound assessment whether the
evidence before it can justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense. The
presumption is that the prosecuting officers regularly performed their duties, and this presumption can
be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere speculation. Indeed, appellant has not
presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that appellant, a Cebuana,
was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboangueña, the guilty party in appellant's
eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal
protection of the laws.
There is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellant's prosecution.

While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not
follow that they are to be protected in the commission of crime. It would be unconscionable, for
instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of murder because others have murdered with impunity. The
remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty
at the expense of society . . . Protection of the law will be extended to all persons equally in the pursuit
of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in the
commission of a crime.
Likewise,
[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be converted into a
defense for others charged with crime, the result would be that the trial of the district attorney for
nonfeasance would become an issue in the trial of many persons charged with heinous crimes and the
enforcement of law would suffer a complete breakdown.124 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
The principle established in Dela Piedra was reiterated and applied in People v. Dumlao:125
A discriminatory purpose is never presumed. It must be remembered that it was not solely respondent
who was charged, but also five of the seven board members. If, indeed, there were discrimination,
respondent Dumlao alone could have been charged. But this was not the case. Fmther, the fact that the
dismissal of the case against his co-accused Canlas and Clave was not appealed is not sufficient to cry
discrimination. This is likewise true for the non-inclusion of the two government officials who signed the
LeasePurchase Agreement and the other two board members. Mere speculation, unsupported by
convincing evidence, cannot establish discrimination on the part of the prosecution and the denial to
respondent of the equal protection of the laws.126
The reason for the requirement of "clear and intentional discrimination" lies in the discretion given to
fiscals in the prosecution of offenses. In People v. Pineda,127 this Court held that the choice of who to
prosecute is addressed to the sound discretion of the investigating prosecutor. He or she may not be
compelled to charge persons when the evidence is insufficient to establish probable cause:
A prosecuting attorney, by the nature of his office, is under no compulsion to file a particular criminal
information where he is not convinced that he has evidence to prop up the averments thereof, or that
the evidence at hand points to a different conclusion. This is not to discount the possibility of the
commission of abuses on the part of the prosecutor. But we must have to recognize that a prosecuting
attorney should not be unduly compelled to work against his conviction. In case of doubt, we should give
him the benefit thereof. A contrary rule may result in our court being unnecessarily swamped with
unmeritorious cases. Worse still, a criminal suspect's right to due process - the sporting idea of fair play
- may be transgressed.128
In Alberto v. De la Cruz,129 this Court said:
Although this power and prerogative of the Fiscal, to determine whether or not the evidence at hand is
sufficient to form a reasonable belief that a person committed an offense, is not absolute and subject to
judicial review, it would be embarrassing for the prosecuting attorney to be compelled to prosecute a
case when he is in no position to do so, because in his opinion, he does not have the necessary evidence
to secure a conviction, or he is not convinced of the merits of the case. The better procedure would be to
appeal the Fiscal's decision to the Ministry of Justice and/or ask for a special prosecutor.130 (Citation
omitted)
Petitioners failed to establish discriminatory intent on the part of the Ombudsman in choosing not to
indict other alleged participants to the anomalous transactions. Their contention that several other public
officials were not criminally charged, by itself, does not amount to a violation of petitioners Abubakar
and Baraguir's right to equal protection of laws. The evidence against the others may have been
insufficient to establish probable cause. There may have been no evidence at all. At this point, all this
Court could do is speculate. In the absence of extrinsic evidence establishing discriminatory intent, a
claim of selective prosecution cannot prosper.
III
Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 punishes a public officer who causes "any undue injury to any
party, including the Government" or gives "any private party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or
preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality,
evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence."
A conviction under this provision reqmres the concurrence of the following elements:
1. The accused must be a public officer discharging administrative, judicial or official

functions;
2. He [or she] must have acted with manifest partiality, evident bad faith or [gross]
inexcusable negligence;
3. That his [or her] action caused any undue injury to any party, including the
government, or giving any private party unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference
in the discharge of his functions.131
The second element provides the modalities by which a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No.
3019 may be committed. "Manifest partiality," "evident bad faith," or "gross inexcusable negligence" are
not separate offenses,132 and proof of the existence of any of these three (3) "in connection with the
prohibited acts . . . is enough to convict."133
These terms were defined in Uriarte v. People:134

There is "manifest partiality" when there is a clear, notorious or plain inclination or predilection to
favor one side or person rather than another. "Evident bad faith" connotes not only bad judgment but
also palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing for some perverse motive or ill will. It contemplates a state of mind affirmatively operating
with furtive design or with some motive or self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purposes. "Gross
inexcusable negligence" refers to negligence characterized by the want of even the slightest care,
acting or omitting to act in a situation where there is a duty to act, not inadvertently but willfully and
intentionally, with conscious indifference to consequences insofar as other persons may be
affected.135 (Emphasis in the original, citations omitted)
The third element refers to two (2) separate acts that qualify as a violation of Section 3(e) of Republic
Act No. 3019. An accused may be charged with the commission of either or both.
An accused is said to have caused undue injury to the government or any party when the latter sustains
actual loss or damage, which must exist as a fact and cannot be based on speculations or conjectures.
Thus, in a situation where the government could have been defrauded, the law would be inapplicable,
there being no actual loss or damage sustained.136
In Pecho v. Sandiganbayan,137 this Court was faced with the issue of whether the attempted or
frustrated stages of the offense defined in Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 are punishable. The
accused and his coconspirators' plan to defraud the government was prevented through the timely
intervention of customs officials.138 In holding that Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 only covers
consummated acts, this Court reasoned among others that:
[T]he third requisite of Section 3(e), viz., "causing undue injury to any party, including the
government," could only mean actual injury or damage which must be established by evidence. [T]he
word causing is the present participle of the word cause. As a verb, the latter means "to be the cause or
occasion of; to effect as an agent; to bring about; to bring into existence; to make to induce; to
compel." The word undue means "more than necessary; not proper; illegal." And the word injury means
"any wrong or damage done to another, either in his person, rights, reputation or property. The invasion
of any legally protected interest of another." Taken together, proof of actual injury or damage is
required.
....
No actual injury or damage having been caused to the Government due to the timely 100% examination
of the shipment and the subsequent issuance of a hold order and a warrant of seizure and detention, the
petitioner must, perforce, be acquitted of the violation of Section 3 (e) of R.A. No. 3019.139 (Citations
omitted)
The loss or damage need not be proven with actual certainty. However, there must be "some reasonable
basis by which the court can measure it."140 Aside from this, the loss or damage must be
substantial.141 It must be "more than necessary, excessive, improper or illegal."142
The second punishable act under Section 3(e) ofRepublic Act No. 3019 is the giving of unwarranted
benefits, advantage, or preference to a private party. This does not require actual damage as it is
sufficient that the accused has given "unjustified favor or benefit to another."143
The terms "unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference" were defined in Uriarte:144

[U]nwarranted means lacking adequate or official support; unjustified; unauthorized; or without
justification or adequate reasons. Advantage means a more favorable or improved position or condition;
benefit or gain of any kind; benefit from course of action. Preference signifies priority or higher
evaluation or desirability; choice or estimation above another.145 (Emphasis in the original, citation
omitted)
III.A
This Court finds that petitioners Baraguir and Guiani gave unwarranted benefits and advantage to
several contractors by allowing them to deploy their equipment ahead of the scheduled public bidding.
As a matter of policy, public contracts are awarded through competitive public bidding. The purpose of
this process is two (2)-fold.
First, it protects public interest by giving the public the "best possible advantages thru open
competition."146 Open and fair competition among bidders is seen as a mechanism by which the public
may obtain the best terms on a given contract. Participating bidders offer competing proposals, which
are evaluated by the appropriate authority "to determine the bid most favorable to the government."147
Second, competitive public bidding avoids "suspicion of favoritism and anomalies in the execution of
public contracts."148
These important public policy considerations demand the strict observance of procedural rules relating to
the bidding process.149
Under Presidential Decree No. 1594, a public contract shall be awarded to the lowest prequalified bidder.
The bid must comply with the terms and conditions stated in the call to bid and must be the most
advantageous to the government.150 After the evaluation of the bids, the winning bidder shall be given a
Notice of Award. The concerned government office or agency and the successful bidder will then execute
the contract, which shall be forwarded to the head of the concerned government office or agency for
approval. The contract's approval signifies its perfection and it is at this time when the successful bidder
may be allowed to commence work upon receipt of a Notice to Proceed.151
Petitioners Baraguir and Guiani insist that the prosecution failed to establish their intent to favor some
contractors in the bidding process. Petitioner Guiani claims that the certificates of mobilization, on which
the prosecution heavily relies, prove nothing.
Their arguments are unmeritorious.
The certificates of mobilization, which were issued at least one (1) week before the date of public
bidding, categorically identified HMB Construction and Supply, Kutawato Construction, Al Mohandiz
Construction, JM Construction, PMA Construction, Al-Aziz-Engineering, and MGL Construction as
contractors for some portions of the Awang-Nuro Road and Cotabato-Lanao Road Projects.
The acts of identifying certain contractors ahead of the scheduled public bidding and of allowing the
advanced deployment of their equipment through the issuance of certificates of mobilization are glaring
irregularities in the bidding procedure that engender suspicion of favoritism and partiality towards the
seven (7) contractors. These irregularities create a reasonable, if not conclusive, presumption that the
concerned public officials had no intention of complying with the rules on public bidding and that the
results were already predetermined.
Although petitiOner Baraguir concedes that contractors can only commence work after they receive a
notice to proceed, he justifies the irregularity on an alleged "risk-taking strategy' employed by some
contractors.152
This appears to be a flimsy excuse. There is no justifiable reason why contractors should be allowed to
deploy their equipment in advance considering that it would defeat the very purpose of competitive
public bidding. Benefits derived from this practice, if any, would certainly not redound to the
government.
Aside from this, the alleged purpose of the contractors in mobilizing their equipment ahead of public
bidding is speculative. Prospective contractors are required to possess the technical capability to execute
the implementation of a given project. Section 3(b) of Presidential Decree No. 1594 lists as a condition
for all bidders the "[a]vailability and commitment of the contractor's equipment to be used for the
subject project."153 The PreQualification Bids and Awards Committee is mandated under the
implementing rules and regulations to look into the "suitability of [the contractor's] available
construction equipment" in assessing technical capability.154
The screening process ensures that bidders have the necessary equipment and personnel to carry out
the implementation of a particular government project. In this regard, it may not even be possible for a
winning bidder to lease equipment from another contractor after it has won because technical capability
is evaluated before the submission of the bids. Assuming that prospective bidders would be permitted to
sublease their equipment from other entities, the sublease agreement should already be finalized prior
to the conduct of public bidding.
Clearly, petitioners Baraguir and Guiani gave seven (7) contractors unwarranted benefits and advantage
through manifest partiality. Petitioner Baraguir also gave unwarranted benefits and advantage to the
contractors through gross inexcusable negligence. Admittedly, he failed to check the dates on the
certificates of mobilization when they were presented to him for his signature.155
III.B
Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir assert that they should benefit from the judgment of acquittal in
Criminal Case No. 24971. The judgment in Criminal Case No. 24971 should likewise apply in Criminal
Case No. 24970.156
Concededly, Criminal Case Nos. 24970 and 24971 are similar in that they are founded upon the same
contract, particularly the Contract for Survey Work.157 However, the charges are different. Petitioner
Guiani was charged in Criminal Case No. 24971 for allegedly entering into an unnecessary engineering
survey contract with Arce Engineering Services. He was acquitted upon a finding that the engineering
survey was indispensable for the project's implementation. On the other hand, in Criminal Case No.
24970, petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani were charged for causing the payment of excessive
mobilization fees to Arce Engineering Services. Therefore, the acquittal of petitioner Guiani in Criminal
Case No. 24971 would have no effect on Criminal Case No. 24970.
The implementing rules and regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1594 allow contractors to obtain
advance payment from the government during the contract's implementation stage. Before a
disbursement can be made, the contractor must submit a written request and furnish an irrevocable
standby letter of credit or a guarantee payment bond. The rules limit the amount of advance payment to
15% of the total contract price.158
A provision in a contract stipulating for a higher percentage of advance payment is invalid. In J.C. Lopez
& Associates, Inc. v. Commission on Audit,159 this Court struck down a contractual provision authorizing
the payment of P18,000,000.00 to a contractor as mobilization cost. The amount, which was 26% of the
total contract price, exceeded the prescribed limitation for advance payment under the implementing
rules and regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1594. This Court held that although parties may
stipulate on such tenns and conditions that they deem convenient, these stipulations should not be
contrary to law. The justification given by the petitioner in that case for the stipulated mobilization cost
was brushed aside.160
In this case, the Contract for Survey Work entered into by petitioner Guiani with Arce Engineering
Services stated, in part:
4. As compensation for the services to be rendered by the SURVEYOR to the CLIENT, the CLIENT hereby
agrees to pay the SURVEYOR the sum of TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P200,000.00), with the
following as Mode of Payment;
4.1. Thirty percent of the Contract Cost or P60,000.00 upon signing of this CONTRACT, with the
SURVEYOR posting a Surety Bond of equal amount[.]161
Section 4 of the Contract for Survey Work gave Arce Engineering Services the right to secure 30% of the
contract cost as advance payment or mobilization fee upon the contract's execution. This is clearly
contrary to the implementing rules and regulations of Presidential Decree No. 1594 on advance
payment.
Petitioner Guiani cannot shift the blame to his subordinates because he entered into the contract with
Arce Engineering Services as Regional Secretary. In consenting to the 30% advance payment, petitioner
Guiani, through evident bad faith, gave unwarranted benefits to Arce Engineering Services. Bad faith, as
contemplated under Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019, connotes "not only bad judgment but also
palpably and patently fraudulent and dishonest purpose to do moral obliquity or conscious
wrongdoing."162
Petitioners impute the increased mobilization fee to the risks that Arce Engineering Services might
encounter in the area to be surveyed.
As pointed out by the Commission on Audit, risks during the actual survey, if any, could have been
covered by the total contract cost.163 If Arce Engineering Services foresaw security and safety issues in
the area, these could have been factored into the contract price. There is no justifiable reason for the
government to award additional mobilization fees to Arce Engineering Services.
Petitioners Abubakar and Baraguir, in allowing the disbursement, gave unwarranted benefits to Arce
Engineering Services through evident bad faith. They cannot seek refuge in the argument that they
relied in good faith on what was stated in the Contract for Survey Vork because the illegality was patent
on the face of the contract. The disbursement should not have been allowed for being contrary to the
provisions of Presidential Decree No. 1594. Furthermore, they are not entitled to the justifying
circumstance of "any person who acts in obedience to an order issued by a superior" under Article 11(6)
of the Revised Penal Code as the order issued by the superior must be for a lawful purpose.164 In this
case, the contractual provision allowing Arce Engineering Services to claim 30% of the contract price as
mobilization fees is clearly unlawful.
III.C
Section 88(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1445165 prohibits advance payments on undelivered supplies
and on services that have not yet been rendered. It states:
CHAPTER 4
Application of Appropriated Funds
....
Section 88. Prohibition Against Advance Payment on Government Contracts. - (1) Except with the prior
approval of the President (Prime Minister) the government shall not be obliged to make an advance
payment for services not yet rendered or for supplies and materials not yet delivered under any contract
therefor. No payment, partial or final, shall be made on any such contract except upon a certification by
the head of the agency concerned to the effect that the services or supplies and materials have been
rendered or delivered in accordance with the terms of the contract and have been duly inspected and
accepted.
An exception to the prohibition on advance payment under Presidential Decree No. 1445 is Memorandum
Order No. 341, which allows government agencies that implement government infrastructure projects to
procure cement, reinforcing steel bars, and asphalt on a pre-payment basis.
The February 18, 1991 Guidelines166 issued by the Department of Public Works and Highways require
contractors who wish to avail of the prepayment facility to submit a written request addressed to the
head of the implementing government agency with the following requirements:
(a) the quantities of materials for which pre-payment is desired which should not exceed the project
requirements per balance of work as of the filing date of the request;
(b) the unit cost of the materials and the corresponding total cost of quantities applied for;
(c) the name of the Supplier to which payment shall be made;
(d) [the] Contract Agreement between Contractor and Supplier indicating the quantities of materials
covered by the purchase agreement, their unit cost and corresponding cost, mode/timing of deliveries to
the project site and terms of payment; [and]
(e) the manner of recouping the amount prepaid, the recovery period of which shall not exceed the date
when the project shall have been 80% complete[.]167
The contractor must also furnish a surety bond as guarantee.168
The head of the implementing agency, on the other hand, is required to process the request and may
make the necessary modifications based on the following:
(a) [the] quantities requested for pre-payment are the actual requirements of the project per balance of
work therein;
(b) the total amounts pre-paid shall be fully recovered not later than the time when 80% of the project
shall have been completed;
(c) recouping the pre-paid amount during the scheduled recovery period will not strain the cash flow of
the contractor which is detrimental to his operations and successful completion of the project. The cash
flow shall consider remaining deductions due to retainage and recoupement of the 15% advance
payment.169
In the present case, petitioners insist that the P14,400,000.00 advance payment was lawful because it
was actually pre-payment for cement under Memorandum Order No. 341. Petitioners posit that the
disbursement vouchers might have been altered to reflect "sub-base aggregates."
The issue on the alleged forgery was never addressed by the Sandiganbayan in its December 8, 2011
Decision. There was also no express finding during the Commission on Audit's investigation as to who
allegedly altered the disbursement vouchers. Nevertheless, the Sandiganbayan observed that the official
receipts issued by the contractors indicated that the payment pertained to the purchase of sub-base
aggregates.170 DPWH-ARMM issued numerous checks171 for which receipts were issued.172 If petitioners'
claims were true, then they should have at least questioned what was stated in the official receipts and
requested for the rectification of the discrepancy.
Thus, there is reason to believe that the P14,400,000.00 was paid in advance for the procurement of
sub-base aggregates.
Considering that sub-base aggregates are excluded from the list of construction materials allowed to be
procured under a pre-payment scheme, the rules on advance payment under Presidential Decree No.
1445 should apply. For an advance payment to be lawful, the materials or supplies should have been
delivered in accordance with the contract and should have been duly inspected and accepted. If there is
no delivery, prior approval of the President is required.173
The Sandiganbayan found that the procurement of sub-base aggregates was not supported by any
purchase orders. There were also no receipts to evidence delivery of the materials on-site.174 Thus, the
disbursement should not have been approved by petitioners due to the absence of appropriate
supporting documents. Undue benefit was given to contractors when they were allowed to claim advance
payments totaling P14,400,000.00 for undelivered materials. These contractors had no right to receive
them under Section 88(1) of Presidential Decree No. 1445.
IV
This Court's ruling in Arias v. Sandiganbayan175 cannot exonerate petitioners from criminal liability.
Arias laid down the doctrine that heads of offices may, in good faith, rely to a certain extent on the acts
of their subordinates "who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations."176 This is based
upon the recognition that heads of offices cannot be expected to examine every single document relative
to government transactions:
We would be setting a bad precedent if a head of office plagued by all too common problems - dishonest
or negligent subordinates, overwork, multiple assignments or positions, or plain incompetence - is
suddenly swept into a conspiracy conviction simply because he did not personally examine every single
detail, painstakingly trace every step from inception, and investigate the motives of every person
involved in a transaction before affixing his signature as the final approving authority.
There appears to be no question from the records that [the] documents used in the negotiated sale were
falsified. A key tax declaration had a typewritten number instead of being machine numbered. The
registration stampmark was antedated and the land [was] reclassified as residential instead of ricefield.
But were the petitioners guilty of conspiracy in the falsification and the subsequent charge of causing
undue injury and damage to the Government?
We can, in retrospect, argue that Arias should have probed records, inspected documents, received
procedures, and questioned persons. It is doubtful if any auditor for a fairly sized office could personally
do all these things in all vouchers presented for his signature. The Court would be asking for the
impossible. All heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable extent on their subordinates and on the
good faith of those who prepare bids, purchase supplies, or enter into negotiations. If a department
secretary entertains important visitors, the auditor is not ordinarily expected to call the restaurant about
the amount of the bill, question each guest whether he was present at the luncheon, inquire whether the
correct amount of food was served, and otherwise personally look into the reimbursement voucher's
accuracy, propriety, and sufficiency. There has to be some added reason why he should examine each
voucher in such detail. Any executive head of even small government agencies or commissions can
attest to the volume of papers that must be signed. There are hundreds of documents, letters,
memoranda, vouchers, and supporting papers that routinely pass through his hands. The number in
bigger offices or departments is even more appalling.177 (Emphasis supplied)
The application of the doctrine is subject to the qualification that the public official has no foreknowledge
of any facts or circumstances that would prompt him or her to investigate or exercise a greater degree
of care.178 In a number of cases, this Court refused to apply the Arias doctrine considering that there
were circumstances that should have prompted the government official to inquire further.179
In the present case, the Arias doctrine cannot exonerate petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir, or Guiani from
criminal liability. There were circumstances that should have prompted them to make further inquiries
on the transactions subject of this case.
In Criminal Case Nos. 24963-24969 on the early mobilization of contractors, the irregularity was already
apparent on the face of the certificates of mobilization, which bore dates earlier than the scheduled
public bidding. This should have already roused suspicion from petitioners Baraguir and Guiani, who
were the last signatories and final approving authorities.
The same can be said for Criminal Case No. 24970. The Contract of Survey Work, which was used as the
primary supporting document for the disbursement of the 30% mobilization fee to Arce Engineering
Services, contained a patently illegal stipulation. Petitioner Guiani cannot blame his subordinates and
claim that he acted in good faith considering that he entered into the contract with Arce Engineering
Services.
Petitioners should have also made further inqmnes regarding the P14,400,000.00 advance payment for
sub-aggregates. There were no appropriate documents such as purchase orders and delivery receipts to
support this disbursement.
The rules on public bidding and on public funds disbursement are imbued with public interest. The
positions and functions of petitioners Abubakar, Baraguir, and Guiani impose upon them a greater
responsibility in ensuring that rules on these matters are complied with. They are expected to exercise a
greater degree of diligence.
WHEREFORE, the Consolidated Petitions are DENIED. The assailed December 8, 2011 Decision and
June 19, 2012 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 24963 to 24969, Criminal Case
No. 24970, and Criminal Case Nos. 24972 to 24983 are AFFIRMED. Petitioner Farouk B. Abubakar is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt often (10) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act
No. 3019. Petitioners Ulama S. Baraguir and Datukan M. Guiani are found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of seventeen (17) counts of violation of Section 3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 201292, August 01, 2018
PENSION AND GRATUITY MANAGEMENT CENTER (PGMC), GHQ, AFP, CAMP AGUINALDO,
QUEZON CITY, REPRESENTED BY ITS CURRENT CHIEF, Petitioner, v. AAA (CA-G.R. SP NO.
04359-MIN),*** Respondent.
DECISION
DEL CASTILLO, J.:

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 are the August 16, 2011 Resolution2 and March 9, 2012
Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA) which dismissed the Petition for Certiorari in CA-G.R. SP No.
04359-MIN and denied herein petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration,4 respectively.
Factual Antecedents
Respondent AAA filed an action for support against her husband, BBB - a retired military person, before
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Isabela, Basilan. The case was docketed as Civil Case No. 921-259 and
assigned to RTC Branch 1.
On February 12, 2010, the trial court issued its Judgment,5 the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the petitioner and against the respondent by way
of the following:
1) Ordering the issuance of a Permanent Protection Order decreeing the respondent to support the
petitioner and the minor child CCC consisting of 50% of his monthly pension to be withheld regularly by
the Pension Gratuity Management Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, General Headquarters,
Fort Bonifacio, Taguig City, to be remitted by the latter by check directly to the petitioner;
2) Ordering the respondent to pay the petitioner support in arrears in the amount of P130,000.00,
representing monthly support of P5,000.00 commencing from January, 2008.
SO ORDERED.6
On February 12, 2010, the trial court issued a Permanent Protection Order7 reiterating what was decreed
in its Judgment and ordering the automatic withholding of BBB's monthly pension by petitioner Pension
Gratuity Management Center of the Armed Forces of the Philippines (PGMC) and its direct remittance to
respondent.
Petitioner filed a Manifestation (with Motion)8 questioning the trial court's directive for it to withhold half
of BBB's pension for direct remittance to respondent, arguing that it may not legally release any portion
of BBB's monthly pension to any other individual as it was not impleaded as a party defendant to Civil
Case No. 921-259; that it is prohibited by law from releasing and distributing monthly pensions of
retired military personnel to individuals other than the retirees themselves; and that pensions are public
funds and may not be appropriated for a purpose not intended by law. To this motion, respondent filed
her Comment,9 to which petitioner filed a Reply.10
In an April 23, 2011 Order,11 the trial court denied petitioner's Manifestation (withMotion) for lack of
merit.
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed an original Petition for Certiorari12 with the CA, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 04359-MIN.
In a August 16, 2011 Resolution, however, the CA dismissed the petition for being tardy and for failing
to strictly comply with Rules 43 and 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure (1997 Rules), particularly for
failure to make a valid tender of payment for the docket and other fees, for having remitted postal
money orders that bear an invalid date, and for failure to state the material dates of receipt of the
assailed judgment and order of the trial court and the date of filing of its motion for reconsideration.
Petitioner moved to reconsider, but the CA held its ground, insisting on a strict application of the 1997
Rules relative to the filing of petitions for certiorari.
Issues
In a February 10, 2016 Resolution,13 this Court resolved to give due course to the Petition, which
contains the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DISMISSED OUTRIGHT THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI UNDER RULE 65 ON THE GROUND THAT ONLY THE MATERIAL DATE OF RECEIPT OF
THE RESOLUTION OF THE RTC DENYING THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION FILED BY THE
PETITIONER WITH THE RTC WAS INDICATED.
II.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT STRICTLY APPLIED THE RULE ON
PAYMENT OF DOCKET FEES AND OTHER LAWFUL FEES BY ORDERING THE DISMISSAL OF THE PETITION
FOR CERTIORARI ON THE GROUND THAT THERE WAS NO VALID TENDER OF PAYMENT OF DOCKET AND
OTHER LAWFUL FEES DUE TO THE FACT THAT THE POSTAL MONEY ORDERS REMITTED BORE AN
INVALID DATE OF JULY 61, 2011.
III.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED WHEN IT REFUSED TO RULE ON SUBSTANTIVE
MERITS OF THE PETITION FOR CERTIORARI.14
Petitioner's Arguments
In praying that the assailed CA dispositions be set aside and that, instead, the case be remanded to the
CA for resolution thereof on the merits, petitioner pleads in its Petition and Reply15 substantial
compliance with the 1997 Rules; that rules of procedure must give way to substantial justice; that the
procedural lapses it committed are not fatal to its cause; and that the substantial issues and merit of its
case outweigh the procedural lapses it committed.
Respondent's Arguments
Respondent, on the other hand, simply counters in her Comment16 that the CA was correct in dismissing
the petition for certiorari for petitioner's failure to properly observe the procedural requirements.
Our Ruling
The Court denies the Petition.
The lone substantive issue for resolution in this suit - which would settle the case once and for all - is
whether petitioner may be validly ordered by the court to withhold half of BBB's pension for direct
remittance to respondent. The Court declares that it can; the issue has already been settled in a
previous case - one involving the very same petitioner in this case.
Thus, in Republic v. Yahon,17 the Court held that PGMC may be ordered to automatically deduct a
portion from the retirement benefits of its member-recipients for direct remittance to the latter's legal
spouse as and by way of support in compliance with a protection order issued by the trial court,
pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 9262 (RA 9262) or the Anti-Violence Against Women and
Their Children Act of 2004. The Court declared therein that RA 9262 - which is a special law; a later
enactment; a support enforcement legislation; and one that addresses one form of violence, which is
economic abuse against women and children - should be construed as laying down an exception to the
general rule that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The Court therein noted that RA 9262
itself explicitly authorizes the courts to order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of
the defendant or respondent by the employer, which shall be remitted directly to the plaintiff or
complainant - other laws to the contrary notwithstanding. Thus, the Court declared:
In this petition, the question of law presented is whether petitioner military institution may be ordered to
automatically deduct a percentage from the retirement benefits of its enlisted personnel, and to give the
same directly to the latter's lawful wife as spousal support in compliance with a protection order issued
by the RTC pursuant to R.A. No. 9262.
A protection order is an order issued by the court to prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary relief Its purpose is to
safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in their daily life and facilitate
the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life. The protection orders issued by the court may
be a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) or a Permanent Protection Order (PPO), while a protection order
that may be issued by the barangay shall be known as a Barangay Protection Order (BPO).
Section 8 of R.A. No. 9262 enumerates the reliefs that may be included in the TPO, PPO or BPO, to wit:
xxxx
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal
support. Notwithstanding other laws to the contrary, the court shall order an appropriate
percentage of the income or salary of the respondent to be withheld regularly by the
respondent's employer for the same to be automatically remitted directly to the woman.
Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in the remittance of support to the woman
and/or her child without justifiable cause shall render the respondent or his employer liable
for indirect contempt of court;
xxxx
Petitioner argues that it cannot comply with the RTC's directive for the automatic deduction of 50% from
S/Sgt. Yahon's retirement benefits and pension to be given directly to respondent, as it contravenes an
explicit mandate under the law governing the retirement and separation of military personnel.
The assailed provision is found in Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1638, which states:
Section 31. The benefits authorized under this Decree, except as provided herein, shall not be
subject to attachment, garnishment, levy, execution or any tax whatsoever; neither shall they
be assigned, ceded, or conveyed to any third person: Provided, That if a retired or separated
officer or enlisted man who is entitled to any benefit under this Decree has unsettled money and/or
property accountabilities incurred while in the active service, not more than fifty per centum of the
pension gratuity or other payment due such officer or enlisted man or his survivors under this Decree
may be withheld and be applied to settle such accountabilities.
A similar provision is found in R.A. No. 8291, otherwise known as the "Government Service Insurance
System Act of 1997," which reads:
SEC. 39. Exemption from Tax, Legal Process and Lien - x x x
xxxx
The funds and/or the properties referred to herein as well as the benefits, sums or monies corresponding
to the benefits under this Act shall be exempt from attachment, garnishment, execution, levy or other
processes issued by the courts, quasijudicial agencies or administrative bodies including Commission on
Audit (COA) disallowances and from all financial obligations of the members, including his pecuniary
accountability arising from or caused or occasioned by his exercise or performance of his official
functions or duties, or incurred relative to or in connection with his position or work except when his
monetary liability, contractual or otherwise, is in favor of the GSIS.
In Sarmiento v. Intermediate Appellate Court, we held that a court order directing the Philippine
National Bank to refrain from releasing to petitioner all his retirement benefits and to deliver one-half of
such monetary benefits to plaintiff as the latter's conjugal share is illegal and improper, as it violates
Section 26 of CA 186 (old GSIS Law) which exempts retirement benefits from execution.
The foregoing exemptions have been incorporated in the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended,
which governs execution of judgments and court orders. Section 13 of Rule 39 enumerates those
properties which are exempt from execution:
SEC. 13. Property exempt from execution. Except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the
following property, and no other, shall be exempt from execution:
xxxx
(1) The right to receive legal support, or money or property obtained as such support, or any pension
or gratuity from the Government;
It is basic in statutory construction that in case of irreconcilable conflict between two laws, the later
enactment must prevail, being the more recent expression of legislative will. Statutes must be so
construed and harmonized with other statutes as to form a uniform system of jurisprudence. However, if
several laws cannot be harmonized, the earlier statute must yield to the later enactment. The later law
is the latest expression of the legislative will.
We hold that Section 8(g) of R.A No. 9262, being a later enactment, should be construed as laying down
an exception to the general rule above-stated that retirement benefits are exempt from execution. The
law itself declares that the court shall order the withholding of a percentage of the income or salary of
the respondent by the employer, which shall be automatically remitted directly to the woman
"[n]otwithstanding other laws to the contrary."
Petitioner further contends that the directive under the TPO to segregate a portion of S/Sgt. Yahon's
retirement benefits was illegal because said [monies] remain as public funds, x x x
xxxx
We disagree.
Section 8(g) of R.A. No. 9262 used the general term "employer," which includes in its coverage the
military institution, S/Sgt. Yahon's employer. Where the law does not distinguish, courts should not
distinguish. Thus, Section 8(g) applies to all employers, whether private or government.
It bears stressing that Section 8(g) providing for spousal and child support, is a support enforcement
legislation. In the United States, provisions of the Child Support Enforcement Act allow garnishment of
certain federal funds where the intended recipient has failed to satisfy a legal obligation of child support.
As these provisions were designed 'to avoid sovereign immunity problems' and provide that 'moneys
payable by the Government to any individual are subject to child support enforcement proceedings,' the
law is clearly intended to 'create a limited waiver of sovereign immunity so that state courts could issue
valid orders directed against Government agencies attaching funds in their possession.'
This Court has already ruled that R.A. No. 9262 is constitutional and does not violate the equal
protection clause. In Garcia v. Drilon the issue of constitutionality was raised by a husband after the
latter failed to obtain an injunction from the CA to enjoin the implementation of a protection order issued
against him by the RTC. We ruled that R.A. No. 9262 rests on real substantial distinctions which justify
the classification under the law: the unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that
women are more likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread bias and prejudice
against women.
We further held in Garcia that the classification is germane to the purpose of the law, viz:
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address
violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared that the State values the dignity of women and
children and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also recognizes the need to protect the
family and its members particularly women and children, from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
xxxx
Under R.A. No. 9262, the provision of spousal and child support specifically addresses one form of
violence committed against women: economic abuse.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially dependent which
includes, but is not limited to the following:
1. Withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity, except in cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid,
serious and moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
2. Deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right to the use and enjoyment of
the conjugal, community or property owned in common;
3. Destroying household property;
4. Controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling the conjugal money or
properties.
The relief provided in Section 8(g) thus fulfills the objective of restoring the dignity of women who are
victims of domestic violence and provide them continued protection against threats to their personal
safety and security.18 (Emphasis and italics in the original; citations omitted)
Having disposed of the case in the foregoing manner, the other issues raised by petitioner are deemed
irrelevant and need not be passed upon by the Court. Quite the contrary, the resolution of the Court on
the substantive issue involved should be enforced with dispatch, this case being one for support.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The August 16, 2011 and March 9, 2012 Resolutions of the Court
of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 04359-MIN, as well as the February 12, 2010 Judgment of the Regional
Trial Court of Isabela, Basilan, Branch 1, in Civil Case No. 921-259 are AFFIRMED in toto.
The case is REMANDED to the court of origin for execution, and if necessary, evaluation and
determination of what is correctly due to respondent AAA by way of support in arrears and interest, if
any, considering the period of time that elapsed since the case was decided by the trial court.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 221103, October 16, 2018
REGINA ONGSIAKO REYES, Petitioner, v. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES ELECTORAL

TRIBUNAL, Respondent.
DECISION
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
In this petition for certiorari filed before this Court, petitioner Regina Ongsiako Reyes challenges the
constitutionality of several provisions of the 2015 Revised Rules of the House of Representatives
Electoral Tribunal (HRET). In particular, petitioner questions (1) the rule which requires the presence of
at least one Justice of the Supreme Court to constitute a quorum; (2) the rule on constitution of a
quorum; and (3) the requisites to be considered a member of the House of Representatives.
The Antecedent Facts
Petitioner alleges that she has two pending quo warranto cases before the HRET. They are (1) Case No.
13-036 (Noeme Mayores Tan and Jeasseca L. Mapacpac v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes) and (2) Case No.
130037 (Eric D. Junio v. Regina Ongsiako Reyes).
On 1 November 2015, the HRET published the 2015 Revised Rules of the House ofRepresentatives
Electoral Tribunal (2015 HRET Rules).
Petitioner alleges that Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules is unconstitutional as it gives the Justices,
collectively, denial or veto powers over the proceedings by simply absenting themselves from any
hearing. In addition, petitioner alleges that the 2015 HRET Rules grant more powers to the Justices,
individually, than the legislators by requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order to constitute a
quorum. Petitioner alleges that even when all six legislators are present, they cannot constitute
themselves as a body and cannot act as an Executive Committee without the presence of any of the
Justices. Petitioner further alleges that the rule violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution
by conferring the privilege of being indispensable members upon the Justices.
Petitioner alleges that the quorum requirement under the 2015 HRET Rules is ambiguous because it
requires only the presence of at least one Justice and four Members of the Tribunal. According to
petitioner, the four Members are not limited to legislators and may include the other two Justices. In
case of inhibition, petitioner alleges that a mere majority of the remaining Members shall be sufficient to
render a decision, instead of the majority of all the Members.
Petitioner likewise alleges that Rule 15, in relation to Rules 17 and 18, of the 2015 HRET Rules
unconstitutionally expanded the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Petitioner
alleges that under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution as well as the 2011 Rules of the HRET,
a petition may be filed within 15 days from the date of the proclamation of the winner, making such
proclamation the operative fact for the HRET to acquire jurisdiction. However, Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET
Rules requires that to be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there should be (1) a
valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. Further, Rule 17 of the 2015 HRET
Rules states that election protests should be filed within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or the
date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later, while Rule 18 provides that petitions for quo
warranto shall be filed within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or the date of actual assumption
of office, whichever is later. Petitioner alleges that this would allow the COMELEC to determine whether
there was a valid proclamation or a proper oath, as well as give it opportunity to entertain cases
between the time of the election and June 30 of the election year or actual assumption of office,
whichever is later.
Petitioner alleges that the application of the 2015 HRET Rules to all pending cases could prejudice her
cases before the HRET.
The HRET, through the Secretary of the Tribunal, filed its own Comment.1 Thus, in a Manifestation and
Motion2 dated 13 January 2016, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) moved that it be excused from
representing the HRET and filing a Comment on the petition. The Court granted the OSG's Manifestation
and Motion in its 2 February 2016 Resolution.3
The HRET maintains that it has the power to promulgate its own rules that would govern the
proceedings before it. The HRET points out that under Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules, a quorum requires
the presence of at least one Justice-member and four members of the Tribunal. The HRET argues that
the requirement rests on substantial distinction because there are only three Justice-members of the
Tribunal as against six Legislator-members. The HRET further argues that the requirement of four
members assures the presence of at least two Legislator-members to constitute a quorum. The HRET
adds that the requirement of the presence of at least one Justice was incorporated in the Rules to
maintain judicial equilibrium in deciding election contests and because the duty to decide election cases
is a judicial function. The HRET states that petitioner's allegation that Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules
gives the Justices virtual veto power to stop the proceedings by simply absenting themselves is not only
speculative but also imputes bad faith on the part of the Justices.
The HRET states that it only has jurisdiction over a member of the House of Representatives. In order to
be considered a member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the following
requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. Hence, the
requirement of concurrence of these three requisites is within the power of the HRET to make.
The Issue
The issue before this Court is the constitutionality of the following provisions of the 2015 HRET Rules:
(1) Rule 6(a) requiring the presence of at least one Justice in order to constitute a quorum;
(2) Rule 15, paragraph 2, in relation to Rule 17; and
(3) Rule 6, in relation to Rule 69.
The Ruling of this Court
The petition has no merit.
The pertinent provisions questioned before this Court are the following:
(I) Rule 6(a) and Rule 6, in relation to Rule 69
(1) Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides:

Rule 6. Meetings; Quorum; Executive Committee Actions on Matters in Between Regular Meetings. -
(a) The Tribunal shall meet on such days and hours as it may designate or at the call of the Chairperson
or of a majority of its Members. The presence of at least one (1) Justice and four (4) Members of the
Tribunal shall be necessary to constitute a quorum. In the absence of the Chairperson, the next Senior
Justice shall preside, and in the absence of both, the Justice present shall take the Chair.
(b) In the absence of a quorum and provided there is at least one Justice in attendance, the Members
present, who shall not be less than three (3), may constitute themselves as an Executive Committee to
act on the agenda for the meeting concerned, provided, however, that its action shall be subject to
confirmation by the Tribunal at any subsequent meeting where a quorum is present.
(c) In between the regular meetings of the Tribunal, the Chairperson, or any three (3) of its Members,
provided at least one (1) of them is a Justice, who may sit as the Executive Committee, may act on the
following matters requiring immediate action by the Tribunal:
1. Any pleading or motion,
(a) Where delay in its resolution may result in irreparable or substantial damage or injury to the rights
of a party or cause delay in the proceedings or action concerned;
(b) Which is urgent in character but does not substantially affect the rights of the adverse party, such as
one for extension of time to comply with an order/resolution of the Tribunal, or to file a pleading which is
not a prohibited pleading and is within the discretion of the Tribunal to grant; and
(c) Where the Tribunal would require a comment, reply, rejoinder or any other similar pleading from any
of the parties or their attorneys;
2. Administrative matters which do not involve new applications or allocations of the appropriations of
the Tribunal; and
3. Such other matters as may be delegated by the Tribunal.

However, any such action/resolution shall be included in the order of business of the immediately
succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its confirmation.
(2) Rule 69 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides:
Rule 69. Votes Required. - In resolving all questions submitted to the Tribunal, all the Members present,
inclusive of the Chairperson, shall vote.
Except as provided in Rule 5(b) of these Rules, the concurrence of at least five (5) Members shall be
necessary for the rendition of decisions and the adoption of formal resolutions, provided that, in cases
where a Member inhibits or cannot take part in the deliberations, a majority vote of the remaining
Members shall be sufficient.
This is without prejudice to the authority of the Supreme Court or the House of Representatives, as the
case may be, to designate Special Member or Members who should act as temporary replacement or
replacements in cases where one or some of the Members of the Tribunal inhibits from a case or is
disqualified from participating in the deliberations of a particular election contest, provided that:
(1) The option herein provided should be resorted [to] only when the required quorum in order for the
Tribunal to proceed with the hearing of the election contest, or in making the final determination of the
case, or in arriving at decisions or resolutions thereof, cannot be met; and
(2) Unless otherwise provided, the designation of the Special Member as replacement shall only be
temporary and limited only to the specific case where the inhibition or disqualification was made.
(II) Rule 15, paragraph 2, in relation to Rule 17
Rules 15 and 17 of the 2015 HRET Rules provide:

Rule 15. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the

following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office.
Rule 17. Election Protest. - A verified election protest contesting the election or returns of any Member
of the House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who had duly filed a certificate of
candidacy and has been voted for the same office, within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election
year or the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later.
xxxx
We shall discuss issues (1) and (3) together.
Presence of at least one Justice-member to Constitute a Quorum
Petitioner alleges that the requirement under Rule 6 of the 2015
HRET Rules that at least one Justice should be present to constitute a quorum violates the equal
protection clause of the 1987 Constitution and gives undue power to the Justices over the legislators.
The argument has no merit.
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides for the composition of the HRET. It states:
Section 17. The Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which
shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their
respective Members. Each Electoral Tribunal shall be composed of nine Members, three of whom shall be
Justices of the Supreme Court to be designated by the Chief Justice, and all the remaining six shall be
Members of the Senate or the House of Representatives, as the case may be, who shall be chosen on
the basis of proportional representation from the political parties and the parties or organizations
registered under the party-list system represented therein. The senior Justice in the Electoral Tribunal
shall be its Chairman.
In accordance with this organization, where the HRET is composed of three Justices of the Supreme
Court and six members of the House of Representatives, it is clear that the HRET is a collegial body with
members from two separate departments of the government: the Judicial and the Legislative
departments. The intention of the framers of the 1987 Constitution is to make the tribunal an
independent, constitutional body subject to constitutional restrictions.4 The origin of the tribunal can be
traced back from the electoral commissions under the 1935 Constitution whose functions were quasi-
judicial in nature.5 The presence of the three Justices, as against six members of the House of
Representatives, was intended as an additional guarantee to ensure impartiality in the judgment of
cases before it.6 The intentions of the framers of the 1935 Constitution were extensively discussed
in Tañada and Macapagal v. Cuenca,7 thus:
Senator Paredes, a veteran legislator and former Speaker of the House of Representatives, said:
x x x what was intended in the creation of the electoral tribunal was to create a sort of collegiate court
composed of nine members: Three of them belonging to the party having the largest number of votes,
and three from the party having the second largest number of votes so that these members may
represent the party, and the members of said party who will sit before the electoral tribunal as
protestees. For when it comes to a party, Mr. President, there is ground to believe that decisions will be
made along party lines. (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 351; italics supplied.)
Senator Laurel, who played an important role in the framing of our Constitution, expressed himself as
follows:
Now, with reference to the protests or contests, relating to the election, the returns and the
qualifications of the members of the legislative bodies, I heard it said here correctly that there was a
time when that was given to the corresponding chamber of the legislative department. So the election,
returns and qualifications of the members of the Congress or legislative body was entrusted to that body
itself as the exclusive body to determine the election, returns and qualifications of its members. There
was some doubt also expressed as to whether that should continue or not, and the greatest argument in
favor of the retention of that provision was the fact that was, among other things, the system obtaining
in the United States under the Federal Constitution of the United States, and there was no reason why
that power or that right vested in the legislative body should not be retained. But it was thought that
that would make the determination of this contest, of this election protest, purely political as has been
observed in the past. (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 376; italics supplied.)
It is interesting to note that not one of the members of the Senate contested the accuracy of the views
thus expressed.
Referring particularly to the philosophy underlying the constitutional provision quoted above, Dr. Aruego
states:
The defense of the Electoral Commission was based primarily upon the hope and belief that the abolition
of party lines because of the equal representation in this body of the majority and the minority parties of
the National Assembly and the intervention of some members of the Supreme Court who, under the
proposed constitutional provision, would also be members of the same, would insure greater political
justice in the determination of election contests for seats in the National Assembly than there would be if
the power had been lodged in the lawmaking body itself. Delegate Francisco summarized the arguments
for the creation of the Electoral Commission in the following words:
I understand that from the time that this question is placed in the hands of members not only of the
majority party but also of the minority party, there is already a condition, a factor which would make
protests decided in a non-partisan manner. We know from experience that many times in the many
protests tried in the House or in the Senate, it was impossible to prevent the factor of party from getting
in. From the moment that it is required that not only the majority but also the minority should intervene
in these questions, we have already enough guarantee that there would be no tyranny on the part of the
majority.
But there is another more detail which is the one which satisfies me most, and that is the intervention of
three justices. So that with this intervention of three justices if there would be any question as to the
justice applied by the majority or the minority, if there would be any fundamental disagreement, or if
there would be nothing but questions purely of party in which the members of the majority as well as
those of the minority should wish to take lightly a protest because the protestant belongs to one of said
parties, we have in this case, as a check upon the two parties, the actuations of the three justices. In
the last analysis, what is really applied in the determination of electoral cases brought before the
tribunals of justice or before the House of Representatives or the Senate? Well, it is nothing more than
the law and the doctrine of the Supreme Court. If that is the case, there will be greater skill in the
application of the laws and in the application of doctrines to electoral matters having as we shall have
three justices who will act impartially in these electoral questions.
I wish to call the attention of my distinguished colleagues to the fact that in electoral protests it is
impossible to set aside party interests. Hence, the best guarantee, I repeat, for the administration of
justice to the parties, for the fact that the laws will not be applied improperly or incorrectly as well as for
the fact that the doctrines of the Supreme Court will be applied rightfully, the best guarantee which we
shall have, I repeat, is the intervention of the three justices. And with the formation of the Electoral
Commission, I say again, the protestants as well as the protestees could remain tranquil in the certainty
that they will receive the justice that they really deserve. If we eliminate from this precept the
intervention of the party of the minority and that of the three justices, then we shall be placing protests
exclusively in the hands of the party in power. And I understand, gentlemen, that in practice that has
not given good results. Many have criticized, many have complained against, the tyranny of the majority
in electoral cases x x x. I repeat that the best guarantee lies in the fact that these questions will be
judged not only by three members of the majority but also by three members of the minority, with the
additional guarantee of the impartial judgment of three justices of the Supreme Court. (The Framing of
the Philippine Constitution by Aruego, Vol. I, pp. 261-263; italics supplied.)
The foregoing was corroborated by Senator Laurel. Speaking for this Court, in Angara vs. Electoral
Commission (63 Phil. 139), he asserted:
The members of the Constitutional Convention who framed our fundamental law were in their majority
men mature in years and experience. To be sure, many of them were familiar with the history and
political development of other countries of the world. When, therefore, they deemed it wise to create an
Electoral Commission as a constitutional organ and invested with the exclusive function of passing upon
and determining the election, returns and qualifications of the members of the National Assembly, they
must have done so not only in the light of their own experience but also having in view the experience of
other enlightened peoples of the world. The creation of the Electoral Commission was designed to
remedy certain evils of which the framers of our Constitution were cognizant. Notwithstanding the
vigorous opposition of some members of the Convention to its creation, the plan, as hereinabove stated,
was approved by that body by a vote of 98 against 58. All that can be said now is that, upon the
approval of the Constitution, the creation of the Electoral Commission is the expression of the wisdom
'ultimate justice of the people'. (Abraham Lincoln, First Inaugural Address, March 4, 1861.)
From the deliberations of our Constitutional Convention it is evident that the purpose was to transfer in
its totality all the powers previously exercised by the legislature in matters pertaining to contested
elections of its members, to an independent and impartial tribunal. It was not so much the knowledge
and appreciation of contemporary constitutional precedents, however, as the long felt need
of determining legislative contests devoid of partisan considerations which prompted the people acting
through their delegates to the Convention, to provide for this body known as the Electoral Commission.
With this end in view, a composite body in which both the majority and minority parties are equally
represented to off-set partisan influence in its deliberations was created, and further endowed with
judicial temper by including in its membership three justices of the Supreme Court, (Pp. 174-175.)
As a matter of fact, during the deliberations of the convention, Delegates Conejero and Roxas said:
El Sr. CONEJERO. Antes de votarse la enmienda, quisiera pedir informacion del Subcomite de Siete.
El Sr. PRESIDENTE. Que dice el Comite?
El Sr. ROXAS. Con mucho gusto.
"El Sr. CONEJERO. Tal como esta el draft, dando tres miembros a la mayoria, y otros tres a la minoria y
tres a la Corte Suprema, no cree su Señoria que este equivale practicamente a dejar el asunto a los
miembros del Tribunal Supremo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Si y no. Creemos que si el tribunal a la Comision esta cotistuido en esa forma, tanto los
miembros de la mayoria como los de la minoria asi como los miembros de la Corte Suprema
considedaran la cuestion sabre la base de sus meritos, sabiendo que el partidismo no es suficiente para
dar el triunfo.
El Sr. CONEJERO. Cree Su Señoria que en un caso como ese, podriamos hacer que tanto los de la
mayoria como los de la minoria prescindieran del partidismo?
El Sr. ROXAS. Creo que si, porque el partidismo no les darla el triunfo." (Angara vs. Electoral
Commission, supra, pp. 168-169; italics supplied.)
It is clear from the foregoing that the main objective of the framers of our Constitution in providing for
the establishment, first, of an Electoral Commission, and then of one Electoral Tribunal for each House of
Congress, was to insure the exercise of judicial impartiality in the disposition of election contests
affecting members of the lawmaking body. To achieve this purpose, two devices were resorted to,
namely: (a) the party having the largest number of votes, and the party having the second largest
number of votes, in the National Assembly or in each House of Congress, were given the same number
of representatives in the Electoral Commission or Tribunal, so that they may realize that partisan
considerations could not control the adjudication of said cases, and thus be induced to act with greater
impartiality; and (b) the Supreme Court was given in said body the same number of representatives as
each one of said political parties, so that the influence of the former may be decisive and endow said
Commission or Tribunal with judicial temper.
This is obvious from the very language of the constitutional provision under consideration. In fact,
Senator Sabido - who had moved to grant to Senator Tañada the "privilege" to make the nominations on
behalf of the party having the second largest number of votes in the Senate - agrees with it. As Senator
Sumulong inquired:
x x x. I suppose Your Honor will agree with me that the framers of the Constitution precisely thought of
creating this Electoral Tribunal so as to prevent the majority from ever having a preponderant majority
in the Tribunal. (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 330; italics supplied.)
Senator Sabido replied:
That is so, x x x. (Id., p. 330.)
Upon further interpretation, Senator Sabido said:
x x x the purpose of the creation of the Electoral Tribunal and of its composition is to maintain a balance
between the two parties and make the members of the Supreme Court the controlling power so to speak
of the Electoral Tribunal or hold the balance of power. That is the ideal situation. (Congressional Record
for the Senate, Vol. III, p. 349; italics supplied.)
Senator Sumulong opined along the same line. His words were:
x x x. The intention is that when the three from the majority and the three from the minority become
members of the Tribunal it is hoped that they will become aware of their judicial functions, not to protect
the protestants or the protestees. It is hoped that they will act as judges because to decide election
cases is a judicial function. But the framers of the Constitution besides being learned were men of
experience. They knew that even Senators like us are not angels, that we are human beings, that if we
should be chosen to go to the Electoral Tribunal no one can say that we will entirely be free from
partisan influence to favor our party, so that in case that hope that the three from the majority and the
three from the minority who will act as Judges should result in disappointment, in case they do not act
as judges but they go there and vote along party lines, still there is the guarantee that they will offset
each other and the result will be that the deciding vote will reside in the hands of the three Justices who
have no partisan motives to favor either the protestees or the protestants. In other words, the whole
idea is to prevent the majority from controlling and dictating the decisions of the Tribunal and to make
sure that the decisive vote will be wielded not by the Congressmen or Senators who are members of the
Tribunal but will be wielded by the Justices who, by virtue of their judicial offices, will have no partisan
motives to serve, either protestants or protestees. That is my understanding of the intention of the
framers of the Constitution when they decided to create the Electoral Tribunal.
xxxx
My idea is that the intention of the framers of the constitution in creating the Electoral Tribunal is to
insure impartiality and independence in its decision, and that is sought to be done by never allowing the
majority party to control the Tribunal, and secondly by seeing to it that the decisive vote in the Tribunal
will be left in the hands of persons who have no partisan interest or motive to favor either protestant or
protestee. (Congressional Record for the Senate, Vol. III, pp. 362-363, 365-366; italics supplied.)
Rule 6 of the 2015 HRET Rules does not grant additional powers to the Justices but rather maintains the
balance of power between the members from the Judicial and Legislative departments as envisioned by
the framers of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions. The presence of the three Justices is meant to tone
down the political nature of the cases involved and do away with the impression that party interests play
a part in the decision-making process.
Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules requires the presence of at least one Justice and four members of the
Tribunal to constitute a quorum. This means that even when all the Justices are present, at least two
members of the House of Representatives need to be present to constitute a quorum. Without this rule,
it would be possible for five members of the House of Representatives to convene and have a quorum
even when no Justice is present. This would render ineffective the rationale contemplated by the framers
of the 1935 and 1987 Constitutions for placing the Justices as members of the HRET. Indeed, petitioner
is nitpicking in claiming that Rule 6(a) unduly favors the Justices because under the same rule, it is
possible for four members of the House of Representatives and only one Justice to constitute a quorum.
Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not make the Justices indispensable members to constitute a
quorum but ensures that representatives from both the Judicial and Legislative departments are present
to constitute a quorum. Members from both the Judicial and Legislative departments become
indispensable to constitute a quorum. The situation cited by petitioner, that it is possible for all the
Justice-members to exercise denial or veto power over the proceedings simply by absenting themselves,
is speculative. As pointed out by the HRET, this allegation also ascribes bad faith, without any basis, on
the part of the Justices.
The last sentence of Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution also provides that "[t]he senior
Justice in the Electoral Tribunal shall be its Chairman." This means that only a Justice can chair the
Electoral Tribunal. As such, there should always be one member of the Tribunal who is a Justice. If all
three Justice-members inhibit themselves in a case, the Supreme Court will designate another Justice to
chair the Electoral Tribunal in accordance with Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution.
Contrary to petitioner's allegation, Rule 6(a) of the 2015 HRET Rules does not violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. The equal protection clause is embodied in Section 1, Article III of
the 1987 Constitution which provides:
Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall
any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.
The Court has explained that the equal protection clause of the Constitution allows classification. The
Court stated:
x x x. A law is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of
inequality, so that it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the
matter of constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences;
that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court has held that the standard
is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a reasonable foundation or rational basis and is
not palpably arbitrary.8
In the case of the HRET, there is a substantial distinction between the Justices of the Supreme Court and
the members of the House of Representatives. There are only three Justice-members while there are six
Legislator-members of the HRET. Hence, there is a valid classification. The classification is justified
because it was placed to ensure the presence of members from both the Judicial and Legislative
branches of the government to constitute a quorum. There is no violation of the equal protection clause
of the Constitution.
Ambiguity of Rule 6 in relation to Rule 69
Petitioner likewise questions Rule 6 in relation to Rule 69 of the 2015 HRET Rules for being ambiguous,
questionable, and undemocratic. Petitioner alleges:
x x x while the general rule requires that the "concurrence of at least five (5) Members shall be
necessary for the rendition of decisions . . ." in cases where a "member inhibits or cannot take part in
the deliberations," a mere "majority of those remaining Members shall be sufficient."
Thus, in case where there are only 5 constituting a quorum whereby at least 1 of the Members present
thereat inhibit, a majority of the remaining four may validly render a decision. In an extreme case where
the 4 of the 5 present inhibit, the Rule allows that the decision of the remaining 1 member shall be the
decision of the Tribunal.
Applied to Petitioner in the cases against her pending with the HRET whereby 2 justices inhibited
themselves, in the event the 2 inhibiting justices are present together with another justice and 2 other
legislator-members, these may qualify as a valid quorum because under Rule 6, their mere "presence" is
the only requirement. Therefore, the majority of the remaining 3 members may vote and their decision
shall be considered the decision of the Tribunal. In case 1 of the remaining 3 opposes the measure, only
2 votes actually represent the decision of the Tribunal. This may happen even if those absent four (4)
members may actually be against the decision, but due to their absence, they were not able to vote.9
The ambiguity referred to by petitioner is absurd and stems from an erroneous understanding of the
Rules. As pointed out by the HRET in its Comment, a member of the Tribunal who inhibits or is
disqualified from participating in the deliberations cannot be considered present for the purpose of
having a quorum. In addition, Rule 69 clearly shows that the Supreme Court and the House of
Representatives have the authority to designate a Special Member or Members who could act as
temporary replacement or replacements in cases where one or some of the Members of the Tribunal
inhibit from a case or are disqualified from participating in the deliberations of a particular election
contest when the required quorum cannot be met. There is no basis to petitioner's claim that a member
who inhibits or otherwise disqualified can sit in the deliberations to achieve the required quorum.
Actions of the Executive Committee
Rule 6(b) and 6(c) of the 2015 HRET Rules provide for instances when the members of the tribunal can
constitute themselves as an Executive Committee, thus:
Rule 6. Meetings; Quorum; Executive Committee Actions on Matters in Between Regular Meetings. -
xxxx
(b) In the absence of a quorum and provided there is at least one Justice in attendance, the Members
present, who shall not be less than three (3), may constitute themselves as an Executive Committee to
act on the agenda for the meeting concerned, provided, however, that its action shall be subject to
confirmation by the Tribunal at any subsequent meeting where a quorum is present.
(c) In between the regular meetings of the Tribunal, the Chairperson, or any three (3) of its Members,
provided at least one (1) of them is a Justice, who may sit as the Executive Committee, may act on the
following matters requiring immediate action by the Tribunal:
1. Any pleading or motion,
(a) Where delay in its resolution may result in irreparable or substantial damage or injury to the rights
of a party or cause delay in the proceedings or action concerned;
(b) Which is urgent in character but does not substantially affect the rights of the adverse party, such as
one for extension of time to comply with an order/resolution of the Tribunal, or to file a pleading which is
not a prohibited pleading and is within the discretion of the Tribunal to grant; and
(c) Where the Tribunal would require a comment, reply, rejoinder or any other similar pleading from any
of the parties or their attorneys;
2. Administrative matters which do not involve new applications or allocations of the appropriations of
the Tribunal; and
3. Such other matters as may be delegated by the Tribunal.

However, any such action/resolution shall be included in the order of business of the immediately
succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its confirmation.
The Rules clearly state that any action or resolution of the Executive Committee "shall be included in the
order of business of the immediately succeeding meeting of the Tribunal for its confirmation." Hence,
even if only three members of the HRET acted as an Executive Committee, and even if all these three
members are Justices of the Supreme Court, their actions are subject to the confirmation by the entire
Tribunal or at least five of its members who constitute a quorum. The confirmation required by the Rules
should bar any apprehension that the Executive Committee would commit any action arbitrarily or in bad
faith. In addition, the Rules enumerated the matters, requiring immediate action, that may be acted
upon by the Executive Committee. Any other matter that may be delegated to the Executive Committee
under Rule 6(c)(3) has to be decided by the entire Tribunal.
Qualifications of a Member of the House of Representatives and Date of Filing of Election

Protest
Petitioner alleges that the HRET unduly expanded the jurisdiction of the COMELEC. Petitioner states that
Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution provides that the HRET shall be the sole judge of all
contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House of
Representatives. According to petitioner, Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules provides for the requisites to
be considered a member of the House of Representatives, as follows: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a
proper oath; and (3) assumption of office. In addition to these requisites, Rule 17 fixed the time for the
filing of an election protest within 15 days from June 30 of the election year or the date of actual
assumption of office, whichever is later. Petitioner alleges that these Rules will allow the COMELEC to
assume jurisdiction between the time of the election and within 15 days from June 30 of the election
year or the date of actual assumption of office, whichever is later. Further, the requirements of a valid
proclamation and a proper oath will allow the COMELEC to look into these matters until there is an actual
assumption of office.
Under the 2015 HRET Rules, the HRET is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns,
and qualifications of the members of the House of Representatives. This is clear under the first
paragraph of Rule 15.
Rule 15. Jurisdiction. - The Tribunal is the sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and
qualifications of the Members of the House of Representatives.
To be considered a Member of the House of Representatives, there must be a concurrence of the

following requisites: (1) a valid proclamation; (2) a proper oath; and (3) assumption of office.
HRET's jurisdiction is provided under Section 17, Article VI of the 1987 Constitution which states that
"[t]he Senate and the House of Representatives shall each have an Electoral Tribunal which shall be the
sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of their respective
Members." There is no room for the COMELEC to assume jurisdiction because HRET's jurisdiction is
constitutionally mandated.
The reckoning event under Rule 15 of the 2015 HRET Rules, being dependent on the taking of oath and
the assumption of office of the winning candidate, is indeterminable. It is difficult, if not impossible, for
the losing candidate who intends to file an election protest or a petition for quo warranto to keep track
when the winning candidate took his oath of office or when he assumed office. The date, time, and place
of the taking of oath depend entirely upon the winning candidate. The winning candidate may or may
not publicize his taking of oath and thus any candidate intending to file a protest will be in a dilemma
when to file the protest. The taking of oath can happen any day and any time after the proclamation. As
to the assumption of office, it is possible that, for one reason or another, the winning candidate will not
assume office at the end of the term of his predecessor but on a later date that is unknown to the losing
candidate.
However, the Court takes judicial notice that in its Resolution No. 16, Series of 2018, dated 20
September 2018,10 the HRET amended Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules. As amended, Rules 17
and 18 now read:
RULE 17. Election Protest. - A verified protest contesting the election or returns of any Member of the
House of Representatives shall be filed by any candidate who has duly filed a certificate of candidacy and
has been voted for the same office within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election year, if the
winning candidate was proclaimed on or before said date. However, if the winning candidate was
proclaimed after June 30 of the election year, a verified election protest shall be filed within fifteen (15)
days from the date of proclamation.
xxxx
RULE 18. Quo Warranto. - A verified petition for quo warranto on the ground of ineligibility may be filed
by any registered voter of the congressional district concerned, or any registered voter in the case of
party-list representatives, within fifteen (15) days from June 30 of the election year, if the winning
candidate was proclaimed on or before said date. However, if the winning candidate was proclaimed
after June 30 of the election year, a verified petition for quo warranto shall be filed within fifteen (15)
days from the date of proclamation. The party filing the petition shall be designated as the petitioner,
while the adverse party shall be known as the respondent.
xxxx
The amendments to Rules 17 and 18 of the 2015 HRET Rules were made "with respect to the reckoning
point within which to file an election protest or a petition for quo warranto, respectively, in order to
further promote a just and expeditious determination and disposition of every election contest brought
before the Tribunal[.]"11 The recent amendments, which were published in The Philippine Star on 26
September 2018 and took effect on 11 October 2018, clarified and removed any doubt as to the
reckoning date for the filing of an election protest. The losing candidate can determine with certainty
when to file his election protest.
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199515, June 25, 2018
RHODORA ILUMIN RACHO, A.K.A. "RHODORA RACHO TANAKA," Petitioner, v. SEIICHI TANAKA,
LOCAL CIVIL REGISTRAR OF LAS PIÑAS CITY, AND THE ADMINISTRATOR AND CIVIL
REGISTRAR GENERAL OF THE NATIONAL STATISTICS OFFICE, Respondents.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
Judicial recognition of a foreign divorce requires that the national law of the foreign spouse and the
divorce decree be pleaded and proved as a fact before the Regional Trial Court. The Filipino spouse may
be granted the capacity to remarry once our courts find that the foreign divorce was validly obtained by
the foreign spouse according to his or her national law, and that the foreign spouse's national law
considers the dissolution of the marital relationship to be absolute.
This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari1 assailing the June 2, 2011 Decision2 and October 3, 2011
Order3 of Branch 254, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City, which denied Rhodora Ilumin Racho's (Racho)
Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to Marry.4 The denial was on the ground
that a Certificate of Divorce issued by the Japanese Embassy was insufficient to prove the existence of a
divorce decree.
Racho and Seiichi Tanaka (Tanaka) were married on April 20, 2001 in Las Piñas City, Metro Manila. They
lived together for nine (9) years in Saitama Prefecture, Japan and did not have any children.5
Racho alleged that on December 16, 2009, Tanaka filed for divorce and the divorce was granted. She
secured a Divorce Certificate6 issued by Consul Kenichiro Takayama (Consul Takayama) of the Japanese
Consulate in the Philippines and had it authenticated7 by an authentication officer of the Department of
Foreign Affairs.8
She filed the Divorce Certificate with the Philippine Consulate General in Tokyo, Japan, where she was
informed that by reason of certain administrative changes, she was required to return to the Philippines
to report the documents for registration and to file the appropriate case for judicial recognition of
divorce.9
She tried to have the Divorce Certificate registered with the Civil Registry of Manila but was refused by
the City Registrar since there was no court order recognizing it. When she went to the Department of
Foreign Affairs to renew her passport, she was likewise told that she needed the proper court order. She
was also informed by the National Statistics Office that her divorce could only be annotated in the
Certificate of Marriage if there was a court order capacitating her to remarry.10
She went to the Japanese Embassy, as advised by her lawyer, and secured a Japanese Law English
Version of the Civil Code of Japan, 2000 Edition.11
On May 19, 2010, she filed a Petition for Judicial Determination and Declaration of Capacity to
Marry12 with the Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City.
On June 2, 2011, Branch 254, Regional Trial Court, Las Piñas City rendered a Decision,13 finding that
Racho failed to prove that Tanaka legally obtained a divorce. It stated that while she was able to prove
Tanaka's national law, the Divorce Certificate was not competent evidence since it was not the divorce
decree itself.14
Racho filed a Motion for Reconsideration,15 arguing that under Japanese law, a divorce by agreement
becomes effective by oral notification, or by a document signed by both parties and by two (2) or more
witnesses.16
In an Order17 dated October 3, 2011, the Regional Trial Court denied the Motion, finding that Racho
failed to present the notification of divorce and its acceptance.18
On December 19, 2011, Racho filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari19 with this Court. In its January
18, 2012 Resolution, this Court deferred action on her Petition pending her submission of a duly
authenticated acceptance certificate of the notification of divorce.20
Petitioner initially submitted a Manifestation,21 stating that a duly-authenticated acceptance certificate

was not among the documents presented at the Regional Trial Court because of its unavailability to
petitioner during trial. She also pointed out that the Divorce Certificate issued by ,the Consulate General
of the Japanese Embassy was sufficient proof of the fact of divorce.22 She also manifested that Tanaka
had secured a marriage license on the basis of the same Divorce Certificate and had already remarried
another Filipino. Nevertheless, she has endeavored to secure the document as directed by this Court.23
On March 16, 2012, petitioner submitted her Compliance,24 attaching a duly authenticated Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce that she obtained in Japan.25 The Office of the Solicitor General
thereafter submitted its Comment26 on the Petition, to which petitioner submitted her Reply.27
Petitioner argues that under the Civil Code of Japan, a divorce by agreement becomes effective upon
notification, whether oral or written, by both parties and by two (2) or more witnesses. She contends
that the Divorce Certificate stating "Acceptance Certification of Notification of Divorce issued by the
Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan on December 16, 2009" is sufficient to prove that she and
her husband have divorced by agreement and have already effected notification of the divorce.28
She avers further that under Japanese law, the manner of proving a divorce by agreement is by record
of its notification and by the fact of its acceptance, both of which were stated in the Divorce Certificate.
She maintains that the Divorce Certificate is signed by Consul Takayama, whom the Department of
Foreign Affairs certified as duly appointed and qualified to sign the document. She also states that the
Divorce Certificate has already been filed and recorded with the Civil Registry Office of Manila.29
She insists that she is now legally capacitated to marry since Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan states
that a matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.30
On the other hand, the Office of the Solicitor General posits that the Certificate of Divorce has no
probative value since it was not properly authenticated under Rule 132, Section 2431 of the Rules of
Court. However, it states that it has no objection to the admission of the Certificate of Acceptance of the
Report of Divorce submitted by petitioner in compliance with this Court's January 18, 2012 Resolution.32
It likewise points out that petitioner never mentioned that she and her husband obtained a divorce by
agreement and only mentioned it in her motion for reconsideration before the Regional Trial Court. Thus,
petitioner failed to prove that she is now capacitated to marry since her divorce was not obtained by the
alien spouse. She also failed to point to a specific provision in the Civil Code of Japan that allows persons
who obtained a divorce by agreement the capacity to remarry. In any case, a divorce by agreement is
not the divorce contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code.33
In rebuttal, petitioner insists that all her evidence, including the Divorce Certificate, was formally offered
and held to be admissible as evidence by the Regional Trial Court.34 She also argues that the Office of
the Solicitor General should not have concluded that the law does not contemplate divorce by agreement
or consensual divorce since a discriminatory situation will arise if this type of divorce is not recognized.35
The issue in this case, initially, was whether or not the Regional Trial Court erred in dismissing the
Petition for Declaration of Capacity to Marry for insufficiency of evidence. After the submission of
Comment, however, the issue has evolved to whether or not the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report
of Divorce is sufficient to prove the fact that a divorce between petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho and
respondent Seiichi Tanaka was validly obtained by the latter according to his national law.
Under Article 26 of the Family Code, a divorce between a foreigner and a Filipino may be recognized in
the Philippines as long as it was validly obtained according to the foreign spouse's national law, thus:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.36 (Emphasis supplied)
The second paragraph was included to avoid an absurd situation where a Filipino spouse remains
married to the foreign spouse even after a validly obtained divorce abroad.37 The addition of the second
paragraph gives the Filipino spouse a substantive right to have the marriage considered as dissolved,
and ultimately, to grant him or her the capacity to remarry.38
Article 26 of the Family Code is applicable only in issues on the validity of remarriage. It cannot be the
basis for any other liability, whether civil or criminal, that the Filipino spouse may incur due to
remarriage.
Mere presentation of the divorce decree before a trial court is insufficient.39 In Garcia v. Recio,40 this
Court established the principle that before a foreign divorce decree is recognized in this jurisdiction, a
separate action must be instituted for that purpose. Courts do not take judicial notice of foreign laws and
foreign judgments; thus, our laws require that the divorce decree and the national law of the foreign
spouse must be pleaded and proved like any other fact before trial courts.41 Hence, in Corpuz v. Sto.
Tomas:42
The starting point in any recognition of a foreign divorce judgment is the acknowledgment that our
courts do not take judicial notice of foreign judgments and laws. Justice Herrera explained that, as a
rule, "no sovereign is bound to give effect within its dominion to a judgment rendered by a tribunal of
another country." This means that the foreign judgment and its authenticity must be proven as facts
under our rules on evidence, together with the alien's applicable national law to show the effect of the
judgment on the alien himself or herself. The recognition may be made in an action instituted specifically
for the purpose or in another action where a party invokes the foreign decree as an integral aspect of his
claim or defense.43
II
Respondent's national law was duly admitted by the Regional Trial Court. Petitioner presented "a copy
[of] the English Version of the Civil Code of Japan (Exh. "K") translated under the authorization of the
Ministry of Justice and the Code of Translation Committee."44 Article 728(1) of the Civil Code of Japan
reads:
Article 728. 1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.45
To prove the fact of divorce, petitioner presented the Divorce Certificate issued by Consul Takayama of
Japan on January 18, 2010, which stated in part:
This is to certify that the above statement has been made on the basis of the Acceptance Certification of
Notification of Divorce issued by the Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama Pref., Japan on December 16,
2009.46
This Certificate only certified that the divorce decree, or the Acceptance Certification of Notification of
Divorce, exists. It is not the divorce decree itself. The Regional Trial Court further clarified:
[T]he Civil Law of Japan recognizes two (2) types of divorce, namely: (1) judicial divorce and (2) divorce
by agreement.
Under the same law, the divorce by agreement becomes effective by notification, orally or in a document
signed by both parties and two or more witnesses of full age, in accordance with the provisions of Family
Registration Law of Japan.47
Thus, while respondent's national law was duly admitted, petitioner failed to present sufficient evidence
before the Regional Trial Court that a divorce was validly obtained according to the national law of her
foreign spouse. The Regional Trial Court would not have erred in dismissing her Petition.
III
Upon appeal to this Court, however, petitioner submitted a Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce,48 certifying that the divorce issued by Susumu Kojima, Mayor of Fukaya City, Saitama
Prefecture, has been accepted on December 16, 2009. The seal on the document was authenticated by
Kazutoyo Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan.49
The probative value of the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is a question of fact that
would not ordinarily be within this Court's ambit to resolve. Issues in a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court50 are limited to questions of law.
In Garcia and Corpuz, this Court remanded the cases to the Regional Trial Courts for the reception of
evidence and for further proceedings.51 More recently in Medina v. Koike,52 this Court remanded the case
to the Court of Appeals to determine the national law of the foreign spouse:
Well entrenched is the rule that this Court is not a trier of facts. The resolution of factual issues is the
function of the lower courts, whose findings on these matters are received with respect and are in fact
binding subject to certain exceptions. In this regard, it is settled that appeals taken from judgments or
final orders rendered by RTC in the exercise of its original jurisdiction raising questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law should be brought to the Court of Appeals (CA) in accordance with Rule 41 of
the Rules of Court.
Nonetheless, despite the procedural restrictions on Rule 45 appeals as above-adverted, the Court may
refer the case to the CA under paragraph 2, Section 6 of Rule 56 of the Rules of Court, which provides:
SEC. 6. Disposition of improper appeal. - . . .
An appeal by certiorari taken to the Supreme Court from the Regional Trial Court submitting issues of
fact may be referred to the Court of Appeals for decision or appropriate action. The determination of the
Supreme Court on whether or not issues of fact are involved shall be final.53
The court records, however, are already sufficient to fully resolve the factual issues.54 Additionally, the
Office of the Solicitor General neither posed any objection to the admission of the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce55 nor argued that the Petition presented questions of fact. In the
interest of judicial economy and efficiency, this Court shall resolve this case on its merits.
IV
Under Rule 132, Section 24 of the Rules of Court, the admissibility of official records that are kept in a
foreign country requires that it must be accompanied by a certificate from a secretary of an embassy or
legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, consular agent or any officer of the foreign service of the
Philippines stationed in that foreign country:
Section 24. Proof of official record. - The record of public documents referred to in paragraph (a) of
Section 19, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by an official publication thereof or by a
copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and accompanied, if
the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office
in which the record is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of the
embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce was accompanied by an Authentication56 issued by
Consul Bryan Dexter B. Lao of the Embassy of the Philippines in Tokyo, Japan, certifying that Kazutoyo
Oyabe, Consular Service Division, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Japan was an official in and for Japan. The
Authentication further certified that he was authorized to sign the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report
of Divorce and that his signature in it was genuine. Applying Rule 132, Section 24, the Certificate of
Acceptance of the Report of Divorce is admissible as evidence of the fact of divorce between petitioner
and respondent.
The Regional Trial Court established that according to the national law of Japan, a divorce by agreement
"becomes effective by notification."57 Considering that the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of
Divorce was duly authenticated, the divorce between petitioner and respondent was validly obtained
according to respondent's national law.
The Office of the Solicitor General, however, posits that divorce by agreement is not the divorce
contemplated in Article 26 of the Family Code, which provides:
Article 26. All marriages solemnized outside the Philippines in accordance with the laws in force in the
country where they were solemnized, and valid there as such, shall also be valid in this country, except
those prohibited under Articles 35 (1), (4), (5) and (6), 36, 37 and 38.
Where a marriage between a Filipino citizen and a foreigner is validly celebrated and a divorce is
thereafter validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse capacitating him or her to remarry, the Filipino
spouse shall have capacity to remarry under Philippine law.58 (Emphasis supplied)
Considering that Article 26 states that divorce must be "validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse,"
the Office of the Solicitor General posits that only the foreign spouse may initiate divorce proceedings.
In a study on foreign marriages in 2007 conducted by the Philippine Statistics Authority, it was found
that "marriages between Filipino brides and foreign grooms comprised 5,537 or 66.7 percent while those
between Filipino grooms and foreign brides numbered 152 or 1.8 percent of the total marriages outside
the country."59 It also found that "[a]bout four in every ten interracial marriages (2,916 or 35.1%) were
between Filipino brides and Japanese grooms." Statistics for foreign marriages in 2016 shows that there
were 1,129 marriages between Filipino men and foreign women but 8,314 marriages between Filipina
women and foreign men.60 Thus, empirical data demonstrates that Filipino women are more likely to
enter into mixed marriages than Filipino men. Under Philippine laws relating to mixed marriages, Filipino
women are twice marginalized.
In this particular instance, it is the Filipina spouse who bears the burden of this narrow interpretation,
which may be unconstitutional. Article II, Section 14 of our Constitution provides:
Section 14. The State recognizes the role of women in nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men.
This constitutional provision provides a more active application than the passive orientation of Article III,
Section 1 of the Constitution does, which simply states that no person shall "be denied the equal
protection of the laws." Equal protection, within the context of Article III, Section 1 only provides that
any legal burden or benefit that is given to men must also be given to women. It does not require the
State to actively pursue "affirmative ways and means to battle the patriarchy-that complex of political,
cultural, and economic factors that ensure women's disempowerment."61
In 1980, our country became a signatory to the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW).62 Under Articles 2(f) and S(a) of the treaty, the Philippines as
a state party, is required:
Article 2
....
(f) to take all appropriate measures, including legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws, regulations,
customs and practices which constitute discrimination against women;
....
Article 5
....
(a) To modify the social and cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving
the elimination of prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the
inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women[.]
By enacting the Constitution and signing on the CEDAW, the State has committed to ensure and to
promote gender equality.
In 2009, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 9710 or the Magna Carta for Women, which provides that
the State "shall take all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations."63 This necessarily includes the second paragraph of Article 26
of the Family Code. Thus, Article 26 should be interpreted to mean that it is irrelevant for courts to
determine if it is the foreign spouse that procures the divorce abroad. Once a divorce decree is issued,
the divorce becomes "validly obtained" and capacitates the foreign spouse to marry. The same status
should be given to the Filipino spouse.
The national law of Japan does not prohibit the Filipino spouse from initiating or participating in the
divorce proceedings. It would be inherently unjust for a Filipino woman to be prohibited by her own
national laws from something that a foreign law may allow. Parenthetically, the prohibition on Filipinos
from participating in divorce proceedings will not be protecting our own nationals.
The Solicitor General's narrow interpretation of Article 26 disregards any agency on the part of the
Filipino spouse. It presumes that the Filipino spouse is incapable of agreeing to the dissolution of the
marital bond. It perpetuates the notion that all divorce proceedings are protracted litigations fraught
with bitterness and drama. Some marriages can end amicably, without the parties harboring any ill will
against each other. The parties could forgo costly court proceedings and opt for, if the national law of
the foreign spouse allows it, a more convenient out-of-court divorce process. This ensures amity
between the former spouses, a friendly atmosphere for the children and extended families, and less
financial burden for the family.
Absolute divorce was prohibited in our jurisdiction only in the mid-20th century. The Philippines had
divorce laws in the past. In 1917, Act No. 271064 was enacted which allowed a wife to file for divorce in
cases of concubinage or a husband to file in cases of adultery.65
Executive Order No. 141, or the New Divorce Law, which was enacted during the Japanese occupation,
provided for 11 grounds for divorce, including "intentional or unjustified desertion continuously for at
least one year prior to the filing of [a petition for divorce]" and "slander by deed or gross insult by one
spouse against the other to such an extent as to make further living together impracticable."66
At the end of World War II, Executive Order No. 141 was declared void and Act No. 2710 again took
effect.67 It was only until the enactment of the Civil Code in 1950 that absolute divorce was prohibited in
our jurisdiction.
It is unfortunate that legislation from the past appears to be more progressive than current enactments.
Our laws should never be intended to put Filipinos at a disadvantage. Considering that the Constitution
guarantees fundamental equality, this Court should not tolerate an unfeeling and callous interpretation
of laws. To rule that the foreign spouse may remarry, while the Filipino may not, only contributes to the
patriarchy. This interpretation encourages unequal partnerships and perpetuates abuse m intimate
relationships.68
In any case, the Solicitor General's argument has already been resolved in Republic v. Manalo,69 where
this Court held:
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 speaks of "a divorce . . . validly obtained abroad by the alien spouse
capacitating him or her to remarry." Based on a clear and plain reading of the provision, it only requires
that there be a divorce validly obtained abroad. The letter of the law does not demand that the alien
spouse should be the one who initiated the proceeding wherein the divorce decree was granted. It does
not distinguish whether the Filipino spouse is the petitioner or the respondent in the foreign divorce
proceeding. The Court is bound by the words of the statute; neither can We put words in the mouths of
the lawmakers. "The legislature is presumed to know the meaning of the words, to have used words
advisedly, and to have expressed its intent by the use of such words as are found in the statute. Verba
legis non est recedendum, or from the words of a statute there should be no departure."
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the word "obtained" should be interpreted to mean that the
divorce proceeding must be actually initiated by the alien spouse, still, the Court will not follow the letter
of the statute when to do so would depart from the true intent of the legislature or would otherwise yield
conclusions inconsistent with the general purpose of the act. Laws have ends to achieve, and statutes
should be so construed as not to defeat but to carry out such ends and purposes. As held in League of
Cities of the Phils., et al. v. COMELEC, et al.:
The legislative intent is not at all times accurately reflected in the manner in which the resulting law is
couched. Thus, applying a verba legis or strictly literal interpretation of a statute may render it
meaningless and lead to inconvenience, an absurd situation or injustice. To obviate this aberration, and
bearing in mind the principle that the intent or the spirit of the law is the law itself, resort should be to
the rule that the spirit of the law controls its letter.
To reiterate, the purpose of Paragraph 2 of Article 26 is to avoid the absurd situation where the Filipino
spouse remains married to the alien spouse who, after a foreign divorce decree that is effective in the
country where it was rendered, is no longer married to the Filipino spouse. The provision is a corrective
measure to address an anomaly where the Filipino spouse is tied to the marriage while the foreign
spouse is free to marry under the laws of his or her country. Whether the Filipino spouse initiated the
foreign divorce proceeding or not, a favorable decree dissolving the marriage bond and capacitating his
or her alien spouse to remarry will have the same result: the Filipino spouse will effectively be without a
husband or wife. A Filipino who initiated a foreign divorce proceeding is in the same place and in like
circumstance as a Filipino who is at the receiving end of an alien initiated proceeding. Therefore, the
subject provision should not make a distinction. In both instance, it is extended as a means to recognize
the residual effect of the foreign divorce decree on Filipinos whose marital ties to their alien spouses are
severed by operation of the latter's national law.70 (Emphasis in the original)
Recent jurisprudence, therefore, holds that a foreign divorce may be recognized in this jurisdiction as
long as it is validly obtained, regardless of who among the spouses initiated the divorce proceedings.
The question in this case, therefore, is not who among the spouses initiated the proceedings but rather if
the divorce obtained by petitioner and respondent was valid.
The Regional Trial Court found that there were two (2) kinds of divorce in Japan: judicial divorce and
divorce by agreement. Petitioner and respondent's divorce was considered as a divorce by agreement,
which is a valid divorce according to Japan's national law.71
The Office of the Solicitor General likewise posits that while petitioner was able to prove that the
national law of Japan allows absolute divorce, she was unable to "point to a specific provision of the
Japan[ese] Civil Code which states that both judicial divorce and divorce by agreement will allow the
spouses to remarry."72
To prove its argument, the Office of the Solicitor General cites Republic v. Orbecido III,73 where this
Court stated:
[R]espondent must also show that the divorce decree allows his former wife to remarry as specifically
required in Article 26. Otherwise, there would be no evidence sufficient to declare that he is capacitated
to enter into another marriage.
Nevertheless, we are unanimous in our holding that Paragraph 2 of Article 26 of the Family Code (E.O.
No. 209, as amended by E.O. No. 227), should be interpreted to allow a Filipino citizen, who has been
divorced by a spouse who had acquired foreign citizenship and remarried, also to remarry. However,
considering that in the present petition there is no sufficient evidence submitted and on record, we are
unable to declare, based on respondent's bare allegations that his wife, who was naturalized as an
American citizen, had obtained a divorce decree and had remarried an American, that respondent is now
capacitated to remarry. Such declaration could only be made properly upon respondent's submission of
the aforecited evidence in his favor.74
The Office of the Solicitor General pointedly ignores that in Orbecido III, the respondent in that case
neither pleaded and proved that his wife had been naturalized as an American citizen, nor presented any
evidence of the national law of his alleged foreign spouse that would allow absolute divorce.
In this case, respondent's nationality was not questioned. The Regional Trial Court duly admitted
petitioner's presentation of respondent's national law. Article 728 of the Civil Code of Japan as quoted by
the Office of the Solicitor General states:
Article 728 of the Japan Civil Code reads:
1. The matrimonial relationship is terminated by divorce.
2. The same shall apply also if after the death of either husband or wife, the surviving spouse declares
his or her intention to terminate the matrimonial relationship.75
The wording of the provision is absolute. The provision contains no other qualifications that could limit
either spouse's capacity to remarry.
In Garcia v. Recio,76 this Court reversed the Regional Trial Court's finding of the Filipino spouse's
capacity to remarry since the national law of the foreign spouse stated certain conditions before the
divorce could be considered absolute:
In its strict legal sense, divorce means the legal dissolution of a lawful union for a cause arising after
marriage. But divorces are of different types. The two basic ones are (1) absolute divorce or a vinculo
matrimonii and (2) limited divorce or a mensa et thoro. The first kind terminates the marriage, while the
second suspends it and leaves the bond in full force. There is no showing in the case at bar which type
of divorce was procured by respondent.
Respondent presented a decree nisi or an interlocutory decree - a conditional or provisional judgment of

divorce. It is in effect the same as a separation from bed and board, although an absolute divorce may
follow after the lapse of the prescribed period during which no reconciliation is effected.
Even after the divorce becomes absolute, the court may under some foreign statutes and practices, still
restrict remarriage. Under some other jurisdictions, remarriage may be limited by statute; thus, the
guilty party in a divorce which was granted on the ground of adultery may be prohibited from marrying
again. The court may allow a remarriage only after proof of good behavior.
On its face, the herein Australian divorce decree contains a restriction that reads:
"1. A party to a marriage who marries again before this decree becomes absolute (unless the other party
has died) commits the offence of bigamy."
This quotation bolsters our contention that the divorce obtained by respondent may have been
restricted. It did not absolutely establish his legal capacity to remarry according to his national law.
Hence, we find no basis for the ruling of the trial court, which erroneously assumed that the Australian
divorce ipso facto restored respondent's capacity to remarry despite the paucity of evidence on this
matter.77
Here, the national law of the foreign spouse states that the matrimonial relationship is terminated by
divorce. The Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce does not state any qualifications that
would restrict the remarriage of any of the parties. There can be no other interpretation than that the
divorce procured by petitioner and respondent is absolute and completely terminates their marital tie.
Even under our laws, the effect of the absolute dissolution of the marital tie is to grant both parties the
legal capacity to remarry. Thus, Article 40 of the Family Code provides:
Article 40. The absolute nullity of a previous marriage may be invoked for purposes of remarriage on the
basis solely of a final judgment declaring such previous marriage void.
Petitioner alleges that respondent has since remarried, the National Statistics Office having found no
impediment to the registration of his Marriage Certificate.78 The validity of respondent's subsequent
marriage is irrelevant for the resolution of the issues in this case. The existence of respondent's Marriage
Certificate, however, only serves to highlight the absurd situation sought to be prevented in the 1985
case of Van Dorn v. Romillo, Jr.:79
It is true that owing to the nationality principle embodied in Article 15 of the Civil Code, only Philippine
nationals are covered by the policy against absolute divorces the same being considered contrary to our
concept of public policy and morality. However, aliens may obtain divorces abroad, which may be
recognized in the Philippines, provided they are valid according to their national law. In this case, the
divorce in Nevada released private respondent from the marriage from the standards of American law,
under which divorce dissolves the marriage. . . .
....
Thus, pursuant to his national law, private respondent is no longer the husband of petitioner. He would
have no standing to sue in the case below as petitioner's husband entitled to exercise control over
conjugal assets. As he is bound by the Decision of his own country's Court, which validly exercised
jurisdiction over him, and whose decision he does not repudiate, he is estopped by his own
representation before said Court from asserting his right over the alleged conjugal property.
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our laws, petitioner has to be considered still
married to private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations under Article 109, et. seq. of the
Civil Code cannot be just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together with, observe respect and
fidelity, and render support to private respondent. The latter should not continue to be one of her heirs
with possible rights to conjugal property. She should not be discriminated against in her own country if
the ends of justice are to be served.80
The ruling in Van Dorn was eventually codified in the second paragraph of Article 26 of the Family Code
through the issuance of Executive Order No. 227 in 1987. The grant of substantive equal rights to the
Filipino spouse was broad enough that this Court, in the 1985 case of Quita v. Court of
Appeals,81 "hinted, by way of obiter dictum"82 that it could be applied to Filipinos who have since been
naturalized as foreign citizens.
In Republic v. Orbecido III,83 this Court noted the obiter in Quita and stated outright that Filipino citizens
who later become naturalized as foreign citizens may validly obtain a divorce from their Filipino spouses:
Thus, taking into consideration the legislative intent and applying the rule of reason, we hold that
Paragraph 2 of Article 26 should be interpreted to include cases involving parties who, at the time of the
celebration of the marriage were Filipino citizens, but later on, one of them becomes naturalized as a
foreign citizen and obtains a divorce decree. The Filipino spouse should likewise be allowed to remarry
as if the other party were a foreigner at the time of the solemnization of the marriage. To rule otherwise
would be to sanction absurdity and injustice. Where the interpretation of a statute according to its exact
and literal import would lead to mischievous results or contravene the clear purpose of the legislature, it
should be construed according to its spirit and reason, disregarding as far as necessary the letter of the
law. A statute may therefore be extended to cases not within the literal meaning of its terms, so long as
they come within its spirit or intent.84
To insist, as the Office of the Solicitor General does, that under our laws, petitioner is still married to
respondent despite the latter's newfound companionship with another cannot be just.85 Justice is better
served if she is not discriminated against in her own country.86 As much as petitioner is free to seek
fulfillment in the love and devotion of another, so should she be free to pledge her commitment within
the institution of marriage.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Regional Trial Court June 2, 2011 Decision and October 3,
2011 Order in SP. Proc. No. 10-0032 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. By virtue of Article 26, second
paragraph of the Family Code and the Certificate of Acceptance of the Report of Divorce dated December
16, 2009, petitioner Rhodora Ilumin Racho is declared capacitated to remarry.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 237987, March 19, 2019
DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC WORKS AND HIGHWAYS, REGION IV-A AND GENEVIEVE E.

CUARESMA, AS ONE OF THE CERTIFYING OFFICERS AT THE TIME OF THE GRANT OF THE
ASSAILED CNA INCENTIVE,* PETITIONERS, v. COMMISSION ON AUDIT, RESPONDENT.
DECISION
REYES, J. JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari under Section 1, Rule 64 of the Rules of Court which seeks to set aside
the Decision No. 2016-3771 dated November 10, 2016 and the Resolution No. 2017-4582 dated
December 27, 2017 of the respondent Commission on Audit (COA), which affirmed Decision No. 2013-
293 dated October 21, 2013 of the COA Regional Office No. IV-A (COA IV-A), which in turn affirmed
Notice of Disallowance (ND) No. 09-01-101-(09) dated December 14, 2009.4
The Facts
On December 16, 2008, the Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH), Central Office, through
then Secretary Hermogenes E. Ebdane, Jr. (Secretaiy Ebdane), issued a memorandum5 authorizing the
grant of Collective Negotiation Agreement (CNA) Incentive to rank-and-file employees in the DPWH for
calendar year 2008. The memorandum provides, among others, that:
3. That the CNA Incentive shall be paid out of savings generated from the Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses (MOOE), completed projects and Engineering and Administrative Overhead (EAO) of
each office (Central Office and Regional and District Offices), subject to the usual accounting and
auditing rules and regulations[.]6
The memorandum was issued pursuant to Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 135, Series of 2005 dated
December 27, 2005, which confirmed the grant of CNA Incentive to rank-and-file employees in
government agencies; and Public Sector Labor-Management Council (PSLMC) Resolution No. 04, Series
of 2002, which supplied the guidelines for the grant of CNA Incentive to rank-and-file employees in
national government agencies (NGAs), state universities and colleges (SUCs), and loca government units
(LGUs).
Later, the DPWH Regional Office No. IV-A (DPWH IV-A) released CNA Incentive for calendar year 2008
to its employees and officers amounting to P3,915,000.00.
On January 6, 2010, DPWH IV-A received a copy of ND No. 09-01-101-(09) dated December 14, 2009,
signed by the Regional Audit Team Leader and Supervising Auditor, both of the COA IV-A. The COA
auditors explained that the CNA Incentive in the amount of P3,915,000.00 was disallowed because it
was paid out of the Engineering and Administrative Overhead (EAO), in violation of the Department of
Budget and Management (DBM) Budget Circular No. 2006-1, issued on February 1, 2006, which states
that CNA Incentive shall be sourced solely from the Maintenance and Other Operating Expenses (MOOE).
The COA auditors also identified several DPWH IV-A personnel whom they found to be liable for the
illegal payment of the subject CNA Incentive. Among those found to be liable is herein petitioner
Genevieve E. Cuaresma (Cuaresma), who was then the Chief Accountant of DPWH IV-A and who
certified the availability of funds, completeness of the supporting documents, and validity of the
obligation for the payment of the subject CNA Incentive.
On May 26, 2010, DPWH IV-A Regional Director Marcelina N. Ocampo (Director Ocampo) sent a letter,
by way of an appeal, to the COA IV-A.
Ruling of COA Regional Office IV-A

In its Decision No. 2013-29 dated October 21, 2013, the COA IV-A dismissed Director Ocampo's appeal.
COA IV-A stressed that the MOOE shall be the sole source of the CNA Incentive as expressly provided for
in Budget Circular No. 2006-1; and that only rank-and-file employees may be granted the benefit of the
said incentive. Thus, it ruled that the release of the subject CNA Incentive, charged from DPWH IV-A's
EAO, to the DPWH IV-A employees including officers with salary grades 24 and above, was illegal. The
dispositive portion of the said decision states:
All told, the questioned Incentive may not be charged to EAO, hence, the instant Appeal is
hereby DISMISSED for lack of merit. ND No. 2009-01-101-09 is hereby AFFIRMED.7
Unconvinced, the DPWH IV-A Employees Association, represented by its president, Engineer Diosdado J.
Villanueva (Engr. Villanueva) elevated an appeal,8 which was treated as a petition for review, to the COA
Proper.
Ruling of the COA
In its assailed Decision9 No. 2016-377 dated November 10, 2016, the COA denied DPWH IV-A
Employees Association's petition. The COA concurred with COA IV-A's conclusion that DPWH IV-A
violated DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-1 when it paid the CNA Incentive out of the savings from the
EAO, instead of the MOOE. Further, the COA observed that DPWH IV-A and its Employees Association
failed to show any proof of the cost-cutting measures it undertook to generate savings as required under
DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-1, PSLMC Resolution No. 4, Series of 2002, and Section 3 of A.O. No.
135, Series of 2005. The dispositive portion of the assailed decision provides:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition for Review of Engr. Diosdado J. Villanueva, President,
Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Region IV-A Employees Association, of Commission
on Audit Regional Office (RO) No. IV-A Decision No. 2013-29 dated October 21, 2013 is
hereby DENIED. Accordingly, Notice of Disallowance No. 2009-01-101-(09) dated December 14, 2009
on the payment of 2008 Collective Negotiation Agreement incentive to officials and employees of DPWH
RO No. IV-A in the total amount of P3,915,000.00 is AFFIRMED.10
DPWH IV-A Employees Association, through Engr. Villanueva, moved for reconsideration, but the same
was denied by the COA in its Resolution11 No. 2017-458 dated December 27, 2017. In denying the
motion for reconsideration, the COA maintained that the CNA Incentive could not be validly sourced from
the EAO. It stressed that DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-1 is clear on this point. Further, it reiterated the
liability of the officers who approved the invalid release of the CNA Incentive as well as the officers who
certified the availability of funds and sufficiency of documents necessary for such release. It, however,
clarified that the officers and employees who were mere passive recipients of the said benefit need not
refund the amounts they received in good faith. The dispositive portion of the resolution states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration of Engr. Diosdado J. Villanueva,
President, Department of Public Works and Highways (DPWH) Regional Office (RO) No. IV-A Employees
Association, is hereby DENIED with FINALITY. Accordingly, Commission on Audit (COA) Decision No.
2016-377 dated November 10, 2016, denying the Petition for Review of COA RO No. IV-A Decision No.
2013-29 dated October 21, 2013 and affirming Notice of Disallowance No. 09-01-101-(09) dated
December 14, 2009, on the payment of Collective Negotiation Agreement Incentive for calendar year
2008 to officials and employees of DPWH RO No. IV-A in the total amount of P3,915,000.00,
is AFFIRMED. However, passive recipients need not refund the benefits they received in good faith,
while the approving/certifying officers remain solidarity liable for the entire amount of disallowance
based on the Silang case.12
On February 28, 2018, Cuaresma received a copy of the COA Resolution No. 2017-458. Considering that
she was among those found to be liable for the disallowed incentive, Cuaresma was prompted to file this
petition.
The Issues
I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE GRANT OF THE CNA INCENTIVE IS VALID AND SUPPORTED BY LAW AND OTHER
PERTINENT RULES AND REGULATIONS.
II.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COA ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN DENYING WITH FINALITY THE MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION
OF ENGR. DIOSDADO J. VILLANUEVA AND FURTHER AFFIRMED THE DECISION NO. 2016-377 DATED
NOVEMBER 10, 2016, DENYING THE PETITION FOR REVIEW OF COA RO NO. IV-A DECISION NO. 2013-
29 DATED OCTOBER 21, 2013 AND AFFIRMING THE NOTICE OF DISALLOWANCE NO. 09-01-101-(09)
DATED DECEMBER 14, 2009, ON THE PAYMENT OF COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATION AGREEMENT INCENTIVE
FOR CALENDAR YEAR 2008 TO OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES OF DPWH RO NO. IV-A IN THE TOTAL
AMOUNT OF PHP3,915,000.00.
III.
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT COA ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO
LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN MODIFYING THE SAID DECISION AND DECLARING THAT
PASSIVE RECIPIENTS NEED NOT REFUND THE BENEFITS THEY RECEIVED IN GOOD FAITH, WHILE THE
APPROVING/CERTIFYING OFFICERS REMAIN SOLIDARILY LIABLE FOR THE ENTIRE AMOUNT OF
DISALLOWANCE BASED ON SILANG CASE.13
Cuaresma insists that the subject CNA Incentive was validly paid out of the EAO. She argues that
payment of the CNA Incentive out of the savings from the EAO in lieu of the MOOE is allowed under the
General Appropriations Act (GAA) because MOOE and EAO serve substantially the same purpose.
According to her, this intent could be gleaned from the budget deliberations of the DPWH in Congress,
where the reason for the reduction of DPWH's MOOE was discussed.
Cuaresma further argues that she should not be held liable for the amount of the disallowance. She
explains that she merely relied on the authority given by then DPWH Secretary Ebdane, when the latter
issued a memorandum stating that the CNA Incentive may be paid out of the savings from the EAO.
Lastly, Cuaresma avers that the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in
excess of jurisdiction when it disallowed the subject CNA Incentive. She asserts that DPWH IV-A was
among the offices singled out by the COA concerning the disallowance of the CNA Incentive. She claims
that there were other offices which granted the CNA Incentive sourced from the savings from EAO but
these releases were allowed. Cuaresma further points out that the DPWH IV-A's CNA Incentive for
calendar year 2007, or for the previous year, was also paid out of the savings from the EAO.
Surprisingly, however, the COA did not disallow the release of this incentive.
In its Comment14 dated August 23, 2018, the COA, through the Office of the Solicitor General, maintains
that the subject CNA Incentive was invalidly released and paid out of the savings from the EAO. It
counters that DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-1 unequivocally states that the CNA Incentive shall be
sourced solely from the savings from the MOOE and to no other fund.
As to Cuaresma's defense that she merely relied on the authority given by Secretary Ebdane, the COA
stresses that the December 16, 2008 memorandum itself cited A.O. No. 135, Series of 2005 as its basis
and even specified that the CNA Incentive shall be subject to the usual accounting and auditing rules
and regulations. As such, the authority under the aforesaid memorandum must be consistently
implemented with the procedural guidelines and be subjected to the conditions imposed under DBM
Budget Circular No. 2006-1.
From the submissions of the parties, the issues to be resolved by the Court could be summarized as
follows: (1) whether the COA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of
jurisdiction when it disallowed the subject CNA Incentive; and (2) whether the COA committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or in excess of jurisdiction when it adjudged certain DPWH IV-A
officers, including Cuaresma, liable for the amount of the disallowance, while passive recipients were not
ordered to share in the liability.
The Court's Ruling
The petition is partly meritorious.
The COA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when it disallowed the subject CNA incentive.
In the discharge of its constitutional mandate, the COA is endowed with enough latitude to determine,
prevent and disallow irregular, unnecessary, excessive, extravagant, or unconscionable expenditures of
government funds. It has the power to ascertain whether public funds were utilized for the purpose for
which they had been intended.15 The 1987 Constitution has expressly made the COA the guardian of
public funds, vesting it with broad powers over all accounts pertaining to government revenue and
expenditures and the exclusive authority to define the scope of its audit and examination, establishing
the techniques and methods for such review, and to promulgate accounting and auditing rules.16
The grant of CNA Incentive in favor of the employees in the NGAs, such as the DPWH, is governed by
PSLMC Resolution No. 4, Series of 2002, A.O. No. 135, Series of 2005, and DBM Budget Circular No.
2006-1.
PSLMC Resolution No. 4, Series of 2002, authorized the grant of CNA Incentive for employees in the
NGAs, SUCs, and LGUs. It states that CNA Incentive may be provided in the CNAs between the
government agency and the employees association therein in recognition of the joint efforts of labor and
management to achieve all planned targets, programs, and services approved in the budget of the
agency at a lesser cost.17 The resolution also provided guidelines which must be followed in the grant of
of CNA Incentive to employees in NGAs, SUCs, and LGUs. Among these is Section 1 which mandated
that only the savings generated after the signing of the CNA may be used for the CNA Incentive;18 and
Section 2 which required the inclusion of provisions on cost-cutting measures and systems improvement
that will be undertaken by both the management and the labor organization to ensure that savings will
be generated after the signing of each CNA.19
A.O. No. 135, Series of 2005, confirmed the grant of CNA Incentive under PSLMC Resolution No. 4,
Series of 2002. It reiterated that CNA Incentive shall be sourced solely from the savings generated
during the life of the CNA,20 and that there must be provisions on cost-cutting measures in the CNA.21 It
further clarified that CNA Incentive may be extended to rank-and-file employees only.22
Finally, DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-1 provided limitations and conditions for the grant of CNA
Incentive. Among these is Item No. 7, which specified the fund from which the CNA Incentive may be
sourced.
7.0 Funding
Source
7.1 The CNA Incentive shall

be sourced solely from
savings from released
Maintenance and Other
Operating Expenses
(MOOE) allotments for
the year under review,
still valid for obligation
during the year of
payment of the CNA,
subject to the following
conditions:
7.1.1 Such savings were

generated out of the cost-
cutting measures identified
in the CNAs and
supplements thereto;
7.1.2 Such savings shall be

reckoned from the date of
signing of the CNA and
supplements thereto;
7.1.3 Such savings shall be net of

the priorities in the use
thereof such as
augmentation of amounts
set aside for compensation,
bonus, retirement gratuity,
terminal leave benefits, old-
age pension of veterans and
other personnel benefits
authorized by law and in
special and general
provisions of the annual
General Appropriations Act,
as well as other MOOE items
found to be deficient.
Augmentation shall be
limited to the actual amount
of deficiencies incurred; and
7.1.4 The basic rule that

augmentation can be done
only if there is deficiency in
specific expenditure items,
should be strictly observed.
(Emphasis supplied)
Clear from the foregoing is that CNA Incentive may not be allocated out of the savings of any fund. To
be valid, the CNA Incentive must be released from the savings of the MOOE. In this case, there is no
dispute that the subject CNA Incentive was paid out of the savings from the EAO. The violation of the
provisions of DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-1 is glaring. Thus, the COA correctly affirmed ND No. 09-
01-101-(09) as there are factual and legal justifications therefor.
Cuaresma, however, insists that savings from the EAO may be used to pay CNA Incentive considering
that EAO and MOOE serve the same purpose. She pointed out that DPWH's MOOE was reduced because
its EAO may be used to cover for the department's administrative expenses. She cited the following
exchange during the budget deliberation before the Committee on Appropriations hearing on September
22, 2010 in support of her argument:
REP. ACHARON:
xxxx
No, you reported that the budget, as I've seen it, [is] really declining from 2009 to x x x last year x x x
including the other operating expenses in different regional offices. Is that correct? So how will you
appropriate this money when you reduce it by almost 55 percent. You mean to say that other regional
offices will no longer have electricity or water? How's that?
MR. SINGSON: Your Honor, there is also what we call engineering administrative overhead, that is
between 3 and 3.5 percent that is provided for the various regions and districts for overhead expenses
and operating expenses, Your Honor.
REP. ACHARON: Okay, so you charge it to the indirect cost of the project. Okay. So I hope that there
will be no complaints from regional offices that they can no longer pay their x x x.23
The Court is not convinced.
In the first place, the cited exchange does not have any material relation to the issue at hand. The Court
notes that the subject hearing before the Committee on Appropriations on September 22, 2010 was for
the purpose of enacting the 2011 GAA. On the other hand, the issue in this case involves the
disallowance of a disbursement of a fund from the 2008 GAA.
Moreover, nothing in the cited exchange would support Cuaresma's conclusion that savings from the
EAO may be used to pay the CNA Incentive in lieu of the savings from the MOOE. While former DPWH
Secretary Rogelio Singson explained that the EAO fund may be used for the administrative expenses of
the DPWH and its regional offices, he never suggested that savings from the EAO may also be the
source of the CNA Incentive. Thus, the Court concurs with the COA's observation:
Further, the TSN shows that Secretary Singson proposed the reduction of DPWH's MOOE considering
that there were other sources of funds to cover DPWH administrative expenses such as the EAO. The
House of Representatives only confirmed the proposed budget of DPWH for 2011 and did not, in any
way, declare that EAO can be used as a source of CNA incentive in lieu of MOOE. The approval of the
proposed budget of DPWH is not a blanket authority to use the EAO fund without complying with the
existing laws and regulations.24
Cuaresma also faults the COA for allegedly being selective when it disallowed the subject CNA Incentive.
She claims that there were other departments and regional offices which sourced their respective CNA
Incentive from the EAO but the COA allowed their releases. Thus, she alleges violation of the equal
protection clause.
This argument is misplaced.
In People v. Dela Piedra,25 the Court declared that an erroneous performance of statutory duty - such as
an apparent selective enforcement of the statute - could not be considered a violation of the equal
protection clause, unless the element of intentional or purposeful discrimination is shown. In that case,
the Court ruled that there is no violation of the equal protection of the laws in prosecuting only one of
the many equally guilty persons. This lone circumstance would not be sufficient to uphold the claim of
denial of the equal protection clause. Absent a clear showing of intentional discrimination, the
prosecuting officers shall be presumed tc have regularly performed their official duties. Thus:
The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by
itself, a denial of the equal protection of the laws. Where the official action purports to be in
conformity to the statutory classification, an erroneous or mistaken performance of the
statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of the equal
protection of the laws. The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in
its unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection
unless there is shown to be present in it an element of intentional or purposeful discrimination. This may
appear on the face of the action taken with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be
shown by extrinsic evidence showing a discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the
action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and
intentional discrimination." Appellant has failed to show that, in charging appellant in court, that there
was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on the part of the prosecuting officials.26 (Emphasis
supplied; citations omitted; italics in the original)
Like the prosecution which has been given the discretion to prosecute whoever it believes to have
committed a crime, depending on its sound assessment of the evidence, the COA has the authority to
disallow disbursements of public funds if, in its judgment, they were utilized in violation of its intended
purpose. Consequently, it is up to the person who claims to have been the victim of selective
enforcement to prove that the same was made for a discriminatory purpose.
In this case, aside from her allegation that DPWH IV-A was among those singled out by the COA
concerning the disallowance of the CNA Incentive, Cuaresma failed to present even a single evidence to
show that the disallowance of the subject CNA Incentive was made pursuant to a discriminatory
purpose. Clearly, no violation of equal protection clause for selective enforcement could be attributed to
the COA as Cuaresma failed to prove that there was intentional discrimination.
Neither could the alleged allowance by the COA of the CNA Incentive for calendar year 2007 be sufficient
reason to conclude that the commission is guilty of grave abuse of discretion. Suffice it to state that the
State cannot be put in estoppel by the mistakes or errors of its officials or agents.27 The supposed error
by the COA in allowing DPWH IV-A's CNA Incentive for calendar year 2007, allegedly similarly sourced
from the savings from the EAO, is insufficient justification to uphold the validity of the CNA Incentive in
question. A contrary ruling would compel the COA to contravene its constitutional duty as the guardian
of public funds.
The COA erred when it absolved the DPWH IV-A employees who received the benefit from any liability.
The Court concurs with the COA's pronouncement that Cuaresma, as well as the other certifying and
approving officers of DPWH IV-A, must be held liable for the amount of the disallowance.
In Manila International Airport Authority v. Commission on Audit,28 the Court held that officers of the
Manila International Airport Authority (MIAA) were not in the position to approve and certify the funding
for the CNA Incentive without assuring themselves that the conditions imposed by PSLMC Resolution No.
2, Series of 2003, are complied with. PSLMC Resolution No. 2 is the resolution governing the grant of
CNA Incentive to employees in Government Financial Institutions and Government-Owned and
Controlled Corporations, such as the MIAA.
In this case, Cuaresma, as one of the certifying officers of DPWH IV-A, was duty-bound to ensure
compliance with the conditions and limitations imposed in PSLMC Resolution No. 4, Series of 2002, in
relation to DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-1, before she could issue certification on the availability of
funds for the subject CNA Incentive. Unfortunately, she failed in this regard considering the non-
observance with the limitation that savings from MOOE shall be the sole source of CNA Incentive. Hence,
she must be held liable for the amount of the disallowance.
Nevertheless, although the CNA Incentive released by the DPWH IV-A was properly disallowed, the COA
erred when it ruled that the DPWH IV-A employees who benefited from the incentive need not refund
the amounts they received. The Court holds that the DPWH IV-A employees are obliged to return the
amounts they received under the principle of unjust enrichment.
Jurisprudence holds that there is unjust enrichment when a person unjustly retains a benefit to the loss
of another, or when a person retains money or property of another against the fundamental principles of
justice, equity and good conscience. The statutory basis for the principle of unjust enrichment is Article
22 of the Civil Code which provides that "[e]very person who through an act of performance by another,
or any other means, acquires or comes into possession of something at the expense of the latter without
just or legal ground, shall return the same to him."
The principle of unjust enrichment under Article 22 requires two conditions: (1) that a person is
benefited without a valid basis or justification, and (2) that such benefit is derived at another's expense
or damage. There is no unjust enrichment when the person who will benefit has a valid claim to such
benefit.29
The conditions set forth under Article 22 of the Civil Code are present in this case.
It is settled that the subject CNA Incentive was invalidly released by the DPWH IV-A to its employees as
a consequence of the erroneous application by its certifying and approving officers of the provisions of
DBM Budget Circular No. 2006-1. As such, it only follows that the DPWH IV-A employees received the
CNA Incentive without valid basis or justification; and that the DPWH IV-A employees have no valid
claim to the benefit. Moreover, it is clear that the DPWH IV-A employees received the subject benefit at
the expense of another, specifically, the government. Thus, applying the principle of unjust enrichment,
the DPWH IV-A employees must return the benefit they unduly received.
The obligation of the DPWH IV-A employees to reimburse the amounts they received becomes more
obvious when the nature of CNA Incentive as negotiated benefit is considered.
It must be recalled that CNA Incentive is granted as a form of reward to motivate employees to exert
more effort toward higher productivity and better performance. However, before any CNA Incentive may
be granted, the CNA on which it is based must first be negotiated, approved, and implemented. On the
negotiation and approval of CNAs, Rule XII of the Amended Rules and Regulations Governing the
Exercise of the Right of Government Employees to Organize, provides:
RULE XII
COLLECTIVE NEGOTIATIONS
Section 1. Subject of negotiation. - Terms and conditions of employment or improvements thereof,
except those that are fixed by law, may be the subject of negotiation.
Section 2. Negotiable matters. - The following concerns may be the subject of negotiation between the
management and the accredited employees' organization:
xxxx
(m) CNA incentive pursuant to PSLMC Resolution No. 4, s. 2002 and Resolution No. 2, s. 2003; and
(n) such other concerns which are not prohibited by law and CSC rules and regulations.
xxxx
Section 4. Effectivity of CNA. - The CNA shall take effect upon its signing by the parties and
ratification by the majority of the rank-and-file employees in the negotiating unit. (Emphasis
supplied)
xxxx
From the provisions of the aforecited rule, there are two necessary steps which must be undertaken
before the CNA Incentive could be released to the government employees: first, the negotiation between
the government agency and the employees' collective negotiation representative; and second, the
approval by the majority of the rank-and-file employees in the negotiating unit. In the first step, the
government employees concerned participates through their duly-elected representative; in the second,
the rank-and-file employees participate directly. Thus, unlike ordinary monetary benefits granted by the
government, the CNA Incentive involve the participation of the employees who are intended to be the beneficiaries thereof.
In this case, the DPWH IV-A employees' participation in the negotiation and approval of the CNA, whether direct or indirect,
certainly gives them the necessary information to know the requirements for the valid release of the CNA Incentive. Verily,
when they received the subject benefit, they must have known that they were undeserving of it.
WHEREFORE, the Decision No. 2016-377 dated November 10, 2016 and the Resolution No. 2017-458 dated December 27,
2017, both of the Commission on Audit, are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. The certifying and approving officers,
as well as all the employees of the DPWH IV-A who received the subject CNA Incentive, are liable for the amount of the
disallowance. They must reimburse the amounts they received through salary deduction, or through whatever mode of
payment the CO A may deem just and proper under the circumstances.
SO ORDERED

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G.R. No.

197676, February 04, 2014

REMMAN ENTERPRISES, INC. AND CHAMBER OF REAL ESTATE AND BUILDERS’

VILLARAMA, JR., J.:

1. Whether there is a justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to adjudicate;

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

No Violation of One–Title One–Subject Rule

No Violation of Due Process

No Violation of Equal Protection Clause

BERNARDINA P. BARTOLOME, Petitioner,

VELASCO, JR., J.:

Nature of the Case

Petitioner raises the following issues in the petition:

I. The Honorable ECC’s Decision is contrary to evidence on record.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is meritorious.

(b) The following beneficiaries shall be considered primary:

(2) Legitimate, legitimated, legally adopted or acknowledged natural

(c) The following beneficiaries shall be considered secondary:

(1) The legitimate parentswholly dependent upon the employee for

(2) The legitimate descendants and illegitimate children who are

As applied, this Court held in Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fortune Tobacco

b. Rule XV, Section 1(c)(1) of the Amended Rules on Employees’ Compensation is in

Petitioner qualifies as John’s dependent parent

G.R. No. 210551, June 30, 2015

1. 6th year - 20%

2. 7th year - 20%

3. 8th year - 20%

4. 9th year - 20%

On all domestic households in Quezon City;

FLOOR AREA IMPOSABLE FEE

a) High-rise Condominium – The Homeowners Association of high- rise

b) High-rise apartment units – Owners of high-rise apartment units shall

Petitioner alleges that he is a registered co-owner of a 371-square-meter residential property in Quezon

A. Propriety of a Petition for Certiorari

6.3 The Assessor’s office of the Id.ntified LGU shall:

a. immediately undertake an inventory of lands within its jurisdiction which shall be

6.4 The Treasurer’s office shall:

B. Locus Standi of Petitioner

D. Failure to Exhaust Administrative Remedies

Additionally, the parties articulate the following positions:

On the Socialized Housing Tax

On the Garbage Fee

The Court’s Ruling

Respondents correctly argued that an ordinance, as in every law, is presumed valid.

(a) Taxation shall be uniform in each local government unit;

(b) Taxes, fees, charges and other impositions shall:

(2) be levied and collected only for public purposes;

(3) not be unjust, excessive, oppressive, or confiscatory;

(b) Documentary stamp tax;

(k) Taxes on premiums paid by way of reinsurance or retrocession;

We now turn to the pertinent provisions of R.A. No. 9003.

(1) strategies in reducing the volume of solid waste generated at source;

(4) the types of wastes to be reduced pursuant to Section 15 of this Act;

(a) types of solid waste;

(b) amount/volume of waste; and

(c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility.

Section 2. Basis of SWM Service Fees

a) Types of solid waste to include special waste

c) distance of the transfer station to the waste management facility

d) capacity or type of LGU constituency

On all domestic households in Quezon City;