Case Digests

Secretary v. Heirs of Dulay to Santos v. Alana

Submitted by:

Group 9

Abayon, Alvan King

Cariaga, Chylsea
Dacera, Nikita
Libang, Mari-Faye Antoinette
Mancao, Dexter Vaughn

Submitted to:

Atty. BJ Bonn Pusta

Property Law

2-Viada
 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation

Secretary v. Heirs of Dulay [764]

G.R. No. 152663, Jan 27, 2006
Characters:
(1) Secretary of Education - represented the Ministry of Education and Culture (now the Department of Education,
Culture and Sports or known as DECS)
(2) Department of Education, Culture and Sports  (DECS) - donee; petitioner
(3) Spouses Rufino Dulay, Sr. and Ignacia Vicente - Donors
(4) Heirs of Dulay - respondent; substituted Rufino Dulay, Sr.
Facts: Spouses Dulay are owners of a parcel of land and a portion of which is donated to DECS, by virtue of a Deed of
Donation, with a condition that the latter would use the property for school purposes. However, DECS started the
construction of the Rizal National High School not on the donated property from the Spouses Dulay, but on the property
donated by another person which is two kilometers away from the land donated by the Spouses Dulay. The latter
requested that the property be returned to them since the land was never used for school purposes for 13 years.
          Rufino Dulay, Sr. died and was substituted by the heirs who filed a complaint for revocation of the Deed of
Donation. On the other hand, DECS together with the Office of the Solicitor General argued that they complied with
condition since the property was used as a technology and home economics laboratory, and the students of the school
planted rice, mahogany seedling and fruit-bearing trees which the produce will be sold and its proceeds will be used for
the construction of the school building on the property. They further argued that the donation was not inofficious, and the
action of the heirs of Dulay had already prescribed. Subsequently, there was an ocular inspection on the land donated.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not the complaint for revocation by the heirs of Dulay should be granted.
(2) Whether or not the complaint for revocation filed by the heirs of Dulay had already prescribed.

Ruling:
(1) On the first issue, the revocation by the heirs was granted by the Supreme Court.
Nothing in the records that could concretely prove that the condition of donation has been complied with by
DECS. The planting of palay on the land donated can hardly be considered and could not have been the "school
purposes" referred to and intended by the donors, and DECS failed to prove that the palay found in the property was
planted by DECS personnel or at its instance or even by students of the Rizal National High School.  Also, as to the
allegation that the land was used as a technology and home economics laboratory of the Rizal National High School is far
from being the truth considering that not only is the said school located two kilometers away from the land donated but
also there was not even a single classroom built on the land. These observations, together with the unrebutted ocular
inspection report made by the trial court which revealed that the land donated remains idle and without any improvement
thereon for more than a decade since the time of the donation. From the foregoing, it could be concluded that DECS failed
to comply with what is incumbent upon them in the deed of donation.
(2) As to the second issue, the right to seek the revocation of donation had not yet prescribed.
It must be stressed that the donation is onerous because the DECS, as donee, was burdened with the obligation
to utilize the land donated for school purposes. Under Article 733 of the New Civil Code, a donation with an onerous
cause is essentially a contract and is thus governed by the rules on contract. The Court did not apply the four-year
prescriptive period for the revocation of donation provided under Article 764 of the New Civil Code and instead apply the
general rules on contracts since Article 733 of the same Code, specifically provided that onerous donations shall be
governed by the rules on contracts.
Since a deed of donation is considered a written contract, it is governed by Article 1144 of the New Civil Code,
which provides that the prescriptive period for an action arising from a written contract is ten (10) years from the time the
cause of action accrues. In the case of donation, the accrual of the cause of action is from the expiration of the time within
which the donee must comply with the conditions or obligations of the donation. In the instant case, however, it must be
noted that the subject donation fixed no period within which the donee can comply with the condition of donation. As such,
resort to Article 1197 of the New Civil Code is necessary. Said article provides that if the obligation does not fix a period,
but from its nature and the circumstances it can be inferred that a period was intended, the courts may fix the duration
thereof. Indeed, from the nature and circumstances of the condition of the subject donation, it can be inferred that a period
was contemplated by the donors. The donors could not have intended their property to remain idle for a very long period
of time when, in fact, they specifically obliged DECS to utilize the land donated for school purposes and thus put it in good
use.
Therefore, it has been 16 years since the execution of the deed of donation. DECS failed to use the property for
the purpose specified in the deed of donation. The property remained barren and unutilized. Even after the heirs of Dulay
sought the return of the property before the courts, DECS still failed to draw up plans to use the property for school
purposes. In fine, petitioner DECS has no use for the property; hence, the same shall be reverted to the heirs of Dulay.
 
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 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation

Zamboanga v. Plagata [764]

G.R. No.164748, Sep 30, 2008

Characters: 
(1) Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. (ZBTKBI) - Petitioner; Donor
(2) Hon. Julius Rhett J. Plagata - Respondent; Labor Arbiter who ordered to levy the property donated
(3) Republic of the Philippines - Donee
(4) Teopisto Mendoza - clerk of ZBTKBI who was illegally dismissed and in his favor the property of ZBTKBI was levied
for payment of backwages

Facts:
ZBTKBI entered into a Deed of Donation with the Republic to donate a parcel of land in favor of the latter. This
was accepted by the Republic. The donation contains a condition which became the center of controversy which provides
“ 4.That in the event barter trading shall be phased out, prohibited, or suspended for more than one (1) year in
Zamboanga City, Philippines, the afore-described parcel of land shall revert back to the DONOR without need of any
further formality or documentation, and the DONOR shall have the first option to purchase the building and improvements
thereon.”
         
ZBTKBI hired Teopisto Mendoza as a clerk and was later terminated on the ground of abandonment of work.
Mendoza filed a complaint for illegal dismissal and for backwages which was granted by Hon. Plagata and a writ of
execution was issued which states that Mendoza is entitled of backwages amounting to Php 90, 930, and should ZBTKBI
fail to pay such amount, the Sheriff is directed to cause the satisfaction of the same on movable or immovable properties
of the former. The property was sold at public auction with Mendoza as the sole highest bidder.
         
ZBTKBI argued that Hon. Plagata and the Sheriff GRAVELY ABUSED THEIR DISCRETION WHEN THEY
CAUSED THE LEVY ON THE PARCEL OF LAND BELONGING TO THE REPUBLIC, and five years has already elapsed
from the finality of judgment. The Court of Appeals ruled that the owner of the property was ZBTKBI and not the Republic.

Issues:
(1)Who is the owner of the properties levied considering that the same has been donated to the Republic?
(2) Is Article 764 on prescription applicable in this case?

Ruling:
(1) The owner of the properties is the ZBTKBI.
It is clear from condition number 4 that the property donated to the Republic, in the event that barter trading was
phased out, prohibited or suspended for more than one year in Zamboanga City, shall revert to the donor without need of
any further formality or documentation. Effective 1 October 1988, per Memorandum Circular No. 1 of the Office of the
President dated 17 June 1988, barter trade in Zamboanga City was totally phased out. Following the condition contained
in the Deed of Donation, the donated land shall revert to ZBTKBI  without further formality or documentation. It follows that
upon the phase-out of barter trade, ZBTKBI again became the owner of the subject land.

(2) No, Article 764 of the New Civil Code is not applicable.
When a deed of donation expressly provides for automatic revocation and reversion of the property donated, the
rules on contract and the general rules on prescription should apply, and not Article 764 of the Civil Code. Since Article
1306 of said Code authorizes the parties to a contract to establish such stipulations not contrary to law, public order or
public policy, the Court ruled that at the very least, that stipulation of the parties providing for automatic revocation of the
deed of donation, without prior judicial action for that purpose, is valid subject to the determination of the propriety of the
rescission sought. Where such propriety is sustained, the decision of the court will be merely declaratory of the
revocation, but it is not in itself the revocatory act.
The automatic reversion of the subject land to the donor upon phase out of barter trading in Zamboanga City
cannot be doubted. Said automatic reversion cannot be averted, merely because ZBTKBI has not yet exercised its option
to purchase the buildings and improvements made and introduced on the land by the Republic; or because the Republic
has not yet sold the same to other interested buyers. Otherwise, there would be gross violation of the clear import of the
conditions set forth in the deed of donation.

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 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation

Philippine Woman’s v. Yangco [764]

G.R. No.199595, Apr 2, 2014

Characters:
(1)Philippine Woman’s Christain Temperance Union, Inc. (PWCTUI) - Petitioner; donee
(2) Teodor R. Yangco 2nd and 3rd Generation Heirs Foundation, Inc. (TRY foundation) - Respondent; Donor

Facts:
The parcel of land allegedly owned by TRY Foundation is donated to PWCTUI with the condition that “Should the
property herein be used for any other purpose or purposes not herein specified, the present gift shall become ipso facto
null and void and property given shall automatically revert to the donor, his heirs and assigns, but any improvement or
improvements placed, constructed and/or maintained on said premises by the Donee, shall remain the property of said
Donee to be by it removed therefrom at its expense after reasonable notice from the donor, his heirs and assigns.”
         
TRY foundation filed before the RTC, acting as a Land Registration Court, a petition for the issuance of New Title
pursuant to Section 108 of PD 1529 alleging that the expiration of the corporate term  of PWCTUI effectively rescinded the
donation pursuant to the "unwritten resolutory condition" deemed written by Article 1315 of the Civil Code14 prescribing
that the Corporation Code, specifically Section 12215 thereof, be read into the donation. The latter provision mandates
dissolved corporation to wind up their affairs and dispose of their assets within three years from the expiration of their
term. PWCTUI opposed the petition arguing that  TRY Foundation has no legal personality to bring the action because the
donation has never been revoked and any right to demand for its revocation already prescribed.
         
The RTC ruled in favor of TRY foundation and affirmed by the Court Appeals. As a result, the property was
reverted back to TRY foundation.

Issues:
(1) Was the action filed by TRY foundation proper as to revert the donated property back to them?
(2)Was it proper for the RTC to rule on the reversion of the donated property in favor of TRY foundation acting as a Land
Registration Court?

Ruling:
(1) No, the action was not proper.
TRY Foundation is actually seeking to recover the possession and ownership of the subject property from PWCTUI
and not merely seeking to obtain a new title over the property. TRY Foundation cannot use the summary proceedings in
Section 108 of P.D. No. 1529 to rescind a contract of donation as such action should be threshed out in ordinary civil
proceedings.

(2)    No, it was not proper for the RTC to rule on the reversion of the donated property in favor of TRY foundation acting as a
Land Registration Court.

The requirement on the service of summons for the court to acquire jurisdiction is essential. Without a valid service of
summons, the court cannot acquire jurisdiction over the defendant, unless the defendant voluntarily submits to it. Service
of summons is a guarantee of one’s right to due process in that he is properly apprised of a pending action against him
and assured of the opportunity to present his defenses to the suit.

In contrast, jurisdiction in a land registration cases being a proceeding in rem, is acquired by constructive seizure of
the land through publication, mailing and posting of the notice of hearing. Persons named in the application are not
summoned but merely notified of the date of initial hearing on the petition.

The absence of the jurisdictional requirements for ordinary civil actions thus prevented the RTC, acting as a land
registration court, from acquiring the power to hear and decide the underlying issue of revocation of donation. Any
determination made involving such issue had no force and effect; it cannot also bind PWCTUI over whom the RTC
acquired no jurisdiction for lack of service of summons. 

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 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation

Camarines Sur v. Bodega [764]

G.R. No. 194199, Mar 22, 2017

Characters:
Province of Camarines Sur – registered owner of a parcel of land in Naga City.
Camarines Sur Teachers’ Association, Inc. (CASTEA) – Donee of 600 square meters of the parcel of land
Bodega Glassware – Entered into a Contract of Lease with CASTEA

Facts:
The Province of Camarines Sur was the registered owner of a parcel of land in Naga City. The Province
donated 600 square meters to CASTEA through a Deed of Donation inter vivos which included an automatic
revocation clause that states:

That the condition of this donation is that the DONEE shall use the above-described portion of land
subject of the present donation for no other purpose except the construction of its building to be owned
and to be constructed by the above-named DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said
Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection with its functions under its charter and by-
laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the Camarines Sur High School Alumni
Association, PROVIDED FURTHERMORE, that the DONEE shall not sell, mortgage or incumber
the property herein donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party
and provided, lastly, that the construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall be
commenced within a period of one (1) year from and after the execution of this donation, otherwise, this
donation shall be deemed automatically revoked and voided and of no further force and effect.

CASTEA accepted the donation but in August of 1995, entered into a Contract of Lease with Bodega over the
donated property. CASTEA leased the property for 20 years to Bodega, and Bodega thereafter took actual
possession of the property.

In July 2005, the Office of the Provincial Legal Officer of the Province of Camarines Sur wrote Bodega
regarding the building it built on the property. The Legal Officer demanded from Bodega to show proof as legal
basis for his possession, but Bodega could not produce any. Nevertheless, the Province left Bodega
undisturbed and merely tolerated its possession of the property.

In 2007, the Province sent a letter to Bodega which stated that Bodega’s occupation was by mere tolerance
and it is now intended that the property be used for the provinces’ developmental projects. The Province
demanded Bodega vacate, but this was not complied with.

Thus, the Province through its then Provincial Governor revoked its donation through a Deed of Revocation of
Donation. It asserted that CASTEA violated the Deed of Donation when it leased the property to Bodega. The
Province invoked the automatic revocation clause in the deed.

Thereafter, the Province filed an action for unlawful detainer against Bodega.

Upon reaching the Court of Appeals, it was explained that Bodega’s possession of the property is based on its
Contract of Lease with CASTEA. While the Province that the automatic revocation clause applies, it should
have first filed an action for reconveyance of the property against CASTEA. It was of the opinion that judicial
intervention is necessary to ascertain if the automatic revocation clause suffices to declare the donation
revoked.

Issue:
W/N the automatic revocation declared the donation of the Province as revoked due to the breach of the Deed
of Donation?

Ruling: Yes. The Court ruled:

We repeated this ruling in Dolar v. Barangay Lublub (Now P.D. Monfort North) Municipality of Dumangas. We
once again held that if a contract of donation provides for automatic rescission or reversion in case of a breach
of a condition and the donee violates it or fails to comply with it, the property donated automatically reverts
back to the donor without need of any judicial declaration. It is onl y when the donee denies the rescission or

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 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation
challenges its propriety that the court can intervene to conclusively settle whether the resolution was proper.
This was also the import of our ruling in Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang Bayan, Inc. v. Plagata.

In this case, the Deed of Donation contains a clear automatic revocation clause.

The provision identifies three conditions for the donation: (1) that the property shall be used for "no other
purpose except the construction of its building to be owned and to be constructed by the above-named
DONEE to house its offices to be used by the said Camarines Sur Teachers' Association, Inc., in connection
with its functions under its charter and by-laws and the Naga City Teachers' Association as well as the
Camarines Sur High School Alumni Association," (2) CASTEA shall "not sell, mortgage or incumber the
property herein donated including any and all improvements thereon in favor of any party," and (3) "the
construction of the building or buildings referred to above shall be commenced within a period of one (1) year
from and after the execution." The last clause of this paragraph states that "otherwise, this donation shall be
deemed automatically revoked x x x." We read the final clause of this provision as an automatic revocation
clause which pertains to all three conditions of the donation. When CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it
breached the first and second conditions.

Accordingly, The Province takes the position that when CASTEA leased the property to Bodega, it violated the
conditions in the Deed of Donation and as such, the property automatically reverted to it. It even executed a
Deed of Revocation. The records show that CASTEA never contested this revocation. Hence, applying the
ruling in De Luna, Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila, Dolor and Zamboanga Barter Traders Kilusang
Bayan, Inc., the Province validly considered the donation revoked and by virtue of the automatic revocation
clause, this revocation was automatic and immediate, without need of judicial intervention. Thus, the CA clearly
erred in its finding that the Province should have first filed an action for reconveyance. This contradicts the
doctrine stated in the aforementioned cases and renders nugatory the very essence of an automatic revocation
clause.

Thus, as the Province validly considered the donation revoked and CASTEA never contested it, the property
donated effectively reverted back to it as owner. In demanding the return of the property, the Province sources
its right of possession on its ownership. Under Article 428 of the Civil Code, the owner has a right of action
against the holder and possessor of the thing in order to recover it.

This right of possession prevails over Bodega's claim which is anchored on its Contract of Lease with
CASTEA. CASTEA's act of leasing the property to Bodega, in breach of the conditions stated in the Deed of
Donation, is the very same act which caused the automatic revocation of the donation. Thus, it had no right,
either as an owner or as an authorized administrator of the property to lease it to Bodega. While a lessor need
not be the owner of the property leased, he or she must, at the very least, have the authority to lease it out.
None exists in this case. Bodega finds no basis for its continued possession of the property.

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 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation

Clemente v. RP [764]
G.R. No. 220008, Feb 20, 2019

Characters:
Mayor Clemente and the Clemente siblings- owners of a parcel of land
Socorro Clemente – Heir of Mayor Clemente
Republic of the Philippines – donee in this case
DPWH – accepted the donation in behalf of the Republic

Facts:
were the owners of a parcel of land covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-50896. During their
lifetime, they executed a Deed of Donation in 1963 over a one-hectare portion of their property which is the
subject property in this case. This was in favor of the Republic of the Philippines.

The Deed provided:

“The herein DONORS hereby voluntarily and freely give, transfer and convey, by way of unconditional
donation, unto said DONEE, his executors and administrators, all of the rights, title and interest which
the aforesaid DONORS have or which pertain to them and which they owned exclusively in the above-
described real property over a one-hectar[e] portion of the same, solely for hospital site only and for no
other else, where a Government Hospital shall be constructed…”

The District Engineer of DPWH accepted the donation.In accordance with the Deed of Donation, the
construction of a building for a hospital was started in the following year. However, for reasons unknown, the
construction was never completed and only its foundation remains.

In 2003, Socorro and Rosario Clemente wrote 2 letters inquiring on the development of the government
hospital. However, the District Engineer informed them that the DPWH no longer had a plan to construct a
hospital at the site and that the DPWH had no budget for the hospital construction.

In 2004, almost forty-one (41) years after the Deed of Donation was executed, Socorro, as heir and successor-
in-interest of Mayor Clemente, filed for Revocation of Donation, Reconveyance and Recovery of Possession
alleging that the Republic failed to comply with the condition of the Donation.

The Republic argued that the obligation to construct a hospital was fulfilled when the hospital started to be
constructed. Also, they argue that the action of Clemente has already prescribed because it has been more
than 10 years since the violation of the condition in the Deed of Donation.

Issues:
1.       W/N the Republic complied with the resolutory condition imposed in the Deed of Donation?
2.        W/N the action of Clemente has already prescribed and laches had already set in?

First issue: W/N the Republic complied with the resolutory condition imposed in the Deed of Donation?
No. The Court here ruled:
The nature of the donation made by the Clemente Siblings is a donation subject to a condition – the
condition being the construction of a government hospital and the use of the Subject Property solely for
hospital purposes. Upon the non-fulfillment of the condition, the donation may be revoked and all the rights
already acquired by the donee shall be deemed lost and extinguished.18 This is a resolutory condition
because it is demandable at once by the done but the non-fulfillment of the condition gives the donor the right
to revoke the donation.
In this case, upon the execution of the Deed of Donation and the acceptance of such donation in the same
instrument, ownership was transferred to the Republic, as evidenced by the new certificate of title issued in the
name of the Province of Quezon. Because the condition in the Deed of Donation is a resolutory condition, until
the donation is revoked, it remains valid.

However, for the donation to remain valid, the donee must comply with its obligation to construct a government
hospital and use the Subject Property as a hospital site. The failure to do so gives the donor the right to revoke
the donation. Article 764 of the Civil Code provides:

6
 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation
Art. 764. The donation shall be revoked at the instance of the donor, when the donee fails to comply
with any of the conditions which the former imposed upon the latter.

In this case, the property donated shall be returned to the donor, the alienations made by the donee and the
mortgages imposed thereon by him being void, with the limitations established, with regard to third persons, by
the Mortgage Law and the Land Registration Laws.

This action shall prescribe after four years from the non-compliance with the condition, may be transmitted to
the heirs of the donor, and may be exercised against the donee's heirs.

It is clear from the records that the donee failed to comply with its obligation to construct a government hospital
and to use the premises as a hospital site.

When the parties provided in the Deed of Donation that the donee should construct a government hospital,
their intention was to have such hospital built and completed, and to have a functioning hospital on the Subject
Property. This can be evidenced by the accompanying words in the Deed of Donation – "solely for hospital site
only and for no other else, where a [g]overnment [h]ospital shall be constructed." The condition imposed upon
the donee has two parts – first, to construct a government hospital, and second, to use the Subject Property
solely as a hospital site. The argument of the Republic that the mere construction of the foundation of a
building complies with the condition that a government hospital be constructed on the Subject Property is
specious. A foundation of a building is obviously not a government hospital. The other condition in the Deed of
Donation, which is to use the Subject Property solely as a hospital site, is also not complied with when the
Subject Property is left idle, which means the Subject Property is not being used as a hospital site. The
foundation of a building cannot function as a hospital site. Thus, even if we are to consider, for the sake of
argument, that the construction of the foundation of a hospital building is enough to comply with the obligation
to construct a government hospital, the subsequent abandonment of the construction results in the non-
compliance with the second part of the donee's obligation – which is to use the Subject Property solely as a
hospital site.

Based on the foregoing, the Court held that the donee failed to comply with the resolutory condition imposed in
the Deed of Donation.

Second issue: W/N the action of Clemente has already prescribed and laches had already set in?
No. The Court explained:

We find that this action is not premature, and has not been barred by prescription or laches.

An action for reconveyance based on a violation of a condition in a Deed of Donation should be instituted
within ten (10) years from the time of such violation. Moreover, an action to revoke a donation based on non-
compliance of the condition prescribes after four (4) years from such non-compliance. Thus, in both cases, to
be able to determine whether the action has prescribed, the time of non-compliance must first be determined.
This is because the failure to comply with the condition imposed will give rise to the cause of action against the
obligor-donee, which is also the starting point of when to count the prescriptive period.

It is imperative to determine the period within which the donee has to comply with the condition to construct a
government hospital and use the site solely as a hospital site, because it is only after such time that it can be
determined with certainty that there was a failure to comply with the condition. Without such determination,
there is no way to determine whether the donee failed to comply with its obligation, and consequently, whether
the prescriptive period to file an action has started to run. Prescription cannot set in if the period to comply with
the obligation cannot be determined with certainty. In this case, the Deed of Donation is bereft of any period
within which the donee should have complied with the condition of constructing a government hospital. Thus,
the action has not yet prescribed.

Based on the Deed of Donation, however, it is apparent that a period was indeed intended by the parties. By
agreeing to the conditions in the Deed of Donation, the donee agreed, and it bound itself to construct a
government hospital and to use the Subject Property solely for hospital purposes. The construction of the said
hospital could not have been intended by the parties to be in a state of limbo as it can be deduced that the
parties intended that the hospital should be built within a reasonable period, although the Deed of Donation
failed to fix a period for such construction.

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 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation
While ideally, a period to comply with the condition should have been fixed by the Court, we find that this will
be an exercise in futility because of the fact that it has been more than fifty (50) years since the Deed of
Donation has been executed; and thus, the reasonable time contemplated by the parties within which to
comply with the condition has already lapsed. In Central Philippine University v. Court of Appeals, which had a
similar factual background with this case, the Court held:
Thus, when the obligation does not fix a period but from its nature and circumstances it can be inferred that a
period was intended, the general rule provided in Art. 1197 of the Civil Code applies, which provides that the
courts may fix the duration thereof because the fulfillment of the obligation itself cannot be demanded until after
the court has fixed the period for compliance therewith and such period has arrived.

Further, in 2003, Socorro already wrote to DPWH asking for updates on the construction of the government
hospital. However, the DPWH informed her that there were no plans to build any hospital on the Subject
Property. Thus, it is clear that the donee no longer has the intention of fulfilling its obligation under the Deed of
Donation. It has now become evident that the donee will no longer comply with the condition to construct a
hospital because a government hospital was already built in another barangay, Barangay Polo. If it becomes
indubitable that the event, in this case the construction of the hospital, will not take place, then the obligation of
the donor to honor the donation is extinguished. Moreover, the donor-obligee can seek rescission of the
donation if the donee-obligor has manifested no intention to comply with the condition of the donation.

For the same reason, the Court find that laches has not set in.

The Supreme Court held: Because of the failure of the Deed of Donation to specify the period within which to
comply with the condition, there can be no delay in asserting the right against the Republic. In contrast, the
Republic is guilty of unreasonable delay and neglect in complying with its obligation to construct a government
hospital and to use the Subject Property as a hospital site.

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 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation

Eduarte v. CA [765]
G.R. No. 105944 | February 9, 1996

Characters: 
 Pedro Calapine: Registered Owner of Land
 Helen Doria: Niece of Pedro; Donee of ½ of the land
 Sps. Eduarte: Purchased Property from Helen. 

Facts: 
Pedro Calapine was the registered owner of a parcel of land in San Pablo City. He executed a deed of
donation Inter vivos over 1/2 of his land to his niece, Helen. Subsequently, he purportedly executed another
deed of donation inter vivos in favor of Helen, this time over the whole parcel of land. 

Helen donated a portion of the lot to Calauan Christian Reformed Church. She then sold and conveyed the
remaining portion of the property to Sps. Eduarte, save for 700sq.m. over her house. 

Pedro then claimed that the signature to the Deed of Donation was a Forgery, and she was unworthy of his
liberality, and filed an action for Revocation of Donation.

Sps. Eduarte argue that Art. 765 does not apply since Acts of Ingratitude pertain to offenses committed by the
Donee (Helen) against the Person/Property of the Donor. They aver that as the offense imputed, which was
Falsification of a Public Document, was neither a crime against the person nor the property of the Donor, but is
a crime against Public Interest (RPC), the same is NOT a ground for Revocation. 

Issue: 
WON Falsification of Public Document by Helen is an Act of Ingratitude against Pedro. 

Held: 
Yes.  It is an act of Ingratitude that would merit the revocation of Donation by Pedro 

All Crimes which offend the Donor show ingratitude and are causes for donation. 
Tolentino’s Commentaries contain:”Offense against donor: all crimes which offend the donor, show
ingratitude and are causes for revocation.”

The 1st sentence was deleted by Sps. Eduarte because it totally controverts their contention. all crimes which
offended donor showing gratitude and are causes of revocation. 

The Sps. Eduarte’s attempt to categorize the offenses according to their classification under the RPC is
unwarranted considering that illegal detention, threats, coercion, are considered as crimes against the person
of the donor despite the fact that they are classified as crimes against personal Liberty and security under the
RPC. 

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 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation

Heirs of Velazquez v. CA
G.R. No. 126996 | February 15, 2000

Characters: 
 Sps. Leoncia De Guzman and Cornelio Aquino: Owned Properties  
 Anatalia; Heirs (Santiago Meneses): Plaintiff, Asking to Revoke Donation 
 Tranquilina; Heirs (Cesario Velasquez): Defendant, Claims Donation is Valid 

Facts:
Sps. Leoncia De Guzman and Cornelio Aquino died intestate, and were childless. Leoncia was survived by her
sisters Anatalia and Tranquilina. During their marriage, Sps. Aquino were able to acquire several properties. 

Heirs of Anatalia (Meneses) filed an action for Annulment, Partition, and damages against Heirs of Tranquilina
(Velasquezes).

They alleged that: Leoncia, before her death, had a talk with Anatalia and Tranquilina, and that Leonica told
that the Documents of Donation and Partition which she and her husband earlier executed were not signed by
them, it was not their intention to give away all of the properties to Cesario Velasquez, because Anatalia has
several children to support. Hence, Cesario and Tranquilina allegedly promise to divide the properties equally. 
Heirs of Anatalia further alleged that the properties were then forcibly taken away from them after the death of
Leoncia. 

Heirs of Tranquilina alleged: During the lifetime of the Sps. Aquino, Leoncia had already Donated their
properties in favor of Heirs of Velazquez. They denied that a conference took place between Leoncia, Anatalia
and Tranquilina. 

Issue: 
WON the Donation in favor of Cesario and Heirs may be revoked. 

Held: 
No. They may not be revoked. 

Donation cannot be revoked unless for the reasons under Art. 760, 764, 765. 
A Donation as a mode of acquiring ownership results in an effective transfer of title over the property from
donor to donee, and donation is perfected from the moment the donor knows of the acceptance by the donee.
Once a donation is accepted, the donee becomes the absolute owner of the property donated. 

The donation of the first parcel made by Sps. Aquino to Velazquez who were 19 and 10 years old respectively
was accepted through their father, in the acceptance was incorporated in the body of the same deed of
donation and made part of it , and was signed by the donor and acceptor. Legally speaking there was delivery
and acceptance of the deed, and the donation existed perfectly and irrevocably. The donation Inter vivos may
only be revoked for reasons provided in Article 760, 764, and 765. 

Donation Propter Nuptias may not be revoked

The donation propter nuptias made in favor of Cesario and wife became property of Sps. Velasquez since
1919. The Deed of Donation propter nuptias Can only be revoked by non performance of the marriage and the
other causes mentioned in Article 86, FC. 
The alleged reason for the reputation of the deed, Sps. Aquino did not intend to give away all of their properties
since Anatalia had several children to support is NOT one of the grounds for the vocation of the nation
either Inter vivos or propter nuptias, although the donation might be inofficious.

10
 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation

Ganuelas v. Cawed
G.R. No. 123968, Apr 24, 2003

Characters:
·         Celestina Ganuelas – Donor
·         Ursulina Ganuelas – Donee, Niece of Celestina, Petitioner
·         Leocadia Flores et al. – Other nieces of Celestina, Private Respondents
Facts:
         Celestina Ganuelas executed a Deed of Donation of Real Property covering seven parcels of land in
favor of Ursulina. It was stipulated that it shall become effective upon the death of the former, and that the
same shall be void if the former survives the latter. Years later, Celestina revoked such donation and have it
set aside. She then died without issue and any surviving ascendants and siblings. Thereafter, Ursulina shared
the donated properties with Flores et al. Several years later, Ursulina secured the corresponding tax
declarations in her name and since then, refused to give Flores et al. any share in the produce of the donated
properties, despite the latter’s demands.
         Flores et al. then filed a complaint alleging, among others, that the said donation was a disposition
mortis causa which failed to comply with the provisions of the Civil Code regarding formalities of wills and
testaments, hence, it was void. In Ursulina’s reply, she alleged that it was actually an donation inter vivos, and
that the subsequent revocation by Celestina of the same was void for being not grounded to those provided by
law.

Issues:
Whether or not the donation is inter vivos and thus, can only be revoked through the reasons provided
under Article 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code.

Ruling:

No. It is a donation mortis causa. Donation inter vivos differs from donation mortis causa in that in the
former, the act is immediately operative even if the actual execution may be deferred until the death of the
donor, while in the latter, nothing is conveyed to or acquired by the donee until the death of the donor-testator.
The distinction between a transfer inter vivos and mortis causa is important as the validity or revocation
of the donation depends upon its nature. The distinguishing characteristics of a donation mortis causa are the
following:
1.      It conveys no title or ownership to the transferee before the death of the transferor; or, what
amounts to the same thing, that the transferor should retain the ownership (full or naked) and
control of the property while alive;
2.      That before his death, the transfer should be revocable by the transferor at will, ad nutum; but
revocability may be provided for indirectly by means of a reserved power in the donor to dispose of
the properties conveyed;
3.      That the transfer should be void if the transferor should survive the transferee.

In this case, there is nothing in the donation which indicates that any right, title or interest in the donated
properties was to be transferred to Ursulina prior to the death of Celestina. The phrase ― “to become effective
upon the death of the DONOR” admits of no other interpretation but that Celestina intended to transfer the
ownership of the properties to Ursulina on her death, not during her lifetime. Not being a donation inter vivos,
its revocation is not subject to the limitations provided by Article 760, 764 and 765 of the Civil Code.

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 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation

Sps. Gestopa vs. CA

G.R. No. 111904, Oct 5, 2000

Characters:
·         Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag – Donors
·         Mercedes Danlag-Pilapil – Donee, Illegitimate daughter of Diego, Private Respondents
·         Spouses Gestopa – Buyers of the donated properties, Petitioner
 
Facts:
         Spouses Diego and Catalina Danlag executed three deeds of donation mortis causa in favor of
Mercedes Danlag-Piliapil concerning four of the six parcels of unregistered lands owned by the former. All
deeds contained the reservation of the rights of the donors to amend, cancel or revoke the donation during
their lifetime, and to sell, mortgage, or encumber the properties donated during the donor’s lifetime. Years
later, they executed a deed of donation inter vivos still in favor of Mercedes covering the aforementioned
parcels of land plus the two remaining parcels reserving their rights to the fruits of the land during their lifetime
and for prohibiting the donee to sell or dispose the properties donated.

Subsequently, they sold two of the said parcels to spouses Gestopa. Thereafter, the spouses Danlag executed
a deed of revocation recovering the six parcels of land donated to Mercedes. Mercedes then filed a petition to
quiet the title of the said donated properties arguing that she had complied with all the conditions provided
under such donation, that she had not been guilty of any acts of ingratitude, and that the spouses Danlag had
no legal basis in revoking the subject donation.

Issue:
         Whether or not the donation is inter vivos and thus, can be revoked on account of officiousness, non-
compliance with the conditions, or ingratitude.

Ruling:
         Yes, the donation is inter vivos. Crucial in resolving whether the donation was inter vivos
or mortis causa is the determination of whether the donor intended to transfer the ownership over the
properties upon the execution of the deed. The Court in this matter provided for the following reasons: (1) that
the spouses donated the parcels of land out of love and affection, a clear indication of a donation inter vivos;
(2) the reservation of a lifetime usufruct; (3) reservation of sufficient properties for maintenance that shows the
intention to part with their six lot; and (4) respondent's acceptance, contained in the deed of donation.

         As a rule, once a deed of donation has been accepted, it cannot be revoked, except for officiousness or
ingratitude, which the spouses failed to invoke. As resolved, the right to dispose of the properties belonged to
Mercedes, the donee. The donor’s right to give consent was merely intended to protect his usufructuary
interests. It is provided under jurisprudence that a limitation on the right to sell during the donors’ lifetime
implied that ownership had passed to the donees and donation was already effective during the donors’
lifetime.

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 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation

Calanasan v. Sps. Dolorito [765]

G.R. No. 171937, Nov 25, 2013

CHARACTERS:
1. Cerila J. Calanasan – petitioner; took care of Evelyn Dolorito since childhood; donor
2. Evelyn C. Dolorito – respondent; donee
3. Teodora J. Calanasan – sister of Cerila

FACTS:
1. In 1982, Evelyn was already married to Virgilio Dolorito, Cerila donated to her a parcel of land which
had earlier been mortgaged for Php 15,000.00. The donation was conditional: Evelyn must redeem the
land and the petitioner was entitled to possess and enjoy the property as long as she lived.
2. Evelyn signified her acceptance of the donation and its terms in the same deed. Evelyn was also able
to redeem the property, had the title transfer to her name, and granted to Cerila usufructuary rights over
the donated land.
3. In 15 August 2002, Cerila, assisted by her sister Teodora, complained with the RTC that Evelyn had
committed acts of ingratitude against her. She prayed that her donation in favor of her niece be
revoked.
4. Evelyn, on the other hand, denied the commission of any act of ingratitude. Evelyn also argued that
Cerila failed to prove that it was Evelyn who committed acts of ingratitude against her; thus, Article 765
of the New Civil Code found no application in the case.

ISSUE:
Whether Cerila may revoke her donation to Evelyn for acts of ingratitude. No, she may not.

RULING:

In Republic of the Phils. v. Silim, the Supreme Court classified donations according to purpose. A pure/simple
donation is the truest form of donation as it is based on pure gratuity. The remuneratory/compensatory type
has for its purpose the rewarding of the donee for past services, which services do not amount to a
demandable debt. A conditional/modal donation, on the other hand, is a consideration for future services; it
also occurs where the donor imposes certain conditions, limitations or charges upon the donee, whose value is
inferior to the donation given. Lastly, an onerous donation imposes upon the donee a reciprocal obligation;
this is made for a valuable consideration whose cost is equal to or more than the thing donated.

Since the donation imposed on the donee the burden of redeeming the property for P15,000.00, the donation
was onerous. As an endowment for a valuable consideration, it partakes of the nature of an ordinary contract;
hence, the rules of contract will govern and Article 765 of the New Civil Code finds no application with respect
to the onerous portion of the donation.

Insofar as the value of the land exceeds the redemption price paid for by the donee, a donation exists, and the
legal provisions on donation apply. Nevertheless, despite the applicability of the provisions on donation to the
gratuitous portion, the Cerila may not dissolve the donation. She has no factual and legal basis for its
revocation, as aptly established by the RTC. First, the ungrateful acts were committed not by the donee
(Evelyn); it was her husband who committed them. Second, the ungrateful acts were perpetrated not against
the donor (Cerila); it was the Teodora who received the alleged ill treatments. These twin considerations place
the case out of the purview of Article 765 of the New Civil Code.

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 Property Case Digests: Revocation of Donation

Santos v. Alana [771]

G.R. No. 154942, Aug 16, 2005

CHARACTERS:
(1) Rolando Santos – petitioner, half-blood siblings with Constancia Santos Alana
(2) Constancia Santos Alana – respondent; half-blood siblings with Rolando
(2) Gregorio Santos – father of the parties; donor

FACTS:
1. During the lifetime of Gregorio, on 16 January 1978, he donated a 39 square meter lot located in Sta.
Cruz, Manila, to Rolando. This was accepted by Rolando on 30 June 1981.
2. On 08 April 1981, Gregorio sold the lot to Rolando as per a Deed of Absolute Sale.
3. Thereafter, Rolando was able to register the lot under his name.
4. Gregorio died on 10 March 1986.
5. On 11 January 1991, Constancia filed with the RTC a complaint for partition and reconveyance against
Rolando. She alleged that during his lifetime, her father Gregorio denied having sold the lot to
petitioner; that she learned of the donation in 1978; and that the donation is inofficious as she was
deprived of her legitime.
6. In his answer, Rolando countered that respondent's suit is barred by prescription considering that she
is aware that he has been in possession of the lot as owner for more than ten (10) years; and that the
lot was sold to him by his father, hence, respondent can no longer claim her legitime.

ISSUE:
1. Whether the donation was inofficious. Yes, it is.
2. Whether Constancia’s action has prescribed. No, it has not.

RULING:
(1) It bears reiterating that under Article 752 of the Civil Code, the donation is inofficoius if it exceeds this
limitation – no person may give or receive, by way of donation, more than he may give or receive by will. In
Imperial vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that inofficiousness may arise only upon the death of
the donor as the value of donation may then be contrasted with the net value of the estate of the donor
deceased. As found by the trial court, Gregorio did not sell the lot to Rolando. He donated it. The trial court
also found that the donation is inofficious as it impairs Constancia's legitime; that at the time of Gregorio's
death, he left no property other than the lot now in controversy he donated to Rolando; and that the deceased
made no reservation for the legitime of Constancia, his daughter and compulsory heir. 

Gregorio could not donate more than he may give by will. Clearly, by donating the entire lot to Rolando,
Gregorio's donation is inofficious as it deprives Constancia of her legitime, which, under Article 888 of the Civil
Code, consists of one-half (1/2) of the hereditary estate of the father and the mother. Since the parents of both
parties are already dead, they will inherit the entire lot, each being entitled to one-half (1/2) thereof.

(2) In Imperial vs. Court of Appeals, the Supreme Court held that "donations, the reduction of which hinges
upont he allegation of impairment of legitime (as in this case), are not controlled by a particular prescriptive
period, for which reason, we must resort to the ordinary rules of prescription. Under Article 1144 of the
Civil Code, actions upon an obligation created by law must be brought within ten years from the time the
right of action accrues. Thus, the ten-year prescriptive period applies to the obligation to reduce inofficious
donations, required under Article 771 of the Civil Code, to the extent that they impair the legitime of compulsory
heirs.

From when shall the ten-year period be reckoned? In Mateo vs. Lagua, involving the reduction, for
inofficiousness, of a donation propter nuptias, we held that the cause of action to enforce a legitime
accrues upon the death of the donor-decedent. Clearly so, since it is only then that the net estate may be
ascertained and on which basis, the legitimes may be determined.

Here, Gregorio died in 1986. Consequently, respondent had until 1996 within which to file the action. Records
show that she filed her suit in 1992, well within the prescriptive period.

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