CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM CRIME
) In fact it is shown he
G.R. No. L-48006 July 8, 1942
FAUSTO BARREDO, petitioner,
vs.
SEVERINO GARCIA and TIMOTEA ALMARIO, respondents.
Celedonio P. Gloria and Antonio Barredo for petitioner.
Jose G. Advincula for respondents.
BOCOBO, J.:
This case comes up from the Court of Appeals which held the petitioner
herein, Fausto Barredo, liable in damages for the death of Faustino Garcia
caused by the negligence of Pedro Fontanilla, a taxi driver employed by said
Fausto Barredo.
At about half past one in the morning of May 3, 1936, on the road between
Malabon and Navotas, Province of Rizal, there was a head-on collision
between a taxi of the Malate Taxicab driven by Pedro Fontanilla and a
carretela guided by Pedro Dimapalis. The carretela was overturned, and one
of its passengers, 16-year-old boy Faustino Garcia, suffered injuries from
which he died two days later. A criminal action was filed against Fontanilla in
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, and he was convicted and sentenced to
an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years of prision
correccional. The court in the criminal case granted the petition that the right
to bring a separate civil action be reserved. The Court of Appeals affirmed the
sentence of the lower court in the criminal case. Severino Garcia and Timotea
Almario, parents of the deceased on March 7, 1939, brought an action in the
Court of First Instance of Manila against Fausto Barredo as the sole proprietor
of the Malate Taxicab and employer of Pedro Fontanilla. On July 8, 1939, the
Court of First Instance of Manila awarded damages in favor of the plaintiffs for
P2,000 plus legal interest from the date of the complaint. This decision was
modified by the Court of Appeals by reducing the damages to P1,000 with
legal interest from the time the action was instituted. It is undisputed that
Fontanilla 's negligence was the cause of the mishap, as he was driving on
the wrong side of the road, and at high speed. As to Barredo's responsibility,
the Court of Appeals found:
... It is admitted that defendant is Fontanilla's employer. There is
proof that he exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to
prevent damage. (See p. 22, appellant's brief.
was careless in employing Fontanilla who had been caught several
times for violation of the Automobile Law and speeding (Exhibit A) —
violation which appeared in the records of the Bureau of Public
Works available to be public and to himself. Therefore, he must
indemnify plaintiffs under the provisions of article 1903 of the Civil
Code.
The main theory of the defense is that the liability of Fausto Barredo is
governed by the Revised Penal Code; hence, his liability is only subsidiary,
and as there has been no civil action against Pedro Fontanilla, the person
criminally liable, Barredo cannot be held responsible in the case. The
petitioner's brief states on page 10:
... The Court of Appeals holds that the petitioner is being sued for his
failure to exercise all the diligence of a good father of a family in the
selection and supervision of Pedro Fontanilla to prevent damages
suffered by the respondents. In other words, The Court of Appeals
insists on applying in the case article 1903 of the Civil Code. Article
1903 of the Civil Code is found in Chapter II, Title 16, Book IV of the
Civil Code. This fact makes said article to a civil liability arising from
a crime as in the case at bar simply because Chapter II of Title 16 of
Book IV of the Civil Code, in the precise words of article 1903 of the
Civil Code itself, is applicable only to "those (obligations) arising from
wrongful or negligent acts or commission not punishable by law.
The gist of the decision of the Court of Appeals is expressed thus:
... We cannot agree to the defendant's contention. The liability sought
to be imposed upon him in this action is not a civil obligation arising
from a felony or a misdemeanor (the crime of Pedro Fontanilla,), but
an obligation imposed in article 1903 of the Civil Code by reason of
his negligence in the selection or supervision of his servant or
employee.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the plaintiffs may bring this
separate civil action against Fausto Barredo, thus making him primarily and
directly, responsible under article 1903 of the Civil Code as an employer of
Pedro Fontanilla. The defendant maintains that Fontanilla's negligence being
punishable by the Penal Code, his (defendant's) liability as an employer is only
subsidiary, according to said Penal code, but Fontanilla has not been sued in
a civil action and his property has not been exhausted. To decide the main
issue, we must cut through the tangle that has, in the minds of many confused
and jumbled together delitos and cuasi delitos, or crimes under the Penal
Code and fault or negligence under articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. This
should be done, because justice may be lost in a labyrinth, unless principles
and remedies are distinctly envisaged. Fortunately, we are aided in our inquiry
by the luminous presentation of the perplexing subject by renown jurists and
we are likewise guided by the decisions of this Court in previous cases as well
as by the solemn clarity of the consideration in several sentences of the
Supreme Tribunal of Spain.
Authorities support the proposition that a quasi-delict or "culpa aquiliana " is a
separate legal institution under the Civil Code with a substantivity all its own,
and individuality that is entirely apart and independent from delict or crime.
Upon this principle and on the wording and spirit article 1903 of the Civil Code,
the primary and direct responsibility of employers may be safely anchored.
The pertinent provisions of the Civil Code and Revised Penal Code are as
follows:
CIVIL CODE
ART. 1089 Obligations arise from law, from contracts and quasi-
contracts, and from acts and omissions which are unlawful or in
which any kind of fault or negligence intervenes.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 1092. Civil obligations arising from felonies or misdemeanors
shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal Code.
ART. 1093. Those which are derived from acts or omissions in which
fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervenes shall be subject
to the provisions of Chapter II, Title XVI of this book.
xxx xxx xxx
ART 1902. Any person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another by his fault or negligence shall be liable for the damage so
done.
ART. 1903. The obligation imposed by the next preceding article is
enforceable, not only for personal acts and omissions, but also for
those of persons for whom another is responsible.
The father and in, case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
liable for any damages caused by the minor children who live with
them.
Guardians are liable for damages done by minors or incapacitated
persons subject to their authority and living with them.
Owners or directors of an establishment or business are equally
liable for any damages caused by their employees while engaged in
the branch of the service in which employed, or on occasion of the
performance of their duties.
The State is subject to the same liability when it acts through a
special agent, but not if the damage shall have been caused by the
official upon whom properly devolved the duty of doing the act
performed, in which case the provisions of the next preceding article
shall be applicable.
Finally, teachers or directors of arts trades are liable for any damages
caused by their pupils or apprentices while they are under their
custody.
The liability imposed by this article shall cease in case the persons
mentioned therein prove that they are exercised all the diligence of a
good father of a family to prevent the damage.
ART. 1904. Any person who pays for damage caused by his
employees may recover from the latter what he may have paid.
REVISED PENAL CODE
ART. 100. Civil liability of a person guilty of felony. — Every person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
ART. 101. Rules regarding civil liability in certain cases. — The
exemption from criminal liability established in subdivisions 1, 2, 3,
5, and 6 of article 12 and in subdivision 4 of article 11 of this Code
 does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall be enforced
to the following rules:
First. In cases of subdivision, 1, 2 and 3 of article 12 the civil liability
for acts committed by any imbecile or insane person, and by a person
under nine years of age, or by one over nine but under fifteen years
of age, who has acted without discernment shall devolve upon those
having such person under their legal authority or control, unless it
appears that there was no fault or negligence on their part.
Should there be no person having such insane, imbecile or minor
under his authority, legal guardianship, or control, or if such person
be insolvent, said insane, imbecile, or minor shall respond with their
own property, excepting property exempt from execution, in
accordance with the civil law.
Second. In cases falling within subdivision 4 of article 11, the person
for whose benefit the harm has been prevented shall be civilly liable
in proportion to the benefit which they may have received.
The courts shall determine, in their sound discretion, the proportionate amount
for which each one shall be liable.
When the respective shares can not be equitably determined, even
approximately, or when the liability also attaches to the Government, or to the
majority of the inhabitants of the town, and, in all events, whenever the
damage has been caused with the consent of the authorities or their agents,
indemnification shall be made in the manner prescribed by special laws or
regulations.
Third. In cases falling within subdivisions 5 and 6 of article 12, the persons
using violence or causing the fear shall be primarily liable and secondarily, or,
if there be no such persons, those doing the act shall be liable, saving always
to the latter that part of their property exempt from execution.
ART. 102. Subsidiary civil liability of innkeepers, tavern keepers and
proprietors of establishment. — In default of persons criminally liable,
innkeepers, tavern keepers, and any other persons or corporation
shall be civilly liable for crimes committed in their establishments, in
all cases where a violation of municipal ordinances or some general
or special police regulation shall have been committed by them or
their employees.
Innkeepers are also subsidiarily liable for the restitution of goods
taken by robbery or theft within their houses lodging therein, or the
person, or for the payment of the value thereof, provided that such
guests shall have notified in advance the innkeeper himself, or the
person representing him, of the deposit of such goods within the inn;
and shall furthermore have followed the directions which such
innkeeper or his representative may have given them with respect to
the care of and vigilance over such goods. No liability shall attach in
case of robbery with violence against or intimidation against or
intimidation of persons unless committed by the innkeeper's
employees.
ART. 103. Subsidiary civil liability of other persons. — The subsidiary
liability established in the next preceding article shall also apply to
employers, teachers, persons, and corporations engaged in any kind
of industry for felonies committed by their servants, pupils, workmen,
apprentices, or employees in the discharge of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
ART. 365. Imprudence and negligence. — Any person who, by
reckless imprudence, shall commit any act which, had it been
intentional, would constitute a grave felony, shall suffer the penalty
of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period; if it would have constituted a less grave felony, the
penalty of arresto mayor in its minimum and medium periods shall be
imposed.
Any person who, by simple imprudence or negligence, shall commit
an act which would otherwise constitute a grave felony, shall suffer
the penalty of arresto mayor in its medium and maximum periods; if
it would have constituted a less serious felony, the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period shall be imposed."
It will thus be seen that while the terms of articles 1902 of the Civil Code seem
to be broad enough to cover the driver's negligence in the instant case,
nevertheless article 1093 limits cuasi-delitos to acts or omissions "not
punishable by law." But inasmuch as article 365 of the Revised Penal Code
punishes not only reckless but even simple imprudence or negligence, the
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code has apparently been
crowded out. It is this overlapping that makes the "confusion worse
confounded." However, a closer study shows that such a concurrence of
scope in regard to negligent acts does not destroy the distinction between the
civil liability arising from a crime and the responsibility for cuasi-delitos or culpa
extra-contractual. The same negligent act causing damages may produce civil
liability arising from a crime under article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, or
create an action for cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual under articles
1902-1910 of the Civil Code.
The individuality of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual looms clear and
unmistakable. This legal institution is of ancient lineage, one of its early
ancestors being the Lex Aquilia in the Roman Law. In fact, in Spanish legal
terminology, this responsibility is often referred to as culpa aquiliana. The
Partidas also contributed to the genealogy of the present fault or negligence
under the Civil Code; for instance, Law 6, Title 15, of Partida 7, says: "Tenudo
es de fazer emienda, porque, como quier que el non fizo a sabiendas en daño
al otro, pero acaescio por su culpa."
The distinctive nature of cuasi-delitos survives in the Civil Code. According to
article 1089, one of the five sources of obligations is this legal institution
of cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual: "los actos . . . en que intervenga
cualquier genero de culpa o negligencia." Then article 1093 provides that this
kind of obligation shall be governed by Chapter II of Title XVI of Book IV,
meaning articles 1902-0910. This portion of the Civil Code is exclusively
devoted to the legal institution of culpa aquiliana.
Some of the differences between crimes under the Penal Code and the culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito under the Civil Code are:
1. That crimes affect the public interest, while cuasi-delitos are only of private
concern.
2. That, consequently, the Penal Code punishes or corrects the criminal act,
while the Civil Code, by means of indemnification, merely repairs the damage.
3. That delicts are not as broad as quasi-delicts, because the former are
punished only if there is a penal law clearly covering them, while the
latter, cuasi-delitos, include all acts in which "any king of fault or negligence
intervenes." However, it should be noted that not all violations of the penal law
produce civil responsibility, such as begging in contravention of ordinances,
violation of the game laws, infraction of the rules of traffic when nobody is hurt.
(See Colin and Capitant, "Curso Elemental de Derecho Civil," Vol. 3, p. 728.)
Let us now ascertain what some jurists say on the separate existence of quasi-
delicts and the employer's primary and direct liability under article 1903 of the
Civil Code.
Dorado Montero in his essay on "Responsibilidad" in the "Enciclopedia
Juridica Española" (Vol. XXVII, p. 414) says:
El concepto juridico de la responsabilidad civil abarca diversos
aspectos y comprende a diferentes personas. Asi, existe una
responsabilidad civil propiamente dicha, que en ningun casl lleva
aparejada responsabilidad criminal alguna, y otra que es
consecuencia indeclinable de la penal que nace de todo delito o
falta."
The juridical concept of civil responsibility has various aspects and
comprises different persons. Thus, there is a civil responsibility,
properly speaking, which in no case carries with it any criminal
responsibility, and another which is a necessary consequence of the
penal liability as a result of every felony or misdemeanor."
Maura, an outstanding authority, was consulted on the following case: There
had been a collision between two trains belonging respectively to the
Ferrocarril Cantabrico and the Ferrocarril del Norte. An employee of the latter
had been prosecuted in a criminal case, in which the company had been made
a party as subsidiarily responsible in civil damages. The employee had been
acquitted in the criminal case, and the employer, the Ferrocarril del Norte, had
also been exonerated. The question asked was whether the Ferrocarril
Cantabrico could still bring a civil action for damages against the Ferrocarril
del Norte. Maura's opinion was in the affirmative, stating in part
(Maura, Dictamenes, Vol. 6, pp. 511-513):
Quedando las cosas asi, a proposito de la realidad pura y neta de
los hechos, todavia menos parece sostenible que exista cosa
juzgada acerca de la obligacion civil de indemnizar los quebrantos y
menoscabos inferidos por el choque de los trenes. El titulo en que
se funda la accion para demandar el resarcimiento, no puede
confundirse con las responsabilidades civiles nacidas de delito,
siquiera exista en este, sea el cual sea, una culpa rodeada de notas
agravatorias que motivan sanciones penales, mas o menos severas.
La lesion causada por delito o falta en los derechos civiles, requiere
restituciones, reparaciones o indemnizaciones, que cual la pena
misma atañen al orden publico; por tal motivo vienen
encomendadas, de ordinario, al Ministerio Fiscal; y claro es que si
por esta via se enmiendan los quebrantos y menoscabos, el
agraviado excusa procurar el ya conseguido desagravio; pero esta
eventual coincidencia de los efectos, no borra la diversidad originaria
de las acciones civiles para pedir indemnizacion.
Estas, para el caso actual (prescindiendo de culpas contractuales,
que no vendrian a cuento y que tiene otro regimen), dimanan, segun
el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, de toda accion u omision, causante
de daños o perjuicios, en que intervenga culpa o negligencia. Es
trivial que acciones semejantes son ejercitadas ante los Tribunales
de lo civil cotidianamente, sin que la Justicia punitiva tenga que
mezclarse en los asuntos. Los articulos 18 al 21 y 121 al 128 del
Codigo Penal, atentos al espiritu y a los fines sociales y politicos del
mismo, desenvuelven y ordenan la materia de responsabilidades
civiles nacidas de delito, en terminos separados del regimen por ley
comun de la culpa que se denomina aquiliana, por alusion a
precedentes legislativos del Corpus Juris. Seria intempestivo un
paralelo entre aquellas ordenaciones, y la de la obligacion de
indemnizar a titulo de culpa civil; pero viene al caso y es necesaria
una de las diferenciaciones que en el tal paralelo se notarian.
Los articulos 20 y 21 del Codigo Penal, despues de distribuir a su
modo las responsabilidades civiles, entre los que sean por diversos
conceptos culpables del delito o falta, las hacen extensivas a las
empresas y los establecimientos al servicio de los cuales estan los
delincuentes; pero con caracter subsidiario, o sea, segun el texto
literal, en defecto de los que sean responsables criminalmente. No
coincide en ello el Codigo Civil, cuyo articulo 1903, dice; La
obligacion que impone el articulo anterior es exigible, no solo por los
actos y omisiones propios, sino por los de aquellas personas de
quienes se debe responder; personas en la enumeracion de las
cuales figuran los dependientes y empleados de los
establecimientos o empresas, sea por actos del servicio, sea con
ocasion de sus funciones. Por esto acontece, y se observa en la
jurisprudencia, que las empresas, despues de intervenir en las
causas criminales con el caracter subsidiario de su responsabilidad
civil por razon del delito, son demandadas y condenadas directa y
aisladamente, cuando se trata de la obligacion, ante los tribunales
civiles.
Siendo como se ve, diverso el titulo de esta obligacion, y formando
verdadero postulado de nuestro regimen judicial la separacion entre
justicia punitiva y tribunales de lo civil, de suerte que tienen unos y
otros normas de fondo en distintos cuerpos legales, y diferentes
modos de proceder, habiendose, por añadidura, abstenido de asistir
al juicio criminal la Compañia del Ferrocarril Cantabrico, que se
reservo ejercitar sus acciones, parece innegable que la de
indemnizacion por los daños y perjuicios que le irrogo el choque, no
estuvo sub judice ante el Tribunal del Jurado, ni fue sentenciada,
sino que permanecio intacta, al pronunciarse el fallo de 21 de marzo.
Aun cuando el veredicto no hubiese sido de inculpabilidad, mostrose
mas arriba, que tal accion quedaba legitimamente reservada para
despues del proceso; pero al declararse que no existio delito, ni
responsabilidad dimanada de delito, materia unica sobre que tenian
jurisdiccion aquellos juzgadores, se redobla el motivo para la
obligacion civil ex lege, y se patentiza mas y mas que la accion para
pedir su cumplimiento permanece incolume, extraña a la cosa
juzgada.
As things are, apropos of the reality pure and simple of the facts, it
seems less tenable that there should be res judicata with regard to
the civil obligation for damages on account of the losses caused by
the collision of the trains. The title upon which the action for
reparation is based cannot be confused with the civil
responsibilities born of a crime, because there exists in the latter,
whatever each nature, a culpa surrounded with aggravating aspects
which give rise to penal measures that are more or less severe. The
injury caused by a felony or misdemeanor upon civil rights requires
restitutions, reparations, or indemnifications which, like the penalty
itself, affect public order; for this reason, they are ordinarily entrusted
to the office of the prosecuting attorney; and it is clear that if by this
means the losses and damages are repaired, the injured party no
longer desires to seek another relief; but this coincidence of effects
does not eliminate the peculiar nature of civil actions to ask for
indemnity.
Such civil actions in the present case (without referring to contractual
faults which are not pertinent and belong to another scope) are
derived, according to article 1902 of the Civil Code, from every act or
omission causing losses and damages in which culpa or negligence
intervenes. It is unimportant that such actions are every day filed
before the civil courts without the criminal courts interfering therewith.
Articles 18 to 21 and 121 to 128 of the Penal Code, bearing in mind
the spirit and the social and political purposes of that Code, develop
and regulate the matter of civil responsibilities arising from a crime,
separately from the regime under common law, of culpa which is
known as aquiliana, in accordance with legislative precedent of
the Corpus Juris. It would be unwarranted to make a detailed
comparison between the former provisions and that regarding the
obligation to indemnify on account of civil culpa; but it is pertinent and
necessary to point out to one of such differences.
Articles 20 and 21 of the Penal Code, after distriburing in their own
way the civil responsibilities among those who, for different reasons,
are guilty of felony or misdemeanor, make such civil responsibilities
applicable to enterprises and establishments for which the guilty
parties render service, but with subsidiary character, that is to say,
according to the wording of the Penal Code, in default of those who
are criminally responsible. In this regard, the Civil Code does not
coincide because article 1903 says: "The obligation imposed by the
next preceding article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of persons for whom another is
responsible." Among the persons enumerated are the subordinates
and employees of establishments or enterprises, either for acts
during their service or on the occasion of their functions. It is for this
reason that it happens, and it is so observed in judicial decisions, that
the companies or enterprises, after taking part in the criminal cases
because of their subsidiary civil responsibility by reason of the crime,
are sued and sentenced directly and separately with regard to
the obligation, before the civil courts.
Seeing that the title of this obligation is different, and the separation
between punitive justice and the civil courts being a true postulate of
our judicial system, so that they have different fundamental norms in
different codes, as well as different modes of procedure, and
inasmuch as the Compaña del Ferrocarril Cantabrico has abstained
from taking part in the criminal case and has reserved the right to
exercise its actions, it seems undeniable that the action for
indemnification for the losses and damages caused to it by the
collision was not sub judice before the Tribunal del Jurado, nor was
it the subject of a sentence, but it remained intact when the decision
of March 21 was rendered. Even if the verdict had not been that of
acquittal, it has already been shown that such action had been
legitimately reserved till after the criminal prosecution; but because
of the declaration of the non-existence of the felony and the non-
existence of the responsibility arising from the crime, which was
the sole subject matter upon which the Tribunal del Jurado had
jurisdiction, there is greater reason for the civil obligation ex lege, and
it becomes clearer that the action for its enforcement remain intact
and is not res judicata.
Laurent, a jurist who has written a monumental work on the French Civil Code,
on which the Spanish Civil Code is largely based and whose provisions
on cuasi-delito or culpa extra-contractual are similar to those of the Spanish
Civil Code, says, referring to article 1384 of the French Civil Code which
corresponds to article 1903, Spanish Civil Code:
The action can be brought directly against the person responsible
(for another), without including the author of the act. The action
against the principal is accessory in the sense that it implies the
existence of a prejudicial act committed by the employee, but it is not
subsidiary in the sense that it can not be instituted till after the
judgment against the author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary
to the principal action; the action for responsibility (of the employer)
is in itself a principal action. (Laurent, Principles of French Civil Law,
Spanish translation, Vol. 20, pp. 734-735.)
Amandi, in his "Cuestionario del Codigo Civil Reformado" (Vol. 4, pp. 429,
430), declares that the responsibility of the employer is principal and not
subsidiary. He writes:
Cuestion 1. La responsabilidad declarada en el articulo 1903 por las
acciones u omisiones de aquellas personas por las que se debe
responder, es subsidiaria? es principal? Para contestar a esta
pregunta es necesario saber, en primer lugar, en que se funda el
precepto legal. Es que realmente se impone una responsabilidad por
una falta ajena? Asi parece a primera vista; pero semejante
afirmacion seria contraria a la justicia y a la maxima universal, segun
la que las faltas son personales, y cada uno responde de aquellas
que le son imputables. La responsabilidad de que tratamos se
impone con ocasion de un delito o culpa, pero no por causa de ellos,
sino por causa del causi delito, esto es, de la imprudencia o de la
negligencia del padre, del tutor, del dueño o director del
establecimiento, del maestro, etc. Cuando cualquiera de las
personas que enumera el articulo citado (menores de edad,
incapacitados, dependientes, aprendices) causan un daño, la ley
presume que el padre, el tutor, el maestro, etc., han cometido una
falta de negligencia para prevenir o evitar el daño. Esta falta es la
que la ley castiga. No hay, pues, responsabilidad por un hecho
ajeno, sino en la apariencia; en realidad la responsabilidad se exige
por un hecho propio. La idea de que esa responsabilidad sea
subsidiaria es, por lo tanto, completamente inadmisible.
 Question No. 1. Is the responsibility declared in article 1903 for the
acts or omissions of those persons for who one is responsible,
subsidiary or principal? In order to answer this question it is
necessary to know, in the first place, on what the legal provision is
based. Is it true that there is a responsibility for the fault of another
person? It seems so at first sight; but such assertion would be
contrary to justice and to the universal maxim that all faults are
personal, and that everyone is liable for those faults that can be
imputed to him. The responsibility in question is imposed on the
occasion of a crime or fault, but not because of the same, but
because of the cuasi-delito, that is to say, the imprudence or
negligence of the father, guardian, proprietor or manager of the
establishment, of the teacher, etc. Whenever anyone of the persons
enumerated in the article referred to (minors, incapacitated persons,
employees, apprentices) causes any damage, the law presumes that
the father, guardian, teacher, etc. have committed an act of
negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. It is this fault
that is condemned by the law. It is, therefore, only apparent that there
is a responsibility for the act of another; in reality the responsibility
exacted is for one's own act. The idea that such responsibility is
subsidiary is, therefore, completely inadmissible.
Oyuelos, in his "Digesto: Principios, Doctrina y Jurisprudencia, Referentes al
Codigo Civil Español," says in Vol. VII, p. 743:
Es decir, no responde de hechos ajenos, porque se responde solo
de su propia culpa, doctrina del articulo 1902; mas por excepcion, se
responde de la ajena respecto de aquellas personas con las que
media algun nexo o vinculo, que motiva o razona la responsabilidad.
Esta responsabilidad, es directa o es subsidiaria? En el orden penal,
el Codigo de esta clase distingue entre menores e incapacitados y
los demas, declarando directa la primera (articulo 19) y subsidiaria
la segunda (articulos 20 y 21); pero en el orden civil, en el caso del
articulo 1903, ha de entenderse directa, por el tenor del articulo que
impone la responsabilidad precisamente "por los actos de aquellas
personas de quienes se deba responder."
That is to say, one is not responsible for the acts of others, because
one is liable only for his own faults, this being the doctrine of article
1902; but, by exception, one is liable for the acts of those persons
with whom there is a bond or tie which gives rise to the responsibility.
Is this responsibility direct or subsidiary? In the order of the penal
law, the Penal Code distinguishes between minors and incapacitated
persons on the one hand, and other persons on the other, declaring
that the responsibility for the former is direct (article 19), and for the
latter, subsidiary (articles 20 and 21); but in the scheme of the civil
law, in the case of article 1903, the responsibility should be
understood as direct, according to the tenor of that articles, for
precisely it imposes responsibility "for the acts of those persons for
whom one should be responsible."
Coming now to the sentences of the Supreme Tribunal of Spain, that court
has upheld the principles above set forth: that a quasi-delict or culpa extra-
contractual is a separate and distinct legal institution, independent from the
civil responsibility arising from criminal liability, and that an employer is, under
article 1903 of the Civil Code, primarily and directly responsible for the
negligent acts of his employee.
One of the most important of those Spanish decisions is that of October 21,
1910. In that case, Ramon Lafuente died as the result of having been run over
by a street car owned by the "compañia Electric Madrileña de Traccion." The
conductor was prosecuted in a criminal case but he was acquitted. Thereupon,
the widow filed a civil action against the street car company, paying for
damages in the amount of 15,000 pesetas. The lower court awarded
damages; so the company appealed to the Supreme Tribunal, alleging
violation of articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code because by final judgment
the non-existence of fault or negligence had been declared. The Supreme
Court of Spain dismissed the appeal, saying:
Considerando que el primer motivo del recurso se funda en el
equivocado supuesto de que el Tribunal a quo, al condonar a la
compañia Electrica Madrileña al pago del daño causado con la
muerte de Ramon La fuente Izquierdo, desconoce el valor y efectos
juridicos de la sentencia absolutoria deictada en la causa criminal
que se siguio por el mismo hecho, cuando es lo cierto que de este
han conocido las dos jurisdicciones bajo diferentes as pectos, y
como la de lo criminal declrao dentro de los limites de su
competencia que el hecho de que se trata no era constitutivo de
delito por no haber mediado descuido o negligencia graves, lo que
no excluye, siendo este el unico fundamento del fallo absolutorio, el
concurso de la culpa o negligencia no califacadas, fuente de
obligaciones civiles segun el articulo 1902 del Codigo, y que
alcanzan, segun el 1903, netre otras perosnas, a los Directores de
establecimientos o empresas por los daños causados por sus
dependientes en determinadas condiciones, es manifesto que la de
lo civil, al conocer del mismo hehco baho este ultimo aspecto y al
condenar a la compañia recurrente a la indemnizacion del daño
causado por uno de sus empleados, lejos de infringer los
 mencionados textos, en relacion con el articulo 116 de la Ley de
Enjuciamiento Criminal, se ha atenido estrictamente a ellos, sin
invadir atribuciones ajenas a su jurisdiccion propia, ni contrariar en
lo mas minimo el fallo recaido en la causa.
Considering that the first ground of the appeal is based on the
mistaken supposition that the trial court, in sentencing the Compañia
Madrileña to the payment of the damage caused by the death of
Ramon Lafuente Izquierdo, disregards the value and juridical effects
of the sentence of acquittal rendered in the criminal case instituted
on account of the same act, when it is a fact that the two jurisdictions
had taken cognizance of the same act in its different aspects, and as
the criminal jurisdiction declared within the limits of its authority that
the act in question did not constitute a felony because there was no
grave carelessness or negligence, and this being the only basis of
acquittal, it does no exclude the co-existence of fault or negligence
which is not qualified, and is a source of civil obligations according to
article 1902 of the Civil Code, affecting, in accordance with article
1903, among other persons, the managers of establishments or
enterprises by reason of the damages caused by employees under
certain conditions, it is manifest that the civil jurisdiccion in taking
cognizance of the same act in this latter aspect and in ordering the
company, appellant herein, to pay an indemnity for the damage
caused by one of its employees, far from violating said legal
provisions, in relation with article 116 of the Law of Criminal
Procedure, strictly followed the same, without invading attributes
which are beyond its own jurisdiction, and without in any way
contradicting the decision in that cause. (Emphasis supplied.)
It will be noted, as to the case just cited:
First. That the conductor was not sued in a civil case, either separately or with
the street car company. This is precisely what happens in the present case:
the driver, Fontanilla, has not been sued in a civil action, either alone or with
his employer.
Second. That the conductor had been acquitted of grave criminal negligence,
but the Supreme Tribunal of Spain said that this did not exclude the co-
existence of fault or negligence, which is not qualified, on the part of the
conductor, under article 1902 of the Civil Code. In the present case, the taxi
driver was found guilty of criminal negligence, so that if he had even sued for
his civil responsibility arising from the crime, he would have been held
primarily liable for civil damages, and Barredo would have been held
subsidiarily liable for the same. But the plaintiffs are directly suing Barredo, on
his primary responsibility because of his own presumed negligence — which
he did not overcome — under article 1903. Thus, there were two liabilities of
Barredo: first, the subsidiary one because of the civil liability of the taxi driver
arising from the latter's criminal negligence; and, second, Barredo's primary
liability as an employer under article 1903. The plaintiffs were free to choose
which course to take, and they preferred the second remedy. In so doing, they
were acting within their rights. It might be observed in passing, that the plaintiff
choose the more expeditious and effective method of relief, because
Fontanilla was either in prison, or had just been released, and besides, he was
probably without property which might be seized in enforcing any judgment
against him for damages.
Third. That inasmuch as in the above sentence of October 21, 1910, the
employer was held liable civilly, notwithstanding the acquittal of the employee
(the conductor) in a previous criminal case, with greater reason should
Barredo, the employer in the case at bar, be held liable for damages in a civil
suit filed against him because his taxi driver had been convicted. The degree
of negligence of the conductor in the Spanish case cited was less than that of
the taxi driver, Fontanilla, because the former was acquitted in the previous
criminal case while the latter was found guilty of criminal negligence and was
sentenced to an indeterminate sentence of one year and one day to two years
of prision correccional.
(See also Sentence of February 19, 1902, which is similar to the one above
quoted.)
In the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain, dated February 14, 1919, an
action was brought against a railroad company for damages because the
station agent, employed by the company, had unjustly and fraudulently,
refused to deliver certain articles consigned to the plaintiff. The Supreme Court
of Spain held that this action was properly under article 1902 of the Civil Code,
the court saying:
Considerando que la sentencia discutida reconoce, en virtud de los
hechos que consigna con relacion a las pruebas del pleito: 1.º, que
las expediciones facturadas por la compañia ferroviaria a la
consignacion del actor de las vasijas vacias que en su demanda
relacionan tenian como fin el que este las devolviera a sus
remitentes con vinos y alcoholes; 2.º, que llegadas a su destino tales
mercanias no se quisieron entregar a dicho consignatario por el jefe
de la estacion sin motivo justificado y con intencion dolosa, y 3.º, que
la falta de entrega de estas expediciones al tiempo de reclamarlas el
demandante le originaron daños y perjuicios en cantidad de bastante
importancia como expendedor al por mayor que era de vinos y
alcoholes por las ganancias que dejo de obtener al verse privado de
servir los pedidos que se le habian hecho por los remitentes en los
envases:
Considerando que sobre esta base hay necesidad de estimar los
cuatro motivos que integran este recurso, porque la demanda inicial
del pleito a que se contrae no contiene accion que nazca del
incumplimiento del contrato de transporte, toda vez que no se funda
en el retraso de la llegada de las mercancias ni de ningun otro
vinculo contractual entre las partes contendientes, careciendo, por
tanto, de aplicacion el articulo 371 del Codigo de Comercio, en que
principalmente descansa el fallo recurrido, sino que se limita a pedir
la reparaction de los daños y perjuicios producidos en el patrimonio
del actor por la injustificada y dolosa negativa del porteador a la
entrega de las mercancias a su nombre consignadas, segun lo
reconoce la sentencia, y cuya responsabilidad esta claramente
sancionada en el articulo 1902 del Codigo Civil, que obliga por el
siguiente a la Compañia demandada como ligada con el causante
de aquellos por relaciones de caracter economico y de jurarquia
administrativa.
Considering that the sentence, in question recognizes, in virtue of
the facts which it declares, in relation to the evidence in the case: (1)
that the invoice issued by the railroad company in favor of the plaintiff
contemplated that the empty receptacles referred to in the complaint
should be returned to the consignors with wines and liquors; (2) that
when the said merchandise reached their destination, their delivery
to the consignee was refused by the station agent without justification
and with fraudulent intent, and (3) that the lack of delivery of these
goods when they were demanded by the plaintiff caused him losses
and damages of considerable importance, as he was a wholesale
vendor of wines and liquors and he failed to realize the profits when
he was unable to fill the orders sent to him by the consignors of the
receptacles:
Considering that upon this basis there is need of upholding the four
assignments of error, as the original complaint did not contain any
cause of action arising from non-fulfillment of a contract of
transportation, because the action was not based on the delay of the
goods nor on any contractual relation between the parties litigant
and, therefore, article 371 of the Code of Commerce, on which the
decision appealed from is based, is not applicable; but it limits to
asking for reparation for losses and damages produced on the
patrimony of the plaintiff on account of the unjustified and fraudulent
refusal of the carrier to deliver the goods consigned to the plaintiff as
stated by the sentence, and the carrier's responsibility is clearly laid
down in article 1902 of the Civil Code which binds, in virtue of the
next article, the defendant company, because the latter is connected
with the person who caused the damage by relations of economic
character and by administrative hierarchy. (Emphasis supplied.)
The above case is pertinent because it shows that the same act may come
under both the Penal Code and the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the
agent was unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been the
subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be also a proper subject of
a civil action under article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it
was the employer and not the employee who was being sued.
Let us now examine the cases previously decided by this Court.
In the leading case of Rakes vs. Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. (7 Phil., 359,
362-365 [year 1907]), the trial court awarded damages to the plaintiff, a laborer
of the defendant, because the latter had negligently failed to repair a tramway
in consequence of which the rails slid off while iron was being transported,
and caught the plaintiff whose leg was broken. This Court held:
It is contended by the defendant, as its first defense to the action that
the necessary conclusion from these collated laws is that the remedy
for injuries through negligence lies only in a criminal action in which
the official criminally responsible must be made primarily liable and
his employer held only subsidiarily to him. According to this theory
the plaintiff should have procured the arrest of the representative of
the company accountable for not repairing the track, and on his
prosecution a suitable fine should have been imposed, payable
primarily by him and secondarily by his employer.
This reasoning misconceived the plan of the Spanish codes upon this
subject. Article 1093 of the Civil Code makes obligations arising from
faults or negligence not punished by the law, subject to the
provisions of Chapter II of Title XVI. Section 1902 of that chapter
reads:
"A person who by an act or omission causes damage to
another when there is fault or negligence shall be obliged to
repair the damage so done.
 "SEC. 1903. The obligation imposed by the preceeding
article is demandable, not only for personal acts and
omissions, but also for those of the persons for whom they
should be responsible.
"The father, and on his death or incapacity, the mother, is
liable for the damages caused by the minors who live with
them.
xxx xxx xxx
"Owners or directors of an establishment or enterprise are
equally liable for the damages caused by their employees
in the service of the branches in which the latter may be
employed or in the performance of their duties.
xxx xxx xxx
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the
persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
As an answer to the argument urged in this particular action it may
be sufficient to point out that nowhere in our general statutes is the
employer penalized for failure to provide or maintain safe appliances
for his workmen. His obligation therefore is one 'not punished by the
laws' and falls under civil rather than criminal jurisprudence. But the
answer may be a broader one. We should be reluctant, under any
conditions, to adopt a forced construction of these scientific codes,
such as is proposed by the defendant, that would rob some of these
articles of effect, would shut out litigants against their will from the
civil courts, would make the assertion of their rights dependent upon
the selection for prosecution of the proper criminal offender, and
render recovery doubtful by reason of the strict rules of proof
prevailing in criminal actions. Even if these articles had always stood
alone, such a construction would be unnecessary, but clear light is
thrown upon their meaning by the provisions of the Law of Criminal
Procedure of Spain (Ley de Enjuiciamiento Criminal), which, though
never in actual force in these Islands, was formerly given a
suppletory or explanatory effect. Under article 111 of this law, both
classes of action, civil and criminal, might be prosecuted jointly or
separately, but while the penal action was pending the civil was
suspended. According to article 112, the penal action once started,
the civil remedy should be sought therewith, unless it had been
waived by the party injured or been expressly reserved by him for
civil proceedings for the future. If the civil action alone was
prosecuted, arising out of a crime that could be enforced only on
private complaint, the penal action thereunder should be
extinguished. These provisions are in harmony with those of articles
23 and 133 of our Penal Code on the same subject.
An examination of this topic might be carried much further, but the
citation of these articles suffices to show that the civil liability was not
intended to be merged in the criminal nor even to be suspended
thereby, except as expressly provided in the law. Where an individual
is civilly liable for a negligent act or omission, it is not required that
the injured party should seek out a third person criminally liable
whose prosecution must be a condition precedent to the enforcement
of the civil right.
Under article 20 of the Penal Code the responsibility of an employer
may be regarded as subsidiary in respect of criminal actions against
his employees only while they are in process of prosecution, or in so
far as they determine the existence of the criminal act from which
liability arises, and his obligation under the civil law and its
enforcement in the civil courts is not barred thereby unless by the
election of the injured person. Inasmuch as no criminal proceeding
had been instituted, growing our of the accident in question, the
provisions of the Penal Code can not affect this action. This
construction renders it unnecessary to finally determine here whether
this subsidiary civil liability in penal actions has survived the laws that
fully regulated it or has been abrogated by the American civil and
criminal procedure now in force in the Philippines.
The difficulty in construing the articles of the code above cited in this
case appears from the briefs before us to have arisen from the
interpretation of the words of article 1093, "fault or negligence not
punished by law," as applied to the comprehensive definition of
offenses in articles 568 and 590 of the Penal Code. It has been
shown that the liability of an employer arising out of his relation to his
employee who is the offender is not to be regarded as derived from
negligence punished by the law, within the meaning of articles 1902
and 1093. More than this, however, it cannot be said to fall within the
class of acts unpunished by the law, the consequence of which are
regulated by articles 1902 and 1903 of the Civil Code. The acts to
which these articles are applicable are understood to be those not
growing out of pre-existing duties of the parties to one another. But
 where relations already formed give rise to duties, whether springing
from contract or quasi contract, then breaches of those duties are
subject to articles 1101, 1103, and 1104 of the same code. A typical
application of this distinction may be found in the consequences of a
railway accident due to defective machinery supplied by the
employer. His liability to his employee would arise out of the contract
of employment, that to the passengers out of the contract for
passage, while that to the injured bystander would originate in the
negligent act itself.
In Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil., 821 (year 1918), the mother of the 8 of 9-
year-old child Salvador Bona brought a civil action against Moreta to recover
damages resulting from the death of the child, who had been run over by an
automobile driven and managed by the defendant. The trial court rendered
judgment requiring the defendant to pay the plaintiff the sum of P1,000 as
indemnity: This Court in affirming the judgment, said in part:
If it were true that the defendant, in coming from the southern part of
Solana Street, had to stop his auto before crossing Real Street,
because he had met vehicles which were going along the latter street
or were coming from the opposite direction along Solana Street, it is
to be believed that, when he again started to run his auto across said
Real Street and to continue its way along Solana Street northward,
he should have adjusted the speed of the auto which he was
operating until he had fully crossed Real Street and had completely
reached a clear way on Solana Street. But, as the child was run over
by the auto precisely at the entrance of Solana Street, this accident
could not have occurred if the auto had been running at a slow speed,
aside from the fact that the defendant, at the moment of crossing
Real Street and entering Solana Street, in a northward direction,
could have seen the child in the act of crossing the latter street from
the sidewalk on the right to that on the left, and if the accident had
occurred in such a way that after the automobile had run over the
body of the child, and the child's body had already been stretched
out on the ground, the automobile still moved along a distance of
about 2 meters, this circumstance shows the fact that the automobile
entered Solana Street from Real Street, at a high speed without the
defendant having blown the horn. If these precautions had been
taken by the defendant, the deplorable accident which caused the
death of the child would not have occurred.
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could have been
prosecuted in a criminal case because his negligence causing the death of
the child was punishable by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance
of the same act of negligence being a proper subject-matter either of a criminal
action with its consequent civil liability arising from a crime or of an entirely
separate and independent civil action for fault or negligence under article 1902
of the Civil Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individually of a cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code has been fully and clearly
recognized, even with regard to a negligent act for which the wrongdoer could
have been prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which, after
such a conviction, he could have been sued for this civil liability arising from
his crime.
Years later (in 1930) this Court had another occasion to apply the same
doctrine. In Bernal and Enverso vs. House and Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant,
Ltd., 54 Phil., 327, the parents of the five-year-old child, Purificacion Bernal,
brought a civil action to recover damages for the child's death as a result of
burns caused by the fault and negligence of the defendants. On the evening
of April 10, 1925, the Good Friday procession was held in Tacloban, Leyte.
Fortunata Enverso with her daughter Purificacion Bernal had come from
another municipality to attend the same. After the procession the mother and
the daughter with two others were passing along Gran Capitan Street in front
of the offices of the Tacloban Electric & Ice Plant, Ltd., owned by defendants
J. V. House, when an automobile appeared from the opposite direction. The
little girl, who was slightly ahead of the rest, was so frightened by the
automobile that she turned to run, but unfortunately she fell into the street
gutter where hot water from the electric plant was flowing. The child died that
same night from the burns. The trial courts dismissed the action because of
the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. But this Court held, on appeal, that
there was no contributory negligence, and allowed the parents P1,000 in
damages from J. V. House who at the time of the tragic occurrence was the
holder of the franchise for the electric plant. This Court said in part:
Although the trial judge made the findings of fact hereinbefore
outlined, he nevertheless was led to order the dismissal of the action
because of the contributory negligence of the plaintiffs. It is from this
point that a majority of the court depart from the stand taken by the
trial judge. The mother and her child had a perfect right to be on the
principal street of Tacloban, Leyte, on the evening when the religious
procession was held. There was nothing abnormal in allowing the
child to run along a few paces in advance of the mother. No one could
foresee the coincidence of an automobile appearing and of a
frightened child running and falling into a ditch filled with hot water.
The doctrine announced in the much debated case of Rakes vs.
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co. ([1907]), 7 Phil., 359), still rule. Article
1902 of the Civil Code must again be enforced. The contributory
negligence of the child and her mother, if any, does not operate as a
 bar to recovery, but in its strictest sense could only result in reduction
of the damages.
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court specifically applied
article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus that although J. V. House could have
been criminally prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal negligence,
nevertheless this Court awarded damages in an independent civil action for
fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil Code.
In Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes (30 Phil., 624 [year 1915), the action was for
damages for the death of the plaintiff's daughter alleged to have been caused
by the negligence of the servant in driving an automobile over the child. It
appeared that the cause of the mishap was a defect in the steering gear. The
defendant Leynes had rented the automobile from the International Garage of
Manila, to be used by him in carrying passengers during the fiesta of Tuy,
Batangas. Leynes was ordered by the lower court to pay P1,000 as damages
to the plaintiff. On appeal this Court reversed the judgment as to Leynes on
the ground that he had shown that the exercised the care of a good father of
a family, thus overcoming the presumption of negligence under article 1903.
This Court said:
As to selection, the defendant has clearly shown that he exercised
the care and diligence of a good father of a family. He obtained the
machine from a reputable garage and it was, so far as appeared, in
good condition. The workmen were likewise selected from a standard
garage, were duly licensed by the Government in their particular
calling, and apparently thoroughly competent. The machine had
been used but a few hours when the accident occurred and it is clear
from the evidence that the defendant had no notice, either actual or
constructive, of the defective condition of the steering gear.
The legal aspect of the case was discussed by this Court thus:
Article 1903 of the Civil Code not only establishes liability in cases of
negligence, but also provides when the liability shall cease. It says:
"The liability referred to in this article shall cease when the
persons mentioned therein prove that they employed all the
diligence of a good father of a family to avoid the damage."
From this article two things are apparent: (1) That when an injury is
caused by the negligence of a servant or employee there instantly
arises a presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of
the matter or employer either in the selection of the servant or
employee, or in supervision over him after the selection, or both; and
(2) that presumption is juris tantum and not juris et de jure, and
consequently, may be rebutted. It follows necessarily that if the
employer shows to the satisfaction of the court that in selection and
supervision he has exercised the care and diligence of a good father
of a family, the presumption is overcome and he is relieve from
liability.
This theory bases the responsibility of the master ultimately on his
own negligence and not on that of his servant.
The doctrine of the case just cited was followed by this Court in Cerf vs.
Medel (33 Phil., 37 [year 1915]). In the latter case, the complaint alleged that
the defendant's servant had so negligently driven an automobile, which was
operated by defendant as a public vehicle, that said automobile struck and
damaged the plaintiff's motorcycle. This Court, applying article 1903 and
following the rule in Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes, said in part (p. 41) that:
The master is liable for the negligent acts of his servant where he is
the owner or director of a business or enterprise and the negligent
acts are committed while the servant is engaged in his master's
employment as such owner.
Another case which followed the decision in Bahia vs. Litonjua and
Leynes was Cuison vs. Norton & Harrison Co., 55 Phil., 18 (year 1930). The
latter case was an action for damages brought by Cuison for the death of his
seven-year-old son Moises. The little boy was on his way to school with his
sister Marciana. Some large pieces of lumber fell from a truck and pinned the
boy underneath, instantly killing him. Two youths, Telesforo Binoya and
Francisco Bautista, who were working for Ora, an employee of defendant
Norton & Harrison Co., pleaded guilty to the crime of homicide through
reckless negligence and were sentenced accordingly. This Court, applying
articles 1902 and 1903, held:
The basis of civil law liability is not respondent superior but the
relationship of pater familias. This theory bases the liability of the
master ultimately on his own negligence and not on that of his
servant. (Bahia vs. Litonjua and Leynes [1915], 30 Phil., 624;
Cangco vs. Manila Railroad Co. [1918], 38 Phil., 768.)
In Walter A. Smith & Co. vs. Cadwallader Gibson Lumber Co., 55 Phil., 517
(year 1930) the plaintiff brought an action for damages for the demolition of its
wharf, which had been struck by the steamer Helen C belonging to the
defendant. This Court held (p. 526):
The evidence shows that Captain Lasa at the time the plaintiff's wharf
collapsed was a duly licensed captain, authorized to navigate and
direct a vessel of any tonnage, and that the appellee contracted his
services because of his reputation as a captain, according to F. C.
Cadwallader. This being so, we are of the opinion that the
presumption of liability against the defendant has been overcome by
the exercise of the care and diligence of a good father of a family in
selecting Captain Lasa, in accordance with the doctrines laid down
by this court in the cases cited above, and the defendant is therefore
absolved from all liability.
It is, therefore, seen that the defendant's theory about his secondary liability
is negatived by the six cases above set forth. He is, on the authority of these
cases, primarily and directly responsible in damages under article 1903, in
relation to article 1902, of the Civil Code.
Let us now take up the Philippine decisions relied upon by the defendant. We
study first, City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., 52 Phil., 586 (year 1928). A
collision between a truck of the City of Manila and a street car of the Manila
Electric Co. took place on June 8, 1925. The truck was damaged in the amount
of P1,788.27. Sixto Eustaquio, the motorman, was prosecuted for the crime of
damage to property and slight injuries through reckless imprudence. He was
found guilty and sentenced to pay a fine of P900, to indemnify the City of
Manila for P1,788.27, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
Unable to collect the indemnity from Eustaquio, the City of Manila filed an
action against the Manila Electric Company to obtain payment, claiming that
the defendant was subsidiarily liable. The main defense was that the
defendant had exercised the diligence of a good father of a family to prevent
the damage. The lower court rendered judgment in favor of the plaintiff. This
Court held, in part, that this case was governed by the Penal Code, saying:
With this preliminary point out of the way, there is no escaping the
conclusion that the provisions of the Penal Code govern. The Penal
Code in easily understandable language authorizes the
determination of subsidiary liability. The Civil Code negatives its
application by providing that civil obligations arising from crimes or
misdemeanors shall be governed by the provisions of the Penal
Code. The conviction of the motorman was a misdemeanor falling
under article 604 of the Penal Code. The act of the motorman was
not a wrongful or negligent act or omission not punishable by law.
Accordingly, the civil obligation connected up with the Penal Code
and not with article 1903 of the Civil Code. In other words, the Penal
Code affirms its jurisdiction while the Civil Code negatives its
jurisdiction. This is a case of criminal negligence out of which civil
liability arises and not a case of civil negligence.
xxx xxx xxx
Our deduction, therefore, is that the case relates to the Penal Code
and not to the Civil Code. Indeed, as pointed out by the trial judge,
any different ruling would permit the master to escape scot-free by
simply alleging and proving that the master had exercised all
diligence in the selection and training of its servants to prevent the
damage. That would be a good defense to a strictly civil action, but
might or might not be to a civil action either as a part of or predicated
on conviction for a crime or misdemeanor. (By way of parenthesis, it
may be said further that the statements here made are offered to
meet the argument advanced during our deliberations to the effect
that article 0902 of the Civil Code should be disregarded and codal
articles 1093 and 1903 applied.)
It is not clear how the above case could support the defendant's proposition,
because the Court of Appeals based its decision in the present case on the
defendant's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code and not
on his subsidiary liability arising from Fontanilla's criminal negligence. In other
words, the case of City of Manila vs. Manila Electric Co., supra, is predicated
on an entirely different theory, which is the subsidiary liability of an employer
arising from a criminal act of his employee, whereas the foundation of the
decision of the Court of Appeals in the present case is the employer's primary
liability under article 1903 of the Civil Code. We have already seen that this is
a proper and independent remedy.
Arambulo vs. Manila Electric Co. (55 Phil., 75), is another case invoked by the
defendant. A motorman in the employ of the Manila Electric Company had
been convicted o homicide by simple negligence and sentenced, among other
things, to pay the heirs of the deceased the sum of P1,000. An action was
then brought to enforce the subsidiary liability of the defendant as employer
under the Penal Code. The defendant attempted to show that it had exercised
the diligence of a good father of a family in selecting the motorman, and
therefore claimed exemption from civil liability. But this Court held:
 In view of the foregoing considerations, we are of opinion and so
hold, (1) that the exemption from civil liability established in article
1903 of the Civil Code for all who have acted with the diligence of a
good father of a family, is not applicable to the subsidiary civil liability
provided in article 20 of the Penal Code.
The above case is also extraneous to the theory of the defendant in the instant
case, because the action there had for its purpose the enforcement of the
defendant's subsidiary liability under the Penal Code, while in the case at bar,
the plaintiff's cause of action is based on the defendant's primary and direct
responsibility under article 1903 of the Civil Code. In fact, the above case
destroys the defendant's contention because that decision illustrates the
principle that the employer's primary responsibility under article 1903 of the
Civil Code is different in character from his subsidiary liability under the Penal
Code.
In trying to apply the two cases just referred to, counsel for the defendant has
failed to recognize the distinction between civil liability arising from a crime,
which is governed by the Penal Code, and the responsibility for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code, and has likewise failed to give
the importance to the latter type of civil action.
The defendant-petitioner also cites Francisco vs. Onrubia (46 Phil., 327). That
case need not be set forth. Suffice it to say that the question involved was also
civil liability arising from a crime. Hence, it is as inapplicable as the two cases
above discussed.
The foregoing authorities clearly demonstrate the separate individuality
of cuasi-delitos or culpa aquiliana under the Civil Code. Specifically they show
that there is a distinction between civil liability arising from criminal negligence
(governed by the Penal Code) and responsibility for fault or negligence under
articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code, and that the same negligent act may
produce either a civil liability arising from a crime under the Penal Code, or a
separate responsibility for fault or negligence under articles 1902 to 1910 of
the Civil Code. Still more concretely, the authorities above cited render it
inescapable to conclude that the employer — in this case the defendant-
petitioner — is primarily and directly liable under article 1903 of the Civil Code.
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked should ordinarily be
sufficient to dispose of this case. But inasmuch as we are announcing
doctrines that have been little understood in the past, it might not be
inappropriate to indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in article 365 punishes not only reckless but
also simple negligence. If we were to hold that articles 1902 to 1910 of the
Civil Code refer only to fault or negligence not punished by law, according to
the literal import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution of culpa
aquiliana would have very little scope and application in actual life. Death or
injury to persons and damage to property through any degree of negligence
— even the slightest — would have to be indemnified only through the
principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In such a state of affairs, what
sphere would remain for cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to
impute to the lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd and
anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the laws, disposed to uphold
the letter that killeth rather than the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the
literal meaning of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle of
such ancient origin and such full-grown development as culpa
aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and made enduring in articles
1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code.
Secondly, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case, proof of guilt beyond
reasonable doubt is required, while in a civil case, preponderance of evidence
is sufficient to make the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous
cases of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond reasonable
doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance of evidence. In such cases, the
defendant can and should be made responsible in a civil action under articles
1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise, there would be many instances of
unvindicated civil wrongs. Ubi jus ibi remedium.
Thirdly, to hold that there is only one way to make defendant's liability
effective, and that is, to sue the driver and exhaust his (the latter's) property
first, would be tantamount to compelling the plaintiff to follow a devious and
cumbersome method of obtaining relief. True, there is such a remedy under
our laws, but there is also a more expeditious way, which is based on the
primary and direct responsibility of the defendant under article 1903 of the Civil
Code. Our view of the law is more likely to facilitate remedy for civil wrongs,
because the procedure indicated by the defendant is wasteful and productive
of delay, it being a matter of common knowledge that professional drivers of
taxis and similar public conveyance usually do not have sufficient means with
which to pay damages. Why, then, should the plaintiff be required in all cases
to go through this roundabout, unnecessary, and probably useless procedure?
In construing the laws, courts have endeavored to shorten and facilitate the
pathways of right and justice.
At this juncture, it should be said that the primary and direct responsibility of
employers and their presumed negligence are principles calculated to protect
society. Workmen and employees should be carefully chosen and supervised
in order to avoid injury to the public. It is the masters or employers who In view of the foregoing, the judgment of the Court of Appeals should be and
principally reap the profits resulting from the services of these servants and is hereby affirmed, with costs against the defendant-petitioner.
employees. It is but right that they should guarantee the latter's careful
conduct for the personnel and patrimonial safety of others. As Theilhard has Yulo, C.J., Moran, Ozaeta and Paras, JJ., concur.
said, "they should reproach themselves, at least, some for their weakness,
others for their poor selection and all for their negligence." And according to
Manresa, "It is much more equitable and just that such responsibility should
fall upon the principal or director who could have chosen a careful and prudent
employee, and not upon the injured person who could not exercise such
selection and who used such employee because of his confidence in the
principal or director." (Vol. 12, p. 622, 2nd Ed.) Many jurists also base this
primary responsibility of the employer on the principle of representation of the
principal by the agent. Thus, Oyuelos says in the work already cited (Vol. 7,
p. 747) that before third persons the employer and employee "vienen a ser
como una sola personalidad, por refundicion de la del dependiente en la de
quien le emplea y utiliza." ("become as one personality by the merging of the
person of the employee in that of him who employs and utilizes him.") All these
observations acquire a peculiar force and significance when it comes to motor
accidents, and there is need of stressing and accentuating the responsibility
of owners of motor vehicles.

Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of both the Penal Code
and the Civil Code on this subject, which has given rise to the overlapping or
concurrence of spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of
the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana, there has grown
up a common practice to seek damages only by virtue of the civil responsibility
arising from a crime, forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by
invoking articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual method
is allowed by our laws, it has nevertheless rendered practically useless and
nugatory the more expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa
aquiliana or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are asked to help
perpetuate this usual course. But we believe it is high time we pointed out to
the harm done by such practice and to restore the principle of responsibility
for fault or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code to its full
rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana to
flow on its own natural channel, so that its waters may no longer be diverted
into that of a crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make for the
better safeguarding of private rights because it re-establishes an ancient and
additional remedy, and for the further reason that an independent civil action,
not depending on the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution,
and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is more likely to
secure adequate and efficacious redress.

G.R. No. L-24803 May 26, 1977
PEDRO ELCANO and PATRICIA ELCANO, in their capacity as
Ascendants of Agapito Elcano, deceased, plaintiffs-appellants,
vs.
REGINALD HILL, minor, and MARVIN HILL, as father and Natural
Guardian of said minor, defendants-appellees.
Cruz & Avecilla for appellants.
Marvin R. Hill & Associates for appellees.
BARREDO, J.:
Appeal from the order of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City dated
January 29, 1965 in Civil Case No. Q-8102, Pedro Elcano et al. vs. Reginald
Hill et al. dismissing, upon motion to dismiss of defendants, the complaint of
plaintiffs for recovery of damages from defendant Reginald Hill, a minor,
married at the time of the occurrence, and his father, the defendant Marvin
Hill, with whom he was living and getting subsistence, for the killing by
Reginald of the son of the plaintiffs, named Agapito Elcano, of which, when
criminally prosecuted, the said accused was acquitted on the ground that his
act was not criminal, because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with mistake."
Actually, the motion to dismiss based on the following grounds:
1. The present action is not only against but a violation of
section 1, Rule 107, which is now Rule III, of the Revised
Rules of Court;
2. The action is barred by a prior judgment which is now
final and or in res-adjudicata;
3. The complaint had no cause of action against defendant
Marvin Hill, because he was relieved as guardian of the
other defendant through emancipation by marriage.
(P. 23, Record [p. 4, Record on Appeal.])
was first denied by the trial court. It was only upon motion for reconsideration
of the defendants of such denial, reiterating the above grounds that the
following order was issued:
Considering the motion for reconsideration filed by the
defendants on January 14, 1965 and after thoroughly
examining the arguments therein contained, the Court finds
the same to be meritorious and well-founded.
WHEREFORE, the Order of this Court on December 8,
1964 is hereby reconsidered by ordering the dismissal of
the above entitled case.
SO ORDERED.
Quezon City, Philippines, January 29, 1965. (p. 40, Record
[p. 21, Record on Appeal.)
Hence, this appeal where plaintiffs-appellants, the spouses Elcano, are
presenting for Our resolution the following assignment of errors:
THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN DISMISSING THE CASE
BY UPHOLDING THE CLAIM OF DEFENDANTS THAT -
I
THE PRESENT ACTION IS NOT ONLY AGAINST BUT
ALSO A VIOLATION OF SECTION 1, RULE 107, NOW
RULE 111, OF THE REVISED RULES OF COURT, AND
THAT SECTION 3(c) OF RULE 111, RULES OF COURT
IS APPLICABLE;
II
THE ACTION IS BARRED BY A PRIOR JUDGMENT
WHICH IS NOW FINAL OR RES-ADJUDICTA;
III
 THE PRINCIPLES OF QUASI-DELICTS, ARTICLES 2176
TO 2194 OF THE CIVIL CODE, ARE INAPPLICABLE IN
THE INSTANT CASE; and
IV
THAT THE COMPLAINT STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION
AGAINST DEFENDANT MARVIN HILL BECAUSE HE
WAS RELIEVED AS GUARDIAN OF THE OTHER
DEFENDANT THROUGH EMANCIPATION BY
MARRIAGE. (page 4, Record.)
It appears that for the killing of the son, Agapito, of plaintiffs-appellants,
defendant- appellee Reginald Hill was prosecuted criminally in Criminal Case
No. 5102 of the Court of First Instance of Quezon City. After due trial, he was
acquitted on the ground that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent
to kill, coupled with mistake." Parenthetically, none of the parties has favored
Us with a copy of the decision of acquittal, presumably because appellants do
not dispute that such indeed was the basis stated in the court's decision. And
so, when appellants filed their complaint against appellees Reginald and his
father, Atty. Marvin Hill, on account of the death of their son, the appellees
filed the motion to dismiss above-referred to.
As We view the foregoing background of this case, the two decisive issues
presented for Our resolution are:
1. Is the present civil action for damages barred by the acquittal of Reginald
in the criminal case wherein the action for civil liability, was not reversed?
2. May Article 2180 (2nd and last paragraphs) of the Civil Code he applied
against Atty. Hill, notwithstanding the undisputed fact that at the time of the
occurrence complained of. Reginald, though a minor, living with and getting
subsistenee from his father, was already legally married?
The first issue presents no more problem than the need for a reiteration and
further clarification of the dual character, criminal and civil, of fault or
negligence as a source of obligation which was firmly established in this
jurisdiction in Barredo vs. Garcia, 73 Phil. 607. In that case, this Court
postulated, on the basis of a scholarly dissertation by Justice Bocobo on the
nature of culpa aquiliana in relation to culpa criminal or delito and
mere culpa or fault, with pertinent citation of decisions of the Supreme Court
of Spain, the works of recognized civilians, and earlier jurisprudence of our
own, that the same given act can result in civil liability not only under the Penal
Code but also under the Civil Code. Thus, the opinion holds:
The, above case is pertinent because it shows that the
same act machinist. come under both the Penal Code and
the Civil Code. In that case, the action of the agent killeth
unjustified and fraudulent and therefore could have been
the subject of a criminal action. And yet, it was held to be
also a proper subject of a civil action under article 1902 of
the Civil Code. It is also to be noted that it was the employer
and not the employee who was being sued. (pp. 615-616,
73 Phil.). 1
It will be noticed that the defendant in the above case could
have been prosecuted in a criminal case because his
negligence causing the death of the child was punishable
by the Penal Code. Here is therefore a clear instance of the
same act of negligence being a proper subject matter either
of a criminal action with its consequent civil liability arising
from a crime or of an entirely separate and independent civil
action for fault or negligence under article 1902 of the Civil
Code. Thus, in this jurisdiction, the separate individuality of
a cuasi-delito or culpa aquiliana, under the Civil Code has
been fully and clearly recognized, even with regard to a
negligent act for which the wrongdoer could have been
prosecuted and convicted in a criminal case and for which,
after such a conviction, he could have been sued for this
civil liability arising from his crime. (p. 617, 73 Phil.) 2
It is most significant that in the case just cited, this Court
specifically applied article 1902 of the Civil Code. It is thus
that although J. V. House could have been criminally
prosecuted for reckless or simple negligence and not only
punished but also made civilly liable because of his criminal
negligence, nevertheless this Court awarded damages in
an independent civil action for fault or negligence under
article 1902 of the Civil Code. (p. 618, 73 Phil.) 3
The legal provisions, authors, and cases already invoked
should ordinarily be sufficient to dispose of this case. But
inasmuch as we are announcing doctrines that have been
little understood, in the past, it might not he inappropriate to
indicate their foundations.
Firstly, the Revised Penal Code in articles 365 punishes not
only reckless but also simple negligence. If we were to hold
that articles 1902 to 1910 of the Civil Code refer only to fault
or negligence not punished by law, accordingly to the literal
import of article 1093 of the Civil Code, the legal institution
of culpa aquiliana would have very little scope and
application in actual life. Death or injury to persons and
damage to property- through any degree of negligence -
even the slightest - would have to be Idemnified only
through the principle of civil liability arising from a crime. In
such a state of affairs, what sphere would remain for cuasi-
delito or culpa aquiliana? We are loath to impute to the
lawmaker any intention to bring about a situation so absurd
and anomalous. Nor are we, in the interpretation of the
laws, disposed to uphold the letter that killeth rather than
the spirit that giveth life. We will not use the literal meaning
of the law to smother and render almost lifeless a principle
of such ancient origin and such full-grown development
as culpa aquiliana or cuasi-delito, which is conserved and
made enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil
Code.
Secondary, to find the accused guilty in a criminal case,
proof of guilt beyond reasonable doubt is required, while in
a civil case, preponderance of evidence is sufficient to make
the defendant pay in damages. There are numerous cases
of criminal negligence which can not be shown beyond
reasonable doubt, but can be proved by a preponderance
of evidence. In such cases, the defendant can and should
be made responsible in a civil action under articles 1902 to
1910 of the Civil Code. Otherwise. there would be many
instances of unvindicated civil wrongs. "Ubi jus Idemnified
remedium." (p. 620,73 Phil.)
Fourthly, because of the broad sweep of the provisions of
both the Penal Code and the Civil Code on this subject,
which has given rise to the overlapping or concurrence of
spheres already discussed, and for lack of understanding of
the character and efficacy of the action for culpa aquiliana,
there has grown up a common practice to seek damages
only by virtue of the civil responsibility arising from a crime,
forgetting that there is another remedy, which is by invoking
articles 1902-1910 of the Civil Code. Although this habitual
method is allowed by, our laws, it has nevertheless
rendered practically useless and nugatory the more
expeditious and effective remedy based on culpa aquiliana
or culpa extra-contractual. In the present case, we are
asked to help perpetuate this usual course. But we believe
it is high time we pointed out to the harms done by such
practice and to restore the principle of responsibility for fault
or negligence under articles 1902 et seq. of the Civil Code
to its full rigor. It is high time we caused the stream of quasi-
delict or culpa aquiliana to flow on its own natural channel,
so that its waters may no longer be diverted into that of a
crime under the Penal Code. This will, it is believed, make
for the better safeguarding or private rights because it
realtor, an ancient and additional remedy, and for the further
reason that an independent civil action, not depending on
the issues, limitations and results of a criminal prosecution,
and entirely directed by the party wronged or his counsel, is
more likely to secure adequate and efficacious redress. (p.
621, 73 Phil.)
Contrary to an immediate impression one might get upon a reading of the
foregoing excerpts from the opinion in Garcia that the concurrence of the
Penal Code and the Civil Code therein referred to contemplate only acts of
negligence and not intentional voluntary acts - deeper reflection would reveal
that the thrust of the pronouncements therein is not so limited, but that in fact
it actually extends to fault or culpa. This can be seen in the reference made
therein to the Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of February 14, 1919,
supra, which involved a case of fraud or estafa, not a negligent act. Indeed,
Article 1093 of the Civil Code of Spain, in force here at the time of Garcia,
provided textually that obligations "which are derived from acts or omissions
in which fault or negligence, not punishable by law, intervene shall be the
subject of Chapter II, Title XV of this book (which refers to quasi-delicts.)" And
it is precisely the underline qualification, "not punishable by law", that Justice
Bocobo emphasized could lead to an ultimo construction or interpretation of
the letter of the law that "killeth, rather than the spirit that giveth lift- hence, the
ruling that "(W)e will not use the literal meaning of the law to smother and
render almost lifeless a principle of such ancient origin and such full-grown
development as culpa aquiliana or quasi-delito, which is conserved and made
enduring in articles 1902 to 1910 of the Spanish Civil Code." And so, because
Justice Bacobo was Chairman of the Code Commission that drafted the
original text of the new Civil Code, it is to be noted that the said Code, which
was enacted after the Garcia doctrine, no longer uses the term, 11 not
punishable by law," thereby making it clear that the concept of culpa
aquiliana includes acts which are criminal in character or in violation of the
penal law, whether voluntary or matter. Thus, the corresponding provisions to
said Article 1093 in the new code, which is Article 1162, simply says,
"Obligations derived from quasi-delicto shall be governed by the provisions of
Chapter 2, Title XVII of this Book, (on quasi-delicts) and by special laws." More
precisely, a new provision, Article 2177 of the new code provides:
ART. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the
preceding article is entirely separate and distinct from the
civil liability arising from negligence under the Penal Code.
But the plaintiff cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission of the defendant.
According to the Code Commission: "The foregoing provision (Article 2177)
through at first sight startling, is not so novel or extraordinary when we
consider the exact nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a "culpa aquiliana" or quasi-
delict, of ancient origin, having always had its own foundation and individuality,
separate from criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and "culpa extracontractual" or "cuasi-delito" has been sustained
by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain and maintained as clear, sound
and perfectly tenable by Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore,
under the proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of criminal
negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not, shall not be a bar to a
subsequent civil action, not for civil liability arising from criminal negligence,
but for damages due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article
forestalls a double recovery.", (Report of the Code) Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer to only acts of
negligence, the same argument of Justice Bacobo about construction that
upholds "the spirit that giveth lift- rather than that which is literal that killeth the
intent of the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same. And
considering that the preliminary chapter on human relations of the new Civil
Code definitely establishes the separability and independence of liability in a
civil action for acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the civil
responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under Sections 2 and 3 (c), Rule
111, contemplate also the same separability, it is "more congruent with the
spirit of law, equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern progress"-
to borrow the felicitous relevant language in Rakes vs. Atlantic. Gulf and
Pacific Co., 7 Phil. 359, to hold, as We do hold, that Article 2176, where it
refers to "fault or negligencia covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but
also acts criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or negligent.
Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the offender in a criminal act,
whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and found guilty or acquitted,
provided that the offended party is not allowed, if he is actually charged also
criminally, to recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in such
eventuality only to the bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in
the two cases vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in
Par. (e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded on
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability for the same
act considered as a quasi-delict only and not as a crime is not estinguished
even by a declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has
not happened or has not been committed by the accused. Briefly stated, We
here hold, in reiteration of Garcia, that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and
negligent acts which may be punishable by law.4
It results, therefore, that the acquittal of Reginal Hill in the criminal case has
not extinguished his liability for quasi-delict, hence that acquittal is not a bar
to the instant action against him.
Coming now to the second issue about the effect of Reginald's emancipation
by marriage on the possible civil liability of Atty. Hill, his father, it is also Our
considered opinion that the conclusion of appellees that Atty. Hill is already
free from responsibility cannot be upheld.
While it is true that parental authority is terminated upon emancipation of the
child (Article 327, Civil Code), and under Article 397, emancipation takes place
"by the marriage of the minor (child)", it is, however, also clear that pursuant
to Article 399, emancipation by marriage of the minor is not really full or
absolute. Thus "(E)mancipation by marriage or by voluntary concession shall
terminate parental authority over the child's person. It shall enable the minor
to administer his property as though he were of age, but he cannot borrow
money or alienate or encumber real property without the consent of his father
or mother, or guardian. He can sue and be sued in court only with the
assistance of his father, mother or guardian."
Now under Article 2180, "(T)he obligation imposed by article 2176 is
demandable not only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of
persons for whom one is responsible. The father and, in case of his death or
incapacity, the mother, are responsible. The father and, in case of his death
or incapacity, the mother, are responsible for the damages caused by the
minor children who live in their company." In the instant case, it is not
controverted that Reginald, although married, was living with his father and
getting subsistence from him at the time of the occurrence in question.
Factually, therefore, Reginald was still subservient to and dependent on his
father, a situation which is not unusual.
It must be borne in mind that, according to Manresa, the reason behind the
joint and solidary liability of presuncion with their offending child under Article
2180 is that is the obligation of the parent to supervise their minor children in
order to prevent them from causing damage to third persons. 5 On the other
hand, the clear implication of Article 399, in providing that a minor
emancipated by marriage may not, nevertheless, sue or be sued without the
assistance of the parents, is that such emancipation does not carry with it
freedom to enter into transactions or do any act that can give rise to judicial
litigation. (See Manresa, Id., Vol. II, pp. 766-767, 776.) And surely, killing
someone else invites judicial action. Otherwise stated, the marriage of a minor
child does not relieve the parents of the duty to see to it that the child, while
still a minor, does not give answerable for the borrowings of money and
alienation or encumbering of real property which cannot be done by their minor
married child without their consent. (Art. 399; Manresa, supra.)
Accordingly, in Our considered view, Article 2180 applies to Atty. Hill
notwithstanding the emancipation by marriage of Reginald. However,
inasmuch as it is evident that Reginald is now of age, as a matter of equity,
the liability of Atty. Hill has become milling, subsidiary to that of his son.
WHEREFORE, the order appealed from is reversed and the trial court is
ordered to proceed in accordance with the foregoing opinion. Costs against
appellees.
Fernando (Chairman), Antonio, and Martin, JJ., concur.
Concepcion Jr., J, is on leave.
Martin, J, was designated to sit in the Second Division.
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is
blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of
liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See
article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil
action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an
adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil.
576, 579).
Separate Opinions
AQUINO, J, concurring:
Article 2176 of the Civil Code comprehends any culpable act, which is
blameworthy, when judged by accepted legal standards. "The Idea thus
expressed is undoubtedly board enough to include any rational conception of
liability for the tortious acts likely to be developed in any society." (Street, J. in
Daywalt vs. Corporacion de PP. Agustinos Recoletos, 39 Phil. 587, 600). See
article 38, Civil Code and the ruling that "the infant tortfeasor is liable in a civil
action to the injured person in the same manner and to the same extent as an
adult" (27 Am. Jur. 812 cited by Bocobo, J., in Magtibay vs. Tiangco, 74 Phil.
576, 579).
Footnotes
1 Referring to Sentence of the Supreme Court of Spain of
February 14, 1919.
2 Referring to Manzanares vs. Moreta, 38 Phil. 821.
3 Referring to Bernal et al, vs. House et al., 54 Phil. 327.
4 Parenthetically, Manresa seemingly holds. the contrary
view thus:
"Sin embargo, para no ineurrir en error hay que tener en
cuenta que los lineage. del precepts contenido en el
presente articulo son bastante mas reducidos, pues no se
hallan comprendidos en el todos los datios que pues tener
por causa la culpa o la negligencia.
"En efecto, examinando detenidamente la terminos general
de la culpa y de la negligencia. se observe que, tanto en
una como en otra de dichas causas, hay tres generoso o
tres especies distintas, a saber:
1. La que represents una accion u omision voluntaria por la
que results incumplida una obligacion anteriormente
constituida.
2. La que sin existencia de una obligacion anterior produce
un dano o perjuicio que, teniendo su origen en un hecho
ilicito, no reviste los caracteres de delito o falta; y
3. La que teniendo por origen un hecho que constituya
delito o falta produce una responsabilidad civil como
accesoria de la responsabilidad criminal.
"La primera de estas tres especies de culpa o negligencia
es siempre accesoria de una obligacion principal, cuyo
incumplimiento da origen a la terminos especial de la culpa
en materia de contratos, y el eatudio de esta debe harms al
examinar cada contrato, en especial, como lo hicimos asi,
analizando entoces los peculiares efectos de dicha culpa
en cada uno de ellos.
"La tercera de las especies citadas es accesoria tambien,
pues no puede concebirse su existencia sin la de un delicto
o falts que la produzca. Es decir, que solo al lado de la
responsabilidad criminal puede supuesto esa
responsabilidad civil y la obligacion proveniente de la culpa,
ineurrir como una consecuencia de la responsabilidad
criminal, y, por consiguente, su examen y regulacion
perusal. al Derecho penal.
"Como consecuencia de ello, results que la unica especie
de culpa y omisiones o negligencia que puede ser y es
meanwhile.' del presente capitulo, es la separability, o sea
la que sin la existencia de una obligacion anterior, y sin
ningun antecedents contractual, produce un dano o
perjuico que tiene su origen en una accion u omision
culpable solo civilmente; as decir, que siendo ilicita, no
reviste sin embargo, los caracteres de un delito o falta por
no estar penada por la ley. Y aun dentro de estos lineage
hay que restringir aun mas los terminos o la materia propria
de este articulo, el cual se refiere unicamente a la culpa o
negligencia personates del obligado, pero no a las que
prudencia de actos o de omisiones de persons., distintas
de este." (pp. 642-643, Vol. XII, Manresa, Codigo Civil
Espanol.)
5 "Nuestro Codigo no ha seguido la escuela italiana, sino
que mas bien se ha instantaneous, en el criterio de la
doctrina full-grown puesto que impone la obligacion de
reparar, el dano causado en virtud de una presuncion juris
tecum de culpa por parte del que tiene bajo su autoridad o
dependecia al causante del daho, derivada del hicimos de
no haber puesto el cuidado y la vinculos debida en los actos
de sus subordinados para evitar dicho resultado. Asi es
que, segun el parrafo ultimo del art. 1,903, cesa dicha
responsabilidad cuando se prueba que los obligados por
los actos ajenos emplearon toda la diligencia de un buen
padre de familia. Luego no es la causa de la obligacion
impuesta la representacion, ni el interes, ni la necesidad de
que haya quienes responda del dano causado por el que
no tiene personalidad in garantias de specialist. para
responsabilidad por siendo sino el incumplimiento implicito
o supuesto de los deberes de precaucion y de prudencia
que impuesta los vinculos civiles que unicamente al
obligado con las persons., por quienes debe
representacion, el mal causado, Por ese motivo coloca
dicha obligacion entre las que prudencia de la culpa of
negligentj (pp. 670671, Manresa, Codigo Civil Espanol, Vol.
XII.)
G.R. No. L-46179 January 31, 1978
CANDIDA VIRATA, TOMAS VIRATA, MANOLITO
VIRATA, EDERLINDA VIRATA, NAPOLEON VIRATA,
ARACELY VIRATA, ZENAIDA VIRATA, LUZMINDA
VIRATA, PACITA VIRATA, and EVANGELINA VIRATA,
petitioners,
vs.
VICTORIO OCHOA, MAXIMO BORILLA and THE COURT
OF FIRST INSTANCE OF CAVITE, 7th JUDICIAL
DISTRICT, BRANCH V, stationed at BACOOR, CAVITE,
respondents.
Remulla, Estrella & Associates for petitioners
Exequil C. Masangkay for respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is an appeal by certiorari, from the order of the Court
of First Instance of Cavite, Branch V, in Civil Case No. B-
134 granting the motion of the defendants to dismiss the
complaint on the ground that there is another action
pending between the same parties for the same cause. 1
The record shows that on September 24, 1975 one Arsenio
Virata died as a result of having been bumped while walking
along Taft Avenue, Pasay City by a passenger jeepney
driven by Maximo Borilla and registered in the name Of
Victoria Ochoa; that Borilla is the employer of Ochoa; that
for the death of Arsenio Virata, a action for homicide
through reckless imprudence was instituted on September
25, 1975 against Maximo Borilla in the Court of First
Instance of Rizal at Pasay City, docketed as C Case No.
3162-P of said court; that at the hearing of the said criminal
case on December 12, 1975, Atty. Julio Francisco, the
private prosecutor, made a reservation to file a separate
civil action for damages against the driver on his criminal
liability; that on February 19, 1976 Atty. Julio Francisco filed
a motion in said c case to withdraw the reservation to file a
separate civil action; that thereafter, the private prosecutor
actively participated in the trial and presented evidence on
the damages; that on June 29, 1976 the heirs of Arsenio
Virata again reserved their right to institute a separate civil
action; that on July 19, 1977 the heirs of Arsenio Virata,
petitioners herein, commenced Civil No. B-134 in the Court
of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor, Branch V, for damages
based on quasi-delict against the driver Maximo Borilla and
the registered owner of the jeepney, Victorio Ochoa; that on
August 13, 1976 the defendants, private respondents filed
a motion to dismiss on the ground that there is another
action, Criminal Case No. 3162-P, pending between the
same parties for the same cause; that on September 8,
1976 the Court of First Instance of Rizal at Pasay City a
decision in Criminal Case No. 3612-P acquitting the
accused Maximo Borilla on the ground that he caused an
injury by name accident; and that on January 31, 1977, the
Court of First Instance of Cavite at Bacoor granted the
motion to Civil Case No. B-134 for damages. 2
The principal issue is whether or not the heirs of Arsenio
Virata, can prosecute an action for the damages based on
quasi-delict against Maximo Borilla and Victoria Ochoa,
driver and owner, respectively on the passenger jeepney
that bumped Arsenio Virata.
It is settled that in negligence cases the aggrieved parties
may choose between an action under the Revised Penal
Code or of quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code
of the Philippines. What is prohibited by Article 2177 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines is to recover twice for the same
negligent act.
The Supreme Court has held that:
According to the Code Commission: 'The foregoing
provision (Article 2177) though at first sight startling, is not
so novel or extraordinary when we consider the exact
nature of criminal and civil negligence. The former is a
violation of the criminal law, while the latter is a 'culpa
aquiliana' or quasi-delict, of ancient origin, having always
had its own foundation and individuality, separate from
criminal negligence. Such distinction between criminal
negligence and 'culpa extra-contractual' or quasi-delito has
been sustained by decision of the Supreme Court of Spain
and maintained as clear, sound and perfectly tenable by
Maura, an outstanding Spanish jurist. Therefore, under the
proposed Article 2177, acquittal from an accusation of
criminal negligence, whether on reasonable doubt or not,
shall not be a bar to a subsequent civil action, not for civil
liability arising from criminal negligence, but for damages
due to a quasi-delict or 'culpa aquiliana'. But said article
forestalls a double recovery. (Report of the Code
Commission, p. 162.)
Although, again, this Article 2177 does seem to literally refer
to only acts of negligence, the same argument of Justice
Bocobo about construction that upholds 'the spirit that given
life' rather than that which is literal that killeth the intent of
the lawmaker should be observed in applying the same.
And considering that the preliminary chapter on human
relations of the new Civil Code definitely establishes the
separability and independence of liability in a civil action for
acts criminal in character (under Articles 29 to 32) from the
civil responsibility arising from crime fixed by Article 100 of
the Penal Code, and, in a sense, the Rules of Court, under
Sections 2 and 3(c), Rule 111, contemplate also the same
separability, it is 'more congruent' with the spirit of law,
equity and justice, and more in harmony with modern
progress', to borrow the felicitous language in Rakes vs.
Atlantic Gulf and Pacific Co., 7 Phil. to 359, to hod as We
do hold, that Article 2176, where it refers to 'fault covers not
only acts 'not punishable by law' but also criminal in
character, whether intentional and voluntary or
consequently, a separate civil action lies against the in a
criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty and acquitted, provided that the offended party
is not allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to
recover damages on both scores, and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the, two
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words the extinction of civil liability refereed to in Par. (c) of
Section 13, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability
founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas
the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-
delict only and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a
declaration in the criminal case that the criminal act charged
has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused. Brief stated, We hold, in reitration of Garcia, that
culpa aquilina includes voluntary and negligent acts which
may be punishable by law. 3
The petitioners are not seeking to recover twice for the
same negligent act. Before Criminal Case No. 3162-P was
decided, they manifested in said criminal case that they
were filing a separate civil action for damages against the
owner and driver of the passenger jeepney based on quasi-
delict. The acquittal of the driver, Maximo Borilla, of the
crime charged in Criminal Case No. 3162-P is not a bar to
the prosecution of Civil Case No. B-134 for damages based
on quasi-delict The source of the obligation sought to be
enforced in Civil Case No. B-134 is quasi-delict, not an act
or omission punishable by law. Under Article 1157 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines, quasi-delict and an act or
omission punishable by law are two different sources of
obligation.
Moreover, for the petitioners to prevail in the action for
damages, Civil Case No. B-134, they have only to establish
their cause of action by preponderance of the evidence.
WHEREFORE, the order of dismissal appealed from is
hereby set aside and Civil Case No. B-134 is reinstated and
remanded to the lower court for further proceedings, with
costs against the private respondents.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Muñoz Palma and
Guerrero, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987
CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City,
Branch 105 and Rosario Claudia respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders of the
respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City dated (1) 8
January 1987 which rejected the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as
private prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913 where
respondent Rosario Claudio is the accused for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22; and (2) 31 March 1987 which denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987; and for mandamus to allow
Atty. Bustos to enter his appearance as private prosecutor in the aforestated
criminal cases.
It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 40909-40913, were filed against respondent Claudio before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and originally assigned to Branch 84.
The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when respondent Claudio,
through counsel, filed a petition for recuse dated May 19,1986.
The cases were re-raffled and consequently assigned on June 25, 1986 to
Branch 105 which was then presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina
During these proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally arraigned on
November 20, 1986 where she pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial was
then set on January 8, 1987.
In the meantime Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge Serquina as
presiding judge of Branch 105.
On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the
appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that
the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not
provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against
property but public order."
The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
dated 8 January 1987 on March 10, 1987.
Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the motion for reconsideration on
March 25, 1987.
In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Court.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court acted with
grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the
appearance of a private prosecutor.
The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an offense against
public order. As such, it is argued that it is the State and the public that are
the principal complainants and, therefore, no civil indemnity is provided for by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a private party or prosecutor may
intervene.
On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that "Every man
criminally liable is also civilly liable," contends that indemnity may be
recovered from the offender regardless of whether or not Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 so provides.
A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issue in
the case at bar.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art.
100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional
theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (
1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose
law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose
person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. However, this rather broad
and general provision is among the most complex and controversial topics in
criminal procedure. It can be misleading in its implications especially where
the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as a
tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed
independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is
intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy
the generally accepted notion that, the civil liability actually arises from the
crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or omission is
felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so
much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing
things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability
is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole
the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In
other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same
felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the
direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently
the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for,
to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is
punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to
another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised
Edition, pp. 246-247).
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,
indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage,
loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another.
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of
the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of
Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every
crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty
party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the
damage, and indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo, 19
Phil. 265).
Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered
the offenses committed against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too
is entitled to relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect.
She was assured that the checks were good when she parted with money,
property or services. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced.
In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986) and the
cases consolidated therewith, we held that "The effects of a worthless check
transcend the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touch the interests of the community at large." Yet, we too recognized the
wrong done to the private party defrauded when we stated therein that "The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or the holder, but also an
injury to the public."
Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of
the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless
check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-
handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the
remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a
separate civil suit. To do so, may leave the offended party unable to recover
even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant
drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to
provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to
40913 is justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the
interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by
the Constitution (Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A
separate civil action for the purpose would only prove to be costly,
burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final
disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where
petitioner's rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial
court, resort t o a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court is
ordered to permit the intervention of a private prosecutor in behalf of petitioner
Charmina B. Banal, in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Criminasl Cases
Nos. 40909 to 40913. The temporary restraining order issued by this court a
quo for further proceedings. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 78911-25 December 11, 1987
CHARMINA B. BANAL, petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. TOMAS V. TADEO, JR., Presiding Judge, RTC-Quezon City,
Branch 105 and Rosario Claudia respondents.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to review and set aside the orders of the
respondent Regional Trial Court, Branch 105, Quezon City dated (1) 8
January 1987 which rejected the appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as
private prosecutor in Criminal Cases Nos. Q-40909 to Q-40913 where
respondent Rosario Claudio is the accused for violation of Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22; and (2) 31 March 1987 which denied the petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the order dated 8 January 1987; and for mandamus to allow
Atty. Bustos to enter his appearance as private prosecutor in the aforestated
criminal cases.
It appears that fifteen (15) separate informations for violation of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 22 or the Bouncing Checks Law, docketed as Criminal Cases
Nos. 40909-40913, were filed against respondent Claudio before the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City and originally assigned to Branch 84.
The presiding judge of Branch 84 inhibited himself when respondent Claudio,
through counsel, filed a petition for recuse dated May 19,1986.
The cases were re-raffled and consequently assigned on June 25, 1986 to
Branch 105 which was then presided over by Judge Johnico G. Serquina
During these proceedings, respondent Claudio was finally arraigned on
November 20, 1986 where she pleaded not guilty to the charges. Pre-trial was
then set on January 8, 1987.
In the meantime Judge Tomas V. Tadeo, Jr. replaced Judge Serquina as
presiding judge of Branch 105.
On January 8, 1987, the respondent court issued an order rejecting the
appearance of Atty. Nicolito L. Bustos as private prosecutor on the ground that
the charge is for the violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 which does not
provide for any civil liability or indemnity and hence, "it is not a crime against
property but public order."
The petitioner, through counsel filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
dated 8 January 1987 on March 10, 1987.
Respondent Claudio filed her opposition to the motion for reconsideration on
March 25, 1987.
In an order dated 31 March 1987, the respondent court denied petitioner's
motion for reconsideration.
Hence, this petition questioning the orders of the respondent Court.
The issue to be resolved is whether or not the respondent Court acted with
grave abuse of discretion or in excess of its jurisdiction in rejecting the
appearance of a private prosecutor.
The respondents make capital of the fact that Batas Pambansa Blg. 22
punishes the act of knowingly issuing worthless checks as an offense against
public order. As such, it is argued that it is the State and the public that are
the principal complainants and, therefore, no civil indemnity is provided for by
Batas Pambansa Blg. 22 for which a private party or prosecutor may
intervene.
On the other hand, the petitioner, relying on the legal axiom that "Every man
criminally liable is also civilly liable," contends that indemnity may be
recovered from the offender regardless of whether or not Batas Pambansa
Blg. 22 so provides.
A careful study of the concept of civil liability allows a solution to the issue in
the case at bar.
Generally, the basis of civil liability arising from crime is the fundamental
postulate of our law that "Every man criminally liable is also civilly liable" (Art.
100, The Revised Penal Code). Underlying this legal principle is the traditional
theory that when a person commits a crime he offends two entities namely (
1) the society in which he lives in or the political entity called the State whose
law he had violated; and (2) the individual member of that society whose
person, right, honor, chastity or property was actually or directly injured or
damaged by the same punishable act or omission. However, this rather broad
and general provision is among the most complex and controversial topics in
criminal procedure. It can be misleading in its implications especially where
the same act or omission may be treated as a crime in one instance and as a
tort in another or where the law allows a separate civil action to proceed
independently of the course of the criminal prosecution with which it is
intimately intertwined. Many legal scholars treat as a misconception or fallacy
the generally accepted notion that, the civil liability actually arises from the
crime when, in the ultimate analysis, it does not. While an act or omission is
felonious because it is punishable by law, it gives rise to civil liability not so
much because it is a crime but because it caused damage to another. Viewing
things pragmatically, we can readily see that what gives rise to the civil liability
is really the obligation and the moral duty of everyone to repair or make whole
the damage caused to another by reason of his own act or omission, done
intentionally or negligently, whether or not the same be punishable by law. In
other words, criminal liability will give rise to civil liability only if the same
felonious act or omission results in damage or injury to another and is the
direct and proximate cause thereof. Damage or injury to another is evidently
the foundation of the civil action. Such is not the case in criminal actions for,
to be criminally liable, it is enough that the act or omission complained of is
punishable, regardless of whether or not it also causes material damage to
another. (See Sangco, Philippine Law on Torts and Damages, 1978, Revised
Edition, pp. 246-247).
Article 20 of the New Civil Code provides:
Every person who, contrary to law, wilfully or negligently
causes damage to another, shall indemnify the latter for the
same.
Regardless, therefore, of whether or not a special law so provides,
indemnification of the offended party may be had on account of the damage,
loss or injury directly suffered as a consequence of the wrongful act of another.
The indemnity which a person is sentenced to pay forms an integral part of
the penalty imposed by law for the commission of a crime (Quemel v. Court of
Appeals, 22 SCRA 44, citing Bagtas v. Director of Prisons, 84 Phil. 692). Every
crime gives rise to a penal or criminal action for the punishment of the guilty
party, and also to civil action for the restitution of the thing, repair of the
damage, and indemnification for the losses. (United States v. Bernardo, 19
Phil. 265).
Indeed one cannot disregard the private party in the case at bar who suffered
the offenses committed against her. Not only the State but the petitioner too
is entitled to relief as a member of the public which the law seeks to protect.
She was assured that the checks were good when she parted with money,
property or services. She suffered with the State when the checks bounced.
In Lozano v. Hon. Martinez (G.R. No. 63419, December 18, 1986) and the
cases consolidated therewith, we held that "The effects of a worthless check
transcend the private interests of the parties directly involved in the transaction
and touch the interests of the community at large." Yet, we too recognized the
wrong done to the private party defrauded when we stated therein that "The
mischief it creates is not only a wrong to the payee or the holder, but also an
injury to the public."
Civil liability to the offended private party cannot thus be denied, The payee of
the check is entitled to receive the payment of money for which the worthless
check was issued. Having been caused the damage, she is entitled to
recompense.
Surely, it could not have been the intendment of the framers of Batas
Pambansa Big. 22 to leave the offended private party defrauded and empty-
handed by excluding the civil liability of the offender, giving her only the
remedy, which in many cases results in a Pyrrhic victory, of having to file a
separate civil suit. To do so, may leave the offended party unable to recover
even the face value of the check due her, thereby unjustly enriching the errant
drawer at the expense of the payee. The protection which the law seeks to
provide would, therefore, be brought to naught.
The petitioner's intervention in the prosecution of Criminal Cases 40909 to
40913 is justified not only for the protection of her interests but also in the
interest of the speedy and inexpensive administration of justice mandated by
the Constitution (Section 16, Article III, Bill of Rights, Constitution of 1987). A
separate civil action for the purpose would only prove to be costly,
burdensome, and time-consuming for both parties and further delay the final
disposition of the case. This multiplicity of suits must be avoided. Where
petitioner's rights may be fulIy adjudicated in the proceedings before the trial
court, resort t o a separate action to recover civil liability is clearly unwarranted.
WHEREFORE the petition is hereby GRANTED. The respondent court is
ordered to permit the intervention of a private prosecutor in behalf of petitioner
Charmina B. Banal, in the prosecution of the civil aspect of Criminasl Cases
Nos. 40909 to 40913. The temporary restraining order issued by this court a
quo for further proceedings. This decision is immediately executory.
SO ORDERED.
Fernan (Chairman), Feliciano, Bidin and Cortes, JJ., concur.
G.R. No. 82146 January 22, 1990
EULOGIO OCCENA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PEDRO M. ICAMINA, Presiding Judge, Branch X of the Regional
Trial Court Sixth Judicial Region, San Jose, Antique; THE PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the Honorable Provincial Fiscal of
Antique; and CRISTINA VEGAFRIA, respondents.
Comelec Legal Assistance Office for petitioner.
Comelec Legal Assistance Officer for private respondent.
FERNAN, C.J.:
On May 31, 1979, herein petitioner Eulogio Occena instituted before the
Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Sibalom, San Remigio — Belison,
Province of Antique, Criminal Case No. 1717, a criminal complaint for Grave
Oral Defamation against herein private respondent Cristina Vegafria for
allegedly openly, publicly and maliciously uttering the following insulting words
and statements: "Gago ikaw nga Barangay Captain, montisco, traidor,
malugus, Hudas," which, freely translated, mean: "You are a foolish Barangay
Captain, ignoramus, traitor, tyrant, Judas" and other words and statements of
similar import which caused great and irreparable damage and injury to his
person and honor.
Private respondent as accused therein entered a plea of not guilty. Trial
thereafter ensued, at which petitioner, without reserving his right to file a
separate civil action for damages actively intervened thru a private prosecutor.
After trial, private respondent was convicted of the offense of Slight Oral
Defamation and was sentenced to pay a fine of Fifty Pesos (P50.00) with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. No
damages were awarded to petitioner in view of the trial court's opinion that
"the facts and circumstances of the case as adduced by the evidence do not
warrant the awarding of moral damages." 1
Disagreeing, petitioner sought relief from the Regional Trial Court, which in a
decision dated March 16, 1987 disposed of petitioner's appeal as follows:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the civil aspect of the lower
court's decision of April 20, 1981 subject of this appeal, for lack of
merit, is hereby DENIED.
After the decision shall have become final, remand the records of this
case to the court of origin, Second Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Sibalom, San Remigio-Belison, Antique, for the execution of its
decision on the criminal aspect.
SO ORDERED. 2
Petitioner is now before us by way of a petition for review on certiorari seeking
to annul the RTC decision for being contrary to Article 100 of the Revised
Penal Code providing that every person criminally liable for a felony is also
civilly liable, and Article 2219 of the New Civil Code providing that moral
damages may be recovered in libel, slander or any other form of defamation.
He submits that public respondent RTC erred in relying on the cases of Roa
vs. de la Cruz, 107 Phil. 10 and Tan vs. Standard Vacuum Oil Co., et al., 91
Phil. 672 cited therein. He differentiates said cases from the case at bar by
saying that in the case of Roa, the decision of the trial court had become final
before Maria C. Roa instituted a civil action for damages; whereas in the
instant case, the decision of the trial court has not yet become final by reason
of the timely appeal interposed by him and no civil action for damages has
been instituted by petitioner against private respondent for the same
cause. Tan, on the other hand, contemplates of two actions, one criminal and
one civil, and the prosecution of the criminal case had resulted in the acquittal
of the accused, which is not the situation here where the civil aspect was
impliedly instituted with the criminal action in accordance with Section 1, Rule
111, of the Rules of Court.
Private respondent for her part argues that the decision of the trial court carries
with it the final adjudication of her civil liability. Since petitioner chose to
actively intervene in the criminal action without reserving his right to file a
separate civil action for damages, he assumed the risk that in the event he
failed to recover damages he cannot appeal from the decision of the lower
court.
We find merit in the petition.
The issues confronting us in the instant petition is whether or not the decision
of the Second Municipal Trial Court of Sibalom, San-Remigio-Belison,
Province of Antique constitutes the final adjudication on the merits of private
respondent's civil liability; and whether or not petitioner is entitled to an award
of damages arising from the remarks uttered by private respondent and found
by the trial court to be defamatory.
The decision of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court as affirmed by the Regional
Trial Court in Criminal Case No. 1709 cannot be considered as a final
adjudication on the civil liability of private respondent simply because said
decision has not yet become final due to the timely appeal filed by petitioner
with respect to the civil liability of the accused in said case. It was only the
unappealed criminal aspect of the case which has become final.
In the case of People vs. Coloma, 105 Phil. 1287, we categorically stated that
from a judgment convicting the accused, two (2) appeals may, accordingly, be
taken. The accused may seek a review of said judgment, as regards both civil
and criminal actions; while the complainant may appeal with respect only to
the civil action, either because the lower court has refused to award damages
or because the award made is unsatisfactory to him. The right of either to
appeal or not to appeal in the event of conviction of the accused is not
dependent upon the other. Thus, private respondent's theory that in actively
intervening in the criminal action, petitioner waived his right to appeal from the
decision that may be rendered therein, is incorrect and inaccurate. Petitioner
may, as he did, appeal from the decision on the civil aspect which is deemed
instituted with the criminal action and such appeal, timely taken, prevents the
decision on the civil liability from attaining finality.
We tackle the second issue by determining the basis of civil liability arising
from crime. Civil obligations arising from criminal offenses are governed by
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which provides that "(E)very person
criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable," in relation to Article 2177 of
the Civil Code on quasi-delict, the provisions for independent civil actions in
the Chapter on Human Relations and the provisions regulating damages, also
found in the Civil Code.
Underlying the legal principle that a person who is criminally liable is also civilly
liable is the view that from the standpoint of its effects, a crime has dual
character: (1) as an offense against the state because of the disturbance of
the social order; and (2) as an offense against the private person injured by
the crime unless it involves the crime of treason, rebellion, espionage,
contempt and others wherein no civil liability arises on the part of the offender
either because there are no damages to be compensated or there is no private
person injured by the crime. 3
In the ultimate analysis, what gives rise to the civil liability is really the
obligation of everyone to repair or to make whole the damage caused to
another by reason of his act or omission, whether done intentional or
negligently and whether or not punishable by law. 4
In the case at bar, private respondent was found guilty of slight oral defamation
and sentenced to a fine of P50.00 with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, but no civil liability arising from the felonious act of the accused
was adjudged. This is erroneous. As a general rule, a person who is found to
be criminally liable offends two (2) entities: the state or society in which he
lives and the individual member of the society or private person who was
injured or damaged by the punishable act or omission. The offense of which
private respondent was found guilty is not one of those felonies where no civil
liability results because either there is no offended party or no damage was
caused to a private person. There is here an offended party, whose main
contention precisely is that he suffered damages in view of the defamatory
words and statements uttered by private respondent, in the amount of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages and the further sum of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000) as exemplary damages.
Article 2219, par. (7) of the Civil Code allows the recovery of moral damages
in case of libel, slander or any other form of defamation This provision of law
establishes the right of an offended party in a case for oral defamation to
recover from the guilty party damages for injury to his feelings and reputation.
The offended party is likewise allowed to recover punitive or exemplary
damages.
It must be remembered that every defamatory imputation is presumed to be
malicious, even if it be true, if no good intention and justifiable motive for
making it is shown. And malice may be inferred from the style and tone of
publication 5 subject to certain exceptions which are not present in the case at
bar.
Calling petitioner who was a barangay captain an ignoramus, traitor, tyrant
and Judas is clearly an imputation of defects in petitioner's character sufficient
to cause him embarrassment and social humiliation. Petitioner testified to the
feelings of shame and anguish he suffered as a result of the incident
complained of. 6 It is patently error for the trial court to overlook this vital piece
of evidence and to conclude that the "facts and circumstances of the case as
adduced by the evidence do not warrant the awarding of moral damages."
Having misapprehended the facts, the trial court's findings with respect thereto
is not conclusive upon us.
From the evidence presented, we rule that for the injury to his feelings and
reputation, being a barangay captain, petitioner is entitled to moral damages
in the sum of P5,000.00 and a further sum of P5,000.00 as exemplary
damages.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The decision of the Regional
Trial Court is hereby MODIFIED and private respondent is ordered to pay
petitioner the amount of P5,000.00 as moral damages and another P5,000.00
as exemplary damages. Costs against private respondent.

SO ORDERED.

Gutierrez, Jr., Feliciano, Bidin and Cortés JJ., concur

G.R. No. 145391 August 26, 2002
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners,
vs.
MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA, respondent.
CARPIO, J.:
The Case
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution 1 dated
December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for certiorari and the
Resolution2 dated August 24, 2000 denying the motion for reconsideration,
both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, in Special
Civil Action No. 17-C (99).
The Facts
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya ("Laroya" for
brevity) and the other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo ("Capitulo" for
brevity) and driven by petitioner Avelino Casupanan ("Casupanan" for brevity),
figured in an accident. As a result, two cases were filed with the Municipal
Circuit Trial Court ("MCTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac. Laroya filed a
criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage
to property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand,
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict,
docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary
investigation stage. Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to
dismiss the civil case on the ground of forum-shopping considering the
pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion in the Order of
March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil
case is a separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal
case. The MCTC denied the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7,
1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
before the Regional Trial Court ("Capas RTC" for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac,
Branch 66,3 assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal.
The Trial Court’s Ruling
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the
petition for certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of
dismissal issued by the MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and
therefore the proper remedy should have been an appeal. The Capas RTC
further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a substitute for a lost
appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the
MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment
and not an abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas
RTC denied the same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
The Issue
The petition premises the legal issue in this wise:
"In a certain vehicular accident involving two parties, each one of
them may think and believe that the accident was caused by the fault
of the other. x x x [T]he first party, believing himself to be the
aggrieved party, opted to file a criminal case for reckless imprudence
against the second party. On the other hand, the second party,
together with his operator, believing themselves to be the real
aggrieved parties, opted in turn to file a civil case for quasi-delict
against the first party who is the very private complainant in the
criminal case."4
Thus, the issue raised is whether an accused in a pending criminal case for
reckless imprudence can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a
separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the
criminal case.
The Court’s Ruling
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC
dismissed on the ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the
criminal case. Casupanan and Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal
case has a counterclaim against the private complainant, he may file the
counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They contend that
an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of
reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved
party in a civil case arising from the same incident. They maintain that under
Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil Code, the civil case can proceed
independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out that Casupanan
was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-
delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party
in the criminal case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does
not state the real antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and
Capitulo forfeited their right to question the order of dismissal when they failed
to avail of the proper remedy of appeal. Laroya argues that there is no
question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is already final and a
petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the
legal question of whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one
action - the independent civil action for quasi-delict against Laroya.
Nature of the Order of Dismissal
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-
shopping under Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94. The MCTC
did not state in its order of dismissal 5 that the dismissal was with prejudice.
Under the Administrative Circular, the order of dismissal is without prejudice
to refiling the complaint, unless the order of dismissal expressly states it is
with prejudice.6 Absent a declaration that the dismissal is with prejudice, the
same is deemed without prejudice. Thus, the MCTC’s dismissal, being silent
on the matter, is a dismissal without prejudice.
Section 1 of Rule 417 provides that an order dismissing an action without
prejudice is not appealable. The remedy of the aggrieved party is to file a
special civil action under Rule 65. Section 1 of Rule 41 expressly states that
"where the judgment or final order is not appealable, the aggrieved party may
file an appropriate special civil action under Rule 65." Clearly, the Capas
RTC’s order dismissing the petition for certiorari, on the ground that the proper
remedy is an ordinary appeal, is erroneous.
Forum-Shopping
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same
parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to
secure a favorable judgment.8 Forum-shopping is present when in the two or
more cases pending, there is identity of parties, rights of action and reliefs
sought.9 However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case because the
law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property based on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo
filed the civil action for damages based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code.
Although these two actions arose from the same act or omission, they have
different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal
punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on
culpa aquiliana actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
These articles on culpa aquiliana read:
"Art. 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another,
there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage
done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing contractual
relation between the parties, is called a quasi-delict and is governed
by the provisions of this Chapter.
Art. 2177. Responsibility for fault or negligence under the preceding
article is entirely separate and distinct from the civil liability arising
from negligence under the Penal Code. But the plaintiff cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the
defendant."
Any aggrieved person can invoke these articles provided he proves, by
preponderance of evidence, that he has suffered damage because of the fault
or negligence of another. Either the private complainant or the accused can
file a separate civil action under these articles. There is nothing in the law or
rules that state only the private complainant in a criminal case may invoke
these articles.
Moreover, paragraph 6, Section 1, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal
Procedure ("2000 Rules" for brevity) expressly requires the accused to litigate
his counterclaim in a separate civil action, to wit:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) x x x.
No counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint may be filed by
the accused in the criminal case, but any cause of action which could
 have been the subject thereof may be litigated in a separate civil
action." (Emphasis supplied)
Since the present Rules require the accused in a criminal action to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil action, there can be no forum-shopping if the
accused files such separate civil action.
Filing of a separate civil action
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure ("1985 Rules"
for brevity), as amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action
independently of the criminal action provided the offended party reserved the
right to file such civil action. Unless the offended party reserved the civil action
before the presentation of the evidence for the prosecution, all civil actions
arising from the same act or omission were deemed "impliedly instituted" in
the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil
liability ex-delicto, the recovery of damages for quasi-delict, and the recovery
of damages for violation of Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human
Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasi-delict under the
1985 Rules, the offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right
to bring such action. Otherwise, such civil action was deemed "impliedly
instituted" in the criminal action. Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules
provided as follows:
"Section 1. – Institution of criminal and civil actions. – When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the
offended party waives the action, reserves his right to institute it
separately, or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the
Revised Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34 and
2176 of the Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same
act or omission of the accused.
A waiver of any of the civil actions extinguishes the others. The
institution of, or the reservation of the right to file, any of said civil
actions separately waives the others.
The reservation of the right to institute the separate civil actions shall
be made before the prosecution starts to present its evidence and
under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
In no case may the offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission of the accused.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules was amended on December 1, 2000
and now provides as follows:
"SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. – (a) When a
criminal action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil
liability arising from the offense charged shall be deemed
instituted with the criminal action unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves the right to institute it separately or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
The reservation of the right to institute separately the civil action shall
be made before the prosecution starts presenting its evidence and
under circumstances affording the offended party a reasonable
opportunity to make such reservation.
xxx
(b) x x x
Where the civil action has been filed separately and trial thereof has
not yet commenced, it may be consolidated with the criminal action
upon application with the court trying the latter case. If the application
is granted, the trial of both actions shall proceed in accordance with
section 2 of this rule governing consolidation of the civil and criminal
actions." (Emphasis supplied)
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, what is "deemed instituted" with the
criminal action is only the action to recover civil liability arising from the crime
or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of
the Civil Code are no longer "deemed instituted," and may be filed separately
and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal
action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver
of the right to file a separate and independent civil action based on these
articles of the Civil Code. The prescriptive period on the civil actions based on
these articles of the Civil Code continues to run even with the filing of the
criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil
Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action "deemed
instituted" in the criminal action.10
Under the present Rule 111, the offended party is still given the option to file
a separate civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto by reserving such right
in the criminal action before the prosecution presents its evidence. Also, the
offended party is deemed to make such reservation if he files a separate civil
action before filing the criminal action. If the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is filed separately but its trial has not yet commenced, the
civil action may be consolidated with the criminal action. The consolidation
under this Rule does not apply to separate civil actions arising from the same
act or omission filed under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code.11
Suspension of the Separate Civil Action
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action,
if reserved in the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment
was rendered in the criminal action. If the separate civil action was filed before
the commencement of the criminal action, the civil action, if still pending, was
suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final judgment was
rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil
action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent
civil actions based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which
could proceed independently regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
The amended provision of Section 2, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules continues
this procedure, to wit:
"SEC. 2. When separate civil action is suspended. – After the
criminal action has been commenced, the separate civil action
arising therefrom cannot be instituted until final judgment has been
entered in the criminal action.
If the criminal action is filed after the said civil action has
already been instituted, the latter shall be suspended in
whatever stage it may be found before judgment on the merits.
The suspension shall last until final judgment is rendered in the
criminal action. Nevertheless, before judgment on the merits is
rendered in the civil action, the same may, upon motion of the
offended party, be consolidated with the criminal action in the court
trying the criminal action. In case of consolidation, the evidence
already adduced in the civil action shall be deemed automatically
reproduced in the criminal action without prejudice to the right of the
prosecution to cross-examine the witnesses presented by the
offended party in the criminal case and of the parties to present
additional evidence. The consolidated criminal and civil actions shall
be tried and decided jointly.
During the pendency of the criminal action, the running of the period
of prescription of the civil action which cannot be instituted separately
or whose proceeding has been suspended shall be tolled.
x x x." (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Section 2, Rule 111 of the present Rules did not change the rule that
the separate civil action, filed to recover damages ex-delicto, is suspended
upon the filing of the criminal action. Section 2 of the present Rule 111 also
prohibits the filing, after commencement of the criminal action, of a separate
civil action to recover damages ex-delicto.
When civil action may proceed independently
The crucial question now is whether Casupanan and Capitulo, who are not
the offended parties in the criminal case, can file a separate civil action against
the offended party in the criminal case. Section 3, Rule 111 of the 2000 Rules
provides as follows:
"SEC 3. When civil action may proceed independently. - In the cases
provided in Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code of the
Philippines, the independent civil action may be brought by
the offended party. It shall proceed independently of the criminal
action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In no
case, however, may the offended party recover damages twice for
the same act or omission charged in the criminal action." (Emphasis
supplied)
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, like its counterpart in the amended 1985
Rules, expressly allows the "offended party" to bring an independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code. As stated in
Section 3 of the present Rule 111, this civil action shall proceed independently
of the criminal action and shall require only a preponderance of evidence. In
no case, however, may the "offended party recover damages twice for the
same act or omission charged in the criminal action."
There is no question that the offended party in the criminal action can file an
independent civil action for quasi-delict against the accused. Section 3 of the
present Rule 111 expressly states that the "offended party" may bring such an
action but the "offended party" may not recover damages twice for the same
act or omission charged in the criminal action. Clearly, Section 3 of Rule 111
refers to the offended party in the criminal action, not to the accused.
Casupanan and Capitulo, however, invoke the ruling in Cabaero vs.
Cantos12 where the Court held that the accused therein could validly institute
a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private complainant in the
criminal case. In Cabaero, the accused in the criminal case filed his Answer
with Counterclaim for malicious prosecution. At that time the Court noted the
"absence of clear-cut rules governing the prosecution on impliedly instituted
civil actions and the necessary consequences and implications thereof."
Thus, the Court ruled that the trial court should confine itself to the criminal
aspect of the case and disregard any counterclaim for civil liability. The Court
further ruled that the accused may file a separate civil case against the
offended party "after the criminal case is terminated and/or in accordance with
the new Rules which may be promulgated." The Court explained that a cross-
claim, counterclaim or third-party complaint on the civil aspect will only
unnecessarily complicate the proceedings and delay the resolution of the
criminal case.
Paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 was incorporated in the 2000
Rules precisely to address the lacuna mentioned in Cabaero. Under this
provision, the accused is barred from filing a counterclaim, cross-claim or
third-party complaint in the criminal case. However, the same provision states
that "any cause of action which could have been the subject (of the
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint) may be litigated in a
separate civil action." The present Rule 111 mandates the accused to file his
counterclaim in a separate civil actiosn which shall proceed independently of
the criminal action, even as the civil action of the offended party is litigated in
the criminal action.
Conclusion
Under Section 1 of the present Rule 111, the independent civil action in
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with
the criminal action but may be filed separately by the offended party even
without reservation. The commencement of the criminal action does not
suspend the prosecution of the independent civil action under these articles
of the Civil Code. The suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers
only to the civil action arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or
filed before the commencement of the criminal action.
Thus, the offended party can file two separate suits for the same act or
omission. The first a criminal case where the civil action to recover civil
liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a civil case for quasi-
delict - without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The two cases can
proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil
action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant. In most
cases, the offended party will have no reason to file a second civil action since
he cannot recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the accused.
In some instances, the accused may be insolvent, necessitating the filing of
another case against his employer or guardians.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in
paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the
counterclaim of the accused "may be litigated in a separate civil action."
This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting
up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal
case. The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim
against the offended party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action
for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period may set in since the period continues
to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article
2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of
this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the
accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to
recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of
law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and
Capitulo is proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089
on the ground of forum-shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court
in the criminal case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the
independent civil action. This possibility has always been recognized ever
since the Civil Code introduced in 1950 the concept of an independent civil
action under Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Code. But the law itself, in
Article 31 of the Code, expressly provides that the independent civil action
"may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and regardless of the
result of the latter." In Azucena vs. Potenciano,13 the Court declared:

"x x x. There can indeed be no other logical conclusion than this, for
to subordinate the civil action contemplated in the said articles to the
result of the criminal prosecution — whether it be conviction or
acquittal — would render meaningless the independent character of
the civil action and the clear injunction in Article 31 that this action
'may proceed independently of the criminal proceedings and
regardless of the result of the latter.’"

More than half a century has passed since the Civil Code introduced the
concept of a civil action separate and independent from the criminal action
although arising from the same act or omission. The Court, however, has yet
to encounter a case of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions of trial courts,
one hearing the criminal case and the other the civil action for quasi-delict.
The fear of conflicting and irreconcilable decisions may be more apparent than
real. In any event, there are sufficient remedies under the Rules of Court to
deal with such remote possibilities.

One final point. The Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure took effect on
December 1, 2000 while the MCTC issued the order of dismissal on December
28, 1999 or before the amendment of the rules. The Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure must be given retroactive effect considering the well-
settled rule that -

"x x x statutes regulating the procedure of the court will be construed

as applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of
their passage. Procedural laws are retroactive in that sense and to
that extent."14

WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The

Resolutions dated December 28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil
Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and Civil Case No. 2089
is REINSTATED.

SO ORDERED.

Puno, Panganiban, and Sandoval-Gutierrez*, JJ., concur.

G.R. No. L-34666 October 30, 1981
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, MERCEDES L.
JAVELLANA, petitioner,
vs.
ITONG AMISTAD respondent.
DE CASTRO, J.:
The legal question raised in this petition for certiorari is whether from a
decision of acquittal, the complainant in a criminal action for estafa, may
appeal with respect to the civil aspect of the case.
The criminal action in this case was commenced in the Court of First Instance
of Baguio and Benguet, under an information which reads:
INFORMATION
The undersigned Acting 1st Assistant City Fiscal accuses ITONG AMISTAD
of the crime of Estafa penalized under Article 316 Paragraph 2, of the Revised
Penal Code, committed as follows:
That on or about January 30, 1965, October 11, 1965, and December 23,
1965, in the City of Baguio, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the abovenamed accused, did then and there, willfully,
unlawfully, and feloniously —
(1) (January 30, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a deed of
sale in favor of Ben Palispis an unsegregated portion of 42,326 square meters
of that parcel of land described in
ORIGINAL CERTIFICATE OF TITLE No. 0-105
A parcel of land (Lot 1, plan Psu-203086-Amd., Civil Reservation Case No. 1,
L.R.C. Civil Reservation Record No. 211), situated in the Res. Sec. "J", City
of Baguio. Bounded on the NE., by property of Honor Kingdoms; on the SW.,
by Lot 2; on the W and NW., by Public land. ... containing an area of EIGHTY
FOUR THOUSAND SIX HUNDRED AND FIFTY THREE (84,653) Square
meters, more or less, ... in the names of spouses I tong Amistad and Luisa
Tengdan.
(2) (October 11, 1965) sell, convey, transfer and deliver by way of a deed of
sale in favor of Teodoro Mat-an the remaining 42,326 square meters of the
above-described parcel of land; and
(3) (December 23, 1965) execute a supplemental deed of sale over the entire
area covered by Original Certificate of Title No. 0-105 in favor of vendees Ben
Palispis and Teodoro Mat-an which effected the issuance of two separate titles
in favor of said vendees —
knowing fully well and purposely withholding the information that on or about
February 10, 1962, he had previously entered into an agreement with one
MERCEDES L. JAVELLANA to convey to her an area of 10,000 square
meters from the above-described parcel of land for the sum of TEN
THOUSAND (P10,000.00) PESOS and had already received from her the
sum of FIVE THOUSAND ( P5,000.00) PESOS, thereby causing damage and
prejudice to said Mercedes L. Javellana in the amount of FIVE THOUSAND
(P5,000.00) PESOS, Philippine Currency.
All contrary to law.
After trial, decision was rendered dated February 8, 1971, and promulgated
on March 18, 1971 acquitting the accused, respondent herein, the Court
holding that "the case of the prosecution is civil in nature" and that "the guilt of
the accused has not been proven beyond reasonable doubt."
From the judgment of acquittal, the complainant, the petitioner herein,
appealed to the Court of Appeals insofar as the civil liability of the accused is
concerned. Without awaiting the completion of the transcript of the
stenographic notes in the case, the Court of Appeals dismissed the appeal
merely on the legal proposition that an appeal by the complainant from a
judgment of acquittal should be disallowed.
The Resolution of the Court of Appeals dated December 1, 1971, is set forth
in full as follows:
This refers to an appeal against the judgment of the Court of First Instance of
Baguio, in Criminal Case No. 4205, wherein the accused Itong Amistad who
was prosecuted for the crime of estafa paragraph 2, Article 316 R.P.C.), was
acquitted. The decision was promulgated on March 18, 1971 and on that same
day, the complainant, through counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal from said
judgment, "insofar as the civil liability of the accused is concerned." Apparently
the appeal was approved by the trial court, the records of the case were
elevated to this Court, and this Court required the completion of the same.
Now, while the right of the offended party to intervene in the criminal action
(Section 15, Rule 110, Rules) as well as to appeal from a final judgment or
ruling or from an order made after judgment affecting the substantial rights of
the appellant (Section 2, Rule 122, Rules) is recognized, the offended party
however, cannot appeal if the accused is acquitted as matters are (People vs.
Herrera 74 Phil. 21). indeed, the trial court in acquitting the herein defendant
stated:
In the mind of the court, the case of the prosecution is civil in nature. In fact,
the supervening acts of the parties after the execution of Exhibit A until the
execution of Exhibit D are clear and unequivocal which ineluctably lead this
court to believe that the guilt of the accused has not been proven beyond
reasonable doubt.
An appeal from the judgment of the Court of First Instance would perforce
require a new determination of defendant's criminal liability. This cannot be
done. Besides, the offended party has the remedy of bringing a civil action
independently of the criminal action.
Indeed, this question is not new. It has already been so ruled by the Supreme
Court in several cases (People vs. Flores, G.R. No. L-7523, December 18,
1957, citing People vs. Velez, 77 Phil. 1026; People vs. Benjamin Liggayu et
al., No. 8224, October 31, 1955; People vs. Joaquin Lipana 72 Phil. 166;
People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679 [decided under the new Rules of Court];
Ricafort vs. Fernan, 101 Phil. 575, 572).
Considering that the complainant is appealing from a judgment acquitting the
accused in a criminal case, her appeal should be disallowed.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby ordered dismissed. The stenographers
who were required to submit their respective transcripts of stenographic notes
in this case are hereby excused therefrom. (pp. 6-7, Brief for the Respondent,
p. 78, Rollo).
A motion for reconsideration of the Resolution of the Court of Appeals was
filed but was denied on January 4, 1972. From both aforesaid Resolutions
dismissing the appeal and the order denying the Motion for Reconsideration,
the petitioner came to this Court on a petition for certiorari with prayer that the
Resolution of the Court of Appeals be reversed, and that judgment be
rendered in favor of petitioner and against respondent insofar as the latter's
hability is concerned —
(a) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner such sum as this Court shall
adjudge to rightfully represent the value of the one hectare portion of the land
involved agreed to be conveyed to petitioner by respondent in accordance
with the Agreement to Convey Real Property (Exhibit "A");
(b) Ordering respondent to pay to petitioner the expenses of litigation actually
incurred by the latter; and
(c) Ordering respondent to pay the costs of suit. (p.28, Brief for the Petitioner,
p. 60, Rollo).
The sole legal question for determination as stated at the outset, is whether
an appeal by the complainant for estafa, may be allowed from a decision
acquitting the accused of the crime charged, only insofar as the latter's civil
liability is concerned.
In support of her affirmative position on the issue above stated, petitioner cites
Section 2, Rules 122 of the Rules of Court which provides:
SEC. 2. Who may appeal.—The People of the Philippines can not appeal if
the defendant would be placed thereby in double jeopardy. In all other cases
either party may appeal from a final judgment or ruling or from an order made
after judgment affecting the substantial rights of the appellant. (p. 12, Brief for
the Petitioner, p. 60, Rollo).
Additionally, she cites Section 3 of Rule 111, from which she quotes the
following:
SEC. 3. Other civil actions arising from offenses.—In all cases not included in
the preceding section the following rules shall be observed:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist. In other cases, the person
entitled to the civil action may institute it in the jurisdiction and in the manner
provided by law against the person who may be liable for restitution of the
thing and reparation or indemnity for the damage suffered. (Rule 111, Rules
of Court in the Philippines.) (pp. 13-14, Id)
Finally, she cites Article 29 of the Civil Code of the Philippines which reads:
ART. 29. When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the
ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil
action for damages for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such
action requires only a preponderance of evidence. Upon motion of the
defendant, the court may require the plaintiff to file a bond to answer for
damages in case the complaint should be found to be malicious.
If in a criminal case the judgment of acquittal is based upon reasonable doubt,
the court shall so declare. In the absence of any declaration to that effect, it
may be inferred from the text of the decision whether or not the acquittal is
due to that ground. (p. 14, id).
From the aforequoted provisions, petitioners contend that the remedy of
appeal is expressly granted to her inasmuch as the civil action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted with the criminal action, Criminal Case No.
4205 of the Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, there having been
no reservation to file a separate civil action or a waiver of the right to file one.
She had in fact hired a private prosecutor to handle, primarily the civil aspect
of the case, the prosecution of the crime remaining under the direction and
control of the prosecuting Fiscal. The private prosecutor presented evidence
bearing on the civil liability of the accused. In a memorandum he filed, he also
discussed extensively the civil liability of the accused, despite which, the trial
court failed to rule on the latter's civil liability to the complainant.
It is this omission, as alleged by petitioner herein, that con constitutes the
thrust of her first assignment of error, the only one We feel called upon to rule
on, among her three assigned errors, the other two having relation to how the
trial court evaluated the evidence, and the extent of damages petitioner
alleges to be entitled to under such evidence, which evidently may not be
passed upon in the instant proceedings, the evidence presented during the
trial not having been elevated to this Court, nor even to the Court of Appeals,
at least not fully or completely.
Confining ourselves, therefore, to the first assigned error, We find no ground
to reverse the Resolution of the Court of Appeals on the purely legal question
of whether the petitioner, as complainant in Criminal Case No. 4025 of the
Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet, for estafa, can appeal from the
judgment acquitting the accused, because the trial court failed to declare the
latter's civil liability to the complainant, which was allegedly proven by the
evidence.
The provision of Article 29 of the Civil Code relied upon by the petitioner clearly
requires the institution of a separate action by the filing of the proper
complaint. To such complaint, the accused as the defendant therein, may file
the appropriate responsive pleading, which may be an answer or a motion to
dismiss. In a criminal action, notwithstanding that the action for the recovery
of civil liability is impliedly instituted therewith, if not reserved or waived, the
accused is not afforded the same remedy. Neither is the mandatory pre-trial
held as is required of all civil actions. The obvious reason is that the civil
liability recoverable in the criminal action is one solely dependent upon
conviction, because said liability arises from the offense, with respect to which
pre-trial is never held to obtain admission as to the commission thereof, except
on the occasion of arraignment. This is the kind of civil liability involved in the
civil action deemed filed simultaneously with the filing of criminal action, unless
it is reserved or waived, as so expressly provided in Section 1, Rule 111 of
the Rules of Court and as held in People vs. Herrera, 74 Phil. 21.
If the civil liability arises from other sources than the commission of the
offense, such as from law or contract or quasi-delict, its enforcement has to
be by an ordinary civil action, which, as expressly provided in Article 29 of the
Civil Code may be disposed of as a mere preponderance of evidence would
warrant. Then, all the defenses available, such as prescription, lack of
jurisdiction, set-off, and the other grounds for a motion to dismiss may be
availed of, as may be proper under the peculiar facts and circumstances of
the case, complete with pre-trial after issues have been joined. Upon these
considerations, it becomes clear that the argument of petitioner invoking the
rule against multiplicity of action may not forcefully or convincingly be put forth.
In the Resolution of the Court of Appeals several cases have been cited which
held that an appeal from the dismissal of the criminal case on motion by the
fiscal may not be taken by the offended party (People vs. Lipana 72 Phil. 168;
People vs. Florendo, 73 Phil. 679). In the case of People vs. Herrera, et al.,
74 Phil. 21, the accused was acquitted without the court making any
pronouncement as to his civil liability, in exactly the same manner that the
Court of First Instance of Baguio and Benguet in Criminal Case No. 4025, was
charged with a similar omission in the case at bar. The Supreme Court did not
permit an appeal by the offended party, the Court saying:
The decision of the justice of the peace court which acquitted the defendant in the prosecution of a criminal case, but also for the respondent or defendant
of the charge and did not make any pronouncement holding the defendant to avail of all defenses and remedies as are open to him in a separate civil
civilly liable put an end to the case, not only by freeing the defendant from action not otherwise available in a criminal action that carries with it the civil
criminal responsibility but also by rejecting all liability for damages arising from action when deemed simultaneously filed with it, to recover civil liability arising
the alleged crime of malicious mischief. The offended parties not having from the crime charged.
reserved their right to bring a separate civil action, the aforesaid decision of
acquittal covered both the criminal and the civil aspects of the case under Rule For all the foregoing, the Resolution appealed from is affirmed, and the instant
107, section l (a) of the new Rules of Court. An appeal from that decision to petition is, accordingly, dismissed, without pronouncement as to costs.
the Court of First Instance, as intended by the offended parties, would reopen
the question of defendant's civil liability arising from the alleged crime. And
considering that such civil liability must be based on the criminal responsibility SO ORDERED.
of the defendant (art. 100, Revised Penal Code), any review or re-examination
of the question of civil liability would perforce require a new determination of
defendant's criminal liability. But another trial upon defendant's criminal
responsibility cannot be held, in view of his previous acquittal in the justice of
the peace court. So the appeal from the decision of the justice of the peace
court is not authorized by law.

Brought out in bold relief in the aforequoted ruling is that what is impliedly
brought simultaneously with the criminal action is the civil action to recover
civil liability arising from the offense. Hence, the two actions may rise or fall
together. However, if the civil action is reserved, or if the ground of acquittal is
reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused, a separate civil action may be
filed, the complainant alleging a cause of action independent of, and not based
on, the commission of an offense. Only preponderance of evidence would
then be required.

The futility of petitioner's instant recourse becomes all too evident upon
consideration of the principles enunciated, particularly in the Herrera case,
since if the civil liability recoverable in a criminal action is one arising from the
crime charged, no longer may the respondent be found criminally liable upon
a review of the evidence, after the verdict of acquittal has been handed down
by the trial court. Again, petitioner tries to show that the cases cited by the
Court of Appeals are not in point. But she has not cited one single case faintly
supporting her position as she has tried to maintain in the instant case.

Nevertheless, petitioner may not complaint, as she does of being denied due
process for disallowing her appeal. She can institute a separate civil action if
her cause of action could come under the category of quasi-delict or one
arising from law, contract or any other known source of civil liability, but
certainly not anymore from the offense of which petitioner had already been
acquitted. It is but fair to require petitioner to take this course of action, not
only because she would have to pay for the lawful expenses for instituting the
action to obtain the relief she seeks from respondent, from which she is spared
G.R. No. 80194 March 21, 1989
EDGAR JARANTILLA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and JOSE KUAN SING, respondents.
Corazon Miraflores and Vicente P. Billena for petitioner.
Manuel S. Gemarino for private respondent.
REGALADO, J.:
The records show that private respondent Jose Kuan Sing was "side-swiped
by a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 in lznart Street, Iloilo City" 1 The
respondent Court of Appeals concurred in the findings of the court a quo that
the said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen (Beetle type) car,
was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla along said street toward the
direction of the provincial capitol, and that private respondent sustained
physical injuries as a consequence. 2
Petitioner was accordingly charged before the then City Court of Iloilo for
serious physical injuries thru reckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207
thereof. 3 Private respondent, as the complaining witness therein, did not
reserve his right to institute a separate civil action and he intervened in the
prosecution of said criminal case through a private prosecutor. 4 Petitioner
was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt".5
On October 30, 1974, private respondent filed a complaint against the
petitioner in the former Court of First Instance of Iloilo, Branch IV, 6 docketed
therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil action involved the same
subject matter and act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027. 7 In his
answer filed therein, the petitioner alleged as special and affirmative detenses
that the private respondent had no cause of action and, additionally, that the
latter's cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal Case
No. 47207 inasmuch as when said criminal case was instituted the civil liability
was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil
aspect and actively participated in the criminal case. 8
Thereafter, acting on a motion to dismiss of therein defendant, the trial court
issued on April 3, 1975 an order of denial, with the suggestion that "(t)o enrich
our jurisprudence, it is suggested that the defendant brings (sic) this ruling to
the Supreme Court by certiorari or other appropriate remedy, to review the
ruling of the court". 9
On June 17, 1975, petitioner filed in this Court a petition for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus, which was docketed as G.R. No. L-
40992, 10 assailing the aforesaid order of the trial court. Said petition was
dismissed for lack of merit in the Court's resolution of July 23, 1975, and a
motion for reconsideration thereof was denied for the same reason in a
resolution of October 28, 1975. 11
After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of the
herein private respondent and ordering herein petitioner to pay the former the
sum of P 6,920.00 for hospitalization, medicines and so forth, P2,000.00 for
other actual expenses, P25,000.00 for moral damages, P5,000.00 for
attorney's fees, and costs. 12
On July 29, 1987, the respondent Court of Appeals 13 affirmed the decision
of the lower court except as to the award for moral damages which it reduced
from P25,000.00 to P18,000.00. A motion for reconsideration was denied by
respondent court on September 18, 1987. 14
The main issue for resolution by Us in the present recourse is whether the
private respondent, who was the complainant in the criminal action for physical
injuries thru reckless imprudence and who participated in the prosecution
thereof without reserving the civil action arising from the act or omission
complained of, can file a separate action for civil liability arising from the same
act or omission where the herein petitioner was acquitted in the criminal action
on reasonable doubt and no civil liability was adjudicated or awarded in the
judgment of acquittal.
Prefatorily, We note that petitioner raises a collateral issue by faulting the
respondent court for refusing to resolve an assignment of error in his appeal
therein, said respondent court holding that the main issue had been passed
upon by this Court in G.R. No. L-40992 hereinbefore mentioned. It is
petitioner's position that the aforesaid two resolutions of the Court in said case,
the first dismissing the petition and the second denying the motion for
reconsideration, do not constitute the "law of the case' which would control the
subsequent proceed ings in this controversy.
1. We incline favorably to petitioner's submission on this score.
The "doctrine of the law of the case" has no application at the aforesaid
posture of the proceedings when the two resolutions were handed down.
While it may be true that G.R. No. L-40992 may have involved some of the
issues which were thereafter submitted for resolution on the merits by the two
lower courts, the proceedings involved there was one for certiorari, prohibition
and mandamus assailing an interlocutory order of the court a quo, specifically,
its order denying therein defendants motion to dismiss. This Court, without
rendering a specific opinion or explanation as to the legal and factual bases
on which its two resolutions were predicated, simply dismissed the special civil
action on that incident for lack of merit. It may very well be that such resolution
was premised on the fact that the Court, at that stage and on the basis of the
facts then presented, did not consider that the denial order of the court a
quo was tainted with grave abuse of discretion. 15 To repeat, no rationale for
such resolutions having been expounded on the merits of that action, no law
of the case may be said to have been laid down in G.R. No. L-40992 to justify
the respondent court's refusal to consider petitioner's claim that his former
acquittal barred the separate action.
'Law of the case' has been defined as the opinion delivered
on a former appeal. More specifically, it means that
whatever is once irrevocably established, as the controlling
legal rule of decision between the same parties in the same
case continues to be the law of the case, whether correct
on general principles or not, so long as the facts on which
such decision was predicated continue to be the facts of the
case before the court (21 C.J.S. 330). (Emphasis
supplied). 16
It need not be stated that the Supreme Court being the court
of last resort, is the final arbiter of all legal questions
properly brought before it and that its decision in any given
case constitutes the law of that particular case . . .
(Emphasis supplied). 17
It is a rule of general application that the decision of an
appellate court in a case is the law of the case on the points
presented throughout all the subsequent proceedings in the
case in both the trial and the appellate courts, and no
question necessarily involved and decided on that appeal
will be considered on a second appeal or writ of error in the
same case, provided the facts and issues are substantially
the same as those on which the first question rested and,
according to some authorities, provided the decision is on
the merits . . . 18
2. With the foregoing ancillary issue out of the way, We now consider the
principal plaint of petitioner.
Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission (in
this case, the negligent sideswiping of private respondent) can create two
kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex delicto and
civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise either
to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of civil
liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under Article
2177 of the Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages under
both types of liability. 19
We also note the reminder of petitioner that in Roa vs. De la Cruz, et al., 20 it
was held that where the offended party elected to claim damages arising from
the offense charged in the criminal case through her intervention as a private
prosecutor, the final judgment rendered therein constituted a bar to the
subsequent civil action based upon the same cause. It is meet, however, not
to lose sight of the fact that the criminal action involved therein was for serious
oral defamation which, while within the contemplation of an independent civil
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code, constitutes only a penal omen and
cannot otherwise be considered as a quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana under
Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code. And while petitioner draws attention
to the supposed reiteration of the Roa doctrine in the later case of Azucena
vs. Potenciano, et al., 21 this time involving damage to property through
negligence as to make out a case of quasi-delict under Articles 2176 and 2180
of the Civil Code, such secondary reliance is misplaced since the therein
plaintiff Azucena did not intervene in the criminal action against defendant
Potenciano. The citation of Roa in the later case of Azucena was, therefore,
clearly obiter and affords no comfort to petitioner.
These are aside from the fact that there have been doctrinal, and even
statutory, 22 changes on the matter of civil actions arising from criminal
offenses and quasi-delicts. We will reserve our discussion on the statutory
aspects for another case and time and, for the nonce, We will consider the
doctrinal developments on this issue.
In the case under consideration, private respondent participated and
intervened in the prosecution of the criminal suit against petitioner. Under the
present jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on
reasonable doubt, it could very well make a pronounce ment on the civil
liability of the accused 23 and the complainant could file a petition for
mandamus to compel the trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment
of acquittal. 24
Private respondent, as already stated, filed a separate civil aciton after such
acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of the Civil Code. We have ruled in
the relatively recent case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et
al. 25 that:
In view of the fact that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz
was acquitted on the ground that 'his guilt was not proven
beyond reasonable doubt' the plaintiff-appellant has the
right to institute a separate civil action to recover damages
from the defendants-appellants (See Mendoza vs. Arrieta,
91 SCRA 113). The well-settled doctrine is that a person,
while not criminally liable may still be civilly liable. 'The
judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the
accused only when it includes a declaration that the facts
from which the civil liability might arise did not exist'. (Padilla
vs. Court of Appeals, 129 SCRA 558 cited in People vs.
Rogelio Ligon y Tria, et al., G.R. No. 74041, July 29, 1987;
Filomeno Urbano vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, G.R.
No. 72964, January 7, 1988). The ruling is based on Article
29 of the Civil Code which provides:
When the accused in a criminal
prosecution is acquitted on the ground
that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt, a civil action for
damages for the same act or omission
may be instituted. Such action requires
only a preponderance of evidence ... 26
Another consideration in favor of private respondent is the doctrine that the
failure of the court to make any pronouncement, favorable or unfavorable, as
to the civil liability of the accused amounts to a reservation of the right to have
the civil liability litigated and determined in a separate action. The rules
nowhere provide that if the court fails to determine the civil liability it becomes
no longer enforceable. 27
Furthermore, in the present case the civil liability sought to be recovered
through the application of Article 29 is no longer that based on or arising from
the criminal offense. There is persuasive logic in the view that, under such
circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the civil liability based
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes the existence of
criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged. Divested of its
penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission becomes in
effect a quasi-delict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be instituted
or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere preponderance
of evidence. 28 Complementary to such considerations, Article 29 enunciates
the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not precluded by
an acquittal on reasonable doubt for the same criminal act or omission.
The allegations of the complaint filed by the private respondent supports and
is constitutive of a case for a quasi-delict committed by the petitioner, thus:
3. That in the evening of July 7, 197l at
about 7:00 o'clock, the plaintiff crossed
Iznart Street from his restaurant situated
at 220 lznart St., Iloilo City, Philippines,
on his way to a meeting of the Cantonese
Club at Aldeguer Street, Iloilo City and
while he was standing on the middle of
the street as there were vehicles coming
from the Provincial Building towards
Plazoleta Gay, Iloilo City, he was
bumped and sideswiped by Volkswagen
car with plate No. B-2508 W which was
on its way from Plazoleta Gay towards
the Provincial Capitol, Iloilo City, which
car was being driven by the defendant in
a reckless and negligent manner, at an
excessive rate of speed and in violation
of the provisions of the Revised Motor
Vehicle (sic) as amended, in relation to
the Land Transportation and Traffic Code
as well as in violation of existing city
ordinances, and by reason of his
inexcusable lack of precaution and failure
to act with due negligence and by failing
to take into consideration (sic) his degree
of intelligence, the atmospheric
conditions of the place as well as the
width, traffic, visibility and other
conditions of lznart Street; 29
Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the respondent to
reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in the criminal
case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for damages. 30 The
Court has also heretofore ruled in Elcano vs. Hill 31 that —
 ... a separate civil action lies against the offender in a
criminal act whether or not he is criminally prosecuted and
found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is
not allowed, if he is also actually charged criminally, to
recover damages on both scores; and would be entitled in
such eventuality only to the bigger award of the two,
assuming the awards made in the two cases vary. In other
words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par. (c) of
Sec. 3 Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; whereas the civil
liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only
and not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration
in the criminal case that the criminal act charged has not
happened or has not been committed by the accused . . .

The aforecited case of Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al. involved
virtually the same factual situation. The Court, in arriving at the conclusion
hereinbefore quoted, expressly declared that the failure of the therein plaintiff
to reserve his right to file a separate civil case is not fatal; that his intervention
in the criminal case did not bar him from filing a separate civil action for
damages, especially considering that the accused therein was acquitted
because his guilt was not proved beyond reasonable doubt; that the two cases
were anchored on two different causes of action, the criminal case being on a
violation of Article 365 of the Revised Penal Code while the subsequent
complaint for damages was based on a quasi-delict; and that in the judgment
in the criminal case the aspect of civil liability was not passed upon and
resolved. Consequently, said civil case may proceed as authorized by Article
29 of the Civil Code.

Our initial adverse observation on a portion of the decision of respondent court

aside, We hold that on the issues decisive of this case it did not err in
sustaining the decision a quo.

WHEREFORE, the writ prayed for is hereby DENIED and the decision of the
respondent Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, without costs.

SO ORDERED G.R. No. 165496 February 12, 2007

HUN HYUNG PARK, Petitioner,

vs.
EUNG WON CHOI, Respondent.
 DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Petitioner, Hun Hyung Park, assails the Court of Appeals (CA) Resolutions
dated May 20, 20041 and September 28, 20042 in CA G.R. CR No. 28344
dismissing his petition and denying reconsideration thereof, respectively.
In an Information3 dated August 31, 2000, respondent, Eung Won Choi, was
charged for violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22, otherwise known as the
Bouncing Checks Law, for issuing on June 28, 1999 Philippine National
Bank Check No. 0077133 postdated August 28, 1999 in the amount of
₱1,875,000 which was dishonored for having been drawn against insufficient
funds.
Upon arraignment, respondent, with the assistance of counsel, pleaded "not
guilty" to the offense charged. Following the pre-trial conference, the
prosecution presented its evidence-in-chief.
After the prosecution rested its case, respondent filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to File Demurrer to Evidence to which he attached his Demurrer,
asserting that the prosecution failed to prove that he received the notice of
dishonor, hence, the presumption of the element of knowledge of
insufficiency of funds did not arise.4
By Order5 of February 27, 2003, the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of
Makati, Branch 65 granted the Demurrer and dismissed the case. The
prosecution’s Motion for Reconsideration was denied. 6
Petitioner appealed the civil aspect7 of the case to the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Makati, contending that the dismissal of the criminal case should
not include its civil aspect.
By Decision of September 11, 2003, Branch 60 of the RTC held that while
the evidence presented was insufficient to prove respondent’s criminal
liability, it did not altogether extinguish his civil liability. It accordingly granted
the appeal of petitioner and ordered respondent to pay him the amount of
₱1,875,000 with legal interest.8
Upon respondent’s motion for reconsideration, however, the RTC set aside
its decision and ordered the remand of the case to the MeTC "for further
proceedings, so that the defendant [-respondent herein] may adduce
evidence on the civil aspect of the case."9 Petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration of the remand of the case having been denied, he elevated
the case to the CA which, by the assailed resolutions, dismissed his petition
for the following reasons:
1. The verification and certification of non-forum shopping attached
to the petition does not fully comply with Section 4, as amended by
A.M. No. 00-2-10-SC, Rule 7, 1997 Rules of Court, because it does
not give the assurance that the allegations of the petition are true
and correct based on authentic records.
2. The petition is not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings
and other material portions of the record, (i.e., motion for leave to
file demurrer to evidence, demurrer to evidence and the opposition
thereto, and the Municipal [sic] Trial Court’s Order dismissing
Criminal Case No. 294690) as would support the allegations of the
petition (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).
3. The Decision dated September 11, 2003 of the Regional Trial
Court attached to the petition is an uncertified and illegible mere
machine copy of the original (Sec. 2, Rule 42, ibid.).
4. Petitioners failed to implead the People of the Philippines as
party-respondent in the petition.10
In his present petition, petitioner assails the above-stated reasons of the
appellate court in dismissing his petition.
The manner of verification for pleadings which are required to be verified,
such as a petition for review before the CA of an appellate judgment of the
RTC,11 is prescribed by Section 4 of Rule 7 of the Rules of Court:
Sec. 4. Verification. Except when otherwise specifically required by law or
rule, pleadings need not be under oath, verified or accompanied by affidavit.
A pleading is verified by an affidavit that the affiant has read the pleading
and that the allegations therein are true and correct of his personal
knowledge or based on authentic records.
A pleading required to be verified which contains a verification based on
"information and belief," or upon "knowledge, information and belief," or
lacks a proper verification shall be treated as an unsigned
pleading.12 (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
Petitioner argues that the word "or" is a disjunctive term signifying
disassociation and independence, hence, he chose to affirm in his petition
he filed before the court a quo that its contents are "true and correct of my
own personal knowledge,"13 and not on the basis of authentic documents.
On the other hand, respondent counters that the word "or" may be
interpreted in a conjunctive sense and construed to mean as "and," or vice
versa, when the context of the law so warrants.
A reading of the above-quoted Section 4 of Rule 7 indicates that a pleading
may be verified under either of the two given modes or under both. The
veracity of the allegations in a pleading may be affirmed based on either
one’s own personal knowledge or on authentic records, or both, as
warranted. The use of the preposition "or" connotes that either source
qualifies as a sufficient basis for verification and, needless to state, the
concurrence of both sources is more than sufficient. 14 Bearing both a
disjunctive and conjunctive sense, this parallel legal signification avoids a
construction that will exclude the combination of the alternatives or bar the
efficacy of any one of the alternatives standing alone. 15
Contrary to petitioner’s position, the range of permutation is not left to the
pleader’s liking, but is dependent on the surrounding nature of the
allegations which may warrant that a verification be based either purely on
personal knowledge, or entirely on authentic records, or on both sources.
As pointed out by respondent, "authentic records" as a basis for verification
bear significance in petitions wherein the greater portions of the allegations
are based on the records of the proceedings in the court of origin and/or the
court a quo, and not solely on the personal knowledge of the petitioner. To
illustrate, petitioner himself could not have affirmed, based on his personal
knowledge, the truthfulness of the statement in his petition 16 before the CA
that at the pre-trial conference respondent admitted having received the
letter of demand, because he (petitioner) was not present during the
conference.17 Hence, petitioner needed to rely on the records to confirm its
veracity.
Verification is not an empty ritual or a meaningless formality. Its import must
never be sacrificed in the name of mere expedience or sheer caprice. For
what is at stake is the matter of verity attested by the sanctity of an oath 18 to
secure an assurance that the allegations in the pleading have been made in
good faith, or are true and correct and not merely speculative. 19
This Court has strictly been enforcing the requirement of verification and
certification and enunciating that obedience to the requirements of
procedural rules is needed if fair results are to be expected therefrom. Utter
disregard of the rules cannot just be rationalized by harking on the policy of
liberal construction.20 While the requirement is not jurisdictional in nature, it
does not make it less a rule. A relaxed application of the rule can only be
justified by the attending circumstances of the case.21
To sustain petitioner’s explanation that the basis of verification is a matter of
simple preference would trivialize the rationale and diminish the resoluteness
of the rule. It would play on predilection and pay no heed in providing
enough assurance of the correctness of the allegations.
On the second reason of the CA in dismissing the petition – that the petition
was not accompanied by copies of certain pleadings and other material
portions of the record as would support the allegations of the petition (i.e.,
Motion for Leave to File Demurrer to Evidence, Demurrer to Evidence and
the Opposition thereto, and the MeTC February 27, 2003 Order dismissing
the case) – petitioner contends that these documents are immaterial to his
appeal.
Contrary to petitioner’s contention, however, the materiality of those
documents is very apparent since the civil aspect of the case, from which he
is appealing, was likewise dismissed by the trial court on account of the
same Demurrer.
Petitioner, nonetheless, posits that he subsequently submitted to the CA
copies of the enumerated documents, save for the MeTC February 27, 2003
Order, as attachments to his Motion for Reconsideration.
The Rules, however, require that the petition must "be accompanied by
clearly legible duplicate original or true copies of the judgments or final
orders of both lower courts, certified correct by the clerk of court."22
A perusal of the petition filed before the CA shows that the only duplicate
original or certified true copies attached as annexes thereto are the January
14, 2004 RTC Order granting respondent’s Motion for Reconsideration and
the March 29, 2004 RTC Order denying petitioner’s Motion for
Reconsideration. The copy of the September 11, 2003 RTC Decision, which
petitioner prayed to be reinstated, is not a certified true copy and is not even
legible. Petitioner later recompensed though by appending to his Motion for
Reconsideration a duplicate original copy.
While petitioner averred before the CA in his Motion for Reconsideration that
the February 27, 2003 MeTC Order was already attached to his petition as
Annex "G," Annex "G" bares a replicate copy of a different order, however. It
was to this Court that petitioner belatedly submitted an uncertified true copy
of the said MeTC Order as an annex to his Reply to respondent’s Comment.
This Court in fact observes that the copy of the other MeTC Order, that
dated May 5, 2003, which petitioner attached to his petition before the CA is
similarly uncertified as true.
Since both Orders of the MeTC were adverse to him even with respect to the
civil aspect of the case, petitioner was mandated to submit them in the
required form.23
In fine, petitioner fell short in his compliance with Section 2 (d) of Rule 42,
the mandatory tenor of which is discernible thereunder and is well
settled.24 He has not, however, advanced any strong compelling reasons to
warrant a relaxation of the Rules, hence, his petition before the CA was
correctly dismissed.
Procedural rules are tools designed to facilitate the adjudication of cases.
Courts and litigants alike are thus enjoined to abide strictly by the rules.
And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in the application
of the rules, this we stress, was never intended to forge a bastion for erring
litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality in the interpretation
and application of the rules applies only in proper cases and under justifiable
causes and circumstances. While it is true that litigation is not a game of
technicalities, it is equally true that every case must be prosecuted in
accordance with the prescribed procedure to insure an orderly and speedy
administration of justice.25 (Emphasis supplied)
As to the third reason for the appellate court’s dismissal of his petition –
failure to implead the People of the Philippines as a party in the petition –
indeed, as petitioner contends, the same is of no moment, he having
appealed only the civil aspect of the case. Passing on the dual purpose of a
criminal action, this Court ruled:
Unless the offended party waives the civil action or reserves the right to
institute it separately or institutes the civil action prior to the criminal
action, there are two actions involved in a criminal case. The first is the
criminal action for the punishment of the offender. The parties are the People
of the Philippines as the plaintiff and the accused. In a criminal action, the
private complainant is merely a witness for the State on the criminal aspect
of the action. The second is the civil action arising from the delict. The
private complainant is the plaintiff and the accused is the defendant. There is
a merger of the trial of the two cases to avoid multiplicity of
suits.26 (Underscoring supplied)
It bears recalling that the MeTC acquitted respondent.27 As a rule, a
judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory and the prosecution
cannot appeal the acquittal because of the constitutional prohibition against
double jeopardy.
Either the offended party or the accused may, however, appeal the civil
aspect of the judgment despite the acquittal of the accused. The public
prosecutor has generally no interest in appealing the civil aspect of a
decision acquitting the accused. The acquittal ends his work. The case is
terminated as far as he is concerned. The real parties in interest in the
civil aspect of a decision are the offended party and the accused. 28
Technicality aside, the petition is devoid of merit.
When a demurrer to evidence is filed without leave of court, the whole case
is submitted for judgment on the basis of the evidence for the prosecution as
the accused is deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. 29 At
that juncture, the court is called upon to decide the case including its civil
aspect, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate civil action
has been waived or reserved.30
If the filing of a separate civil action has not been reserved or priorly
instituted or the enforcement of civil liability is not waived, the trial court
should, in case of conviction, state the civil liability or damages caused by
the wrongful act or omission to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any.31
For, in case of acquittal, the accused may still be adjudged civilly liable. The
extinction of the penal action does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
action where (a) the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt as only
preponderance of evidence is required; (b) the court declares that the liability
of the accused is only civil; and (c) the civil liability of the accused does not
arise from or is not based upon the crime of which the accused was
acquitted.32
The civil action based on delict may, however, be deemed extinguished if
there is a finding on the final judgment in the criminal action that the act or
omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist. 33
In case of a demurrer to evidence filed with leave of court, the accused may
adduce countervailing evidence if the court denies the demurrer. 34 Such
denial bears no distinction as to the two aspects of the case because there is
a disparity of evidentiary value between the quanta of evidence in such
aspects of the case. In other words, a court may not deny the demurrer as to
the criminal aspect and at the same time grant the demurrer as to the civil
aspect, for if the evidence so far presented is not insufficient to prove the
crime beyond reasonable doubt, then the same evidence is likewise not
insufficient to establish civil liability by mere preponderance of evidence.
On the other hand, if the evidence so far presented is insufficient as proof
beyond reasonable doubt, it does not follow that the same evidence is
insufficient to establish a preponderance of evidence. For if the court grants
the demurrer, proceedings on the civil aspect of the case generally
proceeds. The only recognized instance when an acquittal on demurrer
carries with it the dismissal of the civil aspect is when there is a finding that
the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did not exist.
Absent such determination, trial as to the civil aspect of the case must
perforce continue. Thus this Court, in Salazar v. People,35 held:
If demurrer is granted and the accused is acquitted by the court, the accused
has the right to adduce evidence on the civil aspect of the case unless the
court also declares that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist.36
In the instant case, the MeTC granted the demurrer and dismissed the case
without any finding that the act or omission from which the civil liability may
arise did not exist.
Respondent did not assail the RTC order of remand. He thereby recognized
that there is basis for a remand.
Indicatively, respondent stands by his defense that he merely borrowed
₱1,500,000 with the remainder representing the interest, and that he already
made a partial payment of ₱1,590,000. Petitioner counters, however, that
the payments made by respondent pertained to other transactions. 37 Given
these conflicting claims which are factual, a remand of the case would afford
the fullest opportunity for the parties to ventilate, and for the trial court to
resolve the same.
Petitioner finally posits that respondent waived his right to present evidence
on the civil aspect of the case (1) when the grant of the demurrer was
reversed on appeal, citing Section 1 of Rule 33,38 and (2) when respondent
orally opposed petitioner’s motion for reconsideration pleading that
proceedings with respect to the civil aspect of the case continue.
Petitioner’s position is tenuous.
Petitioner’s citation of Section 1 of Rule 33 is incorrect.1awphi1.net Where a
court has jurisdiction over the subject matter and over the person of the
accused, and the crime was committed within its territorial jurisdiction, the
court necessarily exercises jurisdiction over all issues that the law requires it
to resolve.
One of the issues in a criminal case being the civil liability of the accused
arising from the crime, the governing law is the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
not the Rules of Civil Procedure which pertains to a civil action arising from
the initiatory pleading that gives rise to the suit.39
As for petitioner’s attribution of waiver to respondent, it cannot be
determined with certainty from the records the nature of the alleged oral
objections of respondent to petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the
grant of the demurrer to evidence. Any waiver of the right to present
evidence must be positively demonstrated. Any ambiguity in the
voluntariness of the waiver is frowned upon,40 hence, courts must indulge
every reasonable presumption against it.41
This Court therefore upholds respondent’s right to present evidence as
reserved by his filing of leave of court to file the demurrer.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing discussions, DENIED.
The case is REMANDED to the court of origin, Metropolitan Trial Court of
Makati City, Branch 65 which is DIRECTED to forthwith set Criminal Case
No. 294690 for further proceedings only for the purpose of receiving
evidence on the civil aspect of the case.
Costs against petitioner. The appellate court found the verification in petitioner’s petition to have failed
to comply with the rules "because it does not give the assurance that the
SO ORDERED. allegations of the petition are true and correct based on authentic records." It
appears that A verification anchored on such flawed reasoning42
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice The appeal of the offended party from the civil aspect shall not affect the
criminal aspect of the judgment or order appealed from.43
WE CONCUR:

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

ANTONIO T. CARPIO DANTE O. TINGA

Associate Justice Asscociate Justice

PRESBITERO J. VELASCO, JR.

Associate Justice

ATTESTATION

I attest that the conclusions in the above Decision were reached in

consultation before the case was assigned to the writer of the opinion of the
Court’s Division.

LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING
Associate Justice
Chairperson

CERTIFICATION

Pursuant to Article VIII, Section 13 of the Constitution, and the Division

Chairperson’s Attestation, it is hereby certified that the conclusions in the
above Decision were reached in consultation before the case was assigned
to the writer of the Court’s Division.

REYNATO S. PUNO
Chief Justice
G.R. No. 149472 October 15, 2002
JORGE SALAZAR, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
DECISION
PUNO, J.:
In an information dated January 21, 1987, petitioner Jorge Salazar was
charged with estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal
Code. The information reads:
"That on or about the 10th date of January 1986 in the Municipality of Makati,
Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-named accused, being the Vice President and Treasurer of
Aurora/Uni-Group, Inc., received from Olivier Philippines and Skiva
International, Inc. as represented by Teresita M. Tujan the amount of
$41,300.00 for the sole purpose of meeting the cost of textile and labor in the
manufacture of seven hundred dozen stretch twill jeans which he (accused) is
duty bound to deliver to said complainant, and the accused once in possession
of the same, far from complying from his obligation, with unfaithfulness and
abuse of confidence and to defraud said complainant, did, then and there
willfully and unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate, misapply and convert
the same for his own personal use and benefit despite repeated demands to
return the said amount, failed and refused and still fails and refuses to do so,
to the damage and prejudice of said complainant, in the aforementioned
amount of $41,300.00 or its equivalent in Philippine currency.
Contrary to law."1
On arraignment, petitioner pleaded "not guilty" to the charge.
It appears that Skiva International, Inc. ("Skiva") is a New York-based
corporation which imports clothes from the Philippines through its buying
agent, Olivier (Philippines) Inc. ("Olivier"). Aurora Manufacturing &
Development Corporation ("Aurora") and Uni-Group Inc. ("Uni-Group") are
domestic corporations which supply finished clothes to Skiva. Mr. Werner
Lettmayr is the President of both Aurora and Uni-Group while the petitioner,
Jorge Salazar, is the Vice-President and Treasurer of Uni-Group and a
consultant of Aurora.
Skiva, through its buying agent, Olivier, has been purchasing finished clothes
from Aurora and Uni-Group. When an order is procured for the delivery of
clothes, Olivier, issues to the local supplier, Aurora/Uni-Group, a "Purchase
Contract" and Olivier issues to Skiva a "Sales Contract". In these transactions,
payment is usually made by way of a letter of credit wherein the supplier is
paid only upon the presentation of the proper shipping documents to the
designated bank.2
In December 1985, Skiva informed Olivier that it needs ladies jeans to be
delivered sometime in January 1986. Olivier, in turn, through its Officer-in-
Charge, Ms. Teresita Tujan, contacted Aurora and Uni-Group to supply the
jeans. 3 Thus, a Purchase Contract dated December 18, 1985 was issued by
Olivier to Uni-Group wherein Uni-Group was to supply 700 dozens of three (3)
different designs of "Ladies Basic 5 Pockets Stretch Twill Jeans" payable by
means of a letter of credit at sight.4 The Purchase Contract was confirmed by
Mr. Lettmayr on December 30, 1985 .5 A Sales Contract was also issued by
Olivier to Skiva containing the same terms and conditions as the Purchase
Contract and was confirmed by Mr. Jack Chehebar of Skiva.6
On January 7, 1986, the parties agreed that Skiva will advance to Aurora/Uni-
Group the amount of US$41,300.00 (then equivalent to P850,370.00 at the
exchange rate of P20.59 to US$1.00) as Aurora/Uni-Group did not have
sufficient funds to secure raw materials to manufacture the jeans. 7 It was also
agreed that the amount advanced by Skiva represents advance payment of
its order of 700 dozens of ladies jeans. 8 Skiva then issued a check in the said
amount payable to Uni-Group. 9 However, due to the length of time needed
for the check to be cleared, the parties made arrangements to remit the funds
instead by way of telegraphic transfer. 10 Thus, the check issued by Skiva was
returned by Mr. Lettmayr11 and as agreed, the funds were remitted by Skiva
from its bank in New York, the Israel Discount Bank, to the joint account of Mr.
and Mrs. Jorge Salazar and Mr. and Mrs. Werner Lettmayr at Citibank N.A.12
On January 16, 1986, petitioner, who had possession and control of the
passbook of the said joint account, withdrew the amount of
US$21,675.2113 and on January 22, 1986, petitioner withdrew the amount of
US$20,000.00.14 The prosecution also presented evidence that subsequent
to said withdrawals, the amounts of US$71.70 and US$63.99 were deducted
from the joint account as telegraphic transfer fee and commission for the
remittance of the funds to another account.15
In the meantime, Ms. Tujan contacted Aurora/Uni-Group to follow up on the
production of the jeans. She learned that only 3,000 meters out of the 10,000
meters of Litton fabrics required for the order were purchased from Litton Mills
by the petitioner.16 3,000 meters of Litton fabrics are enough to produce only
200 dozens of ladies jeans - an amount insufficient to satisfy the order of Skiva
of 700 dozens of ladies twill jeans.17 Upon inquiry with Mr. Lettmayr, the latter
advised Ms. Tujan that the query be directed to petitioner as petitioner is in
charge of securing the materials. 18 However, Ms. Tujan could not locate the
petitioner.19
Consequently, in a letter dated March 13, 1986, demand was made upon
Aurora/Uni-Group through its President, Mr. Lettmayr, to return the money
advanced in the amount of US$41,300.00.20
For failure of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the ladies jeans or to account for the
US$41,300.00 despite demand, Skiva, through its local agent represented by
Ms. Tujan, filed a criminal complaint for estafa against Mr. Lettmayr and
petitioner. After preliminary investigation, the Public Prosecutor dismissed the
complaint against Mr. Lettmayr and an information was filed against
petitioner.21
After trial, the lower court convicted herein petitioner of estafa under Article
315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code, sentencing him to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of imprisonment of eight (8) years and one (1) day of
prision mayor as the minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day of reclusion temporal as the maximum and to pay Uni-Group and
Aurora the amount of P595,259.00. 22 On March 13, 1997, the lower court
denied petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration. 23 On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court and denied petitioner’s
Motion for Reconsideration.24
Aggrieved by the aforementioned rulings, petitioner files the instant petition for
review.
The petition is bereft of merit.
The following are the elements of estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of
the Revised Penal Code: a) that money, goods or other personal property is
received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for administration, or
under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return
the same; b) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or
property by the offender; or denial on his part of such receipt; c) that such
misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another; and d)
there is demand made by the offended party to the offender.25
We agree with the trial court’s finding that the contract between Skiva and
Aurora/Uni-Group was one of sale.26 Thus, upon remittance by Skiva of its
advance payment in the amount of US$41,300.00, ownership thereof was
transferred to Aurora/Uni-Group and Aurora/Uni-Group had no obligation to
account or deliver the money to Skiva, its only obligation under the contract of
sale being to deliver the 700 dozens of ladies jeans. However, petitioner, as
an employee of Aurora/Uni-Group who was aware of the specific purpose of
the remittance, upon receipt of the amount, had the obligation to account for
the proceeds thereof to Aurora/Uni-Group.
The records establish that: 1) the amount of US$41,300.00 was remitted by
telegraphic transfer to the joint account of the petitioner and his wife and Mr.
and Mrs. Werner Lettmayr;27 2) the said amount was remitted as advance
payment by Skiva for the jeans it ordered; 28 and 3) the amount of
US$21,675.21 was withdrawn by petitioner on January 16, 1986 and the
amount of US$20,000.00 was withdrawn by petitioner on January 22,
1986.29 In fact, petitioner himself admits having withdrawn from the joint
account on two occasions after the remittance was made. 30 Petitioner further
admits having made such withdrawal for the purpose of purchasing materials
to be used for the jeans ordered by Skiva and a portion thereof to be given to
Aurora.31 Thus, upon withdrawal by petitioner of the amounts advanced by
Skiva, petitioner received the same in trust with an obligation to return the
funds or account for the proceeds thereof.
With respect to the element of conversion or misappropriation of the amount
received, petitioner claims that a portion of the amount was used to purchase
3,000 meters of Litton fabrics and the balance was returned to
Aurora.32 However, upon cross-examination, petitioner was unable to recall
the amount paid for the purchase of the fabrics or the amount given to Aurora
nor was petitioner able to identify whether payment for the purchase of fabric
or the return of funds to Aurora was made in cash or in check.33
In fact, except for his bare testimony, petitioner failed to present evidence to
support his defense that payment for the purchase of fabrics had been made
or that the balance of the amount received by petitioner was given to Aurora.
The only reason why the Court is inclined to believe that 3,000 meters of Litton
fabrics were purchased for the manufacture of the jeans is because the
witness for the prosecution, Ms. Tujan, independently verified the purchase of
the said materials from Litton Mills.34
To support petitioner’s claim that the remainder of the amount withdrawn was
returned to Aurora, petitioner presents a letter dated October 15, 1986 from
the Philippine Veterans Investment Development Corporation (PHIVIDEC)
addressed to Mr. Werner Lettmayr, President of Aurora, regarding the
financial audit of Aurora, wherein the amount of P850,780.00 is indicated as
an amount "due to Uni-Group."35 Atty. Cesar Singson, witness for the defense,
testified that the amount of P850,780.00 indicated in the said letter represents
the peso equivalent of the advance payment of US$41,300.00 made by Skiva
to Uni-Group.36
We agree with the trial court that the probative value of the said letter is nil.
The trial court correctly ruled:
"The court doubts the probative value of the contents of [the letter] because
the person who testified thereon, a certain Atty. Cesar Singson, was not the
one who prepared the document. He was only one [of] those who was
furnished a copy thereof. Moreover, when said piece of evidence was
presented, there were inconsistencies in the testimony of the [petitioner] as to
how he was able to procure said documents. In a hearing he testified that he
personally procured said letter from the records of PHIVIDEC and the person
who certified said copy signed the same in his presence. On cross
examination, he testified that he did not personally obtain said letter and he
was not there when the person who authenticated said letter signed it and that
it was only given to him by his former counsel. This is further muddled when
Atty. Singson testified that he was the one who authenticated said document
on December 7, 1987 from his copy upon the request of the accused. Atty.
Singson has already severed his ties with PHIVIDEC on the latter part of the
year 1986. This means that Atty. Singson was no longer connected with
PHIVIDEC when he authenticated said document based on his copy which
implies that the document was not obtained from the records of PHIVIDEC." 37
Further, even assuming that the letter may be given credence, we are unable
to see any indication that the amount of P850,780.00 or at least a portion
thereof (assuming that the said amount represents the advance payment
made by Skiva) has been received by Aurora and/or Uni-Group from
petitioner. At most, what said letter indicates is that Aurora acknowledges
liability to Uni-Group in the said amount or that said amount has been received
by Uni-Group from Skiva as advance payment which Uni-Group may have, in
turn, assigned to Aurora. The glaring fact remains that nowhere can it be seen
from the said letter that there was actual receipt by Aurora from petitioner of
the amount indicated therein, or at least a portion thereof, after deduction of
the cost of the materials purchased to manufacture the jeans ordered.
Moreover, the prosecution was able to establish that upon withdrawal of the
said amounts, petitioner caused the telegraphic transfer of the amount to
another account prior to petitioner’s receipt of the amount in pesos. 38 In fact,
upon being confronted by the prosecution with Exhibits "R" and "T" which are
account debit forms showing that certain amounts were deducted by Citibank
N.A. from the joint account as telegraphic transfer fee for the amounts
withdrawn by petitioner, petitioner admitted that upon withdrawal, "the dollars
was converted by the bank, remitted abroad, and given to me in pesos." 39 The
act committed by petitioner of remitting the funds abroad constitutes an act of
conversion or misappropriation. This Court has previously held that even a
temporary disturbance of property rights constitutes misappropriation.40 The
words "convert" and "misappropriate" as used in Article 315 paragraph 1 (b)
of the Revised Penal Code, connote an act of using or disposing of another’s
property as if it were one’s own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different
from that agreed upon. To "misappropriate" a thing of value for one’s own use
includes, not only conversion to one’s personal advantage but also every
attempt to dispose of the property of another without right.41 Thus, when
petitioner caused the remittance of the amount withdrawn to another account,
such act constituted conversion or misappropriation or unauthorized
disposition of the property, contrary to the purpose for which the property was
devoted.
Petitioner also claims that the third element of estafa is not present as the
party prejudiced, in accordance with the findings of the trial court and the Court
of Appeals, is Skiva, when petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva the
proceeds of the amount withdrawn. Petitioner argues that consistent with the
ruling of the lower court that Aurora is the owner of the sum remitted as
advance payment, petitioner had the obligation to account for the proceeds
thereof to Aurora and not to Skiva. 42 Thus, petitioner maintains that a
conviction for estafa will not hold as no damage to Aurora was alleged in the
information nor did the prosecution present any proof of damage to Aurora.
We are not persuaded.
As held in the case of First Producers Holdings Corporation v. Co,43 in estafa,
the person prejudiced or the immediate victim of the fraud need not be the
owner of the goods misappropriated. Thus, Article 315 of the Revised Penal
Code provides that "any person who shall defraud another by any means
mentioned [in Article 315]" may be held liable for estafa. The use by the law
of the word "another" instead of the word "owner" means that as an element
of the offense, loss should have fallen upon someone other than the
perpetrator of the crime. 44 Thus, the finding of the trial court that Skiva, the
party prejudiced, is not the owner of the sum misappropriated will not nullify
the conviction of the petitioner.
Petitioner claims that the element of demand is absent as no demand was
made by Skiva on petitioner. Petitioner argues that although demand was
made by Skiva to Aurora/Uni-Group and/or Mr. Lettmayr, no demand was
shown to have been made on petitioner himself.
We hold that the element of demand was satisfied when demand was made
upon Aurora/Uni-Group. To require Skiva to make a demand on petitioner
himself would be superfluous and would serve no other additional purpose.
We note that at the time when Ms. Tujan was following up on the delivery of
the jeans, except for the advice of Mr. Lettmayr to direct her queries to
petitioner who was in charge of procuring the materials for the jeans, Ms.
Tujan could not have known that petitioner may be primarily responsible for
the non-delivery of the jeans. As far as Skiva/Olivier was concerned, it was
the obligation of Aurora/Uni-Group to deliver the jeans, which at the time of
demand, was not complied with. Thus, Skiva/Olivier acted appropriately when
it demanded from Aurora/Uni-Group the return of the amount advanced.
To require that demand should have been made by Skiva/Olivier upon
petitioner himself to uphold the conviction of the trial court is to sustain a blind
application of the law. In the case of United States v. Ramirez, 45 this Court
held:
"The consummation of the crime of estafa … does not depend on the fact that
a request for the return of the money is first made and refused in order that
the author of the crime should comply with the obligation to return the sum
misapplied. The appropriation or conversion of money received to the
prejudice of the owner thereof are the sole essential facts which constitute the
crime of estafa, and thereupon the author thereof incurs the penalty imposed
by the Penal Code."
Further, in Tubbs v. People and Court of Appeals 46 this Court ruled that "the
law does not require a demand as a condition precedent to the crime of
embezzlement. It so happens only that failure to account, upon demand for
funds and property held in trust, is circumstantial evidence of
misappropriation."
In Benito Sy y Ong v. People and Court of Appeals,47 we also held that in a
prosecution for estafa, demand is not necessary when there is evidence of
misappropriation.
Petitioner likewise maintains that Skiva has no authority to institute the present
action as estafa was not committed against Skiva but against Aurora/Uni-
Group on the basis of the finding that the transaction between Skiva and
Aurora/Uni-Group was one of sale. Thus, petitioner argues that pursuant to
Section 3, Rule 110 of the Rules on Criminal Procedure,48 the complaint
should not have been instituted by Skiva as it is not the "offended party"
contemplated by the Rules and petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva
the proceeds of the amount withdrawn from the joint account. 49
The "complaint" referred to in Rule 110 contemplates one that is filed in court
to commence a criminal action in those cases where a complaint of the
offended party is required by law, instead of an information which is generally
filed by a fiscal.50 It is not necessary that the proper "offended party" file a
complaint for purposes of preliminary investigation by the fiscal. The rule is
that unless the offense subject of the complaint is one that cannot be
prosecuted de oficio, any competent person may file a complaint for
preliminary investigation.51
Thus, as a general rule, a criminal action is commenced by a complaint or
information, both of which are filed in court. If a complaint is filed directly in
court, the same must be filed by the offended party and in case of an
information, the same must be filed by the fiscal. However, a "complaint" filed
with the fiscal prior to a judicial action may be filed by any person. 52 Thus, in
the case at bar, the complaint was validly filed by Skiva despite the finding of
the lower court that petitioner had no obligation to account to Skiva.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED and the appealed judgment of
the court a quo finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
of Estafa under Article 315 paragraph 1 (b) of the Revised Penal Code is
AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, and Carpio-Morales, JJ., concur.
.R. No. 165732 December 14, 2006 Meanwhile, on January 14, 1998, respondents filed with RTC, Branch 273,
Marikina City, a complaint5 for damages against Pajarillo for negligently
SAFEGUARD SECURITY AGENCY, INC., and ADMER shooting Evangeline and against Safeguard for failing to observe the diligence
PAJARILLO, petitioners, of a good father of a family to prevent the damage committed by its security
vs. guard. Respondents prayed for actual, moral and exemplary damages and
LAURO TANGCO, VAL TANGCO, VERN LARRY TANGCO, VAN LAURO attorney's fees.
TANGCO, VON LARRIE TANGCO, VIEN LARI TANGCO and VIVIEN
LAURIZ TANGCO, respondent. In their Answer,6 petitioners denied the material allegations in the complaint
and alleged that Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family
in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo; that Evangeline's death was not
due to Pajarillo's negligence as the latter acted only in self-defense.
Petitioners set up a compulsory counterclaim for moral damages and
attorney's fees.
DECISION
Trial thereafter ensued. On January 10, 2003, the RTC rendered its
Decision,7 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiffs,

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.: the heirs of Evangeline Tangco, and against defendants Admer
Pajarillo and Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. ordering said
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari filed by Safeguard Security defendants to pay the plaintiffs, jointly and severally, the following:
Agency, Inc. (Safeguard) and Admer Pajarillo (Pajarillo) assailing the
Decision1 dated July 16, 2004 and the Resolution2 dated October 20, 2004 1. ONE HUNDRED FIFTY SEVEN THOUSAND FOUR
issued by the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV No. 77462. HUNDRED THIRTY PESOS (P157,430.00), as actual
damages
On November 3, 1997, at about 2:50 p.m., Evangeline Tangco (Evangeline)
went to Ecology Bank, Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, to renew her time 2. FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as death
deposit per advise of the bank's cashier as she would sign a specimen card. indemnity;
Evangeline, a duly licensed firearm holder with corresponding permit to carry
the same outside her residence, approached security guard Pajarillo, who was
stationed outside the bank, and pulled out her firearm from her bag to deposit 3. ONE MILLION PESOS (P1,000,000.00), as moral
the same for safekeeping. Suddenly, Pajarillo shot Evangeline with his service damages;
shotgun hitting her in the abdomen instantly causing her death.
4. THREE HUNDRED THOUSAND PESOS (P300,000.00),
Lauro Tangco, Evangeline's husband, together with his six minor children as exemplary damages;
(respondents) filed with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, a
criminal case of Homicide against Pajarillo, docketed as Criminal Case No. 0- 5. THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000.00), as
97-73806 and assigned to Branch 78. Respondents reserved their right to file attorney's fees; and
a separate civil action in the said criminal case. The RTC of Quezon City
subsequently convicted Pajarillo of Homicide in its Decision dated January 19, 6. costs of suit.
2000.3 On appeal to the CA, the RTC decision was affirmed with modification
as to the penalty in a Decision4 dated July 31, 2000. Entry of Judgment was
made on August 25, 2001. For lack of merit, defendants' counterclaim is hereby DISMISSED.
 SO ORDERED. 8
The RTC found respondents to be entitled to damages. It rejected Pajarillo's
claim that he merely acted in self-defense. It gave no credence to Pajarillo's
bare claim that Evangeline was seen roaming around the area prior to the
shooting incident since Pajarillo had not made such report to the head office
and the police authorities. The RTC further ruled that being the guard on duty,
the situation demanded that he should have exercised proper prudence and
necessary care by asking Evangeline for him to ascertain the matter instead
of shooting her instantly; that Pajarillo had already been convicted of Homicide
in Criminal Case No. 0-97-73806; and that he also failed to proffer proof
negating liability in the instant case.
The RTC also found Safeguard as employer of Pajarillo to be jointly and
severally liable with Pajarillo. It ruled that while it may be conceded that
Safeguard had perhaps exercised care in the selection of its employees,
particularly of Pajarillo, there was no sufficient evidence to show that
Safeguard exercised the diligence of a good father of a family in the
supervision of its employee; that Safeguard's evidence simply showed that it
required its guards to attend trainings and seminars which is not the
supervision contemplated under the law; that supervision includes not only the
issuance of regulations and instructions designed for the protection of persons
and property, for the guidance of their servants and employees, but also the
duty to see to it that such regulations and instructions are faithfully complied
with.
Petitioners appealed the RTC decision to the CA. On July 16, 2004, the CA
issued its assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the appealed decision is
hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc.'s civil liability in this case is only subsidiary under Art.
103 of the Revised Penal Code. No pronouncement as to costs.9
In finding that Safeguard is only subsidiarily liable, the CA held that the
applicable provisions are not Article 2180 in relation to Article 2176 of the Civil
Code, on quasi-delicts, but the provisions on civil liability arising from felonies
under the Revised Penal Code; that since Pajarillo had been found guilty of
Homicide in a final and executory judgment and is said to be serving sentence
in Muntinlupa, he must be adjudged civilly liable under the provisions of Article
100 of the Revised Penal Code since the civil liability recoverable in the
criminal action is one solely dependent upon conviction, because said liability
arises from the offense charged and no other; that this is also the civil liability
that is deemed extinguished with the extinction of the penal liability with a
pronouncement that the fact from which the civil action might proceed does
not exist; that unlike in civil liability arising from quasi-delict, the defense of
diligence of a good father of a family in the employment and supervision of
employees is inapplicable and irrelevant in civil liabilities based on crimes
or ex-delicto; that Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code provides that the
liability of an employer for the civil liability of their employees is only subsidiary,
not joint or solidary.
Petitioners filed their Motion for Reconsideration which the CA denied in a
Resolution dated October 20, 2004.
Hence, the instant Petition for Review on Certiorari with the following
assignment of errors, to wit:
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in finding petitioner
Pajarillo liable to respondents for the payment of damages and other
money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred when it applied Article
103 of the Revised Penal Code in holding petitioner Safeguard
solidarily [sic] liable with petitioner Pajarillo for the payment of
damages and other money claims.
The Honorable Court of Appeals gravely erred in failing to find that
petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. exercised due diligence
in the selection and supervision of its employees, hence, should be
excused from any liability.10
The issues for resolution are whether (1) Pajarillo is guilty of negligence in
shooting Evangeline; and (2) Safeguard should be held solidarily liable for the
damages awarded to respondents.
Safeguard insists that the claim for damages by respondents is based
on culpa aquiliana under Article 217611 of the Civil Code, in which case, its
liability is jointly and severally with Pajarillo. However, since it has established
that it had exercised due diligence in the selection and supervision of Pajarillo,
it should be exonerated from civil liability.
We will first resolve whether the CA correctly held that respondents, in filing a
separate civil action against petitioners are limited to the recovery of damages
arising from a crime or delict, in which case the liability of Safeguard as
employer under Articles 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code 12 is
subsidiary and the defense of due diligence in the selection and supervision
of employee is not available to it.
The CA erred in ruling that the liability of Safeguard is only subsidiary.
The law at the time the complaint for damages was filed is Rule 111 of the
1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended, to wit:
SECTION 1. Institution of criminal and civil actions. - When a criminal
action is instituted, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability is
impliedly instituted with the criminal action, unless the offended party
waives the civil action, reserves his right to institute it separately, or
institutes the civil action prior to the criminal action.
Such civil action includes recovery of indemnity under the Revised
Penal Code, and damages under Articles 32, 33, 34, and 2176 of the
Civil Code of the Philippines arising from the same act or omission
of the accused.
Respondents reserved the right to file a separate civil action and in fact filed
the same on January 14, 1998.
The CA found that the source of damages in the instant case must be the
crime of homicide, for which he had already been found guilty of and serving
sentence thereof, thus must be governed by the Revised Penal Code.
We do not agree.
An act or omission causing damage to another may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender, i.e., (1) civil liability ex delicto, under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code; and (2) independent civil liabilities,
such as those (a) not arising from an act or omission complained of as a
felony, e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article 31
of the Civil Code, intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the Civil Code; or (b) where the injured party
is granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
action under Article 33 of the Civil Code. Either of these liabilities may be
enforced against the offender subject to the caveat under Article 2177 of the
Civil Code that the offended party cannot recover damages twice for the same
act or omission or under both causes.13
It is important to determine the nature of respondents' cause of action. The
nature of a cause of action is determined by the facts alleged in the complaint
as constituting the cause of action.14 The purpose of an action or suit and the
law to govern it is to be determined not by the claim of the party filing the
action, made in his argument or brief, but rather by the complaint itself, its
allegations and prayer for relief.15
The pertinent portions of the complaint read:
7. That Defendant Admer A. Pajarillo was the guard assigned and
posted in the Ecology Bank – Katipunan Branch, Quezon City, who
was employed and under employment of Safeguard Security
Agency, Inc. hence there is employer-employee relationship
between co-defendants.
The Safeguard Security Agency, Inc. failed to observe the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage to herein plaintiffs.
8. That defendant Admer Pajarillo upon seeing Evangeline Tangco,
who brought her firearm out of her bag, suddenly without exercising
necessary caution/care, and in idiotic manner, with the use of his
shotgun, fired and burst bullets upon Evangeline M. Tangco, killing
her instantly. x x x
xxxx
16. That defendants, being employer and the employee are jointly
and severally liable for the death of Evangeline M. Tangco. 16
Thus, a reading of respondents' complaint shows that the latter are invoking
their right to recover damages against Safeguard for their vicarious
responsibility for the injury caused by Pajarillo's act of shooting and killing
Evangeline under Article 2176, Civil Code which provides:
ARTICLE 2176. Whoever by act or omission causes damage to
another, there being fault or negligence, is obliged to pay for the
damage done. Such fault or negligence, if there is no pre-existing
contractual relation between the parties is called a quasi-delict and
is governed by the provisions of this Chapter.
The scope of Article 2176 is not limited to acts or omissions resulting from
negligence. In Dulay v. Court of Appeals,17 we held:
 x x x Well-entrenched is the doctrine that Article 2176 covers not only
acts committed with negligence, but also acts which are voluntary
and intentional. As far back as the definitive case of Elcano v. Hill (77
SCRA 98 [1977]), this Court already held that:
"x x x Article 2176, where it refers to "fault or negligence,"
covers not only acts "not punishable by law" but also acts
criminal in character, whether intentional and voluntary or
negligent. Consequently, a separate civil action lies against the
offender in a criminal act, whether or not he is criminally prosecuted
and found guilty or acquitted, provided that the offended party is not
allowed, if he is actually charged also criminally, to recover damages
on both scores, and would be entitled in such eventuality only to the
bigger award of the two, assuming the awards made in the two cases
vary. In other words, the extinction of civil liability referred to in Par.
(e) of Section 3, Rule 111, refers exclusively to civil liability founded
on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, whereas the civil liability
for the same act considered as quasi-delict only and not as a crime
is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that the
criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed
by the accused. Briefly stated, We here hold, in reiteration of Garcia,
that culpa aquiliana includes voluntary and negligent acts which may
be punishable by law." (Emphasis supplied)
The civil action filed by respondents was not derived from the criminal liability
of Pajarillo in the criminal case but one based on culpa aquiliana or quasi-
delict which is separate and distinct from the civil liability arising from
crime.18 The source of the obligation sought to be enforced in the civil case is
a quasi-delict not an act or omission punishable by law.
In Bermudez v. Melencio-Herrera,19 where the issue involved was whether the
civil action filed by plaintiff-appellants is founded on crime or on quasi-delict,
we held:
x x x The trial court treated the case as an action based on a crime
in view of the reservation made by the offended party in the criminal
case (Criminal Case No. 92944), also pending before the court, to
file a separate civil action. Said the trial court:
It would appear that plaintiffs instituted this action on the assumption
that defendant Pontino's negligence in the accident of May 10, 1969
constituted a quasi-delict. The Court cannot accept the validity of that
assumption. In Criminal Case No. 92944 of this Court, plaintiffs had
already appeared as complainants. While that case was pending, the
offended parties reserved the right to institute a separate civil action.
If, in a criminal case, the right to file a separate civil action for
damages is reserved, such civil action is to be based on crime and
not on tort. That was the ruling in Joaquin vs. Aniceto, L-18719, Oct.
31, 1964.
We do not agree. The doctrine in the case cited by the trial court is
inapplicable to the instant case x x x.
xxxx
In cases of negligence, the injured party or his heirs has the choice
between an action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime under
Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code and an action for quasi-
delict under Article 2176-2194 of the Civil Code. If a party chooses
the latter, he may hold the employer solidarily liable for the negligent
act of his employee, subject to the employer's defense of exercise of
the diligence of a good father of the family.
In the case at bar, the action filed by appellant was an action for
damages based on quasi-delict. The fact that appellants reserved
their right in the criminal case to file an independent civil action
did not preclude them from choosing to file a civil action
for quasi-delict.20 (Emphasis supplied)
Although the judgment in the criminal case finding Pajarillo guilty of Homicide
is already final and executory, such judgment has no relevance or importance
to this case.21 It would have been entirely different if respondents' cause of
action was for damages arising from a delict, in which case the CA is correct
in finding Safeguard to be only subsidiary liable pursuant to Article 103 of the
Revised Penal Code.22
As clearly shown by the allegations in the complaint, respondents' cause of
action is based on quasi-delict. Under Article 2180 of the Civil Code, when the
injury is caused by the negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a
presumption of law that there was negligence on the part of the master or the
employer either in the selection of the servant or employee, or in the
supervision over him after selection or both. The liability of the employer under
Article 2180 is direct and immediate. Therefore, it is incumbent upon
petitioners to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of their employee.
We must first resolve the issue of whether Pajarillo was negligent in shooting
Evangeline.
The issue of negligence is factual in nature. Whether a person is negligent or
not is a question of fact, which, as a general rule, we cannot pass upon in a
petition for review on certiorari, as our jurisdiction is limited to reviewing errors
of law.23 Generally, factual findings of the trial court, affirmed by the CA, are
final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal. The established
exceptions are: (1) when the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd
or impossible; (2) when there is grave abuse of discretion; (3) when the
findings are grounded entirely on speculations, surmises or conjectures; (4)
when the judgment of the CA is based on misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of fact are conflicting; (6) when the CA, in making its findings, went
beyond the issues of the case and the same is contrary to the admissions of
both appellant and appellee; (7) when the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of specific evidence on which they are based; (8) when the CA
manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties and
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; and (9) when
the findings of fact of the CA are premised on the absence of evidence and
are contradicted by the evidence on record. [24]
A thorough review of the records of the case fails to show any cogent reason
for us to deviate from the factual finding of the trial court and affirmed by the
CA that petitioner Pajarillo was guilty of negligence in shooting Evangeline.
Respondents' evidence established that Evangeline's purpose in going to the
bank was to renew her time deposit.25 On the other hand, Pajarillo claims that
Evangeline drew a gun from her bag and aimed the same at him, thus, acting
instinctively, he shot her in self-defense.
Pajarillo testified that when Evangeline aimed the gun at him at a distance of
about one meter or one arm's length26 he stepped backward, loaded the
chamber of his gun and shot her.27 It is however unimaginable that petitioner
Pajarillo could still make such movements if indeed the gun was already
pointed at him. Any movement could have prompted Evangeline to pull the
trigger to shoot him.
Petitioner Pajarillo would like to justify his action in shooting Evangeline on his
mere apprehension that Evangeline will stage a bank robbery. However, such
claim is befuddled by his own testimony. Pajarillo testified that prior to the
incident, he saw Evangeline roaming under the fly over which was about 10
meters away from the bank28 and saw her talking to a man thereat;29 that she
left the man under the fly-over, crossed the street and approached the bank.
However, except for the bare testimony of Pajarillo, the records do not show
that indeed Evangeline was seen roaming near the vicinity of the bank and
acting suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. In fact, there is no evidence
that Pajarillo called the attention of his head guard or the bank's branch
manager regarding his concerns or that he reported the same to the police
authorities whose outpost is just about 15 meters from the bank.
Moreover, if Evangeline was already roaming the vicinity of the bank, she
could have already apprised herself that Pajarillo, who was posted outside the
bank, was armed with a shotgun; that there were two guards inside the
bank30 manning the entrance door. Thus, it is quite incredible that if she really
had a companion, she would leave him under the fly-over which is 10 meters
far from the bank and stage a bank robbery all by herself without a back-up.
In fact, she would have known, after surveying the area, that aiming her gun
at Pajarillo would not ensure entrance to the bank as there were guards
manning the entrance door.
Evidence, to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of a credible
witness, but it must be credible in itself — such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the
circumstances. We have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its
conformity to our knowledge, observation and experience. Whatever is
repugnant to these belongs to the miraculous and is outside judicial
cognizance.31
That Evangeline just wanted to deposit her gun before entering the bank and
was actually in the act of pulling her gun from her bag when petitioner Pajarillo
recklessly shot her, finds support from the contentions raised in petitioners'
petition for review where they argued that when Evangeline approached the
bank, she was seen pulling a gun from inside her bag and petitioner Pajarillo
who was suddenly beset by fear and perceived the act as a dangerous threat,
shot and killed the deceased out of pure instinct; 32 that the act of drawing a
gun is a threatening act, regardless of whether or not the gun was intended to
be used against petitioner Pajarillo;33 that the fear that was created in the mind
of petitioner Pajarillo as he saw Evangeline Tangco drawing a gun from her
purse was suddenly very real and the former merely reacted out of pure self-
preservation.34
Considering that unlawful aggression on the part of Evangeline is absent,
Pajarillo's claim of self-defense cannot be accepted specially when such claim
was uncorroborated by any separate competent evidence other than his
testimony which was even doubtful. Pajarillo's apprehension that Evangeline
will shoot him to stage a bank robbery has no basis at all. It is therefore clear
that the alleged threat of bank robbery was just a figment of Pajarillo's
imagination which caused such unfounded unlawful aggression on his part.
Petitioners argue that Evangeline was guilty of contributory negligence.
Although she was a licensed firearm holder, she had no business bringing the
gun in such establishment where people would react instinctively upon seeing
the gun; that had Evangeline been prudent, she could have warned Pajarillo
before drawing the gun and did not conduct herself with suspicion by roaming
outside the vicinity of the bank; that she should not have held the gun with the
nozzle pointed at Pajarillo who mistook the act as hold up or robbery.
We are not persuaded.
As we have earlier held, Pajarillo failed to substantiate his claim that
Evangeline was seen roaming outside the vicinity of the bank and acting
suspiciously prior to the shooting incident. Evangeline's death was merely due
to Pajarillo's negligence in shooting her on his imagined threat that Evangeline
will rob the bank.
Safeguard contends that it cannot be jointly held liable since it had adequately
shown that it had exercised the diligence required in the selection and
supervision of its employees. It claims that it had required the guards to
undergo the necessary training and to submit the requisite qualifications and
credentials which even the RTC found to have been complied with; that the
RTC erroneously found that it did not exercise the diligence required in the
supervision of its employee. Safeguard further claims that it conducts
monitoring of the activities of its personnel, wherein supervisors are assigned
to routinely check the activities of the security guards which include among
others, whether or not they are in their proper post and with proper equipment,
as well as regular evaluations of the employees' performances; that the fact
that Pajarillo loaded his firearm contrary to Safeguard's operating procedure
is not sufficient basis to say that Safeguard had failed its duty of proper
supervision; that it was likewise error to say that Safeguard was negligent in
seeing to it that the procedures and policies were not properly implemented
by reason of one unfortunate event.
We are not convinced.
Article 2180 of the Civil Code provides:
Art. 2180. The obligation imposed by Article 2176 is demandable not
only for one's own acts or omissions, but also for those of persons
for whom one is responsible.
xxxx
Employers shall be liable for the damages caused by their
employees and household helpers acting within the scope of their
assigned tasks, even though the former are not engaged in any
business or industry.
xxxx
The responsibility treated of in this article shall cease when the
persons herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.
As the employer of Pajarillo, Safeguard is primarily and solidarily liable for
the quasi-delict committed by the former. Safeguard is presumed to be
negligent in the selection and supervision of his employee by operation of law.
This presumption may be overcome only by satisfactorily showing that the
employer exercised the care and the diligence of a good father of a family in
the selection and the supervision of its employee.
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience, and service records. 35 On the other
hand, due diligence in the supervision of employees includes the formulation
of suitable rules and regulations for the guidance of employees and the
issuance of proper instructions intended for the protection of the public and
persons with whom the employer has relations through his or its employees
and the imposition of necessary disciplinary measures upon employees in
case of breach or as may be warranted to ensure the performance of acts
indispensable to the business of and beneficial to their employer. To this, we
add that actual implementation and monitoring of consistent compliance with
said rules should be the constant concern of the employer, acting through
dependable supervisors who should regularly report on their supervisory
functions.36 To establish these factors in a trial involving the issue of vicarious
liability, employers must submit concrete proof, including documentary
evidence.
We agree with the RTC's finding that Safeguard had exercised the diligence
in the selection of Pajarillo since the record shows that Pajarillo underwent a
psychological and neuro-psychiatric evaluation conducted by the St. Martin de
Porres Center where no psychoses ideations were noted, submitted a
certification on the Pre-licensing training course for security guards, as well as
police and NBI clearances.
The RTC did not err in ruling that Safeguard fell short of the diligence required
in the supervision of its employee, particularly Pajarillo. In this case, while
Safeguard presented Capt. James Camero, its Director for Operations, who
testified on the issuance of company rules and regulations, such as the
Guidelines of Guards Who Will Be Assigned To Banks,37 Weapons
Training,38 Safeguard Training Center Marksmanship Training Lesson
Plan,39 Disciplinary/Corrective Sanctions,40 it had also been established
during Camero's cross-examination that Pajarillo was not aware of such rules
and regulations.41 Notwithstanding Camero's clarification on his re-direct
examination that these company rules and regulations are lesson plans as a
basis of guidelines of the instructors during classroom instructions and not
necessary to give students copy of the same, 42 the records do not show that
Pajarillo had attended such classroom instructions.
The records also failed to show that there was adequate training and
continuous evaluation of the security guard's performance. Pajarillo had only
attended an in-service training on March 1, 1997 conducted by Toyota Sta.
Rosa, his first assignment as security guard of Safeguard, which was in
collaboration with Safeguard. It was established that the concept of such
training was purely on security of equipments to be guarded and protection of
the life of the employees.43
It had not been established that after Pajarillo's training in Toyota, Safeguard
had ever conducted further training of Pajarillo when he was later assigned to
guard a bank which has a different nature of business with that of Toyota. In
fact, Pajarillo testified that being on duty in a bank is different from being on
duty in a factory since a bank is a very sensitive area.44
Moreover, considering his reactions to Evangeline's act of just depositing her
firearm for safekeeping, i.e., of immediately shooting her, confirms that there
was no training or seminar given on how to handle bank clients and on human
psychology.
Furthermore, while Safeguard would like to show that there were inspectors
who go around the bank two times a day to see the daily performance of the
security guards assigned therein, there was no record ever presented of such
daily inspections. In fact, if there was really such inspection made, the alleged
suspicious act of Evangeline could have been taken noticed and reported.
Turning now to the award of damages, we find that the award of actual
damages in the amount P157,430.00 which were the expenses incurred by
respondents in connection with the burial of Evangeline were supported by
receipts. The award of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity for the death of
Evangeline is likewise in order.
As to the award of moral damages, Article 2206 of the Civil Code provides that
the spouse, legitimate children and illegitimate descendants and ascendants
of the deceased may demand moral damages for mental anguish by reason
of the death of the deceased. Moral damages are awarded to enable the
injured party to obtain means, diversions or amusements that will serve to
alleviate the moral suffering he/she has undergone, by reason of the
defendant's culpable action. Its award is aimed at restoration, as much as
possible, of the spiritual status quo ante; thus it must be proportionate to the
suffering inflicted.45 The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of
the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection for him and bears no
relation whatsoever with the wealth or means of the offender.46
In this case, respondents testified as to their moral suffering caused by
Evangeline's death was so sudden causing respondent Lauro to lose a wife
and a mother to six children who were all minors at the time of her death.
In People v. Teehankee, Jr.,47 we awarded one million pesos as moral
damages to the heirs of a seventeen-year-old girl who was murdered. In Metro
Manila Transit Corporation v. Court of Appeals,48 we likewise awarded the
amount of one million pesos as moral damages to the parents of a third year
high school student and who was also their youngest child who died in a
vehicular accident since the girl's death left a void in their lives. Hence, we
hold that the respondents are also entitled to the amount of one million pesos
as Evangeline's death left a void in the lives of her husband and minor children
as they were deprived of her love and care by her untimely demise.
We likewise uphold the award of exemplary damages in the amount
of P300,000.00. Under Article 2229 of the Civil Code, exemplary damages are
imposed by way of example or correction for the public good, in addition to
moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.49 It is awarded as a
deterrent to socially deleterious actions. In quasi-delict, exemplary damages
may be granted if the defendant acted with gross negligence. 50
Pursuant to Article 2208 of the Civil Code, attorney's fees may be recovered
when, as in the instant case, exemplary damages are awarded. Hence, we
affirm the award of attorney's fees in the amount of P30,000.00.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated July 16,
2004 of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that the civil
liability of petitioner Safeguard Security Agency, Inc.
is SOLIDARY and PRIMARY under Article 2180 of the Civil Code.

SO ORDERED.