I.

Crimes Against National Security

G.R. No. 111709 August 30, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO, ANDRES C. INFANTE, CHEONG SAN HIONG, and
JOHN DOES, accused-appellants.

This is one of the older cases which unfortunately has remained in docket of the Court for sometime. It was reassigned,
together with other similar cases, to undersigned ponente in pursuance of A.M. No. 00-9-03-SC dated February 27, 2001.

In the evening of March 2, 1991, "M/T Tabangao," a cargo vessel owned by the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation, loaded with 2,000 barrels of kerosene, 2,600 barrels of regular gasoline, and 40,000 barrels of diesel oil, with
a total value of P40,426,793,87, was sailing off the coast of Mindoro near Silonay Island.

The vessel, manned by 21 crew members, including Captain Edilberto Libo-on, Second Mate Christian Torralba, and
Operator Isaias Ervas, was suddenly boarded, with the use of an aluminum ladder, by seven fully armed pirates led by
Emilio Changco, older brother of accused-appellant Cecilio Changco. The pirates, including accused-appellants Tulin,
Loyola, and Infante, Jr. were armed with M-16 rifles, .45 and .38 caliber handguns, and bolos. They detained the crew and
took complete control of the vessel. Thereafter, accused-appellant Loyola ordered three crew members to paint over,
using black paint, the name "M/T Tabangao" on the front and rear portions of the vessel, as well as the PNOC logo on the
chimney of the vessel. The vessel was then painted with the name "Galilee," with registry at San Lorenzo, Honduras. The
crew was forced to sail to Singapore, all the while sending misleading radio messages to PNOC that the ship was
undergoing repairs.

PNOC, after losing radio contact with the vessel, reported the disappearance of the vessel to the Philippine Coast Guard
and secured the assistance of the Philippine Air Force and the Philippine Navy. However, search and rescue operations
yielded negative results. On March 9, 1991, the ship arrived in the vicinity of Singapore and cruised around the area
presumably to await another vessel which, however, failed to arrive. The pirates were thus forced to return to the
Philippines on March 14, 1991, arriving at Calatagan, Batangas on March 20, 1991 where it remained at sea.

On March 28, 1991, the "M/T Tabangao" again sailed to and anchored about 10 to 18 nautical miles from Singapore's
shoreline where another vessel called "Navi Pride" anchored beside it. Emilio Changco ordered the crew of "M/T
Tabangao" to transfer the vessel's cargo to the hold of "Navi Pride". Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong supervised the
crew of "Navi Pride" in receiving the cargo. The transfer, after an interruption, with both vessels leaving the area, was
completed on March 30, 1991.

On March 30, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" returned to the same area and completed the transfer of cargo to "Navi Pride."

On April 8, 1991, "M/T Tabangao" arrived at Calatagan, Batangas, but the vessel remained at sea. On April 10, 1991, the
members of the crew were released in three batches with the stern warning not to report the incident to government
authorities for a period of two days or until April 12, 1991, otherwise they would be killed. The first batch was fetched from
the shoreline by a newly painted passenger jeep driven by accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, brother of Emilio
Changco, who brought them to Imus, Cavite and gave P20,000.00 to Captain Libo-on for fare of the crew in proceeding to
their respective homes. The second batch was fetched by accused-appellant Changco at midnight of April 10, 1991 and
were brought to different places in Metro Manila.

On April 12, 1991, the Chief Engineer, accompanied by the members of the crew, called the PNOC Shipping and
Transport Corporation office to report the incident. The crew members were brought to the Coast Guard Office for
investigation. The incident was also reported to the National Bureau of Investigation where the officers and members of
the crew executed sworn statements regarding the incident.

A series of arrests was thereafter effected as follows:

a. On May 19, 1991, the NBI received verified information that the pirates were present at U.K. Beach, Balibago,
Calatagan, Batangas. After three days of surveillance, accused-appellant Tulin was arrested and brought to the NBI
headquarters in Manila.
b. Accused-appellants Infante, Jr. and Loyola were arrested by chance at Aguinaldo Hi-way by NBI agents as the latter
were pursuing the mastermind, who managed to evade arrest.

c. On May 20, 1991, accused-appellants Hiong and Changco were arrested at the lobby of Alpha Hotel in Batangas City.

On October 24, 1991, an Information charging qualified piracy or violation of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Piracy in
Philippine Waters) was filed against accused-appellants, as follows:

The undersigned State Prosecutor accuses ROGER P. TULIN, VIRGILIO I. LOYOLA, CECILIO O. CHANGCO,
ANDRES C. INFANTE, and CHEONG SAN HIONG, and nine (9) other JOHN DOES of qualified piracy (Violation
of P.D. No. 532), committed as follows:

That on or about and during the period from March 2 to April 10, 1991, both dates inclusive, and for
sometime prior and subsequent thereto, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, then manning a motor launch and armed with high powered guns, conspiring and confederating
together and mutually helping one another, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously fire
upon, board and seize while in the Philippine waters M/T PNOC TABANGCO loaded with petroleum
products, together with the complement and crew members, employing violence against or intimidation of
persons or force upon things, then direct the vessel to proceed to Singapore where the cargoes were
unloaded and thereafter returned to the Philippines on April 10, 1991, in violation of the aforesaid law.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

(pp. 119-20, Rollo.)

This was docketed as Criminal Case No. 91-94896 before Branch 49 of the Regional Trial Court of the National Capital
Judicial Region stationed in Manila. Upon arraignment, accused-appellants pleaded not guilty to the charge. Trial
thereupon ensued.

Accused-appellants Tulin, Infante, Jr., and Loyola, notwithstanding some inconsistencies in their testimony as to where
they were on March 1, 1991, maintained the defense of denial, and disputed the charge, as well as the transfer of any
cargo from "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride." All of them claimed having their own respective sources of livelihood.
Their story is to the effect that on March 2, 1991, while they were conversing by the beach, a red speedboat with Captain
Edilberto Liboon and Second Mate Christian Torralba on board, approached the seashore. Captain Liboon inquired from
the three if they wanted to work in a vessel. They were told that the work was light and that each worker was to be paid
P3,000.00 a month with additional compensation if they worked beyond that period. They agreed even though they had
no sea-going experience. On board, they cooked, cleaned the vessel, prepared coffee, and ran errands for the officers.
They denied having gone to Singapore, claiming that the vessel only went to Batangas. Upon arrival thereat in the
morning of March 21, 1991, they were paid P1,000.00 each as salary for nineteen days of work, and were told that the
balance would be remitted to their addresses. There was neither receipt nor contracts of employment signed by the
parties.

Accused-appellant Changco categorically denied the charge, averring that he was at home sleeping on April 10, 1991. He
testified that he is the younger brother of Emilio Changco, Jr.

Accused-appellant Cheong San Hiong, also known as Ramzan Ali, adduced evidence that he studied in Sydney,
Australia, obtaining the "Certificate" as Chief Officer, and later completed the course as a "Master" of a vessel, working as
such for two years on board a vessel. He was employed at Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. as Port Captain. The company
was engaged in the business of trading petroleum, including shipoil, bunker lube oil, and petroleum to domestic and
international markets. It owned four vessels, one of which was "Navi Pride."

On March 2, 1991, the day before "M/T Tabangao" was seized by Emilio Changco and his cohorts, Hiong's name was
listed in the company's letter to the Mercantile Section of the Maritime Department of the Singapore government as the
radio telephone operator on board the vessel "Ching Ma."

The company was then dealing for the first time with Paul Gan, a Singaporean broker, who offered to sell to the former
bunker oil for the amount of 300,000.00 Singapore dollars. After the company paid over one-half of the aforesaid amount
to Paul Gan, the latter, together with Joseph Ng, Operations Superintendent of the firm, proceeded to the high seas on
board "Navi Pride" but failed to locate the contact vessel.
The transaction with Paul Gan finally pushed through on March 27, 1991. Hiong, upon his return on board the vessel
"Ching Ma," was assigned to supervise a ship-to-ship transfer of diesel oil off the port of Singapore, the contact vessel to
be designated by Paul Gan. Hiong was ordered to ascertain the quantity and quality of the oil and was given the amount
of 300,000.00 Singapore Dollars for the purchase. Hiong, together with Paul Gan, and the surveyor William Yao, on board
"Navi Pride" sailed toward a vessel called "M/T Galilee". Hiong was told that "M/T Galilee" would be making the transfer.
Although no inspection of "Navi Pride" was made by the port authorities before departure, Navi Marine Services, Pte., Ltd.
was able to procure a port clearance upon submission of General Declaration and crew list. Hiong, Paul Gan, and the
brokers were not in the crew list submitted and did not pass through the immigration. The General Declaration falsely
reflected that the vessel carried 11,900 tons.

On March 28, 1991, "Navi Pride" reached the location of "M/T Galilee". The brokers then told the Captain of the vessel to
ship-side with "M/T Galilee" and then transfer of the oil transpired. Hiong and the surveyor William Yao met the Captain of
"M/T Galilee," called "Captain Bobby" (who later turned out to be Emilio Changco). Hiong claimed that he did not ask for
the full name of Changco nor did he ask for the latter's personal card.

Upon completion of the transfer, Hiong took the soundings of the tanks in the "Navi Pride" and took samples of the cargo.
The surveyor prepared the survey report which "Captain Bobby" signed under the name "Roberto Castillo." Hiong then
handed the payment to Paul Gan and William Yao. Upon arrival at Singapore in the morning of March 29, 1991, Hiong
reported the quantity and quality of the cargo to the company.

Thereafter, Hiong was again asked to supervise another transfer of oil purchased by the firm " from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi
Pride." The same procedure as in the first transfer was observed. This time, Hiong was told that that there were food and
drinks, including beer, purchased by the company for the crew of "M/T Galilee. The transfer took ten hours and was
completed on March 30, 1991. Paul Gan was paid in full for the transfer.

On April 29 or 30, 1991, Emilio Changco intimated to Hiong that he had four vessels and wanted to offer its cargo to cargo
operators. Hiong was asked to act as a broker or ship agent for the sale of the cargo in Singapore. Hiong went to the
Philippines to discuss the matter with Emilio Changco, who laid out the details of the new transfer, this time with "M/T
Polaris" as contact vessel. Hiong was told that the vessel was scheduled to arrive at the port of Batangas that weekend.
After being billeted at Alpha Hotel in Batangas City, where Hiong checked in under the name "SONNY CSH." A person by
the name of "KEVIN OCAMPO," who later turned out to be Emilio Changco himself, also checked in at Alpha Hotel. From
accused-appellant Cecilio Changco, Hiong found out that the vessel was not arriving. Hiong was thereafter arrested by
NBI agents.

After trial, a 95-page decision was rendered convicting accused-appellants of the crime charged. The dispositive portion
of said decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing considerations, judgment is hereby rendered by this Court finding the
accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco guilty beyond reasonable doubt,
as principals, of the crime of piracy in Philippine Waters defined in Section 2(d) of Presidential Decree No. 532
and the accused Cheong San Hiong, as accomplice, to said crime. Under Section 3(a) of the said law, the penalty
for the principals of said crime is mandatory death. However, considering that, under the 1987 Constitution, the
Court cannot impose the death penalty, the accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola, Andres Infante, Jr., and Cecilio
Changco are hereby each meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with all the accessory penalties of the
law. The accused Cheong San Hiong is hereby meted the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, pursuant to
Article 52 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to Section 5 of PD 532. The accused Roger Tulin, Virgilio Loyola,
Andres Infante, Jr. and Cecilio Changco are hereby ordered to return to the PNOC Shipping and Transport
Corporation the "M/T Tabangao" or if the accused can no longer return the same, the said accused are hereby
ordered to remit, jointly and severally, to said corporation the value thereof in the amount of P11,240,000.00,
Philippine Currency, with interests thereon, at the rate of 6% per annum from March 2, 1991 until the said amount
is paid in full. All the accused including Cheong San Hiong are hereby ordered to return to the Caltex Philippines,
Inc. the cargo of the "M/T Tabangao", or if the accused can no longer return the said cargo to said corporation, all
the accused are hereby condemned to pay, jointly and severally, to the Caltex Refinery, Inc., the value of said
cargo in the amount of P40,426,793.87, Philippine Currency plus interests until said amount is paid in full. After
the accused Cheong San Hiong has served his sentence, he shall be deported to Singapore.

All the accused shall be credited for the full period of their detention at the National Bureau of Investigation and
the City Jail of Manila during the pendency of this case provided that they agreed in writing to abide by and
comply strictly with the rules and regulations of the City Jail of Manila and the National Bureau of Investigation.
With costs against all the accused.
 SO ORDERED.

(pp. 149-150, Rollo.)

The matter was then elevated to this Court. The arguments of accused-appellants may be summarized as follows:

Roger P. Tulin, Virgilio I. Loyola, Andres C. Infante, Jr., and Cecilio O. Changco

Accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Jr., and Cecilio Changco assert that the trial court erred in allowing them to
adopt the proceedings taken during the time they were being represented by Mr. Tomas Posadas, a non-lawyer, thereby
depriving them of their constitutional right to procedural due process.

In this regard, said accused-appellants narrate that Mr. Posadas entered his appearance as counsel for all of them.
However, in the course of the proceedings, or on February 11, 1992, the trial court discovered that Mr. Posadas was not a
member of the Philippine Bar. This was after Mr. Posadas had presented and examined seven witnesses for the accused.

Further, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, Infante, Cecilio, Changco uniformly contend that during the custodial
investigation, they were subjected to physical violence; were forced to sign statements without being given the opportunity
to read the contents of the same; were denied assistance of counsel, and were not informed of their rights, in violation of
their constitutional rights.

Said accused-appellants also argue that the trial court erred in finding that the prosecution proved beyond reasonable
doubt that they committed the crime of qualified piracy. They allege that the pirates were outnumbered by the crew who
totaled 22 and who were not guarded at all times. The crew, so these accused-appellants conclude, could have
overpowered the alleged pirates.

Cheong San Hiong

In his brief, Cheong argues that: (1) Republic Act No. 7659 in effect obliterated the crime committed by him; (2) the trial
court erred in declaring that the burden is lodged on him to prove by clear and convincing evidence that he had no
knowledge that Emilio Changco and his cohorts attacked and seized the "M/T Tabangao" and/or that the cargo of the
vessel was stolen or the subject of theft or robbery or piracy; (3) the trial court erred in finding him guilty as an accomplice
to the crime of qualified piracy under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 (Anti-Piracy and Anti-Robbery Law of
1974); (4) the trial court erred in convicting and punishing him as an accomplice when the acts allegedly committed by him
were done or executed outside of Philippine waters and territory, stripping the Philippine courts of jurisdiction to hold him
for trial, to convict, and sentence; (5) the trial court erred in making factual conclusions without evidence on record to
prove the same and which in fact are contrary to the evidence adduced during trial; (6) the trial court erred in convicting
him as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 when he was charged as a principal by direct
participation under said decree, thus violating his constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause of the
accusation against him.

Cheong also posits that the evidence against the other accused-appellants do not prove any participation on his part in
the commission of the crime of qualified piracy. He further argues that he had not in any way participated in the seajacking
of "M/T Tabangao" and in committing the crime of qualified piracy, and that he was not aware that the vessel and its cargo
were pirated.

As legal basis for his appeal, he explains that he was charged under the information with qualified piracy as principal
under Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which refers to Philippine waters. In the case at bar, he argues that he
was convicted for acts done outside Philippine waters or territory. For the State to have criminal jurisdiction, the act must
have been committed within its territory.

We affirm the conviction of all the accused-appellants.

The issues of the instant case may be summarized as follows: (1) what are the legal effects and implications of the fact
that a non-lawyer represented accused-appellants during the trial?; (2) what are the legal effects and implications of the
absence of counsel during the custodial investigation?; (3) did the trial court err in finding that the prosecution was able to
prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused-appellants committed the crime of qualified piracy?; (4) did Republic Act No.
7659 obliterate the crime committed by accused-appellant Cheong?; and (5) can accused-appellant Cheong be convicted
as accomplice when he was not charged as such and when the acts allegedly committed by him were done or executed
outside Philippine waters and territory?

On the first issue, the record reveals that a manifestation (Exhibit "20", Record) was executed by accused-appellants
Tulin, Loyola, Changco, and Infante, Jr. on February 11, 1991, stating that they were adopting the evidence adduced
when they were represented by a non-lawyer. Such waiver of the right to sufficient representation during the trial as
covered by the due process clause shall only be valid if made with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer. During the
trial, accused-appellants, as represented by Atty. Abdul Basar, made a categorical manifestation that said accused-
appellants were apprised of the nature and legal consequences of the subject manifestation, and that they voluntarily and
intelligently executed the same. They also affirmed the truthfulness of its contents when asked in open court (tsn,
February 11, 1992, pp. 7-59).

It is true that an accused person shall be entitled to be present and to defend himself in person and by counsel at every
stage of the proceedings, from arraignment to promulgation of judgment (Section 1, Rule 115, Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure). This is hinged on the fact that a layman is not versed on the technicalities of trial. However, it is also provided
by law that "[r]ights may be waived, unless the waiver is contrary to law, public order, public policy, morals, or good
customs or prejudicial to a third person with right recognized by law." (Article 6, Civil Code of the Philippines). Thus, the
same section of Rule 115 adds that "[u]pon motion, the accused may be allowed to defend himself in person when it
sufficiently appears to the court that he can properly protect his rights without the assistance of counsel." By analogy, but
without prejudice to the sanctions imposed by law for the illegal practice of law, it is amply shown that the rights of
accused-appellants were sufficiently and properly protected by the appearance of Mr. Tomas Posadas. An examination of
the record will show that he knew the technical rules of procedure. Hence, we rule that there was a valid waiver of the
right to sufficient representation during the trial, considering that it was unequivocally, knowingly, and intelligently made
and with the full assistance of a bona fide lawyer, Atty. Abdul Basar. Accordingly, denial of due process cannot be
successfully invoked where a valid waiver of rights has been made (People vs. Serzo, 274 SCRA 553 [1997]; Sayson vs.
People, 166 SCRA 680 [1988]).

However, we must quickly add that the right to counsel during custodial investigation may not be waived except in writing
and in the presence of counsel.

Section 12, Article III of the Constitution reads:

SECTION 12. (1) Any person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have the right to be
informed of his right to remain silent and to have competent and independent counsel preferably of his own
choice. If the person cannot afford the services of counsel, he must be provided with one. These rights cannot be
waived except in writing and in the presence of counsel.

(2) No torture, force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means which vitiate the free will shall be used
against him. Secret detention places, solitary, incommunicado, or other similar forms of detention are prohibited.

(3) Any confession or admission obtained in violation of this or Section 17 hereof shall be inadmissible in
evidence against him.

(4) The law shall provide for penal and civil sanctions for violations of this section as well as compensation to and
rehabilitation of victims of torture or similar practices, and their families.

Such rights originated from Miranda v. Arizona (384 U.S. 436 [1966]) which gave birth to the so-called Miranda doctrine
which is to the effect that prior to any questioning during custodial investigation, the person must be warned that he has a
right to remain silent, that any statement he gives may be used as evidence against him, and that he has the right to the
presence of an attorney, either retained or appointed. The defendant may waive effectuation of these rights, provided the
waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly, and intelligently. The Constitution even adds the more stringent requirement that
the waiver must be in writing and made in the presence of counsel.

Saliently, the absence of counsel during the execution of the so-called confessions of the accused-appellants make them
invalid. In fact, the very basic reading of the Miranda rights was not even shown in the case at bar. Paragraph [3] of the
aforestated Section 12 sets forth the so-called "fruit from the poisonous tree doctrine," a phrase minted by Mr. Justice
Felix Frankfurter in the celebrated case of Nardone vs. United States (308 U.S. 388 [1939]). According to this rule, once
the primary source (the "tree") is shown to have been unlawfully obtained, any secondary or derivative evidence (the
"fruit") derived from it is also inadmissible. The rule is based on the principle that evidence illegally obtained by the State
should not be used to gain other evidence because the originally illegally obtained evidence taints all evidence
subsequently obtained (People vs. Alicando, 251 SCRA 293 [1995]). Thus, in this case, the uncounselled extrajudicial
confessions of accused-appellants, without a valid waiver of the right to counsel, are inadmissible and whatever
information is derived therefrom shall be regarded as likewise inadmissible in evidence against them.

However, regardless of the inadmissibility of the subject confessions, there is sufficient evidence to convict accused-
appellants with moral certainty. We agree with the sound deduction of the trial court that indeed, Emilio Changco (Exhibits
"U" and "UU") and accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. did conspire and confederate to commit the crime
charged. In the words of then trial judge, now Justice Romeo J. Callejo of the Court of Appeals —

. . . The Prosecution presented to the Court an array of witnesses, officers and members of the crew of the "M/T
Tabangao" no less, who identified and pointed to the said Accused as among those who attacked and seized, the
"M/T Tabangao" on March 2, 1991, at about 6:30 o'clock in the afternoon, off Lubang Island, Mindoro, with its
cargo, and brought the said vessel, with its cargo, and the officers and crew of the vessel, in the vicinity of
Horsebough Lighthouse, about sixty-six nautical miles off the shoreline of Singapore and sold its cargo to the
Accused Cheong San Hiong upon which the cargo was discharged from the "M/T Tabangao" to the "Navi Pride"
for the price of about $500,000.00 (American Dollars) on March 29, and 30, 1991. . .

xxx xxx xxx

The Master, the officers and members of the crew of the "M/T Tabangao" were on board the vessel with the
Accused and their cohorts from March 2, 1991 up to April 10, 1991 or for more than one (1) month. There can be
no scintilla of doubt in the mind of the Court that the officers and crew of the vessel could and did see and identify
the seajackers and their leader. In fact, immediately after the Accused were taken into custody by the operatives
of the National Bureau of Investigation, Benjamin Suyo, Norberto Senosa, Christian Torralba and Isaias Wervas
executed their "Joint Affidavit" (Exhibit "B") and pointed to and identified the said Accused as some of the pirates.

xxx xxx xxx

Indeed, when they testified before this Court on their defense, the three (3) Accused admitted to the Court that
they, in fact, boarded the said vessel in the evening of March 2, 1991 and remained on board when the vessel
sailed to its destination, which turned out to be off the port of Singapore.

(pp. 106-112, Rollo.)

We also agree with the trial court's finding that accused-appellants' defense of denial is not supported by any hard
evidence but their bare testimony. Greater weight is given to the categorical identification of the accused by the
prosecution witnesses than to the accused's plain denial of participation in the commission of the crime (People v.
Baccay, 284 SCRA 296 [1998]). Instead, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. narrated a patently desperate
tale that they were hired by three complete strangers (allegedly Captain Edilberto Liboon, Second Mate Christian
Torralba, and their companion) while said accused-appellants were conversing with one another along the seashore at
Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas, to work on board the "M/T Tabangao" which was then anchored off-shore. And
readily, said accused-appellants agreed to work as cooks and handymen for an indefinite period of time without even
saying goodbye to their families, without even knowing their destination or the details of their voyage, without the personal
effects needed for a long voyage at sea. Such evidence is incredible and clearly not in accord with human experience. As
pointed out by the trial court, it is incredible that Captain Liboon, Second Mate Torralba, and their companion "had to
leave the vessel at 9:30 o'clock in the evening and venture in a completely unfamiliar place merely to recruit five (5) cooks
or handymen (p. 113, Rollo)."

Anent accused-appellant Changco's defense of denial with the alibi that on May 14 and 17, he was at his place of work
and that on April 10, 1991, he was in his house in Bacoor, Cavite, sleeping, suffice it to state that alibi is fundamentally
and inherently a weak defense, much more so when uncorroborated by other witnesses (People v. Adora, 275 SCRA 441
[1997]) considering that it is easy to fabricate and concoct, and difficult to disprove. Accused-appellant must adduce clear
and convincing evidence that, at about midnight on April 10, 1991, it was physically impossible for him to have been in
Calatagan, Batangas. Changco not only failed to do this, he was likewise unable to prove that he was in his place of work
on the dates aforestated.

It is doctrinal that the trial court's evaluation of the credibility of a testimony is accorded the highest respect, for trial courts
have an untrammeled opportunity to observe directly the demeanor of witnesses and, thus, to determine whether a certain
witness is telling the truth (People v. Obello, 284 SCRA 79 [1998]).
We likewise uphold the trial court's finding of conspiracy. A conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an
agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide to commit it (Article 8, Revised Penal Code). To be a
conspirator, one need not participate in every detail of execution; he need not even take part in every act or need not even
know the exact part to be performed by the others in the execution of the conspiracy. As noted by the trial court, there are
times when conspirators are assigned separate and different tasks which may appear unrelated to one another, but in
fact, constitute a whole and collective effort to achieve a common criminal design.

We affirm the trial court's finding that Emilio Changco, accused-appellants Tulin, Loyola, and Infante, Jr. and others, were
the ones assigned to attack and seize the "M/T Tabangao" off Lubang, Mindoro, while accused-appellant Cecilio Changco
was to fetch the master and the members of the crew from the shoreline of Calatagan, Batangas after the transfer, and
bring them to Imus, Cavite, and to provide the crew and the officers of the vessel with money for their fare and food
provisions on their way home. These acts had to be well-coordinated. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco need not be
present at the time of the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" since he performed his task in view of an objective
common to all other accused-appellants.

Of notable importance is the connection of accused-appellants to one another. Accused-appellant Cecilio Changco is the
younger brother of Emilio Changco (aka Captain Bobby/Captain Roberto Castillo/Kevin Ocampo), owner of Phil-Asia
Shipping Lines. Cecilio worked for his brother in said corporation. Their residences are approximately six or seven
kilometers away from each other. Their families are close. Accused-appellant Tulin, on the other hand, has known Cecilio
since their parents were neighbors in Aplaya, Balibago, Calatagan, Batangas. Accused-appellant Loyola's wife is a
relative of the Changco brothers by affinity. Besides, Loyola and Emilio Changco had both been accused in a seajacking
case regarding "M/T Isla Luzon" and its cargo of steel coils and plates off Cebu and Bohol in 1989. Emilio Changco (aka
Kevin Ocampo) was convicted of the crime while Loyola at that time remained at large.

As for accused-appellant Hiong, he ratiocinates that he can no longer be convicted of piracy in Philippine waters as
defined and penalized in Sections 2[d] and 3[a], respectively of Presidential Decree No. 532 because Republic Act No.
7659 (effective January 1, 1994), which amended Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, has impliedly superseded
Presidential Decree No. 532. He reasons out that Presidential Decree No. 532 has been rendered "superfluous or
duplicitous" because both Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and Presidential Decree No. 532 punish
piracy committed in Philippine waters. He maintains that in order to reconcile the two laws, the word "any person"
mentioned in Section 1 [d] of Presidential Decree No. 532 must be omitted such that Presidential Decree No. 532 shall
only apply to offenders who are members of the complement or to passengers of the vessel, whereas Republic Act No.
7659 shall apply to offenders who are neither members of the complement or passengers of the vessel, hence, excluding
him from the coverage of the law.

Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, used to provide:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas. — The penalty of reclusion temporal shall be
inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, shall attack or seize a vessel or, not being a member of its
complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of said vessel, its equipment, or personal
belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Italics supplied.)

Article 122, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659 (January 1, 1994), reads:

ARTICLE 122. Piracy in general and mutiny on the high seas or in Philippine waters. — The penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall be inflicted upon any person who, on the high seas, or in Philippine waters, shall attack or seize a
vessel or, not being a member of its complement nor a passenger, shall seize the whole or part of the cargo of
said vessel, its equipment, or personal belongings of its complement or passengers.

(Italics ours)

On the other hand, Section 2 of Presidential Decree No. 532 provides:

SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. — The following shall mean and be understood, as follows:
 d. Piracy. — Any attack upon or seizure of any vessel or the taking away of the whole or part thereof or its cargo,
equipment, or the personal belongings of its complement or passengers, irrespective of the value thereof, by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons or force upon things, committed by any person, including a
passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters, shall be considered as piracy. The
offenders shall be considered as pirates and punished as hereinafter provided (Italics supplied).

To summarize, Article 122 of the Revised Penal Code, before its amendment, provided that piracy must be committed on
the high seas by any person not a member of its complement nor a passenger thereof. Upon its amendment by Republic
Act No. 7659, the coverage of the pertinent provision was widened to include offenses committed "in Philippine waters."
On the other hand, under Presidential Decree No. 532 (issued in 1974), the coverage of the law on piracy embraces any
person including "a passenger or member of the complement of said vessel in Philippine waters." Hence, passenger or
not, a member of the complement or not, any person is covered by the law.

Republic Act No. 7659 neither superseded nor amended the provisions on piracy under Presidential Decree No. 532.
There is no contradiction between the two laws. There is likewise no ambiguity and hence, there is no need to construe or
interpret the law. All the presidential decree did was to widen the coverage of the law, in keeping with the intent to protect
the citizenry as well as neighboring states from crimes against the law of nations. As expressed in one of the "whereas"
clauses of Presidential Decree No. 532, piracy is "among the highest forms of lawlessness condemned by the penal
statutes of all countries." For this reason, piracy under the Article 122, as amended, and piracy under Presidential Decree
No. 532 exist harmoniously as separate laws.

As regards the contention that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over the person of accused-appellant Hiong since
the crime was committed outside Philippine waters, suffice it to state that unquestionably, the attack on and seizure of
"M/T Tabangao" (renamed "M/T Galilee" by the pirates) and its cargo were committed in Philippine waters, although the
captive vessel was later brought by the pirates to Singapore where its cargo was off-loaded, transferred, and sold. And
such transfer was done under accused-appellant Hiong's direct supervision. Although Presidential Decree No. 532
requires that the attack and seizure of the vessel and its cargo be committed in Philippine waters, the disposition by the
pirates of the vessel and its cargo is still deemed part of the act of piracy, hence, the same need not be committed in
Philippine waters.

Moreover, piracy falls under Title One of Book Two of the Revised Penal Code. As such, it is an exception to the rule on
territoriality in criminal law. The same principle applies even if Hiong, in the instant case, were charged, not with a
violation of qualified piracy under the penal code but under a special law, Presidential Decree No. 532 which penalizes
piracy in Philippine waters. Verily, Presidential Decree No. 532 should be applied with more force here since its purpose is
precisely to discourage and prevent piracy in Philippine waters (People v. Catantan, 278 SCRA 761 [1997]). It is likewise,
well-settled that regardless of the law penalizing the same, piracy is a reprehensible crime against the whole world
(People v. Lol-lo, 43 Phil. 19 [1922]).

However, does this constitute a violation of accused-appellant's constitutional right to be informed of the nature and cause
of the accusation against him on the ground that he was convicted as an accomplice under Section 4 of Presidential
Decree No. 532 even though he was charged as a principal by direct participation under Section 2 of said law?

The trial court found that there was insufficiency of evidence showing:

(a) that accused-appellant Hiong directly participated in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (b) that
he induced Emilio Changco and his group in the attack and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo; (c) and that his act
was indispensable in the attack on and seizure of "M/T Tabangao" and its cargo. Nevertheless, the trial court found that
accused-appellant Hiong's participation was indisputably one which aided or abetted Emilio Changco and his band of
pirates in the disposition of the stolen cargo under Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which provides:

SECTION 4. Aiding pirates or highway robbers/brigands or abetting piracy or highway robbery brigandage. — Any
person who knowingly and in any manner aids or protects pirates or highway robbers/brigands, such as giving
them information about the movement of police or other peace officers of the government, or acquires or receives
property taken by such pirates or brigands or in any manner derives any benefit therefrom; or any person who
directly or indirectly abets the commission of piracy or highway robbery or brigandage, shall be considered as an
accomplice of the principal officers and be punished in accordance with Rules prescribed by the Revised Penal
Code.

It shall be presumed that any person who does any of the acts provided in this Section has performed them
knowingly, unless the contrary is proven.
The ruling of the trial court is within well-settled jurisprudence that if there is lack of complete evidence of conspiracy, the
liability is that of an accomplice and not as principal (People v. Tolentino, 40 SCRA 514 [1971]). Any doubt as to the
participation of an individual in the commission of the crime is always resolved in favor of lesser responsibility (People v.
Corbes, 270 SCRA 465 [1997]; People vs. Elfano, Jr., 125 SCRA 792 [1983]; People v. Pastores, 40 SCRA 498 [1971]).

Emphasis must also be placed on the last paragraph of Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 532 which presumes that
any person who does any of the acts provided in said section has performed them knowingly, unless the contrary is
proven. In the case at bar, accused-appellant Hiong had failed to overcome the legal presumption that he knowingly
abetted or aided in the commission of piracy, received property taken by such pirates and derived benefit therefrom.

The record discloses that accused-appellant Hiong aided the pirates in disposing of the stolen cargo by personally
directing its transfer from "M/T Galilee" to "M/T Navi Pride". He profited therefrom by buying the hijacked cargo for Navi
Marine Services, Pte., Ltd. (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 15-23). He even tested the quality and verified the quantity of the
petroleum products, connived with Navi Marine Services personnel in falsifying the General Declarations and Crew List to
ensure that the illegal transfer went through, undetected by Singapore Port Authorities, and supplied, the pirates with
food, beer, and other provisions for their maintenance while in port (tsn, June 3, 1992, pp. 133-134).

We believe that the falsification of the General Declaration (Arrival and Departure) and Crew List was accomplished and
utilized by accused-appellant Hiong and Navi Marine Services personnel in the execution of their scheme to avert
detection by Singapore Port Authorities. Hence, had accused-appellant Hiong not falsified said entries, the Singapore Port
Authorities could have easily discovered the illegal activities that took place and this would have resulted in his arrest and
prosecution in Singapore. Moreover, the transfer of the stolen cargo from "M/T Galilee" to "Navi Pride" could not have
been effected.

We completely uphold the factual findings of the trial court showing in detail accused-appellant Hiong's role in the
disposition of the pirated goods summarized as follows: that on March 27, 1991, Hiong with Captain Biddy Santos
boarded the "Navi Pride," one of the vessels of the Navi Marine, to rendezvous with the "M/T Galilee"; that the firm
submitted the crew list of the vessel (Exhibit "8-CSH", Record) to the port authorities, excluding the name of Hiong; that
the "General Declaration" (for departure) of the "Navi Pride" for its voyage off port of Singapore (Exhibits "HH" and "8-A
CSH", Record) falsely stated that the vessel was scheduled to depart at 2200 (10 o'clock in the evening), that there were
no passengers on board, and the purpose of the voyage was for "cargo operation" and that the vessel was to unload and
transfer 1,900 tons of cargo; that after the transfer of the fuel from "M/T Galilee" with Emilio Changco a. k. a. Captain
Bobby a. k. a. Roberto Castillo at the helm, the surveyor prepared the "Quantity Certificate" (Exhibit "11-C CSH, Record)
stating that the cargo transferred to the "Navi Pride" was 2,406 gross cubic meters; that although Hiong was not the
Master of the vessel, he affixed his signature on the "Certificate" above the word "Master" (Exhibit "11-C-2 CSH", Record);
that he then paid P150,000.00 but did not require any receipt for the amount; that Emilio Changco also did not issue one;
and that in the requisite "General Declaration" upon its arrival at Singapore on March 29, 1991, at 7 o'clock in the evening,
(Exhibits "JJ" and "13-A CSH", Record), it was made to falsely appear that the "Navi Pride" unloaded 1,700 tons of cargo
on the high seas during said voyage when in fact it acquired from the "M/T Galilee" 2,000 metric tons of diesel oil. The
second transfer transpired with the same irregularities as discussed above. It was likewise supervised by accused-
appellant Cheong from his end while Emilio Changco supervised the transfer from his end.

Accused-appellant Hiong maintains that he was merely following the orders of his superiors and that he has no knowledge
of the illegality of the source of the cargo.

First and foremost, accused-appellant Hiong cannot deny knowledge of the source and nature of the cargo since he
himself received the same from "M/T Tabangao". Second, considering that he is a highly educated mariner, he should
have avoided any participation in the cargo transfer given the very suspicious circumstances under which it was acquired.
He failed to show a single piece of deed or bill of sale or even a purchase order or any contract of sale for the purchase by
the firm; he never bothered to ask for and scrutinize the papers and documentation relative to the "M/T Galilee"; he did not
even verify the identity of Captain Robert Castillo whom he met for the first time nor did he check the source of the cargo;
he knew that the transfer took place 66 nautical miles off Singapore in the dead of the night which a marine vessel of his
firm did not ordinarily do; it was also the first time Navi Marine transacted with Paul Gan involving a large sum of money
without any receipt issued therefor; he was not even aware if Paul Gan was a Singaporean national and thus safe to deal
with. It should also be noted that the value of the cargo was P40,426,793.87 or roughly more than US$1,000,000.00
(computed at P30.00 to $1, the exchange rate at that time). Manifestly, the cargo was sold for less than one-half of its
value. Accused-appellant Hiong should have been aware of this irregularity. Nobody in his right mind would go to far away
Singapore, spend much time and money for transportation — only to sell at the aforestated price if it were legitimate sale
involved. This, in addition to the act of falsifying records, clearly shows that accused-appellant Hiong was well aware that
the cargo that his firm was acquiring was purloined.
Lastly, it cannot be correctly said that accused-appellant was "merely following the orders of his superiors." An individual
is justified in performing an act in obedience to an order issued by a superior if such order, is for some lawful purpose and
that the means used by the subordinate to carry out said order is lawful (Reyes, Revised Penal Code, Vol. 1, 1981 ed., p.
212). Notably, the alleged order of Hiong's superior Chua Kim Leng Timothy, is a patent violation not only of Philippine,
but of international law. Such violation was committed on board a Philippine-operated vessel. Moreover, the means used
by Hiong in carrying out said order was equally unlawful. He misled port and immigration authorities, falsified records,
using a mere clerk, Frankie Loh, to consummate said acts. During the trial, Hiong presented himself, and the trial court
was convinced, that he was an intelligent and articulate Port Captain. These circumstances show that he must have
realized the nature and the implications of the order of Chua Kim Leng Timothy. Thereafter, he could have refused to
follow orders to conclude the deal and to effect the transfer of the cargo to the "Navi Pride." He did not do so, for which
reason, he must now suffer the consequences of his actions.

WHEREFORE, finding the conviction of accused-appellants justified by the evidence on record, the Court hereby
AFFIRMS the judgment of the trial court in toto.

SO ORDERED.
 II. Crimes Against the Fundamental Laws of the State

G.R. No. 154130 October 1, 2003

BENITO ASTORGA, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

This is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of a Decision of the Sandiganbayan
in Criminal Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001,1 as well as its Resolutions dated September 28, 2001 and July 10, 2002.

On October 28, 1998, the Office of the Ombudsman filed the following Information against Benito Astorga, Mayor of
Daram, Samar, as well as a number of his men for Arbitrary Detention:

That on or about the 1st day of September, 1997, and for sometime subsequent thereto, at the Municipality of Daram,
Province of Samar, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public
officer, being the Municipal Mayor of Daram, Samar, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
conniving, confederating and mutually helping with unidentified persons, who are herein referred to under fictitious names
JOHN DOES, who were armed with firearms of different calibers, with deliberate intent, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously detain Elpidio Simon, Moises dela Cruz, Wenifredo Maniscan, Renato Militante and Crisanto
Pelias, DENR Employees, at the Municipality of Daram, by not allowing them to leave the place, without any legal and
valid grounds thereby restraining and depriving them of their personal liberty for nine (9) hours, but without exceeding
three (3) days.

CONTRARY TO LAW.2

On September 1, 1997, Regional Special Operations Group (RSOG) of the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources (DENR) Office No. 8, Tacloban City sent a team to the island of Daram, Western Samar to conduct
intelligence gathering and forest protection operations in line with the government’s campaign against illegal logging. The
team was composed of Forester II Moises dela Cruz, Scaler Wenifredo Maniscan, Forest Ranger Renato Militante, and
Tree Marker Crisanto Pelias, with Elpidio E. Simon, Chief of the Forest Protection and Law Enforcement Section, as team
leader. The team was escorted by SPO3 Andres B. Cinco, Jr. and SPO1 Rufo Capoquian. 3

The team stopped at Brgy. Bagacay, Daram, Western Samar at 2:00 p.m., where they saw two yacht-like boats being
constructed. After consulting with the local barangay officials, the team learned that the boats belonged to a certain
Michael Figueroa. However, since Figueroa was not around at the time, the team left Brgy. Bagacay. 4

En route to Brgy. Manungca, Sta. Rita, Samar, the team spotted two more boats being constructed in the vicinity of Brgy.
Lucob-Lucob, Daram, Samar, between 4:30-5:00 p.m., prompting them to stop and investigate. Thus, Maniscan and
Militante disembarked from the DENR’s service pump boat and proceeded to the site of the boat construction. There, they
met Mayor Astorga. After conversing with the mayor, Militante returned to their boat for the purpose of fetching Simon, at
the request of Mayor Astorga.5

When Simon, accompanied by dela Cruz, SPO3 Cinco, and SPO1 Capoquian, approached Mayor Astorga to try and
explain the purpose of their mission, Simon was suddenly slapped hard twice on the shoulder by Mayor Astorga, who
exclaimed, "Puwede ko kamo papaglanguyon pag-uli ha Tacloban. Ano, di ka maaram nga natupa ako? Natupa baya
ako. Diri kamo makauli yana kay puwede kame e charge ha misencounter." (I can make you swim back to Tacloban.
Don’t you know that I can box? I can box. Don’t you know that I can declare this a misencounter?) 6 Mayor Astorga then
ordered someone to fetch "reinforcements," and forty-five (45) minutes later, or between 5:00-6:00 p.m., a banca arrived
bearing ten (10) men, some of them dressed in fatigue uniforms. The men were armed with M-16 and M14 rifles, and they
promptly surrounded the team, guns pointed at the team members. 7 At this, Simon tried to explain to Astorga the purpose
of his team’s mission.8 He then took out his handheld ICOM radio, saying that he was going to contact his people at the
DENR in Catbalogan to inform them of the team’s whereabouts. Suddenly, Mayor Astorga forcibly grabbed Simon’s radio,
saying, "Maupay nga waray kamo radio bis diri somabut an iyo opisina kon hain kamo, bis diri kamo maka aro hin bulig."
(It’s better if you have no radio so that your office would not know your whereabouts and so that you cannot ask for
help).9 Mayor Astorga again slapped the right shoulder of Simon, adding, "Kong siga kamo ha Leyte ayaw pagdad-a dinhi
ha Samar kay diri kamo puwede ha akon." (If you are tough guys in Leyte, do not bring it to Samar because I will not
tolerate it here.)10 Simon then asked Mayor Astorga to allow the team to go home, at which Mayor Astorga retorted that
they would not be allowed to go home and that they would instead be brought to Daram.11 Mayor Astorga then addressed
the team, saying, "Kon magdakop man la kamo, unahon an mga dagko. Kon madakop niyo an mga dagko, an kan
Figueroa dida ha Bagacay puwede ko liwat ipadakop an akon." (If you really want to confiscate anything, you start with
the big-time. If you confiscate the boats of Figueroa at Brgy. Bagacay, I will surrender mine.)12 Simon then tried to reiterate
his request for permission to leave, which just succeeded in irking Mayor Astorga, who angrily said, "Diri kamo maka uli
yana kay dad on ko kamo ha Daram, para didto kita mag uro istorya." (You cannot go home now because I will bring you
to Daram. We will have many things to discuss there.)13

The team was brought to a house where they were told that they would be served dinner. The team had dinner with
Mayor Astorga and several others at a long table, and the meal lasted between 7:00-8:00 p.m.14 After dinner, Militante,
Maniscan and SPO1 Capoquian were allowed to go down from the house, but not to leave the barangay. 15 On the other
hand, SPO3 Cinco and the rest just sat in the house until 2:00 a.m. when the team was finally allowed to
leave.16 1awphi1.nét

Complainants filed a criminal complaint for arbitrary detention against Mayor Astorga and his men, which led to the filing
of the above-quoted Information.

Mayor Astorga was subsequently arraigned on July 3, 2000, wherein he pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged. 17 At
the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of SPO1 Capoquian and SPO3 Cinco, as well as their Joint
Affidavit.18 However, the presentation of Simon’s testimony was not completed, and none of his fellow team members
came forward to testify. Instead, the members of the team sent by the DENR RSOG executed a Joint Affidavit of
Desistance.19

On July 5, 2001, the Sandiganbayan promulgated its Decision, disposing of the case as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered finding accused BENITO ASTORGA Y BOCATCAT
guilty of Arbitrary Detention, and in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, he is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor as
minimum to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correctional as maximum.

SO ORDERED.20

The accused filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated July 11, 200121 which was denied by the Sandiganabayan in a
Resolution dated September 28, 2001.22 A Second Motion for Reconsideration dated October 24, 200123 was also filed,
and this was similarly denied in a Resolution dated July 10, 2002. 24

Hence, the present petition, wherein the petitioner assigns a sole error for review:

5.1. The trial court grievously erred in finding the accused guilty of Arbitrary Detention as defined and penalized under
Article 124 of the Revised Penal Code, based on mere speculations, surmises and conjectures and, worse,
notwithstanding the Affidavit of Desistance executed by the five (5) complaining witnesses wherein the latter categorically
declared petitioner’s innocence of the crime charged. 25

Petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to establish the required quantum of evidence to prove the guilt of the
accused,26 especially in light of the fact that the private complainants executed a Joint Affidavit of Desistance. 27 Petitioner
asserts that nowhere in the records of the case is there any competent evidence that could sufficiently establish the fact
that restraint was employed upon the persons of the team members. 28 Furthermore, he claims that the mere presence of
armed men at the scene does not qualify as competent evidence to prove that fear was in fact instilled in the minds of the
team members, to the extent that they would feel compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob.29

Arbitrary Detention is committed by any public officer or employee who, without legal grounds, detains a person. 30 The
elements of the crime are:

1. That the offender is a public officer or employee.

2. That he detains a person.
3. That the detention is without legal grounds.31

That petitioner, at the time he committed the acts assailed herein, was then Mayor of Daram, Samar is not disputed.
Hence, the first element of Arbitrary Detention, that the offender is a public officer or employee, is undeniably present.
Also, the records are bereft of any allegation on the part of petitioner that his acts were spurred by some legal purpose.
On the contrary, he admitted that his acts were motivated by his "instinct for self-preservation" and the feeling that he was
being "singled out."32 The detention was thus without legal grounds, thereby satisfying the third element enumerated
above.

What remains is the determination of whether or not the team was actually detained.

In the case of People v. Acosta,33 which involved the illegal detention of a child, we found the accused-appellant therein
guilty of kidnapping despite the lack of evidence to show that any physical restraint was employed upon the victim.
However, because the victim was a boy of tender age and he was warned not to leave until his godmother, the accused-
appellant, had returned, he was practically a captive in the sense that he could not leave because of his fear to violate
such instruction.34

In the case of People v. Cortez,35 we held that, in establishing the intent to deprive the victim of his liberty, it is not
necessary that the offended party be kept within an enclosure to restrict her freedom of locomotion. At the time of her
rescue, the offended party in said case was found outside talking to the owner of the house where she had been taken.
She explained that she did not attempt to leave the premises for fear that the kidnappers would make good their threats to
kill her should she do so. We ruled therein that her fear was not baseless as the kidnappers knew where she resided and
they had earlier announced that their intention in looking for her cousin was to kill him on sight. Thus, we concluded that
fear has been known to render people immobile and that appeals to the fears of an individual, such as by threats to kill or
similar threats, are equivalent to the use of actual force or violence. 36

The prevailing jurisprudence on kidnapping and illegal detention is that the curtailment of the victim’s liberty need not
involve any physical restraint upon the victim’s person. If the acts and actuations of the accused can produce such fear in
the mind of the victim sufficient to paralyze the latter, to the extent that the victim is compelled to limit his own actions and
movements in accordance with the wishes of the accused, then the victim is, for all intents and purposes, detained against
his will.

In the case at bar, the restraint resulting from fear is evident. Inspite of their pleas, the witnesses and the complainants
were not allowed by petitioner to go home.37 This refusal was quickly followed by the call for and arrival of almost a dozen
"reinforcements," all armed with military-issue rifles, who proceeded to encircle the team, weapons pointed at the
complainants and the witnesses.38 Given such circumstances, we give credence to SPO1 Capoquian’s statement that it
was not "safe" to refuse Mayor Astorga’s orders.39 It was not just the presence of the armed men, but also the evident
effect these gunmen had on the actions of the team which proves that fear was indeed instilled in the minds of the team
members, to the extent that they felt compelled to stay in Brgy. Lucob-Lucob. The intent to prevent the departure of the
complainants and witnesses against their will is thus clear.

Regarding the Joint Affidavit of Desistance executed by the private complainants, suffice it to say that the principles
governing the use of such instruments in the adjudication of other crimes can be applied here. Thus, in People v.
Ballabare, it was held that an affidavit of desistance is merely an additional ground to buttress the defenses of the
accused, not the sole consideration that can result in acquittal. There must be other circumstances which, when coupled
with the retraction or desistance, create doubts as to the truth of the testimony given by the witnesses at the trial and
accepted by the judge. Here, there are no such circumstances.40 Indeed, the belated claims made in the Joint Affidavit of
Desistance, such as the allegations that the incident was the result of a misunderstanding and that the team acceded to
Mayor Astorga’s orders "out of respect," are belied by petitioner’s own admissions to the contrary. 41 The Joint Affidavit of
Desistance of the private complainants is evidently not a clear repudiation of the material points alleged in the information
and proven at the trial, but a mere expression of the lack of interest of private complainants to pursue the
case.1awphi1.nét This conclusion is supported by one of its latter paragraphs, which reads:

11. That this affidavit was executed by us if only to prove our sincerity and improving DENR relations with the local Chiefs
Executive and other official of Daram, Islands so that DENR programs and project can be effectively implemented through
the support of the local officials for the betterment of the residence living conditions who are facing difficulties and are
much dependent on government support.42

Petitioner also assails the weight given by the trial court to the evidence, pointing out that the Sandiganbayan’s reliance
on the testimony of SPO1 Capoquian is misplaced, for the reason that SPO1 Capoquian is not one of the private
complainants in the case.43 He also makes much of the fact that prosecution witness SPO1 Capoquian was allegedly "not
exactly privy to, and knowledgeable of, what exactly transpired between herein accused and the DENR team leader Mr.
Elpidio E. Simon, from their alleged ‘confrontation,’ until they left Barangay Lucob-Lucob in the early morning of 2
September 1997."44
It is a time-honored doctrine that the trial court’s factual findings are conclusive and binding upon appellate courts unless
some facts or circumstances of weight and substance have been overlooked, misapprehended or
misinterpreted.45 Nothing in the case at bar prompts us to deviate from this doctrine. Indeed, the fact that SPO1
Capoquian is not one of the private complainants is completely irrelevant. Neither penal law nor the rules of evidence
requires damning testimony to be exclusively supplied by the private complainants in cases of Arbitrary Detention.
Furthermore, Mayor Astorga’s claim that SPO1 Capoquian was "not exactly privy" to what transpired between Simon and
himself is belied by the evidence. SPO1 Capoquian testified that he accompanied Simon when the latter went to talk to
petitioner.46 He heard all of Mayor Astorga’s threatening remarks.47 He was with Simon when they were encircled by the
men dressed in fatigues and wielding M-16 and M-14 rifles.48 In sum, SPO1 Capoquian witnessed all the circumstances
which led to the Arbitrary Detention of the team at the hands of Mayor Astorga.

Petitioner submits that it is unclear whether the team was in fact prevented from leaving Brgy. Lucob-Lucob or whether
they had simply decided to "while away the time" and take advantage of the purported hospitality of the accused. 49 On the
contrary, SPO3 Cinco clearly and categorically denied that they were simply "whiling away the time" between their dinner
with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following morning.50 SPO1 Capoquian gave similar testimony, saying that
they did not use the time between their dinner with Mayor Astorga and their departure early the following morning to
"enjoy the place" and that, given a choice, they would have gone home. 51

Petitioner argues that he was denied the "cold neutrality of an impartial judge", because the ponente of the assailed
decision acted both as magistrate and advocate when he propounded "very extensive clarificatory questions" on the
witnesses. Surely, the Sandiganbayan, as a trial court, is not an idle arbiter during a trial. It can propound clarificatory
questions to witnesses in order to ferret out the truth. The impartiality of the court cannot be assailed on the ground that
clarificatory questions were asked during the trial.52

Thus, we affirm the judgment of the Sandiganbayan finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Arbitrary
Detention. Article 124 (1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that, where the detention has not exceeded three days, the
penalty shall be arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, which has a range of
four (4) months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
is entitled to a minimum term to be taken from the penalty next lower in degree, or arresto mayor in its minimum and
medium periods, which has a range of one (1) month and one (1) day to four (4) months. Hence, the Sandiganbayan was
correct in imposing the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight
(8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

Before closing, it may not be amiss to quote the words of Justice Perfecto in his concurring opinion in Lino v. Fugoso,
wherein he decried the impunity enjoyed by public officials in committing arbitrary or illegal detention, and called for the
intensification of efforts towards bringing them to justice:

The provisions of law punishing arbitrary or illegal detention committed by government officers form part of our statute
books even before the advent of American sovereignty in our country. Those provisions were already in effect during the
Spanish regime; they remained in effect under American rule; continued in effect under the Commonwealth. Even under
the Japanese regime they were not repealed. The same provisions continue in the statute books of the free and sovereign
Republic of the Philippines. This notwithstanding, and the complaints often heard of violations of said provisions, it is very
seldom that prosecutions under them have been instituted due to the fact that the erring individuals happened to belong to
the same government to which the prosecuting officers belong. It is high time that every one must do his duty, without fear
or favor, and that prosecuting officers should not answer with cold shrugging of the shoulders the complaints of the victims
of arbitrary or illegal detention.

Only by an earnest enforcement of the provisions of articles 124 and 125 of the Revised Penal Code will it be possible to
reduce to its minimum such wanton trampling of personal freedom as depicted in this case. The responsible officials
should be prosecuted, without prejudice to the detainees’ right to the indemnity to which they may be entitled for the
unjustified violation of their fundamental rights.53

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal
Case No. 24986, dated July 5, 2001 finding petitioner BENITO ASTORGA guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Arbitrary Detention and sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum, is AFFIRMED in toto.

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-2128 May 12, 1948

MELENCIO SAYO and JOAQUIN MOSTERO, petitioners,

vs.
THE CHIEF OF POLICE and THE OFFICER IN CHARGE OF MUNICIPAL JAIL, BOTH OF CITY OF
MANILA, respondents.

Upon complaint of Bernardino Malinao, charging the petitioners with having committed the crime of robbery, Benjamin
Dumlao, a policeman of the City of Manila, arrested the petitioners on April 2, 1948, and presented a complaint against
them with the fiscal's office of Manila. Until April 7, 1948, when the petition for habeas corpus filed with this Court was
heard, the petitioners were still detained or under arrest, and the city fiscal had not yet released or filed against them an
information with the proper courts justice.

This case has not been decided before this time because there was not a sufficient number of Justices to form a quorum
in Manila, And it had to be transferred to the Supreme Court acting in division here in Baguio for deliberation and decision.
We have not until now an official information as to the action taken by the office of the city fiscal on the complaint filed by
the Dumlao against the petitioners. But whatever night have been the action taken by said office, if there was any, we
have to decide this case in order to lay down a ruling on the question involved herein for the information and guidance in
the future of the officers concerned.

The principal question to be determined in the present case in order to decide whether or not the petitioners are being
illegally restrained of their liberty, is the following: Is the city fiscal of manila a judicial authority within the meaning of the
provisions of article 125 of the Revised Penal Code?

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code provides that "the penalties provided in the next proceeding article shall be
imposed upon the public officer or employee who shall detain any person for some legal ground and shall fail to deliver
such person to the proper judicial authorities within the period of six hours."

Taking into consideration the history of the provisions of the above quoted article, the precept of our Constitution
guaranteeing individual liberty, and the provisions of Rules of Court regarding arrest and habeas corpus, we are of the
opinion that the words "judicial authority", as used in said article, mean the courts of justices or judges of said courts
vested with judicial power to order the temporary detention or confinement of a person charged with having committed a
public offense, that is, "the Supreme Court and such inferior courts as may be established by law". (Section 1, Article VIII
of the Constitution.)

Article 125 of the Revised Penal Code was substantially taken from article 202 of the old Penal Code formerly in force of
these Islands, which penalized a public officer other than a judicial officer who, without warrant, "shall arrest a person
upon a charge of crime and shall fail to deliver such person to the judicial authority within twenty four hours after his
arrest." There was no doubt that a judicial authority therein referred to was the judge of a court of justice empowered by
law, after a proper investigation, to order the temporary commitment or detention of the person arrested; and not the city
fiscals or any other officers, who are not authorized by law to do so. Because article 204, which complements said section
202, of the same Code provided that "the penalty of suspension in its minimum and medium degrees shall be imposed
upon the following persons: 1. Any judicial officer who, within the period prescribed by the provisions of the law of criminal
procedure in force, shall fail to release any prisoner under arrest or to commit such prisoner formally by written order
containing a statement of the grounds upon which the same is based."

Although the above quoted provision of article 204 of the old Penal Code has not been incorporated in the Revised Penal
Code the import of said words judicial authority or officer can not be construed as having been modified by the mere
omission of said provision in the Revised Penal Code.

Besides, section 1 (3), Article III, of our Constitution provides that "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons...against unreasonable seizure shall not be violated, and no warrant [of arrest, detention or confinement] shall
issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge after the examination under oath or affirmation of the
complaint and the witness he may produce." Under this constitutional precept no person may be deprived of his liberty,
except by warrant of arrest or commitment issued upon probable cause by a judge after examination of the complainant
and his witness. And the judicial authority to whom the person arrested by a public officers must be surrendered can not
be any other but court or judge who alone is authorized to issue a warrant of commitment or provisional detention of the
person arrested pending the trial of the case against the latter. Without such warrant of commitment, the detention of the
person arrested for than six hours would be illegal and in violation of our Constitution.
Our conclusion is confirmed by section 17, Rule 109 of the Rules of court, which, referring to the duty of an officer after
arrest without warrant, provides that "a person making arrest for legal ground shall, without unnecessary delay, and within
the time prescribed in the Revised Penal Code, take the person arrested to the proper court or judge for such action for
they may deem proper to take;" and by section 11 of Rule 108, which reads that "after the arrest by the defendant and his
delivery to the Court, he shall be informed of the complaint or information filed against him. He shall also informed of the
substance of the testimony and evidence presented against him, and, if he desires to testify or to present witnesses or
evidence in his favor, he may be allowed to do so. The testimony of the witnesses need not be reduced to writing but that
of the defendant shall be taken in writing and subscribed by him.

And it is further corroborated by the provisions of section 1 and 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court. According to the
provision of said section, "a writ of habeas corpus shall extend any person to all cases of illegal confinement or detention
by which any person is illegally deprived of his liberty"; and "if it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his
liberty is in the custody of an officer under process issued by a court or judge, or by virtue of a judgement or order of a
court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the process, render judgment, or make the order, the
writ shall not be allowed. "Which a contrario sensu means that, otherwise, the writ shall be allowed and the person
detained shall be released.

The judicial authority mentioned in section 125 of the Revised Penal Code can not be construed to include the fiscal of the
City of Manila or any other city, because they cannot issue a warrant of arrest or of commitment or temporary confinement
of a person surrendered to legalize the detention of a person arrested without warrant. (Section 7, Rule 108; Hashim vs.
Boncan, 40 Off. Gaz. 13th Supp., p.13; Lino vs. Fugoso, L-1159, promulgated on January 30, 1947, 43 Off. Gaz., 1214).
The investigation which the city of fiscal of Manila makes is not the preliminary investigation proper provided for in section
11, Rule 108, above quoted, to which all person charged with offenses cognizable by the Court of First Instance in
provinces are entitled, but it is a mere investigation made by the city fiscal for the purpose of filing the corresponding
information against the defendant with the proper municipal court or Court of First Instance of Manila if the result of the
investigation so warrants, in order to obtain or secure from the court a warrant of arrest of the defendant. It is provided by
a law as a substitute, in a certain sense, of the preliminary investigation proper to avoid or prevent a hasty or malicious
prosecution, since defendant charged with offenses triable by the courts in the City of Manila are not entitled to a proper
preliminary investigation.

The only executive officers authorized by law to make a proper preliminary investigation in case of temporary absence of
both the justice of the peace and the auxiliary justice of the peace from the municipality, town or place, are the municipal
mayors who are empowered in such case to issue a warrant of arrest of the caused. (Section 3, Rule 108, in connection
with section 6, Rule 108, and section 2 of Rule 109.) The preliminary investigation which a city fiscal may conduct under
section 2, Rule 108, is the investigation referred to in the proceeding paragraph.

Under the law, a complaint charging a person with the commission of an offense cognizable by the courts of Manila is not
filed with municipal court or the Court of First Instance of Manila, because as above stated, the latter do not make or
conduct a preliminary investigation proper. The complaint must be made or filed with the city fiscal of Manila who,
personally or through one of his assistants, makes the investigation, not for the purpose of ordering the arrest of the
accused, but of filing with the proper court the necessary information against the accused if the result of the investigation
so warrants, and obtaining from the court a warrant of arrest or commitment of the accused.

When a person is arrested without warrant in cases permitted bylaw, the officer or person making the arrest should, as
abovestated, without unnecessary delay take or surrender the person arrested, within the period of time prescribed in the
Revised Penal Code, to the court or judge having jurisdiction to try or make a preliminary investigation of the offense
(section 17, Rule 109); and the court or judge shall try and decide the case if the court has original jurisdiction over the
offense charged, or make the preliminary investigation if it is a justice of the peace court having no original jurisdiction,
and then transfer the case to the proper Court of First Instance in accordance with the provisions of section 13, Rule 108.

In the City of Manila, where complaints are not filed directly with the municipal court or the Court of First Instance, the
officer or person making the arrest without warrant shall surrender or take the person arrested to the city fiscal, and the
latter shall make the investigation above mentioned and file, if proper, the corresponding information within the time
prescribed by section 125 of the Revised Penal Code, so that the court may issue a warrant of commitment for the
temporary detention of the accused. And the city fiscal or his assistants shall make the investigation forthwith, unless it is
materially impossible for them to do so, because the testimony of the person or officer making the arrest without warrant is
in such cases ready and available, and shall, immediately after the investigation, either release the person arrested or file
the corresponding information. If the city fiscal has any doubt as to the probability of the defendant having committed the
offense charged, or is not ready to file the information on the strength of the testimony or evidence presented, he should
release and not detain the person arrested for a longer period than that prescribed in the Penal Code, without prejudice to
making or continuing the investigation and filing afterwards the proper information against him with the court, in order to
obtain or secure a warrant of his arrest. Of course, for the purpose of determining the criminal liability of an officer
detaining a person for more than six hours prescribed by the Revised Penal Code, the means of communication as well
as the hour of arrested and other circumstances, such as the time of surrender and the material possibility for the fiscal to
make the investigation and file in time the necessary information, must be taken into consideration.

To consider the city fiscal as the judicial authority referred to in article 125 of the Revised Penal Code, would be to
authorize the detention of a person arrested without warrant for a period longer than that permitted by law without any
process issued by a court of competent jurisdiction. The city fiscal, may not, after due investigation, find sufficient ground
for filing an information or prosecuting the person arrested and release him, after the latter had been illegally detained for
days or weeks without any process issued by a court or judge.

A peace officer has no power or authority to arrest a person without a warrant upon complaint of the offended party or any
other person, except in those cases expressly authorized by law. What he or the complainant may do in such case is to
file a complaint with the city fiscal of Manila, or directly with the justice of the peace courts in municipalities and other
political subdivisions. If the City Fiscal has no authority, and he has not, to order the arrest even if he finds, after due
investigation, that there is a probability that a crime has been committed and the accused is guilty thereof, a fortiori a
police officer has no authority to arrest and detain a person charged with an offense upon complaint of the offended party
or other persons even though, after investigation, he becomes convinced that the accused is guilty of the offense charged.

In view of all the foregoing, without making any pronouncement as to the responsibility of the officers who intervened in
the detention of the petitioners, for the policeman Dumlao may have acted in good faith, in the absence of a clear cut
ruling on the matter in believing that he had complied with the mandate of article 125 by delivering the petitioners within
six hours to the office of the city fiscal, and the latter might have ignored the fact that the petitioners were being actually
detained when the said policeman filed a complaint against them with the city fiscal, we hold that the petitioners are being
illegally restrained of their liberty, and their release is hereby ordered unless they are now detained by virtue of a process
issued by a competent court of justice. So ordered.

Paras, Actg. C.J., Pablo, and Bengzon, JJ., concur.

 III. Assault, Resistance and Disobedience

G.R. No. 201565 October 13 , 2014

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO a.k.a.
"EDEL EUTIQUIANO a.k.a. ESTONILO," ITCOBANES "NONONG NONOY ITCOBANES," ESTONILO-at large,
TITING GALI BOOC-at large, ITCOBANES-at ORLANDO large, TAGALOG MATERDAM a.k.a. "NEGRO
MATERDAM," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a. "BULLDOG DELA CRUZ," Accused,
vs.
EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDE LB RANDO ESTONILO a.k.a.
"EDEL ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES a.k.a. "NONONG ITCOBANES," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ a.k.a.
"BULLDOG DELA CRUZ," Accused-Appellants.

In this appeal, accused-appellants Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr. (Carlos, Sr.), Mayor Reinario Estonilo (Rey), Edelbrando
Estonilo (Edel), Eutiquiano Itcobanes (Nonong), and Calvin Dela Cruz (Bulldog) seek liberty from the judgment 1 of
conviction rendered by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 45, Manila, which found them guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Direct Assault in Criminal Case No. 05-238607.

The above-named accused-appellants, along with four others, namely: Nonoy Estonilo (Nonoy), 2 Titing Booc (Titing),3 and
Gali Itcobanes (Gali),4 and Orlando Tagalog Materdam (Negro)5 were all charged in an Information dated July 30, 2004
that reads:

That on or about April 5, 2004 at 8:00 o’clock in the evening thereof, at Celera Elementary School, 6 Brgy. Villa Inocencio,
Municipality of Placer, Province of Masbate, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-
named accused, with intent to kill, armed with firearms, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with
evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and shoot one
FLORO A. CASAS, while in the performance of his duty being the District Supervisor of public schools, hitting the latter on
the different parts of his body which caused his instantaneous death.7

On November 8, 2005, the prosecutor filed an Amended Information,8 which provides:

That on or about April 5, 2004, at Celera Elementary School, Brgy. Villa Inocencio, Municipality of Placer, Province of
Masbate, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court of Masbate, the above-named accused EX-
MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR. and MAYOR REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, conspiring and confederating together
and helping one another, with intent to kill, and with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously induce their co-accused, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO AL[I]AS "EDEL ESTONILO[,] "
EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES AL[I]AS "NONONG ITCOBANES[,] " NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, GALI
ITCOBANES, ORLANDO MATERDAM Y TAGALOG ALIAS "NEGRO MATERDAM[,]" [and] CALVIN DELA CRUZ AL[I]AS
"BULLDOG DELA CRUZ[,]" who wereall armed with firearms, to attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
person of one FLORO A. CASAS, while in the performance of his duty being a District Supervisor of public schools, by
then and there shooting the latter, hitting said FLORO A. CASAS on the differentparts of his body which were the direct
and immediate cause of his death thereafter.9 When they were arraigned on November 9, 2005, the accused-appellants
pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. On the same date, the RTC issued a pre-trial order which stated, among others:

a) Upon request by the prosecution, the defense admitted the following:

1. The identities of the five (5) accused present;

2. As to the jurisdiction of this Court, there was an Order from the Honorable Supreme Court asto the
transfer of venue;

3. The fact of death of Floro A. Casas;

4. That the victim Floro A. Casas at the time of his death was a District Supervisor of the Department of
Education.

b) However, upon request by the defense, the prosecution did not admit that Ex-Mayor Carlos Estonilo, Sr. and
Mayor Reinario Estonilo were not at the scene ofthe incident during the incident. 10
The prosecution presented nine witnesses, namely: Elsa Q. Casas (Elsa), the victim’s wife; Felix Q. Casas (Felix), the
victim’s son; Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco (Dr. Francisco), the Municipal Health Officer, Placer, Masbate; Senior Police Officer
4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. (SPO4 Lepatan), Placer Police Station; Serapion M. Bedrijo (Serapion), employee of Municipal
Councilor candidate Boy dela Pisa; Carlo S. Antipolo (Antipolo), a resident of Placer, Masbate; Diego L.Casas (Diego),
cousin of the victim; Rosalinda V. Dahonan (Rosalinda), a resident of Placer, Masbate; and Servando P. Rosales
(Servando), former employee of Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr.11 The testimonies of the foregoing witnesses consisted of the
following:

Felix narrated that on April 4, 2005,the day before his father, Floro Casas (Floro), was gunned down, he was with the
latter and some teachers at the Celera Inocencio Elementary School, Placer, Masbate; that they were working on the
closing ceremonies to be held the following day; that one Ranio Morales called on Floro and told him that Mayor Carlos,
Sr. wanted to see him at his (Ranio) house; that Floro and Felix went to see Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that when they saw Mayor
Carlos, Sr., he showed them (Floro and Felix) a program of a celebration of the Federation of 7th Day Adventist that
contained the names of the governor, the congressman, and Placer mayoralty candidate Vicente Cotero (Cotero), as
guests of the said activity; that Felix asked his father why Cotero’s picture was so big while Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s name was
not mentioned in the program; that Floro replied that he cannot help it because Cotero paid for the program; that the
answer angered Mayor Carlos, Sr. and he scolded Floro; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. said "you are now for Cotero but you’re
only Estonilo when you ask for my signature to sign the voucher. This is up to now thatyou will be the supervisor of
Celera"; that Floro responded "when are you a superintendent when you don’t have any scholastic standing. Just look if I
will still vote for your son"; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. replied "let’s see if you can still vote"; and that the following day, Floro
was shot to death.12

But prior to the April 4, 2005 incident, Felix recounted that on December 10, 2003, upon invitation of Nonoy, he joined the
latter’s group for a drinking spree at a videoke bar; that they talked about the death of one Titing Villester; that Nonoy told
Felix that "brod, do not be afraid, because others are supposed to be afraid [of] us because they believe that we were the
ones who killed Titing Villester" that afterwards Felix and the group were fetched at the videoke bar by Edel, a messenger
of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that they were brought to the house of one Bobong Baldecir (a nephew of Mayor Carlos, Sr.) in
Daraga; that uponarriving thereat, Rey uttered "it’s good that Dodong (Felix’s nickname) is with you; that Nonoy then said
"who would not [be] otherwise, his father would be the next victim after Titing Villester"; 13 that Rey then turned to Felix and
said, "it’s very important that your father is with us because a District Supervisor has a big [role] in the Comelec’s choice
for those teachers who would become members of the Board of Election Inspectors"; that Felix clarified that Rey was then
the 2004 mayoralty candidate for Placer, Masbate; and that Felix went along with him since he was in Daraga, the
bailiwick of the Estonilos.14

On cross examination, the counsel for the accused tried to discredit Felix by questioning him on why it took him a long
time to execute an affidavit relative to his father’s killing. Felix explained that he went to Cebu to stay away from Placer,
which isunder the Estonilo’s jurisdiction.15 The defense confronted Felix of a criminal case against him for illegal use of
prohibited drugs, for which he was out on bail.16

On March 28, 2006, the prosecution presented two witnesses, Dr. Ulysses Francisco yPedrano and SPO4 Restituto
Lepatan, Sr. The prosecution and the defense entered into stipulation offacts relative to their testimonies.

[Stipulation of Facts on Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco’s testimony:]

1. That Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, a Municipal Health Officer of Placer, Masbate, is expert in medicine;

2. That he was the one who conducted the Post-Mortem Examination on the dead body of Floro Casas yBaronda
on April 6, 2004 at Katipunan, Placer, Masbate;

3. That in connection with his examination, he prepared the Post Mortem Examination Report, marked as Exhibit
"F," the printed name and signature of Dr. Ulysses P. Francisco, marked as Exhibit "F-1";

4. That he also prepared the Certificate of Death, marked as Exhibit "G" and the Sketch of a Human Body,
marked as Exhibit "H";

5. The veracity and truthfulness of the Post-Mortem Findings indicated in the Post-Mortem Examination Report;
and

6. In the course of the examination of the victim, the said witness recovered three slugs: the 1 st slug was marked
as Exhibit "I," the fragmented slug as Exhibit "I-1," and the metallic object consisting of two pieces of Exhibit "I-2."
[Stipulation of Facts on SPO4 Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr.’s testimony:]

1. That there exists a Police Blotter in the Record/Blotter Book of the Placer, Masbate Police Station relativeto the
shooting incident that occurred on April 5, 2004 at Celera Elementary School. Said Police Blotter was requested
to be marked by the prosecution as Exhibit "J";

2. That said witness prepared the Police Report dated April 17, 2004 relative to the blotter written on the Blotter
Book. Said Police Report was requested to be marked as Exhibit "J-1" and the signature of Sr. Police Officer IV
Restituto L. Lepatan, Sr. as Exhibit "J-1-a";

3. The existence of the Police Blotter as appearing in the Blotter Book page number 325. Said Police Blotter book
page 325 was requested to be marked as Exh. "K" and the bracketed portion thereof as Exh. "K-1."17

According to Dr. Francisco, Floro sustained gunshot wounds caused by more than one firearm based on the sizes of the
slugs recovered and that some of them were fired at close range. The counsel for the accused waived his cross
examination.18

Prosecution witness Serapion testified that while he was printing the name of Municipal Councilor candidate Boy dela Pisa
on the street facing the Celera Elementary School on the night of April 5, 2004, he heard gunshots coming from inside the
compound of the school; that after two or three minutes, he saw more or less six persons coming out of the school; that
he was able to identify three of themas present in the courtroom: Edel, Nonoy, and Nonong; that he saw the six men
approach Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s vehicle, which was parked near the school; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey came out of a
house nearby; that upon reaching the vehicle, Serapion heard Nonoy say to Mayor Carlos, Sr. "mission accomplished,
sir"; that Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered Nonoy and his group to escape, which they did using two motorbikes towards the
direction of Cataingan; and thereafter, that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey drove towards the direction of Daraga. 19

During his cross examination, the defense tried to discredit Serapion by confronting him with the fact thathe has a pending
criminal case for frustrated murder and that he was out on bail.20 Antipolo testified that on April 5, 2004, he was riding his
motorcycle and passing by the gate of the Celera Elementary School when he heard gunshots and someone shouted that
Floro was shot; that he stopped, alighted from his motorcycle, went to the gate, and saw four persons holding short
firearms; that he identified Nonoy and Negro as the two who fired at Floro about seven times; that he identifiedEdel and
Nonong as the two other gun holders; that at that moment, Gali shouted "sir, that’s enough, escape!"; that Gali was
accompanied by someone named Ace, Titing and Bulldog; that right after Gali shouted for them to escape, all of them
hurriedly left the school compound; that he saw Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s pick-up vehicle arrive soon thereafter; that Mayor
Carlos, Sr., Rey and Negro alighted from the vehicle and watched the proceedings; that he heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say
"leave it because it’s already dead"; and that afterwards, the police officers arrived. 21

In an attempt to discredit Antipolo, the defense counsel confronted him with a criminal case against him for homicide of
one Edgardo Estonilo (brother of accused-appellant Edel) that happened on October 30, 2005.22

Elsa was presented to testify on the probable motive for the killing of Floro, the circumstances surrounding the killing and
its discovery, their family background, her husband’s line of work, how she felt on their loss, and the expenses relative to
his killing. She testified that she heard there were people who were jealous of Floro’s position because he could bring
voters to his side during election time;that Placer mayoralty candidate Cotero donated medals for the 2003-2004 closing
ceremony of the entire district of public schools; that during the closing ceremony, the donor’s name was announced,
which angered then Mayor Carlos, Sr.;23 that when Floro was processing a voucher worth ₱70,000.00, Mayor Carlos, Sr.
refused to sign the same and even threw the voucher on the floor saying "let this be signed by Vicente Cotero"; and that
Floro’s cousin, Diego Casas, helped Floro secure the Mayor’s signature by ensuring Mayor Carlos, Sr. that Floro was for
him, and only then did Mayor Carlos, Sr. agree to sign the voucher. 24

Diego L. Casas corroborated Elsa’s testimony relative to the fact that he helped Floro secure Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s
signature on the voucher.25

Rosalinda testified that at 7:00 a.m. on April 10, 2004, Mayor Carlos, Sr. went to her house and told her thathe would kill
her husband following Floro; that she was shocked and scared, thus, she went to the Placer Police Station and reported
the incident; that she went to see her husband, who was then campaigning for mayoralty candidateCotero, and informed
him of what happened; and that she went to Elsa’shouse and informed the latter of the threat. 26

Servando attested that at about 7:00 a.m. on April 1, 2004, he was in the house of Mayor Carlos,Sr. together with said
Mayor, Nonong, Edgar Estonilo, the group of Bulldog, Negro, Alias "S" [Ace], Rollie, Nonong, Edel, and Gali; that he
witnessed Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si Floro Casas"; that Servando later learned thatthe mayor’s men were
unsuccessful in their goal because Floro was no longer in Barangay Taberna, where they intended to execute the mayor’s
order;and that Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his men again planned to kill Floro at Celera Elementary School on April 4, 2004.27

During cross examination, the defense confronted Servando with the latter’s Affidavit of Retraction, which he executed on
June 14, 2004. The affidavit contained a withdrawal of his Sinumpaang Salaysaytaken on May 30, 2004 at the Philippine
National Police-Criminal Investigation and Detection Group (PNP-CIDG) Camp Bonny Serrano, Masbate City relative to
the criminal complaint for direct assault with murder filed against Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his company. He was also asked
about two criminal charges filed against him in Cebu relative toviolation of Republic Act No. 9165, illegal sale and illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.28 On re-direct examination, Servando narrated that Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s nephew, Bobong
Baldecir, fetched him from his house and he was brought to the house of Mayor Carlos, Sr. in Daraga; that from there, he
was brought to Atty. Besario in Cebu; that Atty. Besario informed him about the Affidavit of Retraction that he was
supposed to sign, which he did not understand as it was written in English; and that he clarified that the contents of the
affidavit was not his but those of Bobong.29

The defense on its part called to the witness stand Jesus Baldecir, Jr. (Jesus/Bobong), Quirino D. Calipay (Quirino), and
the five accused-appellants.

Jesus denied Servando’s allegation that he (Jesus) forced him to sign the Affidavit of Retraction. Jesus narrated that
Servando gave word that he (Servando) wanted to meet him (Jesus); that upon their meeting, Servando told him that he
wanted to retract his sworn statement because Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his company did nothing wrong; that Jesus,
Servando and Servando’s wife went to Cebu to meet Atty. Besario; that while traveling, Servando told him that was
evading the men of Governor Go, Vicente Cotero and Casas because he feared for his life; that during the meeting Atty.
Besario prepared the affidavit and translated it to Cebuano dialect; that afterwards, Jesus, Servando and Servando’s wife
went to the Capitol so that Servando could sign it before the prosecutor; that Jesus, Atty. Besario, Servado and his wife,
and Dante Estonilo (another nephew of Mayor Carlos) went to Manila to meet with the media; that the media asked
Servando whether he was forced to sign, or was given money or reward to sign the affidavit of retraction, Servando
replied in the negative; and that the purpose of the press meeting was to present Servando and show that he was not
kidnapped.30

But during his cross examination, Jesus admitted that his nickname was Bobong, and that Mayor Carlos, Sr. ishis uncle;
that he is one of the accused in the criminal case for the kidnapping of Servando; and that it was Dante (Dante) Estonilo
who arranged for the meeting with the media, and who served as Servando’s and his wife’s companion, while he was with
Atty. Besario.31 During his turn, accused-appellant Mayor Carlos, Sr. testified that in the early evening of April 5, 2004
hewas in a house near the Celera Elementary School attending a birthday party; that while thereat, he heard successive
gunshots and went out to ridehis vehicle so he could check the source of the gunshots; that when he reached the school
gate someone informed him that Floro was gunned down; that he did not see the victim because according to the people
it was boarded in a jeep and brought to the hospital; and that he and his son, Rey, confirmed that they were at the school
minutes after the incident.32

During cross examination, Mayor Carlos said that he and Floro were close friends; that he learned that he and his son
were suspects in Floro’s killing five months after the incident; that he confirmed that Rey and Calvin dela Cruz were with
him while inquiring about the shooting at the school; and that he denied having met Felix on April 4, 2004, seeing
Rosalinda after April 5, 2004, or that Servando was his bodyguard.33

Accused-appellant Rey testified that in the early evening of April 5, 2004 he was in his house and was planning
tocampaign at Barangay Matagantang, Placer, Masbate; that on his way to said barangay, he passed by Celera
Elementary School and noticed his father’s vehicle, and that there were several people thereat; that he stopped and
stayed in the school for a few minutes, and then proceeded to meet his candidates for counselors at Ranio’s house; and
that afterwards, they all went to Barangay Matagantang.34

On cross examination, Rey expressed that this criminal case may be politically motivated because his opponents could
not attribute anything to him since he won as mayor.35

Quirino narrated that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he and his family were having supper at their house located in front
of Celera Elementary School’s guardhouse, when they heard gunshots; that they immediately laid down, while Quirino ran
across the road and took cover at the school fence; that he peeped through the fence and saw three persons firing a gun;
that he could not identify them or their victim because it was a bit dark; that after 10 to 20 seconds, hewent back home;
that a certain Joel Alcantara and his companions went to him asking him to go with them inside the school, once inside
the school, they saw Floro lying face down; that he took the liberty to go to the police headquarters located five minutes
away; and that when he and the Placer Chief of Police arrived at the school, he noticed Mayor Carlos, Sr. standing near
the gate.36

For his part, accused-appellant Nonong testified that in the evening of April 5, 2004 he was engaged in a drinking spree in
Nining Berdida’s house at Barangay Pili, Placer, Masbate; and that he stayed in her place until 11:00 p.m.37

During his cross examination, accused-appellant Nonong acknowledged that Mayor Carlos, Sr. is his uncle and Rey is his
second cousin; that he was not Mayor Carlos, Sr.’s bodyguard, but admitted that he handled the latter’s fighting cocks;
and admitted that Barangay Pili is 40 to 45 minutes away from the poblacionof Placer. 38

Edel related that in the evening of April 5, 2004, he was sleeping in his house when Rey called him to go to Ranio’s house
in Placer, Masbate for a meeting; that their group passed by Celera Elementary School and saw that there were plenty of
people, one of whom was Mayor Carlos, Sr.; that their group stopped to inquire about what happened, and learned that
Floro was gunned down; and that he and his group stayed for about five minutes and left.39

Accused-appellant Bulldog was also presented in court and confirmed that he was with Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his wife
attending a birthday party near the Celera Elementary School; that they went to the school to check on what happened
and learned that Floro was shot; and that they did not stay long and went home to Daraga. 40

During cross examination, he deniedthat he was the bodyguard of Mayor Carlos, Sr.; and that he was merely
accompanying the latter to help in pushing his vehicle in case the starter failed to work. 41

After trial, the RTC found the accused-appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged. The fallo of its
March 30, 2009 Decision provides:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused EX-MAYOR CARLOS ESTONILO, SR., MAYOR
REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO ESTONILO alias "EDEL ESTONILO," EUTIQUIANO ITCOBANES alias
"NONONG ITCOBANES," and CALVIN DELA CRUZ alias BULLDOG DELA CRUZ" GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of Murder with Direct Assault under Article 248 and Article 148 in relation to Article 48 all of the
Revised Penal Code and each of said accused are hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20)
years and one (1) day to forty (40) years of reclusion perpetua.

As civil liability pursuant to Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, the aforesaid sentenced the accused are all hereby
ordered to solidarily indemnify the family of the victim Floro Casas in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (₱50,000.00).
Likewise, by way of moral damages, the said accused are furthermore ordered to solidarily pay the said family the amount
of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (₱100,000.00).

The accused are, however, credited in the service of their sentence the full time during which they have been denied.

Let this case be archivedas against the accused NONOY ESTONILO, TITING BOOC, and GALIITCOBANES who have
warrants of arrest issued against them but still remain at large, pending their arrest/s.

As to the accused ORLANDO TAGALOG MATERDAM ALIAS "NEGRO MATERDAM," separate trial isnecessary
considering that he was only recently arrested when the trial of this case as to the other accused was already about to
end.42

The RTC gave credence to the eyewitness account of Antipolo and the corroborating testimony of Serapion, who were
both present at the school grounds during the shooting incident. The RTC pronounced that the evidence on record
showed unity of purpose in the furtherance of a common criminal design, that was the killing of Floro. Accused-appellants
Nonoy and Negro were the gunmen, while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong served as backup gunmen. Accused-
appellant Bulldog, and accused Gali, Titing and one alias Ace served as lookouts. 43

The RTC found accused-appellants Mayor Carlos, Sr. and Rey to have ordered their co-accused to kill Floro based on the
testimony of Servando, who was present when the group planned to kill Floro. Thus, the RTC concluded that Ex-Mayor
Carlos, Sr. is a principal by inducement. And accused-appellant Rey conspired with his father. In sum, the prosecution
was able to establish conspiracy and evident premeditation among all the accused-appellants.44

The accused-appellants’ defense of alibi and denial did not withstand the positive identification of the prosecution
witnesses. The accused appellants claimed that they were somewhere else in Placer, Masbate when the shooting took
place. However, they were not able to establish the physical improbability of their being in the crime scene at the time of
the shooting. The RTC was convinced thatthe motive for the murder was due to Floro’s support for mayoral candidate
Vicente Cotero. Since the victim was a district supervisor of public schools, the RTC convicted the accused appellants of
the complex crime of murder with direct assault.45

All five accused-appellants appealed the foregoing RTC decision to the Court of Appeals alleging that the RTC erred in
concluding that motive was duly established, in appreciating the prosecution evidence and disregarding the salient points
of the defense evidence, and in convicting the accused.46

In its May 12, 2011 Decision, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the RTC decision. 47 The dispositive part
thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, in light of the foregoing, the instant appealed is denied. The Decision dated 30 March 2009 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45 is hereby AFFIRMED with modificationin that the penalty imposed upon
accused-appellants shall simply be reclusion perpetua with its accessory penalties and that the award of civil indemnity is
increased to Seventy[-]Five Thousand Pesos (₱75,000.00).48

The Court of Appeals sustained the findings of fact and conclusions of law of the RTC considering that the RTC had
observed and monitored at close range the conduct, behavior and deportment of the witnesses as they testified. The
Court of Appeals corrected the penalty imposed, and explained that reclusion perpetuais an indivisible penalty which
should be imposed without specifying the duration.

On June 29, 2011, the accused-appellants moved for reconsideration,49 which the Court of Appeals denied in its
November 8, 2011 Resolution.50 Unsatisfied, the accused-appellants appealed their case before this Court.51

This Court’s Ruling

The accused-appellants pray for the reversal of the judgment of conviction in the criminal case on the following
assignment of errors: the RTC and the Court of Appeals erred in (1) giving credence and weight to the prosecution
evidence, (2) finding that there was conspiracy among the accused-appellants, and (3) finding the accused-appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt based on the prosecution evidence.

In essence, the defense disagrees with the disposition of the Court of Appeals affirming their conviction for murder with
direct assault on the ground that some of the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses constitute circumstantial evidence,
and that the prosecution was not able to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

The appeal fails.

After a review of the record of the case, this Court sustains the conviction of the accused-appellants for murder with direct
assault.

The age-old rule is that the task ofassigning values to the testimonies of witnesses on the witness stand and weighing
their credibility is best left to the trial court which forms its first-hand impressions as a witness testifies before it. It is, thus,
no surprise that findings and conclusions of trial courts on the credibility of witnesses enjoy, asa rule, a badge of respect,
for trial courts have the advantage of observing the demeanor of witnesses as they testify. 52

This Court had nevertheless carefully scrutinized the records but found no indication that the trial and the appellate courts
overlooked or failed to appreciate facts that, if considered, would change the outcome of this case. The trial court and the
appellate court did not err in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, particularly of Antipolo who
was an eyewitness to the crime.

Antipolo’s testimony did not suffer from any serious and material inconsistency that could possibly detract from his
credibility. He identified the accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro as those who fired at Floro about seven times,
while accused-appellants Edel and Nonong were on standby also holding their firearms. He also witnessed accused Gali
shouting to the gunmen to stop and escape. He narrated that after all the accused left, Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey and
Materdam arrived aboard the mayor’s vehicle. He also heard Mayor Carlos said "leave it because it’s already dead." From
his direct and straightforward testimony, there is no doubt as to the identity of the culprits.
To successfully prosecute the crime of murder, the following elements must be established: 53 (1) that a person was killed;
(2) that the accused killed him or her; (3) that the killing was attended by any of the qualifying circumstances mentioned in
Article 248of the Revised Penal Code; and (4) that the killing is not parricide or infanticide.54

In this case, the prosecution was able to clearly establish that (1) Floro was killed; (2) Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr., Rey, Edel,
Nonong, and Calvin were five of the nine perpetrators who killed him; (3) the killing was attended by the qualifying
circumstance of evident premeditation as testified to by prosecution eyewitnesses, Servando and Antipolo, as well as
treachery as below discussed; and (4) the killing of Floro was neither parricide nor infanticide.

Of the four elements, the second and third elements are essentially contested by the defense. The Court finds that the
prosecution unquestionably established these two elements.

For the second element, the prosecution presented pieces of evidence which when joined together point to the accused-
appellants as the offenders. Foremost, there is motive to kill Floro. It was Floro’s support for Vicente Cotero, who was
Rey’s opponent for the position of mayor in Placer, Masbate. Second, the prosecution was able to establish that the
accused appellants planned to kill Floro on two separate occasions. The prosecution witness, Servando, was present in
Mayor Carlos, Sr.’shouse when they were plotting to kill Floro. He also heard Mayor Carlos, Sr. say "ipatumba si Floro
Casas." Third, Antipolo was an eye witness to the killing. His testimony was corroborated by another witness, Serapion,
who testified having seen the accused-appellants leaving the school a few minutes after he heard the gunshots. Serapion
also recounted having heard one of them said "mission accomplished sir," after which, Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered them to
leave.

Essentially, the prosecution evidence consists of both direct evidence and circumstantial evidence. The testimony of the
eyewitness Antipolo is direct evidence of the commission of the crime.

Circumstantial evidence is that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in issue may be
established by inference.55 It consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of the main
fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.56 Here, the circumstantial evidence consists of the
testimonies of Servando and Serapion. Servando was present when Mayor Carlos, Sr. ordered his men to kill Floro.
Whether this order was executed can be answered by relating it to Antipolo’s eyewitness account as well as Serapion’s
testimony.

As for the third element of qualifying circumstance, the prosecution witness, Servando, testified that he was present on
the two occasions when the accused-appellants were planning tokill Floro. His categorical and straight forward narration
proves the existence of evident premeditation.

Treachery also attended the killing of Floro. For treachery to be present, two elements must concur: (1) at the time of the
attack, the victim was not in a position to defend himself; and (2) the accused consciously and deliberately adopted the
particular means, methods, or forms of attack employed by him. The essence of treachery is that the attack is deliberate
and without warning, done in a swift and unexpected way, affording the hapless, unarmed and unsuspecting victim no
chance to resist or escape. In this case, accused-appellant Nonoy and accused Negro successively fired at Floro about
seven times – and the victim sustained 13 gunshot wounds all found to have been inflicted at close range giving the latter
no chance at all to evade the attack and defend himself from the unexpected onslaught. Accused-appellants Edel and
Nonong were on standby also holding their firearms to insure the success of their "mission" without risk to themselves;
and three others served as lookouts. Hence, there is no denying that their collective acts point to a clear case of
treachery.
Defense of denial and alibi
The twin defenses of denial and alibi raised by the accused-appellants must fail in light of the positive identification made
by Antipolo and Serapion. Alibi and denial are inherently weak defenses and must be brushed aside when the prosecution
has sufficiently and positively ascertained the identity of the accused as in this case. It is also axiomatic that positive
testimony prevails over negative testimony.57 The accused-appellants’ alibis that they were at different places at the time
of the shooting are negative and self-serving and cannot be given more evidentiary value vis-à-vis the affirmative
testimony of credible witnesses. The accused-appellants, the victim, and the prosecution witnesses reside in the same
municipality and are, therefore, familiar with one another. More so, that the two principal accused in this case are
prominent political figures. Therefore, the prosecution witnesses could not havebeen mistaken on the accused appellants’
identity including those who remained at large.

Further, it has been held that for the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must prove the following: (i) that he was
present at another place at the time of the perpetration of the crime; and (ii) that it was physically impossible for him to be
at the scene of the crime during its commission. Physical impossibility involves the distance and the facility of access
between the crime scene and the location of the accused when the crime was committed; the accused must demonstrate
that he was so far away and could not have been physically present atthe crime scene and its immediate vicinity when the
crime was committed.58 Here, the accused-appellants utterly failed to satisfy the above-quoted requirements. In fact,
Mayor Carlos, Sr. and his other co-accused, except for Nonong, admitted that they were near the school before the
incident and at the school minutes after the killing took place. Certainly, the distance was not too far as to preclude the
presence of accused-appellants at the school, and/or for them to slip away from where they were supposed to be,
unnoticed.

Penalties

On the offense committed by accused-appellants, the RTC correctly concluded that they should be held accountable for
the complex crime of direct assault with murder. There are two modes of committing atentados contra la autoridad o sus
agentesunder Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. Accused-appellants committed the second form of assault, the
elements of which are that there must be an attack, use of force, or serious intimidation or resistance upon a person in
authority or his agent; the assault was made when the said person was performing his duties or on the occasion of such
performance; and the accused knew that the victim is a person in authority or his agent, that is, that the accused must
have the intention to offend, injure or assault the offended party as a person in authority or an agent of a person in
authority.

In this case, Floro was the duly appointed District Supervisor of Public Schools, Placer, Masbate, thus, was a person in
authority. But contrary to the statement of the RTC that there was direct assault just because Floro was a person in
authority, this Court clarifies that the finding of direct assault is based on the fact that the attack or assault on Floro was, in
reality, made by reason of the performance of his duty as the District Supervisor.

When the assault results in the killing of that agent or of a person in authority for that matter, there arisesthe complex
crime of direct assault with murder or homicide.

The offense is a complex crime, the penalty for which is that for the graver offense, to be imposed in the maximum period.
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act No. 7659, provides for the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death for the felony of murder; thus, the imposable penalty should have been death. Plus the fact that there
exists an aggravating circumstance, pursuant to Article 63, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code, the proper penalty is
death. But the imposition of death penalty has been prohibited by Republic Act No. 9346, entitled "An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines"; thus, the RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly imposed
upon accused-appellants the penalty of reclusion perpetua.

The Proper Indemnities

As to the proper monetary awards imposable for the crime charged, modifications must be made herein.1âwphi1 The
award of ₱100,000.00 each as civil indemnity and moral damages is proper to conform with current jurisprudence. 59

Further, when a crime is committed with an aggravating circumstance either as qualifying or generic, an award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 223060 of the New Civil Code. Thus, conformably with the above, the legal
heirs of the victim are also entitled to an award of exemplary damages 61 in the amount of ₱100,000.00.

Lastly, an interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum shall be imposed on all the damages awarded, to earn from
the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid, in line with prevailing jurisprudence.62

At this point, notice must be made that on January 28, 2014, the Superintendent, New Bilibid Prison informed this Court of
the death of accused-appellant Ex-Mayor Carlos, Sr. on January 9, 2013. In view thereof, the case against deceased Ex-
Mayor Carlos, Sr. is hereby ordered dismissed.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court of Appeals Decision dated May 12, 2011 in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 04142,
affirming the Decision dated March 30, 2009, promulgated by the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 45, in Criminal
Case No. 05-238607, finding accused appellants REINARIO "REY" ESTONILO, EDELBRANDO "EDEL" ESTONILO,
EUTIQUIANO "NONONG" ITCOBANES, and CAL VIN "BULLDOG" DELA CRUZ GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of
Murder with Direct Assault, is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS, the award of civil indemnity and moral damages
is increased to ₱100,000.00 each, in addition to ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages, and the imposition of 6% thereon
as legal interest upon finality of this Court's Decision.

SO ORDERED.
LYDIA C. GELIG, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

An examination of the entire records of a case may be explored for the purpose of arriving at a correct conclusion, as an
appeal in criminal cases throws the whole case open for review, it being the duty of the court to correct such error as may
be found in the judgment appealed from.1

Petitioner Lydia Gelig (Lydia) impugns the Decision2 promulgated on January 10, 2006 by the Court of Appeals (CA) in
CA-G.R. CR No. 27488 that vacated and set aside the Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Cebu City, Branch 23,
in Criminal Case No. CU-10314. The RTC Decision convicted Lydia for committing the complex crime of direct assault
with unintentional abortion but the CA found her guilty only of the crime of slight physical injuries.

Factual Antecedents

On June 6, 1982, an Information4 was filed charging Lydia with Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion committed as
follows:

That on the 17th day of July, 1981 at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, at Barangay Nailon, Municipality of Bogo,
Province of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then
and there, willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously assault, attack, employ force and seriously intimidate one Gemma B.
Micarsos a public classroom teacher of Nailon Elementary School while in the performance of official duties and functions
as such which acts consequently caused the unintentional abortion upon the person of the said Gemma S. Micarsos.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Lydia pleaded not guilty during her arraignment. Thereafter, trial ensued.

The Prosecution’s Version

Lydia and private complainant Gemma B. Micarsos (Gemma), were public school teachers at the Nailon Elementary
School, in Nailon, Bogo, Cebu. Lydia’s son, Roseller, was a student of Gemma at the time material to this case.

On July 17, 1981, at around 10:00 o’clock in the morning, Lydia confronted Gemma after learning from Roseller that
Gemma called him a "sissy" while in class. Lydia slapped Gemma in the cheek and pushed her, thereby causing her to
fall and hit a wall divider. As a result of Lydia’s violent assault, Gemma suffered a contusion in her "maxillary area", as
shown by a medical certificate5 issued by a doctor in the Bogo General Hospital. However, Gemma continued to
experience abdominal pains and started bleeding two days after the incident. On August 28, 1981, she was admitted in
the Southern Islands Hospital and was diagnosed, to her surprise, to have suffered incomplete abortion. Accordingly, a
medical certificate6 was issued.

The Defense’s Version

Lydia claimed that she approached Gemma only to tell her to refrain from calling her son names, so that his classmates
will not follow suit. However, Gemma proceeded to attack her by holding her hands and kicking her. She was therefore
forced to retaliate by pushing Gemma against the wall.

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

On October 11, 2002, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Lydia of the complex crime of direct assault with
unintentional abortion. The dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the court finds the accused LYDIA GELIG, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct assault
with unintentional abortion, and she is hereby sentenced to suffer an Indeterminate Penalty of SIX (6) MONTHS OF
ARRESTO MAYOR AS MINIMUM TO FOUR (4) YEARS, TWO (2) MONTHS OF PRISION CORRECCIONAL AS
MAXIMUM. She is likewise ordered to pay the offended party the amount of Ten Thousand (₱10,000.00) Pesos as actual
damages and Fifteen Thousand (₱15,000.00) Pesos for moral damages.

SO ORDERED.7
Thus, Lydia filed an appeal.

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA vacated the trial court’s judgment. It ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for direct assault since Gemma
descended from being a person in authority to a private individual when, instead of pacifying Lydia or informing the
principal of the matter, she engaged in a fight with Lydia.8 Likewise, Lydia’s purpose was not to defy the authorities but to
confront Gemma on the alleged name-calling of her son.9

The appellate court also ruled that Lydia cannot be held liable for unintentional abortion since there was no evidence that
she was aware of Gemma’s pregnancy at the time of the incident. 10 However, it declared that Lydia can be held guilty of
slight physical injuries, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed Decision of the Regional Trial Court-Branch 23 of Cebu City, dated
October 11, 2002 is hereby VACATED AND SET ASIDE. A new one is entered CONVICTING the accused-appellant for
slight physical injuries pursuant to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of
arresto menor minimum of ten (10) days.

SO ORDERED.11

Issues

Still dissatisfied, Lydia filed this petition raising the following as errors:

1. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner is liable for Slight Physical Injuries pursuant
to Article 266 (1) of the Revised Penal Code and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of arresto menor minimum
of ten days.

2. The Honorable Court of Appeals erred in finding that the petitioner can be convicted of Slight Physical Injuries
under the information charging her for Direct Assault with Unintentional Abortion. 12

Our Ruling

The petition lacks merit.

When an accused appeals from the judgment of his conviction, he waives his constitutional guarantee against double
jeopardy and throws the entire case open for appellate review. We are then called upon to render such judgment as law
and justice dictate in the exercise of our concomitant authority to review and sift through the whole case to correct any
error, even if unassigned.13

The Information charged Lydia with committing the complex crime of direct assault with unintentional abortion. Direct
assault is defined and penalized under Article 148 of the Revised Penal Code. The provision reads as follows:

Art. 148. Direct assaults. - Any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the
attainment of any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition, or shall attack, employ
force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of his agents, while engaged in the performance of
official duties, or on occasion of such performance, shall suffer the penalty of prision correccional in its medium and
maximum periods and a fine not exceeding 1,000 pesos, when the assault is committed with a weapon or when the
offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a person in authority. If none of these
circumstances be present, the penalty of prision correccional in its minimum period and a fine not exceeding 500 pesos
shall be imposed.1avvphi1

It is clear from the foregoing provision that direct assault is an offense against public order that may be committed in two
ways: first, by any person or persons who, without a public uprising, shall employ force or intimidation for the attainment of
any of the purposes enumerated in defining the crimes of rebellion and sedition; and second, by any person or persons
who, without a public uprising, shall attack, employ force, or seriously intimidate or resist any person in authority or any of
his agents, while engaged in the performance of official duties, or on occasion of such performance. 14

The case of Lydia falls under the second mode, which is the more common form of assault. Its elements are:
 1. That the offender (a) makes an attack, (b) employs force, (c) makes a serious intimidation, or (d) makes a
serious resistance.

2. That the person assaulted is a person in authority or his agent.

3. That at the time of the assault the person in authority or his agent (a) is engaged in the actual performance of
official duties, or [b] that he is assaulted by reason of the past performance of official duties.

4. That the offender knows that the one he is assaulting is a person in authority or his agent in the exercise of his
duties.

4. That there is no public uprising.15

On the day of the commission of the assault, Gemma was engaged in the performance of her official duties, that is, she
was busy with paperwork while supervising and looking after the needs of pupils who are taking their recess in the
classroom to which she was assigned. Lydia was already angry when she entered the classroom and accused Gemma of
calling her son a "sissy". Lydia refused to be pacified despite the efforts of Gemma and instead initiated a verbal abuse
that enraged the victim. Gemma then proceeded towards the principal’s office but Lydia followed and resorted to the use
of force by slapping and pushing her against a wall divider. The violent act resulted in Gemma’s fall to the floor.

Gemma being a public school teacher, belongs to the class of persons in authority expressly mentioned in Article 152 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended. The pertinent portion of the provision reads as follows:

Art. 152. Persons in Authority and Agents of Persons in Authority – Who shall be deemed as such. –

xxxx

In applying the provisions of articles 148 and 151 of this Code, teachers, professors, and persons charged with the
supervision of public or duly recognized private schools, colleges and universities, and lawyers in the actual performance
of their professional duties or on the occasion of such performance shall be deemed persons in authority. (As amended
by Batas Pambansa Bilang 873, approved June 12, 1985).16

Undoubtedly, the prosecution adduced evidence to establish beyond reasonable doubt the commission of the crime of
direct assault. The appellate court must be consequently overruled in setting aside the trial court’s verdict. It erred in
declaring that Lydia could not be held guilty of direct assault since Gemma was no longer a person in authority at the time
of the assault because she allegedly descended to the level of a private person by fighting with Lydia. The fact remains
that at the moment Lydia initiated her tirades, Gemma was busy attending to her official functions as a teacher. She tried
to pacify Lydia by offering her a seat so that they could talk properly, 17 but Lydia refused and instead unleashed a barrage
of verbal invectives. When Lydia continued with her abusive behavior, Gemma merely retaliated in kind as would a
similarly situated person. Lydia aggravated the situation by slapping Gemma and violently pushing her against a wall
divider while she was going to the principal’s office. No fault could therefore be attributed to Gemma.

The prosecution’s success in proving that Lydia committed the crime of direct assault does not necessarily mean that the
same physical force she employed on Gemma also resulted in the crime of unintentional abortion. There is no evidence
on record to prove that the slapping and pushing of Gemma by Lydia that occurred on July 17, 1981 was the proximate
cause of the abortion. While the medical certificate of Gemma’s attending physician, Dr. Susan Jaca (Dr. Jaca), was
presented to the court to prove that she suffered an abortion, there is no data in the document to prove that her medical
condition was a direct consequence of the July 17, 1981 incident.18 It was therefore vital for the prosecution to present Dr.
Jaca since she was competent to establish a link, if any, between Lydia’s assault and Gemma’s abortion. Without her
testimony, there is no way to ascertain the exact effect of the assault on Gemma’s abortion.

It is worth stressing that Gemma was admitted and confined in a hospital for incomplete abortion on August 28, 1981,
which was 42 days after the July 17, 1981 incident. This interval of time is too lengthy to prove that the discharge of the
fetus from the womb of Gemma was a direct outcome of the assault. Her bleeding and abdominal pain two days after the
said incident were not substantiated by proof other than her testimony. Thus, it is not unlikely that the abortion may have
been the result of other factors.

The Proper Penalty

Having established the guilt of the petitioner beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of direct assault, she must suffer the
penalty imposed by law. The penalty for this crime is prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods and a fine
not exceeding ₱1,000.00, when the offender is a public officer or employee, or when the offender lays hands upon a
person in authority.19 Here, Lydia is a public officer or employee since she is a teacher in a public school. By slapping and
pushing Gemma, another teacher, she laid her hands on a person in authority.1avvphi1

The penalty should be fixed in its medium period in the absence of mitigating or aggravating circumstances. 20 Applying
the Indeterminate Sentence Law,21 the petitioner should be sentenced to an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is
within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e., arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its
minimum period, and the maximum of which is that properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods.

Thus, the proper and precise prison sentence that should be imposed must be within the indeterminate term of four (4)
months and one (1) day to two (2) years and four (4) months of arresto mayor, maximum to prision correccional minimum
to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days of prision
correccional in its medium and maximum periods. A fine of not more than ₱1,000.00 must also be imposed on Lydia in
accordance with law.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals finding petitioner Lydia Gelig guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of slight physical injuries is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Judgment is hereby rendered finding Lydia Gelig guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of direct assault and is ordered to suffer an indeterminate prison term of one (1)
year and one (1) day to three (3) years, six (6) months and twenty-one (21) days of prision correccional. She is also
ordered to pay a fine of ₱1,000.00.

SO ORDERED.
 Crimes Against Public Interest

G.R. No. 179448 June 26, 2013

CARLOS L. TANENGGEE, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is the December 12, 2006
Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653 affirming with modification the June 25, 1999
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 30, in Criminal Case Nos. 98-163806-10 finding Carlos L."
Tanenggee (petitioner) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of five counts of estafa through falsification of commercial
documents. Likewise questioned is the CA's September 6, 2007 Resolution4 denying petitioner's Motion for
Reconsideration5 and Supplemental Motion for Reconsideration.6

Factual Antecedents

On March 27, 1998, five separate Informations7 for estafa through falsification of commercial documents were filed
against petitioner. The said Informations portray the same mode of commission of the crime as in Criminal Case No. 98-
163806 but differ with respect to the numbers of the checks and promissory notes involved and the dates and amounts
thereof, viz:

That on or about July 24, 1997, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused, being then a private individual, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud, thru falsification of commercial document, the
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST CO. (METROBANK), represented by its Legal officer, Atty. Ferdinand R. Aguirre, in
the following manner: herein accused, being then the Manager of the COMMERCIO BRANCH OF METROBANK located
at the New Divisoria Market Bldg., Divisoria, Manila, and taking advantage of his position as such, prepared and filled up
or caused to be prepared and filled up METROBANK Promissory Note Form No. 366857 with letters and figures reading
"BD#083/97" after the letters reading "PN", with figures reading "07.24.97" after the word "DATE", with the amount of
₱16,000,000.00 in words and in figures, and with other words and figures now appearing thereon, typing or causing to be
typed at the right bottom thereof the name reading "ROMEO TAN", feigning and forging or causing to be feigned and
forged on top of said name the signature of Romeo Tan, affixing his own signature at the left bottom thereof purportedly to
show that he witnessed the alleged signing of the said note by Romeo Tan, thereafter preparing and filling up or causing
to be prepared and filled up METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK NO. CC 0000001531, a commercial document, with date
reading "July 24, 1997", with the name reading "Romeo Tan" as payee, and with the sum of ₱15,362,666.67 in words and
in figures, which purports to be the proceeds of the loan being obtained, thereafter affixing his own signature thereon, and
directing the unsuspecting bank cashier to also affix his signature on the said check, as authorized signatories, and finally
affixing, feigning and forging or causing to be affixed, feigned and forged four (4) times at the back thereof the signature of
said Romeo Tan, thereby making it appear, as it did appear that Romeo Tan had participated in the preparation,
execution and signing of the said Promissory Note and the signing and endorsement of the said METROBANK
CASHIER’S CHECK and that he obtained a loan of ₱16,000,000.00 from METROBANK, when in truth and in fact, as the
said accused well knew, such was not the case in that said Romeo Tan did not obtain such loan from METROBANK,
neither did he participate in the preparation, execution and signing of the said promissory note and signing and
endorsement of said METROBANK CASHIER’S CHECK, much less authorize herein accused to prepare, execute and
affix his signature in the said documents; that once the said documents were forged and falsified in the manner above set
forth, the said accused released, obtained and received from the METROBANK the sum of ₱15,363,666.67 purportedly
representing the proceeds of the said loan, which amount, once in his possession, with intent to defraud, he
misappropriated, misapplied and converted to his own personal use and benefit, to the damage and prejudice of the said
METROBANK in the same sum of ₱15,363,666.67, Philippine currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

On May 27, 1998, the RTC entered a plea of not guilty for the petitioner after he refused to enter a plea. 9 The cases were
then consolidated and jointly tried.

The proceedings before the RTC as aptly summarized by the CA are as follows:

During the pre-trial, except for the identity of the accused, the jurisdiction of the court, and that accused was the branch
manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from July 1997 to December 1997, no other stipulations were entered into.
Prosecution marked its exhibits "A" to "L" and sub-markings.
 xxxx

The prosecution alleged that on different occasions, appellant caused to be prepared promissory notes and cashier’s
checks in the name of Romeo Tan, a valued client of the bank since he has substantial deposits in his account, in
connection with the purported loans obtained by the latter from the bank. Appellant approved and signed the cashier’s
check as branch manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch. Appellant affixed, forged or caused to be signed the
signature of Tan as endorser and payee of the proceeds of the checks at the back of the same to show that the latter had
indeed endorsed the same for payment. He handed the checks to the Loans clerk, Maria Dolores Miranda, for
encashment. Once said documents were forged and falsified, appellant released and obtained from Metrobank the
proceeds of the alleged loan and misappropriated the same to his use and benefit. After the discovery of the irregular
loans, an internal audit was conducted and an administrative investigation was held in the Head Office of Metrobank,
during which appellant signed a written statement (marked as Exhibit "N") in the form of questions and answers.

The prosecution presented the following witnesses:

Valentino Elevado, a member of the Internal Affairs Department of Metrobank, testified that he conducted and interviewed
the appellant in January 1998; that in said interview, appellant admitted having committed the allegations in the
Informations, specifically forging the promissory notes; that the proceeds of the loan were secured or personally received
by the appellant although it should be the client of the bank who should receive the same; and that all the answers of the
appellant were contained in a typewritten document voluntarily executed, thumbmarked, and signed by him (Exhibit "N").

Rosemarie Tan Apostol, assistant branch manager, testified that the signatures appearing on the promissory notes were
not the signatures of Romeo Tan; that the promissory notes did not bear her signature although it is required, due to the
fact that Romeo Tan is a valued client and her manager accommodated valued clients; that she signed the corresponding
checks upon instruction of appellant; and that after signing the checks, appellant took the same which remained in his
custody.

Eliodoro M. Constantino, NBI Supervisor and a handwriting expert, testified that the signatures appearing on the
promissory notes and specimen signatures on the signature card of Romeo Tan were not written by one and the same
person.

Maria Dolores Miranda, a Loans Clerk at Metrobank Commercio Branch, testified that several cashier’s checks were
issued in favor of Romeo Tan; that appellant instructed her to encash the same; and that it was appellant who received
the proceeds of the loan.

For his defense, appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee testified that he is a holder of a Masters degree from the Asian Institute
of Management, and was the Branch Manager of Metrobank Commercio Branch from 1994 until he was charged in 1998
[with] the above-named offense. He was with Metrobank for nine (9) years starting as assistant manager of Metrobank
Dasmariñas Branch, Binondo, Manila. As manager, he oversaw the day to day operations of the branch, solicited
accounts and processed loans, among others.

Appellant claimed that he was able to solicit Romeo Tan as a client-depositor when he was the branch manager of
Metrobank Commercio. As a valued client, Romeo Tan was granted a credit line for forty million pesos (₱40,000,000.00)
by Metrobank. Tan was also allowed to open a fictitious account for his personal use and was assisted personally by
appellant in his dealings with the bank. In the middle of 1997, Tan allegedly opened a fictitious account and used the
name Jose Tan. Such practice for valued clients was allowed by and known to the bank to hide their finances due to
rampantkidnappings or from the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) or from their spouses.

According to appellant, Tan availed of his standing credit line (through promissory notes) for five (5) times on the following
dates: 1) 24 July 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000.00), 2) 27 October 1997 for six million pesos
(₱6,000,000.00), 3) 12 November 1997 for three million pesos (₱3,000,000.00), 4) 21 November 1997 for sixteen million
pesos (₱16,000,000,00), 5) 22 December 1997 for two million pesos (₱2,000,000.00). On all these occasions except the
loan on 24 July 1997 when Tan personally went to the bank, Tan allegedly gave his instructions regarding the loan
through the telephone. Upon receiving the instructions, appellant would order the Loans clerk to prepare the promissory
note and send the same through the bank’s messenger to Tan’s office, which was located across the street. The latter
would then return to the bank, through his own messenger, the promissory notes already signed by him. Upon receipt of
the promissory note, appellant would order the preparation of the corresponding cashier’s check representing the
proceeds of the particular loan, send the same through the bank’s messenger to the office of Tan, and the latter would
return the same through his own messenger already endorsed together with a deposit slip under Current Account No.
258-250133-7 of Jose Tan. Only Cashier’s Check dated 21 November 1997 for sixteen million pesos (₱16,000,000.00)
was not endorsed and deposited for, allegedly, it was used to pay the loan obtained on 24 July 1997. Appellant claimed
that all the signatures of Tan appearing on the promissory notes and the cashier’s checks were the genuine signatures of
Tan although he never saw the latter affix them thereon.

In the middle of January 1998, two (2) Metrobank auditors conducted an audit of the Commercio Branch for more than a
week. Thereafter or on 26 January 1998, appellant was asked by Elvira Ong-Chan, senior vice president of Metrobank, to
report to the Head Office on the following day. When appellant arrived at the said office, he was surprised that there were
seven (7) other people present: two (2) senior branch officers, two (2) bank lawyers, two (2) policemen (one in uniform
and the other in plain clothes), and a representative of the Internal Affairs unit of the bank, Valentino Elevado.

Appellant claimed that Elevado asked him to sign a paper (Exhibit "N") in connection with the audit investigation; that he
inquired what he was made to sign but was not offered any explanation; that he was intimidated to sign and was
threatened by the police that he will be brought to the precinct if he will not sign; that he was not able to consult a lawyer
since he was not apprised of the purpose of the meeting; and that "just to get it over with" he signed the paper which
turned out to be a confession. After the said meeting, appellant went to see Tan at his office but was unable to find the
latter. He also tried to phone him but to no avail.10

Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

After the joint trial, the RTC rendered a consolidated Decision 11 dated June 25, 1999 finding petitioner guilty of the crimes
charged, the decretal portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, the Court finds the accused, Carlos Lo Tanenggee, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of
estafa thru falsification of commercial documents charged in each of the five (5) Informations filed and hereby sentences
him to suffer the following penalties:

1. In Criminal Case No. 98-163806, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of
prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory
penalties provided by law.

2. In Criminal Case No. 98-163807, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of
prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱16 Million with interest at 18% per annum
counted from 27 November 1997 until fully paid.

3. In Criminal Case No. 98-163808, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of
prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱6 Million with interest at 18% per annum
counted from 27 October 1997 until fully paid.

4. In Criminal Case No. 98-163809, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of
prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱2 Million with interest at 18% per annum
counted from 22 December 1997 until fully paid.

5. In Criminal Case No. 98-163810, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years of
prision mayor as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion temporal as maximum including the accessory
penalties provided by law, and to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱3 Million with interest at 18% per annum
counted from 12 November 1997 until fully paid.

Accused shall serve the said penalties imposed successively.

As mandated in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum duration of the sentence imposed shall not be more
than threefold the length of time corresponding to the most severe of the penalties imposed upon him and such maximum
period shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.

SO ORDERED.12

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

Petitioner appealed the judgment of conviction to the CA where the case was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 23653. On
December 12, 2006, the CA promulgated its Decision13 affirming with modification the RTC Decision and disposing of the
appeal as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED for lack of merit and the Decision dated 25 June 1999 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Manila, Branch 30 convicting the accused-appellant Carlos Lo Tanenggee on five counts of estafa through
falsification of commercial documents is hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-163806,
he is further ordered to indemnify Metrobank the sum of ₱16 Million with interest at 18% per annum counted from 24 July
1997 until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.14

On December 29, 2006,15 petitioner moved for reconsideration, which the CA denied per its September 6, 2007
Resolution.16

Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court raising the basic issues of: (1)
whether the CA erred in affirming the RTC’s admission in evidence of the petitioner’s written statement based on its
finding that he was not in police custody or under custodial interrogation when the same was taken; and, (2) whether the
essential elements of estafa through falsification of commercial documents were established by the prosecution. 17

The Parties’ Arguments

While he admits signing a written statement,18 petitioner refutes the truth of the contents thereof and alleges that he was
only forced to sign the same without reading its contents. He asserts that said written statement was taken in violation of
his rights under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, particularly of his right to remain silent, right to counsel, and right
to be informed of the first two rights. Hence, the same should not have been admitted in evidence against him.

On the other hand, respondent People of the Philippines, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), maintains that
petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence since the constitutional proscription invoked by petitioner does not
apply to inquiries made in the context of private employment but is applicable only in cases of custodial interrogation. The
OSG thus prays for the affirmance of the appealed CA Decision.

Our Ruling

We find the Petition wanting in merit.

Petitioner’s written statement is admissible in evidence.

The constitutional proscription against the admissibility of admission or confession of guilt obtained in violation of Section
12, Article III of the Constitution, as correctly observed by the CA and the OSG, is applicable only in custodial
interrogation.

Custodial interrogation means any questioning initiated by law enforcement authorities after a person is taken into custody
or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant manner. Indeed, a person under custodial investigation is
guaranteed certain rights which attach upon the commencement thereof, viz: (1) to remain silent, (2) to have competent
and independent counsel preferably of his own choice, and (3) to be informed of the two other rights above. 19 In the
present case, while it is undisputed that petitioner gave an uncounselled written statement regarding an anomaly
discovered in the branch he managed, the following are clear: (1) the questioning was not initiated by a law enforcement
authority but merely by an internal affairs manager of the bank; and, (2) petitioner was neither arrested nor restrained of
his liberty in any significant manner during the questioning. Clearly, petitioner cannot be said to be under custodial
investigation and to have been deprived of the constitutional prerogative during the taking of his written statement.

Moreover, in Remolona v. Civil Service Commission,20 we declared that the right to counsel "applies only to admissions
made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation." Amplifying further on the matter,
the Court made clear in the recent case of Carbonel v. Civil Service Commission: 21

However, it must be remembered that the right to counsel under Section 12 of the Bill of Rights is meant to protect a
suspect during custodial investigation. Thus, the exclusionary rule under paragraph (2), Section 12 of the Bill of Rights
applies only to admissions made in a criminal investigation but not to those made in an administrative investigation. 22
Here, petitioner’s written statement was given during an administrative inquiry conducted by his employer in connection
with an anomaly/irregularity he allegedly committed in the course of his employment. No error can therefore be attributed
to the courts below in admitting in evidence and in giving due consideration to petitioner’s written statement as there is no
constitutional impediment to its admissibility.

Petitioner’s written statement was given voluntarily, knowingly and intelligently.

Petitioner attempts to convince us that he signed, under duress and intimidation, an already prepared typewritten
statement. However, his claim lacks sustainable basis and his supposition is just an afterthought for there is nothing in the
records that would support his claim of duress and intimidation.

Moreover, "it is settled that a confession or admission is presumed voluntary until the contrary is proved and the
confessant bears the burden of proving the contrary." 23 Petitioner failed to overcome this presumption. On the contrary,
his written statement was found to have been executed freely and consciously. The pertinent details he narrated in his
statement were of such nature and quality that only a perpetrator of the crime could furnish. The details contained therein
attest to its voluntariness. As correctly pointed out by the CA:

As the trial court noted, the written statement (Exhibit N) of appellant is replete with details which could only be supplied
by appellant. The statement reflects spontaneity and coherence which cannot be associated with a mind to which
intimidation has been applied. Appellant’s answers to questions 14 and 24 were even initialed by him to indicate his
conformity to the corrections made therein. The response to every question was fully informative, even beyond the
required answers, which only indicates the mind to be free from extraneous restraints. 24

In People v. Muit,25 it was held that "one of the indicia of voluntariness in the execution of petitioner’s extrajudicial
statement is that it contains many details and facts which the investigating officers could not have known and could not
have supplied without the knowledge and information given by him."

Also, the fact that petitioner did not raise a whimper of protest and file any charges, criminal or administrative, against the
investigator and the two policemen present who allegedly intimidated him and forced him to sign negate his bare
assertions of compulsion and intimidation. It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of
compulsion, where he did not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no
physical evidence of violence was presented, his extrajudicial statement shall be considered as having been voluntarily
executed.26

Neither will petitioner’s assertion that he did not read the contents of his statement before affixing his signature thereon
"just to get it over with" prop up the instant Petition. To recall, petitioner has a masteral degree from a reputable
educational institution and had been a bank manager for quite a number of years. He is thus expected to fully understand
and comprehend the significance of signing an instrument. It is just unfortunate that he did not exercise due diligence in
the conduct of his own affairs. He can therefore expect no consideration for it.

Forgery duly established.

"Forgery is present when any writing is counterfeited by the signing of another’s name with intent to defraud." 27 It can be
established by comparing the alleged false signature with the authentic or genuine one. A finding of forgery does not
depend entirely on the testimonies of government handwriting experts whose opinions do not mandatorily bind the courts.
A trial judge is not precluded but is even authorized by law28 to conduct an independent examination of the questioned
signature in order to arrive at a reasonable conclusion as to its authenticity.

In this case, the finding of forgery on the signature of Romeo Tan (Tan) appearing in the promissory notes and cashier’s
checks was not anchored solely on the result of the examination conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI)
Document Examiner. The trial court also made an independent examination of the questioned signatures and after
analyzing the same, reached the conclusion that the signatures of Tan appearing in the promissory notes are different
from his genuine signatures appearing in his Deposit Account Information and Specimen Signature Cards on file with the
bank. Thus, we find no reason to disturb the above findings of the RTC which was affirmed by the CA. A rule of long
standing in this jurisdiction is that findings of a trial court, when affirmed by the CA, are accorded great weight and
respect. Absent any reason to deviate from the said findings, as in this case, the same should be deemed conclusive and
binding to this Court.

No suppression of evidence on the part of the prosecution.

Petitioner claims that the prosecution should have presented Tan in court to shed light on the matter. His non-presentation
created the presumption that his testimony if given would be adverse to the case of the prosecution. Petitioner thus
contends that the prosecution suppressed its own evidence.

Such contention is likewise untenable. The prosecution has the prerogative to choose the evidence or the witnesses it
wishes to present. It has the discretion as to how it should present its case.29 Moreover, the presumption that suppressed
evidence is unfavorable does not apply where the evidence was at the disposal of both the defense and the
prosecution.30 In the present case, if petitioner believes that Tan is the principal witness who could exculpate him from
liability by establishing that it was Tan and not him who signed the subject documents, the most prudent thing to do is to
utilize him as his witness. Anyway, petitioner has the right to have compulsory process to secure Tan’s attendance during
the trial pursuant to Article III, Section 14(2)31 of the Constitution. The records show, however, that petitioner did not
invoke such right. In view of these, no suppression of evidence can be attributed to the prosecution.

Petitioner’s denial is unavailing.

The Court is also not persuaded by the bare and uncorroborated allegation of petitioner that the loans covered by the
promissory notes and the cashier’s checks were personally transacted by Tan against his approved letter of credit,
although he admittedly never saw Tan affix his signature thereto. Again, this allegation, as the RTC aptly observed, is not
supported by established evidence. "It is settled that denials which are unsubstantiated by clear and convincing evidence
are negative and self-serving evidence. They merit no weight in law and cannot be given greater evidentiary value over
the testimony of credible witnesses who testified on affirmative matters."32 The chain of events in this case, from the
preparation of the promissory notes to the encashment of the cashier’s checks, as narrated by the prosecution witnesses
and based on petitioner’s own admission, established beyond reasonable doubt that he committed the unlawful acts
alleged in the Informations.

Elements of falsification of commercial documents established.

Falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article 172 in relation to Article 171 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
refers to falsification by a private individual or a public officer or employee, who did not take advantage of his official
position, of public, private or commercial document. The elements of falsification of documents under paragraph 1, Article
172 of the RPC are: (1) that the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage
of his official position; (2) that he committed any of the acts of falsification enumerated in Article 171 of the RPC;33 and, (3)
that the falsification was committed in a public, official or commercial document.

All the above-mentioned elements were established in this case. First, petitioner is a private individual. Second, the acts
of falsification consisted in petitioner’s (1) counterfeiting or imitating the handwriting or signature of Tan and causing it to
appear that the same is true and genuine in all respects; and (2) causing it to appear that Tan has participated in an act or
proceeding when he did not in fact so participate. Third, the falsification was committed in promissory notes and checks
which are commercial documents. Commercial documents are, in general, documents or instruments which are "used by
merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions." 34 Promissory notes facilitate credit
transactions while a check is a means of payment used in business in lieu of money for convenience in business
transactions. A cashier’s check necessarily facilitates bank transactions for it allows the person whose name and
signature appear thereon to encash the check and withdraw the amount indicated therein. 35

Falsification as a necessary means to commit estafa.

When the offender commits on a public, official or commercial document any of the acts of falsification enumerated in
Article 171 as a necessary means to commit another crime like estafa, theft or malversation, the two crimes form a
complex crime. Under Article 48 of the RPC, there are two classes of a complex crime. A complex crime may refer to a
single act which constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies or to an offense as a necessary means for
committing another.

In Domingo v. People,36 we held:

The falsification of a public, official, or commercial document may be a means of committing estafa, because before the
falsified document is actually utilized to defraud another, the crime of falsification has already been consummated,
damage or intent to cause damage not being an element of the crime of falsification of public, official or commercial
document. In other words, the crime of falsification has already existed. Actually utilizing that falsified public, official or
commercial document to defraud another is estafa. But the damage is caused by the commission of estafa, not by the
falsification of the document. Therefore, the falsification of the public, official or commercial document is only a necessary
means to commit estafa.

"Estafa is generally committed when (a) the accused defrauded another by abuse of confidence, or by means of deceit,
and (b) the offended party or a third party suffered damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary estimation."37 Deceit is the
false representation of a matter of fact, whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by
concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall
act upon it to his legal injury."38

The elements of estafa obtain in this case. By falsely representing that Tan requested him to process purported loans on
the latter’s behalf, petitioner counterfeited or imitated the signature of Tan in the cashier’s checks.1âwphi1 Through these,
petitioner succeeded in withdrawing money from the bank. Once in possession of the amount, petitioner thereafter
invested the same in Eurocan Future Commodities. Clearly, petitioner employed deceit in order to take hold of the money,
misappropriated and converted it to his own personal use and benefit, and these resulted to the damage and prejudice of
the bank in the amount of about ₱43 million.

Taken in its entirety, the proven facts show that petitioner could not have withdrawn the money without falsifying the
questioned documents. The falsification was, therefore, a necessary means to commit estafa, and falsification was
already consummated even before the falsified documents were used to defraud the bank. The conviction of petitioner for
the complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Document by the lower courts was thus proper.
The Proper Imposable Penalty

The penalty for falsification of a commercial document under Article 172 of the RPC is prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods and a fine of not more than ₱5,000.00.

The penalty in estafa cases, on the other hand, as provided under paragraph 1, Article 315 of the RPC is prision
correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in its minimum period39 if the amount defrauded is over ₱12,000.00
but does not exceed ₱22,000.00. If the amount involved exceeds the latter sum, the same paragraph provides the
imposition of the penalty in its maximum period with an incremental penalty of one year imprisonment for every
₱10,000.00 but in no case shall the total penalty exceed 20 years of imprisonment.

Petitioner in this case is found liable for the commission of the complex crime of estafa through falsification of commercial
document. The crime of falsification was established to be a necessary means to commit estafa. Pursuant to Article 48 of
the Code, the penalty to be imposed in such case should be that corresponding to the most serious crime, the same to be
applied in its maximum period. The applicable penalty therefore is for the crime of estafa, being the more serious offense
than falsification.

The amounts involved in this case range from ₱2 million to ₱16 million. Said amounts being in excess of ₱22,000.00, the
penalty imposable should be within the maximum term of six (6) years, eight (8) months and twenty-one (21) days to eight
(8) years of prision mayor, adding one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00. Considering the amounts involved, the
additional penalty of one (1) year for each additional ₱10,000.00 would surely exceed the maximum limitation provided
under Article 315, which is twenty (20) years. Thus, the RTC correctly imposed the maximum term of twenty (20) years of
reclusion temporal.

There is need, however, to modify the penalties imposed by the trial court as affirmed by the CA in each case respecting
the minimum term of imprisonment. The trial court imposed the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment from eight (8) years
of prision mayor as minimum which is beyond the lawful range. Under the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the minimum
term of the penalty should be within the range of the penalty next lower to that prescribed by law for the offense. Since the
penalty prescribed for the estafa charge against petitioner is prision correccional maximum to prision mayor minimum, the
penalty next lower would then be prision correccional in its minimum and medium periods which has a duration of six (6)
months and one (1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months. Thus, the Court sets the minimum term of the indeterminate
penalty at four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional. Petitioner is therefore sentenced in each case to
suffer the indeterminate penalty of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional as minimum to twenty (20)
years of reclusion temporal as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 23653
dated December 12, 2006 and September 6, 2007, respectively, are hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that the
minimum term of the indeterminate sentence to be imposed upon the petitioner should be four (4) years and two (2)
months of prision correccional.
SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 229701

EDWINA RIMANDO y FERNANDO, Petitioner

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent

This is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking the reversal of the Court of
Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated September 6, 2016 and Resolution2 dated January 31, 2017 in CA-G.R. CR No. 36422.
The CA affirmed the Decision3 dated February 6, 2014 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 137 of Makati City, in
Criminal Case No. 12-1761.

An Information was filed against Romeo Rimando y Cachero and Edwina Rimando y Fernando charging them with
violation of Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), to wit:

On the 14th day of September 2012, in the City of Makati, the Philippines, accused conspiring and confederating together
and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with
intent to use, have in their possession, custody and control false and counterfeit 100 pieces U.S. Dollars which are bank
notes, knowing that said notes are all falsified and counterfeit.

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The Facts

We quote the narration of facts of the CA, as follows:

Prosecution's Evidence:

Alex Muñez, Bank Officer I of the Investigation Division, Task Department, Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas (BSP) Complex,
East Avenue, Diliman, Quezon City, testified that:

a) He was tasked to conduct investigations, make arrests and conduct searches and seizures in all cases adversely
affecting the integrity of currencies pursuant to BSP Circular 599, Series of 2008. He recognized appellants because the
latter were arrested for violation of Art. 168 of the RPC;

b) Sometime in July 2012, his office received information from their confidential informant that a certain Pastor Danny and
Datu Romy and their cohorts were involved in the distribution, manufacture, and printing of counterfeit US dollar notes.
They validated the information by conducting a surveillance on the suspects, including appellant Romeo Rimando, also
known as Datu Romy;

c) On September 5, 2012, the confidential informant introduced him to the group of counterfeiters at Farmer's Market,
Araneta Center, Cubao, Quezon City. His team subsequently conducted a test-buy around 3 o'clock in the afternoon. He
was able to buy 3 pieces of USDl00 counterfeit notes for ₱500 per piece. He knew that the notes were fake because he
had been trained to detect counterfeit currencies;

d) In the morning of September 14, 2012, Romeo Rimando called him and offered to sell 100 pieces of USDl00 counterfeit
notes at ₱500 per piece. His office formed a team to conduct an entrapment operation;

e) It was agreed that he and appellants' group would meet at Savory Restaurant along Makati Avenue. Before proceeding
to the venue, they coordinated with the Tactical Operation Center of Philippine National Police (PNP). By 2:00 in the
afternoon, they were already at the restaurant. When Romeo Rimando arrived, he was accompanied by appellant Edwina
Rimando. Members of the entrapment team were strategically positioned in the area;

t) Romeo Rimando talked to him. He asked Romeo Rimando about the counterfeit notes. Romeo Rimando handed him
the counterfeit notes while he gave Romeo Rimando the marked money. After receiving the marked money, Romeo
Romando went over to appellant Edwina Rimando and placed the money inside her bag. Appellants started to walk away
when he gave the prearranged signal-placing his eyeglasses on top of his head. The team then closed in and arrested
appellants.
Reynaldo Paday, Senior Currency Specialist, Investigation Division, Cash Department, BSP, testified that:

1) He was part of the team that conducted the test-buy on September 5, 2012 at Farmer's Market. He was assigned to
assist poseur buyer Alex Muñez and secure the confidential informant during the testbuy. He was about 150 meters from
Alex Muñez when the test-buy took place;

2) Alex Muñez bought 3 pieces of USDl00 counterfeit notes. Afterwards, the team went back to the office and he made an
initial verification of the 3 notes. He later issued a temporary certification that said notes were fake;

3) On September 14, 2012 their team conducted an entrapment operation at Savory Restaurant in Makati Avenue. He
was tasked to secure the perimeter and assist Alex Muñez, who was waiting for the suspect. He observed that an old man
talked with Alex Muñez. Afterwards, Alex Muñez put his eyeglasses on top of his head, the prearranged signal;

4) After they had closed in, he grabbed Romeo Rimando and told the latter he was under arrest. Appellant Edwina
Rimando, who accompanied Romeo Rimando, was also arrested by one of the agents. They proceeded to the vehicle
and conducted an inventory of the 100 pieces of counterfeit notes and marked money. He examined and verified the 100
pieces of notes and concluded that they were counterfeited;

Sylvia Tamayo, Assistant Manager of the Currency Analysis and Redemption Division, Cash Department of the BSP,
confirmed that she issued a Certification dated September 17, 2012. She certified that the 100 pieces US dollar bills were
counterfeit, viz:

This is to certify that the one hundred (100) pieces 100 US Dollar notes submitted for verification as to their genuineness
by Mr. Reynaldo L. Paday, Senior Currency Specialist, Investigation Division, Cash Department per memorandum of even
date and more particularly described as follows:

Denomination Serial Number No. of pieces Amount

100-US Dollar Note AE73685100B 2 US$200.00
-do- AE73685101B 2 200.00
-do- AE73685102B 2 200.00
AE73685103B
-do- 8 800.00
AE73685110B
AE73685112B
-do- 3 300.00
AE73685114B
AE73685116B
-do- 36 3,600.00
AE73685151B
-do- AE73685152B 2 200.00
-do- AE73685153B 3 300.00
-do- AE73685154B 3 300.00
-do- AE73685155B 3 300.00
AE73685156B
-do- 4 400.00
AE7368159B
AE73685170B
-do- 8 800.00
AE73685177B
-do- AE73685 l 78B 1 100.00
AE73685179B
-do- 1 100.00
AE73685178B
-do- AE73685180B 1 100.00
 AE73685182B
-do- 16 1,600.00
AE73685197B
AE73685199B
-do- 3 300.00
AE73685201B
-do- AE73685246B 1 100.00
-do- AE73685249B 1 100.00
100 pcs. US$10,000.00

had been found to be COUNTERFEIT after examination conducted by the Currency Analysis and Redemption Division,
this Department and are therefore being retained by Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas pursuant to BSP Circular No. 61, Series
of 1995. The abovementioned notes had been stamped "COUNTERFEIT" (Subject Romeo Rimando y Cachero a.k.a.
"Datu Romie" and Edwina Rimando y Fernando).

Glenn Peterson, Special Agent of the US Secret Service in Guam testified: the 100 pieces of US Dollar bills were referred
to him for examination. He examined each note under a magnifying glass. Unlike genuine US Dollar notes which were
printed, using Intaglo and Typographic Printing Method, the 100 counterfeit bills were printed with the use of an inkjet
printer.

Appellants' Evidence:

Appellant Edwina Rimando, a freelance real estate agent, testified:

a) At 2:00 in the afternoon of September 14, 2012, she was in Makati Tower Hotel in Kalayaan Street
Makati City. She was invited there by a certain Pong to meet a certain Emily about an old coins
transaction. Her husband, Romeo Rimando, was with her. Emily invited them to eat at a Pizza Hut behind
the hotel. Once there, they just sat on the sofa. Emily left them to smoke and make a call. She followed
Emily outside and the latter told her to look for another restaurant. They walked towards Kalayaan and
Burgos. While waiting for the stop light to change, she and her husband were suddenly apprehended by
the group of Alex Muñez. Pong and Emily suddenly disappeared. They were forced to ride a silver Toyota
Innova;

b) She and her husband were handcuffed. Agent Armida Superales took her bag and said: "Boss,
negative." She also saw Agent Superales take out from her side something wrapped in plastic and put it
inside the bag. When they reached the BSP premises in Quezon City, Agent Superales opened the bag
and declared that there were US dollar bills and a bundle of marked money inside. She and Agent
Superales had an argument;

c) The agents took Romeo Rimando to another room while she was left at the front desk. Alex Munez and
Reynaldo Paday interrogated her and she was asked to admit that the counterfeit notes came from her.
She was afraid because they were threatening her. They told her she could not do anything because
there were no witnesses around. The agents also informed her that they had a companion who was a
shooter. She just kept silent. She was further told that if she admitted the crime, she would be made a
civilian agent, given cash rewards, and set free after the inquest;

Appellant Romeo Rimando, a scrap agent, testified:

1. On September 14, 2012, he and his wife were somewhere along Makati Avenue. They went there upon
invitation by a certain Pong who wanted to transact with them about old coins. They all met at Makati
Tower Hotel with a certain Emily. According to Pong, Emily was a trusted buyer of a hotel guest;

2. They met and talked at the ground floor of the hotel. Afterwards, Emily invited them to have lunch at a
nearby Pizza Hut. There was no table available at the restaurant so Emily suggested they go to Andok's
on Jupiter Street. On the road, they were arrested by a group of 10 agents who had 3 vehicles.

3. He and his wife were handcuffed and forced into a Toyota Innova. Emily and Pong were walking ahead
of them and did not notice that they were already arrested.1awp++i1 When Emily and Pong looked back,
 the two did not concern themselves with what transpired. They were taken to a parking lot near the
Makati Tower Hotel. Inside the Innova, he saw through the back mirror that Pong and Emily were talking
to the operatives;

4. On their way to BSP, their cellphones were taken. Agent Superales grabbed his wife's shoulder bag.
They were told that it was SOP to confiscate their belongings. He saw Agent Superales put into his wife's
bag a plastic wrapped bundle of US dollar bills and marked money worth ₱50,000.00;

5. When they arrived at BSP, Alex Muñez brought him to the storeroom. Alex Muñez took out his pistol
and placed it on top of the table. Alex Muñez also had a plastic bag and said it was going to be used on
him. He was interrogated and told to just admit that the confiscated notes belonged to them;

6. His wife was interrogated by Reynaldo Paday. Afterwards, he and his wife got seated at a table with
Alex Muñez. Alex Muñez was writing his initials on the dollar bills. Photographs were taken of him, his
wife, and the alleged confiscated items;

7. The process ended at 2 o'clock the following day. They were told that they could sleep on the chairs.
Later that day, they were taken for inquest.5

Accordingly, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision dated February 6, 2014. The dispositive portion states:

WHEREFORE PREMISES CONSIDERED, this court finds and declares both accused ROMEO RIMANDO y CACHERO
and EDWINA RIMANDO y FERNANDO GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offense as defined in Art. 168, and
penalized in Art. 166 paragraph I of the Revised Penal Code; and hereby sentence each of them to suffer an
indeterminate penalty of Eight (8) years and One (I) day of prision mayor in its medium period as minimum to Ten (10)
years Eight (8) months and One (I) day of prision mayor in its maximum period as maximum; to pay a fine of ₱5,000.00
and to pay the cost.

The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to bum the one hundred three (103) pieces of counterfeit US$100 dollar notes
subject of the offense.

SO ORDERED.

Before the CA, accused-appellants assigned the following errors, to wit:

I.

The RTC gravely erred in finding that all the elements of the crime charged have been established beyond reasonable
doubt.

II.

The RTC gravely erred in admitting in evidence exhibits "E" to "E-99" (counterfeit US dollar notes) since there were
doubts as to whether a valid entrapment operation took place and whether the counterfeit notes presented in court were
the same ones allegedly confiscated from the accused-appellants.

III.

The RTC gravely erred in admitting in evidence against accused-appellants exhibits "F" to "F-2" (counterfeit US dollar
notes) since there was no proof that they owned or possessed the said counterfeit notes as the same were recovered
from pastor Danny and not from the accused-appellants.

IV.

The RTC gravely erred in giving full faith and credence to the testimonies of agents Alex Muñez and Reynaldo Paday
despite their contradictory statements.6

The CA, in its Decision dated September 6, 2016, affirmed in toto the Decision of the RTC, to wit:
ACCORDINGLY, the appeal is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 6, 2014 is AFFIRMED in all
respects.1âwphi1

SO ORDERED.

Initially, Romeo signified his intention to appeal his case. However, he decided to withdraw his appeal through a letter
dated March 16, 2017.7

On October 7, 2016, Edwina filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

Issue

Whether or not the CA erred in affirming the conviction of petitioner Edwina Rimando.

Ruling of this Court

Inarguably, the resolution of the issues raised by petitioner in her Brief requires us to inquire into the sufficiency of the
evidence presented, including the credibility of the witnesses, a course of action which this Court, as a general rule, will
not do, consistent with our repeated holding that this Court is not a trier of facts. Well-settled is the rule that only questions
of law should be raised in petitions filed under Rule 45. This Court is not a , trier of facts and will not entertain questions of
fact as the factual findings of the appellate court, when supported by substantial evidence, are final, binding or conclusive
on the parties and upon this Court.8

But where the trial court overlooked, misunderstood or misapplied some facts or circumstances of weight and substance
which can affect the result of the case, this Court is duty-bound to correct this palpable error for the right to liberty, which
stands second only to life in the hierarchy of constitutional rights, cannot be lightly taken away. 9 It is the unique nature of
an appeal in a criminal case that the appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate court
to correct, cite, and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they are assigned or unassigned. 10

After a careful review of the records of the case, we sustain the ruling of the CA with respect to the validity of the
entrapment operation conducted by the BSP agents and its findings as to the existence of all the elements of the crime of
illegal possession and use of false treasury bank notes as defined under Article 168 of the Revised Penal Code. The CA
did not also commit grave abuse of discretion in giving credence to the testimonies of the prosecution witnesses and on
the basis thereof, convicted Romeo.

Having charged that petitioner acted in conspiracy with Romeo, it was, however, incumbent upon the prosecution to prove
that both the accused had come to an agreement concerning the commission of the crime and decided to execute the
agreement.

In holding that petitioner conspired with Romeo, the CA quoted with approval the trial court's observation, to wit:

Notwithstanding that Edwina's participation on September 14, 2012 seemed merely to accompany her husband Romeo,
the commonality of intent to pass on and sell counterfeit US$ notes was evident and inferable from the following
circumstances: (1) it was husband Romeo who offered to sell the counterfeit US$ notes to the agent of the BSP; (2)
Edwina accompanied her husband to Makati City coming all the way from their residence in Quezon City; (3) upon arrival
at the designated meeting place, which was in front of the Original Savory restaurant along Makati Avenue, she merely
distanced herself from her husband and Agent Muñez but did not leave them alone entirely; (4) when her husband
handed over to her the marked money, she willingly accepted and placed it inside her handbag; (5) upon receipt of the
marked money she and her husband proceeded to leave the place together. 11

We do not agree.

It bears stressing that conspiracy requires the same degree of proof required to establish the crime beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission without proof of cooperation or
agreement to cooperate is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy.12 In this regard, our ruling in Bahilidad v.
PeopIe13 is instructive, thus:

There is conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony and decide
to commit it. Conspiracy is not presumed. Like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy
must be proven beyond reasonable doubt. While conspiracy need not be established by direct evidence, for it may be
inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the commission of the crime, all taken together,
however, the evidence must be strong enough to show the community of criminal design. For conspiracy to exist, it is
essential that there must be a conscious design to commit an offense. Conspiracy is the product of intentionality on the
part of the cohorts.

It is necessary that a conspirator should have performed some overt act as a direct or indirect contribution to the
execution of the crime committed. The overt act may consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime
itself, or it may consist of moral assistance to his co-conspirators by being present at the commission of the crime or by
exerting moral ascendancy over the other co-conspirators. Hence, the mere presence of an accused at the discussion of
a conspiracy, even approval of it, without any active participation in the same, is not enough for purposes of conviction.

In the instant case, we find petitioner's participation in the crime not adequately proved with moral certainty. There were
no overt acts attributed to her adequate to hold her equally guilty of the crime proved.

Article 168 of the RPC, under which petitioner was charged, provides:

ART. 168. Illegal possession and use of false treasury or bank notes and other instruments of credit. Unless the act be
one of those coming under the provisions of any of the preceding articles, any person who shall knowingly use or have in
his possession, with intent to use any of the false or falsified instruments referred to in this section, shall suffer the penalty
next lower in degree than that prescribed in said articles.

The elements of the crime charged for violation of said law are: (1) that any treasury or bank note or certificate or other
obligation and security payable to bearer, or any instrument payable to order or other document of credit not payable to
bearer is forged or falsified by another person; (2) that the offender knows that any of the said instruments is forged or
falsified; and (3) that he either used or possessed with intent to use any of such forged or falsified instruments.14

None of these elements are present in the case of petitioner. The prosecution was not able to prove that she was even
aware of the counterfeit US$ notes. Moreover, there was no showing that petitioner had a hand or active participation in
the consummation of the illegal transaction. In fact, petitioner was not present during the test-buy operation conducted by
the team of Alex Muñez nor was she spotted during the surveillance.

Mere presence at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission is not, by itself, sufficient to establish
conspiracy.15 To establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or approval of an
illegal act is required.16 Nevertheless, mere knowledge, acquiescence or approval of the act, without the cooperation or
agreement to cooperate, is not enough to constitute one a party to a conspiracy, but that there must be intentional
participation in the transaction with a view to the furtherance of the common design and purpose. 17

The fact that petitioner accompanied her husband at the restaurant and allowed her husband to place the money inside
her bag would not be sufficient to justify the conclusion that conspiracy existed. In order to hold an accused liable as co-
principal by reason of conspiracy, he or she must be shown to have performed an overt act in pursuance or in furtherance
of conspiracy.18

This Court has held that an overt or external act

is defined as some physical activity or deed, indicating the intention to commit a particular crime, more than a mere
planning or preparation, which if carried out to its complete termination following its natural course, without being
frustrated by external obstacles nor by the spontaneous desistance of the perpetrator, will logically and necessarily ripen
into a concrete offense. The raison d'etre for the law requiring a direct overt act is that, in a majority of cases, the conduct
of the accused consisting merely of acts of preparation has never ceased to be equivocal; and this is necessarily so,
irrespective of his declared intent. It is that quality of being equivocal that must be lacking before the act becomes one
which may be said to be a commencement of the commission of the crime, or an overt act or before any fragment of the
crime itself has been committed, and this is so for the reason that so long as the equivocal quality remains, no one can
say with certainty what the intent of the accused is. It is necessary that the overt act should have been the ultimate step
towards the consummation of the design. It is sufficient if it was the first or some subsequent step in a direct movement
towards the commission of the offense after the preparations are made. The act done need not constitute the last
proximate one for completion. It is necessary, however, that the attempt must have a causal relation to the intended
crime. In the words of Viada, the overt acts must have an immediate and necessary relation to the offense. 19
The record is bereft of any hint that petitioner cooperated in the commission of the crime under Article 168 of the RPC.
Taken together, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the test of moral certainty in order to establish that
petitioner conspired with her husband Romeo to commit the crime. Hence, in the absence of conspiracy, if the inculpatory
facts and circumstances are capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the
accused and the other consistent with his guilt, then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty20 and is not
sufficient to support a conviction.21 Exoneration must then be granted as a matter of right.22 Thus, petitioner's acquittal is
in order.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated September 6, 2016 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner
Edwina Rimando is hereby ACQUITTED on the ground that her guilt was not proven beyond reasonable doubt.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 139857 September 15, 2006

LEONILA BATULANON, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

This petition assails the October 30, 1998 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 15221, affirming with
modification the April 15, 1993 Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City, Branch 22 in Criminal Case
Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627, convicting Leonila Batulanon of estafa through falsification of commercial documents,
and the July 29, 1999 Resolution3 denying the motion for reconsideration.

Complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May
1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the
cooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered.4

Thereafter, four informations for estafa thru falsification of commercial documents were filed against Batulanon, to wit:

Criminal Case No. 3625

That on or about the 2nd day of June, 1982 at Poblacion Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South Cotabato,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court said accused being then the manager-cashier of
Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the aff[a]irs of the cooperative,
receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members, taking advantage of her
position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 30-A of PCCI in the name of Erlinda
Omadlao by then and there making an entry therein that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan of P4,160,
Philippine Currency, and by signing on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Erlinda Omadlao showing that
she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Erlinda Omadlao was granted a loan and received the
amount of P4,160 when in truth and in fact the said person was never granted a loan, never received the same,
and never signed the cash/check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and received the
loan of P4,160 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount, and
despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the
aforementioned amount of P4,160, Philippine Currency. 5

Criminal Case No. 3626

That on or about the 24th day of September, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, said accused being then the manager-
cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc. (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of the
cooperative, receiving payments to, and collections of, the same, and paying out loans to members taking
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: Cash/Check Voucher No. 237 A of PCCI in the
name of Gonafreda Oracion by then and there making an entry therein that the said Gonafreda Oracion was
granted a loan of P4,000.00 and by signals on the appropriate line thereon the signature of Gonafreda Oracion
showing that she received the loan, thus making it appear that the said Gonafreda Oracion was granted a loan,
received the loan of P4,000.00 when in truth and in fact said person was never granted a loan, never received the
same, and never signed the Cash/Check voucher issued in her name, and in furtherance of her criminal intent
and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same and received
the amount of P4,000.00 and thereafter misappropriate and convert to her own use and benefit the said amount,
and despite demands, refused and still refuses to restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of PCCI, in the
aforementioned amount of P4,000, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6

Criminal Case No. 3453

 That on or about the 10th day of October 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being then the
manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI), entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of
the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of the same and paying out loans to members, taking
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one
Ferlyn Arroyo with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that the
said Ferlyn Arroyo had a fixed deposit of P1,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount of
P3,500.00, thus making it appear that the said person made a fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was
granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Ferlyn Arroyo never made such a deposit and was never
granted loan and after the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there
again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher of the PCCI in the name of Ferlyn Arroyo by signing therein the signature of
Ferlyn Arroyo, thus making it appear that the said Ferlyn Arroyo received the loan of P3,500, Philippine Currency,
when in truth and in fact said Ferlyn Arroyo never received the loan, and in furtherance of her criminal intent and
fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same, and received the
amount of P3,500, and thereafter, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously misappropriate and
convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and despite demands, refused and still refuses to
restitute the same, to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of P3,500, Philippine
Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

Criminal Case No. 3627

That on or about the 7th day of December, 1982 at Poblacion, Municipality of Polomolok, Province of South
Cotabato, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court, the said accused being then the
manager-cashier of Polomolok Credit Cooperative, Inc., (PCCI) entrusted with the duty of managing the affairs of
the cooperative, receiving payments to, and collection of, the same and paying out loans to members, taking
advantage of her position and with intent to prejudice and defraud the cooperative, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously falsify a commercial document, namely: an Individual Deposits and Loan Ledger of one
Dennis Batulanon with the PCCI by then and there entering on the appropriate column of the ledger the entry that
the said Dennis Batulanon had a fixed deposit of P2,000.00 with the PCCI and was granted a loan in the amount
of P5,000.00 thus making it appear that the said person made fixed deposit on the aforesaid date with, and was
granted a loan by the PCCI when in truth and in fact Dennis Batulanon never made such a deposit and was never
granted loan and offer the document was so falsified in the manner set forth, said accused did then and there
again falsify the Cash/Check Voucher No. 374 A of PCCI in the name of Dennis Batulanon by signing therein the
signature of Dennis Batulanon, thus making it appear that the said Dennis Batulanon received the loan of
P5,000.00 when in truth and in fact said Dennis Batulanon never received the loan and in furtherance of her
criminal intent and fraudulent design to defraud PCCI said accused did then and there release to herself the same
and receive the loan of P5,000, and thereafter, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
misappropriate and convert to her own personal use and benefit the said amount, and [despite] demands, refused
and still refuses to restitute the same to the damage and prejudice of the PCCI in the aforementioned amount of
P5,000, Philippine Currency.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

The cases were raffled to Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court of General Santos City and docketed as Criminal Case
Nos. 3453, 3625, 3626 and 3627.

Batulanon pleaded not guilty to the charges, afterwhich a joint trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented Maria Theresa Medallo, Benedicto Gopio, Jr., and Bonifacio Jayoma as witnesses.

Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers 9 testified that on certain
dates in 1982, Batulanon released four Cash Vouchers representing varying amounts to four different individuals as
follows: On June 2, 1982, Cash Voucher No. 30A 10 for P4,160.00 was released to Erlinda Omadlao; on September 24,
1982, Cash Voucher No. 237A11 for P4,000.00 was released to Gonafreda12 Oracion; P3, 500.00 thru Cash Voucher No.
276A13 was released to Ferlyn Arroyo on October 16, 1982 and on December 7, 1982, P5,000.00 was released to Dennis
Batulanon thru Cash Voucher No. 374A.14
Medallo testified that Omadlao, Oracion, and Dennis Batulanon were not eligible to apply for loan because they were not
bona fide members of the cooperative.15 Ferlyn Arroyo on the other hand, was a member of the cooperative but there was
no proof that she applied for a loan with PCCI in 1982. She subsequently withdrew her membership in 1983.16 Medallo
stated that pursuant to the cooperative's by-laws, only bona fide members who must have a fixed deposit are eligible for
loans.17

Medallo categorically stated that she saw Batulanon sign the names of Oracion and Arroyo in their respective cash
vouchers and made it appear in the records that they were payees and recipients of the amount stated therein.18 As to the
signature of Omadlao in Cash Voucher No. 30A, she declared that the same was actually the handwriting of appellant.19

Gopio, Jr. was a member of PCCI since 1975 and a member of its board of directors since 1979. He corroborated
Medallo's testimony that Omadlao, Arroyo, Oracion and Dennis Batulanon are not members of PCCI. He stated that
Oracion is Batulanon's sister-in-law while Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3 years old in 1982. He averred that
membership in the cooperative is not open to minors.20

Jayoma was the Vice-Chairman of the PCCI Board of Directors in 1980 before becoming its Chairman in 1982 until 1983.
He testified that the loans made to Oracion, Omadlao, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon did not pass through the
cooperative's Credit Committee and PCCI's Board of Directors for screening purposes. He claimed that Oracion's
signature on Cash Voucher No. 237A is Batulanon's handwriting. 21 Jayoma also testified that among the four loans taken,
only that in Arroyo's name was settled.22

The defense presented two witnesses, namely, Maria Theresa Medallo who was presented as a hostile witness and
Batulanon.

Medallo was subpoenaed by the trial court on behalf of the defense and was asked to bring with her the PCCI General
Journal for the year 1982. After certifying that the said document reflected all the financial transactions of the cooperative
for that year, she was asked to identify the entries in the Journal with respect to the vouchers in question. Medallo was
able to identify only Cash Voucher No. 237A in the name of Gonafreda Oracion. She failed to identify the other vouchers
because the Journal had missing pages and she was not the one who prepared the entries.23

Batulanon denied all the charges against her. She claimed that she did not sign the vouchers in the names of Omadlao,
Oracion and Arroyo; that the same were signed by the loan applicants in her presence at the PCCI office after she
personally released the money to them;24 that the three were members of the cooperative as shown by their individual
deposits and the ledger; that the board of directors passed a resolution in August 1982 authorizing her to certify to the
correctness of the entries in the vouchers; that it has become an accepted practice in the cooperative for her to release
loans and dispense with the approval of Gopio Jr., in case of his absence; 25 that she signed the loan application and
voucher of her son Dennis Batulanon because he was a minor but she clarified that she asked Gopio, Jr., to add his
signature on the documents to avoid suspicion of irregularity; 26 that contrary to the testimony of Gopio, Jr., minors are
eligible for membership in the cooperative provided they are children of regular members.

Batulanon admitted that she took out a loan in her son's name because she is no longer qualified for another loan as she
still has to pay off an existing loan; that she had started paying off her son's loan but the cooperative refused to accept her
payments after the cases were filed in court.27 She also declared that one automatically becomes a member when he
deposits money with the cooperative.28 When she was Cashier/Manager of PCCI from 1980 to 1982, the cooperative did
not have by-laws yet.29

On rebuttal, Jayoma belied that PCCI had no by-laws from 1980-1982, because the cooperative had been registered
since 1967.30

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, finding the accused Leonila Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt in all
the above-entitled case, she is sentenced in each of the four cases to 4 months of ARRESTO MAYOR to 1 year
and 2 months of PRISION CORRECTIONAL, to indemnify the PCCI in the total sum of P16,660.00 with legal
interest from the institution of the complaints until fully paid, plus costs.

SO ORDERED.31

The Court of Appeals affirmed with modification the decision of the trial court, thus:
 WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is MODIFIED. Appellant LEONILA BATULANON is found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents under Par. 2, Article 172 of the Revised Penal
Code; and is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor maximum,
AS MINIMUM, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional medium, AS MAXIMUM; to pay a fine
of five thousand (P5,000.00) pesos; and to indemnify the Polomolok Cooperative Credit , Inc. the sum of thirteen
thousand one hundred sixty (P13,160.00), plus legal interests from the filing of the complaints until fully paid, plus
costs.

SO ORDERED.32

The motion for reconsideration was denied, hence this petition.

Batulanon argues that in any falsification case, the best witness is the person whose signature was allegedly forged, thus
the prosecution should have presented Erlinda Omadlao, Gonafreda Oracion and Ferlyn Arroyo instead of relying on the
testimony of an unreliable and biased witness such as Medallo.33 She avers that the crime of falsification of private
document requires as an element prejudice to a third person. She insists that PCCI has not been prejudiced by these loan
transactions because these loans are accounts receivable by the cooperative. 34

The petition lacks merit.

Although the offense charged in the information is estafa through falsification of commercial document, appellant could be
convicted of falsification of private document under the well-settled rule that it is the allegations in the information that
determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the information. In Andaya v.
People,35 we held:

From a legal point of view, and in a very real sense, it is of no concern to the accused what is the technical name
of the crime of which he stands charged. It in no way aids him in a defense on the merits. x x x That to which his
attention should be directed, and in which he, above all things else, should be most interested, are the facts
alleged. The real question is not did he commit a crime given in the law some technical and specific name, but did
he perform the acts alleged in the body of the information in the manner therein set forth. x x x The real and
important question to him is, "Did you perform the acts alleged in the manner alleged?" not, "Did you commit a
crime named murder?" If he performed the acts alleged, in the manner stated, the law determines what the name
of the crime is and fixes the penalty therefor. x x x If the accused performed the acts alleged in the manner
alleged, then he ought to be punished and punished adequately, whatever may be the name of the crime which
those acts constitute.

The elements of falsification of private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 36 of the Revised Penal Code are: (1) that
the offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in paragraph 7, Article 171; (2) that the falsification
was committed in any private document; and (3) that the falsification caused damage to a third party or at least the
falsification was committed with intent to cause such damage.37

In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626, and 3453, Batulanon's act38 of falsification falls under paragraph 2 of Article 171, i.e.,
causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so participate. This
is because by signing the name of Omadlao, Oracion, and Arroyo in Cash Voucher Nos. 30A, 237A, and 267A,
respectively, as payee of the amounts appearing in the corresponding cash vouchers, Batulanon made it appear that they
obtained a loan and received its proceeds when they did not in fact secure said loan nor receive the amounts reflected in
the cash vouchers.

The prosecution established that Batulanon caused the preparation of the Cash Vouchers in the name of Omadlao and
Oracion knowing that they are not PCCI members and not qualified for a loan from the cooperative. In the case of Arroyo,
Batulanon was aware that while the former is a member, she did not apply for a loan with the cooperative.

Medallo categorically declared that she saw Batulanon forge the signatures of Oracion and Arroyo in the vouchers and
made it appear that the amounts stated therein were actually received by these persons. As to the signature of Arroyo,
Medallo's credible testimony and her familiarity with the handwriting of Batulanon proved that it was indeed the latter who
signed the name of Arroyo. Contrary to Batulanon's contention, the prosecution is not duty-bound to present the persons
whose signatures were forged as Medallo's eyewitness account of the incident was sufficient. Moreover, under Section
22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court, the handwriting of a person may be proved by any witness who believes it to be the
handwriting of such person because he has seen the person write, or has seen writing purporting to be his upon which the
witness has acted or been charged, and has thus acquired knowledge of the handwriting of such person.
Her insistence that Medallo is a biased witness is without basis. There is no evidence showing that Medallo was prompted
by any ill motive.

The claim that Batulanon's letter to the cooperative asking for a compromise was not an admission of guilt is untenable.
Section 27, Rule 130 of the Rules of Court provides that in criminal cases, except those involving quasi-offenses or
criminal negligence or those allowed by law to be compromised, an offer of compromise by the accused may be received
in evidence as an implied admission of guilt.

There is no merit in Batulanon's assertion that PCCI has not been prejudiced because the loan transactions are reflected
in its books as accounts receivable. It has been established that PCCI only grants loans to its bona fide members with no
subsisting loan. These alleged borrowers are not members of PCCI and neither are they eligible for a loan. Of the four
accounts, only that in Ferlyn Arroyo's name was settled because her mother, Erlinda, agreed to settle the loan to avoid
legal prosecution with the understanding however, that she will be reimbursed once the money is collected from
Batulanon.39

The Court of Appeals40 correctly ruled that the subject vouchers are private documents and not commercial documents
because they are not documents used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit
transactions41 nor are they defined and regulated by the Code of Commerce or other commercial law.42 Rather, they are
private documents, which have been defined as deeds or instruments executed by a private person without the
intervention of a public notary or of other person legally authorized, by which some disposition or agreement is proved,
evidenced or set forth. 43

In all criminal prosecutions, the burden of proof is on the prosecution to establish the guilt of the accused beyond
reasonable doubt. It has the duty to prove each and every element of the crime charged in the information to warrant a
finding of guilt for the said crime or for any other crime necessarily included therein.44 The prosecution in this case was
able to discharge its burden completely.

As there is no complex crime of estafa through falsification of private document,45 it is important to ascertain whether the
offender is to be charged with falsification of a private document or with estafa. If the falsification of a private document is
committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the estafa can be committed
without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime to be charged is estafa. Thus, in People v. Reyes,46 the
accused made it appear in the time book of the Calamba Sugar Estate that a laborer, Ciriaco Sario, worked 21 days
during the month of July, 1929, when in reality he had worked only 11 days, and then charged the offended party, the
Calamba Sugar Estate, the wages of the laborer for 21 days. The accused misappropriated the wages during which the
laborer did not work for which he was convicted of falsification of private document.

In U.S. v. Infante,47 the accused changed the description of the pawned article on the face of the pawn ticket and made it
appear that the article is of greatly superior value, and thereafter pawned the falsified ticket in another pawnshop for an
amount largely in excess of the true value of the article pawned. He was found guilty of falsification of a private document.
In U.S. v. Chan Tiao,48 the accused presented a document of guaranty purportedly signed by Ortigas Hermanos for the
payment of P2,055.00 as the value of 150 sacks of sugar, and by means of said falsified documents, succeeded in
obtaining the sacks of sugar, was held guilty of falsification of a private document.

In view of the foregoing, we find that the Court of Appeals correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Falsification of Private Documents in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453.

Article 172 punishes the crime of Falsification of a Private Document with the penalty of prision correccional in its medium
and maximum periods with a duration of two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day to six (6) years. There being no
aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period, which is three (3) years, six
(6) months and twenty-one (21) days to four (4) years, nine (9) months and ten (10) days. Taking into consideration the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulanon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty the minimum of which must be within the
range of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision correccional in its minimum period, or four (4) months and one (1)
day to two (2) years and four (4) months.49 Thus, in Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, the Court of Appeals
correctly imposed the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months
of prision correccional, as maximum, which is within the range of the allowed imposable penalty.

Since Batulanon's conviction was for 3 counts of falsification of private documents, she shall suffer the aforementioned
penalties for each count of the offense charged. She is also ordered to indemnify PCCI the amount of P11,660.00
representing the aggregate amount of the 3 loans without deducting the amount of P3,500.00 paid by Ferlyn Arroyo's
mother as the same was settled with the understanding that PCCI will reimburse the former once the money is recovered.
The amount shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the filing of the complaints on November 28, 1994 until
the finality of this judgment. From the time the decision becomes final and executory, the interest rate shall be 12% per
annum until its satisfaction.

However, in Criminal Case No. 3627, the crime committed by Batulanon is estafa and not falsification. Under Article 171
of the Revised Penal Code, the acts that may constitute falsification are the following:

1. Counterfeiting or imitating any handwriting, signature, or rubric;

2. Causing it to appear that persons have participated in any act or proceeding when they did not in fact so
participate;

3. Attributing to persons who have participated in an act or proceeding statements other than those in fact made
by them;

4. Making untruthful statements in a narration of facts;

5. Altering true dates;

6. Making any alteration or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning;

7. Issuing in an authenticated form a document purporting to be a copy of an original document when no such
original exists, or including in such copy a statement contrary to, or different from, that of the genuine original; or;

8. Intercalating any instrument or note relative to the issuance thereof in a protocol, registry, or official book.

In Criminal Case No. 3627, the trial court convicted petitioner Batulanon for falsifying Dennis Batulanon's signature in the
cash voucher based on the Information charging her of signing the name of her 3 year old son, Dennis. The records,
however, reveal that in Cash Voucher No. 374A, petitioner Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did
was to sign: "by: lbatulanon" to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not
fall under any of the modes of falsification under Article 171 because there in nothing untruthful about the fact that she
used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The
essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to
whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her liable
for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that petitioner Batulanon is also guilty
of falsification of private document with respect to Criminal Case No. 3627 involving the cash voucher of Dennis. 50

The elements of estafa through conversion or misappropriation under Art. 315 (1) (b) of the Revised Penal Code are:

(1) that money, goods or other personal property is received by the offender in trust, or on commission, or for
administration, or under any other obligation involving the duty to make delivery of, or to return, the same;

(2) that there be misappropriation or conversion of such money or property by the offender or denial on his part of
such receipt;

(3) that such misappropriation or conversion or denial is to the prejudice of another;

(4) that there is a demand made by the offended party on the offender. (Note: The 4th element is not necessary
when there is evidence of misappropriation of the goods by the defendant) 51

Thus in the case of U.S. v. Sevilla,52 the Court convicted the appellant of estafa by misappropriation. The latter, a
treasurer of the Manila Rail Road Company, took the sum of P8,330.00 out of the funds of the company and used it for
personal purposes. He replaced said cash with his personal check of the same amount drawn on the Philippine National
Bank (PNB), with instruction to his cashier not to deposit the same in the current account of the Manila Rail Road
Company until the end of the month. When an audit was conducted, the check of appellant was discovered to have been
carried in the accounts as part of the cash on hand. An inquiry with the PNB disclosed that he had only P125.66 in his
account, although in the afternoon of the same day, he deposited in his account with the PNB sufficient sum to cover the
check. In handing down a judgment of conviction, the Court explained that:
 Fraudulent intent in committing the conversion or diversion is very evidently not a necessary element of the form
of estafa here discussed; the breach of confidence involved in the conversion or diversion of trust funds takes the
place of fraudulent intent and is in itself sufficient. The reason for this is obvious: Grave as the offense is,
comparatively few men misappropriate trust funds with the intention of defrauding the owner; in most cases the
offender hopes to be able to restore the funds before the defalcation is discovered. x x x

Applying the legal principles here stated to the facts of the case, we find all of the necessary elements of estafa x
x x. That the money for which the appellant's checks were substituted was received by him for safe-keeping or
administration, or both, can hardly be disputed. He was the responsible financial officer of the corporation and as
such had immediate control of the current funds for the purposes of safe-keeping and was charged with the
custody of the same. That he, in the exercise of such control and custody, was aided by subordinates cannot alter
the case nor can the fact that one of the subordinates, the cashier, was a bonded employee who, if he had acted
on his own responsibility, might also have misappropriated the same funds and thus have become guilty of estafa.

Neither can there be any doubt that, in taking money for his personal use, from the funds entrusted to him for
safekeeping and substituting his personal checks therefor with instructions that the checks were to be retained by
the cashier for a certain period, the appellant misappropriated and diverted the funds for that period. The checks
did not constitute cash and as long as they were retained by the appellant or remained under his personal control
they were of no value to the corporation; he might as well have kept them in his pocket as to deliver them to his
subordinate with instructions to retain them.

xxxx

But it is argued in the present case that it was not the intention of the accused to permanently misappropriate the
funds to himself. As we have already stated, such intention rarely exists in cases of this nature and, as we have
seen, it is not a necessary element of the crime. Though authorities have been cited who, at first sight, appear to
hold that misappropriation of trust funds for short periods does not always amount to estafa, we are not disposed
to extend this interpretation of the law to cases where officers of corporations convert corporate funds to their own
use, especially where, as in this case, the corporation is of a quasi-public character. The statute is clear and
makes no distinction between permanent misappropriations and temporary ones. We can see no reason in the
present case why it should not be applied in its literal sense.

The third element of the crime with which the appellant is charged is injury to another. The appellant's counsel
argues that the only injury in this case is the loss of interest suffered by the Railroad Company during the period
the funds were withheld by the appellant. It is, however, well settled by former adjudications of this court that the
disturbance in property rights caused by the misappropriation, though only temporary, is in itself sufficient to
constitute injury within the meaning of paragraph 5, supra. (U.S. vs. Goyenechea, 8 Phil., 117 U.S. vs. Malong, 36
Phil., 821.)53

In the instant case, there is no doubt that as Cashier/Manager, Batulanon holds the money for administration and in trust
for PCCI. Knowing that she is no longer qualified to obtain a loan, she fraudulently used the name of her son who is
likewise disqualified to secure a loan from PCCI. Her misappropriation of the amount she obtained from the loan is also
not disputed as she even admitted receiving the same for personal use. Although the amount received by Batulanon is
reflected in the records as part of the receivables of PCCI, damage was still caused to the latter because the sum
misappropriated by her could have been loaned by PCCI to qualified members, or used in other productive undertakings.
At any rate, the disturbance in property rights caused by Batulaono's misappropriation is in itself sufficient to constitute
injury within the meaning of Article 315.

Considering that the amount misappropriated by Batulanon was P5,000.00, the applicable provision is paragraph (3) of
Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, which imposes the penalty of arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period, where the amount defrauded is over P200.00 but does not exceed P6,000.00. There
being no modifying circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period. With the application of the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, Batulaon is entitled to an indeterminate penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

(1) In Criminal Case Nos. 3625, 3626 and 3453, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of three counts of
falsification of private documents and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as
minimum, to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional, as maximum, for each count, and to
 indemnify complainant Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the amount of P11,660.00 with interest at the
rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment. The interest rate of 12% per annum
shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction; and

(2) In Criminal Case No. 3627, Leonila Batulanon is found GUILTY of estafa and is sentenced to suffer the
penalty of three (3) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to one (1) year and eight (8) months of prision
correccional, as maximum. She is likewise ordered to indemnify Polomolok Credit Cooperative Incorporated the
sum of P5,000.00 with interest at the rate of 6% per annum from November 28, 1994 until finality of this judgment.
The interest rate of 12% per annum shall be imposed from finality of this judgment until its satisfaction.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 186329

DR. FRISCO M. MALABANAN, Petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent

x-----------------------x

GR. Nos. 186584-86

ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, Petitioner,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN - 1st DIVISION, OFF'ICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, HON. SECRETARY OF
THE DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE, Respondents.

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 198598

ABUSAMA M. ALID, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

These three consolidated petitions stem from a common set of facts.

Abusama M. Alid (Alid) was the Assistant Regional Director of the Department of Agriculture (DA), Regional Field Office
No. XII, Cotabato City.1 Frisco M. !vfalabanan (Malabanan), on the other hand, was the Program Director of
the Ginintuang Masaganang Ani Rice Program (GMA Rice Program) of the DA, Field Operations Office, Diliman, Quezon
City.2

On 27 July 2004, Alid obtained a cash advance of Pl 0,496 to defray his expenses for official travel. He was supposed to
attend the turnover ceremony of the outgoing and the incoming Secretaries of the DA and to follow up, on 28 to 31 July
2004, funds intended for the GMA Rice Program. The turnover ceremony did not push through, however, and Alid's trip
was deferred.3

On 22 August 2004, Alid took Philippine Airlines (PAL) Flight PR 188 from Cotabato City to Manila under PAL Ticket No.
07905019614316 (PAL Ticket).4 He attended the turn over ceremony at the DA Central Office in Quezon City on 23
August 2004.5 The following day, or on 24 August 2004, he took a flight from Manila to Cotabato City per another ticket
issued in exchange for the PAL Ticket.6

On 1 September 2004, Alid instructed his secretary to prepare the necessary papers to liquidate the cash advance.

In his Post Travel Report, he declared that his official travel transpired on 28 to 31 July 2004. 7

He likewise attached an altered PAL Ticket in support of his Post Travel Report. The date "22 AUG 2004" was changed to
read "28 JULY 2004", and the flight route "Cotabato-Manila-Cotabato" appearing on the PAL Ticket was altered to read
"Davao-Manila-Cotabato."8

He further attached an undated Certificate of Appearance signed by Malabanan as Director of the GMA Rice
Program.9 The document stated that Alid had appeared at the DA Central Office in Quezon City from 28 to 31 July 2004
for the turnover ceremony and to follow up the status of the funds intended for the GMA Rice Program. 10

During post-audit, discrepancies in the supporting documents were found and investigated. Thereafter, the Office of the
Special Prosecutor charged Alid and Malabanan before the Sandiganbayan with falsification of public documents. 11

In SB-07-CRM-0072, Alid was indicted for falsifying his Post Travel Report, as follows:
That [on] or about July 2004, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Cotabato City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, a high ranking public
officer holding the position of Assistant Regional Director with salary grade 27 of the Department of Agriculture, Regional
Field Office No. XII, Cotabato City, taking advantage of his official position, with abuse of confidence, and committing the
offense in relation to his office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified his
Post Travel Report prepared on September 1, 2004, which is an official document, by making it appear therein that on
July 28, 2004, he proceeded to Davao to take a flight bound for Manila and that he was in Manila up to July 30, 2004 to
attend to the tum-over ceremony of incoming and outgoing DA Secretaries and to follow up the funds intended for the
Ginintuang Masaganang Ani (GMA) Rice Program projects and that on July 31, 2004, he took a taxi from his hotel to the
airport and boarded a flight back to Cotabato City, which document he submitted to support his Liquidation Voucher for
Ten Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six Pesos (₱l 0,496.00) which he cash advanced [sic] for traveling expenses to
Manila for the period July 28-31, 2004, when in truth and in fact, as the accused well knew, he did not take the aforesaid
official trip to Manila for the said period of July 28 to 30, 2004 and that the turn-over ceremony between the incoming and
outgoing DA Secretaries was postponed and moved to August 2004, nor did the accused follow up the funds for GMA
projects in the said month, thus accused made [an] untruthful statement in a narration of facts, the truth of which he was
legally bound to disclose.

CONTRARY TO LAW.12

In SB-07-CRM-0073, the Acting Deputy Special Prosecutor charged Alid with falsifying the PAL Ticket. The Information
stated:

That on or about July 2004, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Cotabato City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, a high ranking public
officer holding the position of Assistant Regional Director with salary grade 27 of the Department of Agriculture, Regional
Field Office No. XII, Cotabato City, taking advantage of his official position and committing the offense in relation to his
office, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be falsified the Philippine Airline (PAL)
plane ticket No. 07905019614316[,] a genuine document which he attached and submitted as supporting document to his
liquidation voucher for the purpose of liquidating his cash advance of Ten Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six
(₱10,496.00) Pesos as traveling expenses for the period July 28-31, 2004 thereby rendering the said plane ticket a
public/official document, which falsification was committed in the following manner to wit: that in the upper right corner of
the said plane ticket indicating the date and place of issue, accused inserted the figure/number 8 after the figure/number 2
and erased the original word Aug (August) and superimposed the [word] July to make it appear that the plane ticket was
purchased/issued on July 28, 2004, when the original date of purchase/issue was August 2, 2004; that in the portion of
the ticket indicating the flight route, accused also erased the original word "Cotabato" and superimposed therein the word
"Davao" and under the column "Date" of flight, accused erased the original figure 22 and superimposed the figure "28"
and also erased the word "Aug." and superimposed the word "Jul" to make it appear that the flight took place on July 28
originating from Davao, thus accused made alterations and intercalations in a genuine document which changed its
original meaning and perverting the truth to make it appear that he made an official trip to Manila, originating from Davao
on July 28, 2004 using a plane ticket issued/purchased on July 28, 2004 to conform with the entries in his liquidation
voucher when accused knew [full] well that he did not make such official trip on said date and route as indicated in the
aforesaid falsified PAL plane ticket.

CONTRARY TO LAW.13

In SB-07-CRM-0074, Alid and Malabanan were charged with falsifying the Certificate of Appearance that the former
attached as a supporting document for the Post Travel Report. The Information reads:

That on or about July 2004, and sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID, a high ranking public officer holding the
position of Assistant Regional Director with salary grade 27 of the Department of Agriculture (DA), Regional Field Office
No. XII, Cotabato City, conspiring and conniving with accused FRISCO MERCADO [MALABANAN], Chief Science
Research Specialist of the Philippine Rice Research Institute (Philrice) and Program Director of the Ginintuang
Masaganang Ani (GMA) [Rice] Program of the Department of Agriculture, Field Operations Service, Diliman, Quezon City,
holding a salary grade of 26, taking advantage of their official positions, with abuse of confidence and committing the
offense in relation to their respective offices, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously falsify or cause to be
falsified an undated Certificate of Appearance issued in the name of ABUSAMA MANGUDADATU ALID noted by accused
FRISCO M. MALABANAN which is an official/public document and which the former submitted as one of the supporting
document[s] to his liquidation voucher of his cash advance of Ten Thousand Four Hundred Ninety Six (₱10,496.00)
Pesos as traveling expenses for the period of July 28-31, 2004 by making it appear in the said Certificate of Appearance
that accused Abusama Mangudadatu Alid appeared in the Office of the DA Central Office, Diliman, Quezon City for the
period of July 28-31, 2004 to attend to the turn-over ceremony of incoming and outgoing DA Secretaries and to follow-up
the funds intended for the GMA Projects Implementation; when in truth and in fact, as both accused well knew, accused
Abusama Mangudadatu Alid did not travel to Manila on said date as the tum-over ceremony of the incoming and outgoing
DA Secretaries was postponed and moved to August 2004 nor did accused Alid follow up with accused Malabanan on the
said period the funds intended for the OMA projects, thus accused made an untruthful statement in a narration of facts,
the truth of which they are legally bound to disclose.

CONTRARYTO LAW.14

Upon arraignment, both Alid and Malabanan entered pleas of "not guilty."15 While the cases were pending before the
Sandiganbayan, the prosecution filed a Motion to Suspend Accused PendenteLite, praying for their preventive suspension
pending trial.16

In a Minute Resolution dated 29 October 2008, the Sandiganbayan granted the motion and ordered the
suspension pendentelite of Alid and Malabanan for 90 days.17

Both of the accused sought reconsideration, but the Sandiganbayan denied their motions in a Minute Resolution dated 30
January 2009.18

Malabanan then filed before this Court a Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition19 praying that the order of
preventive suspension be set aside, and that a writ of prohibition be issued against the Sandiganbayan to forestall the
threatened implementation of the Minute Resolutions.20 This petition was docketed as G.R. No. 186329.

Alid filed a separate Rule 65 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition21 before us, likewise praying that the order of preventive
suspension be set aside, and that a writ of prohibition be issued against the Sandiganbayan's implementation of the
Minute Resolution dated 29 October 2008.22 He further prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order pending
the resolution of the principal case.23 This petition was docketed as G.R. Nos. 186584-86.

In the meantime, the Sandiganbayan proceeded with the criminal cases and eventually rendered a Decision convicting
Alid of falsification of a private document for altering the PAL Ticket.24 The Sandiganbayan, however, acquitted both of the
accused of the other charges. The dispositive portion of its ruling reads:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, judgment is hereby rendered as follows -

1. In SB-07-CRM-0072 - ACQUITTING accused ABUSAMA M. ALID for insufficiency of evidence, with

costs de oficio;

2. In SB-07-CRM-0073 - finding accused ABUSAMA M. ALID GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code
and, with the application of the Indeterminate Sentence Law and without any mitigating or aggravating
circumstance, hereby sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ONE (1) YEAR and ONE (1)
DAY to THREE (3) YEARS, SIX MONTHS and TWENTY-ONE (21) DAYS of prision correccional, as
minimum and maximum, respectively, and to pay a fine of FIVE HUNDRED PESOS (P500.00) with costs
against the accused; and

3. In SB-07-CRM-0074 - ACQUITTING accused ABUSAMA M. ALID and FRISCO M. MALABANAN for

insufficiency of evidence, with costs de

SO ORDERED.25

Alid moved for the reconsideration of the Sandiganbayan's decision convicting him of the crime of falsification of a private
document under paragraph 2 of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.26 The prosecution likewise moved for a partial
reconsideration insofar as the acquittals were concerned. 27 However, the Sandiganbayan denied both motions.28

Alid thereafter filed the present Rule 45 Petition for Review29 before this Court, praying for the reversal of the Decision and
the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan insofar as SB-07-CRM-0073 is concerned. This petition was docketed as G.R. No.
198598.

THE COURT'S RULING

We dismiss the petitions in G.R. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86 for being moot and academic. However, we grant the
petition in G.R. No. 198598 and rule that the Sandiganbayan committed a reversible error in convicting Alid of the crime of
falsification of a private document under Article 172, paragraph 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petitions questioning the order of preventive suspension are moot and academic.

A case becomes moot and academic when, by virtue of supervening events, it ceases to present a justiciable controversy,
such that a declaration thereon would no longer be of practical value.30 As a rule, courts decline jurisdiction over such a
case or dismiss it on the ground of mootness.31

In GR. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86, Alid and Malabanan pray that the Sandiganbayan's order imposing preventive
suspension be set aside and its implementation restrained. It appears from the records, however, that the order of
preventive suspension had already been implemented by the DA on 17 March 2009, 32 and that Alid had already retired
from government service on 30 June 2009.33 Clearly, therefore, by virtue of supervening events, there is no longer any
justiciable controversy with regard to this matter, and any pronouncement that we may make upon it will no longer be of
practical value. Thus, we rule that the Rule 45 petitions in G.R. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86 should be dismissed for
mootness.

II

The Sandiganbayan erred in convicting Alid of the crime of falsification of a private document under paragraph 2
of Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code.

In G.R. No. 198598, the Sandiganbayan convicted Alid of falsification of a private document for altering the PAL Ticket.
We disagree with that conviction for two reasons.

First, a conviction for falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of Article 172 violates the right of Alid to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him given that his Information charged him only with
falsification of documents committed by a public officer under Article 171. Second, for falsifying a commercial document,
the penal provision allegedly violated by Alid was paragraph 1, and not paragraph 2, of Article 172.

Right to Be Informed of the Nature

and the Cause of Accusation

At the outset, we note that the appeal of Alid is grounded on two points: (1) that he was not the one who altered the plane
ticket; and (2) that he had no intent to cause damage. He has not raised the defense that his right to be informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation against him has been violated. However, an appeal in a criminal case opens the
whole matter for the review of any question, including those questions not raised by the parties. 34 In this case, a review is
necessary because the conviction was made in violation of the accused's constitutional rights.

One of the fundamental rights of an accused person is the right to be "informed of the nature and cause of the accusation
against him."35 This means that the accused may not be convicted of an offense unless it is clearly charged in the
Information.36 Even if the prosecution successfully proves the elements of a crime, the accused may not be convicted
thereof, unless that crime is alleged or necessarily included in the Information filed against the latter . 37

Pursuant to this constitutional right, Section 4, Rule 120 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, commands:

Section 4. Judgment in case of variance between allegation and proof. - When there is variance between the offense
charged in the complaint or information and that proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes
the offense proved, the accused shall be convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or of
the offense charged which is included in the offense proved.

Therefore, the accused can only be convicted of an offense when it is both charged and proved. If it is not charged,
although proved, or if it is proved, although not charged, the accused cannot be convicted thereof.38 In other words,
variance between the allegation contained in the Information and the conviction resulting from trial cannot justify a
conviction for either the offense charged or the offense proved unless either is included in the other.
As to when an offense includes or is included in another, Section 5 of Rule 120 provides:

Section 5. When an offense includes or is included in another. - An offense charged necessarily includes the offense
proved when some of the essential elements or ingredients of the former, as alleged in the complaint or information,
constitute the latter. And an offense charged is necessarily included in the offense proved, when the essential ingredients
of the former constitute or form a part of those constituting the latter.

Here, it cannot be overlooked that there is a variance between the felony as charged in the Information and as found in
the judgment of conviction. Applying the rules, the conviction of Alid for falsification of a private document under
paragraph 2, Article 172 is valid only if the elements of that felony constituted the elements of his indictment for
falsification by a public officer under Article 171.

Article 171 - the basis of the indictment of Alid - punishes public officers for falsifying a document by making any alteration
or intercalation in a genuine document which changes its meaning. The elements of falsification under this provision are
as follows:39

1. The offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public.

2. The offender takes advantage of his or her official position.

3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification under Article 171. 40

Article 172 of the Revised Penal Code contains three punishable acts. It reads:

Art. 172. Falsification by Private Individuals and Use of Falsified Documents. - The penalty of prisioncorreccional in its
medium and maximum periods and a fine of not more than 5,000 pesos shall be imposed upon:

1. Any private individual who shall commit any of the falsifications enumerated in the next preceding
article in any public or official document or letter of exchange or any other kind of commercial document;
and

2. Any person who, to the damage of a third party, or with the intent to cause such damage, shall in any
private document commit any of the acts of falsification enumerated in the next preceding article.

Any person who shall knowingly introduce in evidence in any judicial proceeding or to the damage of another or who, with
the intent to cause such damage, shall use any of the false documents embraced in the next preceding article or in any of
the foregoing subdivisions of this article, shall be punished by the penalty next lower in degree.

Paragraph 2 of Article 172 was the basis of Alid's conviction. Its elements are as follows:

1. The offender committed any of the acts of falsification, except those in Article 1 71 (7).

2. The falsification was committed on a private document.

3. The falsification caused damage or was committed with intent to cause damage to a third party. 41

Comparing the two provisions and the elements of falsification respectively enumerated therein, it is readily apparent that
the two felonies are different. Falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 172 goes beyond the elements of falsification
enumerated under Article 171. The former requires additional independent evidence of damage or intention to cause the
same to a third person.42 Simply put, in Article 171, damage is not an element of the crime; but in paragraph 2 of Article
172, or falsification of a private document, damage is an element necessary for conviction.

Therefore, not all the elements of the crime punished by paragraph 2, Article 172 are included under Article 1 71.
Specifically, the former offense requires the element of damage, which is not a requisite in the latter. Indeed, the
Information charging Alid of a felony did not inform him that his alleged falsification caused damage or was committed with
intent to cause damage to a third party.
Since Alid was not specifically informed of the complete nature and cause of the accusation against him, he cannot be
convicted of falsification of a private document under paragraph 2 of Article 172. To convict him therefor, as the
Sandiganbayan did, violates the very proscription found in the Constitution and our Rules of Criminal Procedure. On this
ground alone, we find that the court a quo erred in its decision.

Falsification under Articles 171 and

172 of the Revised Penal Code

Notwithstanding the erroneous conviction meted out by the Sandiganbayan, this Court proceeds to peruse the nature of
the crime established in the records of this case. In People v. Castillo,43 we emphasized a basic rule in criminal
jurisprudence: that the defendant in a criminal case may be found guilty of any offense necessarily included in the
allegation stated in the information and fully established by the evidence.

Guillergan v. People 44 declares that the falsification of documents committed by public officers who take advantage of
their official position under Article 171 necessarily includes the falsification of commercial documents by private persons
punished by paragraph 1 of Article 172. To reiterate, the elements of Article 171 are as follows:

1. The offender is a public officer, employee, or a notary public.

2. The offender takes advantage of his or her official position.

3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification under Article 171.

In turn, paragraph 1 of Article 172 contains these requisites:

1. That the offender is a private individual or a public officer or employee who did not take advantage of his or her
official position.

2. The falsification was committed in a public or official or commercial document.

3. The offender falsifies a document by committing any of the acts of falsification under Article 171.

Analyzing these felonies, we find that neither of them include damage or intent to cause damage as an element of the
crime; and that Article 171 encompasses all the elements required in a conviction for falsification under paragraph 1 of
Article 172. Thus, in Daan v. Sandiganbayan,45 we allowed the accused facing Informations for falsification of public
documents under Article 171 to plead guilty to falsification under Article 172. We specifically stated that "in the charge for
Falsification of Public Documents, petitioner may plead guilty to the lesser offense of Falsification by Private Individuals
inasmuch as it does not appear that petitioner took advantage of his official position in allegedly falsifying the time book
and payroll of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte."46

Here, if the records show sufficient allegations that would convict Al id of paragraph I of Article 172, the Sandiganbayan is
bound to sentence him to that lesser offense.1âwphi1 But, as mentioned, it overlooked this provision and jumped to
convicting him of falsification under paragraph 2 of Article 172. As discussed, the latter felony is not covered by his
indictment under Article 171.

This Court finds that the prosecution has sufficiently alleged all the elements of paragraph 1 of Article 172. As regards the
first element, Alid was a public officer who did not take advantage of his official position.

Offenders are considered to have taken advantage of their official position in falsifying a document if (1) they had the duty
to make or prepare or otherwise intervene in the preparation of the document; or (2) they had official custody of the
falsified document.47 Here, the accused definitely did not have the duty to make, prepare, or intervene in the preparation
of the PAL Ticket. Neither was it in his official custody. Therefore, when he falsified the PAL Ticket, he did not take
advantage of his official position as Assistant Regional Director of the DA.

Anent the second element, the Sandiganbayan concluded that because the PAL Ticket was a private document, Alid
should not have been charged with falsifying a public document. However, the PAL Ticket fell under the category of
commercial documents, which paragraph 1 of Article 172 protects from falsification.
Commercial documents or papers are those used by merchants or business persons to promote or facilitate trade or
credit transactions. Examples include receipts, order slips, and invoices. 48 In Seaoil Petroleum Corporation v. Autocorp
Group, 49 we considered a sales invoice a commercial document and explained:

The Vehicle Sales Invoice [Autocorp sold to Seaoil one unit Robex 200 LC Excavator paid for by checks issued by one
Romeo Valera] is the best evidence of the transaction. A sales invoice is a commercial document. Commercial documents
or papers are those used by merchants or businessmen to promote or facilitate trade or credit transactions. Business
forms, e.g., order slip, delivery charge invoice and the like, are commonly recognized in ordinary commercial transactions
as valid between the parties and, at the very least, they serve as an acknowledgment that a business transaction has in
fact transpired.

In this case, since the PAL Ticket functioned as a sales invoice that memorialized the consummation of the commercial
transaction between the air carrier and the passenger, the Sandiganbayan should have considered the fact that Alid had
altered a commercial document.

Finally, the accused did not dispute that he had altered a genuine document. The date "22 AUG 2004" was changed to
read "28 JULY 2004"; and the flight route "Cotabato-Manila-Cotabato" appearing on the PAL Ticket was altered to read
"Davao-Manila-Cotabato."50 Hence, the third element of the felony punished by paragraph 1 of Article 172 is apparent in
this case.

Criminal Liability of the Accused

Criminal intent or mens rea must be shown in felonies committed by means of dolo, such as falsification.51 Such intent is a
mental state, the existence of which is shown by the overt acts of a person. 52 Thus, the acts of Alid must have displayed,
with moral certainty, his intention to pervert the truth before we adjudge him criminally liable. In cases of falsification, we
have interpreted that the criminal intent to pervert the truth is lacking in cases showing that (1) the accused did not benefit
from the falsification; and (2) no damage was caused either to the government or to a third person.

In Amora, Jr. v. Court of Appeals,53 the accused construction contractor was absolved even if he had admittedly falsified
time books and payrolls. The Court appreciated the fact that he did not benefit from the

transaction and was merely forced to adjust the supporting papers in order to collect the piece of work he had actually
constructed. On that occasion, we explained at length the nuanced appreciation of criminal intent in falsification of
documents, viz.:

Although the project was truly a contract for a piece of work, nevertheless he used the daily wage method and not the
contract vouchers. This was not his idea but by the municipal mayor and treasurer to prepare a payroll and list of laborers
and their period of work and to pay them the minimum wage so that the total payment would equal the total contract price.
This is the so-called bayanihan system practiced by former Mayor Bertumen and Engineer Bertumen of the 2nd
engineering district. In the payrolls only some 20 names of the 200 laborers were listed as not all of them could be
accommodated. Those not listed received their wages from those listed. As all of the utilized laborers were duly paid, not
one complained. Neither did the municipality complain. x x x.

x x x x.

From the foregoing coupled with the fact that the town of Guindulman suffered no damage and even gained on the project
(the cost of the boulders actually delivered was ₱18,285 .00 but Murillo was paid only ₱13,455.00) plus the additional fact
that the alleged complaining witness mentioned in the informations suffered no damage whatsoever and were in fact
awarded no indemnity, it is obvious that the falsifications made by the petitioners were done in good faith; there was no
criminal intent. x x x. In other words, although the accused altered a public document or made a misstatement or
erroneous assertion therein, he would not be guilty of falsification as long as he acted in good faith and no one was
prejudiced by the alteration or error. (Emphasis supplied)54

In Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board v. Court of Appeals,55 the heirs of the deceased falsified the signature of
the latter in a Notice of Appeal. The Court rejected the imputation of falsification because the forgery produced no effect:

In the instant case, given the heirs' admissions contained in several pleadings that Avelino and Pedro are already
deceased and their submission to the jurisdiction of the Regional Adjudicator as the successors-in-interest of the
decedents, the effect would be the same if the heirs did not sign the decedents' names but their own names on the
appeal.56
This Court is well aware that falsification of documents under paragraph 1 of Article 172, like Article 171, does not require
the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person as an element of conviction. But, as early as People v. Pacana,57 we
have said:

Considering that even though in the falsification of public or official documents, whether by public officials or by private
persons, it is unnecessary that there be present the idea of gain or the intent to injure a third person, for the reason that, in
contradistinction to private documents, the principal thing punished is the violation of the solemnly proclaimed, it must,
nevertheless, be borne in mind that the change in the public document must be such as to affect the integrity of the
same or to change the effects which it would otherwise produce; for unless that happens, there could not exist the
essential element of the intention to commit the crime which is required by article 1 [now Article 3] of the Penal Code.
(Emphasis supplied)58

Here we find that, similar to Amara, Jr. and Regional Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board, there is no moral certainty that
Alid benefitted from the transaction, with the government or any third person sustaining damage from his alteration of the
document.

The peculiar situation of this case reveals that Alid falsified the PAL Ticket just to be consistent with the deferred date of
the turnover ceremony for the outgoing and the incoming Secretaries of the DA Central Office in Quezon City. Notably, he
had no control as to the rescheduling of the event he had to attend. Neither did the prosecution show that he had incurred
any additional benefit when he altered the document. Moreover, after he submitted the PAL Ticket that he had used to
support his liquidation for a cash advance of ₱10,496, the public funds kept by the DA remained intact: no apparent illegal
disbursement was made; or any additional expense incurred.

Considering, therefore, the obvious intent of Alid in altering the PAL Ticket - to remedy his liquidation of cash advance
with the correct date of his rescheduled travel - we find no malice on his part when he falsified the document. For this
reason, and seeing the overall circumstances in the case at bar, we cannot justly convict Alid of falsification of a
commercial document under paragraph 1 of Article 172.

WHEREFORE, the Rule 65 petitions in G.R. Nos. 186329 and 186584-86 are hereby DISMISSED for being moot and
academic. The Rule 45 Petition for Review in G.R. No. 198598 is GRANTED. The assailed Decision and Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan are REVERSED and SETASIDE, and a new judgment is hereby rendered ACQUITTING petitioner
Abusama M. Alid in SB-07-CRM-0073.

SO ORDERED.
 Crimes Relative to Prohibited Drugs

G.R. No. 234156, January 07, 2019

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. EMMANUEL OLIVA Y JORJIL, BERNARDO BARANGOT Y

PILAIS AND MARK ANGELO MANALASTAS Y GAPASIN, Accused-Appellants.

This is an appeal from the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated May 31, 2017 dismissing Emmanuel Oliva y Jorjil,
Bernardo Barangot y Pilais and Mark Angelo Manalastas y Gapasin's appeal, and affirming the Decision 2 dated October
28, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 65, Makati City, convicting appellants of Violation of Sections 5 and
11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165.

The facts follow.

The Chief of Station Anti-Illegal Drugs - Special Operations Task Group (SAID-SOTG), on January 23, 2015, received a
report regarding the sale of dangerous drugs by a certain "Manu" in Barangay Cembo, Makati City and its nearby areas.
As such, a buy-bust operation was planned and after coordination with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA),
a buybust team was formed wherein Police Officer 3 (PO3) Luisito Marcelo was designated as the poseur-buyer and
given a P500.00 bill as marked money, and PO1 Darwin Catabay as back-up. Thereafter, the buy-bust team proceeded to
the exact location of "Manu" after it was confirmed by the confidential informant.

When they arrived at the target area, the confidential informant pointed to appellant Oliva as "Manu," the seller of
dangerous drugs; thus, PO3 Marcelo and the confidential informant approached the said appellant. PO3 Marcelo was
introduced by the confidential informant to appellant Oliva as a buyer who wanted to buy P500.00 worth of shabu. PO3
Marcelo handed appellant Oliva the marked money after the latter demanded payment. Appellant Oliva then showed PO3
Marcelo four (4) transparent plastic sachets with white crystalline substance and asked the latter to choose one.
Meanwhile, two (2) other persons, appellants Barangot and Manalastas were also at the target area to buy shabu.
Appellants Barangot and Manalastas, and PO3 Marcelo each took one sachet from the four sachets that appellant Oliva
showed.

Upon receiving the dangerous drug, PO3 Marcelo immediately scratched his chin, which is the pre-arranged signal to his
back-up that the transaction has been completed. Subsequently, PO3 Marcelo grabbed appellants Oliva and Barangot
and, thereafter, PO1 Catabay appeared and arrested appellant Manalastas.

The police officers conducted a body search on appellant Oliva and it yielded another sachet containing white crystalline
substance, the marked money and two (2) more pieces of P500.00 bills. Eventually, appellants Oliva, Barangot and
Manalastas were arrested and brought to the barangay hall where an inventory was conducted and on the basis thereof,
an inventory report was prepared. The confiscated items were then marked and photographed, and a request for
laboratory examination was accomplished and the seized items were submitted to the PNP Crime Laboratory. The
substance found inside the sachets were all tested positive for the. presence of methamphetamine hydrochloride, a
dangerous drug.

Thus, an Information for violation of Section 5, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 was filed against appellant Oliva, that reads as
follows:

On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law and without the
corresponding license and prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and distribute
zero point six (0.06) gram of white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a
dangerous drug, contained in one (1) small transparent plastic sachet, in consideration of Php500.00.

CONTRARY TO LAW.3
Also, in three informations, appellants Oliva, Barangot and Manalastas were separately charged with violation of Section
11 of the said law, thus:
Crim. Case No. 15-196
(against appellant Oliva)

On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law to possess or
otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession zero point ten (0.10) gram of white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4

Crim. Case No. 15-197

(against appellant Barangot)

On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law to possess or
otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession zero point five (0.05) gram of white crystalline substance containing methamphetamine
hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.5

Crim. Case No. 15-198

(against appellant Manalastas)

On the 24th day of January 2015, in the City of Makati, the Philippines, accused, not being authorized by law to possess or
otherwise use any dangerous drug and without the corresponding prescription, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have in his possession zero point three (0.03) gram of white crystalline substance containing
methamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu), a dangerous drug.

CONTRARY TO LAW.6
Upon arraignment, appellants, with the assistance of counsel, entered pleas of "not guilty" on all charges.

All appellants used denial as a defense.

According to appellant Oliva, on January 21, 2015, around 10:30 in the evening, he was in front of a neighbor's house
when several armed men, riding in motorcycles, stopped by and invited him to go with them. When he refused to go, one
of the armed men pointed a gun at him, handcuffed him, and forcibly took him to the SAID-SOTG office where he was
detained.

On the other hand, appellant Barangot maintained that on January 22, 2015, around 2:30 in the morning, he was having a
drinking spree with one Mel and Nonoy when several men barged inside the house and arrested them. They were then
brought to the SAID-SOTG office where they were detained, and subsequently, freed after Mel and Noy paid the police
officers for their release.

Appellant Manalastas also denied committing the offense charged against him and claimed that on the same date, he was
inside his room sleeping, when he was suddenly roused by loud noises causing him to go outside and check the
commotion. He saw armed men inside his house and, thereafter, the latter took him, his mother, a certain Bong, Ronald,
Abby and two (2) boarders to the SAID-SOTG office where they were all detained.

The RTC found appellants guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged against them and were sentenced as
follows:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 15-195, the court finds the accused, Emmanuel Oliva y Jorjil, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of violation of Section 5, Article II, R.A. No. 9165 and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).

2. In Criminal Case Nos. 15-196 to 15-198, the court finds the accused, Emmanuel Oliva y Jorjil, Bernardo Barangot y
Pilais and Mark Angelo Manalastas y Gapasin, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of violation of Section 11,
Article II, RA. No. 9165 and sentences each of them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of twelve (12) years and one (1)
day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Three Hundred
Thousand Pesos (P300,000.00).

The period of detention of the accused should be given full credit.

Let the dangerous drugs subject matter of these cases be disposed of in the manner provided by law.

The Branch Clerk of Court is directed to transmit the plastic sachets containing shabu subject matter of these cases to the
PDEA for said agency's appropriate disposition.
SO ORDERED.7
The RTC ruled that the prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of the appellants.

The CA affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto, thus:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.8
The CA ruled that the prosecution was able to establish the key elements for illegal possession and sale of dangerous
drugs, and that the bare denials of the appellants cannot prevail over the positive testimonies of the police officers. It also
held that the failure of the prosecution to show that the police officers conducted the required physical inventory and take
the photograph of the objects confiscated does not ipso facto render inadmissible in evidence the items seized.

Hence, the present appeal.

Appellants assigned the following errors:

I.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES'
INCREDULOUS TESTIMONIES.

II.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIMES
CHARGED DESPITE THE POLICE OFFICERS' NON-COMPLIANCE WITH SECTION 21 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165
AND ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES AND REGULATIONS.

III.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ADMITTING THE ALLEGEDLY SEIZED DRUGS DESPITE THE POLICE
OFFICERS' FLAWED MANNER IN THE CONDUCT OF INVENTORY AND MARKING THE SAME.

IV.

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH EVERY LINK IN THE CHAIN OF CUSTODY OF THE ALLEGEDLY
SEIZED ITEMS.9
Appellants argue that it is difficult to believe the testimonies of the police officers because it is impossible for appellants to
engage in drug transactions in the middle of the street, under broad daylight, and in the presence of strangers. They also
claim that the arresting officers failed to immediately conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the
same in the presence of the accused, their representative or counsel, a representative of the media and the Department
of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who are required to sign the copies of the inventory. Thus, according to
appellants, the prosecution failed to establish every link in the chain of custody of the seized items.

The appeal is meritorious.

Under Section 5, Article II of R.A. No, 9165 or illegal sale of prohibited drugs, in order to be convicted of the said violation,
the following must concur:
(1) the identity of the buyer and the seller, the object of the sale and its consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
and the payment therefor.10

In illegal sale of dangerous drugs, it is necessary that the sale transaction actually happened and that "the [procured]
object is properly presented as evidence in court and is shown to be the same drugs seized from the accused." 11
Also, under Section 11, Article II of R.A. No. 9165 or illegal possession of dangerous drugs the following must be proven
before an accused can be convicted:
[1] the accused was in possession of dangerous drugs; [2] such possession was not authorized by law; and [3] the
accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of dangerous drugs.12
In both cases involving illegal sale and illegal possession, the illicit drugs confiscated from the accused comprise
the corpus delicti of the charges.13 In People v. Gatlabayan,14 the Court held that it is of paramount importance that the
identity of the dangerous drug be established beyond reasonable doubt; and that it must be proven with certitude that the
substance bought during the buy-bust operation is exactly the same substance offered in evidence before the court. In
fine, the illegal drug must be produced before the court as exhibit and that which was exhibited must be the very same
substance recovered from the suspect.15 Thus, the chain of custody carries out this purpose "as it ensures that
unnecessary doubts concerning the identity of the evidence are removed."16

To ensure an unbroken chain of custody, Section 21(1) of R.A. No. 9165 specifies:
(1) The apprehending team having in trial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.
Supplementing the above-quoted provision, Section 21(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No.
9165 provides:
(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the
Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team,
whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures; Provided, further, that noncompliance with these requirements
under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by
the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and custody over said items[.]
On July 15, 2014, R.A. No. 1064017 was approved to amend R.A. No. 9165. Among other modifications, it essentially
incorporated the saving clause contained in the IRR, thus:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the dangerous drugs, controlled precursors and essential
chemicals, instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
conduct a physical inventory of the seized items and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s
from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, with an elected public official
and a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof: Provided, That the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the
place where the search warrant is served; or at the nearest police station or at the nearest office of the apprehending
officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of warrantless seizures: Provided, finally That noncompliance of these
requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly
preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall not render void and invalid such seizures and custody over said items.
In her Sponsorship Speech on Senate Bill No. 2273, which eventually became R.A. No. 10640, Senator Grace Poe
admitted that "while Section 21 was enshrined in the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act to safeguard the integrity of
the evidence acquired and prevent planting of evidence, the application of said Section resulted in the ineffectiveness of
the government's campaign to stop increasing drug addiction and also, in the conflicting decisions of the
courts."18 Specifically, she cited that "compliance with the rule on witnesses during the physical inventory is difficult. For
one, media representatives are not always available in all corners of the Philippines, especially in more remote areas. For
another, there were instances where elected barangay officials themselves were involved in the punishable acts
apprehended."19 In addition, "[t]he requirement that inventory is required to be done in police station is also very limiting.
Most police stations appeared to be far from locations where accused persons were apprehended." 20

Similarly, Senator Vicente C. Sotto III manifested that in view of the substantial number of acquittals in drug-related cases
due to the varying interpretations of the prosecutors and the judges on Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, there is a need for
"certain adjustments so that we can plug the loopholes in our existing law" and "ensure [its] standard implementation." 21 In
his Co-Sponsorship Speech, he noted:
Numerous drug trafficking activities can be traced to operations of highly organized and powerful local and international
syndicates. The presence of such syndicates that have the resources and the capability to mount a counter-assault to
apprehending law enforcers makes the requirement of Section 21(a) impracticable for law enforcers to comply with. It
makes the place of seizure extremely unsafe for the proper inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs.

xxxx

Section 21(a) of RA 9165 needs to be amended to address the foregoing situation. We did not realize this in 2002 where
the safety of the law enforcers and other persons required to be present in the inventory and photography of seized illegal
drugs and the preservation of the very existence of seized illegal drugs itself are threatened by an immediate retaliatory
action of drug syndicates at the place of seizure. The place where the seized drugs may be inventoried and photographed
has to include a location where the seized drugs as well as the persons who are required to be present during the
inventory and photograph are safe and secure from extreme danger.

It is proposed that the physical inventory and taking of photographs of seized illegal drugs be allowed to be conducted
either in the place of seizure or at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending law enforcers. The proposal will
provide effective measures to ensure the integrity of seized illegal drugs since a safe location makes it more probable for
an inventory and photograph of seized illegal drugs to be properly conducted, thereby reducing the incidents of dismissal
of drug cases due to technicalities.

Non-observance of the prescribed procedures should not automatically mean that the seizure or confiscation is invalid or
illegal, as long as the law enforcement officers could justify the same and could prove that the integrity and the evidentiary
value of the seized items are not tainted. This is the effect of the inclusion in the proposal to amend the phrase "justifiable
grounds." There are instances wherein there are no media people or representatives from the DOJ available and the
absence of these witnesses should not automatically invalidate the drug operation conducted. Even the presence of a
public local elected official also is sometimes impossible especially if the elected official is afraid or scared. 22
The foregoing legislative intent has been taken cognizance of in a number of cases. Just recently, This Court opined
in People v. Miranda:23
The Court, however, clarified that under varied field conditions, strict compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of
RA 9165 may not always be possible. In fact, the Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of RA 9165 - which is now
crystallized into statutory law with the passage of RA 10640 - provide that the said inventory and photography may be
conducted at the nearest police station or office of the apprehending team in instances of warrantless seizure, and that
non-compliance with the requirements of Section 21 of RA 9165 - under justifiable grounds - will not render void and
invalid the seizure and custody over the seized items so long as the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are
properly preserved by the apprehending officer or team. Tersely put, the failure of the apprehending team to strictly
comply with the procedure laid out in Section 21 of RA 9165 and the IRR does not ipso facto render the seizure and
custody over the items as void and invalid, provided that the prosecution satisfactorily proves that: (a) there is justifiable
ground for noncompliance; and (b) the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved.
In People v. Almorfe, the Court stressed that for the above-saving clause to apply, the prosecution must explain the
reasons behind the procedural lapses, and that the integrity and value of the seized evidence had nonetheless been
preserved. Also, in People v. De Guzman, it was emphasized that the justifiable ground for non-compliance must be
proven as a fact, because the Court cannot presume what these grounds are or that they even exist. 24
Under the original provision of Section 21, after seizure and confiscation of the drugs, the apprehending team was
required to immediately conduct a physically inventory and photograph of the same in the presence of (1) the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) a
representative from the media and (3) the DOJ, and (4) any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof. It is assumed that the presence of these three persons will guarantee
"against planting of evidence and frame up," i.e., they are "necessary to insulate the apprehension and incrimination
proceedings from any taint of illegitimacy or irregularity."25 Now, the amendatory law mandates that the conduct of
physical inventory and photograph of the seized items must be in the presence of (1) the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, (2) with an elected public official,
and (3) a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media who shall sign the copies of the inventory and
be given a copy thereof.

In this case, the absence of a representative of the National Prosecution Service or the media during the inventory of the
seized items was not justifiably explained by the prosecution. A review of the Transcript of Stenographic Notes does not
yield any testimony from the arresting officers as to the reason why there was no representative from the DOJ or the
media. The only one present to witness the inventory and the marking was an elected official, Barangay Captain Evelyn
Villamor. Neither was there any testimony to show that any attempt was made to secure the presence of the required
witness.

In People v. Angelita Reyes, et al.,26 this Court enumerated certain instances where the absence of the required
witnesses may be justified, thus:
x x x It must be emphasized that the prosecution must able to prove a justifiable ground in omitting certain requirements
provided in Sec. 21 such as, but not limited to the following: 1) media representatives are not available at that time or that
the police operatives had no time to alert the media due to the immediacy of the operation they were about to undertake,
especially if it is done in more remote areas; 2) the police operatives, with the same reason, failed to find an available
representative of the National Prosecution Service; 3) the police officers, due to time constraints brought about by the
urgency of the operation to be undertaken and in order to comply with the provisions of Article 125 27 of the Revised Penal
Code in the timely delivery of prisoners, were not able to comply with all the requisites set forth in Section 21 of R.A. 9165.
The above-ruling was further reiterated by this Court in People v. Vicente Sipin y De Castro,28 thus:
The prosecution never alleged and proved that the presence of the required witnesses was not obtained for any of the
following reasons, such as: (1) their attendance was impossible because the place of arrest was a remote area;·(2) their
safety during the inventory and photograph of the seized drugs was threatened by an immediate retaliatory action of the
accused or any person/s acting for and in his/her behalf; (3) the elected official themselves were involved in the
punishable acts sought to be apprehended; (4) earnest efforts to secure the presence of a DOJ or media representative
and elected public official within the period required under Article 125 of the Revised Penal Could prove futile through no
fault of the arresting officers, who face the threat of being charged with arbitrary detention; or (5) time constraints and
urgency of the anti-drug operations, which often rely on tips of confidential assets, prevented the law enforcers from
obtaining the presence of the required witnesses even before the offenders could escape.
Certainly, the prosecution bears the burden of proof to show valid cause for non-compliance with the procedure laid down
in Section 21 of R.A. No. 9165, as amended.29 It has the positive duty to demonstrate observance thereto in such a way
that, during the proceedings before the trial court, it must initiate in acknowledging and justifying any perceived deviations
from the requirements of the law.30 Its failure to follow the mandated procedure must be adequately explained and must
be proven as a fact in accordance with the rules on evidence. The rules require that the apprehending officers do not
simply mention a justifiable ground, but also clearly state this ground in their sworn affidavit, coupled with a statement on
the steps they took to preserve the integrity of the seized item.31 A stricter adherence to Section 21 is required where the
quantity of illegal drugs seized is miniscule since it is highly susceptible to planting, tampering, or alteration. 32

Thus, this Court finds it appropriate to acquit the appellants in this case as their guilt has not been established beyond
reasonable doubt. The resolution of the other issues raised by appellants is no longer necessary.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 31, 2017 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No.
08121 dismissing appellants' appeai and affirming the Decision dated October 28, 2015 of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 65, Makati City is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. Appellants Emmanuel Oliva y Jorjil, Bernardo Barangot y Pilais,
Mark Angelo Manalastas y Gapasin are ACQUITTED for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable
doubt. They are ORDERED IMMEDIATELY RELEASED from detention, unless they are confined for any other lawful
cause. Let entry of final judgment be issued immediately.

Let a copy of this Decision be furnished to the Director of the Bureau of Corrections and the Superintendent of the New
Bilibid Prisons, for immediate implementation. Said Director and Superintendent are ORDERED to REPORT to this Court
within five (5) working days from receipt of this Decision the action he/she has taken.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 206590

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee

vs
MYRNA GAYOSO y ARGUELLES, Accused-Appellant

In criminal prosecutions for the illegal sale and possession of shabu, primordial importance must be given to "the
preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items as they will be used to determine the guilt or
innocence of the accused."1

This is an appeal from the June 23, 2011 Decision2 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00744 that
aft1rmed in toto the April 12, 2007 Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Guiuan, Eastern Samar, Branch 3, in
Criminal Case Nos. 2079 and 2078, finding Myrna Gayoso y Arguelles (appellant) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
violating Sections 5 (illegal sale of a dangerous drug) and 11 (illegal possession of a dangerous drug), Article II of
Republic Act (RA) No. 9165, respectively, and imposing upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
₱500,000.00 for selling shabu, and the indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day, as minimum, to
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum, for possessing 0.53gram of shabu.

Factual Antecedents

The Information in Criminal Case No. 2078 contained the following accusatory allegations against appellant:

That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:30 o'clock in the morning at Jetty, Brgy. Hollywood, Guian,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the abovementioned accused who acted
without the necessary pennit from proper authorities whatsoever, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and folonioμsly
hi:i.ve in her possession, control and custody eleven (11) x x x sachets (containing] Methamphdamme Hydrochloride
commonly known as "shabu" weighing 0.53 [gram], a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law. 4

The Information in Criminal Case No. 2079 charged appellant in the following manner:

That on or about the 24th day of March, 2004, at about 5:00 o'clock in the morning at Jetty, Brgy. Hollywood, Guian,
Eastern Samar, Philippines, within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, who acted without
the necessary permit or authority whatsoever, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally sell, deliver and
dispense one (1) pc. small heat sealed sachet of Methamphetamine Hydrochloride commonly known as "shabu" weighing
0.06 [gram], a dangerous drug.

Contrary to law.5

During arraignment, appellant entered a plea of ''not guilty" in both cases. Joint trial then ensued.

Version of the Prosecution

Based on the testimonies of SP03 Victorino de Dios (SP03 De Dios), SP03 Rolando G. Salamida (SP03 Sa1amida), P02
Rex Isip (P02 Isip), SP04 Josefina Bandoy (SP04 Bandoy), P/Insp. Eleazar Barber, Jr. (PI Barber), PS/Insp. Benjamin
Cruto (PSI Cruto ), and the documentary exhibits, the following facts emerged:

PI Barber of the PNP6 Guiuan Police Station directed SP03 De Dios to conduct a surveillance on appellant after receiving
several reports that she was peddling prohibited drugs. Three weeks later, SP03 De Dios confirmed that appellant was
indeed engaged in illegal drug activities. PI Barber filed for and was issued a search warrant. However, prior to
implementing the search warrant, PI Barber decided to conduct a "confirmatory test-buy" designating SP03 De Dios as
poseur-buyer and giving him ₱200.00 marked money for the operation.

On March 24, 2004, SP03 De Dios and a civilian asset proceeded to the house of appellant and asked her if they could
buy shabu. The sale was consummated when appellant took the marked money from SP03 De Dios after giving him a
sachet of shabu. SP03 De Dios immediately informed PI Barber by text message about the successful "confirmatory test-
buy". PI Barber and his team of police officers who were positioned 100 meters away n1shed towards the house of
appellant. He also instructed SP03 De Dios and the civilian asset to summon the Barangay Chairman to witness the
search of the house. When he arrived together with a ko,gawad and a media representative, SP03 Salamida read the
search warrant to appellant.

During the search of the house, SP04 Bandoy found a tin foil under the mattress. SP03 De Dios took it from SP04 Bandoy
and gave it to SP03 Salamida who found seven sachets of shabu inside, in addition to the four sachets of shabu found
inside the right pocket of the short pants of appellant. The search of the house also revealed several drug paraphernalia.
An inventory of seized items was prepared and the same was signed by the Barangay Chairman, P02 Isip, SP04 Bandoy,
and appellant. The sachets of shabu were brought to the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) then to the PNP
Crime Laboratory for qualitative examination. The results of the examination verified that the seized sachets
contained shabu.

Version of Appellant

Appellant denied the charges against her. She claimed that on March 24, 2004, somebody forcibly kicked the front door of
her house and tried to break it open. When she opened the door, PI Barber pushed her aside and told his companions to
move quickly. They went directly to her room; when P02 Isip emerged therefrom seconds later, he was holding a
substance that looked like tawas. SP03 De Dios and SP03 Salamida went in and out of her house. She maintained that
the search warrant was shown to her only after an hour and that the sachets of shabu were planted. She argued that the
police officers fabricated the charges against her since her family had a quarrel with a police officer named Riza1ina
Cuantero regarding the fence separating their houses.

The Ruling of the' Regional Trial Court

The RTC found appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal sale and illegal possession of shabu. It declared that
the prosecution ably established the elements of illegal sale and possession of shabu through the testimonies of its
witnesses who arrested appellant after selling a sachet of the illegal drug in a "test-buy operation" and for possessing 11
sachets of the same drug in her house after enforcing a search watrant immediately thereafter. Appellant had no evidence
that she had license or authority to possess the shabu.

The RTC ruled that the evidence sufficiently established the chain of custody of the sachets of shabu from the time they
were bought from appellant and/or seized from her house, to its turn over to the PDEA and submission to the PNP Crime
Laboratory for examination. The RTC rejected appellant's defense of denial and frame-up in view of her positive
identification by eyewitnesses as the criminal offender.

The RTC therefore sentenced appellant to life imprisonment and to pay a fine of ₱500,000.00 for the illegal sale
of shabu. It also sentenced appellant to suffer the indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day, as
minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day, as maximum and a fine of ₱300,000 for illegal
possession of shabu.

From this judgment, appellant appealed to the CA. In her Brief,7 she assailed the validity of the search warrant claiming
that it was not issued by the RTC upon determination of probable cause. She argued that the "'confirmatory test-buy"
conducted by the poseur buyer and the confidential asset was not valid since they forced her to engage in a drug sale.
She maintained that the shabu presented during trial was inadmissible in evidence due to several gaps in its chain of
custody.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed its Brief for the Appellee 8 praying for the affirmance of the appealed
Decision. It argued that the evidence on which the RTC based its determination of probable cause was sufficient for the
issuance of the search warrant. It asserted that the "test-buy operation" was an entrapment and not an inducement. The
OSG maintained that the shabu confiscated from appellant was admissible in evidence since the prosecution established
the proper chain of custody.

The Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The CA affirmed in toto the RTC ruling finding appellant guilty of unauthorized sale and possession of shabu. The CA
ruled that all the elements for the sale of shabu were established during the "test-buy operation". It held that the illegal
sale of shabu was proven by SP03 De Dios who participated in said operation as the designated poseur buyer. His offer
to buy shabu with marked money and appellant's acceptance by delivering the illegal drug consummated the offense. The
CA likewise declared that the elements for possession of shabu were present in the case against appellant. After
appellant's arrest for illegal sale of shabu, a valid search resulted in the discovery of 11 sachets of shabu inside her
house, which were under her possession and control. She did not have legal authority to possess the same and failed to
overcome the presumption that she consciously knew she was in possession of the illegal drug discovered in her home.

The CA noted that the examination by the trial judge established probable cause in issuing the search warrant, The
deposition of P03 Salamida shows that he had personal knowledge of appellant's drug activities, and the same served as
basis for the finding of probable cause for the purpose of issuing a search warrant.

The CA was not swayed by appellant's contention that the "test-buy operation" amounted to instigation since it is settled
jurisprudence that a "decoy solicitation" is not tantamount to inducement or instigation. The CA was also unconvinced by
appellant's claim that the proof against her was inadmissible since the prosecution failed to show strict compliance with
Section 21 of RA 9165 and its implementing rules on the custody and disposition of the evidence.

Appellant filed a Notice of Appeal.9 On July 15, 2013,10 the Court notified the parties to file their supplemental briefs.
However, appellant opted not to file a supplemental brief since she had extensively argued her cause in her appellants'
brief.11 For its part, the OSG manifested that it would not file a supplemental brief since its appellee's brief filed in the CA
had already discussed and refuted the arguments raised by appellant. 12

Our Ruling

The RTC Issued A Search Warrant After

Finding Probable Case

Appellant contends that there was no probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant. She claims that PI Barber
had no personal knowledge of her alleged drug dealings.

There is no merit in this contention.

Probable cause for a valid search warrant is defined "as such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably
discreet and prudent man to believe that an offense has been committed, and that objects sought in connection with the
offense are in the place sought to be searched." 13 The probable cause must be "determined personally by the judge, after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing
the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized." 14 Probable cause does not mean actual and positive
cause, nor does it import absolute certainty. The determination of the existence of probable cause is concerned only with
the question of whether the affiant has reasonable wounds to believe that the accused committed or is committing the
crime charged.15

Here, the records reveal that the trial court issued the search warrar1t after deposing two witnesses, namely PI Barber
and SP03 Salamida. In particular, the disposition of SP03 Salamida shows that he had personal knowledge of appellant's
drug pushing activities which served as basis for the finding of probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
Thus, whether or not PI Barber had personal knowledge of the illegal drug activities committed by appellant will not
adversely affect the findings of probable cause for the purpose of issuance of search warrant.

Confirmatory test-buy solicitation does

not constitute instigation.

Appellant argues that the "confirmatory test-buy" by the police officers was not valid since she was induced by the'
designated poseur buyer, SP03 De Dios, and the confidential informant to sell the seized shabu.

There is no merit in this argument.

In inducement or instigation - the criminal intent originates in the mind of the instigator and the accused is lured into the
commission of the offense charged in order to prosecute him. The instigator practically induces the would-be accused into
the commission of the offense and himself becomes a co-principal. ['This is distinguished from entrapment wherein] ways
and means are resorted to for the purpose of capturing the lawbreaker inflagrante delicto.16

The "test-buy" operation conducted by the police officers is not prohibited by law. It does not amount to instigation. As in
this case, the solicitation of drugs from appellant by the poseur buyer merely furnishes evidence of a course of
conduct.17 The police received an intelligence report that appellant habitually deals with shabu. They designated a poseur
buyer to confirm the report by engaging in a drug transaction with appellant. There was no proof that the poseur buyer
induced appellant to sell illegal drugs to him.

Notwithstanding the foregoing disquisition, appellant still deserves an acquittal as will be discussed below.

The chain of custody of evidence was not established

Appellant impugns the prosecution's failure to establish the charges of illegal sale and possession of shabu against her
due to the gaps in the chain of custody and the assailable integrity of the evidence in view of non-compliance with Section
21, Article II of RA 9165.

There is merit in this protestation.

The offense of illegal sale of shabu has the following elements: "(1) the identities of the buyer and the seller, the object
and consideration of the sale; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the payment therefor."18 On the other hand, the
offense of illegal possession of shabu has the following elements: "(l) the accused is in possession of an item or an object
which is identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed said drug."19 In the prosecution for illegal sale and possession of shabu, there must be proof that
these offenses were actually committed, coupled with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.20

In both illegal sale and illegal possession of [ shabu,] conviction cannot be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the
identity of said drug. The identity of the [shabu] must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the
elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the [shabu] illegally possessed and sold x xx is the
same [shabu] offered in court as exhibit must likewise be established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to
sustain a guilty verdict.21

"The chain of custody requirement performs this function in that it ensures that unnecessary doubts concerning the
identity of the evidence are removed."22

Chain of custody is defined as "duly recorded authorized movements and custody of seized drugs or controlled chemicals
or plant sources of dangerous drugs or laboratory equipment of each stage, from the time of seizure/confiscation to
receipt in the forensic laboratory to safekeeping, to presentation in court for destruction." 23 In People v. Havana,24 the
Court expounded on the custodial chain procedure in this wise:

As a method of authenticating evidence, the chain of custody rule requires that the admission of an exhibit be preceded
by evidence sufficient to support a finding that the matter in question is what the proponent claims it to be. It would include
testimony about every link in the chain, from the moment the item was picked up to the time it is offered in evidence, in
such a way that every person who touched the exhibit would describe how and from whom it was received, where it was
and what happened to it while in the witness' possession, the condition in which it was received and the condition in which
it was delivered to the next link in the chain. These witnesses would then describe the precautions taken to ensure that
there had been no change in the condition of the item and no opportunity for someone not in the chain to have possession
of the same.

While the testimony about a perfect chain is not always the standard because it is almost always impossible to obtain, an
unbroken chain of custody becomes indispensable and essential when the item of real evidence is not distinctive and is
not readily identifiable, or when its condition at the time of testing or trial is critical, or when a witness has failed to observe
its uniqueness. The same standard obtains in case the evidence is susceptible of alteration, tampering, contamination and
even substitution and exchange. In other words, the exhibit's level of susceptibility to fungibility, alteration or tampering -
without regard to whether the same is advertent or otherwise not - dictates the level of strictness in the application of the
chain of custody rule.

Thus, as a general rule, four links in the chain of custody of the confiscated item must be established:

first, the seizure and marking, if practicable, of the illegal drug recovered from the accused by the apprehending officer;
second, the turnover of the illegal drug seized by the apprehending officer to the investigating officer; third, the turnover by
the investigating officer of the illegal drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory examination; and fourth, the turnover and
submission of the marked illegal drug seized from the forensic chemist to the court. 25
Marking is the placing by the arresting officer or the poseur-buyer of his/her initials and signature on the items after they
have been seized. It is the starting point in the custodial link. It is vital that the seized items be marked immediately since
the succeeding handlers thereof will use the markings as reference.26 The chain of custody rule also requires that the
marking of the seized contraband be done "(l) in the presence of the apprehended violator, and (2) immediately upon
confiscation."27

In this case, the records do not show that the arresting officers marked the seized items with their initials in the presence
of appellant and immediately upon confiscation. While P02 Isip testified that the seized sachets of shabu were marked in
the police station,28 no evidence was presented to show that the marking was accomplished in the presence of appellant.
Moreover, the author of the markings on said items was never identified. None of the police officers admitted placing the
markings. There was therefore a complete absence of evidence to prove authorship of the markings.

While marking of the evidence is allowed in the nearest police station, this contemplates a case of warrantless searches
and seizures.29 Here, the police officers secured a search warrant prior to their operation. They therefore had sufficient
time and opportunity to prepare for its implementation. However, the police officers failed to mark immediately the plastic
sachets of shabu seized inside appellant's house in spite of an Inventory of Property Seized that they prepared while still
inside the said house. The failure of the arresting officers to comply with the marking of evidence immediately after
confiscation constitutes the first gap in the chain of custody.

The turnover of the seized shabu from the arresting officers to the investigating officer in the police station constitutes the
second link in the chain of custody.1âwphi1 In this regard, the Court takes note that the testimonies of the prosecution
witnesses failed to identify the person to whom the seized items were turned over at the police station. While SP03
Salamida was identified as the property custodian of the police station, this does not necessarily mean that he is also the
investigating officer. There is nothing in the records to substantiate this presumption. This total want of evidence gains
importance considering that none of the arresting officers presented as witnesses identified the shabu presented during
trial as the same shabu seized from appellant. Thus, the second link in the chain of custody is missing.

The transfer of the seized shabu from the investigating officer to the forensic chemist in the crime laboratory is the third
link in the chain of custody. While the seized shabu was turned over by PI Barber to the PDEA, he no longer had any
personal knowledge of the manner it was handled therein. He also did not identify the police officer in whose custody the
seized sachets of shabu were placed at the PDEA. He left it to the responsibility of the PDEA to forward the
seized shabu to the crime laboratory. The request for laboratory examination of the PDEA identifies the police officer who
delivered the seized shabu as a certain SPO1 Asis, but he was not presented to testify that the shabu delivered to the
crime laboratory was the same shabu confiscated from appellant. There is a third break in the chain of custody.

Nothing also can be gained from the testimony of the forensic chemist PSI Cruto. His testimony is not clear and positive
since he failed to assert that the alleged packs of chemical substance presented for laboratory examination and tested
positive for shabu were the very same substance allegedly recovered from appellant. His testimony was limited to the
result of the examination he conducted and not on the source of the substance.

From the foregoing, it appears that no chain of custody was established at all. What we have here are individual links with
breaks in-between which could not be seamlessly woven or tied together. The so-called links in the chain of custody show
that the seized shabu was not handled properly starting from the actual seizure, to its turnover in the police station and the
PDEA, as well as its transfer to the crime laboratory for examination. The Court therefore cannot conclude with moral
certainty that the shabu confiscated from appellant was the same as that presented for laboratory examination and then
presented in court.

It is indeed desirable that the chain of custody should be perfect and unbroken. In reality however, this rarely occurs. The
legal standard that must therefore be observed "is the preservation of the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized
items as they will be used to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused." 30 Here, the Court finds that the
apprehending officers failed to properly preserve the integrity and evidentiary value of the confiscated shabu. There are
just too many breaks and gaps to the effect that a chain of custody could not be established at all. Failure of the
prosecution to offer testimony to establish a substantially complete chain of custody of the shabu and the inappropriate
manner of handling the evidence prior to its offer in court diminishes the government's chance of successfully prosecuting
a drug case.31

Aside from the failure of the prosecution to establish an unbroken chain of custody, another procedural lapse casts farther
uncertainty on the identity and integrity of the subject shabu. This refers to the non-compliance by the arresting officers
with the most basic procedural safeguards relative to the custody and disposition of the seized item under Section 21(1),
Article II of RA 9165, which reads as follows:
SEC. 21. Custody and Disposition of Confiscated, Seized, and/or Surrendered Dangerous Drugs, Plant Sources of
Dangerous Drugs, Controlled Precursors and Essential Chemicals, Instruments/Paraphernalia and/or Laboratory
Equipment. - The PDEA shall take charge and have custody of all dangerous drugs, plant sources of dangerous drugs,
controlled precursors and essential chemicals, as well as instruments/paraphernalia and/or laboratory equipment so
confiscated, seized and/or surrendered, for proper disposition in the following manner:

(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drug shall, immediately after seizure and confiscation,
physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom such items were
confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a copy
thereof.

Corollarily, Section 2l(a) of the Implementing Rules and Regulations provides as follows:

Section 2l(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial custody and control of the drug shall, immediately after seizure
and confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a representative from the media,
the Department of Justice (DOJ), and a public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the inventory and be
given a copy thereof: Provided, that the physical inventory and photograph shall be conducted at the place where the
search warrant is served; or at the nearest office of the apprehending officer/team, whichever is practicable, in case of
warrantless seizures; Provided, farther, that non-compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team, shall
not render void and invalid such seizure of and custody over said items.

In this case, the apprehending team never conducted a physical inventory of the seized items at the place where the
search warrant was served in the presence of a representative of the Department of Justice, nor did it photograph the
same in the presence of appellant after their initial custody and control of said drug, and after immediately seizing and
confiscating the same. Neither was an explanation offered for such failure. While this directive of rigid compliance has
been tempered in certain cases, "such liberality, as stated in the Implementing Rules and Regulations can be applied only
when the evidentiary value and integrity of the illegal drug are properly preserved." 32 Such an exception does not obtain in
this case. "Serious uncertainty is generated on the identity of the [shabu] in view of the broken linkages in the chain of
custody. [Thus,] the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to the [apprehending officers] by
the courts below cannot arise."33

WHEREFORE, the appeal is GRANTED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00744 dated June
23, 2011 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Appellant Myrna Gayoso y Arguelles is hereby ACQUITTED of the charges, her
guilt not having been established beyond reasonable doubt.

The Superintendent for the Correctional Institute for Women is hereby ORDERED to immediately RELEASE the appellant
from custody, unless she is held for another lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.
 Offenses Against Decency and Good Customs

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. GLORIA NANGCAS Accused-Appellant.

For review is the Decision1 dated 6 March 2015, of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CRHC No. 01092-MIN, which
affirmed in toto the Decision,2 dated 8 October 2012, of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City, 10th
Judicial Region, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. FC-2009-643, finding herein accused-appellant Gloria Nangcas
(Nangcas) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons under Section 4 in relation to
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208,3 committed against AAA,4 BBB,5 CCC,6 and Judith Singane (Judith), and imposing
upon her the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000.000.00).

THE FACTS

Accused-appellant was charged for Violation of Republic Act No. 9208 or the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003" per
the Information, dated 24 September 2009, which reads:7
"That on 22 March 2009 at about 3:00 o'clock in the afternoon and thereafter, commencing in Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then and there willfully and
unlawfully recruit, transport, transfer, harbor and provide four (4) women, namely, fourteen (14) year-old [AAA], thirteen
(13) year-old [BBB], seventeen (17) year-old [CCC] and nineteen (19) year-old Judith Singane, by means of fraud,
deception, or taking advantage of the vulnerability of said victims for the purpose of offering and selling said victims for
forced labor, slavery or involuntary servitude, that is, by promising them local employment (as househelpers in Camella
Homes, Upper Carmen, Cagayan de Oro City) with a monthly salary of PhP1,500.00 each and that they could go home
every Sunday, but instead, said accused brought them to Marawi City and sold them for PhP1,600.00 each to their great
damage and prejudice.

Contrary to and in violation of Sec. 4, in relation to Section 6, of Republic Act No. 9208.
By virtue of the Warrant dated 18 December 2009,8 Nangcas was arrested and committed to the jurisdiction of the court a
quo on 13 January 2010.9 With the assistance of her counsel, Nangcas pleaded "not guilty" to the offense charged. 10

The Version of the Prosecution

The prosecution presented Judith, AAA, BBB, P/Insp. Exodio Vidal, and Enerio Singane (Enerio) as witnesses. Their
testimonies, taken together, tended to establish the following:

On 22 March 2009, at around three o'clock in the afternoon, Judith was with AAA at xxx when they saw her uncle Junjun
Singane and aunt Marites Simene with Nangcas. The latter approached them and asked if they wanted to work. 11 Judith,
being interested, brought Nangcas to her house to ask permission from her parents. Nangcas informed Judith's parents
that the latter would be working as a house helper at Camella Homes in Cagayan de Oro City, with a salary of P1,500.00
per month and with a rest day every Sunday. Judith's father, Enerio, was adamant at first, but Judith insisted because of
the salary Nangcas offered and the location of the employer was nearby at Camella Homes; hence, Enerio gave his
consent.12 Thereafter, Judith had her things all ready and went with Nangcas. Nangcas, on the other hand, left her
cellphone number with Enerio.13

Since AAA, who was only fourteen (14) years old then,14 showed interest in Nangcas' proposition, the latter then
proceeded to AAA's residence to meet her parents. There, Nangcas also met CCC, AAA's sister, who was only seventeen
years old at that time. CCC also expressed her interest to work as a house helper. Nangcas explained to AAA and CCC's
parents that both would be working as house helpers at Camella Homes in Cagayan de Oro, with a salary of P1,500.00
each. The father of the two girls rejected the idea since he could still manage to support them. Their mother was also
apprehensive that her daughters might be brought to Marawi. However, since AAA and CCC were very much interested
and Nangcas assured their parents that they would only work at Camella Homes, the parents eventually agreed, thinking
that both their daughters would be within each other's reach as they would both be working at Camella
Homes.15 Thereafter, Judith, AAA, CCC, and Nangcas proceeded to the house of BBB, a cousin of AAA and CCC, to
inform her of the job offer.16

BBB was home attending to her younger sibling when Judith, AAA, CCC, and Nangcas arrived. After Nangcas told her of
work available at Camella Homes, BBB agreed thinking that her mother could just visit her there. 17

All the recruits resided at xxx, Cagayan de Oro City.

After the girls had packed their things, Nangcas brought them to Camella Homes. The alleged employer was not there, so
Nangcas informed them that they had to go to Cogon. When they were already in Cogon, Nangcas instructed them to
board a van as they would proceed to Iligan City where the employer was. Though hesitant and doubtful, the girls followed
Nangcas' instructions. Judith, however, noticed that they were already travelling far and tried to talk to Nangcas but to
naught, as the latter slept during the trip.18 Upon reaching their destination, it was only then that Nangcas told them that
they would be working as house helpers in Marawi. The girls complained that their agreement was only to work at
Camella Homes in Cagayan de Oro. But Nangcas informed them that their alleged employer in Iligan was no longer
looking for helpers; and that it was in Marawi where they were needed. The girls wanted to go home but they didn't have
any money for their fare going back to Cagayan de Oro.19 They had no other choice but to stay in Marawi. They were then
brought to the house of one Baby Abas (Baby) where they slept for the night.

The following day, Nangcas brought Judith and BBB to the house of Baby's sister, Cairon Abantas (Cairon), while AAA
and CCC remained to work for Baby. Nangcas went back to Cagayan de Oro.

The recruits worked in Marawi for more than a month. They were not paid their salaries as, according to their employers,
Nangcas had already collected P1,600.00 for each of them. They were also made to eat leftover rice with only "pulaka"
(mixed ginger, chili and onion) as their viand. 20 Furthermore, they were threatened not to go out or attempt to escape or
else, the soldiers would kill them since they were Christians.

Since Judith failed to go home on her scheduled day-off on Sunday, Enerio called up Nangcas to ask about his daughter.
The latter told him that Judith was with her just the other day and that she could go home only after two (2) months.

On 14 April 2009, Judith asked permission to go home since it was her birthday, but she was denied Subsequently, with
the help of the "kasambahay" of the neighboring house who lent them her cellphone, Judith was able to call her father
informing him of her whereabouts.21 Alarmed by the news from his daughter, Enerio went to the Lumbia Police Station to
report the incident and seek assistance to rescue her daughter and three (3) other minors.

P/Insp. Exodio Vidal then assisted Enerio in looking for Nangcas. They went to Nangcas' house but only her children were
there. They left a message inviting Nangcas to their station but she did not respond. 22 On 5 May 2009, P/Insp. Vidal
received orders to proceed to Marawi City to retrieve the girls. The girls' parents and a couple of Muslims accompanied
the police officers. Enerio Singane called the cellphone number used by Judith to contact him and he was able to talk to
the cellphone's owner. The latter gave him the directions to the house of Judith's employer. 23 The police officers
successfully rescued the four (4) girls. The parents of the recruited girls filed the instant action against Nangcas.

The Version of the Defense

Nangcas and Cairon testified for the defense.

Nangcas denied the accusation against her. She claimed that her friend Joni Mohamad (Joni) was looking for two (2)
house helpers to work for him at Camella Homes, Cagayan de Oro, and two (2) others for his mother who lived in Iligan
City.24 She went to xxx to look for interested applicants and there met a couple who told her that their neighbor was
interested. The couple took her to Judith who expressed interest so she decided to meet her parents to ask for their
permission. She informed the parents that Judith would be working at Camella Homes, Cagayan de Oro, with a salary of
P1,500.00.25 She then went to the parents of AAA and CCC and made the same offer. The girls' parents gave their
consent provided that the siblings would work in the same house. 26 After the girls had packed their things, she brought
them to Camella Homes.

Nangcas alleged that while they were at the terminal, she chanced upon BBB, a cousin of AAA and CCC. The former
requested to accompany them to Camella Homes so that she would know where to visit her cousins on her day-off.27 She
agreed; hence, BBB went with them to Camella Homes. When they arrived at Camella Homes, she introduced the girls to
Joni. However, Joni only needed two (2) helpers and chose Judith and CCC to work for him but the latter refused because
she wanted to work as a house helper with her sister AAA. Joni then called his mother to inform her about the house
helpers. The latter instructed him to send them to Iligan and that she would pay for their fare. 28 Nangcas took the four (4)
girls with her to Cogon and boarded a van going to Iligan. However, before they could reach Iligan, Joni's mother called
her and informed her that she was no longer hiring the helpers as her current helper decided not to go home
anymore.29 She asked the driver if he could take them back to Cagayan de Oro but the latter asked for an additional
charge. When she replied that she had no money left, Judith immediately suggested that they proceed to Marawi where
she has an uncle. However, Judith could not contact her uncle, hence she asked the girls if it was okay for them to go to
Marawi and they all agreed. She then contacted her friend Baby Abas (Baby) in Marawi and the latter lent her money to
pay the van driver.30 They stayed in Baby's house for the night. When Baby asked the girls if they were willing to work as
house helpers, they said yes.

Nangcas furthermore alleged that on the following day, AAA and CCC remained with Baby while she brought Judith and
BBB to the house of Baby's sister, Cairon, to work as house helpers with P1,500.00 salary each. Before she left for
Cagayan de Oro, Baby gave her P500.00 while Cairon gave her P1,600.00 for providing them the helpers; 31 Nangcas
added that Judith specifically asked her not to tell their parents about their whereabouts as they would call to inform them
themselves.32

Nangcas finally alleged that by the end of March 2009, she went back to Marawi to follow up on the girls and there
learned that Judith failed to inform their parents of their whereabouts. Nevertheless, all the girls assured her that they
were fine. On 5 May 2009, she was supposed to fetch Judith, who was scheduled to go home for her birthday but she
failed to do so because she had to attend to her husband who was hospitalized for pneumonia. On 7 May 2009, Judith's
father called and informed her that he had already fetched his daughter and the other girls.

Cairon also h stified and professed that she came to know Nangcas only when she brought the girls to work for her. She
recalled offering to pay the girls a salary of P1,500.00 to which the girls agreed. She claimed that she even asked for
Enerio's number to inform him that his daughter was in good hands. 33 She further claimed that Nangcas did not ask for
money but she volunteered to reimburse Nangcas' expenses incurred in bringing the girls. Finally, Cairon alleged that she
paid the girls their salaries and she was surprised when their parents came to her house to get them. 34

The Ruling of the Regional Trial Court

In its decision,35 the RTC36 found Nangcas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons.

The RTC ratiocinated that Nangcas' deception was apparent in the manner with which she dealt with Enerio, Judith, and
three other private complainants: that they were made to believe that the victims would be working as house helpers at
Camella Homes in Cagayan de Oro City; and that Nangcas never bothered to call the girls' parents to inform them of their
children's whereabouts. The RTC also reasoned that Nangcas further deceived Enerio when she told him during the last
week of March that Judith and the other girls were at Camella Homes when she fully knew that they were in Marawi; that
she employed the same deception when she brought the girls from one place to another until they reached Marawi; that
the girls were left penniless and thus had no fare to go back home, thus, leaving no choice but to work against their will.
Finally, The RTC declared that if there was truth to the claim of Nangcas, she should have presented Joni Mohamad and
his mother; that Nangcas had also admitted previously providing helpers to others, and that the incident on 22 March
2009 was not the only occasion he did so. The fallo reads:
ALL THE FOREGOING CONSIDERED, the Court finds accused Gloria Nangcas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Qualified Trafficking in Persons and for which the Court hereby imposes upon GLORIA NANGCAS the penalty of
life imprisonment and a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).

IT IS SO ORDERED.37
Feeling aggrieved with the decision of the RTC, Nangcas appealed to the Court of Appeals, Cagayan de Oro City. 38

The Assailed CA Decision

The CA, through its Twenty-Second Division, accorded respect to the findings of fact of the trial court in the absence of
clear and convincing evidence that the latter ignored facts and circumstances which, if considered on appeal, would have
reversed or modified the outcome of the case. The CA found no merit in the arguments raised by Nangcas, to wit:
First, there is no doubt that the accused-appellant recruited and transported the private complainants to their supposed
employer in Marawi. These are well within the acts that may constitute trafficking, to wit: recruitment, transportation,
transfer or harboring. This meets the first elements of the offense. Second, we are convinced that the accused-appellant
employed fraud and deceit and took advantage of the victims' vulnerability to successfully recruit them. These means
satisfy the second element. Lastly, the foregoing acts and means resulted in the victims' forced labor and slavery.39
The CA disposed of the case in this wise:
WHEREFORE, the appeal is dismissed. The October 8, 2012 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 19, Cagayan
de Oro City in Criminal Case No. 2009-643 for qualified trafficking in persons is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.40
Hence, this appeal.

The Present Appeal

On 19 August 2015, the Court issued a Resolution notifying the parties that they could file their respective supplemental
briefs.41 However, both Nangcas and the Office of the Solicitor General, as counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the
Philippines, manifested that they would no longer file supplemental briefs, as their respective briefs filed with the CA
sufficiently addressed their particular arguments.42
Based on the arguments raised in Nangcas' brief before the CA, the Court is called upon to resolve the following
assignment of errors:

I. THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING THE APPELLANT OF THE OFFENSE
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE OF THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE HER GUILT BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT.43

II. THERE WAS NO FRAUD, DECEPTION OR TAKING ADVANTAGE OF THE VULNERABILITY OF THE
ALLEGED VICTIMS.44

III. THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WERE NOT OFFERED OR SOLD FOR FORCED LABOR, SLAVERY OR
INVOLUNTARY SERVITUDE.45

IV. INCONSISTENT TESTIMONIES OF THE PRIVATE COMPLAINANTS.46

The Arguments of the Accused

Nangcas argues that there was no deception in this case. She maintained that she did not deceive any of the private
complainants nor their parents when their daughters were hired as house helpers. She also maintained that in bringing
the alleged victims to Iligan City, she had no idea that the mother of Joni would no longer be needing house helpers;
hence, with no money to pay for the fare, she had no other choice but to stay with Baby Abas in Marawi City.

Nangcas further argues that contrary to the findings of the court, she did not recruit the victims under the pretext of
domestic employment for the purpose of forced labor, slavery or involuntary servitude. She averred that the alleged
victims worked as house helpers as previously agreed upon, that they were not forced to work contrary to their
agreement. She also averred that the alleged victims were not enticed to work with a high salary and the amount offered
was not that big to entice anyone to leave one's home and work for someone else.

Nangcas finally argues that there were inconsistencies in the testimonies of the private complainants in the following
manner: that Judith testified that she and BBB were brought to the house of Cairon Abantas, the sister of Baby; while AAA
testified that it was she and BBB who stayed with Baby while Judith and CCC were brought to Cairon.

THE COURT'S RULING

We affirm accused-appellant Nangcas' conviction

Accused-appellant's guilt was established beyond reasonable doubt.

Nangcas was charged and convicted for qualified trafficking in persons under Section 4(a), in relation to Section 6(a) and
(c), and Section 3(a), (b), and (d) of R.A. No. 9208, which read:

Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit any of the
following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under the
pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The following are considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;

xxxx

(c) When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed committed
in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with or
without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another
person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other
forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be
considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph.

(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to fully take
care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition.

xxxx

(d) Forced Labor and Slavery - refer to the extraction of work or services from any person by means of enticement,
violence, intimidation or threat, use of force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral
ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception.
Under Republic Act No. 10364,47 the elements of trafficking m persons have been expanded to include the following acts:
(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt
of persons with or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;"

(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments
or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person."

(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." (emphasis supplied)
The information filed against Nangcas sufficiently alleged the recruitment and transportation of Judith and three (3) other
minor victims for forced labor or services, with Nangcas taking advantage of the vulnerability of the young girls through
her assurance and promises of good salary, accessibility of place of work to their respective residences, and weekly
dayoff. Pursuant to Section 6 of R.A. No. 9208, the crime committed by Nangcas was qualified trafficking, as it was
committed in a large scale and three (3) of her victims were under 18 years of age.

The presence of the crime's elements was established by the prosecution witnesses who testified during the trial. The
testimonies of Judith and three (3) other minor victims established that Nangcas employed deception and fraud in gaining
both the victims and their parents' trust and confidence.

In the instant case, we concur with the trial court's decision, to wit:
"Deception was apparent in the manner with which accused dealt with Enerio, Judith and the three other private
complainants. Enerio was made to believe that Judith and company will be working as house helpers at Camella Homes
in Cagayan De Oro City. Through the haze with which the private complainants were transported from Cagayan de Oro
City to Marawi City, what is clear is that Nangcas has Enerio's number but she never called him to inform him they were
proceeding to Marawi City. Much worse, she deceived Enerio anew when she told him sometime in the last week of
March 2009 that Judith and her friends were in Camella when she fully knew they were made to work in Marawi City." 48
The testimonies of the victims and Enerio gave a clear picture as to how the victims were deceived by Nangcas into going
with her, and how she orchestrated the entire trip pretending to take them first to Cagayan De Oro City, then to Iligan, and
finally to Marawi City, so as to be sure that the victims have no other choice but to go to Marawi City and serve as house
helpers. The prosecution has aptly shown that the victims would not have agreed or would not have been allowed by their
parents if Nangcas would directly offer them work at Marawi City; that she deliberately fabricated a story to delude her
victims and their parents.

All told, the prosecution has adequately proved Nangcas' guilt beyond reasonable doubt of the offense as defined in
Section 4 of R.A No. 9208.

Nangkas employed fraud and deception in order to bring the victims to Marawi City.

Deceit is the false representation of a matter of fact whether by words or conduct, by false or misleading allegations, or by
concealment of that which should have been disclosed which deceives or is intended to deceive another so that he shall
act upon it to his legal injury;49 while fraud is every kind of deception whether in the form of insidious machinations,
manipulations, concealments or misrepresentations, for the purpose of leading another party into error and thus execute a
particular act.50

From the factual milieu, it is clear that actual fraud and deception are present in this case, such as when Nangcas induced
and coaxed the victims to go with her. She promised the victims and their parents that their daughters would be working
within Cagayan De Oro City, with an enticing salary of P1,500.00 per month.
At the outset, the intent of Nangcas was obvious. She specifically employed several deceptive tactics to lure the victims
and their parents into agreeing to take the victims, who were mostly minors, and bring them allegedly to Camella Homes
in Cagayan De Oro City, to serve as house helpers. Nangcas represented to Judith and her parents that Judith would be
employed as a house helper, would be allowed to go home once a week, and would be paid P1,500.00 monthly. After
having convinced Judith and her parents, Nangcas used Judith to entice some more of her friends to go with her as house
helpers in Cagayan De Oro City. After recruiting Judith and the three other minor victims, Nangcas immediately boarded
them in a jeepney to Cagayan De Oro City supposedly to bring Judith and her friends to their employer at Camella
Homes.

The record shows that Nangcas' decision to bring the victims to Marawi City was planned, contrary to her defense that
she only took them there after the supposed employer in Iligan changed her mind to accept them as her house helpers. It
was sufficiently established that in Marawi City, Nangcas already had Baby and Cairon ready and waiting for her to bring
the recruits to them and collect her fees. Nangcas' failure to notify the victims' parents of their whereabouts bolsters the
allegation that it was really her intention to conceal the fact that the work was actually in Marawi City and not in Cagayan
de Oro; her acts thus constitute deceit and fraud as defined by law.

The victims were sold for forced labor, slavery or involuntary servitude.

Nangcas alleges that the victims were not sold to slavery as they knew that they would be working as house helpers; as
such, there was no slavery or involuntary servitude. Her argument is completely unfounded.

Slavery is defined as the extraction of work or services from any person by enticement, violence, intimidation or threat,
use of force or coercion, including deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or moral ascendancy, debt bondage or
deception.51 In this case, Judith and the three (3) other minor victims were enticed to work as house helpers after
Nangcas had told them of their supposed salary and where they would be working; only to discover that they were
brought to another place without their consent. In Marawi, the victims were constrained to work with the intention to save
money for their fare going back home; however, when they asked for their salary they were told that it had already been
given to Nangcas.

Alleged inconsistencies are minor and do not affect the credibility of the witnesses.

Nangcas still sought an acquittal by claiming that the prosecution witnesses' testimonies were conflicting and improbable.
Such alleged inconsistencies pertained to the testimonies of Judith and the other minor victims as to who was employed
by whom. These inconsistencies, however, are of no consequence to the fact that Judith and the three minor victims were
taken by appellant to Marawi City against their will and were made to work as house helpers without pay. It is evident that
the supposed inconsistencies in the witnesses' testimonies pertained to minor details that, in any case, could not negate
Nangcas' unlawful activity and violation of R.A. No. 9208. Moreover, the Court has ruled time and again that factual
findings of the trial court, its assessment of the credibility of witnesses and the probative weight of their testimonies, and
the conclusions based on these factual findings are to be given the highest respect. As a rule, the Court will not weigh
anew the evidence already passed upon by the trial court and affirmed by the CA.52

Given the foregoing, the Court finds no cogent reason to reverse Nangcas' conviction for qualified trafficking under R.A.
No. 9208. The RTC and the CA correctly imposed the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of P2,000,000.00, applying
Section 10(c) of R.A. No. 9208, to wit:

Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following penalties and sanctions are hereby established for the offenses
enumerated in this Act:
xxxx

(e) Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
not less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (P5,000,000.00).
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision dated 6 March 2015 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 01092 for Qualified Trafficking in Persons is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 211465 December 3, 2014

PEOPLE OF THE :PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
SHIRLEY A. CASIO, Accused-appellant.

"Chicks mo dong?"1

With this sadly familiar question being used on the streets of many of our cities, the fate of many desperate women is
sealed and their futures vanquished. This case resulted in the rescue of two minors from this pernicious practice.
Hopefully, there will be more rescues. Trafficking in persons is a deplorable crime. It is committed even though the minor
knew about or consented to the act of trafficking.

This case involves Republic Act No. 9208,2 otherwise known as the "Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003."3

Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation of Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a).
The information against accused, dated May 5, 2008, states:

That on or about the 3rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00 o’clock A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did then and there hire
and/or recruit AAA, a minor, 17 years old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and sexual exploitation, by acting as
their procurer for different customers, for money, profit or any other consideration, in Violation of Sec. 4, Par. (a), Qualified
by Sec. 6, Par. (a), of R.A. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).

CONTRARY TO LAW.4

The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM),5 a nongovernmental organization, coordinated with the police in
order to entrap persons engaged in human trafficking in Cebu City. 6

Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros, SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy Carlo Veloso
composed the team of police operatives.7 PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso were designated as decoys, pretending to be tour
guides looking for girls to entertain their guests.8 IJM provided them with marked money, which was recorded in the police
blotter.9

The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms 24 and 25. These rooms were adjacent to each other. Room 24
was designated for the transaction while Room 25 was for the rest of the police team. 10

PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s red light district.
Accused noticed them and called their attention by saying "Chicks mo dong?" (Do you like girls, guys?).11

During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that their conversation with accused went as follows:

Accused: Chicks mo dong?(Do you like girls, guys?)

PO1 Luardo: Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi guests naghulat sa motel. (Are they new? They must be
young because we have guests waiting at the motel.)

Accused: Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and I’ll get them.) 12

At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI Ylanan that they found a prospective subject. 13

After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and BBB, private complainants in this case. 14 Accused: Kining duha
kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied with these two?)
PO1 Veloso: Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat? (Well, are they good in sex?) 15 Accused gave the assurance that
the girls were good in sex. PO1 Luardo inquired how much their serviceswould cost. Accused replied, "Tag kinientos"
(₱500.00).16

PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to come with them to Queensland Motel. Upon proceeding toRoom 24,
PO1 Veloso handed the marked money to accused.17

As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI Ylanan a missed call. This was their pre-arranged signal. The rest
of the team proceeded to Room 24, arrested accused, and informed her of her constitutional rights. The police confiscated
the marked money from accused.18 Meanwhile, AAA and BBB "were brought to Room 25 and placed in the custody of the
representatives from the IJM and the DSWD."19

During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January 27, 1991. This statement was supported by a copy of her
certificate of live birth.20

AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house helper in Mandaue City. In March 2008 she stopped working as a
house helper and transferred to Cebu City. She stayed with her cousin, but she subsequently moved to a boarding house.
It was there where she met her friend, Gee Ann. AAA knew that Gee Ann worked in a disco club. When Gee Ann found
out that AAA was no longer a virgin, she offered AAA work. AAA agreed because she needed the money in order to
helpher father. AAA recalled that she had sex with her first customer. She was paid ₱200.00 and given an additional
₱500.00 as tip. For the first few weeks, Gee Ann provided customers for AAA. Eventually, Gee Ann brought her to
Barangay Kamagayan, telling her that there were more customers in that area.21

AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because AAA would usually see her pimping girls to customers in
Barangay Kamagayan.22 AAA further testified that on May 2, 2008, accused solicited her services for a customer. That
was the first time that she was pimped by accused.23 Accused brought her, BBB, and a certain Jocelyn to Queensland
Motel.24

AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed inthe taxi, while she and BBB went to Room 24. It was in Room 24 where the customer
paid Shirley. The police rushed in and toldAAA and BBB to go to the other room. AAA was then met by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development personnel who informed her that she was rescued and not arrested.25

AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to display herself, along with other girls, between 7 p.m. to 8 p.m.
She received ₱400.00 for every customer who selected her.26

The prosecution also presented the police operatives during trial. PSI Ylanan, SPO1 Mendaros, and SPO1 Altubar
testified that after PO1 Veloso had made the missed call to PSI Ylanan, they "rushed to Room 24 and arrested the
accused."27 SPO1 Altubar retrieved the marked money worth ₱1,000.00 from accused’s right hand "and upon instruction
from PCINSP Ylanan recorded the same at the ‘police blotter prior operation’. . . ." 28

The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from the IJM "in conducting the operation against the accused." 29

Version of the accused

In defense, accused testified thatshe worked as a laundry woman. On the evening of May 2, 2008, she went out to buy
supper. While walking, she was stopped by two men on board a blue car. The two men asked her if she knew someone
named Bingbing. She replied that she only knew Gingging but not Bingbing. The men informed her that they were actually
looking for Gingging, gave her a piece of paper witha number written on it, and told her to tell Gingging to bring
companions. When accused arrived home, she contacted Gingging. Gingging convinced her to come because allegedly,
she would be given money by the two males.30 Ruling of the trial court

The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and held31 that:

Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of person[s] . . . as defined under paragraph (a), Section 3 of R.A. 9208
for the purpose of letting her engage in prostitution asdefined under paragraph [c] of the same Section; the act of "sexual
intercourse" need not have been consummated for the mere "transaction" i.e. the ‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing
over of the "bust money" of Php1,000.00 already consummated the said act.

....
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A. CASIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of trafficking in persons
under paragraph (a), Section 4 as qualified under paragraph (a), Section 6 of R.A. 9208 and sentenced to suffer
imprisonment of TWENTY (20) YEARS and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION (Php1,000,000.00).

Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.

SO ORDERED[.]32

Ruling of the Court of Appeals

The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial court but modified the fine and awarded moral damages. The
dispositive portion of the decision33 reads:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision dated 10
August 2010 promulgated by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CBU-83122 is
AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The accused-appellant is accordingly sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment and a fine of Php2,000,000 and is ordered to pay each of the private complainants Php150,000 as moral
damages.

SO ORDERED.34

Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013, which the Court of Appeals noted and gavedue course in its
resolution36 dated January 6, 2014. The case records of CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01490 were received by this court on
March 17, 2014.37

In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court resolved to notify the parties that they may file their respective
supplemental briefs within 30 days from notice. This court also required the Superintendent of the Correctional Institution
for Women to confirm the confinement of accused.39

Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor General41 filed their respective manifestations, stating that they would
no longer file supplemental briefs considering that all issues had been discussed in the appellant’s brief and appellee’s
brief filed before the Court of Appeals. Through a letter42 dated June 17, 2014, Superintendent IV Rachel D. Ruelo
confirmed accused’s confinement at the Correctional Institution for Women since October 27, 2010.

The sole issue raised by accused iswhether the prosecution was able to prove her guilt beyond reasonable doubt.

However, based on the arguments raised in accused’s brief, the sole issue may be dissected into the following:

(1) Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the police was valid, considering that there was no prior
surveillance and the police did not know the subject of the operation; 43

(2) Whether the prosecution was able to prove accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt even though there was
no evidence presented to show that accused has a history of engaging in human trafficking; 44 and

(3) Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking in persons, considering that AAA admitted that she
works as a prostitute.45

Arguments of accused

Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment. Instead, she was instigated into committing the crime.46 The police
did not conduct prior surveillance and did not evenknow who their subject was. 47 Neither did the police know the identities
of the alleged victims.

Accused further argues that under the subjective test, she should be acquitted because the prosecution did notpresent
evidence that would prove she had a history of engaging in human trafficking or any other offense. She denied being a
pimp and asserted that she was a laundry woman.48 In addition, AAA admitted that she worked as a prostitute. Thus, it
was her decision to display herself to solicit customers.49
 Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee

The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-appellee People of the Philippines, argued that the trial court did
not err in convicting accused because witnesses positively identified her as the person who solicited customers and
received money for AAA and BBB.50 Entrapment operations are valid and have been recognized by courts. 51 Likewise, her
arrest in flagrante delicto is valid.52 Hence, the trial court was correct in stating that accused had "fully consummated the
act of trafficking of persons. . ."53

We affirm accused Shirley A. Casio’s conviction.

I.

Background of Republic Act No. 9208

The United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime (UN CTOC) was "adopted and opened for
signature, ratification and accession"54 on November 15, 2000. The UN CTOC is supplemented by three protocols: (1) the
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and Children; (2) the Protocol
against the Smuggling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol against the Illicit Manufacturing of and
Trafficking in Firearms, their Parts and Components and Ammunition.55

On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the United Nations "Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking
in Persons, Especially Women and Children" (Trafficking Protocol). 56 This was ratified by the Philippine Senate on
September 30, 2001.57 The Trafficking Protocol’s entry into force was on December 25, 2003.58

In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined as:

Article 3 Use of terms For the purposes of this Protocol:

(a) "Trafficking in persons" shall mean the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons,
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse
of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall include,
at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labour or
services, slavery or practices similar to slavery, servitude or the removal of organs;

(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of
this article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;

(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall be
considered "trafficking in persons" even if this does not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (a) of
this article;

(d) "Child" shall mean any person under eighteen years of age.

Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech, stated that the "Anti-Trafficking Act will serve as the enabling law of
the country’s commitment to [the] protocol."59

Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a sponsorship speech and described trafficking in persons as follows:

Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the gravity of its hideousness, is tantamount to modern-day slavery at
work. It is a manifestation of one of the most flagrant forms of violence against human beings. Its victims suffer the brunt
of this insidious form of violence. It is exploitation, coercion, deception, abduction, rape, physical, mental and other forms
of abuse, prostitution, forced labor, and indentured servitude.

....
As of this time, we have signed the following: the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women; the 1995 Convention on the Rights of the Child; the United Nations Convention on the Protection of Migrant
Workers and their Families; and the United Nations’ Resolution on Trafficking in Women and Girls, among others.

Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the United Nations’ Convention Against Organized Crime, including the
Trafficking Protocol in October last year.

At first glance, it appears thatwe are very responsive to the problem. So it seems.

Despite these international agreements, we have yet to come up with a law that shall squarely address human
trafficking.60

During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then numbered as Senate Bill No. 2444, Senator Teresa Aquino-Oreta
asked if there was a necessity for an anti-trafficking law when other laws exist that cover trafficking. 61

Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada explained:

At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the trafficking issue are the Revised Penal Code, Republic Act No. 8042 or
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipino Act, R[epublic] A[ct] No. 6955 or the Mail-Order Bride Act, and Republic Act
No. 8239 or the Philippine Passport Act. These laws address issues such as illegal recruitment, prostitution, falsification of
public documents and the mail-order bride scheme. These laws do not respond to the issue of recruiting, harboring or
transporting persons resulting in prostitution, forced labor, slavery and slavery-like practices. They only address to one or
some elements of trafficking independent of their results or consequence. 62 (Emphasis supplied)

Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to fully address the issue of human trafficking. Republic Act No. 9208
was passed on May 12, 2003, and approved on May 26, 2003.

II.

Elements of trafficking in persons

The elements of trafficking inpersons can be derived from its definition under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, thus:

(1) The actof "recruitment, transportation, transfer or harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s
consent or knowledge, within or across national borders."

(2) The means used which include "threat or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another; and

(3) The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which includes "exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms
of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs." 63

On January 28, 2013,Republic Act No. 1036464 was approved, otherwise known as the "Expanded Anti-Trafficking in
Persons Act of 2012." Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208 was amended by Republic Act No. 10364 as follows:

SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby amended to read as follows:

"SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:

"(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer,
maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national
borders by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at a minimum,
the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs.
"The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation or when
the adoption is induced by any form of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be considered as ‘trafficking in
persons’ even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)

Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of trafficking in persons have been expanded to include the following acts:

(1) The act of "recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining, harboring, or
receipt of persons with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across national borders;"

(2) The means used include "by means of threat, or use of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the giving or
receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person having control over another person"

(3) The purpose of trafficking includes "the exploitation or the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of organs" (Emphasis supplied)

The Court of Appeals found thatAAA and BBB were recruited by accused when their services were peddled to the police
who acted as decoys.65 AAA was a child at the time that accused peddled her services.66 AAA also stated that she agreed
to work as a prostitute because she needed money. 67 Accused took advantage of AAA’s vulnerability as a child and as
one who need money, as proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.68

III.

Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense under Republic Act No. 9208.

Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in prostitution even before May 2, 2008. She concludes that AAA was
predisposed to having sex with "customers" for money.69 For liability under our law, this argument is irrelevant. As defined
under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still becommitted even if the victim gives consent.

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— As used in this Act:

a. Trafficking in Persons - refers to the recruitment, transportation, transfer or harboring, or receipt of persons with
or without the victim's consent or knowledge, within or across national borders by means of threat or use of force,
or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or of position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve the consent of a person
having control over another person for the purpose of exploitation which includes ata minimum, the exploitation or
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or the
removal or sale of organs.

The recruitment transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall also be
considered as "trafficking in persons" even if it does not involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph.70 (Emphasis supplied)

The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by perpetrators
of human trafficking.71 Even without the use of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s consent is not given outof
his or her own free will.

Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the different acts of trafficking in persons. Accused was charged under
Section 4(a), which states:

SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons.— It shall be unlawful for any person, natural or judicial, to commit any of the
following acts.

a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or receive a person by any means, including those done under
the pretext of domestic or overseas employment or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage; 72

Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances when the crime of trafficking in persons is qualified.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons.— The following are considered as qualified trafficking: a. When the trafficked
person is a child;

b. When the adoption is effected through Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the "Inter-Country Adoption
Act of 1995" and said adoption is for the purpose of prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;

c. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed by a syndicate
if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring or confederating with one another. It is deemed
committed in large scale if committed against three (3) or more persons, individually or as a group;

d. When the offender is an ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person who exercise authority over the
trafficked person or when the offense is committed by a public officer or employee;

e. When the trafficked person is recruited to engage in prostitution with any member of the military or law
enforcement agencies;

f. When the offender is a member of the military or law enforcement agencies; and

g. When by reason or on occasion of the act of trafficking in persons, the offended party dies, becomes insane,
suffers mutilation or is afflicted with Human Immunod eficiency Virus (HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS). (Emphasis supplied)73

Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines "child" as:

SEC. 3. Definition of Terms.— As used in this Act:

....

b. Child- refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of age or one who is over eighteen (18) but isunable to fully take
care of or protect himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination because of a physical or
mental disability or condition.74

Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the enumeration of acts of trafficking in persons, accused performed
all the elements in the commission of the offense when she peddled AAA and BBB and offered their services to decoys
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in exchange for money. The offense was also qualified because the trafficked persons were
minors.

Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her services for the customers waiting at Queensland Motel. AAA also
testified that she was only 17 years old when accused peddled her. Her certificate of live birth was presented as evidence
to show that she was born on January 27, 1991.

The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable doubt that accused committed the offense of trafficking in persons,
qualified by the fact that one of the victims was a child. As held by the trial court:

[T]he act of "sexual intercourse" need not have been consummated for the mere "transaction" i.e. that ‘solicitation’ for sex
and the handing over of the "bust money" of Php.1,000.00 already consummated the said act. 75

IV.

Validity of the entrapment operation

In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective test and the subjective test to determine whether there was a valid
entrapment operation:

. . . American federal courts and a majority of state courts use the "subjective" or "origin of intent" test laid down in Sorrells
v. United States to determine whether entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is on the accused's
predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind and inclination before his initial exposure to government
agents. All relevant facts such as the accused's mental and character traits, his past offenses, activities, his eagerness in
committing the crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his state of mind before the crime. The predisposition
test emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the offense rather than the officer's misconduct and reflects an
attempt to draw a line between a "trap for the unwary innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal." If the accused was
found to have been ready and willing to commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the entrapment defense will fail
even if a police agent usedan unduly persuasive inducement.

Some states, however, have adopted the "objective" test. . . . Here, the court considers the nature of the police activity
involved and the propriety of police conduct. The inquiry is focused on the inducements used by government agents, on
police conduct, not on the accused and his predisposition to commit the crime.For the goal of the defense is to deter
unlawful police conduct. The test of entrapment is whether the conduct of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce
a normally law-abiding person, other than one who is ready and willing, to commit the offense; for purposes of this test, it
is presumed that a law-abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is presented by the
simple opportunity to act unlawfully. (Emphasis supplied, citations omitted) 77

Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually apply the objective test in determining the whether there was an
entrapment operation or an instigation.78 However, the use of the objective test should not preclude courts from also
applying the subjective test. She pointed out that:

Applying the "subjective"test it is worth invoking that accusedappellant procures income from being a laundry woman. The
prosecution had not shown any proof evidencing accused-appellant’s history in human trafficking or engagement in any
offense. She is not even familiar to the team who had has [sic] been apprehending human traffickers for quite some
time.79 (Citations omitted)

Accused further argued that the police should have conducted a prior surveillance before the entrapment operation.

Time and again, this court has discussed the difference between entrapment and instigation. In Chang v. People, 80 this
court explained that:

There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal while in the
actual commission of the crime. There is instigation when the accused is induced to commit the crime. The difference in
the nature of the two lies in the origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens reaoriginates from the mind of the
criminal. The idea and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In instigation, the law officer conceives the
commission of the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the idea and carries it into execution. 81

Accused contends that using the subjective test, she was clearly instigated by the police to commit the offense. She
denied being a pimp and claimed that she earned her living as a laundrywoman. On this argument, we agree with the
finding of the Court of Appeals:

[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the transaction with PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso by calling their attention
on whether they wanted girls for that evening, and when the officers responded, it was the accused-appellant who told
them to wait while she would fetch the girls for their perusal.82

This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the offense because she initiated the transaction. As testified by
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo, accused called out their attention by saying "Chicks mo dong?" If accused had no
predisposition to commit the offense, then she most likely would not have asked PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo if they
wanted girls.

The entrapment would still be valid using the objective test. The police merely proceeded to D. Jakosalem Street in
Barangay Kamagayan. It was accused who asked them whether they wanted girls. There was no illicit inducement on the
part of the police for the accused to commit the crime.

When accused was arrested, she was informed of her constitutional rights. 83 The marked money retrieved from her was
recorded in the police blotter prior to the entrapment operation and was presented in court as evidence. 84

On accused’s alibi thatshe was merely out to buy her supper that night, the Court of Appeals noted that accused never
presented Gingging in court. Thus, her alibi was unsubstantiated and cannot be given credence. 85
With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior surveillance is not a condition for an entrapment operation’s validity. 86 In
People v. Padua87 this court underscored the value of flexibility in police operations:

A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which has
no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good police work. However the police carry out its entrapment
operations, for as long as the rights of the accused have not been violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the
wisdom thereof. The police officers may decide that time is of the essence and dispense with the need for prior
surveillance.88 (Citations omitted)

This flexibility is even more important in cases involving trafficking of persons. The urgency of rescuing the victims may at
times require immediate but deliberate action on the part of the law enforcers.

V.

Imposition of fine and award of damages

The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of 2,000,000.00. Section 10 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 provides
that:

SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions.— The following penalties and sanctions are hereby established for the offenses
enumerated in this Act:

....

c. Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of
not less than Two million pesos (₱2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos (₱5,000,000.00);

However, we modify by raising the award of moral damages from ₱150,000.0089 to ₱500,000.00. We also award
exemplary damages in the amount of ₱100,000.00. These amounts are in accordance with the ruling in People v.
Lalli90 where this court held that:

The payment of ₱500,000 as moral damages and ₱100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of Trafficking in Persons
as a Prostitute finds basis in Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which states:

Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:

(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;

(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;

(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;

(4) Adultery or concubinage;

(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;

(6) Illegal search;

(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;

(8) Malicious prosecution;

(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.

....
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of seduction, abduction,
rape, or other lascivious acts. In fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without one’s consent and to be sexually
violated four to five times a day by different strangers is horrendous and atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita
experienced physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in Persons
was aggravated, being committed by a syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise justified.91

Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the kind of poverty and its accompanying desperation that compels our
women to endure indignities. It reflects the weaknesses of that society even as it convicts those who deviantly thrive in
such hopelessness. We should continue to strive for the best of our world, where our choices of human intimacies are real
choices, and not the last resort taken just to survive. Human intimacies enhance our best and closest relationships. It
serves as a foundation for two human beings to face life’s joys and challenges while continually growing together with
many shared experiences. The quality of our human relationships defines the world that we create also for others.

Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB, therefore, to be trafficked, we affirm the text and spirit of our laws. Minors
should spend their adolescence moulding their character in environments free of the vilest motives and the worse of other
human beings. The evidence and the law compel us to affirm the conviction of accused in this case.

But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our duties, we also express the hope that our people and our government
unite against everything inhuman. We contribute to a commitment to finally stamp out slavery and human trafficking.

There are more AAA's and BBBs out there. They, too, deserve to be rescued. They, too, need to be shown that in spite of
what their lives have been, there is still much good in our world.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 2013, finding
accused Shirley A. Casio guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a), qualified by Section 6(a) of Republic
Act No. 9208, and sentencing her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of ₱2,000,000.00, with the
MODIFICATION that accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole under Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law)
in accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346. 92

The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows:

Accused is ordered to pay each of the private complainants:

(1) ₱500,000.00 as moral damages; and

(2) ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.

SO ORDERED.
 Crimes Against Public Officers

G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008

HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

CAN the Sandiganbayan try a government scholaran** accused, along with her brother, of swindling government funds?

MAAARI bang litisin ng Sandiganbayan ang isang iskolar ng bayan, at ang kanyang kapatid, na kapwa
pinararatangan ng estafa ng pera ng bayan?

The jurisdictional question is posed in this petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutions 1 of the Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division, denying petitioner’s motion to quash the information and her motion for reconsideration.

The Antecedents

Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. A student of a state
university is known as a government scholar. She was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21,
1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000.

In the early part of 2000, petitioner discussed with President Estrada the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex in UP
Diliman.2 On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission the Office of the Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI). 3

One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall Annex. 4 President Estrada gave Fifteen Million
Pesos (P15,000,000.00) to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds,
according to the information, was the Office of the President.

The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.5 The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and
Christine Jill De Guzman, Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within
the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the
Ombudsman.6

On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict petitioner and her brother Jade
Ian D. Serana for estafa, docketed as Criminal Case No. 27819 of the Sandiganbayan.7 The Information reads:

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III, Office of the Special Prosecutor, hereby accuses HANNAH
EUNICE D. SERANA and JADE IAN D. SERANA of the crime of Estafa, defined and penalized under Paragraph
2(a), Article 315 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended committed as follows:

That on October, 24, 2000, or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in Quezon City, Metro Manila, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused, HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, a
high-ranking public officer, being then the Student Regent of the University of the Philippines, Diliman, Quezon
City, while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking
advantage of her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private
individual, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government by falsely and
fraudulently representing to former President Joseph Ejercito Estrada that the renovation of the Vinzons Hall of
the University of the Philippines will be renovated and renamed as "President Joseph Ejercito Estrada Student
Hall," and for which purpose accused HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA requested the amount of FIFTEEN
MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying
and believing on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank
Check No. 91353 dated October 24, 2000 in the amount of FIFTEEN MILLION PESOS (P15,000,000.00), which
check was subsequently encashed by accused Jade Ian D. Serana on October 25, 2000 and misappropriated for
their personal use and benefit, and despite repeated demands made upon the accused for them to return
aforesaid amount, the said accused failed and refused to do so to the damage and prejudice of the government in
the aforesaid amount.
 CONTRARY TO LAW. (Underscoring supplied)

Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the
offense charged or over her person, in her capacity as UP student regent.

Petitioner claimed that Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or offenses
over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction.8 It has no jurisdiction over the crime of estafa.9 It only has jurisdiction over
crimes covered by Title VII, Chapter II, Section 2 (Crimes Committed by Public Officers), Book II of the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). Estafa falling under Title X, Chapter VI (Crimes Against Property), Book II of the RPC is not within the
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction.

She also argued that it was President Estrada, not the government, that was duped. Even assuming that she received
the P15,000,000.00, that amount came from Estrada, not from the coffers of the government. 10

Petitioner likewise posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student regent, she was not a
public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the other regents who held their positions in an ex
officio capacity. She addsed that she was a simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent.

She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such power was vested with the
Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the information that it was among her functions or duties
to receive funds, or that the crime was committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.11

The Ombudsman opposed the motion.12 It disputed petitioner’s interpretation of the law. Section 4(b) of Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1606 clearly contains the catch -all phrase "in relation to office," thus, the Sandiganbayan has
jurisdiction over the charges against petitioner. In the same breath, the prosecution countered that the source of the
money is a matter of defense. It should be threshed out during a full-blown trial.13

According to the Ombudsman, petitioner, despite her protestations, iwas a public officer. As a member of the BOR, she
hads the general powers of administration and exerciseds the corporate powers of UP. Based on Mechem’s definition of a
public office, petitioner’s stance that she was not compensated, hence, not a public officer, is erroneous. Compensation is
not an essential part of public office. Parenthetically, compensation has been interpreted to include allowances. By this
definition, petitioner was compensated.14

Sandiganbayan Disposition

In a Resolution dated November 14, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of merit. 15 It
ratiocinated:

The focal point in controversy is the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan over this case.

It is extremely erroneous to hold that only criminal offenses covered by Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of
the Revised Penal Code are within the jurisdiction of this Court. As correctly pointed out by the prosecution,
Section 4(b) of R.A. 8249 provides that the Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other offenses committed by
public officials and employees in relation to their office. From this provision, there is no single doubt that this Court
has jurisdiction over the offense of estafa committed by a public official in relation to his office.

Accused-movant’s claim that being merely a member in representation of the student body, she was never a
public officer since she never received any compensation nor does she fall under Salary Grade 27, is of no
moment, in view of the express provision of Section 4 of Republic Act No. 8249 which provides:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction – The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

(A) x x x

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989 (Republic Act No.
6758), specifically including:
 xxxx

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state

universities or educational institutions or foundations. (Italics supplied)

It is very clear from the aforequoted provision that the Sandiganbayan has original exclusive jurisdiction over all
offenses involving the officials enumerated in subsection (g), irrespective of their salary grades, because the
primordial consideration in the inclusion of these officials is the nature of their responsibilities and functions.

Is accused-movant included in the contemplated provision of law?

A meticulous review of the existing Charter of the University of the Philippines reveals that the Board of Regents,
to which accused-movant belongs, exclusively exercises the general powers of administration and corporate
powers in the university, such as: 1) To receive and appropriate to the ends specified by law such sums as may
be provided by law for the support of the university; 2) To prescribe rules for its own government and to enact for
the government of the university such general ordinances and regulations, not contrary to law, as are consistent
with the purposes of the university; and 3) To appoint, on recommendation of the President of the University,
professors, instructors, lecturers and other employees of the University; to fix their compensation, hours of
service, and such other duties and conditions as it may deem proper; to grant to them in its discretion leave of
absence under such regulations as it may promulgate, any other provisions of law to the contrary notwithstanding,
and to remove them for cause after an investigation and hearing shall have been had.

It is well-established in corporation law that the corporation can act only through its board of directors, or board of
trustees in the case of non-stock corporations. The board of directors or trustees, therefore, is the governing body
of the corporation.

It is unmistakably evident that the Board of Regents of the University of the Philippines is performing functions
similar to those of the Board of Trustees of a non-stock corporation. This draws to fore the conclusion that being a
member of such board, accused-movant undoubtedly falls within the category of public officials upon whom this
Court is vested with original exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of the fact that she does not occupy a position
classified as Salary Grade 27 or higher under the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989.

Finally, this court finds that accused-movant’s contention that the same of P15 Million was received from former
President Estrada and not from the coffers of the government, is a matter a defense that should be properly
ventilated during the trial on the merits of this case.16

On November 19, 2003, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration.17 The motion was denied with finality in a Resolution
dated February 4, 2004.18

Issue

Petitioner is now before this Court, contending that "THE RESPONDENT COURT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF
DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK AND/OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN NOT QUASHING THE INFORMATION
AND DISMISING THE CASE NOTWITHSTANDING THAT IS HAS NO JURISDICTION OVER THE OFFENSE
CHARGED IN THE INFORMATION."19

In her discussion, she reiterates her four-fold argument below, namely: (a) the Sandiganbayan has no jurisdiction
over estafa; (b) petitioner is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27 and she paid her tuition fees; (c) the offense charged
was not committed in relation to her office; (d) the funds in question personally came from President Estrada, not from the
government.

Our Ruling

The petition cannot be granted.

Preliminarily, the denial of a motion to

quash is not correctible by certiorari.
We would ordinarily dismiss this petition for certiorari outright on procedural grounds. Well-established is the rule that
when a motion to quash in a criminal case is denied, the remedy is not a petition for certiorari, but for petitioners to go to
trial, without prejudice to reiterating the special defenses invoked in their motion to quash.20 Remedial measures as
regards interlocutory orders, such as a motion to quash, are frowned upon and often dismissed. 21 The evident reason for
this rule is to avoid multiplicity of appeals in a single action.22

In Newsweek, Inc. v. Intermediate Appellate Court,23 the Court clearly explained and illustrated the rule and the
exceptions, thus:

As a general rule, an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and cannot be subject of appeal
until final judgment or order is rendered. (Sec. 2 of Rule 41). The ordinary procedure to be followed in such a case
is to file an answer, go to trial and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the final judgment.
The same rule applies to an order denying a motion to quash, except that instead of filing an answer a plea is
entered and no appeal lies from a judgment of acquittal.

This general rule is subject to certain exceptions. If the court, in denying the motion to dismiss or motion to quash,
acts without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion, then certiorari or prohibition lies. The
reason is that it would be unfair to require the defendant or accused to undergo the ordeal and expense of a trial if
the court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter or offense, or is not the court of proper venue, or if the denial
of the motion to dismiss or motion to quash is made with grave abuse of discretion or a whimsical and capricious
exercise of judgment. In such cases, the ordinary remedy of appeal cannot be plain and adequate. The following
are a few examples of the exceptions to the general rule.

In De Jesus v. Garcia (19 SCRA 554), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction over
the subject matter, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and prohibition against the City Court of Manila and
directed the respondent court to dismiss the case.

In Lopez v. City Judge (18 SCRA 616), upon the denial of a motion to quash based on lack of jurisdiction over the
offense, this Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent court from further proceeding
in the case.

In Enriquez v. Macadaeg (84 Phil. 674), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on improper venue, this
Court granted the petition for prohibition and enjoined the respondent judge from taking cognizance of the case
except to dismiss the same.

In Manalo v. Mariano (69 SCRA 80), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on bar by prior judgment, this
Court granted the petition for certiorari and directed the respondent judge to dismiss the case.

In Yuviengco v. Dacuycuy (105 SCRA 668), upon the denial of a motion to dismiss based on the Statute of
Frauds, this Court granted the petition for certiorari and dismissed the amended complaint.

In Tacas v. Cariaso (72 SCRA 527), this Court granted the petition for certiorari after the motion to quash based
on double jeopardy was denied by respondent judge and ordered him to desist from further action in the criminal
case except to dismiss the same.

In People v. Ramos (83 SCRA 11), the order denying the motion to quash based on prescription was set aside
on certiorari and the criminal case was dismissed by this Court.24

We do not find the Sandiganbayan to have committed a grave abuse of discretion.

The jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is

set by P.D. No. 1606, as amended, not by
R.A. No. 3019, as amended.

We first address petitioner’s contention that the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan is determined by Section 4 of R.A. No.
3019 (The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, as amended). We note that petitioner refers to Section 4 of the said law
yet quotes Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, in her motion to quash before the Sandiganbayan. 25 She repeats the
reference in the instant petition for certiorari26 and in her memorandum of authorities.27
We cannot bring ourselves to write this off as a mere clerical or typographical error. It bears stressing that petitioner
repeated this claim twice despite corrections made by the Sandiganbayan. 28

Her claim has no basis in law. It is P.D. No. 1606, as amended, rather than R.A. No. 3019, as amended, that determines
the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. A brief legislative history of the statute creating the Sandiganbayan is in order. The
Sandiganbayan was created by P.D. No. 1486, promulgated by then President Ferdinand E. Marcos on June 11, 1978. It
was promulgated to attain the highest norms of official conduct required of public officers and employees, based on the
concept that public officers and employees shall serve with the highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and
efficiency and shall remain at all times accountable to the people. 29

P.D. No. 1486 was, in turn, amended by P.D. No. 1606 which was promulgated on December 10, 1978. P.D. No. 1606
expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.30

P.D. No. 1606 was later amended by P.D. No. 1861 on March 23, 1983, further altering the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction. R.A. No. 7975 approved on March 30, 1995 made succeeding amendments to P.D. No. 1606, which was
again amended on February 5, 1997 by R.A. No. 8249. Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249 further modified the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. As it now stands, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction. - The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving:

A. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, other known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code, where one or more
of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the government, whether in a permanent, acting
or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise classified
as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 989 (Republic Act No. 6758),
specifically including:

" (a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and provincial treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

" (b) City mayor, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers, assessors, engineers,
and other city department heads;

"(c ) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

" (d) Philippine army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

" (e) Officers of the Philippine National Police while occupying the position of provincial director and those holding
the rank of senior superintended or higher;

" (f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the Office of the
Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

" (g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state
universities or educational institutions or foundations.

" (2) Members of Congress and officials thereof classified as Grade "27'" and up under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989;

" (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

" (4) Chairmen and members of Constitutional Commission, without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;
and

" (5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27'" and higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.
 B. Other offenses of felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

C. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.

" In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to Salary Grade "27'" or higher, as
prescribed in the said Republic Act No. 6758, or military and PNP officer mentioned above, exclusive original
jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and
municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

" The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or order of
regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate jurisdiction as
herein provided.

" The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that may arise in
cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986: Provided, That
the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.

" The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the Supreme
Court has promulgated and may thereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to the Court of
Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all cases elevated to the
Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of the Ombudsman, through its
special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in cases filed pursuant to Executive
Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in 1986.

" In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public officers or
employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they shall be tried jointly
with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise exclusive jurisdiction over them.

" Any provisions of law or Rules of Court to the contrary notwithstanding, the criminal action and the
corresponding civil action for the recovery of civil liability shall, at all times, be simultaneously instituted with, and
jointly determined in, the same proceeding by the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate courts, the filing of the
criminal action being deemed to necessarily carry with it the filing of the civil action, and no right to reserve the
filing such civil action separately from the criminal action shall be recognized: Provided, however, That where the
civil action had heretofore been filed separately but judgment therein has not yet been rendered, and the criminal
case is hereafter filed with the Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, said civil action shall be transferred to the
Sandiganbayan or the appropriate court, as the case may be, for consolidation and joint determination with the
criminal action, otherwise the separate civil action shall be deemed abandoned."

Upon the other hand, R.A. No. 3019 is a penal statute approved on August 17, 1960. The said law represses certain acts
of public officers and private persons alike which constitute graft or corrupt practices or which may lead
thereto.31 Pursuant to Section 10 of R.A. No. 3019, all prosecutions for violation of the said law should be filed with the
Sandiganbayan.32

R.A. No. 3019 does not contain an enumeration of the cases over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. In fact,
Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019 erroneously cited by petitioner, deals not with the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but with
prohibition on private individuals. We quote:

Section 4. Prohibition on private individuals. – (a) It shall be unlawful for any person having family or close
personal relation with any public official to capitalize or exploit or take advantage of such family or close personal
relation by directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any present, gift or material or pecuniary advantage from
any other person having some business, transaction, application, request or contract with the government, in
which such public official has to intervene. Family relation shall include the spouse or relatives by consanguinity
or affinity in the third civil degree. The word "close personal relation" shall include close personal friendship, social
and fraternal connections, and professional employment all giving rise to intimacy which assures free access to
such public officer.
 (b) It shall be unlawful for any person knowingly to induce or cause any public official to commit any of the
offenses defined in Section 3 hereof.

In fine, the two statutes differ in that P.D. No. 1606, as amended, defines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan while R.A.
No. 3019, as amended, defines graft and corrupt practices and provides for their penalties.

Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over

the offense of estafa.

Relying on Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606, petitioner contends that estafa is not among those crimes cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. We note that in hoisting this argument, petitioner isolated the first paragraph of Section 4 of P.D. No.
1606, without regard to the succeeding paragraphs of the said provision.

The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust
or an absurd conclusion.33 Interpretatio talis in ambiguis semper fienda est, ut evitetur inconveniens et absurdum. Where
there is ambiguity, such interpretation as will avoid inconvenience and absurdity is to be adopted. Kung saan mayroong
kalabuan, ang pagpapaliwanag ay hindi dapat maging mahirap at katawa-tawa.

Every section, provision or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature.34 The intention of the legislator must be ascertained from the whole text of the law
and every part of the act is to be taken into view.35 In other words, petitioner’s interpretation lies in direct opposition to the
rule that a statute must be interpreted as a whole under the principle that the best interpreter of a statute is the statute
itself.36 Optima statuti interpretatrix est ipsum statutum. Ang isang batas ay marapat na bigyan ng kahulugan sa
kanyang kabuuan sa ilalim ng prinsipyo na ang pinakamainam na interpretasyon ay ang mismong batas.

Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 reads:

B. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and
employees mentioned in subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

Evidently, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials in relation to their office.
We see no plausible or sensible reason to exclude estafa as one of the offenses included in Section 4(bB) of P.D. No.
1606. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the
offense is committed by public officials and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that
(b) the offense is committed in relation to their office.

In Perlas, Jr. v. People,37 the Court had occasion to explain that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an indictment
for estafa versus a director of the National Parks Development Committee, a government instrumentality. The Court held
then:

The National Parks Development Committee was created originally as an Executive Committee on January 14,
1963, for the development of the Quezon Memorial, Luneta and other national parks (Executive Order No. 30). It
was later designated as the National Parks Development Committee (NPDC) on February 7, 1974 (E.O. No. 69).
On January 9, 1966, Mrs. Imelda R. Marcos and Teodoro F. Valencia were designated Chairman and Vice-
Chairman respectively (E.O. No. 3). Despite an attempt to transfer it to the Bureau of Forest Development,
Department of Natural Resources, on December 1, 1975 (Letter of Implementation No. 39, issued pursuant to PD
No. 830, dated November 27, 1975), the NPDC has remained under the Office of the President (E.O. No. 709,
dated July 27, 1981).

Since 1977 to 1981, the annual appropriations decrees listed NPDC as a regular government agency under the
Office of the President and allotments for its maintenance and operating expenses were issued direct to NPDC
(Exh. 10-A, Perlas, Item Nos. 2, 3).

The Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over estafa was reiterated with greater firmness in Bondoc v.
Sandiganbayan.38 Pertinent parts of the Court’s ruling in Bondoc read:

Furthermore, it is not legally possible to transfer Bondoc’s cases to the Regional Trial Court, for the simple reason
that the latter would not have jurisdiction over the offenses. As already above intimated, the inability of the
Sandiganbayan to hold a joint trial of Bondoc’s cases and those of the government employees separately charged
 for the same crimes, has not altered the nature of the offenses charged, as estafa thru falsification punishable by
penalties higher than prision correccional or imprisonment of six years, or a fine of P6,000.00, committed by
government employees in conspiracy with private persons, including Bondoc. These crimes are within the
exclusive, original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They simply cannot be taken cognizance of by the regular
courts, apart from the fact that even if the cases could be so transferred, a joint trial would nonetheless not be
possible.

Petitioner UP student regent

is a public officer.

Petitioner also contends that she is not a public officer. She does not receive any salary or remuneration as a UP student
regent. This is not the first or likely the last time that We will be called upon to define a public officer. In Khan, Jr. v. Office
of the Ombudsman, We ruled that it is difficult to pin down the definition of a public officer. 39 The 1987 Constitution does
not define who are public officers. Rather, the varied definitions and concepts are found in different statutes and
jurisprudence.

In Aparri v. Court of Appeals,40 the Court held that:

A public office is the right, authority, and duty created and conferred by law, by which for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercise by him for the benefit of the public ([Mechem Public Offices
and Officers,] Sec. 1). The right to hold a public office under our political system is therefore not a natural right. It
exists, when it exists at all only because and by virtue of some law expressly or impliedly creating and conferring
it (Mechem Ibid., Sec. 64). There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an
absolute right to hold office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary
and tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary (42 Am. Jur. 881).

In Laurel v. Desierto,41 the Court adopted the definition of Mechem of a public office:

"A public office is the right, authority and duty, created and conferred by law, by which, for a given period, either
fixed by law or enduring at the pleasure of the creating power, an individual is invested with some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public. The individual so
invested is a public officer."42

Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular tuition fee-paying student.
This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The
Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held
that while the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second part specifically
includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express
provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan
as she is placed there by express provision of law.44

Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over Presidents, directors or
trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations, state universities or educational institutions or
foundations. Petitioner falls under this category. As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to
those of a board of trustees of a non-stock corporation.45 By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public officer
as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

Moreover, it is well established that compensation is not an essential element of public office. 46 At most, it is merely
incidental to the public office.47

Delegation of sovereign functions is essential in the public office. An investment in an individual of some portion of the
sovereign functions of the government, to be exercised by him for the benefit of the public makes one a public officer. 48

The administration of the UP is a sovereign function in line with Article XIV of the Constitution. UP performs a legitimate
governmental function by providing advanced instruction in literature, philosophy, the sciences, and arts, and giving
professional and technical training.49 Moreover, UP is maintained by the Government and it declares no dividends and is
not a corporation created for profit.50
The offense charged was committed
in relation to public office, according
to the Information.

Petitioner likewise argues that even assuming that she is a public officer, the Sandiganbayan would still not have
jurisdiction over the offense because it was not committed in relation to her office.

According to petitioner, she had no power or authority to act without the approval of the BOR. She adds there was no
Board Resolution issued by the BOR authorizing her to contract with then President Estrada; and that her acts were not
ratified by the governing body of the state university. Resultantly, her act was done in a private capacity and not in relation
to public office.

It is axiomatic that jurisdiction is determined by the averments in the information. 51 More than that, jurisdiction is not
affected by the pleas or the theories set up by defendant or respondent in an answer, a motion to dismiss, or a motion to
quash.52 Otherwise, jurisdiction would become dependent almost entirely upon the whims of defendant or respondent.53

In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a student regent of U.P.,
"while in the performance of her official functions, committing the offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of
her position, with intent to gain, conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x." (Underscoring supplied)

Clearly, there was no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the information
based on this ground.

Source of funds is a defense that should

be raised during trial on the merits.

It is contended anew that the amount came from President Estrada’s private funds and not from the government coffers.
Petitioner insists the charge has no leg to stand on.

We cannot agree. The information alleges that the funds came from the Office of the President and not its then occupant,
President Joseph Ejercito Estrada. Under the information, it is averred that "petitioner requested the amount of Fifteen
Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00), Philippine Currency, from the Office of the President, and the latter relying and believing
on said false pretenses and misrepresentation gave and delivered to said accused Land Bank Check No. 91353 dated
October 24, 2000 in the amount of Fifteen Million Pesos (P15,000,000.00)."

Again, the Court sustains the Sandiganbayan observation that the source of the P15,000,000 is a matter of defense that
should be ventilated during the trial on the merits of the instant case.54

A lawyer owes candor, fairness

and honesty to the Court.

As a parting note, petitioner’s counsel, Renato G. dela Cruz, misrepresented his reference to Section 4 of P.D. No. 1606
as a quotation from Section 4 of R.A. No. 3019. A review of his motion to quash, the instant petition for certiorari and his
memorandum, unveils the misquotation. We urge petitioner’s counsel to observe Canon 10 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, specifically Rule 10.02 of the Rules stating that "a lawyer shall not misquote or misrepresent."

The Court stressed the importance of this rule in Pangan v. Ramos,55 where Atty Dionisio D. Ramos used the name Pedro
D.D. Ramos in connection with a criminal case. The Court ruled that Atty. Ramos resorted to deception by using a name
different from that with which he was authorized. We severely reprimanded Atty. Ramos and warned that a repetition may
warrant suspension or disbarment.56

We admonish petitioner’s counsel to be more careful and accurate in his citation. A lawyer’s conduct before the court
should be characterized by candor and fairness.57 The administration of justice would gravely suffer if lawyers do not act
with complete candor and honesty before the courts.58

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
RUBIN TAD-Y y BABOR, Petitioners, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

This is a Petition for Review of the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 24162 affirming, on appeal,
the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City, Branch 49, in People v. Rubin Tad - y, et al., Criminal
Case No. 98-19401. The RTC ruling had affirmed the decision of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) in Criminal
Case No. 57216 finding the petitioner guilty of direct bribery.

The Antecedents

Engineer Rubin Tad-y, Structural Analyst and Engineer Nestor Velez, Building Inspector, both of the Office of the City
Engineer (OCE), Bacolod City, were charged with direct bribery under Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code in an
Information filed on July 26, 1995 with the MTCC of Bacolod City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 57216. The accusatory
portion of the Information for direct bribery reads:

That on or about the 24th day of July 1995, in the City of Bacolod, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the herein accused, public officers, being then engineers at the City Engineer's Office, Bacolod City, with corrupt
intent and motivated with pecuniary interest for themselves, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously receive
and accept marked money in the amount of Four Thousand (P4,000.00) Pesos from Julio Encabo, electrical contractor
and duly-authorized representative of Mildred Wong, offended party and owner of Atrium Building located at Gonzaga
Street, Bacolod City, in an entrapment operation conducted by the PNP Criminal Investigation Service Command at
Andre's Bakeshop, Bacolod City, which amount was earlier solicited by said accused from the offended party in exchange
for the signing/approval of permit for building occupancy of the building owned by the offended party, the signing/approval
of said building permit is in connection with the performance of the official duties of said accused as engineers in the
Office of the City Engineer, Bacolod City, in violation of the aforementioned law.

Acts contrary to law.3

Velez and Tad-y were also charged with violation of Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019 4 in an Information filed with the
RTC, docketed as Criminal Case No. 17186. This case was raffled to Branch 44 of the RTC of Bacolod City.

The Case for the People5

The prosecution presented Julio Encabo, a licensed master electrician and electrical contractor, who testified that Mildred
Wong contracted his services for the construction of her 6-storey Atrium building along Gonzaga Street, in front of the
Central Market in Bacolod City.6 On February 16, 1994, the Office of the City Engineer/Building Official issued Building
Permit No. 06945097987 for the construction of the building. The construction of the building was finished by April 25,
1995.8

Between 1:30 and 2:00 p.m. of even date, Encabo arrived at the OCE to arrange the conduct of final building inspections,
and, thereafter, the signing of the corresponding certificates. Rene Cornel, Jose Sotecinal, Ephraim Hechanova, Jose
Mari Sales, Mateo Tuvida and Rubin Tad-y, were the OCE officers-in-charge of the various aspects9 of the building
construction. If all went well, the Building Official would then sign the certificate of occupancy, conformably with the
provisions of the National Building Code (Presidential Decree No. 1096).

Encabo had the certificates of final inspection and occupancy form typed by an OCE secretary. However, Tad-y,
Encabo's compadre, approached the latter and dissuaded him from processing the certificates of final inspection and
occupancy on the building since he (Tad-y) was the one responsible for it; also, Mildred Wong still had an unpaid balance
of P4,000.00 for his services. When Encabo told Tad-y that collecting the amount from Wong would be problematic, Tad-y
replied, "[It's] up [to] you."

Shortly thereafter, some of the officers at the OCE, including Tad-y and Tuvida, conducted their final inspection of the
building. During the first week of May 1995, Encabo and Tad-y had an altercation and in his anger, Tad-y squeezed
Encabo's neck in the presence of the latter's wife.10 Thus, the relations between Tad-y and Encabo became strained.

In the meantime, other officers of the OCE made their respective final inspections during the months of May to June 1995,
and signed the respective certificates of final inspection for the building. Tad-y did not make his final inspection, and
refused to do so unless the money he had demanded was given to him. 11 Encabo even sought the aid of the City Mayor
but did not tell the latter that Tad-y was demanding money because he did not want to place the latter in a bad light.

Nonetheless, on July 6, 1995, Encabo reported the matter to the Criminal Investigation Section (CIS) of the Philippine
National Police (PNP) in Bacolod City, and signed a complaint sheet 12 against Tad-y for extortion. Police officer Alexander
Muñoz was then ordered to conduct an investigation on the complaint.
Muñoz decided to conduct entrapment operations against Tad-y. He asked Encabo to procure P4,000.00, consisting of
forty (40) pieces of P100.00 bills for the purpose.13 Encabo complied. Muñoz listed the serial numbers of the bills and
placed his initials "AM" on the right lower corner of each bill.14 The PNP Crime Laboratory in Bacolod City applied
ultraviolet powder on the bills.15 The money was placed in a white envelope,16 and the envelope was turned over to
Encabo for the entrapment.17 The police officers and Encabo had agreed that the police officers would position
themselves within the vicinity of the Andre's Bakeshop, and after giving the envelope to Tad-y, Encabo would place his
eyeglasses in front of his shirt collar to indicate that Tad-y had already received the money.18

After two aborted attempts,19 Encabo informed Muñoz by telephone that he and Tad-y would inspect the building at
about 3:00 p.m. on July 24, 1995, and that Tad-y would sign the certificate of final inspection afterwards.20 Police officers
Eriberto Castañeda and Muñoz, along with civilian agents, proceeded to Gonzaga Street and positioned themselves as
planned.21

Encabo and Tad-y, accompanied by OCE building inspector Engr. Nestor Velez, arrived at the building at about 5:00 p.m.
on July 24, 1995. Encabo brought with him the envelope22 containing the forty P100.00 bills and the certificate of final
inspection bearing the signatures of all the other OCE officers concerned, which Tad-y was to sign after the inspection of
the building. Tad-y was then wearing his orange OCE bowling team t-shirt. Encabo and Tad-y inspected the building
together for about ten to twenty minutes. Velez, on his own, made a separate inspection of the building. After the
inspection, Encabo, Tad-y and Velez agreed to have a snack and proceeded to the Andre's Bakeshop at the ground floor
of the Atrium Building along Gonzaga Street.23 Velez and Tad-y walked side by side while Encabo followed.24 By then,
Muñoz, Castañeda and the other police officers were already in the vicinity to await Encabo's signal.

Inside the bakeshop, Encabo brought out the certificate of final inspection, which Tad-y forthwith signed.25 Encabo then
gave the envelope containing the forty P100.00 bills to Tad-y. The latter asked Encabo, "What is it for?" Encabo replied
that it was the money Tad-y had been waiting for.26 Tad-y opened the envelope and saw its contents.27 He asked Encabo
if it was dangerous for him to receive the envelope, and the latter answered that it was not. 28 Instead of putting the
envelope in his pocket, Tad-y handed the same to Velez under the table. Velez asked Tad-y what it was, and Tad-y told
Velez to just keep it.29 Thereafter, Tad-y and Velez, followed by Encabo, exited from the bakeshop. Encabo then removed
his eyeglasses and placed it on his shirt collar, the signal that Tad-y had received the money.30 The police officers then
accosted Velez and Tad-y, and asked the latter where the white envelope was. Tad-y denied that he received the
envelope. Encabo told the police officers that Velez had the envelope. 31 When asked where the envelope was, Velez
brought it out from the right pocket of his pants.32 Muñoz told Velez to open the envelope and inspected its contents.
Velez did as he was told, and saw that the envelope contained P100.00 bills.33 Tad-y and Velez were arrested and
brought to the CIS Headquarters, PNP Crime Laboratory.34 Tad-y's shirt was turned over by the accosting officers.
Castañeda also turned over to the PNP Crime Laboratory the white envelope and its contents, with a request 35 for the
PNP Crime Laboratory to test Velez and Tad-y for ultraviolet powder and the latter's shirt to be tested.36

Forensic Chemist Rea Villavicencio conducted the examination and prepared an Initial Laboratory Report, 37 stating that
Rubin B. Tad-y was positive for the presence of yellow ultraviolet powder on his right arm. Villavicencio, likewise,
prepared a sketch38 depicting the body of Tad-y, and showing that his right forearm was positive for ultraviolet powder.

On cross-examination, Encabo admitted that Velez was not aware of everything.39

Edgar Occeña, the Chief of the Inspection Division, later affixed his signature on the certificate of final inspection bearing
Tad-y's signature.40 The City Building Official approved and issued the certificate of occupancy on July 27, 1995.41

The Case for the Accused Tad-y

Accused Tad-y denied demanding and receiving P4,000.00 from Encabo in consideration for the conduct of the building
inspection, and his signature on the certificate of inspection and the certificate of occupancy. He insists that under P.D.
No. 1096, he is not authorized to sign and issue a certificate of occupancy. He testified that in the afternoon of April 25,
1995, Encabo arrived at the OCE requesting that the appropriate officials inspect the 6-storey Atrium building preparatory
to the issuance of a certificate of final inspection.42 The next day, he, Tuvida, Tordesillas, Baja and Danoy conducted the
building inspection.43 They discovered that only four floors were completed. 44 Encabo agreed to inspect the building at
3:00 p.m. of July 24, 1995, which, at Encabo's request, was reset to 4:30 p.m. 45 He and Engr. Velez conducted the
inspection of the building on that day and found some defects in the construction of the building.

After the inspection, Tad-y left Velez and Encabo behind as he was going to a bowling tournament, but, as he was
crossing Gonzaga Street, Velez and Encabo called him and invited him to join them for a snack at Andre's
Bakeshop.46 He agreed because he was hungry. He and Encabo were seated beside each other at the table in the
bakeshop, while Velez was seated at the opposite side.47 While taking their snacks, Encabo brought out the certificate of
final inspection bearing the signatures of the other officers of the OCE who had inspected the building. Tad-y affixed his
signature above his typewritten name with the notation "see back page for structural requisites" at the dorsal portion of the
document. Appearing at the dorsal portion of the certificate is Tad-y's handwritten notation: "Please Post the Allowable
Load on [conspicuous] places especially [in the] area to be used as storage." 48 Before then, he inquired from Encabo
where the other requisite certificates of final inspection, plumbing, Fire Safety Inspection and logbook were, and Encabo
replied that he brought the requisite certificates with him gesturing to his portfolio. Encabo assured him that all the
requirements were in his portfolio.49 With Encabo's assurance, he then affixed his signature in the certificate of final
inspection.50

Momentarily, Encabo told him that he had another document, and forthwith handed a white envelope to him. Believing
that the envelope contained the requisite certificate of final inspection signed by the other officers in the OCE, he received
the envelope and, without opening it, immediately handed it over to Velez who would examine its contents. He then left
the bakeshop with Velez ahead of him, followed by Encabo. He was crossing Gonzaga Street on his way to the bowling
tournament when he was arrested by policemen, who asked him where the white envelope he had earlier received from
Encabo was. He told them that the envelope was with Velez.51

Tad-y then saw Velez being held by a policeman, and that the envelope was already opened. A policeman forced Velez to
go near him. Another policeman forced him (Tad-y) to touch the envelope, but he parried the arm of the policeman with
his right forearm and refused to touch it.52 They were then brought to the PNP headquarters where they were tested for
ultraviolet powder.

Encabo filed a complaint against him because on four (4) prior occasions, he refused to sign the certificate of final
inspection of a house owned by a certain Nelson Señores, as well as the application for a building permit of Joey Yao,
unless the latter paid a 100% surcharge for deficiencies.53 Señores and Yao were the principals of Encabo. In the
evening of April 25, 1995, after he, Tuvida, Baja and Tordesillas had their initial inspections of the building, they had
dinner at the Tasty Treat. When he was about to pay the bill for their food and drinks, Encabo insisted that he would pay
the said bill. This infuriated him, and he squeezed Encabo's chin with his hand. 54

Jimmy Gonzales, a newspaper vendor, corroborated the testimony of the accused that someone forced Velez to hand
over the opened envelope to Tad-y,55 but that Tad-y parried the attempt and refused to receive the envelope. 56

Tad-y marked and offered in evidence the transcript of stenographic notes 57 taken during the trial of September 25, 1995
in Criminal Case No. 17186.

The Case For the Accused Nestor Velez

Nestor Velez denied the charge. He corroborated the testimony of Tad-y and declared that he was appointed as building
inspector of the OCE only on March 16, 1995.58 When he and Tad-y inspected the building in the afternoon of July 24,
1995, they did so separately. After the inspection, Tad-y told him and Encabo that he was going ahead because he was
going to play bowling.59 When Encabo invited him and Tad-y for a snack, Tad-y reluctantly agreed.60

Momentarily, Encabo brought out the certificate of final inspection and handed it to Tad-y for the latter's signature.
However, Tad-y told Encabo that he would note the deficiencies of the building. Tad-y then signed the certificate after
being assured by Encabo that he had all the other certificates. Tad-y gave Velez the envelope and told him to keep it
because he was going to a bowling game.61 Velez received the envelope and put it inside the right pocket of his pants,
thinking that it contained the requisite final safety inspection certificate and other certificates. 62

On his way from the bakeshop, he and Tad-y were arrested by policemen. He opened the white envelope as the
policemen ordered, and saw money inside. He was forced to approach Tad-y, and another policeman forced the latter to
touch the money contained in the envelope. Tad-y resisted.

Edgar Occeña testified that he signed the original and duplicate copies of the certificate of final inspection with the
requisite certificates of the other officers appended thereto. The City Engineer/City Building Official signed the Certificate
of Occupancy on July 27, 1995. The original copy of the certificate of final inspection and occupancy was then released to
Wong, while the duplicate was retained by the OCE.63

Mateo Tuvida testified that he was the engineer in charge of the Mechanical Section of the OCE of Bacolod City since
February 1975.64 On April 25, 1995, he, Baja, Tad-y, Cornel and Yolando Ilog inspected the building at the Gonzaga side
of the street and found that it was already complete but that the structure along Cuadra Street was still incomplete. He
found the mechanical aspect of the building completed when he inspected it in the first week of June 1995. 65 He then
affixed his signature on the certificate of final inspection.66
Venancio Baja testified that he had been in charge of the Electrical Division of the OCE since 1990. He was the assistant
of Jose Sotecinal, the Chief Electrical Engineer. He inspected the Atrium building on April 25, 1995 and found it
incomplete. He again inspected the building and found it in accord with the plans. He then signed the certificate of final
inspection only in the first week of June 1995.67

On September 28, 1998, the MTC rendered judgment convicting Tad-y of direct bribery defined and penalized under
Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code. Velez was acquitted of the charges. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. Accused Engineer Nestor Velez is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Article 210 of the Revised Penal
Code on the ground that it is the finding of this Court that he was innocent of the crime charged;

2. Accused Engineer Ruben Tad-y is hereby pronounced GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of Violation of
Paragraph 2 of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer imprisonment of 2 years and 4
months, as minimum, to 3 years, as maximum, in the absence of any mitigating or aggravating circumstances, in
accordance with the mandatory provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and, to pay the fine in the amount
of P8,000.00 pesos.

3. Accused Ruben Tad-y, in case of his insolvency to pay the fine, shall suffer a subsidiary penalty of imprisonment at the
rate of one day for each 8 pesos and shall remain in confinement until his fine is satisfied. However, his subsidiary
imprisonment shall not exceed one-third of the term of the sentence, and in no case shall it continue for more than one
year, and no fraction or part of day shall be counted against the prisoner, in accordance with Article 39 of the Revised
Penal Code; andcralawlibrary

4. Accused Ruben Tad-y is also hereby ordered to suffer the penalty of special temporary disqualification and is hereby
ordered to be deprived of his right to hold office and employment in the City Engineer's Office, as well as for holding
similar offices or employments either perpetually or during the term of his sentence in accordance with paragraph 4 of
Article 210, in relation to Article 31, paragraphs 1 and 2 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.68

The MTC gave full credence and probative weight to Encabo's testimony, ruling that Tad-y demanded and
received P4,000.00 from Encabo on July 24, 1995 in consideration for his signing a certificate of occupancy. It further
ruled that the accused signed the said certificate on the said date.

Tad-y appealed the decision to the RTC, which rendered judgment on September 13, 1999, affirming the decision of the
MTC with modification as to the penalty imposed. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the trial court is hereby affirmed except for the modifications that the accused Ruben Tad-
y y Babor's sentence should consist of an indeterminate penalty of four (4) months of Arresto Mayor, as minimum, to one
(1) year, eight (8) months and twenty - one (21) days of Prision Correccional, as maximum, and for him to pay the cost.

SO ORDERED.69

The RTC denied Tad-y's motion for reconsideration. However, the RTC agreed with Tad-y's contention that what the latter
signed was a certificate of final inspection and not a certificate of occupancy.

In a parallel development, the RTC rendered judgment on May 18, 2001 in Criminal Case No. 17186, acquitting Tad-y and
Velez of the charge.70

The accused, now the petitioner, filed a Petition for Review of the decision of the RTC. The CA rendered judgment on
February 2, 2001 affirming the RTC decision in toto.71 Upon the denial of the motion for reconsideration of the said
decision, the petitioner filed his Petition for Review on Certiorariwith this Court.

The threshold issue raised by the petitioner is factual - whether the prosecution adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt
of his guilt for direct bribery under the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code.

The petitioner avers that under the Information, and as held by the courts a quo, he was charged with direct bribery under
the second paragraph of Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code, for soliciting and receiving P4,000.00 on July 24, 1995
from Mildred Wong, through Encabo, in consideration for his signing/approval of the certificate of occupancy of the Atrium
Building, and that he signed said certificate on said date.

The petitioner maintains that he did not sign a certificate of occupancy. He posits that a certificate of occupancy is signed
by the city building official, and that he has nothing to do with the execution of such certificate. Hence, he is not criminally
liable for direct bribery, one of the essential elements for the crime being that the act which he agreed to do or execute is
connected to the performance of his official duties.

The petitioner assails the credibility and probative weight of Encabo's testimony. He avers that Encabo had an axe to
grind against him because, on prior occasions, he had denied the applications for building permit filed by his principals
due to structural deficiencies in the buildings.

The petitioner further insists that he did not demand, nor could have demanded the amount of P4,000.00 on April 25,
1995, or thereafter, because as of the said date, the Atrium building had not yet been completed. The petitioner avers that
Encabo's claim that he demanded P4,000.00 for the signing the certificate of final inspection is belied by the fact that he
indicated the deficiencies of the building at the dorsal portion of the certificate. It was only in the first week of June 1995
that Baja and Tuvida made their final inspection and signed the certificate of final inspection. 72 Even Encabo admitted that
the petitioner refused to sign the said certificate because as of July 24, 1995, there had been no final inspection of the
building, and not because he was demanding P4,000.00 from Encabo.

The petitioner posits that the case for the prosecution was enfeebled by its failure to adduce in evidence the certificate of
final inspection he signed on July 24, 1995. It adduced in evidence only the certificate of final inspection bearing all the
signatures of the officers in the OCE, except his.73 He claims that the respondent failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt
that he knew of the contents of the white envelope. He, in fact, believed that the envelope contained the requisite
certificates of inspection. Moreover, he did not open the envelope and instead passed it over to Velez for verification, as
he was on his way to a bowling game.

The petitioner further contends that the respondent even failed to adduce in evidence the white envelope he received from
Encabo, or prove that the said white envelope was what he actually received from Encabo. He posits that there is no
probable cause for his and Velez's warrantless arrest; hence, any evidence confiscated by the policemen from them is
inadmissible in evidence.

The respondent, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), avers that it adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt
of the petitioner's guilt for direct bribery. It insists that the petitioner failed to prove that Encabo had any ulterior motive to
falsely charge and testify against him. The OSG points that the testimony of Encabo is honest and straightforward; hence,
entitled to full probative weight. It is hard to believe, the OSG avers, that the petitioner would accept the envelope without
knowing its contents. The petitioner demanded and received from Encabo the P4,000.00 contained in a white envelope in
consideration of his signing the certificate of occupancy.

The OSG avers that the petitioner's signing of the certificate of occupancy was his duty as the engineer in charge of the
structural design in the City Engineer's Office of Bacolod City. The OSG notes that the petitioner was found positive for
ultraviolet powder.

The Ruling of the Court

The petition is meritorious.

Rule 45 of the Rules of Court provides that only questions of fact may be raised in this Court on a Petition for Review
on Certiorari . The reason is that the Court is not a trier of facts. However, the rule is subject to several exceptions. The
Court may delve into and resolve factual issues in those cases where the findings of the trial court and the CA are absurd,
contrary to the evidence on record, impossible, capricious or arbitrary, or based on a misappreciation of facts.74

In this case, the Court is convinced that the findings of the MTC, the RTC and the CA, on the substantial matters at hand,
are absurd and arbitrary, and contrary to the evidence on record.

Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code provides:

Art. 210. Direct Bribery. 'Any public officer who shall agree to perform an act constituting a crime, in connection with the
performance of his official duties, in consideration of any offer, promise, gift or present received by such officer, personally
or through the mediation of another, shall suffer the penalty of prison mayor in its minimum and medium periods and a
fine of not less than three times the value of the gift, in addition to the penalty corresponding to the crime agreed upon, if
the same shall have been committed.
If the gift was accepted by the officer in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime, and the
officer executed said act, he shall suffer the same penalty provided in the preceding paragraph; and if said act shall not
have been accomplished, the officer shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its medium period and a fine of not
less than twice the value of such gift.

If the object for which the gift was received or promised was to make the public officer refrain from doing something which
it was his official duty to do, he shall suffer the penalties of prision correccional in its maximum period to prision mayor in
its minimum period and a fine not less than three times the value of the gift.

In addition to the penalties provided in the preceding paragraphs, the culprit shall suffer the penalty of special temporary
disqualification.

The provisions contained in the preceding paragraphs shall be made applicable to assessors, arbitrators, appraisal and
claim commissioners, experts or any other persons performing public duties.

Direct bribery has the following essential elements:

1. the offender is a public officer;

2. the offender accepts an offer or promise or receives a gift or present by himself or through another;

3. such offer or promise be accepted or gift or present be received by the public officer with a view to committing some
crime, or in consideration of the execution of an act which does not constitute a crime but the act must be unjust, or to
refrain from doing something which it is his official duty to do; andcralawlibrary

4. the act which the offender agrees to perform or which he executes is connected with the performance of his official
duties.75

The prosecution is mandated to prove, beyond reasonable doubt, the essential elements of the felony and that the
petitioner is the perpetrator thereof.76

Official duties include any action authorized. It is sufficient if the officer has the official power, ability or apparent ability to
bring about or contribute to the desired end. The acts referred to in the law, which the offender agrees to perform or
execute, must be ultimately related to or linked with the performance of his official duties. It is sufficient if his actions,
affected by the payment of the bribe, are parts of any established procedure consistent with the authority of the
government agency.77 However, where the act is entirely outside of the official functions of the officer to whom the money
is offered, the offense is not bribery.78

The agreement between the public officer and the bribe-giver may be express or implied. Such agreement may be proved
by direct or circumstantial evidence. Proof of such an agreement may rest upon relevant and competent circumstantial
evidence. To hold, otherwise, would allow the culprit to escape liability with winks and nods even when the evidence as a
whole proves that there has been a meeting of the minds to exchange official duties for money. 79

It is not necessary that the money is received by the offender before or at the time he agreed to perform or execute an
act. It is sufficient if he received the money afterwards in pursuance of a prior arrangement or agreement. 80

Indisputably, the petitioner is a public officer under Article 203 of the Revised Penal Code. 81 There is no allegation in the
Information that the issuance of the certificate of occupancy is a crime or is unjust.

The Court agrees with the petitioner's contention that the prosecution failed to prove his guilt for the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt.

The MTC convicted the petitioner of direct bribery on its finding that the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Wong,
through Encabo, in consideration of signing a certificate of occupancy, and that on July 24, 1995, the petitioner received
the said amount from Encabo and signed the said certificate for the Atrium building. The CA affirmed the said findings of
the MTC in its decision, thus:

All the elements above are present in the case at bench. Petitioner Ruben Tad-y was an employee at the City Engineer's
Office of Bacolod City. That petitioner-accused accepted the amount of P4,000.00 which he demanded from Julio Encabo,
a representative of Mildred Wong who will secure a certificate of occupancy for the building of the latter and handed it
over to his subordinate Nestor Velez, petitioner's co-accused, on April 24, 1995 at Andre Bakeshop. And in consideration
of the amount thus given, petitioner would sign the certificate of occupancy, which is his duty as engineer in charge of
structural designs at the City Engineer's Office of Bacolod City. It must be added that petitioner signed the certificate of
occupancy, the original of which was kept at the records section of the City Engineer's Office, after receiving the envelope
containing P4,000.00. '82

However, there is no iota of competent and credible evidence to support these findings. There is no evidence on record
that the petitioner and Encabo met on April 24, 1995. In fact, it was only on April 25, 1995 that Encabo arrived at the OCE
to make arrangements for the final inspection of the building by the officers concerned, the signing of the certificate of
inspection by said officers, and the signing of the certificate of occupancy by the building official.

There is also no dispute that what was signed by the petitioner, on July 24, 1995, following his final inspection of the
building, was the certificate of final inspection and not a certificate of occupancy of the building. Thus, Encabo testified:

Q - But in (sic) July 24, 1995 when you mentioned that they inspected again the building?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A - Yes, Sir.

Q - And after inspection you went down to Andre Bakeshop which is the ground floor of the Atrium Building. What
happened there at Andre Bakeshop?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A - I gave him the papers and let him sign the necessary papers.

Q - What necessary papers are you referring to?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A - This certificate of Final Inspection where he is the one who never affixed his signature.

Q - When you gave the Certificate of Final Inspection, he signed it?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A - Yes, Sir.83

It was only on July 27, 1995, after the petitioner had signed the certificate of final inspection on July 24, 1995, that the city
building official approved and issued the certificate of occupancy for the building.84

There is also no credible evidence on record that the petitioner demanded P4,000.00 from Wong, through Encabo, in
exchange for the signing of the certificate of occupancy. Indeed, it is incredible that the petitioner would demand the said
amount as a precondition to his signing a certificate, considering that, under Section 309 of P.D. No. 1096,85 the authority
to sign said certificate is vested specifically on the building official, and not on the petitioner:

Section 309. Certificate of Occupancy

No building or structure shall be used or occupied and no change in the existing use or occupancy classification of a
building or structure or portion thereof shall be made until the Building Official has issued a Certificate of Occupancy
therefor as provided in this Code.

A Certificate of Occupancy shall be issued by the Building Official within thirty (30) days if after final inspection and
submittal of a Certificate of Completion referred to in the preceding section, it is found that the building or structure
complies with the provisions of this Code.

The Certificate of Occupancy shall be posted or displayed in a conspicuous place on the premises and shall not be
removed except upon order of the Building Official.

The non-issuance, suspension and revocation of Certificates of Occupancy and the procedure for appeal therefrom shall
be governed in so far as applicable, by the provisions of Section 306 and 307 of this Code. 86

Calibrating the testimony of Encabo, the prosecution sought to prove that the petitioner agreed to conduct a final
inspection of the building and sign a certificate of final inspection upon the receipt of P4,000.00.

However, the testimony of Encabo is not entitled to full probative weight since it is evasive and chameleonic, enfeebled by
frontal inconsistencies on substantial matters which the trial court and the CA ignored.
In the court a quo, Encabo testified, on direct examination, that on April 25, 1995, the petitioner dissuaded him from
following up and seeing the approval for the certificate of occupancy because Wong failed to pay the P4,000.00, the
balance due for the petitioner's services in securing the building permit. However, Encabo also claimed that the petitioner
agreed to conduct a final inspection of the building and sign a certificate of final inspection if the money was given to the
latter. When he testified in Criminal Case No. 17186, Encabo declared that the petitioner refused to sign a certificate of
inspection on April 25, 1995 unless the P4,000.00 he demanded was paid.87 However, Encabo gave a completely
different story to the CIS when he gave his sworn statement; he claimed that, on April 25, 1995, the petitioner
demanded P4,000.00 in consideration for his signature on the certificate of occupancy.88

When he testified in Criminal Case No. 17186, Encabo admitted that the petitioner did not demand P4,000.00 as a
precondition to his final inspection of the building and his signing of the certificate of final inspection. The petitioner
refused to sign a certificate of final inspection for the sole reason that he had not yet conducted the required final
inspection.

Atty. Sorbito:

On April 25, 1995, when you went there accused Ruben Tad-y refused to sign?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WITNESS:

Yes, Sir.

ATTY. SORBITO:

You mean to say Mr. Encabo that even without final inspection any of the signatories to the occupancy permit can affixed
(sic) their signatures without inspection?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WITNESS:

They have to inspect.

ATTY. SORBITO:

So when Ruben Tad-y refused to sign the permit on April 25, 1995, its because there was no final inspection made
yet?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WITNESS:

Yes, Sir.

ATTY. SORBITO:

It is not because there was no money or P4,000.00?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WITNESS:

No, Sir.

ATTY. SORBITO:

In short, Ruben Tad-y did not ask for anything because only there in (sic) no inspection was (sic)
made?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

WITNESS:

Yes, Sir.89

Encabo could not have asked the petitioner or any of the officers in the OCE for that matter to sign the certificate of
occupancy because only the building official has the authority to sign the same. Moreover, the city building official could
not have signed the certificate because no final inspection of the building had been conducted, and no certificate of final
inspection had been signed by the OCE officers.
Encabo's claim that the petitioner agreed to make a final inspection of the building if he was paid P4,000.00 is belied by
his testimony in the court a quo, that, during the second week of May 1995, the petitioner and the other officers of the
OCE conducted an inspection of the building.90 Encabo did not give any centavo to the petitioner on that occasion.
However, the petitioner and Encabo had a quarrel in the course of which the petitioner tried, in anger, to squeeze
Encabo's neck.91 As testified to by the petitioner, Encabo insisted on paying for the food and drinks consumed by him and
the other OCE officers after their inspection of the building, despite the petitioner's insistence that he should pay for the
bill:

Q You have also mentioned about that incident whether you were antagonized by Mr. Encabo which you said you have
squeezed his chain (sic) with your hands, where was that establishment?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A At the second floor of Tasty Treat at Araneta Street, Bacolod City.

Q And you were drinking beer with Mr. Encabo during that time?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A When I arrived they were already drinking.

Q And you also started to drink beer?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes, Sir.

Q And how many bottles have you consumed, if you can still recall?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Two bottles.

Q And it was even Mr. Encabo who paid the bill for the drinking spree?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

ATTY. SORBITO:

Misleading, your Honor.

COURT:

Who pay (sic) for the bills?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A That is (sic)where the trouble began because after I have consumed two (2) bottles of beer, he asked the bills with the
intention of paying it because there is among the group are (sic) my relatives and it was my purpose to pay.92

Encabo testified that he sought the help of the City Mayor for the petitioner to conduct the final inspection of the building,
but did not inform the Mayor that the petitioner had demanded P4,000.00 in consideration for his inspection of the
building. He claimed that the petitioner was his compadre and he did not want to put him in a bad light:

ATTY. SERFINO:

Q - When you went to the City Mayor, you are yet thinking that you will go to the CIS?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A - I have already reported that.

Q - What is your reason of not telling the mayor that Ruben Tad-y demanded money?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A - Being the government employee and he is my kumpare, I do not want to cause very bad occasion. 93

Encabo projected himself as solicitous and protective of the petitioner's well-being and the maintenance of the
community's regard to his compadre, the petitioner. However, when asked why he had to complain to the CIS and thus
placed the petitioner in jeopardy for prosecution of an offense, Encabo replied that he did so because the petitioner had
mauled him:

Q Now, you have already gone to the CIS, as you said, is it not?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes, Sir.
Q And, you have already reported to the CIS that supposed demand from you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Well, he is (sic) trying to maul me.94

What is so disconcerting is that Encabo claimed that even months after the city building official had already issued the
certificate of occupancy to Wong on July 27, 1995, the petitioner still conducted inspections of the building, along with the
other officers, in September and October 1995:

Q So, you are now certain you have not inspected the building and several other officials of the City Engineer's Office in
the afternoon of April 25, 1995, when you went to the office?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A We do the inspection together with the accused and others during and after April 25 and October 1995.

Q Please answer me, you are definitely sure that it was on April 25, 1995?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes, the inspection.

Q When you said yes, it was not on that date?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A The date is (sic) April 25, 1995 is not exactly the date of inspection.

Q In what month after April 25, 1995 when you inspected the building but prior to October 25,
1995?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A It was October or September, somewhat like that. That September or October I cannot pinpoint the exact date because
I don't have the record of that.95

It is incredible that the petitioner and the other officers would continue with their inspections of the building even months
after the issuance of the certificate of occupancy, and when the petitioner had already been charged with direct bribery in
the MTC. Indeed, on September 21, 1995, Encabo was already testifying in Criminal Case No. 17186 for the prosecution
against the petitioner.

The prosecution cannot find solace in the entrapment operations conducted by the CIS and the aftermath thereof.

First. The petitioner brought along Engineer Nestor Velez, a building inspector in the OCE, on his final inspection of the
building after which they had a snack with Encabo. If, as claimed by Encabo, the petitioner expected to receive P4,000.00
from him, as bribe, it would be contrary to human experience to bring another person along (in this case, Velez) to witness
the receipt of the envelope containing the money. Moreover, the Andre Bakeshop is a public place where people enter to
make purchases. Indeed, this Court in Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan,96 declared'

However, what is revealing is that Mrs. Sevilla and Mrs. Dimaano were present around the table in the canteen with the
petitioner and Mrs. Mutia when the latter allegedly handed the money to the petitioner. There were other persons in the
premises like the PC agents whose identities petitioner possibly did not know. Under the circumstances and in such a
public place it is not probable that petitioner would have the nerve to accept bribe money from Mrs. Mutia even under the
table. If the petitioner knew and was prepared to accept the money from Mrs. Mutia at the canteen, the petitioner would
not have invited her officemate Mrs. Sevilla to join them. Mrs. Sevilla stated she did not see the alleged passing of the
money. She could not have seen the money as it was passed on under the table or when, as petitioner said, it was quickly
placed in her hand when she stood up. What Mrs. Sevilla is sure of is that when they were about to leave the canteen, two
(2) men approached petitioner, one of whom took pictures, and the petitioner shouted at Mrs. Mutia, "What are you trying
to do to me?" The reaction of petitioner is far from one with a guilty conscience.

Second. The petitioner walked ahead of Velez and Encabo out of the Atrium building after the final inspection, and was on
his way to the bowling tournament. However, he joined Encabo and Velez for a snack only because Encabo had invited
him. Such behavior on the part of the petitioner is inconsistent with one who expected to receive P4,000.00 from Encabo
after his final inspection of the building.

Third. When Encabo handed the envelope to the petitioner, the latter inquired what the envelope was for. The petitioner
opened the envelope in full view of Velez and saw its contents. He handed the envelope to Velez instead of putting it into
his pocket, even after Encabo had assured the petitioner that it was not dangerous for the latter to receive it. It is
incredible that, as claimed by Encabo, the petitioner handed over the envelope to Velez under the table.
Such facts and circumstances show that the petitioner had no intention to accept the money and consider it his own; they
negate the prosecution's contention that the petitioner demanded and expected to receive P4,000.00 as bribe money.
Indeed, this Court ruled in Formilleza '

The essential ingredient of indirect bribery as defined in Article 211 of the Revised Penal Code is that the public officer
concerned must have accepted the gift material consideration. There must be a clear intention on the part of the public
officer to take the gift so offered and consider the same as his own property from then on, such as putting away the gift for
safekeeping or pocketing the same. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other sign, circumstance or act to show
such acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime of indirect bribery has been committed. To
hold otherwise will encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting within their physical
custody some gift, money or other property.97

The foregoing ruling of this Court applies not only to charges of indirect bribery but also to direct bribery. The respondent's
contention that the petitioner handed the envelope to Velez under the table is belied by the testimonies of the petitioner
and Velez.

Fourth. The police officers even forced the petitioner to incriminate himself by forcing him to touch the contents of the
envelope, but the petitioner managed to parry the attempt with his right arm. Thus, Velez testified:

Q What happened outside the bakeshop?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A When we went out of the Atrium building, because we plan to left (sic) the place separately or to part ways.

Q You mean to say that Engr. Tad-y was going to his own direction and you to another direction and Mr. Encabo to a
different direction?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes.

Q Were you able to do that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A When I was already at the middle of Gonzaga Street, somebody took hold of my arm, almost my shoulder.

Q Then what happened?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A I was shocked or surprised, somebody took hold of my arm.

Q Did he say anything?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A When I turned my head, he told me that I am (sic) under arrest.

Q What else?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A After hearing that, I asked him what sins (sic) have we committed?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

Q What did he say?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A He was trying to search on my trousers.

Q Did he show any warrant or authority for him to do that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Never.

Q No warrant of arrest or search warrant?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A No.

Q So, what did he find in your trousers?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A While he was searching me, I was asking him, what money and he asked me, "where is that envelope you received",
while he was holding me, it's in your pocket, get it. So, I get (sic) it because he was holding me in my hand and at the
same time squeezing it.
Q What arm?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A At first, it was my left hand that he was searching, he was able to took (sic) hold of my right arm as it is used to be the
one to pick the particular envelope.

Q So, how actually sure were you, when you get (sic) the envelope from your pocket?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A It appears that myself because he was doing it by squeezing my hand.

COURT:

Q About what part of your pocket?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

COURT INTERPRETER:

At this juncture, the witness is pointing at the right side of his pocket.

ATTY. SERFINO:

Q And after you have (sic) involuntarily taken that envelope from your pocket, what did they do?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A When he was squeezing my hand, I was able to get the money and they brought me to Engr. Tad-y.

Q How far was Engr. Tad-y when they brought you there?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Maybe ten to fifteen meters.

Q And when you were already near Engr. Tad-y, did you notice what was happening to Engr. Tad-
y?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A When I was there going toward Engr. Tad-y, I saw one person holding his hands.

Q When you were near him, what happened next?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A When I was near Engr. Tad-y, they let me open that particular envelope.

Q Who was handling that particular envelope towards Engr. Tad-y?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A It's myself holding it while he was holding me towards Engr. Tad-y.

Q You mean the very hand he was holding, squeezing, it's also the hand holding the envelope?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes.

Q Was it [the] left or right hand?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A At first left, when he pulled me it was already his right hand.

Q What happened when you were near Engr. Tad-y?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A When I have already opened the envelope and when they saw the content of that envelope, the money, they try (sic) to
pull that so that Engr. Tad-y will receive the money from me.

Q How did you open that envelope in that stage, was it already opened or did you have to exert some efforts to
open?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A I opened it because it was closed.

Q Did Engr. Tad-y received (sic), take hold of that money?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A When he found out that the content is money, he did not hold it.
Q What did he do?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A He tried not to receive it but he was forced by one arresting officer.

Q What else took place at that stage on that day?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A When they were not able to force Engr. Tad-y to take hold of the money, they tried to stop a taxi.98

The testimony of the petitioner on this matter reads:

Q Now, what happened after you saw that there was another person holding your co-accused?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A They were searching him in order to have the white envelope out.

Q So, did you see any envelope after that?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes, Sir.

Q How did you see it or how did you happen to see it?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Because he let Mr. Velez open his pocket and have it left opened.

Q And then what happened?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A When the said envelope was already opened he hold (sic) Mr. Velez and pulled Mr. Velez towards me.

Q Were they able to come near you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes, Sir.

Q Now, while your co-accused was already near you, what transpired among you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A A person of small size holding the hands of Mr. Velez holding the white envelope because he wants that I will hold the
white envelope.

Q Go ahead.

A It was already opened and he wanted me to hold the white envelope.

Q When you were still inside the bakeshop, will you please inform the Hon. Court if the envelope was already opened or
not?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Not yet.

Q The prosecution witness, Julio Encabo here testified that inside the bakeshop, after he handed to you the envelope, you
opened it and peeped inside the envelope, is this true?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A It is a big lie.

Q Why do you say that it is a big lie?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A It will be subject of the evidence in the Police Laboratory. It was only shown that there was fluorescent powder.

(Witness, at this juncture is pointing to his right arm.)

Q You are referring to Exhibit "4-A"?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Yes, Sir.

ATTY. SERFINO:
I would like to manifest, your Honor that on Exhibit "4", there is nothing there that indicates that there was any powder
marks in the hands of this accused.

Q Now, what else happened when your co-accused was already near you?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A They tried to let the hands of Nestor come towards me but I was trying to move away.

Q On the basis of what you saw, if you know what was the reason that (sic) they were trying to let you hold the
envelope?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

ASST. CITY PROSECUTOR CENTENO:

Asking for a conclusion, your Honor.

COURT:

Sustained.

COURT:

Reform.

ATTY. SERFINO:

Q From that stage, what else happened?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A Since they cannot do the thing of letting the hands of Nestor Velez go near me, it was the person who picked the white
envelope and tried to give it to me, but I was trying to parry it. (Witness is pointing to his right forearm.)

Q Thereafter, what happened?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A (Witness, at this juncture is trying to hold the left hand at his waist.) I do not know whether it was a camera or a gun.

Q What else happened?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

He said to me, "relax ka lang, you might be fell (sic) down."

Q Was he a Tagalog?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A I do not know but he speak (sic) in Tagalog.

Q How did that incident in front of that street came to close?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A I stayed calm but I was afraid of them.

Q After you relaxed because of your fear, is there anything else that took place?chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

A They stopped a taxi and then pulled me to ride in the taxi together with the co-accused, Nestor Velez.99

The testimonies of Velez and the petitioner were corroborated by the Initial Laboratory Report of Forensic Chemist Rea
Villavicencio that the petitioner's right arm tested positive for ultraviolet powder. The Report and Sketch drawn by
Villavicencio did not show that any of the fingers of the petitioner were positive for ultraviolet powder.

In sum then, the Court rules that the prosecution failed to prove the guilt of petitioner Rubin Tad-y of the crime charged.
Consequently, the Petition is GRANTED. The decisions of the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, the Regional Trial Court and
the Court of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime charged in the
Information.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 160929-31 August 16, 2005

RENE P. PONDEVIDA, Petitioners,

vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (Third Division) and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

On April 11, 2003, the Sandiganbayan rendered judgment in Criminal Cases Nos. 24375 to 24377 convicting petitioner
Rene Pondevida, the Municipal Treasurer of Badiangan, Iloilo, of three counts of the complex crime of malversation of
public funds through falsification of commercial documents, and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and perpetual special disqualification for each count. The fallo of the decision reads:

WHEREFORE, in Criminal Case No. 24375, the Court hereby finds the accused RENE P. PONDEVIDA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex offense of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of commercial document
defined and penalized under Arts. 48, 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said
accused to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and PERPETUAL SPECIAL DISQUALIFICATION in
accordance with Art. 31 of the Revised Penal Code and to pay a fine of ₱213,700.00 and indemnify the Municipal
government of Badiangan the sum of ₱213,700.00, with costs.

For insufficiency of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused
DONATO M. AMIGABLE and VICTOR N. GRANDE are hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged in this case, and their
bail bonds posted for their provisional liberty are hereby ordered cancelled.

In Criminal Case No. 24375, the Court hereby finds the accused RENE P. PONDEVIDA GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex offense of Malversation of Public Funds through Falsification of commercial document defined and
penalized under Arts. 48, 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUAL and PERPETUAL SPECIAL DISQUALIFICATION in accordance with Art. 31 of the
Revised Penal Code and to pay a fine of ₱503,287.89 and indemnify the Municipal government of Badiangan the sum of
₱503,287.89, with costs.

For insufficiency of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused
DONATO M. AMIGABLE is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged in this case, and the bail bond posted for his
provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled.

In Criminal Case No. 24377, the Court hereby finds the accused RENE P. PONDEVIDA GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex offense of Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of commercial document defined and
penalized under Arts. 48, 171 and 217 of the Revised Penal Code and hereby sentences the said accused to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA and PERPETUAL SPECIAL DISQUALIFICATION in accordance with Art. 31 of the
Revised Penal Code and to pay a fine of ₱115,153.55 and indemnify the Municipal government of Badiangan the sum of
₱115,153.55, with costs.

For insufficiency of evidence and for failure of the prosecution to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt, accused
DONATO M. AMIGABLE is hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged in this case, and the bail bond posted for his
provisional liberty is hereby ordered cancelled.

Considering that accused NORMA B. TIU is still-at-large, let Criminal Case No. 24376 be ARCHIVED until her arrest.1

The anti-graft court granted the petitioner an extension of time within which to file a motion for reconsideration of its
decision, until May 10, 2003. The said motion was filed on May 9, 2003 which the said court
resolved to deny on September 5, 2003. The petitioner received a copy of the said resolution on September 16, 2003, and
filed his Notice of Appeal2 on September 23, 2003 "pursuant to paragraph (b), Section 1 of Rule X of the Revised Internal
Rules of the Sandiganbayan." In a Resolution3 dated October 3, 2003, the Sandiganbayan denied due course to the
petition for having been filed out of time, thus:

FROM THE FOREGOING, the Notice of Appeal shall no longer prosper considering that it was filed out of time and
considering further that the Decision rendered in these cases, promulgated on April 11, 2003, in so far as Rene P.
Pondevida is concerned, has already become final and executory on September 18, 2003.

Atty. Lily V. Biton, the Division Clerk of Court, is ordered to furnish the Director of Prison, National Penitentiary,
Muntinlupa City, a copy of this Resolution for his perusal, and to issue the corresponding Commitment Order for Rene P.
Pondevida’s service of sentence.
The Sandiganbayan ruled that under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, Pondevida had
only until September 17, 2003 within which to file his notice of appeal, but did so only on September 23, 2003; by then, its
decision had become final and executory.

The petitioner received a copy of the said resolution on October 14, 2003. On December 15, 2003, he filed his petition
for certiorari before this Court, alleging that –

THE SANDIGANBAYAN HAS ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DENIED THE PETITIONER’S NOTICE OF APPEAL BECAUSE THE NOTICE OF APPEAL
HAS BEEN FILED WITHIN THE REGLEMENTARY PERIOD.

II

PETITIONER WAS DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS.

III

THE APPEAL IS SUPPORTED BY MERITORIOUS GROUNDS AND THE CASE IS ENTITLED TO BE REVIEWED BY
THE APPELLATE COURT.4

On January 10, 2005, this Court resolved to give due course to the petition and required the Sandiganbayan to elevate
the records of the cases.5 The Sandiganbayan complied and forthwith elevated the records to this Court.

The petitioner maintains that his notice of appeal was filed on time. He posits that the Sandiganbayan should have applied
Section 1(b), Rule X of its Revised Internal Rules, instead of Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure. The petitioner argues that since Section 1(b), Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan does
not provide a period within which to appeal a decision or final order rendered by it, the applicable rule is that provided in
Section 1(a) of the said Internal Rules, in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. The petitioner avers that
under the latter rule, he had fifteen (15) days from receipt of notice of the September 5, 2003 Sandiganbayan Resolution
(on September 16, 2003), or until October 1, 2003, within which to file his notice of appeal. Hence, his notice of appeal
filed on September 23, 2003 was timely filed.

For its part, the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP) avers that under Section 1, Rule X of the Internal Rules of the
Sandiganbayan, in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, an appeal from a Sandiganbayan judgment where the
accused is sentenced reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is via petition for review on certiorari; the period for appeal
is that provided for in Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, thus:

1.c. As aptly stated by petitioner, the method of appeal in this case is by petition for review on certiorari. This, indeed, is
confirmed by Section 1, Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, i.e., "A party may appeal from a
judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan imposing or affirming a penalty less than death, life imprisonment
or reclusion perpetua in criminal cases, and in civil cases, by filing with the Supreme Court a petition for review
on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure."6

The OSP cited the ruling of this Court in Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan7 to support its position.

The petitioner’s contention, that the remedy from the Sandiganbayan decision which sentenced him to reclusion
perpetua is via notice of appeal under Section 1(b), Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, is correct.
The rule reads:

(b) Exception. – Where the judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan, in the exercise of its original jurisdiction,
imposes the penalty of life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua or where a lesser penalty is imposed involving offenses
committed on the same occasion or which arose out of the same occurrence that gave rise to the more serious offense for
which the penalty of death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment is imposed, the appeal shall be taken by filing a notice
of appeal with the Sandiganbayan and serving a copy thereof to the adverse party.
Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, a petition for review on certiorari to this Court (from a Sandiganbayan decision) is
proper only where, as provided for in Section 1(a), Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, the
penalty imposed is less than death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua:

(a) In General. – A party may appeal from a judgment or final order of the Sandiganbayan imposing or affirming a penalty
less than death, life imprisonment or reclusion perpetua in criminal cases, and in civil cases, by filing with the Supreme
Court a petition for review on certiorari in accordance with Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

Since Section 1(b), Rule X of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan does not provide for a period to appeal,
Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure shall apply:

Sec. 6. Rule 122. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of the
judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from. This period for perfecting an appeal shall be suspended from the
time a motion for new trial or reconsideration is filed until notice of the order overruling the motion has been served upon
the accused or his counsel at which time the balance of the period begins to run.

This is so because under Section 2, Rule 1 of the Revised Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, the Rules of Court
applicable to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) and Court of Appeals (CA) shall, likewise, govern all proceedings in the
Sandiganbayan insofar as applicable:

SEC. 2. Coverage. – These Rules shall apply to the internal operations of the Sandiganbayan.

The Rules of Court, resolutions, circulars, and other issuances promulgated by the Supreme Court relating to or affecting
the Regional Trial Courts and the Court of Appeals, insofar as applicable, shall govern all actions and proceedings filed
with the Sandiganbayan.

Under Section 6, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, the petitioner had only until September 17, 2003
within which to file his notice of appeal, considering that he received the September 5, 2003 Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan on September 16, 2003. However, he filed his notice of appeal only on September 23, 2003, long after
the reglementary period. Hence, the Sandiganbayan acted in accord with its Revised Internal Rules and the Rules of
Criminal Procedure in denying the petitioner’s appeal.

The ruling of this Court in Formilleza is not applicable in the case at bar. What was involved in that case was Presidential
Decree No. 1606, under which the decisions of the Sandiganbayan may be reviewed on petition for certiorari by this
Court:

Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended, governs the procedure through which cases originating from the
Sandiganbayan are elevated to this Court. Under Section 7 thereof, the decisions and final orders of the Sandiganbayan
are subject to review on certiorari by the Supreme Court in accordance with Rule 45 of the Rules of Court. This Court has
ruled that only questions of law may be raised in a petition for certiorari under Rule 45, subject to certain rare exceptions.
Simply stated, one way through which a decision or final order of the Sandiganbayan can be elevated to the Supreme
Court is a Petition for certiorari under Rule 45 and, as a general rule, only questions of law may be raised therein. The
Solicitor General cites the case of Peñaverde v. Sandiganbayan in support of this view.8

The petitioner, however, pleads that even if he filed his notice of appeal beyond the period therefor, the Sandiganbayan
should have subordinated the rigid application of procedural rules to the attainment of substantial justice; hence, his
appeal should have been given due course. After all, he submits, the Court has allowed appeals even if there were delays
of four, six and even seven days.9 The appeal should not be dismissed simply because he followed, in good faith, Section
1(b), Rule X of the Internal Rules of the Sandiganbayan, in relation to Rule 45 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The petitioner argues that he was sentenced to suffer three counts of reclusion perpetua; it would be the apex of injustice
if he would be deprived of his right to appeal and suffer the penalty, considering that the prosecution failed to prove his
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. He pleads for the Court to determine whether his appeal has prima facie merit, so as to
avoid a travesty of justice.

The petitioner avers that in the face of the records, he is not criminally liable for malversation under Article 217 of the
Revised Penal Code because (a) the prosecution failed to prove that, before he was charged with malversation
complexed with falsification of commercial documents in the Office of the Ombudsman, the Office of the Provincial Auditor
had demanded the refund of the amounts of the three checks; and (b) the Sandiganbayan ignored the cash deposit slips
issued by the Land Bank of the Philippines (LBP)10 showing that he deposited ₱1,533,050.26 on June 15, 1995 which
increased to ₱2,286,550.26 when he made an additional deposit on June 21, 1995, as stated in his letter to the Provincial
Auditor, dated June 21, 1995, which included the total amount of the three checks. 11

The petitioner further avers that the charges against him were barred by the decision12 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Iloilo City in Criminal Case No. 48093 promulgated on April 5, 2002, convicting him of malversation of ₱1,176,580.59;
the ₱893,890.87, which is the total amount of the three checks subject of the cases before the Sandiganbayan, is
included in the ₱1,176,580.59 he had deposited with the LBP. The petitioner appended to his petition a copy of the
decision of the RTC.

Elaborating further, the petitioner avers that it was incumbent on the prosecution to prove that he misappropriated, took
away or embezzled the ₱893,890.87 of the municipality for his own personal use and benefit. He asserts that the
prosecution failed to prove that he used the said amount for his personal benefit. The petitioner posits that had the
prosecution proved that he received a demand to account for or refund the said amounts, the burden could have shifted
on him to prove that he did not misappropriate or take away the said amounts for his personal use or benefit. Indeed, the
petitioner notes, Ely Navarro, the leader of the audit team who investigated the matter of the three checks, admitted that
the Office of the Provincial Auditor made no such demand. He avers that Navarro even admitted that it was only in the
Office of the Ombudsman that such demand was made on him by the team of auditors.

The OSP, on the other hand, avers that the perfection of the appeal in the manner and within the period provided by law is
not only mandatory, but is also jurisdictional; since the petitioner failed to appeal within the reglementary period, the
decision had become final and executory and can no longer be nullified or reversed. On the substantive issues, the OSP
avers that demand is not an essential element of malversation. Moreover, the prosecution adduced evidence that the
petitioner consented to the taking of municipal funds. The OSP maintains that the petitioner committed the felony of
malversation upon the delivery of the checks to the three payees and their encashment of the said checks, and that the
refund of the amounts of the checks is not a ground for his acquittal of the crimes charged. Moreover, the petitioner failed
to adduce evidence that the total amount of the three checks was part of the ₱1,108,741.00 he deposited with the LBP on
June 15, 1995. The OSP concludes that the decision of the Sandiganbayan is in accord with the evidence and the law.

On the timeliness of the petitioner’s appeal, the Court agrees with the public respondent’s contention that, as a rule, the
aggrieved party must perfect his appeal within the period as provided for by law. The rule is mandatory in character. A
party’s failure to comply with the law will result in the decision becoming final and executory, and, as such, can no longer
be modified or reversed. Indeed, the rule admits of exceptions, thus:

In the interest of substantial justice, procedural rules of the most mandatory character in terms of compliance, may be
relaxed. In other words, if strict adherence to the letter of the law would result in absurdity and manifest injustice or where
the merit of a party’s cause is apparent and outweighs consideration of non-compliance with certain formal requirements,
procedural rules should definitely be liberally construed. A party-litigant is to be given the fullest opportunity to establish
the merits of his complaint or defense rather than for him to lose life, liberty, honor or property on mere technicalities. We,
therefore, withhold legal approbation on the RTC decision at bar for its palpable failure to comply with the constitutional
and legal mandates thereby denying YAO of his day in court. We also remind all magistrates to heed the demand of
Section 14, Article VIII of the Constitution. It is their solemn and paramount duty to uphold the Constitution and the
principles enshrined therein, lest they be lost in the nitty-gritty of their everyday judicial work.13

Considering that the petitioner was sentenced to suffer three counts of reclusion perpetua, the Court ordered the
Sandiganbayan to elevate the records of the cases for the Court to ascertain, based on the records, whether the appeal of
the petitioner has prima facie merit, or is only an exercise in futility. After all, the petitioner enumerated in his petition the
grounds for his appeal from the decision of the Sandiganbayan, and elaborated his arguments in support thereof; the
OSP, likewise, submitted its refutation of the petitioner’s submissions.

The Court has meticulously reviewed the records and finds that the petitioner failed to show that his appeal from the
decision of the Sandiganbayan is prima facie meritorious.

There is no dispute that State Auditors Helen G. Gamboa and Orlino A. Llauderes conducted an audit of the petitioner’s
cash and accounts for the period ending June 1, 1995. In the course of the said examination, the petitioner submitted the
Cash Production Notice and Cash Account Sheet
covering the General and Special Education Trust Funds up to the said date. Based on the submitted cashbook, the
auditors discovered that the petitioner had a shortage of ₱2,264,820.92. The petitioner was notified of the said findings on
June 1, 1995.
On June 19, 1995, the auditors wrote the petitioner, demanding that the latter refund the amount of ₱2,264,820.92 within
72 hours from notice, and submit an explanation why he incurred the shortage. In response to the letter, the petitioner
wrote the Provincial Auditor of Iloilo on June 21, 1995, as follows:

June 21, 1995

The Provincial Auditor

Province of Iloilo

Iloilo City

S i r:

In compliance with the Memorandum dated June 19, 1995 of the audit team headed by Mrs. Helen Gamboa, State Auditor
II of the Provincial Auditor’s Office in Badiangan, Iloilo hereunder are my justifications/explanation:

1. That the amount of ₱722,809.26 was outright deposited with the Land Bank of the Philippines, Iloilo Branch, on June 5,
1995;

2. That there was also a deposit made on June 15, 1995 amounting to ₱1,108,741.00;

3. That another deposit was done on June 21, 1995 amounting to ₱455,000.00.

In view of the foregoing circumstances, the delay of my deposit was caused to the late posting of all transaction in the
cash book. Another factor is that I was not able to reconcile my bank statement against general ledger accounts.

Very truly yours,

(Sgd.)

RENE PONDEVIDA

Municipal Treasurer14

On the same day, the State Auditors submitted their report to the Provincial Auditor on their examination of the petitioner’s
cash and accounts. Acting on the said report, Ely Navarro, then Officer-in-Charge of the Office of the Provincial Auditor,
wrote the Regional Director of the Department of Finance on June 22, 1995, recommending the petitioner’s relief, and the
designation of the Assistant Municipal Treasurer as his temporary replacement. The Regional Director approved the
recommendation and relieved the petitioner of his duties as Municipal Treasurer.

On July 18, 1995, the petitioner wrote the Provincial Auditor, stating that he had already deposited the amount of
₱2,264,820.92 with the LBP, appending thereto the deposit slips for the said amount.

On August 9, 1995, Provincial Auditor Dominador Tersol issued a Memorandum to Auditors Navarro and Llauderes to
verify whether the ₱2,264,820.92 had, indeed, been refunded to the municipality as the petitioner claimed in his Letter of
June 21, 1995. They were, likewise, directed –

… to conduct an examination on the cash and accounts of accused Pondevida … to establish his accountability from 2
June 1995 to 23 June 1995, as a result of his relief as Municipal Treasurer of the said Municipality on June 23, 1995
brought about by his incurrence of a shortage, amounting to ₱2,264,820.92 as reported by Mrs. Helen Gamboa and Mr.
Orlino A. Llauderes in their report dated June 1, 1995.15

The auditors were also directed to examine the petitioner’s check issuances from June 2, 1995 to June 23, 1995, and to
determine whether the said payments were covered by legitimate transactions and supported by proper documentation.

In the meantime, Gamboa and Llauderes submitted their report on their audit examination of the petitioner’s cash and
accounts, appending thereto the deposit slips referred to in the petitioner’s June 21, 1995 letter to the Provincial Auditor.
In compliance with the Memorandum of the Provincial Auditor, Navarro and Llauderes conducted an examination and
verification of the petitioner’s claim that he had already refunded the amount of ₱2,264,820.92. They concluded that the
shortage in the petitioner’s cash and accounts was only ₱1,176,580.59. They also examined the check disbursements,
and discovered that the petitioner had issued against the municipal funds three checks countersigned by Municipal Mayor
Donato Amigable, with the following particulars:

Check No. Date Payee Amount

051750 6/14/95 Roben Mill & Mining

Supply, Iloilo City ₱213,700.00

051751 6/14/95 Glenn Celis Const-

ruction, Iloilo City 503,287.89

051752 6/14/95 V.N. Grace Enter-

prises, Iloilo City 176,902.78

T o t a l ₱893,890.6716

==========

The auditors also noted that the checks were indorsed and encashed with the LBP, Iloilo City Branch Office, under
Current Account No. 0032-1094-20 of the Municipality of Badiangan, Iloilo, and that Check Nos. 051751 and 051752 were
encashed on June 14, 1995, while Check No. 051750 was encashed on June 15, 1995. 17

On August 23, 1995, Navarro and Llauderes sent a Memorandum 18 to Mayor Amigable, informing him that such checks
were issued without the corresponding disbursement vouchers and supporting documents; and that Glenn Celis, the
proprietor of Glenn Celis Construction, executed an affidavit, stating that he has no transaction with the Municipality of
Badiangan, Iloilo, corresponding to the amount of ₱503,287.89. The mayor was also furnished copies of the three checks.
The auditors requested the mayor and the petitioner to comment thereon within five days from notice thereof. However,
the auditors did not receive any response from the two.

In a Memorandum19 to the Provincial Auditor dated November 14, 1995, Navarro and Llauderes made the following
recommendations on the petitioner’s check disbursements:

For defrauding the government, Rene P. Pondevida, Donato M. Amigable and Olivia K. Grande, shall be jointly and
severally held liable for malversation of public funds pursuant to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines.
For having erred through omission which caused them injury to the government, Norma B. Tiu and Glenn Celis may be
held liable for the same offense.

The annexes hereto attached shall be considered to form part of this report.20

The reports of the auditors were filed with the Ombudsman. After the requisite preliminary investigation, an Information
was filed against the petitioner in the RTC of Iloilo City, docketed as Criminal Case No. 48093, for malversation of public
funds on the ₱1,176,580.59 shortage. The inculpatory portion of the Information reads:

That in or about the month of June 1995, and for sometime prior thereto, at the Municipality of Badiangan, Province of
Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being
then the Municipal Treasurer of Badiangan, Iloilo, and, as such, was in possession and custody of public funds in the
amount of ₱9,962,401.68, Philippine currency, for which he is accountable by reason of the duties of his office, in such
capacity and committing the offense in relation to office, with deliberate intent, with intent to defraud and of gain, did then
and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, take, misappropriate, embezzle and convert to his own
personal use and benefit from the said public funds the amount of One Million One Hundred Seventy-Six Thousand Five
Hundred Eighty Pesos and Fifty-Nine Centavos (₱1,176,580.59) and despite notice and demands made upon him to
account for said public funds, he has failed and up to the present time still fails to do so, to the damage and prejudice of
the government in the amount aforestated.21
On November 24, 1997, three Informations for malversation of public funds through falsification of commercial documents
relating to the checks disbursements were filed in the Sandiganbayan against Mayor Amigable, the petitioner, and three
private individuals, namely, Victor Grande, Norma Tiu and Glenn Celis. The cases were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
24375 to 24377. The inculpatory averments of the Information in Criminal Case No. 24375 read:

That on or about the 14th day of June 1995, or for sometime subsequent thereto, in the Municipality of Badiangan,
Province of Iloilo, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, above-named accused DONATO
AMIGABLE and RENE PONDEVIDA, public officers, being then the Municipal Mayor and Municipal Treasurer,
respectively, of the municipality of Badiangan, Iloilo, in such capacity and committing the offense in relation to office,
taking advantage of their official positions, conniving, confederating and mutually helping with each other and with one
VICTOR GRANDE, a private individual and proprietor of V.N. Grande Enterprises, Iloilo City, with deliberate intent, with
intent to defraud and to falsify, did then and there, falsify a commercial document consisting of a check of LAND BANK
OF THE PHILIPPINES, Iloilo City Branch, bearing Serial No. 051752 dated June 14, 1995, in the amount of ₱176,902.78,
Philippine Currency, with V.N. Grande Enterprises as the payee, by making it appear therein that the municipality of
Badiangan has some accounts payable to V.N. Grande Enterprises for some purchases made in the total amount of
₱176,902.78, Philippine Currency, thereby making untruthful statements in a narration of facts, when, in truth and in fact,
as accused very well knew that while there were purchases made at V.N. Grande Enterprises; hence, the municipality of
Badiangan has some monetary obligation to said establishment, the same amounted only to ₱63,659.00 and not
₱176,902.78, and that such scheme was resorted to by herein accused to be able to obtain the amount of ₱113,243.78,
the difference thereof, once the said documents was falsified, said accused encashed the said LBP check, and with
deliberate intent, with intent of gain, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously appropriate, misappropriate,
take away, embezzle and convert to their own personal use and benefit the amount of ₱113,243.78, Philippine Currency,
and despite notice and demands made upon said accused to account for said public funds, they have failed to do so, to
the damage and prejudice of the government.22

The material averments of the two other Informations are similarly worded, except for the particulars of the checks and the
dates of the alleged commission of the crimes.

On April 5, 2002, the RTC rendered judgment in Criminal Case No. 48093 finding the petitioner guilty of malversation. The
dispositive part of the judgment reads:

Based on the foregoing, We hereby decree that the Prosecution established the guilt of the accused Rene P. Pondevida
beyond reasonable doubt for violation of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

We hereby order that accused Rene P. Pondevida suffers the penalty of imprisonment ranging from 16 years, 5 months
and 11 days to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days of Reclusion Temporal pursuant to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code
in relation to paragraph 1, Article 64, RPC, and in further relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law (Act No. 4225).

Accused Rene P. Pondevida is ordered to be perpetually disqualified to be employed in the government of the Republic of
the Philippines or any of its agencies or instrumentalities for a position that requires handling and/or disposition of public
funds pursuant to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code.

Likewise, pursuant to Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in relation to the Indeterminate Sentence Law a fine
equivalent to one-half of the amount he malversed or ₱588,190.295 is ordered imposed upon the accused Rene P.
Pondevida without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.

SO ORDERED.23

As gleaned from the evidence of the prosecution before the Sandiganbayan, Norma Tiu encashed LBP Check No.
051750 on June 15, 1995, but when she realized that she had no legitimate transaction with the municipality, she turned
over ₱213,700.00 to the petitioner on the said date. Glenn Celis encashed LBP Check No. 051751 on June 14, 1995 but
gave the ₱503,287.89 to the petitioner when the latter demanded that the amount be turned over to him, on his claim that
there was "an erroneous application for payment."24 Victor Grande endorsed LBP Check No. 051752 but his godson,
Engr. Jesus Violeta, Jr., returned ₱115,153.55 to the petitioner on June 14, 1995 and applied the difference of ₱61,745.78
to the payment of materials supplied to the municipality. 25

It also appears, based on the evidence of Mayor Amigable, that the petitioner inveigled him into signing the three checks.
This can also be gleaned from the petitioner’s affidavit:
That I further attest that then Mayor DONATO AMIGABLE is completely innocent of the charges against him considering
that the three (3) checks which I asked Ex-Mayor Amigable to sign were intended to pay for the salaries and wages of the
employees of the Municipality of Badiangan for the period until June 30, 1995 at which time Ex-Mayor Amigable will step
down from office;

As Ex-Mayor Donato Amigable was then winding up his term of office after having served as Mayor for 13½ years, I
requested him to sign the three (3) checks now subject matter of this case with my guarantee that the three (3) checks will
be used for the salaries and wages of Municipal employees;

That Ex-Mayor Donato Amigable had nothing to do with the transactions I made with the three (3) suppliers and I hereby
confirm that Ex-Mayor Amigable has not profited a single centavo from the said three (3) checks or the transactions which
arose out of the said checks.

That I hereby further confirm the innocence of Ex-Mayor Donato Amigable to the charges which were filed against him.26

Malversation is defined and penalized in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, which reads:

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property – Presumption of malversation. – Any public officer who, by reason of
the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall, otherwise, be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property, shall suffer:

1. The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved in the misappropriation
or malversation does not exceed 200 pesos.

2. The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum and medium periods, if the amount involved is more than 200 pesos but
does not exceed 6,000 pesos.

3. The penalty of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal in its minimum period, if the amount involved
is more than 6,000 pesos but is less than 12,000 pesos.

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than 12,000
pesos but is less than 22,000 pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall be reclusion temporal in its
maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine
equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon
demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to
personal uses.

Malversation may be committed by appropriating public funds or property; by taking or misappropriating the same; by
consenting, or through abandonment or negligence, by permitting any other person to take such public funds or property;
or by being otherwise guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or property.

The essential elements common to all acts of malversation under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code are the following:

(a) That the offender be a public officer.

(b) That he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office.

(c) That those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable.

(d) That he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another
person to take them.
A public officer may be liable for malversation even if he does not use public property or funds under his custody for his
personal benefit, but consents to the taking thereof by another person, or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted
such taking.

The prosecution is burdened to prove beyond reasonable doubt, either by direct or circumstantial evidence, that the public
officer appropriated,
misappropriated or consented or through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take public property or
public funds under his custody. Absent such evidence, the public officer cannot be held criminally liable for
malversation.27 Mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of conversion; neither is the mere failure of the public officer
to turn over the funds at any given time sufficient to make even the prima facie case. In fine, conversion must be
proved.28 However, an accountable officer may be convicted of malversation even in the absence of direct proof of
misappropriation so long as there is evidence of shortage in his account which he is unable to explain. 29

Demand to produce public funds under a public officer’s custody is not an essential element of the felony. The law creates
a prima facie presumption of connivance if the public officer fails to produce public funds under his custody upon demand
therefor.30

However, the presumption may be rebutted by evidence that the public officer had fully accounted for the alleged cash
shortage.

In the present case, the petitioner does not dispute the fact that, by his overt acts of drawing and issuing the checks to the
order of Victor Grande, Glenn Celis and Norma Tiu, they were able to encash the checks. Even if the petitioner received
₱893,860.67 from them on June 15, 1997, a day after the checks were encashed, by then, the felonies of malversation
had already
been consummated. Case law has it that the individuals’ taking of funds is completed and is consummated even if the
severance of the funds from the possession was only for an instant.31 Restitution of the said amount after the
consummation of the crimes is not a ground for acquittal of the said crimes.

On the petitioner’s claim that he deposited the amount of ₱893,890.67 with the LBP on June 15, 1995 as evidenced by
the deposit slips,32 the Sandiganbayan declared:

Accused Pondevida asserted that he had deposited these amounts in the account of the Municipality of Badiangan with
the bank. But this assertion of the accused is without evidentiary support of any kind. No document or paper such as
deposit slip or certificate of deposit from the bank has been presented by the accused. 33

The Sandiganbayan is correct. The petitioner was burdened to prove that the said amount was part of the deposit he
made with the LBP on June 15, 1997, but he failed to do so. Indeed, instead of buttressing his petition, the decision of the
RTC in Criminal Case No. 48093 militates against his case. It appears that on June 15, 1995, the petitioner deposited
₱1,108,741.00 in cash.34 However, there is no indication whatsoever in the deposit slips that the ₱893,890.67 refunded by
Grande, Celis and Tiu on the same day was part of the ₱1,108,741.00. Moreover, the three checks issued by the
petitioner were drawn against Account No. 0032-1094-20, that of the
municipality and relating to its general fund. However, of the ₱1,108,741.00 the petitioner deposited on June 15, 1995,
₱192,000.00 was deposited in the municipality’s general fund, and the rest in the special education fund. This is gleaned
from the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 48093, which was, in turn, based on the petitioner’s explanation to the
finding of Gamboa and Llauderes that the petitioner had a ₱2,264,820.92 shortage:

Mr. Pondevida submitted an explanation of his shortage together with the deposit slips on the deposit he made with the
Land Bank of the Philippines, Iloilo City, totalling ₱2,288,550.26 itemized as follows:

Date Deposited Fund LBP Account No. Amount

6/5/95 General Fund 0032-1094-20 ₱722,809.26

6/15/95 General Fund 0032-1094-20 192,800.00

6/15/95 SEF 0032-1251-74 230,800.00

6/21/95 SEF 0032-1251-74 455,000.00

6/15/95 Trust Fund 0032-1251-74 685,141.00

Total Deposits ₱2,286,550.2635

==========

In fine, it was the petitioner’s position in Criminal Case No. 48093 that the total deposit of ₱2,286,550.26 on June 5, 15
and 21, 1995 with the LBP was to be credited to him, that is, against the ₱2,264,820.92 shortage on his cash and
account. This is also gleaned from the petitioner’s letter to the Provincial Auditor dated June 21, 1995, in reply to
Gamboa’s and Llauderes’s Memorandum of June 14, 1995, requiring him to explain the ₱2,264,820.92 shortage. The
petitioner did not claim in the said letter that the said deposit should be credited to his check disbursements of
₱893,890.67.

Indeed, as of June 15, 1995, the petitioner was not yet subject to audit examination for his check disbursements. It was
only on August 23, 1995 that the Provincial Auditor ordered Navarro and Llauderes to conduct an examination of the said
check disbursements.

On the petitioner’s claim that the charges against him in the court a quo were barred by the RTC decision in Criminal
Case No. 48093, the same is belied by no less than the said ruling. The trial court declared that the ₱1,176,580.59
shortage subject matter of the said case was different from the petitioner’s check disbursements subject matter of the
cases in the Sandiganbayan:

The evidence further showed that the three Land Bank checks issued by the accused Pondevida to V.N. Grande
Enterprises, Iloilo City, Check No. 051752 dated 14 June 1995 ₱176,902.98, Exhibit "X"; Glen Celis Construction, Iloilo
City, Check No. 051751 dated 14 June 1995 ₱503,287.89, Exhibit "X-1"; Roben Mill and Mining Supply, Check No.
05[1]750 14 June 1995 ₱213,700.00, were all issued without the prescribed supporting documents. These aforesaid
exhibits are now the subject of a criminal case before the Sandiganbayan – Criminal Case No. 243-75-76-77 for
Malversation of Public Funds thru Falsification of Commercial Documents captioned People of the Philippines versus
Rene P. Pondevida and Donato Amigable pending at the Third Division, Sandiganbayan. 36

Hence, the judgment of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 48093 is not a bar to the petitioner’s prosecution and conviction in
the Sandiganbayan.

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit. The assailed Resolution dated October 3,
2003 and Decision dated April 11, 2003 are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184908, July 03, 2013

MAJOR JOEL G. CANTOS, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Petitioner Major Joel G. Cantos appeals the Decision1 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-07-A/R-0008,
which affirmed with modification the judgment2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 47, convicting him of
the crime of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.

In an Information3 dated February 19, 2003, Major Cantos was charged as follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

That on or about December 21, 2002 or sometime prior or subsequent thereto, in the City of Manila, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, a public officer, being then the Commanding Officer of
the 22nd Finance Service Center, based in the Presidential Security Group, Malacañang Park, Manila and as such is
accountable for public funds received and/or entrusted to him by reason of his office, acting in relation to his office and
taking advantage of the same, did then and there, wi[l]lfully, unlawfully and feloniously take, misappropriate and convert to
his personal use and benefit the amount of THREE MILLION TWO HUNDRED SEVENTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P3,270,000.00), Philippine Currency, from such public funds received by him by reason of his Office to the damage and
prejudice of the Government in the aforestated amount.

CONTRARY TO LAW.

Upon motion by the prosecution, the trial court issued an Order4 granting the amendment of the date of the commission of
the offense from December 21, 2002 to December 21, 2000, the error being merely clerical. When arraigned, Major
Cantos entered a plea of not guilty.5

At the trial, the prosecution presented as witness Major Eligio T. Balao, Jr. 6 He testified that on December 21, 2000, he
reported for duty as Disbursing Officer at the 22nd Finance Service Unit (FSU), Presidential Security Group (PSG),
Malacañang Park, Manila. At that time, he did not notice any unusual incident in the office. He picked up some Bureau of
Internal Revenue (BIR) forms which he filed with the BIR Office at the Port Area, Manila. He returned to the office at
around 10:00 a.m. At around 12:00 noon, his commanding officer, Major Cantos, called him to his office and informed him
that the money he (Major Cantos) was handling, the Special Duty Allowance for the month of December, and other
Maintenance Operating Expenses in the amount of more or less P3 Million was missing from his custody. Shocked, he
asked Major Cantos where he kept the money, to which the latter replied that he placed it in the steel cabinet inside his
room. He then inquired why Major Cantos did not use the safety vault, but Major Cantos did not reply.7

Major Balao further testified that Major Cantos asked him to get a screwdriver so he went out of the office and got one
from his vehicle. He gave the screwdriver to Major Cantos, who used it to unscrew the safety vault. Then, he left the office
and handed the screwdriver to Sgt. Tumabcao. After a few minutes, Major Cantos instructed him to go to the house of
Major Conrado Mendoza in Taguig to get the safety vault’s combination number. However, Major Mendoza was not
around. When he returned to the office at around 4:00 p.m., the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) personnel took his
fingerprints. He learned that all the personnel of the 22nd FSU were subjected to fingerprinting. Thereafter, Col. Espinelli
tried to force him to admit that he took the money, but he maintained that he was not the one who took it. 8

In his defense, Major Cantos testified that on July 2000, he was assigned as the Commanding Officer of the 22nd FSU of
the PSG, Malacañang Park, Manila. His duty was to supervise the disbursement of funds for the PSG personnel and to
perform other finance duties as requested by the PSG Commander, Gen. Rodolfo Diaz. On December 19, 2000, he
received a check from Director Aguas in the amount of P1,975,000 representing the Special Allowance of PSG personnel.
Accompanied by two personnel, he went to the Land Bank branch just across Pasig River and encashed the check. He
placed the money in a duffel bag and kept it inside the steel cabinet in his office together with the P1,295,000 that was
earlier also entrusted to him by Gen. Diaz. Major Cantos added that as far as he knows, he is the only one with the keys
to his office. Although there was a safety vault in his office, he opted to place the money inside the steel cabinet because
he was allegedly previously informed by his predecessor, Major Conrado Mendoza, that the safety vault was defective. He
was also aware that all personnel of the 22 nd FSU had unrestricted access to his office during office hours. 9

Major Cantos also narrated that on December 20, 2000, he arrived at the office at around 9:00 a.m. and checked the steel
filing cabinet. He saw that the money was still there. He left the office at around 4:00 p.m. to celebrate with his wife
because it was their wedding anniversary. On the following day, December 21, 2000, he reported for work around 8:30
a.m. and proceeded with his task of signing vouchers and documents. Between 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., he inspected the
steel cabinet and discovered that the duffel bag which contained the money was missing. He immediately called then
Capt. Balao to his office and asked if the latter saw someone enter the room. Capt. Balao replied that he noticed a person
going inside the room, but advised him not to worry because he is bonded as Disbursing Officer.10
In a state of panic, Major Cantos asked for Capt. Balao’s help in finding the money. Capt. Balao asked him how the
money was lost and why was it not in the vault, to which he replied that he could not put it there because the vault was
defective. Capt. Balao then suggested that they should make it appear that the money was lost in the safety vault. In
pursuit of this plan, Capt. Balao went out of the office and returned with a pair of pliers and a screwdriver. Upon his return,
Capt. Balao went directly to the vault to unscrew it. At this point, Major Cantos told him not to continue anymore as he will
just inform Gen. Diaz about the missing funds. Major Cantos was able to contact Gen. Diaz through his mobile phone and
was advised to just wait for Col. Espinelli. When Col. Espinelli arrived at the office, Col. Espinelli conducted an
investigation of the incident.11

Lt. Col. Al I. Perreras, Executive Officer of the Judge Advocate General Office (JAGO), likewise conducted an
investigation of the incident. His testimony was however dispensed with as the counsels stipulated that he prepared the
Investigation Report, and that if presented, the same would be admitted by defense counsel. 12 It likewise appears from the
evidence that Police Inspector Jesus S. Bacani of the Philippine National Police (PNP) administered a polygraph
examination on Major Cantos and the result showed that he was telling the truth. 13

On April 27, 2007, the RTC rendered a decision convicting Major Cantos of the crime charged, to
wit:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the Court finds the accused Major Joel G. Cantos GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds, under paragraph 4 of Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code, and, there being no mitigating or aggravating circumstance present, hereby sentences him to an indeterminate
penalty of imprisonment for a period of ten (10) years and one (1) day of Prision Mayor, as minimum, to Eighteen (18)
Years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of Reclusion Temporal, as maximum; to reimburse the AFP Finance Service
Center, Presidential Security Group, Armed Forces of the Philippines the amount of Three Million Two Hundred Seventy
Thousand Pesos (P3,270,000.00); to pay a fine of Three Million Two Hundred Seventy Thousand Pesos (P3,270,000.00);
to suffer perpetual special disqualification from holding any public office; and to pay the costs.

SO ORDERED.14

In rendering a judgment of conviction, the RTC explained that although there was no direct proof that Major Cantos
appropriated the money for his own benefit, Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that the failure
of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable, upon demand by any
duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or property to personal uses. The
RTC concluded that Major Cantos failed to rebut this presumption.

Aggrieved, Major Cantos appealed to the Sandiganbayan questioning his conviction by the trial court.

On July 31, 2008, the Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed Decision, the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Decision promulgated on May 3, 2007 in Criminal Case No. 03-212248 of the
Regional Trial Court, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch 47, Manila finding the accused-appellant Major Joel G.
Cantos GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds under Article 217 of the Revised
Penal Code is hereby AFFIRMED, with the modification that instead of being convicted of malversation through
negligence, the Court hereby convicts the accused of malversation through misappropriation. The penalty imposed by the
lower court is also likewise AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.15

The Sandiganbayan sustained the ruling of the RTC. It held that in the crime of malversation, all that is necessary for
conviction is proof that the accountable officer had received public funds and that he did not have them in his possession
when demand therefor was made. There is even no need of direct evidence of personal misappropriation as long as there
is a shortage in his account and petitioner cannot satisfactorily explain the same. In this case, the Sandiganbayan found
petitioner liable for malversation through misappropriation because he failed to dispute the presumption against him. The
Sandiganbayan noted that petitioner’s claim that the money was taken by robbery or theft has not been supported by
sufficient evidence, and is at most, self-serving.

Contending that the Sandiganbayan Decision erred in affirming his convicting, Major Cantos filed a motion for
reconsideration. In its Resolution16 dated October 6, 2008, however, the Sandiganbayan denied the motion.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari. Petitioner assails the Decision of the Sandiganbayan based on the
following grounds:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

I.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN AFFIRMING PETITIONER'S CONVICTION FOR MALVERSATION

DESPITE ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE SHOWING THAT THE FUNDS WERE CONVERTED TO THE PERSONAL USE OF
PETITIONER.

II.

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN ERRED IN AFFIRMING PETITIONER'S CONVICTION ON THE BASIS OF THE
MERE PRESUMPTION CREATED BY ARTICLE 217, PARAGRAPH 4, OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE IN VIEW OF
THE ATTENDANT CIRCUMSTANCES IN THE PRESENT CASE.17nadcralavvonlinelawlibrary

Essentially, the basic issue for our resolution is: Did the Sandiganbayan err in finding petitioner guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of malversation of public funds?

Petitioner argues that mere absence of funds is not sufficient proof of misappropriation which would warrant his
conviction. He stresses that the prosecution has the burden of establishing his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In this
case, petitioner contends that the prosecution failed to prove that he appropriated, took, or misappropriated, or that he
consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another person to take the public funds.

On the other hand, the People, represented by the Office of the Special Prosecutor (OSP), argues that petitioner, as an
accountable officer, may be convicted of malversation of public funds even if there is no direct evidence of
misappropriation. The OSP asserts that the only evidence required is that there is a shortage in the officer’s account
which he has not been able to explain satisfactorily.

The petition must fail.

The Sandiganbayan did not commit a reversible error in its decision convicting petitioner of malversation of public funds,
which is defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, as
follows:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

Art. 217. Malversation of public funds or property. – Presumption of malversation. – Any public officer who, by reason of
the duties of his office, is accountable for public funds or property, shall appropriate the same, or shall take or
misappropriate or shall consent, or through abandonment or negligence, shall permit any other person to take such public
funds or property, wholly or partially, or shall otherwise be guilty of the misappropriation or malversation of such funds or
property shall suffer:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

xxxx

4. The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the amount involved is more than twelve
thousand pesos but is less than twenty-two thousand pesos. If the amount exceeds the latter, the penalty shall
be reclusion temporal in its maximum period to reclusion perpetua.

In all cases, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special disqualification and a fine
equal to the amount of the funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled.

The failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is chargeable,
upon demand by any duly authorized officer, shall be prima facie evidence that he has put such missing funds or
property to personal use. (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)

Thus, the elements of malversation of public funds under Article 217 of the Revised Penal
Code are:cralavvonlinelawlibrary

1. that the offender is a public officer;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

2. that he had the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;chanroblesvirtualawlibrary

3. that those funds or property were public funds or property for which he was accountable; and
4. that he appropriated, took, misappropriated or consented or, through abandonment or negligence, permitted another
person to take them.18

We note that all the above-mentioned elements are here present. Petitioner was a public officer occupying the position of
Commanding Officer of the 22nd FSU of the AFP Finance Center, PSG. By reason of his position, he was tasked to
supervise the disbursement of the Special Duty Allowances and other Maintenance Operating Funds of the PSG
personnel, which are indubitably public funds for which he was accountable. Petitioner in fact admitted in his testimony
that he had complete control and custody of these funds. As to the element of misappropriation, indeed petitioner failed to
rebut the legal presumption that he had misappropriated the fees to his personal use.

In convicting petitioner, the Sandiganbayan cites the presumption in Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
which states that the failure of a public officer to have duly forthcoming any public funds or property with which he is
chargeable, upon demand by any duly authorized officer, is prima facie evidence that he has put such missing fund or
property to personal uses. The presumption is, of course, rebuttable. Accordingly, if petitioner is able to present adequate
evidence that can nullify any likelihood that he put the funds or property to personal use, then that presumption would be
at an end and the prima facie case is effectively negated.

In this case, however, petitioner failed to overcome this prima facie evidence of guilt. He failed to explain the missing
funds in his account and to restitute the amount upon demand. His claim that the money was taken by robbery or theft is
self-serving and has not been supported by evidence. In fact, petitioner even tried to unscrew the safety vault to make it
appear that the money was forcibly taken. Moreover, petitioner’s explanation that there is a possibility that the money was
taken by another is belied by the fact that there was no sign that the steel cabinet was forcibly opened. We also take note
of the fact that it was only petitioner who had the keys to the steel cabinet.19 Thus, the explanation set forth by petitioner is
unsatisfactory and does not overcome the presumption that he has put the missing funds to personal use.

Malversation is committed either intentionally or by negligence. The dolo or the culpa present in the offense is only a
modality in the perpetration of the felony. Even if the mode charged differs from the mode proved, the same offense of
malversation is involved and conviction thereof is proper. 20 All that is necessary for conviction is sufficient proof that the
accountable officer had received public funds, that he did not have them in his possession when demand therefor was
made, and that he could not satisfactorily explain his failure to do so. Direct evidence of personal misappropriation by the
accused is hardly necessary as long as the accused cannot explain satisfactorily the shortage in his accounts. 21 To our
mind, the evidence in this case is thoroughly inconsistent with petitioner’s claim of innocence. Thus, we sustain the
Sandiganbayan’s finding that petitioner’s guilt has been proven beyond reasonable doubt.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated July 31, 2008 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. SB-
07-A/R-0008 convicting Major Joel G. Cantos of the crime of Malversation of Public Funds is AFFIRMED and UPHELD.

With costs against the petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 165711 June 30, 2006

HERMOSO ARRIOLA and MELCHOR RADAN, Petitioners,

vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN, Respondent.

For allegedly having lost the confiscated lumber entrusted to their custody, petitioners Barangay Captain Hermoso Arriola
and Barangay Chief Tanod Melchor Radan of Dulangan, Magdiwang, Romblon were convicted as principal and accessory
respectively by the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 of the crime of Malversation of Public Property
thru Negligence or Abandonment defined and penalized under Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, in an
Information1 docketed as Criminal Case No. 2064, which alleges –

That on, about and during the first week of May, 1996, in barangay Dulangan, municipality of Magdiwang, province of
Romblon, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a duly
appointed/elected Barangay Captain and Chief Tanod of Dulangan, Magdiwang, Romblon and as such, they have under
their custody and control approximately forty four (44) pieces of illegally sawn lumbers of assorted sizes and species, with
an estimated value of P17,611.20, Philippine currency, which were confiscated or recovered by the elements of the
Philippine National Police and DENR personnel and thereafter turned over the same to accused Brgy. Capt. Hermoso
Arriola which he acknowledged to have received the same and stockpiled at the backyard of accused Chief Tanod
Melchor Radan’s house, and through abandonment or negligence, they permitted any other person to take the public
property wholly or partially, to the damage and prejudice of the government in the sum of P17,611.20.

Contrary to law.

Upon arraignment, both pleaded not guilty. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter. On May 3, 1998, the trial court rendered
its Decision,2 the dispositive portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, this Court finds co-accused barangay captain HERMOSO ARRIOLA GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal of the crime of Malversation of Public Property Thru Negligence or Abandonment and he is hereby sentenced to
not less than 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days, as maximum, with the accessories
of the law, with the additional penalty of perpetual special disqualification and of a fine of P17,611.20, Philippine Currency,
and to pay the sum of P13,209.20 as indemnification of consequential damages to the government.

Likewise, co-accused barangay chief tanod MELCHOR RADAN is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as accessory
of the crime of Malversation of Public Property Thru Negligence or Abandonment and he is sentenced to not less than 6
years, as minimum, to 8 years and 8 months, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, with the additional penalty of
perpetual special disqualification and of a fine of P4,402.80, Philippine Currency, and to pay the sum of P4,402.80 as
indemnification of consequential damages to the government.

No subsidiary imprisonment in case of failure to pay the fine is imposed to both accused under Article 39, paragraph 3,
RPC but either accused is subsidiarily liable for the quota of either in the indemnity for consequential damages to the
government (Art. 110, RPC). Both accused shall pay the costs equally.

The accused are entitled to credit for preventive imprisonment under Article 29, RPC.

The accused are allowed to continue on provisional liberty under the same bail bonds during the period to appeal subject
to the consent of the bondsmen (Section 5, Rule 114 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as amended.)

SO ORDERED.3

Petitioners filed an appeal before the Court of Appeals which referred the same to the public respondent Sandiganbayan
on a finding that the latter has jurisdiction over the case.4 On June 29, 2004, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan
resolved5 thus –

Notwithstanding the referral of this case to this Court by the Court of Appeals, it appearing that no correction was made of
the correct appellate court by the appellant, this Court is constrained to DISMISS the instant case pursuant to Section 2,
Rule 50 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure, stating insofar as pertinent, that "(a)n appeal erroneously taken to
the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed outright," and the ruling in the
case of Moll vs. Buban, et al., G.R. No. 136974 promulgated on August 27, 2002, that the designation of the correct
appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal.

Petitioners’ motion for reconsideration was denied 6 by the Sandiganbayan; hence, this petition for certiorari alleging grave
abuse of discretion of the Sandiganbayan in dismissing their appeal. They maintain that the trial court committed the
following errors:

I. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA IS AN ACCOUNTABLE PUBLIC OFFICER WITH

RESPECT TO CONFISCATED ILLEGALLY LOGGED LUMBER, BY REASON OF THE DUTIES OF HIS OFFICE.

II. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA MISAPPROPRIATED OR CONSENTED OR,

THROUGH NEGLIGENCE OR ABANDONMENT, PERMITTED ANOTHER PERSON TO TAKE THE CONFISCATED
LUMBER.

III. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT HERMOSO ARRIOLA MALICIOUSLY OR FRAUDULENTLY

ATTEMPTED TO MAKE IT APPEAR THAT THE MISSING LUMBER WERE FOUND AND RECOVED (sic).

IV. IN RULING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT MELCHOR RADAN IS AN ACCESSORY AFTER THE CRIME WHO
SHOULD BE HELD LIABLE, TOGETHER WITH HIS CO-PETITIONER.

V. IN RULING THAT THE GUILT OF BOTH ACCUSED-APPELLANTS WERE ESTABLISHED BY EVIDENCE OF GUILT
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.7

The factual antecedents of the case are as follows:

At noon on April 22, 1996 Department of Environment and Natural Resources (DENR) Forest Rangers Efren Mandia
(Mandia) and Joepre Ferriol, Senior Inspector Noel Alonzo, the team leader of Task Force Kalikasan together with the
Chief of Police of Magdiwang, Romblon SPO3 Agustin Ramal and some other police officers, confiscated 44 pieces of
illegally sawn lumber totaling 1,174 board feet with an estimated value of P17,611.20. 8

Mandia scaled the lumber and made notches on most of the pieces before issuing the seizure receipt 9 and turning over its
custody to petitioner Arriola in the presence of petitioner Radan. Arriola acknowledged receipt thereof and
signed10 accordingly. Mandia subsequently discovered the lumber missing on May 5, 1996. 11

He went back to Barangay Dulangan on May 14, 1996 accompanied by several police officers and Foresters Gerardo
Sabigan and Glenn Tansiongco. They requested petitioners to turn over custody of the confiscated lumber but the latter
claimed that the same were taken away without their knowledge. Subsequently, petitioners produced lumber and claimed
that these were the ones they recovered. Upon closer inspection however, Mandia noted that the lumber produced by
petitioners were different from those previously confiscated.

The subsequent investigation conducted by Mandia together with Forester and Officer-in-Charge Gerardo Sabigan, SPO1
Jose Fabrique, Jr., and some members of the Multi-Sectoral Forest Protection Committee showed that the missing lumber
was actually hauled to and used in the Magdiwang Cockpit where petitioner Arriola is a stockholder.12

On June 10, 1996, a complaint was filed against petitioners before the Romblon Provincial Prosecution Office.

In his defense, Arriola asserts that contrary to the finding of the trial court, he is not an accountable officer insofar as the
confiscated lumber is concerned. He maintains that none of the powers, duties and functions of a Barangay Captain as
enumerated in the Local Government Code13 (R.A. 7160) directly or by inference suggests that as such Barangay
Captain, he is an accountable officer with respect to the custody of illegally sawn lumber confiscated within his territorial
jurisdiction.

He insists that the confiscated lumber was placed in his custody "not by reason of the duties of his office" as Barangay
Captain, thus he is not legally accountable to answer for its loss so as to make him liable for Malversation under Art. 217
of the Revised Penal Code. Petitioners claim that they did not misappropriate, abandon or neglect the confiscated lumber
and insist that the same were stolen. Arriola claims he visited the stockpiled lumber regularly so the theft probably
occurred at night.
With respect to the replacement lumber they subsequently produced, petitioners believed in good faith that the various
lumber found scattered in a nearby creek were the missing confiscated lumber left by the thieves who failed to transport
them across.

Before going into the merits of the case, we must first resolve the procedural issue of whether the Sandiganbayan
correctly dismissed the appeal. The Sandiganbayan anchored its dismissal on this Court’s pronouncement in Moll v.
Buban14 that the designation of the wrong court does not necessarily affect the validity of the notice of appeal. However,
the designation of the proper court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal. Once made within the said period,
the designation of the correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are forwarded to the Court of
Appeals. Otherwise, Section 2, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court would apply, the relevant portion of which states:

Sec. 2. Dismissal of improper appeal to the Court of Appeals. –

xxxx

An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be
dismissed outright.

In this case, the records had been forwarded to the Court of Appeals which endorsed petitioners’ appeal to the
Sandiganbayan. However, petitioners failed to designate the proper appellate court within the allowable time.

We cannot fault the Sandiganbayan for dismissing the appeal outright for it was merely applying the law and existing
jurisprudence on the matter. Appeal is not a vested right but a mere statutory privilege; thus, appeal must be made strictly
in accordance with provisions set by law.15 Section 2, Rule 50 clearly requires that the correction in designating the proper
appellate court should be made within the 15-day period to appeal.

However, the rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense for they have been adopted to
help secure – not override – substantial justice.16 This Court has repeatedly stressed that the ends of justice would be
served better when cases are determined, not on mere technicality or some procedural nicety, but on the merits – after all
the parties are given full opportunity to ventilate their causes and defenses. Lest it be forgotten, dismissal of appeals
purely on technical grounds is frowned upon.17

Having resolved the procedural issue, we shall now proceed to the merits of the case. The issue boils down to whether or
not petitioners Arriola and Radan are accountable officers within the purview of Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to the confiscated items.

To find an accused guilty of malversation, the prosecution must prove the following essential elements:

a.] The offender is a public officer;

b.] He has the custody or control of funds or property by reason of the duties of his office;

c.] The funds or property involved are public funds or property for which he is accountable; and

d.] He has appropriated, taken or misappropriated, or has consented to, or through abandonment or negligence,
permitted the taking by another person of, such funds or property.

An accountable officer under Article 217 is a public officer who, by reason of his office is accountable for public funds or
property. Sec. 101 (1) of the Government Auditing Code of the Philippines (PD No. 1455) defines accountable officer to
be every officer of any government agency whose duties permit or require the possession or custody of government funds
or property and who shall be accountable therefor and for the safekeeping thereof in conformity with law. 18

In the determination of who is an accountable officer, it is the nature of the duties which he performs – and not the
nomenclature or the relative importance the position held – which is the controlling factor.19

Is petitioner Arriola, who signed as custodian in the seizure receipt for the confiscated lumber an accountable officer with
respect to its loss?
Chapter IV, I-E, (4) of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging states that:

In cases where the apprehension is made by the field DENR officer, the forest products and the conveyance used shall be
deposited to the nearest CENRO/PENRO/RED office, as the case may be, for safekeeping, wherever it is most
convenient. If the transfer of the seized forest products to the above places is not immediately feasible, the same shall be
placed under the custody of any licensed sawmill operator or the nearest local public official such as the Barangay
Captain, Municipal/City Mayor, Provincial Governor or the PC/INP; at the discretion of the confiscating officer taking into
account the safety of the confiscated forest products x x x. In any case, the custody of the forest products shall be duly
acknowledged and receipted by the official taking custody thereof.

In the case of United States v. Lafuente,20 the accused was a Municipal Secretary and a member of the auction
committee. A public auction for the sale of fishery privileges was held pursuant to the provisions of the Municipal Law and
a municipal ordinance. When the auction was concluded, the bidders deposited the amount of their respective bids with
the accused. The latter embezzled the money for his personal use. It was held that the accused is guilty of
misappropriation of public funds. Although a Municipal Secretary’s duties do not normally include the receipt of public
funds, the accused in this case was nonetheless held accountable for the same because the money was deposited with
him under authority of law. The obligation of the secretary was to safeguard the money for the Government. 21

In the instant case, Arriola knowingly and willingly signed the seizure receipt for the confiscated articles. By affixing his
signature in said document, he undertook to safeguard the lumber on behalf of the Government. The receipt contains a
provision which states that as custodian, Arriola "obliges himself to faithfully keep and protect to the best of his ability the
said seized articles from defacement in any manner, destruction or loss and that he will never alter or remove said seized
articles until ordered by the Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources or his duly authorized representative or any
court of Justice in the Philippines."

Although his usual duties as Barangay Captain do not ordinarily include the receipt of confiscated articles on behalf of the
Government, by virtue of the DENR Primer on Illegal Logging, which had for its basis Section 68 of Presidential Decree
No. 705,22 he may be called on to take custody thereof as the need arises. Furthermore, by affixing his signature in the
seizure receipt which clearly enumerates his obligations as a custodian therein, he effectively becomes an accountable
officer therefor.

The records show that prior to its confiscation by the DENR officers on April 22, 1996, the lumber was previously
apprehended by Arriola on April 19, 1996. 23 Thus, even without the seizure receipt where he signed as custodian for the
said lumber, Arriola was accountable therefor because he was the one who originally took possession of it on behalf of
the government.

His claim that the trial court erred in holding him liable for malversation through negligence or abandonment lacks merit.
The lumber curiously turned up at the Magdiwang cockpit structure where he happens to be a stockholder. Also, Arriola
admitted that he already knew about the missing lumber long before the DENR officers came back to get it but he did not
inform them about its loss because "somebody advised me not to report because the one who got the lumber might panic
and tuluyan na ang lumber."24

He even produced 44 pieces of lumber and passed it off as those missing. The evidence showed however that the
species was of a cheaper quality and did not bear the markings made by the apprehending officers of the DENR. All told,
his alibi and denials cannot prevail over the credible testimonies of government witnesses which corroborated each other.
His defenses did not withstand the onslaught of clear and obvious physical, documentary and testimonial evidence
adduced by the prosecution.

With respect to petitioner Radan, the trial court erred in judging him liable as an accessory.

Article 19, par. 2 of the Revised Penal Code defines accessories as those who, having knowledge of the commission of
the crime, and without having participated therein, either as principals or accomplices, take part subsequent to its
commission by concealing or destroying the body of the crime or the effects or instruments thereof, in order to prevent its
discovery.

In the case at bar, the evidence adduced by the prosecution to prove Radan’s liability as an accessory were neither clear
nor convincing. His presence during the time when the DENR officers turned over the custody of the seized items to
Arriola is not enough proof of complicity, nor the fact that the confiscated lumber was placed behind his father’s house.
The assertion that he was responsible for the alleged transport of the confiscated articles to the cockpit in Dulangan was a
mere conjecture.
In all criminal cases, mere speculations cannot substitute for proof in establishing the guilt of the accused.25 When guilt is
not proven with moral certainty, it has been our policy of long standing that the presumption of innocence must be
favored, and exoneration granted as a matter of right.26

We now come to the penalty which should be imposed on petitioner Arriola. According to Article 217, paragraph 4 of the
Revised Penal Code, the penalty for malversation is reclusion temporal in its medium and maximum periods, if the
amount involved is more than P12,000 but less than P22,000. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, and there being
no mitigating or aggravating circumstances, the maximum imposable penalty shall be within the range of 16 years, 5
months and 11 days to 18 years, 5 months and 20 days, while the minimum shall be within the range of 10 years and 1
day to 14 years and 8 months. The trial court therefore properly imposed the penalty of imprisonment to petitioner Arriola
ranging from 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2 months and 20 days, as maximum.

Under the second paragraph of Art. 217, persons guilty of malversation shall also suffer the penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of funds malversed or equal to the total value of the property embezzled,
which in this case is P17,611.20. There will be no subsidiary imprisonment because the principal penalty imposed is
higher than prision correccional.27

WHEREFORE, the May 3, 1998 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Romblon, Romblon, Branch 81 in Criminal Case
No. 2064 finding petitioner Hermoso Arriola guilty of Malversation of Public Property thru Negligence or Abandonment and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of imprisonment to not less than 14 years and 8 months, as minimum, to 18 years, 2
months and 20 days, as maximum, with the accessories of the law, with the additional penalty of perpetual special
disqualification and a fine of P17,611.20 is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS in that the imposition of consequential
damages on petitioner Hermoso Arriola is ordered DELETED for lack of legal basis. Petitioner Melchor Radan is
ACQUITTED for insufficiency of evidence.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 136266 August 13, 2001

EUTIQUIO A. PELIGRINO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

To convict the accused in a prosecution for the violation of Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft Law, mere receipt of a gift or any
other benefits is enough, even without any express demand for it. The duration of the possession is not controlling.
Important are the appellant's words, action and reactions showing acceptance thereof. These are factual in nature and,
absent any arbitrariness, abuse of discretion, or palpable error, the trial court's assessment of their presence or absence
is generally binding on appellate review.

The Case

Before us is a Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the August 24, 1998
Decision1 and the November 16, 1998 Resolution2 of the Sandiganbayan, First Division, in Criminal Case No. 17086. The
dispositive portion of the assailed Decision reads:

"WHEREFORE, premises considered judgment is hereby rendered, finding accused EUTIQUIO A. PELIGRINO,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt, as principal, of having violated Sec. 3(b) of R.A. 3019 as charged, and hereby
imposes upon him in the absence of any modifying circumstances affecting criminal liability, an indeterminate
prison term of SIX (6) YEARS and ONE (1) MONTH as minimum, to NINE (9) YEARS as maximum, with all the
accessories of the law, to suffer perpetual disqualification from office, and to pay the cost.

"There is no pronouncement as to civil liability it being apparently clear that the amount of Three Thousand
(P3,000.00) used in the entrapment has been returned to the offended party.

"Accused ATTY. BUENAVENTURA V. BUENAFE, on the other hand[,] is ACQUITTED on the basis of reasonable
doubt, with cost de oficio.

"His bond is ordered cancelled and any Hold[-] Departure Order issued in this case is set aside and ordered lifted
as to him."3

The assailed Resolution denied the Motion for Reconsideration as follows:

"There being no adequate cause to set aside the decision herein, more particularly since the points raised by the
accused in his motion for reconsideration dated September 2, 1998 have been adequately taken up in the
decision, the said motion for reconsideration is denied."4

This case originated from the Information filed on October 17, 1991 by Special Prosecution Officers Carlos D.
Montemayor and Edna Herrera-Batacan. The accusatory portion reads thus:

"That on or about October 15, 1991, in Makati, Metro Manila, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
accused EUTIQUIO PELIGRINO y ALAAN, a public officer being then an Examiner II of Region IV-A of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, and as such [was] tasked among others, to examine or investigate Books of
Accounts for Income and Business [t]ax [r]eturns earned by professionals (medical practitioners) in order to
determine their compliance and/or tax deficiencies and to collect payments thereof, while in the performance of
his official duties as such public officer, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and criminally demand the amount
of P200,000.00 from Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano, a practicing [g]enetology [d]octor holding office at Pasong Tamo,
Makati, Metro Manila, found by the accused to have incurred an allege[d] deficiency income tax assessment of
P500,000.00 for the calendar years 1988-1989, received P200,000.00, P51,858.57 was in the form of Prudential
Bank Check No. 914077 dated October 15, 1991 payable to the Bureau of Internal Revenue as full payment of
Dr. Feliciano's tax liabilities and the remaining balance to be appropriated to himself, to the damage and prejudice
of Dr. Antonio Feliciano in the amount of P148,141.43 and the government in the amount equal to the deficiency
income tax due it."5

On February 25, 1992, the Information was amended to include Buenaventura V. Buenafe as co-accused. It is reproduced
below:
 "That on or about October 15, 1991 and/or for sometime prior thereto, in Makati, Metro Manila, Philippines, and
within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused EUTIQUIO PELIGRINO y ALAAN and BUENAVENTURA
V. BUENAFE, both public officers, being then Examiner II and Supervisor respectively both of Region IV-A of the
Bureau of Internal Revenue, Makati, Metro Manila, and as such are tasked, among others, to examine or
investigate the Books of Accounts for Income and Business Tax and other accounting records of professionals
(medical practitioners) and to determine their compliance and/or tax deficiencies after assessment, and to collect
payments thereof, taking advantage of their public positions, while in the performance of said official duties as
such public officers, conspiring, confederating and mutual helping each other, did then and there wil[l]fully,
unlawfully and criminally demand directly from taxpayer Antonio N. Feliciano, a practicing [g]enetology [d]octor
holding office at Pasong Tamo, Makati, Metro Manila, found by both accused to have incurred an alleged
deficiency income tax assessment of P500,000.00 for the calendar years 1988 and 1989, the amount of
P200,000.00 Philippine currency, for the purpose of applying a portion thereof in the amount of P51,858.57 as full
payment for deficiency income tax due from said taxpayer for fiscal years 1988 & 1989 and the balance of
P148,141.43 to be appropriated by both accused for themselves as gift or consideration for their promise to make
as they did lower assessment for said fiscal years 1988 & 1989 in the amount of P51,858.57, which request or
demand for money was in connection with a transaction between the government and Dr. Antonio N. Feliciano
wherein both accused in their official capacities had to intervene under the law, and thereafter, accused Eutiguio
A. Peligrino wil[l]fully, unlawfully and criminally received the amount of P200,000.00 in behalf of both accused, to
the damage and prejudice of Dr. Antonio Feliciano in the amount of P148,141.43 and the government in the
amount equal to the deficiency income tax due it."6 (Underscoring in the original.)

On August 28, 1992, the two accused, assisted by their respective lawyers, 7 were arraigned. Both pleaded not guilty.8 On
April 24, 1998, after full trial, the Sandiganbayan convicted petitioner of the offense charged, but acquitted his co-
accused.1âwphi1.nêt

The Facts
Version of the Prosecution

The Sandiganbayan narrated the evidence of the prosecution in this wise:

"Stripped of the non-essentials, the prosecution's evidence shows that about the last week of July or early August
of 1991, accused Atty. Buenafe delivered a letter of authority dated July 4, 1991 (Exhibit K) to complainant Dr.
Antonio N. Feliciano in the latter's office at Valgozon Bldg., Pasong Tamo, Makati. Said Exhibit K is addressed to
Dr. Antonio [N.] Feliciano signed by one Eufracio D. Santos a [d]eputy [c]ommissioner of the BIR stating inter alia
that 'x x x the bearer(s) hereof Revenue Officer Eutiquio Peligrino to be supervised by Buenaventura Buenafe
is/are authorized to examine your books of accounts and other accounting records for income and business for
the calendar/fiscal year(s) ending 1988 & 1989 x x x.' Atty. Buenafe was referred to the accountant of the
complaining witness.

"About two weeks later, the complainant received a telephone call from accused Atty. Buenafe asking him if his
accountant had not told him anything, and when he (complainant) inquired from his accountant Ellen Quijano
about the matter, he was informed that the accused were demanding half a million pesos. Surprised about the
demand, since the books were not even examined, he instructed Ellen Quijano to further clarify the matter.
Thereafter about Sept. 1991, Atty. Buenafe called him up requesting for a meeting in his (complainant's) office.

"On October 10, 1991 accused Eutiquio Peligrino and Atty. Buenaventura Buenafe appeared in the complainant's
office and told the latter that his tax deficiencies would amount to [f]ive [h]undred [t]housand [p]esos
(P500,000.00)[.]

"Flabbergasted, because his books were not even examined, complainant entertained the idea that it was the
beginning of an extortion, and he tried to negotiate for a smaller amount, and finally the two (2) accused agreed to
the amount of [t]wo [h]undred [t]housand, of which [f]ifty [t]housand [p]esos would be paid to the BIR, and the rest
to them. The pay-off would take place on that coming Monday. He immediately wrote a letter to the NBI (Exhibit
A) requesting for assistance, and an NBI Agent Atty. Rafael Ragos, went to his office where they talked and
arranged for an entrapment which was set on October 14. At around noon-time of the said date, he provided the
NBI with the pay-off money consisting of [t]hree [t]housand (P3,000.00) pesos as the entrapment was scheduled
at 4:00 p.m. Prior to this, he had executed an affidavit (Exhibit C). On the said entrapment date, October 14, 1991
neither accused appeared. The complainant further testified:

[']Q What happened next after October 14[?]

A We set it for the next day and I told the NBI people that I ha[d] a feeling that they [would] show up
the next day and so early on the next morning the NBI came to my office.

PJ GARCHITORENA

Q On Monday, how many NBI agents came to your office?

A About two or three, Your Honor.

PROS. CAOILI

Q Now, at about what time did the NBI c[o]me to your office?

A They came before noon, sir.

Q And did the accused Atty. Buenafe and Mr. Peligrino appear on that date, October 15, 1991?

A Atty. Buenafe did not appear but Mr. Peligrino appeared at 4:00 p.m. in my office.

Q When Mr. Peligrino appeared in your office at 4:00 p.m., of October 15, 1991, what transpired?

A By this time I was already ready with the planted money in an envelope, brown Manila envelope
and the NBI agents were already positioned and we ha[d] a pre-arranged signal that if I buzz[ed] or made
a buzzer in the intercom that mean[t] that the money was accepted and they [would] come out and arrest
Mr. Peligrino.

Q Now, were you able to hand the money to Mr. Peligrino?

A Yes, sir.

Q What did he do when he took hold of the money?

A He accepted the envelope and opened it and look inside and saw the money then close[d] it again
and place[d] it in front of him.

Q What happened next?

PJ GARCITORENA

Q And after you turned over the envelope to him, you still ha[d] a conversation with him?

A No, your Honor, I immediately [pressed] the buzzer and then the NBI immediately c[a]me out.

PJ GARCHITORENA

Mr. Caoili.

PROS. CAOILI

Q When the NBI agents came to your room after pressing the button, what happened next?

A There was a commotion, sir, and it happened so fast that I don't remember anymore but they
brought him out of my office with an instruction for me to follow.

Q Did you understand where to follow[?]

A Yes, sir, in the NBI office at Taft Avenue.

 Q And did you do that Mr. Witness?

A Yes, sir.

Q Then what happened at the NBI office?

A I was asked to make an affidavit of what happened which I [did] and signed it.
(TSN August 12, 1993 pp. 19-21 )[']

"Corroborating the declaration of the complaining witness, witness Rafael Z. Ragos an NBI Agent testified that on
October 11, 1991 he was handed a letter ([E]xhibit A) by NBI Deputy Director Antonio Aragon with instruction to
handle the complaint of the author - Dr. Antonio Feliciano. He then contacted the physician - complainant and
requested him to execute an affidavit (Exhibit C). After studying the affidavit, he decided together with other NBI
agents to conduct an entrapment operation. Thus, 30 pieces of one-hundred peso bills were secured and
submitted to the Forensic Chemist Section for marking. He made arrangement with Dr. Feliciano that on October
14, 1991, he, with the members of his team would standby at the office of the said doctor to conduct the
entrapment. Nothing came out of their plan as the two (2) accused did not appear. The following day, he with 8 or
10 NBI agents returned to the office before lunch time and waited for the two (2) suspects. The arrangement was
that, the NBI agents would stay in one of the rooms of the clinic, would wait for the signal of the Doctor which
[was] the sound of the buzzer, and when the buzzer [was] heard they would proceed to arrest the subject of the
operation.

"At around 4:30 p.m., accused Peligrino arrived, and so upon hearing the sound of the buzzer, he [Ragos],
together with his co-NBI agents immediately proceeded to the room of Dr. Feliciano, and on seeing the accused
in possession of the brown envelope which contained the marked money, arrested him, and made a body search
on him. An inventory of the things found in the possession of the accused was made (Exhibit T). The following
were seized from accused Peligrino:

1. Prudential Check No. 914077;

2. BIR Authority to Issue Payment Order dated 28 August 1991 with stated amount of P14,092.92;

3. BIR Authority to Issue Payment Order dated 28 August 1991 with stated amount of P23,760.35;

4. BIR Authority to Issue Payment Order dated 28 August 1991 with stated amount of P14,O05.30;

5. Worksheet labeled 'COMMITTEE ON SPECIAL PROJECTS' with [L]ist of Taxpayers [who were]
Doctors;

6. 1988 and 1989 [P]rovisional Computation (DR. FELICIANO) Tax Assessment;

7. List of Dr. A. FELICIANO's withheld taxes for 1989;

8. Computation of Dr. FELICIANO['s] 1989 Sales of Clinic Supplies and Number of Patients;

9. Computation of Dr. Feliciano's Number of Patients;

10. BIR Letter of Authority No. 0456962 addressed to Dr. ANTONIO N. FELICIANO;

11. Photocopy of Dr. FELICIANO's 1989 Income Tax Return and its attached Auditor's Report, Balance
Sheet, Profit and Loss Statement and Schedule of Salaries and Wages;

12. DR. FELICIANO's 1989 Confirmation Receipts;

13. Photocopy of Dr. FELICIANO's 1988 Income Tax Return and its attachments;

14. DR. FELICIANO's Worksheet for 1989 transactions;

 15. DR. FELICIANO's Worksheet for 1988 transactions;

16. Big-brown envelope containing the Bogus Money with (30) pcs. of marked One Hundred [Peso b]ills.

"The accused was then brought to the NBI Office in Manila where he was examined for the detection of the
fluorescent powder [o]n his hands and body. He then prepared his report (Exhibit Q) after the complainant
executed a written statement.

"NBI agent Raul A. Ancheta also took the witness stand and declared that on October 14, 1991 Agent Ragos
assigned him to get the statement of Dr. Feliciano, after which he was instructed to prepare 'boodle' money to be
submitted to the Forensic Chemist Division of the NBI in preparation for the entrapment. Accordingly, with thirty
(30) pieces of genuine money, he submitted the same to the Forensic Chemist for dustings and proper markings.
He was present in the initial process of dusting the articles with fluorescent powder but did not witness the entire
proceedings. He thereafter retrieved the money from the Forensic Chemist, placed it in an envelope, and
delivered the same to Agent Ragos.

"[O]n the morning of October 14, Agent Ragos called all the members of the entrapment team and made the
necessary briefings. They, thereafter proceeded to the office of Dr. Feliciano, and waited for the accused but
nobody appeared, and Agent Ragos instructed the members of the team to be on the stand by status the
following day.

"The next day, October 15, the NBI agents posted themselves at the different parts of the clinic and waited for the
BIR examiners. His [Agent Rago's] assignment was [at] the main door of the clinic to secure the team members
from outside forces. By 4:00 p.m., only accused Eutiquio Peligrino arrived. He saw him enter the clinic, [go]
directly to the secretary who picked up the phone, and then he saw Dr. Feliciano going out of the room and
conferr[ing] with the accused. Thereafter, they entered the room of Dr. Feliciano. About 15 to 20 minutes, he saw
the other members of the team rushing to the office of the doctor, and after a short while, they came out from the
office with accused Peligrino. Agent Ragos handed him the brown envelope and the blue bag of the accused, and
then they proceeded to the NBI office where he brought the accused to the Office of the Forensic Chemist who
examined him upon presentation of the request (Exhibit E-l). After the examination, he was given a certification by
the Forensic Chemist (Exhibit E).

"Dimpna Dacudao Bermejo, a Forensic Chemist of the NBI declared:

[']Q Miss Witness, do you remember whether you were in your office on October 15, 1991?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did you give any technical assistance during that date?

A Yes, sir.

Q What kind of technical assistance did you give on that date?

A [At] 5:00 of October 15, a certain agent Raul Ancheta came to my laboratory with a letter request
asking for a detection of fluorescent powder [on] a person.

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. CAOILI

May I request, Your Honor, that this letter request for Chemistry examination, disposition form
dated October 15, 1991 be marked as Exhibit E-1[.]

xxx xxx xxx

Q What did you do upon getting this request for examination Miss Witness?
A I examined the letter request whether the contents [were] in order, then I asked him to bring the
subject in my presence and I right away proceeded to my examination.

Q Are you familiar with the subject?

A Yes, sir.

Q If he is in this Court, will you be able to identify him?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

(Witness pointing to a person in Court who when asked gave his name as Mr. Eutiquio Peligrino.)

Q How did you conduct the examination?

A I brought the person [to] our dark room and then I exposed his left and right arms[,] palm[a]r
aspect[,] under the UV light.

PJ GARCHITORENA

Q What is UV light?

A Ultra-Violet light.

PROS. CAOILI

Q What [were] your findings?

A The said Peligrino was found to be positive [for] the presence of fluorescent powder.

Q Did you [put] your findings in writing?

A Yes, sir.

Q There is already here a certification which is already marked as Exhibit E signed by one Dimpna
Bermejo. Will you please go over the same and tell me if you know this document?

A Yes, I was the one who made that document.

xxx xxx xxx

Q It states here that this is only a temporary certification and [the] official report follows. Did you make
that official report?

A Yes, sir.

Q Where is it now?

A Witness presenting a document to the Fiscal which is entitled Physics Report Number P-91-140
dated 17 October 1991.

Q On this report, there is a signature above the typewritten name Dimpna Bermejo[;] whose signature
is that?

A My signature, sir.
 PROS. CAOILI

May I request your Honor, that this Physics Report No. P91-140 be marked as Exhibit E-2.

Q Aside from your report, did you prepare any diagnosis showing where you found this fluorescent
powder in the person of Mr. Peligrino?

A Yes, sir.

xxx xxx xxx

PROS. CAOILI

Your Honor, may I request that these two (2) diagnos[e]s presented by the witness be marked as
Exhibit E-3 for [the] dorsal portion and Exhibit E-4 for the palm[a]r side.

xxx xxx xxx

Q There is a note written in pencil in Exhibit E-3, [on] the bottom portion. Will you please explain to
the Honorable Court what is that note?

A That note states that subject was found to have fluorescent powder [o]n the front shirt, pants and
right arm.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Miss Witness, whose hands are those which were examined supposed to [be]?

A [They] belonged to the subject Peligrino.

Q How about the palm[a]r section, does it also belong to the subject Eutiquio Peligrino?

A Yes, sir.[']

"The records disclose that the prosecution presented documentary evidence consisting of Exhibit A which is a
letter-complaint dated 10/11/91 of the complaining witness addressed to Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI[;] Exhibit
Ban NBI routine slip emanating from Asst. Director Aragon; two (2) sworn statements of Dr. Feliciano marked as
Exhibit[s] C and D which were all offered as part of the testimony of the said doctor; Exhibit E which is a
certification dated October 15, 1991 by the NBI Forensic Chemist Dimpna Bermejo together with her Physics
Report No. P91-140 (Exhibit E-2); all offered as part of the declaration of witness Bermejo; Exhibit F - xerox copy
of the genuine thirty P100 bill[;] three authorities to issue payment order (Exhibits H, I & J); a letter of authority
issued by BIR Director Viray (Exhibit K); Exhibit L which is the Joint Affidavit of Arrest of NBI Agents; Exhibits M
and N[,] the booking sheet and Arrest Report and Arrest Information Sheet respectively for accused Peligrino;
Exhibits O and P[,] the booking sheet & Arrest Report and Arrest Information Sheet respectively for accused
Buenafe; Exhibit Q[;] the Report of the Arresting NBI Agents regarding the entrapment; Exhibit R which [consists
of] some notes of Dr. Feliciano; Exhibit S which is a letter dated 11/26/92 of BIR Deputy Commissioner Santos to
Dr. Feliciano; Exhibit T[,] the inventory/list of documents seized from accused Peligrino[;] and [Exhibit] U[,] the
referral letter of Director Alfredo Lim of the NBI to the Ombudsman. These exhibits were admitted as part of the
testimonies of the witnesses who testified thereon."9

Version of the Defense

Inasmuch as petitioner did not submit his version of the facts, we quote the Sandiganbayan's narration of the defense
evidence as follows:

"The defense was abject denial. Stoutly asserting their innocence, and abjuring the inculpation with vehemence,
both accused took the witness stand, and presented Prosecutor Carlos Montemayor of the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to drive [home] their point. They also submitted as documentary evidence Exhibits 1 to 21 which were
admitted by the Court in its Resolution of October 28, 1994.

"The testimony of accused Buenaventura V. Buenafe may be capsulized as follows:

'That he is 59 years old, married and a Revenue Officer IV with designation of Supervisor in the Bureau of
Internal Revenue; that he first came to know Dr. Feliciano when he served a letter of authority for the
examination of the 1988-89 books of account of the doctor to establish his tax liability; that said letter of
authority was issued by the [d]eputy [c]ommissioner of [i]nternal [r]evenue (Exhibit 9) which has a [life-
time] of 30 days within which to be served and since Examiner Eutiquio Peligrino was on leave he took it
upon himself to serve the same personally on the doctor at the latter's office; that since the letter of
authority came about pursuant to a letter of denunciation of the doctor-complainant, he was checking on
the veracity of the said letter of denunciation and except for the item in the said letter of denunciation
about his ownership of ten (10) cars as the doctor said he ha[d] only three expensive cars [but] he was
able to confirm that the subject [was] living in Forbes Park, ha[d] been treating more than thirty (30)
patients a day, ha[d] a share in Puerto Azul, ha[d] an island off Atimonan, and ha[d] many househelps;
that he charged P200.00 per consultation from low income patients but with respect to foreigners he
asked for a package-deal $1000 for consultation, laboratory examination, etc.

After the interview, he was told by the complainant that the latter's accountant would be coming to his
office later on, and true to form, one Elen Quijencio representing herself as accountant of the doctor,
came to his office, bringing some papers but not the book of accounts. He referred him to his co-accused
Eutiquio Peligrino, and after their examination, he found out that instead of the reported income of [o]ne
[m]illion [pesos] (P1,000,000.00) a year the doctor [should] have reported [t]hree [m]illion pesos
(P3,000,000.00) per year. He told the accountant of his computation who retorted that she would inform
the doctor of the same.

About the end of August 1991, the accountant called him in his office and relayed the information that the
doctor [was] amenable to pay fifty thousand ([P]50,000.00) pesos more or less, and so he consulted his
superior and assessing that it was reasonable, [an] authority to issue payment order (ATIPO) was
prepared. (Exhibits H, K and J also Exhibits 10, 10-A & 10-B respectively). The aggregate amount to be
paid by the complainant including surcharges, interest and compromises as appearing in the three ATIPO
[was] P51,858.57.

'On October 10, 1991 upon invitation of the complainant, he and co-accused went to the former's office
bringing with them the ATIPO's in anticipation of the payment, but the complainant requested xxx
postponement of the payment, and told them to come back the following day; the next day, the
complainant-doctor pleaded again for postponement. He then left the ATIPO [with] his co-accused
Peligrino.

'On October 16, thirty minutes after arrival in his office, he was called by the new [d]irector at the latter's
office where an NBI agent was waiting. He was then invited to the NBI office to identify the papers or
documents seized from Mr. Peligrino. At the NBI Office, he was informed that he was the mastermind of
the extortion aborted by the entrapment laid by the NBI and the complainant on Mr. Peligrino, and when
he denied the same, he was brought before Prosecutor Carlos Montemayor in the Office of the
Ombudsman where he saw the NBI Agent presenting the boodle money, and where he was told by the
Prosecutor to go home when the NBI agent could not answer the Prosecutor's question why he (Buenafe)
was there.'

"On the other hand, accused Eutiquio A. Peligrino, 51 years old, married and a BIR examiner made the following
declaration:

'That he ha[d] been a BIR examiner for thirteen (13) years, and sometime in June or July 1991 he was
assigned as examiner at Revenue District 22, Manila and at the same time one of the members of the
Special Project Committee supervised by his co-accused; that he came to know Dr. Feliciano in the early
part of July 1991 when he was assigned to examine the latter's books of accounts, that when the
accountant of the said doctor went to his office she brought only the working sheets, list of employees
and some of the withholding taxes, and not the most vital document which [was] the books of accounts[;]
nonetheless he made a preliminary assessment based on the information given by his superior co-
 accused Buenafe; that when the accountant [came] back, he told her that if she want[ed] to make a
compromise she [could] talk to his superior.

'On October 10, 1991 co-accused Buenafe told him that they had to go to the clinic of Dr. Feiiciano in
order to present the [A]uthority to [I]ssue Payment Order. They were entertained by the Doctor who told
him that the check for the payment was not yet prepared, and requested them to return the following day.
Again when they went there the next day, the Doctor informed them the check [was] not yet ready since
he was very busy.

'On October 15, 1991 while in his Manila District Office 22, co-accused Buenafe gave him three (3) copies
of [A]uthority to [I]ssue [P]ayment [O]rder and instructed him to deliver the same to Dr. Feliciano, and get
the check if it is already prepared. He arrived at the Office of the Doctor at around 4:00 to 4:30 p.m. and
went directly to the reception hall where he told the receptionist that his purpose in going there [was] to
inform the Doctor of the due date of the ATIPO, and to pick up the check if it [was] already ready.

'He was allowed to enter the clinic where he gave the Doctor the copies of ATIPO. The Doctor asked the
whereabouts of Atty. Buenafe and requested the copies of the ATIPO for xeroxing. While waiting for the
ATIPO to be xeroxed, Dr. Feliciano asked him if he would accept payment in cash to which he said No
and he would accept only check payable to the BIR. Thereafter, the Doctor took a brown envelope from
his drawer, threw it in front of him and said 'yan ang bayad.' The envelope landed close to his arms and
so he pushed it asking: 'What is that sir? My purpose in coming here is to get the check in payment for
the BIR'. Instead of answering him, the Doctor stood up and told him he [was] going to get the xerox copy
of the ATIPO.

'The Doctor returned followed by two (2) persons one of whom grabbed his hands from behind while the
other standing behind him wanted him to hold the envelope but he resisted[,] placing his hands against
his chest, and since the two men realized he [could] not be forced to hold the envelope, they let him go,
picked the envelope and pressed it against his breast.

'He was brought to the NBI office where in one room, a chemist examined him to detect the presence of
fluorescent powder. During the examination, he asked the chemist which of his hand[s was] contaminated
and the chemist answered 'none'. Then, she looked up to the escort behind him, and after that, started
examining his hands, shirt and pants, and then began encircling portions on the diagram in front of her.
Then he was fingerprinted.

'The following day, October 16, 1991 his co-accused arrived and they were brought before Fiscal
Montemayor of the Ombudsman who asked the NBI why the envelope supposedly containing the money
was still sealed. He [could] not remember how the NBI agents replied, but Fiscal Montemayor let go [of]
his co-accused while he was asked to post bail.'

"The defense also presented Carlos Montemayor, 59 years old, married and a Special Prosecutor III in the Office
of the Special Prosecutor, Ombudsman[,] who testified as follows:

[']Q Mr. Witness, can you tell us whether a big brown envelope was presented to you by the NBI
during the inquest preliminary investigation?

A I can not exactly remember if there was an envelope submitted by the NBI during the inquest
investigation. What I remember having x x x seen and [having been] presented by the NBI [were the]
xeroxed copy of the marked money and several affidavits.

Q You mentioned that what [were] presented were only xeroxed copies of the marked money. Did you
see the original of the marked money?

A I am not sure whether it was presented to me or not.

Q How about the diagram of the hands of the alleged persons [and] the presence of fluorescent
powder, can you tell if you have seen them on that day?

A No, what was presented .to me was the Forensic Chemistry Report.[']
"Answering the queries of the Court, he declared:

[']PJ GARCHITORENA

Q Mr. Montemayor, at that time that you were conducting the inquest examination[,] was the accused
Peligrino presented to you?

A Yes, your Honor.

Q Did you ask him any question?

A Well, my companions asked [him] questions x x x because we were three who conducted the
inquest examination.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Was there any question addressed by the panel to Mr. Peligrino at the time with respect to the
evidence?

A Yes, your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q Was Mr. Peligrino asked about the entrapment itself?

A I believe so.

Q Was he confronted in some way with the findings of the NBI with regard to the forensic powder?

A I can not remember anymore, sir.

Q Was the Forensic Report of the NBI presented [in] his presence?

A Yes, sir.

Q Did he protest in anyway the process by which the forensic examination was conducted?

A No, because he waived the right to preliminary investigation.

Q Be that as it may, did he in any way [protest] the proceedings or [protest] that the forensic
examination was irregular or otherwise...

A No protest whatsoever.

Q Was he confronted with any statement?

A He was confronted with the testimony or allegations of Dr. Feliciano[.]

Q Did he make any comment?

A He denied [them].

Q Was the denial general or specific?

A General.
 Q He denied any attempt to extort money from Dr. Feliciano?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q Did he make any protest [or] misbehavior by the NBI?

A No, sir.

Q Did you see him under [some] kind of fear or stress about the NBI? Did he feel afraid?

A I have not noticed any unusual appearance of the accused Peligrino, Your Honor.

xxx xxx xxx

Q And in this particular case Mr. Peligrino was calm and apparently not at all unsettled?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q He was calm in other words?

A Yes, Your Honor.

Q And in his calm condition he did not say the NBI maltreated him?

A No, Your Honor.

Q Or that the entrapment or any of the proceedings were conducted in any manner different from
what the NBI should do?

A He did not protest.[']

"The documentary evidence adduced by the defense consist[s] of Exhibits 1 and 2, [which are] the affidavits of
accused Buenafe dated Nov. 7 and December 18, 1991 respectively; Exhibits 3 and 4, which are the affidavits of
Felicidad Viray[,] then Regional Director of the B1R and that of Antonio Panuncialman[,] then [c]oordinator of the
Special Project Committee of the BIR; Exhibits 5 and 6, the certifications of BIR Revenue District Officer Mamerto
Silang, Cruz[;] and Exhibit 7 the affidavit of one Roselyn Dy all tending to show the efficiency of accused Buenafe
as a BIR employee. To prove the extent of Dr. Feliciano's practice, Exhibits 8 and 8-a consisting of [a] letter of
some 'concerned doctors 0B-Gyne," and a brochure were presented. The letters of authority already marked as
Exhibits K, H, J & I were adopted by the defense as Exhibits 9, 10, 10-A & 10-B[;] while Exhibits M, N, 0, & P of
the prosecution were adduced by the accused as their Exhibits 11 , 11-A, 12 and 12-A. Exhibit 13 is the Counter-
affidavit of accused Peligrino while Exhibits 14 is a copy of a Memorandum for Hon. Mauro Castro[,] the Provincial
Prosecutor of Rizal[; Exhibit] 14-a is a copy of an information charging Dr. Feliciano [with] the crime of Simple
Slander, [Exhibit] 14-B is another information also charging the doctor [with] Simple Slander[;] Exhibit 15 is
another Memorandum for Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro recommending dismissal of the charges of Falsification
of Private Document and Use of Falsified document against Dr. Feliciano[; Exhibit]15-A is a copy of another
Memorandum for Provincial Fiscal Mauro Castro recommending dismissal of the three charges for perjury against
the doctor[;] Exhibit 16 is another Memorandum for dismissal of the charge of perjury against the complainant-
doctor[;] while Exhibit 17 is a certification by the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor of Rizal certifying the filing of
five (5) criminal charges against the doctor[;] Exhibit 18 is a copy of the complaint (civil case) of the doctor against
his own children - Dr. Antonio Feliciano Jr. and Ma. Isabel Feliciano -all these Exhibits (14 to 18 inclusive) were
submitted to show that complainant [was] a very troublesome person. [The a]ccused also presented Exhibits 19,
20 and 21 [which are a] certification of the Dismissal of the Administrative case filed by Dr. Feliciano against
accused Buenafe, as well as [a] certification anent his semestral accomplishment, and a letter of the Metropolitan
Hospital Administrator to xxx BIR [C]ommissioner Ong commending Buenafe respectively.

"While Exhibits 1 to 21 were admitted by the Court in its Minute Resolution of October 28, 1994 there was nothing
said of Exhibits 22 and 23 but considering that they were annexes to the Joint Stipulation of Facts, the Court is
constrained to consider them even if virtually they were not the object of a formal offer. Exhibit 22 is Revenue
Special Order No. 30-91 dated April 2, 1991 signed by BIR Com. Jose Ong appointing Antonio Panuncialman and
 Buenaventura Buenafe as Head & Team Leader respectively of the Committee on Special Projects, Revenue
Region 4-A Manila, while Exhibit 23 is the same as Exhibit 21."10

Ruling of the Sandiganbayan

In its well-written 40-page Decision, the Sandiganbayan ruled that all the elements of the offense described in Section 3,
paragraph (b) of Republic Act 3019 (Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act),11 had been proven. Being a public officer,
specifically an examiner of the BIR, Peligrino had the right to intervene in the subject transaction. He was a member of the
Special Project Committee tasked to verify the tax liabilities of professionals, particularly physicians, within the jurisdiction
of Revenue Region No. 4-A, Manila.

Based on the testimony of private complainant, the NBI agents' entrapment scheme, and the positive results of the
chemical examination done on petitioner, the latter was found by the anti-graft court to have demanded and received
money for his personal benefit in connection with private complainant's tax liabilities. After noting that they had no
improper motive to testify against petitioner, the court a quo accorded full faith and credence to the testimonies of the NBI
agents and the complaining witness.

As regards Buenafe, however, the Sandiganbayan held that there was no sufficient proof that he had conspired with
petitioner: "[A]ll told, as to this accused, there were whispers of doubt anent his culpability, which the prosecution despite
its commendable efforts, has failed to still. Such doubt must set him free."12

Hence, this Petition by Peligrino.

Issues

In his Memorandum, petitioner raises the following issues:

"I. That the Sandiganbayan erred in finding that petitioner demanded and received the envelope with the boodle
money;

"II. That the Sandiganbayan erred in convicting the petitioner on the basis of the lone testimony of Dr. Feliciano an
admittedly discredited witness;

"III. That petitioner was denied his right to equal protection of the law."13

This Court's Ruling

The Petition14 has no merit.

First Issue:

Demand and Receipt of

"Boodle Money"

Section 3(b) of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act (RA 3019, as amended) provides:

"SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. -- In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized
by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be
unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

"(b) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for himself or for
any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government and any other party,
wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

xxx xxx x x x.
The elements of this offense were summed up in Mejia v. Pamaran,15 and we restate them here: (1) the offender is a
public officer (2) who requested or received a gift, a present, a share, a percentage, or a benefit (3) on behalf of the
offender or any other person (4) in connection with a contract or transaction with the government (5) in which the public
officer, in .an official capacity under the law, has the right to intervene.

Petitioner is a BIR examiner assigned to the Special Project Committee tasked "x x x to undertake verification of tax
liabilities of various professionals particularly doctors within the jurisdiction of Revenue Region No. 4-A, Manila x x x."
Since the subject transaction involved the reassessment of taxes due from private complainant, the right of petitioner to
intervene in his official capacity is undisputed. Therefore, elements (1), (4) and (5) of the offense are present.

However, petitioner disputes the prosecution evidence establishing that he demanded and received grease money in
connection with the transaction.

Specifically, he contends that the Sandiganbayan's conclusion that he demanded money from complainant was based
merely on an assumption that was not supported by any evidence. He avers that he merely informed complainant of his
tax deficiencies, and that it was the latter who requested the reduction of the amount claimed.

We are not convinced. Section 3(b) of RA 3019 penalizes three distinct acts -- (1) demanding or requesting; (2) receiving;
or (3) demanding, requesting and receiving -- any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit for oneself or for any other
person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the government and any other party, wherein a public
officer in an official capacity has to intervene under the law. These modes of committing the offense are distinct and
different from each other. Proof of the existence of any of them suffices to warrant conviction.16 The lack of demand is
immaterial. After all, Section 3 (b) of RA 3019 uses the word or between requesting and receiving.

Averring that the incident in complainant's clinic was a frame-up, petitioner contends that there could not have been any
payoff, inasmuch as there was no demand.

Like bribery, this crime is usually proved by evidence acquired during an entrapment, as the giver or briber is usually the
only one who can provide direct evidence of the commission of this crime. Thus, entrapment is resorted to in order to
apprehend a public officer while in the act of obtaining undue benefits.17 However, we have to distinguish between
entrapment and instigation.

In "instigation," officers of the law or their agents incite, induce, instigate or lure the accused into committing an offense,
which the latter otherwise would not commit and has no intention of committing. In "entrapment," the criminal intent or
design to commit the offense charged originates in the mind of the accused, and the law enforcement officials merely
facilitate the commission of the crime.18

Frame-up, like alibi, is invariably viewed with disfavor because, as a line of defense in most criminal prosecutions of this
nature, it is easily concocted, common or standard.19

Petitioner denies that he received payoff money from complainant. According to him, receive, as contemplated in the
offense charged, connotes a voluntary act coupled with knowledge. Hence, where the giving of the money affords the
accused no opportunity either to refuse or to return it to the giver, no punishable offense ensues.20 Petitioner claims that
the 40 seconds or less that the boodle money was in his hands was merely a momentary possession that could not prove
"receipt," which the law requires for the offense charged to be consummated.

We disagree. In Cabrera v. Pajares, acceptance was established because the accused judge placed the bribe money
between the pages of his diary or appointment book, despite his protestations that the money bills landed on the open
pages of his diary, only after he had flung them back to the complainant. 21

In Formilleza v. Sandiganbayan,22 this Court overruled the finding of acceptance, because it was improbable for the
accused to accept bribe money in front of her office mates and in a public place, even if the money had been handed to
her under the table. Furthermore, the accused therein shouted at the complainant, "What are you trying to do to me?"
That is not the normal reaction of one with a guilty conscience.

Furthermore, the Court held in the said case that there must be a clear intention on the part of the public officer to take the
gift so offered and consider it as his or her own property from then on. Mere physical receipt unaccompanied by any other
sign, circumstance or act to show acceptance is not sufficient to lead the court to conclude that the crime has been
committed. To hold otherwise would encourage unscrupulous individuals to frame up public officers by simply putting
within their physical custody some gift, money or other property.23
The duration of the possession is not the controlling element in determining receipt or acceptance. In the case at bar,
petitioner opened the envelope containing the boodle money, looked inside, closed it and placed the envelope beside him
on the table. Such reaction did not signify refusal or resistance to bribery, especially considering that he was not
supposed to accept any cash from the taxpayer. The proximity of the envelope relative to petitioner, as testified to by NBI
Agent Ragos, also belies petitioner's contention that he refused the bribe.

A person found in possession of a thing taken from the recent execution of a wrongful act is presumed to be both the
taker and the doer of the whole act.24

Second Issue:
Credibility of Complaining Witness

Petitioner faults the Sandiganbayan with inconsistency. Supposedly, while stating on the one hand that complainant was
not a credible witness on account of his character, on the other hand it accorded credibility to his testimony that petitioner
had received the boodle money. Likewise, petitioner adds, the same court found complainant's testimony insufficient to
establish Buenafe's complicity, yet deemed the same testimony sufficient to prove petitioner's guilt.

The Sandiganbayan findings adverted to are as follows:

"While the Court is reluctant to consider this declaration of the offended party as satisfactory proof that the
accused [therein petitioner] requested or demanded x x x the sum of P200,000 not only because it was
vehemently denied by the accused but likewise considering the nature and character x x x [or] person of the said
offended party (Exhibit 14 to 18), we are at a loss why in the ensuing event, particularly in the entrapment laid out
by the complainant and the NBI agents, this accused was present and x x x a brown envelop[e] containing the
'boodle money' was retrieved [from him]. x x x."25

Obviously, the anti-graft court did not tag complainant as a discredited witness. It simply said that his testimony by itself
was not sufficient evidence of the commission of the offense. But, taken together with the other pieces of corroborating
evidence, it established a quantum of evidence strong enough to convict petitioner. While the case is weakened by the
many suits filed for and against complainant, the court a quo did not say that he was not at all worthy of belief.

We see no cause to fault the lower court. The assessment of the credibility of a witness is primarily the function of a trial
court, which had the benefit of observing firsthand the demeanor or deportment of the witness. It is well-settled that this
Court will not reverse the trial court's assessment of the credibility of witnesses in the absence of arbitrariness, abuse of
discretion or palpable error.26

It is within the discretion of the Sandiganbayan to weigh the evidence presented by the parties, as well as to accord full
faith to those it regards as credible and reject those it considers perjurious or fabricated. 27

Petitioner further contends that he tested positive for fluorescent powder because the NBI agents had pressed the
envelope to his body.

We are not persuaded. Petitioner failed to ascribe to the NBI agents any ill motive to deliberately implicate him. No malice
was imputed, either, to the chemist who had examined and found him positive for the chemical; thus, we see no cogent
reason to disbelieve her testimony. In the absence of any controverting evidence, the testimonies of public officers are
given full faith and credence, as they are presumed to have acted in the regular performance of their official duties.28

Third Issue:

Right of the Accused to the Equal

Protection of the Law

Petitioner asserts that he should be accorded the same treatment and, thus, acquitted because of his right to the equal
protection of the law.

After all, the Sandiganbayan believed the testimony of Buenafe that the latter had not asked for any payoff money; and he
was, thus, cleared of the charge against him.
We disagree. Petitioner alludes to the doctrine that if the conviction of the accused rests upon the same evidence used to
convict the co-accused, the acquittal of the former should benefit the latter.29 Such doctrine does not apply to this case.
The strongest pieces of evidence against petitioner were the ones obtained from the entrapment, in which Buenafe was
not involved. Hence, the evidence against petitioner and that against his co-accused were simply not at par with each
other.

All in all, petitioner failed to show that Sandiganbayan had committed any reversible error. Quite the contrary, it had acted
judiciously and correctly. Hence, this recourse must fail.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED, and the assailed Decision and Resolution AFFIRMED. Costs against
petitioner.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 146368-69 October 23, 2003

MADELEINE MENDOZA-ONG, petitioner,

vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

This special civil action for certiorari assails Sandiganbayan Resolution 1 dated May 8, 2000, denying petitioner’s Motion to
Quash2 the Information in Criminal Case No. 23848, for violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. No. 3019, 3 as amended. Petitioner
also impugns said court’s Resolution4 dated November 9, 2000, denying her Motion for Reconsideration.

The facts of the case, as culled from the records, are as follows:

Sometime in February 1993, the Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, Northern Samar, passed Resolution No. 93-
132,5 authorizing the municipality to borrow heavy equipment from the Philippine Army’s 53rd Engineering Battalion, to be
utilized in the improvement of Laoang’s Bus Terminal. Resolution No. 93-132 likewise mandated the municipal
government to shoulder the expenses for fuel, oil, and the subsistence allowances of the heavy equipment operators for
the duration of the project.

Allegedly, however, the borrowed Army equipment was diverted by the petitioner, who was then the town mayor 6 of
Laoang, to develop some of her private properties in Rawis, Laoang, Northern Samar. A concerned citizen and ex-
member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Laoang, Juanito G. Poso, Sr., filed a complaint against petitioner and nine (9) other
municipal officers7 with the Office of the Ombudsman (OMB), Visayas, for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.

Acting on the complaint, Graft Investigation Officer Alfonso S. Sarmiento of the OMB ordered herein petitioner and her co-
accused to submit their respective counter-affidavits and other controverting evidence. Thereafter, in a Resolution8 dated
August 16, 1995, investigator Sarmiento recommended the filing of the appropriate criminal action against petitioner for
violation of Sections 3(c) and (e) of R.A. 3019, as amended.9 Despite strenuous opposition and objections by the defense,
on August 1, 1997, two informations were filed against her at the Sandiganbayan docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 23847
and 23848, to wit:

(1) Criminal Case No. 23847

That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime thereafter, in the Municipality of Laoang, Northern Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Laoang, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking
advantage of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the Government and give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to
herself and spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao when she, in the discharge of her official or administrative functions, caused
the improvement or development of her private land in Barangay Rawis through the use of the equipment and resources
of the Philippine Army, to the damage and prejudice of the Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.10

This, however, was amended on October 27, 1998, so that Criminal Case No. 23847 would read as follows:

That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime thereafter, in the Municipality of Laoang, Northern Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Laoang, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking
advantage of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, through manifest partiality and
evident bad faith, cause undue injury to the Government and give unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference to her
husband, Hector Ong, herself, and/or her family and to spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao when she, in the discharge of
her official or administrative functions, caused the improvement or development of a private land owned by her husband,
Hector Ong, herself and/or her family in Barangay Rawis through the use of the equipment and resources of the Philippine
Army, to the damage and prejudice of the Government.

CONTRARY TO LAW.11

(2) Criminal Case No. 23848

That on or about 15 February 1993, or sometime thereafter, in the Municipality of Laoang, Northern Samar, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused Madeleine Mendoza-Ong, a public officer, being then the
Municipal Mayor of Laoang, committing the crime herein charged in relation to, while in the performance and taking
advantage of her official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and criminally, request or receive, directly or
indirectly, a gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit in the form of five (5) drums of diesel fuel, for herself or for
another from the spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons for whom accused Mendoza-Ong, in any manner or capacity,
has secured or obtained, or will secure or obtain, any Municipal Government permit or license anent the operation of the
bus company, JB Lines, owned by the aforenamed spouses, in consideration for the help given or to be given by the
accused.

CONTRARY TO LAW.12

On September 15, 1999, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash with the Sandiganbayan alleging in the main that: (1) the
informations especially in Criminal Case No. 23848, failed to allege facts constituting an offense; (2) that the officer who
filed the information has no authority to do so; and (3) that the accused was deprived of her right to due process and to
the speedy disposition of cases against her.

On May 8, 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash.1awphi1.nét Petitioner duly moved for
reconsideration but this was likewise denied by the Sandiganbayan in its order dated November 9, 2000.

Hence, the instant petition with assigned errors faulting respondent court as follows:

I. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION
WHEN IT FAILED TO DISMISS THE INFORMATIONS FILED AGAINST PETITIONER WHICH CLEARLY DO NOT
ALLEGE SUFFICIENT FACTS CONSTITUTING THE OFFENSE HENCE FAILING TO ALLEGE A PRIMA FACIE CASE
AGAINST PETITIONER, ACCUSED THEREIN.

II. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED PETITIONER’S MOTION
TO QUASH THE INFORMATIONS FILED BY AN OFFICER WHO HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DO SO AND DESPITE THE
FACT THAT THE HEAD OF THE PROSECUTION DIVISION OF RESPONDENT COURT HAD RECOMMENDED THE
DISMISSAL OF SAID CASES.

III. RESPONDENT COURT ACTED WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION WHEN IT REFUSED TO DISMISS THE
INFORMATIONS AGAINST ACCUSED WHO HAD BEEN DEPRIVED OF DUE PROCESS AND SPEEDY
DETERMINATION OF THE CASE IN CLEAR DISREGARD OF THIS HONORABLE COURT’S RULINGS THAT
INORDINATE DELAY IN THE CONDUCT OF PRELIMINARY INVESTIGATIONS WOULD WARRANT DISMISSAL OF
THE CASE.13

Simply put, we find that the sole issue for resolution now is whether the Sandiganbayan gravely erred or gravely abused
its discretion in denying the Motion to Quash filed by petitioner, particularly on the ground that the information in Criminal
Case No. 23848 does not constitute an offense. The other assigned errors are, in our view, without sufficient merit and
deserve no further consideration.

Petitioner claims that in a criminal prosecution for violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. 3019 as amended, the law requires that
the gift received should be "manifestly excessive" as defined by Section 2(c) of the same Act. She adds that it is
imperative to specify the exact value of the five drums of diesel fuel allegedly received by Mayor Ong as public officer to
determine whether such is "manifestly excessive" under the circumstances.14

The fundamental test of the viability of a motion to quash on the ground that the facts averred in the information do not
amount to an offense is whether the facts alleged would establish the essential elements of the crime as defined by law.
In this examination, matters aliunde are not considered.15

Petitioner is charged specifically with violation of Section 3(c) of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended. The pertinent
portions of said law provide:

SEC. 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. – In addition to acts or omissions of public officers already penalized by
existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful:

…
(c) Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit, for himself or for
another, from any person for whom the public officer, in any manner or capacity, has secured or obtained, or will secure or
obtain, any Government permit or license, in consideration for the help given or to be given, without prejudice to Section
thirteen of this Act.

Based on the foregoing, the elements of the offense charged in the assailed information are as follows: (1) the offender is
a public officer; (2) he has secured or obtained, or would secure or obtain, for a person any government permit or license;
(3) he directly or indirectly requested or received from said person any gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit
for himself or for another; and (4) he requested or received the gift, present or other pecuniary or material benefit in
consideration for help given or to be given.16

In the instant case, we find that the information in Crim. Case No. 23848 alleged that: (1) accused Madeleine Mendoza-
Ong, a public officer, being then the Municipal Mayor of Laoang, (2) committed the crime charged in relation to, while in
the performance and taking advantage of her official functions, (3) did request or receive directly or indirectly, a gift,
present or other pecuniary or material benefit in the form of five drums of diesel fuel, for herself or for another, from
spouses Mr. and Mrs. Chupo Lao, persons for whom accused Mendoza-Ong, (4) has secured or obtained, or will secure
or obtain, a Municipal Government permit or license anent the operation of the bus company, JB Lines, owned by said
spouses, in consideration for help given or to be given by the accused. After considering thoroughly this averment as
formulated by the prosecution, we are not prepared to say that the impugned information omitted an element needed to
adequately charge a violation of Section 3(c) of R.A. 3019.

Petitioner pleads that the pertinent statute must be read in its entirety. She argues that a provision of R.A. 3019 such as
Section 3(c) must be interpreted in light of all other provisions, particularly the definition of "receiving any gift," under
Section 2(a) thereof, which reads as follows:

SEC. 2. Definition of terms.- As used in this Act, the term –…

(c) "Receiving any gift" includes the act of accepting directly or indirectly a gift from a person other than a member of the
public officer’s immediate family, in behalf of himself or of any member of his family or relative within the fourth civil
degree, either by consanguinity or affinity, even on the occasion of a family celebration or national festivity like Christmas,
if the value of the gift is under the circumstances manifestly excessive.…

Petitioner contends that pursuant to her reading of the above provision, the value of the alleged gift must be specified in
the information. But note that Section 2(c) abovecited mentions a situation where (1) the value of the gift is manifestly
excessive; (2) from a person who is not a member of the public officer’s immediate family; and (3) even on the occasion of
a family celebration or national festivity.

In contrast, Section 3 (c) earlier quoted in the present case applies regardless of whether the gift’s value is manifestly
excessive or not, and regardless of the occasion. What is important here, in our view, is whether the gift is received in
consideration for help given or to be given by the public officer. The value of the gift is not mentioned at all as an essential
element of the offense charged under Section 3 (c), and there appears no need to require the prosecution to specify such
value in order to comply with the requirements of showing a prima facie case.

Evidently the legislature is aware that in implementing R.A. 3019, it will be precedents that will guide the court on the
issue of what is or what is not manifestly excessive.17

In sum, we are constrained to rule that respondent court did not commit grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, much less did it gravely err, in denying petitioner’s motion to quash the information filed against her
in Criminal Case No. 23848. This ruling, however, is without prejudice to the actual merits of this criminal case as may be
shown during trial before the court a quo.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED. The assailed resolutions of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No.
23848 are AFFIRMED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.
 Crimes Against Persons

G.R. No. 188320 June 29, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,

vs.
HONORIO TIBON y DEISO, Accused-Appellant.

Parricide is the most terrible and unnatural of crimes.1

It is said that, in Romulus’ time, there was no penalty for parricide because it was considered a crime too evil ever to be
committed. While parricide in those days referred to the murder of one’s own parent or ascendant, the killing of one’s own
offspring, which the term’s modern meaning now includes, is equally horrendous and deserving of the stiffest penalty.

This is an appeal from the February 25, 2009 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01406,
which affirmed the August 2, 2005 Decision in Criminal Case Nos. 98-169605-06 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC),
Branch 26 in Manila. The RTC found accused-appellant Honorio Tibon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of two counts of
parricide.

The Facts

Two Informations charged Tibon of the following:

Criminal Case No. 98-169605

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one
KEEN GIST TIBON Y SUMINGIT, 3 years of age and his legitimate son, by then and there stabbing him several times on
the chest with a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the said KEEN GIST TIBON Y SUMINGIT stab wounds which
were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

Criminal Case No. 98-169606

That on or about the 12th day of December, 1998, in the City of Manila, Philippines, the said accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with intent to kill, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one
REGUEL ALBERT TIBON Y SUMINGIT, 2 years of age and his legitimate son, by then and there stabbing him several
times on the chest with a bladed weapon, thereby inflicting upon the said REGUEL ALBERT TIBON Y SUMINGIT stab
wounds which were the direct and immediate cause of his death thereafter.

At his arraignment, Tibon entered a plea of "not guilty." A trial on the merits ensued.

The prosecution presented witnesses Senior Police Officer 3 (SPO3) Jose M. Bagkus; Francisco Abella Abello, Jr.,
Tibon’s neighbor; Medico-Legal Officer Dr. Emmanuel Aranas of the Philippine National Police Crime Laboratory; Gina
Sumingit, Tibon’s common-law wife and mother of the two victims; and Renato Tibon, brother of Tibon. Tibon was the sole
witness for the defense.

During trial, the following facts were established:

Accused-appellant and his common-law wife Gina Sumingit (Gina) lived together as husband and wife since 1994. They
had two children, Keen Gist (KenKen) and Reguel Albert (Reguel). 2 They lived with accused-appellant’s parents and
siblings on the third floor of a rented house in C.M. Recto, Manila. 3 Due to financial difficulties, Gina went to Hong Kong to
work as a domestic helper, leaving accused-appellant with custody of their two children. 4 After some time, accused-
appellant heard from his sister who was also working in Hong Kong that Gina was having an affair with another man. After
the revelation, he was spotted drinking a lot and was seen hitting his two children. 5

On the night of December 12, 1998, at around 11:30 p.m., accused-appellant’s mother6 and his siblings, among them
Zernan and Leilani, went to accused-appellant’s room. They saw accused-appellant with KenKen and Reguel. The two
children appeared lifeless and bore wounds on their bodies. When accused-appellant realized that his mother and siblings
had seen his two children lying on the floor, accused-appellant stabbed himself on the chest with a kitchen knife, to the
shouts of horror of his mother and siblings. He tried to end his life by jumping out the window of their house. 7 Accused-
appellant sustained a head injury from his fall but he and his two children, KenKen ande Reguel, were rushed to Mary
Johnston Hospital by his siblings Renato and Leilani and some of their neighbors. Once at the hospital, accused-appellant
received treatment for his injuries. The two children, however, could no longer be revived.8

Gina called long distance on December 13, 2008 and asked about KenKen and Reguel. When told about the stabbing
incident, she immediately flew back to Manila the next day. 9

Dr. Aranas acted on a written request from the Western Police District (WPD) Homicide Division and the Certificates of
Identity and Consent for Autopsy signed by KenKen and Reguel’s aunt Leilani Tibon. His examination of the victims’
cadavers showed that Reguel, who was attacked while facing the assailant, sustained abrasions on the forehead, cheeks,
and chin and five (5) stab wounds, four (4) of which were caused by a sharp bladed instrument and fatal. The doctor
further observed that for a two-year old to be attacked so violently, the killer must have been extremely angry. 10

The body of three-year old KenKen sustained three (3) stab wounds on the left side of the chest, which were likewise
fatal, as these pierced his heart and left lung.11

WPD Police Investigator SPO3 Bagkus interviewed Tibon while he was undergoing treatment from stab wounds on the
chest and head injuries under police security at the Jose Reyes Medical Center. After being informed by SPO3 Bagkus of
his constitutional rights, Tibon confided that he was despondent and voluntarily admitted to stabbing KenKen and
Reguel.12 Tibon’s sister Leilani, likewise, told SPO3 Bagkus that Tibon was responsible for the killings. 13

Gina confronted Tibon at the hospital where he was confined. She said the latter confessed to stabbing their children and
begged for her forgiveness. She added that he even wrote a letter again the next year asking to be forgiven. Supported by
receipts, she claimed that she spent PhP 173,000 for the wake and funeral of her two children. When asked if she could
quantify the damage caused to her in terms of money, she said it was for PhP 500,000. 14

Tibon denied the charges against him and raised insanity as defense. He said that he could not recall what happened on
the night he allegedly stabbed his two children. He also could not remember being taken to the hospital. He said he was
only informed by his siblings that he had killed KenKen and Reguel, causing him to jump off the window of their house. 15

The Ruling of the Trial Court

The RTC found for the prosecution. It gave full faith and credit to the witnesses who testified against Tibon. In contrast,
Tibon’s testimony was found unworthy of belief. In spite of his defense of insanity, the trial court noted that he was in full
control of his faculties before, during, and after he attacked his two children. The dispositive portion of the RTC Decision
reads:

WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, accused HONORIO TIBON y DENISO is found GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of two (2) counts of Parricide, and sentencing him in each case to suffer the extreme penalty of DEATH
and to pay the heirs of the victims KEEN GIST TIBON and REGUEL ALBERT TIBON P75,000.00 each as civil
indemnity.16

The Ruling of the Appellate Court

On appeal, the CA affirmed the findings of the RTC and found that the defense did not overcome the presumption of
sanity. The appellate court stressed that evidence of insanity after the commission of an offense may be accorded weight
only if there is also proof of abnormal behavior immediately before or simultaneous to the commission of the crime. It
reduced the penalty meted to Tibon to reclusion perpetua.

The fallo of the CA decision states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the 2 August 2005 decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 26) in
Criminal Case No. 98-169605-06 finding accused-appellant Honorio Tibon y Deiso guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of parricide on two (2) counts, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION as to penalty. Pursuant to Republic Act No.
9346, the penalty of death imposed upon accused-appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua, without eligibility for parole.

SO ORDERED.17
Tibon maintains his innocence on appeal to this Court.

On August 3, 2009, this Court notified the parties that they may submit supplemental briefs if they so desired. The parties
manifested their willingness to submit the case on the basis of the records already submitted.

The Issue

WHETHER THE COURT OF APPEALS GRAVELY ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING THE EXEMPTING
CIRCUMSTANCE OF INSANITY IN FAVOR OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLLANT.

The Ruling of this Court

Tibon argues that the exempting circumstance of insanity was established, therefore overthrowing the presumption of
sanity. Combined with Tibon’s testimony, Tibon’s medical record with the National Center for Mental Health (NCMH) and
his strange behavior allegedly show an unstable mind deprived of intelligence. That he had no recollection of the stabbing
incident is further proof of his insanity. His criminal act of stabbing his children was, thus, involuntary.

The People, represented by the Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, rebuts the argument of Tibon by
asserting that his mental state, as ascertained by the NCMH, referred to his condition to stand trial and not his mental
state before and during the commission of the crimes with which he was charged. Furthermore, Tibon’s non-recollection
of the stabbing incident does not prove his insanity and amounts merely to a general denial. The People argues that,
contrary to the requirements on establishing insanity, Tibon was unable to present any competent witness who could
explain his mental condition. Lastly, the reduction of civil indemnity from PhP 75,000 to PhP 50,000 is recommended,
since the crimes were not attended by any aggravating circumstances.

We affirm Tibon’s conviction.

The Revised Penal Code defines parricide as follows:

Art. 246. Parricide. – Any person who shall kill his father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or any of his
ascendants, or descendants, or his spouse, shall be guilty of parricide and shall be punished by the penalty of reclusion
perpetua to death.

Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased is killed by the accused; (3) the deceased is the
father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the
legitimate spouse of the accused.18

This appeal admits that parricide has indeed been committed. The defense, however, banks on Tibon’s insanity to exempt
him from punishment.

The defense has unsatisfactorily shown that Tibon was insane when he stabbed his two young sons. Article 12 of the
Code states:

Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. – The following are exempt from criminal liability:

1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval. x x x

The aforementioned circumstances are not easily available to an accused as a successful defense. Insanity is the
exception rather than the rule in the human condition.19 While Art. 12(1) of the Revised Penal Code provides that an
imbecile or insane person is exempt from criminal liability, unless that person has acted during a lucid interval, the
presumption, under Art. 800 of the Civil Code, is that every human is sane. Anyone who pleads the exempting
circumstance of insanity bears the burden of proving it 20 with clear and convincing evidence.21 It is in the nature of
confession and avoidance. An accused invoking insanity admits to have committed the crime but claims that he or she is
not guilty because of insanity. The testimony or proof of an accused's insanity must, however, relate to the time
immediately preceding or coetaneous with the commission of the offense with which he is charged.22 We agree with the
Solicitor General that the mental records Tibon wishes to support his defense with are inapplicable to the theory he
espouses. The NCMH records of his mental health only pertain to his ability to stand trial and not to his mental state
immediately before or during the commission of the crimes.
The change in Tibon’s behavior was triggered by jealousy. He acted out of jealous rage at the thought of his wife having
an affair overseas. Uncontrolled jealousy and anger are not equivalent to insanity. Nor is being despondent, as Tibon said
he was when interviewed by the police. There is a vast difference between a genuinely insane person and one who has
worked himself up into such a frenzy of anger that he fails to use reason or good judgment in what he does. 23 We reiterate
jurisprudence which has established that only when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence at the time of the
commission of the crime should the exempting circumstance of insanity be considered. 24

It is apt to recall People v. Ocfemia25 where this Court ruled that the professed inability of the accused to recall events
before and after the stabbing incident, as in the instant case, does not necessarily indicate an aberrant mind but is more
indicative of a concocted excuse to exculpate himself. It is simply too convenient for Tibon to claim that he could not
remember anything rather than face the consequences of his terrible deed.

The requirements for a finding of insanity have not been met by the defense. As the appellate court noted, Tibon’s
unusual behavior prior to and after he committed parricide do not meet the stringent standards on an insanity plea as
required by this Court. The presumption of sanity has not been overcome. In contrast, the prosecution, as found by the
lower courts, sufficiently established evidence that Tibon voluntarily killed his two children on the night of December 12,
1998. On this matter, We find no reason to reverse the findings of fact made by the trial court and affirmed by the Court of
Appeals.

A final word. Parricide is differentiated from murder and homicide by the relationship between the killer and his or her
victim. Even without the attendant circumstances qualifying homicide to murder, the law punishes those found guilty of
parricide with reclusion perpetua to death, prior to the enactment of Republic Act No. (RA) 9346 (An Act Prohibiting the
Imposition of the Death Penalty in the Philippines). The commission of parricide is punished more severely than homicide
since human beings are expected to love and support those who are closest to them. The extreme response of killing
someone of one’s own flesh and blood is indeed unnatural and tragic. Tibon must thus be handed down the harshest
penalty for his crimes against his innocent children.

Penalty Imposed

In view of RA 9346, the appellate court correctly modified the sentence of Tibon to reclusion perpetua.

Pecuniary Liability

When death occurs due to a crime, the following damages may be awarded: (1) civil indemnity ex delicto for the death of
the victim; (2) actual or compensatory damages; (3) moral damages; (4) exemplary damages; and (5) temperate
damages.26

The Solicitor General recommended the reduction of civil indemnity from PhP75,000 to PhP50,000. However, recent
jurisprudence pegs civil indemnity in the amount of PhP75,000,27 which is automatically granted to the offended party, or
his/her heirs in case of the former’s death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of the commission of
murder, homicide, parricide and rape.28 People v. Regalario29 has explained that the said award is not dependent on the
actual imposition of the death penalty but on the fact that qualifying circumstances warranting the imposition of the death
penalty attended the commission of the offense.

According to Art. 2199 of the Civil Code, one is entitled to adequate compensation for pecuniary loss suffered by him that
is duly proved. This compensation is termed actual damages. The party seeking actual damages must produce competent
proof or the best evidence obtainable, such as receipts, to justify an award therefor. 30 We note that the trial court failed to
award actual damages in spite of the presentation of receipts showing wake and funeral expenses (Exhibits "R," "R-1,"
"R-2," "R-4," and "R-5") amounting to PhP173,000. We therefore grant said amount.

Moral damages are also in order. Even in the absence of any allegation and proof of the heirs’ emotional suffering, it has
been recognized that the loss of a loved one to a violent death brings emotional pain and anguish, 31 more so in this case
where two young children were brutally killed while their mother was away. The award of PhP75,000.00 is proper
pursuant to established jurisprudence holding that where the imposable penalty is death but reduced to reclusion
perpetua pursuant to RA 9346, the award of moral damages should be increased from P50,000.00 to P75,000.00. 32

Pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence, the trial court should have made accused-appellant account for PhP30,000 as
exemplary damages on account of relationship, a qualifying circumstance, which was alleged and proved, in the crime of
parricide.33
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 01406 convicting
accused-appellant Honorio Tibon y Deiso of parricide is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that accused-appellant
should pay the heir of the victims:

(1) Civil indemnity of PhP 75,000 for each victim;

(2) Actual damages of PhP 173,000;

(3) Moral damages of PhP 75,000 for each victim; and

(4) Exemplary damages of PhP 30,000 for each victim.

SO ORDERED.
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs.JESUS PAYCANA, JR., appellant.

Appellant Jesus Paycana Jr. was charged1 with the complex crime of parricide with unintentional abortion before the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Iriga City, Branch 37. Appellant pleaded not guilty during the arraignment. 2 Pre-trial ensued,
in which appellant admitted that the victim Lilybeth Balandra-Paycana (Lilybeth) is his legitimate wife.3

Appellant sought to exculpate himself from the crime by setting up self-defense, claiming that it was his wife who attacked
him first. In view of the nature of self-defense, it necessarily follows that appellant admits having killed his seven (7)-month
pregnant wife, and in the process put to death their unborn child.

The prosecution presented Tito Balandra (Tito), the father of the victim; Angelina Paycana (Angelina), appellant’s eldest
daughter who personally witnessed the whole gruesome incident; Barangay Tanod Juan Parañal, Jr.; Dr. Stephen
Beltran, who conducted the autopsy; and Santiago Magistrado, Jr., the embalmer who removed the fetus from the
deceased’s body.

The evidence for the prosecution established that on 26 November 2002, at around 6:30 in the morning, appellant, who
worked as a butcher, came home from the slaughter house carrying his tools of trade, a knife, a bolo, and a
sharpener.4 His wife was preparing their children for school and was waiting for him to come home from his work. For
reasons known to him alone, appellant stabbed his wife 14 times. 5 Tito, whose house is at back of appellant’s house,
heard his daughter shouting for help. When he arrived, he saw his daughter lying prostrate near the door and her feet
were trembling. But seeing appellant, who was armed, he stepped back. Angelina told Tito by the window that appellant
had held her mother’s neck and stabbed her. 6

Appellant claimed that he wrested the weapon from Lilybeth after she stabbed him first. According to him, they had an
altercation on the evening of 25 November 2002 because he saw a man coming out from the side of their house and
when he confronted his wife about the man, she did not answer. On the following morning, he told her that they should
live separately. As appellant got his things and was on his way out of the door, Lilybeth stabbed him. But he succeeded in
wresting the knife from Lilybeth. And he stabbed her. He added that he was not aware of the number of times he stabbed
his wife because he was then dizzy and lots of blood was coming out of his wound. 7

The trial court found appellant guilty in a decision dated 14 April 2005. 8 The case was automatically appealed to the Court
of Appeals pursuant to Rule 122 Section 3(d) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure. 9 The appellate court denied appellant’s
appeal in a decision dated 30 May 2007.10 Appellant filed a notice of appeal dated 14 June 2007 before the Court of
Appeals.11

The Court is not convinced by appellant’s assertion that the trial court erred in not appreciating the justifying circumstance
of self-defense in his favor.

Self-defense, being essentially a factual matter, is best addressed by the trial court. 12 In the absence of any showing that
the trial court failed to appreciate facts or circumstances of weight and substance that would have altered its conclusion,
the court below, having seen and heard the witnesses during the trial, is in a better position to evaluate their testimonies.
No compelling reason, therefore, exists for this Court to disturb the trial court’s finding that appellant did not act in self-
defense.

Appellant failed to discharge the burden to prove self-defense. An accused who interposes self-defense admits the
commission of the act complained of. The burden to establish self-defense is on the accused who must show by strong,
clear and convincing evidence that the killing is justified and that, therefore, no criminal liability has attached. The first
paragraph of Article 11 of the Revised Penal Code13 requires, in a plea of self-defense, (1) an unlawful aggression on the
part of the victim, (2) a reasonable necessity of the means employed by the accused to prevent or repel it, and (3) the lack
of sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 14

Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying circumstance of self-defense. Without it, there can be no
self-defense, whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be invoked. 15 Appellant’s claim of self-defense was belied
by the eyewitness testimony of his own daughter Angelina, which was corroborated by the testimony of his father-in-law
Tito and the medical findings. Angelina’s testimony was very clear on how her father strangled and stabbed her mother
just as she was about to greet him upon arriving home. She begged her father to stop, and even tried to grab her father’s
hand but to no avail.16 Tito ran to appellant’s house as he heard his daughter Lilybeth’s screaming for help, and he saw
her lying prostate near the door with her feet trembling. He moved back as he saw appellant armed with a weapon.
Angelina told him by the window that appellant had held her mother’s neck and stabbed her. 17
Moreover, Dr. Rey Tanchuling, a defense witness who attended to appellant’s wound, testified on cross-examination that
the injuries suffered by appellant were possibly self-inflicted considering that they were mere superficial wounds.18

In any event, self-defense on the part of appellant is further negated by the physical evidence in the case. Specifically, the
number of wounds, fourteen (14) in all, indicates that appellant's act was no longer an act of self-defense but a
determined effort to kill his victim.19 The victim died of multiple organ failure secondary to multiple stab wounds.20

The Court agrees with the trial court’s observation, thus:

Angelina who is 15 years old will not testify against her father were it not for the fact that she personally saw her
father to be the aggressor and stab her mother. Telling her grandfather immediately after the incident that
accused stabbed her mother is part of the res gestae hence, admissible as evidence. Between the testimony of
Angelica who positively identified accused to have initiated the stabbing and continuously stabbed her mother and
on the other hand, the testimony of accused that he killed the victim in self-defense, the testimony of the former
prevails.21

The RTC, as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, properly convicted appellant of the complex crime of parricide with
unintentional abortion in the killing of his seven (7)-month pregnant wife.

Bearing the penalty of reclusion perpetua to death, the crime of parricide22 is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2)
the deceased is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or child, whether legitimate or
illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused. The key
element in parricide is the relationship of the offender with the victim. In the case of parricide of a spouse, the best proof of
the relationship between the accused and the deceased would be the marriage certificate. The testimony of the accused
of being married to the victim, in itself, may also be taken as an admission against penal interest.23

As distinguished from infanticide,24 the elements of unintentional abortion25 are as follows: (1) that there is a pregnant
woman; (2) that violence is used upon such pregnant woman without intending an abortion; (3) that the violence is
intentionally exerted; and (4) that as a result of the violence the fetus dies, either in the womb or after having been
expelled therefrom. In the crime of infanticide, it is necessary that the child be born alive and be viable, that is, capable of
independent existence.26 However, even if the child who was expelled prematurely and deliberately were alive at birth, the
offense is abortion due to the fact that a fetus with an intrauterine life of 6 months is not viable. 27 In the present case, the
unborn fetus was also killed when the appellant stabbed Lilybeth several times.

The case before us is governed by the first clause of Article 4828 because by a single act, that of stabbing his wife,
appellant committed the grave felony of parricide as well as the less grave felony of unintentional abortion. A complex
crime is committed when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies.

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period irrespective of the presence of
modifying circumstances. Applying the aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime
(parricide) is death. However, the Court of Appeals properly commuted the penalty of death imposed on the appellant
to reclusion perpetua, pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346.29

Civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 (consistent with prevailing jurisprudence) is automatically granted to the
offended party, or his/her heirs in case of the former’s death, without need of further evidence other than the fact of the
commission of any of the aforementioned crimes (murder, homicide, parricide and rape). Moral and exemplary damages
may be separately granted in addition to indemnity. Moral damages can be awarded only upon sufficient proof that the
complainant is entitled thereto in accordance with Art. 2217 of the Civil Code, while exemplary damages can be awarded
if the crime is committed with one or more aggravating circumstances duly proved. The amounts thereof shall be at the
discretion of the courts.30 Hence, the civil indemnity of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court to the heirs of Lilybeth is in
order. They are also entitled to moral damages in the amount of P50,000.00 as awarded by the trial court.31

In addition to the civil liability and moral damages, the trial court correctly made appellant account for P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages on account of relationship, a qualifying circumstance, which was alleged and proved, in the crime of
parricide.32

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 130634-35 March 12, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MANOLITO OYANIB y MENDOZA, accused-appellant.

Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City
finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and parricide and sentencing him to an indeterminate penalty2 of
six (6) months one day (1) to six (6) years of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years one (1) day to eight (8)
years of prision mayor as maximum,3 and to pay P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the costs for the death of Jesus
Esquierdo, and to reclusion perpetua, to pay P50,000.00 and the costs for the death of his wife, Tita T. Oyanib. 4

On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iligan City two (2)
separate informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza with murder and parricide, as follows:

Criminal Case No. 6012</P>

"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon to wit: a hunting knife about six inches long and with intent
to kill and evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby inflicting upon him the following physical injuries, to
wit:

Cardiorespiratory arrest
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
Multiple organ injury
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen

and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.

"Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances (sic) of
evident premeditation."5

Criminal Case No. 6018

"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the said accused, having conceived and (sic) deliberate intent to kill his wife Tita Oyanib, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously and with evident premeditation, attack, assault, stab and wound his wife,
as a result of said attack, the said Tita Oyanib died.

"Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised Penal Code."6

The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary liberty of accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza in both cases.

On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered to the police authorities 7 and was immediately detained at the
Iligan City Jail.8

On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza by reading the informations against
him and translating them into the Visayan dialect.9 He pleaded not guilty to both charges.

As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the trial court conducted a joint trial.

Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and Tita T. Oyanib (hereafter Tita) were married on February 3,
1979 10 and had two (2) children, Desilor and Julius. They lived in Purok 1, Tambacan, Iligan City.

In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with Manolito keeping custody of their two (2) children.
Tita rented a room at the second floor of the house of Edgardo Lladas (hereafter Edgardo), not far from the place where
her family lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while Edgardo and his family were watching TV at the sala located at
the ground floor of their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City, they heard a commotion coming from the second floor
rented by Tita. The commotion and the noise lasted for quite some time. When it died down, Edgardo went upstairs to
check.11

Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and sprawled on the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus
Esquierdo (hereafter Jesus) while sitting on the latter's stomach. Jesus was wearing a pair of long black pants. When
Edgardo asked Manolito what he was doing, accused told Edgardo not to interfere.

Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police. Meanwhile, the neighbors brought Tita to the hospital. She died
on the way to the hospital.12

SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation Office, Iligan City Police Command, Precinct I, Poblacion,
Iligan City said that at about 9:00 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while he was on duty, he received an information
regarding a stabbing incident at the Llagas residence at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City.13

At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of Jesus lying face up with several stab wounds in different parts of
the body. Jesus was clad in t-shirt and long pants. From the crime scene, he recovered a knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr.
Uy Hospital to check on Tita; he was informed that she was dead. Manolito was the suspect in the killing of Jesus and
Tita.14 The incident was recorded in the police blotter as Entry No. 137138. 15

On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, Medico-Legal Officer, Iligan City examined the bodies of Jesus and
Tita.16 Jesus sustained multiple stab wounds, and those inflicted in the right and left chests and stomach were fatal. 17 The
cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple organ injury and multiple stab
wound chest and abdomen."18

Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal wounds inflicted in the left chest and right side of the
abdomen. The cause of death was "cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock and multiple stab wound."19

As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments, Manolito and Tita decided to live separately. Manolito
retained custody of their two (2) children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed at her friend Merlyn's house for two
(2) months. Afterwards, she transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan, Iligan City, and rented
the second floor.20 The rented space consisted mainly of a sala with one adjoining room. It was arranged in a manner that
if one enters the main entrance door, one is immediately led to the sala and from the sala, directly to the door of the
adjoining room.

Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the
children. However, Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito.21 In fact, she was very open about her relationship
with other men and would flaunt it in front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her paramour, Jesus, in a
very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City. 22 Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus about
this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill
him.23

In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City
National High School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two (2) subjects and invited his parents to a
meeting at the school. Because he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the next day, Manolito
went to Tita's house to ask her to attend the school meeting in his behalf. 24

Upon reaching Tita's rented place, he heard "sounds of romance" (kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the
door lock using a hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and
his pants were down to his knees.

Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 5'9" in
height and weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the assault caused him to lose his balance and fall down. Manolito
took advantage of this opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon seeing Manolito, only to
come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting "kill him Jake, kill
him Jake."25

In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen. Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him again.
Meanwhile, Tita stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita
in the left breast. He stabbed her three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the lifeless body of her
paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor and
inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to interfere because he had nothing to do with it.

Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco, Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his
friend's neighbor. He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning
of the following day, he went to Camague Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora, Zamboanga. While in Lentogan,
he heard over radio DXIC that there was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself up to the police
authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City. 26

When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife's place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-
defense. Prior to the incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus, that they would kill him so they
could live together.27

After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated a joint decision finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
the crimes charged. The dispositive portion reads:

"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and pronouncements and having carefully observed the
demeanor of witnesses, this Court hereby declares accused MANOLITO OYANIB y Mendoza GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and Parricide (Crim. Case No. II-6018) and
and appreciating the two (2) mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation and voluntary surrender without
any aggravating circumstances to consider, this Court sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to suffer
an imprisonment as follows:

"1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:

To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6) MONTHS ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6) YEARS as Minimum
to Six (6) YEARS ONE (1) DAY to EIGHT (8) YEARS as Maximum; to indemnify heirs of Jesus Esquierdo
the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, and to pay the costs.

2.) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:

To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic Act No. 7659; to indemnify heirs of his wife
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and to pay the costs.

"It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is subject to the forty (40) years limitation prescribed in
Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code.

"Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive imprisonment.

"SO ORDERED.

"Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.

"MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge"28

On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza interposed an appeal from the joint decision of the trial court to
the Supreme Court.29

Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article
247 of the Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors allegedly committed by the trial court, which boiled down to the
basic issue of whether accused is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. 30 He
questioned the trial court's appreciation of the facts and the evidence, contending that it ignored and overlooked vital
pieces of physical evidence material to the defense of the accused, like the photograph of the lifeless body of Jesus.
Accused contends that the photograph graphically showed that Jesus' pants were wide open, unzipped and unbuttoned,
revealing that he was not wearing any underwear, lending credence to his defense that he caught his wife and her
paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. On the other hand, the Solicitor General submitted that accused-appellant failed
to discharge the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that he killed the victims under the exceptional
circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the trial court did not err in denying him the
exempting privilege under the Article. 31

We find the appeal meritorious.

At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as
an absolutory and an exempting cause. "An absolutory cause is present 'where the act committed is a crime but for
reasons of public policy and sentiment there is no penalty imposed."' 32

Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of the
court in order to be relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the following
essential elements for such a defense: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter;
and (3) that he has not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she has not consented
to the infidelity of the other spouse.33 Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing evidence, otherwise
his defense would be untenable. "The death caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply put, the killing by the husband of his wife must
concur with her flagrant adultery."34

There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar. The crucial fact that accused must convincingly
prove to the court is that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse or immediately thereafter.

After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have
acted within the circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Admittedly, accused-appellant
surprised his wife and her lover in the act of sexual intercourse.

To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw
his wife and Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who
fought off and kicked the accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in defense of him, but in
support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered to
the police when a call for him to surrender was made.

The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of
Article 247, Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People v. Wagas:35

"The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on
this, authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death. But killing the errant spouse as a purification
is so severe as that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be
resorted to only with great caution so much so that the law requires that it be inflicted only during the sexual
intercourse or immediately thereafter."

WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City in Criminal
Cases Nos. II-6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4)
months of destierro.36 He shall not be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor within a radius of one hundred (100) kilometers
from Iligan city.37

Costs de oficio.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
FRANCISCO ABARCA, accused-appellant.

This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo, Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco
Abarca to death for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.

The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution,
abolishing the penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life imprisonment, we required the accused-
appellant to inform us whether or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In compliance therewith, he filed
a statement informing us that he wished to continue with the case by way of an appeal.

The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban accuses Francisco Abarca of the crime of Murder with
Double Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:

That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with deliberate intent to kill and with evident
premeditation, and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed firearm (armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and
there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the
different parts of his body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH gunshot wounds which
caused his instantaneous death and as a consequence of which also caused gunshot wounds to LINA
AMPARADO and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts of their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot
wounds which otherwise would have caused the death of said Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado,
thus performing all the acts of execution which should have produced the crimes of murders as a
consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, that is by
the timely and able medical assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado which
prevented their death. 1

xxx xxx xxx

On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The Solicitor General states accurately the facts as follows:

Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit relationship. The illicit
relationship apparently began while the accused was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar examinations.
His wife was left behind in their residence in Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).

On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence in Tacloban, Leyte. On the morning of that date he
went to the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern Samar, to fetch his daughter. However, he was not able
to catch the first trip (in the morning). He went back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00 o'clock
trip but the bus had engine trouble and could not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The accused, then
proceeded to the residence of his father after which he went home. He arrived at his residence at the V &
G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00 o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).

Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife, Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual
intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his
revolver. The accused who was then peeping above the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran
away (pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).

The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban City. He went to the house of a PC soldier, C2C
Arturo Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his
house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the
"mahjong session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The accused found Koh playing mahjong. He
fired at Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn, Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina
 Amparado who were occupying a room adjacent to the room where Koh was playing mahjong were also
hit by the shots fired by the accused (pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984). Kingsley Koh died instantaneously
of cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the
head, trunk and abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984; see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was
hospitalized and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp. 17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see also exh.
C). His wife, Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as she was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23,
tsn, Id.). Arnold Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1,000.00 a month was not able to work for 1-
1/2 months because of his wounds. He spent P15,000.00 for medical expenses while his wife spent
Pl,000.00 for the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2

On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment, the dispositive portion whereof reads as follows:

xxx xxx xxx

WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco Abarca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the complex
crime of murder with double frustrated murder as charged in the amended information, and pursuant to
Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which does not consider the effect of mitigating or aggravating
circumstances when the law prescribes a single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is hereby
sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000, complainant
spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00), without
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and to pay the costs.

It appears from the evidence that the deceased Khingsley Paul Koh and defendant's wife had illicit
relationship while he was away in Manila; that the accused had been deceived, betrayed, disgraced and
ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity to
reflect upon his acts. Considering all these circumstances this court believes the accused Francisco
Abarca is deserving of executive clemency, not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a radical reduction
or commutation of his death sentence.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished her Excellency, the President of the Philippines, thru the Ministry
of Justice, Manila.

SO ORDERED. 3

xxx xxx xxx

The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the court a quo:

I.

IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED INSTEAD OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF
CONVICTION UNDER ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;

II.

IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. 4

The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under
exceptional circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder. Article 247 reads in full:

ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married
person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person,
shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of destierro.

If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.

These rules shall be applicable, under the same circumstances, to parents with respect to their daughters
under eighteen years of age, and their seducers, while the daughters are living with their parents.
 Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall not be entitled to the benefits of this article.

We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision applies in the instant case. There is no question that
the accused surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act of illicit copulation, as a result of which,
he went out to kill the deceased in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following elements: (1) that a
legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that
he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter. These elements are present in this case. The trial
court, in convicting the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.

Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife
having sexual intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot, the shooting must be understood to be
the continuation of the pursuit of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in requiring that the
accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . . immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does
not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only requires that the death caused be the proximate result
of the outrage overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the basest act of infidelity. But the killing
should have been actually motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been influenced by external factors.
The killing must be the direct by-product of the accused's rage.

It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define an offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said:

xxx xxx xxx

As may readily be seen from its provisions and its place in the Code, the above-quoted article, far from
defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege or benefit — amounting practically to an exemption
from an adequate punishment — to a legally married person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or
daughter in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of death
or serious physical injuries, considering the enormous provocation and his righteous indignation, the
accused — who would otherwise be criminally liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or
serious physical injury, as the case may be — is punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere
banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more for the protection of the accused than a punishment.
(People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the
offender is exempted from punishment. In effect, therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional circumstances
mentioned therein, amount to an exempting circumstance, for even where death or serious physical
injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A different
interpretation, i.e., that it defines and penalizes a distinct crime, would make the exceptional
circumstances which practically exempt the accused from criminal liability integral elements of the
offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the
information. Such an interpretation would be illogical if not absurd, since a mitigating and much less an
exempting circumstance cannot be an integral element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissons . . .
constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a complaint or information, and a circumstance which
mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused therefrom, not being an essential element of the
offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be
pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs. Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)

That the article in question defines no crime is made more manifest when we consider that its counterpart
in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under the General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII
covering crimes against persons. There can, we think, hardly be any dispute that as part of the general
provisions, it could not have possibly provided for a distinct and separate crime.

xxx xxx xxx

We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code does not define and provide for a
specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the accused for the killing of another or the infliction of
serious physical injuries under the circumstances therein mentioned. ... 7

xxx xxx xxx

Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is banished, but that is intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be
qualified by either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We cannot accordingly appreciate
treachery in this case.

The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and
Arnold Amparado who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the victim. The Solicitor General
recommends a finding of double frustrated murder against the accused-appellant, and being the more severe offense,
proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is where we disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule,
one committing an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule presupposes that the act done amounts to
a felony. 9

But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant was not committing murder when he discharged his
rifle upon the deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not murder. We cannot therefore hold the
appellant liable for frustrated murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.

This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he
was not performing an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be entirely without fault. While it
appears that before firing at the deceased, he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 that is not enough a
precaution to absolve him for the injuries sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his part.
Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries
through simple imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-
half months; 11 there is no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her injuries. We presume that she
was placed in confinement for only ten to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her recovery
period.) 12

For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto
mayor (in its medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to being the graver penalty
(than destierro). 13

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and
21 days to six months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in confinement shall be credited in the
service of these penalties. He is furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the sum of P16,000.00 as
and for hospitalization expense and the sum of P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No
special pronouncement as to costs.

IT IS SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 175315 August 9, 2010

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ELIZER BEDUYA and RIC BEDUYA, Appellants.

In this appeal, we are tasked to determine whether the appellants killed the victim with abuse of superior strength for
which they were convicted of murder.

Factual Antecedents

For our review is the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 00161 which affirmed with
modification the Decision2 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 12, Oroquieta City, Misamis Occidental, finding
appellants Elizer Beduya (Elizer) and Ric Beduya (Ric) guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of murder. The
Information against the appellants contained the following accusatory allegations:

That on or about the 6th day of May 2002, at about 12:15 o’clock midnight, more or less, in barangay Baga, Municipality
of Pana-on, province of Misamis Occidental and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping one another, with intent to kill, with abuse and taking advantage of their
superior strength, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, box and then stab one DOMINADOR S.
ACOPE[,] SR. with the use of a knife hitting him on the left hypochondriac area which caused his death.

CONTRARY TO LAW, with the qualifying circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength[.] 3

Both appellants were arrested. They entered separate pleas of "not guilty" during their arraignment.4 After the termination
of the mandatory pre-trial conference,5 trial ensued.

The Prosecution’s Evidence

Culled from the evidence presented by the prosecution, the following case against the appellants emerged:

On May 6, 2002, at around 11:45 p.m., Roy Bughao (Bughao) was carrying a torch on his way home from the birthday
celebration of his cousin when Elizer and Ric suddenly appeared. Ric went around him while his brother Elizer pointed a
knife. He drew back and swung the torch at them and shouted, "Why do you hurt me, what is my fault?" 6 The Beduya
brothers did not reply and continued their assault. Bughao then scrambled for safety and ran towards the yard of victim
Dominador S. Acope, Sr. (Acope, Sr.) and hid in a dark area.

At around 12:30 a.m. of May 7, 2002, the victim and his son, Dominador Acope, Jr. (Acope, Jr.), were roused from their
sleep by a voice coming from the road in front of their house. The victim went outside while his son peeped through the
window. The victim saw Bughao who readily identified himself and said that Elizer pointed a knife at him. As the Beduya
brothers entered the yard of the victim’s house, Bughao hid himself. While in hiding, he saw the Beduya brothers
approach the victim after they were advised to go home since it was already late. The Beduya brothers did not heed the
advice and instead Ric slapped the victim while Elizer stabbed him. The victim retaliated by striking them with a piece of
wood he got hold of. Elizer and Ric ran away but one of them stumbled on the pile of firewood and the clothesline in the
yard before they succeeded in departing from the premises.

Acope, Jr. immediately proceeded to his uncle’s house which was 40 meters away and sought his help. The incident was
also reported to their Barangay Captain, who responded by going to the residence of the victim. Upon arrival, he saw the
victim lying on the ground and bleeding from a stab wound. The victim told him that, "I will die because of this. x x x I was
boxed by Ric and I was stabbed by Elizer."7 He also told the Barangay Captain that he had no previous quarrel with the
Beduya brothers.

The Barangay Captain took the victim to the Jimenez Medicare Hospital but was later advised to proceed to the MHARS
General Hospital in Ozamis City, where the police officer took the statement of the victim and Acope, Jr. On the next day,
May 8, 2002, the victim died due to "septic and hypovolemic shock secondary to stabbed wound." 8

The Appellants’ Version

Elizer maintained that he did not commit any crime. On May 6, 2002, he went to Baybay, Punta, Panaon, to buy fish. He
usually carried a knife to slice and eat the fish while it is still raw. While on his way home at 10:30 p.m., he was suddenly
attacked and struck by the victim and Bughao. He got hit several times with a piece of wood and Bughao smashed his
right foot. To defend himself, he pulled out his knife and struck randomly. He had no knowledge if he hit someone but his
assailants fled. Eduardo Eltagon (Eduardo) testified that he witnessed the event but he did not interfere since he did not
want to get involved.

Elizer continued to walk, and arrived home at 12:15 a.m. At 1:30 a.m., policemen came to his house and took him to a
hospital. They passed by the house of his brother Ric before proceeding to their destination.

For his part, Ric testified that he was asleep at the time of the incident. He stated that he went to sleep at eight o’clock in
the evening on May 5, 2002 and woke up at four o’clock in the morning of the following day, May 6, 2002, when
the Barangay Captain and policemen came to his house with his brother and asked him to come with them to the hospital.

The Trial Court’s Decision

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of the prosecution, whose witnesses testified candidly on the events that
resulted in the death of the victim. On the other hand, the trial court found as unreliable the witnesses presented by the
defense. It held that Eduardo, at 86 years of age, could not have seen the victim and Bughao attacking Elizer 30 meters
away with a flashlight as his only source of illumination in the dead of night since a test on his vision showed that he could
not "see at a distance little more than beyond his nose."9 Moreover, it ruled that the injuries suffered by Elizer were more
consistent with the defensive blows from a piece of wood the victim used to defend himself, rather than the alleged
assault on him by the victim and Bughao.10

The trial court also held that the circumstance of abuse of superior strength that qualifies the killing of the victim to murder
is present in this case. According to the trial court, the appellants’ combined assault gave them the advantage over the
victim who must have been taken by surprise. The retaliation of the victim with a piece of wood was done only after he
had already been stabbed.11

In disposing of the case, the trial court ruled as follows:

WHEREFORE, finding accused Elizer Beduya and Ric Beduya guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder qualified by
abuse of superior strength without other modifying circumstances, the court sentences them to reclusion perpetua and
orders them to pay in solidum the heirs of Dominador Acope ₱50,000.00 as death indemnity, ₱6,000.00 as funeral
expenses, ₱9,411.85 as medical expenses, and ₱264,000.00 as lost earnings. With costs.

Accused are credited with the full time spent under preventive detention since May 7, 2002.

SO ORDERED.12

The Decision of the Court of Appeals

The case was forwarded to this Court on automatic review and docketed as G.R. No. 158473. However, we referred it to
the CA in accordance with our ruling in People v. Mateo.13 The appellate court affirmed with modification the trial court’s
decision and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION of
increasing the award of the victim’s heirs for the loss of earning capacity of the victim [to] ₱408,000.00.

SO ORDERED.14

The Assignment of Errors

Still aggrieved, the appellants sought a final review of their case raising the following as errors:

I
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO THE INCREDIBLE AND INCONSISTENT
TESTIMONIES OF THE PROSECUTION WITNESSES.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANTS GUILTY OF THE CRIME
CHARGED DESPITE FAILURE [OF] THE PROSECUTION TO PROVE THEIR GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

III

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONSIDERING THE QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF ABUSE OF
SUPERIOR STRENGTH.15

During the pendency of the appeal, appellant Ric died of cardio pulmonary arrest secondary to bleeding peptic ulcer as
shown by his certificate of death.16 Accordingly, we dismissed17 the appeal insofar as said appellant is concerned.
However, judgment shall be rendered as to Elizer.

Our Ruling

There is partial merit in the appeal.

Abuse of Superior Strength as a Qualifying

Circumstance in the Crime of Murder

Murder is the unlawful killing by the accused of a person, which is not parricide or infanticide, provided that any of the
attendant circumstances enumerated in Article 24818 of the Revised Penal Code is present. Abuse of superior strength is
one of the qualifying circumstances mentioned therein that qualifies the killing of the victim to murder.

In this case, the trial and appellate courts commonly concluded that there was intent to kill on the part of the appellants
and that they employed abuse of superior strength to ensure the execution and success of the crime. The appellate court
even adopted the trial court’s finding and conclusion that as Ric punched the victim in the shoulder and appellant Elizer
delivered the fatal stab wound, this combined assault "gave them the advantage over the victim who must have been
taken by surprise. Although the victim struck at accused with a piece of wood, he did so only after he had been stabbed,
causing the two accused to run away."19

This reasoning is erroneous.

"Abuse of superior strength is present whenever there is a notorious inequality of forces between the victim and the
aggressor, assuming a situation of superiority of strength notoriously advantageous for the aggressor selected or taken
advantage of by him in the commission of the crime."20 "The fact that there were two persons who attacked the victim
does not per se establish that the crime was committed with abuse of superior strength, there being no proof of the
relative strength of the aggressors and the victim."21 The evidence must establish that the assailants purposely sought the
advantage, or that they had the deliberate intent to use this advantage.22 "To take advantage of superior strength means
to purposely use excessive force out of proportion to the means of defense available to the person attacked."23 The
appreciation of this aggravating circumstance depends on the age, size, and strength of the parties. 24

The prosecution in this case failed to adduce evidence of a relative disparity in age, size and strength, or force, except for
the showing that two assailants, one of them (Elizer) armed with a knife, assaulted the victim. The presence of two
assailants, one of them armed with a knife, does not ipso facto indicate an abuse of superior strength. 25 Mere superiority
in numbers is not indicative of the presence of this circumstance.26 Neither did the prosecution present proof to show that
the victim suffered from an inferior physical condition from which the circumstance can be inferred. In fact, there is
evidence that the victim was able to get hold of a piece of wood and deliver retaliatory blows against the knife-wielder,
Elizer.27

The events leading to the stabbing further disprove any finding of deliberate intent on the part of the assailants to abuse
their superior strength over that of the victim. The testimonies of the prosecution’s witnesses, on the whole, show that the
incident between the victim and his assailants was unplanned and unpremeditated. The assailants were in pursuit of
Bughao when the victim advised them to go home since it was already late at night. There was indeed no conscious
attempt on the part of the assailants to use or take advantage of any superior strength that they then enjoyed. Particularly,
it has not been clearly established that the appellants, with an advantage in number, purposely resorted to punching the
victim and delivering a fatal stab wound. Neither has it been shown that the victim was simply overwhelmed by the fist
blows delivered by Ric and Elizer’s act of stabbing him. The evidence on this matter is too insufficient for a definitive
conclusion. What has been shown with certainty and clarity is the appellants’ intent to kill, as shown by the stab wound in
the left side of the victim’s body which resulted in his death two days later. As the knife wielder, Elizer is guilty of
assaulting and killing the victim.

In view of the foregoing, we are compelled to rule out the presence of abuse of superior strength as a qualifying
circumstance. Hence, appellants’ guilt must be limited to the crime of homicide.

The Trial Court’s Finding on the Credibility of the Prosecution Witnesses

Elizer maintains that his guilt was not established beyond reasonable doubt since the testimonies of the witnesses of the
prosecution were incredible and materially inconsistent. He argues that Acope, Jr. testified that the victim immediately
went out of his house and approached Bughao, but Bughao declared in the witness stand that the victim came out of his
abode 20 minutes after hearing his shout. He also finds it incredible that Bughao did not bother to take the victim to the
hospital and report the incident to the police after the assailants fled the scene of the crime.

We are not persuaded. It has been "consistently held that appellate courts, as a rule, will not disturb the findings of the
trial court on the credibility of witnesses. We have sustained trial courts in this respect, considering their vantage point in
their evaluation of testimonial evidence, absent x x x any showing of serious error or irregularity that otherwise would alter
the result of the case."28 Here, we find no serious irregularity.

Besides, the inconsistencies ascribed to the prosecution witnesses involve minor details, too trivial to adversely affect
their credibility. Said inconsistencies do not depart from the fact that these witnesses saw the fatal stabbing of the victim
by Elizer. To the extent that inconsistencies were in fact shown, they appear to us "to relate to details of peripheral
significance which do not negate or dissolve the positive identification [by said eyewitnesses of Elizer] as the perpetrator
of the crime."29

Further, the failure of Bughao to immediately report the incident to the police authorities and to extend help to the victim
cannot destroy his credibility as a witness. There is no standard of behavior when a person becomes a witness to a
shocking or gruesome event.30 "The workings of a human mind placed under severe emotional stress are unpredictable
and people react differently x x x."31 The determining factor to consider is that Bughao testified in candid and
straightforward manner and implicated Elizer and Ric as the perpetrators of the crime.

Aside from the eyewitness testimonies of the prosecution witnesses, the dying declaration of the victim also established
the guilt of the appellants beyond reasonable doubt. He was well aware of his imminent death and his declaration that
Elizer was responsible for his stab wound was made in the belief that he would not survive his injury. The declarations by
the victim certainly relate to circumstances pertaining to his impending death and he would have been competent to testify
had he survived in view of the general presumption that a witness is competent to testify.

The victim also executed a Sworn Statement32 on May 7, 2002, while in serious condition in the hospital, declaring that
the appellants assaulted him and it was Elizer who delivered his fatal stab wound. His dying declaration and sworn
statement, taken together with the findings and conclusions of the trial court, establish the guilt of the appellants beyond
reasonable doubt.

The Penalty

Having established Elizer’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of homicide, he must suffer the penalty imposed
by law. The crime of homicide is punishable by reclusion temporal. 33 Since there are no mitigating or aggravating
circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its medium period.34 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,35 he should
be sentenced to an indeterminate term, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next lower in degree, i.e.,
prision mayor, and the maximum of which is that properly imposable under the Revised Penal Code, i.e., reclusion
temporal in its medium period.

Thus, the proper and precise prison sentence that should be imposed must be within the indeterminate term of six (6)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one
(1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal as maximum.

The Award of Damages

The trial court awarded, and the appellate court affirmed, actual damages to the heirs of the victim in the amounts of
₱6,000.00 as funeral expenses and ₱9,411.85 as medical expenses incurred as a result of the incident. However, our
review of the records revealed that the award was not substantiated by any evidence. There was no competent proof on
the specific amounts of actual damages allegedly incurred and this omission cannot be supplied by a broad and general
stipulation during trial that the victim’s wife would testify on the damages brought about by the commission of the crime. In
the absence of proof on the exact sum of actual damages, there was no basis for granting the same. "Credence can be
given only to claims which are duly supported by receipts."36 The award of actual damages should consequently be
deleted as there were no receipts presented evidencing the expenses allegedly incurred.

However, as the heirs of the victim clearly incurred medical and funeral expenses, ₱25,000.00 by way of temperate
damages should be awarded.37 "This award is adjudicated so that a right which has been violated may be recognized or
vindicated, and not for the purpose of indemnification."38

When death results as a consequence of the crime, the heirs of the deceased are entitled to the amount of ₱50,000.00 as
indemnity for the death of the victim without need of any evidence or proof of damages. 39 Accordingly, we award said sum
to the heirs of the victim, Acope, Sr.1avvphi1

"Moral damages are mandatory in cases of murder and homicide without need of allegation and proof other than the
death of the victim. Consistent with this rule, we award the amount of ₱50,000.00 as moral damages in accordance with
prevailing jurisprudence."40

The trial court was correct in awarding indemnity for the loss of earning capacity of the victim. However, the computation
for this award should be more accurate.

Acope, Sr., was 46 years old on the day he died. 41 He earned an average of ₱3,000.00 a month as a farmer
and barangay tanod.42 This is equivalent to the sum of ₱36,000.00 per annum. Pursuant to the American Expectancy
Table of Mortality, which has been adopted in this jurisdiction, the formula for the computation of loss of earning capacity
is provided as follows:

Net Earning Capacity (X) = Life Expectancy x (Gross Annual Income – Living Expenses, e.g., 50% of Gross Annual
Income)

Life expectancy is determined in accordance with the following formula:

Life Expectancy = 2/3 x (80 – age of deceased)43

Accordingly, the unearned income of Acope, Sr., is:

2(80-46)
X= x (₱36,000.00 – ₱18,000.00)
3
= 22.667 x ₱18,000.00
= ₱408,006.00

In applying the formula and computation for net income stated above, the amount of loss of earning capacity is the exact
sum of ₱408,006.00.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is MODIFIED as follows:

1. Elizer Beduya is held guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and shall accordingly suffer an
indeterminate prison term of eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor as minimum to fourteen (14) years,
eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal as maximum;

2. Elizer Beduya is ordered to pay the victim’s heirs the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as
moral damages, ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages in lieu of actual damages, and ₱408,006.00 as indemnity for
loss of earning capacity.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 153559 June 8, 2004

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ANTONIO COMADRE, GEORGE COMADRE and DANILO LOZANO, appellants.

Appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano were charged with Murder with Multiple Frustrated
Murder in an information which reads:

That on or about the 6th of August 1995, at Brgy. San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually helping
one another, with intent to kill and by means of treachery and evident premeditation, availing of nighttime to afford
impunity, and with the use of an explosive, did there and then willfully, unlawfully and feloniously lob a hand
grenade that landed and eventually exploded at the roof of the house of Jaime Agbanlog trajecting deadly
shrapnels that hit and killed one ROBERT AGBANLOG, per the death certificate, and causing Jerry Bullanday,
Jimmy Wabe, Lorenzo Eugenio, Rey Camat, Emelita Agbanlog and Elena Agbanlog to suffer shrapnel wounds on
their bodies, per the medical certificates; thus, to the latter victims, the accused commenced all the acts of
execution that would have produced the crime of Multiple Murder as consequences thereof but nevertheless did
not produce them by reason of the timely and able medical and surgical interventions of physicians, to the
damage and prejudice of the deceased’s heirs and the other victims.

CONTRARY TO LAW.1

On arraignment, appellants pleaded "not guilty".2 Trial on the merits then ensued.

As culled from the records, at around 7:00 in the evening of August 6, 1995, Robert Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Gerry
Bullanday,3 Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were having a drinking spree on the terrace of the house of Robert’s father,
Barangay Councilman Jaime Agbanlog, situated in Barangay San Pedro, Lupao, Nueva Ecija. Jaime Agbanlog was
seated on the banister of the terrace listening to the conversation of the companions of his son. 4

As the drinking session went on, Robert and the others noticed appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and
Danilo Lozano walking. The three stopped in front of the house. While his companions looked on, Antonio suddenly
lobbed an object which fell on the roof of the terrace. Appellants immediately fled by scaling the fence of a nearby school.5

The object, which turned out to be a hand grenade, exploded ripping a hole in the roof of the house. Robert Agbanlog,
Jimmy Wabe, Gerry Bullanday, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were hit by shrapnel and slumped unconscious on the
floor.6 They were all rushed to the San Jose General Hospital in Lupao, Nueva Ecija for medical treatment. However,
Robert Agbanlog died before reaching the hospital.7

Dr. Tirso de los Santos, the medico-legal officer who conducted the autopsy on the cadaver of Robert Agbanlog, certified
that the wounds sustained by the victim were consistent with the injuries inflicted by a grenade explosion and that the
direct cause of death was hypovolemic shock due to hand grenade explosion. 8 The surviving victims, Jimmy Wabe, Rey
Camat, Jaime Agbanlog and Gerry Bullanday sustained shrapnel injuries. 9

SPO3 John Barraceros of the Lupao Municipal Police Station, who investigated the scene of the crime, recovered metallic
fragments at the terrace of the Agbanlog house. These fragments were forwarded to the Explosive Ordinance Disposal
Division in Camp Crame, Quezon City, where SPO2 Jesus Q. Mamaril, a specialist in said division, identified them as
shrapnel of an MK2 hand grenade.10

Denying the charges against him, appellant Antonio Comadre claimed that on the night of August 6, 1995, he was with his
wife and children watching television in the house of his father, Patricio, and his brother, Rogelio. He denied any
participation in the incident and claimed that he was surprised when three policemen from the Lupao Municipal Police
Station went to his house the following morning of August 7, 1995 and asked him to go with them to the police station,
where he has been detained since.11

Appellant George Comadre, for his part, testified that he is the brother of Antonio Comadre and the brother-in-law of
Danilo Lozano. He also denied any involvement in the grenade-throwing incident, claiming that he was at home when it
happened. He stated that he is a friend of Rey Camat and Jimmy Wabe, and that he had no animosity towards them
whatsoever. Appellant also claimed to be in good terms with the Agbanlogs so he has no reason to cause them any
grief.12
Appellant Danilo Lozano similarly denied any complicity in the crime. He declared that he was at home with his ten year-
old son on the night of August 6, 1995. He added that he did not see Antonio and George Comadre that night and has not
seen them for quite sometime, either before or after the incident. Like the two other appellants, Lozano denied having any
misunderstanding with Jaime Agbanlog, Robert Agbanlog and Jimmy Wabe. 13

Antonio’s father, Patricio, and his wife, Lolita, corroborated his claim that he was at home watching television with them
during the night in question.14 Josie Comadre, George’s wife, testified that her husband could not have been among those
who threw a hand grenade at the house of the Agbanlogs because on the evening of August 6, 1995, they were resting
inside their house after working all day in the farm.15

After trial, the court a quo gave credence to the prosecution’s evidence and convicted appellants of the complex crime of
Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder,16 the dispositive portion of which states:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered:

1. Finding accused Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the complex crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder and sentencing them to suffer the
imposable penalty of death;

2. Ordering Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano to pay jointly and severally the heirs
of Robert Agbanlog P50,000.00 as indemnification for his death, P35,000.00 as compensatory damages
and P20,000.00 as moral damages;

3. Ordering accused Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano to pay jointly and severally
Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Gerry Bullanday and Jaime Agbanlog P30,000.00 as indemnity for their
attempted murder.

Costs against the accused.

SO ORDERED.

Hence, this automatic review pursuant to Article 47 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended. Appellants contend that the
trial court erred: (1) when it did not correctly and judiciously interpret and appreciate the evidence and thus, the
miscarriage of justice was obviously omnipresent; (2) when it imposed on the accused-appellants the supreme penalty of
death despite the evident lack of the quantum of evidence to convict them of the crime charged beyond reasonable doubt;
and (3) when it did not apply the law and jurisprudence for the acquittal of the accused-appellants of the crime charged.17

Appellants point to the inconsistencies in the sworn statements of Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio and Gerry
Bullanday in identifying the perpetrators. Wabe, Camat and Eugenio initially executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay on August
7, 1995 at the hospital wherein they did not categorically state who the culprit was but merely named Antonio Comadre as
a suspect. Gerry Bullanday declared that he suspected Antonio Comadre as one of the culprits because he saw the
latter’s ten year-old son bring something in the nearby store before the explosion occurred.

On August 27, 1995, or twenty days later, they went to the police station to give a more detailed account of the incident,
this time identifying Antonio Comadre as the perpetrator together with George Comadre and Danilo Lozano.

A closer scrutiny of the records shows that no contradiction actually exists, as all sworn statements pointed to the same
perpetrators, namely, Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano. Moreover, it appears that the first
statement was executed a day after the incident, when Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat and Lorenzo Eugenio were still in the
hospital for the injuries they sustained. Coherence could not thus be expected in view of their condition. It is therefore not
surprising for the witnesses to come up with a more exhaustive account of the incident after they have regained their
equanimity. The lapse of twenty days between the two statements is immaterial because said period even helped them
recall some facts which they may have initially overlooked.

Witnesses cannot be expected to remember all the details of the harrowing event which unfolded before their eyes. Minor
discrepancies might be found in their testimony, but they do not damage the essential integrity of the evidence in its
material whole, nor should they reflect adversely on the witness’ credibility as they erase suspicion that the same was
perjured.18 Honest inconsistencies on minor and trivial matters serve to strengthen rather than destroy the credibility of a
witness to a crime, especially so when, as in the instant case, the crime is shocking to the conscience and numbing to the
senses.19

Moreover, it was not shown that witnesses Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat, Lorenzo Eugenio and Gerry Bullanday had any
motive to testify falsely against appellants. Absent evidence showing any reason or motive for prosecution witnesses to
perjure, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive exists, and their testimony is thus worthy of full faith and
credit.

The trial court is likewise correct in disregarding appellants’ defense of alibi and denial. For the defense of alibi to prosper,
the accused must prove not only that he was at some other place at the time of the commission of the crime but also that
it was physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or within its immediate vicinity.20

Apart from testifying with respect to the distance of their houses from that of Jaime Agbanlog’s residence, appellants were
unable to give any explanation and neither were they able to show that it was physically impossible for them to be at the
scene of the crime. Hence, the positive identification of the appellants by eyewitnesses Jimmy Wabe, Jaime Agbanlog,
Rey Camat and Gerry Bullanday prevails over their defense of alibi and denial.21

It was established that prior to the grenade explosion, Rey Camat, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe and Gerry Bullanday
were able to identify the culprits, namely, appellants Antonio Comadre, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano because
there was a lamppost in front of the house and the moon was bright.22

Appellants’ argument that Judge Bayani V. Vargas, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City,
Branch 38 erred in rendering the decision because he was not the judge who heard and tried the case is not well taken.

It is not unusual for a judge who did not try a case to decide it on the basis of the record for the trial judge might have
died, resigned, retired, transferred, and so forth.23 As far back as the case of Co Tao v. Court of Appeals24 we have held:
"The fact that the judge who heard the evidence is not the one who rendered the judgment and that for that reason the
latter did not have the opportunity to observe the demeanor of the witnesses during the trial but merely relied on the
records of the case does not render the judgment erroneous." This rule had been followed for quite a long time, and there
is no reason to go against the principle now. 25

However, the trial court’s finding of conspiracy will have to be reassessed. The undisputed facts show that when Antonio
Comadre was in the act of throwing the hand grenade, George Comadre and Danilo Lozano merely looked on without
uttering a single word of encouragement or performed any act to assist him. The trial court held that the mere presence of
George Comadre and Danilo Lozano provided encouragement and a sense of security to Antonio Comadre, thus proving
the existence of conspiracy.

We disagree.

Similar to the physical act constituting the crime itself, the elements of conspiracy must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt. Settled is the rule that to establish conspiracy, evidence of actual cooperation rather than mere cognizance or
approval of an illegal act is required.26

A conspiracy must be established by positive and conclusive evidence. It must be shown to exist as clearly and
convincingly as the commission of the crime itself. Mere presence of a person at the scene of the crime does not make
him a conspirator for conspiracy transcends companionship.27

The evidence shows that George Comadre and Danilo Lozano did not have any participation in the commission of the
crime and must therefore be set free. Their mere presence at the scene of the crime as well as their close relationship
with Antonio are insufficient to establish conspiracy considering that they performed no positive act in furtherance of the
crime.

Neither was it proven that their act of running away with Antonio was an act of giving moral assistance to his criminal act.
The ratiocination of the trial court that "their presence provided encouragement and sense of security to Antonio," is
devoid of any factual basis. Such finding is not supported by the evidence on record and cannot therefore be a valid basis
of a finding of conspiracy.
Time and again we have been guided by the principle that it would be better to set free ten men who might be probably
guilty of the crime charged than to convict one innocent man for a crime he did not commit. 28 There being no conspiracy,
only Antonio Comadre must answer for the crime.

Coming now to Antonio’s liability, we find that the trial court correctly ruled that treachery attended the commission of the
crime. For treachery to be appreciated two conditions must concur: (1) the means, method and form of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or retaliate; and (2) such means, methods and form
of execution was deliberately and consciously adopted by the accused. Its essence lies in the adoption of ways to
minimize or neutralize any resistance, which may be put up by the offended party.

Appellant lobbed a grenade which fell on the roof of the terrace where the unsuspecting victims were having a drinking
spree. The suddenness of the attack coupled with the instantaneous combustion and the tremendous impact of the
explosion did not afford the victims sufficient time to scamper for safety, much less defend themselves; thus insuring the
execution of the crime without risk of reprisal or resistance on their part. Treachery therefore attended the commission of
the crime.

It is significant to note that aside from treachery, the information also alleges the "use of an explosive" 29 as an aggravating
circumstance. Since both attendant circumstances can qualify the killing to murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal
Code,30 we should determine which of the two circumstances will qualify the killing in this case.

When the killing is perpetrated with treachery and by means of explosives, the latter shall be considered as a qualifying
circumstance. Not only does jurisprudence31 support this view but also, since the use of explosives is the principal mode
of attack, reason dictates that this attendant circumstance should qualify the offense instead of treachery which will then
be relegated merely as a generic aggravating circumstance.32

Incidentally, with the enactment on June 6, 1997 of Republic Act No. 8294 33 which also considers the use of explosives as
an aggravating circumstance, there is a need to make the necessary clarification insofar as the legal implications of the
said amendatory law vis-à-vis the qualifying circumstance of "by means of explosion" under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code are concerned. Corollary thereto is the issue of which law should be applied in the instant case. R.A. No.
8294 was a reaction to the onerous and anachronistic penalties imposed under the old illegal possession of firearms law,
P.D. 1866, which prevailed during the tumultuous years of the Marcos dictatorship. The amendatory law was enacted, not
to decriminalize illegal possession of firearms and explosives, but to lower their penalties in order to rationalize them into
more acceptable and realistic levels.34

This legislative intent is conspicuously reflected in the reduction of the corresponding penalties for illegal possession of
firearms, or ammunitions and other related crimes under the amendatory law. Under Section 2 of the said law, the
penalties for unlawful possession of explosives are also lowered. Specifically, when the illegally possessed explosives are
used to commit any of the crimes under the Revised Penal Code, which result in the death of a person, the penalty is no
longer death, unlike in P.D. No. 1866, but it shall be considered only as an aggravating circumstance. Section 3 of P.D.
No. 1866 as amended by Section 2 of R.A. 8294 now reads:

Section 2. Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1866, as amended, is hereby further amended to read as follows:

Section 3. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives. The penalty
of prision mayor in its maximum period to reclusion temporal and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000.00) shall be imposed upon any person who shall unlawfully manufacture, assemble, deal
in, acquire, dispose or possess hand grenade(s), rifle grenade(s), and other explosives, including but not
limited to "pillbox," "molotov cocktail bombs," "fire bombs," or other incendiary devices capable of
producing destructive effect on contiguous objects or causing injury or death to any person.

When a person commits any of the crimes defined in the Revised Penal Code or special law with the use of the
aforementioned explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devises, which results in the death of any person or
persons, the use of such explosives, detonation agents or incendiary devices shall be considered as an
aggravating circumstance. (shall be punished with the penalty of death is DELETED.)

xxx xxx x x x.

With the removal of death as a penalty and the insertion of the term "xxx as an aggravating circumstance," the
unmistakable import is to downgrade the penalty for illegal possession of explosives and consider its use merely as an
aggravating circumstance.
Clearly, Congress intended R.A. No. 8294 to reduce the penalty for illegal possession of firearms and explosives. Also,
Congress clearly intended RA No. 8294 to consider as aggravating circumstance, instead of a separate offense, illegal
possession of firearms and explosives when such possession is used to commit other crimes under the Revised Penal
Code.

It must be made clear, however, that RA No. 8294 did not amend the definition of murder under Article 248, but merely
made the use of explosives an aggravating circumstance when resorted to in committing "any of the crimes defined in the
Revised Penal Code." The legislative purpose is to do away with the use of explosives as a separate crime and to make
such use merely an aggravating circumstance in the commission of any crime already defined in the Revised Penal Code.
Thus, RA No. 8294 merely added the use of unlicensed explosives as one of the aggravating circumstances specified in
Article 14 of the Revised Penal Code. Like the aggravating circumstance of "explosion" in paragraph 12, "evident
premeditation" in paragraph 13, or "treachery" in paragraph 16 of Article 14, the new aggravating circumstance added by
RA No. 8294 does not change the definition of murder in Article 248.

Nonetheless, even if favorable to the appellant, R.A. No. 8294 still cannot be made applicable in this case. Before the use
of unlawfully possessed explosives can be properly appreciated as an aggravating circumstance, it must be adequately
established that the possession was illegal or unlawful, i.e., the accused is without the corresponding authority or permit to
possess. This follows the same requisites in the prosecution of crimes involving illegal possession of firearm 35 which is a
kindred or related offense under P.D. 1866, as amended. This proof does not obtain in the present case. Not only was it
not alleged in the information, but no evidence was adduced by the prosecution to show that the possession by appellant
of the explosive was unlawful.

It is worthy to note that the above requirement of illegality is borne out by the provisions of the law itself, in conjunction
with the pertinent tenets of legal hermeneutics.

A reading of the title36 of R.A. No. 8294 will show that the qualifier "illegal/unlawful ...possession" is followed by "of
firearms, ammunition, or explosives or instruments..." Although the term ammunition is separated from "explosives" by the
disjunctive word "or", it does not mean that "explosives" are no longer included in the items which can be
illegally/unlawfully possessed. In this context, the disjunctive word "or" is not used to separate but to signify a succession
or to conjoin the enumerated items together.37 Moreover, Section 2 of R.A. 8294,38 subtitled: "Section 3. Unlawful
Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Explosives", clearly refers to the unlawful manufacture, sale,
or possession of explosives.

What the law emphasizes is the act’s lack of authority. Thus, when the second paragraph of Section 3, P.D. No. 1866, as
amended by RA No. 8294 speaks of "the use of the aforementioned explosives, etc." as an aggravating circumstance in
the commission of crimes, it refers to those explosives, etc. "unlawfully" manufactured, assembled, dealt in, acquired,
disposed or possessed mentioned in the first paragraph of the same section. What is per se aggravating is the use of
unlawfully "manufactured … or possessed" explosives. The mere use of explosives is not.

The information in this case does not allege that appellant Antonio Comadre had unlawfully possessed or that he had no
authority to possess the grenade that he used in the killing and attempted killings. Even if it were alleged, its presence
was not proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. Rule 110 of the 2000 Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
requires the averment of aggravating circumstances for their application. 39

The inapplicability of R.A. 8294 having been made manifest, the crime committed is Murder committed "by means of
explosion" in accordance with Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code. The same, having been alleged in the
Information, may be properly considered as appellant was sufficiently informed of the nature of the accusation against
him.40

The trial court found appellant guilty of the complex crime of murder with multiple attempted murder under Article 48 of the
Revised Penal Code, which provides:

Art. 48. Penalty for complex crimes. – When a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies, or
when an offense is a necessary means of committing the other, the penalty for the most serious crime shall be
imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period.

The underlying philosophy of complex crimes in the Revised Penal Code, which follows the pro reo principle, is
intended to favor the accused by imposing a single penalty irrespective of the crimes committed. The rationale
being, that the accused who commits two crimes with single criminal impulse demonstrates lesser perversity than
when the crimes are committed by different acts and several criminal resolutions.
 The single act by appellant of detonating a hand grenade may quantitatively constitute a cluster of several
separate and distinct offenses, yet these component criminal offenses should be considered only as a single
crime in law on which a single penalty is imposed because the offender was impelled by a "single criminal
impulse" which shows his lesser degree of perversity. 41

Under the aforecited article, when a single act constitutes two or more grave or less grave felonies the penalty for the
most serious crime shall be imposed, the same to be applied in its maximum period irrespective of the presence of
modifying circumstances, including the generic aggravating circumstance of treachery in this case. 42 Applying the
aforesaid provision of law, the maximum penalty for the most serious crime (murder) is death. The trial court, therefore,
correctly imposed the death penalty.

Three justices of the Court, however, continue to maintain the unconstitutionality of R.A. 7659 insofar as it prescribes the
death penalty. Nevertheless, they submit to the ruling of the majority to the effect that the law is constitutional and that the
death penalty can be lawfully imposed in the case at bar.

Finally, the trial court awarded to the parents of the victim Robert Agbanlog civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00,
P35,000.00 as compensatory damages and P20,000.00 as moral damages. Pursuant to existing jurisprudence 43 the
award of civil indemnity is proper. However, the actual damages awarded to the heirs of Robert Agbanlog should be
modified, considering that the prosecution was able to substantiate only the amount of P18,000.00 as funeral expenses. 44

The award of moral damages is appropriate there being evidence to show emotional suffering on the part of the heirs of
the deceased, but the same must be increased to P50,000.00 in accordance with prevailing judicial policy. 45

With respect to the surviving victims Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat and Gerry Bullanday, the trial court
awarded P30,000.00 each for the injuries they sustained. We find this award inappropriate because they were not able to
present a single receipt to substantiate their claims. Nonetheless, since it appears that they are entitled to actual damages
although the amount thereof cannot be determined, they should be awarded temperate damages of P25,000.00 each. 46

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the appealed decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Jose City, Branch 39
in Criminal Case No. L-16(95) is AFFIRMED insofar as appellant Antonio Comadre is convicted of the complex crime of
Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of death. He is ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim the amount of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P18,000.00 as actual damages
and likewise ordered to pay the surviving victims, Jaime Agbanlog, Jimmy Wabe, Rey Camat and Gerry Bullanday,
P25,000.00 each as temperate damages for the injuries they sustained. Appellants Gregorio Comadre and Danilo Lozano
are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence to establish conspiracy, and they are hereby ordered immediately RELEASED from
confinement unless they are lawfully held in custody for another cause. Costs de oficio.

In accordance with Section 25 of Republic Act 7659 amending Article 83 of the Revised Penal Code, upon finality of this
Decision, let the records

of this case be forwarded to the Office of the President for possible exercise of pardoning power.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 178512 November 26, 2014

ALFREDO DE GUZMAN, JR., Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Frustrated homicide requires intent to kill on the part of the offender. Without proof of such intent, the felony may only be
serious physical injuries. Intent to kill may be established through the overt and external acts and conduct of the offender
before, during and after the assault, or by the nature, location and number of the wounds inflicted on the victim.

The Case

Under review at the instance of the petitioner is the decision promulgated on September 27, 2006,1 whereby the Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed his conviction for frustrated homicide committed against Alexander Flojo under the judgment
rendered on September 10, 2003 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 213, in Mandaluyong City in Criminal Case
No. 191-MD.2

Antecedents

The CA summarized the versions of the parties as follows:

x x x [O]n December 24, 1997, at aboutten o’clock in the evening, Alexander Flojo (hereafter "Alexander") was fetching
water below his rented house at 443 Aglipay Street, Old Zaniga St., Mandaluyong City when suddenly Alfredo De
Guzman (hereafter "Alfredo"), the brother of his land lady, Lucila Bautista (hereafter "Lucila"), hit him on the nape.
Alexander informed Lucila about what Alfredo did to him. Lucila apologized to Alexander by saying, "Pasensya ka na
Mang Alex" and told the latter to just go up. Alexander obliged and went upstairs. He took a rest for about two hours.
Thereafter, at around 12:00 to 12:15 A.M., Alexander went down and continued to fetch water. While pouring water into a
container, Alfredo suddenly appeared in front of Alexander and stabbed him on his left face and chest.

Cirilino Bantaya, a son-in-law of Alexander, saw the latter bleeding on the left portion of his body and begging for help.
Alexander then told Cirilino that Alfredo stabbed him. Cirilino immediately loaded Alexander into his motorcycle (backride)
and brought him to the Mandaluyong City Medical Center. Upon arrival at the hospital, the doctors immediately rendered
medical assistance to Alexander. Alexander stayed in the emergency room of said hospital for about 30 to 40 minutes.
Then, he was brought to the second floor of the said hospital where he was confined for two days. Thereafter, Alexander
was transferred to the Polymedic General Hospital where he was subjected for (sic) further medical examination.

Alexander sustained two stabbed (sic) wounds. (sic) One of which was on the zygoma, left side, and aboutone (1) cm.
long. The other is on his upper left chest which penetrated the fourth intercostal space at the proximal clavicular line
measuring about two (2) cm. The second stabbed (sic) wound penetrated the thoracic wall and left lung of the victim
which resulted to blood air (sic) in the thoracic cavity thus necessitating the insertion of a thoracostomy tube toremove the
blood. According to Dr. Francisco Obmerga, the physician who treated the victim at the Mandaluyong City Medical Center,
the second wound was fatal and could have caused Alexander’s death without timely medical intervention. (Tsn, July 8,
1998, p.8).

On the other hand, Alfredo denied having stabbed Alexander. According to him, on December 25,1997 at around
midnight, he passed by Alexander who was, then, fixing a motorcycle. At that point, he accidentally hit Alexander’s back,
causing the latter to throw invective words against him. He felt insulted, thus, a fistfight ensued between them. They even
rolled on the ground. Alfredo hit Alexander on the cheek causing blood to ooze from the latter’s face. 3

The RTC convicted the petitioner, decreeing thusly:

PRESCINDING (sic) FROM THE FOREGOING

CONSIDERATIONS, the court finds accused Alfredo De Guzman y Agkis a.k.a., "JUNIOR," guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for (sic) the crime of FRUSTRATED HOMICIDE defined and penalized in Article 250 of the Revised Penal Code
and in the absence of any modifying circumstance, he is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of Six (6)
Months and One (1) day of PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of PRISION
MAYOR as MAXIMUM.
The accused is further ordered topay the private complainant compensatory damages in the amount of ₱14,170.35
representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by him as he has duly proven.

SO ORDERED.4

On appeal, the petitioner contended that his guilt had not been proved beyond reasonable doubt; that intent to kill, the
critical element of the crime charged, was not established; that the injuries sustained by Alexander were mere scuffmarks
inflicted in the heatof anger during the fist fight between them; that he did not inflict the stabwounds, insisting that another
person could have inflicted such wounds; and that he had caused only slight physical injuries on Alexander, for which he
should be accordingly found guilty.

Nonetheless, the CA affirmedthe petitioner’s conviction, viz:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The September 10, 2003 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto.

SO ORDERED.5

The CA denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration on May 2, 2007. 6

Issue

Was the petitioner properly found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated homicide?

Ruling

The appeal lacks merit.

The elements of frustrated homicide are: (1) the accused intended to kill his victim, as manifested by his use of a deadly
weapon in his assault; (2) the victim sustained fatal or mortal wound but did not die because of timely medical assistance;
and (3) noneof the qualifying circumstances for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended, is
present.7 Inasmuch as the trial and appellate courts found none of the qualifying circumstances in murder under Article
248 to be present, we immediately proceed to ascertain the presence of the two other elements.

The petitioner adamantly denies that intent to kill was present during the fistfight between him and Alexander.1âwphi1 He
claims that the heightened emotions during the fistfight naturally emboldened both of them, but he maintains that he only
inflicted minor abrasions on Alexander, not the stab wounds that he appeared to have sustained. Hence, he should be
held liable only for serious physical injuries because the intent to kill, the necessary element to characterize the crime as
homicide, was not sufficiently established. He avers that such intentto kill is the main element that distinguishes the crime
of physical injuries from the crime of homicide; and that the crime is homicide only if the intent to kill is competently
shown.

The essential element in frustrated or attempted homicide is the intent of the offender to kill the victim immediately before
or simultaneously with the infliction of injuries. Intent to kill is a specific intent that the State must allege in the information,
and then prove by either direct or circumstantial evidence, as differentiated from a general criminal intent, which is
presumed from the commission of a felony by dolo.8 Intent to kill, being a state of mind, is discerned by the courts only
through external manifestations, i.e., the acts and conduct of the accused at the time of the assault and immediately
thereafter. In Rivera v. People,9 we considered the following factors to determine the presence of intent to kill, namely: (1)
the means used by the malefactors; (2) the nature, location, and number of wounds sustained by the victim; (3) the
conduct of the malefactors before, during, or immediately after the killing of the victim; and (4) the circumstances under
which the crime was committed and the motives of the accused. We have also considered as determinative factors the
motive of the offender and the words he uttered at the time of inflicting the injuries on the victim. 10

Here, both the trial and the appellate court agreed that intent to kill was present. We concur with them. Contrary to the
petitioner’s submission, the wounds sustained by Alexander were not mere scuffmarks inflicted in the heat of anger or as
the result ofa fistfight between them. The petitioner

wielded and used a knife in his assault on Alexander. The medical records indicate, indeed, that Alexander sustained two
stab wounds, specifically, one on his upper left chest and the other on the left side of his face. The petitioner’s attack was
unprovoked with the knife used therein causing such wounds, thereby belying his submission, and firmly proving the
presence of intent to kill. There is also to beno doubt about the wound on Alexander’s chest being sufficient to result into
his death were it not for the timely medical intervention.

With the State having thereby shown that the petitioner already performed all the acts of execution that should produce
the felony of homicide as a consequence, but did not produce it by reason of causes independent of his will, i.e., the
timely medical attention accorded to Alexander, he was properly found guilty of frustrated homicide.

We have no cogent reason to deviate from or to disregard the findings of the trial and appellate courts on the credibility of
Alexander’s testimony. It is not disputed that the testimony of a single but credible and trustworthy witness sufficed to
support the conviction of the petitioner. This guideline finds more compelling application when the lone witness is the
victim himself whose direct and positive identification of his assailant is almost always regarded with indubitable credibility,
owing to the natural tendency of the victim to seek justice for himself, and thus strive to remember the face of his assailant
and to recall the manner in which the latter committed the crime.11 Moreover, it is significant that the petitioner’s mere
denial of the deadly manner of his attack was contradicted by the credible physical evidence corroborating Alexander’s
statements. Under the circumstances, we can only affirm the petitioner’s conviction for frustrated homicide. The
affirmance of the conviction notwithstanding, we find the indeterminate penalty of "Six (6) Months and One (1) day of
PRISION CORR[R]ECCIONAL as MINIMUM to Six (6) Years and One (1) day of PRISION MAYOR as MAXIMUM" 12 fixed
by the RTC erroneous despite the CA concurring with the trial court thereon. Under Section 1 of the Indeterminate
Sentence Law, an indeterminate sentence is imposed on the offender consisting of a maximum term and a minimum
term.13 The maximum term is the penaltyproperly imposed under the Revised Penal

Code after considering any attending modifying circumstances; while the minimum term is within the range of the penalty
next lower than that prescribed by the Revised Penal Codefor the offense committed. Conformably with Article 50 of the
Revised Penal Code,14 frustrated homicide is punished by prision mayor, which is next lower to reclusion temporal, the
penalty for homicide under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code. There being no aggravating or mitigating
circumstances present, however, prision mayorin its medium period – from eight years and one day to 10 years – is
proper. As can be seen, the maximum of six years and one day of prision mayor as fixed by the RTC and affirmed by the
CA was not within the medium period of prision mayor. Accordingly, the correct indeterminate sentence is four years of
prision correccional, as the minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum.

The RTC and the CA also agreed on limiting the civil liability to the sum of ₱14,170.35 as compensatory damages
"representing the actual pecuniary loss suffered by [Alexander] as he has duly proven." 15 We need to revise such civil
liability in order to conform to the law, the Rules of Court and relevant jurisprudence. In Bacolod v. People,16 we
emphatically declared to be "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the accused, and
determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action to recover civil
liability or a waiver of its recovery." We explained why in the following manner:

It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted by
the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission; (2)
the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a separate
civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas we now do lest the Court be unreasonably
seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an
appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also
the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice.

We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to by
law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully
determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such rights
and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should then be
alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties,
which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will be
invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order to do justice to the
complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so unless the enforcement
of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived.17
Alexander as the victim in frustrated homicide suffered moral injuries because the offender committed violence that nearly
took away the victim’s life. "Moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched
reputation, wounded feelings, moral shock, social humiliation, and similar injury. Though incapable of pecuniary
computation, moral damages may be recovered if they are the proximate result of the defendant's wrongful act for
omission."18 Indeed, Article 2219, (1), of the Civil Code expressly recognizes the right of the victim in crimes resulting in
physical injuries.19 Towards that end, the Court, upon its appreciation of the records, decrees that ₱30,000.00 is a
reasonable award of moral damages.20 In addition, AAA was entitled to recover civil indemnity of ₱30,000.00. 21 Both of
these awards did not require allegation and proof.

In addition, the amounts awarded ascivil liability of the petitioner shall earn interest of 6% per annumreckoned from the
finality of this decision until full payment by the accused. WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on
September 27, 2006 finding petitioner Alfredo De Guzman, Jr. GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of FRUSTRATED
HOMICIDE, and SENTENCES him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of four years of prision correccional, as the
minimum, to eight years and one day of prision mayor, as the maximum; ORDERS the petitioner to pay to Alexander Flojo
civil indemnity of ₱30,000.00; moral damages of ₱30,000.00; and compensatory damages of Pl4,170.35, plus interest of
6% per annum on all such awards from the finality of this decision until full payment; and DIRECTS the petitioner to pay
the costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 149028-30 April 2, 2003

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee,

vs.
ARMANDO CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO, MARCIANO CABALLERO, JR., and ROBITO
CABALLERO, accused.
ARMANDO CABALLERO, RICARDO CABALLERO, and MARCIANO CABALLERO, JR., appellants.

Before the Court on automatic review is the Decision1 of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
Branch 57, convicting appellants Armando Caballero, Ricardo Caballero and Marciano Caballero, Jr. of murder in Criminal
Cases Nos. RTC-1217 and RTC-1218 and meting on each of them the supreme penalty of death and ordering them to
pay damages; and of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. RTC-1219 and imposing on them the penalty of reclusion
perpetua.

The Antecedents

Teresito (Dodong) Mondragon and his family lived in a compound surrounded by a barbed-wire fence at New Sumakwel,
Broce Street, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental. Living in the same compound were Ricardo Caballero and his family;
and Myrna Bawin, the sister of Eugene Tayactac, and her family. Beside the compound was the house of Leonilo Broce, a
nephew of Wilma Broce.

In the afternoon of August 3, 1994, Armando (Baby), Robito (Bebot) and Marciano, Jr. (Jun), all surnamed Caballero,
were having a drinking spree in the house of their brother Ricardo in the Mondragon Compound. At about 7:00 p.m. of
said date, Eugene Tayactac and Arnold Barcuma arrived in the sari-sari store of Wilma Broce which was across the
Mondragon Compound. Eugene had dinner in the store while Arnold proceeded to the house of Susana Broce, Eugene’s
girlfriend, for a chat. Susana’s house was about 15 meters away from the store of Wilma. Momentarily, Armando arrived
in the store and asked Eugene in an angry tone: "Gene mopalit ka?" (Gene, will you buy?). Eugene replied: "What is this
all about? We don’t have any quarrel between us." Armando left the store but stood by the gate of the barbed-wired fence
of the Mondragon Compound. His brothers Ricardo, Robito and Marciano, Jr. joined him. Ricardo and Robito were armed
with knives. When Wilma told Eugene that she was closing the store already, he stood up and left the store on his way to
Susana’s house. At that time, Myrna Bawin, who was standing by the window of their house saw her brother Eugene
going out of the store and proceeding to the house of Susana. She called out to him and advised him to go home. Myrna
then left the window to pacify her crying baby.

As Eugene walked by the gate of the Mondragon Compound, Armando suddenly grabbed Eugene towards the
compound. Eugene resisted. Spontaneously, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito joined Armando and assaulted Eugene.
Armando took the wooden pole supporting the clothesline and hit Eugene with it. The latter tried to parry the blows of the
Caballero brothers, to no avail. In the process, Eugene was stabbed three times. As Eugene was being assaulted, Myrna
returned to the window of her house and saw the Caballero brothers assaulting Eugene. She shouted for help for her
hapless brother. Wilma, who witnessed the whole incident, was shocked to immobility at the sudden turn of events.

From the nearby house of Susana, Arnold saw the commotion and rushed to the scene to pacify the protagonists. Arnold
told the Caballero brothers: "Bay, what is the trouble between you and Eugene?" However, Ricardo accosted Arnold and
stabbed the latter on the left side of his body. Forthwith, Robito, Marciano, Jr. and Armando ganged up on Arnold. Two of
them stabbed Arnold on his forearm. Arnold fled for his life and hid under the house of a neighbor.

For his part, Leonilo rushed from his house to where the commotion was. He was, however, met by Robito who stabbed
him on the chest. Wounded, Leonilo retreated and pleaded to his uncle Lucio Broce for help: "Tio, help me because I am
hit." The commotion stopped only upon the arrival of Teresito Mondragon who was able to pacify the Caballero brothers.
They all returned to the compound.

In the meantime, Lucio Broce, the uncle of Leonilo brought the injured Eugene, Leonilo and Arnold to the Planters
Hospital for medical treatment. Eugene and Leonilo eventually died from the stab wounds they sustained.

Dr. Filped A. Maisog performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Eugene. He signed a postmortem report containing the
following findings:

POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION

Name: Eugenio Tayactac, 22 years old, male, single

 Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital
Date & Time of Incident: August 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M.
Date & Time Examined: August 3, 1994 @ 10:40 P.M.

Post-Mortem Findings:

= Stab wound (L) anterior chest 2 cm. 5th ICS MCL directed postero laterally, lacerating (L) auricle of the
heart, and the (L) pulmonary artery and the left middle lobe of the lungs;

= Stab wound (R) anterior chest 2 cm. long 5th ICS parasternal line directed posteriorly;

= Stab wound (R) posterior chest level 7th ICS 2 cm. long directed anteriorly.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe Hemorrhage secondary to Multiple Stab wounds with Massive Hemothorax (L)
and Hemopneumothorax (R).2

He testified that the stab wounds could have been caused by a sharp-edged single-bladed or double-bladed instrument,
or by three instruments.3

Dr. Jose Carlos L. Villarante performed an autopsy on the cadaver of Leonilo. He signed a postmortem report containing
the following findings:

POST-MORTEM EXAMINATION

Name: Leonilo Broce, 22 years old, male, married

Address: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Incident: New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Neg. Occ.
Place of Examination: San Carlos City Hospital
Date & Time of Incident: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:30 P.M.
Date & Time Examined: Aug. 3, 1994 @ 8:45 P.M.

Post-mortem findings:

= Stab wound, (R) post chest, about the level of the 6th and 7th RICS, post. axillary line.

CAUSE OF DEATH: Hypovolemic shock secondary to multiple organ injury.4

Dr. Edgardo B. Quisumbing attended to and operated on Arnold Barcuma. He signed a medical certificate stating that
Arnold sustained the following injuries:

= Lacerated wound 2 cm. (R) forearm middle 3rd

= Incised wound 2 inches (L) forearm middle 3rd

= Stabbed wound, 2 inches in length (L) chest, anterior axillary line at the level of the 7th intercostal space,
penetrating thoracic cavity and abdominal cavity.

... 5

On the witness stand, Dr. Quisumbing testified that the wounds sustained by Arnold could have been caused by three
different sharp-pointed instruments.6 He further testified that Arnold would have died because of the stab wound on his
chest, were it not for the timely medical intervention.

On August 5, 1994, Armando, Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito, were charged with Murder for the death of Leonilo
Broce. The Information, docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC 1217 reads:
 That on or about 8:00 o’clock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together
and helping one another, armed with pieces of wood and hunting knives, and with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapons,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one LEONILO BROCE, by striking the latter with the
use of pieces of wood and stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon said Leonilo Broce physical injury described as
follows:

= Stabbed wound (R) chest penetrating thoracic cavity.

and which injury caused massive hemorrhage which resulted to the death of Leonilo Broce.

That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is attendant in the commission of the offense.

CONTRARY TO LAW.7

They were also charged with the same crime for the death of Eugene Tayactac in an Information docketed as Criminal
Case No. RTC-1218, which reads:

That on or about 8:00 o’clock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together
and helping one another, armed with pieces of wood and hunting knives, and with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, with the use of said weapons,
attack, assault and use personal violence upon the person of one EUGENE TAYACTAC, by striking the latter with
use of pieces of wood and stabbing him thereby inflicting upon said Eugene Tayactac physical injuries which
resulted to the death of the latter.

That an aggravating circumstances of abuse of superior strength is attendant in the commission of the offense.

CONTRARY TO LAW.8

Another Information was filed against the Caballero brothers for frustrated murder for the injuries of Arnold Barcuma.
Docketed as Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, it reads:

That on or about 8:00 o’clock, P.M., August 3, 1994 at New Sumakwel, San Carlos City, Negros Occidental,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring together
and helping one another, armed with pieces of wood and hunting knives, with intent to kill, with treachery and
evident premeditation, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault and use personal
violence upon the person of one ARNOLD BARCUMA, by striking him with the use of pieces of wood and
stabbing him, thereby inflicting upon the latter physical injuries which would have resulted to the death of said
Arnold Barcuma, thus performing all the acts of execution, which would have produced the crime of "Murder", as
a consequence, but nevertheless did not produce it, by reason of causes independent of the will of the accused
that is, the timely medical assistance rendered to said Arnold Barcuma.

That an aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength is attendant in the commission of the offense. 9

Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr., assisted by counsel, were arraigned on September 15, 1994. They pleaded not
guilty to all the charges. Robito Caballero remained at-large.

Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. invoked the defenses of denial and alibi. They adduced evidence that Ricardo was
employed as electrician in the Office of the City Engineer of San Carlos City. Armando was a motor cab driver. Robito
resided in H.C. Rigor Street, San Carlos City while Marciano, Jr. was a resident of Don Juan Subdivision, San Carlos City
and was employed with the Victorias Milling Corporation.

On August 3, 1994, at 8:00 a.m., Robito left San Carlos City and went to Bacolod City. Armando went to the house of his
brother Ricardo to help in the construction of the latter’s house and to take care of Ricardo’s fighting cocks while he was in
his office. Ricardo arrived home at 8:00 p.m. and had dinner with his family and Armando. Momentarily, their sister Mila
and their younger brother Marciano, Jr. arrived in the house of Ricardo. Marciano, Jr. allegedly was mauled by a group of
men and sustained an abrasion, a contusion and swelling of the left side of his face. Ricardo and Armando brought their
brother Marciano, Jr. to the hospital for treatment. On August 4, 1994, Marciano, Jr. was treated for:

= Linear abrasion (L) scapula region;

= Contusion (R) lower lip lateral side;

= Swelling left face.

No. of days of healing: 5-7 days barring complication.10

Ricardo, Armando and Marciano, Jr. denied killing Eugene and assaulting Arnold. They also denied having any altercation
with the victims. They also denied stabbing Leonilo. They had no idea why Wilma, Arnold and Myrna would implicate them
for the deaths of Leonilo and Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold.

After due proceedings, the trial court rendered judgment on May 7, 2001 finding all the three accused, now appellants
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crimes charged, the decretal portion of which reads:

WHEREFORE, accused Armando Caballero, alias "Baby", Ricardo Caballero, alias "Ricky" and Marciano
Caballero, Jr., alias "Jun", having been found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the offenses charged them as
principals, are hereby sentenced to suffer:

1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217 for the murder of Leonilo Broce, there being no mitigating circumstance
present, with the attendant aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength, the maximum
penalty of death and to pay the heirs of Leonilo Broce the sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity;

2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, for the murder of Eugene or Eugenio Tayactac, there being no mitigating
circumstance present, with the attendant aggravating circumstances of treachery and abuse of superior strength,
the maximum penalty of death; and to pay the heirs of Eugene Tayactac the sum of P75,000.00 as indemnity; and

3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for Frustrated Murder, for having seriously inflicted injuries upon the person of
Arnold Barcuma which nearly resulted to his death, there being no mitigating circumstance present, an
imprisonment of twelve (12) years, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years, four (4) months and one (1) day, with no
award as to damages, no evidence having been introduced to establish, the same; and

4. To pay the costs in all three (3) cases.

SO ORDERED.11

In convicting the accused, the trial court found that all of them conspired to kill Eugene and Leonilo and cause injuries to
Arnold. While the trial court stated that it was only appellant Armando who stabbed Eugene, and only the accused Robito
who stabbed Leonilo, however, it concluded that all of them were equally liable for the deaths of Leonilo and Eugene and
for the injuries of Arnold.

In their Brief, the accused, now appellants assail the decision of the trial court contending that:

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT ACQUITTING ACCUSED-APPELLANTS IN CRIMINAL CASES NOS. 1217-1219
DESPITE THE FACT THAT THEIR GUILT WAS NOT PROVEN BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

II

THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN APPRECIATING THE AGGRAVATING CIRCUMSTANCES OF TREACHERY
AND ABUSE OF SUPERIOR STRENGTH ON THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED ACCUSED-APPELLANTS KILLED
THE VICTIMS.

III
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN IMPOSING THE DEATH PENALTY UPON ACCUSED-APPELLANTS ON
THE ASSUMPTION THAT INDEED THEY KILLED THE VICTIMS.12

The Court will delve into and resolve the first two assignments of errors.

The appellants aver that the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt their respective guilt for the deaths of
Eugene and Leonilo and for the injuries sustained by Arnold. They assert that the trial court committed reversible error in
rejecting their defenses of denial and alibi. They claim that at the time of the incident they were in the San Carlos Hospital
for the treatment of the injuries of appellant Marciano, Jr.

The appellants are partly correct.

The trial court correctly found that all the appellants conspired to kill Eugene and assault Arnold; hence, they are
criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the injuries sustained by Arnold. Article 8 of the Revised Penal Code
provides that there is conspiracy when two or more persons agree to commit a felony and decide to commit it. Conspiracy
is always predominantly mental in composition because it consists primarily of a meeting of minds and
intent.13 Conspiracy must be proved with the same quantum of evidence as the crime itself, that is, by proof beyond
reasonable doubt.14 However, direct proof is not required. Conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence.
Conspiracy may be proved through the collective acts of the accused, before, during and after the commission of a felony,
all the accused aiming at the same object, one performing one part and another performing another for the attainment of
the same objective, their acts though apparently independent were in fact concerted and cooperative, indicating closeness
of personal association, concerted action and concurrence of sentiments.15 The overt act or acts of the accused may
consist of active participation in the actual commission of the crime itself or may consist of moral assistance to his co-
conspirators by moving them to execute or implement the criminal plan.16 Direct proof of a person in agreement to commit
a crime is not necessary. It is enough that at the time of the commission of a crime, all the malefactors had the same
purpose and were united in their execution.17 Once established, all the conspirators are criminally liable as co-principals
regardless of the degree of participation of each of them for in contemplation of the law, the act of one is the act of all. 18

Criminal conspiracy must always be founded on facts, not on mere inferences, conjectures and presumptions. 19 Mere
knowledge, acquiescence to or approval of the act without cooperation or agreement to cooperate, is not enough to
constitute one party to a conspiracy absent the intentional participation in the act with a view to the furtherance of the
common objective and purpose.20 Moreover, one is not criminally liable for his act done outside the contemplation of the
conspirators. Co-conspirators are criminally liable only for acts done pursuant to the conspiring on how and what are the
necessary and logic consequence of the intended crime.21

In this case, when appellant Armando asked Eugene at the store of Wilma whether the latter was going to buy something
from the store, Eugene was peeved and remonstrated that he and Armando had no quarrel between them. Appellant
Armando was likewise irked at the reaction of Eugene because from the store, appellant Armando stationed himself by
the gate of the Mondragon Compound near the sari-sari store of Wilma. Appellants Ricardo, Marciano, Jr. and Robito
joined their brother, appellant Armando at the gate. Appellant Ricardo and accused Robito were armed with knives. When
Eugene passed by the gate to the compound, appellant Armando pulled Eugene to the gate but when the latter resisted,
all the appellants ganged up on Eugene. Appellant Armando took the wooden support of the clothesline and hit Eugene
with it. Eugene was stabbed three times on his chest even as he tried to parry the thrusts. When Arnold rushed to
the situs criminis to pacify the appellants and accused Robito, appellant Ricardo stabbed him on the left side of his body.
The other appellants and accused Robito joined appellant Ricardo and ganged up on Arnold. They stabbed Arnold anew
twice on his forearm. Teresito Mondragon, the father-in-law of appellant Ricardo intervened and forthwith, all the
appellants, including accused Robito returned to the Mondragon Compound. Patently, all the appellants by their
simultaneous collective acts before and after the commission of the crimes were united in one common objective, to kill
Eugene, and cause injuries to Arnold for trying to intervene and prevent bloodshed. Hence, all the appellants are
criminally liable for the death of Eugene and for the injuries of Arnold. It does not matter who among the appellants
stabbed Eugene or inflicted injuries on Arnold. The act of one is the act of the others.

However, for the death of Leonilo, the Court believes that the appellants are not criminally liable. The prosecution failed to
adduce evidence that the appellants and the accused Robito conspired to kill Leonilo. The appellants did not actually see
Leonilo rushing out from his house to the situs criminis. They had no foreknowledge that the accused Robito would stab
Leonilo. There was no evidence presented by the prosecution to prove that all the appellants assisted the accused Robito
in killing Leonilo. It must be recalled that Leonilo rushed out of his house when he saw the commotion, with the intention
of aiding the victim or pacifying the protagonists. He was, however, stopped by accused Robito who suddenly stabbed
him on the chest. Leonilo retreated and asked for help. Wilma Broce testified that only the accused Robito stabbed
Leonilo:
 Q After that, what happened next?

A Leonilo Broce came out of his house.

Q Where is the house of Leonilo Broce?

A Still located at Sumakwel.

Q In that case, the very house where Eugene Tayaktak leaned on when he was ganged up by the four?

A Yes.

Q What happened after that?

A When he came out from the house and saw that it was Eugene Tayaktak, he proceeded to approach them
but he was not able to approach them because he was met by Robit "Bebot" Caballero and stabbed by Robito
Caballero.

Q Was LeoniloBroce (sic) hit when he was stabbed by Robito Caballero?

A Yes. He immediately ran back and said: "Tio, help me because I am hit."

INTERPRETER’S (observation)

Witness demonstrating by holding her left armpit.

Q Was Eugene Tayaktak able to escape from the attach (sic) of the Caballero brothers?

A Not (sic).

Q Now what happened to Eugene Tayaktak?

A He appeared very weak and he was staggering.

Q Do you know where Eugene Tayaktak now?

A Already dead.

Q What happened to Leonilo Broce, where is he now?

A The two of them were (sic) already dead.

Q Now, when did the trouble stop if it stopped?

A It stopped when Dodong Mondragon arrived.

Q What did the accused do after the trouble was stopped?

A They went inside the compound of his (sic) father.

Q What happened next?

A Nothing happened. Both of them were brought to the hospital.22

In sum, the trial court committed reversible error in convicting the appellants of murder for the death of Leonilo. As this
Court held in People v. Flora:23
 However, we cannot find Edwin Flora similarly responsible for the death of Emerita Roma and the injury of Flor
Espinas. The evidence only shows conspiracy to kill Ireneo Gallarte and no one else. For acts done outside the
contemplation of the conspirators only the actual perpetrators are liable. In People v. De la Cerna, 21 SCRA 569,
570 (1967), we held:

"... And the rule has always been that co-conspirators are liable only for acts done pursuant to the
conspiracy. For other acts done outside the contemplation of the co-conspirators or which are not the
necessary and logical consequence of the intended crime, only the actual perpetrators are liable. Here,
only Serapio killed (sic) Casiano Cabizares. The latter was not even going to the aid of his father Rafael
but was fleeing away when shot."

To conclude, appellant Edwin Flora is guilty beyond reasonable doubt only of the murder of Ireneo Gallarte. He
has no liability for the death of Emerita Roma nor the injuries of Flor Espinas caused by his co-accused
Hermogenes Flora.

Crimes Committed by Appellants

In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are guilty as co-principals by direct participation of murder, qualified by
treachery. In order that treachery may be considered as a qualifying circumstance, the prosecution is burdened to prove
that:

.... (1) the employment of means of execution that give the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself or to
retaliate; and (2) the means of execution was deliberately or consciously adopted. 24

Even a frontal attack is treacherous if it is sudden and the victim is unarmed. The essence of treachery is a swift and
unexpected attack on the unarmed victim.25

In this case, Eugene was unarmed. He had no inkling that he would be waylaid as he sauntered on his way to his
girlfriend Susana’s house. On the other hand, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole while appellant Ricardo
and accused Robito were armed with knives. The attack on the hapless Eugene was swift and unannounced. Undeniably,
the appellants killed Eugene with treachery.

In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are guilty of frustrated murder under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first
paragraph of the Revised Penal Code which reads:

A felony is consummated when all the elements necessary for its execution and accomplishment are present; and
it is frustrated when the offender performs all the acts of execution which would produce the felony as a
consequence but which, nevertheless, do not produce it by reason of causes independent of the will of the
perpetrator.

The essential elements of a frustrated felony are as follows:

Elements:

1. The offender performs all the acts of execution;

2. All the acts performed would produce the felony as a consequence;

3. But the felony is not produced;

4. By reason of causes independent of the will of the perpetrator.26

In the leading case of United States v. Eduave,27 Justice Moreland, speaking for the Court, distinguished an attempted
from frustrated felony. He said that to be an attempted crime the purpose of the offender must be thwarted by a foreign
force or agency which intervenes and compels him to stop prior to the moment when he has performed all the acts which
should produce the crime as a consequence, which act it is his intention to perform.
The subjective phase in the commission of a crime is that portion of the acts constituting the crime included between the
act which begins the commission of the crime and the last act performed by the offender which, with prior acts, should
result in the consummated crime. Thereafter, the phase is objective.

In case of an attempted crime, the offender never passes the subjective phase in the commission of the crime. The
offender does not arrive at the point of performing all of the acts of execution which should produce the crime. He is
stopped short of that point by some cause apart from his voluntary desistance.

On the other hand, a crime is frustrated when the offender has performed all the acts of execution which should result in
the consummation of the crime. The offender has passed the subjective phase in the commission of the crime.
Subjectively, the crime is complete. Nothing interrupted the offender while passing through the subjective phase. He did
all that is necessary to consummate the crime. However, the crime is not consummated by reason of the intervention of
causes independent of the will of the offender. In homicide cases, the offender is said to have performed all the acts of
execution if the wound inflicted on the victim is mortal and could cause the death of the victim barring medical intervention
or attendance.28

If one inflicts physical injuries on another but the latter survives, the crime committed is either consummated physical
injuries, if the offender had no intention to kill the victim or frustrated or attempted homicide or frustrated murder or
attempted murder if the offender intends to kill the victim. Intent to kill may be proved by evidence of: (a) motive; (b) the
nature or number of weapons used in the commission of the crime; (c) the nature and number of wounds inflicted on the
victim; (d) the manner the crime was committed; and (e) words uttered by the offender at the time the injuries are inflicted
by him on the victim.

In this case, appellant Armando was armed with a wooden pole. Appellant Ricardo and accused Robito used knives. Dr.
Quisumbing, who attended to and operated on Arnold, testified that the stab wound sustained by Arnold on the left side of
his body was mortal and could have caused his death were it not for the timely and effective medical intervention:

Q And how about the size and the depth of the wounds and how big is each wound and how deep.
A The first wound is 2 cm. and the 2nd is about 2 inches and the 3rd is 2 inches in the left, penetrating the
chest near the thorax along the lateral line.
Q So, aside from the 3rd wound there are wounds which are not really very serious?
A As I said before, the most serious is the 3rd wound.
Q So even without the other wounds the 3rd wound - - it could be the cause of the death of the victim?
A Yes, Sir.29

It cannot be denied that the appellants had the intention to kill Arnold. The appellants performed all the acts of execution
but the crime was not consummated because of the timely medical intervention.

Treachery attended the stabbing of Arnold because he was unarmed and the attack on him was swift and sudden. He had
no means and there was no time for him to defend himself. In sum, the appellants are guilty of frustrated murder.

The appellants’ denial of the crimes charged in Criminal Case Nos. RTC-1218 and RTC-1219 cannot prevail over Wilma’s
and Arnold’s positive and straightforward testimonies that the appellants killed Eugene and stabbed Arnold. Moreover,
Wilma and Arnold had no motive to falsely implicate the appellants for the said crimes; hence, their testimony must be
accorded full probative weight.30

Equally barren of merit is appellants’ defense of alibi. Alibi as a defense is inherently weak for it is easy to fabricate and
difficult to disprove. To merit approbation, the appellants were burdened to prove with clear and convincing evidence that
at the time the crimes were committed, they were in a place other than the situs of the crimes such that it was physically
impossible for them to have committed said crimes.31 The appellants dismally failed in this respect. They testified that they
were at the house of appellant Ricardo, which was conveniently near the place where Eugene was killed and Arnold was
assaulted. Moreover, the records show that Marciano, Jr. was treated for his superficial injuries on August 4, 1996, a day
after the incident. This belies the claim of appellants Ricardo and Armando that they were allegedly in the hospital at the
time of the incident.

Penalties Imposable on Appellants

The trial court imposed the death penalty on appellants in Criminal Case No. RTC-1218 on its finding that treachery and
abuse of superior strength were attendant in the killing of Eugene. The Solicitor General does not agree with the trial court
and contends that abuse of superior strength was absorbed by treachery; hence, should not be considered as a separate
aggravating circumstance in the imposition of the penalty on the appellants. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General.
Abuse of superior strength, concurring with treachery is absorbed by treachery.32

The penalty for murder under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Republic Act 7659, is reclusion
perpetua to death. Since aside from the qualified circumstance of treachery, no other modifying circumstance was
attendant in the commission of the crime, the proper penalty for the crime is reclusion perpetua conformably with Article
63 of the Revised Penal Code.

In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, for frustrated murder, the Solicitor General contends that the indeterminate penalty of
from 12 years of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months and 1 day of reclusion temporal as maximum,
imposed on the appellants is not correct. The Court agrees with the Solicitor General. The penalty for frustrated murder is
one degree lower than reclusion perpetua to death, which is reclusion temporal.33 The latter penalty has a range of 12
years and 1 day to 20 years. The maximum of the indeterminate penalty should be taken from reclusion temporal, the
penalty for the crime taking into account any modifying circumstances in the commission of the crime. The minimum of the
indeterminate penalty shall be taken from the full range of prision mayor which is one degree lower than reclusion
temporal. Since there is no modifying circumstance in the commission of frustrated murder, the appellants should be
meted an indeterminate penalty of from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period as
minimum to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as maximum.

Civil Liabilities of Appellants

The trial court ordered the appellants in Criminal Case No. RTC-1218 to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene
Tayactac, the amount of P75,000 by way of indemnity. The trial court did not award moral damages to said heirs. This is
erroneous. Since the penalty imposed on the appellants is reclusion perpetua, the civil indemnity should be only P50,000.
The heirs of the victim should also be awarded the amount of P50,000 as moral damages.34

In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the trial court did not award moral damages to the victim Arnold Barcuma on its finding
that the prosecution failed to adduce any evidence to prove said damages. The Court disagrees with the trial court. The
victim Arnold Barcuma himself testified on his injuries. 35 He is entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P25,000.36 Having suffered injuries and undergone medical treatment he is, as well entitled to actual damages, which in
the absence of evidence would, nevertheless, entitle him to an award of temperate or moderate damages, herein fixed at
P10,000.

The Verdict of the Court

IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Carlos City (Negros Occidental),
Branch 57, in Criminal Cases Nos. RTC-1217 up to RTC-1219 is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATIONS:

1. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1217, the Court, finding the appellants not guilty of the crime charged for failure of
the prosecution to prove their guilt beyond reasonable doubt, REVERSES the judgment of the trial court and
ACQUITS them of the said charge.

2. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1218, the appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder under
Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code, qualified by treachery, and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and ordered to pay in solidum the heirs of the victim Eugene Tayactac, the amounts of P50,000 as civil
indemnity and P50,000 as moral damages.

3. In Criminal Case No. RTC-1219, the appellants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of frustrated murder
under Article 248 in relation to Article 6, first paragraph of the Revised Penal Code and are hereby sentenced to
suffer an indeterminate penalty of from nine (9) years and four (4) months of prision mayor in its medium period,
as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal in its medium period, as
maximum. The appellants are hereby ordered to pay in solidum to the victim Arnold Barcuma the amount of
P25,000 as moral damages and P10,000 as temperate or moderate damages.

Costs de oficio.SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 185710 January 19, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,

vs.
ROMULO TUNIACO, JEFFREY DATULAYTA and ALEX ALEMAN, Accused.
ALEX ALEMAN, Appellant.

This case is about the requirements of a valid extrajudicial confession and the establishment of the existence of corpus
delicti in murder cases.

The Facts and the Case

The city prosecutor of General Santos City charged the accused Romulo Tuniaco, Jeffrey Datulayta, and Alex Aleman
with murder before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of General Santos City in Criminal Case 8370.

Based on the findings of the RTC, in the morning of June 13, 1992 some police officers from the Lagao Police Sub-Station
requested police officer Jaime Tabucon of the Central Police Station of General Santos City homicide division to take the
statement of accused Alex Aleman regarding the slaying of a certain Dondon Cortez. On his arrival at the sub-station,
Tabucon noted the presence of Atty. Ruperto Besinga, Jr. of the Public Attorney’s Office (PAO) who was conversing with
those taken into custody for the offense. When queried if the suspects would be willing to give their statements, Atty.
Besinga said that they were.

Some other police officer first took the statement of accused Jeffrey Datulayta. Officer Tabucon next took the statement of
accused Aleman, whom he observed to be in good physical shape.

Before anything else, officer Tabucon informed accused Aleman in Cebuano of his constitutional right to remain silent and
to the assistance of counsel of his own choice and asked him if he was willing to give a statement. Aleman answered in
the affirmative. When asked if he had any complaint to make, Aleman said that he had none. When Aleman said that he
had no lawyer, Tabucon pointed to Atty. Besinga who claimed that he was assisting all the suspects in the case. Tabucon
warned Aleman that anything he would say may be used against him later in court. Afterwards, the police officer started
taking down Aleman’s statement.

Accused Aleman said that in the course of a drinking bout with accused Datulayta and Tuniaco at around 9 p.m. on June
6, 1992, Dondon Cortez threatened to report his drinking companions’ illegal activities to the police unless they gave him
money for his forthcoming marriage. According to Aleman, Datulayta and Tuniaco had already planned to kill Cortez in
Tupi, South Cotabato, for making the same threats and now they decided to do it. They got Cortez drunk then led him out
supposedly to get the money he needed.

The three accused brought Cortez to Apopong near the dump site and, as they were walking, accused Aleman turned on
Cortez and stabbed him on the stomach. Accused Datulayta, on the other hand, drew out his single shot homemade M16
pistol1 and shot Cortez on the head, causing him to fall. Datulayta handed over the gun to Aleman who fired another shot
on Cortez’s head. Accused Tuniaco used the same gun to pump some bullets into Cortez’s body. Then they covered him
with rice husks.

After taking down the statement, Tabucon explained the substance of it to accused Aleman who then signed it in the
presence of Atty. Besinga.

On June 15, 1992 the police brought Aleman to the City Prosecutor’s Office where he swore to his statement before an
assistant city prosecutor. In the afternoon, accused Datulayta and Aleman led Tabucon, the city prosecutor, and a police
inspector, to the dump site where they left their victim’s body. After some search, the group found a spot covered with
burnt rice husks and a partially burnt body of a man. About a foot from the body, they found the shells of a 5.56 caliber
gun and an armalite rifle.

On being arraigned, all three accused, assisted by Atty. Besinga, pleaded not guilty to the murder charge. After the
prosecution rested its case, accused Tuniaco filed a demurrer to evidence which the Court granted, resulting in the
dismissal of the case against him. On being re-arraigned at his request, accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser
offense of Homicide. The trial court sentenced him to imprisonment of six years and one day and to pay ₱50,000.00 to the
victim’s family.
For some reason, the trial court had Aleman subjected to psychiatric examination at the Davao Mental Hospital. But,
shortly after, the hospital sent word that Aleman had escaped. He was later recaptured. When trial in the case resumed,
Aleman’s new PAO lawyer raised the defense of insanity. This prompted the court to require the Provincial Jail Warden to
issue a certification regarding Aleman’s behavior and mental condition while in jail to determine if he was fit to stand trial.
The warden complied, stating that Aleman had been observed to have good mental condition and did not commit any
infraction while in jail.

Although the prosecution and defense stipulated that Atty. Besinga assisted accused Aleman during the taking of his
extrajudicial confession, the latter, however, recanted what he said to the police during the trial. He testified that sometime
in 1992, some police officers took him from his aunt’s house in Purok Palen, Labangal, General Santos City, and brought
him to the Lagao police station. He was there asked to admit having taken part in the murder of Cortez. When he refused,
they tortured him until he agreed to sign a document admitting his part in the crime.

Accused Aleman also testified that he could not remember having been assisted by Atty. Besinga during the police
investigation. He even denied ever knowing the lawyer. Aleman further denied prior association with accused Tuniaco and
Datulayta. He said that he met them only at the city jail where they were detained for the death of Cortez.

On October 8, 2001 the RTC rendered judgment, finding accused Aleman guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged, and sentenced him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua. The court also ordered him to pay death
indemnity of ₱70,000.00 and moral damages of ₱50,000.00 to the heirs of Cortez.

On appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311, the court rendered judgment on January 21, 2008,
affirming the decision of the RTC with the modification that directed accused Aleman and Datulayta to indemnify the heirs
of Cortez, jointly and severally, in the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱50,000.00 as moral damages;
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages; and ₱25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Aleman appealed to this Court.

The Issues Presented

Accused Aleman raises two issues: a) whether or not the prosecution was able to present evidence of corpus delicti; and
b) whether or not accused Aleman’s extrajudicial confession is admissible in evidence.

The Rulings of the Court

1. Corpus delicti has been defined as the body, foundation, or substance of a crime. The evidence of a dead body with a
gunshot wound on its back would be evidence that murder has been committed. 2 Corpus delicti has two elements: (a) that
a certain result has been established, for example, that a man has died and (b) that some person is criminally responsible
for it.3 The prosecution is burdened to prove corpus delicti beyond reasonable doubt either by direct evidence or by
circumstantial or presumptive evidence.4

The defense claims that the prosecution failed to prove corpus delicti since it did not bother to present a medical
certificate identifying the remains found at the dump site and an autopsy report showing such remains sustained gunshot
and stab wounds that resulted in death; and the shells of the guns used in killing the victim.

But corpus delicti need not be proved by an autopsy report of the dead victim’s body or even by the testimony of the
physician who examined such body.5 While such report or testimony is useful for understanding the nature of the injuries
the victim suffered, they are not indispensable proof of such injuries or of the fact of death. 6 Nor is the presentation of the
murder weapons also indispensable since the physical existence of such weapons is not an element of the crime of
murder.7

Here, the police authorities found the remains of Cortez at the place pointed to by accused Aleman. That physical
confirmation, coming after his testimony of the gruesome murder, sufficiently establishes the corpus delicti of the crime. Of
course, that statement must be admissible in evidence.

2. There is no reason for it not to be. Confession to be admissible must be a) voluntary; b) made with the assistance of a
competent and independent counsel; c) express; and d) in writing. 8 These requirements were met here. A lawyer, not
working with or was not beholden to the police, Atty. Besinga, assisted accused Aleman during the custodial investigation.
Officer Tabucon testified that he saw accused Aleman, before the taking of his statement, conversing with counsel at the
police station. Atty. Besinga did not dispute this claim.
Aleman alleges torture as the reason for the execution of the confession. The appellate court is correct in ruling that such
allegation is baseless. It is a settled rule that where the defendant did not present evidence of compulsion, where he did
not institute any criminal or administrative action against his supposed intimidators, where no physical evidence of
violence was presented, all these will be considered as indicating voluntariness.9 Here, although Aleman claimed that he
bore torture marks on his head, he never brought this to the attention of his counsel, his relatives, or the prosecutor who
administered his oath.

Accused Aleman claims, citing People v. Galit,10 that long questions followed by monosyllabic answers do not satisfy the
requirement that the accused is amply informed of his rights. But this does not apply here. Tabucon testified that he spoke
to Aleman clearly in the language he knew. Aleman, joined by Atty. Besinga, even signed a certification that the
investigator sufficiently explained to him his constitutional rights and that he was still willing to give his statement.

Further, Aleman asserts that he was lacking in education and so he did not fully realize the consequences of a
confession. But as the CA said, no law or jurisprudence requires the police officer to ascertain the educational attainment
of the accused. All that is needed is an effective communication between the interrogator and the suspect to the end that
the latter is able to understand his rights.11 This appears to have been done in this case.

Moreover, as the lower court noted, it is improbable that the police fabricated Aleman’s confession and just forced him to
sign it. The confession has details that only the person who committed the crime could have possibly known. 12 What is
more, accused Datulayta’s confession corroborate that of Aleman in important details. Under the doctrine of interlocking
confessions, such corroboration is circumstantial evidence against the person implicated in it. 131avvphi1

The Court notes that, when it modified the award of civil damages to the heirs of Cortez, the CA made both accused
Aleman and Datulayta, jointly and severally liable, for the damages as modified. But the appeal by one or more of several
accused cannot affect those who did not appeal, except if the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable
to them.14 Here accused Datulayta pleaded guilty to the lesser offense of homicide and the trial court ordered him to pay
only ₱50,000.00 in civil indemnity to the heirs of Cortez. The CA erred in expanding that liability when he did not appeal
from his conviction.15

IN LIGHT OF THE FOREGOING, the Court AFFIRMS the Court of Appeals’ judgment in CA-G.R. CR-HC 00311 dated
January 21, 2008 against accused Alex Aleman. The Court, however, DELETES from such judgment the portion
increasing the civil liability of accused Jeffrey Datulayta who did not appeal from the RTC decision against him.

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v. ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE a.k.a. "Lapad," accused-
appellant.

For the murder of twenty-four-year old Danilo Laurel, ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE alias "Lapad" was charged and
subsequently convicted by the court a quo and sentenced to reclusion perpetua and ordered to pay the heirs of the
victim P100,000.00 as moral damages, P50,000.00 as temperate damages, and another P50,000.00 as exemplary
damages.1cräläwvirtualibräry

On 27 January 1989 at around 9:00 o'clock in the evening Danilo Laurel left his house together with Edwin Selda, a visitor
from Bacolod City, to attend a public dance at Rizal St., Mag-asawang Taytay, Hinigaran, Negros Occidental. Two (2)
hours later, or around 11:00 o'clock that evening, Danilo asked Edwin to take a short break from dancing to attend to their
personal necessities outside the dance hall. Once outside, they decided to have a drink and bought two (2) bottles of Gold
Eagle beer at a nearby store.

Not long after, Danilo, halfway on his first bottle, left to look for a place to relieve himself. According to Edwin, he was only
about three (3) meters from Danilo who was relieving himself when a short, dark bearded man walked past him,
approached Danilo and stabbed him at the side. Danilo retaliated by striking his assailant with a half-filled bottle of beer.
Almost simultaneously, a group of men numbering about seven (7), ganged up on Danilo and hit him with assorted
weapons, i.e., bamboo poles, stones and pieces of wood. Edwin, who was petrified, could only watch helplessly as Danilo
was being mauled and overpowered by his assailants. Danilo fell to the ground and died before he could be given any
medical assistance.

Edwin Selda testified that on 29 January 1989 the police invited him to the Municipal Building of Hinigaran to give his
statement regarding the killing incident and, if necessary, to confirm the identity of the suspect who was then in their
custody. Thereat, he executed an affidavit and affirmed before the police authorities that the man under detention, whom
he later identified as accused Anecito Unlagada, was the same man who stabbed his friend Danilo.

Dr. Rene Ortigas, surgical resident of the Corazon Locsin Montelibano Memorial Hospital, testified that the post-mortem
examination showed that the victim sustained the following injuries: (a) an 8 cm. stab wound, 2nd intercostal space AAL
right directed anteriorly, non-penetrating; (b) an 8 cm. stab wound, 4th intercostal MAL, directed postero-medially, non-
penetrating; (c) an 8 cm. stab wound, 6th intercostal space, mid-clavicular line, directed postero-caudially, penetrating
diaphragm and right dome of liver causing massive hemorrhage, sequestered at right hemithorax and abdomen; (d) an 8
cm. stab wound, 6th intercostal space, mid-clavicular line left, directed postero-laterally, non-penetrating; (e) an 8 cm.
lacerated wound, antero-lateral aspect right thigh; (f) a multiple contusion hematoma, postero-medial aspect left elbow;
and, (g) a multilinear abrasion, zygomatic area left face. Dr. Ortigas opined that wound No. 3 proved to be the only fatal
injury which lacerated the diaphragm and right dome of the liver resulting in massive hemorrhage.

The defense presented a different picture of the story. Guglielmo Laurel testified that on the evening of 27 January 1989
he was at the dance hall when he met accused Anecito Unlagada. He was all by himself. On the same occasion,
according to Guglielmo he also met Danilo Laurel and three (3) other companions although only Edwin Selda was
introduced to him. Soon after, Danilo and his friends left the dance hall to drink liquor. An hour or so later, Danilo's group
returned to the dance hall. An altercation ensued when the gatekeeper refused them entry without a gate pass. From his
vantage point of about forty (40) meters away, Guglielmo observed that a rumble erupted. From a distance, he saw a
man, whom he later recognized as Danilo Laurel, fall to the ground. He however belied having seen the accused Anecito
Unlagada anywhere near the scene of the crime. By his account, the melee broke up only when a policeman fired a
warning shot in the air and the protagonists scampered away.

On cross-examination, however, Guglielmo Laurel asserted positively that accused Unlagada was inside the dance hall
before, during and after the rumble, and stayed there even after a policeman fired a warning shot. This testimony of
witness Guglielmo was corroborated by defense witnesses Jaime Umbiga and Mariano Salazar.

PO3 Jomarie Sarrosa narrated that at around 11:30 in the evening of 27 January 1989 he was inside his house
entertaining some visitors when suddenly he heard frantic shouts, "fight, fight!" Answering the call of duty, he took his
service pistol, went outside and fired a warning shot in the air to break up the fight that was going on some fifty (50)
meters away. Instinctively, the protagonists broke up and scampered away. When he went near the place of the
disturbance, he noticed a man with a deformed hand sprawled on the ground. He however clarified that he described the
place as dark because there were no street lights.

PO3 Sarrosa lifted the prostrate body of the victim and asked a barangay tanod to stay with the victim as he would call a
tricycle to seek emergency medical assistance. According to him, he caused the incident to be entered into the police
blotter while Pfc. Tady and Cpl. Taal investigated the killing incident. The investigators informed him the following morning
that they already had a suspect by the name of "Lapad." He volunteered to look for the suspect since he knew him.

Accused Anecito Unlagada testifying in his defense, recounted that at around 10:00 o'clock in evening of 27 January 1989
while he was inside the dance hall, an altercation ensued near the gate between the gatekeeper and a group of four (4)
individuals who, despite their disruptive behavior, were eventually allowed to get through the gate. At around 11:00
o'clock, a gunshot suddenly rang out. From the people around he learned that a rumble had taken place and that
somebody was killed. But he came to learn the victim's identity only the following morning when he and a certain Lorenzo
Patos were brought by a police officer to the Municipal Building for questioning. At the Municipal Building, he heard
somebody asking who "Lapad" was and an alleged eyewitness, who later turned out to be Edwin Selda, pointed to him as
the man referred to by that name. Anecito Unlagada and Lorenzo Patos were put in jail and a complaint was filed against
them before the Municipal Trial Court of Hinigaran. Meanwhile the case against Lorenzo was dismissed leaving Aniceto
alone to face the charge of murder.

The trial court gave full credence to the inculpatory testimony of prosecution witness Edwin Selda because he was only
three (3) meters away from the victim when the latter was stabbed to death. If it was true, according to the trial court, that
at the Municipal Building Edwin readily identified the person of accused "Lapad" as the suspect, it was not by reason of
any unlawful suggestion but a spontaneous confirmation of his observation of the perpetrator as vividly recalled by him.

The trial court dismissed as incredible the alibi of the accused and the testimonies of the defense witnesses negating
Anecito's culpability. The trial court explained that it was highly unusual that the defense witnesses had their attention
focused on the accused all the time since they were there to witness and enjoy the dance, characterizing their testimonies
as a mere ploy concocted to weave a picture of an innocent man in the person of the accused. 2cräläwvirtualibräry

Accused Anecito Unlagada now assails his conviction on the ground that it was error for the trial court to give full faith and
credence to the lone and uncorroborated testimony of witness Edwin Selda, and in finding that the crime of murder was
committed instead of "death caused in a tumultuous affray" under Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code.

In an attempt to discredit the lone eyewitness, accused-appellant posits the view that the circumstances of the place, the
swiftness of the attack, and the drunken state of the witness engender serious doubt that the witness positively identified
the malefactor.

At the epicenter of most criminal cases is the issue of credibility of the witnesses. In the instant case, a thorough review of
the records however reveals no plausible reason to disbelieve the prosecution eyewitness. It will be recalled that when the
fatal stabbing occurred, Edwin was only three (3) meters away from both the victim and his attacker, as opposed to the
defense witnesses who were standing fifty (50) or so meters away. Edwin's physical proximity to the main protagonists
and the locus criminis afforded him the unenviable position of observing the ghastly crime at very close range. The time
the accused passed in front of Edwin and when he mercilessly stabbed Danilo may be a fleeting moment but such was
sufficient to make a vivid and lasting impression of the bearded perpetrator's image specially so since the victim was a
friend and a companion.

Neither can we accommodate accused-appellant's defense of alibi. Basic is the rule that the defense of alibi should be
rejected when the identity of the accused has been sufficiently and positively established by an eyewitness because alibi
cannot prevail over the positive identification.3 Since no improper motive has been ascribed to Edwin Selda, it creates the
presumption that no such motive in fact existed. In the absence of any evidence showing why the prosecution witness
would have testified falsely, the logical conclusion is that no such improper motive existed and that the testimony is worthy
of full faith and credit.4 The findings and conclusions of the trial court on the credibility of the witness being unblemished
by arbitrariness and capriciousness, this Court is bound to accord them great weight and even finality on appeal.

But, accused-appellant claims that the lower court erred in convicting him of murder qualified by treachery and not "death
in a tumultuous affray."

"Death in a tumultuous affray" is defined in Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code as follows:

Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall
be punished by prision mayor.
A tumultuous affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons who engage in a confused and
tumultuous manner, in the course of which a person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be
ascertained.5 The quarrel in the instant case is between a distinct group of individuals, one of whom was sufficiently
identified as the principal author of the killing, as against a common, particular victim. It is not, as the defense suggests, a
"tumultuous affray" within the meaning of Art. 251 of The Revised Penal Code, that is, a melee or free-for-all, where
several persons not comprising definite or identifiable groups attack one another in a confused and disorganized manner,
resulting in the death or injury of one or some of them.

Verily, the attack was qualified by treachery. The deceased was relieving himself, fully unaware of any danger to his
person when suddenly the accused walked past witness Edwin Selda, approached the victim and stabbed him at the side.
There was hardly any risk at all to accused-appellant; the attack was completely without warning, the victim was caught by
surprise, and given no chance to put up any defense.

The penalty for murder under Art. 248 of The Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death.
Absent any aggravating or mitigating circumstance, the penalty should be imposed in its medium period which, as
correctly imposed by the court a quo, is reclusion perpetua.

The civil aspect of the case should however be modified in consonance with prevailing jurisprudence. In addition
to P50,000.00 as civil indemnity, the heirs of the decedent are entitled to a reduced amount of P50,000.00 as moral
damages, while temperate damages of P50,000.00 and exemplary damages of another P50,000.00 should be deleted for
lack of factual and legal basis.

WHEREFORE, the Decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with the following MODIFICATION: Accused-appellant
ANECITO UNLAGADA y SUANQUE a.k.a. "Lapad" is ordered to pay the heirs of the deceased Danilo Laurel P50,000.00
as civil indemnity, plus moral damages in the reduced amount of P50,000.00. Costs against accused-appellant.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 213792 June 22, 2015

GUILLERMO WACOY y BITOL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent,

x-----------------------x

G.R. No. 213886

JAMES QUIBAC y RAFAEL, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Assailed in these consolidated petitions for review on certiorari 1 are the Decision2 dated December 6, 2013 and the
Resolution3 dated July 21, 2014 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078, which, inter alia, found
petitioners Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol (Wacoy) and James Quibac Rafael (Quibac) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of Homicide.

The Facts

In an Information dated June 10, 2004, Wacoy and Quibac were charged with the crime of Homicide, defined and
penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), before the Regional Trial Court of Benguet, Branch 10
(RTC), as follows:

That on or about the 11th day of April 2004, at Ambongdolan, Municipality of Tublay, Province of Benguet, Philippines,
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring, confederating and mutually
aiding each other, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, maul and kick
the stomach of one ELNER ARO y LARUAN, thereby inflicting upon him blunt traumatic injuries which directly caused his
death thereafter.

That the offense committed was attended by the aggravating circumstance of superior strength. CONTRARY TO LAW.4

According to prosecution witness Edward Benito (Benito), at around 3 o'clock in the afternoon of April 11, 2004, he was
eating corn at a sari-sari store located at Bungis Ambongdolan, Tublay, Benguet, when he heard a commotion at a nearby
establishment. Upon checking what the ruckus was all about, he saw his cousin, Elner Aro (Aro), already sprawled on the
ground. While in that position, he saw Wacoy kick Aro's stomach twice, after which, Wacoy picked up a rock to throw at
Aro but was restrained from doing so. As Aro stood up, Quibac punched him on the stomach, causing him to collapse and
cry in pain. Thereafter, Aro was taken to the hospital.5

At the hospital, Aro was diagnosed to be suffering from "blunt abdominal trauma with injury to the jejunum" and was set
for operation. It was then discovered that he sustained a perforation on his ileum, i.e., the point where the small and large
intestines meet, that caused intestinal bleeding, and that his entire abdominal peritoneum was filled with air and fluid
contents from the bile. However, Aro suffered cardiac arrest during the operation, and while he was revived through
cardiopulmonary resuscitation, he lapsed into a coma after the operation.6

Due to financial constraints, Aro was taken out of the hospital against the doctor's orders and eventually, died the next
day. While Aro's death certificate indicated that the cause of his

death was "cardiopulmonary arrest antecedent to a perforated ileum and generalized peritonitis secondary to mauling," an
autopsy performed on his remains revealed that the cause of his death was "rupture of the aorta secondary to blunt
traumatic injuries."7

In their defense, herein petitioners, Wacoy and Quibac, denied the charge against them. They averred that while playing
pool, they saw Aro drunk and lying down. Suddenly, Aro became unruly and kicked the leg of the pool table, causing
Wacoy to shout and pick up a stone to throw at Aro but Quibac pacified him. They also claimed that Aro almost hit Wacoy
with a 2x3 piece of wood if not for Quibac' s intervention. Wacoy ran but Aro chased him and then tripped and fell to the
ground. Quiniquin Carias (Kinikin), Aro's companion, followed Wacoy to the waiting shed nearby, cornered and kicked the
latter, and the two engaged in a fist fight. Quibac came over to pacify the two and told Wacoy to go home. 8
The RTC Ruling In a Judgment9 dated February 28, 2011, the RTC found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray under Article 251 of the RPC and, accordingly, sentenced
them to suffer the penalty of imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six (6) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional, as minimum, to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor , as maximum, and ordered them to pay
Aro's heirs the amounts of ₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and ₱50,000.00
as moral damages.10

The RTC found that Benito's testimony on the mauling incident does not firmly establish that Wacoy and Quibac conspired
in the killing of Aro, and that the medical reports were neither categorical in stating that the injuries Aro sustained from the
mauling directly contributed to his death. 11

In this relation, it opined that "[a]s conspiracy was not proven and the prosecution has failed to show the extent and effect
of injury [that Wacoy and Quibac] personally inflicted on [Aro] that led to his death xx x," Wacoy and Quibac should be
held criminally liable for the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray and not for Homicide. 12

Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac appealed to the CA.13

The CA Ruling

In a Decision14 dated December 6, 2013, the CA modified Wacoy and Quibac's conviction to that of Homicide under
A1iicle 249 of the RPC with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong, and accordingly
adjusted their prison term to an indeterminate period of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to
twelve (12) years and one ( 1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum. Further, the CA also imposed a legal interest of six
percent ( 6%) per annum on the damages awarded by the RTC pursuant to prevailing jurisprudence. 15

In so ruling, the CA gave credence to Benito's simple, direct, and straightforward testimony. In this relation, it observed
that the mere fact that Benito is Aro's cousin should not militate against his credibility since there was no proof that his
testimony was driven by any ill motive.16 However, contrary to the RTC's findings, the CA ruled that Wacoy and Quibac
should not be convicted of the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray since there were only (2) persons who
inflicted harm on the victim, and that there was no tumultuous affray involving several persons. Instead, they were
convicted of the crime of Homicide, with the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit so grave a wrong
appreciated as it was shown that the purpose of their assault on Aro was only to maltreat or inflict physical harm on him. 17

Aggrieved, Wacoy and Quibac separately moved for reconsideration. 18 In a Resolution19 dated July 21, 2014, the CA
denied Quibac's motions for reconsideration;20 hence, the instant petitions.

The Issue Before the Court

The core issue for the Court's resolution is whether or not the CA correctly found Wacoy and Quibac guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Homicide.

The Court's Ruling

The petition is without merit.

At the outset, it must be stressed that in criminal cases, an appeal throws the entire case wide open for review and the
reviewing tribunal can correct errors, though unassigned in the appealed judgment, or even reverse the trial court's
decision based on grounds other than those that the parties raised as errors. The appeal confers upon the appellate court
full jurisdiction over the case and renders such court competent to examine records, revise the judgment appealed from,
increase the penalty, and cite the proper provision of the penal law. 21

Proceeding from the foregoing, the Court agrees with the CA's ruling modifying Wacoy and Quibac' s conviction from
Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray to that of Homicide, as will be explained hereunder.

Article 251 of the RPC defines and penalizes the crime of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray as follows:

Art. 251. Death caused in a tumultuous affray. - When, while several persons, not composing groups organized for the
common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally, quarrel and assault each other in a confused and
tumultuous manner, and in the course of the affray someone is killed, and it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the
deceased, but the person or persons who inflicted serious physical injuries can be identified, such person or persons shall
be punished by prision mayor.

If it cannot be determined who inflicted the serious physical injuries on the deceased, the penalty of prision correccional in
its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon all those who shall have used violence upon the person of the
victim.

The elements of Death Caused in a Tumultuous Affray are as follows: (a) that there be several persons; (b) that they did
not compose groups organized for the common purpose of assaulting and attacking each other reciprocally; (c) that these
several persons quarrelled and assaulted one another in a confused and tumultuous manner; (d) that someone was killed
in the course of the affray; (e) that it cannot be ascertained who actually killed the deceased; and (j) that the person or
persons who inflicted serious physical injuries or who used violence can be identified. 22 Based on case law, a tumultuous
affray takes place when a quarrel occurs between several persons and they engage in a confused and tumultuous affray,
in the course of which some person is killed or wounded and the author thereof cannot be ascertained.23

On the other hand, the crime of Homicide is defined and penalized under Article 249 of the RPC, which reads:

Art. 249. Homicide. - Any person who, not falling within the provisions of Article 246, shall kill another, without the
attendance of any of the circumstances enumerated in the next preceding article, shall be deemed guilty of homicide and
be punished by reclusion temporal. The elements of Homicide are the following: (a) a person was killed; (b) the accused
killed him without any justifying circumstance; (c) the accused had the intention to kill, which is presumed; and (d) the
killing was not attended by any of the qualifying circumstances of Murder, or by that of Parricide or Infanticide.24

In the instant case, there was no tumultuous affray between groups of persons in the course of which Aro
died.1âwphi1 On the contrary, the evidence clearly established that there were only two (2) persons, Wacoy and Quibac,
who picked on one defenseless individual, Aro, and attacked him repeatedly, taking turns in inflicting punches and kicks
on the poor victim. There was no confusion and tumultuous quarrel or affray, nor was there a reciprocal aggression in that
fateful incident.25 Since Wacoy and Quibac were even identified as the ones who assaulted Aro, the latter's death cannot
be said to have been caused in a tumultuous affray. 26 Therefore, the CA correctly held that Wacoy and Quibac' s act of
mauling Aro was the proximate cause27 of the latter's death; and as such, they must be held criminally liable therefore,
specifically for the crime of Homicide.

On this note, the Court does not find merit in Wacoy's contention that in view of their intent only to inflict slight physical
injuries on Aro, they should only be meted the corresponding penalty therefore in its maximum period,28 pursuant to
Article 49 of the RPC. The said provision reads:

Art. 49. Penalty to be imposed upon the principals when the crime committed is different from that intended. - In cases in
which the felony committed is different from that which the offender intended to commit, the following rules shall be
observed.

1. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be higher than that corresponding to the offense which the
accused intended to commit, the penalty corresponding to the latter shall be imposed in its maximum period.

2. If the penalty prescribed for the felony committed be lower than that corresponding to the one which the
accused intended to commit, the penalty for the former shall be imposed in its maximum period.

3. The rule established by the next preceding paragraph shall not be applicable if the acts committed by the guilty
person shall also constitute an attempt or frustration of another crime, if the law prescribes a higher penalty for
either of the latter offenses, in which case the penalty provided for the attempt or the frustrated crime shall be
imposed in the maximum period.

Jurisprudence instructs that such provision should only apply where the crime committed is different from that intended
and where the felony committed befalls a different person (error in personae); and not to cases where more serious
consequences not intended by the offender result from his felonious act (praeter intentionem),29

as in this case. It is well-settled that if the victim dies because of a deliberate act of the malefactors, intent to kill is
conclusively presumed.30 In such case, even if there is no intent to kill, the crime is Homicide because with respect to
crimes of personal violence, the penal law looks particularly to the material results following the unlawful act and holds the
aggressor responsible for all the consequences thereof.31
Be that as it may, the penalty for the crime of Homicide must be imposed in its minimum period due to the presence of the
mitigating circumstance of lack of intention to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of the RPC in favor of Wacoy
and Quibac, as correctly appreciated by the CA. In determining the presence of this circumstance, it must be considered
that since intention is a mental process and is an internal state of mind, the accused's intention must be judged by his
conduct and external overt acts.32 In this case, the aforesaid mitigating circumstance is available to Wacoy and Quibac,
given the absence of evidence showing that, apart from kicking and punching Aro on the stomach, something else had
been done; thus, evincing the purpose of merely maltreating or inflicting physical harm, and not to end the life of Aro.

Anent the proper penalty to be imposed on Wacoy and Quibac, the CA correctly imposed the penalty of imprisonment for
an indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one ( 1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1)
day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, taking into consideration the provisions of the Indeterminate Sentence Law.

Finally, the awards of civil indemnity and moral damages in the original amount of ₱50,000.00 each are increased to
₱75,000.00 each in order to conform with prevailing jurisprudence. 33 All other awards, as well as the imposition of interest
at the rate of six percent ( 6%) per annum on all the monetary awards from the date of finality of judgment until the same
are fully paid, are retained.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated December 6, 2013 and the Resolution dated July 21, 2014 of
the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 34078 are hereby AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION. Accordingly, petitioners
Guillermo Wacoy y Bitol and James Quibac y Rafael are found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Homicide defined and penalized under Article 249 of the Revised Penal Code with the mitigating circumstance of lack of
intent to commit so grave a wrong under Article 13 (3) of the same Code. They are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
imprisonment for an indeterminate period of six ( 6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12)
years and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, and ordered to pay the heirs of Elner Aro the amounts of
₱25,000.00 as temperate damages, ₱75,000.00 as civil indemnity ex delicto, and ₱75,000.00 as moral damages, all with
interest at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this Decision until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 131421 November 18, 2002

GERONIMO DADO, petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

Before us is a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the June 26, 1997 decision of the Court of
Appeals1 in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886, which affirmed the decision2 dated April 22, 1994, of the Regional Trial Court of
Sultan Kudarat, Branch 19, in Criminal Case No. 2056, finding petitioner Geronimo Dado and his co-accused Francisco
Eraso guilty of the crime of homicide.

In an Information dated August 24, 1993, petitioner Geronimo Dado and accused Francisco Eraso were charged with
murder allegedly committed as follows:

That in the evening of May 25, 1992, at Sitio Paitan, Barangay Sagasa, Municipality of Esperanza, Province of Sultan
Kudarat, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with firearms, with intent
to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack, assault and
shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot wounds upon the
latter which caused his instantaneous death.

CONTRARY TO LAW, particularly Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, with the aggravating
circumstance of taking advantage of superior strength. 3

Upon arraignment on September 22, 1992, petitioner and his co-accused pleaded not guilty.4 Trial thereafter followed.

The antecedent facts as narrated by prosecution witnesses Alfredo Balinas5 and Rufo Alga6 are as follows: On the night of
May 25, 1992, the Esperanza, Sultan Kudarat Police Station formed three teams to intercept cattle rustlers from Barangay
Laguinding, Sultan Kudarat. The team, composed of petitioner SPO4 Geromino Dado and CAFGU members Francisco
Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and Rufo Alga, waited behind a large dike at Sitio Paitan, Sultan Kudarat. Alfredo Balinas and
Rufo Alga, who were both armed with M14 armalite rifles, positioned themselves between petitioner, who was armed with
a caliber .45 pistol, and accused Francisco Eraso, who was carrying an M16 armalite rifle. They were all facing
southwards in a half-kneeling position and were about 2 arms length away from each other. At around 11:00 of the same
evening, the team saw somebody approaching at a distance of 50 meters. Though it was a moonless night, they noticed
that he was half-naked. When he was about 5 meters away from the team, Alfredo Balinas noticed that Francisco Eraso,
who was on his right side, was making some movements. Balinas told Eraso to wait, but before Balinas could beam his
flash light, Eraso fired his M16 armalite rifle at the approaching man. Immediately thereafter, petitioner, who was on the
left side of Rufo Alga, fired a single shot from his .45 caliber pistol. The victim shouted, "Tay Dolfo, ako ini," ("Tay Dolfo,
[this is] me")7 as he fell on the ground. The victim turned out to be Silvestre "Butsoy" Balinas, the nephew of Alfredo
Balinas and not the cattle rustler the team were ordered to intercept. Repentant of what he did, accused Eraso embraced
Alfredo Balinas saying, "Pare, this was not intentionally done and this was merely an accident." 8

Silvestre Balinas died as a result of the gunshot wounds he sustained. The post-mortem examination conducted on his
cadaver by Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor, yielded the following results:

Gunshot wounds located at:

1. (Point of Entry) - at right outer lateral arm with a diameter of 0.25 cm coursing tangentially and exiting at the
right inner arm, about 4 cm below the elbow, 2.5 cm by 3cm in diameter (Point of Exit).

No powder burns noted.

2. (Point of Entry) – 2.5 by 9.5 cm in diameter at upper mid-inner thigh, about 5 cm from the ischial spine.
Exposed were the damaged muscles, blood vessels and the surrounding tissues along the femoral triangle. The
wound coursed upwards toward the pelvic area through the inguinal canal with blast injuries noted [at] the urinary
bladder prostate gland, urethra, part of the ureter, the mid-pelvic bone (symphysis pubis), and the surrounding
vessels and tissues of the pelvis. Marked bleeding was noted along the injured pelvic area. Three (3) pieces of
irregularly shaped metallic slugs were recovered from the body; one, silvery colored, along the iliac spine almost
glued to the bone; two, copper colored, embedded in the urinary bladder substance; three, copper colored,
embedded in blasted substance almost on the pelvic floor. Hematoma noted along the penile area.
 No other injuries noted.9

Dr. Rhodora T. Antenor testified that the fatal wound that caused the death of the victim was the one inflicted on
the mid-inner thigh. The bullet pierced through and injured the organs in the pelvic region where she found three
irregularly shaped metallic fragments. Dr. Antenor added that the position of the victim at that time of the shooting
was higher than the assailant considering that the trajectory of the bullets was upwards. She added that the
wound on the victim’s right outer lateral arm alone, would not bring about death, unless not immediately treated.10

Upon examination by NBI Ballistician Elmer Nelson D. Piedad, the three metallic fragments recovered from the fatal
wound of the victim turned out to be fragments of a 5.56 mm jacketed bullet, thus:

FINDINGS AND CONCLUSION:

xxxxxxxxx

1. Evidence marked "SB-1" is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56mm jacketed bullet and was fired through the
barrel of a caliber 5.56mm firearms.

2. Evidence marked "SB-2" and "SB-3" could be parts of the lead core of evidence copper jacketed marked "SB-1".

x x x x x x x x x.11

On cross-examination, he declared that he is not sure whether the 2 other metallic fragments (marked as exhibit "SB-2"
and "SB-3") recovered from the fatal wound of the victim are indeed parts of "SB-1" which is a part of a copper jacket of a
caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet.12

For his part, petitioner testified that on the night of the incident, he was armed with a .45 caliber pistol. He claimed that
while waiting for the cattle rustlers, he and his team positioned themselves beneath a big hole from which a big tree had
been uprooted. He was facing eastward while his companions, CAFGU members, Francisco Eraso, Alfredo Balinas, and
Rufo Alga, were facing southwards. When he heard rapid gun bursts, he thought they were being fired upon by their
enemies, thus, he immediately fired a single shot eastward. It was only when accused Eraso embraced and asked
forgiveness from Alfredo Balinas, that he realized somebody was shot. 13

On cross-examination however, he admitted that he knew the rapid gun burst which he thought to be from their enemies
came from 2 meters behind him. He explained that his arm was then broken making it difficult for him to move. Thus,
when he heard the gun burst, he did not turn to face the source thereof and instead fired his .45 caliber pistol in front of
him. He declared that his purpose in firing his .45 caliber pistol opposite the source of the rapid gun burst was to
demoralize their enemy.14

On April 22, 1994, the trial court convicted petitioner and accused Eraso of the crime of homicide. The dispositive portion
thereof reads:

WHEREFORE, upon all the foregoing considerations, the Court finds the accused, SPO4 Geronimo Dado and Francisco
Eraso, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of HOMICIDE.

ACCORDINGLY, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the Court hereby sentences the accused, SPO4 Geronimo
Dado and Francisco Eraso, to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment, ranging from EIGHT (8) YEARS and ONE
(1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum, to FOURTEEN (14) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1) DAY of reclusion
temporal, as maximum; to indemnify jointly and severally the heirs of the late Silvestre Balinas, Jr.:

a) the amount of P3,000.00 as actual damages which was duly established in relation to the expenses incurred
for the complete funeral services given to the deceased victim;

b) the amount of P15,000.00, as moral damages;

c) the amount of P10,000.00, as exemplary damages;

d) the amount of P50,000.00, as indemnity for death; and to pay the costs.
IT IS SO ORDERED.15

The aforesaid judgment of conviction was affirmed by the Court of Appeals on June 26, 1997. 16

A petition for review17 was filed by accused Francisco Eraso but the same was denied in a Resolution dated February 11,
1998,18 which became final and executory on March 30, 1998.19 Hence, as regards Francisco Eraso, the decision of the
Court of Appeals finding him guilty of homicide has become final.

Petitioner, on the other hand, filed the instant petition contending that the trial court and the Court of Appeals erred: (1) in
ruling that he acted in conspiracy with accused Francisco Eraso; and (2) in finding him guilty of homicide on the basis of
the evidence presented by the prosecution.

In convicting the petitioner, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals found that conspiracy attended the commission of
the crime. The Court of Appeals ruled that petitioner and accused Eraso conspired in killing the deceased, thus, it is no
longer necessary to establish who caused the fatal wound inasmuch as conspiracy makes the act of one conspirator the
act of all.

A reading, however, of the information filed against petitioner will readily show that the prosecution failed to allege the
circumstance of conspiracy. Pertinent portion of the information states: " x x x the said accused, armed with firearms, with
intent to kill, with evident premeditation and treachery, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, attack,
assault and shot one SILVESTRE BALINAS with the use of the afore-mentioned weapons, thereby inflicting gunshot
wounds upon the latter which caused his instantaneous death. x x x" Undoubtedly, the information does not satisfy the
requirement that conspiracy must be conveyed in "appropriate language." 20 The words "conspired," "confederated," or the
phrase "acting in concert" or "in conspiracy," or their synonyms or derivatives do not appear in the indictment. The
language used by the prosecution in charging the petitioner and his co-accused contains no reference to conspiracy
which must be alleged, not merely inferred from the information. Absent particular statements in the accusatory portion of
the charge sheet concerning any definitive act constituting conspiracy, the same cannot be considered against the
petitioner who must perforce be held accountable only for his own acts or omissions.21 In all criminal prosecutions, the
accused shall first be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. To ensure that the due process
rights of an accused are observed, every indictment must embody the essential elements of the crime charged with
reasonable particularity as to the name of the accused, the time and place of commission of the offense, and the
circumstances thereof.22

Moreover, even if conspiracy was sufficiently alleged in the information, the same cannot be considered against the
petitioner. Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. Although the agreement need not be directly proven, circumstantial evidence of such agreement
must nonetheless be convincingly shown. Indeed, like the offense itself, conspiracy must be proved beyond reasonable
doubt. Thus, it has been held that neither joint nor simultaneous action is per se sufficient proof of conspiracy.23

In the case at bar, petitioner and accused Eraso’s seemingly concerted and almost simultaneous acts were more of a
spontaneous reaction rather than the result of a common plan to kill the victim. Simultaneity alone would not be enough to
demonstrate the concurrence of will or the unity of action and purpose that could be the basis for collective responsibility
of two or more individuals particularly if, as in the case at bar, the incident occurred at the spur of the moment. In
conspiracy, there should be a conscious design to perpetrate the offense. 24

Thus, petitioner can only be held responsible for the acts or omissions which can be proved to have been committed by
him personally. In other words, his criminal accountability, if any, should be determined on an individual rather than on a
collective basis. Petitioner could not be made to answer for the acts done by his co-accused, Franciso Eraso, unless it be
shown that he participated directly and personally in the commission of those acts. It becomes important therefore to
determine whether petitioner inflicted the fatal wound that directly caused the death of the victim.

The trial court found that a .45 caliber bullet will create a bigger entrance wound as compared to a 5.56 mm. bullet which
is of a lower caliber. It concluded that the wound on the inner thigh of the victim must have been caused by a .45 caliber
bullet because said wound had a bigger entrance than the wound sustained by the victim on the right outer lateral
arm.25 However, this conclusion is entirely devoid of basis because no evidence was presented to substantiate said
conclusions. What is decisive is the result of the Ballistic Examination conducted by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, on
the 3 metallic fragments recovered from the fatal wound of the victim. Piedad found that one of said fragments, marked
"SB-1," "is a part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm. jacketed bullet and was fired through the barrel of a caliber 5.56
mm. firearm,"26 and not a part of a .45 caliber bullet.27 Pertinent portion of his testimony, reads:
ATTY. MONTEFERIO:

Q: You have presented before this Honorable Court [a] piece of paper … marked "A-1". This refer to the very
same Exhibit "A-1"?

A: Yes, sir.

xxxxxxxxx

Q: …Please tell us, how did you arrive in your findings that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56 mm.
jacketed bullet; how did you arrive?

A: In a copper jacket[ed] bullet, there is always [a] copper jacket, that is upper part of the bullet, sir.

Q: How did you arrive at the conclusion that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm.?

A: I carefully examined SB-1 in my report to a copper jacket[ed] bullet fired from [a] 5.56 mm., and I found out that
the lands and grooves of the evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked SB-1 is riflings of the standard 5.56 mm., they
have the same lands and grooves.

Q: Did you utilize instruments in order to determine?

A: A bullet comparison microscope.28

xxxxxxxxx

ATTY. PASOK:

xxxxxxxxx

Q: Mr. witness, being a ballistic expert, you know the composition of the bullet of [a] .45 caliber and that of [an]
armalite?

A: Copper jacket.

Q: The composition on the content of the lead of .45 caliber and that of armalite?

A: We are not in the composition but we are on a caliber (sic).

Q: With that answer, it may be possible that this Exhibit "2", SB -1, SB-2 and SB-3, could be bullet from a caliber
.45, M-14 or M-16?

A: It could not be possible. SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and the lead core evidenced (sic) marked
SB-2 and SB-3 could be parts of the copper jacket evidenced (sic) marked SB-1.29

xxxxxxxxx

Q: Look at your Certification and in Exhibit "3-A", in page 2 under the column, "Findings and Conclusions" and I
quote: "Evidenced (sic) marked SB-2 and ‘SB-3’ could be parts of the lead core of evidenced (sic) copper jacket
marked [as] ‘SB-1’. My question, you said could be part of copper jacket marked SB-1, are you telling the Court,
you are sure that this Exhibits "SB-2" and "SB-3" [are] not … part of a copper . . . jacket marked as SB-1?

A: It could be parts or it could not be parts.

Q: You are in doubt that this is really part of SB-1?

A: It could be part, I am doubting.

COURT:

Q: If it could not be parts of the lead core of the copper jacket of 5.56 mm. caliber ammunition, would you say that
the same would be part of the lead core of the copper jacket of a different caliber or ammunition?

A: The copper jacket is parts (sic) of the caliber 5.56 and the lead core could be parts. We cannot evidently
conclude. It could be parts of copper jacket evidenced marked SB-1.

There is no basis.

COURT:

Q: You are saying that practically, any ammunition has copper jacket?

A: The caliber 5.56 mm. there is copper jacket (sic) but something in caliber .38 copper jacket, rubber putted and
lead (sic).

Q: How about .45 firearm?

A: The caliber .45, they are copper jacketed bullet or copper putted (sic) or lead.

Q: The same thing with 5.56 mm.?

A: Yes. All jacketed, 5.56 are all jacketed.

COURT:

Q: That is the reason why you said that your findings and conclusion that the evidenced (sic) marked as SB-2 and
SB-3 could be possibly parts of the lead core or the evidenced (sic) copper jacket marked as SB-1?

A: Could be, Your Honor.

COURT:

Cross for the prosecution.

FISCAL DE PERALTA:

xxxxxxxxx

Q: A caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, is that correct?

A: Some caliber .45 has copper jacket, some copper putted (sic), some lead.

Q: If a caliber .45 bullet has copper jacket, then why is it that in your findings in Exhibit "2", particularly SB-1, you
made it appear that this is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and not from a .45 caliber?

A: It is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm., sir.

Q: Why did you specifically state that SB-1 is part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm?

A: Because it is only a part of a copper jacket of 5.56 mm… because it is only a part.

COURT:

Q: But you said it could be a part?

 A: It is a part, Your Honor.

FISCAL DE PERALTA:

Q: What is the distinction of copper jacket of 5.56 mm. and copper jacket of .45 caliber?

A: They have the same (sic), but in my findings, I compared that to a caliber 5.56 mm. copper jacket fired from
armalite under a microscope, the lands and grooves of the copper jacket and the standard bullet fired from 5.56.,
they are the same in width.

Q: Did you compare riflings of .45 caliber from the specimen marked SB-1?

A: No need to compare because the caliber .45 lands and grooves is too wide, the lands and grooves of .45
caliber is very wide.

They are not the same.

Q: How about the lands and grooves of a caliber 5.56 mm. compared to a .45 caliber?

A: The caliber 5.56 mm. is smaller but on a caliber .45 are very wide.30

The doubt entertained by NBI Ballistician Elmer D. Piedad, as to whether the 2 other metallic fragments (marked as
exhibit "SB-2" and "SB-3") are indeed parts of the lead core of the "SB-1", which is part of a copper jacket of a caliber 5.56
mm. jacketed bullet, must be resolved in favor of petitioner; that is, said metallic fragments cannot be presumed to be
particles of a .45 caliber bullet fired from the .45 caliber pistol of petitioner. Under equipoise rule, where the evidence on
an issue of fact is in equipoise or there is doubt on which side the evidence preponderates, the party having the burden of
proof loses. The equipoise rule finds application if, as in the present case, the inculpatory facts and circumstances are
capable of two or more explanations, one of which is consistent with the innocence of the accused and the other
consistent with his guilt, for then the evidence does not fulfill the test of moral certainty, and does not suffice to produce a
conviction. Briefly stated, the needed quantum of proof to convict the accused of the crime charged is found lacking. 31

Evidently, the prosecution failed to prove that the metallic fragments found in the fatal wound of the victim are particles of
a .45 caliber bullet that emanated from the .45 caliber pistol fired by petitioner. For this reason, the Court cannot in good
conscience affirm his conviction for the crime of homicide.

In the same vein, petitioner cannot be held responsible for the wound inflicted on the victim’s right outer lateral arm for the
same reason that there is no evidence proving beyond moral certainty that said wound was caused by the bullet fired from
petitioner’s .45 caliber pistol.

Nevertheless, petitioner is not completely without liability. The Court sustains the finding of the trial court that petitioner
fired his .45 caliber pistol towards the victim. From the attendant circumstances, it appears that there is no evidence
tending to prove that petitioner had animus interficendi or intent to kill the victim. Note that the prosecution witnesses did
not see whether petitioner aimed to kill the victim.32 Intent to kill cannot be automatically drawn from the mere fact that the
use of firearms is dangerous to life.33 Animus interficendi must be established with the same degree of certainty as is
required of the other elements of the crime. The inference of intent to kill should not be drawn in the absence of
circumstances sufficient to prove such intent beyond reasonable doubt. 34

Absent an intent to kill in firing the gun towards the victim, petitioner should be held liable for the crime of illegal discharge
of firearm under Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code.35 The elements of this crime are: (1) that the offender discharges
a firearm against or at another person; and (2) that the offender has no intention to kill that person. 36 Though the
information charged the petitioner with murder, he could be validly convicted of illegal discharge of firearm, an offense
which is necessarily included in the crime of unlawful killing of a person. Under Rule 120, Section 4, of the Revised Rules
on Criminal Procedure, when there is a variance between the offense charged in the complaint or information and that
proved, and the offense as charged is included in or necessarily includes the offense proved, the accused shall be
convicted of the offense proved which is included in the offense charged, or the offense charged which is included in the
offense proved.

Pursuant to Article 254 of the Revised Penal Code, illegal discharge of firearm is punishable with prision correccional in its
minimum and medium periods There being no modifying circumstances and applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law,
petitioner should be sentenced to suffer the penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum to two (2) years and
eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the June 26, 1997 decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 16886,
affirming the conviction of petitioner for the crime of homicide is SET ASIDE and petitioner is ACQUITTED of the crime
charged on the ground of reasonable doubt.

A new decision is entered finding petitioner Geronimo Dado guilty of the crime of illegal discharge of firearm and
sentencing him to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six (6) months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two (2) years and
eleven (11) months of prision correccional, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 184355

ARNULFO a.k.a. ARNOLD JACABAN, Petitioner,

vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.

Assailed in this Petition for Review on Certiorari is the Decision1 dated July 30, 2008 of the Court ofAppeals (CA), Cebu
City, which affirmed in toto the decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 13, Cebu City, finding petitioner guilty of
illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1866, as amended by Republic Act
(RA) 8294.

An Information was filed with the RTC, Branch 13, Cebu City2 charging petitioner with violation of PD 1866 as amended
by RA 8294, to wit:

That on or about the 16111 day of July 1999, at about 12:45 A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, did then and there have in his possession and
control the following articles, to wit:

1.One (1) cal. 45 pistol "Llama Gabilondo" with SN515090

2.One (1) stainless magazine for caliber 45 pistol loaded with seven (7) rounds of Live ammunitions for caliber .45

3.Three (3) short magazines for caliber 5.56 mm containing fifty-nine rounds of live ammos

4.Two (2) long magazines for caliber 5.56 mm containing fifty-five (55) rounds of live ammos

5.One (1) Bandoler for caliber 5.56 mm

6.One (1) bullet [links] for caliber 7.62 mm with twenty-eight (28) rounds of live ammos for caliber 7.62 mm

7.One (1) bullet clips for caliber 30 M1 Garrand Rifle containing eight (8) rounds of live ammos

8.One (1) plastic sachet containing five (5) rounds of live ammos for caliber 5.56 mm

9.Six (6) rounds live ammos for caliber 7.62 mm

10.One (1) pair Upper Handguard for caliber 5.56 mm M16 rifle

11.One (1) damage carrying handle for caliber 5.56 rifle.

without first securing the necessary license/permit issued therefor from any competent authority.

Contrary to law.3

On July 19, 1999, petitioner was arraigned and pleaded not guilty to the charge.4

Trial on the merits ensued.

The facts, as found by the Court of Appeals, are as follows:

Evidence for the prosecution established that on July 15, 1999, Police Senior Inspector Ipil H. Dueñas (P/SInsp. Dueñas)
of the now defunct Presidential Anti-Organized Crime Task Force (PAOCTF) filed an Application for Search Warrant
before Branch 22 of the RTC, Cebu City, to search the premises of [appellant's] residence at J. Labra St., Guadalupe,
Cebu City and seize the following items.

One (1) 7.62 cal M-14 Rifle;

 Two (2) 5.56 mm M16 Armalite Rifle;

One (1) 12 gauge Shotgun;

One (1) .45 cal. Pistol;

One (1) .9 mm cal. Pistol

A Search Warrant was then immediately issued to the applicant by Judge Pampio A. Abarintos.

At about 12:45 in the morning of July 16, 1999, the search warrant was implemented by P/S Insp. Dueñas as the team
leader, SPO2 Eric Mendoza, SPO2 Eric Abellana. PO1 Allan Jalagpas, PO3 Epifania Manila Sarte and other members of
the PAOCTF. Before reaching appellant's house, the policemen invited three (3) barangay tanods from Guadalupe's
Barangay outpost to accompany them to the house of the appellant.

Upon arrival to appellant's house, SPO2 Abellana served the search warrant to appellant who was just inside the house
together with his wife and other ladies.1awp++i1 Upon informing appellant of the search warrant, he became angry and
denied having committed any illegal activity. P/SInsp. Dueñas assured appellant that he had nothing to worry about if the
PAOCTF would not find anything.

The team proceeded to search the living room in the presence of three tanods and the appellant himself. The team
continued to search the room where SPO2 Abellana found a calibre .45 placed in the ceiling. Appellant, who was at the
living room that time, rushed to the room and grappled with SPO2 Abellana but failed to get hold of the gun.

After an exhaustive search was done, other firearms and ammunitions were recovered from the searched premises. An
inventory was made at the living room of appellant in the presence of appellant himself, the barangay tanods and other
persons present during the search. After appellant and the witnesses signed the inventory receipt, the team proceeded
back to their office with appellant and the confiscated items.

Police Officer IV Dionisio V. Sultan, Chief Clerk of the Firearms and Explosives Division of the Philippine National Police-
Visayas (FED PNP-Visayas), testified that he prepared a certification dated April 29, 2002. Based on their office's master,
appellant is not licensed to possess any kind of firearm or ammunition.

For the defense, they presented witness Felipenerie Jacaban, older sister of the appellant, who testified as to her
presence during the conduct of the search. According to Felipenerie, at about 12:45 in the morning of July 16, 1999,
policemen conducted a raid in the house of Gabriel Arda (uncle of appellant). The policemen who implemented the
warrant were looking for his brother, herein appellant, so she went to appellant's house and informed him that a raid was
conducted at their uncle's house and policemen were looking for him. When appellant arrived at his uncle's house,
policemen searched around the house and a pistol was subsequently recovered. Felipenerie claims that the recovered
pistol was allegedly pledged by a policeman to her father. She also testified that appellant never made any protest and
merely observed the proceeding.5

On July 12, 2005, the RTC rendered its Decision6 convicting petitioner of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding ACCUSED ARNULFO a.k.a. ARNOLD JACABAN GUILTY of the
crime of violation of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294 and sentences him to a penalty of imprisonment of from SIX (6)
YEARS AND ONE (1) DAY of prision mayor, as minimum to SIX (6) YEARS AND EIGHT (8) MONTHS, as maximum,
plus fine in the amount of P30,000.

With cost against the accused.

SO ORDERED.7

In so ruling, the RTC found that the prosecution had established all the elements of the crime charged. Petitioner was in
possession of the firearm, ammunitions and other items with intent to possess the same as they were found inside his
house; and he had no license or permit to possess the same from any competent authority. The RTC did not give
credence to petitioner’s claim that he is not the owner of the house but his uncle, Gabriel Arda, as the latter did not testify
at all and was not in the house at the time of the raid. It was petitioner and his wife who were at the house at 12:45 a.m. of
July 16, 1999; and that petitioner did not protest his arrest.

Petitioner appealed his conviction to the CA. After the respective briefs had been filed, the case was submitted for
decision.

On July 30, 2008, the CA issued its assailed Decision which affirmed in toto the RTC decision.

The CA agreed with the RTC’s conclusion that the elements of the crime charged were duly proved by the prosecution.
Anent petitioner’s claim of the alleged discrepancy in the testimony of PO3 Sarte on the time the raid was conducted, the
CA found the same to be minor and did not damage the essential integrity of the prosecution’s evidence in its material
whole; and that such discrepancy was explained by PO3 Sarte in her testimony.

Hence, this petition for review filed by petitioner.

Petitioner argues that the RTC decision finding him guilty of the crime charged is premised on its erroneous conclusion
that he is the owner the house where the unlicensed firearms and ammunitions were found. He reiterated his claim that
there was discrepancy in the testimony of PO3 Sarte as to the time the raid was conducted.

As a rule, only questions of law may be raised in a petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.8 As such, we
are not duty-bound to analyze and weigh all over again the evidence already considered in the proceedings below. The
findings of facts by a trial court, when affirmed by the Court of Appeals, are binding on the Supreme Court. 9 This rule,
however, is not without exceptions.10 However, petitioner failed to show that his case falls under any of the exceptions.

Section 1 of PD 1866, as amended by RA 8294, provides:

Section 1. Unlawful Manufacture, Sale, Acquisition, Disposition or Possession of Firearms or Ammunition or Instruments
Used or Intended to be Used in the Manufacture of Firearms or Ammunition. - ….....

The penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period and a fine of Thirty thousand pesos (P30,000.00) shall be imposed if
the firearm is classified as high powered firearm which includes those with bores bigger in diameter than .38 caliber and 9
millimeter such as caliber .40, .41, .44, 45 and also lesser calibered firearms but considered powerful such as caliber .357
and caliber .22 center-fire magnum and other firearms with firing capability of full automatic and by burst of two or
three: Provided, however,

That no other crime was committed by the person arrested.

The essential elements in the prosecution for the crime of illegal possession of firearms and ammunitions are: (1) the
existence of subject firearm; and, (2) the fact that the accused who possessed or owned the same does not have the
corresponding license for it.11 The unvarying rule is that ownership is not an essential element of illegal possession of
firearms and ammunition.12 What the law requires is merely possession, which includes not only actual physical
possession, but also constructive possession or the subjection of the thing to one’s control and management.13

Once the prosecution evidence indubitably points to possession without the requisite authority or license, coupled
with animus possidendi or intent to possess on the part of the accused, conviction for violation of the said law must
follow. Animus possidendi is a state of mind, the presence or determination of which is largely dependent on attendant
events in each case. It may be inferred from the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the surrounding
circumstances.14

Here, the prosecution had proved the essential elements of the crime charged under PD 1866 as amended by RA 8294.
The existence of the seized firearm and the ammunitions was established through the testimony of PO3 Sarte. There was
an inventory of the items seized which was made in the presence of the petitioner and the three barangay tanods who all
voluntarily signed the inventory receipt. PO3 Sarte identified all the seized items in open court.

It was convincingly proved that petitioner had constructive possession of the gun and the ammunitions, coupled with the
intent to possess the same. Petitioner's act of immediately rushing from the living room to the room where SPO2 Abellana
found a calibre .45 and grappled with the latter for the possession of the gun proved that the gun was under his control
and management. He also had the animus possidendi or intent to possess the gun when he tried to wrest it from SPO2
Abellana.
Petitioner's lack of authority to possess the firearm was established by the testimony of Police Officer IV Dionisio V.
Sultan, Chief Clerk of the Firearms and Explosive Division of the Philippine National Police-Visayas (FED-PNP- Visayas)
that petitioner is not licensed to possess any kind of firearm or ammunition based on the FED-PNP master list.

Anent petitioner's argument that the house where the firearm was found was not owned by him is not persuasive. We
quote with approval what the RTC said in debunking such issue which was affirmed by the CA, thus:

If the accused is not really the owner of the house where the firearm, ammunitions and other items were found, he should
have protested his arrest. But in the instant case Felipenieri (sic) Jacaban said that there was no protest at all.

If the accused is not really the owner of the house raided by the police officers, what was he and his wife doing there at
12:45 in the morning?

The defense asserted that the house of the accused was already demolished when the road fronting it was widened. But
the defense failed to present the tax declaration covering the said house before it was demolished.

xxx xxx xxx

Gabriel Arda, the alleged owner of the house did not testify. He was allegedly suffering from hypertension. The defense,
however, did not file a motion to take his deposition.

Felipenieri likewise testified that at the time of the raid, the owner of the house was not present. Her testimony bolsters the
fact that Gabriel Arda is not really the owner of the house where the raid was conducted. 15

Even assuming that petitioner is not the owner of the house where the items were recovered, the ownership of the house
is not an essential element of the crime under PD 1866 as amended. While petitioner may not be the owner, he indeed
had control of the house as shown by the following circumstances: (1) When the PAOCTF went to the house to serve the
search warrant, petitioner was very angry and restless and even denied having committed any illegal act, but he was
assured by P/SInsp. Dueñas that he has nothing to answer if they would not find anything, thus, he consented to the
search being conducted; (2) while the search was ongoing, petitioner merely observed the conduct of the search and did
not make any protest at all; and

(3) petitioner did not call for the alleged owner of the house.

As to the alleged discrepancy in PO3 Sarte's testimony as to the time the search was conducted, we agree with the CA
when it found:

Appellant likewise questions the discrepancies in the testimony of prosecution witness PO3 Epifania Sarte. Appellant
contends that PO3 Sarte could not even testify correctly as to the time the raid was conducted. According to appellant, the
established fact on records shows that it was conducted past midnight of July 16, 1999 while witness PO3 Sarte asserted
that it was conducted at 12:45 high noon of said date.

It bears stressing that minor discrepancies might be found in her testimony, but this does not damage the essential
integrity of the evidence in its material whole, nor should it reflect adversely on the witness' credibility as it erases
suspicion that the same was perjured. Here, prior testimony of PO3 Sarte as to the time of the raid is considered only a
trivial matter which is not even enough to destroy or discredit her credibility. Besides, she was able to explain her mistake
when she previously stated that the search was conducted at 12:45 noon of July 16, 1999 instead of 12:45 in the morning
as she was hungry when she first testified. The record likewise does not reveal that PO3 Sarte was actuated by ill-motive
in so testifying against appellant. Thus, when there is nothing to indicate that a witness was actuated by improper motives,
her positive declarations on the witness stand, made under solemn oath, deserve full faith and credence. 16

The RTC sentenced petitioner to an imprisonment of six (6) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to six (6)
years and eight (8) months, as maximum, plus fine in the amount of P30,000.00. The CA upheld the RTC. Under PD
1866, as amended by RA 8294, the penalty for illegal possession of firearms classified as high powered, like cal. 45,
is prision mayor minimum and a fine of P30,000.00. Applying Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, the maximum period
of the imposable penalty cannot exceed prision mayor minimum in its medium period, there being no mitigating or
aggravating circumstance, i.e., six (6) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to seven (7) years and four (4) months. The
minimum period, as provided in the Indeterminate Sentence Law, shall be within the range of prision correccional in its
maximum period, i.e., four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day to six (6) years, the penalty next lower in degree
to prision mayor minimum.17 Thus, the minimum penalty imposable must be modified. Albeit, PD 1866, as amended by
RA 8294, is a malum prohibitum and that the Revised Penal Code is generally not applicable, it has been held that when
a special law, which is a malum prohibitum, adopts the nomenclature of the penalties in the Revised Penal Code, the
latter law shall apply.18

While in 2013, RA 10951 entitled "An Act Providing for a Comprehensive Law on Firearms and Ammunitions and
Providing Penalties for Violation Thereof" took effect, the same finds no application in this case as the law provides for
stiffer penalties which is not at all favorable to the accused.

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated July 30, 2008, is AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATION. Petitioner is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of imprisonment ranging from SIX (6)
YEARS of prision correccional in its maximum period, as minimum, to SIX (6) YEARS, EIGHT (8) MONTHS and ONE (1)
DAY of prision mayor minimum in its medium period, as maximum, and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.

SO ORDERED.