DUE PROCESS CLAUSE

MAYOR ANTONIO J. VILLEGAS,

petitioner, vs. HIU CHIONG TSAI PAO HO and JUDGE FRANCISCO ARCA, respondents.
FACTS
The controverted Ordinance No. 6537 was passed by the Municipal Board of Manila on February 22, 1968 and
signed by the herein petitioner Mayor Antonio J. Villegas of Manila on March 27, 1968.
Section 1 of said Ordinance No. 6537 4 prohibits aliens from being employed or to engage or participate in any
position or occupation or business enumerated therein, whether permanent, temporary or casual, without first securing an
employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying the permit fee of P50.00 except persons employed in the
diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries, or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine
Government and any foreign government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious
orders or congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance is punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three (3) months to six (6) months
or fine of not less than P100.00 but not more than P200.00 or both such fine and imprisonment, upon conviction. 5
On May 4, 1968, private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a petition with
the Court of First Instance of Manila, Branch I, denominated as Civil Case No. 72797, praying for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of Ordinance No. 6537 as well as for a judgment
declaring said Ordinance No. 6537 null and void.
On May 24, 1968, respondent Judge issued the writ of preliminary injunction and on September 17, 1968
rendered judgment declaring Ordinance No. 6537 null and void and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction.
Contesting the aforecited decision of respondent Judge, then Mayor Antonio J. Villegas filed the present petition
on March 27, 1969.

ISSUES
1.) Whether or not the ordinance is arbitrary, oppressive and unreasonable, being applied only to aliens who are
thus, deprived of their rights to life, liberty and property and therefore, violates the due process and equal
protection clauses of the Constitution

RULINGS
1.) While it is true that the first part which requires that the alien shall secure an employment permit from
the Mayor involves the exercise of discretion and judgment in the processing and approval or disapproval of
applications for employment permits and therefore is regulatory in character the second part which requires the
payment of P50.00 as employee's fee is not regulatory but a revenue measure. There is no logic or justification in
exacting P50.00 from aliens who have been cleared for employment. It is obvious that the purpose of the
ordinance is to raise money under the guise of regulation.
The P50.00 fee is unreasonable not only because it is excessive but because it fails to consider valid
substantial differences in situation among individual aliens who are required to pay it. Although the equal
protection clause of the Constitution does not forbid classification, it is imperative that the classification should be
based on real and substantial differences having a reasonable relation to the subject of the particular legislation.
The same amount of P50.00 is being collected from every employed alien whether he is casual or permanent,
part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid executive
Ordinance No. 6537 does not lay down any criterion or standard to guide the Mayor in the exercise of
his discretion. It has been held that where an ordinance of a municipality fails to state any policy or to set up any
standard to guide or limit the mayor's action, expresses no purpose to be attained by requiring a permit,
enumerates no conditions for its grant or refusal, and entirely lacks standard, thus conferring upon the Mayor
arbitrary and unrestricted power to grant or deny the issuance of building permits, such ordinance is invalid, being
an undefined and unlimited delegation of power to allow or prevent an activity per se lawful.
Ordinance No. 6537 is void because it does not contain or suggest any standard or criterion to guide the
mayor in the exercise of the power which has been granted to him by the ordinance.
The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and equal protection rule of the Constitution.

WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby affirmed, without pronouncement as to

costs.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-24693             July 31, 1967

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL MAR INC. and GO
CHIU, petitioners-appellees,
vs.
THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF MANILA, respondent-appellant.
VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.

The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is whether Ordinance
No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it
"unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be
reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.

The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel
and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and
general manager of the second petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his
capacity as such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner
non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating
hotels and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities, regularly
paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood to not less than 2,500 person and representing an investment of more than
P3 million."1 (par. 2). It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted
Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting as
Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).

After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the assertion of its being
beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground
that in the revised charter of the City of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the
challenged ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that the provision in the
same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or
lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any
person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence,
wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the
nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex
would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with
a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of such
owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound
together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open
for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional
and void again on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague,
indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-
incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or,
restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive,
a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room; that the
provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such
hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it
unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty and for its
unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for in Section 4 of the
challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would, cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended
party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of
the due process clause.

There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above ordinance null and
void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor
to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

In the a answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the respondent
Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the
provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds. After
setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance bears a reasonable
relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the
guests or customers not before the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against self incrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law,
respondent Mayor prayed for, its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.

Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated September 28, 1964,
which reads:

1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar Inc. are duly
organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila, while the petitioner
Go Chin is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar Inc., and the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a
resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;

2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City of
Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the
necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;

3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate and
Ermita districts in Manila;

4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which was
approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of Manila, in the
absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b and 669 of the
compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new sections. This ordinance is
similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons stated in its 4th Indorsement dated
February 15, 1963 (Annex B);

5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed
ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;

6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the 105
hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila.1äwphï1.ñët

Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the presumption of the
validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the Constitution resting on the party
who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum
likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two weeks later, on
February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in detail what was set forth in the petition, with
citations of what they considered to be applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the
challenged ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to the alleged
constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed: "The only remaining issue here being purely a
question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for
decision of the Court." It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision
passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly
right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came
to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and, therefore,
null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain
him from enforcing the ordinance in question." Hence this appeal.

As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance.
Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.

Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the presumption of validity
that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption
is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all the
facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the
ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary
should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the
guise of police regulation.2

It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to rebut it is
unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case here. The principle has been
nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co.,3 where the
American Supreme Court through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here
questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the ground
that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law.
As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the resumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such
factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation
of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.

Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally defective as being repugnant to the due
process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover
petitioners. This particular manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of substance. To hold
otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the
most essential, insistent and the least limitable of powers, 4 extending as it does "to all the great public needs." 5 It would
be, to paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be deprived or allowed itself
to be deprived of its competence to promote public health, public morals, public safety and the genera
welfare.6 Negatively put, police power is "that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all that is
hurt full to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society. 7

There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to
public morals. The explanatory note of the Councilor Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts,
speaks of the alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part to the
existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry, presence and exit" and thus become
the "ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then proposes to check the clandestine
harboring of transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration
form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other amendatory
provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the
increase in the licensed fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other
than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would appear therefore that the
stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it.

It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its approval, ordinances punishing vagrancy
and classifying a pimp or procurer as a vagrant;8 provide a license tax for and regulating the maintenance or operation of
public dance halls;9 prohibiting gambling;10 prohibiting jueteng;11 and monte;12 prohibiting playing of panguingui on days
other than Sundays or legal holidays;13 prohibiting the operation of pinball machines;14 and prohibiting any person from
keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium joint or visiting a place where opium is smoked or otherwise used, 15 all of
which are intended to protect public morals.

On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the exercise of the police power,
which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace,
good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties however, the exercise of such police power insofar as it may affect the life,
liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as
either capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable
constitutional guaranty may call for correction by the courts.

We are thus led to considering the insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is raised to the question of due
process.16 There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which the
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid.
What then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive requisite to free the
challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its
doom? It is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness
is ruled out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to paraphrase Cardozo, must
not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression. Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred
by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of the
sporting idea of fair play.17 It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act of officialdom of whatever
branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations of fairness that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political
thought."18 It is not a narrow or "technical conception with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances,"19 decisions based on such a clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry into fundamental principles
of our society."20 Questions of due process are not to be treated narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases. 21

It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking
body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that
what should be deemed unreasonable and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the
face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board of the City of
Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of the challenged ordinance. A strong case
must be found in the records, and, as has been set forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such
character the taint of nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any semblance
even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on due process grounds to single out such
features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain
particulars, its alleged vagueness.

Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the challenged ordinance for hotels
and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, first-class motels being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee
and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license
fees could be classified into those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. 22 As was explained more in detail in
the above Cu Unjieng case: (2) Licenses for non-useful occupations are also incidental to the police power and the right to
exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and aside from applying the
well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as
a general rule, declined to interfere with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons
who might otherwise engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of
the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the nature of privilege taxes for revenue have
frequently been upheld, especially in of licenses for the sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been
declared unreasonable.23

Moreover in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta24 this Court affirmed the doctrine earlier announced by the
American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court
had occasion to affirm that the broad taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and
municipalities is sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects with the only limitation that the tax so levied is for
public purposes, just and uniform.25

As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of Manila in imposing licenses for
revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the
amount," here the license fee of the operator of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power
measure.26 The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation from another decision of
significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of
their lawful occupation and means of livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that
plaintiffs are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets under certain
conditions is permitted x x x . And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in the community may be deprived of their
present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a
case, persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of the
police power embark in these occupations subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that
power."27

Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance makes it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to
lease or rent room or portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be
charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a transgression against the
command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the
immoral or illegitimate use to which such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted.
How could it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of
an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every
regulation of conduct amounts to curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus:
"One thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is this: 'Liberty' as
understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.' Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good
of the individual and for the greater good of the peace and order of society and the general well-being. No man can do
exactly as he pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily subject to
reasonable restraint by general law for the common good x x x The liberty of the citizen may be restrained in the interest
of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power." 28

A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of the enactment of said law,
and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business
and occupations. Persons and property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the
general comfort, health, and prosperity of the state x x x To this fundamental aim of our Government the rights of the
individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to prevail
over authority because then society will fall into anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because
then the individual will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority in his mind
through education and personal discipline, so that there may be established the resultant equilibrium, which means peace
and order and happiness for all.29

It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court nullifying legislation because of undue deprivation of freedom to
contract, People v. Pomar,30 no longer "retains its virtuality as a living principle. The policy of laissez faire  has to some
extent given way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected
with public interest.31 What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the mind or the
person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty
curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measure is wider. 32 How justify then the
allegation of a denial of due process?

Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by invoking the principles of
vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear from a recital in the petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the
alleged grievance is that the provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however,
point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the companion or companions as
indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining whether the companion or companions referred to are
those arriving with the customer or guest at the time of the registry or entering the room With him at about the same time
or coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt as to whether the
maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of its owners or operators; another proviso which
from their standpoint would require a guess as to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease
thereof means a full day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the ordinance
void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty? To ask the question is to answer it. From Connally v. General
Construction Co.33 to Adderley v. Florida,34 the principle has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute
susceptible to such a charge is an enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation before us? A citation
from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the generalities about not supplying criminal laws with
what they omit but there is no canon against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously
mean."35

That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the arguments pressed with such vigor and
determination, the attack against the validity of the challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it.
Respect for constitutional law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a
reversal of the appealed decision.

Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted forthwith. With costs.
RUBI VS. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO

Facts:
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of Mindoro. The provincial
board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that “provincial governor of any province in which non-Christian
inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized, when such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and
order, to direct such inhabitants to take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and
approved by the provincial board”. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800 hectares of
public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in
Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said homestead applications
are previously recommended by the provincial governor. Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive
order No. 2, which says that the provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the
permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised Administrative
Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco River including those in
the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao,
Naujan Lake. Also, that any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code. Said resolution of the provincial
board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the
protection of public forests in which they roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the reservation of Tigbao and
are liable to be punished. It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial
officials of that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao, Mindoro,
against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for
having run away form the reservation.

Issue: Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty without due process of
law. Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.

Held:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his liberty without due process
of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with
said section does not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of
the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the
United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional. The preamble of the resolution of the
provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the
following: (1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the
only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent settlement. The
Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the protection of the public forests in which
they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. Considered purely as an exercise of
the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an
unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of
the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They are
restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that due process of law has not
been followed. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To constitute "due
process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some instances, even a hearing
and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative
officers in applying a law to particular cases. The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines
so that they may approach the highest conception of nationality. The public policy of the Government of the Philippine
Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this
governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can, therefore, not issue
GOVERNOR AMOR D. DELOSO, petitioner,
vs.
THE SANDIGANBAYAN, THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, and THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF
LOCAL GOVERNMENT AND COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT, respondents.

This petition for certiorari seeks to annul and set aside the resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated February 10, 1989 in
Criminal Cases Nos. 9200 to 9204 which preventively suspended petitioner Amor D. Deloso (accused in the criminal
cases) pendente lite  from his position as provincial governor of Zambales and from any office that he may be holding.

The petitioner was the duly elected mayor of Botolan, Zambales in the local elections of November 1971. While he
occupied the position of mayor, a certain Juan Villanueva filed a letter complaint with the Tanodbayan accusing him of
having committed acts in violation of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act 3019) in relation to the award of licenses to operate
fish corrals in the municipal waters of Botolan, Zambales during the period 1976 to 1978 and the issuance of five (5)
tractors of the municipality to certain individuals allegedly without any agreement as to the payment of rentals.

The complaint with respect to the award of licenses to operate fish corrals was dismissed. As regards the other complaint,
the Tanodbayan filed five (5) separate informations, all dated May 30, 1984 accusing the petitioner of violation of Section
3(e), of the Anti-Graft Law with the Sandiganbayan. The cases were docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 9200-9204. Except
for the names of the individuals who were allegedly favored by the petitioner and the dates when these favors were made,
the informations uniformly alleged:

That on or about 3 February 1978 in the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, accused AMOR D. DELOSO, a public officer being then the Municipal
Mayor of the Municipality of Botolan, Zambales, taking advantage of his public and official position, did
then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously give unwarranted benefits to Daniel Ferrer thru manifest
partiality and evident bad faith in the discharge of his official functions by issuing to him a tractor
purchased by the Municipality of Botolan thru a loan financed by the Land Bank of the Philippines for
lease to local farmers at reasonable cost, without any agreement as to the payment of rentals for the use
of tractor by Daniel Ferrer thereby causing undue injury to the Municipality of Botolan. (Rollo, p. 30)

A motion to quash the informations was denied by the Sandiganbayan. A motion for reconsideration was likewise denied.

The petitioner then filed a petition before us (G.R. Nos. 69963-67) to annul the Sandiganbayan's resolutions denying the
petitioner's motion to quash and motion for reconsideration.

In a resolution dated July 28,1988, we dismissed the petition for lack of merit. The resolution became final and executory
on October 17, 1988.

The petitioner was arraigned on January 6, 1989 before the Sandiganbayan. He pleaded NOT GUILTY to the charges
against him.

The Office of the Special Prosecutor then filed a motion to suspend the petitioner pendente lite pursuant to Section 13 of
Republic Act No. 3019.

On February 10, 1989, the Sandiganbayan issued the questioned resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the accused Amor D. Deloso is suspended pendente lite from his
position as Provincial Governor of Zambales and from any other office that he may now be holding.

Let a copy of this Resolution be furnished to the Secretary of the Department of Local Government for
implementation and for him to inform this Court of the action he has taken thereon within five (5) days
from receipt hereof. (Rollo, p. 94)

The day following his receipt of the resolution, or on February 16, 1989, the petitioner filed the instant petition.

On February 17, 1989, the petitioner filed an urgent motion with the Sandiganbayan requesting that the execution and
implementation of the February 10, 1989 suspension order be held in abeyance pending determination of the merits of the
petition. The motion was denied prompting the petitioner to ask the Court for an earlier setting of the trial of the cases
which was denied in an order dated February 22, 1989.
In denying the plea for an earlier schedule of the trial of the cases, the Sandiganbayan said:

The Court notes that these cases have already been set for May 15, 16 and 17 as well as June 5, 6 and
7, 1989 at 8:00 o'clock in the morning and 2:00 o'clock in the afternoon. While the accused claims that
this period is ordinately far, the Court must also be contend with its own calendar. It will be easy enough
for this Court to give the accused an earlier setting. However, such a setting will be best a pretence since
other cases have already been set between now and May 15 where in many instances the accused
themselves are also under suspension by reason of the same provision of law. Under the above
circumstances, no other earlier setting can be granted to the accused without making that setting merely
a sham since other cases which have been set earlier will naturally have a right to expect priority. (Rollo,
p. 135)

In view of this development, the petitioner filed an urgent supplemental application for temporary restraining order and/ or
writ of preliminary injunction to enjoin the Sandiganbayan, the Secretary of Local Government and Community
Development, and all those acting in their behalf from executing and implementing the February 10, 1989 resolution of the
Sandiganbayan.

We treat the respondent's Comment as an answer and decide this petition on its merits.

The petitioner questions the constitutionality of the suspension provision of Section 13 of the Anti-Graft Law (Republic Act
No. 3019).

This same issue was raised in the case of Layno v. Sandiganbayan  (136 SCRA 536 [1985]). After considering the facts
as well as the merits of the case, the Court ruled that the petition need not be resolved through a ruling on the validity of
the provision on mandatory suspension. We instead, decided the case in relation to the principles of due process and
equal protection of the law.

Faced with similar factual circumstances in the instant petition, we apply anew the ruling in the Layno case and decide the
instant petition in relation to the principles of due process and equal protection without having to declare categorically
whether or not the suspension provision of Republic Act 3019 should be struck down as invalid. We limit ourselves to
ascertaining whether or not, under the circumstances of this case, an indefinite suspension becomes unreasonable.

As early as 1974, then Justice Fred Ruiz Castro expressed in a separate opinion the mischief which would result if the
Court allows the indefinite suspension of elective local officials charged with violations of the Anti Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act:

The central point of Senator Padilla's position is that the penalty of suspension is definitely much lower
than that of removal and it would be incongruous if we give to the penalty of suspension more serious
consequences than are attached to the penalty of removal. Senator Padilla opted for the immediate
restoration of the respondent to his position once the favorable result of the election is known.

Parenthetically, it must be stated that while there was an exchange of views between Senator Ganzon
and Senator Manglapus on the Anti-Graft Law, the exchange was limited to the matter of the
commencement of the investigation of the charges, which, according to Senator Ganzon, cannot be made
within one year prior to an election.

And so it is that, on the basis of my discussion above, I bewail the apathy of the majority of the Court
toward efforts to seek enlightenment on legal issues of grave importance from the deliberations of
Congress upon the said issues. It is not quite becoming of judicial magistrates to shunt aside a
suggestion that the interplay of legal provisions be carefully studied and analyzed.

In the deliberations of the Court on this case, I suggested that we examine the possible delimiting effects
of the provisions of the first sentence of section 5 of the Decentralization Act on the provisions of the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act insofar as the suspension from office of an elective local official is
concerned. In no uncertain words did I focus the attention of the Court on the serious ever-present
possibility of harassment of an elective local official taking the form of the filing of a valid information
against him under the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act after his exoneration in an
administrative case involving the same offense.
 I also pointedly brought out the matter of the notorious delay in the courts of justice which could effectively
frustrate an elected or re-elected local official from discharging the duties of his office for the entire term of
his office, and thus nullify the will of the people who elected him. I likewise asked the Court to consider
the situation where an elective local official runs for the National Assembly and is elected despite the fact
that he is under suspension under the authority of the provisions of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act, and sought a definitive answer to the question. What then would happen to the suspension meted out
to him since it is the National Assembly that determines whether he should assume and continue in
office?

All these and other germane questions were brushed aside by the majority of the Court with the sweeping
statement that the provisions of the Decentralization Act apply only to administrative cases. It is the ex
cathedra  attitude, this kind of slothful thinking, that I find abhorrent and therefore deplore " (Oliveros v.
Villaluz, 57 SCRA 163, 197-198 [1974])

Petitioner Deloso was elected governor of the Province of Zambales in the January 18, 1988 local elections. The regular
term of a governor is only 3 years although he shall serve until noon of June 30, 1992 by special provision of the
Constitution. (Section 8, Article X, Section 2, Article XVIII, Constitution). He was, however, ordered suspended from
performing his duties as governor by the Sandiganbayan pursuant to Section 13 of Republic Act No. 3019 by virtue of the
criminal charges filed against him. The order of suspension does not have a definite period so that the petitioner may be
suspended for the rest of his term of office unless his case is terminated sooner. An extended suspension is a distinct
possibility considering that the Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner's plea for earlier dates of trial of his cases on the
ground that there are other cases set earlier which have a right to expect priority.

Under these circumstances the preventive suspension which initially may be justified becomes unreasonable thus raising
a due process question. As we ruled in Layno, Sr. v. Sandiganbayan, (supra):

Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not expire
until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan according
to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full discharge of his
functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26, 1983, he has
been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of suffrage that the
people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or malfeasance,
any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance, criminally. In
either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is entitled to the
constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its continuance,
however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if thereafter he were
acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there would be in such a
case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted likewise on the
people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve as mayor. In
that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive suspension had
outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is thus quite
manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should be lifted.

Moreover, in the earlier case of Garcia v. The Executive Secretary, (6 SCRA 1 [1962]) we ruled on the issue as to whether
the preventive suspension beyond the maximum period of 60 days, provided in Section 35 of the Civil Service Act of 1959
(Republic Act 2260) is illegal and void. Paulino Garcia, the petitioner in the cited case was the Chairman of the National
Science Development Board appointed by the President of the Philippines. He was charged with electioneering and
dishonesty in office. Pending investigation of the administrative charges against him, he was suspended by the Executive
Secretary by authority of the President. In view of his indefinite suspension, he filed a petition praying in effect that the 60-
day period prescribed in the Civil Service Law for preventive suspension having already expired, he be reinstated in the
service pursuant to Section 35 of the said Act. The respondents opposed the petition on the ground that the petitioner was
a presidential appointee and therefore not covered by the 60-day preventive suspension limit under Section 35 of the then
Civil Service Act. The respondents maintained that the petitioner could be indefinitely suspended. In ruling in favor of the
petitioner, the Court stated:

To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President, facing administrative
charges can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a situation where the
preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after due hearing,
contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution (No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be
removed or suspended except for cause as provided by law. [Art. XII, Sec. 4, Constitution of the
Philippines]) and the Civil Service Law (No officer or employee in the Civil Service shall be removed or
 suspended except for cause as provided by law and after due process). ... In the guise of a preventive
suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could, in effect, be removed without a finding of
a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution ... (at pp. 8-9)

The question that now arises is whether or not the ruling in the Garcia case where the suspension was ordered by no less
than the President of the Philippines is applicable to an elective official facing criminal charges under the Anti-Graft Law
and suspended under Section 13, thereof.

The guarantee to an equal protection of the law necessitates the application of the ruling in the Garcia v. Executive
Secretary. Thus, we explained in the Layno case, to wit:

... If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local Government Code would
be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is allowable for the causes
therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof; 'In all cases, preventive
suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension.' (Batas Pambansa Blg.
337, Section 63 (2), last sentence. The first sentence reads as follows: 'Preventive suspension may be
imposed at any time after the issues are joined, when there is reasonable ground to believe that the
respondent has committed the act or acts complained of, when the evidence of culpability is strong, when
the gravity of the offense so warrants, or when the continuance in office of the respondent influence the
witnesses or pose a threat to the safety and integrity of the records and other evidence'). It may be
recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government officials.
So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Secretary (116 Phil. 348 [1962]). According to the
opinion of Justice Barrera: 'To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President,
facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a
situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after
due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service Law.' (Ibid. 351-
352) Further: 'In the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could
in effect, be removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the
Constitution.' (Ibid. 352) Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a
suspension of indefinite duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge
under the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to
negate the safeguard of the equal protection guarantee. (at p. 542)

The application of the Garcia injunction against preventive suspensions for an unreasonable period of time applies with
greater force to elective officials and especially to the petitioner whose term is a relatively short one. The interests of the
sovereign electorate and the province of Zambales cannot be subordinated to the heavy case load of the Sandiganbayan
and of this Court.

It would be most unfair to the people of Zambales who elected the petitioner to the highest provincial office in their
command if they are deprived of his services for an indefinite period with the termination of his case possibly extending
beyond his entire term simply because the big number of sequestration, ill-gotten wealth, murder, malversation of public
finds and other more serious offenses plus incidents and resolutions that may be brought to the Supreme Court prevents
the expedited determination of his innocence or guilt.

The order dated February 10, 1989 suspending the petitioner without a definite period can not be sanctioned. We rule that
henceforth a preventive suspension of an elective public officer under Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 should be limited
to the ninety (90) days under Section 42 of Presidential Decree No. 807, the Civil Service Decree, which period also
appears reasonable and appropriate under the circumstances of this case.

The petitioner also questions the applicability of Section 13 of Republic Act 3019 as amended by Batasan Pambansa Blg.
192 to him. He opines that the suspension provision as amended which qualifies the public officer as incumbent does not
apply to him since he is now occupying the position of governor and not mayor, the position wherein he was charged
under the Anti-Graft Law.

This argument is untenable. The issue was settled in the case of Bayot v. Sandiganbayan (128 SCRA 383 (1984), in this
wise:

... Further, the claim of petitioner that he cannot be suspended because he is presently occupying a
position different from that under which he is charged is untenable. The amendatory provision clearly
states that any incumbent public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a valid information
 under Republic Act 3019 or for any offense involving fraud upon the government or public funds or
property whether as a simple or as a complex offense and in whatever stage or execution and mode of
participation, is pending in court, shall be suspended from office. Thus, by the use of the word office the
same applies to any office which the officer charged may be holding, and not only the particular office
under which he was charged.

One last point. Should the purposes behind preventive suspensions such as preventing the abuse of the prerogatives of
the office, intimidation of witnesses, etc., become manifest, the respondent court is not bereft of remedies or sanctions.
The petitioner may still be suspended but for specifically expressed reasons and not from an automatic application of
Section 13 of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The preventive suspension imposed on petitioner Amor D. Deloso by
virtue of the February 10, 1989 resolution of the Sandiganbayan should be limited to only ninety (90) days after which
Deloso will assume once again the functions of governor of Zambales, without prejudice to the continuation of the trial of
the pending cases against him in the Sandiganbayan. This decision is immediately executory. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
ALFONSO C. BINCE, JR., petitioner,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, PROVINCIAL BOARD OF CANVASSERS OF PANGASINAN, MUNICIPAL BOARDS
OF CANVASSERS OF TAYUG AND SAN MANUEL, PANGASINAN AND EMILIANO MICU, respondents.

Petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. and private respondent Emiliano S. Micu were among the candidates in the synchronized
elections of May 11, 1992 for a seat in the Sanguniang Panlalawigan  of the Province of Pangasinan allotted to its Sixth
Legislative District.

Ten (10) municipalities, including San Quintin, Tayug and San Manuel, comprise the said district.

During the canvassing of the Certificates of Canvass (COC's) for these ten (10) municipalities by respondent Provincial
Board of Canvassers (PBC) on May 20, 1992, private respondent Micu objected to the inclusion of the COC for San
Quintin on the ground that it contained false statements. Accordingly, the COCs for the remaining nine (9) municipalities
were included in the canvass. On May 21, 1992, the PBC rules against the objection of private respondent. 1 From the said
ruling, private respondent Micu appealed to the Commission on Elections (COMELEC), which docketed the case as SPC
No. 92-208.

On June 6, 1992, the COMELEC en banc  promulgated a resolution which reads:

Acting on the appeal filed by petitioner-appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu to the ruling of the Provincial
Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, dated May 21, 1992, the Commission en banc tabulated the votes
obtained by candidates Atty. Emiliano S. Micu and Atty. Alfonso C. Bince for the position of Sangguniang
Panlalawigan member of the province of Pangasinan, using as basis thereof the statement of votes by
precinct submitted by the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan, as (sic) a result of said examination,
the Commission rules, as follows:

1. That the actual number of votes obtained by candidate Alfonso C. Bince in the
municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan is 1,055 votes whereas petitioner/appellant Atty.
Emiliano S. Micu obtained 1,535 votes for the same municipality.

Accordingly, the Provincial Board of Canvassers for the province of Pangasinan is directed to CREDIT in
favor of petitioner/appellant Atty. Emiliano S. Micu with 1,535 votes and candidate Alfonso C. Bince with
1,055 votes in the municipality of San Quintin, Pangasinan. 2

Twenty-one (21) days after the canvass of the COCs for the nine (9) municipalities was completed on May 20, 1992,
private respondent Micu together with the Municipal Boards of Canvassers (MBCs) of Tayug and San Manuel filed with
the PBC petitions for correction of the Statements of Votes (SOVs) earlier prepared for alledged manifest errors
committed in the computation thereof.

In view of the motion of herein petitioner to implement the Resolution of June 6, 1992 which was alleged to have become
final, the PBC, on June 18, 1992, credited in favor of the petitioner and private respondent the votes for each as indicated
in the said resolution and on the basis of the COCs for San Quintin and the other nine (9) municipalities, petitioner had a
total of 27,370 votes while the private respondent had 27,369 votes. Petitioner who won by a margin of 1 vote was not,
however, proclaimed winner because of the absence of authority from the COMELEC.

Accordingly, petitioner filed a formal motion for such authority.

On June 29, 1992, the COMELEC en banc promulgated a Supplemental Order3 directing the PBC "to reconvene, continue
with the provincial canvass and proclaim the winning candidates for Sangguniang Panlalawigan for the Province of
Pangasinan, and other candidates for provincial offices who have not been proclaimed 4 as of that date.

In the meantime, on June 24, 1992, the PBC, acting on the petitions for correction of the SOVs of Tayug and San Manuel
filed by private respondent and the MBCs of the said municipalities, rules "to allow the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of
the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan to correct the Statement of Votes and Certificates of Canvass
and on the basis of the corrected documents, the Board (PBC) will continue the canvass and thereafter proclaim the
winning candidate.5
On June 25, 1992, petitioner Bince appealed from the above ruling allowing the correction alleging that the PBC had no
jurisdiction to entertain the petition. The appeal was docketed as SPC No. 92-384.

On July 8, 1992, private respondent Micu filed before the COMELEC an urgent motion for the issuance of an order
directing the PBC to reconvene and proceed with the canvass. He alleged that the promulgation of COMELEC Resolution
No. 2489 on June 29, 1992 affirmed the ruling of the PBC dated June 24, 1992. Similarly, petitioner Bince filed an urgent
petition to cite Atty. Felimon Asperin and Supt. Primo. A. Mina, Chairman and Member, respectively, of the PBC, for
Contempt with alternative prayer for proclamation as winner and Injunction with prayer for the issuance of Temporary
Restraining Order (TRO).

On July 9, 1992, the PBC Chairman, Atty. Felimon Asperin, filed a petition with the COMELEC seeking a "definitive ruling
and a clear directive or order as to who of the two (2) contending parties should be proclaimed" 6 averring that "there were
corrections already made in a separate sheet of paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass of Tayug
and San Manuel, Pangasinan which corrections if to be considered by the Board in its canvass and proclamation,
candidate Emiliano will win by 72 votes. On the other hand, if these corrections will not be considered, candidate Alfonso
Bince, Jr. will win by one (1) vote.7 On even date, the COMELEC promulgated its resolution, the dispositive portion of
which reads:

(1) To RECONVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes, as corrected, of
the municipalities comprising the 6th District of Pangasinan;

(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan,
on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; in accordance with the
law, the rules and guidelines on canvassing and proclamation. 8

As directed therein, the PBC on July 21, 1992, by a vote of 2-1 with its Chairman Atty. Felimon Asperin dissenting,
proclaimed candidate Bince as the duly elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan  of Pangasinan. Assailing the
proclamation of Bince, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Motion for Contempt and to Annul Proclamation and
Amended Urgent Petition for Contempt and Annul Proclamation on July 22 and 29, 1992, respectively, alleging that the
PBC defied the directive of the COMELEC in its resolution of July 9, 1992. Acting thereon, the COMELEC promulgated a
resolution on July 29, 1992, the decretal portion of which reads:

The Commission RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES:

1. To direct Prosecutor Jose Antonio Guillermo and Supt. Primo Mina, vice-chairman and secretayr,
respectively, of the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan, to show cause why they should not be
declared in contempt of defying and disobeying the Resolution of this Commission dated 09 July 1992,
directing them to RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes as
corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the Municipalities comprising the 6th District of
Pangasinan; and to PROCLAIM the winning candidate of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan,
on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass, aforesaid; instead they excluded the
corrected Certificated of Canvass of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel,
Pangasinan;

2. To ANNUL the proclamation dated 21 July 1992, by the said Provincial Board of Canvassers
(dissented by Chairman Felimon Asperin), of candidate Alfonso Bince;

3. To DIRECT the Provincial Board of Canvassers to recovene immediately and proclaim the winning
candidate for the second position of the Provincial Board, 6th District of Pangasinan, on the basis of the
completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass submitted by the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of all
the municipalities in the 6th District of Pangasinan, in accordance with law. 9

Consequently, petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari before this Court seeking to set aside the foregoing
resolution of the COMELEC, contending that the same was promulgated without prior notice and hearing with respect to
SPC No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384. The case was docketed as G.R. No. 106291.

On February 9, 1993, the Court en banc 10 granted the petition ratiocinating that:

Respondent COMELEC acted without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the
petitioner's proclamation without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the latter of due
process. Moreover, there was no valid correction of the SOVs and COCs for the municipalities of Tayug
and San Manuel to warrant the annullment of the petitioner's proclamation.

1. Petitioner had been proclaimed, had taken his oath of office and had assumed the position of the
second elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan  of the Province of Pangasinan for its Sixth
Legislative District. Such proclamation enjoys the presumption of regularly and validity. The ruling of the
majority of the PBC to proclaim the petitioner is based on its interpretation of the 9 July 1992 Resolution
of respondent COMELEC which does not expressly single out the corrected COCs of Tayug and San
Manuel; since, as of that time, the only corrected COC which existed was that for San Quintin, which was
made by the PBC on 18 June 1992, the majority of the PBC cannot be faulted for ruling the way it did. the
9 July 1992 Resolution (Rollo, p. 51) merely directed it:

(1) To RECOVENE immediately and complete the canvass of the Certificates of Votes,
as corrected, of the Municipal Boards of Canvassers of the municipalities comprising the
6th District of Pangasinan;

(2) To PROCLAIM the winning candidate for Member of the Provincial Board, 6th District
of Pangasinan, on the basis of the completed and corrected Certificates of Canvass,
aforesaid; in accordance with the law, the rules and guideline on canvassing and
proclamation. (Emphasis supplied)

The PBC thus had every reason to believe that the phrase "completed and corrected" COCs could only
refer to the nine 99) COCs for the nine municipalities, canvass for which was completed on 21 May 1992,
and that of San Quintin, respectively. Verily, the above resolution is vague and ambiguous.

Petitioner cannot be deprived of his office without due process of law. Although public office is
not  property under Section 1 of the Bill of Rights of the Constitution (Article III, 1987 Constitution), and
one cannot acquire a vested right to public office (CRUZ, I.A., Constitutional Law, 1991 ed., 101), it is,
nevertheless, a protected right (BERNAS J., The Constitution of the Republic of the Philippines, vol. I,
1987 ed., 40, citing Segovia vs. Noel, 47 Phil. 543 [1925] and Borja vs. Agoncillo, 46 Phil. 432 [1924]).
Due process in proceedings before the respondent COMELEC, exercising its quasi-judicial functions,
requires due notice and hearing, among others. Thus, although the COMELEC possesses, in appropriate
cases, the power to annul or suspend the proclamation of any candidate (Section 248, Omnibus Election
Code [B.P. Blg. 881]), We had ruled in Farinas vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 81763, 3 March
1988), Reyes vs. Commission on Elections G.R. No. 81856, 3 March 1988) and Gallardo
vs.  Commission on Elections  (G.R. No. 85974, 2 May 1989) that the COMELEC is without power to
partially or totally annul a proclamation or suspend the effects of a proclamation without notice and
hearing.

xxx xxx xxx

Furthermore, the said motion to annul proclamation was treated by the respondent COMELEC as a
Special Case (SPC) because its ruling therein was made in connection with SPC No. 92-208 and SPC
No. 92-384. Special Cases under the COMELEC RULES OF PROCEDURE involve the pre-proclamation
controversies (Rule 27 in relation to Section 4(h)l Rule 1, and Section 4, Rule 7). We have categorically
declared in Sarmiento vs. Commission on Elections (G.R. No. 105628, and companion cases, 6 August
1992) that pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of the 1987 Constitution, . . . the commission en banc does
not have jurisdiction to hear and decide pre-proclamation cases at the first instance. Such cases should
first be referred to a division

Hence, the COMELEC en banc had no jurisdiction to decide on the aforesaid to annul the proclamation;
consequently, its 29 July 1992 Resolution is motion is null and void. For this reason too, the
COMELEC en banc  Resolution of 6 June 1992 in SPC No. 92-2()8 resolving the private respondent's
appeal from the ruling of the PBC with respect to the COC of San Quintin is similarly void.

2. It is to be noted, as correctly stressed by the petitioner, that there are no valid corrected Statements of
Votes and Certificates of Canvass for Tayug and San Manuel; thus, any reference to such would be
clearly unfounded. While it may be true that on 24 June 1992, the PBC, acting on simultaneous petitions
to correct the SOVs and COCs for Tayug and San Manuel ordered the MBCs for these two (2)
municipalities to make the appropriate corrections in the said SOVs and their corresponding COCs, none
of said Boards convened to the members of actually implement the order. Such failure could have been
due to the appeal seasonably interposed by the petitioner to the COMELEC or the fact that said members
simply chose not to act thereon. As already adverted to the so-called "corrected" Statements of Votes and
Certificates of Canvass consist of sheets of paper signed by the respective Election Registrars of Tayug
(Annex "F-l" of Comment of private respondent; Annex "A" of Consolidated Reply of petitioner) and San
Manuel (Annex "F-2, Id.; Annex "B", Id.). These are not valid corrections because the Election Registrars,
as Chairmen of the MBCs cannot, by themselves, act for their Section 225 of the respective Board.
Section 225 of the Omnibus Election Code (B.P. Blg. 881) provides that "[A] majority vote of all the
members of the board of canvassers shall be necessary to render a decision." That majority means at
least two (2) of the three (3) members constituting the Board (Section 20(c) of the Electoral Reforms Law
of 1987 (R.A. No. 6646) provides that the "municipal board of canvassers shall be composed of the
election registrar or a representative of the Commission, as chairman, the municipal treasurer, as vice-
chairman, and the most senior district school supervisor or in his absence a principal of the school district
or the elementary school, as members"). As to why the Election Registrars, in their capacities as
Chairmen, were 7th only ones who prepared the so-called correction sheets, is beyond Us. There is no
showing that the other members of the Boards were no longer available. Since they are from the Province
of Pangasinan, they could have been easily summoned by the PBC to appear before it and effect the
corrections on the Statements of Votes and Certificates of Canvass.

Besides, by no stretch of the imagination can these sheets of paper be considered as the corrected SOVs
and COCs. Corrections in a Statement of Vote and a Certificate of Canvass could only be accomplished
either by inserting the authorized corrections into the SOV and COC which were originally prepared and
submitted by the MBC or by preparing a new SOV and COC incorporating therein the authorized
corrections. Thus, the statement in the 29 July 1992 Resolution of the COMELEC referring to "the
Certificates of Canvass of the municipal Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel" (Last clause,
paragraph 1 of the dispositive portion, Annex "A" of Petition: Rollo 15), is palpably unfounded. The
Commission could have 7 been misled by Atty. Asperin's ambiguous reference to "corrections already
made in separate sheets of paper of the Statements of Votes and Certificate of Canvass of Tayug and
San Manuel, Pangasinan" (Quoted in the Resolution of 9 July 1992; Id., 50-51), in his petition asking the
COMELEC to rule on who shall be proclaimed. However, if it only took the trouble to carefully examine
what was held out to be as the corrected documents, respondent COMELEC should not have been
misled.

Even if We are to assume for the sake of argument that these sheets of paper constitute sufficient
corrections, they are, nevertheless, void and of no effect. At the time the Election Registrars prepared
them — on 6 July 1992 — respondent COMELEC had not yet acted on the petitioner's appeal (SPC No.
92-384) from the 24 June 1992 ruling of the PBC authorizing the corrections. Petitioner maintains that
until now, his appeal has not been resolved. The public respondent, on the other hand, through the Office
of the Solicitor General, claims that the same had been:

. . . resolved in the questioned resolution of July 29, 1992, where COMELEC affirmed
respondents (sic) Board's correction that petitioner only received 2,415 votes in Tayug
and 2,179 in San Manuel (see p. 2, Annex "A", Petition) (Rollo, p. 71)

On the same matter, the private respondent asserts that:

This SPC-92-384, is however, deemed terminated and the ruling of the PBC is likewise
deemed affirmed by virtue of the 2nd par., Sec. 16, R.A. No. 7166, supra and
Comelec en banc Resolution No. 2489, supra, dated June 29, 1992 (Id., 36);

If We follow the respondent COMELEC's contention to its logical conclusion, it was only on 29 July 1992
that SPC No. 92-384 was resolved; consequently, the so-called "correction sheets" were still prematurely
prepared. In any event, the COMELEC could not have validly ruled on such appeal in its 29 July 1992
Resolution because the same was promulgated to resolve the Urgent Motion For Contempt and to Annul
Proclamation filed by the private respondent. Furthermore, before the resolution of SPC No. 92-384 on
the abovementioned date, no hearing was set or conducted to resolve the pending motion. Therefore, on
this ground alone, the 29 July 1992 Resolution, even if it was meant to resolve the appeal, is a patent
nullity for having been issued in gross violation of the requirement of notice and hearing mandated by
Section 246 of the Omnibus Election Code, in relation to Section 18 of R.A. No. 7166 and Section 6, Rule
27 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure, and for having been resolved by the COMELEC en banc at the
first instance. The case should have been referred first to a division pursuant to Section 3, Article IX-C of
 the 1987 constitution and Our ruling in Sarmiento vs.  Commission on Elections. Moreover, the
COMELEC's claim that the questioned resolution affirmed the correction made by the Board is totally
baseless. The PBC did not make any corrections. It merely ordered the Municipal Boards of Canvassers
of Tayug and San Manuel to make such corrections. As earlier stated, however, the said MBCs did not
convene to make these corrections. It was the Chairmen alone who signed the sheets of paper purporting
to be corrections.

For being clearly inconsistent with the intention and official stand of respondent COMELEC, private
respondent COMELEC private respondent's theory of termination under the second paragraph of Section
16 of R.A. No. 7166, and the consequent affirmance of the ruling of the PBC ordering the correction of the
number of votes, must necessarily fail.

The foregoing considered, the proclamation of the private respondent on, 13 August 1992 by the
Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan is null and void.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged resolution of the respondent
Commission on Elections of 29 July 1992 and the proclamation of the private respondent on 13 August
1992 as the second Member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Province of Pangasinan,
representing its Sixth Legislative District ANNULLED and SET ASIDE and respondent Commission on
Elections is DIRECTED to resolve the pending incidents conformably with the foregoing disquisitions and
pronouncements.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.11

On February 23, 1993, private respondent Micu filed an Urgent Omnibus Motion before the COMELEC praying that the
latter hear and resolve the pending incidents referred to by this Court. Private respondent was obviously referring to SPC
No. 92-208 and SPC No. 92-384, both cases left unresolved by the COMELEC.

Consequently, the First Division of the COMELEC set the cases for hearing on March 8, 1993. During the hearing, both
Micu and Bince orally manifested the withdrawal of their respective appeals. Also withdrawn were the petitions to
disqualify Atty. Asperin and to cite the Board for contempt. The parties agreed to file their respective memoranda/position
papers by March 15, 1993.

Petitioner Bince filed his Position Paper on March 12, 1993 arguing that the withdrawal of SPC No. 92-208 affirmed the
ruling of the PBC dated May 21, 1992 and even if it were not withdrawn, Section 16 of R.A. 7166 would have worked to
terminate the appeal. Bince likewise asserts that his appeal in SPC No. 92-384 became moot and academic in view of this
Court's ruling nullifying the June 24, 1992 order of the PBC granting the petitions for correction of the SOVs and COCs of
Tayug and San Manuel aside from being superseded by the PBC ruling proclaiming him on July 21, 1992.

On the other hand, private respondent Micu, in his Position Paper filed on March 15, 1993 postulated that the petitions
filed on June 11, 1992 for the correction of the SOVs and COCs of Tayug and San Manuel under Section 6 of Rule 27 of
the Comelec Rules of Procedure, as well as the ruling of the PBC of June 24, 1992 granting the same were valid so that
the withdrawal of Bince's appeal in SPC No. 92-384 firmly affirmed the PBC ruling of June 24, 1992 allowing the
corrections.

On July 15, 1993, the First Division of the COMELEC promulgated a Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:

Viewed from the foregoing considerations, the Commission (First Division) holds that the petitioner
Alfonso C. Bince Jr. is entitled to sit as member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan, Sixth District of
Pangasinan.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission (First Division) RESOLVED, as it hereby RESOLVES, to AFFIRM the
proclamation of petitioner Alfonso C. Bince, Jr. by the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan on
21 July 1992 as the duly elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of the Sixth District of the
Province of Pangasinan.12

On July 20, 1993, private respondent Micu filed a Motion for reconsideration of the above-quoted resolution.
On September 9, 1993, the COMELEC en banc granted the private respondentls motion for reconsideration in a
resolution which dispositively reads as follows:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Motion for Reconsideration filed by respondent Emiliano S.
Micu is granted. The Resolution of the Commission First Division is hereby SET ASIDE. The proclamation
of petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. on July 21, 1992 is hereby declared null and void. Accordingly, the
Provincial Board of Canvassers is hereby directed to reconvene, with proper notices, and to order the
Municipal Board of Canvassers of San Manuel and Tayug to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs
and COCs in the said municipalities. Thereafter, the Provincial Board of Canvassers is directed to include
the results in the said municipalities in its canvass.

The PBC is likewise ordered to proclaim the second elected member of the Sangguniang Panlalawigan of
the Sixth Legislative District of Pangasinan.

SO ORDERED. 13

This is the resolution assailed in the instant petition for certiorari.

We do not find merit in this petition and accordingly rule against petitioner.

Respondent COMELEC did not act without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in annulling the proclamation of
petitioner Alfonso Bince, Jr. and in directing the Provincial Board of Canvassers of Pangasinan to order the Municipal
Boards of Canvassers of Tayug and San Manuel to make the necessary corrections in the SOVs and COCs in said
municipalities and to proclaim the winner in the sixth legislative district of Pangasinan.

At the outset, it is worthy to observe that no error was committed by respondent COMELEC when it resolved the "pending
incidents" of the instant case pursuant to the decision of this Court in the aforesaid case of Bince,  Jr.  v. COMELEC on
February 9, 1993 Petitioner's contention that his proclamation has long been affirmed and confirmed by this Court in the
aforesaid case is baseless. In Bince, we nullified the proclamation of private respondent because the same was done
without the requisite due notice and hearing, thereby depriving the petitioner of his right to due process. In so doing,
however, we did not affirm nor confirm the proclamation of petitioner, hence, our directive to respondent COMELEC to
resolve the pending incidents of the case so as to ascertain the true and lawful winner of the said elections. In effect,
petitioner's proclamation only enjoyed the presumption of regularity and validity of an official act. It was not categorically
declared valid.

Neither can the COMELEC be faulted for subsequently annulling the proclamation of petitioner Bince on account of a
mathematical error in addition committed by respondent MBCs in the computation of the votes received by both petitioner
and private respondent.

The petitions to correct manifest errors were filed on time, that is, before the petitioner's proclamation on July 21, 1992.
The petition of the MBC of San Manuel was filed on June 4, 1992 while that of still, the MBC of Tayug was filed on June 5,
1992. Still, private respondent's petition was filed with the MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel on June 10, 1992 and June
11, 1992, respectively, definitely well within the period required by Section 6 (now Section 7), Rule 27 of the COMELEC
Rules of Procedure. Section 6 clearly provides that the petition for correction may be filed at any time before proclamation
of a winner, thus:

Sec. 6. Correction of errors in tabulation or tallying of results by the board of canvassers. —  (a) Where it
is clearly shown before proclamation that manifest errors were committed in the tabulation or tallying of
election returns, or certificates of canvass, during the canvassing as where (1) a copy of the election
returns of one precinct or two or more copies of a certificate of canvass was tabulated more than once,
(2) two copies of the election returns or certificate of canvass were tabulated separately, (3) there had
been a mistake in the adding or copying of the figures into the certificate of canvass or into the statement
of votes, or (4) so-called election returns from non-existent precincts were included in the canvass, the
board may, motu propio, or upon verified petition by any candidate, political party, organization or
coalition of political parties, after due notice and hearing, correct the errors committed.

(b) The order for correction must be in writing and must be promulgated.

(c) Any candidate, political party, organization or coalition of political parties aggrieved by said order may
appeal therefrom to the Commission within twenty-four (24) hours from the promulgation.
 (d) Once an appeal is made, the board of canvassers shall not proclaim the winning candidates, unless
their votes are not affected by the appeal.

(e) The appeal must implead as respondents all parties who may be adversely affected thereby.

(f) Upon receipt of the appeal, the Clerk of Court concerned shall forthwith issue summons, together with
a copy of the appeal, to the respondents.

(g) The Clerk of Court concerned shall immediately set the appeal for hearing.

(h) The appeal shall be heard an decided by he Commission en banc (Emphasis ours).

The rule is plain and simple. It needs no other interpretation contrary to petitioner's protestation.

Assuming for the sake of argument that the petition was filed out of time, this incident alone will not thwart the proper
determination and resolution of the instant case on substantial grounds. Adherence to a technicality that would put a
stamp of validity on a palpably void proclamation, with the inevitable result of frustrating the people's will cannot be
countenanced. In Benito v.  COMELEC,  14 categorically declared that:

. . . Adjudication of cases on substantive merits and not on technicalities has been consistently observed
by this Court. In the case of Juliano vs.  Court of Appeals (20 SCRA 808) cited in Duremdes
vs.  Commission on Elections (178 SCRA 746), this Court had the occasion to declare that:

Well-settled is the doctrine that election contests involve public interest, and technicalities
and procedural barriers should not be allowed to stand if they constitute an obstacle to
the determination of the true will of the electorate in the choice of their elective officials.
And also settled is the rule that laws governing election contests must be liberally
construed to the end that the will of the people in the choice of public officials may not be
defeated by mere technical objections (Gardiner v. Romulo, 26 Phil. 521; Galang v.
Miranda,  35 Phil. 269; Jalandoni v. Sarcon, G.R. No.
L-6496, January 27, 1962; Macasunding v. Macalanang, G.R. No.
L-22779, March 31, 1965; Cauton v. Commission on Elections, G.R. No. L-25467, April
27, 1967). In an election case the court has an imperative duty to ascertain all means
within its command who is the real candidate elected by the electorate (Ibasco v. Ilao,
G.R. No. L-17512, December 29, 1960). . . . (Juliano vs. Court of Appeals, supra, pp.
818-819). (Emphasis ours)

In the later case of Rodriguez vs.  Commission on Elections (119 SCRA 465), this doctrine was reiterated
and the Court went on to state that:

Since the early case of Gardiner v. Romulo (26 Phil. 521), this Court has made it clear
that it frowns upon any interpretation of the law or the rules that would hinder in any way
not only the free and intelligent casting of the votes in an election but also the correct
ascertainment of the results, This bent or disposition continues to the present. (Id., at p.
474).

The same principle still holds true today. Technicalities of the legal rules enunciated in the election laws
should not frustrate the determination of the popular will.

Undoubtedly therefore, the only issue that remains unresolved is the allowance of the correction of what are purely
mathematical and/or mechanical errors in the addition of the votes received by both candidates. It does not involve the
opening of ballot boxes; neither does it involve the examination and/or appreciation of ballots. The correction sought by
private respondent and respondent MBCs of Tayug and San Manuel is correction of manifest mistakes in mathematical
addition. Certainly, this only calls for a mere clerical act of reflecting the true and correct votes received by the candidates
by the MBCs involved. In this case, the manifest errors sought to be corrected involve the proper and diligent addition of
the votes in the municipalities of Tayug and San Manuel, Pangasinan.

In Tayug, the total votes received by petitioner Bince was erroneously recorded as 2,486 when it should only have been
2,415. Petitioner Bince, in effect, was credited by 71 votes more.
In San Manuel, petitioner Bince received 2,179 votes but was credited with 6 votes more, hence, the SOV reflected the
total number of votes as 2,185. On the other hand, the same SOV indicated that private respondent Micu garnered 2,892
votes but he actually received only 2,888, hence was credited in excess of 4 votes.

Consequently, by margin of 72 votes, private respondent indisputably won the challenged seat in the Sangguniang
Panlalawigan  of the sixth district of Pangasinan. Petitioner's proclamation and assumption into public office was therefore
flawed from the beginning, the same having been based on a faulty tabulation. Hence, respondent COMELEC did not
commit grave abuse of discretion in setting aside the illegal proclamation.

As a parting note, we reiterate' our concern with respect to insignificant disputes plaguing this Court. Trifles such as the
one at issue should not, as much as possible, reach this Court, clog its docket, demand precious judicial time and waste
valuable taxpayers' money, if they can be settled below without prejudice to any party or to the ends of justice.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
 A. PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
Tanada v. Tuvera 146 SCRA 446 (1986) G.R. No. L-63915, December 29, 1986

Fact: Due process was invoked by the petitioners in demanding the disclosure of a number of presidential decrees which
they claimed had not been published as required by law. The government argued that while publication was necessary as
a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise provided,” as when the decrees themselves declared that they were to
become effective immediately upon their approval. In the decision of this case on April 24, 1985, the Court affirmed the
necessity for the publication of some of these decrees, orders respondents to publish in the Official Gazette all
unpublished presidential issuances which are of general application, and unless so published, they shall have no binding
force and effect. The petitioners are now before us again, this time to move for reconsideration/clarification of that
decision.  Specifically, they ask the What is meant by “law of public nature” or “general applicability”? Must a distinction be
made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not? What is meant by “publication”? Where is the
publication to be made? When is the publication to be made?  the petitioners suggest that there should be no distinction
between laws of general applicability and those which are not; that publication means complete publication; and that the
publication must be made forthwith in the Official Gazette

Issue: Whether the Publication of Laws and Decrees in the Official Gazette and Newspaper of General Circulation is a
mandatory requirement of the Constitution?

Held: Yes, Publication is indispensable in every case, but the legislature may in its discretion provide that the usual
fifteen-day period shall be shortened or extended. It is not correct to say that under the disputed clause publication may
be dispensed with altogether. The reason. is that such omission would offend due process insofar as it would deny the
public knowledge of the laws that are supposed to govern the legislature could validly provide that a law e effective
immediately upon its approval notwithstanding the lack of, it is not unlikely that persons not aware of it would be
prejudiced as a result and they would be so not because of a failure to comply with but simply because they did not know
of its existence, Significantly, this is not true only of penal laws as is commonly supposed. One can think of many non-
penal measures, like a law on prescription, which must also be communicated to the persons they may affect before they
can begin to operate. The conclusive presumption that every person knows the law, which of course presupposes that the
law has been published if the presumption is to have any legal justification at all. It is no less important to remember that
Section 6 of the Bill of Rights recognizes “the right of the people to information on matters of public concern,” and this
certainly applies to, among others, and indeed especially, the legislative enactments of the government.
G.R. No. 121234 August 23, 1995

HUBERT J. P. WEBB, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 258,
HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 259,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUÑO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO
LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G.
TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, respondents, LAURO
VIZCONDE, intervenor.

G.R. No. 121245 August 23, 1995

MICHAEL A. GATCHALIAN, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 258,
HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 259,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL
BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G. TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, respondents.

G.R. No. 121297 August 23, 1995

ANTONIO L. LEJANO, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE RAUL E. DE LEON, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 258,
HONORABLE ZOSIMO V. ESCANO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 259,
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ZENON L. DE GUIA, JOVENCITO ZUÑO, LEONARDO GUIYAB, JR., ROBERTO
LAO, PABLO FORMARAN, and NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, and HONORABLE AMELITA G.
TOLENTINO, the Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Parañaque, Branch 274, respondents.

Before the Court are petitions for the issuance of the extraordinary writs of certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with
application for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction to: (1) annul and set aside the Warrants of Arrest
issued against petitioners by respondent Judges Raul E. de Leon and Amelita Tolentino in Criminal Case No. 95-404; (2)
enjoin the respondents from conducting any proceeding in the aforementioned criminal case; and (3) dismiss said criminal
case or include Jessica Alfaro as one of the accused therein. 1

From the records of the case, it appears that on June 19, 1994, the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) filed with the
Department of Justice a letter-complaint charging petitioners Hubert Webb, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio J. Lejano and six
(6) other persons,2 with the crime of Rape with Homicide. Forthwith, the Department of Justice formed a panel of
prosecutors headed by Assistant Chief State Prosecutor Jovencio R. Zuño to conduct the preliminary investigation 3 of
those charged with the rape and killing on June 30, 1991 of Carmela N. Vizconde; 4 her mother Estrellita Nicolas-
Vizconde,5 and her sister Anne Marie Jennifer6 in their home at Number 80 W. Vinzons, St., BF Homes, Parañaque, Metro
Manila.

During the preliminary investigation, the NBI presented the following: (1) the sworn statement dated May 22, 1995 of their
principal witness, Maria Jessica M.  Alfaro who allegedly saw the commission of the crime;7 (2) the sworn statements of
two (2) of the former housemaids of the Webb family in the persons of Nerissa E. Rosales and Mila S. Gaviola;8 (3) the
sworn-statement of Carlos J. Cristobal who alleged that on March 9, 1991 he was a passenger of United Airlines Flight
No. 808 bound for New York and who expressed doubt on whether petitioner Webb was his co-passenger in the trip; (4)
the sworn statement of Lolita Birrer, a former live-in partner of Gerardo Biong, who narrated the manner of how Biong
investigated and tried to cover up the crime at bar;9 (5) the sworn statements of Belen Dometita and Teofilo Minoza, two
of the Vizconde maids, and the sworn statements of Normal White, a security guard and Manciano Gatmaitan, an
engineer. The autopsy reports of the victims were also submitted and they showed that Carmela had nine (9) stab
wounds, Estrellita twelve (12) and Jennifer nineteen (19). 10 The genital examination of Carmela confirmed the presence of
spermatozoa.11

Before submitting his counter-affidavit, petitioner Webb filed with the DOJ Panel a Motion for Production And Examination
of Evidence and Documents for the NBI to produce the following:
 (a) Certification issued by the U.S. Federal Bureau of Investigation on the admission to and stay of Hubert Webb
in the United States from March 9, 1991 to October 22, 1992;

(b) Laboratory Report No. SN-91-17 of the Medico Legal Officer, Dr. Prospero A. Cabanayan, M.D.;

(c) Sworn Statements of Gerardo C. Biong (other than his Sworn Statement dated October 7, 1991);

(d) Photographs of fingerprints lifted from the Vizconde residence taken during the investigation;

(e) Investigation records of NBI on Engr. Danilo Aguas, et al.;

(f) List of names of 135 suspects/persons investigated by the NBI per Progress Report dated September 2, 1991
submitted by Atty. Arlis Vela, Supervising Agent;

(g) Records of arrest, interview, investigation and other written statements of Jessica Alfaro (other than the May
22, 1995 Sworn Statement) conducted by the NBI and other police agencies;

(h) transmittal letter to the NBI, including the report of the investigation conducted by Superintendent Rodolfo C.
Sison, Regional Deputy Director, NCRC;

(i) The names of NBI officials/agents composing the Task Force Jecares, including their respective positions and
duties;

(j) Statements made by other persons in connection with the crime charged.

The motion was granted by the DOJ Panel and the NBI submitted photocopies of the documents. It alleged it lost the
original of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro. This compelled petitioner Webb to file Civil Case No. 951099 in
the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Makati, Br. 63, for the purpose, among others, of obtaining the original of said sworn
statement. He succeeded, for in the course of its proceedings, Atty. Arturo L. Mercader, Jr., produced a copy of said
original in compliance with a subpoena duces tecum. The original was then submitted by petitioner Webb to the DOJ
Panel together with his other evidence. It appears, however, that petitioner Webb failed to obtain from the NBI the copy of
the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) Report despite his request for its production.

Petitioner Webb claimed during the preliminary investigation that he did not commit the crime at bar as he went to the
United States on March 1, 1991 and returned to the Philippines on October 27, 1992. 12 His alibi was corroborated by
Honesto Aragon, Lecinia Edrosolano, Sylvia Climaco, Gina Roque, Sonia Rodriguez, Edgardo Venture and Pamela
Francisco.13 To further support his defense, he submitted documentary evidence that he bought a bicycle and a 1986
Toyota car while in the United States on said dates14 and that he was issued by the State of California Driver's License
No. A8818707 on June 14, 1991.15 Petitioner Webb likewise submitted the letter dated July 25, 1995 of Mr. Robert
Heafner, Legal Attache of the US Embassy, citing certain records tending to confirm, among others, his arrival at San
Francisco, California on March 9, 1991 as a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808.

The other respondents — Hospicio "Pyke" Fernandez, Michael Gatchalian, Antonio "Tony Boy" Lejano, Peter Estrada,
Miguel Rodriguez and Gerardo Biong — submitted sworn statements, responses, and a motion to dismiss denying their
complicity in the rape-killing of the Vizcondes.16 Only the respondents Joey Filart and Artemio "Dong" Ventura failed to file
their counter-affidavits though they were served with subpoena in their last known address. 17 In his sworn statement,
petitioner Gatchalian alleged that from 11 o'clock in the evening of June 29, 1991 until 3 o'clock in the morning of the
following day, he was at the residence of his friends, Carlos and Andrew Syyap, at New Alabang Village, Muntinlupa
watching video tapes. He claimed that his co-petitioner Lejano was with him.

On August 8, 1995, the DOJ Panel issued a 26-page Resolution "finding probable cause to hold respondents for trial" and
recommending that an Information for rape with homicide be filed against petitioners and their co-respondents, 18 On the
same date, it filed the corresponding Information19 against petitioners and their co-accused with the Regional Trial Court of
Parañaque. The case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 95-404 and raffled to Branch 258 presided by respondent
judge Zosimo V. Escano. It was, however, the respondent judge Raul de Leon, pairing judge of Judge Escano, who
issued the warrants of arrest against the petitioners. On August 11, 1995, Judge Escano voluntarily inhibited himself from
the case to avoid any suspicion about his impartiality considering his employment with the NBI before his appointment to
the bench. The case was re-raffled to Branch 274, presided by Judge Amelita Tolentino who issued new warrants of
arrest against the petitioners and their co-accused. On August 11, 1995, petitioner Webb voluntarily surrendered to the
police authorities at Camp Ricardo Papa Sr., in Bicutan, Taguig. Petitioners Gatchalian and Lejano likewise gave
themselves up to the authorities after filing their petitions before us.

In their petitions at bar, petitioners contend: (1) respondent Judges de Leon and Tolentino gravely abused their discretion
when they failed to conduct a preliminary examination before issuing warrants of arrest against them: (2) the DOJ Panel
likewise gravely abused its discretion in holding that there is probable cause to charge them with the crime of rape with
homicide; (3) the DOJ Panel denied them their constitutional right to due process during their preliminary investigation;
and (4) the DOJ Panel unlawfully intruded into judicial prerogative when it failed to charge Jessica Alfaro in the
Information as an accused.

We find the petitions bereft of merit.

Petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for its finding of probable cause. They insist that the May 22, 1995 sworn
statement of Jessica Alfaro is inherently weak and uncorroborated. They hammer on alleged material
inconsistencies between her April 28, 1995 and May 22, 1995 sworn statements. They assail her credibility for her
misdescription of petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blonde. They also criticize the procedure followed by the DOJ
Panel when it did not examine witnesses to clarify the alleged incredulities and inconsistencies in the sworn
statements of the witnesses for the NBI.

We start with a restatement of the purpose of a preliminary investigation. Section 1 of Rule 112 provides that a
preliminary investigation should determine " . . . whether there is a sufficient ground to engender a well-grounded
belief that a crime cognizable by the Regional Trial Court has been committed and that the respondent is probably
guilty thereof, and should be held for trial." Section 3 of the same Rule outlines the procedure in conducting a
preliminary investigation, thus:

Sec. 3. Procedure. — Except as provided for in Section 7 hereof, no complaint or information for an
offense cognizable by the Regional Trial Court shall be filed without a preliminary investigation having
been first conducted in the following manner:

(a) The complaint shall state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of
the complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents, in such number of copies as
there are respondents, plus two (2) copies for the official file. The said affidavits shall be sworn to before
any fiscal, state prosecutor or government official authorized to administer oath, or, in their absence or
unavailability, a notary public, who must certify that he personally examined the affiants and that he is
satisfied that they voluntarily executed and understood their affidavits.

(b) Within ten (10) days after the filing of the complaint, the investigating officer shall either dismiss the
same if he finds no ground to continue with the inquiry, or issue a subpoena to the respondent, attaching
thereto a copy of the complaint, affidavits and other supporting documents. Within ten (10) days from
receipt thereof, the respondent shall submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents. He shall
have the right to examine all other evidence submitted by the complainant.

(c) Such counter-affidavits and other supporting evidence submitted by the respondent shall also be
sworn to and certified as prescribed in paragraph (a) hereof and copies thereof shall be furnished by him
to the complainant.

(d) If the respondent cannot be subpoenaed, or if subpoenaed, does not submit counter-affidavits within
the ten (10) day period, the investigating officer shall base his resolution on the evidence presented by
the complainant.

(e) If the investigating officer believes that there are matters to be clarified, he may set a hearing to
propound clarificatory questions to the parties or their witnesses, during which the parties shall be
afforded an opportunity to be present but without the right to examine or cross-examine. If the parties so
desire, they may submit questions to the investigating officer which the latter may propound to the parties
or witnesses concerned.
 (f) Thereafter, the investigation shall be deemed concluded, and the investigating officer shall resolve the
case within ten (10) days therefrom. Upon the evidence thus adduced, the investigating officer shall
determine whether or not there is sufficient ground to hold the respondent for trial.

Section 4 of Rule 112 then directs that "if the investigating fiscal finds cause to hold the respondent for trial, he
shall prepare the resolution and corresponding information. He shall certify under oath that he, or as shown by the
record, an authorized officer, has personally examined the complainant and his witnesses, that there is
reasonable ground to believe that a crime has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof . . ."

The need to find probable cause is dictated by the Bill of Rights which protects "the right of the people to be secure in their
persons . . . against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature . . ." 20 An arrest without a probable cause is
an unreasonable seizure of a person, and violates the privacy of persons which ought not to be intruded by the
State.21 Probable cause to warrant arrest is not an opaque concept in our jurisdiction. Continuing accretions of case law
reiterate that they are facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man  to believe that an
offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. 22 Other jurisdictions utilize the term man of reasonable
caution 23 or the term ordinarily prudent and cautious man.24 The terms are legally synonymous and their reference is not
to a person with training in the law such as a prosecutor or a judge but to the average man on the street.25 It ought to be
emphasized that in determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of our technical rules of evidence of which his knowledge is nil. Rather, he relies on the calculus of common
sense of which all reasonable men have an abundance.

Applying these basic norms, we are not prepared to rule that the DOJ Panel gravely abused its discretion when it
found probable cause against the petitioners. Petitioners belittle the truthfulness of Alfaro on two (2) grounds: (a)
she allegedly erroneously described petitioner Webb's hair as semi-blond and (b) she committed material
inconsistencies in her two (2) sworn statement, thus:26

xxx xxx xxx

To illustrate, the following are some examples of inconsistencies in the two sworn statements of Alfaro:

On whether Alfaro knew Carmela before the incident in question

First Affidavit: She had NOT met Carmela before June 29, 1991.

Second Affidavit: "I met her in a party sometime in February, 1991."

On whether Alfaro saw the dead bodies

First Affidavit: She did not see the three dead persons on that night. She just said "on the
following day I read in the newspaper that there were three persons who were killed . . ."

Second Affidavit: "I peeped through the first door on the left. I saw two bodies on top of
the bed, bloodied, and in the floor, I saw Hubert on top of Carmela."

On the alleged rape of Carmela Vizconde

First Affidavit: She did not see the act of rape.

Second Affidavit: She saw Hubert Webb "with bare buttocks, on top of Carmela and
pumping, her mouth gagged and she was moaning and I saw tears on her eyes."

On how Webb, Lejano, and Ventura entered the Vizconde house

First Affidavit: "by jumping over the fence, which was only a little more than a meter high."

Second Affidavit: They "entered the gate which was already open."

On whether Alfaro entered the Vizconde house

 First Affidavit: She never entered the house.

Second Affidavit: "I proceeded to the iron grill gate leading to the dirty kitchen."

In its Resolution, the DOJ Panel ruled that these alleged misdescription and inconsistencies did not erode the
credibility of Alfaro. We quote the pertinent ruling, viz.:27

xxx xxx xxx

As regards the admissibility of Alfaro's statements, granting for purposes of argument merely that she is a
co-conspirator, it is well to note that confessions of a co-conspirator may be taken as evidence to show
the probability of the co-conspirator's participation in the commission of the crime (see People vs.
Lumahang, 94 Phil. 1084).

Furthermore, it is a well-established doctrine that conspiracy need not be proved by direct evidence of
prior agreement to commit the crime. Indeed, "only rarely would such a prior agreement be demonstrable
since, in the nature of things, criminal undertakings are only rarely documented by agreements in writing.
Thus, conspiracy may be inferred from the conduct of the accused before, during and after the
commission of the crime, showing that the several accused had acted in concert or in unison with each
other, evincing a common purpose or design." (Angelo vs. Court of Appeals, 210 SCRA 402 [1992],
citations omitted; People vs. Molleda, 86 SCRA 699).

Neither can we discredit Alfaro merely because of the inconsistencies in her two sworn statements.
In Angelo, the Court refused to discredit the testimony of a witness accusing therein petitioner for the
slaying of one Gaviano Samaniego even though said witness failed to name Angelo in his affidavit which
was executed five (5) months earlier. Granting, the Court continued, that a part of the witness' testimony
is untrue, such circumstance is not sufficient to discredit the entire testimony of the witness.

On August 7, 1995, another counsel for respondent Webb submitted his memorandum suggesting that
the instant complaint "should not be decided within the month to give time to the NBI to coordinate with
the FBI on the latter's inquiry into the whereabouts of Hubert Webb . . . and to check on our U.S.-based
witnesses."

In said memorandum, counsel for respondent Webb calls for the application of the maxim  falsus in uno,
falsus in omnibus arising from the inconsistencies of Alfaro's statements, among others. This is
untenable. As held in Angelo:

There is no rule of law which prohibits a court from crediting part of the testimony of a
witness as worthy of belief and from simultaneously rejecting other parts which the court
may find incredible or dubious. The maxim  falsus in uno, falsus in omnibus is not a rule
of law, let alone a general rule of law which is universally applicable. It is not a legal
presumption either. It is merely a latinism describing the conclusion reached by a court in
a particular case after ascribing to the evidence such weight or lack of weight that the
court deemed proper.

In the case before us, complainant reasoned out that Alfaro was then having reservations when she first
executed the first statement and held back vital information due to her natural reaction of mistrust. This
being so, the panel believes that the inconsistencies in Alfaro's two sworn statements have been
sufficiently explained especially specially so where there is no showing that the inconsistencies were
deliberately made to distort the truth. Consequently, the probative value of Alfaro's testimony deserves full
faith and credit. As it has been often noted, ex parte statements are generally incomplete because they
are usually executed when the affiant's state of mind does not give her sufficient and fair opportunity to
comprehend the import of her statement and to narrate in full the incidents which transpired (People vs.
Sarellana, 233 SCRA 31 [1994]; Angelo vs. Court of Appeals, supra). In the case at bar, there is no
dispute that a crime has been committed and what is clear before us is that the totality of the evidence
submitted by the complainant indicate a  prima facie case that respondents conspired in the perpetration
of the imputed offense.

We note that the May 22, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro was given with the assistance of counsel 28 and consists of six
(6) pages, in single space reciting in rich details how the crime was planned and then executed by the petitioners. In
addition, the DOJ Panel evaluated the supporting sworn statements of Nerissa Rosales and Mila Gaviola, former
housemaids of the Webbs, Carlos J. Cristobal, a passenger in United Airlines Flight No. 808 and Lolita Birrer, a paramour
of Gerardo Biong. The Panel assayed their statements as follows: 29

xxx xxx xxx

According to Nerissa E. Rosales, a former housemaid of the Webb family, on June 29, 1991, between
7:00 o'clock and 8:00 o'clock in the evening, Hubert was at home inside his room with two male visitors.
She knew it because she and her co-housemaid, Loany, were instructed by Hubert to bring them three
glasses of juice. It was the last time she saw Hubert and was later told by then Congressman Webb that
Hubert was in the United States.

While Mila S. Gaviola, another former housemaid of the Webb family and who served as a laundry
woman, claims, aside from corroborating the statement of Nerissa Rosales, that on June 30, 1991, she
woke up at around 4:00 in the morning and as what she used to do, she entered the rooms of the Webbs
to get their clothes to be washed. As a matter of fact, in that early morning, she entered Hubert's room
and saw Hubert, who was only wearing his pants, already awake and smoking while he was sitting on his
bed. She picked up Hubert's scattered clothes and brought them together with the clothes of the other
members of the family to the laundry area. After taking her breakfast, she began washing the clothes of
the Webbs. As she was washing the clothes of Hubert Webb, she noticed fresh bloodstains in his shirt.
After she finished the laundry, she went to the servant's quarters. But feeling uneasy, she decided to go
up to the stockroom near Hubert's room to see what he was doing. In the said stockroom, there is a small
door going to Hubert's room and in that door there is a small opening where she used to see Hubert and
his friends sniffing on something. She observed Hubert was quite irritated, uneasy, and walked to and
from inside his room.

On that day, she noticed Hubert left the house at around 1:00 in the afternoon and came back at around
4:00 in the same afternoon and went inside his room using the secret door of the house. It was the last
time that she saw Hubert until she left the Webb family.

On the other hand, Carlos J. Cristobal alleged that on March 9, 1991, at about 10:00 in the morning, he
was at the Ninoy Aquino International Airport as he was then scheduled to take the United Airlines Flight
No. 808 at 2:00 in the afternoon for New York. At the airport's lobby, he saw then Congressman Freddie
Webb with a male companion. He greeted him and Webb answered: "Mabuti naman, at ito, ihahatid ko
ang anak ko papuntang Florida." He knew Freddie Webb because he often watched him then in a
television show "Chicks to Chicks." He observed that the man whom Freddie Webb referred to as his son,
was of the same height as Freddie. The son referred to has fair complexion with no distinguishing marks
on his face. He (son of Webb) was then wearing a striped white jacket. When he and his children were
already inside the plane, he did not see Freddie anymore, but he noticed his son was seated at the front
portion of the economy class. He never noticed Freddie Webb's son upon their arrival in San Francisco.
He claims that, while watching the television program "DONG PUNO LIVE" lately, he saw the wife of
Freddie Webb with her lawyer being interviewed, and when she described Hubert as "moreno" and small
built, with a height of five feet and seven inches tall, and who was the one who left for United States on
March 9, 1991, he nurtured doubts because such description does not fit the physical traits of the son of
Freddie, who left with him for United States on the same flight and date.

Lolita Birrer, alleged that she know Gerardo Biong because she had an affair with him for almost three (3)
years and in fact, she had a child with him who is now four (4) years old. Their relationship started in
February, 1991 until she broke up with him in September 1993. She recalls that on June 29, 1991, at
around 6:00 p.m., Biong invited her to play mahjong at the canteen of a certain Aling Glo located at the
back of the Parañaque Municipal Hall.

At about 2:30, in the early morning of January 30, 1991, the radio operator of the Parañaque police told
Biong that he has a phone call. Before Biong went to the radio room, she was instructed to take him over
and after somebody won the game, she followed Biong at the radio room where she overheard him
uttering, "Ano?, Saan? Mahirap yan, Paano, o sige, aantayin kita, O ano?, dilaw na taxi, o sige." When he
put the phone down, Biong told her, "Mayroon lang akong rerespondehan, ikaw muna ang maupo" and
then, he went outside the canteen apparently waiting for somebody. Twenty minutes later, a taxi, colored
yellow, arrived with a male passenger sitting at the backseat and parked near the canteen. After it made
some signals by blinking its headlight, Biong rode thereat at the front seat beside the driver and then, they
left. She was not able to recognize the male passenger because the window of the taxi was tinted. Biong
 came back at around 7:00 of the same morning and when he arrived, he immediately washed his hands
and face, and took his handkerchief from his pocket which he threw at the trash can. She asked him why
he threw his handkerchief and he answered, "Hmp . . . amoy tae." She inquired what happened in BF
Homes and he replied, "Putang inang mga batang iyon, pinahirapan nila ako."

Biong later invited her for breakfast, but they first went to his office where she observed him doing
something in his steel cabinet while he appeared to be uneasy. Moments later, Galvan, another
policeman of Parañaque, arrived and said, "Oy Biong, may tatlong patay sa BF, imbestigahan mo" to
which Biong answered, "Oo susunod na ako." Biong went to the office of Capt. Don Bartolome who
offered to accompany him and with whom she asked permission to go with them. Before they proceeded
to the place where the killings happened, she asked Biong if he knew the exact address and the latter
immediately responded, "Alam ko na yon." She was surprised because Galvan never told him the place of
the incident.

As soon as they arrived at the Vizconde's residence, Biong instructed the housemaids to contact the
victim's relatives, while the security guard fetched the barangay chairman and the president of the
Homeowners Association. When all these persons were already in the house, Biong started recording the
wounds of the victim. Inside the master's bedroom, she saw Biong took a watch from the jewelry box.
Because she could not tolerate the foul odor, she and Capt. Bartolome went out of the room and
proceeded to the dining area. On top of the dining table, she saw the scattered contents of a shoulder
bag. Moments later, Biong came out from the room and proceeded to the front door to remove the chain
lock; asked the keys from the housemaid and it was only then that the main door was opened. Biong
noticed a stone in front of the broken glass of the door and requested Capt. Bartolome to go inside the
servant's quarters as he doubted the housemaids' claim that they heard nothing unusual. Using the
handle of his gun, Biong broke the remaining glass of the door panel. Bartolome then came out of the
room and told Biong that he can hear the sound of the glass being broken. At the garage, Biong also
noticed same marks on the hood of the car.

On the following day, at around 12:00 noon, Biong arrived in her house together with the Vizconde
housemaids. When Biong was preparing to take a bath, she saw him remove from his pocket the things
she also saw from Vizconde's residence, to wit: calling cards, driver's license, ATM card, a crossed check
worth P80,000.00, earrings, a ring, bracelet, necklace, and the watch he took from the jewelry box inside
the room of the Vizcondes. These jewelry items were later pawned by Biong for P20,000.00 at a
pawnshop in front of Chow-Chow restaurant in Santos Avenue, Parañaque. The next day, she saw Biong
took from his locker at the Parañaque Police Station an imported brown leather jacket, which the latter
claimed to have been given to him by the person who called him up in the early morning of June 30,
1991.

Since then, Biong has been wearing said jacket until they broke up sometime in 1993. She observed that
Biong seemed not interested in pursuing the investigation of the Vizconde case. In fact, when Biong and
this group picked up Mike Gatchalian and brought him to the Parañaque Police Station, she was
surprised that Biong halted the investigation when Gatchalian was profusely sweating while being
interrogated. After the father of Gatchalian talked to Colonel Pureza, the latter called up and instructed
Biong to bring Gatchalian to him (Colonel Pureza) and that was the last thing she remembered regarding
this case.

The DOJ Panel then weighed these inculpatory evidence against the exculpatory evidence of petitioners. It ruled: 30

xxx xxx xxx

The voluminous number of exhibits submitted by respondent Webb to support his defense of denial and
alibi notwithstanding, the panel, after a careful and thorough evaluation of the records, believes that they
cannot outweigh the evidence submitted by the complainant. Alibi cannot prevail over the positive
identification made by a prosecution witness. Verily, alibi deserves scant consideration in the face of
positive identification especially so where the claim of alibi is supported mainly by friends and relatives
(People vs. Apolonia, 235 SCRA 124 [1994]; People vs. Lucas, 181 SCRA 316 and a long line of cases).

Similarly, denial is a self-serving negative which cannot be given greater evidentiary weight than the
declaration of a credible witness who testified on affirmative matters (People vs. Carizo, 233 SCRA 687
 [1994]). Indeed, denial, like alibi, is weak and becomes even more weaker when arrayed against the
positive identification by the witness for the prosecution (People vs. Onpaid, 233 SCRA 62 [1994]).

Surprisingly, Gatchalian's defense of alibi was not corroborated by Lejano, whom he claimed was with
him watching video tapes at the Syyap residence. Other than claiming that he "was not and could not
have been at or near the area of the Vizconde residence at the time of the alleged commission of the
crime," respondent Lejano proffered no evidence to substantiate his claim of alibi.

xxx xxx xxx

On the other hand, respondent Webb seeks to enhance the acceptability of his alibi in the form of
documents tending to show that he was thousands of miles away when the incident occurred. We have
carefully deliberated and argued on the evidence submitted by respondent Webb in support of his
absence from the country since March 9, 1991 to October 26, 1992 and found the same wanting to
exonerate him of the offense charged. The material dates in this case are June 29 and 30, 1991. While
respondent Webb may have submitted proof tending to show that he was issued a California driver's
license on June 14, 1991, there is no showing that he could not have been in the country on the dates
above mentioned. Neither do we find merit in the allegation that respondent Webb personally bought a
bicycle on June 30, 1991 in California in view of his positive identification by Alfaro and the two (2)
househelps of the Webb family who testified that he was here in the country on said dates. Additionally,
the issuance of receipt evidencing the purchase of a bicycle in California is no conclusive proof that the
name appearing thereon was the actual buyer of the merchandise.

Given these conflicting pieces of evidence of the NBI and the petitioners, we hold that the DOJ Panel did not
gravely abuse its discretion when it found probable cause against the petitioners. A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been committed and was committed
by the suspects. Probable cause need not be based on clear and convincing evidence of guilt, neither on
evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt and definitely, not on evidence establishing absolute
certainty of guilt. As well put in Brinegar v. United States,31 while probable cause demands more than "bare
suspicion," it requires "less than evidence which would justify . . . conviction." A finding of probable cause merely
binds over the suspect to stand trial. It is not a pronouncement of guilt.

Considering the low quantum and quality of evidence needed to support a finding of probable cause, we also hold
that the DOJ Panel did not, gravely abuse its discretion in refusing to call the NBI witnesses for clarificatory
questions. The decision to call witnesses for clarificatory questions is addressed to the sound discretion of the
investigator and the investigator alone. If the evidence on hand already yields a probable cause, the investigator
need not hold a clarificatory hearing. To repeat, probable cause merely implies probability of guilt and should be
determined in a summary manner. Preliminary investigation is not a part of trial and it is only in a trial where an
accused can demand the full exercise of his rights, such as the right to confront and cross-examine his accusers
to establish his innocence. In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel correctly adjudged that enough evidence had been
adduced to establish probable cause and clarificatory hearing was unnecessary.

II

We now come to the charge of petitioners that respondent Judge Raul de Leon and, later, respondent Judge
Amelita Tolentino issued warrants of arrest against them without conducting the required preliminary examination.
Petitioners support their stance by highlighting the following facts: (1) the issuance of warrants of arrest in a
matter of few hours; (2) the failure of said judges to issue orders of arrest; (3) the records submitted to the trial
court were incomplete and insufficient from which to base a finding of probable cause; and (4) that even Gerardo
Biong who was included in the Information as a mere accessory had a "NO BAIL" recommendation by the DOJ
Panel. Petitioners postulate that it was impossible to conduct a "searching examination of witnesses and
evaluation of the documents" on the part of said judges.

The issuance of a warrant of arrest interferes with individual liberty and is regulated by no less than the
fundamental law of the land. Section 2 of Article III of the Constitution provides:

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against
unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no
search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally
 by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may
produce and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The aforequoted provision deals with the requirements of probable cause both with respect to issuance of
warrants of arrest or search warrants. The similarities and differences of their requirements ought to be
educational. Some of them are pointed out by Professors LaFave and Israel, thus: 32 "It is generally assumed that
the same quantum of evidence is required whether one is concerned with probable cause to arrest or probable
cause to search. But each requires a showing of probabilities as to somewhat different facts and circumstances,
and thus one can exist without the other. In search cases, two conclusions must be supported by substantial
evidence: that the items sought are in fact seizable by virtue of being connected with criminal activity, and that the
items will be found in the place to be searched. It is not also necessary that a particular person be implicated. By
comparison, in arrest cases there must be probable cause that a crime has been committed and that the person
to be arrested committed it, which of course can exist without any showing that evidence of the crime will be found
at premises under that person's control." Worthy to note, our Rules of Court do not provide for a similar procedure
to be followed in the issuance of warrants of arrest and search warrants. With respect to warrants of arrest,
section 6 of Rule 112 simply provides that "upon filing of an information, the Regional Trial Court may issue a
warrant for the arrest of the accused." In contrast, the procedure to be followed in issuing search warrants is more
defined. Thus, Sections 3, 4 and 5 of Rule 126 provide:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 3. Requisites for issuing search warrant. — A search warrant shall not issue but upon probable
cause in connection with one specific offense to be determined personally by the judge after examination
under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the things to be seized.

Sec. 4. Examination of complainant;  record. — The judge must, before issuing the warrant, personally
examine in the form of searching questions and answers, in writing and under oath the complainant and
any witnesses he may produce on facts personally known to them and attach to the record their sworn
statements together with any affidavits submitted.

Sec. 5. Issuance and form of search warrant. — If the judge is thereupon satisfied of the facts upon which
the application is based, or that there is probable cause to believe that they exist, he must issue the
warrant, which must be substantially in the form prescribed by these Rules.

We discussed the difference in the Procedure of issuing warrants of arrest and search warrants in Soliven
vs. Makasiar,33 thus:

xxx xxx xxx

The second issue, raised by Beltran, calls for an interpretation of the constitutional provision on the
issuance of warrants of arrest. The pertinent provision reads:

Art. III, Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers and
effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for any
purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall issue except
upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under
oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly
describing the place to be searched and the persons or things to be seized.

The addition of the word "personally" after the word "determined" and the deletion of the grant of authority
by the 1973 Constitution to issue warrants to "other responsible officers as may be authorized by law,"
has apparently convinced petitioner Beltran that the Constitution now requires the judge to personally
examine the complainant and his witnesses in his determination of probable cause for the issuance of
warrants of arrest. This is not an accurate interpretation.

What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal responsibility of the issuing judge to
satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause
for the issuance of a warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant
and his witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1) personally evaluate the
 report and the documents submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the
basis thereof, issue a warrant; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause, he may disregard
the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at
a conclusions as to the existence of probable cause.

Sound policy dictates this procedure, otherwise judges would be unduly laden with the preliminary
examination and investigation of criminal complaints instead of concentrating on hearing and deciding
cases filed before their courts.

Clearly then, the Constitution, the Rules of Court, and our case law 34 repudiate the submission of petitioners that
respondent judges should have conducted "searching examination of witnesses" before issuing warrants of arrest
against them. They also reject petitioners' contention that a judge must first issue an order of arrest before issuing
a warrant of arrest. There is no law or rule requiring the issuance of an Order of Arrest prior to a warrant of arrest.

In the case at bar, the DOJ Panel submitted to the trial court its 26-page report, the two (2) sworn statements of
Alfaro and the sworn statements of Carlos Cristobal and Lolita Birrer 35 as well as the counter-affidavits of the
petitioners. Apparently, the painstaking recital and analysis of the parties' evidence made in the DOJ Panel
Report satisfied both judges that there is probable cause to issue warrants of arrest against petitioners. Again, we
stress that before issuing warrants of arrest, judges merely determine  personally the probability, not the
certainty  of guilt of an accused. In doing so, judges do not conduct a de novo hearing to determine the existence
of probable cause. They just  personally review  the initial determination of the prosecutor finding a probable cause
to see if it is supported by substantial evidence. The sufficiency of the review process cannot be measured by
merely counting minutes and hours. The fact that it took the respondent judges a few hours to review and affirm
the probable cause determination of the DOJ Panel does not mean they made no personal evaluation of the
evidence attached to the records of the case.36

Petitioners' reliance on the case of Allado vs. Diokno37 is misplaced. Our Allado ruling is predicated on the utter
failure of the evidence to show the existence of probable cause. Not even the corpus delicti of the crime was
established by the evidence of the prosecution in that case. Given the clear insufficiency of the evidence on
record, we stressed the necessity for the trial judge to make a further personal examination of the complainant
and his witnesses to reach a correct assessment of the existence or non-existence of probable cause before
issuing warrants of arrest against the accused. The case at bar, however, rests on a different factual setting. As
priorly discussed, the various types of evidence extant in the records of the case provide substantial basis for a
finding of probable cause against the petitioner. The corpus delicti of the crime is a given fact. There is an
eyewitness account of the imputed crime given by Alfaro. The alibi defense of petitioner Webb is also disputed by
sworn statements of their former maids. It was therefore unnecessary for the respondent judges to take the further
step of examining ex parte the complainant and their witnesses with searching questions.

III

Petitioners also complain about the denial of their constitutional right to due process and violation of their right to
an impartial investigation. They decry their alleged hasty and malicious prosecution by the NBI and the DOJ
Panel. They also assail the prejudicial publicity that attended their preliminary investigation.

We reject these contentions. The records will show that the DOJ Panel did not conduct the preliminary
investigation with indecent haste. Petitioners were given fair opportunity to prove lack of probable cause against
them. The fairness of this opportunity is well stressed in the Consolidated Comment of the Solicitor General, viz.:

Again, there is no merit in this contention. Petitioners were afforded all the opportunities to be heard.
Petitioner Webb actively participated in the preliminary investigation by appearing in the initial hearing
held on June 30, 1995 and in the second hearing on July 14, 1995; and by filing a "Motion for Production
and Examination of Evidence and Documents" on June 27, 1995 (p. 4, Petition), a "Reply to the
compliance and Comment/Manifestation to the Motion for Production and Examination of Evidence" on
July 5, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), a "Comment and Manifestation" on July 7, 1995 (p. 6, Petition), his "Counter-
Affidavit" on July 14, 1995 (pp. 6-7, Petition) and a "Motion to Resolve" on August 1, 1995. Numerous
letter-requests were also sent by the petitioner Webb's counsel to the DOJ Panel requesting the latter to
furnish him a copy of the reports prepared by the FBI concerning the petitioner's whereabouts during the
material period (Annexes "L", "L-1" and "L-2" of the Supplemental Petition dated August 14, 1995). In fact,
not satisfied with the decision of the DOJ Panel not to issue  subpoena duces tecum to Atty. Arturo L.
Mercader, Jr., petitioner Webb filed a "Petition for Injunction, Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus" with
 the Regional Trial Court, Branch 63 of Makati in order to compel said Atty. Mercader, Jr. to produce the
first sworn statement of Alfaro for submission to the DOJ Panel. (p. 4, Petition) The said court dismissed
the petition after Mercader produced and submitted to the DOJ Panel the first sworn statement of Alfaro,
without ruling on the admissibility and credence of the two (2) conflicting and inconsistent sworn
statements of the principal witness, Alfaro. (Attached hereto is a copy of the order of Judge Ruben A.
Mendiola, RTC-Makati, Branch 63 dated July 28, 1995) marked as Annex "F."

It must also be pointed out that despite the declaration by the DOJ Panel that the preliminary investigation
was to be terminated after the hearing held on July 14, 1995, the panel continued to conduct further
proceedings, e.g. comparison of the photo-copies of the submitted documents with the originals on July
17, 1995. (p. 7, Petition) The panel even entertained the "Response" submitted by accused Miguel
Rodriguez on July 18, 1995. (p. 17 Resolution) In addition to these, the panel even announced that any
party may submit additional evidence  before the resolution of the case. (p. 8, Petition) From the time the
panel declared the termination of the preliminary investigation on July 14, 1995, twenty-seven (27)
days  elapsed before the resolution was promulgated, and the information eventually filed in the Regional
Trial Court of Parañaque on August 10, 1995. This notwithstanding the directive of Section 3(f) Rule 112
of the Revised Rules of Court that the investigating officer shall resolve the case within ten (10) days from
the termination of the preliminary investigation. The DOJ Panel precisely allowed the parties to adduce
more evidence in their behalf and for the panel to study the evidence submitted more fully. This directly
disputes the allegation of the petitioners that the resolution was done with indecent haste in violation of
the rights of the petitioners. During the period of twenty-seven (27) days, the petitioners were free to
adduce and present additional evidence before the DOJ Panel.

Verily, petitioners cannot now assert that they were denied due process during the conduct of the
preliminary investigation simply because the DOJ Panel promulgated the adverse resolution and filed the
Information in court against them.

Petitioners cannot also assail as premature the filing of the Information in court against them for rape with
homicide on the ground that they still have the right to appeal the adverse resolution of the DOJ Panel to the
Secretary of Justice. The filing of said Information is in accord with Department of Justice Order No. 223, series of
1993, dated June 25, 1993. We quote its pertinent sections, viz.:

Sec. 4. Non-Appealable Cases;  Exceptions. — No appeal may be taken from a resolution of the Chief
State Prosecutor/Regional State Prosecutor/Provincial or City Prosecutor finding probable cause except
upon showing of manifest error or grave abuse of discretion.  Notwithstanding the showing of manifest
error or grave abuse of discretion, no appeal shall be entertained where the appellant had already been
arraigned. If the appellant is arraigned during the pendency of the appeal, said appeal shall be
dismissed motu propio by the Secretary of Justice.

An appeal/motion for reinvestigation from a resolution finding probable cause, however, shall not hold the
filing of the information in court.

Sec. 2. When to appeal. — The appeal must be filed within a period of fifteen (15) days from receipt of the
questioned resolution by the party or his counsel. The period shall be interrupted only by the filing of a
motion for reconsideration within ten (10) days from receipt of the resolution and shall continue to run
from the time the resolution denying the motion shall have been received by the movant or his counsel.
(Emphasis supplied)

Without doubt then, the said DOJ Order No. 223 allows the filing of an Information in court after the
consummation of the preliminary investigation even if the accused can still exercise the right to seek a review of
the prosecutor's recommendation with the Secretary of Justice.

Next, petitioners fault the DOJ Panel for not including Alfaro in the Information considering her alleged
conspiratorial participation in the crime of rape with homicide. The non-inclusion of Alfaro is anchored on Republic
Act
No. 6981, entitled "An Act Providing For A Witness Protection, Security And Benefit Program And For Other
Purposes" enacted on April 24, 1991. Alfaro qualified under its Section 10, which provides:

xxx xxx xxx

 Sec. 10. State Witness. — Any person who has participated in the commission of a crime and desires to a
witness for the State, can apply and, if qualified as determined in this Act and by the Department, shall be
admitted into the Program whenever the following circumstances are present:

(a) the offense in which his testimony will be used is a grave felony as defined under the R.P.C. or its
equivalent under special laws;

(b) there is absolute necessity for his testimony;

(c) there is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution of the offense committed;

(d) his testimony can be substantially corroborated on its material points;

(e) he does not appear to be most guilty; and

(f) he has not at anytime been convicted of any crime involving moral turpitude.

An accused discharged from an information or criminal complaint by the court in order that he may be a
State Witness pursuant to Sections 9 and 10 of Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Court may upon his
petition be admitted to the Program if he complies with the other requirements of this Act. Nothing in this
Act shall prevent the discharge of an accused so that he can be used as a Witness under Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Court.

Upon qualification of Alfaro to the program, Section 12 of the said law mandates her non-inclusion in the criminal
Complaint or Information, thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 12. Effect of Admission of a State Witness into the Program. — The certification of admission into
the Program by the Department shall be given full faith and credit by the provincial or city prosecutor who
is required NOT TO INCLUDE THE WITNESS IN THE CRIMINAL COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION and
if included therein, to petition the court for his discharge in order that he can be utilized as a State
Witness. The court shall order the discharge and exclusion of the said accused from the information.

Admission into the Program shall entitle such State Witness to immunity from criminal prosecution for the
offense or offenses in which his testimony will be given or used and all the rights and benefits provided
under Section 8 hereof.

The validity of these provisions is challenged by petitioner Webb. It is urged that they constitute ". . . an intrusion
into judicial prerogative for it is only the court which has the power under the Rules on Criminal Procedure to
discharge an accused as a state witness." The argument is based on Section 9, Rule 119 38 which gives the court
the prerogative to approve the discharge of an accused to be a state witness. Petitioner's argument lacks appeal
for it lies on the faulty assumption that the decision whom to prosecute is a judicial function, the sole prerogative
of courts and beyond executive and legislative interference. In truth, the prosecution of crimes appertains to the
executive department of government whose principal power and responsibility is to see that our laws are faithfully
executed. A necessary component of this power to execute our laws is the right to prosecute their violators. The
right to prosecute vests the prosecutor with a wide range of discretion — the discretion of whether, what and
whom to charge, the exercise of which depends on a smorgasbord of factors which are best appreciated by
prosecutors. We thus hold that it is not constitutionally impermissible for Congress to enact R.A. No. 6981 vesting
in the Department of Justice the power to determine who can qualify as a witness in the program and who shall be
granted immunity from prosecution.39 Section 9 of Rule 119 does not support the proposition that the power to
choose who shall be a state witness is an inherent judicial prerogative. Under this provision, the court, is given the
power to discharge a state witness only because it has already acquired jurisdiction over the crime and the
accused. The discharge of an accused is part of the exercise of jurisdiction but is not a recognition of an inherent
judicial function. Moreover, the Rules of Court have never been interpreted to be beyond change by legislation
designed to improve the administration of our justice system. R.A. No. 6981 is one of the much sought penal
reform laws to help government in its uphill fight against crime, one certain cause of which is the reticence of
witnesses to testify. The rationale for the law is well put by the Department of Justice, viz.: "Witnesses, for fear of
reprisal and economic dislocation, usually refuse to appear and testify in the investigation/prosecution of criminal
complaints/cases. Because of such refusal, criminal complaints/cases have been dismissed for insufficiency
and/or lack of evidence. For a more effective administration of criminal justice, there was a necessity to pass a
law protecting witnesses and granting them certain rights and benefits to ensure their appearance in investigative
bodies/courts."40 Petitioner Webb's challenge to the validity of R.A. No. 6981 cannot therefore succeed.

Further, petitioners charge the NBI with violating their right to discovery proceedings during their preliminary
investigation by suppressing the April 28, 1995 original copy of the sworn statement of Alfaro and the FBI Report.
The argument is novel in this jurisdiction and as it urges an expansive reading of the rights of persons under
preliminary investigation it deserves serious consideration. To start with, our Rules on Criminal Procedure do not
expressly provide for discovery proceedings during the preliminary investigation stage of a criminal
proceeding.41 Sections 10 and 11 of Rule 117 do provide an accused the right to move for a bill of particulars and
for production or inspection of material evidence in possession of the prosecution. 42 But these provisions
apply after the filing of the Complaint or Information in court and the rights are accorded to the accused to assist
them to make an intelligent plea at arraignment and to prepare for trial. 43

This failure to provide discovery procedure during preliminary investigation does not, however, negate its use by a
person under investigation when indispensable to protect his constitutional right to life, liberty and property.
Preliminary investigation is not too early a stage to guard against any significant erosion of the constitutional right
to due process of a potential accused. As aforediscussed, the object of a preliminary investigation is to determine
the probability that the suspect committed a crime. We hold that the finding of a probable cause by itself subjects
the suspect's life, liberty and property to real risk of loss or diminution. In the case at bar, the risk to the liberty of
petitioners cannot be understated for they are charged with the crime of rape with homicide, a non-bailable
offense when the evidence of guilt is strong.

Attuned to the times, our Rules have discarded the pure inquisitorial system of preliminary investigation. Instead,
Rule 112 installed a quasi-judicial type of preliminary investigation conducted by one whose high duty is to be fair
and impartial.44 As this Court emphasized in Rolito Go vs. Court of Appeals,45 "the right to have a preliminary
investigation conducted before being bound over for trial for a criminal offense, and hence formally at risk of
incarceration or some other penalty, is not a mere formal or technical right; it is a substantive right." A preliminary
investigation should therefore be scrupulously conducted so that the constitutional right to liberty of a potential
accused can be protected from any material damage. We uphold the legal basis of the right of petitioners to
demand from their prosecutor, the NBI, the original copy of the April 28, 1995 sworn statement of Alfaro and the
FBI Report during their preliminary investigation considering their exculpatory character, and hence,
unquestionable materiality to the issue of their probable guilt. The right is rooted on the constitutional protection of
due process which we rule to be operational even during the preliminary investigation of a potential accused. It is
also implicit in section (3) (a) of Rule 112 which requires during the preliminary investigation the filing of a sworn
complaint, which shall ". . . state the known address of the respondent and be accompanied by affidavits of the
complainant and his witnesses as well as other supporting documents . . ."

In laying down this rule, the Court is not without enlightened precedents from other jurisdictions. In the 1963
watershed case of Brady v. Maryland 46 the United States Supreme Court held that "suppression of evidence
favorable to an accused upon request violates due process where the evidence is material to guilt or punishment,
irrespective of the good faith or bad faith of the prosecution." Its progeny is the 1935 case of Mooney
v.  Holohan  47 which laid down the proposition that a prosecutor's intentional use of perjured testimony to procure
conviction violates due process. Thus, evolved jurisprudence firming up the prosecutor's duty to disclose to the
defense exculpatory evidence in its possession.48 The rationale is well put by Justice Brennan in Brady49 —
"society wins not only when the guilty are convicted but when criminal trials are fair." Indeed, prosecutors should
not treat litigation like a game of poker where surprises can be sprung and where gain by guile is not punished.

But given the right of petitioners to compel the NBI to disclose exculpatory evidence in their favor, we are not
prepared to rule that the initial non-production of the original sworn statement of Alfaro dated April 28, 1995 could
have resulted in the reasonable likelihood that the DOJ Panel would not have found probable cause. To be sure,
the NBI, on July 4, 1995, upon request of petitioners, submitted a photocopy of Alfaro's April 28, 1995 sworn
statement. It explained it cannot produce the original as it had been lost. Fortunately, petitioners, on July 28,
1995, were able to obtain a copy of the original from Atty. Arturo Mercader in the course of the proceedings in
Civil Case No. 951099.50 As petitioners admit, the DOJ Panel accepted the original of Alfaro's April 28, 1995
sworn statement as a part of their evidence.51 Petitioners thus had the fair chance to explain to the DOJ Panel
then still conducting their preliminary investigation the exculpatory aspects of this sworn statement. Unfortunately
for petitioners, the DOJ Panel still found probable cause to charge them despite the alleged material
discrepancies between the first and second sworn statements of Alfaro. For reasons we have expounded, this
finding of probable cause cannot be struck down as done with grave abuse of discretion. 52 On the other hand, the
FBI Report while corroborative of the alibi of petitioner Webb cannot by itself reverse the probable cause finding of
the DOJ Panel in light of the totality of evidence presented by the NBI.

Finally, we come to the argument of petitioner that the DOJ Panel lost its impartiality due to the prejudicial
publicity waged in the press and broadcast media by the NBI.

Again, petitioners raise the effect of prejudicial publicity on their right to due process while undergoing preliminary
investigation. We find no procedural impediment to its early invocation considering the substantial risk to their
liberty while undergoing a preliminary investigation.

In floating this issue, petitioners touch on some of the most problematic areas in constitutional law where the
conflicting demands of freedom of speech and of the press, the public's right to information, and an accused's
right to a fair and impartial trial collide and compete for prioritization. The process of pinpointing where the
balance should be struck has divided men of learning as the balance keeps moving either on the side of liberty or
on the side of order as the tumult of the time and the welfare of the people dictate. The dance of balance is a
difficult act to follow.

In democratic settings, media coverage of trials of sensational cases cannot be avoided and oftentimes, its
excessiveness has been aggravated by kinetic developments in the telecommunications industry. For sure, few
cases can match the high volume and high velocity of publicity that attended the preliminary investigation of the
case at bar. Our daily diet of facts and fiction about the case continues unabated even today. Commentators still
bombard the public with views not too many of which are sober and sublime. Indeed, even the principal actors in
the case — the NBI, the respondents, their lawyers and their sympathizers — have participated in this media blitz.
The possibility of media abuses and their threat to a fair trial notwithstanding, criminal trials cannot be completely
closed to the press and the public. In the seminal case of Richmond Newspapers, Inc. v. Virginia,53 it was wisely
held:

xxx xxx xxx

(a) The historical evidence of the evolution of the criminal trial in Anglo-American justice demonstrates
conclusively that at the time this Nation's organic laws were adopted, criminal trials both here and in
England had long been presumptively open, thus giving assurance that the proceedings were conducted
fairly to all concerned and discouraging perjury, the misconduct of participants, or decisions based on
secret bias or partiality. In addition, the significant community therapeutic value of public trials was
recognized: when a shocking crime occurs, a community reaction of outrage and public protest often
follows, and thereafter the open processes of justice serve an important prophylactic purpose, providing
an outlet for community concern, hostility, and emotion. To work effectively, it is important that society's
criminal process "satisfy the appearance of justice," Offutt v. United States, 348 US 11, 14, 99 L Ed 11,
75 S Ct 11, which can best be provided by allowing people to observe such process. From this unbroken,
uncontradicted history, supported by reasons as valid today as in centuries past, it must be concluded
that a presumption of openness inheres in the very nature of a criminal trial under this Nation's system of
justice, Cf., e.g., Levine v. United States, 362 US 610, 4 L Ed 2d 989, 80 S Ct 1038.

(b) The freedoms of speech, press, and assembly, expressly guaranteed by the First Amendment, share
a common core purpose of assuring freedom of communication on matters relating to the functioning of
government. In guaranteeing freedoms such as those of speech and press, the First Amendment can be
read as protecting the right of everyone to attend trials so as to give meaning to those explicit guarantees;
the First Amendment right to receive information and ideas means, in the context of trials, that the
guarantees of speech and press, standing alone, prohibit government from summarily closing courtroom
doors which had long been open to the public at the time the First Amendment was adopted. Moreover,
the right of assembly is also relevant, having been regarded not only as an independent right but also as
a catalyst to augment the free exercise of the other First Amendment rights with which it was deliberately
linked by
the draftsmen. A trial courtroom is a public place where the people generally — and representatives of the
media — have a right to be present, and where their presence historically has been thought to enhance
the integrity and quality of what takes place.

(c) Even though the Constitution contains no provision which by its terms guarantees to the public the
right to attend criminal trials, various fundamental rights, not expressly guaranteed, have been recognized
as indispensable to the enjoyment of enumerated rights. The right to attend criminal trials is implicit in the
 guarantees of the First Amendment; without the freedom to attend such trials, which people have
exercised for centuries, important aspects of freedom of speech and of the press could be eviscerated.

Be that as it may, we recognize that pervasive and prejudicial publicity under certain circumstances can deprive
an accused of his due process right to fair trial. Thus, in Martelino, et al. vs. Alejandro, et al.,54 we held that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity there must be allegation and proof  that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, we find nothing in the
records that will prove that the tone and content, of the publicity that attended the investigation of petitioners
fatally infected the fairness and impartiality of the DOJ Panel. Petitioners cannot just rely on the subliminal effects
of publicity on the sense of fairness of the DOJ Panel, for these are basically unbeknown and beyond knowing. To
be sure, the DOJ Panel is composed of an Assistant Chief State Prosecutor and Senior State Prosecutors. Their
long experience in criminal investigation is a factor to consider in determining whether they can easily be blinded
by the klieg lights of publicity. Indeed, their 26-page Resolution carries no indubitable indicia of bias for it does not
appear that they considered any extra-record evidence except evidence properly adduced by the parties. The
length of time the investigation was conducted despite its summary nature and the generosity with which they
accommodated the discovery motions of petitioners speak well of their fairness. At no instance, we note, did
petitioners seek the disqualification of any member of the DOJ Panel on the ground of bias resulting from their
bombardment of prejudicial publicity.

It all remains to state that the Vizconde case will move to a more critical stage as petitioners will now have to
undergo trial on the merits. We stress that probable cause is not synonymous with guilt and while the light of
publicity may be a good disinfectant of unfairness, too much of its heat can bring to flame an accused's right to
fair trial. Without imposing on the trial judge the difficult task of supervising every specie of speech relating to the
case at bar, it behooves her to be reminded of the duty of a trial judge in high profile criminal cases to control
publicity prejudicial to the fair administration of justice. 55 The Court reminds judges that our ability to dispense
impartial justice is an issue in every trial and in every criminal prosecution, the judiciary always stands as a silent
accused. More than convicting the guilty and acquitting the innocent, the business of the judiciary is to assure
fulfillment of the promise that justice shall be done and is done — and that is the only way for the judiciary to get
an acquittal from the bar of public opinion.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are dismissed for lack of showing of grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the respondents. Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. Nos. 121039-45            October 18, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
MAYOR ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, GEORGE MEDIALDEA, ZOILO AMA, BALDWIN BRION, LUIS CORCOLON,
ROGELIO CORCOLON, and PEPITO KAWIT, accused-appellants.

Before us is a motion for reconsideration of our January 25, 1999 decision, penned by Justice Antonio M. Martinez,
affirming in toto the judgment of conviction rendered by Branch 70 of the Pasig City Regional Trial Court finding accused-
appellants Mayor Antonio Sanchez, George Medialdea, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, Luis Corcolon, Rogelio Corcolon and
Pepito Kawit guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape with homicide, and additionally, ordering each of them to
pay the amount of Seven Hundred Thousand Pesos (P700,000.00) to the heirs of the two victims as additional indemnity.
While accused-appellants Antonio Sanchez, Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion and Pepito Kawit seasonably filed their respective
motions for reconsideration, it was only on December 6, 1999 that the Office of the Solicitor General filed its Comment
thereto. And since Justice Martinez had retired earlier on February 2, 1999, in accordance with A.M. No. 99-8-09
promulgated by the Court on February 15, 2000, the motions for reconsideration filed by accused-appellants was
assigned by raffle only on September 18, 2001 to herein ponente for study and preparation of the appropriate action.

In his motion for reconsideration, Mayor Antonio Sanchez avers that he is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity and
that the principal witnesses Aurelio Centeno and Vicencio Malabanan presented by the prosecution are lacking in
credibility. He likewise contends that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter vis-à-vis his whereabouts on the night of
the felony should have been given full faith and credit as against the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan. Lastly, Mayor
Sanchez seeks the reconsideration of the amount of the "gargantuan" damages awarded on the ground that the same
have no factual and legal bases.

In the same vein, accused-appellants Zoilo Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit, in their motion for reconsideration,
maintain that prosecution witnesses Centeno and Malabanan have been sufficiently impeached by prior inconsistent
statements allegedly pertaining to material and crucial points of the events at issue. Not only that, they assert that
independent and disinterested witnesses have destroyed the prosecution’s version of events.

Preliminarily, it may be observed that, except for the issue of civil damages raised by Mayor Sanchez, accused-appellants
have not presented any issue new or different from that which they had previously raised before the trial court and this
Court. Moreover, the issues they have raised have been discussed at length and passed upon by both the court a
quo and by this Court. Thus, on the charge that accused-appellant Sanchez is a victim of trial and conviction by publicity,
in our January 25, 1999 decision, citing People vs. Teehankee, Jr. (249 SCRA 54), we declared:

We cannot sustain appellant’s claim that he was denied the right to impartial trial due to prejudicial publicity. It is
true that the print and broadcast media gave the case at bar pervasive publicity, just like all high profile and high
stake criminal trials. Then and now, we rule that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not incompatible to a free
press. To be sure, responsible reporting enhances an accused’s right to a fair trial for, as well pointed out, "a
responsible press has always been regarded as the handmaiden of effective judicial administration, especially in
the criminal field… The press does not simply publish information about trials but guards against the miscarriage
of justice by subjecting the police, prosecutors, and judicial processes to extensive public scrutiny and criticism."

Pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to fair trial. The mere fact that the trial of
appellant was given a day-to-day, gavel-to-gavel coverage does not by itself prove that publicity so permeated the
mind of the trial judge and impaired his impartiality… Our judges are learned in the law and trained to disregard
off-court evidence and on-camera performances of parties to a litigation. Their mere exposure to publications and
publicity stunts does not per se fatally infect their impartiality.

At best, appellant can only conjure possibility of prejudice on the part of the trial judge due to the barrage of
publicity that characterized the investigation and trial of the case. In Martelino et al. vs. Alejandro et al., we
rejected this standard of possibility of prejudice and adopted the test of actual prejudice as we ruled that to
warrant a finding of prejudicial publicity, there must be allegation and proof that the judges have been unduly
influenced, not simply that they might be, by the barrage of publicity. In the case at bar, the records do not show
that the trial judge developed actual bias against appellant as a consequence of the extensive media coverage of
the pre-trial and trial of his case. The totality of circumstances of the case does not prove that the trial judge
acquired a fixed position as a result of prejudicial publicity which is incapable of change even by evidence
presented during the trial. Appellant has the burden to prove this actual bias and he has not discharged the
burden.
This failure to present proof of actual bias continues to hound accused-appellant Sanchez, having failed, in his motion for
reconsideration, to substantiate his claims of actual bias on the part of the trial judge. Not only that, accused-appellant’s
case has been exhaustively and painstakingly reviewed by the Court itself. Accused-appellant Sanchez has not shown by
an iota of proof that the Court, in the examination of his appeal, was unduly swayed by publicity in affirming the sentence
of conviction imposed by the trial court. The charge of conviction by publicity leveled by accused-appellant has thus no
ground to stand on.

As to the claim that witnesses Centeno and Malabanan lack credibility and that they were sufficiently impeached by prior
inconsistent statements, the same is old hat, to say the least. It is hornbook doctrine in criminal jurisprudence that when
the issue is one of credibility of witnesses, appellate courts will not disturb the findings of the trial court and the appellate
courts will respect these findings considering that trial courts are in a better position to decide the question, having heard
the witnesses themselves and observed their deportment and manner of testifying during the trial (People vs. Mendoza,
332 SCRA 485 [2000]). In the instant case, then Judge Harriet Demetriou found both Centeno and Malabanan to have
testified in a frank, spontaneous, and straightforward manner; and that despite gruelling cross-examination by a battery of
defense lawyers, their testimony never wavered on the substantial matters in issue.

As to the alleged inconsistencies in the testimony of Centeno and Malabanan, suffice it to say that the points raised have
all been carefully and assiduously examined, not only by the trial court but also by the Court itself, and that the
inconsistencies were found to refer to minor and collateral matters. It is well-settled that so long as the witnesses’
declarations agree on substantial matters, the inconsequential inconsistencies and contradictions dilute neither the
witnesses’ credibility nor the verity of their testimony (People vs. Agomo-o, 334 SCRA 279 [2000]). Accused-appellants
have not shown in their motions for reconsideration new evidence to warrant disregard for the above-rule, nor have they
shown that the Court has overlooked, misunderstood, or misapplied some fact of weight and circumstance that would
have materially affected the outcome of the case.

Accused-appellant Sanchez’s argument that the testimony of his 13-year old daughter, Ave Marie Sanchez, as to his
whereabouts on the night of the crime should be given full faith and credence is likewise unavailing. While it is true that
statements of children are accorded great probative value, it is likewise true that alibi is the weakest defense an accused
can concoct. Where nothing supports the alibi except the testimony of a relative, it deserves but scant consideration
(People vs. Waggay, 218 SCRA 742 [1993]). Moreover, accused-appellant Sanchez’s alibi cannot prevail over the
positive declarations of the prosecution that he was at Erais Farm that fateful night. The alibis of accused-appellants Zoilo
Ama, Baldwin Brion, and Pepito Kawit are even worse, not having been corroborated by any other evidence. The
assertions of these accused-appellants as to their innocence are thus entitled short shrift from this Court.

Accused-appellant Sanchez’s asseverations as to the amount of damages awarded is, however, meritorious. The trial
court awarded the Sarmenta family P50,000.00 as civil liability for the wrongful death of Eileen Sarmenta, P106,650.00 for
the funeral expenses they incurred, and P3,276,000.00 for the loss of Eileen Sarmenta’s earning capacity; or a total of
P3,432,650.00 as actual damages. On the other hand, the Gomez family was awarded by the trial court a total of
P3,484,000.00 as actual damages, broken down as follows: P50,000.00 for the wrongful death of Allan Gomez,
P74,000.00 for the latter’s funeral, and P3,360,000.00 for the loss of the latter’s earning capacity.

Similarly, the trial court ordered accused-appellants to pay the sum of P2,000,000.00 to the Sarmenta family and another
P2,000,000.00 to the Gomez family as moral damages. Lastly, the trial court ordered accused-appellants to pay the
Sarmenta and Gomez families the sum of P164,250.00 and 191,000.00, respectively, for litigation expenses incurred.

The Court, in its decision dated January 25, 1999, affirmed in toto the decision of the lower court. However, we also
ordered each accused-appellant to pay the respective heirs of Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez an additional indemnity
of P350,000.00 each, stating that since each accused-appellant had been found guilty of seven counts of rape with
homicide, jurisprudence dictated that for each count, each accused-appellant is liable for civil indemnity of P50,000.00, or
a total of P350,000.00.

Since the trial court’s award of actual damages to the Gomez and Sarmenta families already included civil indemnity in
the amount of P50,000.00, to order each accused-appellant to pay an additional P350,000.00 as civil indemnity would be
"double recovery" of damages on the part of the Gomez and Sarmenta families for the same act or omission. Thus, the
amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial court must each be deducted from the amount of actual damages due to the
Gomez and Sarmenta families.

As for funeral expenses, the Court had occasion to declare in People vs. Timon (281 SCRA 577 [1997]) that "burial
expenses, which are by nature actual expenses must be proved. Since no proof of burial expenses was ever presented in
the instant case, its award will not be allowed." It is a settled rule that there must be proof that actual or compensatory
damages have been suffered and evidence of its actual amount (People vs. Nablo, 319 SCRA 784 [1999]). While the
funeral expenses incurred by the Sarmenta family were supported by the appropriate receipts, the same is not true for the
funeral expenses incurred by the Gomez family. Not having been duly receipted, the amount of P74,000.00 awarded to
the Gomez family as funeral expenses must, perforce, be deleted. However, as the heirs of Allan Gomez clearly incurred
funeral expenses, P10,000.00 by way of nominal damages should be awarded. This award is adjudicated so that a right
which has been violated may be recognized or vindicated, and not for the purpose of indemnification (see People vs.
Candare, 333 SCRA 338 [2000]).

The award of P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00, representing the alleged loss of earning capacity of Sarmenta and
Gomez, respectively, also merit review. Eileen Sarmenta, at the time of her death, was a graduating student of the
College of Agriculture of the University of the Philippines at Los Baños (UPLB), majoring in Food and Nutrition for Large
Animals. Allan Gomez was likewise a senior student of the College of Agriculture of UPLB, majoring in Beef Production.
The trial court, using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, pegged the life expectancy of Sarmenta, 21 years old at
the time of her death, and Gomez, 19 years old at the time of his death, at 39.1 and 40.6 years, respectively. Believing
that the victims would have earned a monthly salary of P15,000.00 and incurred living expenses of P8,000.00 per month,
the trial court awarded P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00 as the amount recoverable by the Sarmenta and Gomez
families, respectively, for the loss of the earning capacity of Eileen and Allan.

While accused-appellant Sanchez contends that the awards of P3,276,000.00 and P3,360,000.00 are baseless in fact and
law, no evidence having been adduced to prove that the victims had any actual income at the time of their demise, it is
well-settled that to be compensated for loss of earning capacity, it is not necessary that the victim, at the time of injury or
death, be gainfully employed. Compensation of this nature is awarded not for loss of earnings but for loss of capacity to
earn money (People vs. Teehankee, supra). Likewise, the fact that the prosecution did not present documentary evidence
to support its claim for damages for loss of earning capacity of the deceased does not preclude recovery of the same
(People vs. Quilang, 312 SCRA 314 [1999]; People vs. Verde, 302 SCRA 690 [1999]). On the part of Eileen Sarmenta,
her mother testified that Eileen had an offer for employment from Monterey Farms. On the other hand, Allan Gomez’s
mother testified that her deceased son planned to work on a private farm after graduation.

Moreover, in Cariaga et al. vs. LTB and Manila Railroad Co. (110 Phil. 346 [1960]), the Court awarded compensatory
damages for the loss of earning capacity to Edgardo Cariaga, a 4th year medical student at UST, stating that while his
scholastic record may not have been first rate, it was, nevertheless, sufficient to justify the assumption that he could have
finished the course, would have passed the board in due time, and that he could have possibly earned as a medical
practitioner the minimum monthly income of P300.00.

Both Sarmenta and Gomez were senior agriculture students at UPLB, the country’s leading educational institution in
agriculture. As reasonably assumed by the trial court, both victims would have graduated in due course. Undeniably, their
untimely death deprived them of their future time and earning capacity. For these deprivation, their heirs are entitled to
compensation. Difficulty, however, arises in measuring the value of Sarmenta’s and Gomez’s lost time and capacity to
earn money in the future, both having been unemployed at the time of death. While the law is clear that the deceased has
a right to his own time — which right cannot be taken from him by a tortfeasor without compensation — the law is also
clear that damages cannot be awarded on the speculation, passion, or guess of the judge or the witnesses. In this case,
Eileen Sarmenta’s mother testified that for a new graduate of UPLB, the basic salary was more or less P15,000.00 per
month. Allan Gomez’s mother, on the other hand, testified that her son could have easily gotten P10,000.00 to
P15,000.00 per month. Clearly, the testimony of said witnesses are speculative, insufficient to prove that in 1993,
Sarmenta and Gomez would have indeed earned P15,000.00 a month had they managed to graduate. However,
considering that Sarmenta and Gomez would have graduated in due time from a reputable university, it would not be
unreasonable to assume that in 1993 they would have earned more than the minimum wage. All factors considered, the
Court believes that it is fair and reasonable to fix the monthly income that the two would have earned in 1993 at P8,000.00
per month (or P96,000.00/year) and their deductible living and other incidental expenses at P3,000.00 per month (or
P36,000.00/year). Hence, in accordance with the formula adopted by the Court in Villa Rey Transit, Inc. vs. CA (31 SCRA
511 [1970]), and using the American Expectancy Table of Mortality, the loss of Sarmenta and Gomez’s earning capacity is
to be computed as follows:

Net earning capacity = Life expectancy x (Gross Annual

Income – Living Expenses)
where: Life expectancy = 2/3 (80 – the
age of the deceased)
Heirs of Eileen Sarmenta:
= 2/3 (80-21) x (96,000 – 36,000)
 = 39.353 x 60,000
= P2,361,180.00
Heirs of Allan Gomez:
= 2/3 (80-19) x (96,000 – 36,000)
= 40.687 x 60,000
= P2,441,220.00

As to the award of P2,000,000.00 each as moral damages to the Sarmenta and Gomez families, these must also be
reduced, the same being excessive. While the assessment of moral damages is left to the discretion of the court
according to the circumstances of each case (Article 2216, Civil Code), the purpose of moral damages is essentially
indemnity or reparation, not punishment or correction. Moral damages are emphatically not intended to enrich a
complainant at the expense of a defendant; they are awarded only to enable the injured party to obtain means, diversions
or amusements that will serve to alleviate the moral suffering he has undergone by reason of the defendant’s culpable
action. In other words, the award of moral damages is aimed at a restoration, within the limits of the possible, of the
spiritual status quo ante; and therefore, it must be proportionate to the suffering inflicted (Dela Serna vs. CA, 233 SCRA
325 [1994]). The intensity of the pain experienced by the relatives of the victim is proportionate to the intensity of affection
for him and bears no relation whatever with the wealth or the means of the offender. The death caused by a beggar is felt
by the parents of the victim as intensely as that caused by the action of a wealthy family. The Court, in the exercise of its
discretion, thus reduces the amount of moral damages awarded to the heirs of Eileen Gomez and Allan Sarmenta to
P1,000,000.00 each. As to the award of attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, the same is reasonable and justified, this
case having dragged on for over eight years.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the conviction of accused-appellants for seven counts of rape with
homicide and the sentence of reclusion perpetua imposed upon them for each of said counts, with MODIFICATION that
the accused be ordered to pay the heirs of the victims as follows:

To the heirs of Eileen Sarmenta:

1. Death indemnity P 350,000.00
2. Moral damages 1,000,000.00
3. Funeral expenses 106,650.00
4. Loss of earning capacity 2,361,180.00
5. Attorney’s fees & litigation expenses     164,250.00
            Total P 3,982,080.00
To the heirs of Allan Gomez:
1. Death indemnity P 350,000.00
2. Moral damages 1,000,000.00
3. Nominal damages 10,000.00
4. Loss of earning capacity 2,441,220.00
5. Attorney’s fees & litigation expenses     191,000.00
            Total P 3,992,220.00

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-54597 December 15, 1982

FELICIDAD ANZALDO, petitioner,
vs.
JACOBO C. CLAVE as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission and as Presidential Executive Assistant; JOSE
A. R. MELO, as Commissioner of the Civil Service Commission, and EULALIA L. VENZON, respondents.
Antonio P. Amistad for petitioner.

Artemio E. Valenton for private respondent.

Madamba, Deza & Almario Law Offices for respondent .

Demegildo Laborte & Lazano Law Offices for respondent public officials.

AQUINO, J.:

This is a controversy over the position of Science Research Supervisor II, whose occupant heads the Medical Research
Department in the Biological Research Center of the National Institute of Science and Technology (NIST).

Doctor Felicidad Estores-Anzaldo 55, seeks to annul the decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave
dated March 20, 1980, revoking her appointment dated January 5, 1978 as Science Research Supervisor II and directing
the appointment to that position of Doctor Eulalia L. Venzon, 48.

The contested position became vacant in 1974 when its incumbent, Doctor Quintin Kintanar, became Director of the
Biological Research Center. Doctor Kintanar recommended that Doctor Venzon be appointed to that position. Doctor
Anzaldo protested against that recommendation. The NIST Reorganization Committee found her protest to be valid and
meritorious (p. 34, Rollo). Because of that impasse, which the NIST Commissioner did not resolve, the position was not
filled up.

At the time the vacancy occurred, or on June 30, 1974, both Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon were holding similar positions
in the Medical Research Department: that of Scientist Research Associate IV with an annual compensation of
P12,013 per annum. Both were next-in-rank to the vacant position.

Later, Doctor Pedro G. Afable, Vice-Chairman, became the Officer-in-Charge of the NIST. Effective January 5, 1978, he
appointed Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position with compensation at P18,384 per annum. The appointment was
approved by the Civil Service Commission.

Doctor Afable, in his letter dated January 20, 1978, explained that the appointment was made after a thorough study and
screening of the qualifications of Doctors Anzaldo and Venzon and upon the recommendation of the NIST Staff
Evaluation Committee that gave 88 points to Doctor Anzaldo and 61 points to Doctor Venzon (p. 78, Rollo).

Doctor Venzon in a letter dated January 23, 1978, addressed to Jacobo C. Clave, appealed to the Office of the President
of the Philippines (pp. 139-40). The appeal was forwarded to the NIST Anzaldo to the contested position (p. 63, Rollo).
The appeal-protest was later sent to the Civil Service Commission.

Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission and Commissioner Jose A. R. Melo recommended in Resolution No.
1178 dated August 23, 1979 that Doctor Venzon be appointed to the contested position, a recommendation which is in
conflict with the 1978 appointment of Doctor Anzaldo which was duly attested and approved by the Civil Service
Commission (pp. 30 and 48, Rollo).

The resolution was made pursuant to section 19(6) of the Civil Service Decree of the Philippines, Presidential Decree No.
807 (which took effect on October 6, 1975) and which provides that "before deciding a contested appointment, the Office
of the President shall consult the Civil Service Commission."

After the denial of her motion for the reconsideration of that resolution, or on January 5, 1980, Doctor Anzaldo appealed to
the Office of the President of the Philippines. As stated earlier, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave (who was
concurrently Chairman of the Civil Service Commission) in his decision of March 20, 1980 revoked Doctor Anzaldo's
appointment and ruled that, "as recommended by the Civil Service Commission" (meaning Chairman Clave himself and
Commissioner Melo), Doctor Venzon should be appointed to the contested position but that Doctor Anzaldo's appointment
to the said position should be considered "valid and effective during the pendency" of Doctor Venzon's protest (p. 36,
Rollo).
In a resolution dated August 14, 1980, Presidential Executive Assistant Clave denied Doctor Anzaldo's motion for
reconsideration. On August 25, 1980, she filed in this Court the instant special civil action of certiorari.

What is manifestly anomalous and questionable about that decision of Presidential Executive Assistant Clave is that it is
an implementation of Resolution No. 1178 dated August 23, 1979 signed by Jacobo C. Clave, as Chairman of the Civil
Service Commission and concurred in by Commissioner Jose A. Melo.

In that resolution, Commissioner Clave and Melo, acting for the Civil Service Commission, recommended that Doctor
Venzon be appointed Science Research Supervisor II in place of Doctor Anzaldo.

When Presidential Executive Assistant Clave said in his decision that he was "inclined to concur in the recommendation of
the Civil Service Commission", what he meant was that he was concurring with Chairman Clave's recommendation: he
was concurring with himself (p. 35, Rollo).

It is evident that Doctor Anzaldo was denied due process of law when Presidential Executive Assistant Clave concurred
with the recommendation of Chairman Clave of the Civil Service Commission. The case is analogous to Zambales
Chromite Mining Co. vs. Court of Appeals, L-49711, November 7, 1979, 94 SCRA 261, where it was held that the decision
of Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources Benjamin M. Gozon, affirming his own decision in a mining case
as Director of Mines was void because it was rendered with grave abuse of discretion and was a mockery of
administrative justice.

Due process of law means fundamental fairness. It is not fair to Doctor Anzaldo that Presidential Executive Assistant
Clave should decide whether his own recommendation as Chairman of the Civil Service Commission, as to who between
Doctor Anzaldo and Doctor Venzon should be appointed Science Research Supervisor II, should be adopted by the
President of the Philippines.

Common sense and propriety dictate that the commissioner in the Civil Service Commission, who should be consulted by
the Office of the President, should be a person different from the person in the Office of the President who would decide
the appeal of the protestant in a contested appointment.

In this case, the person who acted for the Office of the President is the same person in the Civil Service Commission who
was consulted by the Office of the President: Jacobo C. Clave. The Civil Service Decree could not have contemplated that
absurd situation for, as held in the Zambales Chromite  case, that would not be fair to the appellant.

We hold that respondent Clave committed a grave abuse of discretion in deciding the appeal in favor of Doctor Venzon.
The appointing authority, Doctor Afable, acted in accordance with law and properly exercised his discretion in appointing
Doctor Anzaldo to the contested position.

Doctor Anzaldo finished the pharmacy course in 1950 in the College of Pharmacy, University of the Philippines. She
obtained from the Centro Escolar University the degree of Master of Science in Pharmacy in 1962 and in 1965 the degree
of Doctor of Pharmacy.

Aside from her civil service eligibility as a pharmacist, she is a registered medical technologist and supervisor
(unassembled).

She started working in the NIST in 1954 and has served in that agency for about twenty-eight (28) years now. As already
stated, in January, 1978, she was appointed to the contested Position of Science Research Supervisor II. Her present
salary as Science Research Supervisor II, now known as Senior Science Research Specialist, is P 30,624 per
annum after she was given a merit increase by Doctor Kintanar, effective July 1, 1981 (p. 259, Rollo).

On the other hand, Doctor Venzon finished the medical course in the University of Santo Tomas in 1957. She started
working in the NIST in 1960. She has been working in that agency for more than twenty-one (21) years. Doctor Anzaldo is
senior to her in point of service.

Considering that Doctor Anzaldo has competently and satisfactorily discharged the duties of the contested position for
more than four (4) years now and that she is qualified for that position, her appointment should be upheld. Doctor
Venzon's protest should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Clave dated March 20, 1980 is set aside, and petitioner Anzaldo's promotional
appointment to the contested position is declared valid. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. Nos. 131638-39            March 26, 2001

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
LORETA MEDENILLA y DORIA, accused-appellant.
This is an appeal from a joint decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig, Branch 262, promulgated on November 26,
1997, in Criminal Case Nos. 3618-D and 3619-D finding accused-appellant Loreto Medenilla y Doria guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, otherwise known as the
Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.1

Accused-appellant was charged in Criminal Case No. 3618-D for violating Section 15, 2 Article III of R.A. No. 6425. The
information reads as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously sell, deliver and give away to another 5.08 grams of white
crystalline substance positive to the test for methampetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is regulated drug, in
violation of the above cited law.3

Accused-appellant was also charged in Criminal Case No. 3619-D for violating Section 16, 4 Article III of R.A. No. 6425
with an information which reads as follows:

That on or about the 16th day of April, 1996 in the City of Mandaluyong, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, not being lawfully authorized to possess any regulated drug, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have in his possession and/or (sic) under his custody and
control four (4) transparent plastic bags containing white crystalline substance with a total weight of 200.45 grams,
which were found positive to the test for methampetamine hydrochloride (shabu) which is regulated drug, in
violation of the above cited law.5

Arraigned on June 25, 1996, accused-appellant pleaded not guilty to both charges. 6 Joint trial ensued thereafter.

The prosecution's version, as gathered from the testimonies of SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral, SPO1 Neowille De Castro and
P/Sr. Insp. Julita T. De Villa, is as follows:

On April 14, 1996, a confidential informant arrived at the office of the Narcotics Command (NARCOM) in camp Crame and
reported to SPO2 Bonifacio Cabral that there is a certain person engaged in illegal drug pushing activities in Caloocan,
Malabon and Mandaluyong. SPO2 Cabral reported the matter to his superior, Police Senior Inspector
Manzanas.7 Accordingly, Sr. Insp. Manzanas directed SPO2 Cabral to confirm the veracity of the report. Thus, SPO2
Cabral requested the confidential informant to contact the suspected drug pusher to introduce him as a possible buyer. 8

On April 15, 1996, the informant returned to the NARCOM office and told SPO2 Cabral that he had arranged a meeting
with the suspected drug pusher. The two then proceeded to the pre-arranged meeting place at a Seven Eleven Store
along Boni Avenue, Mandaluyong City. At around 5:30 p.m., accused-appellant arrived on board a Toyota
Corolla.9 Without alighting from his car, accused-appellant spoke with the informant. 10 The informant introduced SPO2
Cabral to accused-appellant as a prospective buyer of shabu. Accused-appellant inquired how many grams of shabu he
wanted to buy and SPO2 Cabral replied that he needed five (5) grams. The suspect then offered the shabu at the price of
One Thousand Pesos (P1,000.00) per gram to which SPO2 Cabral agreed. 11 Accused-appellant told SPO2 Cabral to
return the following day. They agreed that the pick up point would be at the United Coconut Planters Bank (UCPB)
Building also along Boni Avenue. Upon their return to Camp Crame, SPO2 Cabral and the informant reported the results
of their meeting to Sr. Insp. Manzanas. Based on their information, a buy-bust operation was planned. SPO2 Cabral was
designated to act as the poseur-buyer with SPO2 de Castro as his back-up. Sr. Insp. Manzanas was assigned to stay in
the car and await the signal to be given by SPO2 Cabral, through his pager, before apprehending accused-appellant.

At around 3:30 in the early morning of April 16, 1996, the buy-bust team proceeded to the agreed meeting place at the
UCPB Building in Boni Avenue.12 Upon reaching the area, SPO2 Cabral alighted from the car while the other operatives
positioned themselves in strategic areas.13 After thirty (30) minutes, accused-appellant arrived. 14 after talking for a short
time with SPO2 Cabral, accused-appellant asked the former if he had the money. 15 SPO2 Cabral showed the bundle of
money16 and accused-appellant told him to wait. When he returned, SPO2 Cabral gave him the money and, in exchange,
accused-appellant handed a pack containing a white crystalline substance. 17 As planned, SPO2 Cabral turned on his
pager which prompted the backup operatives to close in and apprehend accused-appellant. 18 SPO2 Cabral asked
accused-appellant if he could search the latter's car. Accused-appellant acceded to the request and, as a result, SPO2
Cabral found a brown clutch bag at the driver's seat of the car. Inside the clutch bag, they found therein four plastic bags
containing a white crystalline substance which they suspected was shabu.19
Accused-appellant was brought to Camp Crame for booking. SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro then submitted the
substance they confiscated to the PNP Crime Laboratory for examination. 20 They thereafter brought accused-appellant to
the PNP General Hospital for a medical and physical examination. 21

The laboratory report on the white crystalline substance showed that the same tested positive for methamphetamine
hydrochloride or shabu22 and that the contents of the substance sold weighed 5.08 grams while those taken from the bag
had a total weight of 200.45 grams. The report reads:

PHYSICAL SCIENCES REPORT NO. D-448-96

CASE: Alleged Viol of RA 6425 SUSPECT/S:         LORETO MEDENILLA
TIME AND DATE RECEIVED: 2145H 16 April 1996
REQUESTING PARTY/UNIT: C, SOU-HQS-PNPNARCOM
Camp Crame, Quezon City

  SPECIMEN SUBMITTED:

  Exh "A" – One (1) brown "MARUDINI CLUTCH BAG" containing the following specimens:

1. One (1) heat sealed transparent plastic bag marked as Exh "A-1" with 5.08 grams of white crystalline
substance:

2. Four (4) transparent plastic bags marked as Exhs. "A-2" through "A-5" each with white crystalline
substance and having a total weight of 200.45 grams. xxx

PURPOSE OF LABORATORY EXAMINATION:

To determine the presence of prohibited and/or regulated drug. xxx

FINDINGS:

Qualitative examination conducted on the above-stated specimens gave positive result

to the tests for Methamphetamine Hydrochloride, a regulated drug. xxx

CONCLUSION:

Exhs. "A-1", "A-2" through ""A-5" contain methamphetamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug.

REMARKS:

TIME AND DATE COMPLETED:                      0740H 17 April 1996.23

For his defense, accused-appellant presented a different version of the events leading to his arrest.

On or about April 12, 1996, accused-appellant rented a car, a Toyota Corolla, from a certain Jess Hipolito. It was to be
used by his brother for a trip to Pangasinan.24 On April 15, 1996, his brother turned over the car to accused-appellant with
the instruction to return the car to Jess Hipolito.25 However, before returning the car, accused-appellant decided to use the
same for a night out with his friends. Accused-appellant, along with four (4) of his friends, namely, Joy, Tess, Willy and
Jong-jong, went to Bakahan in Quezon City for dinner and, thereafter, transferred to Music Box Lounge located in front of
the said restaurant,. After having some drinks, accused-appellant decided to return the car to Jess Hipolito and just take a
taxicab with his friends in going back to their place in Caloocan City. 26 They all proceeded to the condominium unit of Jess
Hipolito located along Boni Avenue in Mandaluyong City. 27 they reached the place at around 2:30 a.m.28 Accused-
appellant told the guard of the condominium building that he wanted to see Jess Hipolito to retun the car he rented. The
guard instructed him to park the car in front of UCPB. After doing so, accused-appellant, together with Jong-jong and Joy
went up to the unit of Jess Hipolito while their two companions, Willy and Tess, stayed in the lobby. 29 While inside the unit
of Jess Hipolito, accused-appellant was introduced to Alvin. 30 Accused-appellant told Jess Hipolito that he wanted to
return the car. However, Jess Hipolito requested accused-appellant to drive Alvin, using the rented car, to quezon City
since the latter was carrying a large amount of money. 31 Accused-appellant acceded to the request of Jess Hipolito. They
then all went down and, along with Willy and Tess who were then at the lobby, boarded the vehicle. 32 However, when
accused-appellant was about to back out the vehicle, a white car blocked the rear portion of the car. 33 The passengers of
the white car then stepped out of their vehicle and approached them. One of the passengers of the white car, SPO1 de
Castro, asked accused-appellant to roll down his window and, after doing so, SPO2 Cabral introduced himself and his
companions as police officers.34 Accused-appellant then asked: "Bakit po, sir?"35 In response, one of the police officers
said: "May titingnan lang muna kami, baba muna kayo."36 after alighting from the vehicle, accused-appellant and his
companions were frisked.37 Thereafter, SPO2 Cabral noticed a brown clutch bag being held by Alvin and confiscated the
same. SPO2 Cabral then asked accused-appellant if he can search the car. The latter agreed. SPO2 Cabral searched the
car for about 15 minutes but found nothing.38 SPO2 Cabral then opened the brown clutch bag he confiscated from Alvin
and found plastic sachets containing a white crystalline substance. The police officers then instructed accused-appellant
and his companions to board their vehicle. They were all brought to Camp Crame. 39 When they reached the said camp,
they were instructed to alight from the vehicle one by one. The first one to step out of the vehicle and go inside the office
was Alvin. After 20 minutes, the two women, Tess and Joy, were brought inside the office and, after 30 minutes, accused-
appellant, along with the two remaining passengers, Willy and Jong-jong, followed. 40

When they were all inside the NARCOM office, their personal circumstances were taken down. Thereafter, Jong-jong,
Willy and accused-appellant were separated from the group and placed inside the detention cell. Alvin and the two women
were left behind in the office and were later on released. 41 After a few hours, Jong-jong and Willy were brought out of the
detention cell while accused-appellant, who was then sleeping, was left in confinement. Jong-jong and Willy were brought
into the office and were made to sign a document on a yellow pad, prepared by the police officers. The police officers then
cautioned the two that they will be implicated in the case if they interfered. They were then released and accompanied out
to Camp Crame by a police officer.42 Accused-appellant was the only one who remained in detention and was,
subsequently, solely charged for the illegal sale and possession of shabu.

While in detention, accused-appellant learned that the vehicle he borrowed from Jess Hipolito was owned by a certain
Evita Ebora, who was also detained in the Mandaluyong City Jail for a drug-related offense. 43

On November 17, 1997, the trial cour found accused-appellant guilty as charged. The dispositive portion of the trial court's
decision reads:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding accuse LORETO MEDENILLA y DORIA GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 15 and 16, in relation to Section 20, of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended, otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972. Said accused is hereby sentenced to: (a) with
respect to Criminal Case No. 3618-D, suffer an indeterminate sentence of a minimum of one (1) year, eight (8)
months and twenty (20) days, to a maximum of four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional; (b) with
respect to Criminal Case No. 3619-D, suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and pay a fine in the amount of
Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00); (c) suffer all the accessories penalties consequent thereto; and (d) pay the
costs.

The shabu involved in this action is hereby confiscated in favor of the government and ordered to be forwarded to
the Dangerous Drugs Board to be disposed of in accordance with law.

SO ORDERED.44

Hence, this appeal where accused-appellant raises the following issues:

I. Was the accused arrested illegally?

II. Was there in fact any buy-bust operation?

III. Was the accused accorded his right to due process? 45

Being interrelated, we shall discuss the first and second issues jointly.

The defense insist that there was no prior agreement between accused-appellant and SPO2 Cabral for the sale of 5
grams of shabu on April 16, 1996 and that no buy bust operation actually took place. The prosecution's claim that there
was a buy-bust operation is, according to the defense, belied by the testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo de
Jesus that when the incident took place, accused-appellant was not alone but was accompanied by five (5) other
persons.46 thus, the defense argues that since there was no buy-bust operation, the arrest of accused-appellant was
illegal since the arresting officers were not properly armed with a warrant of arrest.
Accused-appellant's argument deserves scant consideration. The prosecution through the testimonies of SPO2 Cabral
and SPO1 de Castro adequately established the fact that there was a legally conducted buy-bust operation. Their
testimonies clearly showed that their confidential informant reported the drug operations of accused-appellant; that a
meeting took place between accused-appellant and SPO2 Cabral where they agreed on the sale of 5 grams of shabu;
that the NARCOM operatives planned a buy-bust operation; that the said operation was indeed conducted; and that the
same resulted in the arrest of accused-appellant and the confiscation of 5 plastic bags containing a white crystalline
substance. In this regard, the testimonies of the police officers were given full credence by the trial court, to wit:

The prosecution witnesses gave a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the apprehension of
accused Medenilla – from the time Cabral was introduced to accused Medenilla up to the buy-bust operation,
which culminated in the arrest of accused-Medenilla. This Court can find no inconsistency in their testimonies and,
as such, gives full faith and credit thereto. In addition, it is to be noted that no evidence exists to show that the law
enforcers failed to perform their duty regularly. Neither was any evidence presented to show that there was
improper motive on the part of said witnesses to falsely implicate accused Medenilla. On the contrary, it was
established that they did not know accused Medenilla prior to the buy bust operation. xxx 47

The trial court's determination of the credibility of the police officers deserves the highest respect by this court, considering
that the trial court had the direct opportunity to observe their deportment and manner of testifying. 48 Furthermore, in the
absence of any proof of any intent on the part of the police authorities to falsely impute such a serious crime against
accused-appellant, the testimonies of SPO2 Cabral and SPO1 de Castro on the buy-bust operation are deserving of belief
due to the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty accorded to law enforcers. 49 Clearly, accused-
appellant's mere denial and concoction of another arrest scenario cannot overcome the positive testimonies of the police
officers.

Even the supposed corroborative testimony of Wilfredo de Jesus is not credible since the said witness appeared to have
been making a mockery of the proceedings before the lower court as noted by the trial judge, to wit:

COURT:

You better refrain from smiling, I have been warning you. You keep on laughing.

Atty. Arias:

Your Honor, because he laughs…….(interrupted)

COURT:

No, he is laughing.

xxx

COURT:

And keep on laughing.

Atty. Arias:

He is smiling your Honor.

COURT:

No, he is not smiling, you can ask him. I do not understand why this guy is keep (sic) on laughing.

Atty. Arias:

"Binabalaan ka na bata. Huwag kang tatawa, huwag kang ngingiti kundi magsalita ka ng maayos at tiyak at
tahasan."50
The testimonies of accused-appellant and Wilfredo de Jesus are not convincing since they are replete with numerous
inconsistencies and improbabilities. First, accused-appellant testified that the Bakahan restaurant and the Music Box
lounge they went to on the evening of April 15, 1996 are located in Quezon City. 51 However, Wilfredo de Jesus claimed
that the said establishments are located in Mandaluyong. 52 The divergence of their assertions on the location of these
establishments goes into the credibility of their claim that they were together with other people and had a night out on the
evening of April 15, 1996. Second, accused-appellant claimed that at the time the police officers approached the car prior
to the arrest, one of the officers requested them to alight from the vehicle. 53 On the other hand, Wilfredo de Jesus testified
that when the police officers approached them, they were forcibly pulled out of their vehicle. 54 Their inconsistency on this
matter renders questionable the veracity of the claim of Wilfredo de Jesus that he was present during the arrest of
accused-appellant by the NARCOM operatives. Third, their claim that they were at the parking lot of UCPB in Boni
Avenue at around 3:00 o'clock in the morning of April 16, 1996 to return the rented vehicle to Jess Hipolito is hard to
believe. Human experience dictates that one does not return a rented vehicle to its owner in the early hours of the
morning. Business transactions, such as returning a rented car, would ordinarily be transacted during regular hours of
work or, perhaps, even earlier but definitely not during the hours of dawn. Fourth, both accused-appellant and Wilfredo de
Jesus claimed the improbable scenario that, after they were accosted by the police officers, they were all brought to camp
Crame by riding the same vehicle they rented. If this is believed, then two unlikely situations are made to appear. Either all
the six original passengers boarded the vehicle along with a seventh passenger, one of the NARCOM operatives who will
ensure that they will proceed to the camp, or only the six original passengers boarded the car to go to Camp Crame and
they were just escorted by the police officers who all rode another vehicle. The first situation is implausible since a bantam
car, like a Toyota Corolla, can only accommodate five, at most six, fully grown adults but, definitely, not seven. On the
other hand, the second situation is contrary to human experience since it will not be in accord with good police operating
procedure to allow a group of suspects arrested for a drug-related offense to board a vehicle by themselves and drive the
same to the police headquarters.

Furthermore, if there were indeed five other passengers on board the vehicle aside from accused-appellant, why were
they not charged or, at least, booked in the records of the NARCOM? No proof, not even an allegation, was presented by
the defense to reasonably explain why charges were not lodged against these alleged other passengers. The most that
accused-appellant did was to claim in his appeal brief that the reason why the other suspects were not charged was
because the police officers feared that bad luck might befall them if all were charged. Thus, he argues:

xxx Due to the belief of karma, the Narcom operatives instead of filing case or cases against all the other
occupants of the car together with the accused, the Narcom operatives filed only one case and that is against the
accused and in open court denied the presence of the other companions of the accused. 55

Clearly, such type of reasoning and justification shows that accused-appellant is already grasping at straws in order that
he may be acquitted, through whatever allegation, legal or otherwise, of the crimes he is charged with.

We now come to the third issue raised by accused-appellant that he was denied due process. In this regard, accused-
appellant claims that he was deprived of such constitutional right on the following grounds:

a) the denial of the court a quo of the motion of the accused through his counsel to have the
questioned shabu quantitatively examined; and

b) the bias attitude of the presiding judge of the lower court. 56

Accused-appellant admits the veracity of the quantitative test conducted by the PNP Crime Laboratory on the 5 plastic
containers of the white crystalline substance which resulted in the issuance of Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-
96.57 This was stipulated upon by accused-appellant when the forensic chemist of the PNP Crime Laboratory, P/Sr. Insp.
Julita T. de Villa, was presented as a witness, to wit:

Prosec. Paz:

The testimony of the witness is formally offered to prove in both cases, Crim. Cases No. 3618-D and 3619-D, that
in Crim. Case 36180D that the white crystalline substance which was sold by the accused Loreto Medenilla to the
police operatives was examined by the witness and found positive to the test of shabu and weighs 5.08 grams
and in Crim. Case No. 3619-D to prove that accused Loreto Medenilla y Doria that the four (4) transparent plastic
bags found in the possession of the accused with a total weight of 200.45 grams was found positive to the test
of shabu as examined by the witness, your Honor.

May we know from counsel for the accused if he is willing to enter into a stipulation?
 COURT:

Atty. Arias, are you willing to enter into stipulation?

Atty. Arias:

I will admit that the witness is an expert, second, I admit that there was an examination conducted by her and that
the result of her examination was reduced into writing.

COURT:

And it was found positive that the specimen submitted to the crime lab was shabu.

Atty. Arias:

Yes, your Honor, according to the examination and I will also state for the record that the witness does not know
where the specimen came from, how the specimen came into being.

xxx

Prosec. Paz:

May we request counsel for the accused to admit the authenticity and veracity of this document prepared by
witness after examining the specimen and the findings as stated in the initial laboratory report.

Atty. Arias:

As we have stated earlier, your Honor, that the result of her examination was reduced into writing, this is the result
of the examination, so be it, your Honor.

xxx

Prosec. Paz:

May we also request that the counsel will admit the weights of the specimens as found by the forensic chemist.

Atty. Arias:

Everything is written in the document.58

However, despite this admission, accused-appellant filed a motion to require the forensic chemist to conduct a
quantitative as well as a qualitative analysis on the subject menthamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu to determine its
purity.59 The trial court, after the prosecution filed its Comment/Opposition 60 to the motion, issued an Order, dated March
17, 1997, denying the motion, to wit:

This resolves the motion filed by the accused through his counsel praying that the forensic chemist be required to
conduct a qualitative and quantitative analysis on the subject methamphetamine hydrochloride.

Records will show (TSN dated October 23, 1996) that the defense counsel, with the express conformity of the
accused, had agreed to enter into stipulations or admissions of facts concerning the nature, quality and quantity of
the specimens submitted for chemical analysis. The results of said analysis indicated that said specimens were
positive to the test for shabu, and they weighed 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively. These results were explicitly
admitted by both the accused and his counsel. The only matter that was not admitted was the alleged source of
the stuff, it being denied that it was found in and taken from the possession of the accused. The defense counsel
who was given the opportunity to cross-examine raised the forensic chemist when she was presented, never
raised the issue or even suggested that what was examined could not have been pure shabu, and that if such
was the case, it was necessary to determine which part is shabu and which was otherwise. It appears that this
idea is merely an after-thought. To the mind of the Court, the attempt to have the specimens examine at this stage
 of the action, when the prosecution had already terminated the presentation of its evidence and is, in fact, about
to make a written formal offer of exhibits, can have no other purpose than to repudiate the findings of the forensic
chemist, which had already been previously admitted. This cannot be permitted bythe Court as it detracts from the
full respect that must be accorded to judicial admissions that have been freely and intelligently made. As correctly
observed by the prosecution, said judicial admissions are conclusive and binding upon the accused. The judicial
admission that the stuff submitted for analysis, weighing 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively, are indeed shabu
forecloses any further challenge as to its alleged purity. To speculate at this stage of the action that the stuff is not
pure shabu is to virtually repudiate the findings of the forensic chemist, previously admitted without any
qualification that the stuff analysed were indeed such illegal drug. This can no longer be permitted by the Court.

WHEREFORE, the instant motion is DENIED for lack of merit. 61

In the instant appeal, accused-appellant insists that he should have been allowed by the trial court to have the shabu
subjected to a quantitative test by the PNP Crime Laboratory. He argues that such a test is crucial in view of the nature of
the penalties for the violation of the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972, as amended, which are graduated depending on the
amount of regulated or prohibited drugs involved in a case. Accused-appellant claims that a quantitative test will definitely
show that the shabu involved herein is not pure and, as such, is less than 200 grams contrary to the assertion of the
prosecution that it is 200.45 grams. He anchors this argument on the contention that shabu is never 100% pure but, at
most, is only 85% unadulterated.62

We find that the trial court committed no reversible error in denying the motion. When the defense stipulated with the
prosecution that the results of the laboratory examination, as reflected in Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96, were
true and correct, the accused-appellant, in effect, admitted that the substance examine was indeed methamphetamine
hydrochloride having a weight of 5.08 grams, for Criminal Case No. 3618-D, and 200.45 grams, for Criminal Case No.
3619-D. Accused-appellant made no qualifications on the veracity of the PNP Crime Laboratory's finding on the total
weight of the examined shabu. In fact, no cross-examination was conducted by accused-appellant's counsel on the
witness, P/Sr. Insp. Julita de Villa, regarding this matter. Thus, when the defense tried to renege on the previous
stipulation by filing a motion requesting for a quantitative test on the shabu involved herein, the trial court was correct in
denying the same.

Furthermore, in the case of People vs. Barita,63 we held that there is no need to examine the entirety of the submitted
specimen since the sample testing is representative of the whole specimen, we held:

We are not persuaded by the claim of accused-appellants that in order for them to be convicted of selling 2,800 grams of
marijuana, the whole specimen must be tested considering that Republic Act 7659 impose a penalty dependent on the
amount or the quantity of drugs seized or taken. This court has ruled that a sample taken from one of the packages is
logically presumed to be representative of the entire contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-
appellant.64

This ruling was reiterated in People vs. Zheng Bai Hui,65 thus:

To recall, appellants sold the NARCOM operatives a substance weighing 992.3 grams. This amount is more than
the minimum of 200 grams required by the law to warrant the imposition of either reclusion perpetua or, if there be
aggravating, circumstances, the death penalty. Appellants however foist the probability that the substance sold
could contain additives or adulterants, and not just methamphetamine hydrochloride. Thus, the actual weight of
pure shabu could be less than 992.3 grams, thereby possibly reducing the imposable penalty.

The contention has no merit. We rejected a similar argument in People vs. Tang Wai Lan:

Accused-appellant then argues that the tests were not done for the entire amount of drugs allegedly found
inside the bags. It is suggested that since the law, Republic Act No. 7659, imposes a penalty dependent
on the amount or quantity of drugs seized or taken, then laboratory test should be undertaken for the
entire amount or quantity of drugs seized in order to determine the proper penalty to be imposed.

The argument is quaint and even borders on being ridiculous. In the present case, even assuming that
the confirmatory tests were conducted on samples taken from only one (1) of the plastic packages,
accused-appellant's arguments must still fail.

It will be recalled that each of the plastic packages weighed 1.1 kilograms, an amount more than sufficient
to justify imposing the penalty under Sec. 14 of Rep. Act No. 6425 as amended by Rep. Act No. 7659. A
 sample taken from one (1) of he packages is logically presumed to be representative of the entire
contents of the package unless proven otherwise by accused-appellant. Therefore, a positive result for
the presence of drugs is indicative that there is 1.1 kilogram of drugs in the plastic package from which
the sample was taken. If it is then proved, beyond reasonable doubt, xxx that accused appellant
transported into the Philippines the plastic packages from which samples were taken for tests, and found
positive as prohibited drugs, then conviction for importing "shabu" is definitely in order.

Thus, if the prosecution proves that the sample is positive for methamphetamine hydrochloride, it can be
presumed that the entire substance is shabu. The burden of evidence shifts to the accused who must prove
otherwise. Appellants in this case have not presented any evidence to overcome the presumption.

It is clear, therefore, that when accused-appellant stipulated that the weight of the examined specimens for Criminal Case
Nos. 3618-D and 3619-D totaled 5.08 and 200.45 grams, respectively, he in effect admitted that the said amounts of
shabu are pure and unadulterated. Moreover, accused-appellant made no reservations as to his admission on the veracity
of the results as reflected in Physical Sciences Report No. D-448-96. His only concern, at that time, was to make it clear
that the forensic scientist who examined the confiscated substance was not aware of where the specimen came
from.66 This was in accord with the theory of the defense that it was not accused-appellant but a companion, Alvin, who
was in possession of the confiscated substance. Thus, due to the absence of any reservation on the total weight of the
shabu examined, accused-appellant can no longer be heard to go back on his previous admission by requesting a
quantitative test of the same.

Nevertheless, accused-appellant argues that a quantitative test should be allowed in view of an alleged circular issued by
this Court sometime in 1996 directing the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct a qualitative and a quantitative examination
on all illegal drugs submitted to the said office in relation to a case. 67

This argument of accused-appellant is totally bereft of any legal basis. This Court never issued any such circular requiring
the PNP Crime Laboratory to conduct quantitative and qualitative tests on substances which they examine. It is clear that
this argument was resorted to by counsel for the defense in order to mislead the trial court and this court into acquitting
his client. This contemptuous conduct of counsel for the defense will be dealt with appropriately.

Accused-appellant also claims that the biased attitude of the trial judge deprived him of due process. In this regard, he
cites in his appeal brief a single instance when the judge allegedly revealed his bias, to wit:

COURT:

Mark it.

Q What happened after the accused handed to you one pack of crystalline substance?

A Immediately, I switched on our voyager pager which prompted my backup to subdue the suspect and introduce
ourselves as Anti Narcotics police, sir.

COURT:

By the way, did you not give the money to the accused when he handed to you the alleged substance?

A I gave it to him, your honor.

COURT:

So the money was already in the possession of the accused when you received the shabu from him.

A Yes, your Honor.68

We fail to see how this single noted instance of questioning can justify a claim that the trial judge was biased. We have
exhaustively examined the transcript of stenographic notes and determined that the trial judge was more than equitable in
presiding over the hearings of this case. Moreover, a judge is not prohibited from propounding clarificatory questions on a
witness if the purpose of which is to arrive at a proper and just determination of the case. Thus, in Zheng Bai Hui, we said:
 In any case, a severe examination by a trial judge of some of the witness for the defense in an effort to develop
the truth and to get at the real facts affords no justification for a charge that he has assisted the prosecution with
an evident desire to secure a conviction, or that he had intimidated the witnesses for the defense. The trial judge
must be accorded a reasonable leeway in putting such questions to witnesses as may be essential to elicit
relevant facts to make the record speak the truth. Trial judges in this jurisdiction are judges of both the law and the
facts, and they would be negligent in the performance of their duties if they permitted a miscarriage of justice as a
result of a failure to propound a proper question to a witness which might develop some material bearing upon the
outcome. In the exercise of sound discretion, he may put such question to the witness as will enable him to
formulate a sound opinion as to the ability or the willingness of the witness to tell the truth. A judge may examine
or cross-examine a witness. He may propound clarificatory questions to test the credibility of the witness and to
extract the truth. He may seek to draw out relevant and material testimony though that testimony may tend to
support or rebut the position taken by one or the other party. It cannot be taken against him if the clarificatory
questions he propounds happen to reveal certain truths which tend to destroy the theory of one party. 69

The sale of less than 200 grams of methampethamine hydrochloride, a regulated drug, is punishable with a penalty
ranging from prision correccional to reclusion temporal, depending on the quantity.70 Thus, if the regulated drug weighs
less than 66.67 grams, then the penalty is prision correctional, if 66.67 grams or more but less than 133.33 grams then
the penalty is prision mayor, and if 133.33 grams or more but less than 200 grams then the penalty is reclusion temporal.
In Criminal Case No. 3618-D, the amount of shabu involved weighs 5.08 grams, as such the appropriate penalty is prision
correccional. There being no aggravating or mitigating circumstances, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium period
or from 2 years, 4 months and 1 day to 4 years and 2 months. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
penalty shall be within the range of prision correccional medium and the minimum penalty shall be within the range of the
penalty next lower to that prescribed or, in this case, arresto mayor. It is, therefore, clear from the foregoing that the trial
committed an error in imposing an indeterminate sentence of 1 year, 8 months and 20 days, as minimum, to 4 years and
2 months, as maximum, of prision correccional. Accordingly, this must be modified.

On the other hand, the possession of 200 grams or more of shabu carries with it the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine ranging from Five hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00) to Ten Million Pesos (P10,000,000.00). Since
no aggravating circumstance attended the commission of the offense, the trial court, in Criminal Case No. 3619-D, was
correct in imposing the penalty of reclusion perpetua with a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig is hereby AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. Accused-
appellant Loreto Medenilla y Doria is hereby found GUILTY of violating Sections 15 and 16 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, and hereby sentenced: (a) in Criminal Case No. 3618-D, to suffer an indeterminate
sentence of 6 months of arresto mayor to 4 years and 2 months of prision correccional; and (b) in Criminal Case No.
3619-D, to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua and to pay a fine of Two Million Pesos (P2,000,000.00).

Counsel for the defense, Atty. Marcelino Arias, is hereby ordered to explain within ten (10) days why he should not be
cited in contempt for citing an inexistent circular in his pleadings.

SO ORDERED.

IMELDA R. MARCOS VS. SANDIGANBAYAN,

G.R. No. 126995, October 6, 1998

Facts:
On June 8, 1984, IMELDA MARCOS and JOSE DANS, as Chairperson and Vice Chairperson of the Light Railway Transit
Authority (LRTA) entered into a Lease Contract with the Philippine General Hospital Foundation, Inc. (PGHFI) which
petitioner Marcos was also the Chair of its Board of Trustees, involving an LRTA property in Pasay City for P102,760.00
per month for 25 years.

On June 27,1984, the PGHFI subleased the said property for P734,000.00 per month to the Transnational Construction
Corporation represented by one Ignacio Gimenez.

After   petitioner’s husband was deposed as President of the Philippines, she and Dans were charged of alleged violation
of Section 3 [g] of RA 3019, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act before the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioner and Jose P. Dans, Jr. were indicted in the said Information, for conspiring and confederating with each other in
entering into subject Lease Agreement alleged to be manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the government.

After trial, the First Division of the Sandiganbayan failed to comply with the legal requirement that all the 3 justices must
be unanimous in its Decision because Justice Garchitorena and Justice Jose Balajadia voted for the conviction of both
accused while Justice Narciso Atienza voted to acquit them.

Thereafter, Justice Garchitorena as Presiding Justice issued Administrative Order No. 288-93 constituting a Special
Division of five and designating Justices Augusto Amores and Cipriano del Rosario.

On September 21, 1993, Justice Amores wrote Justice Garchitorena that he be given 15 days his Manifestation. On the
same date, however, Justice Garchitorena   dissolved the division of 5 allegedly because he and Justice Balajadia had
agreed to the opinion of Justice del Rosario.

On September 24, 1993, a Decision was rendered convicting the petitioner and Dans of violation of Sec. 3 [g] of RA 3019.

On June 29, 1998, the Third Division of the Supreme Court by a vote of 3-2 affirmed the conviction of the petitioner but
acquitted DANS.

Petitioner then filed a Motion for Reconsideration and at the same time prayed that her Motion be heard by the Supreme
Court en banc claiming that her right to due process of law, both substantive and procedural was violated.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petitioner’s right to procedural due process was violated.
Held:
The Court ruled on the affirmative and the motion for reconsideration was granted and Imelda Marcos was acquitted of
the offense charged.
The irregularities committed by the First Division of the Sandiganbayan such as the holding of unscheduled
discussion/deliberation outside its principal office in an informal manner (since the justices met only in a restaurant) with
the presence of a non-member and absence of one member in violation of Sandiganbayan rules violates the right of the
petitioner to be tried in a collegial court.

Under PD No. 1606 as amended, and pursuant to the rules of Sandiganbayan, petitioner cannot be convicted except
upon the vote of three justices, regardless of whether her cases are before a regular division of three (3) justices or a
Special Division of five (5) justices. But more important than the vote of three (3) justices is the process by which they
arrive at their vote. It is indispensable that their vote be preceded by discussion and deliberation by all the members of the
division. The right of the petitioner, therefore, is the right to be heard by all the five justices of the Special Division. She is
entitled to be afforded the opinion of all its members.

With the creation of the Special Division, the petitioner has the right to be heard by the five justices. While the three
justices have already agreed on a decision, it should not deprive petitioner of her vested right to the opinion of Justices
Amores and del Rosario. It may be true that Justice del Rosario had already expressed his opinion during an informal,
unscheduled meeting in the unnamed restaurant but as aforestated, that opinion is not the opinion contemplated by law.
But what is more, petitioner was denied the opinion of Justice Amores for before it could be given, Presiding Justice
Garchitorena dissolved the Special Division.

Prescinding from those premises, it is indisputable that the decision of the First Division of the respondent Sandiganbayan
convicting the petitioner is void for violating her right to substantive and procedural due process.

G.R. No. 156168             December 14, 2004

EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, petitioner,

vs.
JOSE T. CALDERON, respondent.
Thru this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, petitioner Equitable Banking Corporation
(EBC), seeks the reversal and setting aside of the decision dated November 25, 20021 of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 60016, which partially affirmed an earlier decision of the Regional Trial Court at Makati City, Branch 61,
insofar as it grants moral damages and costs of suit to herein respondent, Jose T. Calderon.

The decision under review recites the factual background of the case, as follows:

Plaintiff-appellee [now respondent] Jose T. Calderon (Calderon for brevity), is a businessman engaged in several
business activities here and abroad, either in his capacity as President or Chairman of the Board thereon. In
addition thereto, he is a stockholder of PLDT and a member of the Manila Polo Club, among others. He is a
seasoned traveler, who travels at least seven times a year in the U.S., Europe and Asia. On the other hand, the
defendant-appellant [now petitioner] Equitable Banking Corporation (EBC for brevity), is one of the leading
commercial banking institutions in the Philippines, engaged in commercial banking, such as acceptance of
deposits, extension of loans and credit card facilities, among others.

xxx       xxx       xxx

Sometime in September 1984, Calderon applied and was issued an Equitable International Visa card (Visa card
for brevity). The said Visa card can be used for both peso and dollar transactions within and outside the
Philippines. The credit limit for the peso transaction is TWENTY THOUSAND (P20,000.00) PESOS; while in the
dollar transactions, Calderon is required to maintain a dollar account with a minimum deposit of $3,000.00, the
balance of dollar account shall serve as the credit limit.

In April 1986, Calderon together with some reputable business friends and associates, went to Hongkong for
business and pleasure trips. Specifically on 30 April 1986, Calderon accompanied by his friend, Ed De Leon went
to Gucci Department Store located at the basement of the Peninsula Hotel (Hongkong). There and then, Calderon
purchased several Gucci items (t-shirts, jackets, a pair of shoes, etc.). The cost of his total purchase amounted to
HK$4,030.00 or equivalent to US$523.00. Instead of paying the said items in cash, he used his Visa card (No.
4921 6400 0001 9373) to effect payment thereof on credit. He then presented and gave his credit card to the
saleslady who promptly referred it to the store cashier for verification. Shortly thereafter, the saleslady, in the
presence of his friend, Ed De Leon and other shoppers of different nationalities, informed him that his Visa card
was blacklisted. Calderon sought the reconfirmation of the status of his Visa card from the saleslady, but the latter
simply did not honor it and even threatened to cut it into pieces with the use of a pair of scissors.

Deeply embarrassed and humiliated, and in order to avoid further indignities, Calderon paid cash for the Gucci
goods and items that he bought.

Upon his return to the Philippines, and claiming that he suffered much torment and embarrassment on account of EBC’s
wrongful act of blacklisting/suspending his VISA credit card while at the Gucci store in Hongkong, Calderon filed with the
Regional Trial Court at Makati City a complaint for damages2 against EBC.

In its Answer,3 EBC denied any liability to Calderon, alleging that the latter’s credit card privileges for dollar transactions
were earlier placed under suspension on account of Calderon’s prior use of the same card in excess of his credit limit,
adding that Calderon failed to settle said prior credit purchase on due date, thereby causing his obligation to become past
due. Corollarily, EBC asserts that Calderon also failed to maintain the required minimum deposit of $3,000.00.

To expedite the direct examination of witnesses, the trial court required the parties to submit affidavits, in question-and-
answer form, of their respective witnesses, to be sworn to in court, with cross examination to be made in open court.

Eventually, in a decision dated October 10, 1997,4 the trial court, concluding that "defendant bank was negligent if not in
bad faith, in suspending, or ‘blacklisting’ plaintiff’s credit card without notice or basis", rendered judgment in favor of
Calderon, thus:

WHEREFORE PREMISES ABOVE CONSIDERED, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of plaintiff as against
defendant EQUITABLE BANKING CORPORATION, which is hereby ORDERED to pay plaintiff as follows:

1. the sum of US$150.00 as actual damages;

2. the sum of P200,000.00 as and by way of moral damages;

 3. the amount of P100,000.00 as exemplary damages;

4. the sum of P100,000.00 as attorney’s fees plus P500.00 per court hearing and

5. costs of suit.

SO ORDERED.

Therefrom, EBC went to the Court of Appeals (CA), whereat its recourse was docketed as CA G.R. CV No. 60016.

After due proceedings, the CA, in a decision dated November 25, 2002,5 affirmed that of the trial court but only insofar
as the awards of moral damages, the amount of which was even reduced, and the costs of suits are concerned. More
specifically, the CA decision dispositively reads:6

WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the decision of the court a quo  dated 10 October
1997 is AFFIRMED insofar as the awards of moral damages and costs of suit are concerned. However, anent
the award of moral damages, the same is reduced to One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos.

The rest of the awards are deleted.

SO ORDERED.

Evidently unwilling to accept a judgment short of complete exemption from any liability to Calderon, EBC is now with
us via the instant petition on its lone submission that "THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE
RESPONDENT IS ENTITLED TO MORAL DAMAGES NOTWITHSTANDING ITS FINDING THAT PETITIONER’S
ACTIONS HAVE NOT BEEN ATTENDED WITH ANY MALICE OR BAD FAITH." 7

The petition is impressed with merit.

In law, moral damages include physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded
feelings, moral shock, social humiliation and similar injury.8 However, to be entitled to the award thereof, it is not enough
that one merely suffered sleepless nights, mental anguish or serious anxiety as a result of the actuations of the other
party.9 In Philippine Telegraph & Telephone Corporation vs. Court of Appeals,10 we have had the occasion to reiterate the
conditions to be met in order that moral damages may be recovered, viz:

An award of moral damages would require, firstly, evidence of besmirched reputation, or physical, mental or
psychological suffering sustained by the claimant; secondly, a culpable act or omission factually established;
thirdly, proof that the wrongful act or omission of the defendant is the proximate cause of the damages sustained
by the claimant; and fourthly, that the case is predicated on any of the instances expressed or envisioned by
Articles 2219 and 2220 of the Civil Code.

Particularly, in culpa contractual or breach of contract, as here, moral damages are recoverable only if the defendant has
acted fraudulently or in bad faith,11 or is found guilty of gross negligence amounting to bad faith, or in wanton disregard of
his contractual obligations.12 Verily, the breach must be wanton, reckless, malicious or in bad faith, oppressive or
abusive.13

Here, the CA ruled, and rightly so, that no malice or bad faith attended petitioner’s dishonor of respondent’s credit card.
For, as found no less by the same court, petitioner was justified in doing so under the provisions of its Credit Card
Agreement14 with respondent, paragraph 3 of which states:

xxx the CARDHOLDER agrees not to exceed his/her approved credit limit, otherwise, all charges incurred
including charges incurred through the use of the extension CARD/S, if any in excess of credit limit shall become
due and demandable and the credit privileges shall be automatically suspended without notice to the
CARDHOLDER in accordance with Section 11 hereof.

We are thus at a loss to understand why, despite its very own finding of absence of bad faith or malice on the part of the
petitioner, the CA nonetheless adjudged it liable for moral damages to respondent.
Quite evidently, in holding petitioner liable for moral damages, the CA justified the award on its assessment that EBC was
negligent in not informing Calderon that his credit card was already suspended even before he left for Hongkong,
ratiocinating that petitioner’s right to automatically suspend a cardholder’s privileges without notice should not have been
indiscriminately used in the case of respondent because the latter has already paid his past obligations and has an
existing dollar deposit in an amount more than the required minimum for credit card at the time he made his purchases in
Hongkong. But, as explained by the petitioner in the memorandum it filed with this Court, 15 which explanations were never
controverted by respondent:

"xxx prior to the incident in question (i.e., April 30, 1986 when the purchases at the Gucci store in Hongkong were
made), respondent made credit purchases in Japan and Hongkong from August to September 1985 amounting to
US$14,226.12, while only having a deposit of US$3,639.00 in his dollar account as evidenced by the pertinent
monthly statement of respondent’s credit card transactions and his bank passbook, thus exceeding his credit limit;
these purchases were accommodated by the petitioner on the condition that the amount needed to cover the
same will be deposited in a few days as represented by respondent’s secretary and his company’s general
manager – a certain Mrs. Zamora and Mr. F.R. Oliquiano; respondent however failed to make good on his
commitment; later, respondent likewise failed to make the required deposit on the due date of the purchases as
stated in the pertinent monthly statement of account; as a consequence thereof, his card privileges for dollar
transactions were suspended; it was only four months later – on 31 January 1986, that respondent deposited the
sum of P14,501.89 in his dollar account to cover his purchases; the said amount however was not sufficient to
maintain the required minimum dollar deposit of $3,000.00 as the respondent’s dollar deposit stood at only
US$2,704.94 after satisfaction of his outstanding accounts; a day before he left for Hongkong, respondent made
another deposit of US$14,000.00 in his dollar account but did not bother to request the petitioner for the
reinstatement of his credit card privileges for dollar transactions, thus the same remained under suspension." 16

The foregoing are based on the sworn affidavit of petitioner’s Collection Manager, a certain Lourdes Canlas, who was
never cross examined by the respondent nor did the latter present any evidence to refute its veracity.

Given the above, and with the express provision on automatic suspension without notice under paragraph 3, supra, of the
parties’ Credit Card Agreement, there is simply no basis for holding petitioner negligent for not notifying respondent of the
suspended status of his credit card privileges.

It may be so that respondent, a day before he left for Hongkong, made a deposit of US$14,000.00 to his dollar account
with petitioner. The sad reality, however, is that he never verified the status of his card before departing for Hongkong,
much less requested petitioner to reinstate the same. 17

And, certainly, respondent could not have justifiably assumed that petitioner must have reinstated his card by reason
alone of his having deposited US$14,000.00 a day before he left for Hongkong. As issuer of the card, petitioner has the
option to decide whether to reinstate or altogether terminate a credit card previously suspended on considerations which
the petitioner deemed proper, not the least of which are the cardholder’s payment record, capacity to pay and compliance
with any additional requirements imposed by it. That option, after all, is expressly embodied in the same Credit Card
Agreement, paragraph 12 of which unmistakably states:

The issuer shall likewise have the option of reinstating the card holder’s privileges which have been terminated for
any reason whatsoever upon submission of a new accomplished application form if required by the issuer and
upon payment of an additional processing fee equivalent to annual fee. 18

Even on the aspect of negligence, therefore, petitioner could not have been properly adjudged liable for moral damages.

Unquestionably, respondent suffered damages as a result of the dishonor of his card. There is, however, a material
distinction between damages and injury. To quote from our decision in BPI Express Card Corporation vs. Court of
Appeals:19

Injury is the illegal invasion of a legal right; damage is the loss, hurt or harm which results from the injury; and
damages are the recompense or compensation awarded for the damage suffered.  Thus, there can be damage
without injury in those instances in which the loss or harm was not the result of a violation of a legal
duty. In such cases the consequences must be borne by the injured person alone, the law affords no remedy for
damages resulting from an act which does not amount to a legal injury or wrong. These situations are often
called damnum absque injuria.
 In other words, in order that a plaintiff may maintain an action for the injuries of which he complains, he must
establish that such injuries resulted from a breach of duty which the defendant owed to the plaintiff- a
concurrence of injury to the plaintiff and legal responsibility by the person causing it. The underlying basis for the
award of tort damages is the premise that an individual was injured in contemplation of law. Thus, there must
first be a breach of some duty  and the imposition of liability for that breach before damages may be awarded;
and the breach of such duty should be the proximate cause of the injury. (Emphasis supplied).

In the situation in which respondent finds himself, his is a case of damnum absque injuria.

We do not take issue with the appellate court in its observation that the Credit Card Agreement herein involved is a
contract of adhesion, with the stipulations therein contained unilaterally prepared and imposed by the petitioner to
prospective credit card holders on a take-it-or-leave-it basis. As said by us in Polotan, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals:20

A contract of adhesion is one in which one of the contracting parties imposes a ready-made form of contract
which the other party may accept or reject, but cannot modify. One party prepares the stipulation in the contract,
while the other party merely affixes his signature or his ‘adhesion’ thereto giving no room for negotiation and
depriving the latter of the opportunity to bargain on equal footing.

On the same breath, however, we have equally ruled that such a contract is "as binding as ordinary contracts, the reason
being that the party who adheres to the contract is free to reject it entirely." 21

Moreover, the provision on automatic suspension without notice embodied in the same Credit Card Agreement is couched
in clear and unambiguous term, not to say that the agreement itself was entered into by respondent who, by his own
account, is a reputable businessman engaged in business activities here and abroad.

On a final note, we emphasize that "moral damages are in the category of an award designed to compensate the claim for
actual injury suffered and not to impose a penalty on the wrongdoer." 22

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the decision under review REVERSED and SET ASIDE.

SO ORDERED.

Serapio v. Sandiganbayan

DOCTRINE:

- The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of hearings on his petition for bail.
- When bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to arraignment.
 - The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different
accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court
- A person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on
bail pending the judgment of his case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of right but is discretionary
upon the court.
- Upon an application for bail by the person charged with a capital offense, a hearing thereon must be conducted,
where the prosecution must be accorded an opportunity to discharge its burden of proving that the evidence of
guilt against an accused is strong. The prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to present all the evidence it
may deems necessary for this purpose. When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is strong,
it is the court’s duty to deny the application for bail. However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail
becomes a matter of right.
- Even in cases where the prosecution refuses to adduce evidence in opposition to an application for bail by an
accused charged with a capital offense, the trial court is still under duty to conduct a hearing on said application
FACTS:

- Serapio, accused together with Pres. Estrada and jinggoy for plunder, assails the decision of the sandiganbayan
denying his petition for bail and a petition for habeas corpus.
- Serapio was a member of the board of trustees and the legal counsel of the erap muslim youth foundation.
- Searpio received 200M from Chavit singson, it was a donation for the foundation.
- In 2000, Singson publicly accused Pres. Estrada and Serapio was one of them who was charged in the
sandiganbayan.
- Serapio filed his counter-affidavit and the ombudsman conducted a preliminary investigation and recommended
that they (Estrada and serapio) be charged with plunder. No bail was recommended for the provisional release.
- Serapio filed a motion for reconsideration to hold in abeyance the issuance of warrant of arrest and further
proceeds, also to determine probable cause. However it was denied. Since it was not with the ombudsman
anymore but with the sandiganbayan.
- Sandiganbyan issued a resolution finding probable cause to justify the issuance of warrants of arrest. Serapio
voluntarily surrendered.
- Sandiganbayan set the arraignment, petitioner filed an urgent petition for bail – may 24,2001. Sandiganbayn
denied the motion for urgent petition for bail. Also, declared that the petition for bail can and should be heard
before petitioner’s arraignment.
- June 2001, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution requiring the attendance of petitioner as well as all the other
accused during the hearings on the petitions for bail under pain of waiver of cross-examination.
- The Sandiganbayan, citing its inherent powers to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it determines
best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case, directed the other accused to
participate in the said bail hearing considering that under Section 8, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Court,
whatever evidence is adduced during the bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial.
- Sandiganbyan canceled the bail hearing. Also, the motion for reconsideration was denied.
- The sandiganbyan again reset the arraignment and the hearing for the petition for bail.
- Serapio filed with the court a petition for habeas corpuse but it was denied again through the sandiganbyan
resolution.
- Thus, Serapio filed in this court a petition for certiorari alleging that the sandiganbayan acted without or in excess
of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.

ISSUES: Re: G.R. No. 148769

1. (whether or not) THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION, IN DENYING PETITIONER
SERAPIO’S MOTION TO QUASH

2. (whether or not) THE AMENDED INFORMATION CHARGES MORE THAN ONE OFFENSE.

HELD: Petition dismissed

RATIO:

- ISSUE 1
- Serapio, asserts that there is no allegation in paragraph (a) of the amended Information of a “combination or
series of overt or criminal acts” constituting plunder as described in Section 1(d) of R.A. 7080 as amended.
Neither does the amended Information allege “a pattern of criminal acts.”
 - COURT – we do not agree with SERPIO.
- Section 6 rule 110 – sufficiency of complaint or information, the acts or omissions complained or must be alleged
in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to know what offense is intended to be
charged and enable the court to know the proper judgment. The Information must allege clearly and accurately
the elements of the crime charged.
- In this case, the amended Information specifically alleges that all the accused, including petitioner, connived and
conspired with former President Joseph E. Estrada to commit plunder “through any or a combination or a series of
overt or criminal acts or similar schemes or means.” And in paragraph (a) of the amended Information, petitioner
and his co-accused are charged with receiving or collecting, directly or indirectly, on several instances money in
the aggregate amount of P545,000,000.00.
- It is not necessary to allege in the amended Information a pattern of overt or criminal acts indicative of the overall
unlawful scheme or conspiracy because as Section 3 of R.A. 7080 specifically provides, the same is evidentiary
and the general rule is that matters of evidence need not be alleged in the Information
- Under the amended Information, all the accused, including petitioner, are charged of having conspired and
confabulated together in committing plunder. When two or more persons conspire to commit a crime, each is
responsible for all the acts of others.
- ISSUE 2
- SERAPIO - According to the accused Estradas and Edward Serapio the information charges more than one
offense, namely, bribery (Article 210 of the Revised Penal Code), malversation of public funds or property (Article
217, Revised Penal Code) and violations of Sec. 3(e) of Republic Act (RA No. 3019) and Section 7(d) of RA 6713.
- COURT - This contention is patently unmeritorious. The acts alleged in the information are not charged as
separate offenses but as predicate acts of the crime of plunder.
- This Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan. It is clear on the face of the amended Information that petitioner and
his co-accused are charged only with one crime of plunder and not with the predicate acts or crimes of plunder. It
bears stressing that the predicate acts merely constitute acts of plunder and are not crimes separate and
independent of the crime of plunder.

ISSUES: Re: G.R. No. 149116

Whether or not, THE SANDIGANBAYAN ACTED WITHOUT OR IN EXCESS OF JURISDICTION OR WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION IN SUMMARILY DENYING
PETITIONER SERAPIO’S URGENT OMNIBUS MOTION AND MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION (RE: RESOLUTION
DATED 31 MAY 2001), NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAD TOTALLY DISREGARDED
EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE AND COMMITTED GRAVE AND MANIFEST ERRORS OF LAW SERIOUSLY
PREJUDICIAL TO THE RIGHTS AND INTERESTS OF PETITIONER SERAPIO, AND THERE IS NO PROBABLE
CAUSE TO SUPPORT AN INDICTMENT FOR PLUNDER AS AGAINST PETITIONER SERAPIO.”

HELD: Court does not agree with petitioner

RATIO:

- SERAPIO - Petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying his omnibus
motion to hold in abeyance the issuance of a warrant for his arrest as well as the proceedings in Criminal Case
No. 26558; to conduct a determination of probable cause; and to direct the Ombudsman to conduct a
reinvestigation of the charges him.
- Petitioner asseverates that the Ombudsman had totally disregarded exculpatory evidence and committed grave
abuse of discretion in charging him with plunder. He further argues that there exists no probable cause to support
an indictment for plunder as against him.
- Petitioner insists that he cannot be charged with plunder since: (1) the P200 million he received does not
constitute “ill-gotten wealth” as defined in Section 1(d) of R.A. No. 7080; (2) there is no evidence linking him to the
collection and receipt of jueteng money; (3) there was no showing that petitioner participated in a pattern of
criminal acts indicative of an overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or acquire ill-gotten
wealth, or that his act of receiving the P200 million constitutes an overt criminal act of plunder.
- COURT - The People maintain that the Sandiganbayan committed no grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s omnibus motion. They assert that since the Ombudsman found probable cause to charge petitioner
with the crime of plunder, the Sandiganbayan is bound to assume jurisdiction over the case and to proceed to try
the same.
 - COURT - They further argue that “a finding of probable cause is merely preliminary and prefatory of the eventual
determination of guilt or innocence of the accused,” and that petitioner still has the chance to interpose his
defenses in a full blown trial where his guilt or innocence may finally be determined.
- Sandiganbayan did not commit any GADLEJ.
- Serapio failed to prove that the Ombudsman committed such act of abuse.
- The Court agrees with the Sandiganbayan that petitioner failed to establish that the preliminary investigation
conducted by the Ombudsman was tainted with irregularity or that its findings stated in the joint resolution dated
April 4, 2001 are not supported by the facts, and that a reinvestigation was necessary.
- Certiorari will not lie to invalidate the Sandiganbayan’s resolution denying petitioner’s motion for reinvestigation
since there is nothing to substantiate petitioner’s claim that it gravely abused its discretion in ruling that there was
no need to conduct a reinvestigation of the case.

ISSUES: Re: G.R. No. 148468

As synthesized by the Court from the petition and the pleadings of the parties, the issues for resolution are:
(1) Whether or not petitioner should first be arraigned before hearings of his petition for bail may be conducted;
(2) Whether petitioner may file a motion to quash the amended Information during the pendency of his petition for bail;
(3) Whether a joint hearing of the petition for bail of petitioner and those of the other accused in Criminal Case No. 26558
is mandatory;
(4) Whether the People waived their right to adduce evidence in opposition to the petition for bail of petitioner and failed to
adduce strong evidence of guilt of petitioner for the crime charged; and
(5) Whether petitioner was deprived of his right to due process in Criminal Case No. 26558 and should thus be released
from detention via a writ of habeas corpus.
HELD:
RATIO:
1st issue
- Serapio contends that the Sandiganbayan committed a grave abuse of its discretion amounting to excess or lack
of jurisdiction when it deferred the hearing of his petition for bail to July 10, 2001, arraigned him on said date and
entered a plea of not guilty for him when he refused to be arraigned. He insists that the Rules on Criminal
Procedure, as amended, does not require that he be arraigned first prior to the conduct of bail hearings since the
latter can stand alone and must, of necessity, be heard immediately
- Also, Serapio admitted that he cannot repudiate the evidence or proceedings taken during the bail hearings
because Rule 114, Section 8 of the Revised Rules of Court expressly provides that evidence present during bail
hearings are automatically reproduced during the trial.
- Court – petitioner’s contention is well taken. The arraignment of an accused is not a prerequisite to the conduct of
hearings on his petition for bail.
- Thus, an accused need not wait for his arraignment before filing a petition for bail.
- Court - We held therein that “in cases where it is authorized, bail should be granted before arraignment, otherwise
the accused may be precluded from filing a motion to quash.”
- However, the foregoing pronouncement should not be taken to mean that the hearing on a petition for bail should
at all times precede arraignment, because the rule is that a person deprived of his liberty by virtue of his arrest or
voluntary surrender may apply for bail as soon as he is deprived of his liberty, even before a complaint or
information is filed against him
- to condition the grant of bail to an accused on his arraignment would be to place him in a position where he has to
choose between (1) filing a motion to quash and thus delay his release on bail because until his motion to quash
can be resolved, his arraignment cannot be held, and (2) foregoing the filing of a motion to quash so that he can
be arraigned at once and thereafter be released on bail.
- THUS - It is therefore not necessary that an accused be first arraigned before the conduct of hearings on his
application for bail. For when bail is a matter of right, an accused may apply for and be granted bail even prior to
arraignment
2nd issue
- whether petitioner may file a motion to quash during the pendency of his petition for bail, petitioner maintains that
a motion to quash and a petition for bail are not inconsistent, and may proceed independently of each other.
- COURT - finds that no such inconsistency exists between an application of an accused for bail and his filing of a
motion to quash.
- Bail is the security given for the release of a person in the custody of the law, furnished by him or a bondsman, to
guarantee his appearance before any court as required under the conditions set forth under the Rules of Court.
- Its purpose is to obtain the provisional liberty of a person charged with an offense until his conviction while at the
same time securing his appearance at the trial.
- As stated earlier, a person may apply for bail from the moment that he is deprived of his liberty by virtue of his
arrest or voluntary surrender.
 - The right of an accused right to seek provisional liberty when charged with an offense not punishable by death,
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, or when charged with an offense punishable by such penalties but after
due hearing, evidence of his guilt is found not to be strong, does not preclude his right to assail the validity of the
Information charging him with such offense.
- It must be conceded, however, that if a motion to quash a criminal complaint or Information on the ground that
the same does not charge any offense is granted and the case is dismissed and the accused is ordered released,
the petition for bail of an accused may become moot and academic.
3rd & 4th issue
- Whether or not it is mandatory that the hearings on the petitions for bail of petitioner and accused Jose “Jinggoy”
Estrada in Criminal Case No. 26558 and the trial of the said case as against former President Joseph E. Estrada
be heard jointly.
- SERAPIO - the conduct of joint bail hearings would negate his right to have his petition for bail resolved in a
summary proceeding since said hearings might be converted into a full blown trial on the merits by the
prosecution
- COURT - There is no provision in the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure or the Rules of Procedure of the
Sandiganbayan governing the hearings of two or more petitions for bail filed by different accused or that a petition
for bail of an accused be heard simultaneously with the trial of the case against the other accused.
- The matter of whether or not to conduct a joint hearing of two or more petitions for bail filed by two different
accused or to conduct a hearing of said petition jointly with the trial against another accused is addressed to the
sound discretion of the trial court. Unless grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction is
shown, the Court will not interfere with the exercise by the Sandiganbayan of its discretion.
- A joint hearing of two separate petitions for bail by two accused will of course avoid duplication of time and effort
of both the prosecution and the courts and minimizes the prejudice to the accused, especially so if both movants
for bail are charged of having conspired in the commission of the same crime and the prosecution adduces
essentially the same evident against them.
- However, in the cases at bar, the joinder of the hearings of the petition for bail of petitioner with the trial of the
case against former President Joseph E. Estrada is an entirely different matter.
- For, with the participation of the former president in the hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail, the proceeding
assumes a completely different dimension.
- The proceedings will no longer be summary. As against former President Joseph E. Estrada, the proceedings will
be a full-blown trial which is antithetical to the nature of a bail hearing.
- COURT - the Court finds (sandiganbayan) that it gravely abused its discretion in ordering that the petition for bail
of petitioner and the trial of former President Joseph E. Estrada be held jointly.
- A person charged with a capital offense is not absolutely denied the opportunity to obtain provisional liberty on
bail pending the judgment of his case. However, as to such person, bail is not a matter of right but is discretionary
upon the court
- “Sec. 8. Burden of proof in bail application. — At the hearing of an application for bail filed by a person who is in
custody for the commission of an offense punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, the
prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of guilt is strong. The evidence presented during the
bail hearing shall be considered automatically reproduced at the trial but, upon motion of either party, the court
may recall any witness for additional examination unless the latter is dead, outside the Philippines, or otherwise
unable to testify.”
- There must be a showing that the evidence of guilt against a person charged with a capital offense is not strong
for the court to grant him bail.
- Thus, upon an application for bail by the person charged with a capital offense, a hearing thereon must be
conducted, where the prosecution must be accorded an opportunity to discharge its burden of proving that the
evidence of guilt against an accused is strong.
- The prosecution shall be accorded the opportunity to present all the evidence it may deems necessary for this
purpose.
- When it is satisfactorily demonstrated that the evidence of guilt is strong, it is the court’s duty to deny the
application for bail.
- However, when the evidence of guilt is not strong, bail becomes a matter of right.
- IN THE CASE - SERAPIO is not entitled to bail as a matter of right at this stage of the proceedings.
- The delay in the conduct of hearings on petitioner’s application for bail is therefore not imputable solely to the
Sandiganbayan or to the prosecution. Petitioner is also partly to blame therefor, as is evident from the following
list of motions filed by him and by the prosecution:
- Serapio, cannot be released from detention until the Sandiganbayan conducts a hearing of his application for bail
and resolve the same in his favor. Even then, there must first be a finding that the evidence against petitioner is
not strong before he may be granted bail.

5th ISSUE
 - Anent the issue of the propriety of the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus for petitioner, SERAPIO contends that
he is entitled to the issuance of said writ because the State, through the prosecution’s refusal to present evidence
and by the Sandiganbayan’s refusal to grant a bail hearing, has failed to discharge its burden of proving that as
against him, evidence of guilt for the capital offense of plunder is strong.
- COURT - the writ of habeas corpus will not issue where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty in
custody of an officer under a process issued by the court which jurisdiction to do so.
- In exceptional circumstances, habeas corpus may be granted by the courts even when the person concerned is
detained pursuant to a valid arrest or his voluntary surrender, for this writ of liberty is recognized as “the
fundamental instrument for safeguarding individual freedom against arbitrary and lawless state action” due to “its
ability to cut through barriers of form and procedural mazes.”
- The Court finds no basis for the issuance of a writ of habeas corpus in favor of petitioner.
- The general rule that habeas corpus does not lie where the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the
custody of an officer under process issued by a court which had jurisdiction to issue the same applies, because
petitioner is under detention pursuant to the order of arrest issued by the Sandiganbayan on April 25, 2001 after
the filing by the Ombudsman of the amended information for plunder against petitioner and his co-accused.
Petitioner had in fact voluntarily surrendered himself to the authorities on April 25, 2001 upon learning that a
warrant for his arrest had been issued.
- The issuance of a writ of habeas corpus would not only be unjustified but would also preempt the
Sandiganbayan’s resolution of the pending application for bail of petitioner. The recourse of petitioner is to
forthwith proceed with the hearing on his application for bail.

SUMMARY OF JUDGMENT

1. In G.R. No. 148769 and G.R. No. 149116, the petitions are DISMISSED. The resolutions of respondent
Sandiganbayan subject of said petitions are AFFIRMED; and
2. In G.R. No. 148468, the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The resolution of respondent Sandiganbayan, Annex
“L” of the petition, ordering a joint hearing of petitioner’s petition for bail and the trial of Criminal Case No. 26558 as
against former President Joseph E. Estrada is SET ASIDE; the arraignment of petitioner on July 10, 2001 is also SET
ASIDE.

G.R. No. 139465               October 17, 2000

SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RALPH C. LANTION, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25, and MARK B.
JIMENEZ, respondents.

On January 18, 2000, by a vote of 9-6, we dismissed the petition at bar and ordered the petitioner to furnish private
respondent copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant him a reasonable period within which
to file his comment with supporting evidence.1

On February 3, 2000, the petitioner timely filed an Urgent Motion for Reconsideration. He assails the decision on the
following grounds:

"The majority decision failed to appreciate the following facts and points of substance and of value which, if considered,
would alter the result of the case, thus:

I. There is a substantial difference between an evaluation process antecedent to the filing of an extradition petition
in court and a preliminary investigation.

II. Absence of notice and hearing during the evaluation process will not result in a denial of fundamental fairness.

III. In the evaluation process, instituting a notice and hearing requirement satisfies no higher objective.

IV. The deliberate omission of the notice and hearing requirement in the Philippine Extradition Law is intended to
prevent flight.

V. There is a need to balance the interest between the discretionary powers of government and the rights of an
individual.

VI. The instances cited in the assailed majority decision when the twin rights of notice and hearing may be
dispensed with in this case results in a non sequitur conclusion.

VII. Jimenez is not placed in imminent danger of arrest by the Executive Branch necessitating notice and hearing.

VIII. By instituting a 'proceeding' not contemplated by PD No. 1069, the Supreme Court has encroached upon the
constitutional boundaries separating it from the other two co-equal branches of government.

IX. Bail is not a matter of right in proceedings leading to extradition or in extradition proceedings." 2

On March 28, 2000, a 58-page Comment was filed by the private respondent Mark B. Jimenez, opposing petitioner’s
Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

On April 5, 2000, petitioner filed an Urgent Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance of Action and Filing of Reply.
Thereafter, petitioner filed on June 7, 2000 a Manifestation with the attached Note 327/00 from the Embassy of Canada
and Note No. 34 from the Security Bureau of the Hongkong SAR Government Secretariat. On August 15, 2000, private
respondent filed a Manifestation and Motion for Leave to File Rejoinder in the event that petitioner's April 5, 2000 Motion
would be granted. Private respondent also filed on August 18, 2000, a Motion to Expunge from the records petitioner's
June 7, 2000 Manifestation with its attached note verbales. Except for the Motion to Allow Continuation and Maintenance
of Action, the Court denies these pending motions and hereby resolves petitioner's Urgent Motion for Reconsideration.

The jugular issue is whether or not the private respondent is entitled to the due process right to notice and hearing during
the evaluation stage of the extradition process.

We now hold that private respondent is bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the
extradition process.

First. P.D. No. 10693 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty provides the time when an extraditee shall be
furnished a copy of the petition for extradition as well as its supporting papers, i.e., after the filing of the petition for
extradition in the extradition court, viz:
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing; Service of Notices. - (1) Immediately upon receipt of the
petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order . . . Upon receipt of the answer, or should the accused after having received
the summons fail to answer within the time fixed, the presiding judge shall hear the case or set another date for the
hearing thereof.

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the
accused and the attorney having charge of the case."

It is of judicial notice that the summons includes the petition for extradition which will be answered by the extraditee.

There is no provision in the RP-US Extradition Treaty and in P.D. No. 1069 which gives an extraditee the right to
demand from the petitioner Secretary of Justice copies of the extradition request from the US government and its
supporting documents and to comment thereon while the request is still undergoing evaluation. We cannot write a
provision in the treaty giving private respondent that right where there is none. It is well-settled that a "court cannot alter,
amend, or add to a treaty by the insertion of any clause, small or great, or dispense with any of its conditions and
requirements or take away any qualification, or integral part of any stipulation, upon any motion of equity, or general
convenience, or substantial justice."4

Second. All treaties, including the RP-US Extradition Treaty, should be interpreted in light of their intent. Nothing less
than the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties to which the Philippines is a signatory provides that "a treaty shall be
interpreted in good faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the treaty in their context and
in light of its object and purpose."5 (emphasis supplied) The preambular paragraphs of P.D. No. 1069 define its
intent, viz:

"WHEREAS, under the Constitution[,] the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land, and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations;

WHEREAS, the suppression of crime is the concern not only of the state where it is committed but also of any other
state to which the criminal may have escaped, because it saps the foundation of social life and is an outrage upon
humanity at large, and it is in the interest of civilized communities that crimes should not go unpunished;

WHEREAS, in recognition of this principle the Philippines recently concluded an extradition treaty with the Republic of
Indonesia, and intends to conclude similar treaties with other interested countries;

x x x." (emphasis supplied)

It cannot be gainsaid that today, countries like the Philippines forge extradition treaties to arrest the dramatic rise of
international and transnational crimes like terrorism and drug trafficking. Extradition treaties provide the assurance that the
punishment of these crimes will not be frustrated by the frontiers of territorial sovereignty. Implicit in the treaties should be
the unbending commitment that the perpetrators of these crimes will not be coddled by any signatory state.

It ought to follow that the RP-US Extradition Treaty calls for an interpretation that will minimize if not prevent the escape of
extraditees from the long arm of the law and expedite their trial. The submission of the private respondent, that as a
probable extraditee under the RP-US Extradition Treaty he should be furnished a copy of the US government request for
his extradition and its supporting documents even while they are still under evaluation by petitioner Secretary of Justice,
does not meet this desideratum. The fear of the petitioner Secretary of Justice that the demanded notice is equivalent to a
notice to flee must be deeply rooted on the experience of the executive branch of our government. As it comes from the
branch of our government in charge of the faithful execution of our laws, it deserves the careful consideration of this
Court. In addition, it cannot be gainsaid that private respondent’s demand for advance notice can delay the summary
process of executive evaluation of the extradition request and its accompanying papers. The foresight of Justice Oliver
Wendell Holmes did not miss this danger. In 1911, he held:

"It is common in extradition cases to attempt to bring to bear all the factitious niceties of a criminal trial at common
law. But it is a waste of time . . . if there is presented, even in somewhat untechnical form according to our ideas, such
reasonable ground to suppose him guilty as to make it proper that he should be tried, good faith to the demanding
government requires his surrender."6 (emphasis supplied)
We erode no right of an extraditee when we do not allow time to stand still on his prosecution. Justice is best served when
done without delay.

Third. An equally compelling factor to consider is the understanding of the parties themselves to the RP-US Extradition
Treaty as well as the general interpretation of the issue in question by other countries with similar treaties with the
Philippines. The rule is recognized that while courts have the power to interpret treaties, the meaning given them by the
departments of government particularly charged with their negotiation and enforcement is accorded great weight. 7 The
reason for the rule is laid down in Santos III v. Northwest Orient Airlines, et al.,8 where we stressed that a treaty is a
joint executive-legislative act which enjoys the presumption that "it was first carefully studied and determined to be
constitutional before it was adopted and given the force of law in the country."

Our executive department of government, thru the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) and the Department of Justice
(DOJ), has steadfastly maintained that the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 do not grant the private
respondent a right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of an extradition process. 9 This understanding of
the treaty is shared by the US government, the other party to the treaty. 10 This interpretation by the two governments
cannot be given scant significance. It will be presumptuous for the Court to assume that both governments did not
understand the terms of the treaty they concluded.

Yet, this is not all. Other countries with similar extradition treaties with the Philippines have expressed the same
interpretation adopted by the Philippine and US governments. Canadian11 and Hongkong12 authorities, thru
appropriate note verbales communicated to our Department of Foreign Affairs, stated in unequivocal language that it is
not an international practice to afford a potential extraditee with a copy of the extradition papers during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process. We cannot disregard such a convergence of views unless it is manifestly erroneous.

Fourth. Private respondent, however, peddles the postulate that he must be afforded the right to notice and hearing as
required by our Constitution. He buttresses his position by likening an extradition proceeding to a criminal proceeding and
the evaluation stage to a preliminary investigation.

We are not persuaded. An extradition proceeding is sui generis. It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into
operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of Rights. To begin with, the process of extradition does
not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused. 13 His guilt or innocence will be adjudged in the
court of the state where he will be extradited. Hence, as a rule, constitutional rights that are only relevant to determine the
guilt or innocence of an accused cannot be invoked by an extraditee especially by one whose extradition papers are still
undergoing evaluation.14 As held by the US Supreme Court in United States v. Galanis:

"An extradition proceeding is not a criminal prosecution, and the constitutional safeguards that accompany a criminal trial
in this country do not shield an accused from extradition pursuant to a valid treaty." 15

There are other differences between an extradition proceeding and a criminal proceeding. An extradition proceeding is
summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial. 16 In contradistinction to a criminal proceeding, the
rules of evidence in an extradition proceeding allow admission of evidence under less stringent standards. 17 In terms of the
quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof beyond reasonable doubt for conviction 18 while a
fugitive may be ordered extradited "upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case." 19 Finally, unlike in a criminal
case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding, our courts may adjudge
an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him. 20 The United States adheres to a
similar practice whereby the Secretary of State exercises wide discretion in balancing the equities of the case and the
demands of the nation's foreign relations before making the ultimate decision to extradite. 21

As an extradition proceeding is not criminal in character and the evaluation stage in an extradition proceeding is
not akin to a preliminary investigation, the due process safeguards in the latter do not necessarily apply to the
former. This we hold for the procedural due process required by a given set of circumstances "must begin with a
determination of the precise nature of the government function involved as well as the private interest that has
been affected by governmental action."22 The concept of due process is flexible for "not all situations calling for
procedural safeguards call for the same kind of procedure." 23

Fifth. Private respondent would also impress upon the Court the urgency of his right to notice and hearing considering the
alleged threat to his liberty "which may be more priceless than life." 24 The supposed threat to private respondent’s liberty is
perceived to come from several provisions of the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 which allow provisional
arrest and temporary detention.
We first deal with provisional arrest. The RP-US Extradition Treaty provides as follows:

"PROVISIONAL ARREST

1. In case of urgency, a Contracting Party may request the provisional arrest of the person sought pending
presentation of the request for extradition. A request for provisional arrest may be transmitted through the
diplomatic channel or directly between the Philippine Department of Justice and the United States Department of
Justice.

2. The application for provisional arrest shall contain:

a) a description of the person sought;

b) the location of the person sought, if known;

c) a brief statement of the facts of the case, including, if possible, the time and location of the offense;

d) a description of the laws violated;

e) a statement of the existence of a warrant of arrest or finding of guilt or judgment of conviction against
the person sought; and

f) a statement that a request for extradition for the person sought will follow.

3. The Requesting State shall be notified without delay of the disposition of its application and the reasons for any
denial.

4. A person who is provisionally arrested may be discharged from custody upon the expiration of sixty (60) days
from the date of arrest pursuant to this Treaty if the executive authority of the Requested State has not received
the formal request for extradition and the supporting documents required in Article 7." (emphasis supplied)

In relation to the above, Section 20 of P.D. No. 1069 provides:

"Sec. 20. Provisional Arrest.- (a) In case of urgency, the requesting state may, pursuant to the relevant treaty or
convention and while the same remains in force, request for the provisional arrest of the accused, pending receipt of the
request for extradition made in accordance with Section 4 of this Decree.

(b) A request for provisional arrest shall be sent to the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation, Manila,
either through the diplomatic channels or direct by post or telegraph.

(c) The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation or any official acting on his behalf shall upon receipt of the
request immediately secure a warrant for the provisional arrest of the accused from the presiding judge of the
Court of First Instance of the province or city having jurisdiction of the place, who shall issue the warrant for the
provisional arrest of the accused. The Director of the National Bureau of Investigation through the Secretary of
Foreign Affairs shall inform the requesting state of the result of its request.

(d) If within a period of 20 days after the provisional arrest the Secretary of Foreign Affairs has not received the
request for extradition and the documents mentioned in Section 4 of this Decree, the accused shall be released
from custody." (emphasis supplied)

Both the RP-US Extradition Treaty and P.D. No. 1069 clearly provide that private respondent may be provisionally
arrested only pending receipt of the request for extradition. Our DFA has long received the extradition request from
the United States and has turned it over to the DOJ. It is undisputed that until today, the United States has not requested
for private respondent’s provisional arrest. Therefore, the threat to private respondent’s liberty has passed. It is more
imagined than real.

Nor can the threat to private respondent’s liberty come from Section 6 of P.D. No. 1069, which provides:
"Sec. 6. Issuance of Summons; Temporary Arrest; Hearing, Service of Notices.-  (1) Immediately upon receipt of the
petition, the presiding judge of the court shall, as soon as practicable, summon the accused to appear and to answer the
petition on the day and hour fixed in the order. [H]e may issue a warrant for the immediate arrest of the
accused which may be served anywhere within the Philippines if it appears to the presiding judge that the immediate
arrest and temporary detention of the accused will best serve the ends of justice. . .

(2) The order and notice as well as a copy of the warrant of arrest, if issued, shall be promptly served each upon the
accused and the attorney having charge of the case." (emphasis supplied)

It is evident from the above provision that a warrant of arrest for the temporary detention of the accused pending the
extradition hearing may only be issued by the presiding judge of the extradition court upon filing of the petition for
extradition. As the extradition process is still in the evaluation stage of pertinent documents and there is no certainty that
a petition for extradition will be filed in the appropriate extradition court, the threat to private respondent’s liberty is
merely hypothetical.

Sixth. To be sure, private respondent’s plea for due process deserves serious consideration involving as it does his
primordial right to liberty. His plea to due process, however, collides with important state interests which cannot
also be ignored for they serve the interest of the greater majority. The clash of rights demands a delicate balancing
of interests approach which is a "fundamental postulate of constitutional law." 25 The approach requires that we "take
conscious and detailed consideration of the interplay of interests observable in a given situation or type of
situation."26 These interests usually consist in the exercise by an individual of his basic freedoms on the one hand, and the
government’s promotion of fundamental public interest or policy objectives on the other. 27

In the case at bar, on one end of the balancing pole is the private respondent’s claim to due process predicated on
Section 1, Article III of the Constitution, which provides that "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without
due process of law . . ." Without a bubble of doubt, procedural due process of law lies at the foundation of a civilized
society which accords paramount importance to justice and fairness. It has to be accorded the weight it deserves.

This brings us to the other end of the balancing pole. Petitioner avers that the Court should give more weight to our
national commitment under the RP-US Extradition Treaty to expedite the extradition to the United States of persons
charged with violation of some of its laws. Petitioner also emphasizes the need to defer to the judgment of the Executive
on matters relating to foreign affairs in order not to weaken if not violate the principle of separation of powers.

Considering that in the case at bar, the extradition proceeding is only at its evaluation stage, the nature of the
right being claimed by the private respondent is nebulous and the degree of prejudice he will allegedly suffer is
weak, we accord greater weight to the interests espoused by the government thru the petitioner Secretary of
Justice. In Angara v. Electoral Commission, we held that the "Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold
lines, allotment of power to the executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." 28 Under our
constitutional scheme, executive power is vested in the President of the Philippines. 29 Executive power includes, among
others, the power to contract or guarantee foreign loans and the power to enter into treaties or international
agreements.30 The task of safeguarding that these treaties are duly honored devolves upon the executive department
which has the competence and authority to so act in the international arena. 31 It is traditionally held that the President has
power and even supremacy over the country’s foreign relations. 32 The executive department is aptly accorded deference
on matters of foreign relations considering the President’s most comprehensive and most confidential information about
the international scene of which he is regularly briefed by our diplomatic and consular officials. His access to ultra-
sensitive military intelligence data is also unlimited.33 The deference we give to the executive department is dictated by the
principle of separation of powers. This principle is one of the cornerstones of our democratic government. It cannot be
eroded without endangering our government.

The Philippines also has a national interest to help in suppressing crimes and one way to do it is to facilitate the
extradition of persons covered by treaties duly entered by our government. More and more, crimes are becoming the
concern of one world. Laws involving crimes and crime prevention are undergoing universalization. One manifest purpose
of this trend towards globalization is to deny easy refuge to a criminal whose activities threaten the peace and progress of
civilized countries. It is to the great interest of the Philippines to be part of this irreversible movement in light of its
vulnerability to crimes, especially transnational crimes.

In tilting the balance in favor of the interests of the State, the Court stresses that it is not ruling that the private
respondent has no right to due process at all throughout the length and breadth of the extrajudicial
proceedings. Procedural due process requires a determination of what process is due, when it is due, and the degree of
what is due. Stated otherwise, a prior determination should be made as to whether procedural protections are at all
due and when they are due, which in turn depends on the extent to which an individual will be "condemned to
suffer grievous loss."34 We have explained why an extraditee has no right to notice and hearing during the evaluation
stage of the extradition process. As aforesaid, P.D. No. 1069 which implements the RP-US Extradition Treaty affords an
extraditee sufficient opportunity to meet the evidence against him once the petition is filed in court. The time for the
extraditee to know the basis of the request for his extradition is merely moved to the filing in court of the formal petition
for extradition. The extraditee's right to know is momentarily withheld during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process to accommodate the more compelling interest of the State to prevent escape of potential extraditees which can
be precipitated by premature information of the basis of the request for his extradition. No less compelling at that stage of
the extradition proceedings is the need to be more deferential to the judgment of a co-equal branch of the government,
the Executive, which has been endowed by our Constitution with greater power over matters involving our foreign
relations. Needless to state, this balance of interests is not a static but a moving balance which can be adjusted as the
extradition process moves from the administrative stage to the judicial stage and to the execution stage depending on
factors that will come into play. In sum, we rule that the temporary hold on private respondent's privilege of notice and
hearing is a soft restraint on his right to due process which will not deprive him of fundamental fairness should he
decide to resist the request for his extradition to the United States. There is no denial of due process as long as
fundamental fairness is assured a party.

We end where we began. A myopic interpretation of the due process clause would not suffice to resolve the conflicting
rights in the case at bar. With the global village shrinking at a rapid pace, propelled as it is by technological leaps in
transportation and communication, we need to push further back our horizons and work with the rest of the civilized
nations and move closer to the universal goals of "peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity with all
nations."35 In the end, it is the individual who will reap the harvest of peace and prosperity from these efforts.

WHEREFORE, the Urgent Motion for Reconsideration is GRANTED. The Decision in the case at bar promulgated on
January18, 2000 is REVERSED. The assailed Order issued by the public respondent judge on August 9, 1999 is SET
ASIDE. The temporary restraining order issued by this Court on August 17, 1999 is made PERMANENT. The Regional
Trial Court of Manila, Branch 25 is enjoined from conducting further proceedings in Civil Case No. 99-94684.

SO ORDERED.

Government of the USA v. Hon. Purganan

GR. NO. 148571 Sept. 24 2002
Lessons: Extradition Process, Bail on Extradition, Right of Due Process and Fundamental Fairness in Extradition

Laws: Bill of Rights, PD 1069, US-Phil Extradition Treaty

FACTS:

    Petition is a sequel to the case “Sec. of Justice v. Hon. Lantion”.  The Secretary was ordered to furnish Mr. Jimenez
copies of the extradition request and its supporting papers and to grant the latter a reasonable period within which to file a
comment and supporting evidence.  But, on motion for reconsideration by the Sec. of Justice, it reversed its decision but
held that the Mr. Jimenez was bereft of the right to notice and hearing during the evaluation stage of the extradition
process.  On May 18, 2001, the Government of the USA, represented by the Philippine Department of Justice, filed with
the RTC, the Petition for Extradition praying for the issuance of an order for his “immediate arrest” pursuant to Sec. 6 of
PD 1069 in order to prevent the flight of Jimenez.  Before the RTC could act on the petition, Mr. Jimenez filed before it an
“Urgent Manifestation/Ex-Parte Motion” praying for his application for an arrest warrant be set for hearing.  After the
hearing, as required by the court, Mr. Jimenez submitted his Memorandum.  Therein seeking an alternative prayer that in
case a warrant should issue, he be allowed to post bail in the amount of P100,000.  The court ordered the issuance of a
warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash.  After he had surrendered his passport and
posted the required cash bond, Jimenez was granted provisional liberty. 

    Government of the USA filed a petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to set aside the order for the
issuance of a warrant for his arrest and fixing bail for his temporary liberty at P1M in cash which the court deems best to
take cognizance as there is still  no local jurisprudence to guide lower court.
   
ISSUES:
i.    Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in adopting a procedure of first hearing a potential extraditee before issuing an arrest
warrant under Section 6 of PD No. 1069
ii.    Whether or NOT Hon. Purganan acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting the prayer for bail
iii.    Whether or NOT there is a violation of due process

HELD: Petition is GRANTED. Bail bond posted is CANCELLED.  Regional Trial Court of
  Manila is directed to conduct the extradition proceedings before it.

i.    YES.

By using the phrase “if it appears,” the law further conveys that accuracy is not as
important as speed at such early stage.  From the knowledge and the material then available to it, the court is expected
merely to get a good first impression or a prima facie finding sufficient to make a speedy initial determination as regards
the arrest and detention of the accused.  The prima facie existence of probable cause for hearing the petition and, a priori,
for issuing an arrest warrant was already evident from the Petition itself and its supporting documents.  Hence, after
having already determined therefrom that a prima facie finding did exist, respondent judge gravely abused his discretion
when he set the matter for hearing upon motion of Jimenez.  The silence of the Law and the Treaty leans to the more
reasonable interpretation that there is no intention to punctuate with a hearing every little step in the entire proceedings.  It
also bears emphasizing at this point that extradition proceedings are summary in nature.  Sending to persons sought to be
extradited a notice of the request for their arrest and setting it for hearing at some future date would give them ample
opportunity to prepare and execute an escape which neither the Treaty nor the Law could have intended.

    Even Section 2 of Article III of our Constitution, which is invoked by Jimenez, does not require a notice or a hearing
before the issuance of a warrant of arrest.   To determine probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants, the
Constitution itself requires only the examination under oath or affirmation of complainants and the witnesses they may
produce.
The Proper Procedure to “Best Serve The Ends Of Justice” In Extradition Cases
    Upon receipt of a petition for extradition and its supporting documents, the judge must study them and make, as soon
as possible, a prima facie finding whether
a)    they are sufficient in form and substance
b)    they show compliance with the Extradition Treaty and Law
c)    the person sought is extraditable

At his discretion, the judge may require the submission of further documentation or may personally examine the affiants
and witnesses of the petitioner.  If, in spite of this study and examination, no prima facie finding is possible, the petition
may be dismissed at the discretion of the judge.  On the other hand, if the presence of a prima facie case is determined,
then the magistrate must immediately issue a warrant for the arrest of the extraditee, who is at the same time summoned
to answer the petition and to appear at scheduled summary hearings.  Prior to the issuance of the warrant, the judge must
not inform or notify the potential extraditee of the pendency of the petition, lest the latter be given the opportunity to
escape and frustrate the proceedings. 

ii.    Yes.

The constitutional provision on bail on Article III, Section 13 of the Constitution, as well
as Section 4 of Rule 114 of the Rules of Court, applies only when a person has been arrested and detained for violation of
Philippine criminal laws.  It does not apply to extradition proceedings, because extradition courts do not render judgments
of conviction or acquittal.  Moreover, the constitutional right to bail “flows from the presumption of innocence in favor of
every accused who should not be subjected to the loss of freedom as thereafter he would be entitled to acquittal, unless
his guilt be proved beyond reasonable doubt.  In extradition, the presumption of innocence is not at issue.  The provision
in the Constitution stating that the “right to bail shall not be impaired even when the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
is suspended” finds application “only to persons judicially charged for rebellion or offenses inherent in or directly
connected with invasion.”  

    That the offenses for which Jimenez is sought to be extradited are bailable in the United States is not an argument to
grant him one in the present case.  Extradition proceedings are separate and distinct from the trial for the offenses for
which he is charged.  He should apply for bail before the courts trying the criminal cases against him, not before the
extradition court.

Exceptions to the “No Bail” Rule

    Bail is not a matter of right in extradition cases.  It is subject to judicial discretion in the context of the peculiar facts of
each case.  Bail may be applied for and granted as an exception, only upon a clear and convincing showing
1)    that, once granted bail, the applicant will not be a flight risk or a danger to the community; and
2)    that there exist special, humanitarian and compelling circumstances including, as a matter of reciprocity, those cited
by the highest court in the requesting state when it grants provisional liberty in extradition cases therein

    Since this exception has no express or specific statutory basis, and since it is derived essentially from general
principles of justice and fairness, the applicant bears the burden of proving the above two-tiered requirement with clarity,
precision and emphatic forcefulness.

    It must be noted that even before private respondent ran for and won a congressional seat in Manila, it was already of
public knowledge that the United States was requesting his extradition.  Therefore, his constituents were or should have
been prepared for the consequences of the extradition case.  Thus, the court ruled against his claim that his election to
public office is by itself a compelling reason to grant him bail.   

    Giving premium to delay by considering it as a special circumstance for the grant of bail would be tantamount to giving
him the power to grant bail to himself.  It would also encourage him to stretch out and unreasonably delay the extradition
proceedings even more.   Extradition proceedings should be conducted with all deliberate speed to determine compliance
with the Extradition Treaty and Law; and, while safeguarding basic individual rights, to avoid the legalistic contortions, 
delays and technicalities that may negate that purpose.
   
    That he has not yet fled from the Philippines cannot be taken to mean that he will stand his ground and still be within
reach of our government if and when it matters; that is, upon the resolution of the Petition for Extradition.
   
iii.    NO.

    Potential extraditees are entitled to the rights to due process and to fundamental fairness.  The doctrine of right to due
process and fundamental fairness does not always call for a prior opportunity to be heard.   A subsequent opportunity to
be heard is enough.  He will be given full opportunity to be heard subsequently, when the extradition court hears the
Petition for Extradition.  Indeed, available during the hearings on the petition and the answer is the full chance to be heard
and to enjoy fundamental fairness that is compatible with the summary nature of extradition.

    It is also worth noting that before the US government requested the extradition of respondent, proceedings had already
been conducted in that country.  He already had that opportunity in the requesting state; yet, instead of taking it, he ran
away.

Other Doctrines:

Five Postulates of Extradition

1)    Extradition Is a Major Instrument for the Suppression of Crime

In this era of globalization, easier and faster international travel, and an expanding ring of
international crimes and criminals, we cannot afford to be an isolationist state.  We need to cooperate with other states in
order to improve our chances of suppressing crime in our own country.

2)    The Requesting State Will Accord Due Process to the  Accused

By entering into an extradition treaty, the Philippines is deemed to have reposed its trust
in the reliability or soundness of the legal and judicial system of its treaty partner, as well as in the ability and the
willingness of the latter to grant basic rights to the accused in the pending criminal case therein.

3)    The Proceedings Are Sui Generis

An extradition proceeding is sui generis:

a)    It is not a criminal proceeding which will call into operation all the rights of an accused as guaranteed by the Bill of
Rights.  It does not involve the determination of the guilt or innocence of an accused.  His guilt or innocence will be
adjudged in the court of the state where he will be extradited.
b)    An extradition proceeding is summary in nature while criminal proceedings involve a full-blown trial.
c)    In terms of the quantum of evidence to be satisfied, a criminal case requires proof “beyond reasonable doubt” for
conviction while a fugitive may be ordered extradited “upon showing of the existence of a prima facie case”
d)    Unlike in a criminal case where judgment becomes executory upon being rendered final, in an extradition proceeding,
our courts may adjudge an individual extraditable but the President has the final discretion to extradite him.

Extradition is merely a measure of international judicial assistance through which a person charged with or convicted of a
crime is restored to a jurisdiction with the best claim to try that person.  The ultimate purpose of extradition proceedings in
court is only to determine whether the extradition request complies with the Extradition Treaty, and whether the person
sought is extraditable.

4)    Compliance Shall Be in Good Faith.

We are bound by pacta sunt servanda to comply in good faith with our obligations
under the Treaty.  Accordingly, the Philippines must be ready and in a position to deliver the
accused, should it be found proper

5)    There Is an Underlying Risk of Flight

Indeed, extradition hearings would not even begin, if only the accused were
willing to submit to trial in the requesting country. Prior acts of herein respondent:
a)    leaving the requesting state right before the conclusion of his indictment proceedings there; and
b)    remaining in the requested state despite learning that the requesting state is seeking his return and that the crimes he
is charged with are bailable

Extradition is Essentially Executive

Extradition is essentially an executive, not a judicial, responsibility arising out of the presidential power to conduct foreign
relations and to implement treaties.  Thus, the Executive Department of government has broad discretion in its duty and
power of implementation

[G.R. No. 76118. March 30, 1993.]

THE CENTRAL BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES and RAMON V. TIAOQUI, Petitioners, v. COURT OF APPEALS and
TRIUMPH SAVINGS BANK respondents.

May a Monetary Board resolution placing a private bank under receivership be annulled on the ground of lack of prior
notice and hearing?

This petition seeks review of the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA G.R. SP No. 07867 entitled "The Central Bank of
the Philippines and Ramon V. Tiaoqui v. Hon. Jose C. de Guzman and Triumph Savings Bank," promulgated 26
September 1986, which affirmed the twin orders of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City issued 11 November 1985 1
denying herein petitioners’ motion to dismiss Civil Case No. Q-45139, and directing petitioner Ramon V. Tiaoqui to restore
the private management of Triumph Savings Bank (TSB) to its elected board of directors and officers, subject to Central
Bank comptrollership. 2

The antecedent facts: Based on examination reports submitted by the Supervision and Examination Sector (SES),
Department II, of the Central Bank (CB) "that the financial condition of TSB is one of insolvency and its continuance in
business would involve probable loss to its depositors and creditors," 3 the Monetary Board (MB) issued on 31 May 1985
Resolution No. 596 ordering the closure of TSB, forbidding it from doing business in the Philippines, placing it under
receivership, and appointing Ramon V. Tiaoqui as receiver. Tiaoqui assumed office on 3 June 1985. 4

On 11 June 1985, TSB filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, docketed as Civil Case No. Q-
45139, against Central Bank and Ramon V. Tiaoqui to annul MB Resolution No. 596, with prayer for injunction,
challenging in the process the constitutionality of Sec. 29 of R.A. 269, otherwise known as "The Central Bank Act," as
amended, insofar as it authorizes the Central Bank to take over a banking institution even if it is not charged with violation
of any law or regulation, much less found guilty thereof. 5

On 1 July 1985, the trial court temporarily restrained petitioners from implementing MB Resolution No. 596 "until further
orders", thus prompting them to move for the quashal of the restraining order (TRO) on the ground that it did not comply
with said Sec. 29, i.e., that TSB failed to show convincing proof of arbitrariness and had faith on the part of petitioners;’
and, that TSB failed to post the requisite bond in favor of Central Bank.

On 19 July 1985, acting on the motion to quash the restraining order, the trial court granted the relief sought and denied
the application of TSB for injunction. Thereafter, Triumph Savings Bank filed with Us a petition for certiorari under Rule 65
of the Rules of Court 6 dated 25 July 1985 seeking to enjoin the continued implementation of the questioned MB
resolution.

Meanwhile, on 9 August 1985, Central Bank and Ramon Tiaoqui filed a motion to dismiss the complaint before the RTC
for failure to state a cause of action, i.e., it did not allege ultimate facts showing that the action was plainly arbitrary and
made in bad faith, which are the only grounds for the annulment of Monetary Board resolutions placing a bank under
conservatorship, and that TSB was without legal capacity to sue except through its receiver. 7

On 9 September 1985, TSB filed an urgent motion in the RTC to direct receiver Ramon V. Tiaoqui to restore TSB to its
private management. On 11 November 1985, the RTC in separate orders denied petitioners’ motion to dismiss and
ordered receiver Tiaoqui to restore the management of TSB to its elected board of directors and officers, subject to CB
comptrollership.

Since the orders of the trial court rendered moot the petition for certiorari then pending before this Court, Central Bank
and Tiaoqui moved on 2 December 1985 for the dismissal of G.R. No. 71465 which We granted on 18 December 1985. 8

Instead of proceeding to trial, petitioners elevated the twin orders of the RTC to the Court of Appeals on a petition
for certiorari and prohibition under Rule 65. 9 On 26 September 1986, the appellate court, upheld the orders of the trial
court thus —

"Petitioners’ motion to dismiss was premised on two grounds, namely, that the complaint failed to state a cause of action
and that the Triumph Savings Bank was without capacity to sue except through its appointed receiver.

"Concerning the first ground, petitioners themselves admit that the Monetary Board resolution placing the Triumph
Savings Bank under the receivership of the officials of the Central Bank was done without prior hearing, that is, without
first hearing the side of the bank. They further admit that said resolution can be the subject of judicial review and may be
set aside should it be found that the same was issued with arbitrariness and in bad faith.

"The charge of lack of due process in the complaint may be taken as constitutive of allegations of arbitrariness and bad
faith. This is not of course to be taken as meaning that there must be previous hearing before the Monetary Board may
exercise its powers under Section 29 of its Charter. Rather, judicial review of such action not being foreclosed, it would be
best should private respondent be given the chance to show and prove arbitrariness and bad faith in the issuance of the
questioned resolution, especially so in the light of the statement of private respondent that neither the bank itself nor its
officials were even informed of any charge of violating banking laws.

In regard to lack of capacity to sue on the part of Triumph Savings Bank we view such argument as being specious, for if
we get the drift of petitioners’ argument, they mean to convey the impression that only the CB appointed receiver himself
may question the CB resolution appointing him as such. This may be asking for the impossible, for it cannot be expected
that the master, the CB, will allow the receiver it has appointed to question that very appointment. Should the argument of
petitioners be given circulation, then judicial review of actions of the CB would be effectively checked and foreclosed to
the very bank officials who may feel, as in the case at bar, that the CB action ousting them from the bank deserves to be
set aside.chanrobles virtual lawlibrary

x           x          x

"On the questioned restoration order, this Court must say that it finds nothing whimsical, despotic, capricious, or arbitrary
in its issuance, said action only being in line and congruent to the action of the Supreme Court in the Banco Filipino Case
(G.E. No. 70054) where management of the bank was restored to its duly elected directors and officers, but subject to the
Central Bank comptrollership." 10

On 15 October 1986, Central Bank and its appointed receiver, Ramon V. Tiaoqui, filed this petition under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court praying that the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07867 be set aside, and that the civil
case pending before the RTC of Quezon City, Civil Case No. Q-45139, be dismissed. Petitioners allege that the Court of
Appeals erred —

(1) in affirming that an insolvent bank that had been summarily closed by the Monetary Board should be restored to its
private management supposedly because such summary closure was "arbitrary and in bad faith" and a denial of "due
process" ;

(2) in holding that the "charge of lack of due process" for "want of prior hearing" in a complaint to annul a Monetary Board
receivership resolution under Sec. 29 of RA 265 "may be taken as ... allegations of arbitrariness and bad faith" ; and

(3) in holding that the owners and former officers of an insolvent bank may still act or sue in the name and corporate
capacity of such bank, even after it had been ordered closed and placed under receivership. 11

The respondents, on the other hand, allege inter alia that in the Banco Filipino case, 12 We held that CB violated the rule
on administrative due process laid down in Ang Tibay v. CIR (69 Phil. 635) and Eastern Telecom Corp. v. Dans, Jr. (137
SCRA 628) which requires that prior notice and hearing be afforded to all parties in administrative proceedings. Since MB
Resolution No. 596 was adopted without TSB being previously notified and heard, according to respondents, the same is
void for want of due process; consequently, the bank’s management should be restored to its board of directors and
officers. 13

Petitioners claim that it is the essence of Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 that prior notice and hearing in cases involving bank
closures should not be required since in all probability a hearing would not only cause unnecessary delay but also provide
bank "insiders" and stockholders the opportunity to further dissipate the bank’s resources, create liabilities for the bank up
to the insured amount of P40,000.00, and even destroy evidence of fraud or irregularity in the bank’s operations to the
prejudice of its depositors and creditors. 14 Petitioners further argue that the legislative intent of Sec. 29 is to repose in
the Monetary Board exclusive power to determine the existence of statutory grounds for the closure and liquidation of
banks, having the required expertise and specialized competence to do so.

The first issue raised before Us is whether absence of prior notice and hearing may be considered acts of arbitrariness
and bad faith sufficient to annul a Monetary Board resolution enjoining a bank from doing business and placing it under
receivership. Otherwise stated, is absence of prior notice and hearing constitutive of acts of arbitrariness and bad faith?
cralawnad

Under Sec. 29 of R.A. 265, 15 the Central Bank, through the Monetary Board, is vested with exclusive authority to assess,
evaluate and determine the condition of any bank, and finding such condition to be one of insolvency, or that its
continuance in business would involve probable loss to its depositors or creditors, forbid the bank or non-bank financial
institution to do business in the Philippines; and shall designate an official of the CB or other competent person as
receiver to immediately take charge of its assets and liabilities. The fourth paragraph, 16 which was then in effect at the
time the action was commenced, allows the filing of a case to set aside the actions of the Monetary Board which are
tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith.
Contrary to the notion of private respondent, Sec. 29 does not contemplate prior notice and hearing before a bank may be
directed to stop operations and placed under receivership. When par. 4 (now par. 5, as amended by E.O. 289) provides
for the filing of a case within ten (10) days alter the receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank, it is unmistakable that
the assailed actions should precede the filing of the case. Plainly, the legislature could not have intended to authorize "no
prior notice and hearing" in the closure of the bank and at the same time allow a suit to annul it on the basis of absence
thereof.

In the early case of Rural Bank of Lucena, Inc. v. Area [1965], 17 We held that a previous hearing is nowhere required in
Sec. 29 nor does the constitutional requirement of due process demand that the correctness of the Monetary Board’s
resolution to stop operation and proceed to liquidation of first adjudged before making the resolution effective. It is enough
that a subsequent judicial review be provided.

Even in Banco Filipino, 18 We reiterated that Sec. 29 of R.A. 265 does nor require a previous hearing before the
Monetary Board can implement its resolution closing a bank, since its actions is subject to judicial scrutiny as provided by
law.

It may be emphasized that Sec. 29 does not altogether divest a bank or a non-bank financial institution placed under
receivership of the opportunity to be heard and present evidence on arbitrariness and bad faith because within ten (10)
days from the date the receiver takes charge of the assets of the bank, resort to judicial review may be had by filing an
appropriate pleading with the court. Respondent TSB did in fact avail of this remedy by filing a complaint with the RTC of
Quezon City on the 8th day following the takeover by the receiver of the bank’s assets on 3 June 1985.

This "close now and hear later" scheme is grounded on practical and legal considerations to prevent unwarranted
dissipation of the bank’s assets and as a valid exercise of police power to protect the depositors, creditors, stockholders
and the general public.

In Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 19 We stated that —

". . . due process does not necessarily require a prior hearing; a hearing or an opportunity to be heard may be subsequent
to the closure. One can just imagine the dire consequences of a prior hearing; bank runs would be the order of the day,
resulting in panic and hysteria. In the process, fortunes may be wiped out and disillusionment will run the gamut of the
entire banking community."cralaw virtua1aw library

We stressed in Central Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals 20 that —

". . . the banking business is properly subject to reasonable regulation under the police power of the state because of its
nature and relation to the fiscal affairs of the people and the revenues of the state (9 CJS 32). Banks are affected with
public interest because they receive funds from the general public in the form of deposits. Due to the nature of their
transactions and functions, a fiduciary relationship is created between the banking institutions and their depositors.
Therefore, banks are under the obligation to treat with meticulous care and outmost fidelity the accounts of those who
have reposed their trust and confidence in them (Simex International [Manila], Inc., Court of Appeals, 183 SCRA 360
[1990]).

"It is then the Government’s responsibility to see to it that the financial interests of those who deal with the banks and
banking institutions, as depositors or otherwise, are protected. It this country, that task is delegated to the Central Bank
which, pursuant to its Charter (R.A. 265, as amended), is authorized to administer the monetary, banking and credit
system of the Philippines. Under both the 1973 and 1987 Constitutions, the Central Bank is tasked with providing policy
direction in the areas of money, banking and credit; corollary, it shall have supervision over the operations of banks (Sec.
14, Art. XV, 1973 Constitution, and Sec. 20, Art. XII, 1987 Constitution). Under its charter, the CB is further authorized to
take the necessary steps against any banking institutions if its continued operation would cause prejudice to its
depositors, creditors and the general public as well. This power has been expressly recognized by this Court. In Philippine
Veterans Bank Employees Union-NUBE v. Philippine Veterans Banks (189 SCRA 14 [1990]), this Court held
that:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library

‘. . . [u]nless adequate and determined efforts are taken by the government against the distressed and mismanaged
banks, public faith in the banking system is certain to deteriorate to the prejudice of the national economy itself, not to
mention the losses suffered by the bank depositors, creditors and stockholders, who all deserve the protection of the
government. The government cannot simply cross its arms while the assets of a bank are being depleted through
mismanagement or irregularities. It is the duty of the Central Bank in such an event to step in and salvage the remaining
resources of the bank so that they may continue to be dissipated or plundered by those entrusted with their
management.’"
Section 29 of R.A. 265 should viewed in this light; otherwise, We would be subscribing to a situation where the procedural
rights invoked by private respondent would take precedence over the substantive interests of depositors, creditors and
stockholders over the assets of the bank.

Admittedly, the mere filing of a case for receivership by the Central Bank cab trigger a bank run and drain its assets in
days or even hours leading to insolvency even if the bank be actually solvent. The procedure prescribed in Sec. 29 is truly
designed to protect the interest of all concerned, i.e., the depositors, creditors and stockholders, the bank itself, and the
general public, and the summary closure pales in comparison to the protection afforded public interest. At any rate, the
bank is given full opportunity to prove arbitrariness and bad faith in placing the bank under receivership, in which event,
the resolution may properly nullified and the receivership lifted as the trial court may determine.

The heavy reliance of respondents of the Banco Filipino case is misplaced in view of factual circumstances therein which
are not attendant in the present case. We ruled in Banco Filipino that the closure of the bank was arbitrary and attendant
with grave abuse of discretion, not because of the absence of prior notice and hearing, but the Monetary Board had no
sufficient basis to arrive at a sound conclusion of insolvency to justify the closure. In other words, the arbitrariness, bad
faith and abuse of discretion were determined only after the bank was placed under the conservatorship and evidence
thereon was received by the trial court. As this Court found in that case, the Valenzuela, Aurellano and Tiaoqui Reports
contained unfounded assumptions and deductions which did not reflect the true financial condition of the bank. For
instance, the subtraction of an uncertain amount as valuation reserve from the assets of the bank would merely result in
its net worth or the unimpared capital and surplus; it did not reflect the total financial conditions of Banco Filipino.

Furthermore, the same reports showed that the total assets of Banco Filipino far exceeded its total liabilities.
Consequently, on the basis thereof, the Monetary Board had no valid reason to liquidate the bank; perhaps it could have
merely ordered its reorganization or rehabilitation , if need be. Clearly, there was in that case a manifest arbitrariness,
abuse of discretion and bad faith in the closure of Banco Filipino by the Monetary Board. But, this is not the case before
Us. For here, what is being raised as arbitrary by private respondent is the denial of prior notice and hearing by the
Monetary Board, a matter long settled in this jurisdiction, and not the arbitrariness which the conclusions of the
Supervision and Examination Sector (SES), Department II, of the General Bank were reached.

Once again, We refer to Rural Bank of Buhi, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 21 and reiterate Our pronouncement therein that —

". . . the law is explicit as to the conditions prerequisite to the action of the Monetary Board to forbid the institution to do
business in the Philippines and to appoint a receiver to immediately take charge of the bank’s assets and liabilities. They
are: (a) an examination made by the examining department of the Central Bank; (b) report by said department to the
Monetary Board; and (c) prima facie showing that its continuance in the business would involve probable loss to its
depositors or creditors."cralaw virtua1aw library

In sum, appeal to procedural due process cannot just outweigh the evil sought to be prevented; hence, We rule that Sec.
29 of R.A. 265 is a sound legislation promulgated in accordance with the Constitution in the exercise of police power of
the state. Consequently, the absence of notice and hearing is not valid ground to annul a Monetary Board resolution
placing a bank under receivership, or conservatorship for that matter, may only be annulled after a determination has
been made by the trial court that its issuance was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith. Until such determination is
made, the status quo shall be maintained, i.e., the bank shall continue to be under receivership.

As regards the second ground, to rule that only the receiver may bring suit in behalf of the bank is, to echo the respondent
appellate court, "asking for impossible, for it cannot be expected that the master, the CB, will allow the receiver it has
appointed to question that very appointment." Consequently, only stockholders of a bank could file an action for
annulment of a Monetary Board resolution placing the bank under receivership and prohibiting it from continuing
operations. 22 In Central Bank v. Court of Appeals, 23 We explained the purpose of the law —

". . . in requiring that only the stockholders of record representing the majority of the capital stock may bring the action to
set aside a resolution to a place a bank under conservatorship is to ensure that it be not frustrated or defeated by the
incumbent Board of Directors or officers who may immediately resort to court action to prevent its implementation or
enforcement. It is presumed that such a resolution is directed principally against acts of said Directors and officers which
is directed principally against acts of said Directors and officers which place the bank in a state of continuing inability to
maintain a condition of liquidity adequate to protect the interest of depositors and creditors. Indirectly, it is likewise
intended to protect and safeguard the rights and interests of the stockholders. Common sense and public policy dictate
then the authority to decide on whether to contest the resolution should be lodged with the stockholders owning a majority
of the shares for they are expected to be more objective in determining whether the resolution is plainly arbitrary and
issued in bad faith."cralaw virtua1aw library
It is observed that the complaint in this case was filed on 11 June 1985 or two (2) years prior to 25 July 1987 when E.O.
289 was issued, to be effective sixty (60) days after its approval (Sec. 5). The implication is that before E.O. 289, any
party in interest could institute court proceedings to question a Monetary Board resolution placing a bank under
receivership. Consequently, since the instant complaint was filed by parties representing themselves to be officers of
respondent Bank (Officer-in-Charge and Vice President), the case before the trial court should now take its natural
course. However, after the effectivity of E.O. 289, the procedure stated therein should be followed and observed.

PREMISES considered, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 07867 is AFFIRMED, except insofar as it
upholds the Order of the trial court of 11 November 1985 directing petitioner RAMON V. TIAOQUI to restore the
management of TRIUMPH SAVINGS BANK to its elected Board of Directors and officers, which is hereby SET ASIDE.

Let this case be remanded to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings to determine whether the
issuance of Resolution No. 596 of the Monetary Board was tainted with arbitrariness and bad faith and to decide the case
accordingly.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 85481-82 October 18, 1990

WILLIAM TAN, JOAQUIN TAN LEH and VICENTE TAN, petitioners,
vs.
HERNANI T. BARRIOS, in his capacity as State Prosecutor, Department of Justice, THE CITY FISCAL OF
CAGAYAN DE ORO CITY, THE HONORABLE LEONARDO N. DEMECILLO, Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 24, Cagayan De Oro City, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

On the basis of Proclamation No. 1081 dated September 21, 1972, then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, thru General
Order No. 8 dated September 27, 1972, authorized the AFP Chief of Staff to create military tribunals "to try and decide
cases of military personnel and such other cases as may be referred to them."

In General Order No. 21 dated September 30, 1972, the military tribunals, "exclusive of the civil courts," were vested with
jurisdiction among others, over violations of the law on firearms, and other crimes which were directly related to the
quelling of rebellion and the preservation of the safety and security of the Republic.

In General Order No. 12-b dated November 7, 1972, "crimes against persons . . . as defined and penalized in the Revised
Penal Code" were added to the jurisdiction of military tribunals/commissions.

Subsequently, General Order No. 49, dated October 11, 1974, redefined the jurisdiction of the Military Tribunals. The
enumeration of offenses cognizable by such tribunals excluded crimes against persons as defined and penalized in the
Revised Penal Code. However, although civil courts should have exclusive jurisdiction over such offenses not mentioned
in Section 1 of G.O. No. 49, Section 2 of the same general order provided that "the President may, in the public interest,
refer to a Military Tribunal a case falling under the exclusive jurisdiction of the civil courts" and vice versa.

On April 17, 1975, the three petitioners, with twelve (12) others, were arrested and charged in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67
entitled, "People of the Philippines vs. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc, et al." before the Military Commission No. 1,
for the crimes of:

(1) murder through the use of an unlicensed or illegally possessed firearm, penalized under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code, in relation to Section 1, par. 6 of General Order No. 49, for the killing on August 25, 1973 of Florentino Lim of
tile wealthy Lim Ket Kai family of Cagayan de Oro City; and

(2) unlawful possession, control, and custody of a pistol, caliber .45 SN-1283521 with ammunition, in violation of General
Orders Nos. 6 and 7 in relation to Presidential Decree No. 9.

The accused were:

1. Luis Tan alias Tata alias Go Bon Hoc

2. Ang Tiat Chuan alias Chuana

3. Mariano Velez, Jr.

4. Antonio Occaciones

5. Leopoldo Nicolas

6. Enrique Labita

7. Oscar Yaun

8. Joaquin Tan Leh alias Go Bon Huat alias Taowie

9. Eusebio Tan alias Go Bon Ping

10. Vicente Tan alias Go Bon Beng alias Donge

11. Alfonso Tan alias Go Bon Tiak

 12. Go E Kuan alias Kunga

13. William Tan alias Go Bon Ho

14. Marciano Benemerito alias Marcing alias Dodong

15. Manuel Beleta, and

16. John Doe (Annex A, Petition).

(Names italicized are the petitioners herein.)

Because the case was a "cause celebre" in Cagayan de Oro City, President Marcos, pursuant to the recommendation of
Defense Secretary Juan Ponce Enrile, withdrew his earlier order (issued in response to the requests of the defendants'
lawyers) to transfer the case to the civil courts. Hence, the case was retained in the military court (Annexes A to C of
Supplemental/Amended Petition, pp. 72-88, Rollo). All the accused were detained without bail in the P.C. Stockade in
Camp Crame.

Upon arraignment on May 6, 1975, all the accused pleaded "not guilty." Manuel Beleta was discharged to be used as a
state witness. He was released from detention on May 5, 1975 (p. 4, Rollo).

Almost daily trials were held for more than thirteen (13) months. The testimonies of 45 prosecution witnesses and 35
defense witnesses filled up twenty-one (21) volumes of transcripts consisting of over 10,000 pages (p. 75, Rollo).

On June 10, 1976, a decision entitled "Findings and Sentence," was promulgated by the Military Commission finding five
(5) of the accused namely:

1. Luis Tan

2. Ang Tiat Chuan

3. Mariano Velez, Jr.

4. Antonio Occaciones, and

5. Leopoldo Nicolas

guilty of MURDER. Each of them was sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of from seventeen (17) years, four
(4) months, and twenty-one (21) days, to twenty (20) years.

A sixth accused, Marciano Benemerito, was found guilty of both MURDER and ILLEGAL POSSESSION OF FIREARM,
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of death by electrocution (Annex B, Petition).

Eight (8) of the accused, namely:

1. Oscar Yaun

2. Enrique Labita

3. Eusebio Tan

4. Alfonso Tan

5. Go E Kuan

6. William Tan (petitioner herein)

 7. Joaquin Tan Leh (petitioner herein) and

8. Vicente Tan (petitioner herein)

were acquitted of the charges, and released on June 11, 1976 (p. 8, Rollo).

On January 17, 1981, Proclamation No. 2045 ended martial rule and abolished the military tribunals and commissions.

On May 22, 1987, this Court promulgated a decision in Olaguer vs. Military Commission No. 34, et al. (150 SCRA 144),
vacating the sentence rendered on December 4, 1984 by Military Commission No. 34 against Olaguer, et al. and
declaring that military commissions and tribunals have no jurisdiction, even during the period of martial law, over civilians
charged with criminal offenses properly cognizable by civil courts, as long as those courts are open and functioning as
they did during the period of martial law. This Court declared unconstitutional the creation of the military commissions to
try civilians, and annulled all their proceedings as follows:

Due process of law demands that in all criminal prosecutions (where the accused stands
to lose either his life or his liberty), the accused shall be entitled to, among others, a trial.
The trial contemplated by the due process clause of the Constitution, in relation to the
Charter as a whole, is a trial by judicial process, not by executive or military process,
Military commissions or tribunals, by whatever name they are called, are not courts within
the Philippine judicial system. ...

xxx xxx xxx

Moreover, military tribunals pertain to the Executive Department of the Government and
are simply instrumentalities of the executive power, provided by the legislature for the
President as Commander in-Chief to aid him in properly commanding the army and navy
and enforcing discipline therein, and utilized under his orders or those of his authorized
military representatives. Following the principle of separation of powers underlying the
existing constitutional organization of the Government of the Philippines, the power and
the duty of interpreting the laws (as when an individual should be considered to have
violated the law) is primarily a function of the judiciary. It is not, and it cannot be the
function of the Executive Department, through the military authorities. And as long as the
civil courts in the land remain open and are regularly functioning, as they do so today and
as they did during the period of martial law in the country, military tribunals cannot try and
exercise jurisdiction over civilians for offenses committed by them and which are properly
cognizable by the civil courts. To have it otherwise would be a violation of the
constitutional right to due process of the civilian concerned. (Olaguer, et al. vs. Military
Commission No. 34, 150 SCRA 144, 158-160.)

In October 1986, several months after the EDSA revolution, six (6) habeas corpus petitions were filed in this Court by
some 217 prisoners 1 in the national penitentiary, who had been tried for common crimes and convicted by the military
commissions during the nine-year span of official martial rule (G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599-79600, 79862 and 80565
consolidated and entitled Manuel R. Cruz, et al. vs. Minister Juan Ponce Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700). The petitioners
asked the Court to declare unconstitutional General Order No. 8 creating the military tribunals, annul the proceedings
against them before these bodies, and grant them a retrial in the civil courts where their right to due process may be
accorded respect.

Conformably with the ruling in Olaguer, this Court in Cruz vs. Enrile (160 SCRA 700), nullified the proceedings leading to
the conviction of non-political detainees who should have been brought before the courts of justice as their offenses were
totally unrelated to the insurgency sought to be controlled by martial rule.

The Court —

(1) granted the petition for habeas corpus and ordered the release of those of some who had fully served their sentences,
or had been acquitted, or had been granted amnesty;

(2) dismissed the petitions of those who were military personnel; and
(3) nullified the proceedings against those who were convicted and still serving the sentences meted to them by the
military courts, but, without ordering their release, directed the Department of Justice to file the necessary informations
against them in the proper civil courts. The dispositive part of the decision reads:

Wherefore the petition is hereby GRANTED insofar as petitioners Virgilio

Alejandrino, 2 Domingo Reyes, Antonio Pumar, Teodoro Patono, Andres Parado, Daniel
Campus, 3 Reynaldo C. Reyes and Rosalino de los Santos, 4 are concerned. The Director
of the Bureau of Prisons is hereby ordered to effect the immediate release of the
abovementioned petitioners, unless there are other legal causes that may warrant their
detention.

The petition is DISMISSED as to petitioners Elpidio Cacho, William Lorenzana, Benigno

Bantolino, Getulio G. Braga, Jr., Tomas C. Amarte, Rogelio L. Caricungan, Ernesto
Baradiel, Isabelo Narne, Eric F. Pichay, Pablo Callejo, Russel A. Paulino, Laurel Lamaca,
Tirso F. Bala, Calixto Somera, Edulino Lacsina (Draftee), Ronnie A. Celiz, Elpidio
Urbano, Sofronio Galo, Aquilino Leyran, Leopoldo Arcadio, Rolando Tudin Rosendo I.
Ramos Pacifico Batacan, Edilberto Liberato, Jimmy C. Realis. Democrito Lorana who are
all military personnel.

As to the other petitioners, the Department of Justice is hereby DIRECTED TO FILE the
necessary informations against them in the courts having jurisdiction over the offenses
involved, within one hundred eighty (180) days from notice of this decision, without
prejudice to the reproduction of the evidence submitted by the parties and admitted by
the Military Commission. If eventually convicted, the period of the petitioners' detention
shall be credited in their favor.

The Courts wherein the necessary informations are filed are DIRECTED TO CONDUCT
with dispatch the necessary proceedings inclusive of those for the grant of bail which may
be initiated by the accused. (Cruz, et al. vs. Enrile, et al., 160 SCRA 700, 711-712.)

On September 15, 1988, Secretary of Justice Sedfrey Ordoñez issued Department Order No. 226 designating State
Prosecutor Hernani Barrios "to collaborate with the City Fiscal of Cagayan de Oro City in the investigation/reinvestigation
of Criminal Case No. MC-1-67 and, if the evidence warrants, to prosecute the case in the court of competent jurisdiction"
(Annex C, Petition). On November 15, 1988, State Prosecutor Barrios was designated Acting City Fiscal of Cagayan de
Oro City in hell of the regular fiscal who inhibited himself (p. 66, Rollo).

Without conducting an investigation/reinvestigation, Fiscal Barrios filed on December 9, 1988, in the Regional Trial Court
of Cagayan de Oro City two (2) informations for:

1. Illegal Possession of Firearm docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-824; and

2. Murder docketed as Crim. Case No. 88-825 against all the 15 original defendants in Criminal Case No. MC-1-67
including those who had already died 5 (Annexes D and E, Petition)

The State Prosecutor incorrectly certified in the informations that:

this case is filed in accordance with the Supreme Court Order in the case of Cruz, et al.
vs. Ponce Enrile in G.R. Nos. 75983, 79077, 79599, 79600, 79862 and 80565 as all
accused are detained 6 except those that are already dead. (p. 7, Rollo.)

He recommended bail of P50,000 for each of the accused in the two cases (p. 8, Rollo). Later, he increased the
recommended bail to P140,000 for each accused in the firearm case (Crim. Case No. 88-824). In the murder case (Crim.
Case No. 88-825), he recommended that the bail be increased to P250,000 for each of the accused, except Luis Tan, Ang
Tiat Chuan, and Mariano Velez, Jr., for whom he recommended no bail. Still later, on October 28, 1988, he
recommended  no bail for all the accused (pp. 8-9, Rollo) because of the presence of two aggravating circumstances; (1)
prize or reward; and (2) use of a motor vehicle (p. 65, Rollo).

Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825 of the RTC, Cagayan de Oro City, were assigned by raffle to the sala of RTC
Judge Leonardo N. Demecillo. Before issuing warrants for the arrest of the accused, Judge Demecillo issued an order on
October 26, 1988, requiring State Prosecutor Barrios to submit certified copies of "the supporting affidavits of the previous
cases wherever they are now," and of the Supreme Court order "which is the basis of filing the above-entitled cases,
within five (5) days from receipt" of his said order (Annex F, Petition). The State Prosecutor has not complied with that
order for, as a matter of fact, there is no Supreme Court order to re-file the criminal cases against the herein petitioners
and their twelve (12) coaccused in Crim. Case No. MC-1-67 of the now defunct Military Commission No. 1, because none
of them, except Antonio Occaciones, were parties in the Cruz vs. Enrile habeas corpus cases (160 SCRA 700).

On November 7, 1988, William Tan, Joaquin Tan Leh and Vicente Tan filed this petition for certiorari and prohibition
praying that the informations in Crim. Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88-825, and the order of respondent Judge dated October
26, 1988 be annulled, and that the public respondents or any other prosecution officer "be permanently enjoined from
indicting, prosecuting and trying them anew for the offenses charged therein because they had already been acquitted of
the same by Military Commission No. 1 in Crim. Case No. MC-1-67" (p. 23, Rollo).

On November 23, 1988, the First Division of this Court dismissed the petition for being premature as:

... the petitioners have not yet filed a motion to quash the allegedly invalid informations in
Criminal Cases Nos. 88-824 and 88825 (Annexes D and E) whose annulment they seek
from this Court (Sec. 3, Rule 117, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure). The filing in the
lower court of such motion is the plain, speedy and adequate remedy of the petitioners.
The existence of that remedy (which they have not yet availed of) bars their recourse to
the special civil actions of certiorari and prohibition in this Court (Sec. 1, Rule 65, Rules of
Court (p. 41, Rollo.)

Upon the petitioners' filing a motion for reconsideration informing this Court that the lower court had issued warrants for
their arrest (p. 48, Rollo), we issued a temporary restraining order on January 16, 1989 enjoining the respondents from
implementing the orders of arrest and ordering them to comment on the petition (p. 50, Rollo).

The petitioners allege that State Prosecutor Barrios exceeded his jurisdiction and gravely abused his discretion in
reprosecuting them upon the supposed authority of Cruz vs. Enrile for the following reasons:

1. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not in fact direct the filing of informations by the Secretary of Justice against
THOSE who, like the petitioners, WERE ACQUITTED after court martial proceedings during the period of martial law.

2. The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile does not apply to the petitioners who were not parties in that case, who were not heard,
and over whom the court did not acquire jurisdiction.

3. The reprosecution of the petitioners would violate their right to protection against double jeopardy.

4. The State is estopped from reprosecuting the petitioners after they had been acquitted by the military tribunal which the
State itself had clothed with jurisdiction to try and decide the criminal cases against them. The State may not retroactively
divest of jurisdiction the military tribunal that tried and acquitted them (pp. 14-15, Petition).

5. The retroactive invalidation of the jurisdiction of the military court that acquitted the petitioners would amount to an ex
post facto ruling (p. 81, Rollo, Supplemental Petition).

6. The information against the petitioners in Crim. Case No. 88-825 is null and void because it was filed without a prior
preliminary investigation, nor a finding of probable cause, nor the written approval of the Chief State Prosecutor (Secs. 3
and 4, Rule 112, 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure).

In his Comment dated February 1, 1985 (should be 1989), Fiscal Barrios disclosed that the information in Criminal Case
No. 88-824 for illegal possession of firearm was "already withdrawn by the prosecution at a hearing on January 27, 1988"
(should be 1989?) (pp. 66-68, Rollo). The reason for dropping the charge is not stated. It may be because Benemerito,
the gunman who was convicted of this felony and sentenced to death by the Military Commission, is already dead-
possibly executed. Hence, only the information for murder (Crim. Case No. 88-825) against the petitioners and twelve
(12) others, including those already dead, is pending in the lower court (p. 37, Rollo). He defended the reprosecution of
the petitioners on the ground that it will not constitute double jeopardy because the nullity of the jurisdiction of the military
tribunal that acquitted them prevented the first jeopardy from attaching, thereby nullifying their acquittal. For the same
reason, res judicata is not applicable. Neither prescription, because "it had been interrupted by the filing of the earlier
charge sheets with the Military Commission" (p. 67, Rollo).
The Solicitor General, in his separate comment, argued that the proceedings involving civilians before a military
commission were null and void because we ruled in Olaguer  that military tribunals are bereft of jurisdiction over civilians,
hence, their decisions, whether of conviction or acquittal, do not bar re-prosecution for the same crime before a civil court
(p. 102, Rollo).

The petition is meritorious. The public respondents gravely abused their discretion and acted without or in excess of their
jurisdiction in misconstruing the third paragraph of the dispositive portion of this Court's decision in Cruz vs. Enrile as their
authority to refile in the civil court the criminal actions against petitioners who had been tried and acquitted by Military
Commission No. 1 during the period of martial law. It is an unreasonable application of Cruz vs. Enrile, for the decision
therein will be searched in vain for such authority to reprosecute every civilian who had ever faced a court martial, much
less those who had been acquitted by such bodies more than a decade ago like the petitioners Tan, et al. herein.

The decision in Cruz vs. Enrile would be an instrument of oppression and injustice unless given a limited application only
to the parties/petitioners therein who sought the annulment of the court martial proceedings against themselves and
prayed for a retrial in the civil courts of the criminal cases against them. They alone are affected by the judgment in Cruz
vs. Enrile, not all and sundry who at one time or another had been tried and sentenced by a court martial during the period
of martial law.

Res inter alios judicatae nullum aliis praejudicium faciunt. "Matters adjudged in a cause do not prejudice those who were
not parties to it." (54 C.J. 719.) It is a cardinal rule of procedure that a court's judgment or order in a case shall not
adversely affect persons who were not parties to the self same case (Icasiano vs. Tan, 84 Phil. 860). Hence, this court's
pronouncement in Cruz vs. Enrile  nullifying the proceedings in military courts against the civilian petitioners therein and
ordering the refiling of informations against them in the proper civil courts, may not affect the rights of persons who were
not parties in that case and who, not having submitted to the court's jurisdiction, did not have their day in court (Busacay
vs. Buenaventura, 94 Phil, 1033). Their reprosecution, based on the decision in Cruz vs. Enrile in which they took no part
and were not heard, would be violative of their right to due process, the same right of the petitioners in Cruz vs. Enrile that
this Court endeavored to protect when it nullified the proceedings against them in the military tribunals by applying
the Olaguer doctrine that the trial of civilians by military process was not due process. 7

There is, however, a perceptible lack of consistency in the application of the Olaguer doctrine to Cruz vs. Enrile which
needs to be rectified. For, although the Court nullified the proceedings against the civilians-petitioners who were still
serving their sentences after conviction by the military courts and commissions, and we directed the Secretary of Justice
to file the necessary informations against them in the proper civil courts, we did not nullify the court martial proceedings
against the other civilians petitioners who: (1) had finished serving their sentences; (2) had been granted amnesty; or (3)
had been acquitted by the military courts. We did not order their reprosecution, retrial, and resentencing by the proper civil
courts. We set them free.

In effect, the Court applied one rule for those civilians who were convicted by the military courts and were still serving their
sentences, and another rule for those who were acquitted, or pardoned, or had finished the service of their sentences.
The Court applied a rule of retroactive invalidity to the first group (whom the Court ordered to be reprosecuted before the
proper civil courts) and another of prospective invalidity for the others (whom the Court ordered to be released from
custody).

In the interest of justice and consistency, we hold that Olaguer should, in principle, be applied prospectively only to future
cases and cases still ongoing or not yet final when that decision was promulgated. Hence, there should be no retroactive
nullification of final judgments, whether of conviction or acquittal, rendered by military courts against civilians before the
promulgation of the Olaguer decision. Such final sentences should not be disturbed by the State. Only in particular cases
where the convicted person or the State shows that there was serious denial of the Constitutional rights of the accused
should the nullity of the sentence be declared and a retrial be ordered based on the violation of the constitutional rights of
the accused, and not on the Olaguer doctrine. If a retrial, is no longer possible, the accused should be released since the
judgment against him is null on account of the violation of his constitutional rights and denial of due process.

It may be recalled that Olaguer was rescued from a court martial which sentenced him to death without receiving evidence
in his defense. It would be a cruel distortion of the Olaguer decision to use it as authority for reprosecuting civilians
regardless of whether, unlike Olaguer, they had been accorded a fair trial and regardless of whether they have already
been acquitted and released, or have accepted the sentences imposed on them and commenced serving the same. Not
everybody who was convicted by a military court, much less those who were acquitted and released, desires to undergo
the ordeal of a second trial for the same offense, albeit in a civil court. Indeed, why should one who has accepted the
justness of the verdict of a military court, who is satisfied that he had a fair hearing, and who is willing to serve his
sentence in full, be dragged through the harrow of another hearing in a civil court to risk being convicted a second time
perchance to serve a heavier penalty? Even if there is a chance of being acquitted the second time around, it would be
small comfort for the accused if he is held without bail pending the completion of his second trial which may take as long
as, if not longer than, the sentence he has been serving or already served.

The trial of thousands of civilians for common crimes before military tribunals and commissions during the ten-year period
of martial rule (1971-1981) which were created under general orders issued by President Marcos in the exercise of his
legislative powers, is an operative fact that may not be justly ignored. The belated declaration in 1987 of the
unconstitutionality and invalidity of those proceedings did not erase the reality of their consequences which occurred long
before our decision in Olaguer was promulgated and which now prevent us from carrying Olaguer to the limit of its logic.
Thus, did this Court rule in Municipality of Malabang vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533, where the question arose as to whether
the declaration of nullity of the creation of a municipality by executive order wiped out all the acts of the local government
thus abolished:

In Norton vs. Shelby Count, Mr. Justice Field said: 'An unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in
legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed.' Accordingly, he
held that bonds issued by a board of commissioners created under an invalid statute
were unenforceable.

Executive Order 386 'created no office.' This is not to say, however, that the acts done by
the municipality of Balabagan in the exercise of its corporate powers are a nullity
because the executive order is, in legal contemplation, as inoperative as though it had
never been passed.' For the existence of Executive Order 386 is 'an operative fact which
cannot justly be ignored.' As Chief Justice Hughes explained in Chicot County Drainage
District vs. Baxter State Bank:

'The courts below have proceeded on the theory that the Act of
Congress, having been found to be unconstitutional, was not a law; that it
was inoperative, conferring no rights and imposing no duties, and hence
affording no basis for the challenged decree. Norton vs. Shelby County,
118 U.S. 425, 442; Chicago, I. & L. Ry. Co. vs. Hackett, 228 U.S. 559,
566. It is quite clear, however, that such broad statements as to the
effect of a determination of unconstitutionality must be taken with
qualifications. The actual existence of a statute, prior to such a
determination, is an operative fact and may have consequences which
cannot justly be ignored. The past cannot always be erased by a new
judicial declaration. The effect of the subsequent ruling as to invalidity
may have to be considered in various aspects-with respect to particular
relations, individual and corporate, and particular conduct, private and
official. Questions of rights claimed to have become vested, of status, of
prior determinations deemed to have finality and acted upon accordingly,
of public policy in the light of the nature both of the statute and of its
previous application, demand examination.  These questions are among
the most difficult of those which have engaged the attention of courts,
state and federal, and  it is manifest from numerous decisions that an all-
inclusive statement of a principle of absolute retroactive invalidity, cannot
be justified.

There is then no basis for the respondents' apprehension that the invalidation of the
executive order creating Balabagan would have the effect of unsettling many an act done
in reliance upon the validity of the creation of that municipality. (Municipality of Malabang
vs. Benito, 27 SCRA 533)

The doctrine of "operative facts" applies to the proceedings against the petitioners and their co-accused before Military
Commission No. 1. The principle of absolute invalidity of the jurisdiction of the military courts over civilians should not be
allowed to obliterate the "operative facts" that in the particular case of the petitioners, the proceedings were fair, that there
were no serious violations of their constitutional right to due process, and that the jurisdiction of the military commission
that heard and decided the charges against them during the period of martial law, had been affirmed by this Court (Aquino
vs. Military Commission No. 2, 63 SCRA 546) years before the Olaguer case arose and came before us.

Because of these established operative facts, the refiling of the information against the petitioners would place them in
double jeopardy, in hard fact if not in constitutional logic.
The doctrine of double jeopardy protects the accused from harassment by the strong arm of the State:

The constitutional mandate is (thus) a rule of finality. A single prosecution for any offense
is all the law allows. It protects an accused from harassment, enables him to treat what
had transpired as a closed chapter in his life, either to exult in his freedom or to be
resigned to whatever penalty is imposed, and is a bar to unnecessary litigation, in itself
time-consuming and expense-producing for the state as well. It has been referred to as
'res judicata in prison grey.' The ordeal of a criminal prosecution is inflicted only once, not
whenever it pleases the state to do so. (Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines,
2nd Ed., pp. 722-723.)

Furthermore, depriving the petitioners of the protection of the judgment of acquittal rendered by the military commission in
their particular case by retroactively divesting the military commission of the jurisdiction it had exercised over them would
amount to an ex post facto law or ruling, again, in sharp reality if not in strict constitutional theory. An  ex-post facto  law or
rule, is one which —

1. makes criminal an act done before the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and
punishes such an act;

2. aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed;

3. changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law annexed to the crime when
committed;

4. alters the legal rules of evidence, and authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the
law required at the time of the commission of the offense;

5. assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or deprivation of a right
for something which when done was lawful; and,

6. deprives a person accused of a crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such
as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. (In re: Kay Villegas
Kami, Inc., 35 SCRA 428, 431)

Article IV, Section 22, of the 1987 Constitution prohibits the enactment of an ex post facto law or bill of attainder.

We need not discuss the petitioners' final argument that the information against them is invalid because there was no
preliminary investigation, no finding of probable cause by the investigating fiscal and no prior approval of the information
by the City Fiscal before it was filed.

WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari  and prohibition is granted. Respondent State Prosecutor and the Presiding Judge
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 24, at Cagayan de Oro City, are hereby ordered to discharge the petitioners from the
information in Criminal Case No. 88-825. The temporary restraining order which we issued on January 16, 1989 is hereby
made permanent. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-56741-42 April 15, 1988

AURORA MEJIA, petitioner,
vs.
HON. MANUEL PAMARAN, HON. ROMEO ESCAREAL, HON. CONRADO MOLINA, Presiding Justice and Associate
Justices of the First Division SANDIGANBAYAN, and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

This is a petition for review of the decision of the SANDIGANBAYAN of April 23, 1981, the dispositive part of which reads
as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:

1. In Criminal Case No. 1988, accused Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez is hereby found guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 and is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS as maximum, to suffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to
indemnify the victim Josefina Meimban the sum of Pl,000.00 representing the money given to her; and

2. In Criminal Case No. 1989, accused Aurora Mejia y Rodriguez hereby found guilty beyond is and
reasonable doubt of violation of paragraph (b), Section 3 of Republic Act No. 3019 and is hereby
sentenced to an indeterminate imprisonment ranging from FOUR (4) YEARS and ONE (1) DAY as
minimum to SEVEN (7) YEARS as maximum, to Buffer perpetual disqualification from public office and to
indemnify the victim Pilar Bautista the amount of P500 representing the money given to her.

Accused is further ordered to pay the costs of these proceedings.

In this petition, petitioner raises the following issues:

1. WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN IN TAKING COGNIZANCE OF THE CASES AGAINST

PETITIONER AND IN EVENTUALLY CONVICTING HER, ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION AND IN VIOLATION OF
THE GUARANTY OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW CONSIDERING THAT IT HAS NEITHER BEEN CREATED AS
MANDATED BY THE CONSTITUTION NOR CONSTITUTED AS CONCEIVED BY THE DECREE FOR ITS CREATION;

2. WHETHER OR NOT THE PROCEEDINGS TAKEN BY RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN IN THE CASE AT BAR
ARE VOID AB INITIO CONSIDERING THAT THE DECREE CREATING IT PROVIDE FOR THE PROCEDURES THAT
PARTAKES THE NATURE OF AN EX-POST FACTO LAW AND SUCH PROCEDURES VIOLATE THE GUARANTY TO
EQUAL PROTECTION OF THE LAW CONSIDERING THAT DIFFERENT AND PREJUDICIAL METHOD OF APPEAL IS
PRESCRIBED;

3. WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER MAY BE CONVICTED OF AN OFFENSE NOT ALLEGED IN THE INFORMATION

AS WHEN THE PRETENDED REQUEST AND RECEIPT OF MONEY FROM THE COMPLAINING WITNESS WAS
ALLEGEDLY IN CONSIDERATION OF "THE EARLY SETTING OF A MOTION TO WITHDRAW COMPROMISE
AGREEMENT AND A FAVORABLE RESOLUTION THEREON "WHEN SAID COMPLAINANT WAS NEVER A PARTY
TO ANY COMPROMISE AGREEMENT (Crim. Case No. 1988);

4. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER MAY BE CONVICTED ON FATALLY DEFECTIVE INFORMATION AS WHEN
SAID INFORMATION CHARGES THAT PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY DEMANDED AND RECEIVED P500 AND THE
SANDIGANBAYAN MADE A FINDING THAT THE AMOUNT WAS P1,000 Criminal Case 1988) AND WHEN THE
INFORMATION CHARGES THAT PETITIONER ALLEGEDLY REQUESTED AND RECEIVED P1,000 AND THE
SANDIGANBAYAN MADE A FINDING THAT THE AMOUNT WAS P500 (Crim Case No. 1989) (Annexes "B" and "C")

5. WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE ON RECORD TO JUSTIFY THE VERDICT OF

CONVICTION OF PETITIONER CONSIDERING THAT THE PROSECUTIONS EVIDENCE WAS MAINLY HEARSAY
AND THE MOTIVES OF COMMENT COMPLAINANTS CLEARLY ESTABLISHED;

6. WHETHER OR NOT THE PETITIONER IN HER CAPACITY AS BRANCH CLERK OF COURT NTERVENES IN
SETTING CASES FOR HEARING AND FORMULATES RESOLUTIONS THEREON;

7. WHETHER OR NOT THE RESPONDENT SANDIGANBAYAN COULD DISREGARD ESTABLISHED RULES OF

PROCEDURE, AS WHEN IT ALLOWED THE RECALL OF PETITIONER, AFTER EXHAUSTING CROSS-
EXAMINATION, AND SUBJECTED HER TO ADDITIONAL CROSS-EXAMINATION ON ALLEGED ATTEMPT ON
PETITIONER'S PART TO BRIBE PROSECUTOR CRISTINA PATERNO, WHICH SHOULD HAVE BEEN PART OF THE
PROSECUTION'S EVIDENCE IN CHIEF.
The findings of facts of the respondent court are as follows:

The instant prosecutions had their roots on six (6) ejectment cases filed separately in the City Court of
Manila by Eusebio Lu against Feliciano F. Endangan, Josefina Meimban, Teodorico Bontia, Rolando
Antillon, Jose Mabalot and Vicente Villamor. All were decided by the City Court of Manila against the
defendants, all of whom appealed in due time to the Court of First Instance of Manila where the cases
were raffled to Branch XXVI, presided over b the Honorable Jose P. Alejandro, docketed therein as
follows: Civil Case No, L-22794 (Feliciano F. Endangan), Civil Case No. L-22795 (Josefina Meimban).

Civil Case No. L-22796 (Teodorico Bontia), Civil Case No. L-22797 (Rolando Antillon), Civil Case No. L-
22798 (Jose Mabalot), Civil Cam No. L-22799 (Vicente Villamor), On August 12, 1979, five (5) of the
defendants-appellants, namely, Endangan (Case No. L-22794), Bontia (Case No. L-22796, Antillon (Case
No. L-22797), Mabalot (Case No. L-22798) and Villamor (Case No. L-22799) entered into a compromise
agreement with the plaintiff, Eusebio Lu whereby the appellants individually received from the appellee
the sum of P5,000 in consideration of which the appellants agreed to vacate the premises in question and
remove their houses therefrom within sixty (60) days 3m the date of the execution of the agreement,
failing which the appellee shall have the authority to demolish the appellant's houses with costs thereof
chargeable against them the compromise agree went was-submitted to the court. Josefina Meimban, the
defendants-appellant-in Case No. L-22795, did not join her co-defendants-appellees in entering into the
compromise agreement (Exh. "A"). Up to that stage of the cases, the counsel of record of the defendant-
appellants was Atty. S. G. Doron., On August 22, 1979, Atty. Modesto R. Espano of the Citizens Legal
Assistant Office (CLAO), wrote Atty. Doron to inform him that Mrs. Meimban has sought the assistance of
the CLAO regarding her case, and asked that the records of the case be sent to Mm. (Exh. "F-l"). As a
consequence, Atty. Doron filed on August 30, 1979 his MOTION TO WITHDRAW APPEARANCE as
counsel for defendant-appellant Josefina Meimban in Civil Case No. L-22795. (Exh. "F"). In short, while
the five (5) other defendants-appellants, Endangan, Bontia, Antillon, Mabalot and Villamor, have decided
to settle with the plaintiff through compromise agreement that they signed, Josefina Meimban resolved to
prosecute her appeal in her own case, Civil Case No. L-22795. These backdrops are not disputed.

What transpired while the cases were pending in the Court of First Instance of Manila insofar as material
to the prosecutions at bar, are matters contested by conflicting evidence of the prosecution and the
defense.

Josefina Meimban testified that she followed up her case in Branch XVII of the Court of First Instance of
Manila and had occasion to talk to Danilo Buenaventura of that Branch who told her that her case was
already submitted for decision. She sought assistance from the CLAO where she was instructed by Atty.
Espano to find out the real status of the case. She returned to the court sometime in July 1979 and that
was when she first came to know Atty. Aurora Mejia who told her that the case has not yet been decided
because there was still one party who has not signed the compromise agreement prepared by Atty.
Doron. Atty. Mejia also remarked that she was surprised why rich people were helping in that case, like a
certain Atty. Lu a brother of the plaintiff, who has been approaching the presiding judge; and then told her
she would help them provided they give Pl,000 each for a gift to the Judge, to which she replied she
would broach the matter to her companions. From the court, she went to Atty. Modesto Espano and told
the lawyer the case was not yet submitted. Atty. Espano instructed her to get her papers from Atty. Doron,
which she did. Thereafter, she told Pilar Bautista, daughter of defendant Jose Mabalot in Civil Case No.
L-22798, and Gloria Antonio, daughter of defendant Vicente Villamor in Civil Case No. L-22799, about the
help offered by Atty. Mejia. The two said they would think it over as they had already signed something.
When she went to the court to deposit her rentals Atty. Mejia asked her if her companions were agreeable
to the suggestion and she replied she had already told them and that they would consider the matter.

On August 22, 1979, Meimban and Atty. Espano went to the City Hall and Atty. Espano filed his formal
appearance as counsel for Meimban in Civil Case No. L-22795, Branch XXVI. On that Atty. Mejia again
mentioned to Meimban the gift she was asking from the latter to be given to the Judge, and added that if
Meimban wanted to win the case and she wanted her help, they have to give to the Judge because she
was the one making the decision. She was not able to give any reply. She went home without telling Atty.
Espano what Atty. Mejia had told her When she returned on August 30, 1979 to deposit her rental, Atty.
Mejia asked her why her companions were not yet moving when they had a chance of winning the case
provided they returned the money they received from the plaintiff under the compromise agreement. She
replied she would tell them again. When she told Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio about it, the two
replied that if they could still win their cases by returning the money, she accompany them to Atty.
Espano.
They saw Atty. Espano on October 26, 1979. After knowing the purpose of their visit, Atty. Espano agreed
to help Bautista and Antonio and prepared a MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE COMPROMISE E AND TO
FILE MEMORANDA (Exh."B") Bautista and Antonio signed the motion for their fathers. The three women
Meimban Bautista and Antonio and Atty. Espano proceeded to the City Hall and filed the motion. From
the court they went down to the canteen at the mezzanine floor of the City Hall where Atty. Espano left
them to have some documents xeroxed. Atty. Mejia followed them to the canteen. This time Atty. Mejia
told Bautista she could help them provided they gave her P500 for expenses. Bautista and Antonio just
kept silent. Atty. Espano returned to the canteen and rejoined them. Atty. Mejia told Atty. Espano there
was a chance of winning the Meimban case. Before leaving them, Atty. Mejia told her Meimban to take
care of her companions.

When she deposited her rentals on October 30, 1979, Atty. Mejia told her the Judge needed the money
right away. She promised to give Pl,000 on November 20, 1979. From there she went to Atty. Espano and
told him about it. At Atty. Espano's suggestion they agreed to meet in Branch XXVI at 10:00 a.m. on
November 20 when the, would entrap Atty. Mejia in the delivery of the money with the assistance of her
policeman friend assigned in the office of the Mayor. She arrived in court with Sylvia Dizon from whom
she borrowed P500 to complete the Pl,000 at about 11:00 a.m. but did not meet Atty. Espano. At Atty.
Mejia's instruction they waited for about an hour Sylvia Dizon seated outside in the corridor fronting the
door of Atty. Mejia office. Atty. Mejia asked her if she had brought the money, she replied she had and
gave the P1,000 to Atty. Mejia. She and Sylvia Dizon then left and looked for Atty. Espano in the different
sala.8 of the court. Not finding him, they went to his office. Atty. Espano got mad upon knowing that she
had given the money to Atty. Mejia and told her not to give anymore.

December 7, 1979 was the date set for the hearing of the MOTION TO WITHDRAW THE COMPROMISE
AND TO FILE MEMORANDA (Motion in short) filed by Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio in behalf of their
father (Exh- "C"). Meimban and Pilar Bautista went to Branch XXVI for that hearing. Atty. Mejia told them
to wait and that if an oppositor to the Motion would appear, she would accompany them to the sala of
Judge Cui of Branch XXV (the pair branch of Branch XXVI 1), where the Motion would be heard since
Judge Alejandro of Branch XXVI was on leave. While they were waiting, Atty. Mejia approached her
Meimban and said no oppositor might arrive, and asked her if Bautista had brought one-half (1/2) of the
P1,000.00. She asked Bautista and the latter replied she did not have anything as she thought it was
Meimban who had the money. In the meantime, Atty. Mejia left and told her that if Bautista would have
the money, just put it in an envelope. Bautista borrowed P500 from her, which was supposedly intended
for the branch Clerk of Court of Judge Cui. Bautista placed the money in an envelope and the two of
them, Bautista and Meimban, went to Atty. Mejia's office. Bautista handed the envelope containing the
money to Atty. Mejia who received it.

Pilar Bautista y Mabalot confirmed that her father, Jose Mabalot, had received P5,000.00 from the plaintiff
in Civil Case No. L-22798 pursuant to the compromise agreement that her father had signed; that while
they were waiting for their house to be demolished Josefina Meimban told her they still had hope of
winning the case because she has been frequenting Branch XXVI and talking with Atty. Mejia who had
promised to assist them; that Gloria Antonio, the daughter of one of the other defendants, Vicente
Villamor, convinced her that they try it; and that they asked Meimban to accompany them to Atty. Espano
of the CLAO on October 26, 1979. She testified further that Atty. Espano prepared the Motion at hers and
Antonio's request which they signed for their fathers (Exh. "B"). With Atty. Espano, Meimban and Antonio,
they went to the court and Mod the motion with Atty. Mejia. They proceeded to the canteen, and while
there Atty. Espano left to have some documents xeroxed. Atty. Mejia arrived shortly after Atty. Espano
had left. Atty. Mejia told them if they wanted the resolution of the Motion expedited they each give
Pl,000.00 for expenses. They did not say anything. When Atty. Espano rejoined them, Atty. Mejia
commended him for his memorandum and said it was well prepared and there was hope in the case. Atty.
Mejia then left and they went home after Meimban paid their bill which they shared among themselves.
On December 6,1979, in the afternoon, she and Meimban went to Branch XXVI to file a motion for
postponement of the hearing of the Motion scheduled the next day, December 7,1979. Atty. Mejia told
them to come just the same on the following day despite their motion for postponement. So they did
return on December 7, reaching the court at about 8:30 a.m. Atty. Mejia told them to wait because
oppositors to the Motion might appear. When no oppositor appeared, Atty. Mejia asked them to give even
one-half of the amount intended for expenses because the case was with the a of Judge Cui as Judge
Alejandro was absent, and the money was intended for the clerk of court of Judge Cui. She asked
Meimban if she had money with her and it was from Meimban that she borrowed P500. At Meimban's
suggestion that they put the money in an envelope, they secured one near the GSIS building, put the
P500 in it and returned to the office of Atty. Mejia to whom she handed the envelope containing the
 money. Atty. Mejia received the envelope and placed it inside her desk drawer. A few days later, she
received a copy of an order dated December 10, 1979 signed by Judge Cui denying their Motion (Exh.
"D"). She forthwith went to Atty. Mejia and asked her what happened. Atty. Mejia answered that she go to
Meimban and get the P500 because Meimban still lacked Pl,000, and that she also tell Mrs. Meimban to
see her (Atty. Mejia). She went to Meimban and told her what Atty. Mejia said. They went to Atty. Espano
who told her not to give anything.

Sylvia Dizon y Resurreccion confirmed that she loaned P500 to Josefina Meimban and went with her to
the court on November 20, 1979 to verify if Meimban really needed the money to give to Atty. Mejia. She
was seated at the corridor near the door of Atty. Mejia's office which was partially open, and she saw
Meimban handed an envelope to Atty. Mejia who put it inside her desk drawer.

Atty. Modesto Espano y Rodriguez was with the lawyer assigned by the CLAO to assist Josefina
Meimban in her case. He was with Meimban on August 22, 1979 when he filed his formal appearance in
the case pending before Branch XXVI of the Court of First Instance. On the occasion, he saw Atty. Mejia
talk to Meimban. Later, on October 26, 1979, Meimban told him that Atty. Mejia was demanding money
and gift to be given to the presiding judge of Branch XXVI, of the Judge and that Atty. Mejia would reverse
the decision of the City Court in the appealed case. it was also on that day, October 26, 1979, in his office
at the CLAO that he met Pilar Bautista and Gloria Antonio for the first time accompanied by Meimban.
Bautista and Antonio were also seeking assistance from the CLAO in their desire to withdraw a
compromise agreement that their fathers had signed and submitted to the court for approval. From his
interview of Bautista and Antonio, he gathered that Bautista's father, Jose Mabalot, and Antonio's father
Vicente Villamor, were defendants in the ejectment cases filed by Eusebio Lu and that their fathers were
misled by one Endangan and Atty. Doron into signing the agreement. When he asked the whereabouts of
their fathers he was told that Vicente Villamor was in Cotabato and Jose Mabalot was an octogenarian.
He also gathered from Bautista and Antonio that they had decided to withdraw the compromise
agreement because Atty. Mejia had told them that they had a chance of winning the case by having the
decision of the lower court reversed if they returned the P5,000 given by the plaintiff, as she was the one
preparing the decisions for Branch XXVI. He prepared the Motion (Exh. "B") and had it signed by Bautista
for Jose Mabalot, and Antonio for Vicente Villamor. That same afternoon of October 26, 1979, he filed the
Motion in court with Meimban, Bautista and Antonio. Meimban told him that Atty. Mejia wanted to talk to
her at the canteen. He and his female companions went ahead to the canteen, but he left them there to
have some papers xeroxed at the ground floor of the City Hall. When he returned to the canteen, he saw
Atty. Mejia talking to his women companions. He joined them. Atty. Mejia told him that they could win the
Meimban case because the decision of the lower court was against Batas Pambansa Blg. 25, and
advised him to file a good memorandum. Atty. Mejia also mentioned that there was a good chance of
winning the Mabalot and Villamor cases provided the P5,000 each received by the defendants was
returned. He did not say anything since he had advised his clients already not to give Atty. Mejia anything.
After leaving the canteen and while they were still at the ground floor his clients told him that Atty. Mejia
was demanding money from them for expenses for the Judge. He reiterated his advise to them not to give
any.

Testimony was also given regarding an alleged attempt of Atty. Mejia to bribe the Tanodbayan
Investigator who investigated the complaints that led to the filing of the instant cases. Christina Corall-
Paterna declared that she signed and submitted her recommendation to prosecute the accused for
violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act on the complaint of Josefina Meimban and Pilar
Bautista, and to drop the other complaints, on August 27, 1980. On September 3, 1980, Atty. Mejia came
to her to inquire (nangumusta) She replied she had already collated the evidence and submitted her
recommendation to Director Herrera. Atty. Mejia then placed something on her table wrapped in pink
tissue paper and immediately stood up and left without saying anything. She opened the wrapper and
found an intricate gold chain with a pendant bearing an inscription of letter "C." Her initial reaction was to
return it but on second thought that she needed somebody to witness the returning of the jewelry, and it
being almost 4:00 p.m. and Atty. Mejia might not return to her office anymore, the waited till next morning
and asked one of their employees, Dante Ramos, to return the gold chain the first hour of September 4.
Dante Ramos was able to return it.

Under the first assigned error, petitioner contends that respondent court acted without jurisdiction and in violation of the
guaranty of due process of law as it has neither been created as mandated by the Constitution nor constituted as
conceived by the decree for its creation. Petitioners stress that the creation of the Sandiganbayan by Presidential Decree
No. 1606 is an arrogation by the President of the power vested by the Constitution in the National Assembly.
In the case of Nunez vs. Sandiganbayan  2 this Court categorically ruled on the issue when it held:

It is to be made clear that the power of the then President and Prime Minister Ferdinand E. Marcos to
create the Sandiganbayan in 1978 is not challenged in this proceeding. While such competence under the
1973 Constitution contemplated that such an act should the National Assembly the 1976 Amendments
made clear come from the National Assembly that he as incumbent President" shall continue to exercise
legislative powers until martial law shall have been lifted. 3 Thus, there is an affirmation of the ruling of this
Court in Aquino Jr. v. Commission on Elections 4 decided in 1975. In the language of the ponente, Justice
Makasiar, it dissipated "all doubts as to the legality of such lawmaking authority by the President during
the period of Martial Law, ... . 5 As the opinion went on to state: "It is not a grant of authority to legislate,
but a recognition of such power as already eating in favor of the incumbent President during the period of
Martial Law. 6

Under the second assigned error it is alleged that the procedure provided for by the Sandiganbayan are and hence all
proceedings taken against petitioner are void ab initio being investigation violation of the Constitution.

It is further argued that only one stage of appeal is available to the petitioner under PD No. 1606 which effectively
deprives her of the intermediate recourse to the Court of Appeals and that in said appeal to this Court only issues of law
may be raised and worse still the appeal has become a matter of discretion rather than a matter of right. Petitioner
contends this is a denial of the equal protection of the law.

Again, in Nuñez 7 this Court effectively disposed of this issue when it held:

2. Petitioner in memorandum invokes the guarantee of equal protection in seeking to Presidential Decree
No. 1486. What does it signify? To quote from J.M. Tuason & Co. v. Land Tenure Administration. 8 The
Ideal situation is for the law's benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere of its
coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed by that serene
and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the Idea of law. 9 There is recognition, however, in
the opinion that what in fact eats "cannot approximate the Ideal. Nor is the law susceptible to the reproach
that it does not take into account the realities of the situation. The constitutional guarantee then is not to
be given a meaning that disregards what is, what does in fact exist. To assure that the general welfare be
promoted, which is the end of law, a regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property.
Those adversely affected may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they
can show that the governmental act assailed far from being inspired by the attainment of the common
weal was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support in
reason. 10 Classification is thus not ruled out, it being sufficient to quote from the Tuason decision anew
"that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons
must be treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in the privileges conferred
and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that
equal protection and security shall be given to every person under circumstances which, if not Identical,
are analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should
be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest. 11

3. The premise underlying petitioner's contention on this point is set forth in his memorandum that: 1. The
Sandiganbayan proceedings violates petitioner's right to equal protection, because appeal as a matter of
right became minimized into a mere matter of discretion; — appeal likewise was shrunk and limited only
to questions of law, excluding a review of the facts and trial evidence; and there is only one chance to
appeal conviction, by certiorari to the Supreme Court, instead of the traditional two chances; while all
other estafa indicates are entitled to appeal as a matter of right covering both law and facts and to two
appellate courts, i.e., first to the Court of Appeals and thereafter to the Supreme Court. 12 That is hardly
convincing, considering that the classification satisfies the test announced by this Court through Justice
Laurel in People v. Vera 13 requiring that it must be based on substantial distinctions which make real
differences; it must be germane to the purposes of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions
only, and must apply equally to each member of the class. 14 To repeat, the Constitution specifically
makes the urgency of which cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. It follows that
those who may thereafter be tried by such court ought to have been aware as far back as January 17,
1973, when the present Constitution came into force, that a different procedure for the accused therein,
whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily offensive to the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. Petitioner moreover, cannot be unaware of the ruling of this Court in
Co Chiong v. Cuaderno, 15 a 1949 decision, that the general guarantees of the Bill of rights included
 among which are the due process of law and equal protection clauses must "give way to [a] specific
provision, in that decision, one reserving to "Filipino citizens of the operation of public services or
utilities. 16 The scope of such a principle is not to be con stricted, It is certainly broad enough to cover the
instant situation.

4. The contention that the challenged Presidential Decree is contrary to the ex post facto  provision of the
Constitution is similarly premised on the allegation that "petitioner's right of appeal is being diluted
ordered efficacy wise ... 17 A more searching scrutiny of its rationale would demonstrate the lack of
persuasiveness of such an argument. The Kay Villegas Kami 18 decision, promulgated in 1970, cited by
petitioner, supplies the most recent and binding pronouncement on the matter. To quote from the
ponencia of Justice Makasiar: An ex post facto law is one which: (1) makes criminal an act done before
the passage of the law and which was innocent when done, and punishes such an act; (2) aggravates a
crime, or makes it greater than it was, when committed; (3) changes the punishment and inflicts a greater
punishment than the law annexed to the crime when committed; (4) alters the legal rules of evidence, and
authorizes conviction upon less or different testimony than the law required at the time of the commission
of the offense; (5) assuming to regulate civil rights and remedies only, in effect imposes penalty or
deprivation of a right for something which when done was lawful, and (6) deprives a person accused of a
crime of some lawful protection to which he has become entitled, such as the protection of a former
conviction or acquittal, or a proclamation of amnesty. 19 Even the most careful scrutiny of the above
definition fails to sustain the claim of petitioner. The lawful protection to which an accused" has become
entitled" is qualified, not given a broad scope. It hardly can be argued that the mode of procedure
provided for in the statutory right to appeal is therein embraced. This is hardly a controversial matter. This
Court has spoken in no uncertain terms. In People v. Vilo, 20 a 1949 decision, speaking through the then
Justice, later Chief Justice Paras, it made clear that seven of the nine Justices there composing this
Court, excepting only the ponente himself and the late Justice Perfecto, were of the opinion that Section 9
of the Judiciary Act of 1948, doing away with the requirement of unanimity under Article 47 of the Revised
Penal Code with eight votes sufficing for the imposition of the death sentence, does not suffer from any
constitutional infirmity. For them its applicability to crimes committed before its enactment would not make
the law ex post facto.

5. x x x x

9. The argument based on denial of due process has much less to recommend it. In the exhaustive forty-
two page memorandum of petitioner, only four and a half pages were devoted to its discussion. There is
the allegation of lack of fairness. Much is made of what is characterized as "the tenor and thrust" of the
leading American Supreme Court decision, Snyder v. Massachusetts. 21 Again this citation cuts both
ways. With his usual felicitous choice of words, Justice Cardozo, who penned the opinion, emphasized:
"The law, as we have seen, is sedulous in maintaining for a defendant charged with crime whatever forms
of procedure are of the essence of an opportunity to defend. Privileges so fundamental as to be inherent
in very concept of a fair trial that could be acceptable to the thought of reasonable men will be kept
inviolate and inviolable however, which may be the pressure of incriminating proof. But justice, though
due to the accused, is due to the accuser also. The concept of fairness must not be strained till it is
narrowed to a filament We are to keep the balance true. 22 What is required for compliance with the due
process mandate in criminal proceedings? In Arnault v. Pecson, 23 this Court with Justice Tuason as
ponente, succinctly Identified it with a "a fair and impartial trial and reasonable opportunity for the
preparation of defense. 24 In criminal proceedings then, due process is satisfied if the accused is
"informed as to why he is proceeded against and what charge he hall to meet, with his conviction being
made to rest on evidence that is not tainted with falsity after full opportunity for him to rebut it and the
sentence being implied in accordance with a valid law. It is assumed, of course, that the court that
rendered the decision is one of competent jurisdiction. 25 The above formulation is a reiteration of what
was decided by the American Supreme Court in a case of Philippine origin, Ong Chang Wing v. United
States 26 decided during the period of American rule, 1910 to be precise. Thus: This court has had
frequent occasion to consider the requirements of due process of law as applied to criminal procedure,
and, generally speaking, it may be said that if an accused has been heard in a court of competent
jurisdiction, and proceeded against under the orderly processes of law, and only punished after inquiry
and investigation, upon notice to him, with an opportunity to be heard, and a judgment awarded within the
authority of a constitutional law, then he has had due process of law. 27

Under the third assigned error it is alleged that the information in Criminal Case No. 1988 states that the pretended
request and receipt of money by petitioner from companions t witness Josefina Meimban was in consideration of the early
setting of the hearing of the motion to withdraw the compromise agreement and to secure a favorable resolution thereof
when in fact said complainant was never a party to any compromise agreement so that she could not be convicted of an
offense not alleged in the information.

Under the fourth arraigned error the petitioner alleges that she cannot be convicted on the two defective informations, the
first of which (Crim. Case 1988) she allegedly demanded and received P 500.00 which the respondent court found to be
P1,000.00; and that in Criminal Case No. 1989 the information charged that the petitioner requested and received P
l,000.00 while the respondent court found that the amount received was P500.00 so petitioner pleads she cannot be
convicted on such defective informations. Under both informations petitioner is charged for violation of Section
enumerates the corrupt practices of any public officer which are declared unlawful as among others —

Sec. 3 (b). Directly or indirectly requesting or receiving any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit, for
himself or for any other person, in connection with any contract or transaction between the Government
and any other party, wherein the public officer in his official capacity has to intervene under the law.

The elements of the offense are that —

1. It must be committed by —

1) a public officer;

2) who requested and who received a gift, present, etc.;

3) the gift, present, etc. was for the benefit of said public officer;

4) said public officer requested and/or received the gift, present, etc. in connection with a contract or
transaction with the government; and

5) said officer has the right to intervene in such contract or transaction in his/her official capacity under the
law.

The finding of the respondent court is that the petitioner demanded and received money from the persons involved in
certain cases in Branch 26 of the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila where the petitioner was the branch clerk of court
in consideration of a promise that she will help in getting them a favorable judgment. In the case of the complainant
Josefina Meimban although it is true that she did not enter into an amicable agreement regarding her case as erroneously
alleged in the information, nevertheless it has been shown, and as it is also alleged in the information, that she yielded to
the request of petitioner for some money in consideration of a promise that petitioner wig get a favorable judgment. In a
prosecution under the foregoing provision of the Anti-Graft Law the value of the gift, money or present, etc. is immaterial
nor is it determinative of the guilt or innocence of the accused or the penalty to be imposed. What is penalized is the
receipt of any gift, present, share, percentage, or benefit by a public officer in connection with a contract or transaction
with the Government, wherein the public officer has to intervene in his official capacity.

Under the fifth assigned error petitioner argues that there was an ulterior motive on the part of the complainants in
testifying against her and that the prosecution evidence is hearsay.

Petitioner therefore raises the question of credibility of the witnesses. The rule is that the findings of facts of the
respondent court are conclusive unless there are some facts or circumstances that may have been overlooked that may
otherwise affect the result of the case. Petitioner has not successfully demonstrated any cogent reason why this Court
should depart from this rule.

Petitioner imputes that Meimban and Bautista testified against her as she refused to intercede in their behalf with the
judge to secure a favorable action. The court is not persuaded. Contrary to her pretension that prosecution witnesses
were inmotivated in testifying against her. The Court finds that said complaining witnesses would not impute the serious
charges against petitioner were it not the truth. Moreover, the testimony of said complaining witnesses are corroborated
by Atty. Modesto Espano and Sylvia Dizon who are certainly disinterested witnesses. The bare denial of petitioner cannot
prevail over such positive evidence of the prosecution.

Under the sixth assigned error petitioner alleges that she does not intervene in the setting of the hearing of cases and she
does not formulate resolutions thereof. The branch clerk of court is the administrative assistant of the presiding judge
whose duty is to assist in the management of the calendar of the court and in all other matters not involving the exercise
of discretion or judgment of the judge. It is this special relation of the petitioner with the judge who presumably has
reposed confidence in her which appears to have been taken advantage of by the petitioner in persuading the
complainants to give her money in consideration of a promise to get a favorable resolution of their cases.

Under the seventh assigned error the recall of petitioner for further cross-examination on her attempt to bribe the
Tanodbayan prosecutor is a matter within the sound discretion of respondent court. Indeed the testimony of said
prosecutor that petitioner tried to persuade her not to prosecute petitioner by giving her a gold chain with pendant
wrapped in tissue paper which said prosecutor returned is material evidence to establish the guilt of petitioner.

After a careful review of the records of the case, the Court finds and so holds that the guilt of the petitioner of the offenses
charged against her has been established beyond reasonable doubt. She took advantage of her position as branch clerk
of court by persuading the offended parties Josefina Meimban and Pilar Bautista to deliver to her the sums of P 1,000.00
and P500.00, respectively, in consideration of a promise that petitioner WW get a favorable resolution of their cases in
court.

The evils of corruption are slowly corroding the pillars of our society. Our courts are not spared by this plague. More often
than not those in government who are persuaded or tempted if not actively involved in graft and corruption are the court
personnel who lead litigants to believe that they could get a favorable judgment or action in their favor or are otherwise
approached or persuaded to so help for a consideration. Worse still there are instances when the corruption reaches the
level of the judge which spells the doom of our quest for an honest and impartial administration of justice. Anyone involved
in such corrupt exercise should be denounced. This Court does not hesitate to apply the scalpel to cut off the roots of this
cancer in the judicial system that can destroy the very purpose of its existence.

Those who are involved in the administration of justice from the highest to the lowest level must live up to the strictest
standard of honesty and integrity in the public service. The general public should respect and support such imperative. No
attempt to influence them one way or the other much less to bribe them should be made. One cannot buy a bad case nor
sell a good one. No amount of money can make out a good case out of a bad one. And even if one succeeds in so doing
it would certainly be uncovered and reversed on appeal. Justice will prevail.

This case should be an object lesson for those in the public service. All that we need to do is to go back to the too well
known rule of conduct that honesty is the best policy. Those who cannot live up to this criterion should get out of the
government service. It is as simple as that.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit, with costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 130487               June 19, 2000

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
ROBERTO ESTRADA, accused-appellant.

This is an automatic review of the death penalty imposed on accused-appellant by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44,
Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D. 1 We nullify the proceedings in the court a quo and remand the case for
proper disposition.
In an Information dated December 29, 1994, accused-appellant Roberto Estrada y Lopez was charged with the crime of
murder for the killing of one Rogelio P. Mararac, a security guard. The Information reads:

That on or about the 27th day of December 1994 in the City of Dagupan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, ROBERTO ESTRADA Y LOPEZ, being then armed with a
butcher's knife, with intent to kill one ROGELIO P. MARARAC with treachery and committed in a holy place of
worship, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and criminally, attack, assault and use personal violence upon the
latter by stabbing him, hitting him on vital parts of his body with the said weapon, thereby causing his death
shortly thereafter due to "Cardiorespiratory Arrest, Massive Intrathoracic Hemorrhage, Stab Wound" as per
Autopsy Report and Certificate of Death both issued by Dr. Tomas G. Cornel, Assistant City Health Officer, this
City, to the damage and prejudice of the legal heirs of said deceased ROGELIO P. MARARAC in the amount of
not less than FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00), Philippine currency, and other consequential damages.

Contrary to Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code.

Dagupan City, Philippines December 29, 1994. 2

At the arraignment on January 6, 1995, accused-appellant's counsel, the Public Attorney's Office, filed an "Urgent Motion
to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital." It was alleged that
accused-appellant could not properly and intelligently enter a plea because he was suffering from a mental defect; that
before the commission of the crime, he was confined at the psychiatric ward of the Baguio General Hospital in Baguio
City. He prayed for the suspension of his arraignment and the issuance of an order confining him at the said hospital. 3

The motion was opposed by the City Prosecutor. The trial court, motu proprio, propounded several questions on accused-
appellant. Finding that the questions were understood and answered by him "intelligently," the court denied the motion
that same day. 4

The arraignment proceeded and a plea of not guilty was entered by the court on accused-appellant's behalf. 5

The prosecution presented four (4) witnesses, namely: (1) Dr. Tomas Cornel, the Assistant Health Officer of Dagupan City
who issued the death certificate and conducted the autopsy on the victim; (2) Crisanto Santillan, an eyewitness to the
incident; (3) SPO1 Conrado Francisco, one of the policemen who apprehended accused-appellant; and (4) Rosalinda
Sobremonte, the victim's sister. The prosecution established the following facts:

In the morning of December 27, 1994, at the St. John's Cathedral, Dagupan City, the sacrament of confirmation was being
performed by the Roman Catholic Bishop of Dagupan City on the children of Dagupan. The cathedral was filled with more
than a thousand people. At 11:00 A.M., nearing the close of the rites, the Bishop went down the altar to give his final
blessing to the children in the front rows. While the Bishop was giving his blessing, a man from the crowd went up and
walked towards the center of the altar. He stopped beside the Bishop's chair, turned around and, in full view of the
Catholic faithful, sat on the Bishop's chair. The man was accused-appellant. Crisanto Santillan, who was assisting the
Bishop at the rites, saw accused-appellant. Santillan approached accused-appellant and requested him to vacate the
Bishop's chair. Gripping the chair's armrest, accused-appellant replied in Pangasinese: "No matter what will happen, I will
not move out!" Hearing this, Santillan moved away. 6

Some of the churchgoers summoned Rogelio Mararac, the security guard at the cathedral. Mararac went near accused-
appellant and told him to vacate the Bishop's chair. Accused-appellant stared intensely at the guard. Mararac grabbed his
nightstick and used it to tap accused-appellant's hand on the armrest. Appellant did not budge. Again, Mararac tapped the
latter's hand. Still no reaction. Mararac was about to strike again when suddenly accused-appellant drew a knife from his
back, lunged at Mararac and stabbed him, hitting him below his left throat. Mararac fell. Accused-appellant went over the
victim and tried to stab him again but Mararac parried his thrust. Accused-appellant looked up and around him. He got up,
went to the microphone and shouted: "Anggapuy nayan dia!" (No one can beat me here!). He returned to the Bishop's
chair and sat on it again. Mararac, wounded and bleeding, slowly dragged himself down the altar. 7

Meanwhile, SPO1 Conrado Francisco, who was directing traffic outside, received a report of a commotion inside the
cathedral. Rushing to the cathedral, SPO1 Francisco saw a man, accused-appellant, with red stains on his shirt and a
knife in one hand sitting on a chair at the center of the altar. He ran to accused-appellant and advised him to drop the
knife. Accused-appellant obeyed. He dropped the knife and raised his hands. Thereupon, Chief Inspector Wendy Rosario,
Deputy Police Chief, Dagupan City, who was attending the confirmation rites at the Cathedral, went near accused-
appellant to pick up the knife. Suddenly, accused-appellant embraced Chief Inspector Rosario and the two wrestled with
each other. Chief Inspector Rosario was able to subdue accused-appellant. The police came and when they frisked
appellant, they found a leather scabbard tucked around his waist. 8 He was brought to the police station and placed in jail.

In the meantime, Mararac, the security guard, was brought to the hospital where he expired a few minutes upon arrival.
He died of cardio-respiratory arrest, massive, intra-thoracic hemorrhage, stab wound." 9 He was found to have sustained
two (2) stab wounds: one just below the left throat and the other on the left arm. The autopsy reported the following
findings:

EXTERNAL FINDINGS

1. Stab wound, along the parasternal line, level of the 2nd intercostal space, left, 1 1/2" x 1 1/2"
penetrating. The edge of one side of the wound is sharp and pointed.

2. Stab wound, antero-lateral aspect, distal 3rd, arm, left, 1/2" x 1/4" x 1/2". The edge of one side of the
wound is sharp and pointed.

INTERNAL FINDINGS

Massive intrathoracic, left, hemorrhage with perforation of the upper and lower lobe of the left lung. The left
pulmonary blood vessel was severely cut. 10

After the prosecution rested its case, accused-appellant, with leave of court, filed a "Demurrer to Evidence." He claimed
that the prosecution failed to prove the crime of murder because there was no evidence of the qualifying circumstance of
treachery; that there was unlawful aggression by the victim when he tapped accused-appellant's hand with his nightstick;
and that accused-appellant did not have sufficient ability to calculate his defensive acts because he was of unsound
mind. 11

The "Demurrer to Evidence" was opposed by the public prosecutor. He alleged that the accused "pretended to be weak,
tame and of unsound mind;" that after he made the first stab, he "furiously continued stabbing and slashing the victim to
finish him off undeterred by the fact that he was in a holy place where a religious ceremony was being conducted;" and
the plea of unsound mind had already been ruled upon by the trial court in its order of January 6, 1995. 12

On February 21, 1995, a letter was sent by Inspector Wilfredo F. Valdez, Jail Warden of Dagupan City to the trial court.
Inspector Valdez requested the court to allow accused-appellant, who was confined at the city jail, to be treated at the
Baguio General Hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be transferred to some other institution. The
other prisoners were allegedly not comfortable with appellant because he had been exhibiting unusual behavior. He tried
to climb up the jail roof so he could escape and see his family. 13

As ordered by the trial court, the public prosecutor filed a Comment to the jail warden's letter. He reiterated that the mental
condition of accused-appellant to stand trial had already been determined; unless a competent government agency
certifies otherwise, the trial should proceed; and the city jail warden was not the proper person to determine whether
accused-appellant was mentally ill or not. 14

In an order dated August 21, 1995, the trial court denied the "Demurrer to Evidence". 15 Accused-appellant moved for
reconsideration.

While the motion for reconsideration was pending, on February 26, 1996, counsel for accused-appellant filed a "Motion to
Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination." Appellant's counsel informed the court that accused-
appellant had been exhibiting abnormal behavior for the past weeks; he would shout at the top of his voice and cause
panic among the jail inmates and personnel; that appellant had not been eating and sleeping; that his co-inmates had
been complaining of not getting enough sleep for fear of being attacked by him while asleep; that once, while they were
sleeping, appellant took out all his personal effects and waste matter and burned them inside the cell which again caused
panic among the inmates. Appellant's counsel prayed that his client be confined at the National Center for Mental Health
in Manila or at the Baguio General Hospital. 16 Attached to the motion were two (2) letters. One, dated February 19, 1996,
was from Inspector Pedrito Llopis, Jail Warden, Dagupan City, addressed to the trial court judge informing him of
appellant's irrational behavior and seeking the issuance of a court order for the immediate psychiatric and mental
examination of accused-appellant. 17 The second letter, dated February 21, 1996, was addressed to Inspector Llopis from
the Bukang Liwayway Association, an association of inmates in the Dagupan City Jail. The letter, signed by the president,
secretary and adviser of said association, informed the jail warden of appellant's unusual behavior and requested that
immediate action be taken against him to avoid future violent incidents in the jail. 18
On September 18, 1996, the trial court denied reconsideration of the order denying the "Demurrer to Evidence." The court
ordered accused-appellant to present his evidence on October 15, 1996. 19

Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. Instead, his counsel presented the testimony of Dr. Maria Soledad
Gawidan, 20 a resident physician in the Department of Psychiatry at the Baguio General Hospital, and accused-appellant's
medical and clinical records at the said hospital. 21 Dr. Gawidan testified that appellant had been confined at the BGH from
February 18, 1993 to February 22, 1993 and that he suffered from "Schizophrenic Psychosis, Paranoid Type—
schizophrenia, paranoid, chronic, paranoid type;" 22 and after four (4) days of confinement, he was discharged in improved
physical and mental condition. 23 The medical and clinical records consisted of the following: (1) letter of Dr. Alfredo Sy,
Municipal Health Officer, Calasiao, Pangasinan to Dr. Jesus del Prado, Director, BGH referring accused-appellant for
admission and treatment after "a relapse of his violent behavior;" 24 (2) the clinical cover sheet of appellant at the
BGH; 25 (3) the consent slip of appellant's wife voluntarily entrusting appellant to the BGH; 26 (4) the Patient's Record; 27 (5)
the Consent for Discharge signed by appellant's wife; 28 (6) the Summary and Discharges of appellant; 29 (7) appellant's
clinical case history; 30 (8) the admitting notes; 31 (9) Physician's Order Form; 32 (10) the Treatment Form/medication
sheet; 33 and (11) Nurses' Notes. 34

The trial court rendered a decision on June 23, 1997. It upheld the prosecution evidence and found accused-appellant
guilty of the crime charged and thereby sentenced him to death, viz:

WHEREFORE, the court finds accused Roberto Estrada y Lopez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
Murder and in view of the presence of the aggravating circumstance of cruelty which is not offset by any mitigating
circumstance, the accused is sentenced to suffer the Death Penalty and to indemnify the heirs of the deceased in
the amount of P50,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt

The accused is ordered to pay the sum of P18,870.00 representing actual expenses and P100,000.00 as moral
damages.

SO ORDERED. 25

In this appeal, accused-appellant assigns the following errors:

THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED,
DESPITE CLEAR AND CONVINCING EVIDENCE ON RECORD, SUPPORTING HIS PLEA OF INSANITY.

II

THE LOWER COURT LIKEWISE ERRED IN HOLDING THAT THE STABBING TO DEATH OF ROGELIO
MARARAC WAS ATTENDED WITH TREACHERY AND AGGRAVATED BY CRUELTY,
GRANTING ARGUENDO  THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT'S PLEA OF INSANITY CANNOT BE CONSIDERED
AN EXEMPTING CIRCUMSTANCE. 36

The basic principle in our criminal law is that a person is criminally liable for a felony committed by him. 37 Under the
classical theory on which our penal code is mainly based, the basis of criminal liability is human free Will. 38 Man is
essentially a moral creature with an absolutely free will to choose between good and evil. 39 When he commits a felonious
or criminal act (delito doloso), the act is presumed to have been done voluntarily, 40 i.e., with freedom, intelligence and
intent. 41 Man, therefore, should be adjudged or held accountable for wrongful acts so long as free will appears
unimpaired. 42

In the absence of evidence to the contrary, the law presumes that every person is of sound mind 43 and that all acts are
voluntary. 44 The moral and legal presumption under our law is that freedom and intelligence constitute the normal
condition of a person. 45 This presumption, however, may be overthrown by other factors; and one of these is insanity
which exempts the actor from criminal liability. 46

The Revised Penal Code in Article 12 (1) provides:

Art. 12. Circumstances which exempt from criminal liability. — The following are exempt from criminal liability:
 1. An imbecile or an insane person, unless the latter has acted during a lucid interval.

When the imbecile or an insane person has committed an act which the law defines as a felony (delito),
the court shall order his confinement in one of the hospitals or asylums established for persons thus
afflicted, which he shall not be permitted to leave without first obtaining the permission of the same court.

An insane person is exempt from criminal liability unless he has acted during a lucid interval. If the court therefore
finds the accused insane when the alleged crime was committed, he shall be acquitted but the court shall order
his confinement in a hospital or asylum for treatment until he may be released without danger. An acquittal of the
accused does not result in his outright release, but rather in a verdict which is followed by commitment of the
accused to a mental institution. 47

In the eyes of the law, insanity exists when there is a complete deprivation of intelligence in committing the act. Mere
abnormality of the mental faculties will not exclude imputability. 48 The accused must be "so insane as to be incapable of
entertaining a criminal intent." 49 He must be deprived of reason and act without the least discernment because there is a
complete absence of the power to discern or a total deprivation of freedom of the will. 50

Since the presumption is always in favor of sanity, he who invokes insanity as an exempting circumstance must prove it
by clear and positive evidence. 51 And the evidence on this point must refer to the time preceding the act under
prosecution or to the very moment of its execution. 52

To ascertain a person's mental condition at the time of the act, it is permissible to receive evidence of the condition of his
mind within a reasonable period both before and after that time. 53 Direct testimony is not required. 54 Neither are specific
acts of derangement essential to establish insanity as a defense. 55 Circumstantial evidence, if clear and convincing,
suffices; for the unfathomable mind can only be known by overt acts. A person's thoughts, motives, and emotions may be
evaluated only by outward acts to determine whether these conform to the practice of people of sound mind. 56

In the case at bar, there is no direct proof that accused-appellant was afflicted with insanity at the time he killed Mararac.
The absence of direct proof, nevertheless, does not entirely discount the probability that appellant was not of sound mind
at that time. From the affidavit of Crisanto Santillan 57 attached to the Information, there are certain circumstances that
should have placed the trial court on notice that appellant may not have been in full possession of his mental faculties
when he attacked Mararac. It was highly unusual for a sane person to go up to the altar and sit in the Bishop's chair while
the Bishop was administering the Holy Sacrament of Confirmation to children in a jampacked cathedral. It goes against
normal and ordinary behavior for appellant, without sufficient provocation from the security guard, to stab the latter at the
altar, during sacramental rites and in front of all the Catholic faithful to witness. Appellant did not flee, or at least attempt to
flee after the stabbing. He nonchalantly approached the microphone and, over the public address system, uttered words
to the faithful which the rational person would have been made. He then returned to the Bishop's chair and sat there as if
nothing happened.

Accused-appellant's history of mental illness was brought to the court's attention on the day of arraignment. Counsel for
accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground that his client could not properly and
intelligently enter a plea due to his mental condition. The Motion for Suspension is authorized under Section 12, Rule 116
of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure which provides:

Sec. 12. Suspension of arraignment. — The arraignment shall be suspended, if at the time thereof:

(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which effectively renders him unable
to fully understand the charge against him and to plead intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his
mental examination and, if necessary, his confinement for such purpose.

(b) x x x           x x x          x x x

The arraignment of an accused shall be suspended if at the time thereof he appears to be suffering from an unsound
mental condition of such nature as to render him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto. Under these circumstances, the court must suspend the proceedings and order the mental
examination of the accused, and if confinement be necessary for examination, order such confinement and examination. If
the accused is not in full possession of his mental faculties at the time he is informed at the arraignment of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, the process is itself a  felo de se, for he can neither comprehend the full import of the
charge nor can he give an intelligent plea thereto. 58
The question of suspending the arraignment lies within the discretion of the trial court. 59 And the test to determine whether
the proceedings will be suspended depends on the question of whether the accused, even with the assistance of counsel,
would have a fair trial. This rule was laid down as early as 1917, thus:

In passing on the question of the propriety of suspending the proceedings against an accused person on the
ground of present insanity, the judges should bear in mind that not every aberration of the mind or exhibition of
mental deficiency is sufficient to justify such suspension. The test is to be found in the question whether the
accused would have a fair trial, with the assistance which the law secures or gives; and it is obvious that under a
system of procedure like ours where every accused person has legal counsel, it is not necessary to be so
particular as it used to be in England where the accused had no advocate but himself. 60

In the American jurisdiction, the issue of the accused's "present insanity" or insanity at the time of the court proceedings is
separate and distinct from his criminal responsibility at the time of commission of the act. The defense of insanity in a
criminal trial concerns the defendant's mental condition at the time of the crime's commission. "Present insanity" is
commonly referred to as "competency to stand trial" 61 and relates to the appropriateness of conducting the criminal
proceeding in light of the defendant's present inability to participate meaningfully and effectively. 62 In competency cases,
the accused may have been sane or insane during the commission of the offense which relates to a determination of his
guilt. However, if he is found incompetent to stand trial, the trial is simply postponed until such time as he may be found
competent. Incompetency to stand trial is not a defense; it merely postpones the trial. 63

In determining a defendant's competency to stand trial, the test is whether he has the capacity to comprehend his
position, understand the nature and object of the proceedings against him, to conduct his defense in a rational manner,
and to cooperate, communicate with, and assist his counsel to the end that any available defense may be
interposed. 64 This test is prescribed by state law but it exists generally as a statutory recognition of the rule at common
law. 65 Thus:

[I]f is not enough for the . . . judge to find that the defendant [is] oriented to time and place, and [has] some
recollection of events, but that the test must be whether he has sufficient present ability to consult with his lawyer
with a reasonable degree of rational understanding—and whether he has a rational as well as factual
understanding of the proceedings against him. 66

There are two distinct matters to be determined under this test: (1) whether the defendant is sufficiently coherent to
provide his counsel with information necessary or relevant to constructing a defense; and (2) whether he is able to
comprehend the significance of the trial and his relation to it. 67 The first requisite is the relation between the defendant and
his counsel such that the defendant must be able to confer coherently with his counsel. The second is the relation of the
defendant vis-a-vis the court proceedings, i.e., that he must have a rational as well as a factual understanding of the
proceedings. 68

The rule barring trial or sentence of an insane person is for the protection of the accused, rather than of the public. 69 It has
been held that it is inhuman to require an accused disabled by act of God to make a just defense for his life or liberty. 70 To
put a legally incompetent person on trial or to convict and sentence him is a violation of the constitutional rights to a fair
trial 71 and due process of law; 72 and this has several reasons underlying it. 73 For one, the accuracy of the proceedings
may not be assured, as an incompetent defendant who cannot comprehend the proceedings may not appreciate what
information is relevant to the proof of his innocence. Moreover, he is not in a position to exercise many of the rights
afforded a defendant in a criminal case, e.g., the right to effectively consult with counsel, the right to testify in his own
behalf, and the right to confront opposing witnesses, which rights are safeguards for the accuracy of the trial result.
Second, the fairness of the proceedings may be questioned, as there are certain basic decisions in the course of a
criminal proceeding which a defendant is expected to make for himself, and one of these is his plea. Third, the dignity of
the proceedings may be disrupted, for an incompetent defendant is likely to conduct himself in the courtroom in a manner
which may destroy the decorum of the court. Even if the defendant remains passive, his lack of comprehension
fundamentally impairs the functioning of the trial process. A criminal proceeding is essentially an adversarial proceeding. If
the defendant is not a conscious and intelligent participant, the adjudication loses its character as a reasoned interaction
between an individual and his community and becomes an invective against an insensible object. Fourth, it is important
that the defendant knows why he is being punished, a comprehension which is greatly dependent upon his understanding
of what occurs at trial. An incompetent defendant may not realize the moral reprehensibility of his conduct. The societal
goal of institutionalized retribution may be frustrated when the force of the state is brought to bear against one who cannot
comprehend its significance. 74

The determination of whether a sanity investigation or hearing should be ordered rests generally in the discretion of the
trial court. 75 Mere allegation of insanity is insufficient. There must be evidence or circumstances that raise a "reasonable
doubt" 76 or a "bona fide  doubt" 77 as to defendant's competence to stand trial. Among the factors a judge may consider is
evidence of the defendant's irrational behavior, history of mental illness or behavioral abnormalities, previous confinement
for mental disturbance, demeanor of the defendant, and psychiatric or even lay testimony bearing on the issue of
competency in a particular case. 78

In the case at bar, when accused-appellant moved for suspension of the arraignment on the ground of accused's mental
condition, the trial court denied the motion after finding that the questions propounded on appellant were intelligently
answered by him. The court declared:

x x x           x x x          x x x

It should be noted that when this case was called, the Presiding Judge asked questions on the accused, and he
(accused) answered intelligently. As a matter of fact, when asked where he was born, he answered, in Tayug.

The accused could answer intelligently. He could understand the questions asked of him.

WHEREFORE, for lack of merit, the Urgent Motion to Suspend Arraignment and to Commit Accused to
Psychiatric Ward at Baguio General Hospital, is hereby DENIED.

SO ORDERED. 79

The fact that accused-appellant was able to answer the questions asked by the trial court is not conclusive evidence that
he was competent enough to stand trial and assist in his defense. Section 12, Rule 116 speaks of an unsound mental
condition that "effectively renders [the accused] unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
intelligently thereto." It is not clear whether accused-appellant was of such sound mind as to fully understand the charge
against him. It is also not certain whether his plea was made intelligently. The plea of "not guilty" was not made by
accused-appellant but by the trial court "because of his refusal to plead." 80

The trial court took it solely upon itself to determine the sanity of accused-appellant. The trial judge is not a psychiatrist or
psychologist or some other expert equipped with the specialized knowledge of determining the state of a person's mental
health. To determine the accused-appellants competency to stand trial, the court, in the instant case, should have at least
ordered the examination of accused-appellant, especially in the light of the latter's history of mental illness.

If the medical history was not enough to create a reasonable doubt in the judge's mind of accused-appellants competency
to stand trial, subsequent events should have done so. One month after the prosecution rested its case, the Jail Warden
of Dagupan City wrote the trial judge informing him of accused-appellant's unusual behavior and requesting that he be
examined at the hospital to determine whether he should remain in jail or be placed in some other institution. The trial
judge ignored this letter. One year later, accused-appellant's counsel filed a "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical,
Mental and Psychiatric Examination." Attached to this motion was a second letter by the new Jail Warden of Dagupan City
accompanied by a letter-complaint of the members of the Bukang Liwayway Association of the city jail. Despite the two (2)
attached letters, 81 the judge ignored the "Motion to Confine Accused for Physical, Mental and Psychiatric Examination."
The records are barren of any order disposing of the said motion. The trial court instead ordered accused-appellant to
present his evidence. 82

Dr. Gawidan, testified that the illness of accused-appellant, i.e., schizophrenia, paranoid type, is a "lifetime illness" and
that this requires maintenance medication to avoid relapses. 83 After accused-appellant was discharged on February 22,
1993, he never returned to the hospital, not even for a check-up. 84

Accused-appellant did not take the witness stand. His counsel manifested that accused-appellant was waiving the right to
testify in his own behalf because he was "suffering from mental illness." 85 This manifestation was made in open court
more than two (2) years after the crime, and still, the claim of mental illness was ignored by the trial court. And despite all
the overwhelming indications of accused-appellant's state of mind, the judge persisted in his personal assessment and
never even considered subjecting accused-appellant to a medical examination. To top it all, the judge found appellant
guilty and sentenced him to death!

Sec. 12, Rule 116 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure speaks of a "mental examination." 86 The human mind is an
entity, and understanding it is not purely an intellectual process but depends to a large degree upon emotional and
psychological appreciation. 87 Thus, an intelligent determination of an accused's capacity for rational understanding ought
to rest on a deeper and more comprehensive diagnosis of his mental condition than laymen can make through
observation of his overt behavior. Once a medical or psychiatric diagnosis is made, then can the legal question of
incompetency be determined by the trial court. By this time, the accused's abilities may be measured against the specific
demands a trial will make upon him. 88

If the mental examination on accused-appellant had been promptly and properly made, it may have served a dual
purpose 89 by determining both his competency to stand trial and his sanity at the time of the offense. In some Philippine
cases, the medical and clinical findings of insanity made immediately after the commission of the crime served as one of
the bases for the acquittal of the accused. 90 The crime in the instant case was committed way back in December 1994,
almost six (6) years ago. At this late hour, a medical finding alone may make it impossible for us to evaluate appellant's
mental condition at the time of the crime's commission for him to avail of the exempting circumstance of
insanity. 91 Nonetheless, under the present circumstances, accused-appellant's competence to stand trial must be properly
ascertained to enable him to participate, in his trial meaningfully.

By depriving appellant of a mental examination, the trial court effectively deprived appellant of a fair trial.1awphil The trial
court's negligence was a violation of the basic requirements of due process; and for this reason, the proceedings before
the said court must be nullified. In People v. Serafica, 92 we ordered that the joint decision of the trial court be vacated and
the cases remanded to the court a quo for proper proceeding. The accused, who was charged with two (2) counts of
murder and one (1) count of frustrated murder, entered a plea of "guilty" to all three charges and was sentenced to death.
We found that the accused's plea was not an unconditional admission of guilt because he was "not in full possession of
his mental faculties when he killed the victim;" and thereby ordered that he be subjected to the necessary medical
examination to determine his degree of insanity at the time of commission of the crime. 93

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 44, Dagupan City in Criminal Case No. 94-00860-D
convicting accused-appellant Roberto Estrada and sentencing him to death is vacated and the case is remanded to the
court a quo for the conduct of a proper mental examination on accused-appellant, a determination of his competency to
stand trial, and for further proceedings.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-46496             February 27, 1940

ANG TIBAY, represented by TORIBIO TEODORO, manager and propietor, and

NATIONAL WORKERS BROTHERHOOD, petitioners,
vs.
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS and NATIONAL LABOR UNION, INC., respondents.
The Solicitor-General in behalf of the respondent Court of Industrial Relations in the above-entitled case has filed a motion
for reconsideration and moves that, for the reasons stated in his motion, we reconsider the following legal conclusions of
the majority opinion of this Court:

1. Que un contrato de trabajo, asi individual como colectivo, sin termino fijo de duracion o que no sea para una
determinada, termina o bien por voluntad de cualquiera de las partes o cada vez que ilega el plazo fijado para el
pago de los salarios segun costumbre en la localidad o cunado se termine la obra;

2. Que los obreros de una empresa fabril, que han celebrado contrato, ya individual ya colectivamente, con ell,
sin tiempo fijo, y que se han visto obligados a cesar en sus tarbajos por haberse declarando paro forzoso en la
fabrica en la cual tarbajan, dejan de ser empleados u obreros de la misma;

3. Que un patrono o sociedad que ha celebrado un contrato colectivo de trabajo con sus osbreros sin tiempo fijo
de duracion y sin ser para una obra determiminada y que se niega a readmitir a dichos obreros que cesaron
como consecuencia de un paro forzoso, no es culpable de practica injusta in incurre en la sancion penal del
articulo 5 de la Ley No. 213 del Commonwealth, aunque su negativa a readmitir se deba a que dichos obreros
pertenecen a un determinado organismo obrero, puesto que tales ya han dejado deser empleados suyos por
terminacion del contrato en virtud del paro.

The respondent National Labor Union, Inc., on the other hand, prays for the vacation of the judgement rendered by the
majority of this Court and the remanding of the case to the Court of Industrial Relations for a new trial, and avers:

1. That Toribio Teodoro's claim that on September 26, 1938, there was shortage of leather soles in ANG TIBAY
making it necessary for him to temporarily lay off the members of the National Labor Union Inc., is entirely false
and unsupported by the records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in leather.

2. That the supposed lack of leather materials claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme to systematically
prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

3. That Toribio Teodoro's letter to the Philippine Army dated September 29, 1938, (re supposed delay of leather
soles from the States) was but a scheme to systematically prevent the forfeiture of this bond despite the breach of
his CONTRACT with the Philippine Army.

4. That the National Worker's Brotherhood of ANG TIBAY is a company or employer union dominated by Toribio
Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal. (281 U.S., 548, petitioner's printed memorandum, p.
25.)

5. That in the exercise by the laborers of their rights to collective bargaining, majority rule and elective
representation are highly essential and indispensable. (Sections 2 and 5, Commonwealth Act No. 213.)

6. That the century provisions of the Civil Code which had been (the) principal source of dissensions and
continuous civil war in Spain cannot and should not be made applicable in interpreting and applying the salutary
provisions of a modern labor legislation of American origin where the industrial peace has always been the rule.

7. That the employer Toribio Teodoro was guilty of unfair labor practice for discriminating against the National
Labor Union, Inc., and unjustly favoring the National Workers' Brotherhood.

8. That the exhibits hereto attached are so inaccessible to the respondents that even with the exercise of due
diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of Industrial
Relations.

9. That the attached documents and exhibits are of such far-reaching importance and effect that their admission
would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein.

The petitioner, Ang Tibay, has filed an opposition both to the motion for reconsideration of the respondent National Labor
Union, Inc.

In view of the conclusion reached by us and to be herein after stead with reference to the motion for a new trial of the
respondent National Labor Union, Inc., we are of the opinion that it is not necessary to pass upon the motion for
reconsideration of the Solicitor-General. We shall proceed to dispose of the motion for new trial of the respondent labor
union. Before doing this, however, we deem it necessary, in the interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, in
interest of orderly procedure in cases of this nature, to make several observations regarding the nature of the powers of
the Court of Industrial Relations and emphasize certain guiding principles which should be observed in the trial of cases
brought before it. We have re-examined the entire record of the proceedings had before the Court of Industrial Relations
in this case, and we have found no substantial evidence that the exclusion of the 89 laborers here was due to their union
affiliation or activity. The whole transcript taken contains what transpired during the hearing and is more of a record of
contradictory and conflicting statements of opposing counsel, with sporadic conclusion drawn to suit their own views. It is
evident that these statements and expressions of views of counsel have no evidentiary value.

The Court of Industrial Relations is a special court whose functions are specifically stated in the law of its creation
(Commonwealth Act No. 103). It is more an administrative than a part of the integrated judicial system of the nation. It is
not intended to be a mere receptive organ of the Government. Unlike a court of justice which is essentially passive, acting
only when its jurisdiction is invoked and deciding only cases that are presented to it by the parties litigant, the function of
the Court of Industrial Relations, as will appear from perusal of its organic law, is more active, affirmative and dynamic. It
not only exercises judicial or quasi-judicial functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees
but its functions in the determination of disputes between employers and employees but its functions are far more
comprehensive and expensive. It has jurisdiction over the entire Philippines, to consider, investigate, decide, and settle
any question, matter controversy or dispute arising between, and/or affecting employers and employees or laborers, and
regulate the relations between them, subject to, and in accordance with, the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 103
(section 1). It shall take cognizance or purposes of prevention, arbitration, decision and settlement, of any industrial or
agricultural dispute causing or likely to cause a strike or lockout, arising from differences as regards wages, shares or
compensation, hours of labor or conditions of tenancy or employment, between landlords and tenants or farm-laborers,
provided that the number of employees, laborers or tenants of farm-laborers involved exceeds thirty, and such industrial
or agricultural dispute is submitted to the Court by the Secretary of Labor or by any or both of the parties to the
controversy and certified by the Secretary of labor as existing and proper to be by the Secretary of Labor as existing and
proper to be dealth with by the Court for the sake of public interest. (Section 4, ibid.) It shall, before hearing the dispute
and in the course of such hearing, endeavor to reconcile the parties and induce them to settle the dispute by amicable
agreement. (Paragraph 2, section 4, ibid.) When directed by the President of the Philippines, it shall investigate and study
all industries established in a designated locality, with a view to determinating the necessity and fairness of fixing and
adopting for such industry or locality a minimum wage or share of laborers or tenants, or a maximum "canon" or rental to
be paid by the "inquilinos" or tenants or less to landowners. (Section 5, ibid.) In fine, it may appeal to voluntary arbitration
in the settlement of industrial disputes; may employ mediation or conciliation for that purpose, or recur to the more
effective system of official investigation and compulsory arbitration in order to determine specific controversies between
labor and capital industry and in agriculture. There is in reality here a mingling of executive and judicial functions, which is
a departure from the rigid doctrine of the separation of governmental powers.

In the case of Goseco vs. Court of Industrial Relations et al., G.R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we had
occasion to joint out that the Court of Industrial Relations et al., G. R. No. 46673, promulgated September 13, 1939, we
had occasion to point out that the Court of Industrial Relations is not narrowly constrained by technical rules of procedure,
and the Act requires it to "act according to justice and equity and substantial merits of the case, without regard to
technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any technicalities or legal forms and shall not be bound by any
technical rules of legal evidence but may inform its mind in such manner as it may deem just and equitable." (Section 20,
Commonwealth Act No. 103.) It shall not be restricted to the specific relief claimed or demands made by the parties to the
industrial or agricultural dispute, but may include in the award, order or decision any matter or determination which may
be deemed necessary or expedient for the purpose of settling the dispute or of preventing further industrial or agricultural
disputes. (section 13, ibid.) And in the light of this legislative policy, appeals to this Court have been especially regulated
by the rules recently promulgated by the rules recently promulgated by this Court to carry into the effect the avowed
legislative purpose. The fact, however, that the Court of Industrial Relations may be said to be free from the rigidity of
certain procedural requirements does not mean that it can, in justifiable cases before it, entirely ignore or disregard the
fundamental and essential requirements of due process in trials and investigations of an administrative character. There
are primary rights which must be respected even in proceedings of this character:

(1) The first of these rights is the right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to
present his own case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Hughes, in Morgan v. U.S.,
304 U.S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the citizen shall be protected by the
rudimentary requirements of fair play.

(2) Not only must the party be given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to
establish the rights which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice
Hughes in Morgan v. U.S. 298 U.S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this court in Edwards
 vs. McCoy, 22 Phil., 598, "the right to adduce evidence, without the corresponding duty on the part of the board to
consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or persons to whom the evidence is presented
can thrust it aside without notice or consideration."

(3) "While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity which
cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support it is a nullity, a place when directly attached."
(Edwards vs. McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental is contrary to the vesting of
unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a grant and a limitation upon power.

(4) Not only must there be some evidence to support a finding or conclusion (City of Manila vs. Agustin, G.R. No.
45844, promulgated November 29, 1937, XXXVI O. G. 1335), but the evidence must be "substantial."
(Washington, Virginia and Maryland Coach Co. v. national labor Relations Board, 301 U.S. 142, 147, 57 S. Ct.
648, 650, 81 Law. ed. 965.) It means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind accept as adequate to support
a conclusion." (Appalachian Electric Power v. National Labor Relations Board, 4 Cir., 93 F. 2d 985, 989; National
Labor Relations Board v. Thompson Products, 6 Cir., 97 F. 2d 13, 15; Ballston-Stillwater Knitting Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 2 Cir., 98 F. 2d 758, 760.) . . . The statute provides that "the rules of evidence prevailing in
courts of law and equity shall not be controlling.' The obvious purpose of this and similar provisions is to free
administrative boards from the compulsion of technical rules so that the mere admission of matter which would be
deemed incompetent inn judicial proceedings would not invalidate the administrative order. (Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Baird, 194 U.S. 25, 44, 24 S. Ct. 563, 568, 48 Law. ed. 860; Interstate Commerce Commission v.
Louisville and Nashville R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 93 33 S. Ct. 185, 187, 57 Law. ed. 431; United States v. Abilene and
Southern Ry. Co. S. Ct. 220, 225, 74 Law. ed. 624.) But this assurance of a desirable flexibility in administrative
procedure does not go far as to justify orders without a basis in evidence having rational probative force. Mere
uncorroborated hearsay or rumor does not constitute substantial evidence. (Consolidated Edison Co. v. National
Labor Relations Board, 59 S. Ct. 206, 83 Law. ed. No. 4, Adv. Op., p. 131.)"

(5) The decision must be rendered on the evidence presented at the hearing, or at least contained in the record
and disclosed to the parties affected. (Interstate Commence Commission vs. L. & N. R. Co., 227 U.S. 88, 33 S.
Ct. 185, 57 Law. ed. 431.) Only by confining the administrative tribunal to the evidence disclosed to the parties,
can the latter be protected in their right to know and meet the case against them. It should not, however, detract
from their duty actively to see that the law is enforced, and for that purpose, to use the authorized legal methods
of securing evidence and informing itself of facts material and relevant to the controversy. Boards of inquiry may
be appointed for the purpose of investigating and determining the facts in any given case, but their report and
decision are only advisory. (Section 9, Commonwealth Act No. 103.) The Court of Industrial Relations may refer
any industrial or agricultural dispute or any matter under its consideration or advisement to a local board of
inquiry, a provincial fiscal. a justice of the peace or any public official in any part of the Philippines for
investigation, report and recommendation, and may delegate to such board or public official such powers and
functions as the said Court of Industrial Relations may deem necessary, but such delegation shall not affect the
exercise of the Court itself of any of its powers. (Section 10, ibid.)

(6) The Court of Industrial Relations or any of its judges, therefore, must act on its or his own independent
consideration of the law and facts of the controversy, and not simply accept the views of a subordinate in arriving
at a decision. It may be that the volume of work is such that it is literally Relations personally to decide all
controversies coming before them. In the United States the difficulty is solved with the enactment of statutory
authority authorizing examiners or other subordinates to render final decision, with the right to appeal to board or
commission, but in our case there is no such statutory authority.

(7) The Court of Industrial Relations should, in all controversial questions, render its decision in such a manner
that the parties to the proceeding can know the various issues involved, and the reasons for the decision
rendered. The performance of this duty is inseparable from the authority conferred upon it.

In the right of the foregoing fundamental principles, it is sufficient to observe here that, except as to the alleged agreement
between the Ang Tibay and the National Worker's Brotherhood (appendix A), the record is barren and does not satisfy the
thirst for a factual basis upon which to predicate, in a national way, a conclusion of law.

This result, however, does not now preclude the concession of a new trial prayed for the by respondent National Labor
Union, Inc., it is alleged that "the supposed lack of material claimed by Toribio Teodoro was but a scheme adopted to
systematically discharged all the members of the National Labor Union Inc., from work" and this avernment is desired to
be proved by the petitioner with the "records of the Bureau of Customs and the Books of Accounts of native dealers in
leather"; that "the National Workers Brotherhood Union of Ang Tibay is a company or employer union dominated by
Toribio Teodoro, the existence and functions of which are illegal." Petitioner further alleges under oath that the exhibits
attached to the petition to prove his substantial avernments" are so inaccessible to the respondents that even within the
exercise of due diligence they could not be expected to have obtained them and offered as evidence in the Court of
Industrial Relations", and that the documents attached to the petition "are of such far reaching importance and effect that
their admission would necessarily mean the modification and reversal of the judgment rendered herein." We have
considered the reply of Ang Tibay and its arguments against the petition. By and large, after considerable discussions, we
have come to the conclusion that the interest of justice would be better served if the movant is given opportunity to
present at the hearing the documents referred to in his motion and such other evidence as may be relevant to the main
issue involved. The legislation which created the Court of Industrial Relations and under which it acts is new. The failure
to grasp the fundamental issue involved is not entirely attributable to the parties adversely affected by the result.
Accordingly, the motion for a new trial should be and the same is hereby granted, and the entire record of this case shall
be remanded to the Court of Industrial Relations, with instruction that it reopen the case, receive all such evidence as may
be relevant and otherwise proceed in accordance with the requirements set forth hereinabove. So ordered.

Avanceña, C. J., Villa-Real, Imperial, Diaz, Concepcion and Moran, JJ., concur.

B. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS

ESTRADA V. SANDIGANBAYAN                    G.R. No. 148560. November 19, 2001

FACTS:

Former President Estrada and co-accused were charged for Plunder under RA 7080 (An Act Defining and Penalizing the
Crime of Plunder), as amended by RA 7659.
On the information, it was alleged that Estrada have received billions of pesos through any or a combination or a series of
overt or criminal acts, or similar schemes or means thereby unjustly enriching himself or themselves at the expense and
to the damage of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.

Estrada questions the constitutionality of the Plunder Law since for him:

1. it suffers from the vice of vagueness

2. it dispenses with the "reasonable doubt" standard in criminal prosecutions

3. it abolishes the element of mens rea in crimes already punishable under The Revised Penal Code.

Office of the Ombudsman filed before the Sandiganbayan 8 separate Informations against petitioner.

Estrada filed an Omnibus Motion on the grounds of lack of preliminary investigation, reconsideration/reinvestigation of
offenses and opportunity to prove lack of probable cause but was denied.

Later on, the Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution in Crim. Case No. 26558 finding that a probable cause for the offense of
plunder exists to justify the issuance of warrants for the arrest of the accused.

Estrada moved to quash the Information in Criminal Case No. 26558 on the ground that the facts alleged therein did NOT
constitute an indictable offense since the law on which it was based was unconstitutional for vagueness and that the
Amended Information for Plunder charged more than one offense. Same was denied.

The questioned provisions of the petitioners are Secs. 1, par. (d), 2 and 4 of the Plunder Law which states that:

Section 1. x x x x (d) "Ill-gotten wealth" means any asset, property, business, enterprise or material possession of any
person within the purview of Section Two (2) hereof, acquired by him directly or indirectly through dummies, nominees,
agents, subordinates and/or business associates by any combination or series of the following means or similar schemes:
(1) Through misappropriation, conversion, misuse, or malversation of public funds or raids on the public treasury;
(2) By receiving, directly or indirectly, any commission, gift, share, percentage, kickbacks or any other form of pecuniary
benefit from any person and/or entity in connection with any government contract or project or by reason of the office or
position of the public office concerned;
(3) By the illegal or fraudulent conveyance or disposition of assets belonging to the National Government or any of its
subdivisions, agencies or instrumentalities, or government owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries;
(4) By obtaining, receiving or accepting directly or indirectly any shares of stock, equity or any other form of interest or
participation including the promise of future employment in any business enterprise or undertaking;
(5) By establishing agricultural, industrial or commercial monopolies or other combinations and/or implementation of
decrees and orders intended to benefit particular persons or special interests; or
(6) By taking advantage of official position, authority, relationship, connection or influence to unjustly enrich himself or
themselves at the expense and to the damage and prejudice of the Filipino people and the Republic of the Philippines.
Section 2. Definition of the Crime of Plunder, Penalties. - Any public officer who, by himself or in connivance with
members of his family, relatives by affinity or consanguinity, business associates, subordinates or other persons,
amasses, accumulates or acquires ill-gotten wealth through a combination or series of overt or criminal acts  as
described in Section 1 (d) hereof, in the aggregate amount or total value of at least fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
shall be guilty of the crime of plunder and shall be punished by reclusion perpetua to death.  Any person who participated
with the said public officer in the commission of an offense contributing to the crime of plunder shall likewise be punished
for such offense.  In the imposition of penalties, the degree of participation and the attendance of mitigating and
extenuating circumstances as provided by the  Revised  Penal Code shall be considered by the court. The court shall
declare any and all ill-gotten wealth and their interests and other incomes and assets including the properties and shares
of stocks derived from the deposit or investment thereof forfeited in favor of the State (underscoring supplied).
Section 4. Rule of Evidence. - For purposes of establishing the crime of plunder, it shall not be necessary to prove  each
and every criminal act done by the accused in furtherance of the scheme or conspiracy to amass, accumulate or
acquire ill-gotten wealth, it being sufficient to establish beyond reasonable doubt a pattern of overt or criminal
acts indicative of the overall unlawful scheme or conspiracy (underscoring supplied).
ISSUE:

WON the crime of plunder is unconstitutional for being vague?

HELD:
NO. As long as the law affords some comprehensible guide or rule that would inform those who are subject to it what
conduct would render them liable to its penalties, its validity will be sustained. The amended information itself closely
tracks the language of the law, indicating w/ reasonable certainty the various elements of the offense w/c the petitioner is
alleged to have committed.

We discern nothing in the foregoing that is vague or ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his defense.

Petitioner, however, bewails the failure of the law to provide for the statutory definition of the
terms “combination” and “series” in the key phrase “a combination or series of overt or criminal acts. These
omissions, according to the petitioner, render the Plunder Law unconstitutional for being impermissibly vague and
overbroad and deny him the right to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, hence violative of
his fundamental right to due process.

A statute is not rendered uncertain and void merely because general terms are used herein, or because of the
employment of terms without defining them.

A statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence most
necessarily guess at its meaning and differ in its application. In such instance, the statute is repugnant to the Constitution
in two (2) respects – it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of
what conduct  to avoid; and, it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and becomes an
arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.

A facial challenge is allowed to be made to vague statute and to one which is overbroad because of possible  “chilling
effect” upon protected speech.  The possible harm to society in permitting some unprotected speech to go unpunished is
outweighed by the possibility that the protected speech of others may be deterred and perceived grievances left to fester
because of possible inhibitory effects of overly broad statutes. But in criminal law, the law cannot take chances as in the
area of free speech.

David v. Arroyo (May 3, 2006) 

FACTS:
 Feb. 24, 2006: On the 20th anniv. of EDSA revolution, PGMA issued Presidential Proclamation No. 10171 (PP 1017)
declaring a state of national emergency. She also issued General Order No. 52 (G.O. No. 5) implementing PP 1017.
o They were issued allegedly to suppress the lawlessness of certain elements and the conspiracy between the
opposition, the NDF-CPP-NPA (Extreme Left) and the military adventurists (Extreme Right) to assassinate
her and take over the government. The claims of said elements have been magnified by the national media.
o Some Madgalo members who were indicted in the Oakwood mutiny escaped their detention cell and issued
public statements calling the people to go to the streets and protest. One of their members, a Lt. San Juan,
was recaptured and in his possession were flash disks which contained recordings of meetings bet. NPA and
Magdalo. He also said thru DZRH that Magdalo’s D-Day was on Feb. 24.
o They also discovered a document (Oplan Hackle I) which contained plans for bombings during the PMA
Alumni Homecoming and a plot to assassinate some cabinet members and PGMA. A bomb was allegedly
found during the celebration.
o Military heads (B/Gen. Lim & Col. Querubin) also confided to the Chief of Staff of the AFP, that a huge
number of soldiers would join the rallies to provide a critical mass and armed component to the Anti-Arroyo
protests.
o Head of Leftists groups (CPP-NPA and NDF) proclaimed that the end of Arroyo’s regime was drawing near.
o There was also a bombing of telecommunication towers and cell sites in Bulacan and Bataan and a raid of an
army outpost in Benguet resulting to the death of 3 soldiers.
o Art. 2, Sec. 4 of the Const. makes the defense and preservation of the democratic institutions and the State
the primary duty of Government. Said activities and collateral effects constitute a clear and present danger to
the safety and the integrity of the State and of the Filipino people
 Pursuant to the issuances, PGMA cancelled all plans to celebrate the 20 th anniv. of EDSA and revoked permits earlier
issued by the local gov’t to hold rallies, banned all rallies and canceled all permits for public assemblies.
o Despite this, KMU & NAFLU-KMU marched from various parts of Metro Manila with the intention of
converging at the EDSA shrine. However, they were violently dispersed by huge clusters of anti-riot police
who cited PP 1017 as the ground for the dispersal of their assemblies.
o Among those arrested (without warrant) were Randy David and his companion, Ronald Llamas, president of
Akbayan.
 Feb. 25, 2006 (12:20 AM): Operatives of the PNP-CIDG, on the basis of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5, also raided the
Daily Tribune offices, of which Cacho-Olivares is the editor, confiscating news stories etc. The police also surrounded
the premises of another pro-opposition paper, Malaya, and its sister publication, the tabloid Abante.
o PNP warned that it would take over any media organization that would not follow “standards set by the
government during the state of national emergency.”
 On the same day, the police arrested Cong. Beltran of Anakpawis and Chairman of KMU while leaving his farmhouse
in Bulacan. His warrant was allegedly dated on 1985, a remnant of the Marcos regime. When his members visited
him, they were not admitted bec. of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
 Bayan Muna Rep. Satur Ocampo eluded arrest at the Sulo Hotel in QC but his 2 drivers were taken into custody while
Retired Major Gen. Montaño, former head of the Phil. Const., was arrested while at a golf club. Attempts were also
made to arrest Rep. Mariano, Bayan Muna’s Ted Casiño & Gabriela’s Liza Maza. The “Batasan 5” were subsequently
under the custody of HoR.
 7 consolidated petitions for certiorari and prohibition were filed alleging that in issuing PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5,
PGMA committed grave abuse of discretion and the issuances are void for being unconstitutional.
o 3 of these petitions impleaded PGMA as respondent (G.R. No. 171396 – David, G.R. No. 171483 – KMU,
G.R. No. 171424 – Legarda)
 Mar. 3, 2006: However, PGMA subsequently lifted PP 1017 and issued Proc. No. 1021 declaring that the state of
national emergency has ceased to exist because the AFP and PNP have effectively quelled the said activities.
PETITIONERS’ ARGUMENTS

 G.R. No. 171396: Prof. Randolf David, Lorenzo Tanada III, Ronald Llamas, H. Harry Roque, Joel Butuyan, Roger R.
Rayer, Gary S. Mallari, Romel Regalado Bagares, Christopher Bolastig vs. Gloria Macapagal – Arroyo as
President and Commander in Chief, Exec. Sec. Eduardo Ermita, Hon. Avelino Cruz II, Sec. of Nat’l Defense, Gen.
Generoso Senga, Chief of Staff, AFP, Dir. Gen. Arturo Lomibao, Chief, PNP

1 xxx as President of the Republic of the Philippines, and Commander-in-Chief of the Republic of the Philippines and by virtue of the powers vested upon me by Sec. 18, Art. 7 of the Phil.
Const. which states that: “The President. . . whenever it becomes necessary, . . . may call out (the) armed forces to prevent or suppress. . .rebellion . . .,” and in my capacity as their
Commander-in-Chief, do hereby command the AFP, to maintain law and order throughout the Philippines, prevent or suppress all forms of lawless violence as well as any act of insurrection or
rebellion and to enforce obedience to all the laws and to all decrees, orders and regulations promulgated by me personally or upon my direction; and as provided in Sec. 17, Article 12
of the Const. do hereby declare a State of National Emergency

2 I hereby direct the Chief of Staff of the AFP and the Chief of the PNP, as well as the officers and men of the AFP and PNP, to immediately carry out the necessary and appropriate
actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of terrorism and lawless violence.
 o Assailed PP 1017 on the grounds that (1) it encroaches on the emergency powers of Congress; (2) it is a
subterfuge to avoid the constitutional requirements for the imposition of martial law; and (3) it violates the
constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press, of speech and of assembly.
 G.R. No. 171409: Ninez Cacho-Olivares and Tribune Publishing Co., Inc. vs. Exec. Sec. Ermita and Lomibao
o Challenged the CIDG’s act of raiding the Daily Tribune offices: (1) Such raid is a clear case of “censorship” or
“prior restraint.” (2) “Emergency” refers only to tsunami, typhoon, hurricane and similar occurrences, hence,
there is “absolutely no emergency” that warrants the issuance of PP 1017.
 G.R. No. 171485: Rep. Escudero, and 21 other members of the HoR vs. Ermita, Cruz, Senga, Puno, Lomibao
o PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 constitute “usurpation of legislative powers”; “violation of freedom of expression” and
“a declaration of martial law and PGMA “gravely abused her discretion in calling out the armed forces without
clear and verifiable factual basis of the possibility of lawless violence and a showing that there is necessity to
do so.”
 G.R. No. 171483: KMU, NAFLU-KMU, and their members vs. Her excellency, Pres. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo,
Ermita, Senga, Lomibao
o PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because: (1) they arrogate unto PGMA the power to enact laws
and decrees; (2) their issuance was without factual basis; and (3) they violate freedom of expression and the
right of the people to peaceably assemble to redress their grievances.
 G.R. No. 171400: Alternative Law Groups, Inc. vs. Ermita, Lomibao, Senga
o PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional because they violate: (a) Sec. 4 of Art. II (prime duty of the
Government is to serve and protect the people); (b) Sec. 1 (due process), Sec. 2 (unlawful search and
seizure) and Sec. 4 (freedom of speech, expression, press, assembly, petition for grievances) of Article III; (c)
Sec. 23 of Art. VI (Congress has sole power to declare existence of a state of war and President must be
authorized by Congress by law to exercise powers necessary to carry out policy in times of war or other
national emergency); (d) Sec. 17 of Art. XII (State may during emergency temporarily direct operation of any
privately owned public utility in times of national emergency, when the public interest so requires)
 G.R. No. 171489: Cadiz et al. and IBP vs. Ermita, Lomibao, Senga
o PP 1017 is an “arbitrary and unlawful exercise by the President of her Martial Law powers.” Assuming that PP
1017 is not really a declaration of Martial Law, “it amounts to an exercise by the President of emergency
powers without congressional approval” and “goes beyond the nature and function of a proclamation as
defined under the Revised Administrative Code.”
 G.R. No. 171424: Loren Legarda vs. Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, in her capacity as President and Commander-in-
Chief, Lomibao, Senga, Ermita
o PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are “unconstitutional for being violative of the freedom of expression, including its
cognate rights such as freedom of the press and the right to access to information on matters of public
concern and such issuances prevented her from fully prosecuting her election protest pending before the
PET.

RESPONDENTS’ COMMENTS

 The intent of the Constitution is to give full discretionary powers to the President in determining the necessity of
calling out the armed forces. None of the petitioners has shown that PP 1017 was without factual bases.
 OSG countered that:
o (1) Petitions should be dismissed for being moot;
o (2) Petitioners in G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171424 (Legarda), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171485 (Escudero et al.)
and 171489 (Cadiz et al.) have no legal standing;
o (3) It is not necessary for petitioners to implead President Arroyo as respondent ;
o (4) PP 1017 has constitutional and legal basis; and
o (5) PP 1017 does not violate the people’s right to free expression and redress of grievances.

ISSUES + RULING:

Whether it was proper to implead PGMA as respondent? (NO)

 Incidentally to the issue of locus standi (which petitioners all have), it is not proper to implead PGMA as respondent.
 The President, during his tenure of office or actual incumbency, may not be sued in any civil or criminal case, and
there is no need to provide for it in the Constitution or law.
o From the deliberations of the Const. Commission, the intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the
President from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term. (De Leon)
 It will degrade the dignity of the high office of the President, the Head of State, if he can be dragged into court
litigations while serving as such.
 It is important that he be freed from any form of harassment, hindrance or distraction to enable him to fully
attend to the performance of his official duties and functions.
 Unlike the legislative and judicial branch, only one constitutes the executive branch and anything which impairs his
usefulness in the discharge of the many great and important duties imposed upon him by the Const. necessarily
impairs the operation of the Government.
 HOWEVER, this does not mean that the President is not accountable to anyone. Like any other official, he
remains accountable to the people.
o Sec. 1, Art. XI of the Const: Public Office is a public trust. Public officers and employees must at all times be
accountable to the people, serve them with utmost responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency, act with
patriotism and justice, and lead modest lives.
 But he may be removed from office only in the mode provided by law and that is by impeachment. ( Sec. 2., Art. XI of
the Const.)
OTHER ISSUES NOT RELATED

A. PROCEDURAL

Whether the issuance of PP 1021 renders the petitions moot and academic? (NO)

 Subsequent issuance of PP 1021 did not render the present petitions moot and academic. During the 8 days that PP
1017 was operative, the police officers committed illegal acts in implementing it.
 Also, the court may resolve a case otherwise moot and academic if all the exceptions are present. Issuance of PP
1017 and G.O. No. 5 allegedly violates the Constitution; the issues affect the public’s interest since they involve
people’s basic rights; SC has the duty to formulate guiding and controlling constitutional precepts; and respondents’
contested actions are capable of repetition.
Whether petitioners in 171485 (Escudero et al.), G.R. Nos. 171400 (ALGI), 171483 (KMU et al.), 171489 (Cadiz et al.),
and 171424 (Legarda) have legal standing? (YES, all petitioners have locus standi)

 G.R. No. 171396 & G.R. No. 171409: David & Llamas and Cacho-Olivares & Tribune Publishing Co. Inc have locus
standi since they alleged “direct injury” resulting from “illegal arrest” and “unlawful search” committed by police
operatives pursuant to PP 1017.
 G.R. No. 171485: Opposition Congressmen alleged there was usurpation of legislative powers since the concurrence
of Congress is necessary whenever the alarming powers incident to Martial Law are used.
 G.R. No. 171400: As to ALGI, the liberality rule is applied. When the issue concerns a public right, it is sufficient that
the petitioner is a citizen and has an interest in the execution of the laws.
 G.R. No. 171483: KMU asserted that the issuances violated its right to peaceful assembly. Organizations may be
granted standing to assert the rights of their members.
 G.R. No. 171489 & G.R. No. 171424: Cadiz et al. and Loren Legarda only have standing in view of the
transcendental importance of the issue.
B. SUBSTANTIVE

Whether the Supreme Court can review the factual bases of PP 1017? (YES)

 Sec. 1, Art. VIII of 1987 Const. provides a new definition of judicial power where the courts are authorized to also
“determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government
 It is, however, incumbent upon the petitioner to show that the President’s decision is totally bereft of factual
basis”. Petitioners failed to show that President Arroyo’s exercise of the calling-out power, by issuing PP 1017, is
totally bereft of factual basis.
Whether PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5 are unconstitutional? (In part, see dispositive)

 In times of emergency, our Const. reasonably demands that we repose a certain amount of faith in the basic integrity
and wisdom of the President, at the same time, it obliges him to operate within carefully prescribed procedural
limitations.
a. “Facial Challenge”

 A facial review of PP 1017, using the overbreadth doctrine, is uncalled for since it is an analytical tool for testing “on
their faces” statutes in free speech cases and is not intended for testing the validity of a law that “reflects legitimate
state interest in maintaining comprehensive control over harmful, constitutionally unprotected conduct”. Also,
 challengers must establish that there can be no instance when the assailed law may be valid which was not made in
this case.
 Petitioners likewise did not even attempt to show that PP 1017 is vague in all its application and that all men of
common intelligence cannot understand the meaning and application of PP 1017.
b. Constitutional Basis of PP 1017

Calling-out Power

 PP 1017 is constitutional insofar as it constitutes a call by the President for the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence. Only criterion for the exercise of the calling-out power is that “whenever it becomes necessary,” the
President may call the armed forces “to prevent or suppress lawless violence, invasion or rebellion (Sec. 18, Art.
VII of the Const.).”
 PP 1017 is also not a declaration of Martial Law since it is plain that what the President invoked was her calling-out
power. As such, it cannot be used to justify acts that only under a valid declaration of Martial Law can be done
(arrests w/out warrant, ban on public assemblies, censorship, etc.).
“Take Care” Power

 However, PP 1017’s extraneous provisions giving the President express or implied power (1) to issue decrees; (2) to
direct the AFP to enforce obedience to all laws even those not related to lawless violence as well as decrees
promulgated by the President; and (3) to impose standards on media or any form of prior restraint on the press, are
ultra vires and unconstitutional.
 She cannot call the military to enforce or implement all laws but only such laws pertinent to its duty to suppress
lawless violence.
Power to Take Over

 Under Sec. 17, Art. XII of the Constitution, the President, in the absence of a legislation, cannot take over privately-
owned public utility and private business affected with public interest.
 A distinction must be drawn between the President’s authority to declare “a state of national emergency” and to
exercise emergency powers. Sec. 18, Article VII grants the President such power to declare a state of nat’l
emergency but the exercise of emergency powers, such as the taking over of privately owned public utility or
business affected with public interest, requires a delegation from Congress.
 “Emergency,” as contemplated in our Constitution may include rebellion, economic crisis, pestilence or epidemic,
typhoon, flood, or other similar catastrophe of nationwide proportions or effect.
c. “AS APPLIED CHALLENGE”

 G.O. No. 5 is also valid since it provides a valid standard – that the military and the police should take only the
“necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of lawless violence.”
 But the words “acts of terrorism” found in G.O. No. 5 have not been legally defined and made punishable by
Congress and should thus be deemed deleted from the said G.O since no law can be used as a guide to determine
the limits of the AFP’s authority in carrying out this portion of G.O. No. 5.
 The validity of a statute or ordinance is to be determined from its general purpose and its efficiency to accomplish the
end desired, not from its effects in a particular case. While the general purpose of PP 1017 is to command the
AFP to suppress all forms of lawless violence, invasion or rebellion, there is nothing in PP 1017 allowing the police,
expressly or impliedly, to conduct illegal arrest, search or violate the citizens’ constitutional rights.
 Hence (1) the warrantless arrest of petitioners Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; (2) the dispersal of the rallies
and warrantless arrest of the KMU and NAFLU-KMU members; (3) the imposition of standards on media or any prior
restraint on the press; and (4) the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and the whimsical seizures of some
articles for publication and other materials, are not authorized by the Constitution, the law and jurisprudence.
Not even by the valid provisions of PP 1017 and G.O. No. 5.
DISPOSITION: Petitions are partly granted.

As to PP 1017

 PP 1017 is CONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it constitutes a call by PGMA on the AFP to prevent or suppress lawless
violence.
 However, the provisions of PP 1017 commanding the AFP to enforce laws not related to lawless violence, as well as
decrees promulgated by the President, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
 The provision in PP 1017 declaring national emergency under Sec. 17, Art. VII of the Const. is CONSTITUTIONAL,
but such declaration does not authorize the President to take over privately-owned public utility or business affected
with public interest without prior legislation.
As to G.O. No. 5
 G.O. No. 5 is CONSTITUTIONAL since it provides a standard by which the AFP and the PNP should implement PP
1017, i.e. whatever is “necessary and appropriate actions and measures to suppress and prevent acts of
lawless violence.”
 Considering that “acts of terrorism” have not yet been defined and made punishable by the Legislature, such portion
of G.O. No. 5 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
As to the warrantless arrest of David & Llamas, search and seizure of Tribune offices, imposition of standards on
media

 The warrantless arrest of Randolf S. David and Ronald Llamas; the dispersal and warrantless arrest of the KMU and
NAFLU-KMU members during their rallies, in the absence of proof that these petitioners were committing acts
constituting lawless violence, invasion or rebellion and violating BP 880; the imposition of standards on media or any
form of prior restraint on the press, as well as the warrantless search of the Tribune offices and whimsical seizure of
its articles for publication and other materials, are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
G.R. No. 121777       January 24, 2001

THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,

vs.
CAROL M. DELA PIEDRA, accused-appellant.

Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra questions her conviction for illegal recruitment in large scale and assails, as well,
the constitutionality of the law defining and penalizing said crime.

The Court affirms the constitutionality of the law and the conviction of the accused, but reduces the penalty imposed upon
her.

The accused was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Zamboanga City in an information alleging:

That on or about January 30, 1994, in the City of Zamboanga, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused, without having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration, a license or authority to engage in recruitment and overseas placement of workers, did then and there,
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously, offer and promise for a fee employment abroad particularly in Singapore thus causing
Maria Lourdes Modesto [y] Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, all qualified to apply, in fact
said Maria Lourdes Modesto had already advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of
the promised employment which did not materialized [sic] thus causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the said sum;
furthermore, the acts complained of herein tantamount [sic] to economic sabotage in that the same were committed in
large scale.1

Arraigned on June 20, 1994, the accused pleaded not guilty 2 to these charges.

At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen
Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto. The succeeding narration is gathered from their testimonies:

On January 30, 1994, at exactly 10:00 in the morning, Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment
conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa. Ramos, whose duties include the surveillance of suspected illegal recruiters,
immediately contacted a friend, a certain Mayeth Bellotindos, so they could both go to No. 26-D, Tetuan Highway, Sta.
Cruz, Zamboanga City, where the recruitment was reportedly being undertaken. Upon arriving at the reported area at
around 4:00 p.m., Bellotindos entered the house and pretended to be an applicant. Ramos remained outside and stood on
the pavement, from where he was able to see around six (6) persons in the house's sala. Ramos even heard a woman,
identified as Carol Fegueroa, talk about the possible employment she has to provide in Singapore and the documents that
the applicants have to comply with. Fifteen (15) minutes later, Bellotindos came out with a bio-data form in hand.

On February 1, 1994, Ramos conferred with a certain Capt. Mendoza of the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) to
organize the arrest of the alleged illegal recruiter. Also present were other members of the CIS, including Col. Rodolfo
Almonte, Regional Director of the PNP-CIS for Region IX, Eileen Fermindoza, and a certain SPO3 Santos. The group
planned to entrap the illegal recruiter the next day by having Fermindoza pose as an applicant. 3

On February 2, 1994, at around 8:00 p.m., Col. Almonte directed the case to SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, a member of the
Philippine National Police who was assigned as an investigator of the CIS, to conduct a surveillance of the area to confirm
the report of illegal recruitment. Accordingly, he, along with Eileen Fermindoza, immediately proceeded to Tetuan
Highway. The two did not enter the house where the recruitment was supposedly being conducted, but Fermindoza
interviewed two people who informed them that some people do go inside the house. Upon returning to their office at
around 8:30 a.m., the two reported to Capt. Mendoza who organized a team to conduct the raid.

The raiding team, which included Capt. Mendoza, SPO2 Manalopilar, Fermindoza and a certain Oscar Bucol, quickly set
off and arrived at the reported scene at 9:30 that morning. There they met up with Erlie Ramos of the POEA. Fermindoza
then proceeded to enter the house while the rest of the team posted themselves outside to secure the area. Fermindoza
was instructed to come out after she was given a bio-data form, which will serve as the team's cue to enter the house. 4

Fermindoza introduced herself as a job applicant to a man and a woman, apparently the owners of the house, and went
inside. There, she saw another woman, later identified as Jasmine, coming out of the bathroom. The man to whom
Fermindoza earlier introduced herself told Jasmine that Fermindoza was applying for a position. Jasmine, who was then
only wearing a towel, told her that she would just get dressed. Jasmine then came back and asked Fermindoza what
position she was applying for. Fermindoza replied that she was applying to be a babysitter or any other work so long as
she could go abroad. Jasmine then gave her an application form.

A few minutes later, a certain Carol arrived. Jasmine informed Carol that Fermindoza was an applicant. Fermindoza
asked Carol what the requirements were and whether she (Fermindoza) was qualified. Carol told Fermindoza that if she
had a passport, she could fill up the application papers. Fermindoza replied that she had no passport yet. Carol said she
need not worry since Jasmine will prepare the passport for her. While filling up the application form, three women who
appeared to be friends of Jasmine arrived to follow up the result of their applications and to give their advance payment.
Jasmine got their papers and put them on top of a small table. Fermindoza then proceeded to the door and signaled to the
raiding party by raising her hand.

Capt. Mendoza asked the owners of the house, a married couple, for permission to enter the same. The owners granted
permission after the raiding party introduced themselves as members of the CIS. Inside the house, the raiding party saw
some supposed applicants. Application forms, already filled up, were in the hands of one Mrs. Carol Figueroa. The CIS
asked Figueroa if she had a permit to recruit. Figueroa retorted that she was not engaged in recruitment. Capt. Mendoza
nevertheless proceeded to arrest Figueroa. He took the application forms she was holding as the raiding party seized the
other papers5 on the table.6

The CIS team then brought Figueroa, a certain Jasmine Alejandro, and the three women suspected to be applicants, to
the office for investigation.7

In the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them, Carol Llena
and Carol dela Piedra. The accused was not able to present any authority to recruit when asked by the investigators. 8 A
check by Ramos with the POEA revealed that the acused was not licensed or authorized to conduct recruitment. 9 A
certification10 dated February 2, 1994 stating thus was executed by Renegold M. Macarulay, Officer-in-Charge of the
POEA.

The CIS likewise interviewed the supposed applicants, Lourdes Modesto, Nancy Araneta and Jennelyn Baez, all
registered nurses working at the Cabato Medical Hospital, who executed their respective written statements. 11

At the trial, Nancy Araneta, 23, recounted that she was at Jasmine Alejandro's house in the afternoon of January 30,
1994. Araneta had learned from Sandra Aquino, also a nurse at the Cabato Medical Hospital, that a woman was there to
recruit job applicants for Singapore.

Araneta and her friends, Jennelyn Baez and Sandra Aquino, arrived at Jasmine's house at around 4:30 p.m. Jasmine
welcomed them and told them to sit down. They listened to the "recruiter" who was then talking to a number of people.
The recruiter said that she was "recruiting" nurses for Singapore. Araneta and her friends then filled up bio-data forms and
were required to submit pictures and a transcript of records. They were also told to pay P2,000, and "the rest will be salary
deduction." Araneta submitted her bio-data form to Carol that same afternoon, but did not give any money because she
was "not yet sure."

On the day of the raid on February 2, 1994, Araneta was again at the Alejandro residence to submit her transcript of
records and her picture. She arrived at the house 30 minutes before the raid but did not witness the arrest since she was
at the porch when it happened.12

Maria Lourdes Modesto, 26, was also in Jasmine Alejandro's house on January 30, 1994. A friend of Jasmine had
informed her that there was someone recruiting in Jasmine's house. Upon arriving at the Alejandro residence, Lourdes
was welcomed by Jasmine.1âwphi1.nêt

Lourdes recalled that Carol Figueroa was already briefing some people when she arrived. Carol Figueroa asked if they
would like a "good opportunity" since a hospital was hiring nurses. She gave a breakdown of the fees involved: P30,000
for the visa and the round trip ticket, and P5,000 as placement fee and for the processing of the papers. The initial
payment was P2,000, while P30,000 will be by salary deduction.

Lourdes filled up the application form and submitted it to Jasmine. After the interview, she gave the initial payment of
P2,000 to Jasmine, who assured Lourdes that she was authorized to receive the money. On February 2, 1994, however,
Lourdes went back to the house to get back the money. Jasmine gave back the money to Lourdes after the raid. 13

Denial comprised the accused's defense.

Carol dela Piedra, 37, is a housewife and a resident of Cebu City. Her husband is a businessman from Cebu, the
manager of the Region 7 Branch of the Grollier International Encyclopedia. They own an apartment in Cebu City,
providing lodging to students.

The accused claimed that she goes to Singapore to visit her relatives. She first traveled to Singapore on August 21, 1993
as a tourist, and came back to the Philippines on October 20 of the same year. Thereafter, she returned to Singapore on
December 10, 1993.

On December 21, 1993, while in Singapore, the accused was invited to a Christmas party sponsored by the Zamboanga
City Club Association. On that occasion, she met a certain Laleen Malicay, who sought her help. A midwife, Malicay had
been working in Singapore for six (6) years. Her employer is a certain Mr. Tan, a close friend of Carol.

According to the accused, Malicay sent P15,000 home for her father who was then seriously ill. Malicay was not sure,
however, whether her father received the money so she requested the accused to verify from her relatives receipt thereof.
She informed the accused that she had a cousin by the name of Jasmine Alejandro. Malicay gave the accused Jasmine's
telephone number, address and a sketch of how to get there.

The accused returned to the country on January 21, 1994. From Cebu City, the accused flew to Zamboanga City on
January 23, 1994 to give some presents to her friends.

On January 30, 1994, the accused called up Jasmine Alejandro, Laleen Malicay's cousin, to inform her that she would be
going to her house. At around noon that day, the accused, accompanied by her friend Hilda Falcasantos, arrived at the
house where she found Jasmine entertaining some friends. Jasmine came down with two of her friends whom she
introduced as her classmates. Jasmine told them that the accused was a friend of Laleen Malicay.

The accused relayed to Jasmine Malicay's message regarding the money the latter had sent. Jasmine assured her that
they received the money, and asked Carol to tell Malicay to send more money for medicine for Malicay's mother. Jasmine
also told her that she would send something for Malicay when the accused goes back to Singapore. The accused replied
that she just needed to confirm her flight back to Cebu City, and will return to Jasmine's house. After the meeting with
Jasmine, the accused went shopping with Hilda Falcasantos. The accused was in the house for only fifteen (15) minutes.

On February 2, 1994, the accused went to the Philippine Airlines office at 7:30 in the morning to confirm her 5:30 p.m.
flight to Cebu City. She then proceeded to Jasmine's residence, arriving there at past 8 a.m.

Inside the house, she met a woman who asked her, "Are you Carol from Singapore?" The accused, in turn, asked the
woman if she could do anything for her. The woman inquired from Carol if she was recruiting. Carol replied in the
negative, explaining that she was there just to say goodbye to Jasmine. The woman further asked Carol what the
requirements were if she (the woman) were to go to Singapore. Carol replied that she would need a passport.

Two (2) minutes later, three (3) girls entered the house looking for Jasmine. The woman Carol was talking with then stood
up and went out. A minute after, three (3) members of the CIS and a POEA official arrived. A big man identified himself as
a member of the CIS and informed her that they received a call that she was recruiting. They told her she had just
interviewed a woman from the CIS. She denied this, and said that she came only to say goodbye to the occupants of the
house, and to get whatever Jasmine would be sending for Laleen Malicay. She even showed them her ticket for Cebu
City.

Erlie Ramos then went up to Jasmine's room and returned with some papers. The accused said that those were the
papers that Laleen Malicay requested Jasmine to give to her (the accused). The accused surmised that because Laleen
Malicay wanted to go home but could not find a replacement, one of the applicants in the forms was to be her (Malicay's)
substitute. Ramos told the accused to explain in their office.

The accused denied in court that she went to Jasmine's residence to engage in recruitment. She claimed she came to
Zamboanga City to visit her friends, to whom she could confide since she and her husband were having some problems.
She denied she knew Nancy Araneta or that she brought information sheets for job placement. She also denied
instructing Jasmine to collect P2,000 from alleged applicants as processing fee. 14

The accused presented two witnesses to corroborate her defense.

The first, Jasmine Alejandro, 23, testified that she met the accused for the first time only on January 30, 1994 when the
latter visited them to deliver Laleen Malicay's message regarding the money she sent. Carol, who was accompanied by a
certain Hilda Falcasantos, stayed in their house for 10 to 15 minutes only. Carol came back to the house a few days later
on February 2 at around 8:00 in the morning to "get the envelope for the candidacy of her daughter." Jasmine did not
elaborate.

Jasmine denied that she knew Nancy Araneta or Lourdes Modesto. She denied that the accused conducted recruitment.
She claimed she did not see Carol distribute bio-data or application forms to job applicants. She disclaimed any
knowledge regarding the P2,000 application fee.15

The other defense witness, Ernesto Morales, a policeman, merely testified that the accused stayed in their house in No.
270 Tugbungan, Zamboanga City, for four (4) days before her arrest, although she would sometimes go downtown alone.
He said he did not notice that she conducted any recruitment. 16

On May 5, 1995, the trial court rendered a decision convicting the accused, thus:

WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing consideration[s][,] this Court finds the accused Carol dela Piedra alias
Carol Llena and Carol Figueroa guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale
and hereby sentences her to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and to pay a fine of P100,000.00, and
also to pay the costs.

Being a detention prisoner, the said accused is entitled to the full time of the period of her detention during the
pendency of this case under the condition set forth in Article 29 of the Revised Penal Code.

SO ORDERED.17

The accused, in this appeal, ascribes to the trial court the following errors:

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING SEC. 13 (B) OF P.D. 442[,] AS
AMENDED[,] OTHERWISE KNOWN AS [THE] ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT LAW UNCONSTITUTIONAL.

II

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT HOLDING THAT THE APPREHENDING TEAM
COMPOSED OF POEA AND CIS REPRESENTATIVES ENTERED INTO [sic] THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E]
ALEJANDRO WITHOUT ANY SEARCH WARRANT IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE
PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION, AND ANY EVIDENCE OBTAINED IN VIOLATION THEREOF, SHALL BE
INADMISSIBLE FOR ANY PURPOSE IN ANY PROCEEDING AS PROVIDED UNDER ARTICLE III, SECTION 3,
(2) OF THE SAME CONSTITUTION;

III

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN IGNORING THAT WHEN SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N
FERMINDOZA ENTERED THE RESIDENCE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO, THERE WAS NO CRIME
COMMITTED WHATSOEVER, HENCE THE ARREST OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS ILLEGAL;

[IV]

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT SPO2 [sic] EILE[E]N
FERMINDOZA WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-
APPELLANT SHOULD BE ACQUITTED;

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DETECTING THAT NANCY ARANETA WAS NOT
ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED SHOULD BE EXONERATED;
 VI

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT REALIZING THAT MARIA LOURDES MODESTO
WAS NOT ILLEGALLY RECRUITED BY THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT, HENCE, ACCUSED-APPELLANT
SHOULD BE EXCULPATED;

VII

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT WAS
CHARGED WITH LARGE SCALE ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT ON JANUARY 30, 1994, THE DATE STATED IN
THE INFORMATION AS THE DATE OF THE CRIME, BUT ACCUSED WAS ARRESTED ON FEB. 2, 1994 AND
ALL THE EVIDENCES [sic] INDICATED [sic] THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME WERE [sic] COMMITTED ON FEB.
2, 1994, HENCE, THE INFORMATION IS FATALLY DEFECTIVE;

VIII

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE ALLEGED CRIME OF
ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT WAS COMMITTED NOT ON [sic] LARGE SCALE, HENCE, THE PENALTY SHOULD
NOT BE LIFE IMPRISONMENT;

IX

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THOSE EVIDENCES [sic]
SEIZED AT THE HOUSE OF JASMIN[E] ALEJANDRO AND PRESENTED TO THE COURT WERE PLANTED
BY A BOGUS ATTORNEY[,] ERLIE S. RAMOS OF THE POEA;

WITH DUE RESPECT, THE LOWER COURT ERRED IN NOT DISCOVERING THAT ACCUSED-APPELLANT
DID NOT RECEIVE ANY PAYMENT EVEN A SINGLE CENTAVO FROM THE ALLEGED VICTIMS WHO DID
NOT SUFFER DAMAGE IN ANY MANNER, YET SHE WAS CONVICTED TO SERVE HER ENTIRE LIFE
BEHIND PRISON BARS. SUCH PUNISHMENT WAS CRUEL AND UNUSUAL, HENCE, A WANTON
VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION.18

In the first assigned error, appellant maintains that the law defining "recruitment and placement" violates due process.
Appellant also avers, as part of her sixth assigned error, that she was denied the equal protection of the laws.

We shall address the issues jointly.

Appellant submits that Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining "recruitment and placement" is void for vagueness and,
thus, violates the due process clause.19

Due process requires that the terms of a penal statute must be sufficiently explicit to inform those who are subject to it
what conduct on their part will render them liable to its penalties. 20 A criminal statute that "fails to give a person of ordinary
intelligence fair notice that his contemplated conduct is forbidden by the statute," or is so indefinite that "it encourages
arbitrary and erratic arrests and convictions," is void for vagueness. 21 The constitutional vice in a vague or indefinite
statute is the injustice to the accused in placing him on trial for an offense, the nature of which he is given no fair
warning.22

We reiterated these principles in People vs. Nazario:23

As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men "of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application." It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.

We added, however, that:

 x x x the act must be utterly vague on its face, that is to say, it cannot be clarified by either a saving clause or by
construction. Thus, in Coates v. City of Cincinnati, the U.S. Supreme Court struck down an ordinance that had
made it illegal for "three or more persons to assemble on any sidewalk and there conduct themselves in a manner
annoying to persons passing by." Clearly, the ordinance imposed no standard at all "because one may never
know in advance what 'annoys some people but does not annoy others.'"

Coates highlights what has been referred to as a "perfectly vague" act whose obscurity is evident on its face. It is
to be distinguished, however, from legislation couched in imprecise language—but which nonetheless specifies a
standard though defectively phrased—in which case, it may be "saved" by proper construction.

Here, the provision in question reads:

ART. 13. Definitions.—(a) x x x.

(b) "Recruitment and placement" refers to any act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing,
hiring or procuring workers, and includes referrals, contract services, promising or advertising for employment,
locally or abroad, whether for profit or not: Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or
promises for a fee employment to two or more persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement.

x x x.

When undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority, recruitment activities are punishable as follows:

ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed
illegal and punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law
enforcement officer may initiate complaints under this Article.

(b) Illegal recruitment when committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.

Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or
scheme defined under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons individually or as a group.

x x x.

Art. 39. Penalties. – (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000)
shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein:

(b) Any licensee or holder of authority found violating or causing another to violate any provision of this Title or its
implementing rules and regulations, shall upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less
than five years or a fine of not less than P10,000 nor more than P50,000 or both such imprisonment and fine, at
the discretion of the court;

(c) Any person who is neither a licensee nor a holder of authority under this Title found violating any provision
thereof or its implementing rules and regulations shall, upon conviction thereof, suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of not less than four years nor more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000 nor more than P100,000 or
both such imprisonment and fine, at the discretion of the court;

x x x.

In support of her submission that Article 13 (b) is void for vagueness, appellant invokes People vs. Panis,24 where this
Court, to use appellant's term, "criticized" the definition of "recruitment and placement" as follows:

It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and
deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a
presidential decree is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or consultation,
the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not
infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain
esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.

If the Court in Panis "had to speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision," appellant asks, what more "the
ordinary citizen" who does not possess the "necessary [legal] knowledge?"

Appellant further argues that the acts that constitute "recruitment and placement" suffer from overbreadth since by merely
"referring" a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.

These contentions cannot be sustained.

Appellant's reliance on People vs. Panis is misplaced. The issue in Panis was whether, under the proviso of Article 13 (b),
the crime of illegal recruitment could be committed only "whenever two or more persons are in any manner promised or
offered any employment for a fee." The Court held in the negative, explaining:

As we see it, the proviso was intended neither to impose a condition on the basic rule nor to provide an exception thereto
but merely to create a presumption. The presumption is that the individual or entity is engaged in recruitment and
placement whenever he or it is dealing with two or more persons to whom, in consideration of a fee, an offer or promise of
employment is made in the course of the "canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring (of)
workers."

The number of persons dealt with is not an essential ingredient of the act of recruitment and placement of workers. Any of
the acts mentioned in the basic rule in Article 13(b) will constitute recruitment and placement even if only one prospective
worker is involved. The proviso merely lays down a rule of evidence that where a fee is collected in consideration of a
promise or offer of employment to two or more prospective workers, the individual or entity dealing with them shall be
deemed to be engaged in the act of recruitment and placement. The words "shall be deemed" create that presumption.

This is not unlike the presumption in article 217 of the Revised Penal Code, for example, regarding the failure of a public
officer to produce upon lawful demand funds or property entrusted to his custody. Such failure shall be prima
facie evidence that he has put them to personal use; in other words, he shall be deemed to have malversed such funds or
property. In the instant case, the word "shall be deemed" should by the same token be given the force of a disputable
presumption or of prima facie evidence of engaging in recruitment and placement.

It is unfortunate that we can only speculate on the meaning of the questioned provision for lack of records of debates and
deliberations that would otherwise have been available if the Labor Code had been enacted as a statute rather than a
presidential decree is that they could be, and sometimes were, issued without previous public discussion or consultation,
the promulgator heeding only his own counsel or those of his close advisers in their lofty pinnacle of power. The not
infrequent results are rejection, intentional or not, of the interest of the greater number and, as in the instant case, certain
esoteric provisions that one cannot read against the background facts usually reported in the legislative journals.

At any rate, the interpretation here adopted should give more force to the campaign against illegal recruitment and
placement, which has victimized many Filipino workers seeking a better life in a foreign land, and investing hard-earned
savings or even borrowed funds in pursuit of their dream, only to be awakened to the reality of a cynical deception at the
hands of their own countrymen.

Evidently, therefore, appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt quoted above out of context. The Court,
in Panis, merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The absence of
such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by applying
principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is not a
"perfectly vague act" whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise
language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.

An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a showing that the
defect is such that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature
intended. x x x. In this connection we cannot pretermit reference to the rule that "legislation should not be held invalid on
the ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect. An Act will not
be declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for
which it is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities
necessary for its execution are within the reach of those intrusted therewith." 25
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as " labor or
employment referral" ("referring" an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not
render the law overbroad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends concept of overbreadth.

A statute may be said to be overbroad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively
guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to
punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give
adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible
applications of the statute.26

In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,27 for instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth provisions
prohibiting the posting of election propaganda in any place – including private vehicles – other than in the common poster
areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held that the challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the
use of his property but also deprived the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong,
therefore, was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence, void for overbreadth. In the
present case, however, appellant did not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by the
definition of "recruitment and placement" that would render the same constitutionally overbroad.

Appellant also invokes the equal protection clause 28 in her defense. She points out that although the evidence purportedly
shows that Jasmine Alejandro handed out application forms and even received Lourdes Modesto's payment, appellant
was the only one criminally charged. Alejandro, on the other hand, remained scot-free. From this, appellant concludes that
the prosecution discriminated against her on grounds of regional origins. Appellant is a Cebuana while Alejandro is a
Zamboangueña, and the alleged crime took place in Zamboanga City.

The argument has no merit.

At the outset, it may be stressed that courts are not confined to the language of the statute under challenge in determining
whether that statute has any discriminatory effect. A statute nondiscriminatory on its face may be grossly discriminatory in
its operation.29 Though the law itself be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it is applied and administered by
public authority with an evil eye and unequal hand, so as practically to make unjust and illegal discriminations between
persons in similar circumstances, material to their rights, the denial of equal justice is still within the prohibition of the
Constitution.30

The prosecution of one guilty person while others equally guilty are not prosecuted, however, is not, by itself, a denial of
the equal protection of the laws.31 Where the official action purports to be in conformity to the statutory classification, an
erroneous or mistaken performance of the statutory duty, although a violation of the statute, is not without more a denial of
the equal protection of the laws.32 The unlawful administration by officers of a statute fair on its face, resulting in its
unequal application to those who are entitled to be treated alike, is not a denial of equal protection unless there is shown
to be present in it an element of intentional  or purposeful discrimination. This may appear on the face of the action taken
with respect to a particular class or person, or it may only be shown by extrinsic evidence showing a
discriminatory design over another not to be inferred from the action itself. But a discriminatory purpose is not
presumed, there must be a showing of "clear and intentional discrimination."33 Appellant has failed to show that, in
charging appellant in court, that there was a "clear and intentional discrimination" on the part of the prosecuting officials.

The discretion of who to prosecute depends on the prosecution's sound assessment whether the evidence before it can
justify a reasonable belief that a person has committed an offense.34 The presumption is that the prosecuting officers
regularly performed their duties,35 and this presumption can be overcome only by proof to the contrary, not by mere
speculation. Indeed, appellant has not presented any evidence to overcome this presumption. The mere allegation that
appellant, a Cebuana, was charged with the commission of a crime, while a Zamboangueña, the guilty party in appellant's
eyes, was not, is insufficient to support a conclusion that the prosecution officers denied appellant equal protection of the
laws.

There is also common sense practicality in sustaining appellant's prosecution.

While all persons accused of crime are to be treated on a basis of equality before the law, it does not follow that they are
to be protected in the commission of crime. It would be unconscionable, for instance, to excuse a defendant guilty of
murder because others have murdered with impunity. The remedy for unequal enforcement of the law in such instances
does not lie in the exoneration of the guilty at the expense of society x x x. Protection of the law will be extended to all
persons equally in the pursuit of their lawful occupations, but no person has the right to demand protection of the law in
the commission of a crime.36
Likewise,

[i]f the failure of prosecutors to enforce the criminal laws as to some persons should be converted into a defense for
others charged with crime, the result would be that the trial of the district attorney for nonfeasance would become an issue
in the trial of many persons charged with heinous crimes and the enforcement of law would suffer a complete
breakdown.37

We now come to the third, fourth and fifth assigned errors, all of which involve the finding of guilt by the trial court.

Illegal recruitment is committed when two elements concur. First, the offender has no valid license or authority required by
law to enable one to lawfully engage in recruitment and placement of workers. Second, he or she undertakes either any
activity within the meaning of "recruitment and placement" defined under Article 13 (b), or any prohibited practices
enumerated under Article 34 of the Labor Code.38 In case of illegal recruitment in large scale, a third element is added:
that the accused commits said acts against three or more persons, individually or as a group. 39

In this case, the first element is present. The certification of POEA Officer-in-Charge Macarulay states that appellant is not
licensed or authorized to engage in recruitment and placement.

The second element is also present. Appellant is presumed engaged in recruitment and placement under Article 13 (b) of
the Labor Code. Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that appellant promised them employment for a fee.
Their testimonies corroborate each other on material points: the briefing conducted by appellant, the time and place
thereof, the fees involved. Appellant has not shown that these witnesses were incited by any motive to testify falsely
against her. The absence of evidence as to an improper motive actuating the principal witnesses of the prosecution
strongly tends to sustain that no improper motive existed and that their testimony is worthy of full faith and credence. 40

Appellant's denials cannot prevail over the positive declaration of the prosecution witnesses. Affirmative testimony of
persons who are eyewitnesses of the fact asserted easily overrides negative testimony. 41

That appellant did not receive any payment for the promised or offered employment is of no moment. From the language
of the statute, the act of recruitment may be "for profit or not;" it suffices that the accused "promises or offers for a fee
employment" to warrant conviction for illegal recruitment.

The testimonies of Araneta and Modesto, coming as they do from credible witnesses, meet the standard of proof beyond
reasonable doubt that appellant committed recruitment and placement. We therefore do not deem it necessary to delve
into the second and third assigned errors assailing the legality of appellant's arrest and the seizure of the application
forms. A warrantless arrest, when unlawful, has the effect of invalidating the search incidental thereto and the articles so
seized are rendered inadmissible in evidence.42 Here, even if the documents seized were deemed inadmissible, her
conviction would stand in view of Araneta and Modesto's testimonies.

Appellant attempts to cast doubt on the prosecution's case by claiming in her ninth assigned error that Erlie Ramos of the
POEA supposedly "planted" the application forms. She also assails his character, alleging that he passed himself off as a
lawyer, although this was denied by Ramos.

The claim of "frame-up," like alibi, is a defense that has been invariably viewed by the Court with disfavor for it can easily
be concocted but difficult to prove.43 Apart from her self-serving testimony, appellant has not offered any evidence that she
was indeed framed by Ramos. She has not even hinted at any motive for Ramos to frame her. Law enforcers are
presumed to have performed their duties regularly in the absence of evidence to the contrary. 44

Considering that the two elements of lack of license or authority and the undertaking of an activity constituting recruitment
and placement are present, appellant, at the very least, is liable for "simple" illegal recruitment. But is she guilty of illegal
recruitment in large scale? We find that she is not.

A conviction for large scale illegal recruitment must be based on a finding in each case of illegal recruitment of three or
more persons whether individually or as a group.45 In this case, only two persons, Araneta and Modesto, were proven to
have been recruited by appellant. The third person named in the complaint as having been promised employment for a
fee, Jennelyn Baez, was not presented in court to testify.

It is true that law does not require that at least three victims testify at the trial; nevertheless, it is necessary that there is
sufficient evidence proving that the offense was committed against three or more persons. 46 In this case, evidence that
appellant likewise promised her employment for a fee is sketchy. The only evidence that tends to prove this fact is the
testimony of Nancy Araneta, who said that she and her friends, Baez and Sandra Aquino, came to the briefing and that
they (she and her "friends") filled up application forms.

The affidavit47 Baez executed jointly with Araneta cannot support Araneta's testimony. The affidavit was neither identified,
nor its contents affirmed, by Baez. Insofar as it purports to prove that appellant recruited Baez, therefore, the affidavit is
hearsay and inadmissible.48 In any case, hearsay evidence, such as the said affidavit, has little probative value. 49

Neither can appellant be convicted for recruiting CIS agent Eileen Fermindoza or even the other persons present in the
briefing of January 30, 1994. Appellant is accused of recruiting only the three persons named in the information —
Araneta, Modesto and Baez. The information does not include Fermindoza or the other persons present in the briefing as
among those promised or offered employment for a fee. To convict appellant for the recruitment and placement of
persons other than those alleged to have been offered or promised employment for a fee would violate her right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against her. 50

In any event, the purpose of the offer of the testimonies of Araneta, Morales and Fermindoza, respectively, was limited as
follows:

FISCAL BELDUA:

Your Honor please, we are offering the oral testimony of the witness, as one of those recruited by the
accused, and also to identify some exhibits for the prosecution and as well as to identify the accused. 51

xxx

FISCAL BELDUA:

We are offering the oral testimony of the witness, Your Honor, to testify on the fact about her recruitment
by the accused and immediately before the recruitment, as well as to identify some exhibits for the
prosecution, and also the accused in this case, Your Honor. 52

xxx

FISCAL BELDUA:

This witness is going to testify that at around that date Your Honor, she was connected with the CIS, that
she was instructed together with a companion to conduct a surveillance on the place where the illegal
recruitment was supposed to be going on, that she acted as an applicant, Your Honor, to ascertain the
truthfulness of the illegal recruitment going on, to identify the accused, as well as to identify some exhibits
for the prosecution.53

xxx

Courts may consider a piece of evidence only for the purpose for which it was offered, 54 and the purpose of the offer of
their testimonies did not include the proving of the purported recruitment of other supposed applicants by appellant.

Appellant claims in her seventh assigned error that the information is fatally defective since it charges her with committing
illegal recruitment in large scale on January 30, 1994 while the prosecution evidence supposedly indicates that she
committed the crime on February 2, 1994.

We find that the evidence for the prosecution regarding the date of the commission of the crime does not vary from that
charged in the information. Both Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto testified that on January 30, 1994, while in the
Alejandro residence, appellant offered them employment for a fee. Thus, while the arrest was effected only on February 2,
1994, the crime had already been committed three (3) days earlier on January 30, 1994.

The eighth and tenth assigned errors, respectively, pertain to the penalty of life imprisonment imposed by the trial court as
well as the constitutionality of the law prescribing the same, appellant arguing that it is unconstitutional for being unduly
harsh.55 Section 19 (1), Article III of the Constitution states: "Excessive fines shall not be imposed, nor cruel, degrading or
inhuman punishment inflicted."
The penalty of life imprisonment imposed upon appellant must be reduced. Because the prosecution was able to prove
that appellant committed recruitment and placement against two persons only, she cannot be convicted of illegal
recruitment in large scale, which requires that recruitment be committed against three or more persons. Appellant can
only be convicted of two counts of "simple" illegal recruitment, one for that committed against Nancy Araneta, and another
count for that committed against Lourdes Modesto. Appellant is sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4)
to six (6) years of imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00. This renders immaterial the tenth assigned error, which
assumes that the proper imposable penalty upon appellant is life imprisonment.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the regional trial court is MODIFIED. Appellant is hereby declared guilty of illegal
recruitment on two (2) counts and is sentenced, for each count, to suffer the penalty of four (4) to six (6) years of
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P30,000.00.1âwphi1.nêt

SO ORDERED.
PEOPLE V. DELA PIEDRA                     G.R. No. 121777. January 24, 2001

FACTS: Accused-appellant Carol M. dela Piedra was charged of illegal recruitment in large scale by promising an
employment abroad Maria Lourdes Modesto y Gadrino, Nancy Araneta y Aliwanag and Jennelyn Baez y Timbol, a job to
Singapore without having previously obtained from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, a license or
authority to engage in recruitment and overseas placement of workers. In fact said Maria Lourdes Modesto had already
advanced the amount of P2,000.00 to the accused for and in consideration of the promised employment which did not
materialize. Thus causing damage and prejudice to the latter in the said sum.
Erlie Ramos, Attorney II of the Philippine Overseas Employment Agency (POEA), received a telephone call from an
unidentified woman inquiring about the legitimacy of the recruitment conducted by a certain Mrs. Carol Figueroa.
Ramos. An entrapment was then planned by the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS) headed by Capt. Mendoza and
successfully arrested the accused-appellant.

Later on, in the course of their investigation, the CIS discovered that Carol Figueroa had many aliases, among them,
Carol Llena and Carol dela Piedra.

At the trial, the prosecution presented five (5) witnesses, namely, Erlie Ramos, SPO2 Erwin Manalopilar, Eileen
Fermindoza, Nancy Araneta and Lourdes Modesto and all of them positively testified that the accused offer them a job to
Singapore.

The trial found the accused-appellant guilty of beyond reasonable doubt of Illegal Recruitment committed in a large scale.

ISSUE: WON Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defining recruitment and placement is void for vagueness and, thus,
violates the due process clause.

HELD: NO. Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code is not a vague provision.
As a rule, a statute or act may be said to be vague when it lacks comprehensible standards that men of common
intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in two
respects: (1) it violates due process for failure to accord persons, especially the parties targeted by it, fair notice of the
conduct to avoid; and (2) it leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and become an arbitrary
flexing of the Government muscle.
The court cannot sustain the Appellant argument that the acts that constitute recruitment and placement suffer from
overbreadth since by merely referring a person for employment, a person may be convicted of illegal recruitment.

Evidently,appellant has taken the penultimate paragraph in the excerpt quoted above out of context.  The Court,
in Panis  case, merely bemoaned the lack of records that would help shed light on the meaning of the proviso. The
absence of such records notwithstanding, the Court was able to arrive at a reasonable interpretation of the proviso by
applying principles in criminal law and drawing from the language and intent of the law itself. Section 13 (b), therefore, is
not a perfectly vague act whose obscurity is evident on its face. If at all, the proviso therein is merely couched in imprecise
language that was salvaged by proper construction. It is not void for vagueness.
An act will be declared void and inoperative on the ground of vagueness and uncertainty, only upon a showing that the
defect is such that the courts are unable to determine, with any reasonable degree of certainty, what the legislature
intended. x x x. In this connection we cannot permit reference to the rule that legislation should not be held invalid on the
ground of uncertainty if susceptible of any reasonable construction that will support and give it effect.  An Act will not be
declared inoperative and ineffectual on the ground that it furnishes no adequate means to secure the purpose for which it
is passed, if men of common sense and reason can devise and provide the means, and all the instrumentalities necessary
for its execution are within the reach of those entrusted therewith.
That Section 13 (b) encompasses what appellant apparently considers as customary and harmless acts such as labor or
employment referral (referring an applicant, according to appellant, for employment to a prospective employer) does not
render the law over broad. Evidently, appellant misapprehends concept of over breadth.
A statute may be said to be over broad where it operates to inhibit the exercise of individual freedoms affirmatively
guaranteed by the Constitution, such as the freedom of speech or religion. A generally worded statute, when construed to
punish conduct which cannot be constitutionally punished is unconstitutionally vague to the extent that it fails to give
adequate warning of the boundary between the constitutionally permissible and the constitutionally impermissible
applications of the statute
In Blo Umpar Adiong vs. Commission on Elections,for instance, we struck down as void for overbreadth provisions
prohibiting the posting of election propaganda in any place including private vehicles other than in the common poster
areas sanctioned by the COMELEC. We held that the challenged provisions not only deprived the owner of the vehicle the
use of his property but also deprived the citizen of his right to free speech and information. The prohibition in Adiong,
therefore, was so broad that it covered even constitutionally guaranteed rights and, hence, void for over breadth. 
In the present case, however, appellant did not even specify what constitutionally protected freedoms are embraced by
the definition of recruitment and placement that would render the same constitutionally over broad.
Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. v. Anti-Terrorism Council

Southern Hemisphere Engagement Network, Inc. NGO

GR No. Concerned citizen,
178552 Atty. Soliman Santos, Jr. taxpayer, and
lawyer
GR No.
KMU, NAFLU-KMU, CTUHR citizens
178554
BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE,
KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, PAMALAKAYA, ACT,
HEAD, Guingona, Jr., Lumbera, Constantino, Jr.,
GR No. certiorari and
Sr. Manansan, OSB, Dean Paz, Atty. Lichauco,
178581 prohibition
Ret. Col. Cunanan, Siguion-Reyna, Dr.
Pagaduan-Araullo, Reyes, Ramos, De Jesus,
Baua, Casambre
GR No.
SELDA, EMJP, PCPR
178890
GR No. IBP, CODAL, Senator Madrigal, Osmena III, and
179157 Tañada
GR. No. BAYAN-ST, other reg’l chapters and orgs mostly
179461 based in Southern Tagalog

Respondents:

 Anti-Terrorism Council, composed of:

o Chairperson Eduardo Ermita
o Vice-Chair Raul Gonzales
o Acting Defense Secretary Alberto Romulo
o National Security Adviser Norberto Gonzales
o DILG Secretary Ronaldo Puno
o Finance Secretary MargaritoTeves
 AFP Chief of Staff General HermogenesEsperon
 PNP Chief General Oscar Calderon
 PGMA
 Support agencies of the Anti-Terrorism Council, namely:
o National Intelligence Coordinating Agency
o NBI
o Bureau of Immigration
o Office of Civil Defense
o Intelligence Service of the AFP
o Anti-Money Laundering Center
o Philippine Center on Transnational Crime
o PNP intelligence and investigative elements

FACTS:

 This case consists of 6 petitions challenging the constitutionality of RA 9372, “An Act to Secure the State and
Protect our People from Terrorism,” aka Human Security Act of 2007.
 Petitioner-organizations assert locus standion the basis of being suspected “communist fronts” by the
government, whereas individual petitioners invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine and their status
as citizens and taxpayers.
 KARAPATAN, Hustisya, Desaparecidos, SELDA, EMJP, and PCR allege they have been subjected to “close
security surveillance by state security forces,” their members followed by “suspicious persons” and “vehicles with
dark windshields,” and their offices monitored by “men with military build.” They likewise claim they have been
branded as “enemies of the State.”
  BAYAN, GABRIELA, KMP, MCCCL, COURAGE, KADAMAY, SCW, LFS, Anakbayan, PAMALAKAYA, ACT,
Migrante, HEAD, and Agham would like the Court to take judicial notice of respondents’ alleged action of tagging
them as militant organizations fronting for the CPP and NPA. They claim such tagging is tantamount to the
effects of proscription without following the procedure under the law.
 Meanwhile, IBP and CODAL base their claim of locus standi on their sworn duty to uphold the Constitution.
 Petitioners claim that RA 9372 is vague and broad, in that terms like “widespread and extraordinary fear and
panic among the populace” and “coerce the government to give in to an unlawful demand” are nebulous, leaving
law enforcement agencies with no standard to measure the prohibited acts.

ISSUES:

1. WON petitioners’ resort to certiorari is proper NO.

2. WON petitioners have locus standiNO.
3. WON the Court can take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging” NO.
4. WON petitioners can invoke the “transcendental importance” doctrine NO.
5. WON petitioners can be conferred locus standi as they are taxpayers and citizens NO.
6. WON petitioners were able to present an actual case or controversy NO.
7. WON RA 9372 is vague and broad in defining the crime of terrorism NO.
8. WON a penal statute may be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners NO.
9. WON there is merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its validity
NO.

HELD AND RATIO:

1. Petition for certiorari is improper.

a. Certiorari does not lie against respondents who do not exercise judicial or quasi-judicial functions. Section
1, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court states that petition for certiorari applies when any tribunal, board, or
officer exercising judicial or quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction,
or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
b. Petitioners do not even allege with any modicum of particularity how respondents acted without or in
excess of their respective jurisdictions, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
c. The power of judicial review has 4 requisites:
i. There must be an actual case or controversy.
ii. Petitioners must possess locus standi.
iii. Question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
iv. The issue of constitutionality must be the lismota of the case.
The present case lacks the 1st 2 requisites, which are the most essential.

2. Petitioners lack locus standi.

a. Locus standi or legal standing requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
concrete adverseness.
b. In Anak Mindanao Party-List Group v. The Executive Secretary,locus standihas been defined as that
requiring:
i. That the person assailing must have a direct and personal interest AND
ii. That the person sustained or is in immediate danger of sustaining some direct inquiry as a
result of the act being challenged.
c. For a concerned party to be allowed to raise a constitutional question, he must show that:
i. He has personally suffered some actual or threatened injury;
ii. The injury is fairly traceable to the challenged action; AND
iii. The injury is likely to be redressed by a favorable action.
d. RA 9372 is a penal statute. While Chavez v. PCGG holds that transcendental public importance
dispenses with the requirement that petitioner has experienced or is in actual danger of suffering direct
and personal injury, cases involving the constitutionality of penal legislation belong to an altogether
different genus of constitutional litigation. Such necessitates closer judicial scrutiny of locus standi.
e. The mere invocation of the duty to preserve the rule of law does no, however, suffice to clothe the IBP or
any of its members with standing. They failed to sufficiently demonstrate how its mandate under the
assailed statute revolts against its constitutional rights and duties.
f. Former Senator Ma. Ana Consuelo Madrigal who claims to have been the subject of “political
surveillance” also lacks locus standi. The same is true for WigbertoTañada and Osmeña III, who cite their
 being a human rights advocate and an oppositor, respectively. No concrete injury has been pinpointed,
hence, no locus standi.
3. Court cannot take judicial notice of the alleged “tagging.”
a. Matters of judicial notice have 3 material requisites:
i. matter must be one of common and general knowledge
ii. must be well and authoritatively settled, not doubtful or uncertain or capable of accurate and
ready determination
iii. known to be within thelimits of the jurisdiction of the court
b. The principal guide in determining what facts may be assumed to be judicially known is that of notoriety.
It can be said that judicial notice is limited to facts evidenced by public records and facts of general
notoriety. Hence, it can be said that judicial notice is limited to: (1) facts evidenced by public records and
(2) facts of general notoriety.
c. A court cannot take judicial notice of any fact which, in part, is dependent on the existence or non-
existence of a fact of which the Court has no constructive knowledge.
d. Petitioners’ apprehension is insufficient to substantiate their plea. That no specific charge or proscription
under RA 9371 has been filed against them, 3 years after its effectivity, belies any claim of imminence of
their perceived threat emanating from the so-called tagging. They fail to particularize how the
implementation of specific provisions of RA 9372 would result in direct injury to their organization and
members.
e. Notwithstanding the statement of Ermita and Gonzales that the Arroyo administration will adopt the US
and EU classification of CPP and NPA as terrorist organizations, there is yet to be filed before the courts
an application to declare the CPP and NPA organizations as domestic terrorist or outlawed organization
under RA 9372.
4. In Kilosbayan v. Guingona,to invoke the transcendental doctrine, the following are the determinants:
a. The character of the funds or other assets involved in the case
b. The presence of a clear case of disregard of a constitutional or statutory prohibition by the public
respondent agency or instrumentality of the government;
c. The lack of any other party with a more direct and specific interest in the questions being raised
In the case at bar, there are other partiesnot before the Court withdirect and specific interests in the
questions being raised.

5. Petitioners cannot be conferred upon them as taxpayers and citizens.

a. A taxpayer suit is proper only when there is an exercise of the spending or taxing power of Congress,
whereas citizen standing must rest on direct and personal interest in the proceeding.
b. RA 9372 is a penal statute and does not even provide for any appropriation from Congress for its
implementation, while none of the individual petitioner-citizens has alleged any direct and personal
interest in the implementation of the law.
c. Generalized interest, albeit accompanied by the assertion of a public right, do not establish locus standi.
Evidence of a direct and personal interest is key.
6. Petitioners fail to present an actual case or controversy. None of them faces any charge under RA 9372.
a. Judicial power operates only when there is an actual case or controversy. An actual case or controversy
means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or
anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an advisory opinion.
b. Courts do not sit to adjudicate mere academic questions to satisfy scholarly interest. The pleadings must
show:
i. an active antagonistic assertion of a legal right and
ii. a denial thereof
c. However, a reasonable certainty of the occurrence of a perceived threat to any constitutional interest
suffices to provide a basis for mounting a constitutional challenge. This, however, is qualified by the
presence of sufficient facts.
d. Prevailing American jurisprudence allows adjudication on the merits when an anticipatory petition clearly
shows that the challenged prohibition forbids the conduct or activity that a petitioner seeks to do, as there
would be a justiciable controversy. However, in the case at bar, the petitioners have failed to show that
the challenged provisions of RA 9372 forbid constitutionally protected conduct or activity. No
demonstrable threat has been established, much less a real and existing one.
e. Petitioners have yet to show any connection between the purported “surveillance” and the implementation
of RA 9372. Petitioners obscure allegations of sporadic “surveillance” and supposedly being tagged as
“communist fronts” in no way approximate a credible threat of prosecution. From these allegations, the
Court is being lured to render an advisory opinion, which is not its function. If the case is merely theorized,
it lies beyond judicial review for lack of ripeness. Allegations of abuse must be anchored on real events.
7. The doctrines of void-for-vagueness and overbreadth find no application in the present case since these
doctrines apply only to free speech cases and that RA 9372 regulates conduct, not speech.
 a. Romualdez v. Sandiganbayan: The overbreadth and the vagueness doctrines have special application
only to free speech cases, and are not appropriate for testing the validity of penal statutes.
b. Romualdez v. COMELEC:A facial invalidation of criminal statutes is not appropriate, but the Court
nonetheless proceeded to conduct a vagueness analysis, and concluded that the therein subject election
offense under the Voter’s Registration Act of 1996, with which the therein petitioners were charged, is
couched in precise language.
c. The aforementioned cases rely heavily on Justice Mendoza’s Separate Opinion in the Estrada case:
Allegations that a penal statute is vague and overbroad do not justify a facial review of its validity. A facial
challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute and to one, which is overbroad because of possible
chilling effect upon protected speech. This rationale does not apply to penal statutes. Criminal
statutes have general in terrorem effect. If facial challenge is allowed, the State may well be prevented
from enacting laws against socially harmful conduct. Overbreadth and vagueness doctrines then have
special application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for testing the validity of penal statutes.
8. Since a penal statute may only be assailed for being vague as applied to petitioners, a limited vagueness
analysis of the definition of “terrorism” in RA 9372 is legally impossible absent an actual or imminent
chargeagainst them.
a. The doctrine of vagueness and the doctrine of overbreadth do not operate on the same plane.
i. A statute or acts suffers from the defect of vagueness when:
1. It lacks comprehensible standards that men of common intelligence must necessarily
guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. It is repugnant to the Constitution in 2
ways:
a. Violates due process for failure to accord fair notice of conduct to avoid
b. Leaves law enforcers unbridled discretion in carrying out its provisions and
becomes an arbitrary flexing of the Government muscle.
ii. The overbreadth doctrine decrees that a governmental purpose to control or prevent activities
constitutionally subject to state regulations may not be achieved by means, which sweep
unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.
b. A “facial” challenge is likewise different from an “as applied” challenge.
i. “As applied” challenge considers only extant facts affecting real litigants.
ii. “Facial” challenge is an examination of the entire law, pinpointing its flaws and defects, not only
on the basis of its actual operation to the parties, but also on the assumption or prediction that its
very existence may cause others not before the court to refrain from constitutionally protected
speech or activities.
1. Under no case may ordinary penal statutes be subjected to a facial challenge. If facial
challenge to a penal statute is permitted, the prosecution of crimes may be hampered. No
prosecution would be possible.
9. There is no merit in the claim that RA 9372 regulates speech so as to permit a facial analysis of its
validity.
a. Section 3 of RA 9372 provides the following elements of the crime of terrorism:
i. Offender commits an act punishable under RPC and the enumerated special penal laws;
ii. Commission of the predicate crime sows and creates a condition of widespread and extraordinary
fear and panic among the populace;
iii. The offender is actuated by the desire to coerce the government to give in to an unlawful
demand.
b. Petitioners contend that the element of “unlawful demand” in the definition of terrorism must necessarily
be transmitted through some form of expression protected by the free speech clause. The argument does
not persuade. What RA 9372 seeks to penalize is conduct, not speech.
c. Petitioners’ notion on the transmission of message is entirely inaccurate, as it unduly focuses on just one
particle of an element of the crime. Almost every commission of a crime entails some mincing of words on
the part of offender. Utterances not elemental but inevitably incidental to the doing of the criminal
conduct alter neither the intent of the law to punish socially harmful conduct nor the essence of
the whole act as conduct and not speech.

Concurring opinion of Justice Abad:

- He concurs with the majority opinion, but he says he needs to emphasize that the grounds for dismissal in this case are
more procedural than substantive. Hence, when an actual controversy arises and when it becomes ripe for adjudication,
the specific questions raised here may be raised again.
 EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE

G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993

THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-President
for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES,
and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G. BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches 160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL
CONFEDERATION OF THE JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN
TRIAL COURT JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL
CIRCUIT COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President, TOMAS
G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and Shari'a Courts,
Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the Country, petitioners,
vs.
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and Communications,
JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.

The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the petitioners that this
hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself
affected by these measures and is thus an interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time.
Under our system of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no other
office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with officiousness but in the discharge of an
unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and fairness.

The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Philippine Postal Corporation
through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional Trial
Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts, and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers
of Deeds, along with certain other government offices.

The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as judges will be prejudiced by the
above-named measures. The National Land Registration Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own
activities, such as sending of requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been
allowed to intervene.

The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title embraces more than one subject
and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed
copies of the bill in its final form were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory
and encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.

We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of the constitutionality of statutes.
The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been
carefully studied and determined to be constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it
is constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself upheld. To doubt is to sustain.

We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing that "Every bill passed by the
Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof."

The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to prevent surprise or fraud upon
the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title gives no intimation, and which might therefore be
overlooked and carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered, in order that they may
have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if they shall so desire. 1
It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the franking privilege from the
Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect its purposes.

R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its Powers, Functions and
Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other Purposes Connected Therewith."

The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:

The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal system:

a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal matters, from sender to
addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or confidentiality;

b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding through the unhampered flow or
exchange of postal matters between nations;

c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different users and changing needs,
including but not limited to, philately, transfer of monies and valuables, and the like;

d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the industry to finance the overall cost of
providing the varied range of postal delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion and
continuous upgrading of service standards by the same.

Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:

Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders, instructions, rules and
regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are repealed or modified
accordingly.

All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those provided for under
Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered 69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation
may continue the franking privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the Vice
President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate abuse or unauthorized use thereof.

The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act violates the Constitution.

The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as comprehensive as to cover every single
detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the
provisions of the act, and is not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
constitutional requirement. 2

To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of the statute to be
expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually render legislation impossible. 3 As has been
correctly explained:

The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but matter germane to the subject
as expressed in the title, and adopted to the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be
included in the act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which the act is to be
enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and to remove obstacles in the way of its execution.
If such matters are properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is unnecessary that
they should also have special mention in the title (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).

This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a statute on a given subject is
properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the
new statute is valid, notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a matter more
germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal of previous legislations connected
therewith."4
The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the subject of the statute; and it
is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be briefly expressed in its title. 5 As observed in one case,6 if the
title of an act embraces only one subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters
by implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither within the reason of the
Constitution, nor practicable.

We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is germane to the accomplishment of
the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our
ruling is that, by virtue of its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of
the said law.

II

The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the franking privilege from the
petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was not included in the original version of Senate Bill No.
720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates
Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:

(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed three readings on separate
days, and printed copies thereof in its final form have been distributed to its Members three days before
its passage, except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate enactment to meet a
public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and
the vote thereon shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and  nays entered in the Journal.

The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that amendment to any bill
when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be settled by a conference committee of both
chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second
paragraph could not have been validly added as an amendment.

These argument are unacceptable.

While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences between the Senate and the
House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its broader function is described thus:

A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it may be limited to resolving the
precise differences between the two houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited
in its jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new subject matter can be
inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a conference committee produces unexpected results,
results beyond its mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict limitations on
conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of the authoritarian power of conference
committee (Davies, Legislative Law and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81).

It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was returned to and duly approved by
both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate
President Neptali A. Gonzales and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed
by both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C. Aquino on April 3, 1992.

Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification of the approval of a bill from
the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. v. Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is
conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas  and nays  on the
final reading of the
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old (but still valid) case of U.S.
vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus:

To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature when they are, as we have said,
clear and explicit, would be to violate both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and independent department of the
Government, and to interfere with the legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature.
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an amendment was made upon the
last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed
among the members of each House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by such official assurances from a
coordinate department of the government, to which we owe, at the very least, a becoming courtesy.

III

The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection clause.

It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking privilege from the Judiciary, it
retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the
House of Representatives, the Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and
Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and officers. 10

The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid classification in accordance
with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the
Office of Adult Education, the Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the Philippines; the Armed Forces of the
Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special
Prosecutor); the Kabataang Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and
the National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons. 11

The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair discrimination offends the
requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the
Constitution to provide for a more, specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the particular act assailed
partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon to cut it down is the equal protection clause.

According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should
be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.

The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all persons or things without
distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature
books to all persons, regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the
clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By classification is meant the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from all others in these same
particulars. 13

What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking privilege extended to the
President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to former Presidents of the Philippines purely as
a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of
its need for the privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for the
selection?

We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was carefully deliberated upon, by
the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or
attention was given to its repealing clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary.

We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is unimaginable that the political
departments would have intended this serious slight to the Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the
government. The same observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for the
extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics Office and even some private
individuals but not the courts of justice.

In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the perceived need of the grantee for
the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for
a smoother flow of communication between the government and the people.
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it is the Judiciary, that has
been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there is any major branch of the government that needs the
privilege, it is the Judicial Department, as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify
the distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking privilege while
extending it to others less deserving.

In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office show that from January
1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the
Judiciary and other agencies whose functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the
Department of Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming fromthe
Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners reached the total amount of
P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the
franking privilege must be withdrawn from it.

The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege should be extended only to
those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly
(especially the courts of justice). It is like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really
necessary but not an operation that can save his life.

If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the remedy, it seems to us, is to
withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by
retaining it for some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those
favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem is not solved by
violating the Constitution.

In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been withdrawn, Section 35 has
placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the
Philippines and the members of Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a
similar and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may appreciate the withdrawal of
the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the
Supreme Court should be similarly treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National
Census and Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is not recognized
in the courts of justice.

(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the privilege from the Armed Forces
of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not
send as much frank mail as the Judiciary.)

It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled corporation, was created and is
expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public service. While it may have been established primarily for
private gain, it cannot excuse itself from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the
franchise extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its charter. 14 Among the services it
should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege
in the discharge of their own public functions.

We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion pesos, 55% of which is supplied
by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the
exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.

At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice, the withdrawal from it of the
franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the
respondents themselves, should stress the dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating
with lawyers and litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the national budget
compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than
1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a
purchased stamp to every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.

We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a valid exercise of discretion by
the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that
denies the Judiciary the equal protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction
made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real differences between the Judiciary
and the grantees of the franking privilege.

This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a matter of arbitrariness that this
Court has the duty and power to correct.

IV

In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title and that it was not passed
in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of
the Constitution providing that no person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."

We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. While ruling against the
discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate
power in our own favor. This is inevitable. Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political
system that we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only decide the cases
before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience gives us the light to be right.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of
Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register
of Deeds to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order dated June 2,
1992, is made permanent.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 81958 June 30, 1988

PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC., petitioner,

vs.
HON. FRANKLIN M. DRILON as Secretary of Labor and Employment, and TOMAS D. ACHACOSO, as
Administrator of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, respondents.

The petitioner, Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI, for short), a firm "engaged principally in the
recruitment of Filipino workers, male and female, for overseas placement," 1 challenges the Constitutional validity of
Department Order No. 1, Series of 1988, of the Department of Labor and Employment, in the character of "GUIDELINES
GOVERNING THE TEMPORARY SUSPENSION OF DEPLOYMENT OF FILIPINO DOMESTIC AND HOUSEHOLD
WORKERS," in this petition for certiorari and prohibition. Specifically, the measure is assailed for "discrimination against
males or females;" 2 that it "does not apply to all Filipino workers but only to domestic helpers and females with similar
skills;" 3 and that it is violative of the right to travel. It is held likewise to be an invalid exercise of the lawmaking power,
police power being legislative, and not executive, in character.

In its supplement to the petition, PASEI invokes Section 3, of Article XIII, of the Constitution, providing for worker
participation "in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and benefits as may be provided by
law." 4 Department Order No. 1, it is contended, was passed in the absence of prior consultations. It is claimed, finally, to
be in violation of the Charter's non-impairment clause, in addition to the "great and irreparable injury" that PASEI
members face should the Order be further enforced.

On May 25, 1988, the Solicitor General, on behalf of the respondents Secretary of Labor and Administrator of the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration, filed a Comment informing the Court that on March 8, 1988, the
respondent Labor Secretary lifted the deployment ban in the states of Iraq, Jordan, Qatar, Canada, Hongkong, United
States, Italy, Norway, Austria, and Switzerland. * In submitting the validity of the challenged "guidelines," the Solicitor
General invokes the police power of the Philippine State.

It is admitted that Department Order No. 1 is in the nature of a police power measure. The only question is whether or not
it is valid under the Constitution.

The concept of police power is well-established in this jurisdiction. It has been defined as the "state authority to enact
legislation that may interfere with personal liberty or property in order to promote the general welfare." 5 As defined, it
consists of (1) an imposition of restraint upon liberty or property, (2) in order to foster the common good. It is not capable
of an exact definition but has been, purposely, veiled in general terms to underscore its all-comprehensive embrace.

"Its scope, ever-expanding to meet the exigencies of the times, even to anticipate the future where it could be done,
provides enough room for an efficient and flexible response to conditions and circumstances thus assuring the greatest
benefits." 6

It finds no specific Constitutional grant for the plain reason that it does not owe its origin to the Charter. Along with the
taxing power and eminent domain, it is inborn in the very fact of statehood and sovereignty. It is a fundamental attribute of
government that has enabled it to perform the most vital functions of governance. Marshall, to whom the expression has
been credited, 7 refers to it succinctly as the plenary power of the State "to govern its citizens." 8

"The police power of the State ... is a power coextensive with self- protection, and it is not inaptly termed the "law of
overwhelming necessity." It may be said to be that inherent and plenary power in the State which enables it to prohibit all
things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 9

It constitutes an implied limitation on the Bill of Rights. According to Fernando, it is "rooted in the conception that men in
organizing the state and imposing upon its government limitations to safeguard constitutional rights did not intend thereby
to enable an individual citizen or a group of citizens to obstruct unreasonably the enactment of such salutary measures
calculated to ensure communal peace, safety, good order, and welfare." 10 Significantly, the Bill of Rights itself does not
purport to be an absolute guaranty of individual rights and liberties "Even liberty itself, the greatest of all rights, is not
unrestricted license to act according to one's will." 11 It is subject to the far more overriding demands and requirements of
the greater number.
Notwithstanding its extensive sweep, police power is not without its own limitations. For all its awesome consequences, it
may not be exercised arbitrarily or unreasonably. Otherwise, and in that event, it defeats the purpose for which it is
exercised, that is, to advance the public good. Thus, when the power is used to further private interests at the expense of
the citizenry, there is a clear misuse of the power. 12

In the light of the foregoing, the petition must be dismissed.

As a general rule, official acts enjoy a presumed vahdity. 13 In the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the
contrary, the presumption logically stands.

The petitioner has shown no satisfactory reason why the contested measure should be nullified. There is no question that
Department Order No. 1 applies only to "female contract workers," 14 but it does not thereby make an undue discrimination
between the sexes. It is well-settled that "equality before the law" under the Constitution 15 does not import a perfect
Identity of rights among all men and women. It admits of classifications, provided that (1) such classifications rest on
substantial distinctions; (2) they are germane to the purposes of the law; (3) they are not confined to existing conditions;
and (4) they apply equally to all members of the same class. 16

The Court is satisfied that the classification made-the preference for female workers — rests on substantial distinctions.

As a matter of judicial notice, the Court is well aware of the unhappy plight that has befallen our female labor force
abroad, especially domestic servants, amid exploitative working conditions marked by, in not a few cases, physical and
personal abuse. The sordid tales of maltreatment suffered by migrant Filipina workers, even rape and various forms of
torture, confirmed by testimonies of returning workers, are compelling motives for urgent Government action. As precisely
the caretaker of Constitutional rights, the Court is called upon to protect victims of exploitation. In fulfilling that duty, the
Court sustains the Government's efforts.

The same, however, cannot be said of our male workers. In the first place, there is no evidence that, except perhaps for
isolated instances, our men abroad have been afflicted with an Identical predicament. The petitioner has proffered no
argument that the Government should act similarly with respect to male workers. The Court, of course, is not impressing
some male chauvinistic notion that men are superior to women. What the Court is saying is that it was largely a matter of
evidence (that women domestic workers are being ill-treated abroad in massive instances) and not upon some fanciful or
arbitrary yardstick that the Government acted in this case. It is evidence capable indeed of unquestionable demonstration
and evidence this Court accepts. The Court cannot, however, say the same thing as far as men are concerned. There is
simply no evidence to justify such an inference. Suffice it to state, then, that insofar as classifications are concerned, this
Court is content that distinctions are borne by the evidence. Discrimination in this case is justified.

As we have furthermore indicated, executive determinations are generally final on the Court. Under a republican regime, it
is the executive branch that enforces policy. For their part, the courts decide, in the proper cases, whether that policy, or
the manner by which it is implemented, agrees with the Constitution or the laws, but it is not for them to question its
wisdom. As a co-equal body, the judiciary has great respect for determinations of the Chief Executive or his subalterns,
especially when the legislature itself has specifically given them enough room on how the law should be effectively
enforced. In the case at bar, there is no gainsaying the fact, and the Court will deal with this at greater length shortly, that
Department Order No. 1 implements the rule-making powers granted by the Labor Code. But what should be noted is the
fact that in spite of such a fiction of finality, the Court is on its own persuaded that prevailing conditions indeed call for a
deployment ban.

There is likewise no doubt that such a classification is germane to the purpose behind the measure. Unquestionably, it is
the avowed objective of Department Order No. 1 to "enhance the protection for Filipino female overseas workers" 17 this
Court has no quarrel that in the midst of the terrible mistreatment Filipina workers have suffered abroad, a ban on
deployment will be for their own good and welfare.

The Order does not narrowly apply to existing conditions. Rather, it is intended to apply indefinitely so long as those
conditions exist. This is clear from the Order itself ("Pending review of the administrative and legal measures, in the
Philippines and in the host countries . . ."18), meaning to say that should the authorities arrive at a means impressed with a
greater degree of permanency, the ban shall be lifted. As a stop-gap measure, it is possessed of a necessary malleability,
depending on the circumstances of each case. Accordingly, it provides:

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION. — The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon
recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in
countries where there are:
 1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,

2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and protection of Filipino
workers. 19

The Court finds, finally, the impugned guidelines to be applicable to all female domestic overseas workers. That it does
not apply to "all Filipina workers" 20 is not an argument for unconstitutionality. Had the ban been given universal
applicability, then it would have been unreasonable and arbitrary. For obvious reasons, not all of them are similarly
circumstanced. What the Constitution prohibits is the singling out of a select person or group of persons within an existing
class, to the prejudice of such a person or group or resulting in an unfair advantage to another person or group of
persons. To apply the ban, say exclusively to workers deployed by A, but not to those recruited by B, would obviously
clash with the equal protection clause of the Charter. It would be a classic case of what Chase refers to as a law that
"takes property from A and gives it to B." 21 It would be an unlawful invasion of property rights and freedom of contract and
needless to state, an invalid act. 22 (Fernando says: "Where the classification is based on such distinctions that make a
real difference as infancy, sex, and stage of civilization of minority groups, the better rule, it would seem, is to recognize
its validity only if the young, the women, and the cultural minorities are singled out for favorable treatment. There would be
an element of unreasonableness if on the contrary their status that calls for the law ministering to their needs is made the
basis of discriminatory legislation against them. If such be the case, it would be difficult to refute the assertion of denial of
equal protection." 23 In the case at bar, the assailed Order clearly accords protection to certain women workers, and not
the contrary.)

It is incorrect to say that Department Order No. 1 prescribes a total ban on overseas deployment. From scattered
provisions of the Order, it is evident that such a total ban has hot been contemplated. We quote:

5. AUTHORIZED DEPLOYMENT-The deployment of domestic helpers and workers of similar skills

defined herein to the following [sic] are authorized under these guidelines and are exempted from the
suspension.

5.1 Hirings by immediate members of the family of Heads of State and Government;

5.2 Hirings by Minister, Deputy Minister and the other senior government officials; and

5.3 Hirings by senior officials of the diplomatic corps and duly accredited international
organizations.

5.4 Hirings by employers in countries with whom the Philippines have [sic] bilateral labor
agreements or understanding.

xxx xxx xxx

7. VACATIONING DOMESTIC HELPERS AND WORKERS OF SIMILAR SKILLS--Vacationing domestic

helpers and/or workers of similar skills shall be allowed to process with the POEA and leave for worksite
only if they are returning to the same employer to finish an existing or partially served employment
contract. Those workers returning to worksite to serve a new employer shall be covered by the
suspension and the provision of these guidelines.

xxx xxx xxx

9. LIFTING OF SUSPENSION-The Secretary of Labor and Employment (DOLE) may, upon

recommendation of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), lift the suspension in
countries where there are:

1. Bilateral agreements or understanding with the Philippines, and/or,

2. Existing mechanisms providing for sufficient safeguards to ensure the welfare and
protection of Filipino workers. 24

xxx xxx xxx

The consequence the deployment ban has on the right to travel does not impair the right. The right to travel is subject,
among other things, to the requirements of "public safety," "as may be provided by law." 25 Department Order No. 1 is a
valid implementation of the Labor Code, in particular, its basic policy to "afford protection to labor," 26 pursuant to the
respondent Department of Labor's rule-making authority vested in it by the Labor Code. 27 The petitioner assumes that it is
unreasonable simply because of its impact on the right to travel, but as we have stated, the right itself is not absolute. The
disputed Order is a valid qualification thereto.

Neither is there merit in the contention that Department Order No. 1 constitutes an invalid exercise of legislative power. It
is true that police power is the domain of the legislature, but it does not mean that such an authority may not be lawfully
delegated. As we have mentioned, the Labor Code itself vests the Department of Labor and Employment with rulemaking
powers in the enforcement whereof. 28

The petitioners's reliance on the Constitutional guaranty of worker participation "in policy and decision-making processes
affecting their rights and benefits" 29 is not well-taken. The right granted by this provision, again, must submit to the
demands and necessities of the State's power of regulation.

The Constitution declares that:

Sec. 3. The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized, and
promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all. 30

"Protection to labor" does not signify the promotion of employment alone. What concerns the Constitution more
paramountly is that such an employment be above all, decent, just, and humane. It is bad enough that the country has to
send its sons and daughters to strange lands because it cannot satisfy their employment needs at home. Under these
circumstances, the Government is duty-bound to insure that our toiling expatriates have adequate protection, personally
and economically, while away from home. In this case, the Government has evidence, an evidence the petitioner cannot
seriously dispute, of the lack or inadequacy of such protection, and as part of its duty, it has precisely ordered an indefinite
ban on deployment.

The Court finds furthermore that the Government has not indiscriminately made use of its authority. It is not contested that
it has in fact removed the prohibition with respect to certain countries as manifested by the Solicitor General.

The non-impairment clause of the Constitution, invoked by the petitioner, must yield to the loftier purposes targetted by
the Government. 31 Freedom of contract and enterprise, like all other freedoms, is not free from restrictions, more so in this
jurisdiction, where laissez faire has never been fully accepted as a controlling economic way of life.

This Court understands the grave implications the questioned Order has on the business of recruitment. The concern of
the Government, however, is not necessarily to maintain profits of business firms. In the ordinary sequence of events, it is
profits that suffer as a result of Government regulation. The interest of the State is to provide a decent living to its citizens.
The Government has convinced the Court in this case that this is its intent. We do not find the impugned Order to be
tainted with a grave abuse of discretion to warrant the extraordinary relief prayed for.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. No costs.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999

PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner,

vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA PANCHO MONTERO, and THE
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.

ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.

The constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of Republic Act No. 8249 — an act which further defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan — is being challenged in this petition for prohibition and mandamus. Petitioner Panfilo Lacson, joined by
petitioners-intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr., also seeks to prevent the Sandiganbayan from proceedings
with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 23047-23057 (for multiple murder) against them on the ground of lack of jurisdiction.

The antecedents of this case, as gathered from the parties' pleadings and documentary proofs, are as follows:

In the early morning of May 18, 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies in Metro Manila, where
slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group
(ABRITG) headed by Chieff Superintendent Jewel Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP). The ABRITG was
composed of police officers from the Traffic Management Command (TMC) led by petitioner-intervenor Senior
Superintendent Francisco Zubia, Jr.; Presidential Anti-Crime Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) headed by
petitioner Chief Superintendent Panfilo M. Lacson; Central Police District Command (CPDC) led by Chief Superintendent
Ricardo de Leon; and the Criminal Investigation Command (CIC) headed by petitioner-intervenor Chief Superintendent
Romeo Acop.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the CIC, that what actually transpired at dawn of
May 18, 1995 was a summary execution (or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang
members and the ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desierto formed a panel of investigators headed by the Deputy
Ombudsman for Military Affairs, Bienvenido Blancaflor, to investigate the incident. This panel later absolved from any
criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said
incident was a legitimate police operation.1

However, a review board led by Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified modified the Blancaflor panel's
finding and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26) respondents, including herein
petitioner and intervenors. The recommendation was approved by the Ombudsman except for the withdrawal of the
charges against Chief Supt. Ricardo de Leon.

Thus, on November 2, 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson was among those charged as principal in eleven (11) information
for murder2 before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were
among those charged in the same informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.

Upon motion by all the accused in the 11 information, 3 the Sandiganbayan allowed them to file a motion for
reconsideration of the Ombudsman's action.4

After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed on March 1, 1996 eleven (11) amended informations 5 before the
Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia,
Jr. and other. One of the accused6 was dropped from the case.

On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting
that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2
(paragraphs a and c) of Republic Act No. 7975.7 They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan to cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27
or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher. The highest ranking
principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at
least SG 27.
Thereafter, in a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice Demetriou, with
Justices Lagman and de Leon concurring, and Justices Balajadia and Garchitorena dissenting, 9 the Sandiganbayan
admitted the amended information and ordered the cases transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has
original and exclusive jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief Superintendent
or higher.

On May 17, 1996, the Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should remain
with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.

While these motions for reconsideration were pending resolution, and even before the issue of jurisdiction cropped up with
the filing of the amended informations on March 1, 1996, House Bill No. 2299 10 and No. 109411 (sponsored by
Representatives Edcel C. Lagman and Lagman and Neptali M. Gonzales II, respectively), as well as Senate Bill No.
84412 (sponsored by Senator Neptali Gonzales), were introduced in Congress, defining expanding the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by
deleting the word "principal" from the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975.

These bills were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of the Philippines on
February 5, 1997.

Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14 denying the motion for reconsideration
of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution dated May 8, 1996."

On the same day15 the Sandiganbayan issued and ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997 Resolution, the pertinent portion of
which reads:

After Justice Lagman wrote the Resolution and Justice Demetriou concurred in it, but before Justice de
Leon. Jr. rendered his concurring and dissenting opinion, the legislature enacted Republic Act 8249 and
the President of the Philippines approved it on February 5, 1997. Considering the pertinent provisions of
the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the
Special Prosecutor's motion for reconsideration. Justice de Leon has already done so in his concurring
and dissenting opinion.

x x x           x x x          x x x

Considering that three of the accused in each of these cases are PNP Chief Superintendents: namely,
Jewel T. Canson, Romeo M. Acop and Panfilo M. Lacson, and that trial has not yet begun in all these
cases — in fact, no order of arrest has been issued — this court has competence to take cognizance of
these cases.

To recapitulate, the net result of all the foregoing is that by the vote of 3 of 2, the court admitted the
Amended Informations in these cases by the unanimous vote of 4 with 1 neither concurring not
dissenting, retained jurisdiction to try and decide the cases 16 (Empahasis supplied)

Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section 7 thereof which provides
that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof."
Petitioner argues that:

a) The questioned provisions of the statute were introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was
made to precisely suit the situation in which petitioner's cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring
jurisdiction thereof to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine (9) months
the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the Regional Trial Court, the
passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot,
and frustrate the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975)

b) Retroactive application of the law is plan from the fact that it was again made to suit the peculiar
circumstances in which petitioner's cases were under, namely, that the trial had not yet commenced, as
provided in Section 7, to make certain that those cases will no longer be remanded to the Quezon City
Regional Trial Court, as the Sandiganbayan alone should try them, thus making it an ex post
 facto legislation and a denial of the right of petitioner as an accused in Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057
to procedural due process.

c) The title of the law is misleading in that it contains the aforesaid "innocuous" provisions in Sections 4
and 7 which actually expands rather than defines the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975), thereby violating
the one-title one-subject requirement for the passage of statutes under Section 26 (1), Article VI of the
Constitution.17

For their part, the intervenors, in their petition-in-intervention, add that "while Republic Act No. 8249 innocuously appears
to have merely expanded the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the introduction of Section 4 and 7 in said statute
impressed upon it the character of a class legislation and an ex-post facto statute intended to apply specifically to the
accused in the Kuratong Baleleng case pending before the Sandiganbayan. 18 They further argued that if their case is tried
before the Sandiganbayan their right to procedural due process would be violated as they could no longer avail of the two-
tiered appeal to the Sandiganbayan, which they acquired under R.A. 7975, before recourse to the Supreme Court.

Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in support of the constitutionality of
the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be
dismissed.

This Court then issued a Resolution19 requiring the parties to file simultaneously within a nonextendible period of ten (10)
days from notice thereof additional memoranda on the question of whether the subject amended informations filed a
Criminal Case Nos. 23047-23057 sufficiently allege the commission by the accused therein of the crime charged within
the meaning Section 4 b  of Republic Act No. 8249, so as to bring the said cases within the exclusive original jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan.

The parties, except for the Solicitor General who is representing the People of the Philippines, filed the required
supplemental memorandum within the nonextendible reglementary period.

The established rule is that every law has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality, and to justify its nullification
there must be a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and argumentative one. 20 The burden of
proving the invalidity of the law lies with those who challenge it. That burden, we regret to say, was not convincingly
discharged in the present case.

The creation of the Sandiganbayn was mandated in Section 5, Article XIII of the 1973 Constitution, which provides:

Sec. 5. The Batasang Pambansa shall create a special court, to be known as Sandiganbayan, which shall
have jurisdiction over criminal and civil cases involving graft and corrupt practices and such other
offenses committed by public officers and employees including those in government-owned or controlled
corporations, in relation to their office as may be determined by law.

The said special court is retained in the new (1987) Constitution under the following provisions in Article XI, Section 4:

Sec. 4. The present anti-graft court known as the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise
its jurisdiction as now or hereafter may be provided by law.

Pursuant to the constitutional mandate, Presidential Decree No. 1486 21 created the Sandiganbayan. Thereafter, the
following laws on the Sandiganbayan, in chronological order, were enacted: P.D. No. 1606, 22 Section 20 of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 123,23 P.D. No. 1860,24 P.D. No. 1861,25 R.A. No. 7975, 26 and R.A. No. 8249.27 Under the latest
amendments introduced by Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the following cases:

Sec 4. Section 4 of the same decree [P.D. No. 1606, as amended] is hereby further amended to read as
follows:

Sec. 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Titile VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the accused are officials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineers, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) Officers of the Philippines National Police while occupying the position of  provincial
director and those holding the rank of senior superintendent or higher.

(f) City of provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in the
Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as-Grade "27" and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989;

(3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public
officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases filed pursuant to and connection with Executive Orders Nos. 1,2, 14 and 14-A,
issued in 1986.

In cases where none of the accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27" or
higher, as prescribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or military and PNP officers mentioned above,
exclusive original jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper regional trial court, metropolitan trial
court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the case may be, pursuant to their
jurisdictions as privided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as amended.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or
orders of regional trial courts whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided.

The Sandiganbayan shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions of the issuance of the writs of
mandamus, prohibition, certiorari, habeas corpus, injunctions, and other ancillary writs and processes in
aid of its appellate jurisdiction and over petitions of similar nature, including quo warranto, arising or that
may arise in cases filed or which may be filed under Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14 and 14-A, issued in
1986: Provided, That the jurisdiction over these petitions shall not be exclusive of the Supreme Court.
 The procedure prescribed in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, as well as the implementing rules that the
Supreme Court has promulgated and may hereafter promulgate, relative to appeals/petitions for review to
the Court of Appeals, shall apply to appeals and petitions for review filed with the Sandiganbayan. In all
cases elevated to the Sandiganbayan and from the Sandiganbayan to the Supreme Court, the Office of
the Ombudsman, through its special prosecutor, shall represent the People of the Philippines, except in
cases filed pursuant to Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A, issued in 1986.

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employee, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall exercise
exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 8249 states:

Sec. 7. Transitory provision — This act shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has
not begun as of the approval hereof. (Emphasis supplied)

The Sandiganbayan law prior to R.A. 8249 was R.A. 7975. Section 2 of R.A. 7975 provides:

Sec. 2. Section 4 of the same decree [Presidential Decree No. 1606, as amended) is hereby further
amended to read as follows:

Sec 4. Jurisdiction — The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases
involving:

a. Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal
Code, where one or more of the pricipal accused are afficials occupying the following positions in the
government, whether in a permanent, acting or interim capacity, at the time of the commission of the
offense:

(1) Officials of the executive branch occupying the positions of regional director and higher, otherwise
classified as Grade "27" and higher, of the Compensation and Position Classification Act of 1989
(Republic Act No. 6758), specifically including:

(a) Provincial governors, vice-governors, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, and

provincial treasurers, assessors, engineer, and other provincial department heads;

(b) City mayors, vice-mayors, members of the sangguniang panlungsod, city treasurers,
assessors, engineers, and other city department heads;

(c) Officials of the diplomatic service occupying the position of consul and higher;

(d) Philippine Army and air force colonels, naval captains, and all officers of higher rank;

(e) PNP chief superintendent and PNP officers of higher rank;

(f) City and provincial prosecutors and their assistants, and officials and prosecutors in
the Office of the Ombudsman and special prosecutor;

(g) Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled

corporations, state universities or educational institutions or foundations;

(2) Members of Congress or officials thereof classified as Grade "27" and up under the Compensation
and Position Classification Act of 1989;
 (3) Members of the judiciary without prejudice to the provisions of the Constitution;

(4) Chairman and members of the Constitutional Commissions, without prejudice to the provisions of the
Constitution;

(5) All other national and local officials classified as Grade "27" or higher under the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989.

b. Other offenses or felonies committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in Subsection a
of this section in relation to their office.

c. Civil and criminal cases files pursuant to and in connection with Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 4-A.

In cases where none of the principal accused are occupying positions corresponding to salary Grade "27"
or higher, as presribed in the said Republic Act 6758, or PNP officers occupying the rank of
superintendent or higher, or their equivalent, exclusive jurisdiction thereof shall be vested in the proper
regional trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court, and municipal circuit trial court, as the
case may be, pursuant to their respective jurisdictions as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.

The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate jurisdiction on appelas from the final judgment,
resolutions or orders of regular court where all the accused are occupying positions lower than grade
"27," or not otherwise covered by the preceding enumeration.

x x x           x x x          x x x

In case private individuals are charged as co-principals, accomplices or accessories with the public
officers or employees, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, they
shall be tried jointly with said public officers and employees in the proper courts which shall have
exclusive jurisdiction over them.

xxx xxx xxx (Emphasis supplied)

Sec. 7 of R.A. No. 7975 reads:

Sec. 7. Upon the effectivity of this Act, all criminal cases in which trial has not begun in the
Sandiganbayan shall be referred to the proper courts.

Under paragraphs a and c, Section 4 of R.A. 8249, the word "principal" before the word "accused" appearing in the above-
quoted Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. 7975, was deleted. It is due to this deletion of the word "principal" that the
parties herein are at loggerheads over the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Petitioner and intervenors, relying on R.A.
7975, argue that the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan, has jurisdiction over the subject criminal cases since
none of the principal accused under the amended information has the rank of Superintendent 28 or higher. On the other
hand, the Office of the Ombudsman, through the Special Prosecutor who is tasked to represent the People before the
Supreme Court except in certain cases,29 contends that the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction pursuant to R.A. 8249.

A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as
amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2,
Title VII, Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), 30 (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and 14-A, issued in
1986 (sequestration cases),31 or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes; (2) the
offender comitting the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and (e) is a public official or employee 32 holding any of the positions
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title
VIII of the Revised Penal Code, the governing on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b, Section 4
of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to "other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other crimes
committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection a of (Section 4, R.A. 8249) in relation to their
office. "The phrase" other offenses or felonies" is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was committed
in relation to the accused's officials functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what determines the Sandiganbayan's
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender — that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees
enumerated in paragraph a of Section 4. The offenses mentioned in pargraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not
make any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is charged as a principal,
accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which
does not mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner and entervenors' posture that Section 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the
law33 because its enactment was particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases in the Sandiganbayan, is a
contention too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a
declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive
department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges
the law must present proof of arbitrariness.34

It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of the laws is not violated by a
legislation based on reasonable classification. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is
concurrence of four elements, namely:

(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;

(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;

(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and

(4) must apply equaly to all members of the same class, 35

all of which are present in this case.

The challengers of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 failed to rebut the presumption of constitutionality and reasonables of
the questioned provisions. The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose
trial has not yet commence and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments of the Sandiganbayan
jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had already started as of the approval of the law, rests on
substantial distinction that makes real differences.36 In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented,
whereas in the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witnesses and presented
documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of courts subject to the constitutional
limitations,37 it can be reasonably anticipated that an alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases,
which is why it has to privide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, petitioner and intervenors cannot
now claim that Sections 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them. Precisely,
paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply to "all case involving" certain public officials and, under the transitory
provision in Section 7, to "all cases pending in any court." Contrary to petitioner and intervenors' argument, the law is not
particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in
the Sandiganbayan but also in "any court." It just happened that Kuratong Baleleng cases are one of those affected by the
law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are not affected by the transitory provision under Section 7 of
the new law (R.A. 8249).

In their futile attempt to have said sections nullified, heavy reliance is premised on what is perceived as bad faith on the
part of a Senator and two Justices of the Sandiganbaya 38 for their participation in the passage of the said provisions. In
particular, it is stressed that the Senator had expressed strong sentiments against those officials involved in the Kuratong
Baleleng cases during the hearings conducted on the matter by the committee headed by the Senator. Petitioner further
contends that the legislature is biased against him as he claims to have been selected from among the 67 million other
Filipinos as the object of the deletion of the word "principal" in paragraph a, Section 4 of P.D. 1606, as amended, and of
the transitory provision of R.A. 8249.39 R.A 8249, while still a bill, was acted, deliberated, considered by 23 other Senators
and by about 250 Representatives, and was separately approved by the Senate and House of Representatives and,
finally, by the President of the Philippines.

On the perceived bias that the Sandiganbayan Justices allegedly had against petitioner during the committe hearings, the
same would not constitute sufficient justification to nullify an otherwise valid law. Their presence and participation in the
legislative hearings was deemed necessary by Congress since the matter before the committee involves the graft court of
which one is the head of the Sandiganbayan and the other a member thereof. The Congress, in its plenary legislative
powers, is particularly empowered by the Constitution to invite persons to appear before it whenever it decides to conduct
inquiries in aid of legislation.40

Petitioner and entervenors further further argued that the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 to the Kuratong Baleleng
cases constitutes an ex post facto  law41 for they are deprived of their right to procedural due process as they can no
longer avail of the two-tiered appeal which they had allegedly acquired under R.A. 7975.

Again, this contention is erroneous. There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. In Calder v. Bull,42 an ex post facto law is
one —

(a) which makes an act done criminal before the passing of the law and which was
innocent when committed, and punishes such action; or

(b) which aggravates a crime or makes it greater than when it was committed; or

(c) which changes the punishment and inflicts a greater punishment than the law
annexed to the crime when it was committed.

(d) which alters the legal rules of evidence and recieves less or different testimony that
the law required at the time of the commission of the offense on order to convict the
defendant.43

(e) Every law which, in relation to the offense or its consequences, alters the situation of
a person to his disadvantage.44

This Court added two more to the list, namely:

(f) that which assumes to regulate civil rights and remedies only but in effect imposes a
penalty or deprivation of a right which when done was lawful;

(g) deprives a person accussed of crime of some lawful protection to which he has
become entitled, such as the protection of a former conviction or acquittal, or a
proclamation of a amnesty.45

Ex post facto law, generally, prohibits retrospectivity of penal laws. 46 R.A. 8249 is not penal law. It is a substantive law on
jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and
establish penalties for their violations;47 or those that define crimes, treat of their nature, and provide dor their
punishment.48 R.A 7975, which amended P.D. 1606 as regards the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and
other procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, i.e. one
which prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. 49 Not being
a penal law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

Petitioner's and entervenors' contention that their right to a two-tiered appeal which they acquired under R.A. 7975 has
been diluted by the enactment of R.A. 8249, is incorrect. The same contention has already been rejected by the court
several times50 considering that the right to appeal is not a natural right but statutory in nature that can be regulated by
law. The mode of procedure provided for in the statutory right of appeal is not included in the prohibition against ex post
facto laws.51 R.A. 8249 pertains only to matters of procedure, and being merely an amendatory statute it does not partake
the nature of an ex post facto law. It does not mete out a penalty and, therefore, does not come within the
prohibition.52 Moreover, the law did not alter the rules of evidence or the mode of trial. 53 It has been ruled that adjective
statutes may be made applicable to actions pending and unresolved at the time of their passage. 54

In any case; R.A. 8249 has preserved the accused's right to appeal to the Supreme Court to review questions of law. 55 On
the removal of the intermediate review of facts, the Supreme Court still has the power of review to determine if he
presumption of innocence has been convincing overcome. 56

Another point. The challenged law does not violate the one-title-one-subject provision of the Constitution. Much emphasis
is placed on the wording in the title of the law that it "defines" the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction when what it allegedly does
is to "expand" its jurisdiction. The expantion in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, if it can be considered as such, does
not have to be expressly stated in the title of the law because such is the necessary consequence of the amendments.
The requirement that every bill must only have one subject expressed in the title 57 is satisfied if the title is comprehensive
enough, as in this case, to include subjects related to the general purpose which the statute seeks to achieve. 58 Such rule
is liberally interpreted and should be given a practical rather than a technical construction. There is here sufficient
compliance with such requirement, since the title of R.A. 8249 expresses the general subject (involving the jurisdiction of
the Sandiganbayan and the amendment of P.D. 1606, as amended) and all the provisions of the law are germane to that
general subject.59 The Congress, in employing the word "define" in the title of the law, acted within its power since Section
2, Article VIII of the Constitution itself empowers the legislative body to "define, prescribe, and apportion the jurisdiction of
various courts.60

There being no unconstitutional infirmity in both the subject amendatory provision of Section 4 and the retroactive
procedural application of the law as provided in Section 7 of R.A. No. 8249, we shall now determine whether under the
allegations in the Informations, it is the Sandiganbayan or Regional Trial Court which has jurisdictions over the multiple
murder case against herein petitioner and entervenors.

The jurisdiction of a court is defined by the Constitution or statute. The elements of that definition must appear in the
complaint or information so as to ascertain which court has jurisdiction over a case. Hence the elementary rule that the
jurisdiction of a court is determined by the allegations in the complaint or informations, 61 and not by the evidence
presented by the parties at the trial.62

As stated earlier, the multiple murder charge against petitioner and intervenors falls under Section 4 [paragraph b] of R.A.
8249. Section 4 requires that the offense charged must be committed by the offender in relation to his office in order for
the Sandiganbayan to have jurisdiction over it.63 This jurisdictional requirement is in accordance with Section 5, Article XIII
of the 1973 Constitution which mandated that the Sandiganbayan shall have jurisdiction over criminal cases committed by
the public officers and employees, including those in goverment-owned or controlled corporations, "in relation to their
office as may be determined by law." This constitutional mandate was reiterated in the new (1987) Constitution when it
declared in Section 4 thereof that the Sandiganbayan shall continue to function and exercise its jurisdiction as now or
hereafter may be provided by law.

The remaining question to be resolved then is whether the offense of multiple murder was committed in relation to the
office of the accussed PNP officers.

In People vs. Montejo,64 we held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it (the offense) is
"intimately connected" with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official
functions.65 This intimate relation between the offense charged and the discharge of official duties "must be alleged in the
informations."66

As to how the offense charged be stated in the informations, Section 9, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates:

Sec. 9 Couse of accusation — The acts or omissions complied of as constituting the offense must be
stated in ordinary and concise language  without repetition not necessarily in the terms of the statute
defining the offense, but in such from as is sufficient to enable a person of common understanding to
know what offense is intended to be charged, and enable the court to pronounce proper judgment.
(Emphasis supplied)

As early as 1954 we pronounced that "the factor that characterizes the charge is the actual recital of the facts." 67 The real
nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the informations nor from the specification
of the provision of law alleged to have been violated, they being conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the
complaint or information.68

The noble object or written accusations cannot be overemphasized. This was explained in U.S. v. Karelsen: 69

The object of this written accusations was — First; To furnish the accused with such a descretion of the
charge against him as will enable him to make his defense and second to avail himself of his conviction or
acquittal for protection against a further prosecution for the same cause and third, to inform the court of
the facts alleged so that it may decide whether they are sufficient in law to support a conviction if one
should be had. In order that the requirement may be satisfied,  facts must be stated, not conclusions of
law. Every crime is made up of certain acts and intent these must be set forth in the complaint with
reasonable particularly  of time,  place, names (plaintiff and defendant) and circumstances. In short, the
complaint must contain  a specific allegation  of every fact and circumstance necessary to constitute the
crime charged. (Emphasis supplied)
It is essential, therefore, that the accused be informed of the facts that are imputed to him as "he is presumed to have no
indefendent knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense." 70

Applying these legal principles and doctrines to the present case, we find the amended informations for murder against
herein petitioner and intervenors wanting of specific factual averments to show the intimate relation/connection between
the offense charged and the discharge of official function of the offenders.

In the present case, one of the eleven (11) amended informations 71 for murder reads:

AMENDED INFORMATIONS

The undersigned Special Prosecution Officer III. Office of the Ombudsman hereby accuses CHIEF INSP.
MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP. ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T.
ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN, SPO4 VICENTE P. ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F.
LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2 ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C.
CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F.
CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMEO M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT. PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT.
FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO, CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO III,
CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO
ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS, SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, SPO2
NORBERTO LASAGA, PO2 LEONARDO GLORIA, and PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG of the crime of
Murder as defined and penalize under Article 248 of the Revised Penal Code committed as follows

That on or about May 18, 1995 in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of his Honorable Court, the accused CHIEF INSP. MICHAEL RAY AQUINO, CHIEF INSP.
ERWIN T. VILLACORTE, SENIOR INSP. JOSELITO T. ESQUIVEL, INSP. RICARDO G. DANDAN,
SPO4 VICENTE ARNADO, SPO4 ROBERTO F. LANGCAUON, SPO2 VIRGILIO V. PARAGAS, SPO2
ROLANDO R. JIMENEZ, SPO1 WILFREDO C. CUARTERO, SPO1 ROBERTO O. AGBALOG, and
SPO1 OSMUNDO B. CARINO, all taking advantage of their public and official positions as officers and
members of the Philippine National Police and committing the acts herein alleged in relation to their public
office, conspiring with intent to kill and using firearms with treachery evident premeditation and taking
advantage of their superior strenghts did then and there willfully unlawfully and feloniously shoot JOEL
AMORA, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal wounds which caused his instantaneous death to the
damage and prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.

That accused CHIEF SUPT. JEWEL F. CANSON, CHIEF SUPT. ROMOE M. ACOP, CHIEF SUPT.
PANFILO M. LACSON, SENIOR SUPT. FRANCISCO G. ZUBIAM JR., SUPT. ALMARIO A. HILARIO,
CHIEF INSP. CESAR O. MANCAO II, CHIEF INSP. GIL L. MENESES, SENIOR INSP. GLENN
DUMLAO, SENIOR INSP. ROLANDO ANDUYAN, INSP. CEASAR TANNAGAN, SPO3 WILLY NUAS,
SPO3 CICERO S. BACOLOD, PO2 ALEJANDRO G. LIWANAG committing the acts in relation to office
as officers and members of the Philippine National Police are charged herein as accessories after-the-fact
for concealing the crime herein above alleged by among others falsely representing that there where no
arrest made during the read conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque,
Metro Manila on or about the early dawn of May 18, 1995.

CONTRARY LAW.

While the above-quoted information states that the above-named principal accused committed the crime of murder "in
relation to thier public office, there is, however, no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the victim by the said
principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers. Likewise, the amended
information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then killed the latter while in
their custody.

Even the allegations concerning the criminal participation of herein petitioner and intevenors as among the accessories
after-the-facts, the amended information is vague on this. It is alleged therein that the said accessories concelead "the
crime herein-above alleged by, among others, falsely representing that there were no arrests made during the raid
conducted by the accused herein at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque Metro Manila, on or about the early dawn of May
18, 1995." The sudden mention of the "arrests made during the raid conducted by the accused" surprises the reader.
There is no indication in the amended information that the victim was one of those arrested by the accused during the
"raid." Worse, the raid and arrests were allegedly conducted "at Superville Subdivision, Paranaque, Metro Manila" but, as
alleged in the immediately preceding paragraph of the amended information, the shooting of the victim by the principal
accused occurred in Mariano Marcos Avenue, Quezon City." How the raid, arrests and shooting happened in the two
places far away from each other is puzzling. Again, while there is the allegation in the amended information that the said
accessories committed the offense "in relation to office as officers and members of the (PNP)," we, however, do not see
the intimate connection between the offense charged and the accused's official functions, which, as earlier discussed, is
an essential element in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

The stringent requirement that the charge be set forth with such particularly as will reasonably indicate the exact offense
which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was, sad to say, not satisfied. We believe that the
mere allegation in the amended information that the offense was committed by the accused public officer in relation to his
office is not sufficient. That phrase is merely a conclusion between of law, not a factual avernment that would show the
close intimacy between the offense charged and the discharge of the accused's official duties.

In People vs. Magallanes, 72 where the jurisdiction between the Regional Trial Court and the Sandiganbayan was at issue,
we ruled:

It is an elementary rule that jurisdiction is determined by the allegations in the complaint or information
and not by the result of evidence after trial.

In (People vs) Montejo (108 Phil 613 (1960), where the amended information alleged

Leroy S. Brown City Mayor of Basilan City, as such, has organized groups of police patrol
and civilian commandoes consisting of regular policeman and . . . special policemen
appointed and provided by him with pistols and higher power guns and then established
a camp . . . at Tipo-tipo which is under his command . . . supervision and control where
his co-defendants were stationed entertained criminal complaints and conducted the
corresponding investigations as well as assumed the authority to arrest and detain
person without due process of law and without bringing them to the proper court, and that
in line with this set-up established by said Mayor of Basilan City as such, and acting upon
his orders his co-defendants arrested and maltreated Awalin Tebag who denied in
consequence thereof.

we held that the offense charged was committed in relation to the office of the accused because it was
perpetreated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular of their official functions
and would not have been committed had they not held their office, besides, the accused had no personal
motive in committing the crime thus, there was an intimate connection between the offense and the office
of the accused.

Unlike in Montejo the informations in Criminal Cases Nos. 15562 and 15563 in the court below do not
indicate that the accused arrested and investigated the victims and then killed the latter in the course of
the investigation. The informations merely allege that the accused for the purpose of extracting or extortin
the sum of P353,000.00 abducted, kidnapped and detained the two victims, and failing in their common
purpose they shot; and killed the said victims. For the purpose of determining jurisdiction, it is these
allegations that shall control, and not the evidence presented by the prosecution at the trial.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase committed in relation to public office "does
not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close
intimacy between the discharge of the accused's official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in order to
qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with
the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, 73 not the Sandiganbayan.

WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The Addendum to the March 5,
1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases
Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over the said cases.1âwphi1.nêt
SO ORDERED.

LACSON VS. EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

Facts: 

Eleven persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang, an organized crime syndicate involved in bank
robberies, were slain by elements of the Anti-Bank Robbery andIntelligence Task Group (ABRITG). Among those included
in the ABRITG were petitioners and petitioner-intervenors.

Acting on a media expose of SPO2 Eduardo delos Reyes, a member of the Criminal Investigation Command, that what
actually transpired was a summary execution and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG, Ombudsman Aniano Desiertoformed a panel of investigators to investigate the said incident. Said panel found
the incident as a legitimate police operation. However, a review board modified the panel’s finding and recommended the
indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six respondents including herein petitioner, charged as principal, and herein
petitioner-intervenors, charged as accessories. After a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations
before the Sandiganbayan, where petitioner was charged only as an accessory.

The accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended
informations, the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 of R.A. 7975. They
contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where one or ore of the “principal
accused” are government officals with Salary Grade 27 or higher, or PNP officials with rank of Chief Superintendent or
higher. Thus, they did not qualify under said requisites. However, pending resolution of their motions, R.A. 8249 was
approved amending the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word “principal” from the phrase “principal
accused” in Section 2 of R.A. 7975.

Petitioner questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. 8249, including Section 7 which provides that the said law
shall apply to all cases pending in any court over which trial has not begun as of the approval hereof.

Issues: 

(1) Whether or not Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate the petitioners’ right to due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution as the provisions seemed to have been introduced for the Sandiganbayan to continue to
acquire jurisdiction over the Kuratong Baleleng case.

(2) Whether or not said statute may be considered as an ex-post facto statute.

(3) Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was committed in relation to the
office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the determination whether the case falls within the
Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s jurisdiction.

RULING:

Petitioner and intervenors’ posture that Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 violate their right to equal protection of the law is
too shallow to deserve merit. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant such a
declaration. Every classification made by the law is presumed reasonable and the party who challenges the law
must present proof of arbitrariness. The classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when the following concur: (1) it
must rest on substantial distinction; (2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing
conditions only, and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class; all of which are present in this case.

Paragraph a of Section 4 provides that it shall apply “to all cases involving” certain public officials and under the
transitory provision in Section 7, to “all cases pending in any court.” Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ argument, the
law is not particularly directed only to the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory  provision does not only cover cases
which are in the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.”

There is nothing ex post facto in R.A. 8249. Ex post facto law, generally, provides retroactive effect of penal laws. R.A.
8249 is not apenal law. It is a substantive law on jurisdiction which is not penal in character. Penal laws are those acts of
the Legislature which prohibit certain acts and establish penalties for their violations or those that define crimes and
provide for their punishment. R.A. 7975, as regards the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction, its mode of appeal and other
procedural matters, has been declared by the Court as not a penal law, but clearly a procedural statute, one which
prescribes rules of procedure by which courts applying laws of all kinds can properly administer justice. Not being a  penal
law, the retroactive application of R.A. 8249 cannot be challenged as unconstitutional.

In People vs. Montejo, it was held that an offense is said to have been committed in relation to the office if it is intimately
connected with the office of the offender and perpetrated while he was in the performance of his official functions. Such
intimate relation must be alleged in the information which is essential in determining the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.
However, upon examination of the amended information, there was no specific allegation of facts that the shooting of the
victim by the said principal accused was intimately related to the discharge of their official duties as police officers.
Likewise, the amended information does not indicate that the said accused arrested and investigated the victim and then
killed the latter while in their custody. The stringent requirement that the charge set forth with such particularity as will
reasonably indicate the exact offense which the accused is alleged to have committed in relation to his office was not
established.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was intimately connected with
the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain
murder and, therefore, within the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court and not the Sandiganbayan.
G.R. No. 128845               June 1, 2000

INTERNATIONAL SCHOOL ALLIANCE OF EDUCATORS (ISAE), petitioner,

vs.
HON. LEONARDO A. QUISUMBING in his capacity as the Secretary of Labor and Employment; HON.
CRESENCIANO B. TRAJANO in his capacity as the Acting Secretary of Labor and Employment; DR. BRIAN
MACCAULEY in his capacity as the Superintendent of International School-Manila; and INTERNATIONAL
SCHOOL, INC., respondents.

Receiving salaries less than their counterparts hired abroad, the local-hires of private respondent School, mostly Filipinos,
cry discrimination. We agree. That the local-hires are paid more than their colleagues in other schools is, of course,
beside the point. The point is that employees should be given equal pay for work of equal value. That is a principle long
honored in this jurisdiction. That is a principle that rests on fundamental notions of justice. That is the principle we uphold
today.1âwphi1.nêt

Private respondent International School, Inc. (the School, for short), pursuant to Presidential Decree 732, is a domestic
educational institution established primarily for dependents of foreign diplomatic personnel and other temporary
residents.1 To enable the School to continue carrying out its educational program and improve its standard of instruction,
Section 2(c) of the same decree authorizes the School to employ its own teaching and management personnel selected
by it either locally or abroad, from Philippine or other nationalities, such personnel being exempt from otherwise applicable
laws and regulations attending their employment, except laws that have been or will be enacted for the protection of
employees.

Accordingly, the School hires both foreign and local teachers as members of its faculty, classifying the same into two: (1)
foreign-hires and (2) local-hires. The School employs four tests to determine whether a faculty member should be
classified as a foreign-hire or a local hire:

a. What is one's domicile?

b. Where is one's home economy?

c. To which country does one owe economic allegiance?

d. Was the individual hired abroad specifically to work in the School and was the School responsible for bringing
that individual to the Philippines?2

Should the answer to any of these queries point to the Philippines, the faculty member is classified as a local hire;
otherwise, he or she is deemed a foreign-hire.

The School grants foreign-hires certain benefits not accorded local-hires.1avvphi1 These include housing, transportation,
shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance. Foreign-hires are also paid a salary rate twenty-five percent
(25%) more than local-hires. The School justifies the difference on two "significant economic disadvantages" foreign-hires
have to endure, namely: (a) the "dislocation factor" and (b) limited tenure. The School explains:

A foreign-hire would necessarily have to uproot himself from his home country, leave his family and friends, and
take the risk of deviating from a promising career path — all for the purpose of pursuing his profession as an
educator, but this time in a foreign land. The new foreign hire is faced with economic realities: decent abode for
oneself and/or for one's family, effective means of transportation, allowance for the education of one's children,
adequate insurance against illness and death, and of course the primary benefit of a basic salary/retirement
compensation.
 Because of a limited tenure, the foreign hire is confronted again with the same economic reality after his term: that
he will eventually and inevitably return to his home country where he will have to confront the uncertainty of
obtaining suitable employment after along period in a foreign land.

The compensation scheme is simply the School's adaptive measure to remain competitive on an international
level in terms of attracting competent professionals in the field of international education. 3

When negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement were held on June 1995, petitioner International School
Alliance of Educators, "a legitimate labor union and the collective bargaining representative of all faculty members" 4 of the
School, contested the difference in salary rates between foreign and local-hires. This issue, as well as the question of
whether foreign-hires should be included in the appropriate bargaining unit, eventually caused a deadlock between the
parties.

On September 7, 1995, petitioner filed a notice of strike. The failure of the National Conciliation and Mediation Board to
bring the parties to a compromise prompted the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to assume jurisdiction
over the dispute. On June 10, 1996, the DOLE Acting Secretary, Crescenciano B. Trajano, issued an Order resolving the
parity and representation issues in favor of the School. Then DOLE Secretary Leonardo A. Quisumbing subsequently
denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration in an Order dated March 19, 1997. Petitioner now seeks relief in this Court.

Petitioner claims that the point-of-hire classification employed by the School is discriminatory to Filipinos and that the
grant of higher salaries to foreign-hires constitutes racial discrimination.

The School disputes these claims and gives a breakdown of its faculty members, numbering 38 in all, with nationalities
other than Filipino, who have been hired locally and classified as local hires. 5 The Acting Secretary of Labor found that
these non-Filipino local-hires received the same benefits as the Filipino local-hires.

The compensation package given to local-hires has been shown to apply to all, regardless of race. Truth to tell,
there are foreigners who have been hired locally and who are paid equally as Filipino local hires. 6

The Acting secretary upheld the point-of-hire classification for the distinction in salary rates:

The Principle "equal pay for equal work" does not find applications in the present case. The international
character of the School requires the hiring of foreign personnel to deal with different nationalities and different
cultures, among the student population.

We also take cognizance of the existence of a system of salaries and benefits accorded to foreign hired personnel
which system is universally recognized. We agree that certain amenities have to be provided to these people in
order to entice them to render their services in the Philippines and in the process remain competitive in the
international market.

Furthermore, we took note of the fact that foreign hires have limited contract of employment unlike the local hires
who enjoy security of tenure. To apply parity therefore, in wages and other benefits would also require parity in
other terms and conditions of employment which include the employment which include the employment contract.

A perusal of the parties' 1992-1995 CBA points us to the conditions and provisions for salary and professional
compensation wherein the parties agree as follows:

All members of the bargaining unit shall be compensated only in accordance with Appendix C hereof
provided that the Superintendent of the School has the discretion to recruit and hire expatriate teachers
from abroad, under terms and conditions that are consistent with accepted international practice.

Appendix C of said CBA further provides:

The new salary schedule is deemed at equity with the Overseas Recruited Staff (OSRS) salary schedule.
The 25% differential is reflective of the agreed value of system displacement and contracted status of the
OSRS as differentiated from the tenured status of Locally Recruited Staff (LRS).

To our mind, these provisions demonstrate the parties' recognition of the difference in the status of two types of
employees, hence, the difference in their salaries.
 The Union cannot also invoke the equal protection clause to justify its claim of parity. It is an established principle
of constitutional law that the guarantee of equal protection of the laws is not violated by legislation or private
covenants based on reasonable classification. A classification is reasonable if it is based on substantial
distinctions and apply to all members of the same class. Verily, there is a substantial distinction between foreign
hires and local hires, the former enjoying only a limited tenure, having no amenities of their own in the Philippines
and have to be given a good compensation package in order to attract them to join the teaching faculty of the
School.7

We cannot agree.

That public policy abhors inequality and discrimination is beyond contention. Our Constitution and laws reflect the policy
against these evils. The Constitution8 in the Article on Social Justice and Human Rights exhorts Congress to "give highest
priority to the enactment of measures that protect and enhance the right of all people to human dignity, reduce social,
economic, and political inequalities." The very broad Article 19 of the Civil Code requires every person, "in the exercise of
his rights and in the performance of his duties, [to] act with justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good
faith.

International law, which springs from general principles of law, 9 likewise proscribes discrimination. General principles of
law include principles of equity, 10 i.e., the general principles of fairness and justice, based on the test of what is
reasonable. 11 The Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 12 the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural
Rights, 13 the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 14 the Convention against
Discrimination in Education, 15 the Convention (No. 111) Concerning Discrimination in Respect of Employment and
Occupation 16 — all embody the general principle against discrimination, the very antithesis of fairness and justice. The
Philippines, through its Constitution, has incorporated this principle as part of its national laws.

In the workplace, where the relations between capital and labor are often skewed in favor of capital, inequality and
discrimination by the employer are all the more reprehensible.

The Constitution 17 specifically provides that labor is entitled to "humane conditions of work." These conditions are not
restricted to the physical workplace — the factory, the office or the field — but include as well the manner by which
employers treat their employees.

The Constitution 18 also directs the State to promote "equality of employment opportunities for all." Similarly, the Labor
Code 19 provides that the State shall "ensure equal work opportunities regardless of sex, race or creed." It would be an
affront to both the spirit and letter of these provisions if the State, in spite of its primordial obligation to promote and
ensure equal employment opportunities, closes its eyes to unequal and discriminatory terms and conditions of
employment. 20

Discrimination, particularly in terms of wages, is frowned upon by the Labor Code. Article 135, for example, prohibits and
penalizes 21 the payment of lesser compensation to a female employee as against a male employee for work of equal
value. Article 248 declares it an unfair labor practice for an employer to discriminate in regard to wages in order to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization.

Notably, the International Covenant on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, supra, in Article 7 thereof, provides:

The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right of everyone to the enjoyment of just and
favourable conditions of work, which ensure, in particular:

a. Remuneration which provides all workers, as a minimum, with:

(i) Fair wages and equal remuneration for work of equal value without distinction of any kind, in
particular women being guaranteed conditions of work not inferior to those enjoyed by men, with
equal pay for equal work;

x x x           x x x          x x x

The foregoing provisions impregnably institutionalize in this jurisdiction the long honored legal truism of "equal pay for
equal work." Persons who work with substantially equal qualifications, skill, effort and responsibility, under similar
conditions, should be paid similar salaries. 22 This rule applies to the School, its "international character" notwithstanding.
The School contends that petitioner has not adduced evidence that local-hires perform work equal to that of foreign-
hires. 23 The Court finds this argument a little cavalier. If an employer accords employees the same position and rank, the
presumption is that these employees perform equal work. This presumption is borne by logic and human experience. If
the employer pays one employee less than the rest, it is not for that employee to explain why he receives less or why the
others receive more. That would be adding insult to injury. The employer has discriminated against that employee; it is for
the employer to explain why the employee is treated unfairly.

The employer in this case has failed to discharge this burden. There is no evidence here that foreign-hires perform 25%
more efficiently or effectively than the local-hires. Both groups have similar functions and responsibilities, which they
perform under similar working conditions.

The School cannot invoke the need to entice foreign-hires to leave their domicile to rationalize the distinction in salary
rates without violating the principle of equal work for equal pay.

"Salary" is defined in Black's Law Dictionary (5th ed.) as "a reward or recompense for services performed." Similarly, the
Philippine Legal Encyclopedia states that "salary" is the "[c]onsideration paid at regular intervals for the rendering of
services." In Songco v.  National Labor Relations Commission, 24 we said that:

"salary" means a recompense or consideration made to a person for his pains or industry in another man's
business. Whether it be derived from "salarium," or more fancifully from "sal," the pay of the Roman soldier, it
carries with it the fundamental idea of compensation for services rendered. (Emphasis supplied.)

While we recognize the need of the School to attract foreign-hires, salaries should not be used as an enticement to the
prejudice of local-hires. The local-hires perform the same services as foreign-hires and they ought to be paid the same
salaries as the latter. For the same reason, the "dislocation factor" and the foreign-hires' limited tenure also cannot serve
as valid bases for the distinction in salary rates. The dislocation factor and limited tenure affecting foreign-hires are
adequately compensated by certain benefits accorded them which are not enjoyed by local-hires, such as housing,
transportation, shipping costs, taxes and home leave travel allowances.

The Constitution enjoins the State to "protect the rights of workers and promote their welfare," 25 "to afford labor full
protection." 26 The State, therefore, has the right and duty to regulate the relations between labor and capital. 27 These
relations are not merely contractual but are so impressed with public interest that labor contracts, collective bargaining
agreements included, must yield to the common good. 28 Should such contracts contain stipulations that are contrary to
public policy, courts will not hesitate to strike down these stipulations.

In this case, we find the point-of-hire classification employed by respondent School to justify the distinction in the salary
rates of foreign-hires and local hires to be an invalid classification. There is no reasonable distinction between the
services rendered by foreign-hires and local-hires. The practice of the School of according higher salaries to foreign-hires
contravenes public policy and, certainly, does not deserve the sympathy of this Court.1avvphi1

We agree, however, that foreign-hires do not belong to the same bargaining unit as the local-hires.

A bargaining unit is "a group of employees of a given employer, comprised of all or less than all of the entire body of
employees, consistent with equity to the employer, indicate to be the best suited to serve the reciprocal rights and duties
of the parties under the collective bargaining provisions of the law." 29 The factors in determining the appropriate collective
bargaining unit are (1) the will of the employees (Globe Doctrine); (2) affinity and unity of the employees' interest, such as
substantial similarity of work and duties, or similarity of compensation and working conditions (Substantial Mutual Interests
Rule); (3) prior collective bargaining history; and (4) similarity of employment status. 30 The basic test of an asserted
bargaining unit's acceptability is whether or not it is fundamentally the combination which will best assure to all employees
the exercise of their collective bargaining rights. 31

It does not appear that foreign-hires have indicated their intention to be grouped together with local-hires for purposes of
collective bargaining. The collective bargaining history in the School also shows that these groups were always treated
separately. Foreign-hires have limited tenure; local-hires enjoy security of tenure. Although foreign-hires perform similar
functions under the same working conditions as the local-hires, foreign-hires are accorded certain benefits not granted to
local-hires. These benefits, such as housing, transportation, shipping costs, taxes, and home leave travel allowance, are
reasonably related to their status as foreign-hires, and justify the exclusion of the former from the latter. To include
foreign-hires in a bargaining unit with local-hires would not assure either group the exercise of their respective collective
bargaining rights.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE. The petition is hereby GRANTED IN PART. The Orders of the
Secretary of Labor and Employment dated June 10, 1996 and March 19, 1997, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE
insofar as they uphold the practice of respondent School of according foreign-hires higher salaries than local-hires.

G.R. No. 113811 October 7, 1994

ISHMAEL HIMAGAN, petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and HON. JUDGE HILARIO MAPAYO, RTC, Br. 11, Davao City, respondents.

Petitioner, a policeman assigned with the medical company of the Philippine National Police Regional Headquarters at
Camp Catitigan, Davao City, was implicated in the killing of Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and the attempted murder of Bernabe
Machitar. After the informations for murder1 and attempted murder2 were filed with the Regional Trial Court, Branch 11,
Davao City, on September 16, 1992, the trial court issued an Order suspending petitioner until the termination of the case
on the basis of Section 47, R.A. 6975, otherwise known as Department of Interior and Local Government Act of 1990,
which provides:

Sec. 47. Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case. — Upon the filing of a complaint or information
sufficient in form and substance against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty
imposed by law is six (6) years and one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the
accused from office until the case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall
be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused (Emphasis ours).

On October 11, 1993, petitioner filed a motion to lift the order for his suspension, 3 relying on Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the
Civil Service Decree, that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days and, also, on our ruling in Deloso v.
Sandiganbayan,4 and Layno v. Sandiganbayan.5 In his order dated December 14, 19936 respondent judge denied the
motion pointing out that under Section 47 of R.A. 6975, the accused shall be suspended from office until his case is
terminated. The motion for reconsideration of the order of denial was, likewise, denied. 7 Hence, the petition
for certiorari and mandamus to set aside the orders of respondent Judge and to command him to lift petitioner's
preventive suspension.

We find the petition devoid of merit.

There is no question that the case of petitioner who is charged with murder and attempted murder under the Revised
Penal Code falls squarely under Sec. 47 of RA 6975 which specifically applies to members of the PNP. In dispute
however, is whether the provision limits the period of suspension to 90 days, considering that while the first sentence of
Sec. 47 provides that the accused who is charged with grave felonies where the penalty imposed is six (6) years and one
(1) day shall be suspended from office "until the case is terminated", the second sentence of the same section mandates
that the case, which shall be subject to continuous trial, shall be terminated within 90 days from the arraignment of the
accused.

Petitioner posits that as a member of the Philippine National Police, under Sec. 91 of RA 6975 which reads:

Sec. 91. The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations shall apply to all personnel of
the Department.

he is covered by the Civil Service Law, particularly Sec. 42 of PD 807 of the Civil Service Decree, which limits the
maximum period of suspension to ninety (90) days, thus:

Sec. 42. Lifting of Preventive Suspension Pending Administrative Investigation. — When the

administrative case against the officer or employee under preventive suspension is not finally decided by
the disciplining authority within the period of ninety (90) days after the date of suspension of the
respondent who is not a presidential appointee, the respondent shall be automatically reinstated in the
service; Provided, That when the delay in the disposition of the case is due to the fault, negligence or
petition of the respondent, the period of delay shall not be counted in computing the period of suspension
herein provided.

He claims that an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and would be a
violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws. He further asserts that the requirements in
Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 that "the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the case is terminated" and
the succeeding sentence, "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated within ninety (90) days
from arraignment of the accused" are both substantive and should be taken together to mean that if the case is not
terminated within 90 days, the period of preventive suspension must be lifted because of the command that the trial must
be terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment.

We disagree.

First. The language of the first sentence of Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 is clear, plain and free from ambiguity. It gives no other
meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is
six years and one day or more shall last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the
termination of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be terminated within ninety
(90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first sentence. The two can stand independently of each other.
The first refers to the period of suspension. The second deals with the time frame within which the trial should be finished.

Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the suspension of accused be lifted? The
answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word "shall" before the phrase "be terminated within ninety (90)
days", there is nothing in R.A. 6975 that suggests that the preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is
not terminated within that period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without justifiable
reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where the facts so warrant, to criminal 8 or
civil liability.9 If the trial is unreasonably delayed without fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a
speedy trial, he is not without a remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the
case, the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his liberty by habeas
corpus. 10

Second. Petitioner misapplies Sec. 42 of PD 807. A meticulous reading of the section clearly shows that it refers to the
lifting of preventive suspension in pending administrative investigation, not in criminal cases, as here. What is more,
Section 42 expressly limits the period of preventive suspension to ninety (90) days. Sec. 91 of R.A. 6975 which states that
"The Civil Service Law and its implementing rules shall apply to all personnel of the Department" simply means that the
provisions of the Civil Service Law and its implementing rules and regulations are applicable to members of the Philippine
National Police insofar as the provisions, rules and regulations are not inconsistent with
R.A. 6975. Certainly, Section 42 of the Civil Service Decree which limits the preventive suspension to ninety (90) days
cannot apply to members of the PNP because Sec. 47 of R.A. 6995 provides differently, that is, the suspension where the
penalty imposed by law exceeds six (6) years shall continue until the case is terminated.

Third. Petitioner's reliance on Layno and Deloso is misplaced. These cases all stemmed from charges in violation of R.A.
3019 (1060), otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act which, unlike
R.A. 6975, is silent on the duration of the preventive suspension. Sec. 13 of R.A. 3019 reads as follows:

Suspension and loss of benefits. — Any public officer against whom any criminal prosecution under a
valid information under this Act or under the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on bribery is pending
in court, shall be suspended from office. Should he be convicted by final judgment, he shall lose all
retirement or gratuity benefits under any law, but if he is acquitted, he shall be entitled to reinstatement
and to the salaries and benefits which he failed to receive during suspension, unless in the meantime
administrative proceedings have been filed against him.

In the case of Layno, the duly elected mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur, was preventively suspended after an information
was filed against him for offenses under R.A. 3019 (1060), the Anti-Graft Corrupt Practices Act. He had been suspended
for four (4) months at the time he filed a motion to lift his preventive suspension. We held that his indefinite preventive
suspension violated the "equal protection clause" and shortened his term of office. Thus:

2. Petitioner is a duly elected municipal mayor of Lianga, Surigao del Sur. His term of office does not
expire until 1986. Were it not for this information and the suspension decreed by the Sandiganbayan
according to the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, he would have been all this while in the full
discharge of his functions as such municipal mayor. He was elected precisely to do so. As of October 26,
1983, he has been unable to. It is a basic assumption of the electoral process implicit in the right of
suffrage that the people are entitled to the services of elective officials of their choice. For misfeasance or
malfeasance, any of them could, of course, be proceeded against administratively or, as in this instance,
criminally. In either case, his culpability must be established. Moreover, if there be a criminal action, he is
entitled to the constitutional presumption of innocence. A preventive suspension may be justified. Its
continuance, however, for an unreasonable length of time raises a due process question. For even if
 thereafter he were acquitted, in the meanwhile his right to hold office had been nullified. Clearly, there
would be in such a case an injustice suffered by him. Nor is he the only victim. There is injustice inflicted
likewise on the people of Lianga. They were deprived of the services of the man they had elected to serve
as mayor. In that sense, to paraphrase Justice Cardozo, the protracted continuance of this preventive
suspension had outrun the bounds of reason and resulted in sheer oppression. A denial of due process is
thus quite manifest. It is to avoid such an unconstitutional application that the order of suspension should
be lifted.

3. Nor is it solely the denial of procedural due process that is apparent. There is likewise an equal
protection question. If the case against petitioner Layno were administrative in character the Local
Government Code would be applicable. It is therein clearly provided that while preventive suspension is
allowable for the causes therein enumerated, there is this emphatic limitation on the duration thereof: "In
all cases, preventive suspension shall not extend beyond sixty days after the start of said suspension." It
may be recalled that the principle against indefinite suspension applies equally to national government
officials. So it was held in the leading case of Garcia v. Hon. Executive Secretary. According to the
opinion of Justice Barrera: "To adopt the theory of respondents that an officer appointed by the President,
facing administrative charges, can be preventively suspended indefinitely, would be to countenance a
situation where the preventive suspension can, in effect, be the penalty itself without a finding of guilt after
due hearing, contrary to the express mandate of the Constitution and the Civil Service law." Further: "In
the guise of a preventive suspension, his term of office could be shortened and he could in effect, be
removed without a finding of a cause duly established after due hearing, in violation of the Constitution.
Clearly then, the policy of the law mandated by the Constitution frowns at a suspension of indefinite
duration. In this particular case, the mere fact that petitioner is facing a charge under the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act does not justify a different rule of law. To do so would be to negate the safeguard of
the equal protection guarantee. 11

The case of Deloso, likewise, involved another elective official who

was preventively suspended as provincial governor, also under RA 3019 the Anti-Graft Law. This Court, faced with similar
factual circumstances as in Layno, applied the ruling in the latter case "in relation to the principles of due process and
equal protection."

It is readily apparent that Section 13 of R.A. 3019 upon which the preventive suspension of the accused
in Layno and Deloso was based is silent with respect to the duration of the preventive suspension, such that the
suspension of the accused therein for a prolonged and unreasonable length of time raised a due process question. Not so
in the instant case. Petitioner is charged with murder under the Revised Penal Code and it is undisputed that he falls
squarely under Sec. 47 of R.A. 6975 which categorically states that his suspension shall last until the case is terminated.
The succeeding sentence of the same section requires the case to be subjected to continuous trial which shall be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused. As previously emphasized, nowhere in the law does it
say that after the lapse of the 90-day period for trial, the preventive suspension should be lifted. The law is clear, the
ninety (90) days duration applies to the trial of the case not to the suspension. Nothing else should be read into the law.
When the words and phrases of the statute are clear and unequivocal, their meaning determined from the language
employed and the statute must be taken to mean exactly what it says. 12

Fourth. From the deliberations of the Bicameral Conference Committee on National Defense relative to the bill that
became R.A. 6975, the meaning of Section 47 of R.A. 6975 insofar as the period of suspension is concerned becomes all
the more clear. We quote:

So other than that in that particular section, ano ba itong "Jurisdiction in Criminal Cases?"
What is this all about?

REP. ZAMORA. In case they are charged with crimes.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Ah, the previous one is administrative, no. Now, if it
is charged with a crime, regular courts.

SEN. GONZALES. Ano, the courts mismo ang magsasabing . . .

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, the jurisdiction.

REP. ZAMORA. The jurisdiction if there is robbery.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay. "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal
Case. Upon the filing of a complaint or informations sufficient in form and substance
against a member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six
years and one day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from the
office until the case is terminated."

REP. ALBANO. Where are we now Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Grave felonies ito e. Six years and one day or more.

SEN. SAGUISAG. Kung five years and litigation ng Supreme Court, ganoon ba and . . .?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Hindi, dahil iyong iba panay disciplinary iyon e.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Anong page iyan, Rene?

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Page 29 — Preventive Suspension.

REP. GUTANG. Ang complaint kasi ng mga tao, pagka may pulis na may criminal case
at may baril pa rin at nag-uuniforme, hindi magandang tingnan e. So parang natatakot
iyong mga witnesses.

SEN. GONZALES. Anyway, kung ma-exempt na rito naman siya e.

REP. GUTANG. Mayroong entitlement to reinstatement and pay. . . .

xxx xxx xxx

SEN. PIMENTEL. Dito sa "Preventive Suspension Pending Criminal Case." Okay ito but I
think we should also mandate the early termination of the case. Ibig sabihin, okay, hindi
ba "the suspension of the accused from office until the case is terminated?" Alam naman
natin ang takbo ng mga kaso rito sa ating bansa e.

REP. ZAMORA. Twenty days, okay na.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Hindi, and ibig kong sabihin, let us just assume that a case can be, as
Rene pointed out, can run to six years bago
ma-terminate, sometimes ten years pa nga e. Okay, but maybe we should mandate. . .

REP. ZAMORA. Continuous hearing.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Not only that, but the case must be terminated within a period.

REP. ALBANO. Ninety days na ho sa Supreme Court the trial.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Ha?

REP. ALBANO. The trial must be done within ninety days,

SEN. PIMENTEL. Ang ibig kong sabihin kung maari sanang ilagay rito that the case shall
also be terminated in one year from the time . . . aywan ko kung kaya nating gawin iyon.

REP. ALBANO. One solution, Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Criminal case? Hindi ba that has all been held as
directory even if you put it in the law?
SEN. PIMENTEL. I know, but, iyon na nga, we are looking at some solution to a
particular situation.

SEN. ANGARA. Let's have continuous hearing and be terminated not later than ninety
days.

REP. ZAMORA. Ang point ni Ernie, that's really only the directory. All of these, well, looks
exactly the same thing.

SEN. ANGARA. No, but at least, we will shorten it up in a case like this. We are really
keen on having it quick, swift.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Swift justice.

REP. ALBANO. Mr. Chairman.

THE CHAIRMAN. (SEN. MACEDA). Yes.

REP. ALBANO. Following the Veloso case in Anti-graft cases before the Sandiganbayan,
the preventive suspension is only ninety days. In no case shall it go beyond ninety days
which can also be applicable here because this is a preventive suspension.

SEN. PIMENTEL. No, because you can legislate at least.

SEN. SAGUISAG. But then the case may be anti-graft ha. The case filed against a
policeman may be anti-graft in nature. . .

SEN. PIMENTEL. Correct, correct, but is that a constitutional provision? Is it?

REP. ALBANO. No, but as a standard procedure.

SEN. PIMENTEL. Then you can legislate.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, because this particular provision is for criminal
cases. I know anti-graft is a criminal case but here we are talking, let's say, of murder,
rape, treason, robbery. That's why it is in that context that there is a difference between a
purely anti-graft case and a criminal case which could be a serious case  since it is six
years and one day or more, so it must be already a grave felony.

xxx xxx xxx

REP. ALBANO. . . .

What I mean to say is, preventive suspension, we can use the

Veloso case.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). No, that's too short, that's what I am saying. The
feeling here is, for policeman, we have to be stricter especially if it is a criminal case.

What Rene is just trying to say is, he is agreeable that the suspension is until the case is
terminated, but he just wants some administrative balancing to expedite it.  So let us
study what kind of language could be done along that line. So just on the National Police
Commission . . .

SEN. ANGARA. Can I suggest a language that may reflect. . .

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, please.

 SEN. ANGARA. "Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and be terminated not
later than . . ." whatever we agree.

THE CHAIRMAN (SEN. MACEDA). Okay, so let's study that.

So if there are any further amendments to Chapter 2 on the National Police

Commission. . . . . . 13

The foregoing discussions reveal the legislative intent to place on preventive suspension a member of the PNP charged
with grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law exceeds six years of imprisonment and which suspension continues
until the case against him is terminated.

The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons charged criminally or
administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive suspension is concerned is that policemen carry
weapons and the badge of the law which can be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly
brought out in the legislative discussions.

If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post while his case is pending, his
victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the
mere fact that the accused is in uniform and armed. The imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under
Section 47 of
R.A. 6975 does not violate the suspended policeman's constitutional right to equal protection of the laws.

The equal protection clause exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended to eliminate discrimination and
oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of real differences among men, the equal protection clause
does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all persons shall be treated alike, under like circumstances and
conditions both as to the privileges conferred and liabilities enforced. 14 Thus, the equal protection clause does not
absolutely forbid classifications, such as the one which exists in the instant case. If the classification is based on real and
substantial differences; 15 is germane to the purpose of the law; 16 applies to all members of the same
class; 17 and applies to current as well as future conditions, 18 the classification may not be impugned as violating the
Constitution's equal protection guarantee. A distinction based on real and reasonable considerations related to a proper
legislative purpose such as that which exists here is neither unreasonable, capricious nor unfounded.

ACCORDINGLY, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 142030. April 21, 2005

ARTURO GALLARDO, PETER MELCHOR J. ARCHES, ALLAN B. AMPOLOQUIO, CIRILO N. BACQUIANO, JOSUE
M. RODAJE, BENJAMIN R. MACASAET, JR., VICTORINA DELOS CIENTOS-MIRAL, RODOLFO M. CARTIN,
QUIRINA T. SARTE, NORBERTO E. GOMEZ, GENEFREDO P. ESPINA, NOEL GUINITA, AND OFELIA
NACIONAL, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, SANDIGANBAYAN, HONORABLE ANIANO DESIERTO in his official capacity as
OMBUDSMAN, AND OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, Respondents.

This is an appeal by certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the Resolution of the
Sandiganbayan1 (Second Division) in Criminal Case No. 25092 denying petitioners’ Motion To Quash.

The records show that the above-numbered case originated from a sworn letter-complaint filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao by Atty. Victor dela Serna, for and in behalf of the Public Health Workers (PHWs) of Bansalan,
Davao del Sur, charging herein petitioners Mayor Arturo A. Gallardo, Vice-Mayor Peter Melchor J. Arches, Sangguniang
Bayan members Allan B. Ampoloquio, Cirilo N. Bacquiano, Josue M. Rodaje, Benjamin R. Macasaet, Jr., Victorina delos
Cientos-Miral, Rodolfo M. Cartin, Quirina T. Sarte, Norberto E. Gomez, Genefredo P. Espina, Noel Guinita and Budget
Officer Ofelia Nacional, all public officers of the Municipality of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, with violation of Section 3(e) of
Republic Act No. 3019 for their alleged refusal to appropriate in the municipal budget the amount representing payment of
the mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan accruing to the complaining PHWs in the nature of
unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits.2

On 08 January 1999, herein public respondent Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto approved the Resolution dated 26
November 1998 of Graft Investigation Officer II Jovito A. Coresis, Jr., of the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, finding
probable cause to indict petitioners of the crime alleged. 3

On 13 January 1999, the Information was filed with the Sandiganbayan which reads:

That sometime in or about January, 1998, or shortly prior or subsequent thereto, in Davao del Sur, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the accused Mayor Arturo A. Gallardo with salary grade 27, Vice-mayor Peter
Melchor J. Arches with salary grade 25, Sangguniang Bayan Members with salary grade 24 Allan B. Ampoloquio, Cirilo N.
Bacquiano, Josue M. Rodaje, Benjamin R. Macasaet, Jr., Victorina delos Cientos-Miral, Rodolfo M. Cartin, Quirina T.
Sarte, Norberto E. Gomez, Genefredo P. Espina, Noel Guinita and Budget Officer Ofelia Nacional all public officers of the
Local Government Unit of Bansalan, Davao del Sur, committing the offense while in the performance of their official duties
and taking advantage of their public position, conspiring, confederating and mutually aiding each other, did there and
then, willfully, unlawfully, and criminally, cause undue injury to the Public Health Workers (PHWs) of the Municipality of
Bansalan, to wit: by illegally and unjustifiably refusing to perform their duties to include an appropriation in the municipal
budget for the payment of the mandatory statutory obligations of the Municipality of Bansalan due to the complaining
PHWs in the nature of unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits in the aggregate amount of P3,833,798.10
Philippine currency, thus causing undue damage and injury to the complaining PHWs thru evident bad faith in the
performance of their official duties.4

On 24 February 1999, petitioners filed a Motion for Reinvestigation. 5 The Sandiganbayan granted the motion in a
resolution dated 27 April 1999 and ordered the prosecution to conduct a reinvestigation. 6 In a resolution dated 26 July
1999, Special Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr., recommended the dismissal of the case, which recommendation was
approved by Prosecution Bureau Director Victorio U. Tabanguil, Deputy Special Prosecutor Robert E. Kallos and
concurred in by Special Prosecutor Leonardo P. Tamayo. 7 This recommendation, however, was disapproved by
Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto who stated in his own handwriting "[l]et the court determine if indeed the evidence cannot
stand the judicial scrutiny."8

On 15 November 1999, petitioners filed a motion to quash the information anchored on the following grounds: 1) the facts
charged do not constitute an offense; 2) the accused are denied due process; and 3) the accused are not accorded the
equal protection of laws.9
On 06 January 2000, the Sandiganbayan denied petitioners’ motion. It ruled that the averments in the Information
sufficiently charged the offense, and that the mere fact that cases similar to this case were dismissed by the Ombudsman
does not mean due process or equal protection of the law clause was denied the petitioners.

Hence, this petition.

Petitioners contend that the reinvestigation conducted by Ombudsman Special Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr., showed
that insufficient funds were the reason for petitioners’ failure to appropriate the money to meet the magna carta benefits of
PHWs and that petitioners acted in good faith when they failed to enact the required appropriation ordinance. The
Sandiganbayan should have duly considered such findings and the evidence adduced supporting the same, irrespective
of the opinion of Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto. They conclude that the Sandiganbayan erred when it totally failed to
consider the findings and recommendations of the Office of the Special Prosecutor.

Petitioners likewise argue that the one-sentence disapproval by Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto of the recommendations
of the Office of the Special Prosecutor was arbitrary, whimsical and capricious for he failed to explain how such action
was arrived at, thereby depriving petitioners of their rights to be informed of the facts and the law on which the denial was
based.

At the outset, it must be emphasized that petitioners’ choice of remedy is clearly erroneous.

It is basic that Rule 45 of the Rules of Court governs appeals from judgment or final orders. 10 A final order is one which
disposes of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action, leaving nothing to be done but to
enforce by execution what has been determined.11 The resolution of the Sandiganbayan sought to be reviewed or set
aside is not in any sense judgment or a final order, but an interlocutory order. 12 An order is interlocutory if it does not
dispose of a case completely, but leaves something more to be done on its merits. 13 The order of the Sandiganbayan
denying the motion to quash filed by petitioners is interlocutory in nature because it leaves something more to be done by
the Sandiganbayan, by way of resolving the case on the merits. The denial of petitioners’ motion to quash allows the
same petitioners to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on their part to present the special defenses they invoked in
their motion and if, after trial on the merits, an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom via appeal by certiorari.14

Even if we consider the petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, we find that the Sandiganbayan
did not commit grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioners’ motion to quash.

Petitioners fault the Sandiganbayan for not taking into account the findings and recommendations of the Office of the
Special Prosecutor which found no probable cause to charge them. Allied to this assignment of error is petitioners’
allegation that the Ombudsman failed to accord them due process of law and equal protection of the law. They claimed
they were denied due process because Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto disapproved the recommendation of Special
Prosecutor II Jose O. Montero, Jr., by simply writing a one-line note. The disapproval allegedly deprived them of their right
to be informed of the facts and law on which the said disapproval was based. It is further asseverated that they were
deprived the equal protection of law since the Ombudsman, in sixteen (16) previous cases which were similar to the case
at bar, dismissed the same.

These arguments are specious. Petitioners’ submission that they were deprived of due process hinges on the erroneous
assumption that respondent Ombudsman failed to assess and consider the evidence presented by petitioners when he
disapproved the recommendation by the investigating prosecutor to dismiss the case, and that his ruling was not
supported by evidence on record.

The truth of the matter is that petitioners were not denied due process of law. The order of the Ombudsman for the filing of
the necessary information is not a case of a total absence of factual and legal bases nor a failure to appreciate the
evidence presented. It may appear that the Ombudsman’s one-line note lacks any factual or evidentiary grounds as it did
not set forth the same. The state of affairs, however, is that the Ombudsman’s note stems from his review of the findings
of fact reached by the investigating prosecutor. 15 The Ombudsman, contrary to the investigating prosecutor’s conclusion,
was of the conviction that petitioners are probably guilty of the offense charged, and for this, he is not required to conduct
an investigation anew.16 He is merely determining the propriety and correctness of the recommendation by the
investigating prosecutor, i.e., whether probable cause actually exists or not, on the basis of the findings of fact of the
latter. He may agree, fully or partly, or disagree completely with the investigating prosecutor. Whatever course of action
that the Ombudsman may take, whether to approve or to disapprove the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor,
is but an exercise of his discretionary powers based upon constitutional mandate. 17 Generally, courts should not interfere
in such exercise. It is beyond the ambit of this Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting
or dismissing a complaint filed before it, save in cases where there is clear showing of grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the Ombudsman which is absent in the case at hand. 18 Such
initiative and independence are inherent in the Ombudsman who, beholden to no one, acts as the champion of the people
and preserver of the integrity of the public service. 19

The fact that the Ombudsman merely wrote his recommendation for the filing of the information against petitioners in a
one-line note is not a sufficient basis for this Court to attribute arbitrariness or caprice on the part of respondent. As held
in Olivarez v. Sandiganbayan:20

The mere fact that the order to file the information against petitioner was contained in a marginal note is not sufficient to
impute arbitrariness or caprice on the part of the respondent special prosecutors, absent a clear showing that they gravely
abused their discretion in disapproving the recommendation of the investigating prosecutors to dismiss or withdraw the
case against petitioner. Neither are these notes tainted with or indicative of vindictiveness or arbitrariness as imputed by
petitioner. Public respondents disapproved the recommendation of the investigating prosecutors because they sincerely
believed that there is sufficient evidence to indict the accused.

The contention that petitioners’ right to equal protection of the law has been transgressed is equally untenable. The equal
protection clause requires that the law operates uniformly on all persons under similar circumstances or that all persons
are treated in the same manner, the conditions not being different, both in privileges conferred and the liabilities
imposed.21 It allows reasonable classification. If the classification is characterized by real and substantial differences, one
class may be treated differently from another.22 Simply because the respondent Ombudsman dismissed some cases
allegedly similar to the case at bar is not sufficient to impute arbitrariness or caprice on his part, absent a clear showing
that he gravely abused his discretion in pursuing the instant case. The Ombudsman dismissed those cases because he
believed there were no sufficient grounds for the accused therein to undergo trial. On the other hand, he recommended
the filing of appropriate information against petitioners because there are ample grounds to hold them for trial. He was
only exercising his power and discharging his duty based upon the constitutional mandate of his office. Stated otherwise,
the circumstances obtaining in the numerous cases previously dismissed by the Ombudsman are entirely divergent from
those here existing.

In the same vein, respondent Sandiganbayan could not be blamed for not considering the findings of the special
prosecutor because the rule is that in case of conflict in the conclusions of the Ombudsman and the special prosecutor, it
is the former’s decision that shall prevail since the Office of the Special Prosecutor is under the supervision and control of
the Ombudsman.23 Moreover, once a case has been filed with the court, it is that court, no longer the prosecution, which
has full control of the case, so much so that the information may grant or deny it, in the faithful exercise of judicial
discretion.24 The court is the best and sole judge on what to do with the case before it. 25 In the instant case, respondent
court is convinced that there is adequate evidence against the petitioners. Absence of proof that it gravely abused its
discretion, the conclusion arrived at by the Sandiganbayan in its assailed resolution, will not be disturbed.

Besides, petitioners’ argument that they could not be indicted for violation of Section 3(e) of Rep. Act No. 3019 as they
acted in good faith when they failed to appropriate funds for the unpaid salary differential and magna carta benefits due
the private complainants, is evidentiary in nature and is a matter of defense, which could be raised in a full-blown trial on
the merits.26 As aptly held in Deloso v. Desierto:27

Public prosecutors do not decide whether there is evidence beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the person charged.
They merely determine whether there is sufficient ground to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been
committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof, and should be held for trial. A finding of probable cause does
not require an inquiry as to whether there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction. It is enough that prosecutors
believe that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception
of evidence of the prosecution in support of the charges.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
Beltran v. Secretary of Health G.R. No. 133640, November 25, 2005

Fact:  Republic Act No. 7719 or the National Blood Services Act of 1994 was enacted into law on April 2, 1994. The Act
seeks to provide an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and by regulating blood banks
in the country. Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the Implementing Rules and Regulations of said
law was promulgated by respondent Secretary of the Department of Health (DOH). Section 7 of R.A. 7719 provides
Phase-out of Commercial Blood Banks – All commercial blood banks shall be phased-out over a period of two (2) years
after the effectivity of this Act, extendable to a maximum period of two (2) years by the Secretary.” Section 23 of
Administrative Order No. 9 provides Process of Phasing Out. — The Department shall effect the phasing-out of all
commercial blood banks over a period of two (2) years, extendible for a maximum period of two (2) years after the
effectivity of R.A. 7719. The decision to extend shall be based on the result of a careful study and review of the blood
supply and demand and public safety.” On August 23, 1994, the National Blood Services Act providing for the phase out
of commercial blood banks took effect. On April 28, 1995, Administrative Order No. 9, Series of 1995, constituting the
Implementing Rules and Regulations of said law was promulgated by DOH. The phase-out period was extended for two
years by the DOH. Hence, petitioners were granted by the Secretary of Health their licenses to open and operate a blood
bank only until May 27, 1998. On May 20, 1998, prior to the expiration of the licenses granted to petitioners, they filed a
petition for certiorari with application for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction or temporary restraining order
under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court assailing the constitutionality and validity of the aforementioned Act and its
Implementing Rules and Regulations.

Issue: Whether the law and its implementing rules and regulations violate the equal protection clause enshrined in the
Constitution because it unduly discriminates against commercial or free standing blood banks in a manner that is not
germane to the purpose of the law.

Held: No, the court deem the classification to be valid and reasonable for the following reasons:

One, it was based on substantial distinctions. The former operates for purely humanitarian reasons and as a medical
service while the latter is motivated by profit. Also, while the former wholly encourages voluntary blood donation, the latter
treats blood as a sale of commodity.

Two, the classification, and the consequent phase out of commercial blood banks is germane to the purpose of the law,
that is, to provide the nation with an adequate supply of safe blood by promoting voluntary blood donation and treating
blood transfusion as a humanitarian or medical service rather than a commodity. This necessarily involves the phase out
of commercial blood banks based on the fact that they operate as a business enterprise, and they source their blood
supply from paid blood donors who are considered unsafe compared to voluntary blood donors as shown by the USAID-
sponsored study on the Philippine blood banking system.

Three, the Legislature intended for the general application of the law. Its enactment was not solely to address the peculiar
circumstances of the situation nor was it intended to apply only to the existing conditions.

Lastly, the law applies equally to all commercial blood banks without exception.
ANG LADLAD VS. COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner is a national organization which represents the lesbians, gays, bisexuals, and trans-genders. It filed a petition
for accreditation as a party-list organization to public respondent. However, due to moral grounds, the latter denied the
said petition. To buttress their denial, COMELEC cited certain biblical and quranic passages in their decision. It also
stated that since their ways are immoral and contrary to public policy, they are considered nuissance. In fact, their acts
are even punishable under the Revised Penal Code in its Article 201.

A motion for reconsideration being denied, Petitioner filed this instant Petition on Certiorari under Rule 65 of the ROC.
Ang Ladlad argued that the denial of accreditation, insofar as it justified the exclusion by using religious dogma, violated
the constitutional guarantees against the establishment of religion. Petitioner also claimed that the Assailed Resolutions
contravened its constitutional rights to privacy, freedom of speech and assembly, and equal protection of laws, as well as
constituted violations of the Philippines’ international obligations against discrimination based on sexual orientation.

In its Comment, the COMELEC reiterated that petitioner does not have a concrete and genuine national political agenda
to benefit the nation and that the petition was validly dismissed on moral grounds. It also argued for the first time that the
LGBT sector is not among the sectors enumerated by the Constitution and RA 7941, and that petitioner made untruthful
statements in its petition when it alleged its national existence contrary to actual verification reports by COMELEC’s field
personnel.

Issue:
WON Respondent violated the Non-establishment clause of the Constitution;
WON Respondent erred in denying Petitioners application on moral and legal grounds.

Held:
Respondent mistakenly opines that our ruling in Ang Bagong Bayani stands for the proposition that only those sectors
specifically enumerated in the law or related to said sectors (labor, peasant, fisherfolk, urban poor, indigenous cultural
communities, elderly, handicapped, women, youth, veterans, overseas workers, and professionals) may be registered
under the party-list system. As we explicitly ruled in Ang Bagong Bayani-OFW Labor Party v. Commission on Elections,
“the enumeration of marginalized and under-represented sectors is not exclusive”. The crucial element is not whether a
sector is specifically enumerated, but whether a particular organization complies with the requirements of the Constitution
and RA 7941.

Our Constitution provides in Article III, Section 5 that “[n]o law shall be made respecting an establishment of religion, or
prohibiting the free exercise thereof.” At bottom, what our non-establishment clause calls for is “government neutrality in
religious matters.” Clearly, “governmental reliance on religious justification is inconsistent with this policy of neutrality.” We
thus find that it was grave violation of the non-establishment clause for the COMELEC to utilize the Bible and the Koran to
justify the exclusion of Ang Ladlad. Be it noted that government action must have a secular purpose.
Respondent has failed to explain what societal ills are sought to be prevented, or why special protection is required for the
youth. Neither has the COMELEC condescended to justify its position that petitioner’s admission into the party-list system
would be so harmful as to irreparably damage the moral fabric of society.

We also find the COMELEC’s reference to purported violations of our penal and civil laws flimsy, at best; disingenuous, at
worst. Article 694 of the Civil Code defines a nuisance as “any act, omission, establishment, condition of property, or
anything else which shocks, defies, or disregards decency or morality,” the remedies for which are a prosecution under
the Revised Penal Code or any local ordinance, a civil action, or abatement without judicial proceedings. A violation of
Article 201 of the Revised Penal Code, on the other hand, requires proof beyond reasonable doubt to support a criminal
conviction. It hardly needs to be emphasized that mere allegation of violation of laws is not proof, and a mere blanket
invocation of public morals cannot replace the institution of civil or criminal proceedings and a judicial determination of
liability or culpability.

As such, we hold that moral disapproval, without more, is not a sufficient governmental interest to justify exclusion of
homosexuals from participation in the party-list system. The denial of Ang Ladlad’s registration on purely moral grounds
amounts more to a statement of dislike and disapproval of homosexuals, rather than a tool to further any substantial
public interest.
LOUIS "BAROK" C. BIRAOGO v. THE PHILIPPINE TRUTH COMMISSION OF 2010. CONSOLIDATED WITH G.R. No.
193036

FACTS: For consideration before the Court are two consolidated cases both of which essentially assail the validity and
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1, dated July 30, 2010, entitled "Creating the Philippine Truth Commission of
2010."

In, G.R. No. 192935, Biraogo assails Executive Order No. 1 for being violative of the legislative power of Congress under
Section 1, Article VI of the Constitution as it usurps the constitutional authority of the legislature to create a public office
and to appropriate funds therefor.

The second case, G.R. No. 193036, is a special civil action for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioners Edcel C.
Lagman, Rodolfo B. Albano Jr., Simeon A. Datumanong, and Orlando B. Fua, Sr. (petitioners-legislators) as incumbent
members of the House of Representatives.

The Philippine Truth Commission (PTC) is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary
task to investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and employees, their co-
principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous administration, and thereafter to submit its finding and
recommendations to the President, Congress and the Ombudsman. Though it has been described as an "independent
collegial body," it is essentially an entity within the Office of the President Proper and subject to his control. Doubtless, it
constitutes a public office, as an ad hoc body is one.

To accomplish its task, the PTC shall have all the powers of an investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of
the Administrative Code of 1987. It is not, however, a quasi-judicial body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle,
or render awards in disputes between contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and
corruption and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people in contempt,
much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot determine from such facts if probable cause exists
as to warrant the filing of an information in our courts of law. Needless to state, it cannot impose criminal, civil or
administrative penalties or sanctions.

ISSUES: Is EO No. 1 unconstitutional?

HELD: The Court disagrees with the OSG in questioning the legal standing of the petitioners-legislators to assail
Executive Order No. 1. Evidently, their petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to
which they belong as members. This certainly justifies their resolve to take the cudgels for Congress as an institution and
present the complaints on the usurpation of their power and rights as members of the legislature before the Court.

As held in Philippine Constitution Association v. Enriquez:

To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power of each member thereof, since his office confers a
right to participate in the exercise of the powers of that institution.

An act of the Executive which injures the institution of Congress causes a derivative but nonetheless substantial injury,
which can be questioned by a member of Congress. In such a case, any member of Congress can have a resort to the
courts.

Indeed, legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested by the Constitution
in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the validity of any official action which, to their mind,
infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.

The question, therefore, before the Court is this: Does the creation of the PTC fall within the ambit of the power to
reorganize as expressed in Section 31 of the Revised Administrative Code? Section 31 contemplates "reorganization" as
limited by the following functional and structural lines: (1) restructuring the internal organization of the Office of the
President Proper by abolishing, consolidating or merging units thereof or transferring functions from one unit to another;
(2) transferring any function under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa; or (3)
transferring any agency under the Office of the President to any other Department/Agency or vice versa.

Clearly, the provision refers to reduction of personnel, consolidation of offices, or abolition thereof by reason of economy
or redundancy of functions. These point to situations where a body or an office is already existent but a modification or
alteration thereof has to be effected. The creation of an office is nowhere mentioned, much less envisioned in said
provision. Accordingly, the answer to the question is in the negative.

To say that the PTC is borne out of a restructuring of the Office of the President under Section 31 is a misplaced
supposition, even in the plainest meaning attributable to the term "restructure" an "alteration of an existing structure."
Evidently, the PTC was not part of the structure of the Office of the President prior to the enactment of Executive Order
No. 1.

In the same vein, the creation of the PTC is not justified by the Presidents power of control. Control is essentially the
power to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in the performance of his duties and to
substitute the judgment of the former with that of the latter. Clearly, the power of control is entirely different from the power
to create public offices. The former is inherent in the Executive, while the latter finds basis from either a valid delegation
from Congress, or his inherent duty to faithfully execute the laws.

The question is this, is there a valid delegation of power from Congress, empowering the President to create a public
office? According to the OSG, the power to create a truth commission pursuant to the above provision finds statutory
basis under P.D. 1416, as amended by P.D. No. 1772.

The Court, however, declines to recognize P.D. No. 1416 as a justification for the President to create a public office. Said
decree is already stale, anachronistic and inoperable. P.D. No. 1416 was a delegation to then President Marcos of the
authority to reorganize the administrative structure of the national government including the power to create offices and
transfer appropriations pursuant to one of the purposes of the decree, embodied in its last "Whereas" clause:

WHEREAS, the transition towards the parliamentary form of government will necessitate flexibility in the organization of
the national government.

Clearly, as it was only for the purpose of providing manageability and resiliency during the interim, P.D. No. 1416, as
amended by P.D. No. 1772, became functus oficio upon the convening of the First Congress, as expressly provided in
Section 6, Article XVIII of the 1987 Constitution.

Invoking this authority, the President constituted the PTC to primarily investigate reports of graft and corruption and to
recommend the appropriate action. As previously stated, no quasi-judicial powers have been vested in the said body as it
cannot adjudicate rights of persons who come before it.

Contrary to petitioners apprehension, the PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective
powers. If at all, the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. As pointed out by
the Solicitor General, the recommendation to prosecute is but a consequence of the overall task of the commission to
conduct a fact-finding investigation. The actual prosecution of suspected offenders, much less adjudication on the merits
of the charges against them, is certainly not a function given to the commission. The phrase, "when in the course of its
investigation," under Section 2(g), highlights this fact and gives credence to a contrary interpretation from that of the
petitioners. The function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the courts
remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman.

At any rate, the Ombudsmans power to investigate under R.A. No. 6770 is not exclusive but is shared with other similarly
authorized government agencies. The same holds true with respect to the DOJ. Its authority under Section 3 (2), Chapter
1, Title III, Book IV in the Revised Administrative Code is by no means exclusive and, thus, can be shared with a body
likewise tasked to investigate the commission of crimes.

Although the purpose of the Truth Commission falls within the investigative power of the President, the Court finds
difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of its apparent transgression of the equal
protection clause.

The equal protection clause is aimed at all official state actions, not just those of the legislature. Its inhibitions cover all the
departments of the government including the political and executive departments, and extend to all actions of a state
denying equal protection of the laws, through whatever agency or whatever guise is taken.

It, however, does not require the universal application of the laws to all persons or things without distinction. What it
simply requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Indeed, the equal protection
clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the test of reasonableness. The test has
four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is
not limited to existing conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class."Superficial differences
do not make for a valid classification."
Applying these precepts to this case, Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection
clause. The clear mandate of the envisioned truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth "concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to single out the previous
administration is plain, patent and manifest. Mention of it has been made in at least three portions of the questioned
executive order.

In this regard, it must be borne in mind that the Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of
past administrations. It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating differentiation clearly reverberates to
label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and selective retribution.
The Philippine Supreme Court, according to Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, is vested with Judicial Power
that "includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable
and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave of abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government."

Furthermore, in Section 4(2) thereof, it is vested with the power of judicial review which is the power to declare a treaty,
international or executive agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
unconstitutional. This power also includes the duty to rule on the constitutionality of the application, or operation of
presidential decrees, proclamations, orders, instructions, ordinances, and other regulations. These provisions, however,
have been fertile grounds of conflict between the Supreme Court, on one hand, and the two co-equal bodies of
government, on the other. Many times the Court has been accused of asserting superiority over the other departments.

Thus, the Court, in exercising its power of judicial review, is not imposing its own will upon a co-equal body but rather
simply making sure that any act of government isdone in consonance with the authorities and rights allocated to it by the
Constitution. And, if after said review, the Court finds no constitutional violations of any sort, then, it has no more authority
of proscribing the actions under review. Otherwise, the Court will not be deterred to pronounce said act as void and
unconstitutional. GRANTED.
Garcia vs. J. Drilon and Garcia, G. R. No. 179267, 25 June 2013

Facts:             
Private respondent Rosalie filed a petition before the RTC of Bacolod City a Temporary Protection Order against her
husband, Jesus, pursuant to R.A. 9262, entitled “An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes.” She claimed to be a victim
of physical, emotional, psychological and economic violence, being threatened of deprivation of custody of her children
and of financial support and also a victim of marital infidelity on the part of petitioner.

The TPO was granted but the petitioner failed to faithfully comply with the conditions set forth by the said TPO, private-
respondent filed another application for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. The trial court issued a modified TPO and
extended the same when petitioner failed to comment on why the TPO should not be modified.  After the given time
allowance to answer, the petitioner no longer submitted the required comment as it would be an “axercise in futility.”

Petitioner filed before the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for injunction and TRO on, questioning the
constitutionality of the RA 9262 for violating the due process and equal protection clauses, and the validity of the modified
TPO for being “an unwanted product of an invalid law.”

The CA issued a TRO on the enforcement of the TPO but however, denied the petition for failure to raise the issue of
constitutionality in his pleadings before the trial court and the petition for prohibition to annul protection orders issued by
the trial court constituted collateral attack on said law.

Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied. Thus, this petition is filed.

Issues:
WON the CA erred in dismissing the petition on the theory that the issue of constitutionality was not raised at the earliest
opportunity and that the petition constitutes a collateral attack on the validity of the law.

WON the CA committed serious error in failing to conclude that RA 9262 is discriminatory, unjust and violative of the
equal protection clause.

WON the CA committed grave mistake in not finding that RA 9262 runs counter to the due process clause of the
Constitution

WON the CA erred in not finding that the law does violence to the policy of the state to protect the family as a basic social
institution

WON the CA seriously erredin declaring RA 9262 as invalid and unconstitutional because it allows an undue delegation of
judicial power to Brgy. Officials.

Decision:        
1. Petitioner contends that the RTC has limited authority and jurisdiction, inadequate to tackle the complex issue of
constitutionality. Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute. The question of
constitutionality must be raised at the earliest possible time so that if not raised in the pleadings, it may not be raised in
the trial and if not raised in the trial court, it may not be considered in appeal.

2. RA 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. Equal protection simply requires that all persons
or things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. In Victoriano
v. Elizalde Rope Workerkers’ Union, the Court ruled that all that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable,
which means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real differences; that it
must be germane to the purpose of the law; not limited to existing conditions only; and apply equally to each member of
the class. Therefore, RA9262 is based on a valid classification and did not violate the equal protection clause by favouring
women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the Senate extends its protection.
3. RA 9262 is not violative of the due process clause of the Constitution. The essence of due process is in the reasonable
opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in support of one’s defense. The grant of the TPO
exparte cannot be impugned as violative of the right to due process.

4.  The non-referral of a VAWC case to a mediator is justified. Petitioner’s contention that by not allowing mediation, the
law violated the policy of the State to protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution cannot be
sustained. In a memorandum of the Court, it ruled that the court shall not refer the case or any issue therof to a mediator.
This is so because violence is not a subject for compromise.

5. There is no undue delegation of judicial power to Barangay officials.  Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of
justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on any part of any
branch of the Government while executive power is the power to enforce and administer the laws.  The preliminary
investigation conducted by the prosecutor is an executive, not a judicial, function.  The same holds true with the issuance
of BPO.  Assistance by Brgy. Officials and other law enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty executive function.

The petition for review on certiorari is denied for lack of merit.

 PRIVACY OF COMMUNICATION
OPLE VS. TORRES
The petition at bar is a commendable effort on the part of Senator Blas F. Ople to prevent the shrinking of the right to
privacy, which the revered Mr. Justice Brandeis considered as "the most comprehensive of rights and the right most
valued by civilized men."[1] Petitioner Ople prays that we invalidate Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a
National Computerized Identification Reference System" on two important constitutional grounds, viz: one, it is a
usurpation of the power of Congress to legislate, and two, it impermissibly intrudes on our citizenry's protected zone of
privacy. We grant the petition for the rights sought to be vindicated by the petitioner need stronger barriers against further
erosion.

A.O. No. 308 was issued by President Fidel V. Ramos on December 12, 1996 and reads as follows:

"ADOPTION OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM

WHEREAS, there is a need to provide Filipino citizens and foreign residents with the facility to conveniently transact
business with basic service and social security providers and other government instrumentalities;

WHEREAS, this will require a computerized system to properly and efficiently identify persons seeking basic services on
social security and reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and misrepresentations;

WHEREAS, a concerted and collaborative effort among the various basic services and social security providing agencies
and other government instrumentalities is required to achieve such a system;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FIDEL V. RAMOS, President of the Republic of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers vested in
me by law, do hereby direct the following:

SECTION 1. Establishment of a National Computerized Identification Reference System. A decentralized Identification

Reference System among the key basic services and social security providers is hereby established.

SEC. 2 Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee. An Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee (IACC) to draw-up the
implementing guidelines and oversee the implementation of the System is hereby created, chaired by the Executive
Secretary, with the following as members:

Head, Presidential Management Staff

Secretary, National Economic Development Authority
Secretary, Department of the Interior and
Local Government
Secretary, Department of Health
Administrator, Government Service Insurance
System,
Administrator, Social Security System, Administrator, National Statistics Office Managing Director, National Computer
Center.

SEC. 3. Secretariat. The National Computer Center (NCC) is hereby designated as secretariat to the IACC and as such
shall provide administrative and technical support to the IACC.

SEC. 4. Linkage Among Agencies. The Population Reference Number (PRN) generated by the NSO shall serve as the
common reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies. The IACC Secretariat shall coordinate with
the different Social Security and Services Agencies to establish the standards in the use of Biometrics Technology and in
computer application designs of their respective systems.

SEC. 5. Conduct of Information Dissemination Campaign. The Office of the Press Secretary, in coordination with the
National Statistics Office, the GSIS and SSS as lead agencies and other concerned agencies shall undertake a massive
tri-media information dissemination campaign to educate and raise public awareness on the importance and use of the
PRN and the Social Security Identification Reference.

SEC. 6. Funding.  The funds necessary for the implementation of the system shall be sourced from the respective
budgets of the concerned agencies.
SEC. 7. Submission of Regular Reports. The NSO, GSIS and SSS shall submit regular reports to the Office of the
President, through the IACC, on the status of implementation of this undertaking.

SEC. 8. Effectivity. This Administrative Order shall take effect immediately.

DONE in the City of Manila, this 12th day of December in the year of Our Lord, Nineteen Hundred and Ninety-Six.
 

(SGD.) FIDEL V. RAMOS"

A.O. No. 308 was published in four newspapers of general circulation on January 22, 1997 and January 23, 1997. On
January 24, 1997, petitioner filed the instant petition against respondents, then Executive Secretary Ruben Torres and the
heads of the government agencies, who as members of the Inter-Agency Coordinating Committee, are charged with the
implementation of A.O. No. 308. On April 8, 1997, we issued a temporary restraining order enjoining its implementation.

Petitioner contends:
"A. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A NATIONAL COMPUTERIZED IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM REQUIRES
A LEGISLATIVE ACT. THE ISSUANCE OF A.O. NO. 308 BY THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE
PHILIPPINES IS, THEREFORE, AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF THE
CONGRESS OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES.

B.  THE APPROPRIATION OF PUBLIC FUNDS BY THE PRESIDENT FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308
IS AN UNCONSTITUTIONAL USURPATION OF THE EXCLUSIVE RIGHT OF CONGRESS TO APPROPRIATE PUBLIC
FUNDS FOR EXPENDITURE.

C.  THE IMPLEMENTATION OF A.O. NO. 308 INSIDIOUSLY LAYS THE GROUNDWORK FOR A SYSTEM WHICH
WILL VIOLATE THE BILL OF RIGHTS ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION."[2]

Respondents counter-argue:
A.  THE INSTANT PETITION IS NOT A JUSTICIABLE CASE AS WOULD WARRANT A JUDICIAL REVIEW;

B.  A.O. NO. 308 [1996] WAS ISSUED WITHIN THE EXECUTIVE AND ADMINISTRATIVE POWERS OF THE
PRESIDENT WITHOUT ENCROACHING ON THE LEGISLATIVE POWERS OF CONGRESS;

C.  THE FUNDS NECESSARY FOR THE IMPLEMENTATION OF THE IDENTIFICATION REFERENCE SYSTEM MAY
BE SOURCED FROM THE BUDGETS OF THE CONCERNED AGENCIES;

D.  A.O. NO. 308 [1996] PROTECTS AN INDIVIDUAL'S INTEREST IN PRIVACY.[3]

We now resolve.
I
As is usual in constitutional litigation, respondents raise the threshold issues relating to the standing to sue of the
petitioner and the justiciability of the case at bar. More specifically, respondents aver that petitioner has no legal interest to
uphold and that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308 have yet to be promulgated.

These submissions do not deserve our sympathetic ear. Petitioner Ople is a distinguished member of our Senate. As a
Senator, petitioner is possessed of the requisite standing to bring suit raising the issue that the issuance of A.O. No. 308
is a usurpation of legislative power.[4] As taxpayer and member of the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS),
petitioner can also impugn the legality of the misalignment of public funds and the misuse of GSIS funds to implement
A.O. No. 308.[5]

The ripeness for adjudication of the petition at bar is not affected by the fact that the implementing rules of A.O. No. 308
have yet to be promulgated. Petitioner Ople assails A.O. No. 308 as invalid per se and as infirmed on its face. His action
is not premature for the rules yet to be promulgated cannot cure its fatal defects. Moreover, the respondents themselves
have started the implementation of A.O. No. 308 without waiting for the rules. As early as January 19, 1997, respondent
Social Security System (SSS) caused the publication of a notice to bid for the manufacture of the National Identification
(ID) card.[6] Respondent Executive Secretary Torres has publicly announced that representatives from the GSIS and the
SSS have completed the guidelines for the national identification system.[7] All signals from the respondents show their
unswerving will to implement A.O. No. 308 and we need not wait for the formality of the rules to pass judgment on its
constitutionality. In this light, the dissenters insistence that we tighten the rule on standing is not a commendable stance
as its result would be to throttle an important constitutional principle and a fundamental right.

II
We now come to the core issues. Petitioner claims that A.O. No. 308 is not a mere administrative order but a law
and hence, beyond the power of the President to issue. He alleges that A.O. No. 308 establishes a system of
identification that is all-encompassing in scope, affects the life and liberty of every Filipino citizen and foreign resident, and
more particularly, violates their right to privacy.

Petitioner's sedulous concern for the Executive not to trespass on the lawmaking domain of Congress is understandable.
The blurring of the demarcation line between the power of the Legislature to make laws and the power of the Executive to
execute laws will disturb their delicate balance of power and cannot be allowed. Hence, the exercise by one branch of
government of power belonging to another will be given a stricter scrutiny by this Court.

The line that delineates Legislative and Executive power is not indistinct. Legislative power is "the authority, under the
Constitution, to make laws, and to alter and repeal them."[8] The Constitution, as the will of the people in their original,
sovereign and unlimited capacity, has vested this power in the Congress of the Philippines.[9] The grant of legislative
power to Congress is broad, general and comprehensive.[10] The legislative body possesses plenary power for all
purposes of civil government.[11] Any power, deemed to be legislative by usage and tradition, is necessarily possessed
by Congress, unless the Constitution has lodged it elsewhere.[12] In fine, except as limited by the Constitution, either
expressly or impliedly, legislative power embraces all subjects and extends to matters of general concern or common
interest.[13]

While Congress is vested with the power to enact laws, the President executes the laws.[14] The executive power is
vested in the President.[15] It is generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws.[16] It is the power of
carrying the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance.[17]

As head of the Executive Department, the President is the Chief Executive. He represents the government as a whole and
sees to it that all laws are enforced by the officials and employees of his department.[18] He has control over the
executive department, bureaus and offices. This means that he has the authority to assume directly the functions of the
executive department, bureau and office, or interfere with the discretion of its officials.[19] Corollary to the power of
control, the President also has the duty of supervising the enforcement of laws for the maintenance of general peace and
public order. Thus, he is granted administrative power over bureaus and offices under his control to enable him to
discharge his duties effectively.[20]

Administrative power is concerned with the work of applying policies and enforcing orders as determined by proper
governmental organs.[21] It enables the President to fix a uniform standard of administrative efficiency and check the
official conduct of his agents.[22] To this end, he can issue administrative orders, rules and regulations.

Prescinding from these precepts, we hold that A.O. No. 308 involves a subject that is not appropriate to be covered by an
administrative order. An administrative order is:

"Sec. 3. Administrative Orders.-- Acts of the President which relate to particular aspects of governmental operation in
pursuance of his duties as administrative head shall be promulgated in administrative orders."[23]

An administrative order is an ordinance issued by the President which relates to specific aspects in the administrative
operation of government. It must be in harmony with the law and should be for the sole purpose of implementing the law
and carrying out the legislative policy.[24] We reject the argument that A.O. No. 308 implements the legislative policy of
the Administrative Code of 1987. The Code is a general law and "incorporates in a unified document the major structural,
functional and procedural principles of governance"[25] and "embodies changes in administrative structures and
procedures designed to serve the people."[26] The Code is divided into seven (7) Books: Book I deals with Sovereignty
and General Administration, Book II with the Distribution of Powers of the three branches of Government, Book III on the
Office of the President, Book IV on the Executive Branch, Book V on the Constitutional Commissions, Book VI on National
Government Budgeting, and Book VII on Administrative Procedure. These Books contain provisions on the organization,
powers and general administration of the executive, legislative and judicial branches of government, the organization and
administration of departments, bureaus and offices under the executive branch, the organization and functions of the
Constitutional Commissions and other constitutional bodies, the rules on the national government budget, as well as
guidelines for the exercise by administrative agencies of quasi-legislative and quasi-judicial powers. The Code covers
both the internal administration of government, i.e, internal organization, personnel and recruitment, supervision and
discipline, and the effects of the functions performed by administrative officials on private individuals or parties outside
government.[27]

It cannot be simplistically argued that A.O. No. 308 merely implements the Administrative Code of 1987. It establishes for
the first time a National Computerized Identification Reference System. Such a System requires a delicate adjustment of
various contending state policies-- the primacy of national security, the extent of privacy interest against dossier-gathering
by government, the choice of policies, etc. Indeed, the dissent of Mr. Justice Mendoza states that the A.O. No. 308
involves the all-important freedom of thought. As said administrative order redefines the parameters of some basic rights
of our citizenry vis-a-vis the State as well as the line that separates the administrative power of the President to make
rules and the legislative power of Congress, it ought to be evident that it deals with a subject that should be covered by
law.

Nor is it correct to argue as the dissenters do that A.O. No. 308 is not a law because it confers no right, imposes no duty,
affords no protection, and creates no office. Under A.O. No. 308, a citizen cannot transact business with government
agencies delivering basic services to the people without the contemplated identification card. No citizen will refuse to get
this identification card for no one can avoid dealing with government. It is thus clear as daylight that without the ID, a
citizen will have difficulty exercising his rights and enjoying his privileges. Given this reality, the contention that A.O. No.
308 gives no right and imposes no duty cannot stand.

Again, with due respect, the dissenting opinions unduly expand the limits of administrative legislation and consequently
erodes the plenary power of Congress to make laws. This is contrary to the established approach defining the traditional
limits of administrative legislation. As well stated by Fisher: "x x x Many regulations however, bear directly on the public. It
is here that administrative legislation must be restricted in its scope and application. Regulations are not supposed to be a
substitute for the general policy-making that Congress enacts in the form of a public law. Although administrative
regulations are entitled to respect, the authority to prescribe rules and regulations is not an independent source of power
to make laws."[28]

III
Assuming, arguendo, that A.O. No. 308 need not be the subject of a law, still it cannot pass constitutional muster as an
administrative legislation because facially it violates the right to privacy. The essence of privacy is the "right to be let
alone."[29] In the 1965 case of Griswold v. Connecticut,[30] the United States Supreme Court gave more substance to the
right of privacy when it ruled that the right has a constitutional foundation. It held that there is a right of privacy which can
be found within the penumbras of the First, Third, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments,[31] viz:

"Specific guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras formed by emanations from these guarantees that help give
them life and substance x x x. Various guarantees create zones of privacy. The right of association contained in the
penumbra of the First Amendment is one, as we have seen. The Third Amendment in its prohibition against the quartering
of soldiers `in any house' in time of peace without the consent of the owner is another facet of that privacy. The Fourth
Amendment explicitly affirms the `right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures.' The Fifth Amendment in its Self-Incrimination Clause enables the citizen to create
a zone of privacy which government may not force him to surrender to his detriment. The Ninth Amendment provides:
`The enumeration in the Constitution, of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or disparage others retained by the
people.'"

In the 1968 case of Morfe v. Mutuc,[32] we adopted the Griswold ruling that there is a constitutional right to privacy.
Speaking thru Mr. Justice, later Chief Justice, Enrique Fernando, we held:
"xxx
The Griswold case invalidated a Connecticut statute which made the use of contraceptives a criminal offense on the
ground of its amounting to an unconstitutional invasion of the right of privacy of married persons; rightfully it stressed "a
relationship lying within the zone of privacy created by several fundamental constitutional guarantees." It has wider
implications though. The constitutional right to privacy has come into its own.

So it is likewise in our jurisdiction. The right to privacy as such is accorded recognition independently of its identification
with liberty; in itself, it is fully deserving of constitutional protection. The language of Prof. Emerson is particularly apt: 'The
concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain intrusions into
the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited government.
Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state. In contrast, a
system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly distinguishing it from the
public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector-- protection, in other words, of the dignity and
integrity of the individual--has become increasingly important as modern society has developed. All the forces of a
technological age --industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow the area of privacy and facilitate
intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life marks the difference
between a democratic and a totalitarian society.'"
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is recognized and enshrined in several
provisions of our Constitution.[33] It is expressly recognized in Section 3(1) of the Bill of Rights:

"Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be inviolable except upon lawful order of the court,
or when public safety or order requires otherwise as prescribed by law."

Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill of Rights, viz:[34]
"Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law, nor shall any person be denied
the equal protection of the laws.

Sec. 2. The right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures of whatever nature and for any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the judge after examination under oath or affirmation of
the complainant and the witnesses he may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
x x x.
Sec. 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits prescribed by law shall not be impaired except
upon lawful order of the court. Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national security, public
safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

xxx
Sec. 8. The right of the people, including those employed in the public and private sectors, to form unions, associations,
or societies for purposes not contrary to law shall not be abridged.

Sec. 17. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself."

Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that "[e]very person shall
respect the dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the privacy of another.[35] It also holds a public
officer or employee or any private individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another
person,[36] and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private communications.[37] The Revised Penal Code makes a
crime the violation of secrets by an officer,[38] the revelation of trade and industrial secrets,[39] and trespass to dwelling.
[40] Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-Wiretapping Law,[41] the Secrecy of Bank Deposit
Act[42] and the Intellectual Property Code.[43] The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise recognize the
privacy of certain information.[44]

Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a fundamental right guaranteed by the
Constitution, hence, it is the burden of government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state interest
and that it is narrowly drawn. A.O. No. 308 is predicated on two considerations: (1) the need to provide our citizens and
foreigners with the facility to conveniently transact business with basic service and social security providers and other
government instrumentalities and (2) the need to reduce, if not totally eradicate, fraudulent transactions and
misrepresentations by persons seeking basic services. It is debatable whether these interests are compelling enough to
warrant the issuance of A.O. No. 308. But what is not arguable is the broadness, the vagueness, the overbreadth of A.O.
No. 308 which if implemented will put our people's right to privacy in clear and present danger.

The heart of A.O. No. 308 lies in its Section 4 which provides for a Population Reference Number (PRN) as a "common
reference number to establish a linkage among concerned agencies" through the use of "Biometrics Technology" and
"computer application designs."

Biometry or biometrics is "the science of the application of statistical methods to biological facts; a mathematical analysis
of biological data."[45] The term "biometrics" has now evolved into a broad category of technologies which provide precise
confirmation of an individual's identity through the use of the individual's own physiological and behavioral characteristics.
[46] A physiological characteristic is a relatively stable physical characteristic such as a fingerprint, retinal scan, hand
geometry or facial features. A behavioral characteristic is influenced by the individual's personality and includes voice
print, signature and keystroke.[47] Most biometric identification systems use a card or personal identification number (PIN)
for initial identification. The biometric measurement is used to verify that the individual holding the card or entering the PIN
is the legitimate owner of the card or PIN.[48]

A most common form of biological encoding is finger-scanning where technology scans a fingertip and turns the unique
pattern therein into an individual number which is called a biocrypt. The biocrypt is stored in computer data banks[49] and
becomes a means of identifying an individual using a service. This technology requires one's fingertip to be scanned
every time service or access is provided.[50] Another method is the retinal scan. Retinal scan technology employs optical
technology to map the capillary pattern of the retina of the eye. This technology produces a unique print similar to a finger
print.[51] Another biometric method is known as the "artificial nose." This device chemically analyzes the unique
combination of substances excreted from the skin of people.[52] The latest on the list of biometric achievements is the
thermogram. Scientists have found that by taking pictures of a face using infra-red cameras, a unique heat distribution
pattern is seen. The different densities of bone, skin, fat and blood vessels all contribute to the individual's personal "heat
signature."[53]

In the last few decades, technology has progressed at a galloping rate. Some science fictions are now science facts.
Today, biometrics is no longer limited to the use of fingerprint to identify an individual. It is a new science that uses various
technologies in encoding any and all biological characteristics of an individual for identification. It is noteworthy that A.O.
No. 308 does not state what specific biological characteristics and what particular biometrics technology shall be used to
identify people who will seek its coverage. Considering the banquet of options available to the implementors of A.O. No.
308, the fear that it threatens the right to privacy of our people is not groundless.

A.O. No. 308 should also raise our antennas for a further look will show that it does not state whether encoding of data is
limited to biological information alone for identification purposes. In fact, the Solicitor General claims that the adoption of
the Identification Reference System will contribute to the "generation of population data for development
planning."[54] This is an admission that the PRN will not be used solely for identification but for the generation of other
data with remote relation to the avowed purposes of A.O. No. 308. Clearly, the indefiniteness of A.O. No. 308 can give the
government the roving authority to store and retrieve information for a purpose other than the identification of the
individual through his PRN.

The potential for misuse of the data to be gathered under A.O. No. 308 cannot be underplayed as the dissenters do.
Pursuant to said administrative order, an individual must present his PRN everytime he deals with a government agency
to avail of basic services and security. His transactions with the government agency will necessarily be recorded--
whether it be in the computer or in the documentary file of the agency. The individual's file may include his transactions for
loan availments, income tax returns, statement of assets and liabilities, reimbursements for medication, hospitalization,
etc. The more frequent the use of the PRN, the better the chance of building a huge and formidable information base
through the electronic linkage of the files.[55] The data may be gathered for gainful and useful government purposes; but
the existence of this vast reservoir of personal information constitutes a covert invitation to misuse, a temptation that may
be too great for some of our authorities to resist.[56]

We can even grant, arguendo, that the computer data file will be limited to the name, address and other basic personal
information about the individual.[57] Even that hospitable assumption will not save A.O. No. 308 from constitutional
infirmity for again said order does not tell us in clear and categorical terms how these information gathered shall be
handled. It does not provide who shall control and access the data, under what circumstances and for what purpose.
These factors are essential to safeguard the privacy and guaranty the integrity of the information.[58] Well to note, the
computer linkage gives other government agencies access to the information. Yet, there are no controls to guard against
leakage of information. When the access code of the control programs of the particular computer system is broken, an
intruder, without fear of sanction or penalty, can make use of the data for whatever purpose, or worse, manipulate the
data stored within the system.[59]

It is plain and we hold that A.O. No. 308 falls short of assuring that personal information which will be gathered about our
people will only be processed for unequivocally specified purposes.[60] The lack of proper safeguards in this regard of
A.O. No. 308 may interfere with the individual's liberty of abode and travel by enabling authorities to track down his
movement; it may also enable unscrupulous persons to access confidential information and circumvent the right against
self-incrimination; it may pave the way for "fishing expeditions" by government authorities and evade the right against
unreasonable searches and seizures.[61] The possibilities of abuse and misuse of the PRN, biometrics and computer
technology are accentuated when we consider that the individual lacks control over what can be read or placed on his ID,
much less verify the correctness of the data encoded.[62] They threaten the very abuses that the Bill of Rights seeks to
prevent.[63]
The ability of a sophisticated data center to generate a comprehensive cradle-to-grave dossier on an individual and
transmit it over a national network is one of the most graphic threats of the computer revolution.[64] The computer is
capable of producing a comprehensive dossier on individuals out of information given at different times and for varied
purposes.[65] It can continue adding to the stored data and keeping the information up to date. Retrieval of stored data is
simple. When information of a privileged character finds its way into the computer, it can be extracted together with other
data on the subject.[66] Once extracted, the information is putty in the hands of any person. The end of privacy begins.

Though A.O. No. 308 is undoubtedly not narrowly drawn, the dissenting opinions would dismiss its danger to the right to
privacy as speculative and hypothetical. Again, we cannot countenance such a laidback posture. The Court will not be
true to its role as the ultimate guardian of the people's liberty if it would not immediately smother the sparks that endanger
their rights but would rather wait for the fire that could consume them.

We reject the argument of the Solicitor General that an individual has a reasonable expectation of privacy with regard to
the National ID and the use of biometrics technology as it stands on quicksand. The reasonableness of a person's
expectation of privacy depends on a two-part test: (1) whether by his conduct, the individual has exhibited an expectation
of privacy; and (2) whether this expectation is one that society recognizes as reasonable.[67] The factual circumstances of
the case determines the reasonableness of the expectation.[68] However, other factors, such as customs, physical
surroundings and practices of a particular activity, may serve to create or diminish this expectation.[69] The use of
biometrics and computer technology in A.O. No. 308 does not assure the individual of a reasonable expectation of
privacy.[70] As technology advances, the level of reasonably expected privacy decreases.[71] The measure of protection
granted by the reasonable expectation diminishes as relevant technology becomes more widely accepted.[72] The
security of the computer data file depends not only on the physical inaccessibility of the file but also on the advances in
hardware and software computer technology. A.O. No. 308 is so widely drawn that a minimum standard for a reasonable
expectation of privacy, regardless of technology used, cannot be inferred from its provisions.

The rules and regulations to be drawn by the IACC cannot remedy this fatal defect. Rules and regulations merely
implement the policy of the law or order. On its face, A.O. No. 308 gives the IACC virtually unfettered discretion to
determine the metes and bounds of the ID System.

Nor do our present laws provide adequate safeguards for a reasonable expectation of privacy. Commonwealth Act No.
591 penalizes the disclosure by any person of data furnished by the individual to the NSO with imprisonment and fine.
[73] Republic Act No. 1161 prohibits public disclosure of SSS employment records and reports.[74] These laws, however,
apply to records and data with the NSO and the SSS. It is not clear whether they may be applied to data with the other
government agencies forming part of the National ID System. The need to clarify the penal aspect of A.O. No. 308 is
another reason why its enactment should be given to Congress.

Next, the Solicitor General urges us to validate A.O. No. 308's abridgment of the right of privacy by using the rational
relationship test.[75] He stressed that the purposes of A.O. No. 308 are: (1) to streamline and speed up the
implementation of basic government services, (2) eradicate fraud by avoiding duplication of services, and (3) generate
population data for development planning. He concludes that these purposes justify the incursions into the right to privacy
for the means are rationally related to the end.[76]

We are not impressed by the argument. In Morfe v. Mutuc,[77] we upheld the constitutionality of R.A. 3019, the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act, as a valid police power measure. We declared that the law, in compelling a public officer to
make an annual report disclosing his assets and liabilities, his sources of income and expenses, did not infringe on the
individual's right to privacy. The law was enacted to promote morality in public administration by curtailing and minimizing
the opportunities for official corruption and maintaining a standard of honesty in the public service.[78]

The same circumstances do not obtain in the case at bar. For one, R.A. 3019 is a statute, not an administrative order.
Secondly, R.A. 3019 itself is sufficiently detailed. The law is clear on what practices were prohibited and penalized, and it
was narrowly drawn to avoid abuses. In the case at bar, A.O. No. 308 may have been impelled by a worthy purpose, but,
it cannot pass constitutional scrutiny for it is not narrowly drawn. And we now hold that when the integrity of a fundamental
right is at stake, this court will give the challenged law, administrative order, rule or regulation a stricter scrutiny. It will not
do for the authorities to invoke the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duties. Nor is it enough for the
authorities to prove that their act is not irrational for a basic right can be diminished, if not defeated, even when the
government does not act irrationally. They must satisfactorily show the presence of compelling state interests and that the
law, rule, or regulation is narrowly drawn to preclude abuses. This approach is demanded by the 1987 Constitution whose
entire matrix is designed to protect human rights and to prevent authoritarianism. In case of doubt, the least we can do is
to lean towards the stance that will not put in danger the rights protected by the Constitution.

The case of Whalen v. Roe[79] cited by the Solicitor General is also off-line. In Whalen, the United States Supreme Court
was presented with the question of whether the State of New York could keep a centralized computer record of the names
and addresses of all persons who obtained certain drugs pursuant to a doctor's prescription. The New York State
Controlled Substances Act of 1972 required physicians to identify patients obtaining prescription drugs enumerated in the
statute, i.e., drugs with a recognized medical use but with a potential for abuse, so that the names and addresses of the
patients can be recorded in a centralized computer file of the State Department of Health. The plaintiffs, who were
patients and doctors, claimed that some people might decline necessary medication because of their fear that the
computerized data may be readily available and open to public disclosure; and that once disclosed, it may stigmatize
them as drug addicts.[80] The plaintiffs alleged that the statute invaded a constitutionally protected zone of privacy, i.e,
the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal matters, and the interest in independence in making certain kinds
of important decisions. The U.S. Supreme Court held that while an individual's interest in avoiding disclosure of personal
matters is an aspect of the right to privacy, the statute did not pose a grievous threat to establish a constitutional violation.
The Court found that the statute was necessary to aid in the enforcement of laws designed to minimize the misuse of
dangerous drugs. The patient-identification requirement was a product of an orderly and rational legislative decision made
upon recommendation by a specially appointed commission which held extensive hearings on the matter. Moreover, the
statute was narrowly drawn and contained numerous safeguards against indiscriminate disclosure. The statute laid down
the procedure and requirements for the gathering, storage and retrieval of the information. It enumerated who were
authorized to access the data. It also prohibited public disclosure of the data by imposing penalties for its violation. In view
of these safeguards, the infringement of the patients' right to privacy was justified by a valid exercise of police power. As
we discussed above, A.O. No. 308 lacks these vital safeguards.

Even while we strike down A.O. No. 308, we spell out in neon that the Court is not per se against the use of computers to
accumulate, store, process, retrieve and transmit data to improve our bureaucracy. Computers work wonders to achieve
the efficiency which both government and private industry seek. Many information systems in different countries make use
of the computer to facilitate important social objectives, such as better law enforcement, faster delivery of public services,
more efficient management of credit and insurance programs, improvement of telecommunications and streamlining of
financial activities.[81] Used wisely, data stored in the computer could help good administration by making accurate and
comprehensive information for those who have to frame policy and make key decisions.[82] The benefits of the computer
has revolutionized information technology. It developed the internet,[83] introduced the concept of cyberspace[84] and the
information superhighway where the individual, armed only with his personal computer, may surf and search all kinds and
classes of information from libraries and databases connected to the net.

In no uncertain terms, we also underscore that the right to privacy does not bar all incursions into individual privacy. The
right is not intended to stifle scientific and technological advancements that enhance public service and the common
good. It merely requires that the law be narrowly focused[85] and a compelling interest justify such intrusions.
[86] Intrusions into the right must be accompanied by proper safeguards and well-defined standards to prevent
unconstitutional invasions. We reiterate that any law or order that invades individual privacy will be subjected by this Court
to strict scrutiny. The reason for this stance was laid down in Morfe v. Mutuc, to wit:

"The concept of limited government has always included the idea that governmental powers stop short of certain
intrusions into the personal life of the citizen. This is indeed one of the basic distinctions between absolute and limited
government. Ultimate and pervasive control of the individual, in all aspects of his life, is the hallmark of the absolute state.
In contrast, a system of limited government safeguards a private sector, which belongs to the individual, firmly
distinguishing it from the public sector, which the state can control. Protection of this private sector-- protection, in other
words, of the dignity and integrity of the individual-- has become increasingly important as modern society has developed.
All the forces of a technological age-- industrialization, urbanization, and organization-- operate to narrow the area of
privacy and facilitate intrusion into it. In modern terms, the capacity to maintain and support this enclave of private life
marks the difference between a democratic and a totalitarian society."[87]

IV
The right to privacy is one of the most threatened rights of man living in a mass society. The threats emanate from various
sources-- governments, journalists, employers, social scientists, etc.[88] In the case at bar, the threat comes from the
executive branch of government which by issuing A.O. No. 308 pressures the people to surrender their privacy by giving
information about themselves on the pretext that it will facilitate delivery of basic services. Given the record-keeping power
of the computer, only the indifferent will fail to perceive the danger that A.O. No. 308 gives the government the power to
compile a devastating dossier against unsuspecting citizens. It is timely to take note of the well-worded warning of Kalvin,
Jr., "the disturbing result could be that everyone will live burdened by an unerasable record of his past and his limitations.
In a way, the threat is that because of its record-keeping, the society will have lost its benign capacity to
forget."[89] Oblivious to this counsel, the dissents still say we should not be too quick in labelling the right to privacy as a
fundamental right. We close with the statement that the right to privacy was not engraved in our Constitution for flattery.

IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Administrative Order No. 308 entitled "Adoption of a National
Computerized Identification Reference System" declared null and void for being unconstitutional.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. L-68635 May 14, 1987

IN THE MATTER OF PROCEEDINGS FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AGAINST ATTY. WENCESLAO LAURETA, AND
OF CONTEMPT PROCEEDINGS AGAINST EVA MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE in G.R. No. 68635, entitled "EVA
MARAVILLA-ILUSTRE, vs. HON. INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, ET AL."

Before us are 1) Atty. Wenceslao Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration of the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court
promulgated on March 12, 1987, finding him guilty of grave professional misconduct and suspending him indefinitely from
the practice of law; and 2) Eva Maravilla-Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration of the same Resolution holding her in
contempt and ordering her to pay a fine of P1,000.00.

Essentially, Atty. Laureta maintains that the Order of suspension without hearing violated his right to life and due process
of law and by reason thereof the Order is null and void; that the acts of misconduct imputed to him are without basis; that
the charge against him that it was he who had circulated to the press copies of the Complaint filed before the Tanodbayan
is unfounded such that, even in this Court's Resolution, his having distributed copies to the press is not stated positively;
that the banner headline which appeared In the Daily Express is regrettable but that he was not responsible for such
"misleading headline;" that he "did nothing of the sort" being fully conscious of his responsibilities as a law practitioner and
officer of the Court; that as a former newspaperman, he would not have been satisfied with merely circulating copies of
the Complaint to the press in envelopes where his name appears; "he himself would have written stories about the case in
a manner that sells newspapers; even a series of juicy articles perhaps, something that would have further subjected the
respondent justices to far worse publicity;" that, on the contrary, the press conference scheduled by Ilustre was cancelled
through his efforts in order to prevent any further adverse publicity resulting from the filing of the complaint before the
Tanodbayan; that, as a matter of fact, it was this Court's Resolution that was serialized in the Bulletin Today, which
newspaper also made him the subject of a scathing editorial but that he "understands the cooperation because after all,
the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year;" that he considered it "below his dignity to
plead for the chance to present his side" with the Editor, Mr. Ben Rodriguez, "a long-time personal friend" since he "can
afford to be the sacrificial lamb if only to help the Honorable Court uphold its integrity;" that he was called by a reporter of
DZRH and was asked to comment on the case filed before the Tanodbayan but that his remarks were confined to the
filing of the case by Ilustre herself, and that the judgment of the trial Court had attained its finality long ago; that he is not
Ilustre's counsel before the Tanodbayan and did not prepare the complaint filed before it, his professional services having
been terminated upon the final dismissal of Ilustre's case before this Court; that similarities in the language and
phraseology used in the Ilustre letters, in pleadings before this Court and before the Tanodbayan do not prove his
authorship since other lawyers "even of a mediocre caliber" could very easily have reproduced them; that the discussions
on the merits in the Per Curiam Resolution are "more properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, Justice Raul M. Gonzales
being competent to deal with the case before him;" that he takes exception to the accusation that he has manifested lack
of respect for and exposed to public ridicule the two highest Courts of the land, all he did having been to call attention to
errors or injustice committed in the promulgation of judgments or orders; that he has "not authorized or assisted and/or
abetted and could not have prevented the contemptuous statements, conduct, acts and malicious charges of Eva
Maravilla Ilustre who was no longer his client when these alleged acts were done; that "he is grateful to this Court for the
reminder on the first duty of a lawyer which is to the Court and not to his client, a duty that he has always impressed upon
his law students;" and finally, that "for the record, he is sorry for the adverse publicity generated by the filing of the
complaint against the Justices before the Tanodbayan."

In her own Motion for Reconsideration, Eva Maravilla-Ilustre also raises as her main ground the alleged deprivation of her
constitutional right to due process. She maintains that as contempt proceedings are commonly treated as criminal in
nature, the mode of procedure and rules of evidence in criminal prosecution should be assimilated, as far as practicable,
in this proceeding, and that she should be given every opportunity to present her side. Additionally, she states that, with
some sympathetic lawyers, they made an "investigation" and learned that the Resolution of the First Division was arrived
at without any deliberation by its members; that Court personnel were "tight-lipped about the matter, which is shrouded
mystery" thereby prompting her to pursue a course which she thought was legal and peaceful; that there is nothing wrong
in making public the manner of voting by the Justices, and it was for that reason that she addressed Identical letters to
Associate Justices Andres Narvasa, Ameurfina M. Herrera, Isagani Cruz and Florentino Feliciano; that "if the lawyers of
my opponents were not a Solicitor General, and member of the Supreme Court and a Division Chairman, respectively, the
resolution of May 14, 1986 would not have aroused my suspicion;" that instead of taking the law into her own hands or
joining any violent movement, she took the legitimate step of making a peaceful investigation into how her case was
decided, and brought her grievance to the Tanodbayan "in exasperation" against those whom she felt had committed
injustice against her "in an underhanded manner."

We deny reconsideration in both instances.

The argument premised on lack of hearing and due process, is not impressed with merit. What due process abhors is
absolute lack of opportunity to be heard (Tajonera vs. Lamaroza, et al., 110 SCRA 438 [1981]). The word "hearing" does
not necessarily connote a "trial-type" proceeding. In the show-cause Resolution of this Court, dated January 29, 1987,
Atty. Laureta was given sufficient opportunity to inform this Court of the reasons why he should not be subjected to
dispose action. His Answer, wherein he prayed that the action against him be dismissed, contained twenty-two (22)
pages, double spaced. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre was also given a like opportunity to explain her statements, conduct, acts and
charges against the Court and/or the official actions of the Justices concerned. Her Compliance Answer, wherein she
prayed that the contempt proceeding against her be dismissed, contained nineteen (19) pages, double spaced. Both were
afforded ample latitude to explain matters fully. Atty. Laureta denied having authored the letters written by Ilustre, his
being her counsel before the Tanodbayan, his having circularized to the press copies of the complaint filed before said
body, and his having committed acts unworthy of his profession. But the Court believed otherwise and found that those
letters and the charges levelled against the Justices concerned, of themselves and by themselves, betray not only their
malicious and contemptuous character, but also the lack of respect for the two highest Courts of the land, a complete
obliviousness to the fundamental principle of separation of powers, and a wanton disregard of the cardinal doctrine of
independence of the Judiciary. Res ipsa loquitur. Nothing more needed to have been said or proven. The necessity to
conduct any further evidentially hearing was obviated (See People vs. Hon. Valenzuela, G.R. Nos. 63950-60, April 19,
1985, 135 SCRA 712). Atty. Laureta and Ilustre were given ample opportunity to be heard, and were, in fact, heard.

(1)

In his Motion for Reconsideration, Atty. Laureta reiterates his allegations in his Answer to the show-cause Resolution that
his professional services were terminated by Ilustre after the dismissal of the main petition by this Court; that he had
nothing to do with the contemptuous letters to the individual Justices; and that he is not Ilustre's counsel before the
Tanodbayan.

Significantly enough, however, copy of the Tanodbayan Resolution dismissing Ilustre's Complaint was furnished Atty.
Laureta as "counsel for the complainant" at his address of record. Of note, too, is the fact that it was he who was following
up the Complaint before the Tanodbayan and, after its dismissal, the Motion for Reconsideration of the Order of dismissal.

Of import, as well, is the report of Lorenzo C. Bardel, a process server of this Court, that after having failed to serve copy
of the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 of this Court on Ilustre personally at her address of record, "101 F.
Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City," having been informed that she is 6 not a resident of the place," he proceeded to the
residence of Atty. Laureta where the latter's wife "voluntarily received the two copies of decision for her husband and for
Ms. Maravina-Ilustre" (p. 670, Rollo, Vol. 11).

That Ilustre subsequently received copy of this Court's Resolution delivered to Mrs. Laureta is shown by the fact that she
filed, as of March 27, 1987, a "Petition for Extension of Time to file Motion for Reconsideration" and subsequently the
Motion for Reconsideration. In that Petition Ilustre acknowledged receipt of the Resolution on March 12, 1987, the very
same date Mrs. Laureta received copy thereof. If, indeed, the lawyer-client relationship between her husband and Ilustre
had been allegedly completely severed, all Mrs. Laureta had to do was to return to the Sheriff the copy intended for
Ilustre. As it was, however, service on Atty. Laureta proved to be service on Ilustre as well. The close tie- up between the
corespondents is heightened by the fact that three process servers of this Court failed to serve copy of this Court's Per
Curiam Resolution on Ilustre personally.

Noteworthy, as well, is that by Atty. Laureta's own admission, he was the one called by a "reporter" of DZRH to comment
on the Ilustre charges before the Tanodbayan. If, in fact, he had nothing to do with the complaint, he would not have been
pinpointed at all. And if his disclaimer were the truth, the logical step for him to have taken was to refer the caller to the
lawyer/s allegedly assisting Ilustre, at the very least, out of elementary courtesy and propriety. But he did nothing of the
sort. " He gave his comment with alacrity.

The impudence and lack of respect of Atty. Laureta for this Court again surfaces when he asserts in his Motion for
Reconsideration that he "understands the cooperation" of the Bulletin Today as manifested in the serialized publication of
the Per Curiam Resolution of this Court and his being subjected to a scathing editorial by the same newspaper "because
after all, the Court rendered a favorable judgment in the Bulletin union case last year." The malice lurking in that statement
is most unbecoming of an officer of the Court and is an added reason for denying reconsideration.
Further, Atty. Laureta stubbornly contends that discussions on the merits in the Court's Per Curiam Resolution are more
properly addressed to the Tanodbayan, forgetting, however, his own discourse on the merits in his Answer to this Court's
Resolution dated January 29, 1987. He thus incorrigibly insists on subordinating the Judiciary to the executive
notwithstanding the categorical pronouncement in the Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987, that Article 204 of the
Revised Penal Code has no application to the members of a collegiate Court; that a charge of violation of the Anti-Graft
and Corrupt Practices Act on the ground that a collective decision is "unjust" cannot prosper; plus the clear and extended
dissertation in the same Per Curiam Resolution on the fundamental principle of separation of powers and of checks and
balances, pursuant to which it is this Court "entrusted exclusively with the judicial power to adjudicate with finality all
justifiable disputes, public and private. No other department or agency may pass upon its judgments or declare them
'unjust' upon controlling and irresistible reasons of public policy and of sound practice."

Atty. Laureta's protestations that he has done his best to protect and uphold the dignity of this Court are belied by
environmental facts and circumstances. His apologetic stance for the "adverse publicity" generated by the filing of the
charges against the Justices concerned before the Tanodbayan rings with insincerity. The complaint was calculated
precisely to serve that very purpose. The threat to bring the case to "another forum of justice" was implemented to the fun.
Besides, he misses the heart of the matter. Exposure to the glare of publicity is an occupational hazard. If he has been
visited with disciplinary sanctions it is because by his conduct, acts and statements, he has, overall, deliberately sought to
destroy the "authenticity, integrity, and conclusiveness of collegiate acts," to "undermine the role of the Supreme Court as
the final arbiter of all justifiable disputes," and to subvert public confidence in the integrity of the Courts and the Justices
concerned, and in the orderly administration of justice.

In fine, we discern nothing in Atty. Laureta's Motion for Reconsideration that would call for a modification, much less a
reversal, of our finding that he is guilty of grave professional misconduct that renders him unfit to continue to be entrusted
with the duties and responsibilities pertaining to an attorney and officer of the Court.

(2)

Neither do we find merit in Ilustre's Motion for Reconsideration. She has turned deaf ears to any reason or clarification.
She and her counsel have refused to accept the untenability of their case and the inevitability of losing in Court. They
have allowed suspicion alone to blind their actions and in so doing degraded the administration of justice. "Investigation"
was utterly uncalled for. All conclusions and judgments of the Court, be they en banc or by Division, are arrived at only
after deliberation. The fact that no dissent was indicated in the Minutes of the proceedings held on May 14, 1986 showed
that the members of the Division voted unanimously. Court personnel are not in a position to know the voting in any case
because all deliberations are held behind closed doors without any one of them being present. No malicious inferences
should have been drawn from their inability to furnish the information Ilustre and Atty. Laureta desired The personality of
the Solicitor General never came into the picture. It was Justice Abad Santos, and not Justice Yap, who was Chairman of
the First Division when the Resolution of May 14, 1986 denying the Petition was rendered. Thereafter Justice Yap
inhibited himself from any participation. The fact that the Court en banc upheld the challenged Resolutions of the First
Division emphasizes the irrespective of Ilustre's case irrespective of the personalities involved.

Additionally, Ilustre has been trifling with this Court. She has given our process servers the run-around. Three of them
failed to serve on her personally her copy of this Court's Per Curiam Resolution of March 12, 1987 at her address of
record. Mrs. Laureta informed process server Lorenzo C. Bardel that Ilustre was residing at 17-D, Quezon St., Tondo,
Manila. Romeo C. Regala, another process server, went to that address to serve copy of the Resolution but he reported:

4. That inspite of diligent efforts to locate the address of ms.Eva Maravilla-Ilustre, said address could not
be located;

5. That I even asked the occupants (Cerdan Family) of No. 17 Quezon Street, Tondo, Manila, and they
informed that there is no such Ms. Eva Maravilla-Ilustre in the neighborhood and/or in the vicinity; ... (p.
672, Rollo, Vol. 11).

The third process server, Nelson C. Cabesuela, was also unable to serve copy of this Court's Resolution on Ilustre. He
reported:

2. On March 17, 1987, at about 9:30 A.M., I arrived at the house in the address furnished at; the notice of
judgment (101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City), and was received by an elderly woman who
admitted to be the owner of the house but vehemently refused to be Identified, and told me that she does
not know the addressee Maravilla, and told me further that she always meets different persons looking for
Miss Maravilla because the latter always gives the address of her house;
 3. That, I was reminded of an incident that I also experienced in the same place trying to serve a
resolution to Miss Maravilla which was returned unserved because she is not known in the place; ... (p.
674, Rollo, Vol. II).

And yet, in her Petition for Extension of Time and in her Motion for Reconsideration she persists in giving that address at
101 Felix Manalo St., Cubao, Quezon City, where our process servers were told that she was not a resident of and that
she was unknown thereat. If for her contumacious elusiveness and lack of candor alone, Ilustre deserves no further
standing before this Court.

ACCORDINGLY, the respective Motions for reconsideration of Atty. Wenceslao G. Laureta for the setting aside of the
order suspending him from the practice of law, and of Eva Maravilla Ilustre for the lifting of the penalty for contempt are
DENIED, and this denial is FINAL. Eva Maravilla Ilustre shall pay the fine of P1,000.00 imposed on her within ten (10)
days from notice, or, suffer imprisonment for ten (10) days upon failure to pay said fine within the stipulated period.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-69809 October 16, 1986

EDGARDO A. GAANAN, petitioner,
vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

This petition for certiorari asks for an interpretation of Republic Act (RA) No. 4200, otherwise known as the Anti-
Wiretapping Act, on the issue of whether or not an extension telephone is among the prohibited devices in Section 1 of
the Act, such that its use to overhear a private conversation would constitute unlawful interception of communications
between the two parties using a telephone line.

The facts presented by the People and narrated in the respondent court's decision are not disputed by the petitioner.

In the morning of October 22, 1975, complainant Atty. Tito Pintor and his client Manuel Montebon were in
the living room of complainant's residence discussing the terms for the withdrawal of the complaint for
direct assault which they filed with the Office of the City Fiscal of Cebu against Leonardo Laconico. After
they had decided on the proposed conditions, complainant made a telephone call to Laconico (tsn,
August 26, 1981, pp. 3-5).

That same morning, Laconico telephoned appellant, who is a lawyer, to come to his office and advise him
on the settlement of the direct assault case because his regular lawyer, Atty. Leon Gonzaga, went on a
business trip. According to the request, appellant went to the office of Laconico where he was briefed
about the problem. (Exhibit 'D', tsn, April 22, 1982, pp. 4-5).

When complainant called up, Laconico requested appellant to secretly listen to the telephone
conversation through a telephone extension so as to hear personally the proposed conditions for the
settlement. Appellant heard complainant enumerate the following conditions for withdrawal of the
complaint for direct assault.

(a) the P5,000.00 was no longer acceptable, and that the figure had been increased to P8,000.00. A
breakdown of the P8,000.00 had been made together with other demands, to wit: (a) P5,000.00 no longer
for the teacher Manuel Montebon, but for Atty. Pintor himself in persuading his client to withdraw the case
for Direct Assault against Atty. Laconico before the Cebu City Fiscal's Office;

(b) Public apology to be made by Atty. Laconico before the students of Don Bosco Technical High School;

(c) Pl,000.00 to be given to the Don Bosco Faculty club;

(d) transfer of son of Atty. Laconico to another school or another section of Don Bosco Technical High
School;

(e) Affidavit of desistance by Atty. Laconico on the Maltreatment case earlier filed against Manuel
Montebon at the Cebu City Fiscal's Office, whereas Montebon's affidavit of desistance on the Direct
Assault Case against Atty. Laconico to be filed later;

(f) Allow Manuel Montebon to continue teaching at the Don Bosco Technical School;

(g) Not to divulge the truth about the settlement of the Direct Assault Case to the mass media;

(h) P2,000.00 attorney s fees for Atty. Pintor. (tsn, August 26, 1981, pp. 47-48).

Twenty minutes later, complainant called up again to ask Laconico if he was agreeable to the conditions.
Laconico answered 'Yes'. Complainant then told Laconico to wait for instructions on where to deliver the
money. (tsn, March 10, 1983, pp. 2-12).
 Complainant called up again and instructed Laconico to give the money to his wife at the office of the then
Department of Public Highways. Laconico who earlier alerted his friend Colonel Zulueta of the Criminal
Investigation Service of the Philippine Constabulary, insisted that complainant himself should receive the
money. (tsn, March 10, 1982, pp. 26-33). When he received the money at the Igloo Restaurant,
complainant was arrested by agents of the Philippine Constabulary.

Appellant executed on the following day an affidavit stating that he heard complainant demand P8,000.00
for the withdrawal of the case for direct assault. Laconico attached the affidavit of appellant to the
complainant for robbery/extortion which he filed against complainant. Since appellant listened to the
telephone conversation without complainant's consent, complainant charged appellant and Laconico with
violation of the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

After trial on the merits, the lower court, in a decision dated November 22, 1982, found both Gaanan and Laconico guilty
of violating Section 1 of Republic Act No. 4200. The two were each sentenced to one (1) year imprisonment with costs.
Not satisfied with the decision, the petitioner appealed to the appellate court.

On August 16, 1984, the Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed the decision of the trial court, holding that the
communication between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature and, therefore, covered by Rep. Act
No. 4200; that the petitioner overheard such communication without the knowledge and consent of the complainant; and
that the extension telephone which was used by the petitioner to overhear the telephone conversation between
complainant and Laconico is covered in the term "device' as provided in Rep. Act No. 4200.

In this petition for certiorari, the petitioner assails the decision of the appellate court and raises the following issues; (a)
whether or not the telephone conversation between the complainant and accused Laconico was private in nature; (b)
whether or not an extension telephone is covered by the term "device or arrangement" under Rep. Act No. 4200; (c)
whether or not the petitioner had authority to listen or overhear said telephone conversation and (d) whether or not Rep.
Act No. 4200 is ambiguous and, therefore, should be construed in favor of the petitioner.

Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 4200 provides:

Section 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however
otherwise described:

It shall be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next
preceeding sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such
record, or copies thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the
effective date of this Act in the manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person
or persons; or to communicate the contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish
transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to any other person: Provided, that the use of such
record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal investigation or trial of offenses mentioned
in Section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

We rule for the petitioner.

We are confronted in this case with the interpretation of a penal statute and not a rule of evidence. The issue is not the
admissibility of evidence secured over an extension line of a telephone by a third party. The issue is whether or not the
person called over the telephone and his lawyer listening to the conversation on an extension line should both face prison
sentences simply because the extension was used to enable them to both listen to an alleged attempt at extortion.

There is no question that the telephone conversation between complainant Atty. Pintor and accused Atty. Laconico was
"private" in the sense that the words uttered were made between one person and another as distinguished from words
between a speaker and a public. It is also undisputed that only one of the parties gave the petitioner the authority to listen
to and overhear the caller's message with the use of an extension telephone line. Obviously, complainant Pintor, a
member of the Philippine bar, would not have discussed the alleged demand for an P8,000.00 consideration in order to
have his client withdraw a direct assault charge against Atty. Laconico filed with the Cebu City Fiscal's Office if he knew
that another lawyer was also listening. We have to consider, however, that affirmance of the criminal conviction would, in
effect, mean that a caller by merely using a telephone line can force the listener to secrecy no matter how obscene,
criminal, or annoying the call may be. It would be the word of the caller against the listener's.

Because of technical problems caused by the sensitive nature of electronic equipment and the extra heavy loads which
telephone cables are made to carry in certain areas, telephone users often encounter what are called "crossed lines". An
unwary citizzen who happens to pick up his telephone and who overhears the details of a crime might hesitate to inform
police authorities if he knows that he could be accused under Rep. Act 4200 of using his own telephone to secretly
overhear the private communications of the would be criminals. Surely the law was never intended for such mischievous
results.

The main issue in the resolution of this petition, however, revolves around the meaning of the phrase "any other device or
arrangement." Is an extension of a telephone unit such a device or arrangement as would subject the user to
imprisonment ranging from six months to six years with the accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification for a
public officer or deportation for an alien? Private secretaries with extension lines to their bosses' telephones are
sometimes asked to use answering or recording devices to record business conversations between a boss and another
businessman. Would transcribing a recorded message for the use of the boss be a proscribed offense? or for that matter,
would a "party line" be a device or arrangement under the law?

The petitioner contends that telephones or extension telephones are not included in the enumeration of "commonly
known" listening or recording devices, nor do they belong to the same class of enumerated electronic devices
contemplated by law. He maintains that in 1964, when Senate Bill No. 9 (later Rep. Act No. 4200) was being considered
in the Senate, telephones and extension telephones were already widely used instruments, probably the most popularly
known communication device.

Whether or not listening over a telephone party line would be punishable was discussed on the floor of the Senate. Yet,
when the bill was finalized into a statute, no mention was made of telephones in the enumeration of devices "commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph, detectaphone or walkie talkie or tape recorder or however otherwise described."
The omission was not a mere oversight. Telephone party lines were intentionally deleted from the provisions of the Act.

The respondent People argue that an extension telephone is embraced and covered by the term "device" within the
context of the aforementioned law because it is not a part or portion of a complete set of a telephone apparatus. It is a
separate device and distinct set of a movable apparatus consisting of a wire and a set of telephone receiver not forming
part of a main telephone set which can be detached or removed and can be transferred away from one place to another
and to be plugged or attached to a main telephone line to get the desired communication corning from the other party or
end.

The law refers to a "tap" of a wire or cable or the use of a "device or arrangement" for the purpose of secretly overhearing,
intercepting, or recording the communication. There must be either a physical interruption through a wiretap or
the  deliberate installation of a device or arrangement in order to overhear, intercept, or record the spoken words.

An extension telephone cannot be placed in the same category as a dictaphone, dictagraph or the other devices
enumerated in Section 1 of RA No. 4200 as the use thereof cannot be considered as "tapping" the wire or cable of a
telephone line. The telephone extension in this case was not installed for that purpose. It just happened to be there for
ordinary office use. It is a rule in statutory construction that in order to determine the true intent of the legislature, the
particular clauses and phrases of the statute should not be taken as detached and isolated expressions, but the whole
and every part thereof must be considered in fixing the meaning of any of its parts. (see Commissioner of Customs v.
Esso Estandard Eastern, Inc., 66 SCRA 113,120).

In the case of Empire Insurance Com any v. Rufino (90 SCRA 437, 443-444), we ruled:

Likewise, Article 1372 of the Civil Code stipulates that 'however general the terms of a contract may be,
they shall not be understood to comprehend things that are distinct and cases that are different from
those upon which the parties intended to agree.' Similarly, Article 1374 of the same Code provides that
'the various stipulations of a contract shall be interpreted together, attributing to the doubtful ones that
sense which may result from all of them taken jointly.

xxx xxx xxx

Consequently, the phrase 'all liabilities or obligations of the decedent' used in paragraph 5(c) and 7(d)
should be then restricted only to those listed in the Inventory and should not be construed as to
 comprehend all other obligations of the decedent. The rule that 'particularization followed by a general
expression will ordinarily be restricted to the former' is based on the fact in human experience that usually
the minds of parties are addressed specially to the particularization, and that the generalities, though
broad enough to comprehend other fields if they stood alone, are used in contemplation of that upon
which the minds of the parties are centered. (Hoffman v. Eastern Wisconsin R., etc., Co., 134 Wis. 603,
607, 115 NW 383, cited in Francisco, Revised Rules of Court (Evidence), 1973 ed, pp. 180-181).

Hence, the phrase "device or arrangement" in Section 1 of RA No. 4200, although not exclusive to that enumerated
therein, should be construed to comprehend instruments of the same or similar nature, that is, instruments the use of
which would be tantamount to tapping the main line of a telephone. It refers to instruments whose installation or presence
cannot be presumed by the party or parties being overheard because, by their very nature, they are not of common usage
and their purpose is precisely for tapping, intercepting or recording a telephone conversation.

An extension telephone is an instrument which is very common especially now when the extended unit does not have to
be connected by wire to the main telephone but can be moved from place ' to place within a radius of a kilometer or more.
A person should safely presume that the party he is calling at the other end of the line probably has an extension
telephone and he runs the risk of a third party listening as in the case of a party line or a telephone unit which shares its
line with another. As was held in the case of Rathbun v. United States (355, U.S. 107, 2 L Ed 2d 137-138):

Common experience tells us that a call to a particular telephone number may cause the bell to ring in
more than one ordinarily used instrument. Each party to a telephone conversation takes the risk that the
other party may have an extension telephone and may allow another to overhear the conversation. When
such takes place there has been no violation of any privacy of which the parties may complain.
Consequently, one element of 605, interception, has not occurred.

In the same case, the Court further ruled that the conduct of the party would differ in no way if instead of repeating the
message he held out his hand-set so that another could hear out of it and that there is no distinction between that sort of
action and permitting an outsider to use an extension telephone for the same purpose.

Furthermore, it is a general rule that penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused. Thus, in case of
doubt as in the case at bar, on whether or not an extension telephone is included in the phrase "device or arrangement",
the penal statute must be construed as not including an extension telephone. In the case of People v. Purisima, 86 SCRA
542, 562, we explained the rationale behind the rule:

American jurisprudence sets down the reason for this rule to be the tenderness of the law of the rights of
individuals; the object is to establish a certain rule by conformity to which mankind would be safe, and the
discretion of the court limited. (United States v. Harris, 177 US 305, 44 L Ed 780, 20 S Ct 609; Braffith v.
Virgin Islands (CA3) 26 F2d 646; Caudill v. State, 224 Ind 531, 69 NE2d; Jennings v. Commonwealth,
109 VA 821,63 SE 1080, all cited in 73 Am Jur 2d 452). The purpose is not to enable a guilty person to
escape punishment through a technicality but to provide a precise definition of forbidden acts." (State v.
Zazzaro, 20 A 2d 737, quoted in Martin's Handbook on Statutory Construction, Rev. Ed. pp. 183-184).

In the same case of Purisima, we also ruled that on the construction or interpretation of a legislative measure, the primary
rule is to search for and determine the intent and spirit of the law. A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records will
show that not only did our lawmakers not contemplate the inclusion of an extension telephone as a prohibited device or
arrangement" but of greater importance, they were more concerned with penalizing the act of recording than the act of
merely listening to a telephone conversation.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada. Another possible objection to that is entrapment which is certainly

objectionable. It is made possible by special amendment which Your Honor may
introduce.

Senator Diokno.Your Honor, I would feel that entrapment would be less possible with the
amendment than without it, because with the amendment the evidence of entrapment
would only consist of government testimony as against the testimony of the defendant.
With this amendment, they would have the right, and the government officials and the
person in fact would have the right to tape record their conversation.
 Senator Tañada. In case of entrapment, it would be the government.

Senator Diokno. In the same way, under this provision, neither party could record and,
therefore, the court would be limited to saying: "Okay, who is more credible, the police
officers or the defendant?" In these cases, as experienced lawyers, we know that the
Court go with the peace offices.

(Congressional Record, Vol. 111, No. 33, p. 628, March 12, 1964).

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Diokno. The point I have in mind is that under these conditions, with an agent
outside listening in, he could falsify the testimony and there is no way of checking it. But if
you allow him to record or make a recording in any form of what is happening, then the
chances of falsifying the evidence is not very much.

Senator Tañada. Your Honor, this bill is not intended to prevent the presentation of false
testimony. If we could devise a way by which we could prevent the presentation of false
testimony, it would be wonderful. But what this bill intends to prohibit is the use of tape
record and other electronic devices to intercept private conversations which later on will
be used in court.

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, March 12, 1964, p. 629).

It can be readily seen that our lawmakers intended to discourage, through punishment, persons such as government
authorities or representatives of organized groups from installing devices in order to gather evidence for use in court or to
intimidate, blackmail or gain some unwarranted advantage over the telephone users. Consequently, the mere act of
listening, in order to be punishable must strictly be with the use of the enumerated devices in RA No. 4200 or others of
similar nature. We are of the view that an extension telephone is not among such devices or arrangements.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The decision of the then Intermediate Appellate Court dated August 16, 1984 is
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The petitioner is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violation of Rep. Act No. 4200,
otherwise known as the Anti-Wiretapping Act.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 93833 September 28, 1995

SOCORRO D. RAMIREZ, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, and ESTER S. GARCIA, respondents.

A civil case damages was filed by petitioner Socorro D. Ramirez in the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City alleging that
the private respondent, Ester S. Garcia, in a confrontation in the latter's office, allegedly vexed, insulted and humiliated
her in a "hostile and furious mood" and in a manner offensive to petitioner's dignity and personality," contrary to morals,
good customs and public policy."1

In support of her claim, petitioner produced a verbatim transcript of the event and sought moral damages, attorney's fees
and other expenses of litigation in the amount of P610,000.00, in addition to costs, interests and other reliefs awardable at
the trial court's discretion. The transcript on which the civil case was based was culled from a tape recording of the
confrontation made by petitioner.2 The transcript reads as follows:

Plaintiff Soccoro D. Ramirez (Chuchi) — Good Afternoon M'am.

Defendant Ester S. Garcia (ESG) — Ano ba ang nangyari sa 'yo, nakalimot ka na kung
paano ka napunta rito, porke member ka na, magsumbong ka kung ano ang gagawin ko
sa 'yo.

CHUCHI — Kasi, naka duty ako noon.

ESG — Tapos iniwan no. (Sic)

CHUCHI — Hindi m'am, pero ilan beses na nila akong binalikan, sabing ganoon —

ESG — Ito and (sic) masasabi ko sa 'yo, ayaw kung (sic) mag explain ka, kasi hanggang
10:00 p.m., kinabukasan hindi ka na pumasok. Ngayon ako ang babalik sa 'yo, nag-aaply
ka sa States, nag-aaply ka sa review mo, kung kakailanganin ang certification mo,
kalimutan mo na kasi hindi ka sa akin makakahingi.

CHUCHI — Hindi M'am. Kasi ang ano ko talaga noon i-cocontinue ko up to 10:00 p.m.

ESG —  Bastos ka,  nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka pumasok dito sa hotel.

Magsumbong ka sa Union kung gusto mo. Nakalimutan mo na kung paano ka nakapasok
dito "Do you think that on your own makakapasok ka kung hindi ako. Panunumbyoyan na
kita (Sinusumbatan na kita).

CHUCHI — Itutuloy ko na M'am sana ang duty ko.

ESG — Kaso ilang beses na akong binabalikan doon ng mga no (sic) ko.

ESG — Nakalimutan mo na ba kung paano ka pumasok sa hotel, kung on your own merit
alam ko naman kung gaano ka "ka bobo" mo. Marami ang nag-aaply alam kong hindi ka
papasa.

CHUCHI — Kumuha kami ng exam noon.

ESG — Oo, pero hindi ka papasa.

CHUCHI — Eh, bakit ako ang nakuha ni Dr. Tamayo

ESG — Kukunin ka kasi ako.

 CHUCHI — Eh, di sana —

ESG — Huwag mong ipagmalaki na may utak ka kasi wala kang utak. Akala mo ba
makukuha ka dito kung hindi ako.

CHUCHI — Mag-eexplain ako.

ESG — Huwag na, hindi ako mag-papa-explain sa 'yo, makaalala ka kung paano ka
puma-rito. "Putang-ina" sasabi-sabihin mo kamag-anak ng nanay at tatay mo ang mga
magulang ko.

ESG — Wala na akong pakialam, dahil nandito ka sa loob, nasa labas ka puwede ka ng
hindi pumasok, okey yan nasaloob ka umalis ka doon.

CHUCHI — Kasi M'am, binbalikan ako ng mga taga Union.

ESG — Nandiyan na rin ako, pero huwag mong kalimutan na hindi ka makakapasok
kung hindi ako. Kung hindi mo kinikilala yan okey lang sa akin, dahil tapos ka na.

CHUCHI — Ina-ano ko m'am na utang na loob.

ESG — Huwag na lang, hindi mo utang na loob, kasi kung baga sa no, nilapastangan mo
ako.

CHUCHI — Paano kita nilapastanganan?

ESG — Mabuti pa lumabas ka na. Hindi na ako makikipagusap sa 'yo. Lumabas ka na.
Magsumbong ka.3

As a result of petitioner's recording of the event and alleging that the said act of secretly taping the confrontation was
illegal, private respondent filed a criminal case before the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City for violation of Republic Act
4200, entitled "An Act to prohibit and penalize wire tapping and other related violations of private communication, and
other purposes." An information charging petitioner of violation of the said Act, dated October 6, 1988 is quoted herewith:

INFORMATION

The Undersigned Assistant City Fiscal Accusses Socorro D. Ramirez of Violation of Republic Act No.
4200, committed as follows:

That on or about the 22nd day of February, 1988, in Pasay City Metro Manila,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this honorable court, the above-named accused,
Socorro D. Ramirez not being authorized by Ester S. Garcia to record the latter's
conversation with said accused, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously,
with the use of a tape recorder secretly record the said conversation and thereafter
communicate in writing the contents of the said recording to other person.

Contrary to law.

Pasay City, Metro Manila, September 16, 1988.

MARIANO M. CUNETA
Asst. City Fiscal

Upon arraignment, in lieu of a plea, petitioner filed a Motion to Quash the Information on the ground that the facts charged
do not constitute an offense, particularly a violation of R.A. 4200. In an order May 3, 1989, the trial court granted the
Motion to Quash, agreeing with petitioner that 1) the facts charged do not constitute an offense under R.A. 4200; and that
2) the violation punished by R.A. 4200 refers to a the taping of a communication by a person other than a participant to
the communication.4
From the trial court's Order, the private respondent filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari with this Court, which forthwith
referred the case to the Court of Appeals in a Resolution (by the First Division) of June 19, 1989.

On February 9, 1990, respondent Court of Appeals promulgated its assailed Decision declaring the trial court's order of
May 3, 1989 null and void, and holding that:

[T]he allegations sufficiently constitute an offense punishable under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. In thus
quashing the information based on the ground that the facts alleged do not constitute an offense, the
respondent judge acted in grave abuse of discretion correctible by certiorari.5

Consequently, on February 21, 1990, petitioner filed a Motion for Reconsideration which respondent Court of Appeals
denied in its Resolution6 dated June 19, 1990. Hence, the instant petition.

Petitioner vigorously argues, as her "main and principal issue" 7 that the applicable provision of Republic Act 4200 does not
apply to the taping of a private conversation by one of the parties to the conversation. She contends that the provision
merely refers to the unauthorized taping of a private conversation by a party other than those involved in the
communication.8 In relation to this, petitioner avers that the substance or content of the conversation must be alleged in
the Information, otherwise the facts charged would not constitute a violation of R.A. 4200. 9 Finally, petitioner agues that
R.A. 4200 penalizes the taping of a "private communication," not a "private conversation" and that consequently, her act
of secretly taping her conversation with private respondent was not illegal under the said act. 10

We disagree.

First, legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a statute is clear
and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation would be resorted to only where a
literal interpretation would be either impossible 11 or absurb or would lead to an injustice. 12

Section 1 of R.A. 4200 entitled, " An Act to Prohibit and Penalized Wire Tapping and Other Related Violations of Private
Communication and Other Purposes," provides:

Sec. 1. It shall be unlawfull for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private
communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to
secretly overhear, intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly
known as a dictaphone or dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however
otherwise described.

The aforestated provision clearly and unequivocally makes it illegal for any person, not authorized by all the parties to any
private communication to secretly record such communication by means of a tape recorder. The law makes no distinction
as to whether the party sought to be penalized by the statute ought to be a party other than or different from those
involved in the private communication. The statute's intent to penalize all persons unauthorized to make such recording is
underscored by the use of the qualifier "any". Consequently, as respondent Court of Appeals correctly concluded, "even a
(person) privy to a communication who records his private conversation with another without the knowledge of the latter
(will) qualify as a violator" 13 under this provision of R.A. 4200.

A perusal of the Senate Congressional Records, moreover, supports the respondent court's conclusion that in enacting
R.A. 4200 our lawmakers indeed contemplated to make illegal, unauthorized tape recording of private conversations or
communications taken either by the parties themselves or by third persons. Thus:

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Tañada: That qualified only "overhear".

Senator Padilla: So that when it is intercepted or recorded, the element of secrecy would not appear to be
material. Now, suppose, Your Honor, the recording is not made by all the parties but by some parties and
involved not criminal cases that would be mentioned under section 3 but would cover, for example civil
cases or special proceedings whereby a recording is made not necessarily by all the parties but perhaps
by some in an effort to show the intent of the parties because the actuation of the parties prior,
simultaneous even subsequent to the contract or the act may be indicative of their intention. Suppose
 there is such a recording, would you say, Your Honor, that the intention is to cover it within the purview of
this bill or outside?

Senator Tañada: That is covered by the purview of this bill, Your Honor.

Senator Padilla: Even if the record should be used not in the prosecution of offense but as evidence to be
used in Civil Cases or special proceedings?

Senator Tañada: That is right. This is a complete ban on tape recorded conversations taken without the
authorization of all the parties.

Senator Padilla: Now, would that be reasonable, your Honor?

Senator Tañada: I believe it is reasonable because it is not sporting to record the observation of one
without his knowing it and then using it against him.  It is not fair, it is not sportsmanlike. If the purpose;
Your honor, is to record the intention of the parties. I believe that all the parties should know that the
observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: This might reduce the utility of recorders.

Senator Tañada: Well no. For example, I was to say that in meetings of the board of directors where a
tape recording is taken, there is no objection to this if all the parties know. It is but fair that the people
whose remarks and observations are being made should know that the observations are being recorded.

Senator Padilla: Now, I can understand.

Senator Tañada: That is why when we take statements of persons, we say: "Please be informed that
whatever you say here may be used against you." That is fairness and that is what we demand. Now, in
spite of that warning, he makes damaging statements against his own interest, well, he cannot complain
any more. But if you are going to take a recording of the observations and remarks of a person without
him knowing that it is being taped or recorded, without him knowing that what is being recorded may be
used against him, I think it is unfair.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congression Record, Vol. III, No. 31, p. 584, March 12, 1964)

Senator Diokno: Do you understand, Mr. Senator, that under Section 1 of the bill as now worded, if a
party secretly records a public speech, he would be penalized under Section 1? Because the speech is
public, but the recording is done secretly.

Senator Tañada: Well, that particular aspect is not contemplated by the bill. It is the communication
between one person and another person — not between a speaker and a public.

xxx xxx xxx

(Congressional Record, Vol. III, No. 33, p. 626, March 12, 1964)

xxx xxx xxx

The unambiguity of the express words of the provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the
Congressional Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the provision seeks to
penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.

Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The substance of the same need not be
specifically alleged in the information. What R.A. 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or
recording  private communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation that an individual
made a secret recording of a private communication by means of a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense
under Section 1 of R.A. 4200. As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the nature of the conversation, as
well as its communication to a third person should be professed." 14

Finally, petitioner's contention that the phrase "private communication" in Section 1 of R.A. 4200 does not include "private
conversations" narrows the ordinary meaning of the word "communication" to a point of absurdity. The word communicate
comes from the latin word communicare, meaning "to share or to impart." In its ordinary signification, communication
connotes the act of sharing or imparting signification, communication connotes the act of sharing or imparting, as in
a conversation, 15 or signifies the "process by which meanings or thoughts are shared between individuals through a
common system of symbols (as language signs or gestures)" 16 These definitions are broad enough to include verbal or
non-verbal, written or expressive communications of "meanings or thoughts" which are likely to include the emotionally-
charged exchange, on February 22, 1988, between petitioner and private respondent, in the privacy of the latter's office.
Any doubts about the legislative body's meaning of the phrase "private communication" are, furthermore, put to rest by the
fact that the terms "conversation" and "communication" were interchangeably used by Senator Tañada in his Explanatory
Note to the bill quoted below:

It has been said that innocent people have nothing to fear from their conversations being overheard. But
this statement ignores the usual nature of conversations as well the undeniable fact that most, if not all,
civilized people have some aspects of their lives they do not wish to expose. Free conversations are often
characterized by exaggerations, obscenity, agreeable falsehoods, and the expression of anti-social
desires of views not intended to be taken seriously. The right to the privacy of communication, among
others, has expressly been assured by our Constitution. Needless to state here, the framers of our
Constitution must have recognized the nature of conversations between individuals and the significance
of man's spiritual nature, of his feelings and of his intellect. They must have known that part of the
pleasures and satisfactions of life are to be found in the unaudited, and free exchange
of communication between individuals — free from every unjustifiable intrusion by whatever means. 17

In Gaanan vs.  Intermediate Appellate Court, 18 a case which dealt with the issue of telephone wiretapping, we held that
the use of a telephone extension for the purpose of overhearing a private conversation without authorization did not
violate R.A. 4200 because a telephone extension devise was neither among those "device(s) or arrangement(s)"
enumerated therein, 19 following the principle that "penal statutes must be construed strictly in favor of the accused." 20 The
instant case turns on a different note, because the applicable facts and circumstances pointing to a violation of R.A. 4200
suffer from no ambiguity, and the statute itself explicitly mentions the unauthorized "recording" of private communications
with the use of tape-recorders as among the acts punishable.

WHEREFORE, because the law, as applied to the case at bench is clear and unambiguous and leaves us with no
discretion, the instant petition is hereby DENIED. The decision appealed from is AFFIRMED. Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 121087           August 26, 1999

FELIPE NAVARRO, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS and the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision1 of the Court of Appeals, dated December 14, 1994, which
affirmed the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5, Lucena City, dated July 27, 1992, finding petitioner Felipe
Navarro guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and sentencing him to ten (10) years of  prision mayor, as minimum,
and fourteen (14) years and eight (8) months, and (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, but increased the death
indemnity awarded to the heirs of the victim, Enrique "Ike" Lingan, from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00.

The information against petitioner alleged —

That on or about the 4th day of February, 1990, in the nighttime, in the City of Lucena, Province of Quezon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, being then a member of the
Lucena Integrated National Police, with intent to kill, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault
one Ike Lingan inside the Lucena police headquarters, where authorities are supposed to be engaged in the
discharge of their duties, by boxing the said Ike Lingan in the head with the butt of a gun and thereafter when the
said victim fell, by banging his head against the concrete pavement, as a consequence of which said Ike Lingan
suffered cerebral concussion and shock which directly caused his death.

The evidence show that, at around 8:40 in the evening of February 4, 1990, Stanley Jalbuena and Enrique "Ike" Lingan,
who were reporters of the radio station DWTI in Lucena City, together with one Mario Ilagan, went to the Entertainment
City following reports that it was showing the nude dancers. After the three had seated themselves at a table and ordered
beer, a scantily clad dancer appeared on stage and began to perform a strip act. As she removed her brassieres,
Jalbuena brought out his camera and took a picture. 2

At that point, the floor manager, Dante Liquin, with a security guard, Alex Sioco, approached Jalbuena and demanded to
know why he took a picture.3 Jalbuena replied: "Wala kang pakialam, because this is my job."4 Sioco pushed Jalbuena
towards the table as he warned the latter that he would kill him. 5 When Jalbuena saw that Sioco was about to pull out his
gun, he ran out of the joint followed by his companions. 6

Jalbuena and his companions went to the police station to report the matter. Three of the policeman on duty, including
petitioner Navarro, were having drinks in front of the police station, and they asked Jalbuena and his companions to join
them. Jalbuena declined and went to the desk officer, Sgt. Añonuevo, to report the incident. In a while, Liquin and Sioco
arrived on a motorcycle.7

Sioco and Liquin were met by petitioner Navarro who talked with them in a corner for around fifteen minutes. 8 Afterwards,
petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and, pushing him to the wall, said to him: "Putang ina, kinakalaban mo si Kabo
Liquin, anak yan ni Kabo Liquin, hindi mo ba kilala?" 9 Petitioner Navarro then pulled out his firearm and cocked it, and,
pressing it on the face of Jalbuena, said "Ano, uutasin na kita?" 10

At this point, Lingan intervened and said to petitioner Navarro: "Huwag namang ganyan pumarito kami para magpa-
blotter, I am here to mediate."11 Petitoner Navarro replied: "Walang press, press, mag-sampu pa kayo." 12 He then turned
to Sgt. Añonuevo and told him to make of record the behavior of Jalbuena and Lingan. 13

This angered Lingan, who said: "O, di ilagay mo diyan" 14 Petitioner Navarro retorted: "Talagang ilalagay ko." 15 The two
then had a heated exchange.16 Finally, Lingan said: "Masyado kang abusado, alisin mo yang baril mo at magsuntukan na
lang tayo."17 Petitioner Navarro replied: "Ah, ganoon?"18

As Lingan was about turn away, petitioner Navarro hit him with the handle of the pistol above the left eyebrow. Lingan fell
on the floor, blood flowing down his face. He tried to get up, but petitioner Navarro gave him a fist blow on the forehead
which floored him.19

Petitioner Navarro turned to Jalbuena and said: "Kita mo yan ha, buhay kang testigo, si Ike Lingan and naghamon." 20 He
said to Sgt. Añonuevo: "Ilagay mo diyan sa blotter sa harap ni Alex Sioco at Dante Liquin, na si Ike Lingan ang
naghamon."21 He then poked his gun at the right temple of Jalbuena and made him sign his name on the
blotter.22 Jalbuena could not affix his signature. His right hand was trembling and he simply wrote his name in print. 23
Capt. Coronado, the station commander, called petitioner Navarro to his office, while a policeman took Lingan to the
Quezon Memorial Hospital. The station manager of DWTI, Boy, Casañada, arrived and, learning that Lingan had been
taken to the hospital, proceeded there. But Lingan died from his injuries. 24

Unknown to petitioner Navarro, Jalbuena was able to record on tape the exchange between petitioner and the
deceased.25 The following is an excerpt from the tape recording:

Lingan: Pare, you are abusing yourself.

Navarro: Who is that abusing?

Lingan: I'm here to mediate. Do not include me in the problem. I'm out of the problem.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Navarro: Wala sa akin yan. Ang kaso lang . . .

Lingan: Kalaban mo ang media, pare, Ako at si Stanley, dalawa kami. Okay. Do not fight with me. I just came
here to ayusin things. Do not say bad things against me. I'm the number one loko sa media. I'm the best media
man. . . .

Navarro: Huwag tayong mag-lokohan sa ganyan! Huwag na tayong mag-takotan! Huwag mong sabihing loko ka!

Lingan: I'm brave also.

Navarro: Ay lalo na ako. Tahimik lang naman ako. Wala ka namang masasabi sa akin dahil nag-tatrabaho lang
ako ng ayon sa serbisyo ko.

Lingan: You are challenging me and him. . . .

Navarro: Ay walastik ka naman Ike! Pag may problema ka dito sinasabihan kita na may balita tayong maganda.
Pambihira ka Ike. Huwag mong sabihin na . . . Parang minomonopoly mo eh.

Lingan: Pati ako kalaban ninyo.

Navarro: Talagang kalaban namin ang press. Lahat, hindi lang ikaw!

Lingan: You are wrong. Bakit kalaban nyo ang press?

Navarro: Pulis ito! Aba!

Lingan: Alisin mo ang baril mo! Alisin mo ang baril mo! Suntukan tayo, sige.

Navarro: Mayabang ka ah!

(Sounds of a scuffle)

Navarro: Hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan! Pare hinamon ako nyan, testigo kayo. Alisin ko daw ang
baril ko. Hinamon ako nyan. Pare, ilagay mo diyan, hinamon ako sa harap ni Stanley. Testigo kayo, hinamon ako.
Pulis tayo eh. Puta, buti nga, suntok lang ang inabot nyan. Sa harap ni Alex, ni Joe, ni Stanley, hinamon ako.
Pare, hinamon ako, kinig nyo ha. Hinamon ako nyan. Sige, dalhin nyo sa hospital yan.

Petitioner Felipe Navarro claims that it was the deceased who tried to hit him twice, but he (petitioner) was able to duck
both times, and that Lingan was so drunk he fell on the floor twice, each time hitting his head on the concrete. 26

In giving credence to the evidence for the prosecution, the trial court stated:
 After a thorough and in-depth evaluation of the evidence adduced by the prosecution and the defense, this court
finds that the evidence for the prosecution is the more credible, concrete and sufficient to create that moral
certainty in the mind of the court that accused herein is criminally responsible.

The defense's evidence which consists of outright denial could not under the circumstance overturn the strength
of the prosecution's evidence.

This court finds that the prosecution witnesses, more particularly Stanley Jalbuena, lacked any motive to make
false accusation, distort the truth, testify falsehood or cause accusation of one who had neither brought him harm
or injury.

Going over the evidence on record, the  postmortem report issued by Dra. Eva Yamamoto confirms the detailed
account given by Stanley Jalbuena on how Lingan sustained head injuries.

Said  post-mortem report together with the testimony of Jalbuena sufficiently belie the claim of the defense that the
head injuries of deceased Lingan were caused by the latter's falling down on the concrete pavement head first.

The Court of Appeals affirmed:

We are far from being convinced by appellant's aforesaid disquisition. We have carefully evaluated the conflicting
versions of the incident as presented by both parties, and we find the trial court's factual conclusions to have
better and stronger evidentiary support.

In the first place, the mere fact that Jalbuena was himself a victim of appellant's aggression does not impair the
probative worth of his positive and logical account of the incident in question. In fact, far from proving his
innocence, appellant's unwarranted assault upon Jalbuena, which the defense has virtually admitted, clearly
betrays his violent character or disposition and his capacity to harm others. Apparently, the same motivation that
led him into assailing Jalbuena must have provoked him into also attacking Lingan who had interceded for
Jalbuena and humiliated him and further challenged to a fist fight.1âwphi1.nêt

xxx     xxx     xxx

On the other hand, appellant's explanation as how Lingan was injured is too tenuous and illogical to be accepted.
It is in fact contradicted by the number, nature and location of Lingan's injuries as shown in the  post-
mortem report (Exh. D). According to the defense, Lingan fell two times when he was outbalanced in the course of
boxing the appellant. And yet, Lingan suffered lacerated wounds in his left forehead, left eyebrow, between his left
and right eyebrows, and contusion in the right temporal region of the head (Exh. E.). Certainly, these injuries
could not have been resulted from Lingan's accidental fall.

Hence, this appeal. Petitioner Navarro contends:

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS HAS DECIDED THE CASE NOT IN ACCORD WITH LAW AND WITH
THE APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE SUPREME COURT. ITS CONCLUSION IS A FINDING BASED ON
SPECULATION, SURMISE OR CONJECTURE; THE INFERENCE IT MADE IS MANIFESTLY MISTAKEN,
ABSURD OR IMPOSSIBLE; IT COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION; ITS JUDGMENT IS BASED ON
A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS; ITS FINDING IS CONTRADICTED BY EVIDENCE ON RECORD; AND ITS
FINDING IS DEVOID OF SUPPORT IN THE RECORD.

The appeal is without merit.

First. Petitioner Navarro questions the credibility of the testimony of Jalbuena on the ground that he was a biased witness,
having a grudge against him. The testimony of a witness who has an interest in the conviction of the accused is not, for
this reason alone, unreliable.27 Trial courts, which have the opportunity observe the facial expressions, gestures, and
tones of voice of a witness while testifying, are competent to determine whether his or her testimony should be given
credence.28 In the instant case, petitioner Navarro has not shown that the trial court erred in according weight to the
testimony of Jalbuena.

Indeed, Jalbuena's testimony is confirmed by the voice recording had made. It may be asked whether the tape is
admissible in view of R.A. No. 4200, which prohibits wire tapping. The answer is in the affirmative. The law provides:
 Sec. 1. It shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by all the parties to any private communication or
spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear,
intercept, or record such communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as dictaphone or
dictagraph of dectectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape-recorder, or however otherwise described:

It shall also be unlawful for any person, be he a participant or not in the act or acts penalized in the next preceding
sentence, to knowingly possess any tape record, wire record, disc record, or any other such record, or copies
thereof, of any communication or spoken word secured either before or after the effective date of this Act in the
manner prohibited by this law; or to replay the same for any other person or persons; or to communicate the
contents thereof, either verbally or in writing, or to furnish transcriptions thereof, whether complete or partial, to
any other person: Provided, That the use of such record or any copies thereof as evidence in any civil, criminal
investigation or trial of offenses mentioned in section 3 hereof, shall not be covered by this prohibition.

xxx     xxx     xxx

Sec. 4. Any communication or spoken word, or the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of
the same or any part thereof, or any information therein contained obtained or secured by any person in violation
of the preceding sections of this Act shall not be admissible in evidence in any judicial, quasi-judicial, legislative or
administrative hearing or investigation.

Thus, the law prohibits the overhearing, intercepting, or recording of private communications. 29 Since the exchange
between petitioner Navarro and Lingan was not private, its tape recording is not prohibited.

Nor is there any question that it was duly authenticated. A voice recording is authenticated by the testimony of a witness
(1) that he personally recorded the conversations; (2) that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; and (3)
that the voices on the tape are those of the persons such are claimed to belong. 30 In the instant case, Jalbuena testified
that he personally made the voice recording;31 that the tape played in the court was the one he recorded; 32 and that the
speakers on the tape were petitioner Navarro and Lingan. 33 A sufficient foundation was thus laid for the authentication of
the tape presented by the prosecution.

Second. The voice recording made by Jalbuena established: (1) that there was a heated exchange between petitioner
Navarro and Lingan on the placing in the police blotter of an entry against him and Jalbuena; and (2) that some form of
violence occurred involving petitioner Navarro and Lingan, with the latter getting the worst of it.

Furthermore, Dr. Eva Yamamoto, who performed the autopsy on the body of Lingan, issued the medical
certificate,34 dated February 5, 1990, containing the following findings:

Post Mortem Findings:

= Dried blood, forehead & face

= No blood oozed from the ears, nose & mouth

= Swelling, 3 cm x 2 cm, temporal region, head, right

= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1-2 in depth, lateral eyebrow, Left

= Lacerated wound, 0.5 cm in length, superficial, between the left & right eyebrow

= Lacerated wound, 2 cm in length, 1 cm in depth, forehead, Left

= Cyanosis of the tips of fingers & toes

CAUSE OF DEATH:

= CEREBRAL CONCUSSION & SHOCK

= BLOW ON THE HEAD

Dr. Yamamato testified:

Q   Give your opinion as to what was the possible cause of this findings number one, which is oozing of blood from the
forehead?

A   It may be due to a blow on the forehead or it bumped to a hard object, sir.

Q   Could a metal like a butt of a gun have caused this wound No. 1.?

A   It is possible, sir.

Q   And in the alternative, could have it been caused by bumping on a concrete floor?

A   Possible, sir.

FISCAL:

What could have been the cause of the contusion and swelling under your findings No. 2 doctor?

WITNESS:

It may be caused by bumping to a hard object, sir.

Q   Could a butt of a gun have caused it doctor?

A   The swelling is big so it could have not been caused by a butt of a gun because the butt of a gun is small, sir.

Q   How about this findings No. 4?

A   By a bump or contact of the body to a hard object, sir.

Q   And findings No. 5 what could have caused it?

A   Same cause, sir.

Q   This findings No. 6 what could have caused this wound?

A   Same thing sir.

Q   How about the last finding, cyanosis of tips of fingers and toes, what could have caused it doctor?

WITNESS:

It indicates there was cardiac failure, sir.

FISCAL:

In this same  post mortem report and under the heading cause of death it states: Cause of Death: Cerebral concussion
and Shock, will you explain it?

A   Cerebral concussion means in Tagalog "naalog ang utak" or jarring of the brain, sir.

Q   What could have been the cause of jarring of the brain?

A   It could have been caused by a blow of a hard object, sir.

Q   What about the shock, what could have caused it?

A   It was due to peripheral circulatory failure, sir.

Q   Could any one of both caused the death of the victim?

A   Yes, sir.

Q   Could cerebral concussion alone have caused the death of the deceased?

A   May be, sir.

FISCAL:

Which of these two more likely, to cause death?

WITNESS:

Shock, sir.

Q   Please explain further the meaning of the medical term shock?

A   It is caused by peripheral circulatory failure as I have said earlier sir.

xxx     xxx     xxx

FISCAL:

Could a bumping or pushing of one's head against a concrete floor have caused shock?

WITNESS:

Possible, sir.

How about striking with a butt of a gun, could it cause shock?

A   Possible, sir.35

The above testimony clearly supports the claim of Jalbuena that petitioner Navarro hit Lingan with the handle of his pistol
above the left eyebrow and struck him on the forehead with his fist.

Third. It is argued that the mitigating circumstances of sufficient provocation or threat on the part of the offended party
immediately preceding the act should have been appreciated in favor of petitioner Navarro. Provocation is defined to be
any unjust or improper conduct or act of the offended party, capable of exciting, inciting or irritating anyone. 36 The
provocation must be sufficient and should immediately precede the act. 37 To be sufficient, it must be adequate to excite a
person to commit the wrong, which must accordingly be proportionate in gravity. 38 And it must immediately precede the
act so much so that there is no interval between the provocation by the offended party and the commission of the crime by
the accused.39

In the present case, the remarks of Lingan, which immediately preceded the act of petitioner, constituted sufficient
provocation. In People v. Macaso,40 we appreciated this mitigating circumstance in favor of the accused, a policeman,
who shot a motorist after the latter had repeatedly taunted him with defiant words. Hence, this mitigating circumstance
should be considered in favor of petitioner Navarro.

Furthermore, the mitigating circumstance that the offender had no intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed
should also be appreciated in favor of petitioner. The frantic exclamations of petitioner Navarro after the scuffle that it was
Lingan who provoked him shows that he had no intent to kill the latter. Thus, this mitigating circumstance should be taken
into account in determining the penalty that should be imposed on petitioner Navarro. The allowance of this mitigating
circumstance is consistent with the rule that criminal liability shall be incurred by any person committing a felony although
the wrongful act done be different from that which he intended. 41 In People v.  Castro,42 the mitigating circumstance of lack
of intent to commit so grave a wrong as that committed was appreciated in favor of the accused while finding him guilty of
homicide.

However, the aggravating circumstance of commission of a crime in a place where the public authorities are engaged in
the discharge of their duties should be appreciated against petitioner Navarro. The offense in this case was committed
right in the police station where policemen were discharging their public functions. 43

The crime committed as found by the trial court and the Court of Appeals was homicide, for which the penalty under Art.
249 of the Revised Penal Code is reclusion temporal. As there were two mitigating circumstances and one aggravating
circumstances, the penalty should be fixed in its minimum period. 44 Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, petitioner
Navarro should be sentenced to an indeterminate penalty, the minimum of which is within the range of the penalty next
lower degree, i.e., prision mayor, and the maximum of which is reclusion temporal in its minimum period.45

The indemnity as increased by the Court of Appeals from P30,000.00 to P50,000.00 is in accordance with the current
jurisprudence.46

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the modification that petitioner Felipe Navarro is
hereby SENTENCED to suffer a prison terms of 18 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14 years and 8 months
of reclusion temporal, as maximum.

SO ORDERED.1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. 135882            June 27, 2001

LOURDES T. MARQUEZ, in her capacity as Branch Manager, UNION BANK OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ANIANO A. DESIERTO, in his capacity as OMBUDSMAN, ANGEL C. MAYOR-ALGO, JR., MARY ANN
CORPUZ-MANALAC AND JOSE T. DE JESUS, JR., in their capacity as Chairman and Members of the Panel,
respectively, respondents.

In the petition at bar, petitioner seeks to --

a. Annul and set aside, for having been issued without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction, respondents' order dated September 7, 1998 in OMB-0-97-0411, In Re: Motion
to Cite Lourdes T. Marquez for indirect contempt, received by counsel of September 9,1998, and their order dated
October 14,1998, denying Marquez's motion for reconsideration dated September 10, 1998, received by counsel
on October 20, 1998.

b. Prohibit respondents from implementing their order dated October 14, 1998, in proceeding with the hearing of
the motion to cite Marquez for indirect contempt, through the issuance by this Court of a temporary restraining
order and/or preliminary injunction.1

The antecedent facts are as follows:

Sometime in May 1998, petitioner Marquez received an Order from the Ombudsman Aniano A. Desierto dated April 29,
1998, to produce several bank documents for purposes of inspection in camera  relative to various accounts maintained at
Union Bank of the Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, where petitioner is the branch manager. The accounts to be
inspected are Account Nos. 011-37270, 240-020718, 245-30317-3 and 245-30318-1, involved in a case pending with the
Ombudsman entitled, Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) v. Amado Lagdameo, et al. The order further states:

"It is worth mentioning that the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and to require the production and
inspection of records and documents is sanctioned by the 1987 Philippine Constitution, Republic Act No. 6770,
otherwise known as Ombudsman Act of 1989 and under existing jurisprudence on the matter. It must be noted
that R.A. 6770 especially Section 15 thereof provides, among others, the following powers, functions and duties of
the Ombudsman, to wit:

xxx

(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena duces tecum and take testimony in any investigation or inquiry, including
the power to examine and have access to banks accounts and records;

(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided therein.

Clearly, the specific provision of R.A. 6770, a later legislation, modifies the law on the Secrecy of Bank Deposits
(R.A.1405) and places the office of the Ombudsman in the same footing as the courts of law in this regard." 2

The basis of the Ombudsman in ordering an in camera inspection of the accounts is a trail managers checks purchased
by one George Trivinio, a respondent in OMB-097-0411, pending with the office of the Ombudsman.

It would appear that Mr. George Trivinio, purchased fifty one (51) Managers Checks (MCs) for a total amount of P272.1
Million at Traders Royal Bank, United Nations Avenue branch, on May 2 and 3, 1995. Out of the 51 MCs, eleven (11) MCs
in the amount of P70.6 million, were deposited and credited to an account maintained at the Union Bank, Julia Vargas
Branch.3

On May 26, 1998, the FFIB panel met in conference with petitioner Lourdes T. Marquez and Atty. Fe B. Macalino at the
bank's main office, Ayala Avenue, Makati City. The meeting was for the purpose of allowing petitioner and Atty. Macalino
to view the checks furnished by Traders Royal Bank. After convincing themselves of the veracity of the checks, Atty.
Macalino advised Ms. Marquez to comply with the order of the Ombudsman. Petitioner agreed to an in camera  inspection
set on June 3, 1998.4
However, on June 4,1998, petitioner wrote the Ombudsman explaining to him that the accounts in question cannot readily
be identified and asked for time to respond to the order. The reason forwarded by the petitioner was that "despite diligent
efforts and from the accounts numbers presented, we can not identify these accounts since the checks are issued in cash
or bearer. We surmised that these accounts have long been dormant, hence are not covered by the new account number
generated by the Union Bank system. We therefore have to verify from the Interbank records archives for the
whereabouts of these accounts.5

The Ombudsman, responding to the request of the petitioner for time to comply with the order, stated: "firstly, it must be
emphasized that Union Bank, Julia Vargas Branch was depositary bank of the subject Traders Royal Bank Manager's
Check (MCs), as shown at its dorsal portion and as cleared by the Philippines Clearing House, not the International
Corporate Bank.

Notwithstanding the facts that the checks were payable to cash or bearer, nonetheless, the name of the depositor(s) could
easily be identified since the account numbers x x x where said checks were deposited are identified in the order.

Even assuming that the accounts xxx were already classified as "dormant accounts," the bank is still required to preserve
the records pertaining to the accounts within a certain period of time as required by existing banking rules and regulations.

And finally, the in camera inspection was already extended twice from May 13, 1998 to June 3,1998 thereby giving the
bank enough time within which to sufficiently comply with the order." 6

Thus, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued an order directing petitioner to produce the bank documents relative to
accounts in issue. The order states:

Viewed from the foregoing, your persistent refusal to comply with Ombudsman's order in unjustified, and is merely
intended to delay the investigation of the case. Your act constitutes disobedience of or resistance to a lawful order
issued by this office and is punishable as Indirect Contempt under Section 3(b) of R.A. 6770. The same may also
constitute obstruction in the lawful exercise of the functions of the Ombudsman which is punishable under Section
36 of R.A. 6770.7

On July 10,1998, petitioner together with Union Bank of the Philippines, filed a petition for declaratory relief, prohibition
and injunctions8 with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, against the Ombudsman.

The petition was intended to clear the rights and duties of petitioner. Thus, petitioner sought a declaration of her rights
from the court due to the clear conflict between RA No.6770, Section 15 and R.A. No. 1405, Sections 2 and 3.

Petitioner prayed for a temporary restraining order (TRO) because the Ombudsman and the other persons acting under
his authority were continuously harassing her to produce the bank documents relatives to the accounts in question.
Moreover, on June 16, 1998, the Ombudsman issued another order stating that unless petitioner appeared before the
FFIB with the documents requested, petitioner manager would be charged with indirect contempt and obstruction of
justice.

In the meantime,9 on July 14, 1998, the lower court denied petitioner's prayer for a temporary restraining order and stated
us:

"After hearing the arguments of the parties, the court finds the application for a Temporary Restraining Order to
be without merit.

"Since the application prays for restraint of the respondent, in the exercise of his contempt powers under Section
15(9) in relation to paragraph (8) of RA. 6770, known as " The Ombudsman Act of 1989", there is no great or
irreparable injury from which petitioners may suffer, if respondent is not so restrained. Respondent should he
decide to exercise his contempt powers would still have to apply with the court. x x x Anyone who, without lawful
excuse x x x refuses to produce documents for inspection, when thereunto lawfully required shall be subject to
discipline as in case of contempt of Court and upon application of the individual or body exercising the power in
question shall be dealt with by the Judge of the First Instance (now RTC) having jurisdiction of the case in a
manner provided by the law (section 580 of the Revised Administrative Code). Under the present Constitution
only judges may issue warrants, hence, respondent should apply with the Court for the issuance of the warrant
needed for the enforcement of his contempt orders. It is in these proceedings where petitioner may question the
propriety of respondent's exercise of his contempt powers. Petitioners are not therefore left without any adequate
remedy.
 "The questioned orders were issued with the investigation of the case of Fact-Finding and Intelligence Bureau vs.
Amado Lagdameo, et. al., OMB-0-97-0411, for violation of RA. 3019. Since petitioner failed to show prima facie
evidence that the subject matter of the investigation is outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman, no
writ of injunction may be issued by this Court to delay this investigation pursuant to section 14 of Ombudsman Act
of 1989."10

On July 20,1998, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration based on the following grounds:

a. Petitioners' application for filed Temporary Restraining Order is not only to restrain the Ombudsman from
exercising his contempt powers, but to stop him from implementing his Orders dated April 29, 1998 and June 16,
1998: and

b. The subject matter of the investigation being conducted by the Ombudsman at petitioners' premises is outside
his jurisdiction.11

On July 23, 1998, the Ombudsman filed a motion to dismiss the petition for declaratory relief 12 on the ground that the
Regional Trial Court has no jurisdiction to hear a petition for relief from the findings and orders of the Ombudsman, citing
R.A. No. 6770, Sections 14 and 27. On August 7, 1998, the Ombudsman filed an opposition to petitioner's motion for
reconsideration dated July 20, 1998.13

On August 19,1998, the lower court denied petitioner's motion for reconsideration, 14 and also the Ombudsman's motion to
dismiss. 15

On August 21, 1998, petitioner received a copy of the motion to cite her for contempt, filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman by Agapito B. Rosales, Director, Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FFIB). 16

On August 31, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman an opposition to the motion to cite her in contempt on the
ground that the filing thereof was premature due to the petition pending in the lower court. 17 Petitioner likewise reiterated
that she had no intention to disobey the orders of the Ombudsman. However, she wanted to be clarified as to how she
would comply with the orders without her breaking any law, particularly RA. No. 1405. 18

Respondent Ombudsman panel set the incident for hearing on September 7, 1998. 19 After hearing, the panel issued an
order dated September 7, 1998, ordering petitioner and counsel to appear for a continuation of the hearing of the
contempt charges against her.20

On September 10, 1998, petitioner filed with the Ombudsman a motion for reconsideration of the above order. 21 Her
motion was premised on the fact that there was a pending case with the Regional Trial Court, Makati City, 22 which would
determine whether obeying the orders of the Ombudsman to produce bank documents would not violate any law.

The FFIB opposed the motion,23 and on October 14, 1998, the Ombudsman denied the motion by order the dispositive
portion of which reads:

"Wherefore, respondent Lourdes T. Marquez's motion for reconsideration is hereby DENIED, for lack of merit. Let
the hearing of the motion of the Fact Finding Intelligence Bureau (FFIB) to cite her for indirect contempt to be
intransferrably set to 29 October 1998 at 2:00 o'clock p.m. at which date and time she should appear personally to
submit her additional evidence. Failure to do so shall be deemed a waiver thereof." 24

Hence, the present petition.25

The issue is whether petitioner may be cited for indirect contempt for her failure to produce the documents requested by
the Ombudsman. And whether the order of the Ombudsman to have an in camera  inspection of the questioned account
is allowed as an exception to the law on secrecy of bank deposits (R.A. No.1405).

An examination of the secrecy of bank deposits law (R.A. No.1405) would reveal the following exceptions:

1. Where the depositor consents in writing;

2. Impeachment case;
 3. By court order in bribery or dereliction of duty cases against public officials;

4. Deposit is subject of litigation;

5. Sec. 8, R.A. No.3019, in cases of unexplained wealth as held in the case of PNB vs. Gancayco. 26

The order of the Ombudsman to produce for in camera  inspection the subject accounts with the Union Bank of the
Philippines, Julia Vargas Branch, is based on a pending investigation at the Office of the Ombudsman against Amado
Lagdameo, et. al. for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Sec. 3 (e) and (g) relative to the Joint Venture Agreement between the
Public Estates Authority and AMARI.

We rule that before an in camera  inspection may be allowed, there must be a pending case before a court of competent
jurisdiction. Further, the account must be clearly identified, the inspection limited to the subject matter of the pending case
before the court of competent jurisdiction. The bank personnel and the account holder must be notified to be present
during the inspection, and such inspection may cover only the account identified in the pending case.

In Union Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, we held that "Section 2 of the Law on Secrecy of Bank Deposits, as
amended, declares bank deposits to be "absolutely confidential" except:

(1) In an examination made in the course of a special or general examination of a bank that is specifically
authorized by the Monetary Board after being satisfied that there is reasonable ground to believe that a bank
fraud or serious irregularity has been or is being committed and that it is necessary to look into the deposit to
establish such fraud or irregularity,

(2) In an examination made by an independent auditor hired by the bank to conduct its regular audit provided that
the examination is for audit purposes only and the results thereof shall be for the exclusive use of the bank,

(3) Upon written permission of the depositor,

(4) In cases of impeachment,

(5) Upon order of a competent court in cases of bribery or dereliction of duty of public officials, or

(6) In cases where the money deposited or invested is the subject matter of the litigation". 27

In the case at bar, there is yet no pending litigation before any court of competent authority. What is existing is an
investigation by the Office of the Ombudsman. In short, what the office of the ombudsman would wish to do is to fish for
additional evidence to formally charge Amado Lagdameo, et. al., with the Sandiganbayan. Clearly, there was no pending
case in court which would warrant the opening of the bank account for inspection.

Zone of privacy are recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil Code provides that" [e]very person shall respect the
dignity, personality, privacy and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as actionable torts
several acts for meddling and prying into the privacy of another. It also holds public officer or employee or any private
individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of another person, and recognizes the privacy of
letters and other private communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime of the violation of secrets by an officer,
revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the
Anti-Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act, and the Intellectual Property Code.28

IN VIEW WHEREOF, we GRANT the petition. We order the Ombudsman to cease and desist from requiring Union Bank
Manager Lourdes T. Marquez, or anyone in her place to comply with the order dated October 14,1998, and similar orders.
No costs.

SO ORDERED . 1âwphi1.nêt
G.R. No. 107383             February 20, 1996

CECILIA ZULUETA, petitioner,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and ALFREDO MARTIN, respondents.

This is a petition to review the decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila
(Branch X) which ordered petitioner to return documents and papers taken by her from private respondent's clinic without
the latter's knowledge and consent.

The facts are as follows:

Petitioner Cecilia Zulueta is the wife of private respondent Alfredo Martin. On March 26, 1982, petitioner entered the clinic
of her husband, a doctor of medicine, and in the presence of her mother, a driver and private respondent's secretary,
forcibly opened the drawers and cabinet in her husband's clinic and took 157 documents consisting of private
correspondence between Dr. Martin and his alleged paramours, greetings cards, cancelled checks, diaries, Dr. Martin's
passport, and photographs. The documents and papers were seized for use in evidence in a case for legal separation and
for disqualification from the practice of medicine which petitioner had filed against her husband.

Dr. Martin brought this action below for recovery of the documents and papers and for damages against petitioner. The
case was filed with the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch X, which, after trial, rendered judgment for private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, declaring him "the capital/exclusive owner of the properties described in paragraph 3 of
plaintiff's Complaint or those further described in the Motion to Return and Suppress" and ordering Cecilia Zulueta and
any person acting in her behalf to a immediately return the properties to Dr. Martin and to pay him P5,000.00, as nominal
damages; P5,000.00, as moral damages and attorney's fees; and to pay the costs of the suit. The writ of preliminary
injunction earlier issued was made final and petitioner Cecilia Zulueta and her attorneys and representatives were
enjoined from "using or submitting/admitting as evidence" the documents and papers in question. On appeal, the Court of
Appeals affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court. Hence this petition.

There is no question that the documents and papers in question belong to private respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, and that
they were taken by his wife, the herein petitioner, without his knowledge and consent. For that reason, the trial court
declared the documents and papers to be properties of private respondent, ordered petitioner to return them to private
respondent and enjoined her from using them in evidence. In appealing from the decision of the Court of Appeals
affirming the trial court's decision, petitioner's only ground is that in Alfredo Martin v. Alfonso Felix, Jr., 1 this Court ruled
that the documents and papers (marked as Annexes A-1 to J-7 of respondent's comment in that case) were admissible in
evidence and, therefore, their use by petitioner's attorney, Alfonso Felix did not constitute malpractice or gross
misconduct, For this reason it is contended that the Court of Appeals erred in affirming the decision of the trial court
instead of dismissing private respondent's complaint.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The case against Atty. Felix, Jr. was for disbarment. Among other things, private
respondent, Dr. Alfredo Martin, as complainant in that case, charged that in using the documents in evidence, Atty. Felix,
Jr. committed malpractice or gross misconduct because of the injunctive order of the trial court. In dismissing the
complaint against Atty. Felix, Jr., this Court took note of the following defense of Atty. Felix; Jr. which it found to be
"impressed with merit:"2

On the alleged malpractice or gross misconduct of respondent [Alfonso Felix, Jr.], he maintains that:

....

4. When respondent refiled Cecilia's case for legal separation before the Pasig Regional Trial Court, there was
admittedly an order of the Manila Regional Trial Court prohibiting Cecilia from using the documents Annex "A-1 to
J-7." On September 6, 1983, however having appealed the said order to this Court on a petition for certiorari, this
Court issued a restraining order on aforesaid date which order temporarily set aside the order of the trial court.
Hence, during the enforceability of this Court's order, respondent's request for petitioner to admit the genuineness
and authenticity of the subject annexes cannot be looked upon as malpractice. Notably, petitioner Dr. Martin
finally admitted the truth and authenticity of the questioned annexes, At that point in time, would it have been
 malpractice for respondent to use petitioner's admission as evidence against him in the legal separation case
pending in the Regional Trial Court of Makati? Respondent submits it is not malpractice.

Significantly, petitioner's admission was done not thru his counsel but by Dr. Martin himself under oath, Such
verified admission constitutes an affidavit, and, therefore, receivable in evidence against him. Petitioner became
bound by his admission. For Cecilia to avail herself of her husband's admission and use the same in her action for
legal separation cannot be treated as malpractice.

Thus, the acquittal of Atty. Felix, Jr. in the administrative case amounts to no more than a declaration that his use of the
documents and papers for the purpose of securing Dr. Martin's admission as to their genuiness and authenticity did not
constitute a violation of the injunctive order of the trial court. By no means does the decision in that case establish the
admissibility of the documents and papers in question.

It cannot be overemphasized that if Atty. Felix, Jr. was acquitted of the charge of violating the writ of preliminary injunction
issued by the trial court, it was only because, at the time he used the documents and papers, enforcement of the order of
the trial court was temporarily restrained by this Court. The TRO issued by this Court was eventually lifted as the petition
for certiorari filed by petitioner against the trial court's order was dismissed and, therefore, the prohibition against the
further use of the documents and papers became effective again.

Indeed the documents and papers in question are inadmissible in evidence. The constitutional injunction declaring "the
privacy of communication and correspondence [to be] inviolable"3 is no less applicable simply because it is the wife (who
thinks herself aggrieved by her husband's infidelity) who is the party against whom the constitutional provision is to be
enforced. The only exception to the prohibition in the Constitution is if there is a "lawful order [from a] court or when public
safety or order requires otherwise, as prescribed by law." 4 Any violation of this provision renders the evidence obtained
inadmissible "for any purpose in any proceeding." 5

The intimacies between husband and wife do not justify any one of them in breaking the drawers and cabinets of the other
and in ransacking them for any telltale evidence of marital infidelity. A person, by contracting marriage, does not shed
his/her integrity or his right to privacy as an individual and the constitutional protection is ever available to him or to her.

The law insures absolute freedom of communication between the spouses by making it privileged. Neither husband nor
wife may testify for or against the other without the consent of the affected spouse while the marriage subsists. 6 Neither
may be examined without the consent of the other as to any communication received in confidence by one from the other
during the marriage, save for specified exceptions.7 But one thing is freedom of communication; quite another is a
compulsion for each one to share what one knows with the other. And this has nothing to do with the duty of fidelity that
each owes to the other.

WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED for lack of merit.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 113271 October 16, 1997

WATEROUS DRUG CORPORATION and MS. EMMA CO, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION and ANTONIA MELODIA CATOLICO, respondents.

Nor is he a true Servant [who] buys dear to share in the Profit with the Seller. 1

This petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to declare private respondent Antonia Melodia
Catolico (hereafter Catolico) not a "true Servant," thereby assailing the 30 September 1993 decision 2 and December 1993
Resolution3 of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) in NLRC-NCR CA No. 005160-93, which sustained the
reinstatement and monetary awards in favor of private respondent 4 and denied the petitioners' motion for reconsideration. 5

The facts are as follows:

Catolico was hired as a pharmacist by petitioner Waterous Drug Corporation (hereafter WATEROUS) on 15 August 1988.

On 31 July 1989, Catolico received a memorandum 6 from WATEROUS Vice President-General Manager Emma R. Co
warning her not to dispense medicine to employees chargeable to the latter's accounts because the same was a
prohibited practice. On the same date, Co issued another memorandum 7 to Catolico warning her not to negotiate with
suppliers of medicine without consulting the Purchasing Department, as this would impair the company's control of
purchases and, besides she was not authorized to deal directly with the suppliers.

As regards the first memorandum, Catolico did not deny her responsibility but explained that her act was "due to
negligence," since fellow employee Irene Soliven "obtained the medicines in bad faith and through misrepresentation
when she claimed that she was given a charge slip by the Admitting Dept." Catolico then asked the company to look into
the fraudulent activities of Soliven.8

In a memorandum9 dated 21 November 1989, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda E. Bautro warned Catolico against the
"rush delivery of medicines without the proper documents."

On 29 January 1990, WATEROUS Control Clerk Eugenio Valdez informed Co that he noticed an irregularity involving
Catolico and Yung Shin Pharmaceuticals, Inc. (hereafter YSP), which he described as follows:

. . . A case in point is medicine purchased under our Purchase Order (P.O.) No. 19045 with YSP Sales Invoice
No. 266 representing purchase of ten (10) bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00 per unit. Previews P.O.s issued to
YSP, Inc. showed that the price per bottle is P320.00 while P.O. No. 19045 is priced at P384.00 or an over price
of P64.00 per bottle (or total of P640.00). WDRC paid the amount of P3,840.00 thru MBTC Check No. 222832
dated December 15, 1988. Verification was made to YSP, Inc. to determine the discrepancy and it was found that
the cost per bottle was indeed overpriced. YSP, Inc. Accounting Department (Ms. Estelita Reyes) confirmed that
the difference represents refund of jack-up price of ten bottles of Voren tablets per sales invoice no. 266 as per
their check voucher no. 629552 (shown to the undersigned), which was paid to Ms. Catolico through China Bank
check no. 892068 dated November 9, 1989 . . . .

The undersigned talked to Ms. Catolico regarding the check but she denied having received it and that she is
unaware of the overprice. However, upon conversation with Ms. Saldana, EDRC Espana Pharmacy Clerk, she
confirmed that the check amounting to P640.00 was actually received by Ms. Catolico. As a matter of fact, Ms.
Catolico even asked Ms. Saldana if she opened the envelope containing the check but Ms. Saldana answered her
"talagang ganyan, bukas." It appears that the amount in question (P640.00) had been pocketed by Ms. Catolico. 10

Forthwith, in her memorandum11 dated 37 January 1990, Co asked Catolico to explain, within twenty-four hours, her side
of the reported irregularity. Catolico asked for additional time to give her explanation, 12 and she was granted a 48-hour
extension from 1 to 3 February 1990. However, on 2 February 1990, she was informed that effective 6 February 1990 to 7
March 1990, she would be placed on preventive suspension to protect the interests of the company. 13
In a letter dated 2 February 1990, Catolico requested access to the file containing Sales Invoice No. 266 for her to be able
to make a satisfactory explanation. In said letter she protested Saldaña's invasion of her privacy when Saldaña opened an
envelope addressed to Catolico.14

In a letter15 to Co dated 10 February 1990, Catolico, through her counsel, explained that the check she received from YSP
was a Christmas gift and not a "refund of overprice." She also averred that the preventive suspension was ill-motivated, as
it sprang from an earlier incident between her and Co's secretary, Irene Soliven.

On 5 March 1990, WATEROUS Supervisor Luzviminda Bautro, issued a memorandum 16 notifying Catolico of her
termination; thus:

We received your letter of explanation and your lawyer's letter dated Feb. 2, 1990 and Feb. 10, 1990 respectively
regarding our imposition of preventive suspension on you for acts of dishonesty. However, said letters failed to
rebut the evidences [sic] in our possession which clearly shows that as a Pharmacist stationed at Espana Branch,
you actually made Purchase Orders at YSP Phils., Inc. for 10 bottles of Voren tablets at P384.00/bottle with
previous price of P320.00/bottle only. A check which you received in the amount of P640.00 actually represents
the refund of over price of said medicines and this was confirmed by Ms. Estelita Reyes, YSP Phils., Inc.
Accounting Department.

Your actuation constitutes an act of dishonesty detrimental to the interest of the company. Accordingly, you are
hereby terminated effective March 8, 1990.

On 5 May 1990, Catolico filed before the Office of the Labor Arbiter a complaint for unfair labor practice, illegal dismissal,
and illegal suspension.17

In his decision18 of 10 May 1993, Labor Arbiter Alex Arcadio Lopez found no proof of unfair labor practice against
petitioners. Nevertheless, he decided in favor of Catolico because petitioners failed to "prove what [they] alleged as
complainant's dishonesty," and to show that any investigation was conducted. Hence, the dismissal was without just
cause and due process. He thus declared the dismissal and suspension illegal but disallowed reinstatement, as it would
not be to the best interest of the parties. Accordingly, he awarded separation pay to Catolico computed at one-half
month's pay for every year of service; back wages for one year; and the additional sum of P2,000.00 for illegal suspension
"representing 30 days work." Arbiter Lopez computed the award in favor of Catolico as follows:

30 days Preventive Suspension P2,000.00

Backwages 26,858.50
1/12 of P26,858.50 2,238.21
Separation pay (3 years) 4,305.15
—————
TOTAL AWARD P35,401.86
—————

Petitioners seasonably appealed from the decision and urged the NLRC to set it aside because the Labor Arbiter erred in
finding that Catolico was denied due process and that there was no just cause to terminate her services.

In its decision19 of 30 September 1993, the NLRC affirmed the findings of the Labor Arbiter on the ground that petitioners
were not able to prove a just cause for Catolico's dismissal from her employment. It found that petitioner's evidence
consisted only of the check of P640.00 drawn by YSP in favor of complainant, which her co-employee saw when the latter
opened the envelope. But, it declared that the check was inadmissible in evidence pursuant to Sections 2 and 3(1 and 2)
of Article III of the Constitution.20 It concluded:

With the smoking gun evidence of respondents being rendered inadmissible, by virtue of the constitutional right
invoked by complainants, respondents' case falls apart as it is bereft of evidence which cannot be used as a legal
basis for complainant's dismissal.

The NLRC then dismissed the appeal for lack of merit, but modified the dispositive portion of the appealed decision by
deleting the award for illegal suspension as the same was already included in the computation of the aggregate of the
awards in the amount of P35,401.86.

Their motion for reconsideration having been denied, petitioners filed this special civil action for certiorari, which is
anchored on the following grounds:
 I. Public respondent committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of facts.

II. Due process was duly accorded to private respondent.

III. Public respondent gravely erred in applying Section 3, Article III of the 1987 Constitution.

As to the first and second grounds, petitioners insist that Catolico had been receiving "commissions" from YSP, or
probably from other suppliers, and that the check issued to her on 9 November 1989 was not the first or the last. They
also maintained that Catolico occupied a confidential position and that Catolico's receipt of YSP's check, aggravated by
her "propensity to violate company rules," constituted breach of confidence. And contrary to the findings of NLRC,
Catolico was given ample opportunity to explain her side of the controversy.

Anent the third ground, petitioners submit that, in light of the decision in the People v. Marti,21 the constitutional protection
against unreasonable searches and seizures refers to the immunity of one's person from interference by government and
cannot be extended to acts committed by private individuals so as to bring it within the ambit of alleged unlawful intrusion
by the government.

In its Manifestation in Lieu of Comment, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) disagreed with the NLRC's decision, as
it was of the persuasion that (a) the conclusions reached by public respondent are inconsistent with its findings of fact;
and (b) the incident involving the opening of envelope addressed to private respondent does not warrant the application of
the constitutional provisions. It observed that Catolico was given "several opportunities" to explain her side of the check
controversy, and concluded that the opportunities granted her and her subsequent explanation "satisfy the requirements
of just cause and due process." The OSG was also convinced that Catolico's dismissal was based on just cause and that
Catolico's admission of the existence of the check, as well as her "lame excuse" that it was a Christmas gift from YSP,
constituted substantial evidence of dishonesty. Finally, the OSG echoed petitioners' argument that there was no violation
of the right of privacy of communication in this case,22 adding that petitioner WATEROUS was justified in opening an
envelope from one of its regular suppliers as it could assume that the letter was a business communication in which it had
an interest.

In its Comment which we required to be filed in view of the adverse stand of the OSG, the NLRC contends that petitioners
miserably failed to prove their claim that it committed grave abuse of discretion in its findings of fact. It then prays that we
dismiss this petition.

In her Comment, Catolico asserts that petitioners' evidence is too "flimsy" to justify her dismissal. The check in issue was
given to her, and she had no duty to turn it over to her employer. Company rules do not prohibit an employee from
accepting gifts from clients, and there is no indication in the contentious check that it was meant as a refund for overpriced
medicines. Besides, the check was discovered in violation of the constitutional provision on the right to privacy and
communication; hence, as correctly held by the NLRC, it was inadmissible in evidence.

Catolico likewise disputes petitioners' claim that the audit report and her initial response that she never received a check
were sufficient to justify her dismissal. When she denied having received a check from YSP, she meant that she did not
receive any refund of overprice, consistent with her position that what she received was a token gift. All that can be
gathered from the audit report is that there was apparently an overcharge, with no basis to conclude that Catolico
pocketed the amount in collusion with YSP. She thus concluded that her dismissal was based on a mere suspicion.

Finally, Catolico insists that she could not have breached the trust and confidence of WATEROUS because, being merely
a pharmacist, she did not handle "confidential information or sensitive properties." She was doing the task of a saleslady:
selling drugs and making requisitions when supplies were low.

A thorough review of the record leads us to no other conclusion than that, except as to the third ground, the instant
petition must fail.

Concededly, Catolico was denied due process. Procedural due process requires that an employee be apprised of the
charge against him, given reasonable time to answer the charge, allowed ample opportunity to be heard and defend
himself, and assisted by a representative if the employee so
desires.23 Ample opportunity connotes every kind of assistance that management must accord the employee to enable
him to prepare adequately for his defense, including legal representation. 24

In the case at bar, although Catolico was given an opportunity to explain her side, she was dismissed from the service in
the memorandum of 5 March 1990 issued by her Supervisor after receipt of her letter and that of her counsel. No hearing
was ever conducted after the issues were joined through said letters. The Supervisor's memorandum spoke of "evidences
[sic] in [WATEROUS] possession," which were not, however, submitted. What the "evidences" [sic] other than the sales
invoice and the check were, only the Supervisor knew.

Catolico was also unjustly dismissed. It is settled that the burden is on the employer to prove just and valid cause for
dismissing an employee, and its failure to discharge that burden would result in a finding that the dismissal is
unjustified.25 Here, WATEROUS proved unequal to the task.

It is evident from the Supervisor's memorandum that Catolico was dismissed because of an alleged anomalous
transaction with YSP. Unfortunately for petitioners, their evidence does not establish that there was an overcharge.
Control Clerk Eugenio C. Valdez, who claims to have discovered Catolico's inappropriate transaction, stated in his
affidavit:26

4. My findings revealed that on or before the month of July 31, 1989, Ms. Catolico in violation of the [company]
procedure, made an under the table deal with YSP Phils. to supply WDRC needed medicines like Voren tablets at
a jack-up price of P384.00 per bottle of 50 mg. which has a previous price of only P320.00;

5. I verified the matter to YSP Phils. to determine the discrepancy and I found out that the cost per bottle was
indeed overpriced. The Accounting Department of YSP Phils. through Ms. Estelita Reyes confirmed that there
was really an overprice and she said that the difference was refunded through their check voucher no. 629552
which was shown to me and the payee is Melodia Catolico, through a China Bank Check No. 892068 dated
November 9, 1989.

It clearly appears then that Catolico's dismissal was based on hearsay information. Estelita Reyes never testified nor
executed an affidavit relative to this case; thus, we have to reject the statements attributed to her by Valdez. Hearsay
evidence carries no probative value.27

Besides, it was never shown that petitioners paid for the Voren tablets. While Valdez informed Co, through the former's
memorandum28 of 29 January 1990, that WATEROUS paid YSP P3,840.00 "thru MBTC Check No. 222832," the said
check was never presented in evidence, nor was any receipt from YSP offered by petitioners.

Moreover, the two purchase orders for Voren tablets presented by petitioners do not indicate an overcharge. The
purchase order dated 16 August 198929 stated that the Voren tablets cost P320.00  per box, while the purchase order
dated 5 October 198930 priced the Voren tablets at P384.00 per bottle. The difference in price may then be attributed to
the different packaging used in each purchase order.

Assuming that there was an overcharge, the two purchase orders for the Voren tablets were recommended by Director-
MMG Mario R. Panuncio, verified by AVP-MNG Noli M. Lopez and approved by Vice President-General Manager Emma
R. Co. The purchase orders were silent as to Catolico's participation in the purchase. If the price increase was
objectionable to petitioners, they or their officers should have disapproved the transaction. Consequently, petitioners had
no one to blame for their predicament but themselves. This set of facts emphasizes the exceedingly incredible situation
proposed by petitioners. Despite the memorandum warning Catolico not to negotiate with suppliers of medicine, there was
no proof that she ever transacted, or that she had the opportunity to transact, with the said suppliers. Again, as the
purchase orders indicate, Catolico was not at all involved in the sale of the Voren tablets. There was no occasion for
Catolico to initiate, much less benefit from, what Valdez called an "under the table deal" with YSP.

Catolico's dismissal then was obviously grounded on mere suspicion, which in no case can justify an employee's
dismissal. Suspicion is not among the valid causes provided by the Labor Code for the termination of
employment;31 and even the dismissal of an employee for loss of trust and confidence must rest on substantial grounds
and not on the employer's arbitrariness, whims, caprices, or suspicion. 32 Besides, Catolico was not shown to be a
managerial employee, to which class of employees the term "trust and confidence" is restricted. 33

As regards the constitutional violation upon which the NLRC anchored its decision, we find no reason to revise the
doctrine laid down in People vs. Marti34 that the Bill of Rights does not protect citizens from unreasonable searches and
seizures perpetrated by private individuals. It is not true, as counsel for Catolico claims, that the citizens have no recourse
against such assaults. On the contrary, and as said counsel admits, such an invasion gives rise to both criminal and civil
liabilities.

Finally, since it has been determined by the Labor Arbiter that Catolico's reinstatement would not be to the best interest of
the parties, he correctly awarded separation pay to Catolico. Separation pay in lieu of reinstatement is computed at one
month's salary for every year of service.35 In this case, however, Labor Arbiter Lopez computed the separation pay at one-
half month's salary for every year of service. Catolico did not oppose or raise an objection. As such, we will uphold the
award of separation pay as fixed by the Labor Arbiter.

WHEREFORE, the instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and the challenged decision and resolution of the National
Labor Relations Commission dated 30 September 1993 and 2 December 1993, respectively, in NLRC-NCR CA No.
005160-93 are AFFIRMED, except as to its reason for upholding the Labor Arbiter's decision, viz., that the evidence
against private respondent was inadmissible for having been obtained in violation of her constitutional rights of privacy of
communication and against unreasonable searches and seizures which is hereby set aside.

Costs against petitioners.

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. L-69866 April 15, 1988

ROGELIO ABERCA, RODOLFO BENOSA, NESTOR BODINO NOEL ETABAG DANILO DE LA FUENTE, BELEN
DIAZ-FLORES, MANUEL MARIO GUZMAN, ALAN JAZMINEZ, EDWIN LOPEZ, ALFREDO MANSOS, ALEX
MARCELINO, ELIZABETH PROTACIO-MARCELINO, JOSEPH OLAYER, CARLOS PALMA, MARCO PALO,
ROLANDO SALUTIN, BENJAMIN SESGUNDO, ARTURO TABARA, EDWIN TULALIAN and REBECCA
TULALIAN petitioners,
vs.
MAJ. GEN. FABIAN VER, COL. FIDEL SINGSON, COL. ROLANDO ABADILLA, COL. GERARDO B. LANTORIA,
COL. GALILEO KINTANAR, 1ST LT. COL. PANFILO M. LACSON, MAJ. RODOLFO AGUINALDO, CAPT. DANILO
PIZARRO, 1ST LT. PEDRO TANGO, 1ST LT. ROMEO RICARDO, 1ST LT. RAUL BACALSO, MSGT BIENVENIDO
BALABA and REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, National Capital Judicial Region, Branch XCV (95), Quezon
City, respondents.

This petition for certiorari presents vital issues not heretofore passed upon by this Court. It poses the question whether the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus bars a civil action for damages for illegal searches conducted by
military personnel and other violations of rights and liberties guaranteed under the Constitution. If such action for damages
may be maintained, who can be held liable for such violations: only the military personnel directly involved and/or their
superiors as well.

This case stems from alleged illegal searches and seizures and other violations of the rights and liberties of plaintiffs by
various intelligence units of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, known as Task Force Makabansa (TFM) ordered by
General Fabian Ver "to conduct pre-emptive strikes against known communist-terrorist (CT) underground houses in view
of increasing reports about CT plans to sow disturbances in Metro Manila," Plaintiffs allege, among others, that complying
with said order, elements of the TFM raided several places, employing in most cases defectively issued judicial search
warrants; that during these raids, certain members of the raiding party confiscated a number of purely personal items
belonging to plaintiffs; that plaintiffs were arrested without proper warrants issued by the courts; that for some period after
their arrest, they were denied visits of relatives and lawyers; that plaintiffs were interrogated in violation of their rights to
silence and counsel; that military men who interrogated them employed threats, tortures and other forms of violence on
them in order to obtain incriminatory information or confessions and in order to punish them; that all violations of plaintiffs
constitutional rights were part of a concerted and deliberate plan to forcibly extract information and incriminatory
statements from plaintiffs and to terrorize, harass and punish them, said plans being previously known to and sanctioned
by defendants.

Plaintiffs sought actual/compensatory damages amounting to P39,030.00; moral damages in the amount of at least
P150,000.00 each or a total of P3,000,000.00; exemplary damages in the amount of at least P150,000.00 each or a total
of P3,000,000.00; and attorney's fees amounting to not less than P200,000.00.

A motion to dismiss was filed by defendants, through their counsel, then Solicitor-General Estelito Mendoza, alleging that
(1) plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a damage suit
because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) assuming that the courts can entertain
the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official duties; and (3)
the complaint states no cause of action against the defendants. Opposition to said motion to dismiss was filed by plaintiffs
Marco Palo, Danilo de la Fuente, Benjamin Sesgundo, Nel Etabag, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin on July 8, 1983,
and by plaintiffs Edwin Lopez, Manuel Mario Guzman, Alan Jasminez, Nestor Bodino, Carlos Palma, Arturo Tabara,
Joseph Olayer, Rodolfo Benosa, Belen Diaz, Flores, Rogelio Aberca, Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Marcelino on July 21,
1983. On November 7, 1983, a Consolidated Reply was filed by defendants' counsel.

Then, on November 8, 1983, the Regional Trial Court, National Capital Region, Branch 95, Judge Willelmo C. Fortun,
Presiding, 1 issued a resolution granting the motion to dismiss. I sustained, lock, stock and barrel, the defendants'
contention (1) the plaintiffs may not cause a judicial inquiry into the circumstances of their detention in the guise of a
damage suit because, as to them, the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is suspended; (2) that assuming that the court
can entertain the present action, defendants are immune from liability for acts done in the performance of their official
duties; and (3) that the complaint states no cause of action against defendants, since there is no allegation that the
defendants named in the complaint confiscated plaintiffs' purely personal properties in violation of their constitutional
rights, and with the possible exception of Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Sergeant Bienvenido Balabo committed acts of
torture and maltreatment, or that the defendants had the duty to exercise direct supervision and control of their
subordinates or that they had vicarious liability as employers under Article 2180 of the Civil Code. The lower court stated,
"After a careful study of defendants' arguments, the court finds the same to be meritorious and must, therefore, be
granted. On the other hand, plaintiffs' arguments in their opposition are lacking in merit."

A motion to set aside the order dismissing the complaint and a supplemental motion for reconsideration was filed by the
plaintiffs on November 18, 1983, and November 24, 1983, respectively. On December 9, 1983, the defendants filed a
comment on the aforesaid motion of plaintiffs, furnishing a copy thereof to the attorneys of all the plaintiffs, namely, Attys.
Jose W. Diokno, Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Auguso Sanchez, Antonio L. Rosales, Pedro B. Ella
Jr., Arno V. Sanidad, Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas Aquino.

On December 15, 1983, Judge Fortun issued an order voluntarily inhibiting himself from further proceeding in the case
and leaving the resolution of the motion to set aside the order of dismissal to Judge Lising, "to preclude any suspicion that
he (Judge Fortun) cannot resolve [the] aforesaid pending motion with the cold neutrality of an impartial judge and to put
an end to plaintiffs assertion that the undersigned has no authority or jurisdiction to resolve said pending motion." This
order prompted plaintiffs to reesolve an amplificatory motion for reconsideration signed in the name of the Free Legal
Assistance Group (FLAG) of Mabini Legal Aid Committee, by Attys. Joker P. Arroyo, Felicitas Aquino and Arno Sanidad
on April 12, 1984. On May 2,1984, the defendants filed a comment on said amplificatory motion for reconsideration.

In an order dated May 11, 1984, the trial court, Judge Esteban Lising, Presiding, without acting on the motion to set aside
order of November 8, 1983, issued an order, as follows:

It appearing from the records that, indeed, the following plaintiffs, Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente
and Marco Palo, represented by counsel, Atty. Jose W. Diokno, Alan Jasminez represented by counsel,
Atty. Augusta Sanchez, Spouses Alex Marcelino and Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, represented by
counsel, Atty. Procopio Beltran, Alfredo Mansos represented by counsel, Atty. Rene Sarmiento, and
Rolando Salutin, represented by counsel, Atty. Efren Mercado, failed to file a motion to reconsider the
Order of November 8, 1983, dismissing the complaint, nor interposed an appeal therefrom within the
reglementary period, as prayed for by the defendants, said Order is now final against said plaintiffs.

Assailing the said order of May 11, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for reconsideration on May 28,1984, alleging that it
was not true that plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth
Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin failed to file a motion to reconsider the order of November 8,
1983 dismissing the complaint, within the reglementary period. Plaintiffs claimed that the motion to set aside the order of
November 8, 1983 and the amplificatory motion for reconsideration was filed for all the plaintiffs, although signed by only
some of the lawyers.

In its resolution of September 21, 1984, the respondent court dealt with both motions (1) to reconsider its order of May 11,
1984 declaring that with respect to certain plaintiffs, the resolution of November 8, 1983 had already become final, and (2)
to set aside its resolution of November 8, 1983 granting the defendants' motion to dismiss. In the dispositive portion of the
order of September 21, 1984, the respondent court resolved:

(1) That the motion to set aside the order of finality, dated May 11, 1984, of the Resolution of dismissal of
the complaint of plaintiffs Rogelio Aberca, Danilo de la Fuente, Marco Palo, Alan Jasminez Alex
Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos and Rolando Salutin is deed for lack of merit;

(2) For lack of cause of action as against the following defendants, to wit:

1. Gen Fabian Ver

2. Col. Fidel Singson

3. Col. Rolando Abadilla

4. Lt. Col. Conrado Lantoria, Jr.

5. Col. Galileo Montanar

6. Col. Panfilo Lacson

7. Capt. Danilo Pizaro

 8. 1 Lt Pedro Tango

9. Lt. Romeo Ricardo

10. Lt. Raul Bacalso

the motion to set aside and reconsider the Resolution of dismissal of the present action or complaint,
dated November 8, 1983, is also denied but in so far as it affects and refers to defendants, to wit:

1. Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo, and

2. Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba

the motion to reconsider and set aside the Resolution of dismissal dated November 3, 1983 is granted
and the Resolution of dismissal is, in this respect, reconsidered and modified.

Hence, petitioners filed the instant petition for certiorari on March 15, 1985 seeking to annul and set aside the respondent
court's resolution of November 8, 1983, its order of May 11, 1984, and its resolution dated September 21, 1984.
Respondents were required to comment on the petition, which it did on November 9, 1985. A reply was filed by petitioners
on August 26, 1986.

We find the petition meritorious and decide to give it due course.

At the heart of petitioners' complaint is Article 32 of the Civil Code which provides:

ART. 32. Any public officer or employee, or any private individual who directly or indirectly obstructs,
defeats, violates or in any manner impedes or impairs any of the following rights and liberties of another
person shall be liable to the latter for damages:

(1) Freedom of religion;

(2) Freedom of speech;

(3) Freedom to write for the press or to maintain a periodical publication;

(4) Freedom from arbitrary or illegal detention;

(5) Freedom of suffrage;

(6) The right against deprivation of property without due process

(7) of law;

(8) The right to a just compensation when private property is taken for public use;

(9) The right to the equal protection of the laws;

(10) The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers, and effects against unreasonable searches
and seizures;

(11) The liberty of abode and of changing the same;

(12) The privacy of cmmunication and correspondence;

(13) The right to become a member of associations or societies for purposes not contrary to law;

(14) The right to take part in a peaceable assembly to petition the Government for redress of grievances;
 (15) The right to be free from involuntary servitude in any form;

(16) The rigth of the accused against excessive bail;

(17) The rigth of the aaccused to be heard by himself and counsel, to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against him, to have a speedy and public trial, to meet the witnesses face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of witness in behalf;

(18) Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against ones self, or from being forced to confess
guilt, or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make such confession, except when
the person confessing becomes a State witness;

(19) Freedom from excessive fines or cruel and unusual punishment, unless the same is imposed or
inflicted in accordance with a statute which has not been judicially declared unconstitutional; and

(20) Freedom of access to the courts.

In any of the cases referred to in this article, whether or not the defendant's act or omission constitutes a
criminal offense, the against grieved party has a right to commence an entirely separate and distinct civil
action for damages, and for other relief. Such civil action shall proceed independently of any criminal
prosecution (if the latter be instituted), and may be proved by a preponderance of evidence.

The indemnity shall include moral damages. Exemplary damages may also be adjudicated.

The responsibility herein set forth is not demandable from a judge unless his act or omission constitutes a
violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

It is obvious that the purpose of the above codal provision is to provide a sanction to the deeply cherished rights and
freedoms enshrined in the Constitution. Its message is clear; no man may seek to violate those sacred rights with
impunity. In times of great upheaval or of social and political stress, when the temptation is strongest to yield — borrowing
the words of Chief Justice Claudio Teehankee — to the law of force rather than the force of law, it is necessary to remind
ourselves that certain basic rights and liberties are immutable and cannot be sacrificed to the transient needs or imperious
demands of the ruling power. The rule of law must prevail, or else liberty will perish. Our commitment to democratic
principles and to the rule of law compels us to reject the view which reduces law to nothing but the expression of the will
of the predominant power in the community. "Democracy cannot be a reign of progress, of liberty, of justice, unless the
law is respected by him who makes it and by him for whom it is made. Now this respect implies a maximum of faith, a
minimum of Idealism. On going to the bottom of the matter, we discover that life demands of us a certain residuum of
sentiment which is not derived from reason, but which reason nevertheless controls. 2

Seeking to justify the dismissal of plaintiffs' complaint, the respondents postulate the view that as public officers they are
covered by the mantle of state immunity from suit for acts done in the performance of official duties or function In support
of said contention, respondents maintain that —

Respondents are members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines. Their primary duty is to safeguard
public safety and order. The Constitution no less provides that the President may call them "to prevent or
supress lawless violence, invasion, insurrection or rebellion, or imminent danger thereof." (Constitution,
Article VII, Section 9).

On January 17, 1981, the President issued Proclamation No. 2045 lifting martial law but providing for the
continued suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus in view of the remaining dangers to the
security of the nation. The proclamation also provided "that the call to the Armed Forces of the Philippines
to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insuitection rebellion and subversion shall continue to be in force
and effect."

Petitioners allege in their complaint that their causes of action proceed from respondent General Ver's
order to Task Force Makabansa to launch pre-emptive strikes against communist terrorist underground
houses in Metro Manila. Petitioners claim that this order and its subsequent implementation by elements
of the task force resulted in the violation of their constitutional rights against unlawful searches, seizures
 and arrest, rights to counsel and to silence, and the right to property and that, therefore, respondents Ver
and the named members of the task force should be held liable for damages.

But, by launching a pre-emptive strike against communist terrorists, respondent members of the armed
forces merely performed their official and constitutional duties. To allow petitioners to recover from
respondents by way of damages for acts performed in the exercise of such duties run contrary to the
policy considerations to shield respondents as public officers from undue interference with their duties
and from potentially disabling threats of hability (Aarlon v. Fitzgerald 102 S. Ct. 2731-1 Forbes v. Chuoco
Tiaco, 16 Phil. 634), and upon the necessity of protecting the performance of governmental and public
functions from being harassed unduly or constantly interrupted by private suits (McCallan v. State, 35 Cal.
App. 605; Metran v. Paredes, 79 Phil. 819).

xxx xxx xxx

The immunity of public officers from liability arising from the performance of their duties is now a settled
jurisprudence Alzua v. Johnson, 21 Phil. 308; Zulueta v. Nicolas, 102 Phil. 944; Spalding v. Vilas, 161 US
483; 40 L. Ed. 780, 16 S. Ct. 631; Barr v. Mateo, 360; Butz v. Economon, 438 US 478; 57 L. Ed. 2d 895,
98 S. Ct. 2894; Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 US 232; Forbes v. Chuoco Tiaco, supra; Miller v. de Leune, 602
F. 2d 198; Sami v. US, 617 F. 2d 755).

Respondents-defendants who merely obeyed the lawful orders of the President and his call for the
suppression of the rebellion involving petitioners enjoy such immunity from Suit. 3

We find respondents' invocation of the doctrine of state immunity from suit totally misplaced. The cases invoked by
respondents actually involved acts done by officers in the performance of official duties written the ambit of their powers.
As held in Forbes, etc. vs. Chuoco Tiaco and Crossfield: 4

No one can be held legally responsible in damages or otherwise for doing in a legal manner what he had
authority, under the law, to do. Therefore, if the Governor-General had authority, under the law to deport
or expel the defendants, and circumstances justifying the deportation and the method of carrying it out are
left to him, then he cannot be held liable in damages for the exercise of this power. Moreover, if the courts
are without authority to interfere in any manner, for the purpose of controlling or interferring with the
exercise of the political powers vested in the chief executive authority of the Government, then it must
follow that the courts cannot intervene for the purpose of declaring that he is liable in damages for the
exeercise of this authority.

It may be that the respondents, as members of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, were merely responding to their duty,
as they claim, "to prevent or suppress lawless violence, insurrection, rebellion and subversion" in accordance with
Proclamation No. 2054 of President Marcos, despite the lifting of martial law on January 27, 1981, and in pursuance of
such objective, to launch pre- emptive strikes against alleged communist terrorist underground houses. But this cannot be
construed as a blanket license or a roving commission untramelled by any constitutional restraint, to disregard or
transgress upon the rights and liberties of the individual citizen enshrined in and protected by the Constitution. The
Constitution remains the supreme law of the land to which all officials, high or low, civilian or military, owe obedience and
allegiance at all times.

Article 32 of the Civil Code which renders any public officer or employee or any private individual liable in damages for
violating the Constitutional rights and liberties of another, as enumerated therein, does not exempt the respondents from
responsibility. Only judges are excluded from liability under the said article, provided their acts or omissions do not
constitute a violation of the Penal Code or other penal statute.

This is not to say that military authorities are restrained from pursuing their assigned task or carrying out their mission with
vigor. We have no quarrel with their duty to protect the Republic from its enemies, whether of the left or of the right, or
from within or without, seeking to destroy or subvert our democratic institutions and imperil their very existence. What we
are merely trying to say is that in carrying out this task and mission, constitutional and legal safeguards must be observed,
otherwise, the very fabric of our faith will start to unravel. In the battle of competing Ideologies, the struggle for the mind is
just as vital as the struggle of arms. The linchpin in that psychological struggle is faith in the rule of law. Once that faith is
lost or compromised, the struggle may well be abandoned.

We do not find merit in respondents' suggestion that plaintiffs' cause of action is barred by the suspension of the privilege
of the writ of habeas corpus. Respondents contend that "Petitioners cannot circumvent the suspension of the privilege of
the writ by resorting to a damage suit aimed at the same purpose-judicial inquiry into the alleged illegality of their
detention. While the main relief they ask by the present action is indemnification for alleged damages they suffered, their
causes of action are inextricably based on the same claim of violations of their constitutional rights that they invoked in the
habeas corpus case as grounds for release from detention. Were the petitioners allowed the present suit, the judicial
inquiry barred by the suspension of the privilege of the writ will take place. The net result is that what the courts cannot do,
i.e. override the suspension ordered by the President, petitioners will be able to do by the mere expedient of altering the
title of their action."

We do not agree. We find merit in petitioners' contention that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
does not destroy petitioners' right and cause of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention and other violations of
their constitutional rights. The suspension does not render valid an otherwise illegal arrest or detention. What is
suspended is merely the right of the individual to seek release from detention through the writ of habeas corpus as a
speedy means of obtaining his liberty.

Moreover, as pointed out by petitioners, their right and cause of action for damages are explicitly recognized in P.D. No.
1755 which amended Article 1146 of the Civil Code by adding the following to its text:

However, when the action (for injury to the rights of the plaintiff or for a quasi-delict) arises from or out of
any act, activity or conduct of any public officer involving the exercise of powers or authority arising from
Martial Law including the arrest, detention and/or trial of the plaintiff, the same must be brought within one
(1) year.

Petitioners have a point in contending that even assuming that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus
suspends petitioners' right of action for damages for illegal arrest and detention, it does not and cannot suspend their
rights and causes of action for injuries suffered because of respondents' confiscation of their private belongings, the
violation of their right to remain silent and to counsel and their right to protection against unreasonable searches and
seizures and against torture and other cruel and inhuman treatment.

However, we find it unnecessary to address the constitutional issue pressed upon us. On March 25, 1986, President
Corazon C. Aquino issued Proclamation No. 2, revoking Proclamation Nos. 2045 and 2045-A and lifting the suspension of
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus. The question therefore has become moot and academic.

This brings us to the crucial issue raised in this petition. May a superior officer under the notion of respondent superior be
answerable for damages, jointly and severally with his subordinates, to the person whose constitutional rights and liberties
have been violated?

Respondents contend that the doctrine of  respondent superior is applicable to the case. We agree. The doctrine
of respondent superior has been generally limited in its application to principal and agent or to master and servant (i.e.
employer and employee) relationship. No such relationship exists between superior officers of the military and their
subordinates.

Be that as it may, however, the decisive factor in this case, in our view, is the language of Article 32. The law speaks of an
officer or employee or person 'directly' or "indirectly" responsible for the violation of the constitutional rights and liberties of
another. Thus, it is not the actor alone (i.e. the one directly responsible) who must answer for damages under Article 32;
the person indirectly responsible has also to answer for the damages or injury caused to the aggrieved party.

By this provision, the principle of accountability of public officials under the Constitution 5 acquires added meaning and
asgilrnes a larger dimension. No longer may a superior official relax his vigilance or abdicate his duty to supervise his
subordinates, secure in the thought that he does not have to answer for the transgressions committed by the latter against
the constitutionally protected rights and liberties of the citizen. Part of the factors that propelled people power in February
1986 was the widely held perception that the government was callous or indifferent to, if not actually responsible for, the
rampant violations of human rights. While it would certainly be go naive to expect that violators of human rights would
easily be deterred by the prospect of facing damage suits, it should nonetheless be made clear in no ones terms that
Article 32 of the Civil Code makes the persons who are directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for the transgression
joint tortfeasors.

In the case at bar, the trial court dropped defendants General Fabian Ver, Col. Fidel Singson, Col. Rolando Abadilla, Col.
Gerardo Lantoria, Jr., Col. Galileo Kintanar, Col. Panfilo Lacson, Capt. Danilo Pizarro, lst Lt. Pedro Tango, Lt. Romeo
Ricardo and Lt. Ricardo Bacalso from the acts of their subordinates. Only Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt.
Bienvenido Balaba were kept as defendants on the ground that they alone 'have been specifically mentioned and
Identified to have allegedly caused injuries on the persons of some of the plaintiff which acts of alleged physical violence
constitute a delict or wrong that gave rise to a cause of action. But such finding is not supported by the record, nor is it in
accord with law and jurisprudence.

Firstly, it is wrong to at the plaintiffs' action for damages 5 Section 1, Article 19. to 'acts of alleged physical violence" which
constituted delict or wrong. Article 32 clearly specifies as actionable the act of violating or in any manner impeding or
impairing any of the constitutional rights and liberties enumerated therein, among others —

1. Freedom from arbitrary arrest or illegal detention;

2. The right against deprivation of property without due process of law;

3. The right to be secure in one's person, house, papers and effects against unreasonable searches and
seizures;

4. The privacy of communication and correspondence;

5. Freedom from being compelled to be a witness against one's self, or from being forced to confess guilt,
or from being induced by a promise of immunity or reward to make a confession, except when the person
confessing becomes a state witness.

The complaint in this litigation alleges facts showing with abundant clarity and details, how plaintiffs' constitutional rights
and liberties mentioned in Article 32 of the Civil Code were violated and impaired by defendants. The complaint speaks of,
among others, searches made without search warrants or based on irregularly issued or substantially defective warrants;
seizures and confiscation, without proper receipts, of cash and personal effects belonging to plaintiffs and other items of
property which were not subversive and illegal nor covered by the search warrants; arrest and detention of plaintiffs
without warrant or under irregular, improper and illegal circumstances; detention of plaintiffs at several undisclosed places
of 'safehouses" where they were kept incommunicado and subjected to physical and psychological torture and other
inhuman, degrading and brutal treatment for the purpose of extracting incriminatory statements. The complaint contains a
detailed recital of abuses perpetrated upon the plaintiffs violative of their constitutional rights.

Secondly, neither can it be said that only those shown to have participated "directly" should be held liable. Article 32 of the
Civil Code encompasses within the ambit of its provisions those directly, as well as indirectly, responsible for its violation.

The responsibility of the defendants, whether direct or indirect, is amply set forth in the complaint. It is well established in
our law and jurisprudence that a motion to dismiss on the ground that the complaint states no cause of action must be
based on what appears on the face of the complaint. 6 To determine the sufficiency of the cause of action, only the facts
alleged in the complaint, and no others, should be considered. 7 For this purpose, the motion to dismiss must
hypothetically admit the truth of the facts alleged in the complaint. 8

Applying this test, it is difficult to justify the trial court's ruling, dismissing for lack of cause of action the complaint against
all the defendants, except Major Rodolfo Aguinaldo and Master Sgt. Bienvenido Balaba. The complaint contained
allegations against all the defendants which, if admitted hypothetically, would be sufficient to establish a cause or causes
of action against all of them under Article 32 of the Civil Code.

This brings us to the last issue. Was the trial court correct in dismissing the complaint with respect to plaintiffs Rogelio
Aberca, Danilo de la Puente, Marco Palo, Alan Jazminez, Alex Marcelino, Elizabeth Protacio-Marcelino, Alfredo Mansos
and Rolando Salutin, on the basis of the alleged failure of said plaintiffs to file a motion for reconsideration of the court's
resolution of November 8, 1983, granting the respondent's motion to dismiss?

It is undisputed that a timely motion to set aside said order of November 8, 1983 was filed by 'plaintiffs, through counsel.
True, the motion was signed only by Atty. Joker P. Arroyo, counsel for Benjamin Sesgulido; Atty. Antonio Rosales,
counsel for Edwin Lopez and Manuel Martin Guzman; Atty. Pedro B. Ella, Jr., counsel for Nestor Bodino and Carlos
Palma; Atty. Arno V. Sanidad, counsel for Arturo Tabara; Atty. Felicitas S. Aquino, counsel for Joseph Olayer; and Atty.
Alexander Padilla, counsel for Rodolfo Benosa.

But the body of the motion itself clearly indicated that the motion was filed on behalf of all the plaintiffs. And this must have
been also the understanding of defendants' counsel himself for when he filed his comment on the motion, he furnished
copies thereof, not just to the lawyers who signed the motion, but to all the lawyers of plaintiffs, to wit: Attys. Jose Diokno,
Procopio Beltran, Rene Sarmiento, Efren Mercado, Augusto Sanchez, Antonio Rosales, Pedro Efla Jr., Arno Sanidad,
Alexander Padilla, Joker Arroyo, Rene Saguisag, Ramon Esguerra and Felicitas S. Aquino.

In filing the motion to set aside the resolution of November 8, 1983, the signing attorneys did so on behalf of all the
plaintiff. They needed no specific authority to do that. The authority of an attorney to appear for and in behalf of a party
can be assumed, unless questioned or challenged by the adverse party or the party concerned, which was never done in
this case. Thus, it was grave abuse on the part of respondent judge to take it upon himself to rule that the motion to set
aside the order of November 8, 1953 dismissing the complaint was filed only by some of the plaintiffs, when by its very
language it was clearly intended to be filed by and for the benefit of all of them. It is obvious that the respondent judge
took umbrage under a contrived technicality to declare that the dismissal of the complaint had already become final with
respect to some of the plaintiffs whose lawyers did not sign the motion for reconsideration. Such action tainted with legal
infirmity cannot be sanctioned.

Accordingly, we grant the petition and annul and set aside the resolution of the respondent court, dated November 8,
1983, its order dated May 11, 1984 and its resolution dated September 21, 1984. Let the case be remanded to the
respondent court for further proceedings. With costs against private respondents.

SO ORDERED.
FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION