BILL OF RIGHTS

MODULE 10

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
 The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for prohibition is
whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process clause.
 The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null and void."
 For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the
requisite showing to sustain an attack against its validity.

 The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the petitioners,
Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel del Mar, Inc., and
a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the HOTEL DEL MAR INC" against
the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as such "charged with the
general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the
faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances." (par. 1).
 It was alleged that the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, non-stock corporation
is dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its 18 members "operating hotels and
motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities,
regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood, to not less than 2,500 person and representing
an investment of more than P3 million." (par. 2).
 It was then alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance
No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time
acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).

 After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail.
 There was the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to
enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila
or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would impose
P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels;
 that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any
guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the
prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname,
given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the
length of stay and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and
sex would be specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number,
if any, coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed
his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such
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 registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again
on due process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the
guaranty against self-incrimination;
 that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes and requiring the
maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining
room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary,
unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second
class motels to have a dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance
prohibiting a person less than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses,
tavern or common inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for
the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room
or portion
 thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of certainty
and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the penalty provided for
in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would cause the automatic
cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the destruction of the business and loss
of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the due process clause.

 There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment declaring the above
ordinance null and void and unenforceable
 The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.

 In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal circumstances regarding the
respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to engage in the hotel or motel business in the
City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on
statutory or constitutional grounds.
 After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged ordinance
bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a valid and proper exercise
of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before the court could complain of the
alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-incrimination, with the assertion
that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed f
or its dissolution and the dismissal of the petition.
 Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts dated
September 28, 1964, which reads:
 That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar, Inc.
are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of Manila,

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 while the petitioner Go Chiu is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and the
intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
 That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of the City
of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and to
give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
 That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in Malate
and Ermita districts in Manila;
 That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, which
was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of
Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b
and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new
sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons
stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
 That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the proposed
ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as Annex C;
 That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by the
105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila."

 Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid on the
presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack of conformity to the
Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v. Salaveria, but likewise applicable
American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted point by point the arguments advanced by
petitioners against its validity.
 Then barely two weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating
in detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they considered to be applicable
American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged ordinance "null and void and
unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction issued.

 After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and referring to
the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed:
 The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the Court,
agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court."
 It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision passed upon
the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance, dismissing as is undoubtedly
right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of authority of the City of Manila to regulate
motels, and came to the conclusion that "the challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila,
would be unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void."
 It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against respondent Mayor and his agents "to
restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question.”
 Hence this appeal.
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 As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed.

City of Manila vs. Laguio, Jr

 Private respondent Malate Tourist Development Corporation (MTDC) is a corporation engaged in the
business of operating hotels, motels, hostels and lodging houses.
 It built and opened Victoria Court in Malate which was licensed as a motel although duly accredited with
the Department of Tourism as a hotel.

 On 28 June 1993, MTDC filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Prayer for a Writ of Preliminary
Injunction and/or Temporary Restraining Order (RTC Petition) with the lower court impleading as
defendants, herein petitioners City of Manila, Hon. Alfredo S. Lim, Hon. Joselito L. Atienza, and the
members of the City Council of Manila (City Council).
 MTDC prayed that the Ordinance, insofar as it includes motels and inns as among its prohibited
establishments, be declared invalid and unconstitutional.
 Enacted by the City Council on 9 March 1993 and approved by petitioner City Mayor on 30 March
1993, the said Ordinance is entitled
 AN ORDINANCE PROHIBITING THE ESTABLISHMENT OR OPERATION OF BUSINESSES
PROVIDING CERTAIN FORMS OF AMUSEMENT, ENTERTAINMENT, SERVICES AND
FACILITIES IN THE ERMITA-MALATE AREA, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES FOR VIOLATION
THEREOF, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES.

 The Ordinance is reproduced in full, hereunder:

 SECTION 1. Any provision of existing laws and ordinances to the contrary notwithstanding, no person,
partnership, corporation or entity shall, in the Ermita-Malate area bounded by Teodoro M. Kalaw Sr.
Street in the North, Taft Avenue in the East, Vito Cruz Street in the South and Roxas Boulevard in the
West, pursuant to P.D. 499 be allowed or authorized to contract and engage in, any business providing
certain forms of amusement, entertainment, services and facilities where women are used as tools in
entertainment and which tend to disturb the community, annoy the inhabitants, and adversely affect the
social and moral welfare of the community, such as but not limited to:
1. Sauna Parlors
2. Massage Parlors
3. Karaoke Bars
4. Beerhouses
5. Night Clubs
6. Day Clubs
7. Super Clubs
8. Discotheques
9. Cabarets
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 10. Dance Halls
11. Motels
12. Inns
 SEC. 2. The City Mayor, the City Treasurer or any person acting in behalf of the said officials are
prohibited from issuing permits, temporary or otherwise, or from granting licenses and accepting
payments for the operation of business enumerated in the preceding section.
 SEC. 3. Owners and/or operator of establishments engaged in, or devoted to, the businesses enumerated in
Section 1 hereof are hereby given three (3) months from the date of approval of this ordinance within
which to wind up business operations or to transfer to any place outside of the Ermita-Malate area or
convert said businesses to other kinds of business allowable within the area, such as but not limited to:
1. Curio or antique shop
2. Souvenir Shops
3. Handicrafts display centers
4. Art galleries
5. Records and music shops
6. Restaurants
7. Coffee shops
8. Flower shops
9. Music lounge and sing-along restaurants, with well-defined activities for wholesome family
entertainment that cater to both local and foreign clientele.
10. Theaters engaged in the exhibition, not only of motion pictures but also of cultural shows, stage and
theatrical plays, art exhibitions, concerts and the like.
11. Businesses allowable within the law and medium intensity districts as provided for in the zoning
ordinances for Metropolitan Manila, except new warehouse or open-storage depot, dock or yard, motor
repair shop, gasoline service station, light industry with any machinery, or funeral establishments.
 SEC. 4. Any person violating any provisions of this ordinance, shall upon conviction, be punished by
imprisonment of one (1) year or fine of FIVE THOUSAND (P5,000.00) PESOS, or both, at the discretion
of the Court, PROVIDED, that in case of juridical person, the President, the General Manager, or person-
in-charge of operation shall be liable thereof; PROVIDED FURTHER, that in case of subsequent violation
and conviction, the premises of the erring establishment shall be closed and padlocked permanently.
 SEC. 5. This ordinance shall take effect upon approval.

 In the RTC Petition, MTDC argued that the Ordinance erroneously and improperly included in its
enumeration of prohibited establishments, motels and inns such as MTDC’s Victoria Court considering that
these were not establishments for “amusement” or “entertainment” and they were not “services or facilities
for entertainment,” nor did they use women as “tools for entertainment,” and neither did they “disturb the
community,” “annoy the inhabitants” or “adversely affect the social and moral welfare of the community.”

 MTDC further advanced that the Ordinance was invalid and unconstitutional for the following reasons:

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 (1) The City Council has no power to prohibit the operation of motels as Section 458 (a) 4 (iv)12 of the
Local Government Code of 1991 (the Code) grants to the City Council only the power to regulate the
establishment, operation and maintenance of hotels, motels, inns, pension houses, lodging houses and other
similar establishments;

(2) The Ordinance is void as it is violative of P.D. No. 49913 which specifically de clared portions of the
Ermita-Malate area as a commercial zone with certain restrictions;

(3) The Ordinance does not constitute a proper exercise of police power as the compulsory closure of the
motel business has no reasonable relation to the legitimate municipal interests sought to be protected;

(4) The Ordinance constitutes an ex post facto law by punishing the operation of Victoria Court which was
a legitimate business prior to its enactment;

(5) The Ordinance violates MTDC’s constitutional rights in that:

(a) it is confiscatory and constitutes an invasion of plaintiff’s property rights;
(b) the City Council has no power to find as a fact that a particular thing is a nuisance per se nor does it
have the power to extrajudicially destroy it; and

(6) The Ordinance constitutes a denial of equal protection under the law as no reasonable basis exists for
prohibiting the operation of motels and inns, but not pension houses, hotels, lodging houses or other similar
establishments, and for prohibiting said business in the Ermita-Malate area but not outside of this area.

 In their Answer dated 23 July 1993, petitioners City of Manila and Lim maintained that the City Council
had the power to “prohibit certain forms of entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of
the community” as provided for in Section 458 (a) (vii) of the Local Government Code,16 which reads,
thus:

Section 458. Powers, Duties, Functions and Compensation.

(a) The sangguniang panlungsod, as the legislative body of the city, shall enact ordinances, approve resolutions
and appropriate funds for the general welfare of the city and its inhabitants pursuant to Section 16 of this Code
and in the proper exercise of the corporate powers of the city as provided for under Section 22 of this Code, and
shall:

....

(4) Regulate activities relative to the use of land, buildings and structures within the city in order to promote the
general welfare and for said purpose shall:

....

(vii) Regulate the establishment, operation, and maintenance of any entertainment or amusement facilities,
including theatrical performances, circuses, billiard pools, public dancing schools, public dance halls, sauna
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baths, massage parlors, and other places for entertainment or amusement; regulate such other events or
activities for amusement or entertainment, particularly those which tend to disturb the community or annoy the
inhabitants, or require the suspension or suppression of the same; or, prohibit certain forms of amusement or
entertainment in order to protect the social and moral welfare of the community.

Citing Kwong Sing v. City of Manila, the City of Manila insisted that the power of regulation spoken of in the
above-quoted provision included the power to control, to govern and to restrain places of exhibition and
amusement.

The City of Manila likewise asserted that the Ordinance was enacted by the City Council of Manila to protect
the social and moral welfare of the community in conjunction with its police power as found in Article III,
Section 18(kk) of Republic Act No. 409,19 otherwise known as the Revised Charter of the City of Manila
(Revised Charter of Manila) which reads, thus:

ARTICLE III

THE MUNICIPAL BOARD

Section 18. Legislative powers.—The Municipal Board shall have the following legislative powers:

...

(kk) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the furtherance of
the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort, convenience, and general welfare
of the city and its inhabitants, and such others as may be necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers
and duties conferred by this chapter; and to fix penalties for the violation of ordinances which shall not exceed
two hundred pesos fine or six months’ imprisonment, or both such fine and imprisonment, for a single offense.

Further, the petitioners noted, the Ordinance had the presumption of validity; hence, private respondent had the
burden to prove its illegality or unconstitutionality.

City of Manila also maintained that there was no inconsistency between P.D. 499 and the Ordinance as the
latter simply disauthorized certain forms of businesses and allowed the Ermita-Malate area to remain a
commercial zone.

The Ordinance, the petitioners likewise claimed, cannot be assailed as ex post facto as it was prospective in
operation.

The Ordinance also did not infringe the equal protection clause and cannot be denounced as class legislation as
there existed substantial and real differences between the Ermita-Malate area and other places in the City of
Manila.

On 28 June 1993, respondent Judge Perfecto A.S. Laguio, Jr. (Judge Laguio) issued an ex-parte temporary
restraining order against the enforcement of the Ordinance.25 And on 16 July 1993, again in an intrepid
gesture, he granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by MTDC.

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After trial, on 25 November 1994, Judge Laguio rendered the assailed Decision, enjoining the petitioners from
implementing the Ordinance. The dispositive portion of said Decision reads:

“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered declaring Ordinance No. 778[3], Series of 1993, of the City of
Manila null and void, and making permanent the writ of preliminary injunction that had been issued by this
Court against the defendant.

City of Manila filed with the lower court a Notice of Appeal on 12 December 1994, manifesting that they are
elevating the case to this Court under then Rule 42 on pure questions of law.30

On 11 January 1995, City of Manila filed the present Petition, alleging that the following errors were
committed by the lower court in its ruling:

1) It erred in concluding that the subject ordinance is ultra vires, or otherwise, unfair, unreasonable and
oppressive exercise of police power;

2) It erred in holding that the questioned Ordinance contravenes P.D. 49931 which allows operators of all kinds
of commercial establishments, except those specified therein; and

3) It erred in declaring the Ordinance void and unconstitutional.

In the Petition and in its Memorandum, petitioners in essence repeat the assertions they made before the lower
court. They contend that the assailed Ordinance was enacted in the exercise of the inherent and plenary power
of the State and the general welfare clause exercised by local government units provided for in Art. 3, Sec. 18
(kk) of the Revised Charter of Manila and conjunctively, Section 458 (a) 4 (vii) of the Code.34 They allege that
the Ordinance is a valid exercise of police power; it does not contravene P.D. 499; and that it enjoys the
presumption of validity.

In its Memorandum36 dated 27 May 1996, private respondent maintains that the Ordinance is ultra vires and
that it is void for being repugnant to the general law.

It reiterates that the questioned Ordinance is not a valid exercise of police power; that it is violative of due
process, confiscatory and amounts to an arbitrary interference with its lawful business; that it is violative of the
equal protection clause; and that it confers on petitioner City Mayor or any officer unregulated discretion in the
execution of the Ordinance absent rules to guide and control his actions.

This is an opportune time to express the Court’s deep sentiment and tenderness for the Ermita-Malate area
being its home for several decades. A long-time resident, the Court witnessed the area’s many turn of events. It
relished its glory days and endured its days of infamy.

Much as the Court harks back to the resplendent era of the Old Manila and yearns to restore its lost grandeur, it
believes that the Ordinance is not the fitting means to that end. The Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that
the lower court did not err in declaring the Ordinance, as it did, ultra vires and therefore null and void.

The Ordinance is so replete with constitutional infirmities that almost every sentence thereof violates a
constitutional provision. The prohibitions and sanctions therein transgress the cardinal rights of persons
enshrined by the Constitution. The Court is called upon to shelter these rights from attempts at rendering them
worthless.
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Yrasuegui vs. Philippine Airlines, Inc.

 Petitioner Armando G. Yrasuegui was a former international flight steward of Philippine Airlines, Inc.
(PAL). He stands five feet and eight inches (5’8”) with a large body frame.
 The proper weight for a man of his height and body structure is from 147 to 166 pounds, the ideal weight
being 166 pounds, as mandated by the Cabin and Crew Administration Manual of PAL.
 The weight problem of petitioner dates back to 1984. Back then, PAL advised him to go on an extended
vacation leave from December 29, 1984 to March 4, 1985 to address his weight concerns.
Apparently, petitioner failed to meet the company’s weight standards, prompting another leave without
pay from March 5, 1985 to November 1985.
 After meeting the required weight, petitioner was allowed to return to work. But petitioner’s weight
problem recurred.
 He again went on leave without pay from October 17, 1988 to February 1989.

 On April 26, 1989, petitioner weighed 209 pounds, 43 pounds over his ideal weight. In line with company
policy, he was removed from flight duty effective May 6, 1989 to July 3, 1989.
 He was formally requested to trim down to his ideal weight and report for weight checks on several dates.
 He was also told that he may avail of the services of the company physician should he wish to do so.
 He was advised that his case will be evaluated on July 3, 1989.

 On February 25, 1989, petitioner underwent weight check.


 It was discovered that he gained, instead of losing, weight.
 He was overweight at 215 pounds, which is 49 pounds beyond the limit. Consequently, his off-duty status
was retained.

 On October 17, 1989, PAL Line Administrator Gloria Dizon personally visited petitioner at his residence to
check on the progress of his effort to lose weight.
 Petitioner weighed 217 pounds, gaining 2 pounds from his previous weight.
 After the visit, petitioner made a commitment3 to reduce weight in a letter addressed to Cabin Crew
Group Manager Augusto Barrios.
 The letter, in full, reads: 
Dear Sir:
I would like to guaranty my commitment towards a weight loss from 217 pounds to 200 pounds from
today until 31 Dec. 1989.
From thereon, I promise to continue reducing at a reasonable percentage until such time that my ideal
weight is achieved.

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 Likewise, I promise to personally report to your office at the designated time schedule you will set for my
weight check.

 Despite the lapse of a ninety-day period given him to reach his ideal weight, petitioner remained
overweight. On January 3, 1990, he was informed of the PAL decision for him to remain grounded until
such time that he satisfactorily complies with the weight standards.
 Again, he was directed to report every two weeks for weight checks.

 ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI, failed to report for weight checks.

 Despite that, he was given one more month to comply with the weight requirement.

 As usual, he was asked to report for weight check on different dates.

 He was reminded that his grounding would continue pending satisfactory compliance with the weight
standards.

 Again, ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI failed to report for weight checks, although he was seen submitting
his passport for processing at the PAL Staff Service Division.
 On April 17, 1990, petitioner was formally warned that a repeated refusal to report for weight check
would be dealt with accordingly.
 He was given another set of weight check dates.
 Again, petitioner ignored the directive and did not report for weight checks.
 On June 26, 1990, petitioner was required to explain his refusal to undergo weight checks.

 When ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI tipped the scale on July 30, 1990, he weighed at 212 pounds.
 Clearly, he was still way over his ideal weight of 166 pounds.

 From then on, nothing was heard from petitioner until he followed up his case requesting for leniency on
the latter part of 1992.
 He weighed at 219 pounds on August 20, 1992 and 205 pounds on November 5, 1992.

 On November 13, 1992, PAL finally served petitioner a Notice of Administrative Charge for violation of
company standards on weight requirements.
 He was given 10 days from receipt of the charge within which to file his answer and submit controverting
evidence.

 On December 7, 1992, petitioner submitted his Answer.

 Notably, he did not deny being overweight.
 What he claimed, instead, is that his violation, if any, had already been condoned by PAL since “no action
has been taken by the company” regarding his case “since 1988.”

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  He also claimed that PAL discriminated against him because “the company has not been fair in treating
the cabin crew members who are similarly situated.”

 On December 8, 1992, a clarificatory hearing was held where petitioner manifested that he was undergoing
a weight reduction program to lose at least 2 pounds per week so as to attain his ideal weight.

 On June 15, 1993, petitioner was formally informed by PAL that due to his inability to attain his ideal
weight, “and considering the utmost leniency” extended to him “which spanned a period covering a total of
almost five (5) years,” his services were considered terminated “effective immediately.”

 His motion for reconsideration having been denied, ARMANDO G. YRASUEGUI filed a complaint for
illegal dismissal against PAL.

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United States vs. Toribio

 The evidence of record fully sustains the findings of the trial court that the appellant slaughtered or caused
to be slaughtered for human consumption, the carabao described in the information, without a permit from
the municipal treasurer of the municipality wherein it was slaughtered, in violation of the provisions of
sections 30 and 33 of Act No. 1147, an Act regulating the registration, branding, and slaughter large cattle.

 It appears that in the town of Carmen, in the Province of Bohol, wherein the animal was slaughtered there is
no municipal slaughterhouse, and counsel for appellant contends that under such circumstances the
provisions of Act No. 1147 do not prohibit nor penalize the slaughter of large cattle without a permit of the
municipal treasurer.

 Sections 30, 31, 32, and 33 of the Act are as follows:

SEC. 30. No large cattle shall be slaughtered or killed for food at the municipal slaughterhouse except upon
permit secured from the municipal treasure.

Before issuing the permit for the slaughter of large cattle for human consumption, the municipal treasurer shall
require for branded cattle the production of the original certificate of ownership and certificates of transfer
showing title in the person applying for the permit, and for unbranded cattle such evidence as may satisfy said
treasurer as to the ownership of the animals for which permit to slaughter has been requested.

SEC. 31. No permit to slaughter has been carabaos shall be granted by the municipal treasurer unless such
animals are unfit for agricultural work or for draft purposes, and in no event shall a permit be given to slaughter
for food any animal of any kind which is not fit for human consumption.

SEC. 32. The municipal treasurer shall keep a record of all permits for slaughter issued by him, and such record
shall show the name and residence of the owner, and the class, sex, age, brands, knots of radiated hair
commonly know as remolinos or cowlicks, and other marks of identification of the animal for the slaughter of
which permit is issued and the date on which such permit is issued. Names of owners shall be alphabetically
arranged in the record, together with date of permit.

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A copy of the record of permits granted for slaughter shall be forwarded monthly to the provincial treasurer,
who shall file and properly index the same under the name of the owner, together with date of permit.

SEC. 33. Any person slaughtering or causing to be slaughtered for human consumption or killing for food at
the municipal slaughterhouse any large cattle except upon permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer,
shall be punished by a fine of not less than ten nor more than five hundred pesos, Philippine currency, or by
imprisonment for not less than one month nor more than six months, or by both such fine and imprisonment, in
the discretion of the court.

It is contended that the proper construction of the language of these provisions limits the prohibition contained
in section 30 and the penalty imposed in section 33 to cases (1) of slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption in a municipal slaughter without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2) cases
of killing of large cattle for food in a municipal slaughterhouse without a permit duly secured from the
municipal treasurer; and it is urged that the municipality of Carmen not being provided with a municipal
slaughterhouse, neither the prohibition nor the penalty is applicable to cases of slaughter of large cattle without
a permit in that municipality.

We are of opinion, however, that the prohibition contained in section 30 refers (1) to the slaughter of large
cattle for human consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and (2)
expressly and specifically to the killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such
permit; and that the penalty provided in section 33 applies generally to the slaughter of large cattle for human
consumption, anywhere, without a permit duly secured from the municipal treasurer, and specifically to the
killing for food of large cattle at a municipal slaughterhouse without such permit.

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Atienza, Jr. vs. Commission on Elections

 Respondent Franklin M. Drilon as erstwhile president of the Liberal Party (LP), announced his party’s
withdrawal of support for the administration of President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
 But petitioner Jose L. Atienza, Jr., LP Chairman, and a number of party members denounced Drilon’s
move, claiming that he made the announcement without consulting his party.

 On March 2, 2006 petitioner Atienza hosted a party conference to supposedly discuss local autonomy and
party matters but, when convened, the assembly proceeded to declare all positions in the LP’s ruling body
vacant and elected new officers, with Atienza as LP president.
 Respondent Drilon immediately filed a petition1 with the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) to
nullify the elections.
 He claimed that it was illegal considering that the party’s electing bodies, the National Executive Council
(NECO) and the National Political Council (NAPOLCO), were not properly convened.
 Drilon also claimed that under the amended LP Constitution, party officers were elected to a fixed three-
year term that was yet to end on November 30, 2007.

 On the other hand, petitioner Atienza claimed that the majority of the LP’s NECO and NAPOLCO attended
the March 2, 2006 assembly.
 The election of new officers on that occasion could be likened to “people power,” wherein the LP majority
removed respondent Drilon as president by direct action. Atienza also said that the amendments to the
original LP Constitution, or the Salonga Constitution, giving LP officers a fixed three-year term, had not
been properly ratified.
 Consequently, the term of Drilon and the other officers already ended on July 24, 2006.

 On October 13, 2006, the COMELEC issued a resolution,4 partially granting respondent Drilon’s petition.
 It annulled the March 2, 2006 elections and ordered the holding of a new election under COMELEC
supervision.
 It held that the election of petitioner Atienza and the others with him was invalid since the electing
assembly did not convene in accordance with the Salonga Constitution.

14
  But, since the amendments to the Salonga Constitution had not been properly ratified, Drilon’s term may
be deemed to have ended.
 Thus, he held the position of LP president in a holdover capacity until new officers were elected.

 Both sides of the dispute came to this Court to challenge the COMELEC rulings. On April 17, 2007 a
divided Court issued a resolution, granting respondent Drilon’s petition and denying that of petitioner
Atienza.
 The Court held, through the majority, that the COMELEC had jurisdiction over the intra-party leadership
dispute; that the Salonga Constitution had been validly amended; and that, as a consequence, respondent
Drilon’s term as LP president was to end only on November 30, 2007.

 Subsequently, the LP held a NECO meeting to elect new party leaders before respondent Drilon’s term
expired. Fifty-nine NECO members out of the 87 who were supposedly qualified to vote attended.
 Before the election, however, several persons associated with petitioner Atienza sought to clarify their
membership status and raised issues regarding the composition of the NECO.
 Eventually, that meeting installed respondent Manuel A. Roxas II (Roxas) as the new LP president.

 On January 11, 2008 petitioners Atienza, Matias V. Defensor, Jr., Rodolfo G. Valencia, Danilo E. Suarez,
Solomon R. Chungalao, Salvacion Zaldivar-Perez, Harlin Cast-Abayon, Melvin G. Macusi, and Eleazar P.
Quinto, filed a petition for mandatory and prohibitory injunction6 before the COMELEC against
respondents Roxas, Drilon and J.R. Nereus O. Acosta, the party secretary general.
 Atienza, et al. sought to enjoin Roxas from assuming the presidency of the LP, claiming that the NECO
assembly which elected him was invalidly convened.
 They questioned the existence of a quorum and claimed that the NECO composition ought to have been
based on a list appearing in the party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program.
 Both Atienza and Drilon adopted that list as common exhibit in the earlier cases and it showed that the
NECO had 103 members.

 Petitioners Atienza, et al. also complained that Atienza, the incumbent party chairman, was not invited to
the NECO meeting and that some members, like petitioner Defensor, were given the status of “guests”
during the meeting.
 Atienza’s allies allegedly raised these issues but respondent Drilon arbitrarily thumbed them down and
“railroaded” the proceedings.
 He suspended the meeting and moved it to another room, where Roxas was elected without notice to
Atienza’s allies.

 On the other hand, respondents Roxas, et al. claimed that Roxas’ election as LP president faithfully
complied with the provisions of the amended LP Constitution.
 The party’s 60th Anniversary Souvenir Program could not be used for determining the NECO members
because supervening events changed the body’s number and composition.
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  Some NECO members had died, voluntarily resigned, or had gone on leave after accepting positions in the
government.
 Others had lost their re-election bid or did not run in the May 2007 elections, making them ineligible to
serve as NECO members.
 LP members who got elected to public office also became part of the NECO.
 Certain persons of national stature also became NECO members upon respondent Drilon’s nomination, a
privilege granted the LP president under the amended LP Constitution.
 In other words, the NECO membership was not fixed or static; it changed due to supervening
circumstances.

 Respondents Roxas, et al. also claimed that the party deemed petitioners Atienza, Zaldivar-Perez, and Cast-
Abayon resigned for holding the illegal election of LP officers on March 2, 2006.
 This was pursuant to a March 14, 2006 NAPOLCO resolution that NECO subsequently ratified.
Meanwhile, certain NECO members, like petitioners Defensor, Valencia, and Suarez, forfeited their party
membership when they ran under other political parties during the May 2007 elections.
 They were dropped from the roster of LP members.

 On June 18, 2009 the COMELEC issued the assailed resolution denying petitioners Atienza, et al.’s
petition.
 It noted that the May 2007 elections necessarily changed the composition of the NECO since the amended
LP Constitution explicitly made incumbent senators, members of the House of Representatives, governors
and mayors members of that body.
 That some lost or won these positions in the May 2007 elections affected the NECO membership.
 Petitioners failed to prove that the NECO which elected Roxas as LP president was not properly
convened.

 As for the validity of petitioners Atienza, et al.’s expulsion as LP members, the COMELEC observed that
this was a membership issue that related to disciplinary action within the political party.
 The COMELEC treated it as an internal party matter that was beyond its jurisdiction to resolve.

 Without filing a motion for reconsideration of the COMELEC resolution, petitioners Atienza, et al. filed
this petition for certiorari under Rule 65.

Respondents Roxas, et al. raise the following threshold issues:

1. Whether or not the LP, which was not impleaded in the case, is an indispensable party; and

2. Whether or not petitioners Atienza, et al., as ousted LP members, have the requisite legal standing to
question Roxas’ election.

Petitioners Atienza, et al., on the other hand, raise the following issues:

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 3.  Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it upheld the NECO membership that
elected respondent Roxas as LP president;

4.  Whether or not the COMELEC gravely abused its discretion when it resolved the issue concerning the
validity of the NECO meeting without first resolving the issue concerning the expulsion of Atienza, et al.
from the party; and

5. Whether or not respondents Roxas, et al. violated petitioners Atienza, et al.’s constitutional right to due
process by the latter’s expulsion from the party.

Manila Memorial Park, Inc. vs. Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and Development

 When a party challenges the constitutionality of a law, the burden of proof rests upon him.

 Before us is a Petition for Prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court filed by petitioners Manila
Memorial Park, Inc. and La Funeraria Paz-Sucat, Inc., domestic corporations engaged in the business of
providing funeral and burial services, against public respondents Secretaries of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development (DSWD) and the Department of Finance (DOF).

 Manila Memorial Park, Inc assail the constitutionality of Section 4 of Republic Act (RA) No. 7432, as
amended by RA 9257,and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and DOF insofar as
these allow business establishments to claim the 20% discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction.

Factual Antecedents

 On April 23, 1992, RA 7432 was passed into law, granting senior citizens the following privileges: 

SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens.—The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:

a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to utilization of transportation
services, hotels and similar lodging establishment[s], restaurants and recreation centers and purchase of
medicine anywhere in the country: Provided, That private establishments may claim the cost as tax credit;

b) a minimum of twenty percent (20%) discount on admission fees charged by theaters, cinema houses and
concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure, and amusement;

17
c) exemption from the payment of individual income taxes: Provided, That their annual taxable income does
not exceed the property level as determined by the National Economic and Development Authority (NEDA) for
that year;

d) exemption from training fees for socioeconomic programs undertaken by the OSCA as part of its work;

e) free medical and dental services in government establishment[s] anywhere in the country, subject to
guidelines to be issued by the Department of Health, the Government Service Insurance System and the Social
Security System;

f) to the extent practicable and feasible, the continuance of the same benefits and privileges given by the
Government Service Insurance System (GSIS), Social Security System (SSS) and PAG-IBIG, as the case may
be, as are enjoyed by those in actual service. 

 On August 23, 1993, Revenue Regulations (RR) No. 02-94 was issued to implement RA 7432. Sections 2(i)
and 4 of RR No. 02-94 provide:

Sec. 2. DEFINITIONS.—For purposes of these regulations:

i. Tax Credit — refers to the amount representing the 20% discount granted to a qualified senior citizen by
all establishments relative to their utilization of transportation services, hotels and similar lodging
establishments, restaurants, drugstores, recreation centers, theaters, cinema houses, concert halls, circuses,
carnivals and other similar places of culture, leisure and amusement, which discount shall be deducted by the
said establishments from their gross income for income tax purposes and from their gross sales for value-added
tax or other percentage tax purposes.

Sec. 4. RECORDING/BOOKKEEPING REQUIREMENTS FOR PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS.—

Private establishments, i.e., transport services, hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants, recreation
centers, drugstores, theaters, cinema houses, concert halls, circuses, carnivals and other similar places of
culture[,] leisure and amusement, giving 20% discounts to qualified senior citizens are required to keep
separate and accurate record[s] of sales made to senior citizens, which shall include the name, identification
number, gross sales/

receipts, discounts, dates of transactions and invoice number for every transaction.

 The amount of 20% discount shall be deducted from the gross income for income tax purposes and from
gross sales of the business enterprise concerned for purposes of the VAT and other percentage taxes. 

 In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Central Luzon Drug Corporation, the Court declared Sections 2(i)
and 4 of RR No. 02-94 as erroneous because these contravene RA 7432, thus:

RA 7432 specifically allows private establishments to claim as tax credit the amount of discounts they
grant. In turn, the Implementing Rules and Regulations, issued pursuant thereto, provide the procedures for
its availment. To deny such credit, despite the plain mandate of the law and the regulations carrying out that
mandate, is indefensible.

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 First, the definition given by petitioner is erroneous. It refers to tax credit as the amount representing the 20
percent discount that “shall be deducted by the said establishments from their gross income for income tax
purposes and from their gross sales for value-added tax or other percentage tax purposes.” In ordinary
business language, the tax credit represents the amount of such discount. However, the manner by which
the discount shall be credited against taxes has not been clarified by the revenue regulations.

By ordinary acceptation, a discount is an “abatement or reduction made from the gross amount or value of
anything.”

To be more precise, it is in business parlance “a deduction or lowering of an amount of money;” or “a

reduction from the full amount or value of something, especially a price.”
In business there are many kinds of discount, the most common of which is that affecting the income
statement or financial report upon which the income tax is based.

Sections 2.i and 4 of Revenue Regulations No. (RR) 2-94 define tax credit as the 20 percent discount
deductible from gross income for income tax purposes, or from gross sales for VAT or other percentage tax
purposes. In effect, the tax credit benefit under RA 7432 is related to a sales discount.

This contrived definition is improper, considering that the latter has to be deducted from gross sales in order
to compute the gross income in the income statement and cannot be deducted again, even for purposes of
computing the income tax.

When the law says that the cost of the discount may be claimed as a tax credit, it means that the amount —
when claimed — shall be treated as a reduction from any tax liability, plain and simple.

The option to avail of the tax credit benefit depends upon the existence of a tax liability, but to limit the
benefit to a sales discount — which is not even identical to the discount privilege that is granted by law —
does not define it at all and serves no useful purpose. The definition must, therefore, be stricken down.

Laws Not Amended

by Regulations
 Second, the law cannot be amended by a mere regulation.
 In fact, a regulation that “operates to create a rule out of harmony with the statute is a mere nullity;” it
cannot prevail.

 It is a cardinal rule that courts “will and should respect the contemporaneous construction placed upon a
statute by the executive officers whose duty it is to enforce it x x x.”
 In the scheme of judicial tax administration, the need for certainty and predictability in the implementation
of tax laws is crucial.

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  Our tax authorities fill in the details that “Congress may not have the opportunity or competence to
provide.”
 The regulations these authorities issue are relied upon by taxpayers, who are certain that these will be
followed by the courts.
 Courts, however, will not uphold these authorities’ interpretations when clearly absurd, erroneous or
improper.

 In the present case, the tax authorities have given the term tax credit in Sections 2.i and 4 of RR 2-94 a
meaning utterly in contrast to what RA 7432 provides.
 Their interpretation has muddled x x x the intent of Congress in granting a mere discount privilege, not a
sales discount.
 The administrative agency issuing these regulations may not enlarge, alter or restrict the provisions of the
law it administers; it cannot engraft additional requirements not contemplated by the legislature.

 In case of conflict, the law must prevail.

 A “regulation adopted pursuant to law is law.” Conversely, a regulation or any portion thereof not adopted
pursuant to law is no law and has neither the force nor the effect of law.
 On February 26, 2004, RA 9257[8] amended certain provisions of RA 7432, to wit: 

SECTION 4. Privileges for the Senior Citizens.—The senior citizens shall be entitled to the following:

(a) the grant of twenty percent (20%) discount from all establishments relative to the utilization of
services in hotels and similar lodging establishments, restaurants and recreation centers, and purchase of
medicines in all establishments for the exclusive use or enjoyment of senior citizens, including funeral and
burial services for the death of senior citizens;
The establishment may claim the discounts granted under (a), (f), (g) and (h) as tax deduction based on the
net cost of the goods sold or services rendered: Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as
deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the discount is granted. Provided, further, That
the total amount of the claimed tax deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their
gross sales receipts for tax purposes and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of
the National Internal Revenue Code, as amended. 

To implement the tax provisions of RA 9257, the Secretary of Finance issued RR No. 4-2006, the pertinent
provision of which provides:
SEC. 8. AVAILMENT BY ESTABLISHMENTS OF SALES DISCOUNTS AS DEDUCTION FROM
GROSS INCOME.—Establishments enumerated in subparagraph (6) hereunder granting sales discounts to
senior citizens on the sale of goods and/or services specified thereunder are entitled to deduct the said
discount from gross income subject to the following conditions:

20
(1) Only that portion of the gross sales EXCLUSIVELY USED, CONSUMED OR ENJOYED BY THE
SENIOR CITIZEN shall be eligible for the deductible sales discount.

(2)  The gross selling price and the sales discount MUST BE SEPARATELY INDICATED IN THE
OFFICIAL RECEIPT OR SALES INVOICE issued by the establishment for the sale of goods or services to
the senior citizen.

(3)   Only the actual amount of the discount granted or a sales discount not exceeding 20% of the gross
selling price can be deducted from the gross income, net of value added tax, if applicable, for income tax
purposes, and from gross sales or gross receipts of the business enterprise concerned, for VAT or other
percentage tax purposes.

(4)   The discount can only be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same taxable year that the
discount is granted.

(5)  The business establishment giving sales discounts to qualified senior citizens is required to keep
separate and accurate record[s] of sales, which shall include the name of the senior citizen, TIN, OSCA ID,
gross sales/
receipts, sales discount granted, [date] of [transaction] and invoice number for every sale transaction to
senior citizen.

(6)  Only the following business establishments which granted sales discount to senior citizens on their sale
of goods and/or services may claim the said discount granted as deduction from gross income, namely:
(i) Funeral parlors and similar establishments — The beneficiary or any person who shall shoulder the
funeral and burial expenses of the deceased senior citizen shall claim the discount, such as casket,
embalmment, cremation cost and other related services for the senior citizen upon payment and presentation
of [his] death certificate. 

The DSWD likewise issued its own Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 9257, to wit:
Article 8. Tax Deduction of Establishments.—The establishment may claim the discounts granted
under Rule V, Section 4 — Discounts for Establishments, Section 9, Medical and Dental Services in Private
Facilities and Sections 10 and 11 — Air, Sea and Land Transportation as tax deduction based on the net
cost of the goods sold or services rendered:

Provided, That the cost of the discount shall be allowed as deduction from gross income for the same
taxable year that the discount is granted; Provided, further, That the total amount of the claimed tax
deduction net of value added tax if applicable, shall be included in their gross sales receipts for tax purposes
and shall be subject to proper documentation and to the provisions of the National Internal Revenue Code,
as amended;

21
 Provided, finally, that the implementation of the tax deduction shall be subject to the Revenue Regulations
to be issued by the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) and approved by the Department of Finance (DOF). 

Feeling aggrieved by the tax deduction scheme, petitioners filed the present recourse, praying that Section 4
of RA 7432, as amended by RA 9257, and the implementing rules and regulations issued by the DSWD and
the DOF be declared unconstitutional insofar as these allow business establishments to claim the 20%
discount given to senior citizens as a tax deduction; that the DSWD and the DOF be prohibited from
enforcing the same; and that the tax credit treatment of the 20% discount under the former Section 4 (a) of
RA 7432 be reinstated.

Petitioners raise the following issues:

A. WHETHER THE PETITION PRESENTS AN ACTUAL CASE OR CONTROVERSY.

B. WHETHER SECTION 4 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9257 AND X X X ITS IMPLEMENTING RULES
AND REGULATIONS, INSOFAR AS THEY PROVIDE THAT THE TWENTY PERCENT (20%)
DISCOUNT TO SENIOR CITIZENS MAY BE CLAIMED AS A TAX DEDUCTION BY THE
PRIVATE ESTABLISHMENTS, ARE INVALID AND UNCONSTITUTIONAL

Remman Enterprises, Inc. vs. Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service

 Assailed in this petition for review under Rule 45 is the Decision1 dated July 12, 2011 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Manila, Branch 42 denying the petition to declare as unconstitutional Sections 28(a), 29 and
32 of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9646.

 R.A. No. 9646, otherwise known as the “Real Estate Service Act of the Philippines” was signed into law on
June 29, 2009 by President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo.
 It aims to professionalize the real estate service sector under a regulatory scheme of licensing, registration
and supervision of real estate service practitioners (real estate brokers, appraisers, assessors, consultants
and salespersons) in the country.
 Prior to its enactment, real estate service practitioners were under the supervision of the Department of
Trade and Industry (DTI) through the Bureau of Trade Regulation and Consumer Protection (BTRCP), in
the exercise of its consumer regulation functions.
 Such authority is now transferred to the Professional Regulation Commission (PRC) through the
Professional Regulatory Board of Real Estate Service (PRBRES) created under the new law.

22
 The implementing rules and regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 9646 were promulgated on July 21, 2010 by the
PRC and PRBRES under Resolution No. 02, Series of 2010.

 On December 7, 2010, herein petitioners Remman Enterprises, Inc. (REI) and the Chamber of Real Estate
and Builders’ Association (CREBA) instituted Civil Case No. 10-124776 in the Regional Trial Court of
Manila, Branch 42.
 Petitioners sought to declare as void and unconstitutional the following provisions of R.A. No. 9646: 
 SEC. 28. Exemptions from the Acts Constituting the Practice of Real Estate Service.—The provisions
of this Act and its rules and regulations shall not apply to the following:
(a) Any person, natural or juridical, who shall directly perform by himself/herself the acts mentioned in
Section 3 hereof with reference to his/her or its own property, except real estate developers;

 SEC. 29. Prohibition Against the Unauthorized Practice of Real Estate Service.—No person shall practice
or offer to practice real estate service in the Philippines or offer himself/herself as real estate service
practitioner, or use the title, word, letter, figure or any sign tending to convey the impression that one is a
real estate service practitioner, or advertise or indicate in any manner whatsoever that one is qualified to
practice the profession, or be appointed as real property appraiser or assessor in any national government
entity or local government unit, unless he/she has satisfactorily passed the licensure examination given by
the Board, except as otherwise provided in this Act, a holder of a valid certificate of registration, and
professional identification card or a valid special/temporary permit duly issued to him/her by the Board and
the Commission, and in the case of real estate brokers and private appraisers, they have paid the required
bond as hereto provided.
 SEC. 32. Corporate Practice of the Real Estate Service.—(a) No partnership or corporation shall engage
in the business of real estate service unless it is duly registered with the Securities and Exchange
Commission (SEC), and the persons authorized to act for the partnership or corporation are all duly
registered and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants, as the case may be.
 The partnership or corporation shall regularly submit a list of its real estate service practitioners to the
Commission and to the SEC as part of its annual reportorial requirements.
 There shall at least be one (1) licensed real estate broker for every twenty (20) accredited salespersons.

(b) Divisions or departments of partnerships and corporations engaged in marketing or selling any real estate
development project in the regular course of business must be headed by full-time registered and licensed real
estate brokers.

(c) Branch offices of real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants must be manned by a duly licensed real
estate broker, appraiser or consultant as the case may be.

 In case of resignation or termination from employment of a real estate service practitioner, the same shall be
reported by the employer to the Board within a period not to exceed fifteen (15) days from the date of
effectivity of the resignation or termination.

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 Subject to the provisions of the Labor Code, a corporation or partnership may hire the services of registered
and licensed real estate brokers, appraisers or consultants on commission basis to perform real estate
services and the latter shall be deemed independent con tractors and not employees of such corporations.

 According to petitioners, the new law is constitutionally infirm because

(1) it violates Article VI, Section 26 (1) of the 1987 Philippine Constitution which mandates that “[e]very bill
passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof”;

(2) it is in direct conflict with Executive Order (E.O.) No. 648 which transferred the exclusive jurisdiction of
the National Housing Authority (NHA) to regulate the real estate trade and business to the Human Settlements
Commission, now the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB), which authority includes the
issuance of license to sell of subdivision owners and developers pursuant to Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 957;

(3) it violates the due process clause as it impinges on the real estate developers’ most basic ownership rights,
the right to use and dispose property, which is enshrined in Article 428 of the Civil Code; and

(4) Section 28(a) of R.A. No. 9646 violates the equal protection clause as no substantial distinctions exist
between real estate developers and the exempted group mentioned since both are property owners dealing with
their own property.

 Additionally, petitioners contended that the lofty goal of nurturing and developing a “corps of technically
competent, reasonable and respected professional real estate service practitioners” is not served by
curtailing the right of real estate developers to conduct their business of selling properties.
 On the contrary, these restrictions would have disastrous effects on the real estate industry as the
additional cost of commissions would affect the pricing and affordability of real estate packages.
 When that happens, petitioners claimed that the millions of jobs and billions in revenues that the real
estate industry generates for the government will be a thing of the past.

 After a summary hearing, the trial court denied the prayer for issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction. 

Hence, this appeal on the following questions of law: 

1. Whether there is a justiciable controversy for this Honorable Court to adjudicate;

2. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is unconstitutional for violating the “one title-one subject” rule under Article VI,
Section 26 (1) of the Philippine Constitution;

3. Whether [R.A. No. 9646] is in conflict with PD 957, as amended by EO 648, with respect to the exclusive
jurisdiction of the HLURB to regulate real estate developers;

4. Whether Sections 28(a), 29, and 32 of [R.A. No. 9646], insofar as they affect the rights of real estate
developers, are unconstitutional for violating substantive due process; and

24
5. Whether Section 28(a), which treats real estate developers differently from other natural or juridical persons
who directly perform acts of real estate service with reference to their own property, is unconstitutional for
violating the equal protection clause.

The Court’s Ruling

The petition has no merit.

ALLIANCE OF QUEZON CITY HOMEOWNERS' ASSOCIATION, INC., vs. THE QUEZON CITY
GOVERNMENT, represented by HON. MAYOR HERBERT BAUTISTA, QUEZON CITY
ASSESSOR'S OFFICE, and QUEZON CITY TREASURER'S OFFICE,

The Facts

1. In 2010, the Department of Interior and Local Government and the Department of Finance (DOF)
issued Joint Memorandum Circular No. 2010- 01, directing all local government units to implement
Section 219 of the LGC, which requires assessors to revise the real property assessments in their
respective jurisdictions every three (3) years.

25
2. In the said Memorandum, the assessors were also ordered to:

o (a) require all owners or administrators of real properties, prior to the preparation of the revised
schedule of Fair Market Values (FMV), to file sworn statements declaring the true value of their
properties and the improvements thereon; and

o (b) comply with the DOF issuances relating to the appraisal and assessment of real properties,
particularly, DOF Local Assessment Regulation No. 1-92, DOF Department Order No. 37-09
(Philippine Valuation Standards), and DOF Department Order No. 2010-10 (Mass Appraisal
Guidebook).

3. Hence, given that the last reevaluation of real property assessment values in QC was made way back in
1995 under Ordinance No. SP-357, Series of 1995 (1995 Ordinance), which thus rendered the values
therein outdated,  the QC Assessor prepared a revised schedule of FMV s and submitted it to
the Sangguniang Panlungsod of QC for approval pursuant to Section 212 of the LGC. 

4. On December 5, 2016, the Sangguniang Panlungsod of QC enacted the assailed 2016 Ordinance,

which:

o (a) approved the revised schedule of FMV s of all lands and Basic Unit Construction Cost for
buildings and other structures, whether for residential, commercial, and industrial uses;9 and

o (b) set the new assessment levels at five percent (5%) for residential and fourteen percent (14%)
for commercial and industrial classifications. 

5. The revised schedule increased the FMVs indicated in the 1995 Ordinance to supposedly reflect the
prevailing market price of real properties in QC.  The 2016 Ordinance was approved on December 14,
2016, and pursuant to Section 6 thereof, the General Revision of Real Property Assessment for lands
shall become demandable beginning January 1, 2017, while that for Buildings and other Structures shall
take effect beginning 2018. 

6. On April 7, 2017, petitioner Alliance of Quezon City Homeowners' Association, Inc. (Alliance),
allegedly a non-stock, non-profit corporation, 13 filed the present petition, praying that:

(a) a TRO be issued to restrain the implementation of the 2016 Ordinance;

o ( b) the said Ordinance be declared unconstitutional for violating substantive due process, and
invalid for violating Section 130 of the LGC; and (c) the tax payments made by the QC residents
or individuals based on the 2016 Ordinance's revised schedule of FMVs be refunded.

7. Alliance argued that the 2016 Ordinance should be declared unconstitutional for violating substantive
due process, considering that the increase in FMVs, which resulted in an increase in the taxpayer's base,
and ultimately, the taxes to be paid, was unjust, excessive, oppressive, arbitrary, and confiscatory as
proscribed under Section 130 of the LGC.
26
8. Moreover, it averred that the hike in the FMVs up to 500% of the previous values was arbitrary and has
no factual basis because the 2016 Ordinance contains no standard or explanation on how the QC
Assessor arrived at the new amounts in the Schedule of FMVs. 

9. Alliance further pointed out that there was no real consultation prior to the enactment of the 2016
Ordinance as required by law, noting that only a brief one (1)-day consultation hearing was held in
November 2016 before the approval of the 2016 Ordinance on December 14, 2016. The short timeframe
from the consultation to the approval reveals that the proceedings were fast-tracked. 

10. It likewise argued that the abrupt effectivity of the 2016 Ordinance merely a month after its enactment,
i.e., from December 2016 to January 2017, is unreasonable as it compelled the QC residents to pay
exorbitant real property taxes for the year 2017 without giving them sufficient time to prepare for the
payment of the increased taxes. 

11. Thus, the 2016 Ordinance is confiscatory because their inability to pay the real property taxes will
result in their property being declared as delinquent, and thereafter, auctioned to the public. 

12.  This scenario also amounts to restraint of trade as applied to those properties used in businesses.

13. On April 18, 2017, the Court issued a TRO 21 against the implementation of the 2016 Ordinance and
required respondents to file their comment

14. In their Comment, 22 respondents countered that the petition is procedurally infirm because Alliance:
o (a) failed to exhaust its administrative remedies under the LGC, which were to question the
assessments on the taxpayers' properties by filing a protest before the City Treasurer, as well as
to assail the constitutionality of the 2016 Ordinance before the Secretary of Justice; 23 

o (b) violated the hierarchy of courts when it directly filed its petition before this Court; 24 

o (c) has no legal capacity to sue since its Certificate of Registration as a corporation was revoked
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) in an Order dated February 10, 2004,25 and it
has no separate juridical personality as a homeowners' association due to its non-registration
with the Housing and Land Use Regulatory Board (HLURB); 26 and

o (d) is not a real party-in-interest because it does not own any real property in QC to be affected
by the 2016 Ordinance. 27

15. On the substantive aspect, respondents posited that the 2016 Ordinance complied with all the formal and
substantive requisites for its validity. 28 

27
16. In particular, they claimed that twenty-nine (29) public consultations were conducted in barangay
assemblies throughout the six (6) districts of QC; in fact, Alliance's President, Gloria Soriano, was
present and had actively participated in two (2) of those assemblies. 29

17. Further, respondents maintained that the resulting increase in tax due was reasonable because the
increase in FMV s was tempered by the decrease in the assessment levels to minimize impact on the
taxpayers.  They claimed that the assessment levels were reduced from eighteen percent (18%) to five
percent (5%) for residential classification, and from forty-five (45%) to fourteen (14%) for commercial
and industrial classifications. 

18. They also stressed that the QC Assessor arrived at the new FMV s in the 2016 Ordinance using the
approaches specified in DOF Local Assessment Regulation No. 1-92, which prescribes guidelines in
assessing real properties.  Respondents likewise averred that the assessment was not fast-tracked as it
underwent an immense study for three (3) years from 2013 and was subjected to numerous public
consultations. 

19. They emphasized that the last adjustment in the schedule of FMVs was in 1995 and no revisions were
made since then until the 2016 Ordinance was enacted.

20. They pointed out that the huge leap in FMV s of lands after twenty-one (21) years was inevitable due to
the interplay of economic and market forces, highlighted by significant infrastructure and real estate
development projects, as well as the population growth in QC. 

21.  They further noted that the FMV s in the 2016 Ordinance are fair and equitable, considering that those
values are even lower than the FMVs of QC's neighboring cities in Metro Manila, i.e., Pasay, Caloocan,
Manila, and Mandaluyong.

22. On July 14, 2017, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) likewise filed its Comment, 37 arguing that
the petition should be dismissed on the grounds of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, non-
observance of the hierarchy of courts, and lack of locus standi.

23. It further alleged that the 2016 Ordinance was valid because Alliance failed to: (a) overcome the
presumption of constitutionality; (b) show that the substantial increase in the assessed values of real
properties violates the fundamental principles of taxation; (c) prove that the public hearing required
before passing an ordinance was not complied with; and (d) submit evidence that the 2016 Ordinance
was abruptly implemented. The OSG added that Alliance failed to demonstrate its clear legal right to
enjoin the implementation of the subject ordinance. 

24. In the Reply, 40 Alliance argued, as regards its failure to exhaust administrative remedies, that: first, the
remedy of payment under protest as provided for in Sections 229 and 252 of the LGC is inapplicable in
this case because such remedy requires prior payment of taxes, which would be unfair and unreasonable
on the part of its members who cannot afford to pay the increased taxes; 41 and second, the remedy of

28
 appeal to the Secretary of Justice would not have the effect of suspending the effectivity of the 2016
Ordinance.

25. Alliance also contended that its petition raised only a question of law (i.e., whether respondents gravely
abused its discretion in increasing the FMVs up to 500% as contained in the 2016 Ordinance) which is
cognizable by the Court. 43 In any event, it maintained that the petition is of transcendental importance
warranting the relaxation of the doctrine on hierarchy of courts.

26. Alliance further claimed that it has legal capacity to sue because it is merely representing its trustees
and members who filed the petition in their own personal capacities as taxpayers and residents of QC. In
fact, these trustees and members are the ones who will suffer personal and substantial injury by the
implementation of the 2016 Ordinance.

27. On the merits, Alliance posited that the 2016 Ordinance failed to comply with both the procedural and
substantive requirements for a valid ordinance, considering that:

(a) the alleged twenty-nine (29) public consultation/hearings were conducted without the required
written notices as prescribed under Article 276 (b) of the LGC's Implementing Rules and
Regulations;46 

(b) the 2016 Ordinance is unjust, excessive, oppressive, and confiscatory, and is not based on the
taxpayer's ability to pay;47 

(c) it failed to comply with the assessment calendar prescribed under Section 2 of DOF Local
Assessment Regulation No. 1-92;48 and

(d) there is no legal basis to increase the FMVs based on the latest market developments. 49

The Issues Before the Court

The main issues before the Court are: (1) on the procedural aspects, whether or not the petition is infirm for
violations of the doctrines of exhaustion of administrative remedies and hierarchy of courts, as well as
Alliance's lack of legal capacity to sue; and (2) on the substantive aspect, whether or not the 2016 Ordinance is
valid and constitutional.

29
CITY OF CAGAYAN DE ORO, Petitioner, v. CAGAYAN ELECTRIC POWER & LIGHT CO., INC.
(CEPALCO), Respondent.

The Factual Antecedents

1. On January 24, 2005, the petitioner, through its local legislative council, enacted Ordinance No. 9527-
2005,7 which imposed an annual Mayor's Permit Fee of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00) on every electric
or telecommunications post belonging to public utility companies operating in the city.8 The ordinance
reads:

AN ORDINANCE IMPOSING A MAYOR'S PERMIT FEE ON ELECTRIC

AND/OR TELECOMMUNICATION POLES/POSTS OWNED BY PUBLIC
UTILITY COMPANIES WHICH ARE ERECTED ON GOVERNMENT
AND/OR PRIVATE LOTS ALONG GOVERNMENT STREETS, ROADS,
HIGHWAYS AND/OR ALLEYS AT THE RATE OF FIVE HUNDRED
PESOS (P500.00) PER POST PER YEAR, AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES

BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council (Sangguniang Panlungsod) of the City of

Cagayan de Oro in session assembled that:

Whereas, electric and/or telecommunication poles, posts and towers are sprouting
everywhere in the City;

Whereas, such poles or posts pose hazard to traffic and safety of the public if they
are not well maintained, and even as nuisance to the panorama or skyline of the
City;

Whereas, it is for this reason that the City Government imposes some form of
regulation thereon;

Whereas, the City Government under the Local Government Code is vested with
authority to impose regulatory fees and charges for activities and undertakings
being done in the City;

BE IT ORDAINED by the City Council (Sangguniang Panlungsod) that:

SECTION 1. There shall be imposed a Mayor's Permit Fee on electric and/or telecommunication
poles/posts owned by public utility companies which are erected on government and/or private lots
along government streets, roads, highways and/or alleys at the rate of Five Hundred Pesos (P500.00)
per post per year.

30
 SECTION 2. For this purpose, the City Engineer shall conduct a regular inventory of all electric and
telecommunication poles, posts and towers in the City, indicating the respective owners thereof, and
submit the same to the City Treasurer for purposes of imposing the fee under this Ordinance.

SECTION 3. The provision of Section 1 hereof shall not apply to poles, posts or towers erected or
owned by the national government, its instrumentalities and other local government units.

SECTION 4. The pertinent provisions of Ordinance No. 8847-2003, otherwise known as the 2003
Revenue Code, covering the imposition of Mayor's Permit Fee and other appropriate administrative
provisions thereof shall apply in the imposition of the fee under this Ordinance.

SECTION 5. This Ordinance shall take effect after 15 days following its publication in a local
newspaper of general circulation for at least three (3) consecutive issues.

UNANIMOUSLY APPROVED.9

2. The respondent, Cagayan Electric Power & Light Co., Inc. (CEPALCO) is a public utility engaged in
the distribution of electric power and the owner of an estimated 17,000 utility poles erected within
Cagayan de Oro City.
3. The ordinance entailed that the electricity distributor would have to pay an annual Mayor's Permit Fee
of P8,500,000.00.10
4. CEPALCO thus filed a Petition for Declaratory Relief with Damages & Prayer for Temporary
Restraining Order & Preliminary Injunction11 dated September 30, 2005 before the Cagayan RTC
assailing the ordinance's validity.
5. CEPALCO contended that the imposition, in the guise of police power, was unlawful for violating the
fundamental principle that fees, charges, and other impositions shall not be unjust, excessive,
oppressive, or confiscatory.12 
6. Additionally, CEPALCO argued that, assuming the imposition was a valid regulatory fee, it violated the
legislative franchise that specifically exempted the electricity distributor from taxes or fees assessed by
Cagayan de Oro City.

7. On November 7, 2005, the city filed its Answer with Affirmative/Special Defenses and Compulsory
Counterclaim.14 It countered that the ordinance was a valid exercise of its powers vested by the
applicable provisions of the Constitution, the Local Government Code, and other laws. Also, the city
maintained that Section 9 of CEPALCO's legislative franchise expressly subjected the latter to taxes,
duties, fees, or charges.1
8. On May 5, 2006, pending the determination of the ordinance's validity, the Cagayan RTC issued a writ
of preliminary injunction.16

The RTC's Ruling

 On February 8, 2008, the Cagayan RTC issued a Resolution dismissing the petition for declaratory
relief due to CEPALCO's failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The fallo reads:

31
 WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Court hereby dismissed the petition for failure of
petitioner CEPALCO to exhaust administrative remedies pursuant to Sec. 187, RA 7160 and for
being time-barred under the circumstances. The writ of preliminary injunction issued on May 5,
2006 is hereby dissolved.
SO ORDERED.

 The Cagayan RTC stated that it found the tax excessive, but could not interfere with the decision-
making of the government agency concerned.
 It declared that the issue on excessiveness was a question best addressed to the sound discretion of the
city council of Cagayan de Oro.
 Nonetheless, for CEPALCO's neglect to appeal the ordinance to the Secretary of Justice, the trial court
dismissed the case and ruled that the electricity distributor failed to exhaust administrative remedies.1
 Aggrieved, CEPALCO elevated the case to the CA.18

The CA's Ruling

 On June 10, 2015, the CA promulgated the herein assailed decision granting CEPALCO's appeal. The
dispositive portion reads:

WHEREFORE, the Appeal is GRANTED. The assailed Resolution dated February 8, 2008 of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 17, Cagayan de Oro City is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
City Ordinance No. 9527-2005 is declared void.

SO ORDERED.

 The CA declared the ordinance void for being exorbitant and unreasonable. It held that, since the city
failed to include a discussion on how the members of the city council arrived at the amount of P500.00
per pole, CEPALCO could not be appraised of the logistics of and reasons behind the imposition.
 According to the CA, the city should have explained how the sum would be accounted for, stating the
probable expenses of regulating and inspecting each of the poles.19 The appellate court additionally held
that the doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies was inapplicable considering the case
involved a regulatory fee and not a tax measure.20

The foregoing ultimately led to the filing of the instant petition before this Court.

The Issues

(1) whether or not CEPALCO should have exhausted administrative remedies by challenging Ordinance No.
9527-2005 before the Secretary of Justice prior to instituting the present action; and

(2) whether or not the amount of the Mayor's Permit Fee is excessive, unreasonable, and exorbitant.

32
CONFEDERATION FOR UNITY, , V. COMMISSIONER, BUREAU OF INTERNAL REVENUE

The Antecedents
 On June 20, 2014, respondent CIR issued the assailed RMO No. 23-2014, in furtherance of Revenue
Memorandum Circular (RMC) No. 23-2012 dated February 14, 2012 on the "Reiteration of the
Responsibilities of the Officials and Employees of Government Offices for the Withholding of
Applicable Taxes on Certain Income Payments and the Imposition of Penalties for Non-Compliance
Thereof," in order to clarify and consolidate the responsibilities of the public sector to withhold taxes on
its transactions as a customer (on its purchases of goods and services) and as an employer (on
compensation paid to its officials and employees) under the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC or
Tax Code) of 1997, as amended, and other special laws.

The Petitions
G.R. No. 213446
 On August 6, 2014, petitioners Confederation for Unity, Recognition and Advancement of Government
Employees (COURAGE), et al., organizations/unions of government employees from the
Sandiganbayan, Senate of the Philippines, Court of Appeals, Department of Agrarian Reform,
Department of Social Welfare and Development, Department of Trade and Industry, Metro Manila
Development Authority, National Housing Authority and local government of Quezon City, filed a
Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus,[1] imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of respondent
CIR in issuing RMO No. 23-2014.
 According to petitioners, RMO No. 23-2014 classified as taxable compensation, the following
allowances, bonuses, compensation for services granted to government employees, which they alleged
to be considered by law as non-taxable fringe and de minimis benefits, to wit:
I. Legislative Fringe Benefits q. Uniform Allowance
a. Anniversary Bonus II. Judiciary Benefits
b. Additional Food Subsidy
c. 13th Month Pay a. Additional Compensation Income

d. Food Subsidy b. Extraordinary & Miscellaneous Expenses

e. Cash Gift c. Monthly Special Allowance

f. Cost of Living Assistance d. Additional Cost of Living Allowance (from

g. Efficiency Incentive Bonus Judiciary Development Fund)

h. Financial Relief Assistance e. Productivity Incentive Benefit

i. Grocery Allowance f. Grocery Allowance

j. Hospitalization g. Clothing Allowance

k. Inflationary Assistance Allowance h. Emergency Economic Assistance

l. Longevity Service Pay i. Year-End Bonus (13th Month Pay)

m. Medical Allowance j. Cash Gift

n. Mid-Year Eco. Assistance k. Loyalty Cash Award (Milestone Bonus)

o. Productivity Incentive Benefit l. Christmas Allowance m. Anniversary

p. Transition Allowance Bonus[2]

33
  Petitioners further assert that the imposition of withholding tax on these allowances,
bonuses and benefits, which have been allotted by the Government to its employees free
of tax for a long time, violates the prohibition on non-diminution of benefits under
Article 100 of the Labor Code;[3] and infringes upon the fiscal autonomy of the
Legislature, Judiciary, Constitutional Commissions and Office of the Ombudsman
granted by the Constitution.[4
 Petitioners also claim that RMO No. 23-2014
o (1) constitutes a usurpation of legislative power and diminishes the delegated
power of local government units inasmuch as it defines new offenses and
prescribes penalty therefor, particularly upon local government officials;[5] and
o (2) violates the equal protection clause of the Constitution as it discriminates
against government officials and employees by imposing fringe benefit tax upon
their allowances and benefits, as opposed to the allowances and benefits of
employees of the private sector, the fringe benefit tax of which is borne and paid
by their employers.[6]

o Further, the petition also prays for the issuance of a writ of mandamus ordering
respondent CIR to perform its duty under Section 32(B)(7)(e)(iv) of the NIRC of
1997, as amended, to upgrade the ceiling of the 13th month pay and other
benefits for the concerned officials and employees of the government, including
petitioners.[7]

G.R. No. 213658

o On August 19, 2014, petitioners Armando A. Yanga, President of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Judges Association of Manila, and Ma. Cristina Carmela I. Japzon,
President of the Philippine Association of Court Employees – Manila Chapter, filed a
Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition[8] as duly authorized representatives of said
associations, seeking to nullify RMO No. 23-2014 on the following grounds:
o (1) respondent CIR is bereft of any authority to issue the assailed RMO. The
NIRC of 1997, as amended, expressly vests to the Secretary of Finance the
authority to promulgate all needful rules and regulations for the effective
enforcement of tax provisions;[9] and
o (2) respondent CIR committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction in the issuance of RMO No. 23-2014 when it subjected to
withholding tax benefits and allowances of court employees which are tax-
exempt such as:

34
  (a) Special Allowance for Judiciary (SAJ) under Republic Act (RA) No.
9227 and additional cost of living allowance (AdCOLA) granted under
Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1949 which are considered as non-taxable
fringe benefits under Section 33(A) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended;
 (b) cash gift, loyalty awards, uniform and clothing allowance and
additional compensation (ADCOM) granted to court employees which are
considered  de minimis under Section 33(C)(4) of the same Code;
 (c) allowances and benefits granted by the Judiciary which are not taxable
pursuant to Section 32(7)(E) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended; and
 (d) expenses for the Judiciary provided under Commission on Audit
(COA) Circular 2012-001.[10]

 Petitioners further assert that RMO No. 23-2014 violates their right to due process of law
because while it is ostensibly denominated as a mere revenue issuance, it is an illegal and
unwarranted legislative action which sharply increased the tax burden of officials and
employees of the Judiciary without the benefit of being heard.[11
 On October 21, 2014, the Court resolved to consolidate the foregoing cases.[12]

 Respondents, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed their Consolidated
Comment on December 23, 2014.
 They argue that the petitions are barred by the doctrine of hierarchy of courts and
petitioners failed to present any special and important reasons or exceptional and
compelling circumstance to justify direct recourse to this Court.
 Maintaining that RMO No. 23-2014 was validly issued in accordance with the power of
the CIR to make rulings and opinion in connection with the implementation of internal
revenue laws, respondents aver that unlike Revenue Regulations (RRs), RMOs do not
require the approval or signature of the Secretary of Finance, as these merely provide
directives or instructions in the implementation of stated policies, goals, objectives, plans
and programs of the Bureau.
 According to them, RMO No. 23-2014 is in fact a mere reiteration of the Tax Code and
previous RMOs, and can be traced back to RR No. 01-87 dated April 2, 1987
implementing Executive Order No. 651 which was promulgated by then Secretary of
Finance Jaime V. Ongpin upon recommendation of then CIR Bienvenido A. Tan, Jr.
Thus, the CIR never usurped the power and authority of the legislature in the issuance of
the assailed RMO.[16] Also, contrary to petitioners' assertion, the due process
requirements of hearing and publication are not applicable to RMO No. 23-2014.[17]
 Respondents further argue that petitioners' claim that RMO No. 23-2014 is
unconstitutional has no leg to stand on.

35
  They explain that the constitutional guarantee of fiscal autonomy to Judiciary and
Constitutional Commissions does not include exemption from payment of taxes, which is
the lifeblood of the nation.[18] 
 They also aver that RMO No. 23-2014 never intended to diminish the powers of local
government units.
 It merely reiterates the obligation of the government as an employer to withhold taxes,
which has long been provided by the Tax Code.[19]
 Moreover, respondents assert that the allowances and benefits enumerated in Section III
A, B, C, and D, are not fringe benefits which are exempt from taxation under Section 33
of the Tax Code, nor de minimis benefits excluded from employees' taxable basic salary.
 They explain that the SAJ under RA No. 9227 and AdCOLA under PD No. 1949 are
additional allowances which form part of the employee's basic salary; thus, subject to
withholding taxes.[20]
 Respondents also claim that RMO No. 23-2014 does not violate petitioners' right to
equal protection of laws as it covers all employees and officials of the government. It
does not create a new category of taxable income nor make taxable those which are not
taxable but merely reflect those incomes which are deemed taxable under existing laws.
[21]

 Lastly, respondents aver that mandamus will not lie to compel respondents to increase
the ceiling for tax exemptions because the Tax Code does not impose a mandatory duty
on the part of respondents to do the same.[22]

The Petitions-in-Intervention
 Meanwhile, on September 11, 2014, the National Federation of Employees Associations
of the Department of Agriculture (NAFEDA) et al., duly registered union/association of
employees of the Department of Agriculture, National Agricultural and Fisheries
Council, Commission on Elections, Mines and Geosciences Bureau, and Philippine
Fisheries Development Authority, claiming similar interest as petitioners in G.R. No.
213446, filed a Petition-in-Intervention[23] seeking the nullification of items III, VI and
VII of RMO No. 23-2014 based on the following grounds:
o (1) that respondent CIR acted with grave abuse of discretion and usurped the
power of the Legislature in issuing RMO No. 23-2014 which imposes additional
taxes on government employees and prescribes penalties for government official's
failure to withhold and remit the same;[24] 
o (2) that RMO No. 23-2014 violates the equal protection clause because the
Commission on Human Rights (CHR) was not included among the constitutional
commissions covered by the issuance and the ADCOM of employees of the

36
 Judiciary was subjected to withholding tax but those received by employees of
the Legislative and Executive branches are not;[25] and
o (3) that respondent CIR failed to upgrade the tax exemption ceiling for benefits
under Section 32(B)(7) of the NIRC of 1997, as amended.[26]

 In its Comment,[27] respondents, through the OSG, sought the denial of the Petition-in-
Intervention for failure of the intervenors to seek prior leave of Court and to demonstrate
that the existing consolidated petitions are not sufficient to protect their interest as parties
affected by the assailed RMO.[28] 
 They further contend that, contrary to the intervenors' position, the CHR is not exempt
from the applicability of RMO No. 23-2014.[29] 
 They explain that the enumeration of government offices and constitutional bodies
covered by RMO No. 23-2014 is not exclusive; Section III thereof in fact states that
RMO No. 23-2014 covers all employees of the public sector.[30] 
 They also allege that the ADCOM referred to in Section III(B) of the assailed RMO is
unique to the Judiciary; employees and officials in the executive and legislative do not
receive this specific type of ADCOM enjoyed by the employees and officials of the
Judicial branch.[31]

 On October 10, 2014, a Motion for Intervention with attached Complaint in

Intervention[32] was filed, in G.R. No. 213658, by the Members of the Association of
Regional Trial Court Judges in Iloilo City. Claiming that they are similarly situated with
petitioners, said intervenors pray that the Court declare null and void RMO No. 23-2014
and direct the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) to refund the amount illegally exacted
from the salaries/compensations of the judges by virtue of the implementation of RMO
No. 23-2014.[33] 
 The intervenors claim that RMO No. 23-2014 violates their right to due process as it
takes away a portion of their salaries and compensation without giving them the
opportunity to be heard.[34] They also aver that the implementation of RMO No. 23-2014
resulted in the diminution of their salaries/compensation in violation of Sections 3 and
10, Article VIII of the Constitution.
 In their Comment to the Motion, respondents adopted the arguments in their
Consolidated Comment and further stated that: (1) RMO No. 23-2014 does not diminish
the salaries and compensation of members of the judiciary as it has been judicially settled
that the imposition of taxes on salaries and compensation of judges and justices is not
equivalent to diminution of the same; (2) the allowances and benefits enumerated under
Section III(B) of RMO No. 23-2014 are not fringe benefits exempt from taxation; (3) the
AdCOLA and SAJ are not fringe benefits as these are considered part of the basic salary

37
 of government employees subject to income tax; and (4) there is no valid ground for the
refund of the taxes withheld pursuant to RMO No. 23-2014.

 In sum, petitioners and intervenors (collectively referred to as petitioners) argue

that:
1. RMO No. 23-2014 is ultra vires insofar as:
a. Sections III and IV of RMO No. 23-2014, for subjecting to withholding taxes
non-taxable allowances, bonuses and benefits received by government
employees;
b. Sections VI and VII, for defining new offenses and prescribing penalties therefor,
particularly upon government officials;
2. RMO No. 23-2014 violates the equal protection clause as it discriminates against
government employees;
3. RMO No. 23-2014 violates fiscal autonomy enjoyed by government agencies;
4. The implementation of RMO No. 23-2014 results in diminution of benefits of
government employees, a violation of Article 100 of the Labor Code; and
5. Respondents may be compelled through a writ of mandamus to increase the tax-exempt
ceiling for 13th month pay and other benefits.

Respondents counter that:

1. The instant consolidated petitions are barred by the doctrine of hierarchy of courts;
2. The CIR did not abuse its discretion in the issuance of RMO No. 23-2014 because:
a. It was issued pursuant to the CIR's power to interpret the NIRC of 1997, as
amended, and other tax laws, under Section 4 of the NIRC of 1997, as amended;
b. RMO No. 23-2014 does not discriminate against government employees. It does
not create a new category of taxable income nor make taxable those which are exempt;
c. RMO No. 23-2014 does not result in diminution of benefits;
d. The allowances, bonuses or benefits listed under Section III of the assailed RMO
are not fringe benefits;
e. The fiscal autonomy granted by the Constitution does not include tax exemption;
and
3. Mandamus does not lie against respondents because the NIRC of 1997, as amended, does
not impose a mandatory duty upon them to increase the tax-exempt ceiling for 13th month
pay and other benefits.

Incidentally, in a related case docketed as A.M. No. 16-12-04-SC, the Court, on July 11, 2017,
issued a Resolution directing the Fiscal Management and Budget Office of the Court to maintain

38
the status quo by the non-withholding of taxes from the benefits authorized to be granted to
judiciary officials and personnel, namely, the Mid-year Economic Assistance, the Year-end
Economic Assistance, the Yuletide Assistance, the Special Welfare Assistance (SWA) and the
Additional SWA, until such time that a decision is rendered in the instant consolidated cases.

39
JULITA M. ALDOVINO, , v. GOLD AND GREEN MANPOWER MANAGEMENT AND
DEVELOPMENT SERVICES, INC

 Aldovino and her co-applicants applied for work at Gold and Green Manpower
Management and Development Services, Inc. (Gold and Green Manpower), a local
manning agency whose foreign principal is Sage International Development Company,
Ltd. (Sage International).
 Eventually, they were hired as sewers for Dipper Semi-Conductor Company, Ltd.
(Dipper Semi-Conductor), a Taiwan-based company. Fus

 Their respective employment contracts provided an eight (8)-hour working day, a fixed
monthly salary, and entitlement to overtime pay, among others
 Before they could be deployed for work, Gold and Green Manpower required each
applicant to pay a P72,000.00 placement fee.
 But since the applicants were unable to produce the amount on their own, Gold and
Green Manpower referred them to E-Cash Paylite and Financing, Inc. (E-Cash Paylite),
where they loaned their placement fees
 Once Aldovino and her co-workers arrived in Taiwan, Gold and Green Manpower took
all their travel documents, including their passports.
 They were then made to sign another contract that provides that they would be paid on a
piece-rate basis instead of a fixed monthly salary.
 During their employment, Aldovino and her co-workers toiled from 8:00 a.m. to 9:00
p.m. for six (6) days a week. At times, they were forced to work on Sundays without any
overtime premium.9 Because they were paid on a piece-rate basis, they received less than
the fixed monthly salary stipulated in their original contract. When Aldovino and her co-
workers inquired, Dipper Semi-Conductor refused to disclose the schedule of payment
on a piece-rate basis. Eventually, they defaulted on their loan obligations with E-Cash
Paylite.
 On January 19, 2009, Aldovino and her co-workers, except De Jesus, filed before a local
court in Taiwan a Complaint against their employers, Dipper Semi-Conductor and Sage
International.
 On March 26, 2009, the parties met before the Bureau of Labor Affairs for a dialogue.
There, Dipper Semi-Conductor ordered Aldovino and her co-workers to return to the
Philippines as it was no longer interested in their services. They were then made to
immediately pack their belongings, after which they were dropped off at a train station in
Taipei. After a few hours, a friend brought them to the Manila Economic and Cultural

40
Office, where they stayed for a week. They were then transferred to Hope Shelter, where
they remained for four (4) months while the case was pending.12

Eventually, the parties entered into a Compromise Agreement,13 which read:

1. Event:
A. Reconciliation Part:

This issue is pertaining to the labor Case No. 86 of 2009 at Ban Qiao District Court,
wherein Party A is asking for the payment of salary, etc. from party B. This was
caused by the differences in interpreting the basic salary and the method in calculation
of piece work salary. Both parties is hereby reach (sic) a reconciliation.
B. Compensation Part:

With regard to the damages and fees incurred in the process of this controversy, Party
B shall voluntarily give monetary compensation to Party A.
2. Amount of Payment:
A. Amount of Reconciliation: NT$500,000.00
B. Amount of Compensation: On top of the fees incurred by Party A during the period
Party A left the company of Party B and waiting for going back to their home country,
including board and lodging, livelihood cost, the loss of Recruitment Agency's
commission borne by Party A, airplane ticket, etc. Party B shall pay another
compensation of NT$1 Million.
C. Aside from this, Party A can't ask for compensation of any kind, and all the civil cases
involved shall be cancelled.
3. Mode of Payment
A. When this case reach (sic) reconciliation, Party B will pay to the appointed lawyer of
Party A an amount of NT$500,000 in cash in one transaction. This will be witness
(sic) by the Philippine Labor Center.
B. Both parties will present the following civil and criminal case requests and affidavit of
waiver to the related agencies, lawyers of both will change the documents, and Party
B will secure a RECEIPT AND RELEASE/QUITCLAIM (as in attachment A) signed
by TORZAR SIONY TARROZA, after which, Party B will pay to the appointed
lawyer of Party A an amount of NT$1 Million in cash in one transaction. This will be
witness (sic) by the Philippine Labor Center.

6. After the effectivity of this reconciliation agreement, Party A shall withdraw the
case from the civil court of the Taiwan Banqiao Local court, Party A shall bear the
cost of civil proceeding.

41
 7. After the effectivity of this reconciliation agreement, Party A shall give up all other
rights of compensation. They shall not ask for any compensation based on any other
causes.14

 Based on the Compromise Agreement, Aldovino and her co-workers, except De Jesus,
executed an Affidavit of Quitclaim and Release.
 On July 28, 2009, all of them returned to the Philippines.
 They eventually filed before the Labor Arbiter a case for illegal termination,
underpayment of salaries, human trafficking, illegal signing of papers,17 and other money
claims such as overtime pay, return of placement fees, and moral and exemplary
damages.18
 In its April 8, 2010 Decision,19 the Labor Arbiter dismissed the Complaint for illegal
dismissal but ordered Gold and Green Manpower and Sage International to pay each of
the workers P20,000.00 as financial assistance.

 On appeal, the National Labor Relations Commission, in its July 29, 2010 Decision,
affirmed the Labor Arbiter's Decision. It found that Aldovino and her co-workers were
not illegally dismissed and that they voluntarily returned to the Philippines. Moreover,
the Compromise Agreement barred any further claims arising from their employment

 Additionally, the National Labor Relations Commission deleted the award of financial
assistance for lack of factual and legal bases

 Aldovino and her co-workers moved for reconsideration, but their Motion was denied for
lack of merit in the National Labor Relations Commission August 31, 2010 Resolution.23 

 Hence, they filed before the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari.24

 In its September 29,2011 Decision,25 the Court of Appeals reversed the labor tribunals'
rulings. It not only ruled that Aldovino and her co-workers had been illegally dismissed
from service, but also declared that the Compromise Agreement did not bar them from
filing an illegal dismissal case.

 Accordingly, the Court of Appeals ordered Gold and Green Manpower and Sage
International to pay the workers their salaries "for the unexpired portion of their contract
in accordance with Section 7 of [Republic Act No.] 1002227 and pursuant to Serrano v.

42
 Gallant Maritime Services, Inc.,"28 among others. The dispositive portion of the Court of
Appeals Decision read:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The
Decision dated July 29,2010 and Order dated August 31, 2010 of the NLRC in
NLRC LAC (OFW-L) 05-000409-10, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Respondents Gold and Green Manpower Management and Development
Services, Inc. and Sage International Development Co., Ltd. are hereby ordered to
reimburse petitioners their placement fee with interest at twelve percent (12%)
per annum, and to pay the salaries of petitioners for the unexpired portion of their
respective employment contracts or for three (3) months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less
SO ORDERED.29

 Aldovino and her co-workers moved for partial reconsideration, praying that the three
(3)-month cap stated in the Decision's dispositive portion be annulled, pursuant
to Serrano. However, their Motion was denied in the Court of Appeals' January 26, 2012
Resolution.
 Thus, Aldovino and her co-workers filed a Petition for Review on Certiorari.
 On June 15, 2012, respondents filed their Comment, to which petitioners filed a Reply on
September 5, 2016.
 Petitioners again question the three (3)-month salary cap stated in the dispositive portion
of the Court of Appeals Decision. Citing Serrano, they assert that the three (3)-month
cap in Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995, as reenacted in Republic Act No. 10022, has already been
declared unconstitutional.36
 Petitioners thus assert that they are entitled to the payment of their salaries for the
unexpired portion of their employment contracts.37

 On the other hand, respondents question the legality of the monetary damages awarded to
petitioners. They assert that the Court of Appeals erred in nullifying the parities'
Compromise Agreement, pointing out that the labor tribunals had already rendered it
valid.
 The agreement, they further argue, released them from liability on petitioners' other
claims.39

ISSUE:

43
 whether or not petitioners Julita M. Aldovino, Joan B. Lagrimas, Winnie B. Lingat, Chita
A. Sales, Sherly L. Guinto, Revilla S. De Jesus, and Laila V. Orpilla are entitled to the
payment of their salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contract.
 whether or not Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022, which reinstated the three (3)-
month cap, has the force and effect of law.

To pass upon this issue, this Court must resolve the following:

First, whether or not the Compromise Agreement barred all other claims against
respondents Gold and Green Manpower Management and Development Services, Inc.
and Sage International Development Company, Ltd., and Alberto C. Alvina; and

Second, whether or not petitioners were illegally dismissed and, consequently, entitled to
the reimbursement of their placement fees and payment of moral and exemplary damages
and attorney's fees.

44
PRIVATE HOSPITALS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, INC. (PHAPI)
REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT, DR. RUSTICO JIMENEZ, Petitioner, v. HON.
SALVADOR MEDIALDEA, EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, AND THE ACTING
SECRETARY OF DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH

FACTS

In 1984, Batas Pambansa (BP) Bilang 702 entitled An Act Prohibiting the Demand of
Deposits or Advance Payments for the Confinement or Treatment of Patients in
Hospitals and Medical Clinics in Certain Cases was enacted.
 BP 702 was aimed to stop the practice of hospitals and medical clinics of asking for
deposits or advance payments for treatment or confinement of patients in emergency and
serious cases.
 Essentially, BP 702 makes it unlawful for any director, manager or any other officer of a
hospital or medical clinic to demand any deposit or any other form of advance payment
for confinement or treatment in such hospital or medical clinic in emergency or serious
cases.
  BP 702 penalizes such erring director, manager or any other officer of a hospital or
medical clinic with a fine of not less than one thousand pesos but not more than two
thousand pesos or imprisonment for not less than fifteen days but not more than thirty
days, or both such fine and imprisonment.
 On August 25, 1997, BP 702 was amended by R.A. No. 8344.5 
 R.A. No. 8344 makes it unlawful not only to demand, but also to request, solicit, and
accept any deposit or advance payment as a prerequisite for confinement or medical
treatment in emergency or serious cases.
 R.A. No. 8344 further makes the refusal to administer medical treatment and support as
dictated by good practice of medicine to prevent death or permanent disability unlawful.
 In case the hospital or the medical clinic has no adequate medical capabilities, R.A. No.
8344 outlines the procedure for the transfer of the patient to a facility where appropriate
care can be given
 Under a new provision, R.A. No. 8344 allows the transfer of the patient to an appropriate
hospital consistent with the latter's needs after the hospital or medical clinic has
administered medical treatment and support.

R.A. No. 8344 also provides the following governing definitions for purposes of the law:
ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary

45
(a) Emergency - a condition or state of a patient wherein based on the objective
findings of a prudent medical officer on duty for the day there is immediate danger
and where delay in initial support and treatment may cause loss of life or cause
permanent disability to the patient.

(b) Serious case - refers to a condition of a patient characterized by gravity or danger

wherein based on the objective findings of a prudent medical officer on duty for the
day when left unattended to, may cause loss of life or cause permanent disability to
the patient.

(c) Confinement - a state of being admitted in a hospital or medical clinic for medical
observation, diagnosis, testing, and treatment consistent with the capability and
available facilities of the hospital or clinic.

(d) Hospital - a facility devoted primarily to the diagnosis, treatment and care of
individuals suffering from illness, disease, injury or deformity, or in need of
obstetrical or other medical and nursing care. It shall also be construed as any
institution, building or place where there are facilities and personnel for the continued
and prolonged care of patients.

(e) Emergency treatment and support - any medical or surgical measure within the
capability of the hospital or medical clinic that is administered by qualified health care
professionals to prevent the death or permanent disability of a patient.

(f) Medical clinic - a place in which patients can avail of medical consultation or
treatment on an outpatient basis.

(g) Permanent disability - a condition of physical disability as defined under Article

192-C and Article 193-B and C of Presidential Decree No. 442; as amended,
otherwise known as the Labor Code of the Philippines.

(h) Stabilize - the provision of necessary care until such time that the patient may be
discharged or transferred to another hospital or clinic with a reasonable probability
that no physical deterioration would result from or occur during such discharge or
transfer.

46
 R.A. No. 8344 also increased the penalties prescribed under BP 702 to imprisonment of
not less than six months and one day but not more than two years and four months, or a
fine of not less than twenty thousand pesos, but not more than one hundred thousand
pesos, or both at the discretion of the court.
 However, if the violation was committed pursuant to an established hospital or clinic
policy or upon the instruction of its management, the director or officer responsible for
the formulation and implementation of such policy shall suffer imprisonment of four to
six years, or a fine of not less than one hundred thousand pesos, but not more than five
hundred thousand pesos, or both, at the court's discretion.
 Sensing the need to curb the still prevalent practice of refusing to provide initial medical
treatment and support in emergency or serious cases without the corresponding deposit
or advance payment, House Bill No. 51599 was submitted by the House Committee on
Health which seeks to:
o increase the penalties for violation of BP 702 as amended by R.A. No. 8344;
o expand the definition of "emergency care" to include women in active labor and
at the risk of miscarriage or fetal distress;
o include reimbursement from the Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PhilHealth) for the expenses advanced by hospitals and medical facilities in
treating poor and indigent patients; and
o mandate the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes Office (PCSO) to provide assistance
to poor and marginalized patients on emergency treatment in hospitals.

 This development met similar support from the Senate through Senate Bill No.
135311 submitted by its Committees on Health and Demography, Justice and Human
Rights, and Ways and Means.
 Similar to its lower house counterpart, Senate Bill No. 1353 aims to increase the
penalties for violation of the law; define "basic emergency care"; and include PhilHealth
reimbursement of basic emergency care incurred by the hospital or medical clinic.
 However, peculiar to the Senate version is the presumption of liability imposed against
the hospital, medical clinic, and the involved official, medical practitioner, or employee
in the event of death, permanent disability, serious impairment of the health condition of
the patient, or injury to or loss of the unborn child proceeding from the denial of
admission to the health facility pursuant to a policy or practice of demanding deposits or
advance payments for confinement or treatment.

 A consolidation of Senate Bill No. 1353 and House Bill No. 5159 gave birth to R.A. No.
10932 which was signed into law on August 3, 2017.

47
 Thus, as it presently stands, R.A. No. 10932 makes it unlawful to request, solicit,
demand or accept deposit or advance payment as a prerequisite not only for confinement
or medical treatment but also for administering basic emergency care.
 It expands the scope of "basic emergency care" to include medical procedures and
treatment administered to a woman in active labor.

 In case a transfer to another hospital is deemed appropriate, R.A. No. 10932 further
mandates the local government unit where the hospital or medical clinic is located to
allow free use of its emergency medical vehicle. Moreover, all hospitals are required to
post a notice indicating its classification level and the list of medical services it is
authorized to perform.14
 R.A. No. 10932 also introduces the creation of a Health Facilities Oversight Board
(Board) where complaints against health facilities for violations of the law shall be
initially filed.
 The Board is given the power to investigate, adjudicate and impose administrative
sanctions including the revocation of the health facility's license.
 Further to the matter of penalties, R.A. No. 10932 imposes upon an erring official,
medical practitioner or employee of the hospital or medical clinic the penalty of
imprisonment of not less than six (6) months and one (1) day but not more than two (2)
years and four (4) months, or a fine of not less than P100,000.00, but not more than
P300,000.00, or both at the court's discretion. However, when the violation was made
pursuant to an established hospital policy or upon instructions of its management, the
penalties are increased as against the director or officer formulating and implementing
such policy to four (4) years to six (6) years, or a fine of not less than P500,000.00, but
not more than P1,000,000.00, or both, without prejudice to an award for damages.16
 In addition, R.A. No. 10932 introduces the three-strike rule, or when upon 3 repeated
violations committed pursuant .to an established policy or upon instruction of the
management, the health facility's license to operate shall be revoked by the Department
of Health (DOH).
 The law also makes the president, chairman, board of directors, or trustees and other
officers of the health facility solidarily liable for damages.17
 Apart from the foregoing, R.A. No. 10932 presumes liability against the hospital,
medical clinic, and the official, medical practitioner, or employee involved, in the event
of death, permanent disability, serious impairment or permanent injury to or loss of an
unborn child, proceeding from the denial of admission to a health facility pursuant to a
policy of requiring deposits or advance payments for confinement or treatment.18
 R.A. No. 10932 also mandates that the PhilHealth reimburse the cost of the basic
emergency care and transportation services rendered by the hospital or medical clinic to

48
 poor and indigent patients and that the PCSO provide medical assistance for the basic
emergency care needs of the poor and marginalized groups. Expenses incurred in giving
basic emergency care to poor and indigent patients not reimbursed by PhilHealth are
allowed to be treated as tax deductions.19
 Meanwhile, pending resolution of the instant petition or on April 4, 2018, the DOH
issued Administrative Order No. 2018-0012 implementing R.A. No. 10932.

The Arguments for the Petitioner

 Petitioner claims locus standi to file the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition as
it stands to be directly injured by the implementation of R.A. No. 10932 insofar as the
law regulates the conduct of its members and places the latter's management and
staff at the risk of administrative, civil, and criminal sanctions.
 petitioner claims that the issues herein presented specifically on the denial of due
process and to equal protection of laws are of transcendental importance that should
allow the present petition to prosper despite the absence of direct injury.21
 Petitioner further claims that the issues raised in the instant petition are ripe for
adjudication given the imminent threat of the imposition of the unconstitutional duties
and the corresponding unconstitutional sanctions under R.A. No. 10932 against
petitioner's members with the impending approval of the rules implementing R.A. No.
10932.22 
 Petitioner also argues that an allegation that R.A. No. 10932 infringes upon the
constitutional rights to due process, equal protection of laws and the presumption of
innocence, is sufficient to invoke the Court's power of review.23
 Claiming exception to the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, petitioner also advances the
view that direct resort to the Court is justified given the genuine issues of
constitutionality posed by the present petition.

 petitioner seeks to strike down as unconstitutional R.A. No. 10932 for being unduly
oppressive and thus violative of substantive due process.
 petitioner argues that Section 1 of BP 702 as amended by R.A. No. 8344 and R.A. No.
10932 imposes upon the proprietor, president, director, manager or any other
officer, medical practitioner or employee of a health care institution the duty to
administer basic emergency care or medical treatment and support as dictated by
good practice of medicine to prevent death, or permanent disability, or in the case of
a pregnant woman, permanent injury or loss of her unborn child, or non-
institutional delivery in emergency or serious cases.

49
 Petitioner argues that "basic emergency care" and "emergency treatment and support" as
defined under R.A. No. 10932 imposes upon the physician, the hospital, its management
and staff the untenable duties to actually prevent death, permanent disability, permanent
injury to or loss of an unborn baby or its non-institutional delivery and to sufficiently
address an emergency situation and in case of a woman in active labor, to ensure the safe
delivery of the baby.
 Echoing Lucas, et al. v. Dr. Tuaño,27 petitioner emphasizes that a physician is not an
insurer of the good result of treatment.28 Petitioner thus argues that the duty imposed by
R.A. No. 10932, being predicated on the achievement of an end that is impossible to
guarantee, amounts to a denial of due process.
 petitioner aims to strike down the fines imposed under Section 4 for being unjust,
excessive, and oppressive as they are not commensurate to the act or omission that is
being penalized.30 Petitioner also questions the solidary liability for damages under
Section 4 insofar as it generally makes "other officers" of the health facility solidarily
liable with the president, chairman, members of the board of directors or trustees.
 The presumption of liability spelled under Section 5 of R.A. No. 10932 is also being
assailed for being repugnant to the constitutional presumption of innocence. It is the
contention of petitioner that the presumption of liability clause allows for a presumption
of generalized liability, i.e., administrative, civil and criminal, upon the occurrence of
death, permanent disability and serious impairment of the health condition of the patient
or her unborn child after the denial of the patient's admission due to a hospital policy of
demanding deposits or advance payments.
 Also, petitioner emphasizes that the presumption of liability clause necessarily presumes
that there is, at all times, a causal connection between the injury and the acts or
omissions complained of.33 Expounding on this argument, petitioner argues that the
offense defined under R.A. No. 10932 involves medical malpractice. As such, the
causation between the injury and the medical action are determinable only through the
technical and scientific competence of physicians and thus, cannot be presumed by law.
 Finally, petitioner seeks to strike down as unconstitutional the exclusion of the basic
emergency care of patients not classified as poor, indigent or marginalized from
PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO assistance and tax deductibility under Sections 7 and 8
of R.A. No. 10932 for being violative of the equal protection clause.
 Illustrating its argument, petitioner contends that these provisions would allow a hospital
who treats a poor patient to receive PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO assistance and tax
deduction, and yet the hospital who treats a patient not classified as poor, indigent or
marginalized will not be allowed a similar PhilHealth reimbursement, PCSO assistance
and tax deduction.35 It is likewise the view of petitioner that the law, insofar as it obliges
hospitals, its staff and management to render services to patients not classified as poor,

50
 indigent, or marginalized without the corresponding reimbursement, assistance and tax
deduction, amounts to involuntary servitude.36

The Arguments for the Respondents

 Respondents Hon. Salvador Medialdea, Executive Secretary, and the Acting Secretary of
Department of Health, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), seek to dismiss
the instant petition for being procedurally infirm on the ground that certiorari and
prohibition are proper only against judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial act. Like so,
respondents seek a dismissal of the petition for lack of a justiciable controversy in the
absence of an actual governmental act which directly causes or will imminently cause
injury to the alleged right of petitioner.
 Respondents also attacks petitioner's standing to file the present petition for lack of
personal stake in the outcome of the controversy, it being neither a hospital or health
facility itself.
  Further, respondents assert that the issues raised by petitioner being speculative are not
matters of transcendental importance that would justify a disregard of the rule on locus
standi and the doctrine of hierarchy of courts.39
 respondents contend that R.A. No. 10932 does not impose upon the hospital, medical
facility, its staff or management the duty to guarantee that death, permanent loss or injury
is prevented, neither does it penalize the failure of the physician or the hospital staff to
prevent such occurrences.
 respondents argue that what R.A. No. 10932 prohibits is the act of requesting any form
of advance payment as a prerequisite for administering basic emergency care or medical
treatment, or the act of refusing to administer such as dictated by good practice to
prevent death, permanent loss or injury.40
 respondents maintain that the fines imposed under R.A. No. 10932 are reasonable, and
that in any case, the determination of the propriety of fines for violation of offenses lies
within the discretion of the legislature.
 Respondents add that neither is the solidary liability imposed by law unreasonable
because such arises only from the participatory acts of the directors and officers who are
responsible for the formulation and implementation of policies contrary to the mandates
of R.A. No. 10932 and pertains only to damages which may be awarded to the patient-
complainant
 Respondents likewise defend the validity of the presumption of liability clause on the
argument that the liability therein mentioned pertains to the liability for the death,
permanent disability, serious impairment, injury or loss of the unborn child and that such
presumption arises only upon prior proof that there was denial of admission to the health

51
 facility and that such denial was made pursuant to a policy of demanding deposits for
confinement or treatment.43
 Addressing the supposed violation of the equal protection clause, respondents maintain
that patients classified as "poor", "indigent", or "marginalized" substantially differ from
those who are not categorized as such, hence the provision on PhilHealth reimbursement,
PCSO assistance and tax deduction must be upheld in the face of the equal protection
challenge.44

Issues
whether the Court, in fact, can discharge its power of judicial review.
This is, in turn, determined by addressing the following issues:
(a) are petitions for certiorari and prohibition proper to assail the constitutionality of R.A.
No. 10932;
(b) is direct resort to the Court proper;
(c) has petitioner, as an association of privately-owned hospitals, clinics and other health
facilities, the requisite legal standing; and
(d) is the petition ripe for adjudication.

52
DUE PROCESS
1) RUBI, ET AL. (manguianes) vs. THE PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
 This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the
Province of Mindoro.
 It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province.
 Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
FACTS:
1. On February 1, 1917, the provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 wherein it
was provided that:
 It is necessary to oblige non-christian people of Mindoro to live in one place in order to
make a permanent settlement.
 Their habitation would be selected by the governor and approved by the provincial board
on unoccupied public lands.
 The provincial governor was of the opinion that sitio of Tigbao on Lake Naujan is a
place most convenient for the Mangyanes to live on pursuant to the Administrative
Code.
 The Mangyans may only solicit homesteads on this reservation providing that said
homestead applications are previously recommended by the provincial governor.
2. On February 21, 1917, the Secretary of the Interior approved said resolution No. 25 (series
1917) of the provincial board of Mindoro.
3. On December 4, 1917, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued Executive Order No. 2
which provides that:
 Tthe provincial board, by Resolution No. 25 has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on
Naujan Lake for the permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro.
 Said resolution has been duly approve by the Honorable, the Secretary of the Interior, on
February 21, 1917.
 “Now, therefore, I, Juan Morente, jr., provincial governor of Mindoro, pursuant to the
provisions of section 2145 of the revised Administrative Code, do hereby direct that all
the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans east of the Baco
River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan, to take up
their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake, not later than December 31, 1917.
 "Any Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be
imprisoned not exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised
Administrative Code."
2. It thus appears that:
 the provincial governor of Mindoro and the provincial board thereof directed the
Manguianes in question to take up their habitation in Tigbao, a site on the shore of Lake
Naujan, selected by the provincial governor and approved by the provincial board.

53
  The action was taken in accordance with section 2145 of the Administrative Code of
1917, and
 It was duly approved by the Secretary of the Interior as required by said action.
3. Petitioners, however, challenge the validity of this section of the Administrative Code.
4. This, therefore, becomes the paramount question which the court is called upon the decide.
5. It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
 It is alleged that the Maguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the
provincial officials of that province.
 Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at Tigbao,
Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprive a person of his liberty without
due process of law.
RULING:
The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not deprive a person of his
liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal protection of the laws, and
that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does not constitute slavery and
involuntary servitude.
The Court is further of the opinion that section 2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate
exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous to the Indian policy of the United States.
Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is constitutional.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following:
(1) The failure of former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the
province; and
(2) the only successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a
permanent settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following;
(3) The protection of the Manguianes;
(4) the protection of the public forests in which they roam;
(5) the necessity of introducing civilized customs among the Manguianes. Considered purely as
an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature has exceeded its
rightful authority.
It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great malady requires an equally drastic
remedy.
One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is unduly interfered without when the degree of
civilization of the Manguianes is considered.
They are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say
that due process of law has not been followed. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken
away except by due process of law.

54
To constitute "due process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always
necessary. In some instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is
especially true where much must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in
applying a law to particular cases.
The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may
approach the highest conception of nationality.
The public policy of the Government of the Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit
the Filipino people as a whole.
The Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we
have said, for their own good and the good of the country.
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus
can, therefore, not issue.

2) ACOSTA vs. HON. OCHOA

Consolidated Petitions assailing the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act No.
10591, or the Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition Regulation Act, and their
corresponding provisions in the 2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations for allegedly
violating petitioners' right to bear arms, right to property, and right to privacy.
FACTS:
1. On May 29, 2013, Republic Act No. 10591 (Comprehensive Firearms and Ammunition
Regulation Act) was enacted which currently regulates the ownership, possession, carrying,
manufacture, dealing in, and importation of firearms and ammunition in the country.
2. It was enacted with the view of maintaining peace and order and protecting the people from
violence.
3. On December 7, 2013, its Implementing Rules and Regulations was promulgated pursuant to
the rule-making power granted to the Chief of the Philippine National Police.
4. After the IRRs had become effective, the Philippine National Police centralized all firearms
licensing applications and renewals at its headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City.
5. The pro forma application form for firearm registration which is to be accomplished and
signed by the applicant, contained a paragraph on "Consent of Voluntary Presentation for
Inspection"
CONSENT OF VOLUNTARY PRESENTATION FOR INSPECTION
I hereby undertake to renew the registration of my firearm/s on or before the expiration of
the same; that, pursuant to the provisions of Republic Act No. 10591, I voluntarily give my
consent and authorize the PNP to inspect my firearm/s described above at my
residence/address as indicated in my application and, to confiscate or forfeit the same in
favor of the government for failure to renew my firearm/s registration within six (6)
months before the date of its expiration.
6. If the application is approved, the firearm license card is delivered through Werfast
Documentary Agency, a courier service, instead of having it picked up at Camp Crame or in the
regional offices of the Philippine National Police.
7. (1st petition) On March 25, 2014, licensed firearm owners Eric F. Acosta (Acosta) and
Nathaniel G. Dela Paz (Dela Paz) filed before the Supreme Court a Petition for Prohibition,
assailing the constitutionality of the following provisions of law and acts:

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 a) Sections 4(g), 10, 26, and 39 (a), all of Republic Act No. 10591;
b) Sections 4.4(a), 4.10(b), 7.3, 7.9, 7.11.2(b), 7.12(b), 10.3, 26.3, 26.4, and 39(1)(a) of the
2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations; and
c) The requirement of signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection in the
pro forma application form for firearm registration, for violating Article III, Section 2 of
the Constitution on the right against unreasonable searches and seizures.
8. (2nd petition) On the same day, Peaceful Responsible Owners of Guns, Inc. (PROGUN), a
registered nonstock, nonprofit corporation that aims to represent the interests of legitimate and
licensed gun owners in the Philippines, filed its own Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of
preliminary injunction.
PROGUN questions the following:
a) the centralization of all firearms licensing, renewal, and testing at the Philippine
National Police Headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City, to the detriment of those
who would be coming from places far from Metro Manila;
b) the requirement for applicants for a firearm license to waive their right to privacy and
allow the police to enter their dwellings, in violation of Article III, Section 2 of the
Constitution on the right against unreasonable searches and seizure; and
c) the outsourcing of the delivery of firearm license to a courier service, depriving the
licensee of the right to use the firearm within the period from approval of the application
to the actual date of delivery of the license card.
9. (3rd petition) On June 6, 2014, Guns and Ammo Dealers Association of the Philippines
(Guns and Ammo Dealers), allegedly "an umbrella organization of about 50 members who are
authorized firearms dealers in the Philippines," filed its Petition for Mandamus and Certiorari
with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or a writ of preliminary
injunction.
The following are its grounds for filing the Petition:
a) The Philippine National Police's refusal or failure to establish regional and provincial
offices where individual applicants may obtain the requirements for firearm licenses
allegedly deprive Guns and Ammo Dealers' members of the profits from their firearm
businesses, as they have no licensed customers to sell their firearms to. Many of the
employees of gun dealers were likewise laid off due to losses from zero sales.
b) The Philippine National Police's refusal to accept and act on any firearm license
application since January 2014 constitutes grave abuse of discretion.
c) The centralization of firearms licensing in Camp Crame, Quezon City harms
individual applicants from the provinces and in violation of their right to due process of
law.
PETITIONER’S MAIN ARGUMENT:
In the main, petitioners argue that Republic Act No. 10591 and its Implementing Rules and
Regulations unduly restrict their right to bear anns, their right to property, and their right to
privacy.
RESPONDENT’S ARGUMENT:

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The government, through the Philippine National Police, counters that the keeping and bearing
of arms is a mere privilege, not a right. Thus, whoever seeks to obtain a firearm license has to
either accept or decline the government's terms for the use and possession of a firearm.
ISSUES:
Based on the submissions of the parties, the issues for this Court's resolution are the following:
First, whether or not an actual case or controversy exists warranting this Court's exercise of its
power of judicial review under Article VIII, Section 1 of the Constitution;
Second, whether or not petitioners have legal standing to file their respective Petitions;
Third, whether or not petitioners' direct recourse to this Court was proper in light of the doctrine
of hierarchy of courts;
Fourth, whether or not the 2013 Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic Act No.
10591 is in the nature of an ex post facto law by deeming as vacated all firearm licenses issued
under the old law, and compelling the re-application under the new law under pain of
prosecution for illegal possession of firearms;
Fifth, whether or not the Chief of the Philippine National Police made additional and more
restrictive regulations for gun clubs, sports shooters, reloaders, gunsmithing, competitions, and
indentors, thereby exceeding its rule-making power granted in Section 44 of Republic Act No.
10591;
Sixth, whether or not the licensing fees charged under the Implementing Rules and Regulations
are too numerous and, therefore, unreasonable;
Seventh, whether or not the Chief of the Philippine National Police added penal provisions in
the Implementing Rules and Regulations, thereby invalidly exercising a power exclusively
vested in Congress;
Eighth, whether or not the Implementing Rules and Regulations was drafted with the required
consultation with the concerned sectors of society;
Ninth, whether or not the Philippine National Police exceeded its authority by centralizing
firearms license applications and renewals at its headquarters at Camp Crame, Quezon City and
outsourcing the delivery of firearms license cards to a courier service;
Tenth, whether or not Section 7.3 of the Implementing Rules and Regulations is void for
omitting engineers as persons who may apply for a permit to carry firearm outside of residence
and, therefore, contrary to Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10591;
Eleventh, whether or not the requirement of a license to own and operate a firearm is a violation
of petitioners' right to bear arms;
Twelfth, whether or not the requirement of a license to own and operate a firearm is a valid
exercise of police power and, therefore, not violative of the right to due process;
Thirteenth, whether or not signing the Consent of Voluntary Presentation for Inspection
violates Article III, Section 2 of the Constitution on the protection against unreasonable searches
and seizures;
Fourteenth, whether or not requiring a certification from the president of a recognized gun club
or sports shooting association in order to obtain a firearm license violates Article III, Section 8
of the Constitution on the freedom of association; and
Finally, whether or not respondents are guilty of contempt of court.

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3) ALMORA vs. PNP DG DELA ROSA (ANG HIRAP INTINDIHIN…)

4) CORONA vs. UNITED HARBOR PILOTS ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILS.

PETITION for review of a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila, Branch 6.
FACTS:
1. On July 11, 1974, the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) was created by virtue of Presidential
Decree No. 505.
2. On December 23, 1975, Presidential Decree No. 857 was issued revising the PPA’s charter.
3. On March 21, 1985, pursuant to its power of control, regulation, and supervision of pilots and
the pilotage profession, the PPA promulgated PPA-AO 03-85 which embodied the “Rules and
Regulations Governing Pilotage Services, the Conduct of Pilots and Pilotage Fees in Philippine
Ports.”
4. These rules mandate, inter alia, that aspiring pilots must be holders of pilot licenses and must
train as probationary pilots in outports for three months and in the Port of Manila for four
months.
5. It is only after they have achieved satisfactory performance that they are given permanent and
regular appointments by the PPA itself to exercise harbor pilotage until they reach the age of 70,
unless sooner removed by reason of mental or physical unfitness by the PPA General Manager.
6. Harbor pilots in every harbor district are further required to organize themselves into pilot
associations which would make available such equipment as may be required by the PPA for
effective pilotage services.
7. In view of this mandate, pilot associations invested in floating, communications, and office
equipment.
8. In fact, every new pilot appointed by the PPA automatically becomes a member of a pilot
association and is required to pay a proportionate equivalent equity or capital before being
allowed to assume his duties, as reimbursement to the association concerned of the amount it
paid to his predecessor.
9. Subsequently, then PPA General Manager Rogelio A. Dayan issued PPA-AO No. 04-9 on
July 15, 1992, whose avowed policy was to “instill effective discipline and thereby afford better
protection to the port users through the improvement of pilotage services.”
10. On August 12, 1992, respondents United Harbor Pilots Association and the Manila Pilots
Association, through Capt. Alberto C. Compas, questioned PPA-AO No. 04-92 before the
Department of Transportation and Communication.
11. However, they were informed by then DOTC Secretary Jesus B. Garcia that “the matter of
reviewing, recalling or annulling PPA’s administrative issuances lies exclusively with its Board
of Directors as its governing body.”
12. Meanwhile, on August 31, 1992, the PPA issued a Memorandum Order No. 08-928 which
laid down the criteria or factors to be considered in the reappointment of harbor pilots, viz.:
(1) Qualifying Factors: safety record and physical/mental medical exam report and
(2) Criteria for Evaluation: promptness in servicing vessels, compliance with PPA Pilotage
Guidelines, number of years as a harbor pilot, average GRT of vessels serviced as pilot,
awards/commendations as harbor pilot, and age.

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13. Respondents reiterated their request for the suspension of the implementation of PPA-AO
No. 04-92.
14. But Secretary Garcia insisted on his position that the matter was within the jurisdiction of the
Board of Directors of the PPA.
15. Respondent Capt. Alberto C. Compas appealed this ruling to the Office of the President
(OP), reiterating his arguments before the DOTC.
16. On December 23, 1992 the OP issued an order directing the PPA to hold in abeyance the
implementation of PPA-AO No. 04-92.
17. In its answer, the PPA countered that said administrative order was issued in the exercise of
its administrative control and supervision over harbor pilots under Section 6-a (viii), Article IV
of P.D. No. 857, as amended, and it, along with its implementing guidelines, was intended to
restore order in the ports and to improve the quality of port services.
18. On March 17, 1993, the OP, through then Assistant Executive Secretary for Legal Affairs
Renato C. Corona, dismissed the appeal/petition and lifted the restraining order issued earlier.
He concluded that PPA-AO No. 04-92 applied to all harbor pilots and, for all intents and
purposes, was not the act of Dayan, but of the PPA, which was merely implementing Section 6
of P.D. No. 857, mandating it “to control, regulate and supervise pilotage and conduct of pilots
in any port district.”
19. On the alleged unconstitutionality and illegality of PPA-AO No. 04-92 and its implementing
memoranda and circulars, Secretary Corona opined that:
 The exercise of one’s profession falls within the constitutional guarantee against
wrongful deprivation of, or interference with, property rights without due process. In the
limited context of this case, PPA-AO 04-92 does not constitute a wrongful interference
with, let alone a wrongful deprivation of the property rights of those affected thereby.
 PPA-AO 04-92 does not forbid, but merely regulates, the exercise by harbor pilots of
their profession in PPA’s jurisdictional area.”
20. Consequently, respondents filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and injunction with
prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and damages, before Branch 6 of the
Regional Trial Court of Manila.
21. On September 6, 1993, the trial court rendered the following judgment:
“WHEREFORE, for all the foregoing, this Court hereby rules that:
 Respondents (herein petitioners) have acted in excess of jurisdiction and with grave
abuse of discretion and in a capricious, whimsical and arbitrary manner in promulgating
PPA Administrative Order 04-92 including all its implementing Memoranda, Circulars
and Orders;
 PPA Administrative Order 04-92 and its implementing Circulars and Orders are declared
null and void;
 The respondents are permanently enjoined from implementing PPA Administrative
Order 04-92 and its implementing Memoranda, Circulars and Orders.
22. Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE:
In issuing Administrative Order No. 04-92 (PPA-AO No. 04-92), limiting the term of
appointment of harbor pilots to one year subject to yearly renewal or cancellation, did the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA) violate respondents’ right to exercise their profession and their
right to due process of law?

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RULING:
After carefully examining the records and deliberating on the arguments of the parties, the Court
is convinced that PPA-AO No. 04-92 was issued in stark disregard of respondents’ right against
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Consequently, the instant petition must be denied.

5) EXECUTIVE SECRETARY vs. COURT OF APPEALS

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
1. Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act
of1995, took effect on July 15, 1995.
2. The Omnibus Rules and Regulations Implementing the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Act of 1995 was, thereafter, published in the April 7, 1996 issue of the Manila Bulletin.
3. However, even before the law took effect, the Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter,
Inc. (ARCO-Phil.) filed, on July 17, 1995, a petition for declaratory relief under Rule 63 of the
Rules of Court with the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City to declare as unconstitutional
SOME PROVISIONS OF THE LAW, with a plea for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order and/or writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the respondents therein from enforcing the
assailed provisions of the law.
4. In a supplement to its petition, the ARCO-Phil. alleged that Rep. Act No. 8042 was self-
executory and that no implementing rules were needed.
5. It prayed that the court issue a temporary restraining order to enjoin the enforcement of:
 Section 6, paragraphs (a) to (m) on illegal recruitment,
 Section 7 on penalties for illegal recruitment, and
 Section 9 on venue of criminal actions for illegal recruitments
6. On August 1, 1995, the trial court issued a temporary restraining order effective for a period
of only twenty (20) days therefrom.
7. The law required that only skilled workers were to be deployed for employed abroad.
8. The respondent stressed that unskilled workers also have the right to seek employment
abroad.
According to the respondent:
 The right of unskilled workers to due process is violated because they are prevented
from finding employment and earning a living abroad.
 It cannot be argued that skilled workers are immune from abuses by employers, while
unskilled workers are merely prone to such abuses.
 It was pointed out that both skilled and unskilled workers are subjected to abuses by
foreign employers.
 Furthermore, the prohibition of the deployment of unskilled workers abroad would only
encourage fly-by-night illegal recruiters.
9. The respondent, likewise, alleged that Section 6, subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional
because licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are placed on equal footing with illegal
recruiters.

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  It contended that while the Labor Code distinguished between recruiters who are holders
of licenses and non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, Rep. Act No. 8042
does not make any distinction.
 The penalties in Section 7(a) and (b) being based on an invalid classification are,
therefore, repugnant to the equal protection clause, besides being excessive; hence, such
penalties are violative of Section 19(1), Article III of the Constitution.
 It was also pointed out that the penalty for officers/officials/employees of recruitment
agencies who are found guilty of economic sabotage or large-scale illegal recruitment
under Rep. Act No. 8042 is life imprisonment.
8. In their answer to the petition, the petitioners alleged, inter alia, that
(a) the respondent has no cause of action for a declaratory relief;
(b) the petition was premature as the rules implementing Rep. Act No. 8042 not having been
released as yet;
(c)the assailed provisions do not violate any provisions of the Constitution; and,
(d) the law was approved by Congress in the exercise of the police power of the State.
9. RTC Ruling: the trial court issued on August 21, 1995, an order granting the petitioner’s plea
for a writ of preliminary injunction upon a bond of P50,000.
The petitioner posted the requisite bond and on August 24, 1995, the trial court issued a writ of
preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the following provisions of Rep. Act No.
8042 pending the termination of the proceedings.
10. The petitioners filed a petition for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the order
and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by the trial court on the following grounds:
 Respondent ARCO-PHIL. had utterly failed to show its clear right/s or that of its
member-agencies to be protected by the injunctive relief and/or violation of said rights
by the enforcement of the assailed sections of R.A. 8042;
 Respondent Judge fixed a P50,000 injunction bond which is grossly inadequate to
answer for the damage which petitioner-officials may sustain, should respondent ARCO-
PHIL. be finally adjudged as not being entitled thereto.
11. The petitioners asserted that the respondent is not the real party-in-interest as petitioner in
the trial court.
 It is inconceivable how the respondent, a non-stock and non-profit corporation, could
sustain direct injury as a result of the enforcement of the law.
 They argued that if, at all, any damage would result in the implementation of the law, it
is the licensed and registered recruitment agencies and/or the unskilled Filipino migrant
workers discriminated against who would sustain the said injury or damage, not the
respondent.
12. CA Ruling: On December 5, 1997, the appellate court came out with a four paged decision
dismissing the petition and affirming the assailed order and writ of preliminary injunction issued
by the trial court.
 The appellate court, likewise, denied the petitioners’ motion for reconsideration of the
said decision.
13. The petitioners now come to this Court in a petition for review on certiorari on the following
grounds:

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  Private respondent ARCO-PHIL. Had utterly failed to show its clear right/s or that of its
member-agencies to be protected by the injunctive relief and/or violation of said rights
by the enforcement of the assailed sections of R.A. 8042
 The P50,000 injunction bond fixed by the court a quo and sustained by the Court of
Appeals is grossly inadequate to answer for the damage which petitioners-officials may
sustain, should private respondent ARCO-PHIL. Be finally adjudged as not being
entitled thereto.
ISSUES:
The core issue in this case is whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of its
discretion amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing the assailed order and the writ of
preliminary injunction on a bond of only P50,000, and whether or not the appellate court erred in
affirming the trial court’s order and the writ of preliminary injunction issued by it.
(Whether or not RA 8042 is valid)

6) DY vs. PEOPLE
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of Appeals.
FACTS:
1. Petitioner was the former General Manager of MCCI.
2. In the course of her employment, petitioner assisted Mandy Commodities Company, Inc.
(MCCI) in its business involving several properties.
3. One such business pertained to the construction of warehouses over a property (Numancia
Property) that MCCI leased from the Philippine National Bank (PNB).
4. Sometime in May 1996, in pursuit of MCCI’s business, petitioner proposed to William
Mandy (Mandy), President of MCCI, the purchase of a property owned by Pantranco.
5. As the transaction involved a large amount of money, Mandy agreed to obtain a loan from the
International China Bank of Commerce (ICBC).
6. Petitioner represented that she could facilitate the approval of the loan.
7. True enough, ICBC granted a loan to MCCI in the amount of P20,000,000.00, evidenced by a
promissory note.
8. As security, MCCI also executed a chattel mortgage over the warehouses in the Numancia
Property.
9. Mandy entrusted petitioner with the obligation to manage the payment of the loan.
10. In February 1999, MCCI received a notice of foreclosure over the mortgaged property due to
its default in paying the loan obligation.
11. In order to prevent the foreclosure, Mandy instructed petitioner to facilitate the payment of
the loan.
12. MCCI, through Mandy, issued 13 Allied Bank checks and 12 Asia Trust Bank checks in
varying amounts and in different dates covering the period from May 18, 1999 to April 4, 2000.
13. The total amount of the checks, which were all payable to cash, was P21,706,281.00.
14. Mandy delivered the checks to petitioner.

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15. Mandy claims that he delivered the checks with the instruction that petitioner use the checks
to pay the loan.
16. Petitioner, on the other hand, testified that she encashed the checks and returned the money
to Mandy.
17. ICBC eventually foreclosed the mortgaged property as MCCI continued to default in its
obligation to pay.
18. Mandy claims that it was only at this point in time that he discovered that not a check was
paid to ICBC.
19. Thus, on October 7, 2002, MCCI, represented by Mandy, filed a Complaint-Affidavit for
Estafa before the Office of the City Prosecutor of Manila.
20. On March 3, 2004, an Information was filed against petitioner before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) Manila.
21. After a full-blown trial, the RTC Manila rendered a decision (RTC Decision) acquitting
petitioner.
 The RTC Manila found that while petitioner admitted that she received the checks, the
prosecution failed to establish that she was under any obligation to deliver them to ICBC
in payment of MCCI’s loan.
 The trial court made this finding on the strength of Mandy’s admission that he gave the
checks to petitioner with the agreement that she would encash them. Petitioner would
then pay ICBC using her own checks.
 The trial court further made a finding that Mandy and petitioner entered into a contract of
loan.
 Thus, it held that the prosecution failed to establish an important element of the crime of
estafa—misappropriation or conversion.
 However, while the RTC Manila acquitted petitioner, it ordered her to pay the amount of
the checks.
22. Petitioner filed an appeal of the civil aspect of the RTC Decision with the CA.
23. CA Ruling: the CA found the appeal without merit. (denied the appeal)
 It held that the acquittal of petitioner does not necessarily absolve her of civil liability.
 The CA said that it is settled that when an accused is acquitted on the basis of reasonable
doubt, courts may still find him or her civilly liable if the evidence so warrant.
 The CA explained that the evidence on record adequately prove that petitioner received
the checks as a loan from MCCI.
 Thus, preventing the latter from recovering the amount of the checks would constitute
unjust enrichment.
24. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari (Petition).
 Petitioner argues that since she was acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove
all the elements of the crime charged, there was therefore no crime committed.
 As there was no crime, any civil liability ex delicto cannot be awarded.
ISSUE:
The central issue is the propriety of making a finding of civil liability in a criminal case for
Estafa when the accused is acquitted for failure of the prosecution to prove all the elements of
the crime charged
RULING:

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Our law states that every person criminally liable for a felony is also civilly liable.
This civil liability ex delicto may be recovered through a civil action which, under our Rules of
Court, is deemed instituted with the criminal action.
While they are actions mandatorily fused, they are, in truth, separate actions whose existences
are not dependent on each other. Thus, civil liability ex delicto survives an acquittal in a criminal
case for failure to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
However, the Rules of Court limits this mandatory fusion to a civil action for the recovery of
civil liability ex delicto.
It, by no means, includes a civil liability arising from a different source of obligation, as in the
case of a contract.
Where the civil liability is ex contractu, the court hearing the criminal case has no authority to
award damages.

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