1. ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSO. V.
MAYOR OF The lower court on July 6, 1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to
MANILA
[20 SCRA 849; G.R. NO.L-24693; 31 JULY 1967]
FACTS:
Petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association with one of its members, Hotel del
Mar Inc., and Go Chiu, the president and general manager of the second petitioner, filed a petition
for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila
who was sued in his capacity as such charged with the general power and duty to enforce
ordinances of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the execution and
enforcement of such ordinances. It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is
dedicated to the promotion and protection of the interest of its eighteen members operating hotels
and motels, characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city
authorities and regularly paying taxes. It was alleged that on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760, approved on June 14, 1963 by the then acting
City Mayor, Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga.
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was the
assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to enact
insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City of Manila
or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged ordinance is
unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due process insofar as it would
impose P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for second class motels; that
the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or duly
authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or
accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons
without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times and in his
presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the address, the
occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of companions in the
room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified, with data furnished as
to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any, coupled with a certification that
a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his signature in the presence of
such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with such registration forms and
records kept and bound together, it also being provided that the premises and facilities of such
hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the
Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due
process grounds, not only for being arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being
vague, indefinite and uncertain, and likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and
the guaranty against self-incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying
motels into two classes and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class
motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly
offends against the due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a
conclusion which applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a
dining room; that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less
than 18 years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common
inn unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack
of certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the
penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction would,
cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing the
destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression of the
due process clause.
refrain from enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
ISSUES:
1.) Whether or not the ordinance is violative of the due process clause - NO
2.) Whether or Not Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is unconstitutional, therefore, null and
void - NO
HELD:
1.) NO. Not violative. A Manila ordinance regulating the operation of hotels, motels and lodging
houses is a police measure specifically aimed to safeguards public morals. As such it is immune
from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by anything of
substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of police power
which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the less limitable of
powers extending as it does to all great public needs.
Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount of license fees to be
imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals in the community may be deprived of
their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot prevent the exercise of
police power.
There is no controlling and precise definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which
governmental action should conform in order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each
appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural
and as substantive requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that
matter, from imputation of legal infirmity is responsiveness to the supremacy of reason, obedience
to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted
precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious
proportions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be deemed
unreasonable and what would amount to an abduction of the power to govern is inaction in the
face of an admitted deterioration of the state of public morals.
The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager,
keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern or common inn
or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof more than twice every twenty four hours,
with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot be viewed as a transgression
against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary,
because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of an undesirable
situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct amounts
to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.
2.) NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL.A decent regard for constitutional doctrines of a fundamental
character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a sweeping condemnation of
the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand, consistently with what has
been the accepted standards of constitutional adjudication, in both procedural and substantive
aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset the
presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was expressed
categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity x x x . The action of
the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The councilors must, in the
very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality and with all
 the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action. The local
legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect given notice that the regulations are
essential to the well being of the people x x x . The Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative
action when there is not a clear invasion of personal or property rights under the guise of police
regulation.
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for evidence to
rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its face which is not the case
here. The principle has been nowhere better expressed than in the leading case of O'Gorman &
Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co. where the American Supreme Court through Justice
Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: The statute here questioned deals
with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked to declare it void on the
ground that the specific method of regulation prescribed is unreasonable and hence deprives the
plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of fact may condition the constitutionality
of legislation of this character, the resumption of constitutionality must prevail in the absence of
some factual foundation of record for overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being
laid in the present case, the lower court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation
of facts, the presumption of validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set
aside.
2. RUBI V. PROVINCIAL BOARD OF MINDORO
[39 PHIL 660; G.R. NO. 14078; 7 MAR 1919]
FACTS:
This is an application for habeas corpus in favor of Rubi and other Manguianes of the Province of
Mindoro.
The provincial board of Mindoro adopted resolution No. 25 which states that “provincial governor of
any province in which non-Christian inhabitants (uncivilized tribes) are found is authorized, when
such a course is deemed necessary in the interest of law and order, to direct such inhabitants to
take up their habitation on sites on unoccupied public lands to be selected by him and approved
by the provincial board”. It is resolved that under section 2077 of the Administrative Code, 800
hectares of public land in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake be selected as a site for the
permanent settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. Further, Mangyans may only solicit homesteads
on this reservation providing that said homestead applications are previously recommended by
the provincial governor.
Thereafter, the provincial governor of Mindoro issued executive order No. 2, which says that the
provincial governor has selected a site in the sitio of Tigbao on Naujan Lake for the permanent
settlement of Mangyanes in Mindoro. In that case, pursuant to Section 2145 of the Revised
Administrative Code, all the Mangyans in the townships of Naujan and Pola and the Mangyans
east of the Baco River including those in the districts of Dulangan and Rubi's place in Calapan,
were ordered to take up their habitation on the site of Tigbao, Naujan Lake. Also, that any
Mangyan who shall refuse to comply with this order shall upon conviction be imprisoned not
exceed in sixty days, in accordance with section 2759 of the revised Administrative Code.
Said resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro were claimed as necessary measures for the
protection of the Mangyanes of Mindoro as well as the protection of public forests in which they
roam, and to introduce civilized customs among them.
It appeared that Rubi and those living in his rancheria have not fixed their dwelling within the
reservation of Tigbao and are liable to be punished.
It is alleged that the Manguianes are being illegally deprived of their liberty by the provincial officials of
that province. Rubi and his companions are said to be held on the reservation established at
Tigbao, Mindoro, against their will, and one Dabalos is said to be held under the custody of the
provincial sheriff in the prison at Calapan for having run away form the reservation.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Section 2145 of the Administrative Code deprives a person of his liberty without due
process of law
HELD: NO. Constitutional. The Court held that section 2145 of the Administrative Code does not
deprive a person of his liberty without due process of law and does not deny to him the equal
protection of the laws, and that confinement in reservations in accordance with said section does
not constitute slavery and involuntary servitude. The Court is further of the opinion that section
2145 of the Administrative Code is a legitimate exertion of the police power, somewhat analogous
to the Indian policy of the United States. Section 2145 of the Administrative Code of 1917 is
constitutional.
The preamble of the resolution of the provincial board of Mindoro which set apart the Tigbao
reservation, it will be read, assigned as reasons fort the action, the following: (1) The failure of
former attempts for the advancement of the non-Christian people of the province; and (2) the only
successfully method for educating the Manguianes was to oblige them to live in a permanent
settlement. The Solicitor-General adds the following; (3) The protection of the Manguianes; (4) the
protection of the public forests in which they roam; (5) the necessity of introducing civilized
customs among the Manguianes.
To quote again from the instructive memorandum of the Secretary of the Interior:
Living a nomadic and a wayfaring life and evading the influence of civilization, they (the manguianes)
are engaged in the works of destruction — burning and destroying the forests and making illegal
caiñgins thereon. Not bringing any benefit to the State but instead injuring and damaging its
interests, what will ultimately become of these people with the sort of liberty they wish to preserve
and for which they are now fighting in court? They will ultimately become a heavy burden to the
State and on account of their ignorance they will commit crimes and make depredations, or if not
they will be subjected to involuntary servitude by those who may want to abuse them.
There is no doubt in my mind that this people a right conception of liberty and does not practice
liberty in a rightful way. They understand liberty as the right to do anything they will — going
from one place to another in the mountains, burning and destroying forests and making illegal
caiñgins thereon.
Not knowing what true liberty is and not practising the same rightfully, how can they allege that they
are being deprived thereof without due process of law?
xxx           xxx           xxx
But does the Constitutional guaranty that 'no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due
process of law' apply to a class of persons who do not have a correct idea of what liberty is and do
not practise liberty in a rightful way?
To say that it does will mean to sanction and defend an erroneous idea of such class of persons as to
what liberty is. It will mean, in the case at bar, that the Government should not adopt any
measures looking to the welfare and advancement of the class of persons in question. It will mean
 that this people should be let along in the mountains and in a permanent state of savagery
without even the remotest hope of coming to understand liberty in its true and noble sense. None of the rights of the citizen can be taken away except by due process of law. To constitute "due
process of law," as has been often held, a judicial proceeding is not always necessary. In some
instances, even a hearing and notice are not requisite a rule which is especially true where much
In dealing with the backward population, like the Manguianes, the Government has been placed in the
must be left to the discretion of the administrative officers in applying a law to particular cases.
alternative of either letting them alone or guiding them in the path of civilization. The latter
measure was adopted as the one more in accord with humanity and with national conscience.
The idea of the provision in question is to unify the people of the Philippines so that they may
approach the highest conception of nationality. The public policy of the Government of the
xxx           xxx           xxx Philippine Islands is shaped with a view to benefit the Filipino people as a whole. The
Manguianes, in order to fulfill this governmental policy, must be confined for a time, as we have
said, for their own good and the good of the country.
The national legislation on the subject of non-Christian people has tended more and more towards the
education and civilization of such people and fitting them to be citizens. The progress of those
Therefore, petitioners are not unlawfully imprisoned or restrained of their liberty. Habeas corpus can,
people under the tutelage of the Government is indeed encouraging and the signs of the times
therefore, not issue.
point to a day which is not far distant when they will become useful citizens. In the light of what
has already been accomplished which has been winning the gratitude of most of the backward
people, shall we give up the noble work simply because a certain element, believing that their
personal interests would be injured by such a measure has come forward and challenged the 3 ORQUIOLA v. TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT
authority of the Government to lead this people in the pat of civilization? Shall we, after expending
sweat, treasure, and even blood only to redeem this people from the claws of ignorance and CORPORATION
superstition, now willingly retire because there has been erroneously invoked in their favor that
Constitutional guaranty that no person shall be deprived of his liberty without due process of law? [G.R. No. 141463; August 6, 2002]
To allow them to successfully invoke that Constitutional guaranty at this time will leave the
Government without recourse to pursue the works of civilizing them and making them useful
citizens. They will thus left in a permanent state of savagery and become a vulnerable point to
Petitioners: VICTOR ORQUIOLA and HONORATA ORQUIOLA
attack by those who doubt, nay challenge, the ability of the nation to deal with our backward
Respondents: HON. COURT OF APPEALS, HON. VIVENCIO S. BACLIG, Presiding Judge, Regional
brothers.
Trial Court, Branch 77, Quezon City, THE SHERIFF OF QUEZON CITY and HIS/HER DEPUTIES
and PURA KALAW LEDESMA, substituted by TANDANG SORA DEVELOPMENT CORPORATION
The manguianes in question have been directed to live together at Tigbao. There they are being taught
and guided to improve their living conditions. They are being made to understand that they object Doctrine: No person shall be deprived of property without due process of law. Failure to implead proper
of the government is to organize them politically into fixed and permanent communities. They are parties- in-interest, they cannot be reached by decision as no man shall be affected by any
being aided to live and work. Their children are being educated in a school especially established proceeding to which he is a stranger who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest
for them. In short, everything is being done from them in order that their advancement in in an action are bound by the judgment
civilization and material prosperity may be assured. Certainly their living together in Tigbao does
not make them slaves or put them in a condition compelled to do services for another. They do not FACTS:
work for anybody but for themselves. There is, therefore, no involuntary servitude. Petition for review seeking the reversal of the CA decision which dismissed the petition to prohibit
Judge Vivencio Baclig of the RTC from issuing a writ of demolition against petitioners, and the
sheriff and deputy sheriff from implementing an alias writ of execution.
But they are compelled to live there and prohibited from emigrating to some other places under
penalty of imprisonment. Attention in this connection is invited to the fact that this people, living
Pura Kalaw Ledesma was the registered owner of Lot 689 in Tandang Sora, Quezon City which is
a nomadic and wayfaring life, do not have permanent individual property. They move from one
adjacent to certain portions of Lot 707 of the Piedad Estates, registered in the name of
place to another as the conditions of living warrants, and the entire space where they are roving
Herminigilda Pedro. Herminigilda sold the lots to Mariano Lising, registered them in the name of
about is the property of the nation, the greater part being lands of public domain. Wandering from
M.B. Lising Realty and subdivided them into smaller lots. Petitioners, spouses Victor and
one place to another on the public lands, why can not the government adopt a measure to
Honorata Orquiola, purchased a portion of this Lot 707-A-2.
concentrate them in a certain fixed place on the public lands, instead of permitting them to roam
all over the entire territory? This measure is necessary both in the interest of the public as owner
In 1969, Pura Kalaw Ledesma filed Civil Case against Herminigilda Pedro and Mariano Lising for
of the lands about which they are roving and for the proper accomplishment of the purposes and
allegedly encroaching upon Lot 689. During the pendency of the action, Tandang Sora
objectives of the government. For as people accustomed to nomadic habit, they will always long to
Development Corporation replaced Pura Kalaw Ledesma as plaintiff by virtue of an assignment of
return to the mountains and follow a wayfaring life, and unless a penalty is provinced for, you can
Lot 689 Trial continued for three decades.
not make them live together and the noble intention of the Government of organizing them
politically will come to naught.
On August 21, 1991, the trial court finally adjudged defendants Pedro and Lising jointly and severally
liable for encroaching on plaintiffs land and ordered to remove the house they constructed on the
land they were occupying.
Considered purely as an exercise of the police power, the courts cannot fairly say that the Legislature
has exceeded its rightful authority. It is, indeed, an unusual exercise of that power. But a great On April 2, 1998, petitioners received a Special Order to remove, at their expense, all constructions,
malady requires an equally drastic remedy. One cannot hold that the liberty of the citizen is including barbed wires and fences, which defendants constructed on plaintiff’s property, within
unduly interfered without when the degree of civilization of the Manguianes is considered. They fifteen (15) days from notice otherwise, this Court will issue a writ of demolition against them.
are restrained for their own good and the general good of the Philippines. Nor can one say that
due process of law has not been followed.
Petitioners filed with the CA a petition for prohibition with prayer for a restraining order and
preliminary injunction alleging that they bought the subject parcel of land in good faith and for
value, hence, they were parties in interest. Since they were not impleaded in Civil Case, the writ of
demolition issued in connection therewith cannot be enforced against them because to do so
would amount to deprivation of property without due process of law.
CA dismissed the petition as well as the motion for reconsideration, ruling that petitioners were
considered privies who derived their rights from Lising by virtue of the sale and could be reached
by the execution order in Civil Case
ISSUES:
1. Whether the alias writ of execution may be enforced against petitioners - NO
2. Whether spouses are innocent purchasers for value and builders in good faith - YES
HELD:
1. NO. Petitioners claim that the writ cannot be enforced and that the appellate court relied heavily
on another case, Medina v. Cruz. Petitioners are correct. Medina markedly differs from the
present case on major points. First, the petitioner in Medina acquired the right over the houses
and lot subject of the dispute after the original action was commenced and became final and
executory. In the present case, petitioners acquired the lot before the commencement of Civil Case
No. Q-12918. Second, the right over the disputed land of the predecessors-in-interest of the
petitioner in Medina was based on a title of doubtful authenticity, allegedly a Titulo de
Composicion Con El Estado issued by the Spanish Government in favor of one Don Mariano San
Pedro y Esteban, while the right over the land of the predecessors-in-interest of herein petitioners
is based on a fully recognized Torrens title. Third, petitioners in this case acquired the registered
title in their own names, while the petitioner in Medina merely relied on the title of her
predecessor-in-interest and tax declarations to prove her alleged ownership of the land.
We must stress that where a case like the present one involves a sale of a parcel of land under the
Torrens system, the applicable rule is that a person dealing with the registered property need not
go beyond the certificate of title; he can rely solely on the title and he is charged with notice only
of such burdens and claims as are annotated on the title. It is our view here that the petitioners,
spouses Victor and Honorata Orquiola, are fully entitled to the legal protection of their lot by the
Torrens system, unlike the petitioner in the Medina case who merely relied on a mere Titulo de
Composicion.
2. YES. Buyer in good faith is one who buys the property of another without notice that some other
person has a right to or interest in such property. Buyer for value is one who he pays a full and
fair price at the time of the purchase or before he has notice of the claim or interest of some other
person in the property.
Determination of whether one is a buyer in good faith is a factual issue which generally is outside the
province of this except if CA failed to take into account certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion. CA failed to consider that petitioners purchased
the subject land in 1964 from Mariano Lising and the civil case commenced sometime in 1969.
Petitioners could reasonably rely on Mariano Lisings Certificate of Title which at the time of
purchase was still free from any third party claim. Hence, petitioners are buyers in good faith and
for value.
Builder in good faith - one who builds with the belief that the land he is building on is his, and is
ignorant of any defect or flaw in his title. Petitioner spouses acquired the land without knowledge
of any defect in the title of Mariano Lising. It was only in 1998, when the sheriff of Quezon City
tried to execute the judgment in Civil Case which cannot serve as notice of such adverse claim to
petitioners since they were not impleaded therein as parties.
Petitioners have rights over the subject property and hence they are proper parties in interest in any
case, hence they should have been impleaded in civil case. Failure to implead proper parties in
interest, they cannot be reached by decision as no man shall be affected by any proceeding to
which he is a stranger who did not have his day in court. Only real parties in interest in an action
are bound by the judgment Demolition of their house on their own titled lot tantamounts to a
deprivation of property without due process of law.
Petition granted.
***Medina Case
 Benedicta Mangahas and Francisco Ramos occupied and built houses on the lot without consent
of the owner of property which is the Philippine Realty Corporation (PRC);
 PRC sold the lot to Remedios Magbanua. Mangahas and Ramos opposed and instituted Civil Case
to annul the sale and to compel PRC to execute a contract of sale in their favor. The trial court
dismissed the complaint and ordered Mangahas and Ramos to vacate;
 When Magbanua sought the execution of the judgment in Civil Case petitioner Medina opposed
contending that she bought the houses from spouses Ricardo and Eufrocinia de Guzman
(Mangahas and Ramos sold the property to spouses de Guzman), relying title from Titulo de
Composicion Con El Estado .Medina argued that the trial court did not acquire jurisdiction over
her, claiming that she was not a party in first Civil Case;
 Court ruled that first civil case could be enforced against petitioner even though she was not a
party thereto. Petitioner was privy to the two judgment debtors Mangahas and Ramos;
4 GALMAN V. SANDIGANBAYAN
[144 SCRA 43; G.R. NO.72670; 12 SEP 1986]
FACTS:
Assassination of former Senator Benigno "Ninoy" Aquino, Jr. He was killed from his plane that had
just landed at the Manila International Airport. His brain was smashed by a bullet fired point-
blank into the back of his head by an assassin. The military investigators reported within a span
of three hours that the man who shot Aquino (whose identity was then supposed to be unknown
and was revealed only days later as Rolando Galman) was a communist-hired gunman, and that
the military escorts gunned him down in turn.
President was constrained to create a Fact Finding Board to investigate due to large masses of people
who joined in the ten-day period of national mourning yearning for the truth, justice and freedom.
The fact is that both majority and minority reports were one in rejecting the military version stating
that "the evidence shows to the contrary that Rolando Galman had no subversive affiliations. Only
the soldiers in the staircase with Sen. Aquino could have shot him; that Ninoy's assassination was
the product of a military conspiracy, not a communist plot. Only difference between the two
reports is that the majority report found all the twenty-six private respondents above-named in
the title of the case involved in the military conspiracy; " while the chairman's minority report
would exclude nineteen of them.
Then Pres. Marcos stated that evidence shows that Galman was the killer.

Petitioners pray for issuance of a TRO enjoining respondent court from rendering a decision in the two
criminal cases before it, the Court resolved by nine-to-two votes 11 to issue the restraining order
prayed for. The Court also granted petitioners a five-day period to file a reply to respondents'
separate comments and respondent Tanodbayan a three-day period to submit a copy of his 84-
page memorandum for the prosecution.
But ten days later, the Court by the same nine-to-two-vote ratio in reverse, resolved to dismiss the
petition and to lift the TRO issued ten days earlier enjoining the Sandiganbayan from rendering its
decision. The same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for a new 5-day period counted from
receipt of respondent Tanodbayan's memorandum for the prosecution (which apparently was not
served on them).
Thus, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration, alleging that the dismissal did not indicate the
legal ground for such action and urging that the case be set for a full hearing on the merits that
the people are entitled to due process.
However, respondent Sandiganbayan issued its decision acquitting all the accused of the crime
charged, declaring them innocent and totally absolving them of any civil liability. Respondents
submitted that with the Sandiganbayan's verdict of acquittal, the instant case had become moot
and academic. Thereafter, same Court majority denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for
lack of merit.
Hence, petitioners filed their motion to admit their second motion for reconsideration alleging that
respondents committed serious irregularities constituting mistrial and resulting in miscarriage of
justice and gross violation of the constitutional rights of the petitioners and the sovereign people
of the Philippines to due process of law.
ISSUE:
Whether or not there was a violation of the double jeopardy clause. – NO DOUBLE JEOPARDY
HELD:
NO. Petitioners' second motion for reconsideration is granted and ordering a re-trial of the said cases
which should be conducted with deliberate dispatch and with careful regard for the requirements
of due process.
Deputy Tanodbayan Manuel Herrera (made his expose 15 months later when former Pres. was no
longer around) affirmed the allegations in the second motion for reconsideration that he revealed
that the Sandiganbayan Justices and Tanodbayan prosecutors were ordered by Marcos to
whitewash the Aquino-Galman murder case. Malacañang wanted dismissal to the extent that a
prepared resolution was sent to the Investigating Panel. Malacañang Conference planned a
scenario of trial where the former President ordered then that the resolution be revised by
categorizing the participation of each respondent; decided that the presiding justice, Justice
Pamaran, (First Division) would personally handle the trial. A conference was held in an inner
room of the Palace. Only the First Lady and Presidential Legal Assistant Justice Lazaro were with
the President. The conferees were told to take the back door in going to the room where the
meeting was held, presumably to escape notice by the visitors in the reception hall waiting to see
the President. During the conference, and after an agreement was reached, Pres. Marcos told
them 'Okay, mag moro-moro na lamang kayo;' and that on their way out of the room Pres. Marcos
expressed his thanks to the group and uttered 'I know how to reciprocate'.
The Court then said that the then President (code-named Olympus) had stage-managed in and from
Malacañang Palace "a scripted and predetermined manner of handling and disposing of the
Aquino-Galman murder case;" and that "the prosecution in the Aquino-Galman case and the
Justices who tried and decided the same acted under the compulsion of some pressure which
proved to be beyond their capacity to resist. Also predetermined the final outcome of the case" of
total absolution of the twenty-six respondents-accused of all criminal and civil liability. Pres.
Marcos came up with a public statement aired over television that Senator Aquino was killed not
by his military escorts, but by a communist hired gun. It was, therefore, not a source of wonder
that President Marcos would want the case disposed of in a manner consistent with his
announced theory thereof which, at the same time, would clear his name and his administration
of any suspected guilty participation in the assassination. such a procedure would be a better
arrangement because, if the accused are charged in court and subsequently acquitted, they may
claim the benefit of the doctrine of double jeopardy and thereby avoid another prosecution if some
other witnesses shall appear when President Marcos is no longer in office.
More so was there suppression of vital evidence and harassment of witnesses. The disappearance of
witnesses two weeks after Ninoy's assassination. According to J. Herrera, "nobody was looking for
these persons because they said Marcos was in power. The assignment of the case to Presiding
Justice Pamaran; no evidence at all that the assignment was indeed by virtue of a regular raffle,
except the uncorroborated testimony of Justice Pamaran himself. The custody of the accused and
their confinement in a military camp, instead of in a civilian jail. The monitoring of proceedings
and developments from Malacañang and by Malacañang personnel. The partiality of
Sandiganbayan betrayed by its decision: That President Marcos had wanted all of the twenty-six
accused to be acquitted may not be denied. In rendering its decision, the Sandiganbayan overdid
itself in favoring the presidential directive. Its bias and partiality in favor of the accused was
clearly obvious. The evidence presented by the prosecution was totally ignored and disregarded.
The record shows that the then President misused the overwhelming resources of the government and
his authoritarian powers to corrupt and make a mockery of the judicial process in the Aquino-
Galman murder cases. "This is the evil of one-man rule at its very worst." Our Penal Code
penalizes "any executive officer who shall address any order or suggestion to any judicial
authority with respect to any case or business coming within the exclusive jurisdiction of the
courts of justice."
Impartial court is the very essence of due process of law. This criminal collusion as to the handling
and treatment of the cases by public respondents at the secret Malacañang conference (and
revealed only after fifteen months by Justice Manuel Herrera) completely disqualified respondent
Sandiganbayan and voided ab initio its verdict. The courts would have no reason to exist if they
were allowed to be used as mere tools of injustice, deception and duplicity to subvert and
suppress the truth. More so, in the case at bar where the people and the world are entitled to
know the truth, and the integrity of our judicial system is at stake.
There was no double jeopardy. Courts' Resolution of acquittal was a void judgment for having been
issued without jurisdiction. No double jeopardy attaches, therefore. A void judgment is, in legal
effect, no judgment at all. By it no rights are divested. It neither binds nor bars anyone. All acts
and all claims flowing out of it are void.
Motion to Disqualify/Inhibit should have been resolved ahead. In this case, petitioners' motion for
reconsideration of the abrupt dismissal of their petition and lifting of the TRO enjoining the
Sandiganbayan from rendering its decision had been taken cognizance of by the Court which had
required the respondents', including the Sandiganbayan's, comments. Although no restraining
order was issued anew, respondent Sandiganbayan should not have precipitately issued its
decision of total absolution of all the accused pending the final action of this Court. All of the acts
of the respondent judge manifest grave abuse of discretion on his part amounting to lack of
jurisdiction which substantively prejudiced the petitioner.
With the declaration of nullity of the proceedings, the cases must now be tried before an impartial
court with an unbiased prosecutor. Respondents accused must now face trial for the crimes
charged against them before an impartial court with an unbiased prosecutor with all due process.
 The function of the appointing authority with the mandate of the people, under our system of
government, is to fill the public posts. Justices and judges must ever realize that they have no
constituency, serve no majority nor minority but serve only the public interest as they see it in
accordance with their oath of office, guided only the Constitution and their own conscience and
honor
5. STONEHILL V. DIOKNO
[20 SCRA 383; L-19550; 19 JUN 1967]
FACTS:
Upon application of the officers of the government named on the margin 1 — hereinafter referred to as
Respondents-Prosecutors — several judges2 — hereinafter referred to as Respondents-Judges — issued,
on different dates,3 a total of 42 search warrants against petitioners herein 4 and/or the corporations of
which they were officers,5 directed to the any peace officer, to search the persons above-named and/or
the premises of their offices, warehouses and/or residences, and to seize and take possession of the
following personal property to wit:
Books of accounts, financial records, vouchers, correspondence, receipts, ledgers, journals, portfolios, credit
journals, typewriters, and other documents and/or papers showing all business transactions including
disbursements receipts, balance sheets and profit and loss statements and Bobbins (cigarette wrappers).
as "the subject of the offense; stolen or embezzled and proceeds or fruits of the offense," or "used or intended
to be used as the means of committing the offense," which is described in the applications adverted to
above as "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and the
Revised Penal Code."
Petitioners’ contentions:
(1) they do not describe with particularity the documents, books and things to be seized;
(2) cash money, not mentioned in the warrants, were actually seized;
(3) the warrants were issued to fish evidence against the aforementioned petitioners in deportation cases
filed against them;
(4) the searches and seizures were made in an illegal manner; and
(5) the documents, papers and cash money seized were not delivered to the courts that issued the warrants,
to be disposed of in accordance with law —
Respondents-prosecutors contentions:
1 with respect to the offense committed were abstract. As a consequence, it was impossible for the judges
Hon. Jose W. Diokno, in his capacity as Secretary of Justice, Jose Lukban, in his capacity as Acting Director, National Bureau of
Investigation, Special Prosecutors Pedro D. Cenzon, Efren I. Plana and Manuel Villareal, Jr. and Assistant Fiscal Maneses G. Reyes, City of
Manila.
2
Hon. Amado Roan, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Manila, Hon. Roman Cansino, Judge of the Municipal (now City)
Court of Manila, Hon. Hermogenes Caluag, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City Branch, Hon. Eulogio Mencias, Judge
of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Pasig Branch, and Hon. Damian Jimenez, Judge of the Municipal (now City) Court of Quezon City.
3
Covering the period from March 3 to March 9, 1962.
4 the privacy of communication and correspondence at the mercy of the whims caprice or passion of peace
Harry S. Stonehill, Robert P. Brooks, John J. Brooks and Karl Beck.
5
U.S. Tobacco Corporation, Atlas Cement Corporation, Atlas Development Corporation, Far East Publishing Corporation
(Evening News), Investment Inc., Industrial Business Management Corporation, General Agricultural Corporation, American Asiatic Oil
Corporation, Investment Management Corporation, Holiday Hills, Inc., Republic Glass Corporation, Industrial and Business Management
Corporation, United Housing Corporation, The Philippine Tobacco-Flue-Curing and Redrying Corporation, Republic Real Estate Corporation
and Merconsel Corporation.
(1) that the contested search warrants are valid and have been issued in accordance with law;
(2) that the defects of said warrants, if any, were cured by petitioners' consent; and
(3) That, in any event, the effects seized are admissible in evidence against herein petitioners, regardless of
the alleged illegality of the aforementioned searches and seizures.
The documents, papers, and things seized under the alleged authority of the warrants in question may be
split into two (2) major groups, namely: (a) those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned
corporations, and (b) those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not those found and seized in the offices of the aforementioned corporations are obtained
legally. - YES
2. Whether or not those found and seized in the residences of petitioners herein are obtained legally. - NO
HELD:
1. YES. The petitioners have no cause of action to assail the legality of the contested warrants and of the
seizures made in pursuance thereof, for the simple reason that said corporations have their respective
personalities, separate and distinct from the personality of herein petitioners, regardless of the amount
of shares of stock or of the interest of each of them in said corporations, and whatever the offices they
hold therein may be. Indeed, it is well settled that the legality of a seizure can be contested only by the
party whose rights have been impaired thereby, and that the objection to an unlawful search and seizure
is purely personal and cannot be availed of by third parties. Consequently, petitioners herein may not
validly object to the use in evidence against them of the documents, papers and things seized from the
offices and premises of the corporations adverted to above, since the right to object to the admission of
said papers in evidence belongs exclusively to the corporations, to whom the seized effects belong, and
may not be invoked by the corporate officers in proceedings against them in their individual capacity. 
2. NO. Void warrants. With respect to the documents, papers and things seized in the residences of
petitioners herein, the aforementioned resolution of June 29, 1962, lifted the writ of preliminary
injunction previously issued by this Court, thereby, in effect, restraining herein Respondents-
Prosecutors from using them in evidence against petitioners herein.
Two points must be stressed in connection with this constitutional mandate, namely: (1) that no warrant
shall issue but upon probable cause, to be determined by the judge in the manner set forth in said
provision; and (2) that the warrant shall particularly describe the things to be seized.
None of these requirements has been complied with in the contested warrants. Indeed, the same were issued
upon applications stating that the natural and juridical person therein named had committed a
"violation of Central Ban Laws, Tariff and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal
Code." In other words, no specific offense had been alleged in said applications. The averments thereof
who issued the warrants to have found the existence of probable cause, for the same presupposes the
introduction of competent proof that the party against whom it is sought has performed particular acts,
or committed specific omissions, violating a given provision of our criminal laws. As a matter of fact, the
applications involved in this case do not allege any specific acts performed by herein petitioners. It would
be the legal heresy, of the highest order, to convict anybody of a "violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff
and Customs Laws, Internal Revenue (Code) and Revised Penal Code," — as alleged in the
aforementioned applications — without reference to any determinate provision of said laws.
To uphold the validity of the warrants in question would be to wipe out completely one of the most
fundamental rights guaranteed in our Constitution, for it would place the sanctity of the domicile and
officers. This is precisely the evil sought to be remedied by the constitutional provision above quoted
(Sec. 2, Article III, 1987 Constitution) — to outlaw the so-called general warrants.
We hold, therefore, that the doctrine adopted in the Moncado case must be, as it is hereby, abandoned; that
the warrants for the search of three (3) residences of herein petitioners, as specified in the Resolution of
June 29, 1962, are null and void; that the searches and seizures therein made are illegal; that the writ of
preliminary injunction heretofore issued, in connection with the documents, papers and other effects
thus seized in said residences of herein petitioners is hereby made permanent; that the writs prayed for
 are granted, insofar as the documents, papers and other effects so seized in the aforementioned
residences are concerned; that the aforementioned motion for Reconsideration and Amendment should
be, as it is hereby, denied; and that the petition herein is dismissed and the writs prayed for denied, as
regards the documents, papers and other effects seized in the twenty-nine (29) places, offices and other
premises enumerated in the same Resolution, without special pronouncement as to costs.
6. US V. BUSTOS
[37 PHIL. 731; G.R. L-12592; 8 MAR 1918]
FACTS:
In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared
and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary(privileged communication) through the law office
of Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice
of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office and asking for his
removal. The specific charges against the justice of the peace include the solicitation of money
from persons who have pending cases before the judge. Now, Punsalan alleged that accused
published a writing which was false, scandalous, malicious, defamatory, and libelous against him.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not accused is entitled to constitutional protection by virtue of his right to free speech and
free press.
HELD:
Yes. The guaranties of a free speech and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The
administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly
enforced is, therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of
the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively
suppressed. It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the
investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to
the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.
The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the
complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part of citizens to meet
peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of
persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the appropriate branch or office of the government
for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume
responsibility for the charges made. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs.
Public policy, the welfare of society, and the orderly administration of government have demanded
protection for public opinion. The inevitable and incontestable result has been the development
and adoption of the doctrine of privilege. All persons have an interest in the pure and efficient
administration of justice and of public affairs. The duty under which a party is privileged is
sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in
pursuance thereof although in fact he is mistaken. Although the charges are probably not true as
to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded
their action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is
apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from office of a
person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that
presumption. A privileged communication should not be subjected to microscopic examination to
discover grounds of malice or falsity.
7 NARCISO v. CRUZ
[328 SCRA 505]
FACTS:
After conducting a preliminary investigation on the death of Corazon Sta. Romana-Narciso, wife of
Joselito Narciso, Asst. City Prosecutor Myrna Dimaranan Vidal of Quezon City recommended and
thereafter filed, the information for parricide against Joselito Narciso on November 13, 1991, with
the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Joselito Narciso thereafter asked for a review of the
prosecutor's resolution [before] the Department of Justice (DOJ) which was however denied.
Joselito Narciso moved for reconsideration, which was still denied by the DOJ. The Assistant
Prosecutor Lydia A. Navarro found no reason to disturb the findings of the previous prosecutor
and recommended the remand of the case to the court for arraignment and trial.
On August 3, 1992, accused filed an "Urgent Ex-Parte (Ex Abundanti Cautela) to Allow Accused
Joselito Narciso to Post Bail". The Public Prosecutor registered no objection and said motion was
granted on the same day, allowing accused to post bail at P150,000.00. The private prosecutor
representing private complainant Flor Marie Sta. Romana-Cruz, a sister of accused's deceased
wife, filed an "Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused To Post Bail". Accused objected to the
aforesaid urgent motion by filing a "Motion to Expunge 1) Notice of Appearance of the Private
Prosecutor and the 2) Urgent Motion to Lift Order Allowing Accused to Post Bail". The trial set for
today is hereby cancelled and re-set on November 16, 1992 at 10:30 o'clock in the morning, as
previously scheduled.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the Respondent Court of Appeals correctly ruled that the Order of the Regional Trial
Court which granted bail to the petitioner is substantially and procedurally infirm
notwithstanding the absence of any opposition from the public prosecutor.
HELD:
The Petition is devoid of merit.
The petitioner was charged with parricide which is punishable with reclusion perpetua. He argued
before the CA that he was entitled to bail because the evidence of his guilt was not strong. He
contended that the prosecutor's conformity to his Motion for Bail was tantamount to a finding
that the prosecution evidence against him was not strong.
The Court of Appeals ruled, however, that there was no basis for such finding, since no hearing had
been conducted on the application for bail — summary or otherwise. The appellate court found
that only ten minutes had elapsed between the filing of the Motion by the accused and the Order
granting bail, a lapse of time that could not be deemed sufficient for the trial court to receive and
evaluate any evidence. We agree with the CA.
When the grant of bail is discretionary, the prosecution has the burden of showing that the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong. However, the determination of whether or not the evidence of
 guilt is strong, being a matter of judicial discretion, remains with the judge. "This discretion by
the very nature of things, may rightly be exercised only after the evidence is submitted to the
court at the hearing. Since the discretion is directed to the weight of the evidence and since
evidence cannot properly be weighed if not duly exhibited or produced before the court, it is
obvious that a proper exercise of judicial discretion requires that the evidence of guilt be
submitted to the court, the petitioner having the right of cross examination and to introduce his
own evidence in rebuttal."
Consequently, in the application for bail of a person charged with a capital offense punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, a hearing, whether summary or otherwise in the
discretion of the court, must actually be conducted to determine whether or not the evidence of
guilt against the accused is strong. "A summary hearing means such brief and speedy method of
receiving and considering the evidence of guilt as is practicable and consistent with the purpose of
hearing which is merely to determine the weight of evidence for the purposes of bail. On such
hearing, the court does not sit to try the merits or to enter into any nice inquiry as to the weight
that ought to be allowed to the evidence for or against the accused, nor will it speculate on the
outcome of the trial or on what further evidence may be therein offered and admitted. The course
of inquiry may be left to the discretion of the court which may confine itself to receiving such
evidence as has reference to substantial matters, avoiding unnecessary thoroughness in the
examination and cross examination." If a party is denied the opportunity to be heard, there would
be a violation of procedural due process. (Emphasis supplied.)
The prosecutor has the duty of exercising judicial discretion to determine whether the guilt of the
accused is strong. Judicial discretion is the domain of the judge before whom the petition for
provisional liberty will be decided. The mandated duty to exercise discretion has never been
reposed upon the prosecutor.
The grant of bail is a matter of right except in cases involving capital offenses when the matter is left to
the sound discretion of the court. That discretion lies, not in the determination whether or not a
hearing should be held but in the. appreciation and evaluation of the prosecution's evidence of
guilt against the accused. . . . A hearing is plainly indispensable before a judge can aptly be said
to be in a position to determine whether the evidence for the prosecution is weak or strong
8 SSS v. CA
[175 SCRA 686; July 28, 1989]
Petitioners: SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM EMPLOYEES ASSOCIATION (SSSEA), DIONISION T.
BAYLON, RAMON MODESTO, JUANITO MADURA, REUBEN ZAMORA, VIRGILIO DE ALDAY,
SERGIO ARANETA, PLACIDO AGUSTIN, VIRGILIO MAGPAYO
Respondents: THE COURT OF APPEALS, SOCIAL SECURITY SYSTEM (SSS), HON. CEZAR C.
PERALEJO, RTC, BRANCH 98, QUEZON CITY
FACTS: 
The petitioners went on strike after the SSS failed to act upon the union’s demands concerning the
implementation of their CBA. SSS filed before the court action for damages with prayer for  writ of
preliminary injunction against petitioners for staging an illegal strike. The court issued a
temporary restraining order pending the resolution of the application for preliminary injunction
while petitioners filed a motion to dismiss alleging the court’s lack of jurisdiction over the subject
matter.  Petitioners contend that the court made reversible error in taking cognizance on the
subject matter since the jurisdiction lies on the DOLE or the National Labor Relations
Commission as the case involves a labor dispute. The SSS contends on one hand that the
petitioners are covered by the Civil Service laws, rules and regulation thus have no right to strike.
They are not covered by the NLRC or DOLE therefore the court may enjoin the petitioners from
striking.
ISSUE: 
Whether or not SSS employers have the right to strike
Whether or not the CA erred in taking jurisdiction over the subject matter. 
HELD: 
The Constitutional provisions enshrined on Human Rights and Social Justice provides a guarantee
among workers with the right to organize and conduct peaceful concerted activities such as
strikes. On one hand, Section 14 of E.O No. 180 provides that “the Civil Service law and rules
governing concerted activities and strikes in the government service shall be observed, subject to
any legislation that  may be enacted by Congress” referring to Memorandum Circular No. 6, s.
1987 of the Civil Service Commission which states that “prior to the enactment by Congress of
applicable laws concerning strike by government employees enjoins under pain of administrative
sanctions, all government officers and employees from staging strikes, demonstrations, mass
leaves, walk-outs and other forms of mass action which will result in temporary stoppage or
disruption of public service.” Therefore in the absence of any legislation allowing govt. employees
to strike they are prohibited from doing so.
In Sec. 1 of E.O. No. 180 the employees in the civil service are denominated as
“government employees” and that the SSS is one such government-controlled corporation with an
original charter, having been created under R.A. No. 1161, its employees are part of the civil
service and are covered by the Civil Service Commission’s memorandum prohibiting strikes.
Neither the DOLE nor the NLRC has jurisdiction over the subject matter but instead it is the Public
Sector Labor-Management Council which is not granted by law authority to issue writ of
injunction in labor disputes within its jurisdiction thus the resort of SSS before the general court
for the issuance of a writ of injunction to enjoin the strike is appropriate.
9. SUBAYCO v. SANDIGANBAYAN
August 22, 1996
Facts:
During the martial law, several people planned massive public protests in different parts of the
country. One of the biggest protest rallies was blueprinted as a Welga ng Bayan at Escalante,
Negros Occidental. It ended in tragedy. Twenty (20) demonstrators were shot dead and twenty-
four (24) others were wounded by the military and para-military forces of the Marcos government.
Of several persons charged with various counts of murder and frustrated murder, only three (3)
were convicted Generoso N. Subayco, Alfredo T. Alcalde and Eleuterio O. Ibaez.
The rally was without permit from the local authorities, although the plan was not kept secret from
them. In fact, this planned demonstration was taken up at a conference called by the Provincial
Command and attended by the accused Capt. Sanson.
It was the dispersal operation by Capt. Sanson that led to this tragic incident. Four firetrucks were
dispatched to the crowd of demonstrators, two of them the Cadiz and Escalante firetrucks towards
the demonstrators massed in front of the Rural Bank of Escalante. These hosed the
demonstrators with water but even after the water from them had been exhausted, the
demonstrators stayed put. Capt. Sanson then ordered the throwing of teargas to the
demonstrators by two of his men, Amar and Mercado. The tear gas caused the demonstrators to
lie face down on the ground; they persisted in their places rather than disperse. Then, a single
shot rang out followed by successive gunfire from different directions. As one witness had
described it, it was like New Years Eve.
All of the accused were part of the police-military group which undertook the dispersal operation
during the rally.
Issue: Whether or not the Article 3, Section 4 of the Constitution (the right peaceably assemble and
petition the government for redress of grievance) was violated.
Ruling:
YES. The use of bullets to break up an assembly of people petitioning for redress of grievance cannot
but be bewailed. It is bound to happen again for as long as abuses in government abound.
Precisely to help put a brake on official abuses, people empowerment was codified in various
provisions of the 1987 Constitution. It is high time to remind our officials that under our
Constitution power does not come from the barrel of a gun but from the ballots of the people. It is
thus important to know the unexpurgated will of the people for in a republican government, it is
the people who should truly rule. Consequently, the right of the people to assemble peacefully and
to petition for redress of grievance should not be abridged by officials momentarily holding the
powers of government.
The Constitution did not engage in mystical teaching when it proclaimed in solemn tone that
sovereignty resides in the people and all government authority emanates from them. It should be
clear even to those with intellectual deficits that when the sovereign people assemble to petition
for redress of grievances, all should listen, especially the government. For in a democracy, it is the
people who count; those who are deaf to their grievances are ciphers.
10 VALMONTE v. DE VILLA
[173 SCRA 211; G.R. No. 83988; September 29, 1989]
FACTS:
On 20 January 1987, the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) was activated pursuant to
Letter of Instruction 02/87 of the Philippine General Headquarters, AFP, with the mission of conducting
security operations within its area of responsibility and peripheral areas, for the purpose of establishing
an effective territorial defense, maintaining peace and order, and providing an atmosphere conducive to
the social, economic and political development of the National Capital Region.  As part of its duty to
maintain peace and order, the NCRDC installed checkpoints in various parts of Valenzuela, Metro
Manila.  in Metro Manila.
Petitioners Atty. Ricardo Valmonte, who is a resident of Valenzuela, Metro Manila,  and the Union of Lawyers
and Advocates For People’s Rights (ULAP) sought the declaration of checkpoints in Valenzuela, Metro
Manila and elsewhere as unconstitutional. In the alternative, they prayed that respondents Renato De
Villa and the National Capital Region District Command (NCRDC) be directed to formulate guidelines in
the implementation of checkpoints for the protection of the people. Petitioners contended that the
checkpoints gave the respondents blanket authority to make searches and seizures without search
warrant or court order in violation of the Constitution.
ISSUE:
Do the military and police checkpoints violate the right of the people against unreasonable search and
seizures?
HELD:
[The Court, voting 13-2, DISMISSED the petition.]
NO,  military and police checkpoints DO NOT violate the right of the people against unreasonable
search and seizures.
xxx. Not all searches and seizures are prohibited. Those which are reasonable are not forbidden. A reasonable
search is not to be determined by any fixed formula but is to be resolved according to the facts of each
case.
Where, for example, the officer merely draws aside the curtain of a vacant vehicle which is parked on the
public fair grounds, or simply looks into a vehicle, or flashes a light therein, these do not constitute
unreasonable search.
The setting up of the questioned checkpoints in Valenzuela (and probably in other areas) may be considered
as a security measure to enable the NCRDC to pursue its mission of establishing effective territorial
defense and maintaining peace and order for the benefit of the public. Checkpoints may also be regarded
as measures to thwart plots to destabilize the government, in the interest of public security. In this
connection, the Court may take judicial notice of the shift to urban centers and their suburbs of the
insurgency movement, so clearly reflected in the increased killings in cities of police and military men by
NPA “sparrow units,” not to mention the abundance of unlicensed firearms and the alarming rise in
lawlessness and violence in such urban centers, not all of which are reported in media, most likely
brought about by deteriorating economic conditions – which all sum up to what one can rightly consider,
at the very least, as abnormal times. Between the inherent right of the state to protect its existence and
promote public welfare and an individual's right against a warrantless search which is
however reasonably conducted, the former should prevail.
True, the manning of checkpoints by the military is susceptible of abuse by the men in uniform, in the same
manner that all governmental power is susceptible of abuse. But, at the cost of occasional
inconvenience, discomfort and even irritation to the citizen, the checkpoints during these abnormal
times, when conducted within reasonable limits, are part of the price we pay for an orderly society and a
peaceful community.
11 GUAZON v. DE VILLA
[G.R. No. 80508; January 30, 1990]
FACTS:
This is a petition for prohibition with preliminary injunction to prohibit the military and police officers
represented by public respondents from conducting "Areal Target Zonings" or "Saturation Drives"
The 41 petitioners alleged that the "saturation drive" or "areal target zoning" that were conducted in
their place (Tondo Manila) were unconstitutional.
The alleged acts committed during the raid are the following:
1. Petitioners alleged that there is no specific target house to search and that there is no search
warrant or warrant of arrest served.
2. Most of the policemen are in their civilian clothes and without nameplates or identification cards.
3. The residents were rudely roused from their sleep by banging on the walls and windows of their
houses.
4. The residents were at the point of high-powered guns and herded like cows.
5. Men were ordered to strip down to their briefs for the police to examine their tattoo marks.
6. The residents complained that they're homes were ransacked, tossing their belongings and
destroying their valuables. Some of their money and valuables had disappeared after the
operation.
7. The residents also reported incidents of maulings, spot-beatings, and maltreatment. Those who
were detained also suffered mental and physical torture to extract confessions and tactical
information.
Respondents’ contentions:
 The respondents said that such accusations mentioned above were total lies.
 Respondents contends that the Constitution grants to the government the power to seek and
cripple subversive movements for the maintenance of peace in the state.
 The aerial target zoning was intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements coddled by
the communities were the said drives were conducted.
 Respondents averred that they have intelligently and carefully planned months ahead for the
actual operation and that local and foreign media joined the operation to witness and record such
event.
ISSUE:
WON the areal target zoning and the saturation drive is legal
HELD:
YES. The conduct of areal target zoning or saturation drive is a valid exercise of the military powers of
the President.
According to the Supreme Court, everything stated before them consists only of allegations. According
to petitioners, more than 3,407 persons were arrested in the saturation drives covered by the
petition. No estimates are given for the drives in Block 34, Dagat-dagatan, Navotas; Apelo Cruz
Compound, Pasig; and Sun Valley Drive near the Manila International Airport area. Not one of the
several thousand persons treated in the illegal and inhuman manner described by the petitioners
appears as a petitioner or has come before a trial court to present the kind of evidence admissible
in courts of justice. Moreover, there must have been tens of thousands of nearby residents who
were inconvenienced in addition to the several thousand allegedly arrested. None of those arrested
has apparently been charged and none of those affected has apparently complained.
The areal target zonings in this petition were intended to flush out subversives and criminal elements
particularly because of the blatant assassinations of public officers and police officials by
elements supposedly coddled by the communities where the "drives" were conducted.
Moreover, there is nothing in the Constitution which denies the authority of the Chief Executive, to
order police actions to stop unabated criminality, rising lawlessness, and alarming communist
activities.
Where there is large scale mutiny or actual rebellion, the police or military may go in force to the
combat areas, enter affected residences or buildings, round up suspected rebels and otherwise
quell the mutiny or rebellion without having to secure search warrants and without violating the
Bill of Rights.
The Constitution grants the Government the power to seek and cripple subversive movements which
would bring down constituted authority and substitute a regime where individual liberties are
suppressed as a matter of policy in the name of security of the State
12 ORDONEZ v DIRECTOR OF PRISONS
[August 4, 1994]
Habeas Corpus
FACTS:
Paquinto and Cabangunay are among the civilians who were tried by the military commissions during
the period of martial law. Both were originally condemned to die by musketry, but their sentence
was commuted by the new Constitution to reclusion perpetua.
Their convictions were subsequently nullified by this Court where we held that the military tribunals
had no jurisdiction to try civilians when the courts of justice were functioning.
Accordingly, this Court directed the DOJ to file the corresponding informations in the civil courts
against the petitioners within 180 days from notice of the decision. No information has so far been
filed against Paquinto and Cabangunay, but they have remained under detention.
Ernesto Abaloc, together with Cabangunay and Paquinto, wrote to the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (UNHRC) complaining that their continued detention violated their rights under
Articles 6, 7, 9, 10, 14, and 26 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. 
The UNHRC requested the Republic of the Philippines to submit a written explanation of their
complaint. The DFA furnished the CHR with a copy of the decision. Thereupon, the Commission,
through its Chairman Ordoñez wrote the Secretary of Justice of its intention to sue for the release
of the complaints unless criminal charges had already been filed against them. 
The DOJ informed the Commission that Abaloc had been released and that Paquinto and Cabangunay
were still detained.
The present petition for habeas corpus was filed with this Court. The writ was immediately issued, a
hearing was also scheduled.
At the hearing, Chairman Ordoñez argued for the prisoners and pleaded for their immediate release in
view of the failure of the DOJ to file charges against them within the period specified. He stressed
that their continued detention despite the nullification of their convictions was a clear violation of
their human rights.
For its part, the Office of the Sol Gen, as counsel for the respondent Director of Prisons, argued that
under our ruling the Olaguer decision could not be retroactively applied to decisions of the
military tribunals that have already become final or to persons who were already serving their
sentence. It suggested that, under the circumstances, the only recourse of the prisoners was to
reiterate and pursue their applications for executive clemency.
ISSUE:

WoN the petition for habeas corpus should be granted.
HELD:
Yes. The prisoners have been confined since 1974. We can only guess at the validity of their
convictions as the records of their cases have allegedly been burned.
There is absolutely no question that the prisoners' plea should be heeded. The government has failed
to show that their continued detention is supported by a valid conviction or by the pendency of
charges against them or by any legitimate cause whatsoever. If no information can be filed against
them because the records have been lost, it is not the prisoners who should be made to suffer. In
the eyes of the law, Paquinto and Cabangunay are not guilty or appear to be guilty of any crime
for which they may be validly held. Hence, they are entitled to be set free.
Liberty is not a gift of the government but the right of the governed. Every person is free, save only for
the fetters of the law that limit but do not bind him unless he affronts the rights of others or
offends the public welfare. Liberty is not derived from the sufferance of the government or its
magnanimity or even from the Constitution itself, which merely affirms but does not grant it.
Liberty is a right that inheres in every one of us as a member of the human family. When a person
is deprived of this right, all of us are diminished and debased for liberty is total and indivisible.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Jesus Cabangunay and Leonardo Paquinto should not be
detained in prison a minute longer. They are ordered released IMMEDIATELY.
13 UMIL V. RAMOS
[187 SCRA 311; G.R. NO. 81567; 3 OCT 1991]
FACTS:
On 1 February 1988, military agents were dispatched to the St. Agnes Hospital, Roosevelt Avenue,
Quezon City, to verify a confidential information which was received by their office, about a
"sparrow man" (NPA member) who had been admitted to the said hospital with a gunshot wound.
That the wounded man in the said hospital was among the five (5) male "sparrows" who murdered
two (2) Capcom mobile patrols the day before, or on 31 January 1988 at about 12:00 o'clock
noon, before a road hump along Macanining St., Bagong Barrio, Caloocan City. The wounded
man's name was listed by the hospital management as "Ronnie Javellon," twenty-two (22) years
old of Block 10, Lot 4, South City Homes, Biñan, Laguna however it was disclosed later that the
true name of the wounded man was Rolando Dural. In view of this verification, Rolando Dural
was transferred to the Regional Medical Servicesof the CAPCOM, for security reasons. While
confined thereat, he was positively identified by the eyewitnesses as the one who murdered the 2
CAPCOM mobile patrols.
ISSUE:
Whether or Not Rolando was lawfully arrested.
HELD:
Rolando Dural was arrested for being a member of the NPA, an outlawed subversive organization.
Subversion being a continuing offense, the arrest without warrant is justified as it can be said
that he was committing as offense when arrested. The crimes rebellion, subversion, conspiracy or
proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance therefore in
connection therewith constitute direct assaults against the state and are in the nature of
continuing crimes.
14 GARCIA-PADILLA v. ENRILE
[G.R. No. L-61388; 20 April 1983]
DOCTRINE: suspension of the writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president
CASE Name: IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR THE ISSUANCE OF THE WRIT OF HABEAS
CORPUS FOR DR. AURORA PARONG, NORBERTO PORTUGUESE, SABINO PADILLA, FRANCIS
DIVINAGRACIA, IMELDA DE LOS SANTOS, BENJAMIN PINEDA, ZENAIDA MALLARI, MARIANO
SORIANO, TITO TANGUILIG, LETTY BALLOGAN, BIENVENIDA GARCIA, EUFRONIO ORTIZ, JR.,
JUANITO GRANADA and TOM VASQUEZ. JOSEFINA GARCIA-PADILLA, petitioner, vs. MINISTER
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, GEN. FABIAN C. VER, GEN. FIDEL V. RAMOS, and LT. COL. MIGUEL
CORONEL, respondents.
FACTS:
● Nine (9) of the fourteen (14) detainees herein were arrested when three (3) teams of the PC/INP of
conducted a raid at the residence of Dra. Aurora Parong who were having a conference. 4 other
detainees were arrested the next day
● The (14) detainees were all detained at the PC/INP Command Headquarters, Bayombong, Nueva
Viscaya until their transfer to an undisclosed places.
● Petition for the writ of habeas corpus and mandamus filed by Josefina Garcia-Padilla, mother of
detained petitioner Sabino G. Padilla, Jr.
● The mandamus aspect of the instant petition has, however, become moot and academic, the
whereabouts of petitioners having already become known to petitioner Josefina Garcia-Padilla.
● Petitioner: “arrest of petitioners was patently unlawful and illegal since it was effected without any
warrant of arrest; that the PC/INP raiding team which made the arrest were only armed with a
search warrant “
o Nowhere in said warrant was authority given to make arrests, much less detention; that the
search warrant which authorized respondents to seize "subversive documents, firearms of
assorted caliber, medicine and other subversive paraphernalia" in the house and clinic of Dra.
Aurora Parong was a roving and general warrant and is, therefore, illegal per se because it does
not state specifically the things that are to be seized
o No criminal charges have as of yet been filed against any of the detainees; there is no judgment,
decree, decision or order from a court of law which would validate the continued detention of the
petitioner; that while it is true that a purported telegram stating the issuance of a Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) was shown to the detainees on or about July 11 and 12, 1982, but
counsel and the detainees have not yet been given a copy of such PCO, nor notified of its
contents, raising a doubt whether such commitment order has in fact been issued.
o Respondents are denying the detainees their constitutional right to counsel, averring that the
detainees were allowed regular visits by counsel and relatives during their period of detention
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not petitioners' detention is legal
2. Whether or not the issuance of a Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) has provided the legal
basis of the detention of herein detainees following their arrest for Proclamation No. 2045 covered
offenses
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi):
1. Yes:
o Prior thereto to the arrest, the detainees were identified as members of the Communist Party of
the Philippines (CCP) engaging in subversive activities and using the house of detainee Dra.
Aurora Parong in Bayombong, Nueva Viscaya, as their headquarters.
o Caught in flagrante delicto, the nine (9) detainees mentioned scampered towards different
directions leaving on top of their conference table numerous subversive documents, periodicals,
pamphlets, books, correspondence, stationaries, and other papers, including a plan on how they
would infiltrate the youth and student sector (code-named YORK).
o Also found were one (1) .38 cal. revolver with eight (8) live bullets, nineteen (19) rounds of
ammunition for M16 armalite, eighteen thousand six hundred fifty pesos (P18,650.00) cash
believed to be CPP/NPA funds, assorted medicine packed and ready for distribution, and sizeable
quantity of printing paraphernalia, which were then seized.
o There is no doubt that circumstances attendant in the arrest of the herein detainees fall under a
situation where arrest is lawful even without a judicial warrant as specifically provided for under
Section 6(a), Rules 113 of the Rules of Court and allowed under existing jurisprudence on the
matter. As provided therein, a peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when the person to be arrested has committed or actually committing, or is about to
commit an offense in his presence.
o The arrest of persons involved in the rebellion whether as its fighting armed elements, or for
committing non-violent acts but in furtherance of the rebellion, is more an act of capturing them
in the course of an armed conflict, to quell the rebellion, than for the purpose of immediately
prosecuting them in court for a statutory offense. The arrest, therefore, need not follow the usual
procedure in the prosecution of offenses which requires the determination by a judge of the
existence of probable cause before the issuance of a judicial warrant of arrest and the granting of
bail if the offense is bailable. Obviously, the absence of a judicial warrant is no legal impediment
to arresting or capturing persons committing overt acts of violence against government forces, or
any other milder acts but equally in pursuance of the rebellious movement. The arrest and
detention of persons ordered by the President through the issuance of Presidential
Commitment Order (PCO) is merely preventive.
2. No answer. Political Question
o Reverting to the ruling of Montenegro vs. Castañeda that the President's decision to suspend the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is "final and conclusive upon the courts, and all other
persons."
o Under LOI 1211, a Presidential Commitment Order, the issuance of which is the exclusive
prerogative of the President under the Constitution, may not be declared void by the courts, under
the doctrine of "political question," as has been applied in the Baker and Castañeda cases, on any
ground, let alone its supposed violation of the provision of LOI 1211, thus diluting, if not
abandoning, the doctrine of the Lansang case. The supreme mandate received by the President
from the people and his oath to do justice to every man should be sufficient guarantee, without
need of judicial overseeing, against commission by him of an act of arbitrariness in the discharge
particularly of those duties imposed upon him for the protection of public safety which in itself
includes the protection of life, liberty and property. This Court is not possessed with the attribute
of infallibility that when it reviews the acts of the President in the exercise of his exclusive power,
for possible fault of arbitrariness, it would not itself go so far as to commit the self-same fault.
 NOTE: The questioned power of the president to suspend the privilege of the WoHC was once
again held as discretionary in the president. The SC again reiterated that the suspension of the
writ was a political question to be resolved solely by the president. It was also noted that the
suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus must, indeed, carry with it the suspension
of the right to bail, if the government's campaign to suppress the rebellion is to be enhanced and
rendered effective. If the right to bail may be demanded during the continuance of the rebellion,
and those arrested, captured and detained in the course thereof will be released, they would,
without the least doubt, rejoin their comrades in the field thereby jeopardizing the success of
government efforts to bring to an end the invasion, rebellion or insurrection.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition should be, as it is hereby dismissed.
NOTE:
This ruling was abrogated by Sec 18, Art 7 of the 1987 Constitution which expressly constitutionalized
the Lansang Doctrine. Note as well that under Art 3 (Sec 13) of the Constitution it is stated that
“the right to bail shall not be impaired even if the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus is
suspended.”
14 ***GARCIA-PADILLA v. ENRILE
[G.R. No. L-61388; July 19, 1985]
FACTS:
 Motion for reconsideration was filed by petitioner Garcia Padilla.
 The stress is on the continuing validity of Garcia v. Lansang as well as the existence of the right to
bail even with the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus.
 The motion asserted further that the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus does
not vest the President with the power to issue warrants of arrest or presidential commitment
orders, and that even it be assumed that he has such a power, the Supreme Court may review its
issuance when challenged.
 It was finally alleged that since petitioners were not caught in flagrante delicto, their arrest was
illegal and void.
ISSUES:
Whether or not the suspension of the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus vests the President with the
power to issue warrants of arrest or presidential commitment orders
HELD (including the Ratio Decidendi):
 PCO has been replaced by Preventive Detention Action (PDA), pursuant to PD No. 1877.
o A PDA constitute an authority to arrest and preventively detain persons committing the
aforementioned crimes, for a period not exceeding one (1) year, with the cause or causes of their
arrest subjected to review by the President or by the Review Committee created for that purpose."
 The crimes of subversion and rebellion are continuing offenses.
 Presidential Decree No. 1877 limits the duration of the preventive detention action for the period
not exceeding one year
 The persons who were detained by virtue of Presidential Commitment Order (PCO) issued on July
12, 1982, and in whose behalf the above-captioned cases was filed have been released detention
by the military authorities concerned
 There is no question, therefore, that the force and effectivity of a presidential commitment order
issued as far back as July 12, 1982 had ceased to have any force or effect.
RULING:
WHEREFORE, pursuant to Section 8 of Presidential Decree No. 1877 and Section 8 of the Rules and
Regulations Implementing Presidential Decree No. 1877-A, the motion for reconsideration should
have been granted, and the writ of habeas corpus ordering the release of the detainees covered by
such Section 8 issued, but in the light of the foregoing manifestation as to Norberto Portuguese,
Sabino Padilla, Francis Divinagracia, Imelda de los Santos, Benjamin Pineda, Zenaida Mallari,
Mariano Soriano, Tito Tanguilig, Letty Ballogan, Bienvenido Garcia, Eufronio Ortiz, Jr., Juanito
Granada, and Tom Vasquez, having been released, the petition as to them has been declared moot
and academic. As to Dr. Aurora Parong, since a warrant of arrest against her was issued by the
municipal court of Bayombong on August 4, 1982, for illegal possession of firearm and
ammunitions, the petition is likewise declared moot and academic.
15 MORALES v. ENRILE
[G.R. No. L-61016 April 26, 1983]
Habeas Corpus – The Right to Bail
FACTS:
In April 1982, Morales and some others were arrested while driving a motor vehicle in Laong-Laan St,
QC. They were charged in CFI Rizal for rebellion punishable under the RPC. Morales alleged that
they were arrested without any warrant of arrest; that their constitutional rights were violated,
among them the right to counsel, the right to remain silent, the right to a speedy and public trial,
and the right to bail. Respondents countered that the group of Morales were already under
surveillance for some time before they were arrested and that the warrantless arrest done is valid
and at the same time the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus was already suspended.
ISSUE:  Herein, the only evidence against Galit is his alleged confession. A long question followed by a
Whether or not Morales et al can post bail.
HELD:  under investigation. Galit is from Samar and there is no showing that he understands Tagalog.
Normally, rebellion being a non-capital offense is bailable. But because the privilege of the writ of
habeas corpus remains suspended “with respect to persons at present detained as well as other
who may hereafter be similarly detained for the crimes of insurrection or rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and for all other crimes and offenses committed by
them in furtherance of or on the occasion thereof, or incident thereto, or in connection therewith,”
the natural consequence is that the right to bail for the commission of anyone of the said offenses
is also suspended. To hold otherwise would defeat the very purpose of the suspension. Therefore,
where the offense for which the detainee was arrested is anyone of the said offenses he has no
right to bail even after the charges are filed in court. The crimes of rebellion, subversion,
conspiracy or proposal to commit such crimes, and crimes or offenses committed in furtherance
thereof or in connection therewith constitute direct attacks on the life of the State. Just as an
individual has right to self-defense when his life is endangered, so does the State. The suspension
of the privilege of the writ is to enable the State to hold in preventive imprisonment pending
investigation and trial those persons who plot against it and commit acts that endanger the
State’s very existence. For this measure of self-defense to be effective, the right to bail must also
be deemed suspended with respect to these offenses. However, there is a difference between
preventive and punitive imprisonment. Where the filing of charges in court or the trial of such
charges already filed becomes protracted without any justifiable reason, the detention becomes
punitive in character and the detainee regains his right to freedom. Quite notable in this case
however is that the 2 nd division of the SC reiterated the Lansang Doctrine as opposed to what they
ruled in the Garcia-Padilla Case.
16 PEOPLE v. GALIT
[GR 51770; 20 March 1985]
FACTS:
In August 23, 1977, Mrs. Natividad Fernando was found dead in her bedroom as a result of 7 wounds
inflicted in her body. More than 2 weeks thereafter, the police authorities of Montalban picked up
defendant-appellant, Francisco Galit on suspicion of the murder on the occasion of a robbery.
When the case was referred to the NBI, NBI Agent Flores conducted a preliminary interview of the
suspect who allegedly gave evasive answers to his questions. The following day, Francisco Galit
allegedly voluntarily executed a “Salaysay” admitting his participation in the commission of the
crime and implicating two other persons as his companions. In reality, Galit had been obtained
and interrogated almost continuously for 5 days, but to no avail as he consistently maintained his
innocence. The investigating officers began to maul him and to torture him physically. Galit
admitted what the investigating officers wanted him to admit to the crime and he signed the
confession they prepared. Galit was charged with the Crime of Robbery with Homicide, was found
guilty with the sentence of death penalty. Hence, the automatic review.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a monosyllabic answer to a long question suffices as a voluntary admission that may
be used against the accused?
HELD:
monosyllabic answer does not satisfy the requirements of the law that the accused be informed of
his rights under the Constitution and our laws. Instead there should be several short and clear
questions and every right explained in simple words in a dialect or language known to the person
Moreover, at the time of his arrest, Galit was not permitted to communicate with his lawyer, a
relative, or a friend. In fact, his sisters and other relatives did not know that he had been brought
to the NBI for investigation and it was only about two weeks after he had executed the salaysay
that his relatives were allowed to visit him. His statement does not even contain any waiver of
right to counsel and yet during the investigation he was not assisted by one. At the supposed
reenactment, again Galit was not assisted by counsel of his choice. These constitute gross
violations of his rights.
The alleged confession and the pictures of the supposed re-enactment are inadmissible as evidence
because they were obtained in a manner contrary to law.
Trial courts are cautioned to look carefully into the circumstances surrounding the taking of any
confession, especially where the prisoner claims having been maltreated into giving one. Where
there is any doubt as to the voluntariness, the same must be rejected in toto.
WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from should be, as it is hereby, SET ASIDE, and another one
entered ACQUITTING the accused Francisco Galit of the crime charged. Let him be released from
custody immediately unless held on other charges. With costs de oficio.
17 PEOPLE v. OPIDA
[G.R. No. L-46272; July 13, 1986]
FACTS:
This is an automatic review of the Decision of the Circuit Criminal Court, Seventh Judicial District,
imposing the death penalty upon Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo for the crime of murder.
On July 31, 1976, in Quezon City, several persons ganged up on Fabian Galvan, stoned and hit him
with beer bottles until finally one of them stabbed him to death. The actual knife-wielder was
identified as Mario del Mundo. 3 Nonetheless, Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo were charged
with murder as conspirators and, after trial, sentenced to death. 4
The basis of their conviction by the trial court was the testimony of two prosecution witnesses, neither
of whom positively said that the accused were at the scene of the crime, their extrajudicial
confessions, which were secured without the assistance of counsel, and corroboration of the
alleged conspiracy under the theory of interlocking confession.
What is striking about this case is the way the trial judge conducted his interrogation of the two
accused and their lone witness, Lilian Layug. It was hardly judicious and certainly far from
judicial, at times irrelevant, at Worst malicious. Reading the transcript, one gathers the
impression that the judge had allied himself with the prosecution to discredit at the outset the
credibility of the witnesses for the defense.
ISSUE:  
1. Whether or not the extrajudicial confession that was used as a basis for conviction was admissible
as evidence
2. Whether or not the evident hostility and bias of the judge in the case at bar is proper.
HELD:
1. We have consistently held that, aside from the required assistance of counsel, the rights
guaranteed during a custodial investigation are not supposed to be merely communicated to the
suspect, especially if he is unlettered, but must be painstakingly explained to him so he can
understand their nature and significance. Moreover, manhandling of any sort will vitiate any
extrajudicial confession that may be extracted from him and renders it inadmissible in evidence
against him.
2. Time and again this Court has declared that due process requires no less than the cold neutrality
of an impartial judge.  we have added that the judge must not only be impartial but must also
appear to be impartial, to give added assurance to the parties that his decision will be just. This
guaranty was not observed in this case. Given the obvious hostility of the judge toward the
defense, it was inevitable that all the protestations of the accused in this respect would be, as they
in fact were, dismissed. And once the confessions were admitted, it was easy enough to employ
them as corroborating evidence of the claimed conspiracy among the accused.
The judge disregarded these guarantees and was in fact all too eager to convict the accused, who had
manifestly earned his enmity. When he said at the conclusion of the trial, "You want me to dictate
the decision now?" 23, he was betraying a pre-judgment long before made and obviously waiting
only to be formalized.
WHEREFORE, the conviction of Alberto Opida and Virgilio Marcelo is reversed and they are hereby
ordered released immediately. No costs.
18. People v Capitin
Facts:
(1) Leticia Capitin, the herein accused, was a 22-year old housemaid with
an illegitimate child. On December 10, 1975, she came down from her
room with her lifeless child. She was investigated and on the same
day she signed an extrajudicial confession. On the basis of the
police findings and after an ex parte preliminary investigation, Leticia
was charged with parricide in the Court of First Instance of Manila.
(2) Her arraignment was postponed when she it appeared that she was
mentally disturbed and could not respond to the questions put to her
and later on committed to National Mental Hospital due to
manifestation of schizophrenia.
(3) When she was subsequently arraigned and during trial it is to be noted
that she was still patient of the National Mental Hospital and
apparently not yet in full possession of her mental faculties. During
trial Doctor from NMH testified that she is schizophrenic during the
said incident.
(4) Despite these facts and heavily relying on the extrajudicial confession,
the trial court found her guilty. Based on the witness of the
prosecution, Manuel Flores, who investigated Leticia on the same day
of the killing and took her written statement at the police
headquarters. He said that no pressure of any kind was exerted on her,
emphasizing that she was accompanied then by her father and Soledad
Caparas, He observed that the accused was alternately crying and
smiling and otherwise appeared abnormal but he took her statement
just the same because her answers appeared to be intelligent. On
 cross-examination, he said he had advised her of her constitutional
rights and began the investigation only after she had expressly waived
her right to the assistance of counsel. He did not offer such assistance
to her for free, however, from any of the government and private legal
services available.
Issue: WON the extrajudicial confession is valid?
Ruling: NO.
Much reliance was also placed on the extrajudicial confession 10 which,
the trial court noted, contained "a coherent and logical account of what
had happened" and was signed by the accused-appellant with a steady
hand. The straightforward answers and the firm signature were added
proof of her sanity at the time the statement was taken, which was on
the same day the baby was killed.
The trouble is that the confession was completely inadmissible because it
was taken without observance of the safeguards provided by the Bill of
Rights for the protection of the suspect facing custodial investigation. A
reading of the supposed confession shows there was the usual
mechanical advise of the suspect's rights, including the right to
assistance of counsel, followed by the sacramental query as to whether
or not she was waiving her right to such assistance, followed by the
stereotyped answer so familiar in statements of this nature. As
unacceptable as the question was, the answer thereto was no less so
and could not have been possibly composed by the accused-appellant
in her state of mind at the time and given her limited knowledge of
Tagalog. Although she had lived all her life in Camarines Sur and had
come to Manila only six months earlier, in June of that year, there was
this remarkably fluent exchange between the investigator and Leticia
that ran as follows :
Tanong: Ngayon, matapos mong malaman at maintindihan ang iyong mga
karapatan na binanggit sa itaas, ikaw ba ay nahahanda pa ring
magbigay ng isang malaya at kusang loob na salaysay at sagutin ng
pawang katotohanan ang lahat ng itatanong sa iyo na hindi ka naman
pinipilit,tinatakot o pinangangakuan ng anumang pabuya?
Sagot: Matapos akong mapagsabihan ng aking mga karapatan at
naintindihan ko ang mga ito ako ngayon ay nagsasabi na hindi ko na
kailangan ang abogado at ako ay nahahandang sumagot sa anumang
itatanong sa akin at lubusang magbibigay sa inyo ng isang malaya at
kusang loob ng salaysay na hindi ako tinatakot, pinipilit o
pinangangakuan ng anumang pabuya. **
It is not believable that the organized and ready answer,with all its legal
overtones to boot, could have come from this 22-year old housemaid,
who, on top of her deficiencies in the language (and the law), was
presumably not thinking clearly then (even assuming she was sane)
because she had just killed her child and was under strong emotional
stress.
Under the Galit doctrine as now embodied (and even strengthened) in
Article III, Section 12 (l) of the 1987 Constitution, the written waiver of
the right to counsel must be made with the assistance and in the
presence of counsel. This was not done in the case at bar, as the
statement itself plainly discloses. It is recalled that even before that
doctrine was formally announced, our earlier decisions had already
required that the waiver be made intelligently, after proper notification
of his rights to the suspect, with full understanding by him of the
effects of such waiver. 13 Assuming such valid waiver, we have also
insisted that the confession itself be understandable to the person
signing it, both as to its language and its contents, and must not have
been simply prepared beforehand, details and all for the suspect's
signature.
If we have outlawed confessions written in advance by the police for
persons of limited intelligence or educational attainment, we see no
reason why a confession signed by a person whose sanity is dubious,
as in the present case, should receive any less disapprobation. Leticia's
intelligence was not only limited but impaired.
19 . People v Pecardal
Facts:
(1) The accused was convicted of the crime of robbery with homicide
allegedly for killing a taxi driver by stabbing twenty three times with
balisong.
(2) During Trial, witness Ernesto Daria declared in a joint affidavit that
Pecardal "when questioned readily admitted his participation in
the fatal stabbing of victim ROGELIO LORENDO after robbing him
 of his daily earnings amounting to P200.00; and named EDUARDO
AZARCON as his partner in the commission of the said offense.
(3) They said they thereafter turned over the accused-appellant to the
Quezon City Police Headquarters, where he signed a statement
confessing his guilt. The statement described in detail how the offense
was committed and was marked as Exhibit "H" at the trial.
Significantly, however, it was never specifically offered in
evidence by the prosecution.
(4) The prosecution made much of this confession and argued it could not
have been made except by the actual perpetrator of the crime because
of its detailed narration. Moreover, it had been given by the accused-
appellant voluntarily, after he had been apprised of his constitutional
rights.
(5) The accused-appellant took the stand in his defense mainly to
denounce this confession. He testified on the physical punishment
inflicted on him by the police investigators that ultimately forced him to
sign the statement which he said had been prepared unilaterally by
them. 10 This testimony was not rebutted.
(6) The trial court convicted the accused. The trial judge relied strongly,
if not almost mainly, on this confession. This is strange because,
to repeat, that piece of evidence was never formally offered by the
prosecution or, for that matter even the defense.
Issue:
(1) Whether or not conviction is proper despite failure to present the
extrajudicial confession?
(2) Assuming there is a extrajudicial confession, is it valid?
Ruling:
(1) No. This document should never have been considered at all because of
Rule 132, Section 35, of the Rules of Court. According to Moran, "the
offer is necessary because it is the duty of a judge to rest his findings of
facts and his judgmentonly and strictly upon the evidence offered by
the parties at the trial."
Despite failure to present, the trial judge referred in his decision to Exhibit
"H" as the confession and considered it sufficient basis for the
conviction of the accused. As a matter of fact, Exhibit" H " was not the
confession but the Police Referral of the case to the City Fiscal of
Quezon City dated July 22, 1982
(2) No. even assuming that the supposed confession had been formally
offered in evidence, we would have to reject it just the same because it
violates Section 20, Article IV, of the1973 Constitution.
(a) The undisputed evidence is that the confession was obtained
without according to the accused-appellant the right to counsel
and after he had been subjected to physical compulsion and
maltreatment.
If there was really an interrogation of the accused, the notification of his
constitutional rights by the investigating officer was perfunctory and
pro forma, intended obviously merely to satisfy the prescribed norms
through a recitation by note of the sacramental advise.
(b) Although he was supposedly informed of his right to counsel, he
was not told he could get one if he so desired or that one could be
provided him at his request. It is a matter of record that the
interrogation was made in the absence of counsel de parte or de oficio,
and that the waiver of counsel, if made at all was not made with the
assistance of counsel as required.
(c) Besides the lack of counsel, there was the violence the accused
claimed was inflicted upon him by the police. According to him, he
was undressed, boxed, kicked, hit in the back with a rattan chair, and
electric-shocked. Finally, unable to bear the punishment any longer, he
agreed to sign the prepared confession which he was not allowed to
read. The prosecution did not introduce any witness to refute these
allegations.
COUNTER ARGUMENT: That the ACCUSED orally admitted to Pat
(policemen) the crime before custodial investigation.
It is argued, however, that the accused-appellant orally admitted to Pat.
Ybuan and Pat Daria that he had killed and robbed Florendo. This
admission was made, according to the two policemen in their joint
affidavit, after they apprehended the accused-appellant and started
questioning him.
While Pat Ybuan testified that he informed the suspect of his
constitutional rights at the time of his arrest, there is no record that
 the admission was made by him in the presence of counsel, or that he
had previously waived counsel.
Additionally, even assuming that the accused-appellant was not yet under
custodial investigation at the time and that the requirements of Section
20 were not yet applicable, there is still the question of the credibility of
these two policemen.
20. People v Poyos
Facts:
(1) The crux of this case is the admissibility of an extrajudicial confession
signed under oath by the accused-appellant but later repudiated by
him at the trial. The resolution of this question hinges on the proper
interpretation of Article IV, Section 20, of the 1973 Constitution.
(Article III Section 12 of 1987 Constitution)
Sec. 20. No person shall be compelled to be a witness against himself. Any
person under investigation for the commission of an offense shall have
the right to remain silent and to counsel, and to be informed of such
right. No force, violence, threat, intimidation, or any other means
which vitiates the free will shall be used against him. Any confession
obtained in violation of this section shag be inadmissible in evidence.
(2) Sabas Poyos (grandson in law of the deceased), his wife Liliosa Poyos, and
Florencio Poyos were accused of murdering Paula Angoy, in Balilihan,
Bohol, by hitting her on the neck with a piece of wood.   Only Florencio
1
Poyos was arraigned and tried because his co-accused had escaped and
remained at large. After trial, Florencio Poyos was found guilty of the
charge.
(3) The investigation of the death was made only a year after the burial of the
deceased when the body was exhumed and autopsy was made due to
suspicion of foul-play. Only Poyos was invited for interrogation since the
two could no longer be found.
(4) The result of the interrogation was an extrajudicial confession from the
accused-appellant, subscribed by him before Maria Cleofe L. Clarin, clerk
of court of the CFI, Bohol, and later submitted in evidence against the
accused. As the fourth and last witness for the prosecution Clarin testified
that the confession was freely signed in her presence after the suspect had
avowed that it was duly taken from him.
(5) During trial, Poyos completely denied the charges and alleged that Paula
Angoy was already dead when he arrived at her house and was told by
Sabas Poyos that the victim had died from an accidental fall from a horse.
Most importantly, Florencio Poyos categorically disowned his
extrajudicial confession that he had killed Paula Angoy by hitting her
on the nape with a piece of wood pursuant to an agreement with the
spouses Poyos and Anastacia Uy, and that he had received more than
P4,000.00 for his services. He complained of additions in the
statement to what he had actually said to the investigator. He also
said he did not know how to read and could write only his name and
that he signed the statement, which had been prepared beforehand,
out of fear of the police who said they would make "mamon" out of
him if he did not do as they ordered. In short, he attacked the
confession as false and coerced and not knowingly made.
(5) The whole case of the prosecution rests on the extrajudicial confession,
and so does the decision itself of the trial court It is therefore important to
examine the validity of this document as the only criterion to determine
the innocence or guilt of the accused-appellant.
(6) We observe at the outset that, if true, the accused-appellant's
complaints about the extrajudicial confession could have been avoided
if he had been assisted by counsel during his custodial investigation.
We therefore address ourselves to the primary question of whether or
not there was a valid waiver of the right to the assistance of a lawyer
who could have advised the accused-appellant during his interrogation
or even invoked for him his constitutional right to be silent and to
refuse to submit to any questioning whatsoever.
ISSUE: WON there was valid extrajudicial confession?
RULING:
No. The waiver was supposed to have been made as follows:
FOREWORD: Mr. Florencio Poyos, you are informed that as of now, you
are under investigation in connection with the unusual incident
wherein you are implicated. You are reminded that according to
Section 20, Article IV of our Constitution, you have the right to remain
silent and to hire a lawyer of your own choice that could help you when
you are propounded with questions. You are also reminded that every
 word you say well be used against you in favor of you in Court. Do you
understand this?
(1) It is doubtful, given the tenor of the question, whether there was a
definite waiver by the suspect of his right to counsel. His answer
was categorical enough, to be sure, but the question itself was not as it
spoke of a waiver only "for the moment." As worded, the question
suggested a tentativeness that belied the suspect's supposed
permanent foregoing of his right to counsel, if indeed there was any
waiver at all. Moreover, he was told that he could "hire a lawyer" but
not t hat one could be provided for him for free."
(2) There are some suspicious parts thereof that bolster the claim of the
defense that additions were intercalated, like the following exchange
between the investigator and the accused-appellant:
Q. Do you know why you are here in the office of the Investigator of the
Philippine Constabulary, Camp Dagohoy, City of Tagbilaran?
A: To be asked searching questions in relation to my implication of a big
crime that happened in the residence of Anastacia Uy at Barangay
Baucan Sur, Baluihan, Bohol last August 12, 1980, at around six
o'clock in the late ,afternoon more or less. 17
The answer sounds more like the language of an experienced investigator
rather than of an literate farmer and laborer and lends credence to the
accused-appellant's claim that the statement had been prepared in
advance by the police for him to sign later.
(3) There is the added circumstance that it took three days before the
accused-appellant actually subscribed his statement and it is
conceivable that during that period, the police continued
intimidating him into doing so. We do not doubt that the clerk of
court assured herself that the affiant clearly understood his rights and
the consequences of his waiver of assistance of counsel and that he
was signing the confession freely. Even so, it is possible that she was
not aware of the covert pressure being exerted upon him, which
probably continued up to the time he signed the statement while a PC
soldier, his guard, stood "somewhere near the door.
21 PEOPLE v. COMPIL  
[G.R. No. 95028 May 15, 1995]
FACTS:
Respondent was convicted of Robbery w/ Homicide after he, together w/ his co-accused, robbed MJ
Furnitures in Sta. Cruz, Manila and leaving Manuel Jay killed as a consequence of the robbery.
Several days after the incident, respondent was caught in Quezon Province by the police
authorities. He was found lying on the couch & was immediately frisked & placed under arrest.
Accdg, to Jenelyn, the wife of the deceased Manuel Jay, respondent turned pale & became
speechless & was trembling. However, after gaining composure & upon being interrogated, he
readily admitted his guilt. He was then brought to the Tayabas Police Station where he was
further investigated. On their way back to Manila, he was again interrogated until he confessed
his involvement in the crime. The day after his arrest, respondent, after conferring w/ CLAO
lawyer Claroz & in the presence of his sister Letecia, executed a sworn statement admitting his
participation as a lookout in the crime.
ISSUE:
W/N there was violation of his Miranda Rights which will render his extrajudicial confession
inadmissible?
HELD:
YES
It is evident that the respondent was immediately subjected to an interrogation upon his arrest in
Quezon Province. And the same goes upon his transfer from Tayabas to Manila Police Station. The
arresting officers already elicited incriminating questions & he confessed to the commission of the
crime & admitted his participation. All these, he was not assisted by counsel. The belated arrival
of the CLOA Lawyer the following day will not cure the defect even if the actual signing of the
uncounseled confession was made in the presence of the counsel. The operative act is that when
the police investigation is no longer asking a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has
begun to focus on a particular suspect who has been taken into custody by the police to carry out
a process of interrogation that lends itself to eliciting incriminating statements, & not the signing
of the extrajudicial confession. But the court still finds other sufficient factual circumstances to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
22 PEOPLE v. LUCERO
[244 SCRA 425; G.R. NO.97936; 29 MAY 1995]
FACTS: 
Alejandro Lucero, Bienvenido Echavez, Balbino Echavez, Peter Doe, Richard Doe and John Doe were
charged with the crime of robbery with homicide.
The prosecution: 
Accused-appellant (alighted from a gray-reddish car), armed with handgun, blocked the way of the
said complainant who was on board a Mercedes Benz passing along Road 14, Mindanao Avenue,
 Pag-asa, QC, rob and carry away cash money; one gold necklace with cross pendant, 7 karat; one
gold Rolex watch; one 3 karat gold ring; one 2 karat gold ring, domino style; one solid gold Constitution requires the right to counsel, it did not mean any kind of counsel but effective and
bracelet; all worth P363,600.00, belonging to DR. DEMETRIO Z. MADRID. Accused shot vigilant counsel. The circumstances clearly demonstrate that appellant received no effective
LORENZO BERNALES y ALERIA, a driver of the said offended party, thus inflicting upon him counseling from Atty. Peralta.
mortal wounds, which resulted to the instantaneous death of ALERIA.
Whereof, Decision convicting appellant Alejandro Lucero y Cortel is hereby reversed.
Only the accused Echavez brothers and Alejandro Lucero were apprehended. 

When Lucero told him that he had no lawyer, in due time, Atty. Diosdado Peralta conferred with
Lucero. He apprised Lucero of his constitutional rights. He observed no reaction from Lucero.
Nonetheless, Atty. Peralta gathered the impression that Lucero understood his advice.

When the investigator started asking the preliminary questions, Atty. Peralta left to attend the 23 PEOPLE v. BUSCATO
wake of his friend. The next morning, Lucero was accompanied by CIS agents to Atty. Peralta's [G.R. No. L-40639 November 23, 1976]
house. The extrajudicial statement of Lucero was presented to Atty. Peralta. It was already signed
by Lucero. 
FACTS:
The three accused denied complicity in the crime charged.
On August 22, 1974, the CFI of Cotabato rendered a decision convicting Isidro Buscato and Nestor
Appellant Lucero's defense is alibi. He testified that he was at his house in Caloocan City.
Dalud of the crime Robbery with Homicide. The facts are as follows:
He said he was surprised when several unidentified men accosted him while he was walking
On January 12, 1973, Buscato, Dalud, Ricardo Romo, Manuel Largo, Jabib Tan and Rodolfo Lim had
towards his house. They chased him, handcuffed and blindfolded him and pushed him into a
a drinking spree. After they consumed about 1 gallon of tuba, they decided to leave. Ricardo Romo
jeep. He was blindfolded the whole night and did not know where he was taken. The men turned
and Manuel Largo went to the store of Bangoy opposite the Samarano's Store. Appellants Isidro
out to be police officers. 
Buscato and Nestor Dalud, upon the other hand, walked with Jabib Tan and Rodolfo Lim towards
the direction of the Philippine Trade Center.
The next day, he learned he was in Camp Crame. He claimed that he was tortured. He was not
informed of the offense for which he was being investigated. Neither did they reveal the identity of
At around 7:00 o'clock the following morning (January 13, 1973), the cadaver of Rodolfo Lim was
the complainant.
found at the river bank by Enrique Tagle, navigator of a tugboat, "Atlas".
Lucero denied knowing Dr. Madrid, the Echavez brothers and the other accused in this case. He
On January 16, 1973, According to T/Sgt. Francisco Soriano, he investigated appellant Isidro Buscato
said he only met Dr. Madrid at the CIS Office during the police line-up. He was made to line-up
who allegedly readily admitted his participation in the crime as the one who inflicted the stab
four (4) times before Dr. Madrid finally identified him on the fourth time.
wound on Rodolfo Lim. However, when his investigation was reduced into writing, Buscato
refused to sign the same. In view of Buscato's refusal, he requested S/Sgt. Jorge Vargas to
Lucero also claimed he signed the extrajudicial confession under duress. He denied engaging the
conduct a separate investigation of Jabib Tan and Nestor Dalud.
services of Atty, Peralta. He likewise confirmed that Atty. Peralta was not present during his
actual custodial interrogation.
On the other hand, S/Sgt. Jorge Vargas declared that he conducted the investigation of Jabib Tan and
Nestor Dalud. Both Jabib Tan and Nestor Dalud allegedly voluntarily confessed their participation
After trial, the court a quo acquitted the Echavez brothers for insufficient evidence. The trial
in the slaying of Rodolfo Lim. Jabib Tan allegedly confessed to him that he participated in the
court, however, convicted accused Lucero GUILTY as principal by direct participation of Robbery
planning of the killing and robbing of the victim. Nestor Dalud, on the other hand, admitted
with Homicide and sentenced to suffer an imprisonment term of RECLUSION PERPETUA.
having struck the victim with a piece of bamboo, while Boy Buscato stabbed the victim with a
Batangas knife and afterwards got the wallet and other valuables of the victim. They then placed
the victim inside a sack. These confessions were reduced to writing and subsequently sworn to by
ISSUE: 
Jabib Tan and Nestor Dalud before the Clerk of Court, Branch I, Court of First Instance of
Cotabato. Nestor Dalud also purportedly tape-recorded his confession.
Whether or Not the lower court erred in convicting accused-appellant.
HELD: 
All of the accused interposed the defense of alibi. They also repudiated their extrajudicial confessions
alleging that they were compelled to sign the same by force, violence and intimidation. Isidro
Appellant's conviction cannot be based on his extrajudicial confession.
Buscato recounted his maltreatment by, the PC soldiers from January 15 to18, 1973.
Constitution requires that a person under investigation for the commission of a crime should be
The trial court, however, was persuaded that the extra-judicial confessions of Nestor Dalud and Jabib
provided with counsel. The Court have constitutionalized the right to counsel because of hostility
Tan were voluntarily and freely given by them to the investigators.
against the use of duress and other undue influence in extracting confessions from a suspect.
Force and fraud tarnish confessions can render them inadmissible. 
The accused appealed contending that the extra-judicial confession made by them was obtained by the
investigators by force, violence and intimidation.
The records show that Atty. Peralta, who was not the counsel of choice of appellant. Atty. Peralta
himself admitted he received no reaction from appellant although his impression was that
The OSG favored the accused.
appellant understood him. More so, it was during his absence that appellant gave an
uncounselled confession. 
ISSUE:
W/N a denial by appellant of his participation in the commission of the crime of which he is charged
be given more weight than his confession.
W/N Nestor Dalud's defense of alibi be given weight despite his extra-judicial confession.
HELD:
On the basis of the record, We, therefore, find that the position taken by the Solicitor General is fully
justified. As early as the case of U.S. v. Sgt. De Leon, this Court emphasized that courts "are slow
to accept extrajudicial confessions when they are subsequently disputed, unless they are
corroborated by other testimony." Here, independent of the afore-mentioned extrajudicial
confessions, there is no other evidence which would directly link the herein appellants to the
crime. It appears, moreover, that such confessions were procured by force, violence or threats.
They are, therefore, inadmissible and cannot be used as evidence to prove the guilt of the
appellants.
This right against self-incrimination guaranteed in the fundamental charter cannot be abridged. "If the
government becomes a lawbreaker", once observed Justice Brandeis, "it breeds contempt for law;
it invites every man to become a law unto himself; it invites anarchy. To declare that in the
administration of the criminal law the end justifies the means ... would bring terrible retribution."
There is no question that cruel or degrading treatment to secure confessions from one suspected of a
crime seriously violates his fundamental human rights, the protection of which is basic in a
regime of law and justice.
We thus conclude that without such extrajudicial confessions the evidence of the prosecution has
failed to overcome the constitutional presumption of innocence in favor of the appellants.
ACCORDINGLY, the appealed decision is reversed and appellants Isidro (Boy) Buscato and Nestor
Dalud are ACQUITTED. No costs.
24 People vs Cabrera
Crime: Murder with Assualt upn an agent of a Person in authority
APPELANT ; Ricardo Cabrera
Co-accused Loreto Sipe  (Direct Assault upon an Agent of a Person in Authority)
Victims : Patrolmen Victor Poral and Felix Fellores
Facts:
Patrolmen Victor Poral and Felix Fellores (the latter hereinafter referred to as the VICTIM, for short)
were assigned to keep peace and order at a dance party in Barrio Guinsangan, Norala, South
Cotabato.
An unidentified man approached them reporting that he was being chased by somebody armed with a
gun. Hiding to the place, they saw accused SIPE holding a .20 gauge "paltik." They each fired a
warning shot in the air and ordered SIPE to drop his firearm. SIPE refused. Instead, he sought
cover in a nearby canal and fired at the VICTIM, who was hit in his right thigh. The VICTIM fired
back hitting SIPE on his left thigh near the buttocks. While the VICTIM was loading his riffle for
the next shot, APPELLANT, armed with a bladed weapon rushed from behind and knifed him on
the right side of his body killing him on the spot. APPELLANT then scampered away.
at about 2:00 o'clock in the morning of September 17, 1972, APPELLANT was arrested by the Chief of
Police in the house of Gerardo Maroma where APPELLANT was staying, located about a kilometer
away from the site of the incident.
In separate sworn statements given by APPELLANT at the police headquarters on September 19,
1972 1 and before Municipal Judge Amandito Araneta on September 21, 1972,  the confessed to
having stabbed the VICTIM.
During the trial, however, APPELLANT repudiated his statements alleging that they were obtained by
force and that he admitted his guilt because of the maltreatment to which he was subjected.
As his alibi, APPELLANT maintained that in the evening in question, he attended the dance in the
barrio. After the dance, at about 11:00 P.M., he and his friend went home together and when they
were already nearing the house, they heard gunshots. They paid no heed and just went to sleep.
At dawn, policemen arrived, manhandled the owner, Gerardo Maroma, and thereafter brought
APPELLANT down the house and took him to the municipal building, together with Maroma and
Valle. APPELLANT denied that he was found hiding in the ceiling and that a bloodied knife was
found on his person as the Chief of Police had testified. When queried why he killed a policeman,
APPELLANT replied that he knew nothing of what they were asking him. At the police
headquarters, however, they forced him to sign a confession threatening to kill him if he refused.
RTC: CONVICTED
CA In this appeal, APPELLANT faults the Trial Court with the following errors: in holding that he had
executed his extrajudicial confession voluntarily.
To prove maltreatment, Dr. Arturo P. Pingoy, before whom APPELLANT was brought on September 30,
1972 for examination and treatment of the injuries that he had suffered, testified that he found
APPELLANT "weak and frustrated" with "a generalized kind of wounds appearing from the head to
the lower extremities," 3 some of which had healed, others were healing.
ISSUE
The question then arises as to whether the injuries described were inflicted before or after
APPELLANT's confessions were taken.
HELD; YES
 The crime was committed on September 16, 1972. APPELLANT was arrested on September 17, 1972.
He executed his confessions on September 19 and 21, 1972, respectively, and he continued to be
under police custody from the time of his arrest until September 30, 1972, the date that he was
examined by Dr. Pingoy. Obviously, the maltreatment occurred within that period and the only
purpose would have been to force APPELLANT to admit guilt against his will. The objective having
been achieved, there would have been no reason for further maltreatment thereafter. Moreover, as
APPELLANT had declared, when his statement was taken by the Municipal Judge, he
(APPELLANT) complained about the maltreatment he received at the hands of the police; that the
Judge noted his injuries as he was merely in shorts and shirt, and that the Judge even inquired
why he had many wounds but that when he gave the reason, the Judge merely stated that the
police were "bad." 6
The Chief of Police and the Municipal Judge, each in his turn, testified that APPELLANT was in good
physical shape when the latter gave his statements before them. However, their testimonies
cannot prevail over the physical evidence as shown by the medical findings. During the trial,
APPELLANT also exhibited to the Trial Court the scars from the injuries that he had received.
APPELLANT's confessions having been extracted by force and violence, they stand discredited in the
eyes of the law and cannot be the basis for sustaining a judgment of conviction.
At this juncture, we reiterate the reminder to Judges and Fiscals before whom declarants are brought
for swearing to the truth of their statements to adopt the practice of having the confessants
physically and thoroughly examined by independent and qualified doctors before administering
the oath, even if it is not requested by the accused. If physicians are not available then they
should themselves examine the bodies of the declarants for signs of possible violence. This would
not only deter attempts to secure confessions through violence but would also preclude future
controversies on whether the statements were obtained through torture or not, which only delay
criminal trials.  Then Municipal Judge Amandito Araneta was not only wanting in the observance
of the prescribed practice but was also indifferent to APPELLANT's plight and should be, as he is
hereby, censured.
25 PEOPLE v. BAGASALA
[GR No. L-26182, 31 May 1971]
FACTS:
At 2:00 in the morning, Macario Ongkit and his wife, Juliana, awoke when they heard the barking of
their dog. Macario stood up and armed himself with a bolo and an iron pipe. When he got to his
sala, he saw five men entering his house. He recognized one of the men who wrested the iron pipe
from him as Juanito Bagasala. Tomas Bagasala sought to take away Macario’s bolo. Juanito
demanded from Juliana her key, which prompted her to exclaim, “Juanito, why are you doing this
to us?” This was followed by her plea for help as she was beaten up by Juanito with the iron pipe.
Tomas then succeeded in taking away Macario’s bolo, and wounded the latter on his head,
causing him to fall on the floor. Macario regained consciousness in the morning and told his son
to report the incident to the authorities. When the authorities arrived at Macario’s home, they saw
the lifeless body of Juliana, the iron pipe, and the bolo stained with blood. Macario then told the
Philippine Constabulary that the perpetrators were Tomas and Juanito Bagasala, who were
brought to the hospital where Macario was and was readily identified by him.
Juanito Bagasala then extrajudicially confessed under oath that he was among the group of five
persons who went into the house of the Ongkit spouses precisely for taking away the palay
therein. That admission, along with the testimony of Macario, led the lower court to convict
Juanito and Tomas Bagasala for the crime of robbery with homicide and serious physical injuries
and sentenced them to the penalty of reclusion perpetua. During appeal, Tomas escaped from
prison, thus forfeiting his right to the said appeal.
ISSUE:
W/N Juanito Bagasala should be acquitted because of the inadmissibility of his extrajudicial
confession.
HELD:
NO. If Bagasala’s conviction were predicated solely on the confession, he would be entitled to acquittal,
his attack on its voluntary character having support in the evidence of record (it was shown that
he was beaten up by the police officers while he was being questioned in jail). The constant course
of decisions of the Supreme Court, true to the meaning of the self-incrimination clause forbids the
admission of any confession under such circumstances. It would be to render nugatory a valuable
constitutional right if judges of the courts of first instance display less than full sensitivity to its
command. A conviction resting on such proof, and such proof alone, certainly cannot be allowed
to stand. Nonetheless, a reversal is not called for, as there is sufficient basis for the finding of guilt
as the testimonial evidence is sufficiently weighty and his defense of alibi utterly unconvincing.
In the light of the foregoing, the guilt of the accused having been demonstrated beyond reasonable
doubt, the inadmissibility of the confession extorted from Juanito could not justify a reversal of
his conviction.
 There is, in the Constitution, a safeguard against the disclosure of incriminating facts. It does not
bar the conviction of an accused on a voluntary extrajudicial statement. Certainly, however, where
the confession is involuntary being due to maltreatment or induced by fear or intimidation, there
is a violation of this constitutional provision. Any form of coercion whether physical, mental, or
emotional thus stamps it with inadmissibility. What is essential for its validity is that it proceeds
from the free will of the person confessing. This is the prevailing principle even prior to the
Constitution.
 Involuntary confessions are rejected by all courts—by some on the ground that a concession so
obtained is unreliable and by some on the grounds of humanitarian principles which abhor all
forms of torture or unfairness toward the accused in criminal proceedings. But either theory
arrives at the same goal. Such a confession is not legal evidence and must be rejected. If the
accused satisfactorily shows that it was made involuntarily, the confessions stand discredited in
the eyes of the law and is a thing which never existed.
 The provision that no one is bound to criminate himself is older than the Government of the
United States. At an early day it became a part of the common law of England. It was established
on the grounds of public policy and humanity—of policy, because if the party were required to
testify, it would place the witness under the strongest temptation to commit the crime of perjury,
and of humanity, because it would prevent the exhorting of confessions by duress.
 It is likewise timely to impress anew on police officials that the imperative requirements of truth
and of humanity condemn the utilization of force and violence to extract confessions from
unwilling victims. Crime must be punished and the guilty must not be allowed to escape. A
desirable end cannot, however, be attained by unconstitutional means. There should be less than
full respect for the law if in the process of enforcing it lawless methods are employed. The
Supreme Court manifests in the strongest possible language its abhorrence for the employment of
force to compel a person to sign a statement acknowledging guilt. A decent regard for the dignity
that attaches to every human being as such will be satisfied with nothing less.
26 PEOPLE VS RAMOS
Facts
At about 10:00 o'clock in the evening of May 3. 1981, while P/Lt. E. Mediavillo and P/Sgt. A. Linga,
they had seen and observed one MALCON OLEVERE y NAPA, acting suspiciously near the corner
of Estrada Street. 1 The police officers, after Identifying themselves, stopped and frisked the
suspect and found in his possession dried marijuana leaves. The police officers thereafter placed
Malcon Olevere under arrest. Upon investigation, suspect Olevere declared that he bought the
recovered marijuana leaves from one ROGELIO RAMOS y GAERLAN
The following day, May 4, 1981, at about 12:00 o'clock noon, a police team with suspect Malcon
Olevere y Napa proceeded to the residence of appellant Rogelio Ramos y Gaerlan and arrested
him. The police operatives immediately brought appellant to the Drugs Enforcement Section
Western Police Department Headquarters for investigation.
During the custodial investigation, suspect Malcon Olevere executed a written sworn statement
implicating the accused-appellant Rogelio Ramos as the source of the marijuana leaves. 4 The
accused, after having been duly apprised of his constitutional rights, verbally admitted before Lt.
E. Mediavillo and Sgt. A. Linga the commission of the offense charged. He likewise admitted that
he sold to Malcon Olevere the marijuana leaves for P10.00.

At the trial Patrolman Cruz testified that on May 5, 1981, he investigated and took down the sworn
statement of one Malcon Olevere who disclosed that the accused-appellant Ramos was the source
of the marijuana leaves. Patrolman Cruz also testified that he prepared the Booking Sheet and
Arrest Report of the appellant Ramos and the corresponding Crime Report. 7 Patrolman Agapito
Linga declared on the witness stand that Lt. Mediavilla arrested appellant Ramos because Malcon
Olevere declared that the appellant sold to him the confiscated marijuana leaves. 8 The third
witness, Felisa Vequilla, a forensic chemist, affirmed that after conducting a dangerous drug test,
the leaves confiscated from Malcon Olevere are positive for marijuana.

NOTE: Exhibit "C" Sworn Statement of Malcon Olevere y Napa; Hindi sya nag testify

RTC: Found the accused-appellant Ramos guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime
charged in view of the verbal admission given by the appellant himself and the evidence offered
and admitted in court.

ISSUE

Won the constitutional rights of the accused, more particularly the right to meet the witness against
him face to face and to cross-examination e him has been violated.

Held; Yes

The lower court erred in admitting as evidence the written sworn affidavit of Malcon Olevere. It can be
gleaned from the records that Malcon Olevere executed the written sworn statement declaring that
appellant Ramos sold to him the marijuana leaves for P10.00. This piece of evidence is a mere
scrap of paper because Malcon Olevere was not produced in court for cross-examination. An
affidavit being taken ex-parte is often incomplete and inaccurate. 13 Such kind of evidence is
considered hearsay. 14 The constitutional right to meet witnesses face to face 15 in order not to
deprive persons of their lives and properties without due process of law is well-protected in our
jurisprudence Thus, in People vs. Toledo, 16 We elucidated:

Testimony in open court in actual trial cannot be equated with any out-of-court declaration, even
when the witness has in fact been confronted already by the defendant. The direct relevance of the
trial to the ultimate judgment as to the guilt or innocence of the accused is not present in any
other proceeding and is thus a factor that can influence materially the conduct and demeanor of
the witness as well as the respective efforts of the counsels of the parties.

For the court to admit the sworn statement of Malcon Olevere without giving the adverse party the
right to cross-examine him would easily facilitate the fabrication of evidence and the perpetration
of fraud. The inadmissibility of this sort of evidence is based, not only on the lack of opportunity
on the part of the adverse party to cross-examine the affiant, 17 but also on the commonly known
fact that, generally, an affidavit is not prepared by the affiant himself but by another who uses his
own language in writing the affiant's statements which may either be omitted or misunderstood by
the one writing them