Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila

VOL.
20, JULY 31, 1967 849

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators
Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila
No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.
ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL

MAR, INC. and Go CHIU, petitioners-appellees, vs. THE HONORABLE CITY MAYOR OF
MANILA, respondent-appellant. VICTOR ALABANZA, intervenor-appellee.
Constitutional Law; Municipal Corporations; Presumption as to constitutionality of

ordinance; Evidence is necessary to show invalidity.—An ordinance, having been enacted by coun-cilors
who must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their particular municipality or
city and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject and necessitate action, must be
presumed to be valid and should not be set aside unless there is a clear invasion of personal or property
rights under the guise of police regulation. Unless, therefore, the ordinance is void on its face, the
necessity for evidence to rebut its validity is unavoidable. Where there was no factual foundation laid for
overthrowing an ordinance which is not void on its face, the presumption of constitution-ality must
prevail.
Same; Police power; Ordinance regulating hotels, motels, etc.—A Manila ordinance regulating the
operation of hotels, motels and lodging-houses is a police power measure specifically aimed to safeguard
public morals. As such, it is immune from any imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and
unsupported by anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the
scope of police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the least
limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs".
Same; Nature of police power; Judicial inquiry.—On the legislative organs of the government,
whether national or local, primarily rests the exercise of the police power, which is the power to prescribe
regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and general welfare of the people. In
view of the requirements of certain constitutional guarantees,
850
850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

ANNOTATED

the exercise of such police power, however, insofar as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any
person, is subject to judicial inquiry. Where such exercise of police power may be considered as either
capricious, whimsical, unjust or unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other
applicable constitutional guarantee may call for correction by the courts.
Municipal Corporations; Municipal license fees.—Municipal license fees can be classified into those
imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation or restriction of non-useful
occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. Licenses for non-useful occupations are
incidental to the police power, and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the power to license and
regulate, but in fixing the amount of license fees the municipal corporations are allowed a wide discretion
in this class of cases. Aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must
not be unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere with
such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who might otherwise
engage in non-useful enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor in the determination of the
amount of this kind of license fee.
Same; Discretion in fixing license fees.—Much discretion is given to municipal corporations in
determining the amount of license fees to be imposed for revenue. The mere fact that some individuals in
the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a living cannot
prevent the exercise of the police power. Persons licensed to pursue occupations which may in the public
need and interest be affected by the exercise of the police power embark in those occupations subject to
the disadvantages which may result from the exercise of that power.
Constitutional Law; Due process; Standards of legal infirmity.—There is no controlling and precise
definition of due process. It furnishes though a standard to which governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate case, be valid. The standard of due
process which must exist both as a procedural and as substantive requisite to free the challenged
ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from imputation of legal infirmity, is
responsiveness to the supremacy of reason. obedience to the dictates of justice. It would be an affront to
reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet what a municipal lawmaking body considers
an evil of rather serious pro portions as an arbitrary and capricious exercise of authority. What should be
deemed unreasonable and what would amount
851
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 851

to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an admitted deterioration of the
state of public morals.
Same; Reasonableness of ordinance regulating hotels, etc.—The provision in Ordinance No. 4760 of
the City of Manila, making it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative
of any hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion
thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged,
cannot be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. The prohibition is neither
unreasonable nor arbitrary, because there appears a correspondence between the undeniable existence of
an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction. Moreover, every regulation of conduct
amounts to curtailment of liberty, which cannot be absolute.
Same; Public interest; Government interference.—The policy of laissez faire has to some extent given
way to the assumption by the government of the right of intervention even in contractual relations
affected with public interest. If the liberty invoked were freedom of the mind or the person, the standard
for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed
affects at the most rights of property, the permissible scope of regulatory measures is wider.
Statutes; When statute is void because of ambiguity.— What makes a statute susceptible to a charge
that it is void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty is an enactment either forbidding or
requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning and
diff er as to its application.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Panganiban, Abad & Associates Law Office for respondent-appellant.
J. M. Aruego, Tenchavez & Associates for intervenorappellee.
FERNANDO, J,:
The principal question in this appeal from a judgment of the lower court in an action for
prohibition is whether Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila is violative of the due process
clause. The lower court held that it is and adjudged it "unconstitutional, and, therefore, null
and void." For reasons to be more specifically set forth, such
852
852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

judgment must be reversed, there being a failure of the requisite showing to sustain an attack
against its validity.
The petition for prohibition against Ordinance No. 4760 was filed on July 5, 1963 by the
petitioners, Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, one of its members, Hotel
del Mar, Inc., and a certain Go Chiu, who is "the president and general manager of the second
petitioner" against the respondent Mayor of the City of Manila who was sued in his capacity as
such "charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila and
to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances."
(par. 1). It was alleged that the petitioner non-stock corporation is dedicated to the promotion
and protection of the interest of its eighteen (18) members "operating hotels and motels,
characterized as legitimate businesses duly licensed by both national and city authorities,
regularly paying taxes, employing and giving livelihood, 1
to not less than 2,500 person and
representing an investment of more than P3 million." (par. 2). It was then alleged that on
June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
approved on June 14, 1963 by the then ViceMayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time
acting as Mayor of the City of Manila. (par. 3).
After which the alleged grievances against the ordinance were set forth in detail. There was
the assertion of its being beyond the powers of the Municipal Board of the City of Manila to
enact insofar as it would regulate motels, on the ground that in the revised charter of the City
of Manila or in any other law, no reference is made to motels; that Section 1 of the challenged
ordinance is unconstitutional and void for being unreasonable and violative of due procfess
insofar as it would impose ?6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00 for
second class motels;
_______________
1 The eighteen members are Waldorf Hotel, Hotel Monte Carlo, Golden Gate Motel, Miami Hotel, Palm Spring
Hotel, Flamingo Motel, Holiday Motel, Rainbow Motel, Palo Alto Hotel, Paradise Hotel, Mayfair Hotel, Siesta Court,
Sun Valley Hotel, Springfield Hotel, New Palace Hotel, Hotel del Mar, Longbeach Hotel and Ritz Motel.
853
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 853

Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila,
that the provision in the same section which would require the owner, manager, keeper or
duly authorized representative of a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining
or accepting any guest or customer or letting any room or other quarter to any person or
persons without his filling up the prescribed form in a lobby open to public view at all times
and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and middle name, the date of birth, the
address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay and the number of
companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be specified,
with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any,
coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and
affixed his signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative, with such registration forms and records kept and bound together, it also
being provided that the premises and facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would
be open for inspection either by the City Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized
representatives is unconstitutional and void again on due process grounds, not only for being
arbitrary, unreasonable or oppressive but also for being vague, indefinite and uncertain, and
likewise for the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty against self-
incrimination; that Section 2 of the challenged ordinance classifying motels into two classes
and requiring the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in f irst class motels such as a
telephone in each room, a dining room or, restaurant and laundry similarly offends against the
due process clause for being arbitrary, unreasonable and oppressive, a conclusion which
applies to the portion of the ordinance requiring second class motels to have a dining room;
that the provision of Section 2 of the challenged ordinance prohibiting a person less than 18
years old from being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn
unless accompanied by parents or a lawful guardian and making it unlawful for the owner,
manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of such establishments to lease any room
or portion
854

thereof more than twice every 24 hours, runs counter to the due process guaranty for lack of
certainty and for its unreasonable, arbitrary and oppressive character; and that insofar as the
penalty provided for in Section 4 of the challenged ordinance for a subsequent conviction
would cause the automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party, in effect causing
the destruction of the business and loss of its investments, there is once again a transgression
of the due process clause.
There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment
declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on July 6,
1963 issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering respondent Mayor to refrain from
enforcing said Ordinance No. 4760 from and after July 8, 1963.
In the answer filed on August 3, 1963, there was an admission of the personal
circumstances regarding the respondent Mayor and of the fact that petitioners are licensed to
engage in the hotel or motel business in the City of Manila, of the provisions of the cited
Ordinance but a denial of its alleged nullity, whether on statutory or constitutional grounds.
After setting forth that the petition did fail to state a cause of action and that the challenged
ordinance bears a reasonable relation, to a proper purpose, which is to curb immorality, a
valid and proper exercise of the police power and that only the guests or customers not before
the court could complain of the alleged invasion of the right to privacy and the guaranty
against selfincrimination, with the assertion that the issuance of the preliminary injunction ex
parte was contrary to law, respondent Mayor prayed f or its dissolution and the dismissal of
the petition.
Instead of evidence being offered by both parties, there was submitted a stipulation of facts
dated September 28, 1964, which reads:
"1. That the petitioners Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. and Hotel del Mar,
Inc. are duly organized and existing under the laws of the Philippines, both with offices in the City of
Manila, while the petitioner Go Chiu is the president and general manager of Hotel del Mar, Inc., and
855
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 855

the intervenor Victor Alabanza is a resident of Baguio City, all having the capacity to sue and be sued;
"2. That the respondent Mayor is the duly elected and incumbent City Mayor and chief executive of
the City of Manila charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances of the City of Manila
and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of such ordinances;
"3. That the petitioners are duly licensed to engage in the business of operating hotels and motels in
Malate and Ermita districts in Manila;
"4. That on June 13, 1963, the Municipal Board of the City of Manila enacted Ordinance No. 4760,
which was approved on June 14, 1963, by Vice-Mayor Herminio Astorga, then the acting City Mayor of
Manila, in the absence of the respondent regular City Mayor, amending sections 661, 662, 668-a, 668-b
and 669 of the compilation of the ordinances of the City of Manila besides inserting therein three new
sections. This ordinance is similar to the one vetoed by the respondent Mayor (Annex A) for the reasons
stated in its 4th Indorsement dated February 15, 1963 (Annex B);
"5. That the explanatory note signed by then Councilor Herminio Astorga was submitted with the
proposed ordinance (now Ordinance 4760) to the Municipal Board, copy of which is attached hereto as
Annex C;
"6. That the City of Manila derived in 1963 an annual income of P101,904.05 from license fees paid by
the 105 hotels and motels (including herein petitioners) operating in the City of Manila."
Thereafter came a memorandum for respondent on January 22, 1965, wherein stress was laid
on the presumption of the validity of the challenged ordinance, the burden of showing its lack
of conf ormity to the Constitution resting on the party who assails it, citing not only U.S. v.
Salaveria, but likewise applicable American authorities. Such a memorandum likewise refuted
point by point the arguments advanced by petitioners against its validity. Then barely two
weeks later, on February 4, 1965, the memorandum for petitioners was filed reiterating in
detail what was set forth in the petition, with citations of what they considered to be
applicable American authorities and praying for a judgment declaring the challenged
ordinance "null and void and unenforceable" and making permanent the writ of preliminary
injunction issued.
856

After referring to the motels and hotels, which are members of the petitioners association, and
referring to the alleged constitutional questions raised by the party, the lower court observed:
"The only remaining issue here being purely a question of law, the parties, with the nod of the
Court, agreed to file memoranda and thereafter, to submit the case for decision of the Court."
It does appear obvious then that without any evidence submitted by the parties, the decision
passed upon the alleged infirmity on constitutional grounds of the challenged ordinance,
dismissing as is undoubtedly right and proper the untenable objection on the alleged lack of
authority of the City of Manila to regulate motels, and came to the conclusion that "the
challenged Ordinance No. 4760 of the City of Manila, would be unconstitutional and,
therefore, null and void." It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued against
respondent Mayor and his agents "to restrain him from enforcing the ordinance in question.''"
Hence this appeal.
As noted at the outset, the judgment must be reversed. A decent regard for constitutional
doctrines of a fundamental character ought to have admonished the lower court against such a
sweeping condemnation of the challenged ordinance. Its decision cannot be allowed to stand,
consistently with what has hitherto been the accepted standards of constitutional
adjudication, in both procedural and substantive aspects.
Primarily what calls for a reversal of such a decision is the absence of any evidence to offset
the presumption of validity that attaches to a challenged statute or ordinance. As was
expressed categorically by Justice Malcolm: "The presumption is all in favor of validity. x x x
The action of the elected representatives of the people cannot be lightly set aside. The
councilors must, in the very nature of things, be familiar with the necessities of their
particular municipality and with all the facts and circumstances which surround the subject
and necessitate action. The local legislative body, by enacting the ordinance, has in effect
given notice that the regulations are essential to the wellbeing of the people. x x x The
Judiciary should not lightly set aside legislative action when there is not a clear invasion
857
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 857

2
of personal or property rights under the guise of police regulation."
It admits of no doubt therefore that there being a presumption of validity, the necessity for
evidence to rebut it is unavoidable, unless the statute or ordinance is void on its f ace, which is
not the case here. The principle has been nowhere better 3
expressed than in the leading case
of O'Gorman & Young v. Hartford Fire Insurance Co., where the American Supreme Court
through Justice Brandeis tersely and succinctly summed up the matter thus: "The statute
here questioned deals with a subject clearly within the scope of the police power. We are asked
to declare it void on the ground that the specif ic method of regulation prescribed is
unreasonable and hence deprives the plaintiff of due process of law. As underlying questions of
fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation of this character, the presumption of
constitutionality must prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record for
overthrowing the statute." No such factual foundation being laid in the present case, the lower
court deciding the matter on the pleadings and the stipulation of f acts, the presumption of
validity must prevail and the judgment against the ordinance set aside.
Nor may petitioners assert with plausibility that on its face the ordinance is fatally
defective as being repugnant to the due process clause of the Constitution. The mantle of
protection associated with the due process guaranty does not cover petitioners. This particular
manifestation of a police power measure being specifically aimed to safeguard public morals is
immune from such imputation of nullity resting purely on conjecture and unsupported by
anything of substance. To hold otherwise would be to unduly restrict and narrow the scope of
police power which has been properly characterized as the most essential, insistent and the
_______________
2 US.v. Salaveria (1918), 39 Phil. 102, at p. 111. There was an affirmation of the presumption of validity of
municipal ordinance as announced in the leading Salaveria decision in Eboña v. Daet, (1950) 85 Phil. 369.
3 282 US 251, 328, January 5, 1931.
858

4 5
least limitable of powers, extending as it does "to all the great public needs." It would be, to
paraphrase another leading decision, to destroy the very purpose of the state if it could be
deprived or allowed itself to be deprived of its6
competence to promote public health, public
morals, public safety and the general welfare. Negatively put, police power is "that inherent
and plenary power in the State 7
which enables it to prohibit all that is hurtful to the comfort,
safety, and welfare of society."
There is no question but that the challenged ordinance was precisely enacted to minimize
certain practices hurtful to public morals. The explanatory note of the then Councilor
Herminio Astorga included as annex to the stipulation of facts, speaks of the alarming
increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in Manila traceable in great part
to the existence of motels, which "provide a necessary atmosphere for clandestine entry,
presence and exit" and thus become the "ideal haven for prostitutes and
________________
4 Cf. Ichong v. Hernandez, (1957) 101 Phil. 1155, at p. 1163. AIso: 'To Frankfurter the police power, true to its
etymology, is the power to shape policy. It def ies legal definition; as a response to the dynamic aspects of society, it
cannot be reduced to a constitutional formula. The law must be sensitive to life; in resolving cases. it must not fall
back upon sterile claims; its judgments are not derived from an abstract duel between liberty and the police power.
Instead, in a world of trusts and unions and large-scale industry, it must meet the challenge of drastic social change.
For him as for Holmes, 'society is more than bargain and business' and the jurist's art rises to no higher peak than in
vindicating interests not represented by the items in a balance-sheet. In a progressive society, new interests emerge,
new attitudes appear, social consciousness quickens. In the face of the unknown one cannot choose with certainty. Nor
as yet, has the whole of truth been brought up from its bottomless well and how f ragile in scientif ic proof is the
ultimate validity of any particular economic adjustment. Social development is a process of trial and error; in the
making of policy the f ullest possible opportunity must be given for the play of the human mind. If Congress or
legislature does not regulate, laissez faire—not the individual—must be the regulator. (Hamilton, Pre view of a
Justice (1939) 48 Yale Law Journal, 819).
5 Noble state Bank v. Haskell, 219 U.S. 412.
6 U.S. v. Gomez-Jesus, (1915) 31 Phil. 218.
7 Rubi v. Provincial Board, (1918) 39 Phil. 660.
859
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 859

Association, Inc. vs, City Mayor of Manila
thrill-seekers." The challenged ordinance then "proposes to check the clandestine harboring of
transients and guests of these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill
up a registration form, prepared for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times,
and by introducing several other amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that
characterizes the registration of transients and guests." Moreover, the increase in the licensed
fees was intended to discourage "establishments of the kind from operating for purpose other -
than legal" and at the same time, to increase "the income of the city government." It would
appear therefore that the stipulation of facts, far from sustaining any attack against the
validity of the ordinance, argues eloquently for it,
It is a fact worth noting that this Court has invariably stamped with the seal of its
approval,8 ordinances punishing vagrancy and classifying a pimp or procurer as a
vagrant; providing
9
a license tax for
10
and regulating the11 maintenance12 or operation of public
dance halls; prohibiting gambling; prohibiting jueteng; 13and monte, prohibiting playing of
panguingui 14
on days other than Sundays or legal holidays; prohibiting the operation of pinball
machines; and, prohibiting any person from keeping, conducting or maintaining an opium
15
15
joint or visiting a place where opium is, smoked or otherwise used, all of which are intended
,to protect public morals. ,
On the legislative organs of the government, whether national or local, primarily rest the
exercise of the police power, which, it cannot be too often emphasized, is the
________________
8 U.S. vs. Giner Cruz, (1918) 38 Phil. 677.
9 U.S. vs. Rodriguez, (1918) 38 Phil. 759. See also Sarmiento v. Belderol, L-15719, May 31, 1961; Lapera v.
Vicente, L-18102, June 30, 1962.
10 U.S. v. Pacis, (1915) 31 Phil. 524.
11 U.S. vs. Espiritu-Santo, (1912) 23 Phil. 610; U.S. vs. Joson, (1913) 26 Phil. 1; People vs. Chan Hong, (1938) 65
Phil. 625
12 U.S. v. Tamparong, (1915) 31 Phil. 321.
13 U.S. v. Salaveria, (1918) 39 Phil. 102.
14 Uy Ha v. The City Mayor, L-14149, May 30, 1969; Miranda v. City of Manila, L-17252, May 31, 1961.
15 U.S. v. Ten Yu, (1912) 24 Phil. 1.
860

power to prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. In view of the requirements of due process, equal protection and
other applicable constitutional guaranties, however, the exercise of such police power insofar
as it may affect the life, liberty or property of any person is subject to judicial inquiry. Where
such exercise of police power may be considered as either capricious, whimsical, unjust or
unreasonable, a denial of due process or a violation of any other applicable constitutional
guaranty may call for correction by the courts.
We are thus led to considering the16insistent, almost shrill tone, in which the objection is
raised to the question of due process. There is no controlling and precise definition of due
process. It furnishes though a standard to which the governmental action should conform in
order that deprivation of life, liberty or property, in each appropriate. case, be valid. What
then is the standard of due process which must exist both as a procedural and a substantive
requisite to free the challenged ordinance, or any governmental action for that matter, from
the imputation of legal infirmity sufficient to spell its doom? It is responsiveness to the
supremacy of reason, obedience to the dictates of justice. Negatively put, arbitrariness is ruled
out and unfairness avoided. To satisfy the due process requirement, official action, to
paraphrase Cardozo, must not outrun the bounds of reason and result in sheer oppression.
Due process is thus hostile to any official action marred by lack of reasonableness. Correctly it
has been identified as freedom from arbitrariness. It is the embodiment of
_______________
16 There is no occasion to consider even cursorily the alleged invasion of the right of privacy or the prohibition
against self-incrimination. Petitioners obviously are not the proper parties to do so. Nor may such an incurable defect
be remedied by an accommodating intervenor "who has always taken advantage of, as he exclusively relies on, the
facilities, services and accommodations offered by petitioner-motels. A general merchant, doing business not only in
Baguio City but in the City of Manila, has no legitimate cause for complaint. At least, not according to the case as it
has been developed.
861
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 861

17
the sporting idea of fair play. It exacts fealty "to those strivings for justice" and judges the act
of officialdom of whatever branch "in the light of reason drawn from considerations
18
of fairness
that reflect [democratic] traditions of legal and political thought." It is not a narrow or
"technical conception
19
with fixed content unrelated to time, place and
circumstances," decisions based on such a 20clause requiring a "close and perceptive inquiry
into fundamental principles of our society." Questions 21
of due process are not to be treated
narrowly or pedantically in slavery to form or phrases.
It would thus be an affront to reason to stigmatize an ordinance enacted precisely to meet
what a municipal lawmaking body considers an evil of rather serious proportion an arbitrary
and capricious exercise of authority. It would seem that what should be deemed unreasonable
and what would amount to an abdication of the power to govern is inaction in the face of an
admitted deterioration of the state of public morals. To be more specific, the Municipal Board
of the City of Manila felt the need for a remedial measure. It provided it with the enactment of
the challenged ordinance. A strong case must be found in the records, and, as has been set
forth, none is even attempted here to attach to an ordinance of such character the taint of
nullity for an alleged failure to meet the due process requirement. Nor does it lend any
semblance even of deceptive plausibility to petitioners' indictment of Ordinance No. 4760 on
due process grounds to single out such features as the increased fees for motels and hotels, the
curtailment of the area of freedom to contract, and, in certain particulars, its alleged
vagueness.
Admittedly there was a decided increase of the annual license fees provided for by the
challenged ordinance for
________________
17 Frankfurter, Mr. Justice Holmes and the Supreme Court, (1938) pp. 32-33.
18 Frankfurter, Hannah v. Larche, (1960) 363 U.S. 420, at 487.
19 Cafeteria Workers v. McElroy, (1961) 367 U.S. 1230.
20 Bartkus v. Illinois, (1959) 359 U.S. 121.
21 Pearson v. McGraw, (1939) 308 U.S. 313.
862

both hotels and motels, 150% for the former and over 200% for the latter, f irst-class motels
being required to pay a P6,000 annual fee and second-class motels, P4,500 yearly. It has been
the settled law however, as far back as 1922 that municipal license fees could be classified into
those imposed for regulating occupations or regular enterprises, for the regulation 22
or
restriction of non-useful occupations or enterprises and for revenue purposes only. As was
explained more in detail in the above Cu Unjieng case: "(2) Licenses for non-useful occupations
are also incidental to the police power and the right to exact a fee may be implied from the
power to license and regulate, but in fixing amount of the license fees the municipal
corporations are allowed a much wider discretion in this class of cases than in the former, and
aside from applying the well-known legal principle that municipal ordinances must not be
unreasonable, oppressive, or tyrannical, courts have, as a general rule, declined to interfere
with such discretion. The desirability of imposing restraint upon the number of persons who
might otherwise engage in non-usef ul enterprises is, of course, generally an important factor
in the determination of the amount of this kind of license fee. Hence license fees clearly in the
nature of privilege taxes for revenue have frequently been upheld, especially in cases of
licenses for the23 sale of liquors. In fact, in the latter cases the fees have rarely been declared
unreasonable."
________________
22 Cu Unjieng v. Patstone, (1922) 42 Phil. 818, 828.
23 Citing Swarth v. People, 109 111. 621; Dennehy v. City of Chicago, 120 111. 627; 12 N.E., 227; United States
Distilling Co. v. City of Chicago, 112 111. 19; Drew County v. Bennet, 43 Ark. 364; Merced County v. Fleming, 111
Cal. 46; 43 Pac. 392; Williams v. City Council of West Point, 68 Ga. 816; Cheny v. Shellbyville, 19 Ind. 84; Wiley v.
Owens, 39 Ind. 429; Sweet v. City of Wabash, 41 Ind. 7; Jones v. Grady, 25 La. Ann. 586; Goldsmith v. City of New
Orleans, 31 La. Ann. 646; People ex rel., Cramer v. Medberry, 39 N.Y.S. 207; 17 Misc. Rep., 8; McGuigan v. Town of
Belmont, 89 Wis. 637; 62 N.W., 421; Ex parte Burnett, 30 Ala. 461; Craig v. Burnett, 32 Ala., 728, and Muhlenbrinck
v. Long Branch Commissioner, 42 N.J.L. 364; 36 Am. Rep., 518. At pp. 829-830.
863
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 863

24
Moreover, in the equally leading case of Lutz v. Araneta this Court affirmed the doctrine
earlier announced by the American Supreme Court that taxation may be made to implement
the state's police power. Only the other day, this Court had occasion to affirm that the broad
taxing authority conferred by the Local Autonomy Act of 1959 to cities and municipalities is
sufficiently plenary to cover a wide range of subjects
25
with the only limitation that the tax so
levied is for public purposes, just and uniform.
As a matter of fact, even without reference to the wide latitude enjoyed by the City of
Manila in imposing licenses for revenue, it has been explicitly held in one case that "much
discretion is given to municipal corporations in determining the amount," here the license fee
of the operator
26
of a massage clinic, even if it were viewed purely as a police power
measure. The discussion of this particular matter may fitly close with this pertinent citation
from another decision of significance: "It is urged on behalf of the plaintiffs-appellees that the
enforcement of the ordinance could deprive them of their lawful occupation and means of
livelihood because they can not rent stalls in the public markets. But it appears that plaintiffs
are also dealers in refrigerated or cold storage meat, the sale of which outside the city markets
under certain conditions is permitted. x x x And surely, the mere fact, that some individuals in
the community may be deprived of their present business or a particular mode of earning a
living cannot prevent the exercise of the police power. As was said in a case, persons licensed
to pursue occupations which may in the public need and interest be affected by the exercise of
the police power embark in these occupations
________________
24 98 Phil. 148 (1955), citing Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Grosjean, 301 U.S. 412, 81 L. Ed. 1193; U.S. v. Butler, 297
U.S. 1, 80 L. Ed 477; M'Culloch v. Maryland, 4 Wheat. 316, 4 L. Ed. 579. The Lutz decision was followed in Republic v.
BacolodMurcia Milling, L-19824, July 9, 1966.
25 Ormoc Sugar Co. v. Municipal Board of Ormoc City, L-24322, July 21, 1967.
26 Physical Therapy Organization v. Municipal Board, (1957) 101 Phil. 1142.
864

27
subject to the disadvantages which may result from the legal exercise of that power."
Nor does the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any
hotel, motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or
portion thereof more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment
shall be charged, call for a different conclusion. Again, such a limitation cannot be viewed as a
transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor arbitrary.
Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which
such premises could be, and, according to the explanatory note, are being devoted. How could
it then be arbitrary or oppressive when there appears a correspondence between the
undeniable existence of an undesirable situation and the legislative attempt at correction.
Moreover, petitioners cannot be unaware that every regulation of conduct amounts to
curtailment of liberty which as pointed out by Justice Malcolm cannot be absolute. Thus: "One
thought which runs through all these different conceptions of liberty is plainly apparent. It is
this: 'Liberty' as understood in democracies, is not license; it is 'liberty regulated by law.'
Implied in the term is restraint by law for the good of the individual and for the greater good
of the peace and order of society and the general wellbeing. No man can do exactly as he
pleases. Every man must renounce unbridled license. The right of the individual is necessarily
subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. x x x The liberty of the
citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health,
28
or of the public order and safety,
or otherwise within the proper scope of the police power."
_______________
27 Co Kian & Lee Ban v. City of Manila, (1955) 96 Phil. 649, 654, citing City of New Orleans v. Stafford, 27 L. Ann.
417.
28 Rubiv. Provincial Board, (1919) 39 Phil. 660, at 706, citing Hall v. Geiger-Jones (1916), 242 U.S. 539; Hardie-
Tynes Manufacturing Co. vs. Cruz (1914), 189 Ala. 66.
865
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 865

Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila,
A similar observation was made by Justice Laurel: "Public welfare, then, lies at the bottom of
the enactment of said law, and the state in order to promote the general welfare may interfere
with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and property
may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general comfort,
health, and prosperity of the state x x x. To this fundamental aim of our Government the
rights of the individual are subordinated. Liberty is a blessing without which life is a misery,
but liberty should not be made to prevail over authority because then society will fall into
anarchy. Neither should authority be made to prevail over liberty because then the individual
will fall into slavery. The citizen should achieve the required balance of liberty and authority
in his mind through education and personal discipline, so that there may29be established the
resultant equilibrium, which means peace and order and happiness for all."
It is noteworthy that the only decision of this Court30 nullifying legislation because of undue
deprivation of freedom to contract, People v. Pomar, no longer "retains its virtuality as a
living principle. The policy of laissez fairehas to some extent given way to the assumption by
the government
31
of the right of intervention even in contractual relations affected with public
interest." What may be stressed sufficiently is that if the liberty involved were freedom of the
mind or the person, the standard for the validity of governmental acts is much more rigorous
and exacting, but where the liberty curtailed affects at the most rights of property, the
permissible scope of regulatory
________________
29 Calalang v. Williams (1940), 70 Phil. 726, at 733-734
30 46 Phil 440 (1924). The Philippines was then under American sovereignty, American Supreme Court decisions
hav-ing thus an obligatory effect. No alternative was left to this Court except to follow the then controlling decision
in Adkins v. Children's Hospital (1924), 261 U.S. 525, which subsequently was overruled in West Coast Hotel v.
Parrish(1937), 300 U.S. 379
31 Antamok Goldfields Mining Co. v. Court (1940) 70 Phil. 340, at 360, quoting a concurring opinion of Justice
Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G.R. No. 46496.
866

32
measure is wider. How justify then the allegation of a denial of due process?
Lastly, there is the attempt to impugn the ordinance on another due process ground by
invoking the principle of vagueness or uncertainty. It would appear/from a recital in the
petition itself that what seems to be the gravamen of the alleged grievance is that the
provisions are too detailed and specific rather than vague or uncertain. Petitioners, however,
point to the requirement that a guest should give the name, relationship, age and sex of the
companion or companions as indefinite and uncertain in view of the necessity for determining
whether the companion or companions referred to are those arriving with the customer or
guest at the time of the registry or entering the room with him at about the same time or
coming at any indefinite time later to join him; a proviso in one of its sections which cast doubt
as to whether the maintenance of a restaurant in a motel is dependent upon the discretion of
its owners or operators; another proviso which from their standpoint would require a guess as
to whether the "full rate of payment" to be charged for every such lease thereof means a full
day's or merely a half-day's rate. It may be asked, do these allegations suffice to render the
_______________
32 Cf. "In weighing arguments of the parties it is important to distinguish between the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment as an instrument for transmitting the principles of the First Amendment and those cases in
which it is applied for its own sake. The test of legislation which collides with the Fourteenth Amendment, because it
also collides with the principles of the First, is much more definite than the test when only the Fourteenth is involved.
Much of the vagueness of the due process clause disappears when the specific prohibition of the First become its
standard. The right of a State to regulate, for example, a public utility may well include, so far as the due process test
is concerned, power to impose all of the restrictions which a legislature may have a 'rational basis' for adopting. But
freedoms of speech and of press, of assembly, and of worship may well be infringed on such slender grounds. They are
susceptible of restriction only to prevent an immediate danger to interests which the state may lawfully protect."
(West Virginia State Bd. of Edu. v. Barnette, (1942), 319 U.S. 624, at 639).
867
VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 867

Acuña vs. Yatco
ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty?

33
To ask the 34question is to
answer it. From Connally v. General Construction Co. to Adderley v. Florida, the principle
has been consistently upheld that what makes a statute susceptible to such a charge is an
enactment either forbidding or requiring the doing of an act that men of common intelligence
must necessarily guess at its meaning and differ as to its application. Is this the situation
before us? A citation from Justice Holmes would prove illuminating: "We agree to all the
generalities about not supplying criminal laws with what they omit, but there is no 35
canon
against using common sense in construing laws as saying what they obviously mean."
That is all then that this case presents. As it stands, with all due allowance for the
arguments pressed with such vigor and determination, the attack against the validity of the
challenged ordinance cannot be considered a success. Far from it. Respect for constitutional
law principles so uniformly held and so uninterruptedly adhered to by this Court compels a
reversal of the appealed decision.
Wherefore, the judgment of the lower court is reversed and the injunction issued lifted
forthwith. With costs.
Reyes, J.B.L., Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Sanchez, Castro and Angeles,
JJ., concur.
Concepcion, C.J., and Dizon, J., are on official leave.
Judgment reversed.
___________

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila

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Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association, Inc. vs. City Mayor of Manila

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VOL.

20, JULY 31, 1967 849

No. L-24693. July 31, 1967.

ERMITA-MALATE HOTEL AND MOTEL OPERATORS ASSOCIATION, INC., HOTEL DEL

Constitutional Law; Municipal Corporations; Presumption as to constitutionality of

850 SUPREME COURT REPORTS

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 851

Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators

APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Manila.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

852 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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854 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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856 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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858 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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860 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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862 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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864 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

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Laurel in Ang Tibay v. Court, G.R. No. 46496.

866 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 20, JULY 31, 1967 867

ordinance void on its face for alleged vagueness or uncertainty?

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