ICHONG VS. HERNANDEZ [101 Phil 1117; G.R. No.

L-7995; 31 May 1957]

Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

power. The police power of the City of Manila to enact Ordinance No. 532 is based on Section 2444,
paragraphs (l) and (ee) of the Administrative Code, as amended by Act No. 2744, authorizes the
municipal board of the city of Manila, with the approval of the mayor of the city:

Facts: Republic Act 1180 or commonly known as An Act to Regulate the Retail Business was
passed. The said law provides for a prohibition against foreigners as well as corporations owned by
foreigners from engaging from retail trade in our country. This was protested by the petitioner in this
case. According to him, the said law violates the international and treaty of the Philippines therefore it
is unconstitutional. Specifically, the Treaty of Amity between the Philippines and China was violated
according
to
him.

(l) To regulate and fix the amount of the license fees for the following: xxxx xxxxxlaundries xxxx.

Issue: Whether

or

Not

Republic

Act

1180

is

valid

exercise

of

police

power.

Held: According to the Court, RA 1180 is a valid exercise of police power. It was also then provided
that police power can not be bargained away through the medium of a treaty or a contract. The Court
also provided that RA 1180 was enacted to remedy a real and actual danger to national economy
posed by alien dominance and control. If ever the law infringes upon the said treaty, the latter is
always subject to qualification or amendment by a subsequent law and the same may never curtain
or restrict the scope of the police power of the state.
KWONG SING VS. CITY OF MANILA [41 Phil 103; G.R. No. 15972; 11 Oct 1920]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Kwong Sing, in his own behalf and of other Chinese laundrymen who has general and the
same interest, filed a complaint for a preliminary injunction. The Plaintiffs also questioned the validity
of enforcing Ordinance No. 532 by the city of Manila. Ordinance No. 532 requires that the receipt be
in duplicate in English and Spanish duly signed showing the kind and number of articles delivered by
laundries and dyeing and cleaning establishments. The permanent injunction was denied by the trial
court. The appellants claim is that Ordinance No. 532 savors of class legislation; putting in mind that
they are Chinese nationals. It unjustly discriminates between persons in similar circumstances; and
that it constitutes an arbitrary infringement of property rights. They also contest that the enforcement
of the legislation is an act beyond the scope of their police power. In view of the foregoing, this is an
appeal
with
the
Supreme
Court.
Issues:
(1) Whether or Not the enforcement of Ordinance no, 532 is an act beyond the scope of police power
(2) Whether or Not the enforcement of the same is a class legislation that infringes property rights.
Held: Reasonable restraints of a lawful business for such purposes are permissible under the police

(ee) To enact all ordinances it may deem necessary and proper for the sanitation and safety, the
furtherance of the prosperity, and the promotion of the morality, peace, good order, comfort,
convenience,
and
general
welfare
of
the
city
and
its
inhabitants.
The court held that the obvious purpose of Ordinance No. 532 was to avoid disputes between
laundrymen and their patrons and to protect customers of laundries who are not able to decipher
Chinese characters from being defrauded. (Considering that in the year 1920s, people of Manila are
more
familiar
with
Spanish
and
maybe
English.)
In whether the ordinance is class legislation, the court held that the ordinance invades no
fundamental right, and impairs no personal privilege. Under the guise of police regulation, an attempt
is not made to violate personal property rights. The ordinance is neither discriminatory nor
unreasonable in its operation. It applies to all public laundries without distinction, whether they belong
to Americans, Filipinos, Chinese, or any other nationality. All, without exception, and each every one
of them without distinction, must comply with the ordinance. The obvious objection for the
implementation of the ordinance is based in sec2444 (ee) of the Administrative Code. Although, an
additional burden will be imposed on the business and occupation affected by the ordinance such as
that of the appellant by learning even a few words in Spanish or English, but mostly Arabic numbers
in order to properly issue a receipt, it seems that the same burdens are cast upon the them. Yet, even
if private rights of person or property are subjected to restraint, and even if loss will result to
individuals from the enforcement of the ordinance, this is not sufficient ground for failing to uphold the
power of the legislative body. The very foundation of the police power is the control of private interests
for
the
public
welfare.
Finding that the ordinance is valid, judgment is affirmed, and the petition for a preliminary injunction is
denied, with costs against the appellants.
Ermita Malate Hotel & Motel Operators Association v. City of Manila [GR L-24693, 31 July 1967]
En Banc, Fernando (J): 7 concur, 2 on leave
Facts: On 13 June 1963, Ordinance 4760 was issued by the municipal board of the City of Manila
and approved by Vice Mayor Herminio Astorga, who was at the time acting Mayor of the City of
Manila. The ordinance (1) imposes a P6,000.00 fee per annum for first class motels and P4,500.00
for second class motels; (2) requires the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of
a hotel, motel, or lodging house to refrain from entertaining or accepting any guest or customer or
letting any room or other quarter to any person or persons without his filling up the prescribed form in
a lobby open to public view at all times and in his presence, wherein the surname, given name and
middle name, the date of birth, the address, the occupation, the sex, the nationality, the length of stay
and the number of companions in the room, if any, with the name, relationship, age and sex would be
specified, with data furnished as to his residence certificate as well as his passport number, if any,

coupled with a certification that a person signing such form has personally filled it up and affixed his
signature in the presence of such owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative, with
such registration forms and records kept and bound together; (3) provides that the premises and
facilities of such hotels, motels and lodging houses would be open for inspection either by the City
Mayor, or the Chief of Police, or their duly authorized representatives. The ordinance also classified
motels into two classes and required the maintenance of certain minimum facilities in first class
motels such as a telephone in each room, a dining room or restaurant and laundry; while second
class motels are required to have a dining room. It prohibited a person less than 18 years old from
being accepted in such hotels, motels, lodging houses, tavern or common inn unless accompanied by
parents or a lawful guardian and made it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized
representative of such establishments to lease any room or portion thereof more than twice every 24
hours. It provided a penalty of automatic cancellation of the license of the offended party in case of
conviction. On 5 July 1963, the Ermita-Malate Hotel and Motel Operators Association (EMHMOA), its
member Hotel del Mar, and a certain Go Chiu filed a petition for prohibition against the mayor of the
City of Manila in his capacity as he is charged with the general power and duty to enforce ordinances
of the City of Manila and to give the necessary orders for the faithful execution and enforcement of
such ordinances. There was a plea for the issuance of preliminary injunction and for a final judgment
declaring the above ordinance null and void and unenforceable. The lower court on 6 July 1963
issued a writ of preliminary injunction ordering the Mayor to refrain from enforcing said Ordinance
4760 from and after 8 July 1963. After the submission of the memoranda, ruled that the City of Manila
lack authority to regulate motels and rendering Ordinance 4760 unconstitutional and therefore null
and void. It made permanent the preliminary injunction issued by the Mayor and his agents to restrain
him from enforcing the ordinance. The Mayor of Manila appealed to the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether the regulations imposed on motels and hotels (increasing license fees, partially
restricting the freedom to contract, and restraining the liberty of individuals) is valid and/or
constitutional.
Held: Yes. The ordinance was enacted to minimize certain practices hurtful to public morals. It was
made as there is observed an alarming increase in the rate of prostitution, adultery and fornication in
Manila traceable in great part to the existence of motels, which provide a necessary atmosphere for
clandestine entry, presence and exit and thus become the ideal haven for prostitutes and thrill
seekers. The ordinance proposes to check the clandestine harboring of transients and guests of
these establishments by requiring these transients and guests to fill up a registration form, prepared
for the purpose, in a lobby open to public view at all times, and by introducing several other
amendatory provisions calculated to shatter the privacy that characterizes the registration of
transients and guests. The increase in the license fees was intended to discourage establishments of
the kind from operating for purpose other than legal and to increase the income of the city
government. Further, the restriction on the freedom to contract, insofar as the challenged ordinance
makes it unlawful for the owner, manager, keeper or duly authorized representative of any hotel,
motel, lodging house, tavern, common inn or the like, to lease or rent any room or portion thereof
more than twice every 24 hours, with a proviso that in all cases full payment shall be charged, cannot
be viewed as a transgression against the command of due process. It is neither unreasonable nor
arbitrary. Precisely it was intended to curb the opportunity for the immoral or illegitimate use to which
such premises could be, and, are being devoted. Furthermore, the right of the individual is
necessarily subject to reasonable restraint by general law for the common good. The liberty of the
citizen may be restrained in the interest of the public health, or of the public order and safety, or

otherwise within the proper scope of the police power. State in order to promote the general welfare
may interfere with personal liberty, with property, and with business and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to all kinds of restraints and burdens, in order to secure the general
comfort, health, and prosperity of the state.
EPZA v. Dulay 149 SCRA 305 ( 1987) F:
The San Antonio Development Corporation was the
owner of a piece of land in Lapu-Lapu City which the EPZA expropriated in 1979. The commissioners
appointed by the trial court recommended that the San Antonio Development Corp. be paid P15.00
per square meter. EPZA filed a petition for certiorari, arguing that under PD 1533
thecompensation should be the fair and current market value declared by the owner or the market
value determined by the assessor, whichever is lower. HELD: The method of ascertaining just
compensation under PD 1533 constitutes impermissible encroachment on judicial prerogatives.
Although the court technically would still have the power to determine the just compensation for the
property, following the decree, its task would be relegated to simply stating the lower value of the
property as declared either by the owner or the assessor. Just compensation means the value of the
property at the time of the taking. It means a fair and full equivalent for the loss sustained. All the facts
as to the condition of the property and its surroundings, its improvements and capabilities should be
considered. In this case, the tax declarations used as basis for the just compensation were made long
before the declaration of martial law when the land was much cheaper. To peg the value of the lots on
the basis of those documents which are outdated would be arbitrary and confiscatory
PEOPLE VS FAJARDO (Reyes, J.B.L., J.) 104 Phil 443
Facts: -Juan F. Fajardo former mayor, as of the time of the filing of this case, of the Municipality of
Baao, Camarines Sur) -During his term as mayor, Ordinance No. 7, Series of 1950 was passed
providing that any person or person/s who will construct a building should before constructing, obtain
a written permit from the Municipal Mayor. -4 years after the term ofFajardo, he filed a written request
to the incumbent municipal mayor for a permit to construct a building adjacent to their gasoline station
on a parcel of land registered in Fajardos name * land is located along the national highway
separated from a public plaza by a creek -request for permission was denied because said
construction would destroy the view or beauty of the pubic plaza; Fajardo again requested; denied for
the second time -Fajardo however, proceeded with the construction because they needed a place for
residence very badly; their former house having been destroyed by a typhoon and it was only a
leased property -Fajardo was convicted of having violated said ordinance
Issue: WON the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive ; WON it deprived Fajardo of his right to
use his own property. Ruling: Yes, the ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive and it
denies Fajardo of his right to use his own property. RD: While property may be regulated for the
interest of the public welfare, such exercise of power cannot overstep the bounds by depriving the
owner of his rights to tuse said property without providing him just compensation. A property which is
restricted to be used for a reasonable purpose, beyond regulation, is recognized as a taking.

City of Manila v. Chinese Community of Manila

GR 14355, 31 October 1919 (40 Phil
First Division, Johnson (p): 4 concurring.
Facts: On the 11th day of December, 1916, the city of Manila presented a petition in the Court of First
Instance of said city, praying that certain lands, therein particularly described, be expropriated for the
purpose of constructing a public improvement, specifically for the purpose of extending Rizal Avenue.
The Chinese Community opposed the said expropriation, contending that there was no necessity of
taking, that it already had public character and that it would it would disturb the resting places of the
dead.
The trial court decided that there was no necessity for the expropriation of the strip of land and
absolved each and all of the defendants from all liability under the complaint, without any finding as to
costs. From the judgment, the City of Manila appealed.
Issue: Whether the Chinese cemetery may be validly expropriated by the City of Manila
Held: The exercise of the right of eminent domain, whether directly by the State, or by its authorized
agents, is necessarily in derogation of private rights, and the rule in that case is that the authority
must be strictly construed. No species of property is held by individuals with greater tenacity, and
none is guarded by the constitution and laws more sedulously, than the right to the freehold of
inhabitants. When the legislature interferes with that right, and, for greater public purposes,
appropriates the land of an individual without his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtly interpretation.
The right of expropriation is not an inherent power in a municipal corporation, and before it can
exercise the right some law must exist conferring the power upon it. When the courts come to
determine the question, they must not only find (a) that a law or authority exists for the exercise of the
right of eminent domain, but (b) also that the right or authority is being exercised in accordance with
the law. In the present case there are two conditions imposed upon the authority conceded to the City
of Manila: First, the land must be private; and, second, the purpose must be public. If the court, upon
trial, finds that neither of these conditions exists or that either one of them fails, certainly it cannot be
contended that the right is being exercised in accordance with law. It is a well known fact that
cemeteries may be public or private. The former is a cemetery used by the general community, or
neighborhood, or church, while only a family, or a small portion of the community or neighborhood
uses the latter. Where a emetery is open to the public, it is a public use and no part of the ground can
be taken for other public uses under a general authority. And this immunity extends to the unimproved
and unoccupied parts, which are held in good faith for future use. It is alleged, and not denied, that
the cemetery in question may be used by the general community of Chinese, which fact, in the
general acceptation of the definition of a public cemetery, would make the cemetery in question public
property. If that is true, then, of course, the petition of the plaintiff must be denied, for the reason that
the city of Manila has no authority or right under the law to expropriate public property. But, whether
or not the cemetery is public or private property, its appropriation for the uses of a public street,
especially during the lifetime of those specially interested in its maintenance as a cemetery, should be
a question of great concern, and its appropriation should not be made for such purposes until it is fully

established that the greatest necessity exists therefor. In this case there is no necessity of taking
since there are other ways by which Rizal Avenue may be expanded to ease the traffic situation.
The Supreme Court held that there is no proof of the necessity of opening the street through the
cemetery from the record. But that adjoining and adjacent lands have been offered to the city free of
charge, which answers every purpose of the City. The Supreme Court, thus, affirmed the judgment of
the lower court, with costs against the appellant.
YNOT VS. IAC [148 SCRA 659; G.R. NO. 74457; 20 MAR 1987]
Sunday, February 01, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: Executive Order No. 626-A prohibited the transportation of carabaos and carabeef from one
province to another. The carabaos of petitioner were confiscated for violation of Executive Order No
626-A while he was transporting them from Masbate to Iloilo. Petitioner challenged the
constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A. The government argued that Executive Order No. 626A was issued in the exercise of police power to conserve the carabaos that were still fit for farm work
or
breeding.
Issue: Whether

or

Not

EO

No.

626-A

is

violation

of

Substantive

Due

Process.

Held: The challenged measure is an invalid exercise of police power, because it is not reasonably
necessary for the purpose of the law and is unduly oppressive. It is difficult to see how prohibiting the
transfer of carabaos from one province to another can prevent their indiscriminate killing. Retaining
the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there. Prohibiting the transfer of
carabeef, after the slaughter of the carabaos, will not prevent the slaughter either.
Del Rosario v. Bengzon [GR 88265, 21 December 1989]
En Banc, Grino-Aquino (J): 12 concur, 2 concur in result
Facts: On 15 March 1989, the full text of Republic Act 6675 was published in two newspapers of
general circulation in the Philippines. The law took effect on 30 March 1989, 15 days after its
publication, as provided in Section 15 thereof. Section 7, Phase 3 of Administrative Order 62 was
amended by Administrative Order 76 dated 28 August 1989 by postponing to 1 January 1990 the
effectivity of the sanctions and penalties for violations of the law, provided in Sections 6 and 12 of the
Generics Act and Sections 4 and 7 of the Administrative Order. Officers of the Philippine Medical
Association, the national organization of medical doctors in the Philippines, on behalf of their
professional brethren who are of kindred persuasion, filed a class suit requesting the Court to declare
some provisions (specifically penal) of the Generics Act of 1988 and the implementing Administrative
Order 62 issued pursuant thereto as unconstitutional, hence, null and void. The petition was
captioned as an action for declaratory relief, over which the Court does not exercise jurisdiction.
Nevertheless, in view of the public interest involved, the Court decided to treat it as a petition for
prohibition instead.

Issue: Whether the prohibition against the use by doctors of no substitution and/or words of similar
import in their prescription in the Generics Act is a lawful regulation.
Held: Yes. There is no constitutional infirmity in the Generics Act; rather, it implements the
constitutional mandate for the State to protect and promote the right to health of the people and to
make essential goods, health and other social services available to all the people at affordable cost
(Section 15, Art. II and Section 11, Art. XIII, 1987 Constitution). The prohibition against the use by
doctors of no substitution and/or words of similar import in their prescription, is a valid regulation to
prevent the circumvention of the law. It secures to the patient the right to choose between the brand
name and its generic equivalent since his doctor is allowed to write both the generic and the brand
name in his prescription form. If a doctor is allowed to prescribe a brand-name drug with no
substitution, the patients option to buy a lower-priced, but equally effective, generic equivalent would
thereby be curtailed. The law aims to benefit the impoverished (and often sickly) majority of the
population in a still developing country like ours, not the affluent and generally healthy minority.
Lozano v. Martinez [GR L-63419, 18 December 1986]
En Banc, Yap (J): 9 concur
Facts: Batas Pambansa 22 (BP22; Bouncing Check Law) was approved on 3 April 1979. The
petitions arose from cases involving prosecution of offenses under BP22. (Florentina A. Lozano vs.
RTC Judge Antonio M. Martinez [Manila, Branch XX] in GR L-63419, Luzviminda F. Lobaton vs. RTC
Executive Judge Glicerio L. Cruz [Lemery Batangas, Branch V] in GR L-66839-42, Antonio and
Susan Datuin vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 71654, Oscar
Violago vs. RTC Judge Ernani C. Pano [Quezon City, Branch LXXVIII] in GR 74524-25, Elinor Abad
vs. RTC Judge Nicolad A. Gerochi Jr. [Makati, Branch 139] in GR 75122-49, Amable and Sylvia
Aguiluz vs. Presiding Judge of Branch 154 of Pasig in GR 75812-13, Luis M. Hojas vs. RTC Judge
Senen Penaranda [Cagayan de Oro, Branch XX] in GR 72565-67, and People vs. RTC Judge David
Nitafan [Manila, Branch 52] and Thelma Sarmiento in GR 75789]. Lozano, Lobaton, Datuin, Violago,
Abad, Aguiluz, Hojas and Sarmiento moved seasonably to quash the informations on the ground that
the acts charged did not constitute an offense, the statute being unconstitutional. The motions were
denied by the trial courts, except in one case, which is the subject of GR 75789 (People vs. Nitafan),
wherein the trial court declared the law unconstitutional and dismissed the case. The parties
adversely affected have come to the Supreme Court for relief.

to coerce a debtor to pay his debt. Further, a statute is presumed to be valid. Every presumption must
be indulged in favor of its constitutionality. Where it is clear that the legislature has overstepped the
limits of its authority under the constitution, the Court should not hesitate to wield the axe and let it fall
heavily on the offending statute.

LOZANO VS. MARTINEZ [146 SCRA 323; G.R. No. L-63419; 18 Dec 1986]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law
Facts: A motion to quash the charge against the petitioners for violation of the BP 22 was made,
contending that no offense was committed, as the statute is unconstitutional. Such motion was denied
by the RTC. The petitioners thus elevate the case to the Supreme Court for relief. The Solicitor
General, commented that it was premature for the accused to elevate to the Supreme Court the
orders denying their motions to quash. However, the Supreme Court finds it justifiable to intervene for
the
review
of
lower
court's
denial
of
a
motion
to
quash.
Issue: Whether or not BP 22 is constitutional as it is a proper exercise of police power of the State.
Held: The enactment of BP 22 a valid exercise of the police power and is not repugnant to the
constitutional
inhibition
against
imprisonment
for
debt.
The offense punished by BP 22 is the act of making and issuing a worthless check or a check that is
dishonored upon its presentation for payment. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law
punishes. The law is not intended or designed to coerce a debtor to pay his debt.
The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but anoffense against public order. The
thrust of the law is to prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and
putting them in circulation. An act may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not
malum in se but because of the harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and
criminally punished as malum prohibitum. The state can do this in the exercise of its police power.

Issue: Whether BP 22 is a valid legislative act.

Bautista v. Juinio, 127 SCRA 329 (1984)

Ban on Use of Heavy Cars on Week-ends and Holiday s Valid.

Held:> Yes. It is within the authority of the legislature to enact such a law in the exercise of the police
power. It is within the prerogative of the lawmaking body to proscribe certain acts deemed pernicious
and inimical to public welfare. Acts mala in se are not the only acts which the law can punish. An act
may not be considered by society as inherently wrong, hence, not malum in se, but because of the
harm that it inflicts on the community, it can be outlawed and criminally punished as malum
prohibitum. BP 22 is aimed at putting a stop to or curbing the practice of issuing checks that are
worthless, i.e. checks that end up being rejected or dishonored for payment. The thrust of the law is to
prohibit, under pain of penal sanctions, the making of worthless checks and putting them in
circulation. The law punishes the act not as an offense against property, but an offense against public
order. It is not the non-payment of an obligation which the law punishes, nor is it intended or designed

F:
LOI 689 banned the use of vehicles w/ A and EH plates on week-ends and holidays in view
of the energy crisis. It excepted, however, those classified as S (Service), T (Truck), DPL
(Diplomatic), CC (Consular Corps), and TC (Tourist Cars). The resps., Min. of Public Works,
Transportation, issued memo.providing penalties for viol. of the LOI, namely, fine, confiscation of
vehicles, and cancellation of registration. The petitioners brought suit questioning the validityof the
LOI on the ground that it was discriminatory and a denial of due process. The resps. denied
the Petitioner''''s allegations and argued that the suit amounted to a request for advisory opinion.
HELD: (1) Petitioners are owners of an 8 cylinder 1969 Buick and of a 6 cylinder Willy''''s Kaiser
Jeep. The enforcement of the LOI to them would deprive them of prop. They, therefore, have

standing to challenge the validity of the LOI.

(2) But the LOI cannot be declared void on its face. It has behind it the presumption of
validity. The necessity for evidence to rebut such presumption is unavoidable. As underlying the
questions of fact may condition the constitutionality of legislation the presumption of validity must
prevail in the absence of some factual foundation of record overthrowing the statute. The LOI is an
energy conservation measure; it is an apporpriate response to a problem.
(3) Nor does the LOI deny equal protection to the petitioners. W/in the class to w/c the
petitioner belongs the LOI operate equally and uniformly. That the LOI does not include others does
not render it invalid. The govt is not required to adhere to a policy of "all or none."
(4) To the extent that the Land Transpo. Code does not authorize the impounding of
vehicles as a penalty, to that extent the memo. of the resps. would be ultra vires.
Velasco v. Villegas [GR L-24153, 14 February 1983]
En Banc, Fernando (J): 10 concur, 1 reserving vote, 1 took no part
Facts: Ordinance 4964 was issued by the city of Manila prohibiting any operator of any barbershop to
conduct the business of massaging customers or other persons in any adjacent room(s) of said
barber shop, or in any room(s) within the same building where the barber shop is located as long as
the operator of the barber shop and the rooms where massaging is conducted is the same person.
Tomas Velasco, Lourdes Ramirez, Sy Pin, Edmundo Unson, Apolonia Ramirez, and Lourdes
Lomibao, as component members of the Sta. Cruz Barbershop Association, filed petition for
declaratory relief with the lower court, challenging the constitutionality of the ordinance as it allegedly
amounts to a deprivation of property of their means of livelihood without due process of law. The
petition was denied by the lower court as its availability being dependent on there being as yet no
case involving such issue having been filed. Hence, the appeal.
Issue: Whether Ordinance 4964 is a valid police power measure.
Held: The objectives behind its enactment are: (1) To be able to impose payment of the license fee
for engaging in the business of massage clinic under Ordinance 3659 as amended by Ordinance
4767, an entirely different measure than the ordinance regulating the business of barbershops and,
(2) in order to forestall possible immorality which might grow out of the construction of separate
rooms for massage of customers. The Court has been most liberal in sustaining ordinances based
on the general welfare clause. It has made clear the significance and scope of such a clause, which
delegates in statutory form the police power to a municipality. The clause has been given wide
application by municipal authorities and has in its relation to the particular circumstances of the case
been liberally construed by the courts. Such is the progressive view of Philippine jurisprudence and it
has continued to be.
Taxicab Operators v. The Board of Transportation [GR L-59234, 30 September 1982]
En Banc, Melencio-Herrera (p): 12 concur, 2 concur in the result
Facts: On 10 October 1977, the Board of Transportation (BT) issued Memorandum Circular 77-42
which phases out old and dilapidated taxis; refusing registration to taxi units within the National
Capitol Region having year models over 6 years old. Pursuant to the above BOT circular, the Director
of the Bureau of Land Transportation (BLT) issued Implementing Circular 52, dated 15 August 1980,

instructing the Regional Director, the MV Registrars and other personnel of BLT, all within the National
Capital Region (NCR), to implement said Circular, and formulating a schedule of phase-out of
vehicles to be allowed and accepted for registration as public conveyances. In accordance therewith,
cabs of model 1971 were phase-out in registration year 1978; those of model 1972, in 1979; those of
model 1973, in 1980; and those of model 1974, in 1981. On 27 January 1981, Taxicab Operators of
Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI), including its members Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo
Cabigao, filed a petition with the BT (Case 80-7553), seeking to nullify MC 77-42 or to stop its
implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years of taxicabs of
model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided that, at the time of
registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation. On 16 February 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed
before the BT a Manifestation and Urgent Motion, praying for an early hearing of their petition. The
case was heard on 20 February 1981. On 28 November 1981, TOMMI, et. al. filed before the same
Board a Manifestation and Urgent Motion to Resolve or Decide Main Petition praying that the case
be resolved or decided not later than 10 December 1981 to enable them, in case of denial, to avail of
whatever remedy they may have under the law for the protection of their interests before their 1975
model cabs are phased-out on 1 January 1982. TOMMI, et. al., through its President, allegedly made
personal follow-ups of the case, but was later informed that the records of the case could not be
located. On 29 December 1981, TOMMI, et. al., instituted a petition for certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus with preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order with the Supreme Court.
Issue: Whether Memorandum Circular 77-42, phasing out 6-year old taxicabs and older, is a valid
administrative issuance.
Held: Presidential Decree 101 grants to the Board of Transportation the power to fix just and
reasonable standards, classification, regulations, practices, measurements, or service to be
furnished, imposed, observed, and followed by operators of public utility motor vehicles. The
overriding consideration in the issuance of Memorandum Circular 77-42 is the safety and comfort of
the riding public from the dangers posed by old and dilapidated taxis. The State, in the exercise of its
police power, can prescribe regulations to promote the health, morals, peace, good order, safety and
general welfare of the people. It can prohibit all things hurtful to comfort, safety and welfare of society.
It may also regulate property rights. The necessities imposed by public welfare may justify the
exercise of governmental authority to regulate even if thereby certain groups may plausibly assert
that their interests are disregarded. Dispensing with a public hearing prior to the issuance of the
Circulars is not violative of procedural due process. Previous notice and hearing is not essential to the
validity of general rules or regulations promulgated to govern future conduct of a class or persons or
enterprises, unless the law provides otherwise. It is impractical to subject every taxicab to constant
and recurring evaluation to determine its road-worthiness, not to speak of the fact that it can open the
door to the adoption of multiple standards, possible collusion, and even graft and corruption. A
reasonable standard must be adopted to apply to all vehicles affected uniformly, fairly, and justly. The
span of six years supplies that reasonable standard. The product of experience shows that by that
time taxis have fully depreciated, their cost recovered, and a fair return on investment obtained. They
are also generally dilapidated and no longer fit for safe and comfortable service to the public specially
considering that they are in continuous operation practically 24 hours everyday in three shifts of eight
hours per shift. With that standard of reasonableness and absence of arbitrariness, the requirement
of due process has been met.

Proclamation 131 and EO 229. Proclamation 131 is the creation of Agrarian Reform Fund with initial
fund
of
P50Billion.

Mirasol vs. DPWH

Facts: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public Works and
Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on limited access
highways. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8, 2001 wherein petitioners
sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative issuances. Moreover, petitioners
prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the
enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon
Expressways and the Manila-Cavite (Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.

c. A petition by owners of land which was placed by the DAR under the coverage of Operation Land
Transfer.
d. A petition invoking the right of retention under PD 27 to owners of rice and corn lands not
exceeding
seven
hectares.
Issue: Whether

Issue: Is DPWH Administrative Order No.1, DO 74 violative of the right to travel? Are all motorized
vehicles created equal?

Held: DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain
expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to
administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to regulate
related activities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not possess in the
first place.
We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only justifiable
classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the non-motorized. Not all motorized
vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially different from other light vehicles. The
first may be denied access to some roads where the latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be
reasonably differentiated from newer models.46 We find that real and substantial differences exist
between a motorcycle and other forms of transport sufficient to justify its classification among those
prohibited from plying the toll ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a
child, that a motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling
difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a fourwheeled vehicle.
ASSO. OF SMALL LANDOWNERS VS. SEC. OF DAR [175 SCRA 343; G.R. NO. L-78742; 14 JUL
1989]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

or

Not

the

aforementioned

EOs,

PD,

and

RA

were

constitutional.

Held: The promulgation of PD 27 by President Marcos was valid in exercise of Police power
and eminent
domain.
The power of President Aquino to promulgate Proc. 131 and EO 228 and 229 was authorized under
Sec. 6 of the Transitory Provisions of the 1987 Constitution. Therefore it is a valid exercise of Police
Power
and Eminent
Domain.
RA 6657 is likewise valid. The carrying out of the regulation under CARP becomes necessary to
deprive owners of whatever lands they may own in excess of the maximum area allowed, there is
definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain for which payment of just compensation is
imperative. The taking contemplated is not a mere limitation of the use of the land. What is required is
the surrender of the title and the physical possession of said excess and all beneficial rights accruing
to
the
owner
in
favour
of
the
farmer.
A statute may be sustained under the police power only if there is concurrence of the lawful subject
and
the
method.
Subject and purpose of the Agrarian Reform Law is valid, however what is to be determined is the
method employed to achieve it.
TIO VS. VIDEOGRAM REGULATORY BOARD [151 SCRA 208; G.R. No. L-75697; 18 Jun 1987]
Friday, January 30, 2009 Posted by Coffeeholic Writes
Labels: Case Digests, Political Law

case:

Facts: The case is a petition filed by petitioner on behalf of videogram operators adversely affected
by Presidential Decree No. 1987, An Act Creating the Videogram Regulatory Board" with broad
powers
to
regulate
and
supervise
the
videogram
industry.

a. A petition alleging the constitutionality of PD No. 27, EO 228 and 229 and RA 6657. Subjects of
the petition are a 9-hectare and 5 hectare Riceland worked by four tenants. Tenants were declared
full owners by EO 228 as qualified farmers under PD 27. The petitioners now contend that President
Aquino
usurped
the
legislatures
power.

A month after the promulgation of the said Presidential Decree, the amended the National Internal
Revenue
Code
provided
that:

Facts: Several

petitions

are

the

root of

the

b. A petition by landowners and sugarplanters in Victorias Mill Negros Occidental against

"SEC. 134. Video Tapes. There shall be collected on each processed video-tape cassette, ready
for playback, regardless of length, an annual tax of five pesos; Provided, That locally manufactured or

imported

blank

video

tapes

shall

be

subject

to

sales

tax."

"Section 10. Tax on Sale, Lease or Disposition of Videograms. Notwithstanding any provision of
law to the contrary, the province shall collect a tax of thirty percent (30%) of the purchase price or
rental rate, as the case may be, for every sale, lease or disposition of a videogram containing a
reproduction
of
any
motion
picture
or
audiovisual
program.
Fifty percent (50%) of the proceeds of the tax collected shall accrue to the province, and the other
fifty percent (50%) shall accrue to the municipality where the tax is collected; PROVIDED, That in
Metropolitan Manila, the tax shall be shared equally by the City/Municipality and the Metropolitan
Manila
Commission.
The rationale behind the tax provision is to curb the proliferation and unregulated circulation of
videograms including, among others, videotapes, discs, cassettes or any technical improvement or
variation thereof, have greatly prejudiced the operations of movie houses and theaters. Such
unregulated circulation have caused a sharp decline in theatrical attendance by at least forty percent
(40%) and a tremendous drop in the collection of sales, contractor's specific, amusement and other
taxes, thereby resulting in substantial losses estimated at P450 Million annually in government
revenues.
Videogram(s) establishments collectively earn around P600 Million per annum from rentals, sales and
disposition of videograms, and these earnings have not been subjected to tax, thereby depriving the
Government
of
approximately
P180
Million
in
taxes
each
year.
The unregulated activities of videogram establishments have also affected the viability of the movie
industry.
Issues:
(1) Whether or not tax imposed by the DECREE is a valid exercise of police power.
(2)

Whether

or

nor

the

DECREE

is

constitutional.

Held: Taxation has been made the implement of the state's police power. The levy of the 30% tax is
for a public purpose. It was imposed primarily to answer the need for regulating the video industry,
particularly because of the rampant film piracy, the flagrant violation of intellectual property rights, and
the proliferation of pornographic video tapes. And while it was also an objective of the DECREE to
protect
the
movie
industry,
the
tax
remains
a
valid
imposition.
We find no clear violation of the Constitution which would justify us in pronouncing Presidential
Decree No. 1987 as unconstitutional and void. While the underlying objective of the DECREE is to
protect the moribund movie industry, there is no question that public welfare is at bottom of its
enactment, considering "the unfair competition posed by rampant film piracy; the erosion of the moral
fiber of the viewing public brought about by the availability of unclassified and unreviewed video tapes

containing pornographic films and films with brutally violent sequences; and losses in government
revenues due to the drop in theatrical attendance, not to mention the fact that the activities of video
establishments are virtually untaxed since mere payment of Mayor's permit and municipal license
fees
are
required
to
engage
in
business."
WHEREFORE, the instant Petition is hereby dismissed. No costs.

Digest: Lutz vs. Araneta (GR L-7859, 22 December 1955)

Posted by Berne Guerrero under (a) oas , digests

Lutz vs. Araneta

GR L-7859, 22 December 1955
First Division, Reyes JBL (J): 8 concur
Facts: AWalter Lutz, as Judicial Administrator of the Intestate Estate of Antonio Jayme Ledesma,
sought to recover the sum of P14, 666.40 paid by the estate as taxes from the Commissioner under
Section e of Commonwealth Act 567 (the Sugar Adjustment Act), alleging that such tax is
unconstitutional as it levied for the aid and support of the sugar industry exclusively, which is in his
opinion not a public purpose.
Issue: Whether the tax is valid in supporting an industry.
Held: The tax is levied with a regulatory prupose, i.e. to provide means for the rehabilitation and
stabilization of the threatened sugar industry. The act is primarily an exercise of police power, and is
not a pure exercise of taxing power. As sugar production is one of the great industries of the
Philippines; and that its promotion, protection and advancement redounds greatly to the general
welfare, the legislature found that the general welfare demanded that the industry should be
stabilized, and provided that the distribution of benefits therefrom be readjusted among its component
to enable it to resist the added strain of the increase in tax that it had to sustain. Further, it cannot be
said that the devotion of tax money to experimental stations to seek increase of efficiency in sugar
production, utilization of by-products, etc., as well as to the improvement of living and working
conditions in sugar mills and plantations, without any part of such money being channeled diectly to
private persons, constitute expenditure of tax money for private purposes.
The tax is valid.

Mirasol vs. DPWH

Facts: On 19 February 1968, Secretary Antonio V. Raquiza of the Department of Public
Works and Communications issued AO 1, which, among others, prohibited motorcycles on
limited access highways. Accordingly, petitioners filed an Amended Petition on February 8,

2001 wherein petitioners sought the declaration of nullity of the aforesaid administrative
issuances. Moreover, petitioners prayed for the issuance of a temporary restraining order
and/or preliminary injunction to prevent the enforcement of the total ban on motorcycles
along the entire breadth of North and South Luzon Expressways and the Manila-Cavite
(Coastal Road) Toll Expressway under DO 215.
Issue: Is DPWH Administrative Order No.1, DO 74 violative of the right to travel? Are all
motorized vehicles created equal?
Held: DO 74 and DO 215 are void because the DPWH has no authority to declare certain
expressways as limited access facilities. Under the law, it is the DOTC which is authorized to
administer and enforce all laws, rules and regulations in the field of transportation and to
regulate related activities. The DPWH cannot delegate a power or function which it does not
possess in the first place.
We find that it is neither warranted nor reasonable for petitioners to say that the only
justifiable classification among modes of transport is the motorized against the nonmotorized. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal. A 16-wheeler truck is substantially
different from other light vehicles. The first may be denied access to some roads where the
latter are free to drive. Old vehicles may be reasonably differentiated from newer models.46
We find that real and substantial differences exist between a motorcycle and other forms of
transport sufficient to justify its classification among those prohibited from plying the toll
ways. Amongst all types of motorized transport, it is obvious, even to a child, that a
motorcycle is quite different from a car, a bus or a truck. The most obvious and troubling
difference would be that a two-wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than
a four-wheeled vehicle.

Held: No. It satisfies the requirements of a valid classification, one of

which is that the classification under the law must rest on real or
substantial
distinctions.
The distinction is reasonable. The classification between the members of
the non- Christian and the members of the Christian tribes is not based
upon accident of birth or parentage but upon the degree of civilization
and culture. The term non-Christian tribes refers to a geographical area
and more directly to natives of the Philippines of a low grade civilization
usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities. The
distinction is reasonable for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar
conditions
existing
in
the
nonChristian
tribes
The prohibition is germane to the purposes of the law. It is designed to
insure peace and order in and among the non- Christian tribes has often
resulted in lawlessness and crime thereby hampering the efforts of the
government to raise their standards of life and civilization. This law is not
limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of the
enactment. It is intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions
exists. The Act applies equally to all members of the class. That it may be
unfair in its operation against a certain number of non- Christians by
reason of their degree of culture is not an argument against the equality
of its operation nor affect the reasonableness of theclassification thus
established.

PEOPLE VS. CAYAT [68 PHIL 12; G.R. NO. 45987; 5 MAY 1939]
Facts: Law prohibits any member of a non-Christian tribe to buy,
receive, have in his possession, or drink, any intoxicating liquors of any
kind. The law, Act No. 1639, exempts only the so-called native wines or
liquors which the members of such tribes have been accustomed to take.
Issue: Whether or Not the law denies equal protection to one prosecuted
and
sentenced
for
violation
of
said
law.

Stonehill vs. Diokno (June 19, 1967)

20 SCRA 383
FACTS: After the officers of the government applied for search warrants, the respondents,
who were judges, issued on different dates 42 search warrants against petitioners to search
the latters corporation and domicile. The search was for any document that can be used as
evidence for the violation of Central Bank Laws, Tariff and Customs Law, Internal Revenue
(Code) and the Revised Penal Code.
HELD/RATIO: The warrants were illegal since there was no probable cause for their

issuance and that the warrants didnt particularly describe the things to be seized. They were
tantamount to being general warrants. However, the seized documents were ordered not to be
returned until future determination in an appropriate case.
CONCURRING AND DISSENTING: (Castro, J.) The seized documents should be
returned following the aggrieved person doctrine. Under said doctrine, the seized objects
need not be under the ownership of the aggrieved person. There are two types of persons in
this case, the natural persons and the juridical persons (corporations). The objects seized
would have to be determined by the lower courts whether those are legal or illegal.