LESSON 5; GOOD, EVIL, ETHICS.

HAPPINESS
Aquinas, STH I, q. 5, aa. 1-4. 6

Goodness in Aquinas: Ontological good vis-à-vis ethical good.

First, goodness in general.

(1) Whether goodness and being are the same really?

I answer that, Goodness and being are really the same, and differ only in idea; which is clear
from the following argument. The essence of goodness consists in this that it is in some way
desirable. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. i): "Goodness is what all desire." Now it is clear
that a thing is desirable only in so far as it is perfect; for all desire their own perfection. But
everything is perfect so far as it is actual. Therefore it is clear that a thing is perfect so far as it
exists; for it is existence that makes all things actual, as is clear from the foregoing. Hence it is
clear that goodness and being are the same really. But goodness presents the aspect of
desirableness, which being does not present.

(2) Granted that they differ only in idea, which is prior in thought?

I answer that, In idea being is prior to goodness. For the meaning signified by the name of a
thing is that which the mind conceives of the thing and intends by the word that stands for it.
Therefore, that is prior in idea, which is first conceived by the intellect. Now the first thing
conceived by the intellect is being; because everything is knowable only inasmuch as it is in
actuality. Hence, being is the proper object of the intellect, and is primarily intelligible; as
sound is that which is primarily audible. Therefore in idea being is prior to goodness.

(3) Granted that being is prior, whether every being is good?

I answer that, Every being, as being, is good. For all being, as being, has actuality and is in
some way perfect; since every act implies some sort of perfection; and perfection implies
desirability and goodness, as is clear from Article [1]. Hence it follows that every being as
such is good.

(4) To what cause should goodness be reduced? Whether goodness has the aspect of a final
cause?

I answer that, Since goodness is that which all things desire, and since this has the aspect of an
end, it is clear that goodness implies the aspect of an end. Nevertheless, the idea of goodness
presupposes the idea of an efficient cause, and also of a formal cause. For we see that what is
first in causing, is last in the thing caused. Fire, e.g. heats first of all before it reproduces the form
of fire; though the heat in the fire follows from its substantial form. Now in causing, goodness

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and the end come first, both of which move the agent to act; secondly, the action of the agent
moving to the form; thirdly, comes the form. Hence in that which is caused the converse ought to
take place, so that there should be first, the form whereby it is a being; secondly, we consider in
it its effective power, whereby it is perfect in being, for a thing is perfect when it can reproduce
its like, as the Philosopher says (Meteor. iv); thirdly, there follows the formality of goodness
which is the basic principle of its perfection.

(5) Whether goodness is divided into the virtuous, the useful, and the pleasant?
"Bonum honestum" is the virtuous good considered as fitting

I answer that, This division properly concerns human goodness. But if we consider the nature of
goodness from a higher and more universal point of view, we shall find that this division
properly concerns goodness as such. For everything is good so far as it is desirable, and is a term
of the movement of the appetite; the term of whose movement can be seen from a consideration
of the movement of a natural body. Now the movement of a natural body is terminated by the
end absolutely; and relatively by the means through which it comes to the end, where the
movement ceases; so a thing is called a term of movement, so far as it terminates any part of that
movement. Now the ultimate term of movement can be taken in two ways, either as the thing
itself towards which it tends, e.g. a place or form; or a state of rest in that thing. Thus, in the
movement of the appetite, the thing desired that terminates the movement of the appetite
relatively, as a means by which something tends towards another, is called the useful; but
that sought after as the last thing absolutely terminating the movement of the appetite, as a
thing towards which for its own sake the appetite tends, is called the virtuous; for the
virtuous is that which is desired for its own sake; but that which terminates the movement of
the appetite in the form of rest in the thing desired, is called the pleasant.

Positive and Negative Values (Vendemiati)

Something presents itself to me as a value by appearing to me as an end or goal of a

certain tendency of mine. This end is desirable if I don’t have it yet, or satisfying if I possess it
already. In every case, it in some way contributes to my happiness.

Something presents itself as a negative value if it constitutes an impediment to the

acquisition of a positive value, or if I recognize it as repugnant to one of my tendencies or plans.
A negative value foreseen in the future elicits fear; experienced in the present, it entails
disablement or pain.

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Some first definitions:

· Whoever acts does so in view of an end. This indicates the intentionality of human
action.

· What appears as an end manifests some good which attracts my desires (a value).

· What we desire, we call “good.” This good presents itself as the end of action. We call
its contrary “evil.”

The concept “good” we are describing here is slightly different from that of everyday
language. For example, the goal of an assassin is murder. Objectively, such an end is evil, but the
assassin could not desire it if it did not appear to him (hence, subjectively) as a good for him
(that is, he hopes to profit from it). In effect, everything that is desired, that moves the will, must
necessarily appear, at least under some aspects, as a good.

Good, Useful, and Delightful

The concept “good” is not univocal, but analogous. It indicates something that
corresponds to desire . . . but we can desire something in very different ways. This is evident in
the example described above: I can desire to track down the owner of a wallet that I have found.
I can desire to return to him what he has lost. I can desire the gratification of my conscience
which will come out of this act of restitution.

To track down the wallet’s owner is a useful good, that is to say, a means through which
I realize a further end: the end of returning the wallet. Therefore, whatever is useful is called
“good” in function of some other good.

To experience the gratification of my conscience is a delightful good. Here also, the

gratification arises from the presence of another good, that is, the returning of the wallet.
Therefore, whatever is “delightful” is called “good” in function of some other good.

To return the wallet is a good in itself, that is, a good not as a means or a consequence of
something else. It is good in itself as an action that corresponds to the truth of things, to the
dignity of the human person. For this reason, this action is a “duty”: it elicits in the conscience
the obligation to submit to it. As soon as an action concerns a true and proper good, it is
designated a virtuous good.

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Summary:

* A useful good is a means to reaching a further end.

* A delightful good is that which procures pleasure.

* A virtuous good is that which is an end in itself.

There is a hierarchical and dependent relationship among these three analogues.

 We can be delighted by something. It follows that whatever procures delight is more

important (= it is good in a stronger sense) than the delight itself.

 A thing can be useful for another thing. Hence, the end is more important (= it is a good
in a stronger sense) than the means of reaching it.

 Consequently, the “good” in a full sense is the virtuous good – that which is desired for
itself and not in relation to anything else.

What about Evil?

If everything we want is wanted because it represents a good for us, what then is evil?

We must distinguish two levels: that of being (the ontic level) and that of acting (the moral
level).

On the plane of being, everything, in as much as it is, is good in itself. Its being, in fact,
constitutes its perfection. The in-depth investigation of this concept is the job of metaphysics

What kinds of things can be defined “bad”? Can a material object (a stone, a liquid, a
gas) be bad? Certainly, a stone can be a bad conductor of electricity, that is, bad in as much as it
is little or no use for a determined end. But this end (to conduct electricity well) is a finality that
we ourselves impose on the stone. It is not that of the stone itself! A liquid can be bad as a drink;
a gas can be bad because it is toxic for man – but neither of these material objects is bad in itself
in as much as it is.

Perhaps, then, a living being (an animal, a plant, a virus) can be bad? Our fables our full
of “big, bad wolves,” for example . . . But why are these creatures bad? Because they are

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damaging for man, or for sheep, but certainly not because in themselves and for themselves they
constitute any evil.

We can express certain “value judgements” (which are not, however, moral
judgements) on objects. For example, we can say that a chair is a bad chair if it has one leg
shorter than the others; or that an eye is a bad eye if it does not see well. But let us understand in
what the “evil” of these objects consists: in a privation of order, form, or measure that
renders them in some way lacking or deficient. At this level, moralists speak of ontic evil, not
in the sense that evil is something, but that it is the privation of some element that
contributes to the perfection of a determined being. Illness and death are evils in this sense.
(Physical evils, natural disasters).

In the moral plane, the good and evil we consider regard man’s voluntary behavior.
Everything we want and choose, we want and choose because it appears to us as a good, that is,
as desirable. Consequently, bad human behaviour does not consist in choosing what is bad
(object), but in choosing badly. There is an analogy and a hierarchy among goods. Evil, then,
consists in choosing an inferior good instead of a superior good, that is, in giving priority to
the useful or the pleasurable to the detriment of the true good, since the good of man, the
good of life, consists precisely in a virtuous life.

From this perspective, it is clear that an action which involves an ontic evil can be good
(undergoing surgery so that one can continue supporting family and serve society longer). In
fact, in the qualification of human behaviour as good or bad, it is completely misleading to limit
oneself to the consideration of the ontic goods involved.

The cultural-philosophical tendency that is most wide-spread today radically contests the
notion that an objective response to moral questions can be given at all. There is little belief in
the existence of universal and valid criteria on the basis of which we can establish what is right
and wrong. Good and evil are taken to be purely subjective categories. The virtuous good is a
“value” attributed to any kind of behaviour whatever by free individuals.

But is human freedom really the source of values? In keeping with the method we have
pursued thus far, let’s go back to “the things themselves.”

Consider, for example, propositions such as these:

a) “We must defend the weak from the aggression of the strong.”
b) “Rape is never permissible.”
c) “Motor vehicles must drive on the right.”

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We may feel that such a list offends our intelligence. For one thing, it is incongruent to
put proposition “c” on the same level as “a” and “b.” Why? Because proposition “c” is based on
a simple convention created by human law. We would not be perturbed if the legislator had
decided differently. We drive on the right because it is prescribed by law; if the contrary had
been prescribed, we would drive on the left.

Propositions “a” and “b,” on the other hand, do not depend on human convention.
If there are (and there must be!) human laws that prescribe in various ways what propositions “a”
and “b” affirm, it is not the laws themselves that give a positive value to the defense of the weak
and a negative value to rape. On the contrary, the laws must require defense of the weak because
it is “good” and prohibit rape because it is “bad.” The ideas “good” and “bad” are rooted in the
essence of the human person and the nature of the actions addressed.

When the weak are oppressed by the strong, my freedom does not establish that it is good
to help them. I can only decide to realize this good or not. Where rape is concerned, I am not
free to say: “It’s permissible.” The source of these values lies outside of me, that is, it is
“transcendent.” I do not create these values. I find them. I am in the truth when my thinking
accords with reality. The truth of all this is evident from moral experience itself and the moral
terms used in everyday language.

However, the manner in which we know and discern the true good is a much more
complex question.

9. 2. The True Good

We have already said that anyone who acts, acts for an end. The desired end of an
action is what we have called “good.” But what is the true good to which our actions should
tend?

Since we are speaking of our actions – of human acts – it is clear that the end to which
these acts tend must be an end for man, that is, a good for man. Now, we should remember
that the actions of man are singular and concrete, and human only in so far as they are directed
by reason. Thus, the demands of both rationality and the concrete situation have to be reconciled.

It should be clear that good action is rational action; hence, we must entrust our behavior to the
guidance of reason. As we have often repeated, a person acts in a way worthy of his
humanity when his passions are controlled by his will, and the will is right when it adheres
to the good indicated by the intelligence.

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How does the intelligence grasp what is truly good? This good is not “created” by human
reason, but simply “discovered.” Yes, but discovered where? And how?

9. 2. 1. Man’s “Humanity” as Source

The response that comes from the phenomenology of moral action and from traditional,
classical philosophy is that the good is discovered in man himself, in the “being-such” of
man, in his eîdos, in his most profound identity. In a word, the good is rooted in our
humanity.

Now, our humanity is something we find actualized in ourselves and others, but not in a
static way. Humanity consists in being-human, but this in itself means becoming-human,
making oneself-human, drawing ever closer and better to what we are.

We need to dwell on this for a moment because the foundations of classical ethics, often
misunderstood by modern thinkers, can be found right here.

It’s easy to see that human beings need many things: food, a home, company, culture . . .
Man is a structurally “indigent” creature.

Now, this “indigence” is a fact; it is an empirically observable lack of something. But

to identify a lack means to discover in the “being as it is” the “should be” that points to the
removal of such a lack. Man finds himself to be “imperfect” both physically and spiritually.
In discovering this imperfection, however, he also discovers what direction he should take
to realize his perfection.

This truth is commonly passed over by many contemporary authors who accept as an
axiom the so-called “Law of Hume” (1711-1776) which affirms the impossibility of deriving
moral judgements from judgements of fact: “Having-to-be does not derive from being” (you
can’t derive “ought” from “is”). But man’s needy condition is precisely a “data of fact” (an is)
from which a “having to be” (an ought) rigorously follows. We are human beings, and this
is a fact; but we are imperfect, and this is also a fact. Consequently, our “being-human” is
not simply a fact: it is a task! Our end is to realize the potential implicit in our humanity by
developing ourselves in the direction indicated by our humanity. Our indigence, our
imperfection, our humanity directs us toward certain goals, certain “finishing lines,” if you
will, by inclining us toward specific goods.

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9. 2. 2. Natural Inclinations

What is man? He is first of all a being – “something that is” distinguished by a specific
characteristic: he is a rational animal.

· Reason grasps as human goods the objects of the inclinations (common and specific)
inscribed on human nature.

We can recognize in man three types of tendency or inclination: those which are common
to all beings, those which are common only to animals, and those which are specific to man.

A reader who is unfamiliar with classical philosophical terminology might feel

perplexed: What does it mean to speak of tendencies common to all beings? Can an inanimate
being – a stone – have a tendency?! Modern language creates a problem for us here because
expressions such as “tendency” or “inclination” have assumed a mostly psychological
connotation. Of themselves, however, they do not have this sense. They are, rather, derived from
the language of physics: tendency comes from “to tend,” that is, to draw; inclination comes from
“to incline,” that is, to bend toward a direction. The way we are using them here, however, goes
beyond the physical. For us, they have a meta-physical meaning.

First of all, every being tends to “continue being” according to its own nature. If beings
did not have this tendency, they would not persist. A stone remains identical with itself as long
as an external cause does not interfere to modify it. We could say that in inanimate beings this
tendency is a passive, “static” inclination.

Animals as beings also have the tendency to persist in being according to their own
nature. However, they realize this inclination in a typically animal way. In common language, we
call this “survival instinct.” Beyond the inclination to being, animals possess other inclinations
proper to animal kind, such as that of reproduction and, in many species, the care of their young.

As a rational animal, man participates in the inclinations common to all beings and all
animals, but in a specifically human, or rational, manner. The inclination to preserve his being
and to procreate and educate his children are manifested not only at the “static” or instinctive
level, but at the particularly rational level. Further, in man we find certain specifically human
inclinations, such as the tendency to know the truth (above all, the Supreme Truth) and to live in
society.

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Reason enables us to know the good. To live well, then, means “to live according to
reason.” But this is not to say that reason draws the value and meaning of things from itself. It
finds the aim of duty, the good, in human nature as a whole: corporeal and spiritual, animal and
rational.

It is nature that inclines us toward the good. But this nature is not a hypothetical stage
prior to the development of society, nor is it simply the animal, biological dimension of the
human being. True, the “natural” basis of ethics must be sought in the “natural” inclinations
inherent in every person. But beware! These natural inclinations should not be confused with
spontaneous, subjective desires or with individual taste.

Natural inclinations are connected first of all with the anatomical structure of the body:
the eye is made for seeing, the digestive system for assimilating food, the genital organs for
reproduction, etc. Our somatic structure bears an intrinsic finality: to survive and propagate the
species. At a higher level, we discover in ourselves the exigency of knowing the truth, forming
bonds of friendship, and living in peace. These finalities or exigencies constitute inclinations
whose objects are present to the reason as goods to pursue, while their contraries (death,
extinction of the species, ignorance, enmity, etc.) are understood as evils to avoid.

Thus, the pursuit of these goods is adequate to and consonant with human existence not
because someone has arbitrarily decided upon them, but because human nature is made in this
way. Obviously, it is reason that grasps this consonance – but it is not reason that constitutes it.

If, then, we ask what is the good to which all human existence tends, the response must
be sought at the level of human rationality. This answer does not exclude but includes the level
of being an animal. In other words, the preservation of life, procreation, and the education of
offspring, the knowledge of the truth, social life, and all the other ends to which our humanity
inclines us are “human goods.”

Human goods – such a virtue, maturity, growth in freedom. These are NOT goods to
obtain and possesses like money or career but are rather aspects of human personality. Ethical
goods are virtues. (MAC)

· The task inherent in our humanity, therefore, is to pursue the goods to which our
humanity itself is inclined.

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9. 2. 3. Man’s Ultimate End

In this way, we can come to understand that “human goods” are ordered to the “good
of man.” The finalities we discover in our bodies and minds are in their turn finalized by the
total good of the person. What is this good? It is the perfection of man as such, that is, the
state in which we no longer desire anything because we are fully enjoying the good
obtained: complete happiness.

In reality, we are not founding the good on happiness, but rather, authentic happiness
on the good! We can do this once we show that the concept of authentic good is founded on
the nature of man.

9. 2. 3. 1. Happiness and the Good

Undoubtedly, if we had no desire for happiness we wouldn’t act at all. (We would
have no reason for qualifying anything as “good” or “bad.”

To put it in philosophically precise terms, we can say that happiness “constitutes the
ultimate, formal motivation of choices, and precisely for this reason cannot itself be the
criteria of right choice, nor can the criteria of right choice be deduced from it. Happiness, the
formal end of conduct, cannot be the rule of conduct.”

In other words, everything we want, we want because we desire to be happy. But this
does not mean that the concrete objects of our choices and actions should be considered as mere
“means” to procure happiness! We do not decide, for example, to help a needy person because it
will make us happy, but because it is good to help him. Certainly, to realize the good means
making our lives “good” and, hence, “happy”; nevertheless, good remains an end in itself,
something desired and pursued for itself and not as a means to anything else. It belongs to the
category of the virtuous and not the useful good.

9. 2. 3. 2. Perfect and Imperfect Happiness

Every realization of the good constitutes a partial realization of true happiness. At this
point, however, we run into that “disproportion” where (to borrow a notion from Pascal) man
infinitely transcends man. This is to say that the human heart is characterized by a thirst for total,
absolute happiness which can never be satisfied by any relative, terrestrial good – as are our
actions and human virtues – since every “relative” good, by definition, still leaves room for
desire. The absolute, beatific Good can be nothing other than God alone.

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This truth, about which the pages of St. Augustine and many of the mystics overflow, can
be phenomenologically noted by anyone who reflects dispassionately on human existence. Even
atheists and unbelievers catch a glimpse of it. I cannot help thinking of the poet G. Leopardi
(1798-1837) who expressed the “feeling of the nullity of all things, the insufficiency of all
pleasure to fill the heart, and our tendency toward an infinite that we do not understand.”

Do we conclude, then, that we must believe in the existence of God to understand that
rape is an evil and helping the poor a good? Obviously not. Our study has taken us in the
opposite direction: inquiring into what is good or evil for human beings has lead us to recognize
that their supreme good and perfect happiness is in God!

Certainly, for anyone who refuses the notion of God or, in the spirit of fideism, leaves
Him outside the boundaries of rational knowledge, the desire for happiness is “absurd.” It comes
to be seen as a kind of curse that impedes the taste for pleasure and leads to disquiet. But isn’t
this, perhaps, an intrinsic sanction to remain obstinate and closed to the truth out of self-
sufficient pride? Man is made to know the truth (above all, the highest Truth) with his
intelligence and adhere to the true-good (above all, the highest Good) with his will. When he
refuses the truth, he deviates not only from his own dignity, but also from happiness. The “evil of
living” (to cite the poet Montale), despair with its train of violence, mental illness, toxic-
dependency and suicide – all this finds here its essential motivation.

Openness to the truth, on the other hand, in keeping with the essential structure of our
nature, disposes us to recognize man’s end because it has a certain “connaturality” with it.
“Beatitude,” says St. Thomas, “is nothing other than the joy that comes from the truth.”

Obviously, the revelation of God in Christ opens new horizons at this level while denying
nothing of what has been gained by rational reflection. On the contrary, it helps to clarify it.

The happiness of the wise man who does not know God is the joy that comes from a
virtuous life ordered by reason. It reaches its summit in human friendship and the knowledge of
God through His works. This can be called “imperfect beatitude,” in contrast with perfect,
supernatural beatitude. But we should note right away that the concept “imperfect beatitude” is
problematic since “with the name of beatitude one means only the perfect good of the intellectual
nature.” Imperfect beatitude, then, would be “imperfect perfection”! We might say that we find
ourselves in front of a “dialectical” concept, at once full of assertion and negation, inviting us to
overcome it. Undoubtedly, the concept of “natural happiness” is clearer for us as something
proportioned to human nature. Man can pursue this happiness by his own effort (though not
without the help of God), using his natural faculties correctly to arrive at the knowledge of
humanly accessible truth. But the man who is “happy” in this way still lacks something. And

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let’s not forget that the natural human faculties are in a state of habitual disorder because of
concupiscence, causing us to stop at transitory goods to the neglect of the ultimate good.

Perfect beatitude, or beatitude pure and simple, infinitely surpasses the capacities of
human nature, making them only anticipations. Thus, happiness can only be a gift of God, that is,
supernatural. Philosophy can illustrate the desire for and suitability of happiness, but only
theology can describe its essence and modality.

Ethics and Happiness

Moral philosophy is not limited to furnishing a list of norms, proscriptions, and

prohibitions. An ethics reduced in this manner immediately provokes a radical question: Why
should I submit myself to such norms? The usual response to such a query is: Because this is the
way to be morally good. To which it is easy to reply: But why should I be morally good?

The exigency of developing our human personality is the basis of morality. As we will
see, the full realization of this development constitutes a happy life, while the means of this
development are the virtues.

In synthesis, we can say that moral philosophy is the science of the good or virtuous life,
and therefore, precisely for this reason, it is the art of happiness.

Happiness for some, it means simply “to enjoy,” to go in search of pleasure wherever it
is found. From this perspective, the good life is simply the “pleasurable” life, the “dolce vita”
(sweet life) or very pleasurable “virtual reality.”

The fact is that the object of our desire is not pleasure but the thing that procures
pleasure! Certainly, we want to enjoy . . . but enjoy something! Or better said, we want
“something,” and we welcome the pleasure that it brings. We can define this “something” that
we desire as “the good.”

The central question: “Why live at all?” I can face an experience that is unpleasant
(having a cavity filled) or tiring (getting up early in the morning to study) or boring (reading
certain books . . .), provided that it forms part of the global end of my life.

In effect, there is something for which I must desire and hope, something which
represents the meaning of every one of my desires: I want to be happy. I want to realize fully my
existence, that is, to develop completely my personality. All that I desire, all that I hope for, I
desire and hope for because I believe that it can contribute to my true happiness.

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