Radioactive Waste Management:

An Environmental History Lesson for Engineers (and Others)

By M. Joshua Silverman, Department of History, Carnegie Mellon University

I. Framing the Problem

The United States is at a "gridlock" position regarding nuclear waste management. Existing
nuclear power plants, left to manage wastes in the absence of a coherent national policy, have
become de facto long-term storage sites, using facilities designed only to temporarily house such
materials. Radioactive waste has emerged as one of the issues inhibiting further development of
the nuclear power industry, and the safety implications of forcing every power plant to handle
wastes on a longer-term basis are severe.

Former nuclear weapons production sites face even more significant problems with radioactive
waste management. The scale and scope of the cleanup at these sites is enormous; officials
estimate that seventy-five years and $300 billion will be required to remediate these facilities.
The Department of Energy (DOE), which is responsible for these sites, faces both an
environmental and an administrative quagmire as it attempts to clean up after fifty years of
nuclear weapons production.

The lesson that follows is an introduction to these issues, focusing on an understanding of how,
over time, the problems associated with radioactive waste have developed. This lesson is
predicated on the assumption that radioactive waste management is not a single task to be
accomplished but is rather a multidimensional issue that needs to be understood and addressed
physically, socially, and historically.

The multiple aspects of radioactive waste management this lesson examines include physical and
value-oriented issues. What radioactive waste is, where it is, how it has been generated and
handled, what some of the difficulties are in handling, treating, and disposing of the stuff--these
are central issues in radioactive waste managment. Values are also critical in understanding
radioactive waste, and must be understood in their social and historical contexts--how
radioactive waste has been understood (or misunderstood, as the case may be), how it has meant
different things to different people, and how these meanings have changed over time. An
understanding of these value-oriented issues will enable a discussion of the political problem of
radioactive waste, how it has developed into a metaphorical "hot potato" that nobody is willing
to hold. Understand both values and the physical aspects of radioactive waste will help foster an
understanding of the bureaucratic problems involved in managing this material --resolving the
radioactive waste problem will involve administrative and managerial feats that the DOE has not
yet shown itself capable of handling.

II. The Pre-History of the Problem: Radiation and Health in the early Twentieth Century

The radioactive waste "problem" is not a new one; health and safety concerns have been
associated with radioactive materials throughout the twentieth century. Indeed, such concerns
have existed almost from the discovery of radioactivity in 1895, when a German physicist,
Willem Roentgen, identified what he called "x-rays," and developed a technique for producing
them. The medical community quickly adopted x-rays as a useful diagnostic tool; within a year,
x-ray machines could be found in every major city in the U.S. In 1898, Pierre and Marie Curie
announced that they had identified a new element, radium, that had radioactive properties.
Radium, like x-rays, was adopted for several industrial uses; for example, workers in the 1910s
and 1920s painted watch dials with radium so that they would glow in the dark.

Observers soon noted that these radioactive materials were associated with harmful side effects.
Medical x-ray workers and many scientists were suffering from skin burns, blood disorders, and
a variety of otherwise rare cancers; indeed, Marie Curie suffered terribly from bone diseases
stemming from her prolonged exposure to radium and other radioactive materials. The women
who worked as watch-dial painters began to develop horrible forms of jaw and throat problems.
Health workers learned that these women would use their mouths to "point" their brushes,
thereby ingesting what often amounted to lethal quantities of radioactive compounds.

Several interested organizations and individuals moved, in response to the recognition of the
health effects of radioactive materials, to form independent bodies to study the issues and set
voluntary standards for exposure. In the 1920s their efforts resulted in the formation of the
International Committee on Radiation Protection; in the United States, the National Committee
on Radiation Protection was also established as an affiliated organization. These organizations
provided provided self-governance for radiation-related industrial hygiene for several decades.

III. The Manhattan Project: Large-Scale Work with Radioactive Materials

Industrial work with radioactive materials was relatively small in scale through the 1930s, but
events during and after World War II changed matters dramatically. Indeed, the work done to
construct atomic weapons, begun as war raged across Europe and the Pacific, continues to have
profound environmental and political effects in the contemporary world.

A. The Decision(s) to Build the Bomb

Efforts to construct an atomic bomb in the United States began in the late 1930s, under the
assumption that the Allies were in a race with Germany. In 1938, two German physicists
announced that they had demonstrated fission--the splitting of the atom. Scientists in Europe and
the U.S. recognized that a controlled fission reaction could be made into a new, incredibly
destructive weapon. Many of the most eminent physicists in the U.S. were emigres from
Germany, Austria, Hungary, and Italy; having experienced fascism, they were alarmed by the
prospect of an atomic weapon in the hands of Hitler's regime. The efforts of these emigre
scientists were crucial in prompting the American government to undertake what became known
as the Manhattan Project.

The Manhattan Project refers to the efforts of the Manhattan Engineering District (MED), the
organization created by the U.S. Army to carry out the atomic bomb development program. This
was truly an enormous industrial and scientific undertaking, and was the largest construction
project ever undertaken at the time. The MED spent over $5 billion during the war, of which
nearly half went for constructing production facilities and towns at Oak Ridge, Hanford, and Los
Alamos during the years 1943-45.

B. Health and Safety in the Manhattan Engineering District

Radiation safety was a priority in the MED. Personnel protection was strongly emphasized, even
more than in other types of production work, and the NCRP safety guidelines proved quite
effective in this regard. Scientists were in short supply and even enlisted men (who died by the
thousands overseas) were well protected. The unique nature of the research and production work
made trained personnel even more valuable than normal; there simply were no replacements
available. Management thus emphasized health and safety precautions, as the project could not
afford to lose trained personnel to radiation exposure.

Site selection reflected safety concerns of a different sort. For example, the MED chose to locate
its primary plutonium production facility (Hanford) in eastern Washington, rather than nearer to
the laboratories in Chicago or Oak Ridge, because of fears of the possible consequences of a
major accident. The Hanford facility utilized new and untested production techniques with
extremely dangerous substances. Managers did not know exactly what the risks of operating such
a plant were, but they assumed that they were significant. Thus, they chose to place the facility in
a remote location so that if a catastrophic accident did occur it would affect relatively few
people.

Waste management was not a high priority during the war; this is not a surprise given the
pressures of defeating Germany and Japan. Although managers clearly understood that
production processes would generate vast quantities of highly toxic materials, especially from
the separations processes at Hanford, they did not give much thought to the development of a
long-term waste disposal plan. The MED sought to minimize the immediate risks associated with
these wastes, but deliberately deferred developing disposal solutions for the various waste
management problems until after the war. Even though waste management and health concerns
were re-evaluated after the war ended, the MED never made the solution of waste problems a
priority. As it turned out, neither did its successor, the Atomic Energy Commission.

C. The Legacy of the MED and the rise of the Cold War

The MED was ultimately successful in developing atomic bombs, two of which were dropped on
Japan in August, 1945. Atomic weapons became a central element of American diplomacy from
the moment of their first use, and "the bomb" played a critical role in the emerging Cold War
between the US and the USSR. The tensions between East and West emerged even before the
war ended and escalated throughout the 1940s and 1950s. As a result, with the exception of a
brief post-war lull, the American nuclear weapons production effort begun during the war
continued at a high level well into the 1960s.

The rapid transition from WWII to the Cold War helps to explain the lack of attention paid by
the Manhattan Engineering District and the Atomic Energy Commission to waste managment
issues. As atomic weapons became a defining symbolic and literal expression of American
power, the need to continue production at all costs continued. There was no extended post-war
shut-down of the wartime production network, no time to develop new approaches to waste
production and management. The pressure of the Cold War made for a very uneasy peace
indeed.

IV. The Atomic Energy Commission, 1947-1974

The Atomic Energy Act of 1946 officially created the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) as a
civilian agency with exclusive control over "fissionable" materials. The AEC inherited the
facilities and personnel of the Manhattan Engineering District on January 1, 1947.

A. The AEC and Nuclear Weapons Production

The AEC's first mission was to expand the capacity of the nuclear weapons production complex,
both by adding onto existing facilities and by constructing numerous additional plants. These
plants were scattered across the country, and were run by a variety of corporate and university
contractors.

AEC Nuclear Weapons Production System:

Partial List of Facilities and Contractors as of 1955

AEC Facility State Primary Contractor

Hanford WA General Electric

Savannah River SC DuPont

Fernald OH National Lead

Oak Ridge TN Union Carbide

Los Alamos Laboratory NM University of California

Sandia Laboratory NM Western Electric

Portsmouth OH Goodyear

Mound OH Monsanto

Rocky Flats CO Dow Chemical

Nevada Test Site NV REECO (Reynolds

Electrical Engineering Co.)

The unique nature of the industrial production occurring at the AEC's facilities meant that there
were few industrial precedents for dealing with radioactive waste. Even within the production
network, tasks and techniques varied widely. As a result, contractors tended to follow practices
that they had learned through their prior industrial experience. This led to widely divergent waste
management practices throughout the production system.

Given the wide diversity of production practices, range of contractor backgrounds, and
autonomous bureaucratic networks within the AEC during this period, it is not suprising to learn
that the production system did not operate with a centralized waste management plan. However,
some researchers paid significant attention to radioactive waste during the 1950s. By the end of
the decade the consensus of expert opinion favored certain types of geologic disposal as the best
strategy for the long-term managment of highly radioactive waste, and each site was responsible
for the handling of the wastes produced there.

Although more attention was paid to the issue than during World War II, it is clear that waste
management was not a central concern during the first two decades of the Cold War. Instead, the
increased tensions between the U.S. and the USSR led to continually expanding production
levels which in turn fed an ever-spiraling arms race. Waste management concerns were still not
given high priority when the production system faced continuously increasing demands. The
result of these demands? The U.S., which had one atomic bomb remaining at the end of WWII,
had several dozen nuclear weapons by the end of the 1940s, and several thousand by the end of
the 1950s; in the late 1980s, the US had over 80,000 nuclear warheads, many of which carried a
destructive capacity literally hundreds of times more powerful than the bombs dropped on Japan
in 1945.

B. Nuclear Power: a brief history

In addition to producing nuclear weapons, the Atomic Energy Commission also had the
responsibility for developing peaceful uses of atomic power. This effort became more
pronounced after amendments to Atomic Energy Act in 1954 made commercial nuclear power
possible; prior to that time private control of nuclear fuel was illegal. Commercial nuclear power
has its roots in the "peaceful atom" of the Cold War period. In December, 1953, President
Dwight Eisenhower committed the United States to the development of applications for atomic
science to benefit all of humanity. The program he initiated, known as "Atoms for Peace,
included a sizable research and development effort and was accompanied by an even more
effective public relations campaign.

Administrative and economic difficulties proved to be as formidable as technological ones in

nuclear power development. No insurance company was willing to cover the possible costs
arising from a large-scale nuclear accident; even one such incident would bankrupt the industry.
Congress responded, in 1957, with the Price-Anderson Act, which limited the maximum liability
of a firm operating a nuclear power plant to $560 million--a fraction of the estimated costs of a
major accident.

The first facility devoted specifically to the production of nuclear power for non-military use
opened at Shippingsport, PA (just west of Pittsburgh) in 1957. This was not truly a commercial
venture; although nominally controlled by Duquesne Light Company, the costs were primarily
borne by the AEC as a pilot project. Electric utilities began to invest in nuclear plants in the in
mid-1960s, and the industry boomed as the cost of fossil fuels skyrocketed in response to the
Arab Oil Embargo of 1973. The industry suffered a major setback in 1979, however, when a
malfunction at the Three Mile Island nuclear plant (TMI) caused a partial core meltdown. The
combination of cost escalation, waste management and plant decommissioning concerns, and the
TMI accident effectively crippled the industry. While over one hundred nuclear power plants
continue to operate in the United States, no new plants have been authorized since 1979, and
many plants already under construction at the time of the TMI accident were never completed.

U.S. firms embarked on a nuclear power strategy under the assumption that the radioactive waste
management problem was not especially difficult and would be solved relatively quickly.
Subsequent events would prove otherwise.

C. AEC efforts in radioactive waste management: "Closing Ranks"

Initial radioactive waste management efforts were analogous in intent to traditional industrial and
municipal waste management practice. The AEC sought a "sink" in which it could dump, flush,
or vent radioactive waste products. Sometimes the sink was the ocean; in the latter 1950s, the
AEC licensed commercial boats to haul 55-gallon drums filled with radioactive wastes out to
sea, to be dumped overboard into deep water. Managers reasoned that the barrels would sink
deeply enough that, even if they corroded or ruptured, the wastes would be sufficiently diluted in
the ocean to pose no danger. Numerous facilities flushed wastes into cooling ponds, which often
seeped into nearby streams or rivers. Air was another sink; at Hanford, the greatest amount of
radioactivity released off-site came through the stacks or from venting and evaporation of
contaminated gases. Various on-site dumps or landfills were utilized, and often wastes were
pumped into large holding tanks pending final disposal. Many of these initial efforts would prove
inadequate on environmental grounds or unsustainable in the face of public opposition.

Reprocessing spent nuclear fuel was another important waste management strategy. This activity
recovered plutonium and other fission products from spent uranium fuel rods, which could then
be used for weapons or nuclear fuel. Waste material was thus transformed into a valuable
resource, although the act of reprocessing still generated volatile waste products. Ironically,
reprocessing had the effect of exacerbating the waste management problem in the U.S. even as it
reduced the overall volume of radioactive waste material. The ability to reprocess some material
led managers to ignore the radioactive waste problem by making the need for a long-term
disposal option appear less significant.

Reprocessing may yet play a significant role in a long-term waste management strategy, but the
U.S. stopped reprocessing nuclear fuel during the late 1970s by order of President Jimmy Carter,
who wanted to curtail the availability of the weapons-grade material produced by the process.
This decision turned what had been a resource back into a waste product, and made the lack of a
viable long-term disposal strategy for radioactive waste even more apparent.

The AEC considered high-level wastes created by commercial nuclear power reactors to be a
separate problem from the wastes produced at its weapons production facilities. Its plans to deal
with commercial-side wastes received more public attention than any activities occurring inside
the production facilities.

By the late 1950s, experts involved with the commercial waste problem had recommended a
strategy of geologic storage of high-level radioactive waste from commercial nuclear power
plants as the preferred long-term disposal option. By isolating wastes deep in underground
caverns, these materials could be safety removed from contact with the biosphere. By the early
1960s, geologic storage was the accepted waste management strategy within the AEC.

In 1970, having settled on geologic storage as the best permanent disposal solution, the AEC
announced plans to construct a repository for high-level radioactive waste from commercial
power plants in an abandoned salt mine near Lyons, Kansas. The agency faced unexpected
external opposition to its plan, and after strong challenges from regional representatives, the
AEC withdrew its proposal.

The Lyons episode is important for a number of reasons. First, it meant that the planned national
storage facility would not be built as the agency had expected. The AEC's experts had "closed
ranks" around the geologic disposal option; working in a secretive, classified environment, they
had long since squelched any internal dissent and thus were unprepared when they encountered
opposition from external organizations and the public. Lyons also revealed that the AEC's
expertise was limited--the agency could be successfully challenged by external organizations and
agencies concerned about environmental damage or local health and safety, and also by
opponents of nuclear power.

The AEC's experience at Lyons signalled a significant change, as the agency had until then
enjoyed near-complete control over the operational aspects of the nation's nuclear program. The
AEC typically operated outside the realm of public accountability; much of its business was
conducted in secret to protect national security, and it reported to only one Congressional body,
the Joint Committee on Atomic Energy, with whom it had a generally favorable relationship. As
the primary supporter of scientific and technological work relating to all things nuclear, the
agency had most of the nation's experts on its payroll and access to the latest results and findings.
But in the 1970s, the AEC--and the nation's nuclear industries--were entering into a new and
uncertain period.

V. The beginnings of controversy: the 1970s

The AEC was split into two agencies in 1974. Regulation of the commercial nuclear power
industry was shifted into the newly formed Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), while
production and research activities went to the Energy Research and Development Authority; two
years later ERDA became the Department of Energy (DOE). The creation of the NRC as an
independent agency meant that the commercial nuclear power industry was no longer regulated
by the same organization that also provided it with technical support, a conflict of interest that
had long irked critics of the nation's nuclear program.

The administrative split did not create an equivalent external regulator for weapons production
facilities, however. Despite the recent passage of federal environmental legislation--most
notably, the National Environmental Policy Act (1970) and the Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act (1976)--and despite growing public concerns about pollution and environmental
damage, the DOE claimed immunity from external oversight on the grounds of national security.
Thus, outside agencies and the general public were privy to only limited information regarding
environmental activities at nuclear weapons production facilities.

Yet the DOE's operating environment was beginning to change. The Joint Committee on Atomic
Energy suspended operations shortly after the AEC was split up, which meant that the newly-
formed Energy Department found itself subject to oversight from numerous Congressional
committees that previously lacked the authority to examine the agency's activities. Multiple
Congressional investigations and reports in the latter 1970s and early 1980s helped to reveal the
extent of environmental problems at several major sites, although they rarely led to substantive
changes by the DOE.

During the 1970s and well into the 1980s, the DOE not only fell out of step with public
sentiments about environmental protection but also lagged behind the efforts of private industry
to more effectively control pollution. While public concerns focused on the relatively well-
controlled wastes produced by commercial nuclear power plants, the numerous facilities
involved in nuclear weapons production were shielded by a wall of secrecy. As this wall was
breached in the 1980s, concerns about the public health consequences of nuclear weapons
production increased dramatically.

VI. Paralysis: 1980s-present

The AEC's failure at Lyons left a void in planning for the long-term disposal of commercial
radioactive wastes. The agency's experts had "closed ranks" around the Lyons facility and had
difficulties developing alternative strategies for dealing with radioactive waste. Congress
ultimately imposed a legislative solution with the Nuclear Waste Repository Act of 1982
(NWPA).

The events that followed the passage of the NWPA reveal the difficulties of imposing a
legislative fix on a problem that has not been clearly defined or even fully understood. The
NWPA mandated a timeline for the creation of a storage facility; this timeline has been
repeatedly violated, and at this point the DOE is at least a decade behind schedule. The NWPA
established a process for selecting a permanent storage facility in which numerous locations
around the country were to be assessed as possible sites. The selection process ultimately fell
apart, and a 1987 Congressional amendedment to the NWPA mandated consideration of only one
location, Nevada's Yucca Mountain. Since the act required that DOE establish a permanent
repository, the elimination of all other sites from review meant that Yucca Mountain was named
as the location before the feasibility studies and environmental assessments had been completed.
As might be expected, this situation has bred major litigation as well as significant opposition
from forces in the state of Nevada.

There is another important political dimension to the repository siting issue. Some opponents of
nuclear power oppose a "solution" to the radioactive waste problem because the lack of a
solution prevents the industry from further growth. Nuclear power cannot expand in the United
States until the problem of where to dispose of radioactive waste is solved. Thus, opposition to
Yucca Mountain (or any other proposal) is to a significant extent grounded in factors apart from
the environmental impacts or technical considerations of the facility, which further inhibits
resolution of the issue.

The AEC's troubles with the Lyons facility also foreshadowed the increasingly powerful local
role in radioactive waste management, a role that has been termed NIMBY-ism. NIMBY stands
for "Not In My Back Yard," and the NIMBY mentality has made siting all manner of potentially
hazardous facilities exceptionally difficult; these concerns affect practically every new siting
decision for industrial, technological, or waste management facilities. The state of Nevada is
fighting a classic NIMBY battle against the Yucca Mountain facility, and low-level waste
disposal facilities (also required by NWPA) are also difficult to site. Property owners and
regional residents simply do not want facilities that might pose health risks and devalue property
in their proverbial back-yards.

The growth of the NIMBY-ism reflects dramatically eroded confidence in government authority
and scientific expertise, and has become a major factor not only in radioactive waste
management but in a variety of environmentally sensitive facility-siting issues. The NIMBY
mind-set has been fueled in no small part by revelations of environmental and public health
damage done by nuclear weapons production and testing, as well as other incidents of corporate
or bureaucratic disregard for public health and safety.

The bulk of the information regarding nuclear weapons production has become available only in
the last few years, a result of the changing institutional context of the Department of Energy.
DOE had claimed immunity from external environmental oversight until 1986, when a federal
appeals court upheld a ruling that the agency was subject to federal environmental legislation.
This case, LEAF v. Hodel, ended the Department's self-policing of its environmental affairs, and
a host of waste management problems at DOE production sites were subsequently revealed.

The LEAF v. Hodel decision took place during a time of great change on the international scene.
The Cold War was clearly thawing; in 1989, the Communist Bloc collapsed, the Berlin Wall
came down, and the Cold War was over. By the time of the break-up of the Soviet Union in
1991, the DOE had acknowledged that its nuclear weapons production mission had ended and
that its primary task was to clean up its facilities. This shift has enabled more openness from
DOE, a significant change of policy for the agency. Increased public access to information,
ironically, increased general mis-trust of the agency, as evidence mounted that the DOE had been
hiding problems for decades.

Conclusion

Radioative waste is not a single "thing" that can be isolated and dealt with with a magic bullet.
Rather, radioactive waste management involves numerous physical, political, and cultural factors
in a dynamic, ongoing process. Perhaps the most important player in the radioactive waste
process is the Department of Energy. The DOE is in the midst of a transition from an agency
concerned with the production of nuclear weapons to one whose goal is to clean up after five
decades of production. The bureaucratic and technological problems involved in this transition
are each severe, and will have major impacts on radioactive waste management in the United
States.

Readings for this lesson:

Susan Fallows Tierney, "The Nuclear Waste Disposal Controversy," in Dorothy Nelkin, ed.,
Controversy (Second Edition). Beverly Hills: Sage Publications, 1984: 91-110.

Andrew C. Kadak, "An Intergenerational Approach to High-Level Waste Disposal." Nuclear

News (July, 1997): 49-51.

Adri de la Bruheze, "Closing Ranks: Definition and Stabilization of Radioactive Wastes in the
U.S. Atomic Energy Commission, 1945-1960," in Weibe Bijker and John Law, eds., Shaping
Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change. Cambridge: MIT Press, 1992:
140-174.

Matthew Wald, "Caught Between the Risks of Haste and Hesitation." The New York Times,
September 29, 1997.

Matthew Wald, "Admitting Error at a Weapons Plant." The New York Times, March 23, 1998.

Questions for class discussion:

1. One issue that the readings discuss, in different ways, is the role of the public in radioactive
waste management issues versus the role of experts.

A. - How has the role of the public changed over time?

- What role should the public play in radioactive waste management?

B. - How has the role of experts changed over time?

- What role should expertise play in the radioactive waste management problem?

Does this history provide any lessons for current and future behavior in determining how much
public versus how much expert opinion/input on this issue?

2. In what ways does the radioactive waste problem differ from or resemble other waste
management problems you have considered in this class?

 
3. We can all agree that it’s best to make informed decisions; sometimes, however, decisions get
made under conditions of uncertainty. How much do we need to know before acting?

(Kadak, for example, points out that the radioactive waste problem is one in which decisions
cannot be made under conditions of complete certainty. Waiting for more information may be an
option, but Tierney points out that inaction has been a surrogate for decision-making, that not
acting is a choice that has in fact shaped the operational environment. The New York Times
headline sums up the dilemma of the managers at Hanford; they are "Caught between the risks of
haste and hesitation.")

Introduction

Any activity that produces or uses radioactive materials generates radioactive waste. Mining,
nuclear power generation, and various processes in industry, defense, medicine, and scientific
research produce byproducts that include radioactive waste. Radioactive waste can be in gas,
liquid or solid form, and its level of radioactivity can vary. The waste can remain radioactive for
a few hours or several months or even hundreds of thousands of years. Because it can be so
hazardous and can remain radioactive for so long, finding suitable disposal facilities for
radioactive waste is difficult. Depending on the type of waste disposed, the disposal facility may
need to contain radiation for a very long time. Proper disposal is essential to ensure protection of
the health and safety of the public and quality of the environment including air, soil, and water
supplies.

Radioactive waste disposal practices have changed substantially over the last twenty years.
Evolving environmental protection considerations have provided the impetus to improve disposal
technologies, and, in some cases, clean up facilities that are no longer in use. Designs for new
disposal facilities and disposal methods must meet environmental protection and pollution
prevention standards that are more strict than were foreseen at the beginning of the atomic age.

Disposal of radioactive waste is a complex issue, not only because of the nature of the waste, but
also because of the complicated regulatory structure for dealing with radioactive waste. There are
a variety of stakeholders affected, and there are a number of regulatory entities involved. Federal
government agencies involved in radioactive waste management include: the Environmental
Protection Agency (EPA), the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC), the Department of
Energy (DOE), and the Department of Transportation. In addition, the states and affected Indian
Tribes play a prominent role in protecting the public against the hazards of radioactive waste.

Types Of Radioactive Waste

There are six general categories of radioactive waste:

1. spent nuclear fuel from nuclear reactors

2. high-level waste from the reprocessing of spent nuclear fuel
3. transuranic waste mainly from defense programs
4. uranium mill tailings from the mining and milling of uranium ore
5. low-level waste
 6. naturally occurring and accelerator-produced radioactive materials .

Radioactive waste is categorized according to its origin and not necessarily according to its level
of radioactivity. For example, some low-level waste has the same level of radioactivity as some
high-level waste.

Sources and Volume

In addition to being used to generate commercial electricity, nuclear reactors are used in
government-sponsored research and development programs, universities and industry; in science
and engineering experimental programs; at nuclear weapons production facilities; and by the
U.S. Navy and military services. The operation of nuclear reactors results in spent reactor fuel.
The reprocessing of that spent fuel produces high-level radioactive waste (HLW).

Figure 1
Projected Accumulated Radioactivity of Commercial Spent Fuel Discharges for the DOE/EIA
No-New-Orders and Lower Reference Cases
Integrated Data Base for 1991: U.S. Spent Fuel and Radioactive Waste Inventory Projections and
Characteristics, DOE/ORNL, Oct. 1991. (DOE/RW-0006, Rev. 7)

The fuel for most nuclear reactors consists of pellets of ceramic uranium dioxide that are sealed
in hundreds of metal rods. These rods are bundled together to form what is known as a "fuel
assembly." Depending upon the type and size of the reactor, a fuel assembly can weigh up to
1,500 pounds. As the nuclear reactor operates, uranium atoms fission (split apart) and release
energy. When most of the usable uranium has fissioned, the "spent" fuel assembly is removed
from the reactor.

Until a disposal or long-term storage facility is operational, most spent fuel is stored in water
pools at the reactor site where it was produced. The water removes leftover heat generated by the
spent fuel and serves as a radiation shield to protect workers at the site.

The operation of nuclear reactors over the last twenty years has substantially added to the
amount of radioactive waste in this country. As shown in Figure 1, by the year 2020, the total
amount of spent fuel is expected to increase significantly.
HLW is the liquid waste that results when spent fuel is reprocessed to recover unfissioned
uranium and plutonium. During this process, the fuel is dissolved by strong chemicals, and this
results in liquid HLW. Plans are to solidify these liquids into a form that is suitable for disposal.
Solidification is still in the planning stages. While currently there are no commercial facilities in
this country that reprocess spent fuel, spent fuel from defense program reactors has been
routinely reprocessed for use in producing nuclear weapons or for reuse in new fuel.

Figure 2
Historical and Projected Inventories of Defense High-Level Radioactive Waste
Reference: DOE/RW-0006, Rev.7

Compared to the total inventory of HLW, the volume of commercial HLW from the reprocessing
of commercial spent fuel is almost insignificant, less than one percent. Defense-related HLW
comprises greater than ninety-nine percent of the volume of HLW. Figure 2 shows the historical
and projected volume of defense-related HLW through the year 2020. The effect of the end of
the "Cold War" on these projections is uncertain.

HLW is now stored in underground tanks or stainless steel silos on federal reservations in South
Carolina, Idaho, and Washington and at the Nuclear Fuel Services Plant in West Valley, NY.
These facilities have begun programs to solidify and structurally stabilize the waste in
preparation for disposal at a national repository.

Regulation of Disposal

Some elements, such as plutonium, in HLW and spent fuel are highly radioactive and remain so
for thousands of years. Therefore, the safe disposal of this waste is one of the most controversial
environmental subjects facing the federal government and affected states.

The federal government (the EPA, the DOE, and the NRC) has overall responsibility for the safe
disposal of HLW and spent fuel. The EPA is responsible for developing environmental standards
that apply to both DOE-operated and NRC-licensed facilities. Currently, the NRC is responsible
for licensing such facilities and ensuring their compliance with the EPA standards. DOE is
responsible for developing the deep geologic repository which has been authorized by Congress
for disposing of spent fuel and high level waste. Both the NRC and the Department of
Transportation are responsible for regulating the transportation of these wastes to storage and
disposal sites.

Site Selection for Storage and Disposal

In the early 1980's, the DOE formally adopted a national strategy to develop mined geologic
repositories as disposal facilities for spent fuel and high-level radioactive waste. In 1983, the
DOE identified nine potentially acceptable sites and, in 1984, selected three sites as candidates
for further characterization. In 1987, Congress directed the DOE to pursue the investigation of
only the Yucca Mountain, NV site in order to determine whether the site is suitable for
development as a repository. The DOE has designed a comprehensive "site characterization"
program to evaluate the suitability of the Yucca Mountain site. The objectives of this program
are to: (1) determine the geologic, hydrologic, and geochemical conditions at Yucca Mountain;
(2) provide information needed to design a package for the disposal of radioactive waste; (3)
provide information for the design of the repository facility; and (4) evaluate whether Yucca
Mountain can meet NRC and EPA protection and safety requirements. Figure 3 is an artist's
rendition of the proposed Yucca Mountain repository.

The DOE is also developing plans for the siting and development of a potential Monitored
Retrievable Storage (MRS) facility. The MRS facility could be used to receive and store spent
fuel from commercial power reactors for subsequent shipment to a repository when such a
facility becomes operational.

Setting Environmental Protection Standards

In 1985, the EPA published final regulations that established generally applicable environmental
standards for the management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, HLW, and transuranic (TRU)
wastes. (TRU wastes are discussed in the next section.) The disposal portion of these standards
was successfully challenged in the courts and returned to the Agency for revision. The court was
primarily concerned that the regulations might not adequately protect ground water and
individuals from radioactive contamination. Following the court's ruling in 1987, the EPA
worked to re-promulgate the disposal portion of these standards.

In October 1992, two laws were enacted, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Land
Withdrawal Act and the Energy Policy Act, that affected EPA's development of standards for the
management and disposal of spent nuclear fuel, HLW and TRU wastes. As explained more fully
in the next section on TRU waste, EPA's Administrator issued the revised disposal standards as
mandated by the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act in December 1993. These standards apply to all
HLW, spent fuel, and TRU waste disposal except for disposal at the Yucca Mountain site. The
Energy Policy Act directs the EPA to issue environmental standards, which protect public health
and safety and are specific to the Yucca Mountain site. The Act also requires that the National
Academy of Sciences (NAS) conduct a study to provide findings and recommendations related
to the form and content of environmental radiation protection standards for Yucca Mountain,
Nevada. The EPA's standards for Yucca Mountain must be developed based upon the findings
and recommendations of the NAS and must be issued within one year from the time ' the EPA
receives the NAS recommendations. NRC, as the licensing authority for this site, must
incorporate the EPA's environmental standards in their overall licensing regulations for HLW
disposal (10 CFR 60).

Sources and Volume

Transuranic (TRU) waste materials have been generated in the U.S. since the 1940's. Most of this
waste originates from 0nuclear weapons production facilities for defense programs.
"Transuranic" refers to atoms of man-made elements that are heavier (higher in atomic number)
than uranium. The most prominent element in most TRU waste is plutonium. Some TRU waste
consists of items such as rags, tools, and laboratory equipment contaminated with radioactive
materials. Other forms of TRU waste include organic and inorganic residues or even entire
enclosed contaminated cases in which radioactive materials were handled.

Some TRU waste emits high levels of penetrating radiation; this type requires protective
shielding. However, most TRU waste does not emit high levels of penetrating radiation but poses
a danger when small particles of it are inhaled or ingested. The radiation from the particles is
damaging to lung tissue and internal organs. As long as this type of TRU waste remains enclosed
and contained, it can be handled safely.

Another problem with TRU waste is that most of its radioactive elements are long-lived. That is,
they stay radioactive for a long time. For example, half of the original amount of plutonium-239
in the waste will remain harmful after 24,000 years. Disposal must be carefully planned so that
the waste poses no undue threat to public health or the environment for years to come.

Figure 4
DOE Accumulated TRU Waste
Reference: DOE/RW-0006, Rev.5

The total volume of TRU waste and TRU contaminated soil is estimated at around one million
cubic meters. Figure 4 provides the historical and projected amounts of TRU wastes to the year
2015.
Site Selection for Storage and Disposal

In the past, much of the TRU waste was disposed of similarly to low-level radioactive waste, i.e.,
in pits and trenches covered with soil. In 1970, the Atomic Energy Commission (predecessor to
the DOE) decided that TRU waste should be stored for easy retrieval to await disposal at a
repository. Federal facilities in Washington, Idaho, California, Colorado, New Mexico, Nevada,
Tennessee, South Carolina, Ohio, and Illinois are currently storing TRU waste.

The DOE has evaluated several alternatives for managing buried waste and contaminated soil
including: (1) leaving it in place and monitoring it; (2) leaving it in place and improving the
containment; and (3) removing, processing, and disposing of the waste in a repository.

As a first step in developing a permanent disposal site for TRU waste, the DOE is developing an
underground, geologic repository called the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP), near Carlsbad,
NM. This site has been excavated in a salt bed about 2,100 feet underground. The WIPP will
have to meet environmental standards established by the EPA before it can be used as a
permanent disposal site.

If the WIPP site is eventually determined to be suitable for the disposal of TRU waste, the
underground disposal area is planned to cover 100 acres. It will have a design capacity of over 2
million cubic meters, or about 850,000 barrels, of TRU waste. Figure 5 is a schematic drawing of
the WIPP.

Setting Environmental Protection Standards

As stated earlier, the EPA established environmental standards applicable to spent fuel, HLW
and TRU waste, but they were returned to the Agency by the courts for revision. While the
Energy Policy Act specifies procedures for developing standards for a repository at Yucca
Mountain, NV, the Waste Isolation Pilot Plant (WIPP) Land Withdrawal Act requires the EPA to
promulgate final standards applicable to WIPP and all other spent nuclear fuel, HLW, and TRU
waste disposal facilities other than those developed under the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982.

The WIPP Land Withdrawal Act reinstated all of the EPA's 1985 radioactive waste disposal
standards except for the sections that the court found problematic, i.e., the Individual and
Ground-Water Protection Requirements of the disposal standards. The reinstated sections consist
primarily of containment requirements and assurance requirements. These requirements are
designed to help ensure that the wastes will be disposed of in a manner that limits the release of
radioactive materials.

In 1993, EPA finalized amendments to the standards to address the court's concerns. Individual
radiation protection standards will limit a person's total annual radiation exposure, considering
the sum of all possible exposures. Ground-water protection standards protect present and future
sources of drinking water.
New Regulatory Responsibilities for EPA

Under the WIPP Land Withdrawal Act, Congress gave EPA the responsibility for implementing
its radioactive waste disposal standards at the WIPP. The Act also requires the EPA to review
and approve of the DOE's plans for testing and retrieving waste at the WIPP. EPA must also
ensure compliance with all federal environmental laws and regulations. In order for the WIPP to
become a permanent disposal facility, the EPA must certify that the facility complies with its
disposal standards. If the EPA does not certify the WIPP, the DOE must decommission the
facility. Even if the EPA certifies the WIPP, the Agency will have to determine, on an ongoing
basis, whether it continues to comply with the disposal standards as well as all other federal
environmental laws, regulations, and permit requirements that apply. In particular, DOE must
demonstrate that the WIPP complies with the Clean Air Act; the Comprehensive Environmental
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act; the Solid Waste Disposal Act; the Safe Drinking
Water Act; and the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act.

image River Subarnarekha

THE RIVER
Translated literally, Subarnarekha means 'streak of gold'. With a drainage area of 1.93 million ha
this smallest of India's major inter-state river basins is a mute host to effluents from various
uranium mining and processing units. While most rivers in the country are classified --
depending on the pollution load -- on a 'best designated use’ basis, the Subarnarekha defies any
classification, as the existing parameters do not include radioactivity.

The rain-fed Subarnarekha originates 15 kms south of Ranchi on the Chhotanagpur plateau
draining the states of Jharkhand, Orissa and West Bengal before entering the Bay of Bengal. The
total length of the river is 450 kms and its important tributaries include the Raru, Kanchi,
Karkari, Kharkai, Garra and Sankh rivers.

POLLUTION
The only streaks visible in the river are those of domestic, industrial or - incredibly - radioactive
pollution. Subarnarekha's rich resource base has spelled doom for the basin. Between
Mayurbhanj and Singhbhum districts, on the right banks of the Subarnarekha, are the country’s
richest copper deposits. The proliferation of unplanned and unregulated mining and mineral
processing industries has led to a devastating environmental degradation of the region. Improper
mining practices have led to uncontrolled dumping of overburden (rock and soil extracted while
mining) and mine tailings. During monsoons, this exposed earth flows into the river, increasing
suspended solid and heavy metal load in the water, silting the dams and reservoirs.

Quarrying of construction material, such as granite, basalt, quartzite, dolerite, sandstone,

limestone, dolomite, gravel, and even sand, has created vast stretches of wasteland in the river
basin. Used and abandoned mines and quarries are a source of mineral wastewater and
suspended solids.

Subarnarekha also has to bear radioactive waste that enters the river through seepage from tailing
ponds of the Uranium Corporation of India at Jadugoda. It has three productive uranium mines,
all within a 5 km radius: Jadugoda, Batin and Narwapahar.

The uranium ore is mined from underground and brought to the surface. Uranium is then
extracted and processed to make 'yellow cake', an ingredient used to fuel nuclear plants. What is
left behind are 'tailings' or effluents comprising radioactive products, which are mixed into slurry
and pumped into tailing ponds. These ponds, each covering about 160 ha of land and about 30
metres deep are situated between adjoining villages.

No standards have been met in their construction and no measures taken to control the emissions.
Overflow and seepage from the tailing ponds ultimately ends into the streams that feed
Subarnarekha. These radiations pose the greatest threat to human health, as they harm living
cells, often leading to genetic mutation, cancer and slow death.

Subarnarekha is the lifeline of tribal communities inhabiting the Chhotanagpur belt. Once these
communities made a living out of the river's gold and fish. But today the polluted Subarnarekha
has little to offer. Between 5,000-6,000 families of local tribals, including the fishing community
of Dharas, residing on the riverbanks from Mango in Jamshedpur to Bharagora, have been
affected by the river’s pollution.

Oil and slug deposits on the riverbed deter the growth of moss and fungi, vital food for fish,
hindering the movement of Hilsa fish from the Bay of Bengal to Ghatsila. Even sweet water fish
like sol die in large numbers during their breeding season. Reports reveal that villages in the
region around Ghatsila such as Kalikapara, Royam, Jadugoda, Aminagar, Benasol and Baraghat
are suffering from skin diseases. The male fertility rate has also declined. Unfortunately, people
have not been active in protecting the river as yet, when they could do well and take an example
from other social movements in other river basins.

GOVERNMENT ACTION
Government action has been all but absent in the basin. Although the National River
Conservation Plan (NRCP) intends to clean domestic waste generated from Jamshedpur, Ranchi
and Ghatsila, industrial pollution and runoff from mines is supposed to be tackled by respective
State Pollution Control Boards.

As most industries and mines in this basin fall in Jharkhand state, the onus of checking pollution
falls squarely on the state's Pollution Control Board, which has a particularly poor record in this
regard. While the NRCP would definitely provide welcome amenities to the three earmarked
towns, it would be premature to hope for an overall improvement in the quality of the
Subarnarekha's water until the pollution control board carries out its duties.

Till then Subarnarekha, the ‘stream of gold’, will continue bearing the brunt of industrial
indifference and government's neglect.

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