PAG9CaryPhillipDood 2010 1AugustineOnTheGloryA AugustineAndPhilosoph PDF

All rights reserved.
May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.
Augustine on the Glory

and the Limits of Philosophy
Johannes Brachtendorf
Philosophy and the Pedagogical Function of Belief
Several renowned Augustine interpreters hold that Augustine devel-

oped a notion of rationality based precisely on the unification of
reason and revelation. Étienne Gilson, for example, writes in his
Introduction à l’étude de Saint Augustin: “One never knows if Au-
gustine speaks as a philosopher or a theologian.”1 Rowan Williams
claims that for Augustine not even self-knowledge, as expressed in
his proto-Cartesian formula “si enim fallor, sum,” is possible with-
out the mediation of God’s revelation: “There is nothing that can be
said of the mind’s relation to itself without the mediation of the rev-
elation of God as its creator and lover. At the heart of our self-aware-
ness is the awareness of the self-imparting of God.”2 Williams judges
the unification of philosophy and revelation to be a particular
achievement of Augustine’s, in contrast to which the modern isola-
tion of reason from faith represents a regression.3 Even Alvin Plant-
inga praises Augustine for that concept of rationality which—in
contrast to the Thomistic tradition—joins philosophy and faith in
order to exhaust all sources of knowledge available to us.
In what follows, I will argue against the thesis that Augustine laid
Copyright @ 2010. Lexington Books.
out a unified science in which reason and faith merge. In my opinion,

Augustine frames the relationship between philosophy and revelation
as a well-differentiated coordination of independent parts. Augustine
argues first that philosophy is insufficient for salvation, second that
philosophy is not even necessary because faith suffices for redemption,
and third that philosophy is still valuable since it is helpful in support-
ing and clarifying Christian faith.
3
EBSCO : eBook Academic Collection (EBSCOhost) - printed on 6/6/2019 3:51 PM via PONTIFICIA UNIVERSIDAD
JAVERIANA - BIBLIOTECA CENTRAL
AN: 483050 ; Cary, Phillip, Doody, John, Paffenroth, Kim.; Augustine and Philosophy
Account: s6670599.main.eds
4 Johannes Brachtendorf
Augustine entertains a notion of philosophy as an endeavour of

All rights reserved. May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S. or applicable copyright law.
autonomous reason. For Augustine the whole of metaphysics, includ-

ing the proof of God’s existence, is a work of reason alone, as is episte-
mology and ethics. As Augustine reports, all of this was already taught
accurately by Plato—and that means without the support of revela-
tion.4 Augustine states that Plato found in God “the cause of being,
the principle of reason and the rule of life,”5 and he credits the pagan
philosopher with rightly maintaining “that the wise man is the man
who imitates, knows and loves [this] God, and that participation in
[this] God brings man happiness.”6 Most of Augustine’s metaphysics
is derived from Plato and Neoplatonism: the immateriality of God and
the human soul; unity, truth and goodness as transcendental determi-
nations of being; and evil as a deprivation of good are just several of the
metaphysical theses Augustine inherits from Plotinus and Porphyry.
In the realm of practical philosophy, he adopts the doctrines of the
purposefulness of all action, of God as the final goal and highest good
for humans and of virtue as the necessary means to that goal.
To some extent, Augustine even adopts the Platonic notion of be-
lief in authority as a necessary preparation of knowledge. In De ordine,
for example, Augustine asserts: “With respect to time, authority
comes first, but in the order of reality reason is prior.”7 Authority
comes first, because human beings are so trapped in their false orienta-
tion that any attempt to lead them directly to understanding fails. One
may also think of Plato’s cave allegory, in which the one climbing to-
ward the light must first be persuaded and even compelled to turn
away from the shadows and ascend to true reality. The will and ability
to gain insight must first be produced, and, according to Plato and
Augustine, authority achieves this. Through its call, authority induces
human beings to take up the way of understanding. Augustine sees
this as the task of rhetoric: it drives human beings on, it is “full of
seductive stimuli, which it displays to the people in order to lead them
to the end most useful to them.”8
At some point, however, human beings should outgrow the “cra-
dle of authority,” as Augustine says,9 and turn toward reason and in-
sight. Some of the Bible passages cited most frequently by Augustine
should be understood in this sense, for example Isaiah 7:9, “If you do
not believe, you will not understand” (nisi credideritis, non intel-
legetis) and Matthew 7:7, “Search, and you will find.”10 Belief in au-
thority prepares for understanding, search motivated by belief leads to
knowledge. This preparation, however, is merely pedagogical, just like
in Plato’s allegory. Belief in this sense does not ground understanding.
On the contrary, understanding, once it is reached, supports itself with
Augustine on the Glory and the Limits of Philosophy 5
its own evidence, which allows it to leave the preparatory method of

belief behind. The course of the conversation in De libero arbitrio

makes the transitory character of belief in authority very clear. Again
and again Evodius, Augustine’s interlocutor, proposes a thesis, to
which Augustine responds, “Do you know for sure what you say, or do
you only believe it based on authority?” Evodius willingly confesses
that he has spoken out of belief in authority,11 with the result that
Augustine invariably leads him to the evidence of insight, which no
longer needs to be grounded on belief.
In Confessions I–VII Augustine confirms this concept of the rela-
tionship between understanding and belief in terms of his own life
path. As a child Augustine had been brought up in the Catholic faith
by his mother Monica, and even during his restless youth, he never
gave this faith up. His intellectual escapades—his enthusiasm for Cic-
ero and his Manichaeism and Neoplatonism—were basically just
paths on which Augustine the believer hoped to find understanding.12
For Augustine, Neoplatonism represents the most important philo-
sophical movement, because with its help he was first able to imple-
ment the program of transforming belief in authority into understand-
ing. Furthermore, the Platonic philosophers introduced Augustine to
the well-known schema of the movement toward God: turning away
from the external world, turning inward into oneself, ascending up-
ward to transcendence beyond the ego. Even Augustine’s accounts of
his intellectual ascents to God are clearly modelled after similar
reports by the pagan philosopher Plotinus.13 The encounter with
Neoplatonist philosophy enabled Augustine himself to outgrow the
“cradle of authority,” i.e., to substitute knowledge for belief.
Faith and the Limits of Philosophy
For Augustine, Platonic philosophy does provide insight, but insight

alone is not wisdom, nor does it enable us to lead a happy life. The
second half of Confessions VII and book VIII are designed to show that
autonomous reason, although perfectly legitimate in itself, is unable
to let us reach the ultimate goal of life. As Augustine says, the Pla-
tonists glimpse “from a wooded summit the homeland of peace,”14 and
even know that virtue is the path to this homeland. But they do not
know how one reaches this path and actually becomes virtuous, so
that instead of only seeing the homeland from a distance one is actu-
ally capable of inhabiting the homeland.15 For Augustine, reaching the
goal and holding on to what is seen requires faith in Jesus Christ.
According to Augustine, Christian faith comes into play with the

question: Can human beings make what they objectively recognize as

the highest being into what they subjectively strive for as their su-
preme goal? The question that induces faith is not “what is the highest
good?” or “what is virtue?” but “how can we obtain the highest good?”
or “how do we become virtuous?” Augustine believes that without the
grace of God that comes from faith in Jesus Christ, human beings can
indeed recognize what the good is, but do not have the strength to do
good. Here philosophy hits its limit. For Augustine, philosophy is able
to instruct, but not to convert us to a life of virtue.
Augustine explains this view in several places in his work, most
impressively in his Tractates on the Gospel of John.16 In these trac-
tates, he explicates the relationship of philosophy and Christian faith
by assuming, modifying and augmenting Plato’s image of ascent.17 Ac-
cording to Augustine, we do not have to rise up from a cave into the
light of day as Plato imagines; rather, we have to scale a mountain
from the plains. Just as Plato’s cave person beholds the sun from the
earth’s surface, Augustine’s mountain climber sees the truth, the goal
of life and the homeland he wants to arrive at from the mountain peak.
But for Augustine this homeland is not reached by sight alone. It lies
in the distance and is only glimpsed from afar, for between the moun-
tain summit and the homeland there is a sea that must be overcome—
the sea of life. The means of passage is a ship constructed of wood,
namely the wood of the cross. It is only aboard this ship that humans
can cross the sea and truly reach the homeland glimpsed from the
mountain peak.
Augustine’s image is readily deciphered. The view from the moun-
tain peak represents the noetic vision of the highest good as Plato de-
scribes it in the allegory of the cave and in his divided line analogy. By
extending this image with the element of the sea, however, Augustine
makes his reservation against Platonic noesis apparent. The metaphys-
ical vision of God does not entail that one has reached the goal, he ar-
gues; rather this vision is merely a contemplation from afar. Augustine
therefore draws a distinction between the sight of God and abiding
with him, between intellectual vision and willed adhesion to God, be-
tween the glimpse of the highest good and the ability to hold fast to the
summum bonum.18 Augustine acknowledges that Platonic philosophy
does attain to such a vision, but he does not believe that it enacts a
sustained conversion of the will, away from the orientation towards
finite goods to a focus on God as the highest good. Philosophy is capa-
ble of teaching up to the noetic vision, but it is incapable of converting.
Conversion occurs only through the grace of God, which presupposes
faith in Jesus Christ. Augustine’s expansion of the cave allegory with

the parable of the mountain and the sea demonstrates his esteem for
the theoretical competence of Platonic philosophy but also his denial
of its therapeutic competence, which he attributes to religion.
Augustine further elaborates his depiction by distinguishing three
types of humans: the great ones, the little ones and the proud ones. Of
the great ones he writes, “It is good . . . and best of all, if it be possible,
that we both see whither we ought to go, and hold fast that which car-
ries us as we go. This they were able to do, the great minds . . . they
were able to do this, and saw that which is. For John, seeing, said, ‘In
the beginning was the Word, and the Word was with God, and the
Word was God.’ They saw this, and in order that they might arrive at
that which they saw from afar, they did not depart from the cross of
Christ, and did not despise Christ’s lowliness.”19 The great humans—
and Augustine obviously counts the evangelist John among them—can
see; they dispose of the noetic vision of the divine, and simultaneously
they trust in the cross in order to traverse the sea and arrive at the
envisioned reality. Through philosophy they possess the highest form
of knowledge, and through religion their will is entirely oriented to-
wards God. To philosophize and to believe, to see the good itself and
to love it above everything else, this is the best way to live according
to Augustine.
Of the little ones he writes, “But little ones who cannot under-
stand this, who do not depart from the cross and passion and resurrec-
tion of Christ, are conducted in that same ship to that which they do
not see, in which they also arrive who do see.”20 Philosophical train-
ing, culminating in the visio intellectualis of the Platonists, is there-
fore desirable, according to Augustine, but it is not necessarily required
in order to arrive at the goal. For those who cannot see also reach the
longed-for homeland, if they simply board the ship of faith and trust
that it will bring them to the desired place.
Augustine clarifies this point in Confessions VII. Comparing the
Platonic writings with the Gospel of St. John, he finds the two overlap:
“There [in the Neoplatonists] I read, not of course in these words, but
with entirely the same sense and supported by numerous and varied
reasons, ‘In the beginning was the Word and the Word was with
God,’”21 and so forth. Neoplatonist metaphysics and the Gospel the-
matically coincide. The coinciding, however, is only partial. It pertains
just as far as the Gospel teaches metaphysical truths. Within this par-
tial overlap of contents, Augustine notes a difference in method. Scrip-
ture bears these truths as a matter of faith, while philosophy presents
the same truths in the mode of reason and insight (“supported by nu-
merous and varied reasons”). If the metaphysical truths about God are
taught not only by the philosophers but also by Holy Scripture, and if
they need not be intellectually grasped but can be held by faith in-
stead, then philosophizing is simply not necessary to adopt the right
views about God. According to Augustine, belief in metaphysical
truths can be overtaken by insight, and intellectuals like Augustine
himself will certainly strive for knowledge as far as knowledge goes.
Still, for those with lesser mental abilities, i.e., for those with weak
(mental) eyes, belief in the authority of Scripture suffices even where
Scripture advances metaphysical theses.
For Augustine, those who have the intellectual power to do so
should philosophize, but the simple believer will suffer no harm from
not doing philosophy. On the contrary, the learned are in danger of
taking pride in their knowledge and thus of losing God’s grace. Accord-
ing to Augustine’s autobiography, he himself was at risk of glorying in
his education even after his conversion. In his Cassiciacum dialogues,
Augustine does think that even if dialectic and the liberal arts cannot
lead to happiness, they are still necessary to reach the goal of life. The
Confessions, however, back away from this view, denouncing it as an
expression of the pride of the school.22 And the Retractations say that
many of the saints knew nothing about the liberal arts, and many of
the learned were no saints.23 Those saints reached happiness without
philosophy, i.e., just by faith. For Augustine, philosophy is not neces-
sary for salvation.
Augustine thus rejects the elitism of antiquity, which allows only
the few who have access to the good of education a chance at happi-
ness. From a Christian point of view, this possibility is open to all,
even to those who due to a lack of philosophical training cannot attain
a vision of the eternal, but who faithfully appropriate the teachings of
God through trust in the authority of Holy Scripture. This is what
Augustine means when he writes, “For no one is able to cross the sea
of this world, unless borne by the cross of Christ. Even he who is of
weak eyesight sometimes embraces this cross; and he who does not
see from afar whither he goes, let him not depart from it, and it will
carry him over.”24
Augustine allots the pagan Neoplatonists to the third type of hu-

man, the proud ones. What Paul says in the epistle to the Romans
applies to them: “Professing themselves to be wise, they became
fools” (1:22). Their foolishness does not consist in not knowing God,
Augustine claims, but in the fact that they saw him and still could not
summon the humility to recognize the son of God become human in
Jesus Christ. Augustine writes, “Those, therefore, concerning whom
he said, ‘who, when they had known God,’ saw this which John says,
that ‘by the Word of God all things were made.’ For these things are
also found in the books of the philosophers; and that God has an only-
begotten Son, by whom are all things. They were able to see that
which is, but they saw it from afar: they were unwilling to hold the
lowliness of Christ, in which ship they might have arrived in safety at
that which they were able to see from afar, and the cross of Christ ap-
peared vile to them. The sea has to be crossed, and do you despise the
wood? Oh, proud wisdom!”25
Augustine links the pride of the Neoplatonists to their refusal to
accept the doctrine of incarnation. Though the Neoplatonists also
speak of the divine logos and of its metaphysical presence in the world,
they reject the teaching of the Word become human at a particular
time in history. For Augustine as for the Platonists, philosophy can
provide secure knowledge, because its proper objects are immutable,
eternal principles. Historical facts, however—and the incarnation of
the logos is such a fact—are bound to space and time. They come into
being and pass away. They cannot be grasped by intellectual evidence
but have to be believed, mostly by crediting testimonies made by oth-
ers: eyewitnesses, the Gospel writers, or Church tradition.
Thus Augustine claims that the incarnate son of God is not acces-
sible by philosophy but only by faith. Since recognition of the incarna-
tion is the way for us to become humble and open ourselves for God’s
grace, faith is required for the healing of the soul. All attempts to be-
come virtuous through one’s own efforts must in principle remain
fruitless, and even worse, they give testimony of human pride and
haughtiness. To admit one’s inability, to shed tears of confession, this
means to take the humility of the divine logos as a model and to be-
come meek oneself. If we humbly admit our inability to attain the
good, then, Augustine asserts, God in his grace will bestow on us the
strength to change our lives and to live according to our insight. For
Augustine, the strength of philosophy, namely its power to provide
insight, represents also its weakness, because intellectual evidence is
unable to approach and appropriate Christ’s work of salvation.
Augustine characterizes the wisdom of philosophy as a proud wis-
dom as long as it does not acknowledge the limits of its competence.

In its best form, it is a valid theory—even and especially in the sense
of the Greek theoria, noetic vision—but it must accept that such
theory is solely a matter of knowledge that has to be supplemented by
a reformation of the will, a therapy, a conversion. Augustine clearly
grants philosophy its epistemological claims to a large extent, but he
disputes its capacity to transform the human will from evil to good.
Philosophy may be the love of wisdom, but this love remains unhappy,
according to Augustine, if it does not recognize that it is unable to at-

tain the object of its striving without faith. With his critique of the
project of philosophical wisdom, Augustine simultaneously restricts
the power of knowledge in order to make room for faith.
Intellect, Will and Happiness:

Augustine’s Critique of Ancient Anthropology
Whereas for Plato and Plotinus the ascent to knowledge is necessarily

accompanied by moral reform, Augustine separates the aspect of ethi-
cal refinement from the aspect of noetic vision and thereby reduces
the Platonic endeavor to a mere acquisition of knowledge. He ac-
counts for this separation through penetrating anthropological obser-
vations, which he develops once again by critical interaction with
ancient philosophy. These observations, which in turn have exercised
enormous influence on the modern notions of the human, cannot be
outlined in detail here, but they deserve brief mentioning.
First, Augustine makes the will independent from reason. One
cannot call this voluntarism in the fullest sense, but it is a clear rejec-
tion of so-called “Socratic intellectualism.” Albrecht Dihle regards
Augustine as the “inventor of our modern notion of the will” precisely
for this reason. Augustine, he argues, emphasized that the will does
not by implication follow the judgment of reason but is autonomous
over against it.26 According to the famous thesis in Plato’s Protagoras,
moral wrongdoing is rooted in a deficiency of insight into the true
standing of a good or an ill caused, for example, by passions that cloud
the intellectual gaze or, to some extent, by perspectival illusion: goods
that are temporally near appear greater than temporally remote ones
even if, seen objectively, they are lesser.27 For Plato, philosophy is an
art of measurement—that is, the skill that overcomes perspectivity
and recognizes the objective magnitude of goods and ills.
In contrast, Augustine explains in his Confessions that he acquired
all the knowledge of God that the highest and best philosophy had to
offer. Guided by the writings of the Neoplatonists, he claims even to

have attained the noetic vision of God but still could not stop striving
for finite goods like honor or sexual lust as ultimate goals. “All doubt
had been taken from me that there is an indestructible substance from
which comes all substance. My desire was not to be more certain of
you but to be more stable in you.”28 Insight does not entail a new ori-
entation of one’s way of life because the latter requires an act of the
will, which must be performed independently and which can at times

fiercely resist better understanding. This is the reason why humans, in

Augustine’s image, have not only to scale a mountain but also to cross
a sea. If the will is independent from the understanding, the achieve-
ment of perfect understanding does not suffice to set right the will.
Second, in addition to the independence of the will over against
the intellect, Augustine introduces another novelty—the notion of a
division of the will. He deems it possible that even if the good bur-
geons in the will and the human wants to turn towards the good, he is
nonetheless incapable of doing so. In this case, the will finds itself in
contention with itself. Augustine thus develops a true conception of a
weak will, which—unlike in Plato’s Protagoras (or even in Aristotle’s
works)—is not based on a mere deficiency of knowledge. In Confes-
sions VIII Augustine describes how he suffers from a divided will. One
of its components follows the insight gained by reading the Platonists
and strives for the true good, but another component remains impris-
oned by old habits. He already has a new good will, but simultaneously
he still has his old perverted will so that the new will cannot assert
itself.29 The will is thoroughly split, so that its division cannot be
healed through the will itself. Augustine describes the dichotomy of
the will with words from Paul’s letter to the Galatians, “For what the
flesh desires is opposed to the spirit, and what the spirit desires is op-
posed to the flesh” (Galatians 5:17) and from the letter to the Romans,
“I do not understand my own actions. For I do not do what I want, but
I do the very thing I hate” (Romans 7:15). This is Augustine’s situation
after studying philosophy. Thus Augustine maintains that philosophi-
cal insight is incapable of resolving this dilemma of the will. Reason
alone cannot make us virtuous. The self-blockade of the divided will
cannot be dissolved through understanding, not even through a strenu-
ous act of the will itself. It can only be resolved by God’s help, which
requires from a person an acknowledgement of weakness and conse-
quently an attitude of humility.30 Philosophy is incapable of liberating
humans from their self-dividedness. Therefore, the ship that can carry
across the sea must be carved from the wood of the cross.
Thirdly, Augustine criticizes the Hellenistic ideal of eudaimonia as
unrealistic, at least as concerns earthly existence. A felicitous life is

utterly unattainable here on earth, which, at best, can be a life lived in
the hope of happiness.31 There are two reasons for Augustine’s com-
paratively pessimistic estimation of what may be expected from earthly
life. First of all, happiness, according to him, necessitates eternal life.
Happiness thus—in contrast to what Epicurus and the Stoics believed—
cannot occur in mortal existence. Happiness remains reserved for a
transcendental existence. Second, Augustine regards the Platonic ideal

of the virtues as exaggerated. In Plato’s Republic, justice includes not

only wisdom and courage but also prudence, according to which the
lower parts of the soul understand that they should allow themselves
to be guided by reason and do so gladly. The just therefore live in har-
mony, tranquility and inner peace.32 For Augustine, on the contrary,
virtue is an instrument in the inner struggle. Even the converted per-
son, he contends, is constantly in danger of falling into the ways of this
world and has to perpetually collect himself and direct himself anew
towards God. The passions consistently strive for dominion over rea-
son, and false self-love seeks the subtlest ways of gaining advantage.
Although the will of the converted person is firmly aimed at God, the
passions still have to be actively restrained. Humans remain subject to
temptation, Augustine claims. Constant self-examination is thus re-
quired in order to assess whether one’s way of life is really determined
by a good will or whether a false self-love has subtly intervened.33 Due
to a constitutional diremption, humans can never attain in earthly life
that psychical uniformity and inner peace Plato attributes to the just.
Therefore, in Augustine’s view, the Greek ideal of eudaimonia is unre-
alizable in earthly life. Philosophy, he concludes, cannot lead humans
to self-unity, and even faith, in this respect, can ultimately only awaken
the hope of transcendental perfection.
Christian Faith as True Philosophy?
At a few but significant places, Augustine speaks of Christian faith as

philosophy. In De vera religione (8, 25) Augustine says, “We Christians
hold the view . . . that philosophy, that is striving for wisdom, is not
different from religion.” And in Contra Julianum (IV 72), he urges Ju-
lian: “Do not estimate pagan philosophy higher than our Christian
philosophy, which is the one true philosophy, because the word ‘phi-
losophy’ signifies the search and love of wisdom.”34 If Augustine dis-
tinguishes reason and faith in the manner described above, how can he
speak of Christianity as “true philosophy”?
What Augustine has in mind at these places is the claim of ancient

philosophy to convert humans and to provide wisdom so they can at-
tain ultimate happiness. As manifold and heterogeneous as the differ-
ent schools were, Hellenistic philosophy contains a common focus in
the idea of an ars vivendi—the art of life—which enables humans to
lead a good and successful life.35 This good life allows human nature
to evolve and attain perfection against all cultural deflections. The hu-
man who lives well knows which of the many offered goods is the
highest and how one reaches it. Indeed, humans strive for the happi-
ness that results from the possession of the summum bonum in every-
thing they do, but due to the influence of errors and false dispositions,
they mostly search for the highest good in the wrong places. According
to the common conviction of the major Hellenistic schools, the task
of philosophy consists, first of all, in the elaboration of an adequate
conception of the highest good in order to dispel human ignorance of
the truly good, and, second, in the development of inner attitudes
(namely virtues), which give humans a set orientation in their ways of
living so that they may attain the highest good, possess it and out of
this possession enduringly act justly. “Wisdom” designates the condi-
tion of perfection in which humans have appropriated the summum
bonum and henceforth lead a good and happy life. The purpose and
goal of philosophy, therefore, is to free humans from their ignorance
and vice and help them become wise.36
The Platonic-Neoplatonist philosophy—which, for Augustine,
represents the best philosophy in general—operates with the notion of
human perfection, too. The ascent out of the cave in Plato’s parable
leads humans to the pinnacle of their possibilities of being, both in
terms of their understanding and with respect to virtues.37 For the goal
of the movement is the intellectual vision of the idea of the good. This
ascent is a cognitive-voluntative double endeavor, just as the elevation
to the vision of the divine in Plotinus’s Enneads I 6, “On the Beauti-
ful,” presupposes and brings about a moral purification of the soul.38
The perfection of human life cannot be procured by way of a one se-
mester course in Plato’s doctrine of ideas. It obtains rather at the end
of a decade-long cultivation process that entails both an expansion of
a person’s understanding and a re-formation of her orientation of val-
ues.39 From a Platonic perspective, philosophy constitutes the decisive
means on the path to human perfection. It is the philosopher who de-
scends into the cave, loosens the chains of the cave inhabitants, com-
pels them to conversion and accompanies them to the exit. Along this
path, those released themselves become philosophers, i.e., virtuous
humans capable of intellectually gazing directly into the sun.40
Augustine, however, levels a penetrating critique against Neopla-

tonist philosophy in particular and against the ancient philosophical
project of ars vivendi in general—a critique that concerns the scope,
the power, and the claim of philosophy. Philosophy, according to Au-
gustine, is valuable because it can help people come to the path of
wisdom and advance along it. He contends that it cannot, however,
lead humans to the goal of that path. This step is reserved for religious
faith. What is more: he states that philosophy is not only insufficient

for attaining the goal of life; it is not even necessary for it because re-
ligious faith can equally fulfill the signposting function of philosophy.
While Augustine concedes that it is better if philosophy assumes this
task, he insists that if this is not possible—for example, because some-
one does not possess the required education or is occupied with a com-
mon profession such that he does not have the requisite leisure—faith
suffices. In Augustine’s view, ancient philosophy made a pledge which
it was never able to redeem. For him, only Christianity can fulfil the
promise of wisdom originally made by philosophy. In this sense, he
calls Christianity “true philosophy.”
Philosophy in Support of Faith
Although Augustine holds philosophy to be neither sufficient nor neces-

sary for salvation, he engages quite a lot in this business. In fact, a large
part of the Western philosophical heritage can easily be traced back to
Augustine. Why does Augustine do so much philosophy? Philosophy
allows him to give a clearer exposition of Christian faith. I will mention
just three examples of the use Augustine makes of philosophy. First, in
De libero arbitrio II Augustine develops a philosophical proof of God’s
existence. Second, in De civitate dei XIX Augustine takes up a philo-
sophical discussion with the Epicureans, the Stoics and the Peripatetics
to show that their notions of human fulfilment are inaccurate. Augus-
tine adduces philosophical anthropology to claim that humans by their
very nature long for eternal life, not for pleasure alone, or virtue alone,
or even both combined. Then he tries to show that Christian faith is the
only means to obtain what everybody wants. Anthropology does not
give proof of Christian faith. The idea that God became human could
still be false. However, Augustine’s philosophical argument is meant to
expound the relevance of the Gospel by showing that humans have a
natural desire (a desiderium naturale as Aquinas puts it), a desire
which—in Augustine’s terms—makes our hearts restless until they rest
in God, as promised by faith. Augustine demonstrates not the truth, but
the relevance, of faith by philosophical anthropology.

The third example is De Trinitate, Augustine’s speculative master-
piece. Augustine sets out to explain what Scripture means when it
calls humans images of God. First he develops a theological notion of
the divine trinity. Then he gives a philosophical analysis of the human
mind. If humans are created in the image of God, the decisive feature
must be detectable by a philosophical analysis of human nature.
Augustine finds a Trinitarian structure in the human mind, corre-

sponding to the structure of divine trinity. The theological part of the

argument enables Augustine to reserve the mystery of divine trinity
for faith. The philosophical part, however, allows him to explain to
believers and non-believers alike what faith refers to when it states
that humans are likenesses of God. In De libero arbitrio II as well as
in De civitate dei XIX and in De Trinitate, Augustine uses philosophy
to give support and a clearer exposition to faith.
The Reception of Augustine’s Views:

Aquinas, Descartes, Kant
Since Augustine was considered an uncontestable authority in the

Middle Ages, it is not surprising that one frequently encounters his
estimation of philosophy and its relationship to religion during this
time. At the very beginning of his Summa Theologiae, Aquinas dis-
cusses the relationship of philosophy and theology. “Do we need an-
other doctrine beside philosophy?” is the opening question of the en-
tire work. Aquinas’ answer is well known. Yes, we do need another
doctrine, the so-called sacra doctrina or theologia, without which hu-
mans cannot reach their final destination, namely happiness in the
vision of God.41 Augustine criticizes philosophy not by contaminating
reason with faith, but by restricting the range of reason to theoretical
insight that cannot change our lives. Imposing limits on knowledge
and thus making room for faith is truly Augustine’s achievement.
When Aquinas declares philosophy insufficient, he draws on Augus-
tine’s critique of ancient thinking. The bishop of Hippo paved the way
for Aquinas’ claim that we need another doctrine beside philosophy,
namely the sacra doctrina that is based on faith.
Obviously, Aquinas’ answer rests on a separation of philosophy
and theology, for if the two were identical, his thesis about the neces-
sity of theology in addition to philosophy would be nonsensical. Like
Aristotle, Aquinas holds a deductive concept of science. To do science
means to derive judgments from given principles. According to this
view, sciences are identical if they rest upon the same principles; oth-
erwise they are different. For Aquinas, philosophy and sacra doctrina
do not share the same premises, for the principles of philosophy are
self-evident to reason and thus do not require any further grounding,
whereas the principles of theology are far from self-evident—or, as
Aquinas puts it, they are self-evident only to God and his saints, but
not to human understanding.42 Sacra doctrina starts with truths that
are obvious for God, but for us need to be accepted in the mode of
belief. Whereas philosophy rests upon reason, theology is based on

faith. Thus, for Aquinas, theology is different from philosophy.
Given the differences of the two disciplines, what role can phi-
losophy play for the sacra doctrina? For Aquinas, it is the role of a
handmaiden.43 The metaphor of the handmaiden is spelled out in three
theses. First, philosophy is insufficient for attaining salvation. Even
the perfect philosopher needs something beyond philosophy, namely
divine grace and faith, to reach the goal of life. Second, philosophy is
not even necessary. According to Aquinas, a Christian believer can
obtain happiness without doing any philosophy. Philosophy is acces-
sible only for the learned, i.e., for an intellectual elite that has the
leisure to occupy itself with abstract theories, while salvation in the
Christian sense should be attainable for everybody. Furthermore, hu-
man reason is always prone to error, while faith, for Aquinas, is secure.
Also, philosophy, even if it deals with God, does not know him as well
as faith does, for at its best philosophy might have a correct meta-
physical notion of God, but still falls short of what faith knows about
God’s actions in history, above all in the incarnation.
Third, despite these shortcomings, Aquinas does not entirely re-
ject philosophy, for sacra doctrina, even though it does not depend on
philosophy, can still make use of it. For Aquinas, philosophy is capable
of giving Christian faith a clearer exposition (maior manifestatio).44
For example, sacra doctrina uses the metaphysical proofs of God to
fend off those who reject Christianity on the ground that no God ex-
ists. Also, it uses philosophical anthropology to justify the universal-
ity of its claims. If we can show that humans as such long for ultimate
happiness, we can argue that all humans should at least listen to the
Christian message, because what is promised here is precisely the ful-
filment of a universal and natural human desire. Thus, this message
must be made known to everybody, and nobody should remain indif-
ferent. Clearly, even for Aquinas philosophical anthropology cannot
prove the truth of Christianity, but it can do enough to show that faith
makes sense to everybody.
Aquinas’ view of the relationship of philosophy and theology is
largely equivalent to Augustine’s. According to both, philosophy is

neither sufficient nor necessary for humans to reach their ultimate
goal. Instead faith, whose claims exceed the realm of truths accessible
to reason alone, plays the decisive role. However, faith is not restricted
to super-rational truths, but extends into the realm of reason as well,
thereby creating a sphere of overlap where truths of faith and truths of
reason coincide. Here sacra doctrina can make use of philosophy and
its rational method to explain and defend its own assertions. In numer-
ous passages Aquinas even expressly adduces the authority of Augus-

tine to support his own view of sacra doctrina. For Aquinas the idea
that faith beyond reason is necessary goes back to Augustine,45 as well
as the view of faith as a source of truths about God, which do not con-
tradict the truths of reason, but either coincide with them or transcend
them.46 Thus for Aquinas the scientia fidei is entitled to utilize the
arguments of the philosophers, much as the Israelites, according to
Exodus 3:22, were allowed to seize the gold and silver of the Egyptians,
as Augustine had already pointed out.47
Like Augustine, Thomas Aquinas is of the opinion that philosophy
is neither sufficient for the attainment of salvation, because it cannot
mediate the grace of God, nor necessary, because everything that is
essential to know can be found in Holy Scripture. Nevertheless, phi-
losophy is highly valuable because it is capable of mediating much of
what Holy Scripture teaches by authority through the discernment of
reason.48
Augustine had considerable influence in modernity. René Des-
cartes, for instance—as recent research has shown—is dependent on
Augustine for several central points of his thinking.49 The cogito ergo
sum of the second meditation is anticipated in Augustine’s si fallor,
sum;50 the proof of God from the idea of infinity in the third medita-
tion recalls Augustine’s proof in De libero arbitrio;51 and Descartes’
arguments for the difference of the mind from the body reflect Augus-
tine’s deliberations in De trinitate down to the very wording.52 Des-
cartes even follows Augustine’s guidelines concerning the question
about the possibilities and limits of philosophy. In a letter to Mersenne
in March 1642, he distances himself from Pelagius, who made the
claim, “that one can do good works and merit eternal life without
grace, which was condemned by the Church; and I say that one can
know by natural reason that God exists, but I do not thereby say that
this natural knowledge, of itself and without grace, merits the super-
natural glory we await in heaven.” And Descartes continues, “Howe-
ver, one must note that what is known by natural reason, such as his
being absolutely good, almighty, wholly truthful, and so on . . . cannot
suffice to attain heaven, because for this one must believe in Jesus
Christ and other things that are revealed, which is something that
depends on grace.”53 To attain metaphysical knowledge of God is con-
sequently a genuine task of natural reason and philosophy. But the
capacity of doing good works by which one achieves happiness is not
mediated by philosophy alone. In Descartes’ view, philosophy may
prepare humans for moral improvement, but to achieve it does not lie
in its power. Since there is no happiness for humans without moral

perfection, however, philosophy cannot make people happy. Therapy,

in the sense of a moral conversion of the person from evil to good, is
therefore not a possible task for philosophy according to Descartes.
The wake of this estimation of philosophy and its limits even
reaches Immanuel Kant. His Critique of Practical Reason offers a fun-
damental determination of moral good and also a theory of the highest
good (summum bonum) in which moral good coheres with happiness
such that the moral good, although it is a goal in itself, also represents
a prerequisite for happiness. Since it is not in our power to bring about
this happiness, however, Kant feels justified in postulating the exis-
tence of God as a moral ruler of the world who alone can add happiness
to virtue.54 Kant criticized the eudaimonism of antiquity—particularly
its representatives in Epicurus and the Stoa, which were entangled in
the antinomies of practical reason—because it was conceived without
recourse to God and thus led to the strange thesis that the appetite or
virtue alone is already the highest good.55 A comparison of Kant’s dia-
lectic of practical reason with Augustine’s critique of the Epicurean
and Stoic definitions of the highest good would immediately bring
many parallels to light.56
I would like to demonstrate Kant’s connection to Augustine on
another, deeper point of his ethics. Kant’s ethical theory tells us how
humans should be in order to be allowed to hope for happiness—they
have to have a good will. But the question of how to acquire a good will
is not thereby answered. If we are radically evil, as Kant claims at the
beginning of his book on religion, how can we become good?57 This
question raises the issue of therapy and with it, as Kant is of course
aware, the topic of grace. It is, naturally, a difficult topic because it
gives occasion to all sorts of “ignoble religious ideas” and is especially
suited to abetting “religions which are endeavors to win favor” in com-
plete contradistinction to “religions of good life-conduct.”58 Nonethe-
less, philosophy needs to consider the concept of grace. It cannot do
without it, for it belongs, as Kant states, to the “parerga [by-works] to
religion within the limits of pure reason; they do not belong within it
but border upon it.”59 In this context, Kant writes: “How it is possible
for a naturally evil man to make himself a good man wholly surpasses
our comprehension; for how can a bad tree bring forth good fruit? But
since, by our previous acknowledgment, an originally good tree (good
in predisposition) did bring forth evil fruit, and since the lapse from
good into evil (when one remembers that this originates in freedom) is
no more comprehensible than the re-ascent from evil to good, the pos-
sibility of this last cannot be impugned. For despite the fall, the injunc-
tion that we ought to become better men resounds unabatedly in our

souls; hence this must be within our power, even though what we are
able to do is in itself inadequate and though we thereby only render
ourselves susceptible of higher, and for us inscrutable, assistance.”60
Kant’s move from “ought” to “can” initially sounds quite Pela-
gian: “we ought to become better men . . . hence this must be within
our power.” His further line of thought, however, demonstrates that
Kant is ready to concede that Augustine was right when he maintained
that human reason could not conduct therapy on itself. For, according
to Kant, it is not only the dispensing of happiness to the virtuous but
also the prior moral conversion from a radically evil will to a radically
good will that is impossible without divine assistance. Humans, he
argues, must be allowed to hope that what is not within their power—
to become better persons—will be accomplished by higher assistance.61
Philosophy cannot make positive use of the idea of such assistance
because it remains incomprehensible to it how my own moral good-
ness does not emerge from my own act but rather from another being.
Grace is not a genuinely philosophical concept. But philosophy need
not reject the possibility and reality of a moral-transcendent idea like
that of divine assistance for the conversion of character.62 In his own,
sober and careful manner, Kant expresses the reservation towards phi-
losophy that Augustine had already formulated. Philosophy knows
how humans should be in order to attain happiness, but it might not
be able to make them what they should be because self-conversion
might be outside the realm of natural human faculties. Therefore,
even Kant fosters basically the same reservations toward the therapeu-
tic competence of philosophy as Augustine.
Notes
1. E. Gilson, Introduction à l’étude de Saint Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 1969),

311.
2. R. Williams, “Sapientia and the Trinity: Reflections on De Trinitate,” in
Collectanea Augustiniana. Mélange T.J. van Bavel, ed. B. Bruning, M. Lambe-
rigts, and J. van Houtem (Louvain: Leuven University Press, 1990), 317–32.
Here, p. 323.
3. A full interpretation of Augustine following Williams’ lines is given by
M. Hanby, Augustine and Modernity (London: Routlege, 2003). Cf. the review
by J. Brachtendorf, “Orthodoxy without Augustine: A Response to Michael
Hanby’s Augustine and Modernity,” in Ars Disputandi 6 (2006).
4. See De civitate dei VIII 4; 6-9. For Augustine, there are in fact truths about
the eternal that in principle cannot be grasped without God’s revelation, but
they are few. These concern primarily (1) the resurrection of the body, and thus
the immortality not just of the soul—which can be proved philosophically—but

of the entire human being; and (2) the three-foldness of God, not in the sense of
a three-principle-teaching, which was already held in Neoplatonism, but in the
sense of the Nicene teaching of the sameness of being of the persons.
5. De civitate dei VIII 4.
6. De civitate dei VIII 5.
7. Cf. De ordine II 9, 26. With slight variation, the translation is from The
Essential Augustine, ed. Vernon J. Bourke (Indianapolis: Hacket, 1974), 26.
8. De ordine II 13, 38.
9. De ordine II 9, 26.
10. The New Oxford Annotated Bible, ed. B. Metzger and R. Murphy (New
York: Oxford University Press, 1991). All citations from the Bible are from this
edition. For an example of Augustine’s use of these passages, see De libero
arbitrio II 6, 18.
11. See, for instance, De libero arbitrio I 7, 18; 10, 26; II 1, 1–2, 4.
12. Only in his short skeptical phase does Augustine seem to have doubted
the feasibility of the promise, “Search, and you will find.” Perhaps this is the
reason why he spent so much energy in his early dialogues critiquing skepti-
cism and making it seem ridiculous.
13. Cf. Conf. VII 10, 16–17, 23.
14. Conf. VII 21, 27.
15. Conf. VII 20, 26.
16. Conf. VII 27, for instance, is also instructive. For the following explica-
tions, cf. J. Brachtendorf, “Augustinus und der philosophische Weisheitsbe-
griff,” in T. Fuhrer ed., Die christlich-philosophischen Diskurse der Spätan-
tike: Texte, Personen, Institutionen (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 2008), pp.
261–74 and Augustins Confessiones (Darmstadt: Uissenschaftliche Buchge-
sellschaft, 2005), pp. 119-88.
17. Cf. In Johannis evangelium tractatus, tr. II.
18. For the distinction between seeing and holding fast, cf. also De libero
arbitrio II 36, 141; 41, 161.
19. In Johannis evangelium tractatus, tr. II 3.
20. Ibid., tr. II 3.
21. Conf. VII 9, 13.
22. Conf. IX 4, 7.
23. Retr. I 3, 2.

26. A. Dihle, The Theory of Will in Classical Antiquity (Berkeley: Univer-
sity of California Press, 1982), 144.
27. Plato, Protagoras 352a–357e.
28. Conf. VIII 1,1.
29. Ibid., VIII 21f.
30. Ibid., VIII 27.
31. Cf. De civitate Dei XIX.
32. Republic IV 434d–445e.

33. The tenth book of the Confessions offers the first literary testimony of
such self-examination.
34. Cf. also De civitate dei X 32.
35. On the ethics of happiness, see J. Annas, The Morality of Happiness
(New York: 1993). Excellent summaries and discussions of the teachings of the
Hellenistic schools can be found in Cicero’s dialogues, especially in De finibus
bonorum et malorum, Tusculanae disputationes and De natura deorum.
36. See, for example, Seneca, Epistulae morales 89, 2.
37. Republic VII 514a–518b.
38. Enneads I 6, 9.
39. Plato believes that this is first possible after the age of 50 (cf. Republic
VII 540a).
40. Several of Plato’s comments imply that he understands philosophy as
the way to wisdom, not as wisdom itself. Cf. Phaedrus 278d; Symposium
204a.
41. Cf. ST I q 1, a 1; Sent I prol. q 1, a 1.
42. Cf. ST I q 1, a 2; Sent I prol. q 1, a 3.
43. Cf. ST I q 1, a 5; ScG II 4; Sent I prol. q 1, a 1.
44. Cf. ST I q 1, a 5.
45. Cf. De veritate q 14, a 9 and 10, with reference to Augustine’s Epistula
147 and De praedestinatione sanctorum.
46. Cf. ScG I 3 with indirect reference to Augustine’s anti-Manichean
works; I 7 with reference to Augustine’s De genesi ad litteram II.
47. Cf. In Boetii de Trinitate, proemium q II, a 3, with reference to Augus-
tine, De doctrina christiana II 40, 60f.
48. Aquinas, ST I q. 1.
49. Cf. S. Menn, Descartes and Augustine (Cambridge: Cambridge Univer-
sity Press, 1998); G. Matthews, Thought’s Ego in Augustine and Descartes
(Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1992).
50. Cf. Descartes, II. Meditation, nr. 23; Augustine, De civitate Dei XI 26.
51. Cf. Descartes, III. Meditation; Augustine, De libero arbitrio II, esp. 12,
134–36.
52. Cf. Descartes, II. Meditation, nr. 10; Augustine, De Trinitate X 15f.
53. Oeuvres de Descartes, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris: Vrin 1969–
1976), vol. III, p. 544.
54. Cf. Kant, Critique of Practical Reason, A 220–38.
55. Ibid., A 198–216.
56. Cf. De civitate Dei XIX.

57. Kant, Religion within the Limits of Reason Alone, Book One (“On the
radical evil in human nature”).
58. Ibid., B 62.
59. Ibid., B 63n.
60. Ibid., B 50.
61. Ibid., B 62.
62. Ibid.

PAG9CaryPhillipDood 2010 1AugustineOnTheGloryA AugustineAndPhilosoph PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

PAG9CaryPhillipDood 2010 1AugustineOnTheGloryA AugustineAndPhilosoph PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

All rights reserved.

Augustine on the Glory

Philosophy and the Pedagogical Function of Belief

Several renowned Augustine interpreters hold that Augustine devel-

out a unified science in which reason and faith merge. In my opinion,

Augustine entertains a notion of philosophy as an endeavour of

autonomous reason. For Augustine the whole of metaphysics, includ-

its own evidence, which allows it to leave the preparatory method of

belief behind. The course of the conversation in De libero arbitrio

Faith and the Limits of Philosophy

For Augustine, Platonic philosophy does provide insight, but insight

According to Augustine, Christian faith comes into play with the

question: Can human beings make what they objectively recognize as

faith in Jesus Christ. Augustine’s expansion of the cave allegory with

Augustine allots the pagan Neoplatonists to the third type of hu-

dom as long as it does not acknowledge the limits of its competence.

according to Augustine, if it does not recognize that it is unable to at-

Intellect, Will and Happiness:

Whereas for Plato and Plotinus the ascent to knowledge is necessarily

offer. Guided by the writings of the Neoplatonists, he claims even to

will, which must be performed independently and which can at times

fiercely resist better understanding. This is the reason why humans, in

unrealistic, at least as concerns earthly existence. A felicitous life is

transcendental existence. Second, Augustine regards the Platonic ideal

of the virtues as exaggerated. In Plato’s Republic, justice includes not

Christian Faith as True Philosophy?

At a few but significant places, Augustine speaks of Christian faith as

What Augustine has in mind at these places is the claim of ancient

Augustine, however, levels a penetrating critique against Neopla-

faith. What is more: he states that philosophy is not only insufficient

Philosophy in Support of Faith

Although Augustine holds philosophy to be neither sufficient nor neces-

the relevance, of faith by philosophical anthropology.

Augustine finds a Trinitarian structure in the human mind, corre-

sponding to the structure of divine trinity. The theological part of the

The Reception of Augustine’s Views:

Since Augustine was considered an uncontestable authority in the

belief. Whereas philosophy rests upon reason, theology is based on

largely equivalent to Augustine’s. According to both, philosophy is

ous passages Aquinas even expressly adduces the authority of Augus-

in its power. Since there is no happiness for humans without moral

perfection, however, philosophy cannot make people happy. Therapy,

tion that we ought to become better men resounds unabatedly in our

1. E. Gilson, Introduction à l’étude de Saint Augustin (Paris: Vrin, 1969),

the immortality not just of the soul—which can be proved philosophically—but

25. Ibid., tr. II 4.

32. Republic IV 434d–445e.

56. Cf. De civitate Dei XIX.

You might also like