[G.R. No. 108284. June 30, 1993.

]
SIGMA PERSONNEL SERVICES, petitioner, vs. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS
EMPLOYEE ADMINISTRATION and SUSAN SUMATRE, respondents.
Eugenio S. Tumulak for petitioner.
Divinagracia San Juan for private respondent.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR LAW; OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT; ILLEGAL DISMISSAL OF PROBATIONARY OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKER
IN VIEW OF FALSE GROUND OF DISEASE OR UNSOUNDNESS OF MIND; CASE AT BAR. — The basic issue before the Court
is whether or not Sumatre had been illegally dismissed, in light of the petitioner's contention that the private
respondent was a mere probationary employee who was, on top of this status, mentally unsound. Article 281 of the
Labor Code provides that the services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis may be
terminated for a just cause, or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards
made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement. The second ground is not an issue as
Sumatre was repatriated after only two weeks. We are concerned only with the legality of her dismissal, which it is
claiming was justified because of her behavior when she was in Abu Dhabi. Article 284 of the Labor Code provides: An
employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and whose
continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-employees:
Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2) month salary for
every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one (1) whole year.
This ground was created by the foreign employer in this case. The report of her mental examination showed that she
had "no history of previous psychiatric confinement. She was apparently doing well before she left for Saudi Arabia and
Abu Dhabi, in July 1987." Apparently, she became schizophrenic because of her maltreatment by her employer. The
theory that the injuries of the private respondent were self-inflicted as a result of her schizophrenia has not been
substantiated. It is a mere surmise that cannot overcome her positive declaration, as supported by medical findings, that
she was mauled and beaten up by her employer abroad. In termination cases, the burden of proof is on the employer.
This burden has not been discharged by Sigma.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; CAPACITY OF SISTER OF ILLEGALLY DISMISSED OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKER TO FILE LABOR SUIT
IN LATTER'S BEHALF; CASE AT BAR. — The petitioner's contention that Cynthia Sumatre has no capacity to sue is devoid
of merit. Cynthia Sumatre filed the complaint in behalf of her sister Susan as a real party in interest, conformably to
Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. The private respondent issued a special power of attorney in favor of Cynthia
Sumatre, not to mention the fact that Susan Sumatre herself attended all the hearings of the case. It is also stressed that
in labor cases, simplification of procedure, without regard to technicalities and without sacrificing the fundamental
requisites of due process, is mandated to insure the speedy administration of justice.
3. ID.; ID.; ID.; AWARD OF BACK WAGES IN CASE OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL; CASE AT BAR. — Back wages are granted
for earnings a worker has lost due to his illegal dismissal. We have held that an employer is obliged to pay an illegally
dismissed employee the whole amount of salaries plus all other benefits and bonuses and general increases to which the
latter would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed. There is no reason for not applying this rule in the
case at bar.
4. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; JOINT AND SEVERAL LIABILITY WITH FOREIGN-BASED EMPLOYER OF PRIVATE EMPLOYMENT
AGENCY, WHICH ACTED AS PROCESSING AND DEPLOYING AGENCY, BUT NOT RECRUITING AGENCY, AS TO CLAIMS OF
OVERSEAS CONTRACT WORKER; CASE AT BAR. — Private respondent Sumatre was recruited by one Marife Carandang
for employment as a domestic helper in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Carandang was the Vice President and
Executive Officer of SPM Integrated Services. However, she filed and processed Sumatre's application for overseas
employment with Sigma. The evidence shows that Sumatre paid the placement fee of P11,500.00 to Carandang. A travel
exit pass was issued with Sigma as the stated recruiting agency . . . Section 2(e), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules
implementing the Labor Code requires a private employment agency to assume all responsibilities for the
implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker. Section 10 (a) (2) of the same Rule provides that
a private employment agency can be sued jointly and severally with the principal or foreign-based employer for any
violation of the recruitment agreement or the contract of employment. This provision is also substantially reiterated in
Section 1(f) (3) of Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and Regulations. The private respondent having been illegally
dismissed and not paid the wages due her from the foreign employer, the liabilities arising as a consequence thereof
shall attach to Sigma. Although Sumatre filed her application with and paid the placement fee to Carandang, Sumatre's
papers were processed by Sigma. Sigma appears in fact to have deployed Sumatre, if she did not also recruit her, and so
is solidarily liable with the foreign-based employer for Sumatre's claims.
5. ID.; ID.; ID.; RULE ON FACTUAL FINDINGS OF NLRC AND POEA; CASE AT BAR. — The issue of whether or not the
private respondent was indeed maltreated is a question of fact. The factual findings of administrative bodies are as a
rule binding on this Court, subject to certain established exceptions. The findings of the NLRC and the POEA will not be
reversed by this Court without a showing that they fall under the exceptions.
DECISION
CRUZ, J p:
Susan Sumatre was full of hope and anticipation when she enplaned for a foreign land to work as a domestic. Before her
spread the promise of a new life, with all the enticements of a future bright with the prospect of prosperity and even
happiness. But all this fled in a cruel twinkling. Hardly two weeks after she left, she was back in this country, broken of
body and mind and with nothing but bitter memories of her misadventure.
Petitioner Sigma Personnel Services is a duly licensed recruitment agency authorized by the POEA to recruit and deploy
workers for land-based overseas employment. 1 Private respondent Sumatre was recruited by one Marife Carandang for
employment as a domestic helper in Abu Dhabi, United Arab Emirates. Carandang was the Vice President and Executive
Officer of SPM Integrated Services. 2 However, she filed and processed Sumatre's application for overseas employment
with Sigma. 3
The evidence shows that Sumatre paid the placement fee of P11,500.00 to Carandang. A travel exit pass was issued
with Sigma as the stated recruiting agency. 4 On August 1, 1987, Sumatre was deployed to Abu Dhabi, to be employed
with the National Center for Commercial Relations and Services (NCCRS). Sumatre was met by Querisi-al-Harira, the
owner of NCCRS, who assigned her to a foreign employer. This employer mauled and beat her up and even possibly
raped her. Thereafter, Harira took Sumatre back, locked her up in a room for several days without any food, and
subjected her to physical abuse. 5
Two weeks after Sumatre arrived in Abu Dhabi, she was repatriated to the Philippines, allegedly due to schizophreniform
disorder. Upon her return, she underwent medical and physical examinations at the Camp Crame laboratory and was
found with contusions on her left arm. 6 Mental examination at the National Center for Mental Health resulted in the
following findings: 7
The patient has no history of previous psychiatric confinement. She was apparently doing well before she left for Saudi
Arabia in July, 1987 to work as a domestic help on a 2 year-contract. She came home unexpectedly last August 14, 1987
accompanied by MIA Security guards. She was talking incoherently but repeatedly verbalized that she was raped and
harassed by her boss. She also refused to eat and had to be spooned. These, together with the other presenting
problems promoted the family to bring the patient for consultation on August 15, 1987.
When first seen at the Out-Patient Service, she was fairly kempt, restless but manageable. She was irrelevant with her
responses but claimed that she was a contract worker and she was raped. No details were given. Affect was expansive.
No meaningful interview was established during the first visit. She was given Inapsine Injection, Thorazine, 100 mg. BID
and all impression of Brief Reactive Psychoses was given.
On March 9, 1988, Sumatre's sister, Cynthia Sumatre, filed a complaint against Sigma and SPM Services with the POEA
for payment of unpaid salaries of US$150/month for the unworked and entire duration of her 2-year contract.
Sigma denied that Sumatre had been illegally dismissed and claimed that she did not pass her probationary period of
employment; besides, she was repatriated because she was suffering from schizophreniform disorder. The petitioner
also questioned the capacity to sue of the complainant's sister. Furthermore, it alleged that as there was no implied
agency between SPM Services and Sigma, it could not be held solidarily liable with SPM for the unpaid salaries of the
complainant.
The POEA ruled in favor of the complainant and ordered SPM Services and Sigma to solidarily pay the complainant her
salaries for 2 years amounting to US $4,800.00 or its peso equivalent at the time of payment. They were also required to
pay 5% of the total award as and by way of attorney's fees. 8
On appeal, this decision was affirmed by the NLRC. 9 It is now faulted for grave abuse of discretion in this special civil
action for certiorari.
The basic issue before the Court is whether or not Sumatre had been illegally dismissed, in light of the petitioner's
contention that the private respondent was a mere probationary employee who was, on top of this status, mentally
unsound.
Article 281 of the Labor Code provides that the services of an employee who has been engaged on a probationary basis
may be terminated for a just cause, or when he fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable
standards made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his engagement.
The second ground is not an issue as Sumatre was repatriated after only two weeks. We are concerned only with the
legality of her dismissal, which it is claiming was justified because of her behavior when she was in Abu Dhabi.
Article 284 of the Labor Code provides:
An employer may terminate the services of an employee who has been found to be suffering from any disease and
whose continued employment is prohibited by law or is prejudicial to his health as well as to the health of his co-
employees: Provided, That he is paid separation pay equivalent to at least one (1) month salary or to one-half (1/2)
month salary for every year of service, whichever is greater, a fraction of at least six (6) months being considered as one
(1) whole year.
This ground was created by the foreign employer in this case. The report of her mental examination showed that she
had "no history of previous psychiatric confinement. She was apparently doing well before she left for Saudi Arabia and
Abu Dhabi, in July 1987." 10 Apparently, she became schizophrenic because of her maltreatment by her employer. The
theory that the injuries of the private respondent were self-inflicted as a result of her schizophrenia has not been
substantiated. It is a mere surmise that cannot overcome her positive declaration, as supported by medical findings, that
she was mauled and beaten up by her employer abroad. In termination cases, the burden of proof is on the employer.
11 This burden has not been discharged by Sigma.
Section 2(e), Rule V, Book I of the Omnibus Rules implementing the Labor Code requires a private employment agency
to assume all responsibilities for the implementation of the contract of employment of an overseas worker. 12 Section
10 (a) (2) of the same Rule provides that a private employment agency can be sued jointly and severally with the
principal or foreign-based employer for any violation of the recruitment agreement or the contract of employment. 13
This provision is also substantially reiterated in Section 1(f) (3) of Rule II, Book II of the POEA Rules and Regulations. 14
The private respondent having been illegally dismissed and not paid the wages due her from the foreign employer, the
liabilities arising as a consequence thereof shall attach to Sigma. Although Sumatre filed her application with and paid
the placement fee to Carandang. Sumatre's papers were processed by Sigma. Sigma appears in fact to have deployed
Sumatre, if she did not also recruit her, and so is solidarily liable with the foreign-based employer for Sumatre's claims.
The issue of whether or not the private respondent was indeed maltreated is a question of fact. The factual findings of
administrative bodies are as a rule binding on this Court, subject to certain established exceptions. 15 The findings of the
NLRC and the POEA will not be reversed by this Court without a showing that they fall under the exceptions.
The petitioner's contention that Cynthia Sumatre has no capacity to sue is devoid of merit. Cynthia Sumatre filed the
complaint in behalf of her sister Susan as a real party in interest, conformably to Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of
Court. The private respondent issued a special power of attorney in favor of Cynthia Sumatre, not to mention the fact
that Susan Sumatre herself attended all the hearings of the case. It is also stressed that in labor cases, simplification of
procedure, without regard to technicalities and without sacrificing the fundamental requisites of due process, is
mandated to insure the speedy administration of justice. 16
Back wages are granted for earnings a worker has lost due to his illegal dismissal. We have held that an employer is
obliged to pay an illegally dismissed employee the whole amount of salaries plus all other benefits and bonuses and
general increases to which the latter would have been normally entitled had he not been dismissed. 17 There is no
reason for not applying this rule in the case at bar.
The plight of Susan Sumatre illustrates only too starkly the perils many of our womenfolk have to hazard, and endure at
the hands of foreign employers who find them easy and defenseless prey. It is hoped that the time will come when they
will not have to seek their fortunes abroad in their quest for a better life, finding prosperity and peace in their own land
and in the bosom of their family and friends.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of a clear showing that the questioned resolution is tainted with grave
abuse of discretion. Costs against the petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Griño-Aquino, Bellosillo and Quiason, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 195668. June 25, 2014.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MA. HARLETA VELASCO y BRIONES, MARICAR B. INOVERO, MARISSA
DIALA, and BERNA M. PAULINO, accused,
MARICAR B. INOVERO, accused-appellant.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J p:
The several accused in illegal recruitment committed in large scale against whom the State establishes a conspiracy are
each equally criminally and civilly liable. It follows, therefore, that as far as civil liability is concerned each is solidarily
liable to the victims of the illegal recruitment for the reimbursement of the sums collected from them, regardless of the
extent of the participation of the accused in the illegal recruitment. cSATDC

The Case
Accused-appellant Maricar B. Inovero seeks the review and reversal of the decision promulgated on August 26, 2010, 1
whereby the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed her conviction for illegal recruitment committed in large scale amounting to
economic sabotage under the judgment rendered on January 14, 2008 by the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 133, in
Makati City. 2
Antecedents
On March 17, 2004, the Office of the City Prosecutor of Makati City filed in the RTC two informations 3 charging Inovero,
Ma. Harleta Velasco y Briones, Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino with illegal recruitment as defined and penalized under
Section 6 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Worker's Act of 1995), and 11 informations 4 charging the same accused
with estafa as defined and penalized under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code. Only Inovero was
arrested and prosecuted, the other accused having remained at large. caEIDA
Six cases charging estafa (Criminal Case No. 04-1565, Criminal Case No. 1568, Criminal Case No. 1570, Criminal Case No.
1571 and Criminal Case No. 1572 and Criminal Case No. 1573) and one of the two charging illegal recruitment (Criminal
Case No. 04-1563) were provisionally dismissed because of the failure of the complainants to prosecute. 5 The seven
cases were later permanently dismissed after the complainants did not revive them within two years, as provided in
Section 8, 6 Rule 117 of the Rules of Court.
Trial on the merits ensued as to the remaining cases (Criminal Case No. 04-1562, for illegal recruitment; and Criminal
Case No. 04-1564; Criminal Case No. 04-1566; Criminal Case No. 04-1567; Criminal Case No. 1569 and Criminal Case No.
04-1574, for estafa). 7
The CA recounted the transactions between the complainants and the accused, including Inovero, in the following
manner:
Regarding Criminal Case No. 04-1562, the prosecution presented the five (5) private complainants as witnesses to prove
the crime of Illegal Recruitment, namely: Novesa Baful ("Baful"), Danilo Brizuela ("Brizuela"), Rosanna Aguirre
("Aguirre"), Annaliza Amoyo ("Amoyo"), and Teresa Marbella ("Marbella"), and Mildred Versoza ("Versoza") from the
Philippine Overseas Employment Administration ("POEA").
Baful testified that on May 20, 2003 she, together with her sister-in-law, went to Harvel International Talent
Management and Promotion ("HARVEL") at Unit 509 Cityland Condominium, Makati City upon learning that recruitment
for caregivers to Japan was on-going there. On said date, she allegedly met Inovero; Velasco, and Diala, and saw Inovero
conducting a briefing on the applicants. She also testified that Diala, the alleged talent manager, directed her to submit
certain documents, and to pay Two Thousand Five Hundred Pesos (P2,500.00) as training fee, as well as Thirty Thousand
Pesos (P30,000.00) as placement and processing fees. Diala also advised her to undergo physical examination.
On June 6, 2003, after complying with the aforesaid requirements and after paying Diala the amounts of Eighteen
Thousand Pesos (P18,000.00) and Ten Thousand pesos (P10,000.00), Baful was promised deployment within two (2) to
three (3) months. She likewise testified that Inovero briefed her and her co-applicants on what to wear on the day of
their departure. However, she was never deployed. Finally, she testified that she found out that HARVEL was not
licensed to deploy workers for overseas employment. cHAaCE
Brizuela, another complainant, testified that he went to HARVEL's office in Makati on February 7, 2003 to inquire on the
requirements and hiring procedure for a caregiver in Japan. There, Diala told him the amount required as processing fee
and the documents to be submitted. And when he submitted on March 7, 2003 the required documents and payments,
it was, this time, Paulino who received them. He claimed that he underwent training and medical examination; he
likewise attended an orientation conducted by Inovero at which time, he and his batchmates were advised what clothes
to wear on the day of their departure; he was assured of deployment on the first week of June 2003, however, on the
eve of his supposed "pre-departure orientation seminar," Paulino texted him that the seminar was cancelled because
Inovero, who had the applicants' money, did not show up. He testified that he was not deployed. Neither was his money
returned, as promised.
On cross-examination, Brizuela testified that Inovero was the one who conducted the orientation, and represented to all
the applicants that most of the time, she was in the Japanese Embassy expediting the applicants' visa.
Aguirre, the third complainant to testify, alleged that she went to HARVEL on May 22, 2003, to apply as caregiver in
Japan; there, Diala informed her that Inovero was one of the owners of HARVEL and Velasco was its President; she paid
Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00), and submitted her documents, receipt of which was acknowledged by Diala;
despite her undergoing medical examination and several training seminars, she was however not deployed to Japan.
Worse, she found out that HARVEL was not licensed to recruit workers.
Amoyo, the fourth complainant, testified that she went to HARVEL's office on May 28, 2003 to apply as caregiver in
Japan, and Diala required her to submit certain documents, to undergo training and medical examination, and to pay
Thirty Five Thousand Pesos (P35,000.00) as placement and processing fees. However, after complying with said
requirements, she was never deployed as promised. CSTDIE
Marbella was the last complainant to testify. She alleged that she applied for the position of janitress at HARVEL
sometime in December 2002; just like the rest of the complainants, she was required to submit certain documents and
to pay a total amount of Twenty Thousand pesos (P20,000.00) as processing fee; after paying said fee, Diala and Inovero
promised her and the other applicants that they will be deployed in three (3) months or in June 2003; however, the
promised deployment never materialized; she later found out that HARVEL was not even licensed to recruit workers.
[Mildred] Versoza, on the other hand, is a Labor and Employment Officer at the POEA Licensing Branch. She testified
that she prepared a Certification certifying that neither HARVEL nor Inovero was authorized to recruit workers for
overseas employment as per records at their office.
In her defense, Inovero denied the allegations hurled against her. As summarized in the assailed Decision, she claimed
that she is the niece of accused Velasco, the owner of HARVEL, but denied working there. Explaining her presence in
HARVEL, she alleged that she worked for her uncle, Velasco's husband, as an office assistant, hence, for at least two or
three times a week, she had to go to HARVEL on alleged errands for her uncle. She also testified that her alleged errands
mainly consisted of serving food and refreshments during orientations at HARVEL.
Inovero likewise denied receiving any money from the complainants, nor issuing receipts therefor. 8 cICHTD
Judgment of the RTC
On January 14, 2008, the RTC rendered judgment acquitting Inovero of five counts of estafa but convicting her in
Criminal Case No. 04-1562 of illegal recruitment committed in large scale as defined and penalized by Section 6 and
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995), disposing thusly:
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in the aforestated cases as follows:
In Criminal Case No. 04-1562, accused Maricar Inovero is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Illegal
Recruitment in large scale defined and penalized under Sections 6 and 7, II, of Republic Act No. 8042 otherwise known as
the 'Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995', and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of life
imprisonment. She is likewise ordered to pay a fine of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00).
Criminal Case No. 04-1563 also for illegal recruitment in large scale is hereby ordered dismissed to its finality for failure
of complainants Alvin De Leon, Roderick Acuna, Agosto Vale and Marina Viernes to revive said case despite the lapse of
two years from its provisional dismissal.
Criminal Cases No. 04-1564, 1566, 1567, 1569, 1571 and 1574 are hereby ordered DISMISSED for failure of the
prosecution to adduce sufficient evidence to prove all the elements of the said offense.
Criminal Cases Nos. 1565, 1568, 1570, 1572 and 1573 also for estafa [are] hereby ordered dismissed to its finality for
failure of complainants Agosto Vale, Alvin De Leon, Roselyn Saruyda, Roderick Acuna and Marina Viernes to revive said
cases despite the lapse of two (2) years from its provisional dismissal. ACaEcH
Considering that the accused is a detention prisoner, she shall be credited in the service of her sentence with the full
time during which she has undergone preventive imprisonment if she agrees voluntarily to abide by the same
disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners, otherwise, with four-fifths thereof.
Meanwhile, considering that the accused Ma. Harleta B. Velasco, Marissa Diala and Berna Paulino are still at large, let
alias warrants of arrest be issued against them. In the meantime, let the cases filed against them be archived, which
shall be revived upon their apprehension.
SO ORDERED. 9
Decision of the CA
Inovero appealed, contending that:
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME CHARGED DESPITE THE
PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH [HER] GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT. 10
On August 26, 2010, the CA affirmed the conviction, viz.:
WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The January 14, 2008 Decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED. 11
Issue
In this appeal, Inovero insists that the CA erred in affirming her conviction by the RTC because she had not been an
employee of Harvel at any time; that she could be faulted only for her association with the supposed illegal recruiters;
that in all stages of the complainants' recruitment for overseas employment by Harvel, they had transacted only and
directly with Diala; and that the certification from the POEA to the effect she was not a licensed recruiter was not a
positive proof that she engaged in illegal recruitment.
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
In its assailed decision, the CA affirmed the entire findings of fact of the RTC, stating: HEaCcD
The essential elements of illegal recruitment committed in large scale are: (1) that the accused engaged in acts of
recruitment and placement of workers as defined under Article 13(b) of the Labor Code, or in any prohibited activities
under Article 34 of the same Code; (2) that the accused had not complied with the guidelines issued by the Secretary of
Labor and Employment with respect to the requirement to secure a license or authority to recruit and deploy workers;
and (3) that the accused committed the unlawful acts against 3 or more persons. In simplest terms, illegal recruitment is
committed by persons who, without authority from the government, give the impression that they have the power to
send workers abroad for employment purposes.
In Our view, despite Inovero's protestations that she did not commit illegal recruitment, the following circumstances
contrarily convince Us that she was into illegal recruitment.
First, private complainants Baful and Brizuela commonly testified that Inovero was the one who conducted
orientations/briefings on them; informed them, among others, on how much their salary would be as caregivers in
Japan; and what to wear when they finally will be deployed.
Second, when Diala introduced her (Inovero) to private complainant Amoyo as one of the owners of HARVEL, Inovero
did not bother to correct said representation. Inovero's silence is clearly an implied acquiescence to said representation.
Third, Inovero, while conducting orientation on private complainant Brizuela, represented herself as the one expediting
the release of applicants' working visa for Japan.
Fourth, in a Certification issued and attested to by POEA's Versoza — Inovero had no license nor authority to recruit for
overseas employment. EASIHa
Based on the foregoing, there is therefore no doubt that the RTC correctly found that Inovero committed illegal
recruitment in large scale by giving private complainants the impression that she can send them abroad for employment
purposes, despite the fact that she had no license or authority to do so. 12
It is basic that the Court, not being a trier of facts, must of necessity rely on the findings of fact by the trial court which
are conclusive and binding once affirmed by the CA on intermediate review. The bindingness of the trial court's factual
findings is by virtue of its direct access to the evidence. The direct access affords the trial court the unique advantage to
observe the witnesses' demeanor while testifying, and the personal opportunity to test the accuracy and reliability of
their recollections of past events, both of which are very decisive in a litigation like this criminal prosecution for the
serious crime of illegal recruitment committed in large scale where the parties have disagreed on the material facts. The
Court leaves its confined precinct of dealing only with legal issues in order to deal with factual ones only when the
appellant persuasively demonstrates a clear error in the appreciation of the evidence by both the trial and the appellate
courts. This demonstration was not done herein by the appellant. Hence, the Court upholds the CA's affirmance of the
factual findings by the trial court.
All that Inovero's appeal has offered was her denial of complicity in the illegal recruitment of the complainants. But the
complainants credibly described and affirmed her specific acts during the commission of the crime of illegal recruitment.
Their positive assertions were far trustworthier than her mere denial.
Denial, essentially a negation of a fact, does not prevail over an affirmative assertion of the fact. Thus, courts — both
trial and appellate — have generally viewed the defense of denial in criminal cases with considerable caution, if not with
outright rejection. Such judicial attitude comes from the recognition that denial is inherently weak and unreliable by
virtue of its being an excuse too easy and too convenient for the guilty to make. To be worthy of consideration at all,
denial should be substantiated by clear and convincing evidence. The accused cannot solely rely on her negative and
self-serving negations, for denial carries no weight in law and has no greater evidentiary value than the testimony of
credible witnesses who testify on affirmative matters. 13 It is no different here.
We concur with the RTC and the CA that Inovero was criminally liable for the illegal recruitment charged against her.
Strong and positive evidence demonstrated beyond reasonable doubt her having conspired with her co-accused in the
recruitment of the complainants. The decision of the CA amply recounted her overt part in the conspiracy. Under the
law, there is a conspiracy when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony, and
decide to commit it. 14 EIAaDC
The complainants paid varying sums for placement, training and processing fees, respectively as follows: (a) Baful —
P28,500.00; (b) Brizuela — P38,600.00; (c) Aguirre — P38,600.00; (d) Amoyo — P39,000.00; and (e) Marbella —
P20,250.00. However, the RTC and the CA did not adjudicate Inovero's personal liability for them in their judgments.
Their omission needs to be corrected, notwithstanding that the complainants did not appeal, for not doing so would be
patently unjust and contrary to law. The Court, being the ultimate reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority but also
the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. It is, indeed, a basic tenet of our criminal law that every
person criminally liable is also civilly liable. 15 Civil liability includes restitution, reparation of the damage caused, and
indemnification for consequential damages. 16 To enforce the civil liability, the Rules of Court has deemed to be
instituted with the criminal action the civil action for the recovery of civil liability arising from the offense charged unless
the offended party waives the civil action, or reserves the right to institute the civil action separately, or institutes the
civil action prior to the criminal action. 17 Considering that the crime of illegal recruitment, when it involves the transfer
of funds from the victims to the accused, is inherently in fraud of the former, civil liability should include the return of
the amounts paid as placement, training and processing fees. 18 Hence, Inovero and her co-accused were liable to
indemnify the complainants for all the sums paid.
That the civil liability should be made part of the judgment by the RTC and the CA was not disputable. The Court pointed
out in Bacolod v. People 19 that it was "imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties when convicting the
accused, and determine the civil liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has been a reservation of the action
to recover civil liability or a waiver of its recovery," because:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA disregarded their express mandate under Section 2, Rule 120 of the
Rules of Court to have the judgment, if it was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the offense constituted
by the acts committed by the accused and the aggravating or mitigating circumstances which attended its commission;
(2) the participation of the accused in the offense, whether as principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or omission to be
recovered from the accused by the offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of the civil liability by a
separate civil action has been reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to act as we now do lest the Court be
unreasonably seen as tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did not themselves seek the correction of the
omission by an appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court, as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the
authority but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law and justice. HTCISE
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled to
by law or in equity under the established facts. Their judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they thereby fully
determine the rights and obligations of the litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full determination of such
rights and obligations would they be true to the judicial office of administering justice and equity for all. Courts should
then be alert and cautious in their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal cases. They should prescribe the legal
penalties, which is what the Constitution and the law require and expect them to do. Their prescription of the wrong
penalties will be invalid and ineffectual for being done without jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also determine and set the civil liability ex delicto of the accused, in order
to do justice to the complaining victims who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court mandates them to do so
unless the enforcement of the civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or waived. 20
What was the extent of Inovero's civil liability?
The nature of the obligation of the co-conspirators in the commission of the crime requires solidarity, and each debtor
may be compelled to pay the entire obligation. 21 As a co-conspirator, then, Inovero's civil liability was similar to that of
a joint tortfeasor under the rules of the civil law. Joint tortfeasors are those who command, instigate, promote,
encourage, advise, countenance, cooperate in, aid or abet the commission of a tort, or who approve of it after it is done,
if done for their benefit. 22 They are also referred to as those who act together in committing wrong or whose acts, if
independent of each other, unite in causing a single injury. 23 Under Article 2194 of the Civil Code, joint tortfeasors are
solidarily liable for the resulting damage. In other words, joint tortfeasors are each liable as principals, to the same
extent and in the same manner as if they had performed the wrongful act themselves. As regards the extent of their
respective liabilities, the Court expressed in Far Eastern Shipping Company v. Court of Appeals: 24
. . . . Where several causes producing an injury are concurrent and each is an efficient cause without which the injury
would not have happened, the injury may be attributed to all or any of the causes and recovery may be had against any
or all of the responsible persons although under the circumstances of the case, it may appear that one of them was
more culpable, and that the duty owed by them to the injured person was not same. No actor's negligence ceases to be
a proximate cause merely because it does not exceed the negligence of other acts. Each wrongdoer is responsible for
the entire result and is liable as though his acts were the sole cause of the injury. CHcESa
There is no contribution between joint tort-feasors whose liability is solidary since both of them are liable for the total
damage. Where the concurrent or successive negligent acts or omissions of two or more persons, although acting
independently, are in combination the direct and proximate cause of a single injury to a third person, it is impossible to
determine in what proportion each contributed to the injury and either of them is responsible for the whole injury. . . .
It would not be an excuse for any of the joint tortfeasors to assert that her individual participation in the wrong was
insignificant as compared to those of the others. 25 Joint tortfeasors are not liable pro rata. The damages cannot be
apportioned among them, except by themselves. They cannot insist upon an apportionment, for the purpose of each
paying an aliquot part. They are jointly and severally liable for the whole amount. 26 Hence, Inovero's liability towards
the victims of their illegal recruitment was solidary, regardless of whether she actually received the amounts paid or not,
and notwithstanding that her co-accused, having escaped arrest until now, have remained untried.
Under Article 2211 of the Civil Code, interest as part of the damages may be adjudicated in criminal proceedings in the
discretion of the court. The Court believes and holds that such liability for interest attached to Inovero as a measure of
fairness to the complainants. Thus, Inovero should pay interest of 6% per annum on the sums paid by the complainants
to be reckoned from the finality of this judgment until full payment. 27
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 26, 2010, subject to the MODIFICATION that
appellant Maricar B. Inovero is ordered to pay by way of actual damages to each of the complainants the amounts paid
by them for placement, training and processing fees, respectively as follows:
(a) Noveza Baful — P28,500.00; EaHDcS
(b) Danilo Brizuela — P38,600.00;
(c) Rosanna Aguirre — P38,600.00;
(d) Annaliza Amoyo — P39,000.00; and
(e) Teresa Marbella — P20,250.00.
plus interest on such amounts at the rate of six percent (6%) per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
Inovero shall further pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Leonardo-de Castro, Villarama, Jr. and Reyes, JJ., concur.

[G.R. No. 130940. April 21, 1999.]

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee, vs. RHODELINE CASTILLON, accused-appellant.
The Solicitor General for appellee.
Public Attorney's Office for accused-appellant.
SYNOPSIS
Appellant was charged with and convicted of large-scale illegal recruitment and correspondingly sentenced to life
imprisonment. Evidence for the prosecution disclosed that appellant, without any license to recruit overseas workers,
fraudulently represented to Emily and Nelia Perturbos, Dahlia Acol and Clemencia Bula-ag that she could provide them
employment in Malaysia as factory workers. Appellant demanded a fee of P8,000 for placement and processing but
accepted P4,000 partial payment to which she issued duly signed individual receipts. The complainants, however, were
not able to leave for abroad. Hence, this case against appellant. Appellant denied the charges against her but admitted
having received the amounts of P4,000 from complainants. cdasia
The Supreme Court affirmed the trial court's decision. It found that there was sufficient evidence to sustain appellant's
conviction for large-scale illegal recruitment the prosecution having established beyond reasonable doubt that appellant
who did not have license to engage in the recruitment of workers recruited more than three persons for employment
abroad for a fee.
SYLLABUS
1. LABOR AND SOCIAL LEGISLATION; LABOR CODE; ILLEGAL RECRUITMENT, LARGE-SCALE; ELEMENTS. — Large-
scale illegal recruitment has the following essential elements: (1) The accused undertook [a] recruitment activity defined
under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Art. 34 of the Labor Code. (2) He did not have the license or the
authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. (3) He committed the same against three or
more persons, individually or as a group. ACTEHI
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; ID.; CASE AT BAR. — The prosecution evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that the foregoing
elements were present in this case. There is no question that appellant did not have a license to engage in the
recruitment of workers, as she herself admitted, and that the crime was committed against more than three persons.
Appellant merely contends that she did not engage in the recruitment and placement of workers. Her argument is
belied, however, by the evidence on record. Appellant's recruitment of four persons despite her lack of authority or
license to do so is uncontroverted. She is thus guilty of large-scale illegal recruitment as defined and penalized in Articles
38(b) and 39(a) of the Labor Code. aSEDHC
DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J p:
In these difficult times, many Filipinos pin their hopes for an abundant future on overseas employment. In several cases,
however, illegal recruiters have taken undue advantage of simple folk desperate to work abroad. This Court cannot let
these vultures roam the countryside and prey on the gullibility of our people.
The Case
Rhodeline Castillon appeals the December 8, 1995 Decision 1 of the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch 17, which
convicted her of large-scale illegal recruitment and imposed upon her the penalty of life imprisonment plus a fine of
P100,000.
Prosecutor Emilio G. Dayanghirang III charged appellant in an Information dated January 9, 1995, which we quote:
"The undersigned [charges] the above-named accused [with] the crime of [i]llegal [r]ecruitment [on a] large [s]cale
under Article 38 in relation to Article 39 of Presidential Decree No. 2018, committed as follows:
"That sometime in November, 1994, in the City of Davao, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
the above-mentioned accused, representing [her]self to have the capacity to contract, enlist and recruit workers for
employment abroad, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously for a fee, recruit and promise
employment/job placement abroad to Emily B. Perturbos, Nelia B. Perturbos, Ma. Dahlia S. Acol and Clemencia Bula-ag
by charging fees, [without] being authorized by the rules/regulations set forth by the Department of Labor and
Employment or its instrumentality. 2
Assisted by Counsel de Oficio Juan Zamora of the Public Attorney's Office, appellant pleaded not guilty during her
arrangement on February 14, 1995. 3 Trial ensued in due course. On December 8, 1995, the court a quo rendered its
assailed Decision, the decretal portion of which reads:
"WHEREFORE, finding the evidence of prosecution, more than sufficient to prove the guilt of accused, Rhodeline
Castillon y Lozada of the offense charged, pursuant to Art. 38 in relation to Art 39(a) of PD No. 442, [the] New Labor
Code as amended by PD No. 2018 [, the] accused, Rhodeline Castillon, is sentenced to suffer a penalty of life
imprisonment and to pay a fine of P100,000.00 in favor of government.
"Moreover, pursuant to Art. 100 in relation to Art. 104 of the Revised Penal Code, covering civil indemnity, [the] accused
is ordered to pay each of the complainants, Emily Perturbos, Nelia Perturbos, Maria Dahlia Acol, [and] Clemencia Bula-
ag, the amount of P4,000.00 received by [the] accused. In consideration of her aborted promise[s], to secure
employment of complainants abroad." 4
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
The solicitor general summarized the prosecution's version of the facts as follows:
"On November 12, 1994, Emily Perturbos met Rhodeline Castillon at the Magsaysay Park, Davao City (TSN, March 20,
1995, pp. 3-4). Castillon invited and convinced Perturbos to work with her as factory worker in Malaysia (ibid, p. 4)
Perturbos accepted her offer because Castillon promised that she would take care of the necessary papers for her (Ibid).
Castillon told Perturbos that P8,000.00 would [cover] the processing and placement fees (ibid). Castillon asked from
Perturbos P4,000.00 as partial payment therefor (Ibid).
On November 14, 1994, Perturbos gave Castillon P4,000.00 at the Trader's Inn, Uyangoran, Davao City, where Castillon
had checked in (Ibid, pp. 4, 5 & 7). Thereafter, Perturbos again gave Castillon P4,000.00 (Ibid, pp. 5-6).
Castillon promised Perturbos that she would leave for Manila on December 26, 1994, where they would get their tickets
for Malaysia.
Castillon was also able to recruit Nelia Perturbos, Maria Dahlia Acol and Clemencia Bala-ag by making the same promise,
and she asked from them P4,000.00 each as partial payment for the processing and placement fees (TSN, March 28,
1995, pp. 4-8, 17-20 & 27-30). They paid Castillon P4,000.00 each in their desire to work abroad (Ibid).
When December 26, 1994 came, Castillon, informed her recruits that they would leave for Manila on January 2, 1995,
instead (Ibid., March 20, 1995, p. 7). But when January 2, 1995 came, Castillon failed to show up (Ibid.),
Nelia Perturbos inquired from the Philippine Overseas Employment Administrations whether she had a license to recruit
overseas worker[s] (Ibid, March 28, 1995, p. 25). In response, the POEA issued a certification declaring that Castillon had
no license to recruit overseas workers (Ibid; Exhibit A).
On January 7, 1995, the recruits reported Castillon's illegal activities to the police authorities (TSN, April 17, 1995, pp. 4-
6)."
Version of the Defense
In her Brief, 5 appellant presents the following version of the facts:
"[The a]ccused vehemently denied the accusation imputed [to] her. [She] testified that sometime in 1993 she left the
Philippines for Singapore and was able to work there as a bookkeeper. After working in Singapore for a year, she went
back to her former job as a bookkeeper in Tacurong. Sometime in November 1994, while [she] was awaiting for her
departure [for] Singapore, [she] met private complainant, Emily Perturbos, whom she first met in Suralla, Cotabato in
1993. Emily Perturbos requested the accused-appellant for assistance because the former likewise want[ed] to go to
Singapore with her. Private complainant even invited the accused-appellant to her house on November 12, 1994, and
there and then, Emily Perturbos informed her mother that whether the latter like[d] it or not, she [would] find ways in
order to go to Singapore. Although at first hesitant, [the] accused-appellant expressed her intention to assist Emily
Perturbos in going to Singapore but she reminded the private complainant that they [would] be entering Singapore as
tourists. (TSN, July 21, 1995, pp. 4-16).
"Elated with the prospect of going abroad, Emily Perturbos called by long distance her sister, Nelia Perturbos and
informed [her] that she ha[d] a friend in the person of herein accused-appellant who could assist them in finding work
abroad. Emily Perturbos then introduced three (3) other persons to herein accused-appellant, including her sister, Nelia
Perturbos, and requested the accused to likewise extend assistance to these three (3) persons. (Ibid, p. 15)"
Ruling of the Trial Court
In convicting appellant, the trial court found that the victims paid the appellant P4,000 each, because of her fraudulent
representation that she could provide them employment abroad. It ruled:
"There is no doubt in the records from the evidence of the prosecution [that the] accused solicited, canvassed and
demanded payment from all complainants, the partial amount of P4,000.00, in consideration of a promised employment
abroad, through the efforts and influence of [the] accused herself. The denial of [the] accused, explaining she did not
recruit complainants but she merely help[ed] them for humanitarian reason, cannot be accepted. The records will show,
she herself took the initiative of going with complainant [to] Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur, in order to receive from Emily
and Nelia Perturbos the above-advance payments[;] while in the case of Acol and Bula-ag, she personally went to the[ir]
parents . . . to make representations and assurances [that] she [would] be responsible [for] providing employment [for]
them abroad." 6
The Issue
The defense imputes to the trial court this lone error:
"The court a quo erred in finding the accused-appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of large scale illegal
recruitment.
In other words, appellant is challenging the sufficiency of the prosecution's evidence. cdasia
The Court's Ruling
The appeal is devoid of merit.
Main Issue:
Sufficiency of Prosecution Evidence
Large-scale illegal recruitment has the following essential elements:
"(1) The accused undertook [a] recruitment activity defined under Article 13(b) or any prohibited practice under Art.
34 of the Labor Code.
"(2) He did not have the license or the authority to lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of workers.
"(3) He committed the same against three or more persons, individually or as a group." 7
Article 13 (b) of the Labor Code defines recruitment and placement as follows:
". . . [A]ny act of canvassing, enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring or procuring workers [which] includes
referrals, contact services, promis[es] or advertising for employment, locally or abroad, whether for profit or not:
Provided, That any person or entity which, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee employment to two or more
persons shall be deemed engaged in recruitment and placement."
The prosecution evidence proved beyond reasonable doubt that the foregoing elements were present in this case. There
is no question that appellant did not have a license to engage in the recruitment of workers, as she herself admitted, 8
and that the crime was committed against more than three persons. Appellant merely contends that she did not engage
in the recruitment and placement of workers. Her argument is belied, however, by the evidence on record.
For a fee, appellant promised to find overseas work for Prosecution Witness Emily Perturbos, who testified:
"Q. Sometime on Nov. 12, 1994, do you remember seeing the accused?
xxx xxx xxx
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where?
A. At Magsaysay Park, Davao City.
Q. Why at Magsaysay Park? What did you do?
A. When we met at Magsaysay Park, Davao City, she invited and convinced me to work with her as [a] factory
worker in Malaysia.
Q. What was your reaction to that?
A. I accepted her offer because she told me that she [would] take care of the necessary papers.
Q. Aside from [her] assurance to take care of the necessary papers, what else did she do?
A. She [had] ask[ed] downpayment from me.
Q. How much?
A. She [had] ask[ed] for P8,000.00, but she [later] asked me to pay P4,000.00 as partial payment for the processing
and placement fee.
Q. Did you agree?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. You said, she [had] asked . . . you to give P8,000.00. How much did you give for the payment?
A. I only g[a]ve her P4,000.00.
Q. Do you have [a] document to prove the payment?
A. Yes, sir. I have here the receipt.
xxx xxx xxx
Q. After you gave the amount of P4,000.00 to the accused; Rhodeline Castillon, what happened?
A. She promised that we [would] leave Davao City for Manila on Dec. 26, 1994, and thereat, we [would] get our
tickets from the agency for Malaysia.
Q. Before that, Emily Perturbos, did you give the P4,000.00 to the accused?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Where did you give the money?
A. At Traders Inn at Uyanguren, Davao City.
Q. Why . . . at Traders Inn?
A. She . . . checked . . . in that Inn.
Q. The accused promised you . . . departure for Manila[;] were you able to depart?
A. No, because [the] new year [was] [f]ast approaching[;] she arranged that we [would] instead leave for Manila on
Jan. 2, 1995.
A. Were you able to leave on Jan. 2, 1995 as promised?
A. Not again, sir.
Q. Why?
A. Because she already hid herself.
Q. What did you do when she did not show up?
A. Since she did not show up anymore, for the alleged reason that I was angry with her, I reported the matter to
the police.
Q. What police station?
A. At Sta. Ana Police Station.
Q. Do you have an [excerpt] of the prior blotter at Sta. Ana Police Station?
A. None sir.
Q. Anyway, you reported the matters to the police. Where else did you report the matter?
A. No more, sir. I just asked my elder sister to go to the POE[A] to [ask] for a certification.
Q. Who is your sister?
A. Nelia Perturbos.
Q. Where you able to secure a certification?
A. Yes, sir." 9
The foregoing narration of Emily Perturbos was corroborated by her sister Nelia, who testified thus:
"Q. Please tell the court why . . . you know the accused[.]
A. One time, when I was at Zamboanga, my sister called up my father that she ha[d a] transaction with Rhodeline
Castillon. I was the one who received the call and my sister told [me] over the phone that they were going to Mangagoy
to get money to be given to Rhodeline Castillon as placement and processing fee.
Q. Who was the sister you [were] referring, who called you in Zamboanga?
A. Emily Perturbos.
Q. Now, what did you do when you were called by your sister?
A. I asked her who [was] this Rhodeline Castillon.
Q. What was the answer of Emily Perturbos?
A. According to her, this Rhodeline Castillon [was] her friend who recruited her for work abroad.
Q. Where did you go from Zamboanga based on the call of your sister?
A. A few days after, I returned here in Davao City.
Q. On Nov. 19, 1994, what happened, if any?
A. Rhodeline Castillon went to our house.
Q. Are your referring to Rhodeline Castillon, the accused in this case?
A. Yes, sir.
ATTY. SANGO:
Objection. The witness is incompetent.
FISCAL EVANGELIO.
The accused went to the house.
COURT:
Sustain[ed].
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
Q. You said that Rhodeline Castillon went to your house[;] what happened?
A. I told her, 'so you are going abroad with my sister?' and she answered that 'my quota [had] not [yet been] met,
so I [was] still looking for an applicant.'
Q. What did Rhodeline Castillon tell you?
A. She told me, 'if you are interested, you can also go. According to your sister Marilyn, . . . if you want, you can go
to her and get money [from] her.'
Q. What was you[r] comment on the request of Rhodeline Castillon?
ATTY. SANGO:
Objection. The question is misleading.
COURT:
Reform.
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
Q. On Nov. 21, 1994, what happened, if any?
A. On Nov. 21, 1994, I prepared a note and had it carr[ied] by Rhodeline to my sister [In that note, I] asked money
from her for my placement and processing fee.
Q. What happened to that note?
A. As I said, I gave [Rhodeline] my note, that's why she was given money by my sister and [the former] told me that
I was going to leave on Dec. 26, 1994.
Q. You said, the accused was given money by your sister[;] do you have any proof?
A. I have, sir.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness [handing] the receipt to Fiscal.
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
This receipt was formalized. Will you please read the content of this receipt for the record?
WITNESS:
'Received the amount of P4,000.00 from Nelia Perturbos, representing partial payment and for processing fee as factory
worker for Malaysia." 10
Another prosecution witness, Clemencia Bula-ag, testified as follows:
"A. Upon arriving at our house, Emily Perturbos introduced Rhodeline Castillon to us as her friend.
Q. Please tell the court if there [was] a conversation between you and Rhodeline?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What was your conversation about?
A. She [asked] me that we were going abroad.
Q. What else did she tell you when she said you were going abroad?
A. She [asked] me, if I was interested to go with them abroad and if I was willing to pay P8,000.00.
Q. What particular place abroad did she tell you, if any?
A. Malaysia.
Q. And what did that P8,000.00, represent?
A. According to her, that was for the placement fee and initial payment.
Q. What was your reaction to the offer of the accused?
A. I told her at that time, I [would] consult my father if he [would] allow me to go abroad.
Q. Were you able to get the consent of your father?
A. Yes, to go abroad.
Q. After getting the consent of your father, what did you do?
A. I asked money from my father, because as I said. Rhodeline Castillon asked from me P4,000.00.
Q. Why should you only give P4,000.00, when she asked for P8,000.00?
A. Because she told me to give her P4,000.00 as initial payment.
Q. Where did you give Rhodeline Castillon this P4,000.00?
A. In our house. She was actually waiting for me at that time.
Q. When was that, if you remember?
A. Last Nov. 19, 1994 in the morning.
Q. Do you have any document to show that you gave the amount of P4,000.00?
A. Yes sir.
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
Please show it to the court.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness showing to fiscal the receipt in a 1/8 sheet of paper.
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
Please read for the record, this simple receipt.
WITNESS:
"'Nov. 19, 1994. Received the amount of P4,000.00. from Clemencia Bula-ag for partial payment [of] her processing fee.
Signed by Rhodeline Castillon.'" 11
The last complainant, Ma. Dahlia Acol, testified in this manner:
"A. I was at that time introduced by Emily Perturbos to Rhodeline Castillon. cda
Q. Do you know the accused?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Will you identify her by pointing at her?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. What happened next?
A. I was recruited by Rhodeline Castillon.
Q. Why were you recruited by Rhodeline Castillon?
A. According to her, there is a need for a factory worker in Malaysia.
Q. And what other thing did she tell you?
A. According to her, she needed an applicant for Malaysia.
Q. What was your reaction to that recruitment for Malaysia?
A. She recruited me. But at that time, I told her that I ha[d] no money[;] [at a later] time I was able to give her
money.
Q. How much did the accused [ask] from you?
A. She needed P8,000.00.
Q. What [was] this P8,000.00 for?
A. According to her, that P8,000.00 [would] represent the processing fee. But at that time, she [was] asking the
partial payment of P4,000.00.
Q. Were you able to give her the P4,000.00?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. Do you have any proof to show that you g[a]ve the P4,000.00 to Rhodeline Castillon?
A. Yes, sir.
COURT INTERPRETER:
Witness [handing] a receipt to fiscal written [o]n a [page] of notebook.
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
Q. What is [your] educational attainment?
A. High school.
FISCAL EVANGELIO:
Please read the content of this receipt for the record.
WITNESS:
'Received the amount of P4,000.00 from Ma. Da[h]lia Acol, for partial payment for the processing for her paper.
Rhodeline Castillon. Recruiter.'" 12 (Emphasis supplied.)
The above-quoted testimonies unequivocally prove that appellant promised to the three complainants jobs in Malaysia,
provided they would each pay P4,000 initially and, upon confirmation of their flight, an additional P4,000. The fact that
each of them paid the initial amount of P4,000 is evidenced by the receipts issued and signed by the appellant. Although
the latter questioned the genuineness of the said documents, she admitted during the trial that she received the
amount. 13
In her defense, appellant avers that she was merely helping the complainants find jobs abroad for humanitarian reasons.
Because she had been abroad before, she was allegedly "begged" by the complainants to help them find overseas
employment. Furthermore, she could not have been a recruiter, because she herself was an applicant for an overseas
job, for which she had been recruited by an agency in Manila.
Appellant's arguments are not convincing. First, recruitment includes "any act of canvassing, . . . contracting, . . .
promising or advertising for employment abroad, for profit or not." Second, it is clear that she demanded money from
persons seeking employment abroad. In committing the challenged acts, she was working not with a recruitment
agency, but with her aunt Maricor Acosta. This is clearly proven by a letter, signed by the latter, informing the
complainants that their papers were indeed being processed. Contradicting appellant's claim that her acts were
motivated by humanitarian reasons, the handwritten letter reads: 14
"December 31, 1994
Dear Inday,
Happy New Year! I'm sure that you're very eager to come here and go abroad already. Supposedly, I understand you and
your plan in life but kung pwede ang schedule mo ay sa March or April na. Please lang day, understand us naman ikaw
lang and inaasahan namin diyan sa Mindanao at dagdagan mo pa ang mga applicants mo.
Regarding your applicants, their schedule are as follows and they must know this so that hindi sila mag-alanganin sa atin.
1) Clemencia Bula-ag is on February 18 tentative pa iyan ill just send telegram para hindi na siya mag-stay ng matagal,
she must arrive here on before her flight to Singapore. 2) Dahlia Acol is same as Bula-ag 3) Emily Perturbos is first week
pa sa March same as her sister Nelia Perturbos 4) Juancho Hesus hindi pa mapirmahan ang kanyang working permit, but
don't you worry ginagawa ko ang lahat ng paraan para magkaroon siya ng working visa. Tell them not to worry they can
all came to abroad to fulfill their dreams and be sure that they are all in good health.
About their remaining balance of processing will you please collect them so that maipadala mo dito sa akin especially
Bula-ag, Acol & Emily para matapos na lahat ang papers nila para pagdating nila dito hindi na sila magtagal dito, kung
pwede gawin mo ito ng madali. I'll just send your allowance on January kasi pupunta kami bukas sa Singapore to meet
your sister Gerlyn, hindi ko pa alam ang balik ko sa Manila, asikasuhin ko ang mga papers ng applicants mo & please see
the xerox copy of their passports. See you kung gusto mo, ihatid mo sila sa Maynila basta ikaw by March or April pa.
MARICOR ACOSTA
1903 Visayan Avenue
Balic-Balic Sampaloc
Manila"
The letter reveals that appellant was looking for more applicants in the Mindanao area. This is consonant with the
testimony of Nelia Perturbos that because appellant had not yet reached her quota, the latter persuaded her and her
sister to apply for jobs abroad. 15
Appellant's recruitment of four persons despite her lack of authority or license to do so is uncontroverted. She is thus
guilty of large-scale illegal recruitment as defined and penalized in Articles 38(b) and 39(a) of the Labor Code, which
provide:
"ART. 38. Illegal Recruitment. — (a) Any recruitment activities, including the prohibited practices enumerated
under Article 34 of this Code, to be undertaken by non-licensees or non-holders of authority shall be deemed illegal and
punishable under Article 39 of this Code. The Ministry of Labor and Employment or any law enforcement [officer] may
initiate complaints under this Article.
(b) Illegal recruitment where committed by a syndicate or in large scale shall be considered an offense involving
economic sabotage and shall be penalized in accordance with Article 39 hereof.
Illegal recruitment is deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons conspiring
and/or confederating with one another in carrying out any unlawful or illegal transaction, enterprise or scheme defined
under the first paragraph hereof. Illegal recruitment is deemed committed in large scale if committed against three (3)
or more persons individually or as a group."
ART. 39. Penalties. — (a) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000)
shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as defined herein.
xxx xxx xxx"
Be that as it may, no effort to bring Maricor Acosta to justice has been communicated to this Court. We are therefore
directing the Office of the Clerk of Court to furnish the justice secretary a copy of this Decision, so that he may take
appropriate steps to prosecute her, if so warranted in the premises.
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED and the assailed Decision is AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
Romero, Vitug, Purisima and Gonzaga-Reyes, JJ., concur.

EN BANC
[G.R. No. 152642. November 13, 2012.]
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, ROSALINDA BALDOZ and LUCITA LAZO, petitioners, vs. REY SALAC, WILLIE D. ESPIRITU,
MARIO MONTENEGRO, DODGIE BELONIO, LOLIT SALINEL and BUDDY BONNEVIE, respondents.
[G.R. No. 152710. November 13, 2012.]
HON. PATRICIA A. STO. TOMAS, in her capacity as Secretary of Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE), HON.
ROSALINDA D. BALDOZ, in her capacity as Administrator, Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA), and
the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION GOVERNING BOARD, petitioners, vs. HON. JOSE G. PANEDA,
in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of Branch 220, Quezon City, ASIAN RECRUITMENT COUNCIL PHILIPPINE CHAPTER,
INC. (ARCOPHIL), for itself and in behalf of its members: WORLDCARE PHILIPPINES SERVIZO INTERNATIONALE, INC.,
STEADFAST INTERNATIONAL RECRUITMENT CORP., VERDANT MANPOWER MOBILIZATION CORP., BRENT OVERSEAS
PERSONNEL, INC., ARL MANPOWER SERVICES, INC., DAHLZEN INTERNATIONAL SERVICES, INC., INTERWORLD
PLACEMENT CENTER, INC., LAKAS TAO CONTRACT SERVICES LTD. CO., SSC MULTI-SERVICES, DMJ INTERNATIONAL, and
MIP INTERNATIONAL MANPOWER SERVICES, represented by its proprietress, MARCELINA I. PAGSIBIGAN, respondents.
[G.R. No. 167590. November 13, 2012.]
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented by the HONORABLE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF
LABOR AND EMPLOYMENT (DOLE), the PHILIPPINE OVERSEAS EMPLOYMENT ADMINISTRATION (POEA), the OVERSEAS
WORKERS WELFARE ADMINISTRATION (OWWA), the LABOR ARBITERS OF THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
COMMISSION (NLRC), the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, the HONORABLE SECRETARY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS and
the COMMISSION ON AUDIT (COA), petitioners, vs. PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF SERVICE EXPORTERS, INC. (PASEI),
respondent.
[G.R. Nos. 182978-79. November 13, 2012.]
BECMEN SERVICE EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., petitioner, vs. SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (for and
in behalf of daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC., and JAIME ORTIZ (President of White Falcon
Services, Inc.), respondents.
[G.R. Nos. 184298-99. November 13, 2012.]
SPOUSES SIMPLICIO AND MILA CUARESMA (for and in behalf of deceased daughter, Jasmin G. Cuaresma), petitioners,
vs. WHITE FALCON SERVICES, INC. and BECMEN SERVICES EXPORTER AND PROMOTION, INC., respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J p:
These consolidated cases pertain to the constitutionality of certain provisions of Republic Act 8042, otherwise known as
the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995.
The Facts and the Case
On June 7, 1995 Congress enacted Republic Act (R.A.) 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995
that, for among other purposes, sets the Government's policies on overseas employment and establishes a higher
standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers, their families, and overseas Filipinos in
distress.
G.R. 152642 and G.R. 152710
(Constitutionality of Sections 29 and 30, R.A. 8042)
Sections 29 and 30 of the Act 1 commanded the Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE) to begin deregulating
within one year of its passage the business of handling the recruitment and migration of overseas Filipino workers and
phase out within five years the regulatory functions of the Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA).
On January 8, 2002 respondents Rey Salac, Willie D. Espiritu, Mario Montenegro, Dodgie Belonio, Lolit Salinel, and Buddy
Bonnevie (Salac, et al.) filed a petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus with application for temporary
restraining order (TRO) and preliminary injunction against petitioners, the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and
the Technical Education and Skills Development Authority (TESDA) Secretary-General before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 96. 2
Salac, et al. sought to: 1) nullify DOLE Department Order 10 (DOLE DO 10) and POEA Memorandum Circular 15 (POEA
MC 15); 2) prohibit the DOLE, POEA, and TESDA from implementing the same and from further issuing rules and
regulations that would regulate the recruitment and placement of overseas Filipino workers (OFWs); and 3) also enjoin
them to comply with the policy of deregulation mandated under Sections 29 and 30 of Republic Act 8042.
On March 20, 2002 the Quezon City RTC granted Salac, et al.'s petition and ordered the government agencies mentioned
to deregulate the recruitment and placement of OFWs. 3 The RTC also annulled DOLE DO 10, POEA MC 15, and all other
orders, circulars and issuances that are inconsistent with the policy of deregulation under R.A. 8042.
Prompted by the RTC's above actions, the government officials concerned filed the present petition in G.R. 152642
seeking to annul the RTC's decision and have the same enjoined pending action on the petition.
On April 17, 2002 the Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. intervened in the case before the Court, claiming
that the RTC March 20, 2002 Decision gravely affected them since it paralyzed the deployment abroad of OFWs and
performing artists. The Confederated Association of Licensed Entertainment Agencies, Incorporated (CALEA) intervened
for the same purpose. 4
On May 23, 2002 the Court 5 issued a TRO in the case, enjoining the Quezon City RTC, Branch 96, from enforcing its
decision.
In a parallel case, on February 12, 2002 respondents Asian Recruitment Council Philippine Chapter, Inc. and others
(Arcophil, et al.) filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with application for TRO and preliminary injunction against
the DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the TESDA Director-General, 6 before the RTC of Quezon City, Branch
220, to enjoin the latter from implementing the 2002 Rules and Regulations Governing the Recruitment and
Employment of Overseas Workers and to cease and desist from issuing other orders, circulars, and policies that tend to
regulate the recruitment and placement of OFWs in violation of the policy of deregulation provided in Sections 29 and
30 of R.A. 8042.
On March 12, 2002 the Quezon City RTC rendered an Order, granting the petition and enjoining the government
agencies involved from exercising regulatory functions over the recruitment and placement of OFWs. This prompted the
DOLE Secretary, the POEA Administrator, and the TESDA Director-General to file the present action in G.R. 152710. As in
G.R. 152642, the Court issued on May 23, 2002 a TRO enjoining the Quezon City RTC, Branch 220 from enforcing its
decision.
On December 4, 2008, however, the Republic informed 7 the Court that on April 10, 2007 former President Gloria
Macapagal-Arroyo signed into law R.A. 9422 8 which expressly repealed Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 and adopted
the policy of close government regulation of the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. R.A. 9422 pertinently provides:
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 1. Section 23, paragraph (b.1) of Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipinos Act of 1995" is hereby amended to read as follows:
(b.1) Philippine Overseas Employment Administration — The Administration shall regulate private sector participation in
the recruitment and overseas placement of workers by setting up a licensing and registration system. It shall also
formulate and implement, in coordination with appropriate entities concerned, when necessary, a system for promoting
and monitoring the overseas employment of Filipino workers taking into consideration their welfare and the domestic
manpower requirements.
In addition to its powers and functions, the administration shall inform migrant workers not only of their rights as
workers but also of their rights as human beings, instruct and guide the workers how to assert their rights and provide
the available mechanism to redress violation of their rights.
In the recruitment and placement of workers to service the requirements for trained and competent Filipino workers of
foreign governments and their instrumentalities, and such other employers as public interests may require, the
administration shall deploy only to countries where the Philippines has concluded bilateral labor agreements or
arrangements: Provided, That such countries shall guarantee to protect the rights of Filipino migrant workers; and:
Provided, further, That such countries shall observe and/or comply with the international laws and standards for
migrant workers.
SEC. 2. Section 29 of the same law is hereby repealed.
SEC. 3. Section 30 of the same law is also hereby repealed.
xxx xxx xxx
On August 20, 2009 respondents Salac, et al. told the Court in G.R. 152642 that they agree 9 with the Republic's view
that the repeal of Sections 29 and 30 of R.A. 8042 renders the issues they raised by their action moot and academic. The
Court has no reason to disagree. Consequently, the two cases, G.R. 152642 and 152710, should be dismissed for being
moot and academic.
G.R. 167590
(Constitutionality of Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042)
On August 21, 1995 respondent Philippine Association of Service Exporters, Inc. (PASEI) filed a petition for declaratory
relief and prohibition with prayer for issuance of TRO and writ of preliminary injunction before the RTC of Manila,
seeking to annul Sections 6, 7, and 9 of R.A. 8042 for being unconstitutional. (PASEI also sought to annul a portion of
Section 10 but the Court will take up this point later together with a related case.)
Section 6 defines the crime of "illegal recruitment" and enumerates the acts constituting the same. Section 7 provides
the penalties for prohibited acts. Thus:
SEC. 6. Definition. — For purposes of this Act, illegal recruitment shall mean any act of canvassing, enlisting,
contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, procuring workers and includes referring, contract services, promising or
advertising for employment abroad, whether for profit or not, when undertaken by a non-license or non-holder of
authority contemplated under Article 13(f) of Presidential Decree No. 442, as amended, otherwise known as the Labor
Code of the Philippines: Provided, That such non-license or non-holder, who, in any manner, offers or promises for a fee
employment abroad to two or more persons shall be deemed so engaged. It shall likewise include the following acts,
whether committed by any person, whether a non-licensee, non-holder, licensee or holder of authority:
xxx xxx xxx
SEC. 7. Penalties. —
(a) Any person found guilty of illegal recruitment shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of not less than six (6)
years and one (1) day but not more than twelve (12) years and a fine not less than two hundred thousand pesos
(P200,000.00) nor more than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00).
(b) The penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not less than five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) nor
more than one million pesos (P1,000,000.00) shall be imposed if illegal recruitment constitutes economic sabotage as
defined herein.
Provided, however, That the maximum penalty shall be imposed if the person illegally recruited is less than eighteen
(18) years of age or committed by a non-licensee or non-holder of authority. 10
Finally, Section 9 of R.A. 8042 allowed the filing of criminal actions arising from "illegal recruitment" before the RTC of
the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time of the
commission of the offense.
The RTC of Manila declared Section 6 unconstitutional after hearing on the ground that its definition of "illegal
recruitment" is vague as it fails to distinguish between licensed and non-licensed recruiters 11 and for that reason gives
undue advantage to the non-licensed recruiters in violation of the right to equal protection of those that operate with
government licenses or authorities.
But "illegal recruitment" as defined in Section 6 is clear and unambiguous and, contrary to the RTC's finding, actually
makes a distinction between licensed and non-licensed recruiters. By its terms, persons who engage in "canvassing,
enlisting, contracting, transporting, utilizing, hiring, or procuring workers" without the appropriate government license
or authority are guilty of illegal recruitment whether or not they commit the wrongful acts enumerated in that section.
On the other hand, recruiters who engage in the canvassing, enlisting, etc. of OFWs, although with the appropriate
government license or authority, are guilty of illegal recruitment only if they commit any of the wrongful acts
enumerated in Section 6.
The Manila RTC also declared Section 7 unconstitutional on the ground that its sweeping application of the penalties
failed to make any distinction as to the seriousness of the act committed for the application of the penalty imposed on
such violation. As an example, said the trial court, the mere failure to render a report under Section 6 (h) or obstructing
the inspection by the Labor Department under Section 6 (g) are penalized by imprisonment for six years and one day
and a minimum fine of P200,000.00 but which could unreasonably go even as high as life imprisonment if committed by
at least three persons.
Apparently, the Manila RTC did not agree that the law can impose such grave penalties upon what it believed were
specific acts that were not as condemnable as the others in the lists. But, in fixing uniform penalties for each of the
enumerated acts under Section 6, Congress was within its prerogative to determine what individual acts are equally
reprehensible, consistent with the State policy of according full protection to labor, and deserving of the same penalties.
It is not within the power of the Court to question the wisdom of this kind of choice. Notably, this legislative policy has
been further stressed in July 2010 with the enactment of R.A. 10022 12 which increased even more the duration of the
penalties of imprisonment and the amounts of fine for the commission of the acts listed under Section 7.
Obviously, in fixing such tough penalties, the law considered the unsettling fact that OFWs must work outside the
country's borders and beyond its immediate protection. The law must, therefore, make an effort to somehow protect
them from conscienceless individuals within its jurisdiction who, fueled by greed, are willing to ship them out without
clear assurance that their contracted principals would treat such OFWs fairly and humanely.
As the Court held in People v. Ventura, 13 the State under its police power "may prescribe such regulations as in its
judgment will secure or tend to secure the general welfare of the people, to protect them against the consequence of
ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and fraud." Police power is "that inherent and plenary power of the
State which enables it to prohibit all things hurtful to the comfort, safety, and welfare of society." 14
The Manila RTC also invalidated Section 9 of R.A. 8042 on the ground that allowing the offended parties to file the
criminal case in their place of residence would negate the general rule on venue of criminal cases which is the place
where the crime or any of its essential elements were committed. Venue, said the RTC, is jurisdictional in penal laws
and, allowing the filing of criminal actions at the place of residence of the offended parties violates their right to due
process. Section 9 provides:
SEC. 9. Venue. — A criminal action arising from illegal recruitment as defined herein shall be filed with the Regional Trial
Court of the province or city where the offense was committed or where the offended party actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts: Provided, however, That the aforestated provisions shall also apply to those
criminal actions that have already been filed in court at the time of the effectivity of this Act.
But there is nothing arbitrary or unconstitutional in Congress fixing an alternative venue for violations of Section 6 of
R.A. 8042 that differs from the venue established by the Rules on Criminal Procedure. Indeed, Section 15 (a), Rule 110 of
the latter Rules allows exceptions provided by laws. Thus:
SEC. 15. Place where action is to be instituted. — (a) Subject to existing laws, the criminal action shall be instituted and
tried in the court of the municipality or territory where the offense was committed or where any of its essential
ingredients occurred. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Section 9 of R.A. 8042, as an exception to the rule on venue of criminal actions is, consistent with that law's declared
policy 15 of providing a criminal justice system that protects and serves the best interests of the victims of illegal
recruitment.
G.R. 167590, G.R. 182978-79, 16 and G.R. 184298-99 17
(Constitutionality of Section 10, last sentence of 2nd paragraph)
G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 are consolidated cases. Respondent spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma (the
Cuaresmas) filed a claim for death and insurance benefits and damages against petitioners Becmen Service Exporter and
Promotion, Inc. (Becmen) and White Falcon Services, Inc. (White Falcon) for the death of their daughter Jasmin
Cuaresma while working as staff nurse in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
The Labor Arbiter (LA) dismissed the claim on the ground that the Cuaresmas had already received insurance benefits
arising from their daughter's death from the Overseas Workers Welfare Administration (OWWA). The LA also gave due
credence to the findings of the Saudi Arabian authorities that Jasmin committed suicide.
On appeal, however, the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) found Becmen and White Falcon jointly and
severally liable for Jasmin's death and ordered them to pay the Cuaresmas the amount of US$113,000.00 as actual
damages. The NLRC relied on the Cabanatuan City Health Office's autopsy finding that Jasmin died of criminal violence
and rape.
Becmen and White Falcon appealed the NLRC Decision to the Court of Appeals (CA). 18 On June 28, 2006 the CA held
Becmen and White Falcon jointly and severally liable with their Saudi Arabian employer for actual damages, with
Becmen having a right of reimbursement from White Falcon. Becmen and White Falcon appealed the CA Decision to this
Court.
On April 7, 2009 the Court found Jasmin's death not work-related or work-connected since her rape and death did not
occur while she was on duty at the hospital or doing acts incidental to her employment. The Court deleted the award of
actual damages but ruled that Becmen's corporate directors and officers are solidarily liable with their company for its
failure to investigate the true nature of her death. Becmen and White Falcon abandoned their legal, moral, and social
duty to assist the Cuaresmas in obtaining justice for their daughter. Consequently, the Court held the foreign employer
Rajab and Silsilah, White Falcon, Becmen, and the latter's corporate directors and officers jointly and severally liable to
the Cuaresmas for: 1) P2,500,000.00 as moral damages; 2) P2,500,000.00 as exemplary damages; 3) attorney's fees of
10% of the total monetary award; and 4) cost of suit.
On July 16, 2009 the corporate directors and officers of Becmen, namely, Eufrocina Gumabay, Elvira Taguiam, Lourdes
Bonifacio and Eddie De Guzman (Gumabay, et al.) filed a motion for leave to Intervene. They questioned the
constitutionality of the last sentence of the second paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042 which holds the corporate
directors, officers and partners jointly and solidarily liable with their company for money claims filed by OFWs against
their employers and the recruitment firms. On September 9, 2009 the Court allowed the intervention and admitted
Gumabay, et al.'s motion for reconsideration.
The key issue that Gumabay, et al. present is whether or not the 2nd paragraph of Section 10, R.A. 8042, which holds the
corporate directors, officers, and partners of recruitment and placement agencies jointly and solidarily liable for money
claims and damages that may be adjudged against the latter agencies, is unconstitutional.
In G.R. 167590 (the PASEI case), the Quezon City RTC held as unconstitutional the last sentence of the 2nd paragraph of
Section 10 of R.A. 8042. It pointed out that, absent sufficient proof that the corporate officers and directors of the erring
company had knowledge of and allowed the illegal recruitment, making them automatically liable would violate their
right to due process of law.
The pertinent portion of Section 10 provides:
SEC. 10. Money Claims. — . . .
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all claims under this section
shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a
condition precedent for its approval. The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as
provided by law, shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If the
recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and partners as the case may be,
shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and
damages. (Emphasis supplied)
But the Court has already held, pending adjudication of this case, that the liability of corporate directors and officers is
not automatic. To make them jointly and solidarily liable with their company, there must be a finding that they were
remiss in directing the affairs of that company, such as sponsoring or tolerating the conduct of illegal activities. 19 In the
case of Becmen and White Falcon, 20 while there is evidence that these companies were at fault in not investigating the
cause of Jasmin's death, there is no mention of any evidence in the case against them that intervenors Gumabay, et al.,
Becmen's corporate officers and directors, were personally involved in their company's particular actions or omissions in
Jasmin's case.
As a final note, R.A. 8042 is a police power measure intended to regulate the recruitment and deployment of OFWs. It
aims to curb, if not eliminate, the injustices and abuses suffered by numerous OFWs seeking to work abroad. The rule is
settled that every statute has in its favor the presumption of constitutionality. The Court cannot inquire into the wisdom
or expediency of the laws enacted by the Legislative Department. Hence, in the absence of a clear and unmistakable
case that the statute is unconstitutional, the Court must uphold its validity.
WHEREFORE, in G.R. 152642 and 152710, the Court DISMISSES the petitions for having become moot and academic.
In G.R. 167590, the Court SETS ASIDE the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Manila dated December 8, 2004 and
DECLARES Sections 6, 7, and 9 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional.
In G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 as well as in G.R. 167590, the Court HOLDS the last sentence of the second
paragraph of Section 10 of Republic Act 8042 valid and constitutional. The Court, however, RECONSIDERS and SETS
ASIDE the portion of its Decision in G.R. 182978-79 and G.R. 184298-99 that held intervenors Eufrocina Gumabay, Elvira
Taguiam, Lourdes Bonifacio, and Eddie De Guzman jointly and solidarily liable with respondent Becmen Services
Exporter and Promotion, Inc. to spouses Simplicio and Mila Cuaresma for lack of a finding in those cases that such
intervenors had a part in the act or omission imputed to their corporation.
SO ORDERED.
Sereno, C.J., Carpio, Velasco, Jr., Leonardo-de Castro, Peralta, Del Castillo, Villarama, Jr., Perez, Reyes and Perlas-
Bernabe, JJ., concur.
Brion, J., took no part due to prior participation in related issues in a former position.
Bersamin, J., took no part due to prior participation in the lower court.
Mendoza, J., took no part.

[G.R. No. 175558. February 8, 2012.]

SKIPPERS UNITED PACIFIC, INC. and SKIPPERS MARITIME SERVICES, INC., LTD., petitioners, vs. NATHANIEL DOZA,
NAPOLEON DE GRACIA, ISIDRO L. LATA, and CHARLIE APROSTA, respondents.
DECISION
CARPIO, J p:
The Case
This is a Petition for Review under Rule 45 assailing the 5 July 2006 Decision 1 and 7 November 2006 Resolution 2 of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 88148. 3 AaCTID
This arose from consolidated labor case 4 filed by seafarers Napoleon De Gracia (De Gracia), Isidro L. Lata (Lata), Charlie
Aprosta (Aprosta), and Nathaniel Doza (Doza) against local manning agency Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and its foreign
principal, Skippers Maritime Services, Inc., Ltd. (Skippers) for unremitted home allotment for the month of December
1998, salaries for the unexpired portion of their employment contracts, moral damages, exemplary damages, and
attorney's fees. Skippers, on the other hand, answered with a claim for reimbursement of De Gracia, Aprosta and Lata's
repatriation expenses, as well as award of moral damages and attorney's fees.
De Gracia, Lata, Aprosta and Doza's (De Gracia, et al.) claims were dismissed by the Labor Arbiter for lack of merit. 5 The
Labor Arbiter also dismissed Skippers' claims. 6 De Gracia, et al. appealed 7 the Labor Arbiter's decision with the
National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), but the First Division of the NLRC dismissed the appeal for lack of merit. 8
Doza, et al.'s Motion for Reconsideration was likewise denied by the NLRC, 9 so they filed a Petition for Certiorari with
the Court of Appeals (CA). 10
The CA granted the petition, reversed the Labor Arbiter and NLRC Decisions, and awarded to De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta
their unremitted home allotment, three months salary each representing the unexpired portion of their employment
contracts and attorney's fees. 11 No award was given to Doza for lack of factual basis. 12 The CA denied Skippers'
Motion for Partial Reconsideration. 13 Hence, this Petition.
The Facts
Skippers United Pacific, Inc. deployed, in behalf of Skippers, De Gracia, Lata, and Aprosta to work on board the vessel
MV Wisdom Star, under the following terms and conditions:
Name: Napoleon O. De Gracia
Position: 3rd Engineer
Contract Duration: 10 months
Basic Monthly Salary: US$800.00
Contract Date: 17 July 1998 14
Name: Isidro L. Lata ETCcSa
Position: 4th Engineer
Contract Duration: 12 months
Basic Monthly Salary: US$600.00
Contract Date: 17 April 1998 15
Name: Charlie A. Aprosta
Position: Third Officer
Contract Duration: 12 months
Basic Monthly Salary: US$600.00
Contract Date: 17 April 1998 16
Paragraph 2 of all the employment contracts stated that: "The terms and conditions of the Revised Employment
Contract Governing the Employment of All Seafarers approved per Department Order No. 33 and Memorandum Circular
No. 55, both series of 1996 shall be strictly and faithfully observed." 17 No employment contract was submitted for
Nathaniel Doza.
De Gracia, et al. claimed that Skippers failed to remit their respective allotments for almost five months, compelling
them to air their grievances with the Romanian Seafarers Free Union. 18 On 16 December 1998, ITF Inspector Adrian
Mihalcioiu of the Romanian Seafarers Union sent Captain Savvas of Cosmos Shipping a fax letter, relaying the complaints
of his crew, namely: home allotment delay, unpaid salaries (only advances), late provisions, lack of laundry services (only
one washing machine), and lack of maintenance of the vessel (perforated and unrepaired deck). 19 To date, however,
Skippers only failed to remit the home allotment for the month of December 1998. 20 On 28 January 1999, De Gracia, et
al. were unceremoniously discharged from MV Wisdom Stars and immediately repatriated. 21 Upon arrival in the
Philippines, De Gracia, et al. filed a complaint for illegal dismissal with the Labor Arbiter on 4 April 1999 and prayed for
payment of their home allotment for the month of December 1998, salaries for the unexpired portion of their contracts,
moral damages, exemplary damages, and attorney's fees. 22
Skippers, on the other hand, claims that at around 2:00 a.m. on 3 December 1998, De Gracia, smelling strongly of
alcohol, went to the cabin of Gabriel Oleszek, Master of MV Wisdom Stars, and was rude, shouting noisily to the master.
23 De Gracia left the master's cabin after a few minutes and was heard shouting very loudly somewhere down the
corridors. 24 This incident was evidenced by the Captain's Report sent via telex to Skippers on said date. 25 SCaDAE
Skippers also claims that at 12:00 noon on 22 January 1999, four Filipino seafarers, namely Aprosta, De Gracia, Lata and
Doza, arrived in the master's cabin and demanded immediate repatriation because they were not satisfied with the ship.
26 De Gracia, et al. threatened that they may become crazy any moment and demanded for all outstanding payments
due to them. 27 This is evidenced by a telex of Cosmoship MV Wisdom to Skippers, which however bears conflicting
dates of 22 January 1998 and 22 January 1999. 28
Skippers also claims that, due to the disembarkation of De Gracia, et al., 17 other seafarers disembarked under
abnormal circumstances. 29 For this reason, it was suggested that Polish seafarers be utilized instead of Filipino seamen.
30 This is again evidenced by a fax of Cosmoship MV Wisdom to Skippers, which bears conflicting dates of 24 January
1998 and 24 January 1999. 31
Skippers, in its Position Paper, admitted non-payment of home allotment for the month of December 1998, but prayed
for the offsetting of such amount with the repatriation expenses in the following manner: 32
Seafarer Repatriation Expense Home Allotment Balance
De Gracia US$1,340.00 US$900.00 US$440.00
Aprosta US$1,340.00 US$600.00 US$740.00
Lata US$1,340.00 US$600.00 US$740.00
Since De Gracia, et al., pre-terminated their contracts, Skippers claims they are liable for their repatriation expenses 33
in accordance with Section 19 (G) of Philippine Overseas Employment Administration (POEA) Memorandum Circular No.
55, series of 1996 which states:
G. A seaman who requests for early termination of his contract shall be liable for his repatriation cost as well as the
transportation cost of his replacement. The employer may, in case of compassionate grounds, assume the
transportation cost of the seafarer's replacement.
Skippers also prayed for payment of moral damages and attorney's fees. 34
The Decision of the Labor Arbiter
The Labor Arbiter rendered his Decision on 18 February 2002, with its dispositive portion declaring: cDCEHa
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered dismissing herein action for lack of merit. Respondents' claim for
reimbursement of the expenses they incurred in the repatriation of complainant Nathaniel Doza is likewise dismissed.
SO ORDERED. 35
The Labor Arbiter dismissed De Gracia, et al.'s complaint for illegal dismissal because the seafarers voluntarily pre-
terminated their employment contracts by demanding for immediate repatriation due to dissatisfaction with the ship.
36 The Labor Arbiter held that such voluntary pre-termination of employment contract is akin to resignation, 37 a form
of termination by employee of his employment contract under Article 285 of the Labor Code. The Labor Arbiter gave
weight and credibility to the telex of the master of the vessel to Skippers, claiming that De Gracia, et al., demanded for
immediate repatriation. 38 Due to the absence of illegal dismissal, De Gracia, et. al.'s claim for salaries representing the
unexpired portion of their employment contracts was dismissed. 39
The Labor Arbiter also dismissed De Gracia et al.'s claim for home allotment for December 1998. 40 The Labor Arbiter
explained that payment for home allotment is "in the nature of extraordinary money where the burden of proof is
shifted to the worker who must prove he is entitled to such monetary benefit." 41 Since De Gracia, et al., were not able
to prove their entitlement to home allotment, such claim was dismissed. 42
Lastly, Skippers' claim for reimbursement of repatriation expenses was likewise denied, since Article 19 (G) of POEA
Memorandum Circular No. 55, Series of 1996 allows the employer, in case the seafarer voluntarily pre-terminates his
contract, to assume the repatriation cost of the seafarer on compassionate grounds. 43
The Decision of the NLRC
The NLRC, on 28 October 2002, dismissed De Gracia, et al.'s appeal for lack of merit and affirmed the Labor Arbiter's
decision. 44 The NLRC considered De Gracia, et al.'s claim for home allotment for December 1998 unsubstantiated, since
home allotment is a benefit which De Gracia, et al., must prove their entitlement to. 45 The NLRC also denied the claim
for illegal dismissal because De Gracia, et al., were not able to refute the telex received by Skippers from the vessel's
master that De Gracia, et al., voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts and demanded immediate repatriation due to
their dissatisfaction with the ship's operations. 46 DIESaC
The Decision of the Court of Appeals
The CA, on 5 July 2006, granted De Gracia, et al.'s petition and reversed the decisions of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC, its
dispositive portion reading as follows:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for certiorari is GRANTED. The Resolution dated October 28, 2002 and the Order dated
August 31, 2004 rendered by the public respondent NLRC are ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Let another judgment be
entered holding private respondents jointly and severally liable to petitioners for the payment of:
1. Unremitted home allotment pay for the month of December, 1998 or the equivalent thereof in Philippine pesos:
a. De Gracia = US$900.00
b. Lata = US$600.00
c. Aprosta = US$600.00
2. Salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or for 3 months for every year of the unexpired
term, whichever is less, or the equivalent thereof in Philippine pesos:
a. De Gracia = US$2,400.00
b. Lata = US$1,800.00
c. Aprosta = US$1,800.00
3. Attorney's fees and litigation expenses equivalent to 10% of the total claims.
SO ORDERED. 47
The CA declared the Labor Arbiter and NLRC to have committed grave abuse of discretion when they relied upon the
telex message of the captain of the vessel stating that De Gracia, et al., voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts and
demanded immediate repatriation. 48 The telex message was "a self-serving document that does not satisfy the
requirement of substantial evidence, or that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify the conclusion that petitioners indeed voluntarily demanded their immediate repatriation." 49 For
this reason, the repatriation of De Gracia, et al., prior to the expiration of their contracts showed they were illegally
dismissed from employment. 50 DaIACS
In addition, the failure to remit home allotment pay was effectively admitted by Skippers, and prayed to be offset from
the repatriation expenses. 51 Since there is no proof that De Gracia, et al., voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts,
the repatriation expenses are for the account of Skippers, and cannot be offset with the home allotment pay for
December 1998. 52
No relief was granted to Doza due to lack of factual basis to support his petition. 53 Attorney's fees equivalent to 10% of
the total claims was granted since it involved an action for recovery of wages or where the employee was forced to
litigate and incur expenses to protect his rights and interest. 54
The Issues
Skippers, in its Petition for Review on Certiorari, assigned the following errors in the CA Decision:
a) The Court of Appeals seriously erred in not giving due credence to the master's telex message showing that the
respondents voluntarily requested to be repatriated.
b) The Court of Appeals seriously erred in finding petitioners liable to pay backwages and the alleged unremitted
home allotment pay despite the finding of the Labor Arbiter and the NLRC that the claims are baseless.
c) The Court of Appeals seriously erred in awarding attorney's fees in favor of respondents despite its findings that
the facts attending in this case do not support the claim for moral and exemplary damages. 55
The Ruling of this Court
We deny the petition and affirm the CA Decision, but modify the award.
For a worker's dismissal to be considered valid, it must comply with both procedural and substantive due process. The
legality of the manner of dismissal constitutes procedural due process, while the legality of the act of dismissal
constitutes substantive due process. 56
Procedural due process in dismissal cases consists of the twin requirements of notice and hearing. The employer must
furnish the employee with two written notices before the termination of employment can be effected: (1) the first
notice apprises the employee of the particular acts or omissions for which his dismissal is sought; and (2) the second
notice informs the employee of the employer's decision to dismiss him. Before the issuance of the second notice, the
requirement of a hearing must be complied with by giving the worker an opportunity to be heard. It is not necessary
that an actual hearing be conducted. 57 THEcAS
Substantive due process, on the other hand, requires that dismissal by the employer be made under a just or authorized
cause under Articles 282 to 284 of the Labor Code.
In this case, there was no written notice furnished to De Gracia, et al., regarding the cause of their dismissal. Cosmoship
furnished a written notice (telex) to Skippers, the local manning agency, claiming that De Gracia, et al., were repatriated
because the latter voluntarily pre-terminated their contracts. This telex was given credibility and weight by the Labor
Arbiter and NLRC in deciding that there was pre-termination of the employment contract "akin to resignation" and no
illegal dismissal. However, as correctly ruled by the CA, the telex message is "a biased and self-serving document that
does not satisfy the requirement of substantial evidence." If, indeed, De Gracia, et al., voluntarily pre-terminated their
contracts, then De Gracia, et al., should have submitted their written resignations.
Article 285 of the Labor Code recognizes termination by the employee of the employment contract by "serving written
notice on the employer at least one (1) month in advance." Given that provision, the law contemplates the requirement
of a written notice of resignation. In the absence of a written resignation, it is safe to presume that the employer
terminated the seafarers. In addition, the telex message relied upon by the Labor Arbiter and NLRC bore conflicting
dates of 22 January 1998 and 22 January 1999, giving doubt to the veracity and authenticity of the document. In 22
January 1998, De Gracia, et al., were not even employed yet by the foreign principal. For these reasons, the dismissal of
De Gracia, et al., was illegal.
On the issue of home allotment pay, Skippers effectively admitted non-remittance of home allotment pay for the month
of December 1998 in its Position Paper. Skippers sought the repatriation expenses to be offset with the home allotment
pay. However, since De Gracia, et al.'s dismissal was illegal, their repatriation expenses were for the account of Skippers
and could not be offset with the home allotment pay.
Contrary to the claim of the Labor Arbiter and NLRC that the home allotment pay is in "the nature of extraordinary
money where the burden of proof is shifted to the worker who must prove he is entitled to such monetary benefit,"
Section 8 of POEA Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of 1996, states that the allotment actually constitutes at least
eighty percent (80%) of the seafarer's salary: ScCDET
The seafarer is required to make an allotment which is payable once a month to his designated allottee in the
Philippines through any authorized Philippine bank. The master/employer/agency shall provide the seafarer with
facilities to do so at no expense to the seafarer. The allotment shall be at least eighty percent (80%) of the seafarer's
monthly basic salary including backwages, if any. (Emphasis supplied)
Paragraph 2 of the employment contracts of De Gracia, Lata and Aprosta incorporated the provisions of above
Memorandum Circular No. 55, series of 1996, in the employment contracts. Since said memorandum states that home
allotment of seafarers actually constitutes at least eighty percent (80%) of their salary, home allotment pay is not in the
nature of an extraordinary money or benefit, but should actually be considered as salary which should be paid for
services rendered. For this reason, such non-remittance of home allotment pay should be considered as unpaid salaries,
and Skippers shall be liable to pay the home allotment pay of De Gracia, et al., for the month of December 1998.
Damages
As admitted by Skippers in its Position Paper, the home allotment pay for December 1998 due to De Gracia, Lata and
Aprosta is:
Seafarer Home Allotment Pay
De Gracia US$900.00
Aprosta US$600.00
Lata US$600.00
The monthly salary of De Gracia, according to his employment contract, is only US$800.00. However, since Skippers
admitted in its Position Paper a higher home allotment pay for De Gracia, we award the higher amount of home
allotment pay for De Gracia in the amount of US$900.00. Since the home allotment pay can be considered as unpaid
salaries, the peso equivalent of the dollar amount should be computed using the prevailing rate at the time of
termination since it was due and demandable to De Gracia, et al., on 28 January 1999.
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 (Migrant Workers Act) provides for money claims in cases of unjust termination of
employment contracts:
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as defined by law or contract, the
workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with interest of twelve percent (12%) per
annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of
the unexpired term, whichever is less. HADTEC
The Migrant Workers Act provides that salaries for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less, shall be awarded to the overseas Filipino worker, in
cases of illegal dismissal. However, in 24 March 2009, Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services and Marlow Navigation Co.,
Inc., 58 the Court, in an En Banc Decision, declared unconstitutional the clause "or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" and awarded the entire unexpired portion of the employment contract to the
overseas Filipino worker.
On 8 March 2010, however, Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 (RA 10022) amended Section 10 of the Migrant Workers
Act, and once again reiterated the provision of awarding the unexpired portion of the employment contract or three (3)
months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less.
Nevertheless, since the termination occurred on January 1999 before the passage of the amendatory RA 10022, we shall
apply RA 8042, as unamended, without touching on the constitutionality of Section 7 of RA 10022.
The declaration in March 2009 of the unconstitutionality of the clause "or for three months for every year of the
unexpired term, whichever is less" in RA 8042 shall be given retroactive effect to the termination that occurred in
January 1999 because an unconstitutional clause in the law confers no rights, imposes no duties and affords no
protection. The unconstitutional provision is inoperative, as if it was not passed into law at all. 59
As such, we compute the claims as follows:
Seafarer Contract Contract Repatriation Unexpired Monthly Total
Term Date Date Term Salary Claims
De Gracia 10 months 17 Jul. 1998 28 Jan. 1999 3 months & US$800 US$2933.34
20 days
Lata 12 months 17 Apr. 1998 28 Jan. 1999 2 months & US$600 US$1600
20 days
Aprosta 12 months 17 Apr. 1998 28 Jan. 1999 2 months & US$600 US$1600
20 days
Given the above computation, we modify the CA's imposition of award, and grant to De Gracia, et al., salaries
representing the unexpired portion of their contracts, instead of salaries for three (3) months.
Article 2219 of the Civil Code of the Philippines provides for recovery of moral damages in certain cases: HTDAac
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the following and analogous cases:
(1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
(2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
(4) Adultery or concubinage;
(5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
(6) Illegal search;
(7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
(8) Malicious prosecution;
(9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27, 28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
The parents of the female seduced, abducted, raped, or abused, referred to in No. 3 of this article, may also recover
moral damages.
The spouse, descendants, ascendants, and brothers and sisters may bring the action mentioned in No. 9 of this article, in
the order named.
Article 2229 of the Civil Code, on the other hand, provides for recovery of exemplary damages:
Art. 2229. Exemplary or corrective damages are imposed, by way of example or correction for the public good, in
addition to the moral, temperate, liquidated or compensatory damages.
In this case, we agree with the CA in not awarding moral and exemplary damages for lack of factual basis.
Lastly, Article 2208 of the Civil Code provides for recovery of attorney's fees and expenses of litigation: HIETAc
Art. 2208. In the absence of stipulation, attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, other than judicial costs, cannot
be recovered, except:
(1) When exemplary damages are awarded;
(2) When the defendant's act or omission has compelled the plaintiff to litigate with third persons or to incur
expenses to protect his interest;
(3) In criminal cases of malicious prosecution against the plaintiff;
(4) In case of a clearly unfounded civil action or proceeding against the plaintiff;
(5) Where the defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's plainly valid, just
and demandable claim;
(6) In actions for legal support;
(7) In actions for the recovery of wages of household helpers, laborers and skilled workers;
(8) In actions for indemnity under workmen's compensation and employer's liability laws;
(9) In a separate civil action to recover civil liability arising from a crime;
(10) When at least double judicial costs are awarded;
(11) In any other case where the court deems it just and equitable that attorney's fees and expenses of litigation
should be recovered.
In all cases, the attorney's fees and expenses of litigation must be reasonable.
Article 111 of the Labor Code provides for a maximum award of attorney's fees in cases of recovery of wages:
Art. 111. Attorney's fees. —
a. In cases of unlawful withholding of wages, the culpable party may be assessed attorney's fees equivalent to ten
percent of the amount of wages recovered. cHaDIA
b. It shall be unlawful for any person to demand or accept, in any judicial or administrative proceedings for the
recovery of wages, attorney's fees which exceed ten percent of the amount of wages recovered.
Since De Gracia, et al., had to secure the services of the lawyer to recover their unpaid salaries and protect their interest,
we agree with the CA's imposition of attorney's fees in the amount of ten percent (10%) of the total claims.
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 5 July 2006 with MODIFICATION. Petitioners
Skippers United Pacific, Inc. and Skippers Maritime Services, Inc., Ltd. are jointly and severally liable for payment of the
following:
1) Unremitted home allotment pay for the month of December 1998 in its equivalent rate in Philippine Pesos at
the time of termination on 28 January 1999:
a. De Gracia = US$900.00
b. Lata = US$600.00
c. Aprosta = US$600.00
2) Salary for the unexpired portion of the employment contract or its current equivalent in Philippine Pesos:
a. De Gracia = US$2,933.34
b. Lata = US$1,600.00
c. Aprosta = US$1,600.00
3) Attorney's fees and litigation expenses equivalent to 10% of the total claims. DCHaTc
SO ORDERED.
Brion, Perez, Sereno and Reyes, JJ., concur.