1. Oposa vs Factoran; GR No.

101083; July 30, 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al.,
representing their generation and generations yet unborn, and represented by their
parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of DENR. They prayed that
judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and other
persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising
new TLAs and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable
under the premises.”

They alleged that they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and
healthful ecology and are entitled to protection by the State in its capacity as parens
patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the defendant in allowing TLA holders
to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a misappropriation and/or
impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit of the
plaintiff minors and succeeding generations. The defendant filed a motion to dismiss
the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains
to the legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent

the misappropriation or impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as

generations to come. The Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for
others of their generation, and for the succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their
personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is based on the concept of
intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful ecology
is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which
indispensably include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management,
renewal and conservation of the country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries,
wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to the end that their exploration,
development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as well as the
future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve

that rhythm and harmony for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology.
Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion of their right to a sound environment
constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation to ensure the
protection of that right for the generations to come.
2. MMDA v. Concerned Residents of Manila Bay; GR No. 171947-48;
December 18, 2008

FACTS:

Respondents filed a complaint before the RTC against several government

agencies, among them the petitioners, for the cleanup, rehabilitation, and protection of
the Manila Bay. The complaint alleged that the water quality of the Manila Bay had
fallen way below the allowable standards set by law, specifically PD 1152.
Respondents, as plaintiffs, prayed that petitioners be ordered to clean the Manila Bay
and submit to the RTC a concerted concrete plan of action for the purpose.

RTC rendered a Decision in favor of respondents, ordering the defendant-

government agencies to clean up and rehabilitate Manila Bay.

Petitioners, before the CA, argued that PD 1152 relates only to the cleaning of
specific pollution incidents and do not cover cleaning in general. Apart from raising
concerns about the lack of funds, petitioners also asserted that the cleaning of the
Manila Bay is not a ministerial act, which can be compelled by mandamus.

The CA denied petitioners’ appeal and affirmed the Decision of the RTC in toto.
Hence, this petition.

ISSUES:

Does PD 1152 include a cleanup in general or is it limited only to the cleanup of

specific pollution incidents?
Whether or not petitioners may be compelled by mandamus to clean up and
rehabilitate the Manila Bay?

RULING:

Issue 1:

PD 1152 does not in any way state that the government agencies concerned
ought to confine themselves to the containment, removal, and cleaning operations
when a specific pollution incident occurs. The underlying duty to upgrade the quality
of water is not conditional on the occurrence of any pollution incident.

Even assuming the absence of a categorical legal provision specifically prodding

petitioners to clean up the bay, they and the men and women representing them
cannot escape their obligation to future generations of Filipinos to keep the waters of
the Manila Bay clean and clear as humanly as possible.

Issue 2:

Yes, petitioners may be compelled.

 The MMDA’s duty in the area of solid waste disposal is set forth not only in the
Environment Code (PD 1152) and RA 9003, but in its charter as well. This duty of
putting up a proper waste disposal system cannot be characterized as discretionary,
for, as earlier stated, discretion presupposes the power or right given by law to public
functionaries to act officially according to their judgment or conscience.

A perusal of other petitioners’ respective charters would yield to the conclusion

that these government agencies are enjoined, as a matter of statutory obligation, to
perform certain functions relating directly or indirectly to the cleanup, rehabilitation,
protection, and preservation of the Manila Bay. They are precluded from choosing not
to perform these duties. The petition is denied.

3. International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-Biotech Applications, Inc.

v. Greenpeace Southeast Asia (Philippines); G.R. Nos. 209271, 209276,
209301 & 209430; (December 8, 2015 ruling and July 26, 2016 MR)

FACTS:

The Supreme Court of the Philippines upheld a lower court decision invalidating
an administrative order governing import and release of genetically-modified
organisms (GMOs) in the Philippines. The Court addressed a range of issues, from
standing and mootness to application of the precautionary principle. On the
procedural claims by the petitioners that the case was moot and “academic” because
all field trials had been suspended, the Supreme Court found the paramount public
interest in the case and the fact that the legal issues were capable of repetition yet
evading review justified the Court’s review of the case. The Court also noted the
petitioners were warranted in seeking judicial review because the biotechnology
administrative framework does not provide “a speedy, or adequate remedy.”

The decision explains the current controversy over GMOs and, in particular,
genetically-modified food crops for human consumption. Drawing on research and
case studies from around the world, and the testimony of expert witnesses, the
Supreme Court found there to be no consensus on the safety of Bt talong to humans
and the environment, stating “[t]hese divergent views of local scientists reflect the
continuing international debate on GMOs and the varying degrees of acceptance of GM
technology by states.” The Court also cautioned that the “uncertainties generated by
conflicting scientific findings or limited research [are] not diminished by extensive use
at present of GM technology in agriculture.”

Turning to the existing biosafety regulation in the Philippines, the Supreme

Court found Administrative Order (DAO) 08-2002 deficient because it lacks provisions
for meaningful, participatory, and transparent public consultation prior to field trials
and contains no mechanisms requiring applicants seeking to import or release GMOs
to comply with international biosafety standards. The Court also found that officials
should have complied with environmental impact assessment (EIA) procedures prior to
approving release of Bt talong.

ISSUE:
 Whether or not the precautionary principle is applicable in this case.

HELD: (December 8, 2015 ruling)

Invoking the precautionary principle, the Supreme Court blocked further field
trials of Bt talong until regulatory systems governing the import and release of GMOs
are strengthened. “When these features - uncertainty, the possibility of irreversible
harm, and the possibility of serious harm - coincide, the case for the precautionary
principle is strongest. When in doubt, cases must be resolved in favor of the
constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology.” Page 100. The Court
proceeded to nullify DAO 08-2002 and enjoined applications for contained use, field
testing, propagation and commercialization, and importation of any GMOs until a new
administrative order is adopted.

HELD: (July 26, 2016 MR)

However, upon a closer scrutiny of the parties' arguments, the Court

reconsiders its ruling and now finds merit in petitioners' assertion that the case
should have been dismissed for being moot and academic, and that the aforesaid
exceptions to the said rule should not have been applied.

To recount, these cases, which stemmed from herein respondents petition for
Writ of Kalikasan, were mooted by the undisputed expiration of the Biosafety Permits
issued by the BPI and the completion and termination of the Bt talong field trials
subject of the same

These incidents effectively negated the necessity for the reliefs sought by
respondents in their petition for Writ of Kalikasan as there was no longer any field test
to enjoin. Hence, at the time the CA rendered its Decision dated May 17, 2013, the
reliefs petitioner sought and granted by the CA were no longer capable of execution.

Moreover, the situation respondents complain of is not susceptible to repetition.

As discussed above, DAO 08-2002 has already been superseded by JDC 01-2016.
Hence, future applications for field testing will be governed by JDC 01-2016 which, as
illustrated, adopts a regulatory framework that is substantially different from that of
DAO 08-2002.

All told, with respondents' petition for Writ of Kalikasan already mooted by the
expiration of the Biosafety Permits and the completion of the field trials subject of
these cases, and with none of the exceptions to the mootness principle properly
attending, the Court grants the instant motions for reconsideration and hereby
dismisses the aforesaid petition. With this pronouncement, no discussion on the
substantive merits of the same should be made.

4. Resident Marine Mammals of Tañon Strait v. Sec. Angelo Reyes; G.R.No.

180771; April 21, 2015.

FACTS:
 Petitioners, collectively referred to as the "Resident Marine Mammals" in the
petition, are the toothed whales, dolphins, porpoises, and other cetacean species,
which inhabit the waters in and around the Tañon Strait. They are joined by Gloria
Estenzo Ramos and Rose-Liza Eisma-Osorio as their legal guardians and as friends (to
be collectively known as "the Stewards") who allegedly empathize with, and seek the
protection of, the aforementioned marine species. Also impleaded as an unwilling co-
petitioner is former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, for her express declaration
and undertaking in the ASEAN Charter to protect the Tañon Strait, among others. On
June 13, 2002, the Government of the Philippines, acting through the DOE, entered
into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract-102 (GSEC-102) with JAPEX.

This contract involved geological and geophysical studies of the Tañon Strait.
The studies included surface geology, sample analysis, and reprocessing of seismic
and magnetic data. JAPEX, assisted by DOE, also conducted geophysical and satellite
surveys, as well as oil and gas sampling in Tañon Strait. On December 21, 2004, DOE
and JAPEX formally converted GSEC-102 into SC-46 for the exploration, development,
and production of petroleum resources in a block covering approximately 2,850
square kilometers offshore the Tañon Strait.

JAPEX committed to drill one exploration well during the second sub-phase of
the project. On March 6, 2007, the EMB of DENR Region VII granted an ECC to the
DOE and JAPEX for the offshore oil and gas exploration project in Tañon Strait.14
Months later, on November 16, 2007, JAPEX began to drill an exploratory well, with a
depth of 3,150 meters, near Pinamungajan town in the western Cebu Province. This
drilling lasted until February 8, 2008. The petitioners insist that SC-46 is null and
void for having violated Section 2, Article XII of the 1987 Constitution.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Service Contract No. 46 is violative of the 1987 Philippine

Constitution and statutes.

HELD:

The case was granted. This Court has previously settled the issue of whether
service contracts are still allowed under the 1987 Constitution. In La Bugal, the Court
held that the deletion of the words "service contracts" in the 1987 Constitution did not
amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, portions of the deliberations of the members
of the Constitutional Commission (ConCom) to show that in deliberating on paragraph
4, Section 2, Article XII, they were actually referring to service contracts as understood
in the 1973 Constitution, albeit with safety measures to eliminate or minimize the
abuses prevalent during the martial law regime.

In summarizing the matters discussed in the ConCom, the Court established

that paragraph 4, with the safeguards in place, is the exception to paragraph 1,
Section 2 of Article XII. The following are the safeguards this Court enumerated in La
Bugal: Such service contracts may be entered into only with respect to minerals,
petroleum and other mineral oils.
 The grant thereof is subject to several safeguards, among which are these
requirements: (1) The service contract shall be crafted in accordance with a general
law that will set standard or uniform terms, conditions and requirements, presumably
to attain a certain uniformity in provisions and avoid the possible insertion of terms
disadvantageous to the country. (2) The President shall be the signatory for the
government because, supposedly before an agreement is presented to the President for
signature, it will have been vetted several times over at different levels to ensure that it
conforms to law and can withstand public scrutiny. (3) Within thirty days of the
executed agreement, the President shall report it to Congress to give that branch of
government an opportunity to look over the agreement and interpose timely objections,
if any. Adhering to the aforementioned guidelines, the Court finds that SC-46 is indeed
null and void for noncompliance with the requirements of the 1987 Constitution.

5. Mateo Cariño vs. Insular Government, 212 U.S 449, Law Ed., 594

FACTS:

Mateo Cariño is an Igorot of the province of Benguet. For more than 50 years
before the Treaty of Paris, April 11, 1899, he and his grandfather had lived upon it,
and had maintained fences sufficient for the holding of cattle. His father had
cultivated parts and had used parts for pasturing cattle, and he had used it for
pasture in his turn. They all had been recognized as owners by the Igorot and he had
inherited or received the land from his father, in accordance with Igorot custom. He
applied for the registration of a certain land. There was no document of title issued for
the land when he applied for registration. The government contends that the land in
question belonged to the state.

Under the Spanish Law, all lands belonged to the Spanish Crown except those
with permit private titles. Moreover, there is no prescription against the Crown. In
1893 -1894 and 1896 -1897; he made an application but with no avail. In 1901, the
plaintiff filed a petition, alleging ownership, under the mortgage law, and the lands
were registered to him, that process, however, establishing only possessory title. Even
if the applicant has title, he cannot have it registered, because the Philippine
Commission's Act No. 926, of 1903, excepts the Province of Benguet among others
from its operation.

ISSUES:

A. Whether the land in question belonged to the Spanish Crown under the
Regalian Doctrine.
B. Whether Cariño has ownership and is entitled to registration.

HELD:

A. No. Law and justice require that the applicant should be granted title to his
land. The United States Supreme Court, through Justice Holmes declared:

“It might perhaps, be proper and sufficient to say that when, as far as testimony
or memory goes, the land has been held by individuals under a claim of private
 ownership, it will be presumed to have been held in the same way from before
the Spanish conquest, and never to have been public land.”

There is an existence of native title to land, or ownership of land by Filipinos by

virtue of possession under a claim of ownership since time immemorial and
independent of any grant from the Spanish Crown, as an exception to the
theory of (jura regalia) Regalian Doctrine.

B. YES. The Petition Granted.

a. Land was not registered, and therefore became, if it was not always, public
land.
b. Spanish Law: "Where such possessors shall not be able to produce titled
deeds, it shall be sufficient if they shall show that ancient possession, as a
valid title by prescription." For cultivated land, 20 years, uninterrupted, is
enough, for uncultivated, 30 years.
c. Every native who had not a paper title is not a trespasser.

6. Cruz v. DENR et al.; G.R. No. 135385; December 6, 2000.

FACTS:

Petitioners Isagani Cruz and Cesar Europa filed a suit for prohibition and
mandamus as citizens and taxpayers, assailing the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act No. 8371, otherwise known as the Indigenous People’s
Rights Act of 1997 (IPRA) and its implementing rules and regulations (IRR). The
petitioners assail certain provisions of the IPRA and its IRR on the ground that these
amount to an unlawful deprivation of the State’s ownership over lands of the public
domain as well as minerals and other natural resources therein, in violation of the
regalian doctrine embodied in section 2, Article XII of the Constitution.

ISSUE:

Do the provisions of IPRA contravene the Constitution?

HELD:

No, the provisions of IPRA do not contravene the Constitution. Examining the
IPRA, there is nothing in the law that grants to the ICCs/IPs ownership over the
natural resources within their ancestral domain. Ownership over the natural
resources in the ancestral domains remains with the State and the rights granted by
the IPRA to the ICCs/IPs over the natural resources in their ancestral domains merely
gives them, as owners and occupants of the land on which the resources are found,
the right to the small scale utilization of these resources, and at the same time, a
priority in their large scale development and exploitation.

Additionally, ancestral lands and ancestral domains are not part of the lands of
the public domain. They are private lands and belong to the ICCs/IPs by native title,
which is a concept of private land title that existed irrespective of any royal grant from
the State. However, the right of ownership and possession by the ICCs/IPs of their
ancestral domains is a limited form of ownership and does not include the right to
alienate the same.

7. La Bugal-B’laan vs. Ramos; G.R. No. 127882; December 1, 2004.

FACTS:

The Petition for Prohibition and Mandamus before the Court challenges the
constitutionality of (1) Republic Act 7942 (The Philippine Mining Act of 1995); (2) its
Implementing Rules and Regulations (DENR Administrative Order [DAO] 96-40); and
(3) the Financial and Technical Assistance Agreement (FTAA) dated 30 March 1995,
executed by the government with Western Mining Corporation (Philippines), Inc.
(WMCP).

On 27 January 2004, the Court en banc promulgated its Decision, granting the
Petition and declaring the unconstitutionality of certain provisions of RA 7942, DAO
96-40, as well as of the entire FTAA executed between the government and WMCP,
mainly on the finding that FTAAs are service contracts prohibited by the 1987
Constitution. The Decision struck down the subject FTAA for being similar to service
contracts which, though permitted under the 1973 Constitution, were subsequently
denounced for being antithetical to the principle of sovereignty over our natural
resources, because they allowed foreign control over the exploitation of our natural
resources, to the prejudice of the Filipino nation.

Pursuant to Section 2 Article XII of the Constitution it effectively banned such

service contracts. Subsequently, Victor O. Ramos (Secretary, Department of
Environment and Natural Resources [DENR]), Horacio Ramos (Director, Mines and
Geosciences Bureau [MGB-DENR]), Ruben Torres (Executive Secretary), and the WMC
(Philippines) Inc. filed separate Motions for Reconsideration.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Court has a role in the exercise of the power of control over
the exploration, development and utilization (EDU) of our natural resources?

HELD:

In contrast to express mandate of the President and Congress in the EDU of

natural resources, Article XII of the Constitution is silent on the role of the judiciary.
However, should the President and/or Congress gravely abuse their discretion in this
regard, the courts may exercise their residual duty under Article VIII. Under the
doctrine of separation of powers and due respect for co-equal and coordinate branches
of government, the Court must restrain itself from intruding into policy matters and
must allow the President and Congress maximum discretion in using the resources of
our country and in securing the assistance of foreign groups to eradicate poverty and
answer employment opportunities in the country.

The Court believes that it is not unconstitutional to allow a wide degree of

discretion to the Chief Executive in order to preserve and enhance our country’s
competitiveness in world markets. On the basis of this control standard, the Court
upholds the constitutionality of the Philippine Mining Law, its Implementing Rules
and Regulations – insofar as they relate to financial and technical agreements – as well
as the subject FTAA.

8. DENR v. Yap; G.R.No.167707; October 8, 2008.

FACTS:
This petition is for a review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals
(CA) affirming that of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Kalibo Aklan, which granted
the petition for declaratory relief filed by respondents-claimants Mayor Jose Yap et al,
and ordered the survey of Boracay for titling purposes.

On Nov. 10, 1978, President Marcos issued Proclamation No. 1801 declaring
Boracay Island as a tourist zone and marine reserve. Claiming that Proc. No. 1801
precluded them from filing an application for a judicial confirmation of imperfect title
or survey of land for titling purposes, respondents-claimants filed a petition for
declaratory relief with the RTC in Kalibo, Aklan.

The Republic, through the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) opposed the
petition countering that Boracay Island was an unclassified land of the public domain.
It formed part of the mass of lands classified as “public forest,” which was not
available for disposition pursuant to section 3(a) of PD No. 705 or the Revised Forestry
Code.

ISSUE:

Whether unclassified lands of the public domain are automatically deemed

agricultural land, therefore making these lands alienable.

HELD:

No. To prove that the land subject of an application for registration is alienable,
the applicant must establish the existence of a positive act of the government such as
a presidential proclamation or an executive order, an administrative action,
investigative reports of the Bureau of Lands investigators, and a legislative act or
statute.

A positive act declaring land as alienable and disposable is required. In keeping

with the presumption of state ownership, the Court has time and again emphasized
that there must be a positive act of the government, such as an official proclamation,
declassifying inalienable public land into disposable land for agricultural or other
purposes.

The Regalian Doctrine dictates that all lands of the public domain belong to the
State, that the State is the source of any asserted right to ownership of land and
charged with the conservation of such patrimony.

All lands not otherwise appearing to be clearly within private ownership are
presumed to belong to the State. Thus, all lands that have not been acquired from the
government, either by purchase or by grant, belong to the State as part of the
inalienable public domain.
 9. Zabal vs. Duterte; G.R. No. 238467; February12, 2019.

FACTS:

The present case stemmed from the positive action by the executive department
through a Proclamation No. 475 which placed the island of Boracay under a state of
calamity. Further, the executive department also ordered the closure of Boracay Island
to tourists, so as to conduct a massive cleanup and rehabilitation of the said island.
The said declaration was made due to the islands worsening environmental condition,
as the island has become a cesspool of waste due to man made pollution. The said
pollution in large part is associated with the booming tourism industry in the said
area.

Two of the here Petitioners herein are residents of Boracay and the third
Petitioner was a habitual tourist in the said area. Their arguments in sum states that
the action of the executive in closing down Boracay was done without legal basis and
that the said act constituted a curtailment of their right to make a living and their
right to free and unimpeded travel. The public respondents on the other hand contend
that their action was justified as a valid exerciser of their constitutional and legal
mandate to preserve and take care of the island’s environment and natural beauty.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the acts of the executive department were legal.

HELD:

The acts of the executive branch were held as legal. The said actions were
included in the incidental powers of the executive, further there were no capricious
exercise of discretion done by the public respondents.

Further, no proof was adduced by the petitioners besides mere allegations, that
they would be directly and adversely impacted by the closure. Thi is so since, their
purported income is a mere expectancy and not an assured reality, this ruling was
supported by the case of Galicto v. Aquino III. The said case illustrated that expected
increases in salaries which were contingent events and based in speculation granted
him no legal rights to sue.

In addition, since Proclamation No. 475 does not actually impose a restriction
on the right to travel, its issuance did not result to any substantial alteration of the
relationship between the State and the people. The proclamation is therefore not a law
and conversely, the President did not usurp the law-making power of the legislature.

Certainly, the closure of Boracay, albeit temporarily, gave the island its much-
needed breather, and likewise afforded the government the necessary leeway in its
rehabilitation program. Note that apart from review, evaluation and amendment of
relevant policies, the bulk of the rehabilitation activities involved inspection, testing,
demolition, relocation, and construction. These works could not have easily been done
with tourists present. The rehabilitation works in the first place were not simple,
superficial or mere cosmetic but rather quite complicated, major, and permanent in
character as they were intended to serve as long-term solutions to the problem.

Indeed, the temporary closure of Boracay, although unprecedented and radical

as it may seem, was reasonably necessary and not unduly oppressive under the
circumstances. It was the most practical and realistic means of ensuring that
rehabilitation works in the island are started and carried out in the most efficacious
and expeditious way. Absent a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion,
unreasonableness, arbitrariness or oppressiveness, the Court will not disturb the
executive determination that the closure of Boracay was necessitated by the foregoing
circumstances. As earlier noted, petitioners totally failed to counter the factual bases
of, and justification for the challenged executive action.

Undoubtedly, Proclamation No. 475 is a valid police power measure.